Uncharted Virtual Territory: NATO’s Expansion into Cyber Deterrence

Abstract

This thesis seeks to contribute to a formalized and theoretical framework of cyber deterrence. In light of NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, which issues one of the first explicit cyber deterrent threats on behalf of a state alliance, I attempt to understand the crux of deterrence in cyberspace and explore its feasibility through different currents of traditional deterrence theory as well as within its own branch of scholarly research. I begin by drawing out important theoretical undertones from case studies of historical state-on-state cyber conflicts. I then formalize these intimations through scholarly frameworks of deterrence across domains. I compare these frameworks with that of a developing cyber deterrence framework within cyber conflict literature. I consider the nature of different cyber attacks and the subsequent feasibility of different types of cyber deterrence. I compare this with NATO’s current cyber posture. Then, I raise challenges to cyber deterrence that have manifested as a result of academic postulations as well as in practice. I offer potential solutions to these challenges in addition to strategies that model cyber deterrence through new variables and goals. Ultimately, I conclude that cyber deterrence, as a relatively new and rapidly evolving concept, has yet to produce complex strategies and internationally-recognized norms that would yield credible threats. As a result, NATO and other states should take care to bolster their cyber defense systems, but hold back on making punishing threats they may not be able to deliver on. I make predictions for a trajectory of increased non-state interaction with private entities in cyberspace that will be of strong political interest to states to leverage. This research contributes to an understudied cross-section of war theory and technology and demonstrates a need for proactive international discussion and movement toward ethical engagement in cyber operation.