The Authoritarian Trilemma: The Effects of Repression and Elite Co-optation on the Onset of Coups

Abstract

Authoritarians constantly have to contend with threats to their rule. In particular, they face threats from below, via the risk of popular revolution, and their biggest threat: threats from within, via the risk of coups. In order to mitigate the risks of these threats, authoritarians conduct a number of strategies. They repress dissidents who may want to commit a revolution and they co-opt elites who may enable those revolutions. On the other hand, if they want to prevent a coup, they engage in ``coup-proofing" measures like purging elites that may b a threat to their rule or paying them more to satisfy their demands.

Very little works has been done to relate these two strategies. I claim that the strategies that authoritarians take to mitigate threats outside elite circles make an authoritarian substantially more vulnerable to threats from within. Namely, increasing elite inclusion in power and repression corresponds to an increased risk of coups occurring. To test this theory, I conduct a fixed-effects probit model and find that, all else equal, increasing elite inclusion in power corresponds to a very dramatic increase in the likelihood that a coup occurs. Moreover, increasing the corruption within a state or its level of repressiveness also increases the likelihood that a coup occurs. Meanwhile, these factors have no bearing on whether or not that coup actually succeeds, supporting previous work that the success rate of a coup attempt is stochastic.

Ultimately, I identify what I describe as an ``authoritarian trilemma." An authoritarian cannot simultaneously rent-seek, limit the risk of revolutions, and minimize the risk of coups. When an authoritarian rent-seeks, he has less resources available to manage revolutions or other elites, and opens himself up to both threats. When an authoritarian represses or co-opts elites in order to limit the risk of revolution, he opens himself up to an increased likelihood of coups. When an authoritarian closes off access to power, he increases the likelihood that a revolution occurs.