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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cj82k741k
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dc.contributor.advisorKeohane, Robert Oen_US
dc.contributor.authorOvodenko, Alexanderen_US
dc.contributor.otherPolitics Departmenten_US
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-16T17:26:41Z-
dc.date.available2015-09-16T05:10:05Z-
dc.date.issued2013en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01cj82k741k-
dc.description.abstractGovernments have incentives to form integrated rules and institutions when they pursue international environmental cooperation. Under what conditions do they form environmental cooperation consisting of un-integrated rules and institutions? I argue that governments form integrated cooperation when they share convergent preferences over cooperation. They form un-integrated cooperation when they have divergent preferences. Preferences diverge under one of two conditions: (i) economic actors ("stakeholders") responsible for the environmental problem operate in diffuse markets, or (ii) states have an asymmetrically interdependent relationship in managing the environmental issue. When neither condition holds, governments share convergent preferences over environmental cooperation. I evaluate the importance of stakeholder concentrations by studying patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues such as climate change, ozone layer depletion, biodiversity loss, and mercury pollution. I evaluate the importance of interdependence structures by studying patterns of cooperation on regional rivers, lakes, and seas. The analysis employs original data stemming from agreement texts, field surveys, primary-source interviews, field observations, primary texts, quantitative data, as well as secondary sources. Governments create integrated global environmental cooperation when stakeholders are economically concentrated. They create un-integrated cooperation when stakeholders are economically diffuse. On regional water bodies, governments form integrated cooperation when states share symmetrical exposure to pollution and other externalities. They form un-integrated cooperation when states have asymmetrical exposure. Neither the number of states with control over an environmental issue nor the wealth and geopolitical relations among states better explain patterns of cooperation on global environmental issues or regional water bodies.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherPrinceton, NJ : Princeton Universityen_US
dc.relation.isformatofThe Mudd Manuscript Library retains one bound copy of each dissertation. Search for these copies in the <a href=http://catalog.princeton.edu> library's main catalog </a>en_US
dc.subjectCooperationen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmenten_US
dc.subjectInstitutionsen_US
dc.subject.classificationPolitical Scienceen_US
dc.titlePathways of Cooperation: Integrated and Un-integrated International Environmental Governanceen_US
dc.typeAcademic dissertations (Ph.D.)en_US
pu.projectgrantnumber690-2143en_US
pu.embargo.terms2015-09-16en_US
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