Soldiers of Democracy: Military Legacies and Democratic Transitions in Egypt and Tunisia

Abstract

After the Arab Spring, why did the Egyptian military overthrow its young democracy, while the Tunisian military supported its country's transition? More generally, what motivates some militaries to stage coups against nascent democracies? This dissertation argues that the military's decision is shaped by its former autocrat's coup-proofing strategy. Militaries are more likely to thwart democratization when they had historically been coopted by their autocrats through a share of power or shared identity, and lose their privileged positions under democracy. By contrast, militaries should be more supportive of democratization when they had historically been marginalized, fragmented, and counterbalanced by their autocrats, and thereby gain from democracy. These military legacies from autocracy thus shape the likelihood of future democratic consolidation. This dissertation illustrates the theory through case studies of Egypt and Tunisia, drawing upon over 100 interviews and three surveys of military personnel. It then probes the generalizability of the theory through a cross-national analysis of all democratic transitions between 1783-2016.