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Title: Agency Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration
Authors: Rosen, Harvey
Eaton, Jonathan
Issue Date: 1-Sep-1982
Citation: The Journal of Finance, Vol. 38, No. 5, pp. 1489-1505, December 1983
Series/Report no.: Working Papers (Princeton University. Industrial Relations Section) ; 153
Abstract: In this paper we examine the factors affecting the structure of executives‘ compensation packages. We focus particularly on the role of various types of delayed compensation as means of "bonding" executives to their firms. The basic problem is to design a compensation package that rewards actions that are in the 1ong—run interest of the stockholders. Firms must take into account (1) their ability to discern unfortunate circumstances from mismanagement; (2) the extent to which a compensation package forces the executive to face risks beyond his control; and (3) the willingness of a given executive to bear this risk. we use our theory to interpret some executive compensation data from the early 1970's.
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