Skip navigation
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Title: Long-Term Contracts and Equilibrium Models of the Labor Market: Some Favorable Evidence
Authors: DiNardo, John
Beaudry, Paul
Keywords: implicit contracts
equilibrium models of the labor market
wage determination
Issue Date: 1-May-1989
Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 252
Abstract: In this paper we develop and test a very general implication of competitive contractual arrangements in the labor market. Toward this end we examine whether the level of unemployment prevailing at the beginning of the job has lasting effects on wage payments throughout the job. The intuition behind this test is straightforward. If the labor market functions as a competitive contracting market, then it is the supply and demand conditions at the time of negotiating the contract that determine the wage provisions of the contract. Using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we find that wages strongly depend on the labor market conditions prevailing at the beginning of one’s job. Moreover, our results indicate that the value of new employment contracts varies by approximately l0 percent over the business cycle.
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
252.pdf1.8 MBAdobe PDFView/Download

Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.