Construction of the Subject as a Practice of Clarification of Social Relationships

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Social sciences, Luc Van Campenhoudt teaches us, “are not defined by the phenomena that they study: the phenomena called “economic” by economists, the phenomena called “social” (...) by sociologists or the phenomena called “political” by political scientists. They are defined, theoretically, by the perspective used to study phenomena, by the way in which they make phenomena the subjects of knowledge” (Van Campenhoudt 2001:48). And according to the authors of “The Profession of Sociologists,” sociological research “is organized, in fact, around constructed subjects which no longer have anything in common with the units dissected by naïve perception” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968:57). The immediate, the evident, experiences, are thus only “the surface effect of underlying mechanisms which are at work below (...). The immediate subject is only, at best, the first milestone from which the constituent elements of systems – or of structures – of explanation are articulated or understood” (Vidal 1971:19).

From this perspective, the sociological subject will only be completely defined by the assessment of the degree of deepening of the distance that the researcher will mark between the immediate subject and the constructed subject. There are not, a priori, good and bad subjects; there are not good and bad research subjects, as we can attest from these several examples taken from two (2004, 2005) recent methodological workshops organized by CODESRIA in Central Africa: “Hyper-religiosity and Destabilization of the Family in Kinshasa – Reading of an Existential Paradox”; “The Reappropriation of Endogenous Medical Knowledge in Kinshasa”; “Emergence, Politicization and Fragmentation of Feminist Movements in Kinshasa: A New Reading of Congolese Realities in a Crisis Situation.”

These specific subjects of study, as they have been presented and submitted to discussion, necessarily called for new questioning, not only on the various choices
made, the methods used and the concepts implemented, but especially on the
social relationships to be better defined. In other words, it was not simply a
question of trying to understand the social relationship such as the social actors
were experiencing or understanding it; it was rather a question of elucidating,
through these subjects, what was eluding these actors and could not help but be
missed by them. It is in this perspective that it is necessary to adopt a true scientific
approach, that which according to Patrick Champagne, “implies reflexivity, a
break with common sense and especially the work of construction of a problem”
(Champagne 1990:167) likely to lead to the clarification of the texture of social
relationships.

These epistemological preconditions, which characterize research, remind us
that the subject of knowledge “is never given in advance, never established in a
univocal way: it is always constructed” (Campenhout 2001:48), and registered in
a given issue or as advocates of qualitative research explain, in an issue which will
evolve with the familiarity that the researcher will have little by little constructed
with his corpus after a first reading of the data (Paillé, Mucchielli 2003:16).

In African sociological production, fairly broadly influenced by a dualistic
understanding of social phenomenon, work often supports the description and
interpretation of social facts on bipolar concepts such as: colonized-decolonized,
derelopment-developed, traditional society-modern society, rural-urban. The
contradictions and conflicts only appear at the first stage of research when
inequalities, hierarchies, i.e. dualisms have to be pointed out. After which, the
analysis tends to concentrate on and be limited to internal relationships of the
sub-system (traditional society), as if this could still be envisaged as a significant
totality. Yet, what is in play are economic, political and cultural relationships
which characterize, maintain and develop the internal inequalities and disequilibrium
in these dependant social formations, more and more integrated into the world
economic system.

If we raise the issue of the analysis of social phenomena in terms of structural
dependence, the theoretical formulation and the practical implications of the
questions undergo essential transformations. However, the sociological issue of
the analysis of social then assumes the renunciation of synchronic and functionalist
perspectives, which, as foundations of the “dualist” analysis of subjects, envisage
their study while ignoring time, i.e., by searching for a way to explain the present
in the present. In these conditions, “we cannot get around the task of construc-
tion of the subject without abandoning the search for these pre-fabricated subjects,
social facts dissected, perceived and named by spontaneous sociology or “social
problems” the claim of which to exist as sociological problems is all the greater
because they no longer have social reality for the community of sociologists”
(Bourdieu, Chamboredon and Passeron 1968:60).
The subject to be constructed in this text is tribalism, defined in the context of construction of the post-independent African state. The facts and discourse which render an account of this, are excerpts of the Gabonese social group where the phenomenon, revealing of recurrent political and social tension on the issue of power, has often given rise to approximate and consensual approaches directed both towards the accusation of tribalism and towards the search for ethnic equality and equilibrium. In attempting to become familiar with it, social practices in which and by which the reproduction of the social group happens are of interest to us, to the extent that they fix class inequalities as relevant mechanisms for the domination of one over the others. Its construction authorizes us to go back in time to explore the situation of the phenomenon in Africa from which the method will be derived which will guide the process of production of the subject.

In 1958, the Pan African Conference of Peoples (Accra Conference of 5-13 December 1958, denounced tribalism as a “demonic practice” and as “a serious threat (to) unity… (to) political evolution (and to) the rapid liberation of Africa” (Bozon 1967:862). Roland Olivier and Antony Atmore had written that despite colonial domination “the potential of force of tribalism was still greater than nationalism in many regions. Over the entire continent, regional or local interests based on tribal or linguistic groups were threatening the security and stability of the new States” (Olivier, Atmore 1970:299).

The understanding of tribalism is thus not something immediate, because this phenomenon encompasses very different realities: the use of the term “tribalism” is itself very derogatory and deprecating, and the same is true of the problems that it raises, particularly hate, opposition, struggle, explosions, which connote a confused and opaque semantic field (Copans 1990a:950). Over the past four decades, it has taken over a number of disciplines (anthropology, sociology, political science), their theoretical boundaries as well as their common ground. A recurrent key word in “IPOS” launched by scientific institutions or jargon of political statements of all sorts, the word tribalism will have a tendency to lose its content through an excess of meaning. We will speak of threat to national unity, of centrifugal force, of self-awareness of an ethnic group or of a new dynamic of the tradition which “liberates the forces contained during the colonial period, as we see in several crises that have occurred during recent years which show the resurgence of tribal and/or religious antagonisms” (Balandier 1967:207). Georges Balandier underlines that “modern political activity has only been able to get organized and to express itself by resorting to a true translation; traditional models and symbols once again become the means of communication, and explanation, which officials speaking to peasants have recourse to” (Balandier 1967:5) and more broadly to the whole of post-independent society. In his article, “Tradition and Political Modernity in Africa,” Luc de Heusch explains that “the term tribalism designates at least two orders of more or less distinct reality: more or less strong
acuity of ethnic oppositions in the rural milieu. This factor is not necessarily traditional; the expression “tribalism” can also designate a certain urban “ethnicity,” also foreign to the classical approach of social and cultural anthropology. This time it means regrouping into neighborhoods, within spontaneous socio-economic associations, of people belonging to the same ethnicity, either to a super-ethnicity, or even to a foreign country…”

According to Sylla Lancine, tribalism is rather “a behavior, a positive or negative attitude which creates, in a given social milieu, a network of attractions and repulsions between the members of two or several groups composing this social milieu. The members of each of these groups claim to be linked by blood, but they are much more so by the idea that they have of themselves in relationship to others. Moreover, this tribalism is a group mentality, a gregarious illusion or a state of mind which determines the conduct of individuals belonging to a same group and which regulates their relations, often aggressive, with members of similar groups. This group, which presents itself as opposing others and whose members believe that they are linked by blood, is the tribe” (Lancine 1977:27).

For Guy Landry Hazoumé, this concept designates “the solidarity of the ethnic or linguistic group… We use the term tribalism instead of that of ethnocentrism” (Hazoumé 1972:26-27).

Thus, although there no longer exists a “traditional” Africa strictly speaking, “so true it is that Islamic or Christian values and the ideas forces of Western civilization have brought profound perturbations to the most distance places, affecting more or less, depending on the case, structures (institutions, beliefs), behaviors, mentalities (Thomas, Luneau 1975:266), the mode of phenomenological knowledge which underlies the new dynamic of tradition inspired by Balandier and from which tribalism results, does not raise any question on the relationships which structure the observed facts. On the contrary, things “go without saying.”

It is, on the other hand, the frequency of tribalism which will give way to the constitution of a social problem which becomes evident to all and is grafted onto a dualist conception, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit, according to which development, thus modernity, would allow us to absorb ethnic resentment and would create the conditions for the eradication of tribalism.

Whether this be the pre-independence period (1958-1960) or the post-independence period (1960-2010), transparency is such that it makes the construction of the subject imperative. This essential phase of research consists in cutting a sector of reality, i.e. selecting certain aspects of this multiform reality and “discovering behind common language and appearances, inside a global society, social facts linked by a system of relations particular to the sector studied” (Bachelard 1968:17). The construction of the subject requires recourse to the method. On this plan, “the dialectical is the most complete, the richest and (…)}
insofar as the most complete of methods leading to explanation in sociology” (Grawitz 1990:383). To the extent to which “the dialectical corresponds to fundamental requirements of the concept of method, “it is first an attitude vis-à-vis the subject: empirical and deductive, it therefore calls for a certain way of collecting concrete data. It then represents an attempt at explanation of social facts, i.e. it is directly linked to the idea of totality” (Grawitz 1990:384).

After the choice of the method follows, of course, its exposé:

“Dialectical logic requires that we go further. To really know the subject, it is necessary to embrace and study all of its aspects, its relations and “mediations.” We will never get there entirely, but the necessity of considering all aspects protects us from errors and torpor. There is the first point. Secondly, dialectical logic requires that we consider the subject in its development, its “particular movement” (…) its change (…) its relation with the external world (…). Thirdly, all practices of man should enter into the complete “definition” of the subject, the relation of the subject with what is necessary for man. Fourth point: dialectical logic teaches that “there is no abstract truth,” that “the truth is always concrete” (Lenin 1960:94).

This chapter is aimed at defining the scientific practice of the researcher confronted with the difficult problem of the construction of the subject of knowledge, a subject which is here always the expression of a relationship of force, on two accounts. First, because it necessarily renders an account of a conflictual relationship which is not obvious. Next, because the researcher himself has the chance during observation, “to enter into a relationship with his subject which, as a social relation in a relation, is never of pure knowledge, the data present themselves to him as living, singular configurations and, in short, too human, which tend to establish themselves as structures of the subject “(Bourdieu et al. 1968:36). Finally, it is necessary, in order to construct the subject, to break with “the real and the configurations that it proposes to perception”° because “in sociology as elsewhere, serious research leads to reuniting what the ordinary separates or distinguishing what the ordinary confuses” (Bourdieu et al. 1968:7). The construction of the subject can be divided into three subjects: immediate, pre-constructed subject; then analogous, quasi-constructed subject; and finally constructed subject of knowledge.

The Materiality of Tribalism as an Immediate Social Fact

Today, ethnicity, after having given a negative image of society, would seem to be a positive element which would lead social actors to foresee a new form of sociability going forward. In other words, despite the deconstruction of the concept of ethnicity by Jean Loup Amselle and Elikia Mbokolo (Mbokolo, Amselle
1985), it is considering the dimension of the new sociability, aimed at producing a change in ways of acting, which begins a different construction of the concept of ethnicity.

By accepting that for the following reasons: “acceleration of urban immigration (…), failure of the class wars, abortion of the process of formation of a group of proletariat or a peasantry responsible for revolutionary hopes, questioning of certain aspects of national or nationalist ideology, ethnicity has become a positive value of identity” (Taylor 1991:244), and that “henceforth defined from the interior (…), the ethnic consciousness would take over from the class consciousness which history has not allowed to emerge” (Taylor 1991:244), it would then establish itself as a social fact.

If as a positive value, ethnicity can lead to induce active research on the process of adjustment and integration, it would begin a new perspective on ethnic relations through conviviality. It is, at any rate, the direction of the Pan African Association of Anthropology which, during its workshop held from 1-4 September, 1997 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, stressed the necessity of limiting ethnic conflicts in Africa. The identification of ethnic consciousness to class consciousness raises another theoretical problem in that there is a risk of equating these two concepts in a reality that is one and the same. The transitional situation of the society indeed finds an equation between ethnicities and classes and this juxtaposition, despite studies on social classes already conducted on Africa (Afana 1966; Diop 1972; Nkrumah 1972; Agier, Copans and Morice 1987), from time to time returns ethnicity to the scientific scene as the element which would mark a turning point in the definition and the question of inter-individual and collective relationships, which then would no longer be treated with the driving force and the ill-considered prejudices of the “tribalist” spirit. This issue, in developing a new dimension of ethnicity, was to accentuate the consciousness of a false group, insofar as ethnicity despite its “ethnic minority,” “multi-ethnic society,” “ethnic majority” by-products is only a pre-concept or pre-idea which is used in a mechanical and ill-considered way. There would only be the dynamic aspect of ethnicity to direct the organization of social relationships. This approach, which aims to raise the ethnic question through conviviality, also leads current research to develop under the hegemony of the concept of ethnicity, which is aimed at overriding the former hegemony, the concept of development. On this level, the corrections between social structures and ideologies are translated clearly because it is not a matter of producing a scientific discourse but an ideological discourse on tribalism or development.

We then need to come back to the idea of ethnicity. But in this need to turn back, the tendency is great to turn away from the critique of this concept in order to direct creativity towards fields of research which, while wishing to rethink the total change in structures and schemes of thought, suggest models in agreement with the requirements of development advocated by the neo-colonial State. The definition and the delimitation of “ethnicities,” in their form, their content, and
their space, are leading today to a redistribution of ethnonyms and forms of speech. Such an undertaking, although not without relevance, is in no way attacking the refoundation of a concept which would render an account of what is happening in a social group dominated by relationships of capitalist production. It is rather as a fact of “tradition” that ethnicity was to support the construction of tribalism as a social fact referring to the self-awareness of the group, to the feeling of belonging and social and cultural identity, to the division by quotas of administrative and political jobs within the state apparatus. This enumeration clarifies the drift of ethnicism.

As an immediate subject, tribalism appears to be capturable by observation as a sum of representations: “starting from independence, the first concern (…) was to oppose centrifugal tendencies that the ethnic diversities were exerting so much (…)”; “in order for peace to reign within our walls, it (…) is necessary to ignore (…) tribalism;” “the party condemns the supremacy of one ethnicity over another.”

These various expressions have a relationship with reality. Indeed, for the actors involved in political life and for no matter what observer, the ethnic equilibrium advocated, translated by the term “geopolitical,” has created support because during each cabinet meeting, one of their own (parent, friend, fellow student) is promoted to a prestigious and enhancive function within the state apparatus. In many cases, this is both a request made by the governed and a response of the government in a game established by the government itself. The discourse of “governance” established in a certain way that in order to enumerate the ethnic groups to the State: “no ethnicity will be forgotten;” “no region will be forgotten;” “no ethnicity is superior to another;” “no province is superior to another.”

If this reality is not the scientific real, in order to go from the immediate, preconstructed subject to the scientific subject, we need to stand back, to create some distance with this “phenomenological knowledge,” i.e. the “innate knowledge” that the members of a human group human possess implicitly as to the multiple characteristics of the space where they live” (Lacoste-Dujardin 1976:116).

The epistemological problems here take on two aspects. First, it is necessary to deconstruct the illusory knowledge of common sense which results from this spontaneous approach of phenomenon. Indeed, thought should target the discourse already constituted (immediate subject) in which tribalism, as a label, is never strictly defined but has become an “all-purpose concept” rendering an account of both of the supposed conflictuality between ethnicities, between political parties with real or fictitious electoral bastions (each party being meant to represent an ethnicity), of the necessity of equilibrium and ethnic equality within a single party and also the state apparatus. Next, it is necessary to challenge its transparency to discern under the appearances the true problems which fuel the questioning. It is in this perspective that the reflection on the discourse to be
constructed, in initiating an approach which does not take up the social dissection social of the real coming from social problems of the moment previously mentioned, leads to the identification of a specific problem of research.

The Materiality of Tribalism as an Analogous Subject

To break with the immediate subject, it is necessary to start from two phenomenological situations. The first describes tribalism as a specter which disunites social groups and hinders development and social progress: “our fragile and recent unity has adversaries which are still strong like regionalism, tribalism;” “It is necessary to succeed at defeating our old familiar demons of regionalism and tribalism;” “let’s put aside all our political histories which are rather tribal histories.” The second evokes development in the following terms: “In order to prevent the flight of foreign capital without which the economic take-off of Gabon cannot occur,” a “single party within which we see a permanent intermingling of persons and ideas from all (...) the ethnicities” has been created.4

In the order of priorities, development of the economy precedes the fight against tribalism and is even the determining factor for even the realization of national unity. It is thus an issue of “situational elements, described from the viewpoint of actors, forming organizations which are similar and synthesizable in a single situational form enabling us to achieve a global meaning experienced by the actors in the situation” (Mucchielli 1996:15). We can then consider from now on that tribalism has no particular specificity and that it is necessary to place it in relationship with development: “We forever banish this spirit of tribalism to make Gabon a modern and prosperous country;” “the market economy has (...) encouraged contacts between the various ethnicities;” “tribalism and nepotism, which is its by-product, present a threat to our regions which is infinitely more serious than under-development.”5

The relationship between the two phenomena is very telling, because: either the discourse of the political class only takes up modified, reworked elements of the ideology of development of which tribalism presents one of the stumbling blocks, or their statements with respect to their bases are radically opposed to or differ from the presuppositions of the ideology of development. In the first case, this will only be a discourse of relative autonomy which shows how a social group, at a given period, “codes and decodes its experience of the world in a specific way which bears the mark of social relationships” (Flament, Rouquette 2003:11). In the second case, ideology will be specific and we will then need to examine not only its explicit components (development is progress, social well-being), but also those which are implicit (tradition in general, tribalism and blood relationships as by-products represent obstacles). But be careful, J. Copans warns:

“if there is a socio-intellectual practice which the African powers have been divested of, it is precisely thought on development, on their
development! And if this reflection does not exist, it is simply that development is something totally different from a sociological and economic transition. Development is a procedure of maintaining the status quo on the international scale which includes the extension of perverse relationships of reproduction” (Copans 1990b:160).

In other words, when the ruling political elite corners the concept of development as ideology (dominant), it creates a second one: tribalism. Thus, considering relationships social forces, the articulation in which the dominant discourse plays out is this relationship between what it targets and what is discernable in political language: a positive relationship first since development, which proposes social transformation, is led to an attentive examination of de facto conditions, i.e. a type of analysis of the real. A negative relationship since tribalism throws into question the effort which is undertaken. In fact, these two aspects (positive and negative) are more or less linked, the negative relationship determining the reading of real and the analysis of real intervening in the strategy of the dominant class as a form of critical description. With respect to development, it is led to explain its difficulties by tribalism, ending up finally by making it the enemy, then mythicizing it.

At this level of the presentation of the analogous subject, “discourses, acted or spoken (…), policies (…), are both obstacles and supporting points, rival discourses and part of the subject to analyze” (Champagne et al. 1990:160). These acted and spoken discourses of the field of observation appear as scholarly preconstructions of the main producers of speech and of a schema of society. When the researcher is placed in the situation “of analyzing a reality which presents itself to him, in more or less developed forms, a theatricalization: he should distance himself from this, but be able to render an account of it” (Champagne et al. 1990:160). But how do we break when “the sociologist should consider the fact that today there is a true ‘scholarly common sense,’ a sort of mixture of ordinary common sense and products of social sciences, insofar as (…) each year a number of sociological works appear (…), in short, since there has a been a broad distribution and as a result a sort of popularization of the approach of human sciences or at least of its concepts and its results?” (Champagne et al 1990:165). This concern that Champagne expresses is at the core of the concerns of a number of beginning researchers who, confusing social reality and sociological reality, act as if it were enough to provide oneself with a subject endowed with social reality, to have at the same time a subject endowed with sociological reality. And, it is along with Bachelard that we can remember that: “science realizes its subjects without ever finding them completely made (…) it does not correspond to a world of describing, it corresponds to a world to be constructed” (Bachelard 1968:61). Finally, how to break with this “scholarly common sense,” mode of interpretation that the dominant class uses to analyze the social group and its
conflicts, when this system of interpretation of social facts becomes the mode of knowledge that the society itself takes on? The answer will depend on the personal equation of the researcher. Indeed, “each research theme includes a different subject and each construction should thus adapt to the subject to be constructed. It is probably the moment when the extent of training of the sociologist can be assessed, it is the moment especially where we see the intelligence and the contradictory qualities of the researcher: intuition, rigor, knowledge and imagination, sense of the real and of abstraction” (Grawitz 1993:330).

If the social basis of this “scholarly common sense” is the class which controls the state apparatus, we have seen, its discourse at best only names “the domains of practices that the common language proposed to the sociologist as a field of research, without this registry, which only obeys laws of daily intercomprehension, ever requiring the formulation of principles of definition or indicating an approach of explanatory reconstruction” (Passeron 1992:49). The researcher then should be particularly vigilant to dispel the illusion that the concepts of spontaneous sociology would enable us to directly understand the subject of study, which would have spontaneously offered itself up to observation and understood empirically. Next, he should remember, faced with this common sense, that there is only a sociology of unequal relationships and figures of difference. Finally, it is important in these conditions to call for the epistemological principle which requires the researcher to work towards the unmasking of the hidden. Also, even “if it is possible that a problem related to the social, economic or political life of a society is a problem of research (...) it can (...) happen that it cannot be the subject of research if reasons specific to the process, such as the absence of previous studies, the inappropriateness of instruments of research, inaccessible data, etc., prohibit such a study” (Macé 1997:16). This is why, Macé continues, “it is not incumbent on the researcher to formulate a problem according to its social, political or other relevance; it should not be seen as a research problem” (Macé 1997:16). In order to do this, “the only way to justify a work is to locate a lacuna in previous work dealing with the same subject, and from that point, fill this void” (Macé 1997:22).

The construction of the subject will thus be related to defining the social context itself, i.e. the social group that one can consider to be in a transitional situation and where the capitalist relationships structure the ways in which the social classes act. It is by relationship to this context that the discourse of “scolarly common sense” was established for all the actors and has become an element of the system of ideological influence. Here, the reflection on ideology is double: development, issue of the simulated colonial discontinuity and model of representations and avowed values on the one hand; tribalism, decoded for what it reveals as elements of pre-colonial and colonial (tradition) continuity, on the other, are read for what they protect and mask, namely social relationships of
classes. For the actors of governance, ideology is “a system of opinions which, being founded on a system of accepted values, determines the attitudes and behavior of men with respect to desired objectives of development of the society, social group or individual” (Schaff 1967:50). However, the perspective of colonial discontinuity simulated through development, makes simultaneously possible the production of a discourse on continuity as a response to that of discontinuity. It is in this sense that tribalism, immediate subject inserted into a set of phenomena (development, regionalism, government subsidies, political struggle) which depends on it and on which it depends, is transformed into an analogous subject since as ideology, it is: “decoded, read not for what it gives, but what it protects, it masks: Behind the obvious modulations, the reason for these modulations. This intention and this reason are also ideological, in that they justify the outlines of it. After open ideology, hidden ideology, issue and model of avowed representations and values” (Vidal 1971:21). This is why we cannot study ideological phenomena (tribalism and development) as systems of representations endowed with internal coherence and a power of justification without relating them to class membership and the domination of the ideas of the dominant class. It is in fact proved – the systematic recourse to ethnic fact as an explanatory principle from social contradictions reveals, in any case, an attempt at simplification of the complexity of a social phenomenon, the effects of which are perceptible on different levels: economic, political, social, cultural. Thus, the construction of the subject takes the form of a recapitulative approach which integrates social relationships at work in the social group: those which link the classes one to another; those that the ruling class constructs with and by the State in which it constitutes and legitimates its action. The concept of class refers here “to a theoretical reality, namely, a place in the sociological field where the researcher should mentally place himself to provide himself with all possibilities to arm descriptive questions and analogical hypotheses a methodical work of interpretation of the differentiation or social inequalities” (Passeron 1992:39). With the assistance of this concept, we place social relationships in relation to economic relationships on the one hand and political confrontations on the other.

We can now state that the sociological subject “would not be the immediate real, it would be, in a way, the analogous real. Analogous because it would not reconstruct the immediate real in the same terms by which the immediate real lends itself to naïve reading. But analogous also insofar as this reading could identify it without difficulty” (Vidal 1971:19). Hence, the analogous subject, ideology, quasi-subject, is the product of a specific work of reading which renders an account of the explicit and implicit contents of the double ideology of the elite (tribalism and development). It was found from the time when we determined the place of production of discourse and the social group which is the starter of it. Analogy systematizes “recourses to ‘similarities’ and aims to ‘make the strange
familiar and the familiar strange” (Paillé, Mucchielli 2003:63). The referent “social class” already announces the epistemological position which will envelope all later questioning on the issue and the formulation of hypotheses.

The Materiality of Tribalism as a Subject of Research and Observation

Tribalism and development are the products of relationships of production in effect in the post-independent Gabonese social group within which the break with the past is much less profound than we might think since the previous domination is not abolished but only modified. In this transitional situation, policy registers the fact of ethnic membership as a fact of a constituted social group, with an autonomous economic and political organization, whereas ethnicity is rather an ideological reality here. In the economic realm, the transition is characterized by an almost total absence of development even if the concept of development, element of restructuration of the social group, would like to see tribalism as the explanation of its failure: it is the superstructure engendered by the economic structures of the situation of transition. The political class needed to construct, with a view to appropriating it for itself, the social and economic reality that it was experiencing, in order to confront it, dominate it, put up with it. But especially, it needed a justification which makes its objectives recognized as desirable; in short, an ideology. Yet, “the ideology that a ruling class makes dominant in its ideological state apparatus (ISA) is indeed realized in these ISA, but it goes beyond them, because it comes from elsewhere “(Althusser 1970:38), because ideologies are “not born in the ISA, but from social classes caught in the class struggle: from their conditions of existence, from their practices (…) (Althusser 1970:38). Social reality, constituted both of “true” and of “false”, the false being the illusion instituted and the true referring back to the allusion to the masked real, is thus not transparent to individuals. And, if it seems so, it is a necessary illusion produced by social relationships in order to enable the functioning and reproduction of the social group.

The materiality of the sociological subject begins here with the rupture which consists in detaching ourselves from the share of illusion in social reality, whereas the construction will be based on the allusion to the real that must be emphasized in identifying the research problem. This will be done successively through the critique of the concepts of tribe and ethnicity on the one hand, and through social representations of the phenomenon in the process of domination which enables us “to reproduce the dominators in their domination and subjugate the dominated” (Beynier, Le Gall, Moreau de Bellaing 1984:23). At this decisive moment, there is unquestionably, and in a completely direct way, “overlapping between (our) theory and (its) subject since the latter (subject of study) is only a construction of the theory” (Beynier, Le Gall, Moreau de Bellaing 1984:13). The critique of the concepts of tribe and ethnicity appear as the first act of an indis-
pensable construction because “the words of usual language, like the concepts that they express, are always ambiguous and the scholar who uses them as he receives them from usage and without subjecting them to other development would be exposed to more serious confusion” (Durkheim 1983:1).

The concept of tribe refers to a “homogeneous group, politically and socially autonomous, supposed to descend from a single ancestor by unilinear filiation, organized according to a segmentary mode and occupying a particular territory (…) or, on the contrary, a sub-unit of ethnicity (…)” (Gresles, Perrin, Panoff, Triplier 1990:336-337). One model of society among other, the specific mode of social organization that anthropologists compare to other modes of organization of society, “bands,” “States,” the use of the term tribe poses a problem.

For Maurice Godelier, “it does not suffice (…) to remain silent on the concept of tribe and to no longer invoke it, to appeal to prudence (…) or to criticize vehemently its scandalous lack of precision (…), its sterility and its theoretical untruth (…) and the ideological manipulations of which it is the instrument in the hands of colonial powers (…). But the “difficulties of the empirical concept of tribe come from elsewhere and insist, it seems, that this “general form” in which the social relationships typical of certain societies appear, does not only show the appearance of these social relationships but at the same time suggests something concerning their essence, their nature and their internal connections or, at least, of the fact that it does not make these social relationships appear only as aspects of blood ties, it prevents from seeing otherwise what it shows and to see something other than what it shows” (Godelier 1977:188-235). Today still, the use of the concept of tribe continues to pose the same problems, both for anthropologists and sociologists.

The second term of the conceptual critique is ethnicity, defined in anthropological literature as a group of persons who have perpetuated themselves biologically to a large degree, have fundamental cultural values in common, realized in cultural forms having a clear unity, constitutes a space of communication and interaction, is composed of a group of members which identify themselves and are identified by others as constituting a category that one can distinguish from other categories of the same type” (Poutignat, Streiff-Fernat 1995:206; see also Rohan-Csermak 1990:992-994). This definition gives rise to some questions: “Is ethnicity defined by the common origin of its members? Is this a culturally homogeneous unit? Is this a linguistically homogeneous unit? Is this a unit of lifestyle? Is this a politically organized unit, or at least a set inside of which the cooperation between the composing elements is intense and constant?” (Mercier 1961:65).

Schematically, writes Paul Mercier, “the ethnic group was presented as a closed group, descending from a common ancestor or, more generally, having a same origin, possessing a homogeneous culture and speaking a common language; another
characteristic was added, but not always: a group constituting a unit of a political nature” (Mercier 1966:65). On this latter aspect, Guy Nicolas believes that the idea of ethnicity “concerns a social equality which is situated on the sidelines of politics, where emphasis is placed on the cultural aspect by those who use it, whereas the ‘tribal’ group is presented as fundamentally political” (Nicolas 1973:113). However, what is important to note can be summarized in this assertion of Jean Loup Amselle: “the late opposition and specification of the terms “tribe” and “ethnicity” lead us to pose the problem of the congruence between a historical period (marked by European domination over the rest of the planet) and the use of these concepts. If these terms have taken on a general use, to the detriment of other words like “nation,” it is probably that it was a matter of classifying some societies on the side in denying them a specific quality. This quality, the absence of which would make them dissimilar and inferior to our own societies, is historicity and in this sense the concepts of “ethnicity” and “tribe” are linked to other distinctions by which the large division between anthropology and sociology was made: society without history/society with history, pre-industrial society/industrial society, society without writing/society with writing, community/society” (Amselle 1990:971).

Beyond the myths, the role of which is, according to Roland Barthes, to transform social facts into facts of nature, and beyond the performative effects of nomination, “the emergence of ethnic groups, the mobilization of ethnicity can only be understood (…), as a function of social processes which are more all-embracing, or the expression of capitalism (…) and growth in government domination: increased penetration of the state apparatus, dislocation of civil society, erosion of the social fabric and former forms of sociability” (Juteau 1999:83).

The conceptual critique which has just been made of common language and of the ideological charge of these two ideas (tribe and ethnicity) in the Gabonese social context does not simply concern the illustrative value of the phenomenon of tribalism, but touches directly on its preliminary value which is much more subject to caution. Indeed, these terms which are widely used in social practice, refer “probably to (…) ‘definitions of things,’ but it is these very definitions which organize the preconstructions of spontaneous sociology, to which the mechanical use of such concepts refers, betrays its membership, in that it is hardly answerable except as a “deixique” definition, i.e. a nomination supposing the designation by the finger or the look of “what everyone calls that” (Passeron 1991:50).

The definition of the subject, by including the critique of language, narrowly draws the link with the general context of the subject and shows how incriminated terms and their recurrence become embedded in the practices of social actors (dominants and dominated). The effectiveness of this political discourse was thus able to be developed starting from a distribution of the term tribalism, tribalist and ethnicity, ethnic.
The first register of this distribution is economic: “The market economy (…) facilitated contacts between the varies ethnicities;” “Tribalism brings to bear an infinitely more serious threat than under-development on our regions;” “Concerned (…) with attracting foreign capital without which the economic kick start of Gabon cannot be achieved, the single party was created to put an end to multipartism;” “Didn’t certain ethnic groups or at least certain leaders advocate or haven’t they advocated oppression of certain ethnic minorities in order to acquire with less effort economic ‘better’-being.”

The second register is political: “In order for peace to reign within our walls (…) it is necessary to overlook (…) tribalism;” “this rather somber tableau of the state of our unity should be considered as a warning against the bad Gabonese retrogrades who want to continue to react in ethnic and tribalist terms;” “inter-personal quarrels will always be closely watched by clever schemers and upstarts who will always be able more or less long-term to make them more or less degenerate into quarrels and inter-ethnic rivalries;” “tireless action was conducted (…) in order to avoid having ethnic favoritism damage the equilibrium of our national construction;” “This politician’s policy never manages to give birth to a constructive opposition, but rather discord, the strengthening of ethnic barriers;” “political parties have a strong tendency to identify with an ethnic group. The rivalries between politicians always end up degenerating into inter-ethnic rivalries.”

Finally, the third register, the social, is less dense: “Members of Parliament, you will be the apostles of peace within all families, of peace between all ethnicities;” “No ethnicity can prevail over others;” “No ethnicity will be forgotten.” This very slight corpus cannot be used here as a basis of analysis of formal content. It responds, above all, to our concern for emphasizing the approach more than the results. Thus, this corpus simply translates economic, political and social relationships between the lexical field and the various classes of society. Furthermore, it shows the link between the lexical field and the field of political experience, and especially how these words can become those of structures, especially political, and produce the expected effects. The government appointed after the Gabonese presidential elections of 25 and 27 November 2005 confirms the effectiveness postulated above in clearly marking the topicality of the real hold of the ethnic referent. This is the wording of an invitation: “following the nomination of their daughter, niece, and sister (…) to the position of Minister (…), the esa mesila, ebemeko, essa me waba, ebifa, ebindzum, ebingum, ebifangli, ebindone, essibang tribes and clans (…) invite (…) to the event of (…) that they have organized on Saturday, March 4, 2006.”

The location and effectiveness and of these discourses and practices obviously situated the dominant position of the organizing elite of the government, in part responsible for the massive distribution of the feeling of ethnic membership as a mode of participation in politics. On the other hand, insofar as the quantity of
information provided by each of the terms of the corpus is inversely proportional to the breadth of the semantic field it covers, we note, for example, that in the political discourse consulted, and based on which this fragment of the corpus was developed, the frequency of the word tribe (13 times) seems low compared to ethnicity (39 times) and almost equal to tribalism (14 times). And even if the effects of discourse win out over the relative redundancy of words used, it is because of their pejorative connotation that we will not accept them in the materiality of the subject – tribalism. Because it occupies a front and center place on the social scene going forward, tribalism no longer concerns simply the specific identity of an ethnic group; it intersects all the mechanisms of social and economic exclusion that the social group can experience. Indeed, since the process of construction of the subject marked, with conceptual criticism, the passage of the analogous, semi-constructed subject, to the subject to be constructed as a unit of observation, it seems more and more obvious that political life cannot be lived in the form of identity-based conflict (ethnic). At this stage, we will accept with Bourdieu and Passeron that “a subject of research no matter how partial and fragmented it may be can only be defined and constructed as a function of a theoretical problem which allows us to subject to a systematic questioning the aspects of reality related by the question asked of them” (Bourdieu, Passeron 1968:61-62).

To understand tribalism as ideology results from a process which is “produced in limited strata and groups of individuals (intellectuals, lawyers, politicians, etc.)” (Vadee 1973:6) and implies not only a relationship of power and of domination, but also a sustained problem which clearly distances itself from the ambient positivism ambient. Michel Paty, citing Paul Langevin, writes: “the positivist attitude is essentially critical, analytical, and static; is more appropriate to draw up the check-list of acquired knowledge, to clearly formulate the structure and content of this knowledge than to show to way to extend it or renew it, more appropriate to note the difficulties than to resolve them. This allows of the elimination of concepts or theories, the denunciation of problems and affirmations devoid of meaning, but it does not allow for the formulation of directions for the construction of concepts or new theories” (Paty 1985:897).

The political nature of ideology which we see here shows to what extent our problem suggests establishing a special link between ideology and politics. Indeed, “an ideology is then only the expression, in the vast range of forms of language, of conscience and thought, of the situation of a class” (Vadee 1973:7). The problem is then directed toward the proposal of a functional definition of ideology, and underlines “the functions filled by ideology with respect to society, social groups and individuals” (Schaff 1967:50). If tribalist ideology “tends in part to hide social relationships (dominant, dominated) (…), if it presents the social organization as a quasi-harmonious totality and as the only rational one today, thus as “historical-
natural,” this is because it participates in the conditions of reproduction of system by presenting this type of social organization as the most optimal for all, whereas it is the project of a social fraction. The interests of a minority are understood as the interests of the whole” (Beynier et al. 1984:23).

A fact arising from the ideological practice of a class composed of “introducers of social disorder and guarantor of a future order” (Vidal 1971:21), the problem dealt with here implies two operations of detachment: the position of problems and the formulation of hypotheses. The main question on which the problem of research is based is the following: why has the political expression of the state not taken the social classes as referents since independence? As is often said, “science does not begin with facts and hypotheses, but with a specific problem” (Grawitz 1993:33), a problem which is truly the expression of the underlying social relationship to the subject. As we have previously stressed, this is an issue of a relationship of power, conflictual, between social classes which is not at all obvious and which is carefully masked by the ethnic referent.

Following the formulation of the problem, tribalism appears to be formed through two successive mediations. The first is based on elements of the “colonial situation” which, for lack of having been sufficiently understood as a situation of economic, political and cultural domination, independent of ethnic and regional membership, gives the elite who organize the government the chance to integrate the fact of ethnicity as the means of making up groups dominated by main actors in political and social life. The second mediation, on the other hand, is done by coupling tribalism with development. On the one hand, we promote the arguments of economic development, and, on the other, arguments of “local democracy”: a double strategy which first allows us to situate development in an established institutional framework (the state). Secondly, the issue is to displace the site of social struggles by situating them in a defined socio-cultural space (ethnicity), this displacement having the tendency to unload the possible unpleasant aftertaste of development on identified actors.

Considering that the ideology of tribalism, just as that of development, are dominant in the various state apparati, the mode of development-construction of tribalism becomes perceptible starting with the conception of all of the political elite in close relation with the question posed. But this question itself is the result of a theoretical effort. Theory, understood as “a more or less articulated set of implicit or explicit statements on a phenomenon subject to examination” or “a theory is a statement about the relationship of other statements” (Paillé, Mucchielli 2003:37) is well presented from the start. Indeed, if sociological observation should be “captured” at the expense of common sense, we should immediately add that observation and systematic analysis are often simultaneous and closely intertwined (Loubet Del Baye 1991:30).
The response to the question posed is articulated in a hypothesis: the political elite of independence, engaged in an effort of social transformation, constructed the post-colonial state by means of tribalist ideology and development. At this level, the hypothesis maintains its character of “doubtful but likely conjecture by which imagination anticipates knowledge” (Carbonnel 1996:168). Subsequently, considering it as an anticipated response which takes the form of a “temporary diagnosis,” the hypothesis defines a world vision, a system of representations of a social group which ensures its cohesion, perpetuation and legitimizes a given form of social relations and modes of domination.

This hypothesis, which was developed after a patient work of construction of the subject, is deduced from an already formulated theory of ideology, and which we can state as follows: “Dominant thoughts are nothing but the ideal expression of dominant material relations understood in the form of ideas, thus the expression of relationships which make a class the dominant class; i.e., these are the ideas of its domination” (Marx 1968:76). The theory allows us to consider that the ethnic referent has had the function of hiding realities engendered by class distinction. In this way, the concept of class represents a relatively ambiguous reality, both as theoretical concept (referring to the capitalist mode of production and its progression) which englobes a theory of ideologies, of social difference in general, of class struggle in particular, and as operative concept (participating going forward in the weakening of former social formations, in the life of class conflicts as an image expressing the violence of individuals torn from ethnic solidarity) which shows that there are also other concrete modes of representation of social relationships. This is why tribalism does not express class interests in a dissimulated way. On the contrary, it “constitutes a form of social affiliation in competition with class, the ideological function of which is to mask the class interests convergent between the ethnically dominated groups and the exploited fraction of the ethnically dominated groups” (Poutignat 1995:118-119).

At the end of the construction, the temporary definition of the subject is the following: tribalism designated the intellectual content of concept, of images, of convictions, of assessments characteristics of middle-class and lower middle-class groups which are reinforced in the consciousness of dominated social classes and strata by a mutual suggestion, by the belief that they are also shared by all classes of the social group.

Conclusion

Tribalism is a phenomenon which, when it is recognized as global and absolute, i.e. as the true essence of the identity of a group, this right to be different then becomes a principle which can break up the state. Indeed, ethnic differences insofar as they are taken as parameters of political and social management, hinder
the functioning of the social group. In seeking a compromise between individuals and groups, the rationality of the state which is thought to function based on ethnic equilibrium and government subsidies designed to capture votes, may end up putting its own legitimacy at stake. At this point, we should recognize the relationship of tribalism to the State. Christian Coulon writes: “ethnicity, which is often presented as the explanatory key to political phenomena, is less a given acting on and imprisoning the political and the State than one of the effects of its construction (…). The ethnic phenomena (…) are founded in the genesis of the contemporary state (…). Ethnicity expresses the gestation of the state and uncertainties which go hand in hand with it” (Coulon 1998:51).

Taking the critique of language as a starting point, we have gone on to situate each of the words used by groups and individuals, because words are often misleading and refer to what Bachelard calls counter-thoughts, i.e. preconceived ideas, prejudices, false evidence which, left uncriticized, run the risk of unconsciously guiding research. To this first linguistic obstacle is added a second, the familiarity with the social universe, which constitutes for the sociologist “the epistemological obstacle par excellence, because it continually produces fictitious conceptions or systematizations at the same time as the conditions of their credibility” (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, Passeron 1968:35).

The social universe in which we have registered the construction of the subject – tribalism – is characterized by the presence of classic epistemological obstacles previously noted, for which the rupture is organized in strictly applying the hierarchy of three epistemological acts (conquest, construction and observation) knowing full well that this epistemological hierarchy of scientific acts “subordinates observation to construction and construction to rupture” (Bourdieu and al. 1968:31).

If this epistemological conformity presents the scientific approach followed, it involves more reflexivity from the moment when the empowered discourse takes on the appearance of more sophisticated discourse, thus taking the form of “scholarly common sense.” This characteristic of the social universe shows to what extent “the acquired knowledge of sociology tends to pass progressively into the social world and become part of the very functioning of society” (Champagne et al. 1990:166). Thus, the work of rupture with these various “common senses” (ordinary and scholarly) has led theoretical reflection to “contrast the systematic claims of spontaneous sociology to the organized resistance of a theory of the knowledge of the social, the principles of which contradict point by point the presuppositions of the primary philosophy of the social” (Bourdieu and al. 1968:37).

The reflexive attitude on the concept of ideology, taken as “a set of forms of by-passed consciousness which emanate from relations of domination of class and hide them” (Vakaloulis 1996:67) has allowed us to decipher the dominant
discourse. It is indeed the theme of domination which was at the core of the construction of the subject – tribalism – as the clarification of social relationship dissimulated by the immediate subject. The process of production of the subject has thus shown how, from the pre-scientific representation of the phenomenon having necessitated the rupture (logical critique of concepts, contestation of appearances of discourse instituted), we have arrived at the construction of the subject of knowledge via the analogous subject, thanks to concepts of class, domination, and ideology. These various concepts have contributed to state a hypothesis related to relationships of force between classes.

Notes

1. This is discourse of the political class.
2. *L. De Henau*: “Tradition et modernité politique en Afrique”, Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, vol XLIV, 19 pp. 64-65 [“Tradition and Political Modernity in Africa”], [International Notebooks of Sociology]. Balandier has analyzed the phenomenon very well among black inhabitants of Brazzaville. In Christopher John Gray’s thesis: “Colonial Rule and Crisis in Equatorial Africa : Southern Gabon” which Roland Pourtier reviewed in the Cahiers d’Etudes Africaines [Notebooks of African Studies] XLVI (1), 181, 2006, pp. 205-209, the phenomenon of ethnic regrouping is touched on. According to Pourtier, C. J. Gray’s thesis affirms this opposition between, on the one hand, a world constructed on clanic entities, on their alliances formalized by the exchange of women, on the functioning mode on the mode of networks and spatial fluidity, and, on the other, a social organization based on spatial specificity and a territorial supervision, leaving no room for indecision (p. 207). The fluid and aterritorial system of clans has given way to spatialized ethnic categories, at the same time that the fluidity of space is reabsorbed by crystallization around its new fixed points – cities – and under the effect of rigidities brought about by the administrative conscription of territory (p. 209).
3. Ibid.
4. These are excerpts of Discourse of the Political Class.
5. These are excerpts of Discourse of the Political Class.
6. These are excerpts of Discourse of the Political Class.
7. These are excerpts of Discourse of the Political Class.
8. These are excerpts of Discourse of the Political Class.
9. Each minister named organized a celebratory ceremony to celebrate his “brilliant” promotion which was obviously that of his clan, his family, his village, his ethnicity, his province. These celebrations provide evidence of the way in which the system has succeeded in organizing social relationships around individuals made up, above all, of clans, families.
References


Nicolas, G., 1973, “Fait ethnique et usages du concept d’ethnie” ([“Ethnic Fact and Uses of the Concept of Ethnicity”], *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, vol. LIV.


