Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p2856
 Title: Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms Authors: Kapor, AdamNeilson, Christopher A.Zimmerman, Seth D. Issue Date: Apr-2017 Series/Report no.: 612 Abstract: This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households' belief accuracy. Allowing for belief errors reverses the welfare comparison to favor the deferred acceptance algorithm. URI: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p2856 Appears in Collections: IRS Working Papers

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