Sharing the Stage: A Comparative Analysis of the Far Right in Eastern and Western Europe

Abstract

In recent years, far right parties throughout Europe have been joining forces to gain more power in the European Parliament (EP). The predominant far right leaders in Western and Eastern Europe are seeking to work together, despite having disparate characteristics that have previously made such collaboration difficult. This thesis investigates whether the Eastern and Western far right have become more similar in recent years, as they have existed in the shared arena of the EU, thereby making it possible for these parties to work together. It builds upon scarce and outdated literature to compare the Eastern and Western far right more effectively.

To determine whether the far right in Eastern and Western Europe have grown more similar, I analyze three primary attributes of the far right: (1) positions on democracy, (2) anti-establishment sentiment, and (3) nativist positions regarding immigration and the EU. I propose that, although the Eastern European far right is more anti-democratic and anti-establishment than the Western European far right, the regions are becoming increasingly similar in terms of their nativist positions.

First, I perform a regression analysis using data from the European Social Survey (ESS) to test the differences between far right voters in the East and West. The Western far right is less satisfied with democracy and more anti-establishment than the Eastern far right. Interestingly, the results show a change over time in which the Eastern European far right has become more opposed to immigration, mirroring the Western European far right.

Second, I perform an analysis using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) to analyze the positions of the party elites. The results indicate no significant differences between the Eastern and Western far right regarding democracy and anti-establishment positions. Again, the results show a change over time in which the Eastern far right position on immigration has grown closer to the Western far right position. This trend is also evident in positions on multiculturalism, ethnic minorities, EU foreign policy and the EU in general. The results indicate that when considering both the voters and the party elites, the Eastern far right is more similar to the Western far right than initially expected.

Finally, I propose several policy implications that arise from these results. I suggest that because of these similarities, the European far right will be able to work more cohesively with the Western far right than ever before. Because both regions are anti-democratic, they cannot be separated with calls to democracy (i.e., Orbán’s promoting of an illiberal democracy will not dissuade Western far right parties). The far right is likely to unite along its anti-EU and anti-immigration lines; however, non-far right groups can try to separate the far right along their differences regarding EU regional policy. And because both sets of parties are strongly populist, non-far right politicians should use anti-populist tactics to oppose them.