ESCHATOLOGICAL SUBJECTS: DIVINE AND LITERARY JUDGMENT IN FOURTEENTH-CENTURY FRENCH POETRY

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN

Adviser: Sarah Kay

January 2012
Abstract

This dissertation traces a major trope of later medieval literature: the self-representation of the poet as a defendant who must answer for his poetry before God. In tracing this trope of divine judgment on poetry from the late thirteenth century to the early fifteenth century in France, I argue that the later medieval author's relationship to his audience is portrayed as a site of eschatological judgment, where God's scrutiny is always taking place through the reader's reception of the work of art. While the conceit of the poet on trial before a divine readership is a distinct rhetorical gesture, it is also an expression of ethical anxiety in many ways unique to later medieval vernacular literature. Through the exploration of five major instances of the trope of eschatological judgment on literature—in the work of Marian confraternal poets, Guillaume de Deguileville, Guillaume de Machaut, Jean Froissart, and Christine de Pizan—I follow the trope's development as a rhetorical device during the period. At the same time, I show how the ways in which this rhetorical device was used can illuminate our understanding of later medieval authors' conception of the ethical stakes of literature, of their own authority, and of their connection to audiences.
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Acknowledgements

This dissertation could not have been written without the support of numerous people. Chief among them is my advisor and reader Sarah Kay, whose piercing insight, selfless dedication and tireless good humor helped to keep me going through thick and thin. Simone Marchesi, who likewise waded through many early drafts of the project, also played a pivotal role in its evolution and enabled me to keep my mind on the bigger picture. For their warm camaraderie and the invaluable perspective they gave me, I am indebted to my colleagues at Princeton's Center for the Study of Religion, who came together each week to share their knowledge and experience. In addition, I must thank those people who made it financially possible for me to conduct research, acknowledging the generous support of Princeton University and the Department of French and Italian, the Donald and Mary Hyde Fellowship, and the Center for the Study of Religion. This is not to mention the service of countless librarians, especially at Firestone, Marquand and Mendel libraries in Princeton, the Bibliothèque Nationale de France, the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, the Bibliothèque de l'Arsenal, the British Library, the Cambridge University Library, the John Rylands Library in Manchester, and now, as I write this, the Bangor Public Library in Bangor, Maine. Last but not least, this project would not have been at all possible without the constant, patient encouragement of my wife Samantha. To all those who have leant a hand, and to you, the reader, thank you.
Introduction:

Literature as Eschatological Scene

1. La scène judiciaire

In the tenth book of his Confessions, Augustine considers that the text has been addressed to two rather different audiences. First, Augustine's words were a crying-out to the Almighty, who does not need to read the document to know the secrets of his heart. Second, written down, the most intimate details of the saint's life also become known to readers, who are unable to judge them with the same certainty. While Augustine makes explicit the parallel between his divine and human audiences, he is quick to note that the judgment of the reader is inherently limited:

Quid mihi ergo est cum hominibus, ut audiant confessiones meas, quasi ipsi sanaturi sint omnes languores meos? Curiosum genus ad cognoscendam uitam alienam, desidiosum ad corrigendam suam. (X:3)

What good is it to me that other people hear my confessions, as though they themselves might heal all of my infirmities? They are an inquisitive bunch when it comes to knowing another's life, but lazy to correct their own.

Not only is the reader's judgment short-sighted, but it may not be operating under the purest of motives. Warning against the self-righteous opinions of those who encounter his text, Augustine idealizes a "brotherly" reader who will consider the Confessions from a perspective more closely resembling Christ's own merciful judgment:

Amet in me fraternus animus quod amandum doces, et doleat in me quod dolendum doces. Animus ille hoc faciat fraternus, non extraneus, non filiorum

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1 The expression is borrowed from Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani's La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie. Mathieu-Castellani's reading of both Augustine and Rousseau generally informs my own, and I first discuss her work in detail on page 5.
2 Confessiones, ed. Gibb and Montgomery. All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
alienorum, quorum os locutum est uanitatem, et dextera eorum dextera iniquitatis, sed fraternus ille, qui cum approbat me, gaudet de me, cum autem improbat me, contristatur pro me, quia siue approbet siue improbet me, diligit me. (X:4)

Let a fraternal mind love in me what you teach is to be loved, and to sorrow in me at those things which you teach to be sorrowful. Let it be a brotherly mind who does this, not the mind of a stranger, not the mind of my enemies, whose mouth has spoken vanity, and whose right hand is the right hand of iniquity. But rather let it be a brotherly mind, which, when it approves of me, rejoices in me, and when it disapproves is saddened by me, since whether it approves or disapproves it still loves me.

In this gesture, Augustine reaches forward across the centuries, to defend himself to any and all eventual readers, demanding that they judge the author and his text fairly. At the same time, Augustine closely identifies the judgment of God with the judgment of the reader, as they both represent a scrutiny of the text by those whose final verdict is yet to be pronounced.

The author also identifies his own perspective with that of God. In that it is structured as a difficult ascent toward truth, told retrospectively from after the experience of Christian conversion, the Confessions constantly refer to the alignment of God's view of Augustine with Augustine's view of Augustine. We encounter the author's claims to divine certainty about himself, for example, when he reveals that God had been laughing at his worldly ambitions all along: "I was gaping after honors, money and marriage, but you were laughing at me. I endured the most bitter difficulties in these desires, but all the more gracious were you to me, the less you allowed anything to be sweet to me that was not you" (VI:6).³ From the standpoint of salvation, Augustine no longer sees himself through the chaos of the temporal world, but in perfect clarity and as if from God's eternal present.⁴ Now he too may laugh at the misdirected desires of his youth.

³ "Inhiabam honoribus, lucris, coniugio, et tu inridebas. patiebar in eis cupiditatibus amarissimas difficultates, te propitio tanto magis, quanto minus sinebas mihi dulcescere quod non eras tu."
⁴ See Riley, Character and Conversion, 53-55.
Augustine does not suggest, however, that his ability to judge himself as God does makes him an extraordinary being, more skilled at discerning the truth than his readers. On the contrary, as he approaches divine knowledge about himself, Augustine's subjectivity evaporates along with his autobiographical project, giving way to a perspective which aims to transcend the individuated self entirely. As Patrick Riley has it, "Augustinian conversion reveals the truth of the self only as it denies its autonomy by demonstrating in an overwhelming gesture of illumination that the authentic self lies only in God's grasp." As a puppet of Satan, the human subject's very nature is blindness about itself; its existence is that of a being separated from God through pride. The Confessions, part of Augustine's remedy to this condition, destroy the sinful illusions of ego just as they illuminate the self. Thus, once Augustine's story of the personal struggle for truth has "caught up" to the present time of conversion and the perspective of divine illumination, the personal narrative ends, and the last books of the text are appropriately dedicated to impersonal accounts of time, memory, language and the Bible.

Very different is Jean-Jacques Rousseau's own Confessions, launched into the world (posthumously, in 1782) with these words:

Que la trompette du Jugement dernier sonne quand elle voudra; je viendrai ce livre à la main me présenter devant le souverain juge. Je dirai hautement: 'Voilà ce que j'ai fait, ce que j'ai pensé, ce que je fus. J'ai dit le bien et le mal avec la même franchise. Je n'ai rien tu de mauvais, rien ajouté de bon, et s'il m'est arrivé d'employer quelque ornement indifférent, ce n'a jamais été que pour remplir un vide occasionné par mon défaut de mémoire; j'ai pu supposer vrai ce que je savais avoir pu l'être, jamais ce que je savais être faux. Je me suis montré tel que je fus, méprisable et vil quand je l'ai été, bon, généreux, sublime, quand je l'ai été: j'ai dévoilé mon intérieur tel que tu l'as vu toi-même. Être éternel, rassemble autour de moi l'innombrable foule de mes semblables; qu'ils écoutent mes confessions, qu'ils gémissent de mes indignités, qu'ils rougissent de mes misères. Que chacun

5 Character and Conversion, 25.
6 See Ibid., 26
d'eux découvre à son tour son cœur aux pieds de ton trône avec la même sincérité; et puis qu'un seul te dise, s'il l'ose: Je fus meilleur que cet homme-là.  

Rousseau's use of divine judgment as a framing device for his life story is at a considerable remove from anything resembling a pious self-accusation or a humble deferral of judgment to the Almighty. Not a confession at all, in either the Augustinian or sacramental senses, Rousseau's project demands that the subject's merit be judged only on the completeness of self-representation and not on either the contrition prompted by such a self-accounting or the relative weight of good and evil acts presented as evidence for and against him. Despite the emphasis on a thorough personal inventory, moreover, the author reserves the right to employ his "ornements" whenever the narrative happens to be held up by a "défaut de mémoire." Are we to infer that Rousseau's poetic license will not be answerable, on the Judgment Day, to the revelation of absolute truth by an omniscient deity? While Augustine places himself in the eternal perspective in the later chapters of his *Confessions*, thereby vanishing from his own life story, Rousseau announces that his particular viewpoint as a subject is all he needs to beat the charges against him.  

Although he departs sharply from the Augustinian model of confession, Rousseau too calls upon an ideal readership of brotherly *semblables* who will judge him both justly and mercifully, spurred to look into their own hearts by his unflinching self-regard. This direct appeal to the readership is designed to remind us that Rousseau's *Confessions* were written partly as a response to Voltaire's anonymous tract, *Le sentiment des citoyens* (1764).  

In this short text, Voltaire reveals that Rousseau had left all of his children at a foundling hospital and, speaking in

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the collective voice of the citizens of Geneva, denounces his writings as blasphemous and his thinking as seditious to the state.

As it affirms the autonomy of its own perspective and asks that citizens and readers judge the author differently than had Voltaire, Rousseau's fantasy scene of divine judgment depicts a trial somewhere between heaven and earth, within the elusive jurisdiction of authorial legacy, the literary afterlife. To readers as yet unknown, the author demands that he be tried as a unique human being with all of his particularities. But he also demands that he be judged as an author, within parameters specific to the activity of literary production: it is his book that will represent him, in both the artistic and judicial senses.¹¹

As different as they are from one another, the Confessions of Augustine and Rousseau both use anticipated moments of divine, or eschatological judgment as a device of narrative framing. For both authors, eschatological judgment suggests a perspective in which the text is to be read and judged, and at the same time, a basis for comparison against which to measure their own perspectives and the perspectives of readers.

In this, both Augustine and Rousseau participate in a much wider trend of literary self-representation. Scenes of eschatological judgment have served authors across the centuries as an important master-trope through which to represent the difficult judgments to be made in and about literature. In her admirable study, La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani has documented how authors like Augustine, Montaigne, Rousseau, and Genet have deployed the trope of the author on trial before a divine readership. As Mathieu-Castellani argues, the scène judiciaire represents the act of literary self-disclosure itself, and its reception

¹¹ For Mathieu-Castellani, the scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie is a "modèle omniprésent de représentation aux deux sens du terme" (La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, 36).
by a literary public whose power to judge the author and his text shares in something of the godly:

Le souverain juge, le grand juge: l'entreprise de mise à nu sous le regard de l'Autre déclare ici sans détours et comme sans réserves sa visée: le tribunal imaginaire, présidé par Celui qui voit tout, jusqu'à nos plus secrètes ordures, autorise à la fois l'exaltation et la source angoisse. Encore reste-t-il en ce cas à régler la relation instable entre le grand Juge et les petits juges qui liront un texte écrit pour un autre qu'eux, et tout de même pour eux.\(^{12}\)

The "relation instable" that Mathieu-Castellani posits between God and the reader, and the irreducible multiplicity of the "petits juges" and "grand juge," suggest the existence of an eschatological judgment particular to literary self-representation. The process of writing about oneself is directed toward an eventual judgment which, whether pronounced by God, the reader, or both at once, is anticipated only insofar as it is the judgment of the absolutely other and cannot properly be anticipated. Inasmuch as this judgment is "l'entreprise de mise à nu sous le regard de l'Autre," the conditions for that mise à nu will be dependent upon the other's particular reading of the text, which lies beyond the subject's grasp. As it submits the text to the judgment of a potentially infinite number of readers, most of whom the author will never know, the tribunal of literature opens onto an ever-changing future, with definitive meaning about the text, and about the subject who writes, always out of reach.

In this sense, when scenes of eschatological judgment are used to stage the reception of a literary text, they tend to express a paradox. While the imagined scene of a divine judgment on literature points to a moment of absolute revelation at the end of the world or at the end of a life, the same scene also depicts the more immediate aftermath of writing, in which the author must face his readers, those whom Mathieu-Castellani calls the petits juges. While the judgment of the

reader is much less immutable than the judgment of God, it may be no less exacting, for it constantly submits the text and the author to new opinions and perspectives.\textsuperscript{13}

The ways in which authors of different periods have enacted such literary scenes of divine judgment has much to reveal about how these authors conceived of the reception of their work, their own authority, and their relationship to audiences real and imagined. One period of literature which has been left mostly unexplored in this regard, even in Matthieu-Castellani's excellent book, is the Middle Ages.\textsuperscript{14} Medieval art and literature abounded in scenes of divine judgment, and medieval Christianity placed an unprecedented emphasis on the direct individual experience of God's scrutiny. In the later Middle Ages especially, the omnipresence of eschatological representation gave authors occasion to reflect not only upon the fate of their bodies and souls after death, but also upon the value of their own literary enterprises. Thirteenth- and fourteenth-century authors, like Augustine before them and Rousseau after them, used imagined representations of divine judgment to dramatize the unending scrutiny and reinterparation which their work would undergo in the hands of readers, and the way in which their own judgment would be subject to challenge by judges both petits and grands.

In this dissertation, I consider five major instances in which later medieval poets in France used dramatizations of divine judgment in order to frame their own literary production. I deal in turn with thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Marian devotional poets, with Guillaume de Deguileville's \textit{Pèlerinage de l'âme} (c. 1356), with Guillaume de Machaut's \textit{Jugement dou roy de

\textsuperscript{13} As Mathieu-Castellani puts it nicely, writing about oneself is "un procès interminable" (\textit{La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie}, 225).

\textsuperscript{14} One exception is Philippe Maupeu's excellent account of the fourteenth-century poet Guillaume de Deguileville and his influence on later French poetry, \textit{Pèlerins de vie humaine: autobiographie et allégorie narrative, de Guillaume de Deguileville à Octovien de Saint-Gelais}. In this study, Maupeu does consider Mathieu-Castellani's "scène judiciaire" as a model of autobiographical representation in Deguileville (\textit{Pèlerins}, 24 n2, 257, 265). I discuss Maupeu's work in greater detail when I consider Deguileville in Chapter 2.
Navarre (c. 1349), with Jean Froissart's *Joli buisson de Jonece* (1372-73), and with Christine de Pizan's *Livre de la cité des dames* (1405). To take only one of these examples, which I develop at length in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, Guillaume de Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme* provides a striking case of the eschatological judgment on literature. At the beginning of *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, Deguileville stages the judgment of his own soul, or the soul of his first-person narrator Guillermus, before God's heavenly court. Against the bitter accusations of Satan—the prosecutor or plaintiff in the case—Guillermus mounts an impressive defense of his soul, and uses the occasion to draw attention to his rhetorical abilities as a poet.

As I read it, Deguileville's scene of eschatological judgment also becomes a means of reconsidering earlier episodes in the author's literary career, especially a controversial poem he wrote twenty-five years before, the *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* (c. 1330-31 in its first redaction). While Guillermus speaks eloquently in his defense before the court of heaven, he also defends Deguileville's work and reputation to the readership. In the end, Deguileville's narrator is acquitted of the most serious charges against him and his poetry and is spared the flames of hell. The trial judge, the archangel Saint Michael, sends Guillermus to purgatory to burn away his remaining sins. Even this, however, reads less as a punishment than as a symbolic means of granting Deguileville permission to keep writing, since he continues to document his travels through the Christian afterworld for another 8,000 verses and spends little time detailing his own penitential suffering.

The object of this dissertation is to examine how later medieval poets like Deguileville used such eschatological *scènes judiciaires* to explore the peculiar nature of their status as authors and the particular problems inherent in submitting their work to the judgment of a literary public. My project concerns both the rhetorical and the ethical aspects of the trope of
divine judgment as reader-reception. First, I outline the specificity of the eschatological judgment scene as a rhetorical device used to stage the relationship of the author and the reader in later medieval literature. Second, and at the same time, my effort is to show how this rhetorical device expresses ethical concerns specific to literature, and to the respective duties of author and audience. While later medieval authors used scenes of divine judgment as a means of defending their work to the reader, or of guiding the reader's interpretation of the work, the divine scrutiny of the audience was also a symbolic way for these poets to defer judgment to an interpretive power outside of themselves. The literary-eschatological conceit of later medieval literature is an ethical gesture, in that it represents the considerable responsibility of facing one's audience, the anxiety of responding to criticism about one's writing.

In this ethical gesture, the judgments of God and of the audience are not necessarily opposed; indeed, more often than not, they cannot be neatly separated from each other. Thirteenth and fourteenth century authors like Deguileville frequently suggested that there is a significant overlap between the judgment of the reader and the judgment of God. While the way later medieval authors depicted their audiences reading texts is far from the perfect and immutable judgment of heaven, these authors nevertheless implied that the reader has some part in the author's ultimate salvation or condemnation in the way he or she is effected by the text. Accordingly, they translated the real and imagined criticisms of readers into the accusations to which they themselves would be subject upon departing from this world.

More, perhaps, than either Augustine or Rousseau, later medieval authors like Deguileville tended to place God and the reader into a relationship of proximity rather than one of difference. Through their interpretation of texts, readers were understood to participate in an ongoing process of ethical deliberation which could save or condemn the author. Thus, the
judgment of readers—as fickle or shortsighted as it might be—would also have to be taken into account in one way or another, when the final trumpet blew. In this sense, God's judgment was understood to always be taking place, made manifest in the encounter of the author with those who read his work.

This emphasis on the proximity between human and divine judgment in the work of literature seems to me to be particularly prominent during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, when a number of convergent factors help to explain the importance of the trope of the eschatological scene as a commentary on the nature of authorship. On the most basic level, the trope represents the coming together of two distinct ethical discourses in later medieval Christian culture. The first is the general and pervasive call for individuals to accuse themselves in the here-and-now as before God, conducting a rigorous judgment of the self. As a phenomenon particularly tied to the rise of confessional practice in the West and to emerging discourses of personal subjectivity, the heightened eschatological anticipation of late medieval Europe has been much discussed by historians and literary critics alike.

What has been mostly overlooked until now is the conjunction of this more general variety of eschatological discourse with the specific ethical problems of writing poetry, and more specifically still, vernacular poetry. This second important set of ethical discourses—about writing—was fashioned as authors of the period puzzled over and actively debated issues like the following: In order to be good, must poetry have an evangelical or devotional purpose? Who is responsible for determining the meaning of a text—the author or his readers? What is the proper use of allegory, and of personal exempla? When is the author obligated to retract and rewrite what he has already written, and how should he go about doing so? All of these questions, and many more, were posed repeatedly by authors throughout the Middle Ages, answered in a variety
of different ways, and—with varying degrees of pious expression—treated as a subset of problems within the wider field of Christian ethics.

In the later Middle Ages and the fourteenth century most especially, such questions of literary responsibility assumed a new importance. European poets writing in the vernacular began to treat themselves as authors, which is to say, among other things, that they claimed responsibility for their own bodies of work as cohesive literary objects. Later medieval authors laid claim to authorial status by having their texts compiled together under their own names as "complete-works" codices, by identifying the first-person narrators of their texts with themselves, and by sprinkling their texts with myriad biographical details and allusions. Although it often strikes the modern reader as glibly self-promotional—and rightly so—such self-representation did not come entirely lightly. In an age when deep suspicion was attached to worldly literature and to writing about oneself, vernacular authors especially felt the need to use their self-representation in order to consider the validity of their projects and the nature of their responsibility to readers. Thus did the impulse to judge the self at all times—the great eschatological anxiety of later medieval Europe—transpose questions about reading and writing into the imagined scene of divine judgment, re-staging the specific ethical problems of the poet in terms of an on-going process of scrutiny with direct bearing on the Judgment writ large. If he did not quite become God himself, the reader nevertheless entered into immediate proximity with the divine as he passed judgment on the work of literature and on the author.

But can the judgment of readers—or authors—ever be truly squared with the judgment of God? The medieval period is, after all, chock-full of meditations on the limits of human consciousness and its divorce from the divine mind. While God judges from the eternal present
of the *nunc stans*.\(^{15}\) Human judgment is time-bound; it is mutable and subject to error in every way. While God's judgment is simple, simultaneously comprising at once apprehension and understanding, human judgment is complex, and thus falls victim to delusion because of the *caesura*—the problematic time lag—between apprehension and cognition.\(^{16}\) Human judgment is also inherently iniquitous in its treatment of fellow humans, since the post-Lapsarian condition is marked by the lack of natural justice with which Adam and Eve were endowed but which they forfeited upon eating the apple.\(^{17}\) Even more importantly for the present study, medieval discourse tends to place human judgment at a distance from divine judgment because of the problem of representation, the very nature of language: while human judgments are conducted through—and marred by—words, God's judgment will not be a matter of argumentation and verbal testimony, and will thus remain untainted by the imperfection of language.\(^{18}\)

To a limited extent, this marked opposition between judgments also extends to the kind of texts I examine here, texts which contrast the contingency and mutability of human opinions with the perfect Judgment that is still yet to be pronounced. But representations of divine judgment in these texts also participate in the very same chaos and uncertainty which characterize judgments on earth. God's judgment is not represented monolithically in later medieval texts, but shares in aspects of other, more mundane spheres of judgment, especially human law. Reflecting the rapid growth of legal studies in late medieval Europe,\(^{19}\) literary

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\(^{15}\) On the *nunc stans*, see Augustine, *De civitate dei*, XI:21.


\(^{17}\) See Aquinas, *ST IaIae*, Q.81, arts. 2, 5.

\(^{18}\) See Aquinas, *Compendium theologiae*, I, 244; *ST Suppl.*, Q.88, arts. 2, 4.

\(^{19}\) Brundage (*Medieval Origins*, 217-18) considers that most of the elements necessary for the professionalization of the legal class had occurred by the end of the twelfth century: "Lawyers by the opening decades of the thirteenth century were thus on the cusp on a new professional identity" (218). Evans (*Law and Theology in the Middle Ages*, 50) likewise considers the twelfth century as the time in which the specialized legal class saw much of its development, pointing
depictions of divine judgment from the period imagine the trial proceedings of heaven with a complex deployment of the technical language and procedure of the courtroom. As in Guillaume de Deguileville's version of it in *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, the heavenly court is frequently depicted following the procedure of civil courts, with the principal actors of the eschatological drama—Christ, Mary, Satan and Mankind—all cast in terms of well-defined judicial roles: the judge, the advocate for the defense, the plaintiff, and the defendant.

By borrowing from the domain of human law, later medieval representations of divine judgment expose themselves to the great uncertainties of jurisprudence during the period, which has been best described as an intense "conflict of jurisdictions," a turbulent mix of contradictory systems of judgment.20 *Droit coutumier* came into conflict with royal and seigniorial edicts, as the modern system of common law, then in its infancy, did not merely work from prior precedent, but attempted to create it; in this sense, judgment was not an exclusively judicial act, but also a legislative one, as it acted to constantly rewrite the law.21 In much the same way, the practice of jury nullification, extremely common in the period, allowed juries to rule against the letter of the evidence and thus effectively overturn written statutes.22 Increasingly in the fourteenth century, civil law also entered into conflict with canon law and with those in the Church who saw themselves as the true inheritors of the Roman legal system and wished to especially to the 1158 statue of Bologna, which prohibited anyone who had not studied law for five years from acting as judge or jurisconsult. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, however, the professional identity of the legal class was to become still more formalized, and still more prestigious. Later medieval poets and their aristocratic audiences would generally have had some degree of familiarity with, and often training in, both civil and canon law; on this point, see Poirion, *Le poète et le prince*, 177; Reed, *Middle English Debate Poetry*, 68. In Chapter 1, I provide a more detailed account of the impact which the rise in legal learning had on poetic subjectivity and its eschatological *mise en scène*.

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20 The phrase is Esther Cohen's (*The Crossroads of Justice*, 17).
21 See Cheyette, "Custom, Case Law, and Medieval 'Constitutionalism.' 
maintain the authority of ecclesiastical courts. On the other hand, clerics, officially barred from practicing in civil courts, participated in them frequently all the same.\textsuperscript{23} Most, if not all, of the major philosophical and jurisdictional conflicts of medieval law can be observed as they are transposed into scenes from literature and art of the period which depict the functioning of God's court. Even the extremely indecisive \textit{court d'amour} had its place in medieval eschatological representation, since the Dieu d'Amours, the traditional arbiter of courtly debate poetry about love and sex, is sometimes intentionally confused with Christ, the God of Love who will judge all human beings on the Last Day.\textsuperscript{24}

Representing the divine tribunal as it might unfold were it subject to human trial procedure, medieval authors brought up all of the problems inherent to making a certain, authoritative decision on earth, while also heightening the sense of ethical proximity between human and divine deliberation. Perhaps more important than the specific use of judicial scenarios to model divine jurisprudence in later medieval literature, however, is the fact that divine judgment is imagined there to be a process of verbal argumentation akin to the often chaotic workings of earthly courtrooms. In the major texts I consider, language persists in the literary scene of divine judgment, threatening claims to certainty by demanding that words be dealt with, just as they must be in earthly courts. In God's tribunal, the author's own particular use of language is brought to judgment, and the author claims the right to use still more language to defend himself to God and the readership. In literary representations of the heavenly court, the uncertainty and mutability of language do not so much run counter to divine jurisprudence, as

\textsuperscript{23} See Brundage, \textit{Medieval Origins}, especially 134, 231, 469.

\textsuperscript{24} As, for example, in Genius's sermon in the \textit{Roman de la Rose}, discussed later in this chapter (40-42), and in Froissart's \textit{Joli buisson de Jonece}, which I discuss in Chapter 4.
they pose a challenge to readers' expectations that God's judgment transcend words, rendering all argumentation useless.

In later medieval literary representation of divine judgment, it is not only the legal side of earthly judgment that comes into play, but also judgment as a human faculty of mind. In French, *jugement* had been used well before the fourteenth century to describe both an individual cognitive event—the formation of a personal opinion—and a formal decision made by a judge. In the later medieval period, *jugement* was often used to depict poets formulating opinions in their poetry, and readers casting judgments in response. The ambiguity of the word also features in the eschatological scene of literature, where the reader's favorable reception of the author's poetry is sought at the same time as God's mercy. In the discursive play between the judgment of the reader and the judgment of God, the fourteenth-century author situated his anxiety—real or decorous—about how the text would be received and interpreted.

In later medieval literature, the mixing of divine and earthly jurisprudences to construct a literary courtroom does not entail a reading of the scene of judgment as satirical, parodic or carnavalesque. Indeed, none of the poets I consider in this dissertation deviate appreciably from Christian teachings on divine judgment. Instead, each contributes to a tradition of eschatological

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25 For instance, Brunetto Latini in his *Tresor* (c. 1268) uses *jugement* in the sense of an opinion: "Et por ce ke li tresors ki ci est ne doit pas iestre donës se a home non ki soit souffisables a si haute richeche, la baillerai jou a toi biaus dous amis, car tu en ies bien dignes selonc mon jugement." (ed. Carmody, I:1:4). The online Anglo-Norman dictionary gives a variety of other earlier uses of the word in this sense, such as by the monk Angier in his translation of Gregory's dialogues (c. 1212). This would tend to contradict Laurence De Looze's claim that *jugement* was primarily used in the juridical sense until about the 1360's (*Pseudo-Autobiography*, 16). De Looze is correct, however, that the mid-fourteenth century bears witness to a new emphasis on personal opinion (*jugement*) in literature. As I see it, this phenomenon culminates at the turn of the fifteenth century in the work of Christine de Pizan (See the concluding chapter of this dissertation and Kelly, *Christine de Pizan’s Changing Opinion*). Like *jugement*, the Latin *sententia* has a similarly ambiguous meaning, expressing "an opinion," "a maxim," or "the sentence of a judge." On this point, see Evans, *Law and Theology*, 152-58.
representation that is specific to literature itself, to the ethical concerns unique to reading and writing. These authors all expand the boundaries of eschatological judgment to encompass the activity, and the relationships, most central to their lives as artists. Accordingly, they force the issue of how language—and thus literary production—can properly be squared with a judgment that is supposed to transcend the contingency of words and subjective opinion.

Critics have sometimes understood the slippery interplay of divine and readerly judgment in medieval texts in terms of a process of Christian ascent through increasingly more perfect judgments, or of a devout meditation on the uncertainty of all mortal thought. A good example of this critical perspective is Jeremy Lowe's book *Desiring Truth: The Process of Judgment in Fourteenth-Century Art and Literature*. Lowe argues, much as I do here, that fourteenth-century literature incites the reader's participation in the creation of meaning, giving rise to a mode of judgment that is a "process [...] without a definitive verdict."²⁶ Lowe's argument, however, hinges on the idea that the manifest uncertainty of judgments in fourteenth-century texts is directed toward a higher end—namely a pious understanding that human judgment is flawed and must humble itself before the inscrutability of the divine.

The didactic purpose of contrasting human and divine judgment holds true for the more strictly devotional poetry Lowe analyzes, such as Middle English prayer books, *Pearl*, and even *Piers Plowman*. In these texts, the reader is indeed left with a sense that the limits of human understanding have been deliberately exposed in order to facilitate contemplation of a higher consciousness. In the French fourteenth-century authors I examine, however, the same sense of didacticism and teleology does not apply quite as readily to the relative depiction of divine and human judgments. As I argue, these authors suggest that literary judgments may be ethical, even

²⁶ *Desiring Truth*, 1. Throughout the book, Lowe draws on Deleuze and Guattari's conception of nomadic judgment, as articulated in their *Mille plateaux: capitalisme et schizophrénie II*. 
in their intransience. Unlike God's unchanging judgment from eternity, the reader's judgment rarely stays the same for long. It must, nonetheless, be taken into account somehow if it is to determined whether the author did his God-given duty unto readers. Medieval authors express the difficulty—or impossibility—of squaring human judgments with divine judgment, but at the same time, they express that there is a certain necessity to do right by the reader, a necessity which cannot be completely disentangled from the immanent judgment of heaven. Writing from this perspective, authors depicted the drama of shifting human opinions for other reasons than simply to contrast them with the unchanging perspective of the divine mind. Rather, the unstable nature of the reader's judgment and the unending work of reinterpretation become a fundamental part of divine judgment as they serve to humble the author before a deliberative power he can never fully apprehend—not because it is unchanging, unitary and eternal, but for precisely the opposite reason.

In her discussion of the discursive "layering" of various modes of judgment in medieval literature, Sachi Shimomura has made an admirable start on the sort of project I undertake here, but she commits what I believe to be a fundamental error in distinguishing secular from religious texts based on their use of eschatological judgment:

Here it may be useful to divide medieval narrative along two broadly demarcated time schemes, 'religious' and 'secular,' perhaps most easily distinguishable in terms of the relevance and inclusion of the Last Judgment. These two time schemes—up to and including the Last Judgment, or before Judgment—define the separate temporalities that respectively characterize religious texts (which presume an eschatological frame of reference) and determinedly secular texts (which avoid any closures impelled by external forces like God or eschatology). Secular texts can reshape or evade final judgments; however, they cannot achieve a final closure insofar as they limit themselves to a time frame always prior to Doomsday and open to human knowledge and judgment.27

27 *Odd Bodies*, 6-7.
Far from marking out the discursive or temporal boundaries of the secular and religious, as Shimomura would have it, the kind of judgment scene that I explore in this dissertation tends to blur those boundaries. The fourteenth-century eschatological scene frequently asserts the primacy of religious discourse about judgment, but it also accentuates the points at which that discourse diverges from itself, and the points at which it is subject to other ways of judging which frustrate expectations of finality. As I show throughout this dissertation, divine judgment may be represented in terms of the Last Judgment in literary sources without, however, providing definitive closure. Far from it, as in Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* (Chapter 3) and Jean Froissart's *Joli buisson de Jonece* (Chapter 4), the collective and apocalyptic Judgment Day may be deployed precisely to undermine expectations or desires for ethical certainty about literature. Conversely, in that God's judgment is always happening, the most crucial moment in eschatological time is not the future Doomsday at which that judgment will be revealed, but the present moment as it continually unfolds, submitting human beings, including authors and their readers, to a trial without adjournment. While this present judgment does not admit of certainty, it is no less eschatological. Indeed, in the texts I consider, the lack of closure characteristic of literary judgment only heightens the sense of eschatological anxiety, by presenting the Judgment as an ongoing force in the world which resists the subject's efforts to contain it within a finite system.

Before going any further, it is important to consider in more detail just how it was that later medieval discourses on the individual's eschatological judgment came into such close proximity with discourses on the judgment of literature. In the section that follows, I first outline how the new emphasis on individual judgment and salvation was accompanied by a growing prominence of the individual voice in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century literature. Second, I
show how models of personal eschatological responsibility were also translated into authors' conceptions of their own texts, and into their conceptions of textuality, selfhood and audience.

II. The Eschatological Individual and the Author

Each in their own way, historians such as Jacques Le Goff, Philippe Ariès and Jean Delumeau have argued convincingly for a gradual but significant ideological and cultural shift in the course of the later Middle Ages. During this period, the Christian Last Things—death, judgment, heaven and hell—were less and less a set of events to be lived out in the future by the collectivity of mankind, or the body of the Church. Instead, the eschatological came increasingly to assert direct and immediate consequences on the individual Christian.28 More and more in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the sinner was encouraged to reflect daily on his or her own death and judgment, staging in the mind how God's tribunal would pronounce sentence should he or she die that very moment.

One of the major reasons for the greater personal immediacy of the eschatological was certainly the elaboration of a confessional culture in the course of the thirteenth century, following the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215, which dictated that all men and women in western Christendom confess their sins at least once a year to their parish priest. Famously, for Michel Foucault, the rise of sacramental confession corresponded to an historical interiorization of power through an interiorization of discourse, in which the individual penitent was prompted to interrogate and police himself in a tightly controlled manner.29

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28 Le Goff, La naissance du Purgatoire; Ariès, L'homme devant la mort; Delumeau, Le péché et la peur and La peur en Occident. See also Le Goff, Histoire de la France religieuse, II:152-57.
29 Foucault's Histoire de la sexualité, vol. 1 provides the thinker's most specific development of confessional discourse, but Foucault's conception of the interiorization of power and discourse can be found throughout his work, especially in Surveiller et punir. For an account of how
In a similar sense, later medieval confessional practice might be understood as an interiorization of judgment, in which the individual took shape as a moral being by accusing himself to the confessor in anticipation and imitation of God's scrutiny. Twelfth-century theologians had already done much to advance the concept of personal conscience-examination as a real and immediate form of encounter with divine judgment.  

In his De conversione, Bernard de Clairvaux described the conscience as an "interior voice" (interiorem vocem, II:22) speaking through God which allows the sinner to judge himself (III). By condemning himself now, the sinner may hope to forestall condemnation after death, at which point it will be too late for repentance.  

For such thinkers as Bernard, the judgment of the conscience was not simply a preliminary agent of divine judgment or a kind of meditative warm-up for it. Rather, the conscience was the key witness at the Judgment itself, where it would provide testimony for and against the sinner. As Hughes de Saint Victor explained in his De sacramentis:

Adueniente iudice uniuscuiusque conscientia ad testimonium erit deducta; Nunc autem omnis ante oculos culpa reducitur. & mens super gehenne incendia suo grauius igne cruciatur. [...] Remotis enim omnibus probationibus certum est in die illa ipsum ante se hominem constituendum & ipsam sibi animam in cordis speculo demonstrandam & testes contra eam non deforis aliunde sed intus de semetipsa

confessional practice in the earlier Middle Ages contributed to an individuation of the subject, see Morris, The Discovery of the Individual.

30 See Sheingorn, " 'For God is Such a Doomsman,' " 17.
31 De conversione ad clericos, ed. Leclerc, Rochais, Talbot. On the importance of Bernard in the doctrinal rise of self-examination, see Godman, Paradoxes of Conscience, 54. As Ronald B. Herzman puts it, Bernard's conception of judgment, which Herzman calls "tropological" rather than "eschatological," suggests "that each moment in the present is a moment of judgment, a moment at which one's actions are to be scrutinized with the same care as they surely will be at the final judgment" (" 'Let us Seek Him Also,' " 69). See also Bloch, Medieval French Literature and Law, 228-31.
32 See also Hughes de Saint-Victor, De sacramentis, II:XIV:1.
proferendos. adicienda erunt non aliqua peregrina. sed nimium nota testimonia. id est. opera sua; (II:XVII:21)\textsuperscript{33}

With the coming of the judge, the conscience of each person will be brought in to testify. Then all sin is brought back before the eyes and the mind is tormented above the fires of hell more painfully by its own fire. With all trials removed, it is certain that on that day man must stand before himself and his soul be shown to him in the mirror of his heart and witnesses offered against it, not from somewhere else, but from within himself. And no foreign things will be added, but only well known testimonies, that is, his own works.

From Hughes' perspective, echoed frequently in later medieval discourse, self-accusation in the present differs from the final Judgment in that the former judgment allows for personal change, but self-accusation too participates directly in the otherworldly. The present judgment of the conscience may be considered truly eschatological in that it is the same voice which will testify against the sinner after death and which moves him to repent now, before it is too late. Moreover, because the Judgment Day is only the day when sentence is passed, not the time of judgment itself, the conscience reveals God's ongoing scrutiny, allowing the sinner a viewpoint from which to see himself as the Almighty already does.

The testimony of the conscience at the Judgment was not a new theme in the twelfth century, any more than it was in the thirteenth. In the passage I have just cited, for example, Hughes draws directly from Gregory's late sixth-century \textit{Moralia}.\textsuperscript{34} The idea that confession readies its subject for divine judgment is also present much earlier, for instance in Augustine's sermons.\textsuperscript{35} What \textit{was} new in the twelfth century, however, was a more codified articulation of the self-judgment of the conscience as it was to be performed by the individual Christian

\textsuperscript{33} \textit{De sacramentis christiane fidei}, ed. Berndt. In Chapter 2, I discuss a vivid example of this motif with the damning testimony of Deguileville's \textit{Synderesis}, the narrator's own embodied conscience.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{Moralia}, 15:32:7-8, 7:32:8-9, cited by Berndt, ed., \textit{De sacramentis}, 587 n.

\textsuperscript{35} See Rebillard, \textit{In hora mortis}, 159.
penitent. It is thus in the same period that we may situate the true start of the confessional era announced to all western Christians in 1215.

Characteristically for the twelfth century, the penitents whom Bernard and Hughes exhorted to salutary self-accusation were primarily members of the monastic orders. In the thirteenth century, however, laypersons were increasingly prompted to accuse themselves in order to make an earnest confession and thus prepare for the final Judgment. A properly ordered self-judgment was, among other things, the aim of the thirteenth-century industry of confessional manuals. Although first mostly in Latin, the manuals appeared increasingly in the vernacular, and increasingly written to be read by the lay penitent rather than the confessor. In French, the thirteenth century produced William of Waddington's *Manuel des péchés* (c. 1260), the *Somme le roi* of Laurent d'Orléans (1280) and the *Miroir du monde* (c.1281-2). These handbooks for sinners furnished a uniform discursive space in which the individual could conceive of him- or herself as an object of moral judgment, assuming the place of the accused standing trial before God. The *Somme le roi*, for one, counsels the self-judgment of the confessional as a means of preventing condemnation at the Last Judgment: "car qui ci se jugera veraiement, il n'avra guarde d'estre dampnez au jour de Jugement" (XL:26). The scene of divine judgment imagined in penitential meditation was vital to the individual's salvation, for it allowed him or her a window onto the ongoing process of eschatological scrutiny, of which the Last Judgment would be only

37 On these three manuals in particular, see Boyle, Ibid., 35.
38 This is one of the most important arguments made by Jerry Root in his groundbreaking 'Space to Speke': *The Confessional Subject in Medieval Literature*. On the importance of the confessional manuals, see especially 61-2. Delumeau (*Le péché et la peur*, 222-223) discusses how the manuals were influenced by legal terminology, with the confessor acting as judge of the soul.
the final confirmation. To borrow the same terms which Frank Kermode used to describe early Christianity, the later medieval experience of divine judgment was not imminent but immanent, always taking place and to some extent accessible to the individual through procedures of self-accusation.

Of equal importance to the increasingly personal nature of eschatological belief and representation, the doctrine of the particular judgment had become more well-accepted and widely disseminated than ever during the later medieval period. Instead of looking toward the collective Last Judgment to follow the Resurrection at the end of time, individual penitents were encouraged to think upon their own ending day, the time directly after their death when they and they alone would be called to account. To house those masses of people who had been neither damned nor admitted immediate entrance to heaven at the particular judgment, purgatory gained new doctrinal importance as a spiritual destination. Purgatory is closer than either heaven or hell to individual human life on earth, in that the departed soul in need of purgation may enter it right after death, and in that some degree of change is still possible there. As Le Goff puts it, with the

40 All this is not to say that confessional discourse, especially in its availability to laypersons, did not produce some measure of anxiety on the part of Church authorities, who even in the promotion of confessional practice, sought to strictly limit and control its use. As Jerry Root explains at length (‘Space to Speke,’ 68-83), the Church especially saw confession as containing the potential for error and spiritual harm because of its reliance on language.

41 The Sense of an Ending, 46-7.

42 The general and particular judgments were usually thought of as complementary, not contradictory, but the issue is complex. In some regards, it is true that, as Paul S. Fiddes notes, the particular judgment had come to dominate in the popular imagination by the end of the twelfth century (The Promised End, 87). For the most nuanced and thorough account of the relationship of the two judgments, see Baschet, "Jugement de l’âme, Jugement dernier." Belief in the particular judgment was strengthened especially by papal bull Benedictus deus (1336), issued by Benedict XII, in which it was affirmed that the divine vision is accessible to the just and purified dead before the General Resurrection.
particular judgment and purgatory, "le citoyen de l'au-delà" was born, "entre la mort individuelle et le Jugement dernier."  

The increasingly personal nature of eschatological representation can also be observed in the changing Biblical sources used to represent divine judgment in the later medieval period. Before the twelfth century, the dominant reference for the Judgment in religious iconography was the Book of Revelation. But with the beginning of the twelfth century and increasingly thereafter, the most common source became the Gospel of Matthew, particularly chapters 24 and 25.  

The eschatological scene of Revelation is a fiery cosmic vision full of interpretive puzzles, reigned over by a dark and militant Christ in judgment. If the individual has a place in this last reckoning, it is primarily in view of an ecclesiology, the collective destiny of the Church. The apocalyptic verses of the later chapters of Matthew, on the other hand, stress the immediacy of Christ's judgment through simple parables which emphasize personal accountability and tie the Judgment directly to everyday life. The Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins (Matt. 25:1-13), for example, compares unvigilant sinners to foolish virgins who fail to provision themselves with lamp oil for a wedding and are thus unable to meet the

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43 La naissance du Purgatoire, 316. Taking a somewhat different approach to the relationship of eschatology and literature than myself, Le Goff (Ibid., 390) has argued that the rise of purgatory can be tied to the greater popularity of narrative forms after the beginning of the thirteenth century, as both phenomena depended upon a more complex sense of linear time. For more on the relationship of narrative form and eschatology, see Szittya, "Domesday Bokes," 390-92. On the growing individual importance of death in medieval European culture, see Ariès, L'homme devant la mort. On the proximity of purgatory to earthly life in art, see also Bratu, "Fin des temps et temps du Purgatoire," especially 69-70.

44 See Le Goff, La naissance du Purgatoire, 313-314; Mâle, L'art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France, 369-93; Ariès, L'homme devant la mort, 105.
bridegroom on time. In the Parable of the Talents (Matt. 25:14-30), the return of Christ to judge the world is compared to the homecoming of a master who has left various sums of money with his servants, commanding them to invest and make him a profit; while two of the servants are rewarded for having increased their master's capital in his absence, the third is reproached for having hidden the money away and letting it lie dormant. Like the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins, the Parable of the Talents conveys the immediacy of eschatological responsibility for individual subjects, and both parables are referenced with great frequency in medieval art and literature.

In the eschatological passages of Matthew, moreover, the individual's immediate responsibility is directed toward recognizable human others, to whom he is responsible as before God. When Christ's judgment is depicted in later medieval texts, it most often assumes the form expressed in Matthew 25:34-45: those who perform acts of charity unto the least of Christ's brethren also do so unto Christ himself, and are rewarded with eternal life, while those who do not do so are cast into the lake of fire.

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45 The Parable of the Minas (Lk. 19:12-27) differs somewhat, in that unlike the parable in Matthew, it does not specify that each servant receives a different amount from the master. It is thus less well-suited homiletically for stressing the particularity of individual responsibility before God.

46 Medieval theatre seems to have been something of an exception to the general trend, since the earliest medieval religious play, the Sponsus (11th cent.), dramatized the Parable of the Wise and Foolish Virgins, but would start to give way in the 14th century to mysteries largely based on Revelation. Nevertheless, as I discuss in Chapter 1, later mystery plays were very much concerned with the fate of the individual and depicted the particular judgment, including the sentences of the saved and damned pronounced by Christ in Matthew 25. In iconography, by the thirteenth century, the sword-wielding Judge of the Book of Revelation had also been largely replaced with more human—if no less fearful—images of the Son of Man holding out his arms to display his wounds. On the two typologies of Christ as judge, see Mâle, L'art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France, 360-61, 370-74.

47 On these verses as the sentences to be pronounced by Christ, see Peter Lombard, Sententiae, IV:XLVII:1, 4.
Then he said to those who were at his left hand: depart from me you accursed ones, into eternal fire, prepared for the devil and his angels, for I hungered and you did not give me to eat, I thirsted and you did not give me to drink, I was a stranger, and you did not welcome me, I was naked and you did not clothe me, I was sick and in prison, and you did not come to visit me.

In the spirit of the Gospel of Matthew, later medieval eschatological representation emphasized a present-time Kingdom-at-Hand, in which all people are constantly being judged in the course of their most mundane interactions with others. While the individual's own conscience would testify for or against him, the sinner would also have to face, in Christ's very judgment, the accusation of those living people toward whom he had failed to act ethically.

In later medieval eschatological representation, individuals became defendants in the scene of judgment, and those human others to whom they were called to account became their judges. In literary texts, this responsibility to others as before God included an author's perceived responsibility to readers, with whom medieval authors were often much more intimately acquainted than authors have been to readers in the age of print. Instead of the voice of the poor and the prisoner, some later medieval authors had God speak in the voice of collective and individual audience-members. Expressing their responsibilities to the audience, later medieval authors assigned the reactions of the literary public an important place in the Judgment itself.

This is not to say that personal eschatological narratives were absent from earlier literature. Visionary texts such as the apocryphal *Apocalypse of Saint Paul* provided first-person
accounts of divine judgment long before the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{48} And, as I have already suggested, Augustine's personal narrative of salvation also uses divine judgment to comment on the author's judgment by readers. However, literary depictions of divine judgment in the later Middle Ages represent a cultural phenomenon which is largely unprecedented, at least in Christianity: they suggest not only a personal experience of divine judgment told from the perspective of the writing subject, but a judgment which bears on the subject first and foremost in his capacity as an author, and which calls him to account most especially for what he has written.

By the first part of the thirteenth century, the homiletic insistence on a personal judgment was already an important \textit{topos} used by authors to weigh judgments about their own work and its effects on audiences. Guillaume le Clerc's \textit{Besant de Dieu} (c.1226-7), for example, draws deeply on various parables from the Gospel of Matthew. The \textit{Besant} in the poem's title is a reference to the Parable of the Talents (Old French \textit{besants}, Byzantine coins), which shows how individuals will be held accountable at the Judgment for the specific spiritual capital they have been given by God.\textsuperscript{49} In a conventional treatment of estates satire, Guillaume exhorts all people—rich, poor, kings and officials of the Church—to speedy repentance. But he also includes his own profession in this exhortation, using the parable to highlight the \textit{talent}, the particular spiritual capital, of the \textit{poet}. In the opening verses of Guillaume's poem, the narrator fears that he will have wasted the proverbial \textit{besant} given him by God—the ability to write well—and will be called to account for it:

\textsuperscript{48} The \textit{Apocalypse of Paul} (ed. Silverstein and Hilhorst) dates from the fourth century. See Easting, "Personal Apocalypses," for a good discussion of earlier accounts of personal judgment. See also Gardiner, \textit{Visions of Heaven and Hell Before Dante}.
\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Le besant de Dieu}, ed. Ruelle. In Old and Middle French, \textit{talent} can mean "natural disposition" as well as "desire."
Car ge ne sai quant il vendra
For I know not when he will come
Ne a quele hore il me somondra
nor at what hour he will summon me
Que devant lui viengne a conter
to come before him and account,
Savoir com bien purra durer
to know how long will last
Le guäin que jeo li ai fait
the profit that I made for him on earth,
Et que de son avoir ai trait.
that I derived from his capital.

For Guillaume le Clerc, the personal eschatological economy of sin and merit taught in the
parables of Matthew has special relevance for the effects which the poet's literary abilities has on
others in society. When Guillaume first identifies himself as the author of the Besant, it is both
an accusation (in the third-person) and a reminder to the reader of his previous body of work:

Guillaume, a clerk who was Norman,
who versified in romans,
and used to compose fabliaux and contes.

Guillaume, uns clers qui fu normanz,
Qui versefia en romanz,
and used to compose fabliaux and contes.
En fole e en vain matire
In foolish and vain subject matter
Peccha sovent: Deus li pardont!
did he sin often: God forgive him!

Guillaume's turn to evangelization in the Besant suggests that his literary sins were also sins
against readers, who may have been led astray by his earlier poetry. While Guillaume's previous
authorship of such "fole et vain matire" as his "romanz, fablels e contes" endangers his soul, he
hopes that his accounts may be put in order with his new poem, the Besant itself, which is both a
book and an instrument of spiritual currency. In the composition of the Besant, the gift of
elocuence—the Master's capital—will finally be employed to a good end, by calling readers to
repentance and by expressing the author's own contrition:

Se Deus m'a doné de bien dire
If God has given me the grace
La grace, ne me dei targier,
of eloquence, I cannot hesitate
Mes son besant creistre e chargier
but must make his besant multiply
and yield fruit.

(vv. 2780-82)

It has not gone entirely unnoticed by critics that such poets as Guillaume le Clerc used
personal meditations on divine judgment to frame their own literary production. In his
groundbreaking *La subjectivité littéraire: autour du siècle de saint Louis*, Michel Zink has argued that the thirteenth-century emphasis on personal conscience-examination is one of the major factors behind the rise to prominence in that century of figures like Guillaume le Clerc, Rutebeuf and the great Artois poets Adam de la Halle, Jean Bodel and Baude Fastoul. Zink notes that the literary personae these poets created for themselves were largely constructed through rhetorical gestures of confession and repentance, including meditations on the immanence of the individual's judgment by God.

What Zink has observed for the *siècle de Saint Louis*—the thirteenth century—may be expanded even further for the fourteenth, which bears witness to a still more robust employment of first-person voice in vernacular poetry. Indeed, it was in the fourteenth century that the great superstars of vernacular poetry exploded onto the European literary scene: Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio in Italy; Machaut, Froissart, Eustache Deschamps and Christine de Pizan in France; Chaucer, Gower and Lydgate in England. All of these poets may be defined as *authors* not only for their influence and their level of productivity, but also for the extent to which their work calls attention to its own status as a unique and proprietary literary object. By involving their first-person narrators directly in the plots of their own narratives, these poets created distinct personae.

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50 *La subjectivité*, 59-60, 199-200. Zink (Ibid., 119-22) discusses Guillaume le Clerc in the broad terms of conscience-examination. In the thirteenth century, few figures take the abject, apologetic posture further than Rutebeuf, who was probably influenced by Guillaume le Clerc. See especially, "La repentance Rutebeuf," in Zink, ed., *Oeuvres complètes*, 331-39. Zink (ed., Ibid., 331) notes Rutebeuf's debt to Guillaume le Clerc in terms of the theme of the poet who "se repent d'avoir mis sa plume et le talent que Dieu lui a donné au service d'une littérature frivole ou coupable." On Rutebeuf as a poet of individualized death, see Dufournet, "Deux poètes du Moyen Age en face de la mort," 155.

51 On the idea of medieval authorship in general, see Minnis, *Medieval Theory of Authorship*. Although Minnis deals primarily with the Latin tradition, he discusses vernacular literature, including Gower and Chaucer, in his fifth chapter, "Literary Theory and Literary Practice" (160-210), and in his epilogue, "The Familiar Authors" (211-17), which covers Petrarch, Boccaccio and Dante.
for themselves. Through clever word play and more explicit means, they made frequent reference within the same narratives to their earlier works and to the development of their careers. Composing poetry itself became a narrative thread to rival the knightly aventure of the courtly romance. While the self-presentation of the vernacular writer began to take shape in the poésie personnelle of the thirteenth century, it developed into a true poetics of auctoritas in the fourteenth, in which the first-person voice was endowed with a much more significant referential weight.\(^{52}\)

As the je assumed more importance, so too did the use of penitential introspection as a frame for self-representation. Following Michel Zink's lead, a number of critics have noted that fourteenth-century poets frequently drew upon the language of sacramental confession in order to designate themselves as individual authors.\(^{53}\) In Jerry Root's repurposing of a phrase from Chaucer, confessional practice provided fourteenth-century authors with a "space to speke,"\(^{54}\) that is, a means through which to situate their own presence in the text and to ground their authority in a discourse of truth-production.

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\(^{52}\) This important feature of late medieval vernacular narrative is largely quantitative, that is to say a function of the frequency and scope of self-referential discourse; it does not represent an absolute departure from earlier modes of literary subjectivity. Sarah Kay, for one, has argued persuasively for a more robust conception of authorial subjectivity in the lyric poetry of the twelfth-century troubadours (Subjectivity in Troubadour Poetry). Likewise, the apologetic mode of self-presentation is not unique to the post-Lateran world, only more well developed, and more directly connected to eschatological judgment. For example, at the beginning of Denis Piramus's twelfth-century Vie de seint Edmund le rei, the poet repents for earlier writing (vv. 1-24), although without direct reference to the Judgment. On apologetic self-presentation in the earlier Middle Ages, see Payen, Le motif du repentir, especially chapter 4, "La poésie personnelle de la conversion," 579-590. Payen (589) speaks of a "poésie personnelle de la conversion et de la pénitence," in which self-presentation and self-acusation are inextricably connected.

\(^{53}\) Root, 'Space to Speke;' Senior, In the Grip of Minos. See also Braswell, The Medieval Sinner. For a study of the late medieval tradition in England, with particular reference to Lollardy, see Little, Confession and Resistance.

\(^{54}\) Specifically, Root borrows the phrase from Chaucer's Wife of Bath (Canterbury Tales, vv. 1054-55).
In my view, critics like Root have been extremely astute in documenting the use of confessional discourse as a privileged mode of literary subjectivity and authorial self-presentation in the fourteenth century. I have myself insisted on the importance of confessional culture in the late medieval individuation of the eschatological. However, confessional discourse is only part of the picture; it does not fully account for the cataclysmic event of divine judgment always taking place, which Matthew Senior shrewdly defines as the psychoanalytical "other scene" underlying all confessional discourse: "The confessant addresses his or her pater peccavi not just to the priest but most essentially to a transferential father in heaven. The other scene of Christian confession is the spiritual world of heaven and hell, time and eternity, sin and forgiveness." As the ultimate other scene, eschatological judgment is always present in all of the medieval Christian's dealings with other people, including in the reader's response to the work of the author. This makes the issue of judgment itself much larger than the system of confessional discourse through which that judgment is frequently contemplated in literature. Moreover, traditional confessional discourse—both the Augustinian and sacramental kinds—asserts a level of certainty about the subject, his sins, and his responsibilities in atoning for those sins, which is often absent from later medieval depictions of judgment, where uncertainty keeps the subject's level of anxiety at a maximum. This is especially the case when, as in the later medieval texts I examine, the matter to be judged is literary. By insisting on their resistance to definite answers, the problems specific to language and literary production constantly threaten to overspill discrete systems of Christian confession.

Perhaps greatest among these problems is one which lies at the heart of Mathieu-Castellani's scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, and which took on growing importance in the

55 In the Grip of Minos, 10.
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries as vernacular literature assumed an increasingly personal voice. Namely, to what extent does the self-representational work of literature really represent its author? To what extent is the author directly responsible to readers for his literary creation, and for the version of himself reflected in the text? Like Rousseau's "livre à la main" written to serve as evidence before God, the later medieval work of literature claims to depict, to some degree, the life of its creator; at the same time, it promises a difficult judgment about whether or not the historical author can and should be identified with the voice of the text. This ambiguity between the poet and his work brings me to my next consideration: the way in which later medieval authors used motifs of eschatological judgment to explore the ontological and ethical relationship between themselves and their texts.

III. Textual Self and Liber vitae: Pseudo-Autobiographical Poetry

The particular literary use made of eschatological judgment in fourteenth-century literature must be understood in relation to a specific kind of authorial self-representation and a specific kind of textuality. "Autobiographical" writing in the broadest sense, such as it might be used to characterize the Confessions of Augustine or the Confessions of Rousseau, is of relatively little importance for most of the thirteen centuries separating the two authors.\(^56\) The corpus of autobiography as we tend think of it that generic designation today is thin or practically nonexistent in medieval European literature.\(^57\) However, the looser category of authorial self-representation is a different matter than autobiography, especially for later medieval narrative

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\(^56\) A convincing argument for Augustine's work as un-autobiographical is provided by Riley, Character and Conversion, "Chapter 2: Augustine's Confessions and the Paradoxes of Conversion," 24-59.

\(^57\) See Zumthor, Essai, 66-67. Zumthor makes an exception (67) for Christine de Pizan, whose work he considers autobiographical.
poetry written in the vernacular. While those later medieval poets who wrote about themselves may not have depicted their lives with the same consistent, sustained detail as an Augustine or a Rousseau, mention of the professional activity of writing is extremely common in their work, and later medieval authors left us a wealth of details about their own careers and literary production.

In the fourteenth century, the conception of "pseudo-autobiography," such as it has been elaborated by the critics G.B. Gyibbon-Monypenny and Laurence De Looze, is of particular importance to this discussion.58 As De Looze, especially, employs the term, pseudo-autobiography may be understood as a deeply self-referential mode of literary production, a style of narration in which the narrator is "a poet first" and in which the literary text "is not only about its own creation, but is also the creator's story of himself as creator in the act of creating."59 According to De Looze, the pseudo-autobiographical mode of the fourteenth century also depends upon a rhetorical posture in which the author presents his own life as being virtually indistinguishable from the material existence of the book.60

That which is "pseudo" about a pseudo-autobiographical text, then, has less to do with the relative truth value of self-representation than the degree to which the self-representational text acknowledges its own status as an art object, and by the same token, invites readers to judge its veracity and meaning for themselves. The pseudo- may be opposed not to the real as such but to the discursive insistence on an historical and complete human being, such as one finds to varying

60 Ibid., 8.
degrees, for instance, in the *Confessions* of both Augustine and Rousseau, as well as in Christian attempts to apprehend the self through sacramental confession.

Indeed, when one considers the staging of divine judgment as a feature of self-referential narrative, the later medieval dominance of pseudo- rather than historical autobiography heightens the specificity of a literary-eschatological judgment *as literary*. In comparison with an autobiographical register, like Rousseau's, which claims to present an holistic picture of the writing subject, the creation of a more purely literary persona tends to conflate the life that is on trial before God with the author's artistic production, or even with the book itself. The pseudo-autobiographical submits to judgment only, or primarily, the literary aspect of an individual existence, "the creator's story of himself as creator in the act of creating." The process of writing thus assumes a greater ethical and existential weight, whereas "true" autobiography claims to distribute its judgments much more evenly across all aspects of a life. *Pseudo-self-*presentation, then, does not defer ethical responsibility away from its subject, but places it more squarely onto the shoulders of a literary persona who must answer, above all, for what the author has written.

It is to be expected that later medieval poets should have conceived of their own particular mode of eschatological self-representation. Confessional discourse in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries was regularly shaped by a systematic exposition of the sins most common to specific vocations and classes, and scenes of divine judgment in the period often portrayed the professions and estates—such as jurists, clerics, secular and religious potentates, and merchants—as these groups would be judged by God. Because later medieval authors often

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62 See, for example, Chenu, *Éveil*, 45; Le Goff, *Civilisation de l'Occident médiéval*, 328-9; Le Goff, *Histoire de la France religieuse*, II:103-104.
referred to poetry as a distinct vocation, they also depicted their judgment in heaven based on certain parameters of professional identity. As I have already suggested with the example of Guillaume le Clerc's *Besant de Dieu*, the poet began to imagine himself judged as an author, among other types of people and their characteristic sins.

And yet the author's own particular confessional identity deeply complicated such systematic attempts to account for the individual, by introducing literary problems into the sphere of judgment. The author who presents himself first and foremost as an author, and not as a complete person, may not have to defend himself, as Rousseau does, for abandoning his children or being too eager to receive corporal punishment. What we as readers of later medieval narrative poetry are asked to judge instead are primarily the sins of a literary life: the inevitable errors or offensive material perceived in writing the poet has already produced, instances of bad judgment in matters of opinion, or simply of bad poetry. Frequently, as I show in Chapters 1 and 4, poetry in general may even be put on trial before the throne of God, along with the author and his work. Such questions about writing, and about the moral identity of the writing subject, evade definite answers because they depend largely on the subjective interpretations made by readers.

One result of this uncertainty, especially in the fourteenth century, is that authors often seem to assent to criticism directed against their earlier work and yet do not condemn that work or consign it to the sinful past, as Augustine does with his younger self. The reception of the later medieval text is staged as a trial process which transforms the author's larger body of work, rewriting what has come before; but this trial also recalls and reaffirms previous writing.63 The authors whom I consider here use scenes of divine and readerly judgment not only to designate

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63 As Mathieu-Castellani writes, "La scène judiciaire se met en place dans un double geste de répudiation et de rappel" (*La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie*, 97). I take up this "double geste" in more detail in Chapter 4, on Jean Froissart's *Joli buisson de Jonece*. 
themselves as specific individuals, but also to designate what they have written as specifically theirs, as somehow inherent in their very being. For example, as I discuss in chapters 3 and 4, both Guillaume de Machaut and Jean Froissart stage the accusations of irate readers in order to call attention to their prodigious bodies of poetry. Reader criticism thus becomes an occasion for the author to promote himself and to tie his name ever more strongly to what he has written. At the same time, however, the scene of readerly indictment is also the admission of a heavy responsibility which joins the author inextricably to his work, for better and for worse, and which overlaps to a significant degree with the way the author will be called to account before God.\textsuperscript{64}

The idea of a textual self—a book which doubles with and represents its author—has strong parallels with a major topos of medieval eschatological representation: the \textit{Liber vitae}, or Book of Life. The \textit{Liber vitae} is referenced in Exodus (32:32-33), Isaiah (4:3), Daniel (7:10, 11:1), Revelation (5:1, 20:13-15) and in the Psalms (69:28, 139:16). In these sources it appears as the great text of revealed truth to be opened at the Last Judgment, the record of those who are to be saved, and from which the names of the wicked are to be "blotted out" (Ps. 69:28) at the end of time.

This conception of an eschatological master-text was consciously imitated in actual medieval practices of book production. For instance, beginning in the Carolingian period, the beneficiaries of the communal prayers of monasteries were inscribed in tomes entitled \textit{libri vitae}, meant to correspond more or less exactly to the great Book of Judgment.\textsuperscript{65} In post-conquest

\textsuperscript{64} As Bakhtin put it, I as a creator am tied to what I write through "the unity of my answerability" ("Art and Answerability," in \textit{Art and Answerability: Early Philosophical Essays}, 1-3. 1).

England, the *Domesday Boke* employed the same concept as an organizational principle in the comprehensive accounting made of political subjects and their property.\(^6^6\)

But the Book of Life was not only a record of the spiritual and political collectivity; it also became individualized through medieval depictions of the Book of Conscience, a more personal set of accounts to be squared with the collective Book at the end of time.\(^6^7\) In his *De conversione*, for instance, Bernard de Clairvaux describes the memory as a great volume in which everything has been written with the pen of truth (III); later in the text, in terms intimately familiar to his clerical audience, Bernard compares the desire for repentance to an impossible attempt to expunge what has been written in the memory, just as a scribe would try to scratch out writing from mediocre parchment:

> Quomodo enim a memoria mea excidet vita mea? Membrana vilis et tenuis atramentum forte ebit; qua deinceps arte delebitur? Non enim superficie tenus tinxit; sed prorsus totam intinxit. Frustra conarer eradere: ante scinditur charta quam caracteres miseri deleantur. (XXVIII:5-9)

For how might my life be cut out of my memory? The cheap, thin parchment totally absorbs the black ink; by what art may it thenceforth be deleted? For it does not only saturate the surface, but soaks through and stains the whole. In vain would I attempt to scratch it out: the document itself would be torn apart before the letters spelling out my sins were removed.

Following such personal conceptions of the eschatological text, the book as a symbol of universal totality and unity, a register of the Church or humanity, began to cede in the later medieval period to the idea that its composition and revision was more of an individual

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\(^6^6\) See Szittya, "Domesday Bokes," 374-78. Richard K. Emmerson argues that the Apocalypse may have influenced the medieval conception of 'the book' as a symbol of political, religious, and natural totality and unity" (in Emmerson's introduction to part 3 of *The Apocalypse in the Middle Ages*, "The Apocalypse in Medieval Culture," 293-332. 331).

\(^6^7\) Another important source for the Book of Conscience is the *De contemptu mundi* or *De miseria conditionis humane* of Lothario dei Segni (the future Pope Innocent III), notably III:19 (see the edition by Lewis). On the idea of the Book of Conscience in medieval discourse, see also Chenu, *Éveil*, 42-3; Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 11.
undertaking. As Phillipe Ariès argues, this shift would have been particularly palpable in the thirteenth century with the advent of obligatory confession. At this point, the Liber vitae was no longer only a "census de l'Église universelle." Instead, it became

le registre où sont inscrits les affaires des hommes. Le mot registre apparaît d'ailleurs dans le français au XIIIe siècle. Il est le signe d'une mentalité nouvelle. Les actions de chaque homme ne se perdent plus dans l'espace illimité de la transcendance, ou encore, si l'on veut parler autrement, dans le destin collectif de l'espèce. Les voici désormais individualisées. La vie ne se ramène plus seulement à un souffle (anima, spiritus), à une énergie (virtus). Elle est composée d'une somme de pensées, de paroles, d'actions, ou comme il est dit dans un vieux Confiteor du VIIIe siècle: peccavi in cogitazione et in locutione et in opere, une somme de faits qu'on peut détailler et résumer dans un livre.68

In much the same vein, the last will and testament became an obligatory form of individual self-accounting in later medieval Christianity: people at all levels of society were taught to draw up a final record of their own spiritual accounts in order to prepare for judgment after death.69

In various forms, the Book of Life personalized in the Book of Conscience and the testament also influenced more strictly literary modes of self-presentation in the later Middle Ages. Well before François Villon in the fifteenth-century, Jean de Meun had established the testament as a literary genre in which the author could symbolically leave himself to posterity and make a final act of contrition. Jean ends his late thirteenth- or early fourteenth-century Testament by praying that his name be written "ou saint livre de vie," implicitly tying his own literary self-accounting to the book of divine judgment.70

Sylvia Huot, moreover, has begun to uncover to what extent the production of single-author books in the period, like Watriquet de Couvin's manuscripts in the early fourteenth

68 Ariès, L'homme devant la mort, 106-107.
69 See Chiffoleau, La comptabilité de l'au-delà. See also Le Goff, La naissance du Purgatoire, 315; Ariès, L'homme devant la mort, 188-197; Gros, "Que fery je se n'ay argent?" 70
70 Le testament Maistre Jehan de Meun, ed. Gallarati, v. 2120. As I discuss in Chapter 3 (267-70), Machaut makes a very similar gesture in the "Lay de plour" which follows and concludes his Jugement dou roy de Navarre.
century, reflect contemporary conceptions of the Book of Conscience.71 As Huot argues, sources like the *Ovide moralisé* depict the composition of the Book of Conscience as a process of careful, penitential revision carried out by the individual, in which the personal book must be collated against the perfect exemplar that is at once the Book of Christ's life and the Book of Life.72 Authors like Watriquet would have adopted this conception of a personalized eschatological book in order to construct an implied meta-narrative of spiritual wholeness in manuscripts containing their complete works; the book's boundedness reflected the bound identity of its maker.

Patristic and medieval theologians who commented on the *Liber vitae* tended to emphasize that it should not be understood as a real book, but rather only as a figure for the eternal simultaneity of the divine perspective, the *nunc stans*;73 God sees human events all at once, not as they unfold in linear time, but as a finished and bound object. Human authors, however, experience their life and work as an ongoing process of writing, compilation, reception, and rewriting. The most difficult problem inherent in the creation of such a textual self is thus how the existence of earlier writing within the corpus can be reconciled with new writing which appears to contradict or supersede it. The corpus must respond to the reader's continual judgment, transforming what has already been said in an endless process of revision. But as the

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71 Huot, "The Writer's Mirror." With his *Commedia*, Dante also suggests such an eschatological text: see Hollander, "Dante's Book of the Dead." In her study of the poets of Arras (*A Common Stage*, 98-99), Carol Symes discusses how the correct recording of stories by the jongleurs must be reflected in the divine balancing of accounts.

72 Huot ("The Writer's Mirror," 29, 31) specifically cites the *Ovide moralisé* V, vv. 2394-403; V, vv. 2404-24, and another fourteenth-century text, the unedited *Livre de vie et aiguillon de vrai amour*, as explicitly presenting the Book of Conscience as a text to be edited and amended by individual penitents in imitation of both the Book of Life and the book of Christ's body.

73 See, for example, Hughes de Saint Victor, *De sacramentis*, II:XVII:20; Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XX:14; Aquinas, *ST* Ia, Q.24, art. 1.
book offered up to the reader's judgment, the corpus must also—somehow—achieve coherence as the unified product and reflection of a single human life.

Sachi Shimomura has described the figurative process of personal-textual revision, or *correctio*, in some detail as it occurs in medieval sermons and romances of the period. As read by those on earth, Shimomura asserts, the signs of the book are necessarily more fluid, because the corpus is still a work in process prior to the final Judgment. The work of revision comes to be understood by medieval authors less in terms of expunging earlier material than of adding to that material so as to transform it through new interpretations. For Shimomura, this is because medieval readers would have felt that attempting to remove material from the conscience or the memory denies God his omniscient vision of everything that happens in an individual life. In an intriguing metaphor, Shimomura compares divine omniscience to the "ultraviolet light" of the modern-day paleographer, which reveals the palimpsest text through traces which have not been completely removed from the parchment. As for Bernard de Clairvaux, erasing the ink from the text is impossible. Thus, as Shimomura argues, instead of obliterating previous errors, medieval authors characteristically added to their texts so as to transform the meaning of what had gone before.

This attitude is taken to an extreme, for example, in Jean de Meun's continuation (c. 1270) of Guillaume de Lorris's *Roman de la Rose* (c. 1230), which reads as a much less sober document than Jean's later *Testament*. Nearing the end of Jean's *Rose*, the personification Nature delivers her confession to the priest Genius, which Genius then transforms into a sermon

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74 *Odd Bodies*, especially Chapter 2, "'Sum vnto Bale and Sum to Blis:' From Binary Judgment to Romance Closure," 39-84.
75 Ibid., 66.
76 *Roman de la Rose*, ed. Strubel.
he delivers to the God of Love and his barons. Genius is, among other things, a mitred bishop towering above his congregation from the pulpit and a walking, talking erection. In this dual capacity, he preaches passionately to his audience on the urgent necessity for sexual reproduction. Painting a hell-fire portrait of man's end, Genius warns that those who do not propagate the species will be tormented without cease, while those who do will be rewarded with a spot in paradise, which Genius describes as the magnificent parc de l'agneau (lamb's garden).

Genius's sermon identifies the activity of having sex for procreative purposes with the activity of writing: penises and vaginas become the greffes and tables (styli and tablets) with which Nature had endowed human beings, and which must be employed productively; and when Genius has finished, his words are written on the hearts of the congregation "word for word" (20702). As Genius exhorts his listeners to perform their "œuvres naturels" (19693) diligently, then, he also highlights the writer's own works, demanded of him by God and Nature. The emphasis on writing is particularly striking given that Jean de Meun spends a good portion of Genius's section of the continuation comparing his own work to that of his predecessor, Guillaume de Lorris. While the parc de l'agneau is paradise, it is also a rewritten version of the vergier de deduit (garden of delight) in which Guillaume de Lorris had set the action of his original Rose, a re-troping of the classic hortus conclusus, or walled garden. The Lamb's garden, claims Genius, is superior to Guillaume's orchard in that the latter is only a garden of earthly

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77 These figures, and much of their discourse, are taken from Alain de Lille's twelfth-century De planctu Naturae.

78 The lamb refers to the Lamb of God (agnus Dei), but also surely to those who sit on Christ's right hand, separated from the goats and saved by the blood of the Lamb. On the eschatological nature of Genius's address, see Minnis, Magister Amoris, 110-111.

79 as well as hammers and anvils (martiaus, enclumes, e.g. v. 19549). Genius's identification of sex and writing is amplified from Alain de Lille's De planctu Naturae.
delights, liable to lead the reader to hell with its seductive lies and vanities, its "truffles et fanffelues" (v. 20356). Jean's own parc, on the other hand, is the true and eternal paradise.

Genius's judgment against Guillaume's vergier is difficult to take seriously because he himself claims that sex, chief among earthly delights, will get you to heaven, just as long as it results in offspring. What seems more important than the sermon's dubious message, however, is the virtue which Genius's version of the hortus conclusus ascribes to itself as the emblem of a rewritten text. The parc de l'agneau is not perhaps an improvement on Guillaume's vergier in Christian moral terms, but because it represents Jean de Meun's new reworking and continuation of an earlier text, it is by definition artistically superior. In this, the exhortation to "multiply," one's lineage by using one's stylus or tablet correctly, under forfeit of eternal death, is also the writer's labor (œuvre) of continually producing more and more by reworking earlier material, his own or that of other writers. As an implicit apology for Jean's massive addition to Guillaume's Rose, Genius's sermon on the Judgment Day insists that reproduction is both the natural state of the poet and his God-given duty. A counterpoint to Guillaume le Clerc's Matthewian insistence that he "multiply" what God has given to him, Genius has another kind of eternal life in view: that of fame, which depends both on the author's productive use of his stylus and on the further reproduction of his words by copyists and other poets. Jean, indeed, grants Guillaume a kind of eternal life by continuing and amplifying his original work.

Like Guillaume le Clerc, Rutebeuf, and a number of other thirteenth-century poets, Jean de Meun represents an important innovator of literary voice, who put a marked emphasis on his own authorial presence in and behind the text. If there is a difference in this respect between Jean de Meun and his fourteenth-century descendants, however, it is certainly that the latter are

80 see, for example, v. 19390: "Que leur lignage moutepliant."
always continuing *themselves* within one large document, the corpus. Because of a heightened consciousness of authorial legacy, the theme of book-making as addition rather than expurgation is still more evident in the great pseudo-autobiographical narratives of the major fourteenth-century authors I consider: Guillaume de Deguileville, Guillaume de Machaut, Jean Froissart and Christine de Pizan (who marks the turn of the fifteenth century). These authors in general show a distinct concern with the compilation and reception of their writings into bound codices which identify them as the sole authors. In such "complete works" manuscripts as, for example, those of Guillaume de Machaut, it is possible to trace an implied meta-narrative of revision and compilation, corresponding to the author's own life and literary career.81 In the production of the book, the author makes changes in response to his own changing feelings and opinions and the changing feelings and opinions of his readership. But he also acknowledges that more than one version of himself, of his life and thoughts, can exist together within the same corpus, and indeed that contradictory judgments should continue to exist together for the sake of the literary record, the completeness of the living book of Judgment. Just as it proves hard to fully disentangle God and the readership, so too does it prove difficult to separate the author and the document made in his image from the great eschatological record, the Book of Life in which all human deeds are meticulously recorded.

**IV. The Eschatological**

As I hope now to have suggested, later medieval representations of divine judgment are complex, and are especially so when they are deployed to depict the judgment of literature. Such scenes of judgment do not simply transpose the volatile opinions of earthly readers into the space

81 I discuss Machaut's poetics of compilation in Chapter 3.
of the divine tribunal, or, conversely, bring the solemn work of the heavenly court "down" to earthly literature. Rather, they suggest an interstitial ethical space in which the mutable judgment of readers can and must be reconciled with the judgment of heaven, and must be taken into account by the author as he performs the endless task of writing and rewriting. They also suggest an interstitial time-frame, in that God's eternal judgment is always happening. This idea invests the present actions of reading and writing with a sense of participation in the eschatological, yet without providing the closure that a Last Judgment promises.

If medieval authors themselves spent a fair amount of time trying to reconcile the judgment of the readership with the judgment of God, how might we as readers define the terms of such a judgment, hovering somewhere between heaven and earth, time and eternity, life and literature? As Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani puts it, God is represented as the tiers (third-party) abiding in the judgment of the reader: "Entre moi qui me confesse et toi lecteur qui entend mes confessions, Dieu, témoin, auditeur, spectateur, est le tiers toujours présent, dont la voix est requise." Thus, conversely, the reader is also represented as a third party to the Judgment, a category akin to the poor and the prisoner in whose name Christ passes judgment.

Although Mathieu-Castellani does not refer directly to the work of twentieth-century philosopher Emmanuel Levinas in her study of judicial self-representation, her conception of the tiers is remarkably close to the Levinasian model of a divine presence made manifest in the judgments of other people. Indeed, I believe that Levinas's own distinct definition of eschatological judgment is the model that can best be used to describe the proximal—and paradoxical—relation of divine and readerly judgment in later medieval literature. As a phenomenological and transhistorical account of the structures of consciousness and

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82 La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, 60-61.
conscience, Levinas's conception of the eschatological provides an excellent means of considering a representational tradition—that of the divine judgment on literature—which never explicitly defined itself as such. Throughout this dissertation, I employ Levinas's particular definition of the term "eschatological" to refer to the kind of representation of divine judgment found in the texts I have chosen to examine, texts which make a point of confusing boundaries between the judgment of the reader and the judgment of God. Before concluding this introduction, then, it is important for me to explain what role the thought of Levinas has in this project, and how Levinas's definition of eschatological judgment can illuminate the curious way in which later medieval poets cast their readers as participants in scenes of divine judgment.

Proceeding from the Judeo-Christian tradition, Levinas's category of eschatological experience redefines the parameters of divine judgment, which for Levinas is understood as the ethical trial process continually taking place in the encounter of self and Other. For Levinas, the "eschatological" refers not to a privileged term in a dichotomy between earthly and heavenly judgment, but to a more complex mode of deliberation which is divine but performed through the judgments of human beings. For Levinas, my experience of the other is to be defined as truly eschatological, in that the other interrupts my sense of time, calling me to a cataclysmic judgment now, at each moment: "Ce n'est pas le jugement dernier qui importe, mais le jugement de tous les instants dans le temps où l'on juge les vivants." Levinas's everyday eschatology is not merely analogous to divine judgment or a preliminary apprehension of it;

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83 There is no distinction between the two meanings (moral and ontological/epistemological) in the French word conscience, a semantic ambiguity that Levinas exploits to the fullest throughout his work.
84 On the time of the other as eschatological rather than ontological, see Anderson, "Eschatology and Textuality in Levinas."
85 Totalité et infini (TI), 8. Note that Levinas does not capitalize either word in "jugement dernier." His point is doing so, I believe, is to further differentiate the eschatological judgment that dissolves history and time from the merely historical, sequentially final judgment.
rather, it is only through the judgment of the human other that I become the object of divine judgment:

Il ne peut y avoir, séparée de la relation avec les hommes, aucune 'connaissance' de Dieu. Autrui est le lieu même de la vérité métaphysique et indispensable à mon rapport avec Dieu. Il ne joue point le rôle de médiateur. Autrui n'est pas l'incarnation de Dieu, mais précisément par son visage, où il est désincarné, la manifestation de la hauteur où Dieu se révèle.  

In other words, it is only through the face of the other that we may approach the divine, who is not revealed positively in being, but rather only in the unbridgeable gap between subjects. Levinas's is a negative theology only insomuch as it situates God apart from the ontological, in the absolute otherness which precedes being and in which we are already responsible for others before we begin to be. For Levinas, the equivalence of the eschatological and the social does not empty "God" of meaning, but permits the désincarnation of God, moving the subject's experience beyond being, which is predicated on a monolithic Sameness rather than on ethics.

The other's accusation precedes the subject's consciousness of his own being. Thus, in Levinas's understanding of personal identity, it is only in response to the other's judgment that I may speak as a subject. The true judgment of God, the eschatological, is that encounter with the other through which I defend myself and thus constantly become myself in all of my particularity:

Être jugé ainsi, ne consiste pas à entendre un verdict, s'énonçant impersonnellement et implacablement à partir de principes universels. Une telle voix interromprait le discours direct de l'être soumis au jugement, ferait taire l'apologie, alors que le jugement où se fait entendre la défense, devrait confirmer en vérité la singularité de la volonté qu'il juge.

The other's accusation and judgment make me who I am by summoning me to a response. Since, for Levinas, the ethical relationship precedes being, eschatological judgment is not the process of

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86 TI, 77
87 Ibid., 273.
determining preexisting ontological status or moral value; rather, the other's judgment is the very thing through which the subject has any meaning at all. The judgment of the other, to which subjects are called to answer in their own defense ("summoned," or "appelés à répondre à leur procès"\(^8^8\)) is precisely what makes them subjects in the first place: "Ce jugement de Dieu qui me juge, à la fois me confirme."\(^8^9\)

More specifically, it is the emergence of the \textit{tiers} (third party) in the face of the other which truly makes divine judgment manifest and brings the subject into being: "La présence du visage—l'infini de l'Autre—est dénuement, présence du tiers (c'est-à-dire de toute l'humanité qui nous regarde."\(^9^0\) While \textit{Autrui} for Levinas represents the singular other whose face calls me to account (such as the poor and the prisoner), the face of \textit{Autrui} also makes me aware of the presence of the \textit{tiers}, who is all others in their infinitude of being. The \textit{tiers} deeply complicates the duality of the \textit{face à face} relationship in that it threatens to conflict with my perceived duties to \textit{Autrui} and reminds me that my responsibility can never be completely assumed, since the other is infinite.

For Levinas, it is only through the intervention of the \textit{tiers} that justice may be done for anyone. This is because the \textit{tiers} makes language possible, a language which exceeds the duality of the I-thou relationship to implicate all possible others and their judgments on the subject: "Le langage, comme présence du visage, n'invite pas à la complicité avec l'être préféré, au 'je-tu' se suffisant et oubliex de l'univers; [...] Le tiers me regarde dans les yeux d'autrui—le langage est justice."\(^9^1\) Language allows the presence of all others to be glimpsed, calling me to a duty which can never be fulfilled because it is always expanding and changing. The instability of language is

\(^{8^8}\) \textit{TI}, 8.
\(^{8^9}\) Ibid., 276.
\(^{9^0}\) Ibid., 234.
\(^{9^1}\) Ibid., 234.
thus not a hindrance to justice in Levinas's thought, but rather sets out the impossible parameters toward which justice must strive, ensuring that there can be no end to responsibility in the face of the other. For Levinas, language is also justice because it allows the subject to speak in self-defense, taking shape precisely in his response to the other's accusation: "Il faut que le jugement soit porté sur une volonté qui puisse se défendre dans le jugement et, par son apologie, être présente à son procès [...]." ⁹²

Predicated on language, eschatological justice does not promise a teleological ascent to a singular Judgment more perfect than all others, but rather insists on the autonomy of individual judgments made at particular moments in the course of time. As it operates, eschatological judgment constantly remakes both the law and the subject. ⁹³ As the subject encounters other others, judgment never stops. Existence is thus a procès (trial, process) without an arrêt (verdict, sentence, stopping-point). ⁹⁴ For Levinas, the eschatological is what ends history, but not as a telos or end-point of human time. The final judgment of history—for Levinas, the archetypal Last Judgment—is always spoken through the universalizing, impersonal voice, "la troisième personne," ⁹⁵ which negates the subject's interiority. ⁹⁶ The eschatological judgment, however, causes a rupture in the fabric of the historical, in which the other's summation makes the subject speak in his or her defense, thus fully assuming his or her absolute particularity in the moment: "L'idée eschatologique du jugement [...] implique que les êtres ont une identité 'avant' l'éternité, avant l'achèvement de l'histoire, avant que les temps soient révolus, pendant qu'il en est encore

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⁹² *TI*, 272
⁹³ See Graham Ward on eschatology versus teleology in Levinas: "Eschatology because there is no telos towards which time and creation is moving, no point which will finally synthesize the differences, ruptures and separations which enable the existent to be an existent" ("On Time and Salvation," 162).
⁹⁴ See *TI*, 276-277.
⁹⁵ Ibid., 271. The *troisième personne* is not to be confused with the *tiers*.
⁹⁶ Ibid., 272-3.
The eschatological judgment invests the moment with autonomy, confirming it in the same absolute particularity as the subject: "Soumettant au jugement l'histoire dans son ensemble [...], il restitue à chaque instant sa signification pleine dans cet instant même." Thus, the **eschatos** (ἔζχαηος) of Levinas's eschatology refers not to a point at the end of collective history, but to the ethical relationship which lies beyond history, being and time, as revealed in the other's accusation.

For the way it escapes totalizing and universalizing moral categories, Levinas's eschatological judgment is no less ethically demanding than more traditional Judeo-Christian conceptions of divine judgment. Quite the contrary, for in the encounter with the other, no end of responsibility, no expiation of guilt, may ever be reached. The other's judgment makes it possible for me to speak in my own defense, but it does not thereby lessen my duty, "par l'indulgence, ce qui indiquerait une faille dans le jugement." Rather,

L'exaltation de la singularité dans le jugement se produit précisément dans la responsabilité infinie de la volonté que le jugement suscite. Le jugement se porte sur moi dans la mesure où il me somme de répondre. La vérité se fait dans cette réponse à la sommation. La sommation exalte la singularité précisément parce qu'elle s'adresse à une responsabilité infinie. L'infini de la responsabilité ne traduit pas son immensité actuelle, mais un accroissement de la responsabilité, au fur et à mesure qu'elle s'assume; les devoirs s'élargissent au fur et à mesure qu'ils s'accomplissent. Mieux j'accomplis mon devoir, moins j'ai de droits; plus je suis juste et plus je suis coupable.

With his concept of an ever-expanding duty, Levinas provides a framework in which to conceive of a category of eschatological experience that is no less ethically rigorous—nor even less

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97 *TI*, 8.
98 Ibid., 7-8. As Levinas acknowledges (Ibid., 14), his own thoughts on totality and infinity are heavily marked by the influence of Franz Rosenweig's *Stern de Erlösung*. Much the same may be said for his elaboration of the eschatological, which, like Rosenweig's draws deeply on various traditions of messianic Judaism.
99 Ibid., 273.
100 Ibid., 73-4. See also *Autrement qu'être*, 26-7: "Au fur et à mesure que les responsabilités sont prises, elles se multiplient. [...] La dette s'accroît dans la mesure où elle s'acquitte."
theocentric—for being resistant to a teleological and totalizing "verdict, s'énonçant impersonnellement et implacablement à partir de principes universels."  

Levinas's eschatology provides a particularly rich analogy, I believe, for the judgment of the readership as it is represented in scenes of divine judgment in fourteenth-century literature. For both Levinas and fourteenth-century poets, the "eschatological" judgment may be characterized not as an event to take place at the end of time, but as a process continually unfolding through all human relationships. As it reveals the presence of an infinite third-party (God, toute l'humanité, the audience of poetry), the accusation of Autrui (the poor, the prisoner, the singular reader) makes the subject aware of a responsibility he can never completely fulfill. For the author, this is the responsibility of responding justly to criticism of his work. As readers and their judgments change over time, so too do the perspectives authors take on their own texts, which they must revise in an interminable process of self-defense and correction.

For Levinas, again, the tiers renders justice through language, which both accuses the subject and provides him with the means to defend himself. Later medieval literature stages the author's encounter with his reader as an encounter with otherness itself, with the unapprehendable third-party who is at once God and the larger reading public. In this context, language also becomes a means of rendering justice. In all of its potential for ambiguity and uncertainty, language assures that the author's duty to the infinity of potential readers will never be complete. But language is also the supreme mechanism of divine judgment on the literary work in its capacity for mercy—it allows the medieval literary subject to defend himself and thus constantly to remake himself in response to the summons of readers.

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101 TI, 273.
102 As Levinas has it, again, "Ce jugement de Dieu qui me juge, à la fois me confirme" (Ibid., 276).
In that the endless literary procès of later medieval literature involves at once the author, the author's soul, and the literary text which claims to bare that soul (Liber vitae), it also suggests similarities to Levinas's concept of an eschatological textuality. As the contributors to a recent volume of scholarship—Levinas and Medieval Literature—have argued persuasively, Levinas shows remarkable parallels to many medieval thinkers, both Jewish and Christian, in his way of reading and interpreting Scripture and in his general attitude toward the literary text. In particular, as the scholars in the collection point out, Levinas shared with the Christian Middle Ages the conviction that reading and writing are acts of the highest ethical order, and like them he saw Scripture as the primary model for literary endeavors of all kinds. As Ann W. Astell and Justin A. Jackson write in their introduction, "the Bible as a book is and remains a saying, a word (verbe), that thrives in the intersubjective space of the community." The Bible is an open book insomuch as determination of its meaning is always in process, in the hands of an active readership. Or, as Adriaan Peperzak explains of Levinas's own poetics of the book:

The book is an attempt to fill out and heal all gaps and breaches through a complete and permanent synthesis of what is to be said. The foundering of this effort, however, is manifested by the simple fact that a book demands interpretation and thus refers to people who can explain it through living words. The permanent presence of the written synthesis—a kind of nunc stans from which the whole can be systematically regarded—stands in glaring contradiction to the 'unsystematic' meditations through which Levinas tries to expose speaking itself.

The trial process of writing is not directed toward a definitive verdict or synthesis, but rather points out the ethical primacy of reinterpretation among the members of a literary community. In

103 Levinas and Medieval Literature: The 'Difficult Reading' of English and Rabbinic Texts, ed. Astell and Jackson.
104 See especially the introduction by Astell and Jackson, "Before the Face of the Book: A Levinasian Pre-Face," 1-13.
105 Ibid., 4. Ward ("On Time and Salvation," 166-7) similarly discusses the reading of the Torah in terms of a resistance to totality.
106 To the Other, 218.
its expression through writing, Levinas's eschatological judgment may be regarded not only as an ethical confrontation, but also as a creative modality, in which the self and the world are remade anew in the reinterpretation of each moment, and in which beings participate with God, the absolute other, in an ongoing process of creation.\textsuperscript{107}

Like Levinas's own text, and like the conception of Scripture upon which it is modeled, the fourteenth-century book is reworked through a constant procès. Not only the Bible, but even the most ostensibly secular example of medieval literature tends also to address itself to an interpretive community, in which an active readership judges the text and thus helps create its meaning. As Jeremy Lowe writes, texts from the medieval period "very often demand and depend upon such a relation [reader participation] in the production of meaning: judgment, the willed act of moral engagement, therefore becomes a process, a living, evolving relationship, an open circuit between text and respondent."\textsuperscript{108} It is in this sense of an open and living circuit that, for medieval readers as for Levinas, the book "has a face" through which the ethical encounter of writer and reader occurs, in which the endless task of producing meaning unfolds.\textsuperscript{109} As an imagined extension of the living author in later medieval French literature, the book also exposes

\textsuperscript{107} See Ward, "Time and Salvation," 159, 166-7. In that it demands a constant process of revision, the later medieval book presents further similarities to Levinas's eschatological judgment. Particularly in \textit{Autrement qu'être}, Levinas emphasizes the ethical requirement to embrace a modality of language that is always in movement in reaction to the other, a modality he calls the \textit{Dire} and \textit{Dédire} (saying and unsaying). The act of saying and unsaying works to destabilize the \textit{Dit}—linguistic content, or what has already been said. In the \textit{Dédire}, the subject's certainty is continually challenged, the \textit{Dit} unsaid. As Simon Critchley defines it, "The Saying is the performative disruption of the Said that is immediately refuted by the language in which it shows itself" ("Anarchic Law," 210). See also Waldenfels, "Levinas on the Saying and Said."

\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Desiring Truth}, 1. Attwood (\textit{Dynamic Dichotomy}, 16) has noted that fourteenth-century poets like Machaut and Froissart turn readers into \textit{scripteurs} of their texts, according to Roland Barthes's terminology. In later medieval literature, the identity of the reader as \textit{scripteur} is sometimes quite literal, as in the incorporation of verses attributed to famous patrons into authors' texts, as in Machaut's \textit{Confort d'ami} and Froissart's \textit{Prison amoureuse}.

\textsuperscript{109} See the introduction to \textit{Levinas and Medieval Literature} by Astell and Jackson, eds., who ask "Does the book have a face? Is the face a book?" (1).
something like a face to readers, in that it elaborates a literary persona identifying the author with his corpus and marking the author as ethically responsible for his body of work. The face of the author—the face of the book—continually subjects itself to the judgment of the reading other and exists only because of that judgment\textsuperscript{110}.

\textbf{V. Outline}

In this dissertation, I consider a variety of literary \textit{mises en scène} of divine judgment, ranging from spiritual vision (Deguileville's \textit{Pèlerinage de l'âme}) to more courtly treatments of judgment (Machaut's \textit{Jugement du roy de Navarre} and Froissart's \textit{Joli buisson de Jonece}), to political and artistic manifesto (Christine de Pizan's \textit{Livre de la cité des dames}). All of the scenes of judgment I consider may be termed eschatological in Levinas's sense, in that all of them depict the production of textual meaning by authors and readers in terms of an ethical and creative \textit{procès} in which divine judgment is always already at work. Following Levinas, I use the term "eschatological" to designate representations of judgment which fit the following basic criteria:

1. In its appearance and operation, the eschatological judgment combines divine and earthly qualities in such a way that it is difficult or impossible to separate the earthly judgment from the heavenly, suggesting God's presence as \textit{tiers} in the writing subject's relationship with other human beings.
2. The eschatological judgment does not promise teleological ascent or objective certainty, but points to the primacy of each moment and to the irreducible multiplicity of other beings who call the writing subject to account.
3. Finally, the eschatological judgment does not situate itself beyond words but depends fundamentally on language in order to do justice, both to others and to the writing subject. Using this conception of eschatological judgment as a means of

\textsuperscript{110} J.A. Jackson's article in the collection, "The Infinite Desire of Pearl" (157-84), deals at length with Levinasian eschatology in the literary text.
exploring the rhetorical claims and the ethical stakes of later medieval literature and authorship, the dissertation is structured as follows:

Chapter 1 represents a broad examination of later medieval thinking on the place of language in eschatological judgment. Casting a wide net over the period from the early thirteenth century to the middle of the fourteenth, I consider a variety of European sources, both Latin and vernacular. Specifically, I use these sources to investigate the following problem: although much medieval Christian theological and devotional literature tends to emphasize that human language has no agency in divine judgment, thirteenth- and fourteenth-century poets often suggest otherwise by depicting themselves as speaking participants in scenes of divine judgment. To explain this apparent discrepancy, I first consider the development of poetry as second rhetoric, showing how poetry, law and eschatological judgment had become closely related in rhetorical and poetic theory by the middle part of the fourteenth century. Next, moving from a theoretical basis for poetry to its practice, I consider in detail one theme consistently employed by later medieval poets to imagine a place for language in God's court. This is the great theme of the Virgin Mary as an advocate for mankind (advocata nostra) at the Judgment, which gave poets an important way of imagining their own legal and rhetorical agency. This chapter as a whole also serves to situate the mid-fourteenth century, the starting point for the rest of my corpus, in its historical particularity. By providing context for the development of the eschatological scene as a rhetorical device through the 1350's, and for the development of the writing subject as a defendant responding to heavenly accusation, this chapter helps to ground the more specific discussion of individual fourteenth-century authors in the chapters to follow.

Chapter 2 examines the two versions of the Pèlerinage de vie humaine (1330-1 and 1355) and the Pèlerinage de l'âme (c. 1356) by Cistercian monk Guillaume de Deguileville. First, I
show that the two redactions of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* work to establish a legal and eschatological frame for the reception of Deguileville's poetry, situating the author's literary production in a matrix of divine and human judgments. I then explain how Deguileville further dramatizes the reception of his poetry in the trial of his narrator's soul before God in *Pèlerinage de l'âme*. Drawing upon the rhetorical model of Marian advocacy detailed in Chapter 1, I show that Deguileville adapted this model in order to draw attention to his own rhetorical skills by representing himself as an interlocutor in the heavenly court. Turning in greater detail to themes of literary ethics, I then consider how Deguileville's scene of eschatological judgment specifically allows him to address reader criticisms about his first *Pèlerinage*. Deguileville is especially important to the project as a whole for the way he transforms earlier modes of eschatological representation into a full-fledged vehicle for the representation of the individual author. As the most didactic and devotional of the first-person narratives I consider, Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme* also provides a good example of how the representation of eschatological judgment was used during the period to stage ethical problems specific to Christian writing in the vernacular.

In significant contrast to Deguileville stands the matter of Chapter 3, Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Behaingne* (mid-1330's) and its sequel, the *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* (c. 1349-50). Written in a playful, courtly mode, these two poems may not be especially pious, but they are nonetheless eschatological. For like Guillaume de Deguileville, Guillaume de Machaut also used a scene of divine judgment to revisit an earlier poem, the *Jugement dou roy de Behaingne*, with a piece composed near the mid-century, the *Jugement dou roy de Navarre*. At the beginning of *Navarre*, in the midst of the terrible plague year 1349, Machaut's narrator Guillaume contemplates the impending Judgment Day and considers how he himself will have to
stand before the throne of God to answer for his sins. Machaut's narrator is, at least temporarily, spared this final reckoning and given a new chance at life. Yet he will not escape the severe judgment of the reader, who symbolically replaces the divine judge. Summoning Machaut's narrator, whom she calls "Guillaume," a certain mysterious Dame Bonneurté (Lady Happiness) accuses him of having slandered women in his *Jugement dou roy de Behaingne*. Bonneurté brings Guillaume to the court of the poet's own patron, Charles de Navarre, who is asked to determine whether Machaut's previous judgment about women was defamatory. In an absurd trial, Guillaume loses to his critic Dame Bonneurté, but is then "sentenced" by Charles to write more poetry, effectively being given a new commission by his patron.

*Navarre* is one of Machaut's funniest poems, and yet beneath its self-conscious irony lies an admission that there is something of the divine in readers which calls the writer to responsibility for what he has written, and which must be taken seriously. In the chapter on Machaut, I first examine the way in which the Last Judgment scene of the text's prologue is used to set up—and thus ultimately frustrate—reader expectations for definitive judgment. I then argue that such ideals of definitive judgment are replaced with a different kind of eschatological representation, in which the poet is continually called to account for himself by the reader, thus transforming himself as he constructs the corpus.

If Deguileville and Machaut can be seen as two extremes on a spectrum of devotional and courtly registers, Machaut's immediate poetic heir Jean Froissart falls somewhere between the two. Froissart's own narrative of changing judgments, the diptych *Espinette amoureuse* (c. 1369) and *Joli buisson de Jonece* (c. 1373), is the focal point of Chapter 4. Just like Deguileville and Machaut, Froissart had occasion to return to an earlier work of poetry in a later text, revisiting his courtly love romp *L'espinette amoureuse* in *Le joli buisson de Jonece*, at the time of the
author's ordination as a priest. Through the transports of memory and dreaming, Froissart's narrator revisits the earlier time of Espinette; he comes face to face with his younger self and with that self's bad judgments as a love poet and a lover. At the very end of Buisson occurs arguably the most dramatic moment of the poem, in a sustained meditation on the Last Judgment. Here the narrator uses divine judgment to condemn his more youthful service to frivolous love poetry and to announce his new allegiance to God, the Church and the Virgin Mary.

My approach in Chapter 4 is to examine how Froissart used this scene of divine judgment to stage his own revision of judgments about the ethical value of love poetry. As I show, the eschatological judgment from which Froissart's narrator reviews his literary career is anything but simple, because while the Last Judgment is used to renounce erotic poetry, it also confirms and celebrates the existence of that poetry as an integral part of the author's corpus. By reviewing his more youthful writing from the perspective of the Last Judgment, Froissart does not condemn, but only further cements his earlier poetry within the larger body of work, reinterpreting images of sexual desire according to an allegorical framework of religious devotion and exalting the good judgment of the many patrons whose support he enjoyed while he was composing love poetry. In this chapter, I also consider ways in which Froissart borrowed from earlier poets in his use of the literary scene of divine judgment. Most notably, I examine how Froissart judged his own poetic career in light of the career of Machaut, his greatest influence; and I weigh the probable influence on Froissart's Buisson of an Italian masterwork, Francesco Petrarca's Rime sparse, or Canzoniere. Weighing Froissart's elaboration of the scène judiciaire trope as it drew upon and reacted to the work of previous poets, I show how the author made the trope distinctly his own.
Finally, at the turn of the fifteenth century, Christine de Pizan imagined a rather different version of the trope of reader reception as divine judgment, which provides the subject of this dissertation's fifth and concluding chapter. In her *Livre de la cité des dames* (1405), Christine speaks on behalf of womankind, whom she considers to have been unjustly maligned by the judgments of countless male authors over the centuries. Instead of speaking from the position of the defendant to excuse herself and womankind in God's court, Christine takes the bolder step of rebuilding this court from its very foundations, based on her own judgments about righteous women throughout history. With the help of the personified ladies Raison, Droitture and Justice, Christine uses her judgments as a woman and a writer to lay the bricks and spread the mortar for a wholly new heavenly city populated by wise and virtuous women. As I argue, Christine's version of a divine judgment on literature bespeaks a radical shift in epistemology which assigned a greater and more positive role than ever to human experience and human judgment. This shift is already anticipated to some extent with Machaut and Froissart, but Christine's treatment of human and divine judgment suggest the beginning of a new tradition of thought whose ultimate expression was humanism in the broadest sense of the term.

In this dissertation as a whole, a careful consideration of some of the major poets and poetic trends of the later medieval period works to show how the trope of the reader as divine judge was developed and used during the period in France. Examining a small but vital part of the trope's long history, at a point somewhere between Augustine's *Confessions* and Rousseau's *Confessions*, I outline in detail the trope's rhetorical specificity for the later Middle Ages. At the same time, I demonstrate how the rhetorical posture of the author on trial before God can offer new insights about the ethical consequences which later medieval authors perceived in their own writing. As it extends its jurisdiction to literature itself, the eschatological judgment of later
medieval poetry promises to reveal much about the often problematic relationship between author and audience during the period and helps us to understand the place of literary production at the center of a network of complex, and sometimes contradictory, ethical discourses.
Chapter 1

Representation in Heaven: Judgment of Rhetoric and Rhetoric of Judgment

1. Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?

The thirteenth-century Dies irae hymn, one of the period's most well-known liturgical meditations on the Judgment Day, asks this haunting question:

*Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?*¹

What am I, the wretched one, to say then, at the Resurrection and Judgment? What words can possibly excuse or explain my misdeeds? What will I have to say for myself? Although posed from a rather different perspective, these are also the principle questions of this chapter, in which I consider some of the concrete rhetorical strategies used in later medieval texts to imagine the human subject speaking in self-defense before God.

In its context, of course, the big question of the Dies irae hymn—"What am I to say?"—is not intended to elicit a literal response, but rather to strike fear into the hearts of listeners, inspiring sincere repentance. In doctrinal terms, the correct answer to the question of what I can say is precisely nothing—the human subject can never justify himself in the eyes of his creator, and language in particular has no power to alter the course of divine decisions, to enable self-defense. Not only is pleading impossible at the Judgment, but the time for asking forgiveness has forever passed. At that terrible hour, only the conscience can speak, and it does so not to argue in the subject's favor, but to provide a transparent record of good and evil deeds.

The question which comes next in the Dies irae hymn is also worth considering:

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¹ *Missale romanum*, missae defunctorum 117, v. 19. The hymn is traditionally attributed to Tommaso da Celano.
Quem patronum rogaturus, What advocate shall I seek,
Cum vix iustus sit securus? When even the just man is hardly safe?

Here again, the anticipated answer is wholly negative: no one else will be able to speak for me at the Judgment; there will be no possibility to hire a clever lawyer, unlike in earthly courts.

Perhaps more than any other group of people, medieval jurists found themselves singled out by the interdiction against language at the Judgment. Dishonest lawyers were commonly depicted as being struck dumb before the throne of God, no longer able to talk their way to a favorable decision. While the motif of the heavenly court is abundant in medieval art and literature, it is frequently employed to show the drastic differences between human legal procedure and the divine archetype of justice to which earthly courts fail to conform.

How is it, then, that some thirteenth- and fourteenth-century poets had the unthinkable gall to represent themselves speaking where they should not, defending themselves personally before the heavenly court with a full measure of rhetorical finesse and even legalese? For example, the later Occitan troubadour Peire Cardenal (c. 1205-72) conceived his famous "sirventes novel" (1230's) as a prepared legal argument for the Judgment Day. In the poem, Peire announces his plans to read this sirventes, or invective composition, to the heavenly court when he is summoned to account for his sins there:

Un sirventes novel vueill comensar,
Que retrairai al jor del jutjamén
A sel que-m fes e-m formet de nién.
S'el me cuja de ren arazonar
E s'el me vol metre en la diablía
Ieu li dirai: 'Seinher, merce, non sia!
Qu'el mal segle tormentiei totz mos ans.
E guardas mi, si-us plats, dels tormentans.'
Tota sa cort farai meravillar

2 vv. 20-21.
3 The sirventes can be found in Lavaud, ed., Poésies complètes du troubadour Peire Cardenal, 222-7. For more on this poem, see Léglu, "Moral and Satirical Poetry," 61-63.
Cant auziran lo mieu plaideiamen;
Qu'eu dic qu'el fa ves los sieus faillimen
Si los cuja delir ni enfernar.
(vv. 1-12)

I wish to begin a new sirventes
that I will recite on the Judgment Day
to the one who made me from nothing.
If he thinks he has a case against me,
and if he wants to stick me with the devils,
I'll say, 'Lord, no way!
For I have already suffered all my days in this wicked world.
So spare me, please, from those tormentors.'
I will astonish all in his court
when they hear my plea.
I say that he does toward his own an injustice
if he plans to destroy them or put them in hell.

Peire Cardenal, like many poets of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, had likely received some formal training in the law. He was certainly familiar with basic legal terminology, and he uses such terms as arazonar (to accuse or bring a claim against, v. 4) and plaideiamen (plea, v. 10) to describe his anticipated confrontation with God. At the end of the poem, Peire requests that the Virgin Mary, traditionally the advocate for humankind, bolster his arguments by providing a legal guarantee (garentia, v. 46) on his behalf to Christ.

About a century after Peire's death, in 1376, the Burgundian jurist and poet Jean Le Fèvre wrote his wonderfully extravagant Respit de la mort. Le Fèvre conceived of this poem as an action of legal adjournment (respit) sought against his longtime creditor—God. In the poem, the author confronts his formidable opponent with an abundance of rhetorical tropes and exempla, and inserts into the proceedings some of the real-life lawyers he knew from the Parliament of

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4 See Ourliac, "Troubadours et juristes," 169.
5 A razo was a line of argument, whereas an arazonador was an advocate (See Paterson, Troubadours and Eloquence, 12-13).
6 However, Cardenal criticizes the study of Roman law in other poems. See Ourliac, "Troubadours et juristes," 170.
7 Le respit de la mort, ed. Hasenohr-Esnos.
Paris. On the basis that those who suffer wartime damages are given temporary relief of their debts in French customary law, Jean contends that he has long been at war with the world, and should thus be afforded the same exception:

Je di que doy avoir souffrance; I say that I must be awarded this delay,
car, par le coustume de France, for by the custom of France,
stile et usage tout notoire, in procedure well established,
dont je woel interlocutoire, and according to which I demand a decision,
se l'homme est damagié par guerre, if a man incurs injury or damages in war,
il li loist bien de respit querre, it is legitimate for him to seek delay,
quant en supplicant fait entendre when in pleading humbly he makes it clear
que ait crediteur puissant d'attendre, that he has a powerful creditor to await
et fait caucion juratoire and does swear a solemn oath
pour obtenir la dilatoire. to obtain the adjournment.
(vv. 2917-26)

Jean wins his adjournment; by the grace of God, he is awarded time to repent of his sins and live a better life before a final judgment is passed, more time to pay back God's capital. As was the case for Peire Cardenal in the previous century, pleading successfully with God in a legal setting provides a clever way for the poet to call attention to his own verbal abilities. Much like the biblical Job, in many ways their ultimate model, these poets demanded their right to a fair trial and the opportunity to respond to the accusations against them in heaven.8

Peire Cardenal's *sirventes* and Jean Le Fèvre's plea for a respite are just two examples from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in which poets put the spotlight on themselves by imagining their own legal arguments before God. What follows is an attempt to trace how exactly it was that poets in general came to occupy such an improbable—or impossible—rhetorical position. Accordingly, this is also the most rhetorically focused chapter, which considers persuasive language itself—rather than a single author—as the object of eschatological judgment. The texts I examine in this chapter vary significantly, in terms of time period, genre

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8 On the importance of Job as a model for the literary judgment scene in general, see Mathieu-Castellani, *La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie*, 9-11.
and language. In Latin, I consider Classical, Patristic and medieval sources on rhetoric and Christian doctrine; in Italian, the contributions made to the rhetorical tradition by Brunetto Latini and his student Dante are of great importance for understanding the adoption of rhetorical models by poets writing in the vernacular. In Occitan, I have already cited the thirteenth-century troubadour Peire Cardenal; later in this chapter, I also make a detailed analysis of a mid-fourteenth century Occitan poetic treatise, the Toulousain *Leys d'amors*. In French, I take into account moralizing depictions of divine judgment, mystery plays, a *fabliau*, and a number of Marian devotional texts. By examining the issue of language and divine judgment broadly, it becomes possible to establish the outlines of the later medieval scene of heavenly rhetoric into which the great French poets I examine in subsequent chapters wrote themselves.

In the first part of this chapter, I show how the traditional Christian distrust of rhetoric conceived the scene of eschatological judgment as a forum in which to condemn improper uses of language, especially among members of the ascendant European legal class. I then consider how, with the growth of the civil law and the classical rhetorical training it provided, poets adopted the model of courtroom rhetoric as the basis for their own uses of language. After examining the conditions through which juridical rhetoric and poetry became closely related, I demonstrate how poets depicted rhetoric more positively in the scene of divine judgment, as they imagined eschatological scenarios in which language does indeed seem to exert a persuasive effect on God. Offering an alternative to representations of divine judgment which censure the dishonest or manipulative use of language, these scenes suggest that rhetoric and poetic language, rather than being barred from the operation of divine judgment, may have an exceptional influence in heaven.
I conclude the chapter by exploring in some detail one particular manifestation of the divine judgment scene. This is the lyric and dramatic representation of the advocacy of the Virgin Mary (advocata nostra) on behalf of mankind and against the accusations of Satan. The motif of a lawyerly Mary was readily adopted by poets writing devotional poetry, and poets' use of the motif often implies a connection between Mary's exceptional rhetorical skills and their own. By considering the liberal use which later medieval poets made of the advocata nostra trope, it becomes possible to see in greater detail how poets came to represent themselves—in both the legal and artistic senses of the word—at the center of the scene of judgment.  

For this emphasis on rhetoric, it is important not to lose sight of the ethical aspect of the tradition, which hinges precisely on the correct use of language and the ways in which the language of poets might claim an audience with God. In the first part of the chapter, I consider ethics in regard to the problem of rhetoric itself, and of how persuasive language should and should not be used by Christians. In the last section of the chapter, the focus on ethics turns somewhat away from the responsibility of the human subject and toward the responsibility of the ultimate reader—God—to judge equitably and mercifully. Inasmuch as language is allowed into the heavenly court to represent the guilty human subject, it also becomes the mechanism through which God's mercy is made possible. The ability to speak for oneself or engage representation at the Judgment thus becomes an ethical imperative, in which the human subject, and the poet, demand their right of response.

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9 On this double sense of représentation, see, again, Mathieu-Castellani, La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, 36.
II. *Discussio iudicii*: Judgment in the Heavenly Court

The heavenly court is a representational space with few equals in medieval art and literature for frequency or dramatic vision. Subject to myriad variations, the basic shape of the scene is well known: Christ sits enthroned in judgment before an assembly of angels and saints, chief among them his virgin mother. Mary, and often other saints, provide advocacy for mankind, pleading against the accusations of the Devil that human beings are his rightful property. Somewhere in the courtroom, the archangel Michael weighs souls in a balance scale to determine who is saved and who is damned. What has rarely been remarked about this ubiquitous heavenly court scene is that it often serves to put human language, as much as human salvation, to judgment.

The Judgment's resemblance to legal procedure on Earth was a matter of some preoccupation for medieval theologians, especially the question of whether God's judgment would be carried out through language. Thomas Aquinas affirmed that the Last Judgment would be experienced as a *discussio iudicii* (judicial dialog), assuming a form similar to human trials, but that the event would nevertheless not be a matter of examination and argumentation. For Aquinas, this was because such a process would take too long, and, more importantly, would be unnecessary, since omniscient God does not need to consider evidence like an earthly judge or jury. Instead, the *discussio* should be thought of as an instantaneous revelation to all of humanity of the moral value of each and every soul, in which pleading is null and void:

> Non est autem estimandum quod discussio iudicii erit necessaria ut iudex informentur, sicut contingit in humanis iudiciis, cum omnia sint 'nuda et aperta oculis eius,' ut dicitur Hebr. IV, 13, sed ad hoc est necessaria predicta discussio, ut unicuique innotescat et de se ipso et de aliis quomodo sint digni pena uel gloria, ut sic boni in omnibus de Dei iustitia gaudeant, et mali contra se ipsos irascantur. Nec est estimandum quod huius modi discussio meritorum uerbotenus fiat. Immensum enim tempus requiretur ad enarrandum singolorum cogitata, dicta et facta, bona uel mala: unde Lactantius deceptus fuit ut poneret diem iudicii mille
annis duraturum, quamuis nec hoc tempus sufficare, uideatur, cum ad unius hominis iudicium modo predicto complendum plures dies requirerentur. Fiet ergo uirtute diuina ut statim unicuique occurrant omnia bona uel mala que fecit, pro quibus est premiandus uel puniendus, et non solum unicuique de se ipso, sed etiam unicuique de aliis.\textsuperscript{10}

It is not to be thought that a judicial dialog will be necessary in order for the judge to be informed, as happens in human courts, for all things are 'uncovered and open to his eyes,' as is said in the fourth epistle to the Hebrews, but for the following reason the aforesaid dialog is necessary: that each person know of himself and of all others in just what way they are worthy of punishment or glory, that the good may rejoice that the justice of God is in all things, and the wicked be roused to anger against themselves. Nor is it to be thought that the dialog will be carried out by means of words. For it would take an immense span of time to recount the thoughts, words and deeds, both good and bad, of each person. Therefore Lactantius was wrong in thinking that the day of judgment would last a thousand years, for even this amount of time would barely be enough, as many days would be required to complete the trial process for each person in the aforesaid manner. The divine power will bring it about that, instantaneously, each person will be made aware of all the good and evil he has ever done, for which he is to be rewarded or punished. And this will not only be made known to each person regarding himself, but also regarding all others.

The \textit{discussio iudicii} is only for the purpose of finally revealing God's ongoing judgment, not so that God may weigh evidence and hear arguments to reach a decision about the merits of human souls. To borrow Levinas's terms, Aquinas's just Judgment is not a \textit{procès} (trial procedure) but an \textit{arrêt}, the definitive reading of a verdict and sentence at the end of time.\textsuperscript{11} Because God judges constantly from the \textit{nunc stans} (his position of eternal simultaneity), the particular and general judgments are not the times at which God deliberates and decides, but rather only the times at which God's completed judgment is made known, first to the individual soul, then to the mass of humanity.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Compendium theologiae}, I, 244 (ed. Torrell). On these points, See also \textit{ST Suppl.}, Q.88, arts. 2, 4. On the swiftness and wordlessness of judgment, see also Hughes de Saint Victor, \textit{De sacramentis}, II:XVII:8.

\textsuperscript{11} See the introductory chapter, 48.

\textsuperscript{12} See also Augustine, \textit{De civitate Dei}, XX:1-2.
That God would choose to reveal his judgment to mankind through the familiar scene of a courtroom dialog (discussio iudicii) is perfectly admissible for Aquinas, even necessary (necessaria). Human judgment seems to require the ritual of the courtroom in order to make sense of divine judgment, both in thinking about it in the course of daily life, and in experiencing the event itself after death or at the end of the world. But Aquinas is careful to maintain a distinction between, on the one hand, God's use of legal procedure as a sign with which to communicate his judgments to humanity, and on the other hand humanity's ability to answer the charges and appeal the sentence as in humanis iudiciis.\(^\text{13}\) Moreover, Aquinas's use of the term discussio does not exclude, but only serves to reinforce, the noun's other set of meanings, indeed its original meanings, which are the very antithesis of verbal discussion: discussio as a sudden shattering or violent tearing asunder, or as the action of sorting or sifting, as the proverbial wheat from the chaff.\(^\text{14}\)

That medieval theologians like Aquinas would have considered it impossible to argue with the judgment of God may seem perfectly obvious. In other sources, however, one finds that the emphasis on a non-verbal judgment, as opposed to judgments in humanis iudiciis, is used more specifically to condemn artful speech. This use of the eschatological scene to judge the ethical consequences of language deserves greater attention. Saint Jerome (c. 340-420), for one,

\(^{13}\) This is a reference to Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones*, VII: *De beata vita*, 24 (*PL*, VI, 808), cited by the anonymous editor of *Aquinas's Shorter Summa*, 325 n 364.

\(^{14}\) See Matt. 3:12: "Cujus ventilabrum in manu sua : et permundabit aream suam : et congregabit triticum suum in horreum, paleas autem comburet igni inextinguibili" ("His winnowing fan is in his hand: and he will clear his threshing floor: and he will gather his wheat into the granary, but the chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire.") Similarly to Aquinas, the *Dies irae* hymn refers to the Judgment in the terms of a discussio (with the verb discutio). The word could mean a verbal confrontation, a tearing-asunder or a cosmic winnowing:

Quantus tremor est futurus,
Quando iudex est venturus,
Cuncta stricte discussurus!
(vv. 4-6)
recounts a terrifying dream in which he was brought before Christ, soundly flogged and accused of being a Ciceronian instead of a Christian. Jerome's depiction of personal eschatological judgment was one of the first by a Christian author. Already, it used a scene of divine judgment to dramatize Christian suspicions about rhetoric and rhetoricians, and to confront the ethical anxiety of adapting pagan rhetoric to Christian purposes.

Augustine, Jerome's contemporary, likewise struggled with rhetoric. One of the most memorable sins which Augustine reveals in the Confessions is the selling of his rhetorical skills to the students of Carthage. Like Jerome, Augustine eventually came to accept the necessity of a Christian homiletic rhetoric, whose principles are expounded in De doctrina christiana. One of Augustine's most important caveats in De doctrina, however, is that while rhetoric should be used by Christian preachers to save souls, it should not be used by lawyers in civil disputes. For lawyers quibbling over money, the ability of rhetoric to manipulate the emotions of the court can only lead to the corruption of justice and its turning away from the divine model.

The medieval world inherited many of the same ethical qualms about language expressed by Jerome and Augustine, including especially the need to integrate the art of speaking well into a comprehensive system of moral virtue, and to insist on the primary purpose of rhetoric as a tool for preaching. Medieval artes predicandi, for example, often considered "vices" of rhetoric like

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16 Confessiones, IV: 1-2. In Contra academicos, Augustine writes of having fled the "windy" profession of rhetoric for the nurturing bosom of philosophy: "me pectoris dolor ventosam professionem abicere et in philosophiae gremium confugere coegisset" (ed. Green, I:1:3).
17 See, especially, De doctrina, IV:100-IV:101. Here, Augustine draws on Paul's condemnation of Christians who sue their brethren in civil courts rather than deferring to internal Church authority.
excessive digression alongside personal moral vices. Moreover, as the study of Roman civil law began to be resurrected in the universities of western Europe, so too did the lawyer become a particularly problematic rhetorician as he was in the day of Jerome and Augustine. The first half of the thirteenth century marked the point at which verbal argumentation, rather than oath-taking, began to dominate both canon and civil procedure. The thirteenth century also represented a new highpoint in the reintroduction of Roman law through Justinian's Digest (the Corpus iuris civilis), which had first resurfaced in northern Italy in the late eleventh century and which was now widely taught and used as the basis for legal decisions. For the average European to navigate the legal system, it was increasingly necessary for him or her to call upon a specialized class of jurists trained in the technical points of written law and the art of formal argumentation. Instruction in Roman law became in the course of the thirteenth century not just a component of clerical training, but a path to power and influence as its own discipline. The social standing of advocates and other trained jurists was now equivalent to that of knights and carried with it significant privileges, such as tax-exemption.

For moralists writing against perceived abuses of language, lawyers have seemingly always occupied a special place in hell, but the vilification of the profession is all the more evident in later medieval literature, when the expanding civil law encroached upon the traditional jurisdiction of episcopal courts and canon lawyers. Advocates were liable to find themselves compared to prostitutes for representing guilty or dishonest clients and were regularly singled

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20 See Cheyette, "Custom, Case Law, and Medieval 'Constitutionalism,' " especially 369-75.
21 See Brundage, Medieval Origins, 166.
22 See Ibid., 474.
23 See Ibid., 480.
out in confessional manuals and sermons for the category of sins of the tongue (*peccata linguae*),
due to their perceived mendacity and tendency to argue worthless distinctions.\textsuperscript{24}

Moralizing depictions of divine judgment in the period vividly reflect this anti-legalistic
attitude, and the inability of lawyers to speak in their own defense before God is a common
topo\textsuperscript{2} of eschatological representation. For instance, the early thirteenth-century collections of
exempla for preaching by Étienne de Bourbon and Jacques de Vitry contain anecdotes of lawyers
who attempt unsuccessfully to delay their death and judgment by petitioning for an appeal
("petere a Domino inducias.")\textsuperscript{25} In the early fourteenth-century mystery play, *Le Jour du
Jugement*,\textsuperscript{26} an avocat is one of the more conspicuous figures among the damned. He is sent to
hell because he did not perform charitable acts unto the least of Christ's brethren. This accusation
is drawn directly on the typical "guilty" sentence adopted from Matthew 25:34-45, which is the
exact reverse of the acquittal of just souls:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quant de fain vous m'avez veü</td>
<td>When of hunger you saw me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morir, ne m'avez repeü;</td>
<td>dying, you did not nourish me;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quant j'oy soif, ne me secourutes;</td>
<td>when I thirsted you did not rescue me;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quant fu nulz, envers moy durs fustes</td>
<td>when I was naked, you refused</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De moy donner de vostre robe;</td>
<td>to share your cloth with me;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tant avoiés le cuer si gobe</td>
<td>your heart was so hard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En prison vous m'avez laissié,</td>
<td>that you left me in prison,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Que vers moy n'estes abaissié</td>
<td>and you would not deign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En moy faire bien ne confort.</td>
<td>to do me good or give me comfort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or alez sanz nul reconfort</td>
<td>So go now, hopeless,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touz jours en poinne douleureuse.</td>
<td>into everlasting torment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{24} See Brundage, *Medieval Origins*, 483-4. Brundage cites, for example, Robert of Planborough's
*Summa de poenitentia* (c. 1208-1215), Cardinal Hostiensis's *Summa* (c. 1253), and the *Summa
confessorum* of John of Fribourg (d. 1313).
\textsuperscript{25} quote taken from Jacques de Vitry, *Exempla ex sermonibus vulgaribus XL* (ed. Crane, 15).
Étienne de Bourbon, *Anecdotes historiques, légendes et apologues tirés du recueil inédit
d'Étienne de Bourbon* (ed. Lecoy de la Marche, 439).
\textsuperscript{26} *Le mystère du Jour du Jugement*, ed. Perrot and Nonot.
The lawyer seems not to understand that no appeal is possible at this judgment, that there is no
time left for argument:

Ceste sentence est trop cruelle
Pour nous. N'en pouons appeller?
Quant te venis tu hosteler
En no maison? Ne le savon.
Et nous di, quantes foiz t'avon
Fait refus ne aucun dongier
Donner a boire ou a mengier?
Onques jours ne fus en prison
Que nous seussiens!

This sentence is harsher than we merit.
Can we not make an appeal?
When did you come to lodge
at our house? We don't know.
And tell us, at what times have we
refused you or not bothered
to give you food and drink?
Never were you in prison
that we were aware!

(vv. 2371-79)

Attempting to refute the miraculous event and higher law that is the substitution of Christ for all
mankind, the lawyer applies an overly literal reading of God's words; he takes exception in the
original judicial sense of the term, by claiming that Christ's particular embodied personhood does
not correspond to the poor and imprisoned. But his tactics are worthless in this court, his ability
to parse words and multiply distinctions exposed to ridicule by a judgment that transcends
language.27

Guillaume le Clerc's thirteenth-century Besant de Dieu, discussed in the introductory
chapter, provides another example of the scene of eschatological judgment used to criticize the
legal profession and its use of language. In the course of his enumeration of the moral problems
specific to the respective estates, Guillaume asks,

Que feront li faus plaideor,
Li juge qui, par acointance
Ou par ire ou par malevoillance,
Font tort de dreit et de dreit tort?
La langue qui, par son recort,

What will they do, the false pleaders,
and the judges who, by favoritism,
anger, or malice
make wrong of right and right of wrong?
The tongue which, by its own testimony

27 The lawyer's refusal to acknowledge, or failure to understand, that his lack of charity makes
him guilty before God also recalls the lawyer of the Gospel of Luke, who asks who exactly he
should regard as his neighbor ("Et quis est meus proximus?" Lk. 10:29), prompting the parable
of the Good Samaritan (Lk. 10:25-37).
As is the case with much of his Besant de Dieu, Guillaume's judgment of lawyers here is also an echo of the Gospel of Matthew: "Ex verbis enim tuis justificaberis et ex verbis tuis condemnaberis." (Matt. 12:37, "For through your own words will you be justified, and through your own words condemned.")) For Guillaume le Clerc, jurists will be judged even more than others by the testimony of their own tongues ("par son recort," v. 1096) since it is for deceptive speech that they are most often guilty. Guillaume would no doubt have agreed that, like the legal profession, his own status as a poet put him in an exceptional place in regard to language, and thus that he too would also be judged ex verbis suis. It is clear, however, that Guillaume le Clerc saw the ideal model for poetic rhetoric as clerical and evangelical rather than lawyerly.

In other cases, the eschatological scene is staged to express that the only kind of "argument" which will be effective at the judgment is living a good life now. This point is made satirically in an anonymous thirteenth-century fabliau, Le vilain qui conquist paradis par plait.28 The fabliau tells of a simple peasant soul who dies and manages to talk his way into heaven, winning salvation by arguing with saints Peter, Thomas and Paul, and finally with God himself. The vilain contends that the three apostles behaved rather badly during their lives and still ended up in paradise. From this he concludes that he is all the more worthy of eternal life, since not only did he not commit such grave transgressions as Peter's denial of Christ, Thomas's lack of

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faith, or Paul's persecution of the holy, but instead performed many acts of charity while on earth, faithfully confessed his sins and regularly received communion:

Tant que mes cors vesqui al monde,  As long as my body lived,
Nete vie mena et monde:  it led a good life and pure:
As povres dona de son pain,  It shared its bread with the poor,
Ausmosniers ert et soir et main;  gave alms night and day,
Onques n'ama tençon ne lime;  never loved quarrel or strife,
Volentiers dona droite dime;  gladly paid its tithes.
Les povres o lui osteloit  It lodged the poor,
Et volentiers les herbergoit,  happily bringing them in to
Si les escaufoit a son fu;  warm by its fire.
[..]
Mainte braie, mainte cemisse  It clothed those who had nothing
Mist sor cels qui erent despris.  with many a shirt and pair of pants.
Qant la mors ot mon cors sorpris,  When death pounced upon my body,
Si fu confés veraiement  it had confessed itself sincerely
Et reçut vo cors netement.  and accepted your body purely.
(vv. 137-52)

Faced with the vilain's argument, God is so impressed that he awards the humble man a spot in paradise and compliments him enthusiastically on his rhetorical skill:

—Amis, fait Deus, et je t'otroi  Friend, said God, I grant you
Paradis: si m'as araisnié  paradise: you have so argued your case
Que par plaidier l'as desraisnié!  against me, that you've won your plea.
Bien ses avant metre ta verbe!  You really know how to turn a phrase!
(vv. 162-65)

In the versions of the fabliau found in manuscripts B and D, God adds that the vilain must have been trained at one of Europe's premier universities:

Bien sez demontrer ta parole  You really know how to prove your word,
Tu as este a bone escole.  You have surely been to a good school.
(B, vv. 161-2)

The fabliau provides an ironic commentary about the perceived rhetorical excesses of scholastic culture, which was often criticized for putting verbal form before substance and for teaching
students to lie artfully. If theological matters could be vulnerable to subtle disputation, the fabliau's glib treatment implies, then why should even the heavenly court be immune to sophistry?

The Vilain has an even more particular resonance for the civil legal profession which grew directly out of scholastic culture and its argumentative training, and which was even more often the subject of harsh moral criticism. In the passage quoted above, the vilain acts as an advocate for his own body. He also tells Saint Thomas that he makes quite a sly lawyer, in response to the way the saint has used his authority to block the peasant's entrance into heaven:

—Tumas, Tumas, plus estes cois
Des responsaus que nus legisistes!
( vv. 62-63)
Thomas, Thomas, you answer
more indirectly than any jurist!

Criticizing Thomas, the vilain describes the legal profession rather conventionally, by the way its members use language to incur misdirection and delay. The general setting of the fabliau, which is a distinct variation on the heavenly court, and the emphasis on pleading (plait) and arguing cases (araisnier), also suggest that the "bone escole" God has in mind may be a good faculty of law.

The Vilain stages the eschatological scene with the verbal decor of contemporary rhetorical and legal culture, as a means of criticizing those on earth who cultivate eloquence without spiritual wisdom. Besides its moral satire of lawyers and masters of rhetoric, the fabliau also suggests a prescriptive model for how people should strive to appear at the Judgment, or what they should ideally have to say for themselves when the last trumpet blows. For the fabliau

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29 See Kinne, "Rhetorical Reasoning." My reading here differs somewhat from Kinne's in that I note a greater emphasis on legal education and on rhetoric rather than dialectic, and that I see Le vilain as an allegorical moral fable, while Kinne considers the fabliau to be somewhat "scandalous" for its scepticism (66).
30 See Kinne, Ibid., 61.
uses the familiar space of the heavenly court precisely in order to expose the unbridgeable difference between earthly and heavenly judgments, particularly the way in which arguments made on earth can fool their audiences by syllogism or emotional prodding. What we are meant to take away from the fabliau is that it is the content of the vilain's argument which wins him paradise, not the plait itself. If the peasant's argument is truly pleasing to God ("Bien ses avant metre ta verbe!" v. 165) it is because it is the transparent record of a good life, including charity, communion, and sincere confession. In his emphasis on charitable acts, the peasant simply repeats the conventional formulation for the judgment of the saved derived from Matthew 25, rather than attempting to deconstruct its terms like the lawyer in the fourteenth-century Mystère. The evidence of training in a "bone escole" may likewise be understood as an adherence to the articles of the faith, a better ethical training than the schools of the rhetoricians or lawyers could ever provide.

As Aquinas has it, then, if there is to be a discussio iudiciis, it is but a sign through which God's immutable judgment is translated to humanity. In the end, it is we, and not the members of the heavenly court, who are fooled into thinking that the vilain is really a lawyer: he prevails not because he wins God over with verbal dexterity, but because of the charity and moral uprightness he has exhibited throughout his life. From an initial fantasy of verbal revolt against heaven, the reader is brought back to the purely representational quality of the peasant's speech, reminded of the irony of this low-born vilain being a brilliant public orator.

Texts like this provide a largely negative response to the question of what can be said (Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?) by stressing that language itself will have no agency at the Judgment, that those who profit unduly from rhetoric will be dealt with harshly, and that the best strategy for the wretched human defendant is humility and fear, including a diligent practice of
self-accusation and confession. Yet while moralizing writers often used scenes of divine judgment to criticize the legal profession and its abuses of language, lawyer-poets like the thirteenth-century troubadour Peire Cardenal ("Un sirventes novel") and the fourteenth-century Burgundian jurist Jean Le Fèvre (Respit de la mort) took up the defensive position. Inserting themselves as legal interlocutors before the throne of God, Peire and Jean were also, in a sense, speaking on behalf of poetry and juridical rhetoric as positive forces in the world. Whereas for preachers like Étienne de Bourbon and Jacques de Vitry in the early thirteenth century, the image of the lawyer petitioning God for an appeal or delay provided a negative moral exemplum for an entire social class, it became in the course of that century and the next a relatively common trope used by poets to depict their own profession. Against the suspicion and the outright condemnation which moralizing writers attached to the law and its use of language, later medieval poets were quick to identify their own creative activity in terms of trial process, and readily adopted the particular speaking positions of the defendant and the advocate. In the rest of the chapter, I show how it was that this came about: first, how the activity of composing verse became closely modeled upon the legal profession and its rhetoric; second, how this rhetorical model was translated into representations of the heavenly court.

III. Legal and Poetic Subjectivity in Classical and Medieval Rhetoric

The fact that poets imagined themselves as lawyers—even when, unlike Peire Cardenal and Jean Le Fèvre, they were not lawyers—has something to do with Jerome's one-time personal Antichrist, Cicero. The ascendant legal class of late medieval Europe had cut its teeth not only on texts of Roman law, but also on texts of Roman rhetoric, especially Cicero's De inventione and
the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. For the purposes of this discussion, the most important characteristic of these texts is that they put special emphasis on speaking situations in which the interlocutors are competing not to persuade each other (i.e. dialectic), but rather to convince a third-party. That is, they consider arguments as they are to be addressed either to an individual judge or a collective decision-maker, according to the forensic (judicial) and deliberative (political) branches of rhetoric respectively, rather than its epideictic branch. In the first book of *Ad Herennium* and, especially, throughout the *De inventione*, the tripartite model of plaintiff, defendant and judge is the primary speaking situation for which rhetoric is taught. As the practice of law became ever more dependent upon active verbal disputation and upon a specialized class of jurists, it thus drew increasingly on the rhetoric of *De inventione* and *Ad Herennium*.

Moreover, because of the growth of the written law in the thirteenth century—both Roman and common law—it was increasingly necessary for disputing parties to draw distinctions between law and fact, so as to prove that a given action did or did not adhere to judicial norms as established by texts. The model for argumentation became that of the *exception*, the contention that a specific case differed in one or more ways from the textual precedent which one's opponent had attempted to apply to it. Arguing from exception was an integral part of legal training in the thirteenth century, as taught by such law texts as Philippe de Beaumanoir's *Coutumes de Beauvaisis* (c.1279-1283). Since Ciceronian rhetoric proceeds through a topical analysis of the points of fact open to disputation, it was well suited to

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31 See Guy Achard's Latin and French editions of both texts.
32 See Cox, "Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy," 255.
33 See Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, 112.
34 See Cheyette, "Custom, Case Law and Medieval 'Constitutionalism,'" 375.
35 See the edition by Salmon. Chapter 7 of the *Coutumes* is devoted to exceptions.
complement this system of precedent and exception. In De inventione, for example, Cicero takes the matricide Orestes as his model defendant. There is no getting around the fact that Orestes killed his mother.\textsuperscript{36} What we can dispute is the right of Orestes to kill his mother in retribution for her having murdered Agamemnon, his father and her husband. That Orestes be excepted from the crime of matricide because of the right and duty of retribution is thus the crux of Cicero's model defense.\textsuperscript{37} As the practice of law depended increasingly on a conception of individual legal subjectivity forged through the weighing of precedent and exception, it entered into a close relationship with Cicero's system of structuring arguments based on distinctions between particular persons and actions on the one hand and universal laws on the other.\textsuperscript{38}

In the more modern, argumentative legal system to which classical rhetoric had helped to shape, poets found a ready model for their own rhetorical activity, and for their own protests of exceptionality. Critics have long remarked, for instance, that the sexual pleas of the twelfth-century troubadours are marked by Ciceronian topical theory and strategies of exposition,\textsuperscript{39} as well as by the technical language of legal procedure.\textsuperscript{40} By the second half of the thirteenth century, an increasing number of European poets were specifically trained in the law in addition to, or instead of, clerical training.\textsuperscript{41} I have already mentioned the example of Peire Cardenal, who

\textsuperscript{36} De inventione, I:92.  
\textsuperscript{37} De inventione, I:19.  
\textsuperscript{38} See Leff, "Boethius' De differentiis topicis, Book IV," 14.  
\textsuperscript{39} Since especially the 1970s, there has been serious study of the influence of formal rhetoric on medieval literature in the vernacular. See Kelly, "Topical Invention in Medieval French Literature;" Kelly, Medieval Imagination; Spence, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics," especially 164-66; Paterson, Troubadours and Eloquence; Smith, "Rhetoric;" Gaunt, Troubadours and Irony. Cox ("Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy," 268-70) notes the pervasive literary influence of Cicero, including on the Italian novelle (270).  
\textsuperscript{40} See Kay, Subjectivity, 135-6; Bloch, Medieval French Literature and Law, 176; Léglu, "Defamation in the Troubadour Sirventes;" Ghil, "Imagery and Vocabulary," 449; Ourliac, "Troubadours et juristes."  
\textsuperscript{41} See Ourliac, Ibid., 173.
cuts the figure of the lawyer-troubadour in the thirteenth century, and of Jean Le Fèvre, who
talks his way out of a final judgment and is given more time to pay back God's loan in the
fourteenth century. As fourteenth-century authors who display an intimate familiarity with the
law, with legal training, and/or with courtroom speaking situations, we may also cite Dante,
Boccaccio, Petrarch, Chaucer, Gower, Juan Ruiz, Eustache Deschamps, and all of the major
French poets who figure in this dissertation.

The connections between poetry, law and classical rhetoric became more explicit than
ever when, in the 1260s, the first vernacular translations and commentaries of *De inventione* and
*Ad Herennium* appeared. Brunetto Latini's *Rettorica* (c.1260, from *De inventione*) and the *Fiore
di rettorica* of Latini's friend the Florentine judge Bono Giamboni (c.1260, from *Ad Herennium*)
allowed Italian readers access to these texts for the first time in the vernacular.\(^{42}\) Of particular
importance is Latini's *Rettorica*, for, in choosing to adapt Cicero's *De inventione*, the author had
made a rather unconventional choice. Cicero himself had considered *De inventione* a youthful
and highly flawed work,\(^{43}\) and the text had fallen out of fashion by Latini's time, at which point
the vast majority of other commentaries were based on the pseudo-Ciceronian *Ad Herennium*,

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\(^{42}\) The third book of Latini's *Tresor* (1260) provides French readers with a more condensed
version of Cicero's rhetoric, and Bono Giamboni's Italian translation of Latini's *Tresor* (c. 1266)
gives yet another source to Italian readers (See Murphy, *Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, 113). This
was followed in 1282 with Jean d'Antioche de Harens's French compendium of *De inventione*
and *Ad Herennium*, called the *Rettorique de Marc Tulles Ciceron* (See Murphy, Ibid., 114). In
the 1280's the already influential law faculty at Bologna also became a major center for the
production and dissemination of Italian commentaries on *De inventione* and, especially, *Ad
Herennium* (See Cox, *Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy,* 243). Aristotle's *Rhetorica*, upon which
much of Cicero's rhetoric is based, also became a part of university curriculum toward the last
part of the thirteenth century through a widely disseminated translation by William of Moerbeke
and commentaries by such theological heavyweights as Albertus Magnus, Giles of Rome and
Jean Buridan (See Ward, "The Commentator's Rhetoric," 55). For the most comprehensive
account of the medieval reception of Ciceronian rhetoric, see Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric in
Treatise, Scholion and Commentary*.

which did not deal solely with legal rhetoric. But Latini's translation and commentary ensured the influence of De inventione on vernacular rhetoric and poetry, which would bear the mark of the text's very particular emphasis on courtroom-style pleading.

In his Rettorica, one of the most important additions that Latini made to Cicero's model of legal argumentation was in expanding the primary speaking situation of Ciceronian rhetoric from its respective starting-points—the courtrooms and the council chambers of Republican Rome and, later, the medieval city-states of northern Italy. Latini transferred the adversarial nature of these rhetorical situations to a much wider variety of argumentative positions, suitable for the poet as well as the lawyer. For Latini, the cases in which one might employ legal rhetoric included the lyric poet's conventional plea that his lady love him in return, rewarding his love service with a merciful judgment:

Cosie usatamente adviene che due persone si tramettono lettere l'uno all'altro o in latino o in proxa o in volgare o in altro, nelle quali contendono d'alcuna cosa, e così fanno tencione. Altressi uno amante chiamando merzé alla sua donna dice parole e ragioni molte, et ella si difende in suo dire et inforza le sue ragioni et indebolisce quelle del pregatore. In questi et in molti altri esempi si puote assai bene intendere che lla rettorica di Tullio non è pure ad insegnare piategiare alle corti di ragione [...](76:14)

Thus it so happens regularly that two people send each other letters, either in Latin or in the vernacular, in prose or verse, or otherwise, in which they disagree about something or other, and thus they engage in disputation. In the same way a lover petitioning his lady for mercy uses many different words and lines of reasoning, and she defends herself in her own speech and bolsters her own arguments and tries to undermine those of the plaintiff. In this and in many other examples it may well be understood that Cicero's rhetoric is not meant only for the purpose of teaching pleading in legal courts.

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44 See Ward, *Ciceronian Rhetoric in Treatise, Scholion and Commentary*, 202; Cox, "Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy," 249
46 See Cox, "Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy," 255.
47 ed. Maggini. On Latini's tencione, see Cox, "Ciceronian Rhetoric in Italy," 257-9. See also Kelly (Medieval Imagination, 5, 11-12) on the way this model can be seen to apply to Guillaume de Machaut and other poets.
Latini expanded the practice of rhetoric from spoken and prose Latin to vernacular lyric composition ("o in latino o in proxa o in rima o in volgare o inn altro"), but he kept its juridical spirit intact. Referencing a legalistic trope of vernacular love poetry well-known to his readers—the troubadour's plea for mercy—Latini extrapolated not just Cicero's rhetoric, but more particularly its judicial branch, to cover a much wider variety of social situations in which the poet might find himself speaking. The bedroom, as well as the courtroom, became a space of judgment and legal defense.

Following Brunetto Latini's lead in expanding the scope of legal rhetoric to all kinds of poetry, Ciceronian rhetoric was absorbed enthusiastically into vernacular artes poeticae and works of poetry as second rhetoric. As these sources adapted Cicero's De inventione and the first book of Ad Herennium to the purposes of teaching vernacular verse composition, they likewise continued to expand the situation of juridical rhetoric to the first-person speaking position of poetry. While in Guillaume le Clerc's Besant de Dieu (c. 1226-27), the rhetorical impulse of vernacular poetry was ideally clerical and evangelical—to be opposed to the verbal transgressions of lawyers—in the course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, the poet's justification of his own rhetorical activity—and his own identity as a subject—became increasingly tied to the model provided by the legal profession.

As Latini's student Dante defined the elusive Italian vernacular in De vulgari eloquentiae (c. 1302-5), it is at once aulicum and curiale, suited to both the princely court and the law

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48 As Maggini, ed., explains, the curious "inn altro" should be read as referring to vernaculars which are not Italian, especially French and Occitan (146 n1).
For Dante, the *curial* function of poetic language can best be understood based on the need of the poet to make good judgments when he composes:

> Est etiam merito curiale dicendum, quia curialitas nil aliud quam librata regula eorum que peragenda sunt: et quia statera huiusmodi librationis tantum in excellentissimis curis esse solet, hinc est quod quicquid in actibus nostris bene libratum est, curiale dicatur. (I:17)

It is proper to call this vernacular curial, for what is the meaning of curial other than giving a balanced assessment of what is to be dealt with? And because the scales upon which the issue is weighed are generally found in the most excellent courts, whatever is well-balanced in our actions may be called curial.

Dante also provided courtroom rhetoric an important endorsement in the first book of his *Convivio* (c. 1304-7), where he elaborates an ethics of writing in the first-person voice. Dante considers that there are two circumstances which allow one to write about oneself. One of these circumstances, represented best for Dante by Augustine's *Confessions*, is when talking about oneself will provide readers or hearers spiritual assistance. The other is the mode of speaking in self-defense when one can find no one else to plead one's case, as in Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*:

> E questa necessitate mosse Boezio di se medesimo a parlare, acciò che sotto pretesto di consolazione escusasse la perpetuale infamia del suo essilio, mostrando quello essere ingiusto, poi que altro escusatore non si levava. (I:2)

And this necessity to speak about oneself is shown by Boethius, namely that under pretext of consolation he speak against the perpetual infamy of his exile, showing it to be unjust, because no other advocate would stand up to speak for him.

Even as Dante affirms Augustine's concern that rhetoric be evangelical, he supplements the saint's own confessional mode with an alternative, juridical model of speaking, of which the

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49 Nevertheless, Dante slights Latini in *De vulgari eloquentia* by claiming that his teacher's verse is not worthy of the law court, only for a city council ("non curialia sed municipalia tantum invenientur," I:XIII: 1). I cite from the edition by Botterill.

50 ed. Garfagnini.
Bishop of Hippo might not have approved. For Dante, poetic self-defense is as important a context for the arts of rhetoric as is preaching, and he uses this justification in turn to defend the importance of legal rhetoric as a model for vernacular composition.\(^{51}\)

As a poet whose judgments on society and on himself are distinguishable only with great difficulty from the divine judgments which fill the *Divina comedia*, and as a major devotional poet, Dante already mixed the poetic with the legal and the eschatological.\(^{52}\) Yet, when one considers the *Commedia*, it is striking that, as a *process*, divine judgment is rarely if ever on display there. While Dante's first-person voice and his authority as a witness may be drawn on Ciceronian models of legal subjectivity,\(^{53}\) his divine tribunal takes place well beyond human law and human language. The judgments that Dante shows us in *Inferno* are the sentences meted out by Minos, not the condemnations by Christ which make those sentences necessary. The inmates of Dante's hell do not argue or try to appeal their sentences, but rather cannot stop accusing themselves for all eternity.\(^{54}\) We as readers are not privy to the tribunal which has condemned them, or which peoples the mountain of purgatory, or which raises the just to the sphere of Jupiter, where, in the voice of Justinian's imperial eagle, they proclaim the vast inscrutability of God's justice:

\[
\text{Però ne la giustizia sempiterna} \\
\text{la vista che riceve il vostro mondo,}
\]

But of eternal justice the vision
that your world receives is like an eye

\(^{51}\)In *Dante and the Making of a Modern Author*, Albert Russell Ascoli has explored Dante's models of legal subjectivity and authority at some length, including Dante's use of the concept of authority proper to a credible judicial witness, as found in Cicero's *Topica* (19.73-20.78, cited by Ascoli, 75). Ascoli (103) also compares Cicero's conception of the *auctoritas* of a witness to Dante's conception of *nobilità* (103), discussing Dante's juridical authority in greatest detail in his chapter, "Dividing Authority in Dante's *Monarchia*" (229-273), which includes (263-72) the identification of Dante with the Biblical Daniel.

\(^{52}\)Perhaps the best attempt to make this distinction has been undertaken by Teodolinda Barolini in her *The Undivine Comedy: Detheologizing Dante*.

\(^{53}\)See, again, Ascoli, *Dante and the Making of a Modern Author*, 75, 103.

\(^{54}\)See Senior, *In the Grip of Minos*, 49.
staring into the sea; though near shore it may glimpse the bottom, it penetrates not into the fathoms; and yet the sea floor is there, hidden by the deep.

And while Dante's narrator is able to peer into the folds of the celestial rose in *Paradiso* XXX and see the heavenly court just as it shall be assembled "a l'ultima giustizia" (XXX, v. 45), he is not witness to its judicial operations. At the end of *Purgatorio*, when Beatrice comes to the narrator from the same court and judges him harshly, provoking his tearful shame and repentance, we have one of the most striking instances in which Latini's conjunction of the courtly with the juridical also abuts the eschatological. But it is a judgment in which the voice of the poet—of the rhetorician—is struck dumb and can only sob in self-accusation. This was Beatrice's merciful intention: to prevent her charge's condemnation at the Judgment by causing him to plead guilty now (*Purgatorio* XXXI, vv. 37–42). Neither Dante's theory of poetry nor his practice of it tend to suggest that the poet might also be able to perform self-defense, in the Boethian mode, when he appears before God.

In other sources of the period, however, the writing of poetry is conceived more explicitly as a rhetorical position which not only resembles that of the courtroom speaker, but also the defendant speaking before the court of heaven. In medieval poetic theory, the link between the vernacular poet's plea and divine judgment is made nowhere more dramatically than in an Occitan rhetorical handbook from Toulouse, the *Leys d'amors*, which appeared in its definitive version in 1356.57 In the *Leys*, to which I now turn at length, the scene of divine judgment is the ultimate referent for the activity of poetic composition. As a didactic work about the composition

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55 This verse is a reference to Job 38:16.
56 *The Divine Comedy*, ed. Singleton.
57 ed. Anglade. The *Leys* should be seen as the finished product of an ongoing process of composition which began probably at least in the 1330's (See Anglade, ed., IV:122-23).
of poetry, the *Leys* can help us understand how the rhetorical position of self-defense imagined by theorists like Latini and Dante was also transferred to the heavenly court. Although French poets may not have known the text, I also show that the *Leys*’ particular blending of poetry, rhetoric, law and eschatological themes is anticipated in earlier northern-French poetry. Specifically, the *Leys* share a number of characteristics with French devotional poetry composed to elicit the intervention of the saints. In that the *Leys* consider the poet’s prayers in vernacular verse as part of a larger system of heavenly intercession, they provide one example of a theoretical text about poetry from the middle of the fourteenth century which instructs poets not only to draw upon the model of legal argumentation, but also to locate their production of verse in the rhetorical situation of the Judgment itself. In addition, as a text which adapts earlier models of courtly poetry to specifically devotional ends, the *Leys* provide a good example of divine judgment being used to cast vernacular poetry and rhetoric in a positive ethical light.

**IV. The *Leys d’amors***

Officially authored by the lawyer Guilhem Molinier but almost certainly the product of a number of different collaborators, the *Leys d’amors* (*Laws of Love*, 1356) act as a kind of handbook for the Consistori of Toulouse, which since May of 1324 had held its annual *Jocs Florals* (*Floral Games*) to promote and judge devotional verse in Occitan. An earlier prose version of the text, called the *Flors de gay saber* (c. 1341), is concerned mostly with adapting

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58 There is no equivalent French treatise on poetry until Eustache Deschamps's *Art de Dictier* (1392), and it makes versification a part of music, not rhetoric. That the *Leys* were not known in the Langue d’Oïl is Anglade’s contention, (ed., IV:117-118). I will not attempt to prove him wrong here, but it is certain that the full scope of south-north influence has yet to be appreciated by scholars.

59 See Anglade, ed., IV:31

models of classical rhetoric to vernacular poetry, and with the nuts and bolts of poetic composition in Occitan, such as grammar, genre and rhyme. The Leys of 1356 are divided into three books, are also in prose and, like the Flors, contain a substantial amount of devotional lyric poetry to serve as examples. The second and third book of the Leys are concerned primarily with issues of versification and propose exemplary poems on religious themes. The first of the three books, however, is quite different; it serves as an introduction to the work as a whole, provides historical information about the Consistori and its founders, and deals at length with issues of philosophy and theology alongside its treatment of poetry as second rhetoric.

Founded by the Sobregaya companhia dels VII trobadors de Tolosa—most of whom were either lawyers or merchants and none of whom were professional poets—the Consistori saw itself as the direct inheritance of the Occitan troubadours' art. As the Consistori’s book of instruction, the Leys draw upon such sources as the troubadour N'Ath de Mons, as well as earlier treatises like Raimon Vidal's Catalan Razos de Trobar (c. 1190-1213)\(^\text{61}\) and Uc Faidit's Donatz proensals (mid-thirteenth century).

The Leys are conceived largely as a formalization of troubadour lyric genres like the canso and the sirventes, whose criteria are defined in the text as they are to be judged by the members of the Consistori at the annual poetic games, the Jocs Florals. They are also a formalization—one of the most explicit that has come down to us—of the later medieval impulse to adapt erotic courtly poetry to devotional ends. At the very same time, the Leys provide one of the most distinct expressions of the later medieval impulse to adopt the legal profession and its specialized rhetoric as models for devotional poetry in the vernacular. By 1356 the Consistori was effectively annexed to the University of Toulouse, and closely controlled by the city's

\(^{61}\) The dating is Spence's, "Rhetoric and Hermeneutics," 167. See also Nathaniel B. Smith, "Rhetoric," 404.
community of jurists, including the university's prominent law faculty.\textsuperscript{62} The text thus retains a strong academic and legal flavor.\textsuperscript{63} For example, the opening of the \textit{Leys} tells us that Arnaut Vidal was awarded the first prize in the organization's history for a Marian poem on the third of May, 1324, and was that same year granted the degree of "doctor in gay science," a title which would have given him the special privilege of \textit{determinar}, acting as a judge of poetry in the annual games, the \textit{Jocs Florals} (I:14). Guilhem Molinier is noted as being "savi en dreg," (I:14, "wise in matters legal"), other members of the Consistori are characterized by possessing skills in both canon and civil law, and four out of the organization's seven founders had pursued legal studies.\textsuperscript{64} The \textit{Leys}, whose title denotes an integral legal code for love poetry, are larded with borrowings from Roman law sources and with conventional discussions of what constitutes prudent and equitable judgment.\textsuperscript{65}

Not only do the \textit{Leys} propose a model of rhetoric which, following the neo-Ciceronian tradition, is closely allied with legal culture, but \textit{jutjamen} becomes a part of the creative process itself. The \textit{Leys} adopt the conventional division of rhetoric into the forensic, deliberative and epideictic branches as found in Aristotle and Cicero. However, the Occitan text amplifies to an even greater extent the emphasis which Brunetto Latini, following the \textit{De inventione}, placed upon judicial rhetoric as a model for poetry, spending almost all of its time on \textit{jutjamen}, the judicial branch. In addition to the system of three branches, the \textit{Leys} introduce what appears to be a new division of the elements of rhetoric, in which most of the terms refer to basic concepts of jurisprudence: \textit{locutio, vertatz, drechura, bos e verays jutjamens, and perseveransa de ben}

\textsuperscript{63} For a discussion of how the \textit{Leys} coincide with the impulse to codify the legal profession, see LaFont, "Mutation."
\textsuperscript{64} See Léglu, "Languages in Conflict," 384
\textsuperscript{65} The \textit{Leys} reference Justinian's Code (I:95, I:136) and Gratien's \textit{Decretals} (I:126).
jutjar (I:122, locution, truth, rectitude, good and true judgment, and perseverance in judging correctly). These five parts of rhetoric share only one term (locutio) with the traditional five elements of rhetoric (inventio, dispositio, memoria, pronuntiatio and elocutio) as expounded by Aristotle and Cicero, and they appear to have no known source outside of the Leys.\(^{66}\) In addition, in its discussion of bos e verays jutjamen (good and true judgment), the Leys further divide the process of judgment (jutjar) into a group of principles—assaher, sciensa, jurisdictios, razos, deliberacios, drechura, and finally temors de dieu—which are to be followed in the composition of good poetry (I:135).\(^{67}\)

As might be expected from a document so thoroughly steeped in the legal culture of its day, the Leys borrow heavily from Cicero, through the intermediary of Brunetto Latini (from Latini's Tresor and perhaps also from his Rettorica), and through Latini's contemporary, the thirteenth-century Lombard jurist Albertano da Brescia (c.1195-c.1251).\(^{68}\) Albertano da Brescia is most important in this context for having placed legal rhetoric on nearly the same footing as Christian preaching. In his Liber de doctrina dicendi et tacendi (1245), a book of rhetorical instruction addressed to his son, Albertano cites Augustine's moral approval of advocacy to justify his own teaching of rhetoric for secular juridical purposes (i.e., for money):

Pro Dei servitio, ut faciunt fratres Predicatores et Minores. Pro humano commodo, ut causidici et alii oratores faciunt. Nam secundum beatum Augustinum licet advocato vendere iustam advocationem et iurisperito vendere iustum consilium. (IV:8)\(^{69}\)

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\(^{66}\) In developing this rhetorical system, however, the Leys borrow examples heavily from Albertano da Brescia (see Anglade, ed., IV:59-60)

\(^{67}\) See Paterson (Troubadours and Eloquence, 12-13) on razo and razonador as legal terms.

\(^{68}\) Latini's Tresor is identified as a source by Anglade, ed., IV:53; on Albertano, see Anglade, ed., IV:56-8. Anglade (ed., IV:64) notes that Cicero is the second-most cited author, if through the intermediary of Albertano and perhaps Latini, after Seneca. Murphy (Rhetoric in the Middle Ages, 115) cites Latini, Albertano, Alexandre de Villedieu, Priscian and Donatus.

The proper aims of speaking well are] to serve God, as do Dominicans and Franciscans. And for human gain, as advocates and other orators do. For according to blessed Augustine it is permitted to the lawyer to sell just advocacy and to the jurist to sell just counsel.

Importantly, Albertano refers to Augustine's letters here, not De doctrina, where Augustine makes it clear that the civil law is an inappropriate use of rhetoric for Christians.\(^7^0\) Like Augustine in De doctrina, Albertano does treat the issue of rhetoric with great moral caution, citing Biblical sources on speech ethics like Sirac and Solomon much more than he cites Cicero; when he does cite Cicero, it is from the moral works (particularly De officiis and De amicitia) rather than from De inventione or the pseudo-Ciceronian Ad Herennium. Yet Albertano's treatment begins to suggest the same rehabilitation of legal oratory that will be adopted for the composition of vernacular poetry by Latini, by Dante, and finally in the Leys d'amors themselves.

The Occitan text draws deeply on Albertano da Brescia's conception of rhetoric's dual purpose, for divine service and self-defense:

Las cauzas especials entre las autras que devon e podon moure et endure a bon parlar son aquestas: lauzors divinals, profieytz humanals, o tot essems; defensa de si meteysh, de son amic e de son pruesme, o tot essems; (I:94)\(^7^1\)

The particular things among others that can and should move us to speak well and keep us speaking well are these: divine praise, human profit, or both together; defense of oneself, of one's friend or neighbor, or both together.

Echoing Albertano, the Leys accord much the same importance to those who use rhetoric for divine praise and preaching—monks and priests—and those who use it primarily for advocacy—lawyers: "e leyal avocat e li altre bon clerç [...]" (I:95). Indeed, there are many passages in the first book of the Leys where one may tend to forget that the text is addressed to poets who wish

\(^7^0\) De doctrina, IV:100-101.
\(^7^1\) See also I:82-3. Like Albertano, the Leys (I:95) cite Augustine as a source permitting advocates to sell their services.
to compete in the annual games, and for members of the Consistori who will judge the games, rather than to beginning law and theology students.

The *Leys*, and especially its first book, represent a peculiar discursive mix of poetry with legal and spiritual instruction. Yet it would be a mistake to think of the text as just a loosely connected patchwork of discourses with only sporadic applicability to the art of vernacular composition. Instead, we should read the *Leys* as they were intended, as a code of rules for poetry. We should regard the various concerns with rhetoric, law, theology and versification represented in the first book of the text not as separate disciplines, but rather in terms of the ways they combine with and inform each other so as to construct a composite course of study for poets, what the *Leys* themselves call the *gay saber* or *gaya sciensa*.72

Within this network of discourses, eschatological doctrine occupies a prominent place. At the very end of the *Leys*’ first book, the treatise turns at considerable length to eschatology, including an exposition of the Last Judgment, before returning briefly back to good judgment as it should be used in the practice of rhetoric. The Last Judgment section does not interest me here so much in its treatment of divine judgment—it is a fairly conventional exposition taken from the Thomist or pseudo-Thomist *Compendium theologiae*.73 Rather, the way this scene of judgment is woven discursively into the rest of the text, suddenly appearing as if out of nowhere, serves to

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72 Peter Goodrich ("Gay Science and Law") has argued for this kind of reading of the *Leys*, showing that it represents a point of epistemological convergence for law, rhetoric, poetry and *eros*. In my opinion, Goodrich does make what is an oversimplification by referring to both the 3- and 5- book versions as "the key text" in understanding the "transition from lyric to law" ("Gay Science and Law," 99, emphasis mine). Not only must we deal with the *Flors* and the *Leys* as quite separate texts, but the movement between poetry and jurisprudence is not so one way, as Goodrich sees it. In fact, it seems that by 1356 the poet had made the lawyer-figure his own as much as the law had swallowed up the courts of love.

remind readers of the ethical imperative placed upon the exercise of poetry, the way in which verse composition is always already subject to judgment from on high.\textsuperscript{74}

The Last Judgment section of the \textit{Leys} is positioned in the following way: first, the text discusses how it is necessary to seek good advice (\textit{cosselh}) before judgment, from whom such counsel should be sought, and whether the \textit{cosselh} of women should ever be taken into account.\textsuperscript{75} After discussing \textit{cosselh}, the \textit{Leys} make a relatively short discussion of "las cauzas autras necessarias en jutjamen" (I:190-1), before launching onto the subject of how fear of God (\textit{temors de dieu}, I:192)\textsuperscript{76} is crucial in judgment and how we must keep the judgment before our eyes at all times when making judgments on earth. It is at this point that the text moves to its exposition on the Judgment, "Del Jutjamen de Dieu aprop la general rezurrectio" (I:197-202). The section discusses the Resurrection, the coming of Christ the judge, the manner of judgment, and the sentences of the saved and damned, as derived from Matthew 25. After this, the first book of the \textit{Leys} abruptly ends with a discussion of the fifth point upon which rhetoric is founded, "perseveransa en be jutjar" (I:202, "perseverance in good judgment"), and without so much as a rubric to mark the transition back from divine judgment to rhetoric.\textsuperscript{77} From this point on, the beginning of the second book of the \textit{Leys} is devoted to the \textit{jutjamen de joya}, that is, how the Consistori's panel of judges will be composed, and how they will judge, affirming that they

\textsuperscript{74} It is also true that superior eloquence in court was sometimes considered strong proof of God's favorable judgment during the period. As Esther Cohen writes, "Just as human prowess was evidence of the truth in the duel, human verbal dexterity was an audible proof of the same. The abolition of ordeals in no way excluded supernatural justice from human courts, for even an honest mistake could carry the same meanings and consequences as the loss of a trial by battle" (\textit{The Crossroads of Justice}, 67).

\textsuperscript{75} Much of this section of the first book is derived from Albertano da Brescia's \textit{Liber consolationis} and also draws upon Augustine's \textit{De doctrina}.

\textsuperscript{76} In Augustine's \textit{De doctrina} (II:7), fear of God is the first and most important of the seven steps to wisdom. The others are piety, knowledge, fortitude, counsel, purification and wisdom itself.

\textsuperscript{77} The text is amply rubricated elsewhere.
will not take the poet's social station into account, but "solamen maniera de trobar" (II:16, "only the manner of composing"), based on poetic considerations like *sentensa, compas de sillabas, replicacio* and *sonansa* (II:22) which are then defined in the rest of the *Leys*.

Of the way the Last Judgment fits into the overall schema of the *Leys*, the text's modern editor, Joseph Anglade, made only the following remark:

Le développement du thème des conseils et des jugements amène Guilhem Molinier à la partie finale de ce premier livre: c'est la description du jugement dernier, qui termine ainsi, d'une façon fort inattendue, la première des trois parties d'un ouvrage destiné à donner des préceptes de rhétorique et de métrique plutôt que de morale ou de religion. Guilhem Molinier en est arrivé là par des artifices de rhétorique qui lui ont permis de traiter ensemble plusieurs sujets qui, sans être absolument étrangers les uns aux autres, étaient quelque peu différents. Mais on ne juge pas les œuvres du Moyen âge à la mesure de la rhétorique moderne.

(IV:70)

Anglade may have been correct that the conception of rhetoric on display in the *Leys* is foreign to modern readers, but instead of simply reducing the movement between legal, poetic, and eschatological judgment to a rhetorical slight of hand as he did, it is far more useful to see what this discursive slippage can tell us about the practice of poetic rhetoric, and the ways in which it situated itself ideologically under the authority of divine judgment.

In the *Leys*, divine judgment is the model against which poetic judgment must be measured, and it is the authority to which poetic authority must ultimately answer. It is precisely the discussion of the final necessary quality that one must have in making poetic judgments—fear of God (*temors de dieu*)—which occasions the exposition of the Last Judgment at the end of the first book of the *Leys*. In making each judgment, the poet must always keep the last day before his eyes in the same way that a jurist must keep God's judgment fearfully in mind so as to avoid running counter to the law:

Le Propheta ditz que temors de Dieu es comensamens de savieza; et aquela deu hom haver continuamen en son cor e denan sos huelhs, quar tan grans es
The prophet says that fear of God is the beginning of wisdom; and man must have it always in his heart and before his eyes, for so great is the complexity and the confusion of the written body of laws and decretals that hardly has he enough memory to carry out judgment otherwise.

The poet's privileged connection to the law also authorizes him to make judgments according to the superior ethical training he has received. As such, the commandment not to judge lest one be judged, from Matthew 7:1, is reinterpreted as the commandment to judge carefully, according to the principles set out by the Consistori in its handbook:

Donx las paraulas de Dieu, Nostre Senhor, sos assaber: 'Non vulhatz jutjar,' deu hom entendre per esta maniera: 'Non vulhatz jutjar de cauzas rescostas ni doptozas; no vulhatz jutjar ses juridictio; no vulhatz jutjar ses razo o contra razo; no vulhatz jutjar ses deliberacio de bon conselh; no vulhatz jutjar contra drechura; no vulhatz jutjar ses temor de Dieu; no vulhatz jutjar per voluntat, mas per necessitat, utilitat o per vertat; e si enayssi jutjatz, per vostre jutjamen no seretz jutjat ni condampnat [...]’ (I:193).

Thus the words of our lord God, 'Judge not,' we should understand in this way: 'Judge not concerning things hidden or uncertain; judge not without proper authority; judge not without reason or against reason; judge not without due deliberation based on good counsel; judge not immediately nor in haste or anger; judge not against what is right; judge not without fear of God; judge not because you want to, but because it is necessary or useful, or for the sake of truth; and if you judge in this way, you will not be judged or condemned for it.'

It may be inferred that the moral precepts of judgment laid down in the first book of the Leys are related directly to the rules of verse which will be dealt with in the Leys’ second and third books. By analogy with the jurist, the poet grants himself the special right and duty to judge, a role which is placed directly under the scrutiny of the Judgment itself.

Above all, in order to understand the position of the Last Judgment in the Leys, it is crucial to consider that the text presents devotional verse in the vernacular as being closely related to the liturgy itself, and of a similar importance:
Compas de rims la Gleiza no refuza,
Quar nos ad huelh vezem que d'aquels uza,
Hymnis cantan, antifenas, versetz,
Prozas, respos, prozels e respossetz.
(I:34)78

The church does not refuse rhymed compositions,
For we can see that it uses them too,
singing hymns, antiphonies, psalm passages,
liturgical prose readings and responses.

Praising God and the Virgin eloquently in the vernacular as well as in Latin, the Leys affirm,
does not just constitute an act of rhetoric, it is also an act with positive moral weight: "Saber
dictar es donx obra mot bona." (I:34, "Knowing how to speak well is thus a very good work").
At the Judgment, words too will count as actions and be weighed in the same way. Poets' use of
language to praise God and Mary may thus count in their favor.

From this perspective, the position of the Last Judgment within the Leys is not only a
rhetorical gesture, but one which expresses ethical concerns about vernacular poetry. The power
of judgment on earth is given to the poet, who becomes thereby a participant in an ongoing
process of divine judgment. Every time he composes verse, the would-be troubadour makes
judgments which must be carefully considered both ethically and aesthetically. In turn, the
troubadour is judged both ethically and aesthetically by the Consistori at the annual games,
according to its Leys.

At the same time, the judgments of the Consistori about what constitutes good poetry
stand in for the judgments of God, inasmuch as devotional poetry serves a persuasive,
intercessory effect which the Consistori measures in God's place. Pleading with heaven, the poet
is engaged in an effective act of self-defense, on his own behalf or on behalf of others, just like
Albertano da Brescia's advocate: "defensa de si meteysh, de son amic e de son pruesme, o tot

78 See Anglade, ed., IV:41.
essem's" (I:94). In the Leys, the conjunction of poetry, law and religion resides in none of these domains alone, but at their interstices, in a space which submits vernacular composition to eschatological judgment.

In order to understand how the Leys place legal rhetorical instruction within the rhetorical and ethical frame of divine judgment, it is necessary to consider in more detail the text's particular concern with composing poetry in praise of the Virgin Mary. Not only do the Leys d'amors use Marian devotional poetry as a model for verse composition, but while the Flors del Gay Saber had cast Lady Rhetoric as the purveyor of poetic gifts, the Leys replace Rhetorica with the Virgin and Mayre Gleyza (Mother Church). This symbolic substitution does not serve to diminish the importance of rhetoric, but rather to strengthen it, for the traditional image of Mary as advocate for mankind (advocata nostra) has a palpable presence in the Leys:

Mayres de Dieu glorioza, Glorious Mother of God,
Verges humils gracioza, humble virgin full of grace,
Digna de totas lauzors, worthy of all praise,
Regina bonazurada, most blessed queen,
Vas lo tieu filh avocada with your son be an advocate
Siatz per nos peccadors. for us miserable sinners.
(I:104)

As heavenly advocate, Mary provides one of the most vital conceptual links in the text between divine judgment and the study of judicial rhetoric. Since the Leys speak to poets and jurists as a single audience, Marian advocacy is a ready model for the rhetorical work of both groups. Through Marian devotion, Albertano da Brescia's dual definition of rhetoric in the service of divine praise and preaching (in the Leys, "lauzors divinals, profieytz humanals, o tot essem's") and in persuasive defense of oneself or another ("defensa de si meteysh, de son amic e de son
pruesme, o tot essems") is refashioned into a single poetics.\textsuperscript{79} That is, the \emph{Leys} designates the poetry it teaches as the form of defensive rhetoric which will be most effective in obtaining heaven's mercy, and which is to be studied according to specific rules of versification. The \emph{Leys'} conflation of the poet and the lawyer is not founded solely on the basis of their common rhetorical training, but also on the perceived advocacy undertaken by the poet as he prays in verse for intercession on behalf of himself and others.

As the \emph{Leys} have it, again, "Saber dictar es donx obra mot bona" (I:34, "Knowing how to speak well is thus a very good work"). The fact that a devotional poem is not mere words but a potential good work in and of itself ("obra mot bona") renders the aesthetic or rhetorical value of poetry difficult to distinguish from its moral or eschatological value. Poetry, like the prayers of the saints, is elevated as a highly-coded instrument of salvation. The Consistori's own judgment of lyric poetry based on specific rules of verse and specific devotional themes is thus—implicitly but inescapably—an opinion about what constitutes the most effective means of pleading for the \textit{advocata}'s assistance. To fully understand how the \emph{Leys} combine poetry, rhetoric, law and eschatological doctrine, then, it is necessary to consider the broader tradition of Marian devotional poetry, in which the Virgin can be understood as a model for both the lawyer and the poet.

\textbf{V. \textit{Advocata nostra}: Marian Rhetoric and the Later Medieval Poet}

The Virgin Mary's role as \textit{mediatrix} between God and man is one of the great themes embraced by poets as they refashioned courtly poetry into devotional verse in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Among the most powerful variations on this theme in both

\textsuperscript{79} \emph{Leys}, I:94-5, from Albertano da Brescia, \textit{Liber de doctrina dicendi et tacendi}, IV:8. See above in this chapter, 90.
liturgical and vernacular sources is the distinctly judicial designation of Mary as *advocata nostra*. In medieval art and literature, the Virgin is frequently shown pleading verbally before God on behalf of mankind and on behalf of individual humans, through a wealth of details borrowed from terrestrial legal procedure and courtroom rhetoric.\(^80\) Lending a voice to human beings in the heavenly court, Marian advocacy offers a positive answer to the most vexing questions of the *Dies irae* hymn:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin Phrase</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?</td>
<td>What am I, the wretch, to answer,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quem patronum rogaturus,</td>
<td>What advocate shall I seek,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cum vix iustus sit securus?</td>
<td>When even the just man is hardly safe?(^81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a *patrona* (patron or advocate), the Virgin promises legal intercession to those who devote themselves to her in prayer. As Peter Brown has demonstrated, belief in heavenly patronage can be traced to the complex hierarchical structure of late Roman society, in which it was necessary to engage the favor of patrons who would speak on behalf of their protégés in the corridors of power.\(^82\) Indeed, as Brown has it, this particular social reality helped early Christians to imagine intercession, which, until that point, had remained beyond the grasp of artistic representation; familiar images of Roman patronage "ungagged the doctrine of the intercession of the saints and allowed it to speak out clearly"\(^83\) just as Mary herself leant a miraculous voice to wretched sinners.

In the European Middle Ages, the patronage system persisted, in similar forms, through relationships of fealty; but it also took a rather different shape with the growth of the professional

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\(^80\) See Ellington, *From Sacred Body to Angelic Soul*, 120-122; Gros, *Ave Vierge Marie*, 153-7. Mary was not entirely unique in this, as other saints were also consistently referred to as *advocati* capable of effectively translating and transmitting prayers to God and persuading him to mercy. See Duval, "Les saints protecteurs ici-bas et dans l'au-delà;" Bériou, "L'intercession dans les sermons de la Toussaint."

\(^81\) vv. 19-21.

\(^82\) *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity.*

\(^83\) Ibid., 62.
legal class. In the later Middle Ages, the cult of Mary included what might be described as *advocata nostra'*s informal patronage over lawyers. Medieval devotional sources staged the Virgin's argumentation in the heavenly court with abundant references to contemporary civil legal procedure and its oratorical strategies. In at least one case, the Virgin's argumentation was actually used as a model of rhetorical instruction for beginning law students. As vernacular poets, too, began to show evidence of formal legal and rhetorical training, and as they turned increasingly to devotional subject matter, it is not surprising that these poets linked their own use of artful speech with the Virgin's. Claiming allegiance to the *patrona*, which in medieval Latin can also mean a model to be emulated, poets saw Mary as both a protector and an exemplary image of their own verbal dexterity. This self-identification of the poet with the lawyerly Virgin has generally been overlooked by scholarly accounts of the Marian turn in courtly poetry. As heavenly advocate, Mary may be read as a figure for the poetic vocation and for its exceptional relationship to language. Mary allows language—rhetorically sophisticated legal language—into the scene of divine judgment, making it possible for human beings to counter the charges brought against them. It is in the same sense of lending a voice that Marian devotion should be regarded as a crucial thematic thread within the larger history of later medieval poetic subjectivity; the lawyerly Mary provided poets with a means of conceiving of their own verbal participation by allowing them to fashion themselves as legal subjects able to respond to accusations before God.

This is not to suggest that Marian advocacy was exempt from the doctrinal problem of persuasive speech at the Judgment. While the Church encouraged devotion to Mary and the

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84 See Guyon, "La justice pénal dans le théâtre religieux du XIVe siècle."
85 See Scott L. Taylor, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption" and later in this chapter, 117.
86 As I discuss in chapters 3 and 4, princely literary patrons also became involved in the scene of divine judgment.
saints on all levels of society, theologians stressed that the ability of these *advocati* to intercede on behalf of human beings did not constitute an undue verbal influence on God's judgment.

Some Christian thinkers made this point primarily by limiting saintly intercession to the period during an individual's life on earth: after the separation of body and soul, even the Mother of God would be unable to persuade her son to change his mind.\(^87\) Other theologians, particularly in the later Middle Ages, were less intent on removing the possibility of intercession from the Judgment and more insistent upon the idea that saintly intercession is never actually a moving of God's will, but rather always a result of it.

For Aquinas and Bonaventure, among others, the intervention of the saints is possible as an instrument provided by God to save his elect; it does not introduce a contrary opinion into the heavenly court or influence God's judgment, but is instead another effect of the Aristotelian first cause, the original divine will.\(^88\) Considering that the saints are in perfect accord with God's plan, Aquinas affirms that their pleas are effective not in moving the Almighty to a new judgment, but rather in carrying out God's original design, confirming the immutable judgment of the *nunc stans*:

> Ad secundum dicendum quod sancti impetrant illud quod Deus vult fieri per orationes eorum. Et hoc petunt quod aestimant eorum orationibus implendum secundum Dei voluntatem. (*ST* IIa IIae, Q. 83, art. 11)

To this second proposition it is to be said that the saints succeed in obtaining that which God wants to accomplish by means of their prayers. And they petition for that which they deem will be granted through their prayers according to God's will.

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87 See, for example, Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, XXI:18. On this thorny issue in the earlier Middle Ages, see McLaughlin, *Consorting with Saints*, 209-10. Bauckham (*The Fate of the Dead*, 142-8) also provides a good historical account of the question of intercession at the Last Judgment. See also Delumeau, *Le péché et la peur*, 453.

88 For a more detailed discussion of this intellectual current, see Barbara Faes de Mottoni, "Quelques aspects de la doctrine de l'intercession," especially 121-2. As Faes de Mottoni explains (121), this attitude can be traced in part to Augustine's *De praedestinatione sanctorum*. 
Put another way, if God is persuaded by the rhetoric of the saints, it is because he wills from all time to be persuaded. Conceived like this, the petitions of the saints can possess real instrumentality without ever changing the course of individual or collective salvation.

While for Aquinas, this solution does not necessarily entail that saintly intercession will also be an effective instrument of salvation at the time of Judgment, other sources suggest that it will. For instance, the fourteenth-century mystery play I quoted earlier in the chapter, *Le Jour du Jugement*, places a strong emphasis on the power which Marian advocacy exerts even at the Last Judgment. The play confronts the problem of persuasion by having the lawyer-Virgin make the following disclaimer in the midst of her arguments, not without its own rhetorical power:

Biau doux Filz, rien ne vous demande
Qui soit contre vo voulentez:
Je vous pri cil soient rentez
En paradis qui m'ont amee.

(vv. 1834-37)

Following the orthodox conception of the Judgment as a revelation rather than a process of weighing evidence, the Mystère's approach to Marian representation suggests how the Virgin's rhetoric can act as a figure through which God's will is revealed to humanity, making known who is elect and who is damned. The caveat that the saints' pleas are not strictly persuasive has the effect not of discouraging the depiction of Mary and other saints as advocati engaged in rhetorical disputation, but rather of confirming the existence of such heavenly rhetoric as both an instrument of salvation and a sign of election.\(^89\)

89 From this perspective, would God not also be free to consent that the most egregious sinner in the world act as an advocate at the Judgment? Such is the opinion of Boccaccio's Panfilo, who begins the first day of the *Decameron* by telling of the wicked Ser'Ciappelletto, known especially for his delight in providing false testimony in court. After giving a bogus confession on his deathbed, Ciappelletto becomes a popular saint to whom the people of Burgundy pray for assistance. Panfilo chalks this up not to the triumph of dishonest men in the world, but rather to
For later medieval poets, rhetoric likewise became both a divinely willed instrument and a sign of their own special status as Christian subjects. An orator in the court of heaven, Mary constituted a model for the poet's rhetorical work, and one in sharp juxtaposition to the view that rhetoric has no place in divine judgment. Marian devotional poetry far surpasses what can be called a single tradition, and it lies well beyond my scope to deal with it in anything like a comprehensive manner. However, two distinct strands of the *advocata nostra* motif are particularly relevant in understanding how Marian poetry influenced fourteenth-century literary scenes of divine judgment, such as the Last Judgment which the *Leys d'amors* use to frame the act of poetry. First, and summarily, I discuss the tradition of urban poetic organizations—the northern French confraternities and their *puys*—for what this tradition can reveal about the Marian connection between law and poetry. Second, and calling for a longer analysis, is the so-called Devil's Rights genre of literature, which depicts Mary's advocacy in opposition to Satan's judicial challenge to God that humanity become his rightful possession for all eternity.

**VI. The Puy Tradition**

The *Leys d'amors* were far from the first model of vernacular composition to designate the Virgin as an exemplary figure of legal and poetic rhetoric. As an urban poetic organization, the Toulousain Consistori which produced the *Leys* bears the influence of the versatile northern French merchant city of Arras. As Carol Symes has documented in brilliant detail, beginning in

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90 Carol Symes has discussed the far-reaching influence of the *puy* of Arras, including in the court of Castille, where Alfonso X includes the story of the Virgin's blessing of the *jongleurs* in his own *Cantigas de Santa Maria* (*CSM* 259, cited by Symes in *A Common Stage*, 218 n105). Catherine Léglu has argued more specifically for the direct influence of the *puy* of Arras on the Occitan Consistori in her article, "Languages in Conflict in Toulouse," especially 383-4.
the twelfth century, the Artois confraternal order of the Carité de Notre Dame des Ardents began to put on its annual municipal *puy*, an event of public feasting and Marian devotional verse and theatre, including poetry contests judged by the members of the Carité.\footnote{A Common Stage: Theater and Public Life in Medieval Arras.} The Carité was founded and governed by a group of the city's *jongleurs*, who were both minstrels and civic and household functionaries. By the time of the *puy*’s establishment in the twelfth century, the economic and civic structure of Arras had given rise to favorable conditions for a sophisticated rhetorical culture, in which verbal disputation and formal dialog were highly valued as means of social interaction.\footnote{See Ibid., 27.} In this cultural context, the *jongleurs* of the Carité played an important role. As they had received legal training and were skilled in the drawing up of court documents, the *jongleurs* frequently acted as mediators between various parties and gained substantial social prestige in so doing.\footnote{See Ibid., 42-3.} These poets claimed to receive their unusual civic prestige and their authority over the *puy* not only from their rhetorical, artistic and legal expertise, but above all from a miraculous apparition of the Virgin to them, an event officially confirmed in an episcopal charter of 1241.\footnote{See Ibid., 92.}

Before the *Leys d'amors*, the Artois *puy* had designated Mary as a *patrona* for the poet's work as an intercessor. Not only did the *jongleurs* of Arras demonstrate poetic virtuosity by reciting verse compositions, but their understanding of law was closely tied to "a self-conscious sense of theatricality," in which they performed both legal oratory and poetry.\footnote{See Ibid., 176-77 (quote taken from 176). Symes argues that the conjunction of legal, dramatic and poetic rhetoric in the Artois had much to do with the fact that Picard was both "in precocious use" there "as a literary language," as "a language for the performance of plays," and as "a language of public record from the earliest years of the thirteenth century" (175). On the close
professional talents which these urban notary-poets claimed for themselves as verbal factota—a mastery of legal terminology, formal rhetoric and vernacular verse—could also be extended to successful communication with the heavenly court. As Symes puts it, the confraternity was precisely a way for the jongleurs to "advertise their ability to act as intermediaries among different groups of people," while, through a certain Pauline logic, their alternate identities as motley fools also made them "piously receptive to the call of the divine."96

The Artois poet's dual role of civic intercessor and privileged divine communicant, is not, I believe, without a substantial degree of overlap. Since so much of the devotional poetry and religious theatre which the Carité produced was concerned with Mary's specific role as a legal mediator for mankind, it is not hard to discern in the professional ambitions of the jongleurs an image of the poet himself as a particularly effective mediator, not only between various Artois citizens, but also toward heaven. Indeed, as Gérard Gros has documented, the puy of Arras and others which it inspired in northern France could claim political clout precisely because of their well-known ability to pray effectively in verse.97 Princes turned to poets involved with urban confraternal organizations as a means of obtaining an audience in heaven; in that, the puys functioned not unlike secular versions of monastic houses, intercessors with the intercessors, whose lyric prayers would move Mary and the host of saints to pity, and thus Christ to mercy. We may understand this poetic phenomenon in the same terms of divine instrumentality which Aquinas and Bonaventure assigned to saintly rhetoric: just as the saints could be particularly

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96 Symes, A Common Stage, 85.
97 See Gros, Le poète, la Vierge et le prince du puy, 16, 32. See also Gros's similarly titled work Le poète, la Vierge et le prince.
skilled at pleading in the heavenly court, so too could the poet consider himself as one of those elite able to speak effectively in that forum.

The Artois Carité and its puy had a significant influence on the broader landscape of European vernacular poetry, inspiring similar organizations and annual festivals in other northern-French cities like Paris and Rouen, but also further afield, in England, Castille, and, as I have noted with the example of the Toulousain Leys d'amors, Occitania. Although essentially popular trade guilds, these confraternal organizations were arguably some of the most important rhetorical institutions of their time. By establishing standards for fixed-form composition in the vernacular which were then applied to particular lyric pieces during the annual judgments of the puys, the northern confraternities contributed greatly to the development of poetry as second rhetoric.

By the middle of the fourteenth century, then, the discursive admixture found in the second redaction of the Toulousain Leys (1356)—its particular blend of judicial rhetoric, poetry and eschatological doctrine—is not all that strange a creature. Rather, the Leys should be understood as only a more explicit ideological statement of a trend of Marian devotion already present long before the first Jocs Florals were held, and bolstered by a professional legal culture which was stronger than in the north. The jongleurs of Arras were not connected to a university law faculty as were the members of the Toulousain Consistori, and their legal training was generally that of the notary rather than the advocate per se. Because of the proximity of northern Italy, Roman law was studied earlier and more energetically in the Midi, which was important already by the middle of the twelfth century as a region of production for Latin copies and

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98 For a good discussion of the confraternal tradition in Paris, see Maddox and Sturm-Maddox, eds., *Parisian Confraternity Drama of the Fourteenth Century*. For the later tradition in Rouen, see Hüe, *La poésie palinodique à Rouen, 1486-1550*. 99 See Kelly, "Topical Invention," 233.
vernacular translations of Roman law texts. In Paris, the papal decretal *Super specula* forbade the teaching of Roman civil law beginning in 1219, and for the next two centuries the law faculty there practically ceased to exist, while the study of civil law in southern university cities like Toulouse and Montpellier only continued to expand. In the south, lawyers also enjoyed more social prestige than in the north, marrying into the ranks of the nobility with greater ease. Nevertheless, both the northern *puys* and the Toulousain Consistori which they inspired exemplify the pervasive and concomitant influence which judicial rhetoric and Marian advocacy had on vernacular poetry during the period.

The Toulousain *Jocs Florals*, in many ways the death-knell of the troubadours' high art, produced little enduring verse. But the theoretical connection of rhetoric, law, poetry and Marian advocacy promoted by the northern confraternities had an appreciable influence on the development of first-person voice in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century French poetry. Poets who participated in the Artois Carité and its annual feast, like Adam de la Halle, were some of the most instrumental figures in what Michel Zink has rightly designated the personal turn of thirteenth-century French poetry. In the following century, Guillaume de Machaut and Jean

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100 For example, the Latin *Exceptiones Petri* and the Provençal *Lo codi* were both produced in what is now southern France around the mid-twelfth century (see Brundage, *Medieval Origins*, 91).

101 See Brundage, Ibid., 231.

102 Another difference is that, by this point, the Occitan tradition tended to distinguish between the vulgar *joglar* and the professionally qualified *trobador*, which in the university system of the Toulousain Consistori was outranked by a still higher degree, the *doctor de trobar*, modeled on the doctorates of law and theology. In the first known source for the use of the term, the famous *Declaratio* of the thirteenth-century troubadour Giraut Riquier, the ranks of *trobador* and *doctor de trobar* are defined sharply against that of *joglar* (*Declaratio*, v. 305, vv. 368-69, in Linskill, ed., *Les épîtres de Guiraut Riquier*, 221-31.)


104 *La subjectivité littéraire.*
Froissart both competed successfully in the northern French puys. The first-person narrative works of these poets vividly reflect the spirited rhetorical environment of the annual feasts, the fixed form lyrics, like the chant royal and rondeau, which they helped to popularize and codify, and the emphasis which the puys placed on lyric poetry as, at once, a species of prayer and an object of rhetorical judgment. Machaut, the composer of the Messe de Nostre Dame and a large corpus of individual Marian lyric pieces, was an important devotional poet in his own right. As I show in Chapter 4, Froissart followed Machaut and, likely, Petrarch in adopting the Virgin's advocacy as a model for his own legal and rhetorical subjectivity.

Before considering individual authors from the second half of the fourteenth century, however, it is important to understand how exactly it was that poets employed the trope of Marian advocacy in narrative depictions of eschatological judgment. To do so, we may turn especially to one particular representational tradition of Marian advocacy, that of the Devil's Rights tradition. In the Devil's Rights, the theme of the Virgin's juridical and oratorical expertise is developed to a high level of detail, and suggests numerous comparisons with the way both lawyers and poets use language to persuade. At the same time, the Devil's Rights contributes a different sort of imperative to ethical discourses about rhetoric: it suggests that, in order to be both perfectly just and perfectly merciful, God's judgment must allow human beings the opportunity to respond to the accusations laid against them by Satan. In this way, language is assigned a crucial instrumentality in the process of salvation, in that it makes it possible for God's judgment to be ethical, which is to say both just and merciful. Mary's language, the exemplar for poets, triumphs over the strict legalism of the Devil—his insistence on the letter of

105 See Poirion, Le poète et le prince, 209; Gros, Le poème du puy marial, 84-97; Cerquiglini-Toulet, La couleur de la mélancholie, 10-11.
the law—by persuading God to mercy with *pathos*, and by interpreting texts more creatively than the Adversary.

**VII. Human Rights and the Devil's Rights**

Like the Biblical narrative of Job, to which it owes a considerable debt of influence, the Devil's Rights genre represents its own distinct scenario of a judicial challenge brought before God against man. The genre employs the narrative structure of legal procedure and the technical vocabulary of the law to stage Satan's suit against the Almighty that humanity is his rightful property because of Adam and Eve's transgression in Eden. The thirteenth-century Latin prose *Conflictus inter Deum et Diabolum*, which uses Justinian's *Corpus iuris civilis* to weigh the Devil's claims against mankind, is the earliest known example to deploy a law-court setting in this way.\(^{106}\) The tradition which grew out of the *Conflictus* in the course of the next century made three innovations crucial to an understanding of how the tradition would be adopted by poets in the vernacular. First, the developing tradition placed the debate more squarely in the imagined time-frame of eschatological judgment—initially the General Judgment, then the Particular—rather than representing the original event of the Redemption.\(^{107}\) Second, whereas the *Conflictus* cast the argument as a direct dispute between God and the Devil, the later tradition gave a more pronounced role to humanity as the defendant in the case, rather than casting human beings

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\(^{106}\) C.W. Marx notes that this is the earliest known example of the Devil's Rights dispute being tied to "specific legal arguments" (*The Devil's Rights and the Redemption*, 60). Marx has also produced a good edition of the Latin text, "An Edition and Study of the *Conflictus inter Deum et Diabolum.*"

\(^{107}\) The Redemption itself is the object of the closely related *Procès de Paradis* genre, which imagines a debate in heaven between Mercy and Justice over whether God should sacrifice his only son for the sake of humanity; in this tradition, Mercy plays a very similar role to Mary in the Devil's Rights. On the *Procès de Paradis* and its relation to legal rhetoric, see Enders, *Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama*, 169-204.
merely as disputed pieces of property. Third, to allow humanity legal representation, the tradition
came to introduce the Virgin as man's advocate. All three of these later tendencies may be
observed in the Latin *Processus Sathane infernalis contra genus humanum* (c. 1320)\(^{108}\) and its
Anglo-Norman adaptation *L'advocacie Nostre Dame* (also c. 1320).\(^{109}\)

In the Anglo-Norman *Advocacie*, Satan arrives before the heavenly court (*la court des
cyex*) to demand possession of mankind.\(^{110}\) The angel Gabriel sounds his horn to summon
humanity to the Judgment, yet not a soul comes forward to speak in man's defense. Satan claims
that he should win on the grounds that the defendant failed to appear. However, Christ reminds
the court that his justice is perfectly balanced with mercy, and delays the trial until the following
day—Good Friday—so that humanity can secure suitable representation. Mary, who assumes the
role of advocate for the defense and arrives in court the next morning, counters Satan's claim by
arguing that he never took lawful possession of mankind, since he caused the Fall through malice
and deceit. In a passionate display of maternal emotion, the Virgin then tearfully reminds the
judge—Christ her son—that he died to redeem mankind from original sin and thus definitively
dispossess Satan.

Needless to say, Mary wins the case. Beyond the implications which the text carries for
the doctrine of the Redemption, the way its characters use language also reveals much about the
status of legal and rhetorical knowledge in the early fourteenth century. Satan is depicted as well-
read and articulate:

\(^{108}\) This dating is given by Scott L. Taylor, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption," 70.
\(^{109}\) As Marx notes in his edition of *Conflictus* (24), variations on the basic pattern of the dispute
were numerous. I cite the edition of *L'advocacie* (*Our Lady's Lawsuits*) by Davis and Akehurst,
based on the text edited by Gros.
\(^{110}\) Brundage (*Medieval Origins*, 477) notes *L'advocacie's* pervasive use of legal form. Enders
devotes a substantial section of her study to *L'advocacie* (*Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval
Drama*, 222-33), where she discusses the poem's strong ties to models of legal rhetoric.
Là vint Sathan très bien matin,
Qui bien sceit francois et latin
Et sceit respondre et opposer
Et toute Escription gloser.
(vv. 447-50)

As Mary admits, her opponent is extremely knowledgeable in all legal matters, both civil and canon:

Il sceit assez canon et loyo
Pour troubler 1. bon jugement.
(vv. 762-63)

And as Christ himself concedes from the seat of judgment, not only does Satan "parle courtoisement" (v. 1630), but his claim against humanity does in fact seem fairly reasonable ("y semble que rason requiere," v. 1631).

What is most striking about this depiction of the Devil as a lawyer is that here we do not necessarily recognize the voice of the tempter and the father of lies. Nor, indeed, do Satan's arguments compare to those of the condemned lawyers discussed earlier in this chapter, those wicked rhetoricians who have made a fat living distorting the truth. Instead, Satan's case appears grounded in Scripture and generally displays a concern with justice and a single, correct interpretation of authoritative texts. Most notably, the Devil cites Genesis (v. 1141) to argue that Adam and Eve's disobedience put them and all their progeny into his possession:

Dist Sathan: 'C'est droit qu'i me vaille.  Said Satan, 'The law is on my side here.
Quant Adan et Eve feis
When you made Adam and Eve
Et en paradis les meis,
and put them in the Garden, you told them
Tu deis que des fuyz menjassent,
they could eat of all the trees except one
De tous, fors qu'à .I. n'atouchassent;
that you forbid them to touch.
Ton commandement bien oirent
They heard your commandment
Mès de touz poins désobéirent
but disobeyed it in every respect,
Et contre ton vouloir péchièrent,
sinned against your wishes,
Quer par lour folie mengièrent
and in their folly ate
Le piere pomm du pourpris,
the worst fruit in the garden,
Et pour ce furent il pourpris
and for this were they struck
De maladie si cruel
with a condition so vile
Satan goes so far as to impute that God would be going back on his own textual precedent ("Fey donc tes paroles estables," v. 1175) if he failed to judge in the devil's favor and condemn the entire human race based on his word in Genesis 2:17: the prohibition, on certain pain of death, against eating of the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil. Satan's demand that God's judgment be made in "paroles estables" recalls the essential difference between earthly and heavenly judgment in the moralizing texts I examined earlier in the first part of this chapter: while lawyers are able to twist texts and facts with their use of language, such sophistic practices have no place in the heavenly court. Or at least, according to Satan, they should not.

Elsewhere in the Advocacie, the Devil calls upon strong textual precedent to object to Mary's presence in the court: she ought not be allowed to plead, on the grounds that she is a woman, and on the grounds that she is directly related to the trial judge, Christ (vv. 860-72). But Mary adroitly defends her right to act as counsel by citing exceptions from Roman law sources. 111 And who, indeed, could be more exceptional? Not only is Mary the virgin mother of God, but she claims the right to speak where language—and lawyers—are supposed to fall silent.

In the end, Mary prevails due to a sharp technical knowledge of the law, but also thanks to her plainly superior rhetorical skills. While Satan stakes his entire argument on the established precedent of Genesis, Mary bests him by employing both precedent and pathos to bring the

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111 In the Latin Processus, Mary cites the Decrees, Decretals and Pandects (see Taylor, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption," 73), whereas, in the Advocacie, she brings up exceptions from Justinian's Digeste (v. 1089) and Gratian's Décrétale (v. 1235).
heavenly court to mercy. In so doing, she turns her supposed frailty as a woman to her advantage (v. 1383-95), and she takes a cue from the Ciceronian rhetorical tradition, which emphasized the importance of producing an emotional response in courtroom audiences.\footnote{On Mary's successful use of gesture and pathos as adopted from legal rhetoric, see Enders, \textit{Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama}, 228-230. Mary's rhetorical use of pathos is also discussed by Taylor, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption," 74, and by Keiser, "The Middle English \textit{Planctus Mariae} and the Rhetoric of Pathos."}

\begin{quote}
Lors la peüst l'en regarder, Then could one see her  
Aussi simple comme une teutre, as simple as dove,  
Et ensemble ses mains détéutre, twisting her hands together,  
Trembler, frémir et sanglouter, shivering, shaking and sobbing,  
Eschauffer, suer, dégouter! her body burning and sweating.  
Elle estoit si lasse et si vaine She was so weak and forlorn  
Que sus lie n'avoi nerf ne vaine that in her body she had no nerve or vein  
À quoy l'en ne s'apercheüst from which one could not see  
Que grant angoisse au cuer eüst. that her heart was torn with anguish.
\end{quote}

Turning toward her son the judge, the Virgin calls on him to honor his filial obligations and take pity on mankind, ripping open her shirt to make this point:\footnote{This rhetorical gesture was used to arouse pity in classical depictions of courtroom rhetoric long before its adoption in the Devil's Rights tradition. See Yalom, \textit{A History of the Breast}, 19-20; Boss, \textit{Empress and Handmaid}, 37. I am indebted to my Byzantinist colleague Matthew Milliner for bringing this to my attention.}

\begin{quote}
Ha, beau douz filz, je suy ta mère, Oh, good sweet son, I am your mother,  
Qui te portey .IX. mois entiers: who bore you nine long months.  
Tu me dois oîr volontiers. You must gladly listen to me;  
Je t'enfantey mout povrement I delivered you humbly  
Et te nourri mout doucement. and nursed you sweetly.  
Ta mère suy, mère m'apèles. Your mother I am, mother you call me.  
Beau filz, regarde les mamèles Beautiful son, look upon my breasts,  
De quoy aleitier te souloie, with which I used to feed you,  
Et ces mains, dont bien te savoie and these hands with which  
Souef remuer et berchier. I used to gently cradle and rock you.
\end{quote}

It would seem Satan was justified in claiming that Mary's presence as counsel would prejudice the proceedings. While the Adversary knows the letter of the law backwards and forwards, he is
no match for the Virgin because he does not possess the same ability to arouse compassion in the courtroom.

The conflict between Mary's ability to provoke an emotional response through her *planctus*, and the Devil's more purely textual knowledge of the law, should be read in connection with the idea that, in the event of the Redemption, Christ's New Law both fulfills and supersedes the Old. Mary's rhetorical persuasion of God to mercy was always in God's plan, inasmuch as the Son and his sacrifice were present from all time in the Trinity. The Devil's literal adherence to the Law, contrasted with the more creative textuality of Christ and Mary, is an old theme of eschatological representation. Characteristically, the Devil represents an Hebraic or Pharisaic rigidity which insists on the literal interpretation of Scripture and of the spiritual account-books of individual lives; demons are often depicted as brandishing heavy records of bad deeds at sinners on their deathbeds or just after death. This legalism was successfully countered, and Satan overcome, not primarily by referencing other texts, but by the action of grace, which rewrote the records by imposing Christ's New Law.\(^\text{114}\)

Much like the system of common law taking shape in western Europe in the later Middle Ages, then, Mary's ability to argue from exception provides a picture of the heavenly court as a legal space in which the law is constantly reshaped in the encounter of living legal subjects with established textual precedent. In this, the replacement of old law with new may also be understood in terms of emerging late medieval judicial practices. As Scott L. Taylor has established, the Latin *Processus* upon which *L'advocacie* is based was actually used as a model of trial procedure in early fourteenth-century legal education. In particular, as Taylor argues, Mary would have served as an ideal example of the Bolognese approach to the law, the *mos*

\(^{114}\) See Zaleski, *Otherworldly Journeys*, 71.
italicus, which—also heavily influenced by Cicero—stressed a methodological consideration of personal legal subjectivity (status or condicio hominum) and valued equity over custom.\textsuperscript{115} The Processus and its Anglo-Norman adaptation employed the image of advocata nostra to highlight contemporary points of judicial ethics, especially the need to arrive at an equitable decision beyond the letter of the law, and the right of all legal subjects—even of wretched mankind—to answer the charges against them and engage representation.\textsuperscript{116} As Taylor suggests, this makes the Devil's Rights as much about human law as divine jurisprudence.

Or rather, the Devil's Rights evoke a forum for eschatological justice between heaven and earth, in which the subject is given the possibility of representation, in which the right of mankind to face its accuser becomes an ethical imperative. In this context, persuasive language is not a dishonest or satirical presence in the eschatological scene, but is fully incorporated there as a means of representing God's ineffable mercy, and as an instrument for bringing that mercy about. The Virgin's rhetoric suggests that God's judgment is supremely just only inasmuch as it allows the human subject representation and the possibility of going beyond the law to claim an exceptional pardon. Language, in all of its capacity for emotional manipulation and Derridean differance, becomes the guarantor of heavenly justice, inasmuch as it allows the scene of judgment to stage the rewriting, the unsaying, of established texts.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{115} Taylor, "Reason, Rhetoric, and Redemption," 71.
\textsuperscript{116} As Taylor (Ibid., 68) explains, due process, including right to petition, opportunity to be heard and proper evidence, was a contemporary issue, stemming from the controversy over Henry II's justification of the trial in absentia of Robert of Naples, and the Clementine responses against it.
\textsuperscript{117} As Jody Enders has argued, Mary's feminine style of pleading also serves to rehabilitate legal rhetoric, which had been criticized as effeminate by Quintilian and Lucian (Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama, 223). For Enders, Mary redeems the power of gesture and pathos (actio), making it not effeminate, but rather positively feminine and identified with mercy and goodness (233).
In this, Mary's use of language reflects not only that of the lawyer, but that of the poet, who also seeks to produce an emotional response in divine and human audiences alike, and to transform what has already been written. The potential identification of the lawyerly Mary with the poets who depicted her becomes increasingly clear if we continue to trace the transformation of the Devil's Rights tradition and its influence on more personal accounts of divine judgment. Over the course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, responding to the growing doctrinal emphasis on the particular judgment of the soul immediately after death, the mass of humanity was gradually replaced in the Devil's Rights scenario with more individualized human defendants. In instances where the lawyerly Mary speaks for a single client rather than on behalf of Man in general, the Judgment may often be read as a reflection on the way in which heavenly mercy and the ability to use language creatively are conceptually linked. This theme becomes apparent, for instance, in an early fourteenth-century mystery play, the *Miracle de Pierre le changeur*, in which the depiction of divine judgment is closely drawn on the Devil's Rights. Since the play was originally staged at the Puy des Orfèvres, organized by the powerful gold-workers' guild of Paris,\(^\text{118}\) it also constitutes a distinct literary example of confraternal poets' conception of Mary as a patron of legal and poetic rhetoric.\(^\text{119}\)

The back-story of the *Miracle* is that the rich banker Pierre never did a good deed in his entire life. This well-known fact about the man prompts two beggars to wager a pot of wine: the

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\(^{119}\) In *Rhetoric and the Origins of Medieval Drama*, Enders includes a discussion of mystery plays and notes the importance of the Basoche (founded 1303), which performed theatrical mock trials and was closely tied to confraternal organizations (see especially "Chapter 3: The Theater of the Basoche and the Medieval Dramatic Continuum," 129-161). As Enders points out (134), by the mid-fourteenth century, the Basoche had a partnership with the Confrérie de la Passion, and "in 1400 Paris lawyers formed the Communauté des Procureurs et Avocats au Parlement to replace the Confrérie de Saint Nicolas, named for the patron saint of law and drama—and apparently of legal drama as well" (134).
first beggar says that he will succeed in convincing Pierre to spare him something to eat, while the second says that he will be refused. As it happens, Pierre throws a loaf of bread at the first beggar, not out of charity, but because he is unable to find a more suitable object with which to bash the man's head in. The unrepentant Pierre even says that it was specifically not his intention to feed the beggar but rather:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Certes c'estoit tout mon desir} & \quad \text{All I wanted to do} \\
\text{Que du main tel cop li donnasse} & \quad \text{was to hit him so hard} \\
\text{Qu'en la place mort le jettasse.} & \quad \text{as to knock him dead.}
\end{align*}
\]

( \text{vv. 230-32} )

Apparently, the loaf is not quite stale enough to serve Pierre's purpose. The beggar catches it and, perhaps less than honestly, uses the bread as evidence of Pierre's charity; he brings it to his compatriot so that he may collect on the bet and get his pot of wine. In the meantime, the evil Pierre has suddenly fallen gravely ill, and although he is not yet dead, a group of devils has assembled before the heavenly court to claim the wicked man's soul as their own.

Satan might appear to have an open and shut case here, except that the Virgin quickly arrives on the scene to provide the defense. Ever the lawyer, she asks the angels—her crack legal team—if there isn't the least shred of evidence which would help their client. Frustrated, one of the angels informs Mary of the facts weighing against them: not only did Pierre never perform a single good deed, but his very last act—throwing the loaf at the beggar—was yet another instance of his total lack of human compassion:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Si ne scé de quoy s'aquitta,} & \quad \text{I don't know how he can be let off,} \\
\text{Au povre lors un pain jetta} & \quad \text{for he threw at the poor man a loaf} \\
\text{Non pas de bonne voulenté,} & \quad \text{not out of good will,} \\
\text{Non, mais a dire vérité,} & \quad \text{but to tell you the truth,} \\
\text{Par grant despit et par grant ire.} & \quad \text{with great scorn and anger.}
\end{align*}
\]

( \text{vv. 501-5} )
However, despite Pierre's thoroughly bad intentions, it turns out that his final act is enough to get him off the hook, just as it is enough to win the beggar his pot of wine. Mary begins her defense by launching into a moving *planctus* reminding God that he died on the cross for humanity (vv. 517-57). In this, she follows the basic pattern of Ciceronian rhetorical theory by starting her argument with a direct attempt to influence the emotional state of her audience, an *exordium*. Only afterward does she proceed to the facts of the case, introducing the loaf of bread into evidence as proof that Pierre has not completely lost the capacity for good. The loaf constitutes an exception—seemingly, a dubious one—to Satan's contention that Pierre never performed a good deed:

Oultre, sire, vezci un pain
Qu'il a a un povre donné,
Pour ce qu'il l'ot araisonné
Et de dire s'esvertuoit
Que famine trop le grevoit;
Si li doit estre de prouffit
Plus que touz les maux c'onques fist
Ny en jonnesce n'en viel aage
C'est tout certain.
(vv. 548-57)

Besides, my lord, here is a loaf
that he gave to a poor man
because he asked him for it
and was trying to tell him
that hunger was crushing him.
This must count in his favor
more than all the wicked deeds he did
in youth and in old age—
they must not count against him now;
that's a fact.

Won over by her emotional appeal, God agrees with Mary's claim that throwing the loaf at the beggar constituted an act of charity which outweighs all of Pierre's previous sins. Pierre is given a second chance; he is brought back to life, and devotes the rest of his time on earth to performing charitable acts. He becomes a holy man and even sells himself into slavery to a Muslim in Jerusalem, who is so moved by his example of self-sacrifice that he too converts to Christianity. Mary's subtle massaging of established textual fact for the sake of divine mercy exploits the two senses in which the banker Pierre is a *changeur*; as the play assumes a narrative
of personal spiritual conversion and redemption, Pierre's spiritual book of accounts is dramatically rewritten.

As is true of the Devil's Rights tradition more generally, Mary's judicial activities in *Pierre* include some of the same things for which earthly lawyers were frequently condemned in medieval discourse as in the twenty-first century: the representation of a guilty client, the exploitation of emotional rhetoric, and the distortion of facts. In Mary's exceptional case, however, these are not sins, but instruments of God's will in sparing his elect, and signs of the way God's grace triumphs over the Old Law, miraculously rewriting the bare, immovable facts to which the Devil lays claim.

Like the *jongleurs* of Arras and the members of the Toulousain Consistori, the poets of the Parisian Puy des Orfèvres who wrote and performed *Pierre le changeur* were eager to promote their own rhetorical prowess both in heaven and on earth. They must, therefore, have found particularly attractive the idea that the artful manipulation of language could occupy a positive place in the Judgment. The lawyerly Mary provided them with a *patronus* (model) through which rhetoric could wield decisive agency in the eschatological scene. Writing and performing mystery plays like *Pierre*, the confraternal poets were not only praising Mary's capacity to argue for God's mercy, but also indirectly advertising their own powers to transform language, to produce an emotional response in their audiences, and to impact even the judgment

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120 On another important depiction of the Virgin as a tricky lawyer, and the devil as a more ostensibly ethical, truth-oriented figure, see Patricia C. Fagan's article on the *Cantigas de Santa Maria*, "El Mal Rey y la Ley." As Fagan writes, "The Devil is ironically the fair prosecutor who argues cogently for just retribution of unrepentant sinners, whereas Mary is the flagrant transgressor of the law who tips the scales of justice in favor of her remorseless supplicants [...][48]. On both the devil and the saints and angels tampering with the scales in the heavenly court scene, see Zaleski, *Otherworldly Journeys*, 71; Oakes, "The Scales." Mary's representation of a guilty client is taken to an extreme in the late fifteenth-century Occitan mystery play *Lo Jutgamen General*, where the Virgin agrees to represent the devils themselves but loses her case (*Le Jugement Dernier/Lo Jutgamen General: drame provençal du XVe siècle*, ed. Lazar).
of heaven. The Virgin's exceptional status in regard to persuasive language, a status which she defends eloquently, reflects the exceptionality of poets, who, like Mary, laid claim to a transcendent practice of the spoken and written word.

**VIII. Conclusion**

To return to the question with which I began this chapter:

*Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?*

What am I to say *then*, when the last trumpet blows? In the course of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, this became less of a rhetorical question and more of a question about rhetoric—about how words are to be judged, about strategies of speaking and writing which confer upon the human defendant legal subjectivity, a judicial right of response, and some measure of responsibility for judgment itself. Scenes of eschatological judgment were used throughout the Middle Ages to stage the ethical problems of language, condemning lawyers as the worst among liars and striking poets—even Dante—dumb. But scenes of eschatological judgment were also used to imagine what the practice of heavenly rhetoric might look and sound like were it to figure in the process of salvation, thus providing both lawyers and poets with a model for their own exceptional use of words. Inasmuch as lawyers and poets were taught to imagine God and the saints as their ultimate audience members, inasmuch as they patterned their own activity of intercession on the mediation of the saints, and inasmuch as God's infinite mercy required a right of response for human subjects, both groups used the sublime frame of the Judgment to represent and justify themselves.

Already in the Devil's Rights tradition, the stubborn presence of persuasive speech in the scene of divine judgment begins to call to mind the ethical parameters of Levinas's category of
the eschatological, which depends entirely upon language. It is not simply that it is fair for the subject to speak in his own defense; rather, it is necessary for the subject to respond to the other's accusation in order to have any existence at all, inasmuch as subjectivity is the product of an ongoing process of accusation and response: "Il faut que le jugement soit porté sur une volonté qui puisse se défendre dans le jugement et, par son apologie, être présente à son procès [...]". Levinas's conception of the visage, the face of the other through which God is revealed (désincarné), relies not only on the sense of vision which permits that revelation, but also—or, indeed, primarily—on the faculty of language, which allows the miraculous possibility of face to face communication and self-defense: "Le visage parle. La manifestation du visage est déjà discours." Because language is the condition which alone makes my encounter with the other possible, it is also what structures the eschatological judgment. The tiers (third party), who can be variously defined as God and all the other others, is made manifest through language: "Le tiers me regarde dans les yeux d'autrui—le langage est justice."

When Levinas writes of an eschatological subject "qui puisse se défendre" "à la première personne," it is important to remember that the philosopher is not assigning a metaphorical place to speech, but rather positing language as the sine qua non of just eschatological judgment. Nor does Levinas seem to have in mind a mystical language as the basis for the face à face; rather, he refers to human speech and writing in their everyday imperfection as the only possible

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121 Importantly, Dante names himself only once in the Commedia, in Purgatorio XXX (v. 55), and it is in the first word spoken to the narrator by Beatrice, as she begins accusations against Dante which refer back to his La vita nuova and Convivio. A similar pattern of naming through accusation can be seen in other fourteenth-century authors, such as Guillaume de Deguileville (see the discussion of the signature-acrostic letter entered into evidence against Guillermus in the following chapter, 132-33) and Guillaume de Machaut, whose narrator is first called "Guillaume" in his work as part of Dame Bonneurte's accusation (see Chapter 3, 234).
122 TI, 272
123 Ibid., 61
124 Ibid., 234.
guarantors of justice. The inherent otherness of language, its eternal deferral of signification, make Levinas's eschatological judgment a constant process of reinterpretation and revision in which no end to the subject's ethical responsibility may ever be reached.

But although the judgment scenes of the Devil's Rights tradition gesture toward the presence of the poets who wrote and performed them, and although they use the instability of human language to represent the inscrutable mechanism of grace, these scenes do not show the human subject speaking for himself. The subject does not respond to judgment "à la première personne" as Levinas demands that he must, and as the Dies irae suggests that each sinner will ultimately have to do:

\[
\textit{Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?}
\]

What am I to say, then?

In the rhetorical staging of divine judgment in such texts as I have considered in this chapter, there is a will to the just representation of the human subject, an ethical impulse which leaves eschatological judgment open to the merciful ability of language to bring about personal and textual change. As yet, however, the primary model for a human defense in the heavenly court is still that of saintly intercession rather than direct self-representation, even if poets like those of the Toulousain Consistori and the Artois confrérie imagined that they too had a persuasive effect within this process of intercession. Peire Cardenal's early thirteenth-century sirventes, cited at the beginning of this chapter, is a colorful exception to the general rule, as it highlights the poet's own ability to astonish the heavenly court with his powers of speech, and reduces the Virgin's role to that of a witness or guarantor who will support the poet's arguments after he has spoken.

Broadly speaking, the gesture of a first-person poetic argument in the court of heaven was rare in the thirteenth century, when poets more commonly used the Judgment to mark a
point of renunciation with the sinful past, as is the case, for example, with Guillaume le Clerc's *Besant de Dieu*. The poet's individual presence as an imagined interlocutor in the court of heaven became somewhat more common in the fourteenth century, as testifies Jean Le Fèvre's *Respit de la mort* (1376), in which the poet argues successfully to extend the period of his loan from God.¹²⁵ Le Fèvre notwithstanding, Guillaume de Deguileville, to whom I now turn in Chapter 2, is arguably the most spectacular fourteenth-century example of a poet representing himself before the heavenly court. Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme* (c. 1356) is, moreover, a distinct rewriting of the Devil's Rights scenario, in which the author casts himself as both defendant and advocate, pleading eloquently on his own behalf and managing to save his soul. As I demonstrate, Deguileville fully appropriates the heavenly court scene of the Devil's Rights, and makes the Virgin Mary's rhetoric his own, in order to stage the judgment of his work by readers and his own response to it. Like the poets who wrote and performed versions of the Devil's Rights, Deguileville uses the eschatological scene to claim a human right of response against the accusations of Satan. But he also effects a transformation of the heavenly court into a venue for considering the ethics of literature, a venue in which the author gives himself the opportunity to respond directly to the accusations of his audience.

¹²⁵ In France, at least, this phenomenon can be explained partly by the growing importance of the legal profession, following especially the French royal ordinance of 1345, which served as a definitive codification of the rights and duties of the profession. See Karpik, *Les avocats*, 30.
Chapter 2

A Particular Judgment: The Case of Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme*

**I. Introduction**

As the Devil's Rights tradition shows, the courtroom drama is not a recent invention, nor is it confined to legal proceedings on earth. Texts like *L'advocacie Nostre Dame* and *Pierre le Changeur* fill the scene of divine judgment with outraged prosecutors, silver-tongued attorneys and controversial defendants whose eternal souls hang in the balance. In the middle of the fourteenth century, Guillaume de Deguileville (1295-after 1358), a Cistercian monk at the royal abbey of Chaalis,¹ was to develop in further detail the legal intrigue of this eschatological tradition.

Sometime between 1355 and 1358, Deguileville wrote his *Pèlerinage de l'âme* (*PA*). The speaker of the poem—or self-designated *pèlerin*—narrates a dream in which he dies and travels through heaven, hell and purgatory. Deguileville's narrator-pilgrim is no passive observer of the world beyond, for the dream begins with his own soul's judgment in the heavenly court. At the conclusion of this trial scene, the soul is confined to a term in purgatory, from which the narrator has a close-up view of hell's punishments, before travelling upward again to discover heaven's mysteries. It is, however, the pilgrim's judgment with which I will be mostly concerned in my discussion of *PA*.

The trial scene is long and detailed, comprising some 2,600 verses filled with references to legal procedure as well as to questions of sin, repentance, redemption and judgment.² The scene, and the poem, begin as the narrator dies. His soul ascends from its body (the soul-pilgrim

---

¹ Deguileville may have been the prior of Chaalis. See Faral, "Guillaume de Digulleville," 8.
² *PA* as a whole runs to 11,161 verses in the standard edition by Stürzinger, not counting additional lines provided in the appendices.
is generally depicted naked in manuscript illuminations) and immediately encounters its guardian angel, who intends to take it to heaven. But just as quickly, Satan appears to claim that the pilgrim's soul is rightfully his, and all three continue upward to paradise. There, before the gates of the heavenly city, the Devil submits his claim for judgment. Although the pilgrim's view of the courtroom is blocked by a large courtine (vv. 302-3),³ he can hear everything said as a case is mounted against him. The trial scene generally assumes the proportions of the Devil's Rights tradition.⁴ The prosecution, represented by Satan, Raison, Justice and Verité, faces off against the pilgrim and his defense team, led by Misericorde (Mercy). Both sides are backed by the testimony of formidable witnesses: for the defense, the pilgrim's guardian angel, the Virgin Mary and Saint Benedict. The prosecution, on the other hand, needs only one witness—the pilgrim's conscience, in the form of the hideous worm-woman Synderesis.⁵ The proceedings are

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³ Before his view is obstructed, however, the pilgrim experiences a glorious vision of celestial light and feels intense joy—a momentary glimpse of the beatific vision which the 1336 bull Benedictus Deus had confirmed as doctrine; in other words, the pilgrim is judged one of the saved before the trial even begins. At the end of the poem, once he has spent his term in purgatory, and immediately before waking up from his dream, the pilgrim is afforded another, slightly longer such vision (vv. 11002-13).

⁴ In particular, Faral notes the influence of the Advocacie Nostre Dame on Deguileville ("Guillaume de Digulleville," 49 n4). The Advocacie is the most important source for the trial scene, although not for the subsequent voyage through the afterworld. The most thorough account of the entire tradition of otherworldly voyage narrative, and Deguileville's place in it, is given by Pomel, Voies. See also Galpin, "On the Sources of Guillaume de Deguileville's Pèlerinage de l'âme." Here, Galpin notes the importance of Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose, biblical and apocryphal sources, and Latin visions and legends from early Christianity and the Middle Ages. Elsewhere ("Notes on the Sources of Deguileville's Pèlerinage de l'âme"), Galpin argues for the influence of Huon de Méry's Tornoiement de l'Antechrist (c.1235). Michael Camille identified as influences on Deguileville Raoul de Houdenc's Songe d'ender (1255) and the anonymous thirteenth-century Voie de Paradis ("The Illustrated Manuscripts," I: 7).

⁵ Conscience and Synderesis are not exactly the same thing. Synderesis is usually understood in medieval discourse as the general inclination toward the good possessed by everybody and incapable of making a mistake. Conscience, on the other hand, involves the application of this inclination to particular circumstances and could be mistaken. (See Hogan, Confronting the Truth, 66-87; Pomel, Voies, 355). I use the term "conscience" to translate the character Synderesis for the sake of convenience and because Synderesis is in many ways the ancestor of
adjudicated by the archangel Michael, whom God has appointed to preside over the judgment of souls immediately after death:\(^6\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Phrase</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prevost Michiel de paradis</td>
<td>You, Michael, the provost of paradise,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui de nostre roy es commis</td>
<td>who by our king are charged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A faire jugement et droit</td>
<td>with pronouncing judgment and law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De toute gent quel qu'elle soit</td>
<td>on all people whomsoever they be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jusqu'a tant quë au jugement</td>
<td>until such time as he [Christ]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il descendra personnelment</td>
<td>will descend in person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pour les grans assises tenir</td>
<td>to hold his great tribunal.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vv. 311-17)

Deguileville's insistence on the particular judgment of the individual soul after death, as opposed to the *grans assises* to be held by Christ himself at the Resurrection, is crucial to an understanding of the author's importance in this study of eschatological representation.

Deguileville's judgment scene was one of the first, and certainly one of the most influential, depictions of the particular judgment, which had assumed more doctrinal importance than ever by the middle of the fourteenth century, following the 1336 papal bull *Benedictus Deus.*\(^7\)

Deguileville's narrative had a major impact on later literary portrayals of judgment, including in the English-speaking world, with Lydgate's 1426 translation, *The Pylgremage of the Sowle.*\(^8\)

Deguileville's trial scene was even used, in at least one instance, as allegorical commentary for the liturgical Office of the Dead.\(^9\) The image cycle accompanying the poem was also extremely influential. Unique for a work of vernacular literature, manuscript illuminations of the

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\(^6\) Michael, in turn, names the angel Cherubin as the court's *president* (v. 419). Along with Saint Peter, Cherubin also acts as the court's porter (v. 438, v. 465).


\(^8\) Also extant is an anonymous 1413 translation, which Lydgate may also have authored. In contrast to the poem's relatively minor place in the French tradition, *PA's* adaptations enjoyed greater popularity in the English speaking world than adaptations of *PVH.*

Pelerinage de l’âme were recopied without their original text to represent scenes of divine judgment for the fifteenth-century owners of lavish books of hours.\textsuperscript{10}

Although not the first poet to represent the particular judgment, Deguileville stands apart from his predecessors and contemporaries alike for the level of personal detail he lends to the eschatological scene. With the miracle play Pierre le changeur in the early fourteenth century, I have already discussed one instance in which the particular judgment is dramatized. But while Pierre illustrates a shift in the identity of the defendant from mankind to a specific man, Deguileville's most important innovation upon the Devil's Rights scenario was in making this individual defendant speak in the first person.\textsuperscript{11} As I demonstrate in this chapter, Deguileville fashions his first-person narrator as a literary persona for himself who must also answer for the author's perceived transgressions. Treating Deguileville's representation of his own literary career as a complex "case," my concern is to show in what ways the heavenly trial scene of PA may be interpreted as a judgment on the poet and his work.\textsuperscript{12}

This chapter first briefly considers the trial of the pilgrim's soul as it appears in PA, in order to demonstrate how Deguileville adapted the Devil's Rights model to shift the burden of judgment to a first-person subject. I then move to a discussion of Deguileville's earlier poetry, for

\textsuperscript{10} See Camille, "The Illustrated Manuscripts," I:227: MS Fitzwilliam 62 contains, in addition to a complete Apocalypse series, the visual cycles of all three Pèlerinages without their texts. Other fifteenth century books of hours contain borrowings from Deguileville's trial of the soul, particularly the detail of Satan transcribing testimony against the pilgrim on a scroll (Camille, Ibid., I:244).

\textsuperscript{11} Deguileville's individuation of the Devil's Rights defendant is comparable to his reworking of allegorical pilgrimage narrative to privilege the individual speaker. On this latter point, see Philippe Maupeu's masterful study, Pèlerins de vie humaine: autobiographie et allégorie narrative, de Guillaume de Deguileville à Octovien de Saint-Gelais. See also Maupeu, "La tentation autobiographique." I draw on Maupeu's important work throughout the chapter.

\textsuperscript{12} In a conference paper as yet unpublished, delivered after this chapter was written, Fabienne Pomel has also investigated the thoroughly juridical character of the many documents comprising Deguileville's body of work ("Les écrits pérégrins chez Guillaume de Digulleville").
what it can tell us about how the author perceived his reception by readers. In particular, I consider Deguileville's two redactions of his *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* (1330-1 and 1355), highlighting the ways in which Deguileville used those texts in order to portray his relationship to readers as an ongoing legal and eschatological procès. Punctuated with judgments, incriminations and counteraccusations, Deguileville's earlier work provides something like a case file, which is to be reopened and reconsidered before the heavenly court. Having taken into account the complex literary background of this case, I am then able to return to the scene of judgment in *PA* in the last section of the chapter, in order to demonstrate how Deguileville's earlier writing reemerges there as a matter for eschatological scrutiny. In a more detailed examination of the soul's trial, I show how Deguileville borrows the trope of saintly oratory from the Devil's Rights tradition in order to argue his case. Much like the northern puy-poets and the members of the Toulousain Consistori discussed in the previous chapter, Deguileville employs the Virgin Mary's lawyerly expertise to call attention to his own command of language. But Deguileville is unique in that the verbal dexterity of his first-person defendant invites readers to identify him with the author, and to identify his arguments as a defense of his own poetry.

**II. The Soul's Trial**

In his accusation against the pilgrim's soul (vv. 591-700), Satan claims that he should be consigned to eternal torment because he continued to sin after being washed clean, that is, after having been baptized and absolved of his sins in confession. With Satan's accusation, we may affirm that the scope of judgment has moved definitively away from the mass of mankind and

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13 As I discuss later in the chapter, it is clear that Satan's accusation may be connected to both sacraments—baptism and confession—through events narrated in Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*. 
toward the individual defendant. In Devil's Rights texts like *L'advocacie Nostre Dame*, Satan lays claim to the entirety of humanity for the common legacy of original sin; but with Deguileville, as with texts like *Pierre le changeur*, the Adversary's argument has changed considerably. His complaint no longer concerns original sin so much as the sin which an individual—the pilgrim—has brought upon himself voluntarily and repeatedly, even after his conversion.\(^{14}\)

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{En nostre feu doit estre mis} & \quad \text{He must be thrown into our fire} \\
\text{Et selon ses meffais punis.} & \quad \text{and punished according to his crimes.} \\
\text{Et encor oultre .i. point te di} & \quad \text{And here's yet another point I claim from you:} \\
\text{Quë il doit plus estre puni} & \quad \text{that he must be more greatly punished} \\
\text{De tant qu'il a este lave} & \quad \text{in that he had been washed clean} \\
\text{Et que de puis s'est ramboue} & \quad \text{and then went and muddied himself again} \\
\text{Que se n'eust lavement ëu,} & \quad \text{as if he had never had a washing at all.} \\
\text{Masmement car est bien scëu} & \quad \text{For indeed it is well known} \\
\text{Que pis vault le second meffait} & \quad \text{that the second sin is much worse} \\
\text{Asses que le premier ne fait.} & \quad \text{than ever was the first.} \\
\text{Du second volontairement} & \quad \text{Of the second voluntarily} \\
\text{S'est houni et a escient.} & \quad \text{he disgraced himself and knew it.} \\
\text{Le premier du premier pere,} & \quad \text{The first sin of the first father,} \\
\text{Et de la premiere mere,} & \quad \text{and of the first mother} \\
\text{Li vint par droit heritage} & \quad \text{came to him in rightful inheritance.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(vv. 625-39)

Although Satan traces the narrator's crimes back to the Fall, he is less interested in the events of Eden and more insistent upon the actual sins of the narrator's life, which he claims are much worse for having been committed willfully and in full knowledge of their moral consequences.\(^{15}\)

Satan's accusation against the pilgrim as a specific individual guilty of specific transgressions would seem to call for an individual response. And indeed, although he displays significant anxiety about how he will find representation or mount a defense, Deguileville does

\(^{14}\) Pomel (*Voies*, 413) notes the slippage between individual and collection salvation in Deguileville's judgment scene.

\(^{15}\) I use "actual sins" here in the theological sense of sins committed freely by the individual will and not inherent in fallen human nature.
speak at length on his own behalf. In a first speech (vv. 739-1074), an elaborate lyric-prayer, the pilgrim implores the heavenly court to provide him with their advocacy and the spiritual "alms" he will need to afford such high-powered attorneys as they. He calls directly upon individual members of the court including Christ, Mary, and the Cistercian saints Benedict, Bernard and Guillaume de Bourges, pleading with them for assistance. Later, the pilgrim takes the floor again (vv. 1406-84) to speak more directly in his own defense: while recognizing that he did commit grave sins, in the same breath he displaces a large measure of responsibility for those sins onto Satan and the illusions of the world, who he claims deceived him into wrongdoing. The pilgrim is evidently successful—in his initial request for intercession, if not also in his attempt to evade responsibility—since Misericorde and the Virgin plead to Christ on the pilgrim's behalf and Benedict provides the court with written evidence of the pilgrim's good deeds during his many years as a Cistercian. Finally, Christ is moved to issue a special formal pardon ("Un don de grace especial," v. 2383) to all the wretched pilgrims of the world ("les pelerins chetis," v. 2381) who, like Deguileville's narrator, have recognized the error of their ways, even at the very end. The pilgrim will be sent off to purgatory, not hell.

But is this just? From the beginning of Deguileville's poem, the right of the defendant to speak or receive representation in the heavenly court becomes a central dispute of the trial itself, just as in the Devil's Rights. In his opening arguments against the pilgrim, Deguileville's Satan demands to know,

Qui est qui le puist excuser  
Who is there who might defend him  
Ou qui pour li ose parler?  
Or who dare speak on his behalf?  
(vv. 671-72)
After the pilgrim has already begun to speak in his own defense, Justice cites the established theological precedent that nothing can be said at the Judgment to change its course; her objection includes the truism which bars lawyers from plying their trade in paradise:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sire juges, tu ses tres bien</td>
<td>Lord judge, you know full well,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Et mentir ne t'en puis de rien</td>
<td>and I cannot lie to you about anything,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qu'en ceste court penitance,</td>
<td>that in this court penance, contricion,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contraction, repentance</td>
<td>repentance and prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N'ont point de lieu ne priere.</td>
<td>have no place at all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocas aussi arriere</td>
<td>And advocates too</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En doivent estre, se la jus</td>
<td>must be kept back, down below,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En terre mortel retenus</td>
<td>there on mortal soil.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vv. 1077-84)

There can be no more time for language to persuade, Justice objects. She is especially concerned that the pilgrim's words, and those of his saintly advocates, will have an emotional effect upon the court (which, in the end, they will):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Et ce pelerin que la oy</td>
<td>And this pilgrim that you have heard,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semble que contre ceste loy</td>
<td>it seems that he wants to go against</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vueille venir par son crier</td>
<td>this law in his plea,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Et par la court toute exciter,</td>
<td>inciting all the court to passion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A quoi ne me puis consentir;</td>
<td>To this I cannot consent;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ou temps passe asses loisir</td>
<td>in the past, he has had plenty of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A eu de faire orisons,</td>
<td>to make his prayers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ses cris et lamentacions</td>
<td>cries and lamentations,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D'avoir establi procureurs</td>
<td>to have secured counsellors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui maintenant ses promoteurs</td>
<td>who would now act as advocates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En ceste court fussent pour li.</td>
<td>for him in this court.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trop tart vient a faire son cri.</td>
<td>He comes to late with his plea.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vv. 1087-98)

But Justice's objections are neatly overruled. To the sound of a trumpet, Saint Michael grants the defendant the right to respond and, indeed, places this decision beyond argument:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A donc a voix de buisine</td>
<td>Then to the sound of the trumpet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fu dit: Bien est chose digne</td>
<td>it was pronounced: 'It truly is a worthy thing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Que responde le pelerin</td>
<td>that the pilgrim speak for himself,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De sa voie et de son chemin,</td>
<td>responding about the path he has taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des ouvrages qu'il a fait</td>
<td>and the deeds he has done,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Et que n'ait d'autre chose plait,</td>
<td>and that on this there be no more debate,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As in *Pierre le changeur*, then, the heavenly court opens up to language, making it possible for the human subject to receive a defense. Deguileville goes a step further than the anonymous author or authors of *Pierre*, however; not only does he insist that his narrator be provided adequate representation, but also that he be allowed to speak for himself. Saint Michael's court becomes eschatological according to one of Levinas's most important criteria: it summons a first-person voice to speak in its own defense.

Through his embattled first-person narrator, it is also possible for Deguileville to represent himself as an author, defending his own work. Consider, once again, Saint Michael's words when he grants the pilgrim his right of response:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Fu dit: Bien est chose digne} & \quad \text{It was said, 'It truly is a worthy thing} \\
\text{Que responde le pelerin} & \quad \text{that the pilgrim speak for himself,} \\
\text{De sa voie et de son chemin,} & \quad \text{responding about the path he has taken} \\
\text{Des ouvrages quë il a fait} & \quad \text{and the works he has done.'} \\
\end{align*}
\]

Saint Michael's use of the term "ouvrages" should be understood in its double sense—both moral deeds and literary texts—just as the composition of devotional poetry is referred to as an "obra mot bona" ("very good work") in the Occitan *Leys d'amors*, contemporary to *PA*.

Indeed, for Deguileville as for the compilers of the *Leys*, the conflation of moral acts and literary activity is less of a play on words than it is a matter of belief which invests literary production with ethical and intercessory weight. The pilgrim must respond both for what he has done and for what Deguileville has written.

The resemblance of the defendant and the author is confirmed once and for all during the trial when Justice enters into evidence against the pilgrim a letter which had been written to him

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16 *Leys*, I:34.
by his mentor Grace Dieu. As Justice alleges, Grace Dieu had sent this letter warning the pilgrim that he must repent or risk damnation, but he—bundled up in his comfy bed "like a lord in his court" (vv. 1571-73)—took no heed of the admonition and threw it on the ground. As Justice argues, Grace Dieu's missive is irrefutable proof that the pilgrim had ample knowledge of the perils facing his soul, but took no action. Drawing on the classic question of the Dies irae hymn, Grace Dieu's wording further highlights the supposed impossibility for the pilgrim to speak in his own defense:

Las, que diras au grant sire  
Die illa die ire?  
(vv. 1769-70)

We may be sure, Justice asserts, that the document was addressed to the pilgrim and to none other, since the first letters of its twenty-four stanzas spell out his name: Guillermus de Deguilevilla. This, one of four such acrostic signatures in Deguileville's body of work, serves to dispel any lingering doubts about the intended resemblance between author and narrator. It suggests that the author's self-presentation is as much an object of judgment in heaven as the narrator's sins, and that the Devil's accusation is also a means for Deguileville to playfully advertise his own verbal talents. In this regard, it is all the more significant that Grace Dieu's letter is an elaborate Latin and French lyric insertion which calls attention to the author's command of verse form as much as it condemns his narrator or consigns him to silence before

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17 For more on how this letter both accuses and individuates the pilgrim, see Pomel, Voies, 406.  
18 Does the episode recounted in the letter refer to events narrated in Pèlerinage de vie humaine? Although both versions of PVH end with the pilgrim on his deathbed, as Grace Dieu tells him about the judgment he is about to receive, the pilgrim does not seem to ignore this information, as Justice claims in the trial.  
19 A similar acrostic occurs toward the end of PA, another in the second redaction of Pèlerinage de vie humaine, and a fourth in Deguileville's last known work, the Pèlerinage Jhesucrist (c. 1358). On naming and authority in Deguileville, see Kamath, "Naming the Pilgrim."
the judgment of heaven.²⁰ Both irrefutable proof of his guilt and an ornate signature, Grace Dieu's acrostic signals the author's responsibility, in the fullest sense of the word; Deguileville/Deguilevilla must be allowed to respond to Satan's accusations, because only he can speak for what he has written.

Before it can be fully understood just how this trial stages the particular judgment of the pilgrim, of Guillermus de Deguilevilla, it is necessary to examine the case of Deguileville's first-person defendant in its entirety, which is to say Deguileville's ouvrages, the poetry he had already written before PA, and in which the author's poetic persona, the pilgrim, is already identified as "Guillermus de Deguilevilla." To provide a thorough account of the potential literary judgments to which the defendant Guillermus de Deguilevilla may have been subject by the second half of the 1350's, when PA was written, it is necessary to consider a complex and often puzzling set of textual references, beginning a quarter century before PA. These documents comprise what we might consider Deguileville's lengthy "case file," since in various ways they already begin to describe the author's work and its reception in terms of accusation and judgment.

²⁰ Each of the letter's stanzas are composed of eight alternating French and Latin verses, with the same end rhyme for each verse in a given stanza and a total of twenty different end rhymes. As Pomel puts it, although speaking of the pilgrim's acrostic writing later in PA, "La création poétique de prières d'un genre complexe et par les jeux de lettres est pensée comme offrande rédemptrice, comme un avatar de la satisfaction pénitentielle" (Voies, 192). Pomel also compares the author's presence in his text through his acrostics to God's presence in his creation (Ibid., 422).
III. Des ouvrages quë il a fait: The First Two Pèlerinages

In 1330-1331, Deguileville produced his first version of an allegorical dream vision, the *Pelerinage de vie humaine* (*PVH1*), a poem of over 13,000 lines. In *PVH* the author casts his first-person narrator as a pilgrim on the way to the heavenly Jerusalem, just as he will do again in *PA*, when the pilgrim is stopped before the gates of the city of God by Satan's bitter accusation. Modeled explicitly upon the dream allegory of the thirteenth-century *Roman de la Rose* by Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun, *PVH1* recounts the pilgrim's difficult journey through life, from birth to death. This includes, most memorably, his wanderings on the left (wrong) side of an enormous hedgerow which stretches the length of the pilgrimage route. On the *voie senestre*, the pilgrim is repeatedly attacked by vicious personifications of the seven deadly sins. At last, with the help of his patient guide Grace Dieu (Grace of God), the narrator makes it alive to the Ship of Religion—the monastic life—which promises to convey him safely across the perilous sea of worldly existence (La Mer du Monde) to the heavenly Jerusalem. Keeping the allegorical voyage-frame of the poem in mind, while Saint Michael's reference to the pilgrim-soul's *ouvrages* in *PA* seems to refer to Deguileville's earlier poetry, so too does the archangel's mention of the pilgrim's *voie* and *chemin* (*PA*, v. 1120), the difficult path he took in *PVH1*. I would like to propose here that the *voie* and *chemin* refer not only to the narrator's precarious

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21 13,482 lines to be exact, in the standard text of Stürzinger's edition.
22 Deguileville's works also include the shorter *Roman de la fleur de lis* (1338, ed. Piaget), a number of Latin poems which are now lost, and a third pilgrimage-narrative after *PA*, the *Pèlerinage Jhesucrist* (1358, ed. Stürzinger). For the most comprehensive discussion of Deguileville's career, see Faral, "Guillaume de Digulleville." Deguileville announces *PA* as a continuation of *PVH* at the beginning of the second poem, affirming that it is "deppendant" "de l'autre songe devant" (vv. 27-28) and that it is an extension of the pilgrimage undertaken by the narrator of *PVH*, "Car encor pas ne l'avoie / Acheve si com cuidoie" (vv. 31-32).
path along the hedgerow, but also to the rough road traveled by the author Deguileville, whose
career following PVH1 was marked by both success and controversy.

The first Pelerinage de vie humaine became one of the most popular literary works of
medieval Europe. In its original form, it was copied into no fewer than sixty-four extant
manuscripts,\textsuperscript{23} translated into numerous languages, regularly reworked in French verse and
prose, and inspired a rich allegorical tradition of its own.\textsuperscript{24} But in 1355, a quarter of a century
after the text had first appeared—and immediately prior to the appearance of PA—the now
sexagenarian Deguileville gave the world a drastic revision of PVH1. The second Pelerinage de
vie humaine (PVH2) is significantly longer than the first, and contains a number of noteworthy
omissions, amplifications and additions.\textsuperscript{25}

PVH2 is usually thought to have been written in response to criticisms of the poem,
although the author's exact reasons for his revision remain unclear. In a completely new
prologue, Deguileville begins PVH2 by explaining that, very often when one dreams, one does
not remember all of the dream at once; only little by little does it come back to mind (vv. 1-8).\textsuperscript{26}

Claiming that PVH1 had been only a preliminary draft jotted down upon awaking, Deguileville

\textsuperscript{23} I take this figure from Maupeu, Pèlerins, 270. For the most comprehensive accounting of
Deguileville's manuscripts, see the excellent reference work compiled by Veysséyre, Drobinsky
and Fréger, "Liste des manuscrits des trois Pèlerinages."

\textsuperscript{24} The French portion of the tradition after Deguileville is discussed at greatest length in Maupeu,
Pèlerins. For the manuscript and early printed edition history, see Chapter 4, "Statut de
l'autobiographie dans les éditions manuscrits et imprimées du Pèlerinage de vie humaine," 267-
338. For later reworkings of Deguileville's allegory by other French authors, including Christine
de Pizan, see the second half of Maupeu's book, 339-589.

\textsuperscript{25} For summaries of the changes made in the second redaction, see Faral, "Guillaume de
Digulleville," 29-47; Maupeu, Pèlerins, 64.

\textsuperscript{26} All of Deguileville's major works are in need of modern critical editions, as Stürzinger's
editions of the late nineteenth century are in very rare circulation, and PVH2 exists only in
manuscript. My quotations of the prologue are taken from Maupeu, Pèlerins, 55-57, where
Maupeu has provided an edition of the the first 94 lines of PVH2. All other quotations and
citations from PVH2 in this chapter are from my own close observations of the text as it appears
in ms. BNF fr. 829.
laments that the text had been taken from him dishonestly and copied widely before it was ready
to be diffused:

Sans mon sceü et volenté
Tout mon escript me fu osté,
Par tout divulgué, et scet Dieu
Que je ne le tien pas a gieu,
Quar a mettre et a oster,
A corrigier et ordener
Y avoit mout, si com perceu
Apres quant bien esveïl fu.
(vv. 31-38)

Sans mon sceü et volenté
Without my knowledge or consent
Tout mon escript me fu osté,
my whole text was taken from me,
Par tout divulgué, et scet Dieu
made known everywhere, and God knows
Que je ne le tien pas a gieu,
that I do not hold this for a pleasant thing,
Quar a mettre et a oster,
for to add and to remove,
A corrigier et ordener
to correct and to put into good order
Y avoit mout, si com perceu
much was left, as I realized
Apres quant bien esveïl fu.
after, when I had awakened fully.

Realizing that they were imperfect, the author says he made a thorough effort to search out the
unauthorized, prematurely circulated copies of \textit{PVH1} and correct them (vv. 39-42). But because
this attempt to amend \textit{PVH1} was unsuccessful, Deguileville wrote \textit{PVH2}, which he describes as
a sort of placard to be hung around the neck of the first version in order to announce the
corrections to readers already familiar with the text of 1330-31:

Et iceluy amendement
Quel qu'il soit et adrecement
Tout entour le coul li pendray,
Pour ce que voir le vouray
Par tous les lieus ou a esté
Sans mon vouloir et sans mon gré.
(vv. 63-68)

Et iceluy amendement
And, as it is, this amendment
Quel qu'il soit et adrecement
and this putting-right of things
Tout entour le coul li pendray,
I will hang around his neck,
Pour ce que voir le vouray
for I would like it to be seen
Par tous les lieus ou a esté
in all the places he has been
Sans mon vouloir et sans mon gré.
without my consent or will.

The first book will embark on a second pilgrimage, with the second version \textit{entour le coul}. This
strange image suggests that Deguileville conceived the belatedly revised \textit{pèlerinage} as an act of
literary penance, that his narrator was to perform a ritual return to the places he had already
been—in the world of readers as much as along the allegorical hedgerow—to announce the sins
he had committed in the first pilgrimage.

The revised prologue is startling and obscure. It has left Deguileville's modern
interpreters with a host of questions. To begin with, for what must the pilgrim atone? It is my
belief that the answer lies partly in the failure of the *PVHI* narrator to provide a suitable example for Christian readers. Not only does the pilgrim choose the wrong side of the hedgerow, but once there, he repeatedly fails to ward off the attacks of the personified sins and consistently ignores the advice of Grace Dieu about how best to defend himself—notably, by donning his heavy spiritual armor, which the personification Memoire is good enough to carry behind him everywhere he travels.

Worst of all, perhaps, the original pilgrim reimmerses himself in sin after receiving what ought to have been a definitive confession and absolution. Nearing the end of his disastrous journey along the hedgerow, the pilgrim makes a long prayer requesting the Virgin's aid—the famous ABC-prayer later adapted by Geoffrey Chaucer (vv. 10894-11192).\(^\text{27}\) He then follows Grace Dieu obediently to the tearful Rock of Penitence, in whose spring he bathes in sincere regret for his errors (*PVHI*, vv. 11239-342).\(^\text{28}\) Yet even this seemingly decisive episode of conversion does not free the narrator from sin. Soon thereafter, he meets Jeunece (Youth), who carries him on her back across the Mer du Monde (the Sea of Worldly Life). In the tempestuous Mer, the pilgrim is thrown about on Youth's back and exposed to the spiritual perils of youth, such as the Homerian "Caribdis"—the desire for worldly learning—and the seductive wheel of Fortune. Having exposed her charge's soul to great danger, Jeunece unceremoniously flies off, leaving the pilgrim to drown in the sea (vv. 12249-50). His only recourse is crying out to God for forgiveness one more time:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Se par Jeunece ai ma vie} & \quad \text{If through youth I have} \\
\text{Une piece use folement,} & \quad \text{used a portion of my life unwisely,}
\end{align*}
\]

\(^{27}\) See Phillips, "Chaucer and Degraveyville."

\(^{28}\) The waters of penitence are tears streaming from an eye in a large rock which Grace Dieu, in the manner of Moses, has struck to make flow. For a good account of this episode, see Drobinsky, "La roche qui pleure."
Douz createur, je m'en repent.  sweet creator, I repent of it.  
(vv. 12286-88)

Following this second, less triumphal expression of repentance, Grace Dieu leads the pilgrim to the Ship of Religion, where he is finally able to take shelter from the turmoil of the world and where he stays out of trouble until personified Death comes for him one day while he lies in bed. But certainly, if Deguileville's narrative is meant to represent the journey of a Christian through life, it cannot be thought very exemplary, except as a model of what not to do. For most of the poem, the pilgrim learns precious little from his long-suffering mentor Grace Dieu, displays a nearly comical weakness of will, and is literally beaten by the sins time and again. His entry onto the Ship of Religion seems like a last resort, born of a failure to exercise his free will and defend himself against Satan's influence in the world.

A negative model, or *repoussoir*, does seem to be what Deguileville had in mind with *PVH1*. In the poem's explicit, Deguileville explains that his narrative has been a cautionary tale which Christian readers should use to avoid leaving the right-hand path to the city of God as his narrator-pilgrim had done:

\begin{align*}
Nulle erreur je ne vourroie & \quad I should like to sow no error \\
Maintenir par nulle voie, & \text{in any way, by any means,} \\
Mes bien vourroie et ai voulu & \text{but rather wish and have wanted} \\
Que par le songe qu'ai vëu & \text{that by the dream I have seen} \\
Tous pelerins se radrecassent, & \text{all pilgrims might find the right road} \\
Et de fourvoiement se gardassent. & \text{and that from detours they might turn away.}
\end{align*}

(vv. 13525-30)

But perhaps with *PVH2*, Deguileville was repenting for having offered readers too much of a negative example. In particular, might the author have been motivated to return to his text after twenty-five years because he felt readers might be unable to separate the disastrous detours made by his first-person narrator from the overall spiritual lesson he intended the narrative to convey? Might the repeated failures of the narrator to keep to the straight and narrow have offered a
spectacle for prurient amusement which threatened to eclipse the text's didactic purpose? Or more simply, might Deguileville, older by a quarter of a century, have felt that the original version of his narrator was lacking in maturity—unfinished—and required some updating?

Whatever his reasons for rewriting, Deguileville's pilgrim-narrator comes off significantly better in the second version: unlike the narrator of PVH1, the revised pilgrim initially chooses the less attractive but correct (droite) path along the hedgerow—that of Labour—instead of opting for the seductive and spiritually lethal left-hand route of Idleness (Huiuseuse). The narrator of PVH2 only crosses to the hedgerow's senestre side later when Jeunece carries the pilgrim there on her back; thus Deguileville also identifies Youth more explicitly as a scapegoat upon whom he can shift at least some of the blame for his failures.\footnote{Another change, however, is that Jeunece is less of a negative character than in PVH1, since she saves the pilgrim from Avarice (v. 11956).}

In addition, the pilgrim displays more bravery and resourcefulness during his time on the left side of the hedge. In PVH1, he is first physically attacked by Peresce (Sloth), then by Envie and her children Traison and Detraction, then by Gluttony and Venus. In PVH2, the pilgrim is set upon first by Gluttony and Venus, then by Envie and family.\footnote{In PVH2, the scene begins at v. 10420} In the midst of the second attack,\footnote{PVH2, v. 10464} the pilgrim of 1355 now calls upon Memory to retrieve his armor so that he can fight off the sins, which he had failed to do in the first redaction. And in PVH2 the pilgrim does not fall victim at all to Peresce (Sloth), who had prevented him from donning his armor in PVH1—exercising his Christian will.

It is not only a question in PVH2 of improved spiritual brawn, but also of more impressive brains. In the first Pèlerinage, the pilgrim is forever asking Grace Dieu stupid questions and failing to grasp most of what she has to teach him. But in PVH2, the pilgrim is a
more accomplished student. When he meets the rest of the sins who lie in wait for him after Envie—and there are considerably more in the second version—he is able to defeat most of them by drawing on his impressive knowledge of doctrine.\textsuperscript{32}

Furthermore, the pilgrim's means of dealing with the sins he has already committed seems more exemplary in the second version.\textsuperscript{33} In \textit{PVH2}, Grace Dieu leads him to the Rock of Repentance after he has foundered in the Mer du Monde and composed his ABC-prayer, and directly before his entrance onto the Ship of Religion, instead of prior to the Mer as in \textit{PVH1}.\textsuperscript{34} The pilgrim does not fall back into sin this time, but makes a triumphant escape from it.

Improving his own conduct from one version of the poem to another, the pilgrim undertakes both his original penance and the penance Deguileville assigns to him in the new prologue. He becomes a more positive exemplar for readers to follow, instead of just a cautionary tale designed to steer them clear of the left-hand path through life.

But it is not the narrator alone who must make a revised pilgrimage to repent for his actions. Apostrophizing his original text in the new prologue, Deguileville also designates the \textit{Pèlerinage} itself as a pilgrim in the world:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
    Ne t'avoie pas apelé & Hadn't I called you \\
    Pieça 'pelerin' et nommé & long ago 'pilgrim' \\
    Afin qu'a cheval ne a pié & so that neither on horseback nor on foot \\
    Alasses hors sans mon congié, & you would go forth without my leave, \\
    Mes pour ce que te menasse & but rather that I might bring you \\
    Avec moy quant je alasse & with me when I went \\
    En Jerusalem la cité & into Jerusalem, that city
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{32} This has been noted by Maupeu ("Tentation," 65); the pilgrim refutes the claims of Astrologie and Idolatry, for example. As in \textit{PA}, the pilgrim's powers of argumentation are on display. As I discuss later in the chapter (164-74 ), the pilgrim is viciously attacked by the same sins he first vanquished—Envie, Trahison and Detraction, plus Conspiration—further along in \textit{PVH2}. This, however, does not seem to be the pilgrim's fault, as it refers instead to treachery the author would have faced from among the brethren of Chaalis.

\textsuperscript{33} On these reworkings of the text, see Maupeu, \textit{Pèlerins}, 71, 73-77.

\textsuperscript{34} \textit{PVH2}, vv. 14812-965. See Pomel, \textit{Voies}, 309.
Ou d'aler estoie exité:  
C'est ou je tent, ce est la fin  
Ou doit tendre tout pelerin.  
where I was stirred to go.  
That's where I'm headed, and it's the end  
to which every pilgrim should aspire.  
(vv. 77-86)

A wayward pilgrim, PVHI has strayed from its intended goal, or has been lured from the straight and narrow path by those who copied and disseminated the text without the author's permission, before it had a chance to be perfected. Like the narrator, PVHI must also wear the penitential placard—the revision—to announce its errors to the world. Deguileville knows that he will bring his book—his fellow pilgrim—with him to the heavenly city (vv. 81-82). One of the things implied by this image is that Deguileville's book will be opened and considered again at the Judgment. Like Jean-Jacques Rousseau four centuries later, the author will stand before God with his work in hand. Or rather, he must stand with it hanging around his neck, and he fears that the unrevised poem may not represent him in the best light.

As can also be seen in the passage quoted above ("avec moy," "ou je tent"), Deguileville labels himself a pilgrim. Indeed, the author appears as the most important pilgrim of all. He must regain control of his disobedient text and his defiant narrator, who are to accompany him to the New Jerusalem, and to whom he is bound for all eternity. The task of regaining control is especially pressing for the author since, as Deguileville claims, he himself had made yet another bungled pilgrimage when he went into the world to search out and replace the premature copies:

Or le m'a fallu mendier  
Aus estranges et empruntrer,  
Mes tart pour li bien corriger  
M'est venu et pour adrecier  
Then I had to go out begging  
and borrowing from strangers,  
butter late the idea came to me  
to correct it and put it right.  
(vv. 39-42)

35 On the multivalent identity of Deguileville's pilgrim, see Maupeu, Pèlerins, 62. Similarly, Maupeu ("Tentation," 52). notes the three identities of the first person subject: 1. dreaming narrator in bed at Chaalis 2. allegorical dream-pilgrim and 3. stand-in for the author. Maupeu (Pèlerins, 207-208) further points out that manuscript rubrics identify the narrator sometimes as "le pelerin," sometimes as "l'auteur" or "l'acteur."
Beginning all over again, the author must now guide his text and his narrator back in the direction of his own original desire and intention in writing, that end "ou doit tendre tout pelerin" (v. 86).

The multiple identity of Deguileville's pilgrim suggests the image of a common *corpus*. The pilgrim's is a literary body inhabited by all three beings at once—author, text and narrator. They must endure an uneasy cohabitation in their journey through the world and be judged together at the end of it. In *PA*, the pilgrim's soul may have departed from its body, but it will still be summoned to respond for the *corpus* in its entirety. Deguileville's version of a textual self—the *pelèrin* in his multiple identity as author, narrator and text—insists on the ethical ties which bind the author inextricably to what he has written.

I have now suggested what Deguileville's narrator might have to atone for, and the way in which his pilgrimage might be read as a more positive example the second time around. But what about the pilgrims who are Deguileville's text and the author himself? Are they just as guilty? Making emendations, must Deguileville also make amends? At this point, Deguileville's treatment of authorial responsibility comes vividly into focus. The question of the creator's responsibility for the work of art permeates especially the second *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* and the *Pèlerinage de l'âme*. Later in the chapter, I return to *PA* to examine how the issue of

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36 Pomel affirms that *PVH2* takes the form of a "pénitence rédemptrice pour son auteur" ("Enjeux," 461).

37 I owe much of my thinking about the pseudo-autobiographical corpus as a shared organism to Laurence De Looze (*Pseudo-Autobiography*), as I have discussed in the introduction (34). Maupeu (*Pèlerins*, 193) makes quite a similar point when he compares the pilgrim's injured body to Alain de Lille's *liber experientiae* and later, to the broken book-body of Pierre Abelard (*Ibid.*, 208).

38 Pomel writes that *PVH2* is part of the beginning of a "débat sur la responsabilité morale et idéologique de l'auteur et sur le statut du texte littéraire" ("Enjeux," 466). Although she leaves
Authorial responsibility is dealt with in the pilgrim's response to Satan in the heavenly court. At the moment, my effort will be to show how the 1355 redaction of PVH suggests the existence of a literary controversy which obliged Deguileville himself to respond.

Although his new prologue does not make explicit the nature of the proposed corrigenda, the changes Deguileville effects in PVH2 have led scholars to a number of possible solutions. First, it has frequently been suggested that the 1355 revision may have been prompted by criticisms of Deguileville's poem by his superiors and/or other monks in the abbey at Chaalis. As Fabienne Pomel notes, statements potentially critical of the royalty and the clergy have been omitted from the second version, while much more of the pilgrim's time is spent grappling with enemies of the church, in the addition of a host of personified sins not featured in PVH1, such as Hérésie, Nigromancie, Astrologie, Géomancie, Idolâtrie and Sorcerie.39 In Pomel's words, "Guillaume aurait donc réécrit son texte pour le rendre plus conforme à une idéologie politique et religieuse, vraisemblablement à l'instigation de certains de ses proches ou supérieurs."40 According to Philippe Maupeu, Deguileville's reasons for rewriting may have included a perceived need for more doctrinal precision on matters concerning the Trinity, original sin, grace and free will.41 While it is difficult to say with certainty what elements of PVH1 would have prompted objections from Deguileville's readers, we may indeed consider many of the changes

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39 Pomel, "Enjeux," 460. See also Pomel, Voies, 246, 434-35; Maupeu, Pèlerins, 72-3; Maupeu, "Tentation," 51.
40 Pomel, "Enjeux," 460. See also Badel, Rose, 367. Faral ("Guillaume de Digulleville," 33) has suggested that Deguileville's motives for the revision may have been doctrinal in nature. On the question of orthodoxy, see also Maupeu, Pèlerins, 80-84.
41 Pèlerins, 83-4. See also Badel: "Les corrections apportées en 1355 montrent que ces critiques ont porté sur des passages trop ambigus de point de vue des théologiens, des vers propres à entretenir dans l'esprit du public, cela d'autant plus que le Pèlerinage avait eu de nombreux lecteurs." (Rose, 375)
as attempts to elaborate points of doctrine more clearly, if not to escape charges of heterodoxy. The pilgrim's own improved behavior—particularly his new ability to refute the personified enemies of the Church by relying on doctrine—seems to echo the position Deguileville may have felt a need to defend against his critics.

In a broader sense, *PVH2* stands out as a more erudite work than *PVH1*, a facet of the revision which has likewise not gone unnoticed by prior scholarship. The prologue of *PVH1* addresses a diverse congregation of listeners, rich and poor, male and female, lay and religious:

A ceuz de ceste region
Qui point n'i ont de mansion,
Ains y sont tous com dit Saint Pol,
Riche, povre, sage et fol,
Soient roys, soient roynes,
Pelerins et pelerines,
Une vision veul nuncier
Qui en dormant m'avint l'autrier.

(vv. 1-8)

As Deguileville announces it in the early 1330's, the endeavor of *pèlerinage* is the human condition in its entirety, the common legacy of the Fall and the collective journey back to God. Deguileville's audience is everyone, his pilgrim an allegorical stand-in for humankind facing tribulation. Apparently in order to reflect the author's project of lay evangelization, manuscript frontispieces for *PVH1* usually depict a tonsured speaker at a podium addressing a large crowd

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42 On the more learned and writerly aspect of the revised text, see Faral, "Guillaume de Digulleville," 30-1; Pomel, "Enjeux," 462-3; Pomel, *Voies*, 246, 526-27, 529; Badel, *Rose*, 367. On how this is reflected in manuscript illumination, see Camille, "The Illustrated Manuscripts," I:77-78.

43 This is not to say that, even in *PVH1*, the pilgrim does not sometimes act as a stand-in for the author. Unlike *PVH2* and *PA*, *PVH1* contains no signature acrostic, but it does refer to Deguileville through mention of his father, "Thomas de Deguileville" (v. 5965). Ironically, this mention is made when Grace Dieu explains to her charge that he is not really Thomas's son, but God's.
gathered outdoors.\textsuperscript{44} \textit{PVH1} is, furthermore, divided into four books which correspond to four days during which the dream vision is to be read out to the pilgrims of this world.\textsuperscript{45}

These nods to the oral context of public preaching are by and large omitted in \textit{PVH2}, which reads as being addressed to a more educated, more ecclesiastical (and more male) readership, rather than to a congregation of lay listeners. It is certainly questionable of what use \textit{PVH1} would have been to laypersons, since it suggests at every turn the inherent wickedness of worldly life and presents the pilgrim's debarkation onto the Ship of Religion as the only good solution to his problems. Now, the text seems destined particularly for a monastic audience. \textit{PVH2} includes several additions in Latin and macaronic verse as well as one in Latin prose, and introduces a host of theological topics not covered in \textit{PVH1}. The new prologue no longer refers to a diverse audience of \textit{pelerins et pelerines}, the text is no longer divided into four books/days, and the \textit{PVH2} frontispiece is typically that of the tonsured author alone in his cell, dreaming of the heavenly Jerusalem in bed or writing at his desk. The enthusiastic worldliness of the pilgrim has been considerably toned down. It is the same worldliness which Deguileville makes an effort to disclaim in the new prologue, when he announces his intent to rescue and redeem the pilgrim following his premature wanderings outside the walls of Chaalis. Might it also be possible that Deguileville had been criticized for public preaching, and that he now wished to portray himself as a more traditional, cloistered Cistercian? What we can say for certain is that the new text turns deeply inward: into the Latin-literate readership of the Church and the Cistercian Order, and into the past misadventures of Deguileville's run as a practicing poet.

Most indicative of this general spirit of revision is an apparent about-face by Deguileville concerning one of his major source texts for \textit{PVH1}, the thirteenth-century \textit{Roman de la Rose} of

\textsuperscript{44} See Maupeu, \textit{Pèlerins}, 270.  
\textsuperscript{45} See Maupeu, "Tentation," 53, 56.
Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun. Here the potential controversy of Deguileville's own text may be considered in light of the ultimate literary controversy of the Middle Ages, the Querelle de la Rose. While it is difficult to speak of a fully blossomed Querelle in the 1330-50's, Deguileville's PVH2 is arguably the earliest known document providing evidence of readers' polemical reaction to the thirteenth-century text. In the prologue of PVH1, Deguileville had singled out the biau roumans de la Rose as his most important influence:

En veillant avoie lëu,  When awake I had read,  
Considere et bien vëu considered, and looked at closely,  
Le biau roumans de la Rose. the beautiful Roman de la Rose.  
Bien croi que ce fu la chose I truly believe it was the thing  
Qui plus m'esmut a ce songier which most moved me to this dream  
Que ci apres vous vueil nuncier. that I now want to tell you about. (vv. 9-14)

The Rose's presence in both versions of PVH cannot be denied, beginning with the choice to cast the narrative as a first-person allegorical dream vision—a Macrobian somnium—in the first place. In its more specific elements, too, the bizarre allegorical landscape of PVH1 recalls the Rose of both Guillaume and Jean. Some of Deguileville's personifications, like Huiseuse and

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46 Faral ("Guillaume de Digulleville," 37 n1) considers that PVH2 is the first text we have that bears witness to the Rose controversy, later to escalate with Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson (see later in this dissertation, Chapter 5, 365). Badel (Rose, 363, 372) and Maupeu ("Bivium," 32) offer the same opinion. Fleming argues, rather unconvincingly in my view, that PVH2 is "weak as evidence of a violent moral attack on the Roman," as, according to Fleming the Querelle de la Rose cannot be said to begin until the attacks by Christine and Gerson ("The Moral Reputation of the Roman de la Rose," 43). However, even Fleming concedes (433) a certain degree of criticism aimed at Jean de Meun by Deguileville.

47 For the most comprehensive accounts of Deguileville's use of the Rose, see Badel, Rose, 362-76 and Huot, Medieval Readers, " Chapter 6: 'Exposé sur le Roman de la Rose': Rewriting the Rose in the Pelerinage de vie humaine," 207-38. See also Maupeu's thorough treatment (Pèlerins, 53-55, 80-87, 98-107, 118-127). In Maupeu's opinion (Ibid., 80-83, 120), the Rose may have been especially problematic for the critical eye it casts on those in religious orders. On the Rose's anti-clericism as a problem for Deguileville, see also Gunn, The Mirror of Love, 34-36.
Raison, are directly borrowed from Guillaume's *Rose*, while their grotesque appearances—and the way they overwhelm the narrator along his journey—owe more to Jean's continuation than to Guillaume's beginning. Like the *Rose* narrator, called Amant, Deguileville's pilgrim has set his sights on a hard-won object just the other side of a heavy fortification. While for Amant, this object is the vaginal *Rose*, Guillaume de Deguileville's pilgrim strives for the heavenly Jerusalem. Deguileville's pilgrim-narrator is particularly drawn from the final incarnation of Jean's Amant, who becomes a holy pilgrim at the end of the poem as he approaches the *Rose*. Amant carries a pilgrim's staff and purse (his genitals) and uses them to gain entrance to the *Rose*'s reliquary, between whose columns (thighs) lies the object of his desire. For Deguileville's pilgrim, the staff becomes Hope, and the purse Faith.

With *PVHI*, Deguileville had meant to reappropriate the image of Jean de Meun's erotic pilgrim for a Christian audience, producing what has been justly called a "contrepartie édifiante" of the *Rose*. But at times, Deguileville's protagonist seems all too similar to the oversexed Amant, his tale not so much a moralizing contrepartie as another continuation. Both pilgrims fall under the violent influence of Venus and abandon the guidance of Raison, while Deguileville's narrator aggravates the situation by also departing from God's grace—his patient teacher Grace.

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48 See Camille, "The Illustrated Manuscripts," I:37. Camille (I:37) notes that in BN fr.12462 the illustrator "visually confuses the Oiseuse of the *Roman de la Rose* which he had depicted in the Chantilly MS [MS. 664]" with Deguileville's figure, especially by giving her a mirror and comb. On Deguileville's borrowed characters, see also Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 118-119.

49 Badel notes the negative impact such parallels may have had on the reception of Deguileville's poem: "Ces points de contact sont assez nombreux pour autoriser un soupçon: Guillaume a pris soin de dire que la lecture du *Roman de la Rose* l'avait 'esmu' à songer; n'y aurait-il pas un lien étroit entre la scène finale si obscène de l'œuvre de Jean de Meun et la métaphore du pèlerinage choisi par Digulleville comme fil directeur?" (*Rose*, 65). On this point, see also Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 85, 119.

50 Badel (*Rose*, 365) considers that *PVHI* provides "une contrepartie religieuse, édifiante" of the *Rose*. The same terminology is later reconsidered by Wright, "Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* as 'contrepartie édifiante.' "
Dieu. In its uncomfortably close resemblances to the *Rose*, *PVH1* may have provoked the censure of those who saw in any use of such a profane text a potential moral threat. Pierre-Yves Badel affirms that Deguileville's poem and its rewriting should be placed in the context of a general suspicion which attached itself to late medieval vernacular literature, namely that "la littérature de fiction, plus apte à satisfaire les désirs des hommes qu’à exhorter les pécheurs à la repentance ou à édifier les croyants, a rencontré de réelles résistances et la réprobation de moines et de clercs qui refusaient tout compromis avec le monde." In other words, in *PVH1*, Deguileville would have associated himself too closely with the seductive, purely entertaining aspects of the *Rose*, failing to produce a sufficiently edifying text or a suitably exemplary narrator. Or, from the opposite perspective, Deguileville may have felt diminished confidence in his readers' abilities to correctly read the ambiguities of a fictional, allegorical text. Feeling himself to some extent responsible for the errors of the audience, he restricted the scope of his address to a smaller and more learned public, made the text's hapless protagonist more of a spiritual hero, and, finally, distanced himself from the one medieval text most emblematic of the confusion between allegorical instruction and vulgar entertainment.

Although *PVH2* retains most of its initial borrowings from the *Rose*, modern critics have generally agreed that the revised *Pèlerinage* reflects Deguileville's attempts to put distance between himself and that text, or at least between himself and Jean de Meun. The *Rose*-less prologue of *PVH2* is not the only clue we have that Deguileville's attitude toward the text had changed, or that he felt it important to make his position in a budding *Querelle* known more clearly to readers. It is, for example, highly symbolic that Deguileville's rewritten narrator now

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51 *Rose*, 371.
refuses to enter the left-hand path attended by Huiseuse, the same character who guards the entrance to the hortus conclusus into which Amant enters as Guillaume de Lorris's *Rose* begins.\(^5^3\) Moreover, at the midpoint of the *PVH*\(^2\),\(^5^4\) Deguileville makes explicit mention of Jean de Meun's *Rose* in an added dialog which casts a highly critical eye on that text. In both versions of *PVH*, the pilgrim encounters Venus, who is covered in filth and travelling the pilgrimage road mounted on the back of a hog. In collusion with Gluttony, she attacks the pilgrim, sending one of her cruel darts into his eye.\(^5^5\) As the scene reoccurs in *PVH*\(^2\), Venus discusses the Roman de la Rose explicitly, and at some length, before she attacks the pilgrim.\(^5^6\) She claims that the *Rose* is her own work and that the person who wrote it—Jean de Meun, presumably—was only acting as "her clerk" ("mon clerc escrivain," *PVH*\(^2\), v. 8632). The pilgrim's response to the new apparition of Venus reads as a rejection not only of the goddess's charms, but also of the more vulgar aspects of the *Rose* associated most with its continuator.\(^5^7\)

\(^{53}\) Deguileville's Huiseuse declares her love of "roumans et choses mencongables" (*PVH*\(^1\), v. 6856). On the diverging path (*bivium*) of Huiseuse and Labour, see Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 122-26. Maupeu (126) sees the figure of Labour (represented as a nattier, a weaver) as an emblem of the good writer, while Huiseuse becomes a potential allegory for the first *PVH*\(^1\), which had made too many concessions to the worldly pleasures of reading. See also Maupeu, *"Bivium,"* especially 22-32.

\(^{54}\) In *PVH*\(^2\), Venus enters the text at v. 8556. Huot notes another way in which *PVH*\(^2\) provides a *contrepartie* of the *Rose*: By placing the exchange of Venus and the pilgrim, critical of Jean de Meun's *Rose*, in the midpoint of his text, "Deguileville thus echoes and subverts Jean's tactic of placing a laudatory statement about his own authorship of the *Rose*, spoken by the God of Love, at the midpoint of the *Rose"* (*Medieval Readers*, 226-7).

\(^{55}\) This is a reprise of the *innamoramento* scene of Guillaume de Lorris's *Rose* (vv. 1678-95), although Guillaume's Amant is shot in the eye by the God of Love, not Venus.

\(^{56}\) Venus's added comments on the *Rose* are an amplification of Raison's much briefer negative mention of the text, which is included in both versions of *PVH* (*PVH*\(^1\), v. 882; *PVH*\(^2\), v. 1195).

\(^{57}\) Maupeu, for one, reads the pilgrim's words as a "condamnation" "parfaitement claire" (*Pèlerins*,120). Maupeu (Ibid., 199-203) relates Venus's mention of Jean de Meun's plagiarism to Deguileville's own stolen text. Gunn (*The Mirror of Love*, 34-36) has discussed the scene as an accusation against Jean de Meun for both plagiarism and anti-clericalism. Sylvia Huot writes, "Since in the context of the *Pelerinage* Venus is a wholly negative character, there can be no doubt that Deguileville means to criticize the *Rose* as a frivolous, even dangerous text"
Toy donc, dis, et ton escrivain
Estes de grant mauvaístié plain
(vv. 8765-66)
You then, I said, and your writer too,
are full of great evil.

The pilgrim's denunciation of Venus and her clerk Jean de Meun underlines more clearly what Deguileville's new prologue merely suggests: that the *Rose* in its most thoroughly profane aspect had proven an undesirable influence on the reception of Deguileville's text, despite the author's best intentions in adapting it to Christian allegory; that the *Rose*, like Venus riding a hog, had become an awkward and unexpected barrier on Deguileville's own path to paradise.

Similarly to the *Rose* and, at least in part, because of the *Rose*, *PVH1* was a work of literature both controversial and extremely popular. If we believe that Deguileville truly did try to interrupt the circulation of the first version, his effort was unsuccessful, as the majority of extant manuscripts include the first *PVH* rather than the second. Indeed, as Deguileville put it in his new prologue, *PVH1* had become something of an unstoppable organic force, a plant whose vines had grown so abundantly (*prouvigné*, v. 43) that it was no longer possible to cut through them all to guide their growth:

En tant de lieus s'est prouvignié
Que jamais n'auroie tracié
Ses provains pour eulx bien taillier
In so many places it spread its tendrils
that never could I have located
its roots to trim them back correctly

(Medieval Readers, 227). Huot further hypothesizes (Ibid., 228) that Deguileville's changed attitude in 1355 could be due to "his having encountered the *Rose* in an unexpurgated, non-*B* manuscript"—in other words, that Deguileville would have seen only relatively clean versions of the *Rose* in the 1330's and then a dirtier one later.

58 See Maupeu, "Tentation," 51. Maupeu (*Pèlerins*, 270) notes sixty-four extant copies of *PVH1* and only nine of *PVH2*. From a different perspective, if part of Deguileville's aim was to limit the text's diffusion, the lesser impact of *PVH2* might well be considered a success. In terms of influence, one major exception to the dominance of *PVH1* is in the English translation by Lydgate, which was based on *PVH2*.

59 On the vine metaphor, see Maupeu, "Tentation," 55; Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 61, 207. Although not speaking of Deguileville, Daniel Hobbins provides a similar metaphor: "Medieval writers released their works to the public much like parents sending their children into the world, hoping they will prosper but fearing the worst. The problem was not just corruption but appropriation and control at all stages of the delivery process" (Authorship and Publicity Before Print, 165).
Et pour eulx a point adrecier, and to amend them precisely,  
La quele chose faire on devroit which thing one should do  
Qui bien adroit faire vouroit, who would like to do what is right,  
Si que celui qui le m'osta so that he who took the text from me  
A mon proufit petit pensa. thought little of my own profit. 

The plant in question seems to be a grape-vine, but this passage cannot be read without also recalling the now-absent Rose, in many ways the original root-stock (provain) upon which PVH had been grafted. Despite the author's best efforts to refashion his narrator—and thus his literary persona—into a more exemplary figure, the wayward pilgrim of PVH remained in circulation to accuse Deguileville for also having strayed from the right path—for having created a narrative which readers might misunderstand to the detriment of their souls.

The first Pèlerinage and its rewriting come back up for judgment again in Pèlerinage de l'âme. But already, in both redactions of PVH, Deguileville has a tendency to stage the author's response to reader criticisms in terms of judgments both legal and eschatological. In particular, well before the heavenly trial scene of PA, the pilgrim finds himself at the center of two episodes which serve to stage the author's reception by readers as a legal drama in which the poet must answer for his work. In addition to acting as preliminary trials in which reading and writing are submitted to judgment, both episodes refer insistently to the eschatological dimension of reading, the way in which the literary text submits itself to an immanent divine judgment through the interpretation of the reader. Before turning back to the pilgrim's self-defense in PA, it is helpful to examine these two episodes for what they can reveal about Deguileville's attempts to defend himself as an author, and about the way he already places his body of work into the frame provided by divine judgment. The first of these legal-eschatological episodes, which occurs in both versions of PVH, relates an accusation the pilgrim suffers at the hands of a certain Rude...
Entendement (Vulgar Understanding). The second scene, a substantial addition made in *PVH2*, depicts the pilgrim facing the false accusations of a group of personified sins who have unlawfully gained entry onto the Ship of Religion.

**IV. The Judgment of Rude Entendement**

Even in the first version of *PVH*, Deguileville seems to have anticipated some of the potential judgments readers might make while following his narrator's pilgrimage. Just starting out on his journey, the pilgrim encounters the hulking villain Rude Entendement: 60

Un grant villain mal façonne,  
Ensomcillie et reboule,  
Qui un baston de cornouiller  
Portoit et bien mal pautonner  
Sembloit estre et mal pelerin  
(vv. 5095-5100)

Lumbering at the pilgrim, Rude Entendement accuses him of presumption ("outrecuidance," v. 5120), since he is carrying a pilgrim's staff and purse despite Christ's directive to his apostles (Matt.10:10, Lk. 9:3) not to carry these items when they go out into the world.

The pilgrim describes the scene as a legal dispute. Just as he will be initially dumbstruck at the beginning of his trial in *PA*, the pilgrim cannot come up with the words to counter Rude Entendement's accusation, and complains that he won't be able to find a suitable advocate to speak for him: 61

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60 In *PVH1*, the scene takes place vv. 5093-632; in *PVH2*, vv. 6880-7217. Rude Entendement resembles the character Dangier from the *Roman de la Rose*, who is first described in Guillaume de Lorris's text as a hulking and poorly-shaped villain (vv. 2918-22). On this episode in Deguileville, its treatment of allegory and its correspondences to the *Rose*, see Huot, *Medieval Readers*, 218-220; Kamath, "Unveiling the 'I,' " 49-53.

61 This is one instance in which the pilgrim finds himself unable to argue well. To add insult to injury, he is bested by an illiterate peasant. But Rude Entendement is one villain who will never conquer paradise *par plait*. 
Quant ces paroles j'entendi, When I heard these words, 
Plus que devant fu esbahi; I was even more startled than before, 
Quar response nulle n'avoie for I had no response 
Ne que respondre ne savoie. and did not know how to answer. 
Un advocat eusse loue I would have happily hired a lawyer, 
Volentiers, se l'eusse trouve, if I could have found one, 
Quar bien en avoie mestier, for I truly did have need of one, 
Se l'eusse sceu ou pourchacier. had I only known where to seek one out. 
(vv. 5139-46)^62

The pilgrim need not worry, however, for Lady Raison quickly appears and accuses Rude 
Entendement of attacking pilgrims. Although not an advocate, Raison is identified as an 
"enquesteresse" (officer of inquest, v. 5176) by Rude Entendement, and her legal action, which is 
carried out by orders from the court of heaven, protects the pilgrim against the accusations of 
Rude Entendement.

Raison, heaven's enquesteresse, proceeds to serve Rude Entendement a kind of cease and 
desist order from Grace Dieu. Because Rude Entendement is illiterate, the pilgrim reads it aloud 
to him (vv. 5219-56): the letter commands Rude Entendement to stop bullying pilgrims with his 
heavy club, Stubbornness (Obstination, v. 5239), and to stop trying to take away their staffs and 
purses. Grace Dieu's letter concludes by threatening to summon Rude Entendement to judgment 
before God should he fail to heed her directive:

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Et se de rien il s'opposoit
Ou obeir il ne vouloit,
Jour li donnasses competent
Aus assises du jugement.
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And if in anything he refuses
or does not wish to obey,
I will give him his day in court
before the seat of judgment.
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(5249-52)

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^62 These lines are echoed in the heavenly trial scene of PA, when the pilgrim expresses fear that he won't be able to secure an advocate (vv. 701-38). In PVH, the pilgrim complains soon after his meeting with Rude Entendement that his own body has begun a vicious trial against him:

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Contre moy pour guerroier
Il est advocat devenu.
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To make war against me
he became a lawyer.

(PVHI, vv. 6772-73)

Grace Dieu had already identified the pilgrim's body as his grans anemis (PVHI, v. 5748). Thus, the pilgrim's body is already closely connected to the Enemy, Satan, who prosecutes him in PA.
Rude Entendement, true to his nature, refuses to listen to Raison. He questions her authority over him by bringing up the scholastic debate over names and things. Rude Entendement claims that Raison is a false name, since millers habitually cheat their customers by using a deceptive measure (raison) for grain. Reason calmly explains that

\[
\text{Autre chose est estre Raison} \\
\text{Et autre chose avoir son non.}
\]

(vv. 5293-94)

But leaning on his gnarled club Obstination, Rude Entendement will not relent and continues to assert that Raison must also be false, since she shares her name with the miller's measure (vv. 5315-36). Raison retorts that Rude Entendement obviously knows how to put forward subtle arguments and nice examples (vv. 5341-42), but that in his own case, his name is perfectly apt, since his understanding of the world is severely limited. This shuts him up for a time, and he can only grind his teeth (vv. 5392-94) at Raison and the pilgrim.

The debate about names recalls a well-known section of Jean de Meun's *Rose*, where Jean's version of Raison argues with Amant concerning her prerogative to name things as she sees fit. In the *Rose*, the word in question is not "raison," but "couilles," (balls, v. 5533), which Raison had used when she told Amant the story of Saturn's castration. When Amant objects to Raison's use of such a vulgar term, she defends herself by noting that God endowed her with the power to name, and that names in themselves are not the same as what they describe. Thus, Raison says, she might just as well have called testicles "reliques"—the word would still refer to exactly the same thing (vv. 7100-120).

In the argument Deguileville stages between Raison and Rude Entendement, the issue is much the same: whether or not the signifier should be identified absolutely with the signified. Raison says no, while the stubborn peasant continues to insist otherwise. Since he cannot read
and lacks a basic understanding of sign theory, Rude Entendement is also poorly disposed to comprehend Scripture, and he brings the discussion swiftly back to the accusation he had first made against the pilgrim: that Christ prohibited his apostles from carrying a staff or purse. Raison reviews the relevant passage of the New Testament and reminds Rude Entendement that shortly before Christ's death, he had changed his command (Lk. 22:36) to reflect the new and more difficult circumstances in which the apostles would find themselves: they should now take along a purse and a sword if they have them. The pilgrim is therefore perfectly in the right (vv. 5419-5704). Ever obstinate, Rude Entendement refuses to acknowledge that God could ever change his commands (vv. 5517-26), and Raison again criticizes his inability to read Scripture deeply (vv. 5527-40). When Rude Entendement still fails to understand, and refuses to stop threatening pilgrims, Raison notes that he is only capable of perceiving the outer covering of allegory, its chaff:

'Je le te dirai,' dist Raison,  
'Grossement a tout le hauton;'  
Quar je voi bien qu'autre viande  
Ta rude gorge ne demande.'

'I'll explain it to you,' said Reason,  
'simply and with all the chaff intact,'  
for I see that your rude throat  
asks for no other food.'

(vv. 5586-88)

Since the metaphor of grain and chaff is commonly used in medieval texts to refer to the significance and the superficial appearance of allegory respectively, Raison is saying that Rude Entendement does not know how to properly sift the outer covering of words from their true intention and meaning. He is a bad interpreter of both everyday reality and Scripture, because he puts more stock in the forms and names things take than in what they are meant to signify, swinging his club at the pilgrims of this world without discernment.
Finally, Raison gives up, refusing to waste any more time trying to convince Rude Entendement. She makes good on Grace Dieu's command to summon him to God's judgment if he won't stop attacking pilgrims:

O, dist Raison, maintenant voi
Que plus n'ai a parler a toi
Fors citer tant seulement
Aus assises du jugement,
Je t'i semont sans plus targier,
Viens i sans nul autre envoier!

Okay, said Raison, now I see that I have nothing more to say to you, except only to bring you before the seat of judgment. I do hereby summon you without delay—you will go there with no other in your place!

(vv. 5627-32)

At the Judgment, the winnowing time, Raison is confident that Rude Entendement will be condemned once and for all, and burned with the chaff. While Rude Entendement will not appear personally *aus assises du jugement* during the soul's trial in *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, some of the most important problems he brings up in *PVH* will: how should Deguileville's text be understood—based primarily on the names and coverings it uses (the chaff), or the fruitful grain which those coverings enclose? Is it up to the author to convey his meaning correctly and precisely, or to the reader to fully comprehend his intentions? And, what's in a name? For instance, "pèlerin" and "Guillermus de Deguilevilla"? Is Deguileville's pilgrim inherently tarnished because of his association with Jean de Meun's *Rose*? Is the author directly responsible for the narrator who shares his Latin name?

As with so much of Deguileville's otherworldly allegory, the episode with Rude Entendement is puzzling. At the very least, it seems clear that Rude Entendement also represents a certain bad reading of Deguileville's text, which would confuse the covering of allegory—the signifying integumentum—with its deepest signification. Rude Entendement is identifiable with potential readers, particularly among the laity, who would either accuse Deguileville's

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63 Matt. 3:12, Lk. 3:17
64 On Rude Entendement as a figure for the bad reader, see Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 127, 135.
The allegorical narrative of being too worldly, or who would find in it only matter for amusement (chaff) and fail to profit from the salutary substance (grain) it encloses.

The identification of Rude Entendement with irresponsible readers is especially pertinent given that the episode evokes Jean de Meun's *Rose* and Reason's treatment of names and allegory in that text. While Rude Entendement objects to the pilgrim's carrying a staff and purse because of his bad reading of Scripture, it is difficult to put out of mind the erotic signification which attaches to these objects at the end of Jean's *Rose*. Raison's condemnation of Rude Entendement, who sees only the surface elements of Deguileville's narrative, might serve to caution readers against the same kind of superficiality which would lead them to identify the staff and purse as a penis and testicles. As Venus will do further along the pilgrim's path in *PVH2*, Rude Entendement represents an unsightly obstacle in the author's way as much as a hindrance for the pilgrim. But he is dealt with swiftly by Dame Raison, who steps in to defend the narrator. That Rude Entendement's accusation against the pilgrim is turned around on him by Raison insists that literature is an enterprise with reciprocal, if asymmetrical, ethical demands. While the author's intentions are a matter for judgment on earth and in heaven, the text's audience is warned that reading or understanding texts in the manner of Rude Entendement may bring dire consequences for them in the next world. The scene begins to construct in Deguileville's corpus as a whole an eschatological context for judgment on the literary work, in which divine scrutiny is immanent, and in which the author already begins to mount his defense against the real or potential accusations of readers.

The apologetic aspect of Deguileville's text—the way the narrator finds himself in the middle of controversies about the author and his work—is still more evident in the second *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*, as is the tendency to measure the judgment of readers against the
judgment of God. When read in its entirety, *PVH2* stands out not so much as a penitential work—as its prologue might suggest—but rather as a document written by Deguileville in his own defense. At times, *PVH2* even becomes a raging tirade directed against the author's unnamed critics, perhaps those who, like Rude Entendement, failed to appreciate the spiritual value of *PVH1*. This aspect of the rewritten text becomes most evident in a startling new scene added to the Ship of Religion section of *PVH2*. It is a scene which suggests that Deguileville was put on trial at the abbey of Chaalis by other monks, at least in part for something he had written, and that the author lost his case. As I show, the episode also insists on a future judgment before God in which the author is to be vindicated and his critics silenced. As a scene of judgment, then, the trial at Chaalis helps to illuminate a number of details in the pilgrim's later judgment in the heavenly court scene of *PA*.

**V. Judgment at Chaalis**

The second *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* is best understood as apologetic in the full sense of the word: the new prologue makes a penitential gesture for letting *PVH1* escape into the world before it was ready, but the revised text also acts as a robust defense of Christian doctrine and the author's own grasp of it. More than that, *PVH2* is an effort by Deguileville to defend and justify his entire literary project to the reader. Nowhere in *PVH2* is this attitude more evident than in an added scene which occurs on the Ship of Religion. There, the pilgrim says he wants to recount something that really happened to him and to none other, and that to make this clear he will give us a poem which spells out his name—*Guillermus de Deguilevilla*—with the first letters of twenty-four eight-line stanzas. As he will do in the heavenly trial scene of *PA*, then, Deguileville
winks at the connection between his unfortunate narrator and himself by framing the inset narrative with a signature-acrostic.  

The story told by the acrostic poem of *PVH2* is this: after the pilgrim had already been on the ship for some time, he was attacked by an evil gang of sins who set out to destroy him and who succeeded in badly injuring him, killing his trusty horse Renommé (Good Name), and forcing his temporary exile from the ship. Although we know very little about any real events this mysterious episode may reference, two things are hard to dispute. First, the episode recounts a legal case—perhaps one brought under canon law at the abbey of Chaalis—and a case which the pilgrim lost to his opponents. Second, as Deguileville meant the acrostic-frame to signify, the scene would seem to refer to the author's own legal problems, which were likely triggered or aggravated by the appearance of his first *Pèlerinage*.

To describe the added scene, Philippe Maupeu has adopted Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani's concept of the "scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie," which I have discussed in the opening pages of this study. Maupeu makes a strong case for this judgment scene as the central episode in a poem whose most important revision would have been Deguileville's move away from a universal, allegorical narrator—the pilgrim as he appears in *PVH1*—and toward a more thoroughly autobiographical first-person speaker. I must nuance Maupeu's terminology somewhat by insisting on the category "pseudo-autobiographical," as I have explained its use in

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67 Maupeu, Ibid., 204, 214. On the importance of the Chaalis episode, see also Maupeu, "Tentation," 61-66.
the introduction. Like most of his work, Deguileville's second redaction of *PVH* is pseudo-autobiographical because the personal details the pilgrim offers are intentionally shrouded in no small degree of mystery. And because the pilgrim is not so much recounting the life of the historical person Deguileville, as that of "Guillermus de Deguilevilla," an identity which encompasses all three aspects of the pilgrim at once: poet, narrator and text. Nevertheless, Maupeu's use of Matthieu-Castellani's term "scène judiciaire" rings true: the scene of judgment at Chaalis seems to refer not only to the real-life legal struggles of Deguileville, but also to the more figurative trial he faces at the hands of a readership larger than his abbey. My analysis of this episode owes much to Maupeu's important work on Deguileville's trial scene; what it adds to Maupeu's account is a consideration of how this *scène judiciaire* is also framed with expectations of eschatological justice and thus directly prepares readers for the celestial legal drama of *PA*.

In *PVH1*, the ship of religion is the beginning of the end for the pilgrim's troubles, a destination nearly as important in and of itself as the final goal of the heavenly city. After the violence of the hedgerow and the storms of the Mer du Monde, the ship is the pilgrim's last refuge, where he settles down into the quiet mysteries of Cistercian life and, finally, where he dies in bed just as the dreaming narrator awakes. In *PVH2*, however, all is not so calm aboard ship, in the ship's castle (*château*) that is the monastery. The narrator says that the castle's porter, Paour de Dieu (Fear of God), had neglected his duty while the king was away, letting enter the personifications Envie, Trahison, Déstraction and Conspiration. This motley crew

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68 Pomel (*Voies*, 418) uses the term "pseudo-autobiographique" to speak about the otherworldly vision poems written by Deguileville, Rutebeuf and Raoul de Houdenc. The term, again, was first used to describe fourteenth-century self-representation by Gybson-Monypenny ("Guillaume de Machaut's Erotic 'Autobiography' ") and then, most influentially, by De Looze (*Pseudo-Autobiography*). See Introduction, 33-34.

69 The image, like much of Deguileville's allegory, is disorienting: the monastery is represented as a ship's castle, that is, as a wooden structure built above the main deck of a vessel. At the same time, it is also a stone-and-mortar castle with a king.
brutally attacked the narrator, killing his horse Renommé and leaving the pilgrim in need of a *jambe de fust* (crutch, v. 16079) in order to walk. The episode recalls a very similar scene of aggression—perpetrated by most of the same sins—which occurs on the left side of the hedgerow in both versions of *PVH*. In *PVH1*, the pilgrim is defeated by Envie, Detraction and Trahison on the left-hand path, while in *PVH2*, he dons his armor and defends himself successfully against these sins. Now, with the addition of the personification Conspiration, the episode happens again, this time aboard ship, and this time to the pilgrim's great misfortune. The repeated act of aggression transforms the nature of the scene; it suggests that the pilgrim has been the victim of other peoples' misdeeds, not his own sins. As a portrayal of the author's own victimization, the episode comes into sharpest focus when he recounts it yet a third time, in the signature-acrostic poem itself. The alternating Latin and French acrostic is introduced in the following way: after the pilgrim has been attacked by the vices, he is suddenly honored with a visit of sympathy by none other than Ovid. The Roman poet offers the injured man a means of exacting revenge on his enemies: he extends to him a passage from his own *Ibis*, a vicious series of curses in elegiac couplets written to an unidentified foe while Ovid was exiled on the Black Sea. The pilgrim makes a point of turning down Ovid's potent venom, reserving vengeance for God "au Jugement / que par devant le Roy atent" ("at the Judgment / that awaits before the King," vv. 16132-33), although he leaves the donated verses right were they are, embedded in his own text and pointed coldly at his own enemies:

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70 *PVH1*, vv. 8191-796.
71 See Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 191. That the pilgrim now faces enemies beyond himself is a major crux of Maupeu's argument for *PVH2* as a more autobiographical and more apologetic text.
72 To summarize, in *PVH2*, three versions of the episode occur: 1. on the left side of the hedgerow, where the pilgrim fights back 2. on the ship, with the addition of Conspiration 3. retold immediately after the attack on the ship by the narrator's acrostic poem, which he insists is a personal anecdote about himself, Guillermus de Deguilevilla.
Terra tibi fruges, amnis tibi deneget undas,
Denegat afflatus ventus et aura suos.
Nec tibi sol calidus, nec sit tibi lucida Phoebe,
Destituant oculos sidera clara tuos.\(^3\)

Let the earth deny its fruits to you,
the rivers their waves, the air and winds their breath.
Let the sun give you no heat, the moon no light,
Let the bright stars abandon your eyes.
(vv. 16109-12)

In the same bitter spirit, the pilgrim-author immediately follows the excerpt from *Ibis* with his account of injustice done to him personally, that is, to "Guillermus de Deguilevilla:"

\[\begin{array}{ll}
& Car a nul tel dueil nappartient \\
& Fors a moy seul dont le dueil vient
\end{array}\]

For to no one else does the misery belong
Except I alone who make the plaint.
(vv. 16146-47)

The pilgrim begins the acrostic-signature poem by summarizing the entire story of his life up until that point, starting with how Grace de Dieu called him to live the religious life, and how his time in the monastery was peaceful and free of worry for many years. In fact, this tranquil period seems to coincide exactly with the events narrated in *PVH1*. Deguileville's effort is thus partly to update the first *Pèlerinage*, by showing that things began to turn sour for him at Chaalis, and that he had not yet died serenely in his bed.

When the pilgrim retells his misfortune—Guillermus de Deguilevilla's misfortune—in the acrostic poem, the judicial nature of the episode becomes clearer, even if certain details seem to be purposefully obscured.\(^4\) The pilgrim describes how the personification Conspiration (or "Scilla") rode him down like a helpless beast:

\(^3\) This excerpt serves only to give a flavor for the entire vitriolic passage, in which Deguileville reproduces the following lines from Ovid's poem (ed. Ellis): vv. 107-18, v. 120, and vv. 123-26.

\(^4\) Most notably, when did the episode occur, assuming it did at all? Soon before the retraction of a twenty-five year old text which had begun to be widely copied, or soon after the appearance of *PVH1*? Faral, for one, thinks the events to which Deguileville refers would have happened
Although Deguileville colors his scene with hunting images, evocative of the Acteon myth, to accentuate the violence done to his own person and his good name (the poor horse Renommé), the juridical sense of the verb *persequens* (v. 16206) is just as evident: Guillermus de Deguilevilla was at once the helpless prey of his detractors at Chaalis and the defendant in a legal action which they brought against him. It seems, moreover, that he either spoke out on his own behalf (*clamare*, v. 16210) or initiated a counter-suit against his opponents. Later in the acrostic poem, the legal aspect for the attack against Guillermus is further supported by the mention of Detraction and her accomplice Murmure swearing testimony ("asseruntque de iure," v. 16234) damaging to the pilgrim and to others in the monastery. After the pilgrim's attempt to speak in self-defense, Trahison retaliates, flattening Guillermus with a "longue masse" ("long mace," v. 16219).

In this episode, Deguileville provides clues that his pilgrim was pursued by his enemies for literary transgressions. Since the pilgrim places his anecdote of personal tribulation directly after the donated verses from Ovid's *Ibis*, it seems likely that Deguileville meant to identify Ovid as one who had been harshly treated and banished for something he wrote, his infamous "carmen relatively early in his career, at the latest before 1335, and thus well before *PVH2* ("Guillaume de Digulleville," 9).

75 Faral thinks it is evident that Deguileville had to face "accusations en quelque sorte officielles" ("Guillaume de Digulleville,"10).
et error" ("poem and error"). It has generally been thought that the *carmen et error* in question was the Roman poet's *Ars amatoria*, a satirical handbook on seduction. Particularly because *Ars amatoria* was also a major source of Jean de Meun's *Rose*, it might be inferred that Deguileville was likewise facing official sanction for his worldly first *Pèlerinage*.

This is not the only reference Deguileville makes in the acrostic poem to another author's literary scandal. As Philippe Maupeu has shown, Deguileville's misfortunes at Chaalis are modeled partly on Pierre Abelard's *Historia calamitatum*, a narrative in which Abelard recounts a double injustice: his castration and the 1121 burning of his *Theologia* for heretical propositions. The parallels with Guillermus de Deguilevilla's own problems are striking: the pilgrim Guillermus seems also to have been maliciously deprived of a lower body part or its use (his leg), while Deguileville begins *PVH2* by complaining of the theft of his book by unnamed copyists. The nature of the revisions hint that the first version of *PVH1* may have been accused of doctrinal imprecision, or even heterodoxy, as was the case with Abelard's book.

Whatever the explanation, things go from bad to worse for Deguileville/Deguilevilla, who, it seems, was excommunicated, or, more likely, forced to leave the order.

Sed video nunc expresse,
Dont grande doleur mon cuer presse,
Quod egredi est nescesse,
Et ailleurs celebrer ma messe.

But I see clearly now,
which still presses my heart with sadness,
that it was necessary for me to go out
and say my masses elsewhere.
(vv. 16274-77)

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77 While pleading with the Emperor Augustus in *Tristia* (II:103-106), the exiled Ovid compares himself to Acteon, who accidentally saw too much. Deguileville's mention of being hunted down by dogs vividly recalls the Acteon myth. According to Simone Marchesi ("Distilling Ovid"), Dante would also have used Ovid's Acteon to identify himself as having been unjustly exiled from Florence in *Inferno* 21 and 22.
78 *Pèlerins*, 207-215, 265
79 On the excommunication hypothesis, see Faral, "Guillaume de Digulleville,"10; Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 91. Maupeu (Ibid., 92-3) further speculates that the accusation against the pilgrim may have been that of necromancy.
Crippled, exiled and humiliated, Deguileville cuts short the advocacy of his fellow exile Ovid and takes solace instead in the faith that the false accusations against him at Chaalis will be rectified by God "au Jugement / que par devant le Roy atent" (vv. 16132-33). Deguileville thus begins to prepare us for PA, when the pilgrim's case is indeed retried in heaven, although with Saint Michael presiding as God's lieutenant.\textsuperscript{80} Already during his tribulation at Chaalis, the pilgrim turns to the Virgin, "legatus celi curie" ("advocate to the heavenly court," v. 16286) asking that she help him and punish his enemies. In the penultimate stanza of the acrostic poem, the pilgrim continues to express his faith in a more perfect judgment:

\begin{align*}
&\text{Legi quodam volumine,} & \text{I read in a certain volume,} \\
&\text{Quant fait est bien examiné} & \text{that when facts are well examined,} \\
&\text{Justicie libramine,} & \text{in the scales of Justice,} \\
&\text{Qui a tort, est tantost miné;} & \text{Whosoever is at fault, is just as soon destroyed;} \\
&\text{Et iustus non redit sine} & \text{And the just man does not remain without} \\
&\text{Honneur quant le plait est finé} & \text{honor when the plea is finished.} \\
\end{align*}

(vv. 16326-31)

The image of Lady Justice weighing all the facts in a great scale will be taken back up in PA, when Justice does exactly that, after arguments have been made for and against the pilgrim. And just as Guillermus predicts in the acrostic poem in PVH2, the judgment will be returned in his favor after the arguments have concluded ("quant le plait est finé," v. 16331).

Before ever getting to the scales of heavenly Justice, Guillermus de Deguilevilla did seem to receive some measure of vindication on earth. Just after his acrostic poem, the pilgrim recounts how the king returned to the ship's castle (the monastery) and made things right again by punishing the pilgrim's enemies, chastising the negligent porter and reinstating the pilgrim. The king's return is a secular allegory for return to order in the abbey—the royal abbey of Saint

\textsuperscript{80} Maupeu has noted this continuity, although without developing the idea further: "C'est ce nouveau procès qui attend l'âme du pèlerin dans le Pèlerinage de l'ame" (Pèlerins, 94 n1).
Louis—but it also refers to the eschatological judgment to come, the triumphant return of Christ the King. The pilgrim trusts that the judgment which awaits before this king ("que par devant le Roy atent") will clear his name—Guillermus de Deguilevilla—once and for all. In the new trial scene, as in the pilgrim's previous encounter with Rude Entendement, judgment on earth stands in immediate proximity to judgment in heaven, which rushes into the void created by any act of injustice.

The scope of this immanent eschatological judgment includes the sphere of literary production, in which the author is called to respond to the criticisms of his audience. Deguileville, apparently obliged to the readership to correct his mistakes after twenty-five years, also uses the occasion to replay a now obscure legal event. In the recounting of the event, he pleads his innocence, lashes out at his unnamed detractors, and finally, promises an appeal—a sequel—before the pearly gates. Thus, the future Judgment in Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme* is already made present in the author's earlier writing. This is especially the case in the legal scene of *PVH2*. But even in *PVH1*, as I have suggested with the stubborn (and illiterate) critic who is Rude Entendement, Deguileville stages reader reception by framing it with the awareness of a continuous divine judgment. As I now turn back to reexamine the trial scene of *PA*, when that judgment is revealed, it is possible to show in greater detail how Deguileville's pilgrim is defending not only his soul, but also the author's body of work.

VI. "Jugement que par devant le roy atent:" The Pilgrim's Self-Defense

*PA* picks up where *PVH*, in both of its redactions, leaves off. Aboard the Ship of Religion, the pilgrim falls ill and is visited by Death, sickle in hand and open casket at the ready to collect the pilgrim's body. Grace Dieu, at the pilgrim's bedside, informs him that his soul will
soon be judged worthy or unworthy to enter the long-awaited city of God. The dreamer does not proceed directly to his judgment, but awakens to the sound of the abbey bells chiming matins, at which point \textit{PVH} ends. As \textit{PA} begins, the narrator has returned to bed, full of anxiety over the fleeting nature of human existence. He tosses over onto his other side ("sus l'autre couste," v. 24) and has another dream.\footnote{This prologue to \textit{PA} does not occur in all manuscripts. For example, BNF fr. 829 transitions more swiftly between \textit{PVH} (in its second version) and \textit{PA}.} Thus begins the particular judgment scene, where the soul of Guillermus de Deguilevilla will have to answer for all three manifestations of the pilgrim: author, text, and narrator. As the "other side" ("l'autre couste") of the first dream vision and its \textit{re}-vision, the eschatological scene of \textit{PA} stages a retrial of the pilgrim's case in a new and more perfect forum.

I have already outlined the basic shape of this judgment scene, which Deguileville adapted from the Devil's Rights tradition with a first-person narrator sharing his name. But just as Deguileville makes plain in the signature-acrostic of \textit{PVH}2, the resemblance between the fictional defendant Guillermus de Deguilevilla and the author is more complex than just a shared name; rather, it designates a pilgrim who is at once author, book and narrator, a textual self for which the poet must answer as an individual.

In \textit{PA}, the conflation of the narrator-defendant and the author is suggested most dramatically through the pilgrim's abilities to speak eloquently in the heavenly court, which highlight Deguileville's own gifts of rhetoric and poetry.\footnote{The conflation of author and narrator through their uses of language is an important characteristic of Deguileville's work in general, as his many inset lyric pieces show. It is a connection which is further underlined by the tendency of illuminators to depict the praying pilgrim holding a sheet of writing out to the Virgin during the ABC-prayer episode of \textit{PVH}, as in BNF fr. 828, f.58ra and BNF fr. 1138, f.99va.} After expressing grave doubts about his ability to find representation, and against the bitter objections of Justice and Satan,
Deguileville's defendant launches into his impassioned and highly successful request for intercession (vv. 739-1074); later in the trial, he takes the floor himself to answer Satan's charges and turn the accusation back on his accuser (vv. 1406-84). And why shouldn't this pilgrim, who bears no small resemblance to the author Deguileville, be able to find adequate representation in heaven? As a Cistercian monk, it was part of Deguileville's job to pray effectively for intercession. He may also have considered himself a preacher, and thus an orator, since illuminations in his manuscripts often depict the author speaking to a crowd, including in some frontispieces for *Pd.* An intercessor with the intercessors, Deguileville casts his pilgrim as one whose requests for aid are both eloquent and particularly effective. While Deguileville's identity as a Cistercian marks him as a practitioner of rhetoric, so too does his career as a poet writing in French verse, in the tradition of second rhetoric. All three facets of Deguileville's rhetorical activity—prayer, oratory, and poetry—combine in the pilgrim's speeches to the heavenly court and suggest the author's own ability to produce heavenly rhetoric. In order to show how Deguileville stages the resemblance between his narrator and himself through their uses of language, it is helpful to examine the pilgrim's speeches to the court in some detail, beginning with his initial request for legal aid (vv. 739-1074).

Considered as poetry, the first speech to the court is a good example of Deguileville's often overlooked tendency to insert into his narratives lyric compositions attributed to characters within the text, especially Guillermus, the narrator himself. Already I have mentioned three similar instances of lyric insertion: the ABC-prayer in both versions of *PVH,* which was later

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83 For example, in MS BNF fr. 829, f.140r. In the left-hand panel of the frontispiece, a tonsured speaker addresses a crowd of listeners, including laypersons and women, seated outdoors on the ground. In the right-hand panel, the soul of the same tonsured figure, now lying dead, is shown ascending from its body. I have already suggested that Deguileville may have been criticized for public preaching, or for the more worldly aspect of *PVHI* symbolized by the author-as-preacher motif.
adapted by Chaucer; the acrostic-poem introduced in *PVH2* by Ovid's *Ibis*; and Grace Dieu's letter, which Justice enters into evidence against Guillermus in *PA*. Just as Guillaume de Machaut and Jean Froissart accomplish in their great *dits courtois*, Deguileville's pilgrim symbolically performs the author's own composition through such lyric interludes. As is the case in the great works of Machaut and Froissart which I discuss in the following chapters, poetry becomes the narrator's primary mode of action, which the larger narrative often seems to have been put into motion to sustain and explain.

In *PA*, Deguileville uses the frame of divine judgment—the sublime forum in which the narrator is allowed to speak—partly in order to highlight his own ingenuity as a poet and a rhetorician. The pilgrim's first speech in *PA* is composed of twenty-eight stanzas of twelve verses apiece, with the classic rhyme scheme aabaabbbabba, developed by Hélinant de Froidmont in his *Vers de la mort* (late 1190's) and used frequently thereafter by poets writing in the *complainte* genre. In total, Deguileville's inserted poem contains thirty-four different end-rhymes and never repeats the same combination used in a given stanza. The speech is a conspicuously intricate performance of poetry and gives the lie to the pilgrim's claims of verbal inadequacy in the beginning of the poem itself:

Mes n'ai pas experience  But I have no experience
De demander ne science  in pleading nor knowledge of it,
Qui griefment me desco  which deeply troubles me.
     (vv. 766-68)

At this point, it is also useful to remember that Deguileville's description of the trial scene is composed mostly of sound imagery, since the pilgrim cannot see past the *courtine* which blocks

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84 On the importance of the ABC-poem, and on Deguileville's neglected lyric insertions in general, see Phillips, "Chaucer and Deguileville." As Phillips writes, "Like many late mediaeval dream poems, the *Pèlerinage*, particularly [its second redaction], is a sophisticated lyrico-narrative hybrid, with the potentiality for raising provocative questions about relations between texts and life" (15). See also Hüb, "L'apprentissage de la louange."
his view of the heavenly court. The auditory qualities of the episode serve to underscore the heated oratorical character of this trial. Saint Michael thunders pronouncements to the voice of a trumpet, for example, while Satan and Justice are constantly shouting objections at the bench. And into this same forum Deguileville inserts himself as a poet and a monk, his pleas in verse rising among the voices of the angels.

As much as it is an act of poetry and prayer, then, the pilgrim's first speech to the court also becomes an insistent demonstration of his oratorical abilities. Significantly, while the pilgrim uses this speech successfully to request Mary's advocacy (vv. 871-932), none of the Virgin's words on his behalf are represented directly in the poem. Instead, Mary pleads to Christ behind the scenes. Her traditional speaking part, as a heavenly advocate arguing for clemency, is shared between the personification Misericorde—who is also decidedly Marian—and the pilgrim himself.

Indeed, Deguileville seems to borrow the Virgin's typical courtroom persona from the Devil's Rights tradition precisely in order to showcase his eloquence in the heavenly court. The pilgrim resembles advocata nostra especially in his repeated appeals to pathos, that is, his direct attempts to excite the court to pity, which is precisely what Justice wishes to prevent when she objects:

| Et ce pelerin que la oy               | And this pilgrim that you have heard, |
| Semble que contre ceste løy         | it seems that he wants to go against |
| Vueille venir par son crier         | this law in his plea, |
| Et par la court toute exciter,      | exciting all the court to passion. |

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85 This is in contrast to much of the rest of Deguileville's work, which is often intensely visual. But as the pilgrim's guide Grace Dieu tells him in PVH2, to begin to understand divine truth, he must put his eyes in his ears (vv. 3672-75), rejecting visual evidence for faith.
86 For example, her breast is exposed (PA, v. 2314. See also PVH1, vv. 13281-366). The illuminator of ms. BNF fr. 12465 seems to have purposefully or accidentally conflated Mary and Mercy, since although Misericorde is speaking in the surrounding text, the illumination at f. 102ra shows a haloed Virgin kneeling before Christ seated in judgment.
A quoi ne me puis consentir; To this I cannot consent;  
(vv. 1087-91)

As in *L'advocacie Nostre Dame* and *Pierre le changeur*, the prayers beginning the arguments of the defense are a Ciceronian *exordium*, directly addressed to Michael, Mary, Christ, and the assembly of saints in order to stir their compassion. The pilgrim's efforts to elicit the court's sympathy dominate his speech:

*En moi sont miseres maintes*  
*Plus asses quë en encaintes*  
*Femmes prestes d'enfamentem.*  

In me are so many miseries,  
more even than in pregnant women about to give birth.  
(vv. 1006-8)

Like the lawyer-Virgin of the Devil's Rights, the pilgrim also makes emotional appeals based on family ties: a Cistercian, he names Saint Benedict as his spiritual father (v. 1017) and begs him for assistance; he likewise calls upon his namesake and Cistercian "godfather" (*parrain*, v. 1039) Saint Guillaume de Bourges not to forsake him.  

*Only sporadically does the pilgrim interlace his exordium with direct acknowledgments that he has sinned:*

*Bien scai certes que j'ai grant tort*  
*Et que la pardurable mort*  
*J'ai pieca bien deservie*  

Well I know that I have done great wrong  
and that eternal death  
I did long ago deserve.  
(vv. 895-97)

Although the speech is an expression of repentance, it is also very much an attempt for the pilgrim to defend himself through persuasive rhetoric, rhetoric which is meant to keep readers in mind of Deguileville's own powers to compose verse.

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87 On belief in the intercession of Benedict for individual Cistercians, as recorded in the traditions of the monastery at Monte Cassino, see McLaughlin, * Consorting with Saints*, 216.
Even when the pilgrim is asking others to speak for him, his ability to defend himself is evident. In his opening prayer to the court, the pilgrim already begins to establish a defense by displacing blame onto Satan and his ilk:

- **Par mes annemis decëu,** By my enemies I was deceived
- **Si comme tu Dieux l'as scëu,** just as you, God, knew,
- **Et pour qui sui en jugement,** and on their account I now stand in judgment,
- **Puis qu'en povrete sui chëu,** for into poverty I fell
- **Et qu'ai trouve ve et hëu** and since I found misfortune and anguish
- **Qui me maistroient durement,** which roughly governed me,
- **Drois est, se raison ne me ment,** it is right, if reason does not fail me,
- **Que je quiere sens targement** that I seek some help without delay,
- **Quelqu'aide ou j'arai pëu,** or I will have but little,
- **Sachant se cha ritablement** knowing if in charity
- **Qui que soit ou piteusement** or in pity anyone
- **Sera devers moi esmëu.** will be moved to help me.

(vv. 751-62)

Since Mary's argument on behalf of Adam and Eve in the *Advocacie Nostre Dame* is also that they were deceived by Satan and thus did not come rightfully into the Devil's possession, the pilgrim's application of this claim to his own case suggests that the narrator is assigning himself not only Mary's rhetorical skills, but her legal tactics as well.

The pilgrim's ability to plead, and its resemblance to that of the lawyerly Virgin, are also on display in his other substantial speech to the court (vv. 1406-84), which is a more direct attempt at self-defense. In this speech, the pilgrim cites Genesis (v. 1422) as a precedent for the corruption of mankind's powers of judgment, and then dramatically points across the courtroom to Satan, who also happens to be acting as the court's notary, transcribing the proceedings. The pilgrim claims that the Devil, "this wicked scribe," clouded his youthful judgment to the point that he could not help but do wrong, just as he had deceived Adam and Eve into disobeying God:

- **Car ce mauvais tabellion** For this wicked scribe
- **Qui ores a mes maux escris** who has written down my wrongdoings
- **M'a en tout temps si de pres prins** has always taken such evil advantage of me
- **Que pas n'ai ëu grant lesir** that I have not had much freedom
De bien deles le mal choisir.
Une fois mal pour bien monstre
M'a, autre fois envoine
M'a mal en semblance de bien
En tel maniere que, quant rien
Mal au premier ne savoie,
DECeU je me trouvoie.
(vv. 1426-36)

to choose to reject evil.
Sometimes he showed me evil as good,
sometimes he shrouded the evil
in semblance of good
in such a way that when I
knew nothing to be evil at first,
I found myself deceived.

Like the lawyer-Virgin, the pilgrim refutes Satan's emphasis on his individual responsibility by bringing the matter back to a preexisting and general state of moral blindness incurred by the Devil's own malice in Eden. In so doing, the pilgrim also returns to the problem of free will, which had so dogged him in PVHI, when he was in the grips of Sloth (Peresce) and failed to don his heavy armor.

Even as he attempts to establish that he is not responsible for his sins as an individual, the pilgrim-defendant continues to insist upon his individuality by eloquently upholding the reputation of Guillermus de Deguilevilla the rhetorician. And however the reader—or Satan and Justice—might judge the validity of the pilgrim's pleas, they are evidently quite successful in this version of the heavenly court. After some tense moments of deliberation, a directive comes down from a court still higher than the one over which Saint Michael presides: Christ sends a brief to Misericorde announcing that, moved especially by his mother's pleas, he will make a particular gift of grace to the wretched pilgrims of the world. While the Redemption (the "grant et general" provision of grace) does not afford salvation to those who consistently fail to follow the right path (vv. 2394-2410), those pelerins chetis who repent and make a sincere confession, even in extremis (vv. 2415-20) will be spared condemnation. Christ's letter is placed into Dame Justice's balance scale, where it outweighs all of the evidence against the pilgrim. Not only does this
wretched pilgrim succeed in gaining a pardon for himself, then, he also defies the claims of Satan and Justice that there can be no place for persuasive speech at the Judgment.  

Deguileville the author gets around the theological problems inherent in repentance after the moment of death by using the dream-vision frame to his advantage: the pilgrim is really praying to heaven for mercy as he dreams in his bed at Chaalis, not at the time and place of his particular judgment per se. The loophole provided by the dream gives Deguileville more creative freedom in which to depict his narrator speaking effectively to the court. As an imagined scene of divine judgment into which Deguileville projects himself, however, the trial scene is fully eschatological in the sense which Levinas gives to the term: the scene shows divine judgment breaking through the surface of the everyday and manifesting itself in the present moment; it shows divine judgment taking language into account—the first person language of the defendant and the author himself. In that, the trial already begins to suggest a judgment on the spiritual and rhetorical worth of Deguileville's poetry, if not yet on poems the author had previously written.

Following Christ's directive for clemency, Michael consigns the pilgrim to a term in purgatory, until such time as the disputing parties Mercy and Justice are reconciled. The sentence is faithfully carried out, although Justice and Satan object vociferously and promise to appeal at the "grant jugement derrain" (v. 2616), when the pilgrim's body and soul will be

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88 As in the *Advocacie Nostre Dame*, the pilgrim's trial is marked by a strong emphasis on exception. Deguileville's pilgrim uses the terms *excepcion* and *excepter* (v. 953, v.1147) to claim that Satan should be excluded from pleading since he was long ago banished from the heavenly court, and to get Synderesis's testimony thrown out on the basis that she is a worm (v. 1297). Argument from exception is also employed by the personification Misericorde, who contends that all people stray from the correct path once in a while, *excepte* Christ and his mother (vv. 1943-47). Saint Michael, for his part, declares that only lies are excepted from being admitted into evidence in his court (vv. 1346-52).

89 This is a common topos of eschatological representation, particularly in the *Procès de Paradis* genre. Psalm 85 refers to the reconciliation of mercy and truth. Aquinas asserts that justice and mercy must be present in equal measure in each act of God's judgment (*ST* 1a, Q.21, art. 4).
reunited and judged together by Christ himself. After being led away by his guardian angel, the
pilgrim is purified in the fire of purgatory; but Deguileville does not spend much time
documenting his suffering. Instead, the narrator's sentence becomes an occasion for visiting all
the realms of the afterworld under his angel's guidance. He spends the rest of *PA* detailing the
terrible punishments meted out to sinners in hell and examining celestial mysteries such as the
Redemption and the liturgical calendar. Effectively, although the pilgrim must endure purifying
flame, the outcome of the trial is also a triumphant gesture, in that it authorizes him to keep
writing poetry. As is the case in Dante's eschatological saga, the poet strives for paradise but is
most at home in purgatory. It is a space for constant change in which, as in earthly life, more
writing is always to come.

Because it enables the narrator to avoid eternal punishment—and allows Deguileville to
continue making poetry once the trial is over—rhetoric assumes a surprising degree of agency in
this version of the heavenly court. It therefore rings somewhat incongruously when, nearing the
end of his long dream, the narrator claims that one of the most important lessons he has learned
is that prayers can have no influence on God's judgment after the moment of death:

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Par le songe endoctrinement
Ai eu et enseignement
Que oroison ne priere
Rien ne valent en jugement
Puis que a fait departement
L'espirit de sa teniere.
Penitence mise arriere
N'i a ne semblant ne chiere,
Vain y est tout gemissement
Ne rien qui la balanciere
Muer pëust, tant est fiere,
De faire son pois justement.
(vv. 11042-53)
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Through the dream
I was taught
that neither rhetoric nor prayer
are worth anything at the Judgment
after the soul has departed
from its earthly dwelling place.
Repentance put forth
has no meaning there,
vain is any emotional plea
and there is nothing that may move
the scale-keeper [Justice]
from weighing the matter justly,
so proud is she.
In fact, that "neither rhetoric nor prayer" has any place in the Judgment seems to be precisely not
the lesson which Deguileville's pilgrim learns from his trial. Inasmuch as justice has been done
in the heavenly court, it has been carried out through intricate prayers which draw attention to
the poet's own ability to use language persuasively. Deguileville's doubling of "oroison" and
"prière" in the passage above recalls the Latin etymology of "oroison," from oratio, meaning an
instance of rhetorical speech. Indeed, Deguileville's pleonastic coupling of oraison and prière
only serves to erase their distinction. Although it may be true that there is no place for pleading
at the Judgment itself, Deguileville suggests that the rhetoric he employs in this life is constantly
being judged and will thus serve in his defense before God.

And inasmuch as the pilgrim's rhetoric—his ability to speak for himself—refers to the
verbal abilities of Deguileville the Cistercian-poet, the scene of judgment assumes literary as
well as soteriological dimensions. Or rather, both the literary and the soteriological are conflated
in Deguileville's eschatological scene, which stages the judgment of the author's own poetic
persona. As Deguileville suggests in his prologue to PVH2, his pilgrim is not only the author and
the narrator; he is also the text. That is to say, the poetic persona Guillermus de Deguilevilla is
also a literary persona, who must use his gifts of eloquence to respond for what he has already
written, to answer the real or imagined accusations of readers.

**VII. The Soul Speaks in Defense of the Corpus**

As Grace Dieu's damning letter proves, the pilgrim now standing before the court is none
other than "Guillermus de Deguilevilla," the very same human being responsible for the
Pèlerinage de vie humaine. In that the narrator on trial and the author are conflated into one

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90 This recalls Augustine's gloss on the noun orator in De doctrina, IV:87, in which he says that a
speaker should be "orator antequam dictor," a man of prayer before he is a man of words.
pseudo-autobiographical pilgrim-figure, the defendant's response to Satan's accusation works on both levels: the narrator must answer at once for the narratives in which he was previously involved as protagonist, and for the literary sins of Deguileville the author.

First, it is important to note that the evidence used by Satan and Justice in PA is drawn directly from the events of PVH, which usually precedes PA in manuscripts. For example, in his opening statement to the court, Satan makes reference to a scene which readers can easily identify in terms of the pilgrim's failure to stay clean of sin in PVH after he had bathed in the tears of penitence:

Bien scai que par l'eaue passa  
Et que dedens on le lava;  
Mes tantost com cognoissance  
Il ot et apercevance,  
Sa lavëure pou prisa  
Et en l'ordure se bouta.  
(vv. 597-602)

I know well that he passed through the water  
and that in it he was washed;  
but as soon as he had understanding  
and awareness of this,  
he valued his bath at but little  
and threw himself back into the filth.

In fact, this accusation is significantly more relevant to PVH1 than to PVH2. In PVH1, the pilgrim confesses his sins, bathes in the tears of penitence, and yet goes on directly to immerse himself in the Mer du Monde. As I have discussed, the pilgrim's penitence undergoes significant correction in PVH2, in that it concludes the worldly escapades of the pilgrim's young life instead of only beginning them; the pilgrim's bath in the tears of Penitence comes after the Mer du Monde in the revised text and immediately before his entry onto the Ship of Religion. Satan's accusations about the pilgrim muddying himself after having bathed would thus be more difficult to prove if PVH2 is entered into evidence.

Similarly, Justice cites the pilgrim's gross "recidivance" (v. 2134), a charge which is substantially more true for the pilgrim in PVH1 than in PVH2. Justice also recalls how Grace
Dieu had instructed the pilgrim precisely on how to use his spiritual armor, and how he had failed to do so:

Quel excusance puet avoir, What excuse can he have,
Quant Grace Dieu en son manoir when Grace Dieu in her house
Les armœures li bailla gave him his armor
Et l'aprist et endoctrina and taught and instructed him
Comment soustenir les devoit in how to wear it,
Et comment armer s'en devoit and how he should put it on
Contre tous ses adversaires, against all his adversaries,
Et coment ne prisa gaires and how he did not care at all
Quanque li dist, car n'en fist rien. about anything she said, for he did nothing.
Je le vi et m'en souvient bien. I saw it and remember well.
(vv. 1559-68)

Deguileville's medieval reader too, remembers how the pilgrim failed to act on Grace Dieu's instructions about his armor. But again, this is only part of the story, or rather a different story entirely for readers who are continuing the pilgrim's adventures from PVH2 to PA, instead of from PVH1. In PVH2, the pilgrim does not forget Grace Dieu's teaching: he puts on his armor and successfully resists Envie, Trahison and Detraction when he first meets them along the hedgerow, before going on to triumph over the enemies of the Church with his knowledge of doctrine.

One conclusion that might be drawn from the tendency of the prosecution to rely primarily on PVH1 for its evidence is that Deguileville is once again staging the judgment of his earlier text for having sown error and misunderstandings among his readers. For only when it is convenient to their case is the prosecution inclined to recall episodes from PVH2. Notably, Justice contends that the pilgrim was not a faithful Cistercian:

Se le pelerin qui est la If the pilgrim there
En la religion entra entered into religious life
Et il ne l'a pas gardee and did not keep to it
Si com pensoit a l'entree, as he thought at the beginning,
Non pas qu'on li ait empeschie, not because he was impeded,
Mes seulement par son pechie but only because of his own sin
Et par corrupcion de li, and his own corruption,
Il m'est avis et ainsi di it is my opinion, which I state here
Que pou vaut sa religion. that his religion is worth but little.
(vv. 2143-51)

Justice's words evoke the shadowy trial proceedings brought against Guillermus while he was aboard ship in *PVH2*, and the fact that he was forced to celebrate his masses elsewhere. In *PA* Guillermus calls on Saint Benedict to provide him with testimony that he was, in fact, a good monk, but Justice's questioning of the pilgrim's activities as a Cistercian serves to reopen the obscure dispute related in *PVH2*'s signature-acrostic poem. The heavenly court must consider whether Deguileville himself had strayed from the right path, in company with his pilgrim. This depiction of the particular judgment submits to scrutiny not only the pilgrim-soul, but also his *corpus* and, by extension, the body and soul of the author himself.

At the same time, the pilgrim's need to act as an advocate on his own behalf already describes a fragmented version of the textual self, suggesting that the creator is now at a certain distance from his original pilgrim, for whom he is still, nevertheless, responsible. The author must face his own conscience, his own eschatological record, even if he now feels himself removed from the events set down in that record. The theme of an eschatological text is suggested most powerfully in *PA* through the star witness for the prosecution, the terrible worm Synderesis, who represents the pilgrim's own conscience.\(^91\) Like the accusations of Satan and Justice, Synderesis's testimony is also seemingly drawn from the events of *PVH*. Unlike the speeches of Satan and Justice, however, the narrator does not reproduce most of what Synderesis says verbatim. This is because, the narrator claims, it would take him too long. Yet a more likely reason seems to be that this information would be superfluous to the reader, who has been following the pilgrim throughout his journey from *PVH*:

\(^{91}\) For more on Synderesis, see Pomel, *Voies*, 354-56.
Et saches bien certainement
Quë oncques nu
l mal je ne fis
Que ne déïst en presence
De tous et en audience.
Longuement le mist a dire,
Et je aussi a ce escrire
Trop longuement y mectroie,
Faire aussi ne le vouroie,
Car ce seroit irision
A moi et grant confusion.
(vv. 1373-84)

And know in certainty
that I never committed any sin
that she did not bring up
in the presence of everyone assembled.
She took a long time to say it,
and I would take
too long to write it all down.
Moreover, I wouldn't want to do so,
for it would be harmful
to me and disturbing.

Synderesis's testimony is already written down and available for all to read: it is the pilgrim's own text which now stands before the court (en audience) to accuse him.

Synderesis is a dark reflection of Deguileville's tripartite image as a pèlerin: author, narrator and book bound together and responsible for each other. The pilgrim describes Synderesis as a shriveled hag's head perched atop a worm's tail. Her teeth have been worn down to nothing from always gnawing at the pilgrim's unrepentant heart. Synderesis's repulsive, flapping gums are living proof that the pilgrim had been repeatedly warned by his own conscience but failed to pay attention. She is hideous only because, as she tells the pilgrim, he has made her so:

Mes tu t'es tout deffigure,
Deffourme et defaiture
Par mains peches et par divers,
Par mauvais dis et fais pervers
(vv. 1317-20)

But it was you who disfigured,
disformed and defaced yourself,
by many and diverse sins,
by bad things said and perverse works

Synderesis claims that her profound ugliness is merely a transparent record of the pilgrim's soul, his personal book of conscience, which overlaps significantly with Deguileville's own book. If the pilgrim-narrator had committed "many and diverse sins," isn't the author just as responsible for his conduct?
In this sense, Synderesis's choice of words in the above passage—"par mauvais dis et fais pervers" (v. 1320)—might be read as a pun. As the plural of *dit*, "Dis" can mean "things said," denoting the ways in which Deguileville's narrator may have committed various sins of the tongue, such as blasphemy. But *dit* is also a medieval designation of poetic genre which, although fairly loosely applied in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, always means some kind of a first-person narrative poem, usually in octosyllabic rhyming couplets. Very often in fourteenth-century literature, *dits* appear in the form of dream visions and contain intercalated lyric poetry. According to these characteristics, all of Deguileville's extant works are *dits*. As part of Synderesis's testimony, then, the term has particular resonance not only for the sinful things the narrator may have said, but also for the *mauvais dis* of the author, and perhaps especially for Deguileville's first redaction of *PVH*.

Synderesis's ugliness is the mirror image of the pilgrim-soul's spiritual deficiency, but it is also a startling image of the work of art looking back at its creator. Inasmuch as the worm Synderesis is a personification of the poet's conscience, she is also a figure of Deguileville's earlier work, *PVH1*, which continues to circulate despite any efforts Deguileville may have made to stop it. Synderesis is a *ver*: she is the proverbial worm of conscience which gnaws at the sinner's heart, warning him to repent before it is too late. But she is also a *vers* (verse) of the pilgrim's own making which has returned to accuse its creator. Synderesis is a bookworm.

Reexamining *PA*’s courtroom scene for its literary resonance, it is also helpful to remember to whom Synderesis is transcribing her testimony—the court's *tabellion*, or notary,

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92 Along with the two versions of *PVH* and *PJC*, Deguileville's *Roman de la fleur de lis* can also be classified as a *dit*. The only possible exception to such a categorization would be in Deguileville's lost Latin poetry. All of the texts by Machaut, Froissart, and Christine de Pizan that I discuss in the rest of the dissertation are also best classified as *dits*. 
Satan. In addition to acting as the prosecutor or plaintiff, the Devil apparently sees no conflict of interest in taking transcription of the trial:

Le Sathanas de bout en bout
En i. grant papier escrit tout.
Aussi tost com celle parloit,
Tout aussi tost il escrisoit.
(vv. 1385-89)

The Adversary from end to end
on a great scroll of paper wrote everything.
As soon as she [Synderesis] would speak
just as quickly would he write it down.

One might well object that this would tend to bias the court's record; but like Synderesis, Satan protests his objectivity to the court: he is "tant seulement tabellion," just writing down what the conscience says (v. 1360).

This is not the first time Deguileville claims to have had problems with scribes. In his new prologue to *PVH2*, we recall, the author had accused a nameless person or persons of having copied and circulated the text of *PVH1* before it was ready. It would thus seem appropriate for Deguileville to identify his enemies in part with the notary Satan, who reproduces the events of the pilgrim's life for all to hear, just as Synderesis utters them. The implied resemblance of Satan to those copyists who may have purloined Deguileville's text points to an ethical question which the author had already suggested earlier, in the prologue to *PVH2*: if *PVH1* contained the potential to mislead readers, and if we believe Deguileville's belated claim that his text had been stolen, who is at fault for any harm the text has caused? Deguileville, for writing it, or somebody else for reproducing it without his permission? Is Satan really just a copyist, as he says—"tant seulement tabellion"? Or is he guilty of leading Deguileville's text and narrator astray, diverting them from the author's intentions? By the same token, might we also identify Satan the notary with Jean de Meun, Venus's wicked "notaire" (*PVH2*, v. 8619, v. 8718), whose model had tarnished the moral reputation of *PVH* against the best intentions of its author? Did the Devil—
and not Deguileville—make him do it, as the pilgrim protests in both of his speeches to the heavenly court?

Deguileville's judgment scene raises many such questions about the ethical stakes of the author's own literary enterprise, more than it can claim to answer with certainty. In any event, the representation of the Devil as "just a scribe" highlights yet another of Deguileville's borrowings consistent with the Devil's Rights tradition: Satan's association with a strict, immutable interpretation of texts and individual lives, as opposed to Mary's more creative, "lawyerly" interpretation of them. In the Devil's Rights, the Adversary is a Pharisaical proponent of an unchanging Law and a rigid depiction of individual conduct, while the Virgin steadfastly upholds God's right to change his words, granting mercy to individual sinners without contradicting his will. In PA, Satan and Justice both object furiously to Deguileville's pilgrim being allowed to say anything in his own defense now that he is dead. In this, the trial scene of PA becomes an implied debate not only about whether the pilgrim has written well and acted appropriately in the past, but also about whether or not he should be allowed to write anything more. Because the prosecution relies more heavily on the evidence of PVH1, the un-retouched version of Deguileville's life, Satan again proves himself a stickler for the letter of the law and for the oldest textual precedent available. The pilgrim's life was the narrative of PVH1 and nothing more can be added to it; Deguileville's more apologetic but less popular twenty-fifth anniversary rewrite of PVH can hardly make up for the failures of Deguileville's pilgrim the first time he made his way in the world.

From this perspective, it is instructive that one of the major issues of the trial in the heavenly court is whether the pilgrim's requests for mercy come too late. As Justice claims, "Trop tart vient a faire son cri" ("He comes to late with his plea," v.1098). The accusation that
the pilgrim comes too late to amend or excuse himself refers not only to the fact that he is
supposedly dead, but also calls to mind Deguileville's tardy revision of *PVH1*, a quarter-century
after the appearance of the original. In his exordium to the court, the pilgrim himself repeatedly
admits that he has been negligent about repenting ("Et trop a tart a merci vieng," v. 825), but he
claims there were extenuating circumstances, since he was coerced and deceived into sinning by
Satan, the scribe.

The trial is thus an occasion for the pilgrim to protest once more that he was acting with
only the best of intentions. As in the prologue to *PVH2*, when the author asserts that his text was
copied without his consent, the pilgrim insists that he was the unwitting victim of others'
dishonesty:

Par mes annemis decëu,
Si comme tu Dieux l'as scëu,
Et pour qui sui en jugement,
Puis qu'en povrete sui chëu
Et qu'ai trouve ve et hëu
Qui me maistroient durement
(vv. 751-56)

By my enemies I was deceived
just as you, God, knew,
and for which reason I now stand in judgment,
for into poverty I fell
and since I found misfortune and anguish
which roughly governed me.

This passage, in the beginning of the pilgrim's first address to the court, seems a reference not
only to Satan and the unnamed person or persons accused of copying *PVH1*, but also to the
misfortunes which befell Guillermus de Deguilevilla in the hands of his enemies among the
brethren at Chaalis. The pilgrim's line of argumentation is that he was deceived by Satan, but we
might just as easily infer that his foes are Envie, Treason, Detraction and Conspiration, those
nameless monks who set upon Guillermus in *PVH2*.

As the pilgrim defends himself to the heavenly court in *PA*, he brings up other references
to the brutal attack aboard ship in *PVH2*. For example, he refers to the crutch (*potence*, *PA*,

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93 As Satan reminds us in his own arguments, Envie and Traison are his "creatures" (*PA*, vv. 108-9).
v.763; *jambe de fust, PVH2, v. 16079*) he is now obliged to use after being attacked by Envie, Traison, Detraction and Conspiration. The pilgrim then tells the court that he has been reduced to begging, since his enemies have broken his "instrument" (his leg? his book? his quill?):

Point ne scai d'autre vielle, I know no other instrument-
Mes annemis l'ont quassee. My enemies have smashed mine.
(vv. 785-86)

The pilgrim uses the injustices he has already recounted in *PVH2* in order to elicit sympathy as the case is retried, turning the accusation back on Satan in more ways than one. While his enemies are quicker to refer to the first draft of his poem, the pilgrim makes a point of bringing up incidents like these from the rewritten text which cast him as the victim of others' treachery. He displaces blame onto his detractors, suggesting that the negative image of himself and his *Pèlerinage* was their fault as readers, and perhaps as copyists.

The comparison of texts against other texts is an ongoing motif of *PA*. In particular, the argument of Satan and Justice relies on the contention that the pilgrim cannot plead ignorance of the law, because, being a Cistercian, he knew it well ("Car bien il a scëu la loy," v.1510). As the prosecution outlines, the pilgrim was intimately familiar with the Commandments and the Gospels (vv.1523-25) and had read the lives of the saints (vv.1527-50) and Aristotle's *Ethics* (vv. 1795-1803) before he sinned. In other words, the pilgrim is too well-read to plead ignorance. The Old and New Testaments, the hagiographical tradition, and Aristotle—these are the models the pilgrim should have followed in his own conduct but did not. Rejecting such ideals of behavior, the pilgrim Guillermus de Deguilevilla had failed to listen to Grace Dieu's teaching in *PVH1* and let himself be beaten by Peresce. More implicitly, Deguileville the pilgrim had also spurned such excellent literary models as these in favor of the *Roman de la Rose*. But in *PVH2*, the author had cast off the nefarious influence of Jean de Meun and made his narrator-pilgrim more exemplary,
able to overcome Peresce, don his armor and fight. Must he now be judged according to his first

Pèlerinage?

The symbolic consideration of two texts, two versions of the same life, is also reflected in the final section of the trial, where it is precisely a question of weighing documents against each other. After arguments have been made and witnesses heard, written records are collected on all sides. Justice stands atop a great platform and makes ready her balance scale, fulfilling the pilgrim's pronouncement of faith in divine judgment, made in PVH2 after his crushing defeat on the Ship of Religion:

Legi quodam volumine, I read in a certain volume
Quant fait est bien examiné that when facts are well examined,
Justicie libramine, in the scales of Justice,
Qui a tort, est tantost miné; whosoever is at fault, is just as soon destroyed;
Et iustus non redit sine and the just man does not remain without
Honneur quant le plait est finé honor when the plea is finished.


(PVH2, vv. 16326-31)

In the left-hand pan of Justice's scale is placed the record of everything the pilgrim's soul did wrong, Synderesis's testimony which Satan has transcribed onto a long scroll. Into the right-hand pan are placed documents in the soul's favor, notably Saint Benedict's written testimony for his Cistercian son Guillermus. At first, the scales tip dangerously to the left, and things do not look good for the pilgrim. But finally, Misericorde produces Christ's special letter of pardon, which outweighs all of his sins.95

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94 Another notable writerly detail is that, according to the Devil, the pilgrim's sins are written on his face ("Escrí li est emmi le vis," v. 620), like the seven P's traced on the face of Dante's narrator in Purgatorio (IX, vv. 112-14).

95 This means of representing the judgment of souls, called psychostasis, has a long history which well predates the Christian tradition. As Oakes shows, psychostasis was depicted especially frequently in Cistercian manuscripts, including in PA ("The Scales," 26). Oakes notes the tendency of Mary or Mercy to tip the scales in humanity's favor, whereas Satan does the opposite. On psychostasis, see also Oakes, Ora Pro Nobis, "Chapter 5 The Marian Psychostasis," 129-66, especially 136, 155, 157, 161; Zaleski, The Fate of the Dead, 70 -71; Brandon, The
When the trial of Guillermus de Deguilevilla's soul has concluded, then, the pilgrim's penitence, late as it may be, is affirmed by heaven's judgment. Likewise, Deguileville's own rewriting of his literary image in \textit{PVH2} is affirmed. Christ's gift of grace to "the wretched pilgrims" of the world excuses all three of the pilgrims Deguileville designates in the prologue to \textit{PVH2}: the author, the text and his narrator. Even in the very evidence against him—such as Grace Dieu's letter spelling out his name—the trial has been an occasion for Deguileville to advertise his own status as an exceptional literary figure. The verdict and sentence confirm the pilgrim's special position as one of God's elect, and as an author who speaks for a larger body of work.

After all, the pilgrim's term in purgatory seems less like a punishment than an occasion and an authorization for Deguileville to keep writing as he follows his narrator through the three realms of the afterworld. As he continues to compose, Saint Michael tells Guillermus that he will be a pilgrim just like before—author, narrator and text all at once: 

\begin{verbatim}
Ton bourdon tost tu reprendras  You will take up your staff again right away,
Et ton escherpe come devant    and your purse as before.
\end{verbatim}

(vv. 2572-73)

Like Pierre le changeur, the title character of the Parisian mystery play, Guillermus is granted more time in which to change the text of his life story: but now it is the defendant himself who is allowed to keep writing, adding to and transforming his own textual image, against the protests of Satan and Justice. The judgment of \textit{PA} leads to a purgatory in which the poet will be allowed to perfect himself—and to outdo himself—by continuing to compose.

\textit{Judgment of the Dead}, 79 120 -8, including mention of \textit{PA} (126); Easting, "Personal Apocalypses," 81; Sheingorn, "For God is such A Doomsman," 45.

\textsuperscript{96} See Pomel, \textit{Voies}, 305.
Nor does Deguileville stop at defending his name through this otherworldly trial; he also makes sure that those who wronged him at Chaalis are properly dealt with. When the pilgrim's guardian angel shows him the eternal torments of hell, he sees Envie and her children there, hanging by their treacherous tongues (vv. 4565-694); these are the same personifications who attacked the pilgrim aboard ship. Further along in hell, Trahison is depicted as falsely donning the robes of religion ("en religion vestue," "de faus mantel affublee," v. 4814, v. 4816), lending further support to the idea that the author had been betrayed by members of the community at Chaalis.

For the enemies who pursued him and who remain nameless today, Deguileville asks no mercy. But for himself, he speaks eloquently in order to offer a more transformative version of events. Just as in the Devil's Rights, lawyerly pleading causes the account books of individual lives to be radically rewritten, confounding the strict legalism of Satan. Deguileville's version of the heavenly court also demands the author's right to add on to his corpus so as to transform it. *PVH1* cannot be removed from Deguileville's personal book of accounts; as the author laments in the prologue to *PVH2*, it has sprouted so many tendrils that it is impossible to eradicate its growth from the world (vv. 43-50). But the text can be supplemented with an alternative version of events which both confirms and calls into question the existence of the original.

In Saint Michael's judgment that the pilgrim be allowed to respond for his *ouvrages*, Deguileville demands that he too, be allowed to represent himself in the court of reader opinion. Although he takes a much more hell-fire approach to the ethics of *reading*, Deguileville suggests that it is only right for the author to be allowed to make major changes in his work, even twenty-five years after the fact. In this, mercy and linguistic change are closely related, as in the Devil's
Rights tradition. But with Deguileville, mercy is obtained by a first-person voice defending his own textual revision in a scene of heavenly judgment.

To borrow the terms of Levinas, the voice of the *première personne* becomes crucial to the operation of eschatological justice, in that it allows the subject to provide its own story, over and above the established text of historical experience. Like Levinas's eschatological judgment, Deguileville's trial is also one that is still ongoing, in process, in the always evolving interpretation of the readership. From this perspective, it is crucial to remember that *PA* does not depict the Last Judgment, the "grans assises," or "Jugement / que par devant le Roy atent" that is anticipated many times in both versions of *PVH* and in *PA* itself. The judgment scene here represents only the particular judgment of the soul, or rather, only a dream of it, experienced by the narrator while he is sleeping in his cell at Chaalis, after having been reinstated into the order. It is a vision of how his life would be judged only were he to die then, at the moment of the dream. Deguileville reminds us often of this provisional aspect of his judgment scene, as when the angel Cherubin expresses anxiety over the possibility of *getting it wrong*:

Quant ci apres le temps venra  When afterward the time will come
Que notre bon roy jugera  when our good king will judge
Et tendra ses assises grans  and hold his great tribunal
Et se monsterra tous puissans,  and show himself all-powerful,
Honte seroit, se retraictier  it would be a shame, if it were necessary
Faillot ce quë as a jugier  to retract the judgment that you have to
(vv. 521-26) make now.

Although it vindicates the pilgrim in a higher court than the one he faced at Chaalis, the trial scene of *PA* is not the last judgment to which the pilgrim-soul will be subject, for he will soon enter into an angry dispute with his body over which of them are most at fault (vv. 4052-352), a
reworking of the prolific medieval genre of body-soul debates. The resolution of this disagreement is likewise put off to the Resurrection, when body and soul will be reunited and stand judgment as one. Nor was this Deguileville's last pilgrimage, for he would follow *P*4 in 1358 with his *Pèlerinage Jhesucrist*, a text which repeats the scenario of a legal dispute between Justice and Mercy, and between the Old and New Laws, all over again in its dramatization of the Redemption.

By repeatedly calling attention to the provisional nature of the divine judgment to which he is exposed, Deguileville suggests that literature is likewise an ongoing process of evaluation and reevaluation, no less eschatological for being resistant to closure. Literature belongs to the judgment of each moment, during which texts are constantly held up to scrutiny, subject to the changing opinions of readers, and of the author himself. Impishly—if not impiously—writing himself a favorable judgment on high and torturing his most critical readers in hell, Deguileville also acknowledged literature as a serious ethical enterprise. Writing is eschatological, in that its effect on the audience must be measured before the author can be justly evaluated by God, and in that the author must answer to the particular judgments of all his readers—the Satans, the Trahisons and the Rude Entendements of the world included. Deguileville's means of defense lay in the ability he claimed to keep writing, to alter what he had made previously and to transform his own textual image in response to accusation.

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Whether to his ultimate glory or misfortune, Deguileville was one of the most influential French authors of the fourteenth century, and one of the most widely read authors of late

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97 A thorough overview of the tradition is given by Batiouchkof, "Le débat de l'âme et du corps."
98 See Le Bouteiller, "Le Procès de Paradis du *Pèlerinage de Jésus-Christ.*"
medieval Europe. His *Pèlerinage de l’âme* was the popular apogee of one major strand of eschatological representation, the Devil's Rights. But as the most well-developed, personalized example of the eschatological courtroom saga, Deguileville's text stands in relative contrast with the texts I explore in the second half of this study, narrative *dits* by Guillaume de Machaut, Jean Froissart and Christine de Pizan. This is for the simple reason that none of these authors explicitly stages his or her narrator's judgment before the heavenly court, even in a dream. Instead, their scenes of judgment tend to invest earthly scenes of reading and writing with eschatological qualities. Rather than projecting the specific ethical problems of the author-reader relationship into a traditional representational model of the Judgment, like the Devil's Rights, these authors take the opposite approach, showing the Judgment to be at work behind the author-reader relationship. In particular, the texts I examine next, by Machaut and Froissart, take us from the representational space of the heavenly court, and its saintly patrons, to earthly courts, and to the intimate relationship of poets and their princely and aristocratic patrons.

For not placing their judgments within the strict boundaries of the heavenly court, the courtly poets I discuss clearly drew a significant measure of inspiration from the kind of eschatological scene imagined by Deguileville, for they too depicted the judgment of readers with strong and explicit parallels to God's own reading of human souls as texts. Like Deguileville's body of work, the scenes of judgment I consider in the second half of the study may also be considered eschatological in the Levinasian sense of the term—in that they stage readers' reception of texts as an encounter with the world beyond, with the immanence of divine judgment emerging as the third party (*tiens*) in the author-reader relationship.

The subject of the next chapter, Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* appeared in 1349 or 1350, some years before Deguileville's second redaction of *Pèlerinage de*
vie humaine (1355) and his Pèlerinage de l'âme (c.1356). Nevertheless, Deguileville's scene of judgment may be identified with a much earlier tradition of eschatological representation, the Devil's Rights, into which the author interjects himself via his narrative persona, Guillermus. Guillaume Machaut (1300-77), whose own narrator figure is first called "Guillaume" during a reader's accusation, may be considered more innovative still than Deguileville for the way he combines scenes of divine and human judgment to dramatize the reception of his work.
Chapter 3

Post-Apocalyptic Judgment: Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Navarre*

I. Introduction

Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* (or *JRN*, c. 1349-50)\(^1\) begins with a devastating apocalyptic scene, which is usually read as the poem's prologue. During the terrible plague year 1349, Machaut's narrator finds himself shut up in his room alone contemplating the impending end of the world and the Judgment about to occur. The narrator himself assumes the role of prophet and judge as he condemns broad categories of human beings and laments the world's fall into iniquity, borrowing liberally from the language of contemporary chroniclers who had likewise envisioned the disastrous events of the mid-fourteenth century as signs of the end times.\(^2\) Machaut's narrator then turns his accusations inward as he awaits the judgment of his own soul. Ultimately, however, this is a Doomsday that never happens; the world does not end, and the narrator does not die. Instead, the dark prologue serves to introduce a different sort of judgment. After the apocalyptic vision is revealed to be a false alarm, the mysterious character Dame Bonneurté (Lady Happiness) takes Machaut's narrator totally by surprise, summoning him before her. Calling him "Guillaume" for the first time, Bonneurté accuses the narrator of having slandered women in a poem that the author Machaut had written some ten or fifteen years earlier, the *Jugement dou roy de Behaingne* (or *JRB*).\(^3\) In *JRB*, Machaut had recounted the dispute of two aristocratic interlocutors: a knight thrown over by his lady for another man, and a lady mourning

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\(^1\) In this chapter, I cite the edition by Palmer.  
\(^2\) Machaut's self-assigned role as a judge in *JRN* is perhaps not unrelated to the poet's tendency to assume a legislative function in his composition. Cerquiglini (*Engin*, 15-16) has discussed this in regard to the terms *ordener* and *ordenance* in the poet's work.  
\(^3\) I cite the edition by Palmer. Earp (*A Guide to Research*, 207) dates *JRB* to the mid-1330's.
her lover's death. The knight and the lady each argue that his or her own heartbreak is worse, and in order to settle the disagreement, Machaut's narrator brings the two before the poet's real-life patron, Jean de Luxembourg, the King of Bohemia. Upon hearing the case, Jean judges in favor of the knight, deeming that his pain is greater than that of the bereaved lady.

Now, in *JRN*, Dame Bonneurté confronts Guillaume with her accusation: *JRB* and its judgment are an insult to female emotional experience and to women in general. When Guillaume steadfastly refuses Bonneurté's demand that he overturn the judgment made in his earlier poem, she leads him to the court of his new patron, Charles de Navarre, where an absurd trial takes place to determine whether Guillaume had in fact wronged women by writing *JRB*. Against Bonneurté and her lively entourage of personified virtues, Guillaume attempts to defend his literary reputation. Both sides argue their cases with a confusing barrage of historical and mythological exempla, all of which seem quite irrelevant; the principle issue of the case is quickly left behind as the dispute becomes more about the relative trustworthiness of men and women. As for the defendant, the court is prejudiced against Guillaume from the beginning, and he has little chance of receiving a favorable judgment there. In the end, he loses and is forced to make amends to Bonneurté, and womankind—by writing still more poetry.

As Deguileville will do a few years later, Machaut uses the trial of his first-person narrator to stage the revision of a *corpus* which must be defended as a coherent whole even as it undergoes significant changes. Both Deguileville and Machaut narrow the scope of judgment considerably, replacing the mass of humanity in the defendant's seat with the individual poet responding to accusations against his work. Also like Deguileville's two versions of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* and his *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, Machaut's two judgment poems narrate a movement
through a number of different scenes of judgment, one of which is explicitly the judgment of
heaven and which serves as a point of comparison for the others.

Of particular importance, critics have tended to approach *JRN*'s two momentous
judgments—the interrupted scene of divine judgment at the beginning of the poem, and the
literary judgment at the end—in terms of a sharp dichotomy. D.G. Lanoue and Jerry Root have
each identified in the movement from the imagined Judgment Day of *JRN*'s prologue to its trial
scene the opposition of divine and human judgment respectively. As Root would have it, in *JRN*
Machaut "finds himself caught between two orders of sovereignty, one secular the other
spiritual." While Machaut's narrator laments the injustice of the world in the apocalyptic
prologue of *JRN* and envisions the final Judgment as the only solution to human misbehavior, the
"secular" turn of the rest of the poem seems precisely to illustrate the vain and limited nature of
human judgment by enacting a preposterous trial about love poetry in a kangaroo court.

In my view, such a traditional reading does not fully account for the subtle and
unexpected ways in which Machaut used these scenes of judgment to stage the process of writing
and reader reception. It is far from clear to me that the poet intended the apocalyptic vision of the
prologue to mark a strong opposition between a perfect divine judgment and an imperfect human
judgment. By the same token, the dichotomy often imposed upon the two great judgment scenes
of *JRN* suggests that there is nothing of the spiritual in the secular, nothing of the eschatological
in the reader's judgment. I do believe that there is a juxtaposition at work in *JRN*, but not strictly
speaking between divine and human modes of judgment, earthly and heavenly sovereignty.
Rather, as I demonstrate in this chapter, the most dramatic movement that occurs from the
poem's curious prologue to its final scene of judgment might better be conceived as a movement

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4 Lanoue, "History as Apocalypse;" Root, *Space to Speke,* 122-129.
5 *Space to Speke,* 128.
of the eschatological itself, out of the collective and history-ending judgment of the Apocalypse and into a more personal mode of ethical accounting, the meeting of the individual author with the other to whom he is suddenly obliged to respond as before God—the indignant reader.

While Machaut erects a grandiose apocalyptic scene to open his second Jugement poem, it quickly collapses under its own weight and is replaced by a scene of reading, an alternate judgment. But the eschatological persists in this literary scene in a different form; divine judgment is immanent in the reader's summons and accusation, and in the author's "condemnation" by his new patron. While JRN succeeds in being one of Machaut's funniest poems precisely through its element of legal farce, the case that Bonneurté makes preserves a definite seriousness about the duties of an author to his audience—however ill-defined these duties may remain at the end of the text. Bonneurté's accusation partakes of the eschatological in that it is a sudden appearance to the sinner of the reckoning he will have to face when he departs from this world, revealed through the mouth of a human third party (tières), akin to the un-aided poor and the un-visited prisoner of the Gospel of Matthew. The somewhat irreverent humor of replacing these categories of other human beings with the offended (female) reader is certainly not lost; this gesture cannot, however, be thought merely a joke on Machaut's part, for as JRN entertains readers, it also entertains seriously the various problems of authorial responsibility. It is these ethical problems which, in the end, keep Machaut's poetic persona Guillaume on the defensive and take the place of the more conventional incriminations he had imagined to be hanging over his head as he contemplated the judgment of his soul in the prologue. The final judgment scene of JRN thus interrupts the apocalyptic episode with levity but nonetheless retains much of its eschatological aspect, in that it puts the author on the spot, forcing him to respond for what he has written before a moral and deliberative power greater than himself—the readership.
Unlike the final judgment imagined by Machaut's narrator at the poem's opening, the judgment to which Dame Bonneurté brings him in the court of Charles de Navarre is by design ongoing, its parameters always shifting and a definitive decision always just out of reach. The *JRN*’s trial is, above all, subject to the problems of language. The only convincing argument made by either the defense or the prosecution seems to be that the meaning of any written text is always in flux according to who is reading it and when. As I argue in this chapter, however, the inconclusive nature of the trial does not so much illustrate the imperfection and corruption of human judgment as it proposes an alternate kind of justice, even more demanding in its way than the Doomsday scenario at the beginning of the poem. Bonneurté's case against Guillaume suggests that, for the author, there can never be a definitive judgment about the aesthetic or ethical value of the text, and that the author's labor is one of incessant response to the accusations of readers, whose new perspectives continually demand that earlier writing be reexamined. Bonneurté uses the trial not only to force Guillaume to rewrite what he has written, but also to demonstrate the ethical and artistic need for the author to change his judgments frequently in response to changing points of view—his own and those of his audience. This impulse to constant revision goes against the narrator's initial attempt to find certainty in judgment, symbolized powerfully by his apocalyptic vision.

In the case of *JRN*, the impulse for Machaut to rewrite himself seems to have been borne of the circumstances of history, as the poem marks a major political shift in Machaut's career—the author's sudden departure from service to the House of France, represented by the patron-judge Jean de Luxembourg, and his new allegiance to that house's great enemy, the House of Évreux, incarnated by the patron-judge Charles de Navarre (the notorious Charles le Mauvais). As I outline in the course of this chapter, the back-story to the change of judgments from *JRB* to
*JRN* has potentially much more at stake than the absurd (because patently unsolvable) problem of measuring the affective experience of individuals against each other, or of men against women. Namely, the suit brought by Bonneurté also serves to recall a troubling series of events then taking place in the courts of Machaut's two rival patrons, a true story of political intrigue, sex and murder which, I believe, can be partially uncovered by clues Machaut scattered throughout his poetry.

The potentially explosive historical allusions contained in *JRN* provide another reason to be cautious when treating the comedy of *JRN*, for it is a comedy which was certainly intended to perform at least some degree of reflection on Machaut's own difficult circumstances and on the difficult circumstances of fourteenth-century Europe in general. In the poet's own dramatic change of judgment, we witness the author himself faced with the chaos of history and the sudden prospect of leaving old friends and comfortable political allegiances behind. In this, Machaut's self-abasing/self-promoting portrayal of himself on trial before his readers also serves the more serious purpose of inquiring into the ethical problems of the author changing—or not changing—his opinions over time.

Like Guillaume de Deguileville's Guillermus, Guillaume de Machaut imagines his embattled narrator Guillaume as a kind of textual self, a *corpus* to which the author now finds himself somewhat at odds, but for which he will nevertheless have to respond, as for the actions of his own body. Machaut's solution to this identity crisis is to stage a judgment which upholds

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6 It is much the same question submitted to Tiresias's judgment by Hera and Zeus, only in reverse.

7 In Middle French, "Guillaume" can also mean "fool" or "chump," as well as being a generic name for an ordinary person, like "Joe" in American English. The name thus playfully indicates at once the pseudo-autobiographical particularity of the author and the extent to which the narrator could be anyone. Zumthor (*Essai*, 65) notes that "Guillaume," along with "Pierre" and
the earlier text, the earlier version of himself, even as the decision made in *JRB* is officially overturned. By juxtaposing contradictory judgments within his corpus, the author uses their divergence, paradoxically, to signal his own textual unity—his own ability to rewrite himself and still remain distinctly Guillaume de Machaut. In this, Machaut goes substantially further than Deguileville, for while Deguileville's speeches in self-defense are still marked by the language of contrition and penance, Machaut's own rhetoric manages to avoid apologizing for the past, even as it admits the author's responsibility to transform his judgments in the present and future.

The need for the author to question and transform his opinions is itself performed through the dramatic narrative movement from judgment to judgment in Machaut's *JRB* and *JRN*. While *JRN* begins with a classically apocalyptic vision of divine revelation—a claim on the narrator's part to final moral certainty—this is soon replaced by a much less stable model of judgment which challenges and frustrates Guillaume's vision of himself, leading him both to rewrite his work and to affirm the place of the original text within the corpus. In the complex trajectory from the courtly judgment of *JRB*, to the Apocalypse, to a reader's lawsuit, Machaut's *Jugement* poems do not so much illustrate the dichotomy of heaven's immutable judgment and man's corrupted powers as they suggest an attempt to distance ethical discourse from ideals of absolute and trans-historical truth. Inasmuch as the apocalyptic prologue of *JRN* represents the narrator's efforts to submit human history to one final and definitive judgment, it also serves to foreground his unsuccessful attempts to refute Bonneurté's position by upholding his own previous judgments as definitive. The judgment which follows the prologue, brought to bear by Bonneurté and Charles de Navarre, shows the narrator's desire for firmness of opinion to be flawed, as it asserts that he must change his mind over time in order to do justice to his readers and himself.

"Raoul," provides an example of a name so common that it serves to obscure as much as to elucidate when it is used as a signature to a literary work.
Following this narrative progression, the chapter proceeds by examining in turn each of the three major judgment scenes of Machaut's two *Jugement* poems as they respond to and rewrite each other. First, and in relative brevity, I consider the initial judgment of *JRB*, the opinion about male and female suffering which Bonneurté later demands Guillaume overturn. This courtly case provides a sharp contrast to the second scene of judgment, the apocalyptic reckoning of *JRN*’s prologue, which shatters the innocent tone of *JRB*. I next examine this apocalyptic episode in detail to show how Guillaume employs apocalyptic discourse and how this discourse serves to characterize his vain desire for certainty. Lastly, in Bonneurté’s initial confrontation with Guillaume and in the absurd trial scene that follows it, I trace in Machaut's text a movement of the eschatological away from the final, collective judgment of history (the apocalyptic) and toward the continual ethical process of reading and writing. The latter judgment might be termed "post-apocalyptic," in that it follows immediately upon and gives the lie to the narrator's version of Doomsday, challenging his claims to an objective vision of history and to the necessary coherence of his own opinions over time.

While tracing Machaut's reimagining of the cataclysmic judgment scene from apocalyptic to post-apocalyptic, I have been particularly struck by the ways in which the author's portrayal of ethical judgment passes beyond the traditional apocalyptic discourse in which it is initially framed and informs instead the day-to-day interactions of authors and readers. It is for this reason especially that Machaut follows, rather than precedes Guillaume de Deguileville in this study, for while Deguileville builds squarely upon the Devil's Rights tradition, Machaut shows himself consciously abandoning another such tradition of eschatological text—the Apocalypse as it was transposed onto contemporary events by fourteenth-century chroniclers—and substituting for it a new model of judgment particular to the ethical demands of literature.
In Machaut's innovation, again, his treatment of judgment tends to resist the binary model of human/divine judgment which has often been applied to it. Instead, I believe, the author's narrative of changing judgments might better be conceptualized according to the distinction which Emmanuel Levinas makes between eschatological judgment and the judgment of history, which I have outlined briefly in the introduction. According to Levinas, eschatological judgment examines subjects in their absolute particularity, allowing them to speak in their own defense. By contrast, the judgment of history is concerned with drawing those subjects into a universal version of events and a common time, thus denying subjects their interiority, or what Levinas refers to as the "invisible." History is not concerned with the invisible psychic content of subjects, but only with the pure visibility of impersonal, objective facts. Whereas the eschatological allows those who are judged to speak in their own defense, giving expression to the invisible, the judgment of history is always pronounced in an impersonal third-person voice: "L'absence de la volonté à ce jugement consiste en ce qu'elle ne s'y présente qu'à la troisième personne." By this Levinas means not the grammatical third person per se, but rather a universalizing tendency in which both the subject position and its objects are evacuated of interiority, silenced, unable to defend themselves: "Le jugement viril de l'histoire, le jugement viril de la 'raison pure' est cruel. Les normes universelles de ce jugement font taire l'unicité où se tient l'apologie et d'où elle tire ses arguments."

Perhaps most importantly—though also most paradoxically—for Levinas, the eschatological judgment must be non-teleological. Whereas history posits an end to which all events are heading, the eschatological depends not upon a final sentence or an imminent future,

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8 See Introduction, 48-49.
9 See TI, 272.
10 Ibid., 271.
11 Ibid., 272.
but upon a continually evolving process of judgment, which takes place fully at each moment in time through the action of the conscience: "Le jugement de la conscience doit se référer à une réalité au-delà de l'arrêt de l'histoire qui est aussi un arrêt et une fin." Rather than an "arrêt," (end, arrest, verdict), eschatology goes beyond history through a continually evolving "procès." Accordingly, Levinas rejects the traditional, teleological concept of a Last Judgment as non-eschatological: "Ce n'est pas le jugement dernier qui importe, mais le jugement de tous les instants dans le temps où l'on juge les vivants." Levinas distinguishes between eschatological and historical judgment not in terms of a dichotomy, but rather by positing the eschatological as the great beyond ("au-delà") of history, that which shatters its universality and triumphs precisely by refusing to pronounce the last word: "Il faut que l'invisible se manifeste pour que l'histoire perde son droit au dernier mot, nécessairement injuste pour la subjectivité, inévitablement cruel."

As I argue in this chapter, what Levinas might call the "troisième personne," the impersonal voice of an historical Last Judgment, is expressed dramatically in JRN's prologue only to be replaced by a much more personal, inconclusive and subjective mode of ethical accounting, the infinite procès of writing, audience reception, and rewriting. As in the confraternal poets and Deguileville, the author's ability to transform what he has already written, altering the bare historicity of the text which has gone before, is a necessary response to the reader's accusation. Speaking in self-defense, in his own voice, is also the particular mercy which Machaut demands for himself of readers. Against the "last word" (dernière parole) which

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12 Til., 277.
13 See Ibid., 276.
14 Ibid., 8.
15 Ibid., 272.
characterizes the definitive, trans-historical judgment, an eschatological space opens which both obliges and allows the author to answer for himself by transforming his text over and over again.

II. "Au temps pascour": Judgment at Durbui

Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Behaingne* (Judgment of the King of Bohemia, mid-1330's) begins on an idyllic day in the Easter season ("au temps pascour, " v. 1) as Machaut's narrator lies in a bush, eavesdropping on a knight and a lady as they argue about which of the two suffers more: the lady, whose lover has died, or the knight, whose lady has left him for another man. Both make impassioned pleas but neither succeeds in convincing the other that his or her own heartbreak is greater. Eventually, they conclude that they require a skilled arbiter to decide the issue, and at this moment Machaut's narrator pops conveniently from his leafy hiding place. Making his presence known to the two parties, he tells them that he has heard the entire argument and can think of no better judge to settle the matter than his own patron, Jean de Luxembourg, the King of Bohemia.

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\begin{align*}
\text{Car de largesse} & \quad \text{For he surpasses Alexander} \\
\text{Passe Alixandre et Hector de prouesse.} & \quad \text{in generosity and Hector in prowess.} \\
\text{C'est li estos de toute gentillesse,} & \quad \text{He's the stock of all nobility.} \\
\text{N'il ne vit pas com pers a sa richesse;} & \quad \text{Nor is he a slave to his wealth;} \\
\text{Eins ne vuet rien} & \quad \text{for he wants nothing} \\
\text{Fors que l'onneur de tout le bien terrien,} & \quad \text{but the honor of all earthly virtue,} \\
\text{Et s'est plus liés, quant il puelt dire, 'Tien,'} & \quad \text{and he's happier when he can say,} \\
\text{Qu'uns convoiteus n'est de penre dou sien.} & \quad \text{'}take,' than the covetous one who} \\
\text{Dieu et l'eqlise} & \quad \text{receives from him.} \\
\text{Et lrayuté aisme, et si bien justise} & \quad \text{He loves God, the Church and} \\
\text{Qu'on le clamme l'Espée de Justise.} & \quad \text{loyalty, and dispenses justice so well} \\
(v. 1296-1306) & \quad \text{that he's called the sword of justice.}
\end{align*}
\]

As Kelly has demonstrated ("The Genius of the Patron"), the complicated nature of Machaut's relationships with his many patrons must be taken into account if we are to understand the terms of his artistic production.
Impressed by the narrator's glowing recommendation, the knight and the lady agree that they will present their case to Jean of Luxembourg and defer to his judgment. Making their way to the king's splendid castle at Durbui (in the present-day Belgian province of Luxembourg), the poet and disputants are warmly welcomed by Jean and by his magical court of sixteen personified virtues, figures like Love, Boldness, Generosity and Beauty (vv. 1476-85). There at Durbui, the parties present their case to Jean de Luxembourg and ask him to decide who has suffered more in love.

Modestly, Jean declares himself inferior to the task of judging this unusual case, but the personified virtues come swiftly to his aid, leading him to decide that the knight's heartbreak is greater than the lady's:

Que cils amans sueffre plus de tristesse,
Et que li maus d'amours plus fort le blesse
Que la dame, ou moult a de noblesse,
Et que plus long
Est de confort, dont il ont bon besoing;
Qu'il a plus mal qu'elle n'a, plus de soing,
Et de gревance.
(vv. 1949-56)

That this lover suffers more sadness and that heartache hurts him more than the lady, who is very noble, and that he's further from comfort, which he so needs; and thus I give my judgment that he has more pain than her, more care and cause for grievance.

After pronouncing judgment, Jean magnanimously invites both parties in the dispute to remain at his court to feast and make merry for eight days, at the end of which time he sends them off with rich parting gifts. Machaut's idealization of his patron's jurisprudence and generosity is clear; he has even characterized him as "l'Espée de Justise" ("the sword of justice," v. 1306), which is to say the magnificent instrument of God's judgment on earth.

_JRB_ is hardly an isolated incident of such praise; even well after Jean de Luxembourg's death in 1346 at the Battle of Crécy, Machaut continued to single this patron out for special tribute as a selfless and just ruler (for example, in Machaut's later _Confort d'ami_ [Comfort for a
Friend, 1357). Nevertheless, Machaut does not allow the king of Bohemia to pronounce an immutable, perfect judgment. Jean's verdict is revisited and overturned in the second of Machaut's two judgment poems, the Jugement dou roy de Navarre (JRN, c.1349-50). JRN is both a continuation and a symbolic rewriting of JRB. Significantly, the latter poem's title is often given as the Jugement dou roy de Navarre contre le jugement dou roy de Behaingne, and when it is present in manuscripts, it is always found immediately after JRB.

To fully understand how JRN rewrites the judgment of JRB, it is first necessary to situate the earlier poem in regard to its own influences. JRB is inscribed deeply in the tradition of the courtly love debate, particularly the jugement d'amour, in which two ladies argue the relative merits of loving a clerk or a knight. From this source, Machaut developed the basic narrative structure of both of his Jugement poems, the personified entities who figure in the trial scenes, and the conceit of recording a decision. From the jeu-parti, the favored debate form of the French trouvères, Machaut also drew the convention of naming a real-life ruler as judge. In the matter it brings to the patron's judgment, too, JRB follows the preoccupations of the debate tradition. Although love debate poems usually do not explore the theme of death in quite the same way, the absurdity of trying to compare emotional scars in a court of law produces what

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17 See the edition by Palmer.
19 See Earp's painstaking descriptions of the manuscripts in A Guide to Research, 73-128.
20 The jeu-parti was itself inherited from the partimen, or joc-partit of the Occitan troubadours. On Machaut's debt to the love debate tradition, see Altmann, ed., The Love Debate Poems of Christine de Pizan, 16. See also Calin, A Poet at the Fountain, 39-40.
William Calin has rightly termed JRB's typical "préciosité," its concern with love casuistry, or the minutiae of individual erotic experience.

With JRB, Machaut already made some important innovations upon the material he borrowed from debate poetry. For one thing, the thin narrative structure of the love debate is greatly amplified by Machaut's additional borrowing from dream-vision poetry. In particular, like Guillaume de Deguileville, Machaut drew deeply upon the thirteenth-century Roman de la Rose as a model of first-person voice. Like the narrator of the Rose, Machaut's narrator embarks on a journey that fuels the action of the text rather than merely framing it, taking on a much more substantial role than in earlier manifestations of the love debate tradition. With JRB the debate is transformed into a true and active adventure. For Machaut, the object of that adventure is judgment, which the narrator has an important part in pursuing, since it is he who knows the identity of the perfect judge for the difficult case and leads the disputants to him.

Thus it is also important that Machaut amplified the gesture, already familiar from the jeux-partis of the trouvères and from other manifestations of the debate tradition, in which the dispute is submitted to the patron's judgment. The presentation of his narrator as a kind of legal functionary in the patron's court is probably meant to reflect Machaut's own role as the secretary and notary of Jean de Luxembourg. Thus, Machaut already begins to suggest in JRB that his narrator may be read as a stand-in for himself, as a poetic persona. However, Machaut's narrator is not yet the center of attention, nor the object of accusation, and as yet he is still not explicitly identified as "Guillaume," as he will be by Bonneurte in JRN. In JRB, the judicial power of the

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21 Calin (A Poet at the Fountain, 40) considers that JRB betrays no significant divergences in "ideological content" from the earlier literature of love casuistry.
22 See Brownlee, Poetic Identity, 158-9.
24 See Palmer, ed., The Judgment of the King of Bohemia, xxxii.
patron-king consigns the narrator to a decidedly inferior position.\footnote{See Root, ‘Space to Speke,’ 122; DeLooze, Pseudo-Autobiography, 72.} Contrasted with his master's majestic seat of judgment at Durbui and his exalted justice, the narrator's place in the affair is comical and servile; he hides in a bush listening to the parties argue, and when he emerges, he is even harassed by the heartbroken lady's small dog (vv. 1202-11). Humorous details like these emphasize that the narrator's role is only to bring the case before his patron and to record the judgment, not to influence the decision or offer judgments of his own. While the narrator of JRB takes on an amplified role in the plot when compared with the larger tradition of the love debate, he has as yet no real part of the case and little responsibility for its outcome.\footnote{As Brownlee (Poetic Identity, 158-71) notes, this character in JRB is as yet only a bumbling lover figure modeled partly upon the hapless narrator of the Roman de la Rose, and not the more fully fleshed out poetic persona who will emerge in JRN.}

However, the meaning of judgment and its importance for Machaut's narrator change immediately in the prologue to the Jugement dou roy de Navarre. On November 9, 1349, we find the narrator pacing his little room—perhaps at Reims where Machaut was canon—and thinking hard upon the catastrophic events of that year, in which plague, war, famine and religious fanaticism had seemingly brought Europe to the brink of the Apocalypse. Machaut's narrator adopts the register of doom prophecy as he announces the cataclysmic Judgment about to be pronounced on all mankind. Abruptly, he then turns the judgment inward, telling how he made a full confession in anticipation of death. Just as suddenly, however, the nightmare scenario of the Judgment Day fades into a beautiful spring morning as JRB symbolically begins all over again, leading the narrator to forget about the Judgment and go out hunting hares. All of this in just 540 octosyllabic verses, the strange liminary section of JRN usually referred to as the poem's prologue. It is certainly something of an ironic prologue, in that it begins Machaut's new text with a judgment that mistakenly purports to be the Last, and which is soon replaced by a very
different judgment. But the apocalyptic scene is not completely effaced, for it works to put
Machaut's readers into a mood of eschatological expectation which is, in its own way, fulfilled.
In the section that follows, I examine JRN's prologue in detail to show how it replaces the courtly
debate of JRB with a universal, apocalyptic judgment, before showing how this "Last" Judgment
is itself replaced.

III. Apocalyptic Judgment

Whereas, conventionally for a courtly piece, JRB is set "Au temps pascour que toute riens
s'esgaie" (v. 1, "In the Easter season when all rejoices")—JRN begins at the melancholy passing
of the summer season ("Au departir dou bel esté," v. 1) into a deathly late autumn scene in which
the air is corrupted by the contagion of the Black Death:

L'an mil .ccc. neuf quarente,  On November 9, 1349
Le .ix.e jour de novembre,  I was walking around my room.
M'en aloie par mi ma chambre.  If the air had been clear and pure
Et se li airs fust cler et purs,  I'd have been elsewhere,
Je fusse ailleurs; mais si obscura  but so obscure it was,
Estoit, que montaingnes et plains  that mountains and fields
Estoient de bruines pleins.  were covered in haze.
Pour ce me tenoie a couvert;  So I stayed inside,
Quar ce qu'estre soloit tout vert  for what used to be all green
Estoit mué en autre teint,  had changed its shade;
Car bise l'avait tout desteint,  the north wind had discolored all
Qui mainte fleur a decopée  and cut down flowers
Par la froideure de s'espée.  with the coldness of its blade.
(vv. 24-36)

The clear, warm openness of an amorous landscape has been obscured by an ominous haze,
which forces the narrator to take refuge inside his room.28 This is a far cry from his playful
hiding place in the bush at the beginning of JRB. The quick transition of seasons highlights the

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28 Machaut's juxtaposition of plague and pastoral imagery is discussed at length by Butterfield,
"Pastoral and the Politics of Plague."
vanity and mutability of life, according to the great tradition of Ecclesiastes and of endless medieval variations on the *vanitas* theme: 29

Et me pensai que, se li temps
Estoit encore pires .x. temps,
Voire cent fois, voire cent mil,
N'i a il conseil si soutil
Comme de tout laisser ester,
Puis qu'on ne le pu et contrester,
Et de faire selon le sage
Qui dit et demoustre en sa page
Que, quant il a tout conceü,
Tout yimaginé, tout veü,
Esprouvé, serchié, viseté,
Le monde, c'est tout vanité,
Et qu'il n'i a autre salaire
Fors d'estre liéz et de bien faire.
(vv. 123-36)

And I thought that if things
were ten times worse or even
a hundred or a hundred-thousand
there'd still be no wiser counsel
than to let it all be
because one cannot resist it,
and to do as the sage
says in Scripture:
that, once he has thought all,
imagined all, seen all,
felt, sought and observed all,
that all is vanity
and there is no other reward
than to be happy and to do good.

Machaut would certainly have had good cause to meditate on the transitory nature of human life when he wrote *JRN*. To begin with, Jean de Luxembourg, his longtime patron and the exalted judge of *JRB*, had died only a few years earlier in 1346. *JRN* was most likely begun under the patronage of Jean's daughter Bonne, and the figure of Dame Bonneurté, who appears just after the prologue, may also have been created as an homage to the noblewoman. Bonne had herself perished in September 1349, more recently than her father. 30 Although Bonne's death is not explicitly mentioned in *JRN*, Machaut sustained meditation on the passing of earthly beauty

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29 On Machaut's use of Ecclesiastes, see Ehrhart, "Machaut's *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* and the Book of Ecclesiastes." Ehrhart suggests that Machaut may have been influenced by Bernard of Clairvaux's series of sermons on Ecclesiastes. Lanoue ("History," 6-7) also identifies Machaut's narrator with the sage of Ecclesiastes.

seems to suggest it, as does his presentation of the plague, from which she was thought to have died.\(^{31}\)

The overall tone of *JRN*'s prologue has as much to do with the transience of judgment as it does with the transience of earthly life. As the spring of the previous *Jugement* withers and dies along with the king responsible for the judgment of *JRB* and his daughter, the more innocent, courtly trial of *JRB* cedes to a cosmic day of wrath (*dies irae*). The *vanitas* theme developed through Machaut's borrowing from Ecclesiastes and his use of the seasons is highly conventional, reflecting the extensive medieval *contemptus mundi* tradition. It is fitting, then, that Machaut take the Christian meditation on mortality to its (theo)logical extreme: the coming winter is herald not only of death, but of divine judgment after death or at the end of time. While the "temps pascour" of *JRB* is the classic season of courtly poetry and thus of the love debate, the November of *JRN*'s prologue has a wholly other kind of significance. Liturgically, November is positioned in direct opposition to the rebirth of the Easter season. While the Last Judgment had no assigned place per se in medieval liturgy, it was often associated with Advent and particularly with November as a penitential period, since waiting for Christ's birth was also to await his second coming as judge.\(^{32}\)

 Appropriately then, Machaut fills his November scene with conspicuous apocalyptic imagery, including echoes of Revelation.\(^{33}\) Shut up in his room, Machaut's narrator speaks at length not only of the plague, but of the endless war, social strife, heresy, alleged Jewish plots,

\(^{31}\) Lanoue ("History," 4) suggests that Bonne's death may be behind the tragic vision of the prologue. See also Butterfield, "Pastoral and the Politics of Plague," 16. However, as I discuss later in this chapter (226-27), it is far from certain that the plague is what killed her.

\(^{32}\) See Bevington's introduction to *Homo, Memento Finis*, 1-14. 3.

\(^{33}\) Lanoue ("History," 6-7) sees conspicuous resemblances between the prologue and Revelation. De Looze ("Masquage," 206-7) notes the generally apocalyptic flavor of *JRN*. 
strange astrological signs and devastating earthquakes of the years 1348 and 1349. Most importantly, he begins his diatribe by lamenting the world's fall from justice: 34

Comment par conseil de taverne  How by barroom counsel
Li mondes par tout se gouverne;  the world is everywhere ruled,
Comment justice et verité  how justice and truth
Sont mortes par l'iniquité  were killed by the iniquity
D'Advarice qui en maint regne  of Avarice who in so many places
Com dame souvereinne regne  reigns as sovereign lady.
(vv. 39-44)

As the narrator bemoans the problems of his age, he makes it clear that he thinks they are part of a set of visible signs announcing the end times:

Car ce fu chose assez commune  For it was a common sight
Qu'on vit le soleil et la lune,  to see the sun and moon,
Les estoiles, le ciel, la terre,  the stars, sky and earth
En signefiance de guerre,  showing signs of war
De doleurs, et de pestilence,  and portents foretelling
Faire signes et demoustrances.  misery and pestilence.
(vv. 151-56)

Mais li sires qui tout a fait  But Our Lord who made everything
Par experience de fait  with his own hand
Com sires souvereins et dignes  as worthy sovereign lord
Seur tous, de ces mervilleus signes  over all, showed us the meaning
Nous moustra la signefiance,  of these strange and terrible signs
Et nous en mist hors de doubtance  and took away our doubt
Si a point et si proprement  so precisely and patently
Que chascuns le vit clerement.  that everyone saw it clearly.
(vv. 181-88)

In response to the world's wickedness, and specifically to human iniquity—the drunken "barroom" judgment that appears so prominently in the narrator's list of grievances (v. 39)—Machaut's narrator shows us God deciding to unleash his own justice:

Quant Dieus vit de sa mansion  When God saw from his dwelling
Dou monde la corruption  the corruption of the world
Qui tout partout estoit si grans,  which everywhere was so great,
N'est merevilles s'il fu engrans  it's no wonder if he wanted

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34 Lanoue ("History," 9) notes the special attention injustice receives in the prologue.
De penre crueuse vengence
to take harsh vengeance
De ceste grant desordenance;
for this awful disorder;
Si que tantost, sans plus attendre,
and so, without waiting any longer,
Pour justice et vengence prendre,
for the sake of vengeance and justice,
Fist la mort issir de sa cage
he sprang Death from her cage.

(vv. 346-55)

Et par tout le monde couroit,
And [Death] ran across the world,
Tout tuoit et tout acouroit
killing and destroying all,
Quanqu'il li venoit a l'encontre
whomsoever she met.
N'on ne pooit resister contre.
Nor could anyone resist her.

(vv. 363-66)

The untroubled judgment of Machaut's late patron is swept away with his passing, revealing a
darkened world in which any stable concept of justice or truth is equally dead. Human judgment
is irrevocably corrupt, requiring a final intervention from on high; accordingly, the narrator
represents the plague not merely as an instance of divine retribution in the here and now, but also
as the beginning of the Judgment Day itself, which God will put off no longer ("sans plus
attendre," v. 353).

In JRB, the low and comical position of Machaut's narrator in the bush afforded him a
vantage point from which he could observe the disputing knight and lady and help bring their
case to Jean de Luxembourg's judgment. In JRN's prologue, the narrator adopts a much loftier
perspective, one that claims special knowledge of divine judgment. Although in his little room,
the narrator seems to see from God's dwelling (mansion), looking out at the entire world as it is
cut down by Death for its iniquity. No longer merely the humble notary he was in JRB, the
narrator now casts himself as a fearful judge to replace his deceased patrons. Most notoriously,
he indicts the Jews of Europe, who were accused during those years of having caused the plague
by poisoning water sources. The image here is an explicitly visual one, highlighting the omniscient gaze of the divine that the narrator-poet claims to share:

Mais cils qui haut siet et long voit,  
Qui tout gouverne et tout pourvoit,  
Ceste traïson plus celer  
Ne volt, eins la fist reveler  
Et si generaumt savoir  
Qu'il perdirent corps et avoir.  
(vv. 229-34)

But He who is seated on high and sees far,  
who governs all and provides all,  
no longer wished this treason  
to remain hidden, so he revealed it  
and made it so well known  
that [the Jews] lost their lives and goods.

Along with strange movements of the stars, earthquakes, war, heresy and pestilence, alleged Jewish conspiracies against Christians were considered by some to be a sign of the end times, and the subsequent retaliation against Jews was understood as one with heaven's righteous anger.

But the collective Last Judgment does not happen. Instead, Machaut's language moves from his sweeping condemnation of other human beings to a self-accusation, as the narrator confesses his own sins. Then, he forgets all about his own judgment, too; spring returns, and Machaut's narrator drops the whole thing to go out hunting hares. With this unexpected development, the apocalyptic language of the prologue collapses. I believe that Machaut's apocalypticism should be read as ironic, albeit as quite genuine in its tone of lamentation. Although it is a response to real tragedy, it undermines its own desire for completeness and finality in judgment and gives way, eventually, to an alternative means of conceiving just judgment, and thus a new model of writing.

But in so doing, the tone of the Judgment also continues to echo throughout the earthly judgment which replaces it. As I show in the following section, Machaut constructs his

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35 Notably, René Girard has made much of Machaut's anti-Semitic diatribe, using it to introduce his seminal work on the scapegoat (Le bouc-émissaire, 7-21).

36 See Delumeau, La peur en Occident, 213.
apocalyptic scene in order to build readers' expectations for a final divine reckoning, by drawing on a wealth of familiar topoi culled from both eschatological representation and contemporary chroniclers' accounts of the plague. While readers are frustrated—or amused—by the deferral of divine judgment, the eschatological expectation of the prologue is fulfilled in surprising ways, in that it transfers the drama of otherworldly judgment to the open circuit of the author and reader, the continual procès of literature.

**IV. The Judgment of History**

At this point, it is helpful to recall again the distinction that Levinas draws between eschatological judgment and the judgment of history. While the judgment of history provides an impersonal and inflexible accounting of the events lived out by the human collectivity, the eschatological demands that each individual participate in his or her judgment, resulting in an endless trial resistant to the definitive pronouncements of the "troisième personne," resistant to the claim of an objective and transhistorical version of events, and resistant to a teleological understanding of time. According to Levinas's distinction, the apocalyptic monolog of Machaut's narrator would fall decidedly into the category of the historical. I have already noted that the narrator borrows from Scripture—particularly Ecclesiastes and Revelation—to cast the present time as end time and to establish himself as the judge of a fallen world, temporarily assuming the voice of the doom-prophet. In order to fully understand the narrator's use of apocalyptic judgment and its collapse, it is important to also consider Machaut's other major sources for *JRN*'s prologue, namely the numerous contemporary Latin and vernacular historians who wrote similarly of the plague. For it is not only that Machaut adopts the voice of the soothsayer, but
also that he casts himself as an historian. The narrator's prologue represents a judgment which attempts to end history by pronouncing a last word on it.

Critics, beginning with Alfred Coville, have noted similarities between Machaut's prologue and contemporary plague chronicles; Coville even labeled the prologue to *JRN* a "chronique en vers." As potential historical sources for the prologue, we might cite, for example, the chronicles of Machaut's close contemporary Jean le Bel, or Gabriele de Mussis's *Historia de Morbo* (c.1348), which, like *JRN*'s prologue, mixes imagery from Revelation with astrological signs and dwells on the corruption of the air. But Machaut seems to have been borrowing quite broadly from the chronicle tradition, making it a futile endeavor to trace *JRN*'s prologue to a single ur-source. The major elements of Machaut's account are found in any number of contemporary chronicles: war, bad weather and earthquakes as signs of the apocalypse (vv. 89-90, vv. 95-98, vv. 172-80, vv. 189-211, vv. 265-306), the appearance of flagellant heretics from the Rhineland (vv. 241-56), the accusation of Jews for well-poisoning and subsequent, divinely-authorized retaliation by Christians (vv. 212-40), the foul air (vv. 27-30, vv. 307-20), strange movements in the stars (vv. 151-71), the plague's disturbing pathology (vv. 321-46), the universality of its affliction (v. 321, v. 332, vv. 347-430), the abandonment of friends and family members for fear of contagion (vv. 329-40), the decimation of rural

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37 "Poèmes historiques," 329. Coville (328-331) also discusses Machaut's historiography more generally. See also Palmer, ed., *The Judgment of the King of Navarre*, 215 n; Taylor, "Portraits of Pestilence." Taylor (105) cites similarities with the work of Simon de Covino and Guy de Chauliac, although without arguing that Machaut was influenced by them.

38 *Chronique de Jean le Bel*, ed. Viard and Déprez. Lanoue ("History," 3) notes similarities to the account of Jean le Bel.

39 See de Mussis in Aberth, *The Black Death*, 98-100. Another important source for the plague, especially the astrological influence and the resulting contagion of the air, would have been the 1348 *Compendium* published as a tract by the University of Paris medical faculty. On the *Compendium*, see Bazin-Tacchela, "Rupture et continuité du discours médical," 108-111.

40 In his edition of *JRN*, Palmer suggests that Machaut would have been following one such source closely (215 n) but does not propose a specific source text.
populations and of the agricultural economy (vv. 407-30).\textsuperscript{41} Shared with most contemporary accounts is the hypothesis of divine retribution for the world's sins, including in many instances a similarly apocalyptic tone.\textsuperscript{42}

Although innovative for its transposition of events from the chronicles into verse, \textit{JRN}'s prologue reads like a veritable anthology of plague histories, compressing almost all of that tradition's major \textit{topoi} into a little over four hundred lines. The only major \textit{topos} frequently evoked by chroniclers and not by Machaut's narrator is the geographical origin of the plague, generally in the East; that is perhaps because geography is less important than the theme of universal guilt. Although Machaut was likely an eyewitness to the plague's horrors while at Reims or elsewhere, there is almost no detail in \textit{JRN}'s plague account that could not have been found in a handful of other sources, both Latin and vernacular. This despite the narrator's claim that he had never read any such thing in history:

\begin{center}
Car je ne truis pas en histoire
Lisant nulles si mervelleuses
Si dures ni si perilleuses
(vv. 146-48)
\end{center}

Of course, the unprecedented nature of calamity was also a commonplace of fourteenth-century plague chroniclers, albeit a sincere one during those terrible years.

What I believe may be inferred from the very borrowed discourse of \textit{JRN}'s prologue is a certain ironic awareness of its own failure to do justice to its subjects, to provide a truly definitive version of the truth. Machaut's narrator's diatribe is not an instance of perfect divine judgment, but an all too human attempt, which quickly falls flat, to see as if through the eyes of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} For a general discussion of medieval plague chronicles, see Carmichael, "1 Universal and Particular;" Zanella, "Italia, Francia e Germania." For specific discussion of the \textit{topoi} of meteorological and astrological phenomena, see Smoller, "Of Earthquakes, Hail, Frogs and Geography."
\item \textsuperscript{42} See Zanella, "Italia, Francia e Germania," 88.
\end{itemize}
God. In this, Machaut's prologue corresponds to Claudia Rattazzi Papka's term "fiction of judgment," defined as "a work that claims access to divine revelation while acknowledging its status as a human artifact, and in which visions of order and meaning are presented by the author as if from a divine perspective." Although the narrator does not shy away from the first person singular, he uses it to make himself a merciless judge of history, thundering down blanket statements about the corruption of broad sectors of society and portraying God's angel of death systematically depopulating the world. Machaut's narrator speaks in what Levinas would term "la troisième personne," both through his wholesale condemnation of others and his depersonalizing use of borrowed discourse. He presumes to judge the dead, who cannot speak for themselves.

The universality of human guilt and the correspondingly universal nature of the plague's affliction were arguably the master topoi of all fourteenth-century plague accounts, and especially led chroniclers to envision contemporary events in terms of the Apocalypse. The history-ending judgment of Machaut's narrator may likewise be characterized as a universalizing mode of discourse. It does not pause to consider individual cases or exceptions, but sweepingly condemns, both large groups of people, like the Jews, and the human family in its entirety:

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Vraiment, c'est parole voire,
Qu'on le scet et voit clerelement
Par vray et juste experiment—
Comment nuls ne fait son devoir,
Comment chacuns quiert decevoir
Son proisme; car je ne voy pere,
Fil, ne fille, ne suer, ne frere,
Mere, marrastre, ne cousin,
Tante, oncle, voisin, ne voisine,
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Really, it is true
and one sees and knows clearly
by true and just experience
how none does his duty,
how each seeks to deceive
his neighbor; for I see no father
no son, no daughter,
no brother, no sister, no mother
or stepmother, no cousin, no aunt
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43 "The Limits of Apocalypse," 233. However, the authors that Rattazzi Papka uses as examples—notably Dante and Langland—tend to employ the fiction of judgment much less transparently and ironically than does Machaut. For a lively discussion of how Machaut's vision diverges from that of the divine, see Cerquiglini, " 'Le clerc et le louche,' " 488-89.

44 See Carmichael, "1 Universal and Particular." See also Chareyron, Jean le Bel: le maître de Froissart, 192-5; Lanoue, "History," 5.
Mari, mouillier, amy, n'amie no uncle, no neighbor, no husband, Que li uns l'autre ne cunchie and no friend or lover (vv. 48-58) who doesn't deceive the other.

As the narrator adopts the voice of the historian, the effect is not only to deny the interiority of the subjects he judges, but also his own interiority. He could be any chronicler, and any "personal" reactions he makes are not specific to himself, but belong to the general horror of the age.\(^\text{45}\)

Pursuing the category of historical judgment as Levinas defines it, historicity is also apparent in Machaut's narrator's emphasis on the visible and the obvious: for those who know how to read them, the signs of God's condemnation are there to be clearly and definitively interpreted, in visible evidence like buboes on the flesh, bad weather and strange astrological alignments. As in the narrator's accounts of the divine gaze (vv. 229-34),\(^\text{46}\) sight reigns supreme over the other senses. It is what can be observed and interpreted by an impersonal eye that counts, leaving no room for an interior presence capable of defending itself.\(^\text{47}\) Although Machaut's narrator repeatedly affirms that the signs of the end are seen and understood "clerement" (v. 188) by all, his insistence on an apocalyptic interpretation of these calamitous events seems really to be a way of bolstering his own privileged authority as prophet of doom.

\(^{45}\) Calin (A Poet at the Fountain, 116) terms the narrator in the prologue an "Everyman." In the contention that Machaut's historical judgment is impersonal, my analysis differs considerably from much critical opinion. Michel Zink, for one, has written the following: "[in the JRN's prologue] the plague and the ills of the time are not related to history, but to the poet and his own story. They take their place not in historical time, but in the interior time of the poet who is confronted by historical time. Understanding of these events is governed not by the narration of history, but by the poet's humors, his melancholy" ("The Time of the Plague and the Order of Writing," 275). While Lanoue characterizes the narrator as he presents himself in the prologue as an "allegorized Adam" ("History," 4), like Zink he argues that the personal experience of Machaut's narrator disrupts the discourse of history within the apocalyptic prologue itself (see especially 4).

\(^{46}\) quoted above, 213.

\(^{47}\) This diverges significantly from the account of Root ('Space to Speke,' 127-128), who argues that divine judgment as depicted in the prologue is capable of seeing inner intention.
and judge of mankind. After all, he has already invalidated the ability of sinful humans everywhere to see clearly in their judgments.\textsuperscript{48} It is only the interpretations of the narrator that make the meaning of these signs "clear."

To complete the analogy with Levinas's modern critique of an impersonal, historical judgment, the historical mode as used by Machaut's narrator also describes a teleological progression. The narrator synchronizes the chaotic events of history into a common end time, and he even suggests a specific date for Judgment Day: November 9, 1349. The errors of human justice—of the "barroom counsel" (v. 39) bemoaned in the opening lines of the prologue—seem to fall away as history presses toward a final divine reckoning.\textsuperscript{49} The narrator's voice assumes the movement of judgment toward its ultimate perfection at the end of history.

But this is not what happens at all. This is not the end but a beginning—a prologue—and the narrator's historicizing, apocalyptic voice fades as suddenly as it appears. This fading signals the failure of the narrator's pretensions to definitive truth, even as it builds readers' expectations for a decisive judgment. After his apocalyptic monolog and in stark opposition to it, the narrator reminds us that he is shut up in his little room alone. He is pacing frenetically after having confessed his sins in anticipation of his own impending doom. The juxtaposition of the narrator's previous God's-eye-view to his real situation is purposefully jarring. After having repeatedly affirmed his special revelation of the fate of humanity, the narrator abruptly informs readers of just how little he really knows about what is going on outside:\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48} Here again I am in strong disagreement with Root's analysis of \textit{JRN}'s prologue: "The 'mervilleus signes' produced by the Lord function 'proprement,' that is, literally. They can be clearly understood" ('\textit{Space to Speke}', 124).

\textsuperscript{49} See Root, '\textit{Space to Speke}', 123.

\textsuperscript{50} On the way that the narrator's admissions of weakness and fear contribute to Machaut's poetic persona, see Taylor, "Portraits of Pestilence," 108-109.
This extreme change in perspective might be explained simply by its temporality: the narrator was not yet aware of all that had occurred, only later becoming cognizant of the events and filling in his story with the relevant details. Yet the world doesn't end, so the retroactive suggestion of those events as signs of the last days would be just as problematic as the narrator's conceit that he witnessed them from a God's-eye-view while he was shut up in his room. In fact, Machaut's narrator admits a willful ignorance of the events transpiring outside, which he attributes to his vain desire not to become personally touched by loss:

Car riens n'en voloie savoir, For I wanted to know nothing,  
Pour meins de pensées avoir, in order to have fewer worries,  
Comment qu'asses de mes amis although many of my friends  
Fussent mors et en terre mis. had died and been buried.  
(vv. 455-58)

In the abrupt perspectival shift away from the teleological and collective judgment of history, judgment immediately takes on an introspective and personal frame of reference, since Machaut's narrator turns the accusation on himself and confesses:

Je ne fui mie si hardis I wasn't nearly so brave that  
Que moult ne fusse acouardis. I wasn't cut down to a coward's size.  
Car tuit li plus hardi trambloient For all the bravest men trembled  
De pâour de mort qu'il avoient. from their fear of death.  
Si que très bien me confessai So I confessed myself fully  
De tous les pechiez que fais ay of all the sins I've committed
Et me mis en estat de grace and put myself into a state of grace,
Pour recevoir mort en la place, ready to die then and there
S'il pleüist a Nostre Signeur. should it have pleased the Lord.

(vv. 433-41)

Even the strongest and most just among men have good reason to fear, and the narrator is not among their privileged numbers. The narrator's omniscience crumbles, leaving him to account for himself before God in the first person. The plague had given occasion to the narrator-poet to play judge of human history, but he is now concerned much more with his own story, and what will happen to him after death. In this sense, Machaut's sudden narrowing-down of judgment already suggests that all eschatology is a personal eschatology, in that it is the individual who must at last answer for his or her own sin.

But the particular judgment of the narrator's soul doesn't happen either, any more than the collective Day of Wrath. While it signals an important change of tone, a personalization of the eschatological, the narrator's confession is passed over quickly; he certainly doesn't confess anything to readers, other than the fact that he has confessed. And once the threat of imminent death is removed, he also seems to find it difficult to maintain a penitential, introspective heart. After hearing sounds of celebration, Machaut's narrator throws open his window; he is then told by a friend that the plague has abated and that it is safe to come out (vv. 465-75). Immediately, the narrator forgets about the end of the world and his sins, leaving his room to breathe the fresh air. As if overnight, spring has returned to the earth:

Et ouvri mes yeus et ma chiere And I opened my eyes and turned
Devers l'air qui sis doux estoit my face to the air so sweet
Et si clers qu'il m'amonestoit and so clear that it summoned me

51 Compare with the *Dies irae* hymn: "Quid sum miser tunc dicturus? / Quem patronum rogaturus, / Cum vix iustus sit securus?" (vv. 19-21, "What am I to say then? / What patron shall I seek, / When even the just man is hardly secure?")
Suddenly, the world outside is filled once again with sweet breezes (v. 483, vv. 528-29) and birdsong (vv. 526-27). After the poem's apocalyptic false-start, this scene symbolically reopens *JRN* by evoking the beginning of *JRB*, where the carefree narrator had likewise reveled in the beauty of the new season before his encounter with the disputing knight and lady.\(^52\) Despite the devastation of the plague, the familiar spring scene of lyric poetry and the love debate tradition triumphs in an inevitable return, and new life frustrates the narrator's claims to finality. From the brink of certain death, Machaut's narrator has been reborn into the "temps pascour" of the author's earlier poem, the time of less serious, courtly judgment.\(^53\)

Most of all, the rebirth of the Easter season represents the activity of the poet himself, the work of writing and rewriting. As it suddenly interrupts the doom-laden voice of the prologue, this scene reattaches *JRN* to the most traditional opening of courtly poetry, the *reverdie* (literally re-greening), in which the return of spring both catalyzes and symbolizes the poet's work.\(^54\) The dramatic departure of Machaut's narrator from his room into a landscape of budding flowers and warbling songbirds suggests that for him, death and judgment can be put aside as the adventure of poetic creation becomes possible again.

\(^{52}\) See Calin, *A Poet at the Fountain*, 128.

\(^{53}\) Kay (Place of Thought, 98) has read this as a potential rewriting of the allegorical birth of Deguileville's pilgrim in *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*.

\(^{54}\) See Poirion, *Le poète et le prince*, 115, 488; Zink, *Nature et poésie au Moyen Age*, 176. Zumthor (*Langue et techniques poétiques*, 169-193) notes how *trouvères* often made a specific effort to distance themselves from the idea that their compositions were inspired by the spring (favoring the muse of love); this overly vigorous protest only shows to what extent the connection between spring and poetry was already entrenched, at least in the Occitan tradition upon which the *trouvères* were drawing. For specific discussion of Machaut's use of vernal themes, see Butterfield, "Pastoral and the Politics of Plague." Butterfield notes that this scene is an instance of the *reverdie* and compares it to the pastoral tradition as used by Boccaccio.
Since the world will not end after all, Machaut's narrator decides to spend the new spring day coursing hares, as if he had not just narrowly escaped meeting his maker. For readers, however, there is something decidedly too easy about the disappearance of the Apocalypse and the cliché reappearance of the Easter season, the return to the untroubled day of judgment that took place in \textit{JRB}. While Machaut's oblivious narrator puts the end of the world out of mind immediately to delight his senses, the effect on the audience is quite different: in the abrupt juxtaposition of \textit{JRN}'s two opening scenes—Apocalypse and \textit{reverdie}—it is difficult not to feel the lingering presence of death and judgment behind the surface of this bright spring day, and to recall the narrator's hell-fire condemnation of man's iniquity to man.

Finally sprung from his dismal room, Machaut's narrator has chosen to hunt hares, a common medieval figure for vain sensual pursuits, and particularly for sexual conquest.\textsuperscript{55} The implication thus seems to be that the narrator has quickly fallen back into sin after his panicked moments of self-accusation during the plague. Although the narrator claims to have made a thorough confession in anticipation of his judgment, he seems now to have forgotten that penitential introspection is to be practiced constantly throughout life and not only in preparation for death. Because he doesn't die as he had feared, the narrator's confession \textit{in extremis} has also failed to produce a final judgment on himself. The spiritual comfort to be found in a full confession is foiled in much the same way as the finality of the Apocalypse. On the one hand, the narrator is spared death and the judgment that it brings. On the other hand, the fact that he remains alive makes it less easy for him to fulfill his responsibility by squaring his accounts once and for all.

\textsuperscript{55} See Calin (\textit{A Poet at the Fountain}, 121) on the significance of the hare-hunting scene. On its erotic sense, see also Schmolke-Hasselmann, "Accipiter et chirotheca."
It is into this context that Dame Bonneurté emerges to demand a reckoning which the narrator seems never to have foreseen, even in his most apocalyptic moments. While the narrator is amusing himself in the hunt, Bonneurté sends a messenger to summon him to her. When the narrator responds to the summons and arrives before this mysterious lady, she calls him by his name, Guillaume, for the first time and accuses him of having defamed women in *JRB*. Although the narrator's meeting with Bonneurté parallels his encounter with the knight and the lady in *JRB* and gives rise to a second, opposing judgment, Bonneurté does not simply continue the trial begun in the first *Jugement* by overturning its decision. Rather, Bonneurté's judgment may be read as a means of fulfilling the eschatological expectation prompted by *JRN*'s prologue, albeit in a rather different form. Bonneurté's accusation breaks through the lyric veneer of the *reverdie* to remind Guillaume of the way his writing is constantly subject to both the judgment of God and the judgment of the reader.

In the way her summons interrupts Guillaume's pursuit of vanity, Bonneurté's entrance is, in fact, evocative of another common medieval mode of eschatological representation, the theme of a sudden warning, delivered from the world beyond, to repent of one's sins before it is too late. Critics have sometimes wondered why the narrator—a court clerk of relatively low social stature in *JRB*—is engaged in the traditionally aristocratic activity of the hunt.\(^{57}\) Aside from any implications of upward social mobility the scene may suggest, the fact that Machaut's narrator is interrupted by a mysterious figure while hunting on horseback seems to refer to the *memento mori* tradition of texts. As the most exemplary of vain pursuits, the hunt is symbolically

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\(^{57}\) Calin (Fountain, 122) has pointed out the social incongruity of the poet and his pastime in this scene, although he mistakenly refers to the query as rabbits rather than hares. Cerquiglini (Engin, 122) has argued that the juxtaposed openings of the *Navarre* create a tension between the figures of the knight and the clerk.
interrupted in these texts by the sudden reminder of death, which spurs the mindfulness of the
hunters about their immanent judgment. When the hunt is interrupted, man's pretensions to
mastery over nature are violently overturned and he comes to a devastating awareness of his
mortality. For example, in the widespread medieval legend of the Trois Morts and Trois Vifs
(The Three Living and Three Dead), a group of hunting noblemen are suddenly met by their own
rotting corpses, come from the future to warn them to repent. In much the same vein,
Bonneurté's appearance suddenly interrupts the narrator's insouciance with a reminder that he is
always being judged. Her accusation recalls the divine judgment that the narrator has put out of
mind, by demanding that he repent for what he has written.

And while Bonneurté is radiantly beautiful, not a rotting corpse, she may well represent
the dead come to warn the narrator, as in the memento mori tradition. Bonneurté is an enigmatic
figure who performs a number of important metamorphoses in the course of JRN. Perhaps the
most striking aspect of her identity, however, is her resemblance in name to Bonne de
Luxembourg, under whose patronage Machaut likely began JRN and who died in the autumn of
the year the poem begins, 1349. Whether or not one accepts Ernest Hœpffner's theory that JRN
was written to appease actual members of Machaut's female readership offended by the verdict
of JRB, it is clear from Bonneurté's accusation about JRB that she is an offended reader, and a

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58 Rooney ("The Book of the Dutchess") discusses resemblances to the memento mori tradition in
Chaucer's Book of the Dutchess, but only makes passing mention (299) to this scene in JRN,
which would have been Chaucer's most immediate source. On the Trois Morts legend, see
Scaramella, "L'Italia dei trionfi e dei contrasti," 26-31. Scaramella explains the recurrence of the
hunting detail in the legend by tracing it back to an illumination in the late thirteenth-century
manuscript De arte venandi, written by the Emperor Frederick II. Calin (A Poet at the Fountain,
123) notes that the encounter with Bonneurté recalls traditional romance entrances into the
Arthurian otherworld.
reader intimately familiar with Machaut's work.\textsuperscript{59} For this reason especially, it seems plausible that she is meant to suggest the poet's late patroness.

Although it is now generally accepted that Bonne perished of the same plague outbreak that forms the backdrop for \textit{JRN}'s prologue, rumors reported in the chronicle of Machaut's contemporary Jean le Bel tell a rather different story: many believed that she had been deliberately killed.\textsuperscript{60} If so, it may have been under the orders of her husband Jean, duke of Normandy (soon thereafter Jean II, king of France) as a result of suspicions that she had committed adultery with Raoul de Brienne, constable of France.\textsuperscript{61} In any case, the constable was himself summarily beheaded by Jean II the following year, upon his return from English captivity, possibly because letters Jean received inculpated Raoul in double-dealing with the English, but also possibly due to the same rumors of adultery that may have led to Bonne's death.\textsuperscript{62} Having executed Raoul, Jean conferred the title of constable on the widely unpopular Charles d'Espagne. He also made him the count of Angoulême, a hereditary title claimed by Charles de Navarre, who had the other Charles murdered in 1353.

As for Machaut, the poet had thus far spent his entire career closely tied to the House of France and to those who, like Jean de Luxembourg and his daughter, were allied with that house. Yet after Bonne's death, there is little evidence that Machaut spent any time in the service of her husband the king, which would have been the more predictable career choice.\textsuperscript{63} Instead, he

\textsuperscript{59} Hœpffner, ed., \textit{Œuvres de Guillaume de Machaut}, I:lxix. On the identity of Bonneurté as Bonne, see also Calin, \textit{A Poet at the Fountain}, 40-41; Cerquiglini, \textit{Engin}, 61; Root, 'Space to Speke,' 121.
\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Chronique de Jean le Bel}, LXXXIV (ed. Viard and Déprez, II:183).
\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Chronique de Jean le Bel}, LXXXVII (ed. Viard and Déprez, II:198-200).
\textsuperscript{63} See Cazèlles, \textit{Société politique}, 88; Gauvard, "Portrait du prince."
swiftly aligned himself with Charles de Navarre and the House of Évreux, Jean II's bitter rivals.\(^{64}\) That decisive move by the poet is reflected explicitly in \textit{JRN}, which announces Machaut's new allegiance through the nomination of the young Charles de Navarre as patron-judge, in parallel to Jean de Luxembourg in \textit{JRB}.

At least one scholar, Lawrence Earp, has suggested that the bloody court intrigue of 1349-50 may have been a motivating factor in Machaut's departure from the House of France.\(^{65}\) The poet certainly would not have been alone in reacting this way, since Raoul's execution without trial provoked a wave of anger among the constable's friends and allies in the Norman nobility, many of whom became partisans of Charles de Navarre as a result.\(^{66}\) In any case, it hardly seems a coincidence that the central matter for judgment in \textit{JRN}, as in \textit{JRB}, is an aristocratic love affair ending in death. While \textit{JRB} also considers the death of the lady's lover, \textit{JRN} beginning with its dark prologue makes death a much stronger presence.\(^{67}\) During \textit{JRN}'s trial scene, for instance, the disputants consider the exemplum of an unfaithful stork killed by her mate when he discovers her infidelity (vv. 1671-862).

Even more telling are the words Bonneurte uses as she details her accusation to Guillaume. Comparing the knight's suffering to the lady's in \textit{JRB}, she says that the love affair that ended in death torments her:

\(^{64}\) See Palmer in the introduction to his edition of \textit{JRN}, xiv-xv. Machaut did not definitively cut himself off from the House of France, however, as he later enjoyed the patronage of Jean Duc de Berry, who was the son of Bonne and Jean II, and in whose service Machaut portrays himself in his \textit{Fonteinne amoureuse} (1360). See the editions of \textit{Fonteinne} by Palmer and Cerquiglini-Toulet.

\(^{65}\) \textit{A Guide to Research}, 25.


\(^{67}\) See Lanoue, "History," especially 10-11. As William Calin puts it, "Machaut never lets us forget that love is accompanied by pain and death, and can never escape from either of them" (\textit{A Poet at the Fountain}, 127).
Mais ce n'est pas chose pareille
Au fait d'amours qui me remort,
Qui se defenist par la mort.
(vv. 1006-8)

But [the knight's pain] is not a comparable thing to the love affair that torments me which was undone by death.

Even if all Bonneurté means by her use of the direct object pronoun "me" is that the pain of the other lady troubles her personally as a woman and a reader, it is tempting to also infer the awareness of Machaut and his audience of contemporary events that make a debate poem about love and death hit suddenly much closer to home.

*JRN*'s concern for good judgment and the lamentation of iniquity in its prologue may well constitute an implicit critique of Jean II's actions, particularly since Jean le Bel's chronicle states that the execution of Raoul was "sans loy et sans jugement." But after the failure of the apocalypse to happen, Bonneurté proposes a different sort of eschatological judgment to remedy the failings of human justice. Come from the grave to admonish Guillaume to regard himself more critically, Bonneurté transforms the spectral other of *memento mori* texts into the imagined, idealized reader, the patron whose memory lives on and who demands that Machaut do her justice.

**V. Bonneurté's Accusation**

When the narrator arrives before Bonneurté, she scolds him for having ignored her presence (vv. 760-68), rebuking him for his lack of awareness, as one might expect of an apparition from the other world come to remind the sinner of his immanent judgment. Then, once Bonneurté has Guillaume's attention, she moves on to the matter that prompted her to summon him in the first place: his specific sins. Similar to the way hunter becomes hunted in the *memento mori* tradition, she turns the tables on Guillaume by making him an object of pursuit, in

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68 *Chronique de Jean le Bell*, LXXXVII (ed. Viard and Déprez, II:200).
the full judicial sense. Bonneurté exhorts Guillaume to judge himself in the here and now. At first, she refuses to specify her accusation and insists that Guillaume find the answer for himself, examining his own "livres":

Guillaume, sachies, orendroit  Guillaume, know right from the start
N'en arez plus de ma partie.  that you'll have no more from me.
Car la chose est ainsi partie:  For the affair is underway:
Se je le say, vous le savez,  If I know it, you know it.
Car le fait devers vous avez  Your offense is something
En l'un de vos livres eescript,  you've written in one of your books,
Bien devisié et bien descript:  thoroughly laid out and well described.
Si resgardes dedens vos livres,  Look then into your books;
Bien say que vous n'estes pas ivres  I'm sure you aren't drunk
Quant vos fais amoureus ditez.  when you compose your tales of love,
Dont bien savez de vos dittez,  so you must know of your poems
Quant vous les faites et parfaite,  when you make and perfect them,
Se vous faites bien ou forfaites,  whether you do well or ill,
Dès qu'il sont fait de sanc assis  since you put your will into them
Autant a un mot comme a sis.  as much in one word as in six.
S'il vous plaist, vous y garderez,  Please, look there for the answer,
Qu'autre chose n'en porterez  for you'll get nothing more from me,
De moy, quant a l'eure presente.  (at least not for the moment).
Solez certeins que c'est m'entente.  You can be sure that that is my intention.
(vv. 862-80)

Despite the narrator's earlier claim to have thoroughly confessed his sins (v. 438), Bonneurté's accusation indicates that there is unfinished business left for his soul, that Guillaume's introspection is not yet complete. Given her insistence that Guillaume look inward to discover the nature of his own fault, Bonneurté's choice of words ("livres," v. 869) recalls the proverbial book of conscience.

Even more than the "ouvrages" for which Guillaume de Deguileville must respond in his Pèlerinage de l'âme (v. 1122), the most immediate context for Guillaume's "livres" is literary, since Bonneurté means that she is offended by the judgment made in Machaut's JRB. In response

Calin (A Poet at the Fountain, 122) has noted this role reversal, although without reference to the memento mori tradition.
to Bonneurté's accusation, Guillaume claims that he cannot recall having committed such a sin in his writing. So Bonneurté spells it out for him; she takes issue with the judgment of JRB that the lady whose lover died feels less pain than the jilted knight:

\[\begin{align*}
\text{Vous avez dit et devisié} & \quad \text{You have said and laid out} \\
\text{Et jugié de fait avisié} & \quad \text{and judged from knowledge of the facts} \\
\text{Par diffinitif jugement} & \quad \text{by definitive judgment} \\
\text{Que cils a trop plus malement,} & \quad \text{that he has much more} \\
\text{Griété, tourment, mal, et souffraite} & \quad \text{grief, torment, pain and suffering} \\
\text{Qui truée sa dame forfaite} & \quad \text{who finds his lady unfaithful} \\
\text{Contre lui en fausse maniere,} & \quad \text{to him and false,} \\
\text{Que la très douce dame chiere} & \quad \text{than that very gentle dear lady} \\
\text{Qui avera son dous amy} & \quad \text{who had her sweet lover} \\
\text{Conjoint a son cuer, sans demy,} & \quad \text{joined fully to her heart,} \\
\text{Par amours, sans autre moien,} & \quad \text{by love and no other force,} \\
\text{Puis le savera en loien} & \quad \text{then learned he was in the bonds} \\
\text{De la mort ou il demourra,} & \quad \text{of death and so will remain,} \\
\text{Si que jamais ne le verra.} & \quad \text{so that never will she see him again.}
\end{align*}\]

(vv. 1013-26)

According to the wording of Bonneurté's accusation (vv. 1013-14), the role of judge has passed from the late King of Bohemia—in whose mouth Machaut had placed the first judgment—to the poet himself, who must now take responsibility for it. Although the narrator has no judicial agency in JRB, appearing merely as Jean de Luxembourg's notary or secretary, Bonneurté's indictment confers upon Guillaume the responsibility for having made the judgment, not just for having written it down.\(^70\) Bonneurté regards Guillaume as fundamentally guilty for having neglected to see the validity of the woman's position, the extent of her pain.

With her accusation, Bonneurté insists upon the real ethical importance of the judgments made in poetry. The love debate tradition upon which Machaut's Jugement poems are partly modeled already displays a distinct ethical streak, in that it systematically questions the minutiae of proper conduct for lovers. While rarely delving into such weighty topics as life and death, the

\(^{70}\) See Root, 'Space to Speke,' 122; Palmer, "Transtextuality and the Producing-I," 300; De Looze, Pseudo-Autobiography, 71-72.
court d'amour nonetheless frames itself as a vehicle for ethical investigation that supplements official law. Just as Bonneurté accuses Guillaume of writing a judgment with no regard for the feelings and reputation of women, Machaut's JRB largely sidesteps the ethical import of the love debate tradition, since it attempts to measure relative emotional experience rather than working toward a prescriptive model of courtly conduct, and since it treats the death of the lady's lover rather lightly. Bonneurté's accusation, however, recasts the case of JRB in a more demanding ethical framework as she accuses its author, focusing not on the finer points of courtly behavior, but rather upon the ethics of writing itself. Because for Bonneurté, it was JRB's light tone and its manner of judgment, not the case itself, which were truly frivolous. The bereaved lady was wronged not only by losing the judgment, but by having an issue as serious as the death of her lover treated with levity. It is seemingly for this reason that the reverdie scene of JRB is rewritten in JRN as an exemplary instance of the narrator's thoughtless vanity, which Bonneurté's appearance shatters.

Bonneurté's accusation, however, is also a means of calling greater attention to Machaut's prominence as an author. Guillaume's failure to find in his own livres the sin to which Bonneurté alludes highlights the extensive nature of Machaut's corpus at the time of JRN's composition. Guillaume says that he has no idea what specific part of his work she finds objectionable, nor should he reasonably be expected to know, considering the vastness of his poetic output:

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71 Literary critic and legal historian Peter Goodrich rightly considers the courts of love to constitute an ethically serious "minor jurisprudence" inseparable from the prehistory of modern law and existing somewhere between literary and legal culture. Goodrich argues that the courts of love privilege fluidity over closure, creating an interminable procès which constantly rewrites the law and which is tied to the particular jurisprudence of women (Law in the Courts of Love, especially 178-181).
Guillaume's protest is on one level a comic instance of self-promotion: how can he possibly recall everything that he has written throughout such a long and productive career? In fact, taken as a reflection of Machaut's own evolving corpus, Guillaume's description of his work is quite accurate. At the time of JRN's composition, Machaut's corpus comprised as many as five narrative dits, including the innovative lyric-narrative hybrid Remede de Fortune, as well as a substantial amount of lyric pieces and music.72

Machaut uses Bonneurte's accusation, and Guillaume's response to it, as a means of highlighting what the poet has already written, and of strengthening Machaut's resemblance to his poetic persona, the textual self represented by the narrator, to whom he is bound for better or worse. Does Guillaume's description of Machaut's poetry, deeply heterogeneous but also assembled together in front of him as a whole ("devers moy," v. 885, "consideré toutes ensamble," v. 888), also imply its compilation? Bonneurte speaks of Guillaume's "livres," not his

72 On the chronology of the narrative poems, see Earp, A Guide to Research, 189-94; on the chronology of the music, see Ibid., 273-74.
"livre," but *livre* was commonly used to refer to a part of a codex as well as to the whole. The earliest extent "complete works" Machaut manuscript is the celebrated MS. *C* (BNF fr. 1586), whose most reliable dating ranges 1350-56. The traditional and widely accepted dating of *JRN* is 1349-50, but this is entirely due to the historical details presented in the prologue, so that it can only be placed with any certainty as being written in 1349 or later. It is thus well within the realm of possibility that *JRN* is contemporaneous with *C* or even postdates it, especially since *C* contains *JRB* and the *Dit de l'alérion*, but not *JRN*.

Although it is not entirely clear whether the *livres* of which Bonneurte and Guillaume speak may also refer to such a bound codex, it is nevertheless striking that Guillaume displays an awareness of his sundry poetry as constituting a textual whole that he might put in front of himself to reread, like the personal book of conscience. In this sense, the body of work Guillaume describes also corresponds quite well to the way modern scholars characterize Machaut's manuscripts. As Kevin Brownlee and Sylvia Huot have both shown, Machaut's manuscripts represent a pioneering instance of vernacular poetry compilations in which "the personality of the author is deemed central enough to inspire the conjoining of texts that would not ordinarily be associated." Through careful control over the ordering of his manuscripts,

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73 As for example, Machaut's *Livre du voir dit* and the alternate title of the *Fonteinne amoureuse*, the *Livre du Morpheüs*.

74 See Avril, "Les manuscrits enluminés de Guillaume de Machaut," 119, 124; Earp, *A Guide to Research*, 192. Both Avril and Earp lean toward the latter part of this range of dates. Earp (26-7) speculates, however, that the ms. was likely begun, like *JRN* itself, for Bonne de Luxembourg, who died in 1349, while Avril (71 n17) acknowledges some evidence that *C* already existed as early as 1353.


76 Huot, *Song to Book*, 234. Huot considers that, before Machaut, only Adam de la Halle's manuscripts represent "an author corpus treated as a small book unto itself, with generic division, yet also as a self-contained whole subject to poet organization and provided with an explicit" (*Song to Book*, 235). Brownlee likewise argues that "Machaut's concept of the vernacular poète involves the explicit unification of a generically and linguistically diverse corpus of first-person
Machaut sought to define himself as a corpus-author, tying his identity and authority as a poet to the coming together of separate texts into a bound whole. Whether or not Guillaume's initial dialog with Bonneurté implies that a complete works compilation already existed at the time of *JRN*'s composition, Guillaume's response to her accusation is a means of simultaneously demonstrating the size and diversity of his work and establishing its unity as the extension of a particular human being. Guillaume's protest to Bonneurté is an assertion of authorship, and specifically of the author as the generator of a corpus (if not yet a book) whose unity reflects to some degree the ontological coherence of its maker.

At the same time, Guillaume's response to Bonneurté also betrays a paradoxical facet of Machaut's self-representation as a poet. That is, Machaut's status as an author is in no small way guaranteed by the extent to which his corpus can display formal diversity while still referring to its origin in the same human being. The poet's virtuosity is tested and affirmed by an overarching narrative that has his narrator-persona performing a variety of poetic roles over time. Accordingly, in his retort to Bonneurté, Guillaume simultaneously acknowledges his identity as a book-writer and his present distance from what has come before in his body of work.

In response to Guillaume's protest, Bonneurté changes her earlier refusal to explain the charges and carefully specifies her accusation concerning *JRB* (vv. 1013-26). Guillaume's knowledge of his wrongdoing does not come from within, then, as Bonneurté originally demands that it must. It is Bonneurté the reader who, after the fact, makes Guillaume responsible for the poems into a single oeuvre" (*Poetic Identity*, 14-15). Brownlee further argues that Machaut represents himself as both poet and compiler in *JRN* as well as in the *Voir dit* (Ibid., 15).

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78 See McGrady, "Guillaume de Machaut," 114. De Looze argues that the *Jugement* poems constitute a "mini corpus poetae" (*Pseudo-Autobiography*, 70) and represent "the first sketch by Guillaume de Machaut of the relationship between the poet's life and the book that re-creates it" (Ibid., 71), thus anticipating the full-blown meta-textual phenomenon that is the *Voir dit.*
judgment uttered by his patron, through an interpretive judgment on his writing. It is the reader who bestows upon Guillaume his identity as a maker of books and of judgments, confirming his authority even as she attacks him for his moral shortcomings and demands that he abandon his earlier opinion. Significantly, then, it is also Bonneurté the reader who gives the narrator his name, calling him "Guillaume" for the first time when she summons him before her. In much the same way, Guillaume de Deguileville uses the evidence against him—in the form of Grace Dieu's acrostic letter—to provide a colorful signature for his Pèlerinage de l'âme. Accusation and advertisement come together naturally in the reader's judgment: any publicity is good publicity. But Bonneurté's complaint from beyond the grave retains a solemn aspect. Her accusation makes a serious point—that writing is an ethical act whose diverse and unpredictable effects on readers must somehow be taken into account.

Bonneurté's accusation also suggests that Guillaume's previous turn to introspection, the ostensibly complete self-judgment of the confessional (v. 437) was not ethically sufficient. Since Guillaume cannot understand what has so offended Bonneurté—since he cannot find the offending part of his livres—she must explain it to him. In this sense, the introspective practice of the confessional, like the Apocalypse which precedes it in JRN's prologue, ceases to offer an idealized or complete picture of divine judgment. Instead, Bonneurté's accusation suggests that to be ethical, the author must constantly submit himself to the judgments of readers; it is not enough simply to accuse himself. Machaut's textual self, his corpus, represented by his hapless narrator, must likewise respond to the summons of that reader who always lies just beyond his grasp, and whose reading continually transforms the author and his text. In this sense, the

79 See De Looze, Pseudo-Autobiography, 72; De Looze, "Masquage," 205; Brownlee, Poetic Identity, 21. Brownlee points out that this is the only instance in Machaut's corpus where the poet is named "within the context of the dit itself" (Ibid., 21).
confessional attempt to provide a conclusive historical record of the individual is as flawed as the narrator's attempt to impose a last word on human history.\(^8\)

Having made her accusation about JRB clear, Bonneurté calls upon Guillaume to overturn his earlier judgment (vv. 1027-33). But Guillaume will have none of this; twice he stands firm and refuses to reverse JRB's verdict or to produce a new one:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Dès que mes jugemens outrez} & \quad \text{As soon as a judgment is uttered} \\
\text{Est de moy, je le soustenray,} & \quad \text{by me, I will uphold it,} \\
\text{Tant com soustenir le porray.} & \quad \text{just as long as I am able.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{(vv. 1044-46)}\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Car ce seroit a ma grant honte,} & \quad \text{For it would be to my great shame} \\
\text{Selonc vostre meïsme conte,} & \quad \text{according to your own account,} \\
\text{S'endroit de moy contredisoie} & \quad \text{if I contradicted myself} \\
\text{Le fait que jugié averoie.'} & \quad \text{concerning the case I judged.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[\text{(vv. 1065-67)}\]

Guillaume's position in these passages is confusing. Shortly before (vv. 881-98), he had asserted that his body of work was too large and too diverse for him to be closely attached to any single piece of it. Now, however, his categorical refusal to modify any judgments he has made affirms his corpus as representing a stable, historical identity. While Guillaume is more than ready to acknowledge—indeed to boast of—the formal diversity of his corpus, he is much more reluctant to extend a similarly privileged status to diversity of opinion.

Guillaume explains his refusal to reverse his judgment by saying that if he contradicted himself he would be shamed or dishonored ("Car ce seroit a ma grant honte," v. 1065). Taken as a manifestation of authorship, Guillaume's concern for his honor seems to stem from a fear that if

\(^8\) Palmer has noted that the narrator's new responsibility, assigned to him by Bonneurté, goes against the historical mode: "The passivity of the historical subject (who must suffer what God ordains) gives way to the activity of the poet, who is responsible for the meaning of his poems even as he continues to write, in important senses, what tradition demands" ("The Metafictional Machaut," 86).
his opinion changed it would also weaken his authority, or his very sense of self.\textsuperscript{81} In this case, honor also has a political connotation, since by changing his stance Guillaume would risk undermining the judicial authority of the late Jean de Luxembourg, for whom Machaut reserved an uncommon affection throughout his career.\textsuperscript{82} The change in Machaut's political allegiance, symbolized by the reversal of judgments between \textit{JRB} and \textit{JRN}, is a difficult point for the poet's own literary authority. It is a development that threatens the historical coherence of Machaut's evolving corpus, since the poet is forced to revise his own opinions concerning his allegiance to the House of France as well as the relative emotional experience of men and women.

Nothing is more emblematic of this potentially awkward revision of history than \textit{JRN}'s place in manuscripts. Reading through the narrative poems in Machaut's so-called complete works codices, one may trace the poet's life in broad strokes, since the poems are arranged in a progression that mirrors their order of composition, thus constructing an implied pseudo-autobiographical master-narrative of Machaut's career.\textsuperscript{83} \textit{JRN} is the glaring exception to this chronological order, as it is only found in manuscripts immediately after \textit{JRB}, when in fact it was written rather later and refers to a later point in the poet's career.\textsuperscript{84}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item The narrator's fear is perhaps realized in BNF fr. 1587, where in the only extant manuscript illumination of \textit{JRN}'s trial scene, Guillaume is literally effaced as he is tried: his head has been rubbed out, while a rubric adds insult to injury by misidentifying him as "Guillaume de Loris," the first author of the \textit{Roman de la rose}. See Kay, \textit{Place of Thought}, 104-105.
\item For example, in the later \textit{Confort d'amis}, in which Machaut instructs his now imprisoned patron Charles de Navarre by using Jean de Luxembourg's rule as an example of good governance.
\item That is, \textit{JRB} was most likely produced in the mid-1330's (Earp, \textit{A Guide to Research}, 207), while due to the historical account given in \textit{JRN}'s prologue, the earliest possible date for that poem is 1349. Machaut's \textit{dits Remède}, Lyon and \textit{Alerion} were almost certainly composed between \textit{JRB} and \textit{JRN} but appear consistently after the latter in manuscripts (See Earp, \textit{A Guide to Research}, 77-97, 191). The celebrated General Prologue to Machaut's works (\textit{Œuvres}, ed. Hoepffner, I:1-12) represents a different kind of exception to this chronology: although it was written late in the poet's career and placed before the rest of the poems, it claims to recount the
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
thought to have had a strong role in the ordering of his manuscripts, the disruption of an
otherwise tidy pseudo-autobiographical narrative points to a certain self-consciousness on the
poet's part concerning the way his own historical ties to the House of France had been suddenly
thrown into uncertainty. 85

The same problem about the coherence of an historical, textual self confronts Machaut's
narrator during his dialog with Bonneurté. In response to her accusation, Guillaume holds fast to
his faith in objective and definitive truth. He is still attached, despite himself, to a certain mode
of judgment already symbolized by JRN's apocalyptic prologue, emphasizing the definitive and
objective judgment of human beings. Although the narrator's meditation on the Judgment fails to
bring forth conclusive meaning, it continues to color his attitude toward his own judgments,
which he refuses, on principle, to revise. Guillaume's obsession with certainty also informs his
expectations of how the trial against Bonneurté will go. He initially sees the trial as an
opportunity to prove himself correct once and for all and to preserve his honor (and thus the
honor of his late patron):

Dame, fait avez .i. devis
   Lady, what you've proposed
   Ou ma grant deshonneur moustrez,
   suggests my great dishonor,
   Mais li procès n'est pas outrez,
   but the trial has not yet begun,
   Ne mis en fourme justement.
   nor been put into proper form.
   Pour faire certein jugement,
   To elicit a certain judgment
   Vous me deüissiez dire en quoy
   you must tell me how
   J'ay forfait, et tout le pourquoy
   I have done wrong, and bring
   Amener a conclusion.
   everything to a conclusion.

(vv. 840-47)

beginning of Machaut's vocation, while JRN makes no such artificial concession to narrative
order.
85 On Machaut's possible role in the production of his manuscripts, see Williams, "An Author's
Role;" Huot, Song to Book, 232-38, 242-301; McGrady, Controlling Readers; Brownlee, Poetic
Identity: For a more cautious view of Machaut's role in manuscript production, see Kibler and
Wimsatt, "Machaut's Text and the Question of his Personal Supervision."
It is Guillaume, not the plaintiff Bonneurté, who insists upon a proper trial, brought to a lawful "conclusion" (v. 847), and a "certein jugement" (v. 844), a *sententia diffinitiva* in medieval legal terminology.\(^{86}\) Guillaume holds fast to his faith, first expressed in his chronicler's Apocalypse, that some kind of definitive ruling might be possible.

Even more than exoneration, then, Guillaume wants closure in the affair, but he won't get it from Bonneurté, whose conception of justice is diametrically opposed to his own. In their initial dialog, for instance, Bonneurté tells Guillaume that he should be able to make the opposite judgment just as easily as he made the first judgment:

*Guillaume, se vous tant valez, / Vous le pouez bien ainsi faire / Par soustenir tout le contraire. / Car li contraires, c'est li drois / En tous bons amoureus endrois.*

This statement, difficult to translate, is loaded with ambiguity. On the surface, Bonneurté's claim is simply that Guillaume should be morally and intellectually competent to realize which judgment is correct, namely that a woman whose lover has died necessarily feels more heartache than a man whose lady has left him. Her apparent insistence that there is a right and a wrong side to the issue will later be underlined when the parties in the dispute assemble for the trial and Bonneurté presents Guillaume to the court of Charles de Navarre as an incorrigible sophist who doesn't much care what side he's on (vv. 1499-1504).

However, there is another, opposing sense to Bonneurté's statement in vv. 1034-38. "**Guillaume, se vous tant valez, / Vous le pouez bien ainsi faire / Par soustenir tout le contraire**" could also mean that if Guillaume is worth his salt as a poet, he should be capable of arguing both sides, changing his judgment not for the sake of moral rectitude, but for the sake of

changing judgments. Likewise, Bonneurté's "Car li contraires, c'est li drois / En tous bons amoureus endrois" could mean something like, "the specific contrary of your earlier judgment is always the right one ("li drois") in matters of love, and so the correct and just position to take is that the lady's suffering is greater." On the other hand, these verses could just as easily be read to express that the contrary position, whatever it might be, is always the right one in matters of love, that contrariety itself is the defining criterion or law ("li drois") of good judgment in this domain, since love is founded on the coming together of opposites, the encounter of the self with others.

In much the same way, the narrator of Jean de Meun's Roman de la Rose learns in his quest for knowledge about love that truth cannot be apprehended except by navigating the interplay of contraries: "Ainsi va des contraires choses: / Les unes sont des autres gloses" (vv. 21577-78). Dependent upon the theoretical convergence of contrary qualities, erotic love provides a fertile space for dialectics, which is why it furnished such abundant matter for debate poetry in the late Middle Ages, and also why Machaut used it to transfer the dialectical play of that tradition to the meta-narrative of the individual author and his corpus. Machaut was not the first to use debate poetry to stage the divided self; indeed, some of the oldest examples of the genre already suggest this, particularly the many versions of debates between the Body and Soul, such as Deguileville would later incorporate into his Pèlerinage de l'âme (PA, vv. 4052-4352). Rather, Machaut's unique contribution to the debate tradition was in making the conflicting judgments of the divided self a model of literary self-creation, in which the contradictory nature of the poetic subject is shown not only as a function of the dualistic tension between matter and

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87 "So it is with contrary things / Each is the other's gloss"
spirit (or male and female), but rather as a product of the author's own internal difference over time.\textsuperscript{88}

Taken in light of the dialectical/debate poetry tradition as a whole, Bonneurte's statement about contrariety seems to suggest that, to do justice to the truth, the author must maintain multiple perspectives throughout his body of work. In this, elusive Lady Happiness also represents the author's difficult labor, the endless but necessary task of writing and rewriting himself over time. Bonneurte's accusation questions not only the judgment of \textit{JRB} but also the narrator's belief in a coherent, trans-historical self represented in and by the text. For the way it replaces an apocalyptic judgment with a reader's judgment, Bonneurte's accusation is no less ethically rigorous: it is a post-apocalyptic judgment which promises that there be no end to the author's responsibility to his audience. As a reader with interpretive judgments to bear on Machaut's text, Bonneurte begins to suggest that literary truth is the product of the continual reinterpretation of the past, that the imperious and unpredictable judgment of readers may well surpass the Judgment itself.

Bonneurte's conception of ethical judgment as a continual process of reinterpretation is also suggested by her conception of the role Guillaume will play in the trial. When Bonneurte's servant summons Guillaume, he tells him that he will become his own advocate as he faces

Bonneurte:

\begin{quote}
Se vous savies un po tencier, \\
Bon seroit et pour certein cas \\
Ou vous devenez advocas; \\
(vv. 730-32)
\end{quote}

If you know a little about debating, 
it will help you in a certain case 
where you'll become an advocate.

\textsuperscript{88} Attwood (\textit{Dynamic Dichotomies}, 200) has argued that Machaut began a trend toward the greater internalization of dialogic forms.
Bonneurté's servant does not tell Guillaume that he will defend himself, but rather that he will "become an advocate," which is to say that he will stand in for himself as a legal representative.\(^{89}\) This curious formulation highlights the extent to which Guillaume is already a stranger to his own textual past, and the way in which he will continue to deviate from that past even as he launches his own defense. As is the case for the response of Deguileville's pilgrim Guillermus in the heavenly court, Guillaume must speak for himself, and yet not for himself. He must speak in defense of a corpus—a textual self—to which he is already other.\(^{90}\)

Bonneurté's accusation invests Guillaume with an authority he does not possess in JRB, effectively removing the responsibility for the first judgment about women from Jean de Luxembourg and conferring it upon the poet. However, that does not only make Guillaume a judge, as he styles himself in the prologue when he calls down doom upon mankind. While Guillaume puts his faith in the definitive decisions of judges—earthly or heavenly—the idea that he will become an advocate suggests a different standard of justice. As Bonneurté transfers judgment to the poet, it becomes lawyerly: that is, variable, and in particular, subject to changes in meaning which serve to expose the contingency of language.\(^{91}\) Just as Deguileville and the confraternal poets adopt the Marian model of the lawyer as one skilled in manipulating words and texts, so too does Bonneurté have Guillaume play the role of advocate for his past poetry. By making Guillaume into a lawyer, Bonneurté will use the trial to show that no judgment is

\(^{89}\) On the phenomenon of the love poet acting as an advocate for himself, see Julius, "Love Poetry and the Art of Advocacy." On Machaut's lawyer role, see also Root, 'Space to Speke,' 125-6. My reading runs counter to that of Root (127, 135), however, in that he sees Machaut's advocacy as being not for himself but for the ideology of courtly love in general.

\(^{90}\) De Looze (Pseudo-Autobiography, 79) speaks of Guillaume as an "other" to his own textual past.

\(^{91}\) Calin has convincingly argued that the trial and its outcome depend more on the ability of its disputing parties to be clever lawyers than on the moral truths their legalistic machinations supposedly uncover (A Poet at the Fountain, 110-129).
immune from the destabilizing forces of time and language. As such, Bonneurté will suggest, the mutability of human judgments must be adopted as a principle for justice, rather than condemned, as Guillaume had insisted in the prologue, for giving rise to iniquity.

By the time the trial begins in Charles de Navarre's court, then, two irreconcilable expectations for justice have been established. Following the Doomsday scenario of his prologue, Guillaume looks forward to an ending—a "certein jugement"—that will exonerate him or at least put the issue to rest once and for all. Bonneurté, however, begins to suggest that the trial itself, as much as the judgment to be made at its end, will be a living demonstration of the need for the author to constantly revise his opinions, rather than aiming for the establishment of absolute truths. Bonneurté's judgment remains eschatological, in the Levinasian sense, in that it transfers the apocalyptic anxiety of the poem's prologue to the ongoing ethical and aesthetic process of literature. In the next section, I consider JRN's trial scene in some detail, in order to show how it serves as a distinct counterpoint to the Last Judgment scene of the prologue. Rather than simply highlighting the imperfection of human judgment already decried in the Apocalypse section, the narrator's absurd trial in the court of Charles de Navarre places literature under an alternative eschatological scrutiny, which is no less ethically demanding for the fact that it demands a constant reassessment of the author's case and keeps definitive meaning in the work of art always just out of reach.

VI. Judgment in the Court of Charles de Navarre

For a moment, the spring day of JRN transports readers back to JRB once more, as the right judge for the case is nominated. While Guillaume had himself named the late King of Bohemia as judge in JRB, he now seems at a loss to find a good man to preside over the appeal;
he therefore defers the choice to Bonneurté, who immediately proposes Charles de Navarre. In doing so, she employs laudatory rhetoric similar to that which the narrator himself had used to describe Jean de Luxembourg in *JRB* (*JRB*, vv. 1291-348; *JRN*, vv. 1089-114). This is a significant detail and a sly political statement on Machaut's part; if we are to infer Bonneurté's resemblance to Bonne, we have by implication Jean de Luxembourg's daughter and Jean le Bon's wife (or her vengeful ghost) endorsing Machaut's move to the other side, to the ranks of the rival house.

Once the two disputants have agreed upon Charles as arbiter, they make their way to the new patron's castle. Having arrived there, as in the corresponding scene of *JRB*, Guillaume finds a lively court full of personified virtues to assist in the operation of judgment, though it is a different court, whose members seem to resemble the virtues of Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*, in which happiness (Bonneurté, or *eudaimonia* [εὐδαιμονία]) is the highest end, the *telos*, of virtue.\(^\text{92}\) Bonneurté is warmly received and attended by her court of personifications, who help her prepare her case against Guillaume. The personification Raison holds for Bonneurté a set of scales, designated as both a "balance" and a "livre":

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Et aussi la juste balance} & \quad \text{And moreover the just balance} \\
\text{Li demoustroit signifiance} & \quad \text{showed her the meaning—} \\
\text{Qu'elle devoit en tous cas vivre} & \quad \text{that she must in every way live} \\
\text{Aussi justement com la livre} & \quad \text{as justly as the livre} \\
\text{Ou on ne puet, par nulle voie,} & \quad \text{which one cannot in any way add to} \\
\text{Mettre n'oster, qu'on ne le voie.} & \quad \text{or take from such that the change isn't seen.}
\end{align*}
\]

(vv.1187-92)

In French, *livre* signifies "book" when it is masculine, while here the feminine definite article gives the word the literal meaning of "scales." But the pun is evident: like the scales, judicial and

\(^{92}\) See Ehrhart, "Guillaume de Machaut's Jugement dou roy de Navarre and Medieval Treatments of the Virtues;" Kay, *Place of Thought*, 101-113. Confusingly, the virtues appear alternately as the component parts of Bonneurté, her entourage, and her clothing.
eschatological symbol *par excellence*, the particular justice of the book is in the way it testifies to what is added and removed, bearing witness to the changes of opinion wrought in the course of a life without allowing past judgments to be expunged completely from the record. Although the scales are an instrument of justice, they do not themselves pass judgment, but leave that task to the reader, whose interpretative work is likewise a never-ending effort to achieve balance between divergent points of view. The set of scales held by Justice in Guillaume de Deguileville's later *Pèlerinage de l’âme* also reflects the dual literary and judicial identity of the *livre*, and like Deguileville, Machaut suggests that continually adding to the book is a necessary ethical process for the author.

As Bonneurté's appearance implies, the act of revision must come in response to the reader's judgment, in order to be truly ethical. The new judge, Charles de Navarre, adopts this principle for judgment when he tells Bonneurté and the virtues that they must not only convince him of Guillaume's wrongdoing, but that they must also convince the defendant, in order for their side to win (vv. 1626-28). That Guillaume must admit his own guilt suggests, again, that the narrator is to become other to himself as he is tried, seeing himself and his work from the perspectives of readers. As a stand-in for the author, Guillaume must come to an understanding of the way in which the meaning of his work is dependant upon the person reading it from moment to moment.

As it unfolds, *JRN* 's lengthy trial scene makes this point especially in the way it considers evidence. The bulk of the trial section is composed of exempla from a wide variety of sources,

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93 Charles's requirement is also a reference to the conventions of scholastic *disputatio*—a strong influence on medieval debate poetry and a required exercise for university students, including law students, which required that one party in the debate convince his opponent in order to win. The practice is closely tied to the definition of dialectic as found, for example, in John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon* (ed. Hall, Keats-Rohan, III:2).
such as natural history, mythology and romance, which both Guillaume and the virtues cite at length in order to support their cases. The exempla proposed are but tenuously connected to the initial object of debate, since the text of JRB is conspicuously absent from the proceedings, and since the exempla themselves are totally inconclusive. Guillaume, for his part, tells the story (vv. 2215-314) of a certain clerk of Orléans who, upon receiving letters to the effect that his lady has married another man, goes mad from heartbreak. Guillaume exhorts the court to judge the exemplum as evidence that men suffer more from women's inconstancy (vv. 2308-14). On the other hand, the personification Foy (Faith) carefully reminds the court of the details of Guillaume's exemplum, and then concedes to her adversary that the story itself is likely factual in these points (vv. 2315-52). However, since the content of the letters the clerk received cannot be known any more than the identity of the person who sent them, the meaning of the story is inconclusive, and judgment on it must be deferred to God:

\[
\begin{array}{ll}
\text{Car Diex en ce siecle terrestre} & \text{For God has in this mortal world} \\
\text{A main jugemens si enclose} & \text{enclosed so many judgments} \\
\text{Qu'estre ne porroient esclos} & \text{that could never be revealed} \\
\text{D'homme mortel par sa science.} & \text{by the ways of men.} \\
\text{(vv. 2358-61)} & \\
\end{array}
\]

The proceedings turn away from their expressed end just as the law undermines itself in the figure of the clerk of Orléans, who begins as a prudent and well-read jurist (v. 2219) but is quickly reduced to sleeping on dung heaps (v. 2293) by the movements of love and fortune.\footnote{That the clerk is from Orléans also serves to play up his legal learning, since by the late thirteenth century the city had become the most important center for law in France, even rivaling Bologna. See Brundage, \textit{Medieval Origins}, 232-33.} As Guillaume fulfills the role of advocate, his own exemplum of the clerk grows out of proportion to itself, taking him further and further afield from his original position, in the very effort to defend that position. Ostensibly in order to bring out the meaning of the story of the Clerk of
Orléans, the two sides produce a plethora of divergent tales which succeed only in complicating the discussion by multiplying the possibilities for interpretive divergence. The personification Charité, for her part, follows the story of the clerk with a tale of a rich man, his orchard and its most beloved tree (vv. 2434-532), while Guillaume attempts to elucidate his own point with an anecdote about a mad dog with a worm in its tongue (vv. 2656-92). Franchise then moves with little transition to an enumeration of Greek myths (vv. 2707-822). The purported links between these diverse exempla are as tangential as they sound, and for that reason I will not attempt to explain them in terms of a coherent trial process.

Instead, what is much more interesting is how these loosely connected pieces of evidence illustrate judgment as a constantly evolving creative faculty. Rather than making a rigorous examination of each exemplum based on its content, the disputants instead form the bulk of their interpretations around entirely different narratives. "Testimony" is multiplied ad infinitum but does not add up to a convincing case for either side. As if written upon the clerk's mysterious letters, this use of exempla suggests that history is being pitted against the more personal work of poetry, or in French, in which the two senses of histoire ("history" and "story") come to loggerheads.95 On the one hand, the disputing parties each claim that their respective exempla constitute a visibly significant, linear chain of events, just as Guillaume depicts human history in the prologue. Yet, on the other hand, both Guillaume and the virtues constantly reshape and revise the meanings of these stories, subverting history to the subjective play of the moment.96

95 De Looze (Pseudo-Autobiography, 80-81) speaks in a related way of the diegetic tension between histoire and récit in Machaut's corpus.
96 See Picherit, "Les exemples," 109. Picherit holds that Machaut uses exempla incorrectly whereas his adversaries are well-versed in tried and true classical mythology and win for that reason. More important, in my view, is the way both sides use exempla in a way that is, strictly speaking, not exemplary. McGrady (Controlling Readers, 66) points to a similar strategy in Machaut's Voir dit.
In addition to the potentially endless digressions, the original issue brought before Charles de Navarre's judgment is quickly abandoned, as a secondary dispute arises as to whether men or women are more loyal in love. Judgment breaks down into judgments, into an ongoing creative process quite different from the apocalyptic historiography of *JRN*’s prologue, which had insisted on the visible, verifiable certainty of judgment, on the last word. It is equally significant, therefore, that calls to judgment in the trial scene come as often in reference to the examination of particular pieces of evidence than to the ultimate verdict to be rendered. Guillaume, for example, urges the court not to "mesjugier" when interpreting the exemplum of the clerk of Orléans (v.2314). On the other side, Attemprance recounts the story of a lovelorn girl, who eventually dies of her heartbreak (vv. 1863-2012). As the girl lies in bed, physicians come to examine her urine for diagnostic clues, and their actions are twice referred to by a form of the verb "jugier" in as many lines (vv. 1913-14). Such an instance of inconclusive judgment within a supposedly evidentiary text adds yet another meta-textual layer to Machaut's own work, by continuing to reverse the logical progression of judgments. Instead of pushing toward a *telos* of justice through the historical synthesis of lesser observations and lesser narratives, the trial demonstrates that even the smallest of details may prevent interpretive closure and thus occupy the creative energy of the poet, whose work is no longer innately directed toward a higher end.

The impossible nature of justice in the trial becomes increasingly clear to the reader, but that does not stop both sides from declaring that sufficient evidence has been produced for a definitive judgment to take place. Guillaume himself makes this claim in order to bolster his own rhetoric (vv. 2903-4). As it attempts to push on toward its closing arguments, the prosecution also pretends that the fragmentation of judgment is not happening, and affirms that justice has been done through an objective, universal examination of the facts in the case. The
personification Mesure, for one, asserts that the virtues have successfully proved their case without being distracted by particulars ("Sans rien d'especïal jugier," v. 3572), when in fact nothing could be further from the truth. As William Calin puts it, "the fourteenth-century public could not help but recognize the absurdity of trying to prove universal psychological and moral judgments based upon a few contemporary or historical anecdotes." However, the problem with this trial is more involved than a disconnect between supposedly inappropriate particular examples and the universal truths about men and women they are intended to prove. The collapse of JRN's prologue has already begun to suggest the problems inherent in an objective, universal and "certain jugement." As Sarah Kay has shown, the trial scene which symbolically replaces the Judgment ultimately serves to put universality itself into question as against its composite particulars. Avoiding the judgment of particulars appears in the trial as an impossible ideal of jurisprudence, since for final judgments to be produced, preliminary and necessarily subjective judgments must go into them. Thus, where Deguileville uses the particular judgment of the soul as a means of narrowing the scope of judgment to himself, Machaut goes one step further by replacing his Last Judgment with a multitude of more mundane particular judgments, no less eschatological in the way they suggest the difficult responsibility of the author to continually reinterpret and rewrite what he has already written.

Despite the anarchic turn taken by their arguments, the disputants still appear to be fixated on the idea of the "certein jugement" stipulated by Guillaume in response to Bonneurté's accusation and which he had first imagined in his apocalyptic vision. In this spirit, Raison speaks up to demand a decision:

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97 Calin, A Poet at the Fountain, 120.  
98 "Universality on Trial in Machaut's Judgment Poems," Place of Thought, 95-122.
Sire juges, certeinnement
Your honor, certainly
Chose n'a sous le firmament there is nothing under the heavens
Qui ne tende a conclusion: that doesn't seek its end:
Les unes a perfection some tend toward perfection
Pour plusueurs cas de leur droit tendent; according to their own laws
Et si a autres qui descendent while others descend
De haut ou elles ont esté from on high where they have been,
En declinant d'un temps d'esté falling from the summertime
En l'iver qu'on dit anientir. into the winter of destruction.
Dont cils plais desire a sentir Likewise this trial wishes to reach
De droit conclusions hastype by law a swift conclusion
Par sentence diffinitive, and a definitive sentence,
Pour ce qui est bien pris parfaire in order to perfect what is good
Et ce qui est mal pris deffaire. and undo what is wicked.
(vv. 3735-48)

Like JRN's apocalyptic prologue, Raison's speech is ironic, in that it reaffirms an ideal of certain, teleological judgment which is not to take place. Everything is divided according to its end into the camps of the damned or the saved, and the time of the damned is even represented as winter, as in the prologue. Yet Raison's conclusion is just as premature as Guillaume's imagined Day of Wrath; it hardly seems that we have come to a definitive point regarding the narrator's guilt or innocence, even though calls to judgment have been made constantly. Because judgment must be a composite of many separate observations, and because the singular judgments of that composite have each proved inconclusive, the prosecution can only rely on a series of tautologies to argue its case.99

Eventually, Charles de Navarre assents to Raison's request and passes judgment. Yet his way of doing so is the farthest thing from the "sentence diffinitive" that Raison clamors for or the "certein jugement" that Guillaume demands. Indeed, the patron-judge's pronouncement marks the end of any pretense toward finality in judgment. Charles finds Guillaume guilty, but then, laughing, sentences him to write three lyric pieces, a lay, a chanson and a ballade (vv. 4173-94).

99 See Calin, A Poet at the Fountain, 113.
This is a decision that Guillaume seems only too happy to accept. Just as Deguileville uses his soul's term in purgatory as an occasion for more writing, Guillaume's sentence represents a new commission for Machaut.¹⁰⁰

Calling for more writing and thus for more judgments to be made by eventual readers, Charles's sentence does not put an end to the trial, producing an arrêt, even if the patron, too, speaks of a "conclusion" (v. 4194). Because it immediately announces its own open-endedness, the new judgment does not really reverse the verdict of the Behaingne in the fashion of an appeal to a higher court, but only adds a particular judgment to Machaut's corpus in juxtaposition. In the same way, Charles de Navarre's judicial authority is not presented as either better or worse than that of Jean de Luxembourg, but only different, the product of divergent opinion newly embraced by the poet, who has finally been forced to admit that differing from himself over time may be as much a literary and ethical virtue as a political one. The two judgments of JRB and JRN will stand side by side and bear witness to the way that the poet has become other to his own textual past without, however, undoing it.

Bonneurté's call to embrace the divergent perspectives of readers replaces not only the Last Judgment scene, but also the narrator's confession which follows it. Although penitential images abound in JRN, they are transformed to produce a model of judgment which reinvents the subject at each moment, in response to the other's accusation, in a manner rather different from conventional poetic gestures of repentance. As Bonneurté tells Guillaume shortly before the trial begins,

¹⁰⁰ The irony of a court poet being "punished" by having to write more poetry has not escaped critical attention. See especially Palmer, "Transtextuality and the Producing-I," 298; Kay, Place of Thought, 98.
One way of interpreting this statement is that Guillaume should be open to amending his past according to the demands of the reader and of his own circumstances, but should avoid adopting a penitential discursive posture—speaking on his knees—as he does momentarily in JRN's prologue. With the need to lay claim to a diverse body of work, penitence is no longer a fitting gesture for the author, because old judgments must be upheld even as new ones are produced. 101 For this reason, JRN is also not a palinode in the strict sense, since it does not actually effect a retraction. 102 More than the thirteenth-century poésie pénitentielle of a Guillaume le Clerc or a Rutebeuf, and more even than the apologetic rhetoric of Deguileville, Machaut affirms that the poet's ability to transform his own personal book must rely on a continual process of questioning and rewriting. Rather than an idealized trajectory toward spiritual perfection, in which the work of art is seen through the optic of God's eternal judgment, the conception of poetic judgment which triumphs in JRN redescribes the poet's ethical obligation to rewrite as an inherent result of shifting opinions over time. There can be no final repentance, no definitive, trans-historical judgment upon the self, but only acts of revision in response to the largely unforeseeable reactions of readers and of the author himself as he moves further away from his past. Although Bonneurté seems to reference Aristotle's telos of happiness, she also represents the writer's nagging impulse to keep changing what he has already written ad infinitum, chasing after an elusive satisfaction in his work. Bonneurté keeps calling the writer to submit his poetry to the

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101 McGrady ("Guillaume de Machaut," 116) has similarly pointed out that Machaut lacks a submissive posture toward the personified poetic virtues who visit him in manuscript illuminations to his General Prologue.
102 See Lechat, 'Dire par fiction,' 81-82.
challenge of new perspectives, in view of a process of self-perfection that may never be complete, at least not until the Last Judgment.

Confessional discourse is thus replaced by an impulse to revision that relies more on the constantly-changing parameters of the ethical than on the idea that the subject's guilt or innocence can ever be determined beyond a shadow of a doubt. Rather than the conclusion Guillaume expects and demands, Bonneurté's accusation and Charles's judgment have created a judicial situation closer to the eschatological judgment of Levinas, for whom truth must be actively produced and transformed at each moment through language.\textsuperscript{103} As against a monolithic, trans-historical judgment, the subject must speak to defend himself, because it is in this very apologetics that the subject is created.\textsuperscript{104} As Guillaume defends himself to the reader, acting as an advocate for his corpus, he also recreates himself by staging the continual reinterpretation of an earlier text. As a result, Guillaume becomes other to himself and loses his case, which was based on his assertion that he would maintain his previous position.\textsuperscript{105} Bonneurté has forced her opponent into a discursive stance where, in attempting to defend his past, he has already become inextricably other from it, assuming the advocate's role.\textsuperscript{106}

From this perspective, we may also reread the original charge that Dame Bonneurté brought against Guillaume, that he spoke falsely about women "par diffinitif jugement" (v. 1015). Given the way that judgment itself has shifted in the course of JRN, we may conclude that the fault Bonneurté found with Guillaume's initial judgment in JRB had less to do with its

\textsuperscript{103} See \textit{TI}, 49.
\textsuperscript{104} See \textit{Ibid.}, 272-276.
\textsuperscript{105} See De Looze, \textit{Pseudo-Autobiography}, 75.
\textsuperscript{106} As Jerry Root writes, "Ultimately, \textit{Navarre} turns out to be less a condemnation of its main character, Guillaume, the poet, than a meditation on poetry as a language and a form of discourse beyond proof" (\textit{Space to Speke},' 126).
content than with its *definitive* nature, that her demand that Guillaume revise his judgment likewise had more to do with the act of revision, than with the new opinion itself.\textsuperscript{107}

For Bonneurté, Guillaume's alleged antifeminism also seems to lie more in his firmness of opinion than in the opinion per se. A large part of Guillaume's argument during the trial is that the emotional experience of women is weaker because it is more inconstant.\textsuperscript{108} But by bringing Guillaume to justice, Bonneurté ultimately makes a virtue of the traditionally feminine vice of fickleness, as well as rehabilitating the role of the advocate and his artful tongue. By staging her absurd trial in the court of Machaut's new patron, Bonneurté proves to the court that for Guillaume to be a poet and author he must embrace rather than scorn the vagaries of fortune, reinventing himself frequently and challenging his opinions often.\textsuperscript{109} As Doubtance tells Guillaume sarcastically during the trial, he has been to the school of change:

Mon bieau sire, se Diex me gart,  
Moult avez estrange regart,  
Et s'avez diverse parole;  
Et s'avez esté a l'escole,  
Si com je croy, d'alper en change.

(vv. 3109-13)

Doubtance's statement is meant to expose Guillaume's deceitful rhetoric before the court, but it really serves as a testimony to his master, Dame Bonneurté, who has indeed taught him the literary and ethical merit of changing his opinions.

\textsuperscript{107} Similarly, Bonneurté's initial demand that Guillaume "rappelez" his earlier judgment (v. 1033) suggests that it is being recalled in both senses of the word, brought back up in the text that claims to overturn it.

\textsuperscript{108} See, especially, *JRN*, vv. 3019-46.

\textsuperscript{109} This is a crucial reversal of the position espoused by Bonneurté's Boethian counterpart, Lady Philosophy. Sarah Kay has noted that such a positive reevaluation of fortune is one of the most important elements of late medieval rewritings of Boethius, including in Machaut's own *Remede de Fortune* ("Touching Singularity," 34).
While the trial is consistently absurd, the pervasive themes of heartache and death it examines are anything but, especially when one takes into account the events unfolding at the time of its composition. Although JRN's prologue undoes its own apocalyptic rhetoric and gives over to an alternative sort of judgment, the justice that replaces it in the trial scene has a seriousness and a rigor all its own which may also be termed eschatological. Levinas's category of the eschatological is no less exacting than its traditional Judeo-Christian counterpart; quite the opposite, because no end to responsibility can ever be reached. As the subject continues to respond to the other, recreating himself in an infinite series of singular judgments, his liability does not diminish but can only ever increase:

L'exaltation de la singularité dans le jugement se produit précisément dans la responsabilité infinie de la volonté que le jugement suscite. Le jugement se porte sur moi dans la mesure où il me somme de répondre. La vérité se fait dans cette réponse à la sommation. La sommation exalte la singularité précisément parce qu'elle s'adresse à une responsabilité infinie. L'infini de la responsabilité ne traduit pas son immensité actuelle, mais un accroissement de la responsabilité, au fur et à mesure qu'elle s'assume; les devoirs s'élargissent au fur et à mesure qu'ils s'accomplissent. Mieux j'accomplis mon devoir, moins j'ai de droits; plus je suis juste et plus je suis coupable.  

Likewise, while Guillaume learns that repentance in the strict sense is irreconcilable with authorship, his conviction suggests that he will never hear the end of the reader's criticism and must constantly emend his judgments in response.

The author must become other as he responds for himself. Thus it could not be more fitting that Guillaume's final metamorphosis in the transtextual play of the Jugement poems involves his own adoption of a woman's perspective, as he draws near the position of the reader and thus embraces Bonneurté's judgment, fulfilling Charles's stipulation that Guillaume himself be convinced of his error. A number of manuscripts append JRN with the start made by

110 *TI*, 273-4.
Guillaume on his punishment/commission, the first of the lyric poems, entitled the "Lay de plour" ("The Lay of Tears"). This lay was likely written before JRN, not as an integral part of its composition, and there is no evidence that the rest of the "sentence" was ever completed.111 Significantly, however, the "Lay de plour" is written in the voice of a woman grieving her lover's death. It is a mournful piece, and when read as part of the Jugement poems, it represents another major change in tone to parallel the movement from JRN's prologue to its main narrative. In his apparent punishment, Guillaume is forced to adopt the point of view that lost the judgment in JRB and has now won on appeal. The poet is ever changing as he shifts the position from which interpretive judgments are made, taking on even the voice of his opponent, even the voice of a woman.112 Differing from himself, Guillaume has been led into the very position of female "inconstancy" that he has denounced in the trial. Like the creative vision of female advocacy portrayed in the Marian devotional tradition, Machaut's closing lay suggests that the inconstant judgment of women—the hard-to-please imagined readership of vernacular courtly poetry—may be a positive model of creative power for the poet as he is forced to reinvent himself over time.

This female impersonation will be far from the last metamorphosis Machaut the author performs, so it is equally significant that the sentence pronounced by Charles de Navarre is unfinished, as only one of the lyric pieces was completed or included in manuscripts. This new act of writing opens up a potentially infinite space in which the poet must make and overturn judgments.113 That space is properly speaking the book itself, which affirms past judgments even as it overturns them, and likewise creates the possibility for its own future emendation.

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111 See Earp, A Guide to Research, 238, 365. The "Lay de plour" appears after JRN in mss. Vg, B, E and M (in the last instance, it also appears a second time in the lays section of the manuscript). All of these mss. were compiled after the late 1360's (See Earp, Ibid., 77-97).


113 See Palmer, Ibid, 300.
Machaut's *Livre du voir dit* (c. 1361-65), for example, the poet will continue the endless process of transformation, expanding the model of the literary judgment in *JRN* into a more comprehensive picture of the book as an evolving organism dependent upon the female reader's close collaboration. In *Confort d'ami* (1357), Machaut will return to the juxtaposed judgments of his two most famous patrons, and to the escalating turmoil of fourteenth-century French politics, as he advises the imprisoned Charles de Navarre to take a lesson in good governance from the late Jean de Luxembourg. In Machaut's last poem, *La prise d'Alexandrie* (c. 1369-71), he will even try his hand again at the historical chronicle genre.

The strength of Machaut's book lies not only in the extent to which it rewrites itself as the author becomes other, but also in the way it invites its own rewriting by authors who are absolutely other, the way that, following Roland Barthes' terminology, it constitutes a *texte scriptible* ("writable text"). In this sense, the final judgment scene of *JRN* extends the multivalence and ambiguity of the text well beyond the author's physical death. At the very end of the "Lay de plour," eschatological judgment explicitly reemerges again as part of the grieving lady's lament:

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Ta mort tant me contralie           Your death tortures me so
Et tant de maus me repart,        and gives me so much pain,
Amis, que li cuers me part;       my lover, that my very heart leaves me;
Mais einsois que je devie,         but before I do depart this life,
Humblement mes cuers supplie     my heart humbly pleads with
Au vray Dieu qu'il nous regart    the true God that he look on us
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114 See the edition of *Voir dit* by Imbs and Cerquiglini-Toulet.
115 See the edition of *Prise* by Palmer.
116 The term is introduced in and used by Barthes throughout *S/Z*. Attwood (*Dynamic Dichotomy*, 16) discusses both Machaut and Froissart in terms of Barthes' conception of the *texte scriptible*. De Looze (*"Masquage,"* 208) notes that the survival of textual legacy as posited in *JRN* depends upon the reader.
Laurence De Looze has rightly interpreted these verses as a reference to both the *Liber vitae* and to Machaut's own evolving book, his corpus: "Certainly the Book of the Lord is a common *topos*, and every good Christian hopes to have his name inscribed there. But there is also a more immediate and more appropriate referent, namely, the profane book Guillaume de Machaut is writing and in which the lovers achieve a kind of eternal life."\(^{118}\) The ending figure of the book thus "concludes" Machaut's *Jugement* poems with yet another transformation of traditional eschatological imagery. The *Liber vitae*, momentarily recalling the apocalyptic panegyrics of the *Navarre*'s prologue, is the ultimate closed book: it perfectly reflects the objective actions of each individual in life, and after death what has been written in this book cannot be added to. Its opening at the end of time can only provide a revelation of history, never an instance of its emendation.

Machaut's book, however, is not only subject to change during its author's earthly existence, but calls for rewriting in the literary afterlife. Unlike the Doomsday Book, it is an image of infinity rather than totality, to return once again to Levinas's terminology; it does not claim to encompass truth but is, rather, a reflection of the way that truth is produced through an interminable process of revision, always frustrating attempts to impose a last word.\(^{119}\) The book not only gives life, it is alive. This is where eschatological judgment and poetic regeneration (*reverdie*)—the two juxtaposed opening leitmotifs of *JRN*—are finally, fully united, as the

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\(^{117}\) Palmer's edition of *JRN* rightly numbers the verses of "Lay de plour" separately.

\(^{118}\) De Looze, *Pseudo-Autobiography*, 76.

\(^{119}\) As De Looze puts it, "The insistence on bookmaking militates against the sequential, temporal view of one verdict giving way to another. Rather, the two verdicts will remain in dialectic as texts in the codex" (*Pseudo-Autobiography*, 77).
eschatological is cast as a process for generating new ethical and artistic meaning rather than for determining absolute, trans-historical truth. After *JRN*'s prologue, judgment is no longer apocalyptic, but post-apocalyptic; it has moved beyond certainty and history and into the world of the living (and perhaps the recently dead), for whom judgment is still a work in progress. In *JRN* the transformation of eschatological judgment into an ongoing process becomes a master metaphor for the work of the author, whose personal and literary identity is likewise transformed with each act of judgment, rather than merely revealed or reiterated.

* * *

The literary afterlife of Machaut's book was to be far-reaching in both time and space, but his most immediate successor and interpreter in the French tradition was Jean Froissart, who is the subject of the next chapter. As I show, Froissart reverses Machaut's eschatological exposition by ending, rather than beginning, his *Joli buisson de Jonece* (c. 1373) from the perspective of the Last Judgment, which he uses to symbolically reject erotic poetry and overturn a judgment he himself had made in an earlier poem, *L'espinette amoureuse* (c. 1369). Nevertheless, like his master Machaut, Froissart also introduces uncertainty into this supposedly final judgment, using the eschatological scene to stage the continual reinterpretation of poetry in the encounter of the author with his demanding readers.

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120 De Looze ("Masquage," 208) notes the general association of "procreation et creation littéraire" in *JRN* and calls the "Lay de plour" a sign of "survie textuelle" ("Masquage," 206). See also the introductory chapter, 40-42, where I discuss Genius's sermon on the Judgment Day in Jean de Meun's *Rose*. 
Chapter 4

A Last Judgment: Froissart's Joli buisson de Jonece

I. Introduction

The substantial debt of Jean (Jehan) Froissart (c.1337-c.1405) to Guillaume de Machaut is widely acknowledged by scholars. This is particularly the case in regard to Froissart's development of the lyric-narrative dit form following similar texts by Machaut, such as the Remede de Fortune (c. 1340's) and the Voir dit (1357). Froissart's L'espinette amoureuse (The Hawthorn Bush of Love, c. 1369) and its sequel, Le joli buisson de Jonece (The Fair Bush of Youth, 1372-73) are two such Machauldian dits, which mix a strong first-person narrative with inset lyrics whose composition is performed in the text itself by the author's narrator-cum-poetic persona.

In L'espinette amoureuse, Froissart's narrator portrays himself as a foolish, twelve-year old lover and a novice love poet whose efforts to win the heart of a certain young lady go comically awry time and time again. This proto-*Künstlerroman* provides the narrative frame for a number of inset lyric poems which the narrator offers, without much success, to the young lady. Although he is consistently humiliated and rejected by the object of his desire, Froissart's inexperienced narrator is blinded by love and thus fails to understand that she has no feelings for him.

Le joli buisson de Jonece, Espinette's sequel, is likewise a lyric-narrative hybrid composition. In Buisson, Froissart's narrator, now thirty-five years old and fully disenchanted

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1 For example, see Huot, *Song to Book*, 302-9; De Looze, *Pseudo-Autobiography*, 105-6; Bennett, "The Mirage of Fiction," 286; Lechat, *Dire Par Fiction*, 267, 295-304, 321. The two poets also traveled in many of the same circles, as both enjoyed the patronage of the Houses of Luxembourg and Bohemia. On this point, see Wilkins, "A Pattern of Patronage."
with love, travels back to the days of *Espinette* in a long dream vision. The narrator relives his adolescent courtship of the young lady, with much the same results as the first time around: he writes poetry for her, and she does not return his affection. Finally, the narrator wakes up and realizes that the return to youth has all been merely a deceptive dream. Renouncing love and love poetry once and for all, he proclaims his new allegiance to God and the Virgin Mary in a final lyric composition entitled the "Lay de Nostre Dame."

*Espinette* and *Buisson*, which as a set I take the liberty of referring to as the *Bush* poems, are among Froissart's works most evocative of Machaut. In the *Bush* poems, scholars have noted similarities with and allusions to several of Machaut's lyric-narrative compositions, especially the *Voir dit*, the *Remede de Fortune* and the *Fonteinne amoureuse.* Machaut's *Jugement* poems also clearly have their place within Froissart's frame of intertextual reference in *Espinette* and *Buisson*. For example, in *Espinette* as in Machaut's *JRB*, the action begins when the narrator crawls into a bush on a beautiful spring day. And while Machaut's narrator symbolically travels back in time to the Easter season of *JRB* from the apocalyptic November scene which opens its sequel, the dream vision of Froissart's *Buisson* begins on a dismal November night as the narrator is suddenly transported back to the bright springtime of his own earlier poem, *Espinette*.

Correspondences like this abound, but Froissart's *Bush* poems display their strongest point of structural resemblance with Machaut's *JRB* and *JRN* in that the overarching narrative of

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2 In this chapter, I cite from the editions of both poems by Anthime Fourrier.

the two texts is organized around a series of opposing judgments. At the beginning of *Espinette*, the narrator embarks on his career as a love poet by repeating the mythological Judgment of Paris and choosing Venus as the fairest of the goddesses, over Juno and Pallas. In turn, the narrator's judgment in favor of Venus becomes the pattern for a whole series of bad judgments throughout *Espinette* as, rendered foolish by the goddess of love, he misinterprets the words and actions of the young lady and continues to pursue her after she has repeatedly told him she is not interested.

In *Buisson*, the chronic bad judgment shown by the twelve-year narrator after repeating the Judgment of Paris is remedied as he assumes a new and more pious perspective on his life and work. In his November dream vision, Venus returns to the now thirty-five year old narrator. The goddess leads him back in time to the titular bush of *Espinette*, the hawthorn in which he had judged in her favor twenty-three years earlier. The narrator finds that the bush has now grown to immeasurable size, but within it he is able to relive the events of *Espinette* as if they were happening all over again. Aside from repeating his old mistakes and being rejected one more time by the young lady, the narrator also learns an important lesson from the personified figure who guides him through the bush, Jonece (Youth). Outlining a version of Ptolemy's theory of the seven ages of man, Jonece explains to the narrator that once a man has passed into the astrological age of Jupiter, his judgments grow clearer; under Jupiter's influence, a man finally turns his thoughts to God and learns to reflect clearly on the state of his soul. In this identification of the Jovian age with piety and worldly renunciation, Froissart follows the

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4 This particular structural resemblance has been pointed out by Kay, "'Le Moment de Conclure,'" 155.
5 Although Froissart would not have known Ptolemy in the original Greek, the philosopher's seminal work on astrology, the *Tetrabiblos* (Latin *Quadripartitum*) circulated widely in the West beginning with Plato of Tivoli's 1138 translation of the text from Arabic to Latin.
common late medieval tendency to allegorize Jupiter as the Christian God, as in the early fourteenth-century *Ovide moralisé*, which was a key source of myth material for both Machaut and Froissart.⁶

When he first returns to the bush, Froissart's narrator is so captivated by its vernal beauty that he ignores Jonece's lecture on planetary influence. Nevertheless, Jonece's explanation will prove to be a foreshadowing of the narrator's own passage away from the influence of Venus and toward the influence of Jupiter in the course of the poem. While the Judgment of Paris begins the narrator's service to Venus in *Espinette*, his initiation into the age of Jupiter is made official in *Buisson* with the narrator's awareness of the divine judgment to which he will be subject. Awakening from his dream, the narrator concludes that the pursuit of erotic love and love poetry are vanities ("wiseuses," v. 5160) and will be judged harshly by God when it is time for the soul to account for its actions:

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Car ce sont painnes et nuiseses
Pour l'ame, qui noient n'i pense
Et qui il faut, en fin de cense,
Rendre compte de tous fourfais
Que li corps ara dis et fais,
Qui n'est que cendre et poureture.
(vv. 5161-66)
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For these things are harmful
for the soul, who doesn't intend them,
and for whom it's necessary at the end of its lease
to give an accounting of all the bad things
that the body will have said and done—
the body which is but ashes and decay.

This epiphany leads Froissart's narrator to abandon his idealization of *eros* for devotion to the Virgin Mary, a new commitment celebrated in the "Lay de Nostre Dame" that ends *Buisson* (vv. 5198-442). Faced with eternal condemnation for his service to Venus, the narrator can only pray that the Virgin will speak for him, acting as an advocate on his behalf:

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Humlement je me voel retraire
Viers le Mere dou Roi celestre,
Et li prie qu'elle voelle ester
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Humbly I wish to retire myself
toward the Mother of the heavenly King,
and pray that she agree to act.

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⁶ For example, on both poets' use of the Judgment of Paris from the *Ovide moralisé*, see Ehrhart, *Judgment*, 133.
Pour moi advocate et moiienne
A son Fil, qui tout amaüienne,
Et qui est vrais feus habondans,
Caritables et redondans,
Pour coers enflamer et esprendre.
(vv. 5183-90)

as my advocate and intermediary
with her Son, who mediates everything
and who is the true living fire,
merciful and abundant,
that sets every heart ablaze.

The narrator expounds on a number of biblical themes in the course of his repentance and his
rapt exaltation of the Virgin. Most prominently, he makes a lengthy meditation on the Last
Judgment, using language that echoes the Dies irae hymn's chilling question, "Quid sum miser
tunc dicturus?":

Que diras, What will you say
Quant vera when you meet
Ton Signour your Lord
Au darrain jour? on the Last Day?
Mas et las, Weak and beaten,
Tu trambleras you will shiver
De paour. with fear.
(vv. 5333-39)

For Froissart's narrator-poet, the question of what can be said in his defense runs deep, since it is
his own use of language—his poetry—which comes under the most scrutiny in this imagined
scene of judgment. Breaking with his past as a hopeless lover and an impious love poet,
Froissart's narrator uses Buisson's Last Judgment to perform a dramatic reversal of his earlier
career, which recasts the Bush poems together as a narrative of repentance and conversion to a
higher calling.

As the second-person address ("Que diras?") signals, the Last Judgment of Buisson is
also directed outward, its conversion narrative offered as a moral exemplum to Froissart's
readers, whom he presses to repent.7

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7 In fact, Froissart is specifically addressing the Jews, or alternately, the Jewish Law. Later in this
chapter (314-15), I show how this gesture might be construed to address the readership more
generally.
In that it turns the vain matter of love poetry to devotional and evangelical ends, Froissart's

_Buisson_ recalls the more traditional use of the Last Judgment as the ultimate frame of reference for poets writing in the penitential register, such as Guillaume le Clerc and Rutebeuf in the thirteenth century, who both renounce earlier _vaine matire_ as they imagine themselves trembling before the throne of God.8

As he overturns the Judgment of Paris and the bad judgments of his young narrator in _Espinette_, Froissart places his dramatic eschatological meditation in opposition to an episode in _Buisson_ in which judgments on poetry are sought. In the central dream vision of _Buisson_, the young lady assumes the role of the narrator's judge as she reads his poetry. The personification Desir acts as the narrator's "advocas" (v. 4348) by bringing the young lady a ballad (vv. 3996-4013) which the narrator had written to her, and which is described as "witnessing" to his suffering and "representing him" (vv. 3887-88). A virelay is then entered into evidence (vv. 4048-69), various personifications make speeches, and finally, the narrator himself pleads directly to the young lady for a judgment of mercy, claiming his long suffering (vv. 4450-551):

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8 On both poets, see Introduction, 27-29.
Merchi vous pri a jointes mains, 
Que vos frans coers me soit humains. 
(vv. 4483-84)

With folded hands I pray you for mercy, 
that your noble heart be human to me.

The principal question to be judged here is an old one, oft-repeated in courtly texts and used by Brunetto Latini in his *Rettorica* as a means of transferring legal rhetoric to vernacular love poetry: does the lover's suffering entitle him to mercy? Does the beloved have an ethical obligation, if not to return his feelings, then at least to take pity and reward his love service with like affection? When he asks for the young lady's judgment, the narrator hopes to hear her pronounce this merciful sentence: "Je te retieng pour mon servant" (v. 4546); but instead, she says only

Fols est qui sert qui son tamps pert, 
Mes services fais loyaument 
A personne d'entendement 
Ne fu onques mors ne peris 
Qu'en le fin ne soit remeris. 
(vv. 4556-60)

He's a fool who serves and wastes his time, 
but service performed loyally 
for a person of understanding 
ever was dead or wasted 
so that it was not rewarded in the end.

It is not at all clear whether the young lady is designating the narrator as one still wasting his time in useless service, or one who will be rewarded in the end. Even if the latter case is true, it is not yet apparent when that end might come.

Before the narrator and the young lady can speak further to clarify this judgment, her lively court of personifications interrupts them. The personifications—Plaisance, Desir, Humilité, Jonece, Maniere, Pité, Douls Samblant and Francise—begin a lyric poetry competition. All of them compose *souhetz*, wish-poems that evoke courtly themes, especially the desire for

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9 See Chapter 1, 81-82. Bloch (*Medieval French Literature and Law*, 184-188) discusses this pseudo-juridical question as it occurs in the work of the Occitan troubadours, from whom Latini's account of the legal posture is ultimately drawn. In the *Bailieu* or *Cour d'amours*, the book the narrator lends the young lady and into which he inserts his first poem to her, the question of *merci* is also brought up for judgment (ed. Scully, vv. 2010-79).

10 In a similar vein, in *Espinette* the narrator says that he has been "mortelement jugiés"("sentenced to death," v. 3742) by the personification Male Bouche and the young lady.
eternal love and springtime (vv. 4639-991); the souhetz are dutifully recorded by the narrator-poet and inserted into Froissart's own text. In order to determine whose souhet is the best, the competitors agree to submit their compositions to the judgment of the Dieu d'Amours (v. 5044). In the dream, steeped in the atmosphere of courtly poetry, this nominatio iudicis would seem to refer to Cupid, or Eros, Venus's son and one of the most traditional arbiters of love debate poetry.\(^{11}\)

But this judgment is also interrupted. Before the Dieu d'Amour can be consulted, the dream ends and the narrator-poet wakes up suddenly. After thinking about his dream, he rejects Venus and her poetry, now fearful of the Judgment to come; clearly, the true Dieu d'Amours is now Christ, to whom all of the narrator's actions—but especially his poetry—are to be submitted. Likewise, the burning desire the narrator had felt for the young lady now becomes the eternal fire ("ardant painne," v. 5202) into which unrepentant sinners will be cast. Venus's influence is thrown off for the pious and circumspect age of Jupiter, Venus's son is replaced by the Son of Man, and the wish poems of the dream and the narrator's own love poems to the young lady are transformed into prayers to the Virgin. The end (fin) when all faithful servants will be rewarded with mercy no longer refers to the ambiguous terms of the young lady's judgment, but to the Judgment itself.

\(^{11}\) For example, in *Les débats du clerc et du chevalier* (ed. Oulmont). In the *Baillieu d'amours*, the text which the narrator lends the young lady, cases are presented to the baillif of the God of Love (*Le court d'amours de Mahieu le Poirier*, ed. Scully). Scully (ed., xvi n13, n14; xvii n15) also points to the depiction of the court of the God of Love in *Li fablel dou Dieu d'amours, De Venus la deesse d'amour*, and in Guillaume de Lorris's *Rose* (vv. 863-70).
The *Bush* poems show Froissart at his most pseudo-autobiographical,\(^{12}\) and the final gesture of *Buisson*, its Last Judgment on love poetry, has usually been understood as part of a larger reflection made by Froissart on his own career. At the time of the *Buisson*’s composition in 1373, Froissart had recently been ordained as a priest and been granted the benefice of Estinnes-au-Mont (in the present-day Belgian province of Hainaut). The benefice had been obtained for him by his patron, Wenceslas I, from whose court at Brussels Froissart departed in order to take it.\(^{13}\) Froissart's new status as a man of the cloth, retired from courtly life and courtly poetry, is announced in *Buisson*’s prologue with the narrator's mention of his "ordenance nouvelle":

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Or voi je cangié mon afaire} & \quad \text{Now I see my situation changed} \\
\text{En aultre ordenaunce nouvelle.} & \quad \text{into another, new way of life.}
\end{align*}
\]
\(^{11}\) (vv. 458-59)

*Buisson* was Froissart's last *dit*. After its composition and for the rest of his life, the author would turn his attention away from love poetry to the writing of his famous prose *Chroniques* and his more obscure Arthurian romance *Meliador*, which he never completed. Citing this turning point in the poet's career, Michelle Freeman has iconically labeled *Buisson* Froissart's "farewell to poetry."\(^{14}\) Most scholars have likewise affirmed that the poem articulates a kind of palinode, or dramatic recantation, of the first half of Froissart's body of work. Peter Dembowski and then William Kibler, for instance, have referred to *Buisson* as a Dantesque "mid-life crisis" in which Froissart's poet-narrator performs the author's own repentance and decision to change direction.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{12}\) See De Looze, *Pseudo-Autobiography*, 102-28, where he discusses *Espinette* and *Prison amoureuse*. On De Looze's conception of the pseudo-autobiographical as it applies to Froissart, see also Lassahn, "Pseudo-Autobiography and the Role of the Poet."

\(^{13}\) See De Looze, ed., *Prison amoureuse*, xii. Wenceslas was the son of Jean de Luxembourg, Machaut's most exalted patron.

\(^{14}\) Freeman, "A Farewell to Poetry?" 238. Kay (*Place of Thought*, 124) notes how the rubrics, indexes and explicits of Froissart's poetic manuscripts also reinforce this reading.

\(^{15}\) Dembowski, *Context, Craft and Sense*, 36-41; Kibler, "Froissart's Midlife Crisis." Lassahn (*"Pseudo-Autobiography and the Role of the Poet,"* 127 n3) also notes the similarity with Dante's
It is important to note that Book I of the *Chroniques* was well underway at this point in the poet's life, being complete by the composition of *Buisson* in 1373.\(^\text{16}\) Artistically, if not spiritually, Froissart had already begun to change direction in his career. Moreover, four years before *Buisson*, *Espinette* had already cast a satirical and ironic—if not entirely negative—perspective on Froissart's younger work, since the poem's narrator portrays himself as an older and relatively wiser man now at some remove from the bad judgments of his youth. Although the narrator of *Espinette* stops short of rejecting erotic love out of hand, he begins the poem by noting that its toll (*peage*, v. 2) is far too costly, and he suggests that his own actions while in the service of Venus were but deluded presumption (*oultrecuidance*, v. 98). Throughout *Espinette*, the distance between the older, more seasoned narrator and his younger self works to create some rich dramatic irony each time the narrator, in his *oultrecuidance*, convinces himself that he has a chance with the young lady when he has not.\(^\text{17}\) In *Espinette*, nevertheless, the narrator expresses some measure of nostalgia for young love, however inexplicable it may seem given his past experiences. Moreover, the satirical picture that the narrator paints of his younger self in this poem remains uninformed by the language of religious duty.

\(^\text{16}\) Dembowski has also proposed that a "proto-Meliador" could have existed before 1373 (*Context, Craft and Sense*, 58-59).
\(^\text{17}\) Kibler ("Self-Deception") has written at length on the narrator's delusion and the pervasive irony to which it gives rise. On the distance between narrator and younger self, see also Ehrhart, *Judgment*, 144.
Buisson, in contrast, continues the narrator's story by transforming it directly into a narrative of Christian repentance, symbolized most dramatically by its Last Judgment on love poetry. In terms of Froissart's larger corpus, the Judgment signals a turning-away not only from Espinette, but also from earlier dits amoureux—such as Le paradis d'amour (c. 1361-2), L'orloge amoureuse (1368), and L'amoureuse prison (1372)—and from lyric love poetry written in forms like rondeaux, balades, virelais and lais.

Contrary to Machaut, then, Froissart puts his Last Judgment in the right place, as it were, at the End, where it effects a re-vision of the poetic corpus as a whole, remaking the love poet as a Christian subject and affirming the author's turn to religion and to more grown-up literary endeavors. Instead of passing from a vision of apocalyptic certainty to an open-ended judgment, as in Machaut's Jugement dou roy de Navarre, Froissart trades the manifestly uncertain judgments of love poetry—and of hard-to-please female readers—for a transcendent faith in divine truth and its assured rewards and punishments. Froissart moves from ambiguous and typically courtly judgments—the young lady's cryptic pronouncement about the narrator's love service and the souhetz to be judged by the Dieu d'Amours—to a meditation on the Judgment itself. In this sense, the "ordonnance nouvelle " (v. 459) that Froissart's narrator assumes as an ordained priest is also the ordonnance nouvelle ("new exposition") which he gives to the Machauldian movement of judgments, reordering the shift of opinions over time to reflect the perspective of the newly converted poet who has moved on to prose and away from erotic themes. While Machaut embraces a fluidity of judgments in the meta-narrative of his career and

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18 See the edition of Paradis and Orloge by Dembowski. The date of Orloge is open to some question, but Dembowski (ed., Le paradis d'amour and L'orloge amoureuse, 17) makes a strong case for 1368.
19 See the edition by De Looze.
20 along with Espinette, these dits and lyric forms are all systematically enumerated by the narrator at the beginning of Buisson (vv. 443-53).
corpus, symbolically replacing the Last Judgment of *JRN*’s prologue with the unpredictable judgments of readers, Froissart uses his own eschatological meditation to mark a point of rupture with his earlier, more worldly poetry, and also to mark a certain measure of distance with the playful semiotic chaos represented by Machaut's *Jugements*.

Given the way it puts Froissart's own career in perspective and symbolically rewrites Machaut, it is not my intention to question the "farewell" gesture of *Buisson*. One thing about *Buisson*, however, cannot be overemphasized: that it represents a spectacularly poetic farewell, more self-celebration, homage to the poet's influences, and elaborate thank-you to his adoring fans, than it does a searing self-judgment. Like *Espinette*, *Buisson* provides a fantastic narrative frame for Froissart's love lyrics even as it attempts to widen the author's present distance from love poetry in time and mentality. Froissart's *Buisson* is also a last-go-round which celebrates the poet's life on the road, travelling among the princely courts of Europe and enjoying the material fruits of their patronage. Froissart makes his financial success particularly plain in *Buisson* by spending nearly 150 verses cataloging the various gifts and sums of cash he had received from his many patrons for poetic services rendered (vv. 230-373).

Froissart's humorous obsession with money, not unique to *Buisson*, reflects the author's acute awareness of his own existence as a literary figure, and of his texts as literary commodities,

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21 In 1389 Froissart wrote the *Dit dou florin*, which recounts the theft of forty francs that his patron Gaston Phébus had given him in Avignon, and which were stolen from the poet while he was at mass. In this short *dit*, in which the florin himself speaks to the poet, the language of personal change is even more pronounced than in *Buisson*, and is expressed through the language of monetary change. Although the poem is in many ways a celebration of capital, at its end Froissart turns to the Judgment once again in order to reject the desire for riches:

> Autant vaudront au Jugement
> 
> Estront de chien que marq d'argent!

(At the Judgment, a mark of silver will be just as worthless as a dog turd!

(vv. 491-92)

I cite Fourrier's edition of the poem, from 'Dits' et 'Débats,' 175-190. On *Florin*, see also Zink, "Le temps, c'est de l'argent."
if among a much smaller, more intimate readership than in the age of print. Froissart's poetic works seem never to have achieved the wide circulation of his *Chroniques* and are preserved today in only two manuscripts. 22 Nevertheless, Froissart displayed a distinct concern with his own textual coherence, more explicitly so even than Machaut, whose manuscripts enjoyed greater popularity and richer workmanship. 23 As Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet puts it, "Froissart's essential activity is that of collecting." The nature of his collection is the author-book, the corpus. 24 Because he was so conscious of his public literary status, Froissart was never content to simply write off any part of his past work. In his *Bush* poems especially, the author takes care to designate what he has written as belonging to the Jehan Froissart—renowned writer—and to suggest strong points of resemblance between his narrator-protagonist and himself. 25 Froissart's will to claim as distinctly his own what has come before in the corpus is evident throughout *Espinette* and *Buisson*. Accompanying the critical perspective on love poetry in the latter poem, there is also a strong impulse to recuperate past writing, to defend its place in the author's collection of work. Like Machaut's *JRN*, then, *Buisson* does not only serve to mark a point of rupture with an earlier version of the writing subject, but a crossroads between past and future writing, where Froissart felt it necessary to claim both as his own.

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22 BNF fr. 830 and BNF fr. 831.
23 As Lechat writes, "[…] Froissart occupe une position que nous pourrions dire charnière entre Guillaume de Machaut et Christine [de Pizan]: il innove par rapport au premier, qui ne se représente lui-même que très occasionnellement un manuscrit entre les mains, et il ouvre la voie à la seconde, chez laquelle la lecture, et plus encore l'acte de compilation, joue un rôle essentiel" (*Dire par fiction,* 265). Lechat's view of Machaut is, perhaps, overly conservative; as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, Machaut shows himself to be extremely concerned with how his work is compiled and read in manuscript.
24 "Fullness and Emptiness," 230.
25 For example, in *Buisson*, the author left his signature in words Venus speaks to the narrator: "*Je me voel retraire al ahan / Frois a esté li ars main an* (vv. 930-31). On this signature, see Lassahn, "Pseudo-Autobiography and the Role of the Poet," especially 126. In *Espinette*, the name "Jehan Froissart" is similarly inserted as a pun: "*Je hantoie la tempre et tart, / Dont frois, dont chaus, navrés dou dart*" (vv. 3386-87).
As I show in this chapter, Froissart's will toward re-collection is particularly evident in Buisson's Last Judgment scene, which serves not only as a gesture of renunciation, but also as a reaffirmation of the past. It is apologetic in the full sense of the word—an attempt for the author to defend and reclaim what he has written as an inalienable part of himself. In that it both renounces and defends the poet's past writing, Froissart's Last Judgment scene corresponds closely to the way Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani has defined her concept of la scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie: "La scène judiciaire se met en place dans un double geste de répudiation et de rappel."26 That is, the scène judiciaire works to stage at once the accusation or condemnation of previous writing, and to recall that writing to mind for audiences, reendorsing it as part of a larger evolution of the artist's body of work. Deguileville's PA and Machaut's JRN have already provided two such examples of this double geste, in which earlier writing is spotlighted as it is indicted, advertised as it is accused. In Froissart's Buisson, even as the judgment of God blames the subject for having written vain poetry, so too does it celebrate the subject's connection to his literary past.27

In Buisson, Froissart treats the rappel of his work, as much as its répudiation, as an ethical gesture. For the author, the need for a complete literary record is not only because, as Saint Bernard put it, what has been written on the parchment of the soul can never be scratched out, can never be hidden from the eyes of an omniscient God.28 This is certainly an important part of the impulse to remembering the past in Buisson, and the poem is even framed as a literary testament in which Froissart's pseudo-autobiographical narrator will give a sincere and thorough

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26 La scène judiciaire de l'autobiographie, 97.
27 For another perspective on the tendency for critics to read Froissart's work as "double," see Dembowski, "La position de Froissart-poète." Dembowski challenges the traditional dichotomy of Froissart's career, especially by insisting on the uniqueness of Meliador.
28 See Introduction, 37.
accounting of his life (vv. 1-10). Yet beyond the duty to provide an accurate account of himself, Froissart suggests, the responsibility he feels toward his readers also makes it necessary for him to reaffirm the value of past poetry. While he expresses concern over the state of his soul for having written under the influence of Venus, Froissart's narrator also indicates that he must be accountable to his audience: not only may he be guilty for having endangered their souls with vain entertainment, but, quite apart from that, he is indebted to readers for the generous financial and moral support they provided for his more youthful works. This literary responsibility complicates Froissart's use of the eschatological scene as a moment of conversion away from erotic poetry, by insisting that the author would be sinning against his readers by simply renouncing what he wrote in exchange for their money and goods.

As it concludes what is perhaps the most overtly humorous of all the texts I consider in this dissertation, Froissart's scene of Last Judgment expresses a distinct ethical seriousness about literature which is further complicated—and not only enlivened—by the capitalistic relationship of a writer and his aristocratic and princely consumers. If the more literal account book of author-patron transactions is to be squared with the great Book of judgment, how does the poet define the nature of his responsibilities to the reader, and vice versa? Specifically, is the now repentant author guilty to his readership of having left behind him poetry he himself has characterized as vain? Have well-paying readers been left with a worthless, or even a harmful product?

As a double geste, I believe Froissart's use of the divine judgment motif in *Buisson* may be read as a symbolic attempt to reconcile the two great judges of his life—God and the readership. In this chapter, working my way back to Froissart's closing meditation on the Last Judgment, I attempt to unravel this double aspect of Froissart's judgment scene, the ways in
which Froissart's eschatological meditation constitutes both a repudiation and a reendorsement of Froissart's own past writing, and of the larger tradition of courtly poetry into which it is inscribed.

In line with the most conventional reading of *Buisson*, I begin with repudiation. In the first section of this chapter, I consider how Froissart's imagined Judgment works to enact the "farewell to poetry" spoken of by Freeman.\(^2^9\) Through a broad examination of the *Bush* poems as a continuous narrative, I show how Froissart employed the imagined scene of eschatological judgment at the end of *Buisson* as a counterpoint to the uncertainty of human judgments his pseudo-autobiographical narrator exhibited while in the service of Venus, during his existence as a love poet. What I add to prior scholarly discussion of Froissart's "farewell" and his "mid-life crisis" is a more nuanced picture of the ways in which Froissart used judgment motifs to weigh the ethics of Christian writing in his own work and, somewhat less directly, in the work of his courtly forerunners.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the aspect of *rappel* and to the way that the ethical relationship of author and reader comes to depend on Froissart's defense and revalorization of his earlier poetry as much as on its renunciation. Needing to respond to his expectant readers as well as to God, Froissart calls earlier writing back to mind in order to justify its presence as part of the author's corpus, his complete works. In *Buisson*, the imperative to recall and revalorize earlier poetry enters into conflict with the imperative to renunciation, while the poem's Last Judgment scene suggests a symbolic means of finally reconciling the perspectives of the author's two great judges, Christ and the patron-critic. Accordingly, in the second part of the chapter I begin by tracing in detail how *Buisson* stages the oscillation of the

\(^{2^9}\) "A Farewell to Poetry?" 238.
narrator between writing and renunciation, between his past as a love poet and his future as a priest. I then show how the imagined Last Judgment serves to address both the demands of audiences and the demands of the Almighty.

More than any of the other major poets I have considered, Froissart announces his own influences loudly, sometimes parodically, through a complex weave of intertextual references. Accordingly, while exploring Froissart's Last Judgment as a rappel of past writing, I also consider how it recalls and pays homage to the work of other poets, not only Guillaume de Machaut, but also Guillaume le Clerc (Le besant de Dieu, c. 1226-27), Marian confraternal poets, and even the Italian Petrarch, whose own use of eschatological judgment in Rime sparse seems to be echoed in Buisson. By examining how Froissart rewrites the work of others as he reinvents himself, I show how this author of the generation after Machaut and Deguileville made the trope of the literary judgment scene distinctly his own. As the final fourteenth-century author to be considered, prior to Christine de Pizan's very different treatment of eschatological motifs in the Livre de la cité des dames (1405), Froissart provides an ultimate example of the trope's evolution in the French 1300's and of its use during this dynamic period to weigh the ethical problems of literature.

II. Froissart's Judgment of Paris, or A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Machaut

To work back toward Froissart's meditation on the Judgment Day as it functions in the larger narrative of the Bush poems, the best place to begin is another scene of judgment with cosmic proportions, this one near the beginning of Espinette amoureuse. This first judgment

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30 Another colorful member of this generation of poets to insert himself into an eschatological scene of judgment was Jean Le Fèvre, whose Respit de la mort (1376) I have discussed (Chapter 1, 62-63), and who, much like Froissart, showed a distinct concern with financial metaphors.
scene represents the start of the poet's vocation, and not coincidentally, it is more than a little inspired by Guillaume de Machaut's *Jugement* poems. At the beginning of *Espinette*, in the "joli mois de may" (v. 351), while he sits beneath a hawthorn bush, Froissart's twelve-year old narrator is suddenly confronted by four mysterious figures embroiled in a dispute. While he too had lain in a bush, the narrator of Machaut's *JRB* had encountered a knight, a lady, her lady-in-waiting and a small dog. In Froissart's *Espinette*, the group of four assumes more grandiose proportions: they are the god Mercury and the goddesses Juno, Venus and Pallas; but just like Machaut's group, the goddesses are fighting amongst themselves and seek a judgment to resolve their dispute.

Addressing the narrator, Mercury claims that he has been quietly watching over him for four years. He then refers to the Judgment of Paris legend to explain why he and the goddesses have come to visit the young man so unexpectedly. The legend's details, which Mercury largely skips over, go like this: at the wedding feast of Peleus and Thetis, all of the gods and goddesses of Olympia are in attendance and having a merry old time, when suddenly Eris—Discord—crashes the party. Attempting to provoke a quarrel among Juno, Pallas and Venus, Eris throws a golden apple before them, inscribed with the words "For the Fairest." Naturally, all three goddesses claim the apple for themselves, leading them to seek arbitration from Jupiter. Prudently, Jupiter does not wish to incur the wrath of the other goddesses (including his bad-tempered wife Juno) by favoring one of them, so he recuses himself from the judgment and delegates the shepherd Paris for the task instead. Mercury leads the three goddesses to Mount Ida, where Paris tends his flock, and the goddesses plead their cases and offer various bribes to the bemused young man. In the end, Paris awards the apple to Venus (because her offer proves

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more seductive) and the goddess gives him the love of Helen in return, ultimately setting off the Trojan War.

Speaking to the twelve-year old narrator in Froissart's own bucolic scene of judgment, Mercury explains that Pallas and especially Juno are still enraged by Paris's decision, and that they have demanded the judgment be resubmitted to another authority, none other than the narrator himself. Claiming that since he is young and innocent he ought to be able to make a more clear-headed choice than Paris did (vv. 474-82), Mercury asks the narrator which goddess he thinks the fairest. The narrator admits his ignorance in the matter, but Mercury is more than willing to lend an opinion; he explains in no uncertain terms that Paris made a truly disastrous judgment in awarding the apple to Venus, as among other things, it caused the Trojan War (vv. 440-66). Mercury thus offers the narrator a second chance to right the catastrophic decision by strongly suggesting that he not choose the goddess of love this time. But the narrator just has to learn the hard way and disregards Mercury's sound advice. With little hesitation, he repeats the fateful judgment of Paris and opts for Venus (vv. 483-524). This does not seem to surprise Mercury; with a sigh, the god says only that he thought as much: all lovers make the same decision ("Tout li amant vont celle voie," v. 524). Mercury then disappears into thin air, leaving the narrator in the hands of the goddess of love. The narrator's judgment for Venus signifies the choice of erotic love and love poetry as his vocation, as against the military career represented by Pallas and the life of material wealth by Juno. Venus is overjoyed by the narrator's decision, and she promises that she will reward him by accepting him into her service (vv. 605-8).

As things turn out, this does not seem like much of a reward. Although it does not bring about a second Trojan War, the narrator's judgment has disastrous results for him personally. The momentary choice of a particular life—the service of Venus, the vocation of love poetry—
determines the narrator's interpretation of reality thereafter. Namely, love will blind him to the fact that the young lady with whom he becomes obsessed does not return his sentiments. As in Machaut's *Jugement* poems, then, Froissart's *Espinette* exhibits a semantic migration between *jugement* as an official pronouncement and *jugement* as an individual mental faculty used at each moment of life to interpret the world. The tragicomic series of events following the judgment for Venus, recounted with irony by Froissart's older narrator, deserves to be summarized here in some detail, since it helps to show how bad judgment works in *Espinette* as a function—or rather psychological symptom—of erotic desire, and how Froissart identifies that bad judgment with the poetry of courtly love as typified especially by Machaut's *Jugement* poems.

After Venus promises to reward the narrator, she disappears and the narrator soon meets a young lady reading Adenet le Roi's thirteenth-century romance *Cléomades* (v. 696). The two begin to read together and get along nicely; afterward, the young lady asks him to lend her another good book. Smitten, he writes her a ballad declaring his love and inserts it into the volume he lends her. This is Mahieu le Poirier's *Baillieu d'Amors*, a popular and influential text of the medieval love debate tradition. Upon receiving the book back from the young lady, the narrator is dismayed to find that his literally-inserted lyric is right where he put it, as if she chose to ignore it. This is, indeed, the case, for although she clearly enjoys literature, the young lady

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33 The young lady remains effectively anonymous throughout the *Bush* poems, although at the end of *Espinette* (vv. 4179-85), Froissart's narrator claims that her name is hidden in a previous passage (vv. 3386-89) along with his own (see above in this chapter, n 25). Based on v. 3389 ("Violettes et margerites," the young lady has been usually identified as "Margerite," but Kibler ("Self-Deception," 80-81) has offered the explanation that her name may also be "Violette." Because of this uncertainty and the fact that she is never directly named in the text, I will continue calling the narrator's cruel sweetheart simply the "young lady."
34 The ballad is vv. 927-44. Froissart cites the title of the book as the "Baillieu d'amours" (v. 871), which Fourrier (ed., *Espinette*, 176 n871) has identified as a reference to Mahieu Le Poirier's *Cour d'amour* (see the edition by Scully).
does not care much for any of the narrator's poems. He, however, is blinded by Venus and burns with desire, remaining oblivious to the disinterest of his audience.

Over time, the narrator composes a substantial amount of fixed-form lyric poetry for the young lady, which Froissart inserts into his own text. In these inset lyrics and in the narrative that frames them, the gulf between the young lady's feelings of annoyance toward the narrator and the narrator's ability to accurately judge those feelings grows ever wider. Sometime later, for instance, the narrator offers the young lady a rose, which she tries politely to decline (vv. 994-1004). The narrator, however, misconstrues her refusal as false modesty, insisting that she take the unwanted gift. After another negative response to his pleas (v. 1120), the narrator writes the young lady a ballad demanding her love, to which she replies in exasperation, "He's really asking a lot!" ("Ce qu'il demande, c'est grant cose!" v. 1296). But against his better judgment, the narrator still does not lose hope. When he learns that the young lady is to be married (vv. 1405-6), his first reaction is to vow to kill her husband (vv. 1435-36), but soon thoughts of her impending union propel him into a long state of burning fever, during which he writes a long slew of lyric poetry for her (vv. 1556-2355). The narrator is not simply stubborn or ignorant, but suffers from chronic self-deception, perhaps, as he himself muses in retrospect, as the result of his having been too young for the lessons of love (vv. 133-36).\(^{35}\) He seems to lose his grip on reality entirely as he is possessed by this feverish desire; at one point hallucinating the young lady's presence in a mirror she has given him, he convinces himself that she has sent him a poem of comfort (vv. 2617-996).\(^{36}\) Later in *Espinette*, the young lady resigns herself to tolerating the

\(^{35}\) See, again, Kibler, "Self-Deception."

\(^{36}\) This scene is another good example of Froissart's frequent gestures of homage toward Machaut, since it bears a close resemblance to the intervention of Venus that follows the Judgment of Paris in Machaut's *Fonteinne amoureuse*, as well as to scenes in his *Remede de
narrator's continued intrusions into her life, although she dismisses the poetry he writes for her as emotionally feigned (vv. 3583-85), an insult that he does not register. Soon thereafter, the young lady breaks off their relationship, giving the excuse of malicious rumors told about them (vv. 3751-58). At the end of Espinette, the narrator attempts to enter back into contact with her after "une saison," (v. 3764), by asking her to sit beside him: "Les moi venes chi douce amie" ("Come here beside me, sweet friend," v. 3781). The young lady responds with the perfectly unambiguous words, "'point d'amie chi pour vous!" ("There's no friend for you here!" v. 3783). When she sees that even this outburst has failed to get her point across, she vents her frustration by violently tearing a handful of hair from his head (vv. 3789-92). The narrator, however, is only momentarily deterred, and finally interprets this gesture (vv. 3817-33) as a definitive token of her affection for him, which he composes a closing ballad and lay to celebrate (vv. 3834-4146).  

So does one bad judgment—the fateful repeated choice of Paris—cause the narrator's entire faculty of judgment to be knocked askew in its interpretation of the world and the feelings of others, including his very first reader, the anonymous young lady. Although religious themes are not nearly as explicit in Espinette as in Buisson, already in the former poem the narrator's choice for Venus and its repercussions can be traced directly to late medieval Christian beliefs about the faculty of judgment. As Margaret Ehrhart has shown in her masterful study of the Judgment of Paris legend, the decision of Froissart's narrator to bestow the golden apple on Venus follows the traditional medieval reading of the legend, which was based on the allegorical

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*Fortune* and *Voir dit*. De Looze (*Pseudo-Autobiography*, 110) notes similarities in the mirror episode in both authors, as does Picherit (*"Le rôle des éléments mythologiques,"* 499). Kibler analyzes this scene in detail (*"Self-Deception,"* 94-5). On the young lady as a reader, and on Froissart's women in general, see Bennett, *"Female Readers in Froissart."*
interpretation given to the legend by Fulgentius (c. 460-c. 530).\textsuperscript{39} For Fulgentius, Jupiter's deferral of judgment to Paris represented God's endowment of man with free will and the ability to choose for himself a life of contemplation, of activity or of pleasure-seeking.\textsuperscript{40} In the early fourteenth-century, the \textit{Ovide moralisé} had fully effected the myth's translation into popular Christian allegory by identifying the golden apple as the forbidden fruit of Eden and making Paris's choice emblematic of the Fall.\textsuperscript{41}

In her very comprehensive account, Ehrhart demonstrates to what extent this basic pattern of Christian allegoresis was applied to the Judgment of Paris legend throughout the Middle Ages and in Froissart's poem.\textsuperscript{42} As the emblem of judgments made in the state of blindness incurred by original sin and by his own adolescent sexuality, the narrator's fateful repetition of Paris's judgment is the catalyst for his continued inability to judge the words and actions of the young lady. That the narrator's perceptions are distorted by sexual desire shows how one bad judgment reproduces itself endlessly on the level of the individual poet, much as the faulty judgment made by Adam and Eve reproduces itself in the human lineage as a whole and will do so until the Last Judgment puts things right.

While the narrator's poor judgment is everyone's judgment after the Fall and the judgment of all lovers ("Tout li amant," v. 524), it is also the judgment of Guillaume de Machaut. Not only does Froissart's Judgment of Paris episode recall the bushy opening of Machaut's \textit{Jugement dou roy de Behaingne}, but it conflates that scene with the climactic episode of one of Machaut's most

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\textsuperscript{39} The \textit{Judgment of the Trojan Prince Paris in Medieval Literature}.  
\textsuperscript{40} Ehrhart, Ibid., 76, 84.  
\textsuperscript{41} Ehrhart, Ibid., 85-93. Ehrhart (Ibid., 90) notes that the \textit{OM} is the first text to interpret the Judgment of Paris in the light of salvation history. That being said, as Ehrhart also notes, "The author of the \textit{Ovide moralisé} sees in the Judgment not the fall of Adam and Eve but the fall of Everyman, the individual reenactment of our first parents' sin" (Ibid., 92). The Judgment of Paris is dealt with in books 11-13 of the \textit{OM} (ed. De Boer).  
\textsuperscript{42} Ehrhart, \textit{Judgment}, 141-151.
famous *dits, La fontinne amoureuse* (1360),\(^{43}\) an episode which is Machaut's own version of the Judgment of Paris.\(^{44}\) In *Fonteinne*, Machaut's narrator-poet meets a certain lovelorn prince—identifiable with Machaut's then patron, Jean Duc de Berry, who is weary with heartache because he has to leave France, and the woman he loves, for a long and indefinite period of time. After talking at length and collaborating on some lyric poetry, poet and prince fall asleep together beside a fountain. In a shared dream, Venus comes to them and recounts the judgment of Paris from the beginning, and from her own perspective (vv. 1633-2144). She tells them how Paris chose her and how she gave him Helen in return, conveniently omitting to mention what happened afterward between the Greeks and the Trojans. Boasting of her magical power over lovers, Venus then proves her point by making the prince's lady appear to him in the dream and console him at length (vv. 2207-526). As a result, the prince is saved from a heartache too cruel to endure and declares that he is converted, as it were, to the cult of Venus, promising to build the goddess a temple and make sacrifices to her (vv. 2543-60). In his account of the Judgment of Paris, Machaut lends a relatively sympathetic portrait to Venus. Most especially, the goddess of Love proves a benevolent influence in permitting the beloved to transmit herself to the lover over great distances through the medium of poetry.\(^{45}\) For the poet, the prince's double in *Fonteinne*, the choice of Venus likewise suggests that the goddess is a desirable force in the composition of good verse. As a servant of Venus, Machaut's narrator gives expression to his patron's longing, which makes it possible for the lover who is absent to become present.\(^{46}\)

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\(^{43}\) I cite the edition by Cerquiglini-Toulet.

\(^{44}\) Ehrhart, *Judgment*, 130-41.

\(^{45}\) And, as R. Barton Palmer argues, Machaut's version "connects the young man's choice (viewed as sinful in the *Ovide moralisé*) with a morally worthy dedication to the different aspects of the aristocratic life" (ed., *Fonteinne*, lxii).

\(^{46}\) In *Fonteinne*, these powers are also associated with the God Morpheus, and the poem's alternate title is the *Livre du Morpheüs*. Machaut's exaltation of Venus is not without its own
Froissart's Judgment of Paris, in contrast, is much more unequivocally the depiction of a foolish decision, a rewriting which also serves to characterize Machaúldian courtly poetry in terms of dubious judgment. Froissart's conflation of Machaut's bush scene from *JRB* with his Judgment of Paris scene from *Fonteinne amoureuse* casts the twelve-year old narrator-poet as something of a young Machaut, identifying the posture he himself had adopted as a writer of lyrics and *dits* with that of his most important influence. For Froissart's younger self, the choice for Venus is something of a non-choice, since it represents both a state of sin—carnal desire—into which all people are born, and a poetic over-determination: who else but Machaut could Froissart have imitated? Who else but Venus could he have served in writing poetry? By redescribing the service of Venus as the poet's own vocation, Froissart also parodies his younger attraction to Machaúldian courtly poetry even as he pays homage to Machaut.  

In a more general sense, Froissart's employment of faulty and unstable judgments as a plot device in *Espinette* also calls to mind Machaut's use of judgments in *JRB* and *JRN*. In his *Jugement* poems, as I have argued in the previous chapter, Machaut transforms the playful polemics of later medieval debate poetry into a meditation on the author's own conflicting judgments throughout his career. Similar to Machaut's musical innovations in polyphony, the ironies. Margaret Ehrhart has argued that Machaut's is a moralizing interpretation of the Judgment of Paris legend directed at Jean Duc de Berry, who at the time of the poem's composition was about to leave his new bride Jeanne d'Armagnac to become a hostage in England, where he would remain for the next seven years. According to Ehrhart, Machaut would have used the choice of Venus by both Paris and the fictionalized patron as a negative exempla of how the pursuit of *eros* leads to folly (*Judgment*, 130-41). This interpretation of Machaut's poem is certainly also valid, especially in that it was Jean of Berry's obligation at the time of the poem to leave France in order to be a hostage in England, his duty to reject Venus for Pallas, the goddess of war.  

Lechat ('*Dire par fiction*,' 298) argues that through his own interpretation, Froissart reads Machaut's judgment of Paris as a means of referring to the poet's vocation.
world of his *dits* is a multivocal mix of differing opinions and judgments which altogether create a powerful sense of shifting perspective and deliberate ambiguity.

As a distinct reworking of the Machaudian courtly tradition, Froissart's *Bush* poems make strong use of the motif of shifting judgments over time, using them to dramatize the narrator-poet's wild and foolish youth, and thus the author's own metamorphoses in the course of his own career. In addition to his frequent nods to Machaut, Froissart evokes the playful and chaotic atmosphere of courtly judgment in other ways. In *Espinette*, for example, the copy of the *Baillieu d'amours* that the narrator gives the young lady recalls the wider genre of love-debate poetry. In *Buisson's* dream vision, the young lady's inconclusive judgment adjourns, but does not end, the most recognizable courtly case of all, the suffering poet's plea for mercy. Finally in *Buisson*, Froissart further alludes to the competitive rhetorical aspect of fourteenth-century poetry with the composition of the *souhetz*, which remain unjudged at the very end of the dream vision. Along with the narrator's love-struck judgments in *Espinette*, all of these references by Froissart to Machaut and the larger tradition of courtly poetry serve to highlight that spirit of controlled chaos, of constantly shifting opinions, which Thomas L. Reed has called the "aesthetics of irresolution," characteristic of much medieval debate poetry.48

While he actively cultivates such an aesthetic of shifting judgments, however, the Froissart of 1369's *Espinette* caricatures his young narrator's practice of love poetry as a state of

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48 Reed (*Middle English Debate Poetry and the Aesthetics of Irresolution*) uses the term specifically in regard to debate poetry in England. Machaut's *Voir dit* provides another good example of the author's fascination with uncertain judgments, as the dreaming narrator asks "Le Roi qui ne ment" for his advice on love, but this supposed authority figure only laughs at him and gives him no real answer (ed. Imbs, vv. 5244-733). The game of the "roi qui ne ment" is also referenced in Froissart's *Espinette* (v. 220), as part of the narrator's long litany of childhood pursuits, then relived in the dream world of *Buisson* (v. 4427). In addition, as Kelly has noted, Froissart's creative use of exempla provide—as they do for Machaut—ample demonstration of the author's taste for uncertainty ("Imitation, Metamorphosis," 105).
delusion. He parodically recasts Machaut's pronounced taste for the language of inconclusiveness into what can only be described as a long series of bad judgments, made to seem plainly ridiculous in their interpretation of reality. Four years after *Espinette,* *Buisson* strongly suggests that such an unstable vision of poetic judgment may be ethically deficient as well as simply misguided, in that the pursuit of love poetry is vain, imperiling the souls of both reader and author. At *Buisson's* end, in the age of Jupiter, the uncertain judgments of Machaut's courtly tradition and the bad judgments of the young narrator-poet himself are both replaced by a trembling certainty of the one true Judgment.

In the section that follows, I consider how *Buisson* works to continue the judgment-narrative begun in *Espinette,* as it transforms that narrative into an ascent toward higher truth and clearer judgment. Beginning with Jonece's explanation of the ages of man and ending with the meditation on eschatological judgment that signals the narrator's definitive entrance into the blessed Jovian age, I show how Froissart used the conceit of a divine judgment on literature in order to frame his renunciation of past writing as an act ethically necessary for the mature author.

**III. Buisson under the Sign of Jupiter**

In one of *Buisson's* most important scenes, Froissart's narrator has his whole life—past, present and future—charted out before his eyes and does not even know it yet. At this point, the dreaming narrator has been led by Venus to the mysterious bush, the *Joli buisson* itself. It is apparently the same flowering hawthorn under which the narrator in *Espinette* was called upon to overturn the judgment of Paris, but since that time, it has grown to unfathomable size. Upon entering the bush, Venus introduces the narrator to the personified character who will guide him further, Jonece (Youth), who is his exact double (vv. 1495-97). The narrator, amazed by his new
surroundings, asks Jonece to explain the meaning of the gigantic shrub. Jonece tells his charge that, according to the astronomy lessons he received some time ago, the bush's seven branches correspond to the seven planets that influence man throughout life, in seven neatly demarcated periods of astrological influence (vv. 1554-707) extending from the Moon at birth to Saturn at man's decline and death.

Jonece's understanding of the planets corresponds closely to the schema of the seven ages of man as found in the fourth book of Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*. According to Jonece, the Moon ensures the child's nourishment for the first four years of its life (vv. 1616-26). Mercury, who looks after the child for the next ten years, is responsible for teaching it how to speak and move (vv. 1626-36) before relinquishing control to Venus for the following decade:

Puis vient Venus, qui le reprend
Et qui .X. ans aprères en sogné.
Vous devés savoir de quel sogné:
D'ignorance le leve et monde,
Et li fait conghoistre le monde
Et sentir que c'est de delis,
Tant de viandes com de lis,
Et le fait gai, jol et conté,
Et de tous esbanois l'acointe.
(vv. 1637-45)

Then comes Venus who takes him
And teaches him for ten years with care,
And you should know what goal:
From ignorance she raises and purifies him,
And introduces him to the world
And makes him feel what pleasure is,
In the bedroom and at the table,
And makes him happy, handsome and wise
And knowledgeable of all sorts of amusement.

Although Mercury did hand the young narrator over to Venus after his judgment in *Espinette*, Jonece's vision of celestial influence does not match up perfectly to the narrator's own experiences with the goddess of love. He was twelve, not fourteen, when he entered Venus's

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49 J.A. Burrow's discussion of the Ptolemaic scheme is both concise and thorough, and acknowledges its influence on Froissart (*The Ages of Man*, 37-42; 179-80). The association of Jupiter with justice is not particularly Ptolemaic, but the planet is nevertheless identified in the *Tetrabiblos* with "the renunciation of manual labor, toil, turmoil and dangerous activity" and the assumption of "decorum, foresight, retirement, together with all-embracing deliberation, admonition and consolation." (*Tetrabiblos*, IV:10, trans. F.E. Robbins [Cambridge, MA: 1940], cited in Burrow's appendix, *The Ages of Man*, 198.) In *Paradiso* (XVIII-XX), Dante places the just in the sphere of Jupiter.
service, and this after only four years in Mercury's care, not ten.\textsuperscript{50} Moreover, Jonece's description of the goddess's power is surprisingly positive, casting her as a teacher who frees man of ignorance and acquaints him with the great sensual pleasures of life. Jonece's explanation does not account for the foolish things that the narrator had done while under Venus's service or the considerable pain she had caused him. Jonece's description therefore seems an ironic touch on Froissart's part, since the reader of\textit{Buisson} who has also read\textit{Espinette} is well aware of the havoc Venus has wreaked, and since the original Ptolemaic model likewise presents the goddess in a rather negative light:

\begin{quote}
Venus, taking in charge the third age, that of youth, for the next eight years, corresponding in number to her own period, begins, as is natural, to inspire, at their maturity, an activity of the seminal passages and to implant an impulse toward the embrace of love. At this time particularly a kind of frenzy enters the soul, incontinence, desire for any chance sexual gratification, burning passion, guile, and the blindness of the impetuous lover.\textsuperscript{51}
\end{quote}

This list of physical and psychological symptoms more than accurately describes Froissart's twelve-year-old narrator after his momentous judgment in the hawthorn bush.\textsuperscript{52} He too had been blind to the reality of his situation and had felt the flames of burning passion engulf him.

But the narrator is distracted. He pays little attention to Jonece's answer to his question about the bush. Having been led back in time by Venus, he seems to have reassumed the same youthful oblivion he exhibited in\textit{Espinette}. Much like Machaut's narrator in the section following the prologue of\textit{JRN}, Froissart's now older speaker is captivated by the re-greening (\textit{reverdie}) of his surroundings, the miraculous return to spring on this late November night and

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{50} But as the narrator himself says in\textit{Espinette}, he may have been too young for Venus (vv. 133-36).
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Tetrabiblions}, IV:10, trans. F.E. Robbins (Cambridge, MA, 1940), reprinted in Burrow's appendix, \textit{Ages of Man}, 198.
\textsuperscript{52} Although it does not rely on astrological influence, the \textit{Quatre ages de l'homme} (first half of the thirteenth century) of Philippe de Novare notes that "les jones genz ont faus jugement en aus" because of their amorous proclivities (ed. de Fréville, II:49).
\end{flushright}
the miraculous return to the narrator's earlier love poetry. He confesses to Jonece that he just cannot pay attention to his astrology lesson, since he wants only to think about love, springtime, music and dancing (vv. 1709-55).

Although Froissart's newly-reenchanted narrator gives no thought to it for the time being, Jonece's vision of the seven ages foreshadows his literal and figurative awakening at the end of *Buisson*, his sudden awareness of the Last Judgment, in that this model describes the path the narrator will take from Venus to Jupiter. After Venus, says Jonece, the next ten years of a man's life are spent under the sign of the Sun, when he turns his desires away from love to the acquisition of honor and fortune (vv. 1646-51). Next, Mars begins a twelve-year term which is similarly devoted to the pursuit of wealth and power, but with a more sinister connotation of greed and material acquisition through violence (vv. 1652-67). Following Mars, says Jonece, Jupiter at last directs a man's attention to the welfare of his immortal soul, for a period of twelve years or more, prior to the age of Saturn, the time of his death. As Jonece explains, it is Jupiter who teaches man to think upon his end and to cast off the vain pursuits of youth:

Puis vient Jupiter tout le cours,  Then the time of Jupiter comes around,
Qui a l'omme fet grant secours,  which brings great help to a man,
Car d'outrages et de folies  for from presumptuous acts and other silly things,
Et de plusieurs merancolies,  and prolonged bouts of melancholy,
Ou jadis il s'est embatus  in which he had long been sunk,
Et dont il a esté batus  and by which he had been beaten,
Tant par li com par l'autrui ire,  as much by his own hand as by others' anger,
Compains, vous poës moult bien dire  well, friend, you can truly say
Que la planette l'en deliver  that the planet delivers him at last
Et plus seur estat li livre,  and brings him a more certain state of mind,
Qu'on doit priser et honnourer,  that we all should value and honor,
Car elle li fait savourer  for it allows us to feel
Pais de corps et repos pour l'ame,  peace in the body and in the soul,
Ordener sepulture et lame,  to prepare our sepulcher and stone,
Amer l'eglise et Dieu cremir,  love the Church and fear God,
Recongnoisire et de ce fremir  recognize and tremble at the thought
Que chils mondes n'est qu'uns trespass.  that this world is only passing,
Ceste planete ne lait pas  This planet never abandons the man,
L'omme, anchois l'estoie et yverene
but lights his way summer and winter
Et .XII. ans ou plus le gouverne.
and directs him for twelve years or more.
(vv. 1668-87)

Since "presumptuous acts" (v. 1670) and "bouts of melancholy" (v. 1671) are exactly what the
love-struck narrator had experienced in *Espinette*, Jupiter seems particularly effective in ridding
his subjects of the bad judgments of Venus, who has returned to tempt the dreamer by bringing
him to the great *buisson*. Venus comes back to him after twenty-three years, even though the
decade assigned to her influence by Jonece has long ended. But as Venus herself tells the
narrator at the start of their relationship in *Espinette*,

\[
\begin{align*}
&[...]x. \text{ ans tous entiers} & \text{Ten long years} \\
&Seras mes drois servans rentiers & \text{you will be my liege servant,} \\
&\text{Et en apries sans penser visce} & \text{and afterward, without thinking badly of it,} \\
&Tout ten vivant en mon service & \text{you'll remain in my service your whole life.}
\end{align*}
\]

(vv. 605-8)

Time for Venus is a bit more flexible than for most of the other planets/deities; she arrived early
and came back late to torment the aging and disillusioned narrator when he least expected her. It
seems her spell can only be broken by the rise of Jupiter, for whom time is also relative ("Et .XII.
ans ou plus le gouverne," v. 1687).\(^{53}\)

Indeed, chronologically, it may be true that Froissart's narrator is not yet at the "right"
moment in his life to fall under the sway of Jupiter. According to Jonece's model, at thirty-five
he should have just left the Sun and be in the beginning stages of Mars. But as the *telos* and not
simply the end of a Christian life, Jupiter is more than just a step along the way at a prescribed
period of time; rather, by the end of the poem the planet comes to represent the narrator pulled
out of time altogether and into the eternal present of God's judgment, the *nunc stans*, as he is
finally saved from the pains of temporal existence and the failings of human perception. Jupiter's

\(^{53}\) On the ambiguous period of service to Venus in Froissart's text, see Ehrhart, *Judgment*, 150.
is the perfected age, in that it prepares man for the dark days of Saturn, his decline and death.\textsuperscript{54} Not strictly chronological, but eschatological, Jupiter signifies man come to terms with his end, his soul made ready for the final judgment. Like Augustine's post-conversion self in \textit{Confessions}, the soul under Jupiter's powers leaves behind the illusions of sin and sees himself as God does.

With Jupiter and Venus vying for influence over the narrator, the intervention of the other planets remains largely in the background. However, the desire for material acquisition, characteristic of both the Sun and Mars, also deserves mention. In an obscure passage near the beginning of \textit{Buisson}, the narrator confesses that he has sinned against his nature by unsuccessfully trying his hand at commerce (vv. 94-97).\textsuperscript{55} Not long afterward, the narrator lists the various sums he has been given for his writing by Froissart's many patrons (vv. 230-373). One may well infer that Jupiter's age, the time when a man's thoughts draw toward the ultimate reward, moves the subject away from the vain pursuit of riches as well as from the vanity of erotic desire and erotic poetry.

As I see it, the purpose of Jonece's discussion of the seven ages within the larger narrative of the \textit{Bush} poems is two-fold. In the first place, it serves to give further emphasis to the changing judgments of the pseudo-autobiographical narrator-poet as a function of his existence in time. Like the reversals of opinion in Machaut's \textit{Jugement} poems, the Ptolemaic seven ages model depicts the poet as a creature of differing opinions in the course of a career. The

\textsuperscript{54} See Augustine, \textit{De diversis quaestionibus}, LXXXIII, Bk I, Qu. LVIII, PL40, 43, cited in Burrow's appendix to \textit{Ages of Man}, 199. Here, Augustine identifies the sixth age as the time "in which the Lord comes." Sarah Kay ("Le Moment de Conclure," 156) notes the "Lay de Nostre Dame" signifies the Age of Jupiter rather than that of Mars. Freeman ("A Farewell to Poetry," 242) and Kibler ("Froissart's Midlife Crisis," 66) both note, in my opinion, incorrectly, that Mars is responsible for governing judgment and reward in \textit{Buisson}, while Kelly (\textit{Medieval Imagination}, 179) considers that the narrator's "rude awakening" to a "world of age, care and sin" corresponds to the sign of the Sun.

\textsuperscript{55} "Si me mis en le marcandise" [...] (v. 94). It is not clear to me whether Froissart is referring to actual commerce or to the idea of writing for financial gain.
influences of the heavenly bodies represent not only various ways of being, but fundamentally, ways of seeing the world based on divergent desires, different value judgments that shape one's interpretation of reality. While Venus represents the younger's narrator's careless practice of love poetry, and the Sun and Mars stand in for the narrator writing for money and honor, Jupiter corresponds to the author who is turning his rhetorical gifts to pastoral ends, to the more serious endeavor of prose historiography, and to non-erotic themes in general. By portraying the ages of life as a tumultuous course of competing celestial influences, Jonece's schema of the seven ages amplifies the representation of the author's own career and corpus as being subject to inevitable shifts in judgment during twenty-three years of poetry.

In the second place, Jonece's exposition of the psychological life-cycle also serves to naturalize these shifts in judgment, by making them a regular part of the human developmental pattern, as much as they are stages in a narrative of Christian spiritual growth. This naturalization works to suggest that the poet's errors in judgment are relatively excusable, since they are appropriate to the time in which they took place. As the narrator puts it in Buisson, "leurs saisons ont toutes coses," (v. 1735). Already in Espinette, Froissart's older narrator had forgiven his younger self his trespasses because of the natural inclinations of his age:

Mais tant qu'au fait, j'escuse mieux
Assés les jones que les vieux,
Car Jonece ne voelt qu'esbas
(vv. 17-19)

But all the same I forgive more readily
the young than the old,
for youth wants nothing but fun.

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56 Burrow (The Ages of Man, 42, 179) notes that the ages of man scheme naturalizes the experience of Froissart's narrator and makes of it "a graceful and stylish sign of submission to that very order of nature in which love also had its place" (179).

57 In a similar way, Dante states (Conv., I: I:16) that the Convivio is not to be thought an improvement on the previous work (La Vita Nuova), but rather that it reflects a different point in the author's life, which calls for different themes.
But as there is a time for *esbas*, there is also a time for repentance and preparation for the Judgment, as Jonece makes clear in his description of Jupiter's age. Unlike Machaut's conflicting *Jugements*, then, Jonece's theory of planetary influence works to fit the fragmentation of the self over time and throughout a body of work into an overall narrative progression with a beginning and, especially, an End. Rewriting Machaut's *JRB* and *JRN* in his own diptych of contradictory judgments, Froissart affirms and even amplifies the depiction of the poet and his corpus as fragmented by divergences of opinion, all of which have their time and place. But Froissart transforms his narrator-persona's changes of opinion and sentiment into a narrative of moral perfection and, finally, repentance in the face of divine judgment. In *Buisson*, the inconclusive judgments of Machaut's world, and of the courtly tradition more generally, are replaced by the judgment of Jupiter, the awareness of an ultimate account book into which all literary activity is inscribed, and a faith in the certainty that the Judgment will bring.

It is in the ascent from courtly confusion to divine truth that the *souhetz*, or wish poems originally intended for the judgment of the Dieu d'Amours are replaced by prayers to Christ and Mary in the final verses of *Buisson*. Likewise, the narrator's service to Venus and his request that the young lady grant him a judgment of *merchi* and accept him into her service are replaced by the service he will now undertake to the Church and the clemency he hopes the Virgin's advocacy will win for him:

```
Humlement je me voel retraire
Viers le Mere dou Roi celestre,
Et li prie qu'elle voelle ester
Pour moi advocate et moissenne
A son Fil, qui tout amoissenne,
Et qui est vrais feuhs habondans,
Caritables et redondans,
Pour coers enflamer et esprendre.
(vv. 5183-90)
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Humbly I wish to retire myself
toward the Mother of God in heaven,
and pray that she agree to act
as my advocate and intermediary
with her Son, who mediates everything
and who is the true living fire,
merciful and abundant,
that sets every heart ablaze.
And now that he is cognizant of his own soul's peril, the narrator does not hesitate to accuse his readers, exhorting them to repentance too:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mas et las,</td>
<td>Beaten and weak,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu trambleras</td>
<td>you will tremble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De paour.</td>
<td>with fear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tu oras</td>
<td>You will hear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En ce cas</td>
<td>in this case</td>
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<tr>
<td>Que plusour</td>
<td>that many</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aront s'amour</td>
<td>will have His love</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A plains bras,</td>
<td>with open arms,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Et tu iras</td>
<td>and yet you will go</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>En tristour.</td>
<td>away in misery.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vv. 5337-46)

For the narrator, the movement toward Jupiter represents a new and superior ethics of writing. Placing his work in the perspective of the Last Judgment, he understands that the real purpose of revisiting his younger days as a love poet in the bush has been his own salvation through a very public repentance, providing closure to his past and turning his poetic talents toward devotional and evangelical ends.

But while this gesture of worldly renunciation is dramatic and spelled out explicitly by the narrator, it is only half of the overall effect of the Bush poems and their juxtaposition of judgments. Most importantly, to concentrate exclusively on Froissart's renunciation in Buisson is to overlook the various ways that the author expresses an ethical debt to his readers, not only to the uncaring young lady for whom he first began to write, but also to the more appreciative—and well-paying—audiences Froissart had found among the various courts of Europe. As Froissart suggests, his material and ethical debt to readers demands that he defend and revalorize the poetry he had written for them, even as he claims to move beyond it.

I have now shown how Froissart positioned his Jovian Last Judgment as a counterpoint to love poetry and its disorderly judgments. It remains to see how the ultimate judgment scene of
Buisson also serves to reaffirm the poet's connection to the courtly tradition and to his own past writing. Thus I now move from répudiation to rappel, examining in more detail how Froissart recalls his earlier poetry just as he distances himself from it.

The human faculty of memory is of central importance to late medieval Christian teachings on divine judgment, which exhort sinners to remember their ending day and thus also to use memory to indict themselves in confession. There are a number of different contexts for memory at work in Froissart's Buisson, including especially that of the thirty-five narrator looking back on his own past in nostalgia—in the late-night visitation by Venus that leads to his dream vision—and finally, that of repentance, under the rule of Jupiter. On the surface, these two uses of memory might seem to describe a conflict between an aesthetic impulse, toward courtly poetry and its judgments, and an ethical impulse, toward repentance in the face of the Judgment. However, what is curious about Froissart's Buisson is that it treats as ethical impulses both the desire to return to earlier writing and the desire to renounce that writing. In Buisson, the imagined accusation of readers brings up an alternative set of ethical problems which complicate the straightforward narrative of Christian repentance and conversion. By tracing how these two ethical impulses are systematically juxtaposed throughout Buisson and finally brought together at its End, it will be possible to see Froissart's Last Judgment more clearly for what it really is, a double geste that serves to uphold past writing even as it is symbolically condemned.

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58 Froissart's use of memory often serves to invent the past as much as to recall it. Sarah Kay has written extensively on the implications of Froissart's narrator's faulty and/or creative use of memory. See Kay, "'Le Moment de Conclure;" "Understanding, Remembering, and Forgetting in Froissart's Le joli buisson de Jonece," ch. 5 in Place of Thought, 123-49; "Mémoire et imagination." Michel Zink has also noted that Froissart's use of memory involves an active construction of the past rather than merely a retrieval of previous experience ("L'amour en fuite,"196).
IV. God's Capital, Venus's Gifts and the Judgment of Froissart's Reader

In his prologue to Buisson, Froissart's narrator seems already to have undergone the spiritual transformation recounted at the end of the poem, when the narrator awakens from his dream fantasy of young love and realizes that he is not young but middle-aged, that it is not really May but late November, and that with each passing day he draws closer to his death and judgment. As he introduces Buisson, the narrator has already experienced this dream vision and epiphany and is thus already, as it were, under the care of Jupiter. As he begins the poem, the now spiritually mature narrator frames the account of his adventures in the bush as part of a literary testament, in which he is to make a thorough moral inventory of the past before he dies:59

Des aventures me souvient
Dou temps passé. Or me couvient,
Entroes que j'ai sens et memore,
Encre et papier et escriptore,
Kanivet et penne taillie,
Et volenté apparellie
Qui m'ammoneste et me remort,
Que je remonstre avant me mort
Comment ou Buisson de Jonece
Fui jadis, et par quel adrecce.

I remember the adventures
of times past. Now it is necessary,
when I still have sense and memory,
ink, paper and a place to write,
a knife and sharpened quill,
and a readied will
which warns and exhorts me
to tell before I die
how in the Bush of Youth
I once was, and how I got there.

(vv. 1-10)

In that Buisson is also a re-vision of Espinette, itself a satirical portrait of Froissart's younger days as a writer of love lyrics, the testament promises closure on the poet's life and work, prior to his death ("avant me mort," v. 8). Paired with the Last Judgment at the end of Buisson, the

59 Michelle Freeman ("A Farewell to Poetry?" 243) has noted the testamentary style of the Buisson's opening lines (vv. 1-10). Although Freeman identifies Mars as the governing planet for judgment and reward, these lines seem to fulfill Jonece's claim that the age of Jupiter prompts one to get one's last affairs in order ("Ordener sepulture et lame," v. 1681). On Froissart's place in the tradition of testamentary literature, see Lechat, 'Dire par fiction,' 260. Lechat argues that the opening testamentary style and the ending prayer of Buisson "signifient tous deux sans equivoque le renoncement à la poésie amoureuse" ('Dire par fiction,' 319).
testamentary opening promises readers a retrospective and penitential narrative, a final putting-to-rights of the author's accounts.\(^{60}\)

But the narrator's project of personal accounting is made more difficult from the beginning by the competing ethical claims that God and the readership place on his soul. Readings of *Buisson* as a kind of conversion narrative ("farewell to poetry," "mid-life crisis") risk oversimplifying what is in fact a highly complex tale of personal change and inner conflict, in which the narrator's perspectives—and his judgments—are constantly shifting. It is especially important to remember that, even well *before* his transformative dream and his meditation on the Last Judgment, Froissart's narrator clearly expresses his desire to repent for serving Venus and for wasting his time with the vain matter of love poetry. In fact, the first thing that *Buisson*'s narrator recounts as he makes out his testament is an episode from his more recent past when, in middle age, he was visited by a version of the familiar Boethian character Dame Philozophie. Froissart's Philozophie, actually more of a voice in the narrator's head than a fully fleshed-out Boethian personification,\(^{61}\) accuses the narrator at length of offending Nature by giving up writing (vv. 102-94). As Philozophie contends, Froissart's narrator is exceptionally gifted in poetry, and it would be a grave sin indeed to simply hide his light under a bushel.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{60}\) See, again, Lechat, *Dire par fiction*, 319.

\(^{61}\) This is particularly evident in that, contrary to much of the Boethian tradition, Froissart does not recount Philozophie's appearance with any detail, and does not even treat her as a separate character until over a hundred verses after she has begun to speak, reproaching him for sinning against nature (vv. 59-191). Before Philozophie is named, her voice is identified simply as "Pensees" (v. 102), seemingly internal to the narrator.

\(^{62}\) Freeman ("A Farewell to Poetry?" 237-8) notes that Philozophie's argument reflects "the clerkly topos that one must not hide one's light under a bushel." That Philozophie, like Machaut's equally Boethian Bonneurte, may be read as giving voice to eschatological accusation, provides a counterpoint to Michael Cherniss's general view of the medieval Boethian tradition as a secularization of the apocalyptic (*Boethian Apocalypse: Studies in Middle English Vision Poetry*).
Tu ne dois pas escarciier
Ce qui te poet agratiier;
Se tu ies ables et propisses
D'aucun art et celi guerpisses,
Enviers ta nature mespresn.
(vv. 139-43)

You must not be greedy with
that which can give you a good name;
if you are skillfull and apt
at some art but abandon it,
you sin against your very nature.

As a voice in the narrator's head, Philozophie serves to give expression to readers, imagining what they would say if they knew he was calling it quits. Philozophie's "accusation" is worth quoting at length, both because it is quite funny, and because it expresses the specific duties of those whom God, or Nature, has endowed with the talents of poetry.

Neis, que diroient li signeur
Dont tu as tant eü dou leur,
Li roi, li duch et li bon conte,
Des quels tu ne sces pas le compte,
Les dames et li chevalier?
Foi que je doi a saint Valier,
A mal emploiet le tenroit
Leurs grans largeces et leurs dons.
Et de droit ossi li pardons
Ne t'en deveroit estre fes,
Quant tu ies nouris et parfès,
Et si as discretion d'omme
Et le science qui se nomme,
Entre les nobles, li mestiers gens,
Car tous coers amoreus esgaie,
Tant en est li oïe gaie.
Et tu le voes mettre hors voie,
Si que jamais nul ne voie?
Il ne fait mie a consentir.
Bien t'en poroies repentir!
(vv. 147-68)

And what, indeed, would the lords say
who gave you so much of what was theirs,
the kings, the dukes and the good counts,
whose number you can't even figure,
the ladies and knights?
By the faith I owe Saint Vallier, they'd think
you would be misusing
their liberal payments and their gifts.
And they'd be right, too,
not to pardon you,
since you are well brought-up and made,
and you have the good sense of a man,
and the knowledge that is called
among noble folk, 'the noble profession,'
for it makes every amorous heart rejoice,
such is its hearing gay.
And you want to push it to the side,
so that no one can ever know it?
This is not right at all.
You could well repent of it!

In much the same way that Deguileville and Machaut use their literary guilt as a clever occasion for new poetry, Froissart imagines himself facing the accusations of readers in order to insist that he must be allowed to keep writing, in order to repent for having given up writing before—that is, in order to repent for having repented. Compared with the texts I have examined by Deguileville and Machaut, Froissart's wittiest riff on the trope of reader accusation is that his
poet-narrator is judged first and foremost for his retirement, not for questionable things he has written in the past; surely, he has lots more great poetry to offer the world!

In his humble retirement—his ordinance nouvelle—the repentant narrator wants nothing of the return to poetry, and much less to the pain and burning desire of young love. The first time that Philozophie suggests he begin writing again, he tells her in no uncertain terms that he is not interested:

Pour Dieu, laissiés moi reposer! For God's sake, leave me in peace!
Vous dites que bons jours m'ajourne You wish me good day
Et qu'en grant aise je sejourne: and that I be in great comfort.
Je le vous acorde. Atant, pes! Okay, you've got it. Enough, quiet!
(vv. 218-21)

Nevertheless, Philozophie persists and argues that poetry is the narrator's true purpose as a created being:

Se diex vosist il teuist fet Had God wanted, he would have made you
Un laboureur grant et parfet a great and powerful laborer
A une contenance estrange with a strange face
Ou un bateur en une grange or a thresher in a granary
Un macon ou un aultre ouvrier or a mason or another such manual worker—
Je nai cure quel manouvrier I don't care what kind.
Et il ta donne le science He gave you the know-how
De quoi tu poes par conscience through which you can in good conscience
Loer dieu et servir le monde. praise God and serve the world.
(vv. 179-88)

In its special emphasis on the poet as a specific member of the estates with specific duties to perform unto God and man, Philozophie's diatribe evokes Guillaume le Clerc's thirteenth-century poem Le besant de Dieu, which I have discussed in the introduction and in Chapter 1. In the Besant, the poet affirms that his poetry has a God-given purpose which he must fulfill—the

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63 Freeman ("A Farewell to Poetry?" 237) does note that the narrator is reluctant to return to love poetry, but in my view does not adequately address how this starting point complicates the "farewell" gesture made at the end of the poem.

64 Introduction, 27-28; Chapter 1, 72.
saving of souls—and that he must repent for the "vaine matire" (*Besant*, v. 82) that he wrote in the past, when he misused his poetic abilities writing "romanz, / fablels e contes" (*Besant*, vv. 80-81) with no spiritual value.

Once again, however, Philozophie's is an accusation which weighs on the author's failure to continue writing, rather than on sins contained within his earlier work. Not only, claims Philozophie, have writers been necessary to record the gallant deeds of heroes like Tristan, Perceval and Arthur (vv. 405-13), but the narrator is not all that different from the Doctors and Evangelists whose writings founded the Church itself:

Je te voel encor demander And let me ask you another thing:
Se no fois, qui est approuvee, if our faith, which is most blessed,
Et n'est elle faite et ouvree is not all made and worked upon
Par docteurs et euvangelistes? by the Doctors and the Evangelists?
Sains Pols, sains Bernars, sains Celistes Saint Paul, Saint Bernard, Saint Calixte
Et plusieur aultre saint peudomme, and many another holy man
Que li Sainte Escriptrure nomme, that Holy Scripture names,
N'en ont il esté registreur? weren't they the registers of [our faith]?
(vv. 414-21)

Philozophie is remarkably irreverent in that, while she suggests the narrator may be able to "loer dieu et servir le monde" (v. 187) through his poetry, she seems to disregard any traditional distinction between moralizing verse and the sort of "vaine matire" of which Guillaume le Clerc repents to begin his *Besant*. Philozophie moves without pause between the writers of romance and the Fathers of the Church. Are praising God and serving the world united for the narrator, then, as they might be in the ministry of a parish priest, or are they two separate and contradictory activities? Does the world (*monde*) refer to the readership of worldly poetry, or perhaps to the flock of souls for whom Froissart was now personally responsible?

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65 Saint Calixte was a pope of the third century, whose position in this list seems to be purely for the convenience of the rhyme (see Fourrier, ed., *Buisson*, 250 n418).
66 On the unexpectedly irreverent nature of this version of Dame Philozophie, see Kelly, "Imitation, Metamorphosis," 112.
To an even greater degree than in Philozophie's treatment of the estates, Froissart recalls Guillaume le Clerc's *Besant de Dieu* by insisting on monetary language. Guillaume's titular *besant* is the coin, or *talent*, of Matthew 25, the specific spiritual capital God has given each human being to invest, and of which God will make a thorough accounting at the Judgment. Like Guillaume, Froissart is clear that his own spiritual capital is the ability to write well. But, as is one of the poet's trademarks, Froissart makes his own accounting much more about the literal money he received for writing, and the responsibilities which it entails.\(^\text{67}\) Philozophie says she is very angry with the narrator ("en grant ire," v. 224) and demands that he recite a list of those who have supported his work over the years. The narrator obliges, and, in a lengthy passage (vv. 230-373), enumerates Froissart's many real-life benefactors, including Philippa de Hainaut, Blanche of Lancaster, King Charles V of France and King David II of Scotland, as well as Froissart's beloved patron and sometime poetic collaborator Wenceslas I, whose service the poet had recently left in order to take up his benefice at Estinnes-au-Mont (the benefice was itself something of a gift from Wenceslas).\(^\text{68}\) The list of patrons reads like a veritable account book, in which the narrator notes the specific sums he received for his work: one hundred florins from King Edward III of England (v. 261), "chevaus et florins sans compte" (v. 275) from Lord Edouard Spencer, "fistfuls" of florins more from Enguerrand VII, "li bons sire de Couchi" (vv. 279-81), twenty gold florins from the Count of Savoy (v. 343), and forty ducats from Lord Tiercelès de le Bare (vv. 360-62), among a more general inventory of liberal gifts and hospitality.

\(^{67}\) As in his later *Dit dou florin*, which recounts the theft of the payment Froissart received from Gaston Phébus. See above in this chapter, n21.

\(^{68}\) In *Prison amoureuse*, a number of lyric poems may have been written by Wenceslas, while lyrics appended to Froissart's *Méliador* are explicitly attributed to him.
Suggesting that the repentant narrator is ungrateful for the generous material compensation given to him for his writing, Philozophie implies that these literal sums of money have their ethical weight just as much as the parabolic capital he received from God: to wit, if the poet's previous writing is sinful and to be left in the past, is the author not guilty for bilking his readers, giving them poetry which is not only valueless but potentially destructive to their own souls? Inserted into Froissart's literary testament, then, the financial relationship of poet and patron threatens to frustrate the narrator's desire for a quiet retirement during which he can concentrate on the betterment of his soul. If he is to fully assume his responsibility, Philozophie suggests, he cannot simply forget about those for whom he wrote, but must turn back to writing once again in order to compensate his readers. In this way, Mars and the Sun—emblematic of money—are not completely eclipsed by Jupiter, but also contained within the Jovian perspective. If Froissart is to make it up to God, he must also square his accounts with his human benefactors.

Froissart further underlines the need to reconcile the demands of his generous audience with the demands of religion when, at the beginning of his litany of patrons, his narrator refers to the late Philippa of Hainaut, Queen of England, as having "made and created him" ("Car elle me fist et crea," v. 237). This statement implicitly conflates the generous gifts of the patron and her crucial role in literary creation with the poetic abilities Froissart had received from the ultimate Creator, insisting on the problem of divided loyalties: to whom is the poet most immediately accountable for his talents, and how can he possibly do justice to both God and the reader? In a similar way to Machaut's Jugement poems, then, Buisson and the Bush poems in general are about the author's need to resolve the conflicting judgments of various patrons over time. The difference is that Froissart's newest patrons are God, the Church and the Virgin Mary, not the infamous Charles de Navarre. But like Machaut's JRN, Buisson does not suggest an easy answer.
to this conflict. Even when Froissart's narrator thinks he has achieved a more perfect perspective, having renounced his earlier work for a pious self-judgment, the voice of the readership continues to haunt him.

After having recited the long list of his patrons—a number of whom he notes as being deceased—the narrator is moved to reflect on the fleeting nature of human life ("Mes temps s'en fuit ensi qu'uns ombres," v. 376) and again asks Philozophie to leave him alone so that he can think about more important matters than poetry:

\begin{verbatim}
Si vous suppli, tres chiere dame, So I beg you, very dear lady,
Laissies moi dont penser pour l'ame. Just let me be to think upon my soul.
J'ai eu moult de vainne glore, I have had much vainglory.
S'est bien heure de che temps clore Now it is truly time to put an end to this age
Et de criier a Dieu merchi, and to ask the forgiveness of God,
Qui m'a amené jusqu'a chi. who was brought me thus far.
\end{verbatim}

(\textit{vv. 385-90})

In a sense, Philozophie's visitation of the narrator represents a reversal of the more traditional scenario of eschatological awareness (\textit{memento mori}), in that it does not interrupt the pursuit of vanity with thoughts of man's last end, but rather interrupts the narrator's attempts to think about his last end with the "accusation" on behalf of those for whom the narrator had written worldly poetry. But the effect of this reversal cannot simply be reduced to parody, because Philozophie's glib accusation also suggests that the responsibilities of readers must be taken into account.

Simply retiring from the world is too easy a solution, in that it neglects the extent to which the author's responsibility to other human beings is part of his responsibility to God. In a similar way to the unexpected entrance of Dame Bonneurte in Machaut's \textit{JRN}, the voice of Philozophie emerges to complicate the eschatological judgment by demanding that the audience be given its due. The nature of Froissart's testamentary project demands that the poet make it up to his fans
before he can attain the spiritual peace he desires. Thus, as in JRN, God reemerges unexpectedly as the tiers between author and reader, summoning him to trial just when he least expects it.

Little by little, the narrator begins to be won over by the entreaties of Philozophie, the imagined, collective voice of the readership. But since he is now an older man removed from the passions of youth and beginning his life as a priest, he fails to see what more he can possibly write and asks Philozophie, "Que porai-je de novel dire?" ("What new can I say?" v. 433). In order to protest that he is no longer the same person famous among the great courts of Europe for his exercise of "li mestiers gens" ("the noble profession," v. 160), the narrator proceeds to recite the titles of Froissart's most famous dits, as well as the lyric forms he had once excelled in:

Voirs est qu'un livret fis jadis
Qu'on dist l'Amoureuse Paradis
Et ossi celî del Orloge,
OU grant part del art d'Amours loge;
Apriés, l'Espinette amoureuse,
Qui n'est pas al oëyr ireuse;
Et puis l'Amoureuse Prison,
Qu'en plusieurs places bien prise on,
Rondiaux, balades, virelais,
Grant fuison de dis et de lais;
Mais j'estoie lors pour le temps
Toutes nouveletés sentans
Et avoie prest a le main
A toute heure, au soir et au main,
Matere pour ce dire et faire.
Or voi cangié mon afaire
En aultre ordenance nouvelle.
(vv. 443-60)

Now that he has remembered and celebrated his earlier patrons, it is only right that the narrator recall and honor the poems he wrote in exchange for their money, gifts and hospitality. Froissart's is a literary testament in the fullest sense: not only does it make public the private spiritual accounting of the moribund person, it also provides a thorough accounting of what the author has written. As in Guillaume's protest to Bonneurté in JRN, this work of re-collection is at
once a gesture of distancing and a gesture of recuperation which insists upon the value of past poems for their audiences.

Against his increasingly weak protests, Philozophie continues to encourage Froissart's narrator to look back on his earlier writing to find inspiration and continuity with the present:

```
Et adoncques me renouvelle Philozophie un haut penser And thus Philozophie brought back to me a sublime thought,
Et dist il te couvient penser and said, 'You must think
Au temps passe et a tes oeuvres about the time past and about your works—
Et voel que sus cesti tu oeuvres. this is what I want you to work on.'
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(vv. 460-64)

Philozophie's choice of words here recalls Bonneurté's accusation in Machaut's *JRN* ("Si resgardes dedens vos livres," *JRN* v. 869) as well as Saint Michael's pronouncement that Deguileville's pilgrim respond for his *ouvrages* (*PA*, v. 1121). Philozophie's words suggest that the work of literature (*oevres*, v. 463) is, among other things, an ethical act for which the author must account and that, in this accounting, the author's job is a continual process of rewriting (*tu oeuvres*, v. 464). Compared with Deguileville's cosmic adversaries, or even Machaut's Bonneurté, Philozophie's tone is more gentle chiding than severe reprimand, which reflects the generally favorable way in which Froissart tended to describe his reception by courtly readers.

Froissart is only writing again, he insists, in response to the protests of his audience; he is back by popular demand with another *dit*, the *Joli buisson* itself. In comparison with Deguileville or Machaut, the conceit of reader accusation becomes even more transparently a device for self-promotion, just as it continues to insist on the ethical ties that bind author and reader.

To spark his inspiration, Philozophie has the narrator take out of storage a portrait he had once had made of his "droite dame" (v. 485), the young lady of *Espinette*. The narrator retrieves the beautifully rendered image from the box in which he had kept it hidden for many years and, immediately upon seeing the young lady's face, he is taken back to vivid memories of the time
when he first wrote for her, over two decades earlier. Then, he is inspired to compose the first lyric piece inserted into *Buisson*, a *virelay* ("Vémechi ressuscité," vv. 563-91). As the narrator puts it, the spark was reignited in him (vv. 620-24), enrapturing him once again with young love and its poetry.

After she has convinced the narrator to look back on his *oeuvres*, Philozophie vanishes. Again, the narrator oscillates between his desire to return to the past and his desire to renounce that past. In fact, it is at this point that he makes a first, lengthy meditation on the Last Judgment, just as terrifyingly vivid as the imagined eschatological scene at the end of *Buisson*:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Text</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La n'i ara nullui couvert</td>
<td>There no one shall be covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De kamoukas ne de velus;</td>
<td>with fine silk or velour;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Et sains Mahieu droit la seront,</td>
<td>and Saint Matthew will be right there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qui leurs buisines sonneront</td>
<td>and will sound their trumpets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dont ressuscteront li mort.</td>
<td>which will cause the dead to rise up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vechi pour nous .I. grant remort,</td>
<td>Let this be for us a great warning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car cescuns rara sa char propre.</td>
<td>for each will have his own flesh again.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La n'ara pité nul opprobre</td>
<td>There will be no pity for sin,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ne signourie point d'arroi,</td>
<td>nor will rank have any meaning,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mes vera on le puissant Roi</td>
<td>but we will see the great Lord</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rendre sa crueuse sentense:</td>
<td>render his frightening sentence:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je tramble tous quant bien g'i pense.</td>
<td>I shake all over when I really think about it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(vv. 805-17)\(^69\)

It is unclear whether this is the voice of the fully mature narrator speaking from after his dream as he writes his testament or the voice of the still-hesitating narrator speaking before the dream.\(^70\)

In either case, however, the sudden interruption of the Judgment into an episode of nostalgia for youthful love serves to further accentuate the oscillation of renunciation and writing, between the judgment of the reader and the judgment of God. In this way, Froissart continues to build a mood

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\(^69\) This is an excerpt of the full passage, vv. 802-37.

\(^70\) Michel Zink (*Froissart et le temps*, 164-5) has pointed out the temporal ambiguity of this passage. See also Kay, "'Le Moment de Conclure,'" 164-5.
of eschatological expectation into his text, while combining the immanence of divine judgment with the imagined voice of a dissatisfied audience demanding its money's worth.

After his dialog with Philozophie, the narrator's internal conflict is further heightened as his dream begins and another of the poet's benefactors also returns to accuse the narrator of ingratitude. On a November night—November 30, 1373, to be exact—the middle-aged narrator describes a dismal winter scene which recalls the prologue to Machaut's *JRN*. On this particular November night, the Apocalypse seems less of an immediate possibility than in Machaut's poem, but the weather is gloomy and cold—not at all right for reminiscing about young love as he has been prompted to do by Philozophie—so Froissart's narrator tucks himself into bed nice and early. He is then visited by none other than Venus, the goddess whose service he had entered long ago when he judged in her favor in the hawthorn bush. Seeing Venus again, the narrator is moved to praise her for having given him "don moult riche" (v. 890); the goddess, then, is also designated as something of an important patron. But the narrator's sentiments of gratitude soon fade, and he proceeds to complain at length about the rejection and pain he experienced in the goddess's service and, now, the fact that he has aged ("Car mes jones tamps est passés," v. 919). Finally, he blurs out his long-suppressed anger at Venus and her ilk:71

\[
\begin{align*}
    \text{Siques je di que tout vo sort} & \quad \text{So that I say about all your kind,} \\
    \text{Ne me sont que confusions} & \quad \text{that they are nothing but trouble to me} \\
    \text{Et tres grandes abusions.} & \quad \text{and are very great delusions.} \\
    & \quad \text{(vv. 921-23)}
\end{align*}
\]

In response, Venus scolds the narrator for blaming her unfairly: "Grandement vers moi te mesfés / Quant tu me blasmes sans raison." (vv. 947-48). Like Philozophie, she then encourages him to look back on his past, with language that recalls Christian discourses of penitential introspection:

\[\text{---}
\]

71 This outburst might be compared to Deguileville's pilgrim's rejection of Venus in *PVH2* (vv. 8765-66). See Chapter 2, 150.
Like Philozophie, Venus complicates the narrator's initial repentance by suggesting that he is in error for rejecting love poetry out of hand, and that his accusations against her are both ungrateful and unfounded. In order to prove her point, Venus leads the narrator to the giant hawthorn bush of the poem's title, where he meets his double, Jonece. In the bush, the narrator replays his disastrous attempts to woo the young lady through poetry and, awakening from his dream some four thousand verses later, realizes that the return to spring was an illusion, as it is still late November, and he is still middle-aged. This sudden shock of mortality causes the narrator to reflect on his impending Judgment and, once again, to reject Venus and her poetry—seemingly for good this time. Thinking about his dream, the narrator even returns to his concern with economic motifs, by designating sin as a merciless creditor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pour ce me vodrai retrenchier</td>
<td>Thus I wish to renounce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Que d'acroire a un tel crenchier</td>
<td>borrowing from such a creditor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Que pechiés est, qui tout poet perdre:</td>
<td>as sin, who can make me lose everythi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Je ne m'i doi ne voel aherdre.</td>
<td>I should not, nor do I wish to attach myself to it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the Judgment hanging over his head, the narrator reconsiders his personal book of accounts, attempting to declare his worldly debts null and void so that he can repay his supreme creditor.

But as dramatic as it is, the Last Judgment that Froissart's narrator makes on his poetry is only one part of a much more complex internal struggle between the narrator's perceived duties to readers (and Venus) and his perceived duties to God. That it serves to close Buisson, and to end Froissart's career as a writer of dits, should not blind us to the fact that this Last Judgment also reveals Froissart's double ethical impulse, in which the author's debt to his audience is
acknowledged as much as his debt to God—or, indeed, as an inalienable part of his debt to God, which must somehow be squared with the imperative to stop writing about erotic love now that he has reached the Jovian age. Like his master Machaut, Froissart creates a mood of eschatological anxiety only to frustrate the expectation for a final, definitive judgment, even at the End. As I show in the next section, Froissart uses the closing lay of Buisson in order to reclaim earlier writing for the benefit of audiences, finally reconciling his duty to his well-paying readers—and his debt to Venus—with his duty to God.

V. Recollection and Redemption in Froissart's "Lay de Nostre Dame"

In Chapter 1, I considered how Marian poets called upon the lawyerly Virgin (advocata nostra) to represent human subjects in a new light, a trope Guillaume de Deguileville then transferred to the author's defense of his earlier poetry and his ability to rewrite himself at will. Froissart owed much to French Marian poetry. In particular, the souhetz composed by the personifications at the end of Buisson's dream vision are evocative of the confraternal tradition of devotional poetry made famous by the various puys of northern France. Froissart, in fact, competed successfully at the puys of Abbeville, Lille, Valenciennes and probably Tournai.⁷² Even before the sobering end of the narrator's dream, some of the souhetz already resemble the prayer-poems of the confraternal feasts, as their desire drifts away from earthly love and continuous springtime—the illusory universe of courtly poetry—and toward the Christian promise of eternal life. The personification Douls Samblant, for example, already makes

⁷² See Gros, Le poème du puy marial, 84-97. See also Cerquiglini-Toulet, La couleur de la mélancholie, 10-11. Freeman notes how the souhetz composed in the Buisson's dream-vision evoke the poetry of the confréries and wonders whether the promised crown of flowers in the souhetz episode might not suggest "a French jeux floraux opposed to Petrarch's laurel" ("A Farewell to Poetry?" 242).
reference to the Judgment as he composes his wish for ever-lasting youth, love and poetry, just before the entire group of personifications ask the narrator to present their souhetz to the Dieu d'Amours for judgment:

En cel estat, non pas 1. an entier,  
Mais jusqu'a dont que Diex pour nous jugier  
Vorra cha jus ses signes envoieer,  
Peuïssons nous ensi soalsciier  
En l'eage que nous ariens plus chier!  
(vv. 4921-25)

In this state, not one year only,  
But until that time when God, to judge us,  
will send his signs down into this world,  
may we thus rejoice  
in the age that we all hold dearest!

Even as he expresses the desire that young love become permanent, then, Douls Samblant acknowledges its impermanence, and his awareness of the immanent Judgment to be made on writing by the true God of Love.

In his turn to the devotional mode, Froissart also drew inspiration from Machaut, whose large corpus of lyrics to the Virgin had helped to define much of the preceding tradition of fixed-form poetry in French, and whose polyphonic Messe de Nostre Dame (< 1365) had changed the shape of the liturgy itself.  

In Buisson, Froissart appears to reference Machaut's poetry of courtly devotion at the very moment when he transforms his immature love lyrics into devotional verse, casting off the influence of Machaut's more profane writing: it is a certain "motet nouviel" from Reims (vv. 5075-76) that the Buisson's narrator remembers singing in the very last moments of his dream, on his way to present his poem to the judgment of the Dieu d'Amours, who begins as Cupid but becomes Christ after the narrator has awakened. Ending the dream, this allusion to the Marian motets of Guillaume de Machaut, canon at Reims, provides Froissart with a kind of symbolic transition point between human and divine judgment, and profane and religious expressions of love, in which he can situate his literal and figurative awakening to a

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higher authority on poetry.\textsuperscript{74} Thus, just as he had identified his earlier self with Machaut's topsyturvy judgments and his praise of Venus, so does Froissart's narrator identify his awakened, Jovian self with Machaut's more spiritually mature compositions. In this way, Froissart produces a stronger Machauldian homage than ever, by suggesting that Machaut's own ability to surpass earthly poetry for celestial subjects had inspired his own.

From his fellow confraternal poets and from Machaut, among other sources, Froissart took inspiration for his narrative of conversion, transforming the earthly object of poetic desire and love service into the Virgin. By requesting the Virgin's advocacy at the Judgment, like so many of his predecessors, Froissart was also signaling the traditional role of advocata nostra as a proponent of creative interpretation, whose ability to transform personal narratives and texts was closely tied to her capacity for obtaining mercy. As in Pierre le changeur or Deguileville's Pèlerinage de l'âme, the appeal of Froissart's narrator to the lawyerly Virgin stages the reinterpretation, and thus revalorization, of his own personal narrative, and by implication, Froissart's own text.

The "Lay de Nostre Dame," the closing eschatological meditation and Marian prayer of Buisson, serves to reevaluate and ultimately redeem Froissart's earlier poetry as part of a Christian narrative. In the "Lay de Nostre Dame," references to earlier moments in the Bush poems are made constantly. For example, while in both Espinette and the Buisson's dream vision the narrator suffers from the intense burning of erotic desire, the lay transforms this sensation into the torments of hell ("ardant painne," v. 5202) from which only the Virgin's intercessory

\textsuperscript{74} See Huot, "Reading Across Genres." Huot argues that the motet, "a hybrid genre juxtaposing erotic and devotional registers, has a dramatic effect on the denouement of Froissart's last dit amoureux" (2) and marks "the point at which erotic fantasies give way to penitential meditation" (9). On the motet from Reims, see also Lechat, 'Dire par fiction,' 321.
power can save the narrator; alternately, this burning also becomes the holy fire ("ce saint feu," v. 5191; "li feus plaisans," v. 5408) that Christ lights in the hearts of the faithful. Similarly, the narrator's questionable claim in _Espinette_ that erotic love is the root (_rachine_, v. 83) of goodness is fulfilled in the "Lay de Nostre Dame" as it becomes "la rachine jesse" (v. 5396), which is to say the Virgin as announced in Old Testament prophecy. The still-expanding _buisson_, too, undergoes one last metamorphosis; it is no longer the site of nostalgia for young love or even Ptolemy's cosmos, but now the "Buissons resplendissans" (v. 5402) that spoke to Moses, which the narrator cites as yet another Old Testament prefiguration of the Virgin (vv. 5374-77, vv. 5402-6).\(^{75}\)

The images of the root of Jesse and the burning bush are particularly good examples of a textual continuum between erotic and spiritual desire, rather than a rupture between them, because these images insist on the extent to which the bush of _Espinette_ figuratively grows into the _Buisson_ and ultimately into the burning bush of the lay. While Froissart gestures toward teleological ascent, he also reasserts the presence of the root which cannot be cut out without killing the mature being—the corpus and the Christian subject. Like Guillaume de Deguileville's textual _prouvain_ and its model, the _Roman de la Rose_, Froissart's original bush never dies off but only continues to expand. The original judgment of the hawthorn bush, the choice of Venus, is revalidated in the narrator's Last Judgment. Venus finally proves that she is not to blame after all, but rather an important step in the narrator's development, a teacher, just as Jonece had claimed her to be in his description of the ages of man. Likewise, the young lady's ambiguous judgment

\(^{75}\) Guillaume de Deguileville (_PVH1_, v. 11025) cites the burning bush as a prefiguration of Mary. On this motif, see Mâle, _L'art religieux du XIIIe siècle en France_, 148; Huot, _Song to Book_, 321. Kelly ("Imitation, Metamorphosis," 113) uses the example of the burning bush to highlight the emphasis on metamorphosis and the poet's transformative powers in _Buisson_. Bennett ("The Mirage of Fiction," 288) notes that the bush of _Espinette_ has grown to cosmic proportions, as does Kay ("'Le Moment de Conclure,' " 163).
near the end of the dream, that loyal service is always rewarded in the end, comes to fruition: the end transforms and authorizes what has come before it and justifies the poet-lover's tribulation, which has not in the last accounting come to nothing. Not only has the narrator not wasted his youth, damned himself, or squandered his master's capital, but he will be rewarded, because his desire to serve God was there all along.

In Christian understanding, the Last Judgment is not only a time for the revelation of individual moral worth, but also for finally unveiling the full significance of Scripture to all mankind. For Froissart's narrator, the imagined Last Judgment is likewise as much a spiritual fulfillment of the author's earlier poetry as a pronouncement of the poet's guilt or innocence. Or rather, Froissart makes the symbolic Judgment on his previous poetry an unveiling of its true meaning in order precisely to defend himself for writing it. As Alice Planche has noted, the ultimate model for the work that the "Lay de Nostre Dame" performs on Froissart's earlier, profane poetry is that of scriptural allegoresis, which reinterprets the narrator's earthly desire as the beginning of his ascent toward higher things, and as a foretelling of his new calling:

À en croire la fin, les brûlures de l'amour et l'image de la Dame sont répudiées et exorcisés. Pourtant elles apparaissent au lecteur comme d'obscures annonces, comme des essais et des promesses: un avant, et un Avent […] On accepte mal que les aspects sensuels en soient récusés, sans cicatrice et sans nostalgie, dans un mouvement manichéiste […]  

As Planche's description suggests vividly, Froissart draws close parallels between his own work and Scripture. Throughout the "Lay de Nostre Dame," the narrator insists upon the way Old Testament prophecy announces the Virgin and the birth of Christ:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anchiennement</th>
<th>Long ago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Par mainte gent</td>
<td>by many people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Et justement</td>
<td>and justly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selon l'Anchiien Testament,</td>
<td>according to the Old Testament,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

76 “Buisson Ardent,” 411.
The narrator conflates his youthful poetry of profane love with the prophecy of the Old Testament and with its typological events, now fulfilled in Froissart's new "testament," the symbolic last accounting of Buisson. Cleverly, Froissart suggests that the poetry he had written while in Venus's service also contains higher truth which should not be left out of his corpus, since it had prepared him for Christian devotion, and since it prefigures that devotion for readers of Froissart's complete works.

In this sense, the lay also appears to fulfill Philozophie's earlier affirmation in Buisson, that the narrator might himself be a participant in the same spiritual work as the Evangelists and Doctors, even through his worldly poetry. As Philozophie had put it in her "accusation," he can "Loer dieu et servir le monde" (v. 188) all at the same time. Through its insistence on allegorical reading and creative reinterpretation, Froissart's "Lay de Nostre Dame" not only defends Froissart's earlier poetry but insists upon its importance for readers. By reevaluating the texts into which they have invested time and money as worthy of Christian contemplation, Buisson's Last Judgment asserts that readers may turn back to the author's earlier work without being

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77 Planche ("Buisson Ardent," 397) notes Froissart's own self-comparison to the doctors of the Church.
scandalized or feeling cheated. Froissart thus calls symbolically on *advocata nostra* as the emblem of this large-scale act of textual reinterpretation.

By instructing his audience on just how to read his work, Froissart the priest also makes the ethics of reading part of his evangelical message. Curiously, in the "Lay de Nostre Dame," the narrator directly addresses the "Jewish law" (and later simply "Jew" [Juïs, v. 5380]) in the second person singular; it is this hearer whom he exhorts to repent before it is too late:

Par virtu noble et divine,  
Lois juïse, or adevine  
Comment et par quel doctrine  
Chils qui le monde enlumine,  
Couchiés ou monument digne,  
Ressuscita dou tombiel.  
(by v. 5301-7)

Given his repeated insistence on the allegorical sense of Scripture and, by extension, of his own past poetry, it is my belief that Froissart's addressee should likewise not be understood only in the literal or historical sense, as the Israelites and their descendants. Instead, the apostrophe to the Jewish law may be taken in the typological sense in which it represents a pharisaical adherence to the strict letter of the text. In my earlier discussion of the Devil's Rights tradition and Deguileville's *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, I suggested how this sort of literalism, characterized as both Hebraic and Satanic in representations of eschatological judgment, could also be used to suggest certain bad readers of poetic texts, those unable to correctly interpret allegory or to accept the human subject's ability to rewrite himself. Sternly addressing the same sort of undesirable reader by placing that reader before the seat of Judgment, Froissart's narrator

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78 This sense, whereby "Jewish law" signifies simply "the Jews," has been the traditional reading of this passage, beginning with Auguste Scheler: "Lois juïse (vocatif) doit se traduire par: 'peuple qui vis sous la loi judaïque.' " (ed., *Œuvres de Guillaume de Machaut*, vol. II, n157). The sentiment is echoed by Fourrier in his edition of *Buisson* (264 n) and by Marylène Possamai-Perez in her modern French translation (122 n184).
suggests that the ethics of literature are reciprocal—that while the author has a duty not to mislead or swindle his audience, his audience must be careful not to misjudge his good intentions. Accordingly, the two halves of Froissart's poetic personality should be read together as complements, just as the Old and New testaments complement each other in Christian teaching:

\begin{align*}
\text{Dont, entroes} & \quad \text{So while} \\
\text{Que bien tu te poes} & \quad \text{you still can} \\
\text{Et as loisir dou retourner,} & \quad \text{and have time to turn back,} \\
\text{Si t'esmoes} & \quad \text{rouse yourself} \\
\text{Et ton coer promoes} & \quad \text{and press your heart} \\
\text{Au justement considerer} & \quad \text{to consider carefully} \\
\text{Quel conquoes} & \quad \text{all the ways that} \\
\text{Li Viels ou li Noes} & \quad \text{the Old and the New} \\
\text{Testamens te puet pourfiter.} & \quad \text{Testaments can profit you.}
\end{align*}

(vv. 5354-62)

Taken as an exegetical model to be applied to Froissart's own erotic poetry, the insistence on the essential complementarity of the historical and figurative senses of Scripture demands that the palinode be read, like the advent of the New Law, as both transformation and fulfillment. In this gesture, however, the historical existence of past events is also upheld. Just as it is necessary for Moses' encounter with the burning bush to be both a literal occurrence and a prefiguration of Mary, so too is it necessary for Froissart's misguided past to have really existed, and to be preserved in the record of the corpus, in order for the allegorical sense to be fulfilled.\textsuperscript{79}

At least, such is the judgment that the narrator seeks in his request that Mary, his ultimate reader and patron, defend him—in the heavenly court on the Last Day, and in the court of reader

\textsuperscript{79} In Erich Auerbach's understanding of the terms, Froissart's scriptural poetics would be less allegorical as such and closer to Auerbach's conception of \textit{figura}, which he considers the dominant exegetical mode of the Middle Ages: something real and historical which announces something else real and historical and whose reality does not diminish when the thing it announces comes to fruition. (Auerbach, "Figura," in \textit{Scenes from the Drama of European Literature}, 11-76. See also Gellrich, "Figura, Allegory, and the Question of History;" Minnis, \textit{Medieval Theory of Authorship}, 88.)
opinion. As in so much Marian poetry, Froissart's Virgin is indicative of the coming of the New Law, and of its ability to both rewrite and fulfill the old:

\begin{tabular}{ll}
Sains Jehans au doi & What does Saint John \hspace{2cm} point to for our instruction? \\
Nous enseigne quoi? & That your Son, who wished to die for us, \hspace{2cm} confirmed by his death \\
Ton Fil, qui pour nous volt morir, & our New Law \\
No Nouvelle Loi & when he agreed to become man. \\
Confrema par soi, & \hspace{2cm} \hspace{2cm} \hspace{2cm} \\
Quant homes mortels volt devenir. & \hspace{2cm} \hspace{2cm} \hspace{2cm} \\
\end{tabular}

(\textit{vv. 5224-29})

Implicitly arguing for a more creative reading of Froissart's own earlier poetry, the closing palinode of \textit{Buisson} is more optimistic than it initially seems in regard to the possibility that language will serve in the poet's defense. In \textit{Buisson's Judgment} scene, the poem's central question, which the narrator asks Philozophie before his dream—"Que porai-je de nouvel dire?" (v. 433)—is transformed into the troubling question of the "Lay de Nostre Dame," which Froissart had borrowed from the \textit{Dies irae} hymn: "Que diras?" (v. 5333). But the poet's greatest hope, that something new really can be said, is fulfilled precisely as he completes a rewriting of his past.

In regard to the judgment of the reader, Froissart's rewriting is not only a response to the new imperative to impart spiritual truth, but also to the audience's demand for enjoyment, or the readers' desire to get their money's worth, as expressed before the narrator's dream vision by the knavish Dame Philozophie.\footnote{As Schira Schwam-Baird puts it, "[...] despite the conversion to Our Lady, the fact is that the poet has just recreated 'the carefree days of youth' (except that they are not truly carefree because love is often unprosperous and painful). Whether or not Froissart the cleric will ever court a lady again, [...] Froissart the narrator has spent a considerable amount of dream-time in 'Youth's pretty bush,' which serves as a source of literary pleasure, both for writer and reader" ("Sweet Dreams," 56).}

Froissart's \textit{Last Judgment} on himself authorizes our appreciation of the play of meanings in his writing, the contradictory desires of the subject over the course of time. A good Christian reader might well take a lesson from the narrator's professed renunciation
of inordinate sexual desire; but as a reader one is also invited by the same palinodic gesture to begin all over again, to return like Froissart's narrator to earlier poetry and to the pangs and thrills of young love, to enjoy the intimately human spectacle of an individual struggling with conflicting judgments over time, and the dramatic evolution of a great artist in the course of his career.

In Froissart's double gesture of renunciation and recollection, it is possible to recognize not only the influence of Machaut and French devotional poets, but also that of Petrarch (1304-74), whose name has often appeared in critical speculation about Froissart's literary acquaintances and influences. The Italian poet, who was Machaut's close contemporary, may have provided Froissart with a model for his erotic pseudo-autobiography, for his oscillation between sacred and profane desire, for his lyric-narrative mix, and, indeed, for his juxtaposition of judgments. Petrarch's *Rime sparse*, among other of his works, makes liberal use of conflicting judgments as a means of representing the internal contradictions of the self, divided between love poetry and its renunciation. As a collection of poems which, in its own way, combines lyric poetry with a narrative frame, *Rime sparse* uses its own architecture to describe an authorial subject who is unified despite—or because of—his many contradicting judgments and his oscillations between poetry and piety. Like Froissart's *Buisson, Rime sparse* ends with a rejection of worldly desire and a request for the Virgin to advocate on the narrator's behalf at the Judgment. And like the final meditation of *Buisson*, the ending judgment of *Rime sparse*

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81 I cite the edition of *Rime sparse* by Ponte. The most obvious of Petrarch's other works to perform the divided self is his *Secretum*, which is a debate between the author's pseudo-autobiographical narrator Francesco and Saint Augustine (see the edition by Dotti).

suggests both the renunciation of previous love poetry and its recollection, a recollection which is borne of the impulse to remember the reader.

*Rime sparse* may well have provided Froissart with a model for his own use of judicial and eschatological motifs to signal the author's relationship to readers, especially women. In the section that follows, I do not make anything like an exhaustive treatment of the judgments of *Rime sparse*. Instead, I limit myself to highlighting the most salient points of Petrarch's text as they may have been read by Froissart and imitated in the judgments of *Buisson*. Before concluding this chapter, my consideration of *Rime sparse* reveals another potential layer of Froissart's rich intertextual borrowing, and helps to illuminate his use of the imagined eschatological scene as a gesture directed toward both God and the (female) reader.

**VI. The Lady's Judgment: Froissart and Petrarch**

Froissart had at least two good chances to meet Petrarch, in Avignon in 1360 or in Milan in 1368, around the time the Italian poet and humanist would have completed his four decades of work on *Rime sparse*. Resemblances between *Buisson* and Petrarch's songbook have occasionally been suggested by critics, and, while there is no way of knowing for certain if Froissart had met or read the Italian, the correspondences between the *Bush* poems and *Rime sparse* are substantial enough in my view to warrant a more extended comparison than has yet

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83 It should also be noted here that the characteristics I ascribe to *Rime sparse* are not entirely unique to Petrarch, who draws especially on Guido Guinizelli's tradition of poetic collection and vacillation between different kinds of love, including Guido's ending with "pace spero" two lines before the end of his own *Rime* (ed. Rossi, 26:32).

84 Huot (*Song to Book*, 309; "The Daisy and the Laurel," 245) has argued that Froissart probably at least knew of Petrarch's *Rime sparse* from his visit to Avignon in 1360. In his edition of Froissart's *Prison amoureuse* (xiii), De Looze suggests that Froissart and Petrarch likely crossed paths in 1368, when both were in Milan.
been undertaken. For example, both poets structure their narratives around schemata of the ages of man—Petrarch's seems to have been drawn from Censorinus, while the astrological lecture of Froissart's Jonece is that of a lightly Christianized Ptolemy. Both poets make substantial use of images of burning desire and play upon the ambiguities between fire as passion and fire as punishment. In the Bush poems, Froissart's affinity for emblems from the plant kingdom is also remarkably close to that of Petrarch. In Espinette, the narrator discusses the Daphne and Apollo myth at length, before wishing for his beloved young lady to be transmuted into a laurel tree (vv. 1780-95)—like Daphne, but also, of course, like Petrarch's Laura. In Buisson, the marvelous bush takes on a similar role to the Petrarchan laurel, as it becomes the evergreen site of memory where desire is preserved against the ravages of time and where new poetry is always possible. Like Froissart's narrator when he is led back to the bush, Petrarch's narrator marvels that his laurel has grown to perplexing dimensions:

Solo d'un lauro tal selva verdeggia
che 'l mio adversario con mirabil arte
vago fra i rami ovunque vuol m'adduce.
(107, vv. 12-14)

From just one laurel is made green this forest where my adversary, with marvellous art, goes among the branches leading me where he will.

Most especially, like Froissart's narrator, Petrarch's implied speaker oscillates significantly between love poetry and its renunciation throughout the course of his self-presentation, until finally a choice is made to turn his poetry to Marian praise, in view of the

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85 Huot (Song to Book, 310) notes some resemblances with Rime sparse. On more general similarities between the two poets, see Huot, "The Daisy and the Laurel," 240-1, 244; Burrow, Ages of Man, 180.
86 On Petrarch's use of Censorinus, see Germaine Warkentin's introduction to Cook's translation of Rime sparse, 9-10).
87 On Froissart's laurel, see Huot, "The Daisy and the Laurel." On Petrarch's, see Sturm-Maddox, Petrarch's Laurels; Sturm-Maddox, "Petrarch's Laurel and Jove."
impending Judgment. Just as Buisson begins on a note of testamentary reflection, the moment of conversion at Rime sparse's end is reflected in the sober, retrospective point of view of the very first poem in the collection:

Voi ch'ascoltate in rime sparse il suono
di quei sospiri ond'io nudriva 'l core
in sul mio primo giovenile errore
quand'era in parte altr'uoma da quell ch'i' sono
(1, vv. 1-4)

You who listen to the sound, in scattered rhymes,
of those sighs with which I fed my heart
in my first youthful error,
when I was, in part, a different man than I am now.

And like Froissart's narrator, Petrarch repeatedly declares his desire to repent of love well before his ecstatic turn to the Virgin in the last poem of Rime sparse. Poem 62, for example, reads as a prayer of contrition for having wasted time with earthly desire:

Padre del ciel, dopo i perduti giorni,
dopo le notti vaneggiando spese,
con quell fero desio ch'al cor s'accese,
mirando gli atti per mio mal sì adorni,
piacciati omai col Tuo lume ch'io torni
ad altra vita et a piú belle imprese,
sí ch'avendo le reti indarno tese,
il mio duro adversario se ne scorni.
(62, vv. 1-8)

Father in Heaven, after the lost days,
after the nights spent in delirium,
with that rude desire that enflamed my heart,
gazing on limbs adorned to do me harm,
may it please You that in Your light I turn
to another life and to more beautiful undertakings,
so that having set his nets in vain,
my cruel Adversary be confounded.

Like Froissart's poetic persona, Petrarch's implied narrator frequently expresses his awareness of death and judgment, which compels him to turn away from earthly desire; he laments that "la
morte s'appressa, e'l viver fugge" ("death presses on and life runs away," 79, v. 14), and he confesses that "already the Last Day thunders" in his heart ("et già l'ultimo dí nel cor mi tuona," 101, v. 6).

Yet, despite his eschatological awareness, the implied narrator of Rime sparse returns time and again to erotic yearning with every passing year, just as Froissart's narrator will in the middle-aged dream vision of Buisson. As the catalyst of the Canzoniere's meta-narrative, the narrator's impulse to recollection may be considered ethical, since Petrarch is driven by the memory of his departed Laura, his most important reader, to remember and to honor the past. As he oscillates between writing and renunciation, Petrarch's subject begs to know how the disparate fragments of his life—of his text—should properly be arranged, just as the author constantly rearranged the poems of his song book over forty years of work:88

In quella parte dove Amor mi sprona conven ch'io volga le dogliose rime, che son seguaci de la mente afflicta, quai fi en ultime, lasso, et qua' fi en prime?
(127, vv. 1-4)

Toward this place where Love spurs me, I must direct my mournful rhymes, the followers of a tormented mind. But which ones are last, alas, and which first?

Like Froissart's Buisson, the Canzoniere represents a textual self whose existence is torn between the competing judgments of love and piety, between the desire to use poetry to honor and please the reader—the departed Laura and earthly audiences—and the desire to use poetry to honor and please God and Mary. The conflictual nature of the subject's desire is reflected in the structure of the text itself, which betrays an unresolved ambiguity about whether the subject is moving

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88 This process is the painstaking subject of Marco Santagata's wonderful I frammenti dell'anima: storia e racconto nel Canzoniere di Petrarca.
toward divine transcendence, or back toward the demands of literature and earthly love.

Similarly, in Buisson, Venus returns when the narrator has already repented of her service, complicating Jonece's version of a straightforward narrative movement toward the Jovian age. Philozophie, for her part, torments Froissart's narrator by demanding that he return to writing when the time for love poetry is supposed to be over, throwing the "ordenance nouvelle" of his career and his corpus into disarray.

Near the end of Petrarch's book, a judgment to resolve the divided self is sought in the celebrated canzone 360. The canzone is itself something of a retrial of Petrarch's earlier Secretum, in which the poet's pseudo-autobiographical narrator Francesco dialogues with Saint Augustine concerning earthly desire, and in which Augustine implores Francesco to flee the appetites of the flesh by thinking constantly about his inevitable death.\footnote{See, again, the edition by Dotti.} In the judgment scene of Rime sparse 360, Petrarch's narrator "represents" himself (360, v. 6) before the court of a certain queen "che la parte divina / tien de nostra natura e 'n cima sede." (vv. 3-4, "who directs the divine part of our nature and sits at its summit."). Speaking to this imperious lady, identifiable as Lady Reason, the narrator accuses his "dolce empio signore" (v. 1, "sweet impious lord") of having corrupted him in his youth by filling him with carnal desire and making him write love poetry. This "signore," subsequently identified by the narrator as "il mio adversario" (v. 76), might well be the God of Love, or, recalling the Devil's traditional role as a prosecutor, the adversary Satan. While Petrarch encourages this multiplicity of readings, it seems clear that the Adversary is also a different version of the narrator in time, the past self who loved and who
wrote love poetry, and whose divergent existence must be dealt with through the judgment of Lady Reason.⁹⁰

The Adversary, the canzone's narrator charges, caused him much pain and suffering and led him away from God (vv. 9-75). Answering this charge, the Adversary counters that not only did the narrator come willingly into his service, where he was then rewarded with fame and given an achingly beautiful woman to love, but, far from leading him down the primrose path, earthly desire contributed to the perfection of his soul:

Anchor, et questo è quell che tutto avanza,
da volar sopra 'l ciel li avea dat' ali,
per le cose mortali,
che son scala al fattor, chi ben l'estima:
ché, mirando ei ben fiso quante et quali eran vertuti in quella sua speranza,
d'una in altra sembianza
potea levarsi a l'alta cagion prima;
et ei l'à ditto alcuna volta in rima.
Or m'à posto in oblio con quella donna
ch'i' li die' per colonna
de la sua frale vita. […]
(360, vv. 136-47)

What's more, and this goes beyond all,
I had given him wings to fly to heaven,
through mortal things,
which are steps to the creator, for he who knows:
that, looking upon the number and quality of virtues in that lady, his hope,
from one to the other image
he might raise himself to the first cause;
and he often said as much in his verse.
Yet now he has cast me into oblivion
with that lady whom I gave him for a column
to support his frail little life.

⁹⁰ Schildgen ("Overcoming Augustinian Dichotomies," 153) identifies the Adversary as "another voice of the poet." According to the Adversary (360, v. 80-81), the narrator sold words ("vender parolette," v. 81) in his youth, much like Augustine.
Basing his argument on teleological ascent back to the first cause ("l'alta cagion prima"), the Adversary claims that it would have been impossible for the narrator to reach the very point of renunciation at which he now finds himself if it were not for the preparation he received through the apprenticeship of earthly love. Accordingly, consigning the Adversary to oblio (v. 145) would be most unjust, since he is to thank for having given the narrator wings (v. 137)—or steps (v. 139)—with which to contemplate the mysteries of the divine and ultimately transcend earthly desire.

In much the same way, Froissart suggests in both Espinette and Buisson that carnal desire may provide a vehicle of ascent toward higher things, and that it may be valued for its instrumentality even as it is surpassed. In Espinette, for example, the narrator designates erotic love as the "root" (rachine) from which good conduct grows:

Mieuls ne poet emploier le temps  A man cannot spend his time any better,  Homs, ce m'est vis, qu'au bien amer;    it seems to me, than in loving well.  Car qui voelt son coer entamer For whoever seeks to engage his heart  En bon mours et en nobles teches, in good manners and noble deeds  En tous membres de gentilleches, and all the points of refined behavior,  Amours est la droite rachine love is the proper root  Et coers loyaus qui l'enrachine and the loyal heart in which it is planted  En soi et point ne s'outrequide, and doesn't presume to overreach,  Ne poet avoir l'entente wide cannot lack what it desires  Qu'il ne soit gais et amoureuse or be unhappy or unloving  Et as biens faire virtueus; or slow to good deeds.  (vv. 78-88)

In Buisson, the narrator blames Venus for having led him astray in his youth, much as Petrarch's speaker blames the Adversary; and like the Adversary, Venus protests that, on the contrary, she had been a beneficial influence on the narrator's life, for which he has been most ungrateful (vv. 925-57), just as Philozophie accuses him of being ungrateful toward his patrons.

In order to prove that she is not to blame, Venus demands that Froissart's narrator perform a penetrating act of introspection, which leads him back in time to the bush. The
judgment which takes place there in the bush, just before the end of the narrator's dream, might be read as an unsuccessful attempt to resolve the issue of the poet's duties once and for all, much like Petrarch's *canzone* 360. In Froissart's poem, the question is whether the narrator's service to the young lady, hardly distinguishable from his service to Venus, has been in vain, or whether it will reap a reward of mercy in the end ("en le fin," v. 4560). In that this desired end is eventually transformed into a prayer for salvation at the Judgment, the question is implicitly whether the narrator's service to Venus will be rewarded or punished by God. But as yet in the dream, the young lady's ambiguous judgment (vv. 4556-60) fails to provide any closure.

In Petrarch's case, the preliminary judgment is equally inconclusive. Having heard both sides, Lady Reason, who controls the godly part of human cognition ("che la parte divina / tien de nostra natura," vv. 3-4) frustrates expectations for a divinely inspired judgment. Smiling, she claims that she needs more time to decide, but she also seems to delay her conclusion simply because it is entertaining to keep the two competing impulses of the self in tension. Coyly, the lady admits as much:

Elle allor sorridendo:
'—Piacemi aver vostre questioni udite,
ma piú tempo bisogna a tanta lite.—'
(360, vv. 155-7)

She said then, smiling:
It pleases me to have heard your arguments,
but more time is necessary in such a case.

The unresolved dispute of *canzone* 360 might be taken for something of a model of Petrarch's poetic corpus as a whole, in which divergent desires are brought together in dialog to suggest a complex but nevertheless coherent authorial voice, whose inner divergences are necessary for understanding—and enjoying—the complete work, and which cannot therefore be reduced by privileging one aspect of the voice over another. The sexy and indecisive sovereignty which
Lady Reason exerts over the narrator's dispute with the Adversary adds another important woman to Petrarch's host of imagined readers, alongside or in place of Laura. Like Laura, Reason makes it impossible for the poet to forget the past, although her ethical command to remember is less grave and more playful. In her playfulness, she bears a closer resemblance to Froissart's female readers than does Laura.

Crowning Petrarch's group of readers and judges is another woman, the Virgin whose advocacy the poet requests at the end of the *Rime sparse*. After the inconclusive ruling of *canzone* 360, it might seem that the internal conflict of Petrarch's narrator is at long last resolved in poem 366 ("Vergine bella"), the last of the book, in which earthly love is cast off for higher devotion and higher judgment. Lady Reason, a typically indecisive courtly judge and an imperfect delegate of divine authority, cedes, with the memory of Laura, to the Queen of Heaven, who delivered the triumphant light of justice ("di giustitia il sol," 366, v. 44) into the world. The narrator turns his poetic talents toward the service of this new Lady:

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Che se poca mortal terra caduca
amar con sí mirabil fede soglio,
che devrò far di te, cosa gentile?
Se dal mio stato assai misero et vile
per le tue man resurgo,
Vergine, i' sacro et purgo
al tuo nome et penseri e 'ngengno et stile,
la lingua e 'l cor, le lagrime e i sospiri.
Scorgimi al miglior guado,
et prendi in grado i cangiati desiri.
(366, vv. 121-30)
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For if I used to love a bit of mortal, fleeting earth with such great faith, what should I not do for you, oh noble thing? If from my miserable and vile state I rise up through your hands, Virgin, I consecrate and purify in your name my thoughts, my genius, my style, my tongue and heart, my tears and sighs.
Lead me to the better passage,
and accept willingly my converted desires.

It is Mary, finally, who will intercede for the narrator in order that the only perfect judgment
might exonerate him and, by implication, condemn his Adversary:

Il dì s'appressa, et non pote esser lunge,
si corre il tempo et vola,
Vergine unica et sola,
e'l cor or conscïentia or morte punge.
Raccomandami al tuo figliuol, verace
homo et verace Dio,
ch'accolega 'l mio spirto ultimo in pace.
(366, vv. 131-37)

The Day presses closer, it can't be long,
time so runs and flies away,
Virgin, one and only,
conscience and death sting my heart.
Recommend me to your son,
true man and true God,
that he might receive my last breath in peace.

But even this palinodic judgment, made with the narrator's "last breath," does not provide
closure; nor does it bring peace (*pace*) to the divided subject, as he prays it will. As Patricia
Berrahou Phillippy has argued, Petrarch's closing gesture in *Rime sparse* is a palinode in the full,
classical sense; like the tradition established by Stesichorus and by Plato in his *Phaedrus*,
Petrarch's palinode is both an un-singing and a re-singing. The end of *Rime sparse* both
condemns one earlier period of writing and through that very condemnation, also affirms it by
calling it back to mind. As Phillippy puts it, Petrarch's closing poem refuses to pronounce a "last

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91 *Love's Remedies: Recantation and Renaissance Lyric Poetry*. Neither Petrarch nor Froissart
would not have known Plato's *Phaedrus*. 
word" and multiplies the "oscillation between repetition and recantation" of the poetic subject.

Specifically, in that it recalls the love of Laura in order to proclaim the narrator's "converted desires" ("i cangiati desiri," v. 130), the final gesture also acknowledges the importance of earthly desire as part of an ascent toward heavenly love, just as the Adversary had claimed in the trial of canzone 360. Laura, and smiling Reason, do not simply give way to the Virgin in the last poems of Rime sparse, but are instead recalled as other aspects of the Virgin, who is multiple in her being, just as the poet himself must be. Thus, as Phillippy writes, Petrarch's "final poem provides two options—stepping beyond the poem toward the promise of eternal life, or back to the first sonnet to begin again in an eternal repetition." In its Last Judgment, the divergent impulses of Petrarch's corpus are symbolically reunified in that, in the very move toward transcendence, the reader is invited to begin again by reopening the text at the first page and reading back through the poems addressed to the memory of Laura. As a book, Rime sparse is at once a self-consuming artifact which becomes obsolete once the reader has

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92 Love's Remedies, 25. In her discussion of the "last word," Phillippy is drawing on Bakhtin, from "Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity," in Art and Answerability, 4-256. 143. In this essay, Bakhtin outlines his idea of the literary mode of "confessional self-accounting," in which there can be no last word, no final verdict on the self because there is a necessary dialog between the self and the other (God) which keeps the process always open: "My own word about myself is in principle incapable of being the last word, the word that consummates me. For me myself, my own word is an act that I perform, and my performed act is alive only in the unitary and unique event of being. Hence, no act performed by me is capable of consummating my own life, for it connects my life with the open infinitude of the event of being. Confessional self-accounting does not isolate itself from this unitary event of being; hence, it is potentially infinite" (143).

93 Love's Remedies, 63. A major difference with my own approach is that Phillippy considers Petrarch's internal conflict a conflict between ethical duty and an aesthetic impulse, whereas I have argued that both Petrarch and Froissart must reconcile two competing ethical imperatives—the need to remember and honor the reader and the need to remember and honor God.

94 See Phillippy, Ibid., 62, 80.

95 Ibid., 81.
traced the path of ascent and reached its final verse, and an endless cycle of desire and renunciation that demands to be repeated—and reinterpreted—when one has gotten to the end.

As I have already suggested, this sort of palinodic structure is also the essence of Froissart's meditation on the Last Judgment. In much the same sense as Petrarch's closing prayer-poem, Froissart's palinodic self-judgment at the end of Buisson is double, both condemning and endorsing the worldly poetry that comes before it. Much like Petrarch's "Vergine Bella," Froissart's Virgin recalls the earthly woman as much as she replaces her. Read from the standpoint of the closing lay, most of the inset lyrics in Buisson can be retroactively construed to address both the young lady and Mary, whose double identity is further borne out by the narrator's ambiguous mention throughout Buisson of his "right lady"—his "droite dame" (e.g. v. 1180) or "droite amour" (v. 2310). Thus, as for Petrarch, Froissart's request for the Virgin's advocacy is emblematic of the author's simultaneous rejection and defense of earlier writing. As Phillippy has argued for the Petrarchan palinode, the ending "opens up the text to interpretation of the reader who acts as judge between disputing claims." Like Petrarch's purposefully indecisive Lady Reason or Froissart's ambivalent young lady, the reader is imagined as the arbiter who avoids pronouncing a definitive sentence, preferring instead to enjoy the endless play of competing desires.

In this creative mode of interpretive judgment, even Jupiter—Froissart's astrological emblem of certainty in judgment—is subject to more than one meaning. For Petrarch, Jupiter, or Jove, is the figure who best represents the poet-lover as he changes over time, as the Italian...

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96 On the similar ambiguity of addressee in Petrarch, see Phillippy, Love's Remedies, 81.
97 For Phillippy, the emblem of the Petrarchan palinode is woman, since femininity is associated "with the doubleness of the ode-palinode structure itself" (Ibid., 15), beginning with Stesichorus's palinode to Helen. See also Ibid., 18, 33, 77, where Phillippy uses the term "feminist dialogics" to describe this kind of palinode.
98 Ibid., 63.
author frequently compares Jupiter's transformations in Ovid's *Metamorphoses* with the metamorphoses that he himself undergoes in love.\(^9^9\) If Froissart was drawing on Petrarch, it should not be surprising that Froissart's age of Jupiter represents not only a subject defined by his awareness of the immanent judgment of the Christian God, but also by his resemblance to the same Jove who transforms himself throughout Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and Petrarch's *Rime sparse* in order to fulfill his erotic desire.\(^1^0^0\) Even in the *Ovide moralisé*, which Froissart knew well, Jupiter is not only allegorized as the Christian God, but also left intact as the lascivious pagan deity who is always changing his shape in order to effect sexual conquest. In a similar way, the narrator's own belonging to the age of Jupiter can and should be read as double—for it includes both a continued attachment to sexual desire and a higher judgment which transforms that desire, retroactively, into a prefiguration. The past (both pre-Christian and pre-conversion) stays where it is, as allegorical prefiguration and real presence.\(^1^0^1\)

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\(^9^9\) Phillippy argues that Petrarch's palinode rewrites the conversion scenario of Augustine's *Confessions*, in which the subject makes a definitive break with a sinful past of erotic desire. Instead of such a singular, Augustinian turning point, as Phillippy puts it, Petrarch privileges a model of "Ovidian conversion" which charts the subject's existence through a potentially endless series of metamorphoses (*Love's Remedies*, 62, 72). On Petrarch's use of Jupiter, see also Sturm-Maddox, "Petrarch's Laurel and Jove," 259-61.

\(^1^0^0\) Froissart's Ovidian poetics have been much discussed, including Froissart's tendency to radically rewrite Ovid, or to simply invent pseudo-Ovidian material, and his tendency, like Petrarch, to use Ovid's metamorphoses as a means of figuring his own transformations as an author and a poetic subject. On these points, see Kelly, "Les inventions ovidiennes de Froissart;" Kelly, "Imitation, Metamorphosis;" Kelly, *Medieval Imagination*, 156-69; Graham, "Froissart's Use of Classical Allusion in His Poems;" Picherit, "Le rôle des éléments mythologiques;" Huot, *Song to Book*, 319-322; Brownlee, "Ovide et le moi poétique;" Ribémond, "Froissart, le mythe et la marguerite;" Ribémond, "Froissart et le mythe de Daphné;" Kay, "Mémoire et imagination;" Geri L. Smith, "Froissart's Téléphe;" Lechat, *Dire par fiction*, 262-64, 340-43; Bennett, "The Mirage of Fiction," 296.

\(^1^0^1\) See, again, Auerbach, "Figura" and above, n79.
VII. Post-Apocalyptic Froissart: After Buisson

Froissart's scene of Last Judgment—like Petrarch's—may be termed eschatological in the sense of the category as defined by Levinas: in that it defeats the absolutism of the last word, leaving the author's trial, his procès, open to the constantly evolving judgment of others, his readers. In its Last Judgment, the Book does not represent totality, but rather remains subject to the infinite possibilities of interpretation.

As is true for the texts I have considered by Deguileville and by Machaut, it is also worth pointing out that Froissart's final judgment in Buisson does not provide a Last Judgment—for Levinas, a "dernière parole"—in the metanarrative of the author's career as represented in the corpus. Both of Froissart's extant poetic manuscripts end not with Buisson, but with the short Plaidoirie de la rose et de la violette, a legal debate between two flowers—the Rose and the Violet—about which of the two is more beloved.102 After the flowers' respective advocates have pleaded their cases before Imagination, they agree to submit them to the judgment of the Fleur de Lis, who resides in the "noble royaume de France" (v. 306). It would be difficult to find a more light-hearted, typically courtly, patron-directed, and Machauldian representation of judgment as this.103 While Froissart never wrote another dit after Buisson, he did not completely abandon the jovial and uncertain judgments of courtly debate poetry, which he had both lampooned and celebrated in Espinette and Buisson.

102 See Scheler's edition, in Œuvres de Froissart: poésies, II:235-45. In ms. BNF fr. 830, Buisson is followed by Le dit dou florin and then La plaidoirie. In BNF fr. 831, Buisson is followed directly by La plaidoirie. It bears noting that Buisson does not follow directly upon Espinette in either manuscript. In BNF fr. 830 the two poems are separated by the collections of ballades, virelais and rondéaux. In BNF fr. 831, the same intervening poems are present, as well as Prision, the lais amoureus, the pastourelles, and chançons royaus amoureuses et serventoys de Nostre Dame.

103 Anthime Fourrier (ed., 'Dits' et 'Débats,' 67-68) has pointed to Machaut's Dit de la fleur de lis et de la marguerite as a likely source for this poem.
Nor was Froissart content to place judgment beyond question in his history-writing, for which the author is best remembered and which occupied so much of his labor after *Buisson*.\(^\text{104}\) In the chronicle genre, at least, Froissart far surpassed the Machaut who had dabbled in historiography in the prologue to *JRN* and, later, in the *Prise d'Alexandrie*. As I have argued in the previous chapter, *JRN*'s prologue imitates contemporary chronicles by viewing the events of the plague year from the perspective of an impersonal, universalizing judgment, akin to Levinas's category of the historical. Froissart's great innovation to the chronicle tradition—beginning especially with his third book of *Chroniques*, was in fact his tendency to interject himself into the events he recounts, emphasizing precisely the subjective and personal perspective on human affairs, rather than the judgment of a cold historical voice, or Levinas's "troisième personne."\(^\text{105}\)

Furthermore, as Paul J. Archambault has demonstrated, Froissart's *Chroniques* may be described as giving "an overall impression of ahistoricity"\(^\text{106}\) in that they avoid discussion of cause and effect and flatten time into what Archambault calls "atomistic" moments, autonomous in their perspective. Froissart "does not adopt an omniscient, intellectual viewpoint, but rather describes visual and physical action from a limited and ever shifting point in space."\(^\text{107}\)

Archambault's broader argument about Froissart's *Chroniques* is even more intriguing: that their privileging of the subjective point of view may represent Froissart's contact with the thought of William of Ockham (c. 1288-c. 1348). Ockham had elaborated a theory of human knowledge, conceptualism, in which universal concepts have no existence outside the mind, and in which only particulars really exist. In terms of judgment, however, human beings are not able

\(^{104}\) See the edition of *Chroniques* by Luce, Raynaud and Mirot.

\(^{105}\) On Froissart's privileging of his own voice beginning especially with Book III of the *Chroniques*, see Kay, *Short History*, 81.

\(^{106}\) "Froissart and the Ockhamist Movement," 205.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., 200.
to apprehend particulars directly, as is God, so they must resort to universal abstractions to make sense of their world, leaving room for much doubt about the nature of truth and reality.\textsuperscript{108} Ockhamism also held that no act was morally bad in itself, as morality does not derive from the nature of things, but rather only from the will of God, which human beings cannot apprehend with certainty.

In a general sense, the movement has frequently been credited with producing an atomosphere of uncertainty in fourteenth-century literature, particularly in texts written after the 1330's, when Ockham's work would have enjoyed its widest immediate reception.\textsuperscript{109} The fourteenth-century aesthetic of shifting, uncertain judgments, especially the failure of particular people and cases to match up to universal ideals, is a theme I have brought up frequently throughout this dissertation. For example, the eschatological defendant's plea that his case proves an exception to the rule is nothing other than the clash of the particular and the universal in the act of judgment; in the heavenly court, God's infinite justice and mercy become equated not with the sweeping condemnation of universal groups, but with the careful consideration of unique cases. The trial scene of Machaut's \textit{Jugement dou roy de Navarre} provides a vivid instance of particulars and universals causing problems for human judgment, as its litigants' barrage of

\textsuperscript{108} See Le Goff, \textit{Histoire de la France religieuse}, II:172-3. On Ockham's conception of judgment, see also Brower-Toland, "Ockham on Judgment."

\textsuperscript{109} See, for example, Cerquiglini, \textit{Engin}, 162-4. Laurence De Looze gives an Ockhamist "'crisis of truth'" as one of the major factors contributing to the rise of pseudo-autobiographical narrative in the fourteenth century (\textit{Pseudo-Autobiography}, 8, 12-16). See also Kay, \textit{Place of Thought}, which deals in great detail with the problems surrounding universals and particulars in medieval didactic literature, including in Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart. The supposed fourteenth-century crisis of signs has been a major fixture of criticism about Middle English literature in particular. See, for example, McGerr, \textit{Chaucer's Open Books}; Green, \textit{A Crisis of Truth}; Howard, \textit{The Idea of the Canterbury Tales}. 
disconnected exempla makes it impossible to determine anything with certainty. In turn, this seeming parody of justice becomes an alternative to the model of divine judgment initially proposed in *JRN*, in which the narrator had proclaimed the universal condemnation of human beings for their wickedness. Instead of providing categorical certainty, eschatological justice comes to depend precisely upon the difficult-to-apprehend nature of reality as a set of particulars existing at particular points in time.

Ockham's influence on earlier fourteenth-century literature and thought is, nevertheless, difficult to prove directly, even where the judgment of particulars and universals is a major theme, as in the *Jugement dou roy de Navarre*. Ockham was considered heretical throughout most of the century, and teaching of his works banned. By the end of the fourteenth century and the turning of the fifteenth, however, something of an Ockhamist revival was underway with the influential thought of Pierre d'Ailly (c.1351-1420), whom Froissart may have met around 1398. As Paul Archambaut writes, Froissart's "Chroniques might be read as if they were illustrating the basic postulates of Ockhamist epistemology: since the world outside the mind contains nothing but unconnected particulars, the 'natural,' singular concepts impressed upon the chronicler's imagination by these particulars provide a more authentic version of the real world than do those general, abstract concepts [...]."

In his career after *Buisson* then, Froissart does not make himself monolithically "Jovian," placing his authorial voice beyond question and outside of temporal contingency, but rather returns more than ever to the particular perspective of the individual at specific moments in time.

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110 The best work on particulars and universals in *JRN* is, again, Kay, "Universality on Trial in Machaut's Judgment Poems," in *Place of Thought*, 95-122.
111 See Archambault, "The Ockhamist Movement," 198.
112 Ibid., 202.
In Buisson, Froissart dramatically straddles the fence between two periods of his career. In the extended moment of literary history I have set out to describe—the later medieval use of eschatological judgment to frame acts of reading and writing—Froissart similarly occupies an interstitial place. The disciple of Machaut, but also perhaps of Petrarch and Ockham, Froissart represents a new expression of literary judgment, articulating at least two themes usually identified with the advent of humanism in France. First, a change in poetic voice tending toward a more personal subject of writing and, eventually, a more truly autobiographical discourse about the authorial subject. Second, an overall epistemological concern with subjective judgment as a discrete faculty of man worthy of its own study and cultivation. Both of these themes are found abundantly in Froissart, even more so than in Machaut, or indeed most other fourteenth-century poets in France. And Froissart refers to both themes in his eschatological scene, which becomes a meditation on the unending interpretive work of poet and reader. With Buisson, Froissart amplifies the extent to which the relationship of author and audience, built entirely on the foundation of subjective judgments and language, can figure positively in the author's relationship to the divine.

In this respect, however, Froissart was outdone by one French poet: Christine de Pizan, whose work may be understood as a monumental expression of subjective opinion.\footnote{This point has been made at length by Kelly in Christine de Pizan's Changing Opinion, upon which I draw heavily in the following chapter.} Christine's \textit{Cité des dames}, the subject of the concluding chapter, insists on the power of individual judgment in writing and expresses this power through a new take on the eschatological scene of literature. As I show, Christine's scene of literary judgment in \textit{Cité} signifies a new paradigm of authorial self-representation in which the writer assigns herself more sovereignty than ever
before as a maker of judgments. As such, Christine's work also defines the end point of this study, which has examined the fourteenth-century author's perceived duty to respond to the reader as to God. This ethical impulse drives a mood of anxiety, a mood in many ways particular to fourteenth-century poetry, which makes the writing process at times purgatorial, as it is for Deguileville, and at times post-apocalyptic, as it is for Machaut. Froissart, likewise, is kept awake at night by the nagging voice of the reader, who makes it impossible for him to achieve spiritual closure. Christine's take on literary and eschatological judgment, however, defines itself precisely against this anxious mood of writing, as it places the author into a much greater position of divine authority than the audience. This difference is of fundamental importance because it marks Christine off sharply from the fourteenth-century emphasis on the author's answerability, substituting for it a model in which the poet herself can confidently perform judgment through divine inspiration and without fear of error.
I. The Fourteenth Century and Beyond

If the fourteenth century was caught in a general "'crisis of truth,'"¹ the crisis can be symbolized in part by the eschatological scene such as I have described it throughout this dissertation—as a dramatization of the anxiety over how to reconcile very human judgments about literature with the eternal judgment of heaven. As in Levinas's conception of the eschatological, fourteenth-century French poets made divine judgment manifest in the here-and-now, representing God as the commanding third party (tiers) between the author and the audience of poetry.

In using eschatological motifs to frame acts of reading and writing, authors like Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart also produced important meditations on the complex and varying nature of human judgment. One must be careful, nevertheless, not to overemphasize the value which these fourteenth-century authors placed on human judgment per se. If the reader could stand in for God, it was not because he or she shared in divine powers of discernment, but because his or her reception of the literary work—as flawed or unpredictable as it might be—entailed ethical consequences for its author in the next world. The instability of human judgment thus complicated the imagined scene of divine reckoning immeasurably without, however, proclaiming the autonomy of reader reception. The work of Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart does not suggest a rigid dichotomy of earthly and heavenly judgments, but rather a deep

interconnectedness which treats the judgment of literature as an important part of the long and immanent *procès* of divine reckoning.

While fourteenth-century readers were not shown making judgments in complete independence from God, fourteenth-century authors assigned themselves still less autonomy in their own judgments. If the readership assumed an aspect of the godly in relation to the author, it was precisely because the readership was understood as wholly other, an unpredictable and spectral entity whose judgments called the author outside of himself, putting his very existence into question. The abject and apologetic posture of the defendant relies on a deferral of his authority to somebody else, the one who summons him to respond for what he has written. In that the judgments of the audience are responsible for making the author an author and the book a book, the subject has little or no being outside of the reception—favorable or unfavorable—of his work. Standing trial is a necessary process for the author, who cannot enter into the eternal life of the book until readers have given their consent. While he makes judgments, then, the fourteenth-century author is not primarily a judge, but most of all a defendant, or, as in Machaut's case, an advocate for himself; responding to real and potential accusations about his writing is what gives him consistency in the first place.

In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the portrayal of human judgment changed considerably. Thinkers and artists increasingly privileged human reason, subjective opinion, and their own personal experience, in the gradual rise of humanism in its broadest possible sense. It is with the beginnings of this turn toward individual human deliberation that my study nears its end. Although I do not wish to suggest a strict periodization, I have focused especially on the French fourteenth century because it offers an especially rich viewpoint on a

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2 In Levinas's model of eschatological judgment, "Ce jugement de Dieu qui me juge, à la fois me confirme" (*TI*, 276).
unique convergence of phenomena, namely the concomitant development of a strong poésie personnelle and of a culture saturated with a sense of eschatological immanence. Together, these factors helped to produce an expression of authorial subjectivity and divine judgment which was unique to its time and place. For while the roots of modern literary subjectivity can be situated, in part, in the "pseudo-autobiography" of the later Middle Ages, the cultivation of a more strictly autobiographical perspective coincides with the turn toward individual reasoning justly regarded as a distinguishing feature of the Early Modern period. And while Christian humanist and Enlightenment thought did not banish the divine presence from literature or empty literary ethics of their Judeo-Christian heritage, they nevertheless treated human judgment as an increasingly free-standing category deserving of its own attention.

In Rabelais's Tiers Livre (1546), for example, the hapless protagonist Panurge seeks answers about whether or not he should take a wife by consulting a veritable parade of oracles and other self-appointed experts, including the corrupt judge Bridoye, who decides cases by throwing dice.\(^3\) Throughout the narrative, what Panurge repeatedly fails to learn is that he ought not seek answers about his future in the world of external authorities, but must instead strive to know himself and make judgments according to his own will. Rabelais shows individual human reasoning, based on studied self-knowledge, as the most important guarantor of truth, and he derides those—including to a large extent the clergy—who would profess special insight into the conscience of others or the will of the divine.

The growing emphasis on human judgment also had a profound impact on literary subjectivity. No longer was the posture of the author—especially the vernacular author—quite so

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3 Rabelais, Œuvres complètes, ed. Huchon, 339-513.
tied to what Dante had characterized as the Boethian rhetoric of self-defense. No longer was judgment on the author's work endlessly deferred to an imperious readership who thereby assumed qualities of the divine. Instead, the author's own judgments began to take priority. A generation after Rabelais, for example, Montaigne never stopped putting his own judgments into question, but he elevated his constantly shifting perspective into a sublime art form and a method for investigating reality and ethics. In "Du Repentir," one of the most revealing of his Essais, Montaigne describes his book as consubstantial with himself, a fluid portrait of individual life in which author and text are one and the same object of readers' judgment:

"Icy, nous allons conformément et tout d'un trein, mon livre et moy. Ailleurs, on peut recommander et accuser l'ouvrage à part de l'ouvrier; icy, non: qui touche l'un, touche l'autre. Celuy qui en jugera sans le connoistre, se fera plus de tort qu'à moy; celui qui l'aura conneu, m'a du tout satisfait."

In Montaigne's book can be found traces of the fourteenth-century idea of the corpus, which, modeled upon the Liber vitae, provides a precise moral and ontological record of the individual author. For Montaigne, as for Machaut and Froissart, repentance loses most of its relevance because the subject is bound to judge and act according to the circumstances in which he finds himself at each moment in life: "Lors que je consulte des deportements de ma jeunesse avec ma vieillesse, je trouve que je les ay communement conduits avec ordre, selon moy; c'est tout ce que peut ma resistance. Je ne me flatte pas: à circonstances pareilles, je seroy toujours tel." Montaigne's Essais, much like Guillaume de Machaut's book or Froissart's poetic corpus, embrace the change of opinions over time as ethically and creatively necessary. Yet the catalyst

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4 Dante, Convivio, I:2. See above, Chapter 1, 85-86.
6 ed. Villey-Saulnier, 806.
7 Ibid., 813.
for change comes increasingly from within the subject himself, because the judgment of the other—God and the Readership—does not cast such a long shadow. Instead, the right and the burden of deliberation belong primarily to the author himself—and let us not forget that Montaigne was a distinguished jurisconsult. The reader is asked to judge the work carefully, following the same model of subjective reasoning furnished by the author, who constantly expresses doubts about what he knows. Nevertheless, Montaigne's most important trial is more fully internal than the great *scènes judiciaires* of the fourteenth-century: it takes place according to his laws and in his courtroom: "J'ay mes loix et ma court pour juger de moy, et m'y adresse plus qu'ailleurs." The famous balance scale which the essayist made his personal emblem belongs not to Saint Michel but to Michel de Montaigne, and it serves to weigh received knowledge against his own experience.

Much later, in the eighteenth century, Jean-Jacques Rousseau's imagined scene of eschatological judgment, at the beginning of his *Confessions*, expresses even more dramatically the autonomy of the authorial subject in making judgments and creating art. Following much the same use of the trope employed by Deguileville in his *Pèlerinage de l'âme*, Rousseau imagines himself standing before the throne of God with his book in hand, defending his life and work; but he shows considerably less anxiety about how he and his writing will be judged. Instead, he asserts that the book itself, the product of his own judgments and the record of his singular existence in time, is already his salvation, even if it contains certain gaps and "ornements." Rousseau's version of the classic eschatological scene of literature affirms the independence of the individual in his exercise of moral reasoning and aesthetic judgment, rather than the control

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8 For Montaigne's relationship to the law, see, for example Regosin, "Rusing with the Law;" Tournon, "Justice and the Law;" Maclean, "The Place of Interpretation."
9 ed. Villey-Saulnier, 807.
10 See Introduction, 3-4.
exerted over the author by God and readers. As such, the scene stands as a powerful emblem of Enlightenment and pre-Romantic sensibilities of literature and selfhood. Now the accusatory reading other—Rousseau's Voltaire—is still very much present in the courtroom, but he no longer exerts an unbending ethical power over the author.

In using the grandiose frame of the divine perspective to validate his own perspective, Rousseau was, among other things, transforming Augustine's archetype of confession by calling into question the supposed conformity of the subject's self-regard with absolute, divine truth.\(^{11}\) The trajectory of Augustine's narrative proceeds from the blindness of the sinful self to the transcendent perspective of the converted, in which the subject largely fades into its own understanding of the divine will. God was laughing at the young Augustine from his eternal place in the audience; now, the saint gets the joke and laughs along with his maker as he tells his story, before transforming the personal narrative into a learned treatise on memory, time, language and creation in which further mention of the author's life is scarce. Rousseau's project, in contrast, loudly announces the self-sufficiency of the individual's judgment, even in the face of otherworldly accusation. It is not that Jean-Jacques will reach God's level of understanding about him, but rather that he will perfect his own practice of self-knowledge through writing; for Rousseau, that is more than enough.

Rousseau was not, of course, the first author to depart from the Augustinian model of self-presentation. The Middle Ages, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in particular, offer a pseudo-autobiographical scene of judgment which does not claim direct access to revelation but employs the reader as a judge who, at one and the same time, makes divine judgment manifest and calls into question even God's power to render certainty in the difficult ethical matters of

\(^{11}\) See Riley, *Character and Conversion*, "Chapter 4: The Inversion of Conversion: Rousseau's Autobiographies," 88-137.
literature. Summoned to the reader's judgment, the writing subject of later medieval literature exists in constant anxiety about the reception of his text, but he therefore exists; his uncertainty is what preserves him as a subject, unlike the Augustine who is swallowed up by the same firm self-knowledge he professes. The modern secular subject for which Rousseau is frequently credited should thus be understood as one part of an extremely broad trend in literary subjectivity already at work throughout the long Middle Ages.

Vernacular poets of the later medieval period made especially important contributions to this trend through their elaboration of a first-person subject whose experience of writing became the central focus of narrative. As writers wrote about writing, they also wrote about rewriting, and about their need to change their judgments over time. Doing so, later medieval authors drew a new attention to the subjective experience of the individual in time and space and to the individual's resistance to a discrete, teleological narrative. In *Joli buisson de Jonece*, for example, we find a Froissart who calls into question the end-directed certainty of the Augustinian model of self-judgment and conversion: although, like Augustine, Froissart's narrator claims to see from the clarity of the Last Judgment at the end of his poetic autobiography, there is nothing definitive about this self-portrait, and the identity of Froissart's persona is left swinging in a playful pendulum between young lust and mature love of Holy Church. Nevertheless, even in Froissart, the subject's identity and his judgment still hang upon a rhetoric of eschatological expectation—outward and upward looking—which is increasingly absent from Renaissance and Enlightenment literature.

The fifteenth century in France may be thought of as a period of transition between the deep-seated anxiety about authorship characteristic of later medieval vernacular literature and the broad valorization of personal experience, human reason and authorial presence symbolized by
Rabelais, Montaigne, and eventually Rousseau. As a literary device, the eschatological scene figured less prominently in the fifteenth century than in the fourteenth, even if divine judgment continued to appear frequently in literature in more traditional forms, such as morality plays and *danses macabres*.

The French fifteenth century did produce some texts which use eschatological expectation to frame the persona of the author, such as Jean Régnier's *Fortunes et adversitez* (c. 1430's), the *Temps perdu* and *Temps retrouvé* of Pierre Chastellain (mid-1400's), and especially François Villon's *Lais* (1456) and *Testament* (1461-62). Yet, in these texts as in much fifteenth-century French literature, themes of divine judgment are overshadowed by themes of death itself; meditations on aging and on the spectacle of the decaying body now carry more weight. What is more, these authors put less emphasis on their narrators as specifically literary personae than many fourteenth-century poets, and less of their poetry is devoted to exploring specifically literary problems. Indeed, Villon had been condemned for larceny and murder, not for what he wrote; his identity as a defendant is to be taken quite literally. Thus, although Villon's persona of outlaw poet is classically pseudo-autobiographical, it tends to cast him as an outlaw first and a poet second.

With its widening of authorial persona into the extra-literary sphere, Villon's fifteenth century also brought a new emphasis on subjective judgment and on the perspective of the author. According to Paul Archambault's Ockhamist reading of the later books of the

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14 in *Poésies complètes*, ed. Thiry, 59-87; 89-253. The most comprehensive work about conscience and judgment in Villon is Petit-Morphy, *François Villon et la scolastique*; see also Doss-Quinby, "La composition numérique."
15 On the less eschatological character of Villon's work, see Dufournet, "Deux poètes du Moyen Age en face de la mort," 163.
Chroniques, Froissart (d. 1405) had already played a part in this epistemological shift by emphasizing the "atomistic" viewpoint of the individual in time and space.\textsuperscript{16} The fact that Froissart may have met Petrarch and read his work also makes him a potential transmitter of early humanist poetics to France, if not a transmitter of humanist thought per se.

No French poet, however, can be thought more emblematic of the transitional aspect of the fifteenth century than Christine de Pizan (c. 1365-1430). Christine's work differs in a number of significant ways with the work of the great French authors who preceded her in the fourteenth century. Although she was largely self-taught, Christine was better educated than most of her French forerunners; and while we can only speculate about Petrarch's influence on Froissart, Christine's knowledge of Italian authors—especially Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio—is well attested; Christine's own Italian origins made her a natural point of transmission for humanist thought and poetics, and she is often considered in connection to the circle of early French humanists which included Jean Gerson, Jean de Montreuil and Nicolas de Clamanges. As one consequence of her humanist milieu, politics and good government are also more prominent and more clearly elaborated themes in Christine's corpus than in the work of her French predecessors.

Like the authors I have considered thus far, Christine made frequent written reference to her own life and career. Yet Christine's work is more straightforwardly self-referential than Deguileville, Machaut or Froissart; it calls more for the label of autobiography than of pseudo-autobiography.\textsuperscript{17} Furthermore, Christine's work shows a greater versatility of form and, unlike

\textsuperscript{16} "Froissart and the Ockhamist Movement." And see above, Chapter 4, 333-34.
\textsuperscript{17} Kelly argues that Christine's contribution to the preceding tradition was largely in the singularity of her subject position, which Kelly notes "rings autobiographically true" (Changing Opinion, 177). On Christine's new "autobiographical persona" and its differences in subjectivity with Machaut and Froissart's narrators, but also with other, later fifteenth-century authors (Charles d'Orléans and Villon), see Kelly, Ibid., 179. For Kelly, Christine's autobiographical persona, through whom experience is filtered and measured, corresponds closely to the author's
the French authors who came before her, she not only mastered verse composition, but wrote extensively in prose. Of course, unlike the fourteenth-century authors whose work I have examined, Christine was also a woman; she often felt it necessary to use her presentation of self and authorship to address issues specific to women in society, and to defend her own claims of authority within the male-dominated literary world.

Finally, following the French courtly tradition, Christine took as one of her major themes the volatile nature of human opinions and the shifting judgment of authors and readers;\textsuperscript{18} but she put a greater emphasis on human opinion as a serious object of study and cultivation in its own right. Indeed, Christine's innovative treatment of human judgment serves as a point of convergence for many of the other differences which set her apart from poets of the previous century and of her own century: Christine uses her superior learning and her humanist understanding of the world to defend the authority of her judgments. Her particular viewpoint in making judgments helps to sharply define her autobiographical and authorial persona—even when she puts the rhetoric of feigned ignorance to productive use. Christine's political writings show human judgment honed into a new science of practical reasoning based on experience and circumstance. Last but not least, Christine's sex causes her to question the nature of human opinion ever more sharply, for she portrays herself faced with supposed male authorities who characterize women's judgment as feeble and fickle. Turning around this negative characterization, Christine makes a woman's judgment—her own—the ultimate test case for that of which a properly exercised human judgment is capable.

\textsuperscript{18}Kelly (Changing Opinion, 176-77) discusses Machaut's Jugement poems and concludes that they may have provided Christine with a model for her treatment of questions of love and her own revised opinions. On this point, see also Altmann, "Reopening the Case."
In a masterful study, Douglas Kelly has already demonstrated that Christine represents "a new emphasis in late medieval French literature" on human opinion and its formation through personal experience.\(^{19}\) As Kelly puts it, "Christine is an anomaly in her time. Her conception of opinion and its importance in human life and her manner of dealing with opinions are unique in French literature before Montaigne."\(^{20}\) Kelly also explores the issue of literary subjectivity in Christine's work.\(^{21}\) He concludes that Christine's subject position corresponds to Michel Zink's definition of later medieval subjectivity as "'le point de vue d'une conscience' and, more specifically, 'le produit d'une conscience particulière.'"\(^{22}\) That is, like many earlier poets, Christine turns to the mode of studied-self judgment, borrowing techniques from confessional discourse to frame her perspective as an individual.\(^{23}\)

But, as Kelly argues, speaking particularly of *L'advision Cristine* (1405), Christine's championing of her own judgment goes well beyond the soul-searching of her predecessors and represents a new force in literature whose consequences stretch, ultimately, to the Enlightenment:

Christine's reasoned consideration of her own experience, consideration that leads her to discriminating conclusions that conflict with tradition and received learning, inspires her to contemplate and evaluate the nature and problems of opinion when she confronts it in her reading. In doing so, she contributes something truly original to literary experience: a reflection on the uses and

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\(^{19}\) *Changing Opinion*, vii. On Christine's privileging of personal experience, see also Case, "Christine de Pizan and the Authority of Experience."

\(^{20}\) *Changing Opinion*, 170. See also Kelly's comparison of Christine to Rabelais (Ibid., 4). Kelly goes on to differentiate Christine from Montaigne by emphasizing that her use of personal experience and opinion are always balanced by faith ("She may have doubts, but she is not a sceptic," Ibid., 170). In a similar vein, Reno and Dulac, eds., have compared Christine's treatment of opinion to Erasmus's *In Praise of Folly. (Le livre de l'advision Cristine, xvi-xvii).*


\(^{22}\) Kelly, Ibid., 172, quoting Zink, *La subjectivité littéraire*, 12.

\(^{23}\) As Kelly argues (*Changing Opinion*, 172), Christine turns in *Cité* to a kind of introspection with "its model in the confessionalists." For a discussion of confessional discourse and its criticism in earlier medieval literature, see the introductory chapter to this dissertation, 30-31.
personal evaluation of opinion. Although many of her opinions, especially on religion and monarchy, are representative of her times, the *Advision* shows her looking towards a future that, with Rousseau, would defend individual opinions against traditional learning and contemporary political correctness.24

It is not my intention to repeat all of Kelly's insights here. Instead, I would like to suggest how his very accurate portrait of Christine de Pizan as an advocate of individual reasoning and an innovator of literary voice also finds expression through themes of eschatological judgment in one of Christine's most enduring works, *Le livre de la cité des dames* (prose, 1405). Briefly and by way of conclusion to this dissertation, my aim is to demonstrate how Christine's treatment of eschatological judgment in *Cité* reflects both a point of continuity and a point of rupture with representations of literary judgment in fourteenth-century France, and at the same time with many of that century's tendencies in employing eschatological judgment as a literary device. Christine's work represents continuity with the later medieval tradition in that it uses an eschatological scene of judgment to weigh literary questions. It also marks a significant rupture, in that Christine casts herself—not the reader—in the position of a judge; and in that, while Christine attributes her good judgment to divine counsel and inspiration, she betrays far less anxiety about how it will measure up to the divine perspective.

Before looking specifically at *Cité*, however, it is helpful to understand Christine's perspective on judgment in a more global context. Then it will be possible to see how Christine transforms the eschatological scene of literature in that text to reflect her unique concerns with personal opinion, concerns which resonate throughout her entire body of work.

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24 *Changing Opinion*, 179.
II. Christine's Judgment

One of the most revealing of Christine's texts in regard to her view of human judgment is her *Livre de l'advision Cristine*, written the same year as *Cité* (1405).\(^{25}\) In *Advision*, Christine dramatizes the preponderance of human reasoning in her long dialog with Dame Oppinion, a giant woman formed from the multi-colored shadows of the "innombrables" opinions held by human beings (II:1:12). As Oppinion explains to Christine, she is responsible for the fall of man (II:III:12-14) and for all other errors in human judgment (II:IV). She is a creature of uncertainty who will ultimately be wiped out by the coming of Christ in judgment: "Ma duree sera jusques au derrain jour, et lors finiray" (II:III:31). On the other hand, however, Oppinion is also the origin of all human knowledge apart from that revealed through Scripture (II:V),\(^{26}\) making her both exceedingly powerful and a force for good.\(^{27}\) Even though she is a creature of uncertainty ("tousjours suis en doubt et non certaine," II:XVII:35-36), Oppinion's is the only path to knowledge of things which are not explicitly articles of Christian faith, and she thus holds sovereignty over human beings until the Judgment makes her unnecessary again.\(^{28}\) In fact, as the catalyst of individual reasoning, Oppinion is God's deputy on earth, putting his grace into action: "Et non obstant que de Dieu viengne la grace d'en hault, je suis celle qui la mets a oeuvre ou cuer de la personne, et sans moy riens ne prouffiteroit" (II:III:38-42).

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\(^{25}\) In this chapter, I cite the edition by Reno and Dulac.

\(^{26}\) Oppinion's relationship to Scripture is complex, since Oppinion says that she is responsible for all the "lois et sectes qui ont esté au monde puis son commencement" (II:V:3), except the laws given by Moses and Christ (II:V:4-5), which came directly from heaven. Oppinion even considers Old Testament prophecy and the Book of Revelation to be her work (II:IV:1-7).

\(^{27}\) As Kelly explains, although Lady Opinion was born of Ignorance and Désir de Savoir and helped bring about the Fall, she "is not always a false teacher" since "she is the source of all invention, including poetic invention" (*Changing Opinion*, 45).

\(^{28}\) See Ibid., 45.
The point of Oppinion's long speech to Christine in *Advision* is that she believes the author had committed a gross injustice to her in a work written two years earlier, her voluminous *Livre de la mutacion de fortune* (1403), by ascribing to Dame Fortune—and not her—the tumultuous movements of history. Oppinion's accusation, the focal point of Book II of *Advision*, echoes both the genre of Boethian consolation and the traditional scene of reader-indictment which I have discussed in Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart. Christine, much in the spirit of these poets, makes the writer's accusation by an imperious reader an occasion for promoting her own authority, and the authority of female writers in general. The author "confesses" readily to Oppinion's argument that she, and not Fortune, move both the world and the pens of writers, and that she was therefore slighted in *Mutacion*; Oppinion possesses, says Christine, a strong and powerful "auctorité" (II:XXII:6-7).²⁹

In the course of her body of work, Christine often revised her judgment, and her "confession" of Oppinion's authority is one good example of such a revision.³⁰ Christine's change of opinion pays homage to opinion herself in all of her cloudiness; for it is she who rules the world and demands to be given her due. As a human being and a poet, Christine must cultivate her own good judgment about things; as a rhetorician, she must strive to bring others to good judgment, too.³¹ She will no longer be a subject of Fortune as she had declared herself in *Mutacion*, but a subject of her own reasoning.

After she has been given the credit she deserves as an author, Oppinion drops all accusatory pretense and praises Christine in return, first by grouping her with female prophets of...

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²⁹ On this change of opinion, see Kelly, *Changing Opinion*, 74-76.
³⁰ On the kinds of changing opinion in Christine's work, see Kelly, Ibid., 77; Slerca, "Rétraction."
³¹ Throughout his study, Kelly argues that the practice of rhetoric is especially important to Christine as a way of leading others to good opinions. See especially *Changing Opinion*, 10-13, 24-25.
old (II:XXII)\textsuperscript{32} whose exercise of good judgment shatters the customary opinion that women cannot attain the understanding of "clercs ou religieux" (II:XXII:27). Christine's status as a female writer meant that her claims of superior learning were unaccompanied by a university education and thus liable to be criticized by readers who could not accept her authority. Her strategy to forestall such a criticism was to make Oppinion the common mother of her own knowledge of the world and of the knowledge held by clercs et religieux. Christine's claim is that the opinion of a woman who has undertaken diligent study can equal, or even surpass, the judgments of established authority.

Next, Oppinion exhorts Christine to keep up the good work, in complete confidence of her good judgment, despite what readers—perhaps envious of her talent—might say: "Si te conseil que ton oeuvre tu continues, comme elle soit juste, et ne te doubtes d'errer en moy. Car tant que je seray en toy fondee sur loy, raison et vray sentement, tu ne mesprendras es fondacions de tes oeuvres es choses plus voir semblables, non obstant de plusieurs les divers jugemens, les ungs par moy simplement, les autres par Envie" (II:XXII:38-43).

As Oppinion's nature is uncertainty, it may seem paradoxical that she consoles Christine in the Boethian mode, assuring her that her judgment has been just in all other respects.\textsuperscript{33} But Oppinion has already insisted that she can provide the basis for some certainty, in that she is the first cause which allows the human subject to reach truth, given adequate study and understanding: "[...] c'est assavoir que cause suis moiennant estude et entendement de faire attaindre les choses vraies" (II:XXI:15-16). After Christine's confession of faith to her, Oppinion stresses again that, because Christine's opinion is founded on law, reason and true feeling ("loy,

\textsuperscript{32} On female prophets, see also Cité, II:1-4.
\textsuperscript{33} Christine had inherited—and amplified—from her fourteenth-century forerunners the tendency to rewrite Boethius's Consolatio in surprising ways.
raison, et vray sentement" [II:XXII:40]), it cannot err. 34 This elevation of a woman's opinion, based partly on personal feeling, to the level of "clercs ou religieux" and even the prophets who announced Christ, is one of the strongest expressions in Christine's work of her humanist attitude toward judgment. For Oppinion, anyone's reasoning, when properly cultivated, may be regarded as authoritative, and while human judgment was cut off from the divine perspective even before the Fall, it may still reach sufficient truth when it is employed with the proper preparation and in God's grace.

Christine's strong emphasis on human opinion, fully on display in Advision, can be attributed in part to the preoccupations specific to her time and place. If the chaotic and terrible events of the fourteenth century marked a general "crisis of truth," 35 things only got worse with the turn of the fifteenth century. Not only did war, famine and the Black Death continue to ravage Europe—Christine's husband was killed by a plague outbreak in 1389—but in France, the reign of Charles V, idealized by Christine as a kind of golden age, had ended with the king's death in 1380. Charles's son and successor Charles VI went mad in 1392, breeding a climate of political instability which would ultimately lead to civil war. 36 The religious atmosphere of Christine's world was also marked by the new growth of heretical sects—such as the Lollards and Hussites—and caught in an even more divisive crisis of truth, the Western Schism (1378-1417); with more than one pope claiming authority over God's church on earth, how was the individual Christian to decide?

Part of Christine's response to the turmoil around her was to articulate throughout her prodigious body of work a new model of judgment in which individuals could form their own

34 On "vray sentement" and self-knowledge, see Kelly, Changing Opinion, 86-90, 97-98.
35 De Looze, Pseudo-Autobiography, 8.
36 The king's madness is recounted in Book IV of Froissart's Chroniques.
opinions based on subjective reasoning. This characteristic is one which Christine shares with later writers like Rabelais and Montaigne, both of them also reacting to internecine strife: that, in lieu of absolute certainty, a well-educated human opinion must suffice, and that individual human beings should thus strive to cultivate their own powers of discernment rather than relying solely on established moral authorities who have set themselves up as delegates of divine truth.

In responding to the turmoil of her time by championing the power of opinion, Christine was not alone. Although Kelly does not mention this connection in his study, Christine's view of human opinion seems likely to have been informed by the thought of Jean Gerson (1363-1429), chancellor of the University of Paris and doctor of the Church. Scholars have understood Gerson's relationship to Christine in a variety of ways, including in terms of pastoral care and intellectual friendship. Whether Gerson really let himself become involved in a friendship with a woman cannot be established with certainty, but Christine and Gerson were certainly literary collaborators, as they prosecuted Jean de Meun together in the great Débat sur la Roman de la Rose. The chancellor's only recorded mention of Christine can be found in this document, where he calls her an "outstanding woman" (insigni femina). Gerson was a student of the Ockhamist Pierre d’Ailly (who may also have influenced Froissart), and he is often credited as one of the leading figures of early northern humanism, bringing his influence with him in his

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37 Kelly immediately situates Christine in the period of "the terrible years for France between the death of Charles V in 1380 and the advent of Joan of Arc in 1429" and suggests that this chaotic atmosphere may be responsible for Christine's "heightened awareness of the role of opinion and changing opinions in human affairs" (Changing Opinion, vii).

38 See Le débat sur le Roman de la Rose, ed. Hicks. Kelly discusses the Rose debate at length in Changing Opinion, "Chapter 1: Opinion as a Concept: Definition and Cognition," 7-40. Gerson's influence on Christine has been a major focus of criticism. See, for example, Edsall, "Like Wise Master Builders;" Walters, "Gerson and Christine, Poets;" Walters, "The Figure of the seullette;" Richards, "An Intellectual Friendship." The most comprehensive biography of Gerson available is McGuire, Jean Gerson and the Last Medieval Reformation.

peregrinations of Europe: to the College of Navarre at Paris, in Bruges, Avignon, Constance, and, finally, exiled in Lyon. Gerson himself was particularly concerned with making religion comprehensible to the laity and to women, and to this end, he wrote extensively in French as well as in Latin. He also spent much of his time wrestling with the fact that human beings often have to make judgments about ethical matters without the guarantee of complete certainty.

For Gerson, this included the various problems of authorship, to which references fill much of his body of work. He was particularly concerned with how poetry could best be put to Christian use, and with what he characterizes as his inordinate drive to write and rewrite, as in the wonderful poem Against Curiosity in Writing More Books:

Scribendi quis finis erit. Proth anxia cura
Nonne satis sapiunt edita scripta prius?
Et sapiunt, fateor; sed desipiunt aliquando
Pro motu capitu gustum inest varius
Aetas quemque suum studium fert, non eadem vult
Vir vel decrepitus quae puer aut juvenis
Eruditus. [...] 
Linguarum genera quot sunt, quot et ingeniorum.
I nunc et libros scripto perpetuos
Aeternus liber est unus quem lumine puro
Cernere quaere sciens omnia finis erit
Hinc Salomon: revere Deum mandataque serva
Hoc est omnis homo. terminus iste libris.

What will be the end of writing? O this anxious trouble!
Haven't enough wise things already been written?
They are wise, yes, but sometimes they are foolish.
In changing chapters each age has its own taste
and makes its own study.
When a man is old he does not want the same thing the boy

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40 The most influential proponent of Gerson's humanism has been Gilbert Ouy. See, for example, Ouy's articles "L'humanisme et les mutations politiques et sociales en France;" "Le College de Navarre, berceau de l'humanisme français" (both articles cited by McGuire, Jean Gerson and the Last Medieval Reformation, 411). In his bibliographical guide, McGuire (Ibid., 411-12) provides a more complete list of sources for the view of Gerson as an early humanist.

41 See Hobbins, Authorship and Publicity Before Print, 92-100.

Or learned youth does. [...]  
There are as many minds as kinds of language.  
Go now, then, and write books that last forever.  
The eternal book is the one which  
you should seek to look upon in pure light.  
Then, knowing everything, there will be an end to writing.  
And so, as Solomon says: honor God and keep his commands  
as everyone must do.  
And then books will end.

This is an expression of the kind of anxiety and spiritual fatigue which Machaut had staged in his *Jugement dou roy de Navarre*: the author is compelled to keep writing in response to his own changing perspective, until the Judgment day itself. Then and only then can he be released from that vicious cycle which Deguileville made into his personal purgatory, and which Machaut characterized as his vain effort to reach happiness (*Bonneurté*) in writing. In Froissart's case, Philozophie and Venus came to trouble the poet's sleep after he had already renounced writing poetry for the Church, demanding that he do his duty unto God and man by cranking out another hit.43

Gerson was not called the Consoling Doctor (*Doctor Consolatorius*) for nothing, however. He spent much of his time and effort trying to lessen the anxiety of himself and of those souls in his care by making Christian ethics more intelligible and practical. In terms of his own practice of writing, Gerson seems to have mostly overcome his anxiety, as his body of work is enormous and comprises a wide variety of genres, in poetry and in prose, in Latin and in

43 As Maurice Blanchot described such a state of mind—although in a less eschatological vein—the author is drawn along by the unshakable force of writing itself, powerless to stop:  
La maîtrise de l'écrivain n'est pas dans le main qui écrit, cette main 'malade' qui ne lâche jamais le crayon, qui ne peut le lâcher [...] La maîtrise est toujours le fait de l'autre main, celle qui ne l'écrit pas, capable d'intervenir au moment où il faut, de saisir le crayon et de l'écartier. La maîtrise consiste dans le pouvoir de cesser d'écrire [...]"(*L'espace littéraire*, 19).
French. As Daniel Hobbins argues persuasively, Gerson deserves to be seen as one of the strongest examples of later medieval authorship, in his ability to successfully defend his role as an author, and in the meticulous concern he showed for the compilation and dissemination of his writings.

In a more general sense, Gerson's consoling qualities can also be appreciated in his philosophical approach to human judgment, especially his emphasis on the importance of individual experience and opinion in judgment-making. Like Christine de Pizan's own conception of judgment, Gerson's should be understood in direct relation to the ethical uncertainties of France during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. In particular, the chancellor spent much of his life trying to find a solution to the Schism, which he was finally instrumental in ending through the Council of Constance (1414-18). As Rudolf Schüssler explains in an excellent article, one of the ways in which Gerson reacted to the uncertainty of the Schismatic period was by developing a new theory of moral certainty (certitudo moralis). For Gerson, certitudo moralis represented a distinct category of certainty, separate from both supernatural and natural certainty and applicable in ethical problems lacking a clear solution. While supernatural certainty is infallible and natural certainty based on mathematical proof,

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44 collected in Glorieux's ten-volume Œuvres complètes.
45 Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity Before Print: Jean Gerson and the Transformation of Late Medieval Learning.*
moral certainty does not admit of such absolute truth; instead, it leaves more latitude to the individual subject's ability to discern the ethical from the unethical.

As Schüssler shows, Gerson's *certitudo moralis* lightened the ethical demands placed on the subject in two important ways. First, prior to Gerson, the Christian moral agent had been obligated to limit the risk to his soul as much as possible by making the safest choice in any given ethical dilemma.\(^4^9\) Gerson, however, restricted the kinds of cases of in which this requirement—the *regula magistralis*—applied. Second, Gerson also allowed moral decisions—decisions not admitting of mathematical or theological certainty—to be based on a more limited amount of information than had previously been the norm. Whereas Aristotle and scholastic thinkers had required assent from all or most experts for a given proposition to be authoritative, Gerson freed agents from having to go through the entire previous treatment of a given ethical problem, as long as they could find "a small but authoritative and (in their eyes) convincing set supporters of an opinion."\(^5^0\) This transformation of the grounds for ethical authority coincided in Gerson's thought with a marked attention to individual experience, which could provide the basis for ethical decision-making in matters of diminished certainty.\(^5^1\) Thus, as Schüssler defines it, Gerson's *certitudo moralis* "signifies a level of certainty where moral risk avoidance becomes unnecessary and an agent is entitled to trust his beliefs without fear of error."\(^5^2\) Gerson based this conception of certainty on his particular reading (or mis-reading) of the academic branch of


\(^{5^0}\) Ibid., 452.

\(^{5^1}\) See Hobbins, *Authorship and Publicity Before Print*, 64-65.

\(^{5^2}\) “Jean Gerson, Moral Certainty and the Renaissance of Ancient Scepticism," 453.
scepticism, which he therefore helped to resurrect for Renaissance and Enlightenment humanism.\textsuperscript{53}

For Gerson, as much pastor as theologian, the promotion of moral certainty was designed precisely to lessen the epistemological—and eschatological—burden of the average Christian in making judgments about inconclusive ethical matters, as for example, about which of the two, and later three, anti-popes to obey.\textsuperscript{54} It was one part of the chancellor's lifelong efforts to reduce what he considered irrational scrupulosity in the minds of Christians. Effectively lowering the bar for what can be considered sufficient knowledge upon which to make an ethical decision, Gerson offered his generation a theory of human deliberation which allowed for greater freedom in judgment and less fear of error.\textsuperscript{55}

It is reasonable to suppose that Christine de Pizan, Gerson's partner in the \textit{Rose} debate, may at least have known of the chancellor's views on moral certainty, in addition to his strong model of authorship. This influence is suggested especially by Christine's own understanding of the kinds of certainty available in this world. As Douglas Kelly points out, Christine consistently opposed human opinion to both "certainne science" (of which opinion is nevertheless the first cause) and religious faith, which she often called \textit{loy}.\textsuperscript{56} This division of certainties corresponds

\textsuperscript{54} Schüssler calls Gerson "an innovative director of consciences" (Ibid., 446).
\textsuperscript{55} Schüssler (Ibid., 453) compares Gerson's efforts "to get rid of unjustified opinions that trouble the mind" to "the ancient sceptics' quest for inner calmness." Gerson's theological innovation, in fact, helped pave the way for the era of high casuistry that would occur in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Jesuitism (See Schüssler, Ibid., 453). In Gerson's Latin and French devotional works, the increased autonomy of individual judgment is coupled with, and balanced by, a renewed emphasis on self-interrogation and self-accusation as spiritual practices.
\textsuperscript{56} Kelly, \textit{Changing Opinion}, 1-2. Kelly quotes Christine's phrase "certainne science" from \textit{Le débat sur le Roman de la Rose}, 131: 510-11. The term is also used in \textit{Cité}, I:2. Kelly (Ibid., 1, 31-32) notes that Christine uses the word opinion much more than her opponents in the \textit{Rose}
closely to Gerson's separation of supernatural, natural (mathematical) and moral certainties. And like Gerson, Christine set aside certain ethical domains in which the exercise of opinion is best suited because of the unavailability of absolute certainty. One of the particular circumstances in which Christine promoted the good exercise of opinion-formation was literature, both in reading it and in authoring it. In *Advision*, for example, Oppinion lays claim to all poetic invention, including Christine's own work (II:IV:5-6, II:XXI:25-29). For Christine, drawing perhaps on Gerson's *certitudo moralis*, literature was the sovereign realm of opinion rather than the province of certainty or Christian faith, as it revolved around the most inconclusive ethical matters of all—"'questions of language and social responsibility, on what an author allegedly intended and what various audiences heard.' "\(^{57}\)

In Christine's emphasis on the sovereignty of opinion in literary judgments, she echoes the way in which authors like Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart portrayed the interpretation of texts, expressing an awareness of the mutability of readers' and authors' opinions. In general, however, Christine's portrayal of judgment tends to betray much less anxiety about the author making judgments than in the fourteenth-century texts I have examined. Deguileville, for example, tries to disclaim responsibility for his first draft of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* and sits naked and trembling as he awaits the judgment of his soul. By the end of *Jugement dou roy de Navarre*, Machaut's Guillaume learns that literature must preserve its own uncertainty in order to remain ethical, giving rise to a condition in which the natural state of the author is one of anxiety, of an infinite responsibility to rewrite himself in response to the reader's accusation and to his own changing views. Froissart's narrator considers his changes of mind to be necessary stages in debate and that only she uses it positively. Kelly (*Changing Opinion*, 1n2) finds "no occurrence of the word [opinion] in Gerson's contributions" to the *Rose* debate.

\(^{57}\) Kelly, Ibid., 11, quoting Fenster, "'Perdre son latin,' " 96.
his development as a Christian and a poet; yet even from the Jovian or Augustinian perspective of the End, he vacillates enormously about what he wants and whose judgment he is most interested in pleasing. Machaut and Froissart both took much of their material from the courts of love, so it is not surprising that their narrators often appear like characters of legal satire, caught in an endless intrigue of botched judgments and mistrials which threaten to continue until the Judgment Day itself.

Christine, too, wrote debate poetry which feeds upon the great uncertainties of erotic love, such as her *Livre des trois jugements.* As Peter Goodrich characterizes this text, it is instructive that "[...] Christine's book of judgments contains no judgments, only questions and the elaborate exposition of the emotional states of those caught in the web of amorous disputation." And like Deguileville, Machaut, Froissart and Gerson, Christine was fascinated with the instability of opinion among both readers and authors. But in her narrative works, she created a persona ("Christine") who constantly asserts the authority of her positions, and consistently overcomes self-doubt in order to make good judgments. While Christine is not afraid to show herself changing her mind, as she does about opinion itself in *Advision,* the change is usually an affirmation of the author's power in forming opinions and thus a movement away from anxiety and scrupulosity.

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59 "Gay Science and Law," 110.
III. *Le livre de la cité des dames* and Christine's Divine Authority

Nowhere is this self-affirmation more the case than in Christine's *Livre de la cité des dames*, in which she systematically reconsiders the bad things male authors have written about women over the centuries in light of what she knows to be true from her own learning, as well as her experience and feelings as a woman. As Christine tells the story, she was in her room one day looking through her personal library to find some uplifting poetry to read, when she came across a copy of the thirteenth-century *Lamentations* of Matheolus. Having often heard that this book spoke highly of women, Christine decided to read it for pleasure. But she discovered that Matheolus was anything but kind toward women, and that his *Lamentations* were, in fact, a systematic portrait of the vices allegedly inherent to female nature. Suddenly, Christine says, she was overwhelmed thinking about the countless male authors throughout history who had pronounced similarly, until she was forced to argue against women herself, betraying her better judgment: "Et ainsi m'en rapportoye plus au jugement d'autruy que a ce que moy mesmes en sentoye et savoye" (I:1). Unsure of what to think, Christine cried out to God in a long lamentation, demanding to know how it could be that he, perfect in every respect, could have created women so imperfectly:

Ne formas tu toy mesmes tres singulierement femme et dés lors lui donnas toutes teles inclinacions qu'il te plaisoit qu'elle eust? Et comment pourroit ce estre que tu y eusses en riens failli? Et toutevoys voyoy tant de si grandes accusacions, voire

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60 I cite the edition of *Cité* by Caraffi and Richards.
61 Kelly discusses the role of opinion in *Cité* at length in Changing Opinion, "Chapter 3: Misogyny, Introspection, and Radical Opinion," 77-106.
62 We would do best to read Christine's high hopes for this notoriously misogynistic text ironically, as part of her frequent posture of feigned ignorance. Matheolus's *Liber lamentationum* appeared at the beginning of the 13th century and was translated into French by a Jean Le Fèvre de Ressons (not the Jean Le Fèvre who wrote *Le respite de la mort*) around 1370, accompanied by an ironic palinode. Maureen Cheney Curnow (ed., *Livre de la cité des dames*, vol. II: 1037 n 1) argues that Christine would have been drawing on this translation.
toute jugees, determinees et concludes contre elles. Je ne scay entendre ceste repugnance (I:1).  

God's answer to Christine comes immediately in the form of three resplendent ladies who appear to her in a mysterious ray of sunlight, later identifying themselves as the virtues Raison, Droitture (Rectitude) and Justice. The virtues explain to Christine that they have arrived to help her build a city inhabited entirely by virtuous women. The city, constructed through abundant architectural images (its foundation is in the Field of Letters, Christine's ink is its mortar, her pen a trowel, etc), is Cité itself, a catalog of great women in history which will serve to refute the misogynistic opinions of male authors. In much of its content and structure, Cité recalls Christine's acknowledged model, Boccaccio's De mulieribus claris (On Famous Women, c. 1361-62). But Christine makes significant changes. Boccaccio's text is not particularly kind toward women, treating them as natural inferiors to men physically, intellectually and morally; when he praises a great woman of history, Boccaccio usually does so by noting that she surpasses the usual traits of her sex. Christine, however, specifically defends the virtues of female nature, and while she mentions Boccaccio's influence often in Cité, she also omits exempla he uses, adds others, and offers more positive accounts of famous females he had criticized or condemned, such as Semiramis, Medea, Circe, Ceres and Arachne.

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63 Christine's lamentation is highly reminiscent of the complaint of Job. Later (I:9), the question in this passage is answered directly by the personification Raison, who tells Christine that women too are made in the image of God.
65 See Brown, ed., Famous Women, xviii-xix.
66 Christine tends to concede, however, that women are weaker physically.
67 See Kelly, Changing Opinion, 84.
While it builds upon humanist models of individual achievement in society, the *Cité des dames* also recalls the eschatological heavenly city, especially Augustine's *De civitate dei*, which Christine quotes directly at the end of the text: "Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei!" (III:18). Although many of Christine's examples are drawn from Boccaccio's almost entirely pagan history of womankind, they are intermixed with great Christians, especially in the third book of the text, which is a list of those *saintes* who will crown the city. In this respect, Christine's building project touches both heaven and earth, elaborating an idealistic model for the structure of both, in the same way that Augustine's City of God is always present but partially obscured by the trappings of sinful, worldly society. According to Augustine, this intermingling of the just and the reprobate will last until the Judgment visibly separates them: "Perplexae quippe sunt istae duae civitates in hoc saeculo invicemque permixtae, donec ultimo iudicio dirimantur" (I:35, "For the two cities are mixed together and confused in this world until the Last Judgment separates them."). The world history which Augustine narrates in *De civitate Dei* is thus an unveiling of that which will be shown to one and all before the judgment seat, including those things which have been obscured by the lies of poetry (II:10).

In a similar way, Christine offers readers an Augustinian narrative of God's ongoing judgment in the world by stripping away the layers of worldly power and literary deceit which have covered it. Her aim is to reveal which virtuous women from history most deserve eternal love.  

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68 "Glorious things are said of you, o city of God!" This is taken from *De civitate Dei*, I:21, in which Augustine is himself quoting Psalm 87.3. Hicks and Moreau (eds., *Cité*, 13, 22-23) discuss comparisons between Christine's city and Augustine's. On correspondences and differences with Augustine, see also (inter alia) McLeod, *Virtue and Venom*, 132-133; Quilligan, *Allegory of Female Authority*, 71; Curnow, ed., *Cité*, vol. II: 1037 n. Here, Curnow notes the existence of a 1375 French translation of *De civitate Dei* by Raoul de Presles which Christine may have used.  

69 Eve, whom Christine conspicuously omits, is Petrarch's only Judeo-Christian woman.  

70 Literature is among Augustine's more pressing concerns in *De civitate Dei*. He spends a good portion of the second book in particular discussing the role of theatre and poetry in Greek and Roman cultural life (especially II:8, II:9, II:11, II:12, II:13, II:14).
life. This, of course, is both the Christian promise of heaven and the literary promise of fame, an ambiguity about the nature of her city which insulates Christine somewhat from the problem of building it on the foundations of pagan women. Christine makes clear time and again that Cité is a work of art and of well-cultivated personal opinion, not a work of received truth about women, doctrinal or otherwise. Her heavenly city is literally a construct, built entirely by the labor of the author, by the trowel of her pen and the mortar of her ink. And yet this construct is also a vision of how the Judgment might come about, in Christine's educated opinion. In this sense, it is her heavenly city, and once it is complete, Justice hands it over to her ("Et la te rens close, parfaicte et bien fermee, si que je te promis," III:18).

This is a daring artistic statement, and perhaps a more serious one than the argument by Froissart's sassy version of Dame Philozophie that he can be just like the "docteurs et euvangelistes" who founded the Church (Buisson, v. 417). Likewise, Christine's claim to rebuild the heavenly city from the ground up, and to oversee it as her dominion, is a far cry from Deguileville's pilgrim, who is always finding himself just on the other side of the New Jerusalem. Christine's relatively easy blending of the theological with the poetic is yet another trait which betrays her influence by the great Italian humanists—Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio—and to some extent, perhaps by Gerson. 71 In its assertion of the poet's authority about spiritual matters, Cité even implies a critique of Augustine's civitas Dei, in which he includes precious few female citizens. 72

71 On Gerson's work in connection to the lack of distinction between theology and poetry for Petrarch and Boccaccio, see Hobbins, Authorship and Publicity before Print, 94.
72 As Mary Agnes Edsall writes, "[...] Christine's particular employment of this Augustinian trope is both an implicit critique an effective deployment of exclusive language. Just as the universal "he" and "men" excludes women, so Christine's use of women to epitomize the city of God excludes men. This exclusion is also a critique; for if women constitute the city of God, the corresponding city of men—in this case all men—is in the rule of the devil." ("Like Wise Master
Since the author herself is the one responsible for making judgments about who among women is good and just, she assumes a divinely-ordained power of deliberation which insists on its own legitimacy. As Raison explains, God has sent the three virtues to Christine because of her exceptional dedication to the truth: "Car quoique nous ne soyons pas communes en plusieurs lieux et que nostre congoissance ne viengne a toutes gens, neantmoins toy, pour la grant amour que tu as a l'inquisition de choses vrayes par lone et continuel estude, par quoy tu te rens ycy solitaire et soubtraicte du monde, tu as desservi et dessers estre de nous [...]" (I:3). According to Raison, it is "la providence de Dieu" which established the three virtues among "les gens de ce bas monde affin de mettre en ordre et tenir en equité les establissemens fais par nous mesmes selon le vouloir de Dieu en divers offices [...]" (I:3). Among the "divers offices" to which Raison refers is surely that of the poet, occupied by Christine, who makes judgments in the confidence that her opinion is well-formed. She is not God, but she operates on the special authority he has given her to decide difficult ethical matters which resist absolute certainty, especially the judgments which are made in and about literature.

Therefore, while Christine separates opinion from both certainne science and loy, she demonstrates Dame Oppinion's point in Advision that opinion can also be the basis for certainty, even about many religious matters, as long as it is accompanied by "estude et entendement," and by God's grace. That Christine is able to position herself as something of a theologizing poet is extraordinary, but for her it is an attempt to solve a problem which has not been satisfactorily

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Edsall goes on to argue that Christine's Cité also evokes Jean Gerson's conception of the "cité de paradis, the celestial pattern for earthly society" ("Like Wise Master Builders," 40). One notable exception to Augustine's heavy reliance on male figures is the sibyl Erythrea (De civitate Dei, XIV:23), whom Christine herself uses in Cité (II:2).

This rhetoric of the poet's divine connection is quite prevalent in Cité. For example, Droitture characterizes herself as Christine's "advocate ou ciel" (I:5), and Justice's "essence procedes purely from the person of God" (I:6).
resolved anywhere in biblical or theological authority: whether women are naturally inferior to men. This problem falls for Christine somewhere in the realm of Gerson's *certitudo moralis*, for it can be answered neither by mathematical proofs, nor as a matter of revealed faith. If even Biblical and theological authorities have often condemned the faults of women, or remained silent when they should have defended women, what is the average Christian supposed to believe, and what is a woman supposed to believe about herself? These questions are at the heart of Christine's lamentation to God in the first section of *Cité*, and are systematically answered with the aid of the three virtues in the rest of the text.

While the three virtues help Christine to enumerate many exemplary women from Greco-Roman sources and Judeo-Christian history, these exempla alone do not offer a definitive body of evidence about whether women are naturally inferior. What makes up the difference, allowing Christine to find sufficient certainty to judge in favor of women, is her own "vray sentement" about women (*Advision*, II:XXII:40), drawn from her perspective as a woman. Along with God's grace, Christine's experience and feelings allow her to read the exempla in the way she does and make confident judgments about them. This does not mean that Christine is operating in the realm of absolute certainty: she doesn't need to in order to build her case, which lies instead in the realm of ethical certainty and in the opinions of authors and readers. Accordingly, the framework of the text is transformed from its initial appearance—as a scene of divine revelation by God's messengers Raison, Droitture and Justice—into a proclamation of the validity of the author's own thought processes. The "revelation" of *Cité* comes from God's grace, but it happens entirely within the poet, who uses her own judgments to rebuild the heavenly city brick by brick.

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74 Kelly notes that Christine was combatting misogynistic opinion in its reliance on the authority of "the Bible, interpretations of the Bible, and the writings of Church fathers" (*Changing Opinion*, 80).
75 On "vray sentement," again, see Kelly, *Changing Opinion*, 86-90, 97-98.
It is true that, much like the fourteenth-century texts I have considered, Christine's *Cité* uses the eschatological scene in order to stage the author's response to accusations. In this case, the accusations are those of male authorities who have spoken ill of women throughout history, including not only Matheolus, but also writers such as Ovid (I:9), Cecco d'Ascoli (I:9), Cato of Utica (I:10), Christine's lifelong nemesis Jean de Meun (I:2, II:25) and, less directly, Augustine. As I have already mentioned, Boccaccio himself does not escape completely from Christine's counter-attacks, since she explicitly and implicitly criticizes the Italian poet's work by rewriting a number of his accusatory remarks about specific women. Indeed, much of *Cité* is structured as systematic restatements of male accusations, echoed by Christine in her initial self-doubt, and responses to those accusations by Raison, Droitture and Justice. *Cité* is conceived as a work of defensive rhetoric, as Raison makes plain when she tells Christine that it is to act as an impenetrable fortification against misogynistic attacks (I:4), just as Augustine's city of God would be impenetrable to the barbarians who had sacked Rome in 410.

In the defensive rhetoric of *Cité*, as throughout her body of work, Christine places a strong emphasis on the status of her judgment about women as an unpopular minority opinion. As Raison explains to Christine, this is because judgments against women have all been made by men, who have not given them the opportunity to respond to the charges: "Qui plaide contre un absent gagne vite son procès." (I:3). The situation has been aggravated by women's natural patience, which has suffered men's false accusations without complaint. However, Raison says, that has gone on far too long: "Mais or est temps que leur juste cause soit mise hors des mains de Pharaon" (I:3).

In that the city Christine builds is also the heavenly city, it is an attempt to establish an unassailable place for women in spiritual history, and thus to defend the position of women in
paradise as in earthly society. Christine's defensive rhetoric is eschatological in the Levinasian sense: in that it allows the subject to speak, to participate in its trial, overthrowing the cruel, impersonal and "virile" judgment of history, of the anonymous mass of male authors who had condemned women, if not to hell than to infamy and silence. In her championing of subjective judgment, Christine's eschatological vision is perhaps even closer to that of Levinas than that of Augustine: "Se placer par-delà le jugement de l'histoire, sous le jugement de la vérité, c'est ne pas supposer derrière l'histoire apparente une autre histoire appelée jugement de Dieu—mais méconnaissant tout autant la subjectivité. Se placer sous le jugement de Dieu, c'est exalter la subjectivité, appelée au dépassement moral au-delà des lois [...]." Like *advocata nostra*, the Virgin Mary, whom she places atop her ironclad construction at the beginning of the third book of *Cité*, Christine goes beyond what has already been proclaimed as law to embrace the underdog in her quest for justice, and she rewrites the text offered into evidence by an accusing party (men, the Devil) who relies upon the consistency and sheer volume of previous opinion to argue its case, instead of on subjective feeling—the Virgin's pathos, Christine's *vrai sentiment*.

In her abandonment of the majority opinion, Christine's attitude also closely resembles Gerson's conception of moral certainty in the limitations it places on the need for prior authority and in its emphasis on individual experience. Christine takes this approach to a logical extreme, however, by rejecting even the opinion of a small and authoritative group of experts in favor of the opinion of one woman, herself. Although Christine's opinion runs counter to that of so-called experts on the nature of women, it can still be authoritative because it derives from careful study

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76 On the judgment of history as "virile," see Levinas, *TI*, 272.
77 Ibid., 276.
78 Kelly writes, "In a way [Christine] achieved what Nimrod failed to do with the Tower of Babel, not by aiming to usurp God by building upwards to Heaven, but by bringing Heaven to earth in the person and virtues of the Virgin Mary, queen of the City of Ladies" (*Changing Opinion*, 90). On the Virgin as "Justice herself," see also Kelly, Ibid., 104.
and from Christine's own experience living in a female body, her feelings or "vray sentement."
This is one of the points that Christine the narrator struggles with most as she overcomes her
original self-doubt, asking God how it can be that so many man could have produced erroneous
opinions about women: "Et s'il est ainsi, beau sire Dieux, que ce soit vray que ou sexe feminin
tant d'abominacions habondent, si que tesmoignent maint, et tu dis toy mesmes que le
tesmoignage de plusieurs fait a croire, par quoy je ne doy doubter que ce ne soit vray, helas!"
(1:1). By "tu dis toy mesmes...," Christine is referring to Deuteronomy 17: 6, where Moses
reveals that the testimony of two or three witnesses—and not just one—is necessary for the
imposition of the death penalty. But against the condemnation of womankind she finds in
available witnesses, Christine insists that her own singular testimony is valid, even when—as in
her defense of Semiramis and Medea—she contradicts everybody else's judgment.79

Because its rhetoric works to legitimate the author's own free exercise of opinion,
Christine's defense of general and particular women also constitutes a self-defense, as Mary
Agnes Edsall asserts: "While the Livre de la Cité des Dames is very much about woman, the
universal cateogry, it also is very much about an individual woman, Christine herself, and her
position in the terrestrial hierarchy. It is clear that, like many of her works of this period, this
book includes a defense of her public activities as an author and educated woman."80

But defense is not Christine's primary attitude in relation to herself. While she draws on
the judgment of other authorities, like Boccaccio, Augustine, and perhaps Gerson, she makes it
clear that her own judgment is what really counts. It is especially for this reason that Christine
represents the terminus ad quem of this study, in that her primary goal is not to mount a defense

79 Kelly (Changing Opinion, 78-79) discusses how Christine's position confronts the traditional
conception of valid authority going back to Aristotle, who had tied his definition of authority to
an unanimous concensus or majority opinion among experts.
80 "Like Wise Master Builders," 46.
against reader criticism, but to assert the truth of her own opinions, formed through long study and diligent self-knowledge. Like Augustine, the task that Christine assigns herself is making the heavenly city appear as clearly as possible now, before the Judgment, removing it from the visible world which has obscured it for so long, from "the hands of Pharao" (I:3).

In Cité, Christine's attitude toward her own judgment can be discerned especially clearly by examining, much as I have done in the cases of Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart, how the text transitions between different kinds of judgment. First, Christine's lamentation to God at the start of the text is accompanied by what she considers, in retrospect, to have been an abandonment of her own opinion for the "jugement d'autruy" (I:1). It is this lack of confidence in her own reasoning that the virtues have come to correct, as Raison tells Christine:

Fille chere ne t'espouvantes, car nous ne sommes mie cy venues pour ton contraire, ne faire aucun encombrier, ains pour toy consoler comme piteuses de ta turbacion et te giter hors de l'ignorance, qui tant aveugle ta mesmes congnosiance que tu deboutes de toy ce que tu ne scez de certaine science, et ajoustes foy a ce que tu ne scez ne vois ne congnois autrement fors par pluralité d'opinions estranges (I:2).\(^8\)

"Certaine science," again, represents mathematical certainty, so Raison's point is that Christine should not be so quick to "push away" from herself ("deboutes de toy") those matters which are not admitting of this degree of conclusiveness, and that she should not lend blind faith to the opinions of others just because they happen to be more numerous. Raison further reproaches Christine for accepting without question everything she reads ("Et il semble que tu cuides que toutes les paroles des philosophes soient article de foy et que ilz ne puissent errer. [I:2]"), before telling her that she must return to herself and her own sens: "Or te reviens a toy mesmes, reprens ton sens et plus ne te troubles pour tieulx fanfelues [...]" (I:2).

\(^8\) On this passage, see Kelly (Changing Opinion, 81-82), who discusses how Raison directs Christine on how to properly form an opinion.
As she initially questions the virtues, Christine also becomes interested in legal judgment. She asks how it is that women have traditionally been excluded from pleading and judging in courts (I:11). Raison tells Christine that if women are not allowed to act as judicial officials, they are really better off, because they thereby escape from the heavy responsibilities which courtroom judgment entails. This does not mean, however, that women are not capable of acting in such a capacity, and Raison proceeds to give a number of examples of women who demonstrated good governance and rulership in the absence of men. Christine then asks whether women are capable of attaining the highest branches of learning (I:27) and later (I:33), whether women have ever been responsible for discovering new knowledge. Before enumerating appropriate examples of learned women (I:27), Raison responds that women, in fact, have been compensated for their weaker bodies by an intelligence that is often sharper than men's. Historically, however, most women have been prevented from developing this intelligence because their experience has been limited to performing domestic tasks.

With these two lines of questioning about women's judgment, concerning the legal and political context of judgment and its intellectual context respectively, Christine highlights two points in particular. First, women's judgment is good enough to allow them to participate in politics and higher learning, and they have done so successfully in the past. Second, however, these are not the spheres in which most women actually do use their judgment, the areas in which they are most experienced. For Christine, women's judgment has always existed somewhat apart from that of men, even if it has at times participated in male institutions.\footnote{Quilligan (\textit{The Allegory of Female Authority}, 67, 111) discusses how Christine locates the judicial power of women beyond the official, written law. This is similar to Goodrich's arguments (\textit{Law in the Courts of Love}) about the alternative jurisdiction of women in medieval love debate poetry.} Just women have most
often been hidden, like many of Augustine's just men, behind the illusions of everyday life and the shadow cast by worldly power.

Christine's aim, similar to Augustine's in *De civitate Dei*, is not only to trace the exemplary figures of history, but also to demonstrate to individuals that they are also a part of this history. She wants to show how women's judgment has operated and continues to operate on a more basic level. At the end of the first book, therefore, Christine's attention turns away from the political and academic contexts of judgment (I:43) and toward more mundane opinion-formation. She asks whether women are possessed of the good judgment (*prudence*) necessary to make decisions by themselves on particular ethical matters. Raison answers affirmatively by providing exempla of women who demonstrated great prudence. In the second book, where Droitture replaces Raison as Christine's interlocutor, similar examples are given, such as Droitture's list of women whose advice benefitted their husbands (II:28-35). Then, in the third book of *Cité*, the personification Justice helps Christine to crown her city with great female saints, the Virgin Mary their queen. While one of Christine's first questions to the virtues had been about courtroom pleading, justice now takes on a very different context as it is incarnated most in those women who had shown humble devotion to Christian truth. To women especially, Christine attributes the quiet but self-assured exercise of good judgment, operating behind the scenes since the beginning of the world.

It is this non-official, often obscured context of prudent moral deliberation that Christine seems most interested in as a model for female behavior and for her own authority. She makes it clear throughout *Cité* that all women are possessed of similar capacities for good judgment, although as for men, these capacities differ based on the individual. In responding to Christine's question about *prudence*, for example, Raison tells her that it does not come originally from
learning (science), although science can certainly help it along; good judgment proceeds first from individual nature (1:43). In Christine's case, she has both natural good judgment and good learning. Although she lacks the authority necessary to plead or judge in a courtroom, as well as the authority of a university degree or a church office, she founds her judgment confidently upon prudence and knowledge of herself, without the necessity of absolute certainty or the backing of a majority opinion. In this, Christine also makes a woman's judgment emblematic of a third way between certaine science and religious loy, or, in Gerson's terms, the prudent individual discernment which suffices for certitudo moralis.

All of the French poets I have considered in this study call upon the juridical authority of women in one way or another and treat that authority as a model for their own. Confraternal poets, medieval lawyers, and Guillaume de Deguileville all saw the Virgin Mary's feminine approach to courtroom argumentation as an alternative to the rigidity of Satan's practice of law and as an emblem for their own ability to use words creatively. In a more courtly vein, Machaut, Petrarch and Froissart also sought the Virgin's advocacy, and all of them cast other women (like Machaut's Bonneurté and Froissart's "young lady") as judges and juridical officials. These women's acts of judgment, inherited to a large extent from the court d'amour, serve to give recognition to the supreme target audience of vernacular courtly poetry, female patrons and readers. The judgments of these human women were sometimes portrayed as fickle or hard-to-please, but in their uncertainty they also became a creative force and an important reminder of the ethical burden of writing.

For fourteenth-century authors, the model of female reader as judge was that of an other being to whom the author must respond, thereby making the divine third party manifest. In Cité, on the other hand, Christine is woman, reader, author and divinely-appointed judge all at once.
This difference is of supreme importance, again, because it situates the power of judgment in the hands of the author herself. In addition, the perceived ambiguity and flexibility of women's opinions—which Machaut, Petrarch and Froissart all make into a poetic virtue—is largely replaced in Christine's text with a depiction of women's judgment as equitable and prudent, better than many men at arriving at moral certainty in part because of women's traditional exclusion from the domains of absolute truth.

Elevating women's judgment and her own judgment, Christine provides a supreme example of the powers of human deliberation in general to reach reasonable conclusions without the burden of absolute certainty and according to lived experience and feeling. Christine rehabilitates female judgment as she identifies it not only with creativity, but also with reasonableness of opinion—the ability to arrive at *certitudo moralis*—as against the mathematical level of truth which cannot be reached in many ethical matters, such as literature. Through Christine's example of a woman brought back to her own judgments by divine authority, readers are likewise encouraged to form their own opinions about women and about Christine's text. But Christine does not throw herself on the mercy of the court of reader opinion, as do Deguileville, Machaut and Froissart. Instead, she seizes the spectral role of the female judge, the accusatory reader, and makes it her own, refashioning it into a model of practical ethical reasoning and authorial power.

"Humanist" is a difficult term to define, particularly when faced with the turbulent intellectual climate of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, but one of its consistent characteristics is a pronounced emphasis on the validity of individual reasoning and, increasingly, secular learning. In this sense, Christine was both feminist and humanist. Her combat against the excessive scrupulosity attached to being an author and her readiness to assert
her own authority mark a new approach to the anxiety of vernacular authorship, an approach which no longer sees the author suspended on the judgment of a third party.

While literature, for Christine, still has ethical implications in the next world, her eschatological representation of the literary procès demonstrates how she distanced herself from the persistent anxiety of fourteenth-century discourse on vernacular authorship. A lessening of anxiety is what Cité is all about, as it proceeds from the vicious self-doubt expressed during Christine's lamentation to the firm application of her judgment and her assertion that all women, educated or not, may cultivate their good judgment and thus be judged citizens of the heavenly city. As for the author, she operates under delegated divine authority and cannot go wrong, even if many of the matters she judges resist absolute certainty. Raison, Droitture and Justice appear to Christine according to the familiar model of the Boethian consolation, but they also echo the Consoling Doctor, Jean Gerson, in that they help Christine to stop worrying so much about what readers, and God, will say about her writing, and urge her to get back to work making heaven on earth.

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83 On the Boethian element of Cité, see Kelly, Changing Opinion, 82; Edsall, "Like Wise Master Builders," 47. Edsall (Ibid., 47) points to Petrarch's Boethian poetics in Secretum as an influence on Christine. On Christine's reception of Secretum, see also Richards, "Christine de Pizan, the Conventions of Courtly Diction, and Italian Humanism," 260.
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