Skip navigation
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Essays on State Capacity: Bureaucratic Quality, Corruption and Patronage in Decentralized Bureaucracies
Authors: Kim, Galileu
Advisors: Yashar, Deborah J
Iarryczower, Matias
Contributors: Politics Department
Keywords: Bureaucracy
Political Economy
Public Administration
Public Policy
Subjects: Political science
Public administration
Issue Date: 2021
Publisher: Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Abstract: This dissertation provides a set of theoretical and empirical analyses of bureaucracies in Brazil. In the first chapter, I analyze how the educational sector is exposed to patronage appointments by executive leaders. A key driver for patronage appointments arises by institutional design: the need for mayors to coopt legislators, with negative consequences for the quality of educational services. In the second chapter, coauthored with Romain Ferrali, we analyze how bureaucrats decide to engage in corruption, leveraging randomized audits and structural estimation. We find that audits are largely ineffective at reducing bureaucratic corruption, but a policy redesigning exploiting complementarities can help mitigate corrupt behavior. In the last chapter, I leverage micro-level party affiliation data to identify the extent of partisan networks in local bureaucracies. I find that partisan bureaucrats are primarily wealthy elites, concentrating in the upper echelons of both the private and public sector economies.
Alternate format: The Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the library's main catalog:
Type of Material: Academic dissertations (Ph.D.)
Language: en
Appears in Collections:Politics

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
Kim_princeton_0181D_13676.pdf3.77 MBAdobe PDFView/Download

Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.