THE CITY WITHIN: GROWING UP VIETNAMESE IN LITTLE SAIGON

Jennifer A. Huynh

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Abstract

Social scientists have primarily studied the socioeconomic consequences of ethnic enclaves, with emphasis on immigrants’ earnings and social mobility. Unfortunately, by focusing on the effects of ethnic entrepreneurship on the outcomes of adult immigrants, these studies fail to explore the point of view of immigrant children and the noneconomic effects of ethnic entrepreneurship. This dissertation focuses on these overlooked areas and examines how immigrants and their children living in new suburban ethnic communities are transforming the communities around them, redefining American society in the process.

Suburban segregation has changed the ethnic composition and social spaces in which immigrants spend their time. Using a case study of the largest enclave of Vietnamese refugees in Southern California, I investigate community formation and the effects of ethnic entrepreneurship on first and second generation immigrants. The major empirical findings from this study present several theoretical contributions to the sociology of immigration, transnationalism, and economic sociology. First, I show that academic profiling occurs for Vietnamese in Little Saigon in predominantly minority schools, complicating Asian American theories of race and ethnicity. Vietnamese racially pass as Asian not only for the benefits of the model minority myth but also the class and status that being Asian signals. Second, building on existing theories of immigrant integration, I find that transnational practices and ties work as a new mode of immigrant integration for the second generation. Vietnamese refugees and their children look to Vietnam as a site for transnational economic and political practices, and transnational activism transforms Little Saigon and integration. Finally, I show how the community
serves as a conduit in which memories of war, trauma, and flight are being reconstructed and passed onto the second generation.

These findings have implications on the study of racial and ethnic settlement patterns, immigrant incorporation, and Diaspora in multi-racial contexts. The US government currently has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. Studying the case of the US adoption of Vietnamese refugees, its longest running refugee program in US history, has public policy implications for the integration and treatment of other refugee populations.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Only in America is Saigon being resurrected,” Van Thai Tran, California State Assembly Member.

When I was young, I remember my father donning military garb in preparation for a Black April commemoration and marching down Bolsa Avenue carrying a flag to Freedom Park. In Chua, or temple, I learned that Black April was the day that Saigon fell to the Communists, April 30, 1975, and the reason why my father came to America. Later as a young adult undertaking fieldwork in Vietnam, I learned the celebration of April 30th as a day of liberation and victory over foreign imperialists with fireworks and street-wide celebrations in Hanoi, rather than a day of national mourning as it was for Vietnamese refugees in my community. The community I grew up is Orange County, California, with the largest concentration of Vietnamese refugees outside of Vietnam. Over forty years after the fall of Saigon, the longing for a nation-state has hardly abated for some refugees and their descendants.

In Orange County, a suburban metropolis sandwiched in between Los Angeles and San Diego counties, business leaders and consumers transformed Westminster’s Bolsa Avenue from a street “lined with orange fields and half empty shopping centers” into “the Vietnamese capitol of the United States” (Nguyen 2009). Little Saigon hosts a vibrant ethnic economy of more than 2,000 enterprises and businesses serving the nearly 300,000 Vietnamese living there. The exit sign on the freeway leading to the community is marked “Little Saigon.” This is not a singular ethnic strip mall but a thriving business and residential district with annual tax revenues of $300 million dollars, designated a Special Tourist Zone, and more recently an Anti-Communist Zone.
by the Vietnamese refugees and their American-born children who reside there. Places such as Little Saigon not only generate and contain tangible elements of the Vietnamese American community, they also represent and signify the community in a symbolic and ideological way (Aguilar San Juan 2002). This dissertation is a study of the Vietnamese community in Southern California with a focus on the experiences of the people who created it and of their children as they have carved out a life in the American context.

**Theoretical Significance**

The creation of Little Saigon in Orange County, which in the 1980’s was known as a predominantly white, affluent and conservative Republican suburb, is a sociological puzzle. Government agencies did not intend for the Vietnamese to build a 2,000 business and residential district in the middle of suburbia with a powerful ethnic political block. The policies of the Federal Government had the explicit goal of dispersion in order “to avoid the geographic concentration experienced with the Cuban refugees” (Rumbaut 1995). This plan did not work and today nearly fifty percent of the diaspora live in California in suburban centers. A recent report by Logan and Zhang (2013) using 2010 census data show that forty years after war and resettlement, Vietnamese are as segregated as Blacks. More generally, suburban segregation has changed the ethnic composition and social spaces in which immigrants spend their time. Unlike early 19th and 20th century immigrants who settled in cities, today many immigrants bypass this historic step by moving to suburbs (Price & Singer 2008). A majority of foreign-born now live outside central cities in multi-ethnic metros and suburbs (Farrell 2014; Katz 2010). Suburban Vietnamese communities have also been established in Houston, San Jose, Falls Church and
New Orleans (Walton 2015). With these historical conditions in mind, how did Little Saigon form as an ethnic suburban community?

The progeny of Vietnamese immigrants, their American-born children, are part of a rising demographic of second generation immigrants in the US. In 2015, half of all children under five are minorities, with 1 in 6 counties in the US having majority-minority youth populations (Johnson 2016). This racial diversity is distributed unevenly over geographic space. Suburban segregation has changed the ethnic composition and social spaces in which children of immigrants grow up and spend their time (Szulkin, 2010; Singer 2007). While from the outside, Little Saigon may appear as spatially and racially self-contained and homogenous, the neighborhood finds itself in the midst of a dynamic and multi-racial metropolis of other immigrant and ethnic groups. Second-generation immigrants make up close to fifty-seven percent of California’s youth population between the ages of 8 and 17 (Taylor 2013). States such as California, Texas, Hawaii, and New-Mexico are now majority-minority, and other states are shifting towards this trend. Given these demographic changes, the racial context for second generation Vietnamese illuminate how studies of race and identity outside of white majority settings are necessary (Cheng 2013; O’Campo 2016; Song 2003). Vietnamese growing up in Little Saigon interact primarily with first, second, and third generation Mexicans, Koreans, and Chinese among others, not native-born whites. This changing multiracial context offers new insight into understandings of race and immigrant integration as part of a new expanding literature on race outside the Black and white paradigm.

As one of the the largest refugee populations to experience growing up American, their first generation Vietnamese parents are linguistically isolated; nationally, 67% of Vietnamese are not English proficient. In Little Saigon, this number swells to 86% of first generation immigrants.
who are not able to speak, read, and write in English. Scholarly work often treats Vietnamese
refugees as (1) passive victims of war, (2) heroic Vietnamese warriors (Espiritu 2006) or (3) anti-
Communist model-minorities (Aguilar San Juan 2009; Espiritu 2002). In these treatments,
Vietnamese voices are silenced, framed in such a way that they remain invisible and subject to
the whims of the researcher. Additionally, these academic narratives tell us little of what is or is
not passed on to the second generation in terms of cultural memories through the medium of
language. Particular visions and understandings of Vietnam are passed to the second-generation,
but how does this happen if linguistic barriers exist between generations? I examine how war and
trauma shape not only first generation experiences in the community culturally and personally
but how this filters down to their American-born children.

Ethnic entrepreneurship is a particular mode of immigrant incorporation (Light & Gold
1993; Portes & Bach 1985; Waldinger 1995). In every decennial US census since 1890,
immigrants were more likely than natives to be self-employed (Anderson 2007). Little Saigons
can be found globally in such places as Houston, Seattle, Melbourne, Paris, Warsaw, Czech
Republic, and Montreal. Building upon other immigrant entrepreneurial studies (Portes &
Stepick 1993; Zhou 1992), this dissertation uses an intergenerational lens by focusing on the
children of immigrants who play an integral, yet largely invisible, role in family businesses and
the ethnic community. How are these young adults changing and transforming the ethnic
community? Using Zhou’s (2010) community perspective, I examine the noneconomic effects of
ethnic entrepreneurship that links community building and immigrant entrepreneurship for the
second generation.

The Case of Vietnamese in Orange County
Asians are the fastest growing population in the US; however, the heterogeneity of the Asian American population obscures differences in national origins, socio-economic characteristics, and motives for migration. Vietnamese are the largest Asian refugee population in the US. The size of the community, its geographic concentration, residential segregation, and mode of economic incorporation is significant. Orange County is home to the largest and longest concentration of Vietnamese outside of Vietnam and makes it particularly apt case study for community formation and immigrant integration.

Orange County provides a case study through which to understand race relations in the future. Post 1965 immigration from Asia and Latin America made Orange County one of the first majority-minority counties (Baldassare 1999). The county has undergone a rapid racial and ethnic transition from a homogenous 88% white community in 1970 to nearly 59% percent nonwhite in 2015. The multi-racial suburban context of Orange County provides a case studying of understanding race and new immigrant community formations.

The US government currently has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. Studying the case of the US adoption of Vietnamese refugees, its longest running refugee program in US history, has public policy implications for the integration and treatment of other refugee populations, especially as the number of refugees worldwide is surging, particularly populations from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The Vietnamese case highlights particular lessons and strategies of US immigrant incorporation and community formation.

Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation addresses four specific questions through ethnography and more than five years of participant observation in the community. First, how did the largest community of Vietnamese come to settle in suburban Southern California? Second, how does a changing multiracial context offer new insight into understanding of race and second generation integration? Third, how does the transmission of a refugee identity occur through language across generations? Finally, can a refugee identity or transnational ties serve as a new mode of immigrant integration? These questions point to the larger themes of immigrant integration and community transformation.

In the first half of the dissertation, I orient the reader to the major theoretical literature drawing upon the conceptual frameworks from economic sociology and the sociology of immigration. Chapter three is a description of the methodological approaches used to collect data and my qualitative entry into the field. Chapters four explains the history of the context of Vietnamese in Orange County. Accordingly, this chapter includes the context of exit and context of reception factors for Vietnamese immigrants.

The second part of the dissertation consists of four empirical chapters analyzing different aspects and contexts in which the experiences of second generation Vietnamese growing up in Little Saigon unfold. In chapter five, I describe Orange County, an American suburb and explain how the largest enclave of Vietnamese developed economic and community based institutions including its rise to political power. In Chapter six, I address the politics of memory showing how the community offers an ethnic and social environment in which memories of war and trauma, and flight are being reconstructed and passed to the second generation. In Chapter seven, I look at the ties that bind the first and second generation to Vietnam a half a century after the original settlement. I show how Vietnamese refugees and their children look to Vietnam as a site
for transnational economic and political practices, and how transnational activism transforms Little Saigon while influencing integration. In Chapter eight, I examine the American educational experiences of second generation attending predominantly Latina/o and Asian schools.

**Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework**

This project draws upon existing theoretical elaborations in the sociology of immigration and economic sociology to address my research questions. There are a number of concepts that are of importance, one of the most significant being the ethnic enclave to understand immigrant adaptation. Two historical examples of the enclave concept are the Cubans in Miami and Chinese in New York which serve as prototypes for understanding the economic behavior of nonmainstream groups (Portes 2010). Wei Lei’s (1998) model of ethnoburbs is also instrumental in understanding post 1965 ethnic community formation. The second part of this chapter examines transnationalism, modes of incorporation, and theories of immigrant integration. Each is discussed below.

**The Ethnic Enclave Debate**

Conceptual differences in the understanding of the enclave have long incited debates among scholars (Sanders & Nee 1987, 1992; Portes & Jensen 1987, 1989, 1992; Light et al. 1994; Waldinger 1993; Zhou 1999). The ethnic enclave has been proposed as an alternative form of economic adaptation; the original concept bore out of the traditional dual labor market theory to explain inequality in employment (Portes & Jensen 1987). The enclave hypothesis garnered attention at the time because it ran contrary to conventional economic and sociological wisdom. The latter argued that ethnic economies were at best an employer of last resort with
distinct disadvantages relative to entrance into mainstream sectors of the economy. At worst, they were characterized as “mobility traps” confining immigrant and ethnic minorities to a condition of permanent disadvantage (Borjas 1986, 1990; Bates 1987, 1989). Portes and Manning (1986) instead argue that the enclave is a stepping ground for the first generation to accumulate resources to secure entry of the second generation into the professional class. Waldinger and Bailey show how enclaves serve as places for training and teaching entrepreneurial skills to younger or recently arrived members (Portes 2010: 172). Raijman and Tienda (2000) refer to this as the stepladder hypothesis where entrepreneurship allows for role models and informal training systems. The ethnic enclave model was shown empirically to stimulate employment for minorities who would otherwise be at risk for unemployment in the primary labor market (Light 1994) and helps relieve sources of competition with the native-born (Portes and Zhou 1999).

From the perspective of scholarship, conceptual muddling resulted as the term ethnic enclave was used in a multitude of ways by social scientists (Sanders & Nee 1987; Waldinger 1993; Light 1994; Model 1985). This in turn led scholars to draw conflicting conclusions about the economic impact of the enclave. Thus, the major point of contention in this debate lay in empirically defining the enclave from the ethnic economy. Portes and Jensen (1987, 1992), the original theorists, emphasized that the core of the ethnic enclave thesis lies in the employer definition, an enclave consisting of economic establishments owned by, and in employing co-ethnic immigrants. This is in contrast to the residential definition used by Sanders and Nee (1987, 1992) which defines the enclave as consisting of a high concentration of co-ethnic immigrants. Zhou and Logan later combined these approaches and identified the enclave as (1) place of residence; (2) place of work; and (3) that of an industry with over-representation of
particular ethnic groups in enclave industries. However, the concept of enclave put forth by the founders of the theory is quite distinct from that of ethnic economy; the ethnic enclave is a special case of the ethnic economy requiring locational clustering of firms, economic interdependency, whereas an ethnic economy requires none of these (Light 2000:15). The enclave economy in actuality has emerged only among a few immigrant minorities and is a relatively rare phenomenon (Portes & Shafer 2007; Light 2000).

Portes (2007) using the case of Cubans in Miami characterized the enclave as (1) spatially clustered business district; (2) numerous immigrant-owned firms that employ many co-ethnic workers; and (3) vertical and horizontal economic linkages built on trust, ethnic networks, and a common language. Ethnic enclave economies obtained advantages due to “superior recapture of co-ethnic spending” caused by vertical and horizontal linkages where firms could acquire value at each stage of a product’s movement toward the market, losing little or no value to non-coethnic firms (Light: 2000, 13). For example, ethnic linkages allowed Cubans along Calle Ocho to extract maximum value from every dollar of final product ultimately sold giving them quasi-monopolistic advantage over particular industries (Portes 2007). As Portes showed, “for an ethnic enclave to exist, ethnic entrepreneurs must also employ their coethnics” (Light 1972; Portes 1981; Wilson and Portes 1980). This means that an “ethnic group needs to be relatively large and diversified in socioeconomic status, including at least a small number of members with sufficient economic resources to be able to establish businesses and business experience from the home country” (Wilson and Portes 1980). Second, an ethnic enclave must be spatially bounded from the main economy so that it can function internally as a labor market. Without a spatially bounded labor market, ethnic entrepreneurs cannot count on the availability of co-ethnic laborers, and ethnic laborers cannot count on co-ethnic employers. Certain human
capital skills, such as ethnic language, cultural knowledge, and social network ties to the place of origin, are important and marketable only in the internal labor market defined by an ethnic enclave (Yu 2011).

Expounding upon this original definition, Zhou (1992) examined New York’s Chinatown as an enclave. Both Chinese and Cubans are different in language, religion, race, and motivations for immigration including context of exit and reception factors. Yet, both groups developed patterns of economic and social adaptation that were remarkably similar (Portes 2010). Zhou finds the the enclave has strong socioeconomic potential to help, not retard immigrants’ assimilation into the mainstream (Ling 2009). The economic resources accumulated from self-employment of the first-generation are reinvested in their American born children to secure the best education possible and promote structural assimilation. She finds that the enclave economy has both a structural and cultural component; it includes ethnic institutions that mediate economic action such as chambers of commerce, informal credit associations and hometown associations. Despite low wages, immigrant Chinese women with limited English found working in Chinatown a better option because the enclave enables them to fulfill their roles as wage earners, wives, and mothers (Zhou 2004: 1045). Chinatown is a socioeconomic institution that provides immigrants with advantages and opportunities for assimilation without immigrants and their children losing ethnic identity and solidarity.

**Ethnoburbs**

Post 1965 immigration has given rise to the emergence of new types of ethnic communities. Historically, central cities served as gateways for immigrants and places for assimilation. Yet forces such as deindustrialization, the growth of the service economy, and increased globalized
have shifted immigrants to the suburbs (Vicino & Short 2013). Many new immigrants go directly to the suburbs (Katz 2010). A majority of foreign-born now live outside of central cities; in 2010, roughly 50% of Latina/o and 55% of Asian immigrants reside in suburbia (Farrell 2016).

Upwardly mobile native-born Asian Americans and new professional and entrepreneurial Asian immigrants have created “ethnoburbs” bypassing urban cities to settle in multiracial and multilingual suburbs (Li 2009). Wei Li defines ethnoburbs as a suburban ethnic cluster of residential areas and business districts in large metropolitan areas where a particular immigrant group has a “significant spatial concentration but does not necessarily comprise a majority of the total population” (2009: 12). Ethnoburbs have emerged in “growing knowledge-based economic areas that only began experiencing increased immigrant concentration due to the influx of highly-skilled international migrants” (2006: 22). Places like Northern New Jersey, and Fremont, California have been dubbed global suburbs (ibid). Ethnoburbs replicate some features of an ethnic enclave and some features of a suburb but lack a specific minority identity.

Ethnoburbs upends both spatial assimilation theory and classical assimilation theory. Spatial assimilation theory sees ethnic concentration as a temporary phase in a process of long-term spatial incorporation. It is believed that the upward socioeconomic mobility of immigrants translates into their residential integration into mainstream society (Massey 1985). Similarly, classic assimilation theory predicts that as immigrants and their children achieve higher socioeconomic and social status in the US, they no longer rely on the immigrant neighborhood for support and move out to reside in integrated neighborhoods among whites (Alba and Nee 2003: 22). Ethnoburbs rather are purposively created by immigrants “better equipped with educational, monetary, and social capital” who wish to maintain cultural continuity and identity (Li 2006:2).
Methodologically, an example of measuring ethnoburbs is Walton’s (2015) work on immigrant neighborhoods in California. Akin to the concept of ethnoburb, she measures “resurgent communities” using US census data, classifying particular neighborhood clusters with a median household income equal to or greater than $60,000, and greater than 25% college graduates with more than thirty percent foreign born. For Chinese, her study finds that examples of resurgent communities include Daly City, Hayward, Millibrae, Milipitas, and Irvine in California. Studying ethnoburbs has implications for the study of the enclave as there are some elements of Little Saigon that are similar of Wei Li’s (2009) theory of an ethnoburb. This is explored in Chapter 5.

Transnationalism

Actual and Affective Ties

Ethnoburbs and enclaves are not delimited to the physical boundaries of the city or nation-state. Active entrepreneurial networks are maintained between communities in the receiving and sending countries (Landolt 1999; Zhou 2004; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Levitt 2001; Guarnizo 1997; Wong & Ng 2004). Advances in communication and transportation technologies have allowed immigrants to maintain more frequent, immediate, and intimate contact with the home country (Foner 2007). Community formation and development take place in the context of transnationalism. The conceptual framework of transnationalism is a strategic site to understand how immigration is not a unilateral move from one country to another. The transnational lens examines the cross-border activities of immigrants, and their networks and ties regularly maintained with significant others in the home country, and is important for this study.
Sociologists and anthropologists have used the concept of transnationalism in a multitude of ways and projects leaving to, not surprising, conceptual muddling. Its delimitations range from social fields or support networks across state-nation-borders (Basch 1994); bi-focal identities (Glick Schiller 1999); migrant trans-state-politics (Waldinger & Fitzgerland 2004); ways of being and ways of belonging (Levitt 2004); and transnational circuits (Faist, 2000) among others (Morawska 2003). This is not to belittle its significance. The term transnational was co-opted by migration scholars who “noted that while both migrants and corporations operated in cross-border fields of action, restrictive state policies and the policies of borders were directed at migrants, but not at corporations” (Portes 2000). Glick Schiller and other anthropologists emphasize the ongoing interactions or flow of people, ideas, objects, and capitals in contexts where the state shapes but does not contain such linkages (Levitt 2006).

The literature on transnationalism has been differentiated into two distinct schools of thought. On the one hand, there is the perspective advocated by Alejandro Portes, Luis Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt that conceptualizes transnationalism as a form of practice or actual ties. By their definition, the transnational domain is narrowed to include “activities that require regular and sustained social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation” (Portes 1999). The connotation is that transnationalism only occurs in the actualization of cross-border linkages—most likely, in the form of direct contact—through observed and enumerable practices (for example, visits back home, remittances, and contact with kin living there). Grassroots projects can include the construction and support of schools and roads in one’s hometown or the funding of annual scholarships for students in the home country.

On the other hand, other scholars such as Nina Glick Schiller and Peggy Levitt offer another perspective that conceptualizes transnationalism as a process (Schiller 1995). They see
transnationalism as manifested not so much in the actual cross-border activities of migrants but instead in the lived experiences of being a “transmigrant,” who is defined as an “immigrant whose daily life depends on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identity is configured in relationship to more than one state” (ibid). The transnational process depends upon the affective ties—real or imagined—that immigrants maintain through the reinforcement of ethnonational identities and the preservation of homeland loyalties. In the case of Vietnamese refugees, this could include commemorative events that celebrate the Fall of Saigon in 1975, a community ban against the Vietnamese American flag, or a protest against purchasing goods made in Vietnam.

Not all immigrants are transnational however; other questions for the transnational field include who participates and what is the role of the state? Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) asks these provocative questions:

How does nature of the state in the home country mediate transnational activities? What is the relationship between national-level transnational activities and those carried out between local levels of government? How do social and political contexts in the country of origin affect transnational political practices and organizations? What resources does political socialization in the receiving country give to immigrants?

The scope of this theoretical intervention of my dissertation is to examine how first and second generation broadly participates in transnational endeavors in the enclave which will be taken up in Chapter seven

**Immigrant Adaptation & the Enclave**

The ethnic enclave economy is often celebrated as a mobility structure providing immigrants opportunities for employment regardless of human capital through ethnic solidarity “affecting
social mobility of the family and the group as a whole” (Portes & Bach, 1985; Portes & Zhou, 1992, 1996; Zhou, 2010). Concepts such as “ethnic capital” and “quality of the ethnic environment” (Borjas, 1995) are used to illustrate that youth originating from countries with strong educational traditions may benefit from close contact with other people from their countries of origin after emigrating (Bygren, 2010). Waldinger and Bailey show how enclaves serve as places for training and teaching entrepreneurial skills to younger or recently arrived members (Portes, 2010: 172). Raijman and Tienda (2000) refer to this as the stepladder hypothesis where entrepreneurship allows for role models and informal training systems. Using an intergenerational lens, Zhou and Kim’s (2006) study of community institutions such as schools and civic associations on Chinese and Korean educational attainment illustrates the non-economic benefits of enclave participation for the second generation through private supplementary after-school programs. The enclave consolidates “organizational life and overlapping memberships in businesses, churches, and ethnic institutions tying residents closely to the ethnic community” (2010: 91). Portes argues that the benefits of enclave entrepreneurship accrued primarily to its original builders and secondarily to their offspring (2006). Most second generation in the US do not follow in their parents’ footsteps but use their accumulated resources to obtain advanced degrees and enter well-paid careers (Zhou 1997; Portes 2005). Studies, so far with exception of Zhou and Kim (2010), tend to assume the benefits of the enclave as a mobility structure without exploring the midrange social processes in which social capital is produced. This dissertation uses Zhou’s level of analysis at both “level of the institution- how various institutions exist and interact to generate resources- and the other at the level of the individual- how patterned interpersonal relationships are structured by institutional participation” (2010: 87) to understand the processes of integration. The next section will trace the various theories of
immigrant integration chronologically focusing on how the enclave affects the adaptation of immigrants in ethnic communities.

**Segmented Assimilation**

Sociological theories of immigration build upon classical assimilation theory. Previous theories assumed a somewhat linear route to integration and were based on the experiences of 19th and 20th century European immigrants. In this framework, ethnic-origin traits of new immigrant groups (e.g. customs or language) were seen as weaknesses needed to be discarded in

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1 Theories of straight-line assimilation are based on the experiences of European immigrants to the US in the early 20th century. Straight line assimilation assumes that immigrants will gradually adopt the language and values of the host society, becoming indistinguishable from the majority culture while at the same time promoting their economic mobility. Several key works from this literature include Park and Burgess (1925), The City and Warner & Srole’s (1945) The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups. Writing in reaction to biological explanations of race, Robert Park’s (1950) race relations cycle is one such example of straight line assimilation. The race relations cycle a historical process of contact, competition, accommodation, and assimilation. Assimilation is the final stage and is “a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and by sharing their experience and history are incorporated in a common cultural life” (Park & Burgess, 1969). Assimilation is an unconscious action- it occurs without awareness. A newcomer may find that after years of living in a neighborhood, attending school, and church functions, or visiting stores and offices, she recognizes that she belongs to the community. In subsequent generations, movement out of immigrant enclaves occurs and often resembles movement away from city centers into suburban communities. According to Park (1969), assimilation is more likely to occur for the second generation. For Park and Burgess (1969) assimilation happens through the establishment of social contacts within shared social spaces such as in urban neighborhoods and work environments. Primary contacts such as within family groups or intimate relationships promote rapid assimilation while secondary contacts such as in work environments create accommodation, segregation and competition (Parks and Burgess, 1969). Through the process of “contact, competition, and accommodation” social boundaries and ideas are redefined and dismantled. Another classic work from the straight line assimilation camp is Warner and Srole (1945). The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups describes the integration of eight European-origin immigrant groups in 1930’s New York City. Warner and Srole identify generation as the key temporal market of assimilation (Telles 2008); they believed that all groups were moving ahead but at different paces and that assimilation varied by in factors such as skin color with darker skinned groups such as Sicilians and Greeks experiencing slower assimilation than lighter-skinned groups (ibid). They also examine subordination and strength of the ethnic system. Subordination is measured through freedom of residential choice, freedom to marry out of one’s own group, occupation restriction, exclusion from associations, and the amount of vertical mobility permitted in the host society of members of the ethnic or racial group. The strength of the ethnic system is the second important factor measured by power of the church, presence of separate school, and the political and economic unity of the group along with the number and power of the ethnic associations. They find that the greater the difference between host and immigrant cultures, the greater the subordination that immigrants face, but that this declines over generations. This theory again reaffirms that assimilation was necessary part of upward mobility where process of assimilation was defined as primarily a function of generational replacement; each subsequent generation became closer to the American ideal.
order to successfully assimilate (Zhou 1999). Earlier theories were criticized for assuming the inevitability of assimilation and being uni-directional, not considering how the process of immigrant incorporation simultaneously transforms society and immigrants (Alba 2006).

Building on the classical assimilation framework, segmented assimilation posits that outcomes vary across immigrant minorities and that the question is not whether immigrants and their children will assimilate to US society, but to what segment of society they will assimilate (2002: 55). Unlike earlier straight-line assimilationists, segmented assimilation posits that some immigrant groups will find their pathway to incorporation blocked. The conventional straight line assimilation view emphasized individual pursuit of action with immigrants’ aspirations to improve material and social conditions of their lives’ producing assimilation as an unintended consequence (Waldinger 2016). Segmented assimilation flatly rejects this view and places “importance on the structural embeddedness in constraining individual action” (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). Segmented assimilations’ theoretical intervention is to understand how social structure affects outcomes among immigrants and their children through particular “modes of incorporation”.

In reaction to classic assimilation theory, Portes and Rumbaut (2001) outline “modes of incorporation” which influence the path towards integration: receiving government, society, and family/community resources. The theory also outlines three possible trajectories for the children of immigrants2. How immigrants are received depends on the contextual factors of the immigrant

2 These three are described in Portes and Zhou (1993) and include consonant acculturation which occurs as parents and children learn the language and culture at approximately the same pace (i.e. more educated parents and those fluent in English are more likely to come closer to this path); dissonant acculturation, an outcome which can often although not necessarily lead to downward social mobility, occurs when parents lack sufficient resources (education and income) and sufficient integration into the ethnic community in order to cope with contextual disadvantages; selective acculturation is in between these two extremes of dissonant and consonant acculturation. Selective acculturation is described as a situation where fluent bilingualism in 2nd generation exists preserving channels of communication with parents and strong ethnic ties (110).
receiving country. Contextual factors such as the experience of discrimination and location and structural changes in the labor market render the adaptation of the second generation much more problematic than earlier theories suggested. In addition, race can “overwhelm the influence of class background, religion, or language” (2001). The theory argues that ethnic communities and co-ethnics can generate social capital to weaken the effects of discrimination and negative governmental reception.

Co-ethnics can be the base of support, particularly if they are successful themselves. Thus, existing ethnic communities play an important role in providing social capital and resources to the first and second generation. Zhou (1998) in Growing up Vietnamese-American shows how social capital and selective acculturation can better support children’s adaptation through the dense ties among a community of Vietnamese in Louisiana. Zhou finds that those linked into a strong co-ethnic community do better because of greater social control and reinforced messages of the parents. In Versailles Village, the old Vietnamese proverb “parents may be far away, but neighbors are always near” demonstrates the watchful eye of the community (1999:105).

Selective acculturation, a situation where parents and children learn English fluently and experience fluent bilingualism in the second generation preserves channels of communication with parents. In order to achieve this, the community must be well integrated with considerable resources to give youths the incentive to comply with community norms and to combine them with those of the mainstream (Portes & Rumbaut 1996: 251). This form of acculturation can lead to upward social mobility in spite of a hostile external context (i.e. when contextual disadvantages are high) because the community provides protection against discrimination and encourages the educational achievement of their youths. Partial loss of parental language is
compensated by supportive networks in the immigrant community (ibid). Youth learn key values and normative expectations from their parent’s home country by being embedded in strong co-ethnic networks.

**Boundary construction and race**

More recent scholarship in reaction to segmented assimilation, especially the work of Alba and Nee, conceptualize assimilation as a process of boundary construction where ethnic communities or ethnic identity may be defined as “having symbolic or cultural boundaries that individuals and groups rely on to identify and distinguish themselves from those of other groups” (Alba, 2005). These distinctions are “embedded in a variety of social and cultural differences” that Alba and Nee denote as distal; deeper causes embedded in large structures such as institutional arrangements and the firm/labor market, and proximate which operate at individual level and through social networks (primary groups and the community). Assimilation is a form of ethnic change that is not inevitable nor will it erase inequality, but “will occur through changes that take place for groups on both sides of the boundary” (2005: 17). In the context of assimilation and immigrant incorporation, these boundaries may be seen as being bright, blurred (Alba, 2005), or shifted (2003: 61). A “boundary might be blurred when it is unclear who belongs on either side of the boundary” (Alba, 2005); a boundary can also evolve over time from being bright of clear to becoming blurred (ibid). For example, a boundary can shift, wherein former outsiders are transformed into insiders (e.g. the case of Eastern European once being racialized as non-white).

Alba and Nee use many of the same indicators as segmented assimilation in their theory, such as the importance of human capital. They also argue that segmented assimilation reifies
race; a counter criticism being that that they do not consider race as an important causal mechanism in and of itself. Their definition of assimilation also presupposes decreasing boundaries due to equal interaction of different people of “like-status.” This is problematic given residential and occupational segregation; forty-percent of the foreign-born are workers or laborers or in the service industry and residential segregation continues in enclaves and suburbs (Massey 1993; Shapiro 2004; Farrell 2016; Pinto-Coelho 2015). Ethnic boundaries may be blurring for those with class resources, yet the predominance of ethnoburbs and resurgent communities suggest that even highly affluent and educated non-whites are choosing to self-segregate (Walton 2015; Walton 2016; Li 2009). Unprecedented access to institutions does erase a status of ‘other’. The boundary approach is helpful in that it examines race and integration as a process, rather than merely measuring outcomes. While Alba and Nees definition of mainstream has been attacked in the literature as too encompassing (Portes 2004), it fails to include the undocumented in its analysis. Immigration needs to take into account the intersectionality of identities: gender, race, class, and immigrant status, especially when nearly twenty-five to thirty percent of the US foreign-born are undocumented.

Assimilation theory now recognizes that there is no unitary core culture into which immigrants must assimilate but there are multiple reference groups (Brubaker, 2008: 45). The aforementioned works are all in dialogue with Barth’s work on boundaries. For Barth, the locus of ethnicity is the maintenance of boundaries, and not cultural differentiation. The structured interaction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ takes place across the boundary where “ethnic identity depends on ascription both by members of the ethnic group in question and by outsiders” (Barth 123). The study of assimilation historically has been concerned with the boundary-making process. Together these fields provide a methodological framework for this dissertation to
understand the particular mode of economic adaptation of Vietnamese in Southern California. In
the following chapter, I will describe the research design and methods.
Chapter 3: Data & Methodology

Participant observation and qualitative research have many advantages and disadvantages. This chapter will explain my position in the field and detail my research strategy including data collection, instrumentation, relationships with gatekeepers, entry into the field, analysis, and ethical considerations. The main purpose of this study is two-fold: characterizing the processes of community formation for the first generation, both immigrants and refugees, and showing how the ethnic community, host society, and transnationalism shape the experiences of the second generation growing up in the enclave. Since this research is concerned with the experience and processes of community building and identity, my primary methods included qualitative and ethnographic data.

Quantitative data on the second generation is limited. A challenge to studying the second-generation is a lack of comprehensive public list or sampling frame from which nationally representative samples of the second generation can be drawn (Heckathorn 2006). The 2010 census asked respondents for their country of birth, but did not include questions regarding their parent’s country of origin. Therefore, census data on the second generation is limited to second generation immigrants who are either under the age of 18 or living with their parents. The last census to ask questions regarding parent’s country of origin was the 1990 census. Large datasets focused on specific regions of the United States, typically immigrant receiving destinations, have focused on the children of immigrants including The Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), the Study of the Immigrant Second Generation in Metropolitan New York, and most recently the Immigration and Intergenerational Mobility in Metropolitan Los Angeles (IIMMLA). While IIMMLA contains a qualitative component, it is focused on the larger Los Angeles and Orange County metropolitan area, and the sample size is limited for Orange County.
These data sets are helpful in providing context but does not do as well in capturing the qualitative and subjective dimensions and experiences of growing up Vietnamese. The advantages of ethnography include Geertz’ rich or thick descriptions of the social environment, stressing the socially constructed nature of reality where the relationship between the researcher and situational factors that shape the study are given attention (Denzin 2005: 11).

**Methodological challenges**

**Epistemology**

A fundamental issue concerning ethnographic research is who is more qualified to conduct it, the outsider or the insider (Zinn 1979). Claims have emerged to which truth is better, insider truths that rebut outsider truths or outsider truths that rebut insider truths (Merton 1972). The insider position claims that insiders have a monopolistic or privileged access to knowledge of a group, while the outsider position maintains that unprejudiced knowledge about groups is uncovered by nonmembers of those groups (Merton 1972). There are advantages and disadvantages to both positions. Collins (1986) outlines potential advantages to the outsider position: 1) objectivity, 2) the tendency for people to confide in strangers in a way they would not with one of their own, and 3) the ability of the stranger to see things that would be more difficult for an insider to see. Zinn (1979) suggested that potential advantages of the insider position are: 1) the lenses that co-ethnic researchers approach a question with may prompt them to ask questions in a different way, capturing a different response, 2) there may be aspects of an immigrant group that one from the outsider may not be able to comprehend, and 3) possibly most important, is that insiders are less apt to encourage distrust and hostility, and the experience of feeling excluded from the community at large. One of the disadvantages of insider field research
is the “subjectivity” of the researcher that could lead to “bias” in data gathering and interpretation (Zinn 1979). Denzin (1998: 13) further points out that the myth of value-free research is shattered not only by the researcher’s own commitments, but by the social and political environment in which research is carried out. The social position of the researcher determines what the researcher is likely to observe. The way the researcher interprets the field site is often largely conditioned by the researcher’s own theoretical preconceptions (LeCompte 1982: 101).

So in gathering data and interpretation, who am I, an insider or outsider? And, who determined that in this study? Did I? Did my informants?

I am an insider in many ways. I grew up in Little Saigon, in the cities of Santa Ana and Fountain Valley until the age of 18 when I went away to college at the University of California, Berkeley. My experiences growing up in the community included daily profane routines: attending church, school, helping my father in his small business, and scouting among other activities. Except my world was in Vietnamese: we celebrated the Catholic Feast of Vietnamese Martyrs in November; Vietnamese language was an option in my public high school; and scouting was co-sex and called Hoi Huong Dao. My large extended family and kin networks expand beyond blood relations. Many boat people upon arrival formed deep bonds of kinship with the people they escaped Vietnam with (by boat or through spending time in the refugee camps). Processing times varied for refugees with some spending as little as two months to more than ten years in the camps. The social bonds and networks formed in refugee camps create a form of fictive kinship that followed many refugees to the United States. These ties my father had to his local hometown association of Quang Ai in Orange County for the past thirty-six
years, and my “uncles” and “aunts”—who later as an adult I found out were not really my blood
kin—became important informants in my research.

My father’s experience in re-education camp and time in the Philippines refugee camp
typifies the experience of many boat people. My father is working-class and an entrepreneur of a
small printing company. Growing up, I never thought of us as poor because everyone around you
was just like you. My parents were creative in terms of paying for the things that my brother and
I needed growing up in the community. They bartered printing: business cards and letterhead for
our braces and family dentistry, for our after-school tutoring programs in the community, and
even for housing repairs. It was a reciprocal relationship, and I doubt I could obtain these types
of exchange relationships that my father had in the community as a second generation
immigrant. As a graduate student at Princeton, I felt and understood my class position keenly
because my student stipend was more than my father’s income.

In many ways, I am also an outsider. The fact that I am working on my graduate degree
at Princeton in a social science field made me very distinct from the majority of my first
generation informants. My surname is Huynh which is distinctly Vietnamese but I am multi-
racial and have racial privilege to pass as Asian or other. Racially, I am an outsider—most would
not guess me to be Vietnamese without knowing my surname. I am more often labeled as
Filipina or Latina. This unresolved issue of insider versus outsider is one of values. Whose
values guide observations, the observer- etic or the observed- emic (Vidich & Lymann 1994)?

My understanding and interest cannot ignore my own personal ties growing up in the
community. My father is a boat person, one of 16 children, who was drafted into the war at 18.
My mother, once a devout Catholic and volunteer with Catholic Charities met my father through
her volunteer work. Growing up, my parents took in foster children and helped support distant
cousins after first arriving. I remember as a child sharing my bed with cousin “Muou” (literally translated “10th child”) after she first arrived to the US. In larger Vietnamese families, an excess of children often times are named numbers based on their birth order. I also came to have another brother Tuyen who was later called Tim, where Tim, my younger brother Jonathan, and I shared one bedroom until high school. Tuyen, seven years older than myself, joined a Vietnamese gang. I still remember my father lifting up his thin white undershirt in the kitchen to find the large dragon emblazoned over his back. Aptly, he was part of the gang “Black Dragonz” in high school. I also remember the fighting when he shaved his head similarly to the other gang members at school with one medium tuft of hair in the center. It became a marker of who belonged and who did not in school. My father demanded that he shave the remaining hair off his head and his nickname at school then became “Little Buddha” as he was completely bald. He left our house at 19 after failing several community college classes. He is married now with two children and does nails in Florida.

My younger brother went to college and has a master’s degree in linguistics and teaches English as a Second Language. My brother is most likely representative of those bad boys who turned around. The former Vietnamese gang members who went to college. As the principal of the continuation school in Little Saigon explained to me, gangs in the Vietnamese community are not inter-generational. The difference between the past gangs when I was an adolescent in the 90s and early 2000s and the current Vietnamese gangs is that the new gang members are the student council president and the advanced placement student. Another cousin has a similar story to my cousin, a former gang member and now physician, his parents would come over and talk to our parents about their “bad children.” I still remember my aunt crying in our living room. I was lucky for being a female in the sense that my movement was more controlled and because
we had a stronghold of cousins and family who could take care of us while my father worked. Every day my father would go to a com shop and buy the $1 items that he did not know how to cook or have time to do so at home.

This is where I grew up and where most of my extended or fictive kind also grew up. To me, my beginnings are not seen as exotic, they are normalized because the majority of people around you is Vietnamese and speaks Vietnamese.

Moreover, what we often consider descriptive “fact” in sociology often becomes the interpretations or preconceptions of the people being studied (Kincheloe 2005). Qualitative research often becomes “interpreting the interpreted.” As Kincheloe points out, observation rests on “something researchers can find constant,” meaning “their own direct knowledge and their own judgment” (2005: 389”). Bias is inevitable. Researchers often impose their own notions and cultural categories on certain contexts. For example, how people define poor or rich or success varies by different groups (Lee & Zhou 2014).

Literature also argues that the reliability, validity, and generalizability of qualitatively derived findings can be in doubt (LeCompte 1982: 100). There are “few guidelines for protection against self-delusion let alone the presentation of unreliable or invalid conclusions” with participant observation (Byrman 2001: 275). However, external reliability as defined by Byrman (2001: 273) means the degree to which a study can be replicated, is a difficult criterion to meet in qualitative research such as participant observation since “it is impossible to freeze a social setting and the circumstances of an initial study to make it replicable.” Unique situations cannot be replicated exactly. Even the most precise replication of research methods may fall short of producing identical results (LeCompte 1982: 104). This study in particular included observation and interviews spanning Little Saigon from 2003 to 2014. I lived full time in the enclave from
2010 to 2014 volunteering with Project Motivate, conducting interviews, and working at a tutoring center in Little Saigon.

The nature of research design makes it difficult to determine the reliability of participant observation. In some ways, no ethnographer can reproduce the results of another researcher because information is often dependent on the social role held by the researcher within the environment (Fetterman 2010). Establishing an appropriate role in the environment is important in order “to be regarded by the members of a community as a participant in their activities and interests is key” (Denzin 2008) The researcher needs to take into consideration things such as sex, age, race, class, or occupational activity when entering the social environment (ibid). For example, being female made it difficult and somewhat uneasy when speaking with underground anti-communist political party leaders who were predominantly first generation and male. This was made most apparent when I enlisted the help of a second generation male Vietnamese college student in Houston; the interaction between the first generation Vietnamese interviewee and my second-generation research assistant was very different from my own experience as a multi-racial female. The interviewee’s explanation for why these human rights organizations exist were radically different in tone and content compared to my earlier interactions with the same organizations in the diaspora. Researchers should be ready for tests of either competence or trustworthiness (Bryman 2015). I learned this lesson early on while conducting research at UCLA on Little Saigon. I was told fallacious stories by informants in an internet café popular for second generation. I only found out that this was the case when I returned to the field site again for a second interview. I learned that repeat exposure and over time better relationships can develop and aid in information gathering. As Denzin (2002) points out, “researchers do not obtain similar findings unless they develop corresponding social interactions” (15). Results are
legitimate, but different. Such inferences are features of reality made by ethnographers who hold different social positions or contacts. An outsider would produce a different analysis than someone intimately linked to the community.

Reliability is further difficult due to the selection of informants (LeCompte 1982). Part of participant observation is making sure that informants who provide data are somewhat representative of different groups of the study population. Knowledge gathered is often a function of who gives it. For example, only studying the perceptions of a particular group of second generation in my study may confine observation in one segment of the population potentially precluding participation of others perceptions. In this way, I made a conscious effort to sample people who had grown up and left the enclave, and those who were still living in Southern California. In addition, I sampled second generation of all different class backgrounds, parental waves of immigration (1975, boat people, HO, Amerasians), occupations, and purposively sampled schools and teachers, newspaper reporters, and significant others in the community.

**Preparing for entry into the field**

Asking these questions evolved from my training in urban ethnography. This training was made possibly by an undergraduate program sponsored by the National Science Foundation and the Department of Sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles. In the summer of 2003, I worked under the guidance of Professors Jack Katz and Robert Emerson to produce an independent paper examining the social space of Little Saigon. To my delight, I immersed myself in what was the familiar but armed with a sociological toolkit to understand the places and venues that I had grown up. I spent two months observing social interaction in public spaces
in Little Saigon—ranging from the Catholic Community Center, the infamous Lee’s sandwiches (a chain akin to the Vietnamese version of McDonalds serving street style Vietnamese banh mi sandwiches), and illicit Vietnamese coffee shops among places in the community to ask: How is Little Saigon defining itself as ethnic? What are the markers and boundary processes of racialized spaces? This culminated in a research paper and an academic space to share ethnographic notes with professors, UCLA graduate students, and other REU participants all involved in various urban ethnographic enterprises in Southern California. My dissertation is peppered with ethnographic observations written during this time period.

The summer ethnography practicum later led to my undergraduate honors thesis at the University of California, Berkeley where I conducted fieldwork for three months both in Little Saigon and in Southern Vietnam, documenting the lived experiences of Amerasians. Amerasians, the progeny of American soldiers and Vietnamese women during the war, in the enclave are phenotypically seen as other but are ethnically Vietnamese. In Little Saigon, I found them relegated to service sector jobs in fast-food restaurants, as nail technicians, and waiters. Even in the enclave, they suffer the same discrimination that they faced in Vietnam labeled and stereotyped as children of prostitutes. Through interviews, I learned of their traumatic experiences of being bought and sold as tickets to the United States by wealthy co-ethnics and often times abandoned upon reaching the US. Many have given up the idea of ever meeting their fathers but choose to stay in the enclave because it is familiar culturally and linguistically. The eroticization of my own experience being mixed race in America made me realize how important a historically contingent and fluid understanding of race is. My thesis was awarded highest distinction and honored at my commencement for a transnational approach and comparative fieldwork.
Before this research, I was not aware of the prominent positions of several family members. As a child my mother and father took in several foster children from Vietnam. These children’s spouses, one in particular came to be one of my key gate-keepers. He is a well respected leader in the Vietnamese community that is one of the few apolitical figures in the community. As a senior guidance counselor at a local community college, he helped over one-thousand Vietnamese immigrants transition and navigate the educational system in the US. For him, he helped introduce me to many contacts and meetings with some of Little Saigon’s prominent people including the founder and editor of Nguoi Viet, the largest Vietnamese newspaper circulating in the diaspora.

From the Vietnamese newspaper, I met another key informant who runs an underground political blog and photographers for the newspaper who attended many local events. I also interviewed many media outlets in the community including a TV show called “Generation US” focused specifically on the Vietnamese second generation experience in the United States. At Princeton, I also befriended a graduate student through the Vietnamese Student Association who similarly grew up in Little Saigon and was a lawyer. While I was away writing in graduate school, we would meet to discuss local politics and my reflections of the enclave over dinner. He worked for Loretta Sanchez and as the campaign manager for Phu Nguyen. Phu Nguyen is the owner and operator of the largest transnational Vietnam-US remittance company in the United States “Hoa Phat”, which started in Little Saigon now comprises thirty companies. These informants were important significant others in beginning my research and making and re-making connections to people that I grew up with but did not necessarily analyze or see their role in the community.
In a community that respects and privileges higher education, the cache of the Princeton label also provided an entry point. Many people would assume that I was not from here, rather from the East Coast and would go into detail assuming that I knew nothing about the community until I would selectively reveal the elementary, middle or high schools that I attended and cross-streets of my house. The assumption of some that I was a foreigner in my own neighborhood would often times elicit detailed responses from informants. I sometimes chose this strategy because I had some interviewees who would not detail or describe assuming “you already know this.” This of course did not work for the entry points from relatives and family friends.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I also spent one year as a mentor through Project Motivate, an organization that works with at-risk second generation Vietnamese immigrants in Orange County. Started in 1996 for “academically and socially at-risk Vietnamese youth”, Project Motivate provides a free mentorship program for high school youth age 13 to 17. The program offers a summer camp, study hall, monthly activities, and one-on-one mentorship with a professional Vietnamese American. Typically, mentors were second or 1.5 generation professionals from Orange County who worked in the area, transnationally seeking employment, or college students. I would meet weekly with my mentee at a study hall with other mentors and second-generation Vietnamese mentees. I also worked part-time between 2011 and 2013 at an after-school tutoring company in the enclave teaching writing and reading for the SATs on Saturday mornings. The wall of the tutoring center was enshrined with the tutors faces and the schools that they had graduated from. This was an all encompassing tutoring school—the school provided SAT tutoring, high school subject tutoring and a college admissions package which included consulting on which schools to apply to outside the top 20 universities and college admissions essay help. The school also focused on how to not be “seen as Asian”- one poignant
example was a valedictorian female high school student who was on the varsity wrestling team and spoke Swahili.

In addition to the in depth one on one interviews, I also conducted many semi-informal interviews with political leaders, professors at local universities, and visited the Southeast Asian American archives at the University of California, Irvine.

**Data Sources**

The sources of information that inform this dissertation come from multiple sources: a research project where I studied 87 transnational organizations including fieldwork in three Vietnamese communities in the US with the Center for Migration and Development at Princeton (Houston, San Jose, & Orange County), as well as fieldwork in Vietnam. I also conducted 86 in-depth, one-on-one interviews with second-generation Vietnamese who grew up in Little Saigon and whose parents either owned a business or worked in the enclave. Other sources include Vietnamese and English language-newspapers and the archives at the University of California, Irvine as well as data from the US Census and the IMMMLA. These data sources are explained below in further detail. Questionnaire and surveys are found in the appendix.

**Transnational Methodology**

As part of a collaborative and joint effort with the Center for Migration and Development at Princeton, I worked on a study of transnational organizations in three areas of high concentration of Vietnamese in the US. Data collection included the creation of a national database of Vietnamese-American organizations, interviews with organizational leaders in the US and Vietnam, administering a survey to US organizations, and interviews with various
governmental ministries in Vietnam and overseas Vietnamese committees, as well as field observations of projects in Vietnam. The data includes both qualitative and quantitative components. Due to budget and time constraints, the focus of the transnational organization study is devoted to three areas of the United States: Orange County and Santa Clara County, California, and Harris County, Texas. The states were chosen in particular because they have the largest number and concentration of Vietnamese immigrants (US Census 2010).

A database of transnational organizations in the three geographic areas listed above was created via local Vietnamese language business directories, the GuideStar database, Melissa DATA, and discussions with informants by email, phone or in-person. A directory of 632 organizations was compiled with most entities being hybrids that focus both on domestic and overseas projects in Vietnam. The organization types include economic/business, professional, hometown associations, ethnic/cultural, political, religious, and other (Table 2).

My field observation included visiting enclaves in California to speak with leaders of the community, ethnic news media, Vietnamese consular officials, as well as attending organizational activities. The organizational activities included two protests in California, a trade forum with the California-Asia Business Council in San Francisco, fundraising dinners, and visiting temples to speak with members. Vietnamese celebrations such as the New Year or Tet festival in Orange County provided a venue to speak with many organizations and student groups. Following the methodology of Portes and Zhou (2011), the organizations were not chosen at random but rather as emblematic of their principal types: at least five years old with one or more projects in the home country which later could be monitored during fieldwork in Vietnam.
The results were analyzed by first stratifying the organizations based on type. The organization characterized themselves during the interview as a hybrid or one of the following types of organizations: political; economic/professional; social/cultural; hometown; alumni; and religious. Then, the organizations were split into first and second-generation organizations; the data neither identified the age at migration nor the particular immigrant cohort. The definition of second generation organization refers to organizations in which sixty percent or more of their board members or permanent members are second-generation immigrants, born in the United States. These groups ranged from Lions Club, which sponsors mobile eye clinics in Vietnam, to pro-democracy youth groups advocating for Vietnam to be re-instatement on the list of Countries of Particular Concern for Religious Freedom. Chapter seven presents summary statistics and examples of what is classified as second-generation organizations.

Between January 2009 and January 2010, surveys were conducted with eighty organizations across the United States including 59 surveys in the three largest enclaves in the United States. My fieldwork included site visits to interview and speak with recipients of aid partners in Vietnam for the selected projects. The survey used a closed-ended questionnaire with a few open-ended questions.

Data Collection in Vietnam

The methodology is rigorous in that US-Vietnamese organizations interviewed in the US were also interviewed in Vietnam. Fieldwork in Vietnam took place between July and October 2009, focused on interviews with selected US-Vietnam transnational organizations and governmental agencies involved in overseas Vietnamese affairs at the national, provincial, and local levels. Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries in
Hanoi were conducted, as were interviews with provincial departments in Hai Phong, Hue, and Ho Chi Minh City.

I focused on three areas in Vietnam (Figure 1): Hue in Central Vietnam and two centrally administered cities- Ho Chi Minh City and Hai Phong:

**Ho Chi Minh City** is one of the largest sending communities for overseas Vietnamese, with a population of nearly 7.1 million. Many of the 125,000 Vietnamese citizens who were airlifted in 1975 worked for the Southern regime came from HCMC. HCMC, formerly known as Saigon, was a major sending center for immigrants, boat people, those who came under ODP, HO, and the Amerasian Homecoming Act. After the war, many people in Southern and Central Vietnam left for HCMC and other coastal regions to flee by boat (Figures from Committee for Overseas Vietnamese forthcoming).

**Thua Thien-Hue** Province has a population of nearly 1.1 million with more than 20,000 overseas Vietnamese. Known as the former imperial capital of Vietnam, most of its overseas Vietnamese are in the US, France and Germany. Many left as boat people and under the HO program (See Vu Pham (2003)- Beyond and before boat people: Vietnamese American history before 1975 for a concise record).

**Hai Phong** is located in northern Vietnam about two hours from Hanoi. The centrally administered city has a population of 1.8 million and more than 11,000 overseas Vietnamese living in 35 countries mostly in Canada, the US, England, France, Germany, China and Japan with varying levels of resources and reasons for leaving Vietnam. The overseas community here is one of the
strongest and most successful in mobilizing funds from its overseas community. It has one of the two committees for overseas Vietnamese in the country and its organizational association for overseas Vietnamese is extremely popular with 700 members in more than 11 associations throughout the province. The Vietnamese Americans from Hai Phong are found throughout the US with a large presence in the bay area. Most Vietnamese American from Hai Phong came as boat people via Hong Kong after 1976 and may be part of the “black market” trafficking of immigrants. I selected Hai Phong as a control to find out what made this province successful in its outreach towards the overseas community as most Vietnamese Americans left from central and Southern Vietnam after the war.

![Map of Vietnam](image)

**Figure 1: Map of Vietnam**

Hai Phong: face-to-face interviews with Department of Foreign Affairs- Director & Vice-Director, Fatherland Front, Relatives of Overseas Vietnamese, Department of Overseas Vietnamese Affairs Desk, and the Overseas Vietnamese Committee’s Deputy Standing Chairman

Ho Chi Minh City: face-to-face interviews with officials at HCMC Vietnam Fatherland Front, HCMC People’s Committee, HCMC Department of Foreign Affairs, United States Consulate
Officers in Political and Economic Affairs, ALOV, Committee for Overseas Vietnamese, Fatherland Front-District 9, VUFO-HCMC, PACCOM-HCMC, National Assembly Member, Overseas Vietnamese Business Association

Hue: Department of Foreign Affairs, Hue People’s Committee, Department of Finance and Investment, ALOV- Association of Liaison with Overseas Vietnamese, and Hue Fatherland Front

The research methodology included: site visits with 14 organizations interviewed in the US, in addition to quasi-governmental organizations involved overseas such as ALOV, Association for Liaison for Overseas Vietnamese. Interviews included organizations both registered and not registered with the government. Interviews used a bilingual survey instrument translated into both English and Vietnamese to interview leaders of selected organizations and government officials in Vietnam to understand how projects take place on the ground. Interviews with government affiliated organizations and agencies included face-to-face interviews with officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ministry of Industry and Trade, National Committee for Overseas Vietnamese in Hanoi, Hai Phong, Thua Thien-Hue, and Ho Chi Minh City, and several National Assembly Members. The Association of Liaison with Overseas Vietnamese, an organization operating under the Fatherland Front and various People’s Committees and Department of

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3 Organizational development in Vietnam is growing because of changing attitudes towards international organizations; while Vietnamese American NGOs are not well represented among registered NGOs, the strength of Vietnamese American NGOs in general lies in their ability to gain the support of local partnerships and local governments. Throughout the 1990s the number of INGOs working with Vietnam has increased from approximately 86 registered NGOs in 1992 to approximately 500 registered INGOs today. The director of PACCOM said in an interview that Overseas Vietnamese NGOS account for only 5 to 7% of all registered INGOS. He also noted that most “Vietnamese American NGOs have smaller projects like for sums of US $2000 or $3000. The strength of Vietnamese-American NGOs is that when they implement projects- 70 to 80% have the support of local partnerships.
Finance and Investment, and other mass organizations in Hue and Ho Chi Minh City were interviewed in order to understand how directives operate at the provincial and local level.

The information obtained from this project created an important benchmark to understand the community by interacting with organizational leaders in Little Saigon, and across the nation in different Vietnamese ethnic communities. It gave me comparative insight into the types of organizations located in the diaspora and the overseas outreach that immigrants first and second generation are enacting.

**In-depth interviews**

I obtained respondents with convenience sampling and snowball sampling using personal contacts and a business directory that I created. I assembled the director of Vietnamese businesses using Vietnamese-language phone books and community business directories from the Vietnamese-American Chamber of Commerce in Orange County and Nguoi Viet online: The directory included 14,338 businesses. Businesses were stratified by type of business and later size. The business types included: travel, construction, landscaping, tutoring, meal delivery, signs & banners, plumbing, beauty, financial, grocery/supermarkets, etc, I randomly sampled 35 businesses from this directory and called to inquire the hours of their business. Many of the businesses I found were owned by a single person and had no physical store-front. To be included in my study, I required that the business was at least five years old. I sampled businesses both with physical presence in the enclave and those which were operated out of the house as long as the registered business address was located either in Garden Grove or Westminster, thus serving predominantly Vietnamese clientele. I approached the business and initially spoke with the owner or worker (or whoever I first encountered entering the business)
explaining the project (see verbal consent form in Appendix), and asked for voluntary participation if they have a second-generation child according to the following definition: at least 18 years old, US-born, resided in Orange County for the majority of their childhood and adolescence with one or more refugee parents from Vietnam. Additionally, each participant has at least one parent who currently works or worked full time in the enclave community or who owns or owned a business in ethnic enclave. Approval from the business was not needed from workers because I interviewed the children on their own time, outside of the business premises or work hours. After interviewing a few initial respondents, I asked these respondents to recommend others that they knew whom I might be able to interview. I also used a few key personal informants who were able to recommend several initial respondents from the Catholic Community Center, my volunteer work at Project Motivate, and teachers and friends in the community. There is a risk of sample selection bias in snowball sampling but the range of responses to my interview questions makes me confident that my sample did not fall prey to this bias. I buttressed my use of snowball sampling by interviewing community leaders, and specifically targeting co-ethnic teachers at each of the largest Vietnamese dominant middle school and high schools in the community (Westminster High School, La Quinta High School, Bolsa Grande, Irvine Intermediate). These teachers were second generation co-ethnics who were raised in the community and now teaching other second-generation immigrants. I did not compensate respondents for their time, and this did not seem to influence people’s willingness to speak to me. If the interview took place at a café, I would often purchase beverages for myself and the interviewee.

Interviews were open-ended and semi-structured to cover a variety of topics. In-depth interviews focused on eleven topics related to Vietnamese Second Generation: family history,
child rearing, neighborhoods, ethnic identity, social mobility, language use, peer groups/social networks, dating habits, church participation, transnationalism, and work experience. I began each interview by asking respondents to describe how their parents first came to the US and what they knew about their immigration history. I asked respondents questions about the importance of the enclave in their daily lives and in comparison to their parents. Questions included descriptions about the racial/ethnic makeup of the schools and neighborhoods that they grew up in and language usage with family members. A final set of questions asked about the influence of transnational ties and the salience of ethnic identity in their workplace and everyday interactions. The interview protocol can be found in Appendix X. The interview schedule was adapted from Jimenez’ seminal work on Mexican immigration “Replenished Ethnicity” with additional topics that I added including transnationalism and questions specifically directed about the enclave and the war.

Interviews lasted between one and three hours, and I conducted them in a location where respondents felt most comfortable (often times at a coffee shop, their workplace, business, school, or home). I would often give the respondent the decision to pick the location in order to ensure that they felt most comfortable. I digitally recorded all interviews and analyzed the transcribed interviews manually. The initial broad themed codes for the interviews were based on the questionnaire categories (family history, education and neighborhood information, ethnic identity, etc). In this sense, I implemented a deductive approach in analyzing the data with preconceived themes and with potential directions for the findings (Fine 2004). However, other codes were inductively created from sifting through the responses. In this way, I used both inductive and deductive strategies to disentangle findings and note emergent and dominant themes from the interview. I interviewed 45 females and 41 males. Respondents varied in age
from 20 to 39 years of age, with the median age being 29 years old. The majority of my respondents worked outside the enclave and had at least a bachelor’s degree. For the minority of Vietnamese second generation still working in the enclave, many were entrepreneurs, taking over their parents’ businesses, starting after-school tutoring programs, or working in rare cases as nail technicians or waitresses in Coffee Shops. Growing up, the majority of their parents worked in the enclave or owned a business, with a very high rate of male unemployment for their fathers. This could be the result of Little Saigon attracting a large number of immigrants from the Humanitarian Operation Wave in the 1990s. Those who came under the HO program immigrated at a much older age and had greater difficulty integrating into the US. The most common occupations for parents included sewing and nail technicians. For both males and females, sewing in one of the many factories in Little Saigon owned by Chinese Vietnamese was and still is a primary means of employment in the enclave. Boat people also included a large number of entrepreneurial Chinese. Unfortunately, I was only able to note those Vietnamese who openly claimed Sino or Chinese heritage during the interview. This often was revealed through a number of questions in my in-depth interviews: when an informant described the number of languages they spoke and to whom (grandparents or parents), customs or traditions practiced in the family, ethnic identity, and racial hierarchies. Approximately 30% of my in-depth interviews included Chinese-Vietnamese (sometimes it was one grandparent who was Chinese, a parent, or both parents).

My interviewees were selected based on the following criteria: at least 18 years old, US-born, resided in Orange County for the majority of their childhood and adolescence with one or more refugee parents from Vietnam. Additionally, each participant has at least one parent who currently works or worked full time in the enclave community or who owns or owned a business
in ethnic enclave. Part of my interview population came from sampling a business directory and also snowball sampling.

Data collection and analysis were simultaneous processes in this project. I began analyzing my interviews during data collection in order to explore more deeply other theoretical insights and nuances that I identified in analyzing the interviews I had already conducted (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Throughout my time in the enclave both in the past and presently, I regularly record my experiences using a small hand held recorder to capture random conversations and a notebook.

**Newspapers/Magazines/Archives**

Besides interviews, English language newspapers provide an excellent overall picture of the community and history including American attitudes and political history. Secondary sources make readily available data from the United States Census, surveys, and the political economy of Southern California necessarily to contextualize changes in refugee nationalism to material grounded conditions. But it is oral sources like oral interviews, oral histories, organizational literature, and Vietnamese language media that put on full display the diversity of Little Saigon.

My chapter on entrepreneurship heavily relies on census data and oral histories from the Vietnamese Oral History Project at the University of California, Irvine whereas my chapters on education rely largely on in-depth interviews. My transnational chapter relies on data that I collected for a project for the Center for Migration and Development at Princeton through a multi-university consortium examining transnational behaviors of immigrant groups both in Europe and the United States. Nguoi Viet and Viet Bao, the two largest Vietnamese language newspapers in the community and country, provided useful information into the community
regarding historical and contemporaneous events. These two sources were used as well as content analysis from the Orange County Register and the Los Angeles Times.

**Direct Observation**

Direct observation enabled me to accomplish several goals. Working as a mentor for one year through Project Motivate allowed me to interact directly with second generation students deemed “at risk” by their schools and parents. Working part-time as an SAT tutor at one of the local tutoring centers also provided informal interaction with second generation Vietnamese and their parents. This is in addition to my experience growing up and participating in the life of the enclave.

**Barriers**

Barriers to my dissertation was the ability to recruit more participants who exhibited downward assimilation. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees have at least a bachelor’s degree and or are currently enrolled in college or graduate school. While I did interview several “coffee shop girls,” they are only a minority of my sample. Less than 10% of my interviewees did not finish college. However, the results are not too different from the results from IMMLA on the Vietnamese second generation. IMMLA data also shows that among their sample that less than ten percent of Vietnamese second-generation had attained a high school diploma or less with over 90 percent having at least one year of college or more. Most coffee shop positions are transitional and women stay for a year at most and then leave. Other positions that could be viewed as possibly downward assimilation were cases where several of my second generation informants who could not find employment in the primary economy. Instead, many
took over their parent’s businesses in the enclave or started their own businesses such as law, tax consultation, and after school tutoring programs. Interestingly enough, many of these second generation did not see it as downward mobility rather many felt that it was out of filial piety that they were helping take care of their parents who were aging or elderly or interviewees said that they were helping the Vietnamese community “flourish and modernize” in the words of a second generation lawyer. At least twenty percent of my male informants were former gang members belonging to groups such as Azian Boyz, Black Dragons, and Nip Family. I also had four former female gang members but had become professionals: pharmacist, accountant, business owner of a dance studio outside th enelcave, and even one who is currently a well known professional stylist in Los Angeles. I had to rely on my personal network and childhood friends which did include those examples. My work at Project Motivate allowed me to work directly with at risk youth but since many of them were under the age of 18, I was only able to speak to mentors (who were also predominantly second generation) while speaking colloquially to parents.

Analysis

It can be extremely disruptive to gain consent when conducting interviews (Bryman 2015). The “natural scene” is always somewhat disrupted by the presence of the researcher. As Gilbert describes (2008), “the role of the ethnographer always has an element of deception and the process of participation always involves the researcher engaging in impression management;” the process of participation and role-playing involves both the researcher and the participant and includes how people want others, including the researcher to see them. My positionality as a researcher and doctoral student sometimes led me to believe that informants may have emphasized or valorized the role of education in their upbringing. Also, in terms of
asking questions regarding conflicts at home growing up with parents, I would often times give a personal example in order for the interview to feel comfortable and conversational rather a uni-directional acquisition and assault of personal information. Interviews were semi-structured in order to allow conversation to flow and to meander to other subjects depending on if the participant brought up a new topic of interest. As long as by the end of the interview, I had covered all my thematic topics the order did not matter. After, the first ten interviews, I had the interview schedule memorized and I carried with me a piece of paper with the seven general themes from the index. This is in order for me to mentally note which topics of conversation that we had covered. Ethnographic methodology frequently entails problems of data handling: data overload, serendipity of new data, time demands of processing and coding data (Fetterman 2010). Gans (1962: 111) for example, reports that he needed more than 2,000 index cards to sort and classify his observations and generalizations (Jackson 1982). For my own analysis, within each chapter, I organized my findings according to a series of themes or codes that emerged as patterns throughout the interview transcripts. The interview schedule itself is broken into thematic areas of interest so it was easy to return and code results from within those general themes. The interview schedule was broken down by themes; these themes included: transnationalism, school and work experiences, racial/ethnic identity, labor force participation, language usage, immigration history, and questions about the enclave. The chapters largely follow the themes of transnationalism, education, enclave and work experience, and intergenerational memories of war through language. See Appendix B for the interview schedule.

Moral & Ethical Issues
There are varied concerns about breaking ethical boundaries when using qualitative research. The American Sociological Association instructs researchers to “protect research participants by protecting the physical, social, and psychological well-being of those whom they study” (Ethical Guidelines for Good Research Practice 1999). Fetterman (2010) points out, “Traditional training states that ethnographers must share their research with all parties involved”. However, this is more complicated than at first glance. Lack of informed consent is a controversial feature of participant observation. As Bryman (2015) argues, “It is extremely difficult to present prospective participants with absolutely all the information that might be required to make an informed decision about their involvement”. Even when aware, it is unlikely that all participants are equally informed about the nature of the research. Participants sometimes may be unaware that they are communicating information which may be recorded, and may have temporarily forgotten the researcher’s role, or be oblivious that an ethnographer is “never off-duty”; furthermore, it is often impossible in long-term research for participants successfully to maintain a front in order to deceive the fieldworker (Ellen 1984). Moreover, researchers have noted that it is common, particularly for some groups, to be reluctant to state they don’t want to continue being involved with a project (Alderson 2004). For example, particularly vulnerable groups include children, young people, and people with mental/learning disabilities might find it difficult to tell the researcher they no longer want to participate in a study or they don’t want to answer a particular question. The same issue can apply to people in a range of contexts because of the power relations that can exist between the researcher and the researched or simply a lack of awareness that they can say no to something they have previously agreed to (Wiles 2004: 15). To alleviate the potential of ethical considerations, before each interview, all participants filled out a written consent form. The research consent form briefly described the research, the
confidentiality agreement and supplies contact information in case participants have any questions or comments. Additionally, before beginning the interview, all participants were made aware of the electronic recording device. Verbal agreement was used when interviews took place over the phone. In all cases, I sent the research consent form by email before the interview took place in order to give participants time to review, and in addition brought a hard copy to the in-person interviews. I assured all my participants that voice recordings and transcriptions would be stored and secured via password-protected encryption. To minimize risk and maintain confidentiality, the data was handled in coded form without the subject’s name and identifying information such as the business that employed their parents, etc. Of all my interviews, only one person called and asked for their interview to be retracted; it was a social worker who was afraid her disclosures in the interview would reveal her to the public.

Even studies where informed consent is garnered suffer from other possible violations of confidentiality not under the researcher’s control. Pseudonyms and disguises can often be breached due to internal evidence such as geographical clues or vernacular terms that may not hide all insiders from themselves, their peers, or outsiders (Denzin 2005; Bryman 2015). Because of confidentiality concerns, many ethnographers conceal the location of their sites. However, it is impossible to present research in which historical evidence is introduced without identifying the neighborhood. The general physical area of Little Saigon is disclosed and I attempted to introduce businesses and associations without the use of names, however many organizations wanted to be advertised to the community and were proud of their history serving Vietnamese. When using pseudonyms it poses minimal risk since the area encompasses more than 250,000 persons of Vietnamese descent and more than 2,000 businesses.
Ethnographers also face their own risks. Some dilemmas are more acute for ethnographers because of their moral involvement with their informants. Denzin (2012: 162) discusses the conflict between “being a scientist and a citizen.” For example, my own position within the community highlights how conflict and differences between rights, obligations and interests as a researcher can occur. This was difficult at times when I would see the types of working conditions that my first generation informants faced in the enclave or when I learned and saw first hand many illegal labor practices. Being a critical scholar versus an activist, and a co-ethnic observer sometimes means ignoring community values and facing personal moral dilemmas when writing, describing, or deciding to intervene.

Ethical problems can arise not only on the part of the ethnographer, but for the people whom the ethnographer is observing. People being “studied” can often feel disturbed that a stranger who often seems to come uninvited to watch their every move is invading their privacy. This sense of insecurity was often eradicated when I included multiple visits and encounters with interviewees; for example, after volunteering with Project Motivate after 6 months and getting to know the other mentees would I ask for an interview after a relationship had been established. Sensitivity to historical and cultural differences must also be recognized and taken into account. For certain groups, there will be too high of a cost in participating in research that may stigmatize them within their home communities. Costs and benefits of research for informants are often different than for the researcher (Miles 1994: 291). Study participants’ concern about the inequality of benefits and costs may jeopardize data (ibid). For example, several business owners in my study (1.5 generation) worried about their transnational business transactions being disclosed to the Vietnamese community. As one participant said, “don’t share this or I’ll have protestors outside my shop.” Or as another 1.5 generation participant noted that she did not want
to continue stirring up controversy in the community based on how she felt the Vietnamese community reacted to the LGBT community in fear of possibly jeopardize her position at a Vietnamese newspaper. This tended to be a larger concern for first generation interviewees or parents than for my second generation informants. First generation informants were more distrustful and would often ask about my background and who my father was (his name and where in Vietnam he was from). For my first generation interviewees, it would often put them at ease to know that my father was a second lieutenant in the South Vietnamese Army and fought on Phu Quoc Island, imprisoned after war and spent three years in re-education camp and then escaped by boat and stayed in the Philippines before arriving to the US. I created this mini script and historical narrative from my father’s past when speaking to many first generation because at least one part of the story was something that they personally could relate to or have a close kin that they could relate to. Either the experience of being in a refugee camp, or from Central Vietnam but more importantly it created a distance between myself and the association of being Communist or a northerner.

This blurring of relationships may be symptomatic of another important ethical problem of immersing oneself in the field. Studies of participant observation methodology often concentrate on difficulties in obtaining entry and achieving rapport. (Kent 1992; Raybeck 1992) Typical problems are usually of insufficient rapport or under-rapport, where it becomes hard to carry on the study. Miller (1952: 97-99) explains that researcher may be so intimately tied to the observed that researcher’s investigations become encumbered. In order to aid in this, awareness and reflexivity is paramount. Dialogue with other scholars and leaving Orange County since the age of 18 for college helped to create social and geographic distance between myself and the space, as well as working with other refugee communities abroad.
Social scientists are also often accused of having a “predatory relationship” with their subjects, especially where these “subjects” are relatively powerless and poor (Ellen 1984). The researcher is rarely able to promise informants any material improvement in their circumstances as a result of the study, and is unable to gauge the potential damage which the study may affect (ibid). This was not problematic in my case as second-generation informants were of like status—both being raised in the same neighborhood and coming from the same community. I also tried to balance that fact that my volunteer work with Project Motivate also provided a service of academic homework help.

Participant observation research takes place within a context of shifting pressures and expectations from gate-keepers. Often times, research must be balanced and negotiated along ethical lines that are not always clear and straight-forward. In presenting this work, I hope to be self-reflexive and critical in terms of moral and ethical issues in conducting research as well as the epistemological foundations of my work.
Chapter 4: A History of Refugee Flight and Resettlement in the United States

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the contexts of exit, as well as the human and social capital Vietnamese brought with them to the United States. Portes & Zhou (1993) argue that it is these contexts of exit that interact with conditions in their places of settlement to produce different paths of adaptation. The context of exit includes pre-migration resources such as human capital, social class status in the homeland, and means of migration (Zhou 2004).

The impetus for Vietnamese immigration to the US was largely shaped by the American War in Vietnam. Twenty years of war on a country about the size of California, the Vietnam War was the longest American war followed by Afghanistan. An estimated 3.9 million soldiers and civilians were killed during 20 years of warfare. There were more than 365,000 deaths of Vietnamese civilians including those killed in massacres such as the ones at Bac Chuc, Hue, or Mai Lai, or executed as political prisoners by either the South or North Vietnamese armies. The US dropped more than 19 million gallons of toxins including 13 million gallons of Agent Orange and bombings including 400,000 tons of napalm on Vietnam in the American fight against Communism. Between 1975 and 2015, over one million Vietnamese immigrated to the US as refugees. Scattered and settled throughout the US, these refugees formed visibly anti-communist

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communities. This chapter details the diversity of the Vietnamese diaspora including human
capital and gateways of migration.

**Context of Exit: Immigration from Vietnam to US**

Vietnamese-US migration can be roughly categorized by four waves with diverse human
capital profiles and pre-migration experiences (Truong 2001; Bankston 2001; Zhou 1998).
Understanding the context of exit is crucial for understanding the current situation and attitudes
many Vietnamese in the ethnic community hold to the current regime. Most Vietnamese label
themselves as refugees even if they entered the US under non-refugee immigration categories
(Bloemraad 2006). Anti-communism, a history of colonialism, and legacy of the Vietnam-US
war largely shape the diaspora’s experience and ethnic community activities.

Through Vietnam has had a long history of emigration, the most substantial number of
Vietnamese that left Vietnam immigrated to the United States after the fall of Saigon on April
30, 1975. Vietnam is a nation of nearly 84 million people with 3 million overseas Vietnamese.
Of the estimated 3 million Vietnamese living overseas, the three countries with the largest
populations are the United States with 1.2 million, France with 250,000 and Australia with
200,000 (Small 2008). Canada follows closely with around 151,000 Vietnamese, mostly from the
period 1975-1985 (Chang 2015). Motivations for flight span a continuum from entirely political,
fear of persecution and ideological opposition to the communist regime to largely economic

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5 The colonial legacies of occupation date as far back as 111 BC when China’s Han Dynasty conquered the kingdom
of Vietnam and it became a Chinese province (Pan 1999). Chinese occupation ended nearly a century later in 939
AD. French and later US military control over the area, and territorial wars with China and Cambodia have
influenced its history. See Brocheux’s (2011) work, *Indochina: An Ambiguous Colonization, 1858-1954*, and Short
Viet Minh Road to Power*.
(ibid). In the US, the Vietnamese population exploded from below 10,000 persons in 1970 to 1.3 million in 2000 (Rumbaut 2007: 565). Thus, unlike many other Asian American immigrants, Vietnamese immigration to the US is relatively recent. Migration from Vietnam can be characterized approximately by four waves beginning in 1975 to present.

**First wave:** The first wave began in the spring of 1975 and cumulated with the fall of Saigon on April 30th. Those who left, mainly ex-military, government officials, and people who had worked for the US government or American companies feared retribution by the communists. These first arrivals, around 135,000 settled under the Indochinese Refugee Act in four US military bases in the United States: Camp Pendleton in San Diego, Fort Chaffee in Arkansas, Elgin Air Force Base in Florida, and Fort Indiantown in Pennsylvania. Many of the refugees of the first wave came from relatively privileged backgrounds and had fought alongside American forces or served in the South Vietnamese Government. “They left by whatever means was available: US military aircraft, US Navy ship, small boat, on foot. To stay meant to die” (Valverde 2002). Bloemraad (2006) points out that about 1 percent of South Vietnamese population at that time had a university education, but 19.5 percent of the 1975 wave had attended university in Vietnam. In North America, many faced downward mobility due to lack of English-language skills. Linguistic isolation, economic marginalization and the loss of their country led most Vietnamese to turn to their ethnic community for support (Bloemraad 2006; Zhou, 1998). The first movement of refugees was mainly “impelled or anticipatory” (Valverde 2002). This included those refugees who worked with the American government who would be seen as collaborating with the “imperialist enemy” and therefore considered traitors to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Given these premises, some Vietnamese had time to think and possibly plan their departure. There were however also the thousands who frantically escaped the
Second Wave: In 1977, a second wave of Vietnamese refugees began fleeing Vietnam and this lasted until the mid 1980s. During this time approximately 2 million people fled in small rickety boats and this wave came to be known as the “boat people” (Vo 2005; Rumbaut 1995). Following North Vietnam’s victory, many freedoms were suppressed and former soldiers from the South were sent to prisons and re-education camps (Bloemraad 2006). These soldiers and their families were often subject to persecution, barred from higher education, and relegated to menial jobs. Families were often separated and sent to New Economic Zones to do agricultural labor. Vietnam’s resources were further drained after the war from the the US embargo, border clashes with China, and war in Cambodia (Freeman & Nguyen 2003). This resulted in unemployment and poverty, food shortages, and malnutrition of approximately 40% of the child population (ibid). The closing of businesses owned by Chinese and nationalization and redistribution of land created a mass displacement of people and poverty. To assist Vietnamese refugees, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 which reduced restrictions on entry to the US.

The Vietnamese of the second wave came from diverse backgrounds compared to the first. This wave included the mass departure of the Chinese merchant class. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Chinese settlement in Vietnam predated the arrival of Europeans and increased significantly during the colonial period (Um 2012:1). Following independence from France, the Chinese remained the economic backbone of Vietnam (ibid). In the post-1975 period, persecution of Chinese grew as the new socialist regime attacked the capitalist class and Chinese were forced to migrate from Vietnam. The new regime sought to eradicate all capitalist activities
and the existing conflict between China and Vietnam placed the loyalty of the Chinese Vietnamese in question (Gold 1994: 198). In contrast, many Vietnamese faced imprisonment if they attempted to emigrate. These attempts resulted in jail time and many tried escaping by land by walking through jungle into neighboring Cambodia and into Thailand (Hein 2006). Many informants described attempting to escape four or five times unsuccessfully and spending time in jail. The successful boat people reached refugee camps in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. From those camps, many were admitted to the US, Australia, Canada, and other third countries. It is estimated that between 1979 and 1982 more than 450,000 Vietnamese were admitted to the US.

Many immigrants from the second wave were also compelled to leave having witnessed others from the Southern government being arrested and held in detention in prison (Bloemraad 2006). This “reeducation,” which included subsequent systematic discrimination against some 200,000 former South Vietnamese military personnel and their families, the collectivization of farmland, and forced relocation of citizens from urban to uncultivated or heavily damaged rural areas shaped their context of exit (Le 2007). The second wave was more professionally diverse from rural backgrounds, and many did not speak English (Rumbaut 1989; Takaki 1989). The second wave included more soldiers from the countryside in Central and Southern Vietnam, and was younger with fifty percent under 20 years of age (Vo 2006).

Of the immigrants from the second wave, many informants told horrific stories of escaping by boat or processing times waiting in refugee camps. These stories follow them into the diaspora and are sometimes told to the second generation by the first generation. The popular owner of one beauty salon in the community was known as the cannibal, her ship was at sea for forty-five days with only three survivors. In addition, processing time in refugee camps
was much longer than those in the first wave, with the average wait period being nine months (Caplan 1999). However, camp processing times and conditions varied in different countries with reports of overcrowding and squalid conditions (Caplan 1999). Camps in Hong Kong included waiting times of more than eight years (Loper 2010). This in addition to the psychological distress that unaccompanied minors, youth, and young adults faced waiting for approval to migrate (Felsman 1990; Bun 1995).

**Third wave:** The third wave of Vietnamese migration dates from the mid-1980s when many Vietnamese immigrated under a variety of policies. The first policy was orchestrated by the United Nations with a focus on family reunification and “orderly departure” (Bloemraad 2006): The US media clearly broadcast that Vietnamese refugee situation was not improving, and thousands were dying at sea during their escape (Espiritu 2006). The United Nations attempted to resolve this program through the creation of the Orderly Departure Program (ODP) (Valverde 2012). The ODP provided a safe and legal means for the exit of migrants and refugees, rather than clandestinely escaping by boat or foot. Under the ODP, Vietnamese traveled to the United States as immigrants, followed normal US visa issuance procedures if they had “family members of Vietnamese and Chinese origin from Vietnam already in the United States, former employees of the US government agencies, and other individuals ‘closely identified’ with the US presence in Vietnam before 1975.” (Chang, 2006: 22). Over 200,000 Vietnamese were admitted to the US under the ODP program (Zhou 1998). While the previous two waves are comprised of political refugees, this last wave is composed of various statuses including former re-education detainees and their families, and Amerasians.

One of the specific programs under the ODP included the 1989 Humanitarian Operation Program (or HO). This was an agreement between the US State Department and the Vietnamese
government which allowed former political prisoners to be resettled in the US. Between 70,000 to 80,000 people immigrated to the US. Many of these immigrants spent more than 10 years in reeducation camps and prisons subject to torture and psychological abuse. The emotional trauma of prison and separation from families manifested overseas as a vocal and anti-communist faction of the diaspora (Nguyen 2009). This group is generally described as well-educated, high-ranking officers, and previously held positions of power in Vietnam (Bloemraad 2002). However, migrating in the middle of their lives with limited English skills meant their assimilation was difficult (Lischer 2006).

A final group of Vietnamese arrived in the US under the Amerasian Homecoming Act of 1987, which targeted the offspring of Vietnamese women and US servicemen stationed in Cambodia, Korea, Laos, Thailand or Vietnam. This act eliminated most of the requirements faced by other refugees and immigrants, and directed the US government to bring as many of these children to the US as possible. Individuals born between January 1962 and January 1976 were allowed entry along with their immediate family. Nearly 100,000 Amerasians and their family members immigrated under this act (Chan 2006). Many of these children faced discrimination and were stateless persons for the first 8 to 9 years of their lives they were neither recognized by the Vietnamese or the US government (McKelvey 1995). These Amerasians still face discrimination even within the US ethnic community, as they are often looked upon as the children of prostitutes, even though in many cases their mothers simply worked for the US government. The human capital of this group is relatively low as many were unable to attend school from a young age, left in orphanages, and stigmatized (Valverde 1992). See Table 3 (page 75) summarizes the various waves of Vietnamese immigration and their corresponding human capital factors.
Fourth wave: The United States also passed the Immigration Act of 1990 as an amendment to the Immigration Act of 1965 which expanded legal immigration to the US. While not specifically targeted towards the Vietnamese, this act established three preference categories that facilitated the immigration of Vietnamese: family-sponsored, employment-based, and “diverse” immigrants. Beginning in 1990, out of 675,000 visas issued, 480,000 were set aside for family sponsored immigrants, 140,000 for employment based, and 55,000 for diversity applicants.

The latest wave of immigrants from Vietnam includes the growing population of women marrying US citizens, Erasmus students, and the elderly (Thai 2010; Valverde 2012). A high male mortality rate during the Vietnam war combined with the migration of a larger number of men than women to the US, has led to the lowest ratio of men to women at peak marrying ages in Vietnam and a high ratio of males to females in the Vietnamese diaspora (Peche 2010).

The presence of international students in Vietnam before the early 1990s was relatively rare. The developing economy and need for educated and trained labor force precipitated the flow of students studying abroad. For example, in 1999, only 804 students from Vietnam obtained visas to study in the United States, whereas in 2009 that number was 9,218 (Lemke 2011). The United States hosts the largest number of international students from Vietnam. An estimated 60,000 students studied abroad in 2008 to 120,000 in 2013 in forty-nine countries (Nguyen 2015). The Government’s commitment to sending students overseas includes improving quality of institutional training by setting a quota of students to send annually for master or doctoral level training.

Literature Review: Vietnamese America
Recent scholarship on the Vietnamese-American experience tends to be case studies of particular communities focusing on integration variables such as family with scant attention to the role of entrepreneurship and ethnic businesses on immigrant mobility. Kibria (1993) examines the Vietnamese community of Philadelphia focusing on shifts in family life and changing gender roles. She uses the analogy of the tightrope- as women struggle to use their new resources to their advantage but not in ways that significantly alter or threaten the traditional family system. Like the Cubans and Dominicans, Vietnamese women aspired for middle-class lifestyles, the one in which men were the primary bread-winners and women were homemakers. Vietnamese-American women often viewed the shift in gender balance as temporary- however their activities meant that they came into contact with institutions and organizations outside the family. While her study focuses on family, she pays attention primarily to the lives of urban, pre-1975 middle class South Vietnamese. The patch-working strategy of Vietnamese American women and families is still very relevant.

Despite Orange County being the largest concentration of Vietnamese-Americans, very few studies have focus on this community. The two primary studies thus far have examined Little Saigon through the lens of social ecology and race/ethnic studies. Mazumdar (2000) studies Little Saigon from a psycho-social view, examining how architectural design, space, and food “shapes people’s understanding of who they are and as members of groups providing them with a continuous sense of homeland connection and identity” (320). Aguilar-San Juan (2010) compares ethnic and racial identity in two communities: Orange County, California and Fields Corner, Boston. She focuses on community building and place making, and relies on interviews with English-speaking Vietnamese conducted via snow-ball sampling. Her subjects are mainly religious, social service workers, and university students from the communities. Her scope
however is limited by the very population she samples—English speaking leaders. The perspective of the everyday worker or child is not represented. Vietnamese Americans are racialized in her story but she fails to emphasize the fluidity of these categories especially in Southern California where ethnicity rather than race may become paramount: neighboring Korean, Japanese, and a large Taiwanese population inhabit Orange County and intermarriage between Vietnamese and non-Vietnamese is common. Inter-ethnic tensions between Chinese-Vietnamese and Kinh Vietnamese in Orange County especially in regards to the business community are not given much attention.

Gold’s (1992) study is one of the very few works, which explores Vietnamese-American entrepreneurship in depth at the nascent stage of California’s Vietnamese community. He relies on a sample of 67 Soviet Jewish and Vietnamese enterprises in California and ethnographic data from 1982 to 1990 exploring the prospects for refugee employment in the inchoate stages of Southern and Northern California’s communities. The research describes parallels between Soviet Jewish refugees and Vietnamese entrepreneurs who depend heavily on family networks and resources. Gold argues that many Vietnamese choose to work in the informal economy in order to keep earnings off the books. Thereby, Gold emphasizes family and social networks for Vietnamese mobility rather than community. He astutely makes observations of how Chinese-Vietnamese control many businesses in the community but doesn’t link this to the current transnational business trends of Chinese-Vietnamese investments from overseas.

Normalization of Vietnam-US relations and Vietnam’s entry into the WTO in 2007 have made cross-border business transactions possible in the community (from personal interviews 2013). While his work is important, Gold does not describe how people view their position in the enclave and understand work, nor does he pay any attention to the second generation since
the age group has not come of age. His work tends to emphasize the role of familial ties rather than community resources in helping Vietnamese-American integration. He qualitatively describes the positive context of reception including special refugee aid programs and resources. His work is important in painting a snapshot of the community in the 1980s but community transformation and growth since that period has altered the landscape of Little Saigon which includes over 2000 businesses today.

Transnational Vietnamese-America thus far in the academic literature has been documented as a first generation phenomenon with few studies of the second generation. Studies of transnationalism focus on cross-border marriages (Cam Thai 2006), anti-communist discourse (Dang, 2005; Valverde, 2002), and remittance behavior among low-wage immigrants (Cam Thai, 2016). Second-generation transnationalism thus far has only been described by Espiritu and Tran (2002) who use qualitative and quantitative data (n = 114). Their study focuses on ethnic self-identification and ethnic practices such as “speaking Vietnamese,” and “watching Vietnamese-language videos,” and participation in activities such as “communicating through letters and phone calls, sending remittances, or participating in charitable causes” (344) The authors describe the tension that the second generation feels to become “Americanized” by their parents but their experiences as racialized individuals living in minority neighborhoods and as their children of low-wage workers place them in an uneasy relationship biculturally between the US and Vietnam (394). What is needed is an in-depth examination of the affective processes that link transnational feelings of belonging with actual practice and cross-border activities. Which community organizations facilitate transnational engagement? How are transnational activities understood and received by the community at large, the second generation, and their parents?
Categorizing the Vietnamese refugee experience as homogenous or uniform is misleading as the label refugee ignores the diversity of conditions under which they fled, experiences of war and trauma, and the particular human capital they immigrated with. Their later adaptation was influenced by the aforementioned factors as well as the policies of the US government that welcomed the refugees. The context of exit tells a complex story of immigrants with varying levels of human capital and experiences. Many endured dangerous conditions leaving Vietnam, waited for years in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, and spent years in prison before their departure. Others were the intellectuals and exiled elite of the former Southern regime. In all cases, Vietnamese were granted legal status, received resettlement assistance, and a pathway to citizenship that shaped their future integration outcomes in the US.
Chapter 5: Little Saigon: An Ethnoburb in the Making

In this chapter, I ask how did in the midst of former orange groves and sprawling suburbs did the various waves of Vietnamese refugees manage to build a distinct and recognizable community in a quintessential suburban environment? Second, how does Little Saigon conform to traditional definitions of the ethnic enclave as proposed by Portes & Bach (1985) and the ethnoburb as proposed by Li (1998)? I begin by describing Orange County, an American suburb, and explain how the Vietnamese ethnic enclave economy developed. I examine the longevity of the ethnic enclave and the way ethnic enclaves change across generations. I find that the 1.5 and second generation are revitalizing the community in politics and transnational enterprises. The ethnic community offers a basis of support for parental strategies aiding in immigrant incorporation for the second generation.

Economic transformations

Orange County today is the third most populous county in California, with the 2013 population estimated at 3.1 million (US Census Bureau 2014). It covers an area of 790 square miles and contains 34 cities and numerous unincorporated communities. Located 100 miles from the border of Mexico in Southern California, Orange County is sandwiched between San Diego County and Los Angeles County. Orange County’s formal existence was branded the 8th of March, 1889, when California’s Senate voted to carve out a new political entity from the southern portion of Los Angeles (Olin 1991: 1). Before World War II, Orange County’s economy was dominated by agriculture, hence the name signifying the orange groves that dotted its landscape, but this radically changed in the aftermath of World War II. Between the 1960s and 1980s, the Pacific United States garnered the most military expenditures per capita, and within this Pacific region, California received more military and defense payroll and pension
dollars than any other state (Clayton, 1967; Olin, 1991). Aerospace-defense industries served as the major catalyst for economic development. California was a prime recipient of such funds because it was “the nation’s foremost aircraft producer when aircraft were needed for defense”; the companies that developed included Northrop, Hughes Aircraft, Douglas Aircraft, Rockwell and Ford Motor Company (Kling 1995). Consequently, by the late 1980s, Orange County developed its own cultural and economic autonomy from Los Angeles. By 1982, the county’s economy had grown into the thirtieth largest in the world, with an export-driven economic output approaching $70 billion and rivaling the economies of Portugal, Israel, and Egypt (Sackman 2005). A population explosion naturally corresponded: the county attracted both skilled and unskilled labor growing from 131,000 in 1940 to 1.9 million in 1980 to 3.01 million today (Pulido 2000).

Intended as a bedroom community to Los Angeles, today most of the residents who live in the mega-suburb also work there (Baldassare 1999). Orange County is no longer a suburb of Los Angeles, or even a collection of such suburbs as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, Orange County exhibits the dynamism associated with major urban centers, though much more decentralized than the traditional city (Olin 1991: viii; Kling). Manufacturing, largely in aerospace defense, was the key to Orange County’s economic transformation in the 1960s from an agricultural to an industrial economy. Major employment growth in the 1970s in international trade, finance, and real estate diversified Orange County’s economic activities, providing key opportunities for its immigrant population including the Vietnamese refugees who arrived there (Jonas 1999).

In recent years, foreign investment from Japan, Taiwan, and China have developed Orange County. Irvine has a large number of Chinese and Japanese owned firms, 22.8%
compared to the state’s average of 14.9% (US Census 2010). These companies include the US headquarters for Toshiba, Hitachi, Canon, Mazda, and Kawasaki. The World Trade Association of Orange County first opened in 1976. More recently, Orange County’s International Business Center opened in 2001. Both have global reaches but are dominated by Asian and Latino countries. This project spearheaded by the former mayor of Santa Ana, Miguel Pulido expanded Orange County’s trade with Mexico and Asia. International dignitaries from Mexico, Latin America, and from South and Southeast Asia regularly visit Orange County to connect with their diasporas through this program (Lowenthel, 2009). Well paying jobs in technology and healthcare as well as professional services expect continued growth through 2050 with the largest expansion expected in the service sector (ibid).

These changes demanded an increase in service sector and manufacturing jobs which the Vietnamese readily took advantage of upon arriving in the early 1980s. For the Vietnamese, the ready availability of manufacturing jobs in Orange County was welcomed by the refugee population who initially lacked the linguistic skills to engage in other types of labor. The formation of the traditional Vietnamese family also altered as it became necessary for women to work (Kibria 2002). Women easily found work on manufacturing lines and as seamstresses (Tran 2003). Sewing at home paid piecemeal, and the first wave of families transformed their living rooms, garages and kitchens into sewing centers where children, adults, and extended kin worked together, sometimes inviting neighbors and friends to sew together. Vietnamese immigrants participated in sewing work for two reasons (1) it allowed them to supplement income (working in the factory during the day and home-assembly in the evening) and (2) allowed the family to be together and was a means that everyone in the family could participate in. In the 1980s, garments paid 5 cents per seam. As of March 2016, a member of my family works at a factory in Little
Saigon and earns $15.00 per day cutting thread. In a conversation with an informant, I asked why she wouldn’t search for employment with better wages or unionize with the other employees. My informant responded, ‘there is are better people who will work and take it.” My cousin, her daughter, is second-generation and graduated from Cal State Long Beach and is married to an engineer. Academic studies have shown how participation in home-working resulted in the weakening of Vietnamese bargaining positions with subcontractors and employers (Tran 2003).

Sewing was popular due to the ease of working from home with young children, the ability of all family members to help and ease of learning. While this work remains popular, other ethnic niches needed to develop, especially as manufacturing began to be sent overseas. Today, Vietnamese are closely associated with the growth of professional manicures. Vietnamese-owned salons now dominate almost half of the entire US industry (Hoang 2015). In the 1990s, Vietnamese females far more than any other immigrant group came to dominate the beauty sector, specifically manicures (Eckstein 2011). The manicures offered by the Vietnamese salons differed from traditional salons in that no appointment was needed, the manicures were characterized as inexpensive, quick, and deftly executed (Bagwell 2008). The nail industry developed from inside the refugee camps at Camp Pendleton in San Diego. Hippi Tendren, an actress who visited Camp Pendleton in the 1970s, impressed by the dexterity of the women’s handiwork brought her manicurist to the camp to train women. She convinced them that they could make money as nail technicians to movie stars in California who would spend a lot of money on their nails (Eckstein 2011). In 1999, the Nguyen family opened up the first beauty school in Orange County to teach nails and other forms in Vietnamese and in English. In 2010, more Vietnamese were employed nationally in the US census category “a hairdresser and other grooming services” than in any other occupation (US Census). It is immigrant first-generation
Vietnamese, in particular, who carve out the nail niche. Less than one percent of Vietnamese manicurists are US born (NAILS Magazine, March 2007: 84).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vietnamese 1st Gen</th>
<th>Vietnamese 1.5 Gen</th>
<th>Vietnamese 2nd Gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nail Salons -15.5%</td>
<td>Construction- 13.8%</td>
<td>Arts/entertainment- 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Salons- 14.9%</td>
<td>Finance 11.1%</td>
<td>Professional/computer systems- 14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants- 7%</td>
<td>Physicians- 11.1%</td>
<td>Motion pictures/video industries- 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction- 6%</td>
<td>Restaurants- 8.3%</td>
<td>Retail/Health/personal care- 13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Studies report that among first-generation Asians, Vietnamese (along with Cambodians and Laotians) are concentrated in the lowest paying, least prestigious jobs (Do 2006; Wilson 2003). The next most common form of Vietnamese employment besides nail and beauty salons, at thirteen percent of the population, is “clerical and administrative staff.” “Assembly line workers,” and “industrial equipment operators,” each involved 8 percent of employed Vietnamese (see Table 1).

The transformation of the labor market from primarily agricultural to IT, as well as a foreign investment from Asia and Latin America has created work opportunities in Orange County for the Vietnamese refugees and their children. Orange County was originally idealized as a place to settle due to its proximity to Camp Pendleton, the warm weather, and the inexpensive housing prices in North County were reasons for the Vietnamese to settle in Orange County (Gold 1991; Hein 1995).
Racial and ethnic transformation

The county has undergone a rapid racial and ethnic transition from a homogenous eighty-eight percent white community in 1970 to nearly fifty-seven percent nonwhite in 2013. The Latino and Asian populations have grown markedly in the past thirty years. In 2050, there is expected to be more Asians than whites in Orange County. From 1970 to 2000, the immigrant population increased from approximately 5 percent to nearly 30 percent (Hipp 2009). Immigrants from Somalia, the Middle East, Romania, Philippines, India, Vietnam, Iran, Mexico all call Orange County their home. The majority of immigrants (79%) arrived between 1980 to 2000, with twenty percent arriving in the last decade (Waheed 2014: 26; 2010 American Community Survey). Before 1965, the immigrant population was dominated by Mexican workers from the Bracero program. Changes in 1965 immigration policy created an influx of migrants from Asia altering the immigrant landscape of California from primarily an agricultural workforce to blue collar Latino and Asian assembly line and service workers. In 1999, Hispanic children surpassed white children in Orange County schools (Mordechay 2014).

The varying levels of cultural and economic capital that different immigrant groups have brought with them to the United States have melded with pre-existing class distinctions. People of color are the new majority in Orange County but disproportionately face such issues as poverty, linguistic isolation, and lags in educational attainment (Bean 2015; Vo 2004; Field 2007). Latino families have twice the rate of poverty than the county average (Bean 2015). Korean and Vietnamese residents have lower rates of English language proficiency (Vo 2004). Blacks and Latinos have the highest dropout rates, and Black residents report the highest rate of hate crimes in the county (ibid). Almost a tenth of the county residents are undocumented
immigrants and their children are four times more likely to be living in poverty than those with a 

Pan-ethnic racialization in Orange County hides particular tensions and inequalities; the 
category Asian showcases many different disparities. The varying populations classified as Asian 
have varying levels of socio-economic indicators, Southeast Asians including Cambodians and 
Laotians have higher levels of poverty than Blacks in Orange County, and their experiences 
starkly contrast with other groups classified as Asian American-like Chinese who’s average 
income is higher than whites. These differences are characterized in chapter eight.

This racial transformation of space includes significant economic diversity. In 2012, 
Orange County residents’ median household income is $75,000 per year with the median value 
of homes $537,000, both exceeding national medians of $61,000 and $383,000 respectively. 
Orange County’s overall affluence hides the economic diversity of its inhabitants. There are 
noticeable disparities in income distribution; in 2013, Stanford’s California poverty measure 
found 24 percent of persons in Orange County living in poverty (Bohn 2013). Growing social 
polarization and geographic inequities include Orange County’s rank of 4th out of the largest 100 
metropolitan areas for fastest growing income gap between the rich and poor between 1990 and 
2012 (Waheed 2014:11). In 1990, the top quartile made 7.5 times more than the bottom quartile; 
in 2012 that figure rose to 11.7 (ibid). This polarization is further evidenced by the percent of 
students receiving free or reduced lunch; students as a percent of the total public school 
enrollment increased from 38.7 percent in 2002/03 to 46.4 percent of all students in 2011/12 
(Johnson 2013). This can be exemplified in the amount of per pupil spending on students. In 
areas such as Laguna Beach, per pupil spending for a middle-school is $13,920 per student. In 
Santa Ana, students receive $6,800 per student per year in 2012 and 2013. The income
disparities witnessed naturally have a geographic feature; the county can be divided into northern and southern regions with a greater proportion of poor families living in the north and in Little Saigon (see Figure 2). Shows such as the Housewives of Orange County and the popularized media portrayals of Laguna Beach and films such as the OC essentialize a predominantly white middle to upper class suburbia of affluence concealing the racial and class diversity of the area.

**Median Household Income by City in Orange County, 2008-2012**

![Map of Orange County showing median household income by city, with a legend indicating income levels and a scale for distance.](image)

**Figure 2: Median Household Income by City in Orange County, 2008-2012**

Post 1965 immigration patterns have worked to spatially inscribe new racial and class divisions (Piggot 2012: 88). As shown in Figure 3, more economic middling communities, such as Garden Grove, Fullerton, Costa Mesa, and Anaheim have populations that are at least 30 percent Latino. Within this map, Little Saigon finds itself in North Orange County and hosts a vibrant ethnic economy of more than 2,000 enterprises and businesses serving nearly 250,000 Vietnamese who live there. Orange County’s microcosm of racial, ethnic and class diversity creates an interesting case study to understand race relations and ethnic identity development. As the US population changes, diverse populations are no longer found only in large metropolitan areas or cities, rather there is an ethnic change in suburbs (Cheng 2010).

Figure 3: Percent of People of Color by City, Orange County, 2010
Application of the Ethnic Enclave Hypothesis to Little Saigon

Structural opportunities and a positive context of reception shaped the experiences of Vietnamese in Orange County. Like the Cuban enclave in Miami, many of the first Vietnamese exiles were the professional class and intellectuals, they mobilized their skills and networks to begin new enterprises founding Little Saigon. The human capital differentials are noticeable among the various waves and the corresponding rates of entrepreneurship also show a parallel pattern. This socioeconomic diversity in the Vietnamese population (see table 3) played an instrumental role in building the enclave. Having both well-educated and skilled professionals with invaluable entrepreneurial experience in the homeland created the array of businesses and services available in Little Saigon; this was not a direct translation of skills however as many Vietnamese first-generation faced at first what Pyong Gap Min describes as “status inconsistency” in their being forced to take low-paid, low-status jobs initially. Many of my second generation informants described their parents’ current labor in the US in sewing, factory work, nail technicians, cosmetology and restaurants and their former positions in Vietnam as teachers, architects, or lawyers prior to the War. Table 2 explores the various types of classified jobs advertised in ethnic newspapers available in the enclave as of January 2016.

Table 2: Classified Ads Nguoi Viet Newspaper January 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advertised job (N=5015)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sewing jobs</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurant/market jobs</td>
<td>13.30</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Office-clerical jobs 13.20 660
Hair/nail jobs 13 650
Manufacturing jobs 12.80 640
Domestic assistance 12.60 630
General employment 12 600
Misc. business opportunities 10 500

The class composition is heterogeneous, with many recent arrivals from family reunification policies and international marriages of Vietnamese filling working positions in the enclave, with a population that is continuing to grow as the second generation comes of age and new immigrants arrive to Southern California.

The earlier waves of Vietnamese immigrants had higher human capital and included the entrepreneurial class from Vietnam (see Table 3). That in combination with transnational social capital⁶ created the necessary sources for the enclave to grow. In the early 1980s, Vietnamese immigrant entrepreneurs and international Chinese developers transformed Bolsa from a street “lined with bean fields and half-empty shopping centers” into the “Vietnamese Capital of the United States” (Nguyen 2009). The vibrant ethnic economy relied on the entrepreneurial experience and human capital of its immigrant community, and transnational capital from Hong Kong and China; a study in Orange County by Aguilar (2005) estimates that 33 percent of the first wave were ethnic Chinese who had entrepreneurial connections with China and other Chinese communities in Southern California (2005). Chinese-Vietnamese entrepreneurship constitutes a foundational element of Little Saigon’s ethnic economy. Many of the first entrepreneurs and notably the future “Godfather of Little Saigon,” real estate mogul Frank Jao

⁶ Eckstein (2006) defines transnational social capital as those benefits from social capital that are derived from parties across borders having access to distinctive resources they share. She uses the concept of social capital as defined by Coleman (1988) and Bourdieu (1986) as benefits obtained through networks governed by norms of reciprocity. The concept is further explained in her article, “Transnational family based social capital: Remittances and the transformation of Cuba.” International Journal of Sociology of the Family, 141-171.
were 1st or 1.5 generation Vietnamese of Chinese origin who had owned businesses in Vietnam. Many speak fluent Cantonese, which opens the door to Chinese customers and business contacts all over Asia and North America (Gold 1999; Aguilar 2005).

Table 3: Human Capital for Vietnamese First Generation by Year of Arrival

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>1099</td>
<td>743</td>
<td>2573</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. citizen (%)</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living in poverty (%)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not prof. in English (%)</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than H.S. (%)</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowner (%)</td>
<td>80.7</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>61.9</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>41.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (%)</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-skill job (%)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The rapid development of Little Saigon owes to investment and immigration not only among Vietnamese but a triad of interests by Chinese and Taiwanese entrepreneurs and immigrants. This created a power struggle among business owners early in the history of the founding of the enclave to the present. In 1981, Roger Chen, a young Taiwanese developer and Frank Jao bought properties on the 9000 block of Bolsa Avenue in Westminster. That same year, Duong Huu Chuong, a pharmacist in Vietnam, opened up the largest Asian supermarket in Orange County. He originally opened a small grocery store in Inglewood in 1979 with $5000 he managed to smuggle out of Vietnam (Nguyen 2009). By 1984, along with Chinese co-ethnics in Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States, he opened an import/export business that supplied over 100 grocery stores in Southern California (ibid).
From 1975 to 1984, developers from Taiwan and Hong Kong invested $10 million along Bolsa Avenue paving the way for Little Saigon’s future growth. Ethnic entrepreneurship burgeoned in this time period as more immigrants settled in Orange County. Between 1982 and 1987, the number of Vietnamese owned businesses increased from 4,989 to 25,671, a 415% increase, far exceeding the 135% increase in the Vietnamese population during the same time period (Nguyen 2015). In the span of ten years, ethnic entrepreneurship grew to 7% of Vietnamese immigrants in 1990 as compared to 3% in 1980 (Zhou 1998). This was largely due to the second influx of mostly ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, as a Chinese Vietnamese economy grew in Westminster (Gold 1994). Chain migration and secondary migration brought new residents, workers, and entrepreneurs from Vietnam and from other regions of the United States to Orange County fueling the area’s growth (Aguilar-San Juan 2008).

The presence of transnational behemoths and the exiled entrepreneurial Chinese class spearheaded the development of Little Saigon. Vietnamese-run firms including entrepreneurs grew nationwide from an estimated 59,674 in 1992, to 312,881 in 2012 (Survey of Business Owners, US Census). California had the largest number of Vietnamese-owned firms at 68,812, with Los Angeles-Orange County area having the largest number (32,356) followed by Houston (16,982), and Dallas (12,038). Aggregate receipts of Vietnamese firms in Orange County were $13.4 billion in 2007. By 2010, the rate of self-employment per thousand employed persons nationwide was 94.4, while for Vietnamese it reached 142.9. These numbers undercount the vast number of businesses which operate by cash only and/or are not formalized businesses.

Contributing further to the development of the community are two factors: first, the favorable housing market in Orange County and second, the ethnic strategy of pooling of resources to purchase property. Since the Little Saigon’s beginnings, property prices have soared
in Orange County; the median price of a house in Little Saigon in 1990 was $186,000 and in 2015 the median residential resale is $551,300. It was commonplace for families to pool their resources and buy a home when they first settled (Chiu 2010). Vietnamese nationally have high home ownership rates, 70% in 2010, compared to other foreign-born groups. In California, 53% of Vietnamese in 2008 owned a home (ibid). Much of the housing in Little Saigon is detached single-family stucco ranch houses built in the 1960s and 1970s averaging 1,200 to 1,500 square feet. There is a smattering of apartment and townhouse projects and a few mobile-home parks (Balassone 2005). The tendency is not for families to move; rather, as families became more financially successful, they expand their homes, sometimes to rent out rooms for extra income or buy new properties (ibid). Investment properties include a recent luxury condominium complex that opened next to Phu Loc Tho, the largest Vietnamese shopping mall, with two bedroom condos ranging from $400,000 to $650,000. The strategy of pooling resources among families to buy property and the early housing market in Southern California provided valuable capital to Vietnamese to expand businesses and resources in the community. Moreover, the reduction in interest rates in the 1990s lead people to use home equity lines of credit to expand businesses and invest in property (personal interviews).

The original site for Little Saigon also developed in an area that was in a state of decline with little competition from other Asian immigrant groups who immigrated selectively primarily as professionals with high human capital (Vo 2004). Other Asian immigrant groups in Orange County with significant presence and financial means in the county, such as the Chinese, Taiwanese, Filipinos and Asian Indians have not formed such a concentrated overlapping residential and commercial nexus (ibid). In comparison, the Vietnamese have the most significant spatial district. There is limited contestation to Vietnamese political power from
other Asian ethnic groups. Given their history as refugees, it is not surprising that Vietnamese compared to other Asian immigrants in Orange County have the highest naturalization rates and political incorporation such as voting rates and political representation.

Spatial clustering is evident in Little Saigon; a study by Logan and Zhang (2013) found that the index of dissimilarity for Vietnamese is similar to Blacks, with little change over the last twenty years. A similar study by Emily Walton (2015) using census data in Southern and Northern California found that immigrant enclaves are overrepresented among Vietnamese American ethnic neighborhoods. The boundaries of Little Saigon in Orange County are spread over six cities, Garden Grove, Westminster, Midway City, Santa Ana, Anaheim, and Fountain Valley, see Table 4. In 2010, foreign-born persons comprised 46% of the population in these cities and 58% report a language other than English spoken at home in Westminster. These numbers are comparable in Garden Grove at 43% and 59%, respectively, and Santa Ana at 53% and 80%, respectively (US Census 2010).

7 The Koreans have formed an ethnic enclave in Orange County, Koreatown, on a smaller scale compared to Little Saigon. This enclave grew steadily, especially after the 1992 Los Angeles riots. In Los Angeles, Korean business owners victimized by the looting and violence lost more than 800 businesses (Kim 1992). Seeking safer places to establish businesses and to send their children to better schools, many Koreans moved to Orange County. Today, Koreatown also enjoys a vibrant ethnic business, albeit much smaller, next to Little Saigon.
Figure 4: Five Largest Asian Groups in Orange County by Density, 2010
Source: US Census Bureau, 2008-2012 American Community Survey, UCLA Labor Center, July 2014

Table 4: Vietnamese population as percentage of city in Little Saigon

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% of Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Westminster</td>
<td>36,059</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garden Grove</td>
<td>47,331</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Ana</td>
<td>23,167</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fountain Valley</td>
<td>11,431</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anaheim</td>
<td>14,768</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2010 US Census
The enclave is undergoing a generational transformation with increasing business development abroad. Like the Cubans, Vietnamese initially built upon ethnic networks, ethnic trust and common language for expediency and efficiency of business. Similar to the Cuban case, Vietnamese business owners could deal with other Vietnamese business owners because they already knew and trusted them and could speak in their native language (Portes, 2007). Before 2008, 11 of the 13 board members of the Vietnamese American Chamber of Commerce were native Vietnamese speakers; in 2015, there are only three native Vietnamese speakers. Nguyen, age 35 and generation 1.5, who took over the board in 2009 explained, “It was quite the generation change. I’m thirty years junior the former president. The change was drastic but necessary for building relationships with the younger generation. We are definitely less anti-communist. Our first priority is connecting with the local business community.” However, unlike the board under Nguyen’s predecessors, the board’s aspirations now reach beyond Orange County. He continued, “We live in a global world. If we want to be a chamber of commerce that is significant, that adds value, we need to try to understand the language and politics within our own community, as well as business opportunities abroad.” Transnational firms have emerged among the 1.5 generation albeit often times not publicly known to the community. The creation of these networks and transnational firms by the 1.5 generation and migrant return enterprises follows the typology proposed by Landolt (1997) in her study of Salvadoran immigrants in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. where return enterprises “pioneer lines of business not seen before in the home countries exploiting informational advantage of migrant entrepreneurs” (15). The activities of the predominantly 1.5 generation Vietnamese American Chamber of Commerce group include hosting export workshops highlighting Southeast Asia markets to inform the community about current market trends in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Myanmar. These
activities include how to export and identify markets by inviting experts from the US Department of Commerce and US Small Business Administration. The 1.5 generation Vietnamese are migrant professionals and able to engage in these enterprises that include information technologies and financial services of various kinds and still have the transnational social capital to do so (Portes & Yiu 2015; Gold 1997), compared to the first generations’ focus on cultural and ethnic enterprises of restaurants, food stores, and clothing (Landolt 1997).

The global openness and waning anti-communism of the 1.5 and second generation is not always met with a positive reception by a strongly anti-Communist first generation. There is still a fraction of first generation Vietnamese who have the political power and clout to close businesses through protest and political shamming in the community. As recently as November 2015, protests outside Zen Vegetarian restaurant shut down the twenty-year-old community restaurant. Youtube videos were broadcast around the community and in local political magazines regarding the owner’s frequent trips to Vietnam and “collusion with the Communists.” Many former political prisoners believe that the Vietnamese government pays spies in the community. Local politics in the ethnic community also appears to be influenced by anti-Communist rhetoric. As one news reporter said,

The more vocal segment of the community - the segment most likely to show up on news media - is heavily influenced by anti-communist rhetoric, emphasis on "rhetoric." Because of that, successful politicians like state Assemblymen have figured out that they can get a lot of mileage out of purely symbolic gestures, without actually having to do anything that harm their allies' ability to do business in Vietnam. In contrast, do-ers such as U.S. Rep. Joseph Cao would travel to Vietnam and have an actual shouting match with communist officials about the oppression of religion and the lack of human rights, but extremists would take him to task for even going to Vietnam at all.

The impact of postwar Vietnam on community formation is demonstrated by the current collective effort of the Vietnamese business community to raise money and political support for
Syrian refugees that is inclusive of all generations of Vietnamese immigrants. In crisis, collective organizing takes place where value introjection, “a source of social capital that prompts individuals to behave in ways other than naked greed,” are activated (Portes 1993:1323). On a cool Sunday morning in Fountain Valley, hundreds of mostly high school students, descendants of Vietnamese refugees, joined Arab Americans and others in a four-mile walk to promote awareness of the refugee crisis in Syria. “It’s a relatable cause because my parents were boat people,” said a university high school student who arrived with friends from his school’s Vietnamese Student Association. “I want to see what we can do to help the Syrians because that is us. History is repeating itself” said one bystander whose mother and sister died at sea. As the Washington Post reports, “Syria crisis evokes Vietnamese Boat People” and the OC register announces “Vietnamese Americans stand up for a new cause” reflecting the community’s fundraising efforts. A 1.5 generation Pharmacy owner who organized a badminton fundraiser for Syrian refugees explained, “The Vietnamese people should be the first to sympathize and empathize with the Syrian people because we are all immigrants ourselves, and many of us were refugees once as well. Many of us have lost loved ones, or know of people who have died in the pursuit of freedom.” The Vietnamese newspaper, Nguoi Viet broadcasts daily pictures of Syrian refugees and the Vietnamese community shows collective solidarity. In this case, the power of the refugee identity still serves as a means to unite differences across generational and class lines.

Communities of Contrast: Ethnoburbs in Southern California and Little Saigon

Orange County is a mixed geographic site of multiple Asian communities including traditional ethnic enclaves like Little Saigon and Koreatown, and also ethnoburbs in Irvine.
Irvine has a large number of Chinese and Japanese owned firms, 22.8% compared to the state’s California’s average of 14.9% (US Census 2010). These companies include the US headquarters for Toshiba, Hitachi, Canon, Mazda, and Kawasaki in Orange County. Newly arrived Chinese have settled disproportionally in tracts near Irvine in Southern Orange County (Wright 2005). A large Taiwanese population lives on the borders of Little Saigon in Fountain Valley and Huntington Beach that have opened Ranch 99 supermarkets in Taiwanese and Asian commercial belts. Areas in Irvine and Huntington Beach typify Wei Li’s conceptualization of the ethnoburb-highly affluent professional immigrants setting up multi-ethnic Asian eateries, restaurants, and shopping.

There are some elements of Little Saigon that are similar to Wei Li’s (2009) theory of an ethnoburb. Like an ethnoburb, the enclave includes new immigrants and later generations. Examining Wei Li’s chart (see picture below), the point of disagreement is the idea that internal stratification for the enclave is low. One of the pre-conditions for the creation of the enclave is having a heterogeneous class structure; in the Vietnamese case, Little Saigon is highly stratified in terms of class and human capital backgrounds. Also, for Little Saigon, a large number of 1.5 generation, educated in the US, are spearheading new business initiatives in the enclave. Also, ethnoburbs lack a specific ethnic identity, which is unlike Little Saigon where physical markers and a majority concentration clearly exists.

The generations experience Little Saigon differently. The second generation may use Little Saigon as an ethnoburb; the second generation come to enjoy foodstuffs and experience being Vietnamese through eating traditional food and symbolic ethnicity on Tet and occasions selectively. However, for a large portion of the first generation, Little Saigon is experienced as a traditional enclave where one can find employment, enjoy news media, entertainment, and utilize
doctors and CPAs all in one’s native language. Moreover, the presence of affluent non-white populations alters the meaning and use of the enclave. Non-ethnics use Little Saigon including the large employment of undocumented labor in the enclave. Many times Vietnamese restaurateurs have a preference for Mexican immigrants who they see as non-threatening in terms of sharing recipes and compliant labor sources (personal interviews). Other Asian Americans shop in Little Saigon markets for produce and fresh fish that costs less than their own ethnic markets.

For the first generation, Little Saigon embodies a focal point, a place to remember the past. For later generations not as mired in the actual reality of war, Little Saigon often functions as symbolic ethnicity and cultural consumption, a place to socialize, buy inexpensive commodities and services, such as florists, dentists, and supermarkets, and consume ethnicity through traditional cuisine. Despite differences in perception, the 1.5 generation are the cultural interlocutors revitalizing mom-and-pop businesses and creating new services for the first and second generation with new ties to Vietnam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Ghetto</th>
<th>Enclave</th>
<th>Ethnoburb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dynamics</td>
<td>Forced segregation</td>
<td>Forced &amp; voluntary</td>
<td>Voluntary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>High density</td>
<td>High density</td>
<td>Medium density</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Inner city</td>
<td>Inner city &amp; suburbs</td>
<td>Suburbs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Few ethnically owned businesses</td>
<td>Bias towards service &amp; labor-intensive sectors</td>
<td>Ethnically owned businesses of all kinds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal stratification</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Not much</td>
<td>Very stratified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>Mainly within group</td>
<td>Mainly within group</td>
<td>Both wining &amp; among different groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tension</td>
<td>Intergroup</td>
<td>Mainly intergroup</td>
<td>Inter &amp; intragroup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Mainly inward</td>
<td>Mainly inward</td>
<td>Both inward &amp; outward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example</td>
<td>Traditional Chinatown (19th century)</td>
<td>Contemporary Chinatown</td>
<td>Chinese ethnoburb in the San Gabriel Valley</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


1.5 and 2nd Generation Entrepreneurship
Gia Ly navigates on her iPhone a virtual tour that she designed to promote her family’s businesses; she scans the tables and corners carefully of her family’s Westminster restaurant and with a few screen swipes and finger pinches on her iPhone she completes the tour. Her family’s businesses are more than twenty years old in the community: Zen Vegetarian Restaurant and Crepe Corner. Wind whips three flags outside their store front: those of California, the United States and that of South Vietnam. “In Little Saigon, mom-and-pop owners don’t think of marketing dollars, or how to compete with larger restaurants. This will help them with [Google] ranking and indexing,” she explains. The 34-year-old businesswoman contracts with the search giant Google to sell similar tours to small businesses. She epitomizes Little Saigon’s modern Vietnamese American entrepreneur. Zen, a Vietnamese restaurant in the heart of Little Saigon which she co-owns with her immigrant parents, is the restaurant she grew up helping her parents and is indicative of the type of business that first generation are concentrated in. And, Ly’s work with the online tours and presidency of the Vietnamese American Chamber of Commerce is indicative of the transformation Little Saigon is undergoing through the rise of the 1.5 generation and 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation in politics and commerce.

In this section, I provide an intergenerational transnational analysis that examines the life course of the enclave. My results show that present rates of entrepreneurship are the same for the first and 1.5 generation; however, the industry concentrations of these two generations are notably different. The economic beneficiaries of the enclave are primarily the first wave of exiles and their children, and the large Chinese-Vietnamese entrepreneurial class. These groups benefit as the Vietnamese enclave was developed both through the class and educational resources of the first elite wave, and a later influx of Chinese-Vietnamese business entrepreneurs and their immigrant children. The latter of which is seen as transnational capital and relationships among
Chinese-Vietnamese entrepreneurs have successfully aided the longevity of the enclave. The rising political power of the Vietnamese in Orange County also institutionalized Vietnamese language programming in schools in addition to course content that reflects the Vietnamese American experience.

Immigrant entrepreneurship has long been heralded as a means of social mobility for immigrants (Tseng 1995, Gold 1994; Portes 1987; Zhou 2004). Sociologists have amassed a large body of evidence indicating how ethnic economies are beneficial to a multitude of immigrant groups and communities in the United States for Chinese, Vietnamese, Koreans, and Indians (Zhou, 1998; Wei Lei 1999; Dhingra 2012; Min 2008). Observations of interactions between immigrants, ethnic economies, and communities shows variation in small-business ownership by generation. For example, members of the second generation rarely continue in the same business as their parents in the US context (Kasinitz 2009; Kim 2006; Rangaswamy 2007), and similar debates concerning the enclave as a means of social mobility have been summarized extensively elsewhere (Light 1984; Zhou 2004; Daeyoung 2006). Generational differences in entrepreneurship thus raises questions about the life span of enclaves, of which little is presently known.

**Descriptive Statistics for Self-employment and Income**

In a matter of thirty-six years, Little Saigon expanded to more than 2,000 businesses from the original Williamsburg Center, home to Bolsa’s first Vietnamese businesses in 1980. Café

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8 The skeptical view of immigrant self-employment understands ethnic enterprises as “mobility traps” preventing minority persons from acquiring the necessary skills and experience condemning them to a condition of permanently low returns and relationships of exploitation (Borjas 1986; Nee and Sanders 1994).
culture, a relic from French colonialism, imported from the home country dominates the strip malls of Little Saigon; it is not uncommon to see older men sitting outside recounting stories of the past, smoking cigarettes, and drinking *cafe sua da*. The waitresses, typically recent arrivals from Vietnam, serve the overwhelmingly male clientele who read the paper and discuss the next local Vietnamese candidate. Two of those candidates, Janet Nguyen, a second generation UC Irvine graduate and California Senator, and Mayor Bao Tran, the first openly gay mayor of Garden Grove and 2016 California Senate runner, are political figures that were unthinkable in the first few years of the enclave but who have revitalized the area incorporating transnational exchanges and new business models. Alongside the traditional mom-and-pop stores, new business initiatives which are the makings of the 1.5 generation who are the cultural brokers bringing in different types of customer service and fusion cuisine. Having restaurants open until early in the morning, Little Saigon bustles at night with entertainment targeted towards the second and 1.5 generation including swanky lounges, bars, and restaurants.

I use the following evidence to understand the longevity of the ethnic enclave and the way ethnic enclaves change across generations (1) census data on the economic performance of different ethnic groups in Orange County/Los Angeles using 2010 American Community Survey data and the 2007 Survey of Business Owners and (2) knowledge and familiarity with the history of the immigrant group following Portes and Shafers’ (2007) analysis of the Cuban enclave.

The 2010 American Community Survey provides data for 25,489 adults, ages 25 to 65 who earned more than $500 in the Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana metropolitan statistical area. This large sample can be divided into the ethnic categories of Non-Hispanic white, Non-Hispanic Black, Vietnamese, Chinese, Korean, and Other. The last category is primarily composed of Latinos and other Asian groups. The Vietnamese sample comprises 1,861 cases that
is further subdivided by generation: first-generation, 1.5 generation (those who immigrated before the age of 13), and the US born second-generation. Given that the majority of Vietnamese immigrants arrived to the US after 1975, it is safe to assume that the US born are the second generation. Immigration and Naturalization Services recorded only 643 Vietnamese immigrants arrived to the United States between 1950 and 1974. The second-generation Vietnamese in my data is purposively limited to those who are at least 25 years or older and are the offspring of immigrants arriving between 1975 and 1990 (see Chapter four for an in-depth discussion of the various waves of Vietnamese-US migration).

In terms of comparing Vietnamese with other racial ethnic populations in Southern California, Vietnamese have lower personal incomes and live in in areas of higher poverty as summarized in Table 6. Results show that non-Hispanic whites and Chinese occupy the top of the economic ladder for all-racial ethnic groups in Southern California whereas Vietnamese, Blacks, and Latinos tend to be on the bottom of the economic ladder. The overall mean personal income for first generation Vietnamese is lower than that of Blacks; however, this relationship dramatically changes when considering family income- Vietnamese have higher than average family incomes for the metropolitan statistical area (Table 7). This is largely due to the fact that many Vietnamese live in multi-generational families, with extended kin including grandparents, cousins and recently arrived relatives all contributing to the household. Poverty rates for Vietnamese are 13 percent, higher than average for all other Asian groups in Orange County, and slightly higher than the county average. The cities in Orange County with the highest poverty rates are those which Vietnamese tend to live- Garden Grove, Westminster, and Santa Ana, all

____________________________
cities considered part of Little Saigon.
Table 6: Personal Incomes of Employed Racial and Ethnic Groups in Los Angeles/Orange County Metropolitan Area (Adult Males 25-65)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total MSA</th>
<th>Other-race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>2nd Gen Viet.</th>
<th>1.5 Gen Viet.</th>
<th>1st Gen Viet.</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Income</td>
<td>60780</td>
<td>40182</td>
<td>92465</td>
<td>53572</td>
<td>54552</td>
<td>53301</td>
<td>50843</td>
<td>64446</td>
<td>58278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(473)</td>
<td>(383)</td>
<td>(1055)</td>
<td>(1975)</td>
<td>(8044)</td>
<td>(3544)</td>
<td>(2731)</td>
<td>(2115)</td>
<td>(2369)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>25,489</td>
<td>12,357</td>
<td>9,632</td>
<td>1,126</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>622</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACS, 2010; Note: Universe includes adults who are not unemployed and whose annual income is greater than or equal to $500. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Table 7: Family Incomes of Employed Racial and Ethnic Groups in Los Angeles/Orange County Metropolitan Area

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total MSA</th>
<th>Other-race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>1st Gen Viet.</th>
<th>1.5 Gen Viet.</th>
<th>2nd Gen Viet.</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family Income</td>
<td>93989</td>
<td>70513</td>
<td>127745</td>
<td>82721</td>
<td>96681</td>
<td>94578</td>
<td>113795</td>
<td>102468</td>
<td>88184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>(613)</td>
<td>(597)</td>
<td>(1282)</td>
<td>(2450)</td>
<td>(4746)</td>
<td>(5278)</td>
<td>(13141)</td>
<td>(2904)</td>
<td>(3104)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACS, 2010; Note: Universe includes adults, who are not unemployed and whose annual income is greater than or equal to $500. Standard deviations in parenthesis.

Further differentiating Vietnamese from other groups presented in the data (Table 8), the Vietnamese self-employed do not enjoy a substantial economic advantage in terms of personal incomes compared to their wage-worker and salaried co-ethnics, making them different from all other racial ethnic groups in the data. This difference may be explained in part by the informal cash economy in Little Saigon, a remnant of the community’s beginnings in which Vietnamese commonly kept large amounts of cash and valuables in their homes rather than use banks owing to a fear and distrust of banks, police and courts from after the war (Hong 2010). Today, most businesses accept payment by cash only, particularly service-based businesses such as restaurants, while employee wages too are typically paid in cash.

Table 8 disaggregates the data even further into the categories of self-employed and wage-earners for Vietnamese. Here, self-employment is defined in two categories- general and incorporated. The first category includes all types of enterprises- from personal survival ventures to established firms. The incorporated category more closely reflects the latter type of business where the business is a separate entity from the business owner (Portes & Yiu 2015). As the 2010 census reports incorporated self-employed workers appear to have more human capital compared with non-incorporated self-employed workers. For example, incorporated self-employed workers are more likely to have a bachelor’s degree, speak English well, and be a
Like the Cuban case, first-generation self-employed Vietnamese are, almost by definition ethnic enclave entrepreneurs (Portes 2007). As explained earlier in the chapter, the original business networks were first founded by the 1975 wave of immigrants and overseas interests from China and Taiwan. In contrast to the Cuban case, Vietnamese waged and salaried workers may or may not be employees of the enclave economy. Although the data does not provide a means to establish a comparison, it allows a way to examine the economic situation of Vietnamese workers.

When disaggregating the data by generation, self-employment appears to financially benefit the founders of the enclave and the second wave of first generation Vietnamese which included the Chinese entrepreneurial class. I draw this conclusion by examination of census data and also informal interviews with business owners in the community. In addition, the personal income of the self-employed is higher for the 1.5 generation of the first and second waves, and not the most recent waves of immigrants. In the Vietnamese case, the second wave of first-generation immigrants were also highly likely to be entrepreneurial (see table five). This can be partially explained by the unique context of Chinese entrepreneurs in the second wave of immigrants and Vietnamese with high human capital.10

10 The median total household income for Vietnamese Americans nationally is $53,600 whereas for Vietnamese Chinese Americans it is $57,160. This gap significantly widens in Orange County, where the median total household incomes are $52,000 and $63,000, respectively (ACS, 2010). It is difficult to differentiate the Chinese-Vietnamese population; in the census most Chinese-Vietnamese will ethnically identify as Chinese, rather than the hyphenated identity of Chinese-Vietnamese as shown in past studies (Trieu 2008; Ta 2000; Zong 2015).
Table 8: Personal incomes of working, self-employed, and wage/salaried males by racial and ethnic group in Los Angeles/Orange County MSA ages 25 to 65

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total MSA</th>
<th>Other-race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>1st Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>1.5 Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>Second Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Adults</td>
<td>53478</td>
<td>37555</td>
<td>77296</td>
<td>49566</td>
<td>42700 (1710)</td>
<td>55869 (2805)</td>
<td>53649 (5030)</td>
<td>56391</td>
<td>52446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(300)</td>
<td>(267)</td>
<td>(669)</td>
<td>(1100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>67871</td>
<td>38922</td>
<td>92624</td>
<td>63792</td>
<td>52139 (10321)</td>
<td>34331 (6121)</td>
<td>38892 (14291)</td>
<td>69518</td>
<td>62932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1484)</td>
<td>(1381)</td>
<td>(2333)</td>
<td>(9972)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>105331</td>
<td>61038</td>
<td>13115</td>
<td>10467</td>
<td>73125 (16657)</td>
<td>42160 (9754)</td>
<td>30640 (9645)</td>
<td>96797</td>
<td>87635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incorporated</td>
<td>(3390)</td>
<td>(3595)</td>
<td>(5008)</td>
<td>(25501)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage/Salaried</td>
<td>48569</td>
<td>35520</td>
<td>69300</td>
<td>43570</td>
<td>38742 (1388)</td>
<td>55715 (2862)</td>
<td>49821 (4624)</td>
<td>52957</td>
<td>48039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(268)</td>
<td>(246)</td>
<td>(612)</td>
<td>(910)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACS, 2010; Note: Universe includes adults, who are not unemployed and whose annual income is greater than or equal to $500. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
Who is entrepreneurial?

The most popular type of business to be operated and owned by a first-generation is a Vietnamese restaurant. Finding myself in one of the many cafes on a sunny Southern California afternoon, I speak with Phuong, a first generation immigrant who owns a lucrative pho restaurant called Pho Kim Quy or Pho Kimmy. Why, I ask, her? Well, “it’s easy- if you were a good cook at home, you can cook here.” Restaurants overwhelm the space of Little Saigon with names that illustrate the restaurant’s specialty and region of the cuisine found in Vietnam such “Bun Cha Hanoi” (a type of grilled pork dish unique to the Northern Capital) or “Com Tam Nha Trang” (beef/pork rice dish from Nha Trang, a city in central Vietnam). One can also see how businesses compete in the enclave for customers- restaurants have huge signs saying 50% off, or “buy one get, one free” visible from the street. Entrepreneurship is an economic strategy for first-generation Vietnamese; the results for Southern California replicate national patterns as seen in Table 9. Vietnamese first generation rates of self-employment are consistent with the overall national rate of self-employment of 14%. The most striking result that differs from national results, is that that 1.5 generation in the enclave have greater self-employment rate in Little Saigon compared to national rates for the 1.5 generation. At 14%, the 1.5 generation engage in self-employment just as much as their first generation counterparts. This goes against literature that argues that as immigrants assimilate, they turn less and less to entrepreneurship as a means to economic mobility and financial livelihood. Human capital characteristics are given in Table 10.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial/Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Total MSA</th>
<th>Other-race</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>2nd Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>1.5 Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>1st Gen Vietnamese</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Korean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage/Salaried worker</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.87</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed-General</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed-Incorporated</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.38</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>35,032</td>
<td>17,292</td>
<td>12,817</td>
<td>1,746</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>783</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACS, 2010; Note: Universe includes adults, who are not unemployed and whose annual income is greater than or equal to $500.
Table 10: Human capital characteristics: First Generation and 1.5 Generation Vietnamese in Southern California by date of immigration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1.5 Generation in Southern California</th>
<th>First-Generation in Southern California</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age (years)</td>
<td>41.3</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (%)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean income ($)</td>
<td>66514.34</td>
<td>44721.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not proficient in English (%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than H.S. (%)</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate degree (%)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: American Community Survey 2010

Restaurants are just one of the businesses that first generation are likely to open. Table 11 illustrates the types of businesses second generation and 1.5 generation enter. Hum holds there are economic sectors and markets that offer easy entry but also include high risks of failure for first-generation immigrants (Hum 2002; Waldinger 1989; Le 2007). As shown in Table 11, businesses that provide professional services such as legal, financial, educational, and technical are more likely to be found among the 1.5 generation. The proliferation of these type of professional services is emerging as markers of upward mobility for the 1.5 and second generation (Zhou 1999). All ethnic enclaves contain both types of businesses-professional and
service sector, and in Little Saigon, the 1.5 generation tends to spearhead the professional businesses in the enclave. Thanh Hoang is the president of one of the first Vietnamese-American marketing firms in the US. He left Vietnam at the age of 12, and his company motto is “putting brands into retailer’s hands.” His national and global sales channels include products from Vietnam and the Vietnamese-American community including *Bia Saigon*, a well known brand of beer from Vietnam, and the Vietnamese-American ice coffee brand Lee’s into Costco retailers across the United States. The retail stores he works with includes Target, Kroger, Whole Foods, Wal-mart, and 99 Ranch Supermarket in which he he markets Vietnamese-American products to the mainstream, outside of the enclave.
The organizational and infrastructural synergies that arise from being located in an ethnic enclave explain the positive returns to self-employment for the Vietnamese first-generation and the exit of the second-generation from entrepreneurship. Theories in ethnic entrepreneurship argue that there are different motivations for different generations of immigrants to engage in self-employment. The first generation entrepreneurs entail more push factors into entrepreneurship whereas the second generation searches for new opportunities outside the traditional markets (Baycan-Levent 2007). To highlight the nature of self-employment among the second generation, Table 11 shows the industries in which each generation are concentrated. The relatively small sample size of self-employment among second-generation Vietnamese is

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vietnamese 1st Gen</th>
<th>Vietnamese 1.5 Gen</th>
<th>Vietnamese 2nd Gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paid employee</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid employee (n=910)</td>
<td>Nail salons- 8.0%</td>
<td>Restaurants/food services- 4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty salons- 4.6%</td>
<td>Elementary &amp; secondary teachers- 4.5%</td>
<td>Education-elementary &amp; secondary teachers 6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants- 4.0%</td>
<td>Finance-banking 4.5%</td>
<td>Finance/insurance 5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical equipment- 5.4%</td>
<td>Health-hospitals 4.1%</td>
<td>Professional/investigation &amp; security 4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic component/product manufacturing – 4.2%</td>
<td>Health-office of physicians 3.7%</td>
<td>Professional/accounting 3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paid employee (n = 244)</td>
<td>Health-other health care services 3.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance-securities, commodities, funds, trusts, financial investment 3.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (n=161)</td>
<td>Nail Salons -15.5%</td>
<td>Construction- 13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beauty Salons- 14.9</td>
<td></td>
<td>Retail/health &amp; personal care</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants- 7</td>
<td>Finance-11.1%</td>
<td>Arts entertainment- 16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction-6</td>
<td>Physicians-11.1%</td>
<td>Professional/computer systems- 16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (n=36)</td>
<td>Restaurants- 8.3%</td>
<td>Motions pictures &amp; video industries- 16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed (n=94)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Manufacturing-electro medical instruments- 16.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nail salons -16.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ACS, 2010
evident 6% compared to 14% for the first and 1.5 generation respectively, as second-generation are not choosing the path of entrepreneurship. Instead, the second generation are concentrated in the professions. Many of my interviewees expressed that taking over the family business was not usually even considered an option.

Success for Vietnamese means that their kids have stable jobs. You should be a doctor, lawyer, pharmacist, or engineer- higher professional degrees. You don’t need a higher degree to become a business owner or open a restaurant. They had to open their own business because they didn’t have other options- they couldn’t speak English and they couldn’t use their degrees here. They wanted us to have a better education for more opportunities so we wouldn’t have to struggle. I never thought once that my parents wanted me to take over their restaurant. They used the restaurant so I could have a better life.

For many children of small business owners, taking over the family business was usually associated with downward mobility. A 2009 study by UCLA on the “State of Asian-American Businesses” found that many second-generation Asian Americans were hesitant to pursue entrepreneurship because of their parents’ hardships. When the second generation engages in entrepreneurial activities- it is in the expressive and creative arts. Sahra Vang Nguyen, a filmmaker and daughter of entrepreneurs is one example. Her latest film captures the spirit of the “DIY Generation” who shows how a new breed of entrepreneurs are succeeding outside the enclave. She said that, “Growing up, I didn’t think of my parents as entrepreneurs, I just considered them manual workers doing hard labor. Looking back, I see how amazing my parents were to immigrate to the US with no money, to navigate a new system and to build their own businesses without an American education…my parents showed me that I can carve my own path and I can also be my own boss.”

Besides entrepreneurship, the community is also composed of more than 300 community based organizations serving a variety of interests including the arts, sports, cultural, political, and
hometown associations. The organizational life of the enclave caters specifically to Vietnamese, and these 300 organizations do not include the myriad of pan-ethnic Asian associations that exist in the larger Orange County area. These organizations along with the entrepreneurial life of the enclave show how residential segregation does not lead to disadvantage in the case of the Vietnamese.

**Rise of an Ethnic Political Block**

The entrepreneurial success of Vietnamese in Little Saigon also facilitated its rise to political power and the institutionalization of Vietnamese language programming directly affecting second generation Vietnamese who grow up in the enclave. Vietnamese language becoming part of the schools’ mainstream curriculum is largely due to the rise of Vietnamese as a political force in Orange County. As a headline in 2007 Orange County register reads, “Little Saigon has emerged as a major political force, but party loyalty takes a back seat to ethnic unity,” and similarly from a 2007 Los Angeles Times reads, “Little Saigon’s big clout; Politicians and their parties can no longer afford to overlook Orange County’s Vietnamese-American Community.” At the beginning of 2000, there was a single Vietnamese-American elected official in Orange County. In 2016, there are 19 spread amongst Orange County with two to the county Board of Supervisors, one as a county-clerk and more than a dozen representatives in city councils and various school boards in addition to one non-local representative in the state senate. Two out of every four Asian American voters in California are Vietnamese (Waheed 2014). Vietnamese American voters have consistently shown they are more concerned with electing fellow Vietnamese than they are with party affiliation (Ramakrishnan 2011). Vietnamese have higher rates of political participation in Orange County than all non-Hispanic
whites. Their concentration creates a power base where votes influence elections and local politicians ethnic and non-ethnic will pander to win the favor of the community especially in reard to school politics.

The formalization of Vietnamese language programming in schools has long been pushed by co-ethnic politicians and the community. Seven high schools in the Westminster district offer Vietnamese 1, 2, 3 and 4 Honors. DeMille Elementary School is the first Vietnamese dual-language immersion program. Opened in the Westminster School District, the program is free and open to students from across the county with two 24 student kindergarten classes. Bilingual education programming is often times stigmatized as remedial education that is necessary only until students can enter an English-only curriculum. This is not the case in Little Saigon where Vietnamese language programming has long been institutionalized through weekend Buddhist and Catholic education programs in the community. Offering Vietnamese in schools provides a legitimizing force and way of cementing and creating Vietnamese identity. As one city council person said, “there are more than 10,000 Vietnamese businesses Little Saigon, not to mention mainstream corporations and emerging economic trade in Vietnam. This has huge implications for our community. I’m a second-generation family business owner…I have three young children who I want to learn the language, to preserve our culture and to use in business.”

Assignments include creating a traditional Tet table with with food and decoration for the Lunar New Year celebration. The school described it formally in the bulletin as “an opportunity for Vietnamese classes to share their knowledge about traditional lunar new year with the whole school.” Students are marked based on decorating their table, having essential Tet food, labeling all the food and listing ingredients in Vietnamese and English, and scheduling times for students to take turns to explain the table to others. Shared holidays are one element of a shared culture, “moments in the annual cycle when a community publicly celebrates itself and a public culture emerges (Lavenda 1992:77). Former veterans are invited to campus to give talks in classroom about Vietnam and the war in Vietnamese to the students. This activates learning not only of language but particular moments of history and experience.

School practices draw upon specific cultural capital that privilege certain groups over others. Capital in Bourdieu’s framework represents those ways of thinking in society or items valued by the dominant group and sanctioned by those in power (Bourdieu, 1999). The hidden curriculum of the educational systems privileges particular forms of capital, obfuscating issues of power, social class, ideology and racism that take place in the classroom (Guerrera 1997). By drawing students’ backgrounds and lived experiences into the institutional curriculum and their social lives, students can avert this racialization and privilege their own stories and histories.

Moll and Gonazlez (1994) used this approach to study the literacy practices of working-class Latina/o children.

The institutionalization of Vietnamese language programming in Little Saigon schools’ normalizes Vietnamese language learning and aids in second generation acculturation. Peter Nguyen, a senior at Garden Grove High who understands Vietnamese but by his own report “can barely speak it” said that he enrolled in Vietnamese classes because he cannot win an argument with his parents: “They have an advantage over me because they speak the language. I don’t have the vocabulary to express my side.” There are 75 ways to address elders in Vietnamese, “but many youth don’t know which greeting fits the situation so they don’t talk to them” explained a Vietnamese teacher. As Portes acknowledges, “full Americanization has the effect of disconnecting youth from their parents and depriving them of a cultural reference point on which to ground their sense of self and their personal dignity (Portes 2014: 299). The assumption then is that full Americanization means learning English. By teaching Vietnamese, the schools in Little Saigon are emphasizing that teaching Vietnamese is not in conflict with Americanization. This selective acculturation is contingent upon a supportive network of co-ethnics. For example, Zhou in her study of Vietnamese in Louisiana finds that those linked into a strong co-ethnic
community do better because of greater social control and reinforced messages by the parents. In Versailles Village, the old Vietnamese proverb, “parents may be far away, but neighbors are always near” demonstrates the watchful eye of the community (1999:105).

Class choice such as the option to take Vietnamese language is also supplemented by additional courses that focus on the experiences of students themselves. For example, students at Bolsa Grande have the option to take World History or Vietnamese American History for their Humanities graduation requirement. Vietnamese American History traces the historical background of Vietnam from French colonialism to modern Vietnam. Course goals include understanding “Adaptation for the four waves of refugees.” In a recent final exam, students were asked to write an essay that “Compare and contrast the first generation refugees with second generation” in regards to language, values, and education. Kim (2013) finds in her study of second generation Korean and Chinese, that the immigrant narrative is one in which histories of the home country—issues such as colonialism, imperialism and occupation—are noticeably absent. Modern US school curriculum has long muted and erased the stories of people of color. As Aldridge (2006) argues, when individuals of marginalized groups are mentioned in a text or in a textbook ‘box’, they are sanitized for white consumption and support the dominant culture. For second generation Vietnamese, these classes bridge a cultural and social gap between immigrant and the American-raised generation.

The particular vision and understanding of Vietnamese history and class content are influenced by anti-Communism in the community. In April 2015, the Westminster School District pulled the Vietnamese language course book from middle-school classes, “Let’s Speak Vietnamese” after parents protested, declaring the book “communist”. The city mayor of Westminster, Tri Ta, noticed a Government of Vietnam emblem while helping his seventh grade
daughter complete her homework assignment. The city mayor, Tri Ta, like many in Little Saigon refuse to travel to Vietnam until the government there falls. As Ta explains to a news outlet, “The communist government in Vietnam still violates human rights. There is no freedom in Vietnam- they suppress all forms of political dissent. A relationship with Vietnam is not appropriate at this time.” As explicit representations of what language means and how to speak Vietnamese – many published materials for Chinese language for example used in schools in the US are provided by the Chinese state (Archer 2010). Such materials operate as powerful authorizing agents, written from particular perspectives and institutionalizing particular dominant versions of ‘culture’ in the community. This form of anti-communism suggests a reactionary framework, and form of oppositional politics linked to US Cold War and the civil war between North and South Vietnam that is still lived in the community today (Dang 2005).

**Parenting strategies: Parent’s work in the enclave and upward mobility through education**

The ethnic community offers a basis of support for parental strategies. Academic achievement is a proxy for how well families have done in the US to overcome financial instability (Louie 2004; Lee & Zhou 2015). The instability is experienced in enclave occupations and the instability experienced in Vietnam prior to migration. Academic success of the second generation is a means of comparing social mobility of the first generation with significant others in the community. As one participant explained, “Our parents are always trying to one up one another they are always trying to out do their friends- with their house, their kids- they are always telling people that my boyfriend is a doctor- they tell their friends this stuff unnecessarily. Their drive is to never be poor again and to never be in that situation again or to be on welfare. She wants to show people that she’s successful with her family.” Scholars find that talking about
the accomplishments of the next generation becomes a way for parents to enhance social status and to make up for the daily challenges of survival they face (Louie 2004; Lee & Zhou 2015). These social networks for sharing information are accessed in the enclave in restaurants, at work, and through family members as a way for parents to gauge their children’s performance relative to other people’s children (Rumbaut 2002). As Zhou (1997) argues social networks in the ethnic community facilitate the formation of social capital for immigrant families, and provide a means of social control and shared obligations. Within these networks, parents use their children’s educational performance as a marker of their social status or “bragging rights”

Parents in the enclave distinguish between their physical labor in the enclave and the educational labor of their children. The first generation touts education as a means of upward mobility for the second generation. The second generation experiences this rhetoric in an ambivalent way, both as a means for motivation and also a psychological burden and pressure to succeed. This occurs specifically in the enclave through constant comparisons by parents within the ethnic community. This is similar to the findings by Lee and Zhou (2015) of second generation Chinese and Vietnamese where the reference groups are other co-ethnic Asians. Recent work by Jimenez also finds that the reference group for Asian Americans is no longer Whites in terms of academic achievement (2010). In the Vietnamese enclave, the experience of being compared to co-ethnics is magnified by concentrated co-ethnics and access to resources in Vietnamese language media and organizations. Local Vietnamese newspapers publish the acceptances of students to elite schools across the country. After-school academic test preparation is readily available and easily accessible at all price ranges at various centers offering payment plans (Lee & Zhou 2015). For example, the acceptance of Quan Hai Lu, the son of a South Vietnamese soldier, to West Point is published in English in the Orange County Register
and in Vietnamese in Nguoi Viet. This is only one of many news articles celebrating the successful assimilation of Vietnamese and also reinforcing the model minority trope.

For those children growing up in the enclave, academic achievement is not only conditioned by the pan-ethnic stereotypes of the model minority in schools but by comparisons with family and co-ethnics in the community. As one student said,

It’s a lot of pressure that you deal with your whole life- it’s a weight on your shoulders- why do you have to be a doctor? Then you have one person who is a doctor in your family, then you get compared to that one person- if you look at the US- there aren’t even that many doctors so why do we all need to be doctors and expect this from all of us.

Or as another second-generation informant explained, the expectation was always to attend college:

My cousins went to Yale and Stanford- so that was the standard you know. I always knew that I was going to college, but it was a matter of where to apply. Growing up, we lived next door to each other and they set the bar for me so I ended up going to Harvard. With role models like that, it just kinda helps.

The children of immigrants were aware of the payoff to higher education from watching their parents’ positions in the labor market and reacted at times with ambivalence. Children discussed their parents’ limited English skills and lack of schooling. Many second generation understand that working in the enclave wasn’t a choice for their parents, the ethnic economy was in many ways the only option. Youth understood that their parent’s hoped to push their children into jobs in the mainstream economy. A close link between higher mobility and education was sharply ingrained in participants whose parents pushed for stable jobs:

It goes back to the language problem because for them, the older generation, whatever they picked as their occupation it was always minimum wage- regardless of career path- we (second generation) have a wider range of salaries and opportunities- we don’t have to
be minimum wage. It has to do with parent’s expectations and what they push you to do. They don’t want you to work hard the way they did. That’s why are they working so hard here so their kids can have a better life and eventually take care of them.

Many students expressed a strong sense of family obligation and guilt after watching their parents suffer downward mobility upon arrival in the US. They expressed the need to pay back their parents:

My parents met after they got out of prison (re-education camp in Vietnam). They are older parents. That’s the other thing- they were much older so when they got over here they didn’t have opportunities to go to school or find better jobs so they were stuck with kinds of jobs like seamstresses so they emphasized education because they didn’t have it either. My mom would bring home stuff from the factory to sew. I remember them dedicating this corner of the house to the sewing machines and staying up all night. After doing sewing for a couple of years, my dad went to work at Taco Bell, then my dad went to work as a cook at two to-go (restaurant) places on Bolsa.

Students explained that their choice of majors were often constrained in terms of particular professions such as doctor or lawyer as found in other studies (Lee & Zhou 2014). These jobs were seen as part of the mainstream economy that would buffer their children from discrimination and provide stability. Most students described the occupational choice of their parents narrow because of a motivation by their parents for jobs that were stable. Other scholars of Asian American Studies have written about how Asian parents perceive blocked opportunities and racial discrimination in the United States and hence encourage their children to pursue education as a defensive strategy. Louie finds that immigrant parents encourage their children to choose technical fields in order to circumvent discrimination in the labor market (2004). This rang true with many of my informants. A key reason for entering professional jobs was stability. Most second-generation Vietnamese in my study expressed that their parents wanted them to have a stable career, and professions provided that route.
When my mom first came here, she would have to do cherry picking, sewing, hard manual labor where they would get paid below minimum wage, long hours, that’s why my mom decided to do nails. It’s not too bad and you still make good money.

They didn’t talk too much about Vietnam but every day my dad would work late, so he would come home around 8 pm and we would have dinner and my mom anytime that I wasn’t doing my homework or I was goofing off or playing too much she would say “you have to work hard because you don’t want to end up like your dad.” So sometimes she would put him down to make me feel like I have to go further. My dad was a construction worker and she didn’t want the same for me. But I totally respected what my dad did.

Parents often times did not discuss the war, but discussed their labor and hopes for their children.

The emphasis on manual labor creates a sense of guilt for second generation to achieve economic uplift not only for themselves but for their family. This in turn shapes second generation identity.

In contrast to labor opportunities in the enclave, parents instill in their children that they can achieve mobility through hard work because they can speak English proficiently compared to their parents. Working in the enclave often times in nails or as entrepreneurs meant that monthly income was variable.

For my mom each customer means $5 and now there are so many people doing nails. When people first come here, that’s one of the first jobs they do. It drives prices down. She was always stressed.

The instability of many Vietnamese refugees’ jobs in America was compounded by the uncertainty they remembered in their homeland. This instability included attempting to escape war, victims of political oppression, economic volatility of Vietnam during the 1970s to early 1980s when Vietnam faced famine, wars with China and Cambodia, and recovering from the war with the United States.

This pressure for stability manifests in the pushing of the second generation into professional occupations. Vietnamese niche industries such as pharmacy as one counselor at
Bolsa Grande High School explained, “For Vietnamese parents, success is a pharmacist.”

Another student explained, “My inside joke has always been, if you’re a pharmacist, you’re a failed med-school student. When they first came to America- our parents only wanted us to be doctors. Now it’s like everyone talks about becoming a pharmacist. Another informant shows the dual pressures of both picking a major to appease his parent and then also being compared against his family members.

I went to Cal State Long Beach- I studied history and minored in Information Systems. Information systems was my back up plan to appease my parents. My parents were like “don’t be a teacher” “just do computer science.” My aunts and uncles were like “why don’t you go to UCI or UCLA like your cousins?” I had to pay for my own education- so college for me wasn’t easy either. I had to work full time and go to school full time. My oldest brother, being the oldest, he really wanted to keep up with that expectation so my family doesn’t lose face. He’s 12 years older than I am- he immediately went to Golden West college- a community college and in 3 years time he transferred to UCLA. He didn’t speak the language and he worked hard and just him going to UCLA saved our family compared to our extended family.

The reference point then is peers and family living in the community:

My sister and I have to compete with my other cousins- eventually all my cousins from out of state moved to Orange County. By the time we graduated from high school, they were living here and attending UC schools- Berkeley and UCLA, graduating as dentists and doctors. That was the expectation that I was held to.

Second generation academic success translated into higher social status and honor for working-class families in the community through comparison with others in the enclave. As one participant emphasized,

…with Vietnamese families- there is this competitive nature- my kid is doing this- they just want to be known as the family who’s doing well- they have really good kids who are not juvenile delinquents- to have the perception that they are a good family. Just to have other people see that and acknowledge that- that’s what they want- it’s a Vietnamese thing.
This causes strain for those who do not fit this ideal; as one second generation college student explained,

It’s a harm and a benefit-- I had normal English and normal math in high school- I was one of the lower rung students. Vietnamese, Asians are known for their math and I’m not that good at math and so everyone was like “you’re not Vietnamese.” When, I went to college, I tutored athletes in English. The athletes kept asking me math questions and I was like “I like other stuff and other subjects- I don’t know how to tutor math.” My younger sister’s high school career- she had a hard time- seeing all her friends excelling, and my mom kept asking “what is she going to do?” Because she was just average. It’s part of the culture, parents are stern and kids are afraid to tell their parents- they were drilled into the fact that- your parents say sit here, you sit there.

Identity and success are firmly rooted in a community of co-ethnics and significant others who reinforce a model minority trope. Children’s academic success translates into important capital for status and well-being in the community for the first generation who are working in unstable and low-wage labor and jobs in the enclave. The influence of constant comparisons by the family and parents’ work forms a stranglehold on how Vietnamese second-generation come to see themselves, their educational choices and future labor.
Chapter 6: The Politics of Memories

Heaven and Hell embraced in the belly of our boat. Heaven promised a turning point in our lives, a new future, a new history. Hell, though, displayed our fears: fear of pirates, fear of starvation, fear of poisoning by biscuits soaked in motor oil, fear of running out of water, fear of being unable to stand up, fear of having to urinate in the red pot that was passed from hand to hand, fear that the scabies on the baby's head was contagious, fear of never again setting foot on solid ground, fear of never again seeing the faces of our parents, who were sitting in the darkness surrounded by two hundred people.... fear was transformed into a hundred-faced monster who sawed off our legs and kept us from feeling the stiffness in our immobilized muscles. We were frozen in fear, by fear.... We were numb, imprisoned by the shoulders of some, the legs of others, the fear of everyone. We were paralyzed. (Kim Thuy, Ru)

Novelist Kim Thuy describes poignantly the experience of escaping Vietnam by boat with her family adrift at sea for 17 days before being picked up and transported to a refugee camp in Malaysia. For the first generation, the experience of being Vietnamese is deeply rooted in the refugee experience. For the second generation, the experience of becoming Vietnamese is rooted in silence and historical erasure. This chapter examines how generational differences structure narratives of displacement by attending to how historical trauma infiltrates family dynamics through language. The refugee families’ strategies for forging a cultural identity have changed as a result of the way the first generation remembers and shares the history of Vietnam with the second generation. Intergenerational silence underpins the understanding of the Vietnam War and transforms the second generation from refugees to immigrants (Espiritu 2015). Reactive ethnicity is what happens when those “experiencing prejudice and discrimination respond by reaffirming shared identity” (Portes & Rumbaut 2001). This study finds that reactive ethnicity occurs for a minority of 1.5 and second generation males who are inculcated into a strong anti-communist identity through organizations in the ethnic enclave (Portes & Rumbaut
This chapter ethnographically examines the Vietnamese enclave in order to see how refugees and their offspring convey cultural identity between generations. The community offers an ethnic social environment in which memories of war, trauma, and flight are being reconstructed and passed onto the second generation.

I examine the how language transmits memory in diaspora where familial knowledge is mediated by the ethnic enclave. The recreation of history is memorialized in language. Vietnamese refugees have created an ethnic enclave whose cultural institutions especially, religion and protest, are enshrined in a pre-1975 language. The recreation of this type of refugee nationalism, in Phuong’s phrase, demonstrates a newfound pride that assuages feelings of ambivalence about leaving Vietnam (2008). The second part of this chapter examines how second generation respond to strategies parents develop in reaction to the instability of both the homeland and in the US. These strategies are developed in reaction to the instability of the homeland and the acculturation to the US in order to ensure that children become Vietnamese.

The combination of residential segregation, linguistic isolation and a historical trauma has created a unique space for families and communities in Little Saigon. First generation Vietnamese are linguistically and residentially segregated. 2010 census data shows that 93% of Vietnamese households in the US speak a non-English language at home with only 6% of Vietnamese households speaking only English. Nationally, nearly fifty percent of Vietnamese immigrant adults are not proficient in English. In Orange County’s Little Saigon this percentage is even larger: 75 percent of Vietnamese first generation immigrants said that they could not speak English well or at all (US Census 2010). This is compounded by the fact that Vietnamese segregation from Whites is as high as Black segregation from Whites (Logan & Zhang 2013). Hirsch (2008) describes how the family is a poignant socializing force in the creation of “post-
memories.” In this instance, “the relationship of the second generation to the powerful, often traumatic experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right” (104). When the second generation is not fluent in the parent’s native tongue then intergenerational discord occurs. How then can memory be transferred or distilled to the second generation? How does this process occur in the context of the ethnic enclave?

Little Saigon embodies memory and hope of a homeland lost by the South Vietnamese people at the end of the Vietnam War (Masequesmay 1991). Efforts by the community include the call for the cities of Garden Grove and Westminster to recognize the South Vietnam Flag and to designate the city as a “No Communist Zone” (Tran & Morin 2004). Scholarly literature focuses on the transmission of anti-communism from the first to the second generation largely through art, music, and literature (Lieu 2011; Lam 2005; Tran 2005; Duong & Pelaud 2012). This selection of second generation cases that focuses on art, music, and literature sublimates diasporic identity through cultural products. This is problematic because it oversamples on material culture. Culture is transmitted not only through objects made for cultural consumption, but everyday life. Brubaker explains in *Ethnicity Without Groups* (1994) that ethnicity is embodied and “expressed not only in political projects and nationalist rhetoric but in everyday encounters, practical categories, commonsense knowledge, cultural idioms, cognitive schemes, interaction cues, discursive frames, organizational routines, social networks, and institutional reforms (22). Ethnicity then is a way of interpreting and understanding experience. By speaking about the mundane and profane actions such as celebrating holidays or raising children, understandings of ethnicity emerge from private and common dialogue of people rather than
public performances. I use Brubaker’s strategy to focus on how ethnicity is constructed through language in everyday lived experiences of the second generation, and how they are understood.

**Language, historical trauma, & cultural authenticity**

Vietnamese American exile identity afflicts future generation living in the diaspora. Pre 1975 Vietnam is enshrined in language and passed to the second generation. In this section, I discuss how historical trauma infiltrates family dynamics through language in terms of (1) accents, (2) word choice, (3) status pronouns, (4) mate selection, and (5) silence.

Accents are signifiers as one second generation participant explained upon arriving home from her study abroad experience:

> When I returned home, the first thing my dad said was “Why do you sound like a Communist?” This is because I was based in Hanoi. He followed up by saying, “Your accent has changed,” meaning that I no longer had the Paris-by-Night twang…. I think he has a lot of pride and a lot of fear and misunderstandings about how Vietnam is – modern Vietnam, that is – and the Vietnam that he left. I would never invalidate his feelings. There is a lot of pain still for him. I realize that I’m in this weird no man’s land where he and his friends think of Vietnam in a certain way. With some members of the community, I talk very candidly but I don’t talk too much about homeland politics.

Accents become a clear marker of geographic location- north vs. south which are historically connected to pro-communist and anti-communist partition. In addition to accent, word choices in themselves also are symbols of historical memory. The referencing and teaching of names of cities pass on particular cultural legacies to the children of immigrants. After the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1975, Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City, but it continues to be colloquially called “Saigon” by many in the refugee community. “Saigon’s” persistence in everyday culture enables a politics of remembering that is erased in Vietnam but continues to
live out in the diaspora among the children of immigrants (Nguyen 2002). Indeed, Vietnamese language is a central part of the formation of the second generation as children. Of my second generation informants growing up in Little Saigon, over two-thirds said that their first language was Vietnamese (see Table 12 and Table 13). The first interaction with English language was attending school. Language socialization activities for second generation immigrants in Little Saigon showcase the unique ways that refugee identities are transmitted to the second generation through linguistic patterns in the family and community.

Language is branded as a marker of cultural authenticity by the first generation. As one informant explained, “You have to be bilingual. If you don’t know your roots, then you don’t know your language, you don’t know your culture and history so how can you teach the next generation?” Bilinguality is communicated by accent and word choice, and also status pronouns. Through status pronouns or selecting pronouns based on social hierarchies, the Vietnamese second generation learn the preferences and expectations for their placement in that social hierarchy. Whereas Spanish has formal and informal, the use of status pronouns in Vietnamese language contextualizes gender and age creating social hierarchies which heighten understandings of cultural mores. There are more than thirty different greetings that use status pronouns that children learn from a young age in reference to others. As one participant explained,

The word “toi” refers to the self. As a child, there is no concept of individual self. As a child, I had no grounds on which to use “toi”. As I grow older, I can use “toi” when speaking to people who are slightly older than myself or of slightly higher status than myself, but still within the same generation. For instance, I would not use "toi" when speaking to an aunt or uncle, but I do so when talking to my older brother's wife. I call her older sister (she’s actually a couple of years younger than myself).
Pronoun choices set the stage for understanding concepts of family and self (Hua 2008). Like in Mandarin, the individual self does not exist without reference to the family or some other social group in Vietnamese (Ho 1986). In Vietnamese family context, “children” are called “con” child and refer to themselves in such a way. As one first-generation informant explained, “For someone who is younger, to call herself or himself "toi" in dealing with someone of higher status, whether through age or social position, would be considered disrespectful.” By participating in social interactions in the community, second generation Vietnamese are taught from a young age how to address elders. For the second generation feelings of cultural authenticity are tied to the ability to speak Vietnamese. For those who do not speak Vietnamese, feelings of inadequacy and the guilt of not being to speak to parents persists. As one second generation teacher rationalized,

I see parents trying to explain being Vietnamese in English to the younger generation-there are just some things you can’t translate into English- like the morals and characteristics of being Vietnamese – folklore and things like that. My dad’s nicest innuendos is that over here, it’s just you and me. But over in Vietnam, you and me- there are five or six different you and me’s. There are different ways to convey to an older adult or someone. You can’t expect the younger generation- they don’t get the full conversation- they feel like their parents are yelling at them. But you need to listen carefully- the subtleties of the language are difficult but that’s the best way to understand the culture.

First generation emphasizes language for cultural retention for the community. A first generation informant that I met at one of Little Saigon’s cafes explained to me as we sat at a pool hall:

For the next generation, they will spread out because of the language. With your generation…it is no problem at all, but with the first generation with the language barrier and the culture differences, that’s why we live together in a community. You need to obey your older people because they pay too much, very much and high price for life to bring you here to America
Often times stories are a mechanism of discipline reinforcing a sense of guilt in children for parental sacrifice. Teaching about language and anti-communism becomes a way for children to learn about their parents’ and community’s immigration story, about the sacrifices of the first generation as a means of understanding the reason they are in the United States. One participant explained her drive in school as the first born. Her father would continuously remind her, “You are lucky because everyone in America has opportunity to go to college. In Vietnam, only the rich can go to college or be a big boss. I wish that I could go to college. I had to quit school and go to work after you were born.”

A theme emerging from my interviews is that the Vietnamese language is used with parents and elders as a sign of respect, but with siblings and friends English or a combination of English and Vietnamese is used. As one informant explained, “I still speak to her (mother) in full Vietnamese- you are not allowed to speak English at home- she thinks kids who speak to their parents in English are super disrespectful.” However, this sometimes caused tension and pressure as many second generation are not proficient but are still expected to speak Vietnamese. As one second-generation informant relates,

English to everyone except my parents, with them Vietnamese. When I was at school, I didn’t know how to ask go to the bathroom. I learned English in school. My mom and I don’t understand each other. I can’t speak Vietnamese fluently enough so where she would understand my feelings. I can’t speak English to her where she could understand it. I wonder if this is not only a linguistic gap but a cultural and generational gap? There is a point where we don’t listen to each other anymore- I don’t know half the words in Vietnamese to say half the things that I want to say to her. If I speak English it’s considered rude and then she would just yell.

This informant shows a pattern described by Alba common among the second generation in the US and in France, where “responding to their parents in the dominant language while
understanding what the parents say in the mother tongue’ is well known (Alba 1999; Lopez 2001). In this case, the language gap causes strife between first and second generation because they have varying levels of proficiency with Vietnamese. Often, this results in silence. the youngest children in the family often had less proficiency with Vietnamese. These members of the family often times relied on their older siblings to act as cultural mediators or translators in the family context,

I speak (Vietnamese) with my parents and they are the ones I speak the most with- they don’t understand when I speak English. With my siblings, we speak a mix of English and some other words- I speak more Vietnamese with my older sister than my little one- the little one is more Americanized.

Language also becomes a reason for mate selection for the second generation; nearly thirty percent said that they had a preference for a co-ethnic Vietnamese partner even though sexually attracted to other races because they wanted their parents to be able to communicate with their spouse. However, even in these cases many co-ethnic Vietnamese may not have proficiency in Vietnamese; Mia Tuan (1998) shows how co-ethnicity is not necessary a 1:1 translation of ethnic identity and cultural continuity for third and fourth generation Japanese and Chinese. Often times a cultural gap could exist in a marriage between a second-generation Chinese and a first-generation Chinese and even in marriages that were generationally homogenous, there was no guarantee that the partners and their families would all have a similar relationship to culture and identity (186). Linguistic ability becomes a proxy for cultural continuity.

My dad was more concerned- because he was worried he wouldn’t be able to have a close relationship with is son-in-law or worry that we would convert to a different religion and lose our religion, our Buddhist prayer every month. What would the wedding be like- how would you raise the children- he wanted us to date as long as we could- in hopes of changing but maybe date anyone Asian- but even then he would be worried about
language— it would be hard for us to communicate— say he was Japanese— he wouldn’t be able to speak the language.

For many second generation, Asians are seen as being closer in cultural values than Whites and ideal mate partners in order to please their parents. As one second generation female explained:

I’m drawn to Vietnamese because it’s a cultural thing. Even though I was born and raised here, I look for that similarity where they would understand why I’m a certain way with my parents. My ex fiancé was actually Cambodian and when I was dating him- my mom called me and was like “I want you to end this relationship.” “He’s Cambodian.” I was like “what does that mean?” I was like, he’s Asian, I thought you would be happy.

Similar to Kibria’s findings of second generation Chinese and Koreans, Vietnamese parents also expressed a hierarchy of racial preferences to their second-generation children with co-ethnics and Whites at the top, with blacks being the least preferred. In the middle were other Asians followed by Latinos. Many second generation in my sample said that that was one thing that they would be different compared to their parents upbringing— that they would harbor no racial ethnic preferences whatsoever for their own children. They acknowledged their parents’ racism towards Blacks:

I will try to teach my daughter tolerance which is something my parents’ didn’t really have. They were kind of racist. It was a bit of xenophobia. I try not to impart those values to my daughter. It won’t matter for her who she marries because I can speak English perfectly.

Anti-communism & Silence
Second generation Vietnamese never experienced war directly but their life story remains loosely attached to war and communism. Many members of the Vietnamese second generation could not articulate the details of their parent’s migration history. As one second generation individual summed up his parent’s exodus, “As far as I know- my dad and the war- he defected. As far as boat people- they constructed their own boat and got out of town.” The crisis in memory can be explained by the lack of language available to represent the trauma of war and
the gaps in understanding between the generations, both linguistically and culturally. As one informant explained, “My dad never really talked about what happened (in Vietnam). I know he was a teacher before the war. He told us that the *viet cong* took everything, their land and my grandfather’s properties, Communists or *viet cong* are painted as an illusory abstruse evil force in the minds of the second generation. The tradition of orally transmitting memories from one generation to the next was severely disrupted by migration so that “the generation gap is more than just linguistic barriers and literal translation rather the result between the need to tell and the desire to forget” (Carruthers 2002).

Many of my interviewees expressed that their parents refused to talk about Vietnam; by asking other family members, extended family or grandparents, and piecing together snippets of stories from parents the second generation learn and reconstruct their immigrant narrative. This intergenerational silence mediates parent-child relationships. The trauma experienced by first generation included stories of drifting at sea for days, cannibalism, re-education camps, imprisonment and separation from families for ten years or longer. Long Bui (2002) describes this lack of speaking about the past by the first generation to the second generation as historical amnesia. The first generation are never ignorant or forgetful, rather they are selective in their partial memories, curating a vague history to the second generation. The first generation is often times mired in a culture of silence. As Um (2012) describes, “Straddling the intersections between the need to speak and the inability to express, silence is, for many refugees, a self-imposed and an externally compelled strategy of survival. The only greater fear than that of forgetting is the fear of being disbelieved” (ibid). As this second generation informant describes: “my parents never talked about it- only if I asked would they answer.” Often times extended family living in the household such as a grandparent shares memories and understandings of
Vietnam not disclosed by the first generation. Extended family become purveyors and providers of history and narratives when the first-generation parents do not disclose their experiences to their American born children.

In juxtaposition to this historical amnesia that takes place in the household, physical markers and memorialization of space and performance (protest) show that the war is not forgotten. War memorials and monuments dot the landscape in shopping malls, public parks, parking lots, temples, and school yards. The yellow flag with three stripes lines Bolsa Avenue for three miles. The statutes represent historical figures and events dating from Mongolian invaders of Vietnam, famous generals, to President Reagan. Hirsch calls this memory work, where “the past is not mediated by recall but by imaginative investment, projection and creation” (2012). What differentiates this from the previous literature on Vietnamese diaspora arts is that the embodiment of historical memory is experienced through daily life. It is not always a conscious act on behalf of the participants, rather these historical sites and figures are simultaneously mundane and sacred. They become mundane for the second generation and the sacred for the first generation through a fluid movement of learning, knowing, recognizing, and forgetting.

**Participation, Learning & Memories**

For those on the periphery where language is not reinforced or who lack complete bilingualism, Vietnamese language and historical narratives outside the family are reinforced by community institutions and organizations, especially religious organization. Here, I am not examining religion in general, but how religion functionally offers language courses; all religious sects are spaces for teaching and passing historical memory in Little Saigon. Among first generation immigrants, protest as a cultural praxis in community has been well documented
(Dang 2002; Ong 2004; Ong 2008; Collet 2005; Vo 2003; Espiritu 2006; Lieu 2011). Less well documented are how religion organizations can be sites of reactive ethnicity where practices like “engaged Buddhism” rouse members to instigate social change. Historical trauma is represented in religious texts and language as a mechanism of cultural reproduction of anti-communism to the second generation.

Upon first glance, the Vietnamese Catholic Center has the architectural layout as well as feel of a Buddhist temple. Buddhist temples like Chinese temples are built to resemble mini-palaces. The center consists of several buildings surrounded by a central courtyard. The roof is intricately designed with glazed ceramic tiles, red in this case, and are curved with elegant upward slopes. Stone lions guard the center’s entrance and white ceramic dragons adorn parts of the roof. Inside is a small courtyard with two large blue and white ceramic fountains and flowers abound in brick plots. Two bonsai trees are perched next to one of the buildings with a sign that reads, “Administration.” Outside the signs are in English and Vietnamese. Signs read “Tien hoc le Hau hoc van” and mean, “First learn the behavior, then learn the lesson,” among other proverbs like “khong thay do may lam nen” or “a teacher ensures student success.”

On the stage there are two flags, the American flag and the other Vietnamese national flag (yellow with three horizontal red stripes). The Vietnamese Catholic Center offers many weekend programs for the Vietnamese community. The school enrolls 400 students who attend the summer school both in the morning and in the evening. Inside the fourth grade classroom, the teacher finishes taking roll, he announces that they will play a game today. “We will have two groups; one of you in each group will have to translate the word in Vietnamese. Like “bac si y khoa” (doctor) (he says the word slowly) and then you have to tell me what the word is in English. I’ll give you one minute to look up the word.” Vietnamese Catholics were among the
first to establish institutional spaces thanks to the assistance of local dioceses. Catholic Charities took care of and advised a number of priests who fled in the first wave in 1975 (Nguyen 2009).

There are two things going on- there are Vietnamese Catholic and then Vietnamese identity overall. And it wasn’t until I joined VSA that I started learning about other Vietnamese things like New Years- that’s not something a Catholic would normally celebrate. Because new years, we celebrate more like Buddhist- you visit a temple, you see your fortune for the year, you see your luck and you give out li xi (red envelopes)- the whole temple thing. The ideas of good luck are not very Catholic.

This particular identity of Vietnamese Catholics is enshrined in a double displacement- of being refugees twice. Catholic Vietnamese experience multiplicative identities within the enclave due to war and are a “double diaspora” (Hang 1995). Vietnamese Catholics were displaced in 1945 from Northern Vietnam to Southern Vietnam due to religious persecution, and again after 1975 to the United States as political refugees. French colonial expansion and a history of anti-governmental persecution has largely shaped a unique Catholic Vietnamese identity (Bankston 2000)\(^\text{13}\).

Boy Scouts of America are housed in the Catholic Church. Catholicism and language retention are closely intertwined. Mass is celebrated in Vietnamese, Spanish, and English demonstrating the diverse context that the Vietnamese Catholic Community exists in. Vietnamese Scouting groups which are under the banner of Boy Scouts of America are unique because they include girls. There are Korean and Jewish units around the United States as well. Second generation youth learn about “country’s heroes and its customs and traditions” in Vietnam. They speak Vietnamese and “learn to play traditional Vietnamese games that children played for generations in Vietnam.”

\(^{13}\) Anti-Catholic activities in 19th century Vietnam including 117 Vietnamese Martyrs receive special reverence from Vietnamese Catholics who celebrate the feast day on November 24th. Vietnamese Catholicism has long been anti-communist (include persecution and articles here).
The Unified Buddhist Church is a cultural fact created largely from war and is the largest Buddhist group both before the fall of Saigon and in the diaspora. Buddhist groups have traditionally been involved in the political fate of several Vietnamese governments (Queen 1996; Pagget 2002).

Pagodas and temples were the first and only institutions to cross from Vietnam to America with the exiles. Wherever monks and nuns landed, often in rented or newly bought homes and apartments, the seeds of institutional Buddhism could be planted and with it the seed of a youth education program. Hing, a mother and former professional who arrived in the United States in 1975, remembered that in the early days of exile the temple supplied a means for instructing the young on their pasts and their culture.

The reason everybody started to go to temple...is people wanted to show their children and teach their children Vietnamese culture. We celebrate ancestors "memory day" and anniversary to teach the children about that, about what they do.

In the enclave, the language of protest is organized around political and religious suppression, and takes the form of hunger strikes engaging both first and second generation. Religiously-organized campaigns such as “Faith over Force” are meant to bring awareness of human-rights issues in Vietnam. Organizers include Vietnamese student associations from several colleges including Cal State Fullerton, University of Southern California, and the University of California, Irvine. One participant was quoted the Orange County Register, Minh Tam, aged 74 started his hunger strike at 6 AM and explained his participation in the following way: “Those Buddhist leaders in Vietnam have sacrificed so much. They are also in their 70s and in poor health but still, they persevere in their belief. How could I not do something?” Representatives from the Union of Vietnamese Student Associations said, “It won’t end here. We’re going to
continue to urge our local senators and representatives to speak out on all the human-rights abuses.” Both generations are involved in these demonstrations to bring awareness as one VSA member explained, “We want the Vietnamese community to know what’s happening in Vietnam. I was surprised to find out that of people don’t know about the imprisonment of Buddhist leaders. The communist government in Vietnam took the freedom of religion away.”

**Labor, Sacrifice & Social Mobility**

A common theme in many narratives was that of parental sacrifice and the hardships endured by their parents in terms of adjusting to a new country, financial struggle, racism, and language barriers. Many second generation discussed how despite the benefits of the enclave, the linguistic isolation that their parents still faced relegated them dependent upon the community. Bui (2015) describes this as the debts of memory. Vietnamese parents reference to struggle and sacrifice, and children watching this results often in youth carrying a psychological burden and pressure to make up for their parents lives. As one first generation immigrant shared, “my success is the success of my children.” This changes how the second generation view their labor and social mobility. As one second generation lawyer described:

> I never complain to my dad about my job; he works in a garage that is super hot and super cold. I sometimes thought my dad was a really angry person growing up- he gave up everything- he gave up education to come here and work as a machinist that is not very challenging. In Vietnam, he was an academic and to come here and to be a blue collar worker, I could sense that was a source of anger for him and wanting control. He wanted to make sure that we made something of our lives because he sacrificed so much.

Other times, second generation would empathize and think about how they would handle the situation:

> Financially they didn’t have anything and they relied on welfare and the community. I never really talked to my parents about that- they keep saying that the Vietnamese They
both tried to learn English. I’ve never been put in that position where I felt like a complete outsider. I’ve gone to different countries and I felt like an outsider there. I can’t imagine being a refugee and trying to create a new life- I imagine it’s really scary especially having two young children and not knowing what would happen”

The result of this is that the mentality of the second generation are the investment by the first generation which creates a sense of indebtedness towards parents by the second generation. While the ethnic enclave can be said to be of our upward mobility, the second generation also pays the penance to “pay back” parents. This pay back takes the form of emotional guilt and actual money transfers when children come of age. “Success” as described by several of my second-generation informants included the financial ability to purchase a home for one’s parent, take parent’s on vacation, and gifts including expensive Japanese massage chairs. The second generation learn this through parental stories of co-ethnic friends’ gifts. Many 1.5 generation and second generation know that their responsibility is to take care of aging parents and younger siblings through what Kibria calls “patch-working” or transfer of resources from elder siblings to younger. A strengthened sense of filial obligation in post-adolescent years has been documented by other immigrant groups (Fuligni 1999; Schans, 2008; Yoo, 2010).

This often meant alternative familial arrangements where cousins or grandparents would live together in extended family households as parents would work:

They (parents) were working so hard, and sacrificing, they were working 12 or 14 hours a day so that we can get an education. Back in Vietnam, my mom was a school teacher so she valued education a lot and she sacrificed a lot for my family. Because nails are so saturated here, because there are so many Vietnamese so my mom moved to Indiana and west Virginia, while I was here in California. She gave me the option to move with her but I decided I didn’t want to and I didn’t know anyone there. So I didn’t move there. So I stayed here in OC with my grandmother. My stepfather went with her.
Table 12: Linguistic Profile of Second Generation in Southern California

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Knows English</th>
<th>Knows Foreign Language Speaking</th>
<th>Knows Foreign Language Reading</th>
<th>Knows Foreign Language Writing</th>
<th>Knows Foreign Language Understand</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Very good</td>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td>Well</td>
<td>Very Well</td>
<td>Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>24.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IIMMLA
Table 13: Parental Understanding of English for Vietnamese Second Generation in Southern California

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Not well/not at all</th>
<th>Very Well</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: IMMLA

Similar to Rumbaut (2014)’s findings- the four dimensions of language proficiency measured across all groups (each on a 4-item scale from “very well” to “well,” “not well,” and “not at all”), respondents reported greater ability in understanding a language, followed by speaking, then reading, and then writing in that language.
Chapter 7: Transnationalism and Community Transformation

Sam is a junior at Bolsa Grande High School and second generation Vietnamese. At our first meeting, he is carrying a white backpack with a large Southern Vietnamese flag emblazoned on the pouch. I ask him to explain the meaning and name of his student organization PBC.

“Well, PBC stands for Phan Boi Chau. It’s the name of the revolutionary who traveled abroad to fight for democracy in Vietnam.” The first thing he is eager to tell me is about a recent detainee-Mai Huu Bao who was imprisoned in Vietnam, “but just for a few days, he was US military so he knew how to handle them.” The majority of the members of PBC are second-generation Vietnamese. Sam’s youth group is part of the reserve army for street protests on the weekends in Little Saigon. They also raise funds in the community to donate to detained prisoners in Vietnam. A minority of the second generation is growing up with a strong animosity towards the Vietnamese government. This organization is just one of the many transnational groups spearheaded by the second generation in Little Saigon.

Migrant-homeland ties are the subject of much contemporary interest from scholars focusing on post 1965 immigration from Latin America and Asia. Most immigrants maintain regular contact with family and friends and a sizeable minority engages in routine traffic in back and forth interaction in the pursuit of economic, political, and cultural ends (Portes 2015). Left out of the picture has been the organizational efforts of migrants. Moreover, the transnational links of political refugees like the Vietnamese has been under theorized; home country networks are likely to be different for forced versus voluntary migrants. Unlike most immigrants, refugees are generally barred from returning to their home countries, and hence their capacity to engage in transnational activities is more restricted. For these reasons, refugees and political exiles such as the Vietnamese represent an interesting case study for understanding the continuity of, and
constraints on, the maintenance of active homeland ties for immigrants and their children. While
the transnational literature has largely focused on the occurrence of transnationalism, there has
been comparably scant discussion about the factors that may hinder or curtail transnational
involvement, despite the immigrants’ yearnings to maintain ties, especially for the second
generation.

This chapter addresses several important questions on transnationalism, organizations,
and refugees: How do the first versus second generations initiate and maintain transnational
engagements in Little Saigon, and the US broadly? In particular, how do individuals and
organizations, interact with other stakeholders in the transnational social field, including the state
and civil society? What are the implications for immigrant assimilation? Using a unique dataset
of 632 transnational Vietnam-US organizations, I find that the second generation establish a
delicate balance to pay tribute to their parent’s experience of pain and displacement, while at the
same time asserting their own identities. Many second generation understand their academic
achievement and socioeconomic position relative to coethnics in the enclave. Zhou and Lee
(2007) find that many Asian Americans feel unsuccessful because their reference group for
social mobility includes those who have far exceeded native-born standards in the United States.
I find that transnational practices and overseas engagement by the second generation, for the
minority who participate, provides an additional reference group for integration. Transnational
engagement for the second generation also expands their reference group to those of the same
age cohort remaining in the home country. This provides the second generation with an
alternative reference or comparison group for understanding their own social mobility in the
United States. The ability to return to the homeland is a privileged one; one must have the
capital, time, and means to visit the homeland. This is not available to all second generation Vietnamese.

**The Scope of Transnationalism and Its Stakeholders**

In terms of the empirical basis of transnationalism, past research shows that not all immigrants are transnational, and that in actuality only a small number participate; this is especially true for the second generation (Portes 2007; Guarnizo 2002). Results from several studies show that married adult males take part in transnational activities more frequently than all other sociodemographic groups, and that the more highly educated tend to report higher levels of transnational involvement (ibid). Yet, compared to research on first-generation transnationalism, studies on transnational engagement among the children of immigrants are relatively scarce. Empirical studies that seek to measure second-generation transnationalism ask if the maintenance of homeland ties is either part of the migration experience in which only immigrants partake, or if it transcends the generational boundary to affect the lives of their children. Most studies find that the majority of the second generation is not actively engaging in any form of transnational practice (Kasinitz 2002; Rumbaut 2002). In addition, levels of transnational involvement decline rapidly between the first and second generations; specifically, Rubén Rumbaut finds that, in his San Diego sample, the level of transnational attachments, whether affective or actual, is quite low—always less than 10 percent—across a diverse set of national origin groups (Boyd & Yiu 2007). Similarly, Phillip Kasinitz and associates (2002) find in their New York sample an equally minute proportion of their second-generation respondents who report having sustained commitment to parental homelands.

Studies based on ethnographic research, rather than survey data, yield parallel findings.
In her study of Guatemalan immigrant children living in Los Angeles, Cecilia Menjívar finds that there are “only few opportunities and spaces that may foster the children’s ties to the communities of origin” (2002: 531). Given this dearth in transnational opportunities, she finds that the second generation is not nearly as inclined as the first to remain linked to the origin communities. Espiritu and Tran examine the psyche lives of transnational second generation immigrants in San Diego and how they imagine the homeland without ever visiting, but selectively engage in a transnational social field in terms of culture and identity (Espiritu & Tran 2002).

Of particular importance in investigating the phenomenon of blocked transnationalism are the roles of religious organizations, which are an important part of civil society, and the origin state, whereby the former offers a conduit for carrying out homeland engagements in spite of the institutional and bureaucratic barriers erected by the latter against transnational activity. With respect to religion, Rubén Rumbaut (2002) finds that religiosity is a potential predictor of transnational participation among individuals and across generations. Rumbaut speculates that religious participation fosters the transmission of ethnicity and ethnic socialization from the parental generation to the offspring’s which, in turn, influences the level of transnational engagement.

At an organizational level, religious groups, in both host and home countries, provide an important bridge for facilitating transnational practices (Levitt 2003; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). In the case of the Vietnamese, it is particularly interesting to witness how the first-generation collaborates with religious groups in the home country to circumvent interactions with the Vietnamese state, which refugees still harbor a deep sense of mistrust towards.
Religious organizations were the most popular form of transnational organization for both first and second generation Vietnamese across the nation.

State actions and policies also directly and indirectly influence transnational participation. In many instances, the sending state plays a strong and active role in encouraging and facilitating the transnational activities of its émigré community. Two of the best examples are China and Mexico, whose state policies and initiatives to reach out to and partner with their expatriates have served as ‘best practice’ models on transnational developmentalism for neighboring countries in their respective regions (Zhou & Lee 2015; Isklander 2015).

However, the sending state may not necessarily develop the kind of positive relationship with its émigré community that is conducive to transnational partnerships. As Cecilia Menjívar (2002) argues, “the nation-state, through its policies to limit movement across borders, is still a powerful actor that leads immigrants and their descendants to focus on the host countries” (p.19). In other words, state policies and political bureaucracies are able to dampen – or, block – the transnational engagements of immigrants and their offspring. The most immediate and obvious barrier to transnational involvement is travel restrictions. Even after the removal of institutionalized barriers by the state, non-institutionalized barriers – whether real or imagined – still curtail the direct transnational involvement of immigrant organizations. This is particularly true for sending countries where mass emigration has largely been politically motivated, as in the case of refugees from Vietnam and Nicaragua.

**Varying contexts of exit and blocked transnationalism: The Vietnamese case**

The Vietnamese American population is internally diverse. Their divergent contexts of exit tell a complex story of immigrants with not just varying levels of human capital, but also a
wide spectrum of experiences in and memories of Vietnam. Many endured dangerous conditions while leaving Vietnam, waited for years in refugee camps in Southeast Asia, and spent years in prison before their departure for permanent settlement abroad (Bloemraad 2006). Others, who fled to the United States more immediately and did not endure such protracted transit times, came from the privileged rungs of Vietnamese society, including intellectuals and the exiled elite of the former South Vietnam regime.

Migration from Vietnam to the United States can be characterized by distinct periods and waves (Zhou 2001). The human and social capital of Vietnamese varies as well as their migration experiences; some fled Vietnam aboard small rickety boats or by foot into neighboring Thailand and Cambodia (Small 2012). Others left through a variety of US government sponsored programs such as the Orderly Departure Program, and Humanitarian Operation Program which facilitated immigration and resettlement, while others spent years in refugee camps in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Hong Kong (Chan 2006; Espiritu 2015; Juan 2005; Vo 2004).

For all three waves of Vietnamese immigrants, the relationship between the sending state and the diaspora has been problematic. In earlier times, the relationship was marred by mutual hostility but, over time, this animosity dissolved into cautious engagement (Chueyn 2008). Certainly, the state has made a deliberate effort to reconcile with its emigrant population. Over time, the official stance toward its emigrants has evolved from labeling the emigrants as “traitors” to the more neutral “those living far away from the fatherland” to the highly inclusive “our Vietnamese abroad.” (Dang 2005). Not surprisingly, the timing of these labels coincided with the political and economic developments that the country has undergone since the mid-1980s, as well as recognition by the state of the developmental potential of migrant remittances and foreign investment. While the refugee population residing overseas comprises only 3
percent of the Vietnamese population, they contribute close to nine percent of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) in remittances and investments (Pham 2012).

Recognizing its diaspora as a resource, the state dismantled the two-tiered pricing system for Vietnamese versus non-Vietnamese nationals. In addition, it abolished the 5 percent tax on remittances. The Committee for Overseas Vietnamese estimates that between 350,000 and 400,000 Vietnamese expatriates return each year. Typically, they bring back cash and gifts that range between $2000 and $5000 (Sidel 2007). Policies such as dual nationality, a visa waiver program, and housing purchases facilitate investments in Vietnam by the overseas population. Special organizations such as the Overseas Vietnamese Business Association and government branches at the national, provincial, and local levels have been established to conduct affairs exclusively with the expatriate community. State-sponsored delegations also visit overseas Vietnamese communities to explain various homeland opportunities.

Despite this positive reception of emigrants, first-generation immigrants have proven to be much more reluctant to reciprocate, as their view of the state is still marked by fear and suspicion carried over from the Communist era. Even though the government is actively encouraging investment via state-sponsored policies, expatriate investments remain concealed under informal joint ventures with family members and friends in Vietnam (Chuyen, Small and Vuong 2008; Sidel 2007; Thai 2010). These informal ventures are intentionally created without state recognition and intervention because, as one Vietnamese university professor explained: “It’s the fear of Communists. People are still uncomfortable in doing business here because many believe the government will decide to nationalize.” In addition, as one Vietnamese-American lawyer puts it, “There are members of the community who are still very passionately anti-Communist and who view any normalization of relations with Vietnam as a betrayal not
only of their ideals, but also of all the soldiers who died defending a democratic Vietnam.”

Social connections and informal ties are the most common ways that expatriates make investments.

The staunch opposition of first-generation immigrants to the Vietnamese state has softened over time. This is evident in the evolving nature of community associations across the United States. In addition to their immediate focus on integrating and assisting newly arrived immigrants, the original objectives of these associations often included plotting revolutionary change in Vietnam. By comparison, at present, antigovernment sentiments have waned after forty years living abroad. Community associations have developed new priorities that focus on assisting elderly Vietnamese Americans and the integration of the second generation (Huynh, fieldnotes).

The second generation appears to have accepted the Vietnamese state’s outreach to the émigré community and have engaged in strategic partnerships with the state. In fact, since the normalization of US-Vietnam relations, the Vietnamese government has implemented programs and policies that attempt to attract remittances from the children of immigrants and even the return of the highly skilled to Vietnam (Small 2009). These include the offer of dual citizenship programs and attractive investment opportunities for the second generation. The Vietnamese state actively encourages overseas investments and philanthropy, as well as cultural exchange for youth (see Communist Party of Vietnam Politburo’s Resolution 36/NQ-TU). Among organizations under second-generation leadership, a new brand of political activism has emerged whereby activists are less interested in effecting revolutionary change and instead opt to engineer peaceful transformation.

A growing number of economic organizations are slowly emerging despite people’s
tendency to engage in business on an individual basis. Chapters of the Vietnamese American Chamber of Commerce operate in several areas of high ethnic concentration. These groups, if active, try to maintain an apolitical stance to appease the conservative members of the community.

**Data Collection in the United States**

My study involved creating a national database of Vietnamese American organizations, administering a survey to the leaders of the principal ones, and conducting in-depth interviews with selected groups. Due to budget and time constraints, the focus of the study was limited to three sites: Orange County and Santa Clara County, both in California, and Harris County in Texas. As shown in Table 14, I conducted interviews with 37 organizations in Orange County, 7 organizations in Santa Clara, and 15 organizations in Houston. These sites were chosen because California and Texas are the states with the largest concentration of Vietnamese immigrants. Lion Plaza and the newer Grand Century Plaza in San Jose are the cornerstones of the Northern California Vietnamese community. Little Saigon, a bustling commercial belt in Orange County, serves nearly three hundred thousand Vietnamese, with a large concentration of Vietnamese-operated enterprises. Houston hosts another large Vietnamese community, with vibrant business districts found along Bellaire Boulevard and Milam Street.

A database of transnational organizations located in the three counties was created based on information collected from local Vietnamese-language business directories, commercial data-mining companies (including GuideStar database and Melissa Data), and discussions with informants by email, phone, or in person. A total of 632 organizations were included in my directory. Most have the dual objectives of initiating and implementing domestic and overseas projects in Vietnam. I then categorized them by organizational type. Table 15 presents this
classification.

### Table 14: Interviews with selected organizations and Location of Main Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of Office</th>
<th># organizations interviewed</th>
<th>% of all organizations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orange County, CA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Santa Clara County, CA</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston, Texas</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seattle, Washington</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia/DC area</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>80</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transnational Organization Project, Fieldwork, Huynh 2010

### Table 15: Distribution of Vietnamese Transnational Organizations by Organizational Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>% of all organizations (n=614)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Organizations</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music/Arts</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service Agencies</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td><strong>35.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hometown Associations</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transnational Organization Project, Fieldwork, Huynh 2010
### Table 16: Distribution of Transnational Organizations by Organizational Type in Orange County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>% of all organizations (n=174)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Civic Organizations</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Music/Arts/Cultural</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Service Agencies</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alumni</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hometown Associations</strong></td>
<td><strong>28.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transnational Organization Project, Fieldwork, Huynh 2010

As shown in Table 16, Orange County compared to the rest of the nation has a much more vibrant organizational life that includes resources that focus on culture, social service agencies, civic and educational opportunities. Given the diversity of organizational choices, religious organizations are not the most popular type of organization. Additional field observations outside of my dissertation work were conducted by visiting Vietnamese enclaves in Northern California and Houston to speak with leaders of the community, ethnic news media, and consular officials; various organizational activities were attended as well. These activities included two street protests in California, a trade forum with the California-Asia Business Council, fund-raising dinners, and visits to Buddhist temples. Vietnamese celebrations, such as the New Year, or Tết, Festival in Orange County, provided an open venue for meeting and speaking with leaders and members of many organizations. The organizations were not chosen at random, but rather as emblematic of their principal types; transnational organizations selected for the sample must have existed for at least five years and be currently engaged in one or more projects in Vietnam.

The results were analyzed by first classifying the organizations based on their type. Then,
organizations were classified as first or second generation. Second-generation organizations are those in which 60 percent or more of their board members and/or permanent members were born in the United States\textsuperscript{14}. These groups ranged from a Lions Club, which sponsors mobile eye clinics in Vietnam, to youth groups advocating for Vietnam to be reinstated on the list of Countries of Particular Concern for Religious Freedom. By default, first-generation organizations refer to the remaining organizations in my sample in which the majority of board members and/or permanent members were born in Vietnam. Table 17 presents summary statistics and gives examples of first- and second-generation organizations.

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
Second Generation (% of total sample) & 3.5 \% \\
Percentage of members in a Second Generation Organization & 1.4 \% \\
Organizations with 60\% or more 2\textsuperscript{nd} generation board members & 13.0\% \\
\hline
\multicolumn{2}{|l|}{Second Generation Organizations by types (top four)} \\
Religious & 14.4 \% \\
HTA & 0 \% \\
Political & 20.2 \% \\
Civic/Cultural & 65.4 \% \\
\hline
\multicolumn{2}{|l|}{First Generation Organizations by types (top four)} \\
Religious & 31.5 \% \\
HTA & 26.0 \% \\
Political & 16.3 \% \\
Civic/Cultural & 16.7 \% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Summary Statistics on First- and Second-Generation Organizations}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{14} The data neither identified the age at migration nor the year of arrival among first-generation immigrants.
Table 18: Examples of Vietnamese Organizations by Generational Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Generational Type</th>
<th>% of Permanent Members 2nd gen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Human Rts Network</td>
<td>Northern Ca</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Lend-A-Hand</td>
<td>Houston, Texas</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Damien the Leper</td>
<td>So. California</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hometown</td>
<td>Quang Ngai Hoi</td>
<td>So. California</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Dai Dao Tam Ky Pho Do</td>
<td>So. California</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>1st</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic</td>
<td>Hope Initiative</td>
<td>Houston, Texas</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Transnational Organization Project, Huynh, 2010

**no organizations reported third-generation leadership**
Between January 2009 and January 2010, the survey of 77 transnational Vietnamese organizations was conducted. Table 19 presents data on characteristics of members of these organizations, as reported by their leaders.

Table 19: Characteristics of Members of Vietnamese Organizations (N=77)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 30 years</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 31 years</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than high school(^a)</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College degree only(^a)</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postgraduate studies(^b)</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation (top three)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manual laborer</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business owner</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge of English</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good or very good</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Status (top two)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does not have entry visa</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. citizen</td>
<td>86.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of U.S. residence (1(^st) gen only)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 5 years</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ten years or more</td>
<td>72.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average trips to Vietnam for organizational matters (top two)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never or rarely</td>
<td>48.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least three trips per year</td>
<td>21.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\) Only 84% reported  
\(^b\) Only 65% reported

Data Collection in Vietnam

Organizations that were interviewed in the United States led me to interview their counterparts in Vietnam. Fieldwork in Vietnam took place between July and October 2009, with a focus on selected transnational organizations and governmental agencies involved in overseas Vietnamese affairs at the national, provincial, and local levels. Interviews with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other relevant ministries in Ha Noi were also conducted, as were interviews with provincial departments in Hai Phong, Hue, and Ho Chi Minh City. Site visits were carried
out with fourteen counterparts of US organizations in Vietnam, and additional interviews were conducted with leaders of quasi-governmental organizations that are involved with the overseas community, such as the Association for Liaison with Overseas Vietnamese (ALOV).  

Interviews were based on a bilingual instrument that asked leaders of selected organizations and government officials in Vietnam about how transnational projects are initiated, developed, and implemented. Mass organizations in Hue and Ho Chi Minh City, such as ALOV, which operates under the joint supervision of the Fatherland Front, various people’s committees, and the Department of Finance and Investment, were interviewed in order to understand how state directives operate at the provincial and local levels.

The Transnational Ties of the First and Second Generations

The strength of transnational ties is indicated by cross-border connections that go beyond the occasional trip home or sending of remittances (Guarnizo 1994). In the Vietnamese case, transnational ties, unlike the Latin American cases studied previously are not formally institutionalized, although myriad organizational linkages exist. Rather, for both first and second-generation Vietnamese organizations, projects are generally carried out through personal

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15 Organizational development in Vietnam is growing because of changing attitudes toward international organizations. Although Vietnamese American NGOs are not well represented among the entire roster of registered NGOs, the strength of Vietnamese American NGOs lies in their ability to gain support from local governments and other nonprofit institutions.

16 Another important theme that emerges from our quantitative results as well as interviews is the informality of transnational exchanges, as practiced by both the first- and second-generations. There is still lingering mistrust towards Vietnamese banks and other formal monetary institutions and therefore, collective and individual monetary transfers to Vietnam from the U.S. are significantly underestimated (Sidel 2007). Religious organizations are the most popular conduit for charitable giving in Vietnam; therefore, further examinations of religious institutions as chief tools for development are warranted. Moreover, it is widely recognized that remittances serve as an important impetus for development as they are invested into the creation of small and medium sized enterprises and the expansion of public infrastructures in the migrants’ hometowns (Portes, Haller and Guarnizo 2002). Following this line of research, future studies should examine the role of migrant-owned businesses in Vietnam given the context of blocked transnationalism.
networks of family and friends. The existence of these organizations partially challenges the hypothesis that political refugees and asylum seekers, as well as their descendants, experience blocked transnationalism. Both first and second-generation Vietnamese find different ways to interact with their country. First-generation activities tend to be more informal by working with hometown associations and religious groups, whereas second-generation organizations use their human capital to create more formal ties with Vietnam through government channels. However, the forms of transnational practice for both first- and second-generation organizations may be less institutionalized than what is common for other immigrant groups.

Second-generation organizations focus on both national and local development, instead of relying upon regional and local ties. These organizations are more likely to interact with local and national governments, and their members travel to Vietnam much more frequently compared to their counterparts in first-generation organizations. Over half of the members of second-generation organizations visit Vietnam at least three times per year. Nearly 44 percent remain in contact with central, local, and provincial governments compared to less than 15 percent of first-generation organizations. Second-generation organizations rely more on hiring Vietnamese nationals to implement projects and the aid of local government – given their regular contact with all levels of government and other non-profit institutions – and they rely less on monetary support from the co-ethnic community.

The U.S.-centered activities of second-generation organizations include an emphasis on culture camps focused on retaining Vietnamese culture through language or artistic expressions for immigrant youths. Participation in NGOs and educational summer trips where young adults use their skills to travel and teach in Vietnamese universities is common. Many youths also
return to Vietnam through the sponsorship of business organizations, including internships at large multi-national firms such as Intel, or exchanges with international law firms.

First-generation immigrants who are members of transnational organizations tend to lack experience working with organizational counterparts in Vietnam. This is, in large part, because the development of non-governmental organizations in Vietnam is a much more recent phenomenon and highly regulated in comparison to the U.S. Before Vietnam’s liberalization, most associations and organizations operated informally or were a branch of the government. Vietnam’s political-economic system yielded few opportunities for people to form voluntary organizations. Only since the implementation of the new renovation policies in the late 1980s and the early 1990s did the government provide enabling regulations for the establishment of non-governmental organizations (Kerkvliet et al. 2003). Nevertheless, even at present, many organizations, such as the Women’s Union and the Youth Union, still operate under the Fatherland Front, an umbrella group of pro-government mass movements that has close links to the Community Party and the Vietnamese government.

Organizations led by the second-generation have taken advantage of the more open space for NGOs to operate in Vietnam in recent years. Between 1992 and 2010, the number of international NGOs increased from 183 to approximately 800 as governmental restrictions relaxed. Thousands of small informal grassroots organizations exist in partnership with local communities, even though many of them are not officially supported by the government. As one member of a first-generation political organization explains:

I definitely commend the organizations that are able to work in Vietnam, as there is a lot of red tape, corruption and hoops to have to go through. Many of these groups are working with the Communist government, and I am sure that the government of Vietnam is not necessarily too fond of these groups either, but they allow them for one reason or another.
Second-generation youths perceive the Vietnamese state as a partner in their various developmental projects, despite being cognizant of their parents’ opposition. In the words of a second-generation lawyer:

Many of us grew up in the States and we view history from a different perspective than our parents who still have a lot of resentment towards Vietnam. In that sense, we try to balance our interests. We try to stay very non-controversial.

A young second-generation woman who volunteered with an international NGO noted:

When I returned home, the first thing my dad said was “Why do you sound like a Communist?” This is because I was based in Hanoi. He followed up by saying, “Your accent has changed” …. I think he has a lot of pride and a lot of fear and misunderstandings about how Vietnam is – modern Vietnam, that is – and the Vietnam that he left. I would never invalidate his feelings. There is a lot of pain still for him and for our community. I realize that I’m in this weird no man’s land where he and his friends think of Vietnam in a certain way. With some members of the community, I talk very candidly about my work but I don’t talk too much about homeland politics.

The legal organization, which the Vietnamese-American lawyer who is cited above belongs to, sponsors judges and attorneys from Vietnam to visit the United States, in addition to implementing a fellowship program that allows second-generation law students to work as summer associates in Vietnam. Another second-generation NGO successfully implements newborn-care initiatives that are approved by the government. The Vietnamese second generation then finds itself walking a fine balance between respecting their parents’ wishes and memories of Vietnam and forging their own understandings of the country. Historical memory still transpires to youths who grew up hearing stories about their parents surviving the war, followed by their exodus to the United States.

Regardless of the relationship with the state, religious groups have proven to be an important practical resource for most organizations operating in Vietnam. Forty-four percent of second-generation organizations and 33 percent of first-generation organizations are in regular
contact with religious groups in Vietnam. Religion tends to operate as a legitimate institution that is independent of the state; therefore, religious groups and leaders garner trust from the diaspora as a conduit for transnational activities. Buddhist temples in Vietnam are linked to temples in the United States. A registry of Vietnamese temples around the globe is published annually, listing Buddhist temples in the United States, Australia, Canada, Norway, and New Zealand. One abbot based in the U.S. explained that he is frequently contacted by temples in Vietnam requesting assistance – typically, monetary – for building temples or for disaster relief. Religious leaders from Vietnam also make visits abroad to personally request support for various projects, including funding orphanages and building houses, schools, and libraries.

The causes and activities that are funded by religious groups are selected on an informal basis, oftentimes at the discretion of individual monks. For example, one Vietnamese-American monk took US$10,000 in cash with him on a visit to Central Vietnam to donate to his home temple for building a new library. Another monk described how he travels to Vietnam to visit various temples while passing as a local travelling monk. He takes money from his temple in Northern California and then donates it to projects that he deems most worthy.

**Making sense of blocked transnationalism: the affective ties of the first- and second-generation**

The previous section describes the actual cross-border characteristics and behaviors of first- and second-generation organizations. This section aims to complement this by explaining transnationalism as an affective process. While all organizations serve a role in fulfilling affective ties, not all organizations engage in actual cross-border activities. Transnationalism,
when understood as affective ties, describes the lived experiences and connections – real or imagined – that immigrants maintain with the homeland. Moreover, these ties exist at both the individual and collective levels. Members of the diaspora still practice many rituals taken from the homeland in order to preserve their ancestral connections. For instance, Vietnamese-American families place altars in their homes to honor their ancestors and continue to practice đârn gió (ancestor worship). The expatriates still commemorate the Fall of Saigon (or Black April), which marked the end of the Vietnam War and the full Communist takeover of South Vietnam, and ensure that their U.S.-born offspring recognize the significance of this event by sending them off to school wearing black ribbons.

How individuals think about and understand these events and their sentiments towards Vietnam represent the emotional and psychic spaces that immigrants inhabit. The sights and sounds of co-ethnic neighborhoods constantly reinforce homeland ties and identities among its inhabitants. Local radio stations broadcast the news of incarcerated human rights activists in Vietnam, while newspapers commemorate important dates in Vietnamese history. Patrons walk through a replica of a famous garden in Central Vietnam in their local shopping mall; a string of war memorials dot the landscape in parks and strip malls.

Beyond the co-ethnic neighborhood, many transnational organizations embody a focal point and a tool for empowerment for the exiles to remember and to reimagine their home country. Members of these organizations are able to retain and to reassert their social status prior to migration. The most illustrative example of this is when former army officers don garb and re-enact ceremonies that reproduce the social hierarchy of the Vietnamese military. Many former leaders of the South Vietnamese military have amassed cult figure status and a sizable following in Vietnamese-American communities. Similarly, hometown associations reproduce the social
relations and hierarchies of their corresponding villages – village leaders are often selected as distinguished guests at fundraising dinners and they are granted various privileges.

Vietnamese-American organizations led by the first-generation often celebrate important events in Vietnam’s history, such as the reenactment of the famous Trù’ng Sister revolt in 39 AD, in which two sisters organized a national rebellion against the Chinese which ultimately failed, but inspired subsequent rebellions. The ARVN Rangers, a special military group, participate in various war memorial events in Orange County annually, proudly wearing their military garb and berets. Another popular event is the screening of an independent film, “The Truth about Hồ Chí Minh, across U.S. cities with large Vietnamese populations. During a screening in California, several hundred men stood to salute both the American flag and the former Southern Vietnamese flag, singing the national anthem of the old regime.

The strength of affective ties that connect the first-generation’s imaginary and emotions to their homeland wanes by the second-generation, although they still endure as part of their parents’ legacy. Vietnamese youths acknowledge their parents’ experiences during wartime and their resentment towards the communist state, although they simultaneously forge their own understandings of Vietnam. As a second-generation Vietnamese-American recalls:

My mom was a lawyer in Vietnam. I think it was hard for her when she first came. She worked at a nail salon and had to learn how to cook and wash dishes.... When I describe to my mom what Saigon is like now, she often doesn’t believe me. I tell her that I can buy Levi’s jeans, eat KFC, and watch CNN. She only talks about the Communists taking everything.

Interviews with leaders of hometown associations based in San Jose indicate a lingering fear among some first-generation immigrants of being detained at a Vietnamese airport upon arrival. On the contrary, members of the second-generation are confident of their freedom to move
within the country and to exploit various opportunities, including the prospect of collaborating with the Vietnamese state to conduct transnational activities. A Vietnamese-American leader of a second-generation organization explains this intergenerational rift:

The previous president of this organization was in a situation of upsetting a lot of people when we helped organize a statewide trade mission of a Vietnamese delegation. We later tried to participate in a Vietnamese community event for Tét (New Year) and were stopped. We would be invited to attend only if the president retracted his statement and apologized. It put us in a difficult situation.

As illustrated by this incident, controversies often arise within the ethnic community when second-generation organizations attempt to actively and publicly conduct outreach programs in Vietnam. Compared to first-generation organizations, it is less important for second-generation groups to garner trust and support from the Vietnamese-American community; instead, they are able to capitalize on their knowledge of how civil society works in the United States to establish partnerships with other American institutions. Tellingly, while no leader of a second-generation organization reported that they perceive the Vietnamese government to be a significant hindrance to their operations, almost 60 percent of first-generation organizations do.

The ‘open’ transnationalism practiced by the second-generation in comparison to the more “covert” transnationalism practiced by the first is largely due to the fact that second generation organizations are not as strongly embedded in the ethnic community. By publicly engaging with business leaders and officials back in Vietnam, youths are actively promoting a revitalized Vietnamese-American identity. One second-generation business leader described his decision to open membership in their Chamber of Commerce to people living in Vietnam and to negotiate with the new Vietnamese consulate in the United States. He said his mission was to bring free enterprise to Vietnam. According to him, “It’s time to move forward. This is a Vietnamese American Chamber of Commerce and I don’t want to place my American
citizenship above my loyalties to Vietnam. The opportunities in Vietnam are immense, so why not take advantage [of them]?”

**An Alternative Reference Group for Integration**

In terms of assimilation, transnational engagement for the second generation creates an alternative reference or comparison group for understanding their own social mobility in the United States.

Transnational engagement also plays an integrative function by expanding the reference point for the second generation. In the United States, the comparison group for success and social mobility for Vietnamese are conditioned by co-ethnic peers and a strong success frame (Zhou & Lee 2014). By participating in overseas projects, the second generation are offered an additional reference point: imagining what life would be like if their parent’s migration did not occur. As one participant explained, “I look at all my female cousins my age and they are all married, with kids, cleaning, and waiting on my uncles. Women are still expected to be very submissive in their relationships with men personally and in the workplace. I couldn’t do that.”

Or as another participant explained after spending the summer volunteering on a medical mission, “I am grateful for what I have. If my parent’s had not escaped to America, I probably wouldn’t be in medical school. My parent’s are from a small village in the central and after my dad’s imprisonment because of the war- my sister and I couldn’t have gone to college if we stayed here. We would be farmers or run a store - I mean that’s what my relatives are doing now.”

Second-generation members describe the transnational activities as opportunities for personal career development and a new mode of labor market integration (Yang 2006); in an era
of market reform, Vietnamese second generation can capitalize on their bilingualism and cultural fluency in both the United States and Vietnam to work for an international corporation or to pursue transnational entrepreneurship. Another second-generation member who works for a development agency in Vietnam describes how his involvement is largely due to financial necessity: “Given the economic climate in the U.S., I would not be able to use my college degree the way I can here. I can contribute to the socioeconomic development of the country. My work in Quang Nam (a province in Central Vietnam) means that I can help people directly through microfinance and housing initiatives planning with local government officials and project funders.” The interest among second-generation members to take advantage of this emergent opportunity structure has recently been reciprocated by the Vietnamese government which has enacted a policy designed to attract the “gray matter” of this generation.17

In terms of assimilation, transnational engagement for the second generation creates an alternative reference or comparison group for understanding their own social mobility in the United States. Transnational engagement also plays an integrative function by expanding the reference point for the second generation. In the United States, the comparison group for success and social mobility for Vietnamese are conditioned by co-ethnic peers and a strong success frame (Zhou & Lee 2014). By participating in overseas projects, the second generation are offered an additional reference point: imagining what life would be like if their parent’s migration did not occur. As one participant explained, “I look at all my female cousins my age

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17 Examples of national policies and initiatives that target the return migration of second-generation Vietnamese who are living abroad are aplenty. In 2003, the “Fund for persuading the Overseas Community” was initiated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to include projects that provided Vietnamese language training for overseas youth in addition to cultural exchange programs and conferences on investment opportunities aimed at second-generation Vietnamese. In 2004, the “Politburo Resolution Number 36” was enacted to not only attract foreign investment from overseas Vietnamese but to also lure overseas brainpower by offering incentives and rewards to highly-skilled expatriots to return to Vietnam. In 2007, the national government enacted a visa waiver program which provided overseas Vietnamese (both first- and second-generations) with a five-year travel visa that allowed them to enter and leave the country without restrictions. In 2009, overseas Vietnamese were granted dual citizenship.
and they are all married, with kids, cleaning, and waiting on my uncles. Women are still expected to be very submissive in their relationships with men personally and in the workplace. I couldn’t do that.” Or as another participant explained after spending the summer volunteering on a medical mission, “I am grateful for what I have. If my parent’s had not escaped to America, I probably wouldn’t be in medical school. My parent’s are from a small village in the central and after my dad’s imprisonment because of the war- my sister and I couldn’t have gone to college if we stayed here. We would be farmers or run a store - I mean that’s what my relatives are doing now.”

Opinions about the objectives and activities of transnational organizations among the Vietnamese-American community are mixed, although they have grown progressively more positive. In the words of an immigrant Buddhist monk: “Some older people say that we are helping the Communist blood to flow but really, we want those who have education to have a voice on how people will change their society. Change can only happen through education.” First-generation leaders often say that their goal is to help Vietnam because they are Vietnamese, whereas leaders of second-generation organizations tend to couch their activities in terms of a process of self-discovery. As a U.S.-born leader states: “Growing up, my parents never talked about Vietnam. We weren’t allowed to buy anything with the label ‘made in Vietnam.’ I came here to see it for myself, to see where my parents came from.” Put simply, transnational involvement allows the first-generation to be Vietnamese – that is, to reaffirm their national identity and to re-establish ties with their home country. By contrast, for the second-generation, transnational participation allows members of the second-generation to become Vietnamese, such that through their involvement in homeland projects, they learn more about their origin society and in doing so, they start to identify with being Vietnamese.
Discussion and conclusion

The Vietnamese represents an interesting case study for understanding the continuity of, and constraints to, transnational involvement among exiled immigrants and their offspring. Our analysis of the group’s transnational activities reinforces and refines the analytical utility of the concept of “blocked transnationalism,” which emphasizes the broader political and social factors that may hinder or curtail transnational involvement, particularly among forced migrants such as refugees and asylees (Portes and Rumbaut 2006). Results from our analysis show that although the cross-border activities of exiled immigrants and their children are circumscribed by various institutionalized and psychic barriers, the affective and actual transnational ties of first- and second-generation Vietnamese-Americans are far from limited; instead, the ties that crosscut the United States and Vietnam are strong and extensive.

Returning to the key questions related to the broader literature on transnationalism and development, the case of “blocked transnationalism” among Vietnamese-Americans provide interesting insights. First, what is the incidence and intensity of organizational membership in the Vietnamese immigrant community? Although we do not have exact statistics on the proportion of individuals in the Vietnamese population who are transnationally active, the fact that there are over 600 Vietnamese organizations in just three U.S. counties is a testament to how expansive the transnational network spanning between the United States and Vietnam has become. Hometown associations and religious organizations dominate the organizational landscape for the first-generation.

As for the extent to which second-generation Vietnamese-Americans are involved in transnational activities, even though they represent a small minority in the membership base of
the organizations in our sample (less than 4 percent), they are keen on taking leadership roles and forming their own associations with agendas that diverge from those of organizations led by the first-generation. Moreover, although the incidence of transnational involvement among second-generation Vietnamese-Americans appears to be substantially lower than in the first-generation, the intensity of their involvement is arguably higher: compared to the first-generation organizations surveyed, second-generation associations reported having far more regular communication with all levels of the Vietnamese government and sending members to Vietnam on a regular basis for organizational purposes.

A second set of questions asks about key actors involved in the transnational field and the nature of their interactions, particularly the points of tension and conflict that can be identified among the different stakeholders. Points of tension between transnational actors become apparent when generational distinctions interact with relations with the Vietnamese government. Despite the series of liberalization reforms in Vietnam, members of the first-generation still harbor a deep sense of mistrust in the state; thus, instead of working with state agencies to conduct homeland activities, they prefer to work surreptitiously, often in partnership with religious organizations or personal contacts in Vietnam. The story of the travelling Vietnamese monk from the U.S. allocating donations to local projects that he deems most worthy, illustrates the informality of how most transnational activities of first-generation groups are conducted. For first-generation philanthropists, a sharp division is drawn between “helping fellow Vietnamese at home” and supporting the Vietnamese state.

A third set of questions in the transnationalism literature asks about the impact of transnational organizations on the sending society as well as on the migrants and their offspring themselves. Although our study does not directly address these questions, the findings have some
relevant implications. Certainly, the organizational efforts of Vietnamese-Americans have brought about substantial changes in their homeland. As reported by leaders of our sampled transnational organizations, their organizations are engaged in diverse activities and initiatives that are intended to improve their compatriots’ quality of life and to develop the social infrastructure, including the healthcare and educational systems.

Organizations led by the second-generation are particularly likely to identify national development as a top priority, which is why they are open to partnering with the Vietnamese government. In turn, with the country’s economic growth rates among the highest in the world, the Vietnamese government has enacted policies aimed at attracting the skills and capital of young Vietnamese-Americans, who are deemed valuable assets to the country’s developmental strategy.

Aside from the stated objectives of the organizations to improve the socio-economic standing of their community, their participation in transnational organizations provides them with the opportunity to socialize with co-ethnics which, in turn, helps them to reassert their identities and reconnect with their homeland. Based on field observations, organizational events that involve celebrating Vietnamese holidays and commemorating important historical events are particularly significant in the lives of the first-generation. For them, the chance to recreate these important rituals serves to remind them of their past lives; in particular, those who came from privileged backgrounds are given the opportunity to reassert their former social status.

For the second generation, their participation in organizational activities and initiatives provides them with the opportunity to discover their ancestral roots and to experience modern-day Vietnam, while attempting to remain impartial to their parents’ misgivings about the state of affairs in the country when they were forced to flee. Ultimately, the generational dynamics seen
in the case of Vietnamese-Americans undermine our assumptions about the interplay between first- and second generation transnationalism, which predict the unilateral transmission of attitudes and behaviors between parents and children.
Chapter 8: Navigating the Race and Class Hierarchies in American Schools

While *Brown v. Board* of Education is a widely known landmark Supreme Court case, few can trace its origin to the case of nine-year old Sylvia Mendez and her siblings. In 1945, Gonzalo and Felicitas Mendez moved their family from Santa Ana to Westminster, California. They leased a 40-acre parcel of land from a Japanese American family who was going to lose the land because of internment. Mendez asked his sister, Soledad Vidaurri, to enroll his three children in a nearby school. The school authorities told Mrs. Vidaurri that her children (who were fair skinned and whose last name was French) could be enrolled but the Mendez children (who were dark skinned and who had a Mexican surname) would have to go to the Mexican school a few blocks away (Aguirre 2005). In *Mendez v. Westminster*, the unsung precursor to *Brown v. Board of Education*, judges found that Westminster, Santa Ana, Garden Grove, and Orange School Districts systematically and intentionally segregated Mexican American children into separate schools based solely on their surname and the color of their skin (Strum 2010). La Quinta High School and the schools in Little Saigon are the the same school districts that the first successful challenge to school desegregation took place.

*Mendez* is an important part of the intellectual history of the landmark Brown decision in fighting for school desegregation. Today, seventy years after Mendez, this historic battle continues to be played out. The same school districts in Little Saigon are still overwhelmingly students of color—primarily Mexican and now Vietnamese. Latino and Vietnamese households hold the highest poverty rates in Orange County with 16.5% and 13.7% living in poverty respectively. Almost half (43.7%) of Vietnamese make less than $25,000 a year in Orange County working in low-wage jobs (Orange County Health Needs Assessment 2010). In September 2003, 80% of adults enrolled in Orange County’s CalWorks programs exhausted their
benefits were Vietnamese, although they are only 5% of Orange County’s population (Martelle 2003). Despite being a Title I or low-income school, La Quinta High School has a graduation rate of 92 percent and is rated one of the State of California’s highest performing high schools (Leal 2015). Over 50% of the students are enrolled in advanced placement programs and 94% of the students are minority with the vast majority of those students Vietnamese and Mexican.

I describe in the first part of this chapter the demographics of schools in Little Saigon. This second part of this chapter focuses on how second generation Vietnamese explain their educational success and failure in a segregated space in reference to ethnic others; this is accomplished by (1) drawing upon a refugee narrative and (2) co-opting a pan-ethnic Asian identity. The refugee narrative is used as a frame to explain superior educational drive, making explicit and implicit comparisons to the economic migrant narrative of their Latino classmates.

In addition, I add to existing theories of pan-ethnicity by incorporating and paying attention to class privilege, and the choice of using a pan-ethnic label. The use of an Asian identity also reinforces previous findings by Lee and Zhou (2015) of stereotype promise, “the promise of being viewed through the lens of a positive stereotype leads one to perform in such a way that confirms the positive stereotype enhancing performance” (43). However, I find that the racial and class context in which stereotype promise operates is not emphasized in the theory; stereotype promise depends upon relational racialization. The racial context of integration must be considered in the case of second-generation Vietnamese. The valorization of the Vietnamese second generation as the model minority Asian in the enclave depends on a stigmatized other, in this case, Latino students, predominantly Mexican, in the enclave. I find that the Vietnamese second generation choose to pass as Asian not only for the racial privilege associated with academic achievement and the model minority image (Zhou and Lee, 2015; Cheng, 2012), but
also the class privilege that being seen as Asian in Orange County signifies.

I also argue that the Vietnamese second generation, using Berger’s terms, internalize and externalize a frame of refugee exceptionalism when describing academic success. This form of refugee exceptionalism is defined and critiqued by Tang (2000) as “the ideologies and discursive practices that figure refugees as necessarily in the hyperghetto but never of it” (23). Well-intentioned research seeking to explain Southeast Asian poverty and social deviance is invested in rescuing Southeast Asians from being associated with welfare or with the underclass; poverty is seen as temporary and “adaptive” for Vietnamese and other Southeast Asians. This ideology preserves and extends the narratives of Southeast Asians as being saved through US intervention (2000: 14). In turn, refugee exceptionalism reproduces the model minority myth and reinforces neoliberal logic that posits poor people are poor because they do not take personal responsibility for working hard (Cacho 2012: 78). This explains why refugees like the Vietnamese are able to move out of the inner city and why so many African Americans and Latinos/as in the same residential spaces cannot (ibid). Refugee exceptionalism delineates how poverty, incarceration, and welfare dependency are overlooked among Southeast Asian refugees in favor of an optimistic portrait of the success. The successful refugee narrative overlooks those who still face obstacles to acculturation and how the process of acculturation is neither even nor smooth for all children of immigrants.

The class value of being “Asian” and “refugee exceptionalism” are ideological frames used by the second generation to create social distance between themselves, their working-class background, recently arrived co-ethnics, and other minority immigrant students in schools. This has material implications for Vietnamese; by becoming Asian in the light of the educational institution they both earn advantages and suffer disadvantages. Institutionally, it cuts them off
from affirmative action policies and special programming; at the same time, they are beneficiaries of positive stereotyping institutionally by counselors and teachers. **This denies the history of colonialism, linguistic isolation, war, and mental health issues that exist in the Vietnamese community. They are active participators in their own racialization. Passing as Asian and maintaining a refugee narrative are two strategies used by the second generation to create economic uplift and social distance from minority others.**

**A Majority Minority School: “You’re either Vietnamese or Mexican around here.”**

This section describes the context of schools in Little Saigon and the institutionalization of Vietnamese language programming. The racial demographics of the US are changing and Little Saigon reflects this shift. In 2014, for the first time the number of Latino/a, African-American, and Asian students in K-12 public classrooms surpassed the number of whites nationally. The school districts, Westminster and Garden Grove, that encompass Little Saigon are largely Mexican and Vietnamese (see Table 20). In these predominantly Mexican and Vietnamese student districts, 75% in the first school district and 65% in the second school district are on free or reduced lunch, with close to fifty percent of students in these districts identifying as English language learners, Table 21 and Table 22. This is higher than both the state and national average on both accounts. Several high schools in the area can be classified as belonging to Little Saigon, including La Quinta High, Bolsa Grande High, and Santiago High and are part of Garden Grove Unified School District and Westminster School District\(^{18}\). The

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\(^{18}\) Field notes. After extensive interviews with school board leaders, community members, teachers at both the elementary to secondary level, community college counselors, among others- I find that there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes Little Saigon as a geographic body. From interviews with informants, I use the metric of school populations with more than 30% school body of being of Vietnamese ethnicity as part of Little Saigon.
2014-2015 enrollment for Garden Grove School district was 46,177 students.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language of English Learners</th>
<th>Garden Grove Unified School District</th>
<th>Westminster Unified School District</th>
<th>Cantonese (.4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: California Longitudinal Pupil Achievement Data System (CALPADS). Ethnic Diversity Index developed by Ed-Data.
Table 23: Percentage of Graduates by District, County & State, 2013-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Cohort Graduates</th>
<th>Garden Grove Unified School District</th>
<th>Westminster Unified School District</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>89.7</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: California Longitudinal Pupil Achievement Data System (CALPADS). Ethnic Diversity Index developed by Ed-Data.

Today, three out of four students at La Quinta High are Asian, but more specifically Vietnamese American—the highest such concentration of any high school in America. Huy Tran, second generation Vietnamese, and now a guidance counselor at La Quinta High describes the population:

We’re 15% Latino, 80% Vietnamese, and 5% Other. Our students have the freedom to express themselves, no fear of another group oppressing them. Our student government team are all Viet- they can heat a bowl of rice at lunch and eat it- no one is going to say anything.

As one student explained, “Most of us realize that our school is filled with Vietnamese students. But I don’t think we really consider this as a ‘Vietnamese’ high school. We see it as just a regular high school with regular kids” (OC register, 2014). Over and over again my interviewees expressed the same sentiment:

You were either Mexican or Vietnamese around this area- and it was balanced between these two groups. There was never a moment I felt left out - everybody was Vietnamese. This student paints a picture of racial harmony. In fact, both of the aforementioned statements effectively erases the existence of the Latino other, the second largest group of students. These schools are dominated by second-generation Vietnamese, children of the waves of Vietnamese refugees immigrating in the 1970s and 1980s. The experiences of this recent generation is a lot different from their parents; in the early 1990s these schools were plagued with gang violence,
primarily Vietnamese and Mexican gangs. Si Le who himself graduated from La Quinta in 1986 is a mechanic. Now a father of a current La Quinta High student, he remembers a completely different high school experience:

Back then, there was just a small group of Vietnamese students. Many of us didn’t speak a lot of English. We felt different than everyone else. We often got picked on and made fun of. My children today have it a lot better. Being Vietnamese at La Quinta means you are just like everyone else.

Problems with gangs and inter-racial violence in the early to mid 1990s was common in Garden Grove and Westminster. My analysis of newspaper articles from Orange County Register and Los Angeles Times, the two largest circulating newspapers, include 62 such articles from 1986 to 2000 referencing gang tension in schools. A 1994 article reported 54 registered Vietnamese gangs in Orange County known by the police. A 1996 Orange County Register headline reads, “Vietnamese Café Society turns increasingly dangerous, bloody” with police frustrated by reluctant witnesses. A 1997 Los Angeles Times newspaper reported “Slaying Crime: Police say student was victim of a conflict between Vietnamese student gangs.” Another informant who previously attended Bolsa High who now volunteers as a tutor describes his experience as follows:

There is less gang violence at schools now- gangs were big when I grew up so all my friends were involved and stuff. Are they still involved? No, it just died out. It’s not as desirable to pursue that lifestyle. Vietnamese formed gangs in order to protect themselves- when the first generation came here, there was more racism and tension. They just needed to protect themselves and they didn’t know how to fit in at school- and now there is less of a threat- and people aren’t discriminated against because you’re Vietnamese.

This situation was not unique to Little Saigon and the Vietnamese community; the late 1980s and 1990s was a historical backdrop to the proliferation of “youth gangs” in the state of California and the racialization of youth of color nationally. This rise had much to do with the propositions imposed on California state youth, and in particular, youth from working-class and marginalized
communities. Laws like Proposition 21 (Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act), STEP (Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act) of 1988, and Proposition 184, also known as the “three strikes” law directly impacted gang members and non-gang members alike (Lam 2015). Many youth who were perceived as gang members were pulled over, photographed and placed in the state’s gang database known as Cal-Gang (Gilmore 2007; Chang 2000; Lam 2015).19 Nationally, the wide ranging effects of de-industrialization and the mass exodus and deportation of low-skilled and manufacturing jobs was especially felt in disadvantaged communities. Today, new racial and ethnic hierarchies are being transcribed in schools changing regional racialization where white is no longer the reference point for success (Cheng 2010; Jimenez & Horowitz 2013).

**Becoming Asian and Academic Profiling**

This section outlines how Vietnamese students explain and understand their academic success relative to other immigrant groups. Vietnamese draw upon a refugee narrative when explaining their academic achievement. They also use their racial privilege as Asian to explain success drawing not only upon the model minority stereotype but also the relative affluence and wealth that being Asian in Orange County means. This draws sharply in contrast to previous findings by Kibria who studies second generation Korean and Chinese who questions “Asian affinities” toward pan-ethnicity (2002). This section shows that Vietnamese second generation

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19 It is also important to note that Vietnamese youth gangs at this time were also part of the second wave or boat people in the 1970s and 1980s. Over fifty percent of boat people were young children or teenagers, and some came without parents or family members whose parents could only afford to send one child to escape to the US. This often times resulted in youth spending years in refugee camps without parental supervision or guidance (Chan 1994; Lam 2015)
draw on the refugee narrative and pan-ethnic Asian category to create social distance between recent co-ethnic immigrants, their working-class background, and other minority students.

Vietnamese students not only selectively draw upon a positive Asian identity but also construct a refugee narrative to explain academic achievement. Children of immigrants are embedded in a neoliberal American Dream rhetoric that espouses a democratic ideal wherein hard work and education guarantee upward mobility and job security (Bonilla Silva 1999; Pyke 2004). This refugee narrative creates an ideal of the moral imperative of the refugee experience-in comparison to the economic migrant whose immigration is financially motivated. This refugee narrative is enforced by both first and second generation accounts of explaining educational success, creating a new form of racial triangulation between Latino and white students in the enclave. This narrative is positioned as the refugee having a type of ethnic capital that includes a moral imperative of fighting communism and dislocation. This moral imperative or ethnic capital is believed to fuel academic achievement.

This process of racialization is profoundly interrelated. Kim Jean’s (1999) theory of racial triangulation or a “field of racial positions” argues that Asian Americans have been racially triangulated vis-à-vis whites and blacks in the field of racial positions. This theory can be extended to understand the processes of academic profiling that occurs in schools between Latinos and Asians in Little Saigon. This field shapes the opportunities, constraints and possibilities with which subordinate groups must contend, ultimately serving to reinforce white dominance and privilege (1999: 107). When I asked second generation students to explain why they were doing well academically, many framed their motivation for immigration as a “refugee”:
Ours is to find a better life because of the results of the war - so it’s kinda of more a powerful reason versus them coming over here for economic gain - more it’s political and a lot more bigger significant reason so those powerful stories motivate the generation over here – maybe it’s the way our parents raise us with those stories and what stories do the Mexican immigrants tell their kids.

The ethnic capital frame of refugee exceptionalism is associated with higher educational success in apposition to their Latino classmates. Many informants, when explaining their academic success contrasted their experiences with other immigrants, the unnamed immigrant group most of the time were Latinos. This comparison group also implicitly becomes the racial other in the classroom, their Latino classmates. As one student explained,

The fact that our immigration is because of the war- not sure if the other group did have wars.

The above explanations for academic drive then are founded on a false belief of superior motivation for success. Vietnamese motivation because of their refugee status means as one student explained, “we can’t go back the way they can.” This narrative reinforces group boundaries denying discrimination suffered by both groups; the color-blind discourse ignores the militarization of the US border and creation of an undocumented under-class by US government policies (Massey 2002). This denial of oppression also uplifts the neoliberal narrative that through hard work one can achieve success, and the reinforces the stereotype that failure is due to personal or cultural deficiencies. It also creates a silence surrounding whites, white privilege perpetuating the ideologies of individualism and meritocracy, that everything is fair game for those willing to strive (Ochoa 2013)

When Vietnamese second generation discuss experiences in school, they also draw on essentialist notions of the model minority stereotype and actively choose to highlight academic success as a result of being Asian. I observe the Vietnamese second generation, use these racial
categories as a form of racial privilege as described by Cheng and Tuan. Mia Tuan’s (1998) study of third and fourth generation Chinese and Japanese Americans posits that Asian Americans racial privilege is one where “freedom of not having to think about one’s racial background…the privilege to have one’s race be considered irrelevant.” Tuan concluded that her respondents who grew up in predominantly Asian-American communities enjoyed this privilege “within the context of their neighborhood” (96), consequently suffered fewer injuries, psychological, emotional, and were able to develop greater self-confidence than those who grew up in predominantly white communities. This racialized privilege depends largely on the circulation of the model minority discourse. As Cheng (2013) describes Asian American racialized privilege is being marked a model minority, is not “normal” but a privilege to be considered exceptional, compared to other non-white minority groups (106).

This takes the form of biological arguments that naturalize Asian and assert some groups are inherently smarter than others. As one student explained, “Education is pushed in the Asian community, that’s why we may have an advantage over other people.” Or as another student explained, “It might be a bad thing, you know math class, if you’re Vietnamese, you should be good at math, you should go to math and science. How could you get a C? that type of thing. You’re Vietnamese, you can’t do dance. You’re Asian, it’s in your blood. This is perpetuated by the Vietnamese students themselves and the Latino population. The Vietnamese have to be good at school, and at particular subjects. It’s ok to fail in English for example.”

As the above student expresses, Vietnamese have racial privilege to pass as Asian and actively choose this in their descriptors of academic achievement in school. Being Vietnamese is being Asian and this carries with positive stereotyping (Lee and Zhou 2014). In this way, their Vietnamese identity can be actively chosen as backstage or front-stage in school. This racial
privilege is described by Cheng (2013) in her study of Asian American students in San Gabriel Valley as “enjoyment of greater expectations and opportunities among nonwhite groups relative to others” (13). The racial privilege of Asian is distinct from white privilege because it depends on rather than negates racial otherness (Cheng 2013: 44). Academic success then is attributed both to pan-ethnic stereotypes of Asian in the US context and the supposed superior cultural values that Vietnamese immigrant families bring with them from the homeland due to their refugee status. Lee and Zhou (2014) describe this as stereotype promise, where the promise of being viewed through the lens of a positive stereotype enhances the performance of Asian American students, leading them to work harder in order to confirm racial exceptionalism (7). Jimenez and Horowitz (2013) find that in middle-class and upper-middle class communities “Asianness stands for high-achievement, hard work, and success; whiteness, in contrast white represents low-achievement, laziness, and academic mediocrity” (1). Even in my case, among low-income schools, Vietnamese students take advantage of the ethnoracial Asian category to create social distance between themselves and their working-class background, and other minority students.

Vietnamese are also likely to embrace “being Asian” not only for the stereotype of academic achievement but Asian also symbolizes particular economic hierarchies in Orange County. This finding differs markedly from the work of Kibria who finds among second generation Chinese and Korean informants use strategies of disidentification to highlight ethnonational identity (2002: 81).

Vietnamese are seen as ghetto as one informant explains; Asian is not only associated with the model minority and academic achievement, but Asian also includes presumed wealth; it
becomes in their benefit to appear Asian as Asian is also associated with affluence and wealth in the OC:

We’re ghetto- that’s how other Asians see us. The Vietnamese are ghetto. We speak funny, our language is ugly. I live with a Taiwanese guy and I have a lot of Chinese Vietnamese friends and they don’t identify with Vietnamese because we’re ghetto and we’re not as affluent as other folks- and we still do shady stuff- like this is what my elder taught me- a lot of people go straight- but we’ll figure out how to go around even if it violates morals and ethics, I feel that’s the mentality a lot of Viets have. Get to the point, however you can. Feel comfortable you don’t have to stay on the straight path. I try to stay straight as possible- I don’t really do any drugs and I know some of my friends do that- academically but I try to stay clean.

Compared to other Asian populations in Orange County, Vietnamese are indeed at a socioeconomic disadvantage in terms of education, income and poverty rates (Table 24). All Asians in Orange County with the exception of Vietnamese have higher median household incomes and education than Non-Hispanic Whites. Being Asian symbolizes the wealth and socioeconomic affluence of the groups. Post-1965 migration changed the Asian immigrants to Orange County. Japanese in Orange County were one of the few pre-1965 immigrant Asian populations in Southern California. This population diversified in the 1970s as Japanese corporations began to establish a presence in Orange County. These companies include the US headquarters for Mazda, Ricoh, Suzuki, Toshiba America, Centon Electronics, and Canon (Piggot 2012). Large numbers of Japanese immigrants accompanied this inflow of corporate investment and helped create ethnoburbs in South Orange County. Large numbers of Chinese and Taiwanese immigrated also immigrated after 1965 for work and educational opportunities. Over one-quarter of the US Taiwanese population lives in Orange County. Taiwanese rank with Indians as the most educated population in the United States (US Census 2010). Koreans
although part of the enclave economy of Koreatown immigrated primarily as legal permanent residents with advanced credentials.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Median Household income ($)</th>
<th>Education- at least a BA or higher, 25 years or older (%)</th>
<th>Poverty rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td>87,453</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>111,029</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>126,885</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>135,313</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>111,016</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>90,900</td>
<td>59.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>69,607</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 2012 American Community Survey, American Factfinder

The Vietnamese second generation are keenly aware of their socioeconomic position as refugees and how they differ from other Asians in Orange County, and the pressure to fulfill being seen as Asian:

OC (Orange County) is a very affluent area- there are pockets of poverty and there are areas of affluence- you got to show that image of affluence while being and living in poverty- so it’s stressed out and important for other people compared to LA where there are a lot of poor people and it’s comfortable- folks here try not to do that. People will say OC is very nice so people automatically associate that with you- what are you going to do? You have to live up to that image despite not having it. We are the poor refugees and we try not to be.

This means the posturing of assumed wealth to show success as one student explains:

My Korean friend said that he met a Viet guy from LA and he said the people here in Orange County--we try to portray ourselves as something we’re not. We will wear brand names or use big words that we don’t understand. Flash and identity is huge- people will drive Benzs and BMWs, but they will live in apartments or rent bedrooms.

These products that Vietnamese youth display, buy, and wear can be argued to be indicators of status attainment through social consumption. In Park’s work (2014), Consuming Citizenship children of Korean and Chinese entrepreneurs seek to present themselves as Americans through...
the products they consume. She argues that the language of adaption and assimilation does not adequately problematize the impacts of inequality and consider the barriers to inclusion and social citizenship which are part of the everyday reality for racialized second-generation immigrants. Within the schools of Little Saigon, students use the image of Asians as high-achieving and prosperous and use their racial privilege as Asian when talking about their own academic achievement in contrast to Latino students. When asking the second generation how other Asians see them in the larger Orange County area— they explain how consumerism or conspicuous consumption is a method for creating a sense of social inclusion and success:

They look poor, but drive Mercedez. Seventy-five percent of the students here are on free or reduced lunch, and the kids here drive nicer cars than the teachers and they all have new cell phones. I see my student on reduced lunch and he’s driving a BMW and has an iPhone 6. One of my black friends told me, ‘They know how to work the system. They think black people work the system. No, it’s the Vietnamese.

Two dynamics are being noted in this section; first, are intra-ethnic and generational tensions between more recent arrivals from Vietnam and the US born-Vietnamese second generation.

Second, inter-racial dynamics pit Asian Americans in a class hierarchy of “ghetto Asian” being Vietnamese who through conspicuous consumption

**We’re not all the model minority: intraracial dynamics**

Some second-generation were conscious of the class resources or hyper-selectivity of particular Vietnamese; hyper selectivity as Lee and Zhou find (2014) are some Asian immigrant groups who are not only more highly educated than their compatriots from their countries of origin who did not immigrate, but also more highly educated than the US average (88). Being members of hyper-selected immigrant groups affects the cultural frame that immigrant parents construct as well as the ethnic capital and resources that immigrant communities generate to help
their children attain success (2014: xvi). Some participants were conscious of the hyper
selectivity of their parents and how this affected the ethnic community:

It’s the way you look at the evidence- think about it- the majority of Vietnamese- have there only been immigrants- Vietnamese were refugees- but who were they? They were the anti-communists and the 1975 wave and the Sino-Vietnamese. If you look at strictly the ethnic Vietnamese- they were educated, military officials and our culture is based on Confucianism. So all our parents were educated but not all of them speak English- so the whole thing in our families have been engrained in us is about educational achievement. So when they did this study- they looked at our parents as poor- our parents didn’t have the English abilities, no jobs, low income- they might have the education from Vietnam but because they lack the language ability and their diplomas are not valuable here. There is such a high jump because our families have always been geared towards higher education.

Even with hyper-selectivity of Vietnamese migration- recent waves of immigration from Vietnam have diversified the enclave creating tensions in school between first and second generation students. This is similar to Jimenez findings in his study of Mexican immigrants and replenished ethnicity (2012):

I remember my first elementary school was morning side elementary- I remember walking on campus and all the kids looked like me. It was much easier to adjust and learn the language too. By then, I was in the second grade and I was progressing much faster than the other second graders because I was 9 years old, and my teacher asked me “how old are you?” “9” so she bumped me a grade and that helped my confidence. But even here in Little Saigon I was picked on. The students were Asians that teased me- the Vietnamese kids that teased me who grew up here – I think I received more discrimination and teasing from them than other non-Vietnamese.

Second generation often expressed resentment and social distancing between their first generation counterparts in school. Often times second generation would use markers to identify themselves as US or American born. In stigma Goffman describes the process of disidentification from stigmatized identities involving careful control of information about the self presented to outsiders. Central to these processes are “disidentifiers,” which he describes as “signs that tend in fact or hope to break up an otherwise coherent picture…in a positive direction
desired by the actor” (44). In my results, this tended to be clothes or accents of second-
generation Vietnamese in comparison to recent immigrants. In an analysis of intra-ethnic Asian
disidentification (i.e. distancing of members of one Asian ethnic group from another), Hayano
notes that the signs used by Asian Americans tend to be of a verbal nature involving disclaimers,
jokes, and so forth. Many second generation Vietnamese in my study used the term FOB (Fresh
Off the Boat) to socially categorize and describe coethnic peers on different assimilation
trajectories:

In my high school there was a Vietnamese club and I was pretty involved in it- but I had
mixed feelings about it because ... I like being Vietnamese but I felt in that Vietnamese
club that they were trying to not be Vietnamese- there were two groups- second
generation kids and more 1.5 generation or even more newer newcomers, and there was
this separation between those two groups. The second generation are cooler, more
Americanized, watch better movies, wear better clothes. I felt the identity of the
Vietnamese club was dominated by the 2nd generation group- and actually they were in a
way they were ashamed to be Vietnamese. They would say things like, “let’s start the
meeting before all the FOBs get here.” I felt it very hurtful and just wrong. You were
once a FOB too, your mom or somebody used to be a FOB, we were all newcomers. So I
felt in the Vietnamese club- We had a Vietnamese identity that appeared to the outside
world but within there were factions and not the unity I would hope.

The term FOB is a way for second generation to denigrate those that seem too ethnic (Pyke
2004). Using the term FOB becomes a way for second generation Vietnamese to mark their
assimilated status and distance themselves:

The Vietnamese American students tend to discriminate against the recent immigrants-
it’s the first generation kids against recent immigrants- they call them FOBs, and make
fun of their accents- that’s what I experienced growing up. For the first generation- they
work so hard to dispel this stereotype. Then you have recent immigrants who come and
have to start all over again, and they can’t get rid of that. That’s where is all the animosity
comes from.

On the other hand, having relationships outside your group meant that you were not Vietnamese
enough:
I was actually thinking of my high school experience because there were so many Vietnamese people form different generation or cohorts or whatever. I had a lot of white and Mexican friends, and there were different cliques. I remember there was a group of Vietnamese kids who only hung out with Vietnamese people. They were discriminatory towards other ethnic groups and other Vietnamese who had friends who were outside or non-Vietnamese. It was very weird. It was this weird other type of discrimination from other Vietnamese people. The weird thing is I felt that they were less Vietnamese- there whole thing was you’re not Vietnamese enough because you have White or Mexican friends, but I think I was more Vietnamese than they were.

In this way, second generation face the challenge of creating and displaying themselves as part of the “bicultural middle” that Pyke describes (2003) “balancing Amerianization with an ethnic identity; the negative identities at acculturative extremes cast the bicultural middle as a safe, non-stigmatized cone occupied by the ‘normals’ (Goffman 1964)” (221). Signifiers such as FOB, and the creation of a “refugee” narrative create social distance between recently arrived Vietnamese and Latino immigrant students forming new ethnic hierarchies after *Mendez v. Westminster*. For second generation Vietnamese, claims “Asianess” is a way to exhibit socio-economic parity, mobility, and claims of belonging.
Chapter 9: Conclusion

This work provides an understanding of how memories of Vietnamese pasts filled with trauma, hope, and survival are often unspeakable, but can be created, maintained, contested, and transferred to later generations in the ethnic enclave. In the preceding chapters I examined the ethnic enclave through a qualitative intergenerational lens by looking at four empirical sites in the space of everyday life in the enclave: (1) the individual experiences of second generation Vietnamese in predominantly Latino and Asian schools, (2) the transnational organizational practices of Vietnamese refugees, (3) the transmission of language and memory, and 4) the entrepreneurial endeavors and businesses created in the enclave. In each of these sites, I assessed intergenerational differences and tensions. I started the dissertation with a history of the context of exit and reception factors for Vietnamese immigrants to the United States and traced the political, economic, and social development of the largest enclave of Vietnamese refugees in Southern California.

This chapter summarizes my major findings, the theoretical significance for theories of immigrant integration and race and ethnicity, implications for US Refugee policy, and suggested areas of future research.

Major Empirical Findings & Theoretical Significance

The major empirical findings from this study present several theoretical contributions: (1) complicating Asian American theories of race and ethnicity, (2) evaluating longevity and life cycle of the enclave, (3) analyzing intergenerational transmission of war and trauma through language, and (4) defining transnational engagement as an alternative lens of assimilation. In the
following sections, I first briefly summarize the major empirical findings from each chapter and then present the theoretical contributions in the subsequent paragraphs.

**The Politics of Memories**

The chapter on memory and language illustrates the significance in memory making and transmission of Vietnamese language from the first to the second generation. The memorialization of space and protest show that the war is not forgotten in Little Saigon. In terms of language: status pronouns, accents, word choice, and mate selection are a way of sharing and enforcing historical memory. The aforementioned factors are means of divulging and measuring cultural competencies among members of the second generation. Conflict emerges in the process of acculturation. For many second generation, the language gap creates tensions between generations. In addition, for some first generation Vietnamese there is a purposeful historical erasure and silence of wanting to forget life before immigration that prevents some second generation from knowing or learning about their parent’s migration. This silence can be moderated by the community through ethnic institutions such as the church, and within the family including elder siblings and grandparents who act as cultural interlocutors.

**Theoretical Significance: Selective acculturation and the second generation**

Segmented assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993) posits that selective acculturation, or the retention of ethnic characteristics and close ties to the parent’s culture, can result in upward social mobility for the children of immigrants. My findings show that conflict can emerge in the
process of selective acculturation. Cultural silence is an example of dissonant acculturation that does not lead to downward assimilation. Downward assimilation does not occur because the cultural and social resources accessed through the enclave including family, schools, church, and organizations among other resources play a crucial role in their integration.

**Transnationalism and community transformation**

I measured the transnational ties of first and second generation Vietnamese with Vietnam using a unique dataset of 632 US-Vietnam organizations. From this dataset, I surveyed and interviewed eighty organizations nationally (including thirty-seven organizations in Orange County). I find that distrust in the Vietnamese government wanes in the second generation. The context of exit and generation deeply affects the type of organization formed. The difference in terms of function of organizations in the lives of the first and second generation is marked: for the first generation, transnational engagement is a means of social prestige and status attainment. Participation in transnational organizations is also a powerful medium to reimagine and recreate the past. For the second generation, transnational engagement is a way of “becoming Vietnamese” through participation in cultural and identity based organizations. For both generations, transnationalism plays an important part of the psychological process of immigrant adaptation. The openness of the second generation to admit to working with the Vietnamese government is a key difference in their affective ties at the national and local levels.

**Theoretical Significance:**

One of the problems in sociology in evaluating migrants’ integration is the decision regarding the appropriate reference group (Lee & Zhou 2014). Many second generation
immigrants understand their academic achievement and socioeconomic position relative to co-ethnics in the enclave and their US born peers (Kibria 2003; Louie 2001). One of my novel theoretical contributions is that second generation transnational engagement, for the select minority who participate, expands the reference group or category to those remaining in the home country. I find that transnational practices and overseas engagement by the second generation provides an additional reference group for integration: individuals from the same country of origin with non-immigrant parents. I find that for the second generation that transnational practices can expand the circle of significant others and reference points for integration by using a counterfactual existence- what would my relative socio-economic standing or education level be if parental migration had not occurred? Vietnamese refugees and their children look to Vietnam as a site for transnational economic and political practices influencing both integration and activism in the diaspora.

Navigating the Race and Class Hierarchies in American Schools

Academic profiling occurs for Vietnamese in Little Saigon in predominantly minority schools. Vietnamese racially pass as Asian not only for the benefits of the model minority myth but also the class and status that being Asian in Orange County signals. All Asian Americans in Orange County, with the exception of Vietnamese, far exceed whites in terms of income and educational achievement. A second important findings from this chapter shows that the
Vietnamese selectively use a frame of “refugee exceptionalism” to explain their academic achievement. Vietnamese identity occurs in the context of their imagined relationship with Latinas/os.

**Theoretical Significance:**

This research is part of an expanding literature on race outside the Black-white binary of immigrant racial-ethnic groups, (Cheng 2002; O’Campo 2016; Kim 1999). I argue that second generation Vietnamese selectively use both a frame of “refugee exceptionalism” and racially pass as “Asian” depending on the perceived benefits.

The frame of “refugee exceptionalism” builds upon Espiritu’s narrative on the “good refugee” that is a social and political critique of Western imperialism, and Tang’s (2016) idea of “refugee exceptionalism” described in Chapter eight which promotes Southeast Asians as model minorities. However, I add to these literatures by pointing out that there is a psychological component whereby these stereotypes are internalized and externalized by immigrants themselves. In schools that are predominantly Vietnamese and Mexican, Vietnamese use a frame of refugee exceptionalism to explain their educational success. This reinforces and masks the systematic inequalities and “violence of refugee resettlement program that proclaims Vietnamese and other Southeast Asian refugees to be beneficiaries of American liberal freedoms” (Espiritu 2016; Tang 2016). It also preserves and extends the refugee narrative as successful anti-communist immigrants and reinforces the terms the produce other minorities as the undeserving poor or domestic minorities for whom the underclass concept was formulated (ibid).
From the perspective of racism and prejudice, by passing as Asian, Vietnamese are propagating internalized racism, characterized as the “subtle processes by which racial inequality shapes the way that the oppressed think of themselves and other members of their group” (Pyke and Dang 2003:150). From my interviews, Vietnamese always categorically placed themselves below other Asian American groups in a racial and class hierarchy characterizing themselves as “ghetto” or “poor refugees” in comparison to Taiwanese, Koreans, and Chinese who live in Orange County. Through public consumption of designer brands, phones, and cars, many second generation Vietnamese attempt to create social distance between the poverty of their parents and their neighborhood in order to racially pass as Asian. This is similar to Park’s findings (2005) where children of Korean and Chinese entrepreneurs seek to present themselves as American through the products they consume in order to attain social citizenship. My results reveal that the process of racialization in the enclave occurs in a particular context against and with other immigrant groups.

**Little Saigon: An Ethnoburb in the Making**

I find that entrepreneurship for Vietnamese in Orange County is embraced by the most educated as a vehicle for economic advancement, as those with post-graduate degrees are more likely to engage in self-employment. Using data from the 2010 US Census and 2012 Survey of Business Owners, it can be inferred that advanced educational credentials are a form of class resources that provide positive returns. Previous literature has shown differing results when examining Asian American immigrant entrepreneurship. Among Koreans engaged in self-employment, it is those who typically completed college in Korea who are more likely to open up their own businesses. This is in contrast to Chinese and Indians. Among these groups, those
without college educations from the home country are more likely to be entrepreneurs (Dhingra & Rodriguez 2015).

When examining time of arrival, significant variations in proclivity towards entrepreneurship also exist. Portes and Shafer’s (2007) findings show that the Cuban enclave mainly benefited the first wave of immigrants and their children. Similarly, my results confirm that the economic benefits are mostly for the 1975 exodus and the second wave who included ethnic Chinese, all exhibit higher rates of entrepreneurship in comparison to later waves of immigrants. I extend Portes and Shafers’ analysis by showing that the 1.5 generation, those who immigrated before the age of 13, also enjoy high rates of entrepreneurship. The benefits of immigrant entrepreneurship extend beyond the first generation to transnational enterprises and business revitalization by the 1.5 generation. These enterprises extend the life course of the enclave. The 1.5 generation are characterized as bicultural and bilingual interlocutors and the bridge between the first and second generation (Danico 2005). The 1.5 generation activate and call on particular cultural competencies and identities, becoming Vietnamese, American, and Chinese-Vietnamese, depending on the situation, and are well versed in the tastes of the first and second generation.

**Theoretical Significance:**

I expand the work of the ethnic enclave theory by examining the longevity and life cycle of the enclave. I accomplish this by asking whether or not second generation Vietnamese immigrants become business owners and proprietors. Using US Census data, I find it is the 1.5 generation of the first and second waves who are as likely to become enclave entrepreneurs as their first generation counterparts. The 1.5 generation are continuing the life of the enclave
enabled by their (1) greater access to cultural and social capital outside the enclave; (2) transnational ties to Vietnam, and (3) understanding and ability to appeal to the tastes of both the first generation and second generation. Areas of further research may test if this is the case for other 1.5 generation groups existing in ethnic enclaves.

**Broader Implications**

The US government currently has the largest refugee resettlement program in the world. Studying the case of the US adoption of Vietnamese refugees, its longest running refugee program in US history, has public policy implications for the integration and treatment of other refugee populations, especially as the number of refugees worldwide is surging—particularly populations from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Refugees are primarily distinguished from other immigrant groups by their relationship with the state (Hein 1993). The Vietnamese case highlights how a positive context of reception shaped their integration. Generous federal and state benefits, including access to loans for higher education and small business creation, helped to shape the emergence of ethnic niches including the nail industry and commercial fishing and shrimping (as detailed in Chapter 5). These benefits also allowed a large number of first-generation immigrants and their children to access educational opportunities including training programs at community colleges. For example, as early as 1978, the federal government granted fee waivers to Vietnamese community college students who would take the Test of English as a Foreign Language exam (TOEFL) in order to transfer to four-year colleges (Nguyen 2015). Federally-backed agencies published lists of subsidized childcare centers, access to job and language training programs, citizenship classes, and provided per capita grants to the voluntary agencies to sponsor refugees (Hein 1992). The evidence from Little Saigon confirms what
previous scholars have pointed out, the availability of 36 months of cash assistance among other state and federal assistance was a major contributing factor to the long-term economic success of Vietnamese refugees as compared to the current 8 months of support changed in 1991 (Bloemraad 2006; Dang & Vo 2015). A path towards citizenship also provided important benefits unlike other immigrants who enter through family or employment ties, refugees are admitted on humanitarian grounds with no requirement that they demonstrate economic self-sufficiency (Bruno 2015).

The federal government also placed emphasis on families immigrating together which shaped successful integration and building of the enclave economy. Refugees used kinship networks to navigate their passage to the United States and in their adaptation in the US. Having wage earners and public aid recipients in a household together was a crucial strategy for Vietnamese refugees moving towards self-sufficiency (Caplan 1989; Hein 1993). Many family members would work in the informal economy in Little Saigon in order to receive Medicaid benefits for their children. Kibria’s (1995) study of Vietnamese in Philadelphia also describes the patch-working efforts of Vietnamese families. This was the learned responsibility of second generation Vietnamese to take care of aging parents and younger siblings through transfer of resources from elder family members to younger family members. This also included alternative familial arrangements where cousins or grandparents would live together in an extended household as parents would work. The migration of families as a unit had important consequences; relatives sponsored two third of Indochinese refugees to the United States only seven years after the first wave’s arrival (US General Accounting Office 1983). This meant later waves of refugees often relied on the social, financial, and human-cultural resources of earlier Vietnamese immigrant family members. This is also evidenced from other studies where a
majority of US Asian-owned businesses rely exclusively on unpaid family labor (Bonacich and Modell 1980; Nee & Sanders 2010). Family resources and strategies in addition to public support proved invaluable for Vietnamese integration.

A failed aspect of the US refugee resettlement policies towards the Vietnamese was the purposeful policy of dispersal and assimilation. US federal agencies purposefully dispersed Vietnamese refugees across all fifty states (Ascher 1981; Hing 1993; Rumbaut 1995; Aguilar 2002). The policy intent is disputed; many believe that purposeful dispersal was intended to facilitate assimilation lessening the burden on small municipalities (Le 1994; Zhou 1998; San-Juan 2002). On the other hand, Hing (1993) argues that dispersal reflected the “impulse to control the presence of Asians” within US borders. Nevertheless, refugees subverted American plans for population dispersal with secondary migration. Separated kin through secondary migration and chain migration reunited for greater access to employment, cheaper rents, ethnic-specific social services, and better public benefits (Aguilar San Juan 2002; Dang & Vo 2015). As evidenced in 1989, California’s refugee population was three times larger than that of Texas, the second largest refugee state. Because Southeast Asian refugees initially resettled in California at the rate of 1,564 per month, California had the highest rate of “refugee density” in the world: for every 114 persons residing in the state, one was a refugee in 1989 (Hein 1997). Similarly, the Cuban resettlement program dispersed refugees inhibiting the development of economic ties and delaying the construction of the Cuban enclave (Portes 1987). It was the return of Cubans with savings to Miami that increased capital formation (ibid). For both the Cubans and Vietnamese, refugees themselves became brokers employed in federal agencies and VOLAGS acting as middlemen for ethnic organizations and advocates for social welfare policy affecting refugees (Gold 1992; Hein 1988).
A positive aspect of US policy gleaned from the Vietnamese case highlights the openness and laissez faire policies of the US government towards transnational development and enterprises by the first and second generation. The US government does not preclude second generation from participating overseas in business, non-governmental organizations, among other social remittances as described in Chapter seven. In 2013, only three percent of the overseas population contributed nearly 7% of Vietnam’s GDP. This is only direct cash assistance and does not measure the multitude of enterprises and non-profit associations spearheaded by immigrants (Portes 2015).

Limitations & areas of further research

This study is limited by who I am and my positionality as a second generation multi-racial Vietnamese who grew up in Little Saigon. Future studies should look more in depth at the labor practices in the enclave and how the undocumented Mexican population is sustaining the life-cycle of the enclave. Many restaurants and businesses in Little Saigon rely not only on recent immigrants from Vietnam, but also the large undocumented population in Southern California. Many cooks and people behind the scenes working in the diaspora’s most popular restaurants are not Vietnamese, but Mexican who speak Vietnamese fluently and have worked for the same Vietnamese family for many years. Another population of interest in the enclave which has not been studied rigorously either in Asian American Studies or Sociology are the case of Vietnamese Amerasians- the children of war- born to American servicemen and Vietnamese women. Many occupy a marginal position within the enclave and are subject to stereotypes documented in studies from the 1980s and 1990s (Felsmen 1989; Valverde 1992; McKelvey 1996). From my fieldwork and even within my own family, these members of the Vietnamese
community are still ostracized and subject to intense discrimination. This is taking place in a very different environment where there is an increasing number of inter-racial relationships between Asians, Latino/as, and whites in Southern California among the second generation. A study of transnational ideas of race in the diaspora, inter-generational understandings of race and racism, and what being mixed-race means in Vietnam, the ethnic enclave, and multi-racial metropolis like Little Saigon are potential areas of future research and interest.
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