The Iron Fist that Feeds: Assessing the Politically Coercive Properties of Chinese Debt in Africa

Abstract

In the last two decades, China has lent immense sums to developing and developed nations, and now accounts for 40% of all outstanding foreign debts worldwide. This surge of Chinese debt has raised concern among western critics that China may be lending to increase access to resources and expand political influence. Africa, an oil rich continent of economically and politically vulnerable developing nations, has seen a large increase in debt owed to China. This thesis asks if more Chinese debt causes African recipient countries to vote in greater alignment with China on resolutions related to human rights in the United National General Assembly. I find that resource status is an unreliable predictor of Chinese debt, and there is no evidence that increasing debts to China as a percentage of GDP are correlated with greater African nation-state alignment with China in the United Nations General Assembly. I find, however, that, as China has risen to hegemonic status, its voting behavior has converged with that of the United States. Sino-American voting coincidence suggests that United Nations General Assembly voting blocs who share counter-hegemonic principles may be diverging in overall voting behavior.