JAPAN’S PREOCCUPATION WITH RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF
RELIGION

Adviser: Jacqueline I. Stone

June 2014
Abstract

This dissertation argues that religious freedom first became understood as a universal “human right” under the unique transnational circumstances of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952). This conception was not new in that it was a previously existing “principle” that was imported to Japan by the American occupiers. Rather, it was freshly constructed during the Occupation as the occupiers collaborated with local expert informants in applying wartime propaganda rhetoric about freedom, religion, and civilization to the specific problems of local religious administration and the promotion of democratic practices.

This new understanding of religious freedom as a human right was subsequently retrojected onto Japan’s prewar constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, resulting in two problematic but influential historiographic narratives. On the one hand, the occupiers and many postwar scholars argued that prewar and wartime Japan totally lacked genuine religious freedom. On the other hand, more apologetically inclined scholars have since argued that such assessments failed to recognize a unique “Japanese-style relationship between religion and the state.”

The dissertation charts a middle course between these arguments. It examines the implementation of the concept of religious freedom in Japan during the time that the Meiji Constitution was in effect (1890–1947), mobilizing a variety of primary sources to show that competing interest groups (religious leaders, legislators, scholars, and bureaucrats) advocated diverse interpretations of religious freedom throughout the period. While all of these groups aimed to protect religious freedom as they understood it, there were significant differences between those groups that saw religious freedom as a circumstantially granted privilege, those that saw it as a customary right, and those who viewed it as a civil liberty. Shifting academic, ecclesiastical, and administrative definitions of religion, superstition, and the secular affected
such interpretations, with occasionally devastating results for marginal religions and lasting repercussions for postwar scholarly understandings of Buddhism, Shintō, and “new religions.”

Two closing chapters examine American military government records and Occupation-era Japanese publications, tracing continuities in religious administration policies across the wartime and postwar periods while simultaneously highlighting the conceptual rupture presented by the new interpretation of religious freedom as a universal human right.
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Acknowledgments

Princeton could not have been a more supportive place for me to write this dissertation. The Department of Religion provided a guaranteed annual stipend for five years, the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies and the East Asian Studies Program (EASP) provided additional funding for summer research and conference travel, and EASP also provided a top-up award for my first two years. The Fulbright-IIE program supported a year of research in Tokyo, and the Mrs. Giles Whiting Foundation generously supported my final year of dissertation write-up. Teaching awards from the Department of Religion and the Association of Princeton Graduate Alumni contributed to building my research library.

Someone once told me that I would be a fool not to work with Jackie Stone. A truer statement could not have been made. As a prospective student I knew Jackie had a stellar reputation as a scholar and dissertation advisor. What I came to learn over the course of my six years at Princeton is not only that the reputation is well deserved, but also that it hardly does justice to the reality. Readers of this dissertation will quickly recognize that I am rarely at a loss for words, but in Jackie’s case I simply cannot summarize her mentorship in a way that does it justice. I hope that one day I can be half the mentor to my own students that she has been to me.

Buzzy Teiser has my thanks for many things, but especially for a comment at a crucial moment that helped me to clarify how my arguments about religious freedom in Japan fit into a broader argument about how Japan influenced global understandings of religious freedom as a human right. While time and space limitations prevented me from fully substantiating these points in the current version of the project, Buzzy’s encouragement on this score was indispensable and will help guide the transition from dissertation to book manuscript.
Sheldon Garon’s research partially spurred my interest in some of the subjects discussed here. In many ways, Part II of this dissertation can be seen as an extended response to his own work on religion-state relations in prewar Japan, and Parts I and III grew out of a paper I wrote in a seminar I took with him during my first semester at Princeton. I am indebted to him not only for his detailed comments on my first stab at this project then, but also for his sharp and necessary critiques of my project during my dissertation prospectus defense. I doubt that this final version will satisfy him on all counts, but hopefully my attempt to incorporate those critiques is evident in the project as it stands.

Amy Borovoy’s seminar on social theory and East Asia provided a theoretical foundation for some of the questions that drive this dissertation. More importantly, her research on how postwar Japan served as a sort of “laboratory” for American social scientists to test their pet theories has influenced my project in ways that became increasingly clear to me as I neared the concluding stages of my project. I trust that we will continue the conversation in the coming years, and I regret that scheduling conflicts never let us work together in a teaching context.

Jonathan Gold was instrumental in helping me figure out how to balance my sources’ voices with my own. While I have not always struck the balance to my own satisfaction, his comments at a crucial point in my research helped me to begin thinking through how to write a history built around characters who could represent the ideas at hand while also preserving a critical narrative voice. He, Buzzy, and Jackie all have my thanks for their incredible support as teaching mentors.

David Howell’s seminar on early modern Japanese history informed this project more than the notes and bibliography might suggest. It was only in thinking through the social position of Buddhists as an occupational group that I was able to begin articulating the changes that I saw taking place in the late nineteenth century. A future version of this project will make this
indebtedness more evident by looking at Buddhist responses to the threat of “mixed residence” with foreign Christians during the last decade of the nineteenth century.

I never took a class with David Leheny, which makes me all the more grateful for his generous willingness to serve as discussant for a panel organized by someone he barely knew and, later, as a formal reader of a dissertation outside of his own field. I have no doubt that the political analysis in this dissertation is insufficient as it stands, but I trust that Dave’s characteristic good humor and incisive critiques will greatly improve the book that will eventually follow. Other Princeton faculty members who commented on my work or otherwise contributed to this project include Jeff Stout, Eddie Glaude, Judith Weisenfeld, Wallace Best, Benjamin Elman, and Susan Naquin. Several of the aforementioned faculty members graciously wrote letters of support for my applications for external funding, jobs, and postdoctoral fellowships; many of them also generously offered advice about the job search and life in the academy.

I received considerable support outside of Princeton as well. I thank the staff at the Japan-U.S. Education Commission for their support during my research year abroad, with special thanks to Tōyama Keiko for serving as my primary contact person in Tokyo. Shimazono Susumu, my erstwhile mentor at the University of Tokyo Department of Religious Studies, kindly arranged for me to study at the institution once more by introducing me to Fujiwara Satoko. For her part, Fujiwara-sensei gave me exactly what I needed during my research year in Tokyo: signatures when I needed them and freedom to do my own research without any extraneous demands on my time. She and Iijima Takayoshi (my tutor) made my affiliation with Tōdai very enjoyable, and I benefited as well from conversations with colleagues Terada Michio, Saitō Kōta, Takeuchi Yoshio, Shimizu Toshiki, Kuroda Jun’ichirō, Chiba Shuichi, Park Byoungdo, and Kim
Daeyoung, Michel Mohr, Helen Baroni, and Faye Higa kindly facilitated a Visiting Collaborating Researcher status for me at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa when an unexpected turn of events brought me temporarily back to Honolulu during my write-up year, and the chance to discuss my dissertation with my erstwhile thesis advisor George Tanabe and his partner Willa made my time in Honolulu much richer.

Departmental administrators, archivists, and librarians are the unsung heroes of academia. Here I offer a paean to Patty Bogdziewicz, Lorraine Fuhrmann, Mary Kay Bodnar, Kerry Smith, and Richard Chafey for getting me funding to get where I needed to go and paperwork to get things done on time. I thank the helpful staff at the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park for their kind assistance, and Aita Chiaki, Kana Jenkins, Sakaguchi Eiko, Amy Wasserstrom, and Jean Wu of the East Asian Collection and the Prange Collection at the University of Maryland, College Park (as well as to the University of Maryland itself for the 20th Century Japan Research Award that made my visit to both archives possible). Research for Chapter One was greatly aided by the kind assistance of the Special Collections staff at the Claremont Colleges Honnold/Mudd Library (Carrie Marsh, Jennifer Bidwell, Jamie Weber, and Lisa Crane) in March 2011 as well as the kind permission of Inoue Nobutaka and Hirafuji Kikuko to peruse and photocopy portions of a collection of D.C. Holtom’s Japanese-language library, now held at Kokugakuin University, in June 2009. A 2011 trip to the University of Oregon Special Collections room was equally helpful, and I thank Bruce Tabb and the other staff there for their help in finding and photocopying materials from the extensive William P. Woodard Collection. Gene Reeves and Shinozaki Michio secured access to the Rissho Koseikai library, where the librarians generously gave me a private room and free access to the stacks. Unfortunately anonymous (to me) archivists at the University of Tokyo Meiji
Shortly after my arrival in Japan, Okuyama Michiaki kindly introduced me to Iwata Fumiaki and his junior colleague Ōmi Toshihiro, both of whom gave me incredible access to the trove of documents related to Chikazumi Jōkan and his circle held at the Kyūdō Kaikan. Ōsawa Kōji, a former colleague who is now a researcher at the Office of Religious Affairs (Shūmuka) in the Ministry of Education, kindly gave me a great number of textual resources and leads regarding religions administration. Yoshinaga Shin’ichi, Ōtani Eiichi, Hayashi Makoto, and Hoshino Seiji shared a number of resources related to the Fraternity of New Buddhists as well as information about other Buddhist publications that I simply could not have found on my own. I have also benefited tremendously from the ever-growing repository of digitized texts maintained by the National Diet Library.

Chapter One has been thoroughly worked over from the time Sheldon Garon first commented on it in its initial iteration as a seminar paper in the fall semester of 2008. At that time, an opportunity to co-lead (with Amin Venjara) a class conversation with Talal Asad in Jeff Stout’s seminar happened to coincide with a presentation on the Occupation in Shel Garon’s class; what started as a hectic week of seminar preparation serendipitously spawned the initial conceptualization of this project. I benefited greatly from comments by Yuma Totani (who kindly read the draft paper and encouraged me to look backwards from the Occupation to the prewar period), Bob Huey, Greg Dvorak, Jerome Klena, and others at the 2009 School of Pacific and Asian Studies Graduate Student Conference at the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa. I also thank the Center for Japanese Studies at UH for funding my trip to that conference.
I also learned a lot about my own project through some very tough questions from students at a Princeton EAS “Cracked Pot” practice presentation and from faculty at a Princeton East Asian Studies lunch colloquium in November 2009. Amy Borovoy kindly asked me to join a panel she co-organized for the 2009 meeting of the American Anthropological Association, and I benefited not only from her feedback and support on my chapter, but also from encouraging comments from Rick Shweder, a delightful post-panel conversation with Kristen Ghodsee, and stimulating ideas shared with co-panelists John Borneman and Usha Menon. I am also indebted to Benjamin Dorman, Mark Mullins, Ray Moore, Barbara Ambros, and attendees for questions and comments on an early version of Chapter One given at Panel #196, “Examining Religion in Japan under the Allied Occupation,” at the March 2011 annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Honolulu, HI. At the 16 November 2013 panel on “The Nation” at the Global Secularisms conference held at New York University, I benefited greatly from post-panel feedback from Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Gregorio Bettiza, Bob Richards, and Chika Watanabe. I also thank Michael Rectenwald, Rochelle Almeida, and George Levine for inviting me to submit a version of Chapter One to a conference volume on the topic of “global secularisms.” Finally, a “practice run” of that talk given at Duke University on 13 November was immensely helpful, and I thank Richard Jaffé for organizing and Barbara Ambros, Levi McLaughlin, Matt Mitchell, Pamela Runestad, Michael Quick, Alex McKinley, and Jeffrey Nicolaisen for their very helpful feedback. Aurora was amazingly attentive for a four-month-old.

A very early stab at Chapter Two (and part of Chapter Six) benefited from comments from Steve Covell, Mark Rowe, Hoshino Seiji, Ryan Ward, and Yoshinaga Shin’ichi at the 2010 meeting of the Asian Studies Conference in Japan; I thank co-panelists Jessica Starling, Matthew McMullen, and Matthew Mitchell for the experience as well. Chapter Two was greatly improved
thanks to comments from Dave Leheny, Timothy Benedict, and Terasawa Kunihiko at the Mid-Atlantic Regional Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies held at Princeton University in the fall of 2011. Fellow panelists Isaac Gagné (and his stand-in Takashi Miura), Stephen Poland, and Jessica Starling have my thanks for helping me clarify my approaches to rights and liberties. The paper particularly benefited from comments by Wei Wu, Buzzy Teiser, Jonathan Gold, and Bryan Lowe at a session of the informal “Workshopping Asian Religions Papers” forum at Princeton. Bryan also added some crucial comments just as I was preparing the final draft of the manuscript.

Chapter Three benefited from comments from Michel Mohr and Kerry San Chirico at a presentation given in the Religion Department at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa on 1 November 2013, and from questions and comments from the audience at the Japanese Religions Group and Buddhist Studies Section co-sponsored panel at the November 2013 meeting of the American Academy of Religion. I thank my co-panelists Bryan Lowe, Orion Klautau, Hayashi Makoto, James Dobbins, and Jason Josephson for the conversation, with special thanks to Orion for immediately arranging for the publication of our panel papers in a forthcoming special issue of the journal *Japanese Religions*.

Ryan Moran invited me to share an early version of Chapter Four at the Modern Japan History Workshop held monthly at Waseda University, and Ariel Acosta organized the actual presentation. I particularly benefited from a follow-up email from Jamyung Choi that really helped to clarify the social historical aspects of my project, as well as questions from Ariel Acosta, Ethan Bushelle, Erin Brightwell, Caleb Carter, Danny Orbach, Paul Kreitman, Tatiana Linkhoeva, a woman named Kim whose last name I did not catch, Matthew McMullen, and Kimberley Thomas. The same chapter greatly benefited from comments from students and
faculty (Fujiwara-sensei, Tsuruoka-sensei, Ikezawa-sensei, Ichikawa-sensei, and Nishimura-sensei) at the University of Tokyo Department of Religious Studies weekly seminar in July 2013; I was also fortunate to have Steve Covell in the audience and to talk with him about the project in detail over coffee afterward.

The opportunity to participate in a seminar for graduate students at Nanzan University in June 2013 gave me a chance to share my work in Japanese with a new audience, and Chapter Five is much better for the conversation. I am particularly indebted to Kawahashi Noriko, a Princeton *senpai* who made a point of reaching out to me about my work; Ōtani Eiichi and Hayashi Makoto, two discussants who encouraged me to beef up the modern Buddhist studies aspect of my project; and Yoshida Kazuhiko, Okuyama Michiaki, Awazu Kenta, Paul Swanson, Jeff Schroeder, Hioki Grace, Dylan Luers, and the many others who responded to my work there (including my fellow presenters Caleb Carter, Ethan Bushelle, Kevin Wilson, Mick Deneckere, Alice Freeman, Mun Heajin, and Bernat Martí Oroval).

Faculty in the Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Old Dominion University responded to a presentation that included material from Chapters 1, 4, 5, and an unfinished draft of Chapter Six. I thank them all, with special thanks to Dave Godden, Larry Hatab, Dylan Wittkower, and Scott Girdner for questions that helped me clarify how to shape the closing chapter. Portions of the Chapter Six began as a seminar paper for a course on religion and social theory that I took with Eddie Glaude in the fall of 2009. It benefited from his comments and from readings in a course on social theory and East Asia that I took with Amy Borovoy in the same semester. The same content also benefited from a series of conversations with Levi McLaughlin about the category of “new religions” during an invited visit to Raleigh in November 2013.
During my travels to archives and conferences I was blessed with warm hospitality from many friends and colleagues. Mary Brooner and John Hannah graciously hosted me during a memorable 2011 visit to Eugene that paired days of archival research with nights of jazz, wine, delicious fresh food, and terrific conversation. Kristina Troost kindly opened her home to me in Raleigh when I was passing through on a multi-state lecture tour in November 2013, as did Avram Dodson and Priya Sircar in New York City, Stephen Poland, Ginger Nash, and Milo in New Haven, and Erin Brightwell and April Hughes in Princeton. Jason Webb graciously hooked me up with a choice sublet right next to Tōdai for the summer of 2012, and Ōhashi Akiko was the kindest landlady imaginable. Other hosts in Tokyo and Kyoto during my many research trips include Yoshio Leeper and Kerry Clark, Jessica Starling and family, and Matthew McMullen.

Even as I worked on this project I was tying up loose ends from my previous research on manga, anime, and religion in contemporary Japan. I have no doubt that the dissertation is stronger for the experience of turning my 2008 University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa M.A. thesis into a book. I thank Pat Crosby and my anonymous reviewers for valuable lessons in how to structure a longer project and highlight its significance for a broader audience. This dissertation also benefited, albeit indirectly, from the opportunity to keep presenting and publishing on media and religion in contemporary Japan. A 2009 workshop on religion and film at Kokugakuin University, a 2011 workshop on responses to the Aum Shinrikyō affair (and the special issue of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies that resulted), invited lectures at Southwestern University (2010), North Carolina State University (2013), Bates College (2014), and a 2014 workshop at the National University of Singapore provided opportunities to stay in touch with the older project while also publicizing (and publishing) some new material. I also got some publication opportunities related to this project that I have not yet mentioned, including the chance to write
two archive reviews for the very helpful website *Dissertation Reviews* (thanks to Thomas Mullaney), my first comparative book review for the journal *Religious Studies in Japan* (thanks to Okuyama Michiaki), a review of Ben Dorman’s book on religion and media in occupied Japan for *Nova Religio* (thanks to W. Michael Ashcraft), and a forthcoming introductory article on the religions policies of the Allied Occupation of Japan for *Religion Compass* (thanks to Kawahashi Noriko and Lori Meeks).

I offer a blanket statement of gratitude to all of my colleagues in Religion and East Asian Studies at Princeton, but some people deserve special mention. April Hughes has been incredibly consistent as a friend and colleague, and our shared experiences from day one of our doctoral program have formed the basis for a strong and lasting friendship. Erin Brightwell has been a constant source of laughter and a like-minded partner in crime, be it in Princeton or in Tokyo. Geoff and Emily Smith (and menagerie) were excellent neighbors in the Butler tract. Yulia Frumer was a particularly excellent interlocutor in East Asian Studies who always took my research seriously on its own terms, and Molly Farneth’s perspicacity has been a professional inspiration. Joel Blecher, Kevin Wolfe, and Alex Kocar were colleagues who I never saw enough but always enjoyed, as were the members of my cohort who joined in the happy hours I organized on an intermittent basis: Amin Venjara, Rachel Gross, Leah Hunt-Hendrix, James Young, and the aforementioned Geoff Smith, Molly Farneth, and April Hughes. Paul Kreitman and Lingxia “Jojo” Zhou were great friends in Princeton and Tokyo alike. David Newheiser and Alda Balthrop-Lewis inspired me to step up my culinary skills late in my dissertation writing phase (while I am not yet making my own lemongrass-peanut gelato, I bake a mean lemon meringue pie). Finally, I must thank all of the members of the Jackie Stone/Buzzy Teiser (and now Jonathan Gold) lineage: *senpai* like Steve Covell, Mark Rowe, Lori Meeks, Micah
Auerback, Asuka Sango, Paul Copp, Stuart Young, Levi McLaughlin, Ethan Lindsay, and Bryan Lowe have been, in a word, amazing. Our annual reunions at AAR are something I eagerly anticipate and fondly remember. Kōhai such as Takashi Miura, Wei Wu, Doug Gildow, Kwi Jeong Lee, and Tim Benedict (and new additions that came in my absence—Kyle Bond and Xiaomin Zu) leave me optimistic about the future of the lineage.

Matt McMullen and I made a reprise of our 2005–2007 Tokyo sojourns that incorporated some fantastic exploration of Harmonica Yokochō, Golden Gai, Nonbei Yokocho, and the various new brewpubs around the city while keeping up our ongoing conversation about the state of the field and our respective research projects. Ti Ngo was a terrific addition to these urban peregrinations and conversations, and a great temporary tenant in our Honolulu cottage while we sojourned in Bangladesh. Life in Tokyo was made sweeter by irregular but consistently fun interactions with my erstwhile colleagues Erik Schicketanz, James Mayger, Jeff Graves, Carl Freire, and Jason Clenfield. Finally, thanks to those friends—too numerous to mention individually—in Princeton, Tokyo, Honolulu, and Dhaka who came to our barbecues and dance parties and scotch tastings and games nights and bad movie screenings. I particularly thank you all for studiously avoiding “shop talk” in favor of discussing the virtues of Islays versus Speysides, playing glow-in-the-dark bocce ball in our backyard or a Tokyo park, admiring the astounding martial arts prowess of Bruce Leroy, and spilling rum and coke on our television in moments of terpsichorean excess. Hikes, beach picnics, camping excursions, hot tubs, infinity pools, Spikeball and Cornhole provided much needed respite from dissertation writing and helped to break up the tedium of writing and revising cover letters for job and postdoc applications.
The final paragraphs of this dissertation were written in Dhaka, Bangladesh. I cannot begin to express my thanks to Kasia Paprocki and Anders Bjornberg for sharing their incredible Dhanmondi flat with us, for providing a steady stream of delicious home-cooked meals and fresh-baked bread during the final writing stages, and for very smart questions that came from outside my immediate field and helped me to figure out how to pitch the project (both for the dissertation and for the book manuscript it will eventually become). Thanks as well to Hans Verkerke for his shared love of nerdy topics like sci-fi, a caffeine addiction to match my own, and access to the facilities at the American Club.

My family expanded in the course of working on this project. My in-laws were particularly instrumental in encouraging me to tell the story I wanted to tell instead of backing away from it, and I thank Bruce, Nonnie, Meg, Erik, and Liz for a great conversation on the subject of my dissertation held in Liz’s backyard one summer afternoon in 2011 (Max and Sophie deserve equal credit for tolerating it). Bruce also asked penetrating questions about Chapter Five during a delightful morning walk in Mexico in the late spring of 2013; he not only subsequently read several draft chapters, but also eagerly asked for more chapters faster than I could produce them. Every visit with siblings-in-law Anthony and Nicole inevitably involved some morning when Anthony and I would linger over coffee against the soundtrack of falling mangoes, chirping geckos, and trade winds, discussing Japanese religion, history, and culture as well as our shared love of music. Living across the street from them during my write-up year was a blessing, as was the opportunity to DJ parties with Anthony and our partner in crime Alex.

My own parents, Frank and Sheena, were eager interlocutors as I teased out details of my argument in conversations during rare visits home to Iowa, and my father even tracked down
relevant articles for me. My brother Akili hosted me during a trip to Chicago early in the stages of my PhD and gamely assembled flatpack furniture in Tokyo shortly after our move to Japan.

Finally, Kimberley Anh. There for every moment (even if some of those moments were far away). The woman who moved away from the Hawaiian islands she loved to join me in central Jersey. The woman who gamely moved again with me to a country where she did not speak the language, who made our Kaimukī cottage a home, and who took me with her to Dhaka. This one is for you.

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In the days leading up to the submission of this dissertation I was stricken with a debilitating illness that was almost certainly precipitated by my ill-advised consumption of street food in rural Bangladesh. “Final editing” for me consisted of shivering feverishly in a fetal position on a guest house bathroom floor that was less than pristine; “copyediting” consisted of intravenously ingesting liters of saline in a Dhaka hospital. I happily blame my microscopic intestinal invaders for the typos, dropped words, and other errors that I normally would have caught during my copyediting phase. I cannot, however, blame the little guys for any problems with the content, nor should blame be laid at the feet of any of the aforementioned individuals or institutions. All mistakes and wild interpretations in the following pages are my own.
Japanese terms are represented in a modified Hepburn system, with macrons representing all long vowels: *shūkyō; furitā*. Japanese words are rendered in italics, although commonly known terms and place names (i.e., words that appear in English-language dictionaries) are unitalicized. I have unified all instances of “Shintō” with the macron simply because I like it better that way.

Ideally, this dissertation would have included a glossary of Japanese terms. Unfortunately, I ran out of time and space. I have only included *kanji* in translations where a particular character is crucial for understanding the passage.

Biographical dates are given on first mention in each chapter and otherwise as appropriate, but only for people who are deceased.

Citations from e-books with unstable pagination refer to the appropriate chapter or section, except in cases where I am referring to the argument of the book as a whole. In cases where more precision is required I have given a specific location (e.g., “Location 42 of 150”).

I recognize that using originally Christian vocabulary to discuss Asian groups and practices can be misleading and problematic. However, trying to concoct reasonable alternatives from native terminology can be equally confusing. I have used the term “transsectarian” as a general descriptor of many of the groups under investigation here and as a translation of the Japanese term “*chōshūha*” (lit., “surpassing sects and factions”).1 Where more specificity is required I use the term “transsectarian” to indicate groups that were designed to overcome sectarian doctrinal differences while maintaining denominational distinctiveness vis-à-vis other religions; “trans-

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1 Originally, I had been using the term “ecumenical,” and there may still be some instances of this term that I failed to eradicate from the text. I personally do not have a problem with appropriating this term to serve my own purposes, but I fear that some readers may find it distracting.
denominational” indicates cooperation and collaboration between different religions (e.g., between Buddhism and Christianity).

I also use the term “ecclesiastical” in referring to the concerns of clerics and clerical institutions. A related term that appears in the text is “sacerdotalism,” by which I mean the idea that ordained clerics are deserving of special treatment because they serve a unique and irreplaceable role in mediating between empirical and non-empirical reality. Sacerdotalism is also my preferred translation for kyōkenshugi, a term used by some lay intellectuals in the period under question to criticize clerics’ supercilious attitudes or claims to ultimate doctrinal authority.

Another originally Christian term that I use regularly in the text for lack of a better alternative is “latitudinarian” and the derivative term “latitudinarianism.” I mean “latitudinarian” in the simple sense of showing no particular preference regarding diverse religious practices, ritual regimes, doctrines, or dispositions. “Latitudinarianism” here is often used as a translation for the Japanese phrase jiyū hōnin shugi, which might be awkwardly translated as “a policy of leaving one free to do as one pleases.” I have also used “latitudinarianism” to refer to the laissez-faire attitude espoused by certain policymakers during the Allied Occupation of Japan.

I have used the term “irenic” in both its religious sense (facilitating concord between different sects or factions) and in its more general sense (conducive to peace and peacemaking).

I have tried to be as transparent and as consistent as possible when citing sources from archives. However, at almost every archive I visited I discovered at least one misfiled record (if not several), and archivists may of course change the ordering of materials at some future date. At a minimum, I cite the sources by box and folder number or—in the case of microfilm—by reel and item number. I provide page numbers wherever possible and appropriate, although many of these documents are not paginated.
The following abbreviations have been used for collections and periodicals:

**Collections**

*Andō Masazumi kankei bunsho* (AM)

*Charles Kades Papers* (CKP; University of Maryland Prange Collection)

*Chikazumi Jōkan Papers* (CJP; Kyūdō Kaikan Archives)

*D.C. Holtom Papers* (DCH; Claremont Colleges Honnold/Mudd Library Special Collections)

*Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS)

*Katō Genchi shū* (KGS)

*Kishimoto Hideo shū* (KHS)

*Kizokuin giji sokki roku* (KGSR)

*Makiguchi Tsunesaburō zenshū* (MTZ)

*Prange Collection, University of Maryland at College Park* (P)

*Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, Religion and Cultural Resources Division* (RCR)

*Shin Bukkyō ronsetsu shū* (SBRS)

*Shūgiin giji sokki roku* (SGSR)

*Shūkyō seido chōsa kai* (SSCK)

*William P. Woodard Papers* (WPW; University of Oregon Special Collections)

**Periodicals**

*Bukkyō* (B)
Jolyon Baraka Thomas

Japan's Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

Chūgai nippon (CN)

Daihōrin (D)

Jinja shinpō (JS)

Kyōgaku hōchi (KH)

Meiji Bukkyō (MB)

Meikyō shinshī (MS)

Seikyō jihō (SJ)

Seikyō shinron (SS)

Shin Bukkyō (SB)

Shūkyō jihō (ShJ)

Shūkyō kōron (SK)

Tokkō geppō (TG)

Uchū (U)
PART I
Introduction

The Bellicose Pacifism of Religious Freedom

This is not just a matter of what any new constitution says. Democracy is not only a way of voting. It is a way of thinking. People have to feel equal, not just be regarded by the law as such. Such religious tolerance has to be taught and argued for. Those who oppose it have to be taken on and defeated not only by arms but by ideas.¹

This dissertation is about the history of religious freedom in modern Japan and about how the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) deeply influenced conceptions of religious freedom in the world. In addition to the Occupation era, the project covers the earlier period when Japan’s first modern constitution was in effect (1890–1947). I will outline why the history of religious freedom in Japan during this period deserves scholarly attention shortly, but in order to substantiate that point I must first outline why the concept of religious freedom itself demands critical investigation. I therefore begin with a few brief examples of how the twin ideals of religious freedom and religious tolerance have operated in contemporary geopolitics, using the present to shed light on the past.

The Problem of Religious Freedom

On 25 January 2014, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair published an opinion piece in the Guardian newspaper under the eye-catching title “Religious Difference, Not Ideology, Will Fuel This Century’s Epic Battles.” While Blair almost certainly did not determine the title for his

own article, the content matched the headline. The article laid out a vision in which religion served as the fundamental motivator for armed conflicts and terrorist attacks around the globe:

The fact is that, though of course there are individual grievances or reasons for the violence in each country, there is one thing self-evidently in common: the acts of terrorism are perpetrated by people motivated by an abuse of religion. It is a perversion of faith. But there is no doubt that those who commit the violence often do so by reference to their faith and the sectarian nature of the conflict is a sectarianism based on religion. There is no doubt either that this phenomenon is growing, not abating.²

Through the language of “perversion of faith” and “abuse of religion,” Blair’s article advanced an argument that suggested that religion is primarily about belief, that belief motivates (violent) behavior, and that such beliefs and motivations are “bad religion.”³ The tacit corollary of Blair’s claims was that real religion is pacifist and non-sectarian; he argued in a later paragraph that the ideal of religious tolerance therefore needed to be instilled in people worldwide through a combination of education, persuasion, and military force: “those who oppose it have to be defeated not only by arms but by ideas.”⁴

Blair’s article—and the outreach and education efforts of the Tony Blair Faith Foundation for which it served as an unabashed advertisement—was a response to the 11 September 2001 attacks and a manifestation of the ensuing and ongoing “War on Terror.”⁵ This post-9/11 interest in religion as a prime motivator of violence and international conflict has motivated intelligence agencies, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and academic funding agencies to make deep financial investments in understanding religion as a facet of international relations.⁶ The

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² Blair 2014, 2 (my pagination).
³ These claims have been systematically debunked by Cavanaugh (2009).
⁴ Blair 2014, 3 (my pagination).
⁶ Recent publications in the field of International Relations have exhibited an compulsion with bringing religion into IR analysis after decades of ignoring the topic (see Hurd 2008; S. Thomas
same interest has motivated some of these agencies to laud religious freedom as a panacea for armed conflict and intolerance.\textsuperscript{7} Lobbies with explicitly evangelical Christian missions such as the Institute for Global Engagement have cultivated strong ties with policymakers and have created new academic periodicals to promote their ideas.\textsuperscript{8} Other academic initiatives, such as the Religious Freedom Project hosted by the Berkley Center at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., take a superficially neutral stance even as they advance politically (and theologically) normative claims about the importance of spreading religious freedom worldwide.\textsuperscript{9}

These efforts by lobbyists and think tanks to promote religious freedom and religious tolerance in foreign policy have been matched by initiatives at the highest levels of government in the United States. The recently inaugurated Faith-Based Community Initiative, which operates under the aegis of the United States Department of State, reflects the influence of religious

\textsuperscript{7} For example, Shah et al., \textit{Religious Freedom (Why Now?): Protecting an Embattled Human Right} (Princeton: The Witherspoon Institute, 2013).

\textsuperscript{8} See the IGE website: \url{http://globalengage.org}. Accessed 3 February 2014. The IGE quarterly the \textit{Review of Faith and International Affairs} is exclusively devoted to studies of religious freedom; the Summer 2013 issue was specifically about religious freedom in East and Southeast Asia and included a historically and conceptually problematic overview of religious freedom in Japan (Cooney 2013). Notably, head of IGE Chris Seiple topped a list of nominees for the vacant U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for religious freedom in a \textit{Religion News Service} article that was republished by the \textit{Washington Post} on 15 January 2014. See Markoe 2014a and 2014b. Seiple’s father previously served in the post when it was inaugurated in 1998. See Melani McAlister’s contribution to “Engaging Religion at the Department of State” at \textit{The Immanent Frame}: \url{http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/2013/07/30/engaging-religion-at-the-department-of-state/}. Accessed February 8, 2014.

\textsuperscript{9} See \url{http://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/rfp}. Last accessed 2 February 2014.
lobbies such as the aforementioned Institute of Global Engagement that seek to spur greater state collaboration with religious actors. Secretary of State John Kerry touted the inauguration of the program in the summer of 2013 through the language of pluralism, diversity, and tolerance.10 More recently, United States President Barack Obama gave a speech at the annual National Prayer Breakfast in which he noted that promotion of religious freedom around the world was a central pillar of U.S. foreign policy. “History shows that nations that uphold the rights of their people, including the freedom of religion, are ultimately more just and more peaceful and more successful,” Obama averred. “Nations that do not uphold these rights sow the bitter seeds of instability and violence and extremism. So freedom of religion matters to our national security.”11

While the motivations behind this recent spate of scholarship, academic philanthropy, activism, and policymaking are undoubtedly noble, religious freedom has historically been a problem as much as it has been a solution.12 The conception of “religion” on which some of these contemporary bureaucratic, academic, and diplomatic responses to 9/11 rely fails to

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12 The remainder of this paragraph paraphrases arguments made by Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2013 and a talk given as part of a roundtable at the Global Secularisms conference held at New York University in November 2013), Gregorio Bettiza (same NYU conference) and Michael J. Altman (2013). The Fall 2013 issue of the *Review of Faith and International Affairs* responded to some of these criticisms (especially Hurd’s) by calling for more empirical research on religious freedom (Hoover 2013). Unfortunately, the article that opened the issue failed to
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recognize the problems of definition and application inherent in the category of religion itself.  

Many of these responses have also explicitly outlined visions of “good” and “bad” religion even as they have claimed to embrace religious diversity. They are premised on the twin presuppositions that religion is essentially pacifist (it is not) and that religious ideas in particular serve as motivators of violent behavior (they do not). Paradoxically, these conjoined presuppositions contradict one another, creating an incoherent position that nevertheless enjoys popular support: religion is bad because it is intrinsically parochial and therefore fosters conflict, but religion is good because it is essentially altruistic and therefore lays the groundwork for peace.

There are two ways through which this paradoxical position is commonly resolved. One is to identify some religious dispositions as “genuine” and others as “false.” Words like “cult,” “sect,” and “heresy” do this work, as does appending the suffix “-ism” to otherwise neutral terms to give them a negative or pejorative valence (“Islamism”). The other method—and I should be clear that the two are not mutually exclusive—is to adopt a latitudinarian stance by equally extending “tolerance” to all religious positions. However, to “tolerate” something is to first acknowledge its fundamental abhorrence, second to co-opt or neuter it through generous treatment. That is, policies of toleration operate by subsuming religious difference under overarching regimes. This

acknowledge that even the most meticulous empirical research can be undermined by faulty conceptual tools and researchers’ blind spots.

13 See Sullivan 2005 on difficulties in jurisprudence that arise from competing conceptions of religion.
14 Altman 2013
15 Cavanaugh 2009
16 Brown 2006
often happens by giving priority to the claims of the state over those of religious groups and individuals.\textsuperscript{17}

The assumption that tolerant policies mitigate the religious conflict that arises from competing \textit{beliefs} is not only based on a problematic understanding of “religion.”\textsuperscript{18} It is also based on a flawed history. It either overestimates the historical effectiveness of secular political systems in equitably managing religious difference, or it anticipates a near-future utopia by presuming that religious liberty is a uniquely Western (sometimes “Christian” or “Judeo-Christian”) product that must be adopted by the entire global population despite—or for some parties because of—its culturally specific origins.\textsuperscript{19} Like the aforementioned problem regarding perceptions of religion, these mutually incompatible positions are often held simultaneously by stakeholders such as policymakers, clerics, journalists, academics, and laypeople.\textsuperscript{20} The result—exemplified in the statements by Blair and Obama above—is that religious freedom is upheld as a panacea for conflict, both domestically and internationally.

Behind this incautious celebration of religious liberty as an unmitigated public good lies a conundrum regarding enforcement. At the national scale, states necessarily give greater credence to majoritarian claims in constitutionalization, legislation, jurisprudence, policymaking, and law enforcement, but the mandate to protect “public order” serves as a way to vilify, criminalize, and oppress minority religions.\textsuperscript{21} This problem is not unique to “totalitarian” states, nor is it

\textsuperscript{17} Asad 2003
\textsuperscript{18} See Laborde 2014 for a clear overview of the various critiques of the problematic category of “religion.” Laborde highlights the work done by Talal Asad (1993; 2003) and Saba Mahmood (2005; 2006) in highlighting the anthropology of religion assumed by certain state policies and popular perceptions.
\textsuperscript{19} Cavanaugh 2009; Hurd 2008.
\textsuperscript{20} Hurd 2008
particular to states with Muslim majorities or communist politics, as some have claimed. It is fundamental to the structure of religion-state separation and inherent to guarantees of religious freedom, where states get the ultimate say in what counts as genuine “religion” and which groups are deserving of freedom. Even when domestic religious groups successfully negotiate for separation of religion from the state or for greater state protection of religious liberty, they often do so by redrawing the boundaries of both political and religious orthodoxy: “good” religions fit neatly into the religion/not-religion framework preferred by the state (and, usually, dominant ecclesiastical authority); “bad” religions are designated as “cults,” “superstitions,” or threats to common morality and peace and order.

To turn from the domestic to the international scale, during the global imperial period (that is, the period when North Atlantic nations such as England, Spain, France, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and Portugal colonized most of the world; also the time when the modern category of “religion” came into being) treaty clauses about religious liberty served as ways for colonizers to ensure that their Christian missionaries could garner access to otherwise impenetrable areas. In the context of the asymmetrical power relationships characteristic of colonialism, gunboat diplomacy, and military occupation, such guarantees were understandably regarded by many

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22 Salehin 2013 is an imperfectly executed but reasonably persuasive attempt to use the case of Bangladesh to argue that Muslim-majority nations can exhibit functional democracy according to commonly accepted metrics, including freedom of belief. Unfortunately, the publication of Salehin’s paper in late 2013 was poorly timed. The administration of Sheikh Hasina refused to cede power to a caretaker government so that free elections could be held; the result was that the majority of seats went uncontested. For reasons that are unclear, in the wake of the election many Hindu minority neighborhoods were burned to the ground.

23 See Asad 2003. I return to this issue of “religion-making” in apologetic, bureaucratic, and academic contexts below, drawing on the work of Dressler and Mandair (2011).

24 Examples from the Japanese case can be found in Garon 1997, Josephson 2006a, and Josephson 2012. On the role of terms like “magic” and “superstition” as “other terms” that help to define the boundaries of religion and secular, see Josephson 2012 (a theoretically and historically compelling account) and, less convincingly, van der Veer 2014.
local religious leaders as a threat rather than a boon. More recently, attempts to protect religious liberty as a fundamental human right have run into problems of enforcement. This problem is true of human rights in general (not just religious liberty), although attempts to protect religious freedom were among the earliest cases where this dilemma arose.

These contemporary concerns deserve—and are increasingly receiving—sustained and conscientious scholarly attention. However, that attention also reflects the economic forces that drive and shape scholarship. Organizations like the Mellon Foundation and the United States Department of State commit material resources to better understanding religion as a source of global conflict; the aforementioned Tony Blair Faith Foundation partners with esteemed institutions of higher education to promote scholarship that begins from the premise that “Those who oppose [religious tolerance] have to be taken on and defeated not only by arms but by ideas.” This bellicose rhetoric of intolerant tolerance—and the academic infrastructure it creates and is sustained by in turn—neatly encapsulates the complicated relationship between religious freedom, academic inquiry, and governmentality that is the subject of this dissertation.

Why Japan?

The hijacked planes and devastating attacks on United States territory that spurred the new interest in religion as a motivator for conflict (and the concomitant embrace of “clash of civilizations” rhetoric by United States President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister

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25 Mahmood 2012. On the emergence of “religion” during this period, see Nongbri 2013.
26 Mahmood and Danchin 2014b
27 Moyn 2014
28 Blair 2014, 3 (my pagination).
Tony Blair) have a historical analogue. While it is not at all my intention to say that the events were historically identical—they effectively took place in different worlds—there is a striking functional parallel between the 9/11 attacks and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor of 7/8 December 1941. Both surprise attacks resulted in devastating loss of life and property. Both galvanized Americans and created fertile ground for a militarist (and often explicitly racist) jingoism that was striking in its suddenness and fervor. In both cases, religion was identified as the prime motivator for the attack (Islam in the case of 9/11; Shintō in the case of Pearl Harbor) and in both cases the promotion of religious freedom was offered as a way of turning such “bad religion” into “good religion.” The religiously motivated enemy spurned or did not understand “freedom.” It was the duty of the United States to militarily chastise this intractable foe, to bomb him into submission, and then in the course of military occupation to educate him about the true nature of freedom.

As historian of United States-Japan relations John Dower presciently argued in 2003, the American occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan would not and could not reproduce the “success” story of the Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952) in the way that many policymakers evidently hoped. For all the parallels between the respective onsets of the Pacific War and the War on Terror, fundamental cultural and historical differences militated against any real

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29 Huntington 1996 popularized the concept of a clash of “civilizations” that were based on dominant religions; his thesis reproduced the assumptions of civilizationalist rhetoric that was popular at around the time of World War II.

30 The attack took place on 7 December locally; in Japan it was celebrated as having taken place on 8 December due to the International Date Line difference. During the Pacific War, the eighth of each month was treated as “Imperial Service Day”; on such days religious organizations collected donations for the war effort (including valuable metals that could be melted down), visited wounded soldiers, and prayed for the war dead.

31 Dower 2003
duplication of the unique circumstances that allowed the Japanese to “embrace defeat.”
Nevertheless—and with all due appreciation for the major historical developments of the intervening decades—study of the Allied Occupation of Japan and the ways that the nouns “violence,” “tolerance,” and “freedom” were modulated by the adjective “religious” during that short period is instructive for understanding the problematic place of religion in American foreign policy in the post-9/11 world.

The Allied Occupation of Japan

Human history is replete with fascinating watershed historical moments. The Allied Occupation of Japan must be counted high among them. While it was technically a project of Allied Nations, from the outset Occupation policy was dictated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee of the United States. It was undoubtedly an American project. Occupation military personnel included non-Americans and American people of color, but in 1945 the stereotypical occupier was embodied by Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur: white, male, paternalistic, evangelistic in his Christianity, and ardently anti-communist. Policy matched this stereotype, pitting “white” American civilization against “yellow” Japanese barbarism; democratic Christianity against “ultranationalist” Shintō.

Post-Surrender Planning during the Pacific War and the Creation of Occupation Policy

Building upon earlier transnational agreements such as the Cairo Declaration (November 1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (June 1945), pre-surrender Occupation policy was premised on the thorough demilitarization and democratization of Japan. The basic thrust of this policy

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32 The term “embracing defeat” comes from Dower 1999.
involved Japan’s unmitigated defeat, which was ultimately accomplished through an indiscriminate firebombing campaign of an unprecedented and devastating scale and the first use of atomic weapons. These military policies made no distinction between noncombatants and combatants, for they were premised on the presupposition that the Japanese were so resistant to rehabilitation that they demanded exceptionally stern discipline if not outright extermination. The air strikes wreaked incredible devastation on the cities of the Japanese archipelago while generally shielding Allied bombardiers from harm.

Upon Japan’s unconditional surrender following the atomic strikes of 6 and 9 August 1945, the next stage was to remove the militarists who had overseen the Pacific War and to replace them with democratically oriented (that is, pro-American) leaders who could oversee the Occupation reforms. Meanwhile, the occupiers suspended the Constitution of the Empire of Japan and replaced it (and other laws such as the Peace Preservation Law of 1925 and the Religious Organizations Law of 1939) with a set of Occupation directives until a new constitution could be established. The Civil Liberties Directive of 4 October 1945 guaranteed freedom of expression, belief, and assembly to all Japanese citizens.

For the remainder of the fall of 1945, the occupiers set about the negative task of removing the ideological supports for Japanese militarism and “ultranationalism” from politics and

35 This is not to discount the incredible loss of life on the various fronts throughout the Pacific. However, the air raids allowed the Americans to destroy huge amounts of enemy infrastructure with minimal risk. This was not dissimilar to the current American use of drones in prosecuting the War on Terror.
education. This was accomplished through the purge of politicians, educators, and some leaders of civic organizations; the censorship of textbooks and educational curricula; and the formal disaggregation of Shintō from the state. A subsequent phase of positive policymaking began in the late winter and spring of 1946, when the occupiers began to promulgate new directives aimed at rehabilitating Japan while forestalling any possibility of militarist recidivism.

Occupation policy was characterized by several ironies. In the name of promoting freedom of expression the occupiers censored every publication produced in the country. In the name of promoting religious freedom they created circumstances that were particularly favorable for Christian missionaries (and unfavorable for Shintō shrines and their priests) while subjecting some marginal religious movements to police surveillance. In the name of promoting democracy they reviewed a Japanese constitutional draft, scrapped it, and substituted it with one drawn up by a committee of American advisors who had ostensibly been called in to guarantee that the new document truly represented the will of the Japanese people.

In the framework preferred by Supreme Commander MacArthur and influential figures in the State Department, democracy was a uniquely Western invention—a product of Christian

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36 I put “ultranationalism” in scare quotes because the term seems to have been invented during the Pacific War as a way of vilifying Japanese nationalism and treating it as more pernicious than American “patriotism.” I came to this conclusion by checking the incidence of the terms “ultranationalism and ultra-nationalism” in the Google Books N-gram viewer: https://books.google.com/ngrams/. While scattered references occur prior to 1940, there is an explosion of use of the term after 1941.

37 Chapter One focuses on the negative phase; Chapter Five on the positive. Chapter Six investigates the outcome, looking at both Japanese and American responses.

38 All of these censored publications are housed in the impressive Prange Collection at the University of Maryland, College Park.

39 On the preference given to Christian missionaries, see Moore 2011. On surveillance of marginal religions, see Dorman 2004.

culture—that needed to be implemented in Japan. This Christ-centric democracy would serve double duty as a replacement for problematic prewar and wartime Japanese religion-state relations and as a bulwark against the “godless communism” that was then flourishing on the continent. Religious freedom was a crucial ingredient of the democratic brew that the occupiers prescribed for Japan’s ills. The final irony, of course, was that this particularist understanding of religious freedom—a gift of Western (especially American) Christian civilization to the world—was intrinsically ill-suited for transnational application.

This dissertation tells the story of how the particularist vision of religious freedom favored by many American policymakers gradually transformed into a universalistic one. Specifically, the unique circumstances of the Occupation, in which one national government dictated policy while another enacted it, created an unprecedented situation in which “religious freedom” could no longer simply be a right or privilege guaranteed to citizens by their states. Religious freedom had to become something more than a mere civil liberty. It had to transcend the privileges that attended national citizenship. It had to become timeless. It had to become innate, universal, unquestionable. In short, religious freedom had to become a human right.

If the idea of human rights had been in the air prior to the Pacific War, it was only during the 1940s that it began to condense, precipitating a new understanding of humanity, citizenship, and rights and liberties. The crucial role that Japan played in that process has not been systematically studied. This dissertation aims to rectify this oversight through a focus on religious freedom,

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41 Moore 2011; Woodard 1972.
42 This understanding of religious freedom and religion-state relations was of the type Elizabeth Shakman Hurd (2008, Chapter Two) describes as “Judeo-Christian secularism.”
43 Bell 2014 (preprint) shows how “liberalism” was reconstructed as an antidote to “totalitarianism” in the 1930s and especially the early 1940s; the American brand of liberalism retrojected the concept of “liberalism” onto early American visions of religious freedom and tolerance. Also see Hurd 2008, Chapter Two.
both because religious freedom played a particularly important role in U.S.-Japan relations and because in the late 1940s religious freedom was often understood as the “first” human right. In strong terms, my basic contention is that while abstract theorization about religious freedom as a human right had taken place in rarefied contexts prior to the Occupation, it was only in the course of the Occupation that religious freedom was actually forced to become a “human right” in any concrete sense. As foregoing scholarship on the history of human rights has demonstrated, it would take another several decades for the vague concept of “human rights” itself to become reality.44

Historicizing Human Rights

The process whereby religious freedom became a universal human right was not linear and the outcome not predetermined. Contrary to the teleological orientation that often characterizes contemporary discussions of human rights (in which rights gradually expanded to include greater numbers of formerly disenfranchised people, culminating in universal “human rights”), in the mid-1940s human rights were not universally celebrated, protected, or even acknowledged.45 It is true that some European political philosophers had argued for universal rights centuries before, and it is true that foundational documents of modern states (including the 1776 American Declaration of Independence and the 1789 French Declaration of Rights of Man and the Citizen) included nods to these ideas. It is also true that these founding documents came with significant caveats regarding women, slaves, certain occupational groups, ethnic and religious minorities, and colonial subjects.

44 Moyn 2010
45 Recent critical histories of human rights have elucidated this reality to great effect. See Moyn 2010; Hoffmann, ed. 2011; Iriye, Goedde, and Hitchcock, eds. 2012; and Weitz 2013.
Until recently, histories of human rights have portrayed such caveats as unfortunate exceptions to a universal rule; they have seen the expansion of suffrage, the emancipation of slaves, the civil rights and feminist movements of various nations, the decolonization of the world, and recent legislative and judicial victories for people with disabilities and non-heterosexual orientations as part of an inexorable, progressive march to universal human rights. This progressive orientation still forms the dominant view of rights and liberties in journalism, diplomacy, and the academy. However, more recent critical scholarship on human rights has suggested that human rights only existed as vague dreams or as empty rhetoric until the latter twentieth century.

This dissertation aligns itself with this more recent strain of scholarship, but makes its intervention by highlighting a hitherto overlooked historical episode. It shows that a small Asian nation played a crucial, even indispensable, role in the postwar construction of religious freedom as a universal “human right.”

The New History of Human Rights and the Allied Occupation of Japan

Historically, we can say that some exceptional thinkers seem to have truly regarded “human rights” as innate and universal long before the Occupation. The more common pattern, of course, was to withhold rights from certain groups in favor of majoritarian claims. In the early twentieth century, rights talk also tended to focus on nations rather than on individuals, with a

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46 To be fair, historically many of the people who engaged in projects of domination (slavery, colonization, etc.) rationalized their actions through language that was “liberal” in its time. See Bell 2014 (preprint), 9.
48 Moyn 2010 outlines some of these early attempts, but suggests that the phrase “human rights” served as an empty placeholder that allowed all sorts of interest groups to make competing claims. With Roosevelt’s January 1941 “Four Freedoms” speech, the phrase began to slowly take on a new, coherent meaning.
rather sanguine assessment of benevolent states’ desire and capacity to grant equal rights to citizens. It is no small surprise that the devastating second world war changed that approach, although recent historical scholarship has highlighted the fact that the Holocaust was not the great motivator for the rise in human rights talk that many have assumed.49

What did occur during the course of the war was that United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt began to justify American material contributions to the war raging on the European continent through reference to what he termed the “Four Freedoms” (freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom from fear, and freedom from want). This articulation of universal freedoms in Roosevelt’s January 1941 State of the Union address was the first time the phrase “human rights” was used in any major American political statement, but it functioned primarily as a rhetorical flourish, not as a programmatic outline of a foreign policy centered on the promotion or protection of “human rights.” Indeed, at the time many people were unclear as to what the phrase meant.50

In the wake of the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor, the language of the “Four Freedoms” was repurposed to articulate why Americans were fighting the war. Specifically, rights and freedoms were juxtaposed with the image of the inscrutable, fanatical, ultranationalistic Japanese soldier, who eschewed personal freedom in favor of his unthinking loyalty to a emperor with false presumptions to divinity. Religious freedom in particular featured prominently in the racist propaganda blitz that accompanied the Pacific War. American Christianity was contrasted with Shintō nationalism, emperor worship, and a mystical and vaguely threatening bushidō (the way of the warrior). In the most striking formulations of this propaganda God was on America’s side,

49 Cohen 2012
and He wanted the Japanese to be free to choose Christianity as their national faith.\textsuperscript{51} Like all good propaganda, this approach thoroughly “othered” the enemy and simultaneously created a national identity that was both liberal and Christian (or, in a contemporaneously emerging phrase, “Judeo-Christian”).\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{The Postwar Emergence of Human Rights in International Relations}

It was only after the war, however, that human rights began to take on real significance in international relations, and the recent critical histories of human rights have persuasively shown that “human rights” did not take on their contemporary meaning until the 1970s at the earliest. The United Nations’ famed Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) gestured more to postwar ideals than realities, and importantly many key players on the international scene were skeptical of the concept.\textsuperscript{53} Postcolonial nations like India preferred the language of national self-determination to human rights, and even famed independence crusader Mohandas Ghandi (1869–1948) preferred to think in terms of duties rather than rights.\textsuperscript{54}

Human rights were also an embarrassment for the United States in the postwar and especially the Cold War context, when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could rightly criticize the American government for talking sanctimoniously about rights and liberties but failing to grant unqualified rights to its own citizens of color.\textsuperscript{55} The people who did embrace the language of human rights in the immediate postwar period tended to be religious interest groups who were trying to stave off communist depredations in Eastern Europe by advocating the protection of

\textsuperscript{51} The capitalized words “God” and “He” here reflect contemporary usage in the mid-1940s.
\textsuperscript{52} On the emergence of the term “Judeo-Christian” in the years immediately prior to the Pacific War, see Sehat 2010. See Dower 1986 on American and Japanese propaganda during the war.
\textsuperscript{53} Mazower 2004
\textsuperscript{54} Moyn 2010; Moyn 2014
\textsuperscript{55} Mazower 2004
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religious freedom as a universal human right.\(^{56}\) Through such efforts, human rights talk gradually expanded and very slowly led to the creation of new international norms and expectations. By the late 1970s groups such as Amnesty International were engaged in human rights publicity campaigns, many of which aimed to garner global support that could protect religious minorities from persecution. By the 1980s and 1990s, “humanitarian intervention” became a way for powerful states to mobilize their militaries to protect “human rights” on behalf of minority populations.\(^ {57}\) This marked a transition from vague international ideal to an aspect of international law that could be guaranteed through legitimized use of force. Aiming to protect people from violence (persecution due to religious belief), human rights authorized and legitimated a certain type of violence (intervention to protect people from such persecution).

To return to the nascent phase of human rights discourse in the 1940s, the central argument of this dissertation is that an important and hitherto largely overlooked aspect of the early postwar development of human rights talk took place in Japan. That development had lasting global ramifications for how religious freedom was understood as an ideal to be promoted worldwide. It also had lasting domestic ramifications in Japan in that it deeply shaped postwar understandings of the history of Japanese religion-state relations.

Specifically, the occupiers who were in charge of overseeing religions policy—especially the official policy of inculcating a “desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese populace—embraced the language of human rights as a way of underscoring why Japan’s existing policies and practices of religion-state relations needed to be changed. This rhetorical move arrogated to the American policymakers a tactically superior position. It placed competing “Japanese” and

\(^{56}\) Moyn 2014
“American” visions of religion-state relations in a new universalistic framework, but that framework implicitly favored the occupiers’ political philosophy. It also solved a practical dilemma in that it allowed the occupiers to claim that they were working to protect religious groups’ interests rather than working to undermine them (as many groups justifiably feared since Occupation policies gave preferential treatment to Christians and subjected Shintō institutions to special scrutiny).58

The occupiers’ embrace of the language of religious freedom as a human right and their promotion of latitudinarian religions policy created a situation in which many Japanese religious groups quickly realized that embracing the humanist language of religious liberty could provide them with tactical advantage in their interactions with the state, in apologia associated with sectarian conflict, and in scholarship. While some religious groups were slow to pick up on this maneuver, those that did were able to skillfully use the language of religious freedom as a way to simultaneously seek political favor and to police doctrinal orthodoxy. Their efforts on this score had lasting results, the aftereffects of which can still be felt today.

To offer an example that I trace more thoroughly in Part III, emergent religious movements were able to use the universalist language of religious liberty to successfully campaign for equal treatment by the state and mainstream religious movements during the Occupation. In an apologetic move that began during the Occupation but took several decades to fully take effect, they also successfully encouraged scholars to reject earlier pejorative nomenclature (shinkō shūkyō, or “new fad religions”) in favor of the anodyne label “new religions” (shin shūkyō). This

57 Barnett (2011, 16) persuasively argues that “human rights” and “humanitarianism” should be disaggregated, but frequently “humanitarianism” serves as a rationale for protecting “human rights” and vice versa.
new nomenclature helped marginal movements move into the mainstream by implicitly associating them with a new postwar dispensation and cutting-edge legal theory. It also created a new category of analysis—“new religions”—that was later adopted by American and European scholars. The influence of the postwar Japanese experience on the field of new religious movement studies (NRMS) has only recently been acknowledged in anglophone scholarship.59

The Geopolitics of Religious Freedom

The case of NRMS shows that the Occupation provided circumstances whereby concepts flowed outward from Japan as much as they flowed into Japan from the west. Despite triumphalist American rhetoric to the contrary, the Occupation was not characterized by the one-way transmission of the ideal of religious freedom from the Americans to the Japanese. In fact, it was only in the course of refining Occupation policy that the occupiers were forced to actually define religious freedom. They had to collaborate with local transsectarian religious organizations and Japanese legislators and bureaucrats to do so, meaning that—as had been the case with the concept of “new religions”—apologetic projects directly affected policymaking. As a consequence, religious freedom came to be understood in a new, universalistic fashion for the first time by parties on both sides of the Pacific. This process had lasting ramifications not only for Japan and the United States, but also for the global community in that it created new forms of religious and political orthodoxy that could be policed by the United Nations, humanitarian groups, and scholars of religion.

This Japanese influence on global understandings of religious freedom has been difficult to see in part because of a prevailing historiographic trend to see prewar and wartime Japanese

58 To give just one example of such preferential treatment, Christian missionaries were allowed to return to Japan long before any other non-military personnel; Shintō shrines and priests were subject to steady monitoring for any hints of recidivism.
political practices and ecclesiastical structures as essentially lacking an understanding of “genuine” religious freedom.\textsuperscript{60} This idea of Japan’s bad relationship with “real” religious freedom is a mature form of a common rationale for early Occupation reforms, but it problematically retrojects postwar ideals onto prewar Japanese history. That is, it takes the universalistic approach to religious freedom that developed during the Occupation and assumes that it could and should have existed in a time and place where it did not and could not yet exist.

There is little doubt that religious freedom was of considerable importance to people within and outside of Japan prior to the Pacific War. Even a superficial survey of the historical record reveals that various stakeholders were quite invested in the topic of religious freedom, although they did not always interpret it in liberal or universalist terms. However, if “human rights” as such did not yet exist—that is, if rights were still primarily understood to be privileges granted to citizens by their states—then the right to religious freedom was only capable of being understood as something states allowed or tolerated among their citizens.\textsuperscript{61} In the time of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War (1931–1945) and before, it was simply unimaginable that religious freedom might be an inalienable right that preceded citizenship and transcended state authority.

\textsuperscript{59} Lewis 2004, 3–4.
\textsuperscript{60} I outline this scholarship in more detail throughout the dissertation, but to give just a couple of influential examples, Maruyama Masao’s 1946 meditation on the “theory and psychology of Japanese ultra-nationalism” made this claim (Maruyama 1969), as did Abe Yoshiya’s series of articles (1968–1970) about debates over religious freedom and religious legislation during (what I call) the Meiji Constitutional Period. Helen Hardacre reproduced arguments by Abe and Murakami Shigeyoshi (1970) in her influential 1989 book on Shintō and the state.
\textsuperscript{61} The United States Declaration of Independence has often been linked to postwar conceptions of human rights. Despite the obvious problem that in actual practice it only extended rights to some white men, it is true that the universalist language of the Declaration superficially seems to be a direct predecessor to “human rights.” No doubt there is a conceptual relationship between the two if not a direct line of descent, but one striking difference is that the transparently theological language of the Declaration of Independence was erased in the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, even if the necessity of appending those rights to an
In making this point, I readily acknowledge that conceptions of the “rights of man” and “civil rights” existed during the Meiji Constitutional Period, and Japan’s own “Freedom and People’s Rights Movement” (Jiyū Minken Undō) of the 1880s has been well documented. There is even evidence of Japanese Buddhists using the specific term jinken (“human rights”) as early as the 1880s. I furthermore acknowledge that “religious freedom” existed as a full-blown concept distinct from human rights for centuries, and had been understood by Japanese policymakers as a significant diplomatic and domestic problem by the mid-nineteenth century.

Yet as scholarship on religious freedom in Europe and the United States has shown, interpretations of religious freedom have changed drastically over time. They have also tended to prioritize Protestant equations of religiosity with interiority and assent to propositional beliefs, which has made them fit uncomfortably with dominant Japanese interpretations of the constellation of ritual practices, ecclesiastical organizations, and empirically unverifiable claims now commonly termed “religion.” Another problem emerges in that religious freedom first entered Japan as a way of smuggling Christianity into the country, a situation that was not at all unique to Japan but was reproduced around the globe in an age of empires. In some ways little had changed in this regard between the middle of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth, but here my focus is specifically on how we can parse divergent understandings of the liberal project of “freeing” religious belief and protecting matters of religious conscience.

authority that transcended national political authority remained. The sublimated Christian theology that informed postwar conceptions of human rights sits uneasily with other religiosities.  

62 An excellent study is Kim 2007.  
63 Main 2012, 125–135.  
64 Maxey 2005  
65 Sehat 2010  
67 Mahmood 2012 examines this process in relationship to Egypt.
Deformations of The Secular

The recent critical literature on human rights and religious freedom therefore forms one crucial body of scholarship to which this dissertation responds.\(^68\) I have also written it against the backdrop of a recent explosion of literature about secularism, secularity, and the “post-secular.” As the recent spate of conferences and edited volumes on “secularisms,” “varieties of secularism,” and “global secularisms” indicates, there has been increasing scholarly interest in understanding secularism and secularity as plural cultural practices rather than as a singular political form.\(^69\) Unfortunately, the project of highlighting the existence of “varieties” of secularism without looking at how secularisms have been constructed out of specific points of interaction with cultural “others” runs the risk of reproducing Eurocentric narratives that place the invention of secularism exclusively in Europe. The edited volumes on “secularisms” show global variety in their lists of types of secularism in different geographic locales, but they often assume a unidirectional process in which the concepts of “religion” and “secular” were transmitted from their European home to other parts of the world through the vectors of colonial agents. This epidemiological approach shows how the secular-religious binary spreads and continues to express itself in postcolonial and post-contact settings.

The scholarship on “varieties of secularism” therefore runs the risk of reproducing the same problematically catholic approach that has characterized the fraught “world religions” paradigm, pithily described by Tomoko Masuzawa as “how European universalism was preserved in the

\(^{68}\) Most notably, I have been deeply indebted to the work of scholars associated with the “Politics of Religious Freedom” project, including Saba Mahmood, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Winifred Fallers Sullivan, Peter Danchin, and the numerous contributors to the project blog housed at The Immanent Frame: [http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-religious-freedom/](http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/the-politics-of-religious-freedom/).

\(^{69}\) Jakobsen and Pellegrini, eds. 2008; Warner, VanAnterwerpen, and Calhoun, eds. 2010.
language of pluralism.” 70 One promising avenue for overcoming the problematic “world religions” paradigm has been to highlight historical instances of cross-cultural interaction in which the category of religion served as a way of managing cultural difference. Such scholarship has shown, for example, how European encounters with colonial “others” not only brought the non-native category of “religion” to new places, but also expanded the category for Europeans (and Americans) in new and unexpected ways. 71 The major contribution of this approach is that non-Europeans cease to be seen as passive recipients of foreign categories, but are rather treated as active agents who were not only capable of understanding “religion” and the religion-secular complex in innovative ways, but were also capable of influencing Europeans’ understandings of their own traditions. 72

The Significance of the Japanese Case

Unfortunately, the Japanese contribution to postwar constructions of religious freedom has been overlooked for largely the same reasons that Asian contributions to the construction of the category “religion” had been overlooked until very recently. 73 Like the concept of “religion” itself, there is powerful but problematic tendency to see religious freedom as a uniquely European product that was exported to the rest of the world in the asymmetrical contexts of

70 On the problems with this paradigm, see Masuzawa 2005 and Owen 2011.
71 See van der Veer 2001; Pennington 2005; Masuzawa 2005; App 2009 and 2010; Josephson 2012; Nongbri 2013. A different take on the subject goes back to the European medieval period, showing that theoretically sophisticated conceptions of “Asian religions” existed prior to the imperial period. See Ristuccia 2013.
73 Pioneering research by scholars of Asian religions such as Richard King (1996), Peter van der Veer (2001), Brian K. Pennington (2005), Hugh Urban (2003 and 2009), David McMahan (2008), Jason Ānanda Josephson (2012), and Urs App (2009 and 2010) has shown that the categories of “religion” and—to a lesser extent—“secularism” were constructed as ways of negotiating cultural difference. Also see Nongbri 2013.
colonialism and capitalist globalization. However, recent scholarship has highlighted non-
Europeans’ agency in creating categories and concepts that were deeply influential on Europeans’
(and later, Americans’) understandings of their own concepts and traditions, including
conceptions of secularism and religious freedom.

My approach here should not be mistaken for an attempt to undermine the putative Euro-
American monopoly on religious freedom by saying that Asians developed their own traditions
of religious freedom at the same time as—or prior to—European constructions of the same. For
example, in the context of unequal power relations of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century (when formal guarantees of religious freedom was understood to be markers of
“civilization”), some Japanese Buddhists made the apologetic argument that religious freedom
was actually a Buddhist invention that had been advanced by the famous third century BCE
Indian Buddhist king, Aśoka. It is indeed possible to trace Indian and Chinese strategies for
negotiating differences in ritual regimes, theology, and ecclesiastical organization back to more
than a millennium before the European wars of religion and the Westphalian peace that

74 Scholarly assessments about whether such exportation was a good or a bad thing vary. Some
have highlighted the dubiously positive role that religious freedom has played in securing access
for Christian missionaries and supporting imperialist ventures; others have shown that religious
freedom has offered protection for minority groups against majoritarian claims. Two excellent
sources on the variety of interpretations of religious freedom include Mahmood and Danchin, eds.
2014 and the collection of essays housed at The Immanent Frame curated by Winnifred Fallers
Sullivan and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd under the heading “The Politics of Religious Freedom”:

75 For example, scholars taking a more pluralistic approach have identified the Eurocentric
account as one major shortcoming of Charles Taylor’s 2007 A Secular Age, which provides an
account of the rise of secularity in the West without any substantive reference to the imperial and
commercial encounters between the populations of what he terms “the North Atlantic world” and
other parts of the globe. See Mahmood 2010 for one version of this critique. Incidentally,
Taylor’s 2007 prizewinning tome overshadowed an edited volume published in early 2008 that
highlighted the existence of multiple secularisms that were constructed in conjunction with
various types of religion. See Jakobsen and Pellegrini, eds. 2008.
supposedly inaugurated the modern concept of religious freedom. However, my point is not to pluck the origin of “religious freedom” from Europe and plunk it down at some historical point in Asia. To do so would be to confuse premodern policies of toleration with modern conceptions of religious freedom. Rather, I want to argue that—like the concepts of religion and secularism—the postwar concept of religious freedom as human right was constructed out of the interactions between agents representing different nations with divergent traditions of religion-state relations. Furthermore, the interpreters of religious freedom were not just “American” or “Japanese.” They were clerics, scholars of religion, bureaucrats, lay intellectuals, and journalists. Each of these interest groups had different reasons for promoting religious freedom; each had its own reasons for drawing the boundaries of “religion” and “freedom” differently.

Accordingly, the Japanese case is not important because an overlooked “Japanese-style relationship between religion and state” fundamentally differs from religion-state relations in Europe or America and therefore de-centers Western models (as some Japanese cultural nationalists would have it). The Japanese case is also not important because it is an additional “variety of secularism” to add to the growing list of “global secularisms” that has appeared in the recent social scientific and theoretical literature on secularism and secularity. Rather, the Japanese case is important because the Occupation experience played a hitherto overlooked role

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76 See, e.g., Sonoda Shūe, “Nihon Bukkyō no tokushoku,” in Bukkyō to rekishi, 1919: 363–364. Thanks to Bryan Lowe for introducing me to this reference.
77 For a critique of this narrative about the post-Westphalian peace, see Cavanaugh 2009.
78 See, for example, Inoue and Sakamoto 1987.
79 Jakobsen and Pellegrini, eds. 2008; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun, eds. 2010. A number of these editors and authors have astutely observed that Charles Taylor’s *magnum opus A Secular Age* offers a narrative about the development of a certain type of secularity in what Taylor terms the “North Atlantic world,” but fails to incorporate *at all* the very important role that European encounters with Asian, African, and “New World” others played in the development of modern conceptions of religion, non-religion, and elective conceptions of religious belief, affiliation, and their opposites.
in the creation of global postwar understandings of ideal religion-state relations and religious freedom as a universal human right.

The historical case of the Occupation provides a concrete, temporally specific example of multidirectional, transnational interaction rather than abstract, ahistorical comparison of different national secularisms. Here I want to stress that I am not treating Japan as the test case against which the secularist vision of what Charles Taylor has termed the “North Atlantic world” might be measured. I am showing instead that the secularity of the “North Atlantic world” was directly constructed in conjunction with perceptions of Japanese religion-state relations. During the time period covered by this dissertation (1889–1952), American and Japanese formations of the secular were co-constitutive. This mutual construction was possible because Americans and the Japanese alike regularly and readily claimed that the secularism performed by the other was malformed, ineffective, or illegitimate.80

This emphasis on mutual influence, appropriation, and Japanese agency does not mean that I am rejecting the obvious importance of the particular religion-secular conceptual apparatus developed in European and American contexts, nor am I denying the hegemonic influence it has held due to the vicissitudes of geopolitics. Japan had its own traditional mechanisms for tolerating and managing different ritual regimes, claims to authority, and appeals to tradition.81 Those differed significantly from the model that was forcibly introduced to Japan in the middle

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80 The Japanese critique of American religion-state relations has gone largely overlooked in foregoing scholarship, an unfortunate byproduct of the hegemonic status American conceptions of religious liberty and religion-state relations have come to occupy in the post-Occupation world. This dissertation tells, in part, how that hegemonic status came about while recovering a few instances of the critiques of American religion-state relations advanced by Japanese intellectuals and politicians.

81 Briefly, see Howell 2005 on different modes of identity; Berry 1986 and 1998 on modes for managing political authority, and Hur 2007 and Williams 2005 for discussions of Buddhist clerics’ social status.
of the nineteenth century as a consequence of America’s “gunboat diplomacy.” Whereas the concept of religious freedom emerged in Western Europe as a result of increasing religious diversity, pragmatic political responses to protracted religious conflict, and changing conceptions of the relationship between the individual and the state, in Japan religious freedom was imported—along with the categories of religion and the secular—in an attempt to mimic one of the putative marks of a modern nation-state. These terms formed the conceptual building blocks out of which Japanese modernity was constructed.

Religion-making

As Markus Dressler and Arvind-Pal S. Mandair have recently argued, “secularism” cannot be reduced to a mere legal formulation, nor should it be simply understood as a cognitive or legal toolkit that exists independently from the concept of religion. As such, it is incumbent upon scholars interested in addressing secularism (and, by extension, secularist projects such as the promotion or protection of religious freedom) to determine how, and by whom, religion is defined. Dressler and Mandair have described this process as “religion-making,” and they have helpfully shown that this process happens in three ways: “from above” (i.e., through state initiative or bureaucratic fiat); “from below” (i.e., through apologetic language in which certain interest groups define their own practices and ideas as “religion”); and “from outside” (i.e., through ostensibly dispassionate scholarly categorization). Identifying instances of religion-making...

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84 Dressler and Mandair 2011
makes from above, below, and outside clarifies how religious freedom has been understood by
different interest groups in different historical circumstances. Every chapter of this dissertation
traces how scholars, bureaucrats, clerics, and lay religious leaders “made” religion and, in so
doing, demarcated the scope of religious freedom and identified its potential beneficiaries.

From Above

One of the byproducts of the institution of national secular formations, whether through
constitution or fiat, is the articulation of not only “neutral” secular space but also of a separate
religious realm. This “religion-making from above” determines which groups will be officially
considered religions in the eyes of the law (and therefore deserving of whatever protections a
state may offer). While such “religion-making from above” can be seen in the broadest possible
sense throughout Japanese history—and while the early part of the Meiji era (1868–1912)
included several abortive attempts to define which groups counted as religions and which did
not—the promulgation of the constitution in 1889 provided a concrete legal apparatus for the
state to determine such matters. Notably, that constitution included a clause providing freedom
of religious belief (shinkō no jiyū) to all Japanese citizens provided that exercise of such belief
did not interfere with peace and order or individuals’ duties as subjects; the constitution also
notably did not designate any particular religion as a state religion.

As shown in Part II in particular, the project of “religion-making from above” did not simply
end with the promulgation of the constitution. If anything, it accelerated. In the decades
following the promulgation of the constitution, the Japanese state increased the sophistication of

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85 Recent work by Tyler Roberts (2013) has productively interrogated this sort of schematic.
86 See Ketelaar 1990 for a historical take on early Meiji processes of bureaucratic “religion-
making.” Ketelaar goes on to show a Buddhist process of “religion-making from below” in his
later chapters.
this process by establishing the rules whereby groups could petition for religious status.\textsuperscript{88} There were also repeated attempts to pass legislation that would clarify the relationship between religions and the state. Such legislation was intended to secure a superior position for the state “above” particularist religious claims, exclude certain “superstitious” practices from the purview of “proper religion,” and at the same time mobilize religious ideas and institutions for the purposes of nation-building. This project, often described in contemporary sources as an attempt to establish a comprehensive “religious system,” became particularly exigent in the context of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War (1931–1945).

The first formal attempt to clarify the provisions of the constitution through legislation was a bill drafted by the Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) cabinet in 1899. The bill was met with vociferous opposition on the floor of the House of Peers (Kizokuin) and in the religious press, and after considerable debate it was defeated in February 1900.\textsuperscript{89} The parliamentary defeat of the Yamagata Religions Bill marked a significant setback for the proponents of that bill, which had advanced a statist interpretation of religious freedom that reserved the right to circumstantially grant or revoke the liberties of individuals and groups. Prime Minister Yamagata proceeded to use non-parliamentary measures to establish ordinances regulating the incorporation of religious groups in August of 1900; a bureaucratic shift in the management of Buddhist, Christian, and Shintō sects versus the management of “shrines” in 1913 also created a circumstance in which Shintō shrines were regarded, from an administrative perspective, as

\textsuperscript{87} References to the emperor as “sacred and inviolable” were consistent with constitutionalizing processes in other monarchies of the time. See Josephson 2012.

\textsuperscript{88} As I will show in Chapter Two and Chapter Four, debates over controversial legislation on this subject formed one of the prime places where discussions of religious freedom took place.

\textsuperscript{89} I describe this process in more detail in Chapter Two. For one scholarly account, see Abe 1970a.
different from garden-variety “religions.” However, the remainder of what I call the Meiji Constitutional Period (1890–1947) was marked not by restrictive religious legislation of the sort Yamagata clearly favored, but rather by repeatedly successful efforts to stall drafts of such legislation through skillful use of the democratic process.

While efforts to concoct more aggressive (that is, draconian) religions legislation did exist behind the legislative scenes, it would take more than a quarter of a century before any such legislation actually made it to the floor of parliament. When the idea of a religions bill was raised in 1925, Education Minister Okada Ryōhei (1864–1934) successfully negotiated for a draft of the bill to be investigated by a committee consisting of Buddhist clerics, Shintō priests, and Christian ministers as well as members from both houses of parliament. Members of the committee supported the legislation, and while parliamentary critiques of the bill at an initial hearing in January 1927 were sharp, the bill was successfully sent to a committee for further review. However, the vicissitudes of politics interfered and the bill was shelved when the cabinet was disbanded that April.

A slightly reworked version of the Okada bill was advanced by the new Education Minister Shōda Kazue in 1929, but the new version lacked Okada’s imprimatur and the bill again died in

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90 The government distinguished between “Shrine Shintō” and “sectarian Shintō,” with the former being understood as a system of civic ritual and the latter being understood as a type of “private” religious commitment. See Inoue 2002. The 1913 administrative change also shifted the supervisory responsibility for Shintō to a new department, separate from the division in the Ministry of Education that oversaw “religions.” See Sakamoto 2000.

91 Abe 1970a, esp. 78–79.

92 A nearly full account of the deliberations of the committee is extant in the form of meeting minutes. Thanks to Ōsawa Kōji at the Shūmuka (Office of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Education) for getting me access to these documents.

93 This account is based on Andō Masazumi’s 1935 retrospective of religions legislation (AM Reel #9, Item #122). As a member of the House of Commons and one of the members of the investigative committee, Andō was privy to the committee’s deliberations and the general mood of its members. I cite his retrospective in greater detail in Chapter Four.
committee. Minister of Education Matsuda Genji (1875–1936) apparently tried to advance similar legislation in 1935, but he died of illness on 1 February 1936 without accomplishing his goal.94 It would take another several years before a religions bill—the Religious Organizations Law of 1939—would actually be approved.95 That bill went into effect on 1 April 1940, just six months before the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusan Kai) was established and began to fold various civil society organizations, including religious groups, into the state apparatus in order to support the war effort. The Religious Organizations Law would remain in effect until its abolition under the Occupation Civil Liberties Directive of 4 October 1945.96

The fact that religions legislation was repeatedly proposed does not suggest that religious freedom was absent during the Meiji Constitutional Period. In fact, repeated references to the constitutional religious freedom clause on the floor of the Diet suggest the opposite.97 Both proponents and opponents of the proposed legislation could appeal to religious freedom in support of their positions, with the net effect that the Meiji Constitutional Period as a whole was

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94 The topic of religious legislation was raised in the House of Commons (Shūgiin) on 26 May 1936. At the time, the Minister of Education, Hirao Harasaburō (1866–1945), replied to a question from Nakano Tetsuya (1893–1943) about whether the government was considering legislation to combat the problems of “pseudo religions” (ruiji shūkyō) and various other problems related to religion. Hirao stated at that time that the topic had been sent to committee and that the government intended to act as soon as the committee’s recommendations had been received. SGSR 18 (Kanpō [Official Gazette] extra edition, 27 May 1936), 562–563.
95 The bill was slated for debate in the House of Peers on 21 January 1939, but actual discussion was pushed back until 24 January. At that time, the Religious Organizations Law was debated alongside a bill regarding temples’ voluntary disposal of the state-owned property that had been lent to them.
96 SCAPIN 93, promulgated 4 October 1945. The Religious Organizations Law was shortly replaced by the very liberal Religious Corporations Ordinance of 28 December 1945, which provided unprecedented latitude for the creation of religious groups. That law was, in turn, replaced by the Religious Juridical Persons Law of 3 April 1951.
97 Abe 1970a, 77–79.
characterized by an uneasy balance between what I describe in Chapter Two as statist, corporatist, and latitudinarian visions of religious freedom.98

Here, I simply need to stress that “religion-making from above” was an ongoing process that originated in the office of the Prime Minister (in the case of the 1899 Yamagata Bill) and then in the Ministry of Education, which has overseen religious affairs since the turn of the twentieth century. Efforts to pass religions legislation or to establish a comprehensive “religious system” were primarily representative of bureaucrats’ attempts to demarcate the purview of the field of “religion” from other aspects of social life. Later chapters will show that these efforts sometimes also reflected the interests of ecclesiastical institutions or lay religious leaders (“religion-making from below”).

From Below

Just as scholars have identified the ways in which religious groups in early twentieth-century China renegotiated their relationships with the national government even as the government aimed to manage religions, the case of Japan suggests that state policies regarding religious freedom spur processes of transsectarian organization even as transsectarian lobbies exert considerable political pressure on states.99 While most discussions of the introduction of the category of “religion” into Meiji Japan have focused on the history of academic and bureaucratic uses of the term “shūkyō,” an equally important site of usage is among religious figures themselves, many of whom used the new category in the service of apologetic projects.100 Several interest groups were interested in applying for and receiving recognition of their status as

98 This tension between competing visions of religious freedom matches the similar tension between “moral establishmentarian” and “civil libertarian” positions on religious freedom in American history; see Sehat 2010.
100 Hoshino 2012, i–iii.
religions; others eschewed the formalities of state recognition as a way of asserting the
equality of their transcendent authority vis-à-vis that of the state.\(^{101}\)

This “religion-making from below” was represented in several intertwined—if sometimes
conflicting—impulses. Teaching assemblies, confraternities, and other lay organizations
sometimes sought state recognition as a way of securing legitimacy for themselves and staving
off persecution or slander. Buddhist priests and lay intellectuals who sought to comply with,
augment, or resist state initiatives formed historically unprecedented transsectarian groups that
attempted to overcome doctrinal divides and to transcend sectarian boundaries in favor of
presenting a united political front to lobby for religious interests.\(^{102}\) In most cases, religious
groups’ pragmatic interest in avoiding persecution or securing legal legitimacy corresponded
with bureaucrats’ interest in having a convenient way to manage religions.

Because they speak broadly about “religions” without singling any specific religion out for
special treatment, constitutional religious freedom clauses like the one included in the Meiji
Constitution invite—perhaps even demand—religious interest groups to form transsectarian or
trans-denominational political lobbies so that “the religious world” has a voice to counter that of
the state. In addition to this causal relationship between religion-making from above and
transsectarian collaboration from below, a pattern of mutual influence is also apparent. The state
can operate in concert with transsectarian organizations to determine which groups are defined as
“religions,” while transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations can serve both as

\(^{101}\) For example, groups such as Ōmotokyō (formally founded in 1898 but tracing its origins to
Deguchi Nao’s initial possession experience in 1892) leveraged the power of religion against
temporal authority (to disastrous effect for that particular group, which was suppressed twice by
the police). See Stalker 2008 on Ō motokyō’s history and Garon 1997 on the suppresssion
specifically.
political interest groups lobbying the state for their particular aims and as agencies for carrying out state initiatives. In the Meiji Constitutional Period relationships between transsectarian groups and the state were both combative and cooperative, but over time the violent suppression of marginal religions intensified and the governmental co-optation of transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations progressed. Many such groups were woven into the state apparatus as “administered mass organizations” during the wartime years of 1931–1945.

From Outside

The emergence of the non-confessional academic study of religion in Japan in the early twentieth century was part of a global academic movement that began in Europe and eventually spread to Japan and the United States. In Japan, the emergence of this field was contemporaneous with (and probably dependent upon) the rise of transsectarianism and trans-denominationalism. It also greatly influenced subsequent religion-state relations. The nascent academic field provided state bureaucrats with a new vocabulary to use in the classification and management of religions, and it provided lay and clerical religious leaders with novel ways to level accusations of backwardness against their competitors while securing doctrinal or political legitimacy for themselves. Scholars of religion consequently played increasingly important roles in determining the criteria through which “religion” and “not-religion” were defined in policy.

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102 Important foregoing studies on ecumenism include Ikeda 1976 and Mohr, ed. 2005. Both studies focus on the Meiji era (1868–1912), but there are crucial developments related to ecumenical organizations in later decades that I trace over the course of this dissertation.
103 See, for example, Garon 1997, 60–87.
104 On “administered mass organizations,” see Kasza 1995. A helpful general overview of trends in the period is Ives 2009 (see esp. 13–52), although the author problematically tends to portray Buddhism as a monolithic entity, obfuscating salient differences in competing Buddhist interest groups. I address this issue in Chapters 2 and 4.
105 Isomae 2003; Masuzawa 2005; Hayashi and Isomae, eds. 2008
This dissertation is concerned with the political ramifications of the academic study of religion, with the mobilization of religious studies expertise in military intelligence and foreign policy, and with the ways that religious studies and policymaking alike can serve as vectors for the promotion of specific religious ideals and apologetic projects. Religion-making usually traffics not only in the twin concepts of “religion” and “the secular,” but also in discussions of associated concepts such as “superstition,” “magic,” “spirituality,” and “science.” Although any of these terms (and its analogues in Japanese) might perform a religion-making function, none is guaranteed to appear in any given primary source.

This creates an interpretive challenge in that some acts of religion-making have to be apprehended when the word “religion” itself is not used. By extension, some demarcations of the limits of religious freedom will happen through processes of religion-making that do not make explicit mention of the words “religion” or “freedom.” In subsequent chapters there are places where I have needed to make my arguments about religious freedom through discussions of practices and legislation that did not always explicitly discuss religious freedom as such. For example, academic and bureaucratic attempts to suppress or control “superstitions” and the debates over religions legislation and the ideal “religious system” for modern Japan served as proxies for discussions of religious freedom in that they drew the boundaries of “religion” and “liberties” alike.

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106 Ketelaar 1990, 136–212. See the section on transsectarianism below for more detail.
Periodization

In addition to studying the short Allied Occupation of Japan (1945–1952), this study focuses particularly in Part II on what I call the Meiji Constitutional Period (1890–1947). This time frame has rarely been examined as a discrete historical era, but there are compelling reasons to treat it as such.¹⁰⁸ First, the period was bookended by interactions with the United States (especially) and European nations in which the concept of religious freedom played a major role. It opened with the Japanese government’s overt attempt to appeal to the international community by providing a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom as one mark of Japan’s entry into the ranks of “civilized” nations.¹⁰⁹ Because it extends through the Pacific War and into the postwar Allied Occupation, this periodization offers the opportunity to comparatively assess the operative interpretations of religious freedom found in Japan and its Euro-American counterparts during a time when concepts of human rights were still inchoate, and in the contexts of both war and peace.¹¹⁰

Focusing on this period serves in part as a corrective for the fact that many studies of modern Japanese Buddhism have focused on the Meiji era (1868–1912) at the expense of sustained engagement with broader time spans.¹¹¹ Conversely, some scholars have treated the entirety of

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¹⁰⁷ See Josephson 2012 and van der Veer 2014.
¹⁰⁸ Japanologists tend to periodize by using either imperial reign dates (e.g., the Meiji era, 1868–1912) or the concept of “modern Japan” (1868–?).
¹⁰⁹ The text of Article 28 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (promulgated in 1889 and enacted in 1890) read: “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” See Itō 1889. Japanese oligarchs who drafted the Constitution of the Empire of Japan (that is, the Meiji Constitution, promulgated in 1889 and enacted in 1890) incorporated a religious freedom clause in a pragmatic attempt to appease Western nations that sought unfettered access for their missionaries. See Maxey 2005.
¹¹⁰ On religions policy under the Occupation, see Woodard 1972. On human rights, see Moyn 2010 and Hoffmann, ed. 2011. Also see Weitz 2013.
¹¹¹ Hayashi 2006
the period from 1868 (the time of the Meiji Restoration) to 1945 (the conclusion of the Pacific War) as a single historical period, often with the problematic assumption that Shintō served as Japan’s national religion throughout that period. The latter approach reflects the historian’s penchant for articulating historical periods according to drastic political transitions and regime change (the “restoration” of direct rule to the emperor in 1868; the “democratization” of Japan in 1945), but it potentially obscures some equally significant cultural shifts. In the case of Japanese religions, the 1890 transition from the pre-constitutional to the constitutional legal system was incredibly significant, as was the 1947 transition from one constitution to another.

Furthermore, the 1890–1947 period witnessed epochal developments in the Japanese religious world. First, the provision of a religious freedom clause as part of constitutional law provided a major change from the earlier attempts to establish a “national teaching.”

Second, as I discuss in detail immediately below, there was a drastic increase efforts at transsectarian organization that roughly coincided with the promulgation of the constitution. This happened both as a top-down initiative (e.g., the state organizing several doctrinally diverse religious groups into umbrella organizations and then managing such groups under the broader bureaucratic rubric of “sectarian Shintō”) and as a bottom-up initiative (e.g., Buddhist sects setting aside doctrinal differences in order to secure their rights vis-à-vis the state). Third, increasing internationalization and global trends contributed to the domestic rise of the academic study of religion separate from traditional doctrinal studies. These legal-bureaucratic, ecclesiastical, and academic shifts influenced one another; collectively they form three narrative threads that are woven throughout the dissertation.

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112 Murakami 1970
The Influence of Transsectarianism on Religion-State Relations

The promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889 was the crystallization of a fluid historical process whereby “religion” became an object of legal discourse. At roughly the same time, religious leaders began to recognize themselves as representatives of the newly constituted area of religion, an identity that overlapped with—and at particular times superseded—their parochial commitments to Buddhism, to a particular sect, or to confraternities (kō) and similar organizations devoted to specific deities or sacred locales. As a side effect of this new awareness, lay and clerical religious leaders realized that they could align themselves with one another in order to secure protection from government initiatives, to work for reform, or to secure legitimacy by seeking state favor. While such initiatives were evident as early as the mid-1880s and while they were an obvious response to the persecution Buddhists had suffered in the late 1860s and early 1870s, the promulgation of the constitution spurred a flurry of transsectarian organization. The remainder of this section focuses particularly on such developments in the Buddhist world during the Meiji Constitutional Period.

Early Buddhist attempts at transsectarian organization took place in the idiom of reform. The haibutsu kishaku (“destroy the buddhas; expel Śākyamuni”) movement and the passage of the nikujiki saitai law allowing clerics to marry and eat meat encouraged Buddhists to think of

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113 Ketelaar 1990
114 Hoshino 2012
115 Ketelaar (1990) describes the persecution of Buddhists in the early Meiji era in great detail. Pragmatically, expressions of solidarity transcending sectarian divides and differences in doctrine served as a prophylactic against government persecution (and the accusations of degeneracy on which they had so often been based) in the early part of the Meiji era. Perceptions of Buddhism and Buddhists as dissolute continued well into the twentieth century, becoming a trope that both reform-minded Buddhists and critics of Buddhism would use (to equal effect) down to the present day. See, for example, Klautau 2008.
116 Ikeda 1976
themselves collectively in a new way. Rather than being a particular status group in the rapidly receding Tokugawa social order and rather than being representatives of particular sects with deep doctrinal differences from other sects and factions, Buddhists as a whole became a group that had suffered persecution due to government decree and, increasingly, as a lobby that could exert pressure on the state. Buddhists of the time understood transsectarian reform efforts to be a way to stave off future persecution while proving the importance role Buddhism could play in nation-building efforts.

Buddhism had been wedded to political influence in Japan since its introduction in the sixth century, but the abolition of the Edo-period temple registration system left Buddhists with a challenge and an opportunity to create their political identity anew. In their capacity as census-takers under the temple registration regime, Buddhists had been encouraged to think of themselves primarily along sectarian lines. The decline of this system and the abortive attempt to weave Buddhists into the short-lived kyōdōshoku (doctrinal instructor) effort presented Buddhists with an opportunity to think of their fraternal ties with members of other sects.

These transsectarian impulses manifested themselves as public relations campaigns aimed to improve the image of Buddhist clerics in the popular imagination and as approaches intended to move Buddhism into a more central role in Japanese public and political life. An additional

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117 Ketelaar 1990; Jaffé 2001
118 Jaffé 2001, 95. On status and occupational groups within the Tokugawa social order, see Howell 2005.
119 Hur 2007
120 On the doctrinal instructor system, see Ketelaar 1990.
121 These public relations efforts met with frustration in the face of the nikujiki saitai laws allowing clerics to have choice in whether or not they would marry; no matter what the honzan of the various non-Pure Land sects may have wanted, the majority of priests eventually opted for meat-eating and patrilineal succession of temple duties. See Jaffé 2001. Buddhist unification
trend mobilized the methods and concepts of Western philosophy to argue that Buddhism was the most appropriate religion for the new, modern age. Lay intellectuals who advocated such positions tended to distance themselves from the clerical establishment and exhibited minimal compunction about critiquing establishment practice.

For example, in his seminal 1888 tract, *Bukkyō katsuron joron (Introduction to the Vivification of Buddhism)*, Inoue Enryō spoke of the pallor which had overtaken Buddhism and the necessity of reconfiguring the religion to make it suitable to a modern age. According to Inoue, Buddhism alone was the religion that could harmonize with scientific reason and Western philosophy (provided that it sloughed off vestigial remnants of “superstitious” practices); Christianity was hopelessly bound in a superstitious, irrational worldview. Inoue’s thesis was a rallying cry for lay Buddhists and disaffected young priests, and over the course of the late 1880s and throughout the 1890s various groups attempted to encapsulate his program in periodicals and meetings. In addition to setting aside sectarian differences in pursuit of common goals, many of these young Buddhists set aside loyalty to ecclesiastical institutions in favor of new loyalties to projects of reform.

Efforts, epitomized by lay teachers such as Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939), not only aimed to bring Buddhism into a central place in people’s daily lives but also attempted to reconstruct society generally according to Buddhist principles. In Chigaku’s *Lotus sūtra*-inspired vision, “Lotus villages” would spring up all over Japan, schools would promote the dharma, a national ordination platform would bestow clerical rank, and Japan would serve as the center of a project of *Lotus*-driven world unification that Chigaku outlined in a series of carefully drawn maps and timelines in his *Shūmon no ishin* (1901). Importantly, even in the case of Chigaku’s Renge Kai (Lotus Society, later known as the Risshō Ankoku Kai [Society for Upholding the Correct Doctrine and Pacifying the Nation] and then as the Kokuchū Kai, or National Pillar Society), the vision of Buddhism that was promoted was not as sectarian as it superficially appeared. *Lotus* proselytizing for Chigaku was a trans-Buddhist vision; despite the scholarly tendency to see his worldview as nationalistic, it was actually global in scope (albeit admittedly quixotic).

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122 See Thelle 1987 and Josephson 2006. Also see Hoshino 2009 and 2012 on the influence of Nakanishi Ushiro (1859–1930).
123 Ōtani 2012
Another contributing factor to the robust Japanese transsectarianism of the late nineteenth century was the emergence of a global trend in support of inter-religious dialogue and the concomitant rise of the field of comparative religion. This international trend matched domestic bureaucratic trends, forcing Buddhists to think of themselves as Buddhists in relationship to other religions.124 As Tomoko Masuzawa has indicated, nineteenth-century Europe was characterized by a reconsideration of the category “religion” as Europeans struggled to make sense of how cultural traditions found in areas of European contact and conquest (perhaps particularly Buddhism) could exist as viable alternatives to Christianity.125 These alternatives were recognizable as “religions” complete with sacred texts, clerics, doctrine, and theorization about ritual practice.126

Colonialism and its attendant form of globalization had relativized the realm of religious truth, and by the late nineteenth century anxiety about this matter led to a watershed event in the modern history of religions. The 1893 World Parliament of Religions held in Chicago featured Asian representatives who spoke passionately and proudly of the contributions of Asian religions to world civilization. Their messages presented a palpable, if unexpected, challenge to the tacit presupposition that the Parliament would prove the superiority of Protestant Christianity once and for all.127

Japanese Buddhists returned from the Parliament armed with a new global outlook and renewed vigor for their claims that Japanese Buddhism represented the mature fruit of a tradition

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124 Hoshino 2012
125 Masuzawa 2005
126 This project was an extension of trends already evident in the sixteenth century and particularly characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth, as Urs App has ably shown in his recent book and accompanying article. See App 2010; 2009.
that had germinated in India and flowered in China. The Parliament had given some Japanese Buddhists reason to set aside their sectarian rivalries in favor of pursuing academic and political transsectarian efforts. Trans-denominational conferences were held in 1896 and 1897, and by 1906 the Japan Religionists’ Concord Association, or Nihon Shūkyōka Kyōwa Kai, was founded. These “bottom-up” initiatives were matched by academic and bureaucratic attempts to unify religious leaders in support of nation-building efforts in the early twentieth century, although they frequently failed to overcome insurmountable sectarian differences.

The New Media of Late Meiji Buddhist Youth Culture

To the extent that they were successful, the transsectarian efforts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended to a large degree on the existence of a new media culture that allowed Buddhists to share information quickly. Buddhist journals were among some of the earliest of the special interest publications that proliferated in the Meiji era (1868–1912). While there were several journals that were specifically sectarian in orientation, a number of transsectarian journals such as Meikyō shinshi served as sources of information and identity formation for Buddhists in the wake of the haibutsu kishaku persecution and in the midst of the

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127 Ketelaar 1990, 136–173; King 1999; Masuzawa 2005
128 This interpretation had scriptural precedent in the Śākyamuni’s assertion in Chapter Two of the Lotus sūtra that his assembly had “no more branches and leaves, only firm fruit”—a classic assertion of the superiority of the Mahāyāna but also a useful tool for epigones to assert the superiority of their own Buddhism to that of their progenitors.
129 See Mohr, ed. 2005, a special issue on late Meiji era trends towards Buddhist unity.
130 Ōtani 2012; Hoshino 2012
131 Japan, and the metropolis of Edo in particular, boasted a high rate of literacy already by the Tokugawa Period (1600–1868; see Berry 2006). After the Meiji political transformation of 1868 literacy rates would improve again as access to general education rapidly expanded through the establishment of compulsory education; by the end of the nineteenth century the number of males receiving some degree of standardized education had increased tremendously and girls were attending schools in unprecedented numbers. The expansion of literacy as well as the introduction of new technologies for disseminating print quickly led to an explosion of newspapers and special interest magazines.
ensuing calls for transsectarian reform. Such journals served as gathering points for Buddhist opinion; they also fostered a younger generation of Buddhist intellectuals who absorbed the importance of reform and, due to their exposure to philology, positivist historiography, natural science (the concept of evolution in particular), and European philosophy came to question previous doctrinal standards and sources of clerical authority. While *Meikyō shinshi* (published 1875–1901) and *Chūgai nippō* (published 1897 to the present) generally served as moderately conservative sources of information aimed at clerics, by the late 1880s journals representing this younger generation of reform-minded priests emerged. For example, the monthly journal *Bukkyō* (published 1889–1902) was famous for its sarcastic appraisals of the current state of Buddhism and its inveterate attacks on clerics.

A new form of Buddhist oratory known as *enzetsu* emerged alongside this proliferating print culture. Developed against the backdrop of the apologetic projects that characterized the mid-Meiji era, this *enzetsu* was designed to appeal to educated, middle-class audiences who may not have had a prior relationship with Buddhism. Along with sartorial changes (suits instead of clerical robes), the new emphasis on scientistic criteria distinguished *enzetsu* from other forms of Buddhist oratory such as the hortatory sermon (*sekkyō*) or the expository lecture (*kōgi*). As Hoshino Seiji has shown, the new oratorical medium was intimately tied to transsectarian initiatives such as Ōuchi Seiran’s Wakei Kai (established 1879) and associated journals such as *Meikyō shinshi*. The Wakei Kai held its first *enzetsukai* (lecture meeting) on 3 September 1881; thereafter, transcripts of the *enzetsu* delivered at such meetings were regularly included in the

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132 *Meikyō shinshi* was published from 1875 to 1901. It actually began under the name *Kanjun kyōkai shinbun* in April 1874.

133 *Bukkyō* had gone by the earlier title *Nōjunkai zasshi* (established September 1885); it served as the organ of the progressive Keiikai. See Yoshinaga 2012, 32.

The Political Influence of Transsectarianism during the Meiji Constitutional Period

Against this background, it is evident that the Meiji Constitution itself was created during a time of growing ecumenical awareness and increasing attempts to organize along transsectarian and trans-denominational lines. The promulgation of the constitution—and its concomitant side effects such as more rights for Christians and other marginal groups, restrictions on state interference in religious affairs, and the new language of freedom of conscience—gave religious leaders plenty of ammunition for the battles that they would wage in later decades about the rights and responsibilities of clerics and lay believers vis-à-vis the state. It also provided the framework through which statist impulses to control and manage religions—not to mention religious attempts to circumscribe temporal authority—were mediated.

Specifically, the constitution included a relatively liberal (for its time) provision of religious freedom to all Japanese subjects; it also eschewed acknowledging any particular religion as having a special relationship with the state. The upshot of this legal language was that religions found that they were able to exert the greatest political influence not through their specific sectarian affiliations (although it is not the case that such were wholly unimportant), but through transsectarian lobbying efforts. That is, religions were most likely to influence policymaking and legislation when they could persuasively argue that their claims did not represent the parochial interests of a particular sect, but rather the concerns of the religious world more generally. Over

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135 Okada 2012; Hoshino 2012, esp. 74–82.
136 This practice of publishing enzetsu would continue in Buddhist magazines in the early 20th century; the Dai Nippon Yūben Kai (Greater Japan Eloquence Association) published a series of books compiling noteworthy enzetsu by famous orators. See Dai Nippon Yūben Kai, ed. Katō
time, the constitutional language of religious freedom (shinkō no jiyū) became the primary (not the exclusive) idiom in which such claims were made. Consequently, operative definitions of “religion” and “freedom” in these contexts greatly influenced how religious freedom itself was understood.

This remained true up to and during the Allied Occupation of Japan, but the Occupation also deeply affected how the history of the Meiji Constitutional Period was understood by postwar observers. Although that period was characterized by a robust conversation about religious freedom, contributing voices to that conversation have gone largely unheard in postwar discussions of religious freedom in prewar Japan, having been drowned out by Occupation-era speakers and their narratives about religious freedom. Specifically, in order to rationalize their policy objective of introducing religious freedom to Japan, the occupiers argued that Japan’s prewar relationship with religious freedom—including the existing constitutional guarantee—was illegitimate. Local intellectuals picked up this narrative and elaborated upon it, reinforcing the notion that Japan’s “pre-Occupation with religious freedom” was false and downplaying the “preoccupation with religious freedom” that had characterized the bulk of the Meiji Constitutional Period.

Academic Legacies of the Occupation

A mood of chastened contrition prevailed during and after the Allied Occupation (1945–1952) as Japan’s public intellectuals began to reflect on the previous several decades of Japanese

imperialism and military adventurism. Along with the inevitable feelings of guilt and the quest for meaning that accompanied military defeat, some intellectuals expressed feelings of anger and betrayal at the political, military, and sacerdotal leadership that had led Japan on its disastrous course toward total war that resulted in the firebombing of most of the country’s major cities, the devastating atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the humiliating unconditional surrender that followed. Chastised by the international community for embracing an illiberal theocratic ideology, in the postwar period Japan’s intellectuals exhibited a need to make sense of its source. Several hastily embraced “science” as an antidote to “religious” prewar and wartime ideology, an attitude that the Allies encouraged (even if it overlooked the fact that “science” had been very much a part of Japan’s modern war-making). The fact that the universalistic conception of religious freedom was effectively an invented tradition at the time of the Occupation did not mean that it was any less attractive for Japanese intellectuals who were already primed to interrogate the effectiveness of the Meiji constitutional clause. In this atmosphere, the emergence of an indigenous critical appraisal of Japanese imperial ideology that mirrored the Allied critique of “State Shintō” was almost inevitable.

Given the close ties between Religions Division personnel and leading Japanese scholars of religion such as University of Tokyo professor of religious studies Kishimoto Hideo (1903–

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137 The period of Japanese imperialism overlapped almost perfectly with the time that the Meiji Constitution was in effect. In addition to incorporating the northern island of Hokkaidō into the modern imperial nation-state, Japan unilaterally annexed territories such as Taiwan (in 1895) and the Korean peninsula (1910) prior to engaging in military incursions in China, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific in the 1930s.

138 See Maruyama Masao’s “Author’s Introduction,” written in 1962; Maruyama 1969 [1963], xi–xii.


140 I address the Allied perception of “State Shintō” in detail in Chapter One. Postwar Japanese scholars’ critiques partially reflected the intervention of Occupation Religions Division
Jolyon Baraka Thomas

Japan’s Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

1964), it is hardly surprising that the Japanese scholars would begin to question how the religious freedom clause in the Meiji Constitution could have diverged so significantly from the seemingly “universal” model of religious freedom that the Allies espoused. The influence of the Marxian historiography that dominated the postwar period was palpable, for the researchers who were investigating the role of religion during the Meiji Constitutional Period were quick to identify religion as a tool that had been used to oppress the masses (i.e., “State Shintō”); they read the constitution and the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education as religious documents that infringed upon timeless, universal rights. Conversely, when considering the exercise of religious freedom and freedom of conscience, postwar scholars exhibited considerable fascination with the question of why the religious leaders of the period had done so little to resist statist initiatives.

Operating on the premise that the situation in the West should have been matched step for step by Japan, several scholars argued that Japan’s material modernization was unaccompanied by the concomitant epistemological turn to humanism that should have rightly taken place. Such explanations paired a critique of the emperor system with a condemnation of the Japanese traits and attitudes that supported it, often resorting to reductive descriptions of the backwardness of Japanese national psychology and Japan’s putative inability to pair modern liberal values with the material modernization that accompanied industrialization.¹⁴¹ This served both a descriptive and an apologetic task. By treating their predecessors as ignorant and backward, postwar Japanese intellectuals could prove to themselves and the world that they had finally “modernized.”

personnel, many of whom made the establishment of a sustainable variety of religious freedom into a missionary project.

¹⁴¹ Maruyama 1946
Religion played a crucial role in this project. For example, historians of religion derided Buddhist and Shintō priests for complicity in the production of state ideology, castigating clerics’ failure to stand up to the imperial state as craven and sycophantic. To them, such failure symbolized—in Marxian terms—the persistence of a “feudal” mindset.142 In their haste to make sense of where Japan had gone wrong, many analysts came to the conclusion—which paralleled and reproduced the narrative that guided Occupation policy—that religious freedom had not existed in any real sense during the Meiji Constitutional Period. This assessment masked a series of interrelated normative presuppositions. Scholars assumed that commitments to humanism and associated conceptions of human rights could and should have provided a means of resistance to repressive state policies regarding religion throughout the Meiji Constitutional Period, that religious leaders should have been in the vanguard of such resistance efforts, and that such resistance would have been articulated in a humanist idiom: religious freedom, human rights, civil liberties.

While such normative assessments are valuable from an emic ethical, theological, or doctrinal perspective, they violate what I take to be the obligation of the scholar of religion to view doctrine dispassionately (and without the presupposition that doctrine alone makes people do questionable things).143 They furthermore rest on the somewhat unfair expectation that religious leaders could and should have martyred themselves for their causes rather than trying to effect change from within the prewar and wartime system.

142 Ienaga 1965 is one example.
143 My thoughts on this have recently been productively challenged by Tyler Roberts’s stimulating work Encountering Religion (2013).
On historical grounds, I must also reject the expectation that religious leaders should have appealed to the “principle” of religious freedom.\textsuperscript{144} Operating strictly upon the historical evidence available, it seems unreasonable to expect that religious freedom would have looked the same in the prewar and wartime periods as it did in the postwar period. The search for a type of religious freedom in the Meiji Constitutional Period that was consistent with postwar ideals—particularly the idea of religious freedom as a universal “human right”—has been unfair to historical actors for whom universalist understandings of religious freedom were as yet unavailable.\textsuperscript{145} In later chapters I support this claim by showing that the operative understandings of religious freedom favored by religious interest groups during the balance of the Meiji Constitutional Period were drastically different from the interpretations of religious freedom that dominated the Occupation and postwar periods. Although there were significant historical shifts in how representatives of these various groups interpreted religious freedom over the course of the Meiji Constitutional Period, it was not until late in the Occupation that universalist understandings of religious freedom became commonplace.

\textsuperscript{144} Throughout this dissertation, I place “principle” in scare quotes to indicate that this formulation dehistoricizes and depoliticizes a term that is inherently historically and politically determined.

\textsuperscript{145} Even in the context of increased international commerce, the dominant frame for understanding nations’ relationships vis-à-vis one another was civilizational rather than liberal (i.e., those who “have” civilization versus those who do not). This also played out in domestic politics and policies among the “civilized.” The United States of America exemplified this in its “separate but equal” policy of systemic segregation, among other discriminatory policies aimed at immigrant groups. At any rate, World War II and its aftermath popularized the concept of human rights for the first time in international discourse, but even the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights was more idealistic than realistic. This was particularly due to the fact that human rights by their very nature treat rights as both inherent and transcendent (surpassing the purview of the state), but in the 1940s rights were still understood to derive from citizenship, not to transcend it. It was not until decades later (in the late 1970s) that appeals to human rights per se came to surpass claims to national sovereignty, and in the 1980s “human rights violations” became a rationale for military intervention (Moyn 2010; Hoffmann,
Making the Historical Search for Religious Freedom Feasible

Given the foregoing, one basic contention of this study is that the search for evidence of Japanese legislators, oligarchs, and bureaucrats instantiating a universal principle (i.e., “religious freedom”) in law or ordinance is doomed to failure; the search for evidence of religious leaders consistently advocating a form of religious freedom that would be recognizable as legitimate in the postwar context is similarly futile. A singular, universal “religious freedom” simply did not exist in Japan during the Meiji Constitutional Period. What did exist were multiple, often conflicting, interpretations of religious freedom that were advocated by different interest groups at different times. It is hardly surprising that these interpretations were largely dependent on the operative definitions of “religion(s),” “rights,” and “liberties” espoused by such groups. Equally unsurprising is the fact that the position from which such definitions of religion occurred (from “above,” “below,” or “outside”) significantly affected how these groups perceived the issue.

In the ensuing chapters, I show that statist and humanist interpretations of religious freedom vied for attention and adoption throughout the period, at times coinciding and at times conflicting with readings of religious freedom as a customary right (preserving perquisites based on precedent) or as a civil liberty (granting a sort of enfranchisement to all). Given that interpretations of religious freedom as a civil liberty and as a human right—and these are not synonymous—dominated the Occupation and post-Occupation period, and given that such interpretations tended to prioritize conceptualizations of religion as being primarily a matter of propositional belief, it is natural that postwar scholarship on the subject has tended to focus on

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ed. 2011; Weitz 2013). At the time of the Allies’ war against Japan, the contest was still depicted as a clash of civilization and savagery (on both sides; see Dower 1986).
Yet the basic stance of this dissertation is that structuring historical investigation around the absence of a legal concept is not fruitful. Instead, focusing on how specific interest groups interpreted religious freedom provides a way to forestall the twin counterfactual questions of why religious leaders failed to resist statist initiatives or why they failed to fight for their fundamental human rights.147

In order to perform this task, I conduct a “historical ethnography” by infiltrating various interest groups through examinations of their journals and historical retrospectives, juxtaposing the voices captured in these primary sources with the fractious cacophony of parliamentary debates, the hortatory locutions of the public orator, and the diaries of (and correspondence between) several of the figures that feature prominently in the story I tell (Andō Masazumi, Chikazumi Jōkan, D.C. Holtom, Katō Genchi, Katō Totsudō, Kishimoto Hideo, William P. Woodard). Just as in interviews with living informants, these readings are intimate encounters in which private motivations are bared, inconsistencies are revealed, and the researcher is changed.148

A Pragmatic Approach to Sources and Delimitations of Scope

As the aforementioned focus on how competing interest groups interpreted religious freedom suggests, I have made several pragmatic decisions about how to encompass such a broad span of history (and a span for which there is an overabundance of source material, despite the ravages

146 That is, “civil liberties” are by definition enjoyed by citizens of states; “human rights” are antecedent to national citizenship and are supposedly innate.
147 This question motivates the work of Brian Victoria (1997) and Terasawa Kunihiko (2012), among others.
of the war). I hope that being transparent about these decisions will forestall some potential critiques.

First, of necessity the dissertation focuses to a great extent on the Allied Occupation of Japan. This is due to several factors, not least of which is the simple fact that the earliest iteration of this project began as a seminar paper that took the Occupation as its subject. More importantly, there is a wealth of material about the Occupation that I have been able to access in archives, and I have benefited from professional connections with scholars with similar interest in this formative period in modern Japanese history. Parts I and III of the dissertation focus explicitly on the Occupation, but each chapter in Part II also deals in some way with nuancing an Occupation-era narrative about Japan’s relationship with religious freedom.

Second, in Part II especially I have pragmatically chosen to focus my narrative primarily on Buddhist sources. I recognize that this lends a somewhat skewed picture of the development of religious freedom during the Meiji Constitutional Period, but time and space limitations have made it necessary to refer to Christianity (especially), “new religions,” and Shintō obliquely. That said, the dissertation makes a contribution to the growing literature on modern Japanese Buddhism (and Buddhist modernism) by attempting to cover the hitherto insufficiently studied history of the early twentieth century while avoiding the normative (and often apologetic) project of accounting for Buddhist war responsibility and Buddhist ideological contributions to (ultra)nationalism.149

148 Here I have drawn inspiration from Roberts (2013), who advocates a method for “encountering religion” in a way that leaves the researcher herself open to transformation.
149 One common critique of Jason Ānanda Josephson’s excellent 2012 study The Invention of Religion in Japan has been that he downplayed the Buddhist side of the story in his focus on Shintō and the state (see my own review—Thomas 2014—and Amstutz 2014, especially 56–59). Any reader of Josephson’s larger oeuvre will be aware of his familiarity with Buddhist reform efforts and the ways in which Buddhism became “a religion” in late nineteenth century Japan
Third, there are many possible ways to tell the story of religious freedom in Meiji Constitutional Period Japan. Rather than giving a play-by-play account of historical transitions over the period, I have elected to focus on specific historical moments that were of particular consequence for religious freedom in light of broader doctrinal, legal, and academic trends. I have also selected a few representative figures from the Buddhist world who serve as the main “protagonists” in my narrative.\textsuperscript{150} I trust that my rendition of the history adds something to foregoing accounts, but I acknowledge that it is not the only or final interpretation.

While ideally the dissertation would include an extensive theoretical appraisal of religious freedom as a facet of domestic and international law, I have made a pragmatic decision to leave this sort of inquiry to others. My training only goes so far, and I am more comfortable discussing religious freedom as a matter of social and intellectual history than as a facet of legal history. While I do explore Buddhist responses to controversial religions legislation in considerable detail, I recognize that the lack of sustained discussion of religious freedom as law weakens my case. I hope that my study will fructify future legal studies to the extent possible; I also must acknowledge that much of the early scholarship on the Occupation was conducted from a legal studies standpoint at the expense of taking religion seriously on its own terms.\textsuperscript{151} An earlier generation of scholarship on the religions legislation of the Meiji Constitutional Period also

\textsuperscript{150} As it stands, the project hovers very close to the primary sources produced by these authors. In its future form as a book, it will better situate them in historical context by citing their reception in contemporaneous newspapers and journals.

\textsuperscript{151} Nakano 2003
tended to focus on law and lawmaking at the expense of examining “bottom-up” pressures of the sort described in Part II.\textsuperscript{152}

Finally, my focus on Japanese interactions with the United States necessarily omits study of Japan’s interactions with its Asian neighbors, its colonies, and its Western European allies and enemies. That project would be too large, and others with more expansive linguistic toolkits are better prepared to conduct it anyway. While the influence of the Japanese category of religion on mainland China has already been documented, here I will simply say that a fascinating study could also be done on the role of religious freedom (or policies of religious toleration) in Japanese colonial areas such as Korea, Taiwan, and the puppet state of Manchukuo.\textsuperscript{153}

\textbf{Ethical Considerations}

On an ethical level, one aim of this dissertation is to show that scholarly pretensions to neutrality often mask unexamined political objectives. Historians, anthropologists, and sociologists have all grappled with this issue in the ways befitting their respective disciplines. The methodologically pluralistic field of religious studies has incorporated many of these reflexive critiques (seen, most notably, in the scholarship tracing the often problematic political effects of applying the category “religion” to diverse ideas, phenomena, and practices). Despite the increased sophistication in theory and method brought about by these reflexive endeavors, the inherently secularist structure of the academic study of religion (“religion-making from outside”) creates a frame through which scholars see the world. That structure supports bureaucratic projects as much as it supports apologetic ones.

\textsuperscript{152} Inoue Egyō’s (1972) research comes to mind, as does the aforementioned series of articles by Abe Yoshiya published between 1968 and 1970.
My aim here is to bring this integral secularist frame in the academic study of religion to the fore, using the historical method to highlight instances where religious studies expertise has been “operationalized” by bureaucrats or mobilized by clerics to support their respective religion-making projects. Additionally, I am interested in questioning the problematic tendency on the part of scholars of religion to tell religious groups and individuals how they should be or behave. For historical reasons that I trace over several chapters of this dissertation, this normative attitude is deeply woven into the DNA of the academic study of Japanese religions; it is often problematically masked behind superficially “neutral” descriptive language that (usually, but not always) advances a progressive politics.¹⁵⁴ My own normative project relates not to how religions should be or behave, but to how scholars of religion should position ourselves vis-à-vis our objects of study and vis-à-vis the bureaucrats who would use our expertise for their own political ends.

At a time when the value of humanities expertise has been called into question because of financial concerns about “the bottom line,” it is particularly important, I think, to resist the urge to highlight the value of religious studies expertise by showing that the products of religious studies research can be used for policymaking. Scholars of religion can (and hopefully will) continue to help policymakers make informed and nuanced decisions about religions and religious freedom, but we also have an ethical duty to critique bureaucratic policies as much as we contribute to them. An additional ethical duty is to continuously recall that our expertise gets used by bureaucrats to define religion, and often in problematic ways. As Elizabeth Shakman Hurd has artfully stated:

¹⁵³ For the translation of the Japanese word shūkyō into the Chinese zōngjiào, see Yu 2005 among others.
Defining religion is no simple task. When the United States uses its authority to promote religious freedom abroad, the government weighs in on what counts as religion and what forms of religion should be protected. When the United States officially engages actors abroad as “religious,” it sets standards that effectively bolster the sects, denominations, and religious authorities that it has defined as benevolent, while marginalizing less desirable counterparts.

This approach doesn’t address the complex challenges posed by everyday life in religiously diverse societies. Rather, the “operationalization” of religion by the government allows it to over-simplify complex questions of causation.155

With this in mind, one dynamic that I explore in the chapters that follow is the tendency for the secularist presuppositions of religious studies to provide theoretical support, however unintentionally, for the secularist projects of state bureaucrats and policymakers. Scholars of religion are not infrequently the very sources of the definitions of “good” and “bad” religion on which policymakers rely, even if paradoxically scholars of religion are also some of the parties most likely to resist the treatment of certain religions as “bad” through journalistic or bureaucratic accusations of moral impropriety, violence, or exceptionally irrational beliefs or behavior (“cults,” “superstitions,” “terrorism”).

Invented Identities and Politics “As If”

My project therefore incorporates and responds to the recent critiques of the category “religion” and some associated critiques of the unintended side effects of liberalism, showing that religious freedom is not a panacea for the world’s ills. This does not mean that I simply discount the existence of “religion” or that this dissertation is about “the impossibility of religious freedom.”156 While I professionally resist the assumption that religion exists “out there” as a unique form of human experience and endeavor, pragmatically I recognize that many people

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154 To give just one example, a recent book by Steven Heine (2011) on the religious geography of contemporary Tokyo masked a conservationist approach in the language of description.

155 Hurd 2013, 2 (my pagination).

156 Sullivan 2005
make political, economic, and personal decisions based on factors that they (or others) think of as “religious.”

My project is therefore premised on the assumption that “religion” is socially constructed rather than perennially present, but it is also premised on the assumption that religion is a real “social fact” that cannot simply be jettisoned or reduced to other material or political factors. In this sense, my approach to religion (and therefore my approach to the project of “freeing” religious belief and practice) bears some resemblance to contemporary critical understandings of race and gender. Although we now know that race and gender are socially constructed concepts that are based on stereotyped assemblages of biologically determined phenotypic traits, as “social facts” we must recognize that they play powerful roles in the construction of personal and social identity and associated behaviors. These identities are performed by individuals; they are also perceived by others (even if not actively performed by the perceived). Although we can recognize the arbitrary nature of such performance and perception and although we can recognize that a performative act may not be perceived as intended, we act as if race exists because we know that negative perceptions of race have historically bred discrimination and violence. Non-discrimination policies premised on this acting “as if” work to maximize human freedom, even if their mechanisms for doing so are often clunky.157

Similarly, my argument that conceptions of religious freedom is a human right should not be retrojected onto the pre-Occupation era is neither a defense of prewar and wartime Japanese religions policy nor is it a wholesale rejection of the ideal of religious freedom.158 I most emphatically want to state that I am not calling for the abolition of the ideal of religious freedom,

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157 This issue sat at the heart of controversial Supreme Court cases about affirmative action and voting rights in 2013.
Jolyon Baraka Thomas

Japan’s Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

nor am I trying to advance a monolithic model of religious freedom to replace all others. Rather, while recognizing the arbitrary nature of religious identity and the historically contingent nature of the category of religion itself, I aim to preserve “religious freedom” as an ingenious—if decidedly imperfect—way of mitigating religious oppression (including the suppression of practices and ideas that do not neatly fit within the religion-secular dichotomy).

Even as I celebrate religious freedom as a powerful tool for protecting the weak or disenfranchised, one of the points of this dissertation is that the very phrases “religious freedom” and “freedom of religion (or belief)” and “religious liberty” harbor “imperial liberal” attitudes that subsume various dispositions and traditions under the overarching category of religion with the paradoxical result that they simultaneously emancipate and discursively control.\textsuperscript{159} When we act \textit{as if} religious freedom is a universal human right we provide latitude for protecting minority religious positions, but conceptions of “religion” and “freedom” are not universal. They never can be.\textsuperscript{160} Geopolitically, this means that there is no reasonable “one size fits all” approach to religious freedom that can be taken by all nations (or by the United Nations or other international organizations).\textsuperscript{161} Domestically, while pragmatic considerations exist about the feasibility of application, commitments to religious freedom must sometimes be given lower priority than (ideally equally important) commitments to public welfare or peace and order.\textsuperscript{162} Japan’s revision of the law regulating rules for religious juridical person incorporation following the 1995 Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system are one recent example.\textsuperscript{163}

\textsuperscript{158} Here I am aiming for an approach of “disaggregating religion” as described by Laborde (2014).
\textsuperscript{159} Brown 2006; Shweder 2009
\textsuperscript{160} Mahmood and Danchin, eds. 2014
\textsuperscript{161} Mahmood 2006
\textsuperscript{162} Sullivan 2005; Mahmood and Danchin 2014b.
\textsuperscript{163} On the post-Aum revisions, see Hardacre 2003.
Scholars of religion are uniquely situated to understand this conundrum, but at present we do not have sufficiently sophisticated theoretical or methodological tools to address it. Alas, a doctoral dissertation is too narrowly focused a project to offer a grand theory about how to solve the problems of particularism and universalism in understandings of religious freedom. Here I will simply point out the ethical dilemma with which this dissertation wrestles while emphasizing that my project remains pragmatically historical in that I aim to highlight the historical background behind the emergence of religious freedom as a universal “human right.” A future iteration of the project may venture a bolder, more programmatic approach.

**Overview of the Dissertation**

As the foregoing sections have hopefully indicated, this dissertation sits at the nexus of several fields, including religious studies and Japan studies (fields in which I have formal training), with nods to political science, anthropology, and sociology and their subfields of international relations, human rights, and secularity studies. Its contribution to the academic study of religion lies primarily in dialogue with the recent scholarship historicizing and parsing the fraught categories “religion” and “secular.” My particular intervention on this score avoids broad theorization about these terms (which has already taken place in a great deal of humanistic and social scientific scholarship) in favor of using the specific topic of religious freedom as a key to unlocking how competing interest groups at subnational, national, and international scales have defined and understood religion, the secular, and ideal religion-state relations and how they have modified the nouns “violence,” “tolerance” and “freedom” with the adjective “religious.”
The single chapter that comprises the remainder of Part I introduces the origin of the claim that the Japanese misconstrued a universal principle when they instituted a religious freedom clause as Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution. Specifically, it looks at the research that informed the Shintō Directive that was promulgated on 15 December 1945, showing how contemporaneous religious studies expertise was mobilized to support a foreordained policy of disestablishment. The chapter also calls into question the category of “State Shintō” on which most of the negative Occupation policies relied. That is, rather than accepting the premise that the Shintō Directive disestablished a national religion, I show that the occupiers used the claim that Japan was dominated by a national religion to delegitimize what was effectively a secularist system.

Part II

The three chapters that comprise Part II argue that the postwar understanding of religious freedom as a universal human right was retrojected onto Japan’s prewar constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, resulting in two problematic but highly influential historiographic narratives. On the one hand, the occupiers and many postwar scholars claimed that prewar and wartime Japan totally lacked genuine religious freedom. On the other hand, more apologetically inclined scholars have argued that such assessments failed to recognize a unique “Japanese-style relationship between religion and the state.”

Part II (Chapters Two, Three, and Four) charts a middle course between these equally problematic arguments, both of which focus excessively on the national scale at the expense of
examining competing interpretations at subnational scales. It examines the implementation of the concept of religious freedom in Japan during the time that the Meiji Constitution was in effect (1890–1947), using editorials and articles in transsectarian journals, parliamentary proceedings, diaries, private letters, bureaucratic correspondence, speeches, lectures, and police interrogation records to show that competing interest groups advocated diverse interpretations of religious freedom throughout the period. I show that various interest groups—including religious leaders, legislators, and bureaucrats—were evidently committed to protecting religious freedom. However, there were significant differences between those groups that saw religious freedom as a circumstantially granted privilege, those that saw it as a customary right, and those (a minority in this period) who viewed it as a civil liberty. Shifting academic, ecclesiastical, and bureaucratic definitions of religion, superstition, and the secular affected such interpretations, with occasionally devastating results for marginal religions and lasting repercussions for postwar understandings of Buddhism and Shintō.

Part III

Two closing chapters examine American military government records and Japanese publications from the Occupation era, tracing continuities in religious administration policies across the wartime and postwar periods while simultaneously highlighting the conceptual rupture presented by the new interpretation of religious freedom as a universal human right. Specifically, these closing chapters challenge the American conceit that the Occupation introduced “real” religious freedom to Japan where there previously was none. They also show that scholars of religion collaborated with leaders of religious movements to police orthodoxy through the language of religious freedom, identifying some groups as deserving of toleration or protection.

164 I am deeply indebted to Kimberley Thomas for ongoing conversations about scale that
while treating others as targets for suspicion. Within the limited scope that is feasible for this
dissertation, the final chapter also begins to show how the vision of religious freedom that was
created during the Occupation began to spread outward from Japan to the rest of the world in
American foreign policy, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
postwar scholarship on “new religions,” “State Shintō,” and “Buddhist war responsibility.”

helped me clarify the nature of my intervention on this score.
In entering the war we, peoples who based our hopes for civilization upon the triumph of universalism and human freedom, were sending our armed forces against a mighty war machine. But of even greater importance, from a long range point of view, is the fact that we were opposing our ideals of the equality of man, of self-government, of freedom, and of peace, to powerful and contradictory ideas which must be charged with much of the responsibility for Japan’s aggressive militarism—the Shintō conceptions that the islands of Japan, the people, and their ruler are divine, that their mission is to conquer the world, and that all peoples owe homage to the divine emperor whose authority is absolute.¹

On 7 October 1945, Chief of the Far East Division of the United States Department of State, John Carter Vincent (1900–1972), made a striking comment on NBC’s “University of the Air” public radio program.² Unbeknownst to the policymakers in Tokyo who had just promulgated a civil liberties directive guaranteeing freedom of religion in Japan a mere three days before, Vincent casually outlined a drastic shift in State Department policy.³ Whereas the people responsible for both pre-surrender and immediate post-surrender policy had generally avoided making any explicit, specific mention of Shintō in favor of advancing generic platitudes about the ideal of promoting religious freedom in Japan, Vincent’s statement made it clear that Shintō was to be the target of radical American intervention. “Shintoism insofar as it is a religion of

¹ Ballou 1945, 3. This quote is from a book called Shintō: The Unconquered Enemy, that was published immediately after Japan’s surrender, in October 1945.
² 7 October 1945 is the date given in the “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Volume: Freedom of Religion” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3, 5). William P. Woodard recalled the date as 6 October 1945 in his unpublished manuscript, “The Disestablishment of Shintō” (WPW Box #8, Folder #3, 4). This may reflect an International Date Line difference, as Woodard was still in the United States at the time of the broadcast.
³ SCAPIN 93, promulgated 4 October 1945.
individual Japanese is not to be interfered with,” he proclaimed. “Shintoism, however, insofar as it is directed by the Japanese Government and is a measure enforced from above by the Government, is to be done away with. … Shintoism as a state religion, National Shintō, that is, will go.”

If the New York Times editorial page is any indication of national sentiment, then this declaration was embraced by American audiences as marking the first step in establishing “real religious freedom” in Japan. However, it caught both Occupation officials and their Japanese counterparts by surprise. A flurry of correspondence ensued as government officials in Japan sought to clarify a policy that had not been previously established as an official Occupation directive. Communication between Occupation diplomatic advisor Dean Atcheson and United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes finally confirmed, in line with Vincent’s precipitous and very public statements, that the new policy was to eradicate “National Shintō” while not interfering with Shintō “insofar as it [was] a religion of individual Japanese.”

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4 “History of the Non-Military Aspects” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3), 6. For a detailed account of pre-surrender planning on Shintō, see Nakano 1993 and Nakano 2003. Nakano avers that military planners were interested in what to do with Shintō, although I believe he overstates the degree to which policymakers had formally thought through the issue at this early stage. Many crucial planning documents are included in FRUS, particularly FRUS 1943, 1944, and 1945.


6 Excellent sources on the subject of Occupation religions policy include William P. Woodard’s insider academic account (1972), the 10-year retrospective published by the Japanese Federation of New Religious Organizations (1963), the 1993 volume edited by Ikado Fujio on the Occupation and Japanese religions, a 2003 book by Nakano Tsuyoshi, and some recent essays by Benjamin Dorman (2004), Okuyama Michiaki (2009), Mark R. Mullins (2010), and Dorman’s 2012 book on new religions, media, and political authority during the Occupation. Also see Woodard’s Foreword to the report Religions in Japan (Bunce 1955), initially published by the Civil Information and Education Section of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in 1948. In addition to that study, an excellent primary source is the “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Volume: Freedom of Religion, 2 September 1945–1 September 1946.” WPW Box #13, Folder #3.

7 William P. Woodard, “The Disestablishment of Shinto: The Shinto Directive and the Kokutai Cult,” WPW Box #8, Folder #3, 1–6. The change in tone reflected a personnel change in the
This administrative scramble for clarification of policy was followed by a momentous academic and bureaucratic undertaking. Responding to the communiqué from the State Department, SCAP Civil Information and Education Section Chief Ken R. Dyke (d.u.) instructed Lieutenant William K. Bunce (1907–2008) to draft a directive outlining the new policy. Unfortunately, Bunce was given little guidance as to how to proceed. Bunce was not only not an expert in religion of any sort, but he was also in the difficult position of having to navigate between the Scylla of promoting religious freedom and the Charybdis of eliminating the apparently privileged status granted to a specific religion. Moreover, he was under considerable pressure to complete the directive quickly.

By most accounts, Bunce performed his job as admirably as anyone might have under such unenviable circumstances. He undertook what amounted to a crash course on Japanese religion in general and Shintō in particular. Two months and multiple drafts later he had produced a “Staff Memorandum on State Shintō” that would serve as the basis for the 15 December 1945 Shintō Directive that formally divorced Shintō from governance and public education.

The impact of the Shintō Directive was considerable. The domestic effects on Japanese religious institutions and education were immediate and pronounced, but the document also had an international impact in that it represented an opportunity for Americans (and the international State Department, marking the departure of former ambassador and Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew and other “Japan hands” who had taken a conciliatory approach to Shintō and the imperial system. On Grew and his policy stances, see Nakamura 1992.

On Bunce’s knowledge about Japanese religions, also see Woodard 1972, 197–198.

He was later awarded the Legion of Merit for his work. Woodard 1972, 25; 362.

This document is also called the “Staff Study.” Various versions exist in print, including in Woodard 1972 and Mullins, Shimazono, and Swanson 1993. The version I cite here is twenty-five pages long, followed by a seven-page appendix (providing various statistics about the disposition of religions in Japan in late 1945 and background information about the contemporary Japanese legal framework) and the seven-page text of the Shintō directive itself.
community they technically represented as the face of the Allied Occupation) to juxtapose their particular variety of religion-state relations with a Japanese variety. This act of juxtaposition was a watershed historical moment that initiated a global process of articulating how the ideal of religious freedom could and should operate in international relations and transnational contexts. Specifically, the Staff Memorandum on State Shintō was a site for the confluence of academic, bureaucratic, and apologetic impulses; collectively, those impulses spurred the initial steps in the creation of a new, universalistic understanding of religious freedom.

The Staff Memorandum on State Shintō and the Shintō Directive

The Staff Memorandum on State Shintō encapsulated Bunce’s reading of a range of anglophone scholarship by British, American, and Japanese scholars. It also reflected the significant influence of his regular conversations with University of Tokyo professor of religious studies Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964), who acted as an unofficial advisor to the occupiers on matters of religion and Japanese culture throughout the Occupation. Kishimoto remembered Bunce as an assiduous student who earnestly took notes during their one-on-one tutorials on the basics of Japanese religion. However, the professor also recalled that Bunce was determined to find evidence that supported the official U.S. government view that Shintō was merely a tool used in the service of fostering ultranationalism.


11 I give an overview of this scholarship in a later section, following Bunce’s references and tracing some ideas found in the books that were available to him.
12 On Kishimoto’s role in the Occupation, see Takagi 1993 and Okuyama 2009.
14 Bunce’s attitudes towards Shintō are ably described by Mark Mullins (2010). For Kishimoto’s reflections on Bunce’s attitudes, see Kishimoto 1963, “Arashi no naka no Jinja Shintō.” That essay, “Shrine Shintō in the Midst of the Storm,” was originally published in the Japanese
This inflexibility may have been partially a facet of Bunce’s personality. In his later role as head of the Religions Division of the Occupation Civil Information and Education Section (a post he acquired in part for his work on the Memorandum), Bunce politely but steadfastly resisted various interest groups’ attempts to inject their preferences into Religions Division policy. However, Bunce’s intractability on the issue of Shintō also derived from his direct orders from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to eliminate “National Shintō,” which influential parties in the U.S. State Department understood to be a unique and particularly deleterious system of militarism, nationalism, and religious ritual that characterized Japanese governance.

Federation of New Religious Organizations publication *Sengō shūkyō kaisō roku* and later reproduced in volume 5 of KHS (1976: 3–87). Intriguingly, despite its prominent place in the Shinshūren publication, Kishimoto’s essay was conspicuously absent from the English translation of that book that was serially published in the journal *Contemporary Religions in Japan* (the present-day *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*). This is, I think, because Woodard (editor of *Contemporary Religions in Japan* at the time) dismissed Kishimoto’s claims as conjectural; his own deep respect for Bunce is clearly evident in his memoir about the activities of the Religions Division during the Occupation. See Woodard 1972, 377–378. Incidentally, Woodard played a major role in determining which aspects of Japanese religions would be given significant academic attention in the postwar period. As editor of the main English-language journal specifically dedicated to the study of Japanese religions, Woodard served as the gatekeeper of the field through the 1960s. There is also some indication that he returned to Japan after the Occupation at the specific request of the Japanese government, to help in the process of keeping religion and government separate (personal correspondence of Royal H. Fisher to D.C. Holtom, 25 February 1954, D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder #4). I address the influential roles played by Woodard and Kishimoto on postwar understandings of Japanese religions in the concluding chapter.

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15 Woodard (1972, 186–187) indicated that Bunce even resisted Kishimoto’s own attempts to inject his normative ideas into Occupation policy. I discuss Kishimoto’s role on this score more in Chapter Six.

16 The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was the American organization directly responsible for determining Occupation policy on behalf of the Allied powers. It was created in late 1944; thereafter, its decisions served as official policy given directly to the military Far East command through the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the other Allied Powers subsequently approved this official policy. Thus, U.S. State Department and U.S. military and foreign policy objectives formed the basis for both pre- and post-surrender policy.
Bunce’s orders reflected fundamental inconsistencies and even basic factual errors in policymakers’ understandings of Shintō. In his drafts, residual racist tendencies also appeared in the designation of Shintō as “primitive” and the dismissive claim that Japanese people were unanimously and fanatically dedicated to this state religion. Despite these evident problems, through the mediation of “The Staff Memorandum on State Shintō” this stereotype came to be described in bureaucratic documents, the press, and academia with the pejorative phrase “State Shintō.”

Although the phrase “State Shintō” swiftly came to enjoy currency in these various outlets, conceptually it remained vague. In Bunce’s Memorandum, “State Shintō” was circularly defined as both a manifestation of ultranationalism and as its ultimate source. In his presentation, this “State Shintō” served as a tool that political and military elites had cynically used to foster citizens’ loyalty to the emperor and the state as Japan had modernized. As a side effect of this process, Bunce argued, the state had not truly granted basic rights like religious freedom to Japanese subjects, but had only pretended to do so—and begrudgingly—under tremendous international pressure. The Japanese state had also violated its own constitutional provision of religious freedom by demanding that citizens manifest their loyalty by paying reverence at

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17 Woodard pointed out in his public lecture on “The Disestablishment of Shintō” (WPW Box #8, Folder #3) that although it was taken for granted in the United States that Shintō was ultimately responsible for Japanese militarism and aggression, policymakers had resisted enshrining this understanding in official documents until the promulgation of the Shintō Directive. Woodard complained that most people actually had little idea of how to distinguish between Shintō as a matter of personal conviction and Shintō as an agent of militarism. Woodard preferred to distinguish between the “Kokutai Cult” centered on the emperor, which he deemed separate from Shintō as a religious system based on ritual practices at shrines.

18 On racist depictions of Japan during the war, see Dower 1986. American attempts to dehumanize the Japanese enemy had regularly depicted the Japanese as savages slavishly devoted to an obviously illegitimate god-king. See Capra, dir. 1945, which I discuss in a little more detail below.
shrines, which Bunce—following his tutor Kishimoto—understood to be unambiguously “religious.” Bunce also averred that later legislation such as the Peace Preservation Law (Chian iji hō, 1925) and Religious Organizations Law (Shūkyō dantai hō, 1939) had provided draconian measures for restricting religions that effectively abrogated the constitutional guarantee.

In the first paragraph of the Memorandum, titled “The Problem Presented,” Bunce outlined what was to become the official Occupation position—to many, its raison d’être—as follows:

*State Shintō* has been used by militarists and ultranationalists in Japan to engender and foster a military spirit among the people and to justify a war of expansion. While the defeat, surrender, and subsequent occupation of Japan have undoubtedly done much to destroy the potency of Shintōism as a political force, until Shintō is separated from the state and instruction in Shintō is eliminated from the education system, there will always be the danger that Shintō will be used as an agency for disseminating militaristic and ultra-nationalistic ideology. In order to obviate this danger, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has been directed to accomplish the separation of Shintō from the state and the elimination of Shintō from the education system.

The last sentence of this opening paragraph indicates that although Bunce’s Memorandum officially served as a descriptive neutral analysis of Japanese religion-state relations that was designed to inform policy, it was actually a prescriptive account tailored to support a foreordained objective. This may have been bad scholarship in that it was deterministic, but it served its true purpose by providing authoritative academic support for the Shintō Directive of

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19 On the tautological definition of State Shintō, see Ōhara 1989 and Sakamoto 2005, esp. 152–178.
20 I will discuss this significance of Kishimoto’s influence on this score more below. Briefly, Kishimoto’s position as a scholar of religion primed him to treat all ritual activity as “religious,” with the result that shrine rites that had been officially designated as “civic ritual” appeared to him to be inherently religious. This tension between bureaucratic and academic parsing of “religion” and “secular” would have profound repercussions throughout the Occupation.
21 “Memorandum,” 321. The last sentence included a citation referring to two directives given to SCAP by the SWNCC (SWNCC Paper 150/4, 21 September 1945) and the Department of State (State Serial 23 [Byrnes], 13 October 1945).
15 December 1945, the Occupation edict that officially disaggregated Shintō from all aspects of political and public life.  

22 A Time magazine editorial published on 24 December 1945 observed that the Directive “… was more than formal separation of Church and State. It was the first official U.S. attempt to draw the fine line between genuinely religious doctrine and social propaganda.”

In hindsight the Time assessment might seem a hyperbolic vestige of wartime propaganda, but Bunce’s Memorandum and the Shintō Directive that followed it actually crystallized a process of definition in which the boundaries of religion and the secular were demarcated in an unprecedented fashion for parties on either side of the Pacific. While it was certainly not the first formal attempt to highlight how religion would be addressed in Occupation policy, of necessity the Memorandum was more theoretically sophisticated than earlier pre-surrender plans. It was also more detailed than the initial post-surrender policy documents that had vaguely gestured to the importance of promoting religious freedom as one of a raft of civil liberties. The Memorandum was the first formal attempt to indicate precisely why religious freedom needed to be promoted in Japan, why the Japanese government’s claims about religion-state relations deserved suspicion, and why existing constitutional law and parliamentary legislation—which included an explicit provision of religious freedom and formal separation of religion from the state—needed to be revised.

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23 Anonymous, “International: Shintō after Bunce,” Time 24 December 1945, 1 (my pagination). Publication of this editorial on Christmas Eve 1945 was no doubt symbolically resonant with many Christian Americans at the time; the magazine featured a Christian nativity scene on its front cover with the title “The Christmas Event: Peace on Earth among Men of Good Will.”
Although it is important to acknowledge continuities across the prewar, wartime, Occupation, and postwar periods, the unique circumstances of the Occupation sparked an unprecedented and ultimately global change in the imagining of religious freedom (specifically) and secularism (more generally). The promulgation of the Shintō Directive served as an opportunity for Americans to reflect on their own relationship with religious freedom. Perhaps unintentionally, the *Time* editorial captured the fact that the United States had not historically distinguished “religious doctrine” from “social propaganda” even within its own borders. It also alluded to the contemporaneously emerging narrative of America’s unique relationship with religious freedom, which was rhetorically powerful but historically false.24

With the benefit of historical hindsight, it is possible to say that Bunce’s account represented an irenic impulse to improve on the jingoistic wartime propaganda narrative that the Pacific War represented a clash of civilizations in which the United States and its allies were aligned with the

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24 As David Sehat has recently argued, what he calls the “myth of American religious freedom”—the idea that a strict separation of religion and the state had always characterized American constitutional law, legislation, jurisprudence, and law enforcement—only began to emerge in some Supreme Court decisions in the 1930s. Sehat 2010, Part IV. Those high court decisions were in fact the backlash of a civil libertarian Court against theretofore powerful moral establishmentarian strains in American civil life that assumed that Protestant Christianity formed the backbone of American law and society. Chapters Five and Six will show that this tension between civil libertarian and moral establishmentarian positions continued to play out in policymaking for the remainder of the Occupation. Incidentally, Sehat’s distinction between these two competing ideals of religious freedom can be fruitfully juxtaposed with Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s division of secularism into two types that are overlapping and not necessarily mutually exclusive. What she terms “laicism” anticipates the retreat of religion from public life as a way of securing order (this is close to the civil libertarian position described by Sehat), while “Judeo-Christian secularism” assumes that religion fosters unity and identity and therefore that religious differences generate conflict in international relations (a stance associated with the moral establishmentarian position). While the former aims for the exile of religion from politics, the latter claims “secularism” as a unique Western achievement. Hurd is clearly skeptical of both claims. While her primary interest lies in the contemporary, post-9/11 context, her rubric is helpful because it elucidates how Occupation policy could have been influenced by competing claims about the significance of instituting religious freedom in Japan. See Hurd 2008, 21–43.
forces of democracy and Christianity against sinister Japanese theocratic militarism. However, the Memorandum could not escape the urge to treat the American version of religious freedom as “genuine” and treat the Japanese constitutional guarantee of religious freedom as “fake.” This was doubly problematic. It sublimated, but did not wholly abandon, the supercilious civilizationalist rhetoric that had characterized the Pacific War by aligning Allied political values (freedom, tolerance) with universalist claims. Paradoxically, it also offered an essentialist view that undermined such universalist claims by tacitly acknowledging that two competing versions of religious freedom existed.

Here I would like to suggest that Bunce’s inconsistent portrayal derived from an imperfectly harmonized tension between academic and bureaucratic visions of religion-state relations more than it derived from any genuine distinction between “real” American and “phony” Japanese versions of religious freedom. I will lay out the steps that led me to this conclusion in more detail below, but the ultimate upshot of Bunce’s study was that the Japanese system of religion-state relations that Bunce came to describe with the pejorative phrase “State Shintō” was designated as illegitimate. Despite Japanese claims that religion was separated from the state, Bunce averred that the Japanese political status quo was not authentically a system of separation at all, but rather a state religion.

At the same time that he offered this diagnosis, Bunce simultaneously offered a new interpretation of ideal religion-state relations, using the phrase “religious freedom” as a catchall term to designate this new view. By extension, alternative visions of religious liberty, including whatever version(s) may have existed in prewar and wartime Japan, were dismissed as

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inauthentic. The newly orthodox interpretation of religion-state relations that resulted from these moves was pluralist in the sense that it posited religious freedom as a matter of elective choice and idealized the peaceful coexistence of different religious groups under the irenic banner of the secular state; it was immanentist in that it nominally treated religious freedom as an innate right shared by all humans. It was also wholly unprecedented in that it began the decades-long process of affixing guarantees of religious freedom beyond the jurisdiction of one particular state (although it left open the vexing question of how exactly religious freedom should be protected in this new universalistic, if still inchoate, framework of “human rights”).

In writing the Staff Memorandum on State Shintō, the problem that Bunce faced was not that Japan had an official state religion, but that it explicitly did not have a constitutionally designated state religion. Superficially, Japan had legal separation of religion and state, no explicit mention in the constitution of a national religion, and a constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. In actual practice, the relationship between religious ideas and Japanese politics was more ambiguous. As Vincent’s radio broadcast and subsequent policy directives made clear, influential American policymakers had blamed Shintō in particular for Japanese militarism during the course of the war and had anticipated its eradication in their planning for Japan’s surrender. Prominent Occupation figures like Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur had also diagnosed the problems underlying Japanese militarism as “basically theological.”

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26 On “clash of civilizations rhetoric” during the Pacific War, see Dower 1986. On the postwar transition from civilizationist talk to human rights talk, see Mazower 2011. See Brown 2006 on the subject of tolerance and its deep political linkages to civilizationalist ideals.
27 See Josephson 2012, 226–236, for a comparative discussion of Japan’s 1889 constitution and those of several European countries.
28 Nakano 1993
29 William J. Sebald, Chair of the Committee on the Establishment of Religious Freedom in Japan, in an oral report given at the Forty-Sixth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan (either
therefore had to selectively read modern Japanese history in order to find a national religion that
could be targeted for eradication. State Shintō had to be created to be destroyed.

The Meiji Constitutional Regime as a Secular System

Before I discuss the origins of the phrase “State Shintō” and trace its conceptual development,
I need to outline briefly how and why the Meiji Constitutional regime can and should be
considered a secular system rather than a system of state religion.30 By “Meiji Constitutional
Regime,” I am referring to the political system that was put in place with the inauguration of the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan in 1890 and that lasted until the enactment of the occupier-
drafted Constitution of Japan in 1947. This period was characterized by Japan’s first formal
constitutional guarantee of religious freedom and constitutional separation of religion from the
state.31

My use of the words “secularism” and “secularisms” here is theoretical rather than historical.
That is, the discussion that follows uses these categories not in the sense that they might have
been used by Bunce and his contemporaries, but rather retroactively imposes them on the
historical record to elucidate how the category of religious freedom operated in the early months
of the Occupation. As I will show, the recent theoretical literature on secularism(s)—particularly

26 November or 10 December 1945, citing a post-surrender statement made by MacArthur on 2
September 1945), RCR Box #5773, Folder #7.
30 See Okuyama 2011 for an overview of recent scholarship on State Shintō. An earlier attempt
was Nitta 1999a and 1999b.
31 These constitutional laws were modulated to a certain extent by the Imperial Rescript on
Education (1890), relaxed rules for “mixed residence” that gave greater access to non-Japanese
Christian missionaries (late 1890s), the exigencies of managing colonial populations on the
Korean peninsula and in Taiwan, and the passage of laws clarifying “public order” (the Peace
Preservation Law of 1925) and streamlining the rules for religious incorporation (the Religious
Organizations Law of 1939), and the explicit incorporation of Shintō-based ideals into the public
Jolyon Baraka Thomas  

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scholarship on secularism as a facet of international relations and scholarship on transnational interactions as a crucial component of secular formations—fructifies the historical attempt to make sense of how “religion,” “freedom,” and “religion-state relations” were understood by different Japanese and American interest groups during the Occupation. My approach synthesizes two competing strains of postwar scholarship on religion-state relations in modern Japan and pairs them with these recent advances in the theoretical literature.

One strain of postwar scholarship—both anglophone and Japanese—has generally reproduced the claims advanced in Bunce’s Memorandum; scholars writing in this vein have tended to regard “State Shintō” and “the emperor system” as cynical uses of religious ideas for political ends.32 In this view, the supposedly benign ideas of a quaint indigenous religion were twisted to suit imperialist purposes and militarist goals. While such accounts have merit—there is no doubt that ideas associated with traditional kami veneration were actively used by the Japanese state in the service of nation-building—they problematically assume that such ideas were uniformly influential.33 In some cases, behind this assessment lingers a vestige from school curriculum (as evidenced especially by the publication of the Kokutai no hongi, or Foundational Principles of the Body Politic, by the Ministry of Education in 1937).

32 This account began to emerge immediately after the war during the Occupation, but it was solidified in Murakami Shigeyoshi’s 1970 paperback Kokka Shintō. Murakami argued that “State Shintō” had served as the guiding principle of Japanese governance from the Meiji political transition of 1868 until the conclusion of the war in 1945. Many scholars writing in subsequent decades followed this general line of argument, including Helen Hardacre (1989) and Shimazono Susumu (2010). However, Shimazono in particular has nuanced Murakami’s periodization and has added a focus on the various ways that Japanese citizens were encouraged to participate in the “State Shintō” project. For her part, Hardacre’s recent work has incorporated some of the new scholarship on secularity as a way of better apprehending the Japanese state project. See Hardacre 2011, which applies the framework developed by Taylor (2007) to Japan.

33 An additional problem is the presupposition that an originally pure “Shintō” was sullied by its political appropriation. As Kuroda Toshio (1981) famously argued, “Shintō” itself was a modern invention that served as a comprehensive framework for a diverse set of ritual practices devoted to local, regional, and national kami; he complained that these ideas had been irresponsibly used to support claims of national uniqueness. The very idea of Shintō as an “indigenous religion” is
wartime propaganda in that the Japanese people are regarded as being, or having once been, uniquely susceptible to religious ideology. This interpretation is usually predicated on a tacit binary: Allied versus Japanese, or the enlightened postwar Japanese observer vis-à-vis her benighted wartime predecessor.

Until very recently, such top-down accounts of religion as ideology have dominated the field of Japanese religious studies. This trend reflects the understandable tendency on the part of scholars of religion to attribute political actions and attitudes to religious ideas. However, for several decades now historians of Japan have rightly questioned this top-down, religion-as-inexorably-influential-ideology approach by showing, for example, how the Japanese population supported state-building initiatives from the bottom up and how educated members of Japan’s emerging middle class wedded their particular aims to those of the state.34

Drawing on this cogent critique, an alternative narrative about “State Shintō” has emerged from the field of Shintō studies. Wedding careful evidentiary historiography with deep familiarity with Shintō doctrine and institutions, this strain of scholarship has highlighted the asymmetrical power dynamics of the Occupation as a major contributing factor in the development of the received concept of “State Shintō.”35 Scholars writing in this vein have also argued that the occupiers failed to recognize a unique “Japanese style relationship between religion and the state” (Nihongata seikyō kankei).36 While sometimes excessively apologetic for the wartime regime, this scholarly corrective has persuasively shown that “State Shintō” did not also problematic because such designations have a history of tacitly ranking the “indigenous traditions” below the “universal religions” such as Christianity and Buddhism.

34 On lay interest groups’ complicity in state ideology, for example, see Gluck 1985 and Garon 1997. More recent bottom-up approaches include Shimazono 2009 and 2010 and Azegami 2009 and 2012.
35 Scholars writing in this vein include Sakamoto Koremaru, Nitta Hitoshi, and Ōhara Yasuo, all cited below.
solidify as a system of governance—if it solidified at all—until just before the onset of the Pacific War. Such research has effectually refuted the claim that “State Shintō” was the defining feature of Japanese governance from 1868, when imperial loyalists “restored” the Meiji emperor as the leader of Japan, until 1945, when the Shintō Directive abolished any and all links between Japanese religion and statecraft.

Both of these strains of scholarship share a problematic tendency to focus on the level of the nation-state, giving undue preference to the idea that all Japanese people interpreted religion-state relations and religious freedom in the same way throughout the entirety of Japan’s imperial period. Part II of this dissertation will challenge this view by showing how competing interest groups understood religion, freedom, tolerance, superstition, and ideal relationships between religions and the state in very different ways. Here, however, I want to focus on how both postwar narratives can be nuanced through reference to recent advances in our understandings of secularism(s).

My argument that the Meiji Constitutional regime was a secularist system is consistent with recent scholarship that has focused on secularism as a legal system and set of associated administrative practices. In this view, a neutral social field designated as “the secular” is

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36 Inoue and Sakamoto, eds. 1987
37 See, e.g., Sakamoto 2000.
38 Recently, some scholars of Japanese religions who remain indebted to the traditional “State Shintō” model have been revising their periodization to address the possibility that the Shintō Directive was less effective in abolishing “State Shintō” than had been previously assumed (Shimazono 2010; Breen and Teeuwen 2010; Mullins 2012).
39 This is secularism in the sense described by Talal Asad and (more recently in relationship to Japan) Jason Josephson, although Josephson adds to Asad’s account the important observation that states usually designate both “the secular” and “the religious” through identification of illegitimate practices (“superstitions,” “cults”). Asad 2003; Josephson 2012. The theoretical scholarship on secularism is vast. The landmark studies of Asad (2003) and Taylor (2007) each prompted a flurry of critical response, including Scott and Hirschkind, eds. 2006; Jakobsen and Pellegrini, eds. 2008; Hurd 2008; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun, eds. 2010; Calhoun,
understood to be the jurisdiction of the state, and “religions” are understood as private entities that influence, but are nevertheless separate from, this neutral field. While scholars now recognize that multiple secular systems coexist, as a generally shared feature among them the state is associated with the empirical realm of scientific fact and political authority, while groups that are designated as “religions” claim (and vie for) jurisdiction over non-empirical fields. Paradoxically, in drawing these distinctions between religion and not-religion, states necessarily make doctrinal claims and adjudicate regarding empirically unverifiable matters: they recognize certain groups and ideas as legitimate while dismissing others as illegitimate; they also premise legislation, law enforcement, and jurisprudence on definitions of religion, some of which may be tacit rather than explicit.\(^{40}\)

Historically speaking, while it is true that the Japanese state initially aimed for the establishment of Shintō as Japan’s national religion in the early years of the Meiji era (1868–1912), these efforts foundered on the shoals of sectarian conflict and the ambiguity of supposedly universally held principles.\(^{41}\) Efforts to establish a national religion were ultimately abandoned, and by the time the Meiji Constitution was being enacted many policymakers and


contemporary observers regarded such efforts as passé. While multiple factors such as changing definitions of religion and diplomatic problems contributed to this policy shift, a crucial part of this process was that Buddhist priests in the Jōdo Shinshū sect such as Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911) had advocated the separation of parochial “religion” from a universal “secular” by, first, withdrawing from the Taikyōin (Great Teaching Academy) designed to promulgate a National Teaching and, second, by suggesting that shrine rites be treated as non-religious civic rituals.

So, while the Japanese secular was clearly constructed in conjunction with ideas and ideals derived from the classical texts associated with Shintō (particularly in the imagination of sovereignty, territory, and divine kingship), modern Buddhist political and doctrinal claims contributed significantly to the forms such secularism could take. Internal and external pressures from Christians also meant that Japanese secularism was constructed in relation to a set of norms and practices associated with the “civilization” represented by the contemporary Western imperial powers. By the time of the creation of the 1889 Constitution of the Empire of Japan and the promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education the following year, the Japanese government had elected to institute a secularist system in which certain empirically unverifiable propositions (imperial divine descent) and ritual practices (paying reverence to the emperor) were treated as non-negotiable aspects of citizenship while “religion” (a term now used

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42 Maxey 2005. See Hoshino 2012 on how the category of religion shifted in relationship to the categories of “civilization,” “morality,” and the like. The fact that the push for making Shintō (or Buddhism, for that matter) the national religion of Japan had subsided by the late 1880s has generally been overlooked in the scholarship that has tended to treat Shintō as Japan’s national religion between 1868 and 1945 (or beyond).

43 Nitta 2000

44 Here my reading differs from that of Josephson (2012), who describes the Japanese system as a “Shintō secular.” Later chapters show that Buddhist influence on Japanese secularism remained strong through the Pacific War.
to indicate the three traditions of Buddhism, “sectarian Shintō,” and Christianity) was relegated to the private sphere and regarded as a matter of elective affiliation and personal belief.\textsuperscript{46}

Particularly when combined with the earlier push to make Shintō Japan’s state religion, this sort of vision (first presented in the text of the Meiji Constitution and then further articulated in the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education and later Ministry of Education documents such as the 1937 \textit{Kokutai no hongi}) may seem to have established a sort of emperor-centric state religion in that it based political reality on empirically unverifiable claims. However, functionally it was a \textit{secular} vision of religion-state relations in that it set up a “neutral” public sphere of political and civic ritual and designated certain beliefs and commitments as “religious” while treating other beliefs as illegitimate “superstition.” This ideological project facilitated the management of claims to transcendent authority by placing some such claims within the sole jurisdiction of the state and permitting others to survive in the form of tolerated “religions.”\textsuperscript{47}

The 1889 Constitution demarcated “religious” and “non-religious” spheres in a fashion generally consistent with similar articulations in the constitutions of contemporary European nations; what is more, the Japanese document included a relatively liberal provision for religious freedom that did not designate particular religions as either \textit{verboten} or privileged in the eyes of the state.\textsuperscript{48} In later decades, the Japanese government elaborated on this secularist constitutional framework through the administration of shrines as sites for non-religious civic ritual. This

\textsuperscript{45}See Mahmood 2012
\textsuperscript{46}Maxey 2005. “Sectarian Shintō” designated a certain group of confraternities and groups founded by charismatic leaders that venerated at specific Japanese shrines or took specific kami to be their main objects of veneration.
\textsuperscript{47}See Asad 2003, esp. 181–201. On tolerance as an expression of Foucauldian governmentality, see Brown 2006.
\textsuperscript{48}Maekawa 2013, 16–18; Josephson 2012, 226–236. Even before the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, religious freedom had been a diplomatic problem for Japan that prompted a considerable amount of legal inventiveness (see Maxey 2005).
bureaucratic distinction would not be without its problems (not least of which was the fact that many parishioners and priests continued to treat shrines as “religious” institutions) but the formal separation of religion from the state existed at an institutional, if not always at a practical, level for most of the Meiji Constitutional Period. According to the logic that undergirded the Meiji Constitutional regime, shrine rites, imperial household rites, and imperial pageantry served as civic ritual and the mythic-historical narratives associated with kami were explicitly associated with the head of state, but such “civil religion” could and should be separated from “private” religious commitments associated with Buddhism, Christianity, and the officially recognized Shintō sects.

Over ensuing decades, the bureaucratic treatment of shrine rites as civic ritual and other ritual practices as “religion” invited repeated attempts at clarification. Historically, “Shintō” had only recently come into its own as a religion distinct from Buddhism, and the already fraught relationship between these two traditions had been complicated by the influx of Christianity and the attendant battles over the content and scope of “religion.” The vexing question of whether Shintō was properly understood as a religion or as a non-religious civic ritual system would remain unresolved all the way through the Pacific War, with various attempts to draw the lines between religion and secular, religion and Shintō, and Shintō and secular resulting in some torturous and often unconvincing logic on all sides.

49 Religious journals from the 1930s and early 1940s show considerable perplexity with the subject of shrines’ relationships vis-à-vis “religion.” One point I would like to make here is that while it is certainly clear that some bureaucrats and politicians vociferously advocated making Shintō the national religion of Japan, they were countered (equally vociferously) by others who emphasized the importance of treating shrine rites as part of a secular system of civic ritual. For one insider account of such debates, see Andō 1941, especially 92–97.

50 On the historical development of Shintō, see Kuroda 1981 and Teeuwen 2002, as well as Havens 2006 and Breen and Teeuwen 2010. On tensions between Buddhism and Shintō in the
These differences of opinion reflected competing academic, bureaucratic, and ecclesiastical agendas, but for the most part these rival interpretations were linked in some way or another to the powerful ideal of national unification. In the exigent context of Japan’s Fifteen Years’ War (1931–1945), differences of opinion regarding religion, secular, and Shintō began to be suppressed. As a result, by around 1940 the principle of separation of religion from the state had become significantly weakened in favor of a totalitarian system in which distinctions between religion and secular were subsumed under spiritual mobilization for the war effort. Yet despite the fact that the Japanese government had greatly softened the distinction between religion and non-religion by the onset of the Pacific War in 1941, the American claim that Shintō was Japan’s national religion ignored the fact that even during the war the Japanese government maintained some degree of distinction between “religions” and “government” through its consistent claim that shrine rites were not religious. The most scrupulous government officials emphasized this...
point by refusing to call such rites “Shintō” at all, preferring euphemistic language such as “The Imperial Way” (kōdō) or “The Great Way of the Kami” (kannagara no daidō).

In making this point, I want to emphasize that treating the Meiji Constitutional system as a secularism does deny its coercive and violent character. If anything, secularisms as ideological systems are doubly coercive in that they demand both belief and unbelief—constitutionalization, legislation, jurisprudence, and policymaking designate some “truths” as universally accepted and treat other truth claims as optional choices that are “tolerated” in public contexts. Secularisms also delimit a range of non-negotiable acceptable and unacceptable practices and demand conformity through law enforcement (effectively, legally legitimated acts of violence or the threat of such violence). In secular systems, citizens are required to acknowledge the premise that public space is doctrinally neutral, and private faith-based commitments are expected to have minimal impact on public discourse. Clearly such idealized scenarios rarely work out this way in actual practice—religious interest groups exert considerable political pressure on politicians, for example—but the point here is that secular political systems determine ideologically and physically coercive distinctions between religion and not-religion.

Furthermore, although secular states necessarily describe themselves as limiting governmental power to a neutral, public, and empirical realm, “religion” influences the state not politicians (Andō 1941), and the classification of certain groups as “religions” or “superstitions” was similarly contested (In addition to Garon 1997, see Chapter Four of this dissertation on parliamentary debates about how to best control marginal religious movements through legislation). These facts undermine the claim that a unique “Japanese-style relationship between religion and the state” existed. Rather, multiple concepts of the relationship between religion(s) and the state coexisted and competed, even during the totalitarian period from 1940 to 1945.

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54 Thomas 2014
55 See Brown 2006 on toleration as a tool of governance.
56 Asad 2003
57 This is “laïc” secularism, which anticipates and encourages the exile of religion from public space for the common good. See Hurd 2008, Chapter Two.
only in the political pressure that religious lobbies bring to bear on state policy, but also in the legitimizing tactics that states use to shore up political authority.\textsuperscript{58} For example, in the United States civic rituals (such as presidential inaugurations) and material artifacts (such as currency) refer to an abstract “God” that is Protestant Christian in origin; in prewar and wartime Japan the Shintōesque ideas of imperial divine descent and the divine nation were presented in public school education as historical fact. These political practices derive in part from states’ attempts to affix their political authority to transcendent ideals; many of these sources are intimately related to empirically unverifiable claims that would otherwise be labeled “religion.”\textsuperscript{59} As politics, these practices also appeal to majoritarian religious claims, often at the expense of minority positions.\textsuperscript{60}

Religion and the secular are co-constitutive, but they are not uniform or universal. Different cultures construct their secularisms in conjunction with different dominant modes of religion.\textsuperscript{61} Within a given nation or culture, competing understandings of secularism can also coexist.\textsuperscript{62} This mutual imbrication of religion and secular occurs both in the positive sense of treating certain types of religion as “normal” and linking desacralized majoritarian religious ideals to the nation, on the one hand, and in the negative sense of defining statutory authority over and against clerical or divine authority on the other.\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{58} This is “majoritarian” secularism (what Hurd calls “Judeo-Christian secularism”)—it gives preferential treatment to certain “religious” ideas by assuming that they are shared by all citizens.\textsuperscript{59} However, nationalism can and should be distinguished from religion. See Schilbrack 2013.\textsuperscript{60} See Mahmood and Danchin 2014b.\textsuperscript{61} Jakobsen and Pellegrini 2008; Warner, VanAntwerpen, and Calhoun, eds. 2010.\textsuperscript{62} Hurd 2008; Moyn 2010.\textsuperscript{63} Again, see Hurd’s distinction between “laic” and “Judeo-Christian” secularisms.
In the context of transnational interactions, some secularisms will seem strange or even unrecognizable to those who are embedded in others. Secularisms can be mutually unintelligible. It is certainly true that during the Meiji Constitutional Period Japanese religious leaders, legislators, and bureaucrats understood religious freedom and religion-state relations in ways that would have been counterintuitive to the American occupiers. For example, the Buddhist vision of a complementary relationship between sovereign law and Buddhist dharma was almost certainly anathema to some Americans ensconced in a strong political tradition of rejecting royal authority and an equally strong Protestant tradition of rejecting traditional clerical authority. However, Japanese visions of religion-state relations were neither inauthentic nor illegitimate because they differed from the American variety. Japanese policymakers and

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64 This is particularly true in instances—like the interactions between the United States and Japan—in which one party holds a superior position due to adventitious geopolitical circumstances or deliberate tactical maneuvering. It is obvious that in the unique transnational context of the Occupation, Bunce’s study encapsulated tensions between competing national versions of religion-state relations that were constructed in conjunction with dominant forms of religion in Japan and the United States. The American secularist vision clearly gave primacy of place to Protestant Christian ideals about religion as a matter of interiority and assent to propositional statements of belief; it also valorized antagonistic relationships between religious individuals and excessive clerical authority. The Japanese secularist vision treated empirically unverifiable claims loosely associated with Shintō as non-negotiable facts (Josephson 2012), but it also was premised on Buddhist ideals about the mutually beneficial, complementary relationship between kingly law and Buddhist dharma (Ives 2009).

65 One pitfall in the comparative study of secularisms lies in the possibility of reproducing the same problems that have attended the “world religions” paradigm (see Masuzawa 2005, Owen 2011, and Nongbri 2013 for lucid overviews of what is at stake). There is certainly the danger that discussion of “global secularisms” runs the risk of universalizing the concept of secularism and applying it ahistorically or to inapposite cultural contexts. However, the modern concept of “the secular”—like the modern concept of “religion”—has been constructed not only in European political theory, but also in transnational interactions between Europeans and various “others.” As I have argued elsewhere, as long as these words have existed in their modern senses, they have reflected the interventions of non-European agents. See J.B. Thomas 2014.

66 The American Protestant rejection of royal and papal authority did not necessarily obviate the possibility that religion and politics could mix in America. As Sehat (2010) has argued, for much of American history Protestantism and democracy were understood to be mutually co-constitutive.
religious leaders distributed the capacities of religion and the state somewhat differently from their American counterparts, and like the Americans of the time they sometimes took empirically unverifiable claims to be political facts, but they nevertheless drew substantive distinctions between religion and the state.\textsuperscript{67}

Distinguishing between such “Japanese-style” and “American” varieties of religion-state relations is an important first step—but only a first step—in understanding the conceptual dilemma that Bunce faced when he began research for his study. He was tasked with eradicating a national religion, but targeting one religion for negative treatment in the name of promoting religious freedom would have been hypocritical. At the same time, he could not accept at face value the Japanese constitutional claims that religious freedom was guaranteed and that religion was separated from the state. To do so would not only have undermined the \textit{raison d’être} of the Occupation reforms; accepting the Japanese constitutional model as valid would also have invited the corollary that multiple, equally acceptable modes of religion-state relations existed. While the extent to which Bunce formally and conscientiously thought through this dilemma is unclear, with the benefit of historical hindsight we can see that Bunce needed a way to thoroughly deny the legitimacy of the Japanese distribution of the capacities of religion and state while simultaneously positioning the American version of religion-state relations as the one, true model.

\textsuperscript{67} I am indebted to Jason Josephson’s recent (2012, 94–163) discussion of the Meiji state as being informed by a “Shintō secular” worldview. Like Josephson, I do not assume that secular imaginaries are solely premised on empirically verifiable facts. If secularisms are constructed in conjunction with religions, and if secularisms as bureaucratic and legal projects are based on the “imagined communities” of nations and states, then secularisms necessarily posit some extra-empirical source from which political authority depends (sacral kingship, the sanctified nation) or from which freedom of conscience derives (“belief” as the core component of the citizen). Secularisms operate according to a fiction in which certain beliefs are designated as legitimate.
Bunce therefore turned to anglophone academic scholarship on religion produced by American, British and Japanese scholars. Such research was convenient for his purposes both because it was authoritative and because it consistently described shrine rites and imperial ritual as “religion” (and therefore generally denied that such rites served as expressions of patriotism or civic duty). If Bunce represented one sort of bureaucratic secularist project in that he was trying to reduce the impact of religion on public life, the authoritative tone of scholarship on religion derived from a different sort of secularist vision in which the scholar ostensibly stands outside of her social milieu and dispassionately identifies certain social and cultural phenomena as “religious.” Bunce relied on this academic secular stance in identifying the political-bureaucratic secular of prewar Japan as improper; the same stance allowed him to identify the American political-bureaucratic secular as they only valid option. His dependence on scholars of religion for his historical evidence combined with his non-negotiable directives from the U.S. Department of State, leaving him the single tactic of identifying the Japanese political system as a perversion of a universal norm. In that particular historical moment, this rhetorical move was almost ineluctable because separation of religion from the state and the concept of religious freedom seemed, to the Americans anyway, to be universal ideals that could and should look the same anywhere.

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but optional (religion), others as indisputably “true” (science), and others as illegitimate (superstition). See Josephson 2012, especially 251–262.

68 Dressler and Mandair 2011.

69 This exemplifies the sort of “imperial liberal” thinking described, in different ways, by Schweder (2009) and Brown (2006). Under the aegis of magnanimous concepts such as “tolerance” and abstract ideals of “freedom,” this sort of stance actually arrogates to itself the exclusive ability to identify what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior; it often denigrates non-hegemonic practices (homosexuality, certain religious ways of being, homophobia) as inherently intolerant and therefore in need of reformation.
Some apologetically inclined Japanese scholars have argued that the Shintō Directive was a hypocritical ploy on the part of the Americans. They argue that it imposed a double standard in which Japanese religion-state relations were not evaluated according to the same criteria used to evaluate the relationship between American Christianity and democracy. This is not a wholly inaccurate claim. To offer one cogent example of this sort of critique, the Americans claimed to be teaching the Japanese about the separation of religion from the state, but Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur often explicitly associated the flourishing of democracy with the spread of Christianity, and a push to introduce the words “under God” into the American Pledge of Allegiance recited daily by American children in public schools began during the Occupation (the change ultimately became law in 1954). This was, of course, diametrically opposed to the Occupation reforms recently instituted in Japan, where the recitation of the Imperial Rescript on Education and the veneration of the imperial portrait at public schools had been banned along with any and all references to the idea that the emperor was a direct descendant of Amaterasu.

The Japanese apologists therefore have had considerable grounds for their claims of a double standard; they are probably right as well that the occupiers failed to recognize the validity of Japanese-style religion-state relations. However, here I want to stress that Bunce’s Memorandum did not merely reflect incompatible cultural visions of ideal religion-state relations. I also do not see any evidence that the Shintō Directive was explicitly intended to formalize a double standard in which the Japanese were held to stricter account than the Americans themselves on the subject

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70 The accusation of hypocrisy is a minority position, but influential in Japanese right-wing circles. For one example, see Ōhara 1989. On the idea of a unique “Japanese-style separation of religion and state,” see Yasumaru 1979, 208–211 and Sakamoto and Inoue, eds. 1987. Josephson (2012, 94–165) has recently described the Meiji state as operating under the rubric of the “Shintō secular.”
of separation of religion from the state (even if this was its upshot). Rather, I am arguing that Bunce’s study simultaneously reflected bureaucratic, academic, and apologetic interpretations of religion-state relations as much as it reflected competing national or cultural visions. Specifically, the bureaucratic impulse to limit the impact of religion on public life—the Occupation mandate—relied on scholarship conducted by Japanese, British, and American scholars of religion who tended to read all ritual practices and empirically unverifiable claims as being inherently religious. Sublimated Christian missionary tendencies also exerted considerable influence on the anglophone scholarship about Shintō that Bunce consulted. Consequently, the Staff Memorandum deemed Shintō particularistic and oppressive, contrasting that religion with a set of democratic, liberal principles that were unquestioningly associated with “universal religions” like Protestant Christianity.

These various bureaucratic, academic, and apologetic impulses operated synergistically in Bunce’s account, but not without considerable internal tension. As a bureaucrat serving in an occupying military government, Bunce could not ignore the explicit political objective of strictly separating religion from the state. This objective was ostensibly predicated on a “laic” approach.

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71 See Ōhara 1989.
72 See Dressler and Mandair 2011. Secular systems are not merely constructed in conjunction with the dominant religions of a nation or region, but are also determined by perspective: bureaucrats and politicians may advance top-down understandings of secularism as a state project, which may correspond or conflict with clergies’ distinctions between religion and heresy, which may in turn substantiate or undermine academics’ definitions of religion as a discrete field of human experience. To offer a few brief examples from foregoing scholarship on the Japanese case, Sheldon Garon (1997, 60–87) has persuasively shown that mainstream religious leaders helped the Shōwa state define orthodoxy by treating certain groups such as Ōmotokyō and Hitonomichi as deleterious “superstitions.” Maekawa Michiko’s 2013 dissertation shows that religious studies in Japan consistently offered theoretical support for state initiatives. The role of journalism in establishing orthodoxy and heterodoxy “from outside” is also crucial: Sawada (2004) shows that journalists helped to bring about the downfall of the marginal religious movement Renmonkyō in the late 1890s, and Dorman (2012) has traced the dual role of journalists as “watchdogs” and “servants” of the state.
to religion-state relations that saw religion as a polluting influence in politics and governance and
vice versa, but it also imperfectly masked a majoritarian approach that saw religious freedom and
separation of religion from the state as uniquely Western, Christian contributions to world
civilization. American policymakers of the time easily slid between these two idioms when
discussing religious freedom and religion-state relations, often with confusing results. Did Japan
need to Christianize in order to institute “proper” democratic religious freedom, and if so, what
kind of religious freedom worth the name demanded conversion to a particular religion?

With the benefit of historical hindsight (and with the foregoing discussion of secularisms in
mind), I suggest that Bunce’s “Memorandum on State Shintō” treated an essentially secular
system of Japanese statecraft as a national religion. This allowed him to fulfill his professional
duties and provided a suitable rationale for predetermined Occupation reforms. It also had lasting
consequences in that it used the category of “State Shintō”—a category that until that point had
not enjoyed consistent academic or bureaucratic usage in or outside of Japan—to designate one
variety of religion-state relations as heretical. I discuss the consequences of this move below.

**Exclusive Similarity: State Shintō as a Heretical Secularism**

Bunce settled on the language of “State Shintō” because the implied existence of a coercive
national religion allowed him to describe prewar and wartime Japanese claims about separation
of religion and the state and protection of religious freedom as inherently flawed. This was an act
of what Jason Ānanda Josephson has recently termed “exclusive similarity.”73 Briefly, as part of
a larger argument about how the category of religion operates as a tool of statecraft, Josephson
distinguishes between “hierarchical inclusion,” in which foreign or competing ideas are

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73 Josephson 2012, 24; 29–38.
subsumed within a preexisting hierarchy as being simply different names for familiar concepts (Josephson uses the example of Japanese Buddhists understanding the Christian word *Deus* as just another name for the cosmic buddha Dainichi Nyorai), on the one hand, and “exclusive similarity,” on the other. Whereas hierarchical inclusion accepts alternative viewpoints as essentially the same if outwardly different, exclusive similarity operates by treating alternative viewpoints as superficially similar but essentially different (usually with one ultimately being deemed inferior to the other). Josephson applies this distinction to early encounters between Japanese and Europeans in which the abstract category of “religion” was not yet established as a universal category that superseded cultural differences. In that historical context, both the Japanese and the Europeans (Jesuit missionaries) had two options: they could treat the other as doing something essentially the same (Buddhism as a pale imitation of Christianity, for example), or they could treat the other as essentially different (Buddhism as heresy, from the Christian perspective).

Josephson helpfully outlines how such acts of exclusive similarity create categories such as “heresy” and “superstition” that in turn contribute to the constitution of orthodoxy. Importantly, the creation of such orthodoxy is not limited to mere doctrinal distinctions, but also extends to the problem of whether a certain set of beliefs and practices is regarded as (acceptable) “religion,” spurious “superstition,” or authoritative “science.” As he argues, religion, the secular (=science) and superstition form a “trinary” of mutually constitutive forces. Josephson himself is concerned primarily with how the category of religion entered Japan and how the encounter between the Japanese and their European interlocutors created new understandings of religion based on “exclusive similarity.” However, while he devotes several chapters explicitly to the discussion of what he terms the “Shinto secular,” Josephson does not apply his own theoretical model to the
ways in which competing secularisms (like competing “religions”) can be negotiated through hierarchical inclusion and exclusive similarity. While comparative study of secularisms easily runs the risk of reproducing the problems that attend the “world religions” paradigm (namely, such attempts easily favor Eurocentric models and frequently fail to account for how cross-cultural and transnational encounters contribute to the formation of “religion” or “secularism”), such comparison can elucidate how different interest groups construct competing understandings of secularism in international, national, and subnational contexts.74

Building on Josephson’s stimulating work, I would like to suggest that Bunce’s study (and the Shintō Directive that followed it) exemplified an act of “exclusive similarity.” Both documents used the phrase “State Shintō” to designate a particular variety of religion-state relations—the system enshrined in the Meiji Constitution and modulated through later bureaucratic endeavors—as similar to an implied norm but nevertheless illegitimate. Both documents acknowledged that the Japanese government had formally separated religion from the state, but simultaneously they denied that such separation had been successful. This categorical distinction was rhetorically effective because the very nomenclature of “State Shintō” implied that the target of critique was an oppressive, particularist state religion that wedded religion to the state rather than separating religion from it. The one true model of religion-state relations and religious freedom existed among the Allied powers, and the self-appointed task of the American occupiers was to establish that model in Japan by eradicating the heretical abomination that currently existed.

The account set forward in Bunce’s Memorandum was compelling because it was straightforward. It described Shintō as a primitive religion that lagged behind more civilized

74 In addition to such negotiations at the scale of international relations (as in the Occupation),
religions by millennia in terms of its development. At the same time, the Memorandum argued that Shintō had also served as a particularly effective force in mobilizing the Japanese citizenry in support of the war effort. It suggested that as religion Shintō was particularly weak, but that as political ideology it was uniquely strong. This paradoxical assessment derived from the scholarship that Bunce used in crafting his account. Between the pressures of a pressing deadline, inflexible directives from above, a predetermined outcome, and his own lack of expertise, Bunce turned to academic sources that could provide him with the necessary tools to identify what exactly was wrong with Japanese religion-state relations.

The Scholarship that Informed the Staff Memorandum on State Shintō

In this section I trace Bunce’s citations of anglophone scholarship (including Japanese scholarship in translation) in order to show how specific ideas were taken from their original contexts and used in the service of establishing the concept of “State Shintō” and using it to show that Japanese religion-state relations were inherently flawed. My aim in doing so is not only to show the provenance of the conceptual tools Bunce used to conduct his bureaucratic task, but also to show how the new field of religious studies was marshaled in the service of formulating major international policy.

By the time of the Occupation, religious studies already had a long history in Japan, and Japanese scholars of religion had exerted pressure on various bureaucratic and legislative initiatives during the Meiji Constitutional Period. By contrast, in the United States religious negotiations also occur at national and subnational scales. See Dressler and Mandair 2011.
studies was only just emerging as a field separate from theology, anthropology, and history at the
time of the Pacific War. Despite the fact that the new field was barely established (and the
distinctions between descriptive religious studies and normative theology still largely unclear)
American policymakers quickly seized upon religious studies expertise in preparing for the
Occupation.76

This “operationalization” of religious studies expertise in the context of American foreign
and military policy was new, but it would eventually become the norm.77 Today a network of
think tanks, funding organizations, confessional lobbies, and government agencies produces a
steady stream of research on religion that can be used in foreign policy, but at the time of the
Occupation inexpert military personnel like Bunce cobbled together the best information they
could from material produced by expert researchers.78 This political aspect of religious studies
has not received much scholarly attention to date, but it deserves sustained inquiry not only
because it reveals domestic and international ramifications of the academic study of religion, but

father-in-law—served as a member of the Religious Systems Investigation Committee (Shūkyō
Seido Chōsa Kai) that deliberated over the controversial religions legislation discussed in
Chapter Four. That legislation was eventually passed as the Religious Organizations Law of
1939.
76 The occupiers tried to get University of Tokyo scholar of religion Aneesaki Masaharu to serve
as an official advisor to the Occupation (Kishimoto ultimately served in his stead due to
Aneesaki’s failing health); they also hoped to have Holtom serve as an advisor on Shintō.
77 I am indebted to Gregorio Bettiza and Elizabeth Shakman Hurd for brief but stimulating
conversations on the “operationalization” of religious studies expertise at the Global Secularisms
conference held at New York University in November 2013.
78 This is not to say that no academic infrastructure existed for studying “the Japanese mind”
during the Pacific War. Ruth Benedict’s famous The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (1946) is
one example of the use of anthropology for foreign policy. I have found Amy Borovoy’s recent
research on Benedict very helpful in thinking about this issue.
also because it can show how scholarly categorizations of “religion” and “not-religion” dovetail with the bureaucratic definitions of the same.\(^7^9\)

**Bunce’s Account**

Bunce argued that the Japanese state gave Shintō undue political preference so that Shintō enjoyed preeminent status not only as a *de facto* national religion, but also as the ideological glue that held the nation together and undergirded Japanese militarism. He argued that religious freedom was paid mere lip service in the 1889 constitution and that in actuality religious freedom existed only on the books but not in actual practice. Together, these powerful claims bolstered the Occupation initiative to designate certain ritual practices (venerating the emperor) and ideas (Japan as a divine nation) as essentially “religious” and therefore inappropriate in governance or public school education; they also provided theoretical rationales for positive Occupation reforms such as efforts to instill a “desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese people.\(^8^0\)

Bunce’s Memorandum cited a set of writings by British and American missionary-scholars such as W.G. Aston (1841–1911), Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850–1935), and D.C. Holtom (1884–1962), as well as books in English by a couple of Japanese scholars of religion such as Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949) and Katō Genchi (1873–1965). Against the Japanese government’s argument that shrine rites were civic rites rather than religious ritual, these scholars all deemed such rites as incontrovertibly part of Shintō and furthermore treated Shintō as a religion (however, their reasons for doing so varied considerably). While all of them also shared an evolutionary concept of religion that placed universalistic religions above “primitive”

\(^7^9\) Here it is worth highlighting the similar “operationalization” of area studies expertise during World War II and the Cold War. Many of the chief centers for East Asian studies at Ivy League institutions trace their origins to American military and intelligence initiatives.

\(^8^0\) This chapter focuses on the negative aim of disestablishing “State Shintō”; Chapter Five focuses on the positive aim of instilling a “desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese people.
ones (usually considered “national” or “ethnic”), they differed on how to position Shintō vis-à-vis other religions. As I will show momentarily, the Japanese scholar who actually provided the phrase “State Shintō” rejected the idea that Shintō was inherently primitive, but in Bunce’s Memorandum the idea of Shintō’s primitive nature was reintroduced and even strengthened.

Shintō is Primitive and Artificial: W.G. Aston and Basil Hall Chamberlain

It is hardly surprising that early twentieth century texts emphasized the ostensibly “primitive” nature of Shintō, given that the emergent concept of “world religions” in the late nineteenth century organized religions taxonomically by ranking them on a scale of evolutionary development.81 While specific criteria regarding how to position certain religions varied among scholars, by the turn of the twentieth century the basic rubric used by many scholars of religion placed “universal religions” above “ethnic” ones, with the presupposition that the particularism of ethnic religions such as Daoism and Shintō would lead to their eventual extinction, while the universalism of Christianity (of course) and Buddhism (provided that it looked like Protestant Christianity) would ensure their survival. Bunce reproduced this view in the Memorandum: “[State Shintō] does not, like a universal religion such as Christianity or Buddhism, center on the individual and thus transcend national boundaries. Of necessity, it is racialistic and nationalistic.”82

The notion that Shintō was doomed to eventual extinction was not stated outright in the document, but Bunce explicitly repeated D.C. Holtom’s claim that Shintō was an outmoded religion lagging behind the evolution of occidental religions by some two to four thousand

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81 Masuzawa 2005. The understanding of evolution that undergirded such accounts was flawed in that it was teleological (progressing towards a predetermined goal) rather than adventitious (accidents of environment and random mutation spurring adaptation and speciation).

82 Memorandum, p. 328.
The Memorandum also emphasized the artificial nature of modern Shintō in its explicit indebtedness to Basil Hall Chamberlain’s 1912 pamphlet *The Invention of a New Religion*, which took a rather suspicious view of Japanese statecraft in the late Meiji era. At a time when his compatriots were admiring Japan’s rapid industrialization and even wondering whether Japan might eventually eclipse Great Britain as the world’s next great empire, Chamberlain wrote with awe and trepidation about the extent to which (and the alacrity with which) the Japanese populace embraced the obviously fabricated ritual calendar and imperial mythology. Chamberlain very forcefully argued that the Japanese ruling class had shrewdly concocted an irrational state cult for the purposes of nation-building, a cult in which the state officials “believe even though [they] know it is not true.” Bunce cited Chamberlain’s pamphlet in the Memorandum to highlight the artificial, and therefore illegitimate, nature of modern Shintō.

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83 Holtom 1995 [1938], 3.
84 Aston 1905, 376–377.
85 “Memorandum,” p. 322.
87 Chamberlain 1912, 27.
88 “Memorandum,” 324.
British observers had some of the earliest words in the English-language scholarship on Shintō, but they certainly did not have the last.\footnote{89} The Japanese academy had embraced the new field of the scientific study of religion (Religionswissenschaft) relatively early—well before its inauguration in universities in the United States—and several young Japanese intellectuals traveled to Europe to study philology and comparative religion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.\footnote{90} Building upon the successes of Inoue Tetsujirō’s (1855–1944) lectures in the late nineteenth century, Tokyo Imperial University established a regular lecture (kōza) in Religious Studies (shūkyōgaku) in 1905 and a separate department for the subject in 1918.\footnote{91} Scholars in the university’s Religious Studies department became tremendously influential on Western understandings of Japanese religions over the first half of the twentieth century.\footnote{92} This was particularly true in the case of Anesaki Masaharu, who served as longtime chair of the department and who spent a year lecturing on Japanese religions and culture at Harvard University between 1914 and 1915.

The occupiers had hoped to enlist Anesaki’s aid in the formulation of religions policy, but Anesaki’s failing health precluded his participation (he died in 1949).\footnote{93} Anesaki’s son-in-law and eventual successor as chair of the University of Tokyo Religious Studies department, Kishimoto Hideo, served as primary advisor to the occupiers in his father-in-law’s stead.

\footnote{89} Very recently, Jason Josephson has indicated that Japanese scholars were directly involved in the creation of the idea of “Japanese religions” from the very outset. This important historical point challenges in part Tomoko Masuzawa’s (2005) claim that the “world religions” paradigm was simply an expression of European magnanimity, of how “European universalism was preserved in the language of pluralism.” See J.B. Thomas 2014, referring to Josephson 2012, 192–223.
\footnote{90} On religious studies in Japan, see Hayashi and Isomae, eds. 2008.
\footnote{91} See Isomae 2003 and Takahashi 2008.
\footnote{92} Josephson (2012) has shown that Japanese intellectuals wielded influence on Western understandings of Japanese religions from basically the moment that the words “Japanese” and “religion” were juxtaposed.
Anesaki’s interpretations therefore held particular influence on Occupation religions policy both directly (in his publications on Japanese religions in English) and indirectly through his protégé and relative Kishimoto. In addition to enjoying Kishimoto’s private tutelage, in his compilation of the Memorandum Bunce consulted Anesaki’s *A History of Japanese Religions* (a compilation of his lectures at Harvard University in 1914–1915 that was finished in 1928 and published in 1930) and *The Religious Life of the Japanese People* (published in 1936 and revised in 1938). However, Bunce creatively read—or willfully ignored—some of Anesaki’s points about the status of Shintō vis-à-vis the state.

Anesaki’s primary contribution to the academic conversation on Shintō was his treatment of Shintō as Japan’s indigenous religion and his claim that it was a unique religion distinct from Buddhism. The significance of this claim should not be underestimated. It functioned apologetically, using the language of *religionswissenschaft* to identify as religion a set of ritual practices that Europeans and Americans would likely have described as “primitive” or even “heathen.” This portrayal would come to dominate scholarship on Japanese religions for many decades, with the apologetic aspect of the project trumping several inconvenient historical truths: imperial ritual, local shrine rites, and *jingi* veneration did not necessarily constitute a

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94 Kishimoto’s considerable influence on Occupation policy deserves a separate treatment, which I provide in Chapter Six. Suffice it to say here that, as mentioned above, he served as Bunce’s primary local authority on Japanese religions and lectured Bunce on more than one occasion. Like his father-in-law, Kishimoto spent time at Harvard, earning an M.A. there in 1934. Kishimoto preferred psychological and sociological explanations of religion to his father-in-law’s phenomenological history of religions approach.
95 The book was also very poorly revised by Kishimoto in 1961.
96 This interpretation was later debunked by Kuroda Toshio. While advocates of the “Shintō as Japan’s indigenous religion” position still exist, in general scholarly trends have moved away from this interpretation. See Havens 2006 and Breen and Teeuwen 2010 for good overviews of the field of Shintō studies. In addition to Kuroda’s article, Teeuwen (2002) on the historical development of Shintō as a discrete religion is indispensable reading.
comprehensive system; Shintō had not existed separate from Buddhism for much of Japanese history; and the modern creation of Shintō as a religion distinct from Buddhism was intimately connected with nativist and nationalist projects.\footnote{See Kuroda 1981; Teeuwen 2002; Havens 2006; Breen and Teeuwen 2010.}

Anesaki was clearly aware of some of these historical facts. In his 1930 English-language book Anesaki claimed that Shintō, as Japan’s indigenous (if diffuse) religion, came closest to the national religion of the Japanese people in a cultural sense. However, he was careful to distinguish between Shintō as a shared set of cultural values and ritual practices, on the one hand, and periodic attempts to wed Shintō to the authority of the state on the other. He also indicated that Buddhism, more than Shintō, had actually served as an official state religion for large spans of Japanese history.\footnote{Anesaki 1963 (1930), 9–10.}

To Anesaki, the fate of essentially agrarian Shintō in a rapidly industrializing empire was a matter of pessimistic speculation. By no means did he assume that Shintō was Japan’s indissoluble state religion when he revised his lectures in 1928.\footnote{Anesaki 1963 (1930), 7.} At that time, Anesaki concluded his analysis of Shintō thus:

Lastly, in considering Shintō we must distinguish two categories in its working. One is the official cult of the State, supported by the Government and the communities, the other is the Shintō bodies furnished with church organizations and treated on the same footing as other religious bodies [i.e., the Shintō sects]. The official interpretation is that the Shintō of the first category is not a religion but a part of public institutions. Therein emphasis is laid on the sanctity of the Throne, and its practical efficiency is sought in making the local sanctuary [shrine] the centre of the communal life, with which are associated the local organizations of young men and women. In recent years much effort has been spent in enforcing this official Shintō as a weapon against “dangerous thoughts”; but its efficacy is doubtful, to say the least, because it is mostly in the hands of political leaders much guided by conventions and expediencies. In fact, there is much artificiality in the conventional interpretation that this Shintō is not a religion, but there is some truth too, both because the exponents of the theory are
men who are anything but religious and because their sincerity is not unquestionable.\textsuperscript{100}

Anesaki’s evident suspicion of political leaders’ motives in distinguishing “civic” from “religious” Shintō reflected his academic predilections as much as it reflected historical fact. As I mentioned in an earlier section, it is absolutely true that the status of Shintō as a religion or as a non-religion was a matter of considerable debate during the early Shōwa era (1926–1989) when Anesaki was working on his books. Anesaki astutely recognized the inconsistencies in governmental claims on the subject even as he allowed that there might be some truth to the claims that shrine rites were not religious.

However (and as his description of the proponents of such claims as “men who are anything but religious” indicates), Anesaki brought to his project a normative conception about what constituted “real” religion. While the criteria on which he based this assessment are unclear, Anesaki’s position as a scholar of religion allowed him to make this judgment from “outside” about the relationship between Shintō, state, and society that could both accept and challenge bureaucratic-political and theological claims. What is important here is that Anesaki’s treatment of the “Shintō secular” occurred in the context of his pessimistic speculation about whether Shintō would survive the process of Japan’s industrialization. In other words, he saw the “Shintō as a non-religious” claim as an abrogation of the very criteria that allowed Shintō to operate as “Japan’s indigenous religion.” Real Shintō, in his account, was an endangered species.

While Anesaki treated “Shintō” as unambiguously religious and followed the academic trends of the day in regarding it as Japan’s indigenous religion, he also appealed to evidentiary historiography when he questioned the claim that Shintō had always been associated with Japanese statecraft or had consistently served as the “national religion” of the Japanese people.

\textsuperscript{100} Anesaki 1963 (1930), 407–408.
For example, in a chapter entitled “Shintō, the National and Ethnic Religion” that appeared in the 1938 reprint of his 1936 book, Anesaki rather perplexingly undermined his own chapter title by arguing that descriptions of Shintō as Japan’s national religion were “misleading, if not erroneous.” Anesaki wrote in general agreement of the official government position that shrines were state institutions more than they were religious institutions, but he also pointed out the ambiguous positions of shrine priests, who were nominally state employees but were actually financially supported by donations for their “religious” ritual services. Anesaki settled on the approach of describing Shintō as an indigenous tradition that deeply infused Japanese religiosity as a whole but did not have a strong “religious” character; he treated the state cult as a largely successful attempt to “secularize” formerly religious institutions.

This move, which took place against the backdrop of powerful political figures attempting to harness Shintō for nation-building purposes, allowed Anesaki to register his suspicion of nationalist claims about the non-religious status of Shintō. It also allowed him to argue that shrine priests were essentially religious practitioners, no matter what the government claimed. Anesaki used his position of academic authority to question the bureaucratic-political parsing of religion and secular. As a scholar of religion, Anesaki positioned himself “outside” both religion and politics, arrogating to himself a superior vantage point from which he could (cautiously) register suspicion of the government’s claims. This aspect of Anesaki’s work would be crucial for Bunce’s arguments.

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101 Anesaki 1938, 15.
102 Presumably Anesaki was referring to rites like groundbreaking ceremonies, or jichinsai, and ritual purifications, or oharae.
103 It bears mentioning that the official state orthodoxy solidified around 1937, when the Ministry of Education published the Kokutai no hongi, an educational tract targeted to a general readership that explicitly tied the modern emperor to the sun goddess Amaterasu and suggested that shrine rites were a civic duty.
As a final point of interest, in a footnote to the passage from his 1930 book cited above, Anesaki criticized contemporary thinkers who “try to give a new interpretation on this national cult … import[ing] too much their own new ideas, often borrowed from Occidental thought, and their interpretations are often far-fetched and artificial.” It seems that one thinker to whom Anesaki may have been obliquely referring was his junior colleague, Katō Genchi.

**Shintō is the Universalistic Yet National Religion of Japan: Katō Genchi**

Katō Genchi was born the scion of a prestigious Buddhist temple in Tokyo, but he exhibited an ornery streak from an early age, first by joining the anti-sacerdotalist Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai (Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists) and then by breaking ranks with that group over differences of opinion about the group’s mission. Katō was three years junior to Anesaki at Tokyo Imperial University, and like Anesaki he was greatly indebted to Inoue Tetsujirō’s foundational lectures on comparative religion. Unlike Anesaki, however, Katō never had the opportunity to study abroad. He nevertheless seems to have had considerable facility in English, and published not only in that language but also in German and what appears to be Esperanto.

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104 Anesaki 1963 (1930), 408.
105 I discuss Katō’s involvement with this group, better known as the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai (Fraternity [or Association] of New Buddhists), in Chapter Three. Katō’s early dissatisfaction with the New Buddhists was based on the fact that the Fraternity was devoted exclusively to the reform of Buddhism. He wholeheartedly agreed with the New Buddhist project to eliminate “superstition” and outdated customs, but he also wanted to extend the scope of the organization’s efforts to all religions. Despite these differences, like the New Buddhists Katō was extremely interested in reconciling religion with science and in replacing outmoded forms of religion with superior ones. Katō’s very strong commitment to Social Darwinist principles of religion, which ranked “universalistic” religions above “primitive” ones, seems to have derived equally from his experience with the New Buddhists and from his experience studying with Inoue Tetsujirō at Tokyo Imperial University. Sakaino Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yōnen jidai,” SB 6, no. 4 (1905).
107 The online archive of article titles maintained by the Meiji Japan Society gives an indication of the breadth of Katō’s interests (as well as a sense of his coterie). See the list at [http://www.mkc.gr.jp/seitoku/vol.1-20.htm](http://www.mkc.gr.jp/seitoku/vol.1-20.htm). Katō’s personal correspondence with D.C. Holtom indicates that his facility with English was considerable. D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder #4.
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chairled the religious studies department at Tokyo Imperial University, Katō gave lectures on Shintō there for about twenty years (he was never made full professor). Katō also founded the Meiji Japan Society (Meiji Seitoku Kinen Gakkai, promulgated in 1912 and formally established in 1920) and served as a professor at Kokugakuin University before he was purged as part of Occupation reforms in late 1945.

Katō ended his life in obscurity, but he retained a group of devoted students and continued to offer monthly lectures at his suburban home until his death. Despite his prestigious academic appointments, Katō’s idiosyncratic views seem to have placed him at the periphery of mainstream academic circles (other, of course, than the Meiji Japan Society, which he founded). Despite his somewhat marginal position, Katō would come to wield incredible influence on understandings of Shintō through his protégé, D.C. Holtom.

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108 The short-lived chair in Shintō Studies was established after his retirement in 1933, although Shintō lectures were established by 1920 and a separate department of Shintō Studies was established in 1923. The language of “Shintō Studies” (Shintōgaku) was inaugurated in 1924. See Isomae 2003, 199–221, esp. 212–219.

109 As part of the Occupation reforms, teachers, professors, politicians, and other public figures who were known to have espoused “ultranationalism” were removed from their posts. The irony here is that Occupation mistrust of “State Shintō” was almost wholly indebted to Katō’s student, D.C. Holtom. Katō created the very concept that led to his own purge.

110 See Hylkema-Vos 1990 and the biography compiled by Shimazono Susumu, Maekawa Michiko, and Hara Takashi in KGS, volume 9 (2004). In a letter to D.C. Holtom dated 7 June 1950 Katō complained of his inability to conduct research due to his failing eyesight, the loss of his personal library during the firebombing of Tokyo, and his retirement to Gotenba following his purge (D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder #4). Although he had been purged from his professorial post at Kokugakuin University after the war, Katō apparently served as a professional authority on Shintō for a legal case concerning the status of the Kotohira Shrine in Honolulu in April 1950. RCR Box #5774, Folder #15, “Some Aspects of Shintō” (21 April 1950).

111 Miyamoto 2006, 319.

112 Miyamoto 2006
Over the course of the Taishō era, Katō developed his peculiar view of Shintō as a universal “world religion.”\(^{113}\) This interpretation went quite against the grain for a scholar of religion in this period, when non-evangelistic religions such as Shintō and Daoism were generally understood to be “national” or “ethnic” religions. In his landmark 1926 English-language book *A Study of Shintō*, Katō argued that Shintō was not only a universalistic religion, but one that equaled—if not surpassed—individualistic religions such as Christianity and Buddhism.

Katō claimed that it was precisely because of its fusion of religion with nationalism that Shintō had a unique aspect. This reflected contemporary intellectual trends in that many thinkers of the 1920s and 1930s shared a sanguine view of the state as the best unit for organizing human societies. In the aftermath of World War II nationalism would be viewed with considerable suspicion, but in the early Shōwa era (1926–1989) many people thought of nationalism in positive terms. Association of particular religions with specific “civilizations” was also the norm.\(^{114}\) Katō’s ready embrace of nationalism and his willingness to praise Shintō as a nationalist religion in the prewar and wartime period reveals, in part, the drastic nature of the humanist turn in understandings of religion, religious freedom, and religion-state relations that took place after the war.

It is Katō we can thank for the academic category of State Shintō, although he did not use the term negatively.\(^{115}\) Rather, Katō suggested that although State Shintō (he used the term *Kokkateki Shintō* when writing in Japanese) was ostensibly a secular arm of the state that could

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\(^{113}\) Miyamoto (2006) traces the development of Katō’s idiosyncratic yet highly influential perspective on Shintō in his Japanese-language writings. Since the purpose of this essay is to examine the works that would most likely have influenced Bunce, I have chosen to focus on Katō’s English-language books. Miyamoto persuasively demonstrates that Katō’s views influenced Holtom, who in turn influenced Bunce.

\(^{114}\) Huntington’s famous (and highly problematic) “clash of civilizations” thesis (1996) would have been perfectly at home in the early 1940s.
be subdivided into civic ritual performed at shrines (jinja Shintō) and national morality taught in
schools (kokutai Shintō), in actuality all of these collectively formed a religion that was part and
parcel of Japanese nationhood from time immemorial. “The present writer … advances the view
that Shintō—the State Shintō as well as the Sectarian Shintō—is in very truth a religion, i.e., the
original religion of the Japanese people, or, otherwise stated, the religion of the Japanese people
from the very beginning down to the present time.”

Likewise, in a 1935 handbook entitled What Is Shintō? that was published by the Japanese
Government Railways Board of Tourist Industry as part of its “Tourist Library” series, Katō
wrote:

Shintō, characterised as faith in the Jinnō or Divine Rule of the nation, is not a
religion a posteriori adopted purposely by the State as in the case of the State
religion in a Western country, but the religion a priori of the heart and life of
every Japanese subject, male and female, high and low, old and young, educated
or illiterate. This is the reason why a Japanese never ceases to be a Shintōist, i.e.,
an inborn steadfast holder of the national faith, or one who embraces the national
faith or the Way of the Gods as a group or folk religion, as distinguished from a
personal or individual religion, even though he may accept the tenets of
Buddhism or Confucianism—probably Christianity here in Japan not being
excepted—as his personal or individual religion. In effect this amounts to saying
that abjuration by Japanese of the National Shintō Faith would mean treachery to
the Empire and disloyalty to its Divine Ruler. …

As demonstrated above Shintō is truly the faith of the Japanese people from of old.
It is thus a national religion and so has an aspect of particularism or separatism or
exclusionism like Judaism, but at the same time it is by no means devoid of a
noble spirit of religious universalism.

Katō went on to draw a distinction between “theocratic” religions such as Christianity and
“theanthropic” religions such as Shintō; the latter were, of course, more tolerant than Judaism,
Christianity, and “Mohammedanism.” Katō’s apologetic statements about what he called

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115 See Miyamoto 2006.
“Kokkateki Shintō” (State Shintō) thus served as part of his larger project of asserting the unique and superior character of Japanese Shintō through the language of comparative religion.\(^{119}\) This positive view of “State Shintō” provided fodder for Bunce’s Memorandum not only by giving him a concept articulated by a local intellectual, but also by presenting “State Shintō” as thoroughly pervasive and inextricably linked with Japanese national and ethnic identity.

Incidentally, while Katō’s sanguine view of (what he thought of as) State Shintō was rare for a scholar of religion at his time, we should not assume that this rather romanticized view of Shintō was limited to Japanese scholars. One contributor to the journal of the Meiji Japan Society who wrote admiringly of the religion (he dedicated his book, *The Meaning of Shintō*, “to the memory of Sujin Sumera Mikoto”) was J.W.T. Mason (1879–1941). Mason was convinced of the unique aesthetic and intuitive qualities of Shintō, which he believed formed a particularly powerful antidote to the poisons of intellectualism and materialism. Mason’s book struck a missiological tone, calling for the active instruction of Shintō both in Japan and beyond its borders. His book is particularly striking for its late publication date of 1935.

*State Shintō is Dangerous: D.C. Holtom*

Katō greatly influenced the American missionary-scholar Daniel Clarence Holtom, and it is through the medium of Holtom’s writings on Shintō that Katō’s understanding of State Shintō came to wield such inordinate influence on Allied post-surrender policy.\(^{120}\) While Holtom was generally sympathetic to the Japanese people and notably resistant to his compatriots’ vitriolic anti-Japanese sentiment, he took an increasingly suspicious stance toward Shintō over the course

\(^{119}\) Miyamoto 2006.

\(^{120}\) The mutual affection and respect between the two men is apparent in their correspondence, and Katō regularly gave Holtom offprints of his articles. Nevertheless, Holtom did not accept all of Katō’s ideas at face value; he seems to have been fully aware that Katō’s interpretations of Shintō were hardly mainstream. See Holtom 1927, 445–446.
of his academic career. Holtom had been asked to participate in the Occupation as an advisor or overseer of religious affairs, but he declined, citing his poor health. It must be noted that Holtom was the authority on Shintō in the United States at the onset of the Occupation; the lack of any suitable replacement meant that Walter Nichols, who had grown up in the Kansai region as the son of an Episcopal Bishop and had some facility with the Japanese language, took on the role of liaison with Shintō groups for Religions Division.

Holtom was a Baptist missionary who spent most of his adult life in Japan. He moved to Japan to begin his missionary work in 1910, and during his time in the country he served as Professor of Modern Languages at Tokyo Gakuin (1914–1915), Professor of Church History at Japan Baptist Theological Seminary (1915–1925), Professor of History at Kanto Gakuin (1926–1936), and Dean of Theology at Aoyama Gakuin (1936–1940). At some point during this time,

121 Holtom’s writings on Shintō are summarized below.
122 Woodard 1972, 26. In a letter to Katō Genchi dated 26 October 1950, Holtom said that he very much wished to return to Japan, but that the medical examiners would not give him permission. Holtom faded rather quickly from the international scene once the Occupation was underway. He seems to have had trouble publishing his work, and he complained of battling with “confusion” during the years of 1942 and 1943. He never finished a book manuscript on Japanese religions on which he was working in his retirement, and it seems that he struggled to keep pace with the rapid changes in the state of Japanese religions during and after the Occupation. His last major publication was a chapter in an edited volume on world religions published by Princeton University Press in 1946 (see Jurji, ed. 1946), but correspondence reveals that Holtom attempted, unsuccessfully, to publish at least one other article afterward. An article he submitted to Philosophy East & West in 1953 was rejected because of a problematic opening section that Holtom was evidently unwilling to revise or cut. While the actual content of this manuscript is now unclear, I speculate that Holtom’s arguments were already perceived as outdated by this time. D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folders #4 (correspondence with Charles A. Moore, editor of Philosophy East & West), # 29 (correspondence with Earle B. Cross about the publication of the Rauschenbusch Lectures that Holtom delivered at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in Spring 1942), and #54 (correspondence with Edward Jurji re: Holtom’s contribution to the aforementioned edited volume). Note that folder #54 is not found on the current version of the finding aid for the D.C. Holtom Papers, as the contents of this folder were found interspersed with Holtom’s Haskell Lectures at the time of my visit to the archive (17–18 March 2011).
123 Dorman 2012, 92.
124 For Holtom’s biography, see Haring 1963.
probably in the late 1910s or the very early 1920s, Holtom studied Shintō under Katō’s supervision.\(^{125}\) Although he had traveled back to the United States periodically for short lectureships during his long tenure in Japan, Holtom returned to the United States for good in 1941. He spent a year living in Palo Alto before retiring to San Gabriel, California. From there he watched the developments of the Pacific War from afar while being called upon occasionally for his expertise on Shintō through contributions to government policies, academic journals, university lectures, radio programs, and missionary magazines.

Holtom delivered Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago in the summer of 1940 that were published in 1943 as a book entitled *Modern Japan and Shintō Nationalism*. That book, along with *The National Faith of Japan* (1938) and his doctoral dissertation, the *Political Philosophy of Shintō* (1922), served as the main sources of information on Shintō for Bunce and others directly involved in forming Occupation disestablishment policy.\(^{126}\)

While Holtom’s early writings were hardly apologetic, they were somewhat sympathetic, and he was obviously at pains to show how a seemingly “primitive” religion could exhibit great sophistication. He was, for example, apparently distraught to find how poorly his American compatriots regarded Japan and how they viewed Shintō as “heathen” (throughout his career Holtom seems to have resisted chauvinism in both its Japanese and American manifestations).\(^{127}\) However, if Katō supplied Holtom with the category of “State Shintō,” Holtom’s scholarship contributed significantly to an interpretation of the term that was decidedly more suspicious than

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\(^{125}\) Shimazono et al. 2004, 29. Katō’s influence is quite evident in the series of articles that Holtom published on “The Meaning of Kami” in *Monumenta Nipponica* in 1940 and 1941, especially in the second installment. Holtom was evidently quite attracted to Katō’s mobilization of Western academic theories of religion in support of his statements that Shintō was unambiguously religious. Katō regularly sent copies of his own articles to Holtom.

\(^{126}\) Woodard 1972; Sakamoto 2005, 168.

\(^{127}\) Haring 1963, 892.
that of his mentor.\textsuperscript{128} Holtom borrowed this term and Kato’s focus on the “national psychology” of the Japanese people and used them to promote a view of the national cult as a shrewd and largely successful ploy to eradicate all traces of liberalism, democracy, and freedom of religion from Japanese social and political life.\textsuperscript{129} Kato had described “State Shinto” in glowing terms as an exemplar of the promise of the fusion of religious ideals with national sentiment; Holtom turned this phrase into an imprecation that highlighted the illegitimate nature of the state cult each time he used it.

From the time he published his doctoral dissertation in 1922 (\textit{The Political Philosophy of Shinto}), Holtom took a critical view of the official line that Shinto was not a religion. Focusing in particular on the 1900 separation of the Bureau of Shrines from the Bureau of Religions within the Home Ministry, Holtom suggested that this move was a rhetorical sleight of hand that allowed the government to assert the suprareligious status of Shinto.\textsuperscript{130} Holtom thereby turned Kato’s assertion that Shinto was unambiguously religious in the opposite direction. Rather than arguing that Shinto was actually a religion and superior to other religions in its nationalistic aspect, Holtom suggested that Shinto was actually a religion but an outmoded one that had been manipulated for political use.\textsuperscript{131}

Further refinement of this line of argumentation characterized Holtom’s later works. In \textit{The National Faith of Japan: A Study of Modern Shinto} (1938), Holtom clarified his position by

\textsuperscript{128} Holtom used the phrase “official Shinto” in his 1922 book and a subsequent 1927 article, but by 1938 had started to use the phrase “State Shinto.” Kato’s aforementioned book was published in 1926.

\textsuperscript{129} See Holtom’s six-part article series, “Japanese Christianity and Shinto Nationalism,” \textit{The Christian Century}, January–February 1942 (D.C. Holtom Papers, Box # 1, Folder #45). Also see his Rauschenbusch Lectures given at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in Spring 1942 (D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folders # 27–28).

\textsuperscript{130} Holtom 1922, Chapter One. Also see Holtom 1927.

\textsuperscript{131} See especially his concluding argument: Holtom 1922, 299–308.
showing that the non-religious nature of Shintō was actually a matter of considerable domestic debate. Dismissing as wholly unhelpful to the study of religion those legal theories that treated Shintō as non-religious, Holtom suggested that State Shintō retained significantly “religious” qualities to be treated as such. Moreover, Holtom argued that in an age of scientific rationalism, it was incumbent upon government ideologues to acknowledge the irrational nature of the state cult. It was in this book, too, that Holtom began to draw out the argument for the importance of universalistic principles over particularist ones.¹³²

The nationalism/universalism binary formed the core theme of *Modern Japan and Shintō Nationalism* (1943).¹³³ The book took a decidedly less sanguine view of Shintō than had been apparent in Holtom’s earlier works. Whereas his earlier publications seemed to treat Shintō as a benign local tradition that had been co-opted by the state, in *Modern Japan and Shintō Nationalism* Holtom treated Japan as hopelessly mired in a chauvinistic nationalism more appropriate to a primitive age. It was this book in particular that created and perpetuated the image of Japan as a nation of mindless drones who had been thoroughly indoctrinated with State Shintō ideology.

With the publication of *Modern Japan and Shintō Nationalism*, Holtom’s tone shifted from that of a (mostly) neutral academic observer of religious phenomena to that of an impassioned representative of American civilization. Holtom’s Foreword to *Modern Japan and Shintō*

¹³² Note that the concern with “universal” or “world” religions was something evident in Katō Genchi’s writings throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s.

¹³³ I refer here to the original, not the 1947 reprint. The reprint included two additional chapters that were apparently based upon lectures that Holtom gave at around the time the original version had gone to press. These included his Berkeley lecture, “Some Permanent Values in Japanese Civilization” (14 December 1942) and—I think—his Rauschenbusch Lectures given at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in Spring of 1942. D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder 21; Box # 1, Folders #27–29.
As this Foreword is being written, Singapore has just fallen. The new manifestation of the wide proportions of Japanese plans for world expansion focus into ever sharpening intensity the sense of the critical nature of the problems which the Shintō state presents to the universalism of Christianity and Buddhism as well as to whatever liberalism may still be latent in Japanese national life in general.134

Of course, Holtom’s status as a missionary concerned with Christians’ unfettered freedom to practice their religion played no insignificant role in his portrayal of the war as a clash of civilizations. In a lecture apparently addressed to missionaries and probably given sometime in 1941 or 1942, Holtom identified State Shintō as a great threat to Christianity in Japan.135 Moreover, at around the same time that he wrote the Foreword quoted above, Holtom published a series of articles in the weekly magazine *The Christian Century* detailing the challenges posed to Christianity by the Japanese state. His rhetoric in these publications unambiguously indicated that he took his position as a representative of “all those … whose souls are yet free” seriously.136

Holtom had not entirely lost faith in the people of Japan, however. In December of 1942 he participated in a lecture series on “Permanent Values in Civilization” held at the University of California Berkeley campus in which he spoke approvingly about latent democratic tendencies in

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134 Holtom 1943, vii.
135 Holtom, “Christianity and National Religion” (undated lecture fragment), D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #3, Folder #43. This was, of course, not an inaccurate assessment by this stage.
136 “Japanese Christianity and Shintō Nationalism,” *The Christian Century* (six-part article series, January – February 1942), D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder #45. It seems, too, that Holtom took very personally the Japanese government’s crackdown on potentially seditious elements. His 1942 Rauschenbusch Lectures delivered at the Colgate-Rochester Divinity School featured a developing theme of “the foreign scapegoat,” which seems to have been Holtom’s model for understanding Japanese chauvinism and—perhaps—his way of making sense of his
contemporary Japanese society that he felt had unfortunately been suppressed. Furthermore, as late as September 1944 Holtom participated in a *Reader’s Digest* “Town Meeting of the Air” radio broadcast in which he took the position that Japan could be trusted to enter the ranks of democratic, peace-loving nations following its inevitable defeat in the Pacific War. Even at that late date, Holtom was of the opinion that a prolonged military occupation of Japan would be unnecessary; he preferred to let the Japanese decide for themselves how to move forward after the war. He also cautioned that the U.S. should not get mired in the inevitable internal strife that he thought would follow defeat. Furthermore, in an article dated 14 February 1945, Holtom roundly excoriated the emperor system and State Shintō ideology, but suggested that the use of excessive military force in destroying State Shintō institutions would backfire. Rather, however painful it might be to watch, after militarism had been stripped from the country Japan should be left to its own devices to enter the ranks of democratic nations and dispense with outmoded fictions.

However, Holtom’s thinking seems to have shifted rapidly after this article, and as the war drew to a close Holtom’s criticism of Shintō took on a sharper edge. In an article published in late May 1945, Holtom actively called for a thorough military drubbing to instigate the “spiritual renovation” of the country: “The primary step to be taken in the spiritual renovation of Japan is the administration of a thoroughgoing military defeat. The terrible truth is that nothing will clear

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138 Holtom, “Affirmative Response to the Question: ‘Can We Trust Japan to Keep the Peace without Prolonged Military Occupation?’” during “America’s Town Meeting of the Air” radio broadcast sponsored by *Reader’s Digest*, 14 September 1944 (D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #1, Folder #22).
the air and overturn false gods and false ideals like the winds of disaster in war that are already beginning to blow strongly across Nippon.”140 Whereas Holtom had cautioned as late as February 1945 that the Japanese should be left to decide what to do with Shintō and the emperor system on their own (although he agreed with Chinese critic Sun Fo that “The Mikado Must Go”), by the time he wrote the second article he implied that it really was best for the United States to intervene in Japan’s religious affairs and eradicate State Shintō after all.141 Holtom had come to interpret the war as an epochal clash of enlightened democratic civilization and chauvinistic nationalism, explicitly positioning himself as a representative of the former end of the war approached.

Unpublished documents among Holtom’s collected papers suggest that he felt that Japan’s defeat would bring about a terrible dilemma regarding official Allied policy on Shintō. He submitted and then retracted two drafts of an article to Far Eastern Survey to that effect, one immediately before and one immediately after the promulgation of the Shintō Directive of 15 December 1945.142 In January 1946, Holtom posted a significantly revised version of his earlier article draft that praised the Directive but cautioned that Shintō would not disappear overnight.143 However, by the time he published this article, Holtom’s main influence on Occupation policy

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141 Nakamura 1992, 22–34. “The Mikado Must Go” was an article by Sun Fo that was published in Foreign Affairs in late 1944.
142 Holtom, “The Shintō Dilemma,” D.C. Holtom Papers, Box #2, Folder #43. Holtom’s uneasiness about the Occupation proved to be prescient: the vexatious issues regarding the maintenance of the emperor system and the controversial Yasukuni Shrine not only outlasted the Occupation, but have remained topics of heated debate to the present day. On the emperor system and the possibility of trying the emperor as a war criminal, see Nakamura 1992, Dower 1999, Bix 2000, and Totani 2008. For a recent take on the subject of Yasukuni, see Mullins 2010. As later chapters will show in more detail, the commitment to keep separation of religion from the state as a fundamental component of Occupation policy meant that the Allies’ theoretical commitment to religious freedom was occasionally compromised, particularly in the occupiers’ infringements on the rights of some “Kokutai Shintōists.” See Woodard 1972, 281.
had already taken place, since both the Memorandum and the Shintō Directive that followed it exhibited Bunce’s heavy reliance on Holtom’s earlier work. As the Occupation set in, Holtom himself could only sit back and watch from afar as a small group of inexpert military and civilian personnel hastily cobbled together a religions policy that was based largely on his own research.¹⁴⁴

At the time the war ended in late summer of 1945, however, Holtom’s influence was at its peak.¹⁴⁵ Holtom’s vision of State Shintō received considerable attention as the U.S. and its Allies made preparations for Japan’s surrender and the subsequent Occupation. The interpretation of Shintō that came to characterize official U.S. policy by 1944 and 1945 was largely based on Holtom’s research, which was required reading for U.S. policymakers.¹⁴⁶ That view treated Shintō as the source of Japanese militarism and portrayed the battle for the hearts and minds of the Japanese people as a struggle between democratic freedom and authoritarian theocracy.

¹⁴³ Holtom 1946
¹⁴⁴ On the lack of expertise in religions among Religions Division personnel, see Woodard 1972. As Takemae (2002) and Nakano (2003) have pointed out, it is not exactly true that all Occupation personnel were lacking in specialized training. However, there was nobody in Religions Division that had training in the non-theological academic study of religion; if anything, most RCR members had Christian missionary or seminary backgrounds (see RCR Box #5774, Folder #22).
¹⁴⁵ Holtom was unable to keep pace with rapid changes in the religious situation in Japan once the Occupation was underway. In 1950 he turned to his former mentor, Katō Genchi, asking for materials that might aid his research in retirement. This choice revealed just how out of touch Holtom had become—Katō had been purged five years prior and was effectively living in seclusion at Gotenba. While Kato’s student Anzu Motohiko seems to have provided Holtom with a wealth of materials for some lectures he gave at the Claremont Colleges in July 1950, Holtom was never able to produce another book manuscript (Correspondence between D.C. Holtom, Katō Genchi, and Anzu Motohiko, D.C. Holtom Papers Box #1, Folder #4).
¹⁴⁶ Takemae 2002; Bisson 1944. Woodard privately recorded in a diary entry that Religions Division Chief Ken R. Dyke was altogether far too influenced by D.C. Holtom’s interpretations of Shintō. William P. Woodard diary entry, 4 January [no year, but probably 1946], WPW Box 10a.
This stance appeared, for example, in the 1945 war propaganda film *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, which treated the Japanese as bloodthirsty religious fanatics who were wholly devoted to their divine emperor, pitting the false god of the Japanese against the American genuine article:

To the Japanese, their emperor is the most holy of holies—their visible god. He is also their political ruler—the natural and supernatural—religion and politics all done up in a one-man package. Entrust to one man the powers of the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Premier of Soviet Russia, add to them the powers of the Pope, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, then top it all with the divine authority of our own Son of God, and you will begin to understand what Hirohito means to the Japanese—why they call him the “God Emperor.”

While the influence of this film should not be overestimated since it was produced just before the war ended and never actually put to use (and as war propaganda it was particularly biased), as a period piece it provides great insight into the interpretation of Shintō and the emperor system that motivated Allied policy at the close of the Pacific War. It was this sort of view—distilled out of decades of scholarly debate and infused with a liberal dose of chauvinism—that partially informed Bunce’s non-negotiable stance on Shintō in the Memorandum and the Shintō Directive that followed it. No less than Japan, the U.S. had a divine mission to protect (and disseminate) its way of life at all costs.

**The Relationship between Religious Studies and Policymaking**

Aside from a small number of studies that have indicated the significant social and political consequences of the implementation of the alien concept of religion in non-Western nations, reflexive examination of the role played by academic studies of religion in the formulation of

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147 Capra, dir. *Know Your Enemy: Japan*, ca. 6:30.
148 Also see the epigraph at the beginning of this chapter from Ballou 1946, as well as the review of Ballou’s book by W.H.H. Norman (1946). Chapter Five will show in more detail how this U.S. objective was enacted.
state policy has received surprisingly little academic attention to date. However, the categories and interpretive tools used by scholars of religion have exerted considerable influence on modern states’ domestic and international policies. Experts on religions have sometimes played crucial roles in modern states’ determinations of which domestic religious groups are supposedly benign (and therefore worthy of state protection) and which are allegedly pernicious (and therefore deserving of surveillance and suppression). Scholarly expertise in religious subjects has also played an important role in military intelligence, wartime psychological operations, and foreign policy, although theoretically nuanced and culturally sensitive treatments of religion frequently take a back seat to simplistic bureaucratic distinctions between benign and deleterious religions.

Generally speaking, scholars of religion create religious-secular distinctions by treating religion as a discrete aspect of social life. By adopting a tone of academic authority and a scrupulously non-confessional stance, scholars of religion place themselves in a tactically powerful position that allows researchers to magnanimously tolerate the particularist claims made by specific religions but arrogates to them the prerogative to determine the ultimate facticity of such claims. Similarly, political claims can be accepted at face value or treated as

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149 On the political ramifications of the adoption of this category, see Asad 2003, Isomae 2003 on Japan, and Goossaert 2005, Goossaert 2006, and Yang, ed. 2008 on China. On the political influence of religious studies in Japan, see Maekawa 2013. One trend, seen very recently in scholarly responses to the U.S. Department of State initiative to institute an Office of Faith-Based Community Initiatives, is for scholars to complain that policymakers do not listen to us enough. See Hurd 2013 and Altman 2013.

150 Following the 1993 Branch Davidian incident in Waco, Texas a number of American scholars reflected on this role in print. See, e.g., Gallagher 2007.

151 Mahmood 2006; Reader 2012; Hurd 2013; Altman 2013.

152 Dressler and Mandair 2011

153 From an institutional perspective, the academic field of non-confessional religious studies was still in its infancy in the United States at the time of the Occupation, but in Japan such scholarship had been formally supported at major national universities (particularly Tokyo
a product of “false consciousness” in which religious ideals are determined to be the deep motivators for behavior.

A non-confessional stance is therefore not necessarily a neutral one, and scholarly assistance in states’ policies about religion has often occurred in ways that favor certain modes of religious subjectivity (and certain modes of religious organization) over others. While the ideal of non-confessional neutrality is easily connected to—and perhaps dependent upon—secularist ideals such as the separation of religion and the state and latitudinarian (i.e., permissive) conceptions of religious freedom, academic models may also describe certain religions as being more or less authentic, advanced, or malignant than others. The political and social consequences of such

Imperial University) for decades. Isomae 2003; Isomae and Hayashi, eds. 2008. A considerable body of critical, reflexive scholarship exists on the origins of religious studies. While the point should not be overstated, as Masuzawa (2005) has indicated, the field emerged at least in part from the European encounter with cultural difference; Europeans were forced to incorporate ancient Asian teachings into the category of “religion,” which led to some awkward attempts to posit Asian traditions as proto-Christianity (see App 2009 and App 2010). As Josephson (2012) has recently argued, this process was not a one-way flow in which European magnanimity brought Asian religions into the fold through the category of “world religions,” but rather reflected the tactical efforts of Japanese scholars (and, as King [1999] has shown, Indian scholars) to redefine “religion” to include their traditions, moving from what Josephson calls “theocentric” to “hierocentric” definitions of religion. This move of treating “religion” as a universal aspect of human experience that can be separated from other aspects of social, political, and intellectual life is inherently secularist, creating a (frequently tacit) distinction between religion and not-religion that has been sharply criticized in reflexive scholarship on the field of religious studies (see Asad 1993 and Dressler and Mandair 2011). Ironically, the academic study of religion has nevertheless exerted normative influence. This has happened in part because certain varieties of religion (to the extent that such a thing exists) have been treated as prototypical models: Protestant Christianity in particular has remained the prototypical model for religion (Josephson 2012; Nongbri 2013), while religions have been arranged according to evolutionary models of development in which “civilized” religions were placed above “primitive” ones. In more recent scholarship, the “civilized” and “primitive” binary has been replaced with critiques that identify certain religious agents as ignorant of the teachings of their own traditions or slavishly devoted to them. See Asad 2003, 11.

As Maekawa Michiko (2013) has persuasively argued in a recent dissertation submitted to the Department of Religious Studies and History of Religions (shūkyōgaku/shūkyōshigaku) at the University of Tokyo, the academic study of religion in Japan was characterized in its early
scholarly models can be immediate and even violent, since they are inherently tied to religions’
positions vis-à-vis the state and within the international community.\textsuperscript{155}

\textit{The Academic Study of Religion and the Allied Occupation of Japan}

As I showed in the previous section, the research on which Bunce relied as he crafted his study was directly indebted to the academic tradition of Japanese religious studies and heavily dependent on scholarship produced by American and British missionaries. Both bodies of scholarship adopted a doctrinally anodyne tone even as they frequently labeled certain ideas or movements as particularly deserving of legal protection, police surveillance, or healthy skepticism. Through their selection and juxtaposition of historical facts and doctrinal claims, these scholars of religion could identify certain religions as “primitive” and others as “advanced”; could label some groups as illegitimate “superstitions” while acknowledging the moral authority of others; and could accept sacerdotal authority on matters of, say, ritual procedure while simultaneously denigrating clerical claims on matters of history. While I am not sufficiently versed in the history of American foreign policy related to other nations to make the claim definitively, I suspect that the Occupation represents one of the first instances where such scholarly expertise was mobilized to support foreign policy objectives.

Bunce was naturally drawn to academic accounts of the relationship between Shintō and the state because they represented a type of authority that could supersede mere political claims about the nature and scope of Japanese secularism. Such accounts could authoritatively rank Shintō ideas and practices on a scale from “primitive” to “civilized”; they could also reject certain doctrines, such as the concept of the divine emperor, as patently false. Bunce used these decades by a scholarly commitment to normative projects in which academic “free inquiry” could be used to guide religions to develop in ways more conducive to state projects.\textsuperscript{155} Hurd 2013; Altman 2013. I outlined this problem in the Introduction.
academic claims to buttress the bureaucratic project of redistributing the capacities of religion and the state and strictly separating “Shintō”—now understood to be unambiguously religious—from governance.

While policymakers appreciate scholarship for the authoritative tone it can lend to predetermined bureaucratic initiatives, they also will pick and choose concepts, catchphrases, and claims from scholarly work in order to buttress their own projects. In some cases, as in Bunce’s use of the phrase “State Shintō,” the bureaucratic usage diverged significantly from previous academic usage. While Bunce clearly relied on Holtom’s interpretation of the phrase, he (like Holtom) ignored Katō’s earlier, more positive understanding of State Shintō. Additionally, like Holtom, Bunce also dismissed out of hand the possibility that “State Shintō” might reasonably refer to a non-religious system of civic rituals.

Although use of the specific phrase “State Shintō” (kokka Shintō) was not systematic in prewar Japan, clearly the Japanese government drew a bureaucratic distinction between shrine rites as civic ritual and the “religious” practices of the thirteen recognized Shintō sects. This bureaucratic distinction should not be confused, however, with the contemporaneous academic parsing of Shintō conducted by Japanese experts in religious studies. As seen in Anesaki’s suspicious treatment of the political division of national cult and local “religious” practices at shrines, bureaucratic distinctions between religion and secular influenced academic analysis, but scholars of religion reserved the right to identify specific practices, including ostensibly “non-religious” shrine rites, as incontrovertibly “religious.” Hence Anesaki was able to register his

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156 See Nitta 1999a and 1999b, which distinguishes between “broad” and “narrow” definitions of “State Shintō” that match the two definitions I have outlined here.
own suspicion about the official distinction, and Katō Genchi was able to treat what he called *kokkateki Shintō* (State Shintō) as the universal religion *par excellence*.

The point I want to make in closing is that academic accounts—especially ones like Holtom’s that relied on Japanese scholarship but added an American civilizationalist twist—provided Bunce with an authoritative voice through which he could critique the Japanese government’s bureaucratic distinction between “non-religious” and “religious” Shintō. Following Holtom, Bunce turned the phrase “State Shintō” into an accusatory epithet. By juxtaposing “governance” (“State”) with “religion” (“Shintō”), the phrase “State Shintō” was specifically intended to highlight an illegitimate form of religion-state relations, treating Japanese secularism as a heretical aberration from a universal norm.

Historically, this marked one point in a longstanding iterative process between bureaucratic and academic parsing of “religion” and “secular,” “State” and “Shintō.” That process began with the introduction of “religion” as a legal-bureaucratic category in nineteenth-century Japan and continued with the governmental distinction between religious and non-religious Shintō (a distinction that was subsequently challenged in the 1920s and 1930s through attempts on the part of Japanese scholars of religious studies like Anesaki and Katō to subsume all such ritual practice under the catchall category of religion). In turn, Holtom reinterpreted such academic

157 Katō and Anesaki both infused their scholarship with normative expectations about what constituted “real” religion, and both were indebted to the hierarchical ordering of religions on a scale of “civilizational” development. In the case of missionary-scholars like Holtom, the existence of such normative claims is hardly surprising. While Holtom professionally (and, it must be acknowledged, mostly successfully) resisted the urge to explicitly introduce Christian evangelism into his academic prose, especially in his later work the assumption that Japanese “State Shintō” was oppressive and American Protestant Christianity was emancipatory lay just beneath the surface of his argument. This assumption, of course, dovetailed neatly with the objectives of the United States Department of State and partially indicates why Holtom’s books were required reading for policymakers. The problematic distinction between universalism and
claims, using them (and Katō’s category of State Shintō) to identify Shintō as an oppressive and particularist religion that was improperly linked with the state. As shown at the opening of this chapter, this process culminated in Bunce’s bureaucratic rendition of Shintō as a state religion that was the source of Japanese militarism and the reason for the suppression of civil liberties, including and especially religious freedom. In that final stage, Bunce was able to draw a distinction between one mode of religion-state separation and another, treating the type represented by the American-led Occupation as the only valid option and dismissing the Japanese variety as ersatz and illegitimate.

Chapters Five and Six will show that this iterative process of defining the boundaries of “state” and “religion” and determining the contours of Shintō continued throughout the Occupation, when bureaucrats and scholars alike attempted to clarify what exactly religious freedom was, why Japan had lacked it prior to the Occupation, and how religions should situate themselves vis-à-vis the state and vice versa. Before addressing these issues, however, I need to show that the laws and ordinances promulgated during the Occupation such as the Civil Liberties Directive (4 October 1945), the Shintō Directive (15 December 1945), the Religious Juridical Persons Ordinance (28 December 1945), and the Constitution of Japan (promulgated 3 November 1946 and enacted 3 May 1947) did not establish religious freedom where there previously was none. To do this, I must set aside the distracting category of “State Shintō” (and the now-hegemonic, America-centric, and Protestant-leaning secularism it implicitly

particularism continues to this day, with universalist claims to tolerance and freedom obfuscating their own political (often imperial) agendas and their own histories. See Brown 2006.

158 On the drafting of the constitution, see Dower 1999, 346–404. On the promulgation of the other directives, see “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Volume: Freedom of Religion” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3).
advocated) in order to focus attention on how religion, freedom, and rights were actually defined during the period that the Meiji Constitution was in effect.

The next three chapters will show that competing Japanese interest groups exhibited robust discourse about religious freedom during the entirety of the Meiji Constitutional Period. My intention is to challenge the alluring but problematic claim—seen in Bunce’s Memorandum and in subsequent Occupation policy memos and press releases—that the religious freedom clause of the Meiji Constitution was a farce. I also intend to challenge the idea that Japanese religious leaders were wholly ignorant of the importance of religious freedom. Finally, I want to challenge the notion that a uniquely “Japanese” mode of religion-state relations characterized the Meiji Constitutional Period. This assessment is true only in a superficial sense, for it excessively relies on the cultural nationalist argument that all Japanese people think or act in the same way. Close analysis of Japan’s modern history reveals that this is patently false.

159 This claim appeared not only as a way of rationalizing the Occupation initiative to foster “a desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese populace, but also in influential postwar scholarship. See, for example, Abe 1970a and Hardacre 1989, esp. 114-132.
PART II
Chapter Two

Varieties of Religious Freedom

With the Religions Bill submitted, even in the staid and arid House of Peers the vigor of tiger’s roar and the dragon’s dance was apparent—the screened gallery was nearly constantly full, members of the House of Commons, foreigners, Buddhist priests, and people of religious persuasion hurriedly thronged [to the spot], and despite the season it was as if flowers bloomed in Hibiya Clearing.

On the morning of 14 December 1899, debate raged on the floor of Japan’s House of Peers. Under discussion was a controversial Religions Bill (Shūkyō hōan) that had been advanced on 9 December by the cabinet of Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922). After a certain Secretary Kawata read all fifty-three clauses of the bill aloud, the Prime Minister opened the debate by explaining the cabinet’s position. Arguing that the government had already recognized religious freedom in Article 28 of the 1889 Constitution, and furthermore indicating that the government was committed to upholding that clause, Yamagata claimed that the bill was designed to clarify the special provisions necessary when considering the freedom of religious groups as opposed to the other types of juridical persons outlined in the Civil Code of 1898. While Yamagata did not clarify what specifically constituted the “different nature” of religions in comparison to other humanitarian groups, he argued that the various contemporaneous debates about the role of religion vis-à-vis the state could be resolved through the passage of a bill that monitored the “external” functions of religion such as incorporation and the staging of public events.

1 MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 10
2 Yamagata Aritomo was one of the famed elder statesmen (genrō) of the Meiji era; he was responsible for the modernization of the Japanese military (he held senior military posts during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars). Drawing on his military and bureaucratic connections, Yamagata wielded incredible political influence at the turn of the century. The 1899 draft Religions Bill bore his name as he was serving as Prime Minister at the time.
The bill would thereby ensure peace and order, fulfilling one of the government’s prime responsibilities.

Responses to the bill in the House of Peers were mixed, and the debate that followed Yamagata’s opening speech took over two hours. House members expressed perplexity about the necessity of the bill; many also expressed trepidation about the confusion that would inevitably arise over particular stipulations. Irritation mounted as debate dragged well beyond the usual lunch break at noon, and the discussion was finally tabled with the establishment of an investigative committee of fifteen members who would review the legislation.

When the bill was brought up again in the late morning of 27 February 1900, proceedings got off to an inauspicious start when Chairman Prince Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904) opened the discussion by indicating that a request had been made to make deliberations secret. Tempers immediately flared. In the late fall of 1899 several Buddhist periodicals had been vehemently

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3 The secretary’s given name is not indicated in the House of Peers minutes.
4 Yamagata was probably referring to the debates over “mixed residence” that had been exercising Buddhists in recent years, as well as to recent journalistic exposés of marginal religions such as Renmonkyō and Buddhist indignation over the Sugamo Prison Chaplain Incident, briefly described below.
5 KGSR 9: 92.
6 The Religions Bill was the second item on the docket for that day; the session opened at 10:09 a.m. and the first item on the docket was apparently addressed within just a few minutes. Gauging from the length of the bill and the record of the debate that followed, the reading and discussion of the bill took about two and a half hours. The meeting was adjourned at 12:40 p.m. with the establishment of a special investigative committee of fifteen members that would further weigh the pros and cons of the bill; a related measure regarding a potential revision to the Military Conscription Ordinance dealing specifically with a special exemption for priests was also sent to committee. The only other action taken before adjourning for the day was hearing a very brief committee report on matters relating to the management of Hokkaidō and Okinawa.
7 In addition to the legislative record (KGSR 9), see MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 4–7. As Chapter Four will also show, such investigative committees were perennially assigned to research the pros and cons of the various religions bills under consideration during the Meiji Constitutional Period, but they rarely came to unanimous decisions. In the one instance when committee members seemed to vigorously support the legislation—in the case of the Okada Bill of 1926—the fall of the ruling cabinet led to the scuttling of the bill. See AM Reel #9, Item #122.
voicing their opposition to the legislation as rumors began circulating that the government was about to propose the bill, so the motion for secret debate may have been designed to keep Buddhist activists in the dark about the government’s intentions.\(^8\) Whatever the motivation actually was, eventually the meeting proceeded as a public debate.\(^9\) After a reading of a revised version of the bill, chair of the special investigative committee Marquis Kuroda Nagashige (1867–1939) gave a longwinded account of the twelve meetings of the committee, subjecting the assembly of peers to a tedious recapitulation of the committee’s grueling deliberations.\(^10\)

When the floor was opened up for questions, a vigorous conversation ensued that would take up nearly the entire day.\(^11\) Members returned from an hour-long lunch break with renewed vigor and the bill was debated from quarter past one until nearly five p.m. The parliamentary stenographer dutifully recorded shouted interjections and moments when the chamber erupted in furor over some comment or another. When finally put to a vote late in the afternoon, the measure failed by a relatively slim margin: 121 votes against to 100 in favor.\(^12\) Ultimately, sixteen of the remaining seventeen items on the docket had to be tabled for the next session.

**Buddhist Lobbies in the Late Nineteenth Century**

The fractious drama that unfolded on the legislative stage at the turn of the twentieth century was a microcosm of a larger debate playing out in contemporary Japanese society about how the concept of religious freedom would be interpreted and applied. I focus on this particular moment in part because the conflicts over the Yamagata Religions Bill both anticipate and encapsulate a

\(^8\) I show immediately below why many contemporary Buddhists were suspicious of government initiatives.

\(^9\) KGSR 17: 571–572.

\(^10\) KGSR 17: 574–579.

\(^11\) A more detailed play-by-play account of the deliberations can be found in Abe 1970a.
number of bureaucratic and administrative shifts that characterized the end of the Meiji era (1868–1912) more generally. They also exemplify how the transsectarian Buddhist groups that had developed as a natural response to the persecution and co-optation of earlier decades began to split into factions and lobbies representing competing Buddhist political interests.

The problem for Buddhists at the close of the nineteenth century was not merely that Japanese people were converting to Christianity, but also that foreign missionaries were gaining increased access to vulnerable potential converts. By the late 1890s, Buddhists were up in arms about the threat of “mixed residence” (naichi zakkyo), a system in which foreign Christians would no longer be confined to specific enclaves but would be free to mingle shoulder-to-shoulder with locals and proselytize at will. Many Buddhist clerics feared that the “mixed

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12 KGSR 17: 607.
13 In addition to greater state intervention in the affairs of the Shintō sects and journalistic and police persecution of marginal religions such as Tenrikyō and Renmonkyō, the first decade of the twentieth century saw the promulgation of two Home Ministry ordinances intended to clarify the relationship between state and religion by subjecting religions to stricter bureaucratic scrutiny and more onerous stipulations for incorporation (in 1900 and 1908). Other significant changes in the administrative apparatus for managing religions included establishment of a Religious System Investigative Committee (1901), shrine mergers (1906–1912), and the separation of the agencies responsible for managing “religions” from those responsible for managing “Shintō” (at the very start of the Taishō era, in 1913).
14 I outlined the rise of Buddhist transsectarian groups in the Introduction. Briefly, many of these groups were designed to lobby for Buddhist legal and political interests; they tended to coalesce around new, transsectarian journals such as Meikyō shinshi (Meiji Religious News, published 1875–1901 by laicized priest, reformer, and activist Ōuchi Seiran [1845–1918]). Ōtani Eiichi (2009, 2012) and Hoshino Seiji (2012) have both recently described how Buddhists began to make use of new social media such as special interest magazines and a form of lecture known as enzetsu to solidify pan-Buddhist identity.
15 A famous example is Inoue Enryō’s (1858–1919) Bukkyō katsuron joron (Introduction to the Vivification of Buddhism), published in 1888. Enryō mobilized the tools of Western scholarship to attack Christianity on what had hitherto been its own terms, suggesting that the religion was irrational and ill-equipped to meet the needs of a modern age in comparison to Buddhism. As Jason Josephson (2006b) and Hoshino Seiji (2012) have both indicated, one irony of such Buddhist apologetic efforts was that they actually elevated the status of Christianity by treating the foreign tradition as a genuine threat to Buddhist prestige and by treating Buddhism as a “religion” that should be compared and contrasted with its Western counterpart.
residence” policy would erode their traditional prestige even further, and it was against this background that several pamphlets and booklets targeting a transsectarian Buddhist audience were published between 1897 and 1898, featuring titles like *The Mixed Residence Bookmark* and *Mixed Residence Explained, or, The Mixed Residence Quick Guide*.\(^{16}\)

Furthermore, a furor had erupted in Buddhist circles in 1898 when several Buddhist priests had been summarily dismissed from their posts as chaplains at Sugamo Prison and replaced by a Christian minister.\(^{17}\) Under sustained Buddhist opposition, the decision was eventually reversed because Buddhists successfully made the claim that the majority of the Sugamo inmates were Buddhist and therefore required the services of Buddhist clergics. One of the outcomes of this incident was that precisely at the moment when the Yamagata Religions Bill came under scrutiny in late 1899, Buddhists already had well-organized lobbies in place that could challenge legislation that seemed to run counter to Buddhist interests. These lobbies were made possible in part because oppressive state policies in earlier decades had trained Buddhists to overcome sectarian differences in pursuit of broader political goals.\(^{18}\) Buddhists were able to use the same political networks and special interest publications they had developed in response to the Sugamo incident to spread information about what such a bill might mean for Buddhists and how they could turn the outcome of a such a bill in their favor.\(^{19}\) Various transsectarian organizations

\(^{16}\) Tan, ed. 1897; Inoue 1897; Nakamura 1897; Gyōsei Gakkai, ed. 1898.

\(^{17}\) I am indebted to Cameron Penwell, a PhD candidate at the University of Chicago, for sharing an unpublished 2009 paper on this controversy. Other brief accounts are Thelle 1987, 158–159 and Ōsawa 2009, 17.

\(^{18}\) Such policies include not only the *haibutsu kishaku* persecution but also the conscription of Buddhists into the ranks of “doctrinal instructors” (*kyōdōshoku*) during the ill-fated “Great Promulgation Campaign” designed to foster national identity around three cardinal principles. While many Buddhists preferred to use their positions as doctrinal instructors to advanced their own parochial interests, the Campaign itself combined with a rise in apologetic discourse to foster a new sense of modern Buddhist identity. See Ikeda 1976; Ketelaar 1990; Hoshino 2012.

\(^{19}\) One example is the journal *Seikyō jihō* (*Politics and Religion Times*), discussed below.
lobbied legislators, organized petitions, and showed up en masse at the House of Peers to express their disapproval.  

The Diversity of the Buddhist Response to the Yamagata Bill

Although these Buddhist lobbies often presumed to speak for all Buddhists, in actuality their transsectarian rhetoric masked profound differences in how they conceived the social and political role of Buddhism. For example, the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Kai, founded 1894), one of the more vocal critics of the bill, represented a flourishing Buddhist youth culture largely active in the capital of Tokyo (rather than in the Kyoto area where the headquarters of most Buddhist sects were located). Many of these young priests had been born after the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and had no direct memory of the violent haibutsu kishaku persecution. Furthermore, in contrast to their older clerical counterparts they tended to benefit from a type of modern education that balanced clerical training in ritual and doctrine with fluency in Western political and philosophical concepts. They also came of age at a time when Christians were exerting much greater social influence in Japan, and some of these young Buddhists eagerly adopted Christian ideals of social work and abstemiousness even as they rejected the appropriateness of Christianity’s fit with the Japanese national character.

Additionally, the growing trend of “lay centrality” placed additional pressure on traditional sources of Buddhist authority and added to the diversity of the voices with which Buddhism spoke. Journalists, politicians, disaffected and laicized priests, doctors, educators, and other

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20 See the epigraph, drawn from MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 10. The same issue reported that sectarian leaders put considerable pressure on the legislators who were members of their sects to resist the Yamagata Bill.
21 On this “Buddhist youth culture,” see Ōtani 2012.
23 On the concept of lay centrality, see Hardacre 1988 and Hardacre 1989.
educated individuals used the burgeoning print media and flourishing culture of Buddhist oratory (enzetsu) to absorb and disseminate ideas about Buddhism. With the rise of positivist historiography and philology, traditional interpretations of Buddhist doctrines were rapidly becoming disengaged from their sectarian moorings and clerics were no longer understood as absolute authorities on matters of Buddhist history. Non-ordained intellectuals also began to write authoritatively about Buddhism, presaging the rapid increase in scholarship by lay Buddhists who derived their authority from academic credentials rather than clerical status.

In sum, at the close of the nineteenth century conservative precept revival movements existed alongside youth-based calls for sectarian reform while lay Buddhists wielding the methods of evidentiary scholarship challenged traditional clerical authority. Against this backdrop, it was unlikely that all Buddhists could have shared the same political views regarding controversial legislation like the Yamagata Bill. While the extant materials of Buddhist journals, records of speeches (enzetsu), and parliamentary proceedings can only provide a narrow window into the true diversity of contemporary Buddhist opinion, the materials that are available make it quite clear that Buddhist approaches to religious legislation and the associated topic of religious freedom were far from uniform. The purpose of this chapter is to outline some of these differences as a way of elucidating the simple point that religious freedom was not a single,

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25 Suzuki Daisetsu is one famous example of this trend; he wrote his first book, *Shin shūkyō ron (On the New Religion)* in 1896.
26 Older Buddhist clerics seemed to have been more motivated by the decline of Buddhist prestige. As I showed in the Introduction, reformers such as Fukuda Gyōkai (1809–1888) and Shaku Unshō (1827–1909) responded to accusations of Buddhist degeneracy and new laws decriminalizing meat eating and clerical marriage with calls for revival of the traditional clerical precepts. See Ikeda 1976; Jaffe 2001. Younger clerics also aimed at reform, but they tended to be more progressive. Several of the Buddhists discussed below, such as Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941), participated in Kiyozawa Manshi’s (1863–1903) abortive “Shirakawa Faction” attempt to
unified principle at the turn of the twentieth century. Later chapters will show how the various modes of interpreting religious freedom outlined below came to affect government policy, legislation, and scholarship in subsequent decades.

Statist, Corporatist, and Latitudinarian Approaches to Religious Freedom

This chapter is not the first academic account of the debates over the Yamagata Bill. One important foregoing study is Abe Yoshiya’s series of articles collectively titled “Religious Freedom under the Meiji Constitution.” Abe focused specifically on the government’s interpretation of religious freedom as seen through the language of the proposed legislation and the parliamentary debates that followed it, and he persuasively demonstrated that careful examination of the parliamentary process should lay to rest the idea that Japan totally lacked religious freedom under the Meiji Constitution. I wholeheartedly concur with this aspect of Abe’s argument, but my study addresses one weakness of Abe’s top-down account, namely his failure to describe grassroots pressure on contemporary interpretations of religion and freedom, particularly the critical analyses of the legislation advanced in Buddhist journals at the time.

Abe’s cursory treatment of religious leaders’ reactions to the bill also advanced the view that contemporary religious leaders failed to understand the importance of religious freedom:

The response of religious leaders ... generally lacked an understanding of the nature of the bill which contradicted the concept of a positive guarantee of religious freedom. Most religious leaders, with a few exceptions, were concerned about the competition among the religions and failed to realize that the bill was truly an issue of religion versus government. This lack of understanding among

modernize the Jōdo Shinshū Ōtani -ha sect. I address the role of evidentiary scholarship in rocking the Buddhist boat more in Chapter Three.

28 Abe was responding to a narrative that was common during and immediately after the Occupation.
Two problems attend this characterization. First, I contend that religious leaders fully appreciated the importance of religious freedom, but they understood it in very different terms than postwar observers like Abe did. Few religious leaders living at the turn of the twentieth century thought of any freedom as capable of transcending the authority of the state. Rights, liberties, and privileges were received at the whim of the state; they did not represent universal, transcendent principles that surpassed national boundaries or that were antecedent to citizenship. Second, while Abe did provide some examples of diversity in clerical opinions regarding the proposed legislation, he implied that all religious leaders understood the legislation and the associated topic of religious freedom in the same way.

Close examination of the historical record reveals that this was not the case. Comparison of Buddhist transsectarian publications from the turn of the twentieth century suggests that significant ideological differences were manifested in what appear to have been at least three distinct operative readings of “religious freedom” championed by Buddhists at the time. Statist visions of religious freedom treated it as circumstantial state-granted right and reserved the prerogative of the state to determine when expressions of religious faith infringed upon the government’s prior duty of maintaining peace and order. In contrast, corporatist interpretations

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29 Abe 1970a, 53.
30 Indeed, it was not until the 1970s that “human rights” came to be understood this way, the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights notwithstanding. See Moyn 2010.
31 This attitude was primarily evident among state bureaucrats, but some Buddhists also accepted it as natural. For example, in a short letter to the editor of the Buddhist journal Meikyō shinshi, Katō Totsudō (1870–1949) argued for the statist vision of religious freedom advocated by the Yamagata cabinet. See MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 3. Katō was already famous by this time for his formidable skills as an orator (see Hoshino 2012 on the new Buddhist focus on oratory, or enzetsu, in the Meiji era). As I show in Chapter Three, Katō would throw himself into anti-superstition and self-cultivation campaigns in later years, using academic venues and
treated religious freedom as a customary privilege based on precedent, regarding liberal policies as threats to the positions of traditional religions. Finally, latitudinarian approaches regarded religious freedom as a civil liberty guaranteeing individuals and groups freedom from state intervention. I use these three categories—statist, corporatist, and latitudinarian—to encapsulate interest groups’ parochial interpretations of religious freedom while simultaneously providing an exportable typology of different visions of religion-state relations. These categories are intended to resist the tendency to treat religious freedom as a single ahistorical, universal principle. As such, they help me to read the history of the period without the distracting presupposition that a progressive political project should have informed stakeholders’ decisions.\footnote{Here I draw inspiration from Saba Mahmood’s (2005) stimulating exhortation to extricate scholarly analysis from the goals of progressive politics.}

All three types (statist, corporatist, latitudinarian) of religious freedom were subject to change. The constitutional provision itself may have been somewhat statist, but it was also open to reinterpretation as competing interest groups and powerful political lobbies encouraged the state to rethink its operative conceptions of “religion,” “rights,” “liberties,” and the relationship between “subjecthood” and “citizenship.”\footnote{As a reminder, the text of Article 28 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan read, “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” Itō 1889. Josephson (2012, 226-236) has indicated that this religious freedom clause was actually relatively liberal in comparison with most contemporary European constitutions, some of which singled out certain religions as “state religions” (Catholicism, in Spain) or identified certain religious groups (Jews, in the case of Norway’s constitution) as having fewer rights.} For example, the December 1899 attempt to pass a bill that would more strictly regulate religions was an indication that the relatively statist interpretation of religious freedom enshrined in the constitution was not statist enough for formats to engage in hortatory social edification. By the 1920s, Katō would have the ear of government officials; his vision of the proper relationship between “real” religion and spurious superstition would directly affect government religions policy.

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members of the Yamagata Aritomo cabinet. Conversely, the failure of the bill in February 1900 revealed that powerful legislative factions and religious lobbies preferred either more liberal interpretations of the constitutional clause or—more likely—alternative conservative approaches that would preserve their own vision of the status quo. Most contemporary religious leaders seem to have felt that the government misunderstood religious freedom by taking an excessively latitudinarian stance that gave free rein to Christianity, not that it misunderstood religious freedom because of its potential infringements on their civil liberties.

Some of these interest groups preferred to articulate their positions about religious freedom in terms of threats to traditional religious authority, while others were concerned with state interference in religious affairs. Although they may have elected to use different language, they all expressed deep concern over the relationship between “religion” (in whatever way they understood it) and “freedom” (as they understood it). The category of religion could be expanded and contracted to include or exclude a large variety of groups and practices; freedom could just as easily be interpreted as a threat as it could be interpreted as a boon.

**Religious Freedom as a Circumstantial Right: The Yamagata Religions Bill**

As I argued in the previous chapter, it is not accurate to say that Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution failed to grant religious freedom. Rather, the article legally instantiated a particular interpretation of religious freedom that gave a greater degree of latitude to the prerogatives of the state than it did to individuals or to groups. The promulgation of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 and the furor that followed the 1891 Uchimura Kanzō lèse-majesté incident

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34 Abe Yoshiya (1970a, 31–37) points out that Yamagata’s rhetoric on the floor of the House of Peers was more subdued than his actual position, which was to concentrate as much power as possible in the person of the emperor.
that powerful interest groups—including some scholars, religious leaders, and legislators—preferred to concentrate transcendent power in the person of the emperor and the authority of the state as opposed to dividing transcendence with the newly “private” realm of religion.\(^{35}\) This statist interpretation of religious freedom reserved the right of the state to place the “duties of subjects” and “peace and order” above their government-granted ability to profess a particular faith and behave accordingly in public. In this view, religious freedom was an indulgence provisionally granted to subject-citizens by the state but also subject to circumstantial revocation.

To give an example, the well-documented journalistic persecution of marginal religions such as Renmonkyō that occurred in the last decade of the nineteenth century tended to presume the guilt and illegitimacy of these religions; contemporary calls for their eradication appealed to the state’s duty to maintain peace and order.\(^{36}\) Similarly, Inoue Tetsujirō’s famous indictment of Christianity as being incompatible with public school education—a response to the aforementioned Uchimura Kanzō lèse-majesté incident—drew new lines between public duty and private faith while redistricting “morality” as falling under the jurisdiction of the state.\(^{37}\)

**The Yamagata Religions Bill as an Example of Statist Religious Freedom**

In the draft Religions Bill (Shūkyō hōan) dated 9 December 1899, the cabinet of Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) offered a new interpretation of the scope of the constitutional religious freedom clause. The bill was couched in bureaucratic language that

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\(^{35}\) Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930) was a Christian schoolteacher who made political waves by refusing to bow before the imperial portrait (goshin’ei) at a school ceremony in 1891. Uchimura was forced to resign, but the incident prompted a flurry of debate about the relationships between religious freedom and public duty that was encapsulated in the title of Inoue Tetsujirō’s 1893 book, *The Clash of Education and Religion (Kyōiku to shūkyō no shōtotsu)*.

\(^{36}\) Accounts of this persecution include Sawada 2004, 236–258 and Dorman 2012, 24–44.

explicitly limited religions’ freedom of assembly and left the determination of what counted as a
religion up to the fairly narrow (and circumstantially applied) definition provided by the state.38
As such, it reflected the position of Prime Minister Yamagata Aritomo, who generally distrusted
democratic processes and preferred authoritarian approaches that concentrated as much power as
possible in the state, and in the person of the emperor specifically.39

The bill was largely written in negative language that restricted rights and liberties rather
than granted them, a fact reflected in the majority of the fifteen clauses comprising the first
chapter, “Overview [sōsoku].” For example, the first clause read, “those corporations and
associations that publicly promulgate religion and perform religious ceremonies but do not
conform with this law may not become juridical persons.”40 After defining which groups would
count as “churches” and “temples” (Clauses 2 and 3), the bill stipulated that any corporation or
association that attempted to incorporate other associations already recognized as churches or
temples could not in turn be recognized as such (Clause 4, effectively cutting off religions’
ability to amalgamate and potentially hampering attempts at transsectarian and trans-
denominational collaboration). Those that already belonged to an existing group could not split
off to become groups of their own (Clause 5, forestalling schism).41 Religious groups that
wished to organize a public assembly for religious purposes were required to receive permission
from the appropriate government office at least twenty-four hours in advance. While periodic or
regular observances did not require such permission, the government reserved the right to change
the terms without notice (Clause 8). Any activity deemed a threat to peace and order, destructive

38 The signatories of the bill were Prime Minister and Marquis Yamagata Aritomo, Minister of
Finance and Earl Matsukata Masayoshi (1835–1924), Home Minister and Marquis Saigō
Tsugumichi (1843–1902), and Minister of Justice Kiyoura Keigo (1850–1942).
40 “Shūkyō hōan,” Clause 1. KGSR 9: 89.
of morals and customs, or in opposition to the duties of subjects was subject to revocation or revision by the government (Clause 9).\footnote{KGSR 9, 89–90.} While religious buildings and lands were treated as exempt from taxation (Clause 12), the government reserved the right to define which buildings and lands were eligible (Clause 13). All religions were required to comply with bureaucratic directives and investigations (Clause 14). In a particularly powerful clause, if religions were found to be in breach of the law or if it was deemed to be in the public interest, their recognition (as religions) and all associated permissions could be revoked by the responsible government office.\footnote{KGSR 9, 90.} In short, the definition of “public interest” could be expanded and contracted to suit any number of cases.\footnote{KGSR 9, 90.}

The remaining five chapters of the bill laid out specifics regarding churches and temples (Chapter Two), sects and denominations (\textit{kyōha oyobi shūha}, Chapter Three), priests (\textit{kyōshi}, Chapter Four), and penalties and regulations (\textit{bassoku}, Chapter Five). An appendix indicated the government’s intention that the law should replace prior government directives regarding Buddhism, Shintō, and religion (Clause 47), and that all religious organizations should have conformed to the law within a year of its enactment (i.e., by no later than July 1901).\footnote{KGSR 9, 90.}

Curiously, this appendix did not make any explicit reference to the constitutional religious freedom clause when discussing foregoing laws regarding religions. This striking absence suggests two possible intentions on Yamagata’s part. On the one hand, he may have intended that the bill supplement or nuance the ambiguously worded religious freedom clause, which left

\footnote{The stringent revisions of the stipulations required for achieving religious juridical person status under the Religious Corporations Law (\textit{Shūkyō hōjin hō}) that followed the 1995 Aum Shinrikyō affair are one example of “public interest” superseding religions’ rights. See Baffelli and Reader 2012, 7–11.}
a great deal of latitude in interpretation. If this was his intention, then the draft bill was hardly a step in the right direction. One of the main criticisms of the bill on the floor of the House of Peers was that it was vague, likely to invite confusion, and easily prone to misinterpretation.\textsuperscript{46} On the other hand, Yamagata may have intended to supplant the constitutional religious freedom clause with a new law that amounted to a \textit{de facto}, if not \textit{de jure}, constitutional revision.\textsuperscript{47} This interpretation has dominated the postwar scholarship on the subject:

With the understanding that the strengthening of the Imperial authority was the absolute and sole objective of the constitution, Yamagata could acknowledge the constitutional freedom of religious belief only as the freedom to be incorporated into the Imperial bureaucratic control system. In this context, whereas Yamagata asserted that he honored constitutional freedom of religious belief, what he truly meant was this specifically defined freedom which in essence was contradictory to the concept of the civil rights as intended by the drafter of the Meiji Constitution. The Yamagata Religions Bill, therefore, was an attempt at gravely modifying the constitutional guarantee of the freedom of religious belief.\textsuperscript{48}

While Abe Yoshiya’s interpretation is compelling for many reasons, here I would like to challenge his idea that the constitutional religious freedom clause must be understood as a civil right. In the eyes of influential interpreters like Yamagata, religious freedom was simply a privilege that was granted to citizens. It could be revoked or granted at the government’s whim. I admit that Yamagata’s intention may have been more drastic—it is possible that he did interpret religious freedom as a civil right and specifically aimed to challenge or change the constitutional guarantee (as Abe suggests). However, given the fact that the concept of “civil rights” was still inchoate in Japanese law in the late nineteenth century, I think it far more likely that Yamagata

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item KGSR 9, 90–92, esp. 91–92.
\item See, e.g., KGSR 17: 575.
\item This particular interpretation dominated the postwar Occupation. See the 1955 research monograph \textit{Religions in Japan}, which was attributed to William K. Bunce (1907–?) but was actually the product of the collective efforts of the Religions and Cultural Resources Division, Civil Information and Education Section, SCAP. The book was based on a Religions Division report completed in 1948.
\end{enumerate}
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was interpreting religious freedom in statist terms.\(^4^9\) Put another way, Abe was inclined to read the Meiji Constitution as providing a “civil right,” but this was a perspective that derived from his postwar historical position more than it represented a historically accurate reading of contemporaneous interpretations of Japanese constitutional law.

**Corporatism and Customary Privileges: “Officially Recognized Religion”**

In contrast to the statist interpretation of religious freedom advanced by the Yamagata government, religious freedom was interpreted by some influential interest groups as a customary right preserving the perquisites traditionally granted to occupational groups such as clergy (tax exemption, for example) or to specific religions such as Buddhism.\(^5^0\) Customary rights devolved on clerics as a status or occupational group and on sects and temples as institutions, giving priority to groups rather than to individuals.\(^5^1\) Buddhist clerics seem to have interpreted religious freedom as a customary right when considering the issue in the context of maintaining, securing, or regaining previously held Buddhist privileges; they tended to view religious freedom as an existential threat when considering the legal structures that supported the

\(^{48}\) Abe 1970a, 37.

\(^{49}\) It is worth mentioning that some Buddhists supported the general thrust of the legislation, even if they were not happy with all of the particulars of the bill. For example, in a letter to the editor of *Meikyō shinshi* published on 16 December 1899, Katō Totsudō (1870–1949) wrote that while the bill obviously required some revision, the basic idea behind it was sound. Katō Totsudō, “Shūkyō hōan ni tsuite,” MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 3.

\(^{50}\) By “customary right,” I mean a perquisite traditionally granted to an individual or group based on precedent or a long-standing claim (i.e., claim to property or position). In the case of Japanese religions, customary rights featured most prominently in clerics’ ability to wear special garb (clerical robes), their right to tax exemption and exemption from the corvée, and temples’ rights to serve as landholders, but the language of customary rights might also be applied to the privileges granted to temples and clerics in exchange for their services to the state as census-keepers during the Tokugawa Period (1600–1868). See Hur 2007.

\(^{51}\) Howell 2005 offers a lucid discussion of status and occupational groups in nineteenth-century Japan.
growing influence of Christianity or the rise of emergent religions. To give one example, an 1897 editorial in the opening issue of the transsectarian Buddhist newspaper Kyōgaku hōchi (Religious Studies News) lamented the rise of marginal religions such as Renmonkyō and Tenrikyō and sarcastically wondered whether the rapid growth of the Japanese Christian population would lead to the ridiculous adoption of foreign names like “John” and “James.”

Against this background, one of the positions consistently advocated by some Buddhists confronting the Yamagata Bill was that the Japanese state should institute a program officially recognizing a particular religion or religions as having a special relationship with the Japanese people. This position had been taken by Inoue Enryō as early as 1889 (the year of the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution), but as the threat of mixed residence approached and as the Sugamo Prison Chaplain incident galvanized clerics and lay Buddhists alike to assert the unique relationship between Buddhism and the state, the concept of kōninkyō—officially recognized religion—came to be promoted with much greater force. Various contemporaneous publications, including journals and records of public oratory, featured explications of how a kōninkyō system would work.

Some scholars have looked to the Meiji era for evidence of a unique “Japanese-style relationship between religion and the state” (Nihongata seikyō kankei), and superficially kōninkyō advocacy seems to support the existence of a peculiar approach to religion-state

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52 KH 1: 2.
53 Inoue 1889. Below for brevity’s sake I will often use the term kōninkyō rather than the rather cumbersome “officially recognized religion.”
54 In 1899, former Sugamo chaplain Tōgō Ryōchō’s (d.u.) lectures on the subject—in which he cited letters written by Shinshū cleric Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931)—were recorded by Kitamura Jōshō (d.u.) and published as a response to the Sugamo furor. The pamphlet featured an appendix outlining kōninkyō systems in various countries.
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relations that was unique to Japan. However, just as the Japanese constitution’s provision of religious freedom actually matched the language of contemporary European constitutions, the Japanese advocates of the kōninkyō concept drew much of their inspiration from observation of the countries of Western Europe. Proponents argued that a kōninkyō system both acknowledged the importance of precedent and clearly demarcated genuine “religion” from spurious “superstitions” while also distinguishing trustworthy religions such as Buddhism from untrustworthy foreign religions like Christianity.

In the context of the government’s proposed bill regarding religions, it was only natural that proponents of the kōninkyō concept would speak up. For example, in a 16 December 1899 Meikyō shinshi editorial by Jōdo Shinshū priest and chief editor Andō Tetsuchō (better known as Masazumi, 1876–1955) entitled “Our ‘Officially Recognized Religion,’” the journal argued that the constitutions of all lawful nations of the world included some provision regarding religious

55 This “Japanese-style relationship between religion and the state” was first advanced by Yasumaru Yoshio in 1979; the idea was picked up in Inoue and Sakamoto, eds. 1987 and occasionally resurfaces in contemporary scholarship.

56 On the Japanese constitution vis-à-vis contemporary European constitutions, see Josephson 2012, 226–236. For example, Ashihara Ringen (d.u.) published a tract in 1899 that outlined the kōninkyō systems in various countries such as England, the Austrian Empire, France, the countries of the German Empire, Italy, Belgium and the United States of America. The pamphlet was printed at least twice.

57 The fact that Buddhism and Christianity were even recognized as two similar species of the genus “religion” is striking. In different ways, Isomae Jun’ichi (2003), Hoshino Seiji (2012), and Jason Josephson (2012) have each highlighted the adventitious process whereby this conceptualization became possible. Hoshino’s argument that the concept of “religion” became a sort of lingua franca through which previously incommensurable worldviews became intelligible over the course of the Meiji era is particularly enlightening for my points here. Hoshino’s account focuses primarily on Christians and lay Buddhists, and he persuasively demonstrates that various traditions came to be understood as “religions” through Meiji era apologetic (and therefore inherently comparative) discourse. One point Hoshino’s account stresses is the importance role Christians played in the formulation of the modern concept of “religion,” a fact which substantiates Buddhist concerns about Christian incursions into formerly Buddhist territory. For his part, Josephson shows that “religion” was a category for which Christianity served as the prototypical member.
Japan’s Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

systems. However, although Japan had entered the ranks of such nations thirty years prior with the Meiji Restoration, it had not yet established a transparent religious system. As debates raged about whether such a system would be for the sake of religion or for the sake of the state, many confused “state religion” (kokkyō) with “officially recognized religion” (kōninkyō), and some confused a latitudinarian laissez-faire policy with a kōninkyō policy, thinking that such a policy would treat all religions in the country equally. Lamenting this state of affairs, Andō felt compelled to clarify the outlines of a religious system and to advocate the adoption of a kōninkyō.

In the history of religion-state relations, Andō continued, three types of relationship were apparent: state religion, officially recognized religion, and latitudinarianism. Contemporary examples of countries featuring state religions were limited to England and Russia, but both systems were merely reactions to medieval papal attempts to create a theocratic state (kyōkoku).

As such, they limited religious freedom by wedding religion to the state, ultimately becoming bigoted and ignorant (ganmei korō).

The system of national religion had emerged as an opposition to theocracy, but in turn a libertarian latitudinarian system (jiyū hōnin shugi seido) had emerged in reaction to the national religion paradigm. This latitudinarian approach might be called a “system” out of convenience but it was really no system at all, given that the state effectively ignored religion. The only example of this type would be the United States of North America, Andō said, a country founded upon Puritans’ flight from the oppressive rule of Henry VIII. In the United States each person went his own way and did his own thing, and now the result was readily apparent: the state could neither inspect the various doctrines nor could it manage clerics, and consequently new religions could spring up like sprouts after the rain. Thus the quality of clerics was declining, superficial

Andō Masazumi, as he is better known, serves as one of the major characters in Chapter Four,
religions emerged and spread their poison through the country, and in the end even though groups like the Mormons violated the law—even though such barbarous and immoral cults (yaban haitoku no giaku shūkyō) flouted conventional ethics—there was no means to abolishing them or prevent their spread. Such a “system” was clearly dangerous to the nation.\(^59\)

However, Andō argued, it was possible to avoid both extremes of adopting a national religion, on the one hand, or adopting libertarian latitudinarianism on the other. An officially recognized religion system would strike the sweet spot between these extremes by adjusting regulations to match the relative strength and influence of each of the religions in the country. This could be seen in the German example of designating religions as “Alpha” and “Beta” types, with the Alpha variety given status as public juridical persons and oversight over their own affairs, and those of the Beta variety given status as private juridical persons. Those that lacked formal organization or were of minimal influence were treated as Gamma religions and were managed through regular ordinances regarding public gatherings and meetings.\(^60\) Such a system was based on the principle of religious freedom, embodied the aim of separation of religion and the state, and furthermore did not separate state from religion absolutely, but to just the right degree, thereby solving the great problems shared by state and religion in an orderly system.

So (Andō rhetorically mused), what religion would make a good candidate for such a system in Japan? Such an officially recognized religion—and it seems that Andō could only imagine one religion holding this status—must first not oppose the organization of the state or the body

\(^59\) A quarter of a century after the publication of this editorial, Andō would outline much the same scheme (theocracy giving way to state religion, followed by kōninkyō and policies of strict separation), including the same disparaging treatment of Mormons. However, the later document also drew upon Andō’s tour of Europe in 1923. See Andō 1926.
political (kokutai). Religious rituals should not undermine state rituals, religious organizations should not oppose governmental administration, and as basic prerequisites for such status the religion in question must boast more than one million believers in the country, have more than one hundred years of history there, and must exhibit a deep connection with citizens’ customs, habits, and morals. Religions that failed to pass muster according to these criteria should not be granted officially recognized religion status. On investigation, Andō argued, the only groups that met the above criteria were the various traditional sects of Buddhism.

Recognizing that some might argue that this subjected religions to differential treatment or that it might render the constitutional provision of religious freedom empty, Andō argued that such protestations were the height of ignorance. After all, religious freedom guarantees the individual’s thoughts to be free from restraint, and under a kōninkyō system each person remained free to profess any religion of his choosing without the state being able to intervene in his thoughts. Individuals’ thoughts existed in the interior, intangible realm where the authority of the state could not reach. However, in cases where such individual beliefs were made manifest as a religious organization, they became a matter of external form and substance and the state could not (and should not) just let them be free.

So, while individual beliefs belonged to the realm of thought (and would therefore be free from governmental oversight), religious organizations fell under the purview of government administration. For the government to take a laissez-faire approach would make it indolent regarding its duties, for religious freedom was an individual matter that could not at all apply to groups. Here, Andō argued, one must know that a system of officially recognized religion was

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60 Andō’s source for this information about the German case is unclear. I do know, however, that he was close with Chikazumi Jōkan (discussed below), who also cited the German case approvingly.
based on the aim of religious freedom, and through it the state merely attempted to correct the (presumably faulty) apparatus for administering religion. Just at the time that the Yamagata cabinet was attempting to rush through a system for administering religion, Andō concluded, the government—along with all those who consider themselves true patriots—should take the possibilities presented by a kōninkyō system into account.61

Several features of Andō’s account deserve explication here. First, proponents of the kōninkyō idea saw themselves as advocating a relatively moderate stance (evidenced in Andō’s placement of a kōninkyō system between the extremes of national religion and libertarian latitudinarianism, with the category of a medieval papal kyōkoku serving as an unthinkable theocratic fourth option). Second, in the immediate postwar period (that is, in the late 1940s) the American brand of religious freedom was often treated as normative and universal, but on the eve of the twentieth century kōninkyō proponents treated America as a cultural backwater—internationally powerful, to be sure, but subject to the whims of all sorts of heterodox new religions that undermined national morality and resisted state intervention. The example of the Mormons and the image of a lawless and immoral society created a striking image of what a latitudinarian state policy might look like, but it also undermined the claims of those who might have looked to the United States as the exemplar of religious freedom. Finally, it was no accident that Andō’s criteria for kōninkyō status left room for Buddhism alone to fill the role of kōninkyō, nor was it an accident that he explicitly mentioned only the larger traditional Buddhist sects, effectively foreclosing the possibility that newly arisen Buddhist groups might fit the kōninkyō bill.

61 Adapted from MS 4395 (16 December 1899), 1–3.
Like his contemporaries, Andō made no explicit mention of Shintō. This was no doubt partly a function of the fact that he was writing for a Buddhist audience, but it was also partially due to what seems to have been a general point of tacit agreement among Buddhists at the time: the recently reinvented Shintō religion was not even worthy of mention in the context of discussions of state religion or officially recognized religion. This historical fact undermines postwar claims that Shintō had already achieved the status of national religion by this time. Had Shintō been the national religion, then presumably proponents of making Buddhism Japan’s sole kōninkyō would have articulated their arguments by first delegitimating Shintō or by acknowledging that systems of national religion and officially recognized religions could coexist.

The Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association

Andō Masazumi and his journal, Meikyō shinshi, were by no means the only voices that actively resisted the Yamagata Religions Bill and called for the establishment of Buddhism as Japan’s officially recognized religion. The Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai (hereafter, the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association) was founded by Jōdo Shinshū cleric Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941). Originally from Shiga Prefecture, Chikazumi demonstrated his intellect from an early age and attracted the attention of the Shinshū leadership. On Kiyozawa Manshi’s (1863–1903) recommendation, he traveled to Tokyo as a representative student of the Otani-ha branch of the sect. There, he studied at the First Higher School and joined in founding the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Kai) in 1894, where he

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62 I have relied on the pioneering scholarship of Iwata Fumiaki and his research circle in constructing this overview of Chikazumi’s life, particularly Chikazumi 2009, Ōmi 2009a and 2009b, and Ō sawa 2009. Andō Masazumi and Chikazumi Jōkan were close friends until philosophical differences tore them apart in 1929. See Chapter Four.
63 Kiyozawa was a famed Shinshū reformer. He and Chikazumi remained close after Chikazumi left for Tokyo, and when Chikazumi left on a tour of Europe Kiyozawa occupied Chikazumi’s residence, forming his private study circle the Kōkōdō there.
served as Secretary. Chikazumi studied under Inoue Tetsujirō (1856–1944) at Tokyo Imperial University, graduating with a bachelor’s degree in Western Philosophy in July 1898. In September of the same year he began to participate in resistance to the Sugamo Prison Chaplain Incident, in which Buddhists decried the summary dismissal of four Buddhist chaplains at the prison and their replacement with a Christian priest at the behest of the warden, a Christian.64

This experience apparently prompted Chikazumi’s founding of the Buddhist Citizens’ Alliance Association (Bukkyō Kokumin Dōmei Kai) on 29 October 1898. 65 Although Chikazumi himself had been ordained in 1879, a strain of lay centrality initially characterized the new organization. While it is tempting to view this lay-centric character as representing an anti-sacerdotalism of the sort apparent in the contemporary journal Bukkyō and its later offshoot Shin Bukkyō (discussed below), Ōsawa Kōji has indicated that the Buddhist Citizens’ Alliance Association was actually designed to provide a forum for non-clerics to voice their opposition to the Sugamo decision, since clerics already enjoyed the considerable lobbying power of the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association.66 The urgency of forcefully addressing religion-state relations brought the lay organization closer to clerics, and the group adopted a more inclusive

64 Ōsawa 2009, 17. The warden cited religious freedom as a rationale for his decision, which invited Buddhists to critique his understanding of religious freedom, arguing that such freedom must take into account the fact that the majority of Japanese—and the majority of the prisoners at Sugamo—were Buddhists. See Tōgō 1899.
65 The leadership of the movement is attributed in some contemporary sources to Chikazumi, and in others to Shinshū cleric Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931). I am guessing that Ishikawa pioneered the resistance to the Sugamo decision but left the day-to-day operation of the journal Seikyō jihō largely to the younger Chikazumi. Clearly Ishikawa was a vocal critic of the Sugamo decision; he wrote several letters to prominent politicians and bureaucrats (the prime minister, the chiefs of the army and navy, members of the House of Peers and House of Commons) protesting the decision in 1898. See Tōgō 1898 (Tōgō Ryōchō was one of the dismissed priests; this source is a record of his recollections of the incident in which he reads aloud from Ishikawa’s letters. The document also includes an appendix outlining the officially recognized religions of the various nations.)
character that was reflected in a change both in the group’s name and in its guidelines (kōryō) that took place in May 1899.67

As was common for many transsectarian organizations at the time, the primary activity of the new Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai involved dissemination of ideas and confirmation of group identity through print media.68 The group published a bimonthly periodical, Seikyō jihō (State and Religion Times), from 1 January 1899 until 8 December 1903.69 Seikyō jihō changed formats a few times over the course of its five years of publication (for example, the journal adopted a monthly format for its last eight months of existence), but each issue included a prominent display of the group’s founding principles and an anonymous editorial regarding some aspect of religion-state relations. Other sections included essays (ronsetsu), a society column (shakai, usually devoted to current affairs and likely expropriated from contemporary newspapers), and other miscellanea under various headings.70 Publication occurred regularly on

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66 Chikazumi Shin’ichi points out that the headquarters of both organizations were located in the immediate vicinity of one another. Chikazumi 2009, 7.
67 Yoshinaga Shin’ichi (2012) highlights the correspondence between the anti-superstition stances and lay centrality of both the Buddhist Citizens’ Alliance Association and the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists, discussed below.
68 Ōtani 2012, 42 –70.
69 Until very recently the only extant copies of this journal were scattered at a few universities around Japan; no university had a complete set. However, during attempts to renovate and restore Chikazumi Jōkan’s teaching center, the Kyūdō Kaikan (located in northeastern Tokyo just a few blocks from the University of Tokyo), researchers discovered a large cache of documents including a nearly complete set of the journal and tens of thousands of Chikazumi Jōkan’s letters and other documents. Research on this valuable trove is still in its beginning stages. Thanks to the kind support of researcher Iwata Fumiaki and his junior colleague Ōmi Toshihiro, I acquired full digital copies of Seikyō jihō, the more confessional journal Kyūdō (published February 1904–1922), and the later periodical Shinkai kengen (published 15 January 1929–20 November 1938). I am greatly indebted to these researchers and their collaborators (especially Chikazumi Shin’ichi, Ōsawa Kōji, and Ryan Ward) for their pioneering research based on these journals and the Kyūdō Kaikan materials.
70 Ōsawa 2009, 15 –16.
Taking the general gist of the journal’s editorials into account, here I will focus on two issues that were published between the initial debate of the Yamagata Religions Bill (14 December 1899) and its eventual defeat (27 February 1900). The first is the issue published on 29 December 1899, when the Association made its first comprehensive response to the specifics of the Yamagata proposal. The first editorial, bearing the title “Our Opinion of Absolute Opposition to the Religions Bill,” argued that two indispensable items should be included in any creation of a (legal) religions system. First, the author argued, any religions bill should thoroughly examine the contemporary religious status quo of the citizenry and to the utmost create a bill that matched that situation without creating something that might impede the [moral] development of the nation. Nothing should be done that would force any change upon that status quo, and there should be no rash attempt to force multiple religions to fit into one uncompromising mold. Second, by all means the religious stipulations and political stipulations of the bill should be thoroughly separated, and in those situations where it would be unavoidable to address both simultaneously, priority should be given to religions’ abilities to engage in self-administration while the limits of state oversight of religions should be made abundantly clear. Any legal document that lacked such transparency failed to pass muster as a religions bill.71

A second editorial tackled the problem of religious freedom more directly. Under the title “Misinterpretations of Religious Freedom [Shinkyō no jiyū no gokai],” the anonymous author (almost certainly Chikazumi) skilfully wielded citations from documents such as the Japan-France Treaty and the laws regarding religion in France, Prussia, Austria, and Bavaria (at that time).

71 SJ 24 (29 December 1899), 2.
time a sovereign kingdom within the German empire). Opening the editorial with the claim that Yamagata was taking advantage of Japanese citizens’ ignorance of religious freedom to push forward legislation that would ultimately serve the narrow interests of the cabinet, the author lamented the state of affairs in which the prime minister merely served as an intermediary who introduced interpretations of religious freedom that clearly originated from foreign powers.

In fact, the author claimed, the provision of religious freedom found in the Meiji Constitution merely guaranteed freedom of conscience (i.e., the freedom to believe in any religion) in contrast to the old Tokugawa bakufu system of restricting foreign religions (i.e., Christianity) through severe punitive sanctions. To ignore a particular country’s history and to ignore the relative strength of various religions in favor of adopting an egalitarian stance would be the height of self-interest. By this, the author probably meant to indicate that egalitarian legislation would suit the whims of bureaucrats rather than the needs of religious leaders and their parishioners.72

Instead of such a system, the author continued, freedom of conscience (freedom of belief) should be strictly separated from the administration of religions. For example, France’s religions law guaranteed freedom of assembly, exemption from military conscription, corporate status for religious edifices, and financial support for clerics, but only for Catholics, Protestants, Lutherans, Reformers, and—in Algeria (Arujinia in the original)—Muslims. As long as they did not act in opposition to the national interest, other groups could perform religious rites in private or seek special permission to perform such rites in public. The government reserved the right to dissolve any such groups, while they in turn had no right to assemble without government permission. In particular, such groups were forbidden from collaborating with foreign religions, and they could

72 Andō Masazumi, reflecting on the history of religious legislation in 1935, would recall that the Yamagata Bill was a bureaucrat’s bill rather than one that truly took the needs of religious people into account. AM Reel #9, Item #122.
not achieve juridical person status. Although Jews in France had tried unsuccessfully for some
time to become acknowledged by the state as an official religion, the author approvingly noted
that even with the stipulation that they must make France their motherland they still had not yet
achieved such status. In this way, new religions would fail to achieve official recognition even if
they had been in the country for a century or two.\(^{73}\)

The author’s point here was not, I think, to indicate that Japan should adopt a version of
French law outright, but rather to show how drastically the severity of the law in regard to
marginal religions contrasted with Japan’s own relatively permissive law. Whereas in the French
law Japanese religions would be classed among the second type of religions as being marginal
and subject to intense statutory oversight, under the proposed Japanese law French Catholicism
could come into Japan and receive the same treatment as Buddhism, a move the author
sarcastically rejected. The same types of distinctions seen in the French law, he showed, could
also be seen in contemporary Prussian, Australian, and Bavarian laws. He concluded:

Look, religious freedom does not undermine the administrative distinctions
between religious organizations [i.e., religious freedom does not overlook evident
differences between religions in favor of egalitarian treatment]? Ah, why would
our country alone welcome foreign religions and regard traditional religions,
which rightly preserve the spiritual unity of the citizenry, so coolly? In the next
issue [of *Seikyō jihō*] we will observe actual examples from the various countries,
take up the traditional prerogatives accorded to Buddhism, and explain the truth
of this. Here we proclaim that religious freedom does not at all clash with
prejudice in the treatment of foreign and domestic religions, and we thereby
dispel the misconceptions of the world.”\(^{74}\)

For the next three months the publication of *Seikyō jihō* became rather erratic as Chikazumi
and the other members of the Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai worked tirelessly to lobby the

\(^{73}\) If the author’s reading of contemporary French law is correct, then it substantiates Jason
Josephson’s point that the religious freedom clause in the Meiji Constitution was relatively
liberal for its time. See Josephson 2012, 224–236.

government. Articles in the small number of issues published during this time reiterated the themes of the 29 December 1899 editorials. In January Chikazumi published, under his own name, a tract called Shūkyō hō ronsan (A Critical Treatise on the Religions Bill). This was closely followed by an anonymous pamphlet entitled Our Opinion [Regarding] Opposition to the Religions Bill (the Opinion also appeared in abbreviated form in the 13 February 1900 issue of the journal, which advertised both of the aforementioned pamphlets).\footnote{Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai 1900. The full text of the Opinion is available online as part of the Modern Digital Library maintained by The National Diet Library of Japan. \url{http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/}.}

The Opinion emerged just before the failure of the bill in the House of Peers on 17 February.\footnote{Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai, Shūkyō hōan hantai iken, February 1900. The sixty-one page pamphlet was almost certainly written by Chikazumi Jōkan. The erudition of the document (particularly the author’s claim to familiarity with the situation in the West and his apparent...
through policies that took into account the relative strength and weakness of various sects and assemblies, according more privileges to the stronger and fewer to the weaker of these.\textsuperscript{77} In contrast to this very reasonable system, according to the author of the \textit{Opinion} the research informing the bill advanced by the Yamagata cabinet was slipshod and careless, widely recognized as unrealistic and unfeasible, and evidently intended to destroy traditional systems and ancient bonds. While superficially the bill appeared indebted to an American-style policy of non-interference \([h\text{\={o}}\text{n}i\text{n}shu\text{g}i]\), upon closer examination it was apparent that in regard to the Buddhist sects it adopted a Russian-style supervision of the national religion. Here, the author of the \textit{Opinion} clearly suggested that a national religion system would open Buddhism up to state intervention, which was precisely the critique that advocates of latitudinarianism would say about the \textit{kōn kinkyō} option.

Moreover, the author continued, while the Yamagata bill appeared to take the form of a response to domestic religious leaders’ requests for more oversight, in actuality it was an attempt to acquiesce to foreign religions’ demands for corporate rights. In so doing, the framers of the bill had replaced “religions” or “sects” as the basic legal units with “churches” and “temples.” This brought no small amount of confusion and ran the risk of treating marginal groups with the same deference as that which should be accorded to groups of considerable historical longevity and social clout. The author of the \textit{Opinion} summarized his Introduction thus:

\begin{quote}
In this way the government calls this by the name of religious freedom, names it universal impartiality. However, the government thereby dissolves the true
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{77} It is unclear where the author is getting his information for this claim and claims below about the situation in the West, but in a short 1929 pamphlet entitled \textit{Shūkyō hōan hantai raireki} (\textit{A History of Opposition to Religions Bills}), Chikazumi Jōkan claimed that the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association based its opposition on observations of the situation of the Catholic church in Germany.
authority of the sects and teaching assemblies, and without reflecting on the character of their respective influence places them in one mold, stealing the positions of traditional religions and making them equivalent to new religions, placing the sanctions that should be placed on new religions on traditional religions, putting the cart before the horse. What sort of universal impartiality is this?

In sum, the very first step in the great policy of the government’s religions bill has been made in error. All fifty-three clauses created in accordance with this policy are a sort of idealized law spilling from the brains of the drafters, and due to this the inevitable result is that the government will readily grant corporate rights to foreign religions and conduct limitless oversight of domestic Buddhism. If the bill is passed in this form, the domestic Buddhist groups will have their authority destroyed and their organizations dissolved, and accordingly we must proclaim that this is a great persecution of Buddhist groups. For this reason we, the Buddhists of Greater Japan, make our claim clear and proclaim our complete opposition [to this bill].78

Although the logic of this remarkable document was not always coherent, it encapsulated a major distinction that can be made between the statist approach to religious freedom put forward in the Yamagata Religions Bill and the corporatist approach to religious freedom favored by some Buddhists. The author suggested that a religions bill that treated all religions equally would ignore the important issue of precedent and the degree of familiarity that the citizenry had with each religion. While the importance of separating religion from politics was stressed, the language of religious freedom was not used in a positive sense. Instead, the author claimed that rights should be granted based on precedent and tradition rather than on universal principles that easily obfuscated historical and cultural particulars. Hence his disparaging references to “universal impartiality” and his dismissal of “new religions” (i.e., Christianity, and perhaps groups like Renmonkyō).

The success of the efforts of Chikazumi and the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association is difficult to measure at great historical distance. The failure of the Yamagata Bill was of course a victory, but as Chikazumi himself would later recall it marked a respite in attempts to further
regulate religions rather than a defeat of such attempts once and for all. Although the stance of his organization was also somewhat different from the stances held by the leaders of the various Buddhist sects, they shared an interest in securing the best possible position for Buddhism vis-à-vis the state. Whether they advocated making Buddhism the state religion or making it the “officially recognized religion,” both Chikazumi’s readership and the clerical leadership were ultimately interested in collaborating with government bureaucrats rather than resisting them outright. This was probably because they felt that they could ensure the best treatment for Buddhism and Buddhists from positions within or near the state apparatus rather than from an ambiguous, “free,” position outside it.

It is probably for this reason that the clerical leadership later elected to work with the government when a motion was passed in the House of Commons to establish a “Religious Systems Investigation Committee” on 21 March 1901. That the language of the brief article establishing this Committee sounds vaguely reminiscent of the language used by the author of the Opinion in its call for more research about the domestic religious situation is perhaps not coincidental, for the statist motives of the government bureaucrats and the corporatist motives of Buddhist clerics were significantly aligned: Buddhist clerical leaders wanted to make sure that they could bend the ears of government administrators, who in turn wanted to harness and constrain the ideological power of religion. The Buddhists may have thought that they were recreating the circumstances of the classical formulation おぼ 仏教 (temporal kingly law, Buddhist law); the bureaucrats may have felt that they were creating a system whereby religion

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78 Dai Nippon Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai 1900, 5–6.
79 Chikazumi 1929
80 SGSR 17: 299
could be used to support and magnify state authority rather than harboring potentially seditious sentiment.\footnote{Christopher Ives has also recently suggested that Buddhist clerics operated according to the \textit{ōbō buppō} formula, trying to make Buddhism “useful” to the state by collaborating with state projects. See Ives 2009, esp. 101–127. This is a helpful point, but I think it is important to emphasize that not all Buddhists felt this way. See Chapter Four.}

This governmental move to gather more information through investigative research coincided with a similar move on the part of the Buddhist sects. Anticipating that their case in future religion-state conflicts would be strengthened by surveying religious systems abroad, the Jōdo Shinshū Ōtani-ha leadership sent Chikazumi Jōkan on a tour of Europe and the United States in April 1900, immediately after the failure of the Religions Bill. Chikazumi spent two years in the United States and Western Europe before returning in March 1902. Another cleric associated with the \textit{kōninkyō} faction, Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931), went on a similar tour in 1902.

Chikazumi would continue \textit{Seikyō jihō} for the next year, but a new stage of his life began in which he concentrated his activities more on proselytizing activities and Buddhist reform at his teaching center, the Kyūdō Kaikan, located close to corridors of political power and academe in its position just a couple of blocks from Tokyo Imperial University.\footnote{Ironically, Chikazumi’s travels through Europe and America inspired him to create a new sort of Buddhist outreach program. He instituted a “Sunday school” at his Kyūdō Gakusha (Seeking...
interpretations of religion-state relations. The foregoing shows that such corporatist attitudes can be traced back at least as far as the debates over the Yamagata Bill, when some Buddhists saw a kōninkyō system as a perfect middle ground between statism and latitudinarianism. These attitudes did not constitute a fundamental ignorance of the importance of religious freedom. Rather, they represented a tactical interpretation of religious freedom designed to secure an advantageous position for Buddhism and Buddhists through the framework of customary rights.

**Religious Freedom as Civil Liberty: The Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai**

Although there are important differences between the statist and corporatist models, they were similarly focused on maintaining a certain status quo through managing religions as corporate entities rather than guaranteeing individuals’ freedom of conscience or association. However, religious freedom was also interpreted by some interest groups as a civil liberty guaranteeing individuals and groups freedom from state persecution and journalistic slander, or—described positively—securing their freedom of individual expression and their rights to assemble with whomever they would. By “civil liberty,” I mean the freedom to engage in thoughts or activities without fear of state intervention, criminalization, or the threat of censure or persecution. Religious freedom as a civil liberty was most frequently advocated by Christians and lay Buddhist intellectuals, many of whom treated religion as a matter of personal faith and many of whom had been exposed to contemporary European and American humanistic 

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83 Krämer 2011
84 Postwar conceptions of religious freedom have tended to prioritize the notion of religious freedom as a civil liberty because they treat “religion” as a matter of sincere propositional belief (freedom of conscience) rather than as a matter of group affiliation or public performance (public activity being understood as merely representative of private commitment; see Keane 2012).
ideas about the benefits of tolerating religious difference. This latitudinarian stance also tended to be more individualist than corporatist, although I will show below that there are important caveats to this trend.

At roughly the same time that Chikazumi was vigorously lobbying the government and publishing regarding the proposed religions bill, yet another alternative Buddhist movement was emerging in Tokyo in response to the proposed legislation. However, unlike the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association (described in the previous section as a representative example of the corporatist approach that regarded religious freedom as a customary right), this new group took issue equally with the Buddhist establishment and with the state. Whereas the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association tended to adopt a conservative stance that sought to preserve Buddhist prestige by aligning Buddhism with the state through a kōninkyō arrangement, the Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai (Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists) sought to preserve Buddhist liberty by guaranteeing Buddhist freedom from governmental oversight and overreach. It was in the pages of the magazines Bukkyō (Buddhism, which published Fraternity tracts for about a year between February 1899 and March 1900) and Shin Bukkyō (New Buddhism, established by Fraternity members in July 1900 and published monthly until August 1915) where religious freedom as a civil liberty was most clearly articulated. While the Fraternity members rarely spoke of “civil liberties” explicitly, they were highly suspicious of state intervention into

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85 The founders of the Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai were explicitly indebted to Puritan ideals; the neologism “Seito” was their attempt to translate the word “Puritan” (now translated into Japanese as seikyōto). See [Sakaino] Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yōnen jidai,” SB 6(4), in SBRS 1: 42–43. This idealization of the Puritan model was short-lived. In 1903 the group changed its name to the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai, which I translate as the “Fraternity of New Buddhists.” Others have translated it as the “Association of New Buddhists,” but—as Matt McMullen pointed out to me and as the group’s early literature suggests—the group was far more exclusive (and secretive) than the term “Association” implies. Both lay-centric groups mentioned here—the Greater Japan
religious affairs and more likely than many of their Buddhist contemporaries to advocate egalitarian treatment of all religions.

The Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists was a group of disaffected young priests and lay intellectuals that coalesced in Tokyo right at the turn of the twentieth century in the midst of the furor over the Yamagata Religions Bill. In a retrospective published in 1910, Sakaino Köyō (1871–1933) recalled that the original impetus for the movement derived from an 1894 meeting of Furukawa Rōsen (1871–1899), Sugimura Jūō (1872–1945, also Sojinkan), and others who formed the Tokyo-based Keiikai (Warp and Woof Society), although some founding members’ association with one another can be traced to an even earlier progressive Buddhist group based in Kyoto known as the Hanseikai (Temperance Society, founded 1886). The Keiikai journal, Bukkyō (Buddhism), took a notoriously caustic stance vis-à-vis the clerical establishment.

When Keiikai leader Furukawa Rōsen returned to Kyoto to convalesce while battling tuberculosis (he died on 15 November 1899), a political fissure regarding some of the more strident anti-clerical contributions to Bukkyō emerged. At the same time, Keiikai members split into two factions regarding the kōninkyō issue: Chikazumi Jōkan and Kashiwara Buntarō (d.u.) advocated the elevation of Buddhism—and only Buddhism—to kōninkyō status, while

Buddhist Alliance Association and the Fraternity of Buddhist Puritans—represented a well-educated and generally middle- and upper-class membership.

86 Sakaino 1910, 1–2. Also see Thelle 1987, 207; Davis 1992, 167; Moriya 2005, 286. The Hanseikai journal Hansei zasshi went on to become the liberal journal Chūō kōron, still in publication today. Notably, Chikazumi Jōkan was also a member of the Keiikai. Members of the Buddhist youth culture in Tokyo at the end of the nineteenth century were often affiliated with multiple groups simultaneously, so many of the men who founded and joined the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists had been active in the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association (founded 1894) which represented a clerical intelligentsia demographic. Those who also counted among the members of the Keiikai tended to advocate stances that were more sharply critical of the clerical establishment than seen in this larger group, and distinctions between “old” and “new” Buddhism frequently featured in the pages of the Keiikai journal Bukkyō.

87 Thelle 1987, 213.
several others advocated either elevating both Buddhism and Christianity to such status or abandoning the idea of “officially recognized religion” altogether.\footnote{Yoshinaga 2012, 33.}

With these significant differences of opinion as impetus, the Keiikai unanimously agreed to disband at a meeting held on 5 February 1899.\footnote{Yoshinaga 2012, 34.} One week later, on 12 February 1899, those who had represented the anti-\textit{kōninkyō} camp—Andō Hiromu (1876–?), Sakaino Kōyō, Takashima Beihō (1875–1949), and Tanaka Jirōku (1869–?)—gathered in a dark four and a half tatami mat room in Takashima’s humble Tokyo lodgings and created the Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai (Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists), composing a five-article list of principles:

1. We believe in the original principles of Buddhism.
2. We anticipate the fundamental reform of society through the arousal of faith.
3. We insist on free inquiry into Buddhism.
4. We abolish all superstitious beliefs.
5. We do not acknowledge the necessity of preserving prior religious systems.\footnote{Watanabe Kaikyoku (1872–1933) and Sugimura Jūō (1872–1945) joined the original four as founding members sometime in 1899.}

To this list, in response to the clerical push to make Buddhism an officially recognized religion (which founding members read as an abrogation of the principle of fairness between religions and a dangerous invitation for the state to meddle in private religious matters), the members of the Fraternity added a sixth point about rejecting state interference in religious affairs. This additional principle, “We abolish all governmental protection and oversight of religions” was added to the platform by March 1899, when the existence of the group was first publicized in an anonymous \textit{Bukkyō} editorial.\footnote{Takashima, “Shin Bukkyō jindai shi,” SBRS 2: 1056–1057. See Anonymous, “Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai no soshiki naru,” B 148 (15 March 1899), 101–103. The version of this editorial I cite—from the supplementary primary source material provided with Yoshinaga, ed. 2012—}
Although the members had hoped to turn the journal *Bukkyō* into the official organ for the Fraternity, negotiations with editor Kaji Hōjun (1864–1920) broke down and the members were forced to establish their own journal. In the time between the initial formation of the group in early 1899 and the publication of the first issue of *Shin Bukkyō (New Buddhism)* in July 1900, the furor over the Yamagata Religions Bill galvanized the group and provided a ready-made *raison d’être* for these “up and coming” or “progressive” Buddhists (*shinshin Bukkyōto*) who had espoused stances that were consistently critical of both the Buddhist clerical establishment and the state. Although they had experienced some conflict with the management of *Bukkyō*, a 24 January 1900 *Bukkyō* editorial recounting significant developments in 1899 spoke briefly but approvingly of the nascent organization. The group was able to capitalize on the indignation that greeted the Yamagata Bill by appealing to young intellectuals who favored more latitudinarian stances than those evidenced by the older clerical establishment or the *kōinkyō* faction.

Takashima Beihō later recalled that prospective members were banging down the door in their eagerness to join the group following a promulgation of its formation in *Bukkyō* on 15 March 1899, but the founding members made a policy to apply stringent standards to membership, rejecting first-time applicants as a matter of course. Fraternity members’ bears a handwritten date of 15 October 1899, but cross-referencing it with other sources seems to suggest that the March date is the accurate one (this is corroborated, for example, by Takashima’s 1903 essay “Shin Bukkyō no okotta wake,” *Shin Bukkyō no shiori*, 7).

92 [Sakaino] Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yören jidai,” SBRS 2: 42. *Bukkyō* also apparently had a reputation for representing the Jōdo sect (Kaji was a Jōdo priest), which was a turnoff for the founding members of the Association given their commitment to independence from the clerical leadership and their disdain for sectarianism.


reformist attitudes, their anti-sacerdotalism, and their support of latitudinarian state policies vis-à-vis religion were hardly commonplace at the inception of the group. Members initially treated the group as a secret society to protect themselves from potential fallout associated with these unpopular positions. While this caution derived at least as much from youthful exuberance as from any serious threat to members’ physical wellbeing or social standing, their reformist stance had serious repercussions for those who came from clerical backgrounds. Hence the members’ adoption of code names (e.g., “Mr. 68”) and secret passwords.

Early Editorials in Bukkyō

Immediately following the 15 March 1899 Bukkyō editorial announcing the establishment of the Fraternity was a second editorial entitled “An Opinion On Officially Recognized Religion.” The article began by saying that in the face of the threat of mixed residence (with foreign Christians, naichi zakkyo), a number of people had begun to advocate the treatment of Buddhism as Japan’s officially recognized religion (kōninkyō). However, the author wrote, in response to Nobuta’s role in the development of comparative religious studies in Japan, see Suzuki N. 1970. Kishimoto Nobuta was father of Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964) and co-founder, along with Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949), of the Society for the Study of Comparative Religion (Anesaki was, in turn, Kishimoto Hideo’s academic mentor and father-in-law). Articles about Murakami Senshō include Mohr 2005a, 2005b, Ward 2005, and Okada 2009. For a general overview of Murakami’s life, see Sueki 2004a, 86–109.


96 Takashima, “Shin Bukkyō jindai shi,” SBRS 2: 1063–1064. The password, apparently rarely used in actual practice, involved the posing of the question (perhaps in transliterated Latin?), “Rūchiemu superō?” to which the respondent would reply, “Horao to hōsu.” Takashima suggests that Sugimura Jūō (also Sōjinkan, alias Mr. 68) was the member most committed to the use of code names and secret greetings, implying that the others tolerated his proposals without exhibiting the same degree of enthusiasm for them. That said, Yoshinaga Shin’ichi has indicated that in addition to Sugimura’s penchant for secrecy, the members of the Fraternity were simply perpetuating practices of obfuscation that had been used in the Keiikai and in the pages of the journal Bukkyō to preserve anonymity and thereby ensure freedom of expression without fear of censure or ostracism. Yoshinaga 2012, 34.
the editors felt compelled to express the feeling that Buddhism should not be officially recognized—rather, that it be the subject of a latitudinarian policy. After all, the author continued, what does “officially recognized” mean anyway? Citing the fact that legal scholars exhibited great differences of opinion about the respective purviews of civil and private law, the author dismissed a Seikyō jihō definition of officially recognized religion as being both legally and conceptually untenable. Moreover, to seek state acknowledgment of religions was ultimately to invite statutory oversight and place religion in a subordinate position to the state.

Moving on to criticize recent editorials in Meikyō shinshi that had been calling for the acknowledgment of Buddhism as Japan’s officially recognized religion, the author indicated that such editorials had emphasized that such status would not benefit Buddhism but would be of great benefit to the state. With evident incredulity, the author wondered what might motivate any Buddhist to act in such a manner. While such an initiative coming from the state would be understandable, would it not be strange to have Buddhists themselves calling for such oversight? Moreover, given that Buddhism effectively enjoyed state recognition already while Christianity (as a foreign religion) did not, was it not odd that Buddhists claimed to be languishing while Christianity was flourishing?

Ultimately, the editorial opined, neither Buddhism nor Christianity should be treated as an officially recognized religion. If both were treated as kōninkyō, then Christianity would be given undue preferential treatment because of the government’s evident desire to appease foreign powers. As such, there could be no way to treat the two religions equally other than to adopt a stance of liberal latitudinarianism. Although some might complain that this would put Buddhism
at a disadvantage as *naichi zakkyo* policies went into effect, the writer scoffed that a Buddhism incapable of competing with Christianity on a level playing field was no Buddhism at all.97

The sarcastic, biting tone of this editorial and its willingness to call out contemporaneous publications and groups such as *Seikyō jihō* and *Meikyō shinshi* was characteristic of the caustic rhetoric that characterized *Bukkyō* more generally. As the editorial announcing the formation of the Fraternity had suggested, “old Buddhism” was superstitious, hypocritical, and false, an obstruction to human progress.98 Combating this religion of fogies and fakes, the new Fraternity would not be one of those quasi-political movements seeking personal benefit (almost certainly a thinly veiled reference to the Bukkyō Kokumin Dōmei Kai founded by Chikazumi Jōkan a few months prior), but a purely religious movement based on faith.99

This last claim is rather suspect, for the Fraternity almost immediately turned its attention to forming its own political lobby, the Jiyū Shugi Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai (Liberal Buddhist Alliance Association). The lobby aimed not so much to reject the Yamagata Religions Bill as to counter the claims of the *kōninkyō* faction. This political project was exemplified in a 24 January 1900 *Bukkyō* opinion piece attributed to the Liberal Buddhist Alliance Association called “An Opinion in Response to the Religions Bill.” It began:

> We lament the fact that inveterate Old Buddhists and pigheaded priests do their utmost to preserve their temples through political power and try to conserve the outward forms of their sects and factions out of fears that other religions might infringe on their own territory. We have completely opposed the officially recognized religion philosophy and have rejected governmental protection and interference for quite some time. Now, as the Religions Bill has been submitted,

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97 Adapted from Anonymous, “*Kōninkyō ni kan suru iken,*** B 148 (15 March 1899), 103–109.
98 Such distinctions had already been drawn by Nakanishi Ushirō in 1889. See Ōtani 2012, 45–47. For an extended examination of Nakanishi’s work, see Hoshino 2012.
we liberal and progressive Buddhists announce a few of the points we see in the outlines of that Bill, and we intend to call for transparent, public criticism of it.

In its first point following this somewhat bombastic introduction, the article precisely reproduced the language of the sixth point in the Fraternity platform: “We reject all sorts of political protection and interference regarding religion.” Arguing that as long as religions existed within national boundaries they were necessarily subject to national laws, the anonymous author suggested that as long as religions did not infringe upon morals or public order, the government should adopt a passive, rather than active, approach to managing religions and should allow for the free development of religions according to the natural order of things. The article then went on to say that the Association approved of the fact that the Yamagata Bill ostensibly treated Buddhism and Christianity equally, but hastily added that the bill failed to actually treat the two equally because of significant differences in terminology regarding definitions of priests, churches, temples, and the like. Going on to outline specific clauses that should be cut or modified and points that required further clarification, the document made clear that it was less opposed to the spirit of the law than it was to the advocacy of a kōninkyō system that greeted its submission in the House of Peers. That is, the Liberal Buddhist Alliance Association was not opposed to the statist thrust of the Yamagata Bill nearly as much as it was opposed to the conservative attitudes behind calls for official state recognition of Buddhism.

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101 Here the Fraternity indebtedness to some form of evolutionary thought is apparent; this would become clearer in later years as members attempted to rank religions according to their relative degrees of development.

102 This point was actually fairly close to that of the Opinion published just weeks later by the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association, which similarly called for greater clarity in the “units” targeted by the law.
Members of the Fraternity would later recall the turn of the century attempts to pass a religions bill in the Diet as crucial to the formation of the organization, but again it was not the possibility of passage of the bill itself that was the issue, but rather the kōninkyō debate. For example, in an April 1905 retrospective about the founding of the group, Sakaino Kōyō wrote:

I have not at all forgotten. At the time when the officially recognized religion movement of Ishikawa Shuntai and his ilk was at its height, blindly following their lead, arguments seeking the protection of the government in order to sustain the life of Buddhism reverberated in all directions. At that time when each sect was totally running crazed, among two or three people an indignant recognition instantly emerged: if we did not destroy this pitiful idea that the life of Buddhism could be perpetuated through political power, the true significance of Buddhism could never be demonstrated. With this as a motive, discussions of forming the New Buddhist organization began.103

Similarly, in a contemplative essay published the following year, Sakaino recalled that in the period immediately following the Sugamo Prison Chaplain Problem many in the Buddhist world readily spoke of making Buddhism the national religion. However, when they realized the pitfalls of this approach—presumably, when they realized that many citizens were resistant to the idea of a state religion—they began to advocate making Buddhism the sole “officially recognized religion” in Japan. Sakaino recalled that this kōninkyō lobby enjoyed considerable influence and the financial backing of the Shinshū Ōtani-ha sect, so that while there were a few religious journals that attempted to resist their efforts, the only group that was able to fight the bitter fight was the Fraternity through its publications in Bukkyō. Sakaino acknowledged that while the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists organized the Liberal Buddhist Alliance Association to resist the kōninkyō faction, ultimately they were unable to do much.104

The kōninkyō conflict became something of a moot point when the bill died in the House of Peers in February 1900, but Sakaino recalled that the efforts of the kōninkyō faction continued as

103 Sakaino Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yōnen jidai,” SB 6, no. 4, SBRS 1: 42.
Chikazumi Jōkan and Ishikawa Shuntai were sent to Europe and the United States to survey religious systems there in hopes of helping the government clarify religious systems at home. Sakaino concluded his remarks by sharply commenting that only recently (in 1906) had “Buddhists of the world” started to realize the error of their ways. While it is unclear what Sakaino took as evidence of such a change of heart—and it is equally unclear who he meant to indicate when he disparagingly referred to the “Buddhists of the world”—one possibility is that Sakaino was referring to Chikazumi Jōkan’s recent turn away from politics. When Chikazumi returned from his trip in 1902, he focused much more on hortatory preaching than on political organizing, abolishing Seikyō jihō in favor of his new confessional journal Kyūdō.105 Whatever changes Sakaino saw, they proved to him that the members of the Fraternity had been nearly ten years ahead of the benighted clerics who had foolishly advocated kōninkyo status for Buddhism.106

Sakaino and his colleagues Takashima Beihō and Sugimura Jūō would extol the efforts of the Fraternity in resisting clerical obduracy in their periodic retrospectives in Shin Bukkyō and

105 Chikazumi S. 2009. In the same retrospective, Sakaino highlighted the continuity between Seikyō jihō and Kyūdō, but recent research indicates that during the years of publication of Kyūdō (1904–1922), Chikazumi focused on hortatory sermons more than political activity. Chikazumi’s Kyūdō Kaikan (http://www.kyudo-kaikan.org/), located adjacent to the University of Tokyo and now designated as a Tangible Cultural Resource (yūkei bunkazai), imitated the architecture of a Western church but featured a rokkakudō-style altar, stained glass windows, and an upper gallery with wooden swastikas carved into the railings. Chikazumi gave Sunday sermons at the Kyūdō Kaikan and even held Sunday school there for some time. Chikazumi researcher and archivist at the Kyūdō Kaikan, Ōmi Toshihiro, indicated to me during a visit to this remarkable edifice that Chikazumi went to Europe and the United States to survey religious systems there in support of the political project of securing kōninkyo status, but upon his return he imported a number of the features of European and American religious practices. Personal communication, 2 October 2012. Importantly, however, Chikazumi returned to his pro-kōninkyo position in later years as the government tried to pass new bills regulating religions. I address these later activities in Chapter Four.
other religious magazines, but the extent to which the efforts of the Jiyūshugi Bukkyōto Dōmei Kai were successful in countering the “official religion faction” is unclear.\(^{107}\) As Sakaino’s retrospective indicates, however, after the Fraternity established its own journal in 1900 and after it changed its name in 1903 to the Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai (Fraternity of New Buddhists), members would repeatedly claim that they had been on the right side of history. In the numerous historical retrospectives featured in the pages of *Shin Bukkyō*, it became obligatory to make some reference to the kōninkyō faction as quintessentially representative of the “old Buddhism” against which these “New Buddhists” had been struggling.

At the time of the Yamagata Bill debates (i.e., between December 1899 and February 1900), however, the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists was still more ideal than reality. The six founding members only began to welcome their first applicants a couple of weeks before the bill was defeated in the House of Peers, and over the next several months the young editors struggled to pull together the first issue of *Shin Bukkyō* for publication. When the journal’s first issue was published on 15 July 1900, the opening manifesto masked lingering tensions within the group about the degree to which the state should adopt a latitudinarian stance and the definition of religion on which the concept of religious freedom would be based.\(^{108}\)

Specifically, the New Buddhists’ strident advocacy of the elimination of superstition meshed only uneasily with their rejection of governmental interference in religious affairs. Members of the Fraternity had significant differences of opinion on the subject, but collectively they embraced an individualistic stance that treated religious freedom as a matter of conscience (their emphasis on “sound faith” exemplified their treatment of religion as a matter of propositional

\(^{107}\) In addition to retrospectives published by these authors in *Shin Bukkyō* in 1901, 1905, 1906, 1907, and 1910, see also Takashima’s postwar retrospective published in the transsectarian Buddhist magazine *Daihōrin*. Takashima 1946a, 1946b.
belief) while regarding the external manifestations of faith (assembly and speech) as also being beneficiaries of the religious freedom guarantee. For them, religious freedom was freedom from state oversight and interference more than it was freedom to believe anything one wanted.

The inspiration behind this interpretation of religious freedom is unclear. One possible influence on the Fraternity mindset may have been—as the group’s original name implied—the Puritan quest for religious freedom that marked the early colonization of North America. Fraternity members embraced Puritan ideals of abstemiousness in a time when Buddhist clerics were widely derided as degenerate and dissolute, but it is possible that they were also influenced by the decidedly dramatic story of persecuted Puritans risking the trans-Atlantic passage in pursuit of religious freedom.109

Whatever its source, this treatment of religious freedom as a civil liberty has made the Fraternity an attractive candidate for postwar scholars’ quests for evidence of a liberal tradition in the Meiji Constitutional Period, but members were less liberal than a superficial reading of their rhetoric would suggest.110 Members of the Fraternity sometimes denied the legitimacy of groups and practices that they deemed “superstitious,” and their resistance to state intervention in

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108 I discuss these debates in more detail at the opening of the next chapter.
109 Another reason for their advocacy of religious freedom as a civil liberty—and I must stress here that this is my term, not theirs—may have been the influence of Nakanishi Ushirō (1859–1930), a slightly older reformer whose publications on the subject of “New Buddhism” and “religious revolutions” provided legitimizing force for the various reform efforts of the last decade of the nineteenth century. As Hoshino Seiji has argued, Nakanishi took an evolutionary stance regarding religious development that idealized the Protestant Reformation as a necessary challenge to sacerdotal authority; it is possible that Fraternity members absorbed that interpretation and extended it to include suspicion of state initiatives. See Hoshino 2009 and 2012, esp. 112–130. Ōtani (2012) discusses Nakanishi’s influence on the younger generation, although he stresses that Nakanishi served more as a legitimizer than an instigator.
religious affairs was not based on an unambiguous commitment to purely humanist or universalist principles.\footnote{On the New Buddhists’ criticism of emergent and heterodox groups, see Garon 1997, 80 (citing Takashima 1936). Garon implies that the Fraternity of New Buddhists was still active at the time of the first Ōmoto suppression (sponsoring a rally in 1920 that preceded the raid of 1921), but it seems that the Fraternity disbanded with the dissolution of the journal in 1915. See Akamatsu Tesshin, “Kaisetsu: Shin Bukkyō undō ni tsuite,” SBRS 1: 1123. Nevertheless, Garon’s point still stands that there was a certain irony in the mobilization of “religious freedom” for the purposes of suppressing heterodox movements. I examine this stance in greater detail in Chapter Three.} Furthermore, there was a marked move to more conservative stances among these bearers of Buddhist youth culture as they entered middle age.\footnote{Ōtani Eiichi remarked on this generational shift in his response to comments on his 2012 book at the 29 September 2012 meeting of the Bukkyō to Kindai Kenkyūkai [Buddhism and Modernity Study Association], entitled “Ōtani Eiichi, Kindai Bukkyō to iu shiza o yomu.”} Even if we do count their movement as a liberal one—and it is true that in comparison to older generations and in comparison to many of their clerical counterparts the Fraternity members were liberal—at the time of the debates over the Yamagata Religions Bill the Fraternity was more dream than reality.\footnote{Chapter Three will show how the Fraternity members went about putting their ideals into practice. Fraternity members sacrificed some of their liberalism in efforts to achieve some rapprochement with the state; this had profound results for Buddhist studies and for}

Conclusions

I am arguing in this dissertation that we can understand Meiji Constitutional Period religious freedom better in its historical context if we shift attention away from both universalistic and particularistic (i.e., nationalistic) interpretations of the concept. As seen in several examples here, transsectarian discourse provides a view into the diverse interpretations of religious freedom advanced by competing interest groups during the Meiji Constitutional Period. The statist view adopted by the Yamagata cabinet treated religious freedom as an important constitutional
principle but gave priority to the state’s duty to preserve peace and order. Religious freedom in this view operated in the interior realm of thought and belief, but in the exterior social and political realm the government reserved the right to manage religions as it saw fit, meaning that it could interfere with public expressions of private faith as circumstances dictated.

Religious leaders rightly feared that this might mean trouble for their groups, but rather than seeking freedom from state intervention, many religious leaders jockeyed for position closer to the state. Like the Yamagata cabinet, kōninkyō advocates such as Andō Masazumi and Chikazumi Jōkan made a distinction between religious freedom as a matter of interior belief and the exterior management of religions as corporate entities. Their opposition to the government’s position derived from their evident hope that the government would clarify the relationship between state and religion and elevate Buddhism to a position of prestige based on precedent. They, too, treated religion as a matter of propositional belief in their claims that a kōninkyō system would not abrogate the principle of religious freedom, but they did not publicly acknowledge the possibility that government management of religions might interfere with public expressions of such belief; the extent to which this possibility occurred to them in private moments is unclear.¹¹⁴

It is also striking that at the turn of the twentieth century these kōninkyō advocates treated the United States as a laughable aberration among the various “civilized” nations of the time. For them, American-style latitudinarianism merely led to the emergence of heterodox, immoral policymakers regarding religions, social edification, and “superstition” during the Taishō era (1912–1926).

¹¹⁴ Chikazumi adamantly held to his belief that a kōninkyō system was best for Buddhism even into the late 1920s, when he again resisted state efforts to pass religions bills. I discuss these efforts in Chapter Four, using Chikazumi and—especially—Andō as examples of how former kōninkyō proponents shifted their positions in the context of the war. Chikazumi died in 1941,
religions like the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. Postwar observers may have criticized the prewar and wartime Japanese state for failing to adopt an American-style latitudinarian vision of religious freedom, but at the turn of the twentieth century such a vision was the exception, not the rule.

Despite the boastful rhetoric that characterized later retrospectives, the Fraternity of Buddhist Puritans and their lobby, the Liberal Buddhist Alliance Association, seem to have exerted little actual political pressure on the debates regarding the Yamagata Bill. Nevertheless, the Fraternity represented an important strain of thought that emphasized a latitudinarian interpretation of religious freedom as a civil liberty. Yet as the Fraternity platform made evident, certain groups and ideas failed to pass muster as genuine religions. “Superstitions” required eradication, leading to the torturous logic that such eradication would either not violate marginal groups’ religious freedom or that such groups were essentially not deserving of civil liberties.

I also want to emphasize that some Buddhists’ push to make Buddhism the officially recognized religion of the Japanese state at the turn of the twentieth century reveals a fundamental problem in analyses that have treated Shintō as Japan’s state religion at this time. If Buddhists perceived Japan as lacking a state religion (instead of seeking to replace Shintō with Buddhism as Japan’s state religion), this undermines the claim that either the 1889 Meiji Constitution or the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education codified a national religion that contemporaries recognized as “State Shintō.” I am not suggesting here that a certain type of religious ideology—in a broad sense—was not inculcated in citizens through a combination of

but Andō lived through the war and his correspondence and journals from that period have been preserved.

It should be clear that this is the interpretation evident in my primary sources and is not my view.

Josephson 2012, 224–236.
public education, imperial pageantry, and official ideology—these things are all in evidence throughout the Meiji Constitutional Period and were fairly well established by the turn of the twentieth century. But it seems that people at the time recognized imperial ritual and the rites associated with public education as civic rituals rather than as expressions of religious faith.

The Buddhist clamor for recognition as Japan’s “officially recognized religion” came not because Buddhists were jealous of the exalted status of Shintō priests, but because in their eyes Japan needed things that only Buddhism could provide. For those who fell closer to the interpretation of “officially recognized religion” as a de facto state religion, Buddhism provided the important ritual technologies of nation-pacification (chingo kokka) and imperial coronation (sokui kanjō). For those who saw kōninkyō status as a way of fostering a symbiotic relationship between religion, state, and society, Buddhism served as a known quantity familiar to the Japanese people due to centuries of precedent, and Buddhism alone could contribute the tools of social edification and spiritual mobilization to the exigent project of nation-building.

This leads to another point. Christopher Ives has recently suggested that Buddhists’ primary aim during the Meiji Constitutional Period was to make Buddhism “useful” to the state. The

117 By “religion” here I mean belief in empirically unverifiable entities or realities that are observable through public discourse or action but that otherwise depend upon the exercise of humans’ imaginative faculties. In the case of Meiji Constitutional Period civil religion, the empirically unverifiable content included the idea of the emperor as descendant of the deity Amaterasu, the idea of Japan as a divine nation, and the idea of shrines as sites for the veneration of the spirits of the dead. On Shintō and education, see Shimazono 2010. On imperial pageantry, Fujitani 1996. On war memorial shrines as unambiguously religious institutions, Miyamoto 2012.

118 In this regard, although my reasons for arriving at the conclusion differ, my research substantiates Jason Josephson’s recent argument that Shintō acted as a secular formation rather than as a national religion. Josephson 2012, 132–163.

119 The concept of social edification, kyōka, ably discussed by Garon as “moral suasion” (1997), derives from Buddhist usage: kyōke. Azegami (2009, 2012) has shown that Shintō priests were later able to argue that they were actually closer to “the people” and better suited to engage in such hortatory efforts.

120 Ives 2009, 14–53.
The foregoing suggests that this is only partially correct. Focusing broadly on “Buddhism” and “Buddhists” rather than on specific interest groups within the Buddhist world can lead to an overgeneralized view of the salient trends and changes in Meiji Constitutional Period Buddhist doctrine and praxis. For example, the distinction between lay intellectual and clerical interests is significant. As I have shown here and will continue to show in the next two chapters, while in general transsectarian Buddhist groups eventually opted to align themselves with the state rather than suffer persecution, for a significant portion of the Meiji Constitutional Period they adopted different tactics for advancing their parochial interests.

Although these interest groups all spoke about Buddhism, in actuality their perceptions of what counted as genuine Buddhism, who was authorized to speak for Buddhists, and how Buddhism would benefit state, society, and individuals varied considerably. Furthermore, pragmatic association around shared political commitments sometimes masked fundamental sources of disagreement within Buddhist interest groups about the scope of legal concepts such as freedom, rights, liberties, and privileges. Indeed, the two transsectarian groups examined in detail in this chapter emerged from disagreements about these very terms within the (liberal but clerical) Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association and the (progressive and somewhat anti-clerical) Keiikai.

Finally, from the sources examined in this chapter we can say that no one—not even the relatively progressive New Buddhists, who treated religious freedom as a civil liberty—thought

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121 Hayashi Makoto substantiates this point, arguing that such “useful Buddhism” formed only one corner of the Buddhist world in the early twentieth century. He indicates that early postwar scholarship on “modern Buddhism” tended to take for granted the idea that Buddhists merely served as lackeys for the early twentieth century state. Hayashi 2009, 8; 12.
122 Ōtani 2012, esp. 13–94.
123 They also were preoccupied with adjusting to the rapidly changing circumstances of Japanese modernity, which often superseded the task of accommodating the whims of the state.
Religious freedom was contextually determined, and what counted as “religion” mattered far more to contemporary interest groups than the nature and extent of “freedom.” These concepts were undergoing rapid semantic changes at the turn of the twentieth century, not only in Japan but also around the world.

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124 Recent persuasive arguments that the concept of “human rights” as inalienable rights that transcended nationality and state authority did not yet exist anywhere in the world at this time (See Moyn 2010, Hoffmann, ed. 2011, and Weitz 2013) substantiate Jason Josephson’s argument that the provision of religious freedom articulated in the Meiji Constitution was not a bastardization of a perennial principle, but rather a progressive clause that was in many ways more liberal than its counterparts in the constitutions of European countries such as Spain and Norway. See Josephson 2012, esp. 224–236.

125 This supports Jason Josephson’s (2012) stimulating observation that the categories of religion and superstition operate upon each other in a three-way co-constitutive relationship with the category of the secular. To give one example of the relative importance of “religion” and “freedom” for the Fraternity, a December 1900 Shin Bukkyō editorial entitled “Free Citizens and Religion (Especially This-Worldly Religion)” lamented the fact that Japanese citizens, suddenly thrust into a position of self-governance after long being acclimated to authoritarianism, were ill prepared to handle their new autonomy and hardly ready to act as free political agents. However, the editorial went on to complain that such citizens often misunderstood the importance of religion in political life. As such, the anonymous author advocated mobilizing the power of a reconfigured “this-worldly religion” (gense shugi shūkyō) to meet the exigent needs of the day. See Anonymous, “Jiyū kokumin to shūkyō (toku ni gense shugi no shūkyō),” SB 1(6), 271–274.

126 See Hoshino 2012 for a lucid examination of the development of the category of religion in Meiji era Japan. Hoshino’s work complements Josephson’s (2012) by focusing on the discursive activities of religious leaders rather than on the legal and political ramifications of the term, as Josephson does. Thomas 2014.
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Chapter Three

Free Inquiry

We frankly critique the words of each sage or scholar and investigate the origins of each religion; freely assessing them, we discard those that should be discarded, adopt those that should be adopted, smite the sacerdotalism of the past, and thereby aim to establish a sound faith. The true significance of free inquiry is none other than this…. In a religious world that has reached the height of chaos and dissoluteness, we think that free inquiry can be the sole impetus that can inspire fresh energy; it is the monumental echo that can awaken those who do not attend to the trends of the age, who fruitlessly and blindly follow ecclesiastical authority.¹

The nascent Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists exerted little actual pressure on the contentious parliamentary debates over the Yamagata Religions Bill described in the previous chapter. If anything, the prospect of the bill’s passage put pressure on them, spurring them to open membership of their small and secretive circle to similarly minded individuals so that they could better engage in their reformist project. With the continuing furor over the bill as a backdrop, the six founding members—Takashima Beihō (1875–1949), Sakaino Kōyō (1871–1933), Sugimura Jūō (1872–1945), Andō Hiromu (1876–?), Tanaka Jiroku (1869–?), and Watanabe Kaikyoku (1872–1933)—welcomed Katō Genchi (1873–1965) as their first applicant during their ninth assembly on 27 January 1900.² Genchi, scion of a prominent Buddhist family who would later

² This chapter deals with two individuals with the surname Katō (Katō Genchi and Katō Totsudō; no relation). For clarity I refer to each by his given (or adopted) name. Incidentally, while some primary sources indicate that Andō Hiromu (b. 1876) and Andō Masazumi (also b. 1876; discussed in detail in Chapter Four) are the same person, the indispensable guide to the membership of the Fraternity of New Buddhists edited by Takahashi Hara and Ōmi Toshihiro (2012) treats Andō Hiromu and Andō Masazumi as separate individuals, furthermore indicating that Andō Masazumi’s younger brother happened to be named “Hiromu” but nevertheless was a different person from the man who helped to found the Fraternity of New Buddhists. The
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become one of the leading scholars of Shintō in Japan, was known to the group members through the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Kai, established 1894).³ His impressive academic credentials as a recent graduate of Tokyo Imperial University made him an attractive recruit, as did the opportunity to hold meetings at Genchi’s family temple, the Jōdo Shinshū Takada-ha temple Shōnenji, located in Tokyo’s Asakusa Ward.⁴  

Due to personality conflicts and fundamental disagreements about the group’s mission, Genchi only stayed with the group for about a year and a half.⁵ While his cameo in the story of the New Buddhism movement was quite brief, by the time of his departure in 1901 he had already played a major role in focusing the Fraternity’s attention on the importance of “free inquiry” (jiyū tōkyū) and the promotion of a “sound faith” (kenzen naru shinkō).⁶ For example, at his first meeting with the other members he encouraged them to change the first article of the platform from the blunt “We believe in the principles of Buddhism” (Wagato wa Bukkyō no
Fraternity members were also considerably indebted to Genchi’s thoughts on the relationship between superstition and religion. Drawing on his formal training in the nascent field of comparative religion with Inoue Tetsujirō at Tokyo Imperial University, Genchi championed the academic mode as a way of enlightening the citizenry through the elimination of unwholesome “pseudo-religions” and “superstitions.” At Genchi’s urging, the Fraternity leadership unanimously agreed to begin holding regular enzetsukai, or lecture meetings, to disseminate their ideas more broadly and supplement the group’s monthly publication. Along with the ideal of a “sound faith” (Genchi’s reinterpretation of the first point of the Fraternity platform), “free inquiry” (jiyū tōkyū) would become the focal point of the mature New Buddhism movement and the filter through which other projects were interpreted. Over the long term, the twin New Buddhist ideals of “free inquiry” and “sound faith” would come to deeply influence religion-state relations and conceptions of religious freedom, even if discussions of these topics did not always make explicit reference to the specific phrase shinkyō no jiyū (freedom of religious belief).

While “free inquiry” and “sound faith” reflected Genchi’s early and influential interventions in how the New Buddhist project was conceived, these ideals were significantly modulated

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7 See [Sakaino] Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yonen jidai,” SBRS 2: 43–44; Takashima Beihō, “Shin Bukkyō jindai shi,” SBRS 2: 1066. Katō Genchi was not the only member who was concerned with this distinction. See, for example, Gaken Kobutsu, “Shin shūkyō to shin Bukkyō,” SB 2, no. 9 (1901) SBRS 1: 335–340. Gaken was a pseudonym for Tanaka Jiroku; see Takashima 1946 and Hoshino 2012b, 256–257.

8 Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yonen jidai,” SB 6, no. 4, SBRS 2: 45.

9 See Yoshinaga 2012. By 1901, Genchi had already published his second monograph. The same issue of Shin Bukkyō that announced the first enzetsukai also included an advertisement for
through the intervention of another early addition to the group who happened to share a surname with Genchi: the lay intellectual Katō Totsudō (b. Kumaichirō, 1870–1949). It was Katō Totsudō who penned what would become the definitive statement on “free inquiry” (jiyū tōkyū) for the group in 1903; it replaced an earlier programmatic statement written by Genchi in the May 1901 issue of Shin Bukkyō.11 Totsudō would become one of the chief contributors to Shin Bukkyō in subsequent years, and as a member of the group’s inner circle who shared editorial responsibilities with stalwarts Sakaino Kōyō and Takashima Beihō, he helped to determine the direction and content of Shin Bukkyō.12 Moreover, Totsudō went on to serve as chief editor (shuhitsu) of the journal Shin shūyō (New Self-Cultivation) from 1913, and when Shin Bukkyō ceased publication in 1915 Totsudō’s new journal served as a publication outlet for many of the former Fraternity members.

Using Katō Totsudō’s biography and a sampling of his prodigious scholarly output as a guide, in this chapter I trace a transition that began in the late Meiji era (1868–1912) and flowered in the Taishō era (1912–1926). Katō Totsudō’s oeuvre shows that the Fraternity ideal of “free inquiry”—an anti-sacerdotalist, scientistic commitment to relentless investigation and evaluation of religious doctrines—came to have profoundly political effects in the Taishō and early Shōwa eras that directly impinged upon conceptions of religious freedom and ideal religion-state relations. While previous scholarship has focused primarily on the activities of the Fraternity of New Buddhists while the journal Shin Bukkyō was in print (that is, between 1900 and 1915), I


10 See Okada 2012 for a brief biography. I provide more detail on Katō Totsudō’s life below.
12 Apparently the members preparing for the first Shin Bukkyō enzetsukai in the spring of 1901 desperately hoped that they could get a famed orator like Katō Totsudō or Andō Masazumi to join their ranks. Both eventually did. See Takashima 1946b, 30.
argue that the New Buddhists’ primary influence came in later years, when members entered middle age and garnered the necessary clout to affect some of the major academic, social, and political initiatives of the Taishō era.\(^\text{13}\)

The ideal and practice of “free inquiry” (jiyū tōkyū) became a way for lay Buddhists to assert control over their tradition and partially wrest authority away from clerics. Free inquiry assumed a stance of dispassionate academic observation, using the tools of evidentiary scholarship to evaluate the truth of specific religious doctrines and the effectiveness of religious institutions. This was a rhetorically powerful stance. It gave lay intellectuals an advantage over clerics in the early twentieth century, when rapid urbanization and rising cosmopolitanism and individualism

\(^\text{13}\) Because I am not the first to focus on the Fraternity of New Buddhists, I would like to situate my claims vis-à-vis foregoing scholarship on this movement. As both Hayashi Makoto (2009) and Ōtani Eiichi (2012) have indicated, the early postwar scholarship on modern Buddhism tended to adopt an approach that was explicitly modernist and politically normative and consequently could not help but introduce teleology into the study of Buddhist history. Thus, the distinction between “backward, feudal” Buddhism and “progressive” Buddhism was frequently taken for granted, and the Fraternity of New Buddhists served for postwar experts as a convenient example—if not always an accurate one—of the latter. For example, historians of Meiji-era Buddhism such as Ikeda Eishun (1976) praised the group as a bastion of liberal values in an otherwise illiberal time, situating the New Buddhism movement at the apogee of Meiji Buddhist evolution.

Later scholarship both reproduced and challenged this view. Books by Notto Thelle (1987) and Winston Davis (1992) also portrayed the Fraternity as a site of proto-liberalism, but that view was complicated in Sheldon Garon’s 1997 study on “moral suasion” (kyōka) movements and Jason Josephson’s 2006 Stanford University doctoral dissertation, both of which highlighted the tension in the New Buddhist project between the rejection of political protection and interference and the staunch commitment to the eradication of “superstition.”

Most recently, a multi-year research project spearheaded by Yoshinaga Shin’ichi of Maizuru National College of Technology generated a comprehensive 2012 research report on the Fraternity, its members, and its activities; some of the research found in that report has also appeared in recent monographs by Hoshino Seiji (2012) and Ōtani Eiichi (2012). My project in this particular chapter draws heavily on this most recent generation of research for its background information, but whereas most of the research to date has focused on the period when the Fraternity magazine Shin Bukkyō was in publication—that is, from 1900 to 1915—operating on a hunch I chose to focus more on the activities of the New Buddhists during the Taishō era (1912–1926). I discovered that the Fraternity members enjoyed more political clout as
created a new set of social circumstances in which traditional Buddhist ecclesiastical institutions sometimes struggled to use the parlance of the times in articulating how they could serve the state, society, and individuals alike.14 Armed with the latest academic approaches and fluent in European and American intellectual trends, lay and laicized Buddhist intellectuals had a skill set that helped them put forward their version of Buddhism in terms that spoke to bureaucrats and laypeople alike.

Because of this normative component, the brand of “free inquiry” championed by Totsudō and his New Buddhist colleagues should be distinguished from the relatively abstruse philological scholarship and editorial endeavors that were contemporaneously being conducted at Japan’s imperial universities (especially Tokyo Imperial University) during the same period. That is, Buddhist studies in the Taishō and early Shōwa periods should not be characterized solely by the rise of evidentiary scholarship, philological and historiographic methodologies, and major editorial efforts like the compilation of the Taishō Buddhist canon. These efforts were obviously extremely influential on Buddhist studies (not only in Japan, but worldwide as well) and have been well documented.15

This chapter shows that an equally important—and hitherto largely overlooked—aspect of Buddhist studies emerged in the late 1910s and early 1920s in that lay Buddhist intellectuals began to popularize Buddhist studies for a lay audience while simultaneously using their deep factual knowledge about Buddhist doctrine and history to support political initiatives, particularly social edification (kyōka; previously translated by Sheldon Garon as “moral

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14 This problem was already apparent in the debates over the Yamagata Bill described in Chapter Two.
15 See Hayashi and Ōtani, eds. 2009; Klautau 2012.
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suasion”), spiritual mobilization of the citizenry, and the eradication of superstition. While this “pop” Buddhist studies scholarship rarely made explicit reference to the concept of religious freedom per se, the activities of the New Buddhists exerted considerable influence on contemporary understandings of religious freedom because these intellectuals were deeply invested in defining “religion” and distinguishing between duties, rights, and liberties (particularly in their discussions of how to manage superstition). If the Meiji Constitution had granted freedom of religious belief to Japanese citizens so long as freedom did not interfere with their duties as subjects or disturb peace and order, then New Buddhists like Katō Totsudō provided academic articulations of what constituted “genuine” religious belief and which beliefs and practices may have been detrimental to the “peace and order” of Japanese society.

To tell this story of how the Fraternity came to influence conceptions of religious freedom in the Taishō era, I first situate the Fraternity of New Buddhists and its journal, Shin Bukkyō (New Buddhism), within broader trends in the contemporary Buddhist world. Second, building upon the pioneering research of Yoshinaga Shin’ichi’s study group, I highlight how the Fraternity project during the years Shin Bukkyō was in publication centered primarily on the twin objects of fostering “sound faith” through “free inquiry.”16 With these points established, the bulk of the chapter focuses on the writings and activities of Katō Totsudō, showing how New Buddhist connections with the world of mainstream publishing and with government policymakers helped wed the New Buddhist project of religious reform to the project of nation-building.

I conclude by showing that the New Buddhist project of “free inquiry” provided a way for lay intellectuals and disaffected priests to assert a degree of control over the Buddhist tradition while bypassing clerical authority. Specifically, “free inquiry” positioned the lay Buddhist Katō

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16 Yoshinaga, ed. 2012
Totsudō—not a clerical representative of any of the Buddhist sects—to receive the imprimatur of Home Minister Tokonami Takejirō (1866–1935) as Japan’s leading authority on Buddhism. It was Katō Totsudō, not any sectarian leader, who Tokonami felt could best articulate how to “cultivate the power of the people” through Buddhist teaching and outreach. In turn, Totsudō provided policymakers like Tokonami with a Buddhist political philosophy that emphasized self-governance. His vision also highlighted the indispensable role of social edification (*kyōka*) and the potential of Japan’s ubiquitous Buddhist temples to serve as community centers that could counteract perceived social problems such as indolence and excessive income inequality; Buddhists could also help Japanese citizens navigate between (what Totsudō saw as) the equally deleterious interwar trends of cosmopolitanism and individualism. Totsudō’s biography helps to clarify how harnessing the power of religion for nation-building and eradicating “superstition” became bureaucratic projects. His career also shows how the ostensibly neutral language of scholarship and the stance of academic authority could be used simultaneously for apologetic and bureaucratic ends. Most importantly for the purposes of this dissertation, Totsudō’s scholarship and speeches show that important discussions of ideal religion-state relations did not always make explicit mention of religious freedom per se, but nevertheless articulated what counted as “religion” and which practices were deserving of “freedom.”

The New Buddhism Movement

To briefly recapitulate the background of the New Buddhism movement presented in the previous chapter, the Fraternity of Buddhist Puritans—later renamed the Fraternity of New Buddhists—emerged out of the Keiikai (Warp and Woof Society) and its organ *Bukkyō*
Fraternity continued and expanded the Keiikai project of criticizing the sectarian establishment but added to it a concern with social reform, pairing a progressive political project with a conservative social one. Specifically, the New Buddhists aimed to fundamentally reform society and revamp existing religious systems and ritual practices, eliminating what they perceived to be deleterious beliefs and practices among the general populace and within the sectarian establishment. Because the group had been forged in the crucible of the debates over the Yamagata Religions Bill of 1899 and potential members had been galvanized by what they saw as an inappropriate power grab by the state, members shared the notion that the state should neither interfere in religions’ affairs nor extend any special protection to particular religious denominations. This was a minority position that differed significantly from contemporary attempts on the part of other politically active Buddhists to secure special recognition for Buddhism as a state religion or as an “officially recognized religion” (kōninkyō). Over time, however, the Fraternity commitment to rejecting political protection of religion and governmental interference in religions’ affairs retreated into the background. The promotion of “sound faith” ultimately took priority.

Although the Fraternity members’ political attitudes were outliers among their Buddhist contemporaries, in its transsectarian outlook and its positioning of Buddhism vis-à-vis politics, society, and other religions, the Fraternity magazine Shin Bukkyō (New Buddhism) reflected broader trends in Buddhist print culture of the day. During its sixteen years of publication

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17 Whereas the previous chapter focused primarily on early announcements about the group in the Keiikai organ Bukkyō and a few retrospective articles looking back on resistance to the Yamagata Bill, this chapter looks more at the mature movement.

18 Specifically, a new mode of apologetic (and inherently reflexive) Buddhist discourse had emerged in the aftermath of the haibutsu kishaku (“destroy the buddhas; expel Śākyamuni”) pogroms of the late 1860s and early 1870s. This apologetic mode was solidified in the 1880s and 1890s as Buddhists attempted to stake out particular territory for Buddhism in the rapidly
Shin Bukkyō primarily addressed a small, sympathetic audience of young lay intellectuals and clerics who harbored sincere interest in religious reform. Because of its marginal position, Shin Bukkyō could play several roles: gadfly to the sectarian establishment; publication outlet for young and/or politically progressive Buddhist intellectuals; and a safe place for respected luminaries such as Sanskritist Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945) to air opinions that they might not have expressed in other venues. Indeed, many of the leading figures of the Buddhist world—especially people who were intellectually inclined and particularly those who lacked strong ties to clerical elites—published in Shin Bukkyō at one time or another.

Tables of contents from the journal issues read, with the benefit of historical hindsight, as a changing Meiji state. Buddhist apologia were disseminated through novel social media such as public oratory, the special interest magazine, and academic monographs written in colloquial style. By the time Shin Bukkyō was founded at the turn of the twentieth century, a flourishing Buddhist print culture existed to match the explosion of Buddhist interest groups that had occurred over the previous decade. The diversity of these journals and magazines matched the political diversity of the contemporary Buddhist world: while some journals such as Meikyō shinshi and Kyōgaku hōchi (later, Chūgai nippon) would stake out a mainstream position that appealed to conservatives and reformers alike, other journals such as Bukkyō took an inveterate and frequently satirical stance. Extant copies of these journals are a rich—and still largely untapped—source of information about modern Japanese Buddhism and the development of Buddhist modernism in Japan. On the “new social media” of “Buddhist youth culture,” see Ōtani 2012, 42–70. On enzetsu oratory, see Hoshino 2012, 71–92. Hoshino’s broader project outlines how apologetic discourse functioned to create a universal category of “religion” in Japan that was applied reflexively by various interest groups.

Ōtani Ei’ichi places the maximum distribution of the journal at only about 400 copies in 1906, although he indicates that despite such a limited distribution the journal apparently had considerable notoriety in the contemporary Buddhist world. Ōtani 2012, 60. The journal was banned from publication three times (September 1910, October 1913, and May 1914).

The New Buddhist culture of semi-secrecy aided this, and many contributions were attributed to “Anonymous” (Soregashi) or to obvious pseudonyms. Many of these contributions were by founding members (especially Sakaino Kōyō, Takashima Beihō, and Tanaka Jiroku), but others seem to have been written by outsiders looking for a safe outlet. The 1903 publication The New Buddhism Bookmark (Shin Bukkyō no shiori, discussed in more detail below) promised, for example, to preserve the anonymity of people who wanted to join the group or contribute articles to the magazine. See SB 4, no. 13 (December 1903): 14.
veritable “Who’s Who” of Buddhist academia, although the journal never seems to have served as an outlet for sectarian doctrinal scholarship (shūgaku).21

The Early Issues of Shin Bukkyō

The opening editorial of Shin Bukkyō, published in July 1900 with the title “Our Manifesto” (Wagato no sengen), stridently decried “old Buddhism” as superstitious, pessimistic, and implausible if not delusional.22 The editors rejected “moribund, formalistic old Buddhism” (hinshi no keishiki teki kyū Bukkyō), and were prepared to abandon outmoded ceremonies and traditional Buddhist institutional structure in favor of creating a new, modern Buddhism that would be rationalistic in outlook and scientific in spirit. Although they were careful to say that they did not seek to eradicate Buddhism per se, they went so far as to say that they sought the creation of a new religion (a new Buddhism) that would be simultaneously open to free inquiry (jiyū tōkyū) and at the same time intolerant of superstition.23

While Fraternity members clearly assumed that Buddhism was superior to Christianity in meeting the concerns of the modern era, the group’s original nomenclature—the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists—reflected members’ admiration of Protestantism, which provided a template for a “socially engaged” type of Buddhism that could enlighten the masses and contribute to social welfare while reforming the irrational excesses of earlier generations.24 Unitarianism was particularly attractive due to what Fraternity members felt was its rationalist spirit, and for some

21 This was undoubtedly because the New Buddhist project was anathema to clerics ensconced in the training institutions for Buddhist priests, which tended to be more conservative in their approaches to scholarship.

22 SB 1, no. 1, 1. The editorial was preceded by a table of contents, encouraging messages from luminaries such as Inoue Tetsujirō and Murakami Senshō, a declaration that members would refrain from smoking, and a list of the Fraternity platform and rules. Incidentally, the “wagato” of the title was written with the characters , not the word “warera” (わるれ).

23 See the opening editorial/manifesto, “Wagato no sengen,” SB 1, no. 1 (July 1900), SBRS 1: 3–6.
time Association meetings were even held in a Unitarian-owned building.\textsuperscript{25} The Fraternity focus on “free inquiry” would also parallel the Unitarian project, and the phrase \textit{jiyū tōkyū} was a translation of a Unitarian take on the general Protestant ideal of individuals pursuing investigations of religious doctrines on their own terms, minus the mediation of ecclesiastical authorities.\textsuperscript{26}

As lay intellectuals who enjoyed relatively high degrees of education, many of the Fraternity members preferred to discuss religion in an academic mode rather than a purely confessional one.\textsuperscript{27} The academic stance allowed Fraternity members to speak authoritatively about Buddhism without relying on elite clerical status or any particular sectarian affiliation for their credentials. Academic training at institutions such as Tokyo Imperial University and Tetsugakukan (now Tōyō University) also gave them a toolkit of sophisticated conceptual tools to use in their discussions of Buddhist and social reform.\textsuperscript{28} In this regard, they represented a

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\item \textsuperscript{24} Hoshino 2012 is an excellent source on this subject.
\item \textsuperscript{25} On the Fraternity’s attraction to Unitarianism, see Thelle 1987, 210–213. An editorial note on the first page of SB 4, no. 1 thanked the Unitarians for allowing the group to hold meetings in their church. Takashima recounts the Fraternity’s association with the Unitarians in Takashima 1946b, 29.
\item \textsuperscript{26} I am grateful to Michel Mohr for highlighting this connection for me. Personal communication, 1 November 2013.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Ōtani 2012, 54–64. Fraternity guidelines suggested that members have at least a moderate level of education; potential members with prestigious academic credentials or professional experience were particularly welcomed (see, for example, the guide to membership published in \textit{Shin Bukkyō no shiori}, 14).
\item \textsuperscript{28} Tetsugakukan was founded by Buddhist reformer Inoue Enryō (1858–1919) in 1887. The university served as an academic recruiting ground for the New Buddhists, and New Buddhist efforts clearly reflected Enryō’s dual project of reforming Buddhism for the needs of the future (see Sueki 2004a; Josephson 2006b; Okada 2009) while also eradicating harmful superstitions (Josephson 2006a). Many issues of \textit{Shin Bukkyō} included advertisements seeking students for Tetsugakukan courses; Enryō contributed a congratulatory message to the journal in its second issue. See SB 1, no. 2, v (my pagination). An example of a Tetsugakukan advertisement can be found in the back matter of the same issue. Several of the New Buddhists counted among Inoue Enryō’s pupils, and New Buddhists Sakaino Kōyō and Takashima Beihō later served as Tōyō University presidents (Sakaino from 1918–1923 and Takashima from 1943–1944; Takakusu
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...a burgeoning class of educated middle class intellectuals who stood outside of the corridors of political and sectarian power but nevertheless exerted influence on contemporary understandings of religion through their facility with abstract concepts. This was also a natural reaction to and extension of an earlier generation of apologetic, reformist scholarship conducted by reformist Buddhist scholars such as Nakanishi Ushirō (1859–1930) and Inoue Enryō (1858–1919).

This commitment to academic “free inquiry” exhibited in the pages of *Shin Bukkyō* and in the New Buddhists’ public oratory was balanced by hortatory efforts to improve social morals and eradicate superstition, although the actual social welfare and political lobbying activities of the Fraternity were minimal. One small success was the New Buddhists’ efforts to improve solemn decorum at funerals by passing out handbills advocating the proper mode of respect for the dead (these handbills, written in eloquent prose by Watanabe Kaikyoku, were apparently reprinted in several contemporary newspapers in October 1899). A proposal in 1900 to divide the group into a “research division” (*kenkyūbu*) and “praxis division” (*jikkōbu*) was met with enthusiasm, but the “praxis division,” headed by Murakami Senshō (1851–1929), was short-lived. However, Fraternity members did collaborate with other institutions interested in moral reform, such as the Greater Japan Prostitution Abolition Association.

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Junjirō served as president from 1931–1934). Takashima also operated a bookstore specializing in Tetsugakukan textbooks, and later opened a publishing company that featured topics in Buddhism and philosophy. I discuss the press, Heigo Shuppan, in more detail below. Also see Ōtani 2010.

29 Hoshino Seiji has described such intellectuals in his 2012 monograph *Kindai Nihon no shūkyō gainen*.


34 See SB 1, no. 5 (November 1900): 222.
Despite the ascetic overtones of the Fraternity’s original name, opinions diverged regarding abstemiousness as ideal and practice. While most Fraternity members refrained from smoking, only a few, such as Takashima Beihō, gave up both alcohol and tobacco entirely.\textsuperscript{35} Eventually recognizing that the original nomenclature—the Fraternity of Puritan Buddhists (Bukkyō Seito Dōshikai)—represented a degree of abstemiousness that few in the group actually embodied, the organization changed its name to the Fraternity of New Buddhists (Shin Bukkyōto Dōshikai) in March 1903.\textsuperscript{36}

The Movement Matures

The change in nomenclature in 1903 marked a maturation of the movement in several respects. By that year, the membership was solid and the monthly lecture meetings drew consistently large crowds. The orators themselves, inspired by the addition of skilled rhetoricians such as Katō Totsudō, had also improved their craft.\textsuperscript{37} While the distribution of the journal was hardly immense, it was sustainable.\textsuperscript{38} The early issues of Shin Bukkyō had given the impression of a sophomoric organization struggling to distinguish itself from the earlier journal Bukkyō


\textsuperscript{36} SB 4, no. 3 (March 1903): 175

\textsuperscript{37} Takashima 1946b, 30. In 1906 Totsudō published a primer on rhetoric entitled \textit{Enzetsu bunshō oyō shūji gaku}; in 1908 he published a book on oratory entitled \textit{Yūbenhō}.

\textsuperscript{38} Tanaka Jiroku’s skills as de facto Treasurer helped ensure the journal’s long-term viability. [Sakaino] Kōyō, “Shin Bukkyō yōnen jidai,” SB 6, no. 4 (1905), SBRS 2: 44. Yoshinaga Shin’ichi and Ōtani Ei’ichi have confirmed that the journal had a distribution of about 400 units in 1906. Even considering the high likelihood of \textit{mawashiyomi} reading patterns in which one subscriber shared his copy with several others, it seems unlikely that the journal reached an audience of more than 1,000 at any time.
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(Buddhism, discontinued in 1902), but two special issues—The Religion of the Future and The New Buddhism Bookmark—presented the world with a mature version of that organization.\(^{39}\)

The Religion of the Future (Shōrai no shūkyō) was a series of speculative interviews with thirty-two leading Buddhist and Christian figures and other luminaries that had originally appeared in serialized form in earlier issues of Shin Bukkyō.\(^{40}\) While several of the interviewees were openly skeptical about the New Buddhist project (sometimes preferring to use the interview as a chance to expound on their own reformist visions), one positive effect for the Fraternity was that the document showed them to be in dialogue with many of the leading intellectuals of the day.\(^{41}\) Since they controlled the medium, the relatively junior New Buddhists also got to position the message of each interviewee, with the implication that the New Buddhists themselves, despite their junior stature, had the best vision for the future of Buddhism—and religion more generally—in Japan.\(^{42}\)

\(^{39}\) These documents are also fascinating sources of information on the New Buddhist community. They included songs with traditional musical notation, advertisements, and detailed information about rules for the membership.

\(^{40}\) The interviews had originally been serialized in Shin Bukkyō but were repackaged and published for a general audience in June 1903. See Takashima, ed. 1903.

\(^{41}\) The diversity of the responses the New Buddhists received in reaction to their question reveals that the religious world was not at all unified in its approach to the pressing issues of the day (religion-state relations, the role of religion in fostering morality, or the relative weight given to clerical or academic authority). While some respondents enthusiastically spoke of removing clerical dead wood by shipping useless priests off to Hokkaidō (father of Japanese forensic medicine Katayama Kuniyoshi, 1855–1931), others stressed the importance of precept revival (Shingon cleric Shaku Unshō, 1827–1909); still others advocated the establishment of utopian “Lotus villages” throughout Japan (Nichirenist founder of the Risshō Ankoku Kai [later the Kokuchūkai], Tanaka Chigaku, 1861–1939).

\(^{42}\) See the ad for this publication in SB 4, no. 12 (December 1903): ii (my pagination). The ad boasted that the Fraternity had dared to set aside their own proclivities in favor of asking the luminaries for their unadulterated opinions about the state of religion in Japanese society. The net effect, of course, was to imply that the New Buddhists were magnanimously tolerant of repugnant difference.
If *The Religion of the Future* showed the New Buddhists to be in productive dialogue with leading figures in the religious world, the December 1903 publication of a slim special issue entitled *Shin Bukkyō no shiori (The New Buddhism Bookmark)* marked a new chapter in the history of the Fraternity by clarifying how the New Buddhists positioned themselves vis-à-vis the sectarian establishment and other lay-centric movements of the day.\(^{43}\) *The New Buddhism Bookmark* foregrounded, as most issues of *Shin Bukkyō* did, the six-point Fraternity platform and rules for the membership (page 1); these were supplemented with a general explanation of the organization (page 14), the journal (page 15), and dues (page 16).\(^{44}\) The intervening pages included a retrospective interview with Takashima Beihō in which he outlined the reasons for the original establishment of the Fraternity ("*Shin Bukkyō no okotta wake,"* pages 2–7). Takashima highlighted the periodic need to revitalize Buddhism and implied that the New Buddhist project was the latest in a long line of reforms conducted by Saichō (767–822), Kūkai (774–835), and the founders of the Kamakura “New Buddhist” sects such as Nichiren (1222–1282) and Shinran (1173–1262).\(^{45}\) Takashima’s interview was followed, in turn, by a series of one-page essays on each of the six points of the Fraternity platform: Sakaino Kōyō explicated the principle of a “sound Buddhist faith,” Tanaka Jiroku the “fundamental reform of society,” Katō Totsudō the

\(^{43}\) The pamphlet was published as SB 4, no. 13 (December 1903)

\(^{44}\) These explanatory pages were followed by a series of advertisements for books carried at Takashima’s bookstore, the Keiseidō, a store adjacent to Inoue Enrō’s Tetsugakukan (present-day Tōyō University, located in Hakusan, Bunkyo Ward, Tokyo) that specialized in textbooks for Tetsugakukan students. From 1906, when Tetsugakukan changed its name to Tōyō University, Takashima ran a publishing house, Heigo Shuppan, that also specialized in topics related to Buddhism and philosophy. He continued to run Heigo Shuppan until 1933, when the death of his older sister led him to shutter his bookstore and cede control of Heigo Press to Meiji Shoin. In the twenty-odd years that it was active, however, Takashima’s press served as a major publishing outlet for his New Buddhist colleagues and one of the main publishers of studies on Buddhism. See Ōtani 2012b.
principle of “free inquiry,” Tōru Dōgen (as Tōru Ki’ichi, d.u.) the “eradication of superstition,” Andō Hiromu (as Andō Kōshin) the rejection of the necessity of preserving traditional religious systems and ceremonies, and Sugimura Jūō the rejection of “political protection and interference.”

Intriguingly, with the exception of Katō Totsudō’s essay on free inquiry, each of these essays had already appeared in the May 1901 issue of Shin Bukkyō and was merely reprinted verbatim. Totsudō’s essay alone replaced an earlier one by Katō Genchi, and here I think it instructive to compare the two, as it would be Totsudō’s vision of free inquiry that would dominate the Fraternity project in the ensuing decades, both while Shin Bukkyō was in publication and after the journal’s discontinuation in 1915.

In the earlier issue of Shin Bukkyō published in May 1901, when the Fraternity was engaging in a round of publicity concerning the inauguration of the monthly lecture meetings, Katō Genchi described free inquiry as follows:

Some say that to inquire freely into religion is to destroy religion. However, even if that were the case, the destruction of religion that happens through free inquiry is not destruction for destruction’s sake, but rather destruction for the sake of construction. In planning for the erection of the manor of solid faith, effort must be taken to trim away the rampant brambles of superstition. Now, in order to fulfill this dual responsibility for creation and destruction, free inquiry is conducted through the three methods of criticism, comparison, and historical inquiry. The doctrines and legends of each religion are viewed through a critical method; the truth of all religions is researched through the method of comparison, and the historical value of each religion is investigated through the historical method. Free inquiry into religion relies on the aforementioned surefire and scientific methods, and not only Buddhism and Christianity, but the true spirit of all religions is addressed, and thereby we expect that it will contribute to the great

45 Takashima was neither the first nor the last to make this sort of claim, which still features in some “pop” Buddhist studies scholarship today despite having been thoroughly criticized by scholars who have been more historiographically rigorous.

46 Takashima, “Shin Bukkyō no okotta wake,” Shin Bukkyō no shiori (SB 4, no. 13; December 1903): 2–7. Although Andō Hiromu was one of the founding members of the Fraternity, this was his sole contribution to the journal.
matter of spontaneous peace of mind and wellbeing. The true meaning of our “free inquiry” is none other than this. Should anyone look at us and go so far as to slander and criticize us for needlessly aiming to injure others, he would have gone to the height of false accusation. We solely seek to awaken the stubborn and ignorant, and therefore we occasionally flash the awesome brilliance of the sword of wisdom, and the sparkling beams of light entering their [i.e., the stubborn and ignorant] pupils cannot be stopped.47

Whereas Katō Genchi’s explication of free inquiry focused primarily on academic methods associated with the cutting edge of the field of comparative religion, Katō Totsudō’s message emphasized free inquiry as a way of countering sacerdotalism. Like Genchi, Totsudō emphasized the edification of the masses, but he staked out a new position for the enlightened intellectual that was distinct from both clerical authority and dispassionate academic inquiry. He wrote:

Can we truly say that people of old let the big fish [donshū no uo] slip away, that sages and scholars so thoroughly exhausted the truth?48 Because the words of such sages and scholars are a mixture of wheat and chaff [literally, jewels and stones], we do not [unthinkingly] regard this as the truth and submit to it. Truth is universal, so how at all can we allow any one individual to monopolize it? We candidly critique the words of each sage and scholar and investigate the origins of each religion; freely assessing them we discard those that should be discarded, adopt those that should be adopted, apply a great blow to the sacerdotalism [kyōken shugi] of the past, and thereby aim to establish a sound faith. The true significance of free inquiry is none other than this.

In a religious world that has reached the height of chaos and dissoluteness, we think that free inquiry can be the sole impetus that can inspire fresh energy; it is the monumental echo that can awaken those who do not attend to the trends of the age, who fruitlessly and blindly follow ecclesiastical authority [kyōken]. Such ignorant types will at times be startled by that [echoing] voice and flutter about in agitation. Even though it may not be that they do not try to forestall it, such an attitude [on their part] is a poisonous snake or a vicious beast lying on the path of learning and development. As the first step towards progress we will destroy and criticize [the original has 却, probably a mistake for 卻] such obstructions, and thereby make that path [of learning and progress] flourish.49

48 The meaning of the first clause is lost on me and is probably a literary reference with which I am unfamiliar. The second clause suggests that Katō was arguing against the idea that truth had been established long ago and was no longer up for debate.
Whereas scion of a prestigious Jōdo Shinshū temple family Katō Genchi described “free inquiry” in terms of academic method (as befitted his training in comparative religion at Tokyo Imperial University), the layperson Katō Totsudō described “free inquiry” as a counter to sacerdotalism.50 Both versions of free inquiry had a normative component in that they sought to improve religion in general and Buddhism in particular, and both adopted a defensive tone regarding the reactionary attitudes that greeted their project. Yet Totsudō’s version made explicit something that Genchi’s version only implied—it specifically highlighted sacerdotalism and ecclesiastical authority as obstructions to progress. Like Genchi, Totsudō would highlight the deleterious effects of “superstition” in his other writings; like Genchi, he adopted a teleological approach to religious development that posited a near-future utopia in which outmoded beliefs and practices were sloughed away and a new, rational religion remained. But Totsudō also staked out a position for the New Buddhists that differed from Genchi’s unadulterated academism.51

The “free inquiry” model that matured in the pages of Shin Bukkyō in the following decade allowed lay intellectuals and disaffected priests to make authoritative statements about religion without needing to derive that authority from any sort of sectarian institution. While the ideal of “free inquiry” probably influenced erstwhile New Buddhists who would go on to teach in the department of Buddhist Studies and Indian Philosophy at Tokyo Imperial University (Murakami Senshō and Takakusu Junjirō, for example) it can and should be distinguished from strict philological non-sectarian scholarship just as much as it can be distinguished from sectarian

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50 I cover Totsudō’s personal background below.
51 His vision would become increasingly articulate in later years, but in it free inquiry served as a corrective for clerical degeneracy by keeping ecclesiastical authorities honest. As I will show below, free inquiry simultaneously served a political purpose in that it helped to position a desacralized, rational Buddhism to counter superstition (which Totsudō understood to be both “bad religion” and “bad science”) and to support efforts to edify (kyōka) the populace, eradicate superstition, and to mobilize religion for the sake of nation-building.
Buddhist studies (shūgaku). “Free inquiry” had a normative component in that it was explicitly designed to improve society through spreading familiarity with a radically desacralized Buddhism while identifying certain practices and ideas as deserving of eradication (superstition).

Yoshinaga Shin’ichi has argued that the New Buddhist commitment to fostering “sound faith” in society at large became a presupposition shared by government policymakers and religious leaders alike by the time Shin Bukkyō ceased publication in 1915.\(^{52}\) In this way, the discontinuation of the journal can be seen as a victory for the New Buddhist message rather than a failure. Indeed, both Takashima Beihō and Tanaka Jiroku (writing under the pseudonym Gaken Shō) argued that the discontinuation of Shin Bukkyō marked the ultimate success of the New Buddhist project: Takashima claimed that the journal had served its purpose, while Tanaka suggested that most young religionists had already adopted “New Buddhist-ism.”\(^{53}\)

Yet the aspect of the New Buddhist message that focused on “free inquiry” was inextricable from the project of promoting “sound faith,” meaning that members’ significant contributions to Buddhist studies and religious studies in the ensuing decades were conducted not from a stance of strict academic neutrality, but rather from a stance of social activism. As they entered middle age and gained increasing clout as respected intellectuals with ties to government leaders, the former commitment to “rejecting all sorts of political protection and interference” yielded to the impulse to negotiate protection for certain types of religiosity and interference in the development of other, unsavory, types. In this regard, while the category of “superstition” remained a vague placeholder for a spot between “bad religion” and “bad science,” some of the

\(^{52}\) Yoshinaga 2012, 41.

former Fraternity members continued to attempt to articulate what superstition was, why it was problematic, and how government policies should be adjusted to counteract its deleterious effects.

It was here that their project wielded the greatest influence on contemporaneous conceptions of religious freedom. While they initially resisted collaboration with government bureaucrats who they suspected of aiming to control religion, by the middle of the Taishō era (1912–1926) they were instead offering their professional opinions on how to cultivate religion for nation-building and how to police marginal “superstitions.” The ideal of “free inquiry” subjected all religions to suspicion, but it also valorized certain types of religion as better than others.

The publication records of many of the prominent Fraternity members in the post-Shin Bukkyō period are impressive by any standard. By the early Taishō era when Shin Bukkyō was nearing its end, several members were publishing not only in that magazine but were also publishing in other periodicals as well as stand-alone monographs. Katō Totsudō edited the journal Shin shūyō (New Self-Cultivation), kept up a busy lecture schedule in which he delivered upwards of two hundred speeches a year, and published multiple monographs on sundry aspects of Buddhist doctrine and history. Suzuki Daisetsu (1870–1966), a longtime contributor to Shin Bukkyō who had returned from the United States in 1909, thrust himself into his famed research and publication career.54 Takashima Beihō managed the publishing house Heigo Shuppan, which published Suzuki’s monograph on Emmanuel Swedenborg as well as a series of introductory texts on Buddhism, including monographs on Chinese and Japanese Buddhism by Sakaino Kōyō and a general overview of Buddhism by Totsudō.55 Takakusu Junjirō and Watanabe Kaikyoku compiled and edited the Taishō shinshū daizōkyo, still regarded as the definitive East Asian Buddhist canon today. Erstwhile member Katō Genchi played a formative

54 See Moriya 2005
role in the development of Shintō Studies at Tokyo Imperial University; as I showed in Chapter One his theorization about “State Shintō” (what he called kokkateki Shintō) would eventually play a crucial role, through the mediation of his student D.C. Holtom (1884–1962), in Occupation policymaking.

Any of these figures deserves sustained attention in light of the deeply intertwined New Buddhist ideals of “free inquiry” and “sound faith,” but the remainder of this chapter will use the figure of Katō Totsudō—and his personal relationships with owner of Heigo Press Takashima Beihō and Home Minister Tokonami Takejirō—to show how the New Buddhist ideal of “free inquiry” wielded its greatest political effects in the Taishō era (1912–1926) after the dissolution of the Fraternity of New Buddhists and the discontinuation of Shin Bukkyō in the late 1910s.

Free Inquiry, Social Edification, and Buddhist Studies: The Case of Katō Totsudō

Katō Totsudō was born Katō Kumaichirō in the Tanba–Kameoka region (between Osaka and Kyoto) to a samurai family.56 He displayed academic aptitude from an early age, studying in the prestigious schools of the Kyoto region, but his father’s early demise meant that Totsudō grew up relatively poor. Inspired by the Freedom and People’s Rights Movement of the 1880s, Katō moved to Tokyo in 1889 with the intention of studying law. He studied at the English Law School (Igirisu Hōritsu Gakkō, the predecessor to Chūō University), but struggled to make ends meet. For a period Katō lived hand to mouth in Tokyo, cobbling together a living by writing for various journals, taking up translation work (despite what he described as his limited skills in

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55 Ōtani 2012b
56 The following account of Katō’s life derives in part from his 1928 memoir Fude to shita sanjūnen and in part from Okada Masahiko’s very helpful, if short, biography in the collection of materials on the New Buddhism movement edited by Yoshinaga Shin’ichi (Yoshinaga, ed. 2012).
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foreign languages), and teaching.\textsuperscript{57} By his own account, while he made his living primarily by writing at his desk, at a certain point the debt collectors had marked even this crucial bit of property as subject to seizure.\textsuperscript{58} Just when he seemed to be at a complete loss for gainful employment, through the kind intervention of an acquaintance Totsudō took up a position teaching at the clerical academy affiliated with Tsukiji Honganji, the Settoku Kyōkō (Accumulation of Merit Academy).

This serendipitous turn of events was the catalyst for Totsudō to apply his formidable talents as an orator and writer to the issues facing the contemporary Buddhist world.\textsuperscript{59} Although his academic training was technically in law, once he made the turn to Buddhism Totsudō published regularly and prolifically on his new subject.\textsuperscript{60} His first outline of Japanese Buddhist history was published in 1892; it was followed by his first overview of Buddhist doctrine, \textit{Bukkyō kyōri yōron}, in 1893.\textsuperscript{61} A steady stream of monographs on Buddhist subjects followed throughout the 1890s.

While it is difficult to assess from considerable historical distance how these early publications were received, Totsudō’s works were almost certainly avidly read by his peers in the “Buddhist youth culture” of the day. No doubt his monographs on dispelling Christianity (\textit{Hai Yasokyō ron}, 1899) and preparing for “mixed residence” (\textit{Kokumin zakkyo go no kokoroe},

\textsuperscript{57} Although Totsudō claimed to have limited facility with foreign languages, he did travel to the United States at least twice.

\textsuperscript{58} This account appears in the essay “Waga tsukue,” reproduced in \textit{Fude to shita sanjū nen} but originally published under Katō’s pseudonym Kuroyama Kikutsu in SB 6, no. 8 (1905): 599–602.

\textsuperscript{59} For example, in 1899 Katō penned a pamphlet on the topic of preparing for “mixed residence” (\textit{naichi zakkyo}) entitled \textit{Bukkyō kokumin zakkyo go no kokore} [\textit{Instructions for Buddhist Citizens Following Mixed Residence}].

\textsuperscript{60} In later years Totsudō’s publications married normative political philosophy with Buddhist ideals.
also 1899) resonated with Buddhists who were concerned about the influx of Christians and the latitude granted to non-Japanese missionaries. Totsudō’s authority on Buddhist matters was bolstered due to his editorial work for the main Buddhist journals of the time: *Meikyō shinshi* (Totsudō served as *henshūnin* from 1 May 1893–?) and *Chūgai nippō* (dates unclear). This authority derived entirely from Totsudō’s intellectual acumen, not from his clerical training (he had none) nor from formal affiliation with any particular sect (although he was nominally affiliated with the Sōtō Zen sect, Totsudō’s publications were almost always written from a transsectarian point of view).

Totsudō’s editorial duties reflected his reputation as a skilled rhetorician and writer; he was also famed for his eloquence in speaking. Accordingly, when the Fraternity of Buddhist Puritans began planning their first public lecture meeting, they hoped specifically to bring him on board.

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61 The book included marginal notes for readers unfamiliar with the subject matter, a feature that positions Totsudō’s work among the reformist apologia that proliferated in the 1890s. See Hoshino 2012, esp. 112–130.
62 The beginning date for Totsudō’s editorship of *Meikyō shinshi* can be found in Takaoka 2005, 35. As *henshūnin*, Totsudō was probably responsible for compiling articles and gathering stories of note. This responsibility differed from that of the *shuhitsu* (Chief Editor), who was responsible for writing editorials (Totsudō would serve as *shuhitsu* for other journals later). Totsudō was still serving in some editorial capacity for *Meikyō shinshi* as late as January 1901, when a retrospective editorial in *Shin Bukkyō* included him in a list of editors and journalists who had joined *Shin Bukkyō* in the creation of a “Buddhist-centric Journal Federation [Bukkyōshugi Zasshi Rengō Kai],” an organization about which I have been able to find no other information. See “Meiji sanjūsan nen Bukkyō shōshi [A Brief History of Buddhism in 1900],” SB 2, no. 1 (January 1901): 5. Page 10 of the same article documented recent personnel changes in the editorships of major journals, listing Totsudō as being affiliated with *Meikyō shinshi*.
63 Totsudō taught for some time at Sōtō-shū Daigaku (the predecessor to Komazawa University in Tokyo) and penned a pamphlet for laypeople entitled *Sōtō-shū shinja no shiori*, published in February 1902 by Morie Press.
64 Takashima 1946b, 30. Some of Totsudō’s publications reflect the esteem with which his oratory was greeted. His first extant publication, dated 1891, was on the subject of composition. In 1902 he published a monograph on eloquence, *Yūbengaku no taii* (*Outline of The Study of Eloquence*). The following year Totsudō was featured in several compilations on oratory. In 1906 he published a primer on rhetoric entitled *Enzetatsu bunshō oyō shūji gaku* (*The Study of Applied Rhetoric in Oratory and Writing*); in 1908 he published a book on oratory entitled *Yūben*
While it is unclear when Totsudō formally joined the group, he published his first article in Shin Bukkyō in April 1902. He would go on to serve as one of the most prolific authors for the journal. While founding members Sakaino Kōyō and Takashima Beihō undoubtedly served as the official “face” of the Fraternity of New Buddhists as the chief editors of the journal and the most prolific contributors to it, Totsudō’s eminent stature within the group is evidenced by the esteem with which the members greeted his skills as an orator, their shared trust of Totsudō’s magisterial knowledge of Buddhism despite (and perhaps because of) his non-clerical status, and the fact that he eventually shared editorial duties with the founding members and served as a member of the board (hyōgiin).

While the list of Totsudō’s contributions to Shin Bukkyō does not immediately reveal a consistent thematic pattern, scanning the broader arc of his scholarly output I suggest that his work can be broadly divided into three categories: 1) works on rhetoric and oratory; 2) primers on Buddhism for a non-specialist lay audience (e.g., Bukkyō kōen shū [Collected Lectures on Buddhism], 1910); and 3) works on self-cultivation that were targeted to social edification (kyōka) organizations. Totsudō also published his first memoir in 1911 at the age of forty and...
another memoir in 1928. My analysis below will use these memoirs as a guide for understanding the trajectory of Totsudō’s life and work; I focus on his “pop” scholarship and works on self-cultivation in particular because they seem to best encapsulate the Fraternity understanding that “free inquiry” would facilitate the inculcation of “sound faith” in the populace. These works also best show how Totsudō’s Buddhism-inflected political philosophy could be easily turned to bureaucratic projects (spiritual mobilization for nation-building; the eradication of superstition) and how that political philosophy could inform conceptions of ideal religion-state relations.

While his dedication to his work seems unquestionable, Totsudō’s prodigious output was not merely due to the verve he brought to his subject matter. Although he probably received some income from his work as a lecturer at Buddhist-leaning universities like the Sōtō-shū University and Tōyō University (founded by New Buddhist hero Inoue Enryū, 1858–1919), there was an economic imperative for him to keep producing new material because—by his own account—he primarily lived on honorariums from speeches and essays.69 This was not merely self-effacing rhetoric. For example, an afterword to Totsudō’s 1928 memoir written by fellow New Buddhist and publisher Takashima Beihō described—with Takashima’s characteristic playfulness—how Totsudō was chronically impoverished despite his eminent stature.70 Takashima teased Totsudō for asking him to set a generous royalty price for the volume and suggested that the book would sell well enough that Totsudō would not suffer. Takashima’s ribbing served as a check on scholarly output. However, it does not include his editorials for journals such as Shin shūyō. Given this prodigious output and his punishing lecture schedule, it is unclear how Totsudō found time to sleep. However, as I will show immediately below, Totsudō was driven to produce so much in part because he was almost entirely economically dependent on income from royalties and honorariums.

69 See Katō T. 1928. In addition to teaching at the Settoku Kyōkō affiliated with Tsukiji Honganji, Totsudō taught for some time at Sōtō-shū Daigaku (the predecessor to present-day Komazawa University) and—like many of his fellow New Buddhists—at Tōyō University.

70 Takashima Beihō, “Afterword (Batsu),” Katō T., Fude to shita sanjūnen.
Totsudō’s evident tendency towards mild pomposity, but it also reveals that there was a deep economic motive for Totsudō to continue producing novel variations on his pet themes in order to keep revenue flowing in.

Totsudō claimed a position for himself that was outside of two influential lineages. As his statement on “free inquiry” in Shin Bukkyō suggested, he disparaged sacerdotalism and favored a lay-centric vision of Buddhism. At the same time, Totsudō did not pursue (or was not successful in pursuing) a scholarly career at any of the elite imperial universities. While his erudition was demonstrable, an evident predilection for normative, hortatory rhetoric may have made him ineligible for such positions. Lack of a national university pedigree was probably also a reason.

At any rate, the expository aspects of Totsudō’s lectures and essays consistently operated in the service of his broader project of social edification (kyōka). Even after Shin Bukkyō ceased publication in August 1915, the Fraternity vision of “free inquiry” lived on, manifesting itself in popular, activist scholarship like Totsudō’s that combined exhortation and exposition in equal measure.

71 Sheldon Garon has literally written the book on kyōka (which he translates as “moral suasion”) in modern Japan, with one chapter specifically dedicated to the issue of eradicating superstition by suppressing marginal movements such as Ōmotokyō (see Garon 1997, 60–87). This chapter is greatly indebted to Garon’s work, and actually takes as its impetus a small puzzle that increasingly nagged at my consciousness with each successive reading of his book. Garon highlights the role played by Fraternity members in calling for relatively liberal interpretations of religion-state relations, noting with irony that Takashima Beihō would later lead the charge to encourage state suppression of Ōmotokyō (first at a 1921 rally, and then later in a 1936 Chūō kōron article). The puzzle for me is not that Takashima and other Fraternity members held inconsistent or seemingly paradoxical views—everyone does in some way or another—but rather that Garon’s account left unanswer the extent to which Fraternity members continued to identify themselves as “New Buddhists” after the discontinuation of Shin Bukkyō in 1915. It is now clear to me that Takashima continued to embrace the Fraternity project right up until his death in 1949. In a two-part retrospective article in Daihōrin in April and May 1946, Takashima claimed that the Occupation reforms were finally putting in place some of the policies about which he and his fellow New Buddhists had only dreamed. In a touching addendum, Takashima
Of necessity I must limit my analysis here to a small sample of Totsudō’s prodigious output. I have chosen to focus here on his publications from the Taishō era (1912–1926), including editorials in the journal *Shin shūyō* (*New Self-Cultivation*, a journal that effectively took up the mantle of *Shin Bukkyō* as the latter journal entered its senescent phase), as well as several books published between 1919 and 1927.\(^2\) (This interwar period seems to have been when Katō’s social influence was at its peak.)\(^3\)

Both in their form and content, Totsudō’s publications in the interwar period generally reflected a “Protestant” commitment to minimizing clerical authority and a populist commitment to sharing cutting-edge scholarship with a general audience. For example, most of Totsudō’s books and every issue of his journal *Shin shūyō* (*New Self-Cultivation*) featured *furigana* glosses for all words (not just unusual or difficult ones), thereby allowing people of minimal education to read and understand potentially difficult vocabulary. Some of his books also included marginal notes to guide readers through unfamiliar concepts.\(^4\) As Totsudō wrote in the inaugural issue of *Shin Shūyō* in 1913:

> The development of the academic arts has at long last increased and areas of specialization have become increasingly diverse. Scholars deepen their respective points of expertise, attempting to exhaust [their] sources. Meanwhile the average person’s level of knowledge is far from being expanded—those who absorb themselves in specialization find it hard to engage in the edification of the average person, and the average person has no preparation for acquiring specialized

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\(^2\) On *Shin shūyō* as a successor to *Shin Bukkyō*, see Okada 2012.

\(^3\) One way of measuring Katō’s influence during this time is to highlight the fact that he was asked to write *Bukkyō yori mitaru minryoku kan’yō* by Home Minister Tokonami directly (I discuss this below), but it is also indicative of his stature that Katō was featured in a 1927 volume of the series published by the Greater Japan Eloquence Association, placing Katō along with many other prominent intellectuals of the day. For the narrow purposes of this chapter I am not addressing Katō’s publications from the 1930s and 1940s, although I hope to incorporate them into a later project.

\(^4\) See, e.g., Katō T. 1910.
knowledge. Scholars and the average person are separated, with the scholars increasingly specialized and the average person increasingly estranged. Is this a happy state of affairs for society as a whole? Knowledge in society will first display a sound development when something bridges the gap between the two by popularizing specialized knowledge. The duty of educators truly lies in this.\(^7\)

When writing for a lay audience, Totsudō’s presentation of Buddhist doctrine was almost invariably brief, and references to abstruse Buddhist doctrines were almost always used in support of a political or social objective rather than just being an explanation of Buddhism \textit{per se}. I also do not think it accidental that his published lectures on specific sūtras happened to be on \textit{The Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith} (\textit{Dasheng qixin lun}, a Chinese apocryphon traditionally attributed to Aśvaghoṣa) and the \textit{Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra}.\(^7\) The former text allowed Totsudō to advance an argument about the historical Buddha, while the latter provided a convenient model for his lay-centric view because it famously features a lay protagonist who understands the Buddhist dharma better than eminent members of the monastic community.

While he tailored his messages depending on his audience, in general Totsudō drew upon contemporary European theory, Japanese and Buddhist history, and familiarity with Buddhist doctrine. Totsudō’s references to foregoing scholarship served a dual purpose. On the one hand, he cited such scholarship as a way of increasing lay audiences’ familiarity with the vanguard of academia. This was consistent with his claim in the aforementioned \textit{Shin shūyō} editorial that scholars and educators needed to bridge the gap between abstruse research and daily life. On the other hand, Totsudō’s references to scholarship—particularly scholarship in European

\(^{75}\) Katō Totsudō, “Gakusha to jōjin,” \textit{Shin shūyō} 4, no. 2 (March 1913), 7. Although this issue was listed as volume 4, number 2, it was actually the first volume published under the title “\textit{Shin shūyō}” and Katō Totsudō’s editorship.

languages—served the time-honored purpose of bolstering his own credentials by demonstrating his erudition. By dropping the names of European philosophers with whom his lay audiences were almost certainly not familiar, Totsudō subtly underscored his intellectual prowess. When discussing Buddhism specifically, the academic mode also gave him an edge over clerics in that he could dismiss their claims or practices as outmoded.

Totsudō’s intellectual interests were eclectic, but he consistently mobilized others’ scholarship on law, philosophy, and history to make some fairly simple points. In a time of rapid modernization and urbanization, he argued, Japan needed some sort of counter to the pressures of cosmopolitanism and individualism. Moreover, in an age in which science was rapidly displacing older forms of knowledge, spurious superstitions (meishin) needed to be eradicated in favor of proper religious faith and a commitment to self-cultivation. If individual Japanese citizens could resist anti-scientific practices and embrace a rational religious faith centered on the quest for the ultimate, Japan as a whole would flourish. When he turned from individual responsibility to broader systemic issues, Totsudō argued that because Buddhist temples could already be found in communities large and small throughout Japan, such Buddhist institutions could be mobilized to support social welfare initiatives and reduce the economic disparity and social factors that fostered indolence and apathy, strengthening Japan as a whole in the process. In Totsudō’s vision, Buddhism was the medicine for alleviating social ills like superstition and class stratification, but Buddhist clerics were also part of the problem in that they often merely observed social problems rather than actively addressing them. The implication, of course, was that lay intellectuals like Totsudō himself—and the enlightened social edification movements

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77 Katō T. 1919, 1–18; Katō T. 1923, 124–129
78 Katō T. 1926.
who often served as his audience—were best positioned to convert the power of religion into political power. This was not the mundane politics of supporting specific electoral candidates or pursuing narrow political agendas, but rather the broader political objective of mobilizing the citizenry in support of national agendas.

Here it is crucial to note that Totsudō envisioned people as autonomous citizens engaged in self-governance, not as passive imperial subjects. His message combined an emphasis on personal responsibility and “sound faith” with an equal and related emphasis on the power of religion to support nation-building projects. It is no surprise that some bureaucrats found this message (and its balance of moral exhortation with perspicacious systemic analysis) attractive.

**A Common Project**

Totsudō provided the intellectual gravitas, historical acumen, theoretical sophistication, and prodigious publishing output to present the New Buddhist project of “free inquiry” to broader audiences including social edification organizations, policymakers, politicians, and fellow intellectuals. While his repertoire of examples was somewhat repetitive, just judging from the sheer number of his publications it seems to have been effective. That is, Totsudō may have needed steady publications to pay the bills, but his ideas were popular enough to allow him to recycle the same basic material for years in various lectures and publications.

Totsudō was greatly aided in his project by his fellow New Buddhist Takashima Beihō, whose publishing company Heigo Press produced many of Totsudō’s works. Takashima was

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80 Katō T. 1923.
81 As I argued at the end of Chapter Two, this shows that not all Buddhists were mere lackeys of the state in the interwar period. Chapter Four will continue this line of argument.
82 Takashima even seems to have provided Katō with publishing opportunities when the latter was in danger of running out of money, which was apparently not infrequent—Katō’s prodigious
unique among the New Buddhists in that he was the only one who actively embodied the founding members’ commitment to teetotalism wholeheartedly, but he also stood out because he continued to avidly fly the New Buddhist flag long after the dissolution of the journal. It was Takashima who would claim in 1915, for example, that the discontinuation of *Shin Bukkyō* actually marked a victory for New Buddhist principles, in 1936 that the active suppression of marginal religions such as Ōmotokyō was a natural extension of the New Buddhist project, and even in 1946 that the Allied Occupation had finally instituted the reforms that the New Buddhists had sought for so long. The seemingly inconsistent claims may have marked Takashima as a political opportunist (or as someone who was struggling to maintain his social relevance), but his enthusiasm and his activism also sustained the New Buddhist “free inquiry” project through his publishing company long after the New Buddhist movement had otherwise become defunct.

Although the Fraternity of New Buddhists had famously rejected political protection of religion or interference in religious affairs, in the Taishō era Fraternity members grudgingly came to respect and collaborate with bureaucrats and politicians. In 1912, for example, several of the New Buddhists banded together with other religious leaders such as Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941) and Andō Masazumi (1876–1955) to resist the Three Religions Conference (Sankyō Kaidō) that had been organized by Tokyo Imperial University scholar of religion Anesaki Masaharu (1866–1949) at the behest of Vice Minister Tokonami Takejirō (1866–1935). Like publication activities were not merely reflective of his passion for his subject, but also for his desire to pay the bills. See Takashima’s afterword to *Fude to shita sanjū nen*, also published through Heigo Press. For a very brief overview of the history of the press and the types of books it published, see Ōtani Eiichi’s abstract from the sixty-eighth (2009) meeting of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies (Nihon Shūkyō Gakkai), included in *Shūkyō kenkyū* 83, no. 4 (2010): 1240–1241. A more complete account (Ōtani 2012b) is included in Yoshinaga, ed. 2012. Takashima ran Heigo Press until 1934.

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83 In articles in *Shin Bukkyō*, *Chūō kōron*, and *Daihōrin*, respectively.
84 See Garon 1986, esp. 281.
the New Buddhists’ weak attempts to resist the kōninkyō proponents in 1900, this effort was intended to simultaneously challenge clerical attempts to cozy up to state authority and governmental attempts to control religions. The Three Religions Conference took place on 25 February 1912 and ended with little fanfare, but one result was that a new, mutually beneficial relationship was forged between the New Buddhists and government leaders.85

Ironically, the New Buddhists found themselves benefiting from bureaucratic favor in much the same way that they had critiqued sectarian leaders for doing. Although they had initially resisted Tokonami’s “Three Religions Conference” of 1912 because they viewed it as a crude attempt to subordinate religion to the needs of the state, in the course of their unsuccessful lobbying attempts the New Buddhists—especially Takashima—found common ground with Tokonami. Within just a few years their project and Tokonami’s had become aligned, and Takashima described himself as a “Tokonami fan.”

Takashima’s change of heart was due in part to the fact that Tokonami had used his political leverage to clear Takashima’s name from the rolls of socialist suspects following the Great Treason Incident of 1910, when the police had assumed that Takashima’s politics paralleled those of his socialist friend and erstwhile contributor to Shin Bukkyō, Kōtoku Shūsui (1871–1911). Although Takashima had not asked Tokonami to intervene, the sudden cessation of the near-constant surveillance left him indebted to the politician; he was even more impressed by the fact that Tokonami never explicitly claimed responsibility for clearing Takashima’s name.

The fact that Tokonami could pull strings and perform small favors for those around him was only part of the reason that he and Takashima became allies. Although the New Buddhists were theoretically against political protection and interference in religious affairs, pragmatically they

85 Yoshinaga 2012, 40–41. See Takashima Beihō’s retrospective, “Tokonami fan to natta wake”
still needed to align their social reform projects with contemporary political authority if they wanted any of their desired reforms to see the light of day. Policymakers like Tokonami also needed to have allies in the Buddhist world who could provide theoretical support for their initiatives without getting mired in the messy world of sectarian politics. As a result, a mutually beneficial relationship developed in which Tokonami’s efforts to conscript Buddhism for nation-building projects led him to turn to people like Takashima and Totsudō, who could speak authoritatively about Buddhism in transsectarian terms and who enjoyed a degree of clout as lay intellectuals who produced “pop” Buddhist scholarship. In turn, Takashima and Totsudō were able to benefit from a position closer to the corridors of power to enact their social reforms.

The mutually beneficial relationship worked in part by giving even greater legitimacy to non-clerics in the political sphere. In 1919, for example, Tokonami (now Home Minister) asked Totsudō to write a book on the subject of “cultivating the power of the people as seen from the perspective of Buddhism.” In his Foreword to that book, Tokonami praised the author as one of the few individuals who had the erudition, moral fortitude, and familiarity with Buddhism to conduct such a project.86 The effect of Tokonami’s endorsement was that Totsudō—a layperson with no formal clerical training who was unstinting in his critiques of sacerdotalism—was treated by one of the most eminent and influential policymakers of the day as the authority on Buddhism. This was a stunning victory for the New Buddhist principle of free inquiry, even if it came at the expense of the principle of “rejecting all sorts of political protection and interference.”87


86 See Katō T. 1919, i–ii.
87 As Chapter Four will show, Andō Masazumi would also go on to serve as one of the loudest voices claiming to represent Buddhist interests in the political arena even though he had laicized in 1914, presumably in order to pursue his political career.
The mutually beneficial relationship also worked in that Totsudō readily tied Buddhist principles to political philosophy and prescriptive claims about Japanese democracy. In his 1923 book *Self-Governance and Buddhism*, for example, Totsudō offered a lengthy historical exposition of various political systems throughout Japanese history only to conclude that the best sort of political system was a democratic one that combined benevolent social management and moral self-cultivation.\(^88\) Obviously, he concluded, the best cultural resource for meeting these twin objectives was Buddhism. While the imprimatur of a foreword from the sitting Home Minister was lacking in the later (1923) book, the project was basically the same and Totsudō’s stature already established. Specifically, Totsudō advocated the cultivation of individual citizens according to Buddhist principles (**kyōka**) and the alignment of local Buddhist organizations with national initiatives.\(^89\)

Later publications reflected Totsudō’s political influence in a different way. In 1924 Totsudō served as the unifying figure who helped to mitigate programmatic differences between several competing social edification organizations (**kyōka dantai**). Wielding his clout as an authority on Buddhism and respected orator and author—not to mention his political connections with policymakers in Tokyo—Totsudō was able to create a new national social edification federation called the Greater Japan Social Edification Organization Federation (**Dai Nippon Kyōka Dantai Rengō Kai**). Totsudō served in a leadership capacity of this organization for some time, although so far my efforts to find detailed records regarding the organization itself have been fruitless.\(^90\) What I *can* say is that even as late as 1926 Totsudō was delivering lectures to social edification

\(^88\) Although Totsudō repeated the truism that Japan was unique in having a continuous, unbroken imperial line that embodied a benevolent patriarchy that extended to all Japanese citizens, by documenting significant historical shifts he implied that even the imperial system was subject to the vicissitudes of history.

\(^89\) See Katō T. 1923.
organizations in which he listed up the various social ills of the day and then cited the activities of the new national federation as a way of counteracting such social problems.

Totsudō’s political philosophy saw nationalism as a suitable response to the twin perils of individualism and cosmopolitanism. It was premised on a romantic vision of interconnectedness in which ubiquitous Buddhist temples served as mediating institutions between individuals and the state. Buddhists could provide moral guidance to the citizenry and help to alleviate the social ills that arose from individuals’ misguided behavior, but they could also directly tackle systemic injustice (such as income inequality) in a way that individuals alone could not. While Totsudō was clearly not a communist, he advanced a utopian vision of a socialist democracy in which the benevolent state cared for Buddhist institutions, which in turn cared for and protected the people from capitalist injustices such as income inequality and predatory lending. At the same time, the people needed to be protected from themselves. The allure of “superstitions” remained omnipresent, and while Totsudō adopted a tolerant approach to practices such as augury, physiognomy, and the like, he treated them as outmoded “science” and/or insufficiently developed “religion.”

What remained in Totsudō’s vision was a space for a desacralized Buddhism that could fill the interstitial gaps between individuals and the state. Social edification movements could and should advance anti-superstition campaigns, guarding against the problems wrought by the atomization that attended modernization and urbanization. This meant, of course, that certain ritual practices and groups would eventually need to be eradicated, but the happy result would be a healthier, democratic, robust Japanese society.

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90 I expect to make a fuller examination of this group in a future iteration of this project.
Conclusions: An Overlooked Political Facet of Buddhist Studies

In a 1990 essay, Jacqueline Stone suggested that the Taishō and early Shōwa eras saw three developments that greatly changed Japanese Buddhist studies and propelled Japanese scholarship to global prominence. Buddhist studies emerged as an academic discipline separate from confessional approaches characteristic of traditional sectarian Buddhist studies, and scholars adopted philological, positivist historiographical, and textual exegetical methods while applying methods characteristic of psychology, sociology, archaeology, and comparative religion to the study of Buddhism. These methods informed a monumental attempt to systematize the various Buddhist doctrines through translation and compilation projects.91 Major contemporary developments in the field included the establishment of chairs in Sanskrit (Takakusu Junjirō, 1901) and Indian philosophy (Murakami Senshō, 1917) at Tokyo Imperial University, the compilation of the Taishō shinshū daizōkyō (edited by Takakusu and erstwhile New Buddhist Watanabe Kaikyoku) between 1922 and 1934, and the increasing global academic clout of the standard-bearers of Japanese Buddhist studies.92

92 The Taishō canon was published in one hundred volumes between 1924 and 1934. Takakusu and Watanabe were both affiliated to some degree with the Fraternity of New Buddhists. Watanabe was a founding member, although he contributed only intermittently during his time studying abroad (1900–1910). Takakusu’s relationship with the Fraternity is more difficult to assess. He contributed several articles to Shin Bukkyō but was peripheral enough that members seem to have not counted him among them. Takashima (1946a, 1946b) recalled much later that Takakusu had joined the Keiikai at some point in the 1890s but rarely showed up to meetings and was even struck from the membership rolls as a result. As far as I can determine from his contributions to Shin Bukkyō, Takakusu was sympathetic to the activities of the Fraternity, particularly in terms of their rigorous promotion of free inquiry, although he also exhorted members to clarify their mission. See, for example, Takakusu Junjirō, “Dai jū shūnen no Shin Bukkyō,” Shin Bukkyō 11, no. 7, SBRS 2: 1020–1021.
While the gravitational center of this interwar scholarship was undoubtedly Tokyo Imperial University, equally important trends in Buddhist studies occurred elsewhere in Japanese society. One strain of this scholarship developed within the Fraternity of New Buddhists and then matured and gained greater social and political influence after the discontinuation of the New Buddhist journal *Shin Bukkyō*. This had the notable side effect of giving a stronger political voice to lay or laicized Buddhists than they had historically enjoyed, continuing a process already in motion in which Buddhist sectarian authorities saw some of their political influence erode as young reformers who were fluent in the theoretical language of modern academe captured the attention of policymakers and the reading public.

Although *Shin Bukkyō* was relatively short-lived, it fostered a generation of activist scholars who freely traversed the boundaries between the hallowed halls of academia and more plebeian venues such as public lectures, popular hortatory magazines, and—by the 1920s—radio. Skilled in the use of the social media of their day, these intellectuals published accessible primers on Buddhism, engaged in social edification through public oratory, and vigorously attempted to eradicate superstition through awareness campaigns. After the dissolution of the Fraternity, New Buddhists such as Katō Totsudō and Takashima Beihō not only served as prominent public intellectuals, but they also occasionally bent the ears of politicians and bureaucrats such as Tokonami Takejirō who were formulating religions policy.

The New Buddhist project of free inquiry and the promotion of a sound faith among the Japanese citizenry had profound political ramifications that impinged directly on religious freedom—both conceptually and in practice—in the Taishō and early Shōwa eras (1912–1945). The uniqueness of the New Buddhist version of “free inquiry” is that it collapsed “religion-
making from outside” with “religion-making from below” and, in so doing, directly affected “religion-making from above.” That is, free inquiry was essentially apologetic in that it served as a way for self-identified Buddhists to make their tradition fit with the modern critical spirit, but this apologetic impulse resulted in an academic stance “from outside” that used evidentiary scholarship and cutting-edge political and social theory to criticize clerical institutions and social trends alike. Society needed Buddhism to thrive, but Buddhism needed to change to survive. For policymakers, this was an attractive combination of insider claims and outsider critique that could be used to mobilize religion when convenient (“cultivating the power of the people through Buddhism”) and keep religion in its proper place by countering “superstitions” through social edification and denying ecclesiastical claims to customary rights or privileges.

By drawing distinctions between “good religion,” “outmoded sacerdotalism,” and “deleterious superstition,” the New Buddhists provided the parameters in which discussions of religious freedom could take place. The New Buddhist critique of sacerdotalism gave policymakers a tool for countering the political claims of clerical institutions (particularly claims about the importance of preserving customary rights—one influential understanding of “religious freedom” at the time). The critique of “superstition” gave law enforcement officers a tool for surveilling and suppressing marginal movements (because “superstitions” were not “real religions,” they were by definition not deserving of “religious freedom”). The influence of this project on the average citizen is difficult to measure in quantitative terms, but I strongly suspect that the New Buddhist project of free inquiry served as one factor that contributed to the early

93 Yoshinaga 2012, 41. Shin Bukkyō ceased publication in August 1915. The last Fraternity enzetsukai was held in 1917.
Shōwa era (1926–1989) push to clarify religions legislation.\textsuperscript{95} That push, which began as a Ministry of Education initiative in 1925 and which saw repeated bureaucratic and parliamentary defeats until the 1939 passage of the Religious Corporations Law, would have major ramifications for conceptions of religion-state relations and religious freedom even before the law was formally passed in 1940.\textsuperscript{96}

Specifically, the next chapter shows how the ideal of “free inquiry” can be seen in efforts on the part of laicized or lay-leaning Buddhists to critique the sectarian establishment while remonstrating with the government about how to define both “religion” and “freedom” in the context of debates about the proposed legislation. For example, figures with loose connections to the New Buddhists such as Andō Masazumi (also Tetsuchō, 1876–1955, a laicized Jōdo Shinshū priest and former journalist who became a legislator in the House of Commons and a bureaucrat in the Home Ministry) mobilized references to European and American current affairs and political philosophy as a way of demonstrating their academic prowess and bolstering their political points. Like Totsudō, Andō advocated a Buddhist-centric democratic vision, imagining a near-future utopia in which Buddhism would play a crucial role in Japanese social and political life, both for Japanese citizens in the metropole and for imperial subjects in Japan’s colonies. While Andō considered himself a liberal through and through, he proudly played a major role in

\textsuperscript{95} I provided historical background on this legislation in the Introduction.

\textsuperscript{96} To briefly recapitulate the history of religions legislation outlined in the Introduction, the defeat of the Yamagata Bill in 1900 was followed by a quarter-century in which no major attempts were made to introduce specific legislation regarding religion. That changed in 1925, when—in addition to passing the Peace Preservation Law which gave authorities greater latitude in defining and regulating “peace and order”—bureaucrats in the Ministry of Education began preliminary attempts at passing a new religions bill. The attempts repeatedly failed. However, in 1939 a version of the legislation was finally passed; it went into effect in 1940 and stayed effective until its repeal by the Civil Liberties Directive in October 1945.
facilitating the passage of the Religious Organizations Law of 1939.\textsuperscript{97} That law has generally been seen by postwar scholars as a major infringement on religious freedom, but in his time Andō saw it as a model piece of legislation that protected the rights of religions, both mainstream (such as Buddhism) and marginal (such as Ōmotokyō).

\textsuperscript{97} Andō 1943, 163–184.
Chapter Four

Illiberal “Resistance” and Progressive “Collaboration”

What we call religious freedom, whether in matters of conscience or action, is that each individual may freely believe or freely act. It does not touch upon whether one religion is treated unfairly in relation to another, or whether other religions are tolerated. Therefore the proponents of the Religious Organizations Law, using religious freedom as their rationale, readily concoct the fantasy of uniform treatment of the three religions and force it upon the people.¹

In a letter dated 16 April 1947, Andō Masazumi (1876–1955) petitioned Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) to rescind a purge order that would remove Andō from his position as Chairman of the Board of the recently constituted Japanese Religions Federation (Nihon Shūkyō Renmei, formally established 2 June 1946).² Andō urged the prime minister to take into account his longstanding commitment to liberalism and his demonstrated resistance to ultra-nationalistic efforts. Although it was true that during the war he had served for some time as a mid-level “Manager” in the infamous Imperial Rule Assistance Association (IRAA; the administered mass organization that lent material and ideological support to imperial military initiatives), Andō claimed that he had done so at the behest of his likeminded liberal colleagues in order to effect change from within the militaristic organization.³

The tone and content of Andō’s letter suggested that he hardly deemed himself to be the type of person who should be the target of a purge. However, while Andō’s deposition reflected his

¹ Chikazumi Jōkan, “Sankyō kakuitsu wa futettei naru shūkyō seisaku nari” (CJP “Shūkyō hōan 1”), 1–2.
³ “Re: A Petition for Cancellation of Memorandum for Public Office Purge Directive” (letter from Andō Masazumi directed to Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru), CI&E RCR Box #5787, Folder #18.
training as a journalist in that it was eloquently stated, it also reflected his decades-long career as a politician in that it was only half true.4

Andō’s writings from the early Shōwa era (1926–1989) suggest that his politics were not as unambiguously liberal as his postwar deposition tried to suggest. While it is true that Andō was cautiously critical of the government even as late as the early 1940s, Andō himself was a figure familiar with the corridors of political power who also enjoyed considerable clout in the religious world as a former Jōdo Shinshū priest. His postwar deposition greatly downplayed the prominent role he held in multiple wartime organizations—religious and political—that unambiguously supported the war, not to mention his own strident advocacy in print of the necessity of unifying Japan’s Buddhist sects to meet the exigencies of a war that he regularly depicted (consistent with the racist rhetoric of the time) as a clash of “oppositional Anglo-Saxon thinking” and “holistic Oriental thinking.”5

It might be tempting to view Andō’s story as a shrewd politician’s calculated attempts to align himself first with Japanese, then with American, governmental authority. The more apologetically inclined might dismiss the purge order as a postwar overreaction and take Andō’s deposition at face value, trusting that his participation in the IRAA constituted the genuine effort of a politically liberal Buddhist to effect what small change he could under an increasingly totalitarian military government. Both are reasonable interpretations, but I think it likely that Andō’s apparently paradoxical positions reflected his simultaneous commitments to conflicting ideals. Andō’s political philosophy—and particularly his understanding of religion-state

4 See below for a biographical sketch of Andō.
5 Andō 1941 and Andō 1943 and 1944, discussed in detail below. On racism during the Pacific War, see Dower 1986.
relations—harbored liberal and illiberal elements in equal measure. These libertarian and authoritarian elements came more or less to the fore with changing historical circumstances.

**Countering the Resistance/Collaboration Binary**

Andō’s petition encapsulates a problem that faced the Buddhist world as a whole after the war. Simply put, one pressing concern for Buddhists—a query that came from within their own ranks as well as from outsiders—was the question of why they had failed to resist state initiatives, many of which seemed in retrospect to have either co-opted religion for political purposes or to have abrogated the constitutional principle of religious freedom. In the context of the postwar Occupation, to many it seemed clear that Buddhism had lost its mandate through its complicity in the war effort and what prominent intellectuals quickly came to describe as backward Buddhist “feudalistic tendencies.” This postwar interpretation was based on a rapidly proliferating set of normative ideas about how religion should operate vis-à-vis state and society, but at the time Andō crafted his deposition it was still unclear whether Buddhism had abrogated the basic principles that qualified it as a religion, whether Buddhists had misconstrued the universal principle of separation of religion from the state, or whether Japanese Buddhism itself was the victim of a cruel cultural misunderstanding. These interpretive problems have continued to plague historical scholarship on modern Japanese Buddhism in several ways.

First, a few individuals such as Seno’o Girō (1889–1961), Takagi Kenmyō (1864–1914), and Uchiyama Gudō (1874–1911) have been singled out and celebrated as liberal Buddhist martyrs.

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6 This question continues to be asked today. For example, a two-volume set on the theme of “State and Religion” published by the Kyoto Buddhist Association was spurred in part by recognition among the sectarian leadership that Buddhists had been insufficiently attuned to problems of religion-state relations (Arai and Tanaka, eds. 2008). More recently, an explicitly normative 2012 Temple University dissertation by Terasawa Kunihiko begins with this question of why Buddhists failed to resist state initiatives, which Terasawa describes as Buddhists’ loss of a “critical attitude” vis-à-vis nationalism and kokutai ideology.
who resisted the prewar and wartime Japanese state; similarly, Zen priest and scholar Ichikawa Hakugen (1902–1986) has been celebrated as a postwar critical voice. 8 These men have often been treated as exceptions to the rule, while Buddhist leaders, Buddhist intellectuals, and Buddhist sects as a whole have been criticized for providing theoretical justification for domestic and colonial injustice and for glorifying nationalism. 9 Buddhist sanctification of war has also been regarded as a problematic abrogation of Buddhism’s own precepts denouncing violence, while immanentist Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrine has been faulted for providing theoretical justification for killing the enemy on the battlefield. 10 In some scholarship, Buddhists have been assumed to have supported unjust domestic policies—particularly persecution of marginal religious groups—and military adventurism because of a lingering “feudal” tendency to align themselves with political power. 11 More nuanced treatments have highlighted the longstanding Buddhist connections with kingship and sovereignty and the doctrinal bases for Buddhist support for the war, but they have still ultimately tended to judge Buddhist war participation negatively. 12 Finally, some scholars have described these Buddhist political tendencies as deriving from

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7 See, e.g., Maruyama 1969[1946].
8 Scholarship on the Buddhist socialist Seno’o Girō, for example, includes Ōtani 2008; Ōtani 2012, esp. 71–92 and 252–280; and Shields 2012. On Takagi Kenmyō and Uchiyama Gudō, see Sueki 2004a, 241–266. On Ichikawa Hakugen, see Ives 2009.
9 Heisig and Maraldo, eds. 1994; Sharf 1995
10 As exemplified by the “Critical Buddhism” movement, Buddhists themselves have conducted and encouraged historical studies that either highlight the unfortunate fact of Buddhist complicity in war efforts or have criticized Buddhist doctrine for providing justifications for militarism. For an overview of Critical Buddhism, see Hubbard and Swanson, eds. 1997, Stone 1999, and, more recently, Shields 2011. The paradigmatic (and highly problematic) work on the problem of Zen and war is Victoria 1997. A more nuanced take is Ives 2009, which rehabilitates and revises some of the problems raised by Zen cleric Ichikawa Hakugen as early as 1970.
11 Postwar Marxist scholars like Ienaga Saburō and modernists like Maruyama Masao advanced this interpretation, sharing the teleological premise that religions progressed through different stages of development.
12 Ives 2009 is a good example of this type of scholarship.
Buddhist ignorance about the importance of religious freedom and the separation of religion from the state.\textsuperscript{13}

While any of these topics deserves extended critical treatment, this chapter focuses specifically on the issue of Buddhists’ alleged ignorance regarding the importance of religious freedom. I want to suggest that foregoing scholarship has actually advanced a series of politically and doctrinally normative positions under the guise of doctrinal neutrality that a non-confessional stance characteristic of religious studies/history of religions provides.\textsuperscript{14} Postwar scholars have tended to assume, for example, that “resistance” is the operative mode through which religions should associate themselves with the state, and that such “resistance” should always occur in a libertarian mode (securing maximal freedom for individuals while diminishing the state’s authoritarian power). From this point of view, Buddhist contributions to statist, imperialist, or militarist projects appear to be simple products of myopic self-interest, with the problematic result that Buddhists have been treated as “ignorant” of the principle of religious freedom. In the quest for evidence of a vibrant liberal tradition in the war years, postwar scholars have also tended to valorize Buddhists who martyred themselves for their principles. In some cases they have overlooked the fact that the Buddhists in question were hardly staunch defenders of religious freedom because they have focused exclusively on the historical fact of their persecution by the totalitarian state and have consequently ignored what the Buddhists themselves said (or did not say) about religious freedom.

Rather than attributing Buddhist attitudes and activities to “false consciousness” or historical backwardness, through three cases below I challenge the assumption that “resistance” should always have been liberal or that people in seemingly oppressive situations necessarily wanted to

be “liberated.” I first use the cases of Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941) and his erstwhile collaborator Andō Masazumi (1876–1955) to argue that the complicated questions of Buddhist contributions to Japanese militarism and imperialism are best understood if we abandon the normative presupposition that Buddhists should have resisted out of commitment to either liberal principles (which may not have existed yet in the same forms that they did in the postwar period) or specific Buddhist doctrines (which are infinitely malleable and can be used to oppress as much as they can be used to liberate). This presupposition is frequently presented in some variation on a counterfactual question: Why did Buddhists fail to resist the oppressive religions legislation that bound them so firmly to the state?

This sort of question undoubtedly serves a valuable function in emic discussions of Buddhist doctrine and idealized visions of “engaged Buddhism.” However, phrasing the question in this presentist way makes it unanswerable through standard historiographic methods. The conclusion that Buddhists “failed” to resist is a foregone one, so the historical investigation becomes moot. The counterfactual question of why Buddhists failed to resist is also unanswerable through the non-confessional method favored by scholars of religion because it abrogates the principle of doctrinal neutrality that distinguishes religious studies from theology. It problematically assumes that Buddhist political actions should have been premised on liberal or libertarian principles.

Setting aside the urge to ask this counterfactual and implicitly normative question, I argue that by allowing politically active Buddhists such as Andō and Chikazumi to speak for themselves and the transsectarian constituencies they represented, we can see that what appeared to be Buddhist complicity was sometimes understood in its historical context as a form of

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14 See Maekawa 2013 as well as Chapters 1, 3, and 6 of this dissertation.
15 As Stone (1999a, 182–183) has indicated, doctrine is ideologically undetermined; specific political and ideological readings of religious doctrine are applied in historical context.
resistance. Meanwhile, what contemporary Buddhists understood to be “resistance” was not necessarily framed in terms of principled liberal opposition to statist initiatives based on high-minded ideals of human rights and civil liberties, and—at least in Chikazumi’s case—egalitarian treatment of religions was a problem, not a solution.¹⁶

Whereas Chapter Two focused on one specific moment—the debates over the Yamagata Religions Bill in late 1899 and early 1900—this chapter takes a longer view historically by focusing on the first two decades of the Shōwa era (1926–1989; I focus on 1926–1945 here). The chapter also takes a broader view thematically. While early Shōwa-era legislation relating to religion forms the backdrop for the chapter, my focus is on how politically active Buddhists intervened in bureaucratic and parliamentary conversations about religious freedom, the administration of religious corporations, and the ideal relationship between religions and the state (including civic rituals conducted at shrines). Although from the postwar perspective prominent Buddhists like Andō and Chikazumi may seem to have been complicit with imperial initiatives and the war effort, in his own time each man saw himself as challenging statism and theocracy as much as he aimed to contribute to nation-building.

Through the cases of these two men, I show that Buddhists were hardly ignorant of the importance of religious freedom or the principle of separation, but they rarely interpreted religious freedom in purely civil libertarian terms. As the previous chapter showed, groups had to be counted as “religions” to qualify for the guarantee of religious freedom, and this basically meant that only groups previously recognized by the state as “religions” could serve as legitimate options from among which citizens could choose. Some Buddhists like Chikazumi decried this elective system as a threat to their religious freedom rather than a protection of it, and while this

¹⁶ Garon (1997, 60–87) has also pointed out that religious leaders sometimes downplayed the
illiberal interpretation ultimately lost traction in the early Shōwa debates over religious freedom and religion-state relations, it forms an important example of Buddhist “resistance” to state policies.

It is also important to note that the religions legislation supposedly responsible for binding religious groups closer to the state was actually not as draconian as it has commonly been made out to be. In fact, the Religious Organizations Law of 1939, which has often been criticized as a legal tool that made it easier for the state to surveil and suppress marginal religions, was the result of direct intervention by one politically powerful Buddhist (Andō) who saw the bill as a way to secure a stronger position for Buddhism over the long term while actually liberalizing the rules for incorporation and preserving freedom of belief and freedom of affiliation.

In making this point, I do not mean to suggest that marginal groups were not suppressed. However, in turning from the topics of religious legislation and religious administration to the nitty-gritty details of law enforcement in my final case, I show that at least one famous instance of police suppression offers a potentially counterintuitive lesson on religious freedom. In the 1943 suppression of the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai (Value Creation Education Study Association), the police were able to rationalize their intervention by appealing to the idea of maintaining peace and order, but behind this rationale lay the fact that Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai members disturbed peace and order specifically by infringing on others’ freedom to worship as they chose.

importance of tolerance in favor of protecting their own parochial interests.

17 Critiques of this law appeared in early Occupation policymaking and were picked up by postwar scholars, who accepted the occupiers’ premise that the law deeply infringed on religious liberty. In several respects the law was draconian, but in the historical moment of 1939 observers in both the United States and Japan understood it to be a natural attempt to clarify Japan’s “religions system.” See below.

18 Several studies of journalistic and police suppression exist. Garon (1997, 60–87) is particularly comprehensive.
Meanwhile, Gakkai leader Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944) apparently made no attempt to exonerate himself by appealing to the constitutional religious freedom clause.\(^{19}\)

The following sections are set against the backdrop of the various attempts of passing religious legislation described in the Introduction. Readers are encouraged to review the subsection “religion-making from above” in that chapter for the historical particulars of various attempts to pass religions legislation between 1899 and 1940. Briefly, after the defeat of the Yamagata Bill described in Chapter Two, attempts to pass religions legislation or to create a comprehensive “religious system” retreated into the background until 1925. In that year a “Religious Systems Investigation Committee” was created at the behest of the Ministry of Education in order to pursue the prospect of passing comprehensive religions legislation. The committee’s deliberations resulted in several abortive attempts to create such a bill (in 1927, 1929, and 1935), but it was not until 1939 that the legislation was actually passed.

**Buddhist “Resistance”: Chikazumi Jōkan**

Chikazumi Jōkan (1870–1941) appeared in Chapter Two as one of the chief proponents of the kōninkyō, or “officially recognized religion” stance during the debates on the Yamagata Religions Bill. At that time, he served as the face of the Greater Japan Buddhist Alliance Association—the lay organization developed to operate in tandem with clerical efforts to defeat the Yamagata legislation. Chikazumi was sent to Europe and the United States immediately after the failure of the Yamagata Bill in hopes that he might survey religious systems there and provide his sect, Jōdo Shinshū, with ammunition for future debates.

\(^{19}\) TG August 1943, 152. Shimazono (2006) has also discussed the case in some detail, but my points differ from his in a few important respects described below.
Chikazumi was gone for two formative years. When he returned in March 1902, he launched into a new phase of his career that focused more on religious outreach than on political activism. In June, he initiated a campaign seeking donations for the construction of his Kyūdō Kaikan (Seeking the Path Hall) and began offering weekly Sunday sermons. While his journal Seikyō jihō (State and Religion Times) had continued publication in his absence, that journal’s publication schedule was decreased and then discontinued entirely in December 1903; Chikazumi replaced it with the more confessional journal Kyūdō (Seeking the Path) in February 1904. While Chikazumi apparently understood the change as a purely titular one, it was matched by a shift in content: religion-state relations were pushed to the background as records of Chikazumi’s own sermons and lectures took the fore.

Chikazumi would remain staunchly opposed to the spread of Christianity within Japan throughout his life, but when his Kyūdō Kaikan finished construction in 1918, it served as a physical monument to the inspiration Chikazumi had gained from Christianity during his overseas travels. The interior resembled a Christian church, featuring pews, a hexagonal rokkakudō altar, and an upper balcony illuminated by stained glass with carved railings featuring swastikas rather than crosses. Similarly, the culture of the Kyūdō Kaikan and the youthful

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20 During Chikazumi’s absence Kiyozawa Manshi (1863–1903) sublet his lodgings near Tokyo Imperial University and used them as the basis for his Kōkōdō study circle.
21 Ōmi 2009b
22 Washington (2013) shows that the Kyūdō Kaikan was both a nod and a challenge to the Protestant churches that were competing for the hearts and minds of young Tokyo intellectuals.
23 Due to its unique architecture, the building was designated as a Tangible Cultural Property (yūkei bunkazai) by the Tokyo government in 2002. The excavation of a trove of documents that attended the restoration of the Kyūdō Kaikan in the late 1990s has resulted in a wave of new scholarship on Chikazumi and his circle. This research is still in its incipient phases, but so far the greatest attention has been paid to Chikazumi’s populist activities during the publication of the confessional journal Kyūdō (Ōmi Toshihiro, personal communication, 2 October 2012). The space of the Kyūdō Kaikan itself—and Chikazumi’s activities with the journal Kyūdō—also deserve attention as excellent examples of the transnational influences and the social orientations
intelligentsia that supported it—many members were students and graduates of the nearby First Higher School and Tokyo Imperial University—partially reflected Chikazumi’s admiration of Christian youth groups such as the Young Men’s Christian Association.

Both *Seikyō jihō* (published 1899–1903) and *Kyūdō* (1904–1922) reflected Chikazumi’s fundamental stance that Buddhism should serve as the basis for all aspects of Japanese cultural life in the same way that Christianity played such a role for the countries of Europe and North America. However, whereas *Seikyō jihō* had reflected this position in its rigorous critique of contemporary religion-state relations, *Kyūdō* focused primarily on personal development and social edification. While Chikazumi’s political activism of earlier years was virtually non-existent during the publication of *Kyūdō* (1904–1922), one important exception was the attempt to resist the “Three Religions Conference” organized by Vice Minister of the Interior Tokonami Takejirō (1867–1935) in 1912. As briefly described in the previous chapter, Chikazumi, Andō Masazumi, and several members of the Fraternity of New Buddhists collaborated to resist this event, which they saw as an attempt to facilitate greater government control of religion.

Here I focus on a later phase of Chikazumi’s life, when he returned to his political activism and tried to prevent the establishment of a Religions Bill advanced by Minister of Education Shōda Kazue (1869–1948) in 1929. Chikazumi saw his activities as a type of resistance to misguided state policies, but this “resistance” was not conducted in a liberal mode. As Ōmi

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that have informed Japanese Buddhist modernism. On Buddhist modernism, see McMahan 2008. On transnational influences on modern Japanese Buddhist architecture, see Jaffe 2006 and Washington 2013. The Kyūdō Kaikan is currently open to the public on at least one day a month. See the website: <www.kyudo-kaikan.org>.

24 Ōsawa Kōji has summarized this topical and titular shift as reflecting Chikazumi’s transition from concern with the Buddhist world (*kyōkai* 教界) to the more immediate concerns of his church (*kyōkai* 教会). As Ōsawa himself acknowledges, however, Chikazumi later resumed his activism. Ōsawa 2009, 20–21.
Toshihiro has indicated, Chikazumi saw his primary objective as bringing Buddhism to a more central place in both political and social life.26

Resistance to the Shōda Religious Organizations Bill of 1929

There is little documentation of Chikazumi’s resistance to the failed Okada Religions Bill of 1927 (named for Minister of Education Okada Ryōhei, 1864–1934); by his own account he resisted the legislation but could not mount an effective opposition movement before the bill died during a cabinet shakeup in April of that year.27 However, when a slightly revised version of the Okada legislation was advanced by Minister of Education Shōda Kazue in 1929, Chikazumi poured his energy into its defeat.28 From January to March of 1929, Chikazumi organized lecture meetings, released public statements denouncing the legislation, and published several scathingly critical pamphlets.29 Chikazumi argued that because religious faith was absolute, any

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25 Yoshinaga 2012, 40. I discussed this incident in Chapter Three. See the editorial in Kyūdō 9(1), 1 February 1912, 1–6.
26 In this he was not unlike his contemporary, the Nichirenist Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939), who similarly aimed for the total unification of politics and religion on Buddhist principles. One side effect of this stance was that Chikazumi was suspicious of academic studies of Buddhism because of their “philosophical” (by which he probably meant non-confessional) orientation; he was equally chary of sectarian scholarship, which he felt was excessively arid and lacked a focus on actual religious experience and how doctrine could be applied to the circumstances of personal life. Ōmi 2009b, 23–24. Sueki (2004a) discusses the importance of religious “experience” for many late Meiji era religious thinkers.
27 What is available is a retrospective pamphlet published in January 1929. I discuss this pamphlet below as an example of Chikazumi’s response to the Shōda Bill; I hesitate to use it as evidence for his attitudes at the time of the Okada legislation, although there is little doubt that he was opposed.
28 The bill was first debated in the House of Peers on the afternoon of 15 February 1929; after a long discussion the measure was sent to a committee of fifteen members for further review (one of the members was Okada Ryōhei, namesake of the failed legislation from two years prior). KGSR 15, 321–340. A separate measure regarding the discharge of national property on shrine and temple lands was brought up on the same day, and after some debate the legislators determined that it should be entrusted to the committee investigating the Shōda Bill.
29 It is unclear how Chikazumi first got wind of the proposed legislation, but religious journals began discussing the rumored legislation at least as early as 1 December 1928. The journal Uchū (glossed in some issues as Kosmos) featured a series of five short articles about the proposed
attempt to enforce egalitarian treatment of the three religions of Shintō, Buddhism, and Christianity in the name of religious freedom would actually (and ironically) infringe on the freedoms of the very people the law aimed to protect.30

Before the proposed legislation had even been formally presented to the House of Peers for deliberation, Chikazumi published two pamphlets expressing his opposition. The first, dated 8 January 1929, was an autobiographical retrospective entitled Shūkyō hōan hantai raireki (My History of Opposing Religious Legislation).31 Chikazumi opened his account by reflecting on the Yamagata Bill of 1899. Acknowledging that the Yamagata legislation included no small number of perquisites for Buddhists like tax exemption, Chikazumi said that Buddhists of the time were nevertheless willing to sacrifice such benefits out of principled (and admirable) opposition to the idea that Buddhism might be treated equally with Christianity. The proponents of that legislation, he argued, had been living in fear of foreign powers; confronting the looming reality of mixed residence (naichi zakkyō), they attempted to appease such foreign powers by adopting a foolhardy egalitarian policy. Yet the Buddhists of Japan united and fought the legislation tooth and nail, leading to its defeat in the House of Peers.

Chikazumi claimed that he and others who had been researching religion-state relations at the time of the Yamagata Bill had paid particularly close attention to the German Empire, where a Catholic political party (the Chūōtō—Chikazumi was probably thinking of the contemporaneous Deutsches Zentrums partei) had emerged to champion anti-Protestant policies. While Buddhists

30 See the epigraph to this chapter.
31 The colophon indicates that this pamphlet was published on 29 January 1929, although a handwritten note in the version available from the National Diet Library suggests that the actual
at the time had wondered whether Japan’s Buddhists should adopt a similar strategy, Chikazumi, citing his years of overseas experience, concluded that to blindly follow the German example would be a mistake. Although they would doubtless be able to call upon the majority of Japanese Buddhists to create a similarly powerful political party, in time an anti-Buddhist party would inevitably arise and rend the political world asunder. Chikazumi concluded that it was best to pour one’s energy into awakening one’s faith. This stance reflected a fundamental distinction that Chikazumi consistently drew between religion and politics, even if he regularly participated in political agitation out of commitment to his religious beliefs. As we will see momentarily, this thematic consistency was undermined by Chikazumi’s logical leaps and his tendency to appeal to emotion rather than reason in his appeals.

In his retrospective, Chikazumi lamented the fact that when the religious legislation was proposed, it was because of Buddhist entreaties to the government. Some members of the House of Representatives had campaigned on platforms that linked the passage of comprehensive religions legislation to the prospect of the government selling confiscated property back to Buddhist groups at greatly reduced prices. Eager to regain access to lands they considered rightfully theirs, some Buddhists joined ranks with these politicians and ultimately supported the religions legislation. Chikazumi claimed that the Religious Systems Investigation Committee (Shūkyō Seido Chōsa Kai) was a gathering of such Buddhists and their ilk, and that committee had operated (problematically, in Chikazumi’s opinion) on the premise of egalitarian treatment of religions from the outset. But like the Yamagata Bill, the Okada legislation was ultimately a

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32 Garon 1986, 283.
flawed bill that combined strict supervision of religions with egalitarian treatment of the three religions (i.e., Buddhism, Shintō, and Christianity).

Chikazumi argued that the legislation currently being prepared by the Religious Systems Investigation Committee in 1929 was nothing other than the revived corpse of the very same Okada Bill, now called the “Religious Organizations Law” (rather than the “Religions Bill”). Presumably because he disparaged the idea of linking politics to Buddhist material interests, Chikazumi argued that promoting the legislation, under any name, ultimately amounted to an attempt to create a Buddhist political party. This could only end in sullying the purity of Buddhism. Rumors that some members of the House of Representatives who came from Shinshū Ōtani-ha backgrounds were drowning in this whirlpool of folly were particularly dismaying, Chikazumi averred. While it is possible that he had more than one person in mind, here Chikazumi was almost certainly leveling criticism at his erstwhile friend and former comrade in opposition to religious legislation, Andō Masazumi, who would later proudly claim responsibility for the change in the legislation’s nomenclature.33

Chikazumi’s pamphlet was decidedly not an irenic call for cooperation between religions. While he described coordinated Buddhist actions to oppose both problematic legislation and unpalatable gatherings like the 1912 Three Religions Conference in generally positive terms, he also castigated the leaders of Buddhist organizations for colluding in attempts to influence politics. Chikazumi suggested that the only outcome of such endeavors was increased government oversight and shoddy legislation that put Buddhism on an even plane with other religions. In his closing sentences, Chikazumi’s “absolute faith” appeared in his claim that it was only his own Jōdo Shinshū Ōtani faction that had truly resisted the temptation to succumb to the
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lure of political power. How this sectarian message was interpreted by Chikazumi’s potential allies from other Buddhist sects is difficult to say, but a second pamphlet took a slightly more magnanimous approach.

In Our Reason for Opposing the Religious Organizations Law, Chikazumi argued that his transsectarian lobby, the Buddhist Alliance Against the Religious Corporations Law (Shūkyō Dantai Hō Hantai Bukkyōto Dōmei), opposed the proposed legislation because of the fact that it treated Buddhism, Shintō, and Christianity equally.34 Because faith was absolute, such equal treatment would necessarily infringe on religious sentiment and cause no small amount of discomfort for believers. Moreover, Chikazumi continued, the understanding of religious freedom that was being used as a rationale for the legislation was inherently flawed.

Treating the constitutional religious freedom [provision] as a reason to think that organizations must be equally regulated is a greatly mistaken interpretation. Rather, from the perspective of faith, to treat the various religions equally is to restrict each individual’s freedom. It should not be that Buddhist sects (which have a long history in the country and encompass the vast majority of the people) have to be treated equally with Christian sects (which have their organizational basis in other countries and a small number of believers)!35

Chikazumi went on to argue that the proposed legislation had been recognized by scholars of law to place Christianity in a position to be effectively acknowledged as an “officially recognized religion” along with the de facto recognition of Buddhism and Shintō as customarily having such status.36 To treat Christianity in this way would cause, in the worst sense, a revolution in the religious world. Although the Religious Systems Investigative Committee had

33 See the section on Andō below. Andō 1943 includes the politician’s recollection that Chikazumi repeatedly called on him and asked him to change his mind about the legislation.
34 The Alliance was listed on the cover of this pamphlet as having the same address in Hongō ward as the Kyūdō Kaikan, and Chikazumi was listed as the group’s representative (daihyō). Chikazumi signed the pamphlet and dated it 22 January 1929.
35 Chikazumi, Shūkyō dantai hōan hantai riyū (CJP, Shūkyō hōan vol. 1), 2.
claimed that there was no substantive opposition to the proposed legislation coming from religious circles, if the bill were to progress any further Chikazumi predicted the rise of a great opposition movement, much as had happened with the Yamagata Bill in 1899.

Although Chikazumi was evidently skeptical about egalitarian interpretations of religious freedom, he went on to advocate his own unique brand of separation of religion and politics, arguing that both were sullied when politicians attempted to interfere in religious affairs or religious leaders attempted to involve themselves in politics. A similar problem attended the aforementioned issue of egalitarian treatment: to accept the idea that Buddhism should be treated equally with Christianity as a means of fostering trans-denominational concord could only be said to be a sort of perverted equality. Some of the proponents of the new legislation had gone so far as to provide favors for Christianity and offer means for its assimilation, but this was the height of such “perverted equality” and a great disservice to the people. Not only would it not solve the “thought problem,” but such treatment would actually make the thought of the people even more confused. Any religion that placed its headquarters in another country but aimed to proselytize in Japan (such as Christianity) could not be controlled. As such, the proposed policies would merely invite confusion.

In January of 1929 Chikazumi and his allies were able to launch a sustained attack on legislation that had not yet been formally submitted to the House of Peers for debate and review because news outlets had already been reporting that the legislation was being drafted. Yet the Buddhist Alliance against the Religions Bill was probably operating at least as much on rumor as

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36 Chikazumi may have had in mind Ono Seiichirō, a professor of law at Tokyo Imperial University who frequently collaborated with Chikazumi on resistance to religious legislation.

37 In the context of Japan’s nation-building efforts in the 1920s and 1930s, unifying the “thought” (shisô) of the citizenry was understood to be a major problem. See Kushner 2006.
it was on hard factual information. The government had to formally submit the legislation for the House of Peers to review before the specifics of the proposal could be addressed.39

When the bill, dated 12 February 1929, was brought up for debate in the House of Peers on 15 February 1929, the government’s intentions came to the fore.40 Minister of Education Shōda Kazue (1869–1948) opened the parliamentary deliberations by first highlighting the various intellectual and spiritual problems that had attended the recent rise of “material civilization” (busshitsu bunmei) in Japan. Authorities had unanimously recognized that no single measure could address these problems, he claimed, and various measures needed to be discussed to address economic, educational, and other issues. When it came to faith and belief, however, laws relating to religion—which played such a large role in the social edification and provision of peace of mind for the nation, not to mention in the rousing of national spirit—had only taken the shape of several hundred edicts from the Council of State (Dajōkan) and orders from Ministry of Doctrine (Kyōbusho) promulgated piecemeal since the beginning of the Meiji era. The issue was not just that there was no unified law regarding religion, but that among all of these various laws there was no clearly shared basic principle.41 Shōda concluded by pointing out that—as the nomenclature of the law implied—the bill was designed to address the corporate aspects of

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38 Abe Yoshiya (1970a, 65–66) argued that Shōda, the Minister of Education, engaged in a publicity blitz to garner public support for the bill.

39 Abe (1970a, 65–75) has provided an account of the parliamentary debates. While I agree with his conclusions that the parliamentary deliberations support the idea that religious freedom existed in a very real sense in the Meiji Constitutional Period—and while I also agree that religious freedom was subject to the interpretations of competing interest groups—Abe’s account problematically focused primarily on the voices of politicians and law professors at the expense of providing the voices of religious leaders themselves.

40 Signatories of the bill were Prime Minister Baron Tanaka Giichi, Minister of Finance Mitsuchi Chūzō (1871–1948), Home Minister Mochizuki Keisuke (1867–1941), and Minister of Education Shōda Kazue (1869–1948).

41 Note that for Shōda at this time, the concept of religious freedom did not constitute such a “basic principle”
religion while allowing religions to preserve autonomy in deciding their internal affairs. Of course the government reserved the right to intervene in the rare instances when religious groups infringed on the public welfare or disturbed peace and order, but in general the spirit of the law was to protect religions as social edification groups that could contribute to the spiritual mobilization of the people.

Two things are of immediate interest here. The first is that Shōda made no explicit mention of the constitutional religious freedom clause in his opening statements, breaking with the precedent set by Yamagata Aritomo when he first attempted to introduce a religions bill in 1899. This may have been an oversight on Shōda’s part, but it may also have indicated that he was trying to draw the legislators’ attention to the need to regulate or co-opt religion rather than the need to protect a constitutionally granted civil liberty. The second issue is that Shōda’s rationale for advancing the legislation was that religions could contribute to national projects in their capacity as social edification movements. This represents a positive aspect of the government’s aim in creating the legislation that deserves careful scrutiny in light of portrayals of the various iterations of the religions legislation as attempts to exert increasing authoritarian control over religions. If Shōda’s argument can be taken at face value, then the legislation was not necessarily intended to curtail religions’ rights by providing stricter oversight, but rather to harness the power of religion for the public good.

There are, of course, good reasons to resist such a sanguine reading of the motivations behind the legislation. Not least of these is the fact that what the government considered the “public good” was not necessarily in line with what religious groups themselves may have had in mind. Even with the demonstrable support of many of the sects it was almost unavoidable that some lobbies would be disgruntled with the legislation. Bureaucratically-designed transsectarian focus
groups like the Religious Systems Investigation Committee included representatives of major religious organizations and ostensibly represented the interests of all religions, but their proximity with political power-brokers influenced their understandings of what was important for religions and what constituted the proper relationship between religions and the state. Such interpretations were almost inevitably different from the interpretations of religious leaders who lacked such access and influence, while the hierarchical structure of most Japanese Buddhist sectarian organizations meant that a small number of politically connected Buddhists spoke for the vast majority.

When the floor was opened up for questions, Shōda’s response to a query from Baron Sakatani Yoshirō (1863–1941) was particularly revealing of the government’s intentions. Sakatani advocated a clearer separation between “religions” and “lascivious heresies” (*inshi jakyō*) and suggested that the proposed legislation might have been trying to do too much by regulating religions as corporate entities, on the one hand, and policing religious threats to peace and order on the other. Sakatani went on to suggest that while he did not have any particular reservations about supporting the legislation, he wanted to note that he had received many letters from respected religious leaders urging him to resist it; those he had received urging him to support the legislation tended to have temples’ economic interests primarily at heart. With this in

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42 KGSR 15, 336–340. This response marked the conclusion of the debate; immediately after a motion was carried to send the bill to an investigative committee of fifteen.

43 Like Shōda, Sakatani clearly brought to the debate a normative conception of the role religions should properly play in society, and he suggested that the legislation be adjusted because any “religion” that required penal measures was not worthy of the name. Sakatani also remarked with irony that Shōda had talked about the legislation being designed to “save” religions, which Sakatani felt was the inverse of the normal mode of affairs in which religions saved (*kyūsai*) humans.
mind, Sakatani suggested that Shōda’s optimistic portrayal of near-total religious support for the legislation may have been somewhat mistaken.44

Sakatani’s line of questioning was politely phrased, but it placed Shōda in a tough position first, by calling into question the reliability of Shōda’s statement that religious leaders were united in support of the legislation; and, second, by raising the problem of how religion itself was to be defined. In response, Shōda claimed that the authors of the bill had referred to Itō Hirobumi’s (1841–1909) commentaries on the constitution as they considered the legislation, and had noticed, following Itō, that other countries’ constitutions used different clauses for religious freedom and corporate freedom (dantai kessha no jiyū). Thus, the law could and should not infringe on belief, but could regulate incorporation. Shōda said that he hoped that the new bill would support religions in their important hortatory role while protecting them from the threats posed by so-called “lascivious heresies.” He concluded by stressing that the spirit of religious freedom undergirded the bill and that the right to profess the religion of one’s choice would not at all be infringed upon.45

Neither the sharp questions from Sakatani and his colleague Shirakawa Sukenaga (1871–1961; Shirakawa was a Shintō priest) nor Shōda’s anemic responses were likely to assuage Chikazumi Jōkan’s concerns about the legislation.46 Contemporary debates between legal scholars in the pages of the newspapers were also unlikely to satisfy him, for Chikazumi was clearly not interested in the recondite details of legal theory nor in what paternalistic government

44 If I read Sakatani’s comments correctly, he was actually implying that Shōda was deliberately misleading the chamber. Shōda had drawn the peers’ attention to contemporary news reports that religious organizations supported the legislation, but it is possible that he had deliberately arranged for such reports to appear in the news in the first place. See Abe 1970a, 66.
46 See Abe 1970a for a quick recapitulation of Shirakawa’s questions.
bureaucrats thought was best for religions. Given that he responded to the proposed legislation in strictly negative terms, it is difficult to tell what exactly his positive aims were, but I speculate that Chikazumi ultimately wanted to ensure that Buddhism alone would be officially recognized as the one true religion for the Japanese people. Such an objective may have been unrealistic, but the most important thing here is that Chikazumi thought that elective interpretations of religious freedom (that is, religious freedom as a matter of voluntary affiliation) were based on a false principle of equality that ironically undermined true freedom of religious belief. This position, while not necessarily internally consistent or particularly logical, became even clearer in Chikazumi’s writings from late February and early March 1929.

Chikazumi’s lobbying group, the Buddhist Alliance Against the Religious Corporations Law, held a lecture meeting on 22 February 1929 featuring Chikazumi, Tokyo Imperial University law professor Ono Seichirō (1891–1986), and manager of Heigo Press Takashima Beihō (1875–1949) as the headlining speakers. A handbill that was published on the same date was either drawn up to encapsulate resolutions established at the meeting or passed out to attendees. The handbill denounced the proposed Religious Organizations Law by saying that it abrogated the spirit of religious freedom, even though Chikazumi’s charge in the January pamphlets was that the drafters of the legislation were using religious freedom as an expedient device to assert greater control over religion. The full text of the handbill read:

Resolution:
Because the Religious Organizations Law aims to manage the various religions equally and interferes politically [in their affairs], it damages the essence of religion and abrogates the spirit of religious freedom. Therefore we oppose it and anticipate its repeal.

Supplementary Resolution:

47 Abe 1970a outlines the legal debates that occurred in contemporary newspapers.
Recently the leaders of the various Buddhist sects call themselves [our] representatives; the announcements they make in collaboration with Shintō and Christian leaders are not the general opinion of true and upright Buddhists. Here we denounce their presumptuous and deceitful acts and expect such to be abolished.

22 February 1929, at the Akasaka Tameike Sankaidō
Buddhist Alliance Against the Religions Bill

Chikazumi was clearly incensed that Shōda could so hastily dismiss religious interest groups that were not represented by the heads of the various Buddhist sects. He was also clearly frustrated with the government’s defense of religious freedom as a matter of personal choice. This indignation can be seen in a final extant pamphlet that Chikazumi wrote protesting the legislation, this one dated 2 March 1929. Following up on his critique of the egalitarian treatment of religions seen in the epigraph to this chapter, Chikazumi continued:

As the Religions Bureau of the Ministry of Education actually proclaimed in a pamphlet, it aims to conduct a religions policy of “tolerance of other religions,” “egalitarian treatment,” and so forth. Therefore it interprets religious freedom as meaning the freedom of choice, and then lines up Buddhism, Shintō, and Christianity in front of the people and tells them to voluntarily choose one. In sum, it misconstrues so-called religious freedom as freedom of choice, and with this as a reason, in the end it aims to conduct a policy in which uniform treatment of the three religions [sankyō kakuitsu] forms the fundamental principle of the law. We must say that this oversteps the bounds of religious freedom. If anything, we must say that it forces a lack of freedom on each individual. This is proved by the fact that in none of the various countries of the world does such a law exist that treats the various sects and factions with one common “religions law” or “religious organizations law.”

Chikazumi may have breathed a sigh of relief when the Shōda Bill failed to pass in 1929, but he was immediately embroiled in another controversy when he began advocating reform of the Shinshū Ōtani faction in response to the 1928 defrocking of former head of the sect (kanchō),

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48 Shūkyō Dantai Hōan Hantai Bukkyōto Dōmei, 22 February 1929.
49 “Sankyō kakitsu wa futettei naru shūkyō seisaku nari,” 2 (CJP 1).
Chikazumi was stripped of his clerical rank on 23 July 1929 as a result of this activism, although the official censure did not prevent him from launching a new, characteristically inveterate publication called *Shinkai kengen* on 15 January 1930.\(^{51}\) *Shinkai kengen* was published in a tabloid format of just a couple of pages per issue; while prominent Buddhist intellectuals such as Sakaino Kōyō (1871–1933) and Ono Seiichirō (1891–1986) occasionally contributed, Chikazumi himself wrote the majority of the content.\(^{52}\) Like Chikazumi’s previous publications, *Shinkai kengen* unreservedly critiqued the mutual sullying of religion and politics.

*Shinkai kengen* continued in this vein of admonishing the sectarian leadership for several years, although Chikazumi suffered a cerebral hemorrhage on 30 October 1931 and spent the last decade of his life as an invalid.\(^{53}\) Chikazumi continued to write as much as he was able, and when rumors began to spread that the Ministry of Education was considering advancing the Religious Organizations Law yet again in 1935, Chikazumi devoted one whole issue to the topic. In the 20 December 1935 issue of *Shinkai kengen*, Chikazumi wrote a characteristically impassioned critique of religions legislation that covered almost the entirety of the first (tabloid-sized) page of the issue. The second page featured another retrospective account of the problems that attended religious legislation. Although Chikazumi’s arguments had not changed significantly from those of previous years, one thing that distinguished the 1935 piece from earlier arguments was that Chikazumi was able to use the importance of spiritual mobilization to

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50 Kubutsu Shōnin was evidently a terrible administrator who wasted valuable sectarian resources, but he was also tremendously popular. Ward 2009, 27–29.

51 On *Shinkai kengen*, see Ward 2009.

52 Sakaino was a member of the Fraternity of New Buddhists; Ono was a law professor at Tokyo Imperial University who founded the University of Tokyo Buddhist Youth Association. See Ward 2009, 29.
his advantage in the context of the growing crisis in China and Japan’s estrangement from the broader international community.

The 20 December 1935 issue of *Shinkai kengen* was rare in that it was devoted so explicitly to the issue of religions legislation. Subsequent issues returned to the topic of sectarian reform, and *Shinkai kengen* continued in this manner until 20 November 1938, when the paper abruptly ceased publication shortly after the battlefield death of Chikazumi’s eldest son. Shattered by the loss of his son and already an invalid, Chikazumi himself died three years later on 3 December 1941. Because his publication activities ceased around the same time that the Religious Organizations Law was being drafted in 1938, it is difficult to know how Chikazumi perceived the bill.54

Throughout his life, Chikazumi was torn between reformist and traditionalist impulses.55 While he readily embraced *avant-garde* approaches to proselytism and outreach that reflected his evident indebtedness to Christian models, his vision of the relationship between religion and the state remained staunchly focused on resisting egalitarian interpretations of religious freedom that might place Christianity on an even plane with Buddhism.56 Chikazumi consistently advocated an illiberal interpretation of religious freedom that denounced egalitarianism and

53 *Issues of Shinkai kengen* published immediately after Chikazumi’s illness provided readers with regular updates on his health.
54 The bill was taken up in the House of Peers on 24 January 1939 and sent to a special investigative committee of eighteen members the same day; it was promulgated on 8 April 1939 and went into effect on 1 April 1940. The one clue that I have about Chikazumi’s response is a document included in the collection of materials recovered during the restoration of the Kyūdō Kaikan, a press release by one Tōge Nobuo (d.u.). Although the text of this carefully handwritten document is less rhetorically sophisticated than Chikazumi’s own bombastic writing style, in terms of content it hewed closely to Chikazumi’s arguments in critiquing the legislation. Tōge Nobuo, “Shūkyō dantai hōan hantai iken sho,” CJP, *Shūkyō hōan* Volume 2.
latitudinarianism while nevertheless preserving strict protection for freedom of conscience. In essence, Chikazumi’s interpretation of freedom of belief only allowed for those of absolute faith to have the right to reject the teachings of others. Yet his vision of ideal religion-state relations also had a libertarian element in that he advocated the strict separation of religion from politics as a way of keeping religion from being co-opted by the state or sullied by political connections.

**Buddhist “Complicity”: Andō Masazumi on Religions Legislation**

Chikazumi’s resistance efforts vis-à-vis religions legislation were ultimately unsuccessful, in part because his vision of religion-state relations did not easily mesh with bureaucratic objectives. In contrast, one of the architects of the concept behind the legislation that finally took hold—the self-avowed chief proponent of the idea that the legislation should explicitly seek to manage religious *corporations* rather than religions per se—was Chikazumi’s erstwhile friend and collaborator, Andō Masazumi (1876–1955). Over a long sacerdotal, journalistic, political, and bureaucratic career, Andō would skillfully navigate between protecting Buddhist interests and facilitating greater governmental oversight of religions.

Andō Masazumi was born to a Jōdo Shinshū temple family in Tokyo in 1876; he took the tonsure ten years later in 1886. He benefited from a high degree of education, earning degrees at both Tetsugakkan (now Tōyō University, founded by Inoue Enryō) in 1895 and Tōkyō

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56 On Chikazumi’s indebtedness to Christianity, see Ōmi 2012. Ōmi indicates that Chikazumi’s willingness to learn from Christianity was offset by his evident antipathy to Christian incursions in Japan.

57 This overview of Andō’s life is drawn from a composite of the brief overview maintained as part of the Andō Masazumi kankei bunsho (AM) maintained by the National Diet Library of Japan (http://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/anndoumasazumi.php; accessed 15 February 2012) as well as the brief biography compiled by Takahashi Hara included in Yoshinaga, ed. 2012. Some of the dates in these sources conflict, but to the best of my knowledge the general trajectory of Andō’s life given here is accurate.
Senmon Gakkō (now Waseda University) in 1899. Andō became a writer for the influential religious journal *Meikyō shinshi* in 1894 and wrote for the journal until 1896, when he briefly participated in Kiyozawa Manshi’s (1863–1903) Shirakawa Faction attempt to reform Jōdo Shinshū.\(^{58}\) Andō served as chief editor of *Meikyō shinshi* from 1899 to 1900; he also was the first editor of the Kanazawa-based newspaper *Seikyō shinbun* (*State and Religion News*).

Andō’s journalistic career also extended beyond religious journals. He worked as a reporter for the *Yamato shinbun* for most of 1901 and then joined the *Nippon shinbun* in December of that year. Andō reported from the front lines during the Russo-Japanese War before joining the *Osaka asahi shinbun* in 1906. Andō returned to Tokyo in 1908 to serve as Director and Editor in Chief of the *Tōkyō asahi shinbun*. He continued to maintain some affiliation with that paper until the early 1920s, although his political career soon eclipsed his journalistic one.

Andō’s commitment to Buddhism was indisputable. For example, he established a Buddhist kindergarten on the grounds of Asakusa Honganji in 1902, and in 1910 he created the *Tōkyō Bukkyō Gokoku Dan* (*Tokyo Buddhist Nation-Protecting Corps*) and served as editor of that group’s journal *Seikyō shinron*.\(^{59}\) However, Andō withdrew from the clergy on 24 June 1914

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\(^{58}\) Chikazumi Jōkan also participated. According to Takahashi Hara (2012), Andō and Chikazumi were allies in their efforts to resist legislation that would have provided greater statutory oversight over religions, but their relationship soured after the failed attempt to introduce a religions bill in 1929. By Andō’s own account, he had a sudden change of heart in 1929 and decided to support the legislation, although he felt that it would serve its purpose best if it was clear that the bill was intended to manage religions as corporations, leaving matters of doctrine up to religions themselves. See Andō 1935 (AM #9, Item #122).

\(^{59}\) I discuss this journal in more detail below. Briefly, by 1942 it served as the official organ for the Greater Japan Buddhist Association (*Dai Nippon Bukkyō Kai*). I speculated in a note above that Chikazumi might have been referring to Andō when he criticized contemporary politicians with close ties to transsectarian Buddhist groups. He may have had the Tokyo Buddhist Nation-Protecting Corps (or its later incarnation) in mind.
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and embarked on a career in politics shortly thereafter. After spending a couple of years as a local politician in Tokyo’s Asakusa Ward, Andō became a member of the House of Commons (Shūgiin) in 1919. He would be reelected ten more times in the course of his career. While Andō originally joined the House of Commons with no party affiliation, he joined the Seiyūkai Party in 1924. Thereafter, while continuing to participate in parliamentary politics, Andō served in various political capacities under Seiyūkai Party prime ministers Tanaka Giichi (1864–1929) and Inukai Tsuyoshi (1855–1932). From 1936 Andō served as Secretary-General of the Rikken Seiyūkai, which disbanded in 1940 with the establishment of the IRAA.

Sometime before December of 1941, Andō became Chairperson of the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association League (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Kai Renmei). It is unclear how long he served in this capacity, but Andō’s eminent stature in both the Buddhist and political worlds during the course of the Pacific War is indisputable. The 1 October 1942 issue of Seikyō shinron listed Andō alongside Tokyo Imperial University professors Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949) and Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945) and six other politicians and bureaucrats who had been confirmed as “advisers” (komon) to the Greater Japan Buddhist Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Kai) on 30 August 1942. This organization worked closely with the imperial

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60 Andō’s departure from the clergy may have been a calculated move to allow him to enter politics, since clerics were banned from holding political office until 1925. See Ives 2009, 25–26.
61 Andō traveled to Europe in 1923 and was away from Japan when the great Kantō earthquake occurred. The European trip provided fodder for Andō’s talking points on religion-state relations. See Andō 1926.
62 As indicated on the title page of Andō 1941.
63 SS 29(10), 19 (1 October 1942). Seikyō shinron was the organ of the Greater Japan Buddhist Association. It was about forty pages in length and was published on the first of every month; the publisher was based in Shiba Ward, Tokyo. Very few issues of this journal are extant. Here I cite the one issue of the journal available in the University of Tokyo Meiji Era Newspaper and Journal Archive; I am greatly indebted to the archive staff for their help in arranging for a full reproduction of the entire issue. One other wartime issue of the journal is available in the Andō Masazumi kankei bunshō at the National Diet Library (volume 30, issue 11, 1 November 1943;
state and vigorously supported the war effort, organizing relief efforts, comforting wounded soldiers and bereaved families, and collaborating with Christian and Shintō denominations in donating several planes, fighters, and bombers to the army and navy.\footnote{See SS 29(10). In an interview with Religions Division staff conducted on 15 April 1946, the general affairs officer of the Buddhism section of the postwar Japan Religions League, Hori Sadao (d.u.), indicated that Andō had served as Vice President and Chief Councillor for the Japan League of Religions that was established around October of 1942 (or 1943, according to some sources) to support the war effort. Hori indicated that the wartime Japan League of Religions was directly managed by the Minister of Education. RCR Box #5787, Folder #21.} Andō was also listed as the Chairman of the East Asia Buddhist Cooperation Association (Tōa Bukkyō Kyōwa Kai) in a 10 April 1944 issue of that group’s organ, Wagō no chikara (The Power of Harmony).\footnote{Wagō no chikara 8(4), 10 April 1944 (AM Reel #11, Item #157).}

Shortly after the conclusion of the Pacific War, Andō was selected as president of the newly created Japanese Federation of Religious Organizations, but his earlier participation in the IRAA made him the target of a purge directive.\footnote{“Memorandum: Second ‘Purge’ Order for K. Yoshida and S. Andō,” (1 October 1946), RCR Box #5787, Folder #18. This memorandum lists Andō’s given name as “Seijun,” almost certainly a mistake for the characters used to write “Masazumi.” According to the Memorandum, Yoshida Koichī (d.u.) and Andō resisted the purge directive by saying that the League was a non-governmental organization and therefore their positions did not constitute “public office.” They also speculated that some religious leaders may have schemed to strip them of their positions as a way of seeking revenge for the postwar loss of valuable temple property.} While he therefore could not hold public political office, Andō resisted claims that the purge also applied to his status as president of the private transsectarian organization; he successfully retained his position as head of the Religions Federation for three years before resigning from that post in July 1950.\footnote{“Special Report: Reorganization of the Religions League” (12 September 1950), RCR Box #5787, Folder #18.} Andō reentered national politics after the conclusion of the Occupation. From October 1952, Andō returned to serve in the House of Representatives; he also served as Minister without Portfolio (Kokumu see AM Reel #10, Item #152). Twenty-two non-consecutive issues of the journal published between 1921 and 1927 are available at the Komazawa University library; the Shidō Archive at Keiō University holds thirteen non-consecutive issues published between 1917 and 1924.

**Andō on Religious Legislation and the Topic of Religious Freedom**

During the height of the furor over the Yamagata Religions Bill at the turn of the century Andō had sharply criticized the Yamagata Bill. At that time, in his capacity as chief editor of the influential Buddhist journal *Meikyō shinshi*, Andō had advocated treating Buddhism as Japan’s sole “officially recognized religion” (*kōninkyō*). A quarter of a century later, Andō began to modify his position.68

In a lecture that was included in a 1926 Seiyūkai publication entitled *Lectures on Politics* (*Seiji kōza*), Andō demonstrated his facility with abstract argument in a methodical disquisition on the ideal relationship between religion and the state. Andō began by outlining his opinion that religion and politics comprised the essence of civilization and operated as the drivers of history. He went on to describe the division of labor between politics and religion by attributing to politics the role of overseeing matters of territory, population, and the governance thereof while religion was chiefly concerned with transcendent matters and usually posited some sort of absolute spiritual existence and was intrinsically based on faith. Andō plotted different types of belief on an evolutionary scale, from primitive veneration of animals and plants to veneration of anthropomorphic deities to the civilized religion of venerating abstract spiritual entities.

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68 Andō published a treatise on religion-state relations in 1923 under the title *Seiji to shūkyō to no kankei*. The book included his progressivist understanding of religion-state relations (moving from theocracy to strict separation) but also modulated his strictly secularist stance with his repeated assertion that religion and politics needed to collaborate to ensure the moral foundations of the nation.
Buddhism and Christianity belonged to the latter variety, and both had the added quality of providing some sort of salvation to their believers. While true religions therefore focused on internal matters of faith and consequently left retribution for misdeeds up to the conscience, the state regulated external matters through laws, regulations, and punishments for infractions.

On the subject of how religion and the state could or should intervene in each other’s affairs, Andō provided a typology that reproduced the points in his 1899 *Meikyō shinshi* editorial almost exactly. That is, starting with the example of the Catholic church in Europe, Andō placed medieval Catholic theocracy in opposition to systems of national religion, which were designed to liberate kings from the papal threat of excommunication. In turn, with the same principle of religious freedom in mind such national religion systems could be contrasted with modern “officially recognized religion” (*kōninkyō*) systems that designated certain religions as having legal rights while classifying religious groups according to their size and influence and rejecting the right to recognition for marginal groups. Andō’s progressivist account then turned to systems like those in the United States that were based on thorough separation of religion and the state.

One significant change between Andō’s 1899 portrayal and his 1926 speech was his casual inclusion of his own first-hand experience of travel in Europe, which lent a greater aura of

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69 See Chapter Two.

70 Andō’s understanding of religious freedom in the United States was flawed. As Sehat (2010) has noted, there were significant conflicts between moral establishmentarians, who saw Christianity as the moral basis of American jurisprudence and legislation and tended to think of religious freedom as a corporate right, and civil libertarians, who advocated strict separation as a way of protecting individual rights. Sehat persuasively demonstrates that both positions were deeply influenced by pressing contemporary moral issues such as slavery, emancipation, women’s rights in the context of coverture, separate but equal legislation, universal suffrage, and labor rights.
authority to his observations. Andō advocated the principle of separation as the ideal policy for the Seiyūkai to adopt, but he also argued that there were limits. As in the 1899 Meikyō shinshi editorial cited in Chapter Two, Andō used the example of the Mormons to show that willy-nilly American latitudinarianism was excessive and unreasonable. Andō concluded his speech by pointing out that religion and politics were equally driven by and indebted to morality, and that politics in Japan should properly be informed by a morality that harbored a deep religious faith at its core. Andō revealed himself to be a moral establishmentarian in that he positioned religion at the center of national moral life, but he simultaneously embraced the logic of religious freedom as a civil liberty based on near-total separation of religion and the state.

Due to his professional experience as a journalist and politician, Andō was accustomed to thinking about social problems on a grand scale. As he rose in the Seiyūkai ranks, these skills earned him increasing responsibilities. At around the same time that he delivered the speech summarized above, he became a member of the Religious Systems Investigative Committee (Shūkyō Seido Chōsa Kai) organized by Minister of Education Okada Ryōhei on 12 May 1926. After the Okada Religions Bill failed with the fall of the (first) Wakatsuki Reijirō (1866–1949) cabinet in the spring of 1927, Andō served as Cabinet Consultant (San’yōkan) for the Tanaka cabinet (20 April 1927–2 July 1929). From 1931, he served as Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education (Monbu Seimu Jikan) for the Inukai cabinet (13 December 1931–16 May 1932). By 1933 he was serving as chair of the Seiyūkai Special Committee on Thought and Education.

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71 An abbreviated curriculum vitae on the front page of a campaign pamphlet dated 15 February 1942 suggested that Andō made this trip in his capacity as Editorial Bureau Chief for the Asahi Shinbun. AM Reel #10, Item #137.
72 Andō 1926, 641.
Ministry of Education records show that Andō continued to serve on the Religious Systems Investigation Committee until at least December 1935. He served as chair of the House of Commons special investigative committee on the Religious Organizations Law, and personally presented the bill to that chamber on 23 March 1939.

Andō had for many years been ardently opposed to the idea of religions legislation, but during his first stint as a bureaucrat in the Tanaka administration, he experienced an abrupt change of heart on the issue. While his 1926 speech clearly indicated that he was not opposed to placing limits on religious freedom for the sake of peace and order, Andō was also opposed to the idea that religions legislation should merely make religious administration easier for bureaucrats while overlooking religions’ rights. His progressivist theory of religion-state relations no longer treated a pure kōninkyō system as the ideal one for Japan, but rather embraced a latitudinarian and egalitarian interpretation of religious freedom that included some pragmatic limits to keep potentially harmful religious practices in check. Andō’s staunch resistance to excessive bureaucratic oversight of religions makes it easy to see how he and Chikazumi had previously collaborated in efforts to resist state interference in religions’ affairs. Yet when the failed Okada Bill was resuscitated by Minister of Education Shōda Kazue in 1928, Andō (now a low-ranking cabinet official) abruptly embraced the legislation. He lost his lifelong friend Chikazumi in the process.

Andō’s change of heart was encapsulated in a November 1935 article included as part of a special issue of the religious journal Uchū (Kosmos) on the pros and cons of a Religious
In the article, entitled “The Problem of the Religious Organizations Law: Thirty-Seven Years of History, My Opinion, and the Relationship between the Two,” Andō reflected in detail on his impressions of the various religions bills that had been advanced in Japan since the promulgation of the constitution. I paraphrase his retrospective in considerable detail here both because it is the most comprehensive, if biased, insider account I have found of the legislation and because Andō’s perception of the Shōda Bill as a liberal piece of legislation that protected religious interests challenges the common view that the law represented a statist attempt to restrict religious liberties.

In his article, Andō described the Yamagata Religions Bill of 1899 as the product of an immature parliamentary democracy in which people unfortunately aimed to merely control religions. Authoritarian elements aimed to exert greater control over religions without taking time to consider the unique aspects of religion or religious history. Problematically mimicking Western models, some tried to regulate all religions with one egalitarian bill while also providing greater oversight of Christianity. However, the bureaucracy did not actually embrace a latitudinarian stance, but merely thought that some sort of official religious system was necessary. As a result, a strong resistance movement arose in the general public and among scholars, politicians, and religious leaders. Andō recalled that Ishikawa Shuntai (1842–1931) of the Jōdo

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76 “Shūkyō dantai hō mondai: sanjūnana nenkan no enkaku to yo no iken narabi ni sono kankei,” U 10(11), 1 November 1935 (AM Reel #9, Item #122). Uchū, a magazine about 22 centimeters tall by 14.5 centimeters wide, featured the subtitle Kōdō hatsuyō; shūkyō senpu (Invigorate the Imperial Way and Promulgate Religion). It was edited by law professor Yamaoka Mannosuke (1876–1968) and apparently affiliated with an transsectarian group initially called the Nihon Shūkyō Kōkan (Japan Religions Teaching Hall; see U 2[2], 64). By 1928, the group was called the Nihon Shūkyō Kai (Japanese Religion Association; see U 3[4], 89).

77 A similar retrospective was published in Andō’s 1943 volume Seikai o ayumi tsutsu under the title “Shūkyō dantai hō no konjaku [The Past and Present of the Religious Organizations Law].”
Shinshū Higashi Honganji faction drew upon the membership of the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association, cooperating with Secretary Chikazumi Jōkan to defeat the legislation.\footnote{Andō described the Association as the precursor to the contemporary (in 1935) All Japan Buddhist Youth League (Zen Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Renmei).}

For twenty-eight years the issue of religions legislation was largely overlooked. However, in 1927 the Wakatsuki Cabinet submitted new religions legislation to the House of Peers. Minister of Education Okada Ryōhei was an ardent public proponent of establishing a formal religious system, but he was supported behind the scenes by Education Ministry Bureau of Religions (Shūkyō Kyoku) Chief Shimomura Juichi (1884–1965). At that time the Religious Systems Investigation Committee was formed; Andō claimed he was chosen to participate as a representative of the Seiyūkai political party. The committee met eight times between June and October 1926, with an additional nineteen meetings of the Special Investigative Committee held between 10 July and 2 October. Andō emphasized that the bill that emerged from the Committee’s deliberations was privately shown to scholars, members of both legislative houses, bureaucrats, and representatives from each religious sect and was only submitted after having worked through preliminary negotiations with them.

While the general thrust of this new legislation was quite different from that of the Yamagata Bill, Andō admitted that it was not very thorough in apprehending the significance of religion. Problems included the designation (or definition) of religions, how the administration of religions would be accomplished, the precise nature of the authority the Ministry of Education actually held over religions, the credentialing of clerics and other religious leaders, religious adjudication, and the issue of the allocation of temple property. In Andō’s estimation it was

\footnote{That argument was advanced during the Occupation by policymakers in charge of religion (see Bunce 1955, based on Bunce 1948), but it was picked up and repeated regularly afterward by scholars of religion and historians.}
clearly “a bureaucrat’s bill.” Although Andō vigorously resisted in the committee meetings, the bill was sent to the House of Peers, where Hanai Takuzō (1868–1931) and Mizuno Rentarō (1868–1949) mounted a fierce resistance. Okada and Shimomura offered eloquent defenses of the bill, but to no avail. While the House of Peers Special Investigative Committee met three times—and while the government even offered to make some concessions through revision—the bill was not returned to the floor and all the effort ended in naught.

Andō had criticized the 1927 Okada Bill as a bureaucrat’s dream legislation, so it is particularly striking that when he himself became a bureaucrat later that year, his attitude regarding the bill abruptly shifted. When Education Minister Shōda Kazue directly asked for Andō’s opinion about the bill, Andō suddenly announced himself a vigorous proponent of the legislation. (Although his article says that the decision was based on a period of reflection, Andō’s actual reasoning for his change of position is abrupt and unclear.) Andō, Vice-Minister Awaya (probably a reference to Awaya Ken, 1883–1938) and Religions Bureau Chief Shimomura spent the entire summer working tirelessly on the bill and conducting research to revise the previous bills in order to make a good piece of legislation.

On the subject of this bill’s historical development, Andō stressed that this time the bill was revised to be a “Religious Organizations Law” rather than a “Religions Law,” a recommendation that he himself had made.80 In his opinion, this was not just a change in the name of a law, but also indicated a change in the spirit that informed it. To call it a “religions law” suggested that it would control religion itself, and this would not only be rhetorically inept but also a misguided use of the law. Therefore it should properly indicate that it was about the corporate aspects of religion. More precisely, religious belief was an individual’s free choice, while religion itself was

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80 Andō proudly repeated this claim in Andō 1943, 168–169.
the manifestation of that belief. Therefore, religion per se should not be controlled, overseen, or regulated. In fact, even if one suggested that religion should be controlled, naturally it would be impossible to do so.81

However, Andō continued, religious organizations must accord with the times and follow the directives of national laws. Through some sort of law, this could be accomplished through, on the one hand, providing protection and encouragement, and on the other adding administrative control. Obviously such a law would only apply to religious organizations, not to religion itself. The bill that was eventually submitted not only reflected this change in nomenclature, but also reflected the fact that it had passed through deliberations at the Ministry of Education, within the Religious Systems Investigation Committee, and within the Cabinet and the Ministry of Law.

One thing that deserved attention regarding the 1927 legislation, according to Andō, was the issue of the transfer of previously expropriated nationally-owned lands back to temples (jiin butsudō kokuyū keidaichi jōyo), a controversial measure that was appended to the Okada Bill. Andō had been opposed to this measure and had vigorously argued against it in the Religious Systems Investigation Committee because the measure had substantive material effects for religion; to include it in a “religions bill” was therefore inappropriate. Andō and his allies were determined to disentangle this measure from the 1929 religions legislation, and after more than a dozen meetings negotiating with the Ministry of Finance, the measure regarding the transfer of temple lands was submitted separately from, but simultaneously with, the Shōda bill. Furthermore, in contrast with previous legislation, the bill included the right to trial for any who

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81 By this I think that Andō meant that it was impossible for the state to intervene in citizen’s private, interior decisions, although his own interpretation of religious freedom sometimes seemed to suggest the opposite.
were dissatisfied with the Ministry of Finance’s decisions about the allocation or transfer of temple property.

In addition to these two major changes (that is, the change in nomenclature and the disaggregation of the temple property law), Andō listed twelve changes he and his colleagues introduced into the legislation: 1) The designation of “religion” was abolished, so that sects, factions, and religious associations could all be officially recognized by submitting a request; 2) all references to the Religions Evaluation Committee (Shūkyō Shingi Kai) were eliminated; 3) the prerogative for bureaucratic oversight of religious organizations was limited to matters of the public good, while it was made clear that bureaucrats could not interfere in doctrine or ritual; 4) punitive regulations for religious teachers who lacked credentials were relaxed, and some prior offenders could even become certified; 5) in the case of religious associations (shūkyō kessha), the previous policy of bureaucratic approval (that is, an approval process initiated by the government) was replaced with one in which such associations notified the appropriate authorities of their existence; 6) similarly, for those who wanted to be declared leaders of their sects, the previous system of bureaucratic approval was revised and replaced with one of notifying the authorities; 7) the authority to adjudicate matters of leadership or complaints regarding the same was eliminated, and religious regulations, sectarian systems, and the internal rules of religious organizations were left up to religions themselves, with the Ministry of Education only being able to provide oversight in cases that affected that public interest; 8) the representatives of each church or sect were officially acknowledged and an appropriate regulation was provided guaranteeing the same; 9) not only were the independent Christian churches and other religions (other than Shintō) acknowledged, but Buddhism was as well; 10) two particularly severe clauses in the previous legislation regarding penalties were eliminated,
and these were left up to administrative regulations and penal codes as well as other measures for providing administrative oversight of religions; 11) troublesome procedures related to temples and churches were reduced as much as possible; and 12) compared to the earlier bill, in all thirty-one clauses were eliminated for a total of ninety-nine, and the various surviving clauses were all edited accordingly.82

The legislation that resulted was debated within the Ministry of Education more than ten times before it was finally settled in 1928. In early 1929, the Religious Systems Investigation Committee was convened again, and the legislation was acknowledged and passed.83 It then was rapidly passed through the Cabinet and was submitted, along with the temple property legislation, to the House of Peers on 12 February 1929. The bill was sent to a special investigative committee of fifteen members, and then on 2 March to a smaller committee of seven members that met seven times between 4 March and 13 March 1929. On 14 March the bill was sent back to the full investigative committee, but a decision was still not reached and the committee had to meet four more times. Still unable to reach consensus, the committee began to vote on each clause one by one, but the results were piecemeal. From the eleventh meeting the committee adopted a roundtable format (kondankai), but it soon became clear that the bill was doomed. It was formally declared to be in a state of incomplete examination (shingi miryō) on 24 March 1929.

Outside of the Diet there was some degree of opposition, Andō recalled, but not nearly to the degree of that seen during the Yamagata or Okada Bills. This was in part due to the needs of the

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82 Andō provided no rationale as to why Shintō would have been excluded from the “acknowledgment” of religions.
83 In both 1927 and 1929, the chairman of the committee was Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867–1952), who would later become Prime Minister and preside over the establishment of the 1939 Religious Organizations Law.
time, but also probably because this bill was rather liberal and acknowledged the “essence of religion.” If anything, the public opposition had an air of support for establishing a national religion. Andō recalled that Chikazumi Jōkan had spearheaded a group devoted to the bill’s defeat. But in this case—unlike in the case of the Yamagata Bill—there was no real active, spontaneous demonstration but rather a tendency to attempt to convince each individual lawmaker of the faulty nature of the bill. This was precisely the strategy adopted by legislator Hanai Takuzō, who doggedly criticized the bill point by point in the House of Peers.84

Andō recalled that Chikazumi called on him several times, and in turn Andō visited Chikazumi as well. Andō tried to impress upon his longtime friend that the spirit of the new law was different from its predecessor and that it was necessary for the eradication of superstition (*meishin zosetsu*), but Chikazumi was not at all convinced.85 Andō and Chikazumi had been close friends for thirty years, but their debates turned contentious and they could not reach mutual understanding. However, Andō surmised, this was a crystallization of Chikazumi’s faith and his pure sentiment, and Andō truly valued and respected his friend’s martyr’s attitude. For his part, Andō felt a great sense of responsibility for the defeat of the legislation, and while he collaborated with Minister of Education Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959) on revising and resubmitting the legislation while serving as Parliamentary Vice Minister of Education (in the Inukai cabinet, 1931–1932), the parliament was dissolved before the initiative could work. Subsequent attempts had also come to naught.

Andō concluded his 1935 account by discussing the reasons why religions legislation was necessary. First, with the increasingly complex nature of society, and as a result of the

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84 At present I have no evidence that Chikazumi and Hanai were collaborators, although I cannot rule it out.
85 Here Andō reproduced the language used by the Fraternity of New Buddhists.
competition for survival, people’s anxieties were increasing and were reflected in society. The various pseudo-religions (shūkyō ruiji no dantai) took advantage of the situation by deluding the public while deleterious superstitious activities had become rampant. From the perspective of cultivating sound thought and elevating and strengthening the dignity of the nation this phenomenon was deplorable. Therefore, to eliminate such superstitions and foster a proper religious faith in the people was—under the constitutional principle of religious freedom—the spirit of the direction that the state must take. Religions policy must make this its primary principle. Therefore, Andō had come to feel that passage of the Religious Organizations Law was more urgent than before.

Second, the laws and ordinances regarding religion that were currently in effect were fragmentary edicts that had been promulgated piecemeal by the early Meiji era Council of State and then subsequently by the Home Ministry and Education Ministry. Since that time, the laws had lost their unity and lacked any adjustment to the current situation, and if one examined them closely there was both redundancy and confusion. From the perspective of daily activities performed by the myriad religious organizations, this was both inconvenient and bewildering. Furthermore, in terms of fostering the development of contemporary religious organizations and putting them to use, it seemed that establishing this sort of law would be necessary.

Third, in terms of the present situation, it was necessary to foster religious spirit and religious sentiment, to cultivate and improve lassitude, and create a basis for the people’s hearts. In that, the present religious organizations should be protected, encouraged, and their social activities vivified. In this sense, the establishment of a religious organizations law was obviously necessary. Above all else—and at the risk of repetition—Andō argued that a religious
corporations law must be liberal in spirit and support the autonomy of religious organizations themselves.86

Concluding his account, Andō wrote that he had heard it said that Education Minister Matsuda Genji (1875–1936) had ordered the government to investigate religions legislation and submit it to the Diet and that such preparations were underway. Moreover, rumor had it that the proposed legislation was not being submitted as a religions bill but rather as a religious organizations bill. Andō viewed this news with extreme source of satisfaction. If the content of the bill were also similar to the Shōda legislation, Andō concluded, he would be content.

If Andō’s account in the 1935 Uchū article is to be trusted, then in many ways he was personally responsible for some of the most significant changes in the wording and presentation of religious legislation that took place between 1927 and 1929. By 1935 when rumors were spreading that the legislation was being considered again, Andō very clearly stated that he felt the proposed legislation was good because it was liberal, not because it restricted liberties. This contemporary understanding of religions legislation differs significantly from the interpretations of the postwar period, which tended to plot the repeated attempts to pass such legislation on a teleological course that culminated with the dastardly Religious Organizations Law of 1939, the excesses of which could only be relieved by the emancipating influence of the Occupation.87

Andō’s 1935 retrospective foreshadowed almost perfectly the way the legislation would ultimately be presented when it was finally passed in 1939. The extent to which Andō substantively contributed to the legislation in its final form remains a matter of speculation, but his influence can be seen in two aspects of the Religious Organizations Law that was ultimately

86 AM Reel #9, Item #122, 24.
87 One clear account based on Occupation research that reflects the occupiers’ interpretation of the history is Bunce 1955. See esp. 33–43.
enacted in April 1940. First, and crucially, the change in nomenclature from a “Religions Bill” to “Religious Organizations Law” was not a superficial ploy to pull the wool over religious leaders’ eyes. Andō apparently genuinely believed that this change preserved and protected religions’ interests by making the limited scope of the legislation explicit. Andō’s understanding that any religious legislation should focus on the external aspects of religion was based on a presupposition that religious freedom was inherently a matter of conscience—the right of the individual to believe whatever she wanted—so that legal issues of official recognition through incorporation were disaggregated or distanced from the constitutional religious freedom guarantee.

Second, the distinction that Andō made in his retrospective between “religions,” “newly arisen religions,” and “superstitions” was also taken to be a natural administrative distinction, but if anything the 1939 legislation was less severe than it might have been in that it allowed marginal movements to determine for themselves if they wanted to register themselves with the government as “religions” rather than leaving it up to the police to determine which groups were “religions” and which “superstitions.” Of course, registering with the state could subject marginal movements to additional scrutiny as easily as it could protect them from police intervention, but it nevertheless left it up to associations and organizations themselves to seek recognition as religions so that they could benefit from the perquisites and prestige that attended such status. It also bears mentioning that while the skepticism regarding “superstitions,” “pseudo-religions,” and “recently arisen religions” ran high during the entirety of the Meiji Constitutional Period and especially during the war years, policymakers’ hopes that these active and growing organizations might be conscripted for ideological purposes were exemplified in
both Andô’s retrospective and in the speech given by Minister of Education Araki Sadao (1877–1966) outlining the rationales behind the bill.  

One more point deserves attention regarding the oft-vilified 1939 legislation. Although during the postwar Occupation the Religious Organizations Law would be faulted for greatly restricting religious freedom, at the time it was passed some reports suggested that most religious organizations were quite sanguine about it.  

For example, United States Department of State correspondence from the spring of 1939 suggests that American diplomats—who were primarily concerned with religious legislation as it pertained to Christian missionary activity—readily accepted the Japanese explanation that the law was merely intended to clarify and rationalize matters of administrative procedure.  

The correspondence also strikingly suggests that the American legation understood the explicit aim of suppressing marginal religious movements to

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88 The signatories of the bill were Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma Kiichirō (1867–1952), Minister of Education Baron Araki Sadao, Home Minister Marquis Kido Kōichi (1899–1977; Kido was the previous Minister of Education), and Minister of Finance Ishiwata Sōtarō (1891–1950). KGSR 4 (Kanpō Extra Edition, 25 January 1939), 35.


be a normal and natural objective, even though postwar policy studies would cite the law as one of the primary examples of Japan’s putative lack of genuine religious freedom.91

It remains to be seen, however, how politicians, religious leaders, and bureaucrats imagined ideal religion-state relations in the context of the Pacific War. By the time Japanese aircraft bombed Pearl Harbor on 7/8 December 1941, Japan had already been at war for ten long years. The government’s preoccupation with social edification and “thought problems” in the debates over religions legislation reflected broader concerns about mobilizing the citizenry for the demands of a war fought on multiple fronts. From around 1935, increasingly militaristic and authoritarian trends emerged in the government that gradually coalesced into a new orthodoxy that mobilized the powerful imagery of imperial Japan at the forefront of a new world order.

While historians have rightly questioned the excessively dramatic depiction of the war years as a “dark valley” surrounded by the refulgent liberal peaks of “Taishō Democracy” and the postwar Occupation, it is no secret that Japan’s wartime years were characterized by increasingly draconian restrictions on civil liberties and attempts to fold civil society organizations into the war apparatus through a formal process of conscription.92 Not all Japanese citizens were sanguine about the progress of the war, and subversive elements questioned the official orthodoxy of the sacred nature of the emperor and—by extension—Japan.93 Yet if anything, it seems that collusion with the imperial project was the norm and resistance the exception.94

91 Bunce 1955(1948), among others. See especially the monthly (and later quarterly) “Review of Religions in Japan,” which often made reference to the law. RCR Box #5787, Folder #8. Sehat (2010, Part IV) traces shifts in American jurisprudence in the 1930s and 1940s that partially explain this change in American interpretations of religious freedom.

92 Kasza 1995


94 Kushner 2006
The Ministry of Education was at the center of this ideological effort, but it was not acting alone. A variety of stakeholders readily participated in the “thought war” by producing hortatory propaganda to rally the home front. In his wartime capacity as a prominent politician and as a leader and advisor several different transsectarian Buddhist groups, Andō dutifully played his part in rallying Buddhists to the wartime cause. However, Andō also used the atmosphere of the war to advance some potentially controversial ideas about how Buddhism could be modernized and rationalized. Such projects were not simply to meet the needs of the wartime state, but also to create a new, more powerful role for Buddhists in Japanese moral, intellectual, and political life. Chikazumi had criticized Andō for capitulating to political authority, but Andō had been cultivating a long-term plan that would see a drastically reformed Buddhism meet the needs of the future as much as the wartime present. For Andō, it was not merely the case that Buddhism could and should contribute to imperialist projects in a one-way paradigm of service to the throne. Rather, both Buddhism and the state could and should be improved, and Buddhists had to streamline and modernize their religion in order to best serve the state even as the state had to work to protect Buddhism as a valuable social edification medium.

Andō’s Position on Religion-State Relations during the Pacific War

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95 The repeated attempts to “clarify the national polity” and to elucidate the relationship between Shintō and the kokutai suggest that the Ministry was hard-pressed to develop a coherent line of thinking on the subject. For example, following the Kokutai meichō undō of 1935–1936, the Ministry published the Kokutai no hongi in 1937, a document now infamous for clearly tracing the descent of the emperor from the goddess Amaterasu and sanctifying the Japanese nation as a whole. This was followed by a 1938 publication commissioned by the Ministry and written by Kokugakuin University President Kōno Seizō (1882–1963) entitled Waga kokutai to Shintō (Our National Polity and Shintō).

96 Kushner 2006. Kushner’s book is a natural extension of his mentor Sheldon Garon’s (1997) argument that social edification movements supported and spurred state initiatives nearly as much as they challenged them.
On 20 December 1941, in his dual capacity as a member of the House of Representatives and Chairperson of the Greater Japan Buddhist Youth Association Federation (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Seinen Kai Renmei), Andō published a pamphlet entitled Preparation for the Final Battle and Japanese Buddhism: A Proclamation of Unified Buddhism (Kessen taisei to Nihon Bukkyō: zen’itsu Bukkyō no teishō). The pamphlet was divided into two parts of roughly equal length followed by a five-page appendix entitled “Shrines are not Religion (Jinja wa shūkyō ni arazu).” Published less than two weeks after Japan formally entered into war with the United States, the document clearly (if not always persuasively) laid out Andō’s stance regarding religion-state relations. In it, Andō discussed in detail the role he felt Buddhism should play during a time of war; he also drew clear distinctions between the “religious” qualities of Buddhism and the “areligious” aspects of shrine rites.

Andō’s blueprint for Buddhist reform in Preparation was clearly premised on the idea that Buddhism could serve the nation better if outmoded practices were abandoned and Buddhists worked together to provide spiritual and ideological support for the war effort. Crucially, however, it posited a vision in which Buddhist temples, not Shintō shrines, were the cultural centers of each community and Buddhism formed a matrix that bound Japanese imperial subjects together into an organic whole. Andō attempted to clarify the relationship between Buddhism and the state by criticizing recent calls to make Shintō the national religion and by questioning religious studies scholars’ assertion that shrine rites were indisputably religious. Andō preferred to think of shrine rites as a form of long-standing civic ritual, while the lay-centric,

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97 Andō 1941. The pamphlet’s listed price was 50 sen. A version of this text was serialized in Chūgai nippō in twelve installments from 23 July 1941 under the title “Nihon Bukkyō zenshin no kōryō (A Platform for Advancing Japanese Buddhism). See AM Reel #10, Item #133. The version cited here is available in its entirety online: http://kindai.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1464236.
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this-worldly Mahāyāna Buddhism that had existed in Japan since the time of Shōtoku Taishi was perfectly suited to supporting the body politic. Contrasting the Buddhist emphasis on “gratitude” with the Western emphasis on “happiness” or “satisfaction,” Andō implied that Buddhism was uniquely suited to supporting the Japanese kokutai, particularly as the common cultural core of the East Asian region Japan intended to lead.

The appendix, entitled “Shrines are not Religion,” is of particular note. While Andō explicitly argued that Buddhism strongly supported state initiatives, he also advocated a secularist framework in which religious affiliation and practice were elective affairs while shrine rites constituted civic ritual.

“Shrines are not Religion” was actually composed as a public response to statement that Fujisawa Chikao (1893–1962) had made at a recent meeting of the Central Cooperation Committee (Chūō Kyōryoku Kaigi), in which Fujisawa argued (according to Andō) that Shintō should be treated as Japan’s national religion while Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam should be regarded as “popular religions” (minkyō). Making such a distinction would, according to Fujisawa, ensure that the people were not estranged from (shrine) ritual. While Andō strongly agreed with Fujisawa that maintaining strong connections between the people and (civic) shrine rites was of the utmost importance, he questioned whether it was wise to treat “shrines” (he put the word *jinja* in quotation marks) as “religion,” and a national religion at that. To do so would undermine the theoretical basis which allowed shrine rites to be universally observed by all

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98 Andō did not name names, but he may have been thinking of Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949) and Katō Genchi (1873–1965).
99 The full title was “Shrines are not Religion (National Religion and Ethnic Religion Arguments in the Central Cooperation Committee): Encouraging Clarification from the President of the Konoe [Cabinet] Imperial Rule Assistance Association.”
Japanese; by treating “shrines” as similar to any other garden variety “religion” Fujisawa’s proposal might unintentionally infringe upon the dignity of shrines.

Not only that, but treating “Shintō” as Japan’s national religion would also render meaningless Article 28 of the Constitution of the Empire of Japan. In guaranteeing freedom of religious belief (shinkyō no jiyū), Andō pointed out, the constitution had effectively denied the possibility of establishing a national religion. Moreover, it was unclear whether by “Shintō” Fujisawa intended to indicate shrine rites or “sectarian Shintō.” If the latter, Andō begged Fujisawa to clarify whether he had a specific one of the the thirteen Shintō sects in mind or if he intended to treat any or all of them as Japan’s “national religion.”

Andō’s query undoubtedly served the purpose of rhetorical posturing more than it indicated genuine bewilderment with Fujisawa’s position, but it also highlighted an important distinction that Andō was trying to make from the position of somebody aligned with the Buddhist world.100 For Andō, participation in shrine rites was a sine qua non of Japanese citizenship, but shrine rites did not conflict with religious commitments because they constituted a universal practice (“civic ritual”) rather than the elective, private beliefs and ritual practices characteristic of “religion.”

Preparation was a complex document. Superficially, Andō’s argument supported the now-common perception that Japanese Buddhists were so politically self-interested that they unquestioningly contributed to Japanese militarism, embracing the fiction that shrine rites were not religious just so they could maintain their customary rights and avoid persecution. However, Andō’s argument was far more subtle than such a reading allows. First, he aligned himself with modern Buddhist calls for reform by acknowledging that Buddhism as a whole was in danger of entirely losing its mandate unless the sectarian leadership could set aside petty quibbles in favor
of embracing a new, unified vision of progress. Second, Andō argued that the creation of a unified Buddhist sect would vivify Buddhism and make the religion even better equipped to support the war effort; he also explicitly highlighted the fact that excessive focus on “Shintō” risked alienating other East Asians, while emphasizing a common Buddhist heritage could bind Japanese people to their East Asian brethren. While Andō’s rhetoric during the war was generally supportive of the war effort (and certainly critical of Japan’s enemies), he did not merely capitulate to state authority. Also, despite his evident penchant for holistic, organic visions of society in which the individual parts participated in the creation of a more glorious whole, he did not easily accept totalitarian arguments that placed the needs of the state above all else.

Andō’s calls for Buddhist reform were consistently articulated in terms of a secularist division between the realm of religion and that of governance, on the one hand, and his equally consistent claim that religion (particularly Buddhism) could and should be mobilized for national projects through a comprehensive “religions policy.” In a 1 January 1944 issue of the popular Buddhist magazine *Daihōrin*, Andō was asked to respond to recent revived calls for the eradication of Buddhism (*haibutsu kishaku*). Under the title “Reflections on Japanese History and Traditional Buddhism: In View of the Construction of Greater East Asia, Erect a National Religions System,” Andō systematically debunked the arguments of those who felt that Buddhism did not accord with the Japanese national character due to its status as a foreign

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100 Andō’s argument had an important precedent in Shimaji Mokurai’s (1838–1911) famous argument that shrine rites were not religion. See Nitta 2000; Sueki 2004a, 19–42.
101 In the interest of space, I have omitted a detailed account of Andō’s writings from 1941–1945. I hope to incorporate more of this material in a future draft.
102 Just as discussions of “superstition” and “spiritual mobilization” served as proxies for explicit discussion of “religious freedom” in Chapter Three, discussion of comprehensive “religions policy” served such a function here.
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religion. Arguing that Buddhism was indistinguishable from Japanese culture while simultaneously acknowledging that Buddhists had thus far failed to exert their true trustworthiness and power for the nation, Andō praised anti-Buddhist sentiment as the impetus that would rouse Buddhists from their torpor while also suggesting the animus towards Buddhists was counterproductive and even unpatriotic. Those who leveled such critiques were no better than the liberalist, individualist Europeans and Americans.

Andō’s historical critique in this article is particularly interesting because he readily acknowledged Buddhism’s Indian origin and the fact that Buddhism had not been present on the Japanese archipelago when the Great Divine Way (kannagara no daidō) was established. However, Andō also argued that Shintō per se had not existed either at this time, and that critiques of Buddhism and anti-Buddhist animus had developed later when priests in Shintō-esque lineages had attempted to assert superiority over Buddhism. Andō lamented the fact that such sectarian parochialism had caused all sorts of problems, implying at the same time that Shintō priests’ claims to legitimacy were inferior to Buddhist claims. Here Andō’s distinction between what he called kannagara no daidō and garden-variety Shintō became clear, with the former serving as a non-negotiable component of Japanese citizenship and the latter serving as merely one religion among several.

Andō went on to attribute the haibutsu kishaku movement of the early Meiji era to the fact that Shintō-lineage priests had been offended at the privileged status granted to Buddhism and Buddhists under the Tokugawa regime and had used the change in government to exact their

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103 While kannagara no daidō could be used to indicate Shintō, in Andō’s usage it seems to have been closer to the “Great Divine Way,” which could also mean “Great Imperial Way” in this context. Andō seems to have accepted at face value the ideas of imperial divine descent and the importance of establishing a direct, mutually beneficial relationship between the people and the emperor.
revenge. However, even though these Shintōists had advocated making Shintō the national religion to serve as a bulwark against the threat of Christianity, contemporary political leaders had recognized that the policy of eradicating Buddhism was unfair to Buddhists even as Buddhists had proved their patriotism. Nevertheless, recently some had been reviving the haibutsu kishaku language in relationship to the popular “new world order” (shintaisei) rhetoric. Acknowledging that some outmoded practices should indeed be dispelled and a “new order” established, Andō nevertheless argued that the anti-Buddhist rhetoric and the calls to make Shintō the national religion were superficial. He drew his readers’ attention to an article he had published in the Yomiuri Shinbun in the summer of 1942, where he wrote the following:

If the “Shintō” of the proponents [of making Shintō the national religion] indicates the Great Divine Way [kannagara no daidō], it is neither a national religion [kokkyō] nor a popular religion [minkyō]. As long as one is a Japanese citizen, it [kannagara no daidō] is one’s conviction, the object of one’s respect, and the inexhaustible article of faith. However, what we must understand is that the Great Divine Way is not a religion. If it was a religion, because [religious] belief is free, then that article of faith and that respect [characteristic of the Great Divine Way] would be circumscribed. The general meaning of the Great Divine Way is different; it is the supreme directive to Japanese people. More than a supreme directive, it is the same as [being] “Japanese.” From the moment we are born, it suffuses the bodies and spirits of us Japanese. In contrast to this, sectarian Shintō, Buddhism, and Christianity are religions. Because they are religions, according to the point established by the constitution, “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” Therefore the arguments for national and popular religions enter into the problem of constitutional revision, and should not be taken lightly.

The remainder of Andō’s Daihōrin article recapitulated now-familiar points about the Religious Corporations Law (clearly a point of pride for Andō), the importance of Buddhist reform, and the need for a comprehensive “religions policy” that would allow the state to make

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104 Here Andō was basically recapitulating his arguments made in the second section and the Appendix of the Preparation.
better use of religion as a social edification medium. What interests me here is that in the quote above Andō clearly drew a distinction between garden-variety “religion” and the “Great Divine Way,” equating the latter with a non-negotiable sense of citizenship. While the content of this “Great Divine Way” remained vague, in Andō’s usage it represented the incontrovertible, secular “truth” implicitly acknowledged by all Japanese citizens; “religions” were important as vehicles for social edification, but they represented private, elective commitments.106

Andō’s diaries from 1944 (the earliest available) give no impression that his public opinions were different from his private views. Those opinions were influential. Andō continued to serve in a prominent liaison capacity between the Ministry of Education, the Greater Japan Buddhist Association (Dai Nippon Bukkyō Kai) and the various Buddhist sects regarding discussions of how to create a central Buddhist university (the formal planning of this university began in January 1944) and how to better use Buddhism for social edification efforts (a formal committee on this topic was established in March 1944).107 Andō’s private recollections of these meetings suggest that differences of opinion lingered among bureaucrats and politicians about the best ways to distinguish between the Imperial Way (kōdō) and religion (shūkyō).108 However, his unique position of clout in the political, bureaucratic, and religious worlds gave Andō’s ideas

105 Andō Masazumi, “Nihon rekishi no kaiko to dentō no Bukkyō,” Daihōrin 11, no. 1 (1 January 1944), 8 (AM Reel #11, Item #155).
106 This recalls Jason Josephson’s (2012) argument about the “Shintō secular,” although as I showed in Chapter One we must be cautious in assuming that the modern Japanese secular was only constructed in relationship to Shintō.
107 AM Reel #2, Items 10-1 and 10-2. Presumably the initiative to start the Buddhist university foundered as the Pacific War dragged on. An area of future research is to examine Andō’s diaries from 1944 and 1945 more thoroughly for his unique perspective on how religion-state relations and religious social edification initiatives changed as the war returned to the home front and Japan faced greater problems with both morale and matériel.
108 Andō Masazumi diary entry from 1 March 1944, recalling a meeting of the newly established Religious social edification Policy Commission (Shūkyō Kyōka Hōsaku Iinkai), AM Reel #2, Item #10-2.
about ideal religion-state relations and the role of religion in social edification efforts considerable weight; until the exigencies of the war intervened, Andō’s vision of a comprehensive “religious system” and his vision of a new, “Unified Buddhism” were on their way to completion.

I have presented Andō’s thoughts on the subject of ideal religion-state relations in some detail because of his prominent position as a respected Buddhist politician who also wielded considerable clout in several transsectarian Buddhist organizations. At first glance, Andō seems to represent a Buddhist politics that subsumed Buddhist interests to those of the state. However, careful examination of Andō’s rhetoric suggests that he accepted the logic of imperial divine descent and the divine nation as part of a secularist arrangement in which those ideas were understood to be non-negotiable aspects of Japanese citizenship.109 He rejected, however, the idea of establishing a Japanese “national religion” (whether Buddhism or Shintō).

**Buddhist “Suppression”: The Case of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai**

In the foregoing sections, Chikazumi Jōkan served as an example of Buddhist “resistance” to controversial religions legislation who rejected egalitarianism as an operative principle in legal articulations of religious freedom. I then showed that one of the architects of the oft-criticized 1939 Religious Organizations Law, Andō Masazumi, promoted the law because he thought of it as a liberal piece of legislation that would simultaneously protect religions and harness their power for ideological projects.

109 This attitude substantiates the claim I made in Chapter One that the Meiji Constitutional regime can be characterized as a secular system. Clearly some individuals (Andō’s interlocutors) wanted to make Shintō the national religion, but they failed to do so. A secularist politics premised on the empirically unverifiable ideas of imperial divine descent and the divine nation dominated the period.
Turning now from the topic of religious legislation and Andō’s rather abstract discussions of ideal religion-state relations to the particulars of law enforcement, through the case of the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai I want to show that monochromatic focus on martyrdom and oppression may detract from our ability to see who actually was promoting or protecting religious freedom in the instances when religious organizations were suppressed. While the foregoing sections argued that Buddhists like Andō and Chikazumi did not “resist” the state in the sense of martyring themselves for their respective causes, it is true that some groups and individuals did combat the official orthodoxy and did risk persecution.110 Yet I think it is crucial that in the context of the Fifteen Years’ War some of these marginal groups did not avail themselves of the legal language of religious freedom nearly as much as they appealed to the superior moral authority of Buddhism. While it would be an overstatement to say that the language of religious freedom was unavailable to them, it would be accurate to say that religious freedom was not yet understood to transcend or precede citizenship (and the associated rights and duties thereof) as a “human right.”111 In other words, appeals to religious freedom could only occur within the confines of the national legal system embodied by the constitution, while appeals to transcendent religious authority could challenge the system itself.112 Conversely, the protection of “peace and order”

110 Recently, for example, scholars have celebrated Seno’o Girō (1889–1961) and his Youth League for the Revitalization of Buddhism as an example of a principled martyr who fiercely resisted the state out of commitment to his socialist ideals. See Victoria 1997, 66–73; Ōtani 2008; Ōtani 2012, esp. 71–92 and 252–280; Shields 2012. These stories are valuable examples of liberal “resistance” to state initiatives, although the scholarship on such figures may overstate their influence because scholars and religious groups alike have had a vested interest in recuperating figures of resistance who they can link to postwar ideals of religious freedom and human rights.

111 Moyn 2010, Hoffmann, ed. 2011, Weitz 2013

112 Additionally, conflict with political authority could, in the case of groups in the Nichiren lineage, serve as proof of one’s eventual buddhahood. Jackie Stone, personal communication, 28 July 2013.
could provide the state with a rationale to intervene in the affairs of specific religious groups, sometimes violently.

In the case I describe below, the Special Higher Police arrested and convicted Makiguchi Tsunesaburō (1871–1944) under the 1925 Peace Preservation Law because he had incited his followers to destroy others’ religious altars, talismans, and implements. Safeguarding “peace and order” in this particular case meant attacking one religious group in order to protect the right of other citizens to worship as they chose without being attacked. While the Special Higher Police were almost certainly not operating out of any high-minded principle of protecting religious freedom (they did not specifically mention religious freedom as a rationale for their intervention), the effect of their actions was to draw a distinction between “acceptable” and “unacceptable” religious practice. “Peace and order” became a proxy for demarcating the purview of “religious freedom.”

Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai

The Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai, or “Value Creation Education Study Association,” was established around 1928, although the name of the organization was first formalized on 18 November 1930 with the publication of the first volume of founder Makiguchi Tsunesaburō’s (1871–1944) magnum opus Sōka kyōiku taikei (Outline of Value-Creation Education). Makiguchi advocated a comprehensive system of education that he described as “value-creation” (sōka). In the late 1920s he was introduced to Nichiren Shōshū (The Correct Nichiren Sect), and he quickly

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113 Shimazono 2006, 241. The Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai was the wartime precursor to the postwar Sōka Gakkai. The group exploded in membership after the war when Toda Jōsei (1900–1958), successor to founder Makiguchi Tsunesaburō, guided the group through a massive proselytizing campaign. A fantastic overview of Sōka Gakkai’s history and its present disposition is Levi McLaughlin’s 2009 Princeton University dissertation, “Sōka Gakkai in Japan.” An abbreviated version of the dissertation is available under the same title as part of the Brill handbook on Japanese religions edited by Inken Prohl and John K. Nelson. See McLaughlin 2012.
recognized that the *Lotus sūtra* and the teachings of the thirteenth century Buddhist saint Nichiren (1222–1282) could be aligned with his pedagogical method. Specifically, Makiguchi saw education as the way to nurture an informed and moral citizenry that could shoulder the creation of a new world order. This view meshed well with the Nichirenist vision of a Japan-centric global utopia based on the principles of the *Lotus sūtra*.114

When Makiguchi and several other high-ranking leaders of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai were arrested under the Peace Preservation Law of 1925, the Special Higher Police cited Makiguchi’s alleged incitement of his followers to burn and discard ōnusa (sacred streamers), talismans, and amulets from Ise Shrine as well as domestic altars dedicated to kami (kamidana) and buddhas (butsudan). The initial report in the Special Higher Police monthly magazine *Tokkō geppō* included the following condemnatory analysis:

The Value Creation Education Association of 1–19 Nishiki-chō, Kanda-ku, Tokyo is a religious group that was formed around 1928 when the current President, Makiguchi Tsunesaburō, quit his job as principal of Shirokanedai-chō Elementary School in Shiba Ward [present-day Minato Ward] and conceived a [new] doctrine by adding his own unique interpretation to the doctrines of his Nichiren Shōshū faith (which places its headquarters in Taiseki Temple in Ueno Village, Fuji County, Shizuoka Prefecture) and gathered intellectuals such as elementary school teachers together.115 There are many illegal and threatening aspects of the thought and beliefs of President Makiguchi and those who surround him, and from the start the [Tokyo] Metropolitan Police and the Fukuoka Prefecture Special Higher [Police] Department infiltrated [the group and discovered] not only that President Makiguchi said various unlawful teachings to believers like, “The Emperor is just an ordinary man,” and “‘Be ever loyal’ is not

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114 At the time Makiguchi launched his society, contemporaries like laicized priest Tanaka Chigaku (1861–1939), founder of the Kokuchūkai (National Pillar Society, founded 1914), had been advocating a vision of a *Lotus* utopia with Japan at its center for decades (see Tanaka 1901 for a representative example). Makiguchi’s teachings can therefore be situated as part of a broader pattern of lay Nichiren Buddhist activism known as Nichirenism (*Nichirenshugi*). Previous scholarship on Tanaka’s Nichirenism includes Lee 1975, Tanabe 1989, Stone 1994, Ōtani 2001, and Iguchi 2006. Carl Freire, a PhD candidate in History at the University of California, Berkeley, is currently writing a dissertation on Tanaka and Nichiren-lineage lay movements.

115 The present name of this location is Fujinomiya-shi, Shizuoka Prefecture.
something the emperor himself should say. It should be deleted from the Imperial Rescript on Education,” and “If you slander the Lotus sūtra or Nichiren you will face [karmic] retribution,” and “There is no need to worship at the likes of Ise Jingū.” Moreover, sometime after January of last year some [plaintiffs] wrote to the Metropolitan Police Department, saying that “Among the members of the Value Creation Education Association there are many who are currently employed as primary school teachers; furthermore, the teachings treat the so-called mandala hanging scroll of the Nichiren sect as the ultimate, most venerable object of worship, and [followers] attack the worship of all other kami and buddhas, and furthermore under the name of ‘eliminating slander of the dharma’ they burn and discard talismans, amulets, kamidana and household altars, and in extreme [cases] some housewives who are believers conduct such ‘elimination of the slander of the dharma’ while their husbands are away, causing problems of divorce.” 116 When the Department arrested and investigated Makuguchi Tsunesaburō and five others because of the strong suspicion of sacrilegious disrespect to the Ise Shrine and lèse-majesté on the 7th of this month (July 1943), Terasaka Yōza [?] and four others who were recognized as being under strong suspicion were chased down and arrested (see the appended [chart]); investigations are ongoing.117

Shimazono Susumu has already highlighted the ambiguous nature of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai’s relationship with the wartime Japanese state in a book chapter titled “A Religion of Resistance/A Religion of Cooperation: Transformations in Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai during Wartime.”118 My aim here is not to recapitulate Shimazono’s argument, which highlights the tensions between the suspicious portrayal of Marxist historian of religion Murakami Shigeyoshi (1928–1991) and postwar Sōka Gakkai apologetic scholarship that has portrayed Makiguchi and Toda as liberal martyrs who were presciently aware of the importance of religious freedom. Rather, I intend to show that when members of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai were arrested in 1943—and when Makiguchi Tsunesaburō was interrogated by the Special Higher Police in July and August of that year—Makiguchi was more likely to appeal to the transcendent authority of the Lotus sūtra than he was

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116 In his interrogation, Makiguchi clarified that the group that used this terminology was actually Honmon Butsuryū Kō, not the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai. However, the spirit underlying the practice of destroying and discarding religious materials other than the honzon (primary object of worship) of Nichiren Shōshū was the same. TG August 1943, 158–159; MTZ 10, 210–211.
to make any appeals to the concept of religious freedom. Religious freedom was not yet understood as a transcendent principle that superseded citizenship and state authority.

*Makiguchi Tsunesaburō under Interrogation*

Makiguchi would seem to make an ideal candidate for anyone looking for an example of principled resistance to state authority during the war years. Under interrogation, he spoke without remorse about having directed upwards of five hundred people to destroy Ise amulets, talismans, and domestic altars, an admission that ensured that he would languish in prison for the rest of his life. Whereas leftist Buddhists such as the socialist Seno’o Girō (1889–1961) recanted while in prison, Makiguchi died in prison in 1944 still devoted his cause.

Yet Makiguchi’s resistance was not at all based on liberal principles. He regarded the Constitution of the Empire of Japan as a provisional teaching—a “trace” of the original law of the dharma. The constitutional provision of religious freedom was therefore subordinate to the Nichiren Buddhist injunction to castigate those who slandered the dharma or failed to pay obeisance to the calligraphic maṇḍala used as the central object of worship in the Nichiren Shōshū sect to which Makiguchi belonged. For Makiguchi, the primary objective of his

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118 Shimazono 2006.
119 Jacqueline Stone has indicated to me that Makiguchi likely saw himself as confronting hostile government forces in much the same way that Nichiren (1222–1282) himself had; the very fact of governmental persecution was confirmation of one’s personal righteousness and proof (according to the *Lotus sūtra*) that one’s buddhahood would be assured. Personal communication, 28 July 2013.
120 TG August 1943, 161; MTZ 10, 212–213.
121 On Seno’o, see Victoria 1997, 66–73; Ōtani 2008; and Shields 2012.
122 Makiguchi used the language of *honji suijaku*, referring to the Meiji Constitution as the *suijaku*, or trace, of the original teaching of the *Lotus sūtra*. TG August 1943, 153–154; MTZ 10, 204–205.
123 Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai was a lay association, the members of which all belonged to the Nichiren Shōshū sect. This arrangement reflected Makiguchi’s own evident suspicion of clerical authority and his feeling that he could effect more change as a layperson than as a cleric (see MTZ 10, 188). This arrangement between the lay association and the parent sect would continue
organization in the age of the declining dharma, or mappō, was to ensure that as many people as possible embraced the maṇḍala and the teachings of the Lotus as their sole faith. During his interrogation by the Special Higher Police, Makiguchi repeated time and again that both the emperor above and the people below must accept the truth presented by the honzon of Nichiren Shōshū; a stance encapsulated in the phrase ōbutsu myōgō itten shikai kimyōhō (“unity of kingly [law] and Buddhist [law] under heaven and across the four seas”).

The open-ended questions that open the interrogation record suggest that the questioners were trying to get Makiguchi to speak candidly about his teachings in the hope that he would inadvertently divulge some sort of incriminating stance. They need not have tried any such subterfuge, for Makiguchi—at least the version of Makiguchi who appeared in the record—seemed wholly unconcerned with any threat to his well-being. He spoke at length about Nichiren Shōshū doctrine, the goal of getting everyone in the world to venerate the honzon, and without prompting spoke (or wrote—his answers may have been written rather than verbal) about how he had referred to the emperor as an “ordinary man” (bonbu) and how he had directly encouraged followers to burn amulets, talismans, and any other religious accoutrements that might impugn the sanctity of the Nichiren Shōshū gohonzon.

Even though he might have been expected to appeal to religious freedom as a way of minimizing his sentence or being acquitted, the interrogation records suggest that it was not the

until 1991, when members of Sōka Gakkai were collectively excommunicated from Nichiren Shōshū. See McLaughlin 2012, 298–300. Incidentally, Andō Masazumi had also stressed the importance of lay-centric Buddhism in his December 1941 pamphlet Preparation for the Final Battle and Japanese Buddhism.

124 TG August 1943, 152; MTZ 10, 202–203. The record of the interrogation itself is an intriguing document, and I have endeavored to compare the original with the heavily annotated (and somewhat apologetic) version included in the tenth volume of Makiguchi’s collected works that was published in 1987.
imprisoned Makiguchi who exhibited the greatest concern with religious freedom, but rather the anonymous investigator(s) who conducted the interrogation. Clearly the Special Higher Police were not worried about whether Makiguchi’s arrest infringed on his religious freedom, but the rationale for his arrest indirectly highlighted the way that the concept of “religious freedom” operated in conjunction with the concept of “peace and order” in law enforcement during the Pacific War.

The initial police record documenting Makiguchi’s arrest argued that Makiguchi disturbed public peace and order by ordering followers to destroy religious implements. While it must be acknowledged that accusations of *lèse-majesté* were included in the charges and were hardly insignificant, it was the fact that members of the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai destroyed others’ household *butsudan* and *kamidana* that apparently prompted the Special Higher Police to act rather than merely sticking to surveillance of Makiguchi’s potentially dangerous ideas. The insult to the august imperial line constituted by the immolation or disposal of Ise talismans was doubtless a grave offense in 1943—there is no doubt that by this point the increasingly authoritarian atmosphere had succeeded in totally sanctifying the imperial house—but the legal logic that allowed the police to intervene was superficially the maintenance of “peace and order.” At a deeper level, the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom “provided it did not disturb peace and order” was at stake.

My argument here is about effect rather than intention. There is no evidence that the Special Higher Police thought in formal terms about the protection of “peace and order” as a protection of religious freedom, but the law enforcement aspect of religious freedom is premised on the state’s potential use of legitimized violence to protect people’s right to worship as they choose.

125 It is possible that Makiguchi was trying to protect his followers from incarceration.
and—by extension—to actually use that violence to intervene when one religious group threatens the religious freedom of another. In the case of the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai arrests, preserving “peace and order” was fundamentally a concern that some people’s rights to worship as they wished were being trampled upon by the zealous Nichirenist lay Buddhists, with deleterious side effects like divorce.126

I am not an expert in Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai doctrine or history, and my treatment of Makiguchi’s case has been necessarily superficial. However, my critical reading of the interrogation record suggests that future research on the suppression of marginal religious movements should take into account whether the movements themselves felt that their rights were being infringed upon. I suspect that Makiguchi and his followers had an absolutist vision of authority that could not readily accommodate liberal, latitudinarian visions of religious freedom. I also suspect that while the Special Higher Police were clearly motivated to stamp out heresies that denigrated the majesty of the sanctified kokutai and the imperial person (they referred to the destruction of Ise talismans as “sacrilege,” after all), they found it equally important to protect at least some religious freedoms insofar as they needed to preserve the rights of ordinary citizens to worship as they pleased. Protecting “peace and order” was, in this sense, protecting religious

Shimazono 2006, 245.

126 A subsidiary point is that, in the context of questioning Makiguchi about his ideal of converting the entire world to Nichiren Buddhism, the seemingly incompatible dictates of religious freedom and absolute imperial authority curiously aligned when the interrogator asked with evident surprise whether his majesty the emperor had any real choice in whether to venerate the Nichiren Shōshū honzon. Makiguchi’s response was an unequivocal “no.” While he was careful to indicate his respect for the emperor and clearly saw the emperor as playing a crucial part in the conversion of Japan (and then the world), there was no room for the emperor to adopt a different religious view. The anonymous interrogator’s abrupt shift to a different line of questioning after this exchange makes it difficult to determine whether he found this response discomfiting (because it so explicitly challenged imperial authority) or satisfying (because it established Makiguchi’s guilt beyond doubt).
freedom. The actions of Makiguchi and his followers—burning and discarding valuable and emotionally laden domestic altars—were too blatant for the police to ignore. Those actions did disturb peace and order, and the right of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai members to uphold their exclusivist commitment to what they saw as the true teaching had to be balanced against the right of others to worship as they saw fit. This tension is a perennial problem in the enforcement of legal guarantees of religious freedom, but the crucial point here is that neither the Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai nor the Special Higher Police seems to have understood religious freedom as a universal, innate human right. At its strongest, it was a civil liberty that the special higher police, as the enforcers of imperial law, were duty-bound to protect.

Conclusions

One can only wonder what the effect would have been on Japanese society, including the government, if even a few hundred Buddhist priests had spoken out or, more important, taken action against the war on religious grounds. As [James] Ketelaar has observed: “[Buddhism] was indeed one, if not the only, organization capable of offering effective resistance to state policy.” Large-scale resistance, of course, never occurred, but those few Buddhists who did oppose Japan’s war policies demonstrated that resistance was possible if one were prepared to pay the price. Each and every Japanese Buddhist did have a choice to make.128

Brian Victoria’s counterfactual speculation is clearly predicated on the interpretation that most Buddhists made precisely the wrong choice in choosing to support Japanese militarism. Yet it is probably unrealistic to expect—as he evidently does—that religious groups and individuals would have martyred themselves out of principled resistance to the imperial state.129 The global atmosphere of utopian promise in the 1920s and 1930s made many religious groups quite

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127 This reveals the tension in majoritarian and minority claims inherent in religious freedom practices. See Mahmood and Danchin 2014b.
optimistic about nationalistic ideology and benevolent imperialism. Religious groups were generally more likely to seek some sort of rapprochement with the state rather than to combat political authority at every turn, and it was common in the 1930s and 1940s for Japanese religious groups to adopt corporatist approaches to religion-state relations.\footnote{130}

Against this background, the cases of influential Buddhist figures like Chikazumi and Andō show that the question of why Buddhists failed to resist state initiatives is largely meaningless. The evidence suggests that these men understood themselves to be actively resisting certain state initiatives that ran counter to Buddhist interests. Both envisioned a unique role for Buddhism in the utopian visions of the near future that characterized the early Shōwa era, and both spoke explicitly about ideal religion-state relations and the scope of religious freedom. However, they disappoint anyone who would expect that these discussions would occur in a strictly humanist idiom. Both of them were skeptical of purely latitudinarian or strictly egalitarian policies, and their understandings of freedom of conscience did not always extend to unfettered freedom of expression or affiliation.

Despite these similarities, Andō and Chikazumi represent divergent styles of Buddhist politics that are easily overlooked if we assume that all Buddhists spoke with the same sycophantic voice during the early Shōwa era. While it is true that they both aimed to make Buddhism useful to the state and to society, Chikazumi and Andō differed significantly in the specifics of their proposals.\footnote{131} Chikazumi’s project was more conservative and negative—resisting unpalatable legislation—than Andō’s more positive approach of establishing a new

\footnote{129} Thomas Hastings made a similar argument about famed Christian Kōgawa Toyohiko (1888–1960) in a presentation given at the Center for Theological Inquiry in Princeton on 13 May 2012. 
\footnote{130} Krämer 2011. 
\footnote{131} On “useful Buddhism,” see Ives 2009, esp. 13–54.
position for Buddhism as part of a modern imperial state. Chikazumi also remained committed to the traditional sectarian model even as he advocated reform of Jōdo Shinshū in the pages of Shinjū kōgen, while Andō eventually aimed to abolish sectarianism in favor of a new, unified Buddhism that could advance the national agenda. Andō’s method was to effect change from within the corridors of political power as a politician; Chikazumi’s was to agitate and rally Buddhists to the cause while exerting pressure on politicians through vociferous lobbies.

I chose these figures in part because they both appeared in Chapter Two as proponents of a kōninkō (officially recognized religion) system, but also because they identified their activities as remonstrating with the government at least as much as they saw themselves as contributing to state initiatives. In their positions on the margins of the sectarian establishment (Andō returned to lay life in 1914; Chikazumi’s Kyōdo Kaikan was more “church” than “temple,” and he was temporarily defrocked in July 1929) both men represented a type of Buddhism that was politically distinct from the leadership of their own Jōdo Shinshū sect and the other sects of Japanese Buddhism. In their access to the corridors of governmental power (Chikazumi as spiritual counselor to many of the elite graduates of Tokyo Imperial University; Andō as a legislator and cabinet official), both men enjoyed considerable political influence. Andō and Chikazumi alike represent a model of “engaged Buddhism” that resists the hitherto common portrayal of Buddhists as bloodthirsty imperialists or chauvinist nationalists, on the one hand, or principled socialists on the other.

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132 Andō recalled his differences of opinion with Chikazumi over the 1929 legislation in a 1935 article in Uchū entitled Shūkyō dantai hō mondai. See AM Reel #9, Item #122, 22–23.

133 Chikazumi was returned to the priesthood on 20 April 1936.

Andō and Chikazumi’s rhetoric also highlights how apologetic rhetoric operates through the juxtaposition of religions with each other and with the illegitimate category of “superstition.” Both men unquestioningly assumed that Buddhism was the repository for perennial truths about human existence, and both were unshakeable in their conviction that Buddhism, more than any other force, could provide Japan with the necessary spiritual tools for its national mobilization. However, both also felt that Japanese Buddhists had fallen short of the promise provided by the teachings. This conviction fueled their critiques of the clerical establishment, but it also provided a rationale for them to attack the various marginal groups that were competing with traditional, sectarian Buddhism for the allegiances of the people. Such impulses coincided with bureaucratic attempts to manage religions by subjecting “superstitions” to strict governmental oversight.

Implications for Understandings of Religious Freedom in the Early Shōwa Era

In their respective ways, each of the three cases examined above raises potentially counterintuitive ideas about religious freedom in early Shōwa era Japan. Religious freedom is not easily plotted on a continuum of whether it was wholly present or absent, and some interpretations of religious freedom were not necessarily oriented towards securing maximal freedom for everyone, but rather more freedom for some. Definitions of “religion” and “freedom” were crucial to the visions of religious freedom that each figure or interest group advanced.

The case of Chikazumi Jōkan showed that the question of why Buddhists failed to resist oppressive legislation is the wrong question. Chikazumi and his allies fiercely opposed unpalatable legislation by holding lecture meetings, writing letters, calling on politicians, and publishing strident pamphlets. In addition to the fact that scholarship on Chikazumi is in its

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136 Garon 1997. Jason Josephson (2012) has offered a theoretical analysis of how the boundaries of religion are defined by superstition, which is in turn negated by a legal-scientific “secular.”
incipient stages, his lobbying efforts have probably been overlooked to date because of two factors. The first is that foregoing studies have tended to focus on the elite scale of politically connected sectarian leaders at the expense of examining other influential religious leaders like Chikazumi who operated in extra-sectarian or transsectarian contexts. While Chikazumi eschewed  irenic ecumenism, he did use transsectarian organizations to pursue his political goals.

A second issue, and ultimately a more important one, is that Chikazumi’s illiberal rhetoric does not easily match up with postwar expectations for what “resistance” might have looked like. His vision of religious freedom was based on an unwavering commitment to the separation of religion from politics, but it was decidedly not egalitarian.

Like Chikazumi, Andō presents a potentially counterintuitive image to the postwar observer. On the one hand, his complicity with wartime projects is indisputable. While in the postwar deposition cited at the opening of this chapter he may have tried to pass himself off as a pawn with little clout in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, it is clear that he was a prominent layperson in the Buddhist world who eagerly participated in yoking Buddhism to the war effort and apparently had few qualms about using his status as a former Buddhist priest to convince Buddhists to join in his political projects. Yet in his contributions to the Religious Organizations Law and in his wartime transsectarian organizing, Andō also seems to have been motivated by an effort to protect religious freedom as he understood it. If the figure of Chikazumi Jōkan complicates the search for evidence of liberal “resistance,” Andō represents a type of Buddhist complicity with state projects that complicates the idea of Buddhists simply doing what the state wanted without making demands of their own.

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137 Abe (1968, 1969a, 1969b, 1970a, 1970b, 1970c) spoke of the sectarian leadership being ignorant of or uninterested in the question of religious freedom, but curiously his study did not cite specific examples.
Finally, on the subject of the administration of the law, Makiguchi Tsunesaburō’s story is superficially that of an unjustly persecuted religious martyr who died in prison devoted to his cause and denied his religious freedom, but I think it is important to highlight the fact that Makiguchi apparently had little use for religious freedom when mounting his defense. His interrogators even provided him with a chance to invoke the Japanese constitution, presumably a prime opportunity to seek exoneration for his crimes through appeal to Article 28. But religious freedom apparently did not work that way in Makiguchi’s mind. Whatever the constitution might say, it was a mere trace of the true teaching represented by the *Lotus sūtra*. More importantly, his Nichiren exclusivism—like Chikazumi Jōkan’s “absolute faith”—did not allow for a worldview in which religious affiliation was a matter of choice.138

The other temptation that must be resisted in thinking through the Makiguchi case is the tendency to assume that the state was eager to deny or limit religious freedom. I readily admit that part of Makiguchi’s guilt lay in his heretical statements about the sacrosanct emperor, but an equally important part of his crime—and perhaps the part that allowed the Special Higher Police to act—is that Makiguchi was inciting his followers to infringe on others’ freedoms. The Special Higher Police were able to use the Peace Preservation Law—not, it must be noted, the Religious Organizations Law, which focused more on rules for incorporation—to arrest Makiguchi and other high-ranking Gakkai members and thereby prevent further incursions on others’ right to worship things other than the Nichiren Shōshū *gohonzon*. My point here is that the Special Higher Police aimed to preserve peace and order, but in this particular case “peace and order” included the rights of ordinary citizens to worship as they pleased without interference by the zealous Gakkai members.

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There is no doubt that the war years were oppressive, that the Japanese military engaged in atrocious acts, and that religious ideas were readily mobilized to sanctify violence. The purpose of this chapter has not been to deny these historical facts, but rather to add some nuance to accounts that have too readily described Buddhists as myopically self-interested sycophants who merely sucked up to the state. The next chapter will show how the idea that Japanese religious leaders were ignorant of religious freedom emerged as a way of justifying the Occupation policy of promoting religious freedom in Japan. It was only by arguing that religious freedom was absent that Occupation policymakers could set about the process of establishing it. However, while the occupiers were ostensibly teaching the Japanese people about the importance of religious freedom, in actuality both parties were learning to think of religious freedom in a whole new way.
PART III
Chapter Five

Missionary Positions in Occupation Policy

Although a maximum of freedom on the part of individuals to select and practice a creed of their own choice has been provided, and though all religions and creeds are now entitled to precisely the same opportunities and protection, time will be required before the Japanese people, long accustomed to government paternalism and police scrutiny, can understand the true meaning of religious freedom. The activities of the Religions and Cultural Resources Division in this field, therefore, are now directed towards indoctrination of the Japanese people in the understanding, appreciation, and proper exercise of their new religious liberties.¹

Nearly two years after the cessation of hostilities between Japan and the United States, a small bombshell dropped in the form of a 23 June 1947 Richmond Times-Dispatch article entitled “Rev. Mr. Hopkins Hits AMG [American Military Government] Policy in Japan, Citing Poor Job in Stressing Christianity.” Recently returned from a May 1947 visit to missionary sites in Japan, Okinawa, and Korea, this Garland Evans Hopkins (1913–1965) publicly praised Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, as an earnest man of God.² However, Hopkins dismissed the general’s underlings as incompetent and obstructionist, describing them as inept bureaucrats operating under a “false philosophy of democracy” that advocated neutral, egalitarian treatment of all religions. Occupation policy based on such “false philosophy” favored local religions such as Shintō and Buddhism and left Christianity at a disadvantage. Given that America was a Christian nation, Hopkins argued, the military should

¹ “Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields” (RCR Box #5785, Folder #7, 1 January 1950), 22–23.
² The biographical dates given here are from a WorldCat entry on one Garland Evans Hopkins who apparently authored a book of sermons on the biblical book of Genesis. I suspect that the author of the sermons and the missionary are one and the same person.
reduce all restrictions on missionaries to allow Christianity to expand as rapidly as possible.\(^3\)

“Any who think that the kingdom of God will be ushered into Japan through the beneficent rule of General MacArthur are sadly mistaken,” Hopkins argued. “There will be no democracy in Japan, as there has never been in any country in the world, until the foundation for it is laid by the spread of the Christian faith.”\(^4\)

Hopkins’s incendiary statements were not well received. Missionaries in Japan and senior church officials in the United States hastily dashed off letters to Religions Division expressing their support for Occupation policy and emphasizing that Hopkins spoke as a free agent and did not represent the official stance of the church. At least one church official also directly wrote to Hopkins to suggest that he was hurting, rather than helping, the Christian cause.\(^5\) While Hopkins must therefore be deemed a particularly ardent outlier among those who hoped to spread Christianity in Japan in the wake of the war, the response his statements elicited from head of Religions Division Lieutenant Commander William K. Bunce (1907–2008) reveals a tension in Occupation policy between the ideals of egalitarian latitudinarianism and Christian evangelism.\(^6\)

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\(^3\) RCR Box #5773, Folder #23 (Miscellaneous Correspondence). Hopkins’ assertions were evidently picked up by the Religions News Service at the time.

\(^4\) See RCR Box #5773, Folder #23 (Miscellaneous Correspondence). Hopkins paid a visit to Religions Division on 13 May, during which he claimed to represent the Protestant Bodies of North America and to have some connection with the State Department Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs (Methodist missionaries in Japan later confirmed only that Hopkins served as a liaison between Methodist groups and the government in Washington, D.C.; RCR Box #5773, Folder #20). During his visit, Hopkins forcefully expressed his desire to interview people who might have negative views of the Occupation; he spoke with both Division Chief William K. Bunce (1907–2008) and Researcher William P. Woodard (1896–1973) but seemed dissatisfied with these conversations.

\(^5\) RCR Box #5773, Folder #23 (Miscellaneous Correspondence), letters from Rowland Cross to W.K. Bunce (29 July 1947, with addendum of R. Cross to G.E. Hopkins, dated 23 June 1947) and John Cobb to R.E. Diffendorfer (11 July 1947). The Religions Division was constructed out of a research unit initially assigned to the Civil Information & Education Section in autumn 1945.

\(^6\) Bunce appeared in Chapter One as the author of the Staff Memorandum on State Shintō.
With evident disdain for Hopkins’s intemperate accusations, on 10 July 1947 Bunce wrote a letter to the Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church that stated courteously but firmly that Hopkins’s portrayal was inaccurate. Bunce argued that Hopkins’s caricature was not only unfair to the fine missionaries currently serving in Japan who—like Religions Division officials—had also been a target of Hopkins’s disparaging remarks, but also revealed an appalling lack of awareness about how religious freedom actually operated. The Religions Division chief suggested that after democracy itself, religious freedom was the most frequently cited principle guiding both Allied wartime objectives and the documents laying out post-surrender policy for Japan. Equal treatment of all religions before the neutral state was fundamental to this principle.

However, Bunce went on to imply that Hopkins’s assertions overlooked the fact that commitment to religious freedom was actually providing aid to the Christian cause. He indignantly countered the claim that missionary efforts were being hampered by onerous Occupation policies by pointing out that missionaries had actually been given preferential treatment in comparison to other non-military personnel in terms of access to Japan, writing:

The privileges extended missionaries by SCAP have thus far not been enjoyed by any other persons not attached to the Occupation. They have been granted because it is recognized that Christianity can make an important contribution to the democratization of Japan. I believe that the contribution can be greater if the missionary movement is not tied too closely to the apron strings of the Occupation. General MacArthur’s own deep interest in the adoption by the Japanese of Christian principles is too well known to require mention here. Under his direction everything legitimate under the principle of religious freedom is being done to encourage the missionary movement.8

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7 This claim was actually only partially accurate. As I will show below, the actual content of “religious freedom” remained undefined and inchoate in pre-surrender policy documents. It had to be formally established once the Occupation was underway, in 1946.

8 William K. Bunce, 10 July 1947 Letter to Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church (in response to article from Richmond Times-Dispatch dated 23 June 1947), 2. RCR Box #5773, Folder #20.
This response to Hopkins’s letter shows the profound tensions between two competing understandings of the Occupation mission: to democratize Japan by promoting Christianity, or to democratize Japan by protecting and expanding rights and liberties. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight how these competing understandings informed three paradoxical policy orientations that, in turn, had mostly unintended but lasting consequences for understandings of religious freedom, both in Japan and globally.⁹

First, I investigate the subtle (if sometimes overt) preference given to Christianity based on the contemporary assumption that democracy would flourish in Japan if the nation could be successfully converted. General MacArthur’s ardent evangelism has been well documented and will receive only a brief treatment here.¹⁰ What interests me in particular is that although Religions Division resistance to such evangelism has been praised in postwar scholarship as a victory for liberal principles, private memoranda between members of Religions Division, Religions Division correspondence with missionaries, and suspect portions of otherwise neutral official reports all reveal an unofficial commitment to promote Christianity under the guise of establishing religious freedom. In other words, even those who were most fervently interested in promoting religious freedom seem to have been interested in doing so precisely because it would not only protect Christianity as a minority religion, but also improve its chances for survival in Japan by creating a more fertile epistemological ground in which it could grow. While religious freedom had a history of being used cynically by Christians in colonial and quasi-colonial contexts to gain access to otherwise impenetrable areas, during the Occupation this sort of

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⁹ Previous scholarship specifically on the religious policies of the Occupation includes Woodard 1972; Ikado, ed. 1993; Nakano 2003; Moore 2011; and Dorman 2012.
instrumentalist view was balanced by a more nuanced position that—while still Protestant Christian in origin—treated religious freedom in a more latitudinarian fashion and aimed instead to encourage locals to understand religious belief and affiliation in elective terms.11

Another irony is that even though the occupiers in charge of religions policy regularly criticized the wartime Japanese government for co-opting transsectarian groups and conscripting them into the war effort, Religions Division readily used transsectarian organizations as both sources of information about the religious world and as mediums for the transmission of directives and politically orthodox messages. While the political context was considerably different, functionally the postwar groups (some of which were simply renamed with slight shakeups in chief personnel after the war) were strikingly similar to their wartime counterparts. If during the war these groups were designed to ensure that member organizations contributed materially and ideologically to the war effort, in the postwar period these groups ensured that member organizations embraced the new logic of religious freedom. To compound the irony, even as the occupiers critiqued wartime Japanese religions for their sense of dependence on the state, the Japanese groups came to rely on regular contacts with Religions Division members to confirm that they were conducting their affairs in a manner appropriate to the new regime.

A final irony is that the occupiers were supposed to teach the Japanese people how to understand religious freedom, but in the unique environment of the Occupation the occupiers themselves came to understand religious freedom in a new way. Up until the Occupation, religious freedom had served as a rhetorical placeholder that justified the Pacific War and

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10 The most thorough, if sometimes excessively suspicious, treatment is Moore 2011. Moore’s valuable study occasionally projects contemporary understandings of religious freedom back onto the Occupation period.

11 On instrumentalist uses of religious freedom, see Mahmood 2012 and Josephson 2012.
Jolyon Baraka Thomas  

Japan's Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

sublimated its otherwise overt racism. In addition to the irony that the Americans aimed to teach the Japanese how to enjoy their new civil liberties even at a time when the United States’ own record with civil liberties was hardly unambiguous, the fact that the occupiers were working with policy documents that used the language of “human rights” demanded that they formulate what exactly was being protected and which institutions could guarantee it. The outcome was that the context of the Occupation forced the concept of “human rights” from the status of flowery American wartime rhetoric into its incipience as a full-fledged legal concept, even if the legal apparatus for securing human rights remained unclear. Given the prominence of religious freedom among the “human rights” that the occupiers were trying to promote and protect, I argue that it was during the second phase of the Occupation (roughly between 1946 and 1951) when religious freedom came to be understood, for the first time in history on both sides of the Pacific, as an inalienable right shared by all humans.

Collectively, the three paradoxes or tensions investigated below reveal several points of continuity and rupture that distinguish my project from earlier scholarship on the Occupation. Against the view that the Occupation introduced liberal democratic principles where there previously were none, in the specific case of religious freedom I argue that the occupiers’ methods, like those of the prewar and wartime Japanese government, established a set of

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12 This rationalizing tactic was not insignificant considering the brutality of the war and the incredible loss of life of non-combatants through the use of unprecedented and extremely devastating weaponry (both indiscriminate incendiary bombing and the first use of atomic weapons).

13 The armed forces were still racially segregated at the onset of the Occupation, matching the existence of Jim Crow legislation in the United States itself. In terms of religious rights and liberties, in the mid-1940s it is clear that Protestants were first among equals in the United States, with Catholics and Jews nominally enjoying equal treatment but often suffering discrimination. The internment of Japanese Americans during the war years was also based on a combination of racist thinking and religious prejudice.
acceptable and unacceptable forms of religion and gave preferential treatment to specific religions (especially Christianity). Another point of continuity is that the occupiers, like the wartime Japanese government, used transsectarian religious groups (that is, groups that set aside doctrinal differences in the pursuit of social and political goals) to keep tabs on developments in the religious world and to disseminate information about “proper” modes of religious development. While both governments maintained the pretense of leaving doctrine up to religious leaders, each in its own way established parameters for acceptable doctrine and practice through censorship, surveillance, reprimands, and occasional police crackdowns.

The Occupation was also a period of rupture, but not because the Americans introduced a new form of political organization wholesale. The main change was that the circumstances of the Occupation—a situation in which governance nominally resided with the sovereign Japanese state but was monitored and often directly dictated by the Occupation government—created the necessity for treating rights and liberties as universal principles that transcended the jurisdiction of one particular state. While rights and liberties had been discussed in superficially universalistic terms prior to and during the war, during the Occupation the need to transform that universalism from rhetoric to reality became immediately apparent. Religious freedom could no longer be treated as merely a civil liberty granted to Japanese citizens by the state. Rather, it had to be reconfigured so that it was simultaneously innate (inherent in individuals regardless of their citizenship) and transcendent (superseding the authority of any particular government). This reconfiguration was directly, if paradoxically, related to the continuities between the wartime and

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14 The problem of how to guarantee human rights in the absence of an authoritative world government remains to this day. See Moyn 2010.

15 Here I diverge greatly from Nakano (2003), who sees the Occupation as a point of rupture because it introduced the principle of religious freedom.
Occupation governments. By claiming to protect a “human right,” the occupiers were able to distinguish their governance from that of the wartime Japanese government.

The Mission of the Occupation: A General Overview

While Occupation policies regarding religion were complex and changed over time, they can be distilled down to two major objectives. First, the occupiers were to proclaim religious freedom and arrange for the protection of civil liberties, including freedom of belief, expression, and conscience. Of necessity, this project required eradication of the system that had been in place during the war. I argued in Chapter One that the occupiers created the category of State Shintō to highlight an illegitimate form of secularism. The inherently pejorative phrase “State Shintō” treated the Japanese claim that religion was separate from the state (and that religious freedom was protected) as specious. It implied that Japanese religion-state relations were characterized not by any principle of separation, but rather by a tendency to align religion with the state. Operating from the presupposition that this “State Shintō” differed from more genuine forms of secularism like those found in the Western Europe and (especially) in the United States, the occupiers first had to engage in a negative project of eradicating what they saw as deleterious laws and administrative policies before they could replace them with positive ones.

Disestablishment of the wartime status quo was a fairly straightforward process that involved the promulgation of the Civil Liberties Directive that guaranteed freedoms of speech and religion to Japanese citizens (4 October 1945); the research, drafting, and promulgation of the Shintō Directive that formally extricated Shintō from all aspects of political life (15 December 1945); the promulgation of the Religious Corporations Ordinance that established new criteria and procedures for religious incorporation (28 December 1945); and the formal elimination of
militarism from public school education through the purge of teachers, censorship of school textbooks, and the abolition of courses in history, self-cultivation (shūshin) and geography that were understood to advance chauvinistic ideals derived from “State Shintō” ideology. Additionally (and ironically), the Civil Censorship Detachment censored press and radio, while the Religions Division monitored religious organizations (particularly Shintō shrines) for compliance. Although the censorship would continue for most of the Occupation, in terms of legal changes this negative phase was quite short. It lasted from the onset of the Occupation in the late summer of 1945 into the spring of 1946, when the occupiers began to turn their attention to positive aims such as the drafting of the new constitution, the establishment of the postwar educational system, and similar long-term liberal projects.\textsuperscript{16}

One such project characterized the second objective related to religion, which was the directive to foster a desire for religious freedom among the Japanese people. This ambitious—perhaps quixotic—goal effectively aimed to refashion Japanese society by reconstituting Japanese subjectivity. The concept of religion in its modern sense had been introduced to Japan in the middle of the nineteenth century, and over the course of the next several decades it came to be understood in Japan—as it was being understood in the contemporaneous West—as a universal aspect of human experience with local variations such as “Hinduism,” “Buddhism,” and the like. While (Protestant) Christianity was undoubtedly the prototypical member of the category, the Protestant emphasis on “religion” as a matter of private assent to propositional
statements of belief did not map easily onto Japanese religious practices.\textsuperscript{17} With some exceptions, Japanese people tended to have expansive notions of religious affiliation, and Japanese ritual practice had often been determined by geographical context or the ritual calendar rather than by exclusive affiliation with one denomination or sect.\textsuperscript{18} Accordingly, one task for the occupiers was to bolster a sense of religious freedom that was inherently elective and exclusivist.

Although many Japanese religious and political leaders apparently felt that the 1889 Meiji Constitution had unproblematically guaranteed religious freedom, Occupation policies were based on the rather supercilious assessment that Japan lacked any tradition of “genuine” religious freedom and that the Japanese people therefore needed basic instruction in how to exercise religious liberty.\textsuperscript{19} With no apparent sense of irony, Religions Division officials averred that “the Japanese people, long accustomed to government paternalism … [required] indoctrination … in the understanding, appreciation, and proper exercise of their new religious liberties.”\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{17} Josephson 2012
\textsuperscript{18} One exception to this inclusivist attitude is Nichiren Buddhist exclusivism, documented by Stone (1994).
\textsuperscript{19} Woodard 1972, 49–50; 182–183.
\textsuperscript{20} “Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields” (RCR Box #5785, Folder #7, 1 January 1950), 22–23. Earlier chapters have demonstrated that this interpretation was based on a highly selective appraisal of Japanese history. The debates over the Yamagata religions bill in 1899 and early 1900 outlined in Chapter Two revealed a robust dialogue in which competing visions of religious freedom were weighed, tested, and compared. Subsequent debates about attempts to pass similar religions legislation in 1927, 1929, 1935, and 1939 also reveal that liberal democratic processes greatly influenced the shape the proposed bills took. Even the 1939 Religious Organizations Law—the law that the occupiers would eventually single out as being particularly detrimental to religious freedom—was understood in context to protect religious freedoms, not infringe upon them. Finally, while marginal groups were clearly (and sometimes violently) suppressed by the Japanese state, in context this occurred through a double process whereby they were either denied status as genuine “religions” or criminalized (in the case of Sōka Kyōiku Gakkai outlined briefly in Chapter Four) because they infringed on the religious freedoms of others.
The Occupation diagnosis that Japan had gotten religious freedom wrong in the Meiji Constitution was problematic not only because it was historically inaccurate, but also because it treated religious freedom as a perennial principle that had been cynically distorted by the Japanese state. This sort of suspicious interpretation overlooked the deep linkages between religious freedom and the unequal geopolitical power relations that had characterized Japan’s relationship with the United States and other Western nations for most of the previous century.\footnote{Mahmood 2012}

The problem was not that Japan misinterpreted “genuine” religious freedom, as the occupiers claimed, but that the very form the Japanese legal guarantee of religious freedom could take was inflected by tactical considerations related to Japan’s tenuous diplomatic situation at the close of the nineteenth century. Domestic issues unique to Japan such as managing the relationships between Buddhism, Shintō, Christianity, and burgeoning new religious movements also played a role. As such, the interpretation of religious freedom that was enshrined in the Meiji Constitution reflected the threat posed by unequal treaties, the encroachment of foreign missionaries, and the pragmatic recognition that there were diplomatic and domestic benefits and pitfalls to guaranteeing religious freedom as a civil liberty.\footnote{See Maxey 2005 and Josephson 2012.}

Subsequent interpretations of the scope of religious freedom (in the press, in scholarship, and in police actions) reflected anxieties about potentially seditious movements as well as shifting understandings of rights and liberties as such. In sum, multiple visions of religious freedom had coexisted in prewar and wartime Japan, but most of them did not easily match what the occupiers expected to find. This was true in no small part because for many in the Occupation, religious freedom was at some level synonymous with
the spread of Christianity. For such people, the possibility that Japanese people might choose religions other than Christianity was unthinkable or anathema.

In addition to the problematic assumption that the Japanese people were ignorant about the importance of religious freedom, a second problematic presupposition that informed the Occupation policy of promoting religious freedom was that the concept of religious freedom itself was self-evident. Policymakers initially assumed that Occupation personnel would naturally know—presumably simply by virtue of being American citizens—how to legally implement religious freedom and how to explain the concept to their Japanese counterparts. Yet there was actually a wide variety of opinion among Occupation officials regarding what it meant to institute religious freedom. The concept would therefore have to be defined not only for Japanese religious leaders and politicians eager to ingratiate themselves with the new regime, but also for occupiers who sometimes had trouble distinguishing between elimination of religious favoritism, promotion of Christianity, protection of all religions from excessive governmental oversight and persecution, and laissez-faire policies that readily tolerated marginal religious groups. As I will show, over the course of the Occupation the resolution of such tensions resulted in unprecedented interpretations of religious freedom.

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23 Nakano 1993; Moore 2011
24 This process of definition was complicated by the fact that the occupiers generally mobilized understandings of religion that were deeply inflected by Protestant Christianity. Religion itself was treated as a matter of private assent to propositional statements of belief, belief was generally regarded as more important than ritual practice, personal relationships with deities were valued over relationships that required clerical mediation, and religious affiliation was understood to be singular, not plural. This bias was not only a reflection of Protestantism’s status as the de facto civil religion of the United States in the mid-1940s, but also a remnant of the racist “holy war” rhetoric that had pitted the (ostensibly) rational, universalist Christianity of the United States against the (putatively) irrational, particularist “Shintō” of the Japanese people. On the racist aspects of this rhetoric, see Dower 1986. I discussed the association of specific modes of religiosity with “civilization” in Chapter One. To recap briefly, in the mid-1940s scholarship on religion operated on a quasi-evolutionary paradigm in which the “higher” religions reflected
Irony 1: The Christian Mission of Promoting Religious Freedom

At a meeting of the Allied Council for Japan that took place on the morning of 26 November 1947, Chair of the Committee on the Establishment of Religious Freedom in Japan, William J. Sebald, opened his report with the following statement:

The importance of spiritual concepts in the reorientation of the Japanese nation was clearly stated by the Supreme Commander [General Douglas MacArthur] when he declared following the formal surrender on September 2, 1945: “The problem basically is theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character …. It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.”

From its inception, the occupation has proceeded with minimum display of Allied force. While its course has been firmly charted toward the achievement of political objectives, progress has rested largely upon the application of those guiding tenets of our Christian faith—justice, tolerance, understanding—which, without yielding firmness, have underwritten all Allied policy.25

Such a transparently evangelical pronouncement from a bureaucrat responsible for promoting religious freedom in Japan may seem incongruent. However, Sebald’s remarks represent a strain of thought that exerted significant influence on Occupation policy.26 In this line of thinking, the raison d’être of the Occupation was to promote a mass conversion of the Japanese populace. Christianity would guide Occupation initiatives, and as the foundation for democracy it would serve as a bulwark against both militarist recidivism and communism.27

universal ethical concerns while the “lower” or “primitive” religions remained culturally or geographically bounded and were more likely to focus on tangible outcomes (magic) rather than abstract ideals such as liberation.

25 William J. Sebald, Chair of the Committee on the Establishment of Religious Freedom in Japan, in an oral report given at the Forty-Sixth Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, RCR Box #5773, Folder #7. According to a handwritten note on one version of the document, the meeting may have actually been postponed until 10 December.

26 Both paragraphs paraphrased statements made by Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur. The second paragraph loosely quoted a statement MacArthur made to one Dr. Lewis C. Newton, President of the American Baptist Convention, in a letter reported in the military newspaper Stars and Stripes on 13 December 1946. See Woodard 1972, Appendix G:4, 355.

Although it was extremely influential, this attitude was not official Occupation policy. As Religions Division Chief William K. Bunce pointed out time and again during the Occupation—and as researcher William P. Woodard would note in his 1972 semi-autobiographical academic monograph on Occupation religions policy—there was simply no provision in the documents laying out the objectives of the Occupation in general or those of either the Civil Information and Education Section or the Religions Division that suggested specifically that Christianity should be promoted in Japan. In the area of religion, pre-surrender policy documents indicated that the occupiers were to encourage the Japanese people “to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedom of religion, assembly, speech, and the press.” Freedom of religious worship was to be proclaimed at the outset of the Occupation, while “ultra-nationalistic and militaristic organizations and movements [would] not be permitted to hide behind the cloak of religion.” The Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) was established on 2 October 1945 in order to enact these policies. Given the importance of its task vis-à-vis religions in particular, on 28 November 1945 the Religions Unit

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28 Woodard 1972, 210. A fantastic overview of the pre-surrender policies and their initial implementation in the fall of 1945 is Nakano 1993. The best primary source is FRUS. As Nakano’s chapter and Woodard’s book outline in considerable detail the administrative organization of the policy planning committees and their relationship with the United States Department of State and the Japanese government, I will forego recapitulating those details here.

29 “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Volume: Freedom of Religion, 2 September 1945–1 September 1946,” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3) 2. This language is striking given that some scholars have been recently highlighting how “human rights” did not crystallize conceptually until well after the war (Moyn 2010; Hoffmann, ed. 2011; Weitz 2013). I return to this issue in the next chapter.

30 Notably, the document laying out this policy (6 September 1945 directive SWNCC 150/4, publicly announced by the White House on 22 September 1945) did not subject the freedom of religion clause to the caveat (applied to the other freedoms of assembly, speech, and press) that it would be “subject to the necessity for maintaining the security of the occupying forces.” While this reveals the nearly sacrosanct status of religious freedom in Occupation policy, it is equally notable that Occupation officials did not actually formally define religious freedom for the
of this Section became a separate division called the Religions and Cultural Resources Division (Religions Division hereafter).

The objectives of Religions Division were ambiguous for the first two months of its existence. It was only in February 1946 that the division was given a clear list of objectives separate from those given to the Civil Information and Education Section. From that point on, the mission of Religions Division was to:

a. Expedite the establishment and preservation of religious freedom and encourage the Japanese people to develop a desire for religious freedom.

b. Prohibit Japanese Government sponsorship, support, perpetuation, control, and dissemination of Shintō.

c. Maintain vigilance to see that militaristic and ultra-nationalistic organizations and movements [did] not hide behind the cloak of religion.

d. Maintain liaison with religious organizations in order to insure their understanding and cooperation with the information and education objectives of the Supreme Commander.

e. Collaborate with the Arts and Monuments Division in making recommendations to the Supreme Commander on matters pertaining to the protection, preservation, restitution, salvage, or other disposition of religious articles and religious buildings.

f. Formulate policies relating to the return of Christian missionaries to Japan and Korea.31


31 See “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan: Volume: Freedom of Religion,” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3), 3–4, citing 1 February 1946 Checksheet from SCAP CI&E to Chief ofStaff, “Mission and Functions of the Religions Division.” It bears noting that Occupation documents tended to repeat the same catchphrases: “hide behind the cloak of religion”; “develop a desire for religious freedom.” This probably derives from Occupation bureaucrats’ efforts to show that their policies conformed with initiatives dictated at the upper echelons of the military government and the United States Department of State. One side effect was that such phrases fostered a sort of ossification in Occupation policymaking—catchphrases became shorthand and subsequently became foregone conclusions. Occupation bureaucrats may have struggled to adjust as rapid developments in Japanese society outstripped their initial policy initiatives as a result of this feedback loop.
While this coherent list was not established until six months into the Occupation, some of the objectives were clear from the moment Religions Division was created. In particular, points (b) and (c) occupied Religions Division in the first month of its existence. With the promulgation of a new ordinance regarding rules for incorporation of religious organizations (the Religious Corporations Ordinance, promulgated 28 December 1945), the division soon found itself fielding questions from leaders of religious organizations who were eager to forestall schism or seek incorporation (d).32

Although it was listed first, the policy (a) of “[expediting] the establishment and preservation of religious freedom and encourag[ing] the Japanese people to develop a desire for religious freedom” was quite difficult to implement as its intangible outcomes were not easily measured. As a result, once the basic legal instruments for guaranteeing religious freedom to all were in place, Religions Division could only “encourage the Japanese people to develop a desire for religious freedom” indirectly through ad hoc interactions with religious leaders.33 As I will show, however, Religions Division personnel seized on opportunities presented by invitations to speak at religiously-affiliated colleges to sermonize on the benefits of religious freedom, and their regular meetings with trans-denominational and transsectarian organizations provided rich opportunities for advocacy and guidance.

32 While Religions Division clearly played a major advisory role in helping religious organizations understand the new regime, a number of transsectarian journals emerged in the postwar period that served to clarify matters of procedure for religious institutions. Prominent among these was the postwar journal Shūkyō jihō (Religion Times) which was published from August 1947; the monthly magazine included advice columns about taxation, incorporation, and other aspects of religion-state relations as well as general interest stories from the religious world. See ShJ 1/1. Shūkyō jihō is one of the many Occupation-era magazines included in the Prange Collection of censored documents from the Occupation era. Another transsectarian periodical included in the collection that offered meditations on the future of Japanese religions under the new regime was Shūkyō kōron (SK), a magazine published by the Shūkyō Mondai Kenkyūsho (Religious Problems Research Institute).
As for (f), although the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee documents that initially set post-surrender policy made no explicit mention of promoting Christianity, the model of religious freedom promoted during the Occupation reflected a general Protestant Christian sensibility by regarding religion as primarily a matter of propositional belief, emphasizing free choice in religious affiliation, and codifying suspicion toward clerical authorities (particularly those who wielded, or sought to wield, political power). The policy of facilitating the return of Christian missionaries crept into policy at the very end of December 1945 through a unilateral decision made by General MacArthur; it was formally announced to Occupation personnel on 4 January 1946.

Later reports documenting the progress of Division initiatives regularly made obligatory reference to the objective of facilitating the return of Christian missionaries, almost certainly as a way of appeasing MacArthur. The policy was a sore point for Religions Division officials, as they were usually the front line of defense against the justifiable suspicion on the part of Buddhist and Shintō priests that Occupation policy was biased in favor of Christians. As a

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33 Woodard 1972, 178.
36 For example, the section outlining the activities of the Religions and Cultural Resources Division in a 1 January 1950 report entitled “Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Fields” included a clause stating that in addition to establishing and fostering religious freedom and eliminating ultranationalism from cultural production, one duty of the division was to facilitate Christian mission work in a manner not inconsistent with the principles of religious freedom and separation of church and state. “Mission and Accomplishments of the Occupation in the Civil Information & Education Fields” (RCR Box #5785, Folder #7, 1 January 1950), 20; 25–26.
37 Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard (1896–1973) later recalled that, despite the claims of some Buddhists to the contrary, the Division never discriminated against Buddhism
result, the division tried (ultimately unsuccessfully) to facilitate the arrival of non-Christian missionaries in Japan to mitigate the impression that Christians were receiving special treatment.\footnote{Woodard 1972, 187–188.} As the opening anecdote illustrated, some Christian missionaries were significant annoyances to those responsible for creating and enacting religions policy because of their innate sense of entitlement and their attempts to co-opt the Occupation for their parochial purposes.

**MacArthur’s Christianity**

The Division was particularly hard-pressed to deal with the appearance of favoritism because Supreme Commander General Douglas MacArthur took nearly every opportunity he could to equate the Occupation with a Christianizing mission.\footnote{Woodard 1972, Appendix G:4, 355–359.} MacArthur interpreted the latitude granted to him as Supreme Commander rather liberally, creating opportunities to inject his own “spiritual” project of rehabilitation into the political and economic reforms that dominated prewar and immediate postwar State Department policies.\footnote{Moore 2011, 32–34; 56.} This conceit allowed him to unilaterally inform the State Department via telegram on 29 December 1945 that he planned to facilitate the return of Christian missionaries to Japan.\footnote{Moore 2011, 61–63.} Once missionaries were in the country, he did not hesitate to offer some of them signed letters—easily misconstrued by locals as direct orders from the Supreme Commander demanding compliance—as a way of granting them access to otherwise impenetrable areas.

Here it is instructive to merely offer one example of MacArthur’s evangelistic rhetoric, from a radio address to the United States Congress given on 24 February 1947:

> (Woodard 1972, 279). It may have been true that Buddhists were not treated in a derogatory fashion, but they were certainly at a disadvantage in comparison to Christianity.

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38 Woodard 1972, 187–188.

39 A collection of MacArthur’s quotations about the goal of spreading Christianity in Japan can be found in Woodard 1972, Appendix G:4, 355–359.

40 Moore 2011, 32–34; 56.

A spontaneous development which offers both encouragement and inspiration as a measure of the progress of this concept (the superiority of moral force over physical force) lies in the increasing number of the Japanese people—already estimated at over two million—who, under the stimulus of religious tolerance and freedom, have moved to embrace the Christian faith as a means to fill the spiritual vacuum left in Japanese life by the collapse of their past faith. …

Through the firm encouragement and strengthening of this yet frail spearhead of Christianity in the Far East lies hope that to hundreds of millions of backward peoples, now easy prey to the ignorant fatalism of war, may come a heretofore unknown spiritual strength based upon an entirely new concept of human dignity and human purpose and human relationship—the very antithesis to those evil attributes which throughout history have led to war.42

While the official stance of the Occupation was to promote egalitarian religions policy, MacArthur’s public statements clearly suggested that the Occupation was essentially a Christian mission. Notably, the State Department did not deign to correct the general’s evangelizing rhetoric, lending tacit approval to his cause and implicitly accepting the logic that Christianity would counter Communism in East Asia. While MacArthur would eventually run afoul of United States President Harry Truman (1884–1972) due to an incorrigible propensity for insubordination, on the subject of the Christianization of Japan MacArthur received unofficial but palpable support from the highest echelons of the U.S. government, including statements from Truman himself that suggested that the president agreed with MacArthur’s assessment that

42 Douglas MacArthur, 24 February 1947 radio address to Congress, reproduced in Woodard 1972, 356. MacArthur’s estimates of the total number of Christians in Japan were wildly off-base. While his representation of non-Christian Japanese as counting among “backward peoples” was consistent with the racist rhetoric of the war years, it understandably raised the hackles of religious leaders who did not regard themselves as benighted savages. On the racist rhetoric of the war, see Dower 1986. The irony of white Christians claiming a divine mandate to spread their gospel throughout Japan in the wake of a war in which Japanese aggression had been attributed to a divine mandate to convert the world to the worship of the emperor was evidently lost on MacArthur. The Supreme Commander readily equated Christianity with whiteness, democracy, and political and economic progress. MacArthur regularly referred to Japan’s postwar “spiritual vacuum” in his disquisitions on the need for Christianity in the country; this characterization later crept into mainstream scholarship on Japanese religions as an explanation for the decline of traditional Buddhism or for the rise of new religions. For example, see
the problem with Japan was “basically theological.”  Former Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard’s appraisal of the general’s equation of Christian proselytizing with the defeat of Communism is particularly apt. “Commendable as this motive may have been,” Woodard wrote, “this was a stark reminder that the Japanese extremists did not have any monopoly when it came to using religion, including Christianity, for the achievement of political ends.”

Bunce: Public and Private Sides

MacArthur enjoyed tacit support from his political superiors, but his subordinates who were directly in charge of religions policy chafed at his evangelism. Since they were the ones who had to deal directly with disgruntled local religious leaders, they were more likely to recognize that MacArthur’s estimation of Christianity’s prospects in Japan were greatly overblown. They were also primed to see the detrimental effects of MacArthur’s statements, many of which directly countered the egalitarian vision of religious freedom they had been ordered to implement. In this regard it is crucial to point to the influence of Division Chief William K. Bunce, whose attitudes not only affected everything Religions Division did, but who also single-handedly began the


Moore 2011, 31; 139–140. As the person ultimately responsible for using unprecedented and devastating weaponry on a non-belligerent population, Truman no doubt had a vested interest in appealing to the negative image of Japan’s “perverse” religion as a rationale for his actions. While the atom bomb was the most shocking of the military strategies used against the dehumanized Japanese enemy, it also bears mentioning that the firebombing of nearly every major Japanese city was without precedent in human warfare. The prospect of unleashing such indiscriminate destruction on non-combatants had garnered considerable opprobrium mere years before, but at the height of the war such measures were rationalized through the language of extermination. See Dower 1986, 38–41.

Woodard 1972, 245.
process of redefining religious freedom in terms that could be applied transnationally and across denominations.45

As the opening anecdote indicated, Bunce fiercely resisted missionary attempts to co-opt the Occupation. He also repeatedly tried, with limited success, to implore the supreme commander to tone down his rhetoric. In order to forestall impressions that the Occupation was giving preferential treatment to Christians, on 19 July 1949 Bunce floated the idea of having MacArthur make a public statement to the effect that local religions could contribute to democratizing efforts just as much as Christianity.46 Civil Information and Education Section Chief Donald R. Nugent (d.u.) shot this idea down before it could reach MacArthur, and ultimately nothing came of the proposal.47

Foregoing scholarship has tended to highlight Religions Division’s resistance to MacArthur’s evangelism as a (not wholly unmitigated but nevertheless significant) triumph for civil liberties and a check on abuses of American power.48 However, internal documents reveal that MacArthur was not alone in his hope that Japan would become Christian under Occupation influence.49 Even the most professional of the occupiers in charge of religions policy—those like Bunce who operated strictly by the book in terms of their support for the principle of latitudinarian religious freedom—still revealed themselves to be privately sympathetic with

46 The suggestion apparently originated from University of Tokyo scholar of religious studies Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964).
47 However, near the end of his tenure the Supreme Commander seems to have recognized that his statements may have been having the opposite of their intended effect. While he modified his ardent Christian rhetoric somewhat, he never quite acknowledged that other religions could contribute substantively to Japan’s democratization. Woodard 1972, 241–248; Appendix G:2.
48 Nakano 1993, 66.
49 Christian missionaries eager to return to Japan did so first as part of the Occupation bureaucracy, sometimes proving themselves to be terrible administrators but ardent liaisons between Japanese Christians and their American counterparts. Moore 2011, 36–37.
MacArthur’s aims even if they disagreed with his methods and were evidently frustrated with the awkward position in which his evangelistic fervor put them.\textsuperscript{50}

Publicly, Bunce strictly applied the principle of separation of religion and the state and sought to distance Religions Division from the appearance of giving undue preference to Christian missionaries or Christian doctrine. Privately, however, Bunce revealed himself to be interested in promoting religious freedom and separation of religion and the state precisely because it would provide the best circumstances for Christianity to flourish in Japan. For example, in his response to Hopkins’s provocative comments addressed to the Board of Missions of the Methodist Church, Bunce wrote as follows:

> There has always been a state religion in Japan, and even yet [in July 1947] the requirements of religious freedom are not completely understood. It would be a betrayal of the purpose for which we are occupying Japan if in our enthusiasm for Christianity we should further becloud the issue. I believe that Christianity now faces its greatest opportunity in the history of Japan. The people are receptive and the government friendly. But I also believe that the greatest service the Occupation can in the long run perform for Christianity and all other minority religions is to establish respect for the principle of religious freedom so firmly that years after the Occupation is ended no Japanese official will desire to return to the old policy of favoritism and discrimination. Only on such a basis can Christianity look forward to a hopeful future in Japan.\textsuperscript{51}

While I can only speculate as to the degree to which these private statements to missionaries were intended as conciliatory platitudes rather than heartfelt sentiments, taking the statements at face value suggests that Bunce was actually quite invested in the success of the Christian

\textsuperscript{50} Moore 2011, 68–73.
\textsuperscript{51} 10 July 1947 Letter to Board of Missions, Methodist Church (RCR Box #5773, Folder #20), 3. Woodard (1972, 212) attributes this paragraph to an undated letter addressed to Elizabeth A. Whewell. He may have seen an early draft of a 2 October 1947 letter addressed to Whewell, a copy of which is found in the same RCR box and folder as the letter to the Board of Missions. It is also possible that Bunce recycled the same paragraph.
church.\textsuperscript{52} This reading is corroborated in part by the fact that Bunce was motivated to write in similar terms on multiple occasions. For example, responding to a complaint from a missionary named Elizabeth Whewell that Occupation policy did not allow Christians to hold meetings in public school buildings, on 2 October 1947 Bunce wrote:

\begin{quote}
In its relationships with the Japanese Government and people, the Occupation has been consistently guided by the Christian principles of justice, tolerance, and understanding. Nothing would provide a firmer undergirding of democracy in Japan than the voluntary adoption of these same principles by the Japanese people. It is in recognition of the great contribution that Christianity can make to the democratization of Japan that the door was opened to the return of missionaries a year and a half in advance of the admission of any other non-Occupation personnel. It is gratifying that, despite hardships, so many missionaries have already returned to take up their work again in this war-torn land. I hope that they form only the vanguard of those who will come in answer to the unparalleled opportunities to spread the ideals of the Christian faith.

The principle of religious freedom, which has been universally accepted as basic to democracy, is set forth in the Potsdam Declaration as one of the primary objectives of the Occupation. It is clearly stated in the new Japanese Constitution. It requires that all religious faiths be given an equal opportunity to practice and to propagate their beliefs and that all enjoy equality before the state. To favor one group over another would, I believe, do violence to the principle of religious freedom and in the long run would be detrimental to the Christian cause.\textsuperscript{53}
\end{quote}

Bunce’s response to Whewell’s complaint is significant not only because it revealed his hopes for the ultimate success of Christianity, but also because it explicitly linked such success

\textsuperscript{52} On the subject of Christianity facing “its greatest opportunity in the history of Japan,” it bears mentioning that among the correspondence directed towards the Religions Division, an inordinate number of letters stressed the writers’ convictions that Japan should adopt Christianity as its national religion. This self-selecting group—many members of which addressed their correspondence directly to MacArthur—was almost certainly biased in its acceptance of the new regime and its willingness to operate through Occupation channels, but no doubt to members of the Division at the time it seemed that many Japanese people were quite interested in Christianity. Some correspondents identified themselves as practicing Christians, while others merely expressed interest in learning more about the religion of the occupiers. RCR Box #5773, Folder #6.

\textsuperscript{53} Anonymous [almost certainly W.K. Bunce], 2 October 1947 letter to Elizabeth A. Whewell in response to a 21 July letter complaining about the inability of missionaries to use public schools for Christian meetings. RCR Box #5773, Folder #20.
to the establishment of religious freedom. Superficially, this would seem simply to mean that Japanese people would be free to adopt Christianity as their personal faith. However, I suspect that Bunce was actually highlighting something different. His hopes for Christian flourishing through the promotion of religious freedom existed not because Japanese people would be free to choose Christianity—legally, they had been able to do so for decades—but because the successful promotion of what Occupation policy designated a “desire for religious freedom” would foster a new religious paradigm in which religion was understood as formal affiliation with one particular denomination based on private, individual assent to propositional statements of belief. This amounted to a “Protestantization” of Japanese religiosity that refocused “religion” and portrayed it in terms of internal experience, sacred text, and exclusive affiliation.54

While he seems to have made every effort to separate his private hopes for Christian flourishing in Japan from his public stance as a governmental official, Bunce’s private commitments occasionally leaked into formal policy documents. For example, the following policy regarding Occupation assistance to missionaries not only reinforces the above quotes illustrating Bunce’s predilection for Christianity, but also demonstrates that while the superficial objective of the Occupation was to promote liberal latitudinarian administrative policies and a strict division of religion and the state, the ulterior motive guiding Occupation policy was to turn Japan into a Christian nation:

If the Christian movement in Japan draws support from the Occupation Forces our ultimate purpose to make Christianity permanent in Japan will be defeated at the end of the occupation. At that time the Japanese will repudiate Christianity as a creed of hypocrites whose proponents failed to live as Christians by accepting aid from the Occupation Forces which was not available to Japanese converts.55

54 This “Protestantization” process had begun with the introduction of the category of religion into Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. See Hoshino (2012) and Josephson (2012).
It was rare for such an explicitly evangelical pronouncement to creep into Bunce’s official policy directives. However, the research conducted by his division was—despite its dispassionate and authoritative academic tone—redolent of normative Christian ideals and a missionary outlook. For example, in a review of the 1948 Religions Division report entitled *Religions in Japan*, one T.T. Brumbaugh (d.u.) wrote the following in *The Christian Century* on 7 July 1948:

> Whether or not the American military government, purporting to represent the eleven Allied powers which defeated the nation it now occupies so effectually as to preclude any others from having much voice in its affairs, is a sufficiently unbiased observer to give weight to its judgments of Japan’s religious ideas and institutions, is of course not discussed in the book. In fact, one detects the assumption that these are the viewpoints of Christian Americans, if not indeed of former American missionaries now in the service of the army of occupation — than whom there are none more able to observe without favor or prejudice. However, whether these will be the judgments of history remains to be seen.56

While somewhat tortuously worded, Brumbaugh’s assessment suggested that even Christians writing for a Christian audience were occasionally put off by the missionary rhetoric that pervaded many of the documents produced by Religions Division. Such rhetoric was most likely a byproduct of the training and personal experiences of Religions Division staff. Researcher William P. Woodard had served as a missionary in Japan prior to the war, for example, and Shintō liaison officer Walter Nichols had grown up in Japan as the son of the Episcopal Bishop of Kyoto.57 Several of the Japanese staff members were also apparently Christians, and in some cases their normative statements appeared in staff translations and routine reports.58

56 News clipping from *The Christian Century*, 7 July 1948, RCR Box #5791, Folder #11. The report was subsequently published under Bunce’s name with a foreword by William P. Woodard in 1955.

57 On Woodard, see Clark 2006, 2–3 (my pagination); on Nichols, see Dorman 2012, 92.

58 See, for example, T.S. Kotani, “Draft Memorandum: Religions League, Reasons for the Weakness of,” 22 November 1948 (RCR Box #5787, Folder #18).
In sum, the impulse to spread the Christian gospel was unmistakable during the Occupation. MacArthur served as the public face of this impulse, but even Bunce’s “resistance” to MacArthur’s rhetoric had the ulterior motive of securing the best position for Christianity in the long run. MacArthur exemplified an aggressive strategy, using his influential position as Supreme Commander to cajole the Japanese people into acceptance of his religion. Bunce, for his part, took a tactical approach by securing the best possible legal and social circumstances for the eventual efflorescence of Christianity. Bunce’s approach was predicated on the premise that the successful promotion of religious freedom would lead to an indispensable paradigm shift in Japanese religiosity. The issue here, in short, was that even Bunce’s latitudinarian and relatively inclusivist approach to religious freedom was still indebted to a decidedly Protestant Christian notion of “religion.” It was that particular notion that was highlighted in the Religions Division objective to “foster a desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese populace. The implicit assumption that Japanese people lacked such desire was based on a problematic presupposition that desire for religious freedom could only be manifest in suspicion of political and clerical authority.

**Irony 2: Reproducing Prewar Relationships with Transsectarian Organizations**

I now turn to the specific measures Religions Division used to inculcate Japanese people with a “desire for religious freedom”: liaising with Japanese transsectarian organizations and engaging in outreach projects such as press releases, lectures, and speeches. As Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard would later recall, the Religions Division staff was somewhat at a loss when it came to the objective of fostering a “desire for religious freedom” in the Japanese people. Woodard’s memoir suggests that division members used ad hoc meetings
with religious leaders to emphasize the importance of religious freedom, but this portrayal partially obfuscates the proactive role that he (and others) took in spreading the gospel of religious freedom.\(^{59}\) Members did not simply sit idly in their offices waiting for religious groups to come to them seeking legal and administrative advice; they also actively encouraged religious groups to create transsectarian organizations to serve as political lobbies to protect their interests, fostering a sense of agonism rather than dependence vis-à-vis the state.\(^{60}\) Ironically, this created a close relationship between Religions Division bureaucrats and transsectarian leaders; at times this relationship functionally reproduced, albeit in a more pacific way, the religion-state relationship that had existed in Japan during the Fifteen Years’ War.

In the immediate aftermath of the war, the transsectarian religious organizations that had served as intermediaries between religious groups and the wartime state were quickly reorganized in anticipation of, or in response to, the SCAP reforms.\(^{61}\) In some cases, new transsectarian organizations were created to lobby for member religions’ interests in the potentially inhospitable context of the new regime. For example, the Jinja Honchō (often

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\(^{59}\) While I have only examined a fraction of the documents available in the William P. Woodard Papers (Special Collections, University of Oregon) and the Religions and Cultural Resources Division records included among the Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters held at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, several documents in these collections suggest that Religions Division members understood the directive to “foster the desire for religious freedom” in essentially missionary terms.

\(^{60}\) I should also mention in this regard that my decision to describe religious transsectarian groups as political lobbies may strike some readers as strange. Clearly the legal stipulations regarding the distinctions between religion and politics affected the ways in which such groups could exert influence on politicians. While graft no doubt existed, it must be said that the pressure such groups exerted on politicians and bureaucrats was probably less financial than political, in the sense of being able to mobilize constituents or offer support for bureaucratic initiatives. In this way, too, the postwar system was more akin to its wartime counterpart than different.

\(^{61}\) Leaders’ eagerness to prove to Religions Division that they were now different from their wartime counterparts can be seen in a series of interviews conducted in early 1947. See RCR Box #5787, Folder #21.
translated as the Association of Shintō Shrines) was established on 3 February 1946 through an amalgamation of the preexisting Kōten Kōkyūsho (Institute for the Teaching and Investigation of the Imperial Classics), the Dai Nihon Jingi Kai (Greater Japan Deities Association), and the Jingū Hōsai Kai (Association for the Veneration of [Ise] Shrine). By its own account, the new organization was developed specifically to resist the effects of the 15 December 1945 Shintō Directive (the Occupation directive that disaggregated Shintō from the state and eliminated Shintō-derived ideas from public school education). Given this objective, subsequent interactions with SCAP were naturally mildly combative—it was no secret that shrines suffered more than other religious groups due to the Occupation reforms—but these interactions were not purely antagonistic. In at least one case, the Jinja Honchō invited a member of Religions Division to deliver a speech for the benefit of shrines who were struggling to understand and meet the demands of the new regime.

The Japanese Buddhist Federation and the Sectarian Shintō Association were both carried over with minimal changes after the war. These groups had been in existence in some form or another for many decades, and in the prewar and wartime years they had served simultaneously as political lobbies that could exert pressure on democratically elected politicians and—in wartime—as administered mass organizations that could contribute materially and ideologically to the war effort. In the height of the Pacific War Buddhist organizations in particular had been

62 Recently, John Breen and Mark Teeuwen (2010) have replaced the traditional acronym with a less unfortunate one, referring to the Jinja Honchō as the “National Association of Shrines.”
64 RCR Box #5774, Folder #35 (“Speeches by Religions Division Personnel”).
65 For example, the Buddhist Federation was formally reconstituted in its postwar form at a conference held on 20–21 May 1946. See the handwritten document “Interview Report with Mr. Tatsuo Satomi, Standing Director (Jōnin Riji) of the Buddhist Confederation,” RCR Box
encouraged to amalgamate and the number of Buddhist sects was halved, from fifty-six to twenty-eight.  

Similarly, the Churches of Christ in Japan (often referred to simply as the Kyōdan) had been created on a federal model in 1940 and then consolidated into one unified body in November 1942 after most non-Japanese Christian missionaries had fled the country. This historical background presented a unique situation in the wake of the war. Because Japanese Christians had seized autonomy during the war and had distanced themselves from the influence of foreign missionaries, during the Occupation non-Japanese missionaries found their former positions of authority (as the bearers of “real” Christianity) to have been destabilized. This meant that despite the obvious points of theological commonality between Japanese Christians and recently returned missionaries, a general sense of uncertainty prevailed as to who exactly was in charge of determining the future of Christian doctrine, practice, and organization in Japan. This was exacerbated by the fact that the first missionaries to arrive in Japan in the fall of 1945 did so as members of the Occupation, giving them a tactically superior position through alignment with contemporary political authority.

In sum, the Jinja Honchō was in a position of tension with the Occupation because Shintō shrines had been explicitly targeted for surveillance (if not outright suppression) by the 15 December 1945 Shintō Directive. Member organizations of the Church of Christ of Japan were

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66 I showed in Chapter Four that this sort of amalgamation was not solely a top-down governmental initiative; as a politician with deep ties to the Buddhist community, Andō Masazumi had advocated the amalgamation of all the Buddhists sects into one unified organ to provide material and ideological support to the war effort and the ultimate creation of a Buddhist utopia.

67 See Krämer 2011.

68 Moore 2011, 15–19.
uncertain about their future because they had finally come into their own during the course of the
war and were loath to lose their newfound domestic authority over doctrine and church policy
with the sudden postwar influx of returning foreign missionaries. While the Buddhist Federation
and the Sectarian Shintō Federation lacked strong connections with religious groups overseas
and therefore escaped some of the dilemmas that plagued their Christian counterparts, like all
religious organizations they were anxious about procedures for incorporation, secession, and
taxation under the new regime.69

Against this background, the Greater Japan Wartime Religions Patriotic Association was
reconstituted as the Japan Religious Association (Nippon Shūkyō Kai) in the fall of 1945.
Thereafter it served as an umbrella organization encompassing the aforementioned Buddhist,
Shintō, and Christian trans-denominational organizations and lobbying for their collective
interests.70 The group passed through a tenuous phase in the spring of 1946 when it seemed that
the various member organizations might secede, but a meeting held on 23 May 1946 confirmed
that the organization would survive.71 It was formally inaugurated in its new postwar guise on 2
June 1946, taking the new name the Japanese Religions Federation (Nippon Shūkyō Renmei).

69 The Buddhist Federation actively sought to establish transnational connections with Buddhist
organizations in other countries in the later years of the Occupation.
70 The group would later call itself the Japanese Association of Religious Organizations, or
71 A 5 April 1946 clipping from the Nippon Times included in Religions Division records
suggested that financial difficulties and disputes over common goals threatened to tear the group
apart, but a follow-up clipping from the same newspaper dated 28 May 1946 suggested that the
23 May meeting had been a success. According to the second report, representatives who
attended the 23 May meeting agreed that the government should make more efforts in supporting
non-sectarian religious education in public schools. They therefore proposed revisions to Articles
18 and 85 of the recently promulgated draft constitution. A few months later, Chairman Andō
Masazumi submitted a short article to this effect to the journal Shūkyō kōron, published by the
Shūkyō Mondai Kenkyusho (Religious Problems Research Institute). SK 15(6), 10–12. The issue
was published on the first anniversary of Japan’s defeat (15 August 1946), lending the articles in
it particular significance.
The new trans-denominational organization included four transsectarian bodies: the Jinja Honchō, the Sectarian Shintō Federation, the Buddhist Federation, and the Christian Kyōdan.⁷²

One particular point of interest regarding this new umbrella organization is that while leaders of the organization were at great pains to distinguish it from the Greater Japan Wartime Patriotic Religious Association, functionally it was remarkably similar to the wartime group. This is not to suggest that salient differences did not exist between the two. For example, the wartime organization had been headed by the Japanese Minister of Education and the group received a sizable annual sum from the government (around 300,000 yen) in support of its propaganda efforts. Immediately after the war, the Minister of Education and the Vice-Minister of Education resigned their posts in the organization and government financial support was terminated.

However, the prewar chain of command was preserved to a certain extent because Andō Masazumi (1876–1955) moved from his wartime position of Vice President into the position of Chairperson of the new Federation.⁷³ As a synecdoche for the larger transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations operating during and immediately after the war, Andō represents one way in which continuities in religion-state relations were maintained across the prewar, wartime, and postwar contexts. As the leader of the postwar Religions Federation, Andō strove to ensure that religious interests would be protected under the new regime much in the same way that he had as a leader or adviser in various prewar and wartime transsectarian Buddhist organizations. While his initiatives in this capacity generally reflected what was rapidly becoming an outdated mode of thinking about religion-state relations in the wake of the war—

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⁷² The various officers and member organizations of the new umbrella group are listed in a 3 September 1946 Civil Information and Education Section, Analysis and Research Division (Religions) Staff Translation on the subject of the “Union of Federation of Religions Headquarters and Affiliated Organizations” that was current as of 19 June 1946.
⁷³ Andō was the Buddhist priest-turned-politician who starred in Chapter Four.
specifically, the idea that religion should contribute substantively to national morality and spiritual mobilization—Andō was still able to use his position as a representative for religious constituents to exert considerable pressure on the Japanese government and Occupation officials.

While Religions Division personnel tried to eliminate any hints of favoritism in their dealings with Japanese religions, naturally they were drawn to large transsectarian groups like Andō’s because they served as convenient interfaces for explaining Occupation religions policy and taking the pulse of the domestic religious situation. One side effect of this state of affairs was that independent groups who were not members of any of the four transsectarian organizations (the Jinja Honchō, the Sectarian Shintō Federation, the Buddhist Federation, and the Christian Kyōdan) were at a political or administrative disadvantage. This was especially true in cases where negative press reportage made them targets for surveillance as potential threats to peace and order. (Eventually, several such movements established a new transsectarian organization that could lobby for their interests on 17 October 1951; the group was begrudgingly welcomed into the Japanese Religious Federation shortly thereafter.)

The mutually beneficial relationship between transsectarian organizations and the occupiers in charge of religion is evidenced in part by the fact that Religions Division records included careful documentation about postwar transsectarian groups, including records of their internal affairs and summaries of their monthly meetings with the division. Division researchers also placed some transsectarian group leaders such as Andō Masazumi alongside academic specialists

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74 Dorman 2004. However, leaders of some marginal movements, such as Kitamura Sayo, made a point of taking the initiative to visit Religions Division regularly to ensure that they were in the good graces of the Occupation officials in charge of religious affairs. See Dorman 2012, esp. 180–183.

75 RCR Box #5787 includes several folders with documents related to the postwar Japanese Federation of Religions, the Buddhist Federation, and other religious associations. Also see RCR Box #5774, Folder #13, which includes summaries of monthly meetings held in autumn 1949.
in religion such as Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964) and historians such as Ienaga Saburō (1913–2002) in their lists of trustworthy human resources who could provide information about religions. For their part, the transsectarian groups publicized their interactions with Religions Division and regularly invited Division members to participate in their academic and cultural events. Religions Division members’ actual attendance at conferences and lecture meetings was somewhat rare, but when it happened it lent tacit political approval to the proceedings.

This pattern of interaction developed in part because the Occupation aim of “establishing” religious freedom invited confusion on the part of Japanese religious leaders, most of whom felt that religious freedom had already been guaranteed in the Meiji Constitution and that the legal principle had been generally upheld by the prewar Japanese state. Woodard later recalled that one of the prime responsibilities of Civil Information and Education Section in general—and Religions Division in particular—was to assure religious leaders that a policy of strict separation of religions from the state amounted to an attitude of respect for religions rather than a denigration:

CIE’s [Civil Information and Education Section] attitude of respect for religion had a negative as well as a positive side. From the traditional Japanese point of view the social status of a religion or religious organization was enhanced by official recognition and by being involved in some way with the state. Hence it seemed strange to the Japanese to be told that in separating religion from the state SCAP was showing respect for religion. In their eyes application of the principle of separation lowered the status of religion. CIE’s attitude was, of course, diametrically opposed to such an interpretation. Separation meant that the status of religion had been raised, that religious organizations, being no longer beholden to the state, were free to fulfill their mission to society untrammeled by government officials, that they could even sit in judgment on the state.

77 RCR Box #5787, Folder #18 (“Activities of Religions League”). The retrospective published by the Shinshūren Chōsa Shitsu also included multiple references to the influence of the Religions Division staff.
78 Woodard 1972, 49–50.
Nevertheless a strong suspicion prevailed in religious circles that SCAP was intent on completely secularizing [that is, abolishing religion in] Japan.\(^7^9\)

In order to assuage the trepidation religious leaders felt about the policy of separation, Religions Division officials encouraged religious organizations to restructure the various wartime transsectarian organizations to serve as political lobbies that could exert pressure on the state rather than seeking approval from it.\(^8^0\) Such encouragement led to a paradoxical situation in which religious leaders paid visits to Religions Division to make sure that their activities conformed with the expectations of the Occupation government.

In meetings with religious organizations, Division personnel refrained from offering any support that could be perceived as bias toward a particular religion, but they did encourage the new lobbies to submit petitions to protest, for example, General MacArthur’s statements about the superiority of Christianity or elected officials’ inappropriate actions as far as religion was concerned.\(^8^1\) For example, in a 22 September 1949 meeting with leaders of the Japanese

\(^7^9\) Woodard 1972, 182–183.

\(^8^0\) Later retrospectives produced by these groups would emphasize their prewar predecessors’ pioneering roles in resisting state initiatives or pushing for religious freedom, although such accounts sometimes came at the expense of historical accuracy. For example, the website of the contemporary Japanese Buddhist Association (Zen Nihon Bukkyō Kai, also called the Japanese Buddhist Federation) traces the origins of the organization—which claims to represent over ninety percent of Japanese Buddhist religious juridical persons today—back to the establishment of the Bukkyō Konwa Kai (Buddhist Fellowship Association) in 1900 as a way of “opposing state control of religion” (http://www.jbf.ne.jp/about/about_JBF.html, accessed 15 April 2013). The attempt to trace the creation of a national Buddhist organization of clerics back to a symbolic moment of political resistance posits a false lineage that masks important differences in how religious freedom was understood by competing constituencies in the Buddhist world. As I showed in Chapter Two, during the aforementioned moment in 1900, the Buddhist community was deeply divided over the issue of religion-state relations, the possibility of making Buddhism the national religion, and the role Buddhism should play in society.

\(^8^1\) See “Buddhist Federation Meeting with SCAP,” 22 September 1949 (RCR Box #5824, Folder #7). Walter Nichols (d.u.) represented Religions Division in this particular meeting, as Bunce was away on an inspection trip. Nichols had been born in Japan and knew the language; although he was not a specialist in religion he was selected as an advisor to Religions Division on the
Buddhist Federation, Religions Division advisor Walter Nichols (d.u.) gave substantive advice about how the group should go about creating a new “central Buddhist organ” that could disseminate information to the various sects while also exerting political pressure on the state.82

This pattern of outreach highlights one of the striking ironies of the Occupation as far as the activities of Religions Division are concerned. Although Religions Division researchers critiqued the pre-surrender Japanese state for seeking to control religious groups through administered mass organizations, the Division was obviously not adverse to using transsectarian groups to keep tabs on developments in the religious world and to disseminate administrative information. Some internal memoranda even suggest that some junior members of Religions Division were interested in encouraging the transsectarian organizations to develop in favorable ways by, for example, clearing out dead wood among the leadership or by facilitating more Christian cooperation with the other organizations comprising the Japanese Federation of Religions because it was assumed that Christians could have a salutary influence on such groups.83 Such initiatives amounted to a normative project of refashioning Japanese religiosity by exerting pressure on transsectarian groups to behave in ways more conducive to Occupation initiatives.

The establishment of the Federation of Japanese New Religious Organizations (Shin Nihon Shūkyō Dantai Rengō Kai, commonly known by its Japanese acronym, Shinshūren) in 1951 deserves special attention in this regard. In response to the creation of the various transsectarian organizations that lobbied on behalf of religions’ interests, leaders of new movements such as...
Risshō Kōsei Kai and PL Kyōdan banded together to create a similar organization that would advocate specifically for the interests of emergent movements and ensure that emergent groups would not suffer due to any legal revisions that favored the clerical establishment or that otherwise intruded upon their religious liberties. The fact that the emergent groups organized their own transsectarian lobby is fairly unremarkable since they were initially shunned by the clerical establishment and therefore could not find a voice in the Japanese Religious Federation. Yet it is particularly intriguing that by Shinshūren’s own account, Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard urged the leaders of some emergent religions to organize in this fashion.

Although Woodard was subsequently critical of the lax rules for religious incorporation included in the 28 December 1945 Religious Corporations Ordinance and overtly skeptical of some of the new religious movements, he seems to have been genuinely concerned that marginal

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84 Although the clerical establishment initially shunned the group, eventually its membership was welcomed into the overarching Religions League of Japan. The initial ostracism derived from the establishment perception that the emergent groups were merely ersatz forms of “real” religion, but given their explosive growth in the postwar years the establishment seems to have pragmatically welcomed them into the fold of the larger lobbying body (the Japanese Federation of Religious Organizations informed Religions Division of this change at a meeting held on 17 October 1949; see “Conference between Directors of Religions League and Researchers of RCR,” RCR Box #5787, Folder #18). Since the newer movements were not incorporated into the Japanese Buddhist Federation or the Association of Shintō Shrines, it seems that the defining characteristic of the latter organizations was a focus on sacerdotal preeminence, which ran counter to the emergent groups’ focus on lay centrality.
85 Shin Nihon Shūkyō Dantai Rengō Kai Research Division, “Reminiscences of Religion in Postwar Japan [Part 5],” Contemporary Religions in Japan 7, no. 3 (1966), 249–252; Shinshūren Chōsa Shitsu 1963, 173–175. Woodard makes no corroborating claim in his 1972 memoir, but given his high hopes for the institution of what he perceived as healthy religious freedom it is likely that he played such a role (in addition to his book, also see his editorials in Contemporary Religions in Japan). By the time Sengo shūkyō kaisō roku was published by Shinshūren in 1963, Woodard had been serving as Director of the International Institute for the Study of Religions for nearly a decade. The decision to trace the establishment of the group back to him served an apologetic purpose by linking Shinshūren to the leading non-Japanese figure in the study of Japanese religions of the time.
movements might suffer discrimination. This sympathetic stance was probably partially reflective of his prewar work in Japan as a missionary promulgating a marginal religion, but Woodard’s collected papers suggest that over the course of the Occupation he himself experienced a sort of “conversion” in which he became increasingly disillusioned with Christian proselytism. He leavened his preexisting missionary attitude with an ardent hope that the principle of religious freedom would provide a legal and social avenue for Japanese self-determination.

Woodard’s encouragement of the new religious organizations to organize their own transsectarian group suggests that he recognized that they would have better success legally and socially if they could link their objectives with religious freedom, both as a juridical principle and as a humanist ideal. His influence on Shinshūren can be seen in the group’s intense preoccupation with religious freedom, its anti-clericalism, and its disdain for “authority worship.” The diverse religious organizations that comprise the group take three principles as their shared objectives, namely: 1) to protect the freedom of religious belief; 2) to promote religious cooperation; and 3) to contribute to world peace. These objectives are sufficiently banal as to

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86 See Woodard 1972.
87 Aside from a few scattered statements about the ad hoc nature of interactions between Religions Division personnel and Japanese religious leaders, former Division Researcher William P. Woodard said surprisingly little in his memoir about the methods Religions Division used to educate religious leaders about their “new” rights and liberties. While this chapter is greatly indebted to Woodard’s 1972 academic retrospective as a foundational secondary source with rich detail about Religions Division personnel and their objectives, this section examines Woodard himself based on a critical reading of the materials found in the William P. Woodard Papers housed at the University of Oregon, as well as Religion and Cultural Resources Division records housed in the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.
88 The group currently claims to have seventy member organizations; thirty-seven are listed with hyperlinks on the group’s webpage. The presidency has rotated among the leaders of the constituent organizations. Membership is optional and open to groups that have formed since the onset of the Meiji era (that is, since 1868). Groups that desire to join are invited to attend any of the regular lectures or scholarly meetings in order to have their application for membership
overcome salient differences in doctrine, but they also reflect the level of attention given to religious freedom in the wake of the war. Particularly for religious movements that had suffered persecution during the war or had formally incorporated after it, embracing the version of religious freedom promulgated by the occupiers served an apologetic purpose by rhetorically aligning these new groups with the new regime and associating mainstream temple Buddhism and shrine Shintō with the discredited wartime regime.\(^{89}\) In this regard, it is significant that the founders settled on the name “Shin Nihon Shūkyō Dantai Rengō Kai.” Although usually translated as the “Japanese Federation of New Religious Organizations,” when translated word for word, this could read “League Association of Religious Organizations for the New Japan.”

In sum, the mutually beneficial relationship between Religions Division and the newly formed (or reconstituted) transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations ironically reproduced prewar and wartime circumstances to a certain degree, but it also marked an important step in the reconceptualization of religious freedom. Religious freedom became the currency in which postwar religion-state relationships were managed. Academic, apologetic, and bureaucratic aims could be balanced through this language: the wartime regime could be discredited because of a putative lack of religious freedom, the political aims of religious organizations could be secured through appeals to religious freedom, and the legitimacy of marginal religions could be bolstered. Particularly in the last sense, religious freedom began to take on a more universalist interpretation than it had previously exhibited.

ratified. The academic format serves both as a doctrinally neutral space for establishing common objectives and as a prophylactic against the charges of illegitimacy that might come from journalists or religious groups with longer histories or more conventional pedigrees. See the group’s webpage: [http://www.shinshuren.or.jp/](http://www.shinshuren.or.jp/). Accessed 26 April 2013.
Irony 3: It Was the Occupiers Who Learned the Meaning of Religious Freedom

Although the aim of establishing religious freedom in Japan was included in pre-surrender policy documents, and although the inculcation of a desire for religious freedom was a prime Occupation objective, the vagueness of this directive made it difficult for Religions Division to enact.\(^90\) It was also nearly impossible to test whether or not such efforts had been successful. Behind these challenges lay the simple fact that the pre-surrender planning documents had not clarified what religious freedom would mean in the context of the Occupation. Several types of documents produced by Religions Division (such as policy memos, press releases, and outreach lectures) reveal that the occupiers learned about the significance of religious freedom just as much as the Japanese did. Through these documents, it is possible to trace a trend in which wartime rhetoric about religious freedom as a “human right” gradually became a reality.

Policy Memos

Despite the central role it played in Occupation planning, the concept of religious freedom was not systematically defined until Bunce authored a formal document on the subject on 21 February 1946. It stated:

Religious freedom is a juridical principle concerned with the external relations of individuals and groups. It involves three aspects: (1) Individual autonomy in the choice of creed, (2) Group autonomy in the pursuit of religious activities, and (3) Legal equality of religious groups before the state \([sic]\) Religious freedom is violated by an ecclesiastical institution only when it attempts to enforce its intolerant prescriptions by invoking the sanctions of civil power. Religious freedom involves not only the right on the part of the individual to choose for himself but to be safeguarded against potential coercion. Accordingly, it must embrace two factors: (1) A maximum of freedom to believe in and practice the

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\(^{89}\) See Shinshūren Chōsa Shitsu 1963 for a retrospective account of the Occupation years that strongly reinforces this view from the perspective of the collected new religious movements.

\(^{90}\) Woodard 1972, 178.
creed of their choice on the part of individuals and groups, and (2) A minimum of propagation, restraint, and interference on the part of the government.”

As a policy statement this was clear enough, but the fact that it was announced six months into the Occupation (after all of the major directives related to religion had been promulgated) suggests that it was only in hindsight that Religions Division or CIE personnel realized that the concept of religious freedom was open to multiple interpretations. Furthermore, the fact that Occupation personnel had to be repeatedly reminded that their job was not to propagate Christianity suggests that the vision of “religious freedom” that was being officially advanced was not inherently transparent.

For example, a 25 March 1946 draft of a Religions Division document entitled “Instructions to Information for Agencies of the Occupation Forces in the Field of Japanese Religions” concluded with a paragraph saying that “[w]hile the sympathies of occupational personnel are undoubtedly behind the Christian movement in Japan, the propagation of Christianity is not one of the objectives of the [O]ccupation. Occupation personnel should, therefore, leave the propagation of Christianity among the Japanese people to missionaries and to Japanese Christians.” This statement clearly demarcated the division between permissible and impermissible behaviors for the rank and file (and perhaps for members of Religions Division, several of whom came from missionary backgrounds). However, the final version of the

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91 “History of the Non-Military Aspects of the Allied Occupation of Japan, Volume: Freedom of Religion, 2 September 1945–1 September 1946,” (WPW Box #13, Folder #3), 6–7, citing SCAP CI&E Section statement of 21 February 1946, “Notes on Religious Freedom.” I have not yet accessed the latter document, but virtually the same statement appears in Religions Division press releases. See, for example, the CI&E press release dated 4 October 1946 on the subject of religious freedom: RCR Box #5787, Folder #14 (“General: Comments on Religion by Occupation Personnel”).

92 “Instructions to Information for Agencies of the Occupation Forces in the Field of Japanese Religions,” 25 March 1946, RCR Box #5787, Folder #14 (General: Comments on Religion in
document, attributed to the larger (i.e., superior) Civil Information and Education Section and dated 15 April 1946, omitted this paragraph entirely. It is possible that the first draft reflected Bunce’s attempt to include a clear stipulation regarding proselytizing, while the second draft showed that higher-ups in CIE decided that an overt discussion of such policy might enrage MacArthur. A similar 29 August 1946 memorandum directed to all Civil Information and Education personnel stated that “freedom of religion … does not imply freedom on the part of agents of the civil authority to propagate the religion of their choice.” The repetitive nature of the second memo suggests that some occupiers needed to be reminded repeatedly of the bounds of propriety.

**Press Releases**

While the majority of the directives related to religions policy and religious freedom were promulgated in autumn 1945, the clearest theoretical expressions of religious freedom were articulated after the fact, in 1946. In addition to the February 1946 internal policy statement authored by Bunce and various memos outlining appropriate behavior for occupation personnel, the Civil Information and Education Section authored a 4 October 1946 press release on the subject of religious freedom. Symbolically timed to coincide with the first anniversary of the

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93 “Information for Agencies of the Occupation Forces in the Field of Japanese Religions,” 15 April 1946, RCR Box #5787, Folder #14 (General: Comments on Religion in Japan by Occupation Personnel).
94 Bunce’s later efforts to install policies that would tone down MacArthur’s evangelistic rhetoric were quietly quashed by Colonel Donald Nugent (head of CI&E from Spring 1946). See Woodard 1972, 352–353; Moore 2011, 69–72.
95 “Memorandum to all CIE Personnel: Participation in the Religious Life of the Japanese People,” RCR Box #5802, Folder #9.
96 The autumn 1945 directives included the promulgation of the Civil Liberties Directive on 4 October (abolishing the Religious Organizations Law and proclaiming religious freedom for all),
Civil Liberties Directive that had abolished the 1939 Religious Organizations Law, this document laid out a vision of religious freedom that was specifically designed to supersede alternate visions of religious freedom that may have existed (either among the Japanese or among the occupiers).

The first page of the five-page press release repeated the basic components of Bunce’s internal memo about religious freedom, stating that religious freedom had been universally acclaimed and emphasizing that religious freedom was a juridical principle designed to manage the external relations of religious organizations. Although the press release acknowledged that evangelical religions by their nature resisted egalitarian policies, it argued that such attitudes violated religious freedom only when such groups tried to conscript civil power in the service of their evangelical ends.

The second page of the document turned to the factors that had led to the historical development of the concept and practice of religious freedom. In a single sweeping paragraph, it suggested that religious freedom had developed as a natural outcome of religious wars and persecution, but also out of growing awareness on the part of religious groups that their own freedom from state control could be secured by ensuring that other groups also enjoyed such freedom. Meanwhile, liberal political thinkers who were concerned with “broad humanitarian principles” rather than theology had determined that “individual liberty was impossible without freedom of religion.” Even those religious groups that had traditionally enjoyed political favor had ultimately discovered that state protection came at the price of enduring restrictions.

The document went on to argue that for most of Japanese history religious intolerance had not been much of an issue because religious conflict had been modulated through the inherently the promulgation of the Shintō Directive on 15 December, and the promulgation of the Religious
irenic qualities of Buddhism.\textsuperscript{97} Yet despite this, Japanese people had never truly enjoyed real religious freedom. Citing the Tokugawa bans on Christianity and the Meiji era principle of unity of rites and rule, the press release suggested that Japanese religions had always been expected to conform to the state, and that only a “pretense” of religious liberty had been maintained through the fiction that Shrine Shintō was not a religion.\textsuperscript{98} The necessity for establishing religious freedom was obvious because Japan—like the United States—was a plural society featuring many different and competing religious groups.

After a brief recapitulation of the various directives promulgated in autumn 1945 and their intended outcomes (removal of restrictions on incorporation, more freedom from administrative oversight), the press release suggested that the new directives preserved and protected religious freedom because they had been vetted by various Japanese religious organizations and had even been praised by the Japan Religions League. While confusion had unfortunately erupted as a number of schisms and secessions occurred in response to the laws, this merely represented the growing pains of the new system and eventually the various groups would realign themselves in a mutually beneficial fashion.

So, the document continued, while some may harbor trepidation at the sudden emergence of previously obscure or wholly novel religious movements, calls for state suppression of such

\textsuperscript{97} Although it is true that Buddhism has historically easily accommodated and assimilated other intellectual and ritual repertoires, this was a rather naïve—if not willfully ignorant—reading of Japanese Buddhist sectarian identity. The emphasis on Buddhism’s accommodating nature had been a staple of Japanese Buddhist apologetic rhetoric throughout the early twentieth century and almost certainly influenced the press release in some way, although unfortunately the source for this particular claim is unclear.

\textsuperscript{98} In the prewar period, the Japanese government distinguished between “sectarian Shintō” and “shrine rites.” The criteria for this distinction were fuzzy, but basically the former indicated a type of religious organization that was officially recognized as such by the state and usually
movements were unwarranted. The various civil laws would suffice for managing any unlawful behavior, and in time groups that incorporated as religions for tax evasion purposes would be caught. For those who were concerned about the flourishing of superstition, the press release stressed that what was religion to one person might be superstition to another, and that for still others all religion was nothing more than superstition. It closed on an ambiguous note, suggesting that religious freedom would ultimately serve as a prophylactic against “unwholesome” movements: “Undoubtedly, unworthy religious movements will gain adherents and quacks will for a time be able to pose as religionists. But this is the price that has to be paid to guarantee freedom to all. Quackery flourishes in ignorance. The remedy lies not in governmental paternalism, but in education and time.”

Aside from the ironic critique of “governmental paternalism” from an occupying military power, several features of this document deserve close attention. First, the press release problematically assumed that the boundaries between “religious” and “civil” authority (or “internal” and “external” aspects of religion, for that matter) were transparent and self-evident; it offered platitudes about the desirableness of religious freedom but little clarity on how exactly the postwar vision of religious freedom differed from the variety that had been encapsulated in the Meiji Constitution. Furthermore, beneath the superficially persuasive rhetoric (appealing to historical precedent while positing a teleological march towards universal religious freedom), the document spoke in exceedingly general terms—religious freedom was universally lauded, based on devotion to a particular site or deity; the latter indicated rituals conducted at shrines that the state understood to be civic rituals and expressions of patriotism or loyalty.

99 Many new movements emerged in the wake of the war, and some attracted considerable sensationalist press. See Dorman 2012 for examples of two such groups.
100 General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Civil Information and Education Section Press Release dated 4 October 1946, 11:00 hours (RCR Box #5787, Folder #14).
anonymous thinkers had praised it as the foundation to personal liberty, and nameless religious organizations had recognized that tolerance of others was superior to receiving political favor.\(^{101}\)

It is also striking that the document unconsciously repeated the legitimizing language that the Japanese government had used at the time of the legislative deliberations regarding the 1939 Religious Organizations Law when it justified the postwar directives by suggesting that they had been vetted by Japanese religious organizations.\(^{102}\)

In the crucible of the Occupation, the people directly responsible for creating religions policy were hard-pressed to construct a vision of religious freedom that derived its authority from transnational and transcultural principles. The vagueness of the history the press release proffered was, of course, partially reflective of the fact that press releases speak in the idiom of sound bites and catchphrases. But it was also vague because the occupiers needed to articulate religious freedom in a way that would be simultaneously coercive and culturally odorless. Policymakers had to deny that Japan had ever enjoyed “real” religious freedom in order to justify their drastic interventions in preexisting religions legislation, and at the same time they had to downplay the idea that religious freedom was the unique province of the West. Such an argument would have undermined the idea that religious freedom was a universal principle that could and should be adopted in Japan through the mediation of the Occupation.

Finally, if the press release was designed to fulfill the objective of fostering a desire for religious freedom in the Japanese populace, then it was an unintentionally familiar (to the Japanese) form of religious freedom that was being promoted. The argument that the rise of

\(^{101}\) The one person mentioned by name in the document was President Franklin Roosevelt, who was cited as having included religious freedom as second of his famous “Four Freedoms” speech (the 1941 State of the Union address, delivered on 6 January 1941, almost exactly eleven months before the United States entered the war against Japan).

\(^{102}\) See Chapter Four for a detailed account.
unsavory groups would be better mitigated by granting them more freedom was precisely the logic used by the wartime Japanese state to advance the Religious Organizations Law of 1939. In this view, granting maximal liberty would ultimately ensure that marginal religious organizations conformed with the secularist logic of the state. If they acknowledged that the state represented a neutral public space and that they represented particularist private commitments, then religions also accepted the concomitant expectation that the transcendent political authority of the state exceeded their own authority in mundane matters.

Lectures and Speeches

Religions Division members also used invitations to speak at gatherings sponsored by transsectarian groups and religious universities to push their interpretations of religious freedom. Such appearances had to conform to the basic criterion that they not be seen as lending support to any particular religious group, but they formed prime opportunities for Religions Division bureaucrats to hammer home the point that Japanese religious leaders had mistaken the prewar status quo for genuine liberty and that local religious leaders needed to reeducate themselves in the true significance of religious freedom.

103 Again, I discussed this in Chapter Four.
104 Others have theorized about this more than I can do here. Talal Asad (2003) has discussed how the logic of secularism works by setting up the state as “neutral” and inviting or forcing “religions” to define themselves in opposition to that neutrality. Deeply influenced by Asad, Jason Änanda Josephson (2012) has more recently used the case of Japan to argue that the state appropriates for itself the realm of “the real” while distinguishing itself from (spurious) “superstition” and (tolerated, but irrational) “religion.” I would add that one side effect of this secularist logic is that religions relinquish their capacity to engage in acts of violence unless they condone acts of violence performed by the state such as wars and pogroms; this secularist epistemology distinguishes “religious terrorism” from state-sanctioned “holy war.” The process of defining “religion” vis-à-vis “superstition” and the state would not only directly affect circumstances in Japan with long-lasting effects, but global interpretations of religious freedom as a facet of international diplomacy and as a “human right” were reconstructed in part due to the influence of these Occupation-era decisions. I return to these points at the conclusion of this chapter and in Chapter Six.
For example, an undated speech given by an anonymous member of Religions Division to the Jinja Honchō shows that at least some division representatives readily told religious organizations which aspects of their own doctrines were more or less acceptable under the new regime. The speech, probably delivered in 1946 when the Jinja Honchō was newly formed and trying to clarify Occupation policy vis-à-vis shrines, took a magnanimous but somewhat supercilious approach. The orator stated that the closure of some shrines would probably be unavoidable in the context of the Occupation and that other shrines might face unprecedented economic difficulties. However, he argued, the trees that marked shrine properties should be protected as “the most distinctive and attractive feature of the Japanese landscape” and as physical evidence of longstanding Shintō tradition rather than being felled to make a quick profit. Similarly, while the attrition among parishioners was no doubt a matter of grave concern, by no means should potential or actual parishioners be coerced into supporting shrines.

Turning from such economic matters to the politically problematic nature of Shintō doctrine, the Religions Division representative took the opportunity to lecture the assembly about those aspects of Shintō doctrine that had not been overly tainted by earlier political affiliation and therefore “prevented … from developing religious ethics of a very high order.” Despite the existence of a few minor martial deities, major deities such as imperial progenitrix Amaterasu were actually more interested in peaceful pursuits such as agriculture and weaving. By tying Amaterasu to pacifism, the official implied that Shintō was essentially peaceful and that militarists had corrupted Shintō doctrine during the war years.

Continuing this line of argumentation, the Religions Division representative argued that despite Shintō’s linkages with narratives of racial superiority, scholar of religion Katō Genchi
Jolyon Baraka Thomas  

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(1873–1965) had indicated that the religion had redeemable ethical qualities. Such qualities could and should be developed and nurtured in recognition of the “inherent equality” of all people. The official concluded the speech by saying that it was “to be hoped that Shintō leaders will be able to draw out of their own tradition a philosophy and a practice which while preserving the best of the Japanese heritage will be ethically consistent with advancement in a modern world.”

The orator’s emphasis on “higher ethical principles” reflected one of the conceits of the Occupation that derived from contemporary trends in religious studies and anthropology. As I showed in Chapter One, scholar of Shintō Katō Genchi had appropriated a taxonomic hierarchy of “world religions” in which religions with universalistic tendencies were ranked higher than those with particularist (ethnic or regional) outlooks. Genchi himself had modified this decidedly Eurocentric hierarchy to place Shintō in a position superior to Buddhism and Christianity.

However, the version of his ideas that entered Occupation policy through the mediation of his student, Daniel Clarence Holtom (1884–1962), rejected this representation as specious and treated Shintō as a primitive religion crudely manipulated for modern purposes. It was against this background that the Religions Division representative rather condescendingly invited the

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105 The orator’s implication was that this, rather than the martial orientation of the war years, was the “real” Shintō.

106 Undated speech by Religions Division staff to Jinja Honchō, RCR Box #5774, Folder #35. The document includes interlinear translation from the original English into the Japanese. This may indicate that a Japanese interpreter was given a copy of the text to use for simultaneous translation, or alternatively that a fluent staff member like Nichols delivered the speech in Japanese. Nichols was responsible for liaising with shrines.

107 A recent article on this subject is Sumika 2013.

108 I discussed this in detail in Chapter One. Holtom’s influence was clearly evident in the wording of the 15 December 1945 Shintō Directive. Woodard’s private diary from January 1946 suggests that he felt Civil Information and Education Section Chief Ken R. Dyke (d.u.) had been excessively influenced by Holtom. WPW Box #10a, “Diaries,” loose pages dated 1 and 4 January 1946.
Jinja Honchō audience to search their own tradition for “higher ethical principles,” although it is striking that he made no specific statements as to what this would look like aside from the abandonment of chauvinism and the embrace of egalitarianism.

The lectures and speeches Religions Division officials gave as part of their outreach efforts encapsulated a major epistemic shift that was currently underway regarding how religious freedom could be tied to broader humanistic ideals. The vague nature of the “higher ethical principles” that were being advocated reflected the similarly vague nature of the language of “human rights” that had only recently come into vogue. During the war, “human rights” had served as flowery rhetoric justifying American participation in the war more than they had served as a substantive facet of international law or diplomacy. In the context of the Occupation, however, officials were forced to articulate what precisely this meant. One step of this process, exemplified by the speech delivered to the Jinja Honchō, was to effectively redefine religion so that “real” religions were understood to link themselves to universalistic ideals rather than to particularist sentiments (such as nationalism, in the case of Shintō). The second step was to associate religious freedom with universalism and to invite religious leaders to treat religious freedom as the most precious among all other rights and liberties. Chapter Six will show how local scholars of religion collaborated with Religions Division bureaucrats in this project.

Conclusions

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109 Moyn 2010

110 Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard, for example, frequently referred to religious freedom as the “most precious and fundamental of all freedoms.” WPW Box #9, Folder #1, “Religious Freedom in Postwar Japan” (incomplete text of a speech delivered sometime in the 1960s, probably to a Christian American audience), 1.
My purpose in the foregoing section has not been to suggest that all of the Occupation outreach initiatives were unmitigated successes. However, I think it is crucial to point out that the unique transnational context of the Occupation—combined with the universalistic rhetoric that served as the basis for Allied policy vis-à-vis Japan—created a situation in which religious freedom had to be redefined in a new way not only for the Japanese, but also for the Americans. It was no longer a privilege granted to citizens by their states, nor was it necessarily a liberty that citizens had to secure from their states and fiercely protect. Religious freedom was those things, but it was also now coming to be construed as a right that was inherent to each human individual and that transcended the ambit of national citizenship.\footnote{While Nakano (1993, 67) also very briefly highlights this new meaning of religious freedom, in my view he fails to identify the fact that the concept was not only new to the Japanese, but to the Americans as well.}

Previous scholarship has highlighted the irony of the Occupation attempt to promote freedom of religion, thought, and expression through a program of vigorous censorship.\footnote{Dower 1999; Dorman 2004; Dorman 2012} The aim of this chapter has been to highlight three additional ironies that characterized the activities of Religions Division and were particularly influential on new conceptions of religious freedom, both domestically and globally. These ironies directly contributed to novel interpretations of religious freedom precisely because of the unique situation in which two governments were simultaneously in charge of Japanese law and domestic policy. While the Japanese government nominally retained sovereignty, the Americans dictated policy on behalf of the international community. At the same time, while the Americans superciliously attempted to instantiate “democratic” values such as religious freedom through the claim that they were helping to rehabilitate Japan and reintroduce the Japanese to the global community of nations, they
regularly encountered salient cultural differences that called into question the extent to which the values they were attempting to promote were truly universal.

While they occurred more or less simultaneously, the three paradoxes I have outlined above effectively marked three stages in the development of a new, universalized vision of religious freedom as a “human right.” First, while the tension between Christian evangelism and latitudinarian conceptions of religious freedom had existed for some time, the occupiers in charge of religions policy had to negotiate a situation in which non-Christian religions—and even religions such as Shintō that they themselves had condemned as militaristic—be given just as much respect as Christianity. Their success on this score was decidedly imperfect, but for the Americans serving in the Occupation, religious freedom was suddenly understood to extend to a greater number of groups, many of which stretched Americans’ preexisting conceptions of religion.113

Although foregoing scholarship has emphasized the fact that Religions Division staff professionally resisted the inveterate evangelical rhetoric of Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur and other ardent Christians, some members drew upon their own missionary training to promote religious freedom through hortatory lectures and speeches.114 Moreover, in private correspondence, Religions Division staff—particularly Division Chief Bunce—also revealed themselves to be sympathetic to Christian proselytizing projects, although they argued that Christianity would flourish best if it did not seem to be gaining too much help from the

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113 Sehat (2010) has shown that the idea of Judaism and Christianity sharing a common cultural heritage had only recently emerged in the United States; the equation of “real religion” exclusively with Protestantism (and the assumption that “religious freedom” indicated freedom to choose from among Protestant sects) was still the norm in the United States.

114 Woodard (1972), Nakano (1993, esp. 66–67), and Moore (2011) all treat Religions Division—through the synecdoche of Bunce—as a libertarian hero who resisted MacArthur in
Occupation. While the irony of MacArthur’s attempt to Christianize Japan under the banner of religious freedom has already been thoroughly documented, that irony was compounded by the fact that the occupiers who were directly responsible for discharging religious freedom on the ground were similarly supportive of the eventual efflorescence of Christianity in Japan, albeit via a more indirect route. MacArthur’s vision was an aggressive Christianization that took advantage of the unique (and inherently unequal) circumstances of the Occupation, whereas private correspondence suggests that Bunce’s vision was one in which the spoonful of religious freedom helped the medicine of Christianity go down. Three-quarters of a century since the category of religious freedom had first operated in treaties between Japan and the United States as a thinly veiled attempt to open Japan up to the proselytizing efforts of American missionaries, in the postwar milieu religious freedom again played such a role, albeit in a more subtle fashion in which “genuine” religiosity was essentially equated with Protestant Christian attitudes (interiority, exclusivism in affiliation) rather than Protestant beliefs per se.¹¹⁵

In making this point, I am not suggesting that it was impossible for occupiers like Bunce to uphold the ideal of religious freedom and simultaneously hope for the efflorescence of Christianity in Japan. Bunce was obviously conscientious enough to recognize that explicitly promoting Christianity undermined the project of promoting religious freedom, but his operative understanding of “religion” remained wholly indebted to Protestant Christianity. As a consequence, when he and others in Religions Division described religious freedom, they described it as freedom to choose what to believe and how to affiliate. This understanding of this regard. To be fair, Nakano does highlight the basic Christian premises that undergirded the Occupation.

¹¹⁵ On religious freedom as a diplomatic tool designed to provide opportunities for missionaries in Japan specifically, see Josephson 2012, 71–93. A similar, roughly contemporaneous account of religious freedom as a tool of diplomacy in the Islamic world is Mahmood 2012.
religious freedom can not only be traced back to the Protestant Reformation, but also reflected the mainstream American Protestant suspicion of clerical authority and state religion. As a result—and as Bunce and Woodard both explicitly said—the guiding principle behind much of Religion Division policy was to change the way that Japanese people understood their own religions. This meant calling for a diminution of sacerdotal authority, a new emphasis on the ability of the individual to directly connect with deities without clerical mediation, and the spread of a new model in which sectarian affiliation was determined less by the circumstances of birth and location (Japanese people tended to affiliate with specific Buddhist sects based on family tradition and specific Shintō shrines based on location) and more by individual choice. Chapter Six will trace how this project was avidly picked up by Japanese scholars of religion, who bolstered their own social and political stature by advocating humanist understandings of religion that implicitly favored Protestant models.

The second stage in the reconceptualization of religious freedom involved the mechanisms for bringing religious organizations on board with the aims of the postwar regime. Occupation studies on the state of religious freedom in Japan regularly blamed the prewar Japanese government for providing a circumscribed provision of religious freedom in the Meiji Constitution and sharply criticized the wartime government’s incorporation of religious movements into administered mass organizations. Earlier scholarship has already highlighted the fact that the attempt to proscribe certain doctrines (such as the teaching that the emperor was divine) was a stark contradiction of the general principle that freedom of thought, expression, and belief were being protected under the Occupation.116 Like the wartime Japanese state,

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Religions Division necessarily abrogated its own (ostensibly egalitarian) principle of religious freedom due to the imperative to single out certain religious organizations for special scrutiny.

I have shown that even as they critiqued the wartime Japanese state for using transsectarian groups to monitor religions and to enforce political orthodoxy, Religions Division members encouraged Japanese religious organizations to restructure the very same wartime transsectarian groups (or to form new ones, as in the case of the Japanese Federation of New Religious Organizations). While this ostensibly was to promote member organizations’ ability to lobby the Japanese government for their interests, it also provided Occupation (and Japanese government) bureaucrats with convenient transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations that could report on member organizations’ activities and disseminate governmental information. In this regard, while the political context was considerably different, these postwar transsectarian organizations were functionally quite similar to their wartime counterparts. Moreover, by encouraging religious organizations themselves to link doctrine to the political goal of universal religious freedom, the occupiers could establish a rationale for engaging in reform. Religions Division used transsectarian organizations as conduits for the transmission of its messages regarding the new paradigm, reproducing the mechanism whereby the wartime Japanese state had used transsectarian organizations for establishing political and doctrinal orthodoxy.

This helps to identify the Occupation era as a moment of continuity as much as it was a moment of rupture. The legal structure of separation of religion from the state and the

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117 Dorman (2004) documented similarities between wartime and Occupation-era surveillance of marginal groups.

118 This distinguishes my project from Nakano Tsuyoshi’s earlier studies (1993; 2003) of the premises that guided United States Occupation policy. While critical of U.S. policymaking, Nakano (1993, 66–67) nevertheless reproduces the triumphalist narrative of the Occupation as a desirable and drastic liberal intervention that irrevocably changed Japanese religions policy. I will show in the next chapter that this interpretation is a result of the deep connections between
concomitant governmental guarantee of religious freedom—whether in prewar Japan, during the war, or during the Occupation—creates a situation in which governments cannot help but articulate policies in broad, trans-denominational terms. A natural side effect is that governments must collaborate with transsectarian and trans-denominational organizations (which may be more or less formalized) to define both political and doctrinal orthodoxy. The marginalization of certain movements as illegitimate “superstitions” or “quackery” is an integral part of this process. At any rate, the indication that the Occupiers reproduced the actions of the Japanese state is, to me, far more significant than the indication that they may have misunderstood or overlooked a uniquely “Japanese” mode of religion-state relations, as some apologists would have it. As a form of ideological coercion, secularism in this sense was as characteristic of the Occupation policymaking and the methodological orientations of religious studies (a field with which Nakano explicitly aligns himself, particularly in his 2003 book).

119 Garon 1997 and Josephson 2012 have both identified this trend of defining religious orthodoxy through collaborations between transsectarian religious leaders and policymakers.

120 Josephson (2012) has shown that states necessarily identify some groups as illegitimate “superstitions” or “heresies” to articulate the borders of “the real” (often, but not always, associated with the empirical realm) while “religions” serve as a mediating third term in which “non-real” claims are tolerated. I would add that religions’ “non-real” claims can form convenient tools for political legitimation: the wartime Japanese state clearly focussed on the idea of imperial divine descent and a divine mandate as a legitimating tactic in the war, for example, while as I have shown in this chapter the Americans tended to appeal to Christian universalism in order to rationalize participation in the Pacific War and the radical nature of some of the proposed reforms during the Occupation.

121 I outlined this scholarship in the Introduction. Briefly, scholars such as Abe Yoshiya (1968–1970; 1989), Yasumaru Yoshio (1979), Sakamoto Koremaru and Inoue Nobutaka (1987), and Ōhara Yasuo (1989) have argued that the occupiers failed to understand Japanese religion-state relations as a legitimate, if unique, form of secularism. I agree wholeheartedly with the historical assessment that prewar and wartime Japanese religious policies were secularist (although I reserve judgment on how cynically these secularist policies were enacted or manipulated), but I think that the apologist scholarship has failed on two counts. First, it has tended to assume that all Japanese people interpreted religion-state relations the same way, adopting a top-down model of secularism that is only partially apposite to the historical evidence. The previous three chapters should have sufficiently debunked this point. Second, the scholarship has failed to proffer a new theorization about secularism (an ideological project that aims to separate religion from other aspects of social and political life) and secularity (an epistemological orientation that...
postwar Occupation as it was of the prewar and wartime state, although of course I distinguish between the two regimes’ methods of enforcement. While it bears mentioning here that the occupiers occasionally mobilized the police to surveil and crack down on marginal movements, just as the prewar and wartime Japanese state had done, there is no doubt that the wartime state was far more violent and draconian.\textsuperscript{122} To highlight the similarly ideologically coercive nature of the two regimes (and continuities between them) is not to deny that there are crucial differences between policies that treat some marginal movements as “quackery” and those that regularly quash such movements through police brutality.

The final step in the redefinition of religious freedom during the Occupation was the process of contestation that forced both the Japanese and the Americans to reconstitute their understandings of religion-state relations. That the Japanese were forced to change their understandings of religious freedom is obvious. That the Americans were also changed by the experience has received relatively little attention in the scholarship to date. While in the future I will need to further delve into contemporary domestic American materials such as newspapers and magazines to truly substantiate the point, from the foregoing I can safely argue that the Occupation can be described as a project that was not so much about instantiating the one true version of religious freedom in Japan (despite the occupiers’ rhetoric to that end), but rather an active process of conceptual tinkering that had reverberations for both countries.

The inherently transnational nature of the Occupation—and the prominent role of religious concepts in the military conflict that preceded it—meant that when religious freedom was raised as an ideal to be upheld as a guiding principle for postwar Japan, the version of religious freedom assumes the separation—or the desirableness of such separation—of religion from public and political life and places religious affiliation and belief in the private realm).\textsuperscript{122} See Dorman 2004 and Dorman 2012.
that was put forward could no longer simply be articulated as a right or a liberty granted to citizens by their states. Rather, religious freedom was necessarily tied to transnational, universal ideals based on a shared humanity. In other words, for perhaps the first time in human history, religious freedom became a “human right.”

Nakano (1993, 67) indicated that religious freedom came to be understood as a universal human right in Japan with the promulgation of the Shintō Directive in 1945, but in this chapter I have suggested that the understanding of religious freedom as a universal and fundamental human right was more processual than instantaneous. Furthermore, the new interpretation of religious freedom was not imported to Japan after a long period of cultivation in the West, as Nakano suggests, but was created in the context of the Occupation and was new to both the Japanese and the Americans.

Moyn (2010) has shown that the language of “human rights” first emerged in 1941 and did not coalesce into the contemporary sense of endemic rights that supersede or precede national citizenship until around the 1970s. Whereas Moyn suggests that the language of “human rights” began to be used in European religious circles in the 1950s and 1960s, I am arguing that the Allied Occupation of Japan was an overlooked—and perhaps the first—place where “human rights” were theorized and articulated. Incidentally, Moyn dismisses the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as more rhetoric than substance.
Chapter Six

The Universalization of Religious Freedom

Inevitably, the establishment of religious freedom releases great stores of social energy. Whether shrines and temples can and will adjust themselves permanently to the ways of a free society or will move in the direction of the revival of the authoritarian system, I cannot prophesy. But as the situation stands today, it will be their choice, and there are many who wish to move forward in accordance with their new freedom.1

In May of 1951, elder statesman Andō Masazumi (1876–1955) published a collection of essays under the title Kōwa o mae ni shite: tsuketari, tsuihō no hakusho (Confronting The Peace, with A White Paper on [My] Purge [from Office]).2 Collectively, the essays in the book advanced Andō’s vision about how Japan’s defeat, while painful, could serve as an opportunity for the country to thrive in the new postwar spirit of peace and cooperation.3

Confronting The Peace offered an extended meditation on religion-state relations and Andō’s ideas regarding the role of religious freedom in postwar Japan. While the author retained some of

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2 Andō 1951
3 As the subtitle suggests, the book included a version of Andō’s self-exoneration cited at the opening of Chapter Four. Like many politicians’ memoirs, the book was both vanity publication and political manifesto. While I do not yet know how the book was received in its time, Andō was one of the most prominent figures of the Occupation-era religious world as recently resigned chair of the Japanese Federation of Religious Organizations. In his capacity as Chairperson, he had skillfully navigated the newly formed Japanese Federation of Religions through the Occupation. After his return to the House of Representatives in October 1952, he served as a minister of state (kokumu daijin) in the fifth Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) cabinet (from 21 May 1953 to 24 November 1954) and as Minister of Education in the Hatoyama Ichirō (1883–1959) cabinet from December 1954 to March 1955. Andō’s last post before his death in October 1955 was a brief stint as Minister of Education, where in addition to setting educational policy he had responsibility for overseeing the Religious Affairs Section (Shūmuka) of the Japanese government. The extent to which Andō’s ideas affected Shūmuka policy is a topic for future research.
Andō took a different tack than he had in the prewar and wartime period by adopting new language when it came to the specific topic of religious freedom. No longer was the legal institution of religious freedom a desideratum just because it could serve as an index of Japan’s level of civilization in the eyes of the international community. No longer was protection of religious freedom necessary just as a means for ensuring that ecclesiastical organizations were best positioned to support nation-building at home and connections with people on the Asian mainland and abroad. Such domestic and international considerations remained as important for Andō in the postwar context as they had been prior to and during the war, but in his 1951 book he argued that religious freedom needed protection for another reason.

Andō argued that religious freedom derived from a universal human religiosity. That religiosity formed the foundation of healthy political intercourse, because all humans were collectively bound up in what he termed a shared “moral existence” (dōtokuteki jitsuzai). “Essentially,” Andō wrote, “freedom of religious belief [shūkyō shinkō no jiyū] is among the most fundamental of the rights that citizens should enjoy. That is because faith is an innate human right [sore wa shinkō wa ningen tenpu no jinken dakara de aru].”

This was a striking statement of the sort that Andō would not—and perhaps could not—have made just a few years prior. As far as I have read, during the war Andō had consistently

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4 I described Andō’s evolutionary scheme in Chapters 2 and 4.
5 Andō 1951, 195–196.
6 Andō 1951, 202. The citation is from a chapter entitled “Kokka to shūkyō to no kankei,” dated January 1951.
7 Indeed, very few people in the wartime period (in Japan, the United States, or elsewhere) thought of rights and liberties in both universalistic and individual terms; nations remained the fundamental units of analysis for discussions of rights. Goldstone, cited in Cohen 2012, 67.
understood religious freedom to come from the state rather than from any innate source. Yet by the end of the Occupation, Andō’s conception of religious freedom had clearly changed.

Andō Masazumi’s position as a mediator between the religious and political worlds made him particularly attuned to the issues of religion-state relations, but he was hardly alone in his reconceptualization of religious freedom as an innate human right that derived from a universal human religiosity. Many of his fellow Japanese intellectuals were also busily interpreting the significance of Japan’s defeat and the opportunity it presented for reconstructing Japanese democracy. Like Andō, many of these intellectuals accepted the occupiers’ claim that Japan’s prewar and wartime relationship with religious freedom had been flawed. Taking the Occupation narrative about Japan’s incomplete democratization as a point of departure, such thinkers provided theorization and historiography that positioned prewar and wartime Japan as an aberration from universal democratic norms.

While Andō and many of his fellow Japanese intellectuals can therefore be said to have “embraced a desire for religious freedom” as the occupiers had hoped they might, this does not mean that they were converted from a heretical version of religion-state relations to the one true model. Rather, as I began to show in Chapter Five and will continue to show here, the

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8 Reading between the lines of a 1943 retrospective account of the formation of the 1939 Religious Organizations Law, it is clear that Andō saw religious freedom as coming from the state rather than from another source. Andō 1943, 163–184.
9 For example, Andō’s erstwhile colleague in the Rikken Seiyūkai political party, Uehara Etsujirō (1877–1962), published a short tract on the topic of constitutional revision in which he argued that humans could be described as “religious animals” and that therefore religious freedom needed to be protected by resisting the urge to subsume human religiosity under political “religious systems” (shūkyō seido). See Uehara 1945 (P), 145–146. Uehara had received degrees from the University of Washington and the University of London (a doctorate) before returning to Japan in 1911 to teach and then pursue his political career. His most prominent bureaucratic post was a short stint as Home Minister in 1947.
10 For example, Maruyama (1946) famously averred that there had been no basis in Japan for real freedom of belief until the emperor renounced his divinity in January 1946.
interactions between Americans and Japanese, between bureaucrats and religious groups, and between scholars of religion and their bureaucratic and clerical interlocutors began creating new understandings of religious liberty that were premised on equally novel (if still inchoate) understandings of common humanity, religion as a universal human attribute, and freedom for all groups and practices that were understood to be “genuine” religions. These new understandings were new for the Japanese and Americans alike.

These changes did not happen overnight. They took work and time. The simple point that I want to make in this closing chapter is that a crucial stage in the universalization of religious freedom took place in Japan. It occurred in the context of a military occupation and against the backdrop of having to re-humanize the dehumanized enemy and rationalize inhumane wartime acts. It occurred in an ambiguous situation in which two governments were in charge of the same territory and population. It took place in a cross-cultural scenario in which conceptions of religion necessarily had to expand, forcing a concomitant expansion of understandings of religious liberty.

Interpreters and Interpretations of Religious-Freedom-As-Human-Right

The concept of religious-freedom-as-human-right was gestated in wartime propaganda and born in the policy initiatives of the Allied Occupation. However, as had been the case with the policy of eradicating “National Shinto,” theoretical interpretations that could support and justify the policy of promoting religious-freedom-as-human-right came after the fact. Just as Chapter Five showed how Occupation officials hastily concocted rationales for the promotion of religious freedom once they realized that they had not formally defined the term, this chapter shows a...
parallel move on the part of influential Japanese interpreters such as political theorists, constitutional scholars, and scholars of religion to construct new theories of religious freedom with the start of the Occupation and particularly with the promulgation of the new constitution on 3 November 1946. Such theorization about the importance of protecting religious freedom as a human right was not limited to Japan. During the late 1940s, similar theorization took place in American circles as the United States began using the concept of religious-freedom-as-human-right to confront the new global threat of “godless communism.”

Many of these American and Japanese interpretive efforts harbored fundamental inconsistencies, making the idea of religious-freedom-as-human-right no less prone to uneven application than earlier understandings of religious freedom as customary right, civil liberty, or privilege had been: What counts as religion? How can security be balanced with liberty?

Ultimately, such questions were not made any easier by treating religious freedom as both innate and universal. In fact, treatment of religious freedom as a human right gave rise to another set of questions. Namely, how could a “human right” that transcended the purview of the state and preceded national citizenship be enforced? Who could police a state? What supervisory body existed to ensure that states provided unqualified religious freedom to their citizens? What agent could define “religion” and “freedom” in a way that could preserve the logic of religious-freedom-as-human-right while simultaneously policing states for potential abrogations of that right? While some international humanitarian organizations would ultimately step in to fill this role, a crucial part was played by scholars of religion, who could ostensibly stand “outside” religion and politics alike and designate certain religions legitimate or illegitimate; certain political practices oppressive or emancipatory.

Introduction.
In order to make this argument, I focus first on domestic Japanese discourses about religious freedom during the Occupation, including interpretations of religious freedom advanced by bureaucrats, constitutional scholars, and scholars of religion. For these influential figures, interpreting religious freedom as a timeless, universal principle necessitated the creation of a history that regarded prewar and wartime Japanese practices as “bad religion” and “bad politics.” While this history treated the Occupation as a point of rupture in which the Japanese nation “woke up” from a long nightmare of religious oppression, popular interpretations of the religious freedom clause in the new postwar constitution show that the newly “universal” religious freedom was still premised on problematic distinctions between “religion” and “not-religion,” “good” and “bad” religion, and the delicate balance between “liberty” versus “security.” The embrace of religious freedom as a human right necessitated creating a past in which “real” religious freedom did not exist, but the positive reasons for the promotion of religious freedom as a human right initially remained vague. It was clear that past practices were “bad”; it was less clear what “good” practices needed to replace them. I conclude the first section on postwar interpretations of religious-freedom-as-human-right by showing that scholars of religion stepped forward in this context to provide advice to clerics, laypeople, and bureaucrats alike about how religions and religion-state relations should develop.

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12 The constitution was enacted six months later, on 3 May 1947.

13 Recent theoretical scholarship on religious liberty has highlighted this particular issue. See, for example, Sullivan 2005 and Mahmood and Danchin, eds. 2014.

14 Prominent local intellectuals such as Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) and Minobe Tatsukichi (1873–1948) identified the prewar Japanese relationship with religious freedom as problematic and lacking in understanding of religious freedom as a universal “principle.” However, these early postwar interpretations did not necessarily result in the conclusion that religious freedom should be granted to all groups and practices without exception. Minobe, for example, called for the suppression of “pseudo-religions” (gijishūkyō) in a text explicating the meaning of Article 20 of the new constitution, which began with the clause “Religious freedom is guaranteed to all.”
The following section shows that American responses to the “success story” of the Occupation repositioned American foreign policy within the new human rights framework. One of the many ironies of the Occupation was that even as the Americans were chastising the Japanese for wedding religion to politics, the Americans were in the process of bringing religion into a more central position in American civic life and American foreign policy. The civilizationalist rhetoric that had characterized the Pacific War did not disappear over the course of the Occupation or with the rise of human rights discourse. Rather, it was reconfigured and repurposed in the late 1940s to create a binary scheme that pitted a “democratic civilization” specifically characterized by religious freedom against a “totalitarianism” exemplified by “godless communism.” The Occupation may not have resulted in the total Christianization of Japan that many Americans anticipated, but it nevertheless provided the Americans with a model for promoting religious freedom abroad: Religious freedom had been America’s gift to Japan; it could and should be America’s gift to the world.

Shifting the focus from the theoretical development of religious-freedom-as-human-right to the process whereby religious freedom was safeguarded in actual practice, as a third point I show that while the concept of “human rights” remained inchoate even after the promulgation of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, American and Japanese scholars of Japanese religions wove protection of religious-freedom-as-human-right into the very fabric of their field.

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15 Inboden 2008
16 Mazower 2011
17 The American vision was more dream than reality. In the absence of a holistic international system that could actually guarantee innate “human rights” (as opposed to the “civil rights” and “civil liberties” granted to citizens by their states), the only way to police infringements on religious freedom was to show that certain types of religion deserved protection and certain types of politics deserved censure. American policymakers were not hesitant about making such distinctions based on their own intuitive (and often sectarian) understandings of religion, but that story is a separate issue that would require an entirely different dissertation.
During the Occupation and throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, scholars of Japanese religions highlighted the ideal of latitudinarianism in state policy, designated certain religious ideas and practices as illegitimate while protecting others from censure, and created normative expectations for religious development. Thus, scholars of religion did not just observe and document the “introduction” of religious-freedom-as-human-right in the wake of the war. They actively participated in its construction. In so doing, they also created a particular way of observing and evaluating Japanese religions.

That scholarly gaze has survived up through the present day, deeply shaping the fields of Japanese studies and religious studies alike. In closing I provide three concrete examples of how the concept of religious-freedom-as-human-right has shaped postwar scholarship on Japanese religions. Specifically, studies of “State Shintō,” “new religions,” and “Buddhist war responsibility” have all been fundamentally premised on ahistorical conceptions of religious freedom as a human right and the accompanying normative expectation that religious studies scholarship has an obligation to protect that right.

**Japanese Nightmares**

The first step here is to show how Japanese bureaucrats, political theorists, and scholars of religion and law positioned religious-freedom-as-human-right in the wake of the war. The most pressing problem for them initially was to identify why Japan’s prewar constitutional guarantee of religious freedom had been illegitimate. For example, influential scholars such as the political theorist Maruyama Masao (1914–1996) began advancing the argument that despite the guarantee of religious freedom in Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution, there was, in Maruyama’s words, “in principle no basis in Japan for freedom of belief” until the emperor renounced his divinity in
Maruyama’s assessment was couched in psychological language that effectively treated the prewar and wartime period as a long nightmare from which Japan was just “waking up” during the Occupation. As this section will show, many others followed suit.

A related problem that quickly arose after the promulgation of the new constitution was to identify how the new religious freedom clause (Article 20) and a clause about restrictions on state financing of religious institutions (Article 89) differed from the stipulations of the Meiji Constitution. For the most part, these early attempts focused on showing why Japan had previously gotten religious freedom wrong. When they used the language of religious-freedom-as-human-right, however, they revealed considerable confusion as to what it meant to treat something as an innate “human right.”

This meant that a degree of theorization was necessary to make the language of innate rights fit with the category of religion. Against this backdrop, scholars of religion engaged in a campaign to promote understanding of religious-freedom-as-human-right by treating religiosity as a universal human attribute, but one that had “true” and “false” manifestations. “Real religion” was understood to be internal, private, and for the psychological benefit of humans; “false religion” was understood to be magical, public, and for the material benefit of clerics or the state.

This humanist emphasis would become increasingly important in theoretical justifications of the new religious-freedom-as-human-right paradigm. As a human right in a world characterized by religious pluralism, religious freedom could not come from a transcendent source that was affixed to any particular religious worldview, nor could it flow from states to their citizens (because states, like wartime Japan, might get it “wrong”). The remaining alternative was to have religious freedom well up from within humans themselves. This involved not only a

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18 Maruyama 1969 (1946)
reconceptualization of religious freedom, but also the construction of a “religious anthropology”—a worldview that saw religion as an essential and irreducible component of human life. As the following examples show, many of the Japanese interpreters of the new constitution—legal scholars and scholars of religion alike—advanced humanist interpretations of religion that were intended to counter sacerdotalist or theist interpretations.

Japanese Interpretations of Articles 20 and 89 of the New Constitution

One of the most famous ironies of the Occupation was that in the name of promoting democracy of, by, and for the people, the American occupiers had infamously scrapped the Japanese constitutional drafts and replaced them with a constitution written by a committee of American “advisors.” Article 20 of the new constitution read:

1) Religious freedom is guaranteed to all. No religious organizations shall receive special privileges from the state, nor exercise any political authority.
2) No person may be forced to participate in any religious acts, celebration, rites, or practice.
3) The state and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Upon the promulgation of this new constitution in November 1946 and its enactment in May the following year, a veritable cottage industry of publications outlining the significance of the new regime emerged. These books were usually written in a plain, unadorned style and easily

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19 This could be considered an extension of the idea of “natural religion” that had been popular in the previous century. Hoshino (2012) describes how this idea was imported into Japan. One of the challenges faced by the recent scholarly critiques of “religion” as a sui generis category is that many people rightly worry that abolishing the category wholesale may result in threats to religious liberty. See Laborde 2014.

20 The occupiers’ decision to scrap the Japanese draft and replace it with a hastily compiled American one has been thoroughly documented (Dower 1999, 346–404; the various drafts of the constitution are included in the Charles Kades Papers [CKP], part of the Prange Collection housed at the University of Maryland at College Park.)
accessible—some were even illustrated.\(^{21}\) The sheer volume of such texts suggests that they enjoyed an avid readership, although it may also have been the case that authors recognized an opportunity to capitalize on a timely topic. It also bears mentioning that many of these texts were actually sponsored by the occupiers and were written under mild duress; some were used as textbooks to indoctrinate schoolchildren in the benefits of the new regime.\(^{22}\)

Many of these explanatory tracts showed considerable creativity in parsing the role of religious freedom in the new “peace constitution.” While clearly the new constitution was not of Japanese creation, it did not simply “bestow” religious freedom on the Japanese people. From the moment the constitution was promulgated in November 1946, Japanese people were proactive interpreters of the religious freedom guarantee.

One of these handbooks was published by a group called the Tokyo New Japan Group and edited by one Nagasawa Hitoshi (d.u.). The book went by the title *The New Constitution Reader: All Articles and Clauses Explained* and featured a picture of the National Diet Building on its cover.\(^{23}\) A colophon listed the price as five yen, with a marginal note upping the cost to six.

This accessible primer began with a general introduction by an anonymous author (probably the editor Nagasawa) and then an opening chapter by Kanamori Tokujirō (1886–1959) that laid out the “Characteristic Features of the Revised Constitution—Awareness of Noble Ideals, Respect for Universal Human Principles.”\(^{24}\) Kanamori enumerated these principles and ideals in

\(^{21}\) See, for example, Yomiuri Shinbunsha 1946 (which featured the text of the new constitution followed by short explanatory paragraphs) and Kitaura 1947 (which used the same model and accompanied the text with pictures). Both books courtesy of the Prange Collection.


\(^{23}\) Nagasawa 1946. Courtesy of the Prange Collection.

\(^{24}\) Kanamori was a politician and bureaucrat who served as a minister without portfolio in the first Yoshida Shigeru (1878–1967) cabinet after the war. He published prolifically on the topic of the new constitution and constitutional revision in the years after the war, and seems to have devoted especial attention to the issue of religion in at least some of his publications judging
his subheadings: 1) Lack of Specificity; 2) Thoroughgoing Rationality; 3) Respect for the Individual; 4) Popular Sovereignty; 5) Imperial System; and 6) Upholding World Peace. The first of these sections referred to the fact that the constitution did not advance a particularist sentiment about the uniqueness of Japan vis-à-vis other nations, but rather based the legal document on universal human principles. The second section laid out a secularist argument in that Kanamori praised the diminution of empirically unverifiable claims in politics—he argued that Japan’s prewar constitution had included a provision of religious freedom but failed to adopt a truly rationalist spirit (presumably in its designation of the emperor as “sacred and inviolable”). This was because the prewar regime had based political governance on irrational mythology and because it had adopted a system of “officially recognized religions” that reserved privileges for Buddhist and Shintō sects with established pedigrees while reserving for some Shintō shrines and ideas a position beyond the pale of garden-variety “religion.” The other sections were fairly straightforward explanations of the principles of “democracy,” “freedom,” and “peace” that were enshrined in the new constitution.

The next section of the text, “The New Constitution and Interpretation,” featured the text of the constitution followed by terse explanatory prose. In the section explaining the religious freedom clause (Article 20), the anonymous author wrote:

from their titles. Kanamori’s career is tangential to the story I want to tell here, but a sense of the scope of his writings can be gleaned from the WorldCat entry on his corpus: http://www.worldcat.org/search?q=kanamori+tokujiro&fq=&dblist=638&qt=first_page. Accessed 19 March 2014.
25 The titles of some of these subheadings are partially illegible in the copy of the text available to me from the Prange Collection. Due to Prange Collection policy, I was forced to take photos of the digitized text as it was displayed on a computer screen.
26 Kanamori, in Nagasawa, ed. 1946, 4–5.
27 This constitutional language was standard at the time the Meiji Constitution was drafted.
28 Kanamori, in Nagasawa, ed. 1946, 5–6.
Religious freedom occupies a special position in both the history and ideology [shisō] of claims regarding basic human rights [kihon teki jinken no shuchō]. This clause first clarifies this principle, and then concretely establishes this principle [i.e., of religious freedom]. Therefore religious bodies receiving special privileges from the state or exercising political power are elements that are determined to fall outside the individual’s ability to choose a religion. The third clause particularly outlines that the state or its organs cannot with political backing or from a particular religious position engage in specific religious education or religious activities. To summarize, this article particularly made its aim to abolish the State Shintō system of our country, and to establish the so-called principle of religious freedom.29

Here, the anonymous author of the explanatory text described religious freedom as being an essential component of human rights discourse, but identified the motive for the introduction of a religious freedom clause as being primarily about eradicating “State Shintō.” In other words, at this early stage (the text was published in 1946) the linkage between human rights and religious freedom existed primarily at a rhetorical level. The true motive for promoting religious freedom was understood to be primarily negative (abolishing State Shintō) rather than positive (safeguarding a universal principle); the author implied that “State Shintō” had infringed upon religious-freedom-as-human-right but did not clarify how. The source of religious-freedom-as-human-right was also unclear—the author sidestepped the issue by vaguely gesturing to the “history and ideology of claims regarding basic human rights” without citing any sources.

Another of these constitutional primers was written by Minobe Tatsukichi (1873–1948), the former Tokyo Imperial University law professor who had infamously been forced to resign his post in 1935 for his theory that the emperor was merely an “organ of the state.” Minobe contributed directly to the construction of the new constitution as a local legal adviser; his 1947 text An Overview of the New Constitution can therefore be seen as an accessible treatment of the

main provisions of the constitution by an intellectual who was esteemed for his knowledge of constitutional law and intimately familiar with the new legal regime.\footnote{Minobe 1947, included in the Prange Collection. As I mentioned in my discussion of Maruyama Masao’s post-surrender analysis of Japan’s aberrant national psychology, in the postwar period Minobe was also understood to be an unfortunate victim of Japan’s militarist ideology and a martyr of sorts for liberal causes.}

Minobe’s book covered the constitution methodically, laying out the rationale for its promulgation and comparing it with the constitutions of other countries. Later sections of the book covered each constitutional provision, providing the text of the clause and then following it up with an explanation. Under the heading for Article 20 of the new constitution, Minobe argued that the Meiji Constitution had “acknowledged” religious freedom but had limited it with all sorts of restrictions, meaning that religious freedom itself had not been thoroughly actualized.\footnote{My translation of the text as it appears in Minobe’s book: “Freedom of religion for all is guaranteed. No religious group shall receive special privileges from the state, nor shall it exercise political authority. No individual shall be forced to participate in any religious activity, celebration, or ritual. The state and its organs shall not engage in religious education or any other religious activity.”}

As evidence, Minobe pointed to the prewar treatment of Shintō as Japan’s national religion, state support of shrines and priests, the compulsory participation of schoolchildren in rites at public schools, the compulsory participation of bureaucrats and citizens in shrine rites, and the differing treatment of the thirteen “Shintō sects” and Buddhist schools in comparison to Shintō.\footnote{While Minobe’s accusations were accurate in terms of the compulsory participation in shrine rites, his claim that the prewar constitution made Shintō Japan’s national religion was both disingenuous and irresponsible for a legal scholar, since the Meiji Constitution specifically avoided making any such claim.}

Moving from the Meiji Constitution to the new “peace constitution,” Minobe argued that the 15 December 1945 Shintō Directive had been promulgated in order to eliminate the unsavory legal practices of the past and inaugurate true religious freedom. According to the constitutional scholar, Article 20 of the new constitution had been based on this Occupation directive. In this
Jolyon Baraka Thomas  

Japan's Preoccupation with Religious Freedom

way, he averred, genuine religious freedom would be guaranteed to all. Strikingly, Minobe did not argue that religious freedom derived from some ultimate source, but rather from a directive issued by a military occupying power.

Minobe’s concluding move on the topic of religious freedom was equally striking. Although he had criticized the Meiji Constitution for imposing considerable limits on religious freedom, he suggested—quite against the letter of the religious freedom clause in the postwar constitution—that religious freedom had natural limits in the case of “pseudo-religions”:

The thing that becomes a problem in regard to religious freedom is the concept of the so-called “pseudo-religions [giji shūkyō].” In the old constitution [the clause] “to the extent it does not disturb peace and order or infringe on their duties as subjects” [worked] as a limit on religious freedom and limited it to this guarantee. In contrast to this, in the new constitution there is no such limiting clause, and [religious freedom] is guaranteed as an absolutely inviolable liberty. However, because of that under the new constitution if there were a case where someone put on the mask of religion and deceived the true sentiments of the people and disturbed public order and disseminated absurdly false teachings, it should not be understood that the state could not stop it or that he must be left free to do as he pleased no matter how much it infringed on public order or no matter how much it prevented people from performing their public duties. What the constitution is guaranteeing is only related to true religion, and pseudo-religions are not included, and the state’s ability to proscribe such [groups] must of course be allowed. Determining the boundaries between true religions and pseudo-religions is difficult, but aside from those [groups] that have historically been globally recognized as religions, those that profess themselves to be expressions of supernatural divine will and therefore [aim to] attract the faith of the people—the likes of such should generally be seen as pseudo-religions, and their definition awaits none other than the determination of sound common sense.33

33 Minobe 1947, 106–107. Minobe’s treatment reflected the spirit of his day more than it did the letter of the law. The greatly relaxed rules for religious incorporation presented in the 28 December Religious Corporations Ordinance had presented a situation in which a huge number of new groups incorporated and many secessions occurred. This caused no small bit of consternation for the leaders of well-established sects who saw the schisms as threats to their authority; it also concerned the members of the Occupation Religions and Cultural Resources Division (RCR) to such an extent that researcher William P. Woodard (1972) would later identify the relaxed rules as one of the failures of RCR policy. Journalists of the day also exhibited considerable fascination with the new groups, which made excellent fodder for sensationalist reportage. See Dorman 2012.
Minobe’s account passed on the opportunity to affix rights and liberties to some transcendent source or a universal humanity. However, it did foreground the human in a different way by accepting as unproblematic the idea that the concept of “true religious freedom” was dictated by a foreign government and by leaving it up to humans’ “sound common sense” to distinguish between true and false religion.

A different sort of constitutional interpretation occurred in bureaucratic publications aimed at Japanese religious organizations. Many religious leaders responded to the new constitution with a combination of dread, curiosity, and opportunism. For some—especially the so-called “new religious movements”—the political change and the postwar circumstances provided fertile ground for claiming a new religious dispensation. For others, the future of Japanese religion looked bleak as the very economic and legal structures that had undergirded the religious world of the past came tumbling down. Into this breach stepped the monthly journal Shūkyō jihō (Religion Times), which was established in the summer of 1947 by the Japanese Office of Religious Affairs (Shūmuka) in the Ministry of Education to serve as a one-stop source of information about religions policy. According to Fukuda Shigeru (1910–?), head of the Shūmuka at that time, the journal’s mission was to bridge the gaps that had arisen between policymakers and religionists in the wake of the war.34 On the first page of the inaugural issue he wrote:

> With the enactment of the new Constitution, religious liberty became completely guaranteed. This is truly a fine thing. However, religious liberty has been misinterpreted and abused, and even among religious leaders there are those who freely engage in anachronistic [behavior].

> Moreover, those who misconstrue separation of religion from the state are not few in number. One reason for this is that after the war, a great distance emerged between religious leaders and bureaucrats, and there was no opportunity to parse

34 Fukuda served as chief of the Religious Affairs Division from 11 May 1946 to 24 July 1948. See Shūmu jihō 116, 88. By his own account, he was one of the few “witnesses” to the intricate workings of the reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationship between RCR and the Religious Affairs Division. See Fukuda 1993, 522.
the various laws and promulgations regarding religion; therefore, [religious leaders] do not understand the development and direction of the greatly changed [religious] administration of today; on the other hand, it can be said that the orientation and directions of the bureaucrats themselves have been insufficient.

Therefore, if there were a mediating figure who could keep religious leaders thoroughly, correctly, and swiftly informed regarding the various problems of religious administration while also reflecting the trends of the religious world, how helpful would that be! With what strides—and in what direction—should Japanese religion proceed? This journal *Religion Times* is [precisely] the thing that was born as a response to the general desire for such a signpost.35

Fukuda’s emphasis on the necessity for better collaboration between bureaucrats and religious leaders was no doubt designed to assuage the fears of religious leaders that separation of religion from the state was a denigration of religions’ status.36 Fukuda also averred that religious freedom and religion-state relations were prone to misunderstanding and abuse, but he failed to mention what exactly “proper” religion-state relations looked like. However, on the whole *Religion Times* provided religious leaders with a normative bureaucratic vision, with detailed exposition of how to meet the reporting and taxation demands of the new regime. Many pages of each issue featured a question and answer column (*shitsugi ōtō ran*) that gave religious leaders a chance to ask questions about how to navigate the new bureaucratic system. A “materials explained” column (*shiryō kaisetsu ran*) provided a detailed explication of various laws and ordinances for clerics who may have been confused about the changes introduced by the Religious Corporations Ordinance (28 December 1945).

These step-by-step guides to paperwork and reporting procedures were placed alongside editorials and serialized articles about the proper postwar development of Japanese religions and religion-state relations. For example, the inaugural issue included another article by Fukuda that

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35 ShJ 1, no. 1 (July 1947), 1.
36 As an editorial included in the October 1947 issue claimed, the journal’s purpose was to unite the “center and periphery” (that is, the government and religious organizations), which were like
somewhat defensively explained that the new constitution was not an onerous imposition on
religions’ traditional privileges, as some evidently feared, but was in fact a latitudinarian
document that provided religions with greater freedom than they had hitherto experienced:

If one interprets the new constitution’s provisions by the letter, it may seem
extremely severe, and regarding religion it may look as though nothing can be
done. However, if you read and examine it thoroughly, in its execution it is not
necessarily the case that one needs to think of it in such rigid terms. Recently the
separation of religion from the state has been greatly misinterpreted, and among
some citizens religion is feared, given a wide berth, and in extreme cases there are
some who ignore or scorn religion; that sort of attitude is extremely lamentable.
Because the new constitution is not something that rejects social status but
[actually] respects it, in terms of the mission and status of religion, there is a need
to increasingly deepen understanding of it [i.e., the constitution].

Because the Shūmuka was ultimately in charge of administering religions policy “on the
ground,” the vision of religious freedom advanced in Religion Times is particularly important for
understanding how the Japanese government understood the constitution in the wake of its
enactment in May 1946. Religion Times served a crucial function by interpreting the expectations
of the new regime for worried Japanese clerics; it also served as a way for bureaucrats like
Fukuda to assert some degree of control over the interpretation of the new constitution. The
journal regularly made reference to the ideas of religious freedom and separation of religion from
the state, navigating a line between “anachronistic” (that is, backward or reactionary) tendencies
and (what bureaucrats like Fukuda saw as) excessively progressive stances that misinterpreted
separation for the need to abolish religion altogether.

The Influence of Religious Studies on Conceptions of Religious Freedom

Constitutional scholars and bureaucrats were not the only ones who advanced interpretations
of the new religious freedom clause. While their attitudes were hardly cynically opportunist,
the Occupation gave scholars of religion a chance to underscore the importance of their relatively young field. To policymakers and bureaucrats they were a source of expertise about the religious world; to ecclesiastical authorities they were a source of information about the expectations of the new regime. This unique position allowed religious studies scholars to not only provide the terms through which Occupation policy was formulated, but also to frame the very parameters of “acceptable” and “unacceptable” religion. Here I will trace these trends by looking at University of Tokyo scholars Oguchi Iichi (1910–1986) and Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964) as well as former Religions Division researcher (and ex-missionary) William P. Woodard (1896–1973).

Oguchi Iichi

At the very onset of the Occupation, scholars of religion wasted no time in highlighting the importance of their unique brand of expertise. For example, in an article published on 15 December 1945, University of Tokyo scholar of religious studies Oguchi Iichi argued that greater awareness of religious studies would not only have prevented the problems of the past, but could also help to guide Japan toward a better future:

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38 Takagi 1993, 428.
39 Takagi Kiyoko argued that University of Tokyo professor of religious studies Kishimoto Hideo was caught between the Occupation interpretation that State Shintō was an ultranationalistic religion and the Japanese government’s position that it was not a religion from an administrative standpoint. Kishimoto trod a fine line between these incompatible positions by appealing to the Americans’ penchant for protecting religious freedom. See Takagi 1993, 428.
40 Oguchi Iichi was a scholar of religious studies who had graduated with a bachelor’s degree from the department of religious studies at Tokyo Imperial University in 1935. He continued on in the same department as a graduate student and eventually moved into a professorial post in the school of Oriental Studies (Tōyōgaku) at the same institution. His particular area of expertise was Max Weber’s sociology of religion; he seems to have been the first of many who attempted to apply Weber’s thesis from the Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism to the Japanese case. On the popularity of Weberian sociology in postwar Japanese religious studies, see Hayashi and Yamanaka 1993. Talcott Parsons’s (1902–1979) student Robert Bellah (1927–2013) made
Although from a historical perspective religious studies is a young academic field, perhaps because of the conservatism of its object of study, to the general public it appears as a field for those of antiquarian and eccentric tastes. While it draws attention from the ambits of philosophy, sociology, and folklore studies, as a standalone discipline it does not seem to be regarded as particularly important.

However, when directly observing the reality of Japan’s defeat, the feeling deepens that the extreme lack of religious studies cultivation among administrators and intellectuals in general—especially in the world of thought and education—has been one factor in the sad condition of our country today. If knowledge about religion had existed, proper understanding of the ideas of the divine nation, the chosen people, emperor worship, and unity of rites and rule would have been easier, and the [attitude of] self-righteousness may not have developed. At present religious studies seems not to be the peculiar science of the armchair academic [literally, the philanthropist: tokujika], but the fundamental academic field of the cultured individual.

…Without dwelling on the past, to respond to the predicted flourishing of vulgar religions that will probably accompany the abolition of the Religious Organizations Law, for the sake of the general populace the enlightenment of religious knowledge is necessary. Religious studies as a [force for] cultivation should not be overlooked.41

Oguchi staked out a position for religious studies that was in part wishful thinking, but also in part an accurate representation of the influential role to be played by scholars of religion in negotiating the new postwar field of religion-state relations. In December 1945 Oguchi could only speak vaguely about what this would look like. However, the Shintō Directive that was promulgated on the same day that he published his reflections on the edifying power of religious studies bore the fingerprints of his University of Tokyo colleague, Kishimoto Hideo (1903–1964).42

an early attempt to apply the Weberian thesis to Japan by examining ways in which the Shingaku movement had contributed to the development of proto-modernity during Japan’s Tokugawa period (1600–1868); the book was translated into Japanese and eagerly consumed by the Japanese intelligentsia. See Bellah 1957.

41 Oguchi, “Kyōyō to shite no shūkyōgaku,” SK 14, no. 11 (December 1945), 4.
42 I described Kishimoto’s influence on the Shintō Directive in Chapter One. For his own recollections, see Kishimoto 1963 (included in Shinshūren Chōsa Shitsu, ed. 1963 and KHS 5). For a critical study that used Kishimoto’s own diaries to assess his role, see Okuyama 2009.
The Occupation directive to “encourage the Japanese people to develop a desire for religious freedom” was particularly aided by the activities of Kishimoto, who blended a liberal commitment to latitudinarian policy with a technocratic approach that aimed to redefine the capacities of religion and state in postwar society. Top officials in the Ministry of Education turned to Kishimoto, then a relatively junior assistant professor in the Department of Religious Studies at Tokyo Imperial University, to serve as a mediator between the ministry and its parallel branch in GHQ. In his capacity as an informal advisor to Religions Division and private tutor to author of the Shintō Directive William K. Bunce (1907–2008), Kishimoto greatly influenced Occupation policy. He also served as a consultant for the Religious Affairs Division (Shūmuka) of the Ministry of Education and as an expert witness in hearings on the prospect of post-Occupation constitutional revision. Kishimoto also met regularly with transsectarian groups and published regularly in religious journals and mainstream newspapers so that he could advance his vision of ideal religion-state relations.

Although the mobilization of religious studies expertise during the Occupation was presumably intended to provide an objective, academic standpoint regarding Japanese religions

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44 Advice on the prospect of constitutional revision began during the Occupation but continued after it. One such debate occurred in 1959–1960; see CRJ 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), and 4(1).
45 For example, in a 24 February 1948 Japanese Religious Federation meeting on the subject of religious education, Kishimoto and University of Tokyo Professor Emeritus Uno Enkū (1885–1949) vigorously defended the constitutional principle of separation against Federation Chair Andō Masazumi’s arguments that the new constitution left room for religious education. Otake Masuko, “Report on the [19 February 1948] Conference on Religious Education under the Auspices of Shukyo Renmei (Personal Note for WPW [William P. Woodard]),” 24 February 1948 (RCR Box #5787, Folder #18). Andō would never relinquish this position, but Kishimoto’s resistance to the idea of religious education was a qualified resistance. In a December 1947 article published in the journal Shakaiken Kishimoto argued that non-confessional instruction about religion was a desideratum for public school social studies education. KHS 5, 279–290.
and religion-state relations, Kishimoto was explicitly activist and readily made prescriptive statements about how Japanese religions should behave in the context of the new regime.\footnote{Religions and Cultural Resources Division (RCR) researcher William P. Woodard (1972, 186–187) later recalled that Kishimoto frequently tried to inject his normative ideals into Occupation policy. Bunce apparently resisted many of these efforts, to Kishimoto’s documented chagrin. See Kishimoto 1963.} He used the anodyne tone of academe to speak authoritatively about religious doctrine and history when interacting with Occupation policymakers and Japanese governmental officials, but when talking to religious groups Kishimoto used his academic authority to superciliously draw distinctions between “genuine” and “false” religion. While I do not want to overstate his influence, the academic authority that Kishimoto represented exerted considerable influence on definitions of “religion” and “freedom,” both during the Occupation and afterward.\footnote{One study on Kishimoto’s influence on Occupation policy is Takagi 1993. Okuyama 2009 uses the copy of Kishimoto’s diary housed in the William P. Woodard collection at the University of Oregon to highlight Kishimoto’s private thoughts on the subject of the Shintō Directive.} Indeed, in listing up his contributions as advisor to the occupiers, Kishimoto’s former assistant Takagi Kiyoko argued that Kishimoto persuaded the Japanese to establish “religious freedom in the true sense.”\footnote{Takagi 1993, 433–434. Takagi worked closely with Kishimoto both during and after the war (Kishimoto extended special thanks to her in his 1961 textbook Religious Studies [Shūkyōgaku] and she also helped him establish the International Institute for the Study of Religions). While her 1993 study largely reproduces Kishimoto’s 1963 apologetic account, she adds a degree of historical perspective and a sense of Kishimoto’s unique position as a Japanese academic well versed in English and American culture. Takagi summarizes Kishimoto’s contributions during the Occupation as: 1) facilitating the creation of new directives regarding religion that were beneficial to religious groups and occupiers alike; 2) saving Shintō from total eradication through skillful manipulation of occupiers’ sentiment; and 3) introducing “real” religious freedom to Japan.}

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48 Takagi 1993, 433–434. Takagi worked closely with Kishimoto both during and after the war (Kishimoto extended special thanks to her in his 1961 textbook Religious Studies [Shūkyōgaku] and she also helped him establish the International Institute for the Study of Religions). While her 1993 study largely reproduces Kishimoto’s 1963 apologetic account, she adds a degree of historical perspective and a sense of Kishimoto’s unique position as a Japanese academic well versed in English and American culture. Takagi summarizes Kishimoto’s contributions during the Occupation as: 1) facilitating the creation of new directives regarding religion that were beneficial to religious groups and occupiers alike; 2) saving Shintō from total eradication through skillful manipulation of occupiers’ sentiment; and 3) introducing “real” religious freedom to Japan.
Takagi’s encomium was not an unbiased assessment, and her conception of “religious freedom in the true sense” is one that this dissertation fundamentally rejects.\(^{49}\) That said, the evidence suggests that Kishimoto advanced a particular vision of religion-state relations that diagnosed the problems with the religious world, prescribed antidotes for the various reactionary tendencies he saw as impediments to progress, and offered a long-term prognosis for the continued viability of religions. In this act of “religion-making from outside,” Kishimoto created a humanistic understanding of religion that, in turn, provided theoretical support for the developing postwar conception of “religious-freedom-as-human-right.”

For example, in a March 1947 article entitled “The Modern Religious Spirit and Shrine Shintō” that was serialized in *Jinja shinpō* (*Shrine News*), Kishimoto argued that Shrine Shintō faced two types of problems.\(^{50}\) The first set of immediate problems related to the Occupation reforms, and specifically to how shrines could embrace the principle of religious freedom, eliminate militarism, and eradicate ultranationalistic thought (*kageki naru kokka shugi teki shisō*). The second set of problems was both long-term and fundamental. “In a word,” Kishimoto wrote, “it is a problem of how much Shrine Shintō can persevere in the face of the modern spirit of

\(^{49}\) This conception of “real” religious freedom also features prominently (and problematically) in Nakano Tusyoshi’s (2003) history of the religions policies of the Occupation.

\(^{50}\) Kishimoto preferred to use the term “Shrine Shintō” rather than “State Shintō”; he registered his displeasure with the occupiers’ preferred term in Kishimoto 1963 (see KHS 5, 14–16), suggesting that the occupiers confused Shintō nationalism with Shrine Shintō. Although I cannot tell now whether he was unduly influenced by Kishimoto, Religions Division researcher William P. Woodard also preferred to distinguish between “Shrine Shintō” and what he called the “Kokutai Cult.” See Woodard 1972, 10. *Jinja shinpō* was established on 8 July 1946 as an outlet for news about the shrine world. It was originally housed within the Jinja Honchō, but it was eventually made a separate institution, the Jinja Shinpōsha. See http://www.jinja.co.jp/ayumi03.html. Last accessed 17 February 2014.
Kishimoto’s argument was wide-ranging, but it can be distilled down to two basic points. First, shrines were accustomed to government patronage and political protection, but these things were no longer guaranteed under the new regime. The second point was more important for the reconfiguration of Japanese religiosity that Kishimoto advocated. Kishimoto strove to explain that religion existed primarily to serve human needs rather than the other way around. Whereas previously the divine realm was given priority and clerics and institutions were considered superior to ordinary people, in the new modern age the situation was reversed: religion existed for the sake of humans, and clerics and religious institutions existed to serve the common people. Accordingly, Kishimoto suggested that shrine priests needed to reconfigure their approach to providing ritual services. People should not attend festivals merely to eat, drink, and sightsee only to leave with an empty feeling, Kishimoto argued. While the alternative to this approach was not clearly outlined in his article, he suggested that Shrine Shintō needed to “rediscover the human” (aratamete ningen o hakken sure hitsuyō ga aru).

Looking at the broader arc of his outreach articles and the heavy emphasis on the psychology of religion evident in his research, what Kishimoto apparently meant was that “real” or “superior” religion cultivated exalted inner states, while inferior religious practices were based on magic, pursuit of material benefits, or the melding of religion with politics. That is, Kishimoto’s “religion-making from outside” privatized and “secularized” religion in the sense that it drew a sharp distinction between “religion” and public life. This attitude frequently verged on the paternalistic, as when Kishimoto prefaced “The Path for the Survival of Shrine Shintō”—an

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51 KHS 5, 92–93.
article serialized in *Shrine News* in July 1947—with the potentially incendiary claim that Shintō priests were ignorant of the “true character of religion.”

In addition to publishing hortatory articles in religious journals that were read primarily by clerics, Kishimoto also used the public forum of the newspaper opinion column to outline prescriptive measures for religions’ postwar development. For example, in an article entitled “Expectations for the Religious World at the Start of the [New] Year” that was serialized in the mainstream newspaper *Tokyo Daily News* over five days in early January 1948, Kishimoto began by reiterating his claim that the age of religion being solely for the gods was long past and that the age of religion existing for the sake of humans had arrived. The chief characteristic of modern religion was to construct a worthwhile human life, Kishimoto averred, thereby advocating a humanistic and functionalist understanding of religion: Religion existed to resolve human dilemmas and to establish one’s place in the universe and society. With this understanding of religion in mind, Kishimoto laid out his expectations for Shrine Shintō, Buddhism, Christianity, the groups formerly designated as the Shintō sects (*shōha shūkyō*), the new religions (*shinkō shūkyō*), the political administration of religion, public education, and journalism. These expectations were not merely predictions about the challenges and developments that each of these groups or fields would face; they were prescriptive measures about how to construct ideal religion-state relations.

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52 Kishimoto, “Jinja Shintō no ikiru michi [The Path for the Survival of Shrine Shintō],” KHS 5, 100.
53 See Kishimoto, “Nentō: shūkyō kai ni nozomu,” KHS 5: 200–212. Originally serialized in the *Tokyo Nichinichi Shinbun*, 4–9 January 1948. Even before the war Kishimoto’s scholarship had this prescriptive tone. For example, in a 1934 article entitled “The Task of Buddhism,” Kishimoto argued that Japanese Buddhists needed to modernize their religion to make it more palatable globally.
Kishimoto’s treatment of the problems of religious administration in this article is of particular note. He argued that while the line between religion and the state had been clearly drawn in the immediate postwar period, the reasons for drawing that line were still poorly understood. Separation was not important because religion was now irrelevant (as some apparently feared or thought), but rather because the principle of separation respected religion and guaranteed citizens’ freedom of belief. While Kishimoto argued that separation of religion from the state was the basic requirement of religious freedom because it kept the state from protecting or persecuting specific religions, the rest of his article (and other contemporaneous articles) made clear his own expectation was that certain religious practices—particularly those of the “new religions” and Shintō shrines—were inferior, worthy of suspicion, and in need of refinement.

I have only provided a cursory overview of Kishimoto’s Occupation-era articles here, but collectively they functioned to define religion in a way that was both doctrinally and politically normative. Kishimoto presented his humanist understanding of religion as an essential part of the “modern critical spirit,” but Kishimoto’s outreach articles created that ideal religiosity as much as they described an existing suite of modern attitudes and dispositions. Kishimoto presented religion as socially influential in a way that could be both positive (promoting democracy, fulfilling the emotional needs of the people) and negative (misleading the people through vulgar practices, counteracting postwar cosmopolitanism with recidivist ultranationalism). His outreach publications were clearly designed to encourage clerics, policymakers, and laypeople alike to embrace his functionalist understanding of religion as a conduit for democratization and a font of emotional fulfillment while jettisoning past practices and attitudes such as magic and superstition.
Kishimoto’s influence was bolstered in part because of his prestigious academic appointment at the University of Tokyo, his eventual position as chairperson of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies, and his connections with both the Ministry of Education and the Religions Division of the Occupation. In addition to his close ties to his former student and chair of the Religion and Cultural Resources Division, William K. Bunce (1907–2008), Kishimoto had a close partner in a former missionary who also worked for RCR, William P. Woodard (1896–1973). Woodard’s duties during the Occupation were primarily focused on gathering information rather than setting policy, but by the latter half of the Occupation he was regularly engaging in outreach projects that turned his previous missionary training to the task of promoting religious freedom.54

For example, in a 4 November 1949 speech given at Taishō University on the subject of “Religious Education in Social Studies,” Woodard argued that the most pressing task for a young university in the wake of the war was to investigate the principle of religious freedom, particularly religious freedom as a fundamental aspect of a democratic society.55 Precisely because a Buddhist university such as Taishō was unencumbered by the stipulations regarding religious education that faced public institutions, it was in a unique position to take the lead in

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54 Woodard’s duties were outlined in RCR Box #5774, Folder #22, in a memo from one A.N. Nelson dated 11 May 1946. A brief biography of Woodard is giving in the finding aid to the William P. Woodard Papers housed at the University of Oregon (Clark 2006). Also see Woodard 1972.

55 WPW Box #10, Folder #6, “Religious Education in Social Studies.” The speech was delivered on the occasion of the 23rd anniversary of Taishō’s founding, in 1949. Taishō University is a school with “seminary” sacerdotal programs representing the Jōdo sect, Tendai sect, and the Buzan and Chisan branches of the Shingon sect. According to the university’s website, the school was proposed in 1919 by luminaries in the Buddhist world such as Takakusu Junjirō (1866–1945), Anesaki Masaharu (1873–1949), Murakami Senshō (1851–1929), Maeda Eun (1857–1930), and Sawayanagi Seitarō (1865–1927).
Woodard recommended that Taishō establish a seminar on the topic of religious freedom and separation of religion and the state as a way of staking out a position of authority in this topical field. Although freedom of religion might seem to be self-evident as a matter of elective liberty in terms of religious affiliation, in actual fact the situation was far more complicated and demanded strict scrutiny:

Study of the history of religious freedom and its significance for a democratic society is a matter of great urgency. It should be undertaken at once. It may seem a bit strange to the man on the street to speak this way in regard to such a simple subject. After all, they will say, freedom of religion is freedom of religion, that is, do as you please about it. The thoughtful student will know better, but the average laymen and many religious leaders will not. He will know that it is not a simple problem. Two contrasting points will illustrate the confusion it may [illegible, presumably “elicit”]. For example, people sometimes talk as if freedom of religion can stand by itself irrespective of the political system [illegible, presumably “which”] surrounds it. This is [illegible, presumably “a mistake”]. It must have the support of the system itself. Anyone whose memory goes back ten years, and I imagine that most everyone here has a memory at least that long, understands that freedom of religion cannot exist in a totalitarian or an authoritarian political state. Yet I have heard people argue that freedom of religion existed in pre-war Japan because Article 28 of the Meiji Constitution guaranteed this freedom. They say Japan has been accustomed to religious freedom for nearly a century. I am sure you will readily recognize the lack of understanding on the part of those who talk this way. Such people have not studied Article 28 carefully and hence cannot understand the basic change that has taken place since the war. It is safe to say that on few points in the present constitution is there a much more radical departure from the Meiji Constitution than on this question of religious freedom and the involvement of the state in religion. In spite of the lip service which the Meiji Constitution paid to freedom of religion and even though in prewar Japan most people felt that they had freedom of religion, the fact remains that Article 28 itself, as well as other articles so abridged freedom of religion that when the test came, it was found to be an illusion. There is not time to discuss the point further, but a university which wishes to prepare religious leaders who understand the modern situation should provide ample opportunity for the study of religious freedom so as to make it

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56 Woodard was careful to distinguish between “religious education” in the sense of inculcating or fostering religious sentiment in students and “religion as an aspect of social studies.” He suggested that teachers and administrators must be fully versed in such distinctions, since without them teaching would easily “deteriorate into propaganda.”
plain to the leaders of all sects concerned that there can be no freedom in an authoritarian state.\footnote{57}

Given the social dynamics of the Occupation, it is hardly surprising that Woodard adopted a somewhat patronizing tone in his excessively hasty dismissal of the claim that the Meiji Constitution had legitimately protected religious freedom.\footnote{58} Woodard’s position was characterized at least as much by strong personal conviction as it was by dispassionate academic observation. For him, there was one “real” religious freedom out there for the Japanese people to discover, and his mission was to guide them to it. His position at Religions Division gave him a platform from which he was able to speak to audiences at sectarian universities and seminaries, religious leaders, and the organizers of transsectarian groups. He seems to have wasted no opportunity to impress upon his audiences the dire importance of religious freedom in a healthy democracy; as his Taishō University speech indicated, Woodard also linked religious studies to the promotion of religious freedom.\footnote{59}

Creating The Postwar Religious Studies Infrastructure

Woodard continued his religious freedom outreach through public speeches and lectures throughout the course of the Occupation in his capacity as a researcher for Religions Division. His departure for the United States at the close of the Occupation in 1952 marked a hiatus, rather than a cessation, of such activities on his part.\footnote{60} During the last years of the Occupation...

\footnote{57} “Religious Education in Social Studies” (WPW Box #10, Folder #6), 5–6.
\footnote{58} However, Woodard’s 1972 memoir suggests that he was keenly aware of many of the inconsistencies that characterized the religions policies of the Occupation; he was therefore not at all adverse to criticizing the American government and the bureaucratic elites who set Occupation policy.
\footnote{59} This ties back to this dissertation’s leitmotiv regarding the political ramifications of religious studies.
\footnote{60} For example, in a fragmentary draft of a speech on the subject of religious freedom given at Dōshisha University sometime after the establishment of the aforementioned Institute (probably around 1960), Woodard exhorted his Christian audience to thoroughly investigate religious
Woodard had already begun discussions with local academics and religious leaders about the possibility of establishing a new research institute dedicated to the academic study of Japanese religions. While such an institute would serve first and foremost as a bilingual clearinghouse for timely information on developments in the Japanese religious world, it would also continue the important task—a mandate outlined in Woodard’s Taishō University speech—of investigating religious freedom and determining how this most lofty of principles could be applied to the Japanese context.

This planning eventually bore fruit. Woodard returned to Japan in late 1953 to collaborate with Kishimoto in the establishment of this International Institute for the Study of Religions.61 Between Kishimoto’s influential position as chair of the department of Religious Studies at the University of Tokyo and Woodard’s equally influential position as chair the IISR, the two men shaped the development of postwar religious studies of Japan.62

Woodard, “Religious Freedom—Dōshisha,” WPW Box #10, Folder #5.


62 Takagi (1993) emphasizes this influence in a retrospective on the Occupation, referring to Kishimoto’s (1963) own immodest account. Woodard and Kishimoto jointly directed the center from 1954 until Kishimoto’s death a decade later (1964). Woodard remained the central figure at the Institute until his own departure from Japan in 1966; he died in 1973. Today, the influence of Woodard and Kishimoto on the academic study of Japanese religions is felt through the existence of two influential journals and a research center devoted to curating and disseminating religious materials. The flagship anglophone journal of religious studies in Japan, the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies (published 1974–present), succeeded the IISR quarterly Contemporary Religions in Japan (published 1960–1970). For reasons that are unclear, IISR seems to have
Kishimoto was a man of international stature and considerable influence in the postwar religious studies world. He served as president of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies twice (1950–1954 and 1960–1962), delivered Haskell Lectures at the University of Chicago (1954), held visiting professorships at Stanford (1953–1954) and Princeton (Autumn 1962), and served as head of the Afro-Asian Secretariat of the International Association for the History of Religions (1958–?). In addition to his aforementioned publications that unstintingly offered normative assessments about how religions should develop, Kishimoto published a slim textbook called *Religious Studies (Shūkyōgaku)* in 1961 that laid out a programmatic statement for how the field should develop in the coming decades even as it outlined the history and methodology of the field.

For his part, in his capacity as Director of the Institute Woodard organized roundtable conferences on topical issues in the Japanese religious world and solicited translations of cutting-edge Japanese research in the anglophone journal *Contemporary Religions in Japan* (published 1960–1970). Woodard was responsible not only for editing CRJ, but also for much of the journal’s content: by my count he authored or co-authored forty editorials, book reviews, and obituaries for the journal; he wrote short editorial notes clarifying or critiquing aspects of articles that appeared in the journal as well. He also published a steady stream of Religions Division ceased its activities between 1979 and 1988. However, the 1990s saw a revival of Institute activity, and in 1998 the Institute established the Religious Information Research Center (RIRC), a clearinghouse for news and information about the Japanese religious world. In addition to intermittently publishing volumes on timely religious topics since its revival, IISR has been publishing the annual journal *Gendai shūkyō* since 2001.

Kitagawa 1964. Also see the encomium by Ishizu (1965).

Kishimoto 1961

The journal *Japanese Religions* was actually founded a year before *Contemporary Religions in Japan* (in 1959), but its target audience was initially missionaries. By contrast, Woodard and Kishimoto explicitly aimed for a non-theological, non-missiological tone for their journal. The
documents from his personal records collected during his time in Religions Division to fructify postwar studies of the Occupation. This research—part memoir, part critical appraisal of Occupation religions policy—was published in 1972 as The Allied Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952 and Japanese Religions.

In summary, even if the postwar study of religions in Japan was not totally monopolized by people in Kishimoto and Woodard’s ambit, it would not be inaccurate to say that virtually all postwar non-sectarian scholarship on Japanese religions has been influenced in some way or another by the institutions and journals they established. This was a legacy of the Occupation not only in the sense that the two men initially met through their ongoing interactions at Religions Division headquarters, but also in the sense that both men embraced the Occupation project of “instilling a desire for religious freedom in the Japanese people.” For each of them, that project was intimately tied to the academic study of religion itself. To study religion from an academic standpoint was to promote and protect religious freedom. This attitude had lasting ramifications, editorship of the Japanese Journal of Religious Studies eventually moved to the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture in Nagoya in 1981.

66 See http://nirc.nanzan-u.ac.jp/en/publications/crj/. Last accessed 26 March 2014. The William P. Woodard collection housed at the University of Oregon includes Woodard’s diaries, personal correspondence, and internal Religions Division memoranda; these documents and Woodard’s contributions to CRJ provide deep insight into Woodard’s influential approach to Japanese religions. In aggregate, these documents show that Woodard became somewhat disillusioned with his own Christian missionary background even as he maintained friendly relations with his fellow missionaries. Ultimately, he embraced the idea of promoting religious freedom in Japan instead of promoting Christianity. This project clearly undergirded Woodard’s work with CRJ and his 1972 monograph.

67 For several decades Woodard’s book was the single best source on Occupation religions policy, although it was clearly not unbiased. Perhaps most importantly, Woodard’s postwar assessment helped to create a vision of Religions and Cultural Resources Division chief William K. Bunce (1907–2008) as a hero who introduced the idea of strict separation of religion from the state to Japan through his authorship of the Shintō Directive. This assessment deserves suspicion for reasons that I outlined in Chapter One, but it has been exceptionally tenacious. See especially Nakano 2003, which treats Bunce as a hero who brought “real” religious freedom to Japan.
not only for the postwar study of Japanese religions, but also for the postwar articulation of religious-freedom-as-human-right.

Before I can get to that postwar development, I must first show how efforts to “wake up” from the Japanese wartime nightmare were tied to the postwar American dream of promoting religious freedom worldwide. While on the surface American foreign policy in the postwar period pivoted away from Japan to focus on the communist threat on the Asian mainland, the tools for combating that threat—especially the idea of using “religious freedom” as a bulwark to stem the spread of “godless communism”—were born out of the Pacific War and the postwar Occupation.

American Dreams

In Japan, the American promotion of religious liberty was not only tied to the construction of new Japanese understandings about how to properly parse religion, secular, faith, and freedom, but also to the parallel construction of new American understandings of the same issues. The vision of an American liberal democracy premised on America’s unique relationship with religious freedom was just emerging at around the time of the Pacific War (1941–1945). It was an invented tradition that discovered new liberal heroes (e.g., Locke) and posited an origin for modern liberalism in a theological position (the quest for religious freedom among the early American colonists); it also advocated a set of political practices (latitudinarian religions policy) that nevertheless assumed unshakeable primacy of place for Protestant Christianity.69

68 As an indication of the close relationship between the two men, Kishimoto’s diary is included in the Woodard’s collected papers housed at the University of Oregon. See Okuyama 2009.
69 See Bell 2014 (preprint) on the contextual history of discourses about liberalism. See Sehat 2010 on what he terms the “myth of American religious freedom.”
These particularist understandings of American traditions of democracy and religious freedom had been effective motivators during the war, but they were less effective in the context of the Occupation, when democratic and latitudinarian ideals—and the conceptions of religion and freedom on which they were based—had to be universalized in order to support policies that applied beyond American borders. As the negative image of the Japanese foe was rehabilitated over the course of the Occupation, the ineluctable recognition of non-Christian religiosity as valid forced a reconfiguration of American ideals in which the universal human right to religious freedom superseded, in important ways, the particularist claim about America’s manifest destiny. Similarly, the evident successes of Japan’s fledgling postwar democracy—despite the failure of Christianity to take hold—called into question the causal connection Americans were wont to posit between Protestant Christianity and democracy.

This shift was already apparent in the ways American propaganda discussed the Japanese in war and peace. For example, whereas wartime propaganda films like *Know Your Enemy: Japan* drew a contrast between “good” and “bad” religion by comparing the falsely apotheosized Japanese emperor with “our own Son of God,” the propaganda film *Our Job in Japan* (shown to American soldiers who were to be stationed in the occupied country) argued that the problem of rehabilitating Japan lay in reconfiguring “the Japanese brain.” The former film drew an implicit contrast between indistinguishable Japanese soldiers who were like “prints off of the same negative” and fully enfranchised American individuals capable of thinking for themselves. The latter film was far more magnanimous. The Japanese brain was “just like any

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71 This implied American identity was gendered and radicalized as indisputably white and male; he was also assumed to be Christian. Such pairings of stereotyped “Japanese” and “American” attitudes were arguably more effective in articulating the nature of the “religion” and “freedom”
“other brain” and was equally capable of “making sense,” but it had been “hopped up” with “ancient mumbo jumbo” by militarists who had shrewdly used the “tired old religion of Shintō” in their plan for world domination.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{Our Job in Japan} offered, in embryonic form, an example of the attitude that would come to dominate the later Occupation period. The Japanese were equally human, but not all religious ideas were created equal. The right to choose one’s religion needed to be preserved and strengthened, but there were “better” and “worse” choices of creed. As explicitly outlined in \textit{Our Job in Japan}, the job of the American occupiers was to help the Japanese make “better choices.”

This Occupation project had direct and indirect effects at home. American articles and editorials from the later Occupation period show that Americans loosely kept tabs on the progress of the Occupation but generally paid little attention to Japan now that the nation was no longer considered an existential threat.\textsuperscript{73} For the home audience, however, reportage on Japanese religion tended to reinforce distinctions between “real” and “false” religions. To give just one example, a 4 February 1947 dispatch from Tokyo entitled “Shintō Spreading throughout Japan: Hundreds of Sects Spring Up—Faith Healing and Spirit Possession Are Dominant” by New York Times reporter Burton Crane (1901–1963) shows how reporting on Japan could

\textsuperscript{72} The film was written by Theodore Geisel, better known as children’s book author Dr. Seuss; it featured the famous author’s characteristically rhythmic cadences in the narration. The film explicitly contrasted “good ideas” (a shot of a bearded Buddhist priest) with “ancient mumbo-jumbo” (extended shots of scenes from Shintō festivals with a soundtrack that surely would have sounded alien to contemporary American ears).

\textsuperscript{73} There was, of course, excitement in missionary circles about the opportunities presented by the Occupation, and the military press occasionally reported on the progress of Occupation reforms.

that America claimed to possess than any contemporary platitudinous rhetoric about the unique American relationship with religious freedom.
Shinto, Japan’s religion of blood and iron before the war, is the focus for extreme nationalism’s reverting toward the crude superstitions from which it sprang. Freed from the Education Ministry’s control by the occupation, so-called sectarian Shinto is bursting forth into hundreds of new sects based on Shamanism (spirit possession) and ancient Taoist naturism, faith healing and sun worship. Far from being an instrument for aggression, most of the postwar Shinto sects announce as their purpose the “bringing of peace and happiness to mankind.” Gathered in a small room perhaps fifty devotees of one of these new Shinto sects will place their palms together and start rhythmic chanting. Soon the whole room is enveloped in religious fervor.

By mobilizing phrases like “crude superstition” and highlighting the criminal records of some of the leaders of the new groups, Crane implied that the new sects—and, by extension, Shintō itself—were “false religions.” The image of devotees gathered in a small room engaging in rhythmic chanting and being “enveloped in religious fervor” also played on stereotypes about “proper” (staid) and “improper” (fervent) religious practice. Crane’s mildly disparaging references to multiple deities also implicitly highlighted a distinction between “real” monotheistic religion and “false” polytheism. At the same time, however, Crane’s article functioned to reassure readers that the Occupation reforms had “worked” in that Shintō had been thoroughly demilitarized. The new groups were purportedly seeking “peace,” after all. The article underscored the superiority of the American policy of religious toleration by suggesting

74 Crane’s reminiscences of the Occupation are held as part of a collection of oral interviews at Columbia University; I hope to make use of his recollections in a later iteration of this project.
76 A dispatch on 8 January 1949 by Crane’s New York Times colleague Lindesay Parrott suggested that Shintō was not, however, fading away as some had predicted. Parrott’s article emphasized the growing numbers of Japanese people patronizing major shrines during the New Year season. Parrott, “Japanese Are Returning to Shinto Shrines; Occupation Theory Apparently Incorrect,” The New York Times 8 January 1949.
that the introduction of religious freedom had worked in that these new religious groups, however wacky, had been allowed to flourish.77

From American Export to Human Right

By the close of the Occupation, interactions with a formerly dehumanized enemy had exerted considerable influence on American conceptions of religion and religious freedom. American domestic understandings of authentic “religion” had already been expanding beyond mainline Protestantism over the first half of the twentieth century to include evangelical, Catholic, and Jewish perspectives.78 Against this background, the practical need to extend religious freedom to Buddhists and Shintoists in Japan forced yet another expansion of religious freedom.79 When paired with the wartime rhetoric of human rights and the exigent need to make the language of human rights make sense on a practical level, religious freedom came to be premised on the existence of a universal, innate religiosity that needed to be protected at all costs. The Japanese case offered the Americans confirmation of the idea that America’s relationship with religious freedom was exportable. While it was still largely unclear what the phrase actually meant or how it would be enforced, the language of “human rights” gave religious freedom a universality that the language of American particularism could never achieve.

This universalization of religious freedom took place in a somewhat bizarre fashion. One of the many ironies of the Occupation period is that even as the occupiers encouraged the Japanese to disaggregate religion from politics and reject theories of Japanese uniqueness, the Americans

77 This represented the impulse to control the repugnant “other” through toleration policy. See Brown 2006.
78 Sehat 2010
79 Nakano (2003) draws a contrast, for example, between American president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s understanding of religious freedom as the ability for everyone to be able to “worship God in his own fashion” with William K. Bunce’s more expansive definition that was not explicitly Protestant or even monotheistic.
were in the process of attempting to bring religion into a stronger, more central position in American public life and foreign policy. An additional irony lay in the fact that the Americans had criticized the Japanese for subsuming sectarian differences under the overarching goal of nation-building prior to and during the war, but United States President Harry S. Truman (1884–1972) was similarly invested in getting religious leaders to set aside their sectarian differences in the service of uniting Americans—and the world—in combating communism.80 American promotion of religious freedom abroad took on a new urgency in the incipient Cold War, becoming the centerpiece of what William Inboden has called “America’s diplomatic theology.”81

This was not merely an executive branch project. For example, the New York Times reported on 15 February 1949 that a new “Committee for Protection of Religious Freedom throughout the World” had been established in Brooklyn the day before. According to the article, the group was established to combat communism’s “unprovoked and unrestricted attack on all religions.”82 A few months later, the New York Times editorial page advocated the global promotion of religious freedom by arguing that petty sectarianism had no place in the face of the threat posed by communism:

In many ways the Roman Catholic Church and the members of the [Protestant] religious bodies internationally organized under the title of The World Council of Churches are in disagreement. The schism which produced Protestantism is four centuries old; that which created the Greek Orthodox Church is older still. Yet there is a basic similarity of attitude in all these religious communities toward

80 Truman was evidently devastated when Christian leaders repeatedly allowed sectarian and denominational differences (particularly Protestant rejection of possible collaborations with the Vatican) to supersede the existential threat posed by communism. Inboden 2008. For Truman’s own words, see “The Text of Truman’s Talk to Pilgrims,” The New York Times 28 September 1951.
81 Inboden 2008, Location 390 of 5298 (last page of the Introduction).
those who would deny freedom of religion. This generation’s schism is between
the political tyrants who are trying to subdue religion to their own ends and all
other persons, whether members of churches or not, who reject and defy this
usurpation.

...Even though the doctrinal differences among the sects and religions will remain,
there is one fundamental cause which unites all those who have faith in man’s
possibilities, man’s future and man’s equality in the sight of God. To resist
tyrranny anywhere is to help those resisting it elsewhere. In this fundamental crisis
of freedom there is basic unity among the friends of freedom.83

The New York Times editorial decidedly favored the Protestant Christian view even as it
advocated an ecumenical spirit in which the “friends of freedom” were united in their efforts to
protect religious faith against tyranny and oppression. The author(s) of the editorial posited the
existence of a universal religiosity that was fundamentally tied to human dignity and human
freedom. This sort of language had matured in the context of the Occupation as the
democratizing project was extended to social imaginaries and modes of religious being that were
not necessarily Western or Christian.

The American project of making the world safe for religion through appeals to protecting
religious freedom as a human right was not as ecumenical as its proponents averred. In American
foreign policy Protestantism remained the model for religion, and the right to religious freedom
that Americans were willing to fight to protect was a right that was premised on religion looking
familiar enough that it could be recognized as valid.84 This represented a triumph of Protestant
models of religiosity in international relations in that operative conceptions of religious freedom
were premised on the ideas of private assent to propositional statements of belief, but the
language of “human rights” and the associated conception of a universal religious anthropology
also expanded the range of tolerable beliefs to include modes of religious being and belonging
that were not part of the Western cultural heritage. The incorporation of a religious freedom

clause in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, referred to religion in vague, nondenominational terms: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.”

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Enforcement Problem

Policymakers were already aware at the time of the promulgation of the Declaration that the concept of human rights was vague and liable to misinterpretation or excessively broad application. In 1948 there was still no mechanism for enforcement, no way of determining when and how international observers could and should intervene in domestic politics in order to protect “human rights.” There was also no way of guaranteeing that all animals with human bodies would be regarded as “people” deserving of equal rights. As seen in Minobe’s aforementioned interpretation of the religious freedom clause of the postwar constitution, there was additionally the lingering problem of interpreters circumscribing particular rights based on what they perceived as “common sense” distinctions between “true” and “false” religions. Arguments about the necessity of promoting religious freedom worldwide were complicated by fundamental contradictions within the concept itself: religious freedom was simultaneously understood as a freedom from religion that reduced the excessive impact of religious actors on politics and public life, the liberty to choose whatever religion one wanted without fear of political reprisal, and a liberty born from a particular civilizational complex that was usually

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84 This has continued to be a problem up to the present day. See Mahmood 2006.
86 Mazower 2004; Moyn 2010.
associated with Protestant Christianity (but was sometimes more expansively labeled “Judeo-Christian.”)\textsuperscript{87}

So human rights were not the panacea they superficially seemed to be, and religious freedom was not universalized overnight simply by including it in a list of “human rights” drawn up by the new United Nations organization. What was still needed, then, was a scheme that would position all religions in a comprehensive framework that showed how religious freedom could apply equally to all people everywhere. Equally necessary was a way to ensure that the language of religious freedom was not mistaken for unfettered license. In the postwar period, the concepts of “religious oppression,” “religious violence,” and “political religion” enabled the ongoing project of demarcating “good” from “bad” religion—and therefore the boundaries of religious freedom. Here again, scholars of religion would play a major role. The following section traces how this process played out in Japan and in the postwar study of Japanese religions.\textsuperscript{88}

The Postwar Legacy of the Occupation

This concluding section moves beyond the temporal confines of the Occupation period to show how the universalistic understanding of religious freedom that was created during the Occupation has structured virtually all postwar scholarship on Japanese religions. It also shows that the categories and theoretical models that have resulted have had an easily overlooked global

\textsuperscript{87} Hurd 2008. Bell (2014, preprint) has shown that understandings of “liberalism” were greatly transformed during the war period, with postwar political theory embracing liberal democracy as an antidote to “totalitarianism.” While he focuses on the specter of communism, during the war it was the Japanese (and German) enemy that served as the totalitarian foil for American liberty. Here it is also important to highlight the fact that the Holocaust was apparently less crucial for the postwar formulation of “human rights” talk than has commonly been supposed. See Cohen 2012.

\textsuperscript{88} How the formation of these categories in the academic study of religion influenced developments elsewhere in the world is a topic for future research.
impact in their creation of conceptions of “good” and “bad” religions. In the absence of an international legal system that could safeguard “human rights” (as opposed to “civil rights” and “civil liberties” granted to citizens by their states), scholarship stepped in to fill a legal void by highlighting the ideal of latitudinarianism, designating certain religious ideas and practices as illegitimate, and creating normative expectations for religious development.

This happened in at least three interrelated ways. One was the transformation of marginal religious movements from targets of suspicion into recipients of protection through the creation of the scholarly-apologetic category of “new religions” and the export of that category to the American and European academy. Another was the scholarly elaboration on the category of “State Shintō” as a model for both “bad religion” and “bad secularism.” The third was the construction of the popular narrative that Buddhist clerics in particular had been derelict in their duty to protect rights and freedoms, supposedly abrogating the politically liberal tendencies many academic observers have assumed—problematically—to be inherent in Buddhist doctrine.

“New Religious Movements”

By its own account, the Japanese Federation of New Religious Organizations was created at the suggestion of Religions Division officer William Woodard.89 Unsurprisingly, the Federation regarded the clerical establishments of Buddhism and Shintō as hopelessly out of touch with the religious needs of the Japanese people and mired in a sycophantic relationship vis-à-vis political authority. While Shinshūren member organizations were sharply critical of both the mainstream

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religions (and some new religious movements such as Sōka Gakkai that did not count among the Shinshūren membership), they consistently advocated latitudinarian governmental policies.\textsuperscript{90}

For example, a 1963 decennial retrospective published by the research division mobilized all the accoutrements of an academic publication such as an authoritative, disinterested tone, documentary evidence in the form of charts and photographs, and citations of leading authorities on religion. However, a polemical streak regarding the religious establishment and the governmental authorities appeared throughout:

The lack of the spirit of autonomy and independence, and a strong tendency of relying upon authority are abuses which are like an incurable disease in the religious world of our country.

From the standpoint of religious freedom, not to interfere with religion and to permit religious organizations to make independent activities would be the true sign of the state’s respect for religion.

The men of religion in our country, however, advocate religious freedom on one side and at the same time desire the protection of authority, feeling joyful “to meet with the intentions of the government.” They commit this contradiction and never endeavor to develop the way they should go by their own efforts only.

In the back of the attitude which the religious world showed in regard to the problem of continuation or abolition of the Religious Affairs Section [of the Ministry of Education], a strong authority worship and dependence upon authority seemed to be present. ...

Moreover, even today when more than ten years have passed, these abuses remain deep-rooted in the whole religious world, in the established religions as well as in the new sects. In this sense also, the way of establishing religious freedom in our country may be called very long and steep.\textsuperscript{91}

The new religions had little to lose by embracing the logic of separation of religion and the state and promoting religious freedom. Unlike their mainstream Buddhist counterparts, they had no traditionally close relationship with the state to preserve. This allowed them to identify

\textsuperscript{90} Shin Nihon Shūkyō Dantai Rengō Kai Research Division, 1966\textsuperscript{c}, 268–273.

\textsuperscript{91} Shin Nihon Shūkyō Dantai Rengō Kai Research Division 1965\textsuperscript{a}, 202–203. This section corresponds to \textit{Sengo shūkyō kaiso roku}, 78–79.
themselves as the religious groups best suited to the new postwar context while criticizing the traditional religious establishment:

Nearly twenty years have already passed since the time when freedom of religion was unexpectedly granted as a result of the Occupation policy at the time of the defeat in war. However, freedom of religion in our country is still unripe and has not been rooted in the Japanese soil.

The bureaucracy is still possessed of the idea of control of religion, that religion should be brought up in a right way under the supervision of the government. On the other hand, even men of religion, not to speak of the people in general, do not exactly recognize that freedom of religion is the source of all freedoms and forms the foundation of human rights. For this reason, movements are made in various forms to abolish the principle of separation of church and state and to restrain the freedom of religion.92

The apologetic nature of this fascinating document demonstrates how formerly marginalized religious groups were able to make appeals to religious freedom the mark of an enlightened stance. As the use of a scholarly publication to make these claims suggests, the new religions were not only quick to embrace the legitimizing language of religious freedom; they also recognized the importance of granting themselves legitimacy through academic enterprise.93 For some time the Federation made regular attendance at a scholarly meeting the sole requirement for membership in the organization. This was no doubt because the academic format allowed the Federation leadership to guarantee an doctrinally neutral meeting ground for its member organizations. More importantly, while it would take some time for the change to take effect, members of the Federation successfully pushed for the academic adoption of the nomenclature shinshūkyō (new religions) over the mildly pejorative shinkō shūkyō (new fad religions).94

The new terminology was quickly adopted not only by local scholars, but also by Westerners translating the term for non-Japanese academic audiences (however, some journalists have

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93 Shinshūren Chōsa Shitsu, ed. 1963
94 Ōishi 1964, 47–49. Also see McFarland 1960a, 37.
continued to use the pejorative term up until today). The category of “new religions” was therefore created in Japan in the wake of World War II to serve the apologetic purposes of the groups represented by the nascent Japanese Federation of New Religious Organizations; it was later exported to the rest of the world as a substitute for regnant but disparaging academic terminology.\textsuperscript{95} Translating the new Japanese term shinshūkyō as “new religions,” scholars introduced to the American and European academy an alternative nomenclature for groups that had hitherto been described as marginal or heretical “sects” or innovative but morally pernicious “cults.”\textsuperscript{96}

This does not mean that all scholarship on Japan’s “new religions” accepted the triumphalist attitudes adopted by the new movements themselves (in which they represented the best religious options for postwar Japanese society). Indeed, the first wave of anglophone academic work on Japanese new religions seems to have reflected a primarily missiological impulse that presented a different vision that saw the new religions as stepping stones to Christianity. This scholarship was represented by a small group of studies by and for Christian missionaries. Because the new religious movements readily embraced the legitimizing rhetoric of religion as a matter of private choice and elective affiliation, some Western scholars spoke approvingly of the new groups and seemed particularly enamored of the new religions’ open borrowing of Christian organizational models. One notable example is Harry Thomsen’s \textit{The New Religions of Japan}, which includes a laudatory preface regarding its utility for the missionary headed to Japan to convert “the Buddhists.”\textsuperscript{97} Even scholars who conscientiously avoided explicitly Christian theological

\textsuperscript{95} Lewis 2004, 3.
\textsuperscript{96} The term was also used in a catchall fashion to refer to Asian religious traditions, which were “new” to the west.
\textsuperscript{97} Hansen 1963
language regarded the new religions as convenient vehicles for smuggling Christianity into the country.98

A roughly contemporaneous strain of scholarship was less theologically normative than sociologically normative in that it tried to situate the rise of the new religions within contemporaneously prevailing academic models of modernization and secularization.99 Scholars of religion tried to figure out how to situate Japan within the Weberian “Protestant ethic” framework; Marxist historians like Ienaga Saburō (1913–2002) attempted to do the same with Marxian models of religious innovation as an epiphenomenal marker of material distress.100 Japanese historians such as Murakami Shigeyoshi (1928–1991, a pioneer in the historical study of new religious movements and an early analyst of “State Shintō”) also exhibited a penchant for Marxian treatments of religion, treating emergent religions as a symptom of fundamental economic unease or social “crisis.”101 The American scholar H. Neill McFarland (1923–?) similarly popularized the crisis model in a series of influential English-language publications on Japan’s new religions.102 It is also not insignificant that the premier department for the non-theological academic study of religion—the department of religious studies at the University of

98 McFarland 1960c, 68–69.
99 Harootunian 1993.
100 Hayashi and Yamanaka 1993. Talcott Parsons’ (1902–1979) student Robert Bellah (1927–2013) attempted to apply the Weberian thesis to Japan by examining ways in which the Shingaku movement had contributed to the development of proto-modernity during Japan’s Tokugawa period (1600–1868); the book was translated into Japanese and eagerly consumed by the Japanese intelligentsia. See Bellah 1957. Also see Ienaga 1965, which disparaged the Buddhist “feudal” mindset.
101 See Murakami 2007 (1980) and especially the explanatory comments by Shimazono Susumu, 253–259; also see H. Byron Earhart, “Translator’s Introduction,” in Murakami 1980, xiii–xiv. Many American social scientists of the same period were also beholden to the model of economic base and epiphenomenal, ideological superstructure. See Robbins 2000, 515.
Tokyo—was chaired by successive generations of scholars who had studied at Harvard, where Weberian and Parsonian models of social science clearly dominated.\textsuperscript{103}

Graduates of that department in the postwar period produced a slew of articles, dissertations, and books on Japanese new religions that favored nomothetic analyses of general sociological and historical trends paired with phenomenological approaches to the worldview of the new religions.\textsuperscript{104} Although methodological debates eventually arose about whether to take a strictly quantitative approach to these movements or to include qualitative studies regarding adherents’ worldviews, the terminology of “new religions” became fixed even as the Japanese academy divided into camps favoring relatively sociological and phenomenological methods. Debates have continued among Japanese scholars as to how the term should be applied and refined—the rise of “spirituality studies” and the challenges presented by the violent activities of Aum Shinrikyō in particular have been topics of debate—but the naturalness of the category itself is rarely questioned today.\textsuperscript{105}

In the United States, the establishment of an academic infrastructure devoted exclusively to the study of alternative and emergent movements happened slightly later than it did in Japan. It was motivated by attempts to make sense not only of religious innovation in general, but also a particular violent incident involving a marginal religion of recent provenance. Specifically, the initial formation of a subfield dedicated to the study of “new religions” took place in response to

\textsuperscript{103} See Hara 2009 for a history of the department. Japan’s national universities have historically focused on different branches of religious studies analysis. The University of Kyoto tends to favor a more philosophical approach, while Tōhoku University has tended to specialize in folklore studies.

\textsuperscript{104} As a result, the University of Tokyo lineage largely relinquished idiographic historical and philological studies of religious doctrine to Buddhologists and philologists in departments of Oriental philosophy and the seminaries for training Buddhist and Shintō priests. Sharf 1995a.

\textsuperscript{105} See, for example, Inoue 1991 and 1992; Shimazono 2006 (1992). One overview of the field is Astley 2006.
the infamous Jonestown incident of November 1978, in which nearly nine hundred members of
the Peoples Temple died in a highly publicized murder-suicide.\textsuperscript{106}

The marginal position of new religious movement studies initially matched the peripheral
position of the groups and movements the nascent subfield took as its object of analysis, but it
gradually solidified over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. The founding of the New Religious
Movements Group of the American Academy of Religion in the early 1980s marked the formal
development of the subfield, while the launch of the journal \textit{Nova Religio} in 1997 marked its
coming of age. Today the category of “new religions” enjoys currency throughout the
anglophone academy, although debates continue as to how it should best be applied and
taught.\textsuperscript{107} The flagship journal devoted to the study of these groups, \textit{Nova Religio}, exhibits the
eclectic nature of the field in its subtitle, “The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions.”\textsuperscript{108}
Debates within the pages of this publication reflect profound disagreements about how, when,
and why the categories of “new religion,” “new religious movement,” or “alternative religious
movement” should be applied to specific groups.\textsuperscript{109}

Behind these debates lies a set of lingering issues that led to the creation of the “new
religions” terminology in the first place. The study of “new religions” (as opposed to “cults”)
was designed to take the theological claims and ritual practices of marginal and emergent

\textsuperscript{106} Chidester 1988 is one monograph on the subject of the Jonestown incident.
\textsuperscript{107} The publication of the 2004 \textit{Oxford Handbook for the Study of New Religious Movements} is
one marker of the degree to which new religious movements studies have moved from the
margin to the mainstream of the American Academy of Religion (the Oxford handbooks are
published by the AAR in conjunction with Oxford University Press).
\textsuperscript{108} See Lucas 1997.
\textsuperscript{109} Melton 2004; Barker 2004; Bromley 2004; Robbins 2005; Reader 2005; Gallgher 2007.
These debates reveal a fundamental split between social scientists who focus primarily on the
social function of religion or typologies of religious movements (e.g., Stark and Bainbridge
1979) and humanists who focus more on the cultural or historical ramifications of doctrinal or
ritual innovation.
movements seriously, but issues of coercion, physical violence, group suicide, and abuse have deeply shaped the field. This can be seen in the scholarly responses to the group suicides of the Peoples Temple in 1978 and Heaven’s Gate in 1997; the confrontation between the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and the Branch Davidians at Waco, Texas in 1993; and the Aum Shinrikyō sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995.

These incidents have presented scholars with the conundrum of whether their job is to operate as critics or caretakers of marginal movements. The conundrum has been further complicated by ethical concerns about the feasibility and desirableness of governmental mobilization of religious studies expertise on marginal movements in order to forestall future violent incidents. The “bad religion” of violent groups like Aum Shinrikyō is guarded against by governments who enlist scholars for their intelligence gathering purposes. The “good religion” of benign marginal movements is protected by scholars who protect them against journalistic slander or state persecution.

The case of new religious movement studies shows that an originally “Japanese” concern about religious freedom was exported for use in the West through the language of “new religions.” By contrast, while the category of “State Shintō” has proved equally useful to Japanese and non-Japanese scholars of religion, its scope has generally been limited to Japan proper (or to Japan and its colonial territories).

“State Shintō”

If the historical origins of the “new religions” category have rarely been investigated even as the category itself is cause for ongoing reflection and debate, the origins and delimitations of the

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110 Reader 2012 is a particularly good account of the operationalization of expertise on new religions.
category “State Shintō” have consistently been cause for obstreperous debate in Japan. The concept of State Shintō is familiar to postwar observers not only because of the prominent role it played in Occupation policymaking and contemporaneous journalism, but also due to the influence of academic studies that have crystallized a concept that was—as I showed in Chapter One—initially fluid so that it could fit policy aims that were inherently contradictory. The emergence of the category in the context of a military occupation also meant that for some time “State Shintō” served as the exemplar par excellence of “bad (that is, militant) religion,” with the problematic corollary that “good religion” was understood to be essentially pacifist.112

Foremost among these studies was a slim 1970 volume by Murakami Shigeyoshi that depicted “State Shintō” as a totalizing system that ensnared the hearts and minds of the Japanese people between 1868 to 1945.113 While Murakami’s erudition was considerable, his historical investigations were based on an a priori assumption that something identifiable as “State Shintō” actually existed in the sense described in William Bunce’s (1907–2008) “Staff Study on State Shintō” and the biased scholarship (such as D.C. Holtom’s alarmist books) on which Bunce’s study relied.114 This interpretive decision reflected Murakami’s Marxist leanings at least as much as it reflected historical fact. For Murakami, “State Shintō” was an oppressive system used by a coterie of elites to enthrall the Japanese masses; the Japanese people were in turn psychologically predisposed to accept such a system without complaint. This reading echoed the occupiers’ narrative in its claim that State Shintō impeded Japan’s natural progression towards

112 I argued in the Introduction that this view is highly problematic because it assumes that religion is fundamentally ificent or divisive rather than acknowledging that any religion may be put to peaceful or violent ends. The difference is not one of essence, but rather one of doctrinal interpretation and historical context.
113 Murakami 1970, i.
114 I described this in Chapter One; the main influence on Bunce seems to have been Holtom 1943.
Jolyon Baraka Thomas  

Japan's Preoccupation with Religious Freedom  

democracy. Murakami’s thesis came to enjoy considerable prestige in the years following its publication in 1970, and most subsequent analyses of “State Shintō” have necessarily responded to it.115 Many studies on the relationship of Shintō and the state reproduced the Murakami thesis verbatim, adding to it Kuroda Toshio’s later observation that Shintō was effectively invented in the early Meiji era.116

For example, in her 1989 book Shintō and the State, 1868–1988, Helen Hardacre reproduced Murakami’s periodization and mildly modified his definition of State Shintō. She also argued that religious freedom had not been truly guaranteed under the Meiji Constitution.117 Hardacre’s claim about religious freedom was based on a selective reading of a series of articles by Abe Yoshiya (1937–2003) that embraced his argument that religious leaders in the prewar period were “ignorant” of the principle of religious freedom. Unfortunately, Hardacre overlooked Abe’s more basic point that democratic, not authoritarian, processes characterized the legislative battles over religious legislation in the prewar period.118

This criticism does not diminish the important contribution made by Hardacre’s book, which for a long time has been the single best monograph on the subject and continues to be cited extensively by people within and outside the field of Japanese studies (including, it should be noted, numerous citations by scholars writing on secularisms). The point I am making here is that the category of State Shintō has influenced scholarly analysis to such an extent that even the

115 Yamaguchi 2005 [1999], 4–5; Okuyama 2011, 123–124. Scholars who have been indebted to Murakami include Helen Hardacre (who reproduced his periodization and massaged his definition of State Shintō in her seminal 1989 study Shintō and the State, 1868–1988) and Shimazono Susumu, who expanded upon Murakami’s thesis and nuanced his periodization in his own 2010 shinsho volume, Kokka Shintō to Nihonjin.

116 Kuroda 1981. More recent scholarship has criticized Kuroda’s sweeping claims by showing that a loose amalgamation of ideas, rites, and spaces existed distinct from Buddhism in earlier periods. See Havens 2006 and Breen and Teeuwen 2010, as well as Teeuwen 2002.

most diligent researchers have tended to view historical circumstances through the filter of that concept. The negative result has been that the Occupation-era claim that “State Shintō” was Japan’s “national religion” has been insufficiently interrogated. As I argued in Chapter One, the tendency to view “State Shintō” as a coherent national religion that existed with minimal change between 1868 and 1945 interferes with the ability to see how the Meiji Constitution actually created a secular system (a point that Hardacre herself has recently come to embrace).119

Scholars of religious studies have been particularly likely to interpret the Meiji Constitutional Period as characterized by a single state religion, in part because they (we) are primed by our training to see religion where others see economics or politics at work. This stance, for example, is evident in the recent work of Shimazono Susumu, which tweaks Murakami’s periodization and treats “State Shintō” as an aspect of daily life prior to defeat.120 Shimazono also sees the continuation of “State Shintō”-style politics after the war. While Shimazono and I diverge in our interpretations of “State Shintō” (I see it as a secularism; he sees it as a religion), his recent work is illustrative of how the academic study of religion can reinforce the interpretation of State Shintō as a pervasive national religion even as scholars in other fields (particularly historians) seek to elucidate multiple factors behind the special treatment of shrines.121

Again, here I raise this point not to criticize the research of a trusted and influential mentor to whom I am profoundly indebted, but rather to highlight a general tendency I see in our field. “Religion-making from outside” can identify the political practices of the Meiji Constitutional Period as essentially religious, but that is not the only way to view the history. If the legacy of

119 See Hardacre 2011
120 Shimazono 2009 and 2010
121 For example, anglophone scholarship that takes the “non-religious shrine doctrine” seriously is rare. One very recent volume is Scheid, ed. 2013.
phenomenology for religious studies is to take others’ worldviews and positions seriously on their own terms to the greatest possible extent, then we owe it to the Japanese people of the past to not simply assume that “State Shintō” was religion masquerading as politics. As people of the time claimed, perhaps it was simply an expression of Japanese national identity or a secular system. To repeat a point that I raised in Chapter One and cannot stress enough, to make this observation is not to condone Japanese militarism, nor is it to deny the coerciveness of (what we now call) “State Shintō” as a secular system. That is, I am arguing that it is possible to disaggregate the normative political claim (Japanese militarism was bad) from reductive religious claims (Japanese violence was inherently predicated on religious ideas).

Against the view of “State Shintō” as Japan’s de facto national religion, a small body of Japanese historical scholarship that began to be published roughly contemporaneously with Hardacre’s 1989 book sharply questioned the historiographical applicability of the category of “State Shintō” and advocated circumscribing its use.\(^{122}\) In particular, several historians associated with Kokugakuin University began to question Murakami’s claim that “State Shintō” was a unified, monolithic system that held all Japanese subjects in its thrall from the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868 until the promulgation of the Shintō Directive in 1945. These scholars highlighted the fact that Buddhists—not Shintō priests or the Japanese government—were initially responsible for the argument that Shintō was not a religion.\(^{123}\) They have also argued that “State Shintō” only came into existence through major administrative distinctions made in 1900 and 1913, when jurisdiction over shrines was separated from jurisdiction over “religious”

\(^{122}\) Okuyama 2011 is a lucid overview of this scholarship.

\(^{123}\) Nitta 2000
The more apologetic branch of this scholarship has also identified hypocrisies in Occupation policy, pointing to inconsistencies in the expectations for separation of religion and the state in the Shinto Directive as compared to contemporary expectations in American civic and political life. Unfortunately, such voices have received little attention in the English-language literature; when they do appear, it is often as foils representing “nationalist” views.

To date, these historical and comparative correctives for Occupation-era excesses have failed to gain significant traction in anglophone scholarship. Historians writing in English have rightly questioned the top-down model of “State Shinto” and have recognized it as a product of the peculiar context of the Occupation, but they have tended to correct the “State Shinto” model not so much by relativizing the position of the United States (as the Kokugakuin scholars have done) but rather by highlighting the diverse, bottom-up pressures that supported state projects. In such accounts, what seemed to be a top-down project from the perspective of the occupiers was

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124 Sakamoto 2000. Sakamoto and his protégés have contributed historically nuanced studies of primary sources in several books and edited volumes that have argued that the Murakami thesis is untenable. See, for example, Sakamoto, ed. 2006.

125 See, for example, Ōhara 1989, Sakamoto 1989, and Abe 1989. Such critiques, while sometimes a bit extremist, have made valid points about the continued existence of American “civil religion” even after the United States forced Japan to eradicate all religious ritual from political life. To give just one example, the United States actually inserted the words “under God” into the Pledge of Allegiance recited by schoolchildren in 1954.

126 Compare Sakamoto 1989 with the caricature of his positions in Breen and Teeuwen 2010. If one duty of the academic study of religion is to take diverse religious positions seriously, then the academy has failed in its efforts to seriously address the genuine religious positions of people who genuinely believe or believed that Shinto forms the unbroken core of Japanese tradition or that Shinto could surpass the category of religion. The tendency to read advocacy of Shinto (both pre- and postwar) as insincere demagoguery is unfortunate and unprofessional. As one rather uneven but welcome exception, Skya (2009) treats Shinto nationalism as a genuine religious position rather than a disingenuous political ploy. However, his study still suffers (and perhaps more than most) from the problematic tendency to project normative political ideals back onto historical sources.

127 One exception appears to be Scheid, ed. 2013, although I have only been able to read the Introduction so far.
actually made possible by the ideological efforts of various interest groups and civil society organizations.\(^{128}\)

Recently, some Japanese scholars have also engaged in similar projects mobilizing hitherto untapped documents, showing that rural Shintō priests tried to shore up their authority and protect their parochial interests by linking shrine rites to national mobilization, for example, or showing how State Shintō could only exist through the assent and support of people who had been indoctrinated with the ideas of imperial divine descent, the divine nation, and so forth.\(^{129}\) Both Japanese and non-Japanese scholars have also highlighted the continued postwar existence of practices reminiscent of the wartime regime as a way of challenging the Occupation-era claim that the Shintō Directive successfully eradicated a national religion.\(^{130}\)

Scholarly discussions of “State Shintō” have thereby served a political purpose by operating as a check on ongoing attempts by Japanese politicians and shrine groups to align shrines with political policy or to bring Shintō-derived ideals back into public school education. “State Shintō” has also served as a negative example for Japanese religion-state relations, operating as the foil against which “real” religious freedom is measured. In this sense, scholars and journalists have served as “watchdogs” that have carefully documented and vociferously criticized politicians’ use of the legitimizing language of religion (such as the outcry over former Tokyo governor

\(^{128}\) Two examples are Gluck 1985 and Garon 1997.

\(^{129}\) On shrine priests, see Azegami 2009, which was condensed into an English translation as Azegami 2012. On bottom-up support for the ideas of State Shintō, see Shimazono 2010.

\(^{130}\) Hardacre (1989) highlighted several high-profile court cases related to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine and groundbreaking ceremonies (jichinsai), a project also seen in O’Brien and Ohkoshi 1996. Nakamura (1992) and Dower (1999) both addressed the controversial decision to keep the Shōwa emperor on the throne during the Occupation. More recently, Breen and Teeuwen (2010) skeptically regarded the postwar activities of the Jinja Honchō (National Association of Shrines) as problematic; I also mentioned Shimazono Susumu’s (2010) arguments on this score. Mark Mullins (2012a; 2012b) has also been engaged in an ongoing research project
Ishihara Shintarō’s claim that the 11 March 2011 earthquake and tsunami was “divine retribution” for Japan’s sins) and the pageantry of religious ritual (such as public visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine by prime ministers Koizumi Jun’ichirō and Abe Shinzō). The “bad religion” of renascent “State Shintō” is attacked by an academic majority claiming to protect religious freedom for all. The “good secularism” of ostensibly benign Shintō is protected by an academic minority claiming that Shintō has been misunderstood and that the category of “State Shintō” itself is a product of hypocritical, overbearing American imperialism that held Japan to an unfair double standard in matters of religious freedom.

_Buddhist “War Responsibility”_

Finally, the topic of Buddhist war responsibility has also been an arena for discussions of the importance of religious freedom. For example, in an article entitled “Japan’s Modernization and Buddhism,” published in English in the journal _Contemporary Religions in Japan_ in 1965 (but based on an essay published in Japanese in 1961), historian of Buddhism Ienaga Saburō (1913–2002) argued that Japanese Buddhists had missed a golden opportunity provided by the 1868 Meiji revolution to overcome the “indolence” that had characterized the Tokugawa period (1600–1868). Although Buddhists reacted to the attacks of the _haibutsu kishaku_ (“destroy the buddhas, expel Śākyamuni”) movement by appealing to their long-standing rights vis-à-vis the

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131 To offer just a couple of examples, Shimazono 2010, Breen and Teeuwen 2010 (esp. Chapter 6), and Mullins 2012a and 2012b all register suspicion about the postwar survival of “State Shintō.”

132 This scholarship is almost entirely in Japanese. Ōhara 1989 and Sakamoto 1989 are representative. These studies tend to focus on “State Shintō in the narrow sense” as described by Nitta Hitoshi (1999a; 1999b).
state, in Ienaga’s estimation this appeal was not based (as he thought it should have been), on any commitment to the separation of church and state.\textsuperscript{133}

Ienaga proceeded to suggest that Buddhists aimed to survive under the new Meiji regime by ingratiating themselves with the state, working particularly assiduously to identify the potential threat posed by growing numbers of Japanese Christians. Not only did Buddhists denounce prominent Christians such as Uchimura Kanzō (1861–1930) in the 1890s, but they also actively resisted “democratic trends from below,” meaning that they were unable to develop any alternative path outside of merely following state authority.\textsuperscript{134} Even reformers such as Shimaji Mokurai (1838–1911), who had famously advocated separation of religion and the state in the 1870s, fell into the trap of misconstruing freedom of religion by adopting an apologetic stance that sought favor with the state through persecution of Christians.\textsuperscript{135} In Ienaga’s Marxian retrospective, the Meiji Constitution both failed to provide genuine religious freedom and religious leaders failed to do their duty in securing that freedom. These failures derived from the “feudal” attitudes that Ienaga felt Buddhists were never able to fully shed.

In what seems to have been an attempt to correct the interpretive excesses of earlier studies like Ienaga’s, Abe Yoshiya published a six-part essay series (effectively an academic monograph) entitled “Religious Freedom under the Meiji Constitution” in the journal *Contemporary Religions in Japan* between 1968 and 1970. Abe rejected his predecessors’ presupposition that religious freedom had been entirely absent under the Meiji Constitution. Against the view that Shintō became Japan’s state religion with the Meiji political transition of 1868 and remained so until the end of the war, Abe indicated that the status of Shintō changed

\begin{footnotes}
\item[133] Ienaga 1965, 11.
\item[134] Ienaga 1965, 14; 17.
\item[135] Ienaga 1965, 22.
\end{footnotes}
significantly over the course of modern Japanese history, suggesting that it only made sense to indicate governmental special treatment of Shintō beginning around 1900. This special treatment was not solidified until 1913 when the administrative apparatus for managing shrines was shifted to a department different from the one in charge of managing religions.136

According to Abe, religious freedom did exist in a real legal sense during the Meiji Constitutional Period, but clerics were too myopically focused on jostling for position vis-à-vis the state to notice that their rights were steadily eroding.137 In Abe’s narrative, the burden of responsibility for the loss of religious freedom lay as much with religious leaders who failed to challenge governmental initiatives as it did with state bureaucrats who concocted statist interpretations of religious freedom that placed the state in a position of ultimate authority. In fact, Abe suggested that Buddhist clerics in particular were obstacles to the development of religious freedom in Japan due to their ignorance regarding what was at stake. This narrative matched Ienaga’s disparaging assessment of Buddhist clerics as myopically focused on their own parochial interests; it was also reproduced verbatim in later scholarship.138

A variant of Abe’s critique also circulated in clerical circles as Buddhist priests confronted sectarian complicity in Japan’s war efforts. It was hardly a secret that most Japanese Buddhist sects contributed to the war effort, particularly in the early 1940s. In the context of the postwar regime, then, one of the great challenges for Buddhists was to find tools within Buddhist doctrine to support the postwar ideals of human rights, humanism, strict separation of religion and the state, and egalitarianism.

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137 Abe 1970a, 49; 53
138 As shown above, Helen Hardacre, citing Abe, argued in her influential 1989 study on Shintō and the state that prewar religious leaders had failed to understand the principle of religious
Ichikawa Hakugen (1902–1986) engaged in a protracted critique of Buddhist ethics in this context, particularly in his 1970 piece *Bukkyōsha no sensō sekinin* (*Buddhists’ War Responsibility*).\(^{139}\) This critique was picked up in subsequent scholarship criticizing the relationships between Zen and nationalism and in Brian Daizen Victoria’s influential, if deeply problematic, 1997 monograph *Zen at War*.\(^{140}\) Similar research by non-Japanese scholars has investigated the role of the Kyoto school in legitimating nationalism and war, the role of Japanese militarism (sometimes glossed as *bushidō*) in undermining ostensibly universal Buddhist tenets such as non-violence and compassion, and the long-standing history of Buddhism being used as a tool of statecraft (or of Buddhist law and temporal kingly law as being mutually dependent).\(^{141}\)

Such critiques from within and outside the Buddhist community have continued up to the present. The “Critical Buddhism” (*hihan Bukkyō*) movement centered on the work of the Sōtō Zen cleric-scholars Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō argued that the culture of Japanese imperialism derived from distortions of original Buddhist teaching.\(^{142}\) Specifically, these

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\(^{139}\) Ives 2009

\(^{140}\) Sharf 1995b; Victoria 1997.

\(^{141}\) Heisig and Maraldo, eds. 1994; Ives 2009.

\(^{142}\) See Hubbard and Swanson, eds. 1997 and, more recently, Shields 2011. There are certainly resources within Japanese religious tradition (and within Buddhism as a whole) that can be—and have been—used to maintain the status quo or to forestall political critique. To take Buddhist doctrine at its most basic level, the Buddhist precepts include injunctions against killing or harming others based on the recognition that negative actions produce negative effects. This would seem to automatically disqualify Buddhism as a religion that might be used to support war efforts. However, Buddhist institutions also have a very long tradition of aligning themselves with political power, and for most of Buddhist history this has meant providing theoretical justification for kings’ use of military force and sanctification of kingship itself. While the injunction against harming or killing others is important, Buddhist doctrine has been used to support military projects just as frequently as it has been used to challenge them, and martial imagery has been used in esoteric Buddhist ritual even as Buddhist consecration has been used to
scholars have argued that immanentist Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrines of universal buddha-nature problematically provided theoretical rationales for Buddhist warmongering and complicity in oppression. In responding to high-profile controversies regarding Buddhist oppression of traditionally marginalized groups, Matsumoto and Hakamaya came to articulate a broader critique of Buddhism that questioned aspects of the Japanese Buddhist tradition that seemed to stray from what they saw as the core, irreducible doctrines of codependent origination and no-self. These scholars began from a position of ethical best practices and attempted to philosophically re-evaluate the Buddhist tradition through a “fundamentalist” approach that went back to the perceived doctrinal core of the Buddhist tradition. In their view, Japanese Buddhist participation in the war was based on a misinterpretation of the Buddhist truth. While this assessment caused a considerable stir in the clerical and academic worlds, it overlooked the simple historical fact that Buddhists throughout history have molded doctrine to suit their particular ends.143

Nevertheless, today Buddhist guilt over war complicity and concern about state intervention in religious affairs continues to generate a prodigious research literature. For example, a 2008

It may be that we Buddhist priests only came to clearly be aware of the relationships between state, politics, and religion as a “problem” after the Meiji Restoration. When the new government announced the “restoration of imperial rule and the unity of rites and rule” in the first year of Emperor Meiji’s reign and when it ordered the abolition of combinatory [worship of] kami and buddhas, it applied—as the expression “destroy the buddhas, expel Śākyamuni” suggests—great destructive influence on the Buddhist world. …

The Kyoto Buddhist Association came to directly confront “religion and politics” in 1982 with the establishment of the City of Kyoto Old Capital Preservation Cooperation Tax.¹⁴⁴ Those of us who participated in the Movement Opposing the Old Capital Tax had to recognize the reality that even among the main members of the religious community, the understanding of “religious freedom” and “separation of religion and the state” was surprisingly minimal. …

Finally after we chased the Ancient Capital Tax off into oblivion, the Kyoto Buddhist Association actively learned about “separation of religion and the state” and “religious freedom”; the fact that we established the “Committee for Examining Religion and Politics” in order to deepen our understanding of their significance derives from the regret [those of us in] the religious world felt in the face of these realities. … [T]hrough the activities of the “Committee for Examining Religion and Politics,” we were constantly aware of how the support of “separation of religion and the state” and “religious freedom” was a topic directly addressing clerics ourselves.¹⁴⁵

This contrite tone characterizes some recent “insider” scholarship about religion-state relations and Buddhist political life, but it has been matched by religious studies scholarship that has exhibited a strong tendency to valorize liberal “resistance” and castigate anything resembling Buddhist support for militarism. For example, scholars such as Ōtani Eiichi and James Mark Shields have both turned to the figure of Seno’o Girō (1889–1961) for an example of a Buddhist socialist who resisted imperialism and militarism. While Ōtani’s work has not necessarily

¹⁴⁴ The tax was proposed as a way of earning support for Kyoto Prefecture by effectively hiking the entry fees at temples. Several major tourist destinations closed their gates in protest, and eventually the proposed tax was rescinded.
assumed that Buddhists *should* be pacifist or socialist (his research on Nichirenism is a case in point), in Shields’s estimation Seno’o provided a laudable model for a materialist Buddhism that was consistent with Marxian principles. Similarly, Paul Swanson has recently published a chapter celebrating the life of Buddhist socialist Takagi Kenmyō, whom he describes as “a Meiji misfit and martyr.”

In summary, Buddhist complicity with wartime projects has been understood in a great deal of postwar scholarship as an abrogation of basic Buddhist doctrines or a craven subsumption of Buddhist authority to state authority. Insufficient awareness of religious freedom has been understood as the fundamental political problem for Buddhists to overcome; promotion and protection of religious freedom in the future has become not only a goal, but intrinsic to the scholarly understanding of “good Buddhism.” This stance reflects the deep influence of Buddhist modernist discourse, which has frequently portrayed Buddhist doctrine as intrinsically advancing a liberal political project or, conversely, has mobilized Buddhist doctrine in support of such projects.

**The Pike and Shield of Religious Freedom**

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146 Ōtani 2008; Ōtani 2012, 252–280; Shields 2012. While as the leader of the Youth League for the Revitalization of Buddhism (Shinkō Bukkyō Seinen Dōmei) Seno’o is exactly the sort of figure that is the focus of this dissertation, I set his case aside in earlier chapters not only because he has been the subject of extensive foregoing research, but specifically because I was trying to balance the tendency to focus on particular thinkers as representative of Buddhist “resistance.” The Youth League was established on 5 April 1931 and remained active until Seno’o’s eventual arrest in late 1936. Ōtani’s earlier work on Nichirenism can be found in his 2001 monograph.
147 Swanson 2014
148 See McMahan 2008 on Buddhist modernism in general; also see King and Queen, eds. 1996 for examples. A particularly salient example using the case of Tibetan appeals to environmentalism is provided in Huber 1997.
While I think that religious liberty is generally a good thing and even that it is a desideratum for fully enfranchised democratic citizenship, my task here has not been to advance an activist argument about why religious freedom needs to be protected and disseminated worldwide.\textsuperscript{149} In lieu of an activist argument of this sort, I have been making a historical argument about how the concepts of “freedom” and “religion” that were raised and refined during the Occupation contributed to a series of postwar changes that continue to reverberate globally today. For both ethical and methodological reasons, throughout this dissertation I have traced how these understandings have influenced postwar religious studies scholarship, but I acknowledge that there are many other ways to tell the story. That said, given that my training is in religious studies and Japan studies, I would like to close this chapter with some basic thoughts about religious freedom as it relates to religious studies in and of Japan.

The word for “paradox” in the Japanese language is \textit{mujun}, which literally means “pike and shield.” In the postwar period scholarly appeals to the “principle” of religious freedom have operated as a pike, puncturing the veil of political ideology masquerading as religion (in the case of Buddhist contributions to war) or religion dressed up as politics (in the case of “State Shintō”). At the same time, scholarly appeals to the “principle” of religious freedom have operated as a shield designed to protect weaker groups (such as emergent religious movements) from persecution. Not infrequently, the impenetrability of the shield and the acuity of the pike have been evenly matched but unevenly wielded—postwar decisions about what has been shielded from persecution and what has been subjected to incisive scholarship have been based on tenacious Occupation-era narratives.

\textsuperscript{149} While sympathetic, I have misgivings about such activist projects, which are usually premised on a tacit theology or a religious anthropology that claims to be universal but rarely is. See Laborde 2014.
The non-theological academic study of religion was initially created to fill a perceived gap between the normative practice of theology and the empiricist, positivist disciplines of historiography, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. There have been valuable and vociferous debates about whether religious studies ever has or ever can fulfill this mandate, but my aim here is not to rehash those debates, which largely concern the universality of the category “religion” and the political and theological ramifications of assigning diverse practices to it. For my immediate purposes, as long as there are people in the world who reflexively describe themselves, their groups, or others as “religious” or “religions,” then religious studies has sufficient *raison d’être*. What I am concerned with is whether academic studies of the role of religion in Japan’s modern history have failed to meet the one basic requirement of religious studies—studying “religion” in a non-reductive, redescriptive fashion that does not valorize certain theological claims over others—by building politically and theologically normative claims into historical and sociological analysis.150

The postwar history I traced above suggests that this is precisely what has happened. Certain dispositions in the early phases of postwar Japanese religious studies—dispositions formed in the crucible of the Occupation that reflect the interpretive proclivities of men like Kishimoto Hideo and William P. Woodard—created a situation in which a series of normative political and doctrinal claims came to be taken for granted in the academy: Buddhist priests had lost their mandate because they had abrogated the fundamental doctrinal principle of nonviolence; Shintō was compromised by its history of political use; new religions were cautiously accepted and protected from calumny even as some marginal groups were eyed with suspicion.

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150 “Redescriptive” is a term Brent Nongbri (2013) uses in favor of “etic” or “outsider.”
These postwar attitudes were in turn based on the military mobilization of religious studies expertise for intelligence and policymaking purposes during the war and the Occupation. What has emerged as a result is a situation in which scholarship on religion creates a certain type of secularist frame by standing “outside” and using the position of dispassionate academic authority to observe and describe certain social practices as “religious.” This academic practice is ostensibly apolitical and doctrinally descriptive rather than normative, but in actuality it has been a legacy of the historical fact that Occupation policymakers needed some way to determine the criteria whereby certain groups and practices got labeled as “religion” or as “not-religion.” That political motive, in turn, has encouraged scholars of religion to engage in normative projects that masquerade as neutral ones. Some religions are protected while others are attacked; some political stances are treated as valid while others are dismissed as illegitimate.

While the academic study of religion has benefited from serious reflexive scholarship interrogating the operative categories and methodologies on which it is based, this history of the “operationalization” of religious studies expertise and its effects has been hitherto poorly described or understood. This lacuna in our understanding of the history of the field will continue to have ramifications in scholarship and policymaking as long as it continues to exist; the contentious topic of religious freedom will be one place where it continues to exert considerable social and political influence.

When scholars and policymakers discuss religious freedom as a human right, they begin from the common presupposition that a universal religious anthropology exists. The assumption is that all humans are predisposed to religiosity even if they are not religious. Indeed, this is the only logic that can possibly support claims about the universality of religious freedom as an innate human right. But this very logic emerged historically because formerly dehumanized enemies
had to be humanized; because radically different religiosities (if that is even the right term) had
to be synthesized under a new overarching system of rights and liberties that crossed national
boundaries and cultural barriers, and because a wartime propaganda phrase had to be turned into
reality. Religious freedom is indeed the first human right, but its primaecy of place came about
historically because religion itself had played such a powerful role in a military conflict that was
understood as a clash of civilizations that could only result in the birth of a new world order.
Conclusion

After all, what would be the value of the passion for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of himself? There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. People will say, perhaps, that these games with oneself would better be left backstage; or, at best, that they might properly form part of those preliminary exercises that are forgotten once they have served their purpose. But, then, what is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known?

While a number of scholars have written about the Occupation and its legacy, as I began work on the shifting understandings of religion-state relations in the Occupation period I found myself curious about the prehistory of the Occupation as much as the Occupation itself. That is, if the American occupiers made the eradication of “State Shintō” and the promotion of religious freedom two of their primary objectives—and moreover if they deemed these projects to be antecedent to the instillation of democracy—what exactly existed before the Occupation? To what images of Shintō and statecraft were they responding? To what extent did these images correspond with reality? Finally, to what extent were scholars of religion complicit in the creation of those images prior to the Occupation, and to what extent have scholars of religion perpetuated those images since?

The concept and practice of religious freedom prior to the Occupation thus became a natural, perhaps unavoidable, topic. For while the occupiers had disparaged Japan’s wartime regime as
being both religiously intolerant and theocratic, Japan’s 1889 constitution had included a clear (if cautiously circumscribed) guarantee of religious freedom. Occupation-era rhetoric to the contrary, by the time of Japan’s formal surrender Japan had enjoyed more than fifty years of constitutional law in which freedom of religion existed both on the books and as a matter of vigorous public debate and activism.

Two possibilities therefore presented themselves as to why the Americans would feel that religious freedom was in need of (re)introduction following the Pacific War. Either the Japanese government had abrogated this constitutional principle and the Allies had a moral responsibility to rectify and restore it, or the concept of religious freedom has always been nebulous and its practice perennially contextual and subject to negotiation and reinterpretation by competing interest groups.

It turns out that both are correct, but whereas most foregoing studies of modern Japanese religious history have taken the former view, this dissertation has emphasized the latter. Religious freedom is not universal, and neither are the historical and sociological processes leading to its implementation. Studying the history of religious freedom in Japan in the period between the enactment of its two modern constitutions (in 1890 and 1947) therefore provides a unique case study that reveals not only an alternative view to foregoing histories of religion and politics in Japan, but also a corrective to universalizing theories of religion, liberty, and associated relationships between religions, states, and individuals.

If my personal political commitments are not evident from the foregoing chapters, let me be clear in closing that this dissertation is not a defense of Japanese imperialism or militarism, nor is it a dismissal of the very real suffering experienced both by victims of the war and by members

of religious groups who were subject to persecution. I take these issues seriously and I condemn the horrific actions of the Japanese government and its military during the war. I extend the same condemnation to the other combatants. That said, my attempt to take Japanese imperialist ideology seriously without *a priori* condemnation actually stems from a radical commitment to seeing my own liberal proclivities to their logical conclusions. Opening oneself up to world views that one might initially find repugnant is terribly difficult, but taking those views seriously on their own terms as genuine expressions of deeply held convictions is a logical extension of commitments to liberation. Rather than assuming that liberty will always look the same for all people everywhere, there is great value in having one’s own boundaries pushed and pulled; there is a type of learning that comes particularly from engaging with the other and imaginatively (if temporarily) placing oneself in the other’s shoes.

Like all academic writing, this dissertation has documented a change in thinking. It has told the story of how postwar conceptions of religious-freedom-as-human-right have influenced our understanding of religious freedom in competing legal, political, ecclesiastical, and academic discourses during what I have termed the Meiji Constitutional Period (1890–1947) and the Allied Occupation of Japan that followed it (1945–1952). But it has also obliquely told the story of how my long-standing curiosity about rights, freedom, and shifting definitions of personhood dovetailed with my enduring professional fascination with the conundrum of how the categories of “religion” and “not-religion” have operated and continue to operate in modern and contemporary Japan. I came to understand both “religion” and “freedom” in new and (for me) quite unexpected ways, confronting my own liberal biases, trying to understand others’ illiberal political impulses, and coming through on the other side of the investigation with what I feel is a far more nuanced (if still incomplete) approach to the topic. My liberal commitments not only
survived the process; they were stronger for it. For all that I have critiqued the concept of religious freedom in the preceding pages, my solution is neither to jettison the category of “religion” nor to conclude that pursuit of greater liberty for all is meaningless. At the same time, while I cannot agree with the revisionist historians who would paper over Japan’s imperialist history, I do have new sympathy for the incredibly awkward postwar Japanese position vis-à-vis democracy, religion, and freedom that is one legacy of the Occupation.

I have left the stories of postwar controversies regarding Yasukuni Shrine, the prospect of constitutional revision, and the appropriate balance between latitudinarian and draconian religions policy to others, but I do know that my own position regarding these issues is not as clear-cut as it was when I began the project. These dilemmas must ultimately be resolved by Japanese citizens even as they face rapid population decline, the prolonged effects of devastating natural and artificial disasters, major changes in the traditional structure of the family and the workforce, and military and economic threats from Asian neighbors. If this study fructifies future scholarship that traces these processes of negotiation, I will be very happy indeed.
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