Skip navigation
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01z316q447v
Title: Theory and Evidence on Employer Collusion in the Franchise Sector
Authors: Krueger, Alan
Ashenfelter, Orley
Issue Date: Sep-2017
Series/Report no.: 614a
Abstract: In this paper we study the role of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing competition for workers. Based on an analysis of 2016 Franchise Disclosure Documents, we find that "no- poaching of workers agreements" are included in a surprising 58 percent of major franchisors' contracts, including McDonald's, Burger King, Jiffy Lube and H&R Block. The implications of these no-poaching agreements for models of oligopsony are also discussed. No-poaching agreements are more common for franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries.
URI: http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01z316q447v
Appears in Collections:IRS Working Papers

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat 
614a.pdf633.16 kBAdobe PDFView/Download


Items in Dataspace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.