China’s Semi-Permeable Borders: An Analysis of Inconsistent Government Implementation of the 2012 Exit and Entry Law

Abstract

In the decades since the end of the Cultural Revolution, China has transitioned from a country with closed borders, to a country of emigrants, and now, to a country of immigrants. In 2012, the Chinese central government enacted the Exit and Entry Law, a new and improved upgrade to the 1985 Alien Entry and Exit Law regulating the cross-border migration of foreign peoples. Whereas the 1985 Law was loosely enforced due to the vague nature of the guidelines within the Law, the 2012 Law’s more explicit and comprehensive guidelines for regulation and punishment of illegal aliens seemed to promise firmer enforcement; yet implementation of the Law remains highly inconsistent. This thesis aims to populate the sparse body of academic work on the 2012 Exit and Entry Law and uncover the key factors behind the varied implementation of the 2012 Law by answering two specific research questions: 1) “Who is responsible for the implementation of the 2012 Law” and 2) “What factors determine when and to what extent the government actually enforces the 2012 Law?” The research begins with a literature review and analysis on the Chinese national and local governments’ roles in implementing policy. Examination of the expectations and demands of the national and local governments, the general population, and public and private industries illuminates the burden of policy implementation that is placed on the shoulders of local governments. Having determined that local governments possess the most responsibility for implementation, the case analysis focuses on the factors affecting and outcomes of the decision-making process behind implementation. The case studies analyzed involve illegal migrants from Southeast Asian, West African, and East European countries as well as North Korea and their interactions with local governments and with communities in which they reside. Two nested factors are identified: Corruption (active vs. none) as the primary factor and Type of Illegal Alien (laborer vs. non-laborer) as the nested secondary factor. The nested analysis produces the following assertions: 1) Active corruption leads to no implementation, regardless of the type of illegal immigrant. 2) No active corruption and illegal laborers leads to moderate implementation. 3) No active corruption and non-laborer illegal aliens leads to full implementation. This thesis finds that local governments in China are frequently given the responsibility of enforcing policies created by the national government, but the extent to which these policies are actually enforced is determined by various influences at the local level. The findings of this thesis may have significant implications for policy recommendations to the Chinese government and to other governments around the world who are faced with similar policy implementation struggles either directly or indirectly.