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Title: Intentional Harms Are Worse, Even When They're Not
Authors: Ames, Daniel Lukas
Advisors: Fiske, Susan T
Contributors: Psychology Department
Keywords: blame motivation
Subjects: Experimental psychology
Issue Date: 2014
Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Abstract: This dissertation identifies a tendency for observers to view intentional harms as larger in magnitude than they in fact are. Chapter 1 (Ames & Fiske, 2013a) provides the first demonstrations of this bias, and provides preliminary evidence concerning mechanism. Chapter 2 (Ames & Fiske, under invited revision) extends this work into the realm of motivated social cognition. Specifically, this chapter highlights the apparent failure of well-characterized mental inference (mentalizing) systems to prevent the magnification of intentional emotional harms. Chapter 3 (Ames & Fiske, in preparation) describes a series of experiments designed to provide insight into the psychological mechanisms that underlie the magnification of intentional harms. A final section summarizes the work to date and suggests potential legal applications and theoretical considerations.
Alternate format: The Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the library's main catalog
Type of Material: Academic dissertations (Ph.D.)
Language: en
Appears in Collections:Psychology

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