Authoritarian Governance Under Power-Sharing Agreements

Abstract

A new wave of scholars have embraced the idea that ruling requires authoritarian leaders to surround themselves with allies. This collective form of leadership, as regulated by power-sharing agreements, limits the leader's eagerness to usurp power. My dissertation builds on this scholarship as I examine how authoritarian leaders govern after the power-sharing agreement has been reached. The three chapters I present examine questions such as the reshuffle of cabinet posts, the adoption of free media and the use of repression and co-optation. Examining authoritarian governance under the power-sharing agreement highlights three counterintuitive results. First, when faced with the problem of assigning government positions to regime allies, authoritarian leaders sometimes prefer that the most corrupt members of the ruling coalition occupy senior government posts. Second, the adoption of a free press may depend on the level of allies' knowledge about the regime's ability to withstand a popular uprising. Third, repression and co-optation can be used as weakening strategies to set the stage for the leader to legalize opposition groups, and allow their participation in national elections.