Breaking Free of Square One: Policy Recommendations for the United States Regarding Successful Engagement Strategies Towards North Korea

Abstract

If one must name a singular nation that continuously defies the international community and global order defined by the United States, many would instinctively, and with derision, name the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. While North Korea has consistently challenged the U.S. since the two nations’ acrimonious collision during the Korean War, the recent developments of the DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs have especially consumed the attentions of four U.S. presidential administrations. Since the first nuclear crisis of the early 1990s, North Korea has successfully conducted six nuclear tests and launched multiple intercontinental ballistic missiles, severely raising the prospect of a nuclear-charged, military confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. From the Bush administration’s “axis of evil” stance to the Obama administration’s “strategic patience” strategy, the US’s North Korea policies were varied in their approach yet singular in their purpose: the complete, verified, and irreversible disarmament (CVID) of North Korea’s nuclear weapons. Yet, the four presidential administrations of Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump have all been met with varying degrees of stalemate and failure. Most recently, despite historic meetings with Kim Jong-un in Singapore in 2018, followed by two more in Hanoi and Panmunjom in 2019, the President Trump has yet to reach a decisive accord with Pyeongyang. It is high time that Washington’s North Korea policy is reviewed and reconsidered. This thesis offers a wholistic analysis of the engagement strategies and negotiation frameworks utilized to curtail North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities and seeks to separate the major U.S. approaches that have either been met with significant behavioral changes or sharp ignorance by North Korea. In this pursuit, the thesis compared the policies used by the Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations. Ultimately, the American failure of North Korean nuclear and missile proliferation was defined by these presidential administrations’ misperceptions about North Korea’s intentions, and failure to recognize the underlying inter Korean relationships that determine North Korea’s nuclear and missile strategy. To this end, this thesis canvasses the both the influence and evolution of South Korean strategic thinking towards North Korea. Archival and scholarly data taken from these respective countries reveals Seoul’s policy preferences and cooperation must be valued and considered in conjunction with Washington’s own strategies to guarantee an agreeable road towards eventual reconciliation and denuclearization in Pyeongyang. Based on the strategic policy choices taken by the previous four U.S. administrations, this thesis asserts the superiority of a conciliatory, incentives-based engagement strategy coupled with a bilateral negotiations framework in conducting dialogue with North Korea. Furthermore, this thesis goes on to hold that American policymakers have often eschewed long term dialogue and solutions due to domestic biases of fear and misunderstanding. Both the coercive and reconciliatory overtures made by past U.S. policymakers have failed due to these biases. This thesis provides conclusive evidence that both listening to our allies and understanding our enemies can open avenues for peace that we could never have imagined before.