“HEALTH” RECONSIDERED: PROPOSING A DUALIST BRAIN-BODY THEORY OF HEALTH IN CONSIDERATION OF EMERGING NEUROTECHNOLOGY

Abstract

In modern bioethics, there exists intense debate over how to define what it means to be healthy. Bioethicists often favor either a conception of health as the ability to achieve vital life goals, as posited by the Holistic Theory of Health (HTH), or a conception of health as the maintenance of a normally functioning body according to evolutionary standards, as posited by the Biostatistical Theory of Health (BST). However, in consideration of emerging neurotechnology like deep brain stimulation and other neuroscientific developments, I argue in this thesis that a dualist definition of health which employs an HTH-derived definition of bodily health alongside a BST-derived definition of brain health will best prevent repugnant situations from infiltrating medical practice. Specifically, I recognize that 1) utilizing an HTH-derived bodily health definition best preserves the patient right to bodily autonomy, 2) given evidence that brain interventions necessarily cause trade-offs, a BST-derived brain health definition prevents serious threats to personal identity, human freedoms, and societal stability from being caused by medical treatment, and 3) a BST-derived brain health definition emphasizing objective testing has conceivable potential to enhance psychiatric treatment outcomes. While making this argument, I also consider several potential objections to this framework, giving special consideration to objections on the BST-derived conception of brain health such that this conception proves to be especially unpopular in current bioethical thinking. I conclude that, although this dualist framework is not without flaws, it strongly appears that this conception of health will result in the best possible outcomes as medical practice proceeds into the future.