Chinese Military Men and Cultural Practice in the Early Nineteenth Century Qing Empire (1800-1840)

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Abstract

The military in early nineteenth century China (1800-1840) has often been portrayed as an institution in steep decline, its troops addicted to opium and its officers incompetent and corrupt. This dissertation argues that the narrative of decline has overshadowed significant changes in the relation between military and society during the same period. These changes were shaped most profoundly by the White Lotus War (1796-1804), a major conflict between the Qing dynasty and White Lotus sectarians in central China.

Many of the most neglected effects of the White Lotus War emerged through the deaths and lives of its military participants. In the decades after the war, the tens of thousands of Chinese war dead and military veterans, most of them members of the Green Standard branch of the Qing military, became the focus of cultural practices across the empire. These men are the main subjects of the dissertation. Chapters 2 to 4 explore the commemoration and representation of the Chinese war dead, with case studies on the construction of prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrines, the issuing and reception of hereditary titles to officers killed in battle, and the writing and compilation of nonofficial and official biographies. Chapters 5 to 7 look at the veterans of the war, men who took advantage of loosening state control over discourse on military topics to tell their own stories and were, in turn, the objects of fascination at many levels of society.

The cultural practices discussed in the dissertation emerged at the intersection of state initiatives, cultural tradition, representational space, and personal history. They were a sign of both the hegemony of ideas about the state and the limits of the Qing state as a system. I suggest that the early nineteenth century state took on the role of a cultural authority, authorizing certain sites and symbols related to war as legitimate objects of cultural practice, but increasingly unable or unwilling to directly choreograph war commemoration and military spectacle. The elaborate and top-down production of
military culture that had been typical of the Qianlong reign (1736-1795) gave way under the Jiaqing emperor (1796-1820) to diverse practices organized but not controlled by the state.
Acknowledgments

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List of Abbreviations (for full citations. see Works Cited)

CSCSH: ChuanShaanChu shanhou shiyi dang 川陝楚善後事宜檔 [Archives of the rehabilitation of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Hubei (after the White Lotus War)].

ECCP: *Eminent Chinese of the Ch‘ing Period*.

GXHDSL: *Qinding Da Qing huidian shili (Guangxu chao)* 欽定大清會典事例 (光緒朝) [Collected statutes and precedents of the Guangxu reign].

GZZZ: Gong zhong dang zouch [Palace memorials].

JQHDSL: *Qinding Da Qing huidian shili (Jiaqing chao)* 欽定大清會典事例 (嘉慶朝) [Officially commissioned collected statutes and precedents of the Qing, Jiaqing reign].

LLD: *Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan Qing dai guanyuan liuli dang’an quan bian* 中國第一歷史檔案館藏清代官員履歷檔案全編 [Qing dynasty personnel files held in the Number One Archives of China].

NGDK: Neige daku dang’an 內閣大庫檔案 [Archives of the Grand Secretariat].

NPM: National Palace Museum, Taiwan.

QDSWJ: *Qing dai shi wen ji hui bian* 清代詩文集彙編 [Literary and poetry collections from the Qing].

QDZJ: *Qing dai zhuanji congkan* 清代傳記叢刊 [Compendium of collections of Qing biography]. Volume numbers are followed after a dash by page number (eg. 49-242 = page 242 of volume 49).

QSG: *Qing shi gao* 清史稿 [Draft history of the Qing].

QSL: *Qing shilu* 清實錄 [Veritable Records of the Qing Dynasty].

SSXFFL: *Qinding Jiaoping sansheng xiefei fangl"ue* 欽定剿平三省邪匪方略 [Imperially commissioned campaign record of the pacification of the heterodox bandits in the three provinces (Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei)].

XXSK: *Xuxiu Siku quanshu* 續修四庫全書 [Continuation of the Complete Books in Four Treasuries].
YZHD: Yongzheng Huidian 雍正會典 [Collected statutes of the Yongzheng reign].

ZPZZ: Zhupi zouzhe 础批奏摺 [Vermillion-rescripted memorials].

The following abbreviations indicate reign period names:
SZ = Shunzhi (順治) Period: 1644-1661
KX = Kangxi (康熙) Period: 1662-1722
YZ = Yongzheng (雍正) Period: 1723-1735
QL = Qianlong (乾隆) Period: 1736-1795
JQ = Jiaqing (嘉慶) Period: 1796-1820
DG = Daoguang (道光) Period: 1821-1850
XF = Xianfeng (咸豐) Period: 1851-1861
TZ = Tongzhi (同治) Period: 1862-1874
GX = Guangxu (光緒) Period: 1875-1908
XT = Xuantong (宣統) Period: 1909-1911
MG = Minguo (民國 Republican period), 1911-1949.

JQ1/2/3 indicates the third day of the second month of the first year of the Jiaqing reign. I have converted dates, when necessary, to their equivalents on the Gregorian calendar.
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## Green Standard Ranks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Chinese Title</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tidu</td>
<td>提督</td>
<td>1b</td>
<td>Provincial commander</td>
<td>Commands troops in one province&lt;sup&gt;1&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zongbing</td>
<td>總兵</td>
<td>2a</td>
<td>Brigade general</td>
<td>Commands a brigade (zhen 鎮)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fujiang</td>
<td>副將</td>
<td>2b</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>Commands a regiment (xie 協)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>canjiang</td>
<td>參將</td>
<td>3a</td>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>youji</td>
<td>邊擊</td>
<td>3b</td>
<td>Major</td>
<td>Commands a battalion (ying 營)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dusi</td>
<td>都司</td>
<td>4a</td>
<td>First Captain</td>
<td>May command a battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shoubei</td>
<td>守備</td>
<td>5b</td>
<td>Second Captain</td>
<td>May command a battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qianzong</td>
<td>千総</td>
<td>6a</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>Commands a patrol (shao 嗇)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bazong</td>
<td>把總</td>
<td>7a</td>
<td>Sub-Lieutenant</td>
<td>Commands a squad (si 司) or military post (xun 汛)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waiwei</td>
<td>外委</td>
<td>8a</td>
<td>Ensign</td>
<td>Specific duties unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ewai waiwei</td>
<td>額外外委</td>
<td>9b</td>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>Specific duties unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1912), pp. 337-341.

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<sup>1</sup> The exception to this was the Guyuan command where the provincial commander had jurisdiction over garrisons in two provinces: all of Shaanxi and the eastern part of Gansu. In Guangdong and Fujian there were two provincial commanders, one overseeing the land forces and the other the naval forces.
Chapter 1
The Subjects of War in Early Nineteenth Century China

From the 1970s, the Opium War’s (1839-1842) status as a marker of the beginning of China’s modernization has been, if not displaced, at least challenged by the search for developments tying the period before the war to the late Qing and Republican periods. Yet, the defeat of Qing forces during the Opium War has continued to profoundly influence understandings of one aspect of early nineteenth century Qing history—the history of the military, whether the elite forces of the Manchu, Mongol, and Han Banners, commonly referred to as bannermen, or the largely Han Chinese Green Standards. Depictions of a military lacking in discipline, leadership, and technology have remained entrenched in, and indeed fundamental to, many narratives of China’s nineteenth century history.

These images of the decline of the regular military have served, in particular, as a useful foil for scholars interested in the rise of a variety of irregular militaries, a development more amenable to narratives of China’s national history. Studies of the early nineteenth century military have focused not on the regular forces but on the origins and development of the local militias and regional armies organized by civil officials and local gentry that appeared during the White Lotus War (1796-1804) and, at a much larger scale, the Taiping War (1851-1865). These regional forces, it has been suggested, presaged the fragmentation of political powers that ultimately contributed to the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 and the founding of the Republic. The history of the regular military in the early nineteenth century, when written at all, continues to be written as a history of the overcoming of China’s past.
What of the other histories, those histories whose meanings are not linear, but as Prasenjit Duara described it, “dispersed in space and time”? In this dissertation, I suggest that the story of a regular military giving way to regional elite-led forces has overshadowed a history of shifting, if dispersed, cultural practices related to war and the military in the years after the great turn-of-the-century White Lotus War. The early nineteenth century was not only a time of military decline, but a time of changing relations between military and society. It was a time when state control over writing, commemoration, and other cultural practices related to war and the military began to loosen, when elements of war that had once been hidden behind carefully choreographed military spectacle and official propaganda became increasingly visible, familiar, and available for reinterpretation outside of official auspices. It was also a time of substantial changes to the regional composition of the military. The Green Standards, the force that provided the bulk of men in the White Lotus War, was profoundly affected by the war. In the provinces most directly affected—Sichuan, Gansu, and Shaanxi—the Green Standards saw a massive influx of talented young officers and new soldiers, replacing the thousands who had been killed.

These two developments, a loosening of state control and a military transformed by the experience of war, would become intertwined. Many of the officers and soldiers whose careers were established during the White Lotus War, and the tens of thousands who died in battle, would become objects of cultural practice in the first decades of the nineteenth century, populating the memories, commemorative sites, writings, local legends, and expectations of a society eager to make sense of the violence that was increasingly part of their lived experience. These cultural practices map out a society that

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was receptive to war and its subjects, but also eager to contest the meanings given to these subjects by the state.

Military Culture or Cultural Practice?

The term “cultural practice” is one that needs some explanation before returning to developments in the nineteenth century. In my dissertation, I have intentionally made only limited use of the term “military culture,” a term recently used to denote themes in imperial Chinese history similar to those that I discuss in this dissertation. In a 2010 edited volume titled *The Culture of War in Imperial China*, Nicola Di Cosmo suggested that the term military culture could be used in the Chinese context to refer to “four separate and distinct meanings.” The first was military culture as a “bounded system of conduct and behavior” shared by members of the military; the second was “strategic culture,” or the “accumulated and transmitted knowledge” that provided a basis for decision-making or analysis of a military conflict; the third was “the set of values that determine a society’s inclination for war and military organization”; and the fourth, the “aesthetic and literary tradition that values military events and raises the status of those who accomplish martial exploits.”

Di Cosmo was right, I believe, in his depiction of the scope of interest in the military and war in China. Chapters in the volume show that such interests were not restricted only to members of the military forces or Board of War, the branch of the central government with responsibility for the oversight of the military. However, I am not convinced of the value of attempting to identify a bounded military culture or even a set of shared beliefs or values concerning war and military. My approach in the dissertation has not been to uncover the logic of a shared military culture in the Qing period, but rather to identify the diffuse objects and sites related to war and

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the military around which cultural practices coalesced. I reserve the term military culture for the rituals, visual representations, commemorative sites, and celebrations produced by the Qing government to enhance its martial prestige.

My use of the phrase “cultural practice” draws on the work of William Sewell, who suggested that culture is better understood not as “bounded” and governed by shared rules but simply as “the semiotic dimension of human social practice.” For Sewell, to “engage in cultural practice” is simply “to make use of a semiotic code to do something in the world.” The meaning of these cultural practices, he argued, can be inconsistent, contested, mutable, and weakly bounded. That is, these practices do not together constitute evidence for a rule-bound set of beliefs or meanings shared by a particular people. At the same time, he also argued that there is often a degree of coherence to cultural practices within bounded territories. According to Sewell, this coherence is, in many cases, produced by the actions of “dominant actors” such as governments. These dominant actors have rarely been powerful enough to establish cultural uniformity, but they have often been able to “organize difference.” It is this loose sort of coherence that, Sewell argued, makes it meaningful to talk of an “ordered field of difference.”

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3 Sewell was critical of Clifford Geertz whose notion of culture as a bounded system seems to underly the definition offered by Di Cosmo. William Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” in *Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture*, eds. Bonnell, Hunt and Biernacki (Berkeley: University of California Press, 20), p. 48. For similar descriptions of culture as practice, see Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, “Introduction,” in *Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance*, eds. Esherick and Rankin (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). Here they write: “Elites, or would-be elites, use their resources in strategies designed to enhance or maintain their positions. The focus on strategies calls attention to the dynamic processes of creating and maintaining elite power. Human agents, active creators of their own history, pursue practices and strategies that, through repetition and over time, produce, maintain, and amend cultural structures. These structures in turn shape and constrain the social environment for subsequent activity in an arena” (p. 11).

4 Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” p. 51.

5 Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” p. 56.

6 Sewell, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” p. 56.
Sewell’s depiction of a field of diverse cultural practices given coherence by a dominant actor is useful for a study of the relation between war and culture in the early nineteenth century Qing empire. The dominant producer of military culture remained, as in the previous century, the central government in Peking—a term by which I refer to the inner and outer court organs as well as the emperor. As we shall see in the dissertation, decisions and directives coming from the central government played an essential role in establishing uniform sites and symbols of military culture, including local shrines, standardized military honors, and rank. At the same time, the practices that coalesced around these sites and symbols reflected both changing political circumstances and the imbrication of centrally organized sites with local practices and representational spaces.

From the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Century

The flourishing and visible diversity of cultural practices related to war and the military was very much tied up with larger shifts taking place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. The long-reigning Qianlong emperor (r. 1736-1795) abdicated in 1795 and died in 1799, passing power to his son Jiaqing (r. 1796-1820). Scholars have described the first years after Jiaqing’s accession to power as the beginning of a shift in powers from the center to local elites or a period of moderate and sustainable reforms. While they provide a different interpretation of the significance of the changes that took place, both descriptions are in agreement that the period saw a shift from central control to broader political participation, a shift often described as a devolution of political powers.

The argument for devolution was articulated most influentially by Philip Kuhn in
his 1970 study of militarization in the nineteenth century Qing empire. Kuhn suggested that the beginning of China’s modern period should not be reflexively located at the time of the Opium Wars. He argued that there were, instead, long term developments internal to China that enhanced the powers of the local elites while diminishing the power of the state. Kuhn saw early signs of devolution in the increasing use of militias in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, particularly during the White Lotus War. The militarization of local society during this war was, he suggested, a sign of the state’s acquiescence to an increasingly powerful elite and a precursor to the more far-reaching changes that became most starkly manifest during the Taiping War in the 1850s and 1860s. In these decades, the halting attempts of elites to organize themselves for defense against rebel incursions would become a full-blown reorganization of military power around local and provincial elites, with massive provincial armies like the famed Hunan army of Zeng Guofan held together by personal bonds and native place loyalties.

In the last several years, Kuhn’s arguments regarding the growing power of the Han Chinese elites and literati in the early nineteenth century have been taken up by a number of scholars, including his own students. One of these students, Han Seunghyun, expanded Kuhn’s argument beyond militarization to broader developments in the relation between local elites and the early nineteenth century government. Han argued that the early nineteenth century elite had become increasingly active in many fields of practice, from the management of local infrastructure projects to the writing of local histories to the management of putatively official commemorative shrines for eminent officials (minghuan ci 名宦祠) and local worthies (xiangxian ci 鄉賢祠). He suggested that this

7 Philip A. Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structures, 1796-1864 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980). On the influence of Kuhn’s study, see Joseph Esherick and Mary Rankin, Chinese Local Elites and Patterns of Dominance, p. 7.
8 Han Seunghyun, “Re-inventing Local Tradition,” p. 208.
activism was produced by the convergence of two developments, “a changing [more tolerant] state attitude toward elite activism and concurrent assertion of local elites’ stake in their home areas.” Another one of Kuhn’s students, Matthew Mosca, considered the implications of a more tolerant government in the formation of geographical knowledge among Han literati. Knowledge of Inner Asian regions that had once been carefully guarded by the state, he argued, became increasingly available to Han Chinese literati in the early nineteenth century, ultimately providing the spatial underpinnings for Han nationalism in the early twentieth century. Both Mosca and Han show the emergence of discourses and cultural practices that drew on official resources for legitimacy while increasingly operating outside of direct government control.

The shifting role of the state in the early nineteenth century has also been a point of faith for scholars who consider devolution in the early nineteenth century not in terms of the empowerment of Han Chinese elites but for its contribution to the sustainability of the Qing dynasty. The question in these studies has been not how early nineteenth century developments led to the eventual decline of the dynasty’s political power, but how the dynasty lasted as long as it did. Wang Wensheng argued that a series of military and political crises in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, including the White Lotus War, prompted the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820) to undertake a program of cautious but far-reaching reform that tackled official corruption, reduced stresses on an over-extended state, and encouraged gentry leadership in local mobilization. The reforms undertaken by Jiaqing included decisions that limited the informal powers of

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inner court organs such as the Imperial Household Department and Grand Council—a small group of powerful policymakers appointed by the emperor, and initiatives that opened new avenues for remonstration by commoners, officials, and literati alike.\textsuperscript{12} In contrast to his father, Wang argued, Jiaqing also was less likely to intervene directly in government decision making, preferring instead a more “impersonal approach” that “allowed room for political deliberation and factional compromise.”\textsuperscript{13} Wang directly rejected the characterization of the early nineteenth century as a time of political decline, suggesting instead that Jiaqing’s roadmap put the empire on a path of sustainability that ensured its survival through the tumultuous century before the 1911 revolution.\textsuperscript{14} Daniel McMahon, similarly, suggested that the reforms undertaken by Jiaqing after his accession to power were oriented toward “pragmatic ends of social order, fiscal viability, and national solidarity,” and marked by an “unusual tolerance for remonstration.”\textsuperscript{15} The reforms, according to MacMahon, were also successful in improving the sub-provincial bureaucracy; and laying the way for “a shift toward local mobilization … for social welfare and public works projects.”\textsuperscript{16}

Devolution of powers—whether taken as a sign of growing elite power or a deliberate and successful program of reform led by the Jiaqing emperor—was also an important factor in the development of cultural practices related to war and the military in

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{12} Wang, \textit{White Lotus Rebels}, p. 165. The new opportunities for the expression of literati opinion has been noted by several other scholars. For instance, see Benjamin Elman, \textit{Classicism}, pp. 283-290.
\bibitem{13} Wang, \textit{White Lotus Rebels}, p. 181.
\bibitem{14} Wang, \textit{White Lotus Rebels}, p. 5.
\bibitem{16} McMahon, “Dynastic Decline,” p. 251. Kent Guy described the changes to provincial administration that followed Jiaqing’s accession to power. See Kent R. Guy, \textit{Qing Governors and their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644-1796} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), pp. 137-142. Guy also suggested the importance of a reassertion “of the importance of the rules, standards, and norms of procedure that were the Chinese officials’ traditional response to discrepancy and corruption.” Ibid., p. 142.
\end{thebibliography}
the early nineteenth century. An interest in encouraging the participation of local gentry in war commemoration, for instance, was evident in state initiatives from shrine building (Chapter 2) to the granting of hereditary titles (Chapter 3). Furthermore, as Matthew Mosca has noted, the loosening of state controls extended to a more tolerant view of writing on military topics. Jiaqing’s accession to power in 1799 was followed almost immediately by the printing and reprinting of works on military history and strategy as well as more personal writings by or about military men: biographies and commemorative collections for Chinese officers killed in war, and memoirs of individual experiences on campaign. These works, many of which I will introduce over the course of the dissertation, were important markers of an interest in the military that was taking shape outside of direct state control.

While the devolution of state control following the Qianlong reign helps to account for a general expansion of cultural practices related to war and the military in the early nineteenth century, it does not explain the particular temporalities, ideologies, or regional differences that gave shape and depth to these practices. To understand these characteristics, it is necessary to look at the major military conflict that punctuated the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the White Lotus War (1796-1804).

The White Lotus War (1796-1804)

A general history of the White Lotus War has yet to be written, but studies of its

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17 Matthew Mosca, “Literati Rewriting of China,” pp. 115-117. As noted by Matthew Mosca, the most influential work of military history was Zhao Yi’s Huangchao wugong jisheng (Abundant Record of Imperial Victories), printed in 1799. Among other works, Wang Chang’s memoirs of the Burma campaign Zheng Mian ji lüe (A Brief Account of the Burma Campaign), written in the 1770s, were first printed in 1808, with reprints in 1833, 1876, 1877 and 1893. Other works will be discussed over the course of the dissertation.

18 For a study of the origins of the sects involved in the revolt, see Blaine Gaustad, “Religious Sectarianism and the State in Mid Qing China: Background to the White Lotus Uprising of 1796-1804” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1994); for a study of the War as it affected a single county in Hubei, see Cecily McCaffrey, “Living through Rebellion: A Local History of the
origins generally point to a volatile combination of sectarian activity, government suppression, and demographic instability in central China. Sectarian teachings and networks from Shanxi and Henan had extended to northwestern Hubei and the rugged, heavily forested Han River highlands of southern Shaanxi and northeastern Sichuan in the first half of the 1790s. Missionaries belonging to these sects prophesied of the imminent turn of the kalpa and transmigration of Maitreya to earth where he would support “Niuba” (a descendant of the Ming) and “bring salvation to all.” The turn of the kalpa, they asserted, could be precipitated by the destruction of the old order and escaped by those who accepted the teachings and had the appropriate mantras recited on their behalf. These teachings and their associated sect networks spread rapidly in both southern Hubei and the Han River highlands. According to Blaine Gaustad, the success of these teachings in the early 1790s reflected lack of government control in the area, instability of a poor migrant society, and adaptability of the teachings followed by most of the missionaries.

The spread of these teachings was confronted by an intensive government effort to suppress the sects in 1794 and 1795. Arrests, interrogations, and executions of sect members across much of north and central China were successful in reducing the strength of sects in some areas. However, many sectarians were able to regroup in Hubei. In the southern Hubei counties of Laifeng, Yichang, Zhijiang, and later Xiangyang prefecture,

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19 For a description of the Han River highlands, see Wang, White Lotus Rebels, pp. 54-60.
sect members rose up against the government in late 1795 and 1796. The movement would soon develop connections with counterfeiters, salt-smugglers, and well-armed groups living in the Han River highlands. The uprising, anti-government alliances, and subsequent suppression campaign would affect large swaths of central China—particularly southern Shaanxi and northeastern Sichuan and contiguous regions of Henan and Gansu provinces (Map 1.1).

The suppression campaign, while successful in eliminating the political threat of the White Lotus sects in the region, was plagued by failures in leadership, poorly trained troops, and misappropriation of official funds. The first few years of the campaign saw large battles and siege warfare between Qing and White Lotus forces, resulting in the fragmentation of most major White Lotus armies. This did not, however, bring an end to the war. From 1799 to 1804, battles and the besieging of cities gave way to grinding guerilla warfare involving government forces tracking down a highly mobile enemy and local officials implementing a scorched-earth policy to prevent White Lotus forces from living off the land. The campaign would eventually end with a protracted and bloody search for remnants of White Lotus sectarian groups in the mountainous and deeply forested region of southern Shaanxi and northeastern Sichuan.

More important for this dissertation, however, is a less well-known aspect of the campaign—the massive death toll among Qing forces. By the official count of those enshrined for death in battle (zhenwang 陣亡), more than 87,000 were killed, a figure that included soldiers, officers, and at least some of the xiangyong (local militiamen and hired civilians) killed during the war. This was out of a total of approximately 600,000 Green

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25 Jones and Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline,” p. 140.
26 See forthcoming book by Dai Yingcong.
Map 1.1. Provinces and Prefectures Affected by the White Lotus War along with Select Counties and Prefectures in Dissertation
Base map and points are from Harvard China GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/.
Standard troops and 200,000 Banner troops empire-wide. In other words, perhaps five to ten percent of the combined forces of the dynasty were killed over a period of about ten years. An even higher percentage must have been killed in provinces that provided the bulk of troops for the suppression effort—Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, though extant sources do not allow the calculation of provincial casualties. The vast majority of the military dead were Chinese soldiers and officers in the Green Standard forces.

Death in battle was not, of course, unprecedented in the Qing. But the number of deaths among Chinese forces during the White Lotus War was greater than any eighteenth century campaign. Furthermore, the death toll intersected with policy changes that had been unfolding over the eighteenth century. During the Yongzheng (r. 1723-1735) and Qianlong reigns, policies had been put in place that began to flatten ethnic and rank distinctions among those killed in battle. The first of these policies, implemented under Yongzheng, was a decision to enshrine all military men killed in battle in a central shrine in Peking, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine (zhaozhongci) (see Chapter 2). By the end of the eighteenth century, all military men and irregulars killed in battle were enshrined and entered into an official biographical collection produced by Hanlin academicians, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine Biographies (zhaozhongci liezhuan) (see Chapter 4). The second policy, which came into effect under Qianlong, was the extension of eligibility for hereditary titles to Chinese officials and officers killed in war. While this policy had begun as a largely symbolic gesture of the


28 As I point out in Chapter 2, the number of war dead enshrined between 1724 and 1795 was approximately the same as the number enshrined during the ten years of the White Lotus War.
emperor’s equitable treatment of all his subjects, it soon became codified and administered by the outer court bureaucracy (see Chapter 3).

As a result of these changes in the official treatment of the war dead, Chinese military men killed in war became less a potential resource from which the emperor could select a few exemplary figures, and more irreducible objects of bureaucratic administration. That is, rather than taking care of a small number of sites dedicated to a few honored officers and memorable battles, central and local bureaucracies were compelled to administer posthumous awards, hereditary titles, and commemorative rituals for all who died in battle, regardless of rank. The success (more or less) of the dynasty and its bureaucracy in fulfilling this prerogative not only meant that the dynasty was now able to promulgate its official military culture more broadly, but that elements of this official culture became susceptible to appropriation. Even as the most spectacular elements of official military culture began to fade away under the Jiaqing emperor, the tens of thousands of men entered into shrines or awarded hereditary titles became both newly visible symbols of loyalty to the dynasty and objects of cultural practices outside of direct government control.

Just as the war dead became increasingly available as objects of nonofficial cultural practice, so too did military men who survived the war. The military death toll of the White Lotus War led to a massive turnover of manpower within the Green Standard forces, as I have noted. Some of those recruited to replace the dead came from families with histories of military service, including men awarded with hereditary ranks after the deaths of their male relatives in battle (see Chapter 3). Many young men, facing a

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29 This was superficially consonant with the developments in commemoration in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that have been traced by Thomas Laqueur, Daniel Sherman, and others.
hardscrabble existence in an increasingly overpopulated region, simply joined the military to gain a livelihood. Because of the concentration of the White Lotus War in one region and period, these new recruits—many of whom came to dominate the officer ranks into the early 1840s—formed a pronounced age cohort with similar backgrounds, shared experiences, and an often unconventional take on military service.30

This cohort became objects of and active participants in the expanded discourse on military topics that distinguished the early nineteenth from the eighteenth century. Several officers of this generation gained renown among literati, particularly those reform-minded officials identified with statecraft thinking from the 1820s to 1840s. Most prominent were Guizhou native Yang Fang 楊芳 (1770-1846) (Chapter 6, 7), and Sichuanese Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1761-1837) (Chapter 7) and Luo Siju 羅思舉 (1764-1840) (Chapter 5). Unlike previous generations of military men in the Qing, a number of these men—including Yang Fang and Luo Siju—also began to write autobiographies and personal reflections on military matters, such as the discipline and training of troops. The 1830s and early 1840s, when many of these officers had retired from military service, marked a highpoint of writing by military officers with war experience during the Qing period. To an extent that was unusual in imperial China, the reputations of these military men did not simply emerge from their actions or promotion by the state, but were produced in part through their own writings and efforts at self-fashioning.

30 This study, to a certain extent, takes a prosopographic approach to military culture. Lawrence Stone defined prosopography as “the investigation of the common background characteristics of a group of actors in history by means of a collective study of their lives.” Lawrence Stone, “Prosopography,” Daedalus 100.1 “Historical Studies Today” (Winter, 1971): 46 [46-79]. Thanks to Benjamin Elman for suggesting this approach.
The Green Standards

I have suggested that many of the sites of cultural practice in the nineteenth century were oriented around the military men who were killed or joined the military in the late eighteenth century. Yang Fang, Yang Yuchun, Luo Siju and the other military men in my study are, for the most part, Han Chinese soldiers or officers who served in the Green Standard forces (lüying 綠營), not Manchus, Mongols, or Han bannermen.

While much recent scholarship on military culture in the Qing has focused on the Eight Banners, a examination of the Green Standards is in many ways of greater importance for understanding the relationship between war and society in the early nineteenth century. First, the Green Standards were not only much more numerous than the Banner forces, but were also more deeply integrated into local society. If bannermen were generally segregated in a few large garrisons, Green Standard garrisons (zhen), battalions (ying), and smaller outposts could be found in thousands of towns and strategic points across the empire. Second, the vast majority of those who fought and died in the wars of this period were soldiers of the Green Standards, not the Banners. In the White Lotus War, for instance, one estimate is that bannermen accounted for less than 10,000 of the 117,000 regular troops deployed during the war. 31 Third, with rare exceptions, 32 the expanded field of cultural practices related to war and the military in the early nineteenth century was oriented around Chinese soldiers and officers outside of the Banner system. For instance, neither Manchus nor Mongols were commonly included in local shrines for the war dead, despite official regulations that ordered their enshrinement in the jurisdiction in which

32 For instance, the Banner commander Delengtai was said to have had six shrines built in his honor in Sichuan. Huashana 花沙納, De Zhuangguo gong nianpu 德壯果公年譜 (1856; reprint, Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1971), p. 3399. The presence of many of these shrines can be verified in gazetteers, but there is little further information on how they were viewed by locals.
they were killed (Chapter 2), nor were they often included in nonofficial biographical collections of the war dead (Chapter 4). There was also a divide between the Chinese and Manchu or Mongol officers who served in the largely Chinese Green Standard forces. The bonds of homosociality between Chinese officers, bonds that constituted an important site of writing and reflection by military men on their lives, rarely extended to Manchu and Mongol officers (Chapters 6, 7).

A focus on the Green Standards is also important given our exceedingly thin knowledge of their role in the Qing period. The history of the formation and general duties of the Green Standards are known only in broad strokes. It has been noted that the Green Standard forces were formed from the remnants of the Ming armies that were defeated by or surrendered to Qing forces in the conquest period (1630s-1640s). In order to prevent these armies from constituting a threat to Qing power, the new dynasty divided the armies into hundreds of small garrisons (ranging in size from several thousand to less than one hundred), forbade officers from serving in their home provinces, and instituted a command structure that prevented any one officer from mobilizing a large number of troops in times of war. In times of peace, many Green Standards forces served as a sort of constabulary whose primary duties involved the policing of local disputes, transporting of prisoners, and even maintenance of water works.33

Passing attention has been paid to the ways in which the Green Standards had become differentiated regionally in terms of training, peacetime duties, and degrees of military experience, particularly by the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. In parts of western and southwestern China, the forces played a much more active role than their

eastern counterparts in the extension and consolidation of Qing power. In southwestern provinces of Yunnan and Guizhou, for instance, Green Standard forces were an important occupying force in regions being administratively incorporated into the empire. The same was true of Taiwan. In western provinces like Sichuan and Gansu, Green Standard forces were regularly called upon to participate in the massive campaigns of the Qianlong emperor in the second half of the eighteenth century. In the White Lotus War, fought on terrain and among people inhospitable to Manchu cavalry, the Green Standard forces from these western provinces played an even larger role.

My research indicates that their role during the White Lotus War would have important effects on the constitution of the Green Standards in these provinces. Because demonstrated ability in active combat provided the grounds for rapid promotion, most middle to high-ranking officers in these provinces came to be men who rose through the ranks rather than men who had gained degrees in the military examination system, a system parallel to the civil service exams that tested physical strength and knowledge of military classics. Their combat experience also gave officers from these provinces an outsized influence empire-wide. As we shall see, officers from Sichuan and Gansu were a dominant presence in the officer corps for much of the first half of the nineteenth century.

Much less is known about the cultural connections between the Green Standards

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and Chinese society, whether in the nineteenth century or earlier. The Green Standards have often been studied only in terms of their correspondence with or deviation from regulatory norms established by the government, that is, their “corruption” or “decline.” In part because of the paucity of sources, there are few studies that consider members of the Green Standards as men with individual experiences of war, interpersonal relationships, and reputations within and outside the military. The relative abundance of nonofficial sources on the Green Standards in the early nineteenth century, a product in part of loosening state controls over military discourse, not only allows a questioning of the normative vision of Chinese military men as simply tools of state power, but offers an important opportunity to explore the ways in which military experiences and the bearers of these experiences were viewed through a cultural lens.

The Organization of the Dissertation

The main body of this dissertation has six chapters, divided into two parts. In Chapters 2 to 4, I explore the commemoration of the war dead by the government, in local society, and among literati. In Chapters 5 to 7, I explore the place of the military veterans of the White Lotus War in cultural practices in the first four decades of the nineteenth century.

Chapter 2 examines the expansion of official commemoration for the war dead from a single shrine in Peking to shrines located in all of the empire’s prefectural cities. The Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Peking, established by the Yongzheng emperor in 1724, was the first attempt by the dynasty to enshrine all military men and civil officials killed

38 The normative view was true, for instance, of Philip Kuhn’s influential characterization of the Green Standards as an impersonal or interchangeable military in which officers were successfully prevented from forming personal relationships, a characterization he used to draw a contrast with the new armies led by local elites and literati in the 1850s and 1860s. See Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 125, 147.
in battle (zhengwang 阵亡). By the end of the eighteenth century, Yongzheng’s policy of comprehensive enshrinement of men killed in battle had led repeatedly to crises of overcrowding at the Peking shrine, a problem finally resolved by the building of shrines in prefectural cities across the empire. The configuration of the physical space of cities had remained largely outside the ambit of the Qing state, whose resources simply did not allow for the city-building efforts characteristic of the modernizing regimes of the twentieth century. Decisions about where to locate the shrines revealed the limits of the state’s ability to guide the integration of war commemoration into the urban fabric. The cities in which the shrines were constructed remained rich in what Henri Lefebvre has referred to as representational spaces, the “complex symbolisms” and particular histories that had been produced over time through spatial practice. The geographical scope of this commemorative project allows us to observe the various ways in which a commemorative site established by the state came into relationship with these representational spaces, revealing the interplay between state initiative and local reception.

Chapter 3 continues to explore the effects of official changes in commemorative practice. The explosion in the early nineteenth century of hereditary titles for men killed in battle, like the crowding of the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine, was related to shifts in policies governing the commemoration of Chinese and Banner war dead. Over the course of the eighteenth century the dynasty first extended eligibility for hereditary titles to Chinese subjects and then mandated the bestowal of these titles on all officers killed in battle. With the outbreak of the White Lotus War, these earlier policy changes resulted in the awarding of more than 1,200 hereditary titles for men killed during the war—almost

all inheritable in perpetuity—and nearly one thousand titles for men who had been killed earlier in the dynasty. Much like the shrines, the expansion of hereditary titles reveals to us the consequences of official attempts to shape not only the presentation of an official military culture but its reception by Chinese subjects of the empire.

The central government’s effort to carry out comprehensive commemoration of the war dead also shaped the official biographical record of the war. In Chapter 4, I explore the writing of biographies for men killed during the White Lotus War. I trace the contours of two biographical projects, one under official auspices and the other the project of a single man. The official project was the writing of biographies for the men enshrined in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine. These biographies, produced after many of the major conflicts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, reveal a flattening over time of both individual and ethnic difference. Individuating features of the war dead such as personality were absent from later editions; biographies of men of the same rank became increasingly uniform in length; actions of biographical subjects were defined and encompassed by official categories; and the province eventually displaced ethnic identity as the primary framework for organizing the biographies. The second part of this chapter looks at a very different collection of biographies produced by the literatus Qian Yiji 錢儀吉 (1783-1850). If official biographies were characterized by a flattening of differences among the war dead, Qian’s collection reflected the centrality of personal relationships between the dead and living in preserving the memory of the White Lotus War.

Those who survived the war became subjects of war in a different way from those who were killed. Rather than the flattening of difference that characterized the official treatment of the war dead, there was a sharpening of distinctions between groups of men of different provincial or regional origins, social backgrounds, combat experience,
reputation, and personal relationships. The notion of a depersonalized military, with anonymous officers circulating regularly from post to post in the Green Standards, was belied in reality. These distinctions in the military informed decisions on appointment, mobilization, and demobilization. An attention to these distinctions can also allow us to trace the formation of individual reputation and the extensive networks of personal bonds that ran through the Green Standards.

I begin the second half of the dissertation with a chapter on the self-fashioning and reception of one of the most prominent military officers of the early nineteenth century, Luo Siju. Luo, a Sichuan native and former outlaw, joined his lineage militia and then the regular military in the early years of the White Lotus War. In 1838, he completed an account of his life that comprises the main source for the chapter. This chapter raises the question of how a military life could be represented and narrated—what cultural resources did Luo draw on, whether from the state or from other sources? The reception of Luo’s story, examined in the second half of the chapter, indicates that his efforts at self-fashioning had considerable resonance in his hometown and among literati admirers. By the first decade of the nineteenth century, Luo was already becoming known as an officer whose unconventional persona and knack for clever stratagems had emerged from his years as an outlaw. By the late nineteenth century, Luo had been transformed in most writings into a knight-errant whose official military career was a mere footnote.

In Chapter 6, I examine the history and historiography of the Ningshan mutiny, a revolt involving recruits at Ningshan garrison in 1806. The mutineers, primarily men who had been recruited into the military during the White Lotus War, were ultimately defeated by Qing forces. The Jiaqing emperor’s verdict on the mutiny laid the blame on officers who failed to instill discipline in the new troops. In the 1830s and 1840s, the history of the mutiny had been radically rewritten. The actions of the mutineers were portrayed in a
sympathetic light, emphasis was placed on their warm relations with their recently departed commanding officer, Yang Fang, and blame was placed on the harsh and unreasonable command of his replacement, Yang Zhizhen. The rewriting of the mutiny revealed an increasingly influential discourse validating personal relationships within the military, a theme that I pursue in the final chapter of the dissertation.

In Chapter 7, I further develop the theme of personal bonds among military men in the early nineteenth century. As a conquest dynasty with lingering suspicions about the reliability of Chinese soldiers, the Qing had implemented regulations to keep these men under central control. These regulations included laws designed to prevent the formation of personal loyalties between officers and troops by restricting the length of service at a single post and forbidding officers above a certain rank from serving in their home provinces. The efficacy of these laws began to falter in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Major internal conflicts like the Miao Uprising (1795) and White Lotus War created a pressing need for officers and troops with local knowledge, and the dynasty began to rely heavily on the Chinese Green Standards rather than the Manchu Banners. As the dynasty became more reliant on Chinese forces, it also gave Chinese officers increasing powers to promote, appoint, and train forces as they saw fit. One of the results was the strengthening of personal bonds among military men, bonds that included both long-term relations between officers and troops and among officers. I explore these developments through a case study of Yang Yuchun, a Sichuanese officer who led the Green Standard forces in Gansu and Shaanxi provinces for nearly three decades.
Chapter Two

Commemoration Decentered: The Expansion of Manifest Loyalty Shrines in 1802

In the autumn of 1802, the Minister of the Board of Rites, Changlin 長麟 (1748-1811), sent a memorial to the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820) warning that the Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Peking (zhaozhong ci 昭忠祠), the main shrine for men killed in service to the Qing, had run out of room. Changlin, whose official duties included the oversight of ceremonies at this shrine, noted that several hundred memorial tablets (paiwei 帖位), inscribed with the names of soldiers and officers killed in the ongoing White Lotus War (1796-1804), were standing unhoused in the courtyard of the shrine. Changlin offered two proposals for resolving the problem: space could be created by adding additional tiered niches and tables for offerings (kan’an 當案) to the existing rooms of the shrine or by building another shrine(s) (tiangai ciyu 天蓋祠宇). He awaited the response of the emperor, Jiaqing.

The Manifest Loyalty Shrine, established by the Yongzheng emperor (r. 1723-36) in 1724, was housed in a large walled compound to the east of the Forbidden City. The shrine had been meant to hold tablets inscribed with the names of all Qing soldiers, officers, and officials killed in battle (zhenwang 陣亡), from the Qing conquest in the 1630s and 1640s up to Yongzheng’s own time. It was also intended to hold the tablets of those killed in future wars. However, little space had been reserved in the original design for additional tablets, and the dense concentration of buildings around the shrine, typical

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40 Changlin had recently returned to Peking from a leadership position in the suppression of the White Lotus War. He had played a role in encouraging the recruitment of soldiers from among those displaced by the conflict (nanmin 難民). “Jueluo Changlin 覺羅長麟,” in QSG j.343, p. 11129.
41 The memorial from Changlin is referred to in a communication (yihui 移會) sent to the Board of War. NGDK 195356, JQ7/11/14. The response to the memorial appears in the Jiaqing qiju zhu, vol. 7, p. 554 and QSL JQ7/11/8, p. 405a-b.
42 NGDK 195356, JQ7/11/14.
of Peking’s Inner City, meant that there was little room for expansion outward. Not surprisingly, the steady pace of war during the second half of the eighteenth century had led to chronic problems of tablet overcrowding. The Board of Works, the government organ responsible for renovations to the shrine and the carving of tablets, had proven adept at resolving these problems by making renovations to the existing site. Niches for tablets had been added to hallways, tiers layered more highly, and tablets spaced more tightly.

Against this background of chronic overcrowding and modest renovations, the Jiaqing emperor’s response to Changlin and the Board of Rites was strikingly ambitious. In an edict, issued on December 2, 1802 (JQ7/11/8), he ordered that the Board oversee the construction of new Manifest Loyalty Shrines in each of the more than two hundred prefectural capitals (fucheng 府城) across the empire.43 These prefectural shrines, he ordered, were to hold the tablets of all military men (wuzhi 武職) of rank three and below, civil officials (wenzhi 文職) of rank four and below, and soldiers (bingding 兵丁) and irregulars (xiangyong 鄉勇) killed in battle. In the same edict, he laid out a new vision for the Peking shrine. Rather than holding the tablets of all war dead, it would be reserved for those of higher-ranked military and civil officials, as well as all bannermen (the elite Manchu and Mongol forces).44 Costs for building and holding ceremonies at the prefectural shrines were to be paid from funds collected at the local level such as the land tax (diding).45

Jiaqing’s decision to carry out this ambitious shrine-building project emerged from a conjuncture of two developments that I will trace in the first half of the chapter.

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44 JQHDSL j.365.22b, p. 6214.
45 GXHDSL j.170.JQ7, p. 1159a.
The first was the problem of finite space in the Peking shrine and a rapidly growing number of military casualties—particularly casualties from the largely Han Chinese Green Standards—in the White Lotus War. The second was Jiaqing’s own accession to full power after the death of his father, the Qianlong emperor, in 1799. Jiaqing had taken advantage of his newly-acquired powers to approve a series of policies intended to encourage the political participation of local elites. The building of locally-funded and managed shrines for the war dead not only reflected these broader interests, but was also easily reconciled with the original, but largely unrealized, vision for the original Peking shrine—to remind people from “far and near” of the dedication and courage of members of the Qing military.

The agendas that lay behind the decision to expand the shrines did not, however, determine the ways in which the project was actually implemented. In the second part of the chapter, I trace two features that characterized the building of Manifest Loyalty Shrines in prefectures. The first was a process of detachment from the particular history of the White Lotus War, the event that had initially prompted the decision to expand the shrines. The shrines, as originally envisioned by Jiaqing, were to provide space for the tablets of men killed in this war. However, as the building of the shrines proceeded, it became apparent that the war in central China had little resonance or relevance outside of communities directly affected. Rather than creating a shared memory of the war, the shrines were soon opened to men killed in local conflicts, thus reorienting them toward

47 Jiaqing’s accession also paved the way to influence for a number of officials who had been opposed to Heshen, a high-ranking and notoriously corrupt favorite of Qianlong. At least one of these officials, Fashishan 法式善 (1753-1813), was connected to the shrine-building decision; others, appointed to posts in the provinces, would play a key role in implementing the project. I will discuss their roles later in the chapter.
local rather than translocal memories. The second was a process of negotiation with urban space. The building of the new shrines revealed the many ways in which human agency at both the center and the local level was prompted, mediated, or redirected by spatial factors—from the shortage of physical space to the density of representational spaces. Ultimately, these processes of localization and spatial negotiation would attenuate the dynasty’s control over the physical space and location of the shrines. Thus, if the building of the prefectural shrines marked an unprecedented expansion of official war commemoration to all corners of the Qing empire, it also revealed constraints on the ability of the dynasty to determine exactly what the memory of war would be.

**The Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine and Official Commemoration of the War Dead in the Eighteenth Century**

While the 1802 expansion of the shrines was framed in reference to the original vision for the shrine, laid out by Yongzheng in 1724, it was in many ways a break with approaches to the commemoration of the war dead that had developed during the reigns of Yongzheng and Qianlong. Yongzheng, an emperor known for his activist approach to governance, had established the Manifest Loyalty Shrine in 1724 amidst a flurry of other ambitious commemorative projects that marked the first years of his reign. His original plan for the shrine, expressed in a 1724 edict, contained two key elements: the first was an expressed intention to bring into the shrine the memorial tablets of all officers, soldiers, and officials killed in Qing military campaigns; the second was a concern to make the shrine visible to a broad constituency.

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48 Representational space is a term used by Henri Lefebvre to refer to those spaces “embodying complex symbolisms, sometimes coded, sometimes not, linked to the clandestine or underground side of social life.” Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, p. 33.

49 The history of the shrine in the Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns is also covered by Tobie Meyer-Fong in *What Remains*, pp. 137-140.
The first was the more radical in its departure from earlier practices. There had been shrines for a handful of meritorious officers in Peking before the Yongzheng reign, but there had been no systematic attempt to enshrine all officers, let alone the tens of thousands of unranked soldiers who had died since the founding of the dynasty. The shrine, Yongzheng ordered, was to include not only “civil officials and [high-ranking] military officers” but also those officers of lower ranks and common troops (偏裨士卒) who had “repaid their realm whole-heartedly and without thought of personal danger” (赤心報國奮不顧身者).\(^{50}\) The novelty of the order was apparent in the rather frantic scramble for information on the war dead prompted by his decision. When Yongzheng directed the bureaucracy to establish the shrine, he realized that there were no systematic records of all the war dead. He ordered the Hanlin academicians—central government officials whose duties include the drafting of biographical records—to search for names through all the documents that might have relevant information: the *Veritable Records*, campaign records (*fanglüe 方略*), and Board of War registers (*qingce 清册*). When renovations were completed in 1732, tablets of 10,307 soldiers and 799 officers were entered into the shrine.\(^{51}\)

While Yongzheng himself made no mention of the links between the Manifest Loyalty Shrine and other shrine-building projects during his reign, the inclusiveness of the new shrine corresponded with his broader attempts to incorporate marginal subjects into the official commemorative enterprise. Another of Yongzheng’s projects, the building of county Shrines to the Chaste and Filial (*jiexiao ci 節孝祠*), for instance, had been accompanied by a search for “faithful maidens” from remote and economically-marginal regions. The absolute number of “faithful maidens” (*zhennü 貞女*) honored with

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50 QSL YZ2/10/13, p. 391a.
51 On the completion of renovations and number of initially enshrined, see GXHDSL j.449.YZ7.
imperial testimonials (jingbiao 旌表) jumped from 1.05 per year in the Kangxi reign to 16.54 per year in the Yongzheng reign.\textsuperscript{52} The same period saw a similar increase in the number of chaste widows and chastity martyrs.\textsuperscript{53} The initial round of enshrinement in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, completed in 1732, did not include all who had died in battle up to this date, a fact likely attributable to the patchy documentary record of the conquest period and earlier Qing campaigns. However, Yongzheng’s regulations for the shrine did bring about a massive, if retroactive, recognition of the efforts of common soldiers and a principle of comprehensive enshrinement that continued to be implemented and refined under later emperors.

In addition to his concern for comprehensive enshrinement, Yongzheng’s edict had also suggested that the shrine should be made visible to a broad audience. In Yongzheng’s words, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was to be seen by and inspire feelings of loyalty in visitors from “far and near.”\textsuperscript{54} Again, we can see here a trace of Yongzheng’s thinking on commemorative practice more broadly. His intention for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was similar to principles he had approved for the Shrines to the Chaste and Filial. In the case of the latter, Yongzheng had tried to ensure their visibility by mandating the construction of large and ornate arches on well-traveled routes.\textsuperscript{55} Like these shrines, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was located close to a well-traveled intersection marked by the East Single-Arch (dong dan pailou 東單牌樓) in the Inner City of Peking (Map 2.2).\textsuperscript{56} At the same time, there were limits to Yongzheng’s expressed intention to bring the shrine to the attention of visitors from far and near. For instance, I

\textsuperscript{52} Lu, True to Her Word, p. 80.
\textsuperscript{54} GXHDSL j.449.YZ2.
\textsuperscript{55} Theiss, Disgraceful Matters, p. 31.
\textsuperscript{56} Naquin, Peking, p. 271.
have found no evidence that Yongzheng added the shrine to the itinerary of tribute missions to the capital, unlike other sites displaying Qing martial prowess. Nor was it often mentioned in the writings of men serving in the capital.

Those actually required to attend ceremonies at the Manifest Loyalty Shrine were a rather small subset of Qing society. According to the liturgy, the mandated spring and autumn ceremonies were conducted by officials from the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (Taichang si 太常寺) and Court of State Ceremonial (Honglu si 鴻臚寺). Other visitors may have included those with family ties to the enshrined. Several years after the establishment of the shrine, Yongzheng ordered that the sons and grandsons of the enshrined who were residing in the capital participate in the ceremonies. Beyond ceremonial officials and family members, we can assume that the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, like the shrines for meritorious officers, was accessible to bannermen and officials living in Peking. Of course, even if all able to visit the shrine had done so, they still would have constituted a small minority of imperial subjects.

58 A description of these ceremonies provides some idea of the range of those involved. On the day of the ceremony, officials of the Court of State Ceremonial were to invite (yin 引) the descendants of those enshrined. The ceremony involved officiants along with these invitees. Those descended from enshrinees of the imperial clan (zongshi 宗室) and nobles (wanggong 王公) along with all descendants of enshrinees who held ranks of the first or second degree were to stand on the two sides of the platform (yuetai 坐台) of the front hall (qiandian 前殿). Those officials between the third and fifth degree were to stand on the two sides below the platform of the front hall. All others with official rank were to stand inside the main gate (damen 大門) along the walkways (yonglu 甬路). Officiants—described in the liturgy as zanyinguan 贊引官, chengjiguan 承祭官, daoyinguan 導引官, xingjiguan 興祭官, fenxianguan 分獻官, duzhuguan 警祝官—offered incense, performed genuflections, recited the liturgy, and guided the movements of the invitees. JQHDSL j.365.
59 GXHDSL j.449.YZ11.
60 Susan Naquin argued that the constituency of the shrines for “heroic Bannermen” in Peking was “the Bannermen and officials who served the dynasty.” Naquin, Peking, p. 330. Some top Han Chinese officials also visited the shrine in Peking. Fang Weidian 方偉甸 (1758-1815), an official in Peking in the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns, described a visit to the Peking shrine in his discussion of the building of a local Manifest Loyalty Shrine in the Yun xian zhi (1866), j.10.12b. Presumably, his visit would have taken place during his service as an official at the Court of Imperial Sacrifices (1792, 1794-5).
The same gap between expressed ideal and practice was apparent in the emperor’s own relationship to the shrine. In his edict ordering the establishment of the shrine, Yongzheng foregrounded his own emotional attachment to the war dead: “as for all those officers who with complete loyalty repaid their debt to the dynasty (baoguo 報國), I am greatly pleased with them, and I also have great compassion for them.”61 At the same time, I have found no indications that Yongzheng visited the shrine for the twice-annual ceremonies.

The Manifest Loyalty Shrine during the Yongzheng reign, then, can be seen as an effort to expand official commemoration for the war dead beyond officers to common soldiers of both the Banners and the Green Standards, an effort that accorded with Yongzheng’s intention to extend official recognition to subjects who had contributed to the political or cultural well-being of the dynasty but remained without official recognition. The justification that Yongzheng offered for the extension of commemoration indicates that he was cognizant of the broad signifying capacity of the war dead. Much like the shrines and memorial arches for chaste widows, Yongzheng’s vision for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine went beyond the display of role models for audiences that might themselves act out these roles. He insisted that the shrine and rites for the war dead as a useful means to stir up “loyalty and righteousness” (zhongyi 忠義) among visitors of all backgrounds and as beneficial to good governance (zhidao 治道).62 At the same time, his actions suggest that he saw certain political risks to the building of shrines for the Qing war dead outside of the capital, no doubt a result of his awareness of the bitter memories of Qing conquest that had been transmitted through generations of Han Chinese subjects—particularly the influential elites of the east and southeast. As

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61 QSL YZ2/10/13, p. 391a.
62 QSLYZ2/10/13, p. 391a.
long as the shrine was under the close watch of the central government, the universal appeal and inclusivity of the shrine could be proclaimed but also regulated and circumscribed. It was perhaps a prescient recognition of the risks that shrines for the war dead held for appropriation or divergent interpretations of Manchu military power that led Yongzheng to order the building of only a single shrine, an order that remained unchanged through the Qianlong reign.

The Manifest Loyalty Shrine continued to receive tablets of soldiers and officers killed in war during the succeeding Qianlong reign (1736-1795). However, whereas the shrine during the Yongzheng period had been one of the main focuses of official war commemoration, the shrine under Qianlong was increasingly overshadowed by an elaborate system of war commemoration and martial culture that became a key component of the new emperor’s self-fashioning. As Joanna Waley-Cohen has pointed out, the frequent military campaigning during the Qianlong reign was accompanied and celebrated by a burgeoning of “multi-layered commemorations” of war that far exceeded anything undertaken by Yongzheng. According to Waley-Cohen, many of these commemorative efforts were directed and produced by the emperor himself. Thousands of Qianlong’s poems and essays on war were reproduced in official compilations, carved into stone steles, or inscribed on the battle paintings displayed for foreign emissaries. He ordered the erection of massive stone steles celebrating victories or illustrious officers at centers of imperial power, such as Peking and Chengde, in provincial capitals such as Guilin, and close to battle sites such as Meinuo and Lewuwei in Sichuan. He endorsed

65 Waley-Cohen notes that steles were especially numerous “in the vicinity of the main Qing capitals in Peking and Chengde and at important battlefields and other centres of military success.” Waley-
the enshrinement of the most outstanding officers—usually the highest ranked—in shrines dedicated to one or two officers (zhuan ci 專祠, shuang ci 雙祠). A number of these were located in the capital; others were located in the provinces. By the end of the eighteenth century, at least twenty-five imperially sponsored shrines for officers and officials who had died in battle or contributed to military campaigns were scattered across the empire, from Peking to Yili in the northwest to Fujian in the southeast.

Among other efforts, in 1760 Qianlong established the Ziguangge 紫光閣, or Pavilion of Purple Light, to exhibit series of war paintings (zhantu 戰圖) and portraits of meritorious officials from major campaigns (gongchen xiang 功臣像) to visiting dignitaries and Qing officials. Many of these images of battle were also reprinted, or even carved into lacquer, and gifted to officials in both the civil and military.

In many ways the Ziguangge and its paintings of battle were typical of Qianlong’s...
approach to military culture. Despite the attention that Qianlong paid to war commemoration, the reach of these commemorative efforts outside the upper tiers of officialdom and select constituencies of recalcitrant subjects remained limited. Officials and visiting emissaries remained the primary audience for the elaborate battle scenes and officer portraits hung in the Hall. Qianlong—unlike Yongzheng—did not create new sites for the commemoration of common soldiers. Furthermore, most commemorative monuments outside of Peking were close to the location of campaigns or battles, where they were meant to warn or comfort those immediately affected by or involved in the wars, not to stir up sentiments among Qing subjects more generally. These monuments were often on the sparsely populated frontiers, far from the major populations of Han Chinese. There was no attempt to make visual representations of war or commemorative monuments accessible or visible to all Qing subjects, the sort of universalizing ambition articulated by Yongzheng, but left unrealized until Jiaqing’s decision to order the expansion of Manifest Loyalty Shrines to the prefectures.

The prefectural shrines established under Jiaqing, then, marked both a dramatic expansion of official sites for commemoration of the war dead and a shift in the target of war commemoration. The new shrines required, for the first time, the participation of local gentry and officials in decisions over where and how to construct the shrines. They also would be visible to local audiences who had known little of war or war commemoration in the eighteenth century.

**The Problem of Space at the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine**

If the Manifest Loyalty Shrine’s location in Peking’s Inner City had made it inaccessible to those from “far and near” for the first seven decades of its existence, spatial constraints had created a more prosaic problem: how to find room in the shrine for the growing number of spirit tablets of officers and soldiers killed in Qing military
campaigns. This problem did not figure into Yongzheng’s decision on the establishment of the shrine. However, it had significant effects on both the timing and direction of changes to the shrine under Qianlong and Jiaqing. The building of prefectural shrines during the Jiaqing reign was not simply the product of an individual emperor’s political agenda, but was tied to a slowly thickening history of tablets.

It will be useful to begin with a description of the shrine and its location. The shrine was located near the corner of East Chang’ an street and Chongwen street, two major thoroughfares in the southeastern section of the Inner City (Maps 2.1 and 2.2). It was approximately two kilometers to the east of the Forbidden City. To the east of the shrine, between the shrine and Chongwen street, were residential dwellings and the Huacheng temple (化成寺). To the west was a sutra block storage complex (jingban ku 經版庫). To the south were more residences. The shrine was separated by only one block from the Tangzi, a temple “intended for the private shamanistic rites of the Manchu elite” (Maps 2.1 and 2.2), including offerings to ensure success in military campaigns.

The proximity to the Tangzi may have been coincidental. There is no other evidence that shrine’s proximity to the Forbidden City or the nature of the surrounding compounds had anything do with the selection of the site. The site, rather, had become available as a result of an incident in 1723 that had left it fortuitously unoccupied. Up to

69 The southeastern section of the Inner City housed members of the Solid Blue Banners. The shrine was located off of East Chang’an street 東長安, close to the corner of Chongwen street 崇文. See map in Ch‘ien-lung ching-ch’eng ch’uan t’u 乾隆京城全圖 (photo-lithographed edition) (1750; reprint, 1940).
70 I have not found information on either of these.
71 Naquin, Peking, p. 384.
72 Rawski, Last Emperors, p. 237.
Map 2.1 The Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Peking
Source: Jingshi quantu (between 1736 and 1795)
Map 2.2. The Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Peking (the shrine is the compound in the center of the image)
Source: Qianlong-era map of Peking (ca. 1750; photo-litograph 1940) (http://dsr.nii.ac.jp/toyobunko/ll-11-D-802/V-10/page-hr/0005.html.en)
1723, the future shrine was a mansion housing descendants of Yuele 岳樂 (1625-1689), a grandson of the Qing founder Nurhaci (1559-1626). In the late Kangxi reign, the mansion was occupied by a grandson of Yuele named Wuerzhan 吳爾占 (dates?). Wuerzhan had the misfortune of being closely associated with Kangxi’s son Yinsi 廬袓 (1681-1726), one of Yongzheng’s main competitors for the throne. It was likely this association—and not the charges of ingratitude, slander, and fraternal discord that we read about in the *Veritable Records*—that led Yongzheng to expel Wuerzhan and his brothers from the imperial clan and send them off into exile. Renovations to convert the mansion into a shrine began about a year after Wuerzhan’s expulsion.

When renovations were completed in 1732, as I have noted, the names of 10,307 soldiers and 799 officers killed during the conquest period and first century of Qing rule were inscribed on tablets and installed on niches above the altars. The names of those who had died were engraved into wooden memorial tablets (*paiwei* 牌位) in both

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73 Aixin Jueluo Hengshun 爱新觉罗恒顺, “Qing dai Beijing zongshi wanggong fu di quanmian kaoshu 清代北京宗室王公府第全面考察,” *Manzu yanjiu* 1 (1998): 48. See also the biography of Yuele ("Yolo") in ECCP. Susan Naquin noted that princely mansions were occasionally converted to use as temples. Naquin, *Peking*, p. 392.
74 Zhang Shuangzhi 張雙志, “Yongzheng jiwei xin jie 雍正繼位新解,” *Qing shi yanjiu* 11.4 (2007): 79. The daughter of another grandson of Yuele was the wife of Yinsi.
75 The accusations are in QSL YZ1/3/13, p. 116b-117a.
76 Unfortunately, there are no detailed illustrations or photographs of the shrine from this period or later (the shrine and its surroundings were razed to make way for the building of a legation quarter following the Boxer Uprising [1898-1900]; the site of the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was used for the Austrian Embassy). The best description of the shrine is in the Guangxu-era (r. 1875-1908) Shuntian prefectural gazetteer. According to this description, the shrine was located in a walled compound whose main entrance was flanked by two stone lions. All the central buildings (*zhengwu* 正屋) and gates (*men* 門) were covered with green glazed tiles (緑琉璃瓦). The capping tiles (*tongwa* 隔瓦) and gate frames (*menying* 門檐) were red (*danhuo* 丹纓), and the rafters and beams (*liangdong* 梁棟) were painted in various colors (*wucai* 五彩). Along with open courtyards, the shrine had a total of sixty-four rooms, thirty-six small rooms reserved for regular soldiers (*bingding* 兵丁) and twenty-eight larger rooms reserved for officers and Grand Ministers (*dachen* 大臣). See *Shuntian fu zhi*, “Jing shi zhi,” j.6.35b. Based on my own estimates, the entire area occupied by the shrine complex was approximately one hundred metres in length and one hundred metres wide. On the completion of renovations and number of initially enshrined, see GXHDSL j.449.YZ7.
77 In some sources, these tablets were referred to as *muzhu* 木主.
Fig 2.1. Interior Layout of the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine
Source: Qinding Da Qing huidian tu, j.18.17.
Manchu and Chinese script. The tablets for deceased officers, described in detail in the regulations of the Board of Works, were 38.6 cm (1 chi 3 cun) in height, 14.4 cm (4 cun 5 fen) in width, 2.4 cm (7 fen 5 li) in depth; their base measured 8.64 cm (2 cun 7 fen) in height, 17.6 cm (5 cun 5 fen) in width, and 13.44 cm (4 cun 2 fen) in depth. The tablets of all officers—apart from those of the Grand Ministers residing in the main central building—were placed in two rows (liangceng 兩層). Those of soldiers occupied five rows (wuceng 五層). A diagram of the interior layout of the shrine was included in the Jiaqing Collected Statutes (Fig. 2.1).

The materiality of these tablets is important to keep in mind. The shrine had initially been able to hold approximately 1,700 officers’ tablets and about 15,000 soldiers’ tablets. Over the next sixty years, more than 42,000 were added, reflecting both the massive military campaigns of the eighteenth century and a liberalization of some criteria for enshrining war dead.

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78 *Qinding Gongbu xuzeng zeli* 欽定工部續增則例 (1819), j.87.3a. Note: 1 chi was approximately 32 cm (12.5 inches); 1 cun was approximately 3.2 cm (1.25 inches); 1 fen was 0.32 cm (0.125 inches); 1 li was 0.032 cm (0.0125 inches). See Wilkinson, *Chinese History*, pp. 236-8. I have not found information on the size of soldiers’ tablets—the regulations note only that they were to be the same size as the tablets for chaste widows (jiefu 靄婦), the size of which was also not provided in this source.

79 GXHDSL j.449.YZ4.

80 On campaigns in the eighteenth century, see for example: Peter Purdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University, 2005), and Dai Yingcong, “A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty,” *Modern Asian Studies* 38.1 (2004): 145-188. On the liberalization of criteria: in 1760, the first enshrining of officers’ slaves who died in battle (官兵奴僕陣亡) was approved (GXHDSL j.449.QL25); in 1761, the first record of the enshrining of an officer who did not die in battle but had a long record of service (GXHDSL j.449.QL26); in 1762, more than 10,000 war dead who had “slipped through the cracks” were enshrined (從前遺漏未經祀祀之陣亡人員) (GXHDSL j.449.QL27). On liberalization, see also Meyer-Fong, *What Remains*, p. 140. Note that there had been no enshrinement during most of the Yongzheng reign (after the initial round). This may have been the result of a falsified report submitted by a Han Bannerman named Li Xi 李禧, claiming that officers had died in battle when, in fact, they had died of other causes (NGDK 020345, QL1/6/21). The punishment Li received apparently discouraged others from submitting requests for the enshrining of fallen troops during the Yongzheng reign. It is possible that even with the liberalization of criteria for enshrinement, not all the war dead of the eighteenth century were actually enshrined. To give just one example, Dai Yingcong suggested
In 1753, this constant stream of tablets for the battle dead was beginning to cause problems at the shrine. In this year, the names of 3,910 fallen troops from the recently concluded Jinchuan campaign 金川 (1747-1749) in Sichuan had been sent to the capital for processing. Tablets inscribed and delivered by the Board of Works overwhelmed the capacity of the shrine. Faced with the prospect of hundreds of tablets sitting in the shrine’s courtyard, an unidentified official from the office in charge of producing the Collected Statutes (Huidian guan 會典館), a compendium of regulations and precedents of the Qing government, drafted a communication to the Board of Rites in which he proposed removing soldiers’ (bingding 兵丁) tablets to an open area (xidi 隱地) behind the shrine where they would receive the requisite offerings before being burned, buried, and entered for posterity into a record book. His implication seems to have been that unhoused officers’ tablets could be placed in the areas thus freed up. The proposal, despite an appeal to the Classic of Rites (Liji 禮記), was not followed. Soldiers’ tablets

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81 On the first Jinchuan campaign, see Dai, “The Qing State, Merchants, and the Military Labor Force.” She notes that approximately 70,000 troops were involved in this campaign (p. 37). The process leading to enshrinement was described in the Qianlong edition of the Qinding Libu zeli 欽定禮部則例 (1784-1795). First, a request for posthumous reward was sent from field officers to the Board of War; the Board of War forwarded this request to the Board of Rites, which determined eligibility for enshrinement; if the deceased person was deemed eligible, a communication was sent back to the Board of War asking for the native place and accomplishments of the person; the Board of War sent this information to the Hanlin Academy, where a biography would be composed and the person’s name written in Chinese and Manchu; the name written by the Hanlin Academy would then be forwarded to the Board of Works and inscribed on a tablet to be placed in the shrine (Ibid., j.126.1a-3a).

82 NGDK 194707, QL18/7/29.

83 In the communication, the official quoted a passage from the “Methods for Offerings” (jifa 祭法) chapter of the Classic of Rites which provided guidelines for gradually displacing ancestors from the ancestral sacrifices: “In the ‘Methods for Offerings’ [we learn] that in their temple offerings, people of ancient times still had the system of removing the tablet from the ancestral temple and making an altar, and removing the altar to make a level area” (祭法古人廟霊尚有去祧為壇去壇為壇之制). The attempt to understand state offerings in terms of classical precedents seems to have been part of the duties of the compilers of the Collected Statutes. See, for instance, Charles Wooldridge,
were not burned, but allowed to overflow into tiered niches (kan 亾) built in the verandas (wu 廝) of the existing buildings; the overcrowding of officers’ tablets was resolved by increasing the density of tablets in the rooms of lower-ranking officers, reorganizing tablets, and imposing on all tablets a general temporal order.

There were several principles that appear to have guided the response to the 1753 crisis: (1) additional space could not be created by removing or materially altering the tablets (whether by burning, decreasing their size, or gradually displacing them in accordance with principles in the Classics); (2) the symbolic weighting of space in the shrine—signified by the positioning and density of tablets among the fifty-five rooms and eight verandas—could not be sacrificed in the interest of freeing up space; (3) space could not be increased by expanding outside the land already occupied by the shrine, whether into immediately adjoining land or a separate plot; (4) and, finally, it was preferable to increase the density of tablets in an existing building before considering the construction of another.


GXHDSL j.449.QL18. “The verandas in front and back total eight. Each niche should be divided up with horizontal boards, and [tablets] placed in order” (計前後廊共八處應將各箇皆以横板隔別次第安設).

GXHDSL j.449.QL18. At the same time, a general round of renovations was carried out. Judging by the report in the Grand Secretariat archives, the shrine had fallen into a state of disrepair in the nearly thirty years since its establishment. The cost of repairs was a modest 1,240 ounces of silver (NGDK 021172, QL17/5/22).

One of the reasons for this may have been the fact that the tablets in the various shrines were characterized by what we might call inter-artifactuality: for instance, those of the Xianliang 贊良 shrine were supposed to be larger, those of the Chaste and Filial Shrine were supposed to be smaller, and those of soldiers were to be the same size as those for chaste women (jiefu 節婦). To change the size of one set of tablets would also be to disrupt this set of dimensional relations. See Qinding Gongbu xu zeli, j.87.

In 1753, expansion would have required the transfer of lands already being used for other purposes. To the east of the shrine was the Huacheng temple 化成寺, to the west was a sutra storehouse (jingban ku 經版庫), to the north was a compound likely related to the shrine, and to the south a dense network of alleys.
An exploration of these principles would take me beyond the concerns of this chapter, but it should be noted that their adoption ensured that any solution to overcrowding would only be temporary unless there were no further wars. In 1753, the crisis was, to borrow the words of William Sewell, “neutralized and reabsorbed into the preexisting structures in one way or another.” At the same time, the conservative nature of the principles—in combination with the crowded conditions of the Inner City and new wars—ensured that the shrine would continue to be susceptible to crises requiring increasingly innovative spatial fixes. Later crises might be reabsorbed, but reabsorption would be difficult without abandoning at least one of these principles.

Factors Shaping the 1802 Expansion of Shrines to Prefectural Capitals

With the start of the White Lotus War, the problem of finding space for tablets again arose. From 1796 to 1802, approximately 60,000 tablets had been added to the shrine, more than doubling their number and resulting in another crisis of overcrowding. This crisis had prompted deliberations at the Board of Rites. In 1802, the Minister of the Board, Changlin, made the suggestions I described in the first paragraph of this chapter: adding more niches to the existing shrine or choosing a site for an additional shrine. We can now see that Changlin was drawing on a tradition of modest

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88 William Sewell, in his discussion of the effects of events on historical change, argued that most “ruptures” do not result in structural change but are reabsorbed, “Historical Events as Transformations of Structures,” Theory and Society 25.6 (Dec., 1996): 843.

89 Unfortunately, there is no precise record of population density in Qing Peking. However, Susan Naquin has noted that the number of banner companies in the city increased over the eighteenth century, indicating a growing population. See Naquin, Peking, p. 395.

90 I compiled these numbers from GXHDSL j.449. The total number up to the White Lotus War was 52,229; the total number enshrined during the first seven years of the White Lotus was 59,594. Changlin’s memorial, composed before the end of 1802 gave a smaller total for those enshrined during the course of the White Lotus War: 1,640 officers and 50,600 troops. He noted in the memorial, however, that an unspecified number were still awaiting processing by the Board of Rites (NGDK 195356). The total number of war dead during the rebellion, based on the total of those enshrined was 87,381. See GXHDSL j.449-451.

91 NGDK 195356, JQ7/11/14.
renovations established in 1753. However, these modest approaches may have seemed inadequate given the scale of the problem in 1802. There does appear to have been open space in the shrine courtyard (Fig. 2.2), but the insertion of new buildings into the courtyard would have disrupted the twice-annual rituals performed here.\(^9\)\(^2\) As for the second option, any decision to construct a shrine on a second site in Peking would have had to confront an already crowded Inner City (Maps 2.1 and 2.2). Neither proposal would have been a long-term solution of the problem of overcrowding.

Jiaqing may have been aware that renovations, like those made in 1753, would ultimately be only a short-term fix to the problem of overcrowding. Not surprisingly, his solution showed a concern with resolving once and for all this problem. He ordered, as I have already noted, the building of hundreds of new Manifest Loyalty Shrines in prefectural cities, thereby opening a great deal more space for tablets. He also decided that tablets could be materially altered to allow more names to be fit into a restricted space. Rather than a single tablet for each of the dead, he ordered that tablets be inscribed with fifty names.\(^9\)\(^3\) These fifty-name tablets were to be housed in small shrines comprised of three bays (sanying 三楹), thus retaining a hierarchical division between higher-ranking officers (in the middle) and soldiers and irregulars on the two sides.\(^9\)\(^4\)

Yet, if the emperor had shrine space on his mind, there was more to his decision than pragmatic considerations. The details of expansion and shrine layout provide a clue

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\(^9\)\(^2\) On these rituals, see the *Baqi tongzhi chuji*, j.57, pp. 1128-1130.

\(^9\)\(^3\) He initially ordered that the makers of the tablets for prefectural shrines should consider the number of souls to be enshrined and the available space in the shrine before making a decision about whether to inscribe “ten or one hundred” names on each tablet. He later ordered that all tablets placed in prefectural shrines have space for fifty names. GXHDSL j.451.JQ7.

\(^9\)\(^4\) These shrines were sometimes built from scratch, and sometimes produced by renovations to existing buildings. For instance, in Dajianlu subprefecture, Sichuan, an existing one-bay shrine for the war dead was renovated in keeping with the edict: Tuchanga 圖彥阿, a military officer, added two rooms and divided the tablets of officers and soldiers (分別官兵位次設立案主). *Sichuan tongzhi* (1815), j.36.45a.
that the decision to expand the shrines beyond the Peking site also had roots in the factional politics and shifting political approaches of the late Qianlong and early Jiaqing reigns. The link between the 1802 decision and the changing fortunes of political factions in the Jiaqing court is suggested by an incident in 1793. In this year there had already been concerns among officials in Peking that the shrine’s tablet capacity was about to be overwhelmed. A proposal was made that space might be freed up by having all tablets, including those of high-ranking officers, inscribed with multiple names. Two officials had expressed strong opposition. One was Agui 阿桂 (1717-1797), a Grand Councilor. The other was Fashishan (1753-1818), a Mongol bannerman and jinshi degree holder serving as chancellor (jijiu 祭酒; 4b). There is no detailed record of Agui’s views on the matter. However, a brief note in a biography of Fashishan summarized his opinion that inscribing multiple names on one tablet was possible for soldiers (bingding 兵丁), but “impermissible” (buke 不可) for officers.

Fashishan’s suggestion that multiple names be inscribed on a single tablet had not been approved, perhaps because he, along with Agui, was a leading figure among those at court who opposed the increasingly powerful Heshen, a man who would become notorious for his corrupt handling of political affairs in the late Qianlong reign. While Agui had resigned from the Grand Council in 1796 and died before Jiaqing’s accession to power, Fashishan came to wield substantial influence after 1799. According to James

95 Hucker noted that the chancellor was “head of the top-echelon educational agency in the dynastic capital ... the Directorate of Education (kuo-tzu chien).” Charles Hucker, A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), # 542. Brunnert and Hagelstrom noted, in addition, that the post was held by one Manchu and one Chinese; the literary designation was dasicheng 大司成. Brunnert and Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization, 412a.

96 Qian Lin, comp., Wen xian zheng cun lu 文獻徵存錄 (1858; reprint, QDZJ vol. 10), j.5.102a-b. This biography of Fashishan noted that the practice of squeezing the names of several soldiers onto a single tablet through the use of “narrow characters” (xi zi 緰字) had actually already been implemented. This practice was not noted in the official regulations.
Polachek, he would be one of those to whom “the [Jiaqing] emperor habitually turned whenever he wished to bypass entrenched bureaucratic evaluations.”

Fashishan’s arguments from 1793 were reflected in Jiaqing’s directions for the layout of the shrines in 1802, suggesting that he may have advised the emperor on the matter of the shrines. Like Fashishan, Jiaqing expressed his opposition to any change that would blur hierarchical distinctions between the higher and lower ranks; at the same time, he endorsed the engraving of multiple names on a single tablet as a way of dealing with the problem of overcrowding.

Jiaqing’s decision to establish shrines in prefectural capitals points not only to a piecemeal incorporation of the ideas of individual councilors, but also to the influence of a larger agenda, which Wang Wensheng has described as a desire to encourage “local mobilization under gentry leadership.” Indeed, an interest in activating relations between the shrines and local gentry (or local society more broadly) can be seen running through the three justifications that Jiaqing offered for expanding the shrines. In his edict on the building of the prefectural shrines, he stated: “the majority of the government troops (guanbing) who have died in battle (zhenwang) have come from the various provinces. In addition, there are the xiangyong who have been recruited in each place. The [government troops] are not all bannermen or residents of Shuntian prefecture.”

97 Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, p. 42. Wang Wensheng argued that Fashishan’s regular ceremonial and literary activities in memory of Ming officials martyred for principled stands at court had served as camouflage for criticism and dissent against Heshen. In a poetry club established in the 1790s, Fashishan commemorated Ming officials killed for their “righteous remonstrance against formidable Heshen-like villains at court.” Wang, *White Lotus Rebels*, p. 156.

98 Of course, these commonalities are not necessarily signs of Fashishan’s role in guiding Jiaqing’s decision. However, we will see later in the chapter there is more evidence that men closely connected to Fashishan may have played a role in implementing the policy in the provinces.


100 陣亡官兵等撫調各省者居多且有各處召募鄉勇非盡係八旗及順天府屬之人. *Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao* 清朝續文獻通考 (Reprint, Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshu guan, 1987), j.167, pp. 9180b-9181b.
On the surface of things, these three features—the use of Green Standard troops (Han Chinese) from several provinces, the reliance on a large number of paramilitary forces and local militias (referred to collectively here as xiangyong), and the diminishing reliance on Banner troops (Manchu and Mongol) from the capital area—were not unique to the White Lotus War. The reliance on Green Standard troops from several provinces had been true of the Jinchuan campaign that preceded the crisis of overcrowding in 1753, for instance. Xiangyong, too, had been used in earlier campaigns. However, the three features together helped the emperor to articulate a novel understanding of the relation between the Manifest Loyalty shrines and the local, a term that I use here to denote subprovincial administrative jurisdictions and a geographically defined community with shared experiences, native place identity, and personal bonds. With his statement that that those killed in White Lotus War were not all “bannermen” or residents of “Shuntian,” the emperor redefined the Peking shrine as itself a local shrine, containing the tablets of those who died in Shuntian prefecture (Peking) and aimed at an audience of Shuntian residents. The emperor did not mention that bannermen or Shuntian natives had only ever been a small minority of those enshrined in Peking. With his reference to xiangyong, the emperor drew on the stereotype of xiangyong as local militiamen, with direct and identifiable links to their native places. He conveniently ignored the other characterization of xiangyong: roving paramilitaries or auxiliary forces that he himself had described as “vagrants without occupation” (無業遊民). In his justification for the shrines, xiangyong seem to have served as a metonym for all those who protected their

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101 Xiangyong had been used in the Three Feudatories rebellion and in the Taiwan campaign.
102 For instance, in the 1739 General History of the Eight Banners, a complete list of all Banner officers and soldiers enshrined in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine included only 1,125 officers and 1,477 soldiers. By this time, there were more than 11,000 enshrined altogether, meaning that bannermen constituted only about one quarter of those enshrined. Baqi tongzhi chuji j.57, pp. 1052-1128.
103 QSL JQ8/6/18, p. 523b.
own communities during the suppression campaign, participation that he deemed deserved recognition through the building of the prefectural shrines. With his reference to troops from all provinces, he justified the building of the shrines in locales across the empire. Much like the first two elements, this obscured certain realities on the ground. In this case, the emperor overlooked the fact that the vast majority of troops had come from a few surrounding provinces. As we shall see shortly, this fact would later affect the implementation of the shrine-building project in the eastern provinces.

The rather determined misreading of the Peking shrine, the identities of xiangyong, and the origins of troops in the campaign suggest that the building of prefectural shrines was not a necessary response to overcrowding, but rather wrapped up in an intentional devolution of central powers characteristic of the early years of the Jiaqing reign. At the same time, it is important to point out that this devolutionary aspect of the shrine-building project was combined in the same edict with an integrative aspect. While the building of the prefectural shrines constituted a shift in the administration of war commemoration from the central government to local officials and elites, the emperor also ordered that the shrines be brought into relation with the state cult, the standard set of government-funded and managed shrines, temples, and altars that could be found in each of the empire’s administrative cities. The emperor did not simply hand commemoration of the war dead over to community leaders and local officials, but rather seems to have seen commemoration of the war dead as a way to integrate communities with the center through the framework of the state cult.

104 Various manifestations of this shift have been discussed in recent scholarship by Han Seunghyun and Wang Wensheng. Han Seunghyun, for instance, argued that the early nineteenth-century state “became increasingly concerned about how to enlist the cooperation and aid of local elites,” including an openness to the “enshrinement of local worthies.” Han Seunghyun, “Bandit or Hero? Memories of Zhang Shicheng in Late Imperial and Republican Suzhou,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 68.2 (Dec., 2008): 140, 161.
Jiaqing’s Vision for the Integration of Prefectural Shrines into the State Cult

Jiaqing laid out his vision for the integration of the shrines through the state cult in his 1802 edict. He asserted that the shrines and rituals would provide residence for the loyal souls (antuo zhonghun 安妥忠魂) of those who died and allow them to remain in their native lands (ling ge yi gutu 令各依故土); for the living, the shrines and rituals would produce shared sentiments among the townspeople and family members who came together to observe and listen (鄉闕親屬共觀共聞互知感發).\(^\text{105}\) He went on to explain that the gathering of community and family at the shrine for sacrifices to the dead could also be expected to bring awareness of the “beauty of the dynasty’s principles and clarity of its grace.”\(^\text{106}\) Finally, he turned to the question of the siting of the shrines. “There is nothing better,” he asserted, “than to see whether the Guandi or City God temples of each prefectural city have room to expand, and then enshrine [the war dead] and carry out offerings.\(^\text{107}\)

The envisioned functions of the shrine were similar to those that had been expressed on earlier occasions by Yongzheng. Like Jiaqing, Yongzheng had insisted that family members of those in the shrine should attend the rituals for the dead; he had also asserted that those who saw the arrayed tablets and attended rituals would be filled with loyalty and righteousness (勃然生忠義之心).\(^\text{108}\) Yongzheng had not, however, said anything about the siting of the shrine in a larger commemorative landscape. Instead, he established the Peking shrine in a location that had no apparent symbolic or spiritual relations to surrounding sites, with the possible exception of the Tangzi. Its location in

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\(^{105}\) These aims were expressed in the edict, available in the *Qingchao xu wenxiao tongkao* 清朝續文獻通考 j.167, pp. 9180b-9181b

\(^{106}\) The Chinese text reads: 繼祭不特忠魂咸依故土亦使其鄉闕親屬共見共聞益知國家誼美恩明倍生激勵. Ibid.

\(^{107}\) The Chinese text reads: 莫於外省各府城內如關帝廟城隍廟地址有可展拓者祔祠從祀. Ibid.

\(^{108}\) GXHDSL j.449.YZ2.
the Inner City seems to have been guided pragmatically by the availability of a capacious mansion in the Inner City.

The prefectural shrines, in contrast, were conceived quite explicitly in relation to the state cult. The shrines were to function not only by bringing war commemoration closer to the families of those killed in war, but by activating relationships between the shrine and other sites of state-sponsored worship—the Guandi and City God temples. Whereas Yongzheng had suggested that visitors could have a more or less unmediated relation to the shrine, being moved to loyalty and righteousness by simply participating in rituals at the shrine, Jiaqing understood the function of the shrines to depend, in part at least, on the larger functioning of the state cult.

It is worth considering why Jiaqing may have singled out these two temples as the preferred sites for the Manifest Loyalty Shrines. Given his concern with the visibility of the shrines, we might posit that one of his reasons was their popularity. Much scholarship has shown that both temples were not only present in all administrative cities but also frequented by a broad constituency, including commoners and officials. This was in rather stark contrast to some other sites of the state cult, such as the forlorn Shrines for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial (usually of interest only to officials and examination candidates). It is also likely that the qualities of the deities who occupied these temples accorded with Jiaqing’s intention to use the Manifest Loyalty Shrines to both draw attention to the dynasty’s military power and cultivate the relation between imperial

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109 QSL YZ2/10/13, p. 391a.
110 Stephan Feuchtwang claimed that the City God, Tianhou, and Guandi temples were more often sponsored by commoners than officials and gentry, unlike most of the other temples in the state cult; the City God temples were also, he writes, the sites “of markets and all other kinds of je-nao.” “School-Temple and City God,” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), pp. 585, 589. See also Wu Jen-shu, “Jieqing xinyang yu kangzheng 節慶信仰與抗爭,” Zhongyang yanjiu yuan jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan 34 (Minguo 89.12 [Dec., 2000]): 184.
subjects, local communities, and the dynasty. Guandi, an apotheosized hero from the Three Kingdoms period, had well-known associations with the military. During the Qing, he was often described as a source of divine assistance in battle and a protector of local communities.\textsuperscript{111} The dynasty awarded him a series of titles through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in recognition of his military contributions.\textsuperscript{112} The City God’s relations to the military were less direct. According to Stephan Feuchtwang, in Taiwan at least he was often worshipped “in association with military gods.”\textsuperscript{113} Jiaqing may also have been aware of his role as the overseer of offerings at the altar for abandoned spirits (\textit{litan} 厝壝), as established in the Ming dynasty.\textsuperscript{114} While the role of the City God as overseer of the \textit{litan} was no longer officially-endorsed in the Qing, there are indications that City Gods continued to play this role.\textsuperscript{115}

More important in Jiaqing’s considerations, perhaps, was the fact that both Guandi and the City God were closely associated with the conceptualization of the relationship between local communities and the larger Qing realm. Prasenjit Duara claimed that Guandi “symbolized the relationship of the village with the outside—with

\textsuperscript{111} For instance, in the \textit{Xuanhan xian zhi} 宣漢縣志 (1931) the record of the rebuilding of the Guandi temple in the Jiaqing reign reads: “He was truly outstanding in protecting Our Dynasty and sweeping away the bandit-types” 其捍衛我朝掃除匪類真有著, j.3.16a. Later in the Jiaqing reign, Guandi was promoted for his assistance against the millenarian rebels. He was again promoted for his assistance in a campaign in the northwest against Jehangir in 1828. On his promotion during the former rebellion, see Susan Naquin, \textit{Millenarian Rebellion in China: The Eight Trigrams Uprising of 1813} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), p. 338, f. 102. On the latter see Laura Newby, \textit{The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c.1760-1860} (Leiden: Brill, 2005). Naquin, \textit{Peking}, p. 327.

\textsuperscript{112} Feuchtwang, “School-Temple and City God,” p. 586.


\textsuperscript{114} Wu, \textit{Jibian liangmin}, p. 143.
wider categories such as the state, empire, and national culture.”

As for the City God, Angela Zito suggested that this god not only helped to protect the local community, but was closely associated with local officials, occupying a sort of parallel bureaucratic structure. Both sites, in other words, would have served the dual function of amplifying the effect of the shrines for local communities (by making the Qing war dead analogous to the great heroes of past dynasties like Guandi; by ensuring proper oversight of their spirits), and providing a channel for bringing these local shrines into relation with the dynasty through the state cult.

This interpretation of the emperor’s decision is given credence by the responses of a number of local officials who commented on the building of the shrines. In Yunyang prefecture (Yun county), Hubei, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was built in 1803 next to a recently renovated Guandi temple. The magistrate of Yun county, Gao Cixi (jinshi 1790), traced the selection of the site for the shrine to comments made by an important provincial official who had passed through Yunyang in 1801—Henan lieutenant governor, Fang Weidian (方維甸). Gao recalled that he had given Fang a tour of the Guandi temple, during which Fang reflected on the recent battles with White Lotus forces and made laudatory comments regarding the locals’ resistance: “a task to which they had dedicated themselves even to the point of death” (yi si qin shi 死勤事). According to Gao, Fang then suggested that it would be fitting if those who had

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116 Prasenjit Duara, “Superscribing Symbols,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 47.4 (Nov., 1988): 786. He was also commonly associated with the value expressed through the death of those who had died in battle, “loyalty” (zhong 忠). Duara argued that “of all the possible interpretations of Guandi … the most common was the one that invested him with Confucian virtues and loyalty to established authority.” Prasenjit Duara, *Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), p. 144.


118 Fang did not have jurisdiction over Hubei, but happened to be stationed (zhu 駐) nearby. *Yun xian zhi*, j.10.13b.
died were given offerings beside the Guandi temple.119

Shortly after the order was received to construct prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrines in 1802, Fang composed a record for the Guandi temple in Yunyang in which he further explained the logic of the relation between the war dead and Guandi.120 Fang began his explanation by referring to a “mutual resonance” (xianggan 相感) between the commendable actions of the people of Yunyang prefecture and the “loyal and righteous heart” (zhongyi zhi xin 忠義之心) of Guandi. He then moved on to explain the important role of Guandi in localizing war commemoration. Fang’s explanation substantiated Prasenjit Duara’s argument that Guandi “symbolized the relationship of the village with the outside.”121 For Fang, Guandi offered a framework through which the benefits of offerings to the battle dead—formerly restricted to the capital—could be extended into prefectures and counties.122 As Fang put it, Guandi’s merit was not restricted to his own time, but extended as a constant and expansive support for “moral teachings” (mingjiao 名教) through myriad generations (惟帝之功施未竟於當時而植網常扶名教足以垂範於萬世). In other words, by bringing the local war dead into relation with Guandi, the significance of their deaths would be linked symbolically to an empirewide framework and bring to the local benefits that had been formerly restricted to the capital.

119 Yun xian zhi (1866), j.10.13.
120 Yun xian zhi (1866), j.10.10-13.
122 Fang referred specifically to ceremonies performed for military generals in the Zhou and Tang dynasties: in the Zhou, the left ears of enemies would be delivered to the Pan Palace (Pan gong 洋宮), and military sacrifices were offered to/for the emperor (alone?). In the Tang dynasty, according to Fang, the ceremonies commemorating war were restricted to the emperor and other men of high status; they were not extended to the prefectures and counties (非郡邑可通祀).
Significantly, Fang also suggested that Guandi served to link the actions of the war dead into a tradition of moral teachings that transcended the concerns of the present: the building of the shrine next to the Guandi temple would endow the war dead with a timeless significance.

Gao Cixi’s explanation for the building of the shrine next to the Guandi temple took a somewhat different tack from Fang’s, but like Fang’s emphasized the relations with other sites of the state cult. He explained that while the emperor had not prescribed a single location for the shrine, carrying out rites for the war dead next to the Guandi temple had an appropriateness (yi 義) that was analogous to the placing of the shrine of local worthies next to the school (xuegong 學宮). That is, Gao articulated the emperor’s order within the spatial logic of the state cult in which shrines and temples not only displayed values important to the state but also created a variety of mutually beneficial relationships with other sites, including an amplified didacticism.

Both Fang and Gao, then, represented the building of the shrine not only as a direct presentation of the honored battle dead to their family and communities, but rather in terms of its coming into relation with other sites of the state cult. This, they suggested, had two benefits. First, the relations created would increase the didactic power of the shrine by revealing commonalities between the loyalty of Guandi and the loyalty of the local war dead. Second, through resonance, the shrine would enhance Guandi’s role as protector of the community.

Like Fang and Gao, many local officials tasked with building the shrines showed a concern with the ways in which the dead related to members of the communities in which the shrines were built. Many also attempted to bring the shrines into relation with

124  Yun xian zhi (1866), j.10.14a.
existing commemorative or religious sites, including temples and shrines associated with the state cult. At the same time, the integrative function of the shrines—based on their relation to the state cult—in many cases gave way to local contingencies. The building project revealed the prevailing influence of traditions and representational spaces outside the auspices of the central government. Thus, while some shrines—like the one in Hanyang, Hubei, were built next to or within the compound of a Guandi temple (Fig 2.2)—those who attempted to understand the integrative function of the shrines through their relation to Guandi or the City God were a distinct minority. As we shall see in the following sections, many of the newly built shrines became sites not for the instantiation of an official culture of war, but rather for cultural practices with significance tied deeply to the local.

The Shrines and Local Interests

By the late spring of 1803, governors and governors-general had begun to submit reports on the building of prefectural shrines. They relayed news from officials charged with overseeing the building project in prefectural capitals—prefects, circuit intendants, and lieutenant governors—and detailed their own efforts to ensure that shrines in the provincial capitals accorded to standards. The project, by all extant reports, was completed on schedule. But the implementation of the project had also resulted in two significant modifications to the original plan, both of which downplayed the integrative aspect of the shrines. First, there was a push by provincial officials to detach the shrines from their particular relation to the White Lotus War and make them serve local

125 See, for instance, ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-006 from Henan governor Ma Huiyu; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-010 from Guizhou governor Fuqing; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-009 from Guangxi governor Sun Yuting; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-010 from Anhui governor Alinbao; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-014 from Hunan Governor Gao Qi; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-18 from Liangjiang governor-general Fei Chun; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-018 from ShaanGan governor-general Huiling; ZPZZ from Jiangxi governor Qin Cheng’en; ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-084 from Hubei governor Quanbao.
Figure 2.2 A Manifest Loyalty Shrine inside a Guandi Temple in Hanyang, Hubei
Source: Hanyang xian zhi (1868).
memories. Second, many of the shrines were not built next to Guandi or City God temples, but in locations determined by a diverse range of local concerns and spatial constraints.

The push to open the shrines to locally-important memories began almost immediately after the order to build prefectural shrines had been transmitted to the provinces. Jiaqing’s 1802 edict had specified that the shrines hold the tablets of men killed in the White Lotus War and 1795 Miao Uprising in Guizhou. We can see here echoes of practices during the Qianlong reign, when nearly all official war commemoration apart from the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine had been designed to commemorate a particular campaign rather than provide a general valorization of loyalty. However, this relationship between commemoration and event would prove untenable for the new shrines. As memorials came in from governors and governors-general, the emperor quickly approved requests to allow the enshrinement of men killed in other conflicts.  

The first to submit a request for enshrinement of those killed in other conflicts was Zhejiang governor Ruan Yuan (1764-1849). Zhejiang had seen many men die in ongoing sea battles with pirates. In 1803 Ruan requested that the troops killed in these battles be approved for enshrinement in the newly built Manifest Loyalty Shrines. In response, the Board of Rites sent a communication to other governors notifying them that the shrines were not to be restricted to those who had fought against the White Lotus

126 In some cases, as I discuss in the second half of the chapter, the shrines were actually used to house not only men from the Qing, but also local figures from as far back as the Song dynasty. This was true in Sichuan, as well as other provinces such as Hubei. For an example of the latter, see the zhongyi 忠義 biographies in the Yichang fu zhi.

rebels. Similar requests came from other governors. A memorial from the governor of Guangxi, Sun Yuting 孫玉庭 (1752-1834), noted that “it was only natural (ziying 自應) that those who had died in an incident involving Miao bandits in Guangxi should also be investigated and [have their tablets] produced (chazao 查造) along with those who had served in Sichuan and Hubei [a reference to the White Lotus campaign].” In Anhui, governor Alinbao 阿林保 (?-1809) requested that the shrine in Suzhou be allowed to house those killed in a minor uprising led by Wang Chaoming 王朝名 in the previous year.

From the perspective of these officials, the effective functioning of the shrines appears to have depended less on their promotion of loyalty to the Qing dynasty than immediate connections between the dead and living. Ruan Yuan noted, for instance, that the enshrining of those killed in conflicts with pirates in Zhejiang would not only serve to “comfort their loyal souls” but would cause other soldiers (guanbing) involved in the counterpiracy operations to be spurred on (倍知奮勵). Their requests, in this regard, basically reflected Jiaqing’s own assumption that the prefectural shrines should address the memories of families and communities of those who had died. However, the officials effectively stripped away the one vestige of Qianlong-style commemoration—the creation of commemorative sites celebrating a single military event—that had slipped into Jiaqing’s decision. In areas unaffected by the rebellion, the shrines were detached from any particular historical connotation, and made available as spaces for honoring loyal acts of local people more generally.

128 Communication (yihui) to Board of Works (NGDK 172945, JQ8/11/12).
129 Communication (yihui) to the Board of Works (NGDK 153632, JQ8/7/28). The date of Sun Yuting’s memorial, which has been copied into the yihui, is unclear.
130 ZPZZ 04-01-14-0048-010 JQ8/6/8, enclosure (fupian 附片).
131 NGDK 177018, JQ8/3/5.
Map 2.3 County Manifest Loyalty Shrines, ca. 1805
Base map and points are from China Historical GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/. Data on shrines compiled from local gazetteers.
In areas that had been affected directly by the war, we can also see an effort by officials to use the shrines to meet local concerns. This was most evident in Sichuan, where provincial and prefectural officials had been particularly active in endorsing the shrine-building effort. There, Manifest Loyalty Shrines were not confined to prefectural cities, as the edict had ordered, but also built in a large number of county cities, one step lower in the administrative hierarchy. As shown by Map 2.3, the number of county shrines built in Sichuan (42) was much greater than surrounding provinces (Hubei: 14; Shaanxi: 9; Guizhou: 13; Gansu: insufficient data). Importantly, the building of additional shrines at the county level was combined in many cases with a greater detachment of the shrines from the one avenue that had linked them up to an empirewide framework—the relation with Guandi and City God temples.

**The Building of County Shrines in Kuizhou Prefecture**

The densest cluster of county shrines that I have been able to identify was in Kuizhou, a prefecture straddling the Yangzi river in northeastern Sichuan that was several times overrun by rebels and government troops during the White Lotus War. By 1803, seven shrines had been established in the prefecture and its six counties: Fengjie, Wan, Kai, Daning, Wushan, and Yunyang (Map 2.4). None of the shrines in Kuizhou were located next to the emperor’s preferred sites, the Guandi or City God temples. Two were next to military training grounds, one was beside a school (xueshu 學署), one was behind a shrine for the Tang poet Du Fu, one was a repurposed Ming-era shrine that happened to be already named the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, one was next to Buddhist temple (Caotang si 草堂寺), and one was built on a mountain some three li from the

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132 According to Dai Yingcong, Kai county had spent hundreds of thousands of ounces of silver on militias in the first three years of the White Lotus War. “Civilians Go into Battle,” p. 14. Some xiangyong from Kai county also rose to regular positions in the military as a result of their contributions. See Kai xian zhi (1853), j.25.11b-12a.
One of the factors contributing to the building of county shrines in Kuizhou is not difficult to ascertain. The prefecture had seen heavy fighting during the White Lotus War. Rebels had first appeared in Kuizhou in 1797 and they passed through the prefecture repeatedly until the end of the war in 1804. The number of casualties over these years was considerable. The Daoguang-era Kuizhou gazetteer listed the names of 3,209 men killed in battle against the White Lotus rebels and enshrined in the prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrine. The hardest-hit counties—Yunyang, Daning, and Fengjie—each counted more than seven hundred killed. At the same time, there were counties in surrounding provinces with an equally large number of dead that did not build county shrines. The building of shrines in Kuizhou reveals, first, the power of officials at the provincial level to modify the central directive; and, second, the intention of both officials and elites at the county level to convert the shrines from sites of centrally-organized commemoration to sites addressing the particular configurations of local power and memory.

In 1802, the Kuizhou prefect, Zhou Jingfu 周景福, received an order from the provincial governor ordering the building of a prefectural shrine. Under the direction of

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133 Kai xian zhi (1853), j.9.2b.  
134 Many counties on the Hubei side of the border also built Manifest Loyalty Shrines near the end of the war. The best record of this building that I have found thus far is for the building of a shrine in Zhushan county, Yunyang prefecture. See the 1807 Zhushan xian zhi, j.3.1a-2a. However, markedly fewer shrines were built in Hubei and Shaanxi in comparison to Sichuan. See Map 2.3.  
135 These events were described in some detail in the Kuizhou fu zhi (1891), j.21.  
136 Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.6b-7a, 9b-57a.  
137 See Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.6b-7a, and Daning xian zhi, j.18.23a, The majority of those listed in local gazetteers were described as militiamen (xiangyong and yimin 義民). However, the lists also include a number of soldiers from local garrisons, gentry (shenshi 紳士), and militia heads (tuanshou 團首). There were undoubtedly many deaths here, as elsewhere, that remained unrecorded.  
138 For instance, no shrine was built in Guang’an department, Sichuan where more than 600 were killed in fighting during the White Lotus War. See Guang’an zhou zhi (1860), j.3-4.
Zhou and Xu Dachun 徐大椿 and Cai Xing 蔡星, magistrates of Fengjie county whose offices were also located in Kuizhou city, the shrine was completed by 1803. In accord with the edict, the building had three bays (sanying 三楹), perhaps not dissimilar to the three-bay shrine built in Gaolan county, Gansu (Fig. 2.3). In each bay there were three layers of niches (kan zuo sanceng 竿座三層) holding tablets engraved with fifty names each. The tablets with names of the officers and gentry who died in battle were in the central room (陣亡員弁紳士設立正中) and arranged according to rank (pinzhi daxiao 品職大小). Tablets for regular troops and irregulars who had been decorated for military merit (jungong bingyong yimin 軍功兵勇義民) were separated and housed in the two side rooms. The total number enshrined was 342 officers and government troops, six gentry (shenshi 紳士), and 2,660 militiamen (xiangyong and yimin 義民). All of these names had been sent to Prefect Zhou by the six county magistrates. While the layout of the shrine accorded with the regulations, the chosen location suggested that the local officials, no doubt in collaboration with local elites, had decided to integrate the shrine not into the state cult but into another sort of translocal framework: sites associated with Chinese cultural heroes. The shrine was built in an empty space (xidi 際地) behind a popular shrine for the famous Tang dynasty poet Du Fu 杜甫 (712–770), who had resided in Kuizhou from 766 to 768.

139 Zhou, a native of Xiangfu county, Henan, served from 1803-1806, and again in 1807. Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.23.5b-6a. He had led a local militia against White Lotus rebels in 1797, while serving as magistrate of Fengjie county. QSL JQ2/9/28, p. 283b. Xu was a native of Rugao county, Jiangsu. Cai was a native of Daxing county, in Shunshan. There is little additional information on their lives.

140 In addition to Xu and Cai, the magistrates at the time were: Wushan xian: a man surnamed Wu from Chong'an xian in Fujian (Kuizhou fu zhi [1827], j.23.20a); Yunyang xian: Liang Dunhuai 梁敦懷, native of Xinchang xian, Zhejiang (1797-1804 shu) (ibid., j.23.24a); Wan xian: Liu Guoyong 魯國永, a native of Daxian xian, Shunshan (1800-1805); Kai xian: Ma Mingjian 馬明堅, a native of Jishan xian, Shanxi (1801-1806) (ibid., j.23.38b); Daning xian: Guo Nanying 郭南英, a native of Min xian, Fujian (1803-1808). Details of the shrine are in ibid., j.27.6a-b.

141 Du Fu was known for his poetry addressing the aftermath of another conflict, the An Lushan war, but it is unclear whether this informed the siting of the shrine. It may also be worth noting that Du Fu was
The provincial official in charge of coordinating the shrine-building project in Sichuan, lieutenant governor Yang Kui (1760-1804), had likely approved the prefectural shrine’s location.142 Interestingly, he had also endorsed the building of county shrines in Kuizhou. Responding to a communication from the Kuizhou prefect in 1804 (JQ9/2/3), Yang Kui noted that the original communication from the Board (buwen 部文) had ordered the building of prefectural shrines, and it was thus natural (ziying 自應) that all war dead of the prefecture should be enshrined in the shrine in Kuizhou prefecture. However, Yang went on, “as for building shrines in each county ... they can do as they like” (ting qi bian 聽其便).”143

Yang Kui’s decision to allow the building of county shrines raises two questions: to what extent were officials able to push the shrine-building order beyond its original intention; and why was Yang Kui, in particular, a supporter of expansion? I have already provided some discussion of the first question. I showed above that officials in provincial government such as Ruan Yuan were able to convince the emperor to expand the privilege of enshrinement beyond those killed in the White Lotus War. The situation in Sichuan suggests that provincial officials were, in fact, acting even without imperial approval. Yang Kui, a lieutenant governor placed in charge of the governor-general’s affairs while the governor-general, Lebao, led the campaign against the White Lotus

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142 The full name of the provincial administration commission was chengxuan buzhen shi si 承宣布政使司 Communications between the lieutenant governor and the prefect was usually mediated by the circuit intendant (daotai 道臺). The circuit intendant responsible for Kuizhou at this time was Yan Shihong, a native of Dantu county in Jiangsu. Available documents do not shed any light on his role. For more on Yan and his relationship to the rebellion, see Chapter 5.

143 Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.5a.
Figure 2.3 Manifest Loyalty Shrine with Standard Three-Bay Structure in Gaolan County, Gansu
Source: *Gaolan xian xu zhi*, j.1.30b-31a.
forces, seems to have exercised his judgment with little oversight from the central government, approving the county shrines in Kuizhou, along with nearly forty other shrines built in lower-level administrative towns in Sichuan (Map 2.3). There are no mentions of these shrines in any documents sent from Sichuan to the central government.

Why did Yang Kui support the building of the county shrines? An examination of Yang’s writings and social background brings to light certain factors that may have made him sympathetic to a more expansive shrine-building effort. His writings from the decade prior to appointment in Sichuan reveal a man who was moved by the sacrifices of those who died in battle, and convinced of the utility of shrines as sites for preserving and presenting these sacrifices to a broader audience. His empathy for military men seems to have emerged from his years as a secretary (mufu) in the office of Fukang’an (1795), a talented Banner general who played a leading role in many late eighteenth century campaigns. In poems written during the 1791 campaign to Tibet, Yang Kui expressed sympathy for the hardships faced by soldiers—from treacherous terrain to hunger. He also appreciated the utility of informal traditions that had developed to comfort the souls of those who had died in battle far from home. For instance, during the same campaign, he described the printing of passes (luyin) to direct the souls of deceased soldiers back to their homes.

In his writings on shrines for those killed in the line of duty, Yang Kui emphasized their role in preserving memories and stirring the hearts of visitors. In a

144 QDZJ 156-498. 
145 For instance, he wrote of the hunger of troops when supply lines failed. Yang Kui, Tonghuayin guan shi gao 桐華吟館詩稿 (1807; reprint QDSWJ vol. 457), j.8.6a-b. This and two other poems on the hardships faced by troops in Tibet have been translated in Deng Ruiling, “Several Questions Concerning the Gurkha’s Second Invasion of Tibet (1791-1792),” China Tibetology 2 (Sept., 2010): 27-28. 
146 Yang, Tonghuayin guan shi gao, j.8.8b.
record for the building of the Chengdu shrine for Wenfu 温福 (?-1773), a banner officer killed in the Jinchuan campaign, Yang emphasized the nobility of death in battle: “among the many ways to die, death on the battlefield (jiangchang) is the most meritorious” (死有萬端惟疆場之功大). In his record of the building of the Chengdu Manifest Loyalty Shrine (Zhaozhongci ji) in 1802 he stressed that the nobility of these deaths made it essential that they not be forgotten: “How can we forget those who served our dynasty through the use of arms, whose ambitions were ended prematurely by the sword?” In other writing, he expressed confidence in the efficacy of shrines for those killed in service to the state. In a poem written during the 1791 Tibet campaign, he recounted a visit to the Shrine for Two Loyalists 雙忠祠, built for Fuqing 傅清 (d.1750) and Labdon 拉布敦 (1703-1750), two officials killed after assassinating a rebellious prince in Lhasa. In his preface to the poem, he observed that Tibetans (fanren 番人) had been moved (gan 感) by the loyalty and steadfastness (zhonglie 忠烈) of the two officials. The shrine which was built in their honor in Lhasa, he noted somewhat unconvincingly, continued to receive the offerings of Tibetans up to the present.

The county shrines that Yang Kui had endorsed in Sichuan persisted even as the central government began to issue regulations that implicitly barred the establishment of such sites. In 1807, Kuizhou received a communication from Sichuan governor-general Lebao 勒保 (1740-1819) relaying an order from the Board of Rites that undermined Yang’s approval for county shrines. This order reserved the prefectural Manifest Loyalty

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147 Chengdu xian zhi (1815), j.5.70a.
148 Yang Kui, Tonghuaiyin guan wen chao 桐華吟館文鈔 (1807; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 457), j.1.15a.
149 The two had assassinated prince Jurmet Namjar in 1750, on suspicions that he was working to break off relations with the Qing. Labdon was killed and Fuqing committed suicide when Jurmet Namjar's followers attacked the building in which they were staying. ECCP p. 250.
150 Yang, Tonghuaiyin guan shi gao, j.7.16b.
Shrine for local men who had died fighting for ends beyond family or self-preservation.\textsuperscript{151} The order went on to describe the groups that could be enshrined in the existing \textit{county} Loyal, Righteous, and Filial shrines (Zhongyi xiaodi ci \textsuperscript{152}忠義孝弟祠). These shrines, the Ministers ordered, should be reserved for tablets of entire families (hemen 閬門) killed by bandits, of families in which more than three or four members had been killed at once, of those who encountered bandits (zei 賊) on the road or in their homes and did not surrender but cursed them (ma 罵) [but, only when there was evidence – \textit{youju} 有據], of those who with great fervor (fenji 奮激) committed suicide (ziqiang 自戕), or of those killed cruelly (qianghai 戰害) by bandits.\textsuperscript{153} The implication it seems was that while these deaths were tragic, they were not acts of intentional service for the Qing. The higher administrative level of the prefecture over the county, in other words, corresponded with the greater service to the state of those enshrined in the prefectural Manifest Loyalty

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Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.2b-4a.
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Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.7b. The deliberations received approval from the emperor on JQ8/12/3. The document was received by the Prefect of Kuizhou sometime in the ninth year of the Jiaqing reign. The Loyal, Righteous, and Filial shrines had been established in all counties of the empire by order of Yongzheng in 1723; these shrines, often built on the grounds of prefectural and county school campuses, were intended to “serve the spirits of natives of the prefecture or county.” Romeyn Taylor, “Official Altars, Temples and Shrines Mandated for All Counties in Ming and Qing,” \textit{T’oung Pao}, Second Series, 83, Fasc. 1/3, State and Ritual in China (1997): 101. On the confusion between the Manifest Loyalty Shrines and Loyal, Righteous, and Filial Shrines, see also Meyer-Fong, \textit{What Remains}, p. 139.
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The deliberations also addressed the question of women killed in the rebellion. Women killed by bandits (except for those below the age of ten and servants 賞役婢女), were to have their names inscribed in memorial arches (fang 坊) built on thoroughfares and important roads (only in the case of women were funds to be given by the province) and offerings performed at the Shrines to the Chaste and Filial.
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\textsuperscript{151} In addition to regular soldiers and officers, the Board approved for enshrinement in the Manifest Loyalty Shrines three categories of irregulars not covered by existing regulations: (1) Those who were sent by officials to fight or protect a city or went out of the city to fight, were truly courageous (shizai fenyong chuli 實在奮勇出力) and killed a relatively large number of bandits (sha zei jiao duo 殺賊較多); (2) Those who were sent by officials, but killed very few bandits (wuji 無幾), did not have evidence of having killed bandits, or didn’t kill any bandits at all; (3) Those who died protecting villages and stockades [on their own initiative ... i.e. without official leadership]. The families of the first two groups were to be given monetary awards in addition to the enshrinement of the deceased in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine; the third group was to be simply enshrined without compensation.

\textsuperscript{152} Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.2b-4a.

\textsuperscript{153} Kuizhou fu zhi (1827), j.27.7b. The deliberations received approval from the emperor on JQ8/12/3.
Shrines as compared to those in the county shrines for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial.

Despite the Board’s attempt to carefully delineate inhabitants of the two shrines, a liberal approach to shrine building ultimately prevailed in Sichuan. The six Manifest Loyalty Shrines established in the counties of Kuizhou remained in place. The main effect of the directive from the Board of War seems not to have been compliance but defensiveness. In the Wan county gazetteer, an unnamed contributor defended the building of the county Manifest Loyalty Shrine even while recognizing that the construction of shrines outside of the prefectural city did not accord with regulations.154 The contributor noted that the 1802 edict had ordered the placement of shrines in “prefectural cities under the direct jurisdiction of provinces” (直省府城). However, he continued, “the shrine built in the prefectural city is not often seen by people of the county, [a shrine] placed in the county will be better able to stir up loyal hearts and produce a pervading atmosphere (qi) of righteousness and courage.” 155 Here the contributor took the very sensible approach of extending the logic that both Yongzheng and Jiaqing had used to explain the function of the shrines: that is, the efficacy of the shrines relied on shared native places and family relations of those enshrined and those attending rituals at the shrine.

Gong Gui 龔珪,156 an Assistant Instructor (xundao 訓導) in Wan county in the Daoguang period, offered a defense for the county shrines that referred to Classical and Qing regulatory precedent. He began with a well-worn passage from the “Methods of Sacrifice” (jifa 祭法) chapter in the Book of Rites: “in ancient times, sacrifices were

154 The main editors (zhuxiu 主修) were the former magistrate Wang Yujing 王玉鯨 and the current magistrate Zhang Qin 張琴. It is not clear whether they, or someone else, inserted these comments.
155 Wan xian zhi (1866), j.7.26a-b.
156 He was a student of Cheng Boluan 程伯銮 (1779-1862) at the Dongchuan academy in Chongqing 重慶東川書院.
offered to those who labored to death in discharge of their duties” (古以死勤事則祀之).\textsuperscript{157} He followed this by praising the Qing dynasty for restoring the ancient customs by ordering the building of shrines to the Loyal, Righteous and Filial in communities across the empire. Yet, despite these praiseworthy efforts, he concluded that the enshrining of those “who died while engaged in official business” (mo wangshi) in the prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrine rather than local counties did not adhere to the model of making praise manifest (有殞王事者惟祀諸郡昭忠祠褒顯弗式乎).\textsuperscript{158}

The Manifest Loyalty Shrines in Kuizhou were not only brought into a somewhat awkward relation with the shrines for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial, but positioned in ways that seem to point to substantial variation in the local significance attributed to the shrines. For instance, in two of the counties—Wushan and Fengjie—the shrines were placed next to military training grounds (yanwu ting) and not beside other temples or shrines.\textsuperscript{159} In Fengjie county, the location of the shrine can perhaps be explained by the fact that nearly four hundred regular soldiers from the garrison based in Fengjie had died in the war. Or, perhaps the training grounds here, as in Chengdu, were a popular gathering place where the shrine could be visible to many.\textsuperscript{160} It is also possible that the military training grounds simply offered a piece of land readily available to government officials. There is, unfortunately, no further documentation.


\textsuperscript{158} Gong expressed these views in his record of the building of the Shrine for Loyal, Righteous, and Filial. \textit{Wan xian zhi} (1866), j.36.42a-43a. The date of Gong’s essay was not indicated, but is likely mid-nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Wushan xian zhi} (1893), j.17.2a; \textit{Kuizhou fu zhi} (1827), j.18.15a.

\textsuperscript{160} For a description of the training grounds as a popular gathering place in Chengdu, see Di Wang, \textit{Street Culture in Chengdu: Public Space, Urban Commoners, and Local Politics} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 42.
The use of Manifest Loyalty Shrines for enshrining the dead of earlier dynasties, the diverse locations chosen for the shrines, and the attempt to defend the building of unsanctioned county shrines all suggest that the Manifest Loyalty Shrines became not only sites for the promulgation of an official military culture, but also expressions of heterogeneous local perspectives on the military and war dead. The shrines and their regulations would also, not surprisingly, be susceptible to appropriation into the timeless discourse of “loyalty.” The ambiguous relation of the Manifest Loyalty Shrines and the shrines for Loyal, Righteous, and Filial, for instance, soon provided a resource for some scholar-officials eager to bring more martyrs from the late Ming into local shrines. Tao Zhu 陶澍 (1778-1839), governor of Anhui, submitted a memorial in 1823 in which he laid out a case for the enshrinement of late Ming martyrs Xu Wenjin and Xu Wenjie, natives of Qimen county in Anhui. In making the case, he asserted that the regulations for Manifest Loyalty Shrine allowed those killed in official service (sishi) and entered into a prefectural shrine to also be entered into their county shrines for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial. In his memorial, Tao did not mention that the Manifest Loyalty Shrines had been reserved for those killed in the Qing. Rather, he used Manifest Loyalty Shrines to argue for the validity of enshrinement in Loyal, Righteous, and Filial shrines of men killed in service to any dynasty.

Like Tao Zhu, local elites involved in the shrine-building project tended to detach loyalty from any single historical event or dynasty and evaluate the significance of death through the lens of local (rather than imperial) history and status. In many cases, as we have seen, the one channel between the shrines and the dynasty—their spatial relation to Guandi or City God temples—was basically ignored.

161 Tao Zhu, Tao Wenyi gong quanji 陶文毅公全集 (1840), j.19.14b.
The Chengdu Shrine and Representational Space

The responses of provincial governors and the case of Kuizhou revealed a concerted effort to make the shrines relevant to the particular concerns of their constituencies by either ensuring the eligibility of locals who died in battle, or expanding the shrines to lower-level administrative towns. The case of the Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, provides another example of the ways in which war shrines in the early nineteenth century were incorporated into the religious and commemorative fabric of a city. Unlike the cities of Kuizhou prefecture, the Chengdu Manifest Loyalty Shrine was built in a city that had already been configured around the memories of war. And unlike all the cases examined above, the agency of officials and elites played a decidedly secondary role to the built space of the city. As we will see, the existing configuration of commemorative sites largely determined where the Manifest Loyalty Shrine would be situated.

Chengdu city, comprised of Chengdu and Huaying counties, had a substantial military presence. In addition to the governor-general (1b) of Sichuan, it held the offices of top provincial military leaders: the general of the Banner forces and the provincial commander in chief of the Green Standards (1b).\(^{162}\) It was home to approximately two thousand Banner troops and officers along with ten thousand dependents, who resided in a walled-off zone in the southwest corner of the city;\(^ {163}\) Green Standard troops, totaling between five and six thousand, were divided into eight divisions under the governor-

\(^{162}\) For an overview of the military leadership in Chengdu, see Dai Yingcong, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 143-144

Map 2.5 Chengdu City and Winnowing Fan Street
Source: Chongxiu Chengdu xian zhi (TZ), j.shou.3b-4a.
general and provincial commander in chief.\textsuperscript{164} Both Green Standard and Banner troops had seen frequent duty in the campaigns of the second half of the eighteenth century. By 1816, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine in Chengdu held the names of 771 Green Standard and Banner forces killed in battle.\textsuperscript{165}

The Manifest Loyalty Shrine was established outside of the walled city’s northern gate, on a street called Winnowing Fan Street (boji jie 簾箕街) (Map 2.5).\textsuperscript{166} The street was, in many ways, an obvious choice. In the Ming, there had been a temple erected on this street to Xuantian dadi 玄天大帝 (also known as Zhenwu 真武 or Xuanwu 玄武).

While there is little information on the building of the Xuantian temple, its location to the north of the city was common to many Xuantian temples and reflected the identification of the deity with both the north and the military.\textsuperscript{167} There were also historical connections between Xuantian and dynastic military power. The first and third Ming emperors, for instance, had credited Xuantian for their military success.\textsuperscript{168}

These links with the military persisted, with less concerted official sponsorship, into the Qing. Members of the Green Standards as well as bannermen were active patrons

\textsuperscript{164} According to Dai Yingcong’s calculation, there were about 2,000 Manchu and Mongol troops stationed in the Chengdu garrison. Between 38,000 and 40,000 Green Standard troops were stationed in garrisons throughout the province of Sichuan and Tibet. Dai, The Sichuan Frontier, p. 164.

\textsuperscript{165} Chengdu xian zhi (1816), j.1.77a.

\textsuperscript{166} This shrine was still present in the early twentieth century. See Fu Chongju 傅崇矩, Chengdu tonglan 成都通覽, vol. 1 (1909; Chengdu: Ba Shu shushe, 1987) p. 43. I have not found any evidence that the shrine in the Manchu city survived into the late Qing.


\textsuperscript{168} Shin-Yi Chao, “Zhenwu: The Cult of a Chinese Warrior Deity from the Song to the Ming Dynasties” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2002), pp. 126-143. Chao notes that there are also numerous records of reliance on Xuantian for assistance in battle, divination, and bodily transformation in the Song dynasty.
of Xuantian temples and seem to have relied on the efficacy of the god for divination and assistance in battle. Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1760-1837), a Sichuan native who rose to prominence during the White Lotus War, sponsored the renovation of a Xuantian temple in Guyuan, Gansu, the site of one of the Qing’s largest Green Standard garrisons.  

Xiaoyan 曉巖 (?-1801), a Bannerman who played an important role in raising militias and leading Qing forces against the White Lotus, had close connections to a monastery with historical links to Zhenwu. Some commanders in this period—including Yang Yuchun—went into battle carrying black banners, a color associated with “the Black emperor” 黑帝 (another of the many names used to refer to Zhenwu). There are also indications that Xuantian’s role in military divination rituals continued into the nineteenth century.

Despite the fact that Xuantian’s links to the military were more formal in the Ming than the Qing, there is no indication that any sites with military connections had been built in the area around the temple during the Ming. The building of commemorative shrines and military-sponsored temples seems to have begun only in the eighteenth century in tandem with the increasing role of the Sichuanese military in a variety of Qing campaigns during this period. The earliest was a shrine built for Nian Gengyao 年羹堯 (1679-1726), a prominent military officer who was accused of ninety-nine crimes in 1726 and forced to commit suicide. This shrine, most likely built before

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169 Prior to Yang Yuchun’s sponsorship, the temple had been connected with another military man, Li Gongmao 李公茂, who erected a stele for the temple in 1654. Guyuan zhou zhi, j.10.16b.


171 On Yang Yuchun’s black banner, see Yang Fang, Yang Shizhai gongbao zhongwai qinlao lu 楊時齋宮保中外勤勞錄 (undated manuscript), p. 33a. On Yang Yuchun’s devotion to Zhenwu, see Yang Yongshu, Yang Zhongwu gong jishi lu 楊忠武公記事錄 (1911), p. 27a. Xiang Rong, a protégé of Yang Yuchun’s, also carried a black banner. See Chapter 7.

172 See, for instance, this text on military divination from the 1830s that refers to the deity: Liu Wenlan 劉文讖, Qi men xing jun yao lue 奇門行軍要略 (1835), j.1.5a.
his disgrace, was converted into a Wenchang temple in the late Qianlong or early Jiaqing period by a juren degree holder named Gao Yingjing 高應饒.¹⁷³ Not long after the building of the shrine for Nian, the famous general Yue Zhongqi 岳鍾琪 (1686-1754) built a shrine for a military hero who shared his surname, Yue Fei 岳飛. Dai Yingcong referred to the building of this shrine as “an acknowledgment of the blood bond between the ancient hero and the most powerful Chinese general of the time.”¹⁷⁴

There was a marked increase in shrine building on the street during the second Jinchuan campaign (1771-1776). Two shrines were built for important officers by troops returning from the campaign. One was built in 1773 for Wenfu 溫福 (?-1773) (called the Duke Wen Shrine 溫公祠); the other for Agui 阿桂 (1717-1797) (called the Duke Wencheng shrine 文成公祠).¹⁷⁵ Both Wenfu and Agui had been prominent officers in the Jinchuan campaign. Wenfu had died a gruesome death during the war. After being captured by Jinchuan forces, according to one report, the Jinchuan cavalry had buried him alive and galloped back and forth over his head.¹⁷⁶ Also in 1773, the Solacing the Loyal Shrine, originally located next to a Buddhist temple, Caotang si 草堂寺 south of the city, was relocated to the site of the Zhuge Liang shrine and used to house tablets of the dead of the second Jinchuan campaign.¹⁷⁷ Finally, the Temple of Efficacious Response (Ling ying si 靈應寺) was rebuilt in gratitude for divine assistance in the campaign.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷³ He received the juren degree in QL45. See Chengdu xian zhi (1873) j.5.18a. Wenchang took on a decidedly military aura when he was promoted by the Jiaqing emperor for his role in defending Zitong county, Sichuan, from the White Lotus rebels in 1800. Naquin, Peking, p. 329.
¹⁷⁴ Dai, The Sichuan Frontier, p. 163.
¹⁷⁵ Chengdu xian zhi (1873), j.1.76b-77a. Chengdu xian zhi (1873), j.2.7a.
¹⁷⁶ Waley-Cohen, Culture of War, p. 64.
¹⁷⁷ Chengdu xian zhi (1873), j.2.7a. On connections between Zhuge Liang and the Jinchuan campaign, see Pan Shitong 潘時彤, ed., Zhaolie Zhongwu lingmiao zhi 昭烈忠武陵廟志 (1829), j.7.15b,37a-b.
¹⁷⁸ Chengdu xian zhi (1873), j.2.8b-9a.
The completion of the Chengdu Manifest Loyalty Shrine was announced to the Jiaqing emperor by Lebao (1740-1819), governor-general of Sichuan, in 1803. In his memorial, he declared the successful establishment of shrines in Chengdu and each of the other prefectural cities in the province of Sichuan (he made no mention of the many county shrines). He provided specific, if brief, information on the construction of the shrine in Chengdu:

Provincial Administration Commissioner Yang Kui has reported that there has always been an Earl of Wu Shrine [i.e. a shrine for Zhuge Liang] outside the northern gate of Chengdu. In the past, all of the dead officers of the Jinchuan campaign were enshrined here, and offered spring and autumn offerings. The recently received edict to erect dedicated shrines in the provincial and prefectural cities of each province to provide residence for loyal souls is truly an unprecedented statute (kuangdian). The commissioner and intendant along with the magistrates have selected a piece of land next to the Earl of Wu Shrine and built a shrine. They have placed the requisite plaque above the gate reading “Zhaozhong ci” in order to display the Dynasty’s grace (guo en) and encourage the integrity of its officers.

Along with the identities of those involved in making the decision about where to locate
the new shrine (again, Yang Kui played a leading role), the memorial alerts us to the fact that the Chengdu Manifest Loyalty Shrine was entering an urban environment in which commemorative sites for the battle dead had already been woven together into a densely symbolic spatial fabric. Lebao noted that the selected site was next to a shrine for the famous military strategist of the Three Kingdoms period, Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234). The Zhuge temple, he informed the emperor, had been previously used to house the war dead of the Jinchuan campaigns (1747-1749, 1771-1776) in the Qianlong reign. The shrine was not, notably, next to the Guandi temple, located near the southwest end of the street.

From this brief review, it is obvious that the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was built into an area that had been dedicated to the memory of war and imbued with historical and contemporary military symbolism. Indeed, the selection of the area for military-related sites continued well into the nineteenth century. Winnowing Fan Street was the site of the shrine for the Banner general Delengtai 德楞泰, built in 1810. It would also be home to a shrine for provincial commander Zhan Tai, killed during battles with rebels from Yunnan in 1865. When an early twentieth-century British traveler to Chengdu, Robert Jack, left the city through the north gate he commented that the road was “lined with monuments ... for some miles a veritable Appian Way.” The location of the Manifest Loyalty Shrine next to the Zhuge Liang shrine seems particularly loaded with symbolic weight. There were official links between the White Lotus campaign and Zhuge Liang, 

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180 The shrine on Winnowing Fan Street was one of five major temples or shrines dedicated to Zhuge in Chengdu city. The Winnowing Fan shrine appears to have been originally built in the Ming dynasty during the Wanli reign. See Ma Qiang 马强 and Wu Yan 吴艳, “Miaoyu, shenxiang, xianghuo: Zhuge Liang jisi de fan minjian hua 厮宇神像香火诸葛亮祭祀的范民间化,” Chengdu daxue xuebao (sheke ban) no. 3 (2013): 37.

181 On the Delengtai and Agui shrines, see Liang Zhangju, Yinglian xuhua 楚联续话 (1843), j.1.25b.

who was among several deities honored for his contributions to the campaign and a hero with deep connections in Sichuan, a province that overlapped the Three Kingdoms state of Shu (221-263).\textsuperscript{183} We can also see in Yang Kui’s decision evidence of a larger literati interest in bringing the war dead of the White Lotus War into relation with heroes of the Three Kingdom period, especially Zhuge Liang. We will see further examples of this in Chapters 4 and 5.

**Other Patterns of Shrine-Building**

Of the 156 administrative units—including all prefectures (\textit{fu 府}), departments (\textit{zhou 州}), counties (\textit{xian 縣}) and subprefectures (\textit{ting 廳})—I have surveyed in Sichuan, sixty-four built a Manifest Loyalty Shrine during the Jiaqing reign.\textsuperscript{184} At least ten more were built following battles with rebels from the Yunnan and Sichuan salt mines led by Lan Dashun 藍大順 (?-1864) and Li Yonghe 李永和 (?-1862) in the early 1860s.\textsuperscript{185} In most cases, the compilers of gazetteers did not provide any explanation for why these additional shrines were deemed necessary or why a particular location was chosen. In fact, they rarely offered more than a date of construction, location (usually in relation to another shrine, temple, or administrative building), and lists of enshrinees.\textsuperscript{186}

Nonetheless, the patterns of shrine-building can be suggestive. Based on my survey of gazetteers for all prefectures, subprefectures, counties, and departments in Sichuan, I have identified four patterns in the building of these shrines, several of which

\textsuperscript{183} Sacrifices were to be offered at the shrine at the site of Zhuge Liang’s tomb, at Dingjun mountain 定軍山 SHSYD 606000008, p. 135. The main temple was located in the southern suburbs of Chengdu (Huayang county). On this, see Pan Shitong 潘時彤, ed., \textit{Zhaolie Zhongwu miao zhi 昭烈忠武廟志} (1829 keben).

\textsuperscript{184} Because the date of building is not indicated in several instances, the division between those built in the Jiaqing reign and those built later is somewhat imprecise.

\textsuperscript{185} These were generally referred to in contemporary sources as Yunnan bandits (\textit{Dian fei 滇匪}).

\textsuperscript{186} The entries were usually in the Registers of Offering (\textit{sidian}), Shrines (\textit{cimiao/tanmiao} 殿廟/壇廟), and occasionally Temples (\textit{siguan 寺觀}) sections of local gazetteers.
we have already seen in the previous case studies: (1) seventeen shrines built in the suggested location (nine next to a City God temple, and eight next to a Guandi temple); (2) five shrines built next to sites already used by the military or identified with the military: military garrisons, military parade grounds, existing shrines for prominent military officers, or the north side of cities; (3) two shrines combined with existing Shrines for the Loyal, Righteous, and Filial; (4) eight shrines placed alongside other standard sites of the state cult, including the Wen miao 文廟 and Huo shen miao 火神廟; (5) and thirty-two others whose location was either unidentified or unexplained. It is striking that in half of the cases in Sichuan, the location of the shrines had no discernible pattern. Given the lack of sources, we can only assume that in many cases the shrines were simply built where an empty plot of land at a reasonable price could be found. A study of further cases would likely show that decisions about where to build the shrines emerged from a complex negotiation between human actors, the physical and lived space of cities, and the meanings accorded to this space.

What significance should we ascribe to the gap between the expressed ideal and the various local instantiations? Henri Lefebvre’s tripartite notion of space provides a useful framework for thinking about the building project. To use Lefebvre’s terms, Jiaqing’s edict ordering the construction of shrines in all prefectural cities next to either the City God or Guandi temple was premised on a representation of space, an abstract conception of the homogeneity of administrative cities that underlay the design of the entire state cult. Jiaqing assumed the homogeneity of state religious sites—that each prefecture in the empire had an administrative center with its own Guandi and City God temples. While this conception of space informed the decisions made by officials on the

187 Information on these shrines comes from prefectural and county gazetteers.
ground, they were also confronted with representational spaces, the “complex symbolisms” and particular histories that had been produced over time through spatial practice. ¹⁸⁸ In Chengdu, for instance, Winnowing Fan Street had emerged as a site for the commemoration of war and military men in the Qing period through a combination of directional correlations, Ming-era temples, and legends of Three Kingdoms heroes like Zhuge Liang.

The Manifest Loyalty Shrines were not simply added to the existing framework of the state cult, as Jiaqing seems to have intended, but were rather reoriented around local interests and urban landscapes. The dynasty had little power to determine the nature of war commemoration outside of Peking. Yet, the shrines were not simply evidence of local resistance against central directives. After all, they were not only built as the government had ordered, but built in excess. In their excess, the shrines revealed a commitment to political ideals among elites that was distinct from adherence to government policy—a sort of shadow state that was constructed and reproduced through cultural practices such as enshrinement. As we shall see in my discussion of hereditary titles in the next chapter, when the symbols of official military culture lacked a resonance with these broader political ideals, cultural practices often became contingent on considerations of personal economic benefit, family reputation, and social status.

Chapter Three
Making Nobles: The Extension of Hereditary Titles to the Chinese War Dead

The 1802 building of Manifest Loyalty Shrines in prefectural capitals, while prompted by a surge of casualties during the White Lotus War, was also the product of an earlier shift in the official commemoration of military men killed in war. As we saw in the previous chapter, official commemoration for the war dead prior to the Yongzheng reign had been focused on eminent officers, mostly bannermen. There had been no systematic effort to enshrine common soldiers killed in battle. Yongzheng’s decision in 1724 to establish a shrine for the tablets of all military men killed in battle established a principal of universal enshrinement that would remain effective throughout the eighteenth century, even as the Qianlong emperor shifted his energies to more spectacular displays of military culture.

While Qianlong remained preoccupied with military spectacle, from massive battle paintings to carefully choreographed military parades and tours, he also made a number of decisions pertaining to the official treatment of the less-prominent war dead that would converge with unexpected results at the turn of the nineteenth century. One of these decisions, which I explore in this chapter, was to expand the system of hereditary titles beyond the largely Manchu and Mongol banners to Han Chinese officers and officials killed in battle (zhenwang 阵亡) or service to the state (sishi 死事). Beginning in 1767, hereditary titles—along with accompanying financial incentives and obligations of military service for title heirs—that had once been reserved for bannermen began to be awarded posthumously to Han Chinese as well.

Like the Manifest Loyalty Shrines, however, this extension of hereditary titles to Han Chinese remained something of a minor theme in official commemorative practice
during the Qianlong reign, a symbolic and inconsequential gesture of the dynasty’s unbiased treatment of its Chinese subjects rather than a sustained effort to award all those newly eligible for the titles. This would change in the last years of the 1790s, when the number of hereditary titles awarded to Chinese officers and officials was suddenly amplified by the death toll of the White Lotus War and the active intervention of the Jiaqing emperor, his advisors, and a reinvigorated provincial bureaucracy. The number of titles awarded during the early years of his reign was entirely unprecedented in the Qing. Between 1796 and 1805, the dynasty awarded posthumously at least 2,300 hereditary titles to Chinese officers and civil officials killed in service to the state, far outnumbering the several hundred titles awarded to Chinese subjects in the previous 150 years of Qing rule.

In the first half of the chapter, I explore the decisions that led to the expansion of hereditary titles to Han Chinese and the reasons for the massive surge in titles awarded during the first decade of the Jiaqing reign. The story here is, in part, one of unintended consequences. Initiatives in the Qianlong reign that had been pursued with little enthusiasm by the emperor or his officials triggered a coordinated and efficient bureaucratic response in the Jiaqing reign while also gaining momentum as a result of the White Lotus War. In the second half of the chapter, I look at popular views of both the symbol—the hereditary titles themselves—and the bearers of these symbols, the often unwitting young men who inherited the titles from the fathers or brothers and found themselves thrust into a military career. If the awarding of the titles was in part an attempt by the Jiaqing administration to make visible the dynasty’s esteem for military contributions, the reception of these titles revealed the extent to which the message of military honor and loyalty proclaimed by the dynasty through the awarding of titles was wrapped up in the highly uneven media of the title heirs.
Chinese War Dead and Hereditary Titles before 1784

Wolfgang Franke, the author of one of the few English-language works on hereditary titles during the Qing period, noted that it was rare to find patents for hereditary titles dating from before 1800. While Franke himself offered no explanation for the relatively large number of extant patents from the nineteenth century, there is little doubt that the availability of post-1800 patents reflected a surge in hereditary titles for Chinese officers in the Green Standards that began around 1796 and would continue unabated through the nineteenth century.

Hereditary titles were, of course, awarded by the Qing dynasty prior to 1796. Indeed, this part of the story is the only one that has received any scholarly attention. Hereditary titles had been an important part of the Qing tool kit of symbolic awards since the dynasty’s founding in the seventeenth century. In the Shunzhi reign (1644-1661) the dynasty had established eight hereditary titles (shijue 世爵), subdivided into twenty-six classes, that were bestowed on men—usually officeholders and nearly always bannermen—who had made substantial contributions to the welfare of the dynasty. The titles ranged from duke (gong 公), the highest title, to tashala hafan (given the Chinese name yunqiwei 雲騎尉, cloud commander, hereafter CC, in 1736), the lowest. Each of these titles was heritable for a number of generations—ranging from twenty-six for the highest to one generation for the lowest. An additional honor, a title in perpetuity, was granted to bannermen whose original titles were “inheritable for more than fifteen generations.” After 1751, hereditary titles in perpetuity were extended to all bannermen

189 Wolfgang Franke, “Patents for Hereditary Ranks and Honorary Titles During the Ch’ing Dynasty,” Monumenta Serica 7.1/2 (1942): 58.
191 Franke, “Patents for Hereditary Ranks and Honorary Titles,” p. 43.
who died in battle. In addition to the title due their rank, these men would be concurrently awarded a newly-minted title called the enqiwei (grace commander). After the termination of succession of the title recipient’s regular title, the enqiwei would be awarded to male descendants of the title recipient in perpetuity.\textsuperscript{192} The vast majority of hereditary titles awarded were at the eighth grade: the cloud commander (CC), a pattern that was true in both the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth.

This basic structure of hereditary titles remained unchanged into the nineteenth century. However, there had been important shifts in the regulations governing eligibility for the titles in the second half of the eighteenth century that would have a direct effect on the surge of titles awarded to Han Chinese in the years after 1796. The first was a decision made by the Qianlong emperor to extend the privilege of perpetual inheritance to Chinese officers and officials; the other was the regularization of the awarding of hereditary titles to Chinese officials and officers killed in battle (zhenwang).

The privilege of perpetual inheritance for hereditary titles was extended to Han Chinese in 1767 with an order from Qianlong to award the enqiwei in perpetuity (which I will call the GCP) to all Chinese officers and officials who had “died in service to the state” (sishi 死事). The extension of the GCP to Chinese occurred in the midst of other changes that elevated military merit above aristocratic privilege. In the same year that he extended the right of perpetual inheritance to Han Chinese, Qianlong elevated titles awarded to bannermen for military merit (gongfeng) above titles conferred by imperial favor (enfeng). In 1767 (and again in 1776), Qianlong ordered that only those titles awarded for meritorious military service be eligible for inheritance in perpetuity. Titles conferred by imperial favor could be transmitted, but “were reduced with each

\textsuperscript{192} Franke, “Patents for Hereditary Ranks,” p. 43.
transmission.”

The *Veritable Records*, an official month by month record of court politics, portrayed Qianlong’s decision not as part of his broader effort to celebrate military merit but as a response to the story of Huang Fangdu 黃芳度 (?-1675), a Chinese official who displayed outstanding loyalty during Geng Jingzhong’s 耿精忠 (d.1682) revolt in Fujian in the 1670s. Qianlong’s reading of Huang’s story in the *Veritable Records* of the Kangxi reign (1662-1722), had reminded him that many Chinese killed in service to the dynasty remained without adequate recognition. Huang, he noted, had been given a title, but without perpetual inheritance. The emperor was recorded as asserting that this was symptomatic of the dynasty’s unequal treatment of its Manchu and Han subjects. He ordered that all who had died like Huang should be identified and memorialized by the Grand Council and relevant Boards.

Liang Zhangju 梁章鉅 (1775-1849), a nineteenth century historian, noted that the

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194 Fangdu’s father, Huang Wu 黃梧 (d. 1674), had served under Zheng Chenggong before surrendering to the Qing in 1656. In gratitude for his transfer of loyalties, the Qing granted him the title of Duke of Haicheng 海澄公. Geng Jingzhong invited Huang Wu to join his revolt in 1674, but the latter died of illness before sending his response. Answering on his father’s behalf, Fangdu attempted a ruse: he “outwardly accepted Geng’s invitation to join in the rebellion but secretly recruited 6,000 volunteers to defend Zhangzhou [Fujian], and at the same time reported his decision to Peking.” The rebels were allowed into the city by traitorous officials before the arrival of relief troops from Guangdong. Fangdu committed suicide. ECCP p. 339. The *Veritable Records* recorded the death of Huang and his family as follows: “On the twentieth day of the eleventh month of the fourteenth year of the Kangxi reign, brigade general Wu Shu and others secretly communicated with the rebels and brought them into the city. Huang and his younger brothers fought bravely on the streets, but unable to hold their position retreated to Kaiyuan temple where they committed suicide by throwing themselves into a well. The rebels fished out their bodies and chopped them up. All the men and women of his household were slaughtered. The coffin of Duke Huang Wu was exhumed and broken to pieces, his body was scattered.” QSL KX15/1/14, p. 767a.

195 As Qianlong put it, “Han and Manchus are all my subjects, I have never been able to countenance even the slightest discrimination between the two.” (滿洲漢人皆我臣僕朕亦從不肯稍分畛域). QSL QL32/6/29, p. 680a. This, of course, was a frequently voiced concern, in Qianlong’s reign and earlier. See Lawrence D. Kessler, *K’ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch’ing Rule* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. 117.

1767 decision had indeed led to the awarding of the GCP to descendants of Chinese killed in the line of duty. Several of these were men who had served in the Three Feudatories campaign: Zhang Yong 張勇, Zhao Liangdong 趙良棟 (1621-1697),197 Wang Jinbao 王進寶 (1626-1685), and Sun Sike 孫思克 (1628-1700). Others had served in the Qianlong reign, including Chen Fu 陳福, Dou Bin 丁斌 (?-1759),198 and Gao Tianxi 高天喜 (?-1758). Liang also noted that the descendants of seventeen other Green Standard officers who died in battle during the eighteenth century were given the same title.

According to the Veritable Records, fourteen others who had earned “outstanding military merit” (軍功較著者) were given the GCP at the same time.199 Based on these two sources, only thirty-eight GCP titles were awarded to Han Chinese after the 1767 edict, a tiny proportion of those killed since the establishment of the dynasty. A precedent had been established, but the immediate effects remained nearly invisible.

The second regulatory shift that would shape the sudden increase in hereditary titles at the turn of the century was the regularization of titles for death in battle. In 1784, it was mandated that Han Chinese officers killed in battle be automatically considered for the same hereditary titles as bannermen. Green Standard officers between the ranks of colonel (2b) and ensign (8a)200 who died in battle (zhenwang)—that is, in or immediately after battle and not by lingering wounds or illness suffered as a result of war—were to be...

197 Zhao had received other honors: Yongzheng entered him into the Temple of Eminent Statesmen, in 1782 his rank “was advanced to earl of the first class.” ECCP p. 78.

198 Dou was a native of Guyuan in Shaanxi. Guyuan housed an important military garrison in both the eighteenth and nineteenth century. On Guyuan in the nineteenth century, see Chapter 7.

199 Liang Zhangju 梁章鉅, Langji cong tan 浪迹叢談 (1847; reprint, XXSK vol. 1179), j.4.9a-b. The names of these seventeen officers were also listed in the QSL: Zhang Guoyan 張國彥, Xu Yong 徐勇, Zheng Zhiwen 鄭之文, Jia Dadi 賈大第, Zheng Yu 鄭銓, Fang Xing 房星, Zhao Bangshi 趙邦試, Lin Fang 林芳, Kang Tai 康泰, Kang Hai 康海, Xu Yun 許雲, You Chonggong 游崇功, Luo Wancang 羅萬倉, Xu Zongren 徐宗仁, Li Guoxun 李國勛, Liu Guicai 劉貴才, Liu Fangyu 劉芳雨. See QSL QL32/10/27, p. 761a-b.

200 JQHDSL j.118.18a-19a
awarded the yunqiwei or cloud commander (CC), a title one degree above the GCP. Officers who held the ranks of provincial commander (1b) or brigade general (2a) were made eligible respectively for the qingcheduwei (commandant of light chariots), the sixth of the nine hereditary titles, and qiduwei (commandant of cavalry) titles, the seventh. All these titles were convertible to the GCP after a set series of inheritances.

Qianlong’s explanation for his decision, as recorded in the Veritable Records, paralleled his earlier pronouncements on the extension of the GCP to Han Chinese. Again, he expressed the need to show impartiality toward Green Standard (Chinese) and bannermen. He suggested that the original distinction between Green Standard forces and bannermen had been based, in part, on a real disparity between the contributions of the two in battle. As he put it, “when the Green Standards went on campaign and fought in battle, they fought with less vigor than bannermen (不如旗人奮勇出力).” This assertion was in line with Qianlong’s frequent depictions of Green Standard troops as ill-disciplined, inept, and lacking in martial prowess. However, he followed this characterization of ethnic difference with a claim for the essential equality of those who

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201 A distinction was made between death in battle (zhenwang 陣亡) and death of wounds received in battle (shangwang 傷亡). Those who died of wounds received only the CC, which was not converted to the GCP. JQHDSL j.118.19b

202 Apart from his general concern with impartiality toward different ethnic groups, it is unclear why the emperor made this decision in 1784. It may have simply been one of a series of adjustments made to regulations related to hereditary titles in the 1780s. For instance, the suppression of an uprising in Gansu in 1781 had prompted an adjustment to CC regulations in 1782. In this adjustment, Qianlong was concerned to maintain the distinction between those who died of their wounds (shangwang 傷亡) and those who died immediately in battle. Only the latter were to be eligible for GCP. Until 1784, this regulation applied to bannermen, not members of the Green Standards. QSL QL47/4/16, p. 468a-468b. On the 1781 rebellion, see Jonathan Lipman, “Ethnic Violence in Modern China: Hans and Huis in Gansu, 1781-1929,” in Violence in China: Essays in Culture and Counterculture, eds. Jonathan Lipman and Stevan Harrel (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), pp. 69-71.

203 For a description of Qianlong’s views of the Green Standards, see Waley-Cohen, Culture of War, pp. 64-65.

204 Chang, Court on Horseback, pp. 164-165; Dai, “A Disguised Defeat,” p. 158.
died in battle: “as for those who gave their lives on the battlefield, they have all expressed their loyalty by dying in service to the state (同一抒忠死事), I cannot bear to show even the slightest discrimination.”

The emperor’s pledge to end discrimination against his Chinese subjects seems to have been put into practice, but the effects of the decision were limited by the rather small death tolls of campaigns in the late 1780s. In the Lin Shuangwen (1786-88) and Vietnam campaigns (1788-89), the largest military campaigns of this period, I have found records of eighty titles award to officers killed in the two campaigns, most complemented with the GCP as mandated by the 1784 regulations. The muted effects of the decisions in the 1780s were in sharp contrast to the decade between 1795 and 1805 when there was a sudden and altogether unprecedented awarding of hundreds of CC and GCP titles to Han Chinese subjects. This phenomenon, while enabled by the policy changes made by Qianlong earlier in the eighteenth century, was tightly wrapped up with political changes and the increasing intensity of warfare at the turn of the century. Because the number of GCP and CC titles expanded for rather different reasons, I will treat them separately.

**Political Factors in the Awarding of Grace Commander Titles in 1802**

Qianlong’s 1767 decision to extend perpetual inheritance to Han Chinese through the GCP title marked this title as one that could be used retroactively, to award not only those officers killed in recent battles, but men—like Huang Fangdu—who had been inadequately awarded for their efforts in the earlier years of the dynasty. This retroactive

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205 QSL QL49/12/16, p. 374a-b.
206 Among the best-known to inherit a title after the Lin Shuangwen campaign in Taiwan was the artist and literatus Tang Yifen, whose father died in Taiwan and who was himself killed while serving during the Taiping rebellion. After inheriting the title, Tang entered the military and eventually rose to the rank of brigade general. At the same time, he continued his artistic pursuits and remained well-connected with Jiangnan literati. On Tang Yifen and his family see Susan Mann, *The Talented Women of the Zhang Family* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), pp. 15, 140, 118, 183.
aspect of the title resurfaced in 1792. In this year Qianlong, once again inspired by stories of Chinese martyred for the Qing in the *Veritable Records*, ordered that officials and officers who had died in service to the state (*sishi* 死事) without being granted a hereditary title in perpetuity should be identified and awarded with a GCP title.207

The initial response to Qianlong’s order seemed to indicate that this would be another symbolic effort with little effect. In 1792, officials in the Boards of War and Personnel had drawn up lists of potential candidates—officials and officers killed in service to the state who had not been awarded hereditary titles—that were to be forwarded to provincial officials for further investigation. However, official records indicate that most awarded GCP titles between 1792 and 1795 were bannermen in the capital, not the Han Chinese who seem to have been the intended targets of the order.208

Unlike 1767, Qianlong responded to the disappointing results by ordering that the search for candidates continue, explaining that “because of the great distances [affecting communication] in the provinces, [officials] have been unable to forward replies all at once.”209 It was another seven years before the outcome of this extended search was finally announced. On January 8, 1802 (JQ6/12/5), Jiaqing ordered that the GCP be awarded to descendants (子孙) of “more than 990 men” whose names had been sent from

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207 As in 1767, official records claimed that the edict had been prompted by a story of the self-sacrifice of a Chinese official in the early years of the dynasty. In 1792, we are told that Qianlong encountered the story of Fan Chengmo 范承謨 (1624-1676), governor-general of Fujian when Geng Jingzhong 史經忠反 against the Qing. Fan had remained committed to the dynasty in the face of grave personal risk; he was thrown into prison and executed in 1676 after repeatedly refusing to join the rebel cause. Qianlong had taken particular note of the fact that Fan’s son had only been given the meager award of entry into the Imperial Academy (*rujian* 入監). The emperor described this award as “inadequate to encourage uprightness among officials and comfort brave souls [of the deceased]” (不足以勵臣節而慰忠魂). He ordered Grand Councillors and heads of tribes and Banners (*buqi* 部旗) to identify men already given titles in perpetuity, and award the GCP to all other “officials who had like [Fan Chengmo] died steadfast” (似此殉節諸臣). Ba county 6-03-00448; QSL QL57/9/29.

208 145 bannermen were granted the GCP in 1795. *Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang*, vol. 6, 1384, JQ6/12/5.

209 *Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang*, vol. 6, 1384, JQ6/12/5.
every province.\footnote{QSL JQ6/12/5, pp. 216b-217a.}

Much, of course, had happened between the search for potential title recipients in 1792 and 1795 and the remarkably generous issuing of hereditary titles to Chinese subjects in 1802. A new emperor, Jiaqing, had taken the throne; there had been substantial turnover in the provincial bureaucracy; and the massive White Lotus War had been raging through several provinces of central China. How did these factors relate to the massive round of GCP titles awarded by the emperor in 1802?

Let us begin with the role of the new emperor. I have found no indication in local archives that Jiaqing had reissued his father’s 1795 call for GCP candidates. However, he did offer final approval for the titles and claim that he himself had “carefully examined each [nominated] official’s achievements” (朕詳核諸臣事蹟).\footnote{QSL JQ6/12/5, pp. 216b-217a.} The generous and empire-wide awarding of GCP titles that he approved accorded with his larger efforts to strengthen relations between the center and the local, a series of efforts including “political propaganda, social relief, and moral indoctrination” that Wang Wensheng has characterized as an effort to “win back the hearts and minds of the populace.”\footnote{Wang, \textit{White Lotus Rebels}, p. 203.}

Indeed, the awarding of titles was strikingly similar to other initiatives that he had used in the first years of his reign.\footnote{On some of Jiaqing’s strategies for “consolidating” his power, see Wang, \textit{White Lotus Rebels}, ch. 6.} Soon after his accession to the throne in 1799, Jiaqing had approved a series of awards for descendants of prominent or conscientious locals. In 1800, he ordered an investigation by provincial officials into the descendants of officials who had been enshrined in the Shrines for Local Worthies (\textit{Xianliang ci} 賢良祠); those who showed aptitude (品行才質可造就者) were to be brought for an imperial
audience and considered for unspecified honors.\textsuperscript{214} Significantly, this order, like that related to the GCP, was framed as the completion of one of his father’s earlier decisions. As Wang Wensheng has pointed out, Jiaqing also offered honorary awards and titles to many of the capital appeals petitioners who took advantage of the emperor’s "broadening of the communication avenues."\textsuperscript{215} Other initiatives that seem to have been intended to strengthen the relation with local elites included the 1801 promotion of the deity Wenchang 文昌, very popular among literati, for his assistance in a key battle during the war. This promotion sparked a massive construction campaign across the empire.\textsuperscript{216} Finally, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the emperor ordered the empire-wide construction of Manifest Loyalty Shrines in 1802 to provide an officially sanctioned avenue for local participation in commemoration of the war dead.

However, the massive and costly expansion of what was essentially a military hereditary caste system seems at odds with Jiaqing’s attempt to institute a more frugal government. Cost-cutting measures extended from an eschewal of “lavish court displays and any significant expenditure on his own clothing and housing,”\textsuperscript{217} to a more wide-reaching attempt to reduce government spending in various branches of government, including the military. Soon after taking power, for instance, he had curtailed expenditures related to the military (and commemoration of war) by reducing amounts

\textsuperscript{214} JQHDSL j.120.12b-13a.
\textsuperscript{216} For a full list of the deities honored for their contributions to the campaign, see CSCSH 60600008, pp. 129-139. On the history of Wenchang, see Terry Kleeman, A God’s Own Tale: The Book of Transformation of Wenchang, the Divine Lord of Zitong (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994).
\textsuperscript{217} Pamela Kyle Crossley, The Wobbling Pivot, China since 1800: An Interpretive History (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2010), p. 59.
paid to the survivors of officers who died in battle (1799, 1801), cutting back on military yanglian ("nurturing honesty") expenses (1813), reducing troop numbers and military salaries (1814), and eliminating the enormously expensive southern tours.

Unlike the Manifest Loyalty Shrines, which cost the central government almost nothing (and, in fact, relieved the Board of Works the cost of producing tablets and renovating the Peking shrine), the stipends for title heirs were expensive. Before reaching the age of eligibility (nian wei ji sui zhe) heirs of a GCP title were paid an annual stipend of twenty-three ounces (liang) of silver. In addition, from 1796 they were also paid a nurturing courage (yangdan 養膽) amount of 4.5 ounces annually. Upon beginning training, their stipends were forty-five ounces plus a nurturing courage amount of 9 ounces. Once appointed to a post, the stipend would continue to be paid in addition to the regular salary; expectant officials after training but before receiving an official post (houbu zhi yuan) received a half stipend. The annual expenditures for all the GCP titles awarded in 1802 would have ranged between 30,000 and 60,000 ounces of silver.

While the granting of hereditary titles seems to have reflected Jiaqing’s larger agenda, the expense of these titles is one clue that the scale of the roll-out had not been due simply to deliberate action at the center but rather reflected both the diligence of newly appointed officials in provincial and local government and a growing interest in the titles among certain constituencies. Not unlike the unsanctioned county Manifest Loyalty Shrines, the proliferation of nominations for the GCP titles may have come as

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218 To give a few examples: awards for men who were temporarily acting (shu 署) as officers of a higher rank were to be given posthumous amounts according to their regular rank (JQHDSL j.517.12b-13a); Amounts for lieutenant were reduced by fifty ounces of silver (JQHDSL j.517.15a-b).
221 JQHDSL. j.198.11a.
222 JQHDSL, j.198.11a.
something of a surprise to the emperor.

The large number of nominations was, no doubt, due in part to the efforts of newly appointed local and provincial officials. It is quite possible that the call in 1792 had been stymied by the incompetent administration of late Qianlong officials, many of whom had a reputation for corruption and “malfeasance,” having gained their posts as a result of Heshen’s control over appointments. After acceding to power, Jiaqing used special recommendation and a special examination to replace a large number of these provincial and local officials, particularly those in provinces affected by the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War: Shaanxi, Sichuan, Hubei, Gansu, and Guizhou. The newly-appointed officials at provincial, prefectural, and county levels appear to have not only been diligent administrators but also personally moved by the sacrifice of men killed in war.

One of these officials, Gong Jinghan 龔景瀚 (1747-1802), a man with close connections to Fashishan (a major rival of Heshen, as discussed in Chapter 2), served as a prefect in Gansu, the province that produced the largest number of GCP nominations in 1802. Gong had been appointed through special recommendation following Jiaqing’s accession to power. His praise for several men killed in war, part of an extensive body of writings related to the White Lotus campaign, was mirrored by his efforts to ensure that the descendants of the war dead would receive their just awards. Based on extant

227 Gong was known for his authorship of a widely-circulated essay outlining a strategy for defeating the White Lotus rebels, “Strong walls and clear fields” (堅壁清野). Among his biographical writings on military men were two poems commemorating Han Jiaye, an officer killed during the war whose story I examine in the following chapter. Gong Jinghan, *Tan jing zhai wen chao: shi chao liu juan* 淡靜齋詩文鈔: 詩鈔六卷 (1840), j.6.17a-b. Gong commented extensively on the rebellion in his poetry in
archival documents, at least nine GCP titles were awarded during his tenure as prefect of Lanzhou between 1800 and 1802. The actual number was likely higher. Another official with ties to the new powers in Peking, Fang Ji 方積 (1764-1814), held several positions in Sichuan during the same period, including magistrate of Langzhong county (1799), prefect of Ningyuan (1800), and prefect of Kuizhou (1801). Like Gong, Fang had played an active role in the suppression campaign prior to his appointment as magistrate of Langzhong and had witnessed the death of a number of men under his command. At least five men from Langzhong received the GCP as well as thirteen from Ningyuan. There were no recipients from Kuizhou, where Fang would have arrived too late to oversee the process of finding and verifying candidates for the titles.

Personnel changes at the provincial level may have also contributed to the large number of nominations for GCP titles in provinces affected by White Lotus War. In 1801, when the last documents for title nominees were submitted to Peking, many lieutenant governors—the officials charged with coordinating the implementation of the edict at the provincial level—were men with military connections and ties to the new powers at court.

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228 I have found the names of nine men from Lanzhou awarded the GCP in documents from the NGDK. However, the total number of GCP in Gansu was nearly 250.
229 Daniel McMahon pointed out that Fang Ji “began his career implementing jianbi qingye while he was magistrate of Liangshan County in northeast Sichuan.” See McMahon, “Southern Shaanxi Officials,” p. 140. Fang Ji’s involvement in overseeing local recruitment of xiangyong and fortifications in Sichuan was also discussed by Kuhn in Rebellion and Its Enemies, pp. 41-44.
230 To give a sense of the number of title heirs relative to the population, Jiang Tao estimated the population of Ningyuan as 1,266,000 in 1823. Jiang Tao 羅濤, Zhongguo jindai renkou shi 中國近代人口史 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chuban she, 1993), p. 193.
231 Data compiled from NGDK, Sichuan tongzhi (1815), j.140-141, and relevant local gazetteers.
Chart 3.1 Distribution of GCP and CC Titles by Province (1795-1805)
Data compiled by author from NGDK, QSL, gazetteers, and *Jiaqing Daoguang liang chao shangyu dang*, vol. 6, 1385-1403.
In Sichuan, the province with the third greatest number of GCP awards (Chart 3.1), the lieutenant governor between 1799 and 1804 was Yang Kui (1760-1804), whom we will recall from his role in the construction of the Manifest Loyalty Shrines in Chengdu and Kuizhou prefecture. Prior to his appointment as lieutenant governor in the first year of Jiaqing’s accession to power, Yang had been actively engaged with military affairs, having accompanied a campaign to Tibet several years earlier, an experience he recounted in a small poetry collection. His brother was a friend of Fashishan and others who served as close advisors to Jiaqing. The lieutenant governor of Shaanxi, Wen Chenghui (1755-1832), had led military forces and xiangyong in southern Shaanxi between 1797 and 1801. The largest number of titles in Shaanxi came from Yulin prefecture, home to Yansui garrison, where Wen had served as surveillance commissioner before taking up the post of lieutenant governor. In Gansu, the lieutenant governor was Guang-hou, a veteran of the White Lotus campaign.

Further attesting to the role of officials was the nearly complete lack of response to the search from provinces that had seen fewer changes in the bureaucracy in the early years of the Jiaqing reign. Particularly noteworthy were the provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, both provinces with large and active Green Standard contingents as well as a particularly violent history in the early years of the Qing. Given the two provinces’ histories, the near absence of GCP titles is striking. Twenty-six were awarded in Fujian and twenty-one in Guangdong (Chart 3.1).

While changes in the bureaucracy appear to have been an important factor in the large number of GCP titles awarded in 1802, the success of bureaucrats in drumming up

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232 Yang Fangcan, Yang Rongshang xiansheng nianpu (1879; reprint, Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), p. 73.
233 See Wen Chenghui’s biography in Taigu xian zhi (1931), j.5.
234 QSG j.343, p. 11127.
candidates for the title depended not only on their own diligent search for the offspring of men killed earlier in the Qing, but also on the responses of these offspring. The descendants of candidates for the GCP were required to submit a series of documents verifying their connections to the deceased: including affidavits from family members and neighbors (zu lin ganjie 族鄰甘結), a family tree (zongtu 宗圖), and documents pertaining to their ancestor’s career (lùli 履歷). While many of those nominated for titles appear to have been selected by the Boards of War or Personnel on the basis of a search through central government documents, there is evidence that some who heard of the search for candidates also presented themselves at local yamen requesting consideration.

There were changes to the regulations governing the GCP in the late 1790s that may have prompted some families to accept a nomination or actively seek the title for an ancestor. Most important was a lightening of the demands placed on title heirs. These demands had been considerable. Those who inherited the GCP before coming of age (18 sui [17 years]) had to proceed each year to the provincial capital to collect their half stipend (banfeng 半俸) of twenty-three ounces of silver (the full stipend was forty-five ounces of silver per year). At the age of 18 sui, they were to report to the governor-general of their home province for inspection. If physically acceptable, they were to proceed to Peking for presentation to the Board of War and the emperor (yinjian 引見). The cost of long-distance travel in the Qing could be substantial and the journey

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235 Many of these documents are still held in the Ba County archives, see for instance Ba County 06-02-00259.
236 For a case in which an individual presented himself at the yamen requesting a GCP title for their deceased ancestor, see Ba County 6-03-00455. See also Ba County 6-03-00451 for a case in which the Board of War did not have evidence of death in battle, suggesting that the nomination had been initiated at the local level rather than in the central government.
237 JQHDSL j.463, pp. 1804-1805.
sometimes hazardous, especially from provinces on the frontiers. There is no indication that these travelers were given a travel allowance (panfei 盤費). Those who survived the trip and passed muster in the capital were dispatched to one of the main provincial garrisons (du fu biao 督撫標) for five years of training. These garrisons were generally located in provincial capitals, again presenting the possibly unpleasant prospect of long distance travel.

After training, the title heirs were to remain at the garrison on their full stipend until the opening of a suitable post at the rank of lieutenant (6a), a rank that marked the peak of many officer careers. During the intervening years, sometimes stretching to decades, they were not necessarily exempt from active service in campaigns and there are examples of some dying in battle before being appointed to a regular post. Thus, prior to the White Lotus War, the path from inheritance of the GCP to appointment as an officer and potential promotion had been burdensome, involving costly journeying and a lengthy course of military training far from home. The end of the process, appointment as

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238 Madeline Zelin provides some travel expenses for officials in the eighteenth century: costs were at least in the tens of ounces of silver. See Madeline Zelin, *The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth Century Ch’ing China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 134-135. Amounts given to juren degree holders to travel for exams in the capital were set between three and twenty ounces of silver in the Shunzhi reign and increased on average less than one ounce of silver over the course of the dynasty. GXHDSL j.339.SZ8. Officers transporting prisoners to Peking in 1796 were paid sixty ounces of silver each for travel expenses (panfei 盤費). GXHDSL j.251.JQ1. On hazards of travel: Sha Yin 沙蘆, the heir of a CC title from Taihe county, Yunnan died of an unspecified illness in Zhanyi prefecture (雲益州) while traveling to Peking for his audience with the emperor. See NGDK 114706, JQ13/5/2. However, some in the Qing apparently relished their travels, see Emma Teng, *Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center and Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 20-21.

239 Note that the three or five years of training were sometimes extended when the trainee took leaves of absence. See NGDK 003733, JQ3/12/4.

240 Luo Ergang described the considerable obstacles in the way of those attempting to move from the rank of lieutenant (6a) to second-captain (5b). The latter rank was the gateway to the higher-paying Green Standard officer ranks. See Luo, *Lüying bing zhi*, pp. 305-307.

241 See, for example, NGDK 114885, JQ19/10/27.
an officer at a time when war was frequent and bloody, may have been even less appealing. It had no doubt been awkward for those nominated by special imperial edicts in the decades before 1792 to turn the titles down; it is less surprising that so few given the opportunity to seek the title in 1792 pursued the honor.

However, as the White Lotus War proceeded and heirs of officers killed in battle increased in number, many of the most onerous demands placed on heirs of the lowest-ranked titles, the CC and GCP, were waived and certain benefits were added. 1796, the first year of the White Lotus War, saw a modest pay raise. In this year, the inheritor of the CC was made eligible for a “nurturing honesty” amount of twenty-four ounces of silver paid annually upon beginning his training. GCP heirs were entitled to a more modest nine ounces of silver. In 1799, removing an obstacle that had prevented some from claiming their titles, heirs were no longer required to travel to Peking until they had completed their military training. Also minimizing the costs associated with travel to administrative centers, stipends were to be distributed by local officials, ending the obligation of yearly visits to the provincial capital. In 1800, it was mandated that the training of title heirs no longer be conducted exclusively at the provincial garrison, but at the garrison closest to their place of residence. In 1801, inheritors of the GCP who had

242 The nurturing honesty amount for CC and GCP holders ended when they took up positions that already had nurturing honesty amounts. GXHDSL j.248.JQ1.
243 For instance, see NGDK 113917, JQ18/12/3. In this case, a sub-lieutenant named Li Tingbiao, lost in action in Vietnam (weichu 未出) had been awarded a grace commander title to be inherited once (yici 一次), but his son could not afford the cost to travel to the capital from his home in Guangdong so the title went unclaimed.
244 GXHDSL j.564.JQ4.
245 One instance of the requirement to collect the pay at the provincial capital was noted in NGDK 002364.
246 GXHDSL j.564.JQ5. This edict was mentioned in several documents in the Grand Secretariat archives, including NGDK 000050, JQ5/2/14 and NGDK 114921, JQ6/3/7. In NGDK 123050, JQ7/10/20, we find the case of Rao Zichu 饒自似, a CC heir from Hunan, who was initially to be sent to the governor’s garrison (fubiao 託標), but because of the new regulation was sent first to Zhe’gan
already begun training for the civil service or military examinations were given the option of preparing for the civil exams with the full stipends accorded to their title. And, finally, select heirs were allowed to accept the GCP as an “adornment” (rongshen 榮身) without obligation of military training or service. In sum, the changes that preceded the awarding of GCP titles in 1802 increased stipends, eliminated the requirement for trips to the capital, and allowed those who inherited the titles to remain closer to their families. These changes were no doubt attractive to the families of nominees of all social backgrounds, but must have been particularly so for families who depended on the support of a title heir.

Family History as a Factor in the Search for GCP Title Candidates

If the scale of the awards bestowed in 1802 can be attributed to a combination of factors—from Jiaqing’s accession, to new appointments in the local bureaucracy, to changes in the laws governing title heirs—it remains to be considered what sort of families actually pursued or accepted a title for a deceased ancestor.

Clearly, the largest group of GCP recipients in 1802 were military officers killed garrison and finally to Qianzhou garrison which was in his home subprefecture of Qianzhou. He was crippled during the course of his military training in Qianzhou.

247 See GXHDSL j.564.JQ6 and j.142.JQ10. The decision to allow heirs to pursue civil or military exams was a concession to heirs of the GCP, many of whom were known to have neither interest nor competence in military matters. This option was also eventually extended to the inheritors of CC titles in 1805, perhaps in response to an 1803 memorial from a censor named Shen Yao 申堯, who argued that CC holders should be given the same opportunity as GCP to enter the civil stream. NGDK 169497, JQ8/2. Shen Yao was Henan Circuit Investigating Censor. A jinshi degree holder, he was a native of Huguan county in Shanxi. See LLD, vol. 24, p. 247. For more on the privileges accorded to hereditary title holders who took the civil exams as well as those who had been awarded military merit (jungong) see Qinding xuezheng quanxue 欽定學政全學 (1812), j.18.19a-30b.

248 For instance, in one document we learn that the wife of a man killed in the White Lotus War petitioned to have her husband’s first-born son and heir to his title, Pan Guozhong 潘國忠, stationed close to their hometown because he was still needed in the household. The document reads: “[The deceased is survived by his second wife and Pan Guozhong’s] stepmother Ms. Li. Although [she has given birth to] brothers including Guoshu, they are still young and dependent, and she still needs the help of Guozhong.” NGDK 000137, JQ5/7/18.
in the eighteenth century, particularly during the second Jinchuan campaign (see Chart 3.3). While records are scant, it is likely that the descendants of these officers were not only accustomed to military service but would have been eager to gain automatic promotion to an officer rank. It is also likely that the descendants could have been easily identified by local officials trying to track down title candidates. At the time of the call for nominations, many of the sons and grandsons of these men were already serving in the military.249

A much smaller number of GCP recipients were civil officials, with the largest group comprised of men killed in the violent years of the Qing conquest. In most cases, the descendants of these recipients belonged to well-organized lineages that shared one or more of three features: (1) a history of claiming and receiving official awards for the ancestor nominated for the GCP,250 (2) pre-existing ties to the military, or (3) ancestors who had already been given formal recognition for their support of the Qing during the conquest of the preceding Ming dynasty (ca. 1640s). These features suggest, I believe, that the government’s search for GCP candidates was of most interest to lineages that had already gained benefit from an ancestor who had been quick to abandon the Ming and, in

249 NGDK 122647, JQ7/9/30; NGDK 061726, JQ7/10/21; NGDK 111855, JQ9/1/22.
250 In addition to the cases examined below, several cases were documented in the *Anhui tongzhi* (1878). In this gazetteer, we read about Wang Tingsheng 王廷陞 who died in the Shunzhi reign (ibid., j.166.45b). In 1739 he was enshrined in the Loyalty and Righteousness Shrine, in 1761, he was enshrined in the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine, in 1802 he was awarded the GCP title, which was inherited by his sixth-generation grandson Wang Wenlin 王文彬. The account was taken by compilers of the provincial gazetteer from *Wuyuan xian zhi* 婁源縣志. Also in the *Anhui tongzhi*, we learn of Zhang Qi 張奇 of Wuhu county. Zhang, serving as a magistrate in Wenchang county in 1654, was captured by pirates who tried to force him to submit. Zhang Qi berated them, and they killed him. The pirates also killed his two sons. Following his death, “locals” built a shrine for him. During the Qianlong reign, an edict promoted him posthumously to zhidafu 直大夫 and he was enshrined in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine. In 1802, his descendant Zhang Conglang 張從朗 inherited a GCP title (ibid., j.167.34b-35a). See also the case of Liu Yuanding 劉元鼎 of Shunchang county in Fujian, after his death in 1647, he was entered in the next centuries into the Shrine of Local Worthies, the Zhongyi shrine, the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, and finally awarded the GCP in 1792. See *Shunchang xian zhi* (1936), j.19.2b.
some cases, had connections to the military.

One of these lineages, surnamed Ding, was located in Guang’an department in northeastern Sichuan. The Ding lineage was identified by the compilers of the Guangxu-era gazetteer as an eminent lineage (shizu 世族), an assertion born out by the lineage’s record of service in the military and civil bureaucracy.251 Their fortunes had been established with the military contributions of Ding Xianjun, an ancestor who had joined Qing forces at Da county in the early Shunzhi reign.252 Xianjun went on to a lengthy and successful career, rising to the rank of major (3b). He was killed by cannon fire in 1675 while aiding in the recapture of Lanzhou, seized the year before by troops loyal to Wu Sangui.253 Xianjun was enshrined in the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine in the initial round of enshrinements in the Yongzheng reign.254

Following Xianjun’s death, the Ding family achieved success in the military and civil bureaucracy. Xianjun’s son, Sichang, began his career at the rank of second captain (5b), a position awarded as a hereditary privilege (yin 藩). By 1708, he had been promoted to brigade general (2a). Three of Sichang’s sons also had official careers. Ding Kui began as a sub-lieutenant (7a) at Donghui subprefecture, and eventually worked his way up to first captain (4a) (his biographer noted that he also had occasion to attend an imperial audience at the Yuanmingyuan).255 The second son, Yaorong, served as a sub-

251 Guang’an xian zhi (1907), j.11.5b.
252 Guang’an xian zhi (1907), j.4.35a.
253 Ding’s participation was mentioned by Wen Tao 文轅, “Qing chu ‘Guanxi xunfa’ Wang Jinbao lunlue 清初閩西閩閩‘王進寶論略,” Ningxia shehui kexue 3 (1987): 85 [pp. 83-88]. On this event, see also Wakeman, Great Enterprise, p. 1112 f. 82. He noted that many of the officers who helped to recapture Lanzhou (like Ding Xianjun), “had surrendered as relatively young men to the Manchus, so that virtually their entire career was in the service of the Qing.” One of these was Zhao Liangdong 趙良棟 (1621-1697) a native of Suide, Shaanxi who became a prominent Qing general and progenitor of a powerful family in Ningxia. See Zhao’s biography in ECCP pp. 77-78.
254 Zhaozhongci liezhuan 昭忠祠列傳, 81 ce, j.37.
255 Guang’an xian zhi (1907), j.4.35b.
lieutenant in Kuizhou before dying in the White Lotus War. The third son, Yongzhen, served on the civil side as the vice-prefect (zhizhong 治中) of Shuntian and later worked in the censorate in the capital. Sichang’s grandson, Xinde, the great-grandson of Xianjun, was awarded the GCP in 1802. He served as ensign (8a) in Chongqing, and then sub-lieutenant in the provincial commander’s garrison.

Most lineages that gained GCP titles for their ancestors shared key similarities with the Dings. Like the Dings, they had conquest-period ties to the Qing dynasty, a history of imperial recognition for their ancestors, and sometimes ongoing military ties. One of the best-documented was from Zouping county, Shandong, where a GCP title was awarded to Liu Kaiwen (?-1647) in 1802. Liu was part of a prominent lineage in Zouping, referred to in the Daoguang-era gazetteer as the “western Lius.” The founder of the lineage, Liu Xin, originally from Zaoqian in Henan, had had the good fortune of fighting under both the Hongwu and Yongle emperors. He had been granted the hereditary military title of Battalion Commander (shixi qianhu 世襲千戶) for his efforts in the battle at Baigou River in 1400. In 1402, he was transferred to Zouping, where he settled with his family. According to his biography, each of the households (fang 房) that descended from Liu Xin’s three sons produced “eminent men” (xianren 顯人).

One was Liu Kaiwen, a Ming jinshi degree holder. Like many literati from Shandong, Liu had shifted his allegiances to the Qing soon after the conquest. Rewarded for his decision, he was soon appointed to a post in Hubei where he was killed by “bandits” in 1647. Kaiwen’s son Pengchong was awarded a department magistracy (zhizhou 知州) in gratitude for his father’s contribution to the Qing cause, but he

256 Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.15.27a-b.
257 Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.15.27a-b.
258 On the shifting allegiance of Shandong men, see Wakeman, Great Enterprise, Ch. 8.
abandoned the position shortly after and disappeared. It was only a few years later that a former neighbor encountered him in another county wearing “a yellow cap and wild clothes.” This neighbor brought Pengchong back to his uncle, who chastised him for abandoning his office. Pengchong stayed long enough to pay respects at his parents’ grave, but vanished again the next month.⁵⁵⁹

Despite the eccentric behavior and disappearance of Kaiwen’s son, we can see that the Liu lineage continued to take advantage of the resources offered by the death of their eminent ancestor. The initial award of an official position for Kaiwen’s son was followed several decades later, in 1727, with Kaiwen’s enshrinement along with twelve others in the newly-established Shrine for the Loyal and Righteous (zhongyi ci 忠義祠),⁶⁰⁰ and then, in 1801, by the bestowal of the GCP on his seventh generation heir (qi shi sun 七世孫), Liu Qilin. After Qilin received the title, he entered military training and eventually took up a post at the rank of lieutenant.⁶¹ There is no record of where he served, but the Republican-era gazetteer indicates that the title passed to several generations of Lius after Qilin, all of whom served in the military.⁶² Both the Daoguang and Republican gazetteers included the awarding of the GCP to the Liu family in the complete records (zongji 總記) of the county, along with other events of great local significance: natural disasters, tax remissions, and—interestingly—the 1802 bestowal of another hereditary title, “Erudite of the Five Classics,” to Fu Jingzu 夫敬族 a sixty-fifth generation heir of Fu Sheng 夫勝.⁶³

In sum, the Liu lineage had a long history of military service, they had already

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⁵⁵⁹ Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.15.68b.
⁶⁰⁰ Others enshrined were listed in Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.5.35a.
⁶¹ Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.15.66b.
⁶² Zouping xian zhi (1931), j.13.93a.
⁶³ Zouping xian zhi (1836), j.1.23a. JQHDSL j.118.25b JQ7.
taken advantage of their ancestor’s death to gain privileges from the dynasty, and this ancestor had died in service to the Qing in the conquest period. It might also be noted that they shared with other prominent lineages in Ji’nan prefecture a liberal attitude to official honors. The Li lineage in bordering Changshan county, for instance, did not acquire a GCP title, however like the Lius did pursue a combination of civil and military degrees, hereditary titles, posthumous awards, and purchased rank.264

The link between conquest period contributions to the Qing and the awarding of a GCP title was also true of the Bao lineage of Zhejiang’s Yuhang county. Bao Zhiqi (?-1651), awarded a title in 1802, had like Liu Kaiwen been an eager beneficiary of the Qing conquest. Cursed with “bad luck” (shuqi 敷奇) in the civil service exams during the Ming, he had redeemed himself by being selected as a special talent (shucai 殊才) by the newly-established Qing dynasty. After his selection, he was given the prestige title Gentleman-litterateur (文林郎) and appointed magistrate of recently pacified Enping county in Guangdong. He was killed in 1651 after failing to convince “bandits” (i.e. Ming loyalist troops led by Wang Xing 王興) who had occupied the county city to surrender to the Qing.265

Like the Lius, the Bao lineage had long profited from their ancestor’s early commitment to the Qing. Beginning with Zhiqi’s father, a string of relatives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were bestowed with the same prestige title as Zhiqi—Gentleman-litterateur—and specially appointed (chishou 敷授) to official

265 This detail was originally recorded in the Guangdong minghuan ce 廣東名宦冊. A brief history of the occupation of Enping city can be found in the Zhaqing fu zhi (1833), j.22.45b-46a, and in the Enping xian zhi (1934), j.13.15a-b. Incidentally, his story was marked by the sort of unnatural events that occasionally surrounded the death of a person killed in defense of a just cause. The earth soaked by his blood was eaten by mice who soon died; his killer He Guozuo 何国佐 died of madness (kuangxi 狂死). Yuhang xian zhi (1808), j.26.10a.
Their response to the search for candidates reflected this longer tradition. After learning of the search for candidates for the GCP title, lineage members (zuzhong 族眾) nominated the third son of Zhikui and fifth generation grandson (wu shi sun 五世孫) of Zhiqi, Chenluan. Due to unspecified problems with the submitted documents, the title was only bestowed in 1803.²⁶⁷

While the gazetteer did not explain their reasons for nominating the third son, the decision was perhaps guided by an interest in leaving open other opportunities for the first two. It is quite likely that the GCP title, not restricted to the firstborn son, was a way of gaining official rank for a son who had shown little promise in preparation for the civil service examinations.²⁶⁸ Others of Chenluan’s generation, perhaps his elder brothers, had already met with some success in the exams. Bao Chenzhong, was a graduate for preeminence (bagong) and Bao Chenxi was a tribute student (suigong).²⁶⁹ Bao Chenluan, a third son, followed the military route, despite his family’s strong tradition of success in the civil exams, perhaps indicating that he had already shown little scholarly potential.

The varied interests and backgrounds of those who were awarded GCP titles suggest not simply an embrace of the symbols of official military culture, but rather a

²⁶⁶ A member of the same generation as Zhiqi, Zhifen 之汾, was given a special appointment as magistrate of Henan’s Linzhang county in 1668. Zhifen’s two sons, Shi 鮑栻 and Ying 鮑楹, were appointed respectively magistrates of Wu county in 1702 and Yixing county in 1722. Bao Ying 鮑楹, holder of juren degree, was also a well-known artist. Bao Ying and Bao Shi were sons of Bao Zhifen; both had failed to pass the provincial exams but were placed on the supplementary list (fubang 副榜) and appointed to official positions. Zhizhou 鮑志周 was appointed magistrate of Chunhua county in 1735. Wutiao 鮑吳條 was appointed magistrate of Xinyu county in 1771. Dianlun 鮑殿倫 was appointed as a secretary (zhongshu 中書) to the Grand Secretariat. Yuhang xian zhi (1808), j.24.31-37.

²⁶⁷ The award for Bao Zhiqi was one of eighteen that required further investigation after the approval of titles in 1802. The unspecified documents submitted after 1802 seem to have met the requirements. See a transcription of the edict in the Yuhang xian zhi (1808), j.26.11a-b.

²⁶⁸ There seems to have been no stipulation that the initial inheritor of the GCP in 1802 be a first-born son. The edict specified only that the inheritor be a “son or grandson” (zi sun 子孫). JQHDSL j.118.20a.

²⁶⁹ Yuhang xian zhi (1808), j.24.19a, 17b.
field of cultural practice in which agents had particular reasons and traditions for pursuing a military honor that some may have seen as a burden or even disgrace. Like other elites, the Ding, Liu, and Bao lineages had the resources to ensure that family memories were preserved and remained politically potent over generations. However, there was also much that set them apart. It is noteworthy that in the cases of both the Liu and Ding lineages, there were historical connections with the military that may have made them less reticent to claim an honor that required military service.270 No such tradition seems to have existed for the Bao lineage, but the award offered a stable career and salary for a son who had failed to gain success in the civil exams; the fact that the Bao lineage had already accepted awards for an ancestor who had switched loyalties in the conquest period may have also made them less reluctant to accept an honor that signified their ancestor’s disloyalty to the Ming.

The Awarding of Cloud Commander Titles to the War Dead

If the patterns of distribution of GCP titles in 1802 reveal the uneven nature of the local bureaucracy and diversity of stances toward military honors and service among Han Chinese, the distribution of cloud commander (CC) titles—the eighth-grade titles awarded to most Green Standard officers killed in battle after 1784—shows at first glance the success of the dynasty in carrying out its increasingly ambitious attempt to honor all officers killed in battle. For regular officers, the creation of a bureaucratic mechanism for the awarding of CC titles in 1784 resulted in a distribution that largely reflected the

270 The preservation of the memory of military heroes was not particularly unusual, even among lineages with strong traditions of civil success. The best-known case during this period was that of Ruan Yuan whose grandfather had been in the military, a fact noted by Ruan himself and his acquaintances. Betty Peh-Ti Wei, *Ruan Yuan, 1764-1849* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2006), p. 25. Established lineages with military connections seem to have been particularly common in Shandong, a province with a strong military tradition. As I have already noted, Shandong had a large number of early Qing military men among those who claimed the supplementary commander by grace.
Chart 3.2 Distribution of CC Titles by Rank of Deceased (Deaths Occurring Between 1787 and 1805)
Data compiled from NGDK, QSL, and local gazetteers.
patterns of military death during the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War in the 1790s and early 1800s. I have found no complete count of the CC titles awarded between 1796 and 1805, but my own search through archival materials and local gazetteers suggests that at least 1,200 titles were awarded during this period. On the basis of approximately one thousand posthumous recipients of the CC whose ranks I have identified, Green Standard officers of the lower ranks received the award much more frequently than officers of higher rank, corresponding with the relatively large number of officers at the lower ranks (Chart 3.2). However, those with higher rank received more awards in proportion to their number. This may be explained by the fact that many lower-ranking officers occupied posts in garrisons responsible for local defense and were only very rarely sent on campaigns. It is also possible, though difficult to prove, that the circumstances of a high-ranking officer’s death would have been more likely shaped to conform to the standards of “killed in battle” (zhenwang), standards that did not allow titles for men who had died of illness or lingering wounds.

While narratives of death in battle may have been less than accurate in their details, a rigorous system of crosschecks allowed few opportunities for completely false claims (for instance, claims for officers who did not exist or who had not actually died). When an officer eligible for the CC died in battle, his name would be added to a list sent to the Board of War, usually by a governor or governor-general. The Board cross-checked the submitted lists against officer records kept on file in the capital. In the case of inconsistencies—for instance, when a name submitted was not on the lists kept in the

271 For a breakdown of Green Standard troops by province, garrison, and duty see Luo Ergang, Lüying bing zhi (1945; reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), pp. 118-207.
272 JQHDSL j.517.QL39.
273 These personnel records were updated on a variety of occasions, such as new appointments or promotions.
capital, the officer in the field would be asked for clarification. Clarification would also be requested when a new policy required additional details on the death.

Following preliminary approval by the Board of War, word would be sent to the home province of the deceased officer and from thence down the administrative ladder to the county magistrate, who was ordered to notify the family to present an heir along with supporting documents. These documents, like those required for GCP candidates, included a family tree (zongtu 宗圖), beginning with the parents of the deceased and ending with the heir of the title, as well as a signed affidavit confirming his relationship to the deceased (ganjie 甘結). The affidavit was usually signed by two guarantors—a neighbor and a relative. County officials forwarded this information to the prefect, who would send it in turn to the circuit intendant. All documents were then collected and examined by the lieutenant governor who forwarded them to the governor or governor-general to be sent to the Board of War for approval and filing.

These efforts to verify the identity of CC candidates seem to have ensured that there were relatively few completely false claims. At the same time, there were limits on the dynasty’s ability to directly manage every facet of the administration of CC titles. These limits were most apparent in two areas that I will examine in the following section: (1) the selection of title heirs, a process that involved the families and lineages of the deceased officers, and (2) the awarding of the titles to irregular troops, a poorly

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274 For example, see NGDK 000426, JQ4/6/28 in which Xing Guangzhou 项光周 was listed as a second captain in the list from the commanding officer and a lower-ranked ensign in documents at the Board of War.

275 See, for example, NGDK 002153, JQ3/12/17.

276 A small collection of copies of these documents can be found in the Ba county archives, held at the Sichuan provincial archives in Chengdu. See, for instance, Ba county 6-03-00259, 6-03-00260, 6-03-00261.

277 The process at the local level was similar to that required for families desiring the canonization of widows who had committed suicide. On this, see Janet Theiss, “Managing Martyrdom: Female Suicide and Statecraft in Mid-Qing China,” Nan Nu, 3.1 (June 2001): 62.
documented process that relied heavily on the compliance and diligence of regular officers. It is at these limits that the intersection of state policy and cultural practice become most evident.

**Producing an Heir and the Limits of Cloud Commander Title Administration**

Extant records from the Grand Secretariat archives (NGDK) suggest that firstborn sons were the most common heirs of CC titles awarded to officers killed in battle. In the majority of cases—670 of 927 cases in which the relation of the first heir to the deceased is available—the first person to inherit the title was identified to the local yamen as a son by birth. 217 cases specify that the heir was the eldest son of the main wife (*dichangzi* 嫡長子). The predominance of eldest sons accorded with the regulations, which forbade inheritance by a younger son of the deceased except in cases in which the eldest was physically disabled or proven incompetent after training.278

There were, however, numerous occasions on which the deceased was without sons. In these cases (188 of 927), lineage or family members determined who would inherit the title. Lineages (*zongzu* 宗族) seem to have played a particularly large role in the process of heir selection in the southeastern provinces of Guangdong and Fujian. In one case, a Guangdong native named Zhang Xian who died in the White Lotus War had no sons by birth. However, he had adopted and raised a young boy of a different surname. The “members of the lineage” (*zuzhong* 族眾) decided that the title should pass not to this son, but to a nephew, the son of his elder brother.279 More common than corporate decision making were instances in which the lineage head (*zuzhang* 節) mediated

278 The order of inheritance prioritized the sons and grandsons of the deceased, then his brothers, rather than paternal cousins of the same generation (*堂兄弟*). This practice had been established for military hereditary title holders during the Ming Hongzhi 弘治 reign. See Yue Chih-Chia 趙志嘉, *Ming dai junhu shixi zhidu* (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1987), p. 152.

279 NGDK 061735, JQ7/6/18. See also *Lianzhou fu zhi* (1832), j.19.67a. For a record of the award and Zhang Xian’s biography see ibid., j.20.30a
between officialdom and the heir of the title, a role that could involve advocating for a preferred heir and transmitting documents vouching for the heir’s identity. A lineage head named Huang Chen, a licentiate (shengyuan), represented the lineage of the deceased officer Huang Jichang who had died at sea while en route to a posting in Taiwan. Huang Chen informed officials that Jichang had died without sons, and Wenyu, the third son of Jichang’s elder brother, had been chosen after deliberation (among lineage members?) (yili 議立). Chen also presented officials with a family tree (zongtu 宗圖) and other documents vouching for Wenyu’s identity.

While the precise actions of lineages in arranging the inheritance were not specified in these documents, their presence or absence in the process of inheritance reflected variations in local forms of social organization. The involvement of lineage heads in Guangdong and Fujian testifies to the strength of lineages in these two provinces and the dynasty’s acquiescence to the role of lineage heads in bureaucratic matters, a trend that appears to have increased during the Jiaqing reign. Cases outside of Fujian or Guangdong provide little evidence of lineage involvement, likely reflecting the relative weakness of lineages in many other parts of China, especially areas that had provided most soldiers during the White Lotus War—Sichuan and Gansu.

As illustrated by the case of Zhang Xian, in the absence of a son adoption was the most common strategy for producing an heir. Adoption of an heir for the first inheritance

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280 NGDK 108407, JQ12/3/6. Huang Jichang does not appear in Longxi xian zhi (1879). There is a Longxi Huang genealogy (1868) at the Family History Library in Salt Lake City, Utah. I have not checked to see if this is the same lineage.

281 For another case of lineage involvement, see NGDK 061648, JQ7/4/9; see also Jinjiang xian zhi (1829; reprint, 1990), j.32, p. 963.

282 Theiss, Disgraceful Matters, p. 68. Theiss refers to Zhu Yong 朱勇, Qing dai zongzu fa yanjiu 清代宗族法研究 (Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 1987). Zhu Yong also argued that from the Jiaqing reign the dynasty largely ceased its attempts to curtail the power of lineages and lineage heads (pp. 172-174).
of a title was explicitly mentioned in 65 of 927 cases of CC inheritance for which data are available. Adoption of an heir in the second or third inheritance, for which documentation is scanty, was mentioned in 35 cases (most CC were inherited three times, after which heirs would receive a GCP title). Like Zhang Xian’s nephew, most adoptive heirs were described as sons of a brother of the deceased and thus shared the same surname. In some of these cases, family members claimed that the officer killed in battle had adopted an heir (guoji 過繼) prior to his death. For instance, one CC heir was said to have been adopted by his uncle, Hu Xizhao, one year before the latter’s death in battle. However, there were also many adoptions that took place after the death in battle and raised no particular objections. In these situations, official documents often noted the participation of family members in arranging the adoption.

There were few cases of improper adoption in the archival records. However, it is not unlikely that improper adoptions were more common than the extant sources suggest. The rate of adoption among documented inheritances of the CC was only seven percent

283 On the preference for brothers’ sons, see Waltner, Getting an Heir, p. 24.
284 The terms most commonly used to refer to adopted sons in official documents were guoji zi 過繼子 and sizi 嗣子. According to Ann Waltner, “a child adopted in this manner is legally and ritually the equivalent of a natural child.” However, she goes on to note that there were differences in the legal treatment. Waltner, “The Adoption of Children,” p. 13. The legal distinction was also the case with CC titles. When titles passed to an adopted heir of the deceased officer, the CC was not converted to GCP as was standard for titles inherited by sons by birth.
286 This practice of posthumous adoption was not unique to men who died in battle. Waltner argued that “The purpose of these posthumous adoptions, which were not uncommon, was to insure that the spirits of the dead man and his ancestors would receive sacrifices.” Waltner, Getting an Heir, p. 93. She noted that these adoptions involved the widow, who “was supposed to appoint an heir for her dead husband, in consultation with the lineage elders.” The practice was also mentioned in Arthur P. Wolf and Chieh-shan Huang, Marriage and Adoption in China, 1845-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980), p. 112.
287 One case was that of Wang Qisun, a prominent literatus whose brother had been killed in the first year of the war. Because his brother had no sons of his own, Qisun selected one of his own sons for posthumous adoption. The adopted son completed his three years of training and entered the military. See NGDK 122236, JQ12/12/6.
(65 of 927), much lower than we would expect if we accept Ann Waltner’s argument that perhaps twenty percent of men in China did not have a male heir.  

While we have no way of determining the prevalence of adopted sons being presented as sons by birth, it is telling that both cases I have found of improper inheritance of a CC title involved an attempt to obscure the real identity of an adopted son. The first case appeared in Shiyu county, Shanxi, after an investigation was undertaken into the heir of deceased officer Zhang Jinfu. Zhang Wen had been nominated for the title by Jinfu’s two wives and two concubines, and verified by a neighbor and relative as Jinfu’s eldest son (changzi 長子). The nomination was initially accepted by the local magistrate and approved by the Boards of War and Personnel. However, further investigation by the magistrate revealed that Wen had actually been born to Jinfu’s brother.  

Jinfu and his wife Ms. Li had raised Wen as their own son from the age of three and “loved him as their own,” though, without a contract of adoption (jiyue 繼約). Adopted nephews were not barred from inheriting the title, but they did not have priority. The investigators discovered that Jinfu also had a younger son named Hao who had been born to one of his concubines (the son was referred to as a shuzi 庶子). After investigation into the possibility of corruption or malfeasance, it was concluded that the wives and concubines had been ignorant of the regulations and had erroneously, but naively, presented Wen as the eldest son (changzi). Governor-general Bolin recommended that the women be excused because of their ignorance, that Wen be returned to his birth father’s home, and that the magistrate be punished for failing to

288 Waltner, based on a tabulation of married men without male heirs in two genealogies, estimated that one fifth to one third of married men did not have a male heir. Ann Waltner, “The Adoption of Children in Ming and Early Ch’ing China” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1981), p. 3.

289 Jinfu’s brother had been away on business at the time of the inheritance.
identify the problem prior to the approval of the title.\textsuperscript{290}

Another case involving improper adoption was treated under the statute for false claims of inheritance (\textit{maoxi} 冒贓).\textsuperscript{291} In Pingli county, Shaanxi, a CC title was awarded to Zhang Kui, a leader of the local militia who died in battle in 1799. His “son” Daju was nominated as the legitimate heir. However, after the magistrate re-examined the submitted documents in 1807, part of a broader attempt to root out the abuses of previous years,\textsuperscript{292} Daju was found to be the second son of Zhang Kui’s sister who had hidden her pregnancy and passed the newborn to her brother in 1784. Zhang Kui had taken him as an heir, claiming that he was the son of his own wife (née Luo 羅).\textsuperscript{293} Ms. Luo gave birth to her own son, Dapeng, one year later. When an heir was sought for the hereditary title, Ms. Luo’s son by birth had been taken captive by White Lotus forces and so she presented the adopted Daju as Kui’s real son. The neighbors, who later claimed that they had been unaware of Daju’s real origins, had testified at the yamen that he was indeed the son of Kui.\textsuperscript{294} Magistrate Shi Yan blamed Ms. Luo, noting that Daju had simply acted in obedience to his mother (\textit{tingcong} 聽從). However, because as a woman she was

\textsuperscript{290} GZZZ 008292, JQ7/6/15. Magistrate Wu, still occupying his post two years later, was demoted for his failure to capture deserting troops. NGDK 116054, JQ9/5/2.

\textsuperscript{291} This statute was much more commonly applied during the Ming dynasty. As Michael Szonyi has pointed out, lineages with the duty of providing a conscript for the military employed a variety of strategies to nominate a member, including the drawing of lots. Michael Szonyi, \textit{Practicing Kinship: Lineage and Descent in Late Imperial China} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), p. 63. For more on abuses in the hereditary military system during the Ming, see Yue Chih-Chia, \textit{Mingdai junhu shixi zhidu}. For a Qing-era criticism of the flaws of the Ming hereditary system, see \textit{Buoqing fu zhi} (1849) j.11.1a. On the Ming origins of this statute, see \textit{Da Qing lüli tongkao} 大清律例通考 (1886), j.6; and \textit{Da Qing lüli anyu} 大清律例案語 (1847), j.35.

\textsuperscript{292} For instance, in Sichuan an order was circulated in 1807 to verify the identities of those who had claimed posthumous amounts for \textit{xiangyong} who had died in battle (Ba county, 06-02-00265); an attempt was made to ensure that soldiers did not receive awards on the battlefield and again after returning to their home garrisons (NGDK 122047, JQ13/11/29).

\textsuperscript{293} On the use of female kinship networks to produce an heir, see Waltner, \textit{Getting an Heir}, p. 95.

\textsuperscript{294} NGDK 170515, JQ12/9. Zhang Kui does not appear in either the prefectural or county gazetteers of his native place: \textit{Xing'an fu zhi} (1812) and \textit{Pingli xian zhi} (1898).
ignorant of the law (女流不知律), he advised that she not be punished. The unfortunate Daju, on the other hand, was ordered exiled, conscripted as a foot soldier, and expelled from his adopted lineage. In an odd footnote to the case, the real son had survived the kidnapping and found employment for several years in Wuchang prefecture, in Hubei. When he was finally old enough to find his way home, he returned to Pingli and took up the title.

Both cases speak to the gravity with which the Qing viewed inheritance. As we shall see later in the chapter, punishments for improper inheritance were much harsher than those for the much more common problem of legitimate title heirs shirking their duties. At the same time, the fact that both families nearly got away with their false claims suggests certain limits to the state’s ability to administer the process of heir selection. While safeguards such as affidavits and guarantors were put in place, these were hardly foolproof. It is quite likely that many of the heirs presented to officials as sons by birth or by proper adoption were, in fact, boys who had entered the family through one of many informal routes that had been developed over time, as Ann Waltner has put it, to “get an heir.”

The Uneven Awarding of Cloud Commander Titles to Xiangyong

Despite occasional challenges, the families of most officers killed in battle were able to get an heir. The same was not true of xiangyong, the often rag-tag and unmarried irregulars who were first made eligible for CC titles in 1797. The marginal nature of many xiangyong, along with a chronic lack of documentation, ensured that very few names of xiangyong were submitted to the central government for consideration for hereditary titles. I have found only thirty-seven xiangyong who were given the CC title
over the course of the White Lotus War. Furthermore, unlike the steady stream of awards going to regular officers, the majority of these titles were awarded to the deceased of a small number of battles, suggesting that recognition of the contributions of xiangyong depended a great deal on either special imperial interest in their deaths or the unusual sympathy of a commanding officer. Thus, while the order to extend titles to xiangyong stemmed from the central government’s larger attempt to standardize the awards for death in battle, the awarding of the titles brought to light the disparate values attached to particular xiangyong and the discrimination that many faced from regular officers.

Xiangyong were first made eligible for CC titles in 1797, following the deaths of two xiangyong named Zhong Wanzhou 鍾萬周 and Wu Xiaocai 呉繡才 in a battle in Ziyang county, Shaanxi. On this occasion, Zhong, Wu, and several other xiangyong had led the charge, but were deemed ineligible for awards because they did not have official rank (wu zhixian 無職銜). Following the incident, it was ordered that names of xiangyong who had already been decorated for military service before dying in battle be submitted for consideration for CC titles. The expansion of eligibility, however, did not

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295 Several of the thirty-seven served as leaders of xiangyong contingents, usually described as militia heads (yishou 義首 or tuanshou 團首). I have not included among the xiangyong those with low-grade examination degrees, of whom at least ten received CC titles. Information on xiangyong recipients comes from the NGDK, QSL, and local gazetteers.

296 Five were killed at Gaohe bridge in Pingli county, Shaanxi; four were killed at Jinjia mountain, also in Pingli.

297 The story of Zhong Wanzhou 鍾萬周 was recorded in the Zhuxi xian zhi (1867), j.10.15. Zhong’s son and grandson both fought in the first Opium War; his grandson was killed in battle in 1852 and awarded an additional CC; his great-grandson organized local defenses against the Taiping.

298 A communication (ziwen 吟文) from the Board of War on the bestowal of these awards cited the Grand Council which had directed that the awards were to be distributed to even men such as “righteous braves” (yiyong 義勇) and “those who had never held official rank at all” (並無職守之人), whether military or civil. This edict was cited in the Yuhang xian zhi (GX), j.26.11a-b. The CC was to be awarded to xiangyong who had already been decorated for military service. See NGDK 110083, JQ12/5/22.

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cause any immediate increase in CC titles for *xiangyong* killed in battle. No further titles were awarded to irregulars until 1799, when Jiaqing ordered hereditary titles for nine *xiangyong* killed in the sixth month of fourth year of his reign. In his edict, Jiaqing described what he believed to be a chronic lack of recognition for the contributions of *xiangyong* (here used interchangeably with *yiyong*):

There are virtually no reports of the deaths of *yiyong* in memorials submitted by officers. When we inquire into the reasons, we find that it is because local officials rely on the strength of *xiangyong* to defend against the bandits but when the battle is won they claim the merit for themselves, or even for members of their staff (*muyou*) or relatives. In all cases, they enjoy excessive promotion and recommendation.

*Xiangyong*, in contrast, receive nothing at all. When they are killed in battle, no report is made because they are not in the regular military. Not only do they receive no awards for merit when they kill bandits, when they themselves are killed they receive no posthumous compensation.

How can this bring comfort to loyal souls or stir up fighting spirit?

Their deaths were memorialized by Songyun. He had been appointed governor-general of ShaanGan in 1799 (ECCP p. 692). The incident attracted the attention of Shandong native Hao Yixing 郝英行 (1757-1825) who described his reaction after reading of their deaths in Songyun’s memorial. See Hao Yixing, “Guanzhong yiyong ji,” in Hao Yixing ji, vol. 7 (Jinan, Jilu shushe, 2010), pp. 5370-5372. For a biography of Hao, see ECCP pp. 277-279.

This edict came in the midst of growing suspicion that government troops were relegating
the most dangerous combat operations to xiangyong. Shortly after this edict was issued, the emperor received an intelligence report from ensign (8a) Zhang Qifeng 張起鳳 that government troops under Mingliang 明亮 (1736-1822) had not engaged in combat with bandits for four months. The fighting of the war, Zhang reported, had been left to xiangyong (though they too had been largely inactive, engaging in combat only twice over the same period).\(^301\) The emperor voiced similar suspicions a few months later.\(^302\)

Despite Jiaqing’s attempt to increase the number of hereditary titles awarded to irregulars, there was again little response from military officers. The reasons are unclear. The unusual awarding of nine titles on a single occasion may have been taken as an act of generosity corresponding with the emperor’s accession to power rather than a compelling precedent. The fact that Jiaqing’s opinion of xiangyong spiraled quickly downward in the following years probably did little to encourage officers to nominate deserving candidates.\(^303\) It is also likely that the military establishment continued to be resistant to accepting these newcomers, a problem I explore further later in this chapter and in the second half of the dissertation.\(^304\)

When hereditary titles were awarded to xiangyong, the process was afflicted by poor documentation that could prevent the actual bestowal of the title to an heir of a deceased xiangyong. Records for most xiangyong who joined the campaign were either incomplete, unreliable, or absent altogether. Nor were relevant government bodies equipped to deal with a group that remained ill-defined in reality and regulations.\(^305\) The problem was illustrated in one case involving the second largest group of xiangyong

\(^{301}\) QSL JQ4/10, p. 678a-679a.
\(^{302}\) QSL JQ5/2/9, p. 779a-780a.
\(^{303}\) For negative views expressed by the Jiaqing emperor, see QSL JQ6/3/2, p. 32a.
\(^{304}\) On the hostility toward xiangyong in the military, see also Dai, “Civilians Go to Battle,” p. 173.
\(^{305}\) On this, see also Wang, “White Lotus Rebels” pp. 303-304.
awarded CC titles in a single incident. In 1804, seven xiangyong including one who had already been awarded the regular rank of lieutenant (6a), Wei Zhongcai 魏忠才, were killed during a failed attempt to negotiate the surrender of a group of rebels in Shaanxi. The rebels, themselves former xiangyong, had shortly before approached government troops to lodge a complaint over their mistreatment (presumably by corrupt officials). Jiaqing, informed of the deaths in a memorial from Delengtai 德楞泰 (1745-1809), the imperial commissioner in charge of mopping-up operations, saw the incident as a result of the latter’s indulgent attitude (ruan 軟) toward the “bandits.” Jiaqing later learned that Delengtai had sent Wei Zhongcai and the six others with money to bribe the bandits into submitting. Nonetheless, the emperor saw that the deaths presented an opportunity to try to inspire loyalty among other xiangyong by revealing to them the “generous favor” (wo en 漕恩) that had been shown to Wei and the other deceased xiangyong. To this end, he ordered sacrifices at the site of their deaths and the bestowal of CC titles along with burial amounts usually reserved for regular officers. He also provided Delengtai a script to read to the xiangyong gathered to observe the sacrifices.

Despite the emperor’s personal attention, there was a lapse in communications between the central bureaucracy and officials in Sichuan that resulted in a failure to bestow the correct titles on the heirs of the deceased. We learn in an 1810 document that Delengtai had sent the Board of War a sheaf of documents (ce 冊) with requisite documents.

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306 CSCSH 606000011, JQ9/1/17, pp. 25-27.
307 Wei Zhongcai 魏忠才, the only one of the seven who had held military rank prior to his death, was awarded according to the regulations for second captains; two others, Yang Changtai 楊昌泰 and Hu Gui 胡貴, veteran xiangyong who had earlier been awarded a blue plume (lanling 藍翎), were to be awarded according to the regulations for lieutenants. The other four held neither rank nor decoration and so were not technically eligible for hereditary titles, but the emperor decreed that they should be awarded according to the regulations for sub-lieutenants. Qing zhongqi wu sheng bailianjiao qiyi ziliao, vol. 2, pp. 381-382. Further testifying to Jiaqing's interest in the incident, the killer of Wei Zhongcai was tracked down and executed. CSCSH 606000014, JQ9/10/13, p. 1.
details—probably collected and forwarded to his office by local officials—about the deceased *xiangyong*. However, he did not include with these documents a copy of either his original memorial describing the deaths of the seven *xiangyong* or the imperial edict ordering their posthumous promotion. The Board of War, for its part, failed to cross-check the documents submitted by Delengtai, the standard procedure for documents dealing with deaths in battle. Thus, instead of receiving their due awards, descendants of the seven *xiangyong* inherited terminal grace commander (GC) titles (恩騎尉一次) and a one-time payment of fifty ounces of silver, half the amount given to sub-lieutenants (7a) who died in battle.\(^\text{308}\)

It was only in 1810 that the recently appointed Sichuan lieutenant governor Fang Ji drew attention to the discrepancy between the emperor’s decision to award CC titles and the actual awarding of terminal GC titles. The fact that the issue was raised at all was serendipitous. Fang was not only unusually well-versed in the logistics of the campaign, he would also have been personally familiar with the case, having recently served as prefect of Ningyuan prefecture,\(^\text{309}\) home to one of the deceased *xiangyong*, Hu Gui 胡貴. Nonetheless, traces of the error turned up in the list of title recipients in the Sichuan provincial gazetteer, published six years after Fang Ji brought the matter to official attention. The son of Wei Zhongcai, the leader of the group, was included, but only as the recipient of a hereditary ensign (8a) rank.\(^\text{310}\) One other, Ji Yuchun 吉玉春 of Santai county was not mentioned at all. Of the four deceased from Sichuan, only two were listed correctly: Ma Biao 马彪 of Shizhu department and Hu Gui of Xichang county.\(^\text{311}\)

\(^{308}\) NGDK 047775, JQ15/5/29.

\(^{309}\) Fang served as prefect from JQ5 (1800), see *Xichang xian zhi* (DG), j.1.23a-b. He was preceded by Yan Shihong 嚴士鏞, who served from JQ1-5 (1796-1800), and followed by Shen Nianzi 沈念茲.

\(^{310}\) *Sichuan tong zhi* (1815), j.140.44b.

\(^{311}\) *Sichuan tong zhi* (1815), j.140.31a, j.141.2b.
are no further records of the case in archival materials.

The other CC titles for xiangyong were distributed in ways that further indicate the rather uneven administration of titles for xiangyong killed in battle. There was one more incident that saw multiple awards handed out to xiangyong: four were awarded in 1802, following the deaths of several xiangyong in the same incident in which Han Zichang was killed (I examine the story of Han Zichang’s brother Han Jiaye in Chapter 4). Three others went to militia leaders in Zhushan county in Hubei; a county that had also awarded ten CC titles to military officers. 312 These awards in Zhushan can probably be ascribed to the diligence and military connections of local magistrate Fan Jichang 范繼昌 who served in the position throughout the war. Fan had originally come to Hubei in the entourage of Hengrui 恒瑞 (?-1801), a Manchu officer charged with carrying out the counterinsurgency in that province. 313 He was shortly after appointed magistrate of Zhushan where he took a leading role in setting up local defenses and training xiangyong. He continued to serve in the position after the war, during which time he was deeply involved in postwar rebuilding and served as the main editor of the Jiaqing-era gazetteer. His connections with military officers, familiarity with local defenses, and command of the relevant documents no doubt contributed to the success of Zhushan natives, particularly militiamen, in obtaining the title. 314 Most of the remaining xiangyong recipients had substantial experience in the military, had received earlier official recognition for their contributions, and appear to have been well-known to regular

312 A total of thirteen CC and one supplementary GCP were awarded in Zhushan. See Zhushan xian zhi (1807), j.7.12a-b.
313 Zhushan xian zhi (1807), j.8.9a.
314 Descriptions of the contributions of militiamen or local gentry could be forwarded by local officials to their superiors. See, for example, Gui zhou zhi (Hubei) (1866), j.6.7a.
In other words, their rewards reflected not only the nature of their deaths but also their links to regular officers and officials.

Ironically, even though the xiangyong received a very small proportion of the CC titles awarded during the war, they were highly visible in court discourse on the titles. In the previous chapter, their prominence in Jiaqing’s order to build prefectural shrines reflected their role as a sort of proxy for Jiaqing’s interest in the activation of local elites for imperial ends. In the case of the titles, they were instead used to illustrate the principle that contributions in battle should be awarded regardless of institutional or ethnic identity. As marginal men without military rank the awarding of titles to xiangyong provided an illustration of the erasure of hierarchical and ethnic boundaries for the battle dead.

In many ways, the order to extend CC titles to xiangyong represented the culmination of a shift in the dynasty’s commemoration of the war dead, from the presentation and representation of select officers to an attempt to give official recognition to all who died in battle. At the same time, their marginality in both the military and local society ensured that these regulations remained ineffective in practice. The extremely

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315 For instance, Li Hanchun 李含春 of Da county in Sichuan had served with the military for eight years prior to his death in 1804. He had been awarded a fifth-rank button cap (wupin dingdai 五品頂戴) for merit in battle and a blue plume (lanling 藍翎), a reward for service given to officials below the sixth rank, for his assistance in the capture of rebel leader Ran Tianyuan 冉添元. Da xian zhi (1815), j.36.4a-b. Similarly, Yue Gui 岳貴 of Nanjiang county in Sichuan already had a blue plume and button cap for military merit at the time of his death (jungong dingdai 軍功頂戴), indicating previous military service. QSL JQ9/4/5, p. 726a; Nanjiang xian zhi (1827), j.zhong 24b-25a. Yue was killed in 1803. Qing zhongqi wu sheng bailianjiao qiyi, vol. 4, p. 103. Deng Yusheng 鄧玉聖 of Pengshui county, who died in 1804, had offered his services to the military in 1797 and had been awarded a blue plume sometime before his death. NGDK 110083, JQ12/5/22. He Tianui 賀天貴 of Taoyuan county in Hunan was one of five xiangyong responsible for the killing of rebel leader Zhang Tianlun 張添倫 in 1802. He held a blue plume at the time of his death. Qing zhongqi wu sheng bailianjiao qiyi ziliao, vol. 2, p. 142. Apart from the three militia leaders in Zhushan, few of the titles went to xiangyong who died defending their own communities. One of the few was He Tingzuo 何廷佐, a native of Anhui who had moved to Shaanxi as a child and was killed along with his wife and three younger brothers while defending his adopted county of Shangnan in 1797. His son was given the award in 1804, perhaps because of the memory of his family’s unusual sacrifice. Anhui tong zhi (1878), j.202.15a.
small number of titles awarded to xiangyong killed in battle reflected the hostility of military officers to soldiers from civilian backgrounds and the limits of a system of record-keeping that had not kept up with changes to the composition of the military.

The Reception of Title Recipients and Heirs in Society

The awarding of the CC titles was uneven, at least when it came to xiangyong. But there was nonetheless a substantial number of men in the early nineteenth century who became posthumous recipients and living heirs of hereditary titles for death in battle. The growing number and increasingly diverse social background of recipients and heirs was reflected by an equally diverse array of depictions of these men in a variety of nonofficial sources, from literary collections to local gazetteers. These sources provide an opportunity to examine the extent to which the hereditary titles conveyed to others in Qing society the messages that Qianlong had attached to his extension of the titles beyond the Banners: esteem for military service (shi zhen jiangli rongxing ⽰朕獎勵戎行) and the elimination of discrimination (qishi 歧視) against Chinese subjects.316

If we look at the title recipients who received the greatest coverage in nonofficial writings, it appears that Qianlong’s expressed intention that the titles draw attention to military service was generally disregarded. Unsurprisingly, the recipients to receive the most extensive coverage in writing were not military officers killed in battle, but the much smaller number of civil officials awarded the titles after dying in the line of duty. The attention paid to civil officials awarded the title is illustrated by an epitaph that Deng Xianhe 鄧顯鵬 (1777–1851), a prominent Hunanese scholar, wrote for two brothers from his native county of Xinhua who had been awarded CC titles after their deaths.317 Both

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316 GXHDSL j.142.QL32, QL49.
317 On Deng’s role as compiler of the writings of Wang Fuzhi, see Stephen Platt, Provincial Patriots: The Hunanese and Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007). See also ECCP p. 768.
brothers were civil officials. One, vice-magistrate (tongzhou) Zeng Ai 曾艾, died along with much of his family after Miao rebels broke into the administrative capital of Nanlong prefecture, Guizhou in 1797. The other, Zeng Zhangsi 曾彰泗, a county magistrate, died while defending Yang county city in Shaanxi against the Ningshan mutineers.

At the end of his epitaph for the two brothers, Deng drew his readers’ attention to the fact that the brothers were only two among several other natives of Baoqing prefecture who had received CC titles around the same time. He wrote,

The dynasty’s use of the statutes of posthumous inheritance and the Manifest Loyalty Shrine to honor officials who have died in war is of utmost importance. Since the founding of this dynasty, loyal and upright men worthy of record have been very few. Why is this? Because when there is chaos in the world then the upright and righteous are both brilliant, when the times are peaceful then we are fortunate to have nothing to speak of. Today, there are five households in our prefecture [Baoqing] who have been awarded the cloud commander title, but the Zeng family of Xinhua has been awarded two within less than ten years. Along with all those honored in other families, they not only mark the flourishing of one family’s talents (mencai) but are also the brilliance of our community.

國家以鰥孤之典昭忠祠待疆場死事之臣所以矜龍隆重之者至矣士當其時有不致命遂志捐軀犯難以圖報於萬一者哉顧考寶慶自入國朝來忠節之士可記者甚少何哉蓋世亂則以節義相煦時平則以無事為福大抵然矣今紀郡中得襲雲騎尉世職者凡五家而新化曾氏不十年兩與斯
For Deng, the Zengs and other title recipients in Baoqing were united by the fact that all had been awarded the CC title. But who were these other four households? From other records, we know that all four were military officers. I have not been able to find any other mention in Deng’s writing of the four military officers awarded hereditary titles in the same period.

From the epitaph, it is apparent that Deng saw the titles less as a sign of Qing esteem for military service, than one small part of a constellation of honors and unofficial efforts that added to the “brilliance” of the Zeng brothers’ deaths. Deng noted in the epitaph that Zeng Ai was commended by LiangGuang governor-general Jiqing 吉慶 (?-1802), commemorative arches were built for Zeng Ai’s wife and concubines, and that their stories were promulgated through the efforts of local elites. Deng claimed that he himself had played a role in preserving the memory of the Zengs’ deaths. The Qing Historiography Office (Shi guan 史館), he noted, had produced a biography; there was also a biography draft (zhuan gao 傳稿) written by a certain Yue of Chenggu county. But, these biographies had left out important details regarding Zhangsi’s family members, including a dialogue between Zhangsi’s younger brother and Zhangsi’s suicidal widow in which the latter was persuaded not to kill herself. It was only after his editorial work and personal conversation with Yang Fang—a Green Standard officer and eyewitness whom we will meet again in the second half of the dissertation—Deng asserted, that the story of the escape of Zhangsi’s family became “broadly known.”

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318 Deng Xianhe, Nancun caotang wen chao 南村草堂文钞 (DG; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 523), j.18.37a.
319 For the names and ranks of the other three, see Baoqing fu zhi (1849), j.11.12a-b.
320 Deng, Nancun caotang wen chao, j.18.37a-40b.
321 Deng, Nancun caotang wen chao, j.18.40a.
322 Deng, Nancun caotang wen chao, j.18.40a.
Deng was immodest but probably correct in pointing to the limited ability of official honors alone to make widely known the stories of title recipients. While we must be careful to separate Deng’s self-importance from the effects of his actions, we will see in the following chapter that the stories of the war dead with the broadest transregional audience were typically those that were actively taken up and promoted by literati such as Deng rather than those whose subjects had received the greatest honors from the dynasty. The reasons for interest in a particular title recipient, in most cases, were due less to the official honors than to the social status of the recipient or a particular scholar’s interest in local history. But what of those who inherited the hereditary titles from a father or relative killed in battle? In many ways, they provide a better perspective on the reception of the titles in Qing society. Title heirs were less likely than those killed in battle to be the objects of adulatory biography; and they appeared with some regularity in archival sources. Most evidence suggests that title heirs, like the title recipients, were perceived in radically different ways, depending on their personal circumstances.

As was the case with title recipients, for a small minority of heirs from an elite background, the hereditary titles played some role (usually secondary) in bolstering their prestige among the educated elite. Shi Shanzai, a native of Yuanping county in Zhili, provides a useful illustration. Shi was one of the few CC heirs in the early nineteenth century to rise to the top rank in the Green Standards. His father, Shi Qian 史謙 (?-1788), had been serving as at the lowest rungs of the civil bureaucracy (a jail warden or dianshi).

323 Many who wrote biographies of men posthumously awarded CC were also involved in other local history projects. The famous literatus Zhao Huaiyu 趙懷玉 (1747-1823) of Wujin county wrote epitaphs for two of the three men from his county who had been awarded the CC: Tang Dakui 湯大奎 (?-1788) and Wang Zhaoding 王兆鼎 (?-1799). Suggesting his interest in Wujin history, Zhao also produced a yuefu poetry collection on other notables from Wujin up to the end of the Ming. Zhang Shu, the compiler of a commemorative anthology for Han Jiaye in Wuwei county, Gansu, was also preoccupied with collecting materials for a history of their shared prefecture, Liangzhou. On Zhang Shu and Han Jiaye, see Chapter 4.
Figure 3.1 Portrait of Shi Shanzai
Source: Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaoxong zhipu.
when he was killed during the Lin Shuangwen rebellion in Taiwan (1786-1788). Shi Qian was posthumously awarded a CC title, inherited by Shi Shanzai. After inheriting the title, Shi Shanzai entered the military, rising eventually to the rank of provincial commander (1b) before retiring in 1831. This success as a military officer was likely one of the reasons that the editors of the 1868 Shi genealogy gave him a prominent place among eminent Shi ancestors. Shi Shanzai was among forty-two ancestors, all degree holders or officials, whose portraits graced the first chapter of the genealogy (Fig. 3.1).324

The same genealogy makes it clear that Shi had gained some recognition among scholar-officials outside of his lineage. The editors printed in the genealogy eleven texts dedicated to Shi Shanzai, more than for any other lineage member, including Shi Jirong (1748-1815), who had held a top provincial post (lieutenant governor) in Hunan and Guangxi only a couple of decades before Shi Shanzai’s promotion to provincial commander. The identities of the authors suggest that the attention paid to Shi Shanzai was due in large part to the status of his two sons, both well-connected holders of civil service degrees. The texts for Shi Shanzai consisted of four sixtieth birthday congratulations gathered in 1828 by his son Shi Zhifan 史致蕃 (jinshi 1823) from others awarded the jinshi degree in 1823, three seventieth birthday congratulations (including one from men awarded the juren degree in 1821, classmates of his second son Shi Zhikang 史致康), Shi Shanzai’s official biography, and three commemorative texts written after his death.325 The authors of these texts included such luminaries as Sun

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324 Each of the portraits in the genealogy was accompanied by a colophon, most written by famous literati. Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaozong zhipu (1868), j.2. On a similar series of lineage portraits, see Richard Vinograd, Boundaries of the Self: Chinese Portraits, 1600-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 2.
325 Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaozong zhipu (1868), juan.shou.mulu.
Shanbao 孫善寶 (?-1853), the prominent capital official Huang Juezi 黃爵滋 (1793-1853, jinshi 1823) and fellow jinshi graduates of 1823, Qian Yiji’s son Baohui 錢寶惠 (?), and Shi Shanzai’s son-in-law Lu Jianying 陸建瀛 (1792-1853).

If Shi Shanzai’s rise through the military hierarchy along with the success of his sons helps to explain his prominence within his lineage and among scholar-officials, how did his hereditary title affect the nature of his reputation? If these texts can be taken as evidence, the title had shaped Shi Shanzai’s reputation in two ways. First, and least surprisingly, the title served to link Shi Shanzai’s own life story tightly to his father’s—the title was an occasion for writers to discuss Shi Qian’s noble death in the Lin Shuangwen uprising. However, the writers also treated the title as a signifier of cultural ideals embodied by Shi Shanzai himself: particularly his self-conscious abandonment of a civil career in favor of military service. Despite the fact that heirs of the CC were obliged to undertake military service until the change of regulations in 1801, well after Shi Shanzai’s inheritance, many of the writers presented Shi’s military service anachronistically not as an obligation accompanying inheritance but a principled decision to abandon a promising civil career. Huang Juezi and his fellow jinshi graduates of 1823 wrote of how Shi overcame his feelings (qing) of reluctance in order to pursue a

326 Sun Shanbao (1807 juren), the son of the prominent provincial official Sun Yuting, rose to the rank of Jiangsu governor. See ECCP p. 685. In addition to the text for Shi Shanzai, Sun also wrote the inscription for the portrait of Shi Qian.

327 Huang Juezi has become best known for his strong support for opium prohibition. He was described at some length by Polachek, who referred to him as a key player in the Spring Purification circle and protégé of Pan Shi’en, who would be appointed chief grand councilor in 1835 (Polachek, Inner Opium War, p. 83). Both Huang Juezi and Shi Shanzai’s son Shi Zhifan served as examining officials (kaoguan) in 1828. See Fashishan et al, Qingmi shuwen san zhong 清秘述聞三種 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1982), p. 605.

328 Qian Ziwan was the son of Qian Yiji. In his official career, he served as a president (shangshu) of the Board of Works. See QDZJ 7-25.

329 Lu Jianying received his jinshi in 1822. He rose to the rank of LiangJiang governor-general. He was killed in the Taiping rebellion. See QDZJ 92-713.

330 Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaoazong zhipu (1868), j.4, pp. 368, 374, 377, 387.
righteous (yi) path. Another contributor declared that the success of Shi Shanzai’s sons in the civil service was a “reward” (chou) for his decision to “give up civil service in favor of the military” (去文而事武) after inheriting the title.

This narrative of heroic self-denial was common to many military biographies, where it was often reduced to the pithy trope of “throwing down the brush” (toubi 投筆), a reference to the Han dynasty general Ban Chao 班超 (32-102 C.E.) who had chosen to lead troops against the Xiongnu rather than pursue a civil career. In Shi Shanzai’s case, however, the narrative also accorded with a discourse of principled official activism that had taken root among a number of scholar-officials in Peking in the 1820s, including Huang Juezi and others in a loosely affiliated group that James Polachek referred to as the “Spring Purification” circle. Indeed, the accounts of Shi’s decision to pursue a military career were similar to the story of Yao Ying 姚瑤 (1785-1852), a jinshi degree holder who perhaps best represented the ideals of Huang and others in this group. Much like Shi Shanzai’s supposed rejection of civil pursuits for a military career, Yao had “devoted himself to a career of idealistic service in county-level office,” rather than taking advantage of the opportunity to enter the more prestigious Hanlin Academy. According to Polachek, Yao’s “stubborn adherence to principle” ultimately paid off when admirers in the capital managed to get him appointed to a series of ever higher officials posts.

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331 Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaozong zhipu (1868), j.4, p. 372.
332 Yaojiang Banlin Shi shi xiaozong zhipu (1868), j.4, p. 375. For similar sentiments, see also ibid., pp. 368, 383.
333 The outpouring of writing on Shi Shanzai may have also reflected a surge of interest in Qing imperial ventures at the time of the Qing campaigns in Xinjiang between 1826 and 1828, campaigns in which Shi Shanzai participated. See Laura Newby, The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand, c. 1760-1860 (Leiden: Brill, ), pp. 111-117; see also her article “The Chinese Literary Conquest of Xinjiang,” Modern China 25.4 (Oct., 1999): 451-474.
334 Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 68-69.
The perceptions of title heirs from less prominent families are more difficult to ascertain given the paucity of records. There is some evidence that titles heirs and their families used the titles to bolster their local prestige. Heirs often placed a plaque above the doorway of their households proclaiming the honor (fig. 3.2).\textsuperscript{335} Heirs also commonly had the title inscribed alongside other honors and degrees on the plaques and steles that marked their patronage of temples and other prominent structures.\textsuperscript{336} If at least some heirs were eager to put the titles on display, perceptions of these men in the upper echelons of local society were uneven and correlated rather strongly to their pre-title status. That is, heirs from families on the lower rungs of local society seem to have gained little prestige from their titles among elites.

The general lack of prestige of heirs from non-elite backgrounds was evident in the treatment of heirs in local gazetteers, works that reflected the views of these elites. While lists of title recipients and heirs were recorded, the lists were often incomplete. On one occasion, gazetteer compilers only learned of the existence of a local CC title recipient after gaining access to archives in the Republican period.\textsuperscript{337} Even though detailed archival records existed in local yamen, the stories of many recipients and heirs appear to have been unknown to the elites who sponsored and compiled gazetteers.\textsuperscript{338} The location of the heirs within gazetteers also suggests that the titles were far from the most prestigious honors from the perspective of the civil elite. Names of recipients and heirs of both CC and GCP titles were usually tucked away on the last pages of chapters listing

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\textsuperscript{335} NGDK 108429, JQ9/12/18. The display of plaques inscribed with hereditary titles was also mentioned in William F. Mayers and Goerge M. H. Playfair, \textit{The Chinese Government: A Manual of Chinese Titles, Categorically Arranged and Explained} (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1886), p. 64.
\textsuperscript{336} See for example Zheng Zhenman and Kenneth Dean eds, \textit{Fujian zongjiao beiming huibian, Xinghua fu fen ce} 福建宗教碑銘彙編興化府分冊 (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1995), #238.
\textsuperscript{337} Jiayang xian zhi (1934), j.11.16a.
\textsuperscript{338} For instance, compilers of the \textit{Wan xian zhi} (1866), j.31.1a-b noted that they drew the biographies of several title holders from the Sichuan provincial gazetteer.
\end{flushright}
degree holders, chapters that were organized from the most to least prestigious titles.

In the few legal cases I have seen involving title heirs, the heirs used their titles to lord it over other locals, an attitude that could provoke resentment and was unlikely to have furthered the state’s efforts to instill a respect for the military. For instance, in an incident in Xiangyang prefecture, Hubei, three CC heirs who had just passed their military inspection at the provincial garrison in Xiangyang city were stripped of their titles after assaulting a local tavern owner named Liu Zhiren. Liu had turned the three men away when they came to his shop, claiming to be sold out of noodles. When the three later noticed that he was serving noodles to another guest they suspected that he had willfully refused them service. Enraged, they entered the tavern and beat Liu up. These three were stripped of their titles. Three other title heirs who had remained outside the shop while Liu was beaten were let off without punishment. 339 In another incident, CC heir Xu Youhai 徐有海 was involved in a murder case in Ji’nan, Shandong. Youhai had already been stripped of his rank (gezhi 革職), suggesting that he had performed poorly in tests of strength or military competence. Nonetheless, he retained his title, 340 and returned home in 1802. Shortly after his return, he got into an altercation with some relatives who were arguing over the repayment of a debt in front of his house. One, named Dengtang, was demanding the repayment of the debt. Youhai stepped in and chastised Dengtang. Shortly after, Dengtang’s drunken brother arrived. The drunken brother was not only aware of Youhai’s title, but accused him of using his rank (lit. “cap button” dingdai 頂戴) to lord it over his other family members (革弁倚恃頂戴欺侮他兄

339 NGDK 108521, JQ16/8/5.
340 Those who were stripped of their rank for incompetence could retain their title with the permission of an imperial edict. See Luo, Lüying bing zhi, p. 336.
Youhai’s rank, it seems, was known to his acquaintances, but hardly a source of prestige.

In sum, the titles held by both Shi Shanzai and less prominent heirs, became malleable objects of cultural practice. The titles did not merely signify the dynasty’s intended messages—the ending of discrimination against its Han subjects, the honoring of those who died in service to the Qing, or esteem for military service. Rather, the meaning of the titles became entangled in personal histories and particular circumstances. What united the varied reception of the title heirs was the fact that the titles mattered—albeit to varying degrees—to both their heirs and those with whom these heirs had contact. In William Sewell’s words, the dynasty remained a cultural authority in the field of cultural practice, able to organize cultural practices around officially sanctioned sites and symbols, whether shrines or titles, without being able to determine the meaning or nature of these practices.

The Reception of Title Heirs in the Military

In the military, the overwhelming response to the title heirs was hostile, suggesting a certain resistance to the state’s efforts to insert itself into the existing system of promotions (and informal patronage). In Chapter 7, I will look more closely at the importance of military patronage in the career success of an officer. For now, suffice it to say that few officers could gain promotion without the active support of a superior. The tiny number of title heirs in higher ranks of the military is, therefore, one sign of the resistance many faced after entering military service. If we look at the careers of those

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341 The incident escalated and Youhai pushed the drunken brother to the ground. When this produced even more cursing (ma de lihai 罵得利害) Youhai kicked him and left the scene. The victim of Youhai’s assault died two days later. Youhai was sentenced to death, to be deliberated at the autumn assizes. Jiaqing chao xingke tiben, vol. 1 (Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 2008), pp. 37-38. For another murder case involving the heir of a CC title, see NGDK 153761, JQ10/9/27.
who inherited the titles we can see that they were rare among top-ranking officers in the early nineteenth century. I have found only three (of the more than 2,000) title heirs who gained the top rank of provincial military commander (1b) in the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods, a period of about fifty years.

Let us look first at this small minority who had some success in their military careers. The best-known heir to gain success in the military was Shi Shanzai, discussed in the previous section. However, several other heirs rose beyond their initial rank, a sign that they may have been favored by a commanding officer. For instance, a native of Jiangxi named Wei Zonggao, the son of Wei Xuechun (d. 1797), inherited a CC title when his father died in an ambush in Sichuan at Muniu ping during the White Lotus War. After inheriting the title, he was given a position as acting second captain (5b) at Raozhou battalion. In his biography, we are told that he served under a certain lieutenant colonel (3a) who had been harsh on his troops and lost their support. The conscripted troops (dianxing bing 點行兵) created an uproar and refused to obey his commands (bu ting ling 不聽令). Wei Zonggao used warm words to solace them and inspire them to loyalty and righteousness (ji yi zhongyi 激以忠義). According to his biographer (not always a reliable source), when his superiors heard of his success, he was promoted and ultimately rose to the rank of acting lieutenant colonel (3a). He died at the age of 41, and the title passed to his son.

Another biographer insisted that his subject, a GCP heir, had served with a degree of loyalty and filial piety that captured the attention of his superiors. This heir, Chen

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342 Others who rose to lieutenant colonel among GCP holders include: Li Gaorong 李高榮 (Fujian). Those who rose to major among CC holders include: (1) Wang Yingxiong 王應熊 (Gansu), (2) Zhuang Youyu 莊有愈 (Fujian), (3) Huang Tai 翁泰 (Shaanxi), (4) Xu Quan 徐全 (Zhejiang). Those who rose to first captain: (1) Pei Xichun 費希純 (Shandong), (2) Xiao Yunlong 蕭雲龍 (Shandong), (3) Li Yin 李寅 (Sichuan), (4) Yuan Huang 袁璜 (Fujian).

Fengcheng xian zhi (1873), j.14.13a.
Dewen of Taigu county in Shanxi, had inherited the title after the death of his grandfather Chen Shengju and risen to the rank of first captain (4a). After being injured in Kai county during the White Lotus War he was ordered to return to his garrison to recover.

According to Chen’s biographer, when he heard his name read out from a list of those to be removed from the front lines, he begged to be exempted so that he would not bring shame (kui 姑) on his grandfather. His superior granted the request and he died in battle several years later, receiving an additional CC title.344

It is difficult to say how many title heirs, like Chen Dewen, were honored within the military for their gratitude to their ancestors and loyal service to the dynasty. The tendency of biographers to place their subjects in a positive light makes them a less than reliable source on the reception of title heirs. Indeed, the depictions of heirs in biographies contrasts with archival sources—from troop reviews to legal cases—in which title heirs were more often treated with contempt or disregard. The archives are replete with accounts of heirs who showed up to military training years late, usually claiming to have been sick. There are also numerous examples of men described as lazy and undisciplined, mediocre in talent, or lacking in physical strength.345 As early as 1806, the emperor began complaining about the poor quality of many of the hereditary title heirs entering the military ranks.346 In the same year, a quota system was put in place to limit the appointments of heirs in favor of those who had risen through regular channels.347

344 Taigu xian zhi (1931), j.5.19a-b
345 See, for example, NGDK 124715, JQ12/4; NGDK 111494, JQ16/4/27; NGDK 005519, JQ22/12/19. In the numerous cases of sickness, the position would either be passed on to the next eligible person or taken up after the sickness had been cured.
346 QSL JQ11/7/3, pp. 123a-b.
347 In provinces with tique 諦缺 openings (i.e. openings in which candidates were recommended by memorial from the governor or governor-general, only in Hunan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Fujian), three positions were to go to regular candidates and the fourth to a hereditary title holder. In provinces without tique, the governor or governor-general would communicate with the Board of War to appoint a hereditary title holder for every fifth opening.
Instances of ill-discipline or incompetence among title heirs were frequently recorded in memorials well into the 1830s. A few cases will give a sense of the complaints. In 1817, a certain Da Hengsheng, the younger brother of Hengkui, an ensign (8a) who had died in battle during the White Lotus War, was stripped of his title at the recommendation of Sichuan governor-general Lebao, who offered this description of the younger brother:

Since entering the governor-general’s garrison, he has been incorrigibly slothful, he has not been conscientious in his military training, and has been unrepentant even after being reprimanded. Recently, he has been concocting stories of illness and has not bothered coming to the garrison. It is not fitting that untrainable men like this be allowed to waste an official salary.

Another CC heir in Sichuan, Tian Fu, was given a similarly unflattering description shortly before being stripped of his title: “This title heir is unmotivated and willful, base in nature. Furthermore, he has been loafing around and stirring up trouble. It is not advisable to continue to show patience.” In 1812, Lebao reported on a CC heir named Zhou Qingyuan who had successfully completed his training but turned out to be a scoundrel: his “character is avaricious and idle, he is lazy in carrying out his duties, he

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GXHDSL j.569.JQ11. For a case in which these principles were applied, see NGDK 115907, JQ14/9/28. Without these quotas, the hereditary holders would have come to dominate officerships at the second captain and lieutenant ranks, the ranks at which CC and GCP holders entered the military. In Sichuan, for instance, there were a total of only 50 second captains and 113 lieutenants; HuGuang had 73 and 157 respectively; ShaanGan 122 and 234. See JQHDSL j.437.1a, j.436.1a, j.435.1a.

348 ZPZZ 04-01-17-0056-020.
349 NGDK 110714, JQ19/8/12.
has not reformed himself after repeated orders, and when it came time to review the troops, he avoided the review by concocting a story of illness (捏病).\(^{350}\)

The problems with title heirs continued through the 1810s and 1820s. In a series of troop reviews in Gansu and Shaanxi in 1829, ShaanGan governor-general Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1760-1837) singled out for criticism several whom he described in standard bureaucratic language as untrainable (bukan zaojiu 不堪造就).\(^{351}\) Like other “untrainable” heirs, these men would be sent back to their native places and not given an appointment.\(^{352}\) Several years later, he again had harsh words for three heirs of the GCP title—Ma ?guo, Li Gui, and Chen Rong—at Xining garrison in Gansu.\(^{353}\) Other troop reviews from the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns indicate that Yang Yuchun was hardly alone in making title heirs a target for negative reviews.\(^{354}\)

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\(^{350}\) NGDK 123335, JQ17/12/3.

\(^{351}\) Those whom Yang singled out were qiduwei heir Ma Tengzuo 駱勝佐, CC heir He Cheng 何成, GC heir Song Jie 宋傑, GC heir Han Bojue 韓伯爵, and CC heirs Fan Gaokui 樊高魁, Wu Wenyu 武文玉, Li Jianye 李建業 and Zhang Yousheng 張有昇. See Li Guanghan 李光涵, Shizhai fu jun nianpu 雙治府軍年譜, vol. 124 (1841; reprint, Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chuban she, 1999), pp. 619, 646, 649, 665, 668. The term “untrainable” (bukan zaojiu) was used most commonly when candidates were considered for promotion to the rank of second captain (5b), whether of lieutenants (6a) or of hereditary title heirs. See, for instance, GXHDSL j.564.QL28; GXHDSL j.564.QL50; GXHDSL j.564.JQ8, JQ15. On the difficulty of gaining promotion to second captain, see Chapter 7.

\(^{352}\) JQHDSL j.517.11a.

\(^{353}\) ZPZZ 065692, DG13/10/14.

\(^{354}\) Most of these negative reviews appeared later in the Jiaqing reign and the first half of the Daoguang reign, when the first generation of heirs had completed their training. To give a few examples: In 1808, complaints about several heirs were received from YunGui governor-general Bolin 伯麟 (ZPZZ 404011118, 404011326, 404011967). In 1816, Gansu provincial commander Yang Fang 楊芳 recommended stripping the title of a GCP heir surnamed Du 杜 and CC heir Yang 楊 for incompetence in riding and archery (ZPZZ 048149). Also in 1827, Ruan Yuan, governor-general of YunGui, recommended that Ma Dachun 马大春 be stripped of his title (ZPZZ 058044). In 1828 Li Guodong 李國棟, provincial commander (1b) of Yunnan, recommended the dismissal of CC Deng Zhongwui 鄧中秀 because of his mediocre abilities [Deng was the son of 鄧興祖, a native of Wenshan xian, killed in JQ2 at Xingyi 興義]. In 1828, Dai Sanxi 戴三錫 recommended stripping the CC title from Ma Shengshu 马生祿 at 川北右營 in Sichuan for being untrainable and lazy (ZPZZ 059436). Also in 1828, Songfu 崧孚, Huguang governor-general, recommended stripping the CC from Hu 胡 of the governor-general's right battalion 督標右營 and an heir surnamed Wu of the Xiangyang city guard, neither of whom were able to hit targets in archery practice. Eshan 鄴山
The frequency with which heirs were characterized as incompetent, quite out of proportion with their actual numbers, may point to more than an honest assessment of their abilities. Troop reviews tended to be sparing or vague in their criticisms of officers, a problem that was frequently cited by the emperor and can be verified by archival documents. But the title heirs seem to have presented a conspicuous target for criticism and ill-treatment. As I will discuss later in the dissertation, new recruits into the military were often mistreated or viewed with contempt by established troops and officers; some of the new recruits who became successful were, in turn, contemptuous of the military establishment. It is possible that the negative reviews of title heirs were evidence of this broader hostility within the military establishment toward men who entered the military by nontraditional routes, including those routes established by the central government.

355 Many reviews (yuebing 閲兵) can be found among the Palace Memorials held at the Number One Archives in Beijing, a smaller number are held at the National Palace Museum Archives in Taipei. On critiques of the process of evaluating civil officials, see Guy, Qing Governors, pp. 96-97.

356 For instance, a case in 1792 involved an heir named Feng Kai 馮凱 who had been waiting for an appointment for more than ten years. He had requested permission to retire, but the commanding officer of the local military garrison turned down his request. He had attempted to bypass this officer by writing out his complaint of unfair treatment on his official papers (bu ban zhizhao 部頒執照) and then sent this document to a higher-ranking officer in an attempt to coerce his commanding officer (xiezhi 挟制). Fan was punished for his improper transmission of documents, but his case was forwarded to the Grand Council for deliberation. GXHDSL j.584, p. 572a. For another example of discrimination against title heirs from the 1870s, see John Holmes Agnew and Walter Hilliard Bidwell, “The Peerage in China,” In The Eclectic Magazine: Foreign Literature, Science, and Art Volume 56 (New York: E.R. Pelton, 1892), pp. 771-776. The article told the story of a 32-year-old title heir in Shandong whose father was killed in 1854 defending his hometown. This heir, and another from the same garrison, were not given their proper salary by their commanding officer. The second heir was ultimately forced by his commanding officer to commit suicide; the first heir was dismissed with the excuse that he had “delayed in presenting [himself] at a certain military review.”
Conclusion

In some respects, we might compare the expansion of shrines and titles in the early nineteenth century with other official efforts to institute uniform cultural practice, such as the efforts of both the Ming and Qing dynasties to “standardize” ritual practice. In his 1985 essay on the Tianhou cult, “Standardizing the Gods,” James Watson argued that there was a necessary distinction to be made between the ritual practices of religion and what people actually believed about these rituals. He proposed that the state “‘imposed the structure but not the content … provid[ing] symbols and not beliefs’, thereby allowing different worshippers to construe Tianhou in their own terms.” The evidence I have examined suggests that the standardized sites and symbols of military culture were, like the rituals examined by Watson, understood differently by different people. The expansion of the shrines and titles did not produce a singular understanding of the war dead. At the same time, people remained engaged with, and in some sense, invested in the symbols provided by the government, even when these symbols were given widely varied meaning. The titles were sources of prestige, income, and employment; they legitimized or valorized the memories of the dead; and, they provided new elements to be incorporated into longstanding tropes. Shi Shanzai’s writers used the traditional trope of “throwing down the brush,” for instance, but configured it around Shi’s reception of a hereditary title. Much like Donald Sutton suggested in his discussion of religious standardization, the state “even when absent or outmaneuvered in the struggle over culture … indirectly set the terms of discourse.”

358 Sutton, “Ritual, Cultural Standardization, and Orthopraxy,” p. 16.
The central government in the early nineteenth century did not, however, attempt to “set the terms” of all cultural practice that centered on the war dead. As we shall see in Chapter 4, one of the notable absences of official intervention was in the writing of biographies of the war dead. Rather than circulating biographies outside of officialdom, the government instead constructed an internal system of biographical production that was increasingly cut off from broader cultural practice, reflecting rather directly the spatial and hierarchical organization of the Qing state. In contrast, nonofficial biography, which flourished in the absence of direct government intervention, remained deeply sensitive to the priorities of shifting interpersonal networks and the relation between the sites of death in battle and the supernatural or historical landscape.
Chapter Four

Biographies of the War Dead and the Organization of Memory

When scholars considered the difference between official biographies and nonofficial biographical writings, they often focused on the question of historical reliability. In their 1779 introduction to the great Song dynasty biographical collection Mingchen beizhuan wanyan zhi ji 名臣碑傳琬琰之集 (Collection of jewel-like epitaphs and biographies of eminent Song officials), for instance, the editors of the Siku quanshu asserted that nonofficial life stories such as tomb inscriptions (mubei 墓碑) and unofficial biographies (biezhuan 別傳) had been used since ancient times to fill in where official histories did not reach (bu zhengshi bu ji 補正史不及). The editors criticized these nonofficial biographies for their flattery and fantastic talk, but insisted that they were nevertheless more reliable than the writing of official historians in their diversity of opinion, ordering of events, and precise dating of the beginning and end of official appointments.

The same standard could be applied to the thousands of biographies written after the White Lotus War. One would find, as the Siku editors observed, that nonofficial biographies were rich in flattery and fantastic talk while official biographies left much unsaid with their spare, often formulaic, prose. However, to consider biographies only in terms of their reliability as sources on their subjects’ lives is to miss their utility as sources of broader social and cultural developments. Nonofficial biographies, as David Nivison pointed out many years ago, were also the traces of social relationships: most

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359 Deng Xianhe noted, for instance, that official biographies left out much detail; thus, he argued, the need for other sorts of biographical writings. Deng Xianhe, Nancun caotang wenchao 南村草堂文鈔 (1829-1851; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 523), j.9.24b.
360 Qinding Siku quanshu zongmu, j.57.32b.
biographies were written after the death of the biographical subject, at the request of a son or relative.\textsuperscript{361} Whether or not they were reliable, they still provided evidence of the social status and personal networks of the deceased. Nivison’s observations on the social nature of biography can, I believe, be profitably extended. Biographies of the war dead in the early nineteenth century, my concern in this chapter, not only revealed social relationships among individuals, but also mapped out larger sets of relationships between the memories of war and the structures through which these memories were inscribed and transmitted through time and in space. That is, they reveal how memories were organized.

In the first part of the chapter, I look at the official biographies written for the men killed during the White Lotus War. Through an examination of biographies for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine (\textit{Zhaozhongci liezhuan} 昭中祠列傳) and preliminary biographies for the dynastic history—the history of the Qing that would be compiled by the succeeding dynasty—I suggest that the official biographies of the war dead in the early nineteenth century had become increasingly patterned by a standard set of regulations that governed the lives and deaths of military men. The writing of biography under official auspices was characterized by a mode of encompassment in which every action of the biographical subject was matched with a standard response from the state, individual qualities (appearance, personality, reputation) were supplanted by rank, and sites of action and death were limited to a desacralized space of administrative jurisdictions and physical topography. The encompassing of the war dead within an administrative framework was also evident in shifts in the organization of biographies into larger categories. In the nineteenth century, Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies of all war dead were organized according to the province in which they served at the time of

their deaths, displacing both ethnic and native place divisions among the war dead in favor of the provincial identities that had become increasingly central to administrative practice in the Qing.

Many of the values endorsed in official biographies also appeared in the nonofficial biographies of the war dead that I examine in the second half of the chapter. However, the seemingly shared values were belied by substantial differences in the ways that biographical memory of the war was collected and sustained outside of official auspices. The shared values were, I would suggest, less a sign of official influence on popular biographical practice than the signs of a sort of deep state—a set of widely accepted ideals and and culturally-significant sites that transcended the symbols of a particular dynastic government. By tracing the history of the creation of a single and influential biographical collection, Qian Yiji’s 錢儀吉 (1783-1850) Beizhuan ji 碑傳集, I show how biographical knowledge of the war took shape through the nodes of transregional literati networks and in relation to the uneven contours of what Richard Strassberg has referred to as the “inscribed” landscape of China, places in which “nature was inextricably linked with language and history” and, we might add, often imbued with a degree of supernatural potency.362

If the official biographical compilations were characterized by a reinscription of ordered and hierarchical administrative divisions—institutional, regulatory, and spatial—the writing and compilation of nonofficial biographies both revealed and helped to constitute transregional networks and a relational landscape deeply inscribed with the traces of history and the supernatural. Much like the Manifest Loyalty Shrines and hereditary titles, they expressed the values of the state without being bound by either

administrative space or the temporalities of dynastic history.

Official Biographies for the War Dead

The central government was by far the largest single source of biographies written for men killed in the White Lotus War. Tens of thousands of official biographies (zhuan 傳) for officers and soldiers killed in the war were produced in Peking by Hanlin academicians during and after the rebellion. By 1812, academicians had completed work on a 280 volume collection titled Biographies for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine (Zhaozhongci liezhuan 昭忠祠列傳). 363 This collection was meant to include a biography of every soldier, officer, and official killed during the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War. It may have also included biographies of xiangyong. A copy was preserved in the Archives Offices of the Grand Secretariat (Dianjiting 典籍廳). Academicians also drafted a smaller number of preliminary biographies for eventual inclusion in the official history of the dynasty. Biographies of officers below rank 2 (as well as a number of civil officials and exemplary soldiers and irregulars) were prepared for inclusion in the biographies of the loyal and righteous (zhongyi zhuan 忠義傳), 364 and of officers at the ranks of 1 and 2 for the biographies of eminent officials (dachen zhuan 大臣傳).

The Biographies for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, as their title suggests, were linked to the Manifest Loyalty Shrine. Collections of biographies for men enshrined in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine had been first mandated in 1724, when Yongzheng ordered that biographies be written for all enshrined in order to “transmit their stories through the generations.” The biographies were produced at the office for the compilation of biographies of meritorious officials (Gongchen guan 功臣館), staffed by Hanlin

363 Unfortunately, this collection does not seem to be extant, apart from a single juan held at the National Library of China. This one juan is titled Zhaozhongci liezhuan xu ji 昭忠祠列傳續集.
364 QSG j. 487, p. 13452.
academicians. The first collection in 81 juan, completed in the early Qianlong reign, included biographies for those enshrined in the first round of enshrinement and others killed during the Yongzheng reign. Over the course of the next 150 years, academicians produced at least six more collections with variations on the same title. The last was produced after the Taiping War (1851-1864). These biographies for the Manifest Loyalty Shrines, much like the Peking shrine, had a small audience. The completed collections were submitted for imperial review (jincheng 进呈) before being placed in storage at the Archives Offices of the Grand Secretariat. While they were available for reference at court, there is little indication that they had influence on nonofficial biographical writing or, indeed, any readership outside of court whatsoever. Their explicit purpose—as set out by Yongzheng and Qianlong—was not to promulgate didactic models but to “comfort souls” of the deceased and provide a permanent record (垂諸永久).

Two of these Shrine collections were produced around the time of the White Lotus War. In 1797, biographies were completed for the war dead of the Gurkha and Lin Shuangwen campaigns and submitted for imperial examination. By 1812, work was

365 On the role of the Gongchen guan, see QSL DG9/7/13, p. 434a. The last biographies in the first edition were dated to YZ13 (1735), suggesting that the work was completed shortly after the Yongzheng emperor’s death in 1735.

366 NGDK 136856, JQ17/1/27.

367 I have only found three gazetteers that mentioned the use of these biographies as source materials. Shaoxing fu zhi (1792), zhongjie section cited several biographies from the Shrine collection. The same biographies were used by the editors of the Shanyin xian zhi (1803), j.15.15a, 19a, j.15.36b, 56b, 63b, 68a. Note, the editor of the Shanyin xian zhi also mentions the use of Board archives (bu an 部案) for materials related to those who died in the Jinchuan rebellion (j.16.2a). The Guiji xian zhi (DG) also drew from the Shrine biographies. See Guiji xian zhi, j.17.46b-49b. Xu Liyue 許鰲躍 (QL60 jinshi), the biographer of Xia Yongqian 夏永謙, a sub-district magistrate killed in 1798, noted that even though the Hanlin academy had produced a biography for Xia, it was unlikely that anyone outside of the court would have seen it (公之事翰林院已為立傳然天府所藏外人不能多觀). Xu himself only heard of Xia’s story when he met his son, a military officer by hereditary appointment. See Xu Liyue 許鰲躍, Chunchi wen chao 春池文鈔 (1846; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 470), j.10.12a.

368 JQHDSL j.365, p. 6173-6174.

369 NGDK 262422, JQ2/run6.
finished on a much larger collection for the battle dead of the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War. Work on this latter collection began in 1803, when the Gongchen guan was reopened to process the stories of men killed in the White Lotus War, and Miao and Guo uprisings. In 1804, the academicians had completed work on biographies for the Miao suppression campaign, but work on the biographies for the White Lotus War continued. A communication from 1804 noted that material was still being collected from the provinces. The office remained open in 1805. In 1806, the biographies were submitted for imperial review, but described as filled with errors. Awards for those involved in the compilation effort were withdrawn. It may have taken as many as six more years for the errors to be corrected. The next mention of the collection appeared in 1812, when the work circulated at court in completed form—it was comprised of 280 volumes in fifty boxes.

The biographies for the White Lotus War are not among the six volumes of Shrine biographies still extant. However, a survey of the extant volumes suggests that these

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370 NGDK 116997, JQ9. In 1800, the Historiography Office (Guoshiguan 閫誌) the office responsible for preparing preliminary sections for the official history of the dynasty, had requested Shrine biographies from the Jinchuan campaign archived at the Dianjing (Archives Offices of the Grand Secretariat). The biographies were copied and returned. On the intermittent nature of work on the Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies, see Zhang Tingyu 張廷玉 and Zhu Gui 朱珪, Huangchao cilin diangu 皇朝詞林典故 (1805?), j.32.12a.

371 NGDK 116997, JQ9.

372 For an example of materials being collected from counties for the preparation of the Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies, see Ba county 6-23-00588 and 6-03-00450.

373 This information comes from the biography of Xia Xiushu 夏修恕. Xia was appointed to the office in 1805 and moved to his next position in 1807. Xinjian xian zhi (1871), j.41.28a.

374 NGDK 136856, JQ17/1/27.

375 According to the Zhongguo bianjiang tuji lu 中國邊疆圖籍錄 [Record of works related to the Chinese frontiers], only one juan from the biographies produced for the “pacification of the three provinces” (平定川陝楚三省教案) is still extant. This single juan, which I have seen, is kept at the National Library of China. This catalogue also claims that the other Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographical collections were recopied during the Jiaqing reign. I am not sure what evidence exists for this claim, although it is telling that all the shrine collections at the National Library of China are manuscripts on rough paper. See Deng Yanlin 鄧衍林, Zhongguo bianjiang tuji lu (1958; reprint Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1974), pp. 5-6.
biographies would have been substantially different from the earliest. One of the most apparent developments over the course of the eighteenth century was what I referred to in the introduction to the chapter as a mode of encompassment. That is, if we compare the first edition with editions completed during the Qianlong reign, we see that personal details of biographical subjects were increasingly eclipsed by administrative categories.\(^\text{376}\)

For instance, many of the entries for men at all ranks included a pithy description of personal qualities (eg. “he had courage and insight; his bravery was outstanding” 有膽識 勇力過人), details that were absent from later editions. Biographies in the first edition were also frequently missing details that we would expect to find in the lists (ce 冊) or memorial attachments (zou pian 奏片) with which officials in the field transmitted information on casualties to the central government.\(^\text{377}\)

Few of the biographies in the first edition included any mention of posthumous awards; some did not give the rank or position of the deceased; and the length of biographies did not correspond consistently with the rank of the deceased (officers of the same rank often had biographies of different length, and higher-ranked officers were sometimes given biographies no longer than those of the lowest-ranked).\(^\text{378}\)

Based on their uneven nature, it seems likely that the biographies of the first

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\(^{376}\) This is a process that was observed by Dennis Twitchett and others who have examined the writing of biography in China. It should be emphasized that this development in regard to the Manifest Loyalty biographies was due not to some failure to tap the potential of the biographical genre, but to the basically non-representational nature of the biographies—most were written and preserved for bureaucratic purposes or out of concern for the souls of the deceased, not for circulation to a nonofficial audience.

\(^{377}\) For an example of a memorial attachment with details of death, see CSCSH 00143-00144 JQ9/9/21. For reference to lists of military casualties sent to the Board of War, see Ba County 6-02-00262. In addition to rank and name, these lists would also include the name of the garrison with which a soldier or officer was affiliated. See, for example, Ming Qing shiliao 明清史料戊编, no. 6, pp. 562-563.

\(^{378}\) For instance, compare the biographies of two sub-lieutenants (7a) from Sichuan, both killed in the Kangxi reign: Lin Fengxiang 林鳳翔 and Pi Dengbang 皮登榜 in j.41 of the Yongzheng edition. Lin’s biography was 84 characters in length, Pi’s was only 48.
enshrinees had been cobbled together by Hanlin academicians from disparate sources and, perhaps, that sources on wars during the conquest period were disordered or incomplete.\textsuperscript{379} The post-Yongzheng editions, in contrast, displayed a rigid consistency indicative of a reliance on official personnel records and records of death. The biographies in the later editions invariably began with the native place and rank of the deceased individual; their lengths were regulated to reflect the relative rank of each subject; every death recorded in the collection met the official criteria for enshrinement; and, in the nineteenth century collections, each biography ended with a record of the specific posthumous titles and awards that had been given to the deceased officer.\textsuperscript{380} In

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\textsuperscript{379} On the role of the Hanlin in compiling these biographies, see Wang Jilu 王記錄, \textit{Qing dai shiguan yu Qing dai zhengzhi} 清代史館與清代政治 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2009), p. 74. See also QSL DG4.run7/20, where the Hanlin academy was ordered to compile biographies for those killed in the Millenarian rebellion of 1813. The expressed purpose of the biographies in this case was the rather generic: “to esteem loyalty and integrity” (\textit{yang zhongjie} 揚忠節).
\textsuperscript{380} For instance, we can compare a biography from the Yongzheng edition with a biography from the Daoguang edition. From the Yongzheng edition, the biography of Lin Fengxiang lichkeit 狄鵬祥 read as follows:

“Lin Fengxiang, a native of Sichuan. He responded to a call for soldiers and joined Dading garrison in Guizhou as a regular soldier. He had courage and insight. His bravery was outstanding. He was promoted to sub-lieutenant (7a) of the second squad of the right company of the central battalion of the [Dading] garrison. In Kangxi 46, the Miao forces from Pu’an occupied Sanjiang. Provincial commander Yin Huaxing was dispatched with an order to lead troops in a suppression campaign. They confronted the enemy at Fayan. [Lin] launched a vigorous attack. The Miao were terrified by his sharp attack. He continued to fight with all his strength. He was badly wounded and died. He was awarded according to the statutes.”

From the 200 juan edition (ca. 1850s), the biography of Ma Lin 媽琳 read as follows: “Ma Lin, a native of Songpan ting, Sichuan. He entered the military as a common soldier. In 1826, he was sent to fight the rebel Muslims in Xinjiang. He was repeatedly commended for merit in battle, and awarded a blue plume (\textit{lanling} 藻翎), an award given to officers below the sixth rank. In 1830, he was appointed to sergeant (9b) of Songpan garrison. In the first month of 1833, he was dispatched to Qingxi. In the second month, an attack was launched on Shuitonggou. He fought with all his strength and died in battle. He was given posthumous payment according to the regulations, and awarded with a Cloud Commander title. His younger brother, by birth, [Ma] Qing inherited the title.”

Note that Lin’s biography did not include his native county. It did include a description of his personal qualities and reputation (neither of which were bureaucratically relevant). The circumstances of his death appear ambiguous: he was wounded, but did he die in battle, or later? This sort of ambiguity was entirely absent in later editions. The biographer mentioned that he received a posthumous award did not specify the name of the award. From the 200 juan edition (ca. 1850s), the biography of Ma Lin read as follows: “Ma Lin, a native of Songpan ting, Sichuan. He entered the military as a common soldier. In 1826, he was sent to fight the rebel Muslims in Xinjiang. He was repeatedly commended for merit in battle, and awarded a blue plume (\textit{lanling} 藻翎), an award given to officers below the sixth rank. In 1830, he was appointed to sergeant (9b) of Songpan garrison. In the first month of 1833, he was dispatched to Qingxi. In the second month, an attack was launched on Shuitonggou. He fought with all his strength and died in battle. He was given posthumous payment according to the regulations, and awarded with a Cloud Commander title. His younger brother, by birth, [Ma] Qing inherited the title.”

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other words, distinctive qualities of individuals had been largely displaced by categories of identity ascribed to all others of the same rank.

It should be noted, however, that these categories of identity were themselves in a state of flux. One of the new categories to appear in the early nineteenth century Manifest Loyalty collections was “xiangyong,” the broad covering term for the assorted local militiamen and paramilitaries that had fought in large number during the Miao and White Lotus campaigns. The appearance of biographies of xiangyong marked another development in the shrine collections: in addition to increasing standardization, coverage of the war dead had become more comprehensive. Under Jiaqing, as I have shown in Chapter 2, the privilege of enshrinement in the Manifest Loyalty Shrine was expanded to include nearly all men who died in battle, including at least some irregulars.  

This had contributed to the explosion in the number of tablets and ballooning in the size of the biographical collections. The Yongzheng edition, covering nearly one hundred years, was only 81 juan; the second edition, produced during the Qianlong reign after the first Jinchuan rebellion, was 26 juan; the edition including battle dead of the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War (ca. 1794-1804) was a massive 280 juan; an edition produced after the 1827-1828 campaign in Xinjiang counted 120 juan; and the post-Taiping, also covering approximately ten years, was 360 juan.

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381 The expansion was also mentioned by Tobie Meyer-Fong in What Remains, p. 140.
383 NGDK 119131, DG16/2. This edition also included men killed in the 1813 rebellion. See Li Guoqi, ed., Guo Tingyi xiansheng bai sui mingdan jinian shixue lunwen ji 郭廷以先生百歲冥誕紀念史學論文集 (Taipei: Taiwan Shangwu yinshuguan, 2005), p. 131.
384 Except for the edition produced after the White Lotus War, all others are manuscripts held at the National Library of China in Beijing. The library holds only one juan from the edition produced after the White Lotus War.
It is quite likely that the biographies for the dead of the White Lotus War were organized differently from those in the eighteenth century collections. In the extant collections from the eighteenth century, Hanlin academicians used rank and ethnicity as organizing principles. Bannermen were placed before non-Banner, and those of higher rank were listed before those of lower. For instance, in the first edition, the compilers had begun with hereditary lords (bojue 伯爵), continued on to Grand Ministers (dachen 大臣) and then Banner officers (baqi guanyuan 八旗官員) before finally arriving at Han officials (zhisheng wenzhi 直省文職) and Green Standard officers (zhisheng wuzhi 直省武職). The biographies of regular soldiers, which followed the ranked officials, similarly began with bannermen before moving on to Green Standard troops. The two extant editions from the Daoguang reign (1821-1850), in contrast, maintained the rank distinctions but organized the stories of officers and soldiers in both Green Standard and Banner forces along provincial, rather than institutional or ethnic lines. Officers and soldiers from both forces were listed according to the province of their last posting. For regular soldiers and irregulars, this usually meant that they were listed in their native provinces.

The most likely explanation for the provincialization of the biographical collections was the link between these collections and the Manifest Loyalty Shrines being built in the provinces. With the establishment of the prefectural shrines in 1802, it had been ordered that bannermen garrisoned in the provinces (zhufang bingding 駐防兵丁) be enshrined in the provincial Manifest Loyalty Shrines according to their location of their garrison (zhufang shengfen zhi zhaozhongci nei 駐防省分之昭忠祠内). The

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385 In the Yongzheng and Qianlong editions soldiers (bingding 兵丁) were grouped by native provinces; officers were organized by rank. Bannermen serving as officers in the Green Standards were included along with other Green Standard officers of the same rank.
386 JQHDSL j.365, p. 6212.
Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies also reflected a broader official recognition of the provincialization of banner identity. As Mark Elliott pointed out, in 1730, “the triennial census of banner populations formally recognized the separation of companies between Beijing and the provincial garrisons;” and in 1756, Manchu bannermen were permitted to “reside permanently in the provinces.” The elevation of shared provincial affiliation created the appearance of equitable treatment of Green Standard and Banner forces, further enforcing the claims of the dynasty that all military men were honored according to merit rather than institutional affiliation (or, “ethnicity”).

In addition to the Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies, an innovation of the Yongzheng emperor, the Qing had continued the practice of producing preliminary biographies for eventual inclusion in the dynastic history. Approximately four hundred of these biographies were produced by Hanlin academicians of the historiography office (guoshiguan 國史館) for officers and officials killed during the White Lotus War. Biographies of all officers who held ranks of 1 or 2 at the time of their deaths were included in the Biographies of Eminent Officials (Da chen zhuan 大臣傳). Biographies of many others who held an officer or civil rank at the time of their deaths were included in the Biographies of the Loyal and Righteous (Zhongyi zhuan 忠義傳).

These two sets of biographies presented information that reflected the content of the personnel files of the deceased officers. Common sources included palace memorials, edicts, campaign records, and other information submitted by local garrisons. Based on

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388 As we will recall, the claim that Green Standard and Banner war dead deserved the same treatment was also fundamental to changes made to the awarding of hereditary titles (see Chapter 3).
389 On the historiography office, see Wang, Qing dai shiguan. On the number of biographies, see QSG j.349, p. 11251. Many of the preliminary biographies formed the basis for biographies included in the Draft History of the Qing (QSG). Work on the QSG began in 1914.
390 QSG j.487, p. 13452.
the biographies I have examined, they only rarely drew on nonofficial sources such as epitaphs or accounts of conduct (xingzhuang 行狀).\footnote{This feature of the draft biographies no doubt contributed to Dennis Twitchett’s observation that “many biographies, especially in later histories, appear to us little more than brief curricula of conventional official careers.” Dennis Twitchett, “Problems of Chinese Biography,” in \textit{Confucian Personalities}, eds. Arthur F. Wright and Denis C. Twitchett (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 31.} Like the shrine biographies, the length of the biographies reflected the official rank of their subject, though with less consistency. That is, longer biographies were generally written for men of higher rank. Unlike the Manifest Loyalty Shrine biographies, which aimed to include every soul, the biographies for future inclusion in the dynastic history were not inclusive of all who died in battle. Almost no regular soldiers and only about half of all officers killed in battle were granted a biography. Other differences might be noted: (1) the stories of subjects in the \textit{Biographies of the Loyal and Righteous} were combined into connected biographies (liezhuan 列傳), while all biographies in the shrine collections were discrete; and, (2) the draft biographies were repeatedly redacted, with various versions of each biography archived in a biographical packet (zhuanbao) held at the historiography office.\footnote{Redaction continued through all stages, from draft written on rough paper to a bound edition. In the latter, slips of paper were pasted over characters that required change. In the former, characters were crossed out or written onto the manuscript.}

Despite the differences, a mode of encompassment was prevalent in the draft biographies just as it was in the biographies for the Manifest Loyalty Shrine. That is, the actions of biographical subjects were keyed to and subsumed by their bureaucratic significance. To illustrate this quality, let us look at the biographies of several men who also appeared prominently in nonofficial biographical writing, explored later in this chapter. The first of these men was a low-ranking civil official named Wang Yisun 王翼孫 (?-1796), killed in the first year of the White Lotus War. Wang, a native of Changzhou county in Jiangsu and younger brother of the famous writer Wang Qisun 王芑孫 (1755-}
1817), held one of the lowliest ranks in the civil bureaucracy, sub-district magistrate (巡检, 9b). He was killed while manning a post in Xiangyang, a county in Hubei that had been among the first affected by the uprising. The last version of his draft biography for the Biographies of the Loyal and Righteous read as follows:

The sub-district magistrate of Lüyan postal station in Xiangyang [Hubei], Wang Yisun, died in battle as a result of his leading troops in defense against Nie Jieren and the other bandits who came scurrying and stirring up trouble from Zhijiang. ... Wang Yisun was given posthumous awards according to regulations. All [referring to Wang and others in the same group biography] were awarded with yunqiwei [CC] hereditary titles, to be converted to enqiwei in perpetuity [GCP] after the completion of succession.

襄陽呂堰驛巡檢王翼孫以聶傑人餘匪由枝江竄擾率兵勇堵禦陣亡...

王翼孫賜邸如例均賞雲騎尉世職襲次完時以恩騎尉世職罔替

These few details—focusing on the circumstances of Wang’s death and posthumous awards—were part of a group biography that also included accounts of the county magistrate (知縣) of Badong county, Huang Yingwen 黃應文 and his son, stipend student Huang Yan 黃掞 (linsheng 廪生). The two were killed while leading xiangyong against White Lotus forces in 1796. Two others were also included in the biography: Huang Ren, a magistrate of Dangyang county in Sichuan, and Lin Jiang a

393 On Xiangyang county’s links to the origins of the uprising, see Gaustad, “Religious Sectarianism,” p. 218.
394 Wang Yisun’s biography was included in the biography of Huang Yingwen 黃應文 along with Huang Yan 黃掞, Lin Jiang 林江 and Huang Ren 黃仁. See v. 8 of Guoshi zhongyi zhuan ci bian 國史忠義傳次編 28 卷 in the NPM. The first series was completed in QL59 (Wang, Qing dai shiguan, p. 35); I am not certain when the second series including Wang’s biography was completed.
395 See biographies of Huang Yingwen in QDZJ 104-065, QDZJ 174-741.
vice-magistrate (xiancheng 縣丞) who held the post by purchase (juanzhi 賣職). As we shall see later, far more elaborate versions of Wang Yisun’s story, including information on the investigation into the circumstances of his death, circulated among literati. However, in keeping with the standards for official biographies, the length of Wang’s biography was limited by his rank. 396

If we turn to the draft biography for Han Jiaye, a military officer whose rank was several grades above Wang Yisun’s, we can see that his death was described in much greater detail, as befit his rank, but the structural conventions remained largely the same:

Three or four thousand bandits from Mian county pressed on official positions from Fuchuan. ShanGan governor-general Songyun ordered Jiaye to accompany Ma Yunguang, the second captain (5b) of Longmen Route [battalion] in Zhili [province], in leading more than 900 troops. The best were selected to meet the attack. The entire group of bandits came out of Zhuandongzi. Jiaye pressed his horse and led the charge. The troops followed him. The bandits divided into two wings. They circled Majia ridge, and pressed down from above, circling [Qing forces] on all four sides. Jiaye fought his way out, but his horse tripped and fell to the ground. He stood up, lifted his bow and shot an arrow, striking the flag bearer [of the White Lotus forces]. One bandit pierced Jiaye with his spear. Sub-lieutenant (7a) Gao Tengjiao of Xining garrison in Gansu killed him with a spear thrust, but the bandit throngs pressed forward. Jiaye continued to fight fiercely, but he was struck by a spear and died.

396 The only clue to Wang Yisun’s status was the fact that his biography was included at all. Not all men of Wang’s rank killed in the White Lotus War were recorded in draft biographies. Of the eleven police chief whose deaths I have identified, only eight were awarded with a draft biography. Six of thirty-four xiangyong who were given CC titles were also given zhongyi biographies.
Tengjiao covered him with his body and died. Yunguang also died in the battle. When word of the death was received, Jiaye was promoted two ranks and honored according to the regulations for provincial commander. He was given the posthumous title Wulie, and awarded with a qiduwei hereditary title concurrent with yunqiwei [CC]. His son Xianzu inherited the title.

Despite the greater length of the account, it shared a basic structural affinity with the much shorter description of Wang Yisun’s death. In both cases, the writers of the biographies were careful to note the encompassment of the biographical subject’s actions with an official response—whether a promotion, award, or posthumous title. In fact, the biographers provided virtually nothing that was extraneous to this structure of individual action and state response. We find, for instance, no description of Wang Yisun’s or Han Jiaye’s appearance, personality, or reputation. The exceptional effort of Han Jiaye in battle was briefly described and then neatly encompassed by a hereditary title one level above that due to men of his rank. The focus on the actions of the biographical subjects, such as Han Jiaye, also limited the spatial detail offered by the biographies. The

397 NPM 701002287 “Zhongyi Han Jiaye zhuan 忠義韓加業傳.”
biographies provided only the physical qualities of space that affected the disposition of
the biographical subject—the topography—and the terms that located the subject’s
actions on the surface of the landscape—toponyms.

The comprehensive coverage, bureaucratic encompassment, and highly
circumscribed descriptions of space in official biographies for the dead were in stark
contrast to the nonofficial biographies that I will turn to in the second half of the chapter.
In the following section, I argue that the writing of nonofficial biography and its
associated practices—data collection and verification, the compiling and anthologizing of
biographical writings (both prose and poetry)—served as an important vector for
transregional flows of information on the White Lotus War and war dead. As I will
show, these flows were determined by personal connections among literati rather than
administrative boundaries. Unlike the flow of standardized biographical information up
the hierarchy and into compilations organized to reflect administrative boundaries,
nonofficial biography constituted a body of knowledge on the rebellion shared among
geographically and temporally dispersed acquaintances. In the final section of the chapter,
I will look at the ways in which nonofficial biographies represented the relations between
their biographical subjects and the “inscribed landscape.” If most official biographies
treated space merely as a series of toponyms and surfaces useful for locating the actions
of a deceased officer, we shall see that many nonofficial biographies added to this
conceived space a landscape deeply inscribed with historical traces and supernatural

398 The largest (or most readily accessible) source of biographies on the war dead of the White Lotus War
can be found in the hundreds of gazetteers produced in the nineteenth century. For the most part, these
stories were circumscribed by administrative space: counties, prefectures and provinces. Most of these
biographies share a similar concern with the biographies I have examined in the previous section:
where was the subject from and where did his significant actions take place. These are an important
source, but in the remainder of the chapter I want to look at the ways in which biographies of the war
dead bring to light alternative geographies and, therefore, point to the limits of administrative space as
a rubric for understanding the unfolding legacy of the rebellion.
potentials. In many nonofficial biographical narratives, we see that the war dead were understood not only as loyal subjects of the Qing dynasty but as participants in the production and reproduction of spaces that were either entirely independent or only tangentially related to the unfolding of dynastic history.

**Biographical Practice and the Organization of Literati Knowledge on the War**

My survey of literary and poetry collections and biographical compilations written in the first half of the nineteenth century suggests that only a small number of the war dead became part of sustained discourse among literati from outside their home counties. While biographies of the war dead were numerous in local gazetteers, exceedingly few reached a broader audience. In more than two hundred literary collections that I have examined from the first half of the nineteenth century, I have found biographies of only four men killed in battle during the White Lotus War: the military officers Zhu Shedou, Wang Wenxiong, and Han Jiaye, and the civil official Wang Yisun. Along with biographies I found a somewhat larger number of poems, nearly all about the same small number of men. In other words, extant literati writing from this period shows signs of a broad consensus on who, from among the thousands of war dead, was worth writing about.

This consensus comes into sharp focus in Qian Yiji’s 錢儀吉 (1783-1850) “Biographies and Epitaphs of the [Qing] Empire” (Guochao beizhuan ji 國朝碑傳集). This 160 juan collection, which included biographies of three of the four men in the previous paragraph, exemplified the limited scope and shared subjects in literati

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399 I have surveyed literary collections in the QDSWJ from vol. 420 to vol. 540, which include the works of men writing in the first three decades of the nineteenth century.

400 Qian Yiji, Guochao beizhuan ji (1893; reprint, QDZJ vols. 106-114). Qian Yiji’s collection was also used extensively by Weijing Lu in True to Her Word: The Faithful Maiden Cult in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008). Lu does not discuss the social network that lay behind Qian’s collection of stories of faithful maidens.
biographical writing on the war. It is, therefore, useful as a source for considering both how literati interests came to focus initially on this small number of individuals, and why one scholar working two decades after the war selected the same biographies for his collection.

Before turning to the individual biographies, let us begin by looking briefly at the Beizhuan ji and its compiler, Qian Yiji. The Beizhuan ji was compiled by Qian, but not printed, sometime in the Daoguang reign (1820-1850). It included epitaphs, tomb inscriptions and other nonofficial biographies of approximately 2,000 people, with material drawn from more than 560 works, including literary collections and gazetteers.\(^{401}\) The 160 juan were organized into twenty-five categories, beginning with biographies of the imperial clan (zongshi 宗室) and ending with those of exemplary women (lienu 列女). The biographies in each category were organized chronologically, ending with subjects who had died in the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820). The collection was first printed in 1893.\(^{402}\) It was later reprinted and extended in the twentieth century.

The man who put the collection together, Qian Yiji, was a native of Jiaxing county in Zhejiang. His father, Qian Fuzuo 錢福胙 (1763-1802) was a jinshi degree holder who had spent most of the 1790s in Peking as a Hanlin academician. Qian Yiji lived in the capital city during his father’s tenure. He himself gained a jinshi degree in 1808, and began his official career in Peking in the Hanlin Academy. He would remain employed at various posts in the capital until 1832. During his more than two decades in Peking, Qian became one of the founding members of the Xuannan poetry club, a reform-minded group of officials and literati in Peking with close ties to the examiner Weng Fanggang (1733-1818), a scholar and official who had organized a poetry club for

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\(^{401}\) Information on the Beizhuan ji and Qian Yiji’s life are in ECCP pp. 151-152.

\(^{402}\) ECCP p. 151.
“politically frustrated” scholars in the late Qianlong years. During the 1820s, he served as an official in the Office for the Compilation of the Collection Statutes (Huidian guan 會典館), a period during which he claimed to have gathered (cai ji 采集) many of the stories included in his collection. In 1832, he left Peking for Guangdong, where he served for a time as a director of the Xuehaitang academy. In 1836, he was invited to direct the Daliang academy in Kaifeng, Henan. He remained in Henan until his death in 1850.

Apart from Qian’s brief mention of the access offered by his job in the Office for the Compilation of the Collected Statutes, he provided no further information on how he had managed to gather together the biographies and epitaphs in the Beizhuan ji. In his preface and postface to the collection, he left obscure the process of compilation and focused instead on his reasons for pursuing the monumental task of collecting thousands of biographies. In his preface, he placed his work in a textual tradition. He had “followed the example of” the Song dynasty work by Du Dagui 杜大圭, Ming chen wanyan

403 Wang, White Lotus Rebels, p. 156; Polachek, Inner Opium War, p. 299, f. 49. A total of thirteen men were members of this group, five had studied under Weng Fanggang. The group included: Chen Yongguang 陳用光 (1768-1835), Li Yanzhang 李彦章 (1794-1836), Liang Zhangju 梁章矩 (1775-1849), Liu Siwan 劉嗣繡 (1762-1820), Wu Songliang 吳嵩梁 (1766-1834), Lin Zexu 林則徐, Qian Yiji 錢儀吉 (1783-1850), Zhu Jian 朱鍊 (1769-1850), Xie Jieshu 謝階樹 (1778-1825), Hu Chenggong 胡承珙 (1776-1832), Huang Entao, Tao Zhu 陶澍 (1779-1839) and Dong Guohua. In the preface to the collection, Qian commented that many biographies had been previously restricted to the “golden chest and stone chamber” (金槧石室); that is, they were held by the court and inaccessible to the vast majority of people. As an official working on the compilation of the Collected Statutes he claimed to have access to these materials. QDZJ 106-003-004. In 1828, Qian was also working as editor of the Imperial Gazetteer, Yitong zhi. See Kent Guy, The Emperor’s Four Treasuries: Scholars and the State in the Late Qianlong Era (Cambridge: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1987), p. 95. This work may have given him access to biographies that had been printed in local gazetteers. During this period he also submitted a proposal on the establishment of military agricultural colonies in Altishahr, where a revolt led by Jehangir had been recently suppressed. See Laura Newby, The Empire and the Khanate, p. 109.

404 On the Xuehaitang academy, see Steven B. Miles, The Sea of Learning: Mobility and Identity in Nineteenth-Century Guangzhou (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006). Miles has little to say about Qian Yiji’s role at the academy.

405 ECCP p. 151.
Du’s collection, of 107 juan, was included in the *Siku quanshu*, compiled during the Qianlong reign. Perhaps Qian Yiji had shared the opinion of the *Siku* editors in their comments on Du’s collection that nonofficial biographical sources provided a more reliable record than official biography, despite the fact that they were prone to flattery and fantastic talk.

Qian also took the time to offer two other purposes of his collection. First, he asserted in his preface that his collection of biographies could assist readers by presenting them the accumulated virtue of worthy gentleman (賢士大夫之畜德). In the postface, perhaps adding his voice to the growing chorus of practical concerns shared by his contemporaries, he argued that biographies provided a trove of useful information (such as solutions for water control problems, and correctives for poorly documented accounts).

If Qian saw his work as a collection of stories that could improve the behavior of their readers and offer practical knowledge, it is less evident that he actually used the didactic potential of a particular biography as a criteria for selection. Rather, it would appear, his selection was shaped by the judgments of other literati and enabled by personal relationships that gave him ready access to certain texts. The importance of these factors in the formation of the collection is apparent in the portion of the work that concerns us in this chapter—the biographies of the “loyal and steadfast” (*zhongjie* 忠節), men killed in service to the Qing dynasty. The *zhongjie* biographies were divided into four subchapters. The last, dedicated to men killed during the Jiaqing reign, included

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407 QZDJ 106-004.
408 QDZJ 106-008.
409 QDZJ 106-011-012.
sixteen biographies for thirteen men, composed by fourteen different authors.\textsuperscript{410}

The thirteen individuals included among the \textit{zhongjie} biographies for the Jiaqing period were by no means a representative sample of the tens of thousands killed in war during this period, but rather those whose biographies had been written by men either directly acquainted with Qian or highly-esteem
deemed in his circles. Three of the authors were associated with what James Polachek identified as the “Northern Clique,” a group opposed to Heshen that would gain increasing influence over appointments in the territorial bureaucracy during the Jiaqing reign. More to the point, the group had close ties to the later Xuannan club of which Qian was a founding member. These authors were Qin Ying 秦瀛 (1743-1821), Wang Qisun 王芑孙 (1755-1817), and Hong Liangji 洪亮吉 (1746-1809).\textsuperscript{411} A fourth author, Yun Jing 悌敬 (1757-1817), had also been well-connected in Peking and was from the same county as Hong Liangji, Yanghu.\textsuperscript{412} Yun’s works had been printed prior to Qian’s compilation, and Qian included a number of other biographies by Yun. A fifth author, Xie Jieshu 謝階樹 (1778-1825), was a fellow member of the Xuannan club.\textsuperscript{413}

Several of the remaining nine authors likely encountered Qian after his move to Guangdong in 1832. Wu Yingkui 呉應逵 (dates?) had been involved in the compilation of the Guangdong Provincial Gazetteer, under the editorship of Ruan Yuan, and had also been a teacher at the Xuehaitang, where Qian Yiji became a director in 1832.\textsuperscript{414} Wu

\begin{flushright}
\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item Three of the thirteen men were included in a group biography, the others had at least one biographical text each. Li Changgeng, Zhu Shedou, and Wang Yisun each have at least two dedicated texts. See Table 4.1.
\item For a list of men belonging to this clique, see Polachek, \textit{Inner Opium War}, p. 297, n. 37.
\item ECCP, p. 959.
\item On the membership of Qian and Xie in the Xuannan club, see Polachek, \textit{Inner Opium War}, p. 299, n.49.
\item On Wu Yingkui, see the database “Individual itineraries and the circulation of scientific and technical knowledge in East Asia (16th–20th centuries),” \url{http://iccm.tge-adonis.fr/Database/Actors}. It is also possible that Qian Yiji had gained access to some biographical sources at the library at Xuehaitang.
\end{itemize}
\end{flushright}

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Lanxiu, a native of Jiayi department in Guangdong, seems to have been a friend or close acquaintance of Qian’s. Qian wrote a preface to Wu’s 1831 work *Duan xi yan shi*. Like Qian, Wu had also been a director of the Xuehaitang. Ruan Yuan, perhaps the most famous author in the chapter, had left Guangdong in 1826, but it is not surprising that Qian would have been familiar with his writings. Indeed, many of the biographers in the collection had some connection to Ruan. Those with connections to Ruan included Chen Shouqi, a native of Fuzhou, who had assisted Ruan in the compilation of a coastal gazetteer of Haining, Zhejiang, and Wu Yingkui who assisted in the compilation of the Guangdong provincial gazetteer.

Zhang Shu, the author of an epitaph for Han Jiaye (see above), had known Qian Yiji since both were young boys. Zhang seems to have been instrumental in making a link between Qian and Yue Zhenchuan, another biographer included in the collection. Yue, a native of Yang county in Shaanxi and editor of the Xing’an prefecture gazetteer (1812), served as a secretary in the Grand Secretariat (Neige zhongshu, 7b) after receiving his jinshi degree. After retiring from his official post, he directed several academies in Shaanxi and became involved in literati circles in Xi’an. Yue had first met Zhang Shu in Xi’an in 1801.

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416 Published by Nanhai Wu shi 南海伍氏.
417 On Chen Shouqi, see ECCP, p. 97.
418 QSL DG7/12/17, p. 1180a.
419 On the relationship between Yue Zhenchuan and Zhang Shu, see Yue Zhenchuan, *Cigetang wenji* 萱葛堂文集, j.3.29a (1879; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 441). I have not been able to find information on Qian’s ties with Zhang Yuchun, author of the last two biographies in the chapter, or Zhang Xigu, author of a biography of Zhu Shedou.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Native Place</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Native Place</th>
<th>Office/Rank</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Liangji 洪亮吉</td>
<td>阳湖县 (Jiangsu)</td>
<td>花连布</td>
<td>满洲镶白旗</td>
<td>tidu, 1b</td>
<td>Miao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin Ying 秦瀛</td>
<td>無錫县 (Jiangsu)</td>
<td>王翼孫</td>
<td>长洲县 (Jiangsu)</td>
<td>xunjian, 9b</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xie Jieshu 謝階樹</td>
<td>宜黃県 (Jiangxi)</td>
<td>Wang Yisun</td>
<td>興平県 (Shaanxi)</td>
<td>no office</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yue Zhencuan 岳震川</td>
<td>洋縣 (Shaanxi)</td>
<td>Bo Tingying 白廷英</td>
<td>嘉應州 (Guangdong)</td>
<td>dianshi, unranked subofficial</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Lanxiu 吳蘭修</td>
<td>嘉應州 (Guangdong)</td>
<td>Yang Tang 楊堂, Liang Chong 梁崇, Li Peixiu 劉培秀</td>
<td>嘉應州 (Guangdong)</td>
<td>dianshi, unranked subofficial</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qin Ying 秦瀛</td>
<td>無錫县 (Jiangsu)</td>
<td>Ye Huai 葉槐</td>
<td>錦塘縣 (Zhejiang)</td>
<td>xiancheng, 7a-9b</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Shu 張澍</td>
<td>武威縣 (Gansu)</td>
<td>Han Jiaye 韓嘉業</td>
<td>武威縣 (Gansu)</td>
<td>fujiang, 2b</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Xigu 張錫毂</td>
<td>沔陽縣 (Hubei)</td>
<td>Zhu Shedou 朱射斗</td>
<td>貴築縣 (Guizhou)</td>
<td>zongbing, 2a</td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruan Yuan 阮元</td>
<td>儀徵縣 (Jiangsu)</td>
<td>Zhu Shedou</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>White Lotus War</td>
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</tbody>
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The table of contents can be found in QDZJ 112-769.
In Table 4.1, we can see that Qian included biographies of only eight men killed in the White Lotus War. Three of these men were treated together in a single group biography. Given that civil and military government casualties in the conflict numbered nearly 90,000, the small number of biographies suggests both the limited scope of his work and the scanty information on those killed in the war, especially military men.

Conspicuously small in number were biographies for bannermen. The single bannerman in the chapter, a provincial commander in the Green Standards named Hualianbu 花連布 (?-1796), had died in the Miao Uprising. Also missing were stories of many prominent Green Standard officers who had died during the war, such as Wang Wenxiong 王文雄.
(?-1800). Less surprisingly, Qian included no stories of regular soldiers or low-level xiangyong. Conspicuously present in the compilation were the biographies of men at the bottom rungs of the civil bureaucracy—Wang Yisun, Yang Tang, Liang Chong, and Li Peixiu—whose deaths barely registered in the official record. Despite the fact that far more military officers than civil officials had died in the war, Qian included only two military officers—Zhu Shedou and Han Jiaye. Only one biography from the White Lotus War was of an individual outside the military or civil bureaucracies: Bo Tingying, an elderly man who had been killed along with a large number of family members in Xingping county, Hubei. It is striking to me that within the small group of biographical subjects, Qian included more than one biography for three men. The chapter included multiple biographies for three men—Wang Yisun 王翼孙, Zhu Shedou 朱射斗, and Li Changgeng 李長庚—the first a low-ranking civil official, and the other two high-ranking military officers. Both Wang and Zhu were killed in the White Lotus War. Others in the chapter were represented by a single or group biography.

The uneven coverage of the zhongjie chapter, and the evidence of a clustering of interest around a few figures, is one of the first indications that the stories in Qian’s collection were the traces of social relations that had served to preserve and, in many cases, broadly disseminate stories of a few casualties while leaving the vast majority forgotten outside of their native places. What were these relations, and how had they become instrumental in the formation of Qian’s collection? Let us begin with the case of Wang Yisun.

**Wang Yisun and Wang Qisun**

Wang Yisun, killed in office in Hubei in 1796, was a man who combined low rank and mediocre talent with close ties to influential literati, including his own brother Wang Qisun. In Qian’s collection we find two biographies of Wang Yisun: one, an
account of conduct (xingzhuang) written by Qin Ying, and the other a biography (zhuan) written by Xie Jieshu.421 If this were an official compilation, we might expect the number of stories to correspond with the relative official rank of each subject. But this was clearly not the case. While the others with multiple entries in the compilation, Li Changgeng and Zhu Shedou, were high-ranking military officers, Wang Yisun was a lowly sub-district magistrate (xunjian), albeit the holder of a civil rather than military rank. Rather than a measure of Wang Yisun’s official standing, Qian’s inclusion of the two biographies for Wang Yisun reflected both Qian’s own social connections and earlier developments that had made the story of Wang’s death exceptionally well known in literati circles.

Qian Yiji’s access to the two biographies was due to social connections and access to published works. The first biography, an account of conduct, was written by Qin Ying, an official with close ties to the northern clique, as noted above. Not surprisingly, given their overlapping networks, Qian drew heavily for his collection on Qin’s collected writings, published in 1817, including the account of conduct for Wang Yisun.422 Qian was a close friend with the author of the second biography, Xie Jieshu. Both he and Xie were founding members of the Xuannan poetry club, a club that had taken shape in Peking in the last years of the Jiaqing reign. The club, according to Polachek, was comprised in large part of men who had been students of Weng Fanggang, Zhu Yun, or Zhu Gui—all members of the northern clique. The Xuannan club, he argued, served as both the nexus of a network of ties between literati in Peking and regional

421 Xie was a native of Yihuang 宜黄, Jiangxi. He received his jinshi degree in 1808.
422 Qian included numerous other writings by Qin Ying in his collection. There were a total of 24 biographies written by Qin Ying, making him the fourth most cited biographer in Qian Yiji’s collection. The largest single author of biographies in the collection was Wang Chang 王昶. See Hu Qiwei 胡其伟 “Qian Yiji Beizhuan ji de shiliao jiazhi qianxi 钱仪吉碑传集的史料价值浅析, Xuzhou jiaoyu xueyuan xuebao 徐州教育学院学报 19.1 (Jan, 2004): 38.
administrators and a self-conscious model for literati interaction.423

But there remains the question of why Qin Ying or Xie Jieshu themselves would have written their accounts of Wang Yisun. There was little in Wang’s early career or his official capacity that seemed to justify biographical attention. Wang Yisun was a native of Changzhou county 長洲縣. He abandoned the pursuit of a civil service degree and joined the retinue of a military officer named Li Fengyao 李奉堯 (¿-1789), whom he followed to a variety of posts from Fujian to Malan garrison in Shanxi. After working as a secretary for Li for more than ten years, Yisun gained an appointment to the Imperial Genealogy Bureau in 1785. He was rewarded for his efforts at the Bureau with a ninth grade rank, and in 1790 appointed as sub-district magistrate in Jingmen department, Hubei.424 Shortly after, he was transferred to the position of acting sub-district magistrate (shu xunjian) in Xingshan county. He remained only briefly in this position before being cashiered over an incident in which a soldier under his command beat a man to death.425 Before his death in 1796, he was again serving as a sub-district magistrate, this time at a post station in Hubei named Lüyan station 呂堰驛.426 Wang’s death, shortly after taking up the post, was reported by officials in highly formulaic terms: “When the bandits seized Lüyan, Wang Yisun cursed at the bandits and refused to surrender.”427

It is quite likely that Wang Yisun’s death would have gone mostly unnoticed by literati such as Qin Ying and Xie Jieshu, like the deaths of other men of the same rank

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424 Interestingly, Wang Qisun was quite open about the fact that the appointment of his brother was due to his old friendship with Bi Yuan (yagu 雅故) and many other high ranking officials in Hubei. Wang Qisun, *Tifu weiding gao* 惕甫未定稿, in *Yuanyatang quanji*, vols. 6-13 (1815 augmented edition), j.17.2b-3a.
425 This was referred to by Xie Jieshu as “以事奪官” (he was cashiered because of an incident). Qian, *Beizhuan ji*, 112-776.
426 Note that he had once been visited here by Hong Liangji. See Wang, *Tifu weiding gao*, j.17.4a.
killed in the war, had it not been for the efforts of his elder brother Wang Qisun 王芑孫 (1755-1817) to both expand and promote the story.428 Wang Qisun, unlike his younger brother, was a very well connected scholar-official who, it turned out, was also an adept social organizer.429 In the decade prior to his brother’s death, Wang Qisun had been a resident of Peking, serving as a teacher at the School of the Palace of Universal Peace (a school for children of high officials of the Eight Banners). His circle of acquaintances included Qin Ying and many of the other officials identified by Polachek as members of the northern clique.430

Wang Qisun learned of his brother’s death while en route from the capital to his post as director of schools (jiaoyu) in Huating county, Zhejiang.431 He quickly set about notifying his friends, most still in the capital, of his brother’s death. He sent letters requesting epitaphs from a number of prominent literati whom he counted among his acquaintances—Yuan Mei 袁枚, Wang Chang 王昶, Hong Liangji 洪亮吉, and Qin Ying.432 He also circulated several other documents to a broader circle of friends: a notice (shi 示) of his brother’s death,433 three letters that his brother sent to his family shortly

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428 At least thirteen sub-district magistrates were killed during the rebellion, based on my examination of gazetteer and archival records.
429 As expressed forthrightly by Qin Ying, the author of one of the biographies included in Qian’s compilation, “His elder brother, Tiefu 鐵夫 [Wang Qisun], was my friend (余友).” See Qin Ying, Xiaoxianshanren wenji 小腆山人文集, j.5.68a.
430 On connections between Wang Qisun, Qin Ying, and others associated with the northern clique, see Polachek, Inner Opium War, p. 297, n. 37.
431 Wang was told about the death in a letter from Wuchang prefect Shi Zhan 史湛. See Wang, Tifu weiding gao, j.17.7a.
433 See He Daosheng, Shuangteng shuwu shiji 雙藤書屋詩集 (1821; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 481), j.8.9. He’s poems were dated JQ2 (1797).
Map 4.1 Locations of Contributors to Wang Qisun’s Boyu yi gao (1796)
Base map and points from Harvard China GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/. Other data compiled by the author from Wang Qisun, Boyu yi gao, QDZJ, QSL, and local gazetteers.
Map 4.2 Native Places of Contributors to Wang Qisun's Boyu yi gao
Base map and points from Harvard China GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/. Other data compiled by the author from Wang Qisun, Boyu yi gao, QDZJ, and local gazetteers.
before his death, and a lengthy set of guidelines he had written for the organization of a local militia. In addition to the large number of recipients in Peking, several were in their hometowns in Jiangnan (Map 4.1). Two of the contributors were residents of Huating who may have encountered Wang Qisun after his arrival at the new post; and at least two, Shi Shanchang and Cheng Zhenjia, appear to have been serving in areas affected by the White Lotus War. The vast majority of contributors, like Wang Qisun himself, were natives of the provinces of Zhejiang and Jiangsu (Map 4.2).

In response to Wang Qisun’s requests, eleven men submitted biographical writings (covering nearly the entire range of traditional biographical genres). These included the xingzhuang (account of conduct) by Qin Ying that Qian included in the Beizhuan ji, a muzhiming (funerary essay) by Yuan Mei, a mubiao (epitaph) by Wang Chang, a shibiao (inscribed epitaph) by Hong Liangji, several aici (rhymed eulogies), and a zhuan (biography) by Wang Ningfu. More than forty other men contributed poems after hearing of the death or receiving from Wang Qisun a copy of Qin Ying’s account of conduct and a request to submit a poem. Wang gathered these biographical writings,
poems, and official documents related to his brother’s enshrinement in the Peking Manifest Loyalty Shrine and bestowal of hereditary title, in a work titled Boyu yigao 波餘遺藁. 438

Official documents occupied a prominent position in the Boyu yigao. Wang Qisun placed these official documents in the “head chapter” (shoujuan 首卷) of the collection. He included the imperial patent (chishu 敕書) and edict (shangyu 上諭) granting his brother the posthumous hereditary title of yunqiwei [CC] followed by the memorial attachment (pian 片) that had reported the death, and finally the relevant communications (zi 津) between the Boards of War, Personnel, and Rites. A memorial enclosure from Yongbao (JQ1/8), the acting governor-general of HuGuang, gave the conclusive version of Wang Yisun’s death: he had died “cursing the bandits and refusing to surrender” (罵賊不屈). 439 Yongbao’s language was standard administrative prose. “Cursing bandits” before dying was a description of death that provided an unambiguous basis for entry into
the Manifest Loyalty Shrine, the writing of an official biography, and the granting of posthumous title.\footnote{We can see the same trope appearing repeatedly in earlier dynasties, in both official and nonofficial sources. Refusal to submit was at the top of the list of ways of dying in the Taiping War, as compiled by Wooldridge, “Transformation of Ritual and State,” p. 274.}

The nonofficial accounts, grouped after the official documents in two sections labeled Appendices A and B (fulu shang xia 附錄上下), were united with the account from Yongbao in their description of the moment of Wang Yisun’s death. In nearly every nonofficial account, regardless of genre, we find a description of Wang Yisun’s “cursing” of the bandits prior to death, just as he had in the memorial from Yongbao. According to Qin Ying’s account of conduct, he “faced the bandits and cursed them” (面賊而罵), and in Xie Jieshu’s biography, Wang “refused to submit and cursed the bandits” (不屈罵賊).\footnote{QDZJ 112-775, 778. The official investigation into the death was actually concluded before these other accounts came to light. The first official report of Wang Yisun’s death, sent in a memorial attachment (pian 片) from Yongbao 永保 and Hengrui 恆瑞 on JQ1/8/28, noted that they had previously heard that Wang had died berating the bandits and refusing to surrender (ma zei bu qu 罵賊不屈), however, they had not submitted an official report until the details of his death had been verified by a captured bandit leader named Yu Zongwu 俞宗武.}

The consistency of official and nonofficial sources seems at first glance evidence that nonofficial accounts simply reiterated the official version, only adding more detail. However, a closer look at the commemorative collection indicates that the official account had been received with some skepticism. The shared trope of active resistance before death masked a process of investigation into Wang Yisun’s death carried out by Wang Qisun and several of his close acquaintances. In a number of poetry prefaces and records of correspondence in the commemorative collection we learn that several contributors who had traveled to or served in posts near the place of Wang Yisun’s death had heard contradictory accounts about the death. One of these stories were transmitted to
Wang Qisun by Shi Yunyu 石雲宇 (1756-1837), an official who had been working in the office of Sichuan governor-general Lebao. Shi was a long-time friend of Wang Qisun’s. They had been members of a small poetry society in 1782 and continued to exchange poetry in the following decades. In a brief preface to the poem he contributed to Wang’s collection, Shi described having heard different stories about Wang’s death, including one in which Wang had not died cursing the bandits and refusing to surrender, but had simply been shot by a gun. Shi was privy to the details coming from the interrogations of captured bandits. When these interrogations failed to clarify the details of Wang’s death, he made a point of personally visiting Lüyan station—the site of Wang’s last posting—on his way to the capital. At the station, he interviewed a local innkeeper surnamed Bian who related the story of Wang’s death in great detail. After the interview, Shi informed Wang Qisun that his brother had exhausted his life as he fought a hopeless battle, implying that he had died fighting and not by a gunshot while the rebels were some distance away.

In an account that Wang Qisun wrote of his brother’s life, we learn that another local official surnamed Zhang had sent a letter to Wang shortly after his brother’s death in which he conveyed the news that Wang Yisun had actually committed suicide after the troops he commanded collapsed under attack from the bandits. At the same time, Wang Qisun had been receiving reports from other friends serving in areas

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442 Sui, “Wang Qisun yanjiu,” p. 22; ECCP p. 658. The poetry society was called Bitao shishe 碧桃詩社.
443 The date of this visit is unclear.
444 Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.xia, 23a. The story of Wang Yisun being shot was discredited, in part, because of the information Shi had gained earlier in an interrogation of Zhang Tianlun 張天倫, a captive rebel leader, that the rebels in the early stages of the rebellion did not have access to gunpowder, and so could not have actually shot him (a dubious point). Interestingly, Shi also wrote a memorial on the use of awards for military merit after the rebellion. The memorial was included in his Du xue lu wen gao 獨學廬文稿, 26a-28b.
445 Wang, Tifu weiding gao, j.17.7b.
446 This account also appears in the JQ1/8 aici 哀辭 written by Xu Hengqing.
affected by the White Lotus War. His fellow jinshi graduate Zhan Yingjia 詹應甲 had travelled to the MianHan 沔漢 region (Mianyang and Hanchuan counties in Hubei) (Map 1.1), down the Han river from Xiangyang. Here he met with refugees from Xiangyang who talked about the noble (yilie 義烈) nature of Yisun’s death. Wang heard reports of other refugees who talked of his brother’s burial by rebels after a series of strange events occurred in their midst (wuguai chu qi jian 物怪出其間),447 offering an explanation for why the body could not be found. Wang also seems to have had access to the interrogation report of the White Lotus commander Yu Zongwu 俞宗武 in which Yu claimed to have personally killed Wang Yisun with a spear thrust.

Wang Qisun pieced together a version of his brother’s death that incorporated details from these accounts. In Wang’s version, his brother—alone on the bridge—had killed several of the advancing bandits with his sword (as in Shi’s account) before being injured by a spear (as in the rebel leader’s account), at which point he dove into the river in an attempt to commit suicide (a detail apparently from the official Zhang). The bandits, however, were “enraged” and fished him out, whereupon he “cursed them and refused to surrender” (ma bu qu 罵不屈), was killed by the bandits, stripped of his clothes and tossed back into the river.448 This account, in whole or in excerpts, was then reiterated in all but one of the biographies included in the Boyu yigao.449 It also made its way into later accounts not included in the anthology.450 Those who wrote on the death expressed

447 Wang, Tifu weiding gao, j.17.13b. The rebels had apparently even given the burial site a name: “the tomb of the loyal official Wang of Lüyan” (呂燁忠臣王公之墓).

448 Wang, Tifu weiding gao, j.17.13a

449 Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.shang.3b. Qin describes the death as ma zui bu qu 驚豔不屈. His account was forwarded to the historiography office (以上諸史館焉詁授中書). For Sun Xingyan’s account of the death, see ibid., 5a-6b; for the account by Wang Chang, see ibid., 9a; for Wu Xiqi’s, see ibid., 14a-14b; for Hong Liangji’s, see ibid., 16a. This phrase does not appear in Xu Hengqing’s 徐鏘慶 account, written in JQ1/8.

450 Xu Xiongfei 徐熊飛, a teacher of Qin Ying and acquaintance of Yang Fangcan, included in his commemorative poem, not included in the anthology, details such as Yisun’s fighting alone against
satisfaction that Wang’s disdain and active resistance at the point of death had been demonstrated through investigation.451

The sustained interest in Wang Yisun’s death may have also reflected the success of the earlier biographical writings in drawing connections between Wang Yisun and broader historical traditions. Wang Yisun’s value to the Qing dynasty, as I have noted earlier, was essentially defined by the accordance of his death with regulatory categories. In contrast, contributors to the commemorative collection attempted to dignify Wang Yisun’s death by finding analogies within the Chinese historical tradition. These writers emphasized that Wang Yisun had shown an aptitude in martial skills as a young man and had chosen to serve under a military commander on the frontiers rather than pursuing a literary career. His last days spent frantically organizing a local militia and his death were framed as the culmination of this decision.452

The narrative of a literary talent entering the bandits on the bridge, his death by the thrust of a spear after first falling into the water, and the loss of his clothes. See Xu Xiongfei, Baihaoshan fang shi xuan 白鶴山房詩選 (JQ; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 470), j.1.11a-b.

Qin Ying, for example, emphasized that the final version of the story had been investigated and was reliable (the ke xin 核可信). Qian, Beizhuan ji, 112-775. Why were the details of the investigative process that ultimately produced this version of the death not excised by Wang Qisun as he prepared the anthology? Perhaps a description of the process of producing a biography—including the interviews with witnesses, trips to the site of the death—could be, like the inclusion of official documents, a way of establishing the veracity or reliability of an account. It was not uncommon to see the mention of witnesses to dramatic deaths on occasion in gazetteer biographies. For instance, in the biography of Yang Tingdong 楊廷棟 in Chongxiu Zitong xian zhi (XF), j.3.57b, the compilers note that his dramatic death was witnessed by a neighbor named Zhao Guohu who had also been taken prisoner. In the Ziyang xian zhi (1843) j.6.10b, we are told that the death of Du Yunzhang 杜雲璋 in the rebel camp was witnessed by several others who had escaped, in ibid j.6.14, the death of Tang Wenku 唐文魁 was witnessed by a certain Wang Tingyu. In Xunyang xian zhi (1903) j.10.3a, the death of Gong Zixiong 龔自雄 was witnessed by Wang Liangjin. In the Taiyu xian zhi (1931) j.5.18b, the self-immolation of major (3b) Chen Shengju 陳聖矩 and his son Chen Li 陳禮 during the Jinchuan campaign was witnessed by Chen Diyao.

This aspect of his life was mentioned by Qin Ying and Wang Chang. See Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.shang, 8b. See also mentions by Wu Xiqi (ibid., 12b) and Wang Ningfu (ibid., 27a), and in several poems in Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.xia, 1a, 2b, 5a, 9a, 13a. One contributor, Xu Hengqing, suggested a different interpretation: that Wang Yisun joined Li Fengyao because he was poor and looking for employment. See Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.shang, 21b.
military, often associated with the Han dynasty general Ban Chao 班超 (32–102) who gave up the possibility of a civil career to dedicate his life to the military,⁴⁵³ allowed the literati who wrote of Wang Yisun’s life to gloss over an unremarkable, perhaps even incompetent, career at the lowest rungs of the civil bureaucracy.⁴⁵⁴ The trope also added a veneer of veracity to the story of his determined resistance. That is, if Wang Yisun had indeed been a skilled swordsman and experienced warrior, not just a lowly sub-district magistrate, the story that he died fighting in hand-to-hand combat rather than from a distant gunshot was all the more likely.

Xie Jieshu, not among those contacted by Wang Qisun directly at the time of his brother’s death, provides an instructive epilogue to the efforts of Wang Qisun. In 1796, Xie was still a young man in his hometown of Yihuang, Jiangxi, preparing for the civil service exams (he would gain the jinshi degree in 1808) and writing poetry on his cat, his grandfather’s ox, and other scenes of rural life.⁴⁵⁵ However, after attaining the jinshi degree Xie became a founding member of the Xuannan poetry club, a group of literati in Peking that was closely connected to many who had contributed to Wang Qisun’s collection. He had presumably heard of Wang Yisun’s death from one of these men.

Xie’s biography is not dated, but likely was written sometime after the founding of this club in the late 1810s (and before his death in 1825). What is significant to note

⁴⁵⁴ For a critical assessment of Wang Yisun’s abilities as an official, see the communication between Hong Liangji and a “high official” (probably Bi Yuan), as described in Susan Mann Jones, “Hung Liang-chi (1746-1809): The Perception and Articulation of Political Problems in Late Eighteenth-Century China” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1972), pp. 135-136. Hong Liangji met with Wang Yisun in 1795. After their meeting, Hong wrote a letter to an unidentified high official (probably Bi Yuan) commending Wang Yisun. The reply, in Mann’s description, “was a terse note in which the ‘high official’ made it clear that while Wang appeared to be a sincere and ingenuous person, he was constantly disobeying his superiors, and was generally regarded as a troublemaker.”
⁴⁵⁵ Xie Jieshu, Shouyuetang shi ji 守約堂詩集 (Siku weishou shu jikan, 10.29), j.1-3.
about Xie Jieshu’s attention to Wang Yisun’s story is that the story continued to sustain interest even after the death of Wang Qisun. Xie’s account of the death of Wang Yisun reads as a sort of summation of knowledge on Wang Yisun that had been gathered and redacted in the late eighteenth century. Themes prominent in Xie Jieshu’s account and earlier biographies included the martial training and aptitude that Wang Yisun had acquired while in the retinue of the military officer Li Fengyao, his efforts at organizing local defenses in the early months of the White Lotus War, and, most tellingly, a detailed account of his death with elements that had been vouched for by the earlier biographers through a process of investigation.

Xie’s interest in the story, I would suggest, had much to do with the success of the earlier biographers in crafting a story that resonated with the values of later readers and provided a convincing narrative of Wang Yisun’s death. If we look at Wang Qisun’s collection, we can see something of the process through which members of this network used firsthand evidence and nonofficial historical traditions to supplement and add authority to the bare frame of the official story. They conducted investigations to form the basis of a more reliable story and they tried to draw analogies between Wang Yisun’s death and the death of prominent figures from the ancient past. In effect, through these efforts, Wang Yisun was transformed from the mediocre, unfortunate, and generically-honored sub-bureaucrat who appears in the official record to a diligent, upright, and courageous hero. He became, in other words, the very sort of figure who would have appeared attractive to members of a club formed in the aftermath of a rebellion that had been blamed on the incompetence and pandering of local officials.

456 QDZJ 112-776-778.
457 QDZJ 112-778.
458 Polachek, Inner Opium War, p. 44.
The writings on Wang Yisun by both Xie and the other biographers also marked the limits of the dynasty as a source of meaning for cultural practices. While many of the elements of official and nonofficial biography were similar—from the description of death to the mention of posthumous titles, there were limits in the prestige that official recognition bestowed on the life of a low-ranking official killed in battle. Wang Yisun’s story acquired legitimacy and weight through its conformity to current intellectual trends and ancient traditions.

**Han Jiaye and Zhang Shu**

The circulation of biographical knowledge among literati could also be motivated and sustained by the interest in recording local history, a pursuit popular among many educated elites of the early nineteenth century. In Qian Yiji’s collection of biographies of those killed in the Jiaqing reign, we will note that several authors shared a province with the subjects of their biographies and one, Zhang Shu 張澍 (1776-1847), was from the same county. In the case of Zhang Shu, at least, the writing of a biography and related efforts to commemorate the death of the deceased military officer Han Jiaye were tightly wrapped up with his larger interest in promoting the history and military legacy of his home county of Wuwei and prefecture of Liangzhou, Gansu.

Han Jiaye, a Green Standard officer and native of Wuwei, was killed in battle in 1799. Unlike Wang Yisun, Han was born into a family with a long military tradition and no apparent literary ambitions. His father Han Zengshou 韓增壽 was killed during a

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459 This interest in local history may also explain another of Qian Yiji’s selections, Wu Lanxiu’s group biography for three district jailors (dianshi) from his home department (zhou) of Jiaying in Guangdong who were killed during the White Lotus War. In the biography, Wu referred to the three as men of “our department” (wu zhou). QDZJ 112-781. The interest in local history was more broadly true of the early nineteenth century; it had also been common of earlier periods identified by “localist turns.” On the former, see Han, “Re-inventing Local Tradition,” ch. 2. On the latter see Peter Bol, “‘The Localist Turn’ and ‘Local Identity’ in Later Imperial China,” *Late Imperial China* 24.2 (Dec., 2003): 9.
battle in the Jinchuan campaign. Jiaye joined the military during the first Jinchuan as a common soldier (you hangwu 由行五). He was promoted for merit to ensign (8a) in 1774, and then to sub-lieutenant (7a) in 1775. He was involved in a campaign against Galdan in 1775-1776, and promoted to lieutenant (6a). In 1783, he was promoted to second captain (5b) and then to first captain (4a). In 1795, he was promoted to major (3b). In 1798, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel (3a). In 1799, he was promoted to the rank of colonel (2b). Jiaye was killed in a battle in Mian county, Hubei.\footnote{See Han’s biography in QSG j.489, pp. 13510-11.} His brother, Han Zichang, was also killed during the war in 1802. The death of two brothers in the same war attracted the Jiaqing emperor’s attention. He ordered a shrine, the “Shrine for Two Valorous Officers” (Shuanglie ci 雙烈祠), built in their honor in Wuwei.\footnote{QSG j.87, p. 2604.}

While Han’s official biography was longer than Wang’s, Qian Yiji included only one biography for Han Jiaye among the zhongjie biographies, an epitaph written by a prominent scholar-official named Zhang Shu. Qian may have heard of Han Jiaye’s story while serving at the Office for the Compilation of the Collected Statutes. But, it is more likely that his inclusion of the epitaph was a result of his friendship with its author, Zhang Shu. Qian and Zhang were long-time acquaintances. Qian had encountered Zhang as a boy, while accompanying his father to an official post in Shaanxi. Qian’s father had been struck by Zhang’s unusual scholarly talent. The relationship between Qian Yiji and Zhang had continued when Zhang traveled to Peking at the age of 15 sui (he gained his jinshi at the age of 19 sui).\footnote{Feng Guorui 馮國瑞, Zhang Jiehousheng xiansheng nianpu 張介侯先生年譜, in Zhongguo xibei wenxian congshu, 3rd series, vol. 99 (Lanzhou: Lanzhou guji shudian, 1990), 4a.} Qian and Zhang met again in 1824, when Zhang took up a post in Peking. Zhang recounted a shared visit to view peonies.\footnote{Zhang Shu, Yangsutang wenji 楊素堂文集 (1837; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 536), j.18.2b.} After Zhang returned to
Gansu in 1832, the two continued to correspond on a wide range of topics including their rather active dream lives (1838). Their surviving correspondence does not include mention of the Han brothers, but we know that Zhang had been working on a commemorative collection for Han Jiaye during the 1830s and it is not unlikely that he had told Qian Yiji about the deaths of Jiaye and his brother.

The two volume collection that was printed in the 1840s, *Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu* 武威韓氏忠節錄, was superficially reminiscent of the collection that Wang Qisun put together for his brother several decades earlier. Much like Wang Qisun’s collection, the work by Zhang Shu began with transcriptions of the official documents that recorded Han Jiaye’s death, bestowed hereditary titles, and ordered the building of a shrine for the two brothers. These were followed by a preface, a history of the Han family, and an epitaph for Han Jiaye written by Zhang himself. Also like Wang Qisun’s collection, the entire second volume was comprised of poems commemorating Han Jiaye’s death, written by scholar-officials and educated men. These included poems by men who may have been approached directly by Zhang and at least two contributions—a liturgy and poem by Gong Jinghan 龔景瀚 (?-1803)—that must have been written shortly after Han Jiaye’s death.

Gong Jinghan, an official who helped to formulate the policy of scorched earth and fortifications during the White Lotus War, had been part of the Northern Clique along with Wang Qisun, Qin Ying, He Daosheng, and many of the other contributors to

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465 Between 1836 and 1838, he wrote three poems on the death of Han Jiaye. See Zhang, *Yangsutang wenji*, j.24.5b. After Zhang’s death, Qian wrote the preface for Zhang’s posthumous literary collection, *Yangsutang wenji*, as well as an epitaph for Zhang.
466 Zhang Shu’s preface was dated 1840 (DG20), but another prefatory text by Xu Zonggan referred to a trip taken in 1843, suggesting the work must have been printed sometime later.
467 As Tobie Meyer-Fong has noted, this format was also common to commemorative works produced after the Taiping War. See Meyer-Fong, *What Remains*, p. 164.
Despite Gong’s writings—probably linked to his own service in ShaanGan at the time of Han Jiaye’s death—there are few signs that his contemporaries had taken an active interest in Han Jiaye’s story. Indeed, the locations and native places of contributors to the Han Jiaye collection (Maps 4.3 and 4.4) suggest that the information had circulated through an entirely different network of officials and scholars centered, in this case, around Zhang Shu and including his contacts within Shaanxi officialdom, men with shared native place ties, as well as other acquaintances. As we can see in Map 4.3, Zhang Shu had communicated with men holding posts near to his residence in Xi’an, in his home county of Wuwei and prefecture of Liangzhou, but also as far afield as Guangdong and Peking. The story seems to have been particularly resonant in Wuwei and Ziyang, a county in Shaanxi that had been affected by the White Lotus War. Apart from a dense cluster of contributors from these two areas, the native places of contributors, as shown in Map 4.4, were spread broadly across the empire. This reflected the fact that many contributors were local officials serving in Shaanxi, but natives of other provinces.

Much like the story of Wang Yisun, Han Jiaye’s story appears to have only gained wide circulation through the determined efforts of a well-connected actor, and the pattern of the circulation of the story was highly particular to the personal histories of this actor. Both cases demonstrate the extent to which the memory (at least in writing) of the war dead depended on active promotion outside of state channels.

Wang Qisun’s efforts can be attributed to sorrow over the loss of his younger brother, but what of Zhang Shu’s efforts to compile poems and biographical writings for Han Jiaye? There was, first of all, some personal connection between Zhang and Han.

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Map 4.3 Locations of Contributors to Zhang Shu's Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu, 1840

Base map and points from Harvard China GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/. Other data compiled by the author from Zhang Shu, Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu, QDZJ, QSL, and local gazetteers.
Map 4.4 Native Places of Contributors to Zhang Shu's Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu

Base map and points from Harvard China GIS: www.fas.harvard.edu/~chgis/. Other data compiled by the author from Zhang Shu, Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu. ODZJ. and local gazetteers.
According to Zhang, he had first encountered Han Jiaye when he visited Han Jiaye’s mansion (lidi 里第) as a young boy of eleven sui to congratulate him for his recent military successes.\(^{469}\) However, apart from these tenuous personal ties, there was also much about Zhang’s adult life that makes his interest in Han Jiaye unsurprising. Zhang Shu had considerable knowledge of and personal ties with military men, he had an interest in local history, including biography, and he had a passion for Zhuge Liang, a character who figured prominently in Han Jiaye’s story.\(^{470}\)

Zhang’s closest personal tie with a military man was likely to his own father-in-law, He Shoulin 何守林 (?), an officer and native of Xining county in Gansu. Like Han Jiaye, He had entered the military as a regular soldier and risen into the officer ranks, serving in posts in Gansu, Hubei, and Xinjiang.\(^ {471}\) Zhang also wrote biographies for a number of military men whom he did not know personally, including Shaanxi native Wang Wanxiang 王萬祥 (1643-1701),\(^ {472}\) Li De 李德 (Ming dynasty), and the perennial object of literati interest, Fujianese naval commander Li Changgeng 李長庚 (1750-1807).\(^ {473}\) Zhang admired the passion and courage of these men. He contrasted them with “Confucians” (ru 儒) whose classical scholarship and bellicose speeches belied avarice,

\(^{469}\) Zhang, *Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu*, j.1.47b (p. 230).
\(^{470}\) Note that Qian Yiji wrote a preface for one of Zhang Shu’s works on Zhuge Liang, the *Zhuge Zhongwu gushi*. For the preface, see Qian Yiji, *Kanshi zhai jishi gao* 衙石齋記事稿 (pref. 1834), j.3.30a-b.
\(^{471}\) Zhang, *Yangsutang wenji*, j.25.7-8. According to the biography written by Zhang Shu, his father-in-law had fought in the Jinchuan campaign. He was promoted for merit and his career took him to posts in Gansu, Hubei, and Xinjiang. According to Zhang, He Shoulin was placed in charge of exiled convicts at Balikun. He took steps to improve their quality of life and attempted to prevent abuses, including the forced transport of a massive jade boulder for Heshen. Zhang did not note that He Shoulin was stripped of his rank on suspicion of the illicit hoarding of funds in 1805. See QSL JQ10/5/5, p. 957a.
\(^{472}\) Zhang, *Yangsutang wenji*, j.24.12a-16b. He may have learned of Wang through Wang’s grandson, a magistrate in Chang’an county, Shaanxi, where Zhang Shu lived for a number of years.
\(^{473}\) Zhang, *Yangsutang wenji*, j.22.9a-12b; dated JQ12/11/25.
corruption, and cowardice in the face of danger.  

Zhang Shu’s work on the commemorative collection also accorded with his larger interest in local history. In 1821, prior to his work on the collection, he had compiled and printed a “record of strange things” (yiwu zhi 異物志) for his home prefecture of Liangzhou. He had also gathered notes for a Liangzhou gazetteer and written biographies for a number of his fellow townsmen, including Xie Lianhu 謝蓮湖, He Meisheng 何梅生 and his close friend Pan Yikui 潘挹奎 (?-1829). The enthusiasm for local history that Han Seunghyun has observed in Jiangnan had evidently reached even the far-flung corners of the empire. But the history that was available for retelling in Gansu was not primarily of great literati, but of great military generals. In his preface to the commemorative collection, Zhang Shu placed Han Jiaye and his brother Han Zichang in a long line of great Liangzhou military men. He began the preface with a recitation of the successes of these men from the Han dynasty to the Qing. He asked his reader, “are any more prominent than the military men of our Liang who have shone forth from the pages of the historical records?” He went on to provide a lengthy account of the victories of Liangzhou military men stretching from Peng Yin 殷彭 and Jia Wei 段煨 of the Han dynasty to Jia Pi 賈枇 of the Jin to Zhou Shilü 周世禄 of the Sui. When he finally arrived at the Qing, Zhang noted that the Han brothers were among “great generals too numerous to be written of.” Describing the brothers, he continued:

474 For Zhang Shu’s colorful assertion of this view, see Zhang, <i>Yangsutang wenji</i>, j.25.7a-b.
475 This work included excerpts from a variety of earlier works such as the <i>Taiping yulan</i>, along with Zhang Shu’s own commentary.
476 Zhang, <i>Yangsutang wenji</i>, j.25.4a-5b, j.24.9a-10b, j.24.11b-14b.
477 Zhang Shu was, by all appearances, the most illustrious scholar-official to emerge from Wuwei county in the nineteenth century. His writings—particularly the manuscript he prepared for the compilation of the Liangzhou prefecture gazetteer—provide evidence of an interest in the stories of local heroes.
478 Zhang, <i>Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu</i>, 1a.
[They] campaigned against rebellion and disorder, and were more courageous than any who had come before. Their glorious achievements fill the historical records. The emperor’s grace is rich, awarding hereditary titles. The literati and scholars of our time eagerly contributed poems and prose to glorify their many exploits.

This insertion of the Han brothers into a lengthy Liangzhou prefectural history, with only a gesture toward the awards offered by the Qing dynasty, shifted the grounds on which Zhang Shu assessed Han Jiaye’s military contributions away from the fortunes of the dynasty to the legacy of Liangzhou military men. In keeping with this reframing, we learn later in Zhang’s collection that what he found most commendable about Han’s death was not his contribution to a victory for the Qing dynasty, but rather the strength of his personal resolve. Zhang Shu raised this point when he addressed in his biography for Han Jiaye accusations that Han had unnecessarily led his exhausted troops into an unwinnable battle. According to these accusations, Han had led several hundred exhausted troops out of the city of Mianyang in an attempt to overcome a larger bandit force and then refused to retreat in the face of sure defeat. Zhang wrote:

As for the outcome, it was only a matter of being outnumbered. When confronting the weapons [of the enemy], to suddenly pick up and leave is not an effective battlefield tactic, to order it is to be a coward, to use a consideration of one’s strength as an excuse for saving your own skin.

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479 Zhang, *Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu*, 4a.
This is something that Sir [Han] did not do.

The heroic death of Han Jiaye was, according to Zhang, based on sound strategic thinking, despite the criticisms. But more important for Zhang was Han’s exemplary stance in the face of danger. To turn and run, even if strategically defensible, was repugnant, a selfish act of cowardice. Zhang’s elevation of righteousness over strategy suggested a severing of the moral or personal ends of war from the political, a trend that I will address further in the second half of the dissertation.

If we look at the routes through which the biographies of Wang Yisun and Han Jiaye entered Qian Yiji’s collection, it is apparent that the unison of praise for the “loyalty” of the war dead and shared descriptions of the immediate circumstances of death masked differences in the value attributed to those killed during the war. It is certainly true that elements of military culture promulgated by the dynasty were incorporated into nonofficial biographical narratives, but the lives that had the broadest resonance were rarely those of men most honored by the state. Rather, the organization of biographical memory was contingent on and shaped by personal relationships, intellectual trends, and ties to cultural traditions. The smooth and homogeneous memory of official collections was belied by the fragmentary and uneven memory of the war dead outside of official auspices.

**Inscribed Landscapes in Biographies of the War Dead**

The commemorative collections for Wang Yisun and Han Jiaye were paradigmatic of the uneven literati response to the war dead. Wang Qisun and Zhang Shu

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480 Zhang, *Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu*, 47a-b.
activated literati networks to bring together poems and epitaphs for their particular projects. It was through these diffuse networks, rather than the centralized efforts of the state, that biographical writings came to the attention of later compilers such as Qian Yiji. However, Qian’s selection of biographies shows more than the contours of shared literati knowledge. It also shows evidence of an interest—shared by literate and illiterate alike—in the relationship between the bodies of the war dead and a landscape that was deeply sedimented with the traces of history and religious practice. The spatial depth in many of the biographies in Qian’s collection was a counterpoint to the homogeneous and totalizing conceptual space that the dynasty used to guide the building of the prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrines and organization of shrine biographies.

The story of Zhu Shedou provides a useful illustration of the ways in which the location of death became engrained in the biographical record. The appearance of Zhu in the Beijzhuan ji was likely due to the identity of one of his biographers, the scholar-official Ruan Yuan (1764-1849). Ruan, as I have already noted, not only had connections with Qian Yiji and several other biographers included in the zhongjie subchapter through the Xuehaitang in Guangdong, but was also one of the most famous men of his day. What concerns me here, however, are not Ruan’s connections with Qian but the particular details that Ruan added to the official biography of Zhu. A comparison of his biography with the official biography indicates that he had drawn rather liberally on official documents—perhaps accessed while serving in the historiography office in Peking in 1810. However, there was one incident in Ruan’s biography of Zhu that was not present in the official biography. The story told of the fate of Zhu’s body after his death in battle:

When the bandits had retreated, the troops retrieved Zhu’s body for burial, but they left behind his left foot. The next day, the Sichuanese people picked it up from the battlefield and buried it apart from the body in
Tongchuan prefecture, at the tree of the palm of the Fenghuang mountain immortal. [His son] wanted to have the foot returned for burial, but the Sichuan people kept it, and built another shrine, thinking that if they offered sacrifices to it, it would not be returned.

We can only speculate on Ruan’s reasons for inserting the detail. But whatever his personal reasons, it is indicative of a widely shared sensitivity to the ways in which the human remains of war were added to the inscribed landscape of Sichuan, becoming part of a rich set of cultural resources for making sense of phenomena and experience linked to a particular place.

If we look more broadly at stories related to Zhu, details of Zhu’s incorporation into the inscribed landscape were a common element. Compilers of the Tongchuan prefectural gazetteer, for instance, provided further information on the relationship between Zhu Shedou’s foot and the local holy site—which they referred to as the “stone palm of the immortal.” The site, they noted, was a “great man’s” footprint (juren zuji 巨人足跡). After Zhu Shedou’s foot had been brought to the site for burial, residents of Tongchuan had been moved to absolute sincerity (jingcheng ganzhao 精誠感召). The correspondence of the two feet, they suggested, could not be mere coincidence. The words of these compilers are reminiscent of descriptions of the interaction between the war dead and urban space that I discussed in Chapter 2. Zhu’s detached body part...
resonated with and, thereby, helped to reproduce a landscape deeply inscribed with efficacious sites.\textsuperscript{483}

A reading of other accounts of Zhu’s life and posthumous contributions suggests that he had, in fact, become more broadly incorporated into the inscribed landscape of northeastern Sichuan, the region in which he had served and died during the war. Several of these accounts appeared in the second biography included by Qian Yiji.\textsuperscript{484} Mianyang native Zhang Xigu 張錫穀 (QL54 jinshi),\textsuperscript{485} the author of the biography (an epitaph, muzhiming), had spent much of his career in Guizhou and Sichuan. He recalled hearing about Zhu’s death while inquiring in Guiyang about the situation in Sichuan. He was told:

The Guizhou native Duke Zhu is known in Sichuan as the Tiger General. The bandits are terrified of him. Now he has died in battle. [But] the bandit masses [still?] see him in the day, galloping on his horse and suddenly attacking. They shout ‘Zhu has come’ and then kill each other in confusion. The people of Sichuan are moved by his loyalty.

The power inherent to relics was described by Alexandra Walsham who notes, among other things, that relics “operate as ‘spiritual electrodes’ that transmit waves of sacred energy into the sphere of the terrestrial and temporal.” They, furthermore, have the “capacity” to “infect things with which they exist in close proximity by a form of holy contagion or radioactivity.” See Alexandra Walsham, “Introduction: Relics and Remains,” \textit{Past and Present Supplements 5} (2010): 12-13.

Other peculiar details about Zhu’s death seem to have circulated. For instance, the \textit{Xichong xian zhi} (1876), j.8.14b-15a relates a story of Zhu's death in JQ5/1/28: surrounded and outnumbered by bandits at Maohe mountain 帽盒山, Zhu had used up all of his arrows when he suddenly dismounted, faced to the north and prostrated himself (bai 拜) before remounting and breaking through the surrounding bandits, killing several tens. It was only after this that his horse stumbled and he was killed.

Zhang Xigu produced a brief volume of collected writings \textit{Que xian zhai wen ji} 雀硯齋文集. I have not yet been able to look at this collection. Zhang also wrote the preface for the collection of \textit{Ye yun wen ji} 称芸文集 by Li Tenghua 李騰華, another official who served a lengthy period of time in Guizhou. A brief selection of Zhang’s writing, including his biography of Zhu Shedou, can be found in \textit{Guochao wenlu xubian} (1868; reprint, XXSK vol. 1671-1672).

QDZJ 112-788.
Having heard this account of Zhu’s powers, Zhang sighed and begged to be allowed to write his epitaph. Zhang went on to note that after Zhu’s death the deceased general manifested (xian 顯) himself four more times in battle: once in Zitong county 柰潼縣, and three times in nearby Jiangyou county 江油縣, both counties in northeastern Sichuan.⁴⁸⁷

Another story about Zhu’s posthumous activities in northeastern Sichuan was recorded by Zhang Bangshen 張邦伸 (1737-1803), a Sichuanese juren and avid collector of stories from his home province, and repeated by the compilers of the Baoning prefecture gazetteer. In this incident, Zhu appeared at the head of a brigade of “yin soldiers” to assist in the attack of White Lotus forces who had barricaded themselves into a fortified stockade:

When the bandits brought disorder to Chuanbei, they were pursued by Delengtai. The bandits fled and took up position at Yuanshanchang in Jianzhou. At the time, the brigade general (2a) of Chuanbei garrison, Zhu [Shedou] had already been killed. The bandits fled from Bolin temple to Shimen stockade, official troops attacked from all four sides. Brigade general Zhu stirred up sand and stones as though leading “yin soldiers.” The bandits were terrified. Government troops seized as many as they could. Those who escaped fled toward Nanbu [county].

逆匪亂川北德參贊追剿賊竄據劍州之元山場時川北鎮朱公已遇害賊由柏林驅奔至石門寨官兵四路進攻朱鎮臺若帶領陰兵之狀飛沙走石賊荒

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⁴⁸⁷ QDZJ 112-788. The reappearance of dead soldiers was not unique to China. On the return of the dead during and after war was common in the First World War. See Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 69.
The compilers of another Daoguang-era gazetteer, the *Bazhou zhi*, provided more details about Zhu’s assistance. Zhu, they wrote, was “more courageous than all other generals” (勇冠諸將). After his death, he assisted in a key battle that resulted in the capture of two rebel leaders including Ran Tianyuan, who had earlier killed Zhu Shedou and stolen his horse. In the gazetteer account, the bandits had divided themselves into nine groups, and were pressing in from four sides. Delengtai, a Manchu commander, was outnumbered and in peril of complete defeat when Zhu Shedou descended from the sky on horseback (自天而降) in the midst of a cloud of sand and stones. The rebels were defeated, and Ran taking to Chengdu to be executed in the marketplace. On this occasion, Zhu appears to have taken offense at the bandit, Ran Tianyuan, riding the stolen horse. Zhu used a supernatural horse to gallop toward the battle and take his revenge.

We may be skeptical about the veracity of these stories, but they provide an important indication of the gap between the orderly and hierarchical official military culture and the cultural practices that took shape in a productive relation to the inscribed landscape. Zhu’s posthumous interventions seem to have only occurred in northeastern Sichuan where the reputation he had established during his military career served posthumously as a resource for locals trying to make sense of otherwise inexplicable phenomena during the war. What is important to note is that the sphere of Zhu’s posthumous influence was entirely unconstrained by official administrative boundaries or the state cult. His spirit, rather, circulated along the same paths as his reputation in life.

An interest in recording the ongoing relationship between the war dead and the

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489 *Bazhou zhi* (1833), j.10.33a.
production or reproduction of inscribed space in the region affected by the war was also true of several other biographies in Qian’s collection. Let us return briefly to the story of one of these officers, Han Jiaye. In his commemorative collection for Han, Zhang Shu and other contributors recounted some of the mysterious circumstances following Han’s death. His body had been recovered by the magistrate of Mian county, Ma Yungang 马允刚 (dates?). Ma noted that the body had been wounded in seven places, but the face had retained its lifelike appearance (面色如生). This was a rather common attribute of war dead. Less common was the effect on Han’s body of the grave of Zhuge Liang at Dingjun Mountain. When Han’s body was transported beside the grave, Ma recounted, the body suddenly became too heavy to carry. It was only after the couriers prayed to Zhuge (dao zhi 祆之) that they were able to continue on their way.

It is not surprising that the resonance between Han Jiaye and the Zhuge Liang shrine was of interest to Zhang Shu—he counted the collection of tales about Zhuge among his many and eclectic pursuits. More interestingly, it seems to have been one of

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490 There were also details in the poems and biographies for Wang Yisun that suggested the perception of a relation between the war dead and the ongoing production of space. Hong Liangji noted in his epitaph that bandits had built a shrine for Wang Yisun after repeatedly meeting with defeat in the area around Yanliu station, where Wang had died; Zhan Yingjia described how the bandits had given Wang Yisun’s body a proper burial after being troubled by a series of weird events that they attributed to Wang’s angry spirit. Wang, Boyu yigao, fulu.shang.16b. The repeated defeats of rebels in the area was also attributed to Wang Yisun’s soul (hun) by Zhang Yunao 张云璈, Boyu yigao, fulu.xia.7a. The lifelike appearance of a corpse was frequently noted in biographical writing, especially when the subject had died violently for a noble cause. The lifelike feature was usually the face. For instance, the face of Ding Chengzu, of Pingli county in Shaanxi, killed by White Lotus forces; when discovered by his son, his face was “glowing as though alive” (guang ru sheng 光如生), see Pingli xian zhi (1796), j.7.zhongyi.2b. However, other organs or the entire body could also remain as though alive. In the Tianjin xian xu zhi, j.13.19a, for instance, we read of the exhumed body of Zhou Dalun 周大論, a local official killed during the Lin Shuangwen uprising in Taiwan. The body had been completely decomposed except for the heart, which still ran red with blood. This, the gazetteer compiler tells us, was considered an “strange incident” (yishi). Other examples: in the Xichong xian zhi (1876), j.8.13a-b, we find a description of the corpse of a victim of the White Lotus rebels still “shivering with life” 凛凛有生氣. For more examples, see Yu Yue 俞樾, Chaxiangshi congchao 茶香室叢抄 (1883; reprint, Taipei: Guangwen shuju, 1969), j.16.

491 QDZJ 112-787. Zhang, Wuwei Han shi, xu.5b.
the earliest details of Han’s death to circulate broadly. The first scholar-official to write a poem on Han’s death, Gong Jinghan, dedicated his poem to the connection been Han and Zhuge Liang’s tomb. In Gong’s poem, we are told that the clouds above Dingjun mountain were cold, and that the grass in front of the Zhuge shrine had withered.\(^493\) Ma Yungang, the magistrate of Mian county who had overseen the recovery of Han’s body, also compared Han Jiaye with Zhuge Liang.\(^494\) In the case of Ma, one wonders whether his interest in recording this story was linked to his concurrent role in the renovation of the Zhuge Liang shrine.\(^495\) The resonance between Han and Zhuge may have been for Ma a sign of the ongoing potency of Zhuge’s spirit and, therefore, the relevance of his efforts. Han’s resonance with Zhuge was also noted by younger contributors, such as Sun Kuizhang 孫揆章, a county student (yi linsheng 郡廩生). Sun wrote of how Han Jiaye’s coffin became heavy when carried past the shrine of Zhuge Liang and also noted that Han Jiaye’s shrine had proven to be efficacious against pestilence and drought.\(^496\)

Like the stories of the posthumous effects of Zhu Shedou, this incident involving Han Jiaye and the tomb of Zhuge Liang provides insight into the role of the White Lotus War in the reproduction of representational space. The deaths in battle of both Zhu and Han resonated with local sites dedicated to earlier heroes, what Natalie Zemon Davis has

\(^493\) The grass in front of Zhuge Liang’s tomb may have been a reference to Du Fu’s famous poem, “Chancellor of Shu,” which noted the grass gleaming on the steps of Zhuge’s shrine. On this poem, see Hoyt Tillman, “Reassessing Du Fu’s Line on Zhuge Liang,” pp. 300-301.
\(^494\) Ma wrote at least one other poem in which he drew a connection between the events of the White Lotus War and Zhuge. See Wang et al, eds., Zhuge Liang yanjiu jicheng, xia, p. 1239.
\(^495\) Ma Yungang composed a record of the rebuilding of the Zhuge shrine in Mian county during his tenure as magistrate, a project in which he took a leading role. He was also involved in shrine building in Dingyuan subprefecture, including a shrine for another Three Kingdom hero, Zhang Fei. See Dingyuan ting zhi (1879), j.13; on the shrine for Zhang Fei, see ibid., j.25.11a.
\(^496\) Zhang, Wuwei Han shi zhongjie lu, p. 224. The extent of interest in Zhuge Liang during the Qing can be seen in a recent collection of historical writings on Zhuge: Wang et al, eds., Zhuge Liang yanjiu jicheng. For instance, the work lists seven nianpu written for Zhuge Liang in the Qing, as opposed to only two in the Ming.
referred to as “hot spots” in the landscape.\footnote{Natalie Zemon Davis, “Writing ‘The Rites of Violence’ and Afterward,” in \textit{Ritual and Violence: Natalie Zemon Davis and Early Modern France}, edited by Graeme Murdock et al, \textit{Past and Present Supplement} 7 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 22.} These heroes included those unknown outside their local communities, as in the case of the palm of the immortal, as well as the famous heroes of the Three Kingdoms—Guan Yu and Zhuge Liang. A resonance between the war dead and Guan Yu, we will recall, was central to decisions made in the building of shrines for the war dead. Both Jiaqing and local officials favored sites in proximity to Guandi (Guan Yu) temples. In Zhang’s writing on Han, the hero was the master strategist Zhuge Liang and not Guan Yu.\footnote{It is particularly fitting that the story was brought to light by Zhang Shu. Among his many interests was an unusually intense interest in Zhuge Liang. Among his writings was a collection of writings by Zhuge, \textit{Zhuge Zhongwu hou quan ji} 諸葛忠武侯全集 (1821), and another specifically on Zhuge’s military strategies \textit{Zhuge Zhongwu hou bing fa, si juan} 諸葛忠武侯兵法四卷 (date?). The latter is held at the Sichuan University Library.} But the relationship between the contemporary war dead and the apotheosized hero was represented in similar terms: not as a historical analogy (the war dead had fought bravely like Guan Yu, or strategized like Zhuge Liang), but as a mutually productive relationship activated through spatial proximity.

**Conclusion**

The biographies of the war dead provide an important record of the linkages and disjunctures between the dead and the overlapping spaces of the empire—the homogeneous spaces of administration, the transregional movement of biographical information, and the representational spaces of the inscribed landscape. Whether produced under official auspices or by literati, biographies shared a common ideology—after all, they were produced by “the ‘thinkers’ of a ruling class … ‘its active conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief
source of livelihood.” Both official and nonofficial biographies of the war dead expressed similar values: they focused almost invariably on what Tobie Meyer-Fong has referred to as “the essential act of resistance against the rebels.” Those who died in battle, whether in an official or nonofficial biography, were always represented in active and courageous resistance against impossible odds. But to think only of the ideology of the biographies is to miss their significance as records of and participants in spatial production. The uniform descriptions of “loyalty” of the war dead masked the unevenness and heterogeneity of the spatial relationships that were both created and sustained through biographical practice.

499 Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, revised ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 155-156.
500 Meyer-Fong, What Remains, p. 3.
Chapter Five

Origin Stories: The Self-fashioning and Reception of Luo Siju

In the previous chapters, I emphasized the tension between the Qing dynasty’s use of the war dead to reinscribe homogeneous administrative space, on the one hand, and the fragmentary and uneven reception of the war dead, on the other. In Chapter 2, I showed that the building of prefectural Manifest Loyalty shrines was conceived as an addition to the existing sites of state cult, to be spread evenly through all prefectural capitals. In practice, the relationships between the shrine and local society were affected by earlier uses of urban space and regionally specific experience of war. In Chapter 3, I suggested that the general call for nominations for hereditary titles revealed sharp divisions—regional, familial, and institutional—in perceptions of military honors and the unexpected effects of war on official attempts to shape the reception of military culture. In Chapter 4, I looked at the ways in which the organization of official biography reflected changing administrative concerns while diminishing the singularity of individual biographical subjects. Biographical practices outside of official auspices, in contrast, created transregional flows of information on the war and contributed to the continued vitality of the inscribed landscape.

Much as the official biographical collections and standard guidelines for shrine-building reflected an official penchant for uniformity and homogeneity that was belied in practice, the reception and self-fashioning of veterans after the White Lotus War revealed the array of nonofficial cultural resources that could be used to make sense of the lives of military men who were, superficially at least, simply the impersonal bearers of rank. In the following three chapters, I explore some of the ways in which the official status of military men—that is, their position in the military hierarchy—was supplemented and, in
some cases, subsumed by their creative engagement with these broader cultural traditions and innovations. Rank indeed provided the actions of military men with a degree of legitimacy, but it played a rather small role in determining the extent or nature of their individual reputations in society.

The subject of this chapter, Luo Siju 羅思舉 (1764-1840), provides a striking example of an individual reputation overwhelming the ascribed status of rank. Luo, a native of Dongxiang county in mountainous northeastern Sichuan (Map 5.1), had spent much of his life before entering the military in 1796 on the social margins. By his own account, he had been a gang member, martial arts expert, burglar, and vigilante whose encounters with officialdom had resulted on several occasions in arrest, interrogation, and imprisonment. Luo’s fortunes turned with the outbreak of the White Lotus War. In the first year of the war, he became the leader of a lineage militia in his home county of Dongxiang. After achieving several victories over White Lotus forces, he gained the attention of officials serving in the area. With their recommendation, he was recruited into the Green Standards as a low-ranking officer and rose quickly through the officer ranks. In 1798, he was promoted to assistant brigade commander (5b); in 1800 to first captain (4a); in 1801 to major (3b) and lieutenant colonel (3a). In 1806, he became regional vice commander (2b). In 1814 he was promoted to brigade general (2a), and in 1821 to provincial commander of Guizhou, the top rank in the Green Standards. He went on to hold the same rank in Hubei, Sichuan, and Yunnan.501

The details of Luo’s background and remarkable success attracted the attention of many of his contemporaries. In the decades after the White Lotus War, he began to be described in nonofficial writings as an exemplar of the sort of talents many believed to be

missing in the regular military: an officer who combined courage, prestige, cunning, and strategic acumen. By the middle of the nineteenth century many nonofficial writings on the war presented Luo as one of the two or three most notable Green Standard officers involved in the suppression of the White Lotus forces. Wei Yuan (1794-1857), a prominent member of the statecraft school and author of an influential work on Qing military history (Shengwu ji), identified Luo as an officer whose “prestige” (weiming 威名) had been second only to the “two Yangs” (Yang Fang and Yang Yuchun, two prominent Green Standard officers who will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). Zhu Qi 朱琦 (1803-1861), writing several years later, referred to Luo Siju and Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1761-1837) as the pre-eminent commanders (shi 士) under the great Banner generals (Delengtai, Mingliang, Eledengbao). Luo and Yang were, Zhu gushed, like “bears crouching, and dragons galloping” (若熊之蹲若龍之驁).

While these writers here asserted Luo’s military importance, their writing and those of their contemporaries in some ways belied this assertion. Their writings dwelt less on Luo’s military career than on his origins—his pre-military life as an outlaw and earliest years in the military, when he had operated outside the military chain of command. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, interest in Luo remained unabated among writers of local history, compilers of unusual tales, and even literary

502 Zhu Qi may have had personal reasons for taking an interest in Luo. Zhu was a native of Lingui in Guangxi (jinshi 1835). His father Zhu Fengsen 朱鳳森 was involved in organizing local militias (tuanlian) during the Eight Trigrams Rebellion in 1813. Like his father, Zhu Qi also had first-hand experience with rebellion. In 1846, he organized a militia and accepted the surrender of a man not unlike Luo—a bandit leader, Zhang Jiaxiang 張家祥, who later became an officer in the military. See QSG j.378, pp. 1159-6.

503 Zhu Qi, Yizhitang shi chubian 怡志堂詩初編 (1857), j.1.13b. Along with Luo and Yang, Zhu identified two men that he felt were outstanding among civil officials contributing to the rebellion, Gong Jinghan and Yan Ruyi. His impressions may have been based in part on his reading of Wei Yuan’s Shengwu ji. He cited this work j.1.16b. Without making specific reference to their roles in the White Lotus War, Yao Ying 姚莹 (1785-1853) also singled out Luo Siju and Yang Yuchun as the eminent commanders of land forces during the Jiaqing and Daoguang periods. See QDZJ 176-323.
scholars. As the sentiments of loyalty to the Qing withered away, these men focused even less on his successes as a Qing military commander and more on stories of his life as a knight-errant, vignettes of near escapes and clever ruses that had little to do with the political fortunes of a dynasty.

The great attention to Luo’s story, particularly his years before rising to the top ranks of the Green Standards, was in contrast to his virtual absence from extant official records covering the early years of his career. In many ways, there was an inversely proportional relationship between Luo’s depiction in official and nonofficial writings on Luo—the more he appeared in official records, the less interest events in his life triggered among his contemporaries. What made Luo’s origins so attractive to nineteenth century writers? In this chapter, I argue that the key to understanding Luo’s fame in the nineteenth century was less his career success—which was remarkable, but not unique—than a combination of serendipity, self-fashioning, and self-representation. Luo’s successful efforts to craft his own story and the eager reception of its many elements revealed the durability and resonance of the many traditions that provided a framework for making sense of state-sponsored violence in nineteenth century China.

**Representative Luo: Luo Siju from the Perspective of the Court**

When Wei Yuan combed through official documents from the White Lotus War for information on Luo Siju he discovered that Luo had been known to the emperor as early as 1797, but that “many of the things that Luo did could not be found in government documents” (事多不見奏牘). Wei Yuan’s observations are apt. It is not

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504 Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 458. Luo was first mentioned in the campaign records of the White Lotus War on j.33.39a in a joint memorial from Mingliang, Yimian, and Delengtai dated JQ2/4/7. The first reference to Luo in the QSL is on JQ6/3/11, when it is noted that he was commended by Lebao and awarded the title batulu for military merit. He was first mentioned in an edict (shangyu) in JQ3/9/15 when he was promoted to the rank of second captain (5b). NPM 702000951-0-01.

505 Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 457.
that Luo was invisible in official documents, but rather that his visibility was characterized by an absence of “shi,” the noteworthy things he had done. He was represented not as the unconventional hero known to Wei Yuan from unofficial writings and personal encounters, but as a cog stripped of singularity. Before turning to the Luo of popular culture and literati fascination, it will be useful to briefly examine the much less colorful Luo of official discourse.

In most of the records of the White Lotus War, Luo was virtually indistinguishable from the hundreds of other officers who populate the campaign records (fanglūe). Descriptions were terse and his growing prominence was expressed in a typically bureaucratic way: the higher his rank, the greater his number of appearances in the campaign record. According to the meticulously compiled materials in his official biographical file, Luo was mentioned in the campaign records of the war thirty-four times between 1797 and 1801 (JQ2/4 and JQ6/10). As the war drew to a close and his rank rose, Luo began to appear more frequently, a total of 134 times in the three years between 1802 and 1805 (JQ6/12 and JQ10/1).506 It was also from around 1805 that we see something of a qualitative shift in official representations of Luo—from one among many to one who represented many. Luo was increasingly depicted not only as an officer carrying out his duties, but as an individual who could be used to think about pressing issues facing the military in the postwar years.

Signalling this shift, Luo’s name began to appear in the discussion of cases that had nothing to do with him in particular. In 1805, Luo Siju and Gui Han (another officer, Dongxiang native, and former xiangyong) were used by the Jiaqing emperor to question Liangguang governor-general Wu Xiongguang’s proposal that

506 NPM zhuanbao 702000951.
former *xiangyong* in the officer ranks be demoted one rank and given a period of training before being promoted to positions of responsibility in the military.\(^507\) Luo and Gui, the emperor noted, had proven themselves to be efficient and reliable in both administration and leadership. He asserted that any argument against the promotion of *xiangyong* must be based on real evidence of incompetence (*yiwu* 起误). In 1807, Luo and Gui became part of an official propaganda campaign aimed at *xiangyong* who had been incorporated into garrisons in the Sichuan and Shaanxi border region in the late years of the White Lotus War. Fearing that mutinies at two of these garrisons, Ningshan (for a detailed discussion, see Chapter 6) and Suiding, might spark wider unrest among former *xiangyong* in the military, Jiaqing had directed that word of the two officers’ success in the military be circulated among all recruits from a *xiangyong* background as illustrations of the dynasty’s impartial treatment and bright futures of military men, regardless of background.\(^508\) One month later the emperor issued another edict to Lebao, governor-general of Sichuan, ordering that Lebao “regularly make known” (常時曉諭) to the new troops stationed in that province how Luo Siju and Gui Han had been promoted for their efforts.\(^509\)

In 1808, the topic of discourse had shifted from the reliability of *xiangyong* to an issue related to the laws of avoidance, but Luo and Gui remained familiar objects of discussion. In this year, Jiaqing refused a request for the promotion of Sichuanese

\(^{507}\) QSL JQ10/1/17.  
\(^{508}\) QSL JQ12/2/15, p. 293a-b.  
\(^{509}\) QSL JQ12/3/11, p. 307a-b. The emperor also occasionally exhorted officers to promulgate the stories of *xiangyong* who had been awarded for their loyalty. Zheng Zhongxiang 鄭忠祥 and Shu Hong 舒洪 of Hanzhong prefecture, two demobilized *xiangyong*, were awarded after notifying Yang Fang of a plan to rebel that was being brewed among White Lotus practitioners and former *xiangyong* in 1804. The emperor instructed that “demobilized *xiangyong* in every province should be told their story and, thereby, encouraged” (俾各省散遣勇衙而勵勵). Nayancheng, *Na Wenyi gong zouyi 那文毅公奏議*, in *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao congkan* (Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1968), j.9.1b; QSL JQ9/8/25, p. 817a.
officers within their home province, noting that the promotion of men of xiangyong backgrounds “like Luo Siju and Gui Han” should “not be taken as a precedent” (非可援以为例). In 1817, a new governor-general in Sichuan, Changming 常明 (?-1817), asked that three Sichuanese officers be promoted within the province. The emperor’s response, once again, was an unequivocal denial of the request that drew on the examples of Gui Han and Luo Siju, officers who had been promoted within the province only because of the unusual conditions of the White Lotus War.

The appearance of Luo and Gui in these representative roles was initially somewhat serendipitous. Luo seems to have been a charismatic individual, but he had not yet had a chance to make a personal impression on the Jiaqing emperor—his first audience would be in 1811. However, Luo was one of the few officers in the Green Standards who was Sichuanese and a former xiangyong. He was, it so happened, also a native of Dongxiang, the home county of Gui Han, another successful former xiangyong. These elements of Luo’s identity resonated with pressing concerns in the late years of the White Lotus War: the predominance of Sichuanese veterans in the Green Standard officer ranks, the need to integrate former xiangyong into the regular military, and the need to present these former xiangyong with compelling models to encourage their loyalty.

The predominance of Sichuanese veterans among Green Standard officers was one of the more striking effects of the White Lotus War. My survey of officers holding

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510 QSL JQ13/7/13, p. 633a-b. In the previous year, Delengtai had requested that Luo Siju and Gui Han be allowed to remain in Sichuan despite the contravention of the law of avoidance. See Delengtai, Delengtai zougao, p. 375-376.
511 QSL JQ22/7/27.
512 Luo provided a record of this meeting in Luo Siju, Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu 羅壯勇公年譜 (1907; reprint, Taipei: Wenhui chubanshe, 1971), p. 254.
513 Chen Kangqi (1840-1890) described the postwar rise of Sichuanese as one of the major geographical shifts in the composition of the Green Standard officer ranks over the course of the Qing. Following
the top two ranks in the Green Standards—brigade general (2a) and provincial commander (1b) (for the latter, see Table 7.2)—from 1790 to 1850 indicates a striking predominance of Sichuanese officers. Of the approximately three hundred non-Banner brigade generals serving in the Qing between 1790 and 1850, \(^{514}\) seventy-one can be identified as natives of Sichuan. Of these seventy-one, twenty-four ultimately rose to the rank of provincial commander. \(^{515}\) Top officers from Sichuan outnumbered the next largest provincial contingent—twenty-four men from Gansu—by more than forty. No other provinces produced more than twenty brigade generals during this period. \(^{516}\)

The large number of Sichuanese officers in the first half of the nineteenth century was due to their participation in military efforts at the turn of the century. \(^{517}\) Of the seventy-one brigade generals from Sichuan, nearly all had entered the military during the White Lotus War, an event that had affected Sichuan more than any other province. A

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\(^{514}\) I have counted a nearly equal number of Banner (including Han Banner) officers in the Green Standards who served as brigade general over the same period. I have compiled these figures from records of appointment in the QSL, lists of brigade generals in relevant gazetteers, and the LLD.

\(^{515}\) In one exceptional case, the Sichuanese officer Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1760-1837) rose even higher, gaining appointment as governor of Gansu and governor-general of ShaanGan where he served for much of the 1820s and early 1830s. See my discussion of Yang Yuchun in Chapter 7.


\(^{517}\) The career trajectories of Sichuanese officers demonstrate the importance of military events in providing opportunities for capable men of diverse, sometimes socially marginal backgrounds. Many of the most successful officers began without the privileges of a military examination degree or hereditary privilege (yin), both of which qualified their bearer for entry into the military at an officer rank. Instead, they began as common soldiers and worked their way up through the ranks, gaining promotions for competent leadership, merit in battle, or the capture or killing of rebel leaders. Some—like Luo Siju—began their careers with the even more lowly status of xiangyong.
smaller number joined up during two campaigns that had occurred shortly before: the campaign to expel Gurkhas from Tibet in 1791, and the Miao Uprising in Guizhou and Hunan (1795-1796). Almost none had entered the military through the military examinations.

The prevalence of Sichuanese officers had raised concerns at court in the postwar period over violations of the regulations meant to prevent officers from serving in their home provinces, the so-called laws of avoidance (huibi). According to the laws of avoidance in place at the time of the White Lotus War, high-ranking officers (above the rank of lieutenant colonel (3a) were not allowed to serve in their home provinces. There were, however, certain concessions made for “urgent situations” when a provincial official’s request for the appointment by recommendation (tibu) of an officer within the officer’s home province was considered legitimate. Thus, it was common during the White Lotus War that officers familiar with local conditions would be appointed, even when they were natives of the same province. But the promotion of Sichuanese officers to posts within Sichuan continued even after the war, resurrecting a problem that had plagued Sichuan during much of the Qianlong reign. Testifying to this, the careers of many of the most successful Sichuanese officers of the early nineteenth century were served out in posts close to their homes, and the upper ranks of the military bureaucracy in Sichuan came to be dominated by Sichuanese men.

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518 As Dai Yingcong has pointed out, a large number of the troops in 1791 were Sichuanese. Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, p. 137.
519 JQHDSL j.454.3a-b.
520 JQHDSL j.454.2a.
521 On problems in the Qianlong period, see Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, p. 160.
522 In the first four decades of the nineteenth century, approximately half of the non-Banner brigade generals to serve in Sichuan were Sichuanese natives. Between 1800 and 1810, six of twelve non-Banner brigade generals serving in Sichuan were Sichuanese. Between 1810 and 1820, two of six were Sichuanese. Between 1820 and 1830, six of thirteen were Sichuanese. Between 1830 and 1840,
One effect of the widespread contravention of official policy was to make the provincial origin—and particularly Sichuanese origin—of Green Standard officers a matter of particular concern for the Jiaqing emperor. As both former xiangyong and rapidly promoted Sichuanese officers, Luo Siju and Gui Han stood for both the rationale and the risk behind the contravention of laws of avoidance. Xiangyong were widely regarded as warriors whose value lay in their knowledge of local conditions rather than their military training or discipline.\(^{523}\) And, Sichuanese, as we have seen, were understood to pose an unusually grave threat to a system of officer promotions designed to prevent the formation of personal bases of power. In discussions of the laws of avoidance in Sichuan, Luo and Gui were important but also reduced to symbols.

In tandem with the concern over the promotion of Sichuanese in their home province was a concern over the reliability of xiangyong, particularly those of Sichuanese background. I will discuss the problem of xiangyong integration into the regular military in more length in the following chapter. For the time being, suffice it to say that Luo and Gui were again convenient exemplars of a larger issue. They were among the very few xiangyong who had risen to the top ranks of the Green Standards and, of course, both were Sichuanese. We can assume that the fact that both came from the same county added even more weight to official assertions that the dynasty was determined to treat xiangyong with respect. It is not surprising that the two were chosen as exemplars for restive new troops stationed on the borders of Sichuan and Shaanxi.

In sum, in court discourse during the immediate postwar period, Luo’s origins had been boiled down to a couple of essential identities—xiangyong and Sichuanese. These

\(^{523}\) On the idea of xiangyong as men familiar with local conditions, see Wang, *White Lotus Rebels*, p. 198.
two elements made him analogous to other Sichuanese rising through the ranks and other former xiangyong hoping for success in the military. Luo, along with his compatriot Gui Han, were useful for thinking through larger issues and demonstrating the dynasty’s fair treatment of all its troops. The fantastic exploits that had caused their reputations to spread beyond the halls of power, if known, remained unmentioned.

Military Career as Divine Commission: Luo’s Own Story

We shall see shortly that there was a great disjuncture in the nature of Luo’s depiction in official and nonofficial sources. Yet, there was also a certain consistency in the timeline. Just as Luo had begun to receive particular attention at court at the tail end of the White Lotus war, it was also at this time that Luo began to appear in a variety of nonofficial writings. Indeed, as I will show later in the chapter, it was from a low-ranking official serving during the mutiny in Suiding, the mutiny that had prompted Jiaqing to order the circulation of Luo’s story among new soldiers, that we have the earliest written record of Luo Siju’s life story outside of official documents. At the same time, the Luo we find in nonofficial writings was vastly different from the Luo who featured in discussions of Sichuanese and xiangyong at court, suggesting a source other than the state. In the nonofficial writings from poems to histories, writers were fascinated with those aspects of Luo’s origins that set him apart from his peers, the singular rather than the exemplary. That is, while Luo had become increasingly prominent in official discourse in the decade after the White Lotus War, it is clear that this prominence served only to authorize rather than shape the emerging interest in Luo.

The nature of Luo Siju’s reputation outside of official discourse can be best explained not by the wooden stereotypes of official propaganda but by Luo’s own efforts at self-promotion and self-fashioning. These efforts culminated in a lengthy autobiography that he completed in 1838, two years before his death. The autobiography
not only brought together many of the stories that Luo had already told to his acquaintances in the military and beyond, but also had a profound influence on perceptions of Luo in the later nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before examining Luo’s reputation, then, it will be useful to turn to Luo’s own account of his life story in his autobiography, *Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu* (Chronological autobiography of Duke Luo Zhuangyong).

Information on the composition of the autobiography is somewhat sketchy (see Appendix A for a complete discussion), however it appears that Luo dictated his autobiography to a military secretary in 1838, near the end of his lengthy tenure as Hubei provincial commander. The autobiography remained neglected until the Tongzhi reign (1862-1874), when Luo’s son began work on collating the autobiography along with his father’s writings on emergency medicine and official biography.\(^{524}\) Work on this edition was not completed until the late 1880s, when a printed edition of the autobiography was finally produced by Luo’s grandson. This edition likely provided the basis for two editions printed in the early twentieth century, one in Hangzhou (1907) and one in Wuchang (1908). Modern reprints, which I rely on in this chapter, are based on the Hangzhou edition. Both the Hangzhou and Wuchang editions were titled *Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu* (Chronological autobiography of Duke Luo Zhuangyong).

*Nianpu* (commonly translated as chronological biography, biochronology, or annalistic biography) generally adhered to conventions that made them highly predictable in content and form if not detail. By the nineteenth century, most works in this genre were reserved for recitations of achievements in office, records of meetings with other literati and officials, and momentous personal or family events—births, marriages,

\(^{524}\) *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.13.34a
Many nianpu relied on official sources, often only lightly-redacted and always arranged in strict chronological order. The temporality and sources of most nianpu suggest that the life of the biographical subject was worth writing about because of his relation with the state.

In at least two regards Luo’s autobiography accorded with nianpu conventions: he provided a year-by-year framework of reign dates when recounting his life in the military (he was less consistent in dating incidents that took place during his years as an outlaw), and much of the story dwelt on his official career. However, Luo’s account was not merely an annalistic recitation of his career. Indeed, there is no indication that he himself called his autobiography a nianpu—the title of the Hangzhou and Wuchang editions included his posthumous title (Zhuangyong 壯勇), making it likely that the label “nianpu” had been added after Luo’s death. Nor did his autobiography include the transcription of any official documents, the primary source for many—perhaps the majority—of nianpu written during the mid to late Qing. The building blocks of his account seem to have been remembered incidents and encounters, not documents.

How, then, did Luo remember his story? Unlike the typical nianpu in which

525 In his book on autobiographical writing in China, Pei-yi Wu argued that Qing rule brought an end to the brief flourishing of autobiographical writing in the late Ming. Whereas some men of the late Ming had revealed their “inner worlds,” Wu argued, “the subgenre that flourished” under the Qing “was the annalistic autobiography [i.e. nianpu] that seldom differed in style or format from its model, the annalistic biography. It was best suited for the charting of an official career, the recording of activities least likely to arouse the suspicion of the court.” Pei-yi Wu, Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographical Writings in Traditional China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 235. Martin Huang suggested that “the nineteenth century may not be so much a part of the ‘envoi’ of formal autobiographical writings as Pei-yi Wu argued.” Huang pointed specifically to Luo’s autobiography as an example of a work that was “intensely ‘self-revealing.’” He did not, however, explain how he arrived at this characterization. See Martin Huang, Literati and Self Re/Presentation: Autobiographical Sensibility in the Eighteenth-Century Chinese Novel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995) p. 156, f. 13.

526 The frequent misspelling of the names of officials with whom he had come into contact may suggest that Luo had relied primarily on his own memory, and not documentary sources, to make a record of his experiences.
descriptions of youth centered on the biographical subject’s precocious abilities, filial piety, and preparations for the exams, Luo divided the story of his life before entering the military into two cycles of tribulation that culminated in a journey to the mountains and a dream encounter with the fifth king of hell, Yama or Yanluo 閻羅王. The first cycle began shortly after Luo abandoned his education and began work as a cowherd. According to Luo, he had begun studies at the age of eight sui (seven years), but had little aptitude for memorizing characters.527 After leaving his studies in the same year, he survived a series of three near-drownings (referred to in the autobiography as “water disasters” or shuizai 水災). After the third incident Luo recounted his father’s conclusion that his son must have been receiving “divine assistance” (shenyou 神佑) and exhorted him to respond by “treating the problems of others as his own” and learning from the “loyalty, filiality, uprightness and righteousness” of the ancients. Luo noted that these experiences had a powerful impact on his moral compass—as he put it, they gave him a “desire to move toward the good.”528 Without any apparent irony, Luo moved directly at this point into a lengthy and vivid description of his life from the age of sixteen sui as a member of an outlaw gang in the Qinling and Bashan mountains, rugged and heavily-forested ranges to the north and south of the Han River (Map 1.1).

The second cycle, which unfolded against this background of criminality, was firmly embedded in an inverted moral universe: Luo and his outlaw associates worked for the good while the supposed fountainheads of moral rectitude—family and state—were greedy and cruel. This cycle was comprised of three tribulations (zaonan 遭難) at the hands of family members and officials. In the first tribulation, Luo described how he had fallen victim to several plots concocted by two of his “uncles.” He had raised their ire due

527 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.1a-b.
528 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.2b.
to his membership in a gang and participation in the jailbreak of a gang member arrested for gambling. The uncles, hoping to avoid implication in the criminal activity and gain possession of the land owned by Luo’s father, framed Luo and his father for another crime—the burning down of one of their homes. Their plot was successful. Luo and his father were thrown into prison; the uncles took his father’s land. After their release, Luo moved to Shaanxi to work as a firewood peddler. When Luo returned home several years later, his uncles tried to bury him alive. Luo escaped, was recaptured, escaped again (stark naked), and finally made his way to the home of an individual whom Luo described as a “Confucian” (ru 儒). Luo stole eighty ounces of silver from this home and continued on his way. A devout Buddhist (to judge by his later record of patronage), Luo was careful to explain that he had used some of the stolen money to purchase the release of turtles and most of the rest to assist the widowed and poor. Unfortunately for Luo, the Confucian lodged a complaint and Luo—now aged twenty-four sui—was again arrested and dragged before the magistrate, beginning his second tribulation. On this occasion, after undergoing brutal treatment at the hand of the local magistrate, he was finally released after the intervention of a sympathetic guard. The third and final tribulation saw Luo arrested after being accused of robbing a group of travelling merchants in Taiping subprefecture, Sichuan (Map 5.1). In Luo’s account, he refused to confess to his crimes even under harsh interrogation. Suspicious that Luo might be relying on “heterodox techniques” (xiefa 邪法) to resist the effects of torture, Magistrate Deng Huang—an official who may have later played a role in spreading

529 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.3b.
530 The best-known Buddhist temple patronized by Luo was the large Wenshu yuan 文殊院 in Chengdu. On Luo’s patronage of this temple, see Zhou Xun 周詢, Shuhai congtan 書海叢談 (1948; reprint, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1966), j.3.36a-37b.
531 This series of events is described in Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.3b-6a.
532 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.6a-b.
stories of Luo to other parts of Sichuan—ordered the sprinkling of the blood of a black cat, a black worm (*shan* 蟲), and a pigeon onto Luo’s stomach.\textsuperscript{533} Deng’s plan backfired when Luo seized the container of blood, gulped it down, and still did not confess. Thrown back into his cell, he suddenly had a vision that he described for his reader in the following passage:

I saw an old man with a white beard who said to me: ‘The year [of punishment] for your crime has been completed.’ I asked him: ‘Who are you sir?’ He replied: ‘I am White Cloud.’ Then he took from his bosom a cake that looked like a peach, but was not a peach, and gave it to me to eat.\textsuperscript{534} When it reached my stomach I felt invigorated. When I extended my legs the stone rolled away and the cover opened. I rolled over and got up. I looked up and saw the stars and moon were like a painting. I stretched my arm and felt my body, everything seemed all right, just that my bones were a little sore. Then I leaped over the wall and fled away.


Luo may have intended the peach and White Cloud to serve as reminders to his readers of the divine plan that he believed lay behind his ongoing tribulations.\textsuperscript{536} These were also

\textsuperscript{533} Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.9a. In Luo’s autobiography the name was misprinted as Deng Hong 鄧洪. Deng was a *juren* degree holder from Xincheng county, Jiangxi. See *Taiping xian zhi* (1893), j.6.4a.

\textsuperscript{534} Peaches were a common Daoist symbol of immortality. See Livia Kohn, *Daoism Handbook* (Leiden: Brill, 2000) p. 127.

\textsuperscript{535} Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.9a.

\textsuperscript{536} The second tribulation again involved a plot by his uncles and resulted in Luo being tortured by a local magistrate named Wei. Luo was only released after the intervention of an upright clerk.
details that Luo had spoke of long before the writing of his autobiography. As I will show shortly, they became part of the lore about Luo that circulated among his educated admirers in the early nineteenth century.

The details that Luo wove into his tales of tribulation resonate with what we know of the Sichuan-Shaanxi border region in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Yan Ruyi 嚴如煜 (1759-1826), an official with a lengthy career in the region, described the prevalence of rapacious officials, a thriving underworld of gamblers, criminal gangs, sworn brotherhoods, and families who “do not adhere to proper ritual and ethics.” But it should be clear that there was more to Luo’s account than an authentic portrayal of life at the margins of society. The life he represented unfolded in a numerical and spatial progression that borrowed from tropes that would have been familiar to many, if not all, of Luo’s readers. The passage through precisely three tribulations often signaled imminent self-realization or enlightenment in autobiographical writing. As Pei-Yi Wu has pointed out, many autobiographers structured their life stories as a movement through three passes (guan 關), what Wu calls “spatial figures reminiscent of the rites of passage, rituals of initiation, ordeals, or tests of personal worth.” While Luo did not specifically refer to passes, his account was similarly oriented around a spatial progression involving ordeals and finally transcendence and transformation in the mountains.

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According to Luo’s account, after his final escape from prison he rejoined his gang and lived the life of an outlaw (albeit a principled outlaw) from the late 1780s until his killing of a corrupt and abusive local strongman in 1794 compelled him to flee for his life into the Zhongnan mountains, an important Daoist site to the southwest of Xi’an. In the mountains, Luo was rescued from his pursuers by a man whom he referred to as a “man of the Way” (daoren 道人), a common term referring to religious specialists engaged in self-cultivation in the late imperial period.\(^{540}\) The man led him to a mountaintop refuge where, for the following year, Luo received his instruction. It was here that Luo’s transformation from outlaw to officer was initiated. After a year spent eating pine seeds and practicing the way of the real person (xiu zhenren dao 修真人道), Luo recalled that he had been ordered by his master to leave the mountain. When Luo refused, his master explained that gravity of Luo’s task and delivered a message from Heaven (tian 天) ordering Luo to, “repay (baoxiao 報效) your country (guojia 國家).”\(^{541}\) Adding a slightly coercive note, the master continued, “If you stay here, not only will Heaven bring calamity upon you, this temple will also meet with reproach.”\(^{542}\) Luo accordingly left the mountains and returned to Shaanxi where he had a dream that provided a further divine endorsement for leaving life as an outlaw for military service.\(^{543}\)

The dream centered on the fifth king of hell, Yama (or, Yanluo 閻羅王). Yama would have been known to Luo and readers of the autobiography from his frequent


\(^{541}\) The speech of the master need not be read as an expression of loyalty for the Qing. Daniel Overmyer noted that sectarian scriptures (baojuan) always included rulers on their lists of those deserving of “grateful repayment,” and that these texts generally had a “positive spirit” toward ruler and state. Daniel Overmyer, “Attitudes toward the Ruler and State in Chinese Popular Religious Literature: Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Pao-chüan,” *Harvard Journal of Asian Studies* 44.2 (Dec., 1984): 348, 352.

\(^{542}\) Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.20b.

\(^{543}\) Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.21a.
appearances in operatic and visual representations where he was usually represented precisely as he appeared in Luo’s account of his dream: black-faced and black-bearded, writing in a ledger. In popular representations, Yama passed judgment on completed actions and also ordained the fate of those who appeared in his court. It was perhaps Yama’s dual role—as both a judge of past actions and determiner of fate—that made him a frequent presence in dreams that stood at a turning point in their dreamers’ lives. Hong Xiuquan’s dream battle with a demonic Yama prophesied his eradication of religious sites as leader of the Taiping rebels in the 1850s and 1860s. Wang Futing’s dream of Yama prompted him to pursue a life of religious devotion, ultimately leading to his taking the tonsure as the monk Tanxu.

Much as it did for Hong and Wang, the dream of Yama served Luo as a sort of inaugural motif in his life story. The dream contained within it both a prophesy and a

For another mention of Yama by one of Luo’s military contemporaries, see the training manual by Xue Dalie 薛大烈, Xunbing jiyao 訓兵輯要 (1818; reprint, Beijing: Xueyuan chubanshe, 2005). In this manual, Xue reminded troops that their fates were in the hand of Yama. See Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

Even more common were stories in which a person traveled to hell in a dream to bargain over his or her fate. Stories of this sort can be found in the tales of Pu Songling and Feng Menglong. Richard Von Glahn noted that journeys to the underworld by mortals—what he called “return-from-the-grave” narratives—were “a standard literary genre from the sixth century onward.” See Richard Von Glahn, The Sinister Way: The Divine and the Demonic in Chinese Religious Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), p. 141. For an account of another dream journey to hell, see Xue Fucheng 薛福成, Yong’an biji 廬盦筆記 (1897; reprint, Taipei: Guangwen, 1969), j.5.


Hayden White described an “inaugural motif” as one of the motifs that is used to transform a chronicle into a story. He wrote, “an event which is simply reported as having happened at a certain time and place is transformed into an inaugurating event by its characterization as such ... a transitional motif, on the other hand, signals to the reader to hold his expectations about the significance of the events contained in it in abeyance until some terminating motif has been provided.” Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in 19th-century Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), pp. 5-6.
sanction for the life that would follow.\textsuperscript{549} The prophesy was transparent: Yama’s approval of Luo’s killing of precisely four men corresponded to the number of rebel leaders that Luo later reported having killed or captured during the White Lotus War.\textsuperscript{550} Like the prophesy, and rather unlike the opaque messages conveyed by most dreams, Yama’s sanction for Luo’s life of violence was also unambiguous: “You must continue to act in this way. Do absolutely no harm to good people. But if there are people who deserve to be killed, then you should immediately kill them without any pity.”\textsuperscript{551} Shortly after the dream, Luo heard of the outbreak of the White Lotus War. In 1796, at the age of thirty-two sui, he abandoned his life as an outlaw, returned to Dongxiang, and joined a militia that had been organized by members of the Luo lineage.

Under Luo’s leadership (and through his prose), we learn that the militia—comprised of locals with no military experience—managed a dramatic defeat of White Lotus forces in a battle in Dongxiang county.\textsuperscript{552} After the battle, another lineage member had claimed credit and duly received a rank button. It was only sometime later that a scrupulous relative named Luo Sizhong brought Luo Siju’s leadership to the attention of Luo Dingguo 羅定國 (d. 1800, no relation with Luo Siju), commanding officer of several hundred Green Standard troops stationed in Dongxiang.\textsuperscript{553} After verifying his story, Dingguo awarded Luo Siju with the rank of lieutenant (6a), marking his formal entrance

\textsuperscript{549} Prophesy (zhao 兆) was one of the common approaches to dream interpretation, as proposed by the late Ming dream interpreter Chen Shiyuan. See Judith Zeitlin, \textit{Historian of the Strange: Pu Songling and the Chinese Classical Tale} (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 138.

\textsuperscript{550} This detail appeared in Luo’s account of his audience with the Jiaqing emperor in 1819. Responding to the emperor’s question of whether he had captured any rebel leaders (頭子), Luo responded, “I captured Tang Mingwan and Zhang Jian and killed Zhang Shilong and Zhang Shihu.” Luo, \textit{Luo Zhuangyong gong}, j.2.76a.

\textsuperscript{551} Luo, \textit{Luo Zhuangyong gong}, j.1.21a.

\textsuperscript{552} Luo, \textit{Luo Zhuangyong gong}, j.1.22b. For an official report on the unreliability of xiangyong in Dongxiang, see SSXFFL j.20.25b.

\textsuperscript{553} Luo Dingguo was also Sichuanese, from Santai county in Tongchuan prefecture. He had been sent to Dongxiang in command of 400 troops in the autumn of 1796. SSXFFL j.20.22a.
into the Green Standards.554

Luo’s use of his mountain encounter and dream journey to hell as a background to his decision to join the local militia and enter the military served two important functions in his larger narrative. First, this background allowed him to sidestep other possible explanations for his entrance into the military including, most obviously, the opportunity for a stable and well-paying job, the likely motivation for many of the irregulars who served during the White Lotus War.555 Despite (or perhaps because of) the fact that Luo would eventually become enormously wealthy, he professed no interest in profiting from his military career. Like military heroes in the popular tradition, Luo was careful to display what Ruhlmann described as a “total indifference to money.”556 Second, the commission from the daoren and King Yama provided a sanction that set Luo apart from others in the military. Through the remainder of Luo’s autobiography he not only frequently professed disdain for his superiors but preferred to rely for victory on his own cunning, rather than orders coming from his superiors.

We see these two themes of selfless altruism and individual agency coming together in a story that would be one of the most widely-circulated tales of Luo’s career, his single-handed defeat of White Lotus forces encamped at Fengcheng, a town in Dongxiang county (Map 5.1). In December of 1796 (JQ1/11), shortly after Luo received his rank, he noted in his autobiography that White Lotus forces under Wang Sanhuai 王三槐 had occupied Fengcheng.557 According to Luo, elites displaced from the town offered 5,000 ounces of silver to anyone able to expel the “bandits.” Hearing of the award,
Luo Siju approached Luo Dingguo with a plan to defeat the “bandits” and a request that Dingguo provide a backup (waiying 外應) force of five hundred men. Dingguo refused the request,\(^{558}\) instead sending Luo Siju off with a couple of bags of gunpowder on what he must have imagined would be a suicide mission. Luo took the gunpowder and proceeded at night into the encampment. Through the strategic use of explosions and fire, Luo claimed to have singlehandedly driven White Lotus forces from their camp.\(^ {559}\)

As I have noted, Luo’s victory at Fengcheng would become the best-known of the many stories that circulated about Luo among literati and local historians. But given that Luo was the only source for the story, we must attribute the popularity of the story less to his actual actions than to his own deft handling of the narrative. First, he emphasized his altruism. In the account of the story we find in his autobiography, Luo took care to note that he had turned down the award offered by the elites of Fengcheng. Second, he represented his actions in ways that conveyed his courage and strategic acumen: sneaking into the camp alone, creating explosions at just the right time. Like many other episodes related by Luo, he emphasized what Lisa Raphals has referred to as “metic intelligence,” an intelligence that “embraces a set of skills and mental attitudes that range from wisdom, forethought, keen attention, and resourcefulness to subtle indirection, craft, deception and cunning [and that] relies on skill, strategy, and a general knack for handling whatever

\(^{558}\) Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.24a. In Wei Yuan’s version of this story, he wrote that others in the military (*junzhong 軍中*) thought Luo had gone mad, and some said that he was a spy. Wei, *Shengwu ji* 聖武記 (1842; reprint, Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1984), p. 457.

\(^{559}\) Luo arrived at the bandit encampment late at night, finding most of them sleeping; he ignited gunpowder in a stable (*caofang 草房*); the sound of explosions awoke the bandits and the fire soon spread to nearby dwellings where they were sleeping; the bandits began firing their guns wildly; Luo escaped on a horse that was fleeing the fire; he was pursued by bandits, but managed to escape by leaving the horse and scaling a cliff; he then made his way back to the main camp to report the victory. The next day, Luo returned to the site, and saw numerous dead; he distributed the abandoned weapons and goods among other militia members. Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.25a.
comes along." This was, of course, a mode of intelligence that was common to many of the great martial heroes and strategic thinkers of the Chinese past. Luo further enhanced the story by claiming that his single-handed victory had been falsely claimed by others. After the victory, he asserted, Luo Dingguo submitted a report claiming that the victory had been due to his own efforts and the assistance of a group of militiamen led by a salt merchant named Gong and a militia head named Yao.

As we read through Luo’s account of his life, it soon becomes apparent that Luo Dingguo was only the first of many officers that Luo resented for failing to recognize his abilities. Even after his apparently stunning victory at Fengcheng, Luo Siju claimed to have been marginalized by many in the military establishment. For instance, shortly after the victory, he had been dispatched by Yingshan, the acting governor-general of Sichuan, to serve under the commanding officer in Dongxiang city, a Manchu named Fozhu. Luo’s advice to Fozhu to fortify the city against an imminent rebel attack fell on deaf ears. As Luo had predicted, the city soon fell to rebels under Wang Sanhuai. Fozhu and several other officials were killed. Luo himself left the city before the attack.

Luo combined descriptions of his acumen and marginalization by the military

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560 Lisa Raphals, *Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. xi-xii. Luo described numerous incidents in which he “hatched a plan” (sheng ji 生計) that ultimately led to victory, and a smaller number in which a plan happened to backfire. Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.11a, j.1.14b, j.1.23b, j.1.25a, j.1.30a-b, j.1.37b, j.1.38a, j.1.41a, j.1.43b, j.1.46a, j.1.47b, j.1.51a-b, j.1.59b, j.1.61a, j.2.41a-b. This mode of intelligence was exemplified by Zhuge Liang, a figure much admired in the early nineteenth century. For a collection of some of the numerous writings on Zhuge Liang from the Qing and earlier dynasties, see Wang Ruigong et al. eds., *Zhuge Liang yanjiu jicheng* (Jinan: Qi Lu shushe, 1997).

561 Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.25b. Another account suggested that Luo Dingguo had been skeptical of Luo Siju’s claims; it was only after he traveled the next morning to the site of incident, and saw the bodies of rebels that he believed the story. This detail was mentioned by Gu Fuchu in his biography of Luo in *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.12.25a. Gu wrote that Luo Dingguo discovered the bodies of several tens of thousands of bandits.

562 Wei Yuan described the role of Yingshan in dispatching Luo Siju in Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 457.
establishment with confident assertion of his growing prestige. In one of the stories that Luo related in his memoir, he described a ruse he had used to defeat a group of ‘bandits’ in Yuechi county. Tian Chaogui 田朝貴 (?-1810), another Green Standard officer, had been defeated on seven occasions by the bandits. Luo arrived to reinforce Tian’s troops, and soon discovered that Tian’s cowardice was one of the reasons for the defeats. Deciding to use this to his advantage, Luo put away his own banner and set off in pursuit of the bandits. In the evening, he set up camp. Thinking that the troops were under Tian’s command, the bandits attacked. When they got close, Luo had his own banner—which he described as a red Eight Trigram banner—unfurled. The rebels fled in terror and were soundly defeated. For Luo, the purpose of the distinctive banner was to inform enemies of his presence. Luo expressed confidence in the effect of his presence on enemies on several occasions in his autobiography. As these stories makes clear, Luo saw his efficacy in battle as dependent not only on clever strategy, but also on effectively

564 Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.1.41b, j.2.8a; Luo also described how his reputation for defeating the “bandits” at Fengcheng had circulated among the rebels ( j.1.31a); and how they fled when they saw his banner (j.1.46b, j.1.68b, j.2.6a, j.2.29b, j.2.41b-42a). The terror of “bandits” who became aware of Luo Siju’s presence was taken on faith by some of his admirers and seen as a key component of his strategic repertoire. This was not surprising given the longstanding assumptions about the effects of fear on enemy forces in battle. See David Graff, “Narrative Maneuvers: The Representation of Battle in Tang Historical Writing,” in *Military Culture in Imperial China*, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 148. Wei Yuan, for instance, wrote that when bandits became aware of the identity of their opponent their “gall was deflated” (骸膽落). There is, unfortunately, little to indicate whether the White Lotus rebels themselves were familiar with the officers they faced, or particularly terrified when confronted by an officer of reputation such as Luo Siju. Confessions, one of the few sources that provide a rebel perspective, shed only dim light on the question and may well have been coerced. In general, they confirmed the official version of events, the version that emphasized the agency of generals and minimized the contributions of low to middle ranking officers like Luo. On several occasions, captive rebels were asked to identify the officers they feared the most. One explained that he and his comrades had first been most afraid of Eledengbao, but later had feared Yang Yuchun. None of the captives whose confessions have been reprinted professed a fear of Luo Siju. *Qing zhongqi wusheng Bailian jiao qiyi ziliao* 清中期五省白蓮教起義資料, vol. 5, pp. 129, 162. When it appeared that the captives knew too much about the identity of officers, there was suspicion that they might have been turncoats. See CSCSH vol. 10, JQ8/11, pp. 89-92.
conveying his identity to the enemy forces.

The ways in which Luo fashioned this story seem indicative of a belief that official symbols were impotent, or at best secondary, in establishing the reputation of the individual officer. That is, Luo seems to have felt that an officer could not expect to instill fear in his enemies or admiration among his acquaintances by simply adorning himself with the standard symbols of the dynasty, a view that seems to have been shared by other officers in both the Green Standards and Banner forces.\(^{565}\) Much like his narrative of divine commission and stories of official incompetence, the state was made to appear almost inconsequential to his success on or off the battlefield. Luo constructed the story of his military career by drawing heavily on popular martial traditions—whether the supernatural or stories of single-handed action and cunning.\(^{566}\)

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565 There is some evidence that many officers fashioned themselves through clothing, weaponry, and grooming to be recognized and feared by their enemies. The carefully sculpted beard of Yang Yuchun was one of the most commented upon features of a military man in the early nineteenth century, its effects on enemies often noted. On the fear of rebels upon seeing Yang Yuchun’s beard, and Jiaqing’s admiration of his beard see Chongqing zhou zhi (1877), j.8.13b-14a. We know that Yang Yuchun was also identified in battle by a distinctive black banner that he had seen in a dream. See Guang'an zhou zhi (1860), j.42.37b. The general Eledengbao was identified by two banners carried by his troops into battle: a brigade of surrendered rebels carrying a red banner and a brigade of xiangyong carrying a white banner. According to Chen Kangqi, when the “bandits” saw troops approaching with red and white banners they would be terrified, telling each other “The troops of Mr. E have arrived” before fleeing. See Chen Kangqi 陳康祺, Lang qian ji wen 郎潛紀聞 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990), er bi.j.15, p. 600. Gui Han had a distinctive banner that caused fear in the hearts of bandits. See Shixiangcunjushi 石香村居士, Kanjing jiaofei shu bian 戴靖教匪述編 (Taipei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1968), j.5.9b. An officer named Huang Fugu 黃富國, from Zhushan in Hubei, was also identified by a black banner (hei zhi 黑幟), and was known to his enemies as “black tiger.” A shrine was built in his honor after he died in battle. See Li Zongfang 李宗昉 (1779-1846), Wenmiaoxiang shi shi 聞妙香室詩 (1835; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 530), j.9.15b.

566 Given the particular colors (often black, a color linked to the deity Zhenwu) and designs chosen for the banners of military officers, it also seems likely that banners could also be an expression of the officer’s devotion to—and perhaps an attempt to draw power from—a particular deity. On the role of Zhenwu in the military, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation and Noelle Giuffrida, “Representing the Daoist God Zhenwu, the Perfected Warrior, in Late Imperial China” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kansas, 2008); and Chao Shin-yi, “Zhenwu: The Cult of a Chinese Warrior Deity from the Song to the Ming Dynasties (960-1644)” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2003). Luo Siju himself sponsored at least one Zhenwu temple in his home county, see Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.2.44a.
Luo in Nonofficial Writings

Extant writings from the early nineteenth century suggest that it was during the decade after the White Lotus War that Luo Siju began to attract the notice of a broader audience of educated men with an interest in military affairs. The earliest reference I have found to Luo in nonofficial writing, a poem dated to 1807, was written by a man who had met Luo after the latter was dispatched to quell a mutiny in Suining, Sichuan (see Map 5.1). Two further references to Luo in the 1810s and 1820s suggest that his reputation had spread to other parts of Sichuan and outside of official circles, and that he was beginning to be accorded an importance in the White Lotus War that had not been apparent in official documents. In the early 1840s, Wei Yuan provided the most thorough summary to that point of Luo and his role in the war in his extremely influential history of Qing warfare, the Shengwu ji.

While stories of Luo and his contributions to the suppression of the White Lotus uprising spread, there was little variation in their content or emphases. Temporally, nearly all continued to focus on either his days as an outlaw or his earliest contributions to the suppression of the uprising. This was a period of his life prior to complete assimilation into the military hierarchy, when his actions could be represented as unconstrained by his superiors or regulations. Thematically, most nonofficial accounts reiterated a few stories in which Luo displayed his metic intelligence, usually in ways that demonstrated the efficacy of unfettered individual agency. In other words, both the temporal and thematic focus of these writings suggest that the knowledge of Luo’s story was related more to his own efforts at self-promotion than to the propaganda of the state, reviewed earlier in the chapter.

The general tenor of writing on Luo was apparent in the earliest reference I have found to Luo outside of official documents, an 1806 poem by Wang Liangzuo 王良佐 (ca.
Wang Liangzuo had the misfortune of being seized and badly beaten by the mutineers in the early stages of the uprising, but a poem that he claimed to have presented to Luo Siju said nothing about his own trauma or Luo’s role in suppressing the mutiny. Instead it celebrated the adventures of Luo’s youth, adventures apparently recounted by Luo while he and Wang were both in Da county. The poem—with

567 Note that Dazhou was renamed Suiding fu in 1802. Dai Yingcong noted that Dazhou had been the headquarters since 1797, “but had not been under any real threat in that period.” See Dai, “Civilians Go to Battle,” p. 161.

568 These troops, like those stationed at Ningshan garrison (Chapter 6), were comprised largely of new recruits unhappy about irregularities in their pay. According to one account, the mutineers burned down a number of homes, seized provisions and weapons from the armory, and released prisoners form the jail. They were soon joined by several hundred locals. Lebao ordered Gui Han and Luo Siju to investigate and also ordered the mobilization of local militias in surrounding communities. Yan Shihong, serving as circuit intendant of eastern Sichuan, led militias and local troops in defending Suiding city. Yu Yongning led another militia to seize the rebels. The rebels were soon surrounded by troops and militias, including men under the command of Luo and Gui. The names of Luo and Gui were forwarded for promotion. See Da xian zhi (1815), j.26.5b-6b.

569 One year later Luo led the suppression of another mutiny at Wuping in Shaanxi, killing leaders Han Jintang and Zhou Shigui. He was awarded with the rank of brigade general for his efforts and officially commended for disregarding provincial boundaries and crossing into Shaanxi from his area of jurisdiction in Sichuan. Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.12.17b. In his own account, Luo emphasized that his harsh treatment of the mutineers had prevented the mutiny from escalating into a larger rebellion, as had happened because of Delengtai’s lenient treatment of the mutineers in Ningshan.

570 This poem was printed in 1817 in Wang Liangzuo, Xiaolu zhong ji 小蘆中集 (1817; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 483). In a preface written by Yu Yongning 余永寧, we learn that Wang had been at the military
references to a peach left on Luo’s pillow, the rescue of a hungry hero in Huaiyin (淮陰), escapes from prison, dreams of travel to immortals, and gatherings of heroes—alluded to episodes that would also be featured in Luo’s autobiography, written more than thirty years later.

It is not clear how widely Wang’s collection circulated. The poem is, nonetheless, valuable for the clues it provides regarding the nature of Luo’s reputation outside of the narrow concerns of official propaganda. It shows, first of all, Wang’s interest in the details of Luo’s life as an outlaw, a topic that was entirely absent in official sources. Secondly, it referred to Luo’s metic intelligence (Luo’s slipping undetected out of prison), a recurring interest in nearly all later writing on Luo. Third, it focused almost exclusively on stories prior to Luo’s rise in the military ranks. Fourth, these details suggest that Luo was not only becoming known, but playing an active role in crafting and disseminating his own story. Not only did Wang note in the title of the poem that he had heard Luo talking of his youth, he also included details that could have come only from Luo himself (like the peach on his pillow). This evidence of Luo’s self-promotion through storytelling accords with comments made by others, including Wei Yuan, who would encounter Luo in the following decades. In the words of one of Luo’s

571 “Huaiyin” alludes to an ancient story in which a commoner named Han Xin, reduced to begging, was fed by a washer-woman named Piao from Huaiyin and then later went on to become one of Liu Bang’s generals. Martin Huang, Negotiating Masculinities in Late Imperial China (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), p. 115. In his autobiography, Luo also claimed to have been rescued by an old woman who recognized his unusual potential. Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.15a.

572 Wang’s collection was printed in 1817 by the Gong shou tang, a printer that has left behind few other traces.

573 Wu Zhenyu, governor-general of YunGui, described how Luo had “held nothing back” when the two had gotten together to drink and talk of their youth. Wu Zhenyu, Yang ji zhai yulu 養吉齋餘錄 (GX; reprint, XSKQS, vol. 1158), j.9.7a-b. This description of Luo’s interest in talking about life as an outlaw was repeated by Xu Ke in Qingbai leichao, where he wrote that Luo “had no prohibitions
biographers, when Luo spoke of his military experiences his “eyebrows would hover and his color rise.”

Wang’s poem also points to the suppression of the Suiding mutiny in 1807 as a key moment in the spread of Luo’s reputation among civil officials in Sichuan. In the previous section, I noted that the Jiaqing had ordered provincial officials to broadcast stories of the success of Luo and Gui to new recruits in Sichuan and Shaanxi in March of 1807, shortly after the Suiding mutiny. This effort does not seem to have determined the content of views of Luo—which strayed a great distance from the rather wooden official depictions—but it may have brought the young officer to the attention of officials serving in the area, particularly those who dealt directly with the new troops.

In addition to Wang Liangzuo, a number of officials involved in the suppression of the mutiny would later write about Luo, or claim to have played some role in his career. Yan Shihong 嚴士鈇 (1745-1828), the circuit intendant of Eastern Sichuan (Chuandong daoyuan) at the time, would eventually become known for his role in selecting Luo as head of the xiangyong brigade in 1797. Magistrates Xu Chenmo 徐陳謨 (1801 jinshi) and Yu Yongning 余永寧 (?) assisted in the suppression of the mutiny and, incidentally, wrote prefaces to Wang’s poetry collection including the poem on Luo Siju. Xu, a native of Qishui county in Jiangxi, would go on to serve as the magistrate of Luo’s home county of Dongxiang. During his tenure in Dongxiang, Xu compiled a gazetteer that included a

when it came to talking of his life as a bandit” (對人言生平作賊事不稱誂) (p. 831). Another aspect of Luo’s self-promotion to officials and literati was his penchant for displaying his wounds, as evidence of his courage in battle and filial piety. These accounts made their way into Luo’s biography in the QSG, j.347, p. 11205. Wei Yuan recorded a similar experience in Shengwu ji, p. 461.

Gu Fuchu, “Hubei tidu Luo Siju zhuanshu 湖北提督羅思舉傳,” QDZJ 117-731

Chen, Lang qian ji wen, j.6, p. 192. Yan’s selection of Luo and Gui is also mentioned by Cheng Enze 程恩澤 (1785-1837) in his biography of Yan. See QDZJ 156-386. All the sources that describe Yan’s role in recommending Luo were written decades later, when Luo had already risen from his lowly post at the bottom of the Green Standards to a top provincial command, putting in some doubt their reliability.
lengthy and adulatory biography of Luo, as I discuss later in this chapter. Yu, a native of Daxing county in Shuntian prefecture,⁵⁷⁶ left few extant writings, so it is impossible to say whether he too played a role in circulating stories about Luo. Nonetheless, like Xu and Yan, Yu went on to serve elsewhere in Sichuan, including a post close to where the next extant poem on Luo was written.

This second poem I have identified, written several years after Wang’s, suggests that stories about Luo had made their way westward in Sichuan, beyond the areas directly affected by the White Lotus War and Suiding mutiny. The poem was written by Wu Zhenyu 吳振棫 (1792-1870), a Zhejiang native who would later become the governor-general of YunGui.⁵⁷⁷ Wu wrote the poem as a young man, accompanying his father at an official post in Zizhou department (zhili zhou), just south of Chengdu (where his father served from 1808-1811).⁵⁷⁸

Wu does not indicate how he heard of Luo. Perhaps he had heard stories about Luo while travelling to Zizhou, a route that would have taken him and his father through areas heavily affected by the war, such as Kuizhou prefecture (Map 5.1). But it is also possible that stories about Luo had been transmitted, as I have already suggested, by other officials. The three immediately preceding magistrates in Zizhou had either met or

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⁵⁷⁶ Yu served much of his career in Sichuan and was involved in the suppression campaign. In 1797 (JQ2), he was serving as jail warden (dianshi). In 1800 (JQ5), he served as acting magistrate of Shehong county. See Shehong xian zhi (1819), j.10.4b. In 1807 (JQ12), he served as acting magistrate of Dazhou; in 1812 (JQ17), he became prefect of Suiding. He later served as prefect of Chengdu, Xuzhou, and Kuizhou. Da xian zhi (1815), j.34.13-14. In 1809 (JQ14) he served as magistrate of Taiping xian. Taiping xian zhi (1893), j.6.5b.


⁵⁷⁸ Wu, Yangji zhai yu lu, j.5.1. His father, Wu Sheng 吳昇 (1755-1824), served as magistrate of Zizhou in 1809. See Zizhou zhili zhou zhi (1876), j.11.17a. Wu Sheng maintained a connection with Sichuan. In 1819, he served as prefect of Kuizhou prefecture. See Kuizhou fu zhi (1891), j.zhiguan xia 秋宮下.6b. Wu Sheng recorded some of his experiences as an official in Sichuan in his poetry collection Xiao Luofushan guan shi chao 小羅浮山館詩抄 (1865; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 443).
had occasion to hear of Luo. Deng Huang 鄧璜 (magistrate of Zizhou from 1803-1805) had interrogated Luo after his arrest in Taiping county shortly before the White Lotus War, as I have noted earlier. Zhou Qiyao 周起瑤, magistrate of Zizhou in 1805, had been magistrate of Zhangming county (Map 5.1), also in Sichuan, when the county was threatened by White Lotus forces in 1800. In the same year Luo Siju had been with government forces in Jianzhou, approximately eighty kilometers northeast of Zhangming. Yang Jingwei 楊經緯 (acting magistrate of Zizhou from 1806-1808), had earlier served as assistant magistrate (xiancheng 縣丞) of Suining, Sichuan, a county which had also been threatened by White Lotus forces in 1800 (Map 5.1). Yu Yongning, who may have met Luo during his involvement in the suppression of the Suiding mutiny, served as prefect in nearby Chengdu close to the end of Wu Sheng’s tenure in Zizhou.

Whatever the source for Wu’s poem, it shared with Wang’s a focus on Luo’s life prior to his assimilation into the military establishment, his origins rather than his later career. However, Wu celebrated Luo’s early contributions to the military effort rather than his life as an outlaw:

 Barbarous clouds nibble at the moon, countless banners black
Intoxicated, the general sets fire to the bandits at night
The flames rise in the wind and the wind whistles in anger
The general lets out a great laugh as myriad bones are hardened by

579 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.1.9a. In Luo’s autobiography, the name was miswritten as Deng Hong 鄧洪. Deng was a juren degree holder from Xincheng county, Jiangxi. See Taiping xian zhi (1893), j.6.4a.
580 On the incursion of White Lotus forces in 1800, see Zhangming xian zhi (1874), j.38.
581 Shixiangcunjushi, Kanjing jiaofei shubian, j.5.5a-b.
582 Zhou Qiyao was listed among magistrates in Zhangming xian zhi (1874), j.34.4a; Yang Jingwei was listed in the Suining xian zhi (1877), j.1.72b.
火

He rides alone back to camp, his sword unbloodied

Ah! Oh!

He bravely approached the bandits, and the bandits lost their courage

The general is alive and the bandits dead

His awesome reputation now spreads to high and low

The terrified wails of children at night are no longer heard

The ten year war is ended and shields are gathered up

Snake and tiger are frosted white, no more illness and suffering

Tattooed ruffians bring their swords to be sold

On the mountain a new gathering on the lands once scorched

Wu’s preface, written at least a decade after the poem, explained that the topic of the poem was Luo’s single-handed victory over the bandits at Fengcheng in 1797, described in the previous section. As with Wang’s poem, we can see that Wu was struck by the individual valor that Luo evidenced in the early stages of his military career, but he also attempted to frame Luo’s actions in a larger political context. The arch of the poem brought Luo’s actions at Fengcheng (the first half of the poem) in direct relation with the ultimate suppression of the uprising, conveyed by the images of a realm at peace in the second half of the poem. Arguably, we can see in Wu’s poem an early indication of the

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583 Wu Zhenyu, Huayi guan shi chao 花宜館詩抄 (1865; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 576), j.1.1a-b.
584 Wu referred to Luo in the preface as provincial commander (1b), a rank that he first attained in 1821.
585 Wu wrote in the preface, “the bandits had occupied the mountain top, repeated attacks had failed to dislodge them. A call went out for a courageous volunteer who would be able to overcome the bandits. Luo answered the call, and went alone by night to set fire to their camp. The bandits fled in terror. After this, Luo met with success after success, and he rose to the rank of provincial commander.” See Wu, Huayi guan shi chao, j.1.1a-b. Wu wrote another poem on Luo while both served in Yunnan. See ibid., j.3.19b-20a.
link being established between Luo’s victories and the larger suppression campaign, a link that would be even more strongly asserted several decades later.

Wu also claimed in the poem that Luo’s reputation had spread to all levels of society (to “the grasses and trees”) after the incident at Fengcheng. The writings of another poet in the 1810s provide some evidence that this may have indeed been the case. A Zhejiang native involved in the salt trade (yanjia 鹽筍), Fan Kai 范锴 (1764-1844) wrote about Luo in several poems based on stories he had been told while traveling in northeastern Sichuan in 1818.\textsuperscript{586} The poems recounted a number of events and figures of the war: the destruction of Dongxiang county,\textsuperscript{587} occasions of supernatural intervention,\textsuperscript{588} and the victories of “generals” (jiangjun) such as Yang Yuchun, Zhu Shedou, and Luo Siju.\textsuperscript{589}

Fan’s poems in which Luo Siju appeared focused on his leadership, strategic acumen, and growing reputation. Fan first mentioned Luo in his poetic account of a battle against bandits encamped at Xiangluping 香爐坪, Sichuan, in the fifth month of the second year of the Jiaqing reign.\textsuperscript{590} Fan described in his preface to the poem how troops led by Luo and Gui Han had assisted brigade general Zhu Shedou (see Chapter 4) in routing the bandits. He went on to suggest that this incident established Luo, Gui, and their “righteous troops” as a crack force (以是桂羅義兵皆成勁旅). In the poem, he emphasized the reputation of the leaders: “raging battle shrouded by cloud, the famous generals appeared; to the present day, their brave reputation is spoken by ten thousand

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item He claimed to have spent more than twenty years travelling in these two provinces. Fan Kai, \textit{Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao} 芷谿魚隱詩稿 (1836; reprint, QDSWJ vol. 480), j.3.18b. On his involvement in the salt trade, see his biography in the \textit{Wucheng xian zhi} (1881), j.18.19a.
\item Fan, \textit{Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao}, j.3.2a-3a.
\item Fan, \textit{Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao}, j.3.14b.
\item Fan, \textit{Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao}, j.3.8b, j.3.9b.
\item For documents related to this incident, see SSXFFL j.37. Neither Luo nor Gui appear in the official documents included in the campaign records (fanglüe).
\end{enumerate}
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voices.” In another poem, Fan focused specifically on an incident in which Luo and Gui had used vegetation to camouflage their troops while launching a surprise attack on the rebels. In sum, Fan celebrated Luo as an outstanding leader of great personal reputation and metic intelligence.

Luo’s actions as described by Wang Liangzuo, Wu Zhenyu, and Fan Kai—his escape from prison, his strategic use of gunpowder at Fengcheng, his use of camouflage—resonated with the celebration of metic intelligence that had characterized literati writings on military matters long before the nineteenth century. It is impossible to say with any certainty that this period saw a rising interest in this aspect of military endeavor, but poems and essays celebrating the archetypical strategist Zhuge Liang 諸葛亮 (181-234), can be found in nearly every literary collection produced during the nineteenth century. We will also recall from Chapter 4 the links drawn by Zhang Shu between Zhuge and Han Jiaye, the officer whose body became heavy when carried past Zhuge’s tomb. It is perhaps not surprising that Luo’s use of gunpowder at Fengcheng was echoed in the anachronistic attribution of gunpowder stories to Zhuge Liang, common in the late imperial period. Gunpowder multiplied the effect of the individual, and lent itself to the construction of narratives celebrating an undiluted and unambiguously effective form of individual agency.

Apart from the fact that Fan shared with the other poets a fascination with Luo’s metic intelligence, his collection of poems provides further evidence of an ongoing reconfiguration of the history of the suppression campaign around a handful of officers

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591 Fan, Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao, j.3.3b.
592 Fan, Tiaoxiyuyin shi gao, j.3.4a-b. This incident was also described in Shixiangcunjushi, Kanjing jiaofei shu bian, 3b.
who had become well-known in the years following the campaign. We will recall that Luo had featured only marginally in the official record of the campaign. Indeed, the earliest poem I have found—Wang Liangzuo’s 1806 poem on Luo’s life as an outlaw—had made no attempt to relate Luo’s actions to the larger history of the war. Wu’s poem, written between 1808 and 1811, linked Luo’s actions at Fengcheng to the suppression of the rebellion, but offered little explanation of the relation. In Fan’s poems, written in 1818, Luo was quite explicitly attributed a place among men who had figured prominently in the official record of the war—Yang Yuchun (on whom, more in Chapter 7), and Zhu Shedou (see Chapter 4).

In the 1820s, assertions of Luo Siju’s unusual courage and strategic acumen as well as his important contributions to the suppression of the rebellion were incorporated by Shixiangcunjushi (dates?) into the narrative of the Kanjing Jiaofei shu bian 截靖教匪述编 (1826), according to one scholar “one of the most important histories of the suppression of the 1796-1804 rebellion.”594 Indicating the sustained interest in Luo’s pre-military life, the author first introduced Luo with a colorful (but vague) description of his life as a renegade and martial arts expert: referring to escapes from prison, flight over rooftops, and “iron-bound feet.”595 In the remainder of the account, Luo’s contributions received mostly passing mention.596 Only two incidents provided a more detailed account of Luo’s role. Both emphasized either Luo’s metic intelligence or capacity for operating outside the chain of command. One was the story of Luo’s leadership of the camouflaged xiangyong, also recounted in a poem by Fan Kai; the other was a story of Luo’s single-

595 Shixiangcunjushi, Kanjing jiaofei shu bian, j.1.8a.
596 Shixiangcunjushi, Kanjing jiaofei shu bian, j.1.8a, j.2.3b, j.2.4a, j.4.4b, j.4.7a, j.4.8a, j.4.10a, j.5.5b, j.6.3a, j.6.4a, j.7.4b, j.7.5a, j.7.6b, j.8.2a. Interestingly, the author paid more attention to Gui Han than Luo Siju.
handed capture of seventy rebels in 1800.

While Shixiangcunjushi paid considerable attention to Luo’s efforts in the White Lotus War, Luo’s role in the war was given its clearest and most detailed articulation in the 1840s by Wei Yuan, a Hunanese scholar and official associated with the statecraft school of the early and mid-nineteenth century. Wei Yuan, like others associated with the school, was concerned with addressing the fiscal, military, social, and administrative problems of the early nineteenth century. He was also, as noted by Peter Perdue, a believer in the “superiority of ‘human talent’ (rencai) over ‘material means’ (caiyong).”

Philip Kuhn and Susan Mann, similarly, noted that Wei was “concerned particularly with the recruitment of talent in the military” and “insisted that China could become both wealthy and powerful by adopting new policies that would improve the caliber of her soldiers, especially officers.” Kuhn and Mann listed several policies proposed by Wei, such as “specialized training, higher salaries and prestige, and flexible regional recruitment for military personnel.”

We might add to this list Wei’s belief that great military leaders owed their abilities to innate talent and experience rather than mere bureaucratic efficiency. Luo’s preference for operating outside the chain of command, along with his eccentric personality, seems to have made him an attractive figure to those like Wei who were attempting to think of ways to inject individual talent into the increasingly moribund military system.

598 Jones and Kuhn, “Roots of Dynastic Decline, p. 150.
599 Wei, Shengwu ji, pp. 510, 520.
600 Lin Zexu, for instance, described Luo as a man from “an irregular route” (fei zheng lu 非正路) who proved successful as a military officer. Lin Zexu 林則徐, “Kongzhi Zhen’gan bingyong bing chakan ge tizhen youlie pian 控制鎮壓兵勇並察看各鎮優劣片,” in Ge Shijun 葛士瀟, comp., Huangchao jingshi wen xu bian (1901; reprint, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), j.69.1a-b. Luo Siju and Gui Han were described as men who successfully led militias against bandits in the White Lotus War in a text titled “Lian mintuan yi zhang guoshi yi 準民團以張國勢議,” in He Liangdong 何良棟, comp., Huangchao jingshi wen si bian (1902; reprint, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), j.37.7b-8a. On the
Wei Yuan appended a lengthy account of Luo’s life to a record of the White Lotus War in his influential *Shengwu ji* 聖武紀 (1842), a work that included narratives of many of the major Qing military campaigns through the 1830s and essays in which Wei Yuan set forth a variety of proposals for military reform. The work was written shortly after Luo’s death in 1840, and so Wei Yuan may have read Luo’s autobiography. It is also possible that Luo had told Wei about his life when they met in Sichuan some years earlier.

Wei was explicit in pointing to the need to rewrite the history of Luo Siju’s role in the White Lotus War—as I have noted, he justified his biography of Luo Siju by asserting that many of Luo’s contributions had been neglected in the official record. Wei Yuan’s account was, in many ways, an implicit critique of the way that officialdom writ large had failed to tap into the potential of men like Luo while promoting incompetent officers and officials of the higher ranks. Thus, while Wei included in his biography aspects of Luo’s life that had been of interest to the writers I have already discussed—Luo’s victories through strategy or cunning, the spread and effects of his reputation—he also added stories that showed the opposition Luo had faced from establishment officers and civil officials, as we can see in Table 5.1.

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601 Mosca noted that the *Shengwu ji* had its preface dated the seventh month of Daoguang 22 (August 6–September 4, 1842), precisely when the Treaty of Nanjing was being signed. Matthew Mosca, *From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the Transformation of Geopolitics in Qing China* (Stanford University Press, 2013), p. 274.

602 Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 460.

603 Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 457.
Table 5.1 – Incidents in Wei Yuan’s biography of Luo Siju (numbered by order of appearance in the biography)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Luo’s metic intelligence (use of strategy or cunning to achieve victory)</th>
<th>Luo’s growing reputation and its effects</th>
<th>Opposition to Luo by establishment officials and convention</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Luo’s single-handed defeat of rebels at Fengcheng (1796; p. 457)</td>
<td>(3) The journey of Liu Qing and Luo Siju into a rebel camp (1796; p. 458)</td>
<td>(2) The failure of Fozhu and other military officers to heed Luo's advice, leading to the capture of Dongxiang (1796; p. 458)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Luo’s use explosions to attack rebels camped at Xiangluping (1796; p. 458)</td>
<td>(6) A daring surprise attack on a hilltop stronghold, in which the bandits fled in terror after Luo announced his presence (“I am the Luo Siju who took Fengcheng fort”) (1798; p. 458)</td>
<td>(11) Lebao falsely attributes Luo Siju’s successes to the efforts of other generals (1802; p. 460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) His use of a white rebel banner to fool rebels into a trap (1797; p. 459)</td>
<td>(7) An attack in which Luo came up with a plan to scale a wall with a small number of crack troops and set fire to the camp while the rebels were distracted by other forces (1798; p. 459)</td>
<td>(12) Luo Siju forbidden to offer assistance in suppressing Ningshan mutiny by magistrate Yuan Shixiu (1806; p.460)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) An attack in which Luo came up with a plan to scale a wall with a small number of crack troops and set fire to the camp while the rebels were distracted by other forces (1798; p. 459)</td>
<td>(8) Luo’s order to his men to use stones rather than arrows against rebels holding bamboo shields (1799; p. 459)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) His use of a locally-known path to sneak up on bandits who had captured official troops under Qishiwu (1799; p. 459)</td>
<td>(10) Borrowing the banner of a general of lesser reputation to trick bandits into a fight (1802; p. 460)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Luo, as represented by Wei, embodied many of the latter’s ideas about military talent. The Luo who appeared in the *Shengwu ji* had great personal prestige, he operated outside of conventional military structures in a way that allowed him to make use of his
innate talent, and he was the product of a region that had produced the most successful officers of the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, as we can also see from the dates of the incidents in Table 5.1—and as Wei explicitly argued—Luo’s most remarkable achievements came before he had become established in the military (其奇功在未建節鉞時). Luo provided Wei not only with an exemplary military talent, but an illustration of the ways in which the military establishment could blunt this talent.

Like many others who wrote about Luo, Wei Yuan’s description of Luo accorded closely with elements of the life story fashioned by Luo himself. He was interested, in particular, in the original Luo, unsullied by the corruption of the official system. However, as we have seen, Luo’s own story of his origins included much that Wei Yuan did not describe. In particular, Wei said nothing about Luo’s formative experiences as an outlaw, focusing instead on Luo’s early years in the Luo militia and the Green Standards.

**Luo in the late Qing and Republican periods**

The interest in presenting Luo as an exemplar of the military talent that could emerge through a break with conventional military recruitment and command seems to have waned in the decades after Wei Yuan’s account. In works produced in the last decades of the nineteenth century there was instead a focus on accounts of Luo’s days as an outlaw and the colorful tales of his transition from outlaw to officer. Many accounts of Luo during this period referred to him specifically as a knight-errant (xia 俠), a term commonly used to describe the brave, upright, and often unconventional martial heroes of popular fiction and theater.

One of the enabling factors in this shift of interest was the circulation of Luo’s autobiography, which included rich details about his life before joining the militia in

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604 Wei, *Shengwu ji*, p. 461.
1796. The importance of Luo’s autobiography was mentioned by at least one of those who wrote on Luo in the second half of the nineteenth century, Gu Fuchu 龔復初 (1813-1894). Gu, a native of Changzhou county in Jiangsu, penned a biography of Luo while serving as the prefect of Suiding prefecture (Luo’s home prefecture) sometime between 1862 and 1867. Gu noted that Luo had written an autobiography in two juan (ziji qi shengping shiji wei er juan 自輯其生平事蹟為二卷) and that he (Gu) had chosen the most important incidents (大者) for his biography. Many incidents that Gu selected from the autobiography, still an unprinted manuscript, took place after Luo’s incorporation into the military. But Gu also included the story of Luo’s victory in Fengcheng and other incidents set in Luo’s pre-military life. For instance, he described “Heaven’s” intervention in saving Luo from prison; Luo’s encounter with a “daoist master” (daoshi 道士, referred to as a daoren 道人 in Luo’s own account) who taught him battle formations (zhenfa 陣法) and martial arts. Added to these were details not in the extant autobiography but perhaps circulating in Suiding. Gu wrote that Luo “sent out five-hundred letters” to his former associates, asking them to join him in returning to Dongxiang to fight the rebels; and he described Luo’s physical prowess in terms that resonated with common conceptions of the knight-errant: “brave and resourceful, nimble and quick, able to leap over a wall of several ren, he came and went as though flying.”

In the 1870s we see the first evidence since the 1840s of the circulation of stories about Luo beyond his home prefecture, though it is unclear how these stories came to

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605 Gu Fuchu’s literary collection, which included a biography of Luo Siju and drafts of prefaces for a never-completed gazetteer of Suiding prefecture, was printed in 1867. In one of these prefaces, he referred to the “Yunnanese bandits” (dianfei), who threatened the prefecture in 1862. Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.10.25.

606 Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.12.26b.

607 There is no indication that he was affiliated with institutional Daoism, so I have chosen to use a small “d”.

608 Gu, Leyu jinglian zhai wengao, p. 93. One ren is approximately seven or eight feet.
circulate. Chen Kangqi’s *Langqian jiwen* 郎潛紀聞 (1880), a collection of anecdotes compiled shortly after Gu’s biography, included one story about Luo that seems to have been based loosely on an account from Luo’s autobiography. In the story, Chen described how Luo had only left his former life for a career in the military after being rescued by an old woman who examined his visage and persuaded him to enter the military. The story of an old woman rescuing Luo from arrest had appeared in Wang Liangzuo’s 1806 poem, the earliest extant account of Luo’s early days, as well as Luo’s own autobiography. Wang, we will recall, had alluded to Luo’s rescue with the story of the Marquis of Huaiyin, another commoner who was rescued from poverty by a woman. The narrative of a down-and-out commoner assisted by a prescient woman before gaining success in the military was a well-worn narrative that must have resonated with Luo’s audiences.

By the late Qing and early Republican period, it is clear that the stories of most interest took place during Luo’s pre-military life or at the moment of transition from outlaw to militia member. Many of these stories had been absent in earlier biographical writings, or present in only cryptic form (as in the poem by Wang Liangzuo). Other sources identified Luo directly as a “knight-errant” (*xia*) and described his life as an outlaw. Xu Ke 徐珂 (1869-1928), whose *Qingbai lei chaoh* 清稗類鈔 (1917)—a collection of 15,000 excerpts drawn from Xu’s reading in Qing-era jottings and other sources—included five stories about Luo in the categories of “upright knight-errancy” (*yixia* 義俠), “skillful bravery” (*jiyong* 技勇), “incidents from war” (*zhanshi* 戰事), and “bright intelligence” (*mingzhi* 明智). Many of the details were also in Luo’s autobiography, suggesting that the autobiography had began to have an influence on

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610 Luo’s biographer in the 1894 Yunnan provincial gazetteer, for instance, labeled him a “knight-errant” and described in some detail Luo’s early days (including his troubles with the law).
perceptions of Luo. Stories likely drawn from the autobiography included Luo’s rescue of women who had been kidnapped by local strongmen,\textsuperscript{611} his pouring of scalding porridge on the head of a corrupt local tough, and encounter with a daoist.\textsuperscript{612} But Xu also included tales about Luo I have not found in other sources. For instance, he recounted a story about Luo Siju and Gui Han killing a fierce woman bandit known for her skills with an iron whip,\textsuperscript{613} and another about Luo scaring apes out of the mountains where they were causing trouble for the locals.\textsuperscript{614}

What is striking about all these collections is the extent to which Luo’s reputation appears to have been detached from his status as a military officer. Despite the fact that Luo had dedicated a substantial portion of his autobiography to his military career, this part of his life was nearly absent from the anecdotal literature and biographical writing of the late Qing and Republican periods. His reputation had been essentially transferred into the timeless cultural realm of knights-errant, validated not by the symbolic sanction of the state but by its resonance with well-established tropes and martial figures.

**Luo in his Home County, Dongxiang**

Interestingly, there was one place in which Luo’s reputation seems to have remained stubbornly attached to his military career—his home county of Dongxiang. During the Cultural Revolution, according to one account, Luo’s elaborate tomb (Fig. 5.1) became the target for Red Guards intent on destroying traces of the imperial past. The Red Guards exhumed Luo’s body—still dressed in official robes, looted his tomb, and distributed the goods among the locals who had gathered around to watch.\textsuperscript{615} The author

\textsuperscript{611} Xu, *Qing bai lei chao*, p. 2723.
\textsuperscript{612} Xu, *Qing bai lei chao*, p. 2926.
\textsuperscript{613} Xu, *Qing bai lei chao*, p. 2906.
\textsuperscript{614} Xu, *Qing bai lei chao*, p. 3346.
of the account noted that officials wishing to show their loyalty for the Ming would ask for burial without their official robes. Luo’s burial in his official robes indicated, the author suggested, his “complete loyalty for the Manchu Qing.”

This image of Luo as a loyal official seems at odds with both his self-fashioning and the nature of his reputation in the rest of China. However, it accords with his efforts to consolidate his own elite status in his home county. If Luo had represented himself elsewhere as a renegade, opposed to an entrenched military establishment, in his home county he and his descendants had drawn considerable benefits—material and symbolic—from Luo’s official rank.

Luo Siju’s management of his legacy in his home county followed a predictable but effective pattern of transformation of martial success into civil capital. Luo was an active lineage builder, a contributor to charitable work, and the central node of an increasingly dense network of symbolic and personal ties with the dynasty. The occupation of Dongxiang city during the White Lotus War had resulted in substantial damage. Luo was among other local elites in Dongxiang who had contributed to the rebuilding of local schools, government offices, and numerous shrines and temples attached to the state cult. Local elites sponsored the rebuilding of infrastructure and temples; other local groups, such as boat builders and woodworkers, sponsored the rebuilding of temples to their patron deities. Luo himself contributed funds for the rebuilding of bridges and temples destroyed during the war.

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618 *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931) j.3.35a.
619 Luo, *Luo Zhuangyong gong*, j.2.43b-44a.
Figure 5.1 Luo Siju’s Tomb in Dongxiang County, Sichuan
Source: Luo, Jinpan Luo shi zongpu. 1845.
In addition to his contributions to postwar rebuilding, Luo also worked to ensure that his contributions during the war would remain manifest through a legacy of successful descendants. The Luo lineage benefited from the great wealth that Luo Siju accumulated as an officer during and after the war.\textsuperscript{620} His work on behalf of his lineage began in earnest in the early 1810s when he held a couple of posts close to his hometown—first in Taiping county, then later as brigade general (2a) in Chongqing prefecture. In 1811, he spent five thousand ounces of silver on the construction of a lineage hall; in the same year, he erected an arch in Dongxiang city to “repay the favor of his parents” (bao qin’en 報親恩). Several years later, he invested in the building of an academy for the instruction of youngsters in the Luo lineage. The Wenchang academy 文昌書院, named after a deity favored by many literati and an object of recent official promotion for divine intervention during the war, housed a library of five thousand juan. These books were purchased with funds from Luo.\textsuperscript{621}

Luo Siju’s descendants continued his efforts to establish the lineage. After Luo’s death in 1838, his body was interred in an impressive tomb constructed in his hometown of Luojiaba, next to the tomb he had built for his father (Fig. 5.1).\textsuperscript{622} A shrine for Luo was

\textsuperscript{620} One biography of Luo claimed that he had spent most of his earnings in building his lineage (所得俸皆以頌宗族). Chongqing fu zhi (1843), j.6.9b.

\textsuperscript{621} Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, p. 255. The story of Luo’s building of the academy appeared in his biography in the Chongqing fu zhi (1843), j.6.9b. We might note that the academy also added a literary veneer to Luo’s reputation outside of the county. Wang Menggeng 王夢庚 (?-1843), an official who had known Luo while serving as the magistrate of Taiping county, described his visit to the academy in 1827. After viewing the impressive collection of books from all “six categories” (liu ji 六籍), he concluded that Luo was indeed fond of the literary arts (hao wen 好文). Wang added that every time Luo looked at a volume, he would break into a toothy grin (每見掙紩笑啓齒). Wang Menggeng, “Puguangchang guan Luo shi yi cangshu ou fu 冰壺山館詩鈔” in Binhushan guan shi chao 冰壺山館詩鈔 (preface dated 1829). On the promotion of Wenchang in 1801, see Wooldridge, “Transformations of Ritual,” p. 70, and Naquin, Peking, p. 329.

\textsuperscript{622} The mausoleum—a compound with several multi-roomed buildings—was described at some length in the Luo genealogy. Luo Xuanzhen and Luo Huazhen, comps., Jinpan Luo shi zongpu (1845) vol. 2, p. 58-59.
built by his descendants in 1887, and rebuilt in 1901; the statue of Luo was replaced during the Republican period. The construction of monuments and lineage institutions, establishing Luo’s material legacy in the county, was accompanied by the production of the first genealogy for Luo Siju’s branch of the Luo lineage (Jinpan Luo shi zongpu 羅氏宗譜). The first edition was printed in 1814, under Luo Siju’s own direction. A second edition was printed in 1845, shortly after his death. Testifying to Luo’s connections among local officials, the first edition was graced with prefaces by local luminaries, such as the magistrate of Taiping department Wang Menggeng (see above), and the prefect of Suiding, Hengmin 恆敏 (?-1832). The Daoguang edition of the genealogy included documents of enfeoffment (gaochi 詣敕) for Luo’s family members as well as Luo Siju’s account of his lineage’s past, an account that he would also use nearly verbatim to introduce his autobiography.

Luo Siju and his descendants also enjoyed the symbols and career advantages of official favor. His rank as provincial commander made him one of very few men in Dongxiang to meet with success in either the military or civil service. In the first 150 years of the Qing, there had been no jinshi degrees awarded to Dongxiang natives, and

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623 The shrine was named the Luo Zhuangyong gong ci 羅壯勇公祠. Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.3.33a. Wang Menggeng later served as magistrate of Jianwei county and prefect of Chongqing. During his tenure in Chongqing, he served as the main editor of the Chongqing fu zhi (1843), which included a lengthy biography of Luo Siju and a record of Luo’s contributions to lineage building in Dongxiang.

624 Luo, Jinpan Luo shi zongpu, vol. 1, p. 74. Luo used the account to establish the illustrious origins of his lineage. He claimed that his own ancestors had travelled from Jujiang prefecture in Jiangxi at an unspecified time in the past, and then settled in Macheng county in Hubei. In the second year of the Ming dynasty (1369), a descendant of these settlers named Luo Mengzong 羅孟宗 had moved from Macheng into Sichuan, establishing a branch of the lineage in Dongxiang county. As Liang Yong has pointed out, the story of immigration from Macheng was part of the “collective memory” of inhabitants in northeastern Sichuan, and was a commonly used strategy for reconstructing (or covering up less flattering) lineage histories. Liang Yong 梁勇, “‘Macheng Xiaogan xiang’: yi ge zuyuandi jiyi di lishi jiedu ‘麻城孝感乡’: 一个祖源地记忆的历史解读,” Xueshu yuekan no. 3 (2009): 140-146. On Macheng, see also William Rowe, Seven Centuries of Violence in a Chinese County (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
only four *juren* along with a handful of miscellaneous officially awarded statuses.\(^{626}\)

There appear to have been no military degree holders.\(^{627}\) Among the degree holders, fewer than ten held office. A career in either the military or the civil bureaucracy was, it is quite clear, an exceptional occurrence. The very fact that Luo had risen to the top of the military ensured that he would be honored locally as an eminent man. In addition to his rank, there were other conspicuous symbols of official honor. An arch for Luo Siju was first built in 1813; an arch for his wife was built in 1809.\(^{628}\) The court awarded his parents and grandparents honorary titles in 1821.\(^{629}\) After Luo’s death, a number of his male descendants inherited hereditary titles bestowing military rank. His eldest son, Xizhen 羅熙鎮, was the first to inherit a title and rank from his father;\(^{630}\) he served as an assistant brigade commander at the governor-general's garrison in Chengdu.\(^{631}\) Xizhen’s son Biaocun 羅杓村 (?-1873), died at the age of thirty-nine sui, after nearly bankrupting the family.\(^{632}\) The title then passed to Luo Siju’s adopted son, Benzhen 羅本鎮 (d. 1873). Benzhen received the title during the Taiping War, in which he apparently fought with merit. Benzhen’s son, Zhencai 羅珍材 (18??-19??), the collator of Luo’s autobiography, was the most successful of Luo’s descendants in the military. He rose to the rank of colonel (2b) in Guangdong’s Chixi subprefecture. According to his biography, he was an acquaintance of the famous military officer and artist, Tang Yifen (a hereditary title holder), and later served under the late-Qing official and reformer Zhang Zhidong 張之

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\(^{626}\) Five tribute students by grace (*engong* 恩貢), seven graduates for preeminence (*bagong* 拔貢), a larger number of tribute students (*suigong* 歲貢) and tribute students by purchase (*ligong* 例貢).

\(^{627}\) *Dongxiang xian zhi* (1821) j.12; *Dongxiang xian zhi* (1902), j.7; *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.12.7.15.

\(^{628}\) An arch for Luo was first built in 1813 and then rebuilt in 1915. *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.2.69b. An arch for his wife was built in 1809. *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.2.71a.

\(^{629}\) *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.13a.27b.

\(^{630}\) The rank came with the title of Qingche duwei 輕車都尉.

\(^{631}\) His full post was second captain (5b), expectant appointee to first captain (4a) at the central battalion of the governor-general's garrison (Sichuan dubiao zhongying).

\(^{632}\) *Xuanhan xian zhi* (1931), j.13.32b-33a.
Luo Siju’s success in establishing his lineage among the elites of Dongxiang was reflected in his prominent position in local gazetteers. In the Daoguang edition, compiled under the guidance of magistrate Xu Chenmo, compilers emphasized the contribution of Dongxiang men to the defense of their own county. In the same chapter that recounted the history of the war, they twice emphasized the importance of local militiamen in overcoming the White Lotus forces in Dongxiang and included biographies of those, such as Luo, who had achieved military office as a result of their efforts. Luo’s biography, four pages in length, was the longest in the chapter.

The section of the biography covering the years of the war provided the story of Luo’s single-handed victory at Fengcheng followed directly by an incident in which Luo got out of a tight situation with a clever ruse. Luo and five others, sent on a reconnaissance mission, had suddenly found themselves surrounded by several thousand bandits. Realizing escape was impossible Luo devised a plan. He tied the five men up and ordered them to pretend to be his captives; Luo himself pretended to be a member of another rebel band. The rebels were fooled, and readers would certainly have appreciated Luo’s quick thinking, but neither this incident nor the biography made Luo a key player in the outcome of the war. The main actors in the history of the war were the high-ranking, largely Banner, commanders.

This account of Luo’s activities during the White Lotus War, repeated nearly verbatim in the Guangxu edition of the Dongxiang gazetteer, was entirely rewritten in the

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633 In the introduction to the military accomplishments chapter, the gazetteer asserted that official troops had fought in company (he 合) with xiangyong; later the compilers went even further, arguing that xiangyong had in fact played a larger role than regular troops in suppressing the rebellion in Dongxiang. *Dongxiang xian zhi* (1821), j.21.

634 *Dongxiang xian zhi* (1821), j.21.4b.
Republican period gazetteer. Compilers in the Republican period thrust Luo into a central role. The gazetteer’s history of the war now began with the story of Luo Siju. The history began by noting that Luo had been in Dingyuan subprefecture, Shaanxi, when the rebellion first broke out. When he heard that the rebels were threatening Dongxiang, he rushed back to his village and went to visit a cousin named Luo Sihui, a government student. With financial backing from Sihui, Luo Siju began to train locals in martial arts. The history went on to describe Luo’s role in two events in 1796. In the first, Luo proved himself a capable and inspiring leader of an ill-equipped and fearful local militia. The militia members he had been training were terrified of an imminent attack and had taken refuge behind a mountain. Luo told them that he would climb the mountain to survey the situation: if the rebels were numerous, he would beckon them to retreat; if they were few, he would beckon them to advance. From the mountain, Luo saw that the rebels were “swarming” across and realized that retreat was not a viable plan. So he beckoned the militia to advance, despite the large number of rebels. When they saw Luo rushing forward with a great shout, their vital energy (qi) was multiplied and they followed him. Several hundred rebels were killed and five were captured. The rest returned to Fengcheng. The first of these events was not recorded in the earlier gazetteers, though its inclusion in Wei Yuan’s Shengwu ji shows that it had become part of the Luo lore by the early 1840s. The second event in the history was Luo’s use of gunpowder to achieve a single-handed victory at Fengcheng. The gazetteer provided a detailed account, followed by an assertion that Luo’s reputation (ming) from this point spread across “all of eastern Sichuan.” In the remainder of the history, Luo’s victories through strategic acumen and reputation not only overshadowed the decisions and movements of the

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635 Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.10.10a.
636 Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.10.10b.
higher-ranking commanders, but the hierarchy that placed him under their command was occasionally overturned—rather than receiving orders, Luo was represented as their adviser.637

The shift from the Qing-era gazetteers to the Republican demonstrated the extent to which Luo’s reputation in Dongxiang, unlike his personal reputation elsewhere in the empire, had been intertwined with his career in the military. This intertwining was not surprising given the very apparent legacy of official favor that was manifest in the lives of both Luo and his descendants. However, this relationship did present local historians in the Republican period, writing after the fall of the Qing, with something of a conundrum. That is, how could the White Lotus War be told as a story of something other than the Qing’s overcoming of a troublesome rebellion? Rather than deleting the history of the war altogether, the local historians seem to have simply substituted the Qing establishment at the center of the war with the Luo establishment.

**Conclusion**

Despite Luo Siju’s minor role in official documents of the White Lotus War, by the mid-nineteenth century Luo had come to be portrayed as a key player in the suppression effort. This portrayal was, however, built largely on origin stories—stories from the period before Luo had become part of the military establishment. As Luo advanced through the ranks, as his flair for unconventional action and single-handed heroics was submerged by official obligations, interest in his life appears to have waned. I have argued that Luo himself laid the groundwork for the development of a reputation based on origin stories. His story of single-handedly defeating the rebels at Fengcheng without assistance from the regular military—a story with no other witnesses—appeared

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637 Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.10.20a, j.10.23a, j.10.24b. On Luo’s advice to Delengtai, see ibid., j.10.15b.
repeatedly in accounts of his life from the first half of the nineteenth century. The profusion of stories circulating orally and through his autobiography opened the way to different readings of his life through the nineteenth century and Republican periods. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, many extracted Luo from the history of the White Louts War and downplayed his military identity, representing him as an outlaw who embodied the timeless ideals of the knight-errant. Others searched for some justification or motivating force for military action to replace or supplement the notion of loyalty to the dynasty. Some, including Luo himself, suggested that Luo had been less a loyal servant of the Qing than a man carrying out a divinely-ordained mission.

What comes through in nearly all of these accounts was a fascination with outstanding military men along with a profound lack of faith in the official institutions in which these men operated and became known. Despite his military rank and lengthy service, writers from Wang Liangzu to Wei Yuan did not celebrate Luo as a Qing military hero but as a cultural hero. The transformation of Luo from a military officer into a cultural hero was not unlike the fate of the Manifest Loyalty Shrines—conceived in relation to the state cult but ultimately made captive to local interests, or the heirs of hereditary titles, whose status as titleholders was almost always secondary to their social standing. Of course, there was a certain irony in this detachment that was apparent in Luo’s legacy in Dongxiang. If the nature of Luo’s popular reputation reflected cultural ideals of knight-errancy and unconventional military heroes, the fact that he was remembered at all was really due to the great success that he had as an officer in the Qing military. Even as it was written out of the story, the Qing dynasty ultimately determined which historical actors would be remembered and which would be forgotten.
Chapter Six

History and Historiography of the Ningshan Mutiny (1806)

On August 18, 1806, several hundred of the six thousand soldiers stationed at Ningshan garrison in southern Shaanxi rose up against their acting brigade general, Yang Zhizhen. After dispatching of the officer, the soldiers made their way north to Ningshan city. The inhabitants of the city fled north to the Jiao stockade, a stronghold belonging to a prominent local lineage. Failing to break through the defenses at the stockade, the mutineers fled into the surrounding mountains where they soon attracted several thousand hangers-on from among the recent migrant population and a handful of soldiers from smaller battalions. The mutineers, and others who joined the uprising, would be pursued by government forces for more than three months before finally surrendering on November 10 of 1806.

On January 28 of the following year, the Jiaqing emperor issued an edict in which he placed blame for the uprising squarely on the shoulders of the long-time brigade general of Ningshan garrison, Yang Fang 楊芳 (1770-1846). Yang had not been in Ningshan at the time of the mutiny, but the emperor asserted that his indulgent leadership in the previous years had left the garrisoned troops unchecked and prone to rebellion. In rather stark contrast, accounts of the mutiny written outside of official channels in the 1830s and 1840s depicted the uprising as primarily the consequence of the acting brigade general’s harsh treatment of troops at the garrison while arguing that Yang Fang’s close relationship to the Ningshan troops had curtailed rather than expanded the scale of the uprising.

In Chapter 5, I showed that the cultural resonance of Luo Siju’s activities increasingly took priority over the relation of these activities to political ends. With the
exception of his home county of Dongxiang, Luo’s reputation by the late nineteenth century had been largely detached from his status as a military officer. His success in making himself an exemplar of metic intelligence diverted attention from the question of what his remarkable deeds had actually achieved. The accounts of the Ningshan mutiny in the 1830s and 1840s similarly marked a decline in the predominance of official representations of military action and officers. As these official representations began to lose their monopoly, they were challenged and displaced by nonofficial representations of military men that emphasized not the immediate relation between state and military—that is, the military as a spectacular extension of Qing power and military men as merely agents of the dynasty—but the mediation of this relation by Chinese officers whose successes were ascribed to personal charisma and intimate bonds with their troops.

Ironically, both the original verdict and those who rewrote histories of the mutiny in the 1830s and 1840s marginalized two elements that had, I believe, played an important role in its unfolding: the horizontal relationships among troops and the relationship between the troops and local society in southern Shaanxi. The intense focus on officership was accompanied by an almost complete lack of interest in exploring the ways in which soldiers had organized themselves. In this chapter, I will attempt to restore something of the marginalized elements of the uprising before turning to an examination of the historiography that took shape in the 1830s and 1840s.

**Ningshan Garrison and the Problem of New Troops**

Ningshan garrison was located at the Wulang pass (五郎關), approximately fifteen li (about 8 km) southeast of Ningshan sub-prefectural city, a small city whose
earthen walls had only been built in 1798. Wulang pass guarded one of the routes from Sichuan and southern Shaanxi into the north of Shaanxi. Like Ningshan city, the main administrative center of Ningshan subprefecture, the garrison was located in the far south of the subprefecture, at the edge of the rugged and heavily forested Qinling mountain range that divided Ningshan from counties to the north. The garrison had been expanded tenfold in 1802 in response to a shift of hostilities into the border region of Sichuan and Shaanxi provinces, a last refuge for White Lotus forces. In 1800 and 1801, there had been a movement of White Lotus forces toward Ningshan and the surrounding Qinling mountains. The contingent of troops in the subprefecture, mostly new recruits serving as city guards, numbered only about six hundred. Officials feared that the garrison’s defenses were inadequate to prevent the enemy forces from moving through the pass and into central Shaanxi, a route that would take them to the provincial capital Xi’an.

In 1801, recently-appointed governor of Shaanxi Lu Youren 雒有仁 (1742-1802) dispatched to Ningshan six thousand former xiangyong—paramilitary forces hired from the civilian population during the White Lotus War—with experience fighting in

638 Da Qing yitong zhi (JQ), j.229.1b. On the location of Wulang pass, see ibid. and Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.1.4b: The city was destroyed during the mutiny and rebuilt in 1812. The new city was 506 zhang and 9 chi (about 1 mile) in circumference, with three gates. Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.2.1a.
639 The route to Xi’an via Ningshan was described by Eric Teichman as a route that Chinese travellers considered “just passable.” See Eric Teichman, Travels of a Consular Official in North-West China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), p. 40.
640 This range was also known as the “South Mountains” (Nanshan).
641 Rebels had already crossed the border of Ningshan subprefecture in 1798 (led by Gao Junde) and in 1798-1799 (led by Zhang Hancho). According to the Ningshan gazetteer, the number of “bandits” increased from 1799, making it impossible to distinguish one group from another. Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.19a. Again, according to the gazetteer, the policy of strong walls and clear fields was implemented. It took another three years for the last of the rebels in the area, still led by Zhang Hancho and Ke Wenming, to be wiped out. Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.19a-b.
642 QSL JQ5/8/6.
mountainous terrain. Some had already fought together before arriving in Ningshan. For instance, 2,400 of the men were xiangyong who had fought under a licentiate (shengyuan 生員) named Wu Min 伍敏, a native of Qu county in northeastern Sichuan, about three hundred kilometers to the south of Ningshan. Most of the xiangyong, like Wu and many of the recent civilian migrants to Ningshan, were from Sichuan.

The decision to man Ningshan with former xiangyong was in part a result of the need to resettle the tens of thousands of xiangyong who had fought alongside regular troops during the White Lotus War. The majority of xiangyong employed in the suppression campaign had returned to civilian life, either because of their own reluctance to join the regular military or because of officially mandated demobilization. However, a substantial minority—numbering perhaps 12,000—entered the regular military and

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643 QSL JQ6/10/1, p. 161a.
644 Wei, Shengwu ji, p. 369. Wu Min served later as a county magistrate and then prefect before being transferred to Gansu in 1826 to assist Eshan 鄂山 (1770-1838) in logistical arrangements for the military campaign in Xinjiang (1826-28). For a biography of Wu Min, see Qu xian zhi (1932), j.10.24a-b.
645 Wei Yuan asserted that more than half of the men involved in the mutiny were from Sichuan. Wei, Shengwu ji, p. 365. On the Sichuanese background of the new troops, see also Jiaobu tingji (NPM 604000089), JQ11.7.17, court letter to Lebao.
646 Local gazetteers provided many stories of men who fought valiantly on the battlefield, and were no doubt compensated for their efforts, but turned down offers of military rank. For example, Dangyang xian zhi (1866), j.12.12b; Fang xian zhi (1866), j.9.6b; Taiping xian zhi (1893), j.7.6a; Xingshan xian zhi (1884), j.7.21; Ziyang xian zhi (1843), j.5.3a; Zhuxi xian zhi (1867), j.10.26a. In QSL JQ5/4/25, p. 859b-861a it was suggested that serving as a xiangyong was more attractive than serving as a regular soldier: the pay was higher and those who served were free to come and go. Field officers attributed lack of interest among xiangyong in military service to money. Nayancheng, for instance, noted that many xiangyong refused to join the military because they were aware that the amount of pay they would receive as soldiers in the regular army would be inadequate to pay for even basic supplies. Nayancheng, Na Wenyi gong zouyi, j.8.34a. According to Wu Xionguang, the low pay of soldiers made it necessary for them to take up jobs outside of their garrisons, often as instructors in martial arts. See Wu Xionguang 呂希光, Yijiang bilu 伊江筆錄 (19th century; reprint, XSDK vol. 1177), j.1.10a. Some local observers felt that most xiangyong were simply profit-seekers and not interested in the meager stipends of regular troops. One suggested that the most reliable source of fighters would be merchants rather than soldiers, who came from elsewhere, or xiangyong, who were mostly rootless vagrants. It was only merchants, he argued, who really had something to lose from the war. Zhuxi xian zhi (1867), j.12.50a.
came to be referred to as “new troops” (xinbing 新兵).\textsuperscript{647} Whereas in Ningshan the garrison was founded almost exclusively by new troops, most new troops were dispersed among soldiers at existing garrisons. In Hubei, many of the 3,500 troops added to various garrisons were selected from among former xiangyong; some new officers were selected from among xiangyong who had shown ability during the campaign.\textsuperscript{648} In Henan, more than 2,500 new troops were used as a pool to fill positions that were vacated by established troops.\textsuperscript{649} By training alongside established troops, the emperor and his advisors expected new troops to “gradually become familiar with military discipline (jilü 紀律).”\textsuperscript{650}

The new troops dispersed to existing garrisons were often greeted with hostility. Tensions between new troops and officers stationed at these garrisons continued well into the nineteenth century, particularly in Sichuan and Shaanxi, where many xiangyong had been recruited from among the rootless male population.\textsuperscript{651} In 1812, for instance, a former xiangyong in the Dazhou garrison in Sichuan killed an officer after becoming drunk, an act that Sichuan governor-general Lebao attributed to the violent character of the

\textsuperscript{647} Xue Dalie mentioned the presence of a large number of former xiangyong among the lower-ranked officers in a review of troops in southern Shaanxi, ZPZZ 04-01-18-0024-066, JQ12/6/2. He noted that they were mostly selected and promoted (babu 拔補) for “killing bandits” and often had talent (cai shang hao 材尚好) but were unfamiliar with the military arts (jiyi bu shen xianxi 技藝不甚嫻習). The stories of xiangyong who joined the army can also be found among the biographies and historical records of local gazetteers. Some entered the military after their talent was recognized by military commanders. See An xian zhi (1864), j.25.11b, 19b; Zhangming xian zhi (1874), j.38.6a-b. Others were nominated for military rank by local officials. See Yuechi xian zhi (1875), j.11.33a-34a.

\textsuperscript{648} QSL JQ7/1/12, p. 240b-241a.

\textsuperscript{649} CSCSH, 606000009, JQ8/8-9, pp. 91-95. The policy adopted in Henan was to wait for positions to open up and then use new troops to fill these positions.

\textsuperscript{650} In the Veritable Records, we read: “If they receive training in military regulations along with the regular troops, all will gradually become familiar with military discipline.” QSL JQ10/2/12, p. 914a.

\textsuperscript{651} According to a memorial submitted by Wang Zhiyi 汪志伊 (received on JQ12/2/15), acting governor of Hubei in 1806, more than 4,800 “new troops” had been added to garrisons in Hubei since 1802. These new troops had been training alongside the regular troops (zhenbing) and had shown no inclination to rebel. They were, as Wang put it, “exceedingly well-behaved” (ji wei anjing 極為安靜). See QSL JQ12/2/15, p. 293a.
xiangyong (原恐其凶悍滋事). However, indicating his awareness of tensions between the new soldiers and established troops, Lebao also took steps that he felt would ensure the former were accepted. He warned officers not to discriminate against those joining their garrisons: “you must not take the fact that they entered the military as xiangyong as a reason for looking down on them.”

An 1818 case indicates that even those new soldiers who had become officers could be targets of discrimination. Jiaqing chastised the brigade general (2a) of Shaan’an garrison, Liu Guancheng 劉管城 (1763-1838), for discriminating against a former xiangyong under his command, Zhao Qigui 趙啟貴. Zhao and several other officers had gone to pay respects to Liu on the fourth day of the New Year, having spent the third day engaged in personal celebrations, as was customary. Liu, apparently unaware of the custom, took offense and humiliated the officers to the point that they claimed sickness and refused to undertake their duties. In his edict, the emperor exonerated Zhao Qigui:

There are many among provincial military officers who have been selected for promotion from among regular soldiers and xiangyong. For Liu Guancheng to willfully bully and humiliate them is preposterous. Let Liu Guancheng’s punishment be deliberated by the Board. As for Zhao Qigui and the others who were shamed by their superior officer and therefore claimed illness, this is certainly not an instance of talking back to a superior, and does not show disregard for proper ceremony. It is not necessary to punish Zhao Qigui, Gao Liansheng, or Duan Yongfu.

各省武職大員由兵丁鄉勇拔擢者甚多劉管城如此肆意欺陵其乖謬更甚

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653 ZPZZ 04-01-16-0099-023 JQ12/2/27. Lebao also ordered that the stories of Luo Siju and Gui Han, whom we will recall from Chapter 5 as exemplars of men from irregular backgrounds, be promulgated widely to demonstrate the emperor’s fair treatment of men of all backgrounds.
The Ningshan mutiny itself revealed ongoing tensions between the new recruits and officers from the military establishment, as I explain in further detail below. However, the large number of new recruits clustered at the garrison provided an opportunity for organized rather than piecemeal resistance. It also meant that the burden of keeping these troops under control, and the consequences of success or failure, lay on the backs of a small number of commanding officers.

Yang Fang 楊芳 (1770-1846), an officer who had entered the military during the 1795 Miao uprising in his home province of Guizhou, was promoted to brigade-general of Ningshan garrison in 1801, taking over from Liu Zhiren 劉之仁 (17? -1826). Yang was given instructions to divide the 6,000 men at the garrison into a force of 2,400 foot soldiers (bubing 步兵), 2,400 cavalry (mabing 馬兵), and 1,200 guards (shoubing 守兵). Yang eventually supplemented their numbers with recruits from around the garrison. In his autobiography, Yang Fang wrote that the soldiers under his command in Ningshan were primarily mountain people (shanmin 山民, or shan zhong zhi min 山中之民) experienced in fighting in the rugged terrain surrounding the garrison. The foot soldiers were to receive a base monthly salary of 1.5 ounces (liang) of silver, the salaries of the cavalry troops were 2 ounces, and the salaries of the guards 1 ounce.

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654 QSL JQ23/5/7, p. 520a.
655 Interestingly both Yang Fang and Liu Zhiren were from Tongren prefecture in Guizhou, though from different counties. The two were among the very few from this part of Guizhou who rose to prominent positions in the official ranks.
657 The Nanjiang county gazetteer described the aptitude of “shanmin” for mountain fighting in contrast to the regular troops who were unable to track the fleet-footed bandits through the mountains. Nanjiang xian zhi (1922), j.下, 53b.
658 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 139.
Despite their considerable military experience and local knowledge, Yang recalled having doubts about their reliability. By Yang’s account, his early days at the garrison were difficult. The ranking of troops and the related pay cuts for those placed in the lowest rank caused discontent and desertions. In his autobiography, Yang raised the example of one selected as a foot soldier, named Liu Li 劉禮, whom he punished severely and handed over to officials of his native place for refusing to accept the appointment. Yang noted as well that many chosen as guards had deserted and fled into the mountains to become bandits, no doubt a more profitable pursuit. One of these guards, captured after the mutiny, confessed that he had deserted his post for fear of being subject to military discipline (pa jushu 怕拘束). According to Yang, the situation had improved after these deserters were replaced with local recruits and marriages arranged between the new troops and women captured from rebel forces.

Apart from Yang’s account, the earliest description I have found of the situation at the Ningshan garrison is in an 1804 memorial submitted by Nayancheng 那彥成 (1764-1833), the governor-general of ShaanGan, and Fang Weidian 方維甸 (1758-1815), governor of Shaanxi. The memorial, written after their review of troops at the garrison, outlined a litany of problems. The troops, they wrote, had been hastily recruited from among “inferior irregulars, men who abandoned their posts, gamblers, and rascals.” They were, furthermore, unreliable and duplicitous. When alone, they put on a pretense of accepting orders, but in a group they showed open disregard for discipline. Even

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659 He wrote, “The new troops were all recruited from among the xiangyong and migrants. They do not match up to the troops from established garrisons in their discipline.” See Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 137.
660 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 139.
661 ZPZZ 04-01-0504-033, [JQ11/10].
662 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 139.
663 ZPZZ 04-01-17-0040-007, JQ9/7/22.
664 ZPZZ 04-01-17-0040-007, JQ9/7/22.
worse, the troops had developed tactics for evading punishment. When an individual was to be punished, his fellow soldiers would band together to prevent the punishment from being carried out. The poor quality of the troops was compounded, they asserted, by the situation of the garrison. Yang Fang had been preoccupied with tracking down rebels and so had spent little time training the troops; the pay of the troops, especially the lowest ranked, was insufficient given the high cost of food in the area. The two officials predicted that these troubling tendencies were likely to lead to an incident (zishi 滋事).

A little more than one year after this report, Nayancheng’s replacement as governor-general of Shaanxi, Weishenbu 倭什布 (?-1810), described what appeared to be remarkable progress in the formation of disciplined soldiers. After touring Ningshan garrison and observing military exercises, he noted that “even though most of the troops came into the military as xiangyong, their marches and attacks (bufa 步伐) were orderly (zhengqi 整齊) … [and] since they entered the military, they have been quite content with their lot (頗知安分).” He went on to inform the emperor that many of the men had been making a living from the garrison land, and marrying wives from around the garrison or from their home towns.

Weishenbu’s glowing report smacks of the perfunctory troop reviews that were common during this time. As we will recall from the discussion of hereditary title heirs in Chapter 4, troop reviews could serve as an opportunity to protect a reviewing officer’s own interests. Nonetheless, it is not impossible that Weishenbu’s review contained elements of truth. According to Yang Fang, the brigade general, many of the men had

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666 Numerous troop reviews can be found in both the Number One Archives in Beijing and the Palace Archives in Taipei; they were also included in the collected memorials and nianpu of several officials including Nayancheng and Yang Yuchun. One of the few exceptions to generally glowing reviews was the reviews of hereditary title holders. This may have been a result of their outsider status in the garrisons to which they were dispatched. I discuss this in Chapter 3.
indeed been married (though, in Yang’s account, the wives were not locals but rather women seized from captured rebel husbands).\textsuperscript{667} It is also likely that Yang had paid some attention to military drills, an area of military practice for which he would become well-known.\textsuperscript{668} Finally, provincial officials had attempted in the previous year to provide the troops with farmland. However, it was Nayancheng and Fang Weidian whose fears proved prescient. Only one year after Weishenbu’s review, the scene he had drawn of order and domesticity was disrupted when several hundred new recruits revolted.

**Economic Hardships and the Local Context of the Garrison**

To understand what had gone wrong it is necessary to look more carefully at the local context of Ningshan garrison. The garrison was strategically located, but the mountainous surroundings posed logistical problems. Most pressing was the unusually high cost of food in the area. In 1803, at the request of the Military Commissioner Eledengbao 經略額勒登保 (1748-1805), the new soldiers were to be given supplementary salaries of 5 qian each month in addition to a grain stipend.\textsuperscript{669} The supplementary salaries were to be reduced after three years to the same level as that of soldiers in the established garrisons in southern Shaanxi. In 1804, Nayancheng and Fang Weidian, cognizant of the high cost of food in the area and wary of the volatility of the soldiers, had proposed what they believed was a long-term solution to both issues. In a memorial, they argued that since much land in Ningshan had been abandoned during the recent war, it would be simple and economical to buy up land and allocate it to the troops, enabling them to supply their own needs and gradually lose their penchant for cruelty.\textsuperscript{670}

\textsuperscript{667} Yang, *Zibian nianpu*, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{668} See, for instance, Yang Fang’s memorial on the topic included in He Changling, ed., *Huangchao jingshi wenbian* (1826; reprint, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1972), j.71.8b-9a.
\textsuperscript{669} QSL JQ8/run2/27, p. 450b.
\textsuperscript{670} They were following the always vaunted but less-often successful model of the self-funding military colony (*tuntian*). They recommended the same solution for several other garrisons with substantial
They proposed that each of the 8,617 troops at these garrisons be given a piece of land valued at ten ounces of silver,\(^{671}\) with money to purchase the land coming from the “retained extra-day” funds of each garrison (ge ying jiekuang 各營截爛),\(^{672}\) in cases where funds were inadequate, they suggested that the difference could be made up with contributions from the nurturing honesty amounts (juanlian 捐廉) or from the treasury (jie dong tang xiang 傑動帑項) to be repaid by 1810 with a yearly tax of profits from the land.\(^{673}\) The purchase of land was to be overseen by Zhu Xun 朱勳 (?-1829), the Shaanxi lieutenant governor.

We learn in an 1804 memorial (JQ9/11/26) that the Grand Council approved the tuntian program after deliberation,\(^{674}\) despite some opposition. Their approval was not surprising, given the generally high-regard with which officials viewed tuntian systems and the success with which a similar system had been used among aborigines following the Jinchuan war.\(^{675}\) Among the dissenters was military commissioner Eledengbao. He

numbers of new troops, including Shaan’an zhénying 陝安鎮營, Hanzhong xìeying 漢中協營, Yangping guān 陽平關, Ningqiang 宁羌, and Lüeyáng 略陽.

\(^{671}\) It is unclear how much land this would purchase, but it was certainly not a large amount and was very likely inadequate except as a small supplement to the soldiers’ regular salaries. For instance, in the year of the mutiny, a migrant to Ningshan paid 10 ounces of silver and 3 qian to cultivate—but not purchase—a section of mountain land (shandi 山地) as a tenant (佃種); his yearly rent was 5 piculs (wu shi 五石). ZPZZ, 04-01-26-0031-010, JQ21/7/18. In earlier implementations of the tuntian system elsewhere in the empire: (1) soldiers in the newly established tuntian around Guzhou 古州 in Guizhou were given between 6 and 10 mu of land, depending on its quality, as noted in Guo Songyi 郭松義 and Sang Shiguang 桑士光, “Qing dài de Guizhou Guzhou tuntian 清代的貴州古州屯田,” Qing shí yanjiu 清史研究 no. 1 (1991): 8; (2) soldiers settling land in the northwest between the 1757 through the 1770s had been given an average of 20 mu of land, as noted in Perdue, China Marches West, p. 345.

\(^{672}\) Definition from Ch’ing Administrative Terms, #486: 截爛銀: “Retained extra-day fund. 'Retain' means to keep. That is, keeping the duties collected on the thirtieth day of a large month to be used for administrative expenses.”

\(^{673}\) ZPZZ, 04-01-17-0040-007, JQ9/7/22.

\(^{674}\) Nayancheng, Na Wényí gòng zǒuyì, j.8.25b.

\(^{675}\) As John Shepherd puts it, “military colonies had a utopian appeal to Confucian scholars and were attractive to a state that preferred light taxes and limited spending.” John Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 334.
voiced his doubts that these soldiers could be trusted to become self-supporting farmers.\textsuperscript{676} He deemed it more practical to find tenants and use the rent revenue to supplement government funding. In an 1804 memorial, Eledengbao suggested that if land were distributed to the soldiers there was the danger that they would sell it off illegally and that taxes would be evaded (盜賣抗糧).\textsuperscript{677}

As Eledengbao had predicted, the scheme to turn the soldiers into farmers failed almost immediately.\textsuperscript{678} Much of the land that the soldiers were given was rented to non-military tenants, a development formalized in the aftermath of the uprising.\textsuperscript{679} The difficulty of farming was no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the mountainous land surrounding the garrison was poorly suited to intensive agriculture, being rocky and far from a water supply.\textsuperscript{680} Others in the region who farmed this sort of land could simply pull up stakes and leave, but this was not an option for the garrisoned troops.\textsuperscript{681}

\textsuperscript{676} Given the population pressures in this area, Eledengbao’s fears seem well-founded. Much of the agricultural land in the region had already been claimed. According to Daniel McMahon, beginning in the Yongzheng reign, surplus labor had gone into “industry in the Bashan and Qinling Ranges, as lumber, paper, and iron ore were extracted and shipped to markets in Shaanxi, Gansu, Sichuan, and Hubei.” However, McMahon continues, “Rural enterprise … proved unstable and insufficient to absorb the borderland’s swelling population.” See Daniel McMahon, “Qing Reconstruction in the Southern Shaanxi Highlands: State Perceptions and Plans, 1799–1820,” \textit{Late Imperial China} 30.1 (June 2009): 94.

\textsuperscript{677} QSL JQ9/8/16, p. 810b.

\textsuperscript{678} Vermeer mentions that tuntian in 1812 in Ankang comprised one quarter of its tax-paying land. He cites \textit{Xu Xing’an fu zhi} 續興安府志, j.2. I did not find the information that he claimed to be citing. QSL JQ11/12/28, p. 256a.

\textsuperscript{679} Arable land in general was limited, and the area around the garrison lacked an adequate water supply. When the subprefecture was created, the surrounding counties provided a total of ninety-nine qing 頃 and forty-seven mu 歐 (i.e. 9947 mu). The 1829 gazetteer claims that the mountainous terrain made it impossible to calculate the precise amount of land; taxes were calculated on the basis of initial estimate of arable land. \textit{Ningshan tingzhi} (1829), j.2.15b, 2.17a.

\textsuperscript{680} Daniel McMahon, “The Essentials of a Qing Frontier,” 321. McMahon provided a translated text by Yan Ruyi that gives some sense of the approach to farming in bordering Hanzhong prefecture: “The mountain people (shan min) cut down trees and open the wilds. The shaded areas are fertile and within one or two years the mixed grains will inevitably flourish upon them. After four to five years, however, the field soil will have become loose from digging. As the mountain slopes are steep and there are sudden rainstorms in the summer and fall, surges of rainwater create [erosion] scars, leaving channels of stone. When this occurs, it is necessary for the mountain people to find new lands to open
If the economic plight of the troops at Ningshan garrison was a factor in the outbreak of the uprising, it was the particular relations between the troops and the surrounding region that would shape the unfolding of the mutiny from its very early stages. Ningshan subprefecture had been established only recently in response to rapid population growth in the late eighteenth century, carved from mountainous areas of surrounding counties (Chang’an, Zhouzhi, Shiquan, Yang, and Zhen’an, see Map 1.1) in 1783 and given the name Wulang subprefecture. A wall and moat were built around the subprefectural capital in 1798, and in 1800 Wulang was renamed Ningshan.682

In the years before the White Lotus War, the arrival of migrants had brought rapid change to the once-sparsely populated region. Like much of southern Shaanxi—a region often referred to as Shaan’nan 陝南—the area around Ningshan was sparsely populated until the Qianlong reign when it began to attract migrants from increasingly overpopulated regions outside of Shaanxi.683 Most migrants before the White Lotus War came from the provinces of Anhui, Shanxi, and Henan.684 The war, however, had a major impact on the demographic makeup of the subprefecture. According to the 1829 Ningshan gazetteer, Ningshan had lost “an immeasurable” number of people because of the war.685 The abandoned land was soon taken up by a new wave of migrants. Fifty or sixty percent of these migrants, according to the gazetteer, came from Hubei and Sichuan; twenty or thirty percent came from Jiangnan, Jiangxi, Shanxi, Henan, and LiangGuang; a

and farm .... They are unable to rely on the primeval forests (laolin) for steady work, and so move from place to place in search of their livelihood. These people cannot help but drift. The conditions of the land make them this way.”

682 For information on the formation of the subprefecture, see Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.1.1a-b and Da Qing yitong zhi (JQ), j.227.9a.
683 Note the region known as Shaan’nan corresponded roughly with Shaan’an circuit 陝安道, an area encompassing Xing’an and Hanzhong prefectures.
684 Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.4.13b.
685 Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.2.16b.
smaller number came from Shandong, Zhili, Zhejiang, and Gansu. Yan Ruyi 嚴如煜 (1759-1826), also writing in the aftermath of the war, asserted that the area was populated by no more than ten or twenty percent locals.686 By 1828, the gazetteer counted a population of 115,391 households with 50,119 grown men. The compiler of the gazetteer suggested that people from other provinces were attracted by the low taxes and abundant land in the mountains (“land that people from this province [Shaanxi] saw as wasteland, was seen by people from other provinces as a paradise” [letu 樂土]). He also made note of a detail that will be important for our understanding of the mutiny. People from Sichuan, he wrote, tended to work in the mountains; those from Hubei on the land by rivers.687

The sudden expansion of the garrison in 1802 had injected into the local economy a mass of battle-hardened and ill-disciplined troops, resulting in tensions between the troops and locals. Nayancheng and Fang Weidian mentioned a case in 1804 in which a new soldier named Lei Shaotang 雷紹唐 beat a commoner named Gan Wencheng to death.688 While murders seem to have been uncommon, conflicts were not. We are told in the Ningshan gazetteer that deserters from the garrison had previously (i.e. before the mutiny) “been a source of worry because of their stirring up of trouble among the commoners, but now did not cross into the people’s land.”689

We can also deduce from the local gazetteer that the antagonisms were sustained

686 Yan Ruyi 嚴如煜, Sansheng bianfang beiian 三省邊防備覽 (1830; reprint, XXSK, vol. 732), j.11.21a. Vermeer cautions that this is likely an exaggeration “because descendants were still considered to be immigrants, and sometimes registered as such, even after several generations.” See Vermeer, “The Mountain Frontier,” p. 304.
687 The clustering of migrants from similar origins in the larger Shaan’nan area was noted also by Zhang Liren 張力仁, “Qing dai Shannan Taiba shan di de renlei xingwei ji qi yu huanjing de guanxi 清代陝南秦巴山地的人类行为及其与环境的关系,” Dili yanjiu 27.1 (Jan., 2008): 183.
688 Nayancheng, Na Wenyi gong zouyi, j.8.11a (JQ9/7/8).
689 Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.5a.
by a rather striking ignorance about the garrison and its officers among local elites. The gazetteer, produced with the heavy involvement of the powerful Jiao lineage, a lineage whose stockade had provided refuge to officials and city-dwellers during the mutiny, provided erroneous information about almost every aspect of the garrison. Not only was Yang Fang, the brigade general at Ningshan for five years, missing from the narrative accounts of the mutiny in the gazetteer, his name did not appear in the list of brigade generals at the garrison. This list contained only two names: Liu Zhiren, marked down as serving from 1801 to 1803, and Han Zichang, described as serving in 1803. From other sources, we know that both entries are incorrect. Liu served less than one year before the position passed to Yang Fang in 1801. Han Zichang had died in battle one year before his supposed service in Ningshan. It was Yang Zhizhen, the acting brigade general killed in the mutiny, whose memory seems to have registered most strongly among the Ningshan elite. The compilers of the gazetteer

The gazetteer compiler admitted that the lists of military officers were incomplete and filled with mistakes, a result of the loss of records from the military offices during the mutiny, Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.7a.

Two of the six editors (bianji) of the gazetteer were surnamed Jiao: Jiao Shiguan and Jiao Yunqing; another, named Jiao Shaogong, was involved in gathering materials (caifang). Four Jiao men were among the few degree holders from Ningshan: (1) Jiao Junzheng was a tribute student by grace (en gongsheng) who served as instructor in Gongchang prefecture; he had also been involved in the construction of several temples on the official registry of offerings prior to the White Lotus War. See the inscription, “Wulang guan chuangjian zhu miao bei” in Wu Gang, ed., Shaanxi jinshi wenxian huiji, Ankang beishi (Xi’an: Sanqin chubanshe, 1991); (2) Jiao Shiyan, killed in the mutiny, was a tribute student (suigong); (3) Jiao Junyong was a stipend student (linsheng); (4) Jiao Shitong was a rank 9b purchased degree holder (juanzhi). Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.9a-b.

The gazetteer did include, however, a stele inscription authored by Yang Fang on the tuntian system. Han was enshrined in the Wuwei shuanglie ci in the second month of the seventh year of the Jiaqing reign. See QSG j.87, p. 2604. He served as an acting (shu) colonel (2b) of Ningshan in 1802 (JQ7), see Sansheng fanglue, j.293.6a, j.295.23b.
included a commemorative poem for Yang written by magistrate Zhang Chen.\textsuperscript{694}

While neither official documents nor the local gazetteer offer substantial information on the relationships between the garrison and the surrounding community, an examination of the targets selected by the mutinous troops as well as the provincial background of those who later joined the uprising suggests that the mutiny was not only a protest against an officer who had refused to give some soldiers their pay but also an opportunity for poor Sichuanese, including a rather small number of the new troops in the garrison, to express their resentment against the landed elite of Ningshan clustered in and around the subprefectural walled city.

The Mutiny

The mutiny began at Ningshan garrison on August 18, 1806 (JQ11/7/5), when a group of about 160 soldiers, led by Chen Xianlun 陳先倫, Chen Dashun 陳達順, and Wang Mazi 王麻子, killed the acting brigade general Yang Zhizhen and major (youji; 3b) Luo Quanliang 羅全亮. After seizing weapons from the armory, they proceeded to Ningshan city. Early in the morning of August 19,\textsuperscript{696} at the fourth watch (\textit{si gu} 四鼓), they arrived at the city gates and were let in by co-conspirators. Once inside, they raided the treasury and local jail, and burnt and pillaged several buildings. Most of the officials and city dwellers managed to escape to the Jiao family stockade, immediately north of

\textsuperscript{694} The poem read: 寧陝廳弔署總兵楊公之喪不識將軍而楊公事可傳一尊山不動人心血盈前厚毒知誰爾當災讓汝先至今兩樽際猶染碧痕鮮. Zhang Chen served as magistrate from 1815-1817, he was a native of Wanping county in Shuntian.

\textsuperscript{695} Eduard Vermeer described a similar silence on the social and economic factors behind the White Lotus War. Having reviewed the major compilations on the campaign, he suggested that “These official reports display a great interest in the minutest military detail, and some other government matters, but take no interest in the socio-economic circumstances of rebels or the general population of the five provinces concerned.” See Vermeer, “The Mountain Frontier in Late Imperial China,” p. 303.

\textsuperscript{696} I use the Western calendar in the following section for convenience. August 19 corresponds with the date of JQ11/7/6.
the city (Map 6.1).

A memorial from governor Fang Weidian, submitted shortly after the mutiny began, suggested that the new soldiers had been angry over the cut in supplementary pay, about which they had not been properly informed. Fang suggested that several, including Chen Dashun, had secretly spread rumors about the cut (密布謗言). He offered another reason for the mutiny: the officers at Ningshan had forbidden the troops from forming groups (jie meng 结盟) and had chastised them too harshly, causing them to harbor resentment. In his response, the emperor dismissed this second explanation out of hand, and it did not appear in any later memorials. We might note that two of Fang’s explanations for the mutiny had to do with the horizontal links among soldiers—the spread of rumors and the forming of groups.

The mutiny would soon attract other disgruntled soldiers from the surrounding area. By the early morning of August 20, the mutineers had left the stockade and proceeded to several other nearby military battalions including Simudi, about forty kilometers northwest of Ningshan city, where they arrived late in the night of the same day. On August 25, they arrived in Huayang battalion, also in southern Shaanxi. They were joined at Huayang and Simudi by several tens of new soldiers serving at these battalions. According to the confession of Chen Xianlun, a leader of the mutiny, they chose these two battalions because “there were many soldiers there that we knew well.”

On September 2, they were joined by sixty or seventy new soldiers from

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697 This memorial was referred to in a court letter to Fang Weidian and Yang Yuchun, *Jiaobu tingji* 剿捕廷寄, QJ11/7/26, p. 99 (NPM 604000089).
701 Delengtai, *Delengtai zougao*, p. 146.
Map 6.1 Ningshan Garrison, Ningshan City, and the Jiao Family Stockade
Source: Ningshan ting zhi (1829).
Jiangkou battalion, located about twenty kilometers northeast of Ningshan city.\(^{702}\) On September 12, the mutineers had moved west to Chenggu county and then back east to Yang county where they killed the magistrate Zeng Zangsi in front of the City God, a deity of the state cult who people of all social classes appealed to for justice.\(^{703}\) The mutineers were joined by a number of new soldiers serving in Yang county.\(^{704}\) Some of the rebelling troops must have been literate, for they also sent notices (\textit{chuantie}) to new soldiers stationed in Liuba subprefecture, to the northeast of Yang county.\(^{705}\)

By this time, the original mutineers and their fellow new soldiers from surrounding battalions had also been joined by a variety of hangers-on. It was reported that the whole group already numbered more than two thousand. From Yang county the entire group moved north to Huayang battalion but were prevented from proceeding along the cliff walkway because of high waters.\(^{706}\) On September 19, they moved east again to Shiquan county, directly south of Ningshan. They were turned back from the county city. The rebels returned to Ningshan city on September 23 and were confronted by a group of new troops led by acting brigade general Hu Dingtai 胡定泰.\(^{707}\) Several of these troops defected and joined the rebels.\(^{708}\) From September 23 to 28, the rebels burned the official yamen and soldiers’ quarters in Ningshan city and then lay siege to the Jiao

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\(^{702}\) \textit{Jiaobu tingji} (NPM 604000089), pp. 191, 247.


\(^{705}\) \textit{Jiaobu tingji} (NPM 604000089), JQ11/8/8, p. 161, court letter to Delengtai. The topic of relations among new soldiers in different garrisons also appeared in the interrogation reports that were included in Delengtai’s collected memorials. Three of these are reports of the interrogations of the three soldiers accused of instigating the mutiny, Chen Dashun, Chen Xianlun, and Xiang Gui. Chen Xianlun, for instance, noted that he had friends in the area from Simudi to Huayang. See \textit{Delengtai zougao}, p. 146.

\(^{706}\) \textit{Jiaobu tingji} (NPM 604000089), JQ11/8/8, p. 155, court letter to Weishenbu.

\(^{707}\) Delengtai, \textit{Delengtai zougao}, p. 68; \textit{Ningshan ting zhi} (1829), j.3.19b.

\(^{708}\) Delengtai, \textit{Delengtai zougao}, p. 37.
family stockade (焦家堡) where Hu, magistrate Li Jing 李晶, and others from the city had fled. Several defenders, including Jiao Shiyan 焦世彦 and Jiao Shigui 焦世贵, were killed in the attack. Both were awarded posthumously for their bravery. The defenders claimed to have killed several hundred of the mutineers, a number not verified in official sources. The mutineers and the others who had joined them departed from Ningshan again on the seventeenth.

The apparent animosity toward the local officials in Ningshan prompted the emperor to express his suspicion that the officials, including both the brigade general Yang Zhizhen and the local magistrate Li Jing, had been guilty of corruption or mistreating the new troops. Indeed, the execution of magistrate Zeng Zhangsi in front of the City God suggests the mutineers had grievances against local officials for which they sought justice. However, the investigation was not pursued.

As they marched east and west through the mountains in October and November—areas populated primarily by recently arrived Sichuanese settlers and forestry workers—the nearly two hundred mutinous soldiers from Ningshan and several tens of soldiers from other battalions were joined by a much larger number of men and women with and without previous connections with the military. The size of the rebel group eventually numbered at least four thousand. After leaving Ningshan, the logic of this large group’s movements is difficult to ascertain. They moved toward the border with Henan, but also toward Sichuan, prompting troop mobilizations in the border regions of both provinces. They seem to have been preoccupied with evading the increasing

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709 Ningshan ting zhi (1829), j.3.4b-5a.
711 Jiaobu tingji (NPM 604000089), JQ11/7/18, court letter to Fang Weidian and Yang Yuchun.
712 Jiaobu tingji (NPM 604000089), JQ11/9/14, court letter to Ma Huiyu.
number of troops, including Banner troops from Xi’an, that had surrounded them. However, among the actions that are decipherable, they continued to maintain communications with new troops in other garrisons, including one in which another mutiny would soon break out. These links among troops would be visible at an encounter between Qing forces and mutineers on October 29. Confronted by the mutineers at Fangchai pass in Liuba subprefecture, some soldiers recognized the mutineers and refused to fight. Many of the vastly outnumbered mutineers were allowed to escape. Despite the collapse of Qing troops, a number of the mutineers spoke to Yang Yuchun and expressed their desire to surrender.

The mutiny ended not with a battle, but with negotiation. Yang Fang arrived at Fangchai pass on October 30, one day after the poor showing of Qing forces. Hearing that the mutineers had requested a meeting to negotiate their surrender, Yang Fang volunteered to venture alone into the rebel camp, where most of the mutineers agreed to surrender. A number of those who surrendered would join Yang Fang in tracking down others who had earlier fled from the main rebel group. On November 10, Yang Fang led the mutineers to the Qing camp to surrender. The surrendered rebels included thousands of hangers-on, whom Delengtai described as escaped prisoners, refugees, and deserters. Delengtai dealt lightly with most of the captives. He released 3,812 who had not served in the military and sent 224 mutinous soldiers back to their garrisons for punishment. Among those released, more than one thousand were identified as natives of Sichuan, while the others Delengtai described vaguely as “people who live in the

713 Luo Siju described how soldiers from Shaanxi made their way to Suiding in Sichuan. Luo, _Luo Zhuangyong gong_ , p. 241.
714 Delengtai, _Delengtai zougao_ , pp. 379, 477.
715 QSL JQ11/10/16, p. 195b.
mountains” (居山内者).16 The mutiny had lasted almost four months.

Jiaqing received word of Delengtai’s lenience with great displeasure. After some debate about whether the mutinous troops should be executed, sent into military exile, or forced into slavery, the emperor ordered that the surrendered mutineers not be returned to their garrisons as Delengtai had ordered, but be sent into perpetual exile in Xinjiang where they were to carefully watched by local officials. If any of the exiled troops caused the slightest trouble, he ordered, they were to be severely punished.17 The official verdict on culpability for the mutiny came down strongly against Yang Fang, the officer who had commanded Ningshan garrison for many years. Accused by the emperor of failing to instill discipline in the troops under his command and attempting to gain a reputation for tolerance, thereby causing the troops to mutiny, Yang Fang was exiled to Yili. The emperor ordered him released from exile on April 24, 1807 (JQ12/3/18), and he was demoted to the rank of second captain (5b) in Guyuan, Gansu.18 Yang Yuchun, the provincial military commander of Guyuan, and Yang Fang’s immediate superior, was demoted to the position that Yang Fang had just vacated: brigade general of Ningshan.19

The unfolding of the mutiny, in many ways, reflected longer term patterns in the relations among new soldiers and between these new soldiers and the surrounding locale. The animosity toward the established elite, shared by both the new soldiers and poor Sichuanese settlers, was evidenced both by the swelling of the rebel band as it moved through mountainous areas populated in large part by other Sichuanese, and by their targeted attacks on the fortified towns and stockades that housed officials and established

716 Delengtai, Delengtai zougao, p. 234.
718 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 197.
719 The verdict can be found in QSL JQ11/12/20, p. 250a. Ironically, it was Yang Fang’s perceived ability to discipline soldiers that had led to his being sent to Guyuan, where another uprising had been brewing among new soldiers. See Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 140.
Their repeated attacks against Ningshan city and the Jiao family stockade, in particular, suggested animosities that had built over the preceding years of relations between the garrisoned troops and impoverished mountain-dwellers, on the one hand, and the relatively prosperous community around the city, on the other. It is also clear that some of the new soldiers had developed or maintained modes of organization that were largely independent of their officers or the military chain of command, a fact mentioned in one of the first memorials noted above. Their movements and the flow of information about the mutiny reflected informal routes of communication that tied together different garrisons. Judging by the fact that only about two hundred of the six thousand new soldiers stationed at Ningshan garrison actually joined the mutiny (though others seem to have given at least passive support), it might also be suggested that group loyalties among a few proved a far more compelling reason for joining the mutiny than the economic hardships suffered by all the new soldiers.

Whatever the reasons for the mutiny, the emperor and grand councilors were reluctant to pursue leads that might legitimize the mutineers’ actions: the harsh discipline imposed by the temporary brigade general and the mistreatment of new troops by local

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720 Zhang Liren 張力仁, quoting from Yang xian xiangtu zhi 洋縣鄉土志, noted the divide in Yang county (immediately bordering Ningshan to the west) between towns, which were home to a relatively stable population of locals, and mountains, which were characterized by a floating population of tenants. See Zhang Liren, “ Qing dai Shaan’nan Qinba shandi de renlei xingwei jiqi yu huanjing de guanxi” 清代陝南秦巴山地的人类行为及其与环境的联系, Dili yanjiu 27.1 (Jan., 2008): 184.

721 A mutiny that took place shortly after, at Dazhou battalion in Suining prefecture, Sichuan, provides an interesting counterpoint. The mutineers in this case killed only their commanding officer, Wang Guoxiong, and did not attempt to attack other local officials. Wang’s actions were ultimately deemed responsible for the mutiny.

722 Luo Siju, an officer very familiar with the region, argued that there were strong ties among the many new troops scattered around the Shaanxi and Sichuan border region. These relations, he feared, might prove stronger than ties of loyalty to either the dynasty or their own officers. He also argued that the awarding of surrendered mutineers would only encourage others among the new recruits to rebel. In other words, he represented the new troops as both mercenary, motivated by the opportunity for material gain, and as men whose loyalties lay not with their officers or the state but to each other. Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong, j.2.46b.
officials. Interestingly, they also paid little attention to the signs of strong personal bonds among soldiers—cemented by later flows of communication—that provided a fraternal alternative to the military hierarchy and ultimately undermined Qing efforts to end the mutiny through force at Fangchài pass.

**New Soldiers, Their Officers, and the Historiography of the Mutiny**

If the development of the mutiny is arguably best understood in relation to settlement patterns, the tensions between landowners and recently arrived settlers—military and non-military alike, and a resilient web of relations among new troops stationed at garrisons across the Southern Shaanxi and Sichuan border region, the historiography that emerged in the decades following the incident, much of it during the 1830s and 1840s, was predominated by a rather different concern: the relationship between the new troops and their officers. This relationship had also been central to the official verdict. As I noted, the emperor had insisted that blame for the uprising was to be placed on those officers, especially Yang Fang, who had indulged the new troops and shown undue lenience. However, in the accounts written in the 1830s and 1840s, Yang Fang’s indulgence was recast as a sort of familial affection that had developed between him and his men over their years together at war. The mutineers, likewise, were recast from undisciplined scoundrels to tragic victims of circumstance. These accounts placed blame for the uprising solely on the harsh command of the brigade general who had replaced Yang Fang, Yang Zhizhen.

The rewriting of the history of the mutiny was, I argue, part of a larger reconsideration of the proper relations among officers and troops that took place during the Daoguang reign (1820-1850). If the Green Standard officer had previously stood as a transparent medium for orders coming from above, a mere cog in the military hierarchy, many military officers and a number of literati began to advocate an approach to
officership that took into consideration the particularity of each officer’s relationship with his troops, a relationship that could involve both discipline and affection. We will see in the following chapter that this concern had been reflected in an unusual outpouring of writing on military training by officers, much of which stressed not the need to implement orders or follow regulations but rather the importance of establishing durable relationships among officers and between officers and the soldiers under their command.

In the following section, I will narrow my focus to some of the most detailed and influential accounts of the mutiny itself: the autobiography of Yang Fang, Gongfu Yang Guoyong hou zibian nianpu 宮傳楊果勇侯自編年譜 (1840), a preface to this autobiography by He Changling 賀長齡 (1785-1848), and an account of the mutiny in Wei Yuan’s 魏源 (1794-1857) Shengwu ji 聖武記 (1842).

The Accounts of Yang Fang, He Changling, and Wei Yuan

Yang Fang’s autobiography, printed in 1840, provides an unusually detailed account of life in the military. The autobiography, covering the years from Yang Fang’s birth in 1770 to 1830, offered information absent from official documents and revealing of the personal experiences of an officer. Indeed, Yang seems to have seen the autobiography as an opportunity to establish a version of events more reliable than one could find in official documents or the writings of later biographers. He asserted in the postface to his autobiography that one could not rely on nianpu or biographical accounts written after one’s life, representations that were invariably “distant from the original appearance of the subject (jiong fei qiren benlai mianmu 迥非其人本來面目).” 723 Like others discussed earlier in the dissertation—from Wang Qisun to Wei Yuan—Yang hoped to ensure that later generations would have access to what he asserted was the true

723 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 470.
story, a story obscured or missing from official records.

Yang Fang’s concern with setting straight the historical record was nowhere more apparent than in his account of the origins of the uprising at Ningshan, an incident for which he had born much of the blame. Yang Fang, who was in Guyuan, Gansu when the uprising began, told the story of the uprising through the eyes of others: the first account was from the perspective of Yang Fang's wife, Ms. Long 龔氏; the other was from a leader of the mutineers, Pu Dafang 蒲大芳. Despite some differences in detail, both accounts located the actions of the mutinous soldiers in a moral field of action that shifted blame from Yang Fang and onto the harsh or incompetent administration of other officials, civil and military. As first-hand witnesses of the uprising, they also lent Yang Fang’s account of the uprising an aura of authenticity. Much like Wang Qisun’s gathering of first-hand accounts of his brother’s death, discussed in Chapter 4, Yang Fang was intent not only to tell his version of the story but to buttress it.

When the mutiny broke out, Ms. Long was in the brigade general’s quarters, located in the walled city. According to Yang, he learned that she, along with their unborn child, had survived the mutiny in a letter he received while en route back to Ningshan from Guyuan. In this letter, Ms. Long described being awoken in the morning of August 19, 1806 by the sound of people desperately trying to enter the brigade general’s compound. After allowing them in, she directed them to different parts of the compound: women and children were sent to the offices (shufang 書房) on the left and right; soldiers who had not joined the mutiny were told to go to the second hall (er tang 二堂). At daybreak, she peered between the cracks in the outer wall. Seeing that the compound was surrounded by mutineers, she told a servant girl to invite the rebels into the third hall (san tang 三堂).

After the mutineers entered, “dripping with sweat and blood,” they prostrated
themselves and voiced their grievances. Their pay had not been delivered, they had already endured two months of starvation (已經忍飢兩月). Furthermore, they asserted, their commanding officer Yang Zhizhen had responded to their entreaties by even harsher rebukes (jia tongze 加痛責). When Ms. Long suggested they hand over their leaders and surrender, they explained that they had already sworn a blood oath to die together and, since they had already killed their commanding officer, could not expect lenience. While failing to convince them to surrender, Ms. Long persuaded the mutineers to allow her and those trapped with her—both men and women—to leave Ningshan. The families of the officers murdered by the mutineers were disguised as servants with the hope that they would not be recognized. Ms. Long herself was transported in a sedan chair. They arrived safely in Xing’an prefecture.  

While Ms. Long appeared in this account as both determined and forceful, Yang Fang made it clear that he believed her survival had been due not only to her own strength of personality but to the mutineers’ personal loyalty to him. Even before receiving word of his wife’s well-being, he claimed to have told several other officers that the mutinous troops would not kill his wife because of the strong bonds formed over the five years spent fighting against rebel forces in the surrounding mountains. There was no “mathematical” (shu) guarantee of my wife’s survival, he wrote, but in terms of “principle” (li) her survival is certain. He continued, “In the five years since I established the garrison I have commanded the troops in tracking down and exterminating [the rebels]. We have shared good times and hard ... they could certainly not bear to harm my family.”

In his account of Ms. Long’s escape from the mutineers, Yang made three points.

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724 Yang, Zibian nianpu, pp. 144-146.
725 Yang, Zibian nianpu, pp. 142-143.
First, the soldiers had a legitimate grievance. They had, as they told his wife, endured two months of hunger. Second, Yang indicated that his replacement, Yang Zhizhen, had responded unreasonably to the soldiers’ concern over their diminished pay. Third, he emphasized that the trusting relationship that had developed between himself and the men under his command had not been a cause of the mutiny but had, in fact, diminished the severity of the uprising.\textsuperscript{726} The troops had decided not to kill his wife and others in the brigade-general’s compound because of their loyalty to him. In other words, Yang used his wife’s account to emphasize the morally defensible—if legally misguided—logic of the new soldiers’ action and his own position as both object and commander of their loyalty.

A similar effort to explain the mutineers’ actions while vindicating his own style of leadership was evident in Yang’s recollection of an extended conversation between himself and Pu Dafang, a mutineer who led the surrender of the rebels and a figure for whom he expressed considerable sympathy.\textsuperscript{727} In the conversation, Pu described the hardships caused by a sudden cut in pay and the harshness of the acting brigade general, Yang Zhizhen. He told Yang that prior to the revolt the soldiers had been refused money from the zhentai 鎮台 (a polite way of referring to the brigade general). Pu also suggested that the mutiny had actually been sparked by one hard-drinking soldier, a cavalryman named Chen Xianlun 陳先倫 who killed Yang Zhizhen in a drunken rage.\textsuperscript{728} He exonerated the most poorly paid of the soldiers, the guards (shoubing 守兵), who were conscientiously protecting the granaries when the mutiny broke out. These same guards,

\begin{footnotesize}
\footnote{726}{Yang wrote earlier in his account of how an incompetent magistrate charged with distributing food relief to the troops at Ningshan had already nearly provoked an uprising that had been defused only by Yang’s intervention Yang, \textit{Zibian nianpu}, p. 140. The official, Zhang Yue 張約, served as magistrate from 1800 to 1806. He was a native of Hanyang county in Hubei.}

\footnote{727}{The conversation is recorded in Yang, \textit{Zibian nianpu}, pp. 176-179.}

\footnote{728}{Yang, \textit{Zibian nianpu}, p. 176.}
\end{footnotesize}
Pu asserted, came to the rescue of Ms. Long and the others trapped in the brigade general’s residence. They only later joined the revolt because of a sworn oath, not because of any desire to rebel.

The two accounts formed an important part of a counter-narrative that Yang constructed in his retelling of the uprising. In this narrative, he distinguished himself from harsh officers and an uncompromising law, illuminating and endorsing a realm of action in which ‘brotherly’ relations among soldiers and an intimate, if still hierarchical, relation between himself and his troops were essential for the maintenance of a content and reliable fighting force. He consistently distinguished, through the voices of his wife and Pu Dafang, between the few ring leaders and the rest of the soldiers, and between the mutineers and those who had joined them later, whom he described on one occasion as “bandit hangers-on” (fucong feitu 附從匪徒) but generally disregarded. And, interestingly, he shed some light on the relations among troops, suggesting that they were solidified not by a shared loyalty to the dynasty but by sworn oaths.

Yang’s account of the mutiny climaxed with two incidents that depicted the strength of attachment between himself and the troops. Yang arrived at Fangchai pass in Liuba county on October 30, a little more than three months after the outbreak of the mutiny. Here he joined a group of other officers and eight thousand Banner and Green

729 In Yang’s account of the event, he continued to defend the new troops in the face of persistent doubt about their reliability. See Yang, Zibian nianpu, pp. 152-153, where Yang defended six hundred troops from Ningshan who had been captured by government forces. To demonstrate their reliability, he asked three of them to spend the night in his tent and told them they could feel free to take his head. Yang offered to lead the six hundred troops to Yang county to engage the mutineers, but governor Fang Weidian “strongly opposed it” because he felt the new troops could not be trusted (方公以新兵不可靠力止之). In ibid., pp. 155-158, he addressed mutinous troops at Shiquan county where they had recently fought a battle with Wang Zhaomeng. He again offered the mutinous troops a chance to chop off his head. In ibid., p. 161, he noted the suspicion of officials in Hu county upon his arrival with new troops; they refused to let them into the city. In ibid., p. 169, he again noted that more than thirty of the mutineers had spent the night with him.

730 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 168.
Standard forces under their command.\textsuperscript{731} As I noted above, the initial encounter between these forces and the rebels on October 29 had been a failure. Many of the troops were personally acquainted with the mutineers and refused to fight. Nonetheless, a number of the mutineers had managed to speak with Yang Yuchun, expressing their desire to surrender to Qing forces.

On November 1, Yang Fang made contact with Pu Dafang and several other of the mutineers who had approached Yang Yuchun. In Yang’s account, upon recognizing their former brigade general the mutineers dismounted and prostrated themselves on the ground, weeping.\textsuperscript{732} When they got up, they circled around, embracing each other. Yang described their emotions as \textit{juanjuan} (longing, reluctance to part). Their encounter was broken up only by the arrival of a group of unfamiliar bandits (\textit{feitu} 匪徒) who had joined the mutineers and were now rushing down the mountain hoping to fight.\textsuperscript{733}

Several days later, Yang Fang ventured alone into the rebel camp, a journey that he described at some length in his autobiography. Upon his arrival, the mutineers knelt to welcome him into the camp before leading him to Pu Dafang, who Yang noted had “earned the hearts” of the mutineers and displaced the initial leaders of the mutiny. From Pu, Yang learned that a number of the mutineers who were unwilling to surrender, including the original instigators of the mutiny, had left the camp. Yang pursued these mutineers on horseback and when he caught up with them delivered two lengthy speeches in which he attempted to persuade them to surrender. In the first, he emphasized the dynasty’s intolerance for rebellion. This speech, Yang wrote, left them speechless but unrepentant. The second, on the theme of their shared experiences over the previous

\textsuperscript{731} The officers named by Yang were Yang Yuchun, Feng Shen, Tian Chaogui, You Dongyun, Sulefang’a, Zhaketa’er, Fu Yu.
\textsuperscript{732} Yang, \textit{Zibian nianpu}, p. 168.
\textsuperscript{733} Yang, \textit{Zibian nianpu}, pp. 168-169.
years and his own paternal care (which he compared favorably with the care they received from their own parents)\textsuperscript{734} brought them to tears and ultimately convinced them to tie up their unrepentant leaders and surrender.\textsuperscript{735} On November 10, after about one week with the rebels, Yang led Pu Dafang and the other rebels to the main military camp to surrender.\textsuperscript{736}

In sum, Yang Fang’s two accounts of the mutiny emphasized the close personal bonds he had established with soldiers at the garrison; they shifted the blame for the mutiny onto the harsh or incompetent officials who had replaced him; and they suggested that, in the right hands (namely, his), even troops of the most violent nature could be transformed. These themes were reiterated in briefer accounts of the mutiny written by two of the leading figures in the statecraft movement in the Daoguang reign: He Changling 賀長齡 (1785-1848) and Wei Yuan 魏源 (1794-1857), both of whom found in

\textsuperscript{734} On the use of a parent/child analogy to describe the relationship between officers and the troops under their command, before and after this period, see Colin Robert Green's reference to the Ming general Qi Jiguang, in “The Spirit of the Military (Junren hun): The Tradition and its Revival in the Republican Period” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of British Columbia, 2003), pp. 100, 107; Zeng Guofan’s use of the analogy in Li, Zeng Guofan bingfa, p. 221; and a further discussion in Chapter 7 of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{735} Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 172. This representation of a single officer relying on personal relations to persuade rebels to change their ways can be found elsewhere in writing during the Daoguang period. For instance, in the Nanbu xian zhi (1849), j.13.2a-3b, we read a biography of the official Wang Jiandong 王建東 who traveled to meet with the leader of White Lotus rebels in Nanbu county. After describing Wang making his way to the bandits’ camp, and the bandit’s response (the bandits looked at each other in fright, they lifted arrows to their bows, and formed into ranks 賊眾相顧駭愕控弦引矢嚴陣以待), the biographer imagined a dialogue between Wang and Luo Qiqing: “Wang went directly into [the bandit camp] and said to the leader, ‘I have come.’ Luo Qiqing said, ‘What have you, upright official, come to do?’ At this, he led all the rebels in bowing to the ground in respect. Wang said, ‘The dynasty has promulgated an edict of exoneration. Do you know of it?’ Luo said, ‘I know of it.’ Wang then said, ‘Why then have you not accepted mercy?’ Luo said, ‘My crime is great, I know that punishment will be difficult to escape.’ Wang said, ‘I can exempt you from execution.’ (吾能免汝死) Luo didn’t surrender, but he did promise to not to attack Nanbu as long as Wang was in office. Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 181.
Yang an exemplar of the military leadership lacking in the Green Standards.737

He Changling’s account of the mutiny provides a brief but telling example of the resonance of Yang’s actions with those officials and literati concerned with military affairs in the mid-nineteenth century. He’s account of the mutiny appeared in the preface that he wrote for Yang’s nianpu in 1840.738 The preface reviewed the highlights of Yang’s career, among which was included a brief passage on his actions during the Ningshan mutiny. He did not describe the mutiny itself, but rather provided an adulatory account of Yang’s display of courage and fortitude when visiting the mutineers after the battle at Fangchai pass. As Yang entered the rebel ranks, He wrote, his face showed not the slightest fear for he had “nurtured” (yang) these troops. In other words, for He, Yang’s courageous ride into the ranks of the mutineers was based on the officer’s educated assumption that his long relationship with the troops would prevent them from harming him. While He referred to the mutineers with the pejorative term “bandits” (zei), his description of Yang’s confidence that the troops he had “nurtured” would not harm him also strongly suggests He’s agreement with Yang that they were ultimately rebels against the state and not their long-time commander.

He Changling’s description of Yang accorded more broadly with his thinking on military reform, a problem that had been much on his mind as he served as governor in the restive province of Guizhou from 1836 to 1845. During this time, as Philip Kuhn has pointed out, He had proposed a program of military reform that would have involved the drafting of “men from the underworld” to staff a force tasked with tracking down

737 For another account praising an officer named He Wentao 何文鶴 for his paternal relationship to new troops (xinbing) under his command, see Yan Ruyi, Leyuan wenchao ba juan 樂園文釵: 八卷 (1840; reprint, QDWSJ vol. 455), j.4.8b.

738 Note that this preface is not included in the widely available Guangwen shuju 廣文書局 edition of Yang’s nianpu.
In the early 1840s, he had also commented on the importance of military leadership. In an 1843 memorial, he followed a standard framework, distinguishing between “commanders” (dajiang) and “battle generals” (zhanjiang). He asserted that the latter—among whom he likely would have included Yang Fang—should have the “courage of an attack chariot” (shechong zhi yong 折衝之勇). He also insisted that they must “share in hardships and good times with their troops,” maintain “clarity in ranks” in order to “restore military administration” (必其明階級以修軍政), and drill their troops conscientiously in order to strengthen the prestige of the military (zhen junwei 振軍威). He Changling’s ideas on the training of locals and diligent military leadership, with an emphasis on the sharing of experience with one’s troops, accorded with Yang’s own narrative of the mutiny. Like Yang Fang he assumed the potential of irregulars to be transformed through the efforts and empathy of a single commander.

He’s take on the mutiny was reflected in a longer account written by Wei Yuan, another statecraft thinker who had paid a great deal of attention to the problem of military reform in his influential history of Qing military history (Shengwu ji). Wei Yuan followed Yang Fang in emphasizing the responsibility of the acting brigade general, Yang Zhizhen, whose culpability for the mutiny he characterized as follows:

At the time, Shaanxi [i.e. Guyuan] provincial commander Yang Yuchun had gone to the capital and brigade general Yang Fang had gone to Guyuan to serve in his place. Colonel (2b) Yang Zhizhen had temporarily replaced Yang Fang as Ningshan brigade general. When the soldiers came to him with their complaints, he did not make the situation clear to them,

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739 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, p. 51.
740 He, Nai’an wencun, j.[shou].11a-b.
741 He, Nai’an wencun, j.[shou].11a-b.
but just gave them a beating (笞治). Thereupon, Chen Dashun and Chen Xianlun of the left and right battalions conspired to revolt.

Drawing a stark contrast with Yang Zhizhen, Wei Yuan continued by emphasizing Yang Fang’s close relations with his troops. He asserted that the mutineers had released Yang’s family because Yang had “earned the esteem of his troops” (de shixin 得士心).\(^{743}\) He later described Yang Fang’s bravery—particularly his riding alone into the midst of the mutineers to negotiate their surrender. Wei Yuan concluded his chapter on the mutiny by noting that Yang Fang’s important role in persuading the mutineers to surrender had not been included in the memorial sent by Delengtai after the surrender. The memorial instead had laid the blame for the mutiny on Yang Fang’s indulgent treatment (jiao dai 驕待) of the new troops at Ningshan.\(^ {744}\)

Wei’s defense of Yang Fang’s leadership in Ningshan might be attributed in part to their close personal relationship. Wei Yuan had served as a tutor for Yang Fang’s sons while Yang was the provincial commander of Zhili in 1822, and had occasional interactions with Yang in the following years.\(^ {745}\) Regardless of their relationship, Yang’s actions at Ningshan exemplified Wei’s ideas on military leadership, some of which I have already discussed in the previous chapter. Like Luo Siju, Yang Fang had a disregard for personal risk, a willingness to undertake unsanctioned action, and an ability to tap into

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\(^{742}\) Wei, Shengwu ji, p. 365.

\(^{743}\) Wei, Shengwu ji, p. 365.

\(^{744}\) Wei, Shengwu ji, p. 372. For Delengtai’s assessment of Yang Fang, see Delengtai, Delengtai zougao, p. 378. Despite blaming the mutiny on Yang’s indulgence, Delengtai expressed faith in Yang Fang’s talent as a military officer. See ibid., p. 378-379.

the potential of soldiers from an irregular background.\textsuperscript{746} He seems to have exemplified the individual “human talent” ([式才](rencai) that Wei Yuan believed was necessary for military success.\textsuperscript{747} Much like He, Wei advocated a mode of officership in which the officer had considerable latitude to exercise his own judgment, rely on personal charisma, and expose himself to risk.

Each of these qualities, admired by all three writers, was in some way a challenge to the dynasty’s control over the military, either suggesting a disregard for the chain of command or a lack of confidence in the loyalty of troops toward the state. Not surprisingly, the accounts of the mutiny offered by Yang, He, and Wei ran directly against the official verdict reviewed above. The stance of the court toward the mutineers had been unsympathetic, as indicated early on by the emperor’s insistence that the mutineers not be referred to as “rebelling soldiers” ([叛兵](panbing)) but as “rebelling bandits” ([叛匪](panfei) or [叛賊](panzei)).\textsuperscript{748} In contrast, Yang, He, and Wei suggested that the mutineers’ discontent was legitimate. We might note that the term “panbing” was conspicuously present in the accounts of both Yang Fang and Wei Yuan, suggesting their disagreement with the characterization of the mutineers as simply unruly bandits. The emperor had also rejected the suggestion that problems could have been caused by an overly harsh brigade general unfamiliar with the troops. The problems, in his judgment, had emerged from a lack of discipline created by Yang Fang’s undue indulgence. Yang, He, and Wei, in contrast, suggested that it was only the continued affection between Yang and his troops that had been instrumental in preventing the mutineers from

\textsuperscript{746} On Wei Yuan’s high regard for paramilitaries from Sanyuanli in the Opium War, see Polachek, Inner Opium War, pp. 196-197.

\textsuperscript{747} For a translation of Wei Yuan’s discussion of human talent ([式才](rencai) in the preface to Shengwu ji, see Perdue, China Marches West, p. 502.

\textsuperscript{748} Delengtai, Delengtai zougao, p. 21.
pursuing greater violence and, ultimately, bringing the mutiny to an end.

**Songyun and the Execution of the Mutineers**

Of course, there was not a complete consensus on the nature of the mutineers and their relationship with Yang Fang. In the years immediately after the mutiny, there remained some who questioned the transformative effect of Yang Fang’s leadership on his men. Most prominent was Yili military governor, Songyun 松筠 (1752-1835), the official who ordered the execution of the mutineers sent into exile in Xinjiang. An account of Songyun’s official career, written by an anonymous author, provides the only detailed description I have found of the final demise of the mutineers in 1807:

In the eleventh month of the previous year (1806), Ta’erbahatai councilor Xiangbao sent a secret report that Pu Dafang and the other exiled mutineers from Ningshan were scheming to disobey. Songyun was aware that these mutineers were originally xiangyong, scoundrels who were malicious and unrepentant. At Ningshan garrison, they killed the government troops and went on a rampage. At that time the suppression of the rebellion was not carried through to the end (bu guo). It was memorialized that these men be exiled to Ta’erbahatai, Kashgar, Wushen, and Aksu. This decision could be regarded as contempt for principle. Punishments needed to be meted out as quickly as possible in order to prevent those living outside of the empire from taking the [defenses on the] frontiers lightly. Songyun immediately sent an order to Xiangbao and dispatched the Yili commandent, Se’erguan, to join him. Together they investigated and arrested the plotting mutineer Pu Dafang and more than fifty others. They executed those who had been exiled to Wushen, Aksu,
and Kashgar in the southern route.749

This account of the mutinous troops, and especially their leader Pu Dafang, differed markedly from that offered by Yang Fang and echoed by Wei Yuan and He Changling. For Yang Fang, Pu was a leader who “gained the hearts of his men” and an intermediary between Yang and the other mutineers.750 For Songyun, in contrast, Pu was only a “plotting mutineer” deserving of the harsh sentence he received. The negotiated settlement with the mutineers was not a sign of Yang Fang’s emotional hold on his troops, but rather an occasion on which the suppression of rebels had been left incomplete.

The difference between Songyun’s description of the mutineers and those of Yang, Wei, and He is useful for bringing to light a larger shift in thinking on the military in the nineteenth century. One perspective, espoused by Yang Fang, was concerned with how a military could be strengthened by cultivating close relationships among military men. The other, which we see in Songyun’s biography, focused not on relationships but on outward appearance or spectacle. In Yang Fang’s account, the moralization of the mutineers’ actions accorded with his attempt to weave a narrative showing how the reliability of the new soldiers was a product of intimacy between officers and troops and

749 Song Wenqing gong sheng guan lu 松文清公升官錄, in Beijing tushuguan cang zhenben nianpu congkan, vol.119 (Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), pp. 301-303. The description of the executions continued: “Wang Wenlong, Zhou Feng, and the others had rebelled along with Pu Dafang, destroying Yang county [city] and burning and pillaging Yanwu and Hu county. Since being exiled, they were even crueler. Since Pu Dafang and those with him were executed, it is certain that when Wang Wenlong and the others heard of it they would cause a disturbance. In this year, Songyun sent a communication to the councilor of the southern route, ordering him to transfer all of the convicts to Yili. At the same time, he ordered Se’erguan to wait for the convicts to arrive at Yongling and then divide them up and execute them. Songyun was afraid that the matter would not be kept secret, so decided it was better not to first submit a memorial. [After the emperor heard of the executions] Songyun received an edict stripping him of his position. His case was sent to the Board of Punishment to determine the punishment. Later, he responded to the edict with a memorial explaining himself. He received another edict telling him that if he had earlier clarified his actions in a memorial, it would not have come to his sudden removal from his post.”

750 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 158.
not the rigid application of regulations. For Songyun, the question of whether the soldiers had acted justifiably in Ningshan seems to have been of little interest. As soldiers, their value to the dynasty depended on their ability to project an image of the dynasty’s undivided power and not the resonance of their actions with nonofficial moral traditions. An army in which troops were allowed to base decisions on moral judgment and emotional bonds was also an army unlikely to inspire fear in their enemies (as had indeed been the case at Fangchai pass).

Songyun’s emphasis on the external appearance of the military may have been less a sign of his personal opinion than an effect of the geographical difference between Shaanxi and Xinjiang. He was not alone in worrying that those on the borders would lose their fear the Qing military if its troops showed signs of weakness. During the campaign in Xinjiang from 1826-1828, for instance, the Daoguang emperor had expressed a concern that the “outer barbarians” (waiyi 外夷) would disdain (qingshi 輕視) the Qing military if it did not produce a quick victory. It is quite likely that the inward turn of warfare in the nineteenth century was one of the factors laying behind the shift from a concern with spectacle to a concern with relationships. Songyun’s opinions accorded with the official military culture that had flourished during the Qianlong reign, a period in which much warfare had been conducted on the western or southwestern frontiers. The culture that accompanied this warfare was characterized by careful choreography and visual display—the hanging of portraits of military officers and battle paintings in the Ziguangge in Peking, the circulation of battle prints, the parading of illustrious officers in front of visiting emissaries at state banquets, an obsession with the uniform appearance of

troops even at the lowest ranks. These efforts were less an attempt to commemorate war than an effort to impress potentially unruly border peoples with the might of the Qing military.

As I have argued earlier in the dissertation, there was a reconfiguration and, in many regards, a curtailing of this spectacular military aesthetic beginning in the Jiaqing reign. Among the most visible changes was a decision not to produce battle paintings and officer portraits for any of the campaigns between 1796 and 1850, with the single exception of the campaign against Jehangir in the Daoguang reign. Also in marked contrast with the eighteenth century was the elimination of the massive grand review of troops (dayue 大閱) in the capital, an event that had been attended by “outer vassals” (waifan 外藩) who were described by Zeng Guofan as “awestruck” (破膽).753

The curtailing of the spectacular aspects of official military culture was also accompanied by a resurgence of cultural practices in China proper in which the state remained a “cultural authority”—authorizing certain sites and symbols as legitimate objects of cultural practice—but withdrew from direct choreography of the presentation and representation of the military. The fact that Yang Fang’s justification of affectionate relations between officer and and mutinous troops could appear quite openly in the Daoguang reign was one indication that military culture as a production of the dynasty,

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752 For an example of Qianlong’s concern with the appearance of even low-ranking troops, see his expression of disgust with the Green Standard use of tiger uniforms (hu mao hu yi 虎帽虎衣). QSL QL56/11/12, p. 680b-681a. The presentation of military men to foreign dignitaries was not, of course, unique to the Qing. It was also a prominent part of Ming court culture. On the latter, see David Robinson, “The Ming Court,” in Culture, Courtiers and Competition: The Ming Court (1368-1644), ed. David Robinson (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 45-46.

753 According to Zeng Guofan, this review had been held more than twenty times prior to 1812, but not held at all after this until 1850s. Li Tiandao 李天道, Zeng Guofan bingfa 曾國藩兵法 (Taipei: Diancangge, 2004), pp. 44-45. For a history of the dayue, see Waley-Cohen, Culture of War in China, pp. 71-75.
what James Scott has referred to as a public transcript,\textsuperscript{754} was giving way to military
culture as a field of practice. This change was due, no doubt, in part the shift from border
campaigns to internal wars, such as the White Lotus War. The inward turn of war seems
to have prompted some nineteenth century writers to detach troops from their status as
symbols of the dynasty, and reimagine them as actors embedded in complex interpersonal
relationships—whether within the military or with their opponents. The totalizing divide
between the undivided military and their barbarian other was simply untenable.

To return briefly to the Ningshan garrison, after the mutiny, the garrison was
reduced to a battalion (\textit{ying ō}) and brought under the jurisdiction of the brigade general
of nearby Hanzhong garrison.\textsuperscript{755} The antagonism between the established elite and recent
migrants that seems to have turned a small mutiny into a much larger uprising had also
apparently been defused. By the late 1820s, the Ningshan gazetteer compiler asserted, the
various groups of settlers were amicable, despite different customs, and usually able to
settle matters without involving the officials.\textsuperscript{756} The mutiny also led directly to a strong
official stance against the recruitment of \textit{xiangyong}, a stance that would be tested during
the Eight Trigrams uprising in 1813. However, if the garrison failed as an experiment in
the conversion of \textit{xiangyong} into regular troops, it succeeded in providing elements for
the writing of a new subject of war. This subject, a soldier formed over time by personal
bonds rather than an impersonal tool of a superior’s political ends, will be explored
further in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{754} James Scott, “The Public Transcript as a Respectable Performance,” in \textit{Domination and the Arts of

\textsuperscript{755} \textit{Hanzhong fu zhi} (1814), j.19.13b. The garrison was changed to a battalion (\textit{ying ō}) in 1808.
Although Ningshan and Dongjiangkou were not actually within Hanzhong prefecture, they both were

\textsuperscript{756} \textit{Ningshan ting zhi} (1829), j.1.18a
Chapter 7
‘A Mother’s Love’: Yang Yuchun and the Personal Bonds Among Military Men

In his influential study of the militarization of local elites in the mid-nineteenth century, Philip Kuhn argued that the armies organized by Hu Linyi 胡林翼 (1812-1861), Zeng Guofan 曾國藩 (1811-1872), and others to assist in the suppression of the Taiping in the mid-nineteenth century were characterized by a “personal mode of command” that drew inspiration from the Ming military thinker Qi Jiguang 戚繼光 (1528-1587). According to Kuhn, the “personal mode of command” taken up by mid-nineteenth century scholar-officials was “precisely the opposite of that which governed the Ch’ing [Qing] military: where the Ch’ing system avoided close and lasting contact between commanders and their troops, Ch’i’s [Qi’s] system fostered such contact. Where the Ch’ing system stressed the interchangeability of personnel, Ch’i’s system stressed durable personal loyalties.” It is true that Kuhn’s primary goal was not to understand the workings of the regular forces. His sketch of these forces, rather, allowed him to bring into greater relief the distinctive nature of the newly formed militias and provincial armies of the mid-nineteenth century. At the same time, Kuhn’s characterization of the regular military as a force ruled by a system of impersonal appointments was, if not a complete mischaracterization, at least an oversimplification that neglected important developments within the Green Standard arm of the regular forces during the early nineteenth century.

757 Kuhn, Rebellion and Its Enemies, p. 125.
758 Kuhn’s description of the Green Standard was based largely on Luo Ergang’s Lüying bing zhi.  
759 In their chapter in the Cambridge History, Susan Mann Jones and Philip Kuhn suggested that “the tendency to infuse impersonal systems with personalistic ties was manifested in all sphere of social interaction” in the early nineteenth century. However, they did not consider the implications of this development on the regular military. Jones and Kuhn, “Dynastic Decline,” p. 115.
There is much evidence that two features Kuhn used to distinguish regular forces from mid-nineteenth century “personal armies” (qinbing 親兵) were already emerging within the Green Standard forces of the early nineteenth century. As we shall see in this chapter, careers of regular military officers in the early nineteenth century were often shaped by their non-interchangeability. Many men gained appointment on the basis of experience, expertise, and personal relationships to trusted commanders. “Durable personal loyalties,” in turn, were not only more and more common within the early nineteenth century Green Standards, but deemed essential to the effective functioning of the Chinese forces in a substantial corpus of writings by officers, literati, officials, and even the Daoguang emperor (r. 1821-1850).

We have already seen examples of these developments earlier in the dissertation. The prevalence of Sichuanese officers like Luo Siju within their home province during the first decades of the nineteenth century, often in contravention of the laws of avoidance, had been justified by their particular expertise with the terrain and customs of their province. In the rewriting of the history of the Ningshan mutiny in the 1830s and early 1840s, Yang Fang, He Changling, and Wei Yuan reversed the official determination of the causes of the mutiny, asserting that the affection between Yang and his troops had been instrumental in resolving rather than causing the crisis. While an exploration of the full extent of these developments in the nineteenth century would require a more extensive survey of archival materials, this chapter provides further evidence for these developments through a case study of a military commander whose role in the nurturing and promotion of military talent was particularly well-documented in both official and nonofficial sources, Yang Yuchun 楊遇春 (1760-1837).

Yang, a native of Sichuan and military juren degree holder who had risen rapidly through the ranks during the White Lotus War, was with little doubt the most influential
military officer of the early nineteenth century. He served at the top of the military hierarchy in ShaanGan for more than three decades, holding posts of provincial commander (1b) of Gansu and Guyuan from 1800 to 1825 and governor-general (1a) of ShaanGan from 1825 to 1835. The first part of the chapter will examine the reasons for Yang’s lengthy tenure in the ShaanGan region and his influence on the Green Standard forces in ShaanGan and empirewide. I contend that Yang’s lengthy tenure, along with changing policies and approaches adopted by the central government during this period, paved the way for the emergence of lasting horizontal and vertical relations among Chinese military men in ShaanGan and, to a more limited extent, elsewhere in the empire. This is an image of the Green Standards that is in stark contrast to the “interchangeable” military described by Kuhn.

In the second part of the chapter, I go on to argue that these developments in ShaanGan were accompanied by an increasingly prominent discourse among officers serving in the Green Standard forces that validated close relationships among military men. A broad consensus on the importance of close bonds among troops and between officers and those under their command was apparent in the numerous manuals on training and discipline written by military officers between the 1810s and 1830s. Similar sentiments appeared in biographical and autobiographical writings by military men, writings that shed light not only on the relationships between soldiers and officers but also the close, even affectionate relationships among officers.

The Influence of Provincial Commanders

Much of Yang Yuchun’s career in the Green Standards was spent at the rank of provincial commander, tidu (1b), and it was during his years as provincial commander that his role as a patron of military talent became most apparent. Before turning to Yang’s own role as a patron, it is important to first consider the extent to which provincial
commanders were able to influence the officer ranks, whether regionally or more broadly. The early nineteenth century saw three developments that, I argue, laid the groundwork for Yang’s considerable influence with the Green Standards: new powers of appointment were accorded to provincial commanders; a continued prevalence of appointments by recommendation (*tibu 題補*); and a growing length of tenure, particularly in regions of strategic concern.

The early years of the Jiaqing reign saw devolution of powers over appointment from metropolitan officials and governors-general to top-ranking officers within the Green Standard forces. In 1800, Jiaqing gave provincial commanders the power to appoint men to the three lowest ranks in the Green Standards—ensign (9b-8a), sub-lieutenant (7a) and lieutenant (6a). The emperor explained that his decision was a favor to men of the lower ranks. Prior to this decision, appointment to these ranks had required the personal intervention of the governor-general. Two or three candidates would be recommended (*baosong 保送*) by their immediate commanding officer, they would then proceed to the provincial commander of Green Standard forces for inspection (*kaoyan 考验*), and finally for appointment (*babu 拔補*) by the governor-general.

Much like the system for approving the appointment of hereditary title heirs in Chapter 2, the requirement for travel to distant offices was perceived as a burden on impoverished low-ranking officers who “feared the hardship of accumulating expenses” (窮弁畏贈累之苦).\(^{760}\) Jiaqing ordered that responsibility for these appointments be given to governors-general or provincial commanders—whichever office was within closest travelling distance. Rather than requiring all recommended and examined officers to proceed to the governor-general’s yamen for a face-to-face meeting, the governor-general

\(^{760}\) QSL JQ5/6/3, p. 919b.
was simply to be informed of the appointments made at the discretion of provincial commander. He, in turn, would notify the Board of War of the appointment.\textsuperscript{761} When the governor-general undertook his inspection tours of garrisons under his jurisdiction (閩兵), he was to test those men appointed by provincial commanders.\textsuperscript{762}

In addition to the direct power to appoint men to the lowest ranks, provincial commanders continued to have considerable influence over the appointment of officers at higher ranks. The main avenue for this influence was the system of “appointment by recommendation” (題補). Dai Yingcong noted that the tibu system “allowed provincial officials to recommend lower officers to the higher openings within their provinces, whereas the regular procedures required the Board of War to prepare the slate from a pool of candidates who were often from other provinces.”\textsuperscript{763} In the eighteenth century, according to Dai, the system had been justified as a way to rapidly replace officers in important posts and to ensure that officers appointed to these posts were familiar with local conditions. In the nineteenth century, the official logic behind tibu appointments remained much the same. Provinces considered strategically most important—such as Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan—continued to have a high number of posts reserved for tibu appointments.\textsuperscript{764} According to Luo Ergang’s calculations (based on the Jiaqing Collected Statutes, 1818), in Sichuan, 61.6% of posts between the ranks of second captain (5b) and colonel (2b) were appointed through tibu; in Shaanxi, the figure was 61.1%; in Gansu, 96.4%.\textsuperscript{765}

\textsuperscript{761} QSL JQ5/6/3, p. 919b.
\textsuperscript{762} GXHDSL j.564, pp. 321b-322a.
\textsuperscript{763} Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, p. 148.
\textsuperscript{764} By way of comparison, the rate of tibu appointments in some provinces was very low: In Shanxi, for instance, only 1.3% of posts were selected through the tibu system. Luo Ergang, Lüying bing zhi, p. 315.
\textsuperscript{765} The full list is provided by Luo, Lüying bing zhi, p. 315. According to Luo, the list is based on the JQ Huidian j.35-37.
Wang Zhiming has argued that there was in fact an increase in the empire-wide ratio of *tibu* appointments from the Yongzheng to Jiaqing reigns. According to the numbers collected by Wang, approximately 48% of officers who had imperial audiences (*yinjian*)—usually when leaving or taking up a post—had *tibu* appointments in the Yongzheng reign; in the Qianlong period, the number had risen to 55%; in the Jiaqing period the ratio was 58%. While it was not impossible to pass through a military career without a *tibu* appointment, the men from Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu who—as I will discuss shortly—increasingly dominated the top ranks of the Green Standards in the early nineteenth century nearly always benefited from a *tibu* appointment on several occasions in their careers. My survey of official resumés, prepared for the emperor before imperial audiences, suggests that *tibu* appointments played a key role in the careers of numerous officers who rose to the highest ranks during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns. Of 114 officers from this period with at least one *tibu* appointment, 24 rose to the rank of provincial commander and 53 rose to the rank of brigade general. Some of these officers enjoyed as many as four *tibu* appointments over the course of their careers.

Because these statistics were based on high-ranking officers coming to Peking for an imperial audience, the rising ratio of *tibu* appointments among these men suggests not only that the high ranks were increasingly dominated by men promoted through the *tibu* process but, moreover, that officers from provinces with a higher ratio of *tibu* posts, such as Gansu and Sichuan, were coming to dominate high officer posts empire-wide. That is, it would appear that many of the officers who would come to dominate the high ranks in the Green Standards had spent their early careers in provinces with high ratios of *tibu*

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767 Official resumes of officers with imperial audiences during the Jiaqing and Daoguang can be found in LLD, j.2.
appointment. Given that many of these officers had multiple tibu appointments, they also seem to have benefitted from a series of appointments within the same province, reflecting a degree of confidence or familiarity on the part of their superior officers. What we see in these numbers is not an interchangeable military but, rather, two things: (1) a system of regional military formations within the Green Standards in which young officers were both well known to their superiors and reliant on this familiarity for their career success; and (2) the growing importance of several of these formations as sources for high-ranking officers empire-wide.

The powers of appointment accorded to provincial commanders, whether through direct appointment to lower ranks or through the tibu system, were augmented by a third development in the early nineteenth century: a growing length of tenure for top military commanders in the Green Standards. In the years after the White Lotus War, the tenures of provincial commanders (1b), the top rank in the Green Standard forces, saw marked growth. The average length of a posting during the Qianlong reign (1736-1795) was 2.8 years. In the Jiaqing reign (1796-1820), the average tenure grew to 3.9 years, and in the Daoguang reign (1821-1850) it decreased slightly to 3.6 years. The number of lengthy appointments had also increased as a ratio of all appointments. In the Qianlong reign, only 23% of provincial commander appointments lasted five years or longer; in the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns this had increased to 33%. A similar development occurred at the rank of brigade general (2b), immediately below the provincial commander. In the key military region of ShaanGan, which I will focus on for most of this chapter, the

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768 I have compiled this data from the QSL. Several provincial commanders between 1800 and 1840 held tenures of at least one decade: Yang Yuchun (1802-6; 1808-25) and Hu Chao 胡超 (1833-45) in Guyuan; Li Guodong 李國棟 in Yunnan (1825-36); Feng Shen 豐紳 (1801-11) and Gui Han 桂涵 in Sichuan (1822-33); Luo Siju 羅思舉 in Hubei (1825-40); Zhu Tingbiao in Hunan (1815-23); Wang Yingfeng 王應鳳 in Zhejiang (1820-32); Xu Wenmo 許文謨 (1806-24) and Ma Jisheng 馬濟勝 (1824-38) in the Fujian land forces; Wang Delu 王得祿 in the Fujian naval forces (1808-20).
average length of tenure for brigade generals increased from 2.9 years in the Qianlong period to 3.7 years during the Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns. More significantly, perhaps, many of these brigade generals spent a substantial portion of their careers as officers in only one provincial command: an average of 15.7 years. The growth of provincial commander tenures brought expanded opportunities to ease the promotion of their protégés through the ranks, a key enabling factor in the development of distinct regional military formations characterized by close and long-lasting ties between officers holding senior ranks and their younger protégés.

The growing tenure of provincial commanders provided them new opportunities to influence appointment within their jurisdiction. At the lower levels, a long-serving provincial commander could usher his favorites through the three lowest ranks with little interference from his superiors. In tibu appointments, the influence of the commander was limited by the need to gain the approval of higher-ranking provincial officials and the emperor himself. However, the vast number of candidates competing for a small number of posts meant that the favor of a provincial commander could play an important, sometimes even essential, role in the promotion of an officer to a tibu post. To illustrate this role, let us look at the most common use of tibu appointments, the promotion from lieutenant (6a) to second captain (5b).

In the early nineteenth century, there were approximately 800 second captain positions empire-wide. Candidates for these positions—positions that marked the

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769 The statistics on appointments of brigade generals and provincial commanders are based primarily on data from QSL, which notes the appointment and transfer of officers at the brigade general and provincial commander ranks. These statistics, of course, are only suggestive of patterns that require further investigation. As Kent Guy pointed out in his study of the tenure of provincial governors, the length of terms “should be understood in terms of thick descriptions, considerations of moment and function, rather than thin statistical ones.” Guy, Qing Governors, p. 83.

770 This average is based on biographical materials for brigade generals from gazetteers and QDZJ and the quanwei database at http://archive.lhp.sinica.edu.tw/ttsweb/html_name/search.php.
gateway to higher offi cerships—included not only the 1,600 men holding the
immediately subordinate rank of lieutenant but also the hundreds of military jinshi degree
holders as well as heirs of the cloud commander (yunqiwei) hereditary title (numbering at
least 1,000 men in this period). Given the great disparity between the number of
candidates and available positions, it is clear that many lieutenants never made the
transition. Those who did relied on the favor of a commanding of cer. For lieutenants,
the fi rst step in the process of tibu appointment to a second captain post was admission
into a pool of qualified candidates for both tibu and regular posts. The creation of the
pool began with inspections at the provincial level, which took place after a requisite
period of six years at the rank of lieutenant, a period known as fengman 俸滿. The
inspection was undertaken by governor-general (or govern or), provincial commander,
and brigade general (由督撫提鎮考驗). These inspections, as summarized by Luo
Ergang, considered aptitude and military skills (rencai gongma 人才弓馬), age and
physical strength (nianli jingzhuang 年力精壯), and familiarity with the duties of an
offi cer (shu’an yingwu 熟暗營伍).

Those candidates who passed inspection at the provincial level would be sent to
Peking for a test conducted by the Board of War. Those approved by the Board would
move on to an imperial audience (yinjian 引見) and fi nal approval for eligibility for a
second captain post. The approved candidates were, at this point, divided into two groups.

771 Heirs of the GC title were eligible for appointment as lieutenant, one rank lower than CC heirs. On the
regulations governing the awarding of second captain ranks to military jinshi, see JQHDSL j.448. On
the military examination system, see S. R. Gilbert, “Mengzi’s Art of War: The Kangxi Emperor
Reforms the Qing Military Examinations,” in Military Culture in Imperial China, edited by Nicola Di
Cosmo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009). The triennial military examinations produced
approximately 100 to 200 military jinshi.

772 On occasion, the requirement that fengman be completed before promotion was waived. For an
example, see NGDK 044291, JQ15/8/18.

773 Luo, Lüying bing zhi, p. 305.
Those with experience in war (chubing 出兵) would be put into the pool for tibu posts (houti 候題); those without such experience would be added to the list for regular openings (houtui 候推) according to the date of their imperial audience (按引見年月日期). In the following three years, the performance of those on the list for regular posts would be monitored. Those who continued to show promise would remain eligible for appointments; those who did not could be removed from the list. Those who showed outstanding promise could be promoted from the list for regular openings to the list for tibu appointments; or, if already on the list for tibu appointments, given precedence in appointment (gai wei jiyong 改為即用). Significantly, precedence could be granted at the provincial level, without further inspection by the Board of War or an imperial audience.

When a tibu post opened up in a given province, the provincial commander in conference with the governor-general or governor would select from eligible candidates on the tibu list and notify the Board of War.

Thus, a provincial commander had influence at the beginning of the tibu process, when he could nominate candidates for approval at higher levels, and at the end of the process, when he could help match vacant posts within his province with eligible candidates. A provincial commander’s ability to influence the officer ranks of a given military region through the tibu system was, however, circumscribed by the length of his tenure. The shorter tenures of provincial commanders in the eighteenth century relative to the early nineteenth would have reduced their ability to influence the process. That is, while provincial commanders with short tenures would have been able to nominate men at the early stages or help choose appointees from among a pool of tibu candidates, he

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774 Luo, Lüying bing zhi, p. 305. In cases where there was a shortage of lieutenants (6a) with combat experience (chubing 出兵) or outstanding merit, the governor or governor-general could select outstanding lieutenants from the 候推 pool. JQHDSL j.450, p. 1247.  
775 Luo, Lüying bing zhi, p. 306.
would have only rarely been able to participate in both the nomination and selection stage. Nor would a short-serving provincial commander be likely to know personally the candidates at the selection stage. As we shall see through the case of Yang Yuchun, the growth in the length of provincial commander tenures in the first half of the nineteenth century introduced new opportunities for these commanders to nominate and select men they believed suited to *tibu* posts, men whom they had often already personally ushered through the lower ranks.

**Yang Yuchun and the Guyuan Command**

The potential of these structural developments to lay the groundwork for the development of regional military formations centered on powerful commanders was most clearly exemplified in the Guyuan command in ShaanGan, where Yang Yuchun served as provincial commander from 1802 to 1805 and 1808 to 1824.

The strategically significant jurisdiction of the Guyuan provincial commander included all of Shaanxi province and the eastern portion of Gansu. Both provinces were within the ShaanGan administrative region (Map 7.1). ShaanGan had a Green Standard military presence of approximately 100,000 men under the command of three provincial commanders based in Guyuan department, Ganzhou prefecture, and Urumqi. Of the three, the Guyuan command had the most men. The Guyuan provincial commander counted 12,617 troops and 316 officers directly under his command along with 28,935 troops and 680 officers in five other garrisons under his jurisdiction (Table 7.1).

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776 For information on location of garrisons in ShaanGan, see JQHDSL j.474.
777 For a breakdown of numbers for each garrison, see Table 1.
Map 7.1 The ShaanGan region and garrisons under the Guyuan provincial commander (ca. 1818)

Base map and points are from Harvard China GIS: www fas harvard edu/~chgis/
Table 7.1. Garrisons and Troops under the Guyuan Provincial Commander

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Garrison Name</th>
<th>Location of offices of tidu (1b) or zongbing (2a)</th>
<th>Number of Officers and Troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guyuan</td>
<td>Guyuan zhou, Gansu</td>
<td>317 officers (including tidu)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12617 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yansui zhen</td>
<td>Yulin fu, Shaanxi</td>
<td>171 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5902 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaan’an zhen</td>
<td>Xing’an fu, Shaanxi</td>
<td>91 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4651 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezhou zhen</td>
<td>Hezhou, Gansu</td>
<td>159 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8132 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hanzhong zhen</td>
<td>Hanzhong fu, Shaanxi</td>
<td>153 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6691 troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xi’an zhen</td>
<td>Xi’an fu, Shaanxi</td>
<td>106 officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3559 troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Yang’s appointment as provincial commander of Guyuan was the culmination of two decades of military service during which he benefited from the patronage of two of the empire’s most powerful generals. Yang, a native of Chongqing department 崇慶州 in Sichuan (not to be confused with Chongqing prefecture) and military juren degree holder, had attracted the attention of the Manchu general Fukang’an 福康安 (1753-1796) early in

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778 JQHDSL j.474.
his career. He served under Fukang’an over the course of campaigns in Tibet, Taiwan, and Guizhou in the 1780s and 1790s. After Fukang’an’s death in 1796, Yang would go on to fight under another Manchu general, Eledengbao 额勒登保 (1748-1805), during the White Lotus War. It was during this conflict that he moved into the upper echelons of the military hierarchy. In the first five years of this rebellion he rose from major (3b) to provincial commander (1b) of Gansu (1800-1802) and then of Guyuan. Yang’s lengthy tenure in Guyuan, followed by a decade as governor-general of ShaanGan, allowed him to wield substantial influence both within Guyuan and, indirectly, across the Green Standard forces where his protégés would come to predominate the top ranks. His 18 years at Guyuan command was the longest tenure of any provincial commander at a single post since at least 1735.\footnote{I surveyed provincial commander appointments listed in the QSL during the Qianlong, Jiaqing and Daoguang reigns.} It is also noteworthy that he took up the post of provincial commander—often occupied by men at the nadir of their careers—at an unusually young age. Born in 1760, he was in his early forties when he began his time at Guyuan, not much older than many of the lower-ranking officers with whom he had developed close relations during the White Lotus War.

The success of Guyuan troops under Yang’s leadership was most likely the main reason for the unusual length of his tenure as provincial commander. Troops from Guyuan were active in many of the major conflicts of the early nineteenth century. They played a key role in the suppression of the 1813 Eight Trigrams uprising in Shandong and Zhili, the 1814 uprising among lumbermen in Shaanxi and the revolt led by Jehangir in Alitshahr from 1826 to 1828.\footnote{For a history of this revolt, see Laura Newby, \textit{The Empire and the Khanate: A Political History of Qing Relations with Khoqand c.1760-1860} (Leiden: Brill, 2005), ch. 4.} They would also be sent to fight in the distant Opium
War in the early 1840s. Apart from the Opium War, which took place several years after his death, Yang Yuchun was given a leadership role in each of these conflicts.

The length of his term may have also been due in part to factors particular to the administration of border regions. As Kent Guy has noted, lengthy terms for provincial governors also tended to be most common in provinces on the borders, where duties were specialized and nontransferable. Not surprisingly, the government in the northwest was, in Guy’s terms, “more insular” than governments elsewhere in the empire, with most governors coming from within the same region or the capital, rather than from other provinces. Similar patterns appear to have been true of the early nineteenth century military. Yang Yuchun was only the first of three long-serving provincial commanders of Guyuan in the first half of the nineteenth century. Yang Yuchun was followed as Guyuan commander by Yang Fang, who served from 1825 to 1833 and Hu Chao (?-1849), who served from 1829 to 1845.

Whatever the reasons for the longevity of Yang Yuchun’s tenure in Guyuan, it is clear that he took advantage of his lengthy posting to fill the officer ranks with men he trusted. A late nineteenth century biography of Yang Yuchun, by one of his descendants, provided the lengthiest list I have found of the “numerous” (hongduo 宏多) men “formed” (zaojiu 造就) by Yang. If we examine the thirteen men on this list a number of shared
features are immediately apparent. Nearly all of these officers were, like Yang himself, natives of Sichuan. The exceptions were Qi Shen, a native of Xinye county in Henan, Luo Ying’ao and Shi Shengyu, natives of Gansu, and Yang Fang, a native of Guizhou. Second, many had served under Yang Yuchun as common soldiers or junior officers during conflicts of the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century. Third, nearly all had spent a substantial amount of time as officers under Yang Yuchun’s jurisdiction in Guyuan. The length of his tenure would have allowed him to remain active in the careers of many of these officers for a decade or more. Fourth, none of these officers had entered the officer ranks through the military examination system, suggesting that their early rise from regular soldiers to officers had been the result of the recognition of a superior officer rather than a bureaucrat in Peking.

The devolution in powers of appointment to provincial commanders, examined in the previous section, coincided with Yang Yuchun’s own rise to the top of the Green Standard ranks. In 1800 he was promoted to the post of Gansu provincial commander, and in 1802 to Guyuan commander. The latter position gave him jurisdiction over five garrisons in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces (Table 7.1). Apart from a two-year demotion after the Ningshan uprising, he held this post until 1825, when Daoguang appointed him governor-general of ShaanGan. Several officers listed by the biographer—including Chen Jinshou, Tang Feng, and Xiang Rong—were promoted to ranks of ensign (8a), sub-lieutenant (7a), or lieutenant (6a) within the Guyuan command, promotions that could

Shen 齊慎 (1775-1844), Xiang Rong 向榮 (?-1856), Chen Jinshou 陳金炤 (?-1856), Tang Feng 唐俸 (?-1839), Wu Tinggang 吳廷剛 (?-1814), Ma Tenglong 馬騰龍 (1775-1852), Lü Tianfeng 呂天俸 (?), Yu Buyun 余步雲 (1774-1842), Hu Chao 胡超 (?-1849), Zhu Tingbiao 許廷彪 (1770-1842), and Yang Fang.

On Yang Yuchun’s preference for Sichuanese natives, see also the end of this chapter. For an example of a less prominent Sichuanese native whose military career was propelled by Yang, see the biography of Pu Ming 蒲明 in Zhangming xian zhi (1874), j.38.5a-b.

The only degree holder among Yang Yuchun’s protégés was Qi Shen, a military student (wusheng).
have been made by Yang as a provincial commander. There were also a number of men on this list who gained *tibu* appointments during Yang’s tenure as either Guyuan provincial commander or ShaanGan governor-general. These included Chen, Tang, and Xiang, as well as Qi Shen, Luo Ying’ao, and Shi Shengyu.  

The similar backgrounds of these officers, along with the powers of appointment accorded to Yang as Guyuan provincial commander, are suggestive of Yang Yuchun’s influence and particular concerns. If this list is any indication, Yang had a preference for Sichuanese officers who had risen through the ranks from common soldiers, rather than through the military examination system, and whom he had known as a young officer during the White Lotus War. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find sources that reveal the particulars of the relations between these men and Yang Yuchun. The one exception, which I examine in detail later in this chapter, was the relation between Yang Yuchun and Yang Fang. More typically scanty in documentation was the relation between Yang Yuchun and Xiang Rong, a native of Daning county in Sichuan who had entered the military during the early years of the White Lotus War. Yang’s relation with Xiang, while only scantily documented, provides some indication of how his powers of appointment and lengthy tenure could have a profound impact on the career fortunes of a soldier who gained his attention.

According to most accounts of Xiang’s life, he had been kidnapped as a youth by White Lotus forces moving through his village in northeastern Sichuan in 1796. These

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788 The information on the men in this paragraph is from the QSL, LLD, QDZJ, gazetteer biographies, and Ming-Qing renwu zhuangji ziliao (http://archive.ihp.sinica.edu.tw/tsweb/html_name/search.php).

789 He would become an important commander against the Taiping in the early 1850s before dying in battle in 1856. Xiang became notorious in some circles for his failures against the Taiping. See Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies*, p. 114.
forces, impressed by his imposing physique, had forced him to join their ranks. Xiang remained with the White Lotus forces for approximately one year. After the contingent to which he was attached was defeated in Henan, Xiang was captured by a military degree holder named Zhang Qi’ao (張起_DAC? (1796-1826) who returned Xiang to his father. According to one biographer, his father beat him terribly for serving with the rebels, prompting Xiang to flee from his home. Xiang soon made his way to Shaanxi province and entered the Guyuan command as a common soldier sometime in the late 1790s. Yang Yuchun, who had been appointed the Guyuan provincial commander in 1802, seems to have taken an interest in Xiang. Yang Yongshu, a descendant and author of an illustrated biography of Yang Yuchun, wrote that Yang had arranged a marriage for Xiang with the daughter of a gardener (huajiang 花匠) who worked in the provincial commander’s headquarters. Other accounts suggest that Xiang came to Yang’s attention during or shortly before the suppression of the Eight Trigrams uprising in 1813.

These other accounts, while less colorful, are better supported by the trajectory of Xiang’s career. It was only after the campaign in 1813 that Xiang began to move up the ranks: in 1816 Yang promoted him from ensign (8a) to sub-lieutenant (7a) of the front battalion of the Guyuan command (Guyuan tibiao qianying); in 1821, Yang promoted Xiang to lieutenant (6a). In 1824, after completing a three-year eligibility period

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790 This is described, for instance, in Daning xian zhi (1886), j.8.muzhi.1 in an epitaph for Xiang Rong by Jiangsu governor Xu Naizhao 許乃釗 (1799-1878).
791 Chen Danran 陳澹然, “Xiang Rong Zhang Guoliang liezhuan 向榮張國樑列傳” in Chen Danran, Jiang biao zhong lüe, QDZJ 60-345. Zhang Qi’ao would eventually rise to the rank of brigade general. If this account of Xiang’s origins is true, the encounter with Zhang would have taken place in 1796 or 1797, when Zhang was still in Henan. See Zhang’s biography in QDZJ 170-327. Interestingly, Zhang also became a military officer under Yang Yuchun’s command in 1803 (QDZJ 170-329). Zhang would serve out his career in ShaanGan, culminating with an appointment as brigade general at Hezhou, one of the garrisons under the jurisdiction of the Guyuan provincial commander.
792 Yang Yongshu 楊永淑, Yang Zhongwu gong jishi lu 楊忠武公記事錄 (Baohuantang, 1911), 11b. See, for instance, Guangxi tongzi jiyao (1889), j.1.43a.
(fengman), Xiang was promoted to second captain (5b) of Ningshan battalion, a tibu appointment within Yang’s jurisdiction. In the same year, Xiang was promoted to first captain (4a) of the Jingyuan regiment stationed in Jingyuan county, 140 km to the east of Guyuan city and immediately under the Guyuan provincial commander. In 1827 and 1828, Xiang Rong joined Yang Yuchun in the campaign to suppress the revolt led by Jehangir in Altishahr. In 1829, he was appointed first captain (4a) of Jinsuoguan in Yaozhou, a department (zhou) that was located approximately 70 km north of Xi’an. Xiang stayed at this post until his transfer to Zhili in 1833 (Map 7.1). Yang Yuchun and Xiang Rong had known each other for at least thirty years by the time of Xiang’s transfer.

Many sources indicate that Yang Yuchun’s official powers of appointment, clearly important in Xiang’s early career, were accompanied by an informal relationship that was enabled by the lengthy period that the two spent in the same command. For at least part of his period of service in ShaanGan, Xiang Rong belonged to Yang Yuchun’s bodyguard (often referred to as geshiha 戈什哈), a small group of crack troops that Yang had begun to recruit during the White Lotus War. Xiang’s membership in the bodyguard (a force which, it should be noted, was entirely invisible in government sources) suggests that Xiang and Yang were at least well acquainted, and possibly quite intimate. One biographer recounted an incident that revealed Yang’s particular attachment to these troops, describing how Yang had risked death to retrieve the bodies of two of the men who had been killed by rebels in the 1813 uprising. The geographical

[795] Li, Shizhai fujun nianpu, vol. 124, p. 160. This revolt was described by Laura Newby in The Empire and the Khanate (Leiden: Brill, 2005), ch. 4.
[796] Geshiha is a Manchu term. In 1803, Jiaqing had proscribed the use of the term geshiha in memorials. He asserted that the use of the term was a “vulgar custom” (louxi) that should be replaced by the use of the actual names and ranks of those being referred to. QSL JQ8/7/12, p. 547a.
[798] Li, Guochao xianzheng shilüe, QDZJ 193-52.
proximity of some of Xiang’s appointments to Yang Yuchun’s own offices may be a further sign that Yang attempted to keep the young officer close to his side (Map 7.1). Biographical sources, while short on details and written some time after the death of Xiang, described a close personal relationship rather than mere professional ties between Xiang and Yang. Zhu Kongzhang 朱孔彰 (1842-1919) asserted that Yang Yuchun “trusted and cherished Xiang the most” (zui xin’ai zhi 最信愛之). Chen Danran (1859-1930) suggested that Xiang had been the champion in riding and archery during a military review, after which he received instruction from Yang Yuchun in the military arts.

Are these stories reliable? At best, we can say that many of the details of the close and lasting relationship between Yang Yuchun and Xiang Rong are consistent with other sources that describe Yang Yuchun’s recruitment and cultivation of personal troops from the early nineteenth century. A biography of Yang Yuchun, written by his two sons in 1839, described his leadership of a group of troops from Hezhou in Gansu, men who had “long served under his command” (jiu suo ling 舊所領). In one often-repeated incident

799 The claims of biographical sources must be treated with caution, as Peter Bol has pointed out, claims that a biographical subject had a particular teacher can say more about the perceived importance of the teacher than any sustained relationship between teacher and student. In the case of Xiang Rong, however, I believe there is adequate evidence to assume that Yang was close to Xiang and had played an important role in Xiang’s career. See Peter Bol, “GIS, Prosopography, and History,” Annals of GIS 18.1 (March 2012): 3.
800 Zhu Kongzhang, Xianfeng yilai gongchen biezhuan 咸豐以來功臣別傳, j.13a, (QDZJ 49-242).
801 Chen Danran, “Xiang Rong Zhang Guoliang liezhuhan,” QDZJ 60-346. One of these arts may have included the cultivation of relationships with the supernatural realm. Judging by his use of a black banner in battle, Xiang Rong likely inherited Yang Yuchun’s devotion for the deity Zhenwu and, like Yang, borrowed the deity’s considerable prestige and power to bolster his own. According to Chen Danran, Xiang, like Yang, carried a black banner. Xiang’s black banner and its effects on Taiping forces were also mentioned in Xu zuan Jiangning fu zhi (1880), j.14.1.14b
802 Yang Guozuo 楊國佐 and Yang Guozhen 楊國楨, Zhongwu gong nianpu 忠武功年譜 (ca. 1840-50; reprint, Beijing: Beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 1999), 16b. Who were these Hezhou troops? While I have found no source that identifies the troops, it is possible that they included Zhu Gui, a native of Hezhou, an officer who would be killed in the Opium War along with more than 200 other troops from Gansu. See Zhu’s biography in the QSG j.372.
from the White Lotus War, Yang offered clemency to eight hundred rebels in exchange for their loyalty to his command.\textsuperscript{803} Wei Yuan described Yang Yuchun’s use of “personal soldiers” (qinbing 親兵) in the White Lotus War and Ningshan mutiny in 1806.\textsuperscript{804} Yang Fang, whose biography of Yang Yuchun I will discuss later in this chapter, described a small group of about eighty talented warriors of diverse provincial origins—both bodyguards (geshiha) and experienced officers (suizheng deli yuanbian 隨征得利員弁)—that Yang Yuchun summoned and led to Henan in 1813.\textsuperscript{805} Many of Yang Yuchun’s biographers also asserted that he had an unusual ability to inspire those under his command. His two sons described their father’s ability to give exhausted troops courage and fortitude (疲兵經公訓練膽力即壯而精).\textsuperscript{806} The troops he had trained, they suggested, fought ably under his command but became listless or ill disciplined when transferred to other officers.\textsuperscript{807}

In the 1850s, Yang Yuchun was remembered by some as an officer who had made effective use of personal forces within the regular military. A memorial from Fuzhan 福旃 (?) in 1853, for instance, argued for the establishment of personal forces for all governors-general and provincial commanders, asserting that Yang Yuchun had “a personally-cultivated force numbering more than three hundred men” (自養親兵三百餘人) that had enabled him to “kill bandits and gain success” (殺賊立功).\textsuperscript{808}

While Yang’s case may not be representative, his active patronage of Xiang Rong, the shared backgrounds of many of his appointees, and the substantial evidence that he

\textsuperscript{804} Wei, \textit{Shengwu ji}, p. 520.
\textsuperscript{805} Yang Fang, \textit{Yang Shizhai}, pp. 30b-31a.
\textsuperscript{806} Yang Guozuo and Yang Guozhen, \textit{Zhongwu gong nianpu}, p. 17a.
\textsuperscript{807} Yang Guozuo and Yang Guozhen, \textit{Zhongwu gong nianpu}, p. 17a-b.
had relied on personal forces should be enough to question the characterization of the Green Standard forces as uniformly a collection of interchangeable parts that was radically dissimilar from the “personal” forces formed by literati during the Taiping War. Structural developments in the Green Standards allowed Yang to exert substantial influence over the composition of the officer ranks in Guyuan. The structural opportunities for the nurturing of protégés were accompanied, in Yang’s case, by his reputation at court. In the following section, I show that Yang Yuchun’s personal influence in the Green Standards was further enabled by the Daoguang emperor’s decision to entrust military leadership to men who had been personally trained and selected by Yang. Yang’s reputation at court provided channels for the extension of his influence beyond the Guyuan command to the officer ranks of the Green Standards empire-wide.

Yang Yuchun’s Reputation within the Bureaucracy and the Reliance on Personal Relationships among Green Standard Officers

In 1821, in his tenth month as emperor, Daoguang raised the problem of military training in an edict circulated among high-ranking provincial officials and military officers. He noted that Jiaqing had once called on officers to be diligent in training even during times of peace. Yet, Daoguang asserted, the various Banner forces remained inferior to those of earlier periods (fei congqian ke bi 非從前可比) and the quality of Green Standard troops was uneven (qiangruo bu yi 強弱不一). He ordered “generals [of the Banner forces], governors-general and governors, provincial commanders, and brigade generals [of the Green Standards]” to individually submit carefully considered plans on how to supplement the regular training schedule.  

809 QSL DG1/10/24, p. 446a.
Daoguang’s expressed concern with military preparedness stood in a long line of similar pronouncements by earlier emperors, but his reaction to memorials submitted in response to his edict provide us with insight into problems that were particular to the provincial commanders and Green Standard forces of the 1810s and 1820s. Daoguang’s reactions, many of which were preserved in the *Veritable Records*, ranged from effusive praise to scathing criticism. Indeed, he seems to have spared only one officer, Yang Yuchun, from either criticism or warning. In his response to Yang Yuchun, whom he had awarded the prestigious title Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent (*taizishaobao*) only one month earlier, the emperor praised Yang for his diligence and competence in Guyuan:

For a long time your training and drilling of military men has been effective. I am well aware of the victories that have been gained as a result. It is indeed rare to find men like you among provincial commanders. Because I know that military preparedness must not be allowed to become lax, I promulgated an edict [calling for proposals on training]. How I think fondly of the powerful forces under your command, effusive in their loyalty and conscientious in their duties. You must continue to train your men as before. I have specially sent along calligraphy of the characters for good fortune and longevity, wishing you great happiness and long life.

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810 On expressions of concern over Banner and Green Standard decline by Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong, see Chang, *A Court on Horseback*, pp. 167-178.
811 According to Yang Fang, Daoguang had talked on many occasions with his officials (*dachen*) about the merit (*gong*) of officers during the 1813 rebellion and they had concluded that Yang Yuchun’s merit had been the greatest, thus the emperor decided to award him with the title. Yang Fang, *Yang Shizhai*, p. 34b.
The emperor was less effusive in response to others who had responded to his edict. He commended Yang Fang, provincial commander of Zhili and a protégé of Yang Yuchun, for his observations on the importance of formations in battle and his detailed diagrams but also warned him not to “rely on empty words alone” (tu tuo kongyan 徒託空言). Similarly, he warned Wang Delu 王得祿 (?-1842), commander of Zhejiang, not to treat the order to improve training as “a mere formality” (juwen 具文) or to allow “negligence to develop over time.” He ordered the long-serving commander of Fujian land forces, Xu Wenmo 許文謙 (?-1824), to act in accordance to the existing regulations and chastised him for focusing on the obstacles to implementing a revised training program.

The emperor reserved his harshest response for the governor of Guangdong, to whom he wrote that “your so-called ‘increase in training in order to produce real results’ was nothing but empty verbiage (一片虛文) that you have done nothing to carry out.” This critique, along with Daoguang’s quick replacement of two provincial commanders in Guangdong in 1821, suggests that he may have been informed of pressing issues with the military in the province.

If Daoguang understood the military to be confronted not so much with a general decline in military preparedness as with stark regional differences in the competency of officers, his solution to the problem remained grounded in conventional techniques of punishment and flattery: in his responses, he threatened incompetent officers with punishment or demotion and praised those, like Yang Yuchun, whose efforts had

812 QSL DG1/12/27, p. 497a.
813 QSL DG1/12/27, p. 477b.
814 QSL DG2/2/18, p. 519a-b.
produced results. He did not provide an avenue for Yang to extend his influence beyond Guyuan. His responses did, however, provide a clear indication that he considered Yang Yuchun outstanding among officers.

Yang Yuchun’s reputation as an able commander and diligent military trainer continued to be burnished at court in the years after 1821. Daoguang himself had met with Yang Yuchun during an imperial audience in the first month of the second year of his reign. If we can trust Yang Fang’s record of the audience, Daoguang had praised Yang Yuchun for his “integrity in carrying out official duties” (banshi caoshou 辨事操守), while also admonishing him to instruct (jiaoxun) his eldest son and younger brother (a military officer). The audience was followed by the promotion of Yang Yuchun’s eldest son, Yang Guozhen (1782-1849) from the post of Yunnan salt taotai (yanfadao, 4a) to Yunnan judicial commissioner (anchashi 3a).817

In 1823, Nayancheng, a prominent Manchu official under whom Yang Yuchun and forces from Guyuan had served during the suppression of the 1813 Millenarian uprising, submitted a review of garrisons in Guyuan. The review was glowing, in contrast with Nayancheng’s review of the Ningshan garrison two decades earlier (See Chapter 6). Nayancheng asserted that “battle formations were extremely orderly,” weapons were in good condition, soldiers demonstrated a remarkable competence in archery and shooting, and Yang Yuchun had successfully instructed them in a “quick attack formation” (速戰陣隊) that was both rapid and orderly (快速整齊). They were, Nayancheng asserted, on the top tier of all the Green Standard forces (實可為通營伍之魁堪以列為一等).818

Two years after Nayancheng’s review, Yang Yuchun was promoted to the post of acting (shu) governor-general of ShaanGan (DG5/10/27), while concurrently serving as

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817 Yang, Yang Shizhai, 35a-36b.
818 NGDK 204522, DG3/7.
provincial commander of Guyuan. In an edict, the emperor expressed his confidence in Yang’s familiarity with military affairs (yingwu 營務) in Shaanxi and Gansu, while reminding him to be diligent in the administration of civil affairs (difang gongshi 地方公事). Yang’s success in civil administration is the topic for another study, but he appears to have retained his reputation as an excellent military commander. Shaanxi governor Lu Kun (1772-1835), dispatched to Suzhou 蘇州 in Gansu province in 1826 to assist ShaanGan governor-general Eshan manage the food supply for the large army dispatched to suppress an uprising in Altishahr, was impressed by the quality of the officers he encountered as well as the battle techniques and weaponry skills that they and their troops had mastered. In 1828, shortly after taking up a new post as governor of Shanxi, Lu Kun submitted a memorial requesting that officers and troops from Shaanxi be sent to Shanxi where officers were “unfamiliar with the methods of training.” Lu Kun’s proposal was approved, with the caveat that the officers from Shaanxi would remain in Shanxi only until the troops there had become familiar with the new techniques, after which they were to return to their home garrisons.

In 1833, the reputation of Yang Yuchun and the Guyuan forces as an elite within the Green Standards would become instrumental in a larger effort to address military decline through officer transfers. On May 16 of this year, Daoguang laid out a litany of problems within the Green Standards that had come to his attention during the previous

819 QSL DG5/12/9.
820 QSL DG8/7/17, p. 136a.
821 In the same year, another veteran of the Xinjiang campaign, Yang Yuchun, passed through the province of Henan from Peking en route to his governor-generalship in ShaanGan. Like Lu Kun, he was worried by the poor condition of troops that he encountered. In a memorial, he explained that he had given his son Yang Guozhen, the governor of Henan, a copy of his “Regulations for Training Soldiers” (練兵章程) and ordered two officers and a number of troops with experience in training and troop formations to circulate around garrisons in Henan and Hebei. Li, Shizhai fu jun nianpu, vol. 124, p. 503.
year: troops in Guangdong were “smoking opium,” troops in Henan were “wandering into Anhui and killing innocent people,” troops in Fujian were guilty of extortion” (勒折夫價) and there were cases of soldiers killing salt officials (yan guan 鹽官).822 While his response to the training proposals in 1821 had already suggested his awareness of the unevenness of the officer corps, Daoguang now turned his attention more directly, and more creatively, to this problem. First, he ordered that troop reviews be conducted by trustworthy central officials (gongzheng dayuan 公正大員) rather than the provincial officials whom he believed were merely carrying out the formalities (xuying gushi 虛應故事).823 Second, he expressed his approval for a proposal that had come from two of his governors-general—Lu Kun,824 the governor-general of Guangdong, and Qishan 琦善 (?-1854), the governor-general of Zhili—to transfer officers with combat experience and expertise in training to two provinces with particularly pressing problems: Guangdong and Zhili. In the same year, six officers from ShaanGan were transferred to Zhili, the province surrounding Peking and nine officers were transferred from HuGuang (Hubei and Hunan) to Guangdong.825

Guangdong and Zhili encapsulated larger problems in the early 1800s—the influx of opium, the lack of combat experience among troops, and revolts among sectarians and ethnic minorities. In 1832, an uprising of Yao living on the borders of Guangdong, 

822 QSL DG13/3/27, pp. 508a-b.
823 QSL DG13/3/27, pp. 508a-b.
824 It is quite likely that Lu Kun’s experience with officer transfers to Shanxi laid the framework for his request for a transfer of officers to Guangdong. Qishan’s personal experiences provide fewer clues for his similar proposal. He had experience with military administration, having served as governor and provincial commander of Shandong province. During his time here, his duties had included the reintegration of Shandong troops who participated in the suppression of Jehangir’s uprising in 1826 and 1827. He had also occasionally argued for exemptions from the laws of avoidance in order to appoint competent officers. In 1828, for instance, he had advocated for the promotion of Wang Shikui 王世魁, an “outstanding” officer, to first captain (4a). See Wei Hsiu-mei 魏秀梅, “Qishan zai Yu Lu de zhengji 琦善在豫的政績, 1814-1829,” Jindai shi yanjiu suo jikan, 22 (1993.06): 488.
Guangxi and Hunan had brought the dismal state of forces in Guangdong province to Daoguang’s attention. Many of the Guangdong troops were reportedly addicted to opium—as Daoguang had concluded in the 1833 edict, and most had refused to fight. Two officers who had been dispatched from other provinces expressed the opinion that the opium addiction of the Guangdong troops was compounded by the lack of combat experience among both soldiers and officers.

While the situation of the Green Standards in Zhili seems to have been less dire, governor-general Qishan had described incompetence and ill discipline within the officer ranks during a review of garrisons in 1832. The emperor also deemed Zhili, the province surrounding the capital, to be strategically important and, like Guangdong, garrisoned by forces that were both poorly trained and lacking in combat experience.

While not explicitly stated in the decision, Qishan and the emperor may have also been concerned by the persistent influence of “heterodox teachings” (xiejiao 邪教) in a number of Zhili counties, teachings that had already played a role in producing the crisis of 1813.

The decision to transfer officers from ShaanGan and HuGuang provided a further opportunity for provincial commanders in these regions to extend their influence beyond their own commands. The responsibility for selecting the officers who would be

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826 See Wei Yuan’s history of this rebellion and comments on Wei Yuan’s history in Jane Kate Leonard *Wei Yuan and China’s Rediscovery of the Maritime World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1984), pp. 28-29. See also Polachek’s observations on the high rate of opium addiction among the Guangdong troops during this rebellion. Polachek, *Inner Opium War*, pp. 109-110.

827 NGDK 207107b, DG12/11/18.

828 In the report, Qishan recommended for demotion the following officers: Haguorui 哈圖瑞, Wang Jiqing 王繼清, Mei Yunbiao 梅雲彪, Chen Zhaorui 陳兆瑞, and Hong Fu 洪福. NGDK 185108, DG12/4.

829 QSL DG13/1/23, pp. 447b-448a.

830 NGDK 215513, DG12/7; see also the work *Poxie xiangbian 破邪詳辯* by Huang Yupian, magistrate of Qinghe in 1830. This text is partially translated by Gregory Scott, “Heterodox Religious Groups and the State in Ming-Qing China” (M.A. Thesis, University of Toronto, 2005).
transferred in 1833 lay not with officials in the central government but with two provincial commanders in Hunan and Hubei, and the former provincial commander of Guyuan, Yang Yuchun. The latter, currently serving as the governor-general of ShaanGan, selected the six officers to be transferred from ShaanGan to Zhili. In the transfer to Guangdong, the provincial commander of Hubei, Luo Siju, selected all three officers from Hubei province: Luo Yubin 羅玉斌 (?-1858), Zhao Rusheng 趙如勝 (?-late 1850s), and Jia Liangsi 賈良璉 (?). There is evidence that the men selected by Yang and Luo had the personal trust of their commanders. Among those chosen by Yang Yuchun was his former bodyguard—Xiang Rong—and others whom he had known for several decades. There is less information on the men selected by Luo Siju, but it is telling that all three of the men were natives of the county in which Luo had already served for eight years as provincial commander (and would continue to serve until 1840). It is likely that Luo’s choices—like Yang Yuchun’s—were based on his direct personal knowledge of the three.

Daoguang, for his part, approved nearly all of the officers recommended for transfer. His confidence in the discernment Yang Yuchun and Luo Siju was further indicated by the career trajectories of the transferred officers. In Zhili the transfers had a lasting effect on the military staff in the province. By the late 1830s and 1840s, many of

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831 NGDK 174126, DG23/3/28. Luo Yubin 羅玉斌, Zhao Rusheng 趙如勝, and Jia Liangsi 賈良璉 were natives of Gucheng county, the location of the Hubei provincial commander’s offices.

832 The officers selected jointly by Yu Buyun and Zeng Sheng included two from Fenghuang, the location of the Hunan provincial commander’s offices; I have not been able to find information on the other four.

833 Daoguang did not approve the transfer of Wang Xipeng 王錫朋, an officer who had fought under Yang Yuchun before being transferred to Hunan in 1828. Daoguang deemed the duties of his post in Hunan (寶慶協副將) too pressing (現居緊要) to hand over to another officer. QSL DG13/1/12, p. 434b. Wang would later become well known for his heroic death in the Opium War. On Wang’s link with Yang Yuchun, see Mei Zengliang 梅曾亮, Bojian shan fang wenji 柏梔山房文集 (1856; reprint, Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1969), j.9.2a.
those transferred in 1833 had risen to the top two ranks of the Green Standards in Zhili; others would go on to successful careers elsewhere in the empire. The three men chosen by Luo Siju were also successful, though less prominent. Luo Binyu would become a brigade general in Jiangxi; Zhao would also rise to the rank of brigade general.

While the careers of these officers suggest that Daoguang trusted his commanders, the emperor expressed a degree of ambivalence about the use of officer transfers. He insisted that his approval in 1833 was only a temporary expedient, meant to address pressing and particular needs in Zhili and Guangdong. Thus, while he shared with Lu Kun and Qishan an assumption that the most effective vector for the inculcation of military skills was experienced officers cultivated by trusted commanders, he was concerned that this approach to improving the Green Standard forces brought with it certain risks. One of these risks, no doubt, was the devolution of central control over appointment to powerful provincial officials like Yang Yuchun and Luo Siju. If

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834 The officers sent to Zhili, for instance, were commended in 1835 for their participation in a crackdown against heterodox teachings. QSL DG15/4/17, pp. 67b-68a. Several of the officers remained in Zhili to serve as brigade generals and provincial commanders. Shi Shengyu served as brigade general of Xuanhua garrison from 1840 to 1844; Chen Jinshou as brigade general of Zhengding garrison from 1835-1838 (huli) and of Tianjin from 1840 to 1842. He enjoyed a lengthy tenure as provincial commander from 1842-1856. Wang Guofu served as general of Daming brigade 大名鎮 in 1838 (shu). Xiang Rong served as general of Zhending brigade in 1842 and Tongyong brigade from 1842 to 1847. Many of the men selected for transfer by Yang Yuchun in 1833 also had success outside of Zhili. Ma Dianjia served as provincial commander of land forces in Guangdong from 1841 to 1844, and provincial commander of Guangxi from 1844 to 1848. Xiang Rong served as Sichuan provincial commander from 1847 to 1850 and provincial commander of Hunan, Shaanxi, and Hubei from 1850 until his death in 1856. Chen Jinshou served as provincial commander of Zhili from 1842 to 1856. Shi Shengyu served as provincial commander of Hunan from 1844 to 1845, and of Guyuan from 1845 1848 and 1850 to 1852, and of Urumqi from 1848 to 1850. Xiang and Chen were among the leading commanders of government forces during the early years of the Taiping War. Both continued to be identified and esteemed as men who had received their training under Yang Yuchun. According to the QSG, Chen’s selection as a commander during the Opium War had also been based on his past relationship with Yang Yuchun. QSG j.403, p. 11881.

835 In his edict ordering the transfer of the officers to Zhili, he stated: “This is the capital region, it is an area of particular importance, other provinces should not take this decision as a precedent” (此係畿輔地方尤關緊要他省不得援以為例). QSL DG13/1/23, pp. 447b-448a.
implemented empire-wide, the system of officer transfers might have given military commanders the power to shape not only the regional forces under their command, but to develop transregional networks of affiliation and personal loyalty.

Ironically, despite the limited extent of the transfer, men personally connected with Yang became prominent across the empire. The men transferred to Zhili joined the many other protégés of Yang Yuchun at the top ranks of the Green Standards. In 1840, eleven of eighteen provincial commanders in the Green Standards had spent much of their early careers under Yang’s command (Table 7.2). In the same year, Yang’s own son, Yang Guozhen, was serving as governor of Shanxi with the concurrent post of provincial commander of the Shanxi Green Standards.

Given the emperor’s concerns, the officer transfers in the early 1830s did not set a formal precedent for military appointment in the rest of the Daoguang reign. The regular system of appointment remained in place. However, the transfers did bring into relief the growing reliance on officers with personal connections to trusted provincial commanders, a reliance that was most evident among the protégés of the ShaanGan governor-general and former Guyuan commander, Yang Yuchun. It is clear that the emperor and officials such as Lu Kun saw the relationship between provincial commander and officers as more than coincidental. Officers from ShaanGan were favored not just because of their own experience or rank, but because they had been trained and selected for promotion by Yang Yuchun, a trusted commander. This judgment corresponded with a growing discourse on the importance of personal relationships within the military, a discourse whose embrace of personal relationships went well beyond the tentative steps of the Daoguang emperor.
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<td>1810</td>
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<td>1850</td>
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Table 7.2 Provincial Commanders and Native Places (1800-1850): Protégés of Yang Yuchun Shaded in Gray
Sources: QSL, QDZJ, biographical writings
Personal Relationships in Military Manuals

The extension of provincial commander tenures and targeted reliance on interprovincial transfers suggest that the early nineteenth century emperors saw sustained mentorship as a useful, if risky, strategy for improving the quality of officers in the Green Standards. This view at the center allowed for the development of long-lasting personal bonds among military men within provincial commands, such as Guyuan, and the extension of these bonds throughout the high ranks of the Green Standard forces. At the same time, the formation of these bonds were not simply an automatic response to central initiatives, but shaped by independent cultural values and traditions within the military. In this regard, they reflected other developments I have discussed—much like the building of shrines or reception of titles, the cultural practices that emerged in the early nineteenth century could be prompted by official initiatives without becoming local instantiations of an officially-choreographed military culture.

The promotion of relationships among military men can be found in manuals on military training and discipline that were produced in increasing number by military officers in the first decades of the nineteenth century. The manuals, which circulated as manuscripts, individually printed treatises and appendices to biographical writings or gazetteers, were produced by a sizable number of officers who had entered the military in the late eighteenth century and had first-hand experiences of war. Works by Luo Siju, Xue Dalie 薛大烈 (1760-1815), Chen Jieping 陈階平 (1766-1844), and Yang Fang are still extant. Others, which I have not seen, were written by Yu Buyun 余步雲 (1774-

836 Two manuals, undated, are included in Luo Siju’s nianpu: the first is titled Jiaobing tiaoyue 教兵條約 (Principles for instructing troops), the second is titled Xingjun jili 行軍紀律 (Military discipline). Xue Dalie’s manual, printed in 1818, is titled Xunbing jiyao 訓兵要 (Essentials for the training of troops); Chen Jieping’s manual, printed in the 1824 Fenghuang county gazetteer, is titled Xunbing liu tiao 訓兵六條 (Six items on the training of troops). One can also find references to manuals whose authorship is unclear. For instance, compilers of the Yongzhou fu zhi (1828), j.9b noted that the
1842), Hu Chao 胡超 (?-1849), Yang Yuchun 阮毓春, and Zhou Zhilin 周志林 (?- ca.1840).837 The authors of these manuals wrote extensively of the importance of cultivating relationships among military men—both hierarchical relationships between officers and troops and horizontal relationships among troops.

The appearance of these works in the early nineteenth century reflected two developments. First, as Matthew Mosca has pointed out, there was a general relaxation of censorship in the Jiaqing period, including the censorship of works on military topics.838 Second, and perhaps more importantly, a growing reliance on Green Standard troops in the suppression of major internal uprisings had likely made Chinese officers aware of the limits of officially-cherished values such as loyalty to create a reliable fighting force. The Ningshan mutiny, for instance, had revealed how quickly loyalty to the dynasty could be supplanted by the much more durable horizontal loyalties among military recruits (see Chapter 6). Authors of these military manuals—including Yang Fang, Xue Dalie, and Luo Siju, all of whom had firsthand experience of this mutiny—were unanimous in expressing the importance of the devotion of military men to the dynasty, but they were
also unanimous in their doubt about the efficacy of this devotion to motivate or bring order to troops in battle.

These concerns appeared in the speeches that the manuals sketched out for an officer trying to inspire troops in battle. In his 1818 manual entitled Xunbing jiyao 訓兵輯要 (Essentials for the training of troops), Xue Dalie provided a script in which the troops were to be told that they might claim to be willing to “abandon their lives” (sheming 拈命) when safe and secure, but in battle would “shrink back in fear” (weisuo 畏縮). Chen Jieping, who served for many years as a brigade general in Hunan, reiterated the same statement nearly word for word in a manual titled Xunbing liu tiao 訓兵六條 (Six items on the training of troops) that was included in the 1824 Fenghuang gazetteer. Reflecting their predominant concern with training (xunbing, jiaobing, lianbing) and discipline (jilü), the manuals had very little to say about other aspects of the military arts, such as prognostication or strategy. Instead, they were devoted almost entirely (and with little variation) to practical approaches that an officer might use to motivate troops in battle.

What were these approaches? First, the manuals suggested that an officer might make use of cultural traditions that were broadly shared by men within (and outside) the

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839 Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 3b (p. 16).
840 Fenghuang ting zhi (1824), j.20.25b-26a. Interestingly, Chen was also described by Bao Shichen as an officer who had selected and personally trained a group of men who were very successful in their military careers. QDZJ 171-315. Chen was a native of Sizhou zhilizhou in Anhui province. For a brief biography, see Baoying xian zhi (1932), j.17. He was acquainted with Wei Yuan, who met him in 1824 while Wei was visiting the office of Yang Fang in Hunan. See Wei Yuan nianpu, p. 23.
841 For a discussion of the military uses of prognostication in earlier periods, see Ralph D. Sawyer, “Martial Prognostication,” in Di Cosmo, ed., Military Culture in Imperial China, 45-64.
842 The lack of variation is not surprising, given the close connections among many of these authors. Xue Dalie and Yang Fang, for instance, were both close associates of Yang Yuchun, often cited as an expert on military training and discipline. Xue’s daughter was married to one of Yang Yangchun’s sons. ZPZZ 04-01-01-0504-020, JQ12/12/17. Chen Jieping served under Yang Fang in Hunan and, according to Bao Shichen, learned from him the new plum flower battle formation as well as other battle tactics designed by Yang. See QDZJ 171-318.
military. For instance, all referred to historical figures (notably, not Qing military men) who had gained fame as warriors. The authors assumed—probably correctly—that soldiers would be aware of and eager to follow the examples of the Song dynasty general Yue Fei or the third-century Guan Yu, a hero of the Three Kingdoms period who was both a popular deity and a character in opera and fiction in the late imperial period.

Chen, Xue, and Luo Siju suggested reminding troops that life and death were outside the control of an individual. Xue Dalie referred to Yama, the fifth King of Hell, whom we will remember from Luo Siju’s dream in Chapter 5. According to Xue, troops must be reminded that if Yama had determined their time of death, there was little reason to run from battle. Chen Jieping made a similar argument, only replacing Yama with fate, suggesting that “one’s life was established at birth” (性命是生時注定的).

Reflecting Richard Smith’s observation that a pervasive “fatalism” in Qing society “did not cripple self-reliance,” Xue and Chen also described the many things that a soldier could do to survive a battle. The authors admonished soldiers on the importance of military skills (wuyi 武藝) and provided officers with detailed instructions on how these skills could be imparted. Xue Dalie emphasized the need for mastery of

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843 For instance, Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 5a (p. 19).
844 Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 3b (p. 16).
845 Fenghuang ting zhi (1824), j.20.26a.
847 Like many other aspects of these manuals, we can find clear parallels in the writings of Qi Jiguang. For instance, on the importance of training in military arts see Qi Jiguang, Lianbing shiji 練兵實紀, j.4. Xiao wuyi 校武藝. Works by Qi Jiguang were reprinted in the Siku quanshu during the Qianlong reign, but I have found no other extant editions from his reign. In contrast, multiple editions were printed in the first half of the nineteenth century and used widely as a source for military officers’ own works on military training. Early nineteenth century reprinted editions of Qi Jiguang’s writings included Jixiao xinshu 紀效新書 (1804, 1805, 1840, 1841); Lianbing shiji 練兵實紀 (1808, 1840, 1844); Jixiao xinshu lianbing shiji quanke 紀效新書練兵實紀全刻 (1819); Lirong yaolüe 萊戎要略 (1831, 1848). Liang Zhangju 粱章鉅, 1775-1849, writing in the 1830s, commented on the wide use of Qi Jiguang’s writings among his contemporaries. See Liang Zhangju, Tui’an suibi 退鼇隨筆 (1875; reprint, Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1969), j.13.7a.
these skills in a topic that he labeled “exercising the gall” (liandan 練膽). The priority in training soldiers, Xue argued, was instilling them with “gall” and the best way to instill gall was to make soldiers proficient in military skills through regular practice. Yang Fang similarly argued that training in military skills could be used to overcome the problem of fear in battle. Luo Siju made a point of emphasizing that military skills were important both because they would increase the likelihood of surviving a battle, and because they provided the most reliable route for “establishing merit” (ligong 立功), a euphemism for monetary awards and promotion. The emphasis on the success that soldiers could expect if they pursued their training with diligence and mastered military skills expressed a common assumption that soldiers were more likely to fight for immediate benefits than for a sense of loyalty to the dynasty, an assumption that also underlay the detailed official system of payments for performance in battle.

More relevant to my discussion in this chapter, the authors of these manuals also advocated the incorporation of troops into relationships that would help to strengthen their resolve and discipline in battle. These relationships included, first of all, the spatial

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848 Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 3b (p. 16). Xue supported his argument with a reference to the story of Yue Fei. Xue asserted that Yue became successful because of his skills. Like Yue Fei, those who excelled in the military arts would survive battle, gain recognition, and become wealthy. Xue appended to his manual a series of illustrations of battle formations and weapons.

849 Among Yang’s writings was a manual on archery techniques that he claimed were passed down within his family (射法得自家傳). Yang Fang, Lun she 論射 (1838), postface. In the manual, he asserted not only that skills gave confidence, but that the mastery of a skill like archery required (and was inseparable from) the mastery of essence (jing 精), spirit (shen 神), and vital energy (qi 氣) (ibid., j.1.1a-b).

850 Luo Siju told his imaginary audience of soldiers that: “Not learning the military arts is the same as not caring for your own survival. Think about it!” (你若不學武藝是要性命也思之思之). Luo Siju, Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu, p. 334. He may have borrowed the phrase “think about it” from Qi Jiguang, who uses the same phrase in his entry on practicing military arts. Qi Jiguang, “Xiao wuyi 枚武藝 [Practicing the military arts],” in Lianbing shiji, j.4.

851 He Yueyu, the author of Yang Yuchun’s epitaph attributed the same idea to Yang Yuchun in a speech that he gave to troops in Guyuan who had been complaining about the hardships of training. See He Yueyu, Cunchengzhai wenji (1872; reprint, Taipei: Huawen shuju, 1969), j.7.4a.

852 This system is described by Luo, Lüying bing zhi, pp. 329-330.
organization of soldiers into battle formations (zhen 阵). In a memorial that was also reprinted in his collected works and the 1826 edition of the Huangchao jingshi wenbian, Yang Fang provided a particularly detailed explanation of the importance of formations for overcoming the lack of resolve that, he believed, would affect even the bravest soldier in battle:

As for resolve, it can be great or it can be small; as for qi [vital energy], it can be brave or it can be cowardly, but neither can be relied upon. It seems that in addition to [individual] spirit and strength, it is necessary to take into consideration the methods of power through unified action. It is my opinion that courage and qi are produced from military skills, but military skills do not lead to battle formations. It is like when a tiger leaves the mountain [his position of advantage] and is taunted by dogs. If troops attack with coordination, then on the offensive they will have order and on the retreat they will be well governed. The brave must not attack alone and stumble; the cowardly must not fear and flee.

夫膽有大小氣有勇怯均難憑識似應於精壯之中再酌以衆擎易舉之法臣思膽氣生於武藝而武藝非陣歸宿譬如虎離山谷猶畏犬欺東之以陣庶幾出而有節人而有制勇者不得獨衝而蹶怯者不得畏葸而北

Yang followed the argument for formations by arguing that the prescribed schedule of military drills should be supplemented with training in “advance and continuous fire” (jinbu lianhuan qiang 進步連環槍), a formation that integrated carriage-mounted cannon,

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853 Yang, Lianbing zoushu, pp. 443-444. Later in the memorial he argued: “As for the problem of unevenness in courage and timidity [among troops], it can be treated with formations. If [troops] are ordered to advance and retreat in a regulated manner, then their resolve and energy will be fortified” (至勇怯不齊束之以陣俾令進退有節則膽氣可壯). Ibid., p. 452.
cavalry, and foot soldiers armed with matchlocks, bows, and spears. He wrote, “Among regular formations taught by the Qing, the advance and continuous fire formation is the most beneficial for infantry. It surpasses the formations of the past.” The formation, which seems to have existed in a number of variations, was highly regarded by other contemporaries. Luo Siju, for instance, contrasted it with formations in which soldiers simply lined up and discharged their guns together. Luo wrote in his training manual that “soldiers must not be ordered to fire in unison” (paifang); when there is an incident, it can be predicted that the firing of guns and cannon in rotation, allowing a continuous stream of fire, will cause the bandits to be terrified.

In Yang’s version of the formation, troops would be formed into platoons (dui) of 64 men, each organized around a carriage mounted with two cannon. The mouths of the cannon faced toward the rear of the carriage. Soldiers holding onto the shafts, which also served to support the two cannon, maneuvered the carriage. The carriage was to be protected against cavalry attack by portable spear fences (jumachun). When the enemy came within 200 paces, they were to be fired at by the cannon; when they came within 100 paces, they were to be fired at by matchlocks; when they came within 50 to 70 paces, they were to be fired at with bows. Five men on horseback were to wait behind the lines. Each of these platoons of 64 men was to be combined with four others to make a company of 320, together comprising a “plum flower formation” (meihua shi). In

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854 The use of gunfire in formation and its usefulness in diminishing anxiety in battle has been noted by scholars of Western warfare. See, for instance, Gervase Phillips, “Military Morality Transformed: Weapons and Soldiers on the Nineteenth-Century Battlefield,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 41.4 (Spring 2011): 566.

855 Yang, Zibian nianpu, pp. 443-444. The continuous fire formation (lianhuo) was originally used by the huoqi and jianrui brigades in the Eight Banners. In QL39, it was ordered that Green Standard forces using the matchlock (niaoqiang) also be trained in the technique. QSL QL39/11/14, p. 1249b.

856 Luo, Jiaobing tiaoyue, p. 333. For examples of the use of this formation in battle in the 1826 and 1827 campaign in Xinjiang, see Li, Shizhai fu jun nianpu, vol. 124, pp. 145, 153.

857 Yang, Lianbing zoushu, p. 471.
battle, the five platoons would coordinate their advance and firing in a configuration that resembled the five petals of a plum flower. Bao Shichen 包世臣 (1775-1855) credited this technique to Yang Fang,²⁵⁸ though the advance and continuous fire formation combining cannon, cavalry, and foot soldiers was also an important part of Yang Yuchun’s drilling regimen and battlefield strategy.²⁵⁹

The authors of the military manuals also insisted on the importance of relationships among troops and between officers and the men under their command. Xue Dalie, Chen Dajie, and Luo Siju emphasized the importance of “friendly relations” (dunmu 敦睦) among troops outside of combat. Xue, for instance, suggested that if soldiers were not harmonious in times of peace they could not be expected to have their comrades come to their aid in battle.²⁶⁰ He cited the sworn brotherhood between the Three Kingdom heroes Liu Bei, Zhang Fei, and Guan Yu—a staple of popular theater—as an example of the efficacy of strong ties among military men.²⁶¹ Luo Siju argued that, “elder soldiers should be as elder brothers, the younger soldiers should be as younger brothers, and that all should be like members of the same family.”²⁶²

Each of the authors I have reviewed also described the relationship between officers and troops. They asserted, with varying emphases, that this relationship should be characterized by both fear (commonly described as wei 懾) and mutual obligation or

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²⁵⁸ On the attribution of this technique to Yang Fang, in particular, see Bao Shichen’s biography of Chen Jieping in QDZJ 171-318.
²⁵⁹ For some examples of Yang Yuchun’s use of the formation, see Li, Yang Shizhai fu jun nianpu, vol.124, pp. 647, 650, 665, 670.
²⁶⁰ Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 2b (p. 14). When you are in the midst of close combat, striving just to breathe, and just at that time someone comes to help you, you don’t only save your own life, you also can kill bandits and establish your merit … if you don’t have good relationships in daily life, how can you expect this? (到那上陣殺的時節性命只爭呼吸那時得個人來一臂相助不但你保全性命更可殺賊立功如此關係甚大不是平日相好安得有此).
²⁶¹ Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 2a (p. 14).
interdependence (a concept usually expressed in terms of familial bonds). In Xue Dalie’s discussion of “exercising the heart” (練心總論), he suggested that troops who feared their officers more than they feared their enemies would invariably be successful in battle. In his discussion of “exercising the gall” (liandan 練膽), he argued that the power of summary execution was important because it ensured that troops would fear their commanders more than the enemy (士卒之畏將甚於畏敵也). Luo Siju, similarly, argued that soldiers who did not follow the commands of officers in battle should be summarily executed as a warning to others. On the other hand, Luo and Xue also argued that the cultivation of close relationships and interdependence among officers and troops was essential to an effective fighting force. In his manual on training, Luo wrote, “Officers must see their troops as a father sees a son, and soldiers must see their comrades as feet and hands. Officers are like fathers teaching their sons, soldiers are like elder brothers teaching their younger brothers, like teachers teaching their disciples.” In his manual on discipline during a campaign, Xingjun jilü, Luo emphasized the need for troops to protect their officers in battle and officers to cherish (愛惜) their troops. He asserted that “when troops and officers are united in spirit and effort there will be no enemy [able to withstand them].” Both Luo and Xue quoted the ancient military text Sima fa, one of the texts on the curriculum of the military exams, which advocated the literal incorporation of officers and troops: “the army’s commanding general is the body, the companies are the limbs, and the squads of five are the thumb and fingers” 

863 In the same topic, Xue argued that men below the age of 20 sui are more easily instilled with ‘gall’ (dan) because they had not yet given thought to survival (思活) and were easier to stir up (鼓舞). See Xue, Xunbing jiyao, 9a-b (pp. 27-8). 

864 Luo, Xingjun jilü, p. 342. This was one of many crimes for which he prescribed execution. Others included execution of those who divulged information, who complained or slandered, who showed contempt for military discipline. 

865 Luo, Jiaobing tiaoyue, p. 325. 

866 Luo, Xingjun jilü, p. 337.
These military authors in the early nineteenth century did not reject hierarchy, but they invariably represented these hierarchical relationships unfolding over time. In other words, their discourse on relationships within the military had both a spatial element (troop formations, the high officer and low troops) and a temporal element, similar to what Kuhn referred to as “durability” in his description of Qi Jiguang’s writings about personal bonds. Troop formations required practice over time; the metaphors of kinship and body implied permanence, growing coordination among parts, and the trauma of loss or dismemberment. The benefits of close relations seem to have been accepted by most men who commanded troops. Their manuals conveyed a conviction that the success of the military depended not only on the maintenance of a rigid hierarchy or the promotion of normative values such as loyalty but also on the nurturing of relationships of mutual interdependence and even affection among members of the military forces.

**The Bond between Yang Yuchun and Yang Fang**

If they had much to say on relations among soldiers and between officers and soldiers, the manuals on training and discipline were silent on the relationship among officers. This is not because there were no personal bonds. Earlier in the chapter, I have suggested that Yang Yuchun, Luo Siju, and other provincial commanders played an important role in the promotion of men through the officer corps. These men, including Xiang Rong and others involved in interprovincial officer transfers in 1833, clearly benefited from their long-term personal relationships with their commanders. However, there was something risky about the representation of these bonds. As Daoguang himself seems to have perceived, strong personal bonds among officers, especially when these

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bonds tied together different regional commands, threatened to attenuate the dynasty’s ability to claim the exclusive loyalty of its military officers. Not surprisingly, few military officers wrote in much detail on their relationships with other officers. The account by one military officer, Yang Fang, of his relationship with Yang Yuchun, is therefore invaluable both for its representation of affection among officers and for the strategies he adopted to keep his account of personal bonds among officers from directly challenging the dynasty’s authority over the military hierarchy.

The relationship between Yang Fang and Yang Yuchun has been noted in twentieth century scholarship, but it remains unstudied. In his brief biography of Yang Yuchun, Fang Chao-ying asserted that Yang Fang and Yang Yuchun were known as the two Yangs (er Yang 二楊). The editors of the Qing Draft History declared that “everyone” (tianxia 天下) called them the two Yangs. Xu Ke, the compiler of the vast collection of Qing period anecdotes, Qingbai leichao, also referred to them as the “two Yangs” (er Yang). The origin of the popular identification between the two Yangs is unclear, but it was undoubtedly a product in part of Yang Fang’s depiction of their relationship in several works that had a wide readership in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: his own autobiography, Gongfu Yang Guoyong hou zibian nianpu 宮傅楊果勇侯自編年譜, printed in 1840, and his biography of Yang Yuchun, Yang Shizhai Gongbao zhongwai qinlao lu 楊時齋宮保中外勤勞錄, printed between 1837 and

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868 Interestingly, Yang Fang was not the only officer surnamed Yang to be associated with Yang Yuchun. Yang Kuiyou 楊奎猷 (?-1806), a native of Jiaying in Guangdong who, like Yang Yuchun, had fought in the Miao and White Lotus campaigns was endowed with an impressive beard. According to his biography, Kuiyou’s beard was entirely white during the White Lotus campaign while Yang Yuchun’s was black. They were only distinguishable by the color of their beards. The biographer asserted that they were referred to by others in the military as the “two Yangs.” See Guangdong tong zhi (1822), j.35.

869 QSG j.316, p. 11198.
870 Xu, Qingbai leichao, p. 3348.
Before turning to these works, let us look briefly at Yang Fang’s professional connections with Yang Yuchun. Like the officers transferred to Zhili in 1833, Yang Fang had been closely attached to Yang Yuchun through much of his military career. The two first met during the Miao Uprising in 1795, when Yang Yuchun, a 35 year old officer in the retinue of the Manchu general Fukang’an, arrived in Yang Fang’s home province of Guizhou. Within a year after their initial meeting, Yang Fang entered the military and gained his first officer posting at the age of 25 or 26. The two Yangs would serve under the Banner general Eledengbao for much of the White Lotus War. From 1802 until 1806 Yang Fang was brigade general of Ningshan, a brigade that was under the jurisdiction of Yang Yuchun, the Guyuan provincial commander. Between 1810 and 1812 and in 1814, Yang Fang would again come under Yang Yuchun’s command when he served as Xi’an and then Hanzhong brigade general, both in Shaanxi province. From 1815 to 1824, Yang Fang served at a variety of posts outside of ShaanGan. His return to ShaanGan took place in 1825, the same year as Yang Yuchun’s promotion to governor-general. Yang Fang would serve as Guyuan provincial commander from 1825 until 1833, when he was transferred to the post of Sichuan provincial commander. Yang Fang spent a total of approximately eighteen years at posts that came under Yang Yuchun’s jurisdiction. While Yang Fang may have garnered some practical benefit from his relationship with Yang Yuchun during his early career, he spent much of his career at the top two ranks of brigade general (2a) and provincial commander (1b), neither of which were eligible for direct appointment by a provincial commander or governor general. However, the

871 The two versions of this work that I have seen, one in Hong Kong University and the other at the National Library in Peking, are not dated. However, the work must date after Yang Yuchun’s death in 1837 and before Yang Fang’s death in 1846.
location of the posts along with their shared combat experience did ensure that the two officers were in frequent contact.872

Yang Fang’s descriptions of Yang Yuchun conveyed his admiration for the older officer’s abilities. In both his own autobiography and his biography of Yang Yuchun, Yang Fang not only praised Yang Yuchun’s courage, leadership abilities, and strategic acumen but also represented him as key contributor to military success in the major campaigns of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In his biography of Yang Yuchun, written after the latter’s death, he summed up Yang Yuchun’s contributions: “in the extermination of rebellious barbarians, the suppression of heretical bandits and the pacification of the frontiers, it is Yang Yuchun whose contributions have been the greatest.”873

His assessments of Yang Yuchun were, no doubt, partly a result of the generic expectations of biography, a genre that typically spoke of the deceased in glowing terms. However, Yang Fang’s own autobiography conveyed a growing sense of mutual obligation and affection between the two officers. Yang Fang’s first mention of Yang Yuchun in his autobiography is significant for understanding the ways in which he fashioned the story of his own military career in reference to Yang Yuchun. In the entry for the year Qianlong 44 (1779), Yang Fang described how he had been given the courtesy name (zi 子) “Yuchun” by his first teacher, Mr. Zhu, in 1779. This courtesy name was precisely the same as the “Yuchun” in Yang Yuchun’s name. After Yang Fang met Yang Yuchun for the first time in 1795, he noted in the same entry, he changed his

872 Yang Yuchun does seem to have played a role in appointing Yang Fang to the army sent against the revolt in Xinjiang in 1826 and 1827. Yang Fang provided an account of this in his autobiography. Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 285.
873 Yang Fang, Yang Shizhai Gongbao zhongwai qinlao lu, 51b. For another glowing assessment, see Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 129.
courtesy name to Tongkui and took on the sobriquet (hao 號) Chengcun 誠村. Yang Fang used the naming incident in his autobiography as an occasion to refer to Yang Yuchun as zu shufu 祖叔父 (literally, lineage member of my father’s generation but younger than my father). He would continue to refer to Yang Yuchun as zu shufu or simply “uncle” (shu 叔) through the remainder of the autobiography.\footnote{Yang, 
*Zibian nianpu*, p. 30. He also provided a brief record of Yang’s earlier military experiences and his service under Fukang’an.}

It is not improbable that Yang Fang had originally changed his name to avoid confusion or disrespect for an elder,\footnote{“Individuation” has been described as a reason that Chinese change their names. Rubie S. Watson, “The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society,” in *American Ethnologist* 13.4 (November 1986): 622.} but his inclusion of the incident in his narrative (it was one of only two events that he recalled from 1779) suggests that he recounted the coincidence and later name change to signal a relationship that went beyond professional protocol or obligation. Like many Chinese, Yang Fang saw himself as somehow related to others with a shared surname.\footnote{In his autobiography, Yang Fang traced his own family to the Han dynasty official Yang Zhen 楊震 (54-124). See Yang, *Zibian nianpu*, 1a. In this very broad sense of shared surnames, the two were indeed part of the same lineage (zu). On the assumption of common ancestry with others sharing the same surname, see Maurice Freedman, *Lineage Organization in Southeastern China* (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 4-5.} He did not, however, use the term “uncle” to refer to any others surnamed Yang in his autobiography. The kinship term, I would suggest, was more than a reference to their shared surname and age differential—Yang Yuchun, born in 1762, was eight years older than Yang Fang. Rather, his representation of Yang Yuchun as uncle conveyed a particular intimacy that developed between the two.

In Yang Fang’s account, the bond between the two was established in their first meeting in Yang Fang’s hometown of Songtao, Guizhou. Miao forces had besieged the town during their uprising in 1795. Fukang’an, the general in charge of the suppression effort, dispatched Yang Yuchun to relieve the siege. According to Yang Fang, Yang
Yuchun’s arrival struck fear into the hearts of the Miao, who fled the city. Upon entering the city, Yang Yuchun attempted to determine who was responsible for the successful defense of the city. In the process of this investigation, he encountered Yang Fang and the two experienced “a profound recognition of each others’ abilities” (shen xiang qi shi 深相器識), a scene depicted in an illustrated biography of Yang Yuchun (Fig. 7.1). As Yang Fang’s narrative unfolds, we learn that Yang Yuchun’s recognition of his ability resulted in his appointment to a post in the military. Yang Yuchun “recommended” (jian 薦) him to the commanding generals (da jiangjun 大將軍) of the forces in Guizhou and he thereupon come under the command of the Banner commander Eledengbao 額勒登保 (1748-1805) (both Yangs would continue to serve under Eledengbao until 1801). Several years later, Yang Fang asserted that Yang Yuchun had again requested his promotion, this time to a brigade in Guizhou.

If Yang Yuchun had indeed played a role in either appointment, it would have been outside the regular system and, therefore, invisible to official sources. Nor have I found independent accounts that corroborate Yang Fang’s assertions. If the veracity of Yang’s account can be questioned, it is important to make note of how he characterized his early relationship with Yang Yuchun. Though the two were under the command of Banner generals Fukang’an and then Eledengbao the relationship of the two Yangs was not an extension of this military hierarchy but rather a site of difference, characterized more by fraternity and affection than hierarchy and authority. This configuration of relationships between the Chinese officers and their Banner commanders was apparent in nearly every one of Yang Fang’s descriptions of encounters with Yang Yuchun.

One of the first instances appeared in Yang Fang’s description of a victory over

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877 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 32.
878 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 36.
Figure 7.1 The Meeting of Yang Fang and Yang Yuchun in Songt ao, 1795
Source: Yang, Yang Zhongwu gong jishi lu (1911).
White Lotus forces in 1798. Yang Fang, Yang Yuchun, and several other young officers serving under the Banner general Eledengbao gathered after the victory. Yang Yuchun, the highest-ranked of the gathered officers, addressed the others (all of them Chinese, most in their twenties and thirties). As Yang Fang recalled it, Yang Yuchun told them that Eledengbao was the only general who had not shirked his responsibility to fight by claiming illness. Yang Yuchun went on, “those of us (wo bei 我輩) [serving under his command], are the only ones still remaining [and actively waging war against the rebels] (所存者我輩數人耳),” and, he continued, “although Eledengbao is severe (yanran 嚴然), if we remain loyal and continue to fight despite the hardships, Heaven will surely come to our aid. In the future, those who serve under Eledengbao will be successful. It would not be wise to turn or backs on him.”

Writing more than thirty years later when many of these men had, in fact, risen to the top ranks of the Green Standards, Yang Fang praised Yang Yuchun for his perspicacity (shili 識力). But the passage also conveys something of how Yang Fang imagined the relationship between the Chinese officers and Eledengbao. Eledengbao was a figure of authority whose severe command had contributed to the shared identity among a group of young Chinese officers. At the same time, Eledengbao was clearly not part of the “we” (wo bei) referred to by Yang Yuchun.

Eledengbao occupied a similar role in an incident involving both Yangs in 1800. On this occasion, Yang Fang against represented the Banner general as a figure of authority whose command was essential to, yet distinct from, the bonds among Chinese

879 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 48. Others fighting under the command of Eledengbao at this same time included several who would rise to important posts: Wang Zhaomeng 王兆夢 and Wu Tinggang 吳廷剛 both served as Guangdong provincial commander; Zhu Tingbiao 祝廷彪 rose to Hunan provincial commander; Zhang Feng 張鳴 rose to Yunnan provincial commander; Tang Wenshu 唐文淑 rose to Guizhou provincial commander; Liu Rui 劉瑞, You Dongyun 游棟雲, Zhang Tingkai 張廷楷 and 李東宣 all rose to the rank of brigade general.

880 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 49.
officers. After a defeat of Qing forces at Tiger Cliff (hu ya 虎塂) in 1800, Eledengbao had removed Yang Yuchun from his post as wing commander (yizhang 異長). According to Yang Fang, the removal stemmed from a conflict between Yang Yuchun and the other wing commander, a Manchu named Mukedengbu 穆克登布 (?-1803). Mukedengbu had recommended to Eledengbao that Yang Yuchun be replaced by a Bannerman named Ximing 喜明 (?-1843). After receiving the news, Yang Fang and a group of other officers approached Mukedengbu to lodge a protest. Despite Mukedengbu’s superior rank, Yang Fang issued him a lightly veiled threat of insubordination and compared himself to the forthright official Zhou Chang of the Han dynasty. Yang continued by noting that Mukedengbu had related the visit of Yang Fang and the other officers to Eledengbao, who asked Mukedengbu “who was the leader.” When Mukedengbu replied, “Yang [Fang],” Eledengbao smiled and said: “we should listen to what he says.” After “sleeping on it” (寢其事) he restored Yang Yuchun to the post of wing commander. Eledengbao’s decision was framed by Yang as a sanctioning of the principled stance of the Chinese officers. Eledengbao’s decision, as depicted by Yang, ensured that the hierarchy of Banner and Green Standard remained in place, but it also revealed Yang’s attempt to subordinate this hierarchy to informal bonds based on moral principle.

We find the clearest articulation of the relation between authority and affection embodied by Eledengbao and Yang Yuchun in an incident that took place nearly a quarter of a century later when Yang Fang was in his late fifties and Yang Yuchun in his

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881 On the disagreement between Yang Yuchun and Mukedengbu, see Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 77.
882 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 83. Sima Qian noted that Zhou Chang, a royal secretary in the court of Emperor Gaozu, was “the sort of person who never hesitated to speak his mind.” On one occasion, Zhou Chang stammered out his opposition to the emperor’s decision to remove the heir apparent in favor of his son by a concubine, Lady Qi. After Zhou’s opposition, the emperor changed his mind. See Sima Qian, Records of the Grand Historian: Han Dynasty, Vol. 1, trans. Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 209.
883 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 83.
mid-sixties. In the intervening years, Yang Fang’s career had taken him to posts both within and outside of ShaanGan but his relationship with Yang Yuchun remained central to the telling of his life story. In 1826, one year after his return to ShaanGan to take up the post of Guyuan provincial commander, an uprising took place in Xinjiang under the leadership of Jehangir 張格爾 (d. 1828), a descendant of the former rulers of the region who had been exiled to Khokand in 1758. The campaign to suppress the uprising involved tens of thousands of troops and officers from Shaanxi and Gansu. The capture of Jehangir in 1828 was followed by a series of victory celebrations the likes of which had not been seen since Qianlong’s campaigns in the previous century.

The campaign and the celebrations that followed loomed large in the personal narratives of Yang Fang and other military officers who wrote memoirs of the period. Much of this writing, including Yang Fang’s, detailed the honors, gifts, and promotions awarded to victorious officers by the dynasty. But Yang Fang also framed the event around his relationship with Yang Yuchun. According to the account in his autobiography, Yang Fang had originally been ordered to remain at his post in Guyuan (坐鎮務), but Yang Yuchun had personally intervened with a memorial requesting that Yang Fang be allowed to join the campaign. The emperor agreed to the request, and Yang Fang was ordered to proceed to Xinjiang.

After the capture of Jehangir in 1828, Yang Fang traveled to Peking for an imperial audience. On his way, he passed through Lanzhou where Yang Yuchun was

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884 Hu Chao also wrote extensively on this campaign in his memoirs, Jun yu ji yong 軍餘紀詠 (1842). This work is held at the National Library of China in Beijing.
885 See, for instance, Yang Fang’s lengthy poem in response to his official honors. Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 338.
886 Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 285.
887 Yang Fang has a lengthy description of this audience, during which he claimed to have been called to see the emperor twenty-seven times. Yang, Zibian nianpu, p. 346-354.
serving as ShaanGan governor-general. Yang Yuchun had prepared a welcome banquet in the suburbs of Lanzhou. Yang Fang described the emotional greeting he received by Yang Yuchun. After many tears and the holding of hands, Yang began to deliver a speech in which he thanked his “uncle” for his affectionate support through his career. Yang contrasted Eledengbao’s harsh discipline with the gentleness of Yang Yuchun:

My uncle’s affection for me is like that of a widowed mother [for her son]. One cannot develop through indulgence alone. Eledengbao’s harsh discipline was like the bright sun. When a father is harsh a son will run away. It is also an obstacle to the development of talent. It was because I feared the discipline of Eledengbao that I dared not be ill-disciplined. It was because of uncle’s affection that I could not bear to leave [the military]. Over the course of five or six years [during the White Lotus War] I was promoted to brigade general, and on many occasions I was relieved of my rank. From the start, there was the favor of a strict father and a loving mother that [I enjoy] today. I cannot help but be moved to tears.

In this passage, Yang Fang created a gendered contrast between the Banner officer Eledengbao and Yang Yuchun. He described both as necessary for his formation as an officer, but they occupied distinct roles. He placed Eledengbao in the position of a strict father, while describing Yang Yuchun as a widowed mother showing affection for her son.

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888 Yang, Zibian nianpu, pp. 343-344.
Yang Fang’s description of Yang Yuchun as a widowed mother provides insight into how he viewed the relationship among Chinese officers. Yang Fang’s use of the term “widowed mother” (shuangmu 嬰母) to describe Yang Yuchun suggests, first, his support for nurturing relationships within the military, a support that was also apparent in his description of the Ningshan mutiny.\textsuperscript{889} Second, Yang manipulated the familiar gendered distinction between Chinese and Manchu in which the former were portrayed as effeminate and militarily weak while the latter embodied masculinity.\textsuperscript{890} Yang’s feminization of Yang Yuchun did not denote the latter’s lack of military power but captured the affection between men who would otherwise be bound by the rigid protocols of hierarchy. Eledengbao, while respected as a father, was cut off from the Chinese officers by his position in a military hierarchy that placed bannermen above officers in the Green Standards. Finally, the description of Yang Yuchun as a specifically widowed mother is telling, suggesting that this father figure was almost entirely absent from Yang Fang’s development.

In sum, the ethnic division between Banner and Green Standard, represented here by Eledengbao and Yang Yuchun, allowed Yang Fang to displace rigid hierarchy and authority to the ethnic division between Manchu and Chinese while presenting the Green Standard military as a sphere in which relations could be both hierarchical and affectionate, like that of mother and son or brothers of the same generation. By the same

\textsuperscript{889} Yang and his readers were likely to have been familiar with the bond of many men to their mothers, revealed in hundreds of autobiographies written in the Ming and Qing periods. On the mother-son bond, see Hsiung Ping-chen, “Constructed Emotions: The Bond between Mother and Sons in Late Imperial China,” \textit{Late Imperial China} 15.1 (June 1994): 87-117.

\textsuperscript{890} On the view of Han as effeminate and Manchus as masculine, see Joanna Waley-Cohen, “Militarization of Culture in Eighteenth-Century China,” in \textit{Military Culture in Imperial China}, ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 292-293. Note that Waley-Cohen also acknowledged the ambiguity of the gendered division—there was no clear and consistent equation between wu (martiality) and masculinity in Chinese culture, nor between wen and femininity.
account, Yang Fang displaced the ethnic relation into family structure, with the Manchu general occupying the role of the father and the Chinese superior the role of the mother. This, of course, corresponded with the Manchu dynasty’s own gendering of the divide between Banner and Green Standard forces. However, if the dynasty used gendered language to denote the inferiority of Chinese forces on the battlefield, Yang Fang used the same language to carve out a sort of inner quarters in which Chinese military men were able to show their mutual affection while maintaining the hierarchical division between Banner and Green Standard. What Susan Mann described as the “deep emotional attachment” between men was not unique to literati, but was also true of officers within the military.  

The case of Yang Yuchun, Yang Fang, and his many other protégés reveals something of the complexity of the relation between the Qing dynasty and Green Standards in the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, there was an emerging consensus at the highest levels of government that a consideration of experience and personal connections was essential in the processes of appointment, training, and selection of men to be sent to war. Daoguang’s efforts to improve military training through the normal channels in 1821, for instance, had quickly been shown to be entirely ineffectual. By 1832, he had turned to the less conventional approach of transferring protégés of his trusted commanders in ShaanGan and Hubei. On the other hand, the increasing reliance on men with personal ties to trusted commanders like Yang Yuchun also facilitated the growth of durable personal relationships that challenged the normatively impersonal nature of the military system. The relationships that took shape among Green Standard officers may have helped to restore the discipline of some

regional forces, but they also began to entrench the role of personal bonds in recruitment, promotion, and appointment. As we saw with Yang Fang and the many military manuals, these bonds were not only materially beneficial to the officers involved, but also provided officers and troops with affection, friendship, and courage.

**Epilogue**

Not surprisingly, the particular configuration of military hierarchy and personal bonds in ShaanGan was to the distinct disadvantage of those in the Green Standards who were not recognized as military talents, had not had the opportunity to participate in a major campaign, had not been patronized by higher-ranking officers, or were simply not from the right provincial background. In 1834, an uprising took place among recently demobilized soldiers in Lanzhou, the city that housed the governor-general’s offices and a large military garrison. The demobilized troops involved in the uprising, all Gansu natives, formed themselves into a sworn brotherhood. Those who joined called themselves “brothers” (dixiong 弟兄), drank the ashes of talismans and wove amulets into their hair. Their many years in the military, as had also been apparent among the mutineers in Ningshan, had not erased their deep immersion in traditions of brotherhood that flowed through the military and the margins of Chinese society. 892

The uprising was quickly put down. But the interrogation reports revealed that the uprising had been rooted in disgruntlement over Yang Yuchun’s management of the military. Many of the participants in the uprising told interrogators that they had been resentful both because of their demobilization—one of many efforts in the early nineteenth century to reduce the cost and improve the quality of the military—and also because of a perception that Sichuan natives and men personally connected with Yang

892 Li, *Shizhai fu jun nianpu*, vol. 125, p. 661.
Yuchun were being given preferential treatment.\textsuperscript{893} One officer implicated in the uprising, Ye Changtai, provided a lengthy list of accusations against Yang.\textsuperscript{894} Most of Ye’s accusations stemmed from his belief that Yang had been unfair in selecting officers for rotating frontier duty in Xinjiang, a duty performed by thousands of Green Standard troops and officers from Shaanxi and Gansu. Ye accused Yang of selecting him for this duty while improperly excusing Chen Gui, Jiang Dezhi, and Xu Yingkui from the same duties. Jiang Dezhi, Ye asserted, had been excused only after a personal request from his brother Jiang Deren.\textsuperscript{895} Ye described Xu Yingkui as a family member of Yang Yuchun as well as a fellow Sichuan native.

Yang Yuchun explained away the accusations of Ye and the others involved in the uprising,\textsuperscript{896} but their accusations were not without a hint of truth. Jiang Deren, a veteran of the White Lotus War, the 1813 Eight Trigrams uprising, and the Xinjiang campaign in 1826 and 1827, was one of many veteran officers serving in ShaanGan who had maintained a long acquaintance with Yang Yuchun. In 1814, Yang Yuchun had selected him for a \textit{tibu} appointment at the rank of major (3b) in his own Guyuan command.\textsuperscript{897} Xu Yingkui was not a close relative of Yang Yuchun, as Ye had asserted, but Yang himself conceded that Xu was a native of Sichuan and a distant relation (\textit{guage} 瓜葛).\textsuperscript{898}

\textsuperscript{893} On changes to the military in the Jiaqing reign, see Luo, \textit{Lüying bing zhi}, p. 96. In 1832, 1,950 troops had been demobilized in the ShaanGan region. On disgruntlement over use of Sichuanese troops in Gansu, see Li, \textit{Shizhai fu jun nianpu}, vol. 125, p. 614.
\textsuperscript{894} Ye Changtai had not benefited from a previous connection with Yang Yuchun. He was not a veteran of earlier campaigns, and he had been promoted to acting first captain (4a) by Yang Yuchun’s predecessor as governor-general of ShaanGan, Eshan. It was ultimately determined that Ye Changtai had not been involved in the uprising—it just so happened that his sword had been purchased by one of the leaders. But he was cashiered and sent back to Gansu for further questioning by Yang Yuchun and Wu Changhua, the judicial commissioner.
\textsuperscript{895} Li, \textit{Shizhai fu jun nianpu}, vol. 125, pp. 498-500.
\textsuperscript{896} Li, \textit{Shizhai fu jun nianpu}, vol. 125, p. 503.
\textsuperscript{897} NGDK 112671, JQ19/10/20; Jiang Dezhi had been recommended for promotion by Yang Fang to second captain in 1829. Li, \textit{Shizhai fu jun nianpu}, vol. 125, p. 501.
\textsuperscript{898} Li, \textit{Shizhai fu jun nianpu}, vol. 125, p. 507.
the accusation that troops from Sichuan were taking the posts that should be going to
Gansu men, Yang explained that many Sichuanese had accompanied the recent campaign
in Xinjiang (1826-1828). After being released from the military, many of these men had
answered calls for new recruits in Gansu. Yang’s policy in selecting new recruits, he said,
was to “choose those with ability, courage, and no criminal background regardless of
their native place.” In any case, he noted, there were only a little more than sixty
Sichuan natives in the governor-general’s command, and there were also many from
Shandong, Shaanxi, Henan, and elsewhere.

Daoguang accepted Yang Yuchun’s explanations. In his vermillion rescript, the
emperor wrote Yang “is truly my most trusted official [lit. heart, backbone, thigh, and
arm 心膂股肱] it is unthinkable that I would become angered and cause harm to this
body because of [the accusations of] this ignorant and reckless rascal.” The emperor’s
use of a metaphor of the body is telling. He viewed the punishment of Yang not as the
removal of one interchangeable part, but rather as an act that would inflict irreparable
damage on the body of the state, an amputation rather than a repair. In many ways, the
emperor’s use of an organic metaphor to describe the relationship between Yang Yuchun
and the state is a reminder of the extent to which the normative military—hierarchical,
bureaucratic, homogeneous, and state-centric—was morphing, with or without official
authorization, into a force shaped by regional variation and personal relationships among
military men.

899 Li, Shizhai fu jun nianpu, vol. 125, p. 625.
900 Li, Shizhai fu jun nianpu, vol. 125, p. 519.
Conclusion

From Presentation to Practice

I have argued in this dissertation that cultural practices related to war and the military in the early nineteenth century marked a clear shift from the top-down presentation of military culture that had been a characteristic feature of the Qianlong reign (r. 1736-1795). The choreographed military parades, prints and paintings of battle scenes, portraits of meritorious officers, and rituals marking military victory largely disappeared in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century.

Yet even as the Qing dynasty under the Jiaqing emperor (r. 1796-1820) brought an end to the most overt celebrations of military might, it became increasingly active in the field of cultural practices related to the war dead. In the first half of the dissertation, I showed that the withering of military spectacle was accompanied by an expansion in the geographical scope and absolute number of official sites and symbols honoring the war dead. Far from simply giving up control of commemoration, the dynasty in the early nineteenth century remained a cultural authority whose symbolic imprint on the war dead and veterans of wars served to organize what would have otherwise been incommensurable practices and discourses. Official projects for the commemoration of war dead were not simply displaced by or neglected in favor of nonofficial practices, but rather provided some coherence for memories that would have otherwise been irreducibly “messy and personal.”

Thus, many of the practices and discourses that took shape around the war dead were not conjured up in isolation from the state, but were rather clustered around

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officially-sanctioned commemorative sites, symbols of imperial favor, and official
documents and biographies of the war dead. If official military culture had previously
been presented to the subjects of the Qing dynasty as a series of completed artifacts, now
the dynasty both expected and demanded their participation in this culture’s unfolding.

This shift from presentation to cultural practice, while affirming the dynasty’s
cultural relevance, also showed the limits of its ability to determine how its symbols and
sites honoring the war dead were received by subjects of different regional, family, and
class backgrounds. In Chapters 2 to 4, I looked at three major expansions of official
efforts to honor the war dead of the White Lotus War (1796-1804): the empire-wide
building of prefectural Manifest Loyalty Shrines, the granting of hereditary titles to
thousands of Chinese officers killed in battle, and the writing of Manifest Loyalty Shrine
biographies for the war dead. I showed that each of these efforts was characterized by a
processing of the war dead that was orderly but granular, serial rather than synthetic.
These were modes of commemoration that tended, in other words, to bring an appearance
of order to a large number of disparate elements without imposing any but the most
generic and abstract of meanings. One shrine, title, or biographical trope was meant to be
similar to any other, but the ways in which they were understood was left largely up to
their local (or translocal) audiences. My examination of the reception of official
commemorative efforts brought to light not a shared understanding of the military or war,
but rather heterogeneous, often strategic, appropriations of official symbols as well as
attempts to supplement official meanings through the use of a variety of cultural
resources, from literary tropes of the knight-errant to a landscape inscribed with
supernatural sites and historical memory.

In Chapter 2, I showed that Jiaqing conceived of the prefectural Manifest Loyalty
Shrines honoring the war dead of the White Lotus War as entirely homogeneous—
indistinguishable in location, architecture, and rituals honoring the dead. They were to be a standard three-bay design, built close to one of two existing sites of the state cult, and occupied by hierarchically organized memorial tablets. In some ways, the prescribed homogeneity of the shrines along with their claim to honor the extremely generic value of “loyalty” made them like blank slates, easily susceptible to processes of re-historicization and re-spatialization. Rather than standing simply as commemorative sites for the dead of the White Lotus War, they readily came to commemorate military events and courageous men (occasionally women too) of local significance. Rather than standing only in relation to other temples or shrines of the state cult, their siting reflected in many cases the power and singularity of existing religious sites, local ideas about how memories of war should be incorporated into the urban landscape, or practical concerns about land availability and cost.

The awarding of hereditary titles to the Chinese war dead, which I examined in Chapter 3, marked a major expansion of hereditary titles into the Chinese military and across the officer ranks. Where hereditary titles in the eighteenth century had been awarded to those who best embodied the cherished values of a particular emperor, they were now handed out to even the most mediocre officer killed in battle and, of course, this officer’s often equally mediocre offspring. The reception of the thousands of newly-minted title heirs in the nineteenth century revealed stark disparities in perceptions of official military culture and memories of war in different parts of the empire. Ultimately, the messages that the titles awarded to Han Chinese officers were supposed to convey—the equal treatment of Han and Banner war dead or the Qing dynasty’s esteem for the loyal—became secondary to the status, native place, or competence of the titleholders.

If the rollout of hereditary titles failed to inspire reverence for the loyal and gratitude for the dynasty’s impartial treatment of its Chinese subjects, the massive
production of biographies of the war dead undertaken by the Hanlin Academy was an official project that was never intended to sway public understandings of the war dead. These thousands of brief biographical sketches, which I discuss in Chapter 4, were kept in archives in the capital. Their organization and content revealed a nearly complete bureaucratization of life-story writing. Typical of what James Scott has called “seeing like a state” were the comprehensive coverage, the encompassing of singular actions by standard regulations, and the flattening of historically-inscribed space into ahistorical place names. A comparison of these biographies written under official auspices and the biographies collected by Qian Yiji in the Daoguang reign (r. 1821-1850) brought into relief the contrast between the official biographical project and that of a rather eccentric individual. If the former resulted in biographies that were nearly indistinguishable encompassings of military life and death by official categories, the latter revealed the various singularities that could propel a casualty of war from an anonymous list of names in a local gazetteer to fame within a transregional literati network. Qian’s collection, along with the many sources that he drew upon, provided some answers to the question of what made someone killed in war memorable—a native place shared with an afficionado of local history, a famous and well-connected sibling, or a literally larger-than-life reputation.

The larger-than-life reputations of some of the war dead was a quality shared by a number of the Green Standard officers who survived the White Lotus War. One of the major interests of this dissertation has been to examine the large and interconnected cohort of officers that became established during the internal wars of the 1790s—the Miao Uprising and White Lotus War—and rose to prominence over the first decades of

the nineteenth century. My exploration of these men’s lives, writing, and reputation provided insight into the relationship between the Chinese military and the dynasty and representations of this relationship.

I suggested in the second half of the dissertation that many of the most-admired officers of the first half of the nineteenth century were men who fashioned themselves as individuals unfettered by chains of command, men who relied on their own moral or strategic compasses and cultivated durable relationships with troops and subordinates. In Chapter 5, I looked at the reception and self-fashioning of Luo Siju, a prominent veteran of the White Lotus War. Luo dedicated considerable effort to the crafting of his own image through storytelling and an autobiography completed in 1838, near the end of his life. Widely admired by his contemporaries and the two or three generations that followed, Luo illustrated the potential for a military career to be converted into cultural capital by an individual who understood what the market was looking for.

What sold, it seems, were origin stories. Not histories of military careers but tales set in the period of Luo’s life when he was not yet a fully-established member of the military hierarchy. The most frequently cited stories focused on the serendipitous encounters that preceded Luo’s entrance into the military and the single-handed victories that propelled him from a local militia into the officer ranks. There was, in fact, an inversely proportional relationship between his rank and the degree of interest in his life. The higher he rose, the duller his stories seemed to appear to his audience. Stories of gaining official rank or receiving gifts from the emperor could not compete with tales of cunning, bravery, and divine commission.

The rewriting of the history of the Ningshan mutiny in southern Shaanxi, which took place at about the same time as Luo Siju was dictating his autobiography, provided further evidence of the interest in officers who were able to operate outside the confines
of the military hierarchy. In my study of the mutiny in Chapter 6, I suggested that the gap between the official verdict in 1806 and rewritings in the 1830s and early 1840s illustrated an increasingly prominent ideal of officership in which the best officer was no longer simply an extension of the state, but rather a mediator who blunted the harshness of the law and served as a more immediate object of his troops’ loyalty.

In Chapter 7, I explored the broader implications of this discourse on personal relationships in the military. Looking at the formation of personal bonds centered on Yang Yuchun, the long-serving provincial commander of Guyuan and governor-general of ShaanGan, I showed that a rich vein of writings on personal relationships accompanied and provided a rationale for expanding networks of patron-protégé relationships within the Green Standards. Military forces held together by the strength of personal bonds between officers and soldiers have long been associated with the Taiping War (1851-1864). My study of Yang Yuchun and his many protégés suggests that the importance of personal bonds had been recognized in the first half of the nineteenth century when officers of the Green Standards and even the court began to explore the potentials of personal relationships to produce a better-trained and more reliable fighting force.

Despite the valorization of officers who operated outside institutional constraints, the fame of Luo Siju, Yang Fang, and Yang Yuchun remained founded on the fact of their military success. It was no coincidence that the three most famous military officers of the early nineteenth century were men who had attained the highest rank in the Green Standards. Even as they represented themselves as outsiders, they gained both legitimacy and prestige from the official trappings of success. As with the war dead, the dynasty remained less a producer of culture than a cultural authority, determining not so much the meaning as the shape and location of cultural practices.

The cultural practices that took shape after the White Lotus War have generally
been disregarded in favor of political readings of the war. The war has been examined as an economic effect, evidence of Qing military decline, or even a sign of imperial decline more broadly. These readings treat the White Lotus War as a turning point in national history, allowing for its incorporation into a narrative of modernization in which the past is finally overcome rather than unevenly accumulated or haphazardly forgotten. In contrast to this narrative, I have tried to show that the White Lotus War, like any war, was not only a plot twist in political history but an interruption, amplification, or interference with many unfolding histories—the history of urban landscapes forced to accommodate new shrines or the history of families turned from ragged outlaws to well-heeled elites.

This study, focusing on the effects of the White Lotus War on and through the Green Standard military, has offered only a partial picture of the war’s effects. There is much research to be done on other histories or cultural traditions that intersected with the war. For instance, I have only touched briefly upon the way in which the war was brought into relation with the heroes and sites of the Three Kingdoms period. The war, much of which took place on a landscape still inscribed with the battle sites and graves of this period, was naturally resonant with stories of battles and heroic deeds that had been passed down. My research for this dissertation has indicated that there is substantial material for a history of internal wars in relation to a wildly popular cult of Zhuge Liang in the early nineteenth century, a period that saw the printing of collections of writings on Zhuge (including one by Zhang Shu, Chapter 4), the reconstruction of Zhuge shrines in Sichuan, praise for Zhuge’s assistance in battle from official sources, innumerable shrine visits documented by travellers to the province, and an ongoing appetite for Zhuge in literature and drama.

The dismissal of the Green Standards as marginal to the main narrative of
nineteenth century Chinese history has been based on assumption that the military was simply an instrument of the Qing dynasty, two institutions joined in a lockstep of decline. The people who actually served in the military have been painted with broad and unflattering strokes. A reconsideration of the role of the Green Standards in Qing society requires a repersonalization of these forces, an effort to look at the military less as an institution than as a constellation of human actors. This dissertation has made some efforts to move in this direction, but there are many questions that deserve further research. At the micro level, genealogical sources, gazetteers, official documents, and biographical writings provide an excellent set of resources for studying the family histories of military men. The male descendants of thousands of hereditary title holders as well as officers like Luo Siju and Yang Yuchun continued to serve in the military for generations—to the end of the Qing, and often into the Republican period. How did these families view military service, and how did views change over time? To what extent did military service provide a way of joining the local elite? How many were able to gain success in the civil exams? How did the wives of military men—like Yang Fang’s wife—cope with the various hardships of military life? An exploration of these families would extend research that has already been done by Edward McCord and others on military families in the late Qing and Republican periods.  

At the macro level, a personalization of the Green Standards would involve a compilation of data on the composition of the officer corps in the nineteenth century. While my study has indicated that Sichuanese were predominant among the highest-ranking officers during the period I have covered, virtually nothing is known about the low to middle ranks. From which provinces and counties were these officers coming, and

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where did they most commonly serve? How many were holders of military examination degrees, how many had hereditary titles? Gazetteers, which often include degree status and native place of military officers provide a rich if ungainly resource for a study of the native places and career trajectories. These can be supplemented by the records of appointment found in official resumes and biographies, campaign records, and other official documents. Biographical databases of military men can be profitably added to the already well-established databases of civil officials and prominent literati.

Further research will undoubtedly show that characterizations of the Green Standards as inept and ineffectual have overshadowed the stories of military men as elites in local society, as participants in the full spectrum of cultural practices from religion to writing, and as men whose violence could make them objects of both scorn and fascination, contempt and admiration.
Appendix A – Luo Siju’s Autobiography

The Zhongguo lidai renwu nianpu kaolu (ZLRNK) lists six extant (jiancun 見存) editions of Luo Siju’s autobiography under two different titles: Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu 羅壯勇公年譜 and Luo Gongbao zishu nianpu 羅宮保自述年譜.

Most sources assert that Luo Siju did not write but rather dictated his autobiography. ZLRNK claims that the autobiography was written down (lu 錄) by his son Luo Benzhen 羅本鎮 (d. 1873), on the basis of his father’s dictation (koushou 口授). However, it is unlikely that Luo Benzhen was the one to transcribe the autobiography, given that he was only 6 sui at the time of his father’s death. Other sources indicate that a manuscript version of the autobiography was already extant before Benzhen became involved in transmitting the text. In a record written by Luo Benzhen’s son, Luo Zhencai, we read that Luo Benzhen had begun work on the printing of a handwritten manuscript (shougao) after receiving a request from Peking to send information for Luo Siju’s official biography (功臣列傳). According to Zhencai, his father hired two men—Ma Yunfeng 馬雲峰 and Wei Futang 衛馥堂—to undertake the work of collation (kanjiao 勘校). However, he died before they completed the work, and the project was abandoned until being taken up again by Zhencai in 1889.

Qiao Shunan 喬樹楠 (1850-1917), a native of Huayang, Sichuan who assisted Luo Zhencai in collating the autobiography in 1889, wrote in his “Record of Collation” (jiaokan ji 校勘記) that he had read a handwritten manuscript (xieben 寫本) preserved by the Luo family. On the basis of the vulgar and clumsy (bisai zhanzhuan 鄙俚拙轉) language of the manuscript, he proposed that the autobiography had probably been

905 Xuanhan xian zhi (1931), j.13.32a
906 Luo, Luo Zhuangyong gong (1908), j.2.110a-b.
dictated (koushou) by Luo Siju, a man unfamiliar with literary writing (bu xi shishu 不習詩書), and written down by a military secretary (junzhong si wenjizhe 軍中司文籍者). Qiao claimed that the manuscript held by the Luo family was not divided into juan (wu juan 無卷). He also asserted that he had not dared to “add or change even one character.” Qiao’s claim that the original text was not divided into juan seems to contradict an earlier mention of the autobiography by Gu Fuchu, who served as prefect of Suiding prefecture sometime between 1862 and 1867. According to Gu, a version of Luo’s autobiography that he used as a source for a biography of Luo was already divided into two juan.

Luo Zhencai claimed that the edition he and Qiao Shunan had collated in 1889 formed the basis for two editions printed in the early twentieth century. In 1907, the autobiography was printed in Hangzhou for inclusion in the Zhenqitang congshu 振綺堂叢書. In 1908, the autobiography was printed in Wuchang, Hubei by the Zhaoxing shuwu 轟杏書屋. Based on my examination of the two editions, they are nearly identical in content, but printed off of different blocks. They also shared the same title, Luo Zhuangyong gong nianpu. Luo Zhencai’s claim that both were based on the same source is, I believe, reliable. It should, however, be noted that the Zhaoxing shuwu edition, produced in cooperation with Luo’s descendants, contained a number of texts attributed to Luo Siju that are not in the Zhenqitang edition. These additional texts included a work on emergency medicine titled Jijiu liangfang 急救良方, a document related to the Wenchang academy established by Luo, and assorted jottings.

The Zhenqitang edition has been reprinted in three more recent collectanea. The most recent reprinting is in the Beijing National Library nianpu collection. I have relied

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907 Gu Fuchu’s literary collection, which included a biography of Luo Siju and drafts of prefaces for a never-completed gazetteer of Suiding prefecture, was printed in 1867. In the Suiding prefecture preface, he referred to the “Yunnanese bandits” (dianfei), who threatened the prefecture in 1862 (MG Xuanhan xian zhi, j.10.25)
in my chapter primarily on the photo lithograph edition included in the *Jindai Zhongguo shiliao fenlei xuankan*. Columbia University library holds a copy of the Zhaoxing shuwu edition.

Given that a number of people were involved in the transmission of the autobiography, we must consider the extent to which it can be considered an autobiography at all. Do the printed editions of the autobiography reflect Luo’s original dictation? There is some evidence to suggest that the Qiao edition, if not an exact copy of the earlier manuscript edition, at least reflected some of the ways in which Luo had attempted to frame his life. As I showed in Chapter 5, a number of the supernatural stories that we find in the printed editions circulated earlier in other genres, including the earliest extant poem on Luo’s early career, by Wang Liangzuo. The story of Luo’s encounter with Yama, central to the printed biographies, also appears in an undated manuscript with the title *Jingjianlu* 經見錄, purportedly by Luo, now held at the National Library in Beijing.

On a last note, it is worth noting that the Zhenqi tang collectanea in which the autobiography was included was edited by Wang Kangnian 汪康年 (1860-1911), “a pioneer in Chinese journalism” and advocate for “modernization and reform” (ECCP p. 822). As editor of the journal *Chinese Progress*, he revealed an interest in popular participation in political process. Editorials in the journal railed against problems in the Qing government not dissimilar from those pointed to by Luo: “corruption, ineptitude, inertia, the obsolete civil service examinations and official recruitment system, and the lack of smooth coordination between the monarch and local officials in the field.”

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