Free-Riding Political Actors: A Case Study and Political History of New York City Transit Policy

Abstract

Public transit in New York City has a long and storied history, but the modern chapter from the mid 20th century until today has been marred with a negative reputation. Frequent train delays, lapses in service, dilapidated and dirty stations, run-down subway cars, and more have caused the transit system of our nations largest city to pale in comparison to the high-quality transit systems of similarly sized cities around the world like Tokyo, London, or Paris. The poor state of public transit in New York has been perpetuated by political conflict and failures on the part of government to appropriately value the system and its role in New York City. The vast transit system produces immense economic benefits for the city, region, and federal economies due to its ability to transport millions of people a day across the city and region for work. Transit is uniquely vital to New York City, as it is the only major city in the country where a majority of its residents use public transit. New York does not depend on car-centric infrastructure the way that other cities do, as it developed around a strong public transit system. Public transit is the essential vehicle through which New York’s massive economic outputs are able to be produced through its transport of residents, as without public transit, easy travel throughout the city would not be possible. Despite transit’s unique but essential role in New York City, political and governmental actors have frequently made politically expedient decisions rather than prudent policy decisions related to public transit. This has resulted in frequent disinvestment or underinvestment in public transit since the mid-20th century. This constitutes the basis of my analysis in this thesis, where I apply Mancur Olson’s definition of the free-rider problem to the relationship between government and public transit/public transit users in New York City.

Mancur Olson’s economic theory discusses the motivations of individuals when engaged in matters of collective action and says that individuals are more motivated by their own interests and outcomes than they are with group outcomes. In addition, he discusses complexities of collective action when there are situations where some individuals may benefit even if they do not contribute themselves to making something happen. This can be applied to New York City transit, as political actors benefit from New York’s expansive transit system as it supports the massive economy in New York City. They benefit from positive economic outcomes as they are able to take credit for aiding in maintaining or producing the components of a strong economy through their work on policy. However, frequent underinvestment and use of the transit system for political gain means that political actors often benefit from the transit system and its ability to support the New York economy without directly contributing to its well-being. The politicization, exploitation, and undervaluing of the transit system is explored in this thesis through in-depth historical analysis of key crisis points in the transit systems history: The 1966 transit strike, the 1968 formation of the MTA, the 1970s fiscal crisis in New York City, and the 1980s renaissance of the transit system. This troubling history has culminated in the free-rider problem between political actors and public transit that we see today, but it can be combatted in several ways. The MTA must engage in a rigorous messaging campaign to continually demonstrate the severity of the state of the system and the importance of restoring it, the federal government must make longer term financial commitments to invest in the system similar to recent New York state efforts, the MTA must prioritize essential maintenance and upgrades over expansion programs, and the MTA must create a clear hierarchy of transit needs that prioritizes the most essential repairs to strengthen existing operations and service before investing in system expansion.