An Offer You Can't Refuse: Powerholders Pursue Hierarchy Maintenance through Controlling Resources and Preserving Compliance

Abstract

Social power drives cognition, behavior, and goal pursuit, according to previous research. This literature fails to describe the nature of these goals and motivations, but further theories about power and group hierarchies help to fill this gap. This paper hypothesizes that powerful people are compelled to maintain their position in a hierarchy in which they control the valued outcomes of the members below them; this effect is stronger for autocratic than democratic leaders. To test the hypotheses, a study primed participants (n=182) with one of two forms of power (autocratic, democratic) or no power (control). In an ultimatum bargaining game, participants allocated fractions of $1 to themselves and a partner, who could only accept or reject the offer. Participants encountered one of two types of online partners (combative, cooperative) who were characterized as defiant or compliant followers. Analyses of the monetary offers, partner ratings, reaction times, and coded strategies revealed several key findings. Regardless of power prime, participants were motivated to maintain control over gameplay and partner compliance: they lowered offers to and wanted to continue playing with compliant followers (exploiting), and they raised offers to and wanted to expel combative followers from gameplay (cutting their losses). This research could have implications in future study of social power, interventions in various micro social spheres, and legal analysis of labor rights and laws.

Keywords: social power, group hierarchy, leadership styles, compliance, leader-follower relationships, goal pursuit mechanisms