Playing Orban's Pávatánc: Protecting Article 2 Values Against the Illiberal Threat to EU Integration

Abstract

The threat to liberal democratic principles stands as a major international concern for the current world order. Illiberalism as a political system has achieved growing appeal as an alternative to the post-Cold War hegemonic status of Western liberal democracy. Illiberalism’s rise is not isolated to authoritarian regimes; it has gained substantive entrenchment in a number of the world’s constitutional democracies. Furthermore, illiberalism stands to disrupt international institutions that are fundamentally grounded in liberal democratic consensus.

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Hungary stands as the Weberian “ideal type” for illiberal democratic regimes. Within the bounds of the European Union—a supranational organization premised on liberal democratic principles—Viktor Orban has successfully implemented a domestic political model in stark contradiction to those very principles. As such, Hungarian illiberalism poses an existential threat to EU solidarity and integration. This thesis’ primary research question is as follows: how might the European Union—in the face of growing illiberalism—seek to reassert the rule of law and democratic norms inherent to its founding treaty agreements? With Hungary as the central case study, this thesis leverages primary and secondary sources, elite interviews, and relevant quantitative metrics to answer this research question.

In Chapter 1, this thesis argues that Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary has developed a tripartite “illiberal model” that has single-handedly precipitated liberal democratic backsliding in Hungary. Chapter 1 further unpacks the perfectly legal implementation of this model—through a labyrinthine agglomeration of parliamentary laws and tactical political framing methodologies. In Chapter 2, this thesis presents case study analyses of current European Union tactics for checking Article 2 values disjunctures—specifically soft power coercion and material sanctions. Chapter 2 explores Orban’s self-described pávatánc (peacock dance)—a political game of working within, yet to the very detriment of, European Union institutions. Chapter 2 argues that—due to specific endogenous shortcomings—the European Union’s primary tactics for combating rule of law derogations are incapable of achieving values realignment. Therefore, Chapter 3 presents feasible and salient policy solutions for the assertion of Article 2 values, contending that new policies can be developed and untested policies enforced to address the existential threat of illiberalism. This thesis specifically argues for the full implementation of Rule-of-Law Conditionality, an independent and nonpartisan Rule-of-Law Commission, and a new European Union treaty agreement for democratic preservation.