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dc.contributor.authorCameron, Lisaen_US
dc.identifier.citationEconomic Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1999en_US
dc.description.abstractImplementing the ultimatum game experimentally in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the monthly expenditure of the average participant. Contrary to predictions in the literature, the results show no evidence of approaching the sub-game perfect, selfish outcomes. Responders seem to be just as willing to reject a given percentage offer at high stakes as at low stakes, and Proposers make slightly less selfish offers as the stakes increase.en_US
dc.relation.ispartofseriesWorking Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 345en_US
dc.subjectexperimental economicsen_US
dc.subjectultimatum gameen_US
dc.subjectlarge stakesen_US
dc.titleRaising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesiaen_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
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