Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014f16c547g
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dc.contributor.authorAlan B. Krueger-
dc.contributor.authorOrley Ashenfelter-
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-28T18:25:54Z-
dc.date.available2017-09-28T18:25:54Z-
dc.date.issued2017-09-
dc.identifier.urihttp://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp014f16c547g-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we study the role of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing find that “no-poaching of workers agreements” are included in a surprising 58 percent of major franchisors’ contracts, including McDonald’s, Burger King, Jiffy Lube and H&R Block. Theoretical models of oligopsony and dynamic monopsony, as well as incentives for investment in job training, are discussed in the context of these no-poaching agreements. Although the occurrence of no-poaching agreements is difficult to predict from franchise or industry characteristics, no-poaching agreements are more common for franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.relation.ispartofseries614-
dc.subjectcollusionen_US
dc.subjectno-poaching agreementen_US
dc.subjectmonopsonyen_US
dc.subjectoligopsonyen_US
dc.subjectfranchiseen_US
dc.subjectJEL codes: J42, J41, J63en_US
dc.titleTheory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sectoren_US
dc.typeWorking Paperen_US
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

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