Ending the Cold War Against Cuba: A Policy Recommendation for the Biden Administration

Abstract

The Cuban embargo is the product of a long history of coercive, self-interested policy borne out of the tensions of the Cold War. Even as the U.S. has endeavored to move past the Cold War, the economic embargo has remained; today it exists not merely as a relic of the era, but rather as the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy towards Cuba. Given the embargo’s ineffectiveness and its heavy costs upon Cubans and Americans alike, this seems inexplicable. This thesis will shed light on this paradox, and chart a path towards dismantling the embargo and creating a Cuba policy that is more effective and better serves U.S. interests.

In an effort to gather an unbiased and comprehensive understanding of the situation, the research draws upon a broad collection of government publications, peer-reviewed scholarly literature, news sources, and primary sources. The research reveals that the embargo originated from Cold War concerns over economic interests and regional influence and has since been perpetuated by hardline Cuban American lobbyists who have outperformed and thus outweighed the anti-embargo influence of the agribusiness lobby and international pressure. However, having established these salient factors, a reassessment of their current status indicates that the dynamic is shifting in favor of dismantling the embargo and normalizing relations.

Undeniably, the embargo has a failed policy for over six decades. It has failed to dismantle the Cuban regime yet inflicts heavy costs on the people of both Cuba and the U.S. While this has not generated strong opposition to date, the costs to the U.S. are beginning to mount: the embargo limits agribusiness profits, erodes U.S. international standing, and undermines the U.S.’ regional hegemony by enabling China and Russia to establish a Latin American foothold within Cuba. With the politics of the pandemic rendering Americans more sympathetic to the Cuban people’s plight, and the funding of the Cuban American lobby — and therefore influence — faltering in recent years, we can see how problems, politics and policies are converging to produce what Kingdon (1984) proffered as the quintessential “policy window” to change the status quo of U.S.-Cuba relations.

Due to the Democrats’ slim congressional majority, and Senator Menendez’s (D-NJ and chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) support for the embargo, removing the embargo in toto remains unrealistic. Nonetheless, this thesis identifies the current policy window that the Biden administration can capitalize upon to achieve significant policy change through executive as well as more limited legislative action. Senator Boozman (R-AR) has expressed support for anti-embargo legislation that benefits agribusiness by targeting the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA). These are the steps I suggest President Biden take: (1) In the first nine months, the administration should inform the U.S. citizenry of the embargo’s problematic nature and reengage Cuba diplomatically to foster good will and negotiate grounds on which anti-embargo policy would be implemented; (2) President Biden ought to restore the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) regarding Cuba to their status on January 20th, 2017; and (3) President Biden should promote legislation to amend the TSRA to remove the restrictions on agricultural exports. Through these measures the Biden administration can take significant strides towards dismantling the embargo and normalizing relations.