Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p2856
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dc.contributor.authorNeilson, Christopher A.-
dc.contributor.authorZimmerman, Seth D.-
dc.date.accessioned2017-08-03T14:20:56Z-
dc.date.available2017-08-03T14:20:56Z-
dc.date.issued2017-04-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015d86p2856-
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school choice participants in a strategic setting, we show that beliefs about admissions chances differ from rational expectations values and predict choice behavior. To quantify the welfare costs of belief errors, we estimate a model of school choice that incorporates subjective beliefs. We evaluate the equilibrium effects of switching to a strategy-proof deferred acceptance algorithm, and of improving households' belief accuracy. Allowing for belief errors reverses the welfare comparison to favor the deferred acceptance algorithm.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries612-
dc.titleHeterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanismsen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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