Himalayan Rivalries: A Changing Asian Strategic Landscape

Abstract

With Himalayan hostilities rising, outright war between China and India no longer seems quite so far-fetched. Since 2013, in fact, the frightening prospects for Sino-Indian conflict over the disputed Himalayan territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh have only intensified, culminating thus far in the Doklam standoff of 2017 and the bloody fighting at Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso in May-September 2020. Within this thesis, therefore, I set out to assess questions surrounding the impact of recent Sino-Indian border hostilities on Sino-Indian relations (and, consequently, the Asian strategic landscape at large), chiefly through fact-based historical analysis. I propose that border tensions in the 2010s have prompted the Republic of India to question the value of upholding Sino-Indian rapprochement (and, correspondingly, its long-established policy of strategic autonomy). As a response to Chinese aggression, in fact, India has chosen to strengthen its military ties with the United States, a former Cold War enemy. So as to conduct my study of Sino-Indian relations, I accordingly examine evidence from primary sources (e.g., press releases by India's Ministry of External Affairs and China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lok Sabha hearings, Sino-British and Sino-Indian treaty arrangements, speeches and interviews by Chinese and Indian government officials, etc.) and any necessary secondary sources (e.g., academic readings and news articles on Sino-Indian border happenings). Upon finishing my analysis of the available sources, I found that friendly Sino-Indian relations depend closely upon the stability of the countries’ Himalayan borders and, consequently, that Sino-Indian ties have recently worsened considerably due to intensifying bouts of Himalayan fighting since the early 2010s (Chapter Two). I further concluded that Himalayan conflict has escalated due to a failure at Sino-Indian border arbitration, which itself is attributable to a Chinese refusal to clarify the Line of Actual Control, India’s misguided emphasis on confidence-building measures, and an inability to institute productive bilateral summits (Chapter Three). Subsequently, I determined that certain difficulties in Sino-Indian relations (e.g., the China-Pakistan Strategic Partnership and Himalayan water disputes) frequently guaranteed the failure of such boundary discussions and, therefore, enabled the rising tide of Sino-Indian animosities in the 2010s (Chapter Four). Ultimately, I found, as I initially expected, that India, now confronting a newly-assertive China in the Himalayas, has begun to discard with its long-established policy of strategic autonomy and has, instead, steadily enhanced its defense/military ties with its Western allies, especially the United States, since 2014 (Chapter Five). With such a sweeping shift in Sino-Indian relations (and, consequently, the Asian strategic landscape at large) underway, Asia has likely now begun to enter a contentious new chapter in its post-Cold War history – and with still-unforeseen, and potentially far-reaching, repercussions for billions of Chinese and Indian lives.