THE MORAL PSYCHOLOGY OF SINCERITY
IN FIFTH-CENTURY ATHENS

Jennifer Mann

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS

Adviser: Andrew L. Ford

January 2012
Abstract

The value of sincerity acquires increased importance at moments that put strain on one’s rational interest in being sincere, such as the pervasive condition of war and political revolution. As might be predicted, in response to the stress of Athens’ domestic and international turmoil in the last third of the fifth century, Athenian texts from this period do spotlight thematic concerns such as the opacity of the human mind or self and the problem of discriminating between sincerity and insincerity in others. This dissertation considers how four fifth-century, Athenian texts engage the politically pertinent theme of sincerity: Thucydides’ History, Sophocles’ Ajax, Euripides’ Hecuba and Sophocles’ Philoctetes all demonstrate a marked concern with this value. Within each of these works, I look for the embedded assumptions about the constitution of the self and consider how factors within the self are portrayed as impacting an individual’s ability to manifest sincerity. Sincerity of self is presented as a product of either reason or emotion: that is, an individual might demonstrate sincerity either as a result of consistent adherence to a consciously worked out code of rational values or through action in accordance with his spontaneous, innate emotional impulses. Central to fifth-century discussions of sincerity, and indeed of all virtues, is whether it is most stably attained through education or through inheritance from noble parents. The primary aim of this dissertation is to determine how fifth-century thinkers conceived of the moral psychology of sincerity, or how they saw the parts of the self as interacting to engender sincerity.

Sincerity is a virtue that gains salience at the junctures of human life: the juncture between the interior of the self and the exterior world of human interaction; the juncture between individual interest and group interest; and the juncture between commitment to the interests of private friends and public ‘friends’ (i.e. fellow citizens). One cannot conceive of sincerity in isolation and indeed each of the texts I consider gives significant weight to the role of the surrounding community in the sincerity (or lack thereof) of the individual. As Thucydides’ History and the Hecuba forcefully illustrate, there are conditions in one’s surrounding society under which sincerity of self is undesirable or imprudent for the individual. Yet, each of the four texts further demonstrates that to some degree sincerity of self-representation is the necessary foundation for a healthy, functional democratic society.
Acknowledgements

I would like to express my deepest appreciation and admiration, first, for my friend and mentor, Susan Lape, for her friendship, endless support and advice, thought-provoking conversation and incisive feedback. Her intellectual generosity is the more noteworthy for being offered outside of any formal role on my committee. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to my dissertation committee for their patience in awaiting the completion of this project. I know that Andrew Ford did not expect to be the front man on the committee, so I must thank him for the time he has put into this project and for his abundant help, both editorial and substantive. Josh Ober has been everything I could have hoped for in an advisor: he has been incredibly generous with his time and input, particularly appreciated considering his myriad commitments; and he has been consistently encouraging, supportive and intellectually inspiring. As a sounding board, Josh has an amazing ability to perceive what I’m trying to say and to reframe it in wonderfully clear terms. And, last but never least, I am honored to have had the opportunity to work with and come to know Froma Zeitlin. She has had a central role in shaping me intellectually through her stimulating seminars and through my experience as her research assistant. I have no doubt that many in the world of Classics and beyond would agree with me when I confess that I was awed by her mastery of this field and by her brilliance before I even met her, and am all the more so afterwards. I must also acknowledge my warm appreciation of Andrew Feldherr and Bob Kaster for their patient supportiveness during their tenures as DGS. It is difficult to select out only a few significant influences that have most contributed to my education and my work, as my experience and interactions in the Classics Department and generally at Princeton have been in every way gratifying. I am forever grateful for all of the opportunities for intellectual exploration that Princeton afforded me. My greatest debt, however, is to my wonderful husband, Jonathan, for reasons well known to him.
"Sincerity is everthing. If you can fake it, you've got it made."

George Burns
Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iv
Sincerity and Athenian Democracy .................................................................................. 1
  Terminology of Sincerity .............................................................................................. 7
  Four Criteria of Sincerity Assessments ......................................................................... 16
  The Moral Psychology of Sincerity .............................................................................. 31
  Why Sincerity Matters .................................................................................................. 39
  A Methodological Note ............................................................................................... 45
Thucydides: Two Models of Sincerity ............................................................................. 49
  Human Nature in Thucydides ....................................................................................... 51
  Pericles’ Model of Rational Sincerity .......................................................................... 62
  The Teachings of Pericles: Fostering Rational Sincerity in the Polis ......................... 75
  Pericles and ὀργή .......................................................................................................... 80
  Cleon’s Model of Emotional Sincerity .......................................................................... 83
  Emotional Sincerity Put to the Test ............................................................................ 91
  Pericles’ and Cleon’s Models of Sincerity Reviewed .................................................. 95
  Sincerity Requirements for Leaders vs. Citizens ......................................................... 97
Sophocles’ Ajax: The Role of Sophrosune in Being a Sincere Person ............................. 102
  Consistently Inconsistent: Ajax’ Passionate Nature .................................................... 105
  Reciprocity As Consistency Over Time ...................................................................... 110
  Sophrosune .................................................................................................................. 117
  Odyssean Sophrosune: The Argument for Controlled Inconsistency ......................... 133
  Sincerity, Sophrosune and Citizenship ...................................................................... 141
Euripides’ Hecuba: Emotional Challenges to Sincerity ............................................... 146
  Hecuba on the Stability of Good Character .................................................................. 150
  Hecuba’s Transformation .............................................................................................. 154
  Sincerity, Trust and the Unified Self ............................................................................ 161
  Hecuba: The Disintegration of a Self ......................................................................... 167
  Psychological Disintegration as Physical Metamorphosis ........................................ 175
  The Role of Community in Individual Sincerity ......................................................... 178
The Emotional Impact of the Betrayal of a Friendship ........................................ 182
Sophocles’ Philoctetes: A Positive Model of Emotional Sincerity ..................... 186
Sophistic Anthropology and the Social Compact ............................................. 188
Rival Models of Nobility/Heroism ..................................................................... 192
Logoi vs. Erga as Indicators of Inner Intention ................................................. 201
Education and the Permeable Self .................................................................. 205
Opposing Models of the Self ........................................................................... 210
The Complexity of the Rational Self ............................................................... 215
The Emotional Temperament: The Power and Limitation of the Emotions ....... 220
Shame ............................................................................................................. 226
A Friendship of Equals: Like Attracts Like ..................................................... 229
Philoctetes, the Noble Savage .......................................................................... 232
The Integrated Emotional Self ......................................................................... 238
Emotional Sincerity ......................................................................................... 239
Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 242
References ....................................................................................................... 246
Sincerity and Athenian Democracy

What is sincerity? Is it a disposition? Is it a phenomenon of the self, or an epiphenomenon of the self? That is, is it a quality that we should understand as inherent to the self or as an attribution that derives from social judgments about us? Is it a result of the interactions between the parts of our selves, or a product of the part of the self that is dominant in our characters? What does it mean and entail for someone to be sincere? Is it even an attainable ideal or is it a vestigial relic of a unified conception of the self? These are some of the most basic questions about the topic of sincerity that remain unanswered both for contemporary and ancient Athenian thinkers about the self. It is not surprising that there is confusion over the nature and definition of this value, for sincerity is a value that is often mobilized but seldom afforded sustained consideration. Stuart Hampshire observes: “I shall argue that sincerity is a dubious, uncertain ideal, and that it is very difficult to attain. It is not something obvious and simple, and it is not true that we all know what it is.”1 The topic of sincerity sits at the crossroads of many philosophical and psychological discourses, including the fields of political theory, moral psychology, philosophy of mind, theories of the self and speech act theory. My work elucidating the value of sincerity in the ancient Athenian democracy aspires not only to elaborate a particular, historically situated account of the concept, but also to contribute to the discussions of sincerity taking shape more broadly in these other fields.

I am interested in how concerns about the sincerity of both politicians and average citizens play out in the ancient Athenian democracy. My primary concern here is to explore the moral psychology of sincerity at the end of the fifth century: that is, in the ancient context, what are the key attributes of a sincere person and specifically what kind of self gives rise to sincerity? I confine myself to the late fifth century for the reason that, with Plato, we see a significant shift in both the account of the moral psychology of sincerity and in the extended, explicit study of moral psychology that merits its own separate study. Further, the arbitrary distinction between the fifth and fourth centuries happens to coincide neatly, from an Athenian standpoint, with some critical social and

---

1 Hampshire 1971, 232. For a similar sentiment, see A. D. M. Walker 1978. Further, for the difficulty of pinning down the nature and role of the sincerity norm, see Moran 2005.
historical events that mark the end of an era: the end of the Peloponnesian War that had occupied Athens for the last third of the fifth century; the resolution of a period of civic upheaval punctuated by two oligarchic revolutions, in 411 BCE and 404/3 BCE; the political amnesty of 403 that sought to reunify the political community of Athens; and the trial and death of Socrates in 399 BCE. As the writings of Theognis and Thucydides make clear, concerns about the internal motivations of one’s fellow citizens take on a greater urgency in a climate of civic divisiveness. It is no surprise, then, that there was a developing anxiety in the late fifth century about the opaque nature of man and a concomitant interest in what qualities of the self might lend themselves to a sincere disposition, together with an exploration of the relationship between a political culture of trust and individual sincerity.  

Though many texts from this period spotlight the theme of sincerity, few texts or authors offer a sustained consideration of, specifically, the moral psychology of the sincere person. For this project, then, I consider only texts dealing with the interrelation of the elements in the self that conduce to a sincere character. This leads me specifically to Thucydides, one of whose central preoccupations is the nature of human morality, and to the genre of tragedy, which provides many sustained, in-depth explorations of the forces within the self and human virtue. Indeed, a number of tragedies deal directly with the topic of sincerity of self and the limitations on the human ability to remain sincere over time under radically varying circumstances. In the following chapters, then, I look closely at Thucydides’ History, for its attempt to elaborate a specifically political model of sincerity and to parse out two distinct claims to sincerity that emerge from different personality types; an early Sophocles play, the Ajax, for its meditation on the functions of emotion and rational self-discipline in a personality; Euripides’ Hecuba, as both an exploration of the impact of political culture on individual sincerity and a portrait of the elements and considerations within an individual self, Hecuba’s, that precipitate a shift in character from sincere to insincere; and, lastly, a late Sophocles play, the Philoctetes, for its reversal of many of the conclusions of the Ajax and for its unusual emphasis on the positive role of emotion in securing a sustained nobility of self. I further limited myself to

---

2 For the complementarity between trust and sincerity, see Williams 2002, Ch. 5.
texts treating the theme of sincerity in its political context, rather than in a strictly private context.³

As it happens, sincerity is used in English without a lot of precision or consistency. Even Lionel Trilling’s seminal work on sincerity falls short of an adequate definition for the concept. Trilling, preferencing the modern value of authenticity, only broadly shapes a rough, working definition of sincerity for the purposes of discussing it as a primitive precursor to the contemporary push for authenticity. Critiquing Trilling’s work in just these terms, William Chace observes that the key terms of *Sincerity and Authenticity* “are given a variety of interpretations, but this variety never shapes itself into a clear system. ‘Sincerity’ is not seen steadily and whole…”⁴ Trilling’s real interest, then, is in shaping authenticity as existing in opposition to sincerity, rather than in sincerity per se.⁵ Further, Trilling’s interest in discussing sincerity is specifically historical: he imagines an almost utopian time before the postmodern disintegrated self, a time that admitted the possibility of “the perfectly autonomous self”, or the sincere, integrated self.⁶

Trilling’s succinct definition of sincerity as a “congruence between avowal and actual feeling”⁷ presumes a coherent, unified self for which it is possible to imagine a one-to-one correspondence between expression and internal experience. This assumption posits sincerity as a cultural value that necessarily loses its force with the modern emergence and broad acceptance of a complex, Freudian self, divided between the pull of subterranean emotion and the seat of cognitive function. Trilling charts the decline of sincerity’s influence as a value, together with the concomitant rise in the value of authenticity. The supposition is that authenticity carries a greater burden of self-awareness; that is, as a complex view of the self takes hold, an individual must labor to

---

³ It is this consideration, for example, that led me to leave aside Euripides’ *Hippolytus*, although it does represent a consideration of the moral psychology of sincerity, because it handles sincerity in a familial and erotic context, as an issue that arises between family members.
⁴ Chace 1980, 147.
⁵ See also Chace 1980, 146-172.
⁶ ibid., 153; see also 152.
⁷ Trilling 1972, 2.
make himself an object of consideration. With the rise of authenticity, the dictates of virtue become both more lax and more stringent: authenticity connotes a rigorous process of “soul searching”, but, unlike sincerity, authenticity carries no burden of having noble, virtuous instincts. In other words, ascriptions of sincerity are only assigned to those with naturally noble impulses, but authenticity requires merely an accurate revelation of one’s internal life, irrespective of its nobility. The standard of authenticity embraces the “unconditioned nature of the self”, warts and all.

As mentioned above, Trilling’s work suggests that, with the more recent cultural evolution from valuing sincerity to emphasizing authenticity, speaking of sincerity in the contemporary milieu is anachronistic. That is, according to Trilling’s argument, once the instability and lability of consciousness became a commonly shared idea, the value of sincerity should have lost ground. And yet, despite the broadly accepted cultural belief that we are all layered selves, performing in various social roles, and caught between the pull of competing psychic forces, we still hold our contemporary politicians to a putatively out-moded standard of sincerity: we expect them to be transparent, consistent, homogenous selves who demonstrate a patent commitment to the good of their constituency over their own private interests. Certainly there is rampant cynicism concerning the sincerity of contemporary politicians; nevertheless, concrete proof of a lack of any of these traits has serious repercussions for a political career. In the end, though there is a certain psychological logic to Trilling’s presumption that sincerity would give way to authenticity, sincerity has not, as predicted, lost its purchase as a value that we expect from both our public figures and our personal acquaintances.

I advance, as a basic definition that applies to all uses of sincerity, that it involves an accurate representation or translation to others by an individual of his inner mental

---

8 Nehamas’ book (1999), The Virtues of Authenticity, interestingly applies the contemporary concept of authenticity to Socrates’ rigorous and on-going testing of his own and others’ beliefs, convictions and knowledge. Nehamas uses ‘authenticity’ to link the essays in his book, yet it is clear that the modern concern with authenticity of self is more properly applicable to Socrates than Plato.
9 Trilling 1972, 56.
10 For further discussion of the distinction between the concepts of sincerity and authenticity, see Graff 1999, 309-17 (in Rodden 1999).
11 Markovits (2008, 1), for example, makes a good case for the importance of sincerity claims in the political climate of the 2008 U.S. presidential election.
state, beliefs, intentions and motivations. This is basically a restatement of Trilling’s definition of sincerity as a “congruence between avowal and feeling” (2); yet, with “feeling” being a term more associated with emotion than thought, I prefer to unpack his definition in more neutral terms. Sincerity sits within a lexical field of value terms that share significant overlap. I have already highlighted the differences between sincerity and authenticity above. It will be helpful at the outset to distinguish further between sincerity and honesty and sincerity and integrity. Like sincerity and unlike authenticity, honesty and integrity are only ever positive valuations of the content of another’s moral character. Sincerity and honesty both entail a commitment to truth, though honesty connotes a general commitment to truth, while sincerity suggests a regard for communicating the truth about oneself. Integrity, like sincerity, at its root involves a wholeness or singleness of self, but the value of integrity places exclusive emphasis on the consistent application or adherence to one’s code of ethical principles. Judgments of others’ sincerity and integrity, then, rely upon evidence of consistency in thought or behavior. Integrity, however, implies neither transparency nor a mandate to align one’s interests with some morally salient group of people.

---

12 I will complicate this simple definition below.
13 For a somewhat unusual conception of sincerity as natural goodness as opposed to morality, i.e. constructed goodness, see André Gide’s Journal, 11 January 1892: ‘Je m’agite dans ce dilemme: être moral, être sincère. La morale consiste à supplanter l’être naturel (le vieil homme) par un être factice préféré. Mais alors, on n’est plus sincère. Le vieil homme, c’est l’homme sincère.’
14 For a distinction between insincerity and outright lying, see Williams 2002, 96-100. Sincerity, Williams argues, entails more than simply abstention from lying. Williams further differentiates between lying and other more subtle forms of deceptive speech (esp. 100-10).
15 Kaster’s (2005, 134-48) discussion of the Roman concept of integrity is thought-provoking. I read him as arguing that integrity for Romans implies a discreet internalized sense of identity that in some way sets one apart from the surrounding community. By contrast, Greek (or at least Athenian) sincerity draws one toward the values, commitments and engagements of one’s community. Ideally in the Athenian context, a demonstration of sincerity entails perfecting the harmony between the individual and his community. After all, the most trustworthy (and sincere) person in Athens is the citizen who unquestionably represents and typifies Athenian citizenship norms.
16 See below for an extended discussion of my assertion that social assessments of sincerity take into account a number of factors beyond transparency, including homogeneity of self, consistency of character and behavior, and a manifest, genuine
Trilling locates sincerity as a post-Renaissance cultural value. He remarks on the impossibility of discussing Achilles’ sincerity, and yet it is Achilles who offers us perhaps the earliest and clearest statement on the value of sincerity in Trilling’s own terms as a “congruence between avowal and actual feeling”: “hateful as the gates of Hades to me is the man who hides one thing in his breast but speaks another” (*Il. 9.312-3*). Achilles prefaces this declaration with a more detailed description of the qualities of his own μῦθος, or speech, saying, “Zeus-born son of Laertes, resourceful Odysseus, it is necessary that I speak out my speech without concern for pain, in exactly the manner in which I think it and as it will have been accomplished, so that you will not coo about me, seated on this side and on that” (*Il. 9.308-11*). This definitive assertion elucidates several key features of sincere speech in the ancient world: first, Achilles speaks without regard for pain, either to himself or to his audience. That is, his speech is not informed by concern for how it might affect his own reputation or for how it might impact his hearers. His goal in speaking is not to give pleasure, but to inform others about his internal experience and beliefs. He explicitly claims that his speech simply translates his inner world into words. As he thinks, so he speaks. Lastly, Achilles elevates his speech to the level of action, asserting confidently that his words will be accomplished through his deeds. Achilles’ description of the quality of his speech represents primarily a deep commitment to transparency, and secondarily an assertion of his own consistency over time. That is, when he guarantees that his words will be reflected in action at a later time, he is assuring his consistency of view over time.

commitment to supporting the interests of those making the assessment, whether one’s friends or fellow citizens (or at minimum a commitment to pursuing one’s selfish interests only to the extent that such a pursuit will not impair that person’s or group’s ability whatsoever to pursue his or their own interests).

18 While I deeply admire Trilling’s incredible breadth of knowledge and his pioneering work on this subject, I find it problematic that he asserts without sufficient, or really any, argument that sincerity cannot be spoken of as a moral element before this historical period.

19 (*Il. 9.312-3*: ἐχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὑμώς Ἀίδαο πύλησι/ ὅς χ’ ἔτερον μὲν κεύθη ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπη, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπη. *Il. 9.308-11*: διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη πολυμήχαν᾽ Ὀδυσσεῦ/ χοὶ μὲν δὴ τὸν μῦθον ἀπηλεγέως ἀποειπεῖν/ ἣ περ δὴ φρονέω τε καὶ ὡς τετελεσμένον ἔσται,/ ὡς μὴ μοι τρύζοναι παρήμενοι ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος. 
There is no one ancient Greek word for sincerity. There are not even stably recurring periphrases for the concept. Rather, each author generates his own semantic field around the concept of accurate self-representation. Despite the lack of clear terminology, the common thread in different authors is an anxiety over and attempts to assay or discern the truthfulness of another’s presentation of himself to who he actually is. There is much attention in ancient sources given to discussing the problem inherent to judging the accuracy of others’ representations of themselves, particularly in a political context. Given the variety in ancient articulations of sincerity, I have endeavored to boil these varied expressions down to their irreducible, core concerns, i.e. to four criteria that inform judgments about others’ sincerity: transparency, consistency, homogeneity and shared commitment to the interests of one’s community members. Both ancient and modern judgments of sincerity rely upon these criteria to some degree. These will be outlined below, but first I would like to outline some of the terminology of sincerity in ancient texts.

**Terminology of Sincerity**

As I mention above, there is no one word in Greek for the parallel value that we term ‘sincerity’. Instead, each author must invent his own periphrases for the concept. Many authors share in common the adjective ποικίλος, meaning literally ‘many-colored’, ‘dappled’ or ‘intricate’, to indicate complexity of self and insincerity. Complexity of self is at odds with ancient conceptions of sincerity. The noble, sincere self is single, simple, composed of one homogenous substance. Theognis, echoing a common metaphor for insincerity, describes the inconstant friend as one who harbors a cold and mottled (ποικίλον) snake in his bosom (599-602). The *Hecuba*’s chorus of Trojan women uses the same adjective, ποικίλος, when referring to Odysseus’ insincere flattery for the purpose of gaining political influence. In connection with insincerity, they stress his complexity of mind, calling him ποικιλόφρων (*Hec*. 131-3). Further, unlike Achilles, Odysseus is one who speaks to give pleasure (132, ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστής), a signpost of insincerity in speech.

---

21 *Hec*. 131-3: ὁ ποικιλόφρων/ κόπας ἡδυλόγος δημοχαριστής/ Λαερτιάδης
Ποικίλος is an adjective that indicates a lack of simplicity or homogeneity and that consequently comes to be associated with trickery or cunning. Along the same lines, someone who exhibits doubleness of self represents a dangerous acquaintance: “he who has a two-fold mind (δίχα νόον) with one tongue, that man is a terrible comrade” (Theog. 91-2). And, again, in Sophocles’ play of the same name, Philoctetes describes the intricacy of Odysseus’ evil mind as “always looking out through its recesses” (1013-4). Insincerity and deviousness are routinely linked, then, with complexity or doubleness of mind. This description of the insincere self as variegated or non-homogenous informs contrasting depictions of the sincere self: for example, Demosthenes habitually terms the sincere self ἀπλόος, or single, simple. Theognis speaks positively of πυκινὰς φρένας (1388), selves that are dense or compact, suggesting that, far from being variegated, such selves represent a closely packed, homogenous substance.

Theognis contrasts someone who is a friend only on the surface with someone who is a friend all the way down: Theognis cautions his young protégé, “Make none of these townsmen your friend ‘from the heart’, Polypaïdes, for the sake of any need; but seem to all to be a friend ‘from the tongue’” (Theog. 61-3). This lesson of pragmatic insincerity, echoed also at 213-8, occasions an accompanying lesson: never make assumptions about another until you have thoroughly tested him out, his temperament (ὀργήν), the “rhythm” of his self, i.e. his disposition (ὑπομόνη), and his habitual mode of living (τρόπον) (963-4). In a similar vein, Theognis advises, “you can know the mind (νόον) of neither man nor woman before you have tested it out like that of a beast of burden” (125-6). These lines hint at the perceived difficulties of truly knowing another.

---

22 Theog. 91-2: ὃς δὲ μη γλώσσῃ δίχ᾽ ἐχει νόον, οὗτος ἐταιρος/ δεινὸς Κύρν᾽.
23 Phil. 1013-4: ἥ κακὴ σὴ διὰ μυχῶν βλέπουσ᾽ ἀεὶ/ ψυχή… For the Philoctetes, I use Hugh Lloyd-Jones’ 1990 Oxford text unless otherwise noted.
24 For sincerity as single-mindedness, see Hampshire 1971; for a discussion of this article, see A. D. M. Walker 1978, 481-7, et passim.
25 For example, see Dem. 4.51, 10.76, 18.321 (Dem. 10 is most certainly spurious, though this may not matter for my purposes here). For sincerity as purity of mind, or lack of contaminating impurities of various sorts, see A. D. M. Walker 1978.
26 Theog. 61-3: μηδένα τῶνδε φίλον ποιεῖ Πολυπαϊθ σῶτων/ ἐκ θυμοῦ χρείης οὖνεα μηδεμής/ ἀλλὰ δόκει μὲν πάσιν ἀπὸ γλώσσης φίλος εἶναι…
Anne Duncan, discussing the prevalence of sincerity themes in the forensic speeches of Aeschines and Demosthenes, argues for “evidence of an anxiety about the changeability of the self, or perhaps the gap between the appearance and reality of the self.”

Jon Hesk observes a similar anxiety in the tragedies of Euripides, where the notion of a troubling and destructive gulf between the appearance and reality of the opaque self is a central theme. The difficulty of discerning another’s true nature and the very real possibility of a discrepancy between self-representation and true inner motivation are thematized in the *Heracles* (655-70); *Electra* (367f., 550-1); *Medea* (516-9); *Hippolytus* (413-4, 612, 616-7, 925-31, 950-7); and *Hecuba* (1187-91). Most notable are three remarkably similar passages lamenting the difficulty of detecting insincerity even in those closest to us:

**Medea 516-9:**

Ὤ Ζεῦ, τί δή χρυσοῦ μὲν ὡς κίβδηλος ἦ τεκμηρίου ἀνθρώποισιν ὑπάγοις σαφῆ, ἀνθρώπων δ’ ὡς χαὶ τὸν κακὸν διείδεται σύνεσις τῆς χαρακτῆρος ἐμπέφυκε σῶματι;

O Zeus, why have you granted mankind a sure proof of counterfeit gold, but for he who finds it necessary to discern the base man among men no distinctive mark is stamped by nature on the body?

**Hecuba 1187-91:**

Ἄγαμεμνων, ἄνθρωποι τινὶ ἐχθῆν ποτὲ τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλῶσσαν ἑαυτὸν ἤλεγχον ἀλλ’ ἐὰν χρήσεν ἤδοσεν χρήσεν ἢ ἔδει λέγειν, ἐὰν οὐ ποιήσας τοὺς λόγους εἶναι σαθροῦς, καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι τάδε εὖ λέγειν ποτέ.

Agamemnon, it should never be the case for men that their tongue would have more strength than their deeds; but if someone has done noble deeds, he ought to speak noble things, and if in turn he has done base things, his words should be unsound, and he should never be able to speak well of unjust deeds.

---

27 Duncan 2006, 89.
29 For all Euripides passages, I use Diggle’s Oxford text unless otherwise noted.
Hippolytus 925-31:
Φεῦ, χρήν βροτοῖς τῶν φίλων τεχνίμιον
σαφές τι κείσθαι καὶ διάγνωσιν φρενόν,
όσις τ᾽ ἂληθῆς ἐστιν ὡς τε μὴ φίλος,
δισιάς τε φωνάς πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἔχειν,
tίνι μὲν δικαίαν τὴν δ᾽ ὀπως ἔτυγχανεν,
ὡς ἤ φρονοῦσα τάδιν ἔξηλέγχητο
πρός τὴς δικαιας, κοῦχ ἀν ἰπατώμεθα.

Alas, there should be for mortals some clear sign
of friends and a means of discerning their minds,
who is a true friend and who is not,
and all men should have two voices,
the one just, the other however it happened to be,
so that the voice thinking unjust things might be refuted
by the just voice, and we would not be deceived.

A common theme to each of these passages, in addition to their clear demonstration of
the anxiety produced by human opacity, is the emphasis on the problem of recognizing
the insincere self, this is a factor of the degree of anxiety generated by the problem of
accurately knowing and predicting our fellow human beings. In addition, in the context of
civic strife within the nascent polis, the archaic period gives rise to the language of the
counterfeit self (κίβδηλος) – that is, a self that appears noble, trustworthy, honest on the
outside, but which at its core is base, untrustworthy and dishonest – which persists into
the democracy, as we find in the Medea passage above. For its evocation of a
discrepancy between the inside and outside of the self, the language of the “counterfeit”
self emerges as an important term in discussions of sincerity.

It is often by contrast with the negative qualities of the insincere person that the
portrait of the sincere man takes its shape. Another metaphor for the self opposes
straightness to crookedness: “the actions of the noble are always more straight” (Theog.
1026, ἱθύτεραι), while “unjust men” are characterized by twisted or crooked speech
(Theog. 1147, σκολιὸν λόγον). Demosthenes uses similar language, saying “from a soul

---

30 For concerns about human opacity and untrustworthiness in the Athenian context, see
Ober 1998, Ch. 2. On the Hippolytus passage, see Zeitlin 1996, 254; Hesk 2000, 278f.;
duBois 1991, 12-3; Goff 1990, 46.
31 Kurke 1999, passim; Hesk 2000, 285; Theog. 117, 119, 123, 965; Hdt. 1.66.3, 1.75.2,
5.91.2; Ar. Frogs 721; Eur. El. 550, Hipp. 616, Med. 516. See also παράσημος as a
that is straight (ὀρθῆς), just and incorruptible, appointed as the leader of the greatest matters of any of the men of my time, I have conducted all of these matters sincerely (ὑγιῶς) and justly” (Dem. 18.298). Here, the quality of being υγιής (healthy, pure, wholesome) stands as a synonym for sincerity, and the sincere soul is, like Theognis’ “ιθύς ἄνήρ”, “ὀρθή” (straight). Again, at 19.39, Demosthenes exclaims that nothing in a letter from Philip, which he purports was composed by Aeschines, is υγιές. Thucydides also uses the adjective υγιής in a context suggesting a meaning of “sincere” (4.22.2): “but he commanded them, if they had any sincere (ὑγιὲς) intentions, to speak before all.” Lastly, Philoctetes bitterly reproaches Odysseus for having no thought that is “sincere or free” (1006, υγιὲς μηδ’ ἐλεύθερον). All of these instances of υγιής with a meaning of “sincere” suggest that perhaps insincerity was viewed as an infirmity or imbalance in the self, analogous to a disease of the body.

Thucydides persistently calls attention to the gap between interested speakers’ words and their actual thoughts or intentions. Thucydides, of course, purports to have a unique ability to render human opacity transparent, spelling out for the reader the “real” motivations behind others’ words and actions. In Book 5, Alcibiades conceives a plot to trick the Spartan envoys who came to Athens to negotiate for the return of Pylos. Thucydides relates of this plot that Alcibiades “did these things, wishing to separate [the envoys] from Nicias, and so that, accusing them in the Assembly that they had nothing true (ἀληθὲς) in their mind nor did they ever say the same things, he might effect an alliance with the Argives, the Eleans and the Mantineans” (5.45.3). Aside from

33 Consider also that the institution of the εὔθυνα or εὔθυναι at Athens, or the audit of an official’s conduct during his term of office, is termed a “straightening out” in the context of an examination aimed at determining his honesty as a public servant. This observation was suggested to me in conversation by S. Lape.
35 Thuc. 4.22.2: ἄλλα εἰ τι υγιὲς διανοοῦνται, λέγειν ἐξέλευσον ἀπαίσιν. Throughout, Thucydides passages are taken from the Oxford Classical Text by Henry Stuart Jones (1942).
36 Thuc. 5.45.3: βουλώμενος δὲ αὐτοῦς Νικίου τε ἀποστήσας ταῦτα ἑρμοῦ ἐπηράσει καὶ ὅπως ἐν τῷ δήμῳ διαβαλὼς αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐν νῷ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ λέγουσιν
highlighting here Alcibiades’ insincerity, Thucydides gives a periphrasis for insincerity that indicates that, in the fifth century, sincerity in the sense of a regard for truth in one’s self-representation has not yet been lexically distinguished from the notion of truth generally.\textsuperscript{37} This will be true all the way through the classical period, as will be seen as well in Aristotle’s word choice below.

Παρρησία also belongs among the Greek terms that fall within the lexical field of sincerity for its emphasis on frankness and on speaking without shame or regard for the pleasure of one’s listeners.\textsuperscript{38} As becomes clear, however, from the very outset of discussion of this term with the problem of how to translate it, i.e. as “free speech” or “frank speech”, the concept of παρρησία does not neatly map onto the concept of sincerity. Jeffrey Henderson argues, “Speakers often appealed to parrhēsia to show that they intended to speak truthfully and in the demos’ interests, not their own.”\textsuperscript{39} It will become clearer below that this understanding of the term brings παρρησία quite close to my definition of sincerity. Further, Sara Monoson says of παρρησία, “it meant speaking one’s own mind, that is, frankly saying what one thinks”, which also strongly resembles the definition of sincerity.\textsuperscript{40} It might seem, then, that παρρησία makes a promising candidate as a Greek word for sincerity. Yet the Athenians found it desirable to put legal constraints on the exercise of παρρησία, in its sense of bold, even aggressive, critical speech that has the potential to cross into the realm of slander;\textsuperscript{41} and this is where παρρησία begins to diverge from sincerity, as one cannot envision a political community wishing to curtail the sincerity of its public speakers. Further, sincerity is not only an

37 For the modern blurring between sincerity and truthfulness, see Williams 2002, 93-4.
38 For an extended discussion of the association between παρρησία and shamelessness, see Saxonhouse 2006. Markovits (2008, 2) conflates the modern term ‘sincerity’ with the ancient concept of παρρησία. For a cogent explanation of why this is unsatisfying and inaccurate, see S. Sara Monoson’s review of Markovits’ book: Perspectives on Politics 7:1, 2009: 179-80.
40 Monoson 2000, 52.
aspect of speech – it can function as a descriptor of one’s entire self-representation.\textsuperscript{42} Παρρησια specifically designates \textit{speech} that is \textit{critical}; it therefore intersects with sincerity only over a specific range of speech content.\textsuperscript{43}

The term παρρησια is used in a variety of senses by different authors and even within particular authors’ work, sometimes aligning rather neatly with the conception of sincere speech and other times bearing no resemblance to sincerity. Demosthenes in multiple passages uses παρρησια in a way that is synonymous with sincerity, for example in his closing words to the First Philippic oration:\textsuperscript{44}

\begin{quote}
Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν οὔτ᾽ ἄλλοτε πώποτε πρὸς χάριν εἰλόμην λέγειν, ὁ τι ἄν μὴ καὶ συνοίσειν πεπεισμένος ὥ, ὡς ἄν ὑγινώσκω πάνθ᾽ ἀπλώς οὐδὲν ὑποστειλάμενος, πεπαρρησίασαι.
\end{quote}

I at any rate have not at any time ever yet chosen to say anything to gain your favor that I was not persuaded would also confer a benefit, and now, everything I know I have spoken out sincerely and boldly, concealing nothing.

Dem. 4.51

In our democratic sources, παρρησια is most commonly associated with speech that is bold before power, including the power of the demos, rendering παρρησια a critical aspect of the proper functioning of democratic deliberation: that is, the frank criticism implied by παρρησια “served as a check against bad judgment by encouraging the kind of spirited debate that the demos needed in order to choose the best proposals in an assembly or the better case in a law court.”\textsuperscript{45} Παρρησια emerged initially to designate

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} For ex., see Williams 2002, 96-100.
\item \textsuperscript{43} See Foucault (2001, 11-20) for the limits on the meaning of παρρησια and its association with criticism. For παρρησια as criticism, see further Henderson 1998, 257; Monoson 1994, 175.
\item \textsuperscript{44} For similar usage, see also Dem. 3.3, 8.32, 10.76; Isoc. 15.43. Although the 4\textsuperscript{th} Philippic (Dem. 10) is not thought to be a genuine Demosthenic speech, I am not sure how much this matters to my point. For the text of the First Philippic, I use Sandys’ 1897 text, reprinted in 1979. For Demosthenes’ idiosyncratic use of the key terms of democratic ideology, see Lape, \textit{forthcoming}.
\item \textsuperscript{45} Henderson 1998, 256.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the kind of open, bold, critical speech that is not possible in a tyranny. As a distinctively democratic value, it also comes to be associated by critics of popular rule with the shameless and unrestrained speech of the masses. In stark contrast, then, to Demosthenes’ usage of παρρησία, Euripides’ portrayal in the Orestes of the speech of a putative parrhesiast stands in clear opposition to sincere speech. In this play, a messenger relays four speeches from Orestes’ trial for the murder of his mother, each of which represents a distinct variety of political speech. First, the herald Talthybius, portrayed as less than free, dependent on those in power (889), equivocates, delivering a speech that is double (890, διχόμυθα), “turning around words fair and base” (891-2, καλοὺς κακοὺς). Talthybius’ deferential speech, bent on flattery, is not a frank representation of his own views. His speech is immediately juxtaposed to the blunt and independent judgment of the aristocratic Diomedes (898-900, Διομήδης ἄναξ).

An anonymous Argive citizen delivers the third opinion, a man who is brash and unpleasently uninhibited in his speech (902-16). This man too, despite his boldness, fails to reveal his own true opinions, instead parroting words that were suggested to him by Tyndareus, Orestes’ maternal grandfather (915). It is only the fourth man, a landed farmer, who speaks sincerely. This farmer is as virtuous politically as his fellow citizen is an aggressive chatterbox: though he is able to speak eloquently when he wishes (921), he minds his own affairs for the most part (919). The messenger asserts that this farmer has lived a pure, blameless life; and it is his proposal that is the boldest of the four, that

---

48 For a full analysis of παρρησία in this scene from the Orestes, see Foucault 2001, 57-71.
49 903: ἀθυρόγλωσσος, ἰσχύων θράσει; 905: θορύβῳ τε πίσυνος κἀμαθεῖ παρρησίᾳ. Though there are suspicions that lines 904-13 may be an interpolation (deleted by Hartung, followed by Diggle and Kovacs), line 903 nevertheless represents a description of παρρησία that is in keeping with several hostile accounts (see above). Further, after Talthybius’ speech that defers to the power of Agamemnon, this anonymous citizen’s uninhibited boldness also resonates with democratic accounts of παρρησία.
50 915: ὑπὸ δ’ ἔτεινε Τυνδάρεως λόγους. Also, line 904: he has been compelled or suborned (ἥναγκασμένος).
51 The farmer’s sincerity is bolstered by the unmixed, uncontaminated or pure quality of his life (922, ἀκέραιον βίον). Further, this adjective, ἀκέραιον, implicitly links his
Orestes should be rewarded for killing his mother under the circumstances (923-9). If the ideal of παρρησία means speaking one’s own thoughts boldly without concern for social hierarchies, then it is this moderate, independent farmer who best exemplifies the ideal according to the account of the messenger.

Through this episode, Euripides indicates that a negative connotation for παρρησία, one that runs directly counter to the notion of an accurate self-representation, would be recognized by the Athenian audience as one potential engagement with this concept. This is the view of παρρησία as license associated with aristocratic critics of popular rule, who associate παρρησία more with Cleon’s style of aggressive, critical abuse than with the dignified, considered expression of one’s views exhibited by the farmer above. In sum, though παρρησία does have a connection to sincerity where it connotes frank criticism, it can also signify the undisciplined speech of even a patently insincere person.

Aristotle is the first to undertake a sustained, explicit study of sincerity. In the Nicomachean Ethics (1127a-b), he discusses sincerity as the observance of the mean between boastfulness about oneself and self-deprecation, saying that such a man’s words about himself accord with the reality about him. This is a clear consideration of what an accurate self-representation entails. Part of a systematic assessment of virtue as the observance of the mean between two opposing vices, Aristotle acknowledges that, like several other virtues he considers, this mean behavior is a virtue without a name (1127a10, ἀνώνυμος). Aristotle terms a man who exhibits this virtue a “lover of truth” (φιλαλήθης) and simply “truthful” (ἀληθευτικός, 1127a-b). In the context, however, it is clear that this man is truthful about himself – in other words, sincere. Aristotle sets sincerity in opposition to pretence or pretending with regard to one’s own qualities (1127a20, προσποιήμα, προσποιητικός). Aristotle’s analysis makes clear that, although

sincerity to his credentials as a pure-blooded, authentic citizen using Athenian norms of civic ideology; that is, a citizen born of two citizen parents. The messenger suggests that it is the farmer’s blameless life and unassailable citizenship status that give him the confidence of his convictions. This resonates with the conception of παρρησία offered by Euripides at Hipp. 420-5. See Lape (2010) for the racial ideology behind Athenian citizenship norms and the connection with trustworthiness.
there was no single word for the virtue of accurate self-representation, the concept that we term ‘sincerity’ was not foreign in the 4th-century Greek context.

**Four Criteria of Sincerity Assessments**

Sincerity is a virtue that sits at the intersection of a number of related virtues: honesty, integrity, trustworthiness, reliability, authenticity and loyalty, among others. Sincerity is a compound virtue, in the sense that it yokes together a number of these other virtues within its field of meaning. For example, while sincerity entails honesty, loyalty, integrity and so forth, it is not coextensive with these other concepts. These things are a part of sincerity, but sincerity also entails something more. Sincerity demands honesty about oneself, about the sort of inner thoughts, feelings and experiences that inform one’s motivations, intentions or ultimate behavior. The sense of sincerity that most readily leaps to mind involves the notion of transparency; and yet ‘sincere’ is also used as an adjective to describe people in ways that suggest implicit meanings that go beyond transparency. I have already mentioned Achilles’ formulation of sincerity as entailing transparency and consistency. In addition, other ancient periphrases for sincerity emphasize different criteria by which to judge another’s sincerity, namely, homogeneity of self, i.e., a uniformity in the quality of one’s self from the perceivable surface all the way down to one’s core; and the exhibition of a shared commitment to the interests of one’s fellows, whether personal friends or fellow citizens. The following four qualities represent personal characteristics or commitments either asserted by an individual of himself to portray himself as sincere or ascribed to an individual by another on the basis of which sincerity judgments are made.

---

52 For the distinction between trust and trustworthiness, see Williams 2002, 88-9.
53 Moran (2005) makes a compelling argument that we value sincerity for more than its supposed role in affording unfiltered or direct access to another’s interiority (a passive role from the perspective of the sincere person): an individual exhibiting sincerity also constitutes and represents himself to others as a certain sort of moral being who signals his conscious, intentional involvement in his assertions in such a way that expressly invites trust (an active role).
54 For the “mysterious complexity” behind English uses of sincerity, see A. D. M. Walker 1978, 489.
I. Transparency:

If someone applauds you so long as you see him,
But, when separated in another place, he utters malicious speech,
Such a man is surely in no way a very good friend:
Whoever speaks smooth things with his tongue, but thinks different things.

Theog. 93-6

Indeed who is the one who deceives the city? Is it not he who does not say the things which he thinks? Upon whom does the herald justly call down curses? Is it not upon such a man as this? Of what greater wrong could someone accuse a public speaker than that he does not think and speak the same things?

Dem. 18.282

The Theognidean passage above emphasizes transparency as the primary quality of a trustworthy comrade. This sentiment echoes Achilles’ assertion of his preference for transparency in his dealings with others, as well as resembling Achilles’ implicit linking of transparency and consistency as qualities of a sincere friend (Il. 9.312-3). The central concern in judgments of another person’s character with respect to his sincerity is whether what you see is what you get, so to speak; that is, am I prepared to hazard the assumption that this person will behave in a way that accords with his self-presentation to me right now? The uncomfortable fact is, for ancient and contemporary humans alike, that the minds of our fellow men are opaque. We cannot probe them, test them or in any way know them beyond our social instincts about others and beyond what others choose

55 I take all Theognis passages from M. L. West’s 1989 edition of Iambi et Elegi Graeci. 56 The text used is that printed in the 2001 Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics edition by Yunis.
to convey about themselves. There is no guarantee, however, that either our instincts or
the information conveyed by others is accurate. For this reason, different cultures
throughout time have placed a normative value on transparency in interpersonal
relationships. The ideal of transparent behavior entails an open and accurate
representation of one’s inner world for others externally. The assumption is that, if I can
gather a true and accurate snapshot of who someone really is right now, I can reasonably
expect to be able to extrapolate from this data to know who he will be at a later date or in
a different context as well. The longer we interact with a transparent person, the more
data points we can gather about his character. In this way, then, one could hope truly to
know another person and to be able to predict his behavior with a high degree of
accuracy. This sort of transparency is what the Theognidean passage above desires in a
friend: that his vocal expressions instantiate a faithful model of his inner thoughts and
feelings. And in Demosthenes’ speech, excerpted above, he pinpoints the danger to the
demos that attends the non-transparent orator, i.e. that he might harbor some personal
agenda that is at odds with the city’s interest.57

Transparency of self is, of course, a fiction and a highly problematic basis on
which to judge anything about another person. First, we can never actually observe
transparency. We are always taking someone’s word for it. The human mind is
inescapably opaque. To a large extent, we even fail to know our own minds.58
Furthermore, given the broad contemporary consensus that our selves are comprised of
competing desires and motivations, of unconscious drives and conscious commitments,
we would have to behave in an utterly schizophrenic way in order to reveal ourselves
transparently. And how could we hope to convey the vast swirl of emotions and drives
that are unknown even to ourselves? In the ancient world, there was probably not a

57 See also Dem. 18.281: ταὐτὰ γὰρ συμφέρονθ' εἰλόμην τουτοί, καὶ οὐδὲν
ἔξαμετον οὐδ' ὅδιον πεποίημαι (“I have chosen for myself the same benefits as my
compatriots, and I pursue no specific or personal ends”). Here, transparency is linked
with the need to demonstrate with clear proofs the alignment of one’s interests with the
community interests in order to qualify as sincere.
58 Consider Nietzsche’s pessimistic view of the possibility of self-knowledge (Golffing
translation, 1956, 149): “The sad truth is that we remain necessarily strangers to
ourselves, we don’t understand our own substance, we must mistake ourselves; the
axiom, “Each man is farthest from himself,” will hold for us to all eternity. Of ourselves
we are not ‘knowers’….”
conception of an unconscious mind, but many ancient writers demonstrate a conception of the self as existing in the interplay between emotion and reason. Whenever we flatter ourselves that we are revealing ourselves transparently, we have always first made a conscious choice about what part of ourselves we want to locate as the seat of our identities. In fact, this is precisely Harry Frankfurt’s reasoning when he declares unequivocally in the last line of his treatise, On Bullshit, that “sincerity itself is bullshit.”

II. Homogeneity

The ruin of counterfeit gold and silver is bearable, 
Cyrnus, and it is easy for the expert to discover it; 
But if the mind of a friend escapes one’s notice in his breast 
Being false, and he harbors a deceitful heart in his chest, 
The god made this the most counterfeit thing for mortals, 
And this is the most troublesome thing of all to judge. 
For you cannot know the mind of a man or woman, 
Until you put it to the test like that of a beast of burden, 
Nor can you evaluate it like one who comes to the market; 
For many times outward appearances deceive the judgment. 

Theog. 119-28

In the ancient context, transparency and homogeneity of self are tightly linked ideas. Homogeneity of the self’s “substance” could even be seen as a metaphor for the

60 The text here encounters some trouble. In this line, I prefer the emendation of Camerarius: ὅσπερ ποτ’ ἐς ὅνιον ἐλθών in place of ὅσπερ ποτ’ ἐς ὅριον ἐλθών, which makes little sense.
sincere, transparent self. The supposition is that the noble, transparent man will be pure of substance; that is, what you see on the outside, the evidence from his speech and behavior, will be the same in quality as the character or nature that he harbors inside. On the other hand, the base will always parade themselves as noble, but their interior characters are of a low quality, analogous to a base metal. In this way, base men resemble counterfeit coins, noble in appearance on the outside, but base and of low value on the inside. Leslie Kurke unpacks the work that the metaphor of the noble metals is doing to characterize the noble self as unchanging over time and as continuous of substance from the external to the internal.\textsuperscript{62} The language of metals as a metaphor for the homogenous self imposes the constraint that the noble, sincere self should be characterized by its singleness or unity of substance. The sincere self is ἁπλόος, or simple, uncompounded (see, e.g., Dem. 18.321).

Homogeneity of self can also refer to an individual’s appropriate demonstration of an inherited uniformity of nature down the family line. For example, the essential uniformity that Philoctetes repeatedly expects and emphasizes in Neoptolemus is the boy’s uniformity of nature with his father. He assumes that Neoptolemus will establish through his speech and actions that he is γενναῖος, or the true son of his father, that he has inherited his father’s nature. In the Athenian political context, homogeneity of substance comes to indicate the purity of autochthonous blood as opposed to the adulterated or mixed blood of someone with mixed, non-Athenian parentage. The pure blood of the Athenian citizen confers nobility of character, sincerity and perfect loyalty to the democracy.\textsuperscript{63} The perceived danger, though, was that there were counterfeit citizens.

\textsuperscript{61} Consider, for example, \textit{Theog.} 87-90: μὴ μ’ ἔπεσιν μὲν στέργε, νόον δ’ ἔχε καὶ φρένος ἄλλη, εἰ μὲ φιλεῖς καὶ οὐι πιστὸς ἔνεστι νόος. ἢ μὲ φιλεὶ καθαρὸν θέμενος νόον, ἢ μ’ ἀποειπὼν ἐχθάρμενος ἄμφαδεν νεῖκος ἐκείος ἐωράμενος (“Don’t love me with words, but hold your mind and heart elsewhere, if you love me and your mind is trustworthy. Either love me having a pure mind, or, refusing me, hate me, raising a public quarrel.”). Here, the transparent self is conceived of as being pure of substance, or without alloy (καθαρὸν). For homogeneity of self as central to English senses of sincerity as well, see A. D. M. Walker 1978, 488-90.

\textsuperscript{62} Kurke 1999, esp. Ch. 1.

\textsuperscript{63} See Ober 1989, 97-8; Lape 2010, \textit{passim}. 
living among the Athenians whose sincerity and loyalty to the democracy was highly suspect.\textsuperscript{64}

In the ancient context, the notion of the unified, unsophisticated or simple self exists side-by-side with a widely accepted understanding of the self as divided between rational judgments and irrational emotions.\textsuperscript{65} Today, too, an anachronistic association between sincerity and singleness or unity of self coexists uncomfortably with a broadly accepted notion of the self as divided between unconscious impulses and conscious judgments. Nevertheless, in assessing others’ sincerity, it is common to create a link between sincerity and simplicity of self.

III. Consistency

“Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι…καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους…πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐννοιών καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους.”

Pericles: “I hold the same judgment, Athenians, always…although I know that men change their judgments in accordance with circumstances.”

\textit{Thuc.} 1.140.1

παρῄνει δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν παρόντων ἄπειρα καὶ πρότερον…

[Pericles] advised concerning their present circumstances the very same things he had also advised earlier…

\textit{Thuc.} 2.13.2

\textsuperscript{64} Lape 2010, 145-9. Though sincerity is accorded a highly positive value in Greek morality and specifically in Athenian political ideology, there are conditions under which countervailing values and pressures might lend a positive spin to its opposite, trickery or insincerity, especially in situations such as civil war (as at Corcyra or in Theognis’ Megara) and war. Hesk (2000, 197-8, \textit{passim}) notes that over the course of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians learned the necessary value of trickery and insincerity in wartime. Hence, there is an acknowledgement that the deployment of strategic insincerity to accomplish one’s own selfish ends is sometimes reasonable and even preferable to sincerity.

\textsuperscript{65} I refer to the emotions as irrational in the sense of being outside of the control of the rational will (Sabini and Silver 1998, 5). I do not mean to suggest that ancient Greek conceptions of the emotions reject the emotions’ cognitive content. For an excellent survey of ancient emotion and especially an account of the cultural specificity of emotion, see Konstan 2006.
Περικλῆς δὲ στρατηγὸς ὄν καὶ τότε περὶ μὲν τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξίεναι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὴν αὐτὴν γνώμην εἶχεν ὃσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ ἐσβολῇ.

But Pericles, who was general, adhered to the same judgment also at that time concerning the Athenians’ not marching out as he had in the earlier invasion.

*Thuc.* 2.55.2

“καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμι καὶ οὐκ ἔξισταμ…”

Pericles: “I am the same man and do not change…”

*Thuc.* 2.61.2

Consistency is the hallmark of Periclean sincerity. Pericles, with Thucydides’ hearty agreement, asserts that he is always the same person in his policies, his speech and his actions. He frames his trustworthiness as a leader before the Athenian demos in terms of his remarkable stability of self. Because of his consistency, the citizenry of Athens can reliably predict the policies he will pursue and the behavior he will exhibit in the future. His consistency, in other words, makes him a known quantity. The drive governing our admiration of transparent self-presentation stems at its core from our longing to be able to predict others’ behavior out in time and across social contexts. If we see a transparent interaction with another person as a single-frame snapshot of his character at a point in time, the data we gather from consistency of behavior and speech gives us a broader picture over a range of time. Theoretically, one transparent interaction provides a thick cross-section of a person’s character at one point in time; we get a deep glimpse of who he is at that specific moment. There is no guarantee, however, that this will tell us anything whatsoever about who he will be at a later point in time, whether one second from now or one year from now. Consistency is assessed, by comparison, by gathering more superficial data, data that has no recourse to internal state of mind, but that enriches the picture of someone’s character by providing data over time. While we cannot ever truly judge another’s transparency, it is entirely possible to observe consistency, both of speech and action. The limitation to this information as a key to someone’s sincerity is

---

that, unless we spend every second of our lives with another person, we will always have incomplete data on that person’s consistency.

Though it is most often transparency or a quality of honesty about oneself that is stressed in attempts to define sincerity (e.g. consider Trilling’s definition), consistency is far more important to conceptions of sincerity in common usage than one might think given the paucity of explicit discussion. For example, politicians who change their positions on an issue over time lay themselves open to accusations of insincerity, bribery and pandering to the voters.⁶⁷ Consider Demosthenes’ strident accusations that, because Aeschines changed his position on war with Philip and specifically on the Peace of Philocrates, Aeschines must have sold himself to Philip (Dem. 19.9-28). Sincerity as a social virtue is most important as it extends out in time. Anne Duncan, writing about the importance for Aeschines and Demosthenes of presenting themselves as sincere while imputing insincerity to their rivals, asserts, “Politicians were expected to present a stable, predictable, consistent self – the exact opposite of an actor.”⁶⁸ She goes on to note, “Changing one’s political stance was a tense issue, often attributed by one’s opponents to bribery”.⁶⁹

We most want to know that another person is sincere when we are transacting some kind of agreement, contract or deal with him. A transparent demeanor during a transaction might indicate his genuine intention of fulfilling his end of the agreement at a time in the future; yet, as I stress above, transparency tells us next to nothing about what that person’s commitments will be in the future. Transparency tells us only what he hopes or expects his intentions will be in the future. When, however, someone indicates a transparent intention to uphold a promise, say, to return a borrowed book, but then later loses interest in that commitment and fails to return the book, even if he is openly and transparently unconcerned, the book lender would most likely consider the borrower faithless, unreliable and insincere. He proved to be incapable of keeping a simple

⁶⁷ In the contemporary context, consider John Kerry, the “flip-flopper”; or, more recently, Mitt Romney’s struggles to explain away his change of stance on several important issues, notably health care reform and abortion.
⁶⁸ Duncan 2006, 88.
⁶⁹ Ibid., 89.
promise. This suggests that we expect more than transparency from a sincere person. We expect sufficient self-discipline from someone to guarantee his consistency of self and consistency of commitments over time.

IV. Identity of Interests with a Broader Group

Περικλῆς ὁ Ξανθίππου…προηγόρευε τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ ὅτι Ἀρχίδαμος μὲν οἱ ξένοις εἶν, οὐ μέντοι ἐπὶ κακῷ γε τῆς πόλεως γένοιτο, τοὺς δὲ ἄγρους τοὺς ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ὁίκιας ἢν ἄρα μὴ δημόσιωσιν οἱ πολέμιοι ὦστε καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀφίησιν αὐτὰ δήμοσια εἶναι καὶ μηδεμίαν οἱ ὑποψίαι κατὰ ταῦτα γέγονεσθαι.

Pericles son of Xanthippus...announced in advance to the Athenians in the Assembly that Archidamus may be his guest-friend, but this should not be to the detriment of the state, and in case the enemy should not ravage his fields and houses like the others, he gave them up to be the property of the demos, and so that no suspicion would arise against him on their account. Thuc. 2.13.1

οἱ βάρβαροι δὲ μήτε τοὺς φίλους φίλους ἠγείροντε μήτε τοὺς καλῶς τεθνηκότας θαυμάζεθ᾽, ὡς ἢν ἡ μὲν Ἑλλὰς εὐτυχῇ, ύμεῖς δ᾽ ἐξῆθ᾽ ὀμοία τοῖς βουλεύμασιν.

Continue, barbarians, not considering your friends as friends
And not admiring those who have died nobly,
In order that Greece might prosper,
And that you might have circumstances that resemble your resolutions.
Eur. Hec. 328-31

ἐγὼ σὲ καὶ σὸν παῖδα καὶ τύχας σέθεν,
ἲ Ἐκάβη, δι᾽ ὅτι οὐκεῖν θ᾽ ἰκεῖαιν ἔχω,
καὶ βούλομαι θεῶν θ᾽ οὐνεκ᾽ ἀνόσιον ξένον καὶ τοῦ δικαίου τήνδε σοι δούναι δίκην,
εἰ πως φανεί γ᾽ ὡστε σοι τ᾽ ἔχειν καλῶς στρατῷ τε μὴ δόξαιμι Κασσάνδρας χάριν
Θρῆκης ἀνακτῆντον τὸν δικαίου φόνον.
ἔστιν γὰρ ἡ ταραχής ἐμπέπτωσε μοι,
τὸν ἀνδρα τοῦτον φίλουν ἠγείται στρατός,
τὸν κατθανόντα δ᾽ ἐχθρόν· εἰ δ᾽ ἔμοι φίλος?

---

70 For the relation between promise-keeping and sincerity, see Williams 2002.
ὀδ᾿ ἐστὶ, χωρὶς τούτο καὶ κοινὸν στρατῷ.
πρὸς ταῦτα φρόντις· ὥς θέλοντα μὲν μʼ ἐχεῖς
σοι ξυμπονῆσαι καὶ ταχὺν προσαρκέσαι,
βραδύν δʼ, Ἀχαιῶν εἰ διαβληθήσομαι.

I pity you and your son and your misfortunes,
Hecuba, because of pity I hold your suppliant hand,
and I wish for the sake of the gods and justice
that your impious guest-friend would pay the penalty to you,
if somehow it might appear that things go well for you
and I might not appear to the army to have planned
this murder of the lord of Thrace for the sake of Cassandra.
It is for this reason that unease has fallen upon me;
the army considers this man a friend,
and the dead man an enemy; if the latter is a friend to me,
this is separate and not common to the army.
Given these concerns, consider: you have me as someone willing
to work with you and quick to assist you,
but slow if it will set me at variance with the Achaeans.

Eur. Hec. 850-63

The Thucydidean passage stresses the importance for a politician of aligning his
interests with those of the demos as a whole.72 Pericles is aware that, if his private
interests can be perceived as in any way divergent from the demos’ interests, this will
bring him under suspicion as untrustworthy.73 The demos will assume that Pericles
harbors mixed motivations, between his own private concerns and his duty as a steward
of the commonweal, calling into question his sincerity when he advises specific policies:
that is, are his policies designed to benefit the city as a whole as he suggests, or does he
really have an eye on his personal affairs? Pericles’ political move described here is of a
piece with Pericles’ pervasive message that there is no place in the political sphere for the
pursuit of private interests at the public expense. For better or worse, Pericles suggests
that each citizen must link his own personal flourishing with the flourishing of the

71 I use Gregory’s 1999 text, while also consulting the textual decisions made in Daitz’
Teubner edition and Diggle’s Oxford text. For line 859, I accept Gregory’s use of
Elmsley’s emendation as making the most sense. See Gregory 1999, 147.
72 For Pericles’ departure from a traditional model of politics, see Connor 1971, 35-84;
Ober 1989, 90-1.
73 For the observation that affirmations of loyalty to the polis have become requisite in the
political sphere of the 5th century, see Connor 1971, 99-108.
commonwealth (2.60.2-4). Thucydides sets Pericles apart from his successors as the model of the sincere politician for exactly this commitment to the public good over private ambition (2.65.7). His self-presentation as a sincere politician, in other words, is convincing because Pericles manifestly links his interests with Athens’. As Pericles recognizes, a political figure cannot openly pursue a personal agenda of private gain, either in the ancient or modern context. Therefore, any politician who uses his political platform to secure personal ends must do so by misrepresenting himself in an insincere manner. Such insincere orators, so the thinking goes, are likely to give advice that is contrary to their true convictions about what is best for the city, advising instead the policy that conduces to their own gain. On a personal level, Theognis too asserts a connection between the trustworthy friend and a man who is like-minded, that is, who shares his friend’s interests and circumstances (Theog. 79-82).

These sorts of calculations lie behind the two passages from the Hecuba, in which both Odysseus and Agamemnon demonstrate a concern for being perceived by the demos-army as having unmixed motivations as public figures. That is, they wish to be seen as having coextensive interests with the army. In the first passage, Odysseus and Hecuba disagree about who should properly constitute a philos. Hecuba, as an aristocratic former queen, implicitly employs a more aristocratic definition of friendship: philoi are those within one’s kinship and status groups. She anticipates, therefore, that Odysseus, a fellow aristocrat who has successfully engaged in a supplication relationship with her,

---

74 For a discussion of this passages and its implications concerning Pericles’ successors, see Gomme 1966, vol. II.

75 Alcibiades is an unusual exception to many rules, this one included: he brazenly acknowledges his private pursuit of personal glory, while also suggesting, though, that his private interests align nicely with Athens’ best interests. Thucydides, however, takes care to stress the insincerity – in the sense of a complete lack of concern for how things turn out for his fellow citizens (see 6.17.3) – of Alcibiades’ rhetoric before Alcibiades even speaks (6.15.2; see also 6.1-5 for the contrast between Thucydides’ factual account of the island of Sicily and Alcibiades’ loose and inaccurate account, designed to inspire false courage in the Athenians).

76 Theog. 79-82: παύρους εὑρήσεις Πολυπαϊδη ἄνδρας ἑταίρους/ πιστοὺς ἐν χαλεποῖς πρήγμασι γινομένους/ οἵτινες ἂν τολμῷεν ὀμόφρονα θυμόν ἔχοντες/ ίσον τῶν ἄγαθῶν τῶν τε κακῶν μετέχειν (“You will find, Polypaides, few men who are trustworthy comrades in difficult matters, the sort of men who have the steadfastness of will to be like-minded with you and to share equally in good circumstances and bad”).

26
will consider her a *philos* of sorts (252-7).\(^{77}\) She has an expectation that, because she spared Odysseus’ life in Troy (239-48), he owes her a reciprocal favor, such as sparing her daughter’s life. She forgets, though, that Odysseus is not a monarch. He is not in a position to make such unilateral decisions.

Odysseus, as a member of what is anachronistically portrayed as a democratic polity, claims that, out of a prudential calculus, his *philoi* are those within his political community. Odysseus counters Hecuba’s claims on him by asserting that doing as she asks constitutes “not considering friends as friends” (328-9), under the assumption that to treat a friend as a friend, one cannot hold anything aside as separate from them that might engender mixed motivations. Hecuba’s notion of aristocratic friendship does exactly this, placing Odysseus in the middle between doing what is best for the political community and what is best for his private “friend”, Hecuba. Odysseus solves the dilemma by simply rejecting the existence of a *philia* relationship with Hecuba by defining friendship strictly as that relationship which pertains between fellow citizens. Odysseus goes on to suggest that the good fortune of a political community rides on such identification of personal interests with community interests (330-1).

This very issue arises again in Hecuba’s dealings with Agamemnon, of whom she also asks a favor that puts him in an awkward position between trying to satisfy the demands of both his political friends and his personal friend (857-63).\(^{78}\) Agamemnon makes the connection between sharing interests with the army-demos and being viewed by them as sincere even more explicit than Odysseus. He is concerned that, if he does harm to someone the army views as a friend (the Thracian lord, Polymestor), he will be viewed with suspicion and criticism by his political community. To be clear, the army’s judgment of his sincerity rests upon their interpretation of his interests as coextensive with theirs. Agamemnon takes a seemingly weaker stance than Odysseus, agreeing to

\(^{77}\) For contrasting conceptions of *philia* in the *Hecuba*, see Belfiore 2000, 147-9. For a successful supplication as initiating a relationship of *philia* or *xenia* and entailing reciprocal obligations, see Belfiore 2000, 8, 15-9.

\(^{78}\) See also Segal 1993, 193-4.
help Hecuba only to the extent that he would not be discovered doing so by his compatriots (861-3).79

If the Odysseus of this play appears cold and callous toward Hecuba’s suffering, one can at least admire him for being consistent in his convictions. Odysseus, as a successful politician who knows how things work (131-3), does not comply with the army’s expectations of a political figure only in appearance; he has fully committed to “thinking the things that are necessary” (228, ἄ δεῖ φρονεῖν).80 By contrast, Agamemnon prudentially complies with democratic norms only to the extent he needs to to get by. If the army learns that he harbors mixed motivations, Agamemnon’s sincerity and trustworthiness as a political figure will be called into question. His accounting for this in his decision-making confirms the political ideology that equates sincerity with the identity of a politician’s interests with those of the whole political group. The action of this play represents an implicit critique of this configuration of sincerity by the democratic polis and highlights the theoretical tension this ideology puts on personal friendships, as well as raising the question of whether such a model of sincerity is truly desirable. Euripides suggests here that not only is it not wrong for the two leaders to help someone who has been grievously wronged herself, it is wrong of them not to (see 844-5). Out of a concern to appear sincere before the army, Odysseus and Agamemnon fail to further the ends of justice by openly condemning the atrocious behavior of Polymestor, Hecuba’s murderous and deceitful guest-friend. It is the “democratic” standard of sincerity that generates much injustice when both Agamemnon and Odysseus cite the political necessity of aligning their interests and motivations with the demos’ as the reason for denying Hecuba the full assistance that justice requires.

79 In fact, though, I would argue that Agamemnon, with his conditional offer of aid, exhibits stronger moral convictions than Odysseus, showing more concern for the obligations of different kinds of friendship than Odysseus.

80 In this sense, then, from the army’s perspective, Odysseus is a highly sincere figure in this play. The play highlights the fact that often being sincere to one group necessarily implies insincerity toward another party. For example, Odysseus had entered into a special kind of relationship with Hecuba by supplicating her, which entails a tacit agreement to reciprocate at a later time. He reneges on this deal now that it is no longer convenient to him. Odysseus is thus insincere toward Hecuba while being sincere toward the army.
John Jeffries Martin, in his monograph on the Renaissance self, quotes Francesco Guicciardini, a political writer of the Italian Renaissance: “Frank sincerity is a quality much extolled among men and pleasing to everyone, while simulation, on the contrary, is detested and condemned. Yet for a man’s self, simulation is of the two by far the most useful, sincerity tending rather to the interest of others.” This echoes Theognis’ ambivalent sentiments, when he both praises sincerity and detests insincerity in others (87-92, 93-6, 117-28, 415-8, 963-6), and advances a prudent insincerity for oneself (61-5, 73-6, 213-8, 365-6, 1071-4). Guicciardini’s sentiment gives an indication of how sincerity is connected to a concern for others’ interests. Sincerity is an inherently other-regarding virtue. In other words, we are motivated to be sincere to others by our interest in the flourishing of our interpersonal relationships, whether private or political. Responsible membership in a community places a moral obligation on us to represent our inner selves honestly to others. Pure self-interest, however, would more likely lead one to a prudential cautiousness about revealing one’s hand, so to speak. By the same token, someone who cares only about himself and his own needs but who, with a devil-may-care abandon, communicates this selfishness transparently, consistently and homogenously would not be labeled sincere by any community of people. Sincerity is, after all, a positive, social, relational value. Indeed, it is not at all clear why anyone who truly had no concern for others would bother with the rigors involved in a sincere translation of self to others.

To be judged sincere, an individual must demonstrate some combination of these four qualities of the sincere self – transparency, consistency, homogeneity and a shared identity of interests with a broader group. There is something distinctly different about the first three criteria and the fourth criterion: transparency, homogeneity and consistency are descriptors of specific qualities of the self. The fourth criterion of judgments of

81 Martin 2004, 117. Bernard Williams, on the other hand, seems to treat sincerity as the spontaneous, default position in speech (Moran 2005, 332-3), with insincerity occurring as a deviation from the natural mode. Kant argues for sincerity as a duty to oneself in the sense that presenting one’s true inner thoughts and avoiding kowtowing preserves one’s dignity as a human being (Williams 2002, 106-7).

82 Alcibiades tries out transparent honesty concerning his personal ambition and desire for private gain and it is precisely this that leads to the demos’ suspicions of his trustworthiness or sincerity as a politician (6.15-16, 6.27-8, 6.53).
sincerity, however, describes not the self, but the quality of the self’s interaction with its community. An ascription of sincerity tells us something about the individual, i.e. what sort of person he is, as well as indicating something about his social values and contextualizing how that individual’s self-representation immerses itself within his broader community. In this sense, it is a two-dimensional virtue. Someone who is transparent alone is simply transparent; but someone who is transparent because he is motivated by proper concern for the good of his community is sincere. Similarly, when we speak only of someone’s other-orientedness, this is called altruism or selflessness. To get an attribution of sincerity, transparency and other-orientedness must come together in an individual’s character (likewise with the other descriptors of character: consistency and homogeneity). In short, then, sincerity entails the possession of some combination of the qualities of transparency, consistency and homogeneity, in addition to the demonstration of shared interests with one’s community. Though exhibitions of sincerity can vary in terms of the qualities of self, the common feature to all attributions of sincerity is other-orientedness, or a manifest alignment of one’s interests with a relevant group’s interests. For the sake of clarity, I have tried to represent this discussion visually in the figure below. I have chosen to represent homogeneity as a subset of transparency, for reasons discussed above.

---

83 For selfishness as incompatible with attributions of sincerity, see A. D. M. Walker 1978, 495-6. For sincerity as entailing only a positive assessment of someone’s concern for others, see A. D. M. Walker 1978, 487-8, 494.

84 To reiterate, by “community”, I mean whatever group is making the sincerity assessment. So, for example, Theognis exhibits scorn for the demos of his city, interested only in being judged sincere within his small circle of friends. The relevant group for him, then, is his peer group: he aligns his interests with them and not with the despised demos. Yet the cycle of civic distrust extends even into his small band of friends, collapsing the circle of trusted philoi down to Theognis and Cyrmus, and perhaps just to Theognis himself.
The Moral Psychology of Sincerity

In each of the four texts I consider in the following chapters, the author takes a stance on whether a virtuous character, which includes the exhibition of sincerity, derives from a) an inherited, noble emotional temperament or b) consistent commitment to a rationally worked out code of social values. Each of these ancient accounts of what in a self engenders sincerity formulates sincerity as to some degree the result of interactions between two parts of the self, i.e. reason and emotion. The conception of moral psychology as a contest or battle between rival factions within the psyche is well known from Plato and this model of psychic strife was available to each of the authors I consider here as well, but, interestingly, before Plato it appears to be more likely that the elements of the self will be seen as allied or similar in quality, as is the case in each of the texts I consider here. To elaborate, Pericles’ rational intelligence leads him to adhere to a code of values that is other-regarding (2.60.2-4), in the sense that he cares deeply about the impact of his speech and actions on his political community. Emerging naturally as a product of Pericles’ rational reflection are other-regarding emotions such as pride in the polis or patriotism, and regard and respect for fellow citizens (e.g. 2.43.1, 2.60.5). For Thucydides, the faculties that govern reason and the emotions, while in some sense distinct, are nevertheless tethered to each other. That is, they move in tandem: if Pericles’ rational faculty is characterized as other-regarding, so too his emotional temperament is comprised of emotions that are civic-minded or other-regarding.

On the other hand, though much less is said about him, we can infer that Thucydides’ Antiphon, the architect of the Four Hundred, possessed extraordinary

---

85 See Kahn 1985 on the origins of moral psychology in the fifth century in Democritus’ thought.
86 For Pericles’ association with reason and rational judgment, see Edmunds 1975, 8; Thuc. 1.140.1, 2.13.2, 2.34.6-8, 2.59.3, 2.60.5, 2.62.5, 2.65.8. For Pericles’ argument for citizens’ obligation to serve the polis, see Yunis 1996, 79-80.
87 Someone like Alcibiades, by contrast, advances his own interests without much concern at all for how this pursuit impacts his community. In this way, he is a highly self-regarding figure.
88 For Pericles as exemplifying the ideal citizen values he promotes, see Wohl 2002, 62f. For Pericles’ devotion to the polis, see Yunis 1996, 73.
intelligence (8.68), yet his intelligence is more characterized as self-regarding, seeking as he did to deprive many Athenian citizens of the franchise in order to garner more of the community’s resources for himself. Just as his intelligence is more self-regarding, so it seems that his emotional desire for honor is of a different quality than Pericles’: while Pericles holds a cooperative conception of honor as something accorded to him by the polis as a whole for furthering its prosperity, I would extrapolate from Thucydides’ portrayal of Antiphon’s actions that Thucydides’ Antiphon holds a more selfish, competitive (aristocratic) notion of honor as that which we receive for winning out over others and taking a larger chunk of the community-resource pie. Antiphon is probably more interested in winning honor among his elite peers than from the polis as a whole. Thus, in contrast to Pericles, Thucydides seamlessly characterizes Antiphon’s reason and emotions as self-regarding.

Thucydides gives an assessment of Antiphon’s qualities as a political figure that invites comparison with Pericles’ evaluation of himself as a political leader.

**Thucydides on Pericles:**

καίτοι ἔμοι τοιούτῳ ἀνδρὶ ὀργίζεσθε ὃς οὐδενὸς ἥσσων οἶομαι εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύοντα καίτα, φιλόπολις τέ καὶ χρηστάτων κρείσσων. ὃ τε γὰρ γνοὺς καὶ μὴ σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἰσο ὧ ν ἡ ἐνθυμήθη ὃ τε ἑχων ἀμφότερα, τῇ δὲ πόλει δύσνους, σὺν ἂν ὁμοίως τι οἰκείως φράζοι· προσώντος δὲ καὶ τούδε, χρήματι δὲ νικωμένου, τὰ ἐξύμπαντα τοῦτον ἐνός ἄν πωλοῖτο.

And yet you are angry with me, the sort of man who, I think, is inferior to no one in judging what must be done and in explaining these things, and I

---

89 For the debate over the identity of this Antiphon, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1981, 170f.; Luginbill 1997, 1999; Gagarin 1990.

90 For the scholarly discomfort that Thucydides should appear to admire this subverter of the democracy, see Gomme, Andrewes and Dover 1981, 171-2. Further, for discussion over what exactly Thucydides might have meant by saying of Antiphon, “ἀρετή τε ὑσσων ὁμοίως” see p.172. Of Thucydides’ attribution of ἀρετή to Antiphon, Hornblower (1987, 169) says, “I doubt if…Thucydides’ praise for the aretē of Antiphon implies admiration for more than this man’s technical proficiency as a speaker…”

91 Hornblower 1987, 169.

92 In Thucydides, these qualities are far from stable in human beings, but rather are subject to change based on external conditions. When individuals’ moral temperaments change, though, he portrays this as a linked shift in the quality of both reason and the emotions (see Thuc. 1.140.1 & 3.82.2).
am both patriotic and above the lure of money. For he who makes sound judgments but does not expound them clearly is in the same situation as if he did not consider the matter fully at all; but he who possesses both of these qualities (judgment & speaking skills), but is ill-disposed toward the polis, would not speak as dutifully; yet, having this quality as well, but being unable to resist money, because of this one vice, everything would be for sale.

Thuc. 2.60.5-6

Thucydides on Antiphon:

The man who forwarded this proposition was Peisander, and in other regards he was openly most zealous in helping to overthrow the democracy: however, the man who planned the whole thing, in what manner he brought affairs to this point, and most of all was in charge was Antiphon, a man who, among the Athenians of his time, in excellence was inferior to no one and was the best at considering a matter thoroughly and at judging what things to say, though he was not willingly present among the demos nor in any other public gathering, but was held in suspicion by the multitude for his reputation for shrewd intelligence, and yet he was the one man who, by giving some advice, was most able to help those contending in the lawcourts and in the assembly.

Thuc. 8.68.1

In terms of the abilities relevant to political figures, Pericles and Antiphon are roughly equivalent. What distinguishes them, a factor that Pericles explicitly addresses, are the qualities of being patriotic and stronger than the lure of money: Pericles has these two qualities, but Thucydides is silent on this aspect of Antiphon’s character. Though Thucydides does patently admire rational intelligence, he makes it clear in the example of Antiphon that intelligence or a dominant rational faculty alone does not guarantee that someone will have other-regarding values or be sincere. For Thucydides, the faculties of reason and emotion as parts that contribute to the make-up of the self are themselves value-neutral. By viewing Thucydides’ assessments of Pericles and Antiphon side-by-
side, the importance of social values in the outcome of an individual’s character emerges. The two men clearly differ in their social values, but Thucydides does not explicitly offer a cause for this difference. Though both men possess above-average intelligence, Thucydides does not account for the fact that their rational intelligence led them to opposite conclusions. Pericles reasons that his own interests are best served by the flourishing of the entire community, while Antiphon employs his intelligence to orchestrate an oligarchic coup and to shrink the size of his relevant community.

The portrayal of Antiphon matches in many ways the model of a specific class of citizen at Corcyra, the aristocratic, intelligent figure who responds to the chaos of *stasis* by retiring from the public sphere (3.82.4, 8; 3.83.3). Antiphon’s depiction illustrates too the way revolution turns individuals inward to a more selfish perspective, perhaps out of rational self-interest (3.83.1-2); and the instinctive drive in such unstable conditions to collapse one’s circle of trusted *philoi* in the sense of friendship based on public ties down to *philoi* in the sense of friendship founded on shared selfish interests. It is impossible to say to what degree Pericles’ or Antiphon’s character traits should be seen as merely a product of their surrounding political circumstances (see, e.g., 3.82.2).

Just as reason and emotion in Thucydides can function both positively and negatively in the self and in the community, in the *Ajax* and the *Philoctetes*, Sophocles too treats the dual nature of the emotions, portraying emotional impulses in the two plays as both positive and negative forces in the self. In the *Ajax*, Sophocles foregrounds the negative emotions of anger, vengeance and the selfish greed for repute; hence, Ajax’ negative emotions, the foremost forces in his self, engender in him a self-regarding, insincere character. With this focus on negative emotions, Odyssean rationality comes off quite positively here as the faculty responsible for generating other-regarding concern and sincerity of self – but, in this portrayal of Odysseus, he departs from his usual cold, calculating rationality by demonstrating compassion, humility and emotional sensitivity. In this play, Odysseus’ reasoning concerning the mutability of human fortunes is complemented by a sympathetic, humane emotional temperament. It is significant that in

---

93 See *Ajax* 351, 367, e.g., where his focus is solely on himself and his own woes. For the self-involved quality of Ajax’ speech, see Blundell 1989, Ch. 3, esp. 72 n.62. For the selfishness of the heroic ethos generally, see Lawrence 2005.
this positive portrayal of Odysseus, he is not his usual passionless, calculating self. The positive emotions are an important component of the sincere self. Further, the selfish quality of Ajax’ emotions is continuous with the selfish reasoning that leads to his suicide and the abandonment of his moral responsibilities to those dependent on him (e.g. 492-524, 560-70, 652-3, 687-89). Interestingly, Odysseus makes a compelling case to Agamemnon in this play for the appropriateness of flexibility under certain conditions (1332-61); that is, while Ajax and Odysseus were enemies, after Ajax’ death, Odysseus finds it more proper to focus on the positive qualities of his rival and to make Ajax’ friends his own (1376-80). Odysseus thus argues for limited inconsistency as a fitting facet of sincerity. As with Ajax, the impulses of Odysseus’ reason and his emotions are continuous in quality, both being in his case predominantly other-regarding.

In contrast to the focus on Ajax’ negative emotion, in the Philoctetes, Sophocles focuses instead on positive, other-regarding emotions. Philoctetes himself exhibits primarily the emotions of affection, concern for friends and pity (332-8, 414-34, 530-2, 662-70, 801-3). In this play, Sophocles grants the inherited emotional temperament the prominent, positive role in generating sincerity in an individual. Because Philoctetes possesses by inherited nature an other-regarding, kind character, he also inherently cares about being virtuous with others, which includes a commitment not to deceive others in his self-representation. In fact, it is too strong to say that he is committed to sincerity in his self-representation: Philoctetes simply is by nature a transparent person with an altruistic concern for others (i.e. sincere). Where the positive emotions and inherited nature are stressed, then, in the Philoctetes, noble emotion as the guiding element of the self is the only route to sincerity and rationality takes on a negative valence.

Sophocles juxtaposes Odysseus’ savage ruthlessness, supported by cold, rational argumentation, with Philoctetes’ philosophy of supportive friendship, rooted in the emotions of pity, trust and affection, in a way that encourages the audience to discern the

94 Blundell 1989, Ch. 3.
96 For Odysseus as having a cooperative ethos, see Barker 2004, 16; Holt 1981, 287; for Odysseus’ morality generally, see Garvie 1998, 124.
97 For Odysseus’ sincerity, see Blundell 1989, 95f.; as rationally consistent, see North 1966, 2, 55; and Blundell 1989, 102; for his selflessness, see Blundell 1989, 61.
interplay of two distinct models of the self, the rational self versus the emotional self (also see 79-80 vs. 1052). In Odysseus’ case and in Neoptolemus’ case as long as he acts as a double for Odysseus, cold, self-regarding rationality goes together with cold, self-regarding emotion, such as greed for gain and repute and a lust for personal victory (e.g. 81-5, 111-19, 134, 1052). Eventually for Neoptolemus, with the other-regarding emotions predominant in the self, the rational capacity too works in support of the interests of a friend (1314-47). In both Sophocles’ plays too, then, the qualities of the self are continuous.

The Philoctetes, produced much later in the Peloponnesian War than the Ajax, draws a comparatively negative conclusion about the possibilities for sincerity and moral decency in the population at large. While in the Ajax the hero’s selfish regard stands out against the concern for the obligations of kinship and philia demonstrated by the chorus of sailors, Tecmessa and Teucer, in the Philoctetes, this balance is reversed, with the noble altruism of Philoctetes and Neoptolemus representing isolated examples of kindness and concern for others. The Philoctetes first indulges in an aristocratic isolationist fantasy framed as a retreat from the corrupt demos-army to an ethically purer world animated by the implicit mutual trust of two πιστοὶ ἑταῖροι (1397-1408) – before delivering a rapprochement between the two morally noble aristocrats and their broader community (1409-68). Sophocles, in the Philoctetes, engages in a meditation on the effects of education or influence versus inherited nature on the quality of the self and its potential for sincerity. Here, he subtly complicates the stark terms of the contemporary

99 North (1966, 65–6) states it thus: “The Philoctetes depicts an absorbing conflict between two opposing ways of life: that of the ἄγαθὴ φύσις, which is fully developed in Philoctetes; and that of the sophistic guile and ruthless self-will embodied in Odysseus.”
100 This is an impossibly entangled play, though, with cold rationality and selfish greed being uncomfortably aligned with duty to the larger group.
101 For the dating of the Ajax, see Hesk 2003, 14: “most scholars conjecture that the tragedy was written and performed some time in the 440s.” On the dating of the play, see also Garvie 1998, 6-8. The Philoctetes was first performed about 30 years later, in 409BC.
102 The Atreids, however, are unattractive figures in both plays. They do not themselves appear in the Philoctetes, yet we can extrapolate their insincerity toward a former group member as the leaders who set the moral tone for the army under their command and as the ones who explicitly give Odysseus his orders.
103 See Rose 1992, 305.
debate over nature versus nurture by implying that a sincere disposition stems from a sophisticated interaction in which nurture turns on or activates nature.

Euripides’ *Hecuba* dramatizes the impossibility of being sincere and consistent without the support of a community that shares these values.\(^\text{104}\) Hecuba’s rational commitment to objective justice and consistency of self (e.g. 271-92, 591-602),\(^\text{105}\) though remarkably enduring, proves no match for the lust for vengeance that washes over her upon recognition of Polydorus’ body and the sudden understanding of the meaning of her recent dreams (681-6, 702-6).\(^\text{106}\) Further, the overwhelming experience of a need for vengeance changes Hecuba in one instant, suddenly affording her an objective perception of herself as a social actor. Polymestor’s betrayal deals the last blow to her natural engagement with others and to an understanding of herself as enmeshed in a culture of shared values and norms of behavior. Though Euripides certainly suggests that rational consistency is the only avenue we have as humans for approaching sincerity of character, he stages other negative uses to which reason can be put (e.g. Odysseus’ sophistic, self-interested argumentation, 299-331) and reason’s helplessness as a stabilizing force in the self (esp. 684-720).\(^\text{107}\) Euripides does not attribute a negative judgment to Hecuba’s desire for vengeance. One might say, though, that emotion overwhelms the conditions in the self that conduce to sincerity; or that Hecuba simply realizes that it is not in her rational self-interest, as she thought it was, to be a sincere, accountable person. It is not rational to play by the rules of the game when everyone else is cheating. In any case, she transitions before our eyes from an objective, other-regarding, sincere character to a subjective, self-

\(^{104}\) See also Thuc. 3.83.1; for this passage as relevant to the *Hecuba*, see Segal 1993, 158, 186, 202; Nussbaum 2001, 404-5; Reckford 1985, 125-6; Finley 1967; Hogan 1972. For failure of Hecuba’s community to uphold the standards of justice, see Zeitlin 1996, 176, 210.

\(^{105}\) I should note that there is much debate over whether lines 599-602 are original to the text: see Gregory (1999, 118) for a discussion of those scholars who are for and against deleting the lines and their reasons. I agree with Kamerbeek (1986, 101), who strongly defends the authenticity of these lines.

\(^{106}\) For this moment of recognition as central to the play’s meaning, see Zeitlin 1996, 187-8.

\(^{107}\) For metrical indications of Hecuba’s extreme grief, see Gregory 1999, 129; Dale 1968, 110.
It is, then, Hecuba’s consistent rationality, tethered to a generous emotional temperament (e.g. 239f.), that generates Hecuba’s moral commitments and social values in the first half of the play. But her betrayal by a close friend causes the parts of her self to become unharnessed from her social values; from an enmeshed member of a community she suddenly becomes an atomized, self-interested agent.

A recurrent theme in these various accounts of sincerity is the role that self-consciousness plays in either fostering the conditions for sincerity or destroying them. For Thucydides’ Pericles and the Odysseus of the Ajax, an appropriate and objective understanding of one’s own role within his social network promotes a rational and emotional commitment to the cohesion of the group and the welfare of others, which in turn contributes to an ethical commitment to being truthful with others about one’s internal motivations and beliefs. In the Hecuba and Philoctetes, though, an awareness of and a willingness to exploit the potential artificiality of social roles undermines sincere expression. Hecuba’s keen awareness after the discovery of Polydorus’ body that one is always being seen to act and to feel and being judged on this performance of self subverts the potential for naturalness and spontaneity of expression (736f., 968-75). For Hecuba, the cognizance and assumption that everyone else is also exploiting the potential in performing themselves eliminates any moral obligation to sincerity of self-representation.

The role of self-consciousness in the virtue of sincerity is a central debate in contemporary discussions of sincerity as well. Stuart Hampshire opposes the ideal of naïve naturalness and spontaneity (lack of self-consciousness) with the ideal of wholeness or uniformity of mind (no gap between what you think/feel and what you do). That is, in the case of uniformity of mind, self-consciousness is not inconsistent with sincerity. It is immediately apparent when reading contemporary discussions on sincerity that the terms used and the points argued have changed remarkably little in the

---

108 For the sudden shift in Hecuba’s moral convictions, see Nussbaum 2001; for her transition to doublemindedness and resemblance to ποικιλόφρων Odysseus, see Reckford 1985, 119, 124; Zeitlin 1996, 195; Segal 1993, 162-3, 218; for Hecuba’s cynicism in the latter half of the play, see Segal 1993, 274; Conacher 1967, 162f.; Reckford 1985, 120f.; Michelini 1987, 151f.

intervening millennia. The significant change has been in the broad acceptance of the existence of an unconscious part of our selves that is a significant factor in determining who we are, our inner motivations and our ultimate actions.

**Why Sincerity Matters**

The evidence gathered from the disciplines of neuropsychology and neurobiology increasingly suggests that what we think of as our self is heavily contingent on circumstance and that it is also a function of physical and chemical processes in our brains. Put most dramatically, neuropsychologist Paul Broks asserts, “We are all just a car crash or a slip away from being a different person.”

There is no essential “I”, then, that is not subject to change. In fact, the self is a highly labile entity that is very much susceptible to change over time, even identity-altering change. And yet, in our day-to-day interactions, it is simply a practical necessity to behave as though we believe that others are consistent, predictable selves. If we truly took on board the instability of self, we would not dare to engage in any of the multitude of contracts and agreements, ranging in degrees of formality, that structure our social human lives. It would become too risky to place any trust in even our most basic relationships with family, friends and spouses. It is hard to imagine how human life could go forward if we abandoned any assumption of others’ sincerity, trustworthiness or predictability. Hence, sincerity as a moral ideal persists in uncomfortable coexistence with the broad acceptance of a divided, contingent and changeable self.

Much of human life involves risk. It is for this reason that human beings have, as long as we have existed, sought to find ways of minimizing risk, such as by seeking to guarantee future outcomes. We provide a measure of security for ourselves by making accurate predictions about future events; yet human opacity and the potential for convincing misrepresentation of self activate considerable anxiety over our prospects of accurately forecasting another’s behavior. In a democratic polity in which each citizen relies to some degree upon each of his fellow citizens for his own flourishing, this interdependence puts stress on easy interpersonal trust and the intuitive desire to push past or

---

110 Paul Broks on WNYC’s Radiolab, season 1, episode 1; Feb. 4, 2005.
overcome the opacity of others’ selves.\textsuperscript{111} Theognis in particular highlights the link between civic tension and concerns about the sincerity not only of one’s fellow citizens, but also of those within one’s own circle of companions. He exposes the cracks that develop in interpersonal relationships under uncertain conditions, going so far as to coach insincerity as the more advantageous position for the sensibly cautious citizen/friend:

\[ \text{θυμέ, φίλους κατὰ πάντας ἐπίστρεφε ποικίλον ἦθος,} \]
\[ ὁργὴν συμμίσγων ἣντιν ἐκαστὸς ἐχει.} \]
\[ πολυπλόκου ὁργὴν ἴσχε πολυπλόκου, ὡς ποτὶ πέτρῃ,} \]
\[ τῇ προσσμιλήσῃ, τοῖς ἢδεῖν ἐφάνη.} \]
\[ νῦν μὲν τῇ ἐφέπου, τότε δ᾽ ἀλλοίῳ χρόα γίνου.} \]
\[ χρέοσον τοι σοφὴ γίνεται ἀτροπής.\textsuperscript{112} \]

Heart, toward all of your friends keep turning a variable disposition, mingling it together with the temperament which each one has. Take on the temper of the complex octopus, which appears to look like the rock to which it is attached. Now go along in this direction, but at another time adopt another complexion. Truly cleverness is stronger than inflexibility. Theog. 213-8

This passage echoes the breakdown in mutual trust between citizens that Thucydides outlines in his narrative of the Corcyrean stasis (3.83). Theognis here gives a first-hand account of the calculations that take place in an atmosphere of civil unrest. The speaker cautions against trusting even one’s \textit{philoi}.\textsuperscript{113} As the comparison with the camouflaged octopus suggests, this is a matter of survival, in which sincerity, it seems, entails a liability or vulnerability and a wanton disregard for rational self-interest, particularly in unstable social conditions. Conditions of civic stress, however, are precisely the times in

\textsuperscript{111} The difficulties of trusting in other opaque selves only intensify as the scale of the community increases. If, as Theognis teaches us, even trusting in a circle of close companions is problematic, we can only imagine the risks involved in a community of relative strangers, such as comprise the Athenian demos.

\textsuperscript{112} West questions the authenticity of these couplets, but I do not feel that that matters for my purposes.

\textsuperscript{113} Being insincere in speech is elsewhere justified by Theognis by others’ insincerity in actions (see 53-68).
which the mutual sincerity and trust of citizens is most crucial for pulling through the crisis together.

In ancient Athens, the democratic ideology placed a high premium on social cohesion, as seen in the value of homonoia (unity of mind or thought).\(^{114}\) This indicates an awareness of the high stakes involved in the cooperative enterprise of the democracy, which is comprised of inter-dependent citizens who must be counted upon not to betray the common cause for their own advancement.\(^{115}\) There are clear signs in Athenian texts from the late fifth-century of a keen awareness that there could be a gap between a public figure’s professed intention behind his actions or speech and his true motivating intention. Athenian concerns about the sincerity of public speakers is only natural, given a realistic conception of political actors as motivated to some degree by their own personal goals.\(^{116}\) As anticipated by Theognis, this awareness of the high stakes of a cooperative, speech-based enterprise is heightened at several historic points, such as during the stress of the Peloponnesian War and the plague, and particularly following the oligarchic revolutions of 411 and 404/3. During periods of civil duress, accurately predicting the behavior of one’s compatriots takes on a greater urgency. The impetus motivating assessments of others’ sincerity, then, particularly in a political context, is an anxious desire to ferret out members of the group who might compromise the success or flourishing of the community.

Although I hope to argue in the future that the attempts to assay others’ sincerity pick up momentum and intensity throughout the fourth century, Demosthenes, a fourth-century orator, makes a timeless statement about the risks to a democracy stemming from public speakers’ insincerity (Dem. 19.184-6):

\[
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔσθ᾽ ὁ τι μεῖξον ἕν ύμᾶς ἀδικήσει τις ἤ πευδῇ λέγων. οἶς γὰρ ἔστ᾽ ἐν λόγοις ἡ πολιτεία, πῶς, ἀν οὕτωι μὴ ἄληθείς ὤσιν, ἀσφαλῶς ἔστι πολιτεύεσθαι; ἀν δὲ δὴ καὶ πρός ἃ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει δῶρα τὶς λαμβάνων λέγη, πῶς οὔχι καὶ κινδυνεύσετε; οὐδὲ γε τοὺς χρόνους ἑσοῦν ἔστ᾽ ἀδίκημα ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ τυράννου
\]

\(^{114}\) Ober 1989, 297, 315; 1998, 69, 158; Lape 2010, 169; see also Loraux 1986, 168.
\(^{115}\) For a concise discussion of the payoffs and doubts over trustworthiness that arise in a cooperative scenario, see Ober 2008, 6-12.
\(^{116}\) Ober (1998, 78) notes the difficulty of trusting speeches delivered in a competitive environment.
A man could do you no greater injury than by telling lies. Since, for those whose government is based upon speeches, how, if they are not true, can it be safely governed? But if someone, taking bribes, should advise things that benefit our enemies, how would you not also be endangered? Nor is it an equal wrong to steal away opportunities from an oligarchy or a tyranny and from you; far from it. For in these forms of government, I think, everything happens swiftly upon command; but for you, first the Council must hear and deliberate concerning all matters, and this when public, written notice has first been distributed to the herald and to the ambassadors, not always, and then they must convene the Assembly, and this only when it has been established by the laws. Next, those speakers who say the best things must get the upper hand and prevail over those who are speaking in opposition by reason of either ignorance or wickedness. And after all these things, when something has been resolved and its advantage is apparent, time must be given for the poverty of the many, in which they furnish themselves with whatever things are needed in order that they are able to bring to pass the things resolved upon. Surely, he who steals away these opportunities of a government form such as ours does not steal away our time, this man, no, but he utterly obstructs the conduct of our political procedures.

In this strong, clear statement, Demosthenes cogently asserts that the effect of insincere political speech is the complete interruption of the institutional procedures of democratic deliberation. Here, Demosthenes convincingly suggests that insincerity entails the outright theft of one’s fellow citizens’ political agency.

Similarly, in his account of the Sicilian Debate, Thucydides depicts the breakdown in the democratic process of deliberation incited by Alcibiades’ enthusiasm...
for the expedition (see Thuc. 6.9-26). His speech is insincere in an unusual way: he is unusually open about his own self-interested motives, but he misrepresents his knowledge about the facts. Alcibiades admits transparently and unapologetically that he is out for his own gain in the political sphere, arguing that his personal interests align with the demos’ interests and that such unabashed selfishness and greed for personal repute is actually good for the city: that is, through his own quest for prestige, he has also glorified Athens (6.1.6). And yet, although Alcibiades asserts the identity of his interests and Athens’ interests, he is being disingenuous here, as evidenced by his ready defection to Sparta. Further, within his speech promoting the Sicilian Expedition, he misrepresents the facts about Sicily, motivated by his personal lust for gain. Commenting on the Athenians’ ignorance of the facts about Sicily in the beginning of Book Six, Thucydides demonstrates through this episode the vulnerability of a demos that must often rely upon the so-called “expert knowledge” of self-interested speakers in its decision making.

Alcibiades’ insincere speech sets off a domino effect that causes the previously earnest Nicias to speak counter to his true opinions (6.20-3; cf. 6.9.2, παρὰ γνώμην) and that then silences dissenting Athenians in the audience. Alcibiades creates an atmosphere, in other words, that is toxic to sincerity of speech. In the end, the process of deliberating and then voting is perverted by Alcibiades’ insincerity, when those against the expedition keep quiet instead of voting their true preferences for fear of appearing “ill-disposed toward the polis”.

This episode, like Thucydides’ History throughout, points up the mutually reinforcing relationship between sincere speech and a culture of trust. That is, a general atmosphere of mutual trust in society creates the conditions that foster sincere speech, and actual sincerity, in turn, creates an atmosphere of mutual trust. Of course, speech can only be judged as sincere or not after the fact. In Alcibiades’ case, for instance, both the Athenians’ actual experience of Sicily and Alcibiades’ later actions reveal the falseness of his speech favoring the expedition.

117 Alcibiades is introduced by Thucydides as the very embodiment of enthusiasm or passion (ἐπιθυμία): 6.15; see Ober 1998, 109, 109n.105.
118 Thuc. 6.24.4: ὡστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἶ τω ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἠρέσκε, δεδιώς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονών κακόν τε σῆμεν, δέξειν εἶναι τῇ πόλει ἠσυχίαν ἐγένετο.
119 See esp. Thuc. 3.83 for an account of the breakdown in the positive, mutually reinforcing cycle of individual sincerity and in the atmosphere of public trust.
Inasmuch as I hope to have demonstrated above how central a theme sincerity is for political theory, I primarily seek to outline here the ancient conceptions of self that inform understandings of sincerity and of where it comes from in an individual self. In addition, this work reveals some key insights into the ancient model of the self. By calling attention to the interplay between the internal experience of self and the exterior representation of this interiority, the ideal of sincerity stimulates a new awareness of the interior landscape of experience, the thoughts, emotions, beliefs, as well as a keen consciousness of the representation of self, i.e. the specific relation between one’s words and deeds and one’s inner self. As we see from Socrates’ concern for the internalization of values, the perpetual examination of the self, and the necessity of sincere dialogue for the furtherance of philosophic truth, this new focus on the interior self and sincerity of self seems to have played a significant role in the emergence of the genre of philosophy.

The growing discussion and anxiety over sincerity in the fifth-century yields a distinct formulation of two clear-cut models of the self: the sincere self and the insincere self. While the insincere self is identified by its varied expression and lack of clear borders, the sincere self exhibits clearly bounded, internally cohesive content. We see this clearly in the Philoctetes, where Sophocles dramatizes the young Neoptolemus’ coming of age story, from his initial, borrowed, yet personally unsettled account of his ethical commitments (86-95) to his eventual emergence as a self-determined, independent man. Neoptolemus’ eventual firm and confident commitment to sincerity can only be generated internally (895ff.), triggered by an emotional reaction of pity with its complimentary cognitive processing, rather than simply being transmitted from his father, Achilles. Whereas at the beginning of the play Neoptolemus’ lack of a distinct sense of self leaves some wiggle room within which it is still possible for him to assume a

---

120 I have been inspired to explore the concept of sincerity as a way of getting at ancient models of the self by John Jeffries Martin’s insightful monograph on Renaissance conceptions of identity and self, Myths of Renaissance Individualism (2004) and by Richard Moran’s challenging article, “Problems of Sincerity” (2005). Both argue, from different directions, that individuals recruit the sincerity norm both to constitute and present their selves in a way that actively invites others’ trust in them as a specific sort of reliable, moral being. In Kant’s extreme view, only a sincere self can rightly consider itself a human being, since our existence as natural beings is linked to the end of sincerely communicating our thoughts via rational speech (Metaphysics of Morals, Ak. 6, 429: Gregor 1996, 552).
polymorphous identity, his newfound moral strength and clarity (e.g. 915, 1291-2, 1385) establish for him a firm, stable identity that is impermeable to external influence or pressure.

Different ancient accounts formulate the sincere self with different emphases: for example, Thucydides, Sophocles (in the Ajax) and Euripides (in the Hecuba) depict sincerity as the product of a primarily rational understanding of the individual’s role in his community; but, in the Philoctetes, it is Neoptolemus’ undeniable emotional reaction of pity toward Philoctetes that leads him to reject duplicity and to settle firmly on a transparent relationship with the wounded man (915). In general, accounts that emphasize the role of rationality in generating sincerity look to consistent self-presentation as the hallmark of sincerity, while an emotional model of sincerity, trusting more in the immediacy of emotion, features transparency as the central aspect of sincerity. What these different emphases share is their common attempt to sort out from a subjective perspective what the proper relationship should be between internal experience and external expression, as well as to discover how, as an objective observer, to identify the sincere person.

A Methodological Note

History and tragedy, as well as drama more generally, have for quite some time been extensively and explicitly mined for evidence of Athenian civic and moral norms (which share considerable overlap). To begin with tragedy, Kenneth Dover has notably argued that, because dramatists are presenting their works to the mass public in a competitive environment, they can ill afford to write a play that is wildly at variance with the norms of Greek popular morality. In evidence of this proposition, one might adduce the shock and outrage with which Euripides’ first treatment of the Hippolytus was received. In short, given what we know of the context of Athenian dramatic performances, it is extremely unlikely that tragedies are unreflective of and out of step

---

121 Blundell 1988, 140; see also Nussbaum 1976, 33.
122 Dover 1974, 5-6.
123 For bibliography on Euripides’ two productions of the same play, see Zeitlin 1996, 219n.1.
with popular morality. As a countervailing consideration, however, Dover further observes, “Tragedy can afford to give an airing to ideas which may be novel to many members of the audience and perhaps may not always be easily grasped; this the audience will accept in a genre…allowed by tradition to be…enigmatic.”

Dover rightly draws a distinction between works immediately subjected to popular judgments and works, such as Thucydides’ *History*, that are composed for an interested audience to enjoy in private. The former, including tragedies, can logically be accepted as reflective to a significant degree of popular morality, while the genre of history is more problematic in its association with contemporary moral norms. Thucydides is comparatively free to express idiosyncratic opinions or assessments of historical events that are divergent from popular opinions and assessments.

The following chapters use evidence from Thucydides’ *History* and from three tragedies to elaborate the Athenian ideal of sincerity as an aspect of Greek popular morality. Yet, as admitted above, there are limitations to the use of these genres. There are two issues at stake in the sort of argumentation I am employing in the next chapters: does the text in question represent the views of its author reliably? And, second, does it reflect broad popular attitudes on sincerity? As to the first question, when I recruit Thucydides’ characterizations of various historical figures to elucidate some aspect of sincerity as a popular value, I contend that the evidence is likely to combine a representation of some part of the range of popular views with Thucydides’ own personal thoughts on the subject. In other words, Thucydides’ *History* must certainly to some degree reveal his views, and it must also inadvertently encode a great deal of popular ideology. I do not claim to know with certainty what Thucydides thinks about sincerity and indeed I am left with many questions on this subject; but, Thucydides does throw in strong hints and sometimes explicit judgments on his “characters” that would lead me to the conclusion, for example, that he values and admires the sincerity of Pericles (e.g. at 2.65.8), but parodies Pericles’ model of sincerity in the figure of Cleon (3.38.1 and generally in his portrayal). Further, the historian gives some explicit statements in his own voice, albeit dense and open to various interpretations, concerning his views on

---

124 Dover 1974, 17.
125 ibid., 5.
human nature (or moral psychology) that I feel provide interpretive keys to understanding his text as an instructive guide to human life. So, in sum, I can discern the outlines of Thucydides’ own views, but not always the particulars.

On the second question, Thucydides may harbor an idiosyncratic view on sincerity in some regards, yet he is also at some level in dialogue with discussions on sincerity that are framed in terms common to his cultural and historical milieu. The strongest argument for this shared framing of the issue is the fact that each of the four texts I consider as evidence for the moral psychology of sincerity situates sincerity within the interactions in the self between reason and emotion and within the contemporary debate on nature versus nurture as the origin of virtue. The framework of dichotomies, reason/emotion and nature/nurture, reflects the general contemporary means of encompassing the debate, yet within this framework there is ample room for idiosyncratic meditations on the subject. Even Plato, who signals a sizeable shift in the configuration of the moral psychology of sincerity, still works within this broad framework.

In the case of the tragedies, even less can be said about the specific views of the playwrights. The recurrence of themes in a body of work might hint at a personal perspective, but, since the dramatists do not ever get the opportunity in their plays to speak in propria persona, hints are all we will ever have. In the case of Sophocles, we have two plays with widely divergent treatments of sincerity, the Ajax and the Philoctetes. The fact of human opacity and the wish for transparency are tough issues that admit no ready solutions. It makes sense, then, that Sophocles would approach the subject from various directions, trying out different models of sincerity at different times in his life and career. It would be foolish, though, to say that Sophocles or Euripides endorses this or that configuration of sincerity fully. All we can say is that, within a particular work, a particular enunciation of sincerity comes off as preferable or undesirable for complicated reasons. Dover notes that ancient Athenian theatergoers were deeply familiar with both their own contemporary notions of morality and with the heroic ethos of a mythic past.126 Sophocles’ Ajax dramatizes the collision of those two moral systems, not giving a clear-cut positive or negative spin to either ethos, but nevertheless firmly asserting the incompatibility of the self-regarding heroic ethos with the cooperative

126 ibid., 18.
expectation of sincerity in the democracy. To be clear, then, there is a common, shared framing of fifth-century discussions of sincerity. The casual asides on sincerity such as we find in comedy and oratory may be more directly representative of popular opinions about sincerity; but it is the genres of tragedy, history and philosophy that offer an opportunity for more in-depth, sustained explorations of the models of self that underlie these popular assumptions about sincerity, as well as providing a forum for calling attention to the internal inconsistencies in the popular rhetoric and ideology of sincerity.
This chapter will explicitly address the ambiguity of Trilling’s definition of sincerity as a simple congruence between avowal and feeling. With his contrasting portraits of Pericles and Cleon, Thucydides presents two clear models of sincerity, models I will term rational sincerity and emotional sincerity. My basic claim is that Thucydides’ statements on human nature are informed by an implicit psychological theory of a bipartite self. That is, the human self is comprised of the elements of reason and emotion. Further, his views on human nature and the notion of the bipartite self underwrite Thucydides’ treatment of sincerity. In the case of Pericles’ rational sincerity, Thucydides signposts for the reader that it is Pericles’ rational intelligence that guarantees and stabilizes his political views and policies out in time. He exhibits extraordinary consistency compared to others, especially under the uncertain conditions occasioned by war and plague.

Cleon, on the other hand, is characterized by his excesses of violent emotion (3.36.6). He even goes so far as to make an explicit argument against “tricky” intelligence and for deciding political policy on the basis of pure, spontaneous emotion (3.37-40). The implicit notion behind Cleon’s argumentation is that rational intelligence, as something we humans can consciously manipulate and change, represents an artifice and as such is less trustworthy than the natural emotion that lies outside of our conscious control. Cleon valorizes the raw power of the aggressive emotions and instincts (3.40.7). This sort of reasoning points forward to the troubling formulation of sincerity emblematic of civil unrest: at Corcyra, “the angry man is always trustworthy, while the voice of reason is suspect” (3.82.5).¹

¹ 3.82.5: καὶ ὁ μὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ ὑποπτος. I translated the latter half loosely above, going for my understanding of its implicit sense. Literally, it means “but the one speaking against him is suspect”. Further, Thucydides says that during a stasis, “τόλμη μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη” (3.82.4, “irrational daring was regarded as manly loyalty toward one’s companions”). This sentiment aligns with Cleon’s self-representation before the demos in his speech on Mytilene (3.37-40). All Thucydides passages are taken from Henry Stuart Jones’ Oxford text.
To be explicit, it is my assumption that, while Thucydides does portray some sense of the particular public personalities of both Pericles and Cleon, we are not meant to perceive in his account of these figures merely depictions of idiosyncratic psychologies. The lesson we should glean from his analysis of these two historical figures is rather more complex. Thucydides has simplified or culled the idiosyncratic aspects of personality to portray two distinct types or models of self. To complicate our ability to interpret these two models of politician, we are meant to read Pericles and Cleon, portrayed here as successive types of leader (though they were in fact contemporaries and political rivals), as illustrative of the different types of people who end up gaining ascendancy in different political and social conditions. That is, with Pericles as the most fleshed out starting point on the spectrum of the relative health of a political community, Cleon represents a step in the direction toward stasis (2.65.7, 10). Thucydides largely leaves it to us to determine the degree to which we should attribute the actions of political figures to their innate character type or to their reflexive reaction to the increasingly unstable political atmosphere.

Thucydides’ model of sincerity is a psychological model, a point that becomes clear by looking at his depictions of the contrasting figures of Pericles and Cleon. In this chapter, I will analyze Pericles’ model of rational sincerity and then contrast this with Cleon’s model of sincerity, which privileges spontaneous emotional reactions. I will begin by elaborating my view of Thucydides’ conception of human nature as a function of the interplay between the rational and passionate aspects of the self. Both of these capacities are common to all human selves, but they have a role in the generation of distinct selves through their varied interactions and qualities in each individual.\(^2\) I then

---

\(^2\) For more on the factors in the self that account for distinct personalities, see Farenga 2006. I sometimes use the terms ‘character’ and ‘personality’ in addition to ‘self’ throughout this work. To be clear, my understanding is that the self, configured in a certain way, generates one’s personality or character. When we speak of someone as a sincere person, it is at the level of personality or character, which are the external manifestations of the self. To understand the workings of this personality or character that permit sincerity, one has to work backwards to discern the configuration of the self. In literature, this is possible, as authors will often provide a glimpse of the configuration of a character’s self, i.e. the balance/relationship between his rational and passionate aspects; in reality, however, people are opaque and it is not possible to determine with any certitude how another self is configured.
establish Pericles’ marked dedication to reason or rationality and discuss the implications of his configuration of self for his ability to be, in Thucydides’ account, unimpeachably sincere. I suggest that his rational intelligence and big-picture thinking stabilize his personality over time, leading to a remarkable degree of consistency in his thinking, speech, policy and actions. Further, reason suggests to Pericles the importance of pursuing common goals over narrow self-interest, leading him to identify his own interests with the interests of the polis as a whole. Pericles’ commitment to the primacy of reason extends to a program of educating the demos in rational decision-making. By contrast, I discuss Cleon’s service to his emotions. Viewing rationality as a secondary experience, Cleon asserts a preference for the spontaneous, unfiltered experience of the passionate impulses. The sorts of emotions that he stresses, however, yield self-regarding, unpredictable and ultimately insincere behavior as a public leader.3

### Human Nature in Thucydides

Thucydides is a thought-provoking and complex thinker on the human condition and the nature of the human self.4 His work persistently asks us to consider the meaning of human nature and human motivation. Given human nature as Thucydides conceives it, is sincerity possible for human beings, or is it possible only under specific circumstances? Can one choose to become more sincere or are we enslaved by the nature with which we are born? Where do our social values come from – are they innate or a product of reason?

---

3 I make no judgments on Cleon as an actual historical figure. It is clear that Thucydides is quite hostile to Cleon and likely unfairly biased against him for his own personal reasons (see Woodhead 1960); however, I am interested only in Thucydides’ portrayal of him as it reveals Thucydides’ assumptions about the nature of sincerity.

4 My views on human nature in Thucydides are nearly identical to that of Luginbill 1999, and have also been strongly influenced by Price 2001 and Farrar 1988. Reeve 1999 appears to have a similar view, though his interpretation of specific passages is too freewheeling at times. These scholars represent a fairly new and still not broadly accepted trend of seeing Thucydides’ human nature not as an unchanging or unvarying, but as predictable in its response to stimuli. The majority of scholars conceive of Thucydides’ human nature as a static constant, including Homblower 1987, 1991; Edmunds 1975; Connor 1984; Saxonhouse 1978; Gomme 1966; Cogan 1981; Pouncey 1980. See also Ahrensford 2000, who discusses human nature in Thucydides without weighing in on this issue.
These are just some of the questions raised by Thucydides’ recurrent remarks about human nature and his explanations of human motivation. Many of these questions will remain unanswered here; but, as a way of approaching an answer, albeit limited, to others, I turn to some of my initial curiosities regarding the understanding of sincerity in the ancient world: what are the parts of the self; what is their relation to each other; and what is the role of inheritance versus education? It is my hope that ferreting out what Thucydides might mean by ‘human nature’ will lead us closer to his views on sincerity and on the sources of social and moral values in the self. The questions raised by the topic of sincerity are central questions for the disciplines of moral psychology and ethical philosophy. Thucydides has much to contribute to these fields. Before turning to Thucydides’ two models of sincerity, it will be helpful to clarify my understanding of Thucydides’ conception of human nature and to unpack his implicit theory of a bipartite soul, i.e. a self composed of two distinct parts.

Thucydides discusses two general elements of the personality that he perceives are universal to all human beings, rational judgment and passions (ἡ γνώμη and αἱ ὀργαί). That is, according to Thucydides, there are two types of products generated by the activity of the self, rational or evaluative thought and emotional impulses, and that these two products are distinct in nature. In the context of the stasis (civil unrest) at Corcyra, Thucydides makes a statement that is key to understanding how he conceives of the interrelation of these two elements of the personality (3.82.2):

ἐν μὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγμασιν αἱ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀμείνους τὰς γνώμας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἀπουσίας ἀνάγκασι πίπτειν· ὁ δὲ πόλεμος ύφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁμοίων.

In times of peace and good circumstances both states and individuals have better judgments (τὰς γνώμας) because of not falling upon involuntary necessities; but war, taking away the easy provision of daily wants, is a teacher of violence and causes the passions (τὰς ὀργὰς) of most men to resemble the prevailing conditions.

This passage, treating both γνώμαι and ὀργαί, suggests that both the rational and the emotional facets of the self are affected negatively by unfavorable external conditions, and that they shift together and in the same direction. Presumably the opposite would...
hold true as well: in prosperous times, both the capacity for rational judgment and the passions become nobler, moving together on an upward trajectory. I posit, further, that by “better judgments”, Thucydides means judgments that are more community-minded or other-regarding. As his account of the degradation in citizen relations at Corcyra shows, prosperous times are characterized by the cohesion of the citizen group, with citizens conceiving of the entire citizen body as their community. By contrast, uncertain times are marked by the fragmentation of citizens into smaller interest groups whose boundaries are drawn by shared selfish interests (3.82.6). In such conditions, the faculty of reason, normally having the positive connotation of rational judgment or intelligence, comes to designate the sort of selfish plotting or cleverness that is symptomatic of staseis (3.82.5, 7).

It is implied by this passage, then, that the passions, although often spoken of disparagingly by Thucydides, can have a neutral, or even positive, connotation as well; i.e. the emotions and the evaluative capacity complement each other. This is borne out by several noteworthy uses of words connoting intense, passionate desire in the History: ἔρως (6.24.3), passionate love or lust, and its cognate ἐραστής (2.43.1), one who experiences passionate love or lust. First, Pericles seeks to mobilize a specific sort of passionate love that arises as a result of rational conclusions in the Funeral Oration, when

---

5 For a similar reading of this passage, see Reeve 1999, 439-40. Further, Price 2001, 27: War is a “teacher of violence” in the sense “that it disposes men to violent acts which in a peaceful mindset they would never have contemplated.” For the parts of the self as allied, see further Luginbill 1999, 25-30.
6 By “other-regarding” I do not mean “altruistic” or “self-disregarding”, but rather judgments that include in their consideration the impact of individual action on others and care about this impact.
7 For the role of reason as supporting the passions, see also 4.108.4. Luginbill (1999, 28) describes rational judgment as a “facilitator” of the passions. According to Luginbill, the factor that serves to restrain human beings from action is not internal, but is the force of necessity (Ch. 4). The evaluative component of the self (γνώμη) attempts to mediate between the impulses of ὄργη and its assessment of what is possible given the limits of τύχη, or random chance (Luginbill 54).
8 For negative uses of ὄργη, see, e.g., 1.130.2, 2.22.1, 3.36.2, 3.42.1, 4.122.5. For ὄργη as connoting the whole range of human emotions (not only the negative emotion of anger), see Farrar 1988, 156. For an account of anger (ὁγγή) at Corcyra, see Allen 2000, 78.
9 For the strong association between ὄργη and ἔρως, see Allen 2000, 118-9. For an extended discussion of ἔρως in the political sphere, see Ludwig 2002.
he enjoins the citizen audience that “you must every day actively contemplate the power of Athens and become her lovers (ἐραστάς).” And, later, at 6.24.3, in the course of the assembly debate over the Sicilian Expedition and after Nicias’ second speech on the subject, Thucydides says that a “passionate lust (ἔρως) for sailing fell upon everyone alike.” In this second instance, Thucydides goes on to say that the intense emotion of the crowd led to a disastrous breakdown in the process of democratic deliberation such that skeptics of the enterprise felt compelled to keep quiet (6.24.4). The same emotion, then, of passionate love (ἔρως) is portrayed in different contexts as both fostering Pericles’ rational goals and as hindering rational debate.

Alcibiades, Nicias’ disputant in the Sicilian Debate, intentionally marshals the passionate emotions of the crowd, in order that the enthusiasm of the crowd would overcome Nicias’ cautionary speech against embarking for Sicily and that the Assembly would adopt his own policy in favor of the expedition. Nicias, speaking again after this inflammatory speech of Alcibiades’, inadvertently fans the flames of the audience’s passion for the expedition by exaggerating how big the invading force would have to be in order to succeed in Sicily (6.19.2-23). Josiah Ober, referring to the intense emotional response evoked in the audience by the combination of the two speeches, aptly describes the Assembly as sufferers of “erotic possession” and as a “collectivity possessed and artificially unified by desire”.

Nicias’ first speech of the debate makes a highly reasoned argument against the expedition, relying on sound logic and an evident mastery of the facts of the case (6.9-14). Alcibiades’ response, instead of countering with a similar argument grounded in reason and the mastery of facts, misrepresents the truth of the situation in Sicily and aims

10 2.43.1: (χρή)...τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ᾽ ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωμένους καὶ ἐραστάς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς. For critical debate over what Pericles might mean here, see Lape 2010, 182; Hornblower 1991, 311; Connor 1971, 97-8; Wohl 2002, 55-62.
11 6.24.3: καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὀμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι. ἔρως also appears at 3.45.5, here also in a negative sense, used by Diodotus to signal one of the impulses that drive men to commit a crime, regardless of the severity of the punishment attending that crime, in the hopes that they will evade detection.
12 For an interesting discussion of the contrasting roles of ἔρως in Pericles’ and Alcibiades’ language, see Ludwig 2002, 332-3.
13 For the role of emotion at this Assembly, see Desmond 2006.
more at stirring up the emotions of his audience than at rational persuasion. Ober notes that Alcibiades brazenly admits that he has a history of using words (logoi) to arouse passion (orgê) in order to inspire trust (pistis) in his listeners (6.17.1). He attempts, through arguments aimed at the emotions, to overcome the reason of Nicias’ speech and hence to overwhelm the rational faculties of his audience with the power of enthusiasm (ἐπιθυμία). The intense power of the ἔρως unleashed in this debate overpowers the ability of the crowd to reason objectively through the facts of the case.

Pericles also seeks quite intentionally to inspire ἔρως in his listeners, but to a very different end and with different effect. Throughout Thucydides’ characterization of him, Pericles is strongly associated with rational judgment, or γνώμη. Yet, as Pericles himself acknowledges at 1.140.1, the passions and reason move in tandem:

Καίπερ εἰδὼς τοὺς ἄνθρωπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πόλεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πράσσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἑυμμορφὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους.

Although I know that men are not moved by the same ὀργῇ when they are actually engaged in war as when they are being persuaded to undertake it, but change their γνώμαι in accordance with events.

With this understanding of the interplay between reason and emotion, Pericles’ speeches demonstrate the acknowledgement that he will be most effective in fostering a certain kind of rationality (3.82.4: τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν, “an intelligence which comprehends the whole”19) if he also inspires the kinds of emotions that complement that rationality. Hence, the ἔρως that Pericles encourages his citizen-lovers to experience is a positive, civic emotion that nurtures a tendency to value the good of the whole city above one’s narrow self-interest.20

15 Ober 1998, 111.
16 Alcibiades is in fact introduced by Thucydides as the very embodiment of enthusiasm or passion (ἐπιθυμία): 6.15: see Ober 1998, 109, 109n.105.
17 For ὀργή as a destabilizing force, see Allen 2000, 78, 94.
18 Translation by Farrar 1988, 160.
20 For another example of Pericles’ wedding of the rational and emotional elements in a speech and another positive account of the activation of emotion, see Ober 1998, 82,
Whereas Alcibiades’ ἔρως emerges from the activation and inflammation of the selfish human desire for personal gain, Pericles’ ἔρως is a rational, pro-social emotion. Pericles makes use of the reality that we humans are motivated by a concern for our own safety and flourishing: from a reasoned consideration of self-interest as intimately linked to community interest, Pericles subsumes thoughts on self-interest under the rational and accurate assessment of community interest (1.143.5, 2.43, 2.60.2-4). Quite the opposite, Alcibiades, in his own personal eagerness for the Sicilian Expedition, elides community interest with his direct appeals to his audience’s individual emotional impulses – greed for personal profit, fear of missing an opportunity, hatred for the Peloponnesians, and the excitement of daring activity (6.18, 6.24.3). For Pericles, a rational assessment of Athens as inherently worthy of the deep devotion, respect and love of its citizens leads logically to his invocation of erotic love for Athens. Alcibiades encourages a focus on personal gain that, in its enthusiasm, overmasters the ability of citizens’ to reason through the stakes of this venture to Sicily for the community as a whole. For Pericles, reason inspires logical, civic-minded emotion; for Alcibiades, irrational, selfish emotion engenders self-interested, narrow reasoning. The qualities of the self are continuous: other-regarding rationality has as its counterpart other-regarding emotion, and self-regarding emotion matches up with self-involved reason.

touching on the conclusion to Pericles’ first speech. For a somewhat darker understanding of Pericles’ activation of ἔρως, see Wohl 2002, 55f.

21 It seems that, for Thucydides, the domains of emotion and reason are not clearly delimited and that the two aspects of the self can sometimes blur the divisions between them. Emotion can be rational (fear, patriotic love, etc.) and rational judgment can be emotionally led; see also Luginbill 1999, 56f. Kahn (1985) suggests that at the end of the fifth century moral psychology was not yet fully worked out. To my mind, though, Thucydides has quite clear ideas about the roles in the self for the different components and that the above blurring makes sense by having the component in the lead color the quality of the other. For instance, if emotion is dominant, evaluations will be made on emotional criteria and will facilitate the satisfaction of desire. If reason is dominant, the emotions can serve as the counterpart or even result of rational conclusions. Thucydides has a moral psychology that is subtle and sophisticated, far more so than that of Democritus; yet Kahn, writing about the state of moral psychology at the end of the fifth century, fails to consider Thucydides at all.

22 Ben-Ze’ev (2000, 92-99) surveys various attempts to group the emotions for the purposes of classification, settling himself on a distinction between the positive and the negative emotions (see 99f.). While the emotions I consider do fall neatly into positive
This suggests that when other-regarding reason is foremost in the self, the emotions too will be community-regarding (for Pericles, it is not logical to be purely self-interested). According to Thucydides, the process of reasoning can lead to emotions that are objective and even rational in quality. But when we are in the grip of the emotions that do not align with reason, that is, emotions that are selfish and irrational, our reasoning processes too are corrupted by selfishness and irrationality. Lastly, during prosperous times, the person who is primarily dominated by the emotional element of the self will have nobler emotional impulses and hence his evaluative capacity will also be more directed toward group flourishing.

23 As is common in Greek thought more generally, for Thucydides, each emotion has a positive and a negative aim or degree: the zeal or enthusiasm that is characteristic of Athenians is credited as one of three causes of the Greek victory over the Persians at the decisive battle of Salamis (1.74.1, προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην); then again, at Corcyra, τὸ πρόθυμον is one of the causes of the evils of stasis (3.82.8). I also discuss above the destructive, selfish enthusiasm of Alcibiades. Zeal is a positive so long as it is directed at the success of the group as a whole; it becomes a liability when its aim narrows to one’s personal flourishing. The positive functioning of emotions is a matter of proper balance and proper aim.

24 I would divide these sorts of emotions into two categories, according to Thucydides: panic or fear over continued survival or flourishing; and the greedy, appetitive ambition for personal gain. Both of these categories include purely self-regarding emotions. The other-regarding emotions, again according to Thucydides, are generated by a dominant reason.
In sum, then, Thucydides’ conception of human nature consists in a self comprised of rational judgments and emotional impulses. Further, he sees these components as allied within the self rather than at odds with each other. This conception does represent a formulation of a divided self, but one for which the separate components function only semi-autonomously. The rational element (γνώμη) and the emotional element (ὀργή) are, in a sense, yoked together; where one goes, the other follows. Just as there are better and worse γνώμαι, so there are better and worse ὀργαί.\footnote{See also Farrar 1988, 135.} I argue, with Farrar and Price, that, when Thucydides says that the cycle of stasis will remain a constant in human affairs “so long as the nature of humankind is the same” (3.82.2),\footnote{3.82.2: ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἦ...} he is not suggesting that human nature is a static, stable category, but rather that the components of the human self are always affected in similar ways by similar circumstances.\footnote{Farrar 1988, 131f.; Price 2001, 26f. See also Lape (2010, 140) on Thucydides’ conception of human nature: “Human nature, according to Thucydides’ text, is a psychological structure common to all people, but variable in its expression.”}

According to this conception of human nature, sincerity in the sense of homogeneity is impossible to achieve, because the two components of the self, while continuous in quality, are of different natures; and sincerity as transparency is nearly impossible to achieve, because it would be practically impossible to express openly the complexity of our psychologies; sincerity in the sense of consistency, then, is the best we can hope for and this too, requiring a sophisticated degree of self-awareness and self-discipline, is nearly impossible for most people to achieve. Further, as I argue in the introductory chapter, sincerity entails an other-regarding mindset.\footnote{See esp. section IV, Identity of Interests with a Broader Group, under the heading ‘Four Criteria of Sincerity Assessments’.} So, for Thucydides, sincerity is only the product of a self that is comprised of a dominant rationality bolstered by rational emotion. As we see from Thucydides’ narrative, the consistency of self and the other-regarding mindset that result in the sincere self emerge only in individuals, such
as Pericles and Themistocles, who possess extraordinary native intelligence. ²⁹ The average Athenian *during wartime* appears to be dominated by self-concerned emotion and to need constant reinforcement in rationality from a leader like Pericles. ³⁰ Without such repeated and consistent reinforcement, the demos falls back into its pattern of action based on reaction to self-regarding emotional stimuli. ³¹ In the figure below, I represent visually the distinction Thucydides draws between the average, emotion-dominated citizen and the exceptionally intelligent leader.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace</th>
<th>War/Stasis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emotion-Dominated Citizen</td>
<td>Objective, Pro-Social</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Subjective, Selfish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judgment-Dominated Leader</td>
<td>Objective, Pro-Social</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When I argue below, then, that Pericles is a proponent of rational sincerity, by which I mean that he privileges the dominance of γνώμη over ὀργή, or of reason over emotion, I do not intend to suggest that Pericles feels that these components of the self are able to be separated out nor that rationality should function to suppress self-regarding emotion; but, rather, that his aims are to recruit reason to foster more public-mindedness among the citizenry of Athens – that is, with reason at the fore, he hopes to stimulate emotions that operate pro-socially, such as his civic ἔρως – and to use his influence with the multitude to neutralize, sometimes quite forcefully, the self-regarding emotions that might be detrimental to this project.

Pericles seeks to recruit specific, pro-social emotions that will support the rational understanding that self-interest lies in the safety and success of the polis, emotions such

²⁹ For Pericles’ noteworthy consistency, see 1.140.1, 2.13.2, 2.55.2, 2.61.2. For his remarkable intelligence and judgment, see below. For Themistocles’ remarkable native intelligence, see 1.138.3.
³⁰ For the rarity of objective thought, comparative weakness of γνώμη in Thucydides, and domination of most people by passion, see also Luginbill 1999, 60; Desmond 2006, 375.
³¹ For the demos’ inconsistency toward Pericles’ policies, see 1.140.1, 2.21, 2.59-2.60.1, 2.61.2-3, 2.65.3-4.
as shame at not contributing to the common safety and success, pride in the accomplishments of past generations, ambition to live up to the model of the fallen warriors or Athenian ancestors, pride in self-sacrifice, patriotism or love of polis, and confidence in Athens’ material and human resources. I argue that Cleon, on the other hand, seeks to marshal pre-social, individualistic emotion, or ὀργή, i.e. the sort of emotions that are felt prior to the taming influence of reason. He hopes to animate in his audience the sort of survival-mode, atomistic thinking that leads one to query, “What’s in this for me?”, rather than, “What’s in this for us as a community?” Further, he denigrates the cooler temper of the Athenians after the first Assembly on the matter, pushing them to ground their policy decisions in the hot-tempered passion of anger (esp. 3.40.7). His implicit claim is that the trustworthiness and sincerity of speakers inheres in their transparent expression of emotion. Such open expression of passion is opposed to supposedly sophist speakers who, because of a selfish pursuit of repute and/or money, misrepresent their real views on the best policy for Athens (that is, they speak παρὰ δόξαν, 3.37.5). Such self-interested orators can be identified by their elegant, rational, rhetorical speech (3.38.1-2). Cleon smoothly conflates intelligence and the ability to deliver a clear, rational argument with sophism, insincerity and bribery (3.37.3-38).

Thucydides disrupts the nature or nurture dichotomy by suggesting both that for most people circumstances have a strong influence over character and that there are inborn propensities that govern how individuals will respond in specific circumstances. Some people, perhaps possessing greater rationality and intelligence by nature, have a less panicked, emotional response to even the direst of circumstances, such as plague or

---

32 2.40.2, 2.60.4, 2.61.1, 2.63.
33 2.36.
34 1.144.3-4, 2.35.2, 2.42-3, 2.45.1, 2.61.4, 2.62.3, 2.64.2-6.
35 2.44.3-4.
36 2.37-2.42.1, 2.43.1.
37 1.141.2-143, 2.13.2-8, 2.62. It is worth noting that Pericles’ assessment of the lack of unity among the Peloponnesians (1.141.2) is not unlike Alcibiades’ assessment of Sicily as a disparate mob (6.17). Both speakers aim thus to hearten the Athenians for war, but Pericles does so out of concern for Athens’ best interest (1.140.2-1.141.1), Alcibiades out of his own self-interest (6.15.2, 6.16.5-6).
In the plague narrative, Thucydides says that, though most people were afraid to visit the sick, including even their own relatives, there were some few who “made pretensions to goodness” (2.51.5) and continued visiting friends as a matter of honor. Further, at 3.82.2, Thucydides says that “war likens the passions of most men to their prevailing conditions,” indicating that some people might be more resistant to the degradation of intelligence outlined in the Corcyraean stasis narrative (3.82-3).

Certainly this puts the reader in mind of Pericles, whose dispassionate response to the unpleasant necessities of war remains in the rational register compared to the mass of citizens. Pericles seems to be, for Thucydides, one of these individuals with an inborn propensity for rationality. Cleon, on the other hand, appears to be hotheaded by nature. What’s more, he seeks to excite the self-interested emotions of his Athenian audience (3.39.8, 3.40.7, cf. 3.42.1-2).

Thucydides seems to suggest that the configuration of the self, as dominated either by its rational faculty or its emotional capacity, is innate. It is apparently impossible in the long term to overcome one’s inborn propensity toward a certain character type. The demos as a group tends to be dominated by emotion, but Pericles acts as though he believes that he can educate them to be more pro-social both rationally and emotionally. Thucydides portrays Pericles as a teacher of the populace (2.40.2, 2.60.5-6), instructing them in the reasoning behind his own judgments with the implication that they might learn from him how to become more rational. If Pericles succeeds to any degree in increasing the powers of rational judgment of the Athenian populace, the lesson sticks only so long as he is alive and leading the people (e.g. 2.65.7), suggesting that Thucydides sees the possibility for changing one’s temperament as extremely limited – hence the need at the political level for the consistent and regular instruction of a Periclean leader and the danger of a Cleontic leader. The instruction of Pericles exerts no permanent, lasting effect on the dominant, emotional nature of the demos. Though by

---

38 See Edmunds 1975, 11-4, for Pericles’ steady γνώμη, as contrasted with the average citizen’s changing γνῶμαι.
39 2.51.5: οἱ ἀρετῆς τι μεταποιούμενοι.
40 3.82.2: ὁ δὲ πόλεμος...πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὀμοί.
41 See Price 2001, 50f.
42 Yunis 1996, 72-6.
nature dominated by emotion, the quality of the demos’ emotional impulses will be impacted by circumstances, more pro-social in stable social conditions and narrowly self-interested under duress. Thucydides portrays the human condition, then, as inescapably bound to these cycles of civic cohesion and civic breakdown. Though the vast majority of people prove to be incapable of transcending for long their reflexive response to circumstance, fortunately circumstances for mankind are constantly changing.

One important point for my purposes is not how far individuals are able to change, but rather Pericles’ efforts in that direction, demonstrating something about his own view of sincerity: i.e. that consistency of character, safeguarded by accurate rational judgments about the world as it really is and by rational foresight, is vitally important to maintaining a healthy commonwealth. Even within Thucydides’ limited view of the persistence of rationality under adverse conditions, it could be sufficient, however, for a community’s well-being that a significant degree of rationality and consistency be present (at least) in leaders and that the people need only be open to instruction in rationality by their politicians. The problems come in when speakers are not themselves inclined toward rationality and when, because of their lack of independent social standing and due to the presence of competition among them, they indulge instead their own and the demos’ appetitive passions (2.65.10).

**Pericles’ Model of Rational Sincerity**

Lowell Edmunds demonstrates that Thucydides programmatically links Pericles with the faculty of γνώμη:43 Pericles begins his first speech with the words, “I hold, Athenians, to the same γνώμη as always” (1.140.1).44 And at 2.34.6, Pericles is the man chosen to give the Funeral Oration because he is deemed by the community to be “not unintelligent with regard to γνώμη”;45 again, in a key passage assessing Pericles as a leader, Thucydides states that Pericles’ long-standing position of substantial influence

---

43 Edmunds 1975, 8.
44 1.140.1: ‘Τῆς μὲν γνώμης, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, αἰεὶ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχομαι…’
45 2.34.6: γνώμη τε δοξῇ μὴ ἀξύνετος εἶναι...
within the city derives in large part from his γνώμη (2.65.8);"46 lasty, introducing Pericles’ third speech, Thucydides states that Pericles’ aim was to “remove the ὀργή from [the Athenians’] γνώμη”.47 Edmunds writes further that “the concept of gnome proves to be the basis of Pericles’ policy,”48 citing the passage where Pericles says of himself, ‘I think that I am less than no man in understanding (γνῶναι) the necessary policy and expounding it” (2.60.5).49 Edmunds observes that Pericles emphasizes γνώμη and Athens’ material resources as the two key factors upon which the success of his military strategy depends (2.13.2).50 Although in the Funeral Oration he uses the word γνώμη only twice, “it is clear that Pericles regards gnome as the guiding principle of Athenian life, since he speaks of the Athenian holidays as ‘rest for the gnome’ (2.38.1).”51 Edmunds contends that Pericles applies this word to himself with a meaning of “policy based on reason.”52

Thucydides posits a close relationship between a nexus of concepts concerning intelligence and rationality: reason or judgment (γνώμη), intelligence (ξύνεσις)53 and foresight (πρόνοια).54 In his first speech, Pericles suggests that, his war policy being based in consistent reason, those who back him can “lay claim to xyνεσις”55 (1.140.1, τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι). At 2.62.5, Pericles explains, in his third recorded speech to the Athenians, that the intelligence (ξύνεσις) that “puts its trust in reason (γνώμη)” yields a “foresight (πρόνοια) that is more secure.”56 Finally, the Athenians note the

46 2.65.8: ἐκεῖνος μὲν δυνατὸς ὃν τῷ ἔξωμαι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωρότατος γενόμενος κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως…
47 For this translation, see Farrar 1988, 160. 2.59.3: ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης…
48 Edmunds 1975, 8.
49 2.60.5: οὐδὲν ἢσσον οἶομαι εἶναι γνώναι τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι ταύτα…
50 Edmunds 1975, 8.
51 ibid., 9.
52 ibid., 9. See esp. 2.62.4-5.
53 Thucydides also uses τὸ ξυνετόν for ‘intelligence’.
54 See Edmunds 1975, 9 for the association between ξύνεσις, γνώμη and πρόνοια.
55 ibid., 9. In this passage, Pericles almost separates himself from his ability to reason clearly, offering this faculty as a community resource to which all citizens can lay claim. His γνώμη becomes conflated with the common judgment (τοῖς κοινῆς δόξαις).
56 See also 6.13.1 for a connection between γνώμη (or, in this case, γιγνώσκω) and πρόνοια, where Nicias says that the older men in the audience “know rationally that the
“intelligence of rational judgment” (1.75.1, γνώμης ξυνέσεως) shown by their forebears against the Persians. So, Thucydides views these three qualities - intelligence, rational judgment and foresight - as bearing some significant connection to each other, with perhaps rational judgment and foresight flowing forth from innate intelligence.

Thucydides further emphasizes Pericles’ association with each of these three qualities throughout his characterization of him. It is uncontroversial, then, to assert that Pericles is strongly identified with reason and the rational element of the self. I argue that his high degree of rational intelligence is central to Pericles’ characterization in general, enjoying a causal relationship with his other defining characteristics, such as his big-picture thinking, his loyalty to the polis, including his immunity to bribery and lack of factionalism, and his consistent predictability over time. I will briefly address each of these secondary qualities in turn, discussing how, in Pericles’ case, they stem from reason.

I have already argued that Thucydides draws a close connection between rational intelligence and foresight, suggesting that he believes foresight to be a product of native intelligence. The accuracy of Pericles’ foresight is well-established: Thucydides says that “after the war broke out, in this too [Pericles] appears to have accurately forecast [Athens’] strength” (2.65.5), and that “after he died, [Pericles’] foresight (ἡ πρόνοια αὐτοῦ) concerning the war became still more fully recognized” (2.65.6). While foresight represents the ability to perceive the long view, focusing only on foresight misses another important aspect of Pericles’ intelligence, i.e. his mastery of the synchronic, broad view. Within the Corcyra narrative, Thucydides notes the devaluation of what he terms “intelligence that comprehends the whole picture” (3.82.4).

This big-picture intelligence comes naturally to Pericles, for whom it is a hallmark of his characterization that he perceives the broad implications of policy decisions. Each of least successes are won by enthusiasm, but the most by foresight”: γνώντας ὅτι ἐπιθυμίᾳ ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλεῖστα…

Again, as with Pericles, Thucydides seems to suggest that the ξύνεσις of the demos (1.75.1) at that time was the ξύνεσις of Themistocles (1.74.1).

1.140.1, 2.13.2, 2.34.6-8, 2.60.5, 2.62.5, 2.65.8.

See also Themistocles’ foresight as a forecaster (εἰκαστής) as stemming from his extraordinary intelligence (1.138.3).

Following Price’s translation (2001, 53) of τὸ πρὸς ἀπαν ξυνετόν (3.82.4).
Pericles’ speeches advances a complex, over-arching argument resulting from his synthesis of a multiplicity of variables.

This all-encompassing intelligence lies behind Pericles’ consistent policy, espoused in the first speech (1.140.1f.), of making no concessions to Sparta. At stake is Athens’ sovereign standing in the Greek world as a relative equal to Sparta (1.140.5, 1.141.1). Given recent actions on the part of the Spartans, Pericles synthesizes these short-term data and presents an analysis of how events will play out in response to various Athenian reactions to Spartan behavior. In the short-term, we have Sparta’s increasingly commanding tone with Athens, as well as Sparta’s refusal to abide by the terms of the treaty by rejecting Athenian offers of arbitration (1.140.2-3). Pericles’ speech projects two opposing scenarios as possible outcomes resulting from these short-term data: in the first case, Athens does not go to war and Athenian inaction in the face of Spartan arrogance yields, at length, Athenian slavery (1.141.1). Further, Pericles takes a reasoned account of the respective positions of the two interested parties and concludes that Athens should enter into a war with Sparta with confidence in a favorable outcome (1.141.2-1.143.2). Another big-picture conclusion that Pericles presents is that, given her strengths, Athens must privilege citizens’ lives and the fleet over Athenian land and houses (1.143.5). Although most men, thinking short-term under the sway of emotion (ὀργή), will mourn the damage to their property, Pericles points out that “houses and land do not procure men, but men procure these” (1.143.5).

---

61 see 1.143.5: χρὴ ὅτι…καὶ Πελοποννησίοις ύπερ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι… For the short-term quality of the emotions that are not rationally inspired (as Pericles’ patriotic ἔρως is), consider the demos’ rapid shifts of emotion in response to misfortune, as opposed to Pericles’ rational stability of view; see, e.g., Thuc. 1.140.1, 2.21, 2.61.2-3, 3.36; see also the constantly shifting social and lexical terrain during the stasis at Corcyra (3.79-85), a time during which the populace is seemingly overtaken by the self-oriented passions of fear, panic and greed. Pericles’ hope is that rational patriotic ἔρως would be more stable than other emotions, just as his own faculty of reason, perceiving the long view, is less subject to the shifts caused in most people by misfortune. It should be noted, however, that reason for most people seems equally short-term in scope, dominated primarily, as Thucydides portrays them, by their emotions. It is only those who are predominantly rational who appear to be consistent and stable in their views (such as Pericles). Themistocles too, so long as he was one of their number, was highly consistent in his loyalty and helpfulness to Athenian flourishing; it
In his second speech, the Funeral Oration, Pericles again goes for a big-picture message rather than giving a eulogy for the individual fallen citizens, abstracting from these specific men to give a eulogy instead of the city that produced them. Pericles glorifies Athens’ constitution, culture and customs, preferring to let the fallen warriors’ reputations stand on the strength of their deeds and the deeds performed by the city in their honor (2.35, 2.46). Pericles uses this opportunity to undertake the broader task of clarifying “the nature of the obligation owed by individual citizens to the community as a whole, particularly in an exemplary polis. Pericles argues that the Athenians must be ready to die not merely in defense of the polis—an unexceptional demand—but for its greater glory.” The speech represents a lesson, then, in political theory, justifying to and for the audience the demand the city places on them to risk death in battle to further the prospering of the community as a whole.

Thucydides states that Pericles called an Assembly after the second Spartan invasion for the purposes of heartening the Athenians and restoring them to a less fearful temperament (2.59.3). This speech does accomplish the goals necessitated by the short-term conditions of fear and anger among the Athenian populace; yet, in the midst of his attempts to embolden his audience, Pericles slips in a complex argument championing his position that, for one who apprehends the broad perspective, it makes rational sense to accept short-term personal setbacks in favor of the greater long-term rewards accomplished within a healthy commonwealth (2.60.2-4, 2.61.4). He goes on to reiterate for the Athenians his earlier argument, which they seem to have lost sight of, that at stake from the long-view perspective is the loss of Athens’ sovereignty versus the preservation of her independence. While the Athenians indulge their disappointment over the damage to their property and the devastation wrought by the plague, they forget to take into

was only after they ostracized him that his rational self-interest lay with parties other than the Athenians.

1.143.5: τίν τε ὀλόφυρσιν μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τάδε τοὺς ἄνδρας, ἀλλ’ οἱ ἄνδρες ταῦτα κτῶνται.

See also Ford 2002, 128-30. Ford (2002, 130) makes the nice point that Pericles offers as proofs of his own sincerity in his portrayal of Athens the manifest signs of its power (Thuc. 2.41.2, 4).


For Thucydides as political theorist, see Ober 2006.
account what would result from submitting to the Spartans (2.61.2, 2.62.3). Pericles goes on to elucidate the dangers of retreating from empire, dangers which had not perhaps occurred to the majority of citizens in their emotional state (2.63).

Pericles consistently upholds the preeminence of γνώμη, which allows big-picture perception, over both ὀργή, which most often mires one in short-term perceptions, and over the randomness of τύχη, or chance, throughout this third speech. As I note above, Pericles contends that intelligence (ξύνεσις) rooted in rational judgment (γνώμη), which in turn draws on the facts of existing circumstances (ἀπὸ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων), is the surest route to a more trustworthy confidence (τὴν τόλμαν ἐχυρωτέραν) in one’s position (2.62.5). Pericles still holds to his original policy (2.61.2) despite the chance misfortunes of the plague, because, his perception being anchored in γνώμη, he still foresees the long-term benefits of his strategy; whereas, he tells the Athenians, “since your suffering now holds the perception of each of you in its grip, while the manifestation of the advantages is still far off for all of you, and due to a great reversal having befallen you in so short a time, your strength of purpose to persevere in the things which you rationally decided (ἔγνωτε) is weak” (2.61.2).68 Because they are currently more mastered by their emotions than the masters of their γνώμη, the Athenians are weak in their resolutions. Pericles, though, with his encompassing intelligence, is less aggrieved by his short-term woes because he holds the long-term advantages clearly in his mind. The advantage, for him, then, is not so far off as it is for the mass of Athenians. And, indeed, Pericles concludes his speech by saying that “the sort who are least distressed in their γνώμη by chance misfortune and who in action most endure, these are the strongest of cities and of individuals” (2.64.6).69

---

66 See above. Only Pericles’ unusual formulation of “rational” emotions seems resistant to constant fluctuation.
67 I take ‘τὸ αἰφνίδιον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον καὶ τὸ πλείστῳ παραλόγῳ ξυμβαῖνον’ (2.61.3), referring especially to the plague, to be a periphrasis for τύχη. For Pericles’ confidence in γνώμη and concomitant disdain for τύχη, see Edmunds 1975, esp. 15-23.
68 2.61.2: διότι τὸ μὲν λυποῦν ἔχει ἤδη τὴν αἴσθησιν ἑκάστῳ, τῆς δὲ ωφελίμος ἔπεστι ἐπὶ ἡ δήλωσις ἄπασι, καὶ μεταβολής μεγάλης, καὶ ταύτης ἐξ ὀλίγου, ἐμπεσούσης ταπεινῇ ὑμῶν ἤ διάνοια ἐγκατατεθεῖν αἱ ἐγνωτε.
69 2.64.6: ὡς οὖν στις τῶν ξυμφορὰς γνώμη μὲν ἡ ἱστα λυποῦνται, ἔργῳ δὲ μάλιστα ἀντέχουσιν, οὕτοι καὶ πόλεως καὶ ἰδιωτῶν κράτιστοι εἰσιν.
Pericles’ γνώμη, then, is of a different character than the γνώμη of the average Athenian citizen, whether by nature or by careful discipline, we are not told; but, where the average citizen’s γνώμη falters in the face of misfortune, Pericles remains steadfast in his judgment. Pericles twice notes the fluctuation in γνώμη of most people under changing circumstances. In his third speech, he rebukes the Athenians, saying, “you were persuaded (of my policy) when still unharmed, but you repent now that you are under duress, and my advice seems wrong to you in your weakness of γνώμη” (2.61.2). He begins his first speech with a similar sentiment: “I know that men do not experience the same passion (τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ) when being persuaded to make war as when they are actively engaged in war, but they change their judgments (τὰς γνώμας) in accordance with the prevailing circumstances” (1.140.1). Pericles delivers both of these lines in the immediate context of asserting the constancy of his own γνώμη, suggesting that his γνώμη is somehow stronger in kind because it is more independent of the sway of the passions. Certainly, Pericles’ γνώμη is the source of his foresight and his broad perspective on events. It is through his innate intelligence and understanding of state policy, as well as his ability to maintain a rational viewpoint even under stressful conditions, that Pericles holds the big picture in his mind when other people have succumbed to short-term, emotionally based assessments of self-interest.73

70 2.61.2: ξυνέβη ὑμῖν πεισθῆναι μὲν ἄκεραίοις, μεταμέλειν δὲ κακουμένοις, καὶ τὸν ἐμὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ ὑμετέρῳ ἑσθενεῖ τῆς γνώμης μὴ ὀρθὸν φαίνεσθαι...
71 I rendered the grammar of this passage a bit loosely for reasons of clarity and sense. 1.140.1: εἰδὼς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐ τῇ αὐτῇ ὀργῇ ἀναπειθομένους τε πολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ πρῶσοσοντας, πρὸς δὲ τὰς ξυμφορὰς καὶ τὰς γνώμας τρεπομένους.
72 Because Pericles uses the same word to speak both of his own steadfast rational judgment and the weak rationality of the average Athenian, Edmunds (1975) suggests that this word has two vastly different, even opposing, meanings: using it of himself, Pericles means “‘intelligence’ or ‘reason,’” (10) or “‘policy based on reason’” (9); using it of the masses, he means “gnome as based on the passions” or “opinion” (10).
73 It could also be argued that at Corcyra, for example, individuals are still acting in rational self-interest, but that, with conditions of mutual trust so degraded, it is now more rational to behave as they do. This is not borne out by Thucydides’ analysis of this crisis, however. He emphasizes instead the role of emotion in driving the erratic, aggressive behavior of the revolutionaries (see Thuc. 3.79-85, passim). Further, after the death of Pericles when the atmosphere of mutual trust has begun to be eroded, Thucydides ascribes the problems in Athens to the power of the appetite, self-regarding passions.
His big-picture thinking is a significant factor in Pericles’ consistency of character and policy over time. Above, I already point to the explanation for Pericles’ remarkable consistency and sameness over time, qualities that are sustained features of Thucydides’ characterization of him.\textsuperscript{74} As I have noted, Pericles twice makes a claim to a greater steadfastness of judgment than other people, because of his remarkable rationality (his strong \(\gammaνώμη\)): at 1.140.1, he asserts, “I hold, men of Athens, ever to the same \(\gammaνώμη\) of not conceding to the Peloponnesians;”\textsuperscript{75} and at 2.61.2, he says, “I am the same man and do not change.”\textsuperscript{76} His foresight allows Pericles to predict ahead of time the hardships that his policy will entail. As he says, “the unforeseen, unexpected and that which happens most contrary to calculation enslave thought” (2.61.3).\textsuperscript{77} Because of Pericles’ accurate predictive abilities, almost nothing is unforeseen or omitted from his calculations, including even the variable impact of \(\tauύχη\). Although Pericles could not have predicted the plague, he understood the random role of \(\tauύχη\) in human affairs and was able to remain unflappable even in such a dire emergency. In his first speech, he acknowledges that “it is possible for the circumstances of our affairs to take as blundering a course as men’s plans” (1.140.1).\textsuperscript{78} Edmunds adduces this passage as evidence of Pericles’ confidence in his own planning (\(\gammaνώμη\)) and accompanying scorn for \(\tauύχη\), noting in this context the remarkable mention of \(\tauύχη\), turning on its head, as it does, the trope that \(\tauύχη\) is typically recruited to \textit{dissuade} an audience from going to war, not as in this case, to “inspire martial ardor.”\textsuperscript{79} With this statement, Pericles argues that “chance is not an objective force impervious to human reason…, but, through the implications of Pericles’
simile, is reduced to the same status as human error, that is, to the subjective.”

In sum, then, Pericles’ broad and long views allow him to plan for and take into account multiple, complex variables and to foresee the role even of the “unforeseen” in his plans. This, in turn, immunizes him against the sudden emotional reactions to adversity of panic and fear, allowing him to remain in the rational register at all times, and guaranteeing his extraordinary consistency over time.\footnote{Desmond 2006, 375: “A leader is exceptional, then, when he can resist passions or whims of the moment to articulate a larger vision and can inspire his followers similarly to rise above the present.”}

Another defining feature of Pericles’ characterization by Thucydides is his consistent and dedicated loyalty to the polis. Pericles introduces this formula for what it takes to make a trustworthy and effective politician, concluding with a candid assessment of his own strengths: “I think that I am less than no man in understanding (γνῶναί) the necessary policy and expounding it, and I am both devoted to the polis (φιλόπολίς) and stronger than money (immune to bribery)” (2.60.5).\footnote{2.60.5: οὐδενὸς ἦσσων οἴομαι εἶναι γνῶναί τε τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἐρμηνεῦσαι ταῦτα, φιλόπολίς τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείσσων. For Pericles’ as exemplifying the ideal citizen values he promotes, see Wohl 2002, 62f.} Pericles, then, not only lays claim to an unparalleled devotion to the city, but he also asserts that this loyalty is essential to being a good leader of a democracy. Thucydides sounds a similar note in his encomium of Pericles, citing as the cause of his having led the city so successfully “his moral authority and his γνώμη and his being patently incorruptible with money” (2.65.8).\footnote{2.65.8: αἴτιον δ’ ἦν ὅτι ἔκεινος μὲν δυνατὸς ὄν τῷ τε ἄξιώματι καὶ τῇ γνώμῃ χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδοφότατος γενόμενος... I render ἄξιωμα as ‘moral authority’ because I feel that this best encompasses all of the nuances of the word, including Pericles’ public reputation, the honor attending his rank as a long-term general, and his moral and public standing as someone with a highly aristocratic pedigree.}

In both of these key passages assessing Pericles as a leader, a noteworthy and significant connection is drawn between rational intelligence and loyalty or trustworthiness to the demos.

In one way or another, a central theme of each of Pericles’ speeches is his doctrine of placing the interests of the whole community above narrow self-interest. First, Pericles coaches non-attachment to the trappings of personal wealth in favor of
preserving the source of wealth production—according to Pericles, this is the potential inherent in men’s lives (1.143.5). Pericles portrays the essence of the city as distinct from its land and houses, implying that this true essence of the city is a far greater and more secure possession than property; it represents the inexhaustible potential to (re)create prosperous conditions, whereas land and houses are easily lost, insecure possessions. Then, in the Funeral Oration, Pericles argues that it is entirely rational to decide to risk one’s life for the survival and prosperity of the city. Pericles presents his case for placing the city’s interests above one’s narrow interests in terms of reciprocity, arguing first that citizens owe a debt of obligation to their ancestors who handed down to the present generation a city augmented in glory and wealth by their labor (2.36.1-3, cf. 1.144.3). This city, comprised of its individual citizens who engender its praise-worthy civic culture, becomes something greater than the sum of its parts through Pericles’ rhetoric. Pericles reifies the city as an entity that demands veneration, the subordination of personal interest to her greater interest, and the ultimate sacrifice of risking one’s life in her protection (2.43.1). Presenting this argument again in the implied terms of reciprocity, Pericles gives much consideration to an almost overwhelming enumeration of the many services and benefits Athens offers her citizens, which in turn places an obligation on individual citizens to repay her with services and benefits in the form of securing her survival and flourishing.

Lastly, Pericles’ doctrine of privileging the general interest over narrow self-interest comes to its fullest and most explicit expression in his third speech (2.60.2-4):

εγὼ γὰρ ἠγούμαι πόλιν πλείω ξύμπασαν ὀρθουμένην όφελείν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ἤ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν εὐπραγοῦσαν, ἄθροὰν δὲ σφάλλομένην. καλῶς µὲν γὰρ φερόµενος ἄνηρ τὸ καθ’ ἐκαστὸν διαφθειροµένης τῆς πατρίδος οὔδὲν ἴησον ξυναπόλλυτα, κακοτυχῶν δὲ ἐν εὐτυχούσῃ πολλῷ μᾶλλον διασώζεται. ὅπως οὖν πόλις µὲν τὰς ἰδίας χρηµατὰς οἶα τε φέρειν, εἰς δὲ ἐκαστὸς τὰς ἐκείνης ἀδύνατος, πῶς οὐ χρῆ πάντας ἃµίνειν αὐτῇ...

For I maintain that a city is of greater benefit to its citizens when it succeeds as a whole than when it flourishes in regard to each of its citizens, but fails as a whole. For a man may fare well in his own affairs, but with his country ruined, he to no less degree is destroyed with it, but if

---

84 Yunis 1996, 82.
he suffers misfortune amid his country’s success, he is far more likely to come through safely. Since, then, a city is able to bear such private misfortunes, but each citizen by himself is unable to bear hers, surely it is necessary that all citizens defend her...

And, further (2.63.1):

τῆς τε πόλεως ὑμᾶς εἰκὸς τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄρχειν, φύερ ἀπαντες ἄγάλλεσθε, βοηθεῖν, καὶ μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς πόνους ἢ μηδὲ τὰς τιμὰς διώκειν:

It is fair that you support the honor of the city accruing from its empire, in which you all delight, and that you not shun its burdens or else that you not pursue its rewards;

By constructing the city as a moral entity as Pericles explicitly does in the Funeral Oration, he posits a relationship between citizens and their city that entails certain moral obligations and duties, a relationship of reciprocal demands. He argues here that the city, conferring copious benefits on its citizens as it does, has a moral right to expect its citizens to support its best interest. Pericles also cogently argues that the city’s well-being is in the best, long-term interests of each individual citizen, that aligning one’s personal interests with the general interest is the most rational course of action. Hence, when Pericles asserts that he is faultlessly loyal to the city, this is a direct result of his rational calculations of his own best interest, stemming from his γνώμη and his foresight. He is impervious to bribery attempts because he has made a reasoned, big-picture assessment that pursuing personal gain at the expense of the city’s interests entails only small short-term gain, but potentially devastating long-term costs.

Addressing Pericles’ assessment of himself as φίλοπολις, Yunis observes that this attribute—“devotion to the polis—is a basic theme of Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles throughout.”85 He adduces 2.13.1 in support of this statement, where Pericles announced in the Athenian Assembly that his private friendship with the Spartan king, Archidamus, should not bring harm to the city and that, should his estate be left unravaged in the Spartan invasion, he would dedicate it as public property. This account showcases Pericles’ loyalty to the city above his private interest. Connor includes this

85 ibid., 73.
word, φιλοπολίς, in his discussion of a new political vocabulary that appears in the late 5th century, along with the words φιλόδημος, εὖνος τῷ δημῷ, and their opposites, all words describing a politician’s sincerely loyal frame of mind toward the polis or lack thereof. As Connor observes, “the individual’s relation to the polis comes to be spoken of in ways that had formerly been reserved almost exclusively for his relations to persons.” These words convey devotion to the city, with their appearance suggesting that affirmations of loyalty to the polis have become requisite in the political sphere. Connor argues that in this period for the first time the tension between a politician’s public and private loyalties is enunciated and problematized. Concern that public speakers might be acting from mixed motivations, divided between their public duty and the lure of private gain, has newly become an explicit issue. Pericles seems to be highly sensitive to this tension in Athenian politics, frequently asserting his own loyalty and steadfastness (1.140.1, 2.60.5, 2.61.2) and taking measures to prevent suspicion over his motives (2.13.1).

Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles’ public-mindedness and devotion to the polis, together with his careful downplaying of personal ties such as at 2.13.1, jibes with Plutarch’s description of Pericles’ withdrawal from friends and minimization of a private life generally. Plutarch depicts Pericles as avoiding his friends’ dinner invitations (Plut. Per. 7.4-5), and as arranging his personal household management so as to occupy the least of his time, even at the expense of profit, thus freeing himself for public business (Plut. Per. 16.4-5). Connor contends that this sort of gesture “reminds the observer of his devotion to the common good and emphasizes that Pericles is a public man, more concerned with the city than with his own pleasures, willing to subordinate his personal fancies and friendships to the needs of the city.” Pericles departs significantly from the

86 Connor 1971, 100. For Connor’s discussion of this trend in Athenian politics, see Connor 1971, 99-108.  
87 ibid., 105.  
88 ibid.  
89 See Connor 1971, 121-128 for the significance of Plutarch’s anecdotes (in Pericles).  
90 Discussed at Connor 1971, 121, 124, respectively.  
91 ibid., 128. For a discussion of this idea that includes Plutarch’s contradictory anecdotes of Pericles’ social ties with the intellectual elite, see Ober 1989, 86-90.
former model of politics,\textsuperscript{92} by freeing himself from “dangerous obligations to \textit{philoi}.”\textsuperscript{93} This move allows him to present himself as a uniquely public man, with no private entanglements to affect his judgment of the best policy for the whole city. In this way, he can convincingly claim that his interests are aligned with the entire city and that he is not a party man.

Plutarch’s portrait of a man who has minimal private associations and is independent from party politics fits well with Thucydides’ portrayal of Pericles. Connor notes the similarities between Pericles’ markedly new transfer of the vocabulary of erotic relationships to the political arena, when he urges each citizen to become an \textit{ἐραστὴς}, or lover, of Athens (2.43.1), and Aristophanes’ caricature of Cleon in the \textit{Knights} as \textit{ἐραστής} of Demos (732).\textsuperscript{94} It is significant, though, that, while “Cleon” (or the thinly veiled caricature of him as the character Paphlagon in the \textit{Knights}) claims that he is the lover of the \textit{demos}, Pericles exhorts his compatriots to be lovers of the \textit{polis}.\textsuperscript{95} And, again, whereas the term \textit{φιλόδημος} is connected to Cleon by parallel or association (\textit{Knights} 786-7), being used of Paphlagon’s rival in the \textit{Knights}, Pericles terms himself \textit{φιλόπολις} in his third speech (2.60.5). Within Thucydides’ text, too, Cleon is associated with terms connoting partisan politics, as a “demagogue and most persuasive with the masses” (4.21.3; also 3.36.6).\textsuperscript{96} As Yunis observes, “neither of the terms of this description is ever applied to Pericles by Thucydides;”\textsuperscript{97} nor does Thucydides ever apply to Pericles any other term connoting association with a faction or involvement in any way in partisan politics. Pericles uniformly presents himself as aligning his interests with the interests of the whole city, in the knowledge that cooperation yields the highest rewards for all parties in the long run.\textsuperscript{98} In fact, not only does Pericles not involve himself in party politics, but he also refrains from the slanderous smear tactics of impugning his rivals or

\textsuperscript{92} See Connor 1971, 35-84; Ober 1989, 90-1.
\textsuperscript{93} ibid., 122. On this theme in Athenian politics, see Ch. 3 on Euripides’ \textit{Hecuba}.
\textsuperscript{94} ibid., 121, 121n.62.
\textsuperscript{95} See also Wohl 2002, 75-6.
\textsuperscript{96} 4.21.3: Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου, ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ᾽ ἐκείνον τὸν χρόνον ὃν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος.
\textsuperscript{97} Yunis 1996, 74.
\textsuperscript{98} For a concise discussion of the payoffs and doubts over trustworthiness that arise in a cooperative scenario, see Ober 2008, 6-12.
their policies; he never once even addresses a rival’s existence. While this could very well be explained as a literary device used by Thucydides to illustrate in bold strokes the decline in Athenian politics and particularly in the Athenian ability to deliberate effectively or to demonstrate Pericles’ utter singularity and smooth mastery of his political position, Pericles’ refusal to introduce sincerity politics into his rhetoric—i.e. pernicious attacks on rivals’ sincerity, honesty, and trustworthiness—certainly fits with his goal of nurturing a political entity that hangs together cohesively and consistently.

In sum, Thucydides gives a prominent place to rationality in his characterization of Pericles, emphasizing his γνώμη (rational judgment), his ξύνεσις (intelligence), and his πρόνοια (foresight). From this constellation of rational virtues stems Pericles’ ability to take not just the long view, but also the broad view. It is, in turn, from Pericles’ rationality and big-picture perception that he gains the strength and stability to exhibit a consistent self over time, always the same of judgment and politically predictable. These qualities of rationality and big-picture perception also engender Pericles’ staunch loyalty to the polis in several regards: rational calculation leads Pericles to the view that the general well-being of his community is more in his own long-term interests than personal profit acquired at the expense of the city. This view leads Pericles, then, to a rational motivation for being politically trustworthy and public-minded and leads him to resist the temptations of bribery and factional politics. Furthermore, his dedicated public-spiritedness causes Pericles to minimize his private commitments, both because of a reasoned caution about suspicions of insincerity or mixed motivation and because of a genuine commitment to the public weal.

The Teachings of Pericles: Fostering Rational Sincerity in the Polis

In assessing Pericles’ commitment to rational sincerity, it is important to look not only at how Pericles conducts himself in the political arena, but also at what values he

99 Pericles confines himself only to broad generalities, such as at 2.63.3-2.64.1.
100 Ober (1998, 78-9) notes the difficulty in trusting speeches delivered in a competitive environment; Thucydides thus allows Pericles to appear to the reader all the more trustworthy and sincere because he is “removed” (by the author) from this competitive milieu.
seeks to foster in the Athenian populace by means of his influential public role. In this section, I will consider how Pericles’ personal ethos of rational sincerity plays out in his leadership style and how it impacts the Athenian populace at large. Not only is rationality important for Pericles personally, but he also makes it clear that he feels it is an essential component in maintaining a consistent, intelligent state policy. Pericles praises Athens’ process of democratic deliberation (2.40.2-3), indicating that for him, unlike for the Spartans and Cleon, debate is not an obstacle to action, but rather a necessary precursor to reasoned action. Deliberation facilitates the pooling of community knowledge and the cultivation of a rational understanding of current circumstances. For Pericles, to ensure a level of consistency in policy and action, deliberation must represent a rational, objective and appropriate interaction with accurate facts rather than an indulgence in spontaneous, emotional reactions to events. For example, in response to seeing their land ravaged at Acharnae in the first Spartan invasion, the Athenians’ tempers flare and they grow angry with Pericles for not allowing them to return battle (2.21). Pericles, however, equating ὀργή with poor judgment, refuses to call an Assembly or any sort of public gathering, “in fear that, coming together under the sway of passion more than of reason, they would make a mistake” (2.22.1). Here again, Pericles remains convinced of the accuracy of his rational, long-view analysis of the situation; the Athenian people, however, seeing the reality of what the war would mean for them, forget their earlier agreement with Pericles’ policy and their judgments are overwhelmed by ὀργή.

---

101 The Spartans: implied as the contrast with Athens at 2.40.2-3; Cleon: 3.37f.
102 Ober 2008.
103 2.22.1: …τοῦ μὴ ὀργῇ τι μάλλον ἢ γνώμῃ ἐξυνελθόντας ἐξαμαρτεῖν… North (1966, 110) notes that the Athenians blamed the oracle mongers and Nicias’ reliance on oracles for the failure of the Sicilian Expedition; she takes this as an “indication of the failure of post-Periclean leaders to control the irrational factors in politics and war” (1966, 110). By contrast, she adduces 2.21.3 as an indication of Pericles’ firm control of the selfish and the irrational when he refuses to convene an Assembly once the oracle mongers had roused the populace after the Spartan invasion (North 1966, 110 n.80).
104 2.22.1: Περικλῆς…πιστεύουν δὲ ὀρθῶς γνώσειν περί τοῦ μὴ ἐπεξείμαι…
105 Their passions also change in quality, becoming more self-regarding in their fear of personal misfortune; as Pericles acknowledges, “I know that men do not experience the same passion (ὀργῆ) when being persuaded to make war as when they are actively engaged in war, but they change their judgments (γνώμαι) in accordance with the prevailing circumstances” (1.140.1).
In his speeches, Pericles strives to harness passion (ὀργή) and to foster greater rationality (γνώμη). In his first speech, as he outlines the respective situations of Athens and Sparta, Pericles cautions the Athenians not to give way to ὀργή against the Peloponnesians because of material losses. Then, when the Athenians are dejected by the misfortunes of the war thus far, Pericles calls an Assembly in order, Thucydides says, “both to hearten them and to remove the passion from their γνώμη” (2.59.3). And, within his speech at that Assembly, Pericles seeks to “part the Athenians from their ὀργή against him and to divert their γνώμη from their current troubles” (2.65.1). Further, it is within this speech that Pericles most explicitly coaches the Athenians in nurturing a stability and consistency of γνώμη. Pericles begins by explaining to his audience their own psychology, which he objectively observes: they have changed from their previous firm resolution of adopting his policy due to private misfortunes (2.61.3). Because they had faltered in their rationality, falling under the sway of emotion, a part of the self with a more short-term scope, the Athenians could no longer remember or perceive the long-term advantages for which they had hazarded the fortunes of war (2.61.3). That is, Pericles successfully though tenuously draws the demos to the higher-order rationality of concern for the city as a whole more than for one’s personal fortunes. While they are in his presence and perhaps for a short time thereafter, the demos’ rational and emotional capacities are coaxed into becoming more other-regarding. Personal misfortune, however, floods them with the self-regarding emotions of fear and panic, bringing both aspects of the self down to a level of self-regard.

Pericles scolds the Athenians, asserting that this changeability and hesitation in the face of personal affliction falls short of the greatness of their customs and upbringing (2.61.4), enjoining them that, “ceasing to feel pain for their private affairs, they should take part instead in securing the preservation of the common good” (2.61.4). Further, it is in this speech that Pericles instructs the Athenians that, when intelligence (ξύνεσις) is

106 1.143.5: καὶ Πελοποννησίως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ὀργισθέντας πολλῷ πλέοσι μὴ διαμάχεσθαι…
107 2.59.3: ἐβούλετο θαρσῦναί τε καὶ ἀπαγαγὼν τὸ ὀργιζόμενον τῆς γνώμης…
108 2.65.1: τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τῆς τε ἐς αὐτὸν ὀργῆς παραλέιναι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν παρόντων δεινῶν ἄπαγειν τὴν γνώμην.
109 For an analysis of how fear functions in Thucydides’ narrative, see Desmond 2006.
110 2.61.4: ἀπαλγήσαντας δὲ τὰ ἱδία τοῦ κοινοῦ τῆς σωτηρίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι.
joined together with rational judgment (γνώμη), this combination lays the foundation for a “more sound boldness” in action (τὴν τόλμαν ἐχυρωτέραν) and a “more securely founded foresight” that withstands short-term hardship (βεβαιοτέρα ἡ πρόνοια) (2.62.5). Lastly, he instructs his compatriots, firmness and consistency of γνώμη makes both cities and individuals strong (2.64.6).

Whenever the demos wants to abandon a previously decided-upon course of action under the influence of their current suffering, Pericles finds the appropriate time to speak and persuades them to hold steady in their resolve. Knowing that the mass of Athenians has a hard time holding the long view in mind in the face of hardship, he speaks to them repeatedly on the same subjects, using his own judgment to bolster their resolution and to temper their erratic impulses of panic, fear, over-confidence or greed. As I have argued, it is because of Pericles’ long-view intelligence that he is able to remain rational and consistent and to hold long-term goals in his mind. He seeks through his speeches, as we have them, to instill this same understanding in his listeners, by dispelling the self-regarding passions that cloud their γνώμη, or rational judgment.

To accomplish his aim of persuading the demos to hold steady to a consistent state policy, as well as to privilege group interest over narrow self-interest, Pericles takes productive advantage of the fact that human beings are shaped by external circumstance. Ober notes that, in order for a democracy to survive as a stable entity, the demos must have “an accurate understanding of the effect of its present decisions and actions on the future circumstances of the polis as a whole”; this is what Pericles strives in his speeches to impart to the Athenian demos. Thucydides suggests that for Athens to achieve and maintain prosperity, she will require a leader possessed of native talents, including both “the capacity to act quickly and decisively on the basis of well-reasoned conclusions” and the ability to instruct and persuade through speech. Both Farrar and Yunis argue compellingly for Pericles’ role as an instructor or teacher of the demos, coaching them in rational decision-making skills. Yunis argues that Pericles explicitly

111 Yunis 1996, 89.
113 ibid., 79-80.
114 Farrar 1988, 158-167; Yunis 1996, Ch. 3.
claims an instructive role for public speakers, explaining in the Funeral Oration that Athenians reflect seriously on public matters, in the belief that “words are no hindrance to deeds, but rather not being instructed beforehand (προδιδαχθῆναι) by speech” (2.40.2); and then, in his third speech, Pericles claims that an essential quality of a public speaker is the ability to explain policy (ἐρμηνεύσαι) and to instruct the demos clearly (σαφῶς διδάξας) (2.60.5-6). Yunis asserts that Pericles does not simply persuade the demos to vote for his policies, but that he instructs them in proper policy, adding that “Periclean rhetoric was the voice that kept the Athenians rational en masse.” Both Pericles and Cleon must reckon with a demos that wants to reconsider an earlier decision. For Pericles, this is a result of their poor understanding and his solution is “speeches that are repeated and that aim to instruct.” Cleon’s response, on the other hand, is the outright denial of the “utility of democratic deliberation.” For Pericles, instructive rhetoric is important for its role as a stabilizing force: a strengthened γνώμη among the citizens functions as Pericles’ own γνώμη does, to reinforce community-minded decisions, to blunt the emotional response to misfortune and to bolster steady conviction. In this way, Pericles’ instructive rhetoric “imposes long-term, consistent, wise policy on the unstable mechanism of democratic deliberation.”

For Farrar, Pericles’ γνώμη leads the city “both as reason (Pericles is Athens’ gnomē) and through reason, by shaping the attitudes of the citizens and promoting their own self-control.” In Farrar’s account, Pericles has two main goals in his instruction of his fellow citizens: to teach them to put the well-being of the collectivity above their own private self-interest; and to instruct them in gaining an objective view of the workings of their own psychology. The two aims are related: this objective grasp on their own emotional responses will aid in developing the sort of understanding that “can reveal how

---

115 Yunis 1996, 73-5.
116 ibid., 76.
117 ibid., 86.
118 ibid., 89.
119 ibid.
120 ibid., 76.
121 ibid., 85.
122 Farrar 1988, 158.
123 ibid., 161f.
124 ibid., 160-1.
men are constrained, and how their real interests are defined, by the way the world actually is, now. And it can foster the self-control which...is essential now to the realization of those interests.”¹²⁵ Both Farrar and Yunis agree that Pericles’ style of rhetoric treats the mass of citizens as relative equals, in the sense of being able to be reached through reason.¹²⁶

**Pericles and ὀργή**

As I have already suggested, the relationship between γνώμη and ὀργή in Thucydides’ *History* is a complex one: dominant, other-regarding reason can alter the quality of emotion, but self-regarding passions can also drag the rational faculty down with them to the level of narrow selfishness. Γνώμη and ὀργή go together hand-in-hand, with γνώμη not always representing a disinterested rationality. And, during periods of civic stability and material well-being, ὀργή can serve to reinforce some of the positive aspects of civic ideology, by giving emotional strength to such impulses as patriotism, civic pride, respect for fellow citizens, etc. The picture at Corcyra is not of individuals lacking γνώμη, but rather of intelligence put to base use, its master having become the crude impulse to revenge (3.83, 3.82.7). In the Corcyra narrative, Thucydides portrays an out-of-order and out-of-balance γνώμη, in the sense that rational intelligence is only being used to satisfy the base impulses and that it is no longer able to perceive accurately the best interests of the individual. Pericles, perceiving the dynamic between rationality and the emotions, shows a deep understanding of human psychology, together with the insight that he can ill afford to cultivate γνώμη without acknowledging the impact of ὀργή. His speeches, then, while largely aimed at fostering greater rationality among his audience, give limited but crucial attention to the shaping of ὀργή as well, seeking to marshal the passions in service to γνώμη.

Pericles, in his role as a public speaker, is depicted as a leader with the power of stabilizing the γνώμη of citizens by maintaining a careful balance in their emotions, drawing them away from the extremes of fear and over-confidence with the judicious

¹²⁵ ibid., 130.
¹²⁶ ibid., 164-5; Yunis 1996, 78.
promoting of the opposite emotion. Thucydides offers this description of Pericles’ ability to balance the demos’ moods (2.65.9):

ὅπότε γοῦν αἰσθότο τι αὐτοὺς παρὰ καιρὸν ὦβρει θαρσοῦντας, λέγων κατέπλησεν ἐπὶ τὸ φοβεῖσθαι, καὶ δεδιότας αὐ ἀλόγως ἀντικαθίστη πᾶλιν ἐπὶ τὸ θαρσεῖν.

At any rate, whenever he saw them in some way unseasonably inflated in courage from hubris, by speaking, he used to terrify them into a state of fear; and, again, seeing them unreasonably fearful, he used to restore them again to a state of confidence.

This passage uses strong language to depict Pericles’ unsubtle manipulation of the demos’ emotions. With his rhetoric, he astounds and restores (καταπλήσσω and ἀντικαθίστημι) his Athenian audience toward the end of evening out their emotions. From Thucydides’ account, the Athenians require intensity of speech to prevent their emotional responses from interfering with their public-minded reasoning capacity. Here we see him striking a delicate balance between the two potent emotions of fear and exuberance. With this practice, Pericles continues his goal of teaching his fellow Athenians to be more rational by instructing them openly in the practice of balancing out the conflicting elements of the self. Farrar argues that it is Pericles’ transparency about what he is doing that distinguishes this rhetorical style from emotional manipulation: in his third speech, Pericles transparently reveals to his audience that he is about to use a rhetorical approach that will impact their emotions, i.e. he will buoy their spirits by directing them to contemplate the power of Athens (2.62). I would argue, however, that Pericles is blatantly employing emotional manipulation, and I would distinguish this from rational manipulation. That is, he apparently must manipulate emotions as the precondition for respecting citizens’ rationality and for reaching them with reason. By shepherding the Athenians away from the extremes of emotion, then, Pericles creates the conditions for greater rationality, keeping the self-regarding passionate impulses in check sufficiently so that γνώμη can remain ascendant. Thucydides’ narrative reveals that this is a woefully short-term state of affairs for the Athenian demos.

127 Farrar 1988, 164-5.
Sincerity, as Thucydides conceives of it, is an issue of finding and maintaining the proper balance or alignment in the self, between the intellectual and the emotional faculties. In the knowledge that reason and the passions can be mutually reinforcing, we see Pericles activating emotions in the Athenians for reasons other than simply restraining and balancing their more extreme, negative impulses. In each of his speeches, Pericles also seeks to inspire positive emotions that will cultivate the demos’ ability to place the common interest above personal interest and to hold steadfast to a consistent plan of action. In his first speech, a reasoned exposition of his war strategy, Pericles does seek to instill confidence in the Athenian people, but he also concludes his speech with a stimulating account of Athens’ ancestors and their glorious role in the Persian wars (1.144.3), designed to inspire present-day Athenians with civic pride and the desire to live up to their forefathers’ example. The Funeral Oration throughout seeks to spark emotions of civic pride, love and admiration for the polis, and affection for one’s fellow citizens, to the end of motivating Athenians to greater civic-mindedness and selfless acts in the service of the city. This speech again holds up the model of the ancestors, adding to it the model of the fallen warriors as models of Athenian heroism that each citizen should strive to match. In a more subtle move, Pericles represents average Athenians in an already idealized state, as model citizens (e.g. 2.37.2; 2.39.1, 4; 2.40.2; 2.41.1), holding out to them a pride of self that would spur them to live up to this idealized portrait of themselves and would cause them to feel ashamed to fall short of this ideal.128 Similarly, in his third speech, Pericles instills in his audience a sense of awe for the power of Athens and evokes admiration for the sort of citizen who is hardy in the face of misfortune (2.61.4, 2.64.6), who lives up to the greatness of Athens’ customs (2.61.4), and who is energetic and ambitious in Athens’ service (2.64.4, 2.63.3). In short, he again offers the Athenian audience an idealized version of themselves to which they can aspire.

In sum, then, while Pericles’ ultimate goal is the fostering of greater rationality among the Athenian populace, he does not neglect the important role of the emotions in furthering this aim. He employs the passions toward this end in two ways. As we see repeatedly in Thucydides’ narrative, it is only when self-regarding emotion tips too far toward one extreme that the force of reason appears to deteriorate (e.g. 2.21, 2.59f.,

128 For the idealizing rhetoric of the Funeral Oration, see Wohl 2002, 31f.
so, first, by shepherding the demos away from excessive levels of any particular selfish emotion, such as panic or over-confidence, Pericles sets up the right conditions for reason to remain preeminent in citizens’ minds. And, second, Pericles takes productive advantage of the power of emotion when he fosters civic-minded, public-oriented emotions that complement his public policy aims of inspiring other-regarding rational conclusions. These sorts of public-oriented emotions serve to bolster Pericles’ rational goals and are therefore an important part of his overarching goal of maintaining a consistent, stable state policy.

**Cleon’s Model of Emotional Sincerity**

Cleon is well known to us as a negative figure from Athenian politics, thanks to Aristophanes and Thucydides. He first appears in Thucydides’ narrative in the context of the debate over the fate of the Mytileneans. Thucydides preconditions our reading of Cleon’s words and actions from the moment of his introduction, with his first statement about Cleon being that he is the “most violent of citizens” and “by far the most influential with the demos at that time.” With such an opening, Thucydides constrains us as readers from the outset to view Cleon as a man of faction and of spontaneous, aggressive passion. Thucydides also notes that it was Cleon who, in the previous Assembly, had put forward the motion to put the Mytileneans to death. This initial portrait already presents a clear contrast with Pericles, who appears almost passionless in his disciplined commitment to reason and who is nowhere mentioned in league with any faction, but rather appeals to the city as a whole. I will first examine Cleon’s expression of his emotional model of sincerity, by which I mean that Cleon purports to believe that the most trustworthy, sincere speech is speech that derives from the immediacy of the emotional experience. I then propose to examine how this model of sincerity plays out in

---

129 For extreme ὀργή as overtaking rationality, see Allen 2000, 78.
130 3.36.6: ἰματότατος τῶν πολιτῶν τῷ τε δήμῳ παρὰ πολὺ ἐν τῷ τότε πιθανότατος...
131 Although Pericles seeks to recruit a passionate civic zeal in his audience, we do not feel his emotions; that is, he does not directly demonstrate or expose his emotional side the way that Cleon does.
Thucydides’ description of Cleon’s actions following his introduction into the narrative with his infamous speech on Mytilene.

Before launching into an analysis of how Cleon compares to Pericles in terms of sincerity, it is important to address the impact of status on the two men’s political options. As noted above, Cleon is introduced as a politician who came to power through his influence with a specific segment of the Athenian population, the demos. In contrast, Thucydides credits Pericles’ independence from any particular party in part to his rank or social position.\(^{132}\) Fifth-century Athens, though in many ways radically egalitarian, was still a society in which birth and social status carried a lot of weight. The fact that Pericles has a highly aristocratic pedigree, together with the wealth that that often entails, endows him with substantial social capital straight out of the gate, so to speak, affording him a certain amount of social and moral authority simply by virtue of his descent. He is also one of the last public figures to combine the official standing of a long-term generalship with highly effective speaking skills.\(^{133}\) Additionally, his wealth and social standing position Pericles to exercise an exit option that his less noble counterparts do not have, an exit option that Themistocles used before him, and Alcibiades chooses after him (see Thuc. 1.135-8, 6.17.3). That is, should Pericles’ popularity with the multitude wane and his influence evaporate with it, he has not lost all. Calling upon his aristocratic connections, he could relocate and continue to live a wealthy lifestyle among elites in other cities. One could say, on the other hand, that for someone like Cleon, when once the demos has turned on him, he has lost everything.\(^ {134}\) With far more limited options, then, Cleon has much more at stake in pleasing the demos, as opposed to Pericles’ relative freedom to offend; so, although Cleon appears to be a far less upstanding, sincere

\(^{132}\) 2.65.8: ἀξιώματι.

\(^{133}\) For important distinctions between Pericles and later public speakers, see Ober 1989, 91-3.

\(^{134}\) In this sense, it might seem as though Cleon instantiates the Periclean ideal of aligning his fate with the demos’. It is, however, a significant distinction that Cleon identifies himself with the demos rather than the polis as a whole.
politician than Pericles, it is important to note that Cleon and Pericles did not start out on a level playing field, socially speaking.\textsuperscript{135}

Thucydides invites us to consider Pericles and Cleon side by side, given their clear verbal echoes of each other: both contrast themselves to a fickle citizenry by claims of steadfastness in their own views (2.61.2, 3.38.1); and both admit that, although the empire may be a tyranny, there is no easy way to back out of it at this point (2.63.2, 3.37.2, 3.40.4).\textsuperscript{136} Further, in his eulogy of Pericles, Thucydides explicitly contrasts the leadership of Pericles with that of his inferior successors, of whom Cleon is the first mentioned. As an entré into their crucial differences, consider again the episode after the Spartans have ravaged Acharnae in which Pericles, because he sees that the Athenians “are at present angry and not thinking the best thoughts…and did not convene an Assembly nor any other meeting, lest, coming together, they might err in a decision made more under the sway of passion (ὀργῇ) than of judgment (γνώμῃ)” (2.22.1). Pericles, then, clearly views high emotion as detrimental to public decision-making. Contrast this view with Cleon’s expression, in the Mytilenean Debate, of disappointment that a debate has been called that is not inspired by passion (3.38.1):

\begin{quote}
Εγὼ μὲν οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς εἰμὶ τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ θαυμάζω μὲν τὸν προθέντων αὐτὸς περὶ Μυτιληναίων λέγειν καὶ χρόνου διστασάμην ἐμποιοῦσαν, ὃ ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἡδικητόν μᾶλλον (ὁ γὰρ παθὼν τῷ δράσαντι ἀμβλυτέρᾳ τῇ ὀργῇ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀμύνεσθαι δὲ τῷ παθεῖν ὅτι ἐγγυτάτω καθέσμενον ἀντίπαλον ὃν μᾶλλον τὴν τιμωρίαν ἀναλαμβάνει)…
\end{quote}

For my part, I am the same in my judgment and I wonder at those proposing to speak again concerning the Mytileneans and introducing a delay in time, which is more in the interest of those who have committed injustice (for the sufferer sets out against the perpetrator with a blunter anger, but vengeance, when it follows most closely upon the wrong, exacts retribution that corresponds most closely to the suffering).

\textsuperscript{135} Yunis (1996, 88) rightly notes that, “with regard to historical veracity, Thucydides’ account of Cleon is about as trustworthy as his account of Pericles.” For Thucydides’ biases in regard to Cleon, see Woodhead 1960.

\textsuperscript{136} For parallels between Pericles and Cleon, see Connor 1971, 120, 134; de Romilly 1963, 163-7.
Cleon was quite satisfied with the results of the previous day’s debate, which decided policy in the heat of anger (3.36.2). He plainly believes that the cold light of reason distorts people’s views, yielding enfeebled policy, and that decisions are well made under the spontaneous influence of anger. Cleon’s speech, as reproduced by Thucydides, represents Cleon’s attempt to reinvigorate the anger of the day before.\footnote{137}

Thucydides pointedly emphasizes an association between Cleon and passionate emotion from the moment we encounter him. Just as Pericles privileges and fosters reason through his speeches, Cleon favors spontaneous emotion, in the professed belief that acting on immediate emotion is more transparent and true to inner experience, as well as being better for the polis, than action and expression that has first passed through the artificial filter of reason.\footnote{138} As A. A. Andrewes notes, Cleon “appeals to unregulated emotion to carry his violent proposal,” relying on the average citizen’s “distrust of the clever.”\footnote{139} Further, James A. Andrews observes that Cleon seeks through his speech to heighten the unspoken emotions of his audience, commenting that “the pleasure afforded by Cleon’s speech involves gratification of desires largely emotional;”\footnote{140} elaborating, he charges that the rationale behind Cleon’s argument for severe punishment of the Mytileneans encodes “certain powerful emotional appeals”; an appeal to the demos’ fear of a general revolt against Athens’ rule and to raw anger.\footnote{141} Andrewes characterizes 3.37.3, where Cleon suggests that reversing the previous day’s measure stems from “cleverness combined with lack of discipline,”\footnote{142} as a “rejection of the use of reason.”\footnote{143}

Throughout his speech, Cleon fosters an array of emotional responses in his audience: most notably, he attempts to reawaken the Athenians’ strong impulse to revenge by inviting them to recall, and hence to re-experience, their feelings of suffering.

\footnote{137}{See also Mara 2001, 826.}
\footnote{138}{For the overlap between Cleon’s reasoning and the reasoning of the revolutionaries at Corcyra, cf. 3.82.4-5. Like Cleon, the revolutionaries present rational calculation as the antithesis of sincere loyalty to party: τὸλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη (3.82.4). During the stasis at Corcyra too immediacy of emotion signifies true loyalty. For the “savage moralizing” at Coreyla, see Ahrensdorf 2000.}
\footnote{139}{Andrewes 1962, 76.}
\footnote{140}{Andrews 2000, 47, n.8.}
\footnote{141}{ibid., 48. See also Mara 2001.}
\footnote{142}{Thuc. 3.37.3, δεξιότης μετὰ ἀχολασίας.}
\footnote{143}{Andrewes 1962, 72.}
and the desire for revenge clearly felt the day before (3.40.7). To this end, Cleon contends that Mytilene has wronged Athens more grievously than any state previously, particularly because of the high esteem in which Athens held her (3.39.3). He characterizes the revolt as an insulting abuse of Athens’ kindness, with Athens having granted Mytilene the unique privilege of internal independence and even of the possession of her own fleet of triremes. Under such circumstances, he argues, the revolt is more properly understood as premeditated and unwarranted aggression than rebellion against an oppressor (3.39.2). Cleon levels especially pointed accusations against the demos of Mytilene, lest the Athenians imagine them the innocent, passive party to this revolt and hence hesitate to punish them as severely as the oligarchic faction (3.39.6). With all of this, Cleon seeks to stir up the cooled passion for revenge, recalling for the Athenians the justification of the previous day’s resolution to punish the Mytileneans harshly and as a cohesive body.

In addition to the desire for revenge, Cleon makes an appeal to the Athenians’ unexpressed desire to extend their power; in other words, he incites and encourages the demos’ greed. He carefully observes that leniency will engender a cascade of revolts, which will endanger the empire’s material wealth (3.39.8, τά χρήματα) and, secondarily, Athenian lives (αἱ ψυχαί). Continuing to play on his audience’s fear of losing their wealth or of missing an opportunity to amass more, Cleon argues that, when their allies rebel, as they surely will when they see how lightly the Athenians punish the Mytileneans, even an Athenian success against them will be devastating to the city’s finances: “even if we succeed, recovering a ruined city, then for the future we will be deprived of the revenue, on account of which we are powerful” (3.39.8). Echoing Pericles’ allowance that the empire amounts to an unjust tyranny, Cleon threatens the people that behaving honorably (3.40.4, ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι) will cost them the steady

---

144 Thuc. 3.39.2: τί ἄλλο οὕτωι ἢ ἐπεβούλευον τε καὶ ἐπανέστησαν μᾶλλον ἢ ἀπέστησαν.
146 See Balot 2001, Ch.5.
147 3.39.8: καὶ τυχόντες μὲν πόλιν ἐφθαρμένην παραλαβόντες τῆς ἔπειτα προσόδου, δι’ Ἰησοῦν τοῦ λοιπον στεφθεθε...
148 For the rareness of this verb and its echo of Pericles at 2.63.2, see de Romilly 1963, 164.
income the empire garners. While Pericles uses the argument that abandoning the empire is unsafe in order to hearten the demos to continue in their adherence to a rational plan for the defense of the city (2.63), Cleon uses a similar argument to encourage greed.

More than the desire for revenge and greed, Cleon plays on his audience’s fear and suspicion: fear of rebellion and of losing their empire (3.39.7-8), fear and mistrust of their allies’ and fellow citizens’ motives (3.37.2), fear of being hoodwinked by sophistic arguments or of seeming to be unsophisticated (3.38.2f.), suspicion that politicians are being bribed to advise the Assembly the way they do (3.38.2), and the fear of looking weak in the Greek world (3.39.7, 3.40.7). Appeals to fear permeate Cleon’s speech.\textsuperscript{149} It is, however, the fear and mistrust that Cleon tries to foster of his political opponents that is most devastating for the city’s welfare.\textsuperscript{150} As Diodotus observes, the city is deprived of her advisers by fear (3.42.4),\textsuperscript{151} and certainly, with his McCarthy-esque suggestion that anyone who speaks in favor of leniency toward the Mytileneans has sold his loyalty to the demos, Cleon seeks to silence Diodotus before he even speaks.\textsuperscript{152} This preemptive slander puts Diodotus in the position of defending his concern for Athens’ best interest at the outset of his speech.

As part of his program preemptively to discredit anyone who speaks against him, Cleon manipulates his audience’s wariness of sophistic arguments, as if conditioning them to think that, because Diodotus will speak coherently, elegantly and rationally, he must be employing tricky sophistic arguments in order to hoodwink the audience with his intelligence. Cleon’s speech is explicitly anti-intellectual (3.37.3-5).\textsuperscript{153} He portrays intelligence as manipulative and dangerous, preferring the Spartan model of ignorant self-control to the Periclean model of reasoned debate, which he considers “cleverness

\textsuperscript{149} The Syracusan demagogue, Athenagoras, presents a similar figure, attempting to breed fear and suspicion among the citizens by characterizing his political opponents as would-be oligarchs (6.36-40). Cleon stops short of this particular rhetorical dishonesty, though by a narrow margin, accusing his rivals instead of taking bribes or attempting only to boost their own reputations for cleverness (3.317.4-5, 3.38.2).

\textsuperscript{150} For the central role of mistrust in Cleon’s democratic theory, see Mara 2001.

\textsuperscript{151} 3.42.4: ἢ τε πόλις οὐκ ὠφελεῖται ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε· φόβῳ γὰρ ἀποστρεῖται τῶν ἐνμβούλων.

\textsuperscript{152} Thuc. 3.38.2, and 3.40.1. See also Orwin 1984, 315.

combined with lack of discipline” (3.37.3). Here, of course, Cleon is himself being manipulative in referring to the previous day’s measure as though it were a long-standing law. Further, his professed preference for citizens who practice self-control (σωφροσύνη) does not square with his broader appeal to Athenians to condemn the Mytileneans under the influence of their anger. What I take to be his main target here, rather than the choice between self-control and recklessness, is actually intellectualism as compared to his own doctrine of ‘emotionalism’, i.e. the privileging of the emotional.  

Cleon briefly describes two types of politician, the humble, average fellow in awe of the laws and the intellectually gifted orator, who treats the political arena as a forum for showcasing his wit and for contending for personal glory with his opponents. The more cerebral politicians, he implies, are “induced by the thrill of cleverness and competition in intelligence to advise your multitude against their true opinion” (3.37.5, παρὰ δόξαν). With this, Cleon asserts that the intellectual elite politician is not truly interested in the good of the city or of the average citizen. This sort of orator, Cleon asserts, is insincere, because he presents himself as a public servant, but he is really selfishly motivated by concerns for his own reputation. Throughout his exceptionally anti-intellectual speech, Cleon makes the subtle case that the entire mode of behavior and speech of the intellectual elite is akin to a false construction, equating it with the cultivated erudition of the sophists.

Collapsing the distinction between the rational intelligence possessed to varying degrees by all men and this contrived sophistic intellectualism, Cleon encourages his audience to reject rationality altogether, while promoting the emotional experience as the more immediate, more transparent, and hence more sincere, experience than the intellectual. He calls upon the audience to return to their authentic emotional experience in recalling their anger against the Mytileneans. With this argument, Cleon brushes over the fact that the feelings of pity and compassion motivating the Athenians’ change of heart are also emotional responses. Cleon, explicitly recruiting the self-regarding

---

154 3.37.3: ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης...δεξιότης μετὰ ἀκολογίας.
155 See also Mara 2001, 825-7.
156 This is not to say that Cleon has worked out a developed, full-bodied theory that positive emotions are less authentic than negative emotions; Cleon, like many
emotions of anger and fear, has no personal use for an other-regarding emotion like pity. Cleon puts a spin on intelligence that implies for his audience that his opponent’s fancy rhetorical arguments are the real threat to his position. As Andrewes observes, Cleon’s attack on sophistry is “merely a way to put unreason over, using the plain man’s prejudice against fancy thinking to prevent any thinking at all.”

Cleon prefers an uneducated, tractable audience of citizens who do not think too much, and so his project, as Thucydides portrays it, is to fashion a political arena in which the passions are primary and rational discussion discouraged.

Cleon marshals exceedingly strong language in support of his argument for the authenticity of opinions formed under the influence of intense emotion, urging Athenians not to be traitors to themselves, presumably by forgetting their initial emotions and allowing cooler rationality (or other emotions) to hold sway. In saying this, Cleon contends that the rational component of the self is inherently inauthentic to the real self, the emotional self. In discussing Pericles as a model of the sincere leader, I look not only at his personal behavior as an indicator of his sincerity, but also at what qualities he felt it was important to foster in his fellow citizens. It is clear from the preceding discussion that Cleon coaches his audience in values that are diametrically opposed to Pericles’.

Pericles privileges rational intelligence, or γνώμη, inspiring calculated emotional responses in his audience toward the end of strengthening rational discipline and resolve. Cleon, by contrast, asks his fellow citizens “to become in your γνώμη as near as possible to your suffering,” seeking, in other words, to bring the quality of the rational faculty down to the level of the crude, self-involved passions. By linking them in this way, Cleon tries to bring γνώμη under the power of selfish ὀργή.

In addition to discrediting the intellectual elite, I mention above that Cleon appeals to his audience’s greed and vengefulness. He encourages the demos to indulge themselves in these desires, to imagine themselves as tyrants, able to act as they wish, contemporary politicians, simply finds that he gets more personal traction from marshalling the negative force behind fear and greed (see Balot 2001, 52).

Andrewes 1962, 75. Andrewes goes on to note that it is “not irrelevant that Perikles was friendly with the sophists of his day.”

For Cleon’s reliance on emotion, see also Ober 1998, 97, 103.

3.40.7: γενόμενοι δ᾽ ὃτι ἐγγύτατα τῇ γνώμῃ τοῦ πάσχειν...
“irresponsibly and without accountability.” While Pericles counsels rational self-discipline and moderation, Cleon caters to the appetites. Thucydides says that Cleon, foremost among the Athenians, spurred them in their desire to “grasp at something more,” a direct reversal of Pericles’ policy. Further, Farrar makes much of Pericles’ program of teaching the Athenians to be more rational by showing them to perceive things as they really are. In the Mytilenean Debate, Cleon pointedly abstains from teaching the demos how things really are, i.e. he elides the connection between the Mytileneans’ misfortune and the way the Athenians themselves act in the Greek world.

Cleon says of the Mytileneans that they “thought it fit to put might before right;” that their sudden good fortune made them over-confident; that “succeeding within reason is safer than success that exceeds expectation” and that “states more easily ward off misadventure than they maintain prosperity.” All of these statements could be applied to Athens, and Athenians could well afford to be self-reflective about the lesson Mytilene offers them, yet Cleon helps his audience miss this connection.

**Emotional Sincerity Put to the Test**

Following the Mytilenean Debate, we get mostly scattered snippets of material about Cleon and I propose using these to glean any further evidence we can about how he comes across as a political actor, in other words, to learn what sort of politician results from his model of emotionally derived sincerity. We next encounter Cleon at a moment in the narrative when Athens has the opportunity to conclude the war. Sparta, in its

---

160 Andrews 2000, 61; see also Balot 2001, Ch.5; Wohl 2002, 94.
161 4.21.2-3: τοῦ δὲ πλέονος ὁφέγοντο. μάλλον δὲ ἄυτοὺς ἐνήγε Κλέων ὁ Κλεαινέτου...
162 Farrar 1988, 158f.
163 3.39.3: ἵσχὺν αὔξωσαντες τοῦ δικαίου προθείνανω
164 3.39.4: εἴωθε δὲ τῶν πόλεων αἷς ἂν μᾶλλον καὶ διή ἐλαχίστου ἀπροσδόκητος εὐπραγία ἠλθη, ἐς ἰδίων τρέπειν.
165 3.39.4: τὰ δὲ πολλὰ κατὰ λόγον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὐτυχοῦντα ἀσφαλέστερα ἢ παρὰ δόξη, καὶ κακοπραγίαν ὡς εἰπείν ἰδίον ἀπωθοῦντα ἢ εὐδαιμονίαν διασώζοντα.
166 Ober (1998, 103) concurs that Cleon has no “coherent vision” to teach the Athenians, his speech being “based on nothing other than the assumed validity of short-term emotional responses.”
desperation over its men being blockaded on the island of Sphacteria, is willing to offer peace on terms that are favorable to the Athenians but that still preserve Spartan dignity (4.15f.). Embedded in the Spartan envoys’ speech before the Athenian Assembly is an echo of Cleon’s own critique of the Mytileneans, that too much good fortune engenders over-confidence.\(^\text{167}\) Despite the envoys’ attempt at warning the Athenians of the whims of fortune, however, the Athenian demos rejects the peace offer, taking for granted that the offer would remain on the table (4.21.2). Thucydides then asserts as their motivation in rejecting the offer that they wanted to “grasp at something more” (4.21.2), Thucydides’ indication of their unrestrained greed; and first to encourage the demos’ appetitiveness is Cleon (4.21.3). Cleon then tacks more “grasping” demands onto the peace proposal and, when the Spartans reasonably request to confer on this in a smaller group to save face, violently attacks them with accusations of harboring a dishonorable and dishonest purpose in not wishing to speak before the whole Assembly (4.21.3-22). Here, once again, Cleon presents himself as a hot-tempered, spontaneous and immoderate actor, one, moreover, who fosters these traits among the demos.

When the Athenians later regret not having accepted the Spartans’ peace offer and blame Cleon for advising against it, Cleon in turn slanders the messengers from Sphacteria, by saying that they are misrepresenting the situation there. Cleon and Theagenes are then appointed to go investigate and to see the situation for themselves. This backs Cleon into a corner, for he knows that the messengers are in fact telling the truth (4.27.3). Cleon, knowing that he would therefore either have to admit that the messengers told the truth or be exposed as a liar, yet again puts the blame off on someone else: he impugns his rival Nicias’ manhood and insinuates that had he, Cleon, been general, he would already have seized the Spartans on Sphacteria (4.27.4-5). At this point, Nicias calls Cleon’s bluff, resigning his command and offering that Cleon take it over (4.28.1, 3). Interestingly, when Cleon assumes that Nicias is himself bluffing, he pretends to be ready to lead the expedition. When, however, he sees that Nicias is serious, Cleon attempts to back out of the situation in a panic (4.28).\(^\text{168}\) The public pressure for

\(^{167}\) cf. 3.39.4 and 4.18.

\(^{168}\) He apparently does not believe himself to be an effective military leader, so his irresponsible posturing that he could do a better job than Nicias simply contributes to the
Cleon to take on this command is too great at this point, though, for him to wriggle out of it and he agrees to go amid boastful predictions of speedy success (4.28.4).

There are several interesting points to be gleaned from this episode concerning what sort of character Cleon proves to have. First, because Cleon’s actions are rooted in emotion and spontaneous passion, he behaves erratically, changing his tack as he reacts spontaneously to immediate circumstances: that is, he is consistently inconsistent. His behavior is entirely dictated by external events, meaning that he lacks an internal compass, such as Pericles’ broadly encompassing rational vision, to guide his actions. Rather, mired in the “now” of emotion, Cleon does not demonstrate long-term goals or accurate predictive abilities that might stabilize his behavior. When he perceives himself to be in disfavor, he consistently and, I might say, ruthlessly looks outward for someone else to attack in order to take the pressure off of himself. As we have seen, when the demos attributes their failure to accept the Spartan peace offer to Cleon, he in turn censures the messengers from Sphacteria, accusing them of lying about the situation there. Then, when the Athenians take him at his word and appoint him as a commissioner to go and investigate, he realizes that he is again in a bind and looks for someone else to blame, hitting upon Nicias. When Nicias offers Cleon his command and Cleon first realizes that he is serious, he attempts to withdraw his offer, his actions being here conditioned by his fear. Cleon is led by his emotions, causing him to make unpredictable, wild swings between extremes of behavior. Second, Cleon has no problem misrepresenting his thoughts and feelings to others, because he simply does at any given moment whatever his emotions dictate. His actions are not based upon a consistent, rationally worked out code of ethics. A secondary effect of this is that, because he misrepresents himself publicly, he makes the assumption that others are doing the same. For instance, making a logical assumption based on his own behavior, he believes that Nicias is only pretending in giving up his command (4.28.2).

overall picture of his reckless insincerity. Unexpectedly, Cleon does handle his command at Sphacteria remarkably effectively.

169 Cleon also exhibits a consistently belligerent mode of social interaction: when cornered, he lashes out at others.


171 4.28.2: δεδώξ ἡδη...
When Pericles finds himself in disfavor with the people, he consistently stands by his position, defending it and attempting to bring the people back around to his stance. By contrast, Cleon blows with the wind, adapting his position to each new changing moment. And, far from standing firm and upholding his judgments, his strategy lies in looking for someone else upon whom to throw blame. Cleon is a man of the moment with no clear and consistent policy. His habit of improvisation makes sense: consistency requires forethought and a rational idea of how the situation really is to dictate a steady, long-term course of action.

Cleon’s actions in Book 5 further show that he has no strong sense of himself and his purpose. His slavery to others’ opinions of him ultimately leads to his demise. He is camped out with his force at Amphipolis, awaiting reinforcements, when word reaches him that his army finds him weak and incompetent for keeping them so long inactive (5.7.2). In a rash, unconsidered reaction to this news, Cleon decides to break camp and to move out to a vantage allowing him a view of the area. He makes the excuse to his men that he is not delaying his attack on Amphipolis because he doubts being able to triumph without reinforcements, but rather that he wants to be in a position “to surround and storm the city” (5.7.3). Brasidas, however, being an excellent judge of how things really are and how he can use the situation to his advantage, puts in motion a two-pronged attack on Cleon’s force. Thucydides notes that Cleon at no point intended to fight, thinking at first that he had plenty of leisure to withdraw (5.7.5, 5.10.3). Later, his panic at the prospect of battle drives him to flee shamelessly, at which point he is overtaken and killed (5.10.4, 9).

Although as a politician there is an implicit assumption that one is committed to the best interest of the state, Cleon shows by his actions that foremost in Cleon’s mind is Cleon. Being ruled by the self-regarding passions, he is naturally highly self-absorbed. An army of soldiers like Cleon would have no chance, and a city comprised of citizens like him would dissolve into chaos. In his final assessment of Cleon, Thucydides alleges that, among the Athenians, Cleon was the principal obstacle to peace because he feared in a condition of peace that “behaving wickedly he would be more exposed and slandering
he would be less believed.” Thucydides’ ultimate judgment of Cleon’s brand of extreme insincerity. Without elaborating, Thucydides suggests that a healthy and stable polis is somehow better at ferreting out insincerity in its leaders. Politicians in Cleon’s mold thrive in unstable civic conditions and opportunistically parasitize their struggling polis. Cleon takes malicious advantage of the fact that conditions at Athens had not yet reached the lows of public trust seen at Corcyra. His policy positions are dictated by highly personal, self-involved concerns. Because of his willingness to obey the dictates of his emotions, he is partially responsible for the breakdown in deliberative debate at Athens following Pericles’ death. He slanders, lies, pretends and sows mistrust among his fellow citizens as it suits him. It is patently clear that, as a model of leadership and even of living together as a group, Cleon’s experiment in emotional sincerity fails utterly.

**Pericles’ and Cleon’s Models of Sincerity Reviewed**

Between Pericles and Cleon, we have two distinct models of sincerity: Pericles’ model of rational sincerity involves having a rationally worked out code of right action to guide and color one’s complementary emotional impulses. This model ensures a high degree of consistency over time and across contexts. While this model does not place an explicit emphasis on transparency or homogeneity, the ability to act in accordance with a controlled, rational plan obviates the need for such transparency and homogeneity, as there will be instead a high level of predictability – what the demand for sincerity for the most part seeks to guarantee. Further, Pericles makes a strong case that the most rational course of action would lead civic actors to place community interests ahead of their own private interests. This in turn suggests that, because the rational person sees it as being in his best interest to safeguard the interests of the state, it is reasonable to trust that this

---

172 5.16.1: καταφανέστερος νομίζων ἂν εἶναι κακουργῶν καὶ ἀπιστότερος διαβάλλων…

173 For Cleon’s hypocrisy, see Wohl 2002, 97.
rational figure is acting out of civic-minded motivations, without requiring that he be homogeneous or transparent.\textsuperscript{174}

Cleon’s model of emotional sincerity equates reason and rational argument with contrived ‘cleverness’. Cleon suggests in his speeches that the contrivance of intelligence directs individuals to be inauthentic, to conceal or even to contradict their true emotional impulses. He favors acting with immediacy, leaving no time for rationality to mediate genuine emotional dictates. On first glance, acting in accordance with spontaneous emotional urges would appear to yield complete transparency; yet, as we see from Cleon’s example, obeying the whims of passion can also lead to the self-serving manipulation of others in order to attain one’s desire. Having no rationally derived code of right action disciplining him with the thought of how, given the big picture, he ought to treat his fellows justly in order to obtain just treatment for himself, Cleon does not hesitate when it comes to lying, manipulating and pretending to believe something he does not. Because Cleon’s model of sincerity is emotion-driven, it is a subjective model, meaning that everything is only labeled as right or wrong as it affects him, as it contributes to the satisfaction of his whims. Cleon’s model of sincerity, in fact, turns out to look more like what we would define as its opposite, insincerity.

Both Pericles and Cleon make the claim “I am the same man,” but they mean very different things by this statement. Thucydides, with his characterization of these two figures in his narrative, is exploring two discrete approaches to the constitution of the self. When Pericles says “I,” he is referring to the part of his self that is predictable and disciplined by reason. He identifies his self with his rational faculties. When Cleon says “I,” he refers to the spontaneous immediacy of his subjective experience, which he values as primary and authentic. While he is consistently vengeful and passion-driven with respect to the punishment of the Mytileneans, there is no guarantee in his model that his emotions will lead him to consistent policy views from day to day. And, as we see from

\textsuperscript{174} We use criteria like transparency and homogeneity as indicators of sincerity; but the primary aim of assessing others’ sincerity is getting at how we can predict that another person will be loyal in a crunch; that he will honor his commitments; and that the policies he advises really are, as he says they are, motivated by a concern for the common interest. Where we find in another a high degree of consistency and a strong belief that he is committed to the common interest, there can be less weight placed on the more demanding and intrusive criteria of transparency and homogeneity.
his behavior, he is far less predictable than Pericles, always pursuing the policy that
conforms to his current selfish conception of his best interests.

**Sincerity Requirements for Leaders vs. Citizens**

In conclusion, let us reconsider Pericles’ model of sincerity in some of its more
subtle aspects. Pericles’ model, being more rationally worked out than Cleon’s, is far
more complex and refined, reserving different roles for citizens and public speakers, and
reserving accordingly disparate burdens of sincerity for different actors, depending on
their roles. Ober touches on the higher standard of foresight for leaders, based on
Diodotus’ statement that “it is necessary concerning such great matters and in such a case
that we (rhetors) see fit to give some advice, thinking further ahead than you who
consider only briefly” (3.43.4).\(^{175}\)

Certainly Pericles’ level of foresight, intelligence and big-picture thinking is
higher than that attainable by the average Athenian, due largely to innate talent. Reason
leads him to a personal philosophy of public-mindedness. As a public speaker and
advisor, in a role requiring trustworthiness, he must be above reproach, harboring no
private motivations that could potentially conflict with his carrying out of the demos’ best
interest (see e.g. 2.13.1).\(^{176}\) Pericles, in fact, presents himself in the public sphere as
someone whose self is so dominated by rationality as to harbor no self-regarding passions
at all. Because of his perceptive grasp of human nature, Pericles knows that most people
have an inability to maintain control over their passions under duress (1.140.1, 2.61.2-3).
The temptation to further one’s own personal ends is one that every citizen faces; but
Pericles’ speeches suggest that he sets a higher bar for political speakers, as the agents
most responsible for setting and shaping policy. The effective leader’s personality,
therefore, must be different in quality from an average citizen’s. While others are able to

---

\(^{175}\) Ober 1998, 99. Yunis (1996, 74-5) also touches briefly on the idea of a political
division of labor between rhetors and citizens. 3.43.4: χρὴ δὲ πρὸς τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ἐν
τῷ τοιῷδε ἄξιον τι ἡμᾶς περαιτέρω προνοοῦντας λέγειν ύμῶν τῶν δι’ ὀλίγου
οὐκοπούντων…

\(^{176}\) See Farrar 1988, 175: “Thucydides’ language emphasizes the importance of an
exclusively ‘public’ attitude on the part of a democratic leader.”
access an other-regarding γνώμη and the complementary emotional quality only in the best of times, a leader’s γνώμη must remain centered on the community well-being in the worst of times as well. His sincerity — in the sense of consistency, patriotism, incorruptibility, and accountability — must run deeper and be more resilient to misfortune than the average citizen’s.

In the leader’s role, there is no room for self-interest; yet Pericles does not hold the citizenry to the same standard, nor could he reasonably. Discussing the nature of civic obligation most especially in the Funeral Oration, Pericles outlines minimal sincerity requirements for the average citizen. At 2.42.3, Pericles articulates the remarkable argument that “even for those who are worse in other respects it is just that their courage in battle on behalf of their country be set above all else; for they, concealing baseness with nobility, have publicly been of greater service than they have done harm by their private actions.”[177] Pericles sounds a similar note with his normative description of Athens as a city in which citizens are tolerant of each other’s individual modes of conducting their private lives (2.37.2; see also 3.37.2),[178] implying a distinct private sphere that is shielded from scrutiny.[179] Suggesting that it is only legitimate to scrutinize a fellow citizen on the basis of his public, political behavior, Pericles makes an argument for limiting the criteria by which to judge a fellow citizen’s sincerity that goes against the cultural grain. The formulation of good deeds concealing bad deeds argues against the criteria of transparency and homogeneity in judging the sincerity of one’s fellow citizens. The individual in his role as a citizen and in his role as a private person, Pericles

---

[177] 2.42.3: καὶ γὰρ τοῖς τάλλα χείροις δίκαιοιν τὴν ἐς τοὺς πολέμους ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος ἀνδραγαθίαν προστίθεσθαι: ἁγαθῷ γὰρ κακὸν ἀφανίσαντες κοινῶς μᾶλλον ὀφέλησαν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων ἔβλαψαν.

[178] 2.37.2: ἑλευθερῶς δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ’ ἡμέρας ἐπιθετευμάτων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δὲ δι’ ὀργῆς τὸν πέλας, εἰ καθ’ ἱδονὴν τὶ δρᾶ, ἐχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀξίμιους μὲν, λυπηρὰς δὲ τῇ ὁψει ἀχθηδόνας προστίθεμενοι. (“We govern ourselves freely in regard to state affairs and we are free too from suspicion toward each other in our daily pursuits, not harboring anger toward our neighbor if he does whatever he likes, nor displaying those irritating looks that, though harmless, are offensive.”) To Cleon’s mind, this openness and trust is more a fault than a credit to Athenian political culture.

[179] For the compelling argument that Athenian democracy promoted certain quasi-rights, such as the negative liberty described here by Pericles, see Ober 2005, Ch. 5. See also Wallace 1994.
suggests, must be conceptually separate. Following immediately upon the heels of these idealizing sentiments, however, with Pericles acknowledging the temptation of money for rich and poor alike (2.42.4), the truth resurfaces that the conditions of an individual’s private life can and do impact his service in the public sphere (2.42.4). Further, being civic-minded is a direct result of one’s internal motivations, personal inclinations and moral leanings. In the model of citizenship articulated in the Funeral Oration, though, a man must be judged only on the quality of his observable actions, with speculation as to the quality of his motivations being dismissed from legitimate consideration.

The fiction of this bright, clear line delineating the public and private spheres complements Pericles’ project of reifying the city of Athens as a moral entity: he encourages his fellow citizens that they must “every day actively contemplate the power of the city and become her lovers” (2.43.1). With these words and generally throughout the Funeral Oration, Pericles constructs an entity toward which citizens should feel a moral obligation. Here Athens is a lover; elsewhere, the source of opportunity and prosperity for citizens (2.60.2-4). By invoking the city in this way, Pericles leaves no room for citizens to harbor divided loyalties toward Athens. Just as the Funeral Oration in general pushes back from eulogizing the particular citizens who died to eulogizing the state that produced them (2.35.1, 2.42.1-2, 2.43.1), this illusion Pericles creates of a fetishized city serves to push back the realm of sincerity from the depths of the soul to the state level.180 His rhetoric places the burden of sincerity on the city itself in a sense: Athens’ laws treat all citizens equally and generate impartial decisions, always consistent over time (2.37.1). Pericles also portrays Athens as an unchanging entity that remains in some crucial sense the same city down through the generations, only changing in that its power and greatness grow with each successive generation (2.36). In Pericles’ vision, Athens becomes deity-like for her citizens, overwhelming and powerful. It is this illusion that creates the ideological space for Pericles to lessen the burden of sincerity for average citizens. By creating an entity that is consistent and trustworthy by means that are

180 This seems to me to run opposite to Plato’s agenda in the Republic: that is, Plato analogizes the individual soul to the state for the purposes of exaggerating and examining the workings of the individual self. Pericles, in contrast, proposes an outright substitution of trust in the constancy and consistency of the state for any probing into the internality of others’ selves.
seemingly independent of the quality of its citizens, Pericles tries to ease the pressure on individual citizens to police the civic body for “counterfeit” citizens, or citizens whose motives are suspect.

In the Funeral Oration, then, Pericles explicitly makes a case for holding citizens to a thinner model of sincerity than the model to which he feels a leader must adhere. He delineates the duties of the citizen leniently, allowing private citizens a freer range of behavior than politicians in their personal lives, asking at minimum that they be unimpeachably civic-minded in their love of Athens, their willingness to die for the polis in battle, and their participation in public affairs. Pericles also accepts that, although leaders should remain unwaveringly focused on the public interest, average citizens will inevitably be concerned with their private interests. This is not of concern so long as private gain is not pursued at the expense of the public good. In general, Pericles holds average Athenians to a lower standard with respect to self-absorption and ignorance. It is Pericles’ long-view kind of intelligence that allows him to know the proper course of action and to adhere to it over time. Acknowledging that not everyone possesses this kind of γνώμη, Pericles is content that, if citizens can be fickle and labile, they are at least open to persuasion by him; and he aims nevertheless to encourage them in the direction of becoming more objective and rational, as well as to influence them in adopting ever greater civic pride and a more enthusiastic love for their city, with a view toward becoming more predictable politically.

With Pericles’ two different models of sincerity, for leaders and for average citizens, the requirements for sincerity shift. With his insistence on a private sphere for citizens that is free of judgment by one’s compatriots, Pericles removes the burden of transparency and homogeneity for private citizens. They can be whatever they want to be in their private lives, so long as they are dutiful in their public roles as citizens. He hopes through his instruction that average citizens will understand that their interests are directly linked to the flourishing of the polis at large. His model for private citizens, then, emphasizes public consistency and a shared identity of interests as the primary components of civic sincerity. As a politician, of course, Pericles holds himself to much
thicker model of sincerity, demonstrating his own homogeneity of character and transparency of motivation.\textsuperscript{181}

In sum, then, both Pericles and Cleon make explicit claims to sincerity. Thucydides makes it clear, however, that Pericles intends to be sincere to the polis as a whole, while Cleon owes his loyalty to the demos. Through the lesson of his narrative, Thucydides reveals that the boundaries of sincerity are slippery: it is acceptable to employ deception with outsiders to the political community, especially during a war (e.g. 1.90-1, 1.137.4, 7.73); but, as a city in war becomes internally fragmented into interest groups, rival internal groups come to be treated with the same hostility as external enemies of war, rendering internal insincerity morally palatable where before it was not. Thucydides insists that it is only sincerity toward the political group as a whole that really constitutes sincerity. When individuals are sincere only at the level of party, this introduces deception into domestic politics and sets in motion the destruction of city, party and individual alike. Pericles has it right, according to Thucydides: the only rational course is to align personal interest with the interests of the polis as a whole.

\textsuperscript{181} See e.g. 2.13.1, 2.60.5, and discussion of Pericles’ minimization of a private life above.
Sophocles’ Ajax: The Role of Sophrosune in Being a Sincere Person

As I discuss in the previous chapter, Thucydides in his History presents us with two competing models of sincerity in the characters of Pericles and Cleon, with both men making explicit claims to sincerity. Pericles’ model relies on his consistency, in that he is always the same person over time and across social contexts; while Cleon makes claims to transparency, being a proponent of spontaneously and immediately giving vent to one’s emotional impulses. The first model of sincerity, Pericles’, relies upon self-discipline and a rationally worked out set of principles to which one reliably adheres. The second, Cleon’s, is rather more a personality type, one that is whimsical and putatively transparent, but lacking in personal discipline. Although in our common parlance transparency is an important part of sincerity, Cleon’s emotionally driven model of sincerity in practice leads to erratic and unreliable behavior, as we see in Thucydides’ narrative, behavior that we could all agree, upon seeing it, fails to meet our intuitive definition of sincerity. In this chapter, I will elaborate on these distinctions, discussing how the rational insights of sophrosune contribute to sincerity of self. In Sophocles’ Ajax, Ajax is utterly overmastered by his wild emotions of anger and vengefulness after losing the contest for the arms of Achilles. Throughout the play, Sophocles consistently characterizes Ajax as a self-absorbed man, who accepts kindness and services from his philoi without showing reciprocal favor toward them. He lacks the sophrosune that enables a person to accept and act in accordance with his position in the social and divine orders and that encourages one to adhere to the norms of reciprocity thought to structure those orders. Further, he lacks the personal discipline that serves both to stabilize one’s character over time while also preventing an unreasonable rigidity. Through the Ajax, Sophocles investigates the manner in which sophrosune underwrites sincerity between friends and between citizens.

This reading of Ajax’ character as self-indulgent may seem jarring given his well-known characterization in the mythic tradition. For instance, when asked about him by Priam in the teichoscopia scene in the Iliad, Helen replies, “That is enormous Ajax, the
bulwark of the Achaeans” (Il. 3.228-9).¹ This familiar epithet as the ‘bulwark of the Achaeans’ implies that Ajax is the very essence of stability, reliability and constancy. In the mythological tradition, though, there is room for multiple interpretations and characterizations of both of the central figures of this play, Ajax and Odysseus. Sophocles is here deemphasizing one aspect of Ajax’ traditional characterization, his reliability, and selecting out and exaggerating another, his reputation for having a high temper and a passionate nature.² Within Ajax’ temperament, Sophocles portrays the hero’s passionate nature as interfering with his quality of reliability, as he rejects responsibility for his philoi, who range from the chorus of sailors, to his spear-bride Tecmessa and his son Eurysaces, his parents and his brother Teucer. Just as the character of Ajax departs in many ways from the character we might expect given his Iliadic depiction, so too does Sophocles’ portrayal of Odysseus hold some surprises for this play’s audience.

Sophocles further uses the platform of this play to investigate how the heroic ethos, with its self-absorbed emphasis on the hero’s pursuit of glory and prizes – an ethos so admired not only within the frame of the Iliad, but even within democratic Athens – in fact conflicts with the cooperative ideology of the democracy. This play anachronistically imports Ajax into a setting that turns out to be structured by the democratic institutions of gathering to deliberate and vote, by the democratic birth norms and generally by the democracy’s other-regarding political and social norms, only to dramatize the inevitable clash between ethoi.³ It is important to note that, while Ajax adheres consistently to his heroic ethos and his actions make sense in light of it, it is the juxtaposition of his ethos with the democratic ethos that gives a negative coloring to Ajax’ actions (and, by implication, to the heroic ethos itself). I do not intend to suggest that Sophocles presents this work as a judgment against Ajax, but rather that he uses this myth to explore and highlight some important features of democratic ideology. For my purposes, it is significant that, among these themes, Sophocles touches upon how Ajax’ actions might be judged according to the democratic emphasis on sincerity and its specific formulation.

¹ Il. 3.229: οὗτος δ’ Αἴας ἐστὶ πελώριος, ἕρκος Ἀχαϊών.
² See Winnington-Ingram (1980, Ch. 2) for another discussion of the way in which Sophocles uses Iliadic allusion in this play to point up Ajax’ shortcomings.
In this chapter, I first evaluate Ajax’ character generally, establishing his selfishness and self-absorption as it negatively impacts his ability to function as a *philos* and community member. He famously deceives his *philoi* in the well-known lying speech (or *Trugrede*) and makes wild, emotionally driven turnabouts in his allegiance, from a Greek ally to the Greek army’s worst enemy (1052-4). What’s more, by refusing to acknowledge that he owes loyalty to anyone else, including those who have been abidingly loyal to him, Ajax breaks an implicit agreement to return like for like, i.e. to show reciprocity, a foundational moral value in Greek society. After considering the connection between reciprocity and *sophrosune*, in its sense of perceiving where one fits into the social and divine orders, I go on to investigate the importance of *sophrosune* in this play in greater depth. Addressing the social and historical context of the term, I situate the *Ajax* within that story, assessing Ajax himself and his distinct and express lack of *sophrosune*. I assess how this personal failing leads Ajax to be not only a bad friend, but also a bad citizen. I further explore the *sophrosune* of several other major characters and/or their views on this virtue, including Teucer, the Atreidae, Athena, and Odysseus.

Odysseus I consider in depth, as a foil to Ajax with as much to offer on the subject of *sophrosune* and its role in sincerity as Ajax himself, looking particularly at Odysseus’ flexibility. I contend that Odysseus’ sophisticated conception of *sophrosune*, allowing for controlled flexibility, contributes to his depiction in this play as not only a sincere friend, but also as the ideal model of the sincere, democratic citizen. Odysseus, because of the encompassing perspective his *sophrosune* provides, puts a greater emphasis on group cohesion and the welfare of the entire community than any other character in the play, and presents a reasoned argument for a limitation on the pursuit of narrow self-interest. Turning to Ajax once again, I suggest that Ajax takes no personal responsibility for group well-being, pursuing his self-interest to the detriment of his community. Lastly, I think through how this play, with its portrait of a sincere, yet

---

4 For the abundance of shifting relationships within this play, see Knox 1961, 10. The play’s complexity accommodates at once arguments for Ajax’ instability and disloyalty and an argument for his justification for such a shift in allegiance due to his treatment at the hands of the Atreidae. Yet, while Ajax was certainly slighted by the Atreidae, he carries his response too far by any account, heroic or democratic.

5 For the meaning of *sophrosune* in this play, see Knox 1961, 17.
flexible, character, deals with what it takes under real-life circumstances to remain sincere by downplaying the ideological emphasis on consistency that pervades the rhetoric on sincerity.

**Consistently Inconsistent: Ajax’ Passionate Nature**

Sophocles chooses to set the opening of the play’s action after the contest for Achilles’ arms and immediately following Ajax’ wild night raid, on which he slaughters some of the cattle - together with their herdsmen - belonging collectively to the Greek army. He does this under a delusion caused by Athena that the cattle are instead the Greek generals and Odysseus (42-65, 447-53). In an opening exchange with her favorite, Odysseus, Athena herself reveals the events of the previous night as well as her role in them as the source of Ajax’ madness (1-133). When we meet Ajax, he is still laboring under the misconception that he is torturing Odysseus (91-117). Soon thereafter recovering his wits, a significant portion of the first two-thirds of the play deals with Ajax’ extremes of distress over his loss of honor and shows Ajax agitatedly brooding over what course of action he can take to best restore his own sense of self-worth, as well as his prestige before his father. Despite the earnest attempt of his spear-bride Tecmessa to dissuade him (485-524), Ajax settles on suicide as the only option, going off on his own to kill himself with the spear he got from Hector, his enemy guest-friend. The last third of the play is taken up with a double *agōn*, with Ajax’ brother, Teucer, contending first with Menelaus, then with Agamemnon, in an attempt to secure burial for Ajax’ body. This contentious issue is resolved only by Odysseus’ timely intervention, with Odysseus employing skill in diplomacy and relying on the strength of his friendship with Agamemnon to win sanction for the burial.

At his first appearance, Ajax is being “hunted” by Odysseus (2, θηρώμενον; 20, ἱχνεύω), casting Ajax not only as his enemy, but also as an animal, Odysseus’ prey. Ajax has, just prior to the events of the play, undergone a radical break in his personality, from a high-tempered young man to a raging madman. In such a wild state, it is fitting that Ajax should be characterized as a wild animal in the opening lines, since the Greeks
conceive of both madmen and animals as lacking in rationality or self-control.\textsuperscript{6} The Ajax of this play is immediately behaving in a way that is divergent from his reputation as a man of brash courage, a hero who reacts to life spontaneously and openly. Here, instead, he has just the previous night launched a sneaky attack against the Greek generals, more in the mode of Odysseus (47, νύκτωρ, δόλιος).\textsuperscript{7} Further, Ajax is doing something inconceivable, or believes that he is, by binding, torturing and killing what he thinks are free, aristocratic Greeks (51-65). Odysseus, seeing Ajax’ madness, is afraid of him, even with the goddess Athena standing by his side (74-88). Although Athena rebukes Odysseus for being a coward (75), asking him, “was he not before a man?” (77), it is not hard to understand Odysseus’ discomfort – there is something radically different and unsettling about Ajax now. In his raging state of mind, Ajax is no longer predictable or consistent with the person he was previously. He is now an utterly unknown quantity. The intensity of his rage, demonstrating his utter disinterest in or incapacity for self-discipline, together with his break from the proper perception of reality, is inherently unnerving for Odysseus to witness. Ajax’ rage has swollen out of appropriate bounds and out of his own control, fundamentally changing who he is.\textsuperscript{8}

Even after Ajax recovers from his madness, Tecmessa comments that he is not the same person as he was before this episode, adducing his weeping and disconsolate lamenting, actions that he had previously always scorned as befitting a base man (317-20). In addition to the blow to his reputation that the events of the previous night will cause, Ajax has changed internally, speaking words hitherto foreign to his heroic ethos (410-1). The chorus notes as well that Ajax is no longer “fixed in his habitual temperament, but he stands outside of it” (639-40).\textsuperscript{9} Because of his uncharacteristic actions and humiliation, Ajax feels that something essential to his self-definition has

\textsuperscript{6} For Ajax’ passion and lack of reason, see Winnington-Ingram 1980, 43-4.
\textsuperscript{7} See also Hesk 2003, 75. For the pointed contrast with the Iliadic Ajax, see Il. 17.645-7; and Winnington-Ingram 1980, 15f.
\textsuperscript{8} For the extremes in the Sophoclean hero’s temperament, see Knox 1966, Ch. 1.
\textsuperscript{9} 639-40: οὐκέτι συντρόφος/ ὀργαῖς ἐμπεδος, ἀλλ’ ἐκτὸς ὀμμέλει. I take all Ajax passages from Stanford’s 1963 text.
changed forever, making him no longer “worthy of looking upon either the race of the
gods or of ephemeral man to any profit” (397-400).

Because he feels betrayed by his putative friends in their awarding of the arms of
Achilles to Odysseus instead of to him, Ajax has also recently experienced a marked shift
in his allegiance toward his erstwhile allies, the Atreidae, Odysseus and the Greek army
as a whole. Selfishly motivated by his own pride and sense of honor, Ajax is not able to
find a middle ground in his reaction to the contest for Achilles’ arms. Not only does he
show himself unwilling to try to maintain stable friendships with allies to whom his oath
bound him (1113), but he even goes so far as to respond to their perceived slight of his
honor by torturing and killing those he now considers enemies. This extreme, self-
involved reaction to a perceived slight is emblematic of Ajax’ personality in this play.
With his more intimate philoi, the chorus, his wife Tecmessa and son Eurysaces, Ajax
repeatedly accepts the benefits of their stable adherence to the principles of sincere
friendship (350), expecting and enjoying their unwavering loyalty to him, while
demonstrating little to no awareness or concern for the troubles he has brought upon
them.

Immediately upon learning the results of the judgment for Achilles’ arms, Ajax
becomes consumed with rage at not having won the arms himself. This is prior to his
madness, so it cannot be argued that either madness or Athena is responsible for Ajax’
conversion to a wild, raging beast. He was already disposed to be this person. The
madness is limited to his confused perception; that is, Athena occluded his vision,
making him believe that he was torturing and killing the Atreidae and Odysseus, when he
was in fact only slaughtering cattle (42-65, 447-53). In this sense, of having a temporarily
flawed perception of reality, Ajax is a changed man and it is his acute shame following
this madness that is responsible for the behavioral alterations commented upon by his
philoi. His sneaky, murderous thoughts and the over-intensity of his emotional response,

10 397-400: οὔτε γὰρ θεῶν γένος/ οὔθ᾽ ἀμέριων ἔτʼ ἄξιος/ βλέπειν τιν᾽ εἰς ὀνησιν ἀνθρώπων.
11 See Ajax 351, 367, e.g., where his focus is solely on himself and his own woes.
12 For Ajax’ ‘bad behavior’ as long-standing, see Knox 1961, 7. For the central question
of the state of Ajax’ mind, see Winnington-Ingram 1980, Ch. 2.
however, were purely his own.\textsuperscript{13} Ajax’ explicit scorn for \textit{sophrosune}, or self-discipline, throughout the play shows a conscious propensity for letting his emotions run their course unchecked. His personal ethos places no value upon being a consistent, predictable, stable personality.

I have just been arguing that Ajax underwent a significant change in his personality prior to the events of this play. But has he in fact undergone a transformation, or was he always the same man: erratic, deeply self-involved, ruled by his passions and therefore a highly unstable personality? We are presented with two conflicting accounts on this score: Athena’s brief general comments on Ajax’ former greatness (118-20) and the messenger’s narration of Calchas’ assessment of Ajax’ prior hot temper and arrogance (762-77, note that Calchas depicts Ajax as intemperate both before leaving for Troy and at Troy).

I mention above that Sophocles takes the characteristics for which Ajax is traditionally known and emphasizes his passionate, hotheaded nature while downplaying his famous reliability as the ‘bulwark of the Achaeans’. But, although one of the dominant features of Ajax’ depiction here is his heroic selfishness, Sophocles does not let us forget about Ajax’ Iliadic willingness to sacrifice himself in defense of the Greek army and his comrades. Though here Ajax scorns \textit{sophrosune} and the changes wrought by time, Athena describes him as formerly the very epitome of \textit{sophrosune}, timeliness, and rational intelligence: “What man was ever found to have more forethought than this man, or to be better at doing the right thing at the right time?”\textsuperscript{14} Further, the chorus and Teucer, both committed to entirely charitable views of Ajax’ actions, repeatedly stress his greatness and selfless service to his community (158-71, 616-20, 1266-88, 1338-41, 1378-80).

Charles Segal charts Ajax’ shift from cooperative community protector to self-involved destroyer of others through the recurring and contrasting images of Ajax’ shield and sword.\textsuperscript{15} In epic, Ajax is strongly identified in his role as a defender with his enormous, indestructible shield, made from seven hides (575-6), to the extent that his

\textsuperscript{13} For Athena’s limited role in Ajax’ insanity, see Knox 1961, 5; Rose 1995, 66.
\textsuperscript{14} 119-20: τούτου τίς ἰν σοι τάνδρος ἢ προνοοστέρος/ ἢ δρόν ἀμείνων ἡμέρηθη τὰ καίμια;
\textsuperscript{15} Segal 1999, 116-8.
son, Eurysaces, is named for his “broad shield” (574-5). Odysseus, in his opening lines, names Ajax by his epic role: Ajax the shield-bearer (19, Αἴαντι τῷ σακεσφόρῳ). His association with this shield signals Ajax’ involvement in his community. Though, as Ajax seeks in this play to remove himself from all social equations, his focus is less on his shield (the object that involves him with others) than it is obsessed with his sword and associated imagery. Kirkwood observes, “the sword comes gradually and ominously into greater and greater prominence.” Sword and iron imagery runs throughout the play and is well detailed by Segal, so I will mention only the high points: our first images of Ajax are of his “head and sword-killing hands dripping with sweat” (10, ξιφοκτόνους) and of him “alone, leaping across the plain with freshly dripping sword” (29-30, σὺν νεορράντῳ ξίφει). Just as a shield implies the presence of others who need protecting, the wielding of his sword is characterized as lonely (esp. 29, 815f., 1283-4). And, of course, it is by the use of his sword, a gift from his enemy, Hector, that he successfully and finally rejects all social ties, deleting himself “as a link between the generations”. This selfish version of Ajax will be buried with all of his arms, except his shield (572-7, 1408). I suspect that, rather than Ajax’ undergoing a significant shift in his personality from an earlier, more cooperative self to his current self-centered, competitive self, we are presented in this play with two layered versions of Ajax, the Iliadic and the Sophoclean. Whereas the Iliadic Ajax is blunt, reliable, courageous, the Sophoclean Ajax is unclear, unreliable and sneaky.

Ajax’ self-involvement with his emotions creates a fundamental instability in his language. The hero’s characteristic silence does not serve him well in this context of conflict. Segal notes how Ajax “vacillates between the extremes of talking big and utter silence.” In his madness, he speaks words not his own, words inspired by the daimon (243-4). Ajax’ speech is marked in this play by its inconsistency: he says “such things

---

16 For the shield and sword themes, see also Stanford 1963, 276-8; and Kirkwood 1994, 222-3.
17 Kirkwood 1994, 222.
18 Segal 1999, 137.
19 ibid., 134.
20 243-4: κακὰ δεννάζων ὅμμαθ’, ἄ διαμοι/ κοὐδεῖς ἄνδρῶν ἐδίδαξεν (“Reviling them (the cattle) with evil words, which a daimon and no one of men had taught him”).
as he would never have dared speak before” (410-11). Segal convincingly argues that Ajax’ speech is not for the purpose of communicating at all. He is utterly bound up with himself, his extremes of feeling and his desperate search for a solution to his dishonor. Though his famous speech does certainly enact a deception (see, e.g., 807-8), it makes most sense that Ajax does not intend to deceive exactly, but that he simply speaks for his own benefit, that the words are “addressed to Ajax’ own soul.” Speech for Ajax is not aimed at the translation of himself to others; that is of no interest to him. The problem is that those around him assume that he speaks, as they do, in order to convey to an external audience his internal thoughts and experiences and his auditors hold him to such a standard of interpretation (693-718, 807). In this case, Ajax’ insincerity of speech and self-representation does not necessarily stem from a sneaky, deceitful motivation, but from a unilateral and unexpressed decision to opt out of the regime of social communication entirely. Yet, then again, there are elements of this speech that defy such a generous interpretation.

Reciprocity As Consistency Over Time

Ajax’ butchering of the cattle brings disgrace and trouble upon his philoi as well as upon himself (174, 200, 227, 252, 255), yet he only ever recognizes his own personal shame. Although his subordinate philoi repeatedly emphasize their dependence on him (136-40, 158-61, 200, 492-503, 514-20, 615, 900-2, 1211-16), Ajax only once, and then with questionable sincerity, acknowledges that he might have some responsibility towards others, when he shows pity for abandoning his wife and son among enemies within his deception speech (652-3). The chorus, highly solicitous of Ajax throughout the play, consistently links its interests with Ajax’. Despite his humiliation, they

---

21 410-11: τοιάδ' ἀνδρα χρήσιμον/ φωνεῖν, ἃ πρόοσθεν οὕτως οὐ̣χ ἐτλη ποτ’ ἄν.
22 Segal 1999, 133-38.
23 ibid., 133. This is Knox’ view as well: 1961, 10-3.
24 Blundell 1989, 73.
25 Although in the earlier speech to his son, he exhibits a tender demeanor toward Eurysaces, Ajax does not show any awareness that he might appropriately be held accountable for abandoning his family. He leaves all responsibility for them to his brother, Teucer.
repeatedly give him a positive characterization (e.g. 170-1). As Mary Whitlock Blundell points out, Ajax rarely refers to another as *philos* (349f., 406), though his subordinates repeatedly refer to themselves as his *philoi* (330, 483, 615, 910, 917, 920, 1413) and to him as a *philos* (941, 977, 996, 1015). It is noteworthy that the occasions on which Ajax refers to the chorus of sailors as his *philoi* arise when he is either rejoicing in their loyalty to him or complaining to them of his own situation. That is, he only acknowledges his *philoi* as such when they are of use to him.

Tecmessa too remains steadfastly loyal and devoted to Ajax throughout the play, a fact that is even more remarkable than the chorus’ unswerving allegiance, as Ajax is the cause of much grief for her. Having destroyed her fatherland (515), it was Ajax who was also most responsible for her enslavement (490, σῇ μᾶλιστα χειρί) after a privileged upbringing in the wealthiest household in Phrygia (487-8). And yet Tecmessa has with admirable sangfroid adapted to her situation, joining her interests with Ajax’ and even genuinely wishing him well (491). With Ajax, she is “affectionate, obedient and eager to please” (294, 529, 537). As much as she is kind toward him, Ajax is harsh and uncaring toward her, frequently rebuking her and issuing high-handed commands (292-3, 312-3, 527-8, 586, 589-95, 684-6). To those who believe that Ajax, in the deception speech, evinces a volte-face in his attitude toward his family and shows a newfound concern for them, I would note that Ajax is just as harsh and self-centered in his final words to Tecmessa as he has been throughout the play: “But, you, going inside, woman, pray to the gods to accomplish completely the things which my heart desires” (684-6). Froma Zeitlin, while also noting the ambiguity of this speech, observes, “the outcome of the plot tells us that Ajax has not undergone any fundamental conversion of spirit.”

Toward his son Eurysaces and his parents, Ajax exhibits more consideration than he does toward any other figures in the play. The lengthy address to his son portrays Ajax’ sympathetic reflection on the consequences that his actions will have on his child and represents one of the only instances where Ajax exhibits an other-regarding attitude.

---

26 Blundell 1989, 72 n.62.
27 ibid., 75.
28 684-6: σὺ δὲ/ εἴσω/ θεοῖς ἐλθοῦσα διὰ τέλους, γύναι/ εὐχου τελείωσαι τούμον ὄν ἐρά/ κέα.
29 Zeitlin 1996, 359-60 (also 1990, 82).
Within this speech, Ajax also evinces concern for his parents, particularly for his mother, by attempting to provide protection, first, for Eurysaces in the person of Teucer and, then, for his mother, Eriboea, in the person of Eurysaces. Blundell, nevertheless, reads this speech as basically selfish, writing that it contains “no word of affection” and remains “self-centred in its treatment of the son as an extension of the father.”30 Ajax lays burdens upon his young son without any thought for his son’s independence as a person, demanding that he be like his father in every way except for his poor luck (550-1). And, just as Ajax assumes that Teucer will take over the responsibility of protecting Eurysaces, he expects that his son will tend to his grandparents (565-71), a duty that should have fallen to Ajax himself. Ajax transfers his obligations of reciprocity toward his philoi to other philoi without consulting them, abandoning personal responsibility in favor of a selfish concern for his own honor.

It is Ajax’ logic that it would be tantamount to disrespect if he would show his face to his father without having equaled and even surpassed his father’s greatness as a hero. Given the depiction of Telamon in this play, Ajax could easily be imagined to be parroting a code of honor instilled by his father when he says, “but it is necessary for the well-born man either to live honorably or to have died honorably” (479-80).31 Tecmessa, however, in line with her counter-argument to Ajax that it is observing due reciprocity that makes one noble (520-4), contravenes Ajax’ logic, suggesting that Ajax would in fact fail to respect or to show shame before his parents were he to abandon his duty to protect them in their old age (506-9). Her words bring out the possibility that Ajax is acting from purely selfish motives in his decision to die and is thereby abandoning certain duties of philia, that his reasoning on this matter is specious and designed to clear him of obligation toward his family.32

Teucer is left to pick up the pieces of Ajax’ life: he must protect Eurysaces and get him to Salamis; and defend Ajax’ body and secure it an honorable burial, which involves fiercely contending over Ajax’ honor with the Atreidae. As I mention above, Ajax does not consult Teucer about any of these responsibilities, but simply expects that

30 Blundell 1989, 79.
31 479-80: ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καλῶς ζῆν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι/ τὸν εὐγενῆ χοή.
32 Of course, one must also note the possibility that selfishness motivates Tecmessa words, as Ajax’ decision very much impacts her life and well-being.
Teucer will come through for him. Ajax twice commands that Teucer be told of his death so that he might rush to the body and protect it (687-9, 826-30); and so that he might immediately defend Ajax’ other philoi from the hatred of the Greek army (560-4, 689).

For all that he demands of his brother, Ajax never once shows any awareness or recognition of the difficult situation in which he leaves Teucer.\(^{33}\) Ajax treats his brother “merely as a useful supporter.”\(^{34}\) Yet Teucer willingly and uncomplainingly takes upon himself the responsibility for Ajax’ friends and family immediately upon his return and without needing to be asked (983f.). Despite Ajax’ selfishness, Teucer maintains a highly positive view of Ajax, defending him passionately and at great risk to himself before the Atreidae. His interpretation of events highlights only what is positive in Ajax’ character and actions, asserting that Ajax came as an independent chief to fight for the Atreidae in accord with his oath, which he valued (1099-1114); that Ajax was cheated in the contest for the arms by a rigged voting process, painting his wild rage as righteous (1135-7); and that Ajax’ many heroic feats in the service of the Atreidae entitled him to better regard from them than he received (1266-88). Teucer and his brother share many traits in common, their lack of humility before authority figures and their hot-headed quickness to anger;\(^{35}\) yet Teucer’s great acts of courage within this play are performed out of selfless loyalty to his brother, while Ajax’ actions are uniformly self-regarding.

Just as Ajax fails in his duties of reciprocity toward his friends and family, so too does he exhibit a similar narcissism toward the gods, arrogantly claiming that he will win glory in battle even without the help of the gods (768-9), spurning the assistance of Athena on the battlefield (770-5), and claiming that he no longer owes the gods any debt (589-90). He views his relationship with the gods to be one of equals: when Athena asks him to stop torturing Odysseus, he casually dismisses her (111-113); and in his dying prayer, with a similarly brazen, peremptory tone, Ajax commands Zeus, Hermes, the Erinyes, and Helios to do his bidding, repeatedly using the imperative in his prayer (824,

\(^{33}\) For Teucer’s troubles, see 721-32; 980; 1008-1020; and certainly the arguments Teucer has with Menelaus and later Agamemnon qualify as challenges that he has to deal with in order to get his brother buried, 1047f., 1226f.

\(^{34}\) Blundell 1989, 80.

\(^{35}\) Ajax and Teucer also share their irascibility and hot-headedness with their father, Telamon (1017-8); yet Telamon does attempt to teach respect for the authority of the gods (764-5), advice which Ajax promptly rejects (767-9).
At no point does Ajax ever consider that he may be at fault in some way that led Athena to punish him. He recognizes that she has punished him (401-3, 450-3), but never delves into the question of cause (454-6). Ajax simply states that Athena stayed his hand from killing his intended targets, exhibiting no remorse for his wild attempt at revenge and instead displaying only aggravation that he was thwarted. Ajax, unhumbled by his punishment, and after having been warned by the chorus “not to say a big word” (386), boldly announces that he will say a “big word” (422-3). Ajax angrily exclaims to Tecmessa that he no longer owes the gods the satisfaction of any debt, as though he feels freed of obligation because of Athena’s betrayal of their alliance (117, 455-6). But, in fact, he never recognized owing the gods any service, irrespective of their treatment of him (762-777). According to the messenger’s account of Calchas’ words to Teucer, Ajax was more or less the same arrogant, self-involved character we encounter in this play both earlier in the war and before he left home to sail to Troy (762-77).

Blundell insightfully points to the three appearances of ἄνοος and its cognate ἄνόητος, meaning ‘senseless, foolish, or lacking understanding,’ as important to the discussion of reciprocity in this play. In the chorus’ opening lines, they contend that, while they need Ajax for protection, he has need of them too (158-63):

καίτοι σμικροὶ μεγάλων χωρίς
σφαλεορόν πύργου όμα πέλοντα;
μετά γὰρ μεγάλων βαίως ἄριστ’ ἂν καὶ μέγας ὀφθοίθ’ ὑπὸ μικροτέρων.
ἀλλ’ οὐ δυνατὸν τοὺς ἄνοητους
toύτων γνώμας προδιδάσκειν.

“and yet small men apart from great men
make an uncertain defense of a wall;
for the humble man in the midst of great men would best succeed, so too the great man supported by smaller men.
but it is not possible to teach those lacking understanding
judgments of these kinds.”

---

36 386: μὴ δὲν μέγ’ εἶπης.
37 Blundell 1989, 67. 422-3: ἔπος/ ἔξερο μέγ’…
38 ibid., 86-7.
The chorus casts those who do not comprehend the crucial role of reciprocal friendship for the humble and great alike as senseless, or lacking in proper understanding. Later in the play, Teucer, referring to Agamemnon’s deficient sense of gratitude and his failure to show due reciprocity for Ajax’ service in battle, addresses Agamemnon as “you who just spoke many words that were lacking in understanding” (1272). Again, the inability to perceive the value of giving due reciprocity is rendered by the word ἄνόητος. We might, then, understand Calchas’ description of Ajax as ἄνους (763), in the context of Ajax’ scornful rejection of the gods’ help in battle, as indicating a lack of understanding of his dependence on others of both higher and lower standing than himself, i.e. both the gods and his subordinate philoi. If this interpretation is right, then what it means to “not think in accordance with one’s humanity” (761, 777), given as the flaw in Ajax that has aroused Athena’s divine wrath, should be understood as thinking that one can stand on one’s own, without recognizing dependence on others. Ajax, like every human being, exists within a web of social obligations and benefits, yet he “disregards the reciprocal bond of philia in both directions”, denying his dependence on the gods and unresponsive to the needs of his subordinate philoi. It is only the gods who can choose whether or not to honor the bonds of reciprocity, yet Ajax tries to equate himself with the gods by enjoying the services others provide him while considering reciprocal service optional.

Tecmessa counters Ajax’ failure to include his philoi in his calculations by enjoining him to show himself noble (εὐγενὴς) by not letting “remembrance of kind treatment flow away” (523-4). Reminding him of the basic principle of reciprocity, she asserts that, “it is charis (a kindness or favor) that always begets charis” (522). She connects remembrance and long-term responsibility as aspects of philia. Whereas

39 1272: ὃ πολλὰ λέξας ἄρτι κανόητ’ ἐπη.
40 761: μὴ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον φρονῆ. 777: οὐ κατ’ ἄνθρωπον φρονῶν.
41 Blundell 1989, 87.
42 Prayers to the gods are often framed in terms of reciprocity (i.e. “here are all the good things I’ve done for you, now grant me this small favor”), yet it is always an unknown whether the god/s prayed to will be moved by such arguments to do the favor asked.
43 523-4: ὅτου δ’ ἀπορρεῖ μνῆστις ἐὖ πεπονθότος, οὐκ ἀν γένοιτ’ ἐθ’ οὔτος εὐγενῆς ἀνήρ.
44 522: χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίτκουσ’ ἀεὶ.
45 For reciprocity and memory as playing a role in sincerity, see Theog. 101-12, esp. 111-2: οἱ δ’ ἡγαθοὶ τὸ μέγιστον ἐπαυπίσκουσι παθόντες/ μνήμα δ’ ἔχουσ’ ἄγαθῶν καὶ
passion is spontaneous and ignorant of time, trustworthy and consistent friendship requires the rational ability to be mindful over time and to guarantee oneself over an extent of time; and it requires an objective rational insight into one’s involvement in the social order. *Philia*, encompassing both friendship and kinship, inherently entails “concern for the interests of philoi as well as oneself.” While Ajax couches his decision to kill himself in the language of nobility, Tecmessa contends that nobility entails the reciprocal treatment of friends. Teucer uses similar language to make an explicit connection between reciprocity and memory when arguing with Agamemnon, expressing outrage that *charis* quickly “flows away” (1267, διαρρεῖ) if, having forgotten Ajax’ frequent protection of him in battle, Agamemnon does not appropriately reciprocate this service (1266f.). Inasmuch as Teucer’s argument links reciprocity, nobility and memory, it also makes a connection between being self-disciplined (in the sense of disciplining oneself to be the sort of person who can remember and return appropriate action after an extent of time) and being a consistent, sincere *philos*.

In all fairness, Sophocles presents Ajax as a man in an impossible situation: whether he lives or dies, he will be letting down someone close to him, either the philoi who are with him in the Greek camp or his father’s expectations of him. Sophocles does not dramatize a situation that admits of easy judgment. It is, however, Ajax’ own uncontrolled emotion that puts him in this predicament, and the contrast with Teucer is clear. That is, Ajax is an isolated hero who rejects the demands of reciprocity, while Teucer is an embedded community member who understands and readily fulfills his obligations to others. That said, Blundell begins her chapter on the Ajax with a wonderfully apt epigraph by John Stuart Mill, which I find appropriate to my theme to excerpt here:

In *Genealogy of Morals*, 2nd Essay.

46 Blundell 1989, 75.
47 479-80: ἀλλ᾽ ἢ καλῶς ζήν ἢ καλῶς τεθνηκέναι/ τὸν εὐγενῆ χρῆ.
48 See also Blundell 1989, 75.
49 For the isolation of Sophoclean heroes, see Knox 1966, 32-4.
50 Borrowed from Blundell 1989, 60.
He who accepts benefits, and denies a return of them when needed, inflicts a real hurt, by disappointing one of the most natural and reasonable of expectations, and one which he must at least tacitly have encouraged, otherwise the benefits would seldom have been conferred. The important rank, among human evils and wrongs, of the disappointment of expectation, is shown in the fact that it constitutes the principal criminality of two such highly immoral acts as a breach of friendship and a breach of promise. (emphasis mine)

J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*

By figuring reciprocal service as a tacit contract, Mill elegantly enunciates a key connection between sincerity and reciprocity: i.e. that the honoring of one’s commitments and obligations requires memory and consistency of self. According to this account, as in Sophocles’ *Ajax*, sincerity is an act and result of the rational will.

**Sophrosune**

In her landmark study on *sophrosune*, Helen North notes in her preface that *sophrosune* could be thought of as the “‘strong repression of the new individualistic impulse’ to absolute liberty.” The ancient Greeks themselves, etymologizing the word as “saving phronesis,” conceived of this virtue as a charioteer, reining in the liveliness of his team of horses. This charioteer image suggests both the limitation of the appetites by reason, as well as the judicious utilization of these appetites as the energy underlying action. *Sophrosune*, then, does not entail such a tight control on the emotions as the...

---

51 Nietzsche (trans. Golffing 1956, ‘Second Essay’: 189-90) sounds a similar note when he writes: “To breed an animal with the right to make promises—is not this the paradoxical problem nature has set itself with regard to man?...Now this naturally forgetful animal...has created for itself an opposite power, that of remembering...—specifically in cases where it is a question of promises...so that, between the original determination and the actual performance of the thing willed, a whole world of new things, conditions, even volitional acts, can be interposed without snapping the long chain of the will...In short, he must have become not only calculating but himself calculable, regular even to his own perception, if he is to stand pledge for his own future as a guarantor does.”

52 North 1966, p. x of introduction, quoting Werner Jaeger.

53 ibid.

54 ibid.
suppression of them altogether. Rather, like sincerity, it is a virtue of moderation and balance, steering a middle course between, in Aristotle’s terms, lack of restraint and lack of feeling.\textsuperscript{55} It is in the archaic period that \textit{sophrosune} begins to shift from meaning simply “‘sound-minded’ or ‘prudent’”, with Theognis first giving the word political significance and using it “as an antonym of \textit{hybris} in both public and private life.”\textsuperscript{56} In the beginning of the 5\textsuperscript{th} century, by which time \textit{sophrosune} had come to signify self-discipline and the control of the appetites, \textit{sophrosune} began to connote moral purity.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, in Sophocles, characters are depicted with varying levels of sophistication in their conceptions of \textit{sophrosune}, with a true, deep conception implying more than the habitual, rote limitation of the appetites and a profound perception of oneself in relation to one’s circumstances.\textsuperscript{58} This ‘thick’ notion of \textit{sophrosune} is what allows Odysseus’ flexibility in this play, discussed below, to fall under the rubric of \textit{sophrosune} and to be portrayed as virtuous instead of shifty.

North argues that, by Thucydides’ time, \textit{sophrosune} is a loaded political term, with the associations “sound, conservative, aristocratic, oligarchic,” and is a word Thucydides applies especially to Sparta.\textsuperscript{59} Sophocles takes on this stereotype and turns it on its head, demonstrating in the \textit{Ajax} that \textit{sophrosune} is a crucial virtue for the democratic citizen. North emphasizes that \textit{sophrosune} is alien to the Sophoclean hero; that no heroic character within Sophocles’ plays ever discusses this virtue with “unalloyed admiration”; and that Sophocles arrays \textit{sophrosune} in opposition to the “heroic, the \textit{eugenes}, the \textit{megalopsychos}”.\textsuperscript{60} Ajax in particular speaks quite scornfully of \textit{sophrosune}. These factors have led some scholars to conclude that Sophocles himself thought little of \textit{sophrosune}.\textsuperscript{61} Yet Sophocles unambiguously communicates the message that \textit{sophrosune} is an admirable and necessary democratic virtue by illustrating that no

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} ibid., 78, 78n.117. Ari. \textit{Eth. Nic.} 1119a 1f.: \textit{ἄκολολος} and \textit{ἀναισθησία}.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} ibid., 16-7.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} ibid., 30; “the notions of purification (\textit{katharsis}) and sophrosyne coincide.”
  \item \textsuperscript{58} ibid., 54-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} ibid., 102.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} ibid., 54, 52, 32, respectively.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} ibid., 53, 53n.48, 49. North cites Whitman and Adams, two scholars who idealize the nobility of the hero. While admittedly \textit{sophrosune} is not a flashy or heroic virtue, these scholars have neglected the possibility of admiring the hero without wholly accepting his values and have evidently not perceived the usefulness of \textit{sophrosune} within society.
\end{itemize}
society could survive having more Ajaxes running around. Further, Ajax, a figure who expressly lacks *sophrosune*, dies about two-thirds of the way through the play, leaving the last third to the portrayal of how Odysseus’ *sophrosune* resolves conflict, creates friendship where there was enmity and achieves a somewhat happy ending after the tragic ending of Ajax’ suicide.

Within this play, multiple characters discuss *sophrosune*, with different characters advancing varying connotations of the word. I mention above that Ajax puts himself on a level with the gods; another way in which Ajax equates himself to a god is in exempting himself from the need to exercise *sophrosune*. Gods in this play, and in Greek literature as a whole, are characterized as powerful beings that act on the basis of their whims and passions and, being independent and all-powerful, without concern for consequences and without a need for constraining their self-centered desires. Certainly Athena fits this mold, taking satisfaction in her personal vengeance against Ajax without thought for the innocent mortals harmed along the way. When the chorus proffers a divine cause for Ajax’ madness (172-181), it considers first that it may have been Artemis, insulted by some oversight of an offering for her, either of the spoils of battle or of her share after a successful hunt; or that it was Ares Enyalios, angry at Ajax’ lack of gratitude for his assistance in battle. The motives offered as plausible reasons for the gods to take revenge on Ajax sound remarkably like Ajax’ own motives for exacting vengeance upon the Atreidae and Odysseus, and show Ajax as similarly undisciplined of his passionate impulses as the gods.

For the gods, given that they are all-powerful, there is no reason or motivation to exercise *sophrosune* in their dealings with humans; but for humans it is essential for getting along in society and engaging in joint ventures, such as this cooperative effort of waging war against Troy, that we sometimes limit and constrain our own desires by virtue of taking stock of our embedded social positions, i.e. that we employ *sophrosune*.

---

62 This play contains more instances of *sophronein* and its cognates than any other Sophoclean play: North 1966, 58. This is also true of *hubris* and its cognates, appearing here more than in any other extant Greek play: MacDowell 1976, 21.

63 Athena is herself the goddess of *sophrosune*, yet this does not mean that she is held to the same standard of self-discipline and self-knowledge that mortals are.

64 Blundell 1989, 66; Garvie 1998, 142-3. For Ajax as a double for Athena and as a divine figure in this play, see Blundell 1989, 65-6; Knox 1961, 8-9.
Ajax conceives of exhibiting *sophrosune* as being submissive and weak (e.g. 586, 650-2, 677f.), as refraining from doing whatever one wants out of fear of authority. He does not see that there may be reasons other than fear that might motivate someone to curtail his selfish impulses, such as caring for others, or having respect for a majority decision, for the gods, for human life, for another’s status as a free or well-born person. Ajax uses *sophronein* as the Atreidae do and similarly fails to see that he has any obligation to display it, seeing *sophrosune* only as a quality imposed harshly by a strong external necessity (586, 1075, 1259).

M. Sicherl, relying on North, suggests that Ajax’ *sophrosune* is not that of the Atreidae, with Ajax using it to mean “sound-minded, having true self-knowledge and mastery of himself.”65 *Pace* Sicherl and North, Ajax does not use *sophronein* in this sense when he harshly rebukes Tecmessa (586), essentially instructing her to know her place as his subordinate and shut up. Though North and Sicherl are assuredly referring to Ajax’ use of *sophronein* in the deception speech, when he queries, “Then how shall we not learn good sense?,”66 in the midst of philosophically pondering his own social and metaphysical roles. Ajax’ query follows immediately upon his description of the balanced alternation of nature and the reciprocal submission of natural forces to their opposites, such as winter to summer, and night to day (669-77). Sicherl interprets Ajax as having come to full knowledge of himself and where he fits into the divine and social orders,67 as viewing his death as his own submission to the will of the gods and the Atreidae.68

I would argue that here too, however, in the deception speech, Ajax is using the term *sophronein* to mean the curbing of one’s will before a stronger force - in a negative sense, as the acceptance of a weaker position. While it is to a degree an act of *sophrosune* in itself for Ajax to articulate accurately what *sophrosune* requires and entails in the natural and social realms and to evince a reasoned reflection upon his own inability to fit in (demonstrating self-knowledge), I contend that Ajax, by his death, signals not his acceptance of ‘what must be’ in submission to the gods and the Atreidae, but his utter

65 Sicherl 1977, 81-2.
66 677: ἡμεῖς δὲ πῶς οὐ γνωσόμεθα σωφρονεῖν; Translation Garvie 1998, 71. See also Hesk (2003, 76, 83) for Ajax’ sarcastic frame of mind in this passage.
67 Sicherl 1977, 82.
68 ibid., 86f.
rejection of *sophrosune* as a value for himself and his willful refusal to embrace it personally. Ajax views *sophrosune* here, as elsewhere, as the undignified “acquiescence in limitation” before a superior such as he expects from his inferiors. Hesk suggests the possibility that Ajax is “articulating the ‘insight’ of ‘mutability’ but not accepting it” (emphasis his). Moreover, it is clear that his moment of insightful reflection has not changed Ajax a whit: he is still imperious and self-centered with his wife and the sailor chorus immediately upon concluding his meditation (684-92); and in his dying prayer, he continues to treat the gods as his equals and coldly invokes the Erinyes, goddesses of retribution, to devour the entire army, evincing not an inkling of remorse toward the gods or the Atreidae. As Garvie aptly puts it, “this is not the language of a man who has learnt *sophrosyne*.”

Sophocles highlights with unmistakable lexical hints the qualities of Ajax’ character that are incompatible with *sophrosune*. According to North, they are his irrationality (40, δυσλόγιστον), his “acts of audacity” (46, τόλμαις), his “boldness of spirit” (46, φρενῶν θράσει), and the references to his madness and illness (e.g. 59, μανιάσιν νόσοις, e.g. 66, νόσου). For Knox, it is that Ajax is “unadaptable” (913, δυστράπελος); lacking tolerance as one who would not, as Odysseus would, “put up with much” (411, οὐκ ἔτλη ποτ’ ἄν; 466, οὐκ ἔστι τοὔργον τλητόν); he is “stubborn-minded” (926, στερεόφρων), “unthinking” (e.g. 766, ἀφρόνως), “raw, wild, untamed”

---

69 North 1966, 52.
70 Hesk 2003, 84.
71 Garvie 1998, 207. I adopt Garvie’s translation of γεύω as “devour” as one that makes more sense in English than “taste”. For his dying prayer as signaling Ajax’ utter lack of repentance, see Rose 1995, 77.
72 Garvie 1998, 207.
73 North 1966, 59 n.61.
74 Knox 1961, 24. As opposed to the quality adduced by Pericles in his Funeral Oration (2.41.1: εὐτραπέλως) as “one of the key qualities of the Athenian democratic ideal” (p.24), Ajax is δυστράπελος, perhaps suggesting here that Ajax falls short of being a good democratic citizen. North further notes that this word is noteworthy for its appearance only here in all of Greek tragedy.
75 Knox 1961, 22; Odysseus is described as one who would do all and tolerate much: 445: παντουργῷ; 956: πολύτλας ἀνήρ. And - like father like son - Telamon is also described as intolerant: 463: πῶς με τληστεῖα ποτ’ εἰσιδεῖν…;
Further, Ajax’ behavior against the cattle, thought by him to be the Atreidae and Odysseus, is once, by Tecmessa, explicitly termed hubris (304). Ajax commits hubris against fellow heroes and former allies and rejoices in doing so (271-2, 301-4).

Lastly, one of the most persistent adjectives applied to Ajax is μόνος, or ‘alone’. As with Ajax’ characterization generally, this word has both positive and negative connotations. He alone of the heroes risked his safety in dangerous battle situations (1276, 1283). On the other hand, Ajax’ night attack against the cattle, the action because of which this story becomes a tragedy, is only made possible by Ajax’ being ‘alone’. His entire ethos and personality are alienating, with Ajax refusing to take counsel from his philoi: when Tecmessa tries to dissuade him from going out on his night raid, he curtly rebukes her with the hackneyed maxim that “for a woman, silence confers beauty” (293). In keeping with his loner status, Ajax’ tent occupies an extreme position in the Greek camp (3-4), signifying at once his prowess as a hero and his disinterest in congress with his fellow Greeks. Reflecting on the similarities between Ajax’ and Achilles’ tent positions and their personalities, Hesk observes that “their might and stature also make them emotionally extreme and prone to marginalisation and isolation.” Since sophrosune is a virtue dealing partly with the appropriate relations among men, being ‘alone’ signals a lack of and a lack of interest in exercising sophrosune, as well as an extremeness of personality.

---

76 Knox 1961, 21, 205: ὡμοκρατής; 548: ὡμοῖς νόμοις; 885: ὡμόθυμον; 930: ὡμόφρων. Goldhill notes the association of this word (ὁμός) with “attitudes at odds with the norms of human behavior in society” (Goldhill 1986, 187).
77 For Ajax as hubristic, see Cairns 1996, 10-13; Winnington-Ingram 1980, 13-15.
78 29, 47, 294, 467, 796, 1276; it is noteworthy that, as the language of the play repeatedly hints, there are strong resemblances in the male line of Ajax’ family, between Telamon and his sons, Ajax and Teucer, and between Ajax and his son, Euryaces; Euryaces too is several times described as ‘alone’: 511, 985, in his case signaling his vulnerability, as opposed to the extraordinary strength that sets his father apart from other men. Monos is applied to other characters as well, but in a way that links them to other people, unlike in Ajax’ case: e.g. Ajax says the chorus ‘alone’ remain loyal friends to him, 349-50; and Odysseus ‘alone’ stood as Ajax’ defender among the Argives, 1384.
79 293: γυναιξὶ κόσμον ἡ σιγὴ φέρει.
80 Hesk 2003, 41.
Hesk observes, “the imagery and rhetoric of ‘bigness versus smallness’ informs the entire tragedy’s debate over what a good man looks like.”

Throughout the play, Ajax’ bulky size is offered as a contrast to *sophrosune*, as though being physically large amounts to direct evidence of ‘thinking big’. When Athena formulates the lesson to Odysseus against ‘thinking big’, giving Ajax as example, she warns against “lifting up for oneself any *bulk/mass*, if, more than another, you are weighed down either by the strength of your hand or the depth of your great wealth” (129-30). Her language, using terms relating to size and mass in a play that repeatedly calls attention to Ajax’ bulk, is notable. Her formulation here attributes moral ‘weight’ to one’s physicality, the problem here stemming more from having great physical strength (χειρὶ) than from being physically large. Menelaus, in the midst of his gnomic advocation of his brand of *sophrosune*, says, “it is necessary that a man, even if he should grow a large body, know that he may fall even from a small mishap” (1077-8). Agamemnon too suggests that large physical size is mutually exclusive with *sophrosune*: “for neither the stout nor the broad-backed men are the least likely to be tripped up, but those who think well who have influence in every situation” (1250-2). Throughout the play, it is suggested that Ajax’ physical body itself acts as a barrier to his achieving *sophrosune*.

Knox insightfully draws attention to the political undertones in Ajax’ description of the orderly cycle of the assumption and yielding of power in the natural world. With his language, Ajax equates the natural cycle of change with the orderly surrender of political office at the end of a term of office (666-73):

---

81 Hesk 2003, 28.
82 This notion, i.e. that Ajax’ physical form gives hints as to his internal character, reveals an ancient assumption about the correlation between internal and external selves. That is, from the way that someone looks, it is reasonable to extrapolate his key moral characteristics.
83 129-30: μηδ’ ὄγκον ἄρῃ μηδέν’, εἰ τινὸς πλέον/ ἢ χειρὶ βρίθεις ἢ μαχροῦ πλούτου βόθει. I borrow Garvie’s (1998, 137) rendering with “the depth of your great wealth”.
84 1077-8: ἀλλ’ ἀνδρὰ χρή, κἂν σώμα γεννήθη μέγα,/ δοκεῖν πεσεῖν ἄν κᾶν ἀπὸ ομιχροῦ κατωθ. I borrow Garvie’s (1998, 137) rendering with “the depth of your great wealth”.
85 1250-2: οὔ γὰρ οἱ πλατεῖς/ οὔδ’ εὑρόνωτοι φῶτες ἀσφαλέστατοι,/ ἀλλ’ οἱ φρονοῦντες εὖ κρατοῦν πανταχοῦ. I borrow Garvie’s (1998, 137) rendering with “the depth of your great wealth”.
So then, from now on, we will know to yield to the gods, And we will learn to honor the Atreidae. They are the ones in command, and so one must give way. What else then? For even things that are mighty and very powerful Give way to office; this, for instance, winters of Treading snow under foot give ground to summer with its abundant fruit; And the dreary circle of night resigns itself to The luster of day, drawn by white horses, blazing.

Strikingly, Ajax selects terms that are familiar from the Athenian political arena: ἄρχοντες, or archons, the term for the chief magistrates at Athens; τιμαῖς, or the term for Athenian political office itself; and ἔξισταται, the verb used for resigning from office. This passage comes in the midst of a speech that uses sophrosune to mean the necessity of sometimes subordinating one’s will to another and the judgment to know when to do so – knowing, e.g., when to ‘resign from office’, or step away from power. The tone of bitter sarcasm throughout the speech suggests that, although Ajax demonstrates understanding here that it is sometimes necessary to repress one’s will in favor of another, he still views this in a highly negative light, as something weak and done only under duress, only after having been forced by a stronger power not to act selfishly. He does not see this action of stepping back, giving in, or submitting as something valuable in its own right, as something that enables community and cooperation.


87 Ibid., 23-4.
88 For his sarcastic tone throughout the deception speech, see Hesk 2003, 76, 81; Blundell 1989, 82f.
Lawrence exposes the conflicts within this ethos, showing how the hero’s courage becomes inseparably attached to honor such that, if honor is removed from the equation, the hero “falls into radical instability”. The heroic ethos creates heroes who are addicted to honor, utterly dependent upon garnering esteem from their peers for their sense of self-worth. Ajax ultimately fails to find a way to generate self-value from within, resolving his crisis of self-esteem by obliterating his self. In this way, Ajax’ situation is especially pitiable. His heroic culture encourages heroes in seeking validation from the community; or, rather, the community repays the service of its protectors in the currency of honor and glory. Ajax’ (and Teucer’s, 1266-87) understanding of his unique service to the community could only be sustained by his being awarded Achilles’ arms and thus being acknowledged as ‘best’. Both Ajax and Teucer see it as a black and white issue, but there are many great heroes in the Greek army and only one could be ‘best’. But, unbeknownst to Ajax, the terrain has shifted: Ajax unwittingly competes in a contest where the definition of ‘best’ has drifted from heroic to democratic. Lawrence intriguingly argues that Ajax’ response to his public humiliation is to collapse his social context down “into a narrower world populated only by himself,” a world comprised of only friends or enemies, with his philoi viewed as merely embodied continuations of his own will, and Telamon and Eurysaces as “past and future embodiments of the heroic ideal.”

In contrast to the self-centeredness of the heroic ideal, Blundell comments upon the proliferation of ‘συν-verbs’ (indicating cooperation or shared activity) at the end of the play in the context of the mutual effort necessary to securing Ajax’ burial, concluding that “such cooperation is alien to Ajax.” So, the sophrosune essential to cooperative action, in both the personal and political realms, is impossible for Ajax and contrary to his very nature. He is unable and unwilling to subject his will to another’s authority. Sophocles, when he inserts those three clear references to Athenian democratic procedure into a speech on the nature of sophrosune and Ajax’ incompatibility with this quality, communicates the crucial role of sophrosune in a functioning democracy and hence Ajax’ incompatibility with a democratic form of government. In fact, this play repeatedly

89 Lawrence 2005, 19.
90 ibid., 25; see also p.22: “We note here the dangerously constricted social context which provides the domain of his moral endeavour.”
91 Blundell 1989, 103-4.
confuses the issue of whether the Greek army could be said to function as an autocracy, with the Atreidae as its tyrants (1072-83, 1226f., etc.), or as a democracy (1072-83, 1135-6, 1239-43, 1259-63, etc.), leaving us to conclude that Ajax is incompatible with any system of organization that limits his doing exactly as he pleases.

Like his brother, Teucer too has an unruly and passionate temperament. Demonstrating that he is hot-tempered and rash, he also indulges himself in “big” talk in his arguments with Menelaus and Agamemnon (e.g. 1125). He too is boastful and overbearingly confident in his abilities (1120f.). Teucer dares to speak “beyond his station,” addressing the Atreidae rudely, abusively and dismissively. It would seem at first glance that Teucer, like Ajax, makes a terrible citizen, refusing to submit his will to the will of the majority if their decision arouses his passions, a point which Agamemnon makes explicit (1239-45). From Agamemnon’s perspective, Teucer is guilty of verbal hubris (1258). Though, because in Teucer’s encounters with the commanders, we are able to observe how the Atreidae speak and behave to their supposed inferiors, as well as because he acts selflessly in service to his brother, Teucer comes off much more sympathetically than his brother, as a bold parrhesiast (one who lays claim to frankness in speech without respect for traditional hierarchies). Elton Barker contends that Teucer “– by drawing on anti-Spartan prejudice and Iliadic precedent – draws the audience in on his side to support the principle of dissent.” Although both Ajax and Teucer engage in vigorous, even aggressive dissent, Teucer’s protest against the authority of the Atreidae relies on words, stopping short of violence. Ajax’ murderous attack, though, is patently transgressive: “taking individual action outside institutional means of redress…cannot and does not gain sanction.” Teucer’s entrance and his defense of his brother’s cause, thus, represent a turning point in how the audience views Ajax’ case.

---

92 In the dispute between Teucer and the Atreidai, sophrosune as a Spartan value is contrasted with the bold democratic value of parrhesia. Odysseus’ entrance and his speech collapse such a dichotomy, combining in one person as he does both virtues. The key for Odysseus is employing each of these seemingly opposite values each in its season.
94 ibid., 7.
Teucer, despite his marked resemblance in temperament to his brother, somehow represents the man that we all somehow wish Ajax could be. The excessiveness of Ajax’ hot temper is turned to an asset in Teucer, who directs his own spirited character to the impassioned defense of his brother’s reputation and to the physical protection of Ajax’s corpse, Tecmessa and Eurysaces. Teucer differs from Ajax in his unselfish acceptance of the responsibilities Ajax has bequeathed to him. Teucer also differs from Ajax in his ability to reassess situations as conditions change and to make new judgments accordingly. He displays a reasoned, appropriate flexibility, manifested by his attitude shift toward Odysseus (1381-2). Although Teucer is characterized by the Atreidae as being as deficient in sophrosune as his brother (e.g. 1120, 1259), Teucer in fact shows a very sensitive comprehension of his place in the social and political orders, an awareness of how things really are and an ability to adapt to this reality, and demonstrates a moving openness to accepting the demands of philia.

The Atreidae both try to shame Teucer in order to silence his dissent, Menelaus by rebuking him with his lowly status as an archer, and Agamemnon by emphasizing his bastard roots. Teucer defends himself on both counts, but of particular interest is his discussion with Agamemnon about their ancestors. Agamemnon frames his attack on Teucer’s parentage in terms of 5th-century Athenian citizenship norms, alluding to Teucer’s mixed parentage by accusing him of speaking in a barbaric tongue (1262-3). In Athens, after the passage of Pericles’ double endogamy law of 451/450, an Athenian citizen required two Athenian parents, making those born of mixed parentage from this point disqualified for citizenship. Susan Lape has argued that characterizing someone’s speech as foreign-sounding or as not typical of the Attic dialect was a way of impugning that person’s birth, and hence his citizenship status. Agamemnon goes so far as to assert that Teucer has no right to be speaking here at all, that he needs to have a free representative there to speak for him (a προστάτης, 1260-1), in accordance with

95 See also Hesk 2003, 125.
96 See Scodel 2006, 68f.
97 ibid., 71. For the dating of the play relative to the law of 451/450, see Hesk 2003, 14: “most scholars conjecture that the tragedy was written and performed some time in the 440s.” On the dating of the play, see also Garvie 1998, 6-8.
98 See Lape 2010, 64f.
Athenian practice for non-citizens. Certainly Teucer apprehends the aim of Agamemnon’s attack in precisely these terms, responding with a defense of his own birth and a corresponding attack on Agamemnon’s.

Agamemnon accuses Teucer of committing *hubris* through his “too free speech”, connecting his audacious speech to a lack of *sophrosune* (1258-9). Barker suggests that Teucer’s dissent, by recruiting Athenian, anti-Sparta propaganda, is depicted as specifically a “legitimate, *Athenian*, rejection” of Menelaus’ (Spartan) model of authority. Barker, however, fails to note the irony of Teucer’s role in redeeming dissent as desirable and Athenian; that is, that Teucer could not be an Athenian by his own proud admission of mixed parentage. Teucer undermines the ideology of a 1:1 relationship between having pure Athenian blood and being sincere (in the sense of having inherited an unmixed loyalty to the polis) or at least asserts that pure Athenian ancestry is not the only route to sincerity. Teucer, despite his mixed parentage, performs the role of the ideal democratic citizen by engaging in one of the most democratic acts, that is, speaking truth shamelessly to authority. Arlene Saxonhouse, in *Free Speech and Democracy in Ancient Athens*, argues that the Athenian practice of *parrhesia*, a central value of the Athenian democracy, entails speaking one’s mind without regard for status or authority, speaking without shame. Neither Ajax nor Teucer “knows his place”, which is in some sense very democratic. Yet, as Saxonhouse notes, the democracy cannot tolerate complete shamelessness, and certainly no society could afford to allow its citizens the excessive license of Ajax. Teucer demonstrates his possession of *sophrosune* with an appropriate compromise between shamelessness in speech but limitation on action. With his straightforward, blunt manner of speech and steadfast, selfless loyalty, Teucer represents the epitome of sincerity secured by the rational comprehension of one’s place in a social network. His portrayal also highlights the problem that the demands of

99 1258: κἀξελευθεροστομεῖς, meaning “too free mouth” and, by extension, “too free speech”.
101 For the heritability of political and moral traits, including loyalty to the polis, see Ober 1989, 97-8; Lape 2010, e.g. 22, 31, 33.
102 For more on the oddness of the debate between Teucer and Agamemnon and Teucer’s undermining of Athenian citizenship norms, see Scodel 2006, 65-78.
103 Saxonhouse 2006, 8, *et passim*. 

128
sincerity, as an ideal that requires the alignment of interests with some community of others, often force a choice between loyalty to one’s kinship community or to one’s political community.

It would be easy to conflate the views of Ajax and the Atreidae on *sophrosune*, and indeed they do share significant similarities; yet I feel that an assumption that their views are the same would cause us to miss some important subtleties enunciated by the Atreidae concerning this virtue, since they come at the issue from such a different standpoint than Ajax – the Atreidae as rulers who seek to establish order and their own dominance of a large group of relative equals, and Ajax as one of many heroes who craves honor and esteem from his peers. While Ajax must resolve whether he can bear to submit his will to the will of superiors, Agamemnon only ever faces the determination of whether to submit to a friend, not out of necessity, but out of regard for his friend and on the principle of reciprocity. That said, though there are many overlaps in their usage of *sophronein*, I will consider what Agamemnon and/or Menelaus has to say about *sophrosune* as distinct from Ajax’ views.

Menelaus advocates a harsh discipline imposed from without by an authoritarian figure, used to keep subordinates in line (1073-6), a view that he shares with his brother, Agamemnon.¹⁰⁴ Neither the Atreidae nor Ajax has a conscious conception of the benefit of personal discipline, internally imposed and derived from rational consideration. This in turn leads to a very limited and suspicious view of others. Menelaus asserts that fear (1074, 1084, δέος, 1076, φόβος), primarily, and then shame, or respect for others (1076, αἰδώς, 1079, αἰσχύνη), lead to the rule of law in a polis, *sophrosune* in an army, and *soteria*, or safety, for an individual (1073f.), in the context of illustrating that Ajax’ behavior undermines each of these positive states of affairs. In this play, Menelaus is a repellant figure, making it hard to perceive the value in anything he says; but it does make sense that *sophrosune* in an army is important, in his sense of knowing one’s place and respecting authority. Authority, however, must also be respectable. There is certainly too little information to know whether the claim is justified, but Teucer accuses the

¹⁰⁴ The way that Agamemnon addresses Teucer demonstrates that he shares his brother’s views on the role of authority (1226f.).
Atreidae of having rigged the voting in the contest for Achilles’ arms (1135).105 Interestingly, Menelaus does not deny that the result of the contest was flawed, cryptically replying, “this error lay with the judges, not me” (1136).106 Ajax and Teucer are suspicious of the decency of the Atreidae, which is partly responsible for the tension between the two parties.107 Menelaus and Agamemnon do not come off as trustworthy, but rather as tyrannical.

The problem with the management of the Greek army by the Atreidae is that there is no transparency of process in the voting, nor a means of addressing concerns openly without threats of violence. Menelaus and his brother are utterly intolerant of criticism of their ‘rule’, leaving Ajax no avenue of redress for his wrongs. Ajax’ anger may justifiably have been as much about the injustice he suspected was perpetrated against him in the voting (though this possibility is only introduced after his death and could function more as an aspect of Teucer’s rehabilitation of his brother’s reputation) as about his inability to accept a majority decision that goes against his interests. The Atreidae’s standpoint on *sophrosune*, then, is morally inconsistent, in the sense that they expect their subordinates to exercise *sophrosune*, but feel themselves to be exempt from displaying self-discipline, and this despite the fact that there is a clear role for the *sophrosune* of superiors in establishing and maintaining group order, something they purport to care very much about, through the transparency and trustworthiness of leaders and of organizational processes.

We know from Plutarch, in a passage that links fear with the sense of respect,108 that at Sparta there were temples dedicated to Fear, as the chief factor responsible for their constitutional stability.109 Sophocles depicts Menelaus’ philosophy on order as

---

105 On the guilt or innocence of the Atreidae in this matter, see Garvie 1998, 228-9. The accusation: 1135: κλέπτης γὰρ αὐτοῦ ψηφοποιὸς ἠὑρέθη (“yes, you were found to be a vote-making thief of him,” Garvie, 228).
106 1136: ἐν τοῖς δικασταῖς, κοὐκ ἐμοί, τόδ᾽ ἐσφάλη.
107 In addition to Teucer’s accusation of cheating in the voting over the arms when arguing with Menelaus, Blundell (1989, 89 n.147) notes that at lines 1285-7, “Ajax’s forthright courage is contrasted with various ways in which lots could be biased, thus casting doubt on the fairness of such ostensibly impartial procedures.”
108 Plutarch *Cleomenes* 9.4: ἰνὰ γὰρ δέος, ἐνθὰ καὶ αἰδώς.
typically Spartan. The problem with his political philosophy is that Menelaus fails to apply any of its lessons to himself, believing that he himself is exempt from displaying *sophrosune*, fear, or respect for others. Not perceiving the flaws and inconsistencies in his views, Menelaus fails to apprehend that his lack of these qualities could bring down a city or an army just as well as his subordinates’ lack of them. *Sophrosune* entails rational judgment of when it is appropriate to rule and when to be ruled. One crucial difference between Ajax’ view on *sophrosune* and the view of the Atreidae, however, is that Agamemnon does in the end display some extent of this virtue by being willing to yield to Odysseus, whereas Ajax is never able to yield. This action of Agamemnon’s showcases his consistency, i.e. he remains consistent both in his enmity toward Ajax and in his friendship toward Odysseus. Where Agamemnon ultimately allows himself to be persuaded by his friend, the pleas and attempts at persuasion by Ajax’ friends never have an impact on his action, even if we do take seriously his claim in the deception speech to have been moved by Tecmessa (646-53). Agamemnon even goes so far as to say that for the sake of their friendship, which apparently runs quite deep, he would do an even greater favor for Odysseus (1370-1). Here, despite his unattractive characterization to this point, Agamemnon shows himself a better man than Ajax, by managing to hold true to his own convictions while still perceiving the wisdom of limited flexibility for the sake of friendship.

Although Ajax’ offense toward Athena is never explicitly discussed in terms of *hubris*, it is clear that this play juxtaposes *hubris* and *sophrosune* as opposites, and after Ajax takes an inappropriate tone with Athena, repeatedly giving her orders, Athena offers Ajax’ behavior as a contrast to *sophrosune* (127-33), telling Odysseus to

---

111 Menelaus, in an echo of Ajax’ sentiments in the deception speech, shows himself to be aware of a principle of alternation, though his thinking is flawed. His reasoning goes astray somewhere, showing that he lacks appreciation for the lesson of Ajax’ fall: 1087: “Before he was a ‘hot-tempered committer of *hybris*’ (Garvie 1998, 224), but now again (I claim the right to) think big.”
112 It is problematic in the deception speech when Ajax characterizes yielding to a *philos* as being feminized (650-2); Agamemnon is a model of yielding and still maintaining ‘face’.
113 For Ajax’ *hubris*, see Cairns 1996, 10-13.
114 112: τάλλ᾽ ἐγὼ σ᾽ ἐφίεμαι; 116: τοῦτο οὐ δ᾽ ἐφίεμαι.
look upon this example and know that the gods love the self-disciplined and detest the base, or wicked.\textsuperscript{115} In the scene between Athena and Ajax, Odysseus serves as a foil for Ajax’ overweening pride, himself showing a pious, disciplined respect for Athena, illustrating why he deserves to be her favorite (14f.).\textsuperscript{116} Furthermore, Odysseus indicates a clear conception of where humankind fits into the divine order, musing, “I see that as many of us as live are nothing more than phantoms or an unsubstantial shadow” (125-6).\textsuperscript{117}

Athena summarizes the lesson of Ajax’ fall for Odysseus, listing the qualities that she identifies with the σώφρων (temperate, self-controlled): speaking in a respectful way to the gods, not becoming puffed up with pride because of strength or riches, and knowledge of dependence upon the gods (127-32). This is spoken in the context of identifying what Ajax has done to provoke her divine anger, but Athena’s conception of sophrosune speaks as much to the Atreidae’s problematic model of sophrosune as it does to Ajax’ flawed understanding of the virtue. For both Ajax and the Atreidae, generally speaking, sophrosune means compliance with the wishes of a superior, with themselves being the superior who must be obeyed, while Athena makes it explicit that it is not only our superiors with whom we need be concerned and that no human being is exempt from exercising sophrosune: the stricture that we should not become puffed up with pride over being superior in some regard to our fellow man is concerned, not only with the treatment of our superiors, but also with that of our peers and subordinates. In this, Athena has a far more democratic conception of sophrosune than the Atreidae or Ajax. Or, rather, as a figure of a superior and different nature than humans, the differences between mortals are flattened out from her perspective. For Odysseus and Athena, sophrosune connotes a rational recognition (by human beings) of one’s place in the social and divine orders and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{115} 132-3: τούς δὲ σώφρονας/ θεοὶ φιλοῦσι καὶ στυγοῦσι τοὺς κακούς.
\item \textsuperscript{116} Rose (1995, 63) notes that Sophocles consciously chooses the variant of the Ajax myth that has the contest for the arms decided by vote of the entire Greek army, constituting “a direct judgment by the community about its own leadership.” Odysseus’ behavior within this play also indicates why he deserves to be the army’s ‘favorite’.
\item \textsuperscript{117} 125-6: ὅρω γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἀλλὸ πλὴν/ εἰδωλ', ὡσοιτ' ἔχουμεν, ἢ κούφην σκιάν. This thought introduces the theme running throughout the play of the ephemerality of man’s fortunes, which Ajax seeks to transcend (Ajax 397-400, 756-7; Segal 1999, 112; Fränkel 1946).
\end{itemize}
a consequent curtailment of one’s selfish impulses (again, by mortals, not gods). This curtailment of impulse stems directly from an understanding of one’s place and of one’s dependence on others. Athena posits a conception of sophrosune with which Odysseus signals his agreement and compliance by his behavior toward her in this scene.

**Odyssean Sophrosune: The Argument for Controlled Inconsistency**

For those critics who conclude that Ajax cannot be lying in the deception speech because that conflicts with his traditional characterization as a hero, it is worth noting that neither Ajax nor Odysseus conforms to his traditional characterization in this play; though, throughout the play, Ajax’ philoi do continue to represent Odysseus in his customary guise as the deceitful, cunning trickster (103, 148-50, 189, 379-82, 387-91, 955-60, 971). In the first negative depiction of Odysseus in the play, Ajax calls him a ‘cunning fox’ (103: τούπιτριπτον κίναδος). At the beginning of the play, we do not know that Odysseus will not turn out to be the villain, as in the Philoctetes. He is initially represented as both a sneaky animal and a hunter of men, leading us to believe that he will be the cunning Odysseus we expect. The chorus even gives us the alternate version of Odysseus’ origin, alleging that it is Sisyphus, the crafty king of Corinth, who is Odysseus’ father, not Laertes, in order to emphasize his insincerity and untrustworthiness (189); however, already in the opening scene with Athena, the Odysseus of this play confounds our expectations.

Both Athena and Ajax rejoice in the shame of their enemies: “Athena mocks Ajax as he mocks his enemies, calling herself his ‘ally’ and ironically accepting his insulting commands.” She invites Odysseus to enjoy his rival’s humiliation (79). Likewise, Ajax, believing that he is torturing the Atreidae and Odysseus, takes immense pleasure in his “work” (116, ἔργον), returning with relish to his task after speaking with Athena. Ajax also fully expects Odysseus to share his viewpoint and to take great delight in Ajax’ own misfortune (379f.). These two, Athena and Ajax, are both adherents of the traditional

---

118 See also Saxonhouse (2006, 61 n.10) for sophrosune as limiting selfish impulse.
119 See commentary at Garvie 1998, 144.
120 Knox 1961, 6.
moral code of Helping Friends/Harming Enemies. Odysseus, though, in the first indication that he observes different norms, cannot enjoy his enemy’s disgrace. He evinces a broader, more sophisticated viewpoint, imagining himself in Ajax’ place (121-6):

ءَضْعُوِيِّرِيَّمَوْ ِّدِ َنِّي
َذَوْتُهِنَّ ِّعَمَّاِ، ِّكَاَّيْرَ َّنِّمَ َذَوْمٌ،
َّبَوَيِّنَّهُ َّنِّي َسَوْحَتْطِئَّنٌّلَّا َكَاَّيَّ،
ْيُنَّهُ َّنِّي ِّنَوَّذَبُنَُّوُدَّ َّلُّوُدَّ َسَوْحَبٌ،
َّوَّرَّ َغَّيَّرَ َّمُّمَّاُ َنُيِّرَنُّ فَنَّاَّزَ َلَّاَلَّا َبَلِّٰنَ
ِّيِدَوُيِّ، ِّدَوَيِّرَ ِّزَوَمَ، ِّيَ َكَوْفَيِّنَ َسَوْحَبٌ.

I pity him,
Wretched as he is, nonetheless, although he is my enemy,
Because he has been yoked together with a terrible delusion,
Looking in no way to his situation more than to my own.
For I see that we are nothing other than
Phantoms, as many of us as are living, or an insubstantial shadow.

It is because of his broader perspective that Odysseus is able to feel pity for Ajax, because he is able to perceive the commonality in their human condition and to know that his existence too is at the whim of the gods. Looking upon Ajax in his misfortune, Odysseus sees the vulnerability of his own position and of his own social status. North, in her discussion of the Mytilene Debate, draws an implicit connection between sophrosune and the emotion of pity, and indeed, for one who has a rational understanding of his own position in the world, pity can be a logical emotional companion to this intellectual insight. While Ajax only seems able to see as far as his own particular situation, Odysseus exhibits a kind of thinking that is more encompassing in its scope, taking himself as an object and understanding his role in a larger picture. Garvie even asserts that Odysseus’ moral stance is “much more attractive than that of the goddess and evidently beyond her understanding.”

A major theme of the Ajax is the contrast between Ajax’ rigidity and Odysseus’ flexibility. We get our first glimpse of Odysseus’ baffling flexibility in the opening scene

---

121 On the role of this traditional moral code within this play, see Knox 1961, 4-6.
with Athena, where we are surprised that Odysseus, known to have a rivalrous and hostile relationship with Ajax, passes on the opportunity to gloat over Ajax’ madness. While Ajax was admittedly his enemy when he came looking for him (18, 78), Odysseus immediately adopts a softer attitude toward him upon seeing the ruin of the so recently great hero. Odysseus returns toward the end of the play, strikingly, to defend Ajax’ honor and his reputation for greatness and to join Teucer’s cause to secure Ajax an honorable burial (1332f.). He claims to Teucer at this point that, as much as he was an enemy, he is now a friend (1376-7), naming Ajax the “noblest of men” and generally defending Ajax’ worth as a hero (1340, 1344-5, 1355, 1357, 1380). To win his brother’s burial, Teucer vigorously embraces his role as dissident. When things seem to have come to an impasse, however, with dissent failing to win the Atreidae’s approval, and perhaps at a point where the argument can only stand to escalate, Odysseus magically appears, much to the relief of the nervous chorus (1316-7). His expert tact in approaching the situation has been remarked upon by critics, and his attitude characterized as anti-dissent, turning from hostility to a focus on philia.

Though Ajax famously mocks the Odyssean principle of alternation and mutability in the deception speech, Odysseus here makes a compelling case for being open to change and for why this is not (always) indicative of personal instability. Agamemnon replies to Odysseus, seemingly in surprise, that an attitude of flexibility is representative of men who are ἐμπληκτος (1358) - an interesting word, which can be translated as “malleable,” “unstable,” “inconsistent,” or even “insincere”. This leaves Odysseus in the unexpected position of making the case for the allowance of controlled inconsistency within the scope of sincerity and friendship. Odysseus insistently claims the moral high ground for his flexibility: “by no means let violence prevail over you into hating him so much that you trample on justice” (1334-5); “it is not just to harm a good

124 1376-7: καὶ νῦν γε Τεύκρῳ τάπο τούδ᾿ ἀγγέλλομαι,/ ὅσον τότ᾽ ἔχθρος ἦν, τοσὸνδ᾽ εἶναι φίλος.
man, if he should die, not even if you happen to hate him” (1344-5); 128 “I hated him, when it was kalos (honorable) to hate him” (1347); 129 and “do not take pleasure, son of Atreus, in advantages that are not kalos” (1349). 130 With these sentiments, he characterizes extremes of emotion as responsible for injustice. Odysseus uses strongly moralizing language with Agamemnon to defend and to explain his abrupt change in attitude toward Ajax and to suggest that this change of heart is an appropriate one for Agamemnon to adopt as well. With words that recall Ajax’ bitter insight in the deception speech, Odysseus excuses Ajax’ instability of personality by setting a higher value on his aretē (excellence) than on his hostile actions in this play (1357), saying “many men are intensely friends and then later bitter” (1359). 131 Stopping short of advocating inconsistency, Odysseus shifts the focus to the negative aspect of Agamemnon’s (and Ajax’) rigidity. 132 Perceiving the reality that “human attitudes do not remain fixed”, 133 Odysseus forges a philosophy of moderation, one that chooses against indulging the limitless pursuit of one’s hatred precisely because an enemy may not be an enemy forever. 134 A rigid mind, Odysseus suggests, is simply out of touch with reality and rationally inconsistent, as are Agamemnon and Ajax, both themselves letting remembrance of charis flow away, yet intemperately enraged when they themselves are treated in this way. 135

Of Odysseus’ flexibility, Blundell notes, “Paradoxically it is this very flexibility which enables him to remain consistent.” 136 In a sense, Odysseus undergoes a relatively superficial change in order to remain the same person in a more fundamental sense,

128 1344-5: ἄνδρα δ᾽ ὃν δίκαιον, εἰ θάνοι/ βιλάπτειν τὸν ἔσθλον, οὐδ᾽ ἐὰν μισῶν κυρῇς.
129 1347: ἐμίσουν δ᾽, ἡνίκ᾽ ἴν μισεῖν καλόν.
130 1349: μὴ χαῖρ᾽, Ἀτρείδη, κέρδεσιν τοῖς μὴ καλοῖς.
131 1357: νικᾷ γὰρ ἁρετή με τῆς ἐχθρας πολύ; for the problems relating to this line, see Stanford’s commentary (1963), and Dawe 1973, 172. 1359: ἥ κάρτα πολλοὶ νῦν φίλοι καϊνὴς παροί.
132 Blundell 1989, 98.
134 See also Blundell 1989, 101.
135 Ajax ignores Tecmessa’s appeal to charis, 520f., and Teucer accuses Agamemnon of having forgotten the charis of Ajax’ valiant protection of the Greek army and of Agamemnon himself in battle, 1266f.
136 Blundell 1989, 103.
shifting his attitude (secondary) in order to conform to his rational principles (primary) of placing a higher value on piety and justice than the pursuit of personal enmity and of limiting the indulgence of enmity with the caveat that one’s current enemy may one day become a friend. It is worth noting that Ajax apprehends the idea of the mutability in human relations and takes it to the most negative extreme, concluding that friendship is therefore never trustworthy and that one must restrict the assistance one gives a friend, knowing that it might later turn out to have been a waste of energy: “(for I just now understand that) in regard to helping a friend I will aim to help him just so much, considering that he will not always remain such” (678-82). At any rate, Odysseus’ change in attitude in this play falls into the category of a change mandated by rational sincerity: he has taken on board new information (Ajax’ madness and his death) and has adjusted his attitude accordingly. By contrast, Ajax and the Atreidae, in their stubborn persistence in the same attitudes, are motivated more by emotion than by rational considerations. Interestingly, the case of Odysseus shows that it can sometimes be highly sincere to be open to changing one’s mind, and hence to tolerate a little inconsistency when a rational, cogent argument can be proffered for doing so.

Odysseus displays the highest degree of sophrosune and sincerity of anyone in this play. North compares Odysseus in the Ajax to Pericles, the common feature being their reliance on reason to guide action rather than allowing oneself to be directed by emotional impulse. North adduces this same Odysseus in her discussion of the most sophisticated level of sophrosune for his “recognition of the common humanity that he shares with his enemy,” noting that his sophrosune is “of an enlightened variety.” It is his reason and sound-mindedness that allow him to perceive his own human condition by viewing Ajax’ suffering. Odysseus demonstrates sophrosune in his relationship with Athena, letting respect for her trump his fear of the raging Ajax. Odysseus has also mastered the concept of reciprocity. In the opening scene, Athena offers Odysseus a

---

137 678-82: ἐπίσταμαι γὰρ ἀρτίως ὅτι...ἐς τε τὸν φίλον/ τοσαῦθ᾽ ὑπουργῶν ὑφελείν βουλήσομαι,/ ώς αἰὲν οὐ μενούντα.
138 See Blundell 1989, 95f.
139 North 1966, 2. By the same token, Ajax resembles Cleon in his undisciplined passions.
140 ibid., 55.
141 Blundell 1989, 61: Odysseus displays sophrosune, “the self-discipline which, amongst other things, enables one to place the desires of a philos above one’s own.”
reciprocal exchange: he should tell her why he is prowling about and she will inform him of what has happened in the night. He immediately complies, giving the goddess an explanation of his actions. And his friend Agamemnon demonstrates reciprocity toward him, presumably on the strength of a history of successful reciprocal exchanges:

Agamemnon grants Odysseus an enormous charis, or favor, in allowing Ajax to be buried, saying that he would grant his friend an even greater charis (1370-3). While Ajax accomplishes nothing good for himself on the strength of philia within this play, Odysseus recruits philia in order to, in large part, heal the rift within the community, which has been the basis of the action here, and to win accession to his view of the best course of events.

Odysseus, throughout the play, exhibits a strong character and a coherent set of moral principles. Further, as Blundell rightly notes, “Odysseus himself, though moved by pity, is not a passionate character. His hatred and loves are directed by principle.” He, in turn, “requires from Agamemnon a self-discipline” in which principle constrains “the passionate impulses of pleasure, hatred and personal kerdos.” In this, Odysseus could not be more different from the wildly passionate Ajax. Odysseus exhibits ample sophrosune and attempts to instruct his friend in this wisdom of perceiving one’s place in the divine and social orders, advising Agamemnon that “you prevail when you yield to your friends” (1353). Odysseus, while avoiding a confrontational tone, takes a bold approach with Agamemnon, indicating his intention to speak frankly on the strength of their friendship by opening the conversation with the words, “is it possible to speak truth...

---

138 See Hesk 2003, 41. The concept of reciprocal exchange is emphasized by the use of the word charin in Athena’s offer to Odysseus (11-13): καί σ’ οὐδὲν εἶσω τήσδε πατπαίνειν πύλης/ ἔτ᾽ ἔργον ἔστιν, ἐννέπειν δ’ ὅτου χάριν/ ὡς καρδίνειας μάθης (“there is no longer any need for you to look inside this gate, but you should tell me for the sake of what you set yourself this effort, so that you might learn from me who knows”). As Blundell (1989, 66n.27) notes (of a different line), “Charis is used here in an idiom meaning ‘for the sake of’, but in this context it retains the connotation of reciprocal favour.”

143 Blundell 1989, 102.

144 ibid.

145 1353: χρατεῖς τοι τῶν φίλων νικώμενος.
as a friend?” (1328-9). Throughout this scene, Odysseus conducts himself with the perfect balance between respect for authority and democratic boldness before authority. North is right to choose this Odysseus, from all of Greek literature, as an exemplum of the highest degree of *sophrosune*.

Odysseus, with his diplomacy, tact, flexibility, persuasiveness and his emphasis on cooperation over conflict, is a man “who is by nature most adapted to the conditions of life in the polis, the ordered society;” his virtues are the virtues essential for democratic society. As Blundell notes, when Ajax’ model of justice is violated, he resorts to violence, revenge and self-help to redress his wrongs. Odysseus, on the other hand, holds a model of justice that sets limits on the selfish pursuit of vengeance. He recruits the weapons of persuasion and diplomacy and exercises personal restraint when he sees justice challenged. It is widely assumed in this play, and more broadly in 5th-century Athenian culture, that hostility toward an enemy applies also by association to an enemy’s *philoi*. Ajax, for example, takes as given the loyalty of the entire Greek army toward the Atreidae and hence curses them all in his dying words. The Atreidae and Odysseus are his enemies, so Ajax’ hostility must necessarily extend to all of their *philoi* as well. Odysseus, strikingly, interrupts this cycle of enmity by association, “offering friendship to the surviving *philoi* of his worst enemy.

This remarkable move has broader implications: Odysseus also moves away from the common Greek assumption that a man and his *philoi* are in some way the same, that one can, at least, accurately judge a man’s character by looking at those with whom he spends his time. Odysseus views each man, in each individual circumstance, as worthy of receiving a fresh, fair and impartial judgment. Though this undoubtedly goes against the current of Athenian belief, it is nevertheless a far more democratic attitude than the prevailing cultural assumption. This attitude essentially concedes that a ‘thin’ assessment of a man is enough, it is acceptable to take him simply as he seems at face value in any

---

146 For this as a formula for παρρησία, see e.g. Eur. *El.* 1049-59; Eur. *Ba.* 668-9. 1328-9: ἔξεστιν οὖν εἰπόντι τἀληθῆ φίλῳ σοὶ μηδὲν ἢ πάρος ξυνηρετεῖν; literally, “is it possible for a friend, speaking truth, to assist you in no way less than before?”

147 Knox 1961, 22.


149 See also Blundell 1989, 102.

150 ibid., 102.
given moment, thus obviating the need to pry deeply into one’s social life and deepest private habits, behaviors and associations in an attempt to ‘see through’ the man. Odysseus’ model is less suspicious, demonstrating a basic trust in one’s fellow man. Odysseus evinces a concern, not only for his own narrow private interests, but also for the harmony within the army and piety toward the gods, among other things. He looks out for Ajax’ dependents where Ajax failed to do so, coming across as quite altruistic.

Placing the cohesion of his society and general moral principles above the inclinations of his passions, Odysseus is a model citizen. In this play, Odysseus evinces a straightforward sincerity in all of his interactions, with Athena, with Agamemnon and with Ajax’ philoi. Odysseus rejects the idea that commitment to the ideal of sincerity forces a choice between various obligations, in this case to his friend Agamemnon or to the philoi he acquires on the basis of principle. Instead, like Neoptolemus in the Philoctetes, Odysseus finds a way to reconcile, albeit uneasily, the interests of both groups of philoi while remaining true to himself. These aspects of his character emerge as a product of his rational insight, together with an emotional temperament that is revealed from the outset to be other-regarding. In this text, it is unclear whether Odysseus’ other-regarding emotional nature shapes his rational insights or vice versa. It is only clear that, where Odysseus is seamlessly concerned for others, Ajax is portrayed as similarly self-involved.

Ajax, in stark contrast to Odysseus, “is motivated by pleasure in that he indulges to the full the desires to which his conceptions of justice, honour and eugeneia give rise.”151 The repeated description of Ajax as ‘mindless’ or ‘thoughtless’ comes to seem an almost willful state of being that he has explicitly chosen, given his scorn of sophrosune.152 It is an entirely fair assessment of Ajax that, as one who throughout pursues “personal gratification to the exclusion of the claims of all philoi,” including even the gods, “his inclinations seem unconstrained by principles that might curtail the selfish pursuit of pleasure.”153 He shows no respect for the ties that bind us to other men, ties of friendship, kinship, piety, citizenship, nor even for the institutions of the state that

151 Blundell 1989, 72.
152 763: ἄνους; 766: ἀφρόνως.
153 Blundell 1989, 68.
maintain order in society. Knox notes that Sophocles makes explicit lexical associations between the tribunal convened to give a judgment on the arms and the 5th-century Athenian lawcourts.\textsuperscript{154} The institution of the lawcourts arose in order to limit self-help and to end a cycle of personal vendetta and yet Ajax, utterly impervious to concerns for social order and in accordance with his personal ‘savage law’ (548),\textsuperscript{155} remorselessly pursues his narrow self-interest, i.e. vengeance, to the intended detriment of his community.

In sum, the fact that Ajax is incapable of and uninterested in exercising self-discipline over his passions has serious consequences for his ability to be sincere. Being strictly self-oriented leads to insincerity in the sense that he is willing to do anything to fulfill his own desires, even resorting to uncharacteristic trickery (47, νύκτωρ, δόλιος) and deceptive rhetoric (646-92). Sincerity entails a concern for others, in the sense of aligning one’s interests with broader community interests and of being a good friend and citizen, but Ajax is solely concerned here with his reputation. Given what we are told of earlier incidents in his life (prior to the action of the play), his behavior within this play, with the possible baffling exception of his philosophical ruminations in the deception speech, is all of a piece with his former self. When Ajax admits his inflexibility and resistance to substantive change in his personality (594-5), he is right: he possesses a stably unstable character; i.e. we can count on him to follow whithersoever his emotional impulses may lead in his observance of his personal ‘wild law’ (548, ὤμοῖς νόμοις).

Odysseus, inasmuch as he is seemingly passionless, is a much more steadfast, loyal friend and community member. He has a much stronger vision about what membership in a community entails, and it is his rationally worked-out convictions that hold him steady and consistent in a predictable temperament.

**Sincerity, Sophrosune and Citizenship**

The *Ajax* is explicitly concerned with self-discipline as it relates to the issue of what sort of person would make a good citizen. At the outset, we might expect to find

\textsuperscript{154} Knox 1961, 22-3.
\textsuperscript{155} 548: ὤμοῖς νόμοις.
two distinct models of sincerity that align with traditional characterizations: that is, Ajax will be blunt, straightforward, courageous and honest and Odysseus will be sneaky, shifty, rhetorical and untrustworthy. Yet Sophocles confounds our expectations by reimagining Ajax’ tendency toward brutishness and high temper as leading to a selfish orientation, the unthinking satisfaction of emotional impulses, sneakiness and insincerity. On the other hand, Odysseus’ usual qualities of being persuasive with words and his chameleon-like adaptation to circumstances are unexpectedly yoked to an odd brand of moral consistency, community-mindedness and sincerity.

In this play, *sophrosune* entails both the rational and emotional understanding of the proper time to submit, to yield in one’s willfulness, or to allow one’s will to be governed by another.\(^{156}\) Time is key to this formulation of *sophrosune* as “timely alternation”. Ajax is deeply aware of the way in which cycles of time structure ordinary human lives (646-7, 669-76) and it is this cyclical alternation of ruling and being ruled, this existence within time, that he feels compelled to opt out of. There is no sense in this play, however, that *sophrosune* entails the discipline of selfish impulse by objective rationality. Here, as in Thucydides, the parts of the self are perceived as continuous. It is impossible to unravel the influence on Odysseus’ character of his other-regarding emotional temperament and his rational objectivity. That is, we cannot know whether his rational insight on the mutability of human fortunes, the insight that leads him to shift from enmity to friendship with Ajax’ *philoi*, stems from his emotional response of pity at the sight of Ajax’ madness, or whether his pity emerges from his rational understanding of the human condition (121-6). In any case, the elements of Odysseus’ self are continuous in quality, with both his emotional responses and his reasoning encompassing his own role as one among a community of others.

Similarly, Ajax’ emotional impulses are self-regarding in that he is primarily concerned with his own honor and reputation. His brief moment of objective rationality in the deception speech shows him even still entrenched in selfish thinking: whereas Odysseus implicitly reasons that enmity must be limited as one may someday consider an

---
\(^{156}\) Hence the important recurrence throughout the play of the concept of timeliness, or ὁ καιρός or τὰ καίρια: 34, 38, 120, 1084, 1168, 1316. The connection between *sophrosune* and τὰ καίρια comes out especially nicely in Athena’s praise of Ajax’ former keen perception of timeliness (120).
enemy a friend (esp.1359), Ajax overtly concludes that efforts on behalf of a friend should be minimal if the same man might one day become an enemy (678-83). Out of selfish regard, Ajax wants to minimize his personal energy expenditure. Further, his insights in the deception speech do not alter his selfish determination to end his life, abandoning his obligations to philoi. Ajax is self-regarding through and through. And both Odysseus’ thinking and his actions take others into account at all times; it is this concern for others, together with what appears to be a primary rationality, that underwrites his sincere dealings with others.

The end of the play deals with a situation in which Odysseus needs to persuade his friend Agamemnon to allow something that he is radically opposed to allowing, the honorable burial of Ajax. Odysseus is successful in persuading Agamemnon precisely because he has been a consistently loyal and trustworthy friend over time. If we contrast this scene with the scene at the end of the Philoctetes, which I discuss in a later chapter, it is noteworthy that, once Neoptolemus betrays Philoctetes’ trust, no measure that Neoptolemus takes to win it back is successful. The play comes to a dramatic impasse, necessitating the intervention of a divine and thoroughly trusted friend to Philoctetes, Heracles. It is significant that the Ajax requires no divine intervention, thus establishing the importance and value of being consistently sincere and trustworthy in one’s dealings. Even though others in the play are suspicious of Odysseus, what is important is that Agamemnon, the friend who knows him well, harbors no suspicions of him whatsoever.

The Ajax also engages in the contemplation of the virtue of sincerity in reality. There is a strong trend in the Greek ideology of sincerity toward insisting upon unity of self and homogeneity. 157 This play, through the character of Odysseus, acknowledges that

157 I come to this conclusion because here, as elsewhere, aside from mentioning his pity for Ajax, Odysseus appears to be relatively passionless. Sophocles seems to emphasize, out of a range of characteristics for which Odysseus is known, his rationality, in order to explore its impact on sincerity of self.

158 See, e.g., Theog. 87-90, considering sincerity in the context of erotic love. The speaker here values transparency and a mind that is unified, unmixed or pure: “μή μ᾽ ἐπειπὶν μὲν ὀτέργη, νόον δ᾽ ἔχε καὶ φέρναις ἄλλη/ εἰ με φιλεῖς καὶ οοι πιστὸς ἔνεστι νόος./ ἦ με φύλει καθαρὸν θέμενος νόον, ἦ μ᾽ ἀφοειπὼν ἔγαθαιο, ἀμφαιδήν νέικος ἀειράμενος.” (“Do not love me with words, but hold your mind and heart apart, if you love me and the mind within you is trustworthy. Either love me, harboring an unmixed/pure mind, or, renouncing me, hate me openly, publicly raising a quarrel.”)
in real life we all harbor mixed motivations and complicated personalities, making perfect unity and transparency an impossible standard. In response to this reality, it is Odysseus’ solution that we must all discipline ourselves to adhere to generalizing, rationally formulated principles in order to create ourselves as sincere selves. In this play, with its overlapping emphasis on Odysseus as both a trustworthy friend and an other-regarding community member, ‘sincere’ comes to overlap as well with being a good citizen.

Looking back at Thucydides, some important similarities emerge between the characters of Pericles and the Odysseus of this play. Both men are big-picture, rational thinkers, which has two relevant implications: both exhibit self-consciousness and both are other-regarding. A rational view on the world enables both men to take themselves as objects of contemplation, viewing themselves as small parts in a larger whole. Though some philosophers consider self-consciousness to represent a hindrance to sincerity, they tend to be employing a model of sincerity that entails transparency and homogeneity. According to these criteria, self-consciousness suggests both a layering of self that is not homogenous and a cognitive filter on one’s emotions that hampers transparency. I will argue in the following chapters on the Hecuba and the Philoctetes that Euripides and Sophocles present self-consciousness in just this way in these plays, that is, as a negative awareness that facilitates pretending and acting in various roles. Yet, for Pericles and the Odysseus of this play, self-consciousness is a natural and positive by-product of a rational viewpoint of reality. In other words, one must be able to see oneself within reality in order to perceive one’s own reality accurately. In fact, in the Ajax, self-consciousness explicitly entails a humble awareness of one’s own insignificance – a rational insight – that supports and sustains Odysseus’ sincerity. The model of sincerity operative in the Ajax and for Thucydides’ Pericles emphasizes the criteria of consistency

Similarly, at Theog. 91-2, a two-fold mind (δίχ’ νόον) makes for a terrible friend (ἐτταίρος δειλός). See also, in Theognis, the language of the perfection of gold as a metaphor for the perfect homogeneity of self: 415-8; 447-52; 1105-6; see Theog. 963-70 for insistence on homogeneity of self; lastly, see Theog. 599-602 for non-homogeneity, being ποικίλος, as term for insincerity.

159 See Hampshire 1971 and the section on Hegel in the following chapter.
of self and a shared identity of interests with one’s community. Self-consciousness is a necessary accompaniment to these criteria.
Euripides’ Hecuba: Emotional Challenges to Sincerity

Based on the models of self outlined in Thucydides and the Ajax, I have been characterizing sincerity as a corollary of objective rationality, supported by objective, rationally generated, positive emotions such as pity, affection and civic loyalty. Sophrosune, as the rational judgment that affords an objective perspective of one’s place within a larger whole and as underwriting a sort of reasoned moderation of self, plays a crucial role in these accounts as a stabilizing force in the sincere personality.¹ In this chapter, however, I consider the limitations on the power of a consistent application of objective reason in generating and maintaining a stable self, and I explore the impact of one’s social milieu on the possibility for and practicality of engaging others in a sincere manner. To this end, I will consider Euripides’ Hecuba, a play that problematizes the rational will by depicting its ultimate failure to secure a stable character in the title character, despite her earnest faith in the combined powers of noble parentage and training in rational ethics to anchor the noble self (596-602). This play portrays a human being at the extremes of suffering and showcases a classic struggle between the subjective and objective elements that contend within the human soul and the analogous moral conflict for Agamemnon and Odysseus between obligations to friends and polis.

By depicting the vulnerability of human character to external circumstance, Euripides dramatizes the individual’s options for responding to injustice as constrained by factors out of his or her control.² Despite Hecuba’s prior demonstration of remarkable objectivity and rational consistency in her reaction to grief (see, e.g., 585-618), her aristocratic community’s failure to uphold shared Greek standards of justice leads her to

¹ I use sophrosune in the sense of the capacity for self-discipline that can maintain consistency and stability of identity (see Ch. 2). For example, in the Ajax, the rational insights of Odysseus’ sophrosune lead him to limit the extremes of his own self-regarding emotions, such as his personal enmity toward his rival, under certain conditions.

² In this chapter, I am taking up a thread introduced by Froma Zeitlin (1996, 177-8): “But aside from the perhaps discomfiting fact that ancient opinions strongly supported the justice of Hekabe’s revenge, Euripides has constructed a plot that puts maximum pressure on the tension between the stability (and autonomy) of a singular self and the network of reciprocal relations, both manifest and hidden, into which a character is inexorably drawn.”
pursue violent self-help in exacting just vengeance for her murdered son, Polydorus. Lastly, this play explores the devastating impact of insincerity on its victim. Hecuba’s relation to her Greek masters is openly an unequal one characterized by hostility. When the Greek army votes to sacrifice Hecuba’s daughter, Polyxena, to the ghost of Achilles (107f., 218-21), Hecuba may find this unjust (251f.), but it makes sense in the context of war and she handles her loss with great dignity and with admirable objectivity. The insincerity and deception of her close personal friend, Polymestor, however, represents injustice of an entirely different order and overwhelms her capacity for rational comprehension and objective distance.

Hecuba expounds a traditional, aristocratic account of virtue extolling the incorruptibility of a character properly shaped by a combination of noble parentage and good nurture (589f.). In her estimation, a rational, consistent education in nobility of behavior, underwritten by noble descent, results in sameness and predictability of character over time: “the good man is never anything other than good, nor does he change his nature due to misfortune but he is ever worthy” (597-8). Hecuba herself seems at first to fulfill the ideal of such stability in the face of extreme misfortune: she demonstrates this stability by clinging persistently to her rationally held values despite having endured the unimaginable losses of children, husband, status and country before the beginning of the play’s events. At the play’s outset, she possesses an admirable character that persists consistently in its nobility even in the face of such extreme losses. Much of the scholarly interpretation of this play centers on the question of whether Hecuba undergoes a culpable, ethical degeneration within the compass of the dramatic action. Judith Mossman rightly reminds us that tragedy thrives in the realm of gray: “My feeling is that we should not expect to be able to give our total approbation or condemnation to the actions of a major tragic heroine like Hecuba: if we think we can we are probably over-simplifying the case.” Further, a condemnatory judgment of Hecuba seems unwarranted.

---

3 The passage is excerpted and discussed as a whole on p.5. I engage there as well in the debate over whether these lines are an interpolation or original to the text.
4 Hecuba might be the most tragic of tragic figures. It is fitting that Hamlet conjures her as the fictional character whose surfeit of misfortune might most ‘sincerely’ evoke the emotions of a refined audience (Hamlet 444f.).
5 Mossman 1995, 203.
by the conclusion of the play, where Agamemnon judges Hecuba’s actions just in light of the offense (1240-51).

I do not here take a position on the debate over whether Hecuba undergoes a moral degeneration in the course of this play⁶ – in other words, that Euripides intends for her metamorphosis to signal a moral condemnation of her actions. This question may well be worth asking, but lies outside the bounds of my current inquiry. The important point for my argument is that she experiences a significant shift in her core values of a sort that undermines her claim to a stable character. I seek in this chapter not to judge Hecuba for proving unequal to the rigors of consistency of self under her excessively tragic circumstances, but rather to explain how this squares with her explicit claims about stability of character. Further, her stoic, dignified acceptance of all of her inconceivable losses prior to Polydorus, followed by her dramatic character shift following Polydorus' murder, seems to me to require some explanation, which I hope to provide by considering this text through the lens of its sincerity themes.

This play begins as the Greeks are sailing home from Troy with their Trojan captives, Hecuba and her daughters, Polyxena and Cassandra, among them. They have stopped off in Thrace in response to the ghost of Achilles, who demands the sacrifice of Polyxena (7-9, 35-43).⁷ Roughly the first half of the play, then, concerns the events surrounding Polyxena’s death and Hecuba’s reaction to it. Immediately after Polyxena’s death, Hecuba learns of the murder of her youngest son, Polydorus, by the local ruler and Hecuba’s guest-friend, Polymestor, when the body of Polydorus washes ashore by the Greek camp, providing the interpretive key to understanding Hecuba’s recent recurrent dreams about her son (658f., esp. 702-6). The play is structured around three important scenes of attempted persuasion:⁸ Hecuba’s supplication of Odysseus to spare her daughter’s life (239-95); her supplication of Agamemnon to help her obtain justice for the murder of Polydorus (752-845); and the contest between Hecuba and Polymestor

---

⁶ See Zeitlin (1996, 177-8, and n.15) for a critique of the argument that Hecuba suffers a moral degeneration and that her metamorphosis signifies her downfall and punishment. I am uninterested in judging Hecuba or in arguing that Euripides intends her metamorphosis as a condemnation of her actions.

⁷ For the strange, liminal and sinister qualities of this Thracian landscape, see Zeitlin 1996, esp. 172-4.

⁸ Segal 1993, 191-2.
before Agamemnon as judge following Hecuba’s blinding of Polymestor and murder of his two sons (1129-1237).

My line of argument is this: Hecuba is depicted here as a figure who believes deeply in a moral order that she expects to be shared by the other aristocratic figures with whom she comes into contact: Polymestor, Odysseus, and Agamemnon, as well as by the members of her kin group, such as Polyxena. As Zeitlin rightly observes, however, “Hekabe is the only standard-bearer in the play for an objective moral order: the norms of justice and fair treatment, the sanctions of respect and pity for the weak, the rules pertaining to xenia, and, of course, the proper treatment of the dead.” As the play progresses and Hecuba repeatedly finds herself in encounters with men who “abdicate their roles of moral authority,” with the most devastating such encounter being with her former dear friend Polymestor, Hecuba comes to the corrosive realization that her faith in this objective moral order is not shared. She realizes that, if she wants to accomplish the requital for the murder of her son that she feels the norms of justice demand, she will have to rely on her own wiles to obtain this satisfaction. Her faith in a social order governed by shared conventions is shattered. Martha Nussbaum, who focuses on the moral degeneration question, argues that Hecuba turns from a belief in an objective, shared set of cultural conventions (nomos) to a self-oriented nomos of vengeance, which engenders in her a character that is deceptive and guileful. The formerly sincere elements of her character no longer have any place in her changed perception of the social order. Hecuba, with her new nomos, becomes utterly self-seeking and self-interested; revenge is her only aim. From this moment, Hecuba becomes adept in

10 ibid., 176.
11 For the absence of the gods from this play, see Zeitlin 1996, 174-6; Mossman 1995, 3. Although in this play, “many general references are made to divinities, many conventional appeals to the usual pieties” (Zeitlin 175), Hecuba looks to human aid rather than divine to enact just vengeance for her son’s murder.
12 Nussbaum 2001, 408f.
13 Hecuba comes to question the intrinsic value of sincerity, seeing its value instead as instrumental. See Williams 2002, Ch. 5 for the moral significance of this distinction.
14 Nussbaum 2001, 414-5. While, for the most part, I accept Nussbaum’s analysis of Hecuba’s shift in governing nomos, I want to distance myself from any imputation that sincerity for Hecuba is morally choiceworthy. I treat her transition from a unified self
deception, subtlety and the misrepresentation to others of her inner self. Further, the
events of this play initiate a development in Hecuba’s self from an integrated self to a
divided, or disintegrated self. Euripides portrays this development as one that
compromises her ability to manifest sincerity.

**Hecuba on the Stability of Good Character**

Impressed by the herald’s account of the nobility with which her daughter Polyxena died, Hecuba delivers a famous speech on the stability of a noble human character (592-602):

```
οὔκουν δεινόν, εἳ γῆ μὲν κακὴ
tυχόνσα καρποῦ θεόθεν εὖ στάχυν φέρει,
χρηστὴ δ᾽ ἀμαρτοῦσ᾽ ἐὼν χρεὼν αὐτὴν τυχεῖν
κακὸν δίδωσι καρπόν, ἀνθρωποὶ δ᾽ ἀεὶ
ὁ μὲν πονηρὸς οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν κακὸς,
ὁ δ᾽ ἐσθλὸς ἐσθλός, οὐδὲ συμφορᾶς ὑπὸ
φύσιν διέφθειε, ἀλλὰ χρηστὸς ἐστ᾽ ἀεὶ;
ἄρ᾽ οἱ τεκόντες διαφέρουσι ἢ τροφαὶ;
ἐξει γε μὲντο καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς
δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τούτο δ᾽ ἦν τὶς εὐ μάθῃ,
οἴδεν τὸ γ᾽ αἰσχρὸν κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθῶν.
```;

with an objective worldview to a divided self with a subjective perspective as analytically
prior to any discussion of whether this shift is blameworthy or not. In fact, Euripides’
portrayal of Hecuba’s circumstances effectively calls into question the value of sincerity
under certain conditions. In the Theognidea insincerity in speech is justified by the
insincere actions of others (e.g. 61-8).

15 I take all *Hecuba* passages from Gregory’s 1999 text. Diggle and Kovacs follow
Sakrorraphos in questioning the authenticity of lines 599-602. Many scholars, however,
have weighed in to support the authenticity of these lines: Collard 1991, 162; Johansen
1959, 158f.; Mossman 1995, 121-2; Gregory 1999, 117-8; Kamerbeek (1986, 101): “This
is an instance of downright wrong athetesis.” My own opinion is that these lines develop
on ideas expressed lines earlier in a natural way; Mossman (1995, 122) adds that these
lines take up a dialogue with Polyxena’s words about her own upbringing (351, 375-8).
Further, they echo sentiments expressed elsewhere in Euripides: *Supp.* 909-17. I feel
there are ample grounds for treating them as authentic.

16 Wakefield suggests emending the line by replacing μαθών with σταθμῶν; Porson
similarly suggests μετρῶν. Both are appealing for picking up the notion of measuring
introduced with κανόν, a carpenter’s or mason’s rule.
Is it not strange, if poor soil
Receiving what is proper from the god bears a good harvest,
While good soil, deprived of the things that are necessary that it receive
Yields a poor harvest, but with regard to men always
The base man is nothing other than base,
While the good man is good, nor does he due to chance events
Forget his nature but he is ever good?
Is it the parents or education that makes the difference?
Certainly also having been well educated has the capability of
Teaching nobility; if one learns this well,
He comes to know by learning the base too by the standard of the noble.

Employing an agricultural analogy, Hecuba here complicates the traditional Greek model that posits that human beings are like plants, in the sense that our moral development is dependent on nurture - external conditions over which we have little control. Instead, Hecuba recruits this analogy only to suggest that there is something significantly different about the cultivation of crops and the cultivation of a stable, virtuous human character. Human character, she asserts, is a stable entity. Unlike environment-dependent plants, once formed, our selves are unchanging and consistent, resistant to degeneration, even when put to the test by unfavorable external conditions (597-8).

Acknowledging that human character likely derives from something more than simply heredity, Hecuba admits that an external factor initially shapes good character – nurture or education certainly assists in molding the young mind (599, τροφαί; 600, τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς). Nurtu, she says, teaches the standard of goodness (602, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ), allowing an individual to complement and sustain his inborn nature once he has thoroughly learned to distinguish the noble from the shameful through the process of youthful habituation. That is, one learns the good and thereby learns to avoid the base. Hecuba confidently asserts, though, that after this initial period of malleability, the character is fully formed and impervious to the effects of circumstance. Having once

---

17 For more on this model of human development, see Nussbaum 2001, 400f. See also Gregory 1999, 117. For the theme of nature vs. nurture in 5th-century literature, see Collard 1991, 162.

18 The notion, however, that a good upbringing is sufficient to instill virtue is not suggested here: see, e.g., Eur. frag. 810, Kannicht, TGrF: μέγιστον ἀρ᾽ ἡ νῆ φύσις· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν/ οὐδεὶς τρέφων εὐ χριστόν ἂν θείῃ ποτέ (“Nature plays the greatest role; for no one could ever render the base nature serviceable through good nurture.”).

19 This is an aristocratic account of the origin of virtue.
mastered the ethical standard of good and bad (καλός, αἰσχρός), this standard deeply structures our psychologies and we are then capable of applying the standard independently under changing conditions.\(^{20}\) That is, with nurture having instilled in us a clear distinction between noble and base behavior, this standard of proper conduct is fully internalized. Going forth in the world, with its diverse circumstances, we maintain a rational comprehension of this distinction between the noble and the base. With a psychology structured by a rational understanding of the good, the noble self will respond to every situation with spontaneous right action, knowing by habituation what response ‘the good’ requires of him.

According to Hecuba’s thinking, then, a stable character is made possible by *sophrosune*, understood as the consistent application of the rational faculty. That is, by means of a disciplined assessment and measuring of situations against the standard of goodness (602, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ), one guarantees a stable predictability of reaction, the standard itself remaining constant. In Fragment 959, Euripides asserts that he deems *sophrosune* an essential component of virtue.\(^ {21}\) North discusses the involvement of *sophrosune* in the contemporary debate over the relationship between nature and social convention (*phusis* vs. *nomos*), explaining that *sophrosune* is central to two contemporary concerns, whether virtue originates from nature or nurture and how suffering exposes the true qualities of the human character.\(^ {22}\) The *Hecuba* is centrally concerned with both of these questions. Although, as North notes, there are few female characters in Euripidean tragedy whose passion-inspired behavior cannot be attributed to a defect in *sophrosune*,\(^ {23}\) nowhere does Euripides explicitly mention Hecuba’s *sophrosune* or lack thereof; this despite the fact that “Euripides is especially sensitive to the consequences (in terms of *sophrosune*) resulting from the triumph of anger and vengefulness” over reason.\(^ {24}\) In the case of Hecuba, however, unlike many of Euripides’ other female characters, her grief is so natural, understandable and complete that it would perhaps seem inappropriately harsh

\(^{20}\) Nussbaum 2001, 403.

\(^{21}\) See North 1966, 69. Fragment 959, Kannicht, *TGrF*: ἐγὼ δ̣ οὐδὲν πρεσβύτερον/νομίζω τὰς σωφροσύνας̣, ἐπεὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀεὶ ἐξέστη (“I deem nothing more venerable than *sophrosune*, since it is always present with the good”).

\(^{22}\) North 1966, 74.

\(^{23}\) ibid., 71.

\(^{24}\) ibid., 76.
to label her as defective in *sophrosune*, particularly since throughout the play it is her first inclination to pursue her vengeance through the objective institutions of supplication and shared convention. Rather, this play reveals the general weakness of *sophrosune* for all human beings in the face of unimaginable loss and the ultimate impotence of rational self-discipline to guarantee the consistency of character throughout all of life’s conditions. Hecuba is, however, a consistent champion of *sophrosune* in her repeated admonitions to others to beware of over-confidence in one’s position of wealth and power (282f., 623f.), a central insight of *sophrosune*.²⁵

Early in the play, Odysseus offers Hecuba a model for dealing with less-than-ideal conditions, advising her, “it is wise also in unfortunate circumstances to think the things that are required” (228).²⁶ He goes on to show that he adheres to this motto in life: when he was caught as a spy in Troy and was at the whim of Hecuba herself, he openly avers that he used “the invention of many words in order that I might not die” (250).²⁷ In other words, he was willing to say anything to avoid death;²⁸ concerns for dignity, truth and sincerity evaporated. Indeed, it is suggested early in the play that this willingness to say whatever is expedient to his aims is not limited to life and death conditions. The chorus characterizes Odysseus as “a mottled-minded liar, the sweet-tongued demos-pleaser, the son of Laertes” (131-3).²⁹ He is someone who coins (κόπις, from κόπτω, to strike coins) whatever pleasing words suit his purposes in order to win political influence with the masses. Odysseus, then, in keeping with his common dramatic characterization, advocates a flexibility of character as practical rather than valuing stability or consistency of character for its own sake.³⁰ He makes it clear that he values expediency over notions of absolute, objective moral value.

---

²⁵ See, e.g., North 1966, 16-8, *et passim*.
²⁶ 228: σοφόν τοι κάν κακοῖς ἄ δει φρονεῖν.
²⁷ 250: πολλῶν λόγων εὑρήμαθ᾽ ὡστε μὴ θανεῖν.
²⁸ For Odysseus’ association with πανουργία, the willingness to do anything, see e.g. Blundell 1989, 188f., 211.
²⁹ 131-3: ὁ ποικιλόφρων/ κόπις ἡμιλόγος δημοχαριστὴς/ Λαερτίαδης… These accusations are reiterated by Hecuba at 252-7.
³⁰ However, here, as opposed to in the *Ajax*, this personal philosophy is not given a positive spin.
In her interaction with Odysseus, Hecuba rejects both the man and his model of behavior (251-7). Despite her desperate circumstances, as one whose daughter is about to become a sacrificial victim, Hecuba is not willing to say anything, but comports herself with dignity and speaks from righteous indignation and moral outrage. She justly rebukes Odysseus for not repaying her generous treatment of him when he was under her sway in Troy, but for instead harming her to gain some advantage with the masses of the army (252-3). Unlike her, she claims, he does not adhere to the principle of popular morality of helping friends (256-7). Further, she pleads against Polyxena’s sacrifice using rational argument and lofty principles: Polyxena makes an inappropriate sacrificial victim on several grounds (258-70); according to the dictates of justice, Odysseus owes her a kindness in return for favors received, and furthermore he is obligated to respond to her supplication of him (271-81); Odysseus, she implies, should treat her with gentleness and dignity in the knowledge that the fortunes of even the powerful can suffer sudden reverses (282-5); and lastly she claims that, on a religious and legal basis, the sacrifice of her daughter would be transgressive (287-92). In this plea, Hecuba stakes a claim to the moral high ground and maintains this level of righteousness throughout. Despite the high emotion of the context, her speech is remarkably objective in tone, with Hecuba making only the slightest of subjective references to the emotional impact of this situation on her and refusing to exploit the tragedy of her plight and the frailty of her old age.

Hecuba’s Transformation

Hecuba’s interchange with Odysseus forms a stark contrast with her plea to Agamemnon for aid in avenging herself against Polymestor, which I will address below.31

31 See also the chorus’ remarks on Odysseus at 131-3. It is in fact Odysseus who tips the balance in the assembly (107, ξυνόδῳ) of the Achaeans in favor of sacrificing Polyxena (130-40). Not only, then, does he not help Hecuba, but he even actively supports her misfortune.

32 This, of course, is according to Hecuba. Odysseus will level a similar accusation against Hecuba (and all barbarians) (327-31). It is a matter of competing notions of who constitutes a ‘friend’.

33 That these speeches are meant to form a contrasting pair is indicated by the repetition of Hecuba’s suppliant plea (286, 806, αἰδέσθητι με): Segal 1993, 191-2.
Between these two important supplication speeches, addressed to Odysseus and to Agamemnon in turn, Hecuba suffers a new devastating blow: the discovery of the murder of her youngest son by someone she had considered one of her dearest friends (681f., 794). Hecuba’s recognition of the fate of Polydorus marks an important moment in the play, as prefigured by the maidservant’s dramatic words (esp. 667f.). Zeitlin regards the recognition of Polydorus’ murder as particularly significant for Hecuba’s character, as the “turning point of the play at its Dionysiac core.”

Prior to this scene, anyone would readily admit that the aged queen has suffered a surfeit of personal tragedy; yet, horrific as her losses have been, they are not unpredictable in a context of war and have been inflicted by enemies. Polymestor’s shocking betrayal of the relationships of ἥξενια and φιλία is of an entirely different character than, for example, Odysseus’ rejection of her supplication. Despite her previous misfortunes, Hecuba has to this point been able to maintain her core values and worldview. This fresh blow, however, leaves her utterly dumbfounded and stupefied (684-720). Though the loss of Polyxena was certainly also tragic for Hecuba, I would contend that she is never out of her mind with grief; she remains, in fact, quite rational (see 585f., esp. 587-8). After brief expressions of grief for Polyxena, Hecuba adjusts to the reality of the situation, comforted by Polyxena’s nobility, and sets about organizing the preparations for her daughter’s burial. There is no indication that Hecuba views herself as having been wronged beyond what is expected in wartime. Furthermore, the

36 The marked changes in Hecuba’s speech, discussed below, demonstrate the contrast between this personal betrayal and her other wartime misfortunes.
37 Mossman (1995, 122) notes that Hecuba’s reflections at 585-602 allow her to understand her daughter’s position on dying and that this understanding fortifies her to deal with the loss.
38 While Odysseus is in the conflicted position of being Hecuba’s philos on the basis of a private supplication (see Belfiore 2000, 7-8 for supplication as initiating a relationship of xenia for social equals and as analogous to kinship) and her enemy in war, Polymestor is both private philos and xenos and the two friends’ political entities are not in a state of hostility toward each other. Though Odysseus does transgress the cultural norms of xenia, as a political enemy, it is somewhat more to be expected than the terrible betrayal by a private friend for purely personal gain.
notion of vengeance does not enter her mind. It is certainly noteworthy, then, that, upon
her recognition of Polydorus, Hecuba exclaims that now she will “begin a Bacchic
nomos” (685-6).

Martha Nussbaum’s reading of the Hecuba charts what she sees as a shift in
Hecuba’s convictions: Hecuba begins the play with a naïve yet admirable belief that,
while ethical standards are generated within human society and not backed by any
objective, absolute standard independent of mankind, they are nevertheless enduring and
provide a stable underpinning for our human psychologies.\(^{39}\) Nussbaum locates Hecuba’s
shift to a more cynical perception of the role of ethical values in human society at the
point where she learns of her son’s brutal murder (681f.) by one who was “first among
the number of my philoi” (794).\(^ {40}\) That is, Hecuba realizes from the atrocious murder of
her son that the ethical standards in which she has placed so much faith are in fact not as
secure and inviolable as she thought. At this point, Nussbaum claims, assuming a play on
the multiple meanings of the word nomos, that Hecuba signifies her changing perspective
by taking up a new nomos, or ethical standard, that of revenge (684-6):\(^ {41}\)

\(^{39}\) Nussbaum 2001, 400-3.
\(^{40}\) 794: ἀφθιμῷ πρῶτα τῶν ἐμῶν φίλων.
\(^{41}\) Nussbaum (in agreement with Reckford 1985, 211n.7) posits a play on two of the
meanings of nomos, ‘law, or convention’ and ‘song’. Her reading of the Hecuba has
drawn sharp criticism (see, e.g., Mossman 1995, 166-7; Heath 1987; Gregory 1999, 129),
particularly for her reading of these lines and the suggestion of the pun on nomos. It
should be noted that her work on this play has also been received with praise and
acceptance (e.g. Heath 1987; Segal 1993, Chs. 9-11, passim). I adopt the following
reading of the Greek, favored by Porson, Paley, Daitz and Diggle (see Mossman 1995,
167n.8), as well as by Kovacs in the Loeb (1995), as opposed to the reading favored by
Murray (ὦ τέκνον τέκνον, αἰῶνια, κατάφρονων γόνων, βασιχεῖον ἐξ ἀλάστορος
ἀρτιμαθῆ νόμον), for the reason that Nussbaum’s compelling reading of these lines has
been critiqued (Mossman 1995, 166-7, 167n.8-9) for relying upon the Murray text; yet I
wish to show that, using this reading, Nussbaum’s point still stands. As for Gregory’s
critique that the text does not invite us to read a play on words in the two meanings of
nomos (p.129), in a play in which nomos is such a significant theme, this seems narrow-
minded, particularly when Gregory herself highlights an earlier pun between
νόμος... ἱοῦς (291) and ἱονομία (p.81-2). That Euripides, then, would play around with
the shades of meaning and associations of the word nomos is not far-fetched.
ὦ τέκνον τέκνον,
aiai, xatáρχομαι νόμον
βαχχεῖον, εἰς ἀλάστορος
ἀρτιμαθῆς κακῶν.

O child child,
Alas, I begin a bacchic song,
Having just learnt of my misfortunes
Sent from an avenging spirit.

From this point, revenge becomes Hecuba’s guiding principle and the new *nomos* that structures her psyche. As I mention above, Hecuba’s language changes from the moment she recognizes that the dead body before her is her son, with repetition of words signaling her unspeakable distress and disbelief: at 684, she laments, “oh, my child, my child!” (ὦ τέκνον τέκνον); at 689, she stammers, “unbelievable, unbelievable, new, new are the things I see” (ἄπιστ᾽ ἄπιστα, καινὰ καινὰ δέρκομαι); at 694, again she repeats, “ὦ τέκνον τέκνον”; asked by the chorus leader who has committed this heinous crime, Hecuba stumbles, “my, my friend” (710, ἐμὸς ἐμὸς ἔξως).

42 Utterly beyond believing and newly invented (689, ἄπιστα, καινὰ), she claims, is the monstrosity of this act, a crime so shocking that it is unable to be spoken about (714, ἄρρητ᾽) or named (ἀνωνόμαστα); it is beyond amazement (714, θαυμάτων πέρα). Euripides, in this scene between Hecuba, her maidservant and the chorus, employs *epirrhematikon*, or a half-lyric dialogue, in order to offset Hecuba’s grief against her interlocutors’ relative calm: while Hecuba sings, her companions reply in trimeter. 43 Hecuba predominantly sings in dochmiacs here, a meter used by the tragedians to express extremes of emotion: this meter “to a much greater extent than any other metrical type appears to have a definite

---

42 Euripides employs *anadiplosis* and *polyptoton* to signal the extremes of Hecuba’s lament (e.g. 689-90). From the moment of her entrance on stage, Hecuba’s disturbance by the visions in her dreams and worry about her daughter is signposted by her use of *anadiplosis* (96); then, learning of Polyxena’s impending sacrifice, Hecuba shifts to lyric lament, peppering her song with *anadiplosis* and *polyptoton*, which is mirrored by her daughter (154-206). Such figures of speech are a common feature of Euripides’ lament style. Here, it is these elements of style, taken together with her use of *epirrhematikon*, dochmiacs, her word choice and the remarkable loss of her characteristic composure following Polydorus’ recognition that signal an extraordinary degree of grief over the unexpected and violent murder of her son by a friend.

43 Gregory 1999, 129.
emotional connotation.” Hecuba’s speech, then, contributes to the picture of a woman whose rational self-control is faltering and who is in the grip of an involuntary transition from primarily rational to primarily emotional.

Soon after Hecuba learns of Polydorus’ murder, Agamemnon enters and an awkward exchange ensues, in which Agamemnon repeatedly addresses Hecuba, but she, deeply engrossed in her self-address, does not reply. Instead, she remains with her back to him, musing over whether she can trust him and wondering what sort of reception she will get from him. Segal notes that this scene, with Hecuba’s repeated asides and rebuff of Agamemnon’s direct address, is “an effect unique in extant Greek drama.” Ultimately, she resolves on supplicating him, seeing his usefulness as an instrument in her revenge: “I could not exact vengeance for my children without him” (749-50).

When Hecuba’s long supplication speech to Agamemnon is set against her supplication speech to Odysseus, some interesting differences emerge that expose Hecuba’s internal transformation.

As Zeitlin notes, the primary feature of Hecuba’s metamorphosis at the play’s end is the “intensification of her gaze”. This is a process that originates with the shocking sight of Polydorus’ corpse. This moment is eye-opening for Hecuba; she sees things she has never seen before (689). As I argue above, in support of Nussbaum’s reading, Hecuba shifts to a nomos of revenge at this crucial turning point, indicating a simultaneous shift in meter and worldview. A certain naïveté or innocence that she possessed in the beginning of the play is now lost. Hecuba’s view of the world becomes at the same time more self-conscious and more cynical. She begins to limit or control visual access to herself in a way that represents a marked disjunction from her previous interactions with others. With her increased cynicism about the motives of others comes a newly emerging self-consciousness about her own role in society. Hecuba no longer interacts with others

---

44 ibid.; see also Dale 1968, 110.
45 Segal 1993, 203.
46 749-50: οὐχ ἄν δύναμιν τοῦθεν τιμωρεῖν ἄτερ/ τέκνοις τοῖς ἐμοῖς. Zeitlin (1996, 191-94) gives a compelling interpretation of Hecuba’s “funny math”, of her killing of Polymestor’s two children in exchange for her one son’s murder. It is interesting that here already Hecuba speaks of avenging her children.
in a spontaneous, uncontrived manner, but rather shows a heightened awareness of how she is perceived (807-11):

οἴκτιρον ἡμᾶς, ὡς γραφεύς τ᾽ ἀποσταθείς
ιδοὺ με κάναθομον οὐ ἔχω κακά·
τύραννος ἢ ποτ᾽ ἄλλα νῦν δούλη σέθεν,
εὔπαις ποτ᾽ οὖσα, νῦν δὲ γραύς ἀπαίς θ᾽ άμα,
ἀπολις ἐρημος, ἀθλιωτάτη βροτῶν.

Pity me, and standing back like a painter
See me and observe closely what sort of evils I suffer;
I was once a queen but am now your slave,
Once blessed with children, now I am at once an old woman and childless,
Cityless, bereft, most wretched of mortals.

Like a stage director, Hecuba sets the scene for Agamemnon, directing him in how he should view her and how he should interpret what he sees. She shows herself willing at this point to use her own physical appearance and the tragedy of her plight as an instrument in accomplishing the end of persuasion, something she stopped short of with Odysseus previously.

As I touched upon above, with her single-minded devotion to revenge and her new awareness that her former aristocratic conception of social justice is not necessarily shared as she had thought it was, Hecuba develops an instrumental view of the world; everything must do some work toward her goal of revenge. She demonstrates, for example, an instrumental view of Agamemnon, deciding to share her thoughts with him on the grounds that she needs his help if she wants to obtain vengeance (749-50). Then, in making her case for Agamemnon’s aid, when Agamemnon apparently attempts to back away from her, Hecuba misunderstands his reluctance. With a new perception of the power self-interest holds for many of the people around her, she makes an assumption about the sort of argument that will most likely persuade. She consequently abandons the

48 See also Nussbaum 2001, 414-5.
49 I will address this below in greater detail. As Agamemnon explains, though, he hesitates to help out of a concern that, if the army discovers his mixed motivations (between supporting their interests and supporting the interests of a private, aristocratic philos), they will regard him as insincere in the sense that his interests are not coextensive with theirs (850-63).
more objective arguments based on the principles of justice and attempts to play, instead, on the general’s subjective attachment to her daughter, Cassandra (824-32). Hecuba appeals to the principle of reciprocity, asking him what χάρις (gratitude or return) her daughter’s loving embraces have earned her. Hecuba has adopted Odysseus’ model of valuing expediency above all else and is now willing to say anything in order to accomplish her ends.

Hecuba also evinces a greater self-consciousness about how she is perceived in her interpersonal interactions. When Agamemnon first approaches her after the discovery of Polydorus’ murder, Hecuba turns her back to him and refuses to face him or to engage with him until she has decided what approach to take (739-40, 743-4). Similarly, when she reunites with Polymestor, her son’s murderer, she refuses to look him directly in the face, saying that she is “unable to look at him with straight eyes” (968, 972). Reading these two scenes together with Hecuba’s pointed request that Agamemnon should step back and view her as an object, as a painter would his subject (807-11), I contend that Hecuba’s naturalness in social settings has evaporated with the knowledge that what for her were shared social conventions are not in fact shared by her peers. She has a new, more cynical awareness that those around her are motivated not by a noble concern for justice and piety, but by narrow self-interest. She has come to understand that the way she presents herself in the world holds far more weight than the validity of her claims. It is with this cynicism that Hecuba instructs Agamemnon to stand back and look at her; she is staging her grief and personal tragedy for him, highly aware of using her appearance as

---

50 828-30: ποῦ τάς φίλας δήτ᾽ εὐφρόνας λέξεις, ἄναξ; ἢ τῶν ἐν εὐνῇ φιλτάτων ἀσπασμάτων/ χάριν τίν᾽ ἔξει παῖς ἐμή, κείνης δ᾽ ἔγω; Hecuba had earlier recruited the principle of χάρις with Odysseus without success, i.e. that he owed her a kindness in return for her having spared his life in Troy; here, she turns to an appeal more rooted in self-interest than objective principle, one that she hopes will speak more powerfully to her audience’s desire. Critics have had varied responses to these lines, from the moral condemnation of Hecuba to defending this sentiment as unextraordinary in the ancient context: see, e.g., Nussbaum 2001, 414-5; Zeitlin 1996, 203-4; Gregory 1999, 143; Mossman 1995, 127-8; Lembke/Reckford 1991, 13; Segal 1993, 182-3.

51 968: αἰσχύνομαι σε προοβλέπειν ἐναντίον…; 972: κοῦκ ἀν δυναίμην προοβλέπειν ὀρθάς κόρας.

52 For two other compelling accounts of how vision and the gaze are working in these scenes, see Zeitlin (1996, 189-91) and Nussbaum (2001, 410-12). I do not feel that these accounts are mutually exclusive with mine.
a tool in her argument. She controls direct eye contact with others now so that she will be in control of her appearance. She has changed from the Hecuba of the beginning of the play, evincing a sharpened ability to imagine how she appears to others and to use her image to manipulate her interlocutors.

**Sincerity, Trust and the Unified Self**

Moral philosophers, ancient and modern alike, for the most part agree that there is a certain disposition that is a prerequisite for sincerity.  

Ancient periphrases for sincerity frequently posit that this value emanates from a simple or integral self, a self that is homogenous and undivided in its essence. In his book, *Talk Is Cheap*, John Haiman explores alienation from one’s self, or the transition from a unified self to a divided self, as a process with external signs that indicate the extent of alienation. He argues that, as a unified self, an individual is completely involved in his environment and generally lacks a self-conscious awareness of himself; he interacts in his environment naturally and spontaneously, without contrivance. The unified self is not cynical, ironic or sarcastic. This state of unification or non-alienation from one’s self is intimately connected to the state of sincerity. In the ancient world, Demosthenes makes an explicit association between sincerity and simplicity of self (Dem. 18.321):

\[
Δύο δ’, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, τὸν φύσει μέτριον πολίτην ἔχειν δεῖ…ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις τὴν τοῦ γενναίου καὶ τοῦ πρωτείου τῇ πόλει προάμεσον διαφυλάττειν, ἐν παντὶ δὲ καὶ καὶ πράξει τὴν εὐνοίαν…ταύτην τούτην παρ’ ἐμοὶ μεμενηκυῖαν ἑπεὶ ἀπλῶς.
\]

It is necessary, men of Athens, that the virtuous citizen have by nature two qualities; when in a position of authority he should firmly maintain a

---

53 By disposition, I mean to indicate the manifestation of a specific relationship between the parts of the self. For the modern debate on the effect of self-consciousness and complexity of self on the ability to be sincere, see Trilling 1972; Hampshire 1971; Hegel 1967.
55 ibid., passim.
57 Greek taken from Yunis’ 2001 text of Dem. 18.
policy that secures the honor and first rank of the city, and at every opportunity and in every action he should demonstrate his loyal disposition toward the city...this, you will find, has sincerely been my own steadfast disposition.

Demosthenes speaks here in the context of demonstrating his own sincerity as a public figure, asserting his own patent and unwavering loyalty to the interests of Athens as an entity. He claims to have exhibited such a patriotic disposition ἄπλως, that is, simply, or in a way that is not compound or complex. The devoted, sincere public speaker, then, has a simple, uncomplicated self and it is this simplicity that guarantees his sincerity. Further, he is free of mixed motivations, being seamlessly public-minded from his ‘private’ life to his role as a public advisor.

Thucydides also gives clear expression to the relationship between simplicity of self and sincerity, in his account of the Corcyraean stasis (3.83.1):

καὶ τὸ εὔηθες, οὗ τὸ γενναῖον πλεῖστον μετέχει, καταγελασθὲν ἡφανίσθη, τὸ δὲ ἀντιτετάχθαμ ἁλλήλαι τῇ γνώμη ἀπίστως ἐπὶ πολὺ διήνεγκεν· οὐ γὰρ ἦν οὐ διαλύσων οὗτε λόγος ἐχυρὸς οὗτε ὁρκος φοβερὸς, χρείοοντος δὲ ὄντες ἀπαντες λογισμῷ ἐς τὸ ἀνέλπιστον τοῦ βεβαίου μὴ παθεῖν μᾶλλον προοιμότοιν ἢ πιστεύσαι ἐδύναντο.

And that guilelessness, which constitutes the greatest part of a noble nature, being derided, disappeared, while being ranged mistrustfully against each other in their minds prevailed to a great extent; for there was no word trustworthy enough nor oath dreadful enough to reconcile men, but all, if they were stronger, taking into their calculations the hopelessness of security, were more likely to make provisions against being wronged than they were able to trust others.

This passage outlines the cycle of mistrust that, once under way, continues to expand outward, eroding men’s ability to trust in their fellow citizens. Thucydides, then, associates this quality of τὸ εὔηθες, which can be translated as “simplicity”, “guilelessness” or “open-heartedness”,59 with both nobility of character and the ability to

58 It is no coincidence that so many scholars think of Thucydides in connection with this play (e.g. Segal 1993, 158, 186, 202; Nussbaum 2001, 404-5; Reckford 1985, 125-6; Finley 1967; Hogan 1972).

59 For a useful discussion of the history of this term’s use in scholarship, including various translations, see Peter Pouncey’s BMCR review of Crane’s Thucydides and the
trust in one’s fellow man, as well as with being sincere and being capable of judging others as sincere. A sort of complexity of thought creeps into men’s minds in this account and citizens cease to interact with each other simply and unself-consciously. The cycle of civic unrest introduces a new awareness of one’s position relative to others and a complicated calculation (λογισμῷ) of survival. This passage illustrates the importance of trust in the external signs of sincerity manifested by others (or lack of suspicion).

Thucydides puts a similar sentiment in the mouths of the Mytilenians, stressing the intimate relationship between trust and sincerity: “we know that neither friendship among men is secure nor is an alliance between cities fruitful, unless they behave toward each other with transparent honesty and are generally similar in disposition” (3.10.1). Relationships, then, whether private or political, must be formed on a foundation of mutual trust in each other’s patent sincerity. Thucydides’ history as a whole details the concomitant decline in trust and sincerity in Athenian society, with the time of Pericles’ influence representing the pinnacle of sincerity and public trust. Pericles himself is known to be an honest and unimpeachably trustworthy leader, which in turn creates an atmosphere of mutual trust among Athenians. Indeed, in his funeral oration, Pericles illustrates a culture of acceptance, toleration and liberality among citizens (e.g. 2.37.2-3, 2.42.3). Under Pericles’ influence, the quality of openness and trust, τὸ εὔηθες, yet persists in Athenian society.

Thucydides goes on to chart the highly corrosive impact that Cleon’s political style has on this culture of mutual trust. Cleon strives to engender suspicion of their public speakers among the Athenian demos by impugning the sincerity of public speakers.

Ancient Simplicity. Pouncey suggests, I think rightly, that another good translation of τὸ εὔηθες is “straightforwardness”. In any of these guises, τὸ εὔηθες has clear overtones of “sincerity”.

60 This simplicity of mind should be contrasted with, e.g., the ποικιλόφρων Odysseus, he of heterogeneous mind (Hec. 131-3), an adjective used to indicate his insincerity.

61 3.10.1: εἰδότες οὔτε φιλίαν ιδιώταις βέβαιον γενομένην οὔτε κοινωνίαν πόλεων ἐς οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ μετ’ ἁρετῆς δοκούσης ἐς ἀλλήλους γνώνοντο καὶ τὰλλα ὀμοίωτοποι εἰν. I follow C. F. Smith in understanding ἁρετῆς δοκούσης to suggest “transparent honesty”, based on context.

62 Thucydides also remarks on the necessity of a similarity of character between the two parties of a relationship. For the importance to sincere friendship of the two parties’ conviction that they are in some crucial regard alike, see Chapter 4 on the Philoctetes.
and by questioning speakers’ motives for the policies they advise (3.37-8). Thucydides portrays the eventual impact such rhetoric has on Athens’ political sphere in his account of the Sicilian Debate, when the breakdown of mutual trust among citizens interrupts the proper functioning of democratic deliberation (esp. 6.24.4). As the Thucydidean passage excerpted above suggests, without trust in one’s fellow citizens, sincerity disappears, and, in turn, without individual sincerity, public trust wanes. Trust and sincerity seem, then, to exist in a binary relation and to rely upon a certain optimism about others’ motives. Simplicity of mind is the quality that Thucydides singles out as key to both nobility of character (including sincerity) and to reciprocal confidence among citizens (trust).

G. W. F. Hegel gives an account of the process of self-disintegration that will feel remarkably familiar to readers of the *Hecuba*. He implies that the moment that spurs the process is an experience of acute emotion, such as that experienced by Hecuba. This discrete, traumatic moment of disintegration begets the self:

```
Since the pure ego sees itself outside self, and torn in sunder, everything that has continuity and universality, everything that bears the name of law, good, and right, is thereby torn to pieces at the same time, and goes to rack and ruin: all identity and concord break up, for what holds sway is the purest discord and disunion…the pure ego itself is absolutely disintegrated (538).
```

In this stark moment of sudden recognition of one’s own self-existence, there is an abrupt shift to self-interest as the reigning paradigm for the individual (538-9). Hecuba experiences such an acute, pregnant moment with her shocking realization that the universal laws and norms in which she had so much faith are not stable, shared

---

63 For example, Pericles’ trust in the external signs of public service, 2.42.3; and his charitable portrayal of the relations between citizens, 2.37.2, cf. 6.15.4.
64 The inception of the process of disintegration is not fully fleshed out by Hegel, but he does mention the “distraught” disintegrated self, which I take to indicate that strong emotion is a factor in the process: Hegel 1967, Baillie translation, 543.
65 It may seem paradoxical that it is the divided self that pursues self-interest and that its interests are not themselves divided; but, by divided self, I mean only that consciousness is split between perception, as all animals have, of sensory stimuli and the new layer of perception of oneself perceiving and being perceived (that is, awareness of oneself thinking, acting, being). The parts of Hecuba’s self are still continuous or aligned, but now with emotion more in the lead. Vengeance becomes her driving motive and her reason is now co-opted to help her accomplish this aim.
foundations of community life for those around her. In that moment, her relation to the ‘universal power’ (i.e. the sources of power in society) becomes one of spontaneous and deep alienation; further, she can no longer identify herself with power, now fully accepting and embracing her loss of status (see 756-7, 1274).

In other words, for Hegel, a person characterized by naïveté and simplicity represents a unified (universal) self, a self he would term the “noble consciousness” or the “honest soul”. The noble consciousness is an “unsophisticated mind”. He finds himself in ingenuous accord with objective reality (for Hegel, the state-power and wealth) and has a naïve faith in the accepted and shared norms of his society (538). For Hegel, the unified self pertains when one exists in a “harmonious relation to the external power of society” to the extent of fully identifying with it, but the unified self exists as a category only to give definition to the disintegrated self by contrast. He speaks of the “heroism of ignoble flattery” as part of the transition from an integrated to a disintegrated consciousness. At this point, the individual gains an awareness of his unharmonious relationship to external power and from expediency chooses to continue in the interaction, while no longer naively and wholly identifying with that power. In the next

---

66 By Hecuba’s community, I mean her aristocratic community. While Hecuba is admittedly now a slave, there is also a sense in which she expects a certain understanding between herself, so recently a queen, and her fellow aristocrats, Odysseus and Agamemnon. With Odysseus, her sense of familiarity stems from their previously established supplication relationship, a form of xenia. Between Agamemnon and Hecuba there stands a sort of kinship relation due to his relationship with her daughter; see 859-60, where, by extension, Polydorus is a philos of Agamemnon’s.

67 Hegel, Baillie translation, 1967, 536, 538, 541, 543-6. Hegel (1967, 526) asserts that in fact that noble consciousness is not yet a proper ‘self’, but rather a “universal substance”. A self by Hegel’s definition implies an internal division that permits self-consciousness. In other words, until one can know oneself as a self, he is not a self; see also Lacan 1977, 1-7.

68 Hegel, Baillie translation, 1967, 544. The naïve or noble consciousness exists in the “natural state of innocence” (546).

69 ibid., 524-5, 527, 535, 538.

70 Trilling 1972, 35.

71 Such as the false flattery that Hecuba offers Agamemnon at 841f.

stage, the self becomes actively antagonistic toward the state-power. The base self is self-serving in its interests and seeks to accomplish selfish ends beyond what is considered seemly to his status, for which reason he must resort to covert approaches to these ends: “between the intentions of the base self and its avowals there is no congruence.” The disintegrated self, then, is cynical and mistrustful of the sources of power in her society. Whereas before Hecuba believed that the sources of power existed to secure the ends of justice, now she perceives state power as an extension of interests that are not her own. Further, having come to a perception of himself as a separate entity acting in his own self-interest within the broader group, from whom he feels alienated, he is double-minded, in the sense of having an immediate perception of his own senses and of being keenly aware of himself being perceived by others.

To a striking degree, Hegel’s account of the disintegration of a self mirrors Hecuba’s internal transformation. Hecuba begins the play as a woman who, so recently a queen rather than a slave, yet identifies with the external sources of power and wealth in her society. She evinces an implicit trust in the structures of “law, good, and right”, believing initially that she can address her wrongs within these objective political and cultural values. She exhibits a firm faith in both a rationally stabilized character and a rationally stabilized community life. We have no cause to doubt her sincerity early in the play – her speech appears to represent a transparent translation of her inner thought to the outside world. She sets out as a unified self, lacking the cynicism that she comes to

---

73 Trilling 1972, 36-7. In a transvaluation of terms, Hegel celebrates the progress toward a ‘base’, divided self, which he sees as an expansion, and hence advancement, of the consciousness of one’s particularity.
75 Trilling 1972, 37-8. Remember that Trilling’s definition of sincerity is the “congruence between avowal and actual feeling” (2).
76 Hegel, Baillie translation, 1967, 538-9, 545-7. For the association between double-mindedness and insincerity, see Theog. 91-2.
77 Hegel, Baillie translation, 1967, 538. For Hegel and for Hecuba, these are the important categories of shared political life.
78 Though Hecuba certainly does not imagine that she can take her case to court, she does allude and appeal to the particular brand of justice operative in democratic Athens (291-2); as well as the objective cultural norms that govern reciprocity, supplication, religion and kinship (251-90; 788-806; 844-5). For Agamemnon as personifying “institutionalized justice”, see Gregory 1999, xxxii.
display especially after her recognition of Polymestor’s treachery. Following this betrayal, having lost her trust in others’ motives, she herself resorts to insincerity, guile and cynicism. If others will not “play by the rules”, how can she? In both Thucydides’ and Hegel’s accounts of sincerity, then, there is a clear linkage between unity and guilelessness of self, trust of others and manifestations of sincerity; and, on the other hand, between dividedness or complexity of self, cynicism and insincerity. In the Hecuba, Euripides takes up such associations and dramatizes the heroine’s transition from sincerity and integration of self to the coupled extremes of insincerity and disintegration of self.

**Hecuba: The Disintegration of a Self**

Without elaborating his claims, Kenneth Reckford also appears to have been arguing that Hecuba undergoes some crucial change in her sense of self within the course of this play, a change from naïve to guileful, from direct and straight-forward to sneaky and self-conscious, and from an objective champion of universal values to a subjective manipulator of the rhetoric of universal law. Contemplating Hecuba’s speech to Agamemnon as distinctly different from her appeal to Odysseus, Reckford writes: “The ambiguity of her language indicates her hypocrisy, her double-mindedness;”

and, “It would not be difficult for a well-trained actor to get across the idea that Hecuba’s plea [to Agamemnon] is ‘sophisticated,’ that she is speaking more like the poikilophrōn Odysseus than like her earlier, simpler self.”

Reckford makes these claims, without much in the way of explanation or support, adding also that Hecuba’s “character has changed” (italics his).

I mention above that Haiman details the symptoms by which we can diagnose the state of a self’s disintegration. According to Haiman, drawing a distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is self-consciousness or self-awareness that

---

79 Reckford 1985, 119; for his failure to flesh out or support his assertions, see Mossman (1995, 182n.41), who bluntly responds to this claim, “I do not understand what Reckford means by his comment.”

80 Reckford 1985, 124.

81 ibid.
reveals a division in the self.\textsuperscript{82} From the moment of her discovery of Polydorus’ body, Hecuba presents with a number of symptoms of acute self-awareness, or consciousness of herself as an other, engaged in a social role, and as being seen and judged by her social peers:\textsuperscript{83}

1) self-address (736-751): Hecuba speaks to herself at length regarding how she ought to approach Agamemnon before returning his direct address.

2) self-reference (736): Hecuba peculiarly says to herself, “by saying ‘you’ I mean myself”.\textsuperscript{84}

3) self-conscious emotions (798, 968-72): in these passages, Hecuba expresses shame or a self-conscious awareness of her low social status.

4) affectation or image-cultivation (807-11, 841-5, 886-7): in these lines, Hecuba is cultivating an image of herself as pitiable; flattering Agamemnon and consciously attempting to press him into a certain aristocratic social role;\textsuperscript{85} and, lastly, explicitly imagining herself in a mythic revenge role, as one of the Danaids or one of the women of Lemnos.

As Haiman notes, from a self-conscious awareness of oneself as a social actor, it is “only a short step to manipulating” one’s physical and social image.\textsuperscript{86} There is something distinctly different about the Hecuba who engages with Odysseus and the Hecuba who

\textsuperscript{82} Haiman 1998, 67-8.

\textsuperscript{83} While I am inspired by Haiman’s (1998, Ch.5) account of these symptoms of self-consciousness or division in the self, I do not adhere strictly to the examples he gives. In his short list of symptoms, he gives four very limited examples: for example, stage fright is one symptom, but he then elaborates under that heading to include any emotion that is “self-conscious or otherwise implicitly reflexive” (72), giving a long list of other sorts of emotions; so, while I do not limit myself to his list of 4 symptoms, I follow the spirit of his symptomology.

\textsuperscript{84} 736: δύστην᾽ — ἐμαυτὴν γὰρ λέγω λέγουσα σέ.

\textsuperscript{85} For the cynicism behind this seemingly noble sentiment (that “it belongs to a man of nobility to serve justice everywhere and always to harm bad men”, trans. Segal), see Segal 1993, 204-5.

\textsuperscript{86} Haiman 1998, 67.
supplicates Agamemnon. This list of symptoms goes some way toward elucidating and pinning down what constitutes that difference. The symptoms listed above all share the idea of a new self-consciousness in Hecuba and get at, I think, what Reckford terms Hecuba’s “double-mindedness”; that is, her mind is now sensitive not only to the events going on around her, but also now has a keen perception of how she fits into these events as a social actor and of how she is seen by others. The philosophical question remains to be answered: how does an awareness of oneself impact one’s ability to be sincere? Though Stuart Hampshire argues that some degree of self-knowledge is in fact essential to an understanding of what one believes in order to determine one’s consistent adherence to these views, this play suggests that Hecuba’s self-knowledge negatively impacts her natural and spontaneous interactions, rendering her more artificial in her self-presentation.\footnote{Hampshire 1971. In addition to this play, other ancient explorations of this question are presented by Thucydides and Sophocles, in the Ajax and the Philoctetes. Tragedy is instructive in revealing the process behind this step from self-awareness to manipulation of self-image.}

I will consider several passages in light of Hegel’s account of the process of self-disintegration. First, briefly: I have already discussed Hecuba’s staging of her own appearance for Agamemnon, when she directs him to stand back and leads him through exactly what he will see in her when he does so (807-11). These lines demonstrate Hecuba’s ability to imagine how she would (or could, given a little help) look to others and her willingness to use this as an instrument in her attempts at persuasion; she shows herself, in short, willing to act. Earlier, when she admonishes Odysseus not to be too confident in his success, as she herself has experienced the fall from a position of power and wealth to slavery, Hecuba is expressing her genuine suffering in her current situation (282-5).\footnote{282-5: οὐ τοὺς χρατοῦντας χρῆ χρατεῖν ἃ μὴ χρεῶν/ οὐδ᾽ εὐτυχοῦντας εὖ δοξεῖν πράξειν ἄei/ ἀγάῳ γὰρ ἢ ποτ᾽ ἄλλα νῦν οὐκ εἰμί ἐτι,/ τὸν πάντα δ᾽ ὀλβον ἡμαρ ἐν/ μ᾽ ἀφεὶλετο.} By contrast, when speaking with Agamemnon, she is highly conscious of being seen to suffer (807-11).

Hecuba, within her speech to Agamemnon, also resorts to what Hegel terms the “heroism of ignoble flattery”, concluding her speech by addressing Agamemnon,
“master, greatest light for the Greeks” (841). Given Agamemnon’s moral weakness in this play (he has just demonstrated his reluctance to help her by attempting to pull away from her supplicant grasp, 812-3; see also 850-63; 866-69), this lofty address rings particularly false and insincere. She further seeks to constrain and constitute Agamemnon’s identity in a subtle, self-interested way, as one with an avenging hand (842-3, χεῖρα τιμωρόν) and as fitting a specific definition of a ‘noble’ man. She asserts that it is the general feature of a ‘noble, or good’ man (844, ἐσθλοῦ) “to serve the ends of justice and to do evil to base men everywhere, always” (844-5). Here Hecuba seeks to deploy the concept of universal justice in service to her own personal nomos of revenge. With this assertion, Hecuba challenges Agamemnon’s own self-identity as an aristocratic, noble man: she seeks to make his continued self-identification as one of the social and moral elite contingent upon his fulfilling of her self-serving definition of noble.

Further, with Hegel’s process of rejecting one’s identification with the forces of social power comes cynicism and scorn as one no longer holds the hegemonic value system as one’s own. Hegel notes that the disintegrated self is a base self, one that has abandoned traditional morality in favor of pursuing selfish ends by covert means. Hecuba’s cynicism and bitterness in the latter half of the play stand out in comparison to her optimism and earnestness in the previous scenes. Where with Odysseus, she appealed to political, democratic law (291-2), with Agamemnon she casts a broader net

---

89 Hegel, Baillie translation, 1967, 540. 841: ὦ δέσποτ’, ὦ μέγιστον Ἑλληνικός...
90 See Althusser (1971, 128-32) for an account of interpellation as an attempt to constitute another’s identity along specific ideological lines. Hecuba seeks to constitute Agamemnon as a specific sort of noble man. Recognition is a key part of a successful interpellation (129): Agamemnon must recognize himself in her account of nobility.
91 844-5: ἐσθλοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς τῇ δίκῃ θ’ ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ τοὺς κακοὺς δρᾶν πανταχοῦ κακῶς ἀεί.
93 Cf. Hecuba’s earnest moral indignation at 251f.; and her open, naïve and optimistic musings at 589f.
94 In her speech before Odysseus, Hecuba appeals to cultural norms, but there is no appeal anywhere to the gods or to conceptions of divine justice. It is Polyxena who introduces Zeus as protector of suppliants (Ζεὺς Ἰκέσιος), and only then to note that she is not invoking him (345).
with arguments from religion and universal law (787-806); but, misunderstanding Agamemnon’s reluctance as evidence that her appeal to abstract principle has failed to sway him, Hecuba laments that she has not paid money to learn the art of persuasive rhetoric (814f.). Here, she wishes to acquire not what is instilled through heredity or nurture (in other words not a part of traditional nobility of character), but something that must be paid for, something that anyone can pay for and acquire—persuasion.

Agamemnon’s attempt to pull away from her after she tests out her arguments from principle confirms fully Hecuba’s loss of faith in the power of nomos. Now she realizes that Peithō alone rules over men (816). Here she wishes for the skill of Odysseus in sophistic rhetoric—i.e., not in sincere speech, but in contrived, “aimed” speech. She next tries her hand at such aimed speech, leaving behind arguments from general principle and targeting Agamemnon’s individual desires.

Hecuba tunes her argument specifically to Agamemnon, appealing to the power of sex and his desire for her daughter, Cassandra (824f.). Segal observes that the “shift from law to sex within Hecuba’s appeal to Agamemnon in lines 799-832 not only lays bare the moral bankruptcy of this world,” but it also “clarifies the helplessness of law.” Hecuba herself has confronted this reality through her interactions in this play and cynically adapts her approach accordingly.

It appears, furthermore, that Hecuba succeeds to a certain degree on the strength of her appeal to sex: although Agamemnon claims in his

---

95 For two excellent accounts of the role of nomos in this play, see Segal 1993, Ch. 11 and Nussbaum 2001.

96 In truth, Agamemnon is moved by her appeal to moral principle, but in his mind a commitment to moral decency is counterbalanced by his concern to maintain his political influence by maintaining a certain image before the army (850-863). Hecuba notes that his fear over his public image “enslaves” him (864-7); in a strange reversal, she, his slave, then sets him, her master, free (869, ἔγὼ σὲ ἔλευθε…ἐλεύθερον…).

97 In the sense of either shared social (and legal) conventions that establish recognized standards of right and wrong (including the conventions of religious belief and practice) or in the sense of a universal, divine law that establishes an absolute, independent standard of justice that is not culturally specific. Such a universal law as that implied at 800 is more truly an ἴσος νόμος than the Athenian law appealed to at 291-2 in that it applies to all humankind.

98 Segal 1993, 183-4.

99 Segal (1993, 274n.48) notes that “the degeneration in this movement from nomos to persuasion and eros” has often been commented on by scholars, e.g. Conacher 1967, 162f.; Reckford 1985, 120f.; Michelini 1987, 151f.
reply to care for the abstract concerns of justice and piety, he spends far more of this
statement worrying that the army will think he is placing his selfish erotic interests over
the general group interest (854-63).100

Having highlighted the aspects of Hecuba’s speech to Agamemnon that reveal her
abandonment of sincere simplicity, I will now look back more specifically at her abstract
appeal to law and justice in light of these later passages, as well as in the context of her
earlier appeal to ‘an equal law’ (291, ἱσος νόμος) when pleading with Odysseus. Hecuba
lays the foundation for her appeal to divine law in her address to Agamemnon by opening
with an account of Polymestor’s extreme impiety and his lack of regard for the gods
(787-97). She then transitions to this appeal to a universal, divine law (798-805):

ημεῖς μὲν οὖν δούλοι τε κάσθενεις ἱσος·
ἀλλ᾽ οὶ θεοὶ σθένουσι χρείων χρατόν
νόμος νόμω γὰρ τούς θεοὺς ἱγούμεθα
καὶ ζῶμεν ἄδικα καὶ δίκαι᾽ ὁμιμένοι
ός ἐξ οὶ ἀνελθὼν εἰ διαφθαρήσεται
καὶ μὴ δίσιν δώσουν οἴπερ ξένους
κτείνους ἠ θεῶν ἱερὰ τολμῶσιν φέρειν.

Now perhaps we are slaves and insignificant;
But the gods have strength, as does the law that governs
Them; for it is by law/custom that we recognize the gods
And live, discriminating between unjust things and just things;
If this, coming before you, should be weakened and if
They do not pay the penalty, the sort who murder their

---

100 See Segal 1993, 193-4, where he notes that Agamemnon “devotes ten lines of his
fourteen-line speech (850-63) to excusing himself to the army” for putting narrow interest
above group interest.

101 This is a famously ambiguous invocation of νόμος. To indicate the sort of universal
law she has in mind here, she adduces the broadly shared horror at both killing guests and
looting temples that transcends political boundaries. For different accounts of the
meaning of νόμος here, see, e.g., Mossman 1995, Gregory 1991, Gregory 1999,

102 ἱσον here, in a passage on νόμος, is certainly a reference to Hecuba’s earlier appeal to
an ἱσος νόμος “among your people” (291); yet I am uncertain exactly what to make of
this echo of her earlier line. Perhaps Hecuba is suggesting that, if the civic law does not
live up to its reputation as equal in application, at least divine law should; though,
according to Agamemnon’s actions here, this equality of divine law is at risk (divine law
too is unstable and depends up upon human implementation).
Guest-friends or dare to bear away the sacred things of the gods,
Then there is nothing equal to these things among mankind.

Looking back at her speech to Odysseus, as the last point in her objective appeal to the principles of justice, decency and law, Hecuba asserts the existence “among your people” (291, ἐν ὑμῖν) of a law, equal in force for both free men and slaves, regarding the shedding of blood. Here, though she is a slave speaking to a free man, Hecuba seeks to put herself on an equal plane with Odysseus in at least this one field, that of civic law. This attempt is unsuccessful, with Odysseus both ignoring this reference to civic law and also asserting a clear boundary between a democratically defined notion of friend and enemy (303-16) and between Greek and barbarian (321-31). Her second appeal to law, quoted above, should be seen as an extension and adaptation of Hecuba’s “effort to cut across the barriers of power and status through universally accepted norms of behavior.” Note that, in this second appeal to an ‘equal law’, Hecuba mobilizes similar language as in her first sincere appeal to Odysseus, but in this case she speaks opportunistically, not sincerely. That is, she no longer evinces a sincere belief in the existence of shared nomoi, but recruits this language as instrumental to her goal of personal revenge.

This time, Hecuba broadens her appeal to law by invoking divine law rather than civic law and by combining “the human force of law with the divine,” utilizing the ambiguity in the word nomos as referencing both the universal law of the gods and the convention by which we learn the difference between good and bad through the process of nurture (600-2). By speaking in general terms of mankind’s (implicitly shared) belief in the gods, as well as the (implicitly shared) standard of right and wrong, and the (implicitly shared) horror at the crimes of murdering a guest and looting a temple, Hecuba rejects Odysseus’ attempt to make a distinction between Greek and barbarian. This represents a more forceful attempt than her plea to Odysseus to assert the

---

103 291-2: νόμος δ᾽ ἐν ὑμῖν τοῖς ἔλευθεροις Ἰοσ/ καὶ τοῖσι δούλοις αἵματος κεῖται πέρι.
104 Segal 1993, 192.
105 ibid., 193.
106 ibid.
commonality among all of mankind, irrespective of status distinctions, such as Greek/barbarian and free/slave.

On the surface, then, this is a noble appeal to abstract moral principle; however, there are several factors that might arouse our suspicions as to the sincerity of Hecuba’s conviction here. For example, Segal notes that “over against this appeal to law as a moral imperative of universal validity is the change in its content. In the first passage (266ff.) she was trying to save a life; here she is planning to kill in an act of retributive justice.”  

Hecuba is too subjectively invested in this appeal for her to be able to sell it compellingly as an objective appeal to abstract moral principle. Her involved subjectivity is belied by her easy transition from piety, justice and law to persuasion, sex and shameless flattery. This second speech is tailored more specifically to her target and shows her newly developed willingness to “say anything” in the model of Odysseus. This is thus a more cynical speech than her earlier appeal to this same ποικιλόφρων demos-pleaser (131-2) whom Hecuba has now come to resemble. She is knowingly aiming at the motives that she imagines will work on Agamemnon, such as pity and desire. By wishing to acquire the power of persuasion that is pointedly flagged as sophistic, Hecuba is explicitly wishing to employ a model of speech that is not sincere, that succeeds by any means necessary. As Segal aptly puts it: “These considerations do not necessarily diminish the value of Hecuba’s divinely sanctioned law in absolute terms, but they do suggest a confusion of ends and means. A high moral principle cannot escape being transformed into an instrument of revenge.”

Furthermore, Hecuba herself revises and undermines the power of the very abstract values she has been espousing by designating Peithō the sole tyrant over men; i.e. even nomos and the gods are weak in comparison with the power of persuasion.

---

107 ibid.
108 See also Segal 1993, 210.
109 See also Segal (1993, 176), who rightly observes that “Hecuba may invoke a universalizing law (799ff.), but to gain her revenge she has to work on and through Agamemnon and by ad hominem arguments.”
110 ibid., 204.
Psychological Disintegration as Physical Metamorphosis

Euripides highlights Hecuba’s internal disintegration of self by coupling this psychological development with physical symptoms, which, scattered throughout the play, prepare us for the ultimate physical manifestation of Hecuba’s psychological transformation, her metamorphosis into a dog with fiery eyes (1265). As Polyxena exits to go to her death, Hecuba cries, “Ah! I faint; my limbs are loosened” (438). Of this line, Zeitlin says, “The form of her body dissolves.” Later, speaking to Agamemnon, Hecuba strangely cries out, “If only there might be a voice in my arms, my hands, my hair, and the step of my foot, either through the arts of Daedalus or one of the gods, so that weeping in unison, they might grasp your knees and launch words at you of every kind” (836-40). Again, Hecuba imagines for herself a sort of dissolution: “The coherence of the body’s form dissolves and yet reunites, gathering force and intensity along the way.” There is a difference, though, between these two scenes: in the earlier scene, as Polyxena is taken from her, Hecuba simply describes her feeling of coming apart in her grief, whereas later she actively wishes through some artificial act for her body to disassemble and rearrange itself in a way that will contribute to her revenge plot. Since Polyxena’s exit, Hecuba has become double-minded, i.e. she has developed an ability to imagine and manipulate the image of her own body. Both of these scenes, though, serve to prefigure Hecuba’s actual metamorphosis, which is itself “a symbolic projection of the inner change that we have seen developing throughout the play.”

111 1265: κύων γενήσῃ πύρσ᾽ ἔχουσα δέργματα.
112 438: οἲ ἃγώ, προλείπω· λύεται δὲ μου μέλη. It is interesting to note that προλείπω literally means ‘to leave behind’, as though grief and violence prompt Hecuba to split from herself in some way; also, the sense of λύω, ‘to loosen’ or ‘unharness’ suggests that her limbs are physically separating from her body. This line would make sense as a physical description of metamorphosis into another form.
113 Zeitlin 1996, 207.
115 Zeitlin 1996, 204.
116 Segal 1993, 185.
Well before Hecuba becomes transformed into a dog, she first becomes, in a sense, the enemy whose model of behavior she explicitly rejected earlier in the play: Odysseus. As Zeitlin appealing articulates, lurking in the background as Polymestor’s double is Polyphemus, the Cyclops of the *Odyssey*, with whom he shares certain central features: “violator of xenia, blinded in revenge, threat of anthropophagy, parting curse.”\(^{117}\) Zeitlin goes on to note the similarity of their names and the fact that both dwell in an isolated coastal locale that serves as a stopping point for Greeks returning home from Troy.\(^{118}\) With Polymestor standing in for Polyphemus, Hecuba is then cast in the role of Odysseus. Not only has she adopted his rhetorical style, but she has also taken on Odysseus’ common dramatic qualities of guilefulness, wiliness and forethought.\(^{119}\) And, like Odysseus, Hecuba becomes ποικιλόφρων in the course of this play: with her new, more complicated mental representation of her self, Hecuba also gains a more complex representation and understanding of other selves and their motivations.

Hecuba’s willing embrace of ignobility becomes most apparent in her open acceptance of the status of slave and later of beast, if only she is able to accomplish her revenge. Agamemnon asks whether she wants her freedom, to which she responds, “Certainly not; if I can take vengeance on the base, I am willing to be a slave for my whole life” (756-7).\(^{120}\) Similarly, Hecuba responds with apathy when Polymestor prophesies her death and transformation into a beast: “This is not at all a concern for me, because you paid the penalty” (1274).\(^{121}\) Segal writes of this appalling reaction to her own destruction, “Her metamorphosis signifies not just the loss of control over her body but also the loss of control over her hatred and violence. When vengefulness gets out of control, it overrides all other considerations, including the loss of her humanity.”\(^{122}\) Truly, her sole governing *nomos* has become revenge. In this work, Euripides plays around with the question of who is really free: Hecuba’s “democratic”, aristocratic masters, or Hecuba herself, now a slave. In response to Agamemnon’s wishy-washy pledge to help, Hecuba

---

118 ibid.
119 ibid.; Segal 1993, 162-3.
120 756-7: οὐ δῆτα· τοὺς κακοὺς δὲ τιμωρουμένη/ αἰώνα τὸν σύμπαντα δουλεύειν θέλω.
121 1274: οὐδὲν μέλει μοι, σοῦ γέ μοι δόντος δίκην.
122 Segal 1993, 186.
exclaims in reproof: “Ah! There is no one of mortals who is free; for each is a slave either to money or chance or the mass of the city and written laws prevent him from living in a manner that accords with his true opinion” (864-7). With these words, Hecuba effects an odd reversal, putting herself in the position of freeing Agamemnon, whom she figures as a slave to public opinion. Though Hecuba is a slave of fate in this play, there is also a sense in which her slavery and her personal tragedy have unexpectedly set her free to a greater degree than her “democratic” masters. Consideration of the conditions and outcome of her life no longer constrain her actions. Opting for slavery and bestiality, Hecuba is carefree so long as she attains the vengeance she craves.

Zeitlin cautions that Hecuba’s metamorphosis should not be seen as simply a metaphor for her “moral conversion to bestial status;” rather, her transformation joins her forever to her enemy, Polymestor, he as Orion, the blind hunter, and she as Sirius, his dog with the fiery gaze. I have already noted how a process of extreme disillusionment triggers Hecuba’s disintegration of self, leading her to abandon her former objective values and to privilege expediency over principle. Hecuba begins the play as someone who is capable of “noble, disinterested moral action for its own sake” — she accepted Odysseus’ supplication of her in Troy as her enemy and generously spared his life (239f.). By the end of the play, however, she has come to the realization that she now lives in a world that, like her, has been brutalized by war and has lost the capacity for pity, reciprocal feeling and disinterested moral action. Hecuba herself has been brought down to the level of her enemies, Odysseus and Polymestor, by the events of the play. Just as Hecuba reveals Polymestor for what he is, one of the most bestial, insincere

123 864-7: φεῦ ὁ νεκρὸν ὡς ὑπὸ πότε ὡς ὥστε ἔλθῃ ἐλεύθερος· ἢ χρημάτων γὰρ δοῦλός ἐστι ἢ τύχης· ἢ πλῆθος αὐτὸν πόλεος ἢ νόμων γραφαὶ· εἰργοῦσα χρήσθαι μὴ κατὰ γνώμην τρόποις. For Hecuba’s juxtaposition here of private constraints and public constraints, see Gregory 1999, 148. Hecuba is quite critical of democracy here, but not with the usual aristocratic scorn for the democratic excess of freedom; rather she portrays the hallmarks of Athenian democracy, majority rule and written law, as rendering its citizens slaves. Both Polyxena and Hecuba locate freedom only in death: see e.g. 357-8; 367-8; 550.
124 For the recurring characterization of Agamemnon as caught between public and private motivations, see Gregory 1999, 62-3, 146.
125 Zeitlin 1996, 185.
126 ibid., 185-6.
127 Segal 1993, 218.
characters in all of Greek drama (1217, 1056f.), he too reveals for her the extent to which she has lost herself to revenge and been transformed into something other than she was at the start of the play (1259f.). As similar figures, then, it is fitting at this point that Hecuba and Polymestor are forever linked to each other.

The Role of Community in Individual Sincerity

What this play forcefully brings to light is the costarring role of one’s surrounding community in being sincere. That is, an individual commitment to sincerity of self is insufficient to maintaining this sincerity over time. The values and behavior of those around us significantly constrain our own values and behavior. Not only must the conditions for sincerity be met within the individual self; society too plays a role in creating the conditions for personal sincerity. For three major characters in the play, their sincerity is challenged or corrupted by the constraints of their surrounding community: Odysseus, Agamemnon and Hecuba. Only Polyxena consistently maintains a sincere commitment to her aristocratic values to the end. The catch is that, anticipating that factors beyond her control will soon challenge her consistency, Polyxena finds she can only sustain sincerity in life by choosing death.

Odysseus articulates a black-and-white conception of the group toward which he is committed to being sincere: i.e. as Odysseus presents the issue, if there are two groups that can reasonably make a claim to being his philoi, the demos/army and his aristocratic personal ties (like Hecuba), his choice of the demos/army as philoi is mutually exclusive with any claim his private aristocratic friends could make on him. With his clear-cut conception of who constitutes a philos, Odysseus rejects the pull of mixed motivations that makes Agamemnon so uneasy (857). Hecuba begins her plea to Odysseus for her daughter’s life by reminding him of her merciful acceptance of his supplication when he was under her power in Troy (239-53). Here she implicitly reasons that this successful supplication initiated a relationship of friendship (256). Her demands on Odysseus, then,

---

128 I have already detailed in the Introduction what Odysseus’ and Agamemnon’s replies to Hecuba’s pleas for aid reveal about the strong association in democratic Athens between sincerity and having coextensive interests with the demos, so I will not duplicate that argument here.
are on the basis of a friendship that is aristocratic and personal in nature. To Hecuba’s mind, sincerity in friendship requires helping a friend (256-7, shared interests) and reciprocal treatment (252-3, consistency). Odysseus responds with a sincerity argument of his own: consistency of friendship toward Achilles entails treating him as a friend while he is alive and likewise after he is dead (311-2). Odysseus compellingly notes that sincerity among political *philoi* is essential to the cohesion of the political group and justifies the demands the group makes on the individual (313-16). In his estimation, not satisfying Achilles’ demand is tantamount to “not regarding friends as friends” (328-9). 129

While Agamemnon waffles between his personal and political obligations, Odysseus at least definitively and consistently opts to be sincere toward his political group. Theoretically, this should make him the ideal democratic citizen; this sort of perfect sincerity toward the demos is, after all, what democratic ideology demands. But, by fleshing out the details of how this ideal would play out in a scenario involving two opposed but reasonable demands, Euripides here reveals the unattractiveness of this ideal in reality.

Though Odysseus argues that the sincerity claims that hold the most weight with him are those made on him by his political peers, there is much about his characterization that might lead us to doubt even his sincerity toward his compatriots. When caught in Troy, Odysseus was acting as a spy (239, *κατάσκοπος*) for the Greek army, having disguised his appearance with tattered clothing and blood on his face (240-1). 130 To save himself when discovered, he used the “invention of many words” (250, *πολλῶν λόγων εὑρήμαθ*). Further, he gives Hecuba a succinct bit of advice that could be said to encapsulate his life philosophy: “it is clever/wise to think whatever is required even in

---

129 328-9: μήτε τοὺς φίλους φίλους/ ἱγεῖσθε…

130 In the context of war, loyalty and patriotism to polis may reasonably entail insincerity toward and deception of the enemy (e.g. Themistocles’ deception of his Spartan ‘friends’ to aid the Athenians in rebuilding their city walls, Thuc. 1.90-1; Thucydides concludes his remarks on Themistocles with an admiring appraisal of his intelligence). Sometime in the late 5th century, however, deception and insincerity of any sort begins to be problematized, a process that is complete by the time Demosthenes surprisingly characterizes Themistocles’ insincerity as unAthenian (Dem. 20.73-4; on this, see Hesk 2000, 40-51). Here, Odysseus’ so-called loyalty and sincerity to the army come off, not as admirable, but as unfeeling and cruel.
misfortune” (228). The overall impression is that Odysseus is plastic: constrained only by chance and external circumstance, he conforms his nature, his appearance, his words and his actions as necessary in the furtherance of his self-interest. Even his physical form is unstable, capable of being molded by him to his needs: he is amorphous, lacking definitive shape or form (240, ἄμορφος). Within his putatively principled explanation of his commitment to being sincere to his political group, his self-interested motivation sneaks in: he craves lasting fame (320, διὰ μακροῦ). It is as a result of his prudential calculation that he is sincere toward his political peers, knowing that appearing trustworthy and sincere is a crucial step to enjoying political influence in a democratic polity. Nothing about Odysseus, however, fits the model of the sincere man.

Odysseus, then, eliminates the problem of mixed motivations by refusing to admit under the scope of “friendship” anyone who is not encompassed within his political group. Agamemnon, on the other hand, is much more conflicted by the opposing demands made on him by his political friends and his private friends. His understanding of what constitutes a philos is more representative of that of the average audience member than Odysseus’. Greek popular morality recognizes the obligations on individuals from both private philoi, such as family members, and political philoi, or one’s fellow citizens. These obligations are not typically figured as opposing, but rather as continuous and complementary: for example, those who honor their parents and treat them well are considered more trustworthy stewards of public affairs than those who mistreat their parents (e.g. Aesch. 1.28). Here, though, Agamemnon is placed in a position where helping a private friend will be perceived as harming his public friends and vice versa: he explains to Hecuba, “It is for this reason that unease has fallen upon me; the army considers this man a friend (Polymestor), and the dead man an enemy

---

131 228: σοφὸν τοι κὰν κακοῖς ἃ δεῖ φρονεῖν.
132 His words too convey a double meaning, capable of being interpreted in a way that portrays him in a positive, human light, yet simultaneously suggesting his unreachable coldness: when asked if he remembers his foray into Troy as a spy, he replies, “I do remember; for it did not touch the surface of my heart” (242, οἶδ᾽· οὐ γὰρ ἄκρας καρδίας ἔψαυσέ μου). This is taken to be an instance of litotes by most commentators and translators, though it is also an example of Odysseus’ smoothness of rhetoric, which both conceals and reveals the truth at once. Further, in evidence of Hecuba’s transformation into her enemy, Polymestor prophesies her assumption of Odysseus’ instability of physical form (1266, μορφῆς τῆς ἐμῆς μετάστασιν).
(Polydorus); if he is a friend to me (Polydorus), this is separate and not common to the army” (857-60).  
Hence, while Agamemnon’s pledge to grant Hecuba passive assistance may appear morally weak from the standpoint of Hecuba-sympathizers (which Euripides has conditioned the audience to be to some degree), his middle-of-the-road position is far more moderate and just than Odysseus’ cruel and calculating delineation of a philos. While Odysseus appears to have no objective concern for the standards of justice, right and universal law, Agamemnon does at least to an extent seem genuinely motivated by these objective considerations and by pity for Hecuba’s baseless suffering (783, 785, 850-3).  

Democratic values come off quite poorly in this play. The democratic sincerity ethos is implicated as responsible for the varying degrees of insincerity of both Odysseus and Agamemnon. It is the demos’ demand for perfectly consistent and transparent loyalty from its political figures that makes both men atrocious personal friends. Further, in the “full Assembly of the Achaeans” (107), the two sons of Theseus stand in as the representatives par excellence of Athenian democratic citizens and culture (122-29). The off-kilter logic driven by their democratic homonoia (123-5) and public-spiritedness (127-9) leads them to argue for the barbaric human sacrifice demanded by Achilles’ ghost (125-6). Their conformance to democratic sincerity norms is highlighted by their express denial that private motivations play any part in their resolution. Further, these “scions of Athens” (123) resemble Cleon in their preference for the political traction gained from negative, violent proposals over a concern for right behavior. 

---

133 857-60: ἔστιν γὰρ ᾧ ταραγμὸς ἐμπέπτωκέ μοι/ τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον φίλιον ἥγειται στρατός,/ τὸν κατθανόντα δ᾽ ἐχθρόν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐμοὶ φίλος/ ὡδ᾽ ἔστι, χωρὶς τοῦτο κοὐ καινὸν στρατό. Gregory sensibly adopts Elmsley’s emendation of line 859, changing δὲ σοὶ to δ᾽ ἐμοί, preferred also by Collard (1991, 174) and Kovacs in the Loeb.

134 I qualify his objective concern for justice because it must be noted that Agamemnon is repeatedly tagged within this play as more motivated by his private self-interest than by objective concern for law, custom and right: 120-2 (cf. 122-29); 824-35; 854-6. For his mixed motivations as a common feature of Agamemnon’s mythic and dramatic characterization, see Gregory 1999, 62-3.

135 For the anachronistic reference to the Athenian democratic Assembly, see Gregory 1999, 58.


137 See Balot 2001, 52.
like Theseus’ sons, proves his commitment to the public interest by forcefully arguing for Polyxena’s sacrifice (130-40). Achilles’ unparalleled heroic prowess elides the possibility of questioning whether his demand is just or reasonable: that is, because it is Achilles asking, this simply cannot be discussed. The validity of Odysseus’ claim to be acting sincerely in the interests of his political community is diminished when we consider that, in order to support community interest, he did not need to argue forcefully for the sacrifice; this is going too far. His commitment to group interest is repeatedly impugned as less than objective in motive. What is most likely, and as Hecuba accuses, is that Odysseus actively supports her misfortune in order to advance his own political career (131-3; 251-7).

This play is quite pessimistic about the possibility for sincerity over the long-term in the human self. As previously noted, the only character who maintains a consistent and noble self is only able to do so by ending her young life before chance and misfortune can begin to erode her resolve. Two things beget insincerity in this play: the unrealistic and unattractive (as portrayed here) democratic sincerity norms engender some degree of insincerity in both Odysseus and Agamemnon; and Polymestor’s personal insincerity, compounded by the democratic insincerity of her captors, forces Hecuba to resort to deception and insincerity herself in order to accomplish her just revenge on her former friend. What emerges from this play is that, in order to be sincere, we must be able to trust that those around us are also sincere to a sufficient degree. Moreover, it becomes clear that the specific formulation of sincerity demanded by a community’s norms of behavior will play a significant role in how individual community members express and instantiate sincerity themselves. This second point is rather obvious, but it is important to note that Euripides suggests that Athens’ specific model of sincerity, as he portrays it here, in fact generates insincerity in its members.

The Emotional Impact of the Betrayal of a Friendship

After accomplishing her revenge, Hecuba delivers an impassioned lament to Agamemnon that harks back to her earnest moral indignation of the first half of the play (1187-94):
Ἀγάμεμνον, ἀνθρώποισιν οὐκ ἔχειν ποτε τῶν πραγμάτων τὴν γλώσσαν ἵσχυειν πλέον· ἀλλὰ εἴτε χρήστ᾽ ἔδρασε, χρήστ᾽ ἐδει λέγειν, εἴτ᾽ αὐτὸ πονηρά, τοὺς λόγους εἶναι σαθροὺς, καὶ μὴ δύνασθαι τάδικ᾽ εὖ λέγειν ποτέ. σοφοὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσ᾽ οἱ τάδ᾽ ἱμιμβεχῶκτες, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δύνανται διὰ τέλους εἶναι σοφοί, κακῶς δ᾽ ἀπώλοντ᾽ οὔτις ἔξηλυξέ πω.

Agamemnon, the tongue of men ought never
Have more strength than their deeds;
But if he has done good things, he ought to speak good things,
But if, again, he has done base things, his words ought to be rotten,
And he ought never be able to speak well of unjust things.
Those who have perfected these things are clever,
But they are not able to be clever to the end,
They die badly; no one has yet escaped.

Hecuba bitterly laments the existence of human insincerity and opacity. Had Polymestor not been so expert at concealing the disjuncture between his words and deeds, the play would have ended with Polyxena’s sacrifice. Yet, as Segal insightfully points out, “Euripides puts universalizing morals into the mouths of his characters, only to show how questionable these norms are when applied to the speakers themselves.” Hecuba herself proves quite adept as well in deception and the concealment of her true intentions. Where she differs from Polymestor, though, is in the justification of her cause. Hecuba’s basic good character might provide yet another explanation for her reluctance to look Polymestor straight in the eyes (968, 972). Although Hecuba is able to do what circumstances require of her, she is not able to be as bald-faced about her deception as Polymestor. She yet has too much decency to look him directly in the eye and pretend to care for him as he shamelessly does (and has always done) to her (e.g. 953-95; cf. 596).

---

138 For the suggestion within the play that Polymestor, revealed as base now, must always have been base, see Mossman’s (1995, 121) interpretation of Hecuba’s speech at 592-98 as referring secondarily to Polymestor. Hecuba notes here that “the base man is never anything other than base” (596).
139 Segal 1993, 195.
140 See, for example, Zeitlin 1996, 190-1; Nussbaum 2001, 411-2; Segal 1993, 168, 207.
The sophists’ account of human anthropology, discussed notably by Peter Rose, describes a progression from the violence and narrow self-interest of an atomized, pre-polis existence to the elevation of persuasion over force and of the common good over narrow self-interest.\footnote{For a discussion of sophistic anthropology, see Rose 1992, Ch. 5, esp. pp.274-6.} This transition is occasioned by the formation of a social compact among men that enables the cooperative organization of men into cities. The society of the Hecuba, then, demonstrates a sort of reverse anthropology. Hecuba uses persuasion to pursue violence and shifts of necessity from the objective pursuit of justice to the subjective pursuit of personal vengeance. The social compact between men, entailing agreement on key values, breaks down post-war and outside of the geographical space of the city.\footnote{See Rose 1992, 274-5.} In the wilds of Thrace, the Greeks are cityless, only barely acknowledging the existence of the objective institutions of law and justice.

Segal argues that it is the coarsening, dehumanizing effect of war that acts as the “significant catalyst of Hecuba’s changes”;\footnote{Segal 1993, 186.} as I suggest above, though, Polymestor’s betrayal is not a direct result of war, but rather of his own perfidious nature. He simply saw an opportunity to indulge his greed, but he himself, not being directly involved in the war, can only speciously use the conflict as an excuse for his betrayal (1131f.). Further, Hecuba staunchly withstands and resists the dehumanizing effects of war, such as the supposed breakdown of pity and reciprocity. What does act as the catalyst in her transformation is the ruthless, self-interested betrayal of a close private friendship. The intensity of personal feeling explains her fierce, powerful emotional response to this particular blow. The way in which war plays a powerful role in the drama of Hecuba’s metamorphosis is in the post-war absence or breakdown in religious and political structures that might have served to “mitigate or avert the Dionysiac effect of women who are made to take over the power and the plot when men abdicate their roles of moral authority”.\footnote{Zeitlin 1996, 176.}

There are several significant sincerity themes at work in this play. The Hecuba highlights the problem of trust, or the difficulty of discerning a true friend from a fake, as well as underlining the impenetrability of another person’s motives. Hecuba and Priam
mistake Polymestor for a trusted *philos*, failing to detect the sinister disjuncture between his words and his intentions that might have predicted his treacherous deeds (596).

Euripides also uses this play to point up the vulnerability of human character to events and emotions that are beyond our power to withstand. This play portrays its eponymous character praising rationality as a stabilizing force both within human character and within community life. To Hecuba, it is the rational faculty that enables moral decisions, by its power of discernment between right and wrong based upon the standard learned as a child. Hecuba’s betrayal by a friend, however, puts self-regarding emotion in the driver seat of her self, figuratively speaking; and this flood of emotion not only alters her core commitments, it also utterly overwhelms her very identity, as Hecuba and as a human being. To be clear, then, Hecuba’s self is anchored by consistent rationality initially and is able to withstand the emotions of unimaginable misfortune with losing itself. Polymestor’s betrayal is of an entirely different order, though, occasioning an emotional response that cannot be rationally contained or even rationally understood. It is this experience of overpowering emotion that deals the conquering blow to Hecuba’s steadfast rational consistency. When rationality was the dominant element in her self, Hecuba’s outlook was objective; under the sway of emotion, however, Hecuba becomes primarily self-regarding and it is this that creates the conditions for her insincerity.

Unlike in Hegel’s account of the process of self-disintegration, Euripides does not conceive of this process as an advancement leading to an expansion of consciousness, but rather sees it as the source of tragedy in this human story. The play, then, is pessimistic about the human potential for sincerity, given that we are powerless to stabilize ourselves under the dire conditions whimsical fate can deal us. In the following chapter, on the *Philoctetes*, Sophocles will present a far more positive view of the emotions, with a powerful emotional experience of pity, identification and friendship leading to Neoptolemus’ *reintegration* of self from a state of disintegration, which itself was caused by association with the rational, corrupt Odysseus.
Sophocles’ *Philoctetes*: A Positive Model of Emotional Sincerity

Thusfar, throughout the previous chapters, the emotions have come off quite badly as a basis for stability of personality that would ensure personal sincerity: in Thucydides, Cleon represents an entirely negative model of emotional sincerity, with his emotional character causing wild and erratic behavior and justifying for him any course of action that satisfies his narrow self-interest. In the *Ajax*, Sophocles similarly characterizes the hero as a deeply emotional figure, whose irrational impulses drive his self-oriented, unpredictable actions; in this play, it is rather the cool rationality of Odysseus that shines forth as the example to be followed. Again, in Euripides’ *Hecuba*, Hecuba herself delivers a speech praising the value of a stable character secured by the rational discrimination between right and wrong conduct. Ultimately unable to adhere consistently to this standard herself, Hecuba is overwhelmed by her emotional reaction to her youngest son’s murder and her betrayal by a close personal friend. Each of these accounts posits an identifiable model of the self as the result of emotional dominance within the self: what Cleon, Ajax and the vengeful Hecuba share in common is an unpredictability, a capacity for deception and self-oriented behavior – qualities of insincerity. In each case, the emotionally motivated individual is or becomes isolated from his or her community. Emotions, then, in these portrayals are depicted as driving people apart rather than bringing them together.

In the *Philoctetes*, by contrast, Sophocles explores a more positive role for the emotions, presenting us with an alternative perspective on the emotions’ role in establishing lasting, sincere personal bonds, as a basis for joint action and as fundamental to mutual human survival and flourishing. As Sophocles portrays them, the representatives of the Greek army who arrive at Lemnos reveal the underlying corruption of their society. The Greek army, represented here by Odysseus, Neoptolemus and the chorus of sailors, is characterized by its aggressive, cynical leadership, which is marked by violence, deception and selfish regard. The crux of the play is who Neoptolemus will turn out to be, a coldly rational man like Odysseus, ruthlessly pursuing self-interest at others’ expense, or an emotionally driven, passionate man like Philoctetes, whose moral

---

1 See also Hawkins 1999.
compass is directed by his emotional responses to both friends and enemies. Will he succumb to Odysseus’ model, despite weak early resistance (86-120), of obeying those in authority and of working toward communal ends by employing disreputable means where necessary? Or will Philoctetes’ example of open trusting, spontaneous affection and moral decency win out? For Neoptolemus, this episode is a coming of age story – a young man’s journey of discovery to find a fixed identity for himself. Initially, manipulating the young man’s self-conscious ambition to live up to his father’s heroic reputation and uncertainty about what that means in practice, Odysseus easily overcomes Neoptolemus’ resistance to deception. Yet, after Neoptolemus witnesses an attack of Philoctetes’ painful disease, his self-interested resolve to deceive the pitiable man is broken. In his encounter with Philoctetes, it is a spontaneous emotional response that ultimately moves Neoptolemus, not anything in Philoctetes’ rational plea for rescue. Neoptolemus’ emotional reactions of pity and affection toward Philoctetes, products of a gradual and uneven progression, lead in the end to a lasting, mutually productive partnership that results in the Greek victory over the Trojans. Emotions, then, not only establish a secure, private bond of friendship between two men, but also lay the foundation for the success of the entire Greek army. The key difference between this positive portrayal of the emotions as securing both sincerity of self and social bonds and Sophocles’ earlier negative portrayal of emotion in the Ajax, as well as the negative accounts of Thucydides and Euripides’ Hecuba, lies in the specific emotions stressed: that is, the negative accounts of emotion all center on the isolating, self-involved and intemperate emotions, such as anger (Ajax), vengefulness (Hecuba) and greed (Cleon), whereas this play foregrounds instead such social, other-regarding and moderate emotions as pity and affection. Where the earlier texts depict emotion as a destabilizing

---

2 That is, while Odysseus appears passionless, Philoctetes vacillates between extremes of kindness and affection and deep bitterness and hatred.
3 See Whitby 1996 for parallels between the Odyssean Telemachus and Neoptolemus, who is here determined to discover an identity for himself through knowledge of his father and through finding a paternal surrogate.
4 Philoctetes also quite reasonably harbors the negative emotions of hatred and bitterness toward the Atreidae and it is these negative emotions that threaten to isolate him permanently. Yet, while bitter toward the specific group that harmed him, he is open, naïve and affectionate toward perfect strangers. And, through the symbol of the bow, he
force within the self that undermines consistency, homogeneity and appropriate concern for others, here Neoptolemus’ emotional experience grounds him in his inherited noble values, affording him a firmly settled sense of right and wrong and a spontaneous, confident awareness of what right action entails. In this aristocratic paradigm of sincerity, nothing could provide for more transparency, homogeneity and consistency of self, as well as the proper concern for others, than the spontaneous emotional dictates of the noble nature.

**Sophistic Anthropology and the Social Compact**

Peter Rose’s well-known discussion of the *Philoctetes* elaborates Sophocles’ engagement through this play with the ideas espoused by the anthropologically oriented Sophists on the process of human development into societies. He outlines three stages in this process:  

Stage 1: the exertions of human beings struggling to subsist prior to organization into cooperative groups  
Stage 2: the formation of a social compact or contract, meaning the development of cooperative bonds that enable the establishment of organized groupings of men, chiefly *poleis*  
Stage 3: the operation of complex civil and political society as organized by its societal structures, e.g. economic, educational, political

Sophocles stages the *Philoctetes* in such a way as to signal a dialogue with the theoretical underpinnings of these stages of human development, combining this thematic thread with an interplay with another contemporary sophistic debate over the primacy of inborn nature versus the power of influence and education in shaping character. Sophocles employs two key innovations on the Philoctetes myth that facilitate his anthropological

---

is more firmly linked to the cooperative virtues of altruistic friendship, trustworthiness, sincerity and pity. See Gill 1980, esp. 138-9.  
5 Rose 1992, 274.
project: the uninhabited wildness of Lemnos and the inclusion of the character of Neoptolemus. The island’s isolation from civilization recreates the conditions of a presocial, prehistoric time, returning Philoctetes to a “state of nature”. The arrival of the deceitful, corrupt outsiders occasions the intersection and interplay of all three stages of development: Philoctetes struggles alone to survive, before encountering a potential friend with whom he can establish a cooperative bond or social compact; he discovers, though, that the compact has a false foundation, based on the sort of deception and corruption associated with the third, contemporary stage of human anthropology.

This play represents Sophocles’ own perspective on the genesis of the social compact. Imagined by the sophists as a broad basis for societal bonds, Sophocles instead frames the social compact as an excessively narrow, private, aristocratic friendship between two men. Yet this narrow emotional bond does impact the broader sphere of the friends’ community: the success of the Greek army is grounded in this private relationship of mutual trust and sincerity. Sophocles’ engagement on the subject of how a social compact comes to exist intersects with many of the themes I have been raising so far: sincerity, the interplay of the rational and emotional elements of the self, and the basis for conditions of mutual trust. This play explores the importance of sincerity in the formation of successful human relationships, political and personal, as well as the impact of insincerity in the private sphere on the public sphere.

For the sophists, Rose asserts, the social compact has its roots in spontaneous emotional expressions between people who share a fundamental agreement on key ideas, founded on “spontaneous pity” for the suffering of another, “spontaneous affection” between men who are similar in important ways, and “sincere persuasion” designed to

---

7 ibid., 283.
8 ibid., 288-9.
9 The sophists envision personal, emotional bonds as the foundation for broader community bonds, leading to a strong society held together by the glue of mutual trust and affection between citizens. This play leaves open the possibility that this narrow friendship could catalyze an ever-expanding atmosphere of affection and trust among the Greek army; however, the general pessimism of the play and Heracles’ dark hint of Neoptolemus’ future savagery at the sack of Troy suggest that instead the corruption of contemporary society will negatively impact this new friendship (on Neoptolemus’ future sacrilege, see, e.g., Hawkins 1999, 357; Easterling 1978, 39).
promote a friend’s best interests. According to Rose, the survival of the human species necessitates the foundation of a social contract; yet, the possibility of this contract rests upon the emergence of the following conditions:

bonds of affection (philia), like-mindedness (homonoia), pity (to oikteirein), the substitution of persuasion (peithô) for violence (hubris, bia, kratos), the subordination of narrowly conceived self-interest (kerdos, to sumpheron) to respect (aidôs) for others, right conduct (dikê), and a sense of the common good (to koinon, to ksunon).

I would add sincerity to this list of criteria needed for a cooperative bond to form between men. By the end of the play, Neoptolemus comes to fulfill all of these conditions in relation to Philoctetes. So long as Neoptolemus remains committed to deception, any bond with Philoctetes is false and superficial. It is Neoptolemus’ emotional attachment, occasioned by Philoctetes’ suffering, which enables a genuine friendship to form between the two.

In this account, however, the social compact threatens to be a dead end. Neoptolemus advises what is best for himself and for his friend, i.e. going to Troy, overlapping his own interest with his conception of Philoctetes’ best interest (1381-5); yet the moment that solidifies the compact between these two friends is when Neoptolemus at length agrees to ferry Philoctetes, not to Troy, but home, contrary to Neoptolemus’ own interests (1402). The two then negotiate a transaction of mutually reciprocal assistance: Neoptolemus will take Philoctetes home, and Philoctetes in turn will provide the protection of his bow when the Greek army attacks (1402-7). Before

---

10 Rose 1992, 289.
11 ibid., 275-6.
12 It is interesting to note that Rose (1992, 276) places the genesis of language “out of inarticulate cries” in the second stage, with the formation of the social compact; in the Philoctetes, it is the inarticulate cries themselves, of pain, that occasion a true friendship between Neoptolemus and Philoctetes. Language apparently has no softening impact on Neoptolemus.
13 See Gill 1980.
14 Blundell 1988, 142; Rose 1992, 304; see also Gill 1980, 139-42.
Heracles appears to persuade Philoctetes to go to Troy, the cooperative bond of affection between these two men runs the risk of stalling them in the second stage of human development, at the social compact, which here threatens to cut them off from other bonds rather than functioning, as it should, to extend their social network. In Nancy Worman’s terms, Neoptolemus comes perilously close to being infected with Philoctetes’ antisocial disease.\(^{15}\) Reminiscent of Achilles’ fantasy of forming a society of two, comprised only of himself and Patroclus (\(II.16.97-100\)),\(^ {16}\) this isolationist bond runs radically counter to the sophists’ conception of “a broad social compact based on common human needs”.\(^ {17}\) Though the anthropological story of the transition from a rough, primitive existence to the organization into cities is supposed to be a happy narrative of advancement, Sophocles raises the question here of whether the contemporary political culture represents an advancement after all.

In either scenario, with the two men sailing to Troy with the Greek army or both alienating themselves by a retreat to their respective homes, neither Philoctetes nor Neoptolemus has sufficient strength to thrive and succeed independently: Philoctetes cannot get home or find succor from his wounds without Neoptolemus, and Neoptolemus cannot fend off the Greek army or win glory without Philoctetes (1423-4, 1433-5). The social compact between the two men can only take shape, though, once Neoptolemus learns the value of transparent sincerity and Philoctetes yields in his inflexibility concerning the Atreidai and Odysseus. Heracles appears and exhorts Philoctetes to sail for Troy with Neoptolemus, using a heroic simile to foreshadow their bond of trust and equality: “guard each other like two lions who share their kills, he you and you him.”\(^ {18}\) With this simile, Heracles portrays a relationship in which neither man is the inferior

\(^{15}\) Worman 2000, 11, 27.

\(^{16}\) \(II.16.97-100\): αἱ γὰρ Ζεὺς τε πάτερ καὶ Αθηναΐη καὶ Ἀπολλὸν/ μὴτε τις οὖν Τρώων θάνατον φύσιν ὃσσοι ἔσων,/ μὴτε τίς Ἀργεῖων, νόμοι δὲ ἐκδύμεν ὠλεθρὸν/ ὁφο' ὁι Τροίης ιερὰ χρῆσθεν 

\(^{17}\) Rose 1992, 305.

\(^{18}\) 1436-7: ἀλλ᾽ ὡς λέοντες συννόμω φυλάσσετον/ οὕτως σε καὶ σὺ τόνδ’. All \textit{Philoctetes} passages are taken from Hugh Lloyd-Jones’ 1990 Oxford text unless otherwise noted.
partner. The relationship may have started out with Philoctetes in a paternal role, but ultimately it evolves into a friendship of equals.\(^{19}\) This simile, however, with its imagery straddling the line between the first and second stages of human anthropological development, suggests that the friends’ reentrance into society is still somehow troublingly limited. Although Heracles foresees that the two friends will rejoin their community, their narrow, two-person social compact represents a sort of withdrawal into a private bond of trust and mutual flourishing. Sophocles transforms what ought to serve as the basis for broad, public organization into a private relationship. Nevertheless, this private relationship does provide a positive model of significant, joint action and cooperation. The Greek army, a loose grouping of individuals all motivated by a selfish pursuit for glory, is unable to bring its endeavor to completion. Success requires the synergistic bond of a friendship founded on equality, sincerity and genuine affection. With contemporary society’s ruthless focus on personal victory at any cost, this highly effective pairing of friends posits a positive model of caring cooperation.

**Rival Models of Nobility/Heroism**

In their interactions with the impressionable young Neoptolemus, Philoctetes and Odysseus evince competing ideas of what one should want to be known for, i.e. rival models of aristocratic heroism. Odysseus’ model of heroism privileges loyalty to the political group combined with a martial focus on personal glory and victory at any cost; in Odysseus’ heroic code, emphasizing winning as it does, there is no room for pity (54-5, 79-85, 111, 1054-62) and indeed this is an emotion for which Neoptolemus assumes Odysseus will reproach him (1074-5). Odysseus, in fact, comes off as entirely dispassionate and values rationality for its role in plotting deception. In short, then, Odysseus’ model of heroism is political, selfish and rational. By contrast, Philoctetes’ words on several occasions suggest that he places a positive value on private *philia*, cooperation and altruistic kindness toward one’s fellow man: he advises Neoptolemus that, according to his ethical code, being “serviceable, or useful” to others (476, τὸ

\(^{19}\) See Kosak 1999.
χρηστόν) brings the sort of fame in which he is interested; 20 further, he alludes to his altruistic, merciful act of kindness toward the suffering Heracles for which he received his famous bow (667-70; 801-3). 21 For Philoctetes, kindness toward others is in part motivated by the emotion of pity, which he considers a noble, praiseworthy emotion (475-6, 500-3). Philoctetes, then, privileges a model of nobility that is private, other-oriented and emotional. In this play, we have three characters – Odysseus, Philoctetes and Neoptolemus (whose ethical development will be discussed below) – all drawing upon traditional expressions of heroism and inherited aristocratic excellence, 22 yet each character has his own highly distinct beliefs and justifications of how these traditional values should inform behavior.

Philoctetes’ word for villainy, τὰ πανοῦργα (448), is a characteristic for which Odysseus is particularly known; 23 i.e. Odysseus is known for being willing to say and do anything in the accomplishment of his aims. Odysseus as much as acknowledges this when he promises Neoptolemus that, in return for doing this one shameful thing, he will win a good reputation (83-5). Odysseus exhorts his young pupil to care more about ends

20 475-6: Philoctetes avers that for the well-born (τοῖσι γενναίοισι), helpful or beneficial action (τὸ χρηστὸν) brings good repute (εὐκλεές).
21 For Philoctetes’ privileging of private friendship, I have in mind his genuine interest in and concern for his friends who went on to Troy (332-3; 410-34), as well as his private commitment to helping his friend while simultaneously eschewing political ties (1405-7). His hostility toward the political realm stems from the fact that it is encompassed by the Atreidae; in his view, his enemies are the political sphere. Initially, however, Philoctetes was more sincerely public-minded than even Odysseus (1025-8). Before his abandonment, he did not distinguish public and private philoi. For Philoctetes’ association with trustworthy, altruistic friendship, see Gill 1980.
22 Each of the three characters utilizes some combination of terms from traditional aristocratic, heroic ethics. For ex., words connoting inherent ethical goodness or nobility (γενναῖος, ἐσθλός, ἐυσεβής, καλός, ἀγαθός, χρηστός, ἀρετή, εὐγενής, ἀξίος), victory or success (νίκη), justice (δίκαιος), daring (θράσος, τόλμα, εὐκάρδιος), a notion of what properly causes shame (αἰσχρός, αἰσχύνη), concern for repute or esteem (κλέος, εὔκλεια), the appropriate relationship between words vs. actions (λόγος, ἔργον), pity (ἔλεος, οἶκτος), generosity of spirit (χάρις, εὐεργεσία), endurance (forms of τλάω), etc.
23 Blundell (1989, 188) discusses the pejorative associations of panourgia; n.20: “it is associated with trampling on justice and sophrosune.”
and not to worry too much about means.24 Yet, by Odysseus’ own example, behaving in a shameful manner earns one a negative reputation: the merchant describes Odysseus as “the one who hears said of himself every disgraceful and abusive word” (607-8).25 These, then, are central aspects of Odysseus’ ethos: shamelessness and placing a higher value on kleos and victory by any means than on a stable and consistent ethical code.26

While Odysseus is characterized by a shameless, morally flexible pursuit of glory,27 Philoctetes’ character is marked by his affectionate and trusting nature. At times the educational regimes of Odysseus and Philoctetes seem to echo each other, while in other ways they are directly divergent.28 Philoctetes’ account of the values that garner good repute demonstrates the divergence of content in the men’s views. Whereas Odysseus seeks a reputation for personal victory over a foe and serviceability to the political group (81-5, 1052), Philoctetes claims that it is a reputation for kindness or helpfulness (476, τοῖς γενναίοις) toward a fellow man that is appropriate to the nobly born (475, τοῖς γενναίοις). Philoctetes’ own fame derives in large part from his willingness to perform a selfless kindness toward a friend in need, Heracles (670, 801-3); and, conversely, when in need himself, he demonstrates a readiness to prove his gratitude and


25 607-8: ὁ πάντ᾽ ἀκούων αἰσχρὰ καὶ λωβὴτ᾽ ἔπη/… Ὀδυσσεῖς. It could be argued that Odysseus cares more about winning χάλεος than about the specific content of that χάλεος: consider lines 64-6, 607-8 and Podlecki 1966, 238.

26 For Odysseus’ shamelessness, see Carlevale 2000, 35; for his moral flexibility, see esp. 1049; and Carlevale 2000, 34-5; for his moral inconsistency, see, e.g., 83, 1247-8. Nussbaum (1976, 30) notes the “initial attractiveness” of Odysseus’ views and their “ultimate defectiveness”. There is precedent in the ancient context for the justification of such a self-oriented stance as Odysseus’ here: Theognis coaches Cyrus in insincerity as a practical and powerful position (213-8; see also 1071-4). Further, Hesk (2000, 190-201) provides an interesting interpretation of this play as an exploration of the ‘noble lie’ that takes Odysseus’ position seriously as being constrained by necessity and intended to secure the safety of the Greek army.

27 This is not to say that the pursuit of glory is in itself shameless, but rather that Odysseus’ particular means of winning glory is explicitly unharnessed from the constraints of shame (83, 1049).

28 For the verbal echoes and differences between Odysseus’ and Philoctetes’ appeals to Neoptolemus, see Kirkwood 1994, 243 n.23; Rose 1992, 314; Blundell 1989, 192, 199-200.
friendship by granting Neoptolemus the remarkable favor of allowing the boy to hold his prized bow (667-9). Philoctetes further suggests that shame plays an important role in motivating the noble man to pursue right action: “behaving shamefully is hated by the nobly born” (475-6).²⁹

In addition, the effusively affectionate nature of Philoctetes’ speech signals the emphasis on kindness in his characterization: for example, the prevalence of phil- words in Philoctetes’ speech stands out (e.g.224, 234, 237, 242, etc.), as does his abundant use of the affectionate, paternal address of Neoptolemus as “son” (παῖ, τέκνον; e.g.260, 268, 276, 284, 300, 307, 315; this is 7 times just in one speech!). This should be opposed to the rarity of such affectionate speech from Odysseus.³⁰ Philoctetes’ character is marked by his trusting, spontaneous affection (see e.g. 234-8); by contrast, Odysseus only uses an affectionate address, such as “son”, when it is expedient to his aim of persuasion. He is otherwise a cold, ruthless man focused only on accomplishing his aims (see, e.g., 1003, 1054-62; 81-2, 1052).³¹

²⁹ 475-6: τοῖοι γενναίοισι το/ τό τ᾽ αίσχρον ἐχθρὸν…
³⁰ See Rose 1992, 314; Blundell 1989, 187; Nussbaum 1976, 36. Philoctetes effusively refers to Neoptolemus as “son”, using this paternal address a total of 52 times; Odysseus, by contrast, is far more comfortable adhering to formality, addressing the boy with a patronymic “son of” construction (50, 96, 1237) more often than he uses the affectionate, paternal “son” (79, 130). Furthermore, in both cases when he uses the more affectionate address, Odysseus is knowingly urging Neoptolemus to do something dishonest and counter to his nature. Philoctetes does also use a “son of…” address twice, but, the first time, he warms it up considerably from the formal “Ἀχιλλέως παῖ” to “ὦ φιλτάτου πατρὸς”; the second time, Philoctetes uses the formal patronymic as an indication of the emotional distance created by the boy’s deception (940). Interestingly, the chorus calls Neoptolemus “son” a total of 8 times, 5 of which occur within the space of 30 lines (833, 843, 845, 855, 863), when they seem to perceive a weakening in Neoptolemus’ resolve to trick Philoctetes; for them, then, as for Odysseus, this address represents an insincere attempt to manipulate the boy using false affection.
³¹ This raises the question of whether Odysseus and the Atreidae are pursuing a civic or a personal goal in attacking Troy. Certainly, the Atreidae’s initial motivations are personal. Once at war, though, each hero is motivated by a personal quest for glory to contribute to the common Greek success. Odysseus also took on communal obligations through his oath (72). Further, with the anachronistic democratic overlay that is common to Attic drama (see, e.g., Easterling 1985), fighting in the war becomes more akin to civic duty (e.g. 1143-5). Odysseus’ supposed commitment to the will of the majority is problematized, however, by his own admission that his public-mindedness stems from compulsion (72-4, 1025-8, 1144). Additionally, while Odysseus and the chorus present
Odysseus seeks to imbue familiar terms of nobility with “new” content (52, τι καινόν).\(^{32}\) Cloaking this mission on Lemnos in terms suggesting a heroic exploit (50-1, 81-2, 84-5, 113, 117), Odysseus departs from the traditional concept of the heroic by encouraging the expedient use of deception, disguise and ambush (54-5, 77-8, 101-11, 128-31).\(^{33}\) Odysseus innovates further when he suggests that the very essence of heroism lies in obedience to authority and in serving as a subordinate helper (53), certainly a rather unheroic notion of heroism.\(^{34}\) He senses from the start, however, that Neoptolemus’ inborn \textit{phusis} will object to this “new” model of heroism, that Neoptolemus will be resistant to attempts to alter his inherited instincts of what constitutes noble behavior (79-80, 1068).\(^{35}\) Rose discusses Odysseus’ laughable attempts to educate Neoptolemus in a new sense of “right” behavior (δίκαιος; 82, 1049-51, 1246-7) by advocating moral flexibility and by justifying any means in the accomplishment of a goal: collapsing the concepts of δίκαιος and εὐσέβεια, Odysseus portrays these qualities as “irrelevant in the present but available when the circumstances require” (85, 1050-1).\(^{36}\) Odysseus’ heroic aim is repute. He wants the fame associated with a noble character (he mentions such qualities as justness, piety and general moral goodness; 82, 1050-1), but his emphasis is on what is \textit{said} about him rather than on instantiating those qualities.\(^ {37}\) Odysseus seeks to characterize his current behavior in terms of εὐσέβεια, speciously extrapolating from the commitment to this plot as a matter of securing the success of the Greek army (67, 109, 134, 1143-5, 1243, 1293-4; see also 989-90), Odysseus is also several times portrayed as merely a lackey of the commanders, serving their personal ends more than broad political goals (e.g. 6, 386-7, 1024, 1390). See Easterling (1978, 32, 37) for observation that Sophocles treats the “theme of duty with some reserve”.

\(^{32}\) On this, see Rose 1992, 314-9. 50-3: δεῖ σ’ ἐφ’ οίς ἐλημύθατος/ γενναῖον εἶναι, μὴ μόνον τῷ σώματι,/ ἀλλ’ ἣν τῷ καινόν…\textit{κλύῃς}.

\(^{33}\) Blundell (1989, 189, 199) observes that Odysseus coaches Neoptolemus not in a new conception of heroic values, but in dismissing morality altogether.

\(^{34}\) For the theme of service or subservience in Odysseus’ language, see Nussbaum 1976, 36.

\(^{35}\) For a discussion of what \textit{phusis} means in this play, see Carlevale 2000, 47-8.

\(^{36}\) Rose 1992, 315.

\(^{37}\) 85: \textit{κέκλησο}, “you will be spoken of”; 1050: where there is a public judgment, or κρίσις, he will be found pious. Odysseus wants to be \textit{known} for possessing positive moral qualities, but he is in \textit{fact} empty of sustained moral content (1049).
prophecy of Helenus that Zeus has decreed this mission and has even sanctioned the means by which Odysseus is accomplishing it (989-90, 1293).³⁸

Interpersonal emotions have no role in Odysseus’ heroic code. When he directs the chorus to remain by Philoctetes while preparations for sailing are under way, Neoptolemus anticipates that Odysseus will rebuke him for being by nature too full of pity (1074).³⁹ The relative coldness and formality of Odysseus’ language has already been noted above. Not only does Odysseus utterly fail to exhibit appropriate pity for Philoctetes, either now or in the past when he abandoned him on orders from the Atreidae (6), but he even shows unnecessary cruelty, taunting the wounded man with the vision of the commanders awarding the prized bow of Heracles to Odysseus himself (1061-2). Further, Odysseus exhorts Neoptolemus not to look at the pitiable Philoctetes, lest “being noble as you are, you will destroy our success” (1068-9);⁴⁰ it is apparently not a problem for Odysseus to look directly at Philoctetes’ suffering without an emotional response. Even Odysseus’ purported fondness (79, 130) for his young protégé appears to be predicated on Neoptolemus’ perfect obedience to the older man’s authority. When Neoptolemus demonstrates independent thought, Odysseus threatens to kill him (1250-55). Odysseus’ rather Spartan model of heroism values obedience to superiors and the usefulness of rational trickery, while scorning other-regarding emotion as weakness of will (1068-9).⁴¹

Odysseus attracts Neoptolemus to his way of thinking with the lure of the reputation that Odysseus claims the young man will win if he agrees to Odysseus’ plan: Neoptolemus will be known as “most respectful of all mortals” (85: πάντων εὐσεβέστατος βροτῶν) and as “clever and good” (119: σοφὸς…κἀγαθὸς). This latter formulation represents a pithy distillation of Odysseus’ new heroic code, as contrasted with the traditional formulation of the aristocratic, heroic code, καλὸς κἀγαθὸς. The traditional aristocratic code, with one term indicating physical beauty (καλὸς) and one term connoting internal moral goodness (κἀγαθὸς), suggests a continuity of self from the external to the internal. Odysseus, in keeping with his insincerity, disrupts this continuity

³⁸ Rose 1992, 315.
³⁹ 1074-5: ἀκούσομαι μὲν ὡς ἔφυν οὐκοτον πλέως/ πρὸς τούδ’.
⁴⁰ 1068-9: μὴ πρόσλευσο, γενναιός περ ὄν/ Ἦμων ὅπως μὴ τὴν τύχην διαφθερεῖς.
between the internal and the external by inventing a new code that emphasizes only internal qualities, one of them being a dubious cleverness (σοφός).\textsuperscript{42}

Philoctetes too presents Neoptolemus with an updated model of heroism that Worman aptly terms “emotional heroism”.\textsuperscript{43} In response to Neoptolemus’ cruelly casual farewell to the diseased stranger and his suggestion to his men that they set off (461-5), Philoctetes immediately makes an appeal for aid that employs traditional heroic language, but with a personalized, updated content:\textsuperscript{44} “among those who are true to their noble origins (i.e. noble sons of noble fathers), the dishonorable action is hated and kindness is well-regarded. There will be for you, if you ignore this request, a reproach that is not καλός, but for you, doing it, my son, there will be the greatest reward of good reputation…” (475-8).\textsuperscript{45} In this formulation, there is a continuity between one’s inner moral disposition, perceived externally through kind actions, and the external reputation one garners for acting on such feelings. That is, one’s reputation is directly tied to who one actually is. Whereas Odysseus places the emphasis on the perception of piety or justness (81-5, 1050-1), Philoctetes’ horror at any use of deception (esp. 927f.) indicates his commitment to transparency and homogeneity of self, i.e. actually being what one is reputed to be. Philoctetes’ moral code emphasizes respect for the claims of reciprocity (658-9, 662-70, 672, 1405-7), altruistic kindness (662-70, 801-3), pity (501,\textit{passim}), the obligations of friendship and supplication (e.g. 477-8, 484f., 530-2, 929-30, 941-2, 1445-7), and sincerity (307-11, 941-3, 1271-2, 1384, 1398-9) over selfish gain and glory (475-6). In short, Blundell acknowledges Philoctetes’ preference for conformance to “intrinsic moral standards” over the “approval of the community at large”.\textsuperscript{46} Also important to Philoctetes’ morality is being true to one’s nature, or being the true son of one’s father (e.g. 475, 950, 1310-12). And for Philoctetes, one demonstrates the nature he has by the people he is willing to help (1362-66, 1371-2); he makes an assumption that a man would only help those whom he is like in important respects.

\textsuperscript{42} For the moral ambiguity of s\textit{ophos}, see Blundell 1989, 191, & n.33. See also 1050: δυκαίων κάγαθοθών.
\textsuperscript{43} Worman 2000, 8.
\textsuperscript{44} Rose 1992, 292.
\textsuperscript{45} 475-8: τοῖσι γενναίοισι το/ τό τ᾽ αἰσχρὸν ἐγθοθόν καὶ τὸ χρηστὸν εὐκλεές,/ σοὶ δ᾽, ἐκλιπόντι τοῦτ᾽, ὡνείδος οὐ καλὸν/ δήσαστι δ᾽, ὦ παῖ, πλεῖστον εὐκλείας γέρας…
\textsuperscript{46} Blundell 1989, 200.
Neoptolemus’ moral values are the most complicated, undergoing different stages of development throughout the course of the play. Neoptolemus comes to the action with a simple, Iliadic conception of heroism akin to his father’s: that is, he favors open violence over deception and desires a reputation for being noble. He avows, “It is my nature to do nothing by base means, I myself am not such a man by nature, nor, so they say, was the one who begot me. But I am ready to take the man by force and not by trickery…I would rather, my lord, fail while acting nobly than triumph ignobly” (88-95). He shares with Odysseus the emphasis on reputation and glory and a willingness to use violence (90, 112-20), but, like Philoctetes, Neoptolemus is limited by an internalized conception of nobility in the means one can employ to reach that end (86-95). Initially, Neoptolemus’ vulnerability is his Achillean preoccupation with glory and renown. He asserts of this deception plot, “although having been sent as an accomplice to you, I shrink from being called a betrayer” (93-4); but, upon learning of the reputation he will earn from success on Lemnos, he casts off his moral qualms, the hero in him initially placing a higher value on status than on right action (115-20). Persuaded by Odysseus’ account of the personal benefit he will gain from this treacherous plot, Neoptolemus, after some hesitation, decisively exclaims, “I will do it, casting off all shame!” (120). Selfish concern for glory lays Neoptolemus open to Odysseus’ influence.


48 Neoptolemus initially sees the world in terms of violence: either he will use open violence (90) or it will be used on him (92). For Odysseus’ remarkable and constant association with force in this play, see 314, 321, 563, 592, 644, 983, 985, 988, 1297. The gods too, problematically linked to Odysseus’ underhanded tactics (133-4), are associated with violence (601).

49 For the similarities and differences between Achilles’ and Neoptolemus’ conceptions of heroism, see Blundell 1988, 142-3. Beye (1970, 70) notes that ultimately Neoptolemus cannot find sufficient motivation in an Achillean model of heroism.

50 93-4: πεμφθείς γε μέντοι σοι ξυνεργάτης ὁκνῶ/ προδότης καλεῖσθαι.

51 120: ποήσω, πάσαν αἰσχύνην ἀφεῖς.

52 See also Podlecki 1966, 237-8.
Neoptolemus’ transition to genuine friendship and pity toward Philoctetes is gradual and uneven, characterized by some back and forth. The first inkling that he might be moved by Philoctetes’ generous friendship comes after Philoctetes agrees to let him hold the famous bow (671-4), though it is yet unclear whether Neoptolemus’ response should be read as sincere or in keeping with his previous deceptive self-presentation. It is during the second episode that Neoptolemus mostly obviously begins to falter in his resolve to deceive Philoctetes, beginning straightaway with his apparently genuine dismay at Philoctetes’ pain (730f.). Though he seemingly remains committed to self-interest and the aim of success at Troy (839-42), Neoptolemus becomes incapable of further tolerating deception (895-916). At this point, though, he still believes that he is accomplishing by force what is in his friend’s best interests (919-20). His first moral impulse is to reject deception; but, when transparency fails to relieve his moral pain (969-70), it takes some time before he rejects too the compulsion of a friend (1224f.). It is only after Neoptolemus reappears with the resolution to return the bow to Philoctetes (1224f.) that the young man has come to a full and independent sense of right and wrong. At 1291-2, he undoes his initial wrong by returning the bow to Philoctetes. The final element in his moral evolution is Neoptolemus’ subordination of his self-interest to the request of his friend and his agreement to keep the promise made as part of the deception plot (1402).

Whereas Odysseus’ model of heroism aims at aligning the needs and demands of the community on its individual members with selfish opportunism, Philoctetes instantiates a more private code of behavior that dictates right action on the basis of an action’s impact on other individuals, philoi, rather than on the community as a whole. Having found his moral compass, Neoptolemus exhibits a confident independence of thought from both of his erstwhile mentors. The young man discovers for himself that obeying authority figures is not necessarily the route to noble, right, just behavior (1225-

---

53 For the unseen moral development occurring internally for Neoptolemus, see Hawkins 1999, 345.
54 Nussbaum (1976, 29-30) discusses an illustration of this difference in Philoctetes’ and Odysseus’ characteristic uses of χρή and δεῖ, respectively. Whitby (1996, 40 n.14) notes that Neoptolemus, like his father, is also motivated more by the needs of a private philos than those of the wider group.
Neoptolemus roundly rejects Odysseus’ new heroic formula of σοφός κἀγαθὸς when he emphatically asserts concerning his speech and actions that “if they are just, they are better than clever” (1246). He concludes that, for him, ends do not justify means. By the end of the play, in a complex interaction, nurture has turned on nature: Neoptolemus has, by virtue of his powerful emotional interaction with Philoctetes, discovered his own moral sense, which indeed surpasses both available models of morality in its synthesis of public and private needs (1300-4, 1326-47, 1373-91) and in its synthesis of emotional instinct with rational flexibility. To be clear, then, Neoptolemus comes to the play with a simple, straightforward model of heroism, his father’s, that values above all honesty and transparency (88-95), but that also values a reputation for heroism (e.g. 116, 118). It is this concern for repute that leads him to stray briefly into Odysseus’ model of heroic action that privileges reputation and success above all else. Interaction with the wounded, but noble, Philoctetes brings the young man back to the part of his early moral code that emphasizes honesty and transparency, while he simultaneously departs from the traditional heroic acceptance of violence. From this foundation of a commitment to frankness, Neoptolemus develops a moral intuition that distinguishes between ends and means and values friendship. Although he exhibits a mature independence from authority, Neoptolemus nevertheless gracefully negotiates between the demands of public service, private philia and self-interest.

**Logoi vs. Erga as Indicators of Inner Intention**

A key theme of the play is its involvement in the contemporary logos-ergon discourse, i.e. the debate over the relationship between speech and actions. In this play, this dichotomy represents a distinction between what is most expedient (logoi) versus

---

55 1245-6: ΟΔ. σὺ δ᾽ οὔτε φωνεῖς οὔτε δρασείες σοφά. ΝΕΟ. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δίκαια, τῶν σοφῶν χρείοσσο τάδε.

56 For Neoptolemus’ rational flexibility, consider 1270: οὔκουν ἔνεστι καὶ μεταγνῶναι πάλιν; and his speech at 1314-47, especially his rebuke of Philoctetes for his mulish intransigence and imperviousness to reason (1321-22).
what is most trustworthy (*erga*). A divergent view on this issue characterizes the two older men’s ethical systems. For Philoctetes, as for Achilles, one’s word is accomplished straightforwardly in action. For Odysseus, though words do accomplish action, the relationship between one’s word and one’s action is more circuitous and cannot be easily perceived by an interlocutor. In the beginning of the play, when Neoptolemus voices his objections to using cunning or treachery to achieve victory over an opponent (86-95), Odysseus responds with this assessment of his own development over time (96-9):

> ἐσθλοῦ πατρὸς παῖ, καυτὸς ὃν νέος ποτὲ
> γλώσσαν μὲν ἀργὸν, χεῖρα δ’ εἶχον ἐργάτιν·
> νῦν δ’ εἰς ἐλεγχὸν ἔξιών ὀρῶ βροτοῖς
> τὴν γλώσσαν, οὐχὶ τὰργα, πάνθ’ ἴγουμένην.

Son of a noble father, I myself when I was young had an Inactive tongue but an industrious hand; But when I bring it to the test I see that for mortals Words, not deeds, have the greatest influence in all things.

Odysseus, then, explicitly privileges words and the art of persuasion (*logoi*) over actions (*erga*), claiming that it is of greater benefit to an individual to be proficient at verbal persuasion than to live by the traditional heroic (and Achillean) code of valuing straightforward, brute action. Rose notes that Sophocles persistently within this play links

---

57 For the central significance of speech and its trustworthiness or lack thereof in this play, see addendum (1966, 246f.) to Podlecki’s article. Podlecki notes that attempts at communication via *logoi*, or reasoned discourse, are constantly thwarted, corrupted or interrupted in this play (244).


59 Carlevale (2000, 35) notes that Odysseus has a purely instrumental view of language. Blundell (1989, 190) notes that this speech on the power of the tongue “rephrases the conflict between deception and force as one of word and deed”, massaging the debate into moral terms that support his point of view. She further (1989, 221) sees in Heracles’ appearance the “ironic truth in Odysseus’ claim for the primacy of the tongue;” but Sophocles pointedly distinguishes between mere *logoi* and divine *muthoi*. Further, as a divine speech act that cannot be denied, Heracles’ *muthoi* are more akin to deed than word: see Podlecki (1966, 244-5), who distinguishes between the rational communication signified by *logos* and the “divine fiat” of Heracles’ *muthoi*; further, he notes (245) that in this play, as opposed to other Sophoclean plays where λόγος and μύθος are frequently interchangeable, Sophocles strongly differentiates the two forms of speech by using μύθος 3 times after Heracles’ appearance and not at all before this (1410, 1417, 1447).
speech with “trickery, deceit and lying.” Given the context of Odysseus’ attempt to overcome Neoptolemus’ preference for open action to deceptive speech, I read this passage as indicating Odysseus’ resistance to coupling inner intention with a matching action, or his rejection of a direct 1:1 relationship between interior intention and exterior action on the basis of that intention. Odysseus complicates the simple relationship between intention and action with a disruptive mediating term, speech. In this, he resists transparency of self, finding it expedient to his penchant for deception to uncouple words from action. Odysseus, who at no point considers performing an action motivated by feelings of friendship or pity and who does not value following up words of friendship with deeds of proof, reveals that his philosophy on the greater value of words than deeds makes him incapable of genuine friendship; and, indeed, as soon as Neoptolemus disagrees with him, Odysseus turns on him viciously (1250f.), evincing a superficial conception of philia.61

By contrast, Philoctetes repeatedly places a greater emphasis on actions as being truer indicators of mindset (307-11, 438-40, 530-2, 906-7). It was the act of kindness toward Heracles that won Philoctetes his famous bow (670, 801-3) and it is the act of returning the bow that restores Neoptolemus to the status of philos (1295) and to Philoctetes’ esteem as the true son of his father (1310-2). With Neoptolemus’ return of the bow excepted, words have so often proven unreliable for Philoctetes: previous visitors to Lemnos have pitied him in word (307-8, λόγοις ἐλεοῦσι), but ultimately balk

---

60 Rose 1992, 307-8. This is in contrast to the older generation of sophists, for whom speech was viewed as a remedy for violence; yet Sophocles here reveals Odysseus’ preference for speech not as a step toward progress but as a degeneration. See how, here, Odysseus is characterized by a preference for speech together with violence (e.g. 314, 321, 592).

61 See also Hawkins 1999, 348.

62 After Neoptolemus’ confession of his deception, Philoctetes abruptly ceases to address him as “son”. The first time he returns to this address is immediately following the return of the bow (1295). After a significant breach of trust, then, it requires a grand gesture to restore Philoctetes to a limited trust in his young acquaintance – he will only be swayed in his obduracy, though, by his trusted friend, Heracles, who never betrayed him (and who is, furthermore, divine).
at supporting their words with the action of saving him from his isolation (307-11).  

Philoctetes himself, though, demonstrates a strong connection between friendship and action. When Neoptolemus and his sailors apparently agree to help him escape from his island exile, Philoctetes responds with an overwhelming outpouring of gratitude and immediately seeks to link his affection toward them to actions in proof of his friendship (530f.). Unlike all of the men who have visited his island previously, Philoctetes demonstrates with grand displays of generosity that he knows how to be a friend in deed and not only in word (530-2, 568-9, 670, 671-3, 801-3). Assuming that he knows the son because he knows the father, Philoctetes exhibits a touching trust in Neoptolemus when he agrees to let him hold his bow, an object that represents his very livelihood, and says that he would grant him any other favor within his ability as well (658-9, 667-70). On the other hand, Philoctetes, like Achilles at Il.9.312-3, is disgusted by those whose words and deeds do not match up, asserting scornfully of the Atreidae that they are brave in word only but cowardly in battle (1306-7). Philoctetes takes the discrepancy between their words and deeds as a sign of baseness and insincerity, labeling the Atreidae the “false heralds of the Achaeans” (1306, ψευδοκήρυκας), a word indicating their dishonesty in speech.

Significantly, Philoctetes’ generosity in deed stimulates the first stirrings of moral decency in Neoptolemus: after the wounded man freely agrees to let him hold the bow, Neoptolemus appears to backtrack a bit, equivocating by saying that he only wants to hold the bow if it is themis, or appropriate, for him (661). Philoctetes’ trust in him occasions Neoptolemus’ expression of appreciation for the sort of genuine friendship Philoctetes represents (671-3). Shortly thereafter, when Philoctetes has again manifested

---

63 For this reason, Sophocles sets Heracles’ effective words to Philoctetes apart from the words of the other characters in this play as μῦθοι rather than λόγοι. See Falkner 1998, 48; Segal 1999, 352.
64 531-2: πῶς ἂν ὑμῖν ἐμφανὴς/ ἔργῳ γενοίμην, ὥς μ᾽ ἔθεσθε προσφιλῆ.
65 For the parallels between this play and the Embassy scene in II.9 and links between the characters of Philoctetes and Achilles, see Beye 1970; Blundell 1988, 144.
66 1306-7: κακοὺς/ ὀντας πρὸς αἰχμήν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς λόγοις θρασεῖς.
67 For this passage as offering an etymology and even a reinterpretation of Philoctetes’ name, from “fond of gain” to “the best κτῆμα is a φίλος” (Daly 1982, 441), see Daly 1982; Campbell 1972, 81-2. Daly notes that this passage defines the very essence of
a touching confidence in his new friend, Neoptolemus too makes a bold gesture of friendship, proving that he feels no disgust at Philoctetes’ wound by offering to take hold of him and to assist him physically (760-1). This play indicates that the only sure foundation for trustworthy friendship is acts of philia. Philoctetes’ friendship with Heracles, too, is initiated and secured by an act of kindness (670, 801-3). In the course of the play, Neoptolemus increasingly shows that he is moved by this model of act-based friendship. With Neoptolemus having offered to return the bow, Philoctetes exclaims, “O speaker of most dear words, if you speak sincere words” (1290, εἰ λέγεις ἐτήτυμα). Neoptolemus responds, “The deed will be clear” (1291). Neoptolemus too understands that, while words can be misunderstood or false, deeds are a concrete manifestation of inner intention.

**Education and the Permeable Self**

This play explores the theme of the shaping of character through education or the influence that those with whom we spend time can have on the person we become. Sophocles contrasts the two older men’s appeals to Neoptolemus: Odysseus claims that, if Neoptolemus will only turn himself over to Odysseus and shamelessness for one short day, he will ever after attain the reputation for being the most pious or dutiful of mortals (83-5). Philoctetes, echoing Odysseus’ language, enjoins Neoptolemus to endure less than one day of discomfort in order to avoid reproach and win the greatest prize of glory (477-83). Both men appeal to Neoptolemus’ desire to be known as gennaios (50-3, 475-8); but, while Odysseus instructs him to “dismiss the instinctive promptings of his phusis, friendship as reciprocal kind treatment (441). This etymology also points up the marked ingratitude of the Atreidai for Philoctetes’ voluntary service to their cause (1026-8).

68 On this scene and the issue of therapeutic touch in this play, see Kosak 1999.

69 1290-1: ΦΙ. ὦ φύλαττε εἰπὼν, εἰ λέγεις ἐτήτυμα. ΝΕΟ. τοῦργον παρέστη φανερόν.

70 This play opposes rational intelligence and speech, the skills of the polis, to emotion and deed, the ethos of the heroic warrior; Sophocles criticizes democratic politics by portraying Odysseus, the politician, using speech and intellect more for deception than open persuasion.
Philoctetes encourages him to heed them.” Philoctetes makes a claim about what noble behavior entails, but he does not, like Odysseus, attempt to instruct Neoptolemus with the end of changing his nature; rather, Philoctetes hopes to elicit the nature that the young man already has as his paternal inheritance. Philoctetes does not explicitly take on an educational role with Neoptolemus. His role corresponds to the model of “traditional heroic, aristocratic male bonding”, with the older man taking on a paternal role of educating by example.

Odysseus opens the play with an overt attempt to educate Neoptolemus to act in ways that are counter to his inborn nature (50-69, 79-85, 96-9); so, while he operates on the assumption that the self is open to influence, he also acknowledges the concept of inherited personality, an essential self that can be predicted to some degree by knowledge of the father’s character. Odysseus assumes, on the basis of the identity of Neoptolemus’ father, Achilles, that Neoptolemus is inherently opposed to deception and trickery and possesses instead a blunt, straightforward character (79-80). It is Odysseus’ goal in the early lines of the play to convince his protégé that there are circumstances that necessitate deception and in which deceptive tactics are appropriate and acceptable (esp. 96-119). Odysseus endeavors to override Neoptolemus’ inherited moral instincts using ends-justify-means arguments and by insisting that it is for the communal good of the Greek army that he and Neoptolemus accomplish their goals here on Lemnos (66-7, 113-5). Odysseus does not immediately clarify these goals. We know only that they require trickery.

In preparation for this mission on Lemnos, Odysseus seeks to train Neoptolemus in “verbal theft”, that is, in winning Philoctetes’ trust by presenting himself in a way that mirrors Philoctetes’ own character. Odysseus coaches the young man that he must speak

---

71 Blundell 1988, 139. See also Hawkins 1999, 343.
72 Rose 1992, 321. Kosak (1999, 93) makes the important point that, though the relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus may start out in the hierarchical model of a father-son bond, by the end, the two must become equals. Her article highlights the judicious use of therapeutic touch in preserving the possibility of this eventual equality.
73 For the issue of Sophocles’ confusing unfolding of the terms of the prophecy of Helenus, see, e.g., commentaries by Kamerbeek (1980) and Campbell (1879); Hinds 1967; Gill 1980.
74 Worman 2000, 5.
so as to “steal away the soul of Philoctetes by means of words” (54-5);\(^75\) he must trick Philoctetes by making himself appear to be so much like him that his speech dispossesses the wounded hero of the ability to make an accurate judgment of his interlocutor’s character for himself.\(^76\) To this end, Neoptolemus presents a carefully crafted persona that weaves aspects of his actual personality with characteristics of Philoctetes’ personality and situation.\(^77\) The effect of Odysseus’ education, then, if it is successful, will be to teach his young accomplice to be inauthentic, to appear to be other than he actually is; in other words, he is teaching the art of insincerity.

In the beginning of the play, Neoptolemus has a strong drive to rival his father in martial renown, but he also cares about how he goes about winning repute, desiring as well a reputation for nobility of character. At this point, Neoptolemus evinces a martial worldview with his readiness to use violence (90). His Iliadic, reputation-based conception of heroism, with its focus on fame and success, initially more closely resembles Odysseus’ selfish quest for repute than Philoctetes’ model of reciprocal friendship and “heroic” kindness. It is perhaps for this reason that, as Rose notes, Neoptolemus is more readily susceptible to Odysseus’ education than Philoctetes’ example, with Odysseus needing only around 80 lines to overcome Neoptolemus’ scruples, while the young man resists the impact of Philoctetes’ kindness and genuine friendship for over 800 lines.\(^78\) Odysseus has only to attract Neoptolemus with the lure of something “sweet” (81) and the prizes of glory and repute (115-9) to overcome the boy’s resistance to treachery.\(^79\) With Philoctetes, however, Neoptolemus demonstrates a persistent resistance to the wounded man’s sincerity and kindness. When he has apparently been moved to sincere pity by Philoctetes’ suffering (806, 882-8, 895f.), simply the entrance of Odysseus on stage is enough to curb his compassionate impulses temporarily. In fact, once Odysseus returns to the stage, Neoptolemus immediately returns to a subordinate role, cowed into silence and obedience (974-1080). Odysseus,

\(^{75}\) 54-5: τὴν Φιλοκτήτου σε δεῖ ψυχὴν ὡπως λόγουιν ἐκκλέψεις λέγων...
\(^{76}\) Worman 2000, 20.
\(^{77}\) ibid., 23.
\(^{78}\) Rose 1992, 313.
\(^{79}\) Blundell (1989, 191) notes that Odysseus tailors his appeal to the son of Achilles particularly, with his offer of prizes that are moral rather than material.
with the aim of encouraging Neoptolemus’ appetite for glory while repressing the emotional response of pity, directs Neoptolemus not to look at Philoctetes (1068). Odysseus hopes, by controlling Neoptolemus’ emotional instincts, to maintain his hold on the boy. Odysseus’ sizeable influence over Neoptolemus is amplified by the young man’s initial selfishness.

Philoctetes too exerts an influence on Neoptolemus’ character. Making assumptions about the young man’s temperament on the basis of his own essentialist model of the self, Philoctetes addresses Neoptolemus as a young man possessed of a nature that corresponds to his father’s noble nature (475f., 662-70, 874, 950, 971-2, 1007f., 1284, 1310-3). This expectation of nobility has a strong impact on the young man, who desires to be known as noble, like his father: the older man’s frequent assertions of Neoptolemus’ moral rectitude increasingly raise the boy’s discomfort over his involvement in what he knows to be a base deception. Philoctetes’ primary contribution to shaping the young man’s character, then, is not in his influence or example so much as in stimulating an emotional response of pity that leads Neoptolemus to a full recognition of his inherited nature and to discover on his own what constitutes right action for him.

In addition to considering the power of influence in shaping Neoptolemus’ character, the *Philoctetes* considers and challenges the aristocratic notion that the elite, because they set an example of right behavior for the masses, lead on the basis of a claim to ethical superiority. The play as a whole outlines an all-encompassing cycle of bad influence, originating with the gods and extending to the common mass of citizen-sailors. Just as Odysseus sets a poor example for his impressionable young protégé, Sophocles portrays the chorus looking to their aristocratic, elite lord (135, δεσπότ’; 150, 507, ἄναξ) for guidance and an example of how to act. On the basis of his powerful position in society, supported by divine sanction (138-42), Neoptolemus is expected to possess “skill” (138, τέχνα) and “judgment” (139, γνώμα) and to advise his men; in this play, “τέχνη” does not, however, have a neutral connotation, connoting “cunning contrivance”

80 See also Beye 1970, 73.
81 See also Hawkins (1999, 347) for the chorus’ dependence on and development of Neoptolemus’ verbal cues.
more than “skill”, and the chorus is looking for guidance in how to be insincere (135-6). The interaction between Neoptolemus and his sailors nicely demonstrates how corruption spreads by association. With Odysseus having turned the boy to trickery against his nature, Neoptolemus in turn sets a negative example for his sailors by leading them in a dishonorable plot. The chorus looks to their young lord to decide their course of action, asserting that it falls to him whether they sail away or help Philoctetes (963-4); and, again, the chorus says to Philoctetes that what Neoptolemus says to him, they too say (1072-3). The chorus cannot act independently, but must look constantly to their social superiors to decide their course of action. It is for this reason that a heavy moral burden falls on the leaders of the Greek army to act nobly, as the moral character of those they command to act with them is in their hands (385-8).

In society at large, meaning Greek society as represented by visitors to Lemnos, there has been a general breakdown in the process of moral education, as there are only corrupt models of behavior, from the Atreidae to Odysseus, the instrument of their plans, to Neoptolemus and the common class of sailors, who are in turn the instruments of Odysseus’ plots. As Rose aptly puts it, “Bad education by the leaders is offered as an explanation for all the city’s and the entire army’s misconduct (384-85).” When Neoptolemus tells Philoctetes his tale of being cheated of his father’s arms, he claims that the blame for this wrong falls most heavily on the Atreidae, who, as the commanders of the army, set the moral tone for all those under them, including Odysseus: “And I do not fault him (Odysseus) as I do those in command; for the entire polis and the entire army are under the sway of the rulers; those of men who lack the appropriate balance in their souls (οἱ δ᾽ ἀκοσμοῦντες) become base through the words of those who teach them” (385-8). This is devilishly hypocritical of Neoptolemus to remark, as he is seemingly

82 The chorus associates positions of influence with tricky rationality here. 135-6: τί χρή τί χρή με, δέσποτ’, ἐν ξένῳ ξένον/ στέγειν, ἢ τί λέγειν πρὸς ἄνδρ’ ὑπόπταν;
83 See also Rose 1992, 321.
84 Lines 385-8 have been suspected as spurious by Reeve and Barrett, though Dawe 1985 and Kamerbeek 1980 seem to accept them as authentic.
85 Rose 1992, 321.
86 385-8: [κοῦκ αἵτιοιμι κείνον ὡς τούς ἐν τέλει/ πόλις γὰρ ἢστι πάσα τῶν ἠγουμένων/ στρατῷ τε σύμπαι: οἱ δ᾽ ἀλοσμοῦντες βροτῶν/ διδασκάλων λόγοις γίγνονται χαοῖ.] See note above on controversy over the authenticity of these lines.
cognizant that he has himself been corrupted by Odysseus’ base example and that he himself, as an elite, ought to set a good moral example for his sailors.

Just as the current military leaders set a bad example for the masses, so the gods set a bad example for all of humanity: Hermes and Athena are problematically implicated in Odysseus’ shifty tactics of trickery and victory at any cost (133-4). The gods generally are linked with Odysseus’ penchant for violence (601). Lastly, Philoctetes draws the conclusion that, if they do not cherish and protect the noble, righteous man, the gods themselves must be base (452). Neoptolemus observes that war ever claims the noble but leaves behind the base (436-7). Further, the base have greater political sway than the noble, with the noble man perishing while the coward holds sway (456-7). This is a description of the political situation among the Greek army. These statements about the base flourishing while the good men perish implicate the gods in teaching mankind that nobility is not rewarded and morality not valued by the Olympians. This is a significant theme of the play: that the qualities of the self, in particular the moral qualities, are deeply impacted by the example of superiors at every level, including the immortals, and by the influence of surrounding culture more generally.

**Opposing Models of the Self**

Sophocles juxtaposes Odysseus’ savage ruthlessness, supported by cold, rational argumentation, with Philoctetes’ philosophy of supportive friendship, rooted in the emotions of pity, trust and affection, in a way that encourages the audience to discern the interplay of two distinct models of the self: Philoctetes demonstrates a belief in an immutable, essential self which attains its significant qualities through inheritance from the father. The essential self, as an entity engendered by the biological process of reproduction, is a natural self in the sense that its essence is instilled by a natural

---

87 Despite his extremely pessimistic view of the gods in this passage, Philoctetes reverently calls upon the gods often (736-8, 747, 770, 933, 967, 1181-5): Blundell 1989, 197.

88 North (1966, 65-6) states it thus: “The Philoctetes depicts an absorbing conflict between two opposing ways of life: that of the ἁγαθὴ φύσις, which is fully developed in Philoctetes; and that of the sophistic guile and ruthless self-will embodied in Odysseus.”
Odysseus, while acknowledging the existence of an inherited nature, adheres to a malleable or flexible view of the self – i.e. he assumes that the self develops dynamically over time through interactions with the external world and, moreover, that the putatively fixed, immutable properties of the essential self are not in fact perfectly stable. Sophocles goes further to align the emotions with the essential self: the emotions, as unfiltered, immediate and instinctive are “natural”, the spontaneous reaction of an inherited nature. Yet it is through access to the rational faculty that both Odysseus and Philoctetes see the possibility, albeit limited, of influencing and shaping the supposedly unalterable inherited nature. Rationality, in this play, is distanced from nature, as a conscious, filtered function of the self. Odysseus, with his faith in the power of rational persuasion, expects that Neoptolemus will be vulnerable to influence through rational argument and can be persuaded to deviate from his natural inclinations.

As I mention above, Odysseus acknowledges the power of inherited nature to determine behavior, conceding, “I know, son, that you are not by nature the sort of man to say such things nor to contrive evils” (79-80). Odysseus worries that Neoptolemus’ nature might stand in the way of the success of this mission (79-80, 1068-9); yet he has many tools at hand that he believes can overcome instinctive, inherited tendencies. He makes use of such diverse means of persuasion as the power of a son’s longing to live up to his father’s example (50-2, 113-19), a young man’s awe of elder authority figures (53, 96-9) and even the simple physical tactic of having Neoptolemus avert his gaze from Philoctetes, the object of his pity (1068-9). Further, Odysseus employs rational speech

89 Gelman 2003, 3: “Roughly, essentialism is the view that categories have an underlying reality or true nature that one cannot observe directly but that gives an object its identity”; and, essentialist categories are “discovered (rather than invented), they are natural (rather than artificial), they predict other properties...”. For full discussions of essentialist reasoning, see Gelman 2003; and Fuss 1989.

90 As such, the emotions are more trustworthy. For a similar viewpoint, i.e. that the truly reliable friend is the friend “from the heart”, that it is more difficult to discern another’s judgments, and for a contrast between the reliability of “heart” as opposed to the speech, consider Theog. 59-63: ἀλλήλους δ’ ἀπατῶσιν ἐπ’ ἀλλήλους γελώντες/ οὐτε παντών γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτε ἁγαθῶν/ μηδένα τόνδε φίλον πωεύ Πολυπαΐδης ἀστῶν/ ἐκ θυμοῦ χρείη ὁ πόλεμος ἐκ ἀλλᾶ δόξει μὲν πάσαιν ἀπὸ γλώσσης φίλος εἶναι...

91 79-80: ἐξουσία, παῖ, φύσει σε μη πεφυκότα/ τοιαύτα φωνεῖν μηδὲ τέχναθαι κακά.

92 See also Hawkins 1999, 343-4.
to activate powerful self-regarding emotions in Neoptolemus, such as fear and greed, which might override the boy’s natural inclinations toward nobility and transparency (81-5, 117-9, 1241-55).

Philoctetes, on the other hand, evinces his belief in an essential self by placing a marked emphasis on parentage. For Philoctetes, children inherit from their parents a fundamental essence that can be used to predict the characteristics and even behavior of the children. Upon learning of Neoptolemus’ descent from Achilles, Philoctetes immediately addresses the boy affectionately, emphasizing his good birth on both sides: “O son of the dearest father, of a dear land, nursling of old Lycomedes” (242-3). He exhibits an unprecedented trust in Neoptolemus, pledging to allow him to hold the bow, on the assumption that the boy’s nature is noble because of his noble lineage (874). Further, after learning of his deception, Philoctetes pleads with Neoptolemus to “now even still come to yourself” (950), implying that the young man’s behavior represents an uncharacteristic aberration from his essential, inherited nature. It is unfathomable to Philoctetes that Neoptolemus is himself corrupt; rather, these base deeds must have another source (971-2). Philoctetes later accuses Odysseus of “taking this boy as your screen” (1007-8), giving Neoptolemus the benefit of the doubt for being ignorant, for innocently obeying authority, and for being an unwilling participant in this plot (1010-1015). When Neoptolemus does finally return the bow to its rightful owner, this action confirms for Philoctetes that the boy is the true son of Achilles (1310-2).

---

93 It is interesting that, even though Neoptolemus cannot be imagined to comply with Athenian birth norms of having two Athenian parents, yet Sophocles nods to this norm by emphasizing his good birth from both a noble mother and a noble father. Susan Lape (2010, 26-30) argues compellingly that in the aristocratic tradition, nobility was thought to pass down to ancestors without degeneration. The operation of the Periclean law of 451/0, however, “altered the traditional conception of autochthonous ancestry from a secure potency impervious to change to an ancestral legacy vulnerable to intergenerational corruption and contamination” (Lape 2010, 30). It is at this point that we also begin to see concerns that even the pure aristocratic essence is subject to corruption by association with the corrupt. This deeply discomfiting idea interrupts the smooth prediction of another’s sincerity on the basis of his descent.

94 950: ἀλλὰ νῦν ἐν σαυτοῦ γενοῦ. Neoptolemus too shares an essential conception of the self, lamenting that “everything is nauseating when one, having abandoned his own nature, does things that are unlike him” (902-3, τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν/…λιπών).

95 971-2: οὐκ εἰ κακὸς σὺ· πρὸς κακὸν δ’ ἀνδρὸν μαθὼν/ ἔοικας ἥκειν αἰσχρά.
Philoctetes acknowledges the vulnerability of the innate nature to corrupting influence, in this case, the education of Odysseus: he asserts that a nature can go astray by habituation in bad behavior or thought patterns (1360-1). In angry defiance of Neoptolemus’ plea that Philoctetes return with him to Troy, Philoctetes calls him by that paradoxical epithet, “most hateful scion of a most noble father” (1284). In Philoctetes’ philosophy, it is hard to understand how someone nobly born can be himself ignoble. In order to square the fact of Odysseus’ baseness with his belief in inherited nature, Philoctetes posits an alternate parentage for him, with Laertes having bought Odysseus from his biological father, the trickster Sisyphus (416-7, 622-5). Philoctetes, then, concedes the permeability of the essential nature to negative influences, while yet seeking to make sense of a nature gone astray with an essentializing explanation, such as alternate parentage in Odysseus’ case and the naïveté and misguidedness of youth in Neoptolemus’ case (971-2, 1007-12). Both Odysseus and Philoctetes make statements acknowledging the power of the other’s conception of human nature, while yet emphasizing an overriding belief in their own respective conceptions of the self.

Rationality and emotion are portrayed in this play as two diametrical extremes: Odysseus appears unemotional and rational, and Philoctetes is characterized by his emotional responses primarily and by a minimal rationality. In keeping with his traditional persona, the Odysseus of this play is a cold, passionless man, “not quick to anger” (377) and seemingly immune to emotional pain (64-6). Before encountering Philoctetes, the chorus speaks of him as though he were a wild beast about whom they need to learn in order to counter his ferocious attack (150f.). They assume that he will be a suspicious man (136), so Sophocles sets us up to be particularly surprised, then, when Philoctetes is in fact warmly welcoming, kind and unsuspicious (219f.). Philoctetes is,

---

96 1284: ἀρίστου πατρὸς ἔχθιστος γεγώς.
97 By Philoctetes’ minimal rationality, I mean to suggest, not that he is stupid, but that his rational capacity is developed only to the extent of contriving his survival, not beyond this to conceiving of complex plots of deception. Further, his frequent attacks of his disease generate an incapacity for rational speech (Podlecki 1966, 234). Hawkins (1999, 355) describes Philoctetes as “emotion not tempered by reason”. See also Carlevale 2000, 36. More on this below.
ironically, insufficiently suspicious, having no radar for deception. He is a man divided between the conflicting emotions of affection and friendship and a deep and destructive bitterness over his abandonment (see 1316-23), while Odysseus is associated with complex, rational plotting.  

Sophocles distinguishes between Philoctetes’ rudimentary and unsophisticated rationality that at minimum allows him to contrive the physical, material means of subsistence, and Odysseus’ complex rational plotting. That is, Philoctetes’ rational plotting is generated by the necessity of physical survival, while Odysseus’ rational plotting exists for the purpose of devising stratagems for deceiving his rivals. Odysseus’ developed rationality is here characterized negatively. Using lexical repetitions, Sophocles draws attention to Philoctetes’ physical “contrivances” (295, ἐμηχανώμην) of survival as opposed to Odysseus’ rational plotting to deceive (1135, πολυμηχάνου ἀνδρός). Further, Odysseus characterizes his scheme as “devising evils” (80, τεχνᾶσθαι κακά) and Neoptolemus agrees that it involves acting “from an evil plot” (88, ἐκ τέχνης κακῆς); Philoctetes’ only “device”, however, is a poorly made wooden cup (35-6, φλαυρουργοῦ τινος τεχνήματ’ ἀνδρός).  

Odysseus presents a marked contrast to the emotionalism of Philoctetes in his lack of “phil-” words and in his parsimonious affection toward Neoptolemus, as noted above. The two men’s distinctive styles of speech are also suggestive of their differing models of the self. Worman contrasts Philoctetes’ volatile and unpredictable speech with Odysseus’ disciplined, measured speech, attributing this difference to the “linguistic conflict that arises from the clash of health and disease”. In addition to this explanation, though, their distinctive speech patterns signal Philoctetes as an emotional man who speaks spontaneously and transparently and Odysseus as a man who carefully and  

99 Worman 2000, 23.  
100 Hawkins (1999, 348) asserts that Odysseus and Philoctetes “stand as opposed extremes of reason and passion.”  
102 ibid.  
103 For the style of one’s speech as indicative of inner character and values, see Ford 2002, passim, but esp. 39f.  
104 Worman 2000, 10.
consciously constructs his speech. Odysseus smoothly tailors his speech to his targeted audience. Assuming that nature can be altered by access to the rational faculty, Odysseus expects to mold Neoptolemus into an extension of himself to act as his agent in this matter of tricking Philoctetes into returning to Troy.

By contrast, Philoctetes speaks at times in a choppy, inelegant style, particularly when the influence of his snakebite causes him to stammer awkwardly. Philoctetes exhibits a hungry eagerness for dialogue with his fellow man. For example, he exclaims joyfully at the familiarity of the dress and language of the Greek sailors, peppering them with abrupt questions concerning their appearance on his island (esp. 219-38). He guilelessly accepts everything he hears from these strangers as truth, touchingly sharing in Neoptolemus’ feigned emotions following his deceptive story (403f.), and evinces a genuine eagerness for news of his friends among the Greek army (332-8, 410-44). He is nowhere anything but naively transparent: during the attack of his disease, Philoctetes cannot conceal his unease (742-3). Philoctetes reacts emotionally in the moment, with joy and affection toward the Greek sailors at first and then with open horror and repugnance toward Neoptolemus once he learns of his betrayal. There is every reason to believe that Philoctetes’ speech represents a transparent communication of his inner world.

The Complexity of the Rational Self

In this play, rationality, associated with Odyssean-style speech and deception, is largely characterized as negative. Philoctetes says of Odysseus that “the unforeseen and veiled words of a deceitful mind slipped in under my radar” (1111-2; see also 100, 108-9, 842). He also claims of Odysseus that he has no thought that is sincere (1006, ὑγιὲς) or

---

105 For Philoctetes’ transparency, see Carlevale 2000, 37: Philoctetes’ voice is his “true voice” (205-6, ἐτύμα/ φθογγά); and, for Philoctetes, alone “on Lemnos…lies are unthinkable”.
106 See also Worman 2000, 26.
107 For the compelling argument that Neoptolemus’ story and Heracles’ life story represent two opposing models for the play’s action, see Hamilton 1975.
108 See Easterling (1978, 28) for claim that no one is this play has clear motives except Philoctetes.
free (ἐλεύθερον).

As mentioned above, Sophocles contrasts the nature of the two men’s rational capacities, with paired uses of the terms τέχνη and μηχανή (see, e.g., 35-6 vs. 80, 88; 295 vs. 1135). While Philoctetes is certainly depicted as a man possessed of sufficient rational intelligence, it is in their interactions with their fellow men where Odysseus and Philoctetes diverge in their relation to rationality: Philoctetes uses his rational intelligence to survive, but in his dealings with men he is motivated by and characterized by the straightforward simplicity of his spontaneous emotional reaction to events and others; whereas Odysseus is depicted as a man divorced from his emotions in his relations with others. Instead, Odysseus utilizes the powers of his intellect to contrive complex plots to overcome rivals. Rationality in this play, as the filter or layer “on top of” natural emotion, implies a complexity of self that by definition yields an insincere personality.

The themes of hunting and survival (σωτερία) of this play reveal the cruelty associated with Odyssean rationality. Rose argues that Sophocles underscores the “ferocity” in the contemporary application of sophistic doctrines with his use of the hunting theme to contrast the contemporary and the presocial stages of human development. Philoctetes’ hunting for the purpose of survival presents a stark contrast with Odysseus’ deceitful hunting of men. Consider especially lines 1004-8: “O my arms, what things you suffer in the want of my bowstring, caught together

---

110 For ὑγιής as ‘honest’ or ‘sincere’ when used of thoughts or speech, see Thuc. 4.22.2: ἀλλὰ ἐὰν γνίης διανοούνται, λέγειν ἐκέλευσον ἄπασι; see also Dem. 19.39. That ὑγιής is often rendered as ‘wholesome’ also hints at its connection to sincerity, in the sense that sincerity implies a quality of singleness, integrity or wholeness.


112 Worman 2000, 31: “Sophocles depicts Odysseus as unemotional in the extreme, coolly intent on the control and coercion of the disruptive agent that Philoctetes embodies.” He is not impacted emotionally by disgust or pity, exhibiting no emotional response to Philoctetes’ suffering.

113 Rose also notes the contrast between Philoctetes’ discovery of necessities for his belly (Rose 1992, 308, 287-8) and Odysseus’ discovery of outrageous things to say (991).

114 Rose 1992, 308.

115 The merchant that Odysseus sends claims that Odysseus and Diomedes are out on a mission together, hunting down another man (570-1, 591-2). Odysseus and Diomedes are also linked in treachery in Il.10. Here, it is not Diomedes, but Neoptolemus, who is Odysseus’ partner. Odysseus, then, seeks to fashion Neoptolemus into his new partner in shady plots.
(συνθηρώμεναι) by this man. O you who thinks nothing sincere or frank (ὑγιὲς μηδ᾽ ἐλεύθερον), how you snuck up on me, how you hunted after me (ἐθηράσω), taking this boy, unknown to me, as your hunting screen (πρόβλημα).” The two men also demonstrate divergent perspectives on the notion of σωτηρία (preservation, safety). Odysseus, through his entreaties to Hermes and Athena Polias (aka Νίκη/Victory), forges a link between himself, trickery and democratic Athens, claiming that Athena-of-the-Polis always saves him as he undertakes a deceitful plot to gain victory over a foe (133-4, Ἀθάνα Πολιάς, ἥ σῴζει μ᾽ ἀεί).117 Echoing Odysseus’ phrasing, Philoctetes rejoices in his ability to generate the spark of fire, which, he says, always saves him (297, ἐφήν᾽ ἀφαντὸν φῶς, ὃ καὶ σῴζει μ᾽ ἀεί). The lexical repetition here contrasts the literal power of fire to preserve human life with Odysseus’ success in duplicity.118 Odysseus’ speech, once he and Neoptolemus have possession of the bow, further reveals the characteristic cruelty and self-orientation of his contemporary, third-stage thinking.119 Here he coldly asserts that, having the bow, he has no need of Philoctetes (1055-60). With his “callous calculation of what is not needed”,120 Odysseus exposes his ruthlessly instrumentalist view of human beings as simply potential tools in his own gambits for victory and its attendant glory (see 1052). Sophocles dramatizes “through his characterization of Odysseus the underlying selfish individualism, hypocrisy and brutality” of the society he represents.121

A recurring thread running through the entire play is the contrast between violence (βία) and friendship (φιλία). I have already discussed Philoctetes’ strong linkage with the values and obligations of friendship and even the suggested etymology of his name at 670-3 as “the best κτῆμα (possession) is a φίλος (friend)”122 By contrast,

117 For the import of Odysseus’ prayer to this odd coupling of gods, see Nussbaum 1976, 29.
118 Rose 1992, 309.
119 ibid., 317.
120 ibid., 318.
121 ibid., 316.
122 Daly 1982, 441; see also Campbell 1972, 81-2.
Odysseus is overwhelmingly associated with violence or force (βία).\(^{123}\) He is three times referred to as Ὄδυσσεως βία (314, 321, 592, ‘the violence of Odysseus’). Further, Neoptolemus, speaking with the false merchant, puts himself in the same position as Philoctetes, as one threatened with Odysseus’ violence (563, also 643-4). Then, in Philoctetes’ confrontation with Odysseus, Odysseus’ impending violence toward his foe is overdetermined (983, 985, 988, 1297). Able to relate to the world in no other way, Odysseus seeks to co-opt Philoctetes into his violent worldview as well, offering him the choice of being carried away by force (983-8) or coming voluntarily in order to direct his own violent impulses against Troy (998).\(^{124}\) Neoptolemus too gives expression to his martial understanding of the way the world works early on: that is, one either employs force or is the victim of force (90, 92). Although Odysseus tries to persuade Neoptolemus at first that neither persuasion nor force will work against Philoctetes (103), what becomes clear in the course of the action is that deception is a kind of violence. Philoctetes, by contrast, is a pacific fellow, opposed to participation in the war at Troy, interested only in home, family and friends. Neoptolemus too must abandon his own martial aspirations for the sake of solidifying his φιλία with Philoctetes; in other words, he must choose φιλία over βία. The ultimate impetus of the play is to reintegrate Philoctetes into the war effort (βία) and to collapse the stark distinction between φιλία and βία: Philoctetes’ engagement at Troy will be one of combined force and friendship (1425-37). In a sense, Philoctetes must be realigned with the full symbolism of the bow, itself signifying both friendship and war (1431-3).

Rationality in this play conjures associations with civilization, cruelty and deception or insincerity. To push the point further, rationality here implies a sort of complexity of self that is at odds with ancient conceptions of sincerity. Philoctetes attributes to Odysseus an “evil mind” that looks out διὰ μυχῶν, “through its innermost

\(^{123}\) It is unclear whether this association with violence should be indicative of the corruption of the third stage of human development, i.e. civilization, or whether we should note that despite his rough, first-stage existence it is Philoctetes who exemplifies civilized virtues, in a sort of reverse of the anthropological stages.

\(^{124}\) Easterling (1978, 38) notes the complexity of Odysseus’ motives: he is portrayed negatively, but he is not as thoroughly evil as Philoctetes imagines. After all, his ultimate aim is the reintegration of Philoctetes as a peer of the Atreidae (997).
recesses or nooks” (1013-4). Odysseus’ mind, then, has multiple layers of consciousness, with some kind of core consciousness that is aware of itself, that can look out from within the depths of his mind and objectively contemplate the mind as a whole. With its many nooks and folds, Odysseus’ mind is heterogeneous, making him inherently untrustworthy. Odysseus’ layering of self extends outward as well: he seeks to convert others into doubles of himself, who can accomplish his actions without his presence being necessary, as is the case with the false merchant and Neoptolemus (temporarily). Philoctetes accuses Odysseus of taking Neoptolemus as his screen (1008, πρόβλημα). Not stopping, then, at concealing himself with a physical disguise, Odysseus even uses other human beings as additional layers to mask his role in this affair. Further, when Philoctetes laments that “the invisible (ἄσκοπα) and hidden words (κρυπτά ἔπη) of a tricky mind crept in under his radar (ὑπέδυ)” (1111-2), he seems to consider Neoptolemus a mere puppet and mouthpiece for Odysseus’ deception. Odysseus cultivates rational cleverness as a means of disguising and concealing himself. Rationality, then, affords an avenue for abandoning one’s true nature, as Odysseus encourages Neoptolemus to do. Odysseus might even be said to lack a nature that is authentically his own, so proficient is he at taking on other personae. Philoctetes, foreseeing his future ill treatment at the hands of Odysseus, pronounces, “for men whose judgment (γνώμη) has become the mother of evils, it brings forth other evils as well” (1360-1). When the rational capacity is corrupted, it corrupts the entire self. Neoptolemus, with his persistent numbness to Philoctetes’ plight, illustrates how difficult it is to overcome a corrupted course of reasoning.

125 1013-4: ἡ κακὴ σῇ διὰ μυχῶν βλέπουσ᾽ ἡ/ ψυχή...
126 See also Levine 2003, 7.
127 See also Carlevale 2000, 50.
128 Phil. 1360-1: οἶς γὰρ ἡ γνώμη κακών/ μήτηρ γένηται, κάλλα παιδεύει κακά. For line 1361, I prefer this text (with Campbell, Dawe, Kamerbeek) to the alternative suggestions (see Webster’s 1970 text, Lloyd-Jones’ 1990 Oxford text, and 1994 Loeb text). In the 1994 Loeb, Lloyd-Jones replaces παιδεύει with φιτεύει, but, in this play, where rationality is overtly aligned with education, this emendation seems unwarranted.
Neoptolemus, in the beginning of the play, gives little hint of his deeply emotional character; however, when Odysseus encourages the boy to tell a lying tale that maligns Odysseus himself, some interesting aspects of Neoptolemus’ self-perception emerge. Neoptolemus tells a story that mirrors the ills Philoctetes suffered at the hands of the Atreidae and Odysseus. Philoctetes, upon hearing Neoptolemus’ story of having been wronged in the awarding of Achilles’ arms, remarks with surprise that Odysseus and the Atreidae could have perpetrated such villainy if Ajax was present. Ajax is an important figure lurking in the subtext of this play: through his deceptive story, Neoptolemus becomes a double for both Ajax, who also famously became irate upon losing the arms of Achilles to Odysseus, and for Achilles, with the army thinking they see Achilles himself when Neoptolemus arrives at Troy (356-8). Ajax and Achilles are heroes from the same mold, emotional defenders of right and rebels against perceived injustice. Consider Neoptolemus’ emotional temperament in this tale versus Odysseus’

---

129 Beye (1970, 70) suggests, though, that Neoptolemus’ cry of anguish at the sight of Philoctetes’ bandages foreshadows his eventual sensitivity to Philoctetes’ pain. See also Hawkins (1999, 346) for evidence of Neoptolemus’ sensitivity to Philoctetes’ pain before Philoctetes’ first entrance.

130 Roberts (1989, 174) argues compellingly that Neoptolemus’ story “is an uncertain mixture of true and false”. She notes that, in this, the boy has adopted an Odyssean manner of story-telling (168). Further, by failing to correct Philoctetes at 1364-5, Neoptolemus makes this “lying tale” his true story (Roberts 170-1; this point is also made by Taplin 1987, 70). Taplin (1987, 69f.) comes to a similar conclusion about this speech. Hamilton (1975, 132) observes that Neoptolemus glibly expands Odysseus’ 10-line kernel into a 48-line narrative “with an amplitude of detail worthy of an arch-deceiver”. Podlecki (1966, 239) too sees Neoptolemus as an arch-deceiver who surpasses even Odysseus. Calder (1971), also convinced that it is Neoptolemus here who is the arch-deceiver, not Odysseus, insists that this entire speech is an utter fabrication…as is his putative repentance later in the play! By contrast, Carlevalle (2000, 39) emphasizes Neoptolemus’ tendency to reveal truth even in a story meant to deceive.

131 343-90: in this ‘messenger speech’, Neoptolemus stands in for Ajax, calling to mind Neoptolemus’ traditional reputation for being wild and brutal and introducing this valence of his personality as a subtext in this play, in which, by contrast, he is ultimately portrayed as sympathetic, kind, sincere and loyal (this conflict in Neoptolemus’ characterization Calder finds particularly troubling: 1971, 168).

132 For Neoptolemus’ “words, mood, and pretended action” as a “lying parody of his great-hearted father”, see Knox 1966, 123.
fictional reaction to the young man’s bitter insults: Neoptolemus weeps over his father’s body (360, ἐνταξίωσα); he again bursts into tears (367, ὑπερβαφοῦσάς) of grievous rage (368, ὀργῇ βαφοῦσάς) when denied his father’s arms; and, yet again, he loses his temper, provoked to anger by Odysseus’ reply to him (374, χολωθεῖς). Odysseus, by contrast, not quick to anger (377, οὐ δύσοργος; see also 64-6), replies in a succinct, controlled way to this boy’s barrage of insults. Though it is certainly feasible to argue that Neoptolemus portrays himself this way in an attempt to mirror Philoctetes’ emotional temperament, we must also consider that Neoptolemus, not a charlatan by nature, leaks his true identity when he lies, unable to envision himself in any other way than as he really is, a young man motivated by his emotional impulses in the mold of the emotional heroes, Achilles and Ajax.

Philoctetes’ speech rationally expounding his suffering appears to have no real impact on Neoptolemus. He coolly continues in the deception plot outlined by Odysseus (319f.). The scene with the false merchant displays the depth of his hypocrisy (542-627): Neoptolemus closely follows Odysseus’ advice of making the most of the merchant’s words. At this point, Neoptolemus does not appear to harbor authentic feelings of friendship toward Philoctetes, attempting still to get both Philoctetes and his bow (but in his own possession) onto his ship (639-57). The only reason Neoptolemus can give the false merchant for counting Philoctetes as his “greatest friend” (586: φίλος μέγιστος) is his shared hatred of the Atreidae, which for Neoptolemus is only a deception. There is nothing inherent to Philoctetes that Neoptolemus cares about. Neoptolemus declares that the merchant must speak everything openly in front of Philoctetes (580-1, ἐς φῶς), knowing that the entire ensuing discussion will be a complete lie. Not stopping, then, at a simple intellectual deception of Philoctetes, Neoptolemus dupes the wounded man on an emotional level as well by feigning open, trusting friendship. The entire scene with the false merchant represents an absurd and cruel parody of sincere friendship.

Neoptolemus’ transformation into a true friend to Philoctetes is gradual, unfolding in steps with advances and regressions. Philoctetes’ effusive kindness, his open trusting

133 For Neoptolemus’ hesitation to sail as evidence, not of his first stirrings of moral discomfort, but of his dilemma over arriving at the ship with Philoctetes still in possession of his bow, see Kamerbeek 1980, 100.

134 See also Podlecki 1966, 239.
and his exhibition of friendly reciprocity begin to elicit a response from Neoptolemus. There is some debate over where we might place the first stirrings of genuine pity and friendship in Neoptolemus. Certainly, though, by the time Philoctetes has an attack of his disease, becoming incapacitated by the pain, Neoptolemus’ composure is ruffled and he seems to speak as himself for the first time with Philoctetes (730f.). The young man is clearly discomfited by this face-to-face experience of Philoctetes’ ailment (730-818), which had previously only been clinically described to him. Neoptolemus queries Philoctetes almost frantically and redundantly about what is going on. Neoptolemus makes a truly touching gesture, given the accounts of all other visitors’ and the Greek army’s response to Philoctetes’ disease, offering to take hold of and physically support the desperate man (761). Finally, Neoptolemus succumbs to the very tactic he sought to use against Philoctetes: at first, he consciously mirrors Philoctetes’ personality and misfortunes back to him to gain his sympathy and trust; having witnessed the man’s pain, however, Neoptolemus begins genuinely and unconsciously to mimic aspects of Philoctetes’ disease. Like Philoctetes at the onset of his attack (730-1, 740-1), Neoptolemus becomes stunned into silence (804-5); and, like the wounded man, Neoptolemus too suffers pain and groans (cf. 734, 736, 806). His cry of moral anguish, “παπαῖ”, echoes Philoctetes’ cries of physical anguish (746, 754); and mirroring the “terrible burden of the disease” (755, δεινόν γε τούπισαγμα), Neoptolemus experiences a “terrible” burden of pity (965, οἶκτος δεινὸς).

Rose rightly observes the irony that it is his firsthand witnessing of one of Philoctetes’ attacks, an experience that repels the

---

135 Though I might place it at 671-3, where Neoptolemus might reasonably be moved by the trust and kindness of Philoctetes at 658-70, Kamerbeek (1980, 103) seems to follow Jebb in viewing these lines as merely a stiff response to Philoctetes’ effusiveness. Blundell (1988, 139) asserts that the “first sign of [Neoptolemus’] sense of shame appears when the chorus exhort him to abscond with the bow while Philoctetes sleeps.”

136 761: βούλῃ λάβωμαι δῆτα καὶ θίγω τί σου; on this scene, see Kosak 1999.

137 The kinship and resemblance between the two friends is already foreshadowed, though, when Neoptolemus experiences pain (86, ἀλγῶ) at the mention of shamelessness and deception.

138 Contrast this with Odysseus, who does not feel pain (Worman 2000, 23): 66.

139 Whitby 1996, 34.

140 See Worman (2000, 27) on the infectiousness of Philoctetes’ disease on those around him – though, really, the only person who seems affected in this way by Philoctetes’ disease is Neoptolemus.
other Greeks and all other would-be rescuers, that penetrates the young man’s coldly rational demeanor and morally compels him to remain by the sick man’s side (774-817). Whereas others “shrink from” contact with the disease (225, ὀξνῷ), Neoptolemus shrinks only from the label of traitor (93-4, ὀξνῷ προδότης καλεῖθαι) and in fact explicitly does not shrink from assisting Philoctetes physically after his bout with the illness (887, οὐκ ὀξνοῦ). Experience of Philoctetes’ sickness destabilizes the defenses Neoptolemus has erected against sympathy and affection. After seeing the torturous pain Philoctetes contends with, Neoptolemus refuses to let go of him, thinking that he is providing support (817). He also pledges openly, willingly and sincerely to wait and remain by Philoctetes’ side (810-13).

Having witnessed the attack, Neoptolemus is yet torn between self-interest and concern for his friend: out of affection and pity, he refuses to make off with the bow, but out of self-interest he will also not return the bow to Philoctetes (925). He still clings to the prospect of victory at Troy (839-41) and to his youthful awe of authority (925-6). His joy at Philoctetes’ recovery, though, is sincere (882f). Having come through this experience of sharing Philoctetes’ suffering with him brings Neoptolemus to a state of aporia, confused as to how to handle his mixed motivations (895f.). His cold rationality breaks down and he becomes incapable of further deceit (915-6). The means, however, by which “he regains and confirms his original intuitions is not the Socratic path of rational argument,” but rather it is “feelings which alert him to the demands of his phusis.”

141 Rose 1992, 296.
142 Ironically, it soon after falls to Philoctetes to “shrink from” Neoptolemus in horror at his confusing words (907, ἐν οἷς δ’ ἀὐδᾷς ὀξνῶ). Of course, Odysseus experiences no such sensitivity, shrinking from nothing distasteful so long as it confers a profit (111).
144 Kosak (1999, 130) sees Neoptolemus’ later hesitation to help Philoctetes to his feet as a sign of his growing discomf ort over the false basis of their friendship.
145 Podlecki (1966, 240 n.17) nicely notes of lines 925-6 that Neoptolemus’ claim to be following orders in withholding the bow from Philoctetes is reminiscent of Odysseus’ denial of responsibility for any wrongdoing against Philoctetes (6).
146 Blundell 1988, 140.
147 ibid.; see also Nussbaum 1976, 33; Hawkins 1999, 341, 345.
Neoptolemus must yet undergo two stages in his maturation into a genuine friend and a man of noble character: he must first overcome his awe of authority (beginning at 1224), and, second, relinquish his self-interest in favor of keeping an oath (1402f.). His steadfastness in his mission of deception for Odysseus produces an intense discomfort for Neoptolemus (969-70). In order to maintain his resolve, he must turn away from his friend, refusing either to look at or speak to Philoctetes (934-5, 1068). Now, because of his identification with Philoctetes in friendship, looking at him while disappointing him unsettles his resolution. Neoptolemus’ emotions are strong and burdensome and it is these emotions that necessitate a painful break from Odysseus. He frets, “Oh me, what shall I do? I should never have left Skyros, so much am I grieved by these events” (969-70). To Philoctetes, his young companion’s pain is plainly evident (1011, δήλος).

Following an impassioned exchange between Odysseus and Philoctetes, the chorus exhorts Philoctetes to trust in Neoptolemus, to “draw near to one who draws near to you in all goodwill” (1163-4), and indeed Neoptolemus has slowly been coming to a point of evincing a real concern for the interests of his friend, rather than always keeping his own selfish interest in view.

Neoptolemus’ newfound emotional regard for the interests of another changes the character of his rational faculty too. That is, rationality under the influence of other-regarding emotion shifts away from its association with trickery, transformed into a means of fostering the best interests of a friend. Neoptolemus makes a clear, rational argument complete with several “proofs” of sincerity (see 1324, 1341-2), attempting to persuade Philoctetes that it is in his own best interest to sail to Troy (1314-47). He seeks to advise (1322, νουθετῇ) Philoctetes as a counsellor (1321, σύμβουλον) in a spirit of goodwill (1322, εὐνοίᾳ), yet it becomes clear that rational speech has no effect on the betrayed Philoctetes, just as Philoctetes’ rational account of his suffering and misfortunes

---

148 969-70: οἴμοι, τί δράσω; μή ποτ’ ὄφελον λιπεῖν/ τὴν Σκῦρον - οὕτω τοῖς παροῦσιν ἄχθομαι.
149 1163-4: πρὸς θεῶν, εἰ τι σέβῃ ξένον, πέλασσον, εὐνοίᾳ πάσᾳ πελάταιν.
150 Blundell (1989, 224 n.136) outlines an interesting shift in Neoptolemus’ speech that signals his gradual transition to selfless friendship: “‘I shall sack Troy’ (114; cf. 347, 353); ‘I shall sack Troy with you’ (920); ‘you will sack Troy with me’ (1335); ‘you will sack Troy’ (1347).”
151 Hawkins (1999, 355) calls this speech “thoroughly rational”.

224
(254-316) had no effect on Neoptolemus. Philoctetes cannot go to Troy with Odysseus and assist the Atreidae in their capture of the city and still save face (1352-3).\textsuperscript{152} Furthermore, having suffered ill treatment at the hands of the Atreidae and Odysseus and betrayal by Neoptolemus, he anticipates further evil treatment by these men, opining that men exhibit continuity of character, for better or worse (1358-61).

In this play, rationality is weak, in the sense that neither Neoptolemus nor Philoctetes is able to respond fully to rational accounts. Neoptolemus can only engage in a genuine relationship of friendship when his rational mind is overcome or bypassed by the powerful emotional experience of witnessing the extreme suffering of the kind, noble Philoctetes. And Philoctetes, once emotionally betrayed by a boy who “seemed to know nothing evil” (960), is thereafter deaf to all argument concerning his rational self-interest. Having an emotional wound that corresponds to his physical wound,\textsuperscript{153} he requires the intervention of Heracles to convince him to sail for Troy, an intervention that draws its effectiveness from the strength of his emotional ties of friendship with the hero.

Rationality is linked in this play to the power of selfishness and to the abandonment of one’s inborn nature. An experience of strong emotion, on the other hand, leads Neoptolemus toward harmony with his inherited noble nature. In Neoptolemus’ view, Philoctetes’ imperviousness to rationality indicates that he has grown “savage” (1321, ἠγρίωσαι). The problem, as portrayed in this play, is the emotions’ resistance to the positive power of rational persuasion, as shown by Philoctetes’ stubbornness.\textsuperscript{154} Despite Neoptolemus’ failure to persuade Philoctetes, though, he nevertheless in his final permutation represents the integration of the rational faculty with the emotional capacity; but now, as opposed to the beginning of the play, his emotions are foregrounded in his self, with rationality serving their ends.

\textsuperscript{152} 1352-3: ἀλλ᾽ εἰςάθω δῆτ᾽; εἰτα πῶς ο ὀ δύσμορος/ ἐξ φῶς τάδ᾽ ἔρξας εἶμι;
\textsuperscript{153} See also Podlecki (1966, 245) for the ‘spiritual’ aspect of Philoctetes’ wound that stems from his mistreatment.
\textsuperscript{154} Although Philoctetes’ inflexibility is presented as a flaw to some degree, Philoctetes’ stubbornness regarding his reintegration in the Greek army contrasts with Neoptolemus’ initial moral flexibility: that is, Philoctetes persistently refuses to compromise his values for the allure of any prize. The idea that he will gain glory as the one who takes Troy does not move him at all; nor does the promise of a cure for his disease. He demonstrates a remarkable strength of will and stability of character in this regard.
Shame

An important issue in a discussion of sincerity is the role of shame. Shame is not a virtue that one possesses at all times. Rather, it is an emotion or a capacity for that emotion that is time- and condition-dependent. Odysseus lacks such a capacity. He does not feel shame even when it is appropriate to do so. He attempts to coach Neoptolemus in shamelessness as well, but Neoptolemus possesses a sense of shame by birthright (86-95). Though Neoptolemus appears to cast off shame at Odysseus’ prodding (120), his capacity for this emotion is persistent (524-5) and becomes the more pronounced after he witnesses the reality of Philoctetes’ disease (842, 902-3, 906, 908-9, 1234, 1249). As Neoptolemus emerges from his aporia (897), or moral confusion, he is determined to right the injustice of his earlier deception. Having resolved to return the bow to Philoctetes, he becomes shame-free (1383, see 1224f.). Being shame-free is not the same as being shameless: Neoptolemus still retains a capacity for shame, but, as a result of his new commitment to sincerity and genuine nobility of action, he no longer has cause to feel shame.155 In the course of the play, Neoptolemus evolves from having a negative or empty sense of shame — that is, he experiences shame at the prospect of not appearing to be noble before others — to a positive or substantive sense of shame — he develops a need to be noble without regard for appearances.156 The experiences of pity and affection have the first impact on Neoptolemus’ character, and these emotional experiences in turn reactivate his sense of shame. It is his reinvigorated sense of shame that renders Neoptolemus’ discomfort over the deception intolerable and leads to his decision to return the bow to Philoctetes.

Early in the play, Odysseus effectively wins Neoptolemus over to his plan by tempting him with the selfish pleasure of an acquisition won by victory over a rival (81f.). Neoptolemus puts up but feeble rational resistance, asking, “Do you not find it

---

155 Ben-Ze’ev (2000, 528) argues that “shame indicates that we violated a certain profound norm, and in this sense we are morally bad, but it also expresses the fact that we care about this norm and this caring is commendable from a moral point of view.” Odysseus, being shameless, is morally ‘bad’ in the sense that he violates moral norms and does not care.

156 For Neoptolemus’ internalization of aristocratic, heroic moral values, see Rose 1992, 300-1.
shameful to tell lies?” (108). He further admits that he has no experience with creating a disjuncture between his external projection of himself and his internal self, querying, “Looking how would someone dare to utter such words?” (110). Still, at this stage, Neoptolemus is highly motivated by the allure of personal gain (112-120). The lure of prizes and repute lead him to disregard his feelings of shame at employing deception (120). Neoptolemus is not, then, an innocent tabula rasa, waiting to be educated by one or the other of the authority figures in his life. His character has content from the beginning that more closely resembles the content of Odysseus’ moral system than Philoctetes’. By willingly casting off shame, a value crucial to the functioning of the aristocratic moral code, the young man comes closest to becoming a double for the amoral Odysseus, a notoriously shameless character. Yet, though he intended to cast off shame, Neoptolemus remains motivated by anxiety over how he is perceived by others: the chorus having offered seemingly genuine pity for Philoctetes’ plight, Neoptolemus is concerned lest he be shown up by his men, responding, “But certainly it is shameful that I would seem to this man inferior to you in working in his interest” (524-5). Before the attack of Philoctetes’ disease, then, Neoptolemus is concerned about how he seems to others.

His shame, it seems, is part of his nature that can be temporarily disregarded but not entirely dismissed. Saying that he has abandoned his own nature (902-3), Neoptolemus claims that he has long since (πάλα) been distressed by the thought of being exposed as base (906, αἰσχρὸς φανοῦμαι). This echoes his claim to have long been in pain over Philoctetes’ woes (806). It seems, then, that Neoptolemus has been experiencing a crisis of self well before he expresses it externally. He is concerned to be exposed as a counterfeit, parading as noble externally, but being in fact base because of his willingness to use trickery (e.g. 1272). Acknowledging that it is just as shameful to

---

157 On Odysseus’ values in this play, see Rose 1992, 315.
158 Blundell (1989, 191) argues that, whereas Odysseus is only concerned to be seen as virtuous, Neoptolemus desires actually to be good, citing 86-8. I would argue, however, that Neoptolemus is susceptible to Odysseus’ education because he does not yet perceive a strong distinction between seeming virtuous and being virtuous. He comes to this understanding in the course of the play.
159 For the function of counterfeit coinage in aristocratic moral language, see Kurke 1999, Chapter 1, esp. p.48.
lie openly as to neglect to mention things in a way that misleads (908-9), Neoptolemus resolves to hide nothing from his new friend and confesses the whole scam (915f.). Philoctetes explicitly links insincerity with the lack of a capacity for shame, asking Neoptolemus incredulously, “Are you not ashamed to look at me, who turned to you as your suppliant, you merciless beast?” (929-30). According to Philoctetes, then, Neoptolemus demonstrates a lack of shame by daring to look at him, despite having been openly exposed as a traitor.

Neoptolemus’ vocabulary, once he returns to the stage to give Philoctetes his bow, is awash in words of shame (1228, 1234, 1249). At some point off-stage, after being cowed into silence by the timely appearance of Odysseus, Neoptolemus finds a way out of his moral confusion and, for the first time, exhibits a lack of regard for what the army will think of him. Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, in his book, *The Subtlety of Emotions*, argues that the experience of shame, typically entailing an audience, is intensified as the audience increases in size. Neoptolemus has an opposite experience, feeling the most intense shame at his own knowledge of committing shameful acts and at being exposed before Philoctetes alone (see 902-3, 906, 908-9). He is no longer concerned about the Greek army, Odysseus or his sailors (1250-4). The fact that his sense of shame intensifies as the audience shrinks indicates Neoptolemus’ internalization of the norms governing shame. He cares only to act in accordance with his own personal, internalized sense of justice (1246, 1251, 1253). He now clearly perceives his obedience to authority as a mistake (1224-8). It is only with this independent conviction that Neoptolemus becomes a moral man in his own right, in different ways challenging both of his erstwhile mentors (1224-62, 1316f.), and resolves the situation of the play in a way that is both satisfactory to all parties and morally upright.

We witness, then, a clear evolution in Neoptolemus’ sense of shame, concomitant with his evolving commitment to sincerity. His sense of shame begins as primarily a concern for appearances. He longs for a reputation among his peers as noble and worthy of his father’s example (86-95). Neoptolemus’ growing affection and concern for his

---

160 929-30: οὐδ᾽ ἐπαισχύνῃ μ᾽ ὧρῶν/ τὸν προστρόπαιον, τὸν ικέτην, ὦ σχέτλιε;  
161 Ben-Ze’ev 2000, 528.  
162 See also Rose 1992, 300-1.
wounded friend, however, leads him to a substantive sense of shame, or a desire to be as noble as Philoctetes thinks he is. At this point, he ceases to care about his reputation among the Greek army. He has a newfound confidence in an independent, internalized code of right behavior (1228-53). Shame, in addition to pity and caring, clearly has a role in Neoptolemus’ crisis of self-identity and in his emergence from this crisis as a noble, sincere man.

**A Friendship of Equals: Like Attracts Like**

Philoctetes is confounded that Neoptolemus could countenance going to Troy and fighting for the Atreidae, given the young man’s tale of mistreatment at the generals’ hands concerning his father’s arms (1362-66).

Philoctetes coaxes his young friend, saying that, if Neoptolemus takes him home, he will not, “by aiding base men, seem to resemble base men in his nature” (1371-2). It is a trope in Greek literature that one is like in quality to his friends, or the people he helps, two sets of people assumed to be coextensive. By the end of this play, Neoptolemus has gravitated toward Philoctetes in friendship, a man whom he proves to be “like”, though this resemblance between the two friends is hardly a foregone conclusion. Neoptolemus imitates Odysseus’ model of character for quite a long time, up until the point when he has a face-to-face experience with Philoctetes’ pain. The young man narrowly escapes becoming a double for Odysseus. Although Neoptolemus’ inchoate moral sensibilities share significant overlap with those of both of his older role models, the young man evolves in his worldview to more closely resemble Philoctetes because of the emotional connection that they share.

Philoctetes greets Neoptolemus and his men with open, trusting and spontaneous affection; in this, he employs broad (and superficial) criteria of likeness, commenting on

---

163 1364-5: οἶδε σοι καθύβρισαν/ πατρὸς γέρας συλώντες. Scholars have remarked with surprise that Neoptolemus does not bother to correct Philoctetes here. See, e.g., Roberts 1989, 170-1. Calder (1971) even takes this as evidence that Neoptolemus never undergoes any significant moral change in this play, remaining always an arch-deceiver.

164 1371-2: κοὐ κακοὺς ἐπωφελῶν/ δόξεις ὡμοίος τοῖς κακοῖς πεφυκέναι.

165 This is intentionally somewhat circular in the way that much social logic is circular: the two men develop an emotional connection because of their likeness and their likeness increases because they have an emotional connection; this is a mutually reinforcing cycle.
the familiar manner of their dress (223-4) and speech (234-5). As he comes to enjoy a longer acquaintance with these men, he refines his criteria of trust, requiring a deeper, ethical likeness between himself and his new companions. It is his assumption of likeness with these men that leads him to consider them friends: the chorus and Neoptolemus, Philoctetes says, have sailed, “possessing a clear token of pain” similar to his own (403-4) and, he goes on, “you harmonize with me” (405) because of Neoptolemus’ story of outrage similar to Philoctetes’ own misfortunes. In reality, the only bond of similarity between these men is based on a deception. Neoptolemus disingenuously claims to share Philoctetes’ hatred of the Atreidae and Odysseus. Being naïve and trusting of others’ sincerity lays Philoctetes open to being duped regarding the authenticity of tokens and the trueness of the harmony between himself and others.

Neoptolemus at first appears indifferent to Philoctetes’ plight and immovably committed to the plan of deceit, particularly in comparison with the emotive chorus of sailors, who profess deep sympathy with the wounded man; but Philoctetes begins to forge a connection of sympathy with Neoptolemus by the “revelation of shared affections” for various Greek heroes – Achilles, Ajax, Nestor, his son Antilochus, and Patroclus (332-435). Because the two men have aristocratic bonds of friendship in common, it is only natural that they would be friends as well. As Worman argues, Neoptolemus’ softening attitude toward Philoctetes is reflected in the increasing overlap between his language and Philoctetes’ as he comes to identify with Philoctetes. Neoptolemus further sees in Philoctetes a model of aristocratic bearing that he imagines for himself: Neoptolemus shares with Philoctetes his pride in his ancestry, coming together with a proud nobility of nature. Neoptolemus does not yet value transparency for its own sake, but rather parrots his father’s moral stance on subterfuge in order to assert an ethical resemblance of him. Over the course of the play, Neoptolemus’ moral

---

166 On the affection stemming from likeness, see also Rose 1992, 290.
167 403-5: ἔχοντες, ὡς ἔοικε, σύμβολον σαφὲς/ λύπης πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὦ ξένοι, πεπλεύκατε./ καὶ μοι προσῴδεθ ... 
169 See Rose 1992, 290.
170 ibid., 291.
171 Worman 2000, 23.
172 ibid., 24.
code comes increasingly to resemble Philoctetes.¹⁷³ I discuss above the new model of heroism that Philoctetes instantiates. When he awakes from the attack of his disease, he praises his young protégé in transformed heroic language, for his endurance, pity, and cooperative help (870-1).¹⁷⁴ As Neoptolemus finds in the older man a model that he can comfortably emulate, a model that resonates with his own immature aristocratic self-identity, the two men become more alike, in their speech and even in their bodily experiences of suffering and speechlessness. Robert Newman, working off of a thesis that meter works in this play to accentuate and mirror the characters’ personalities and moral commitments, chronicles a significant shift in Neoptolemus’ speech.¹⁷⁵ As Neoptolemus undergoes a moral transformation, from his firm support of Odysseus’ deception plot to a sincere devotion to Philoctetes’ interests, his speech dramatically moves from a metrical resemblance to Odysseus’ smooth, polished speech to mirroring the metrical qualities of Philoctetes’ speech.¹⁷⁶ In the end, Neoptolemus comes to resemble Philoctetes in important ways, as acknowledged by Heracles’ heroic simile: the two men become essentially indistinguishable as two lions that share their kills.

Just as like attracts like, in a moral sense, in the relationship between Philoctetes and Neoptolemus, so the Atreidae and Odysseus demonstrate a moral resemblance to each other. Odysseus blames the authority of the Atreidae for his actions in abandoning Philoctetes on Lemnos (6), but Philoctetes adds later that the Atreidae also blame Odysseus (1028).¹⁷⁷ These three friends (the Atreidae and Odysseus) appear to share a penchant for trickery and ruthlessness. Both parties are implicated in the abuse of Philoctetes before, at the time of his abandonment, and now in this present scheme (1023-4); and both parties casually employ trickery to attain their aims. Odysseus’ trickery is well established in this play. For the trickery of the Atreidae, Philoctetes makes a vague

¹⁷³ Rose 1992, 314.
¹⁷⁴ Rose 1992, 297.
¹⁷⁶ Newman (1991, 309-10) charts the number of resolutions in each characters’ speech. Odysseus comes in at 6%, compared to Philoctetes’ 12%, a gap that signifies the “moral opposition” between the two men (309). His most interesting observation, though, is that, up to line 1222, the use of resolution in Neoptolemus’ lines is at 4%. From 1222-1402, that number “dramatically increases” (310) to 16%.
¹⁷⁷ Roberts 1989, 172.
allusion to their need to compel Odysseus to serve them in their expedition to Troy by use of a trick (1025, κλοπῇ).  

Moreover, just as Neoptolemus, on the basis of a burgeoning emotional connection, begins increasingly to resemble Philoctetes, so Philoctetes self-consciously likens himself to Heracles, both to his story, in the effect on him of ownership of the bow, and to his moral commitments. This play dramatizes the process of friends growing ever more similar as a result of emotional stimuli and reveals this as the basis to some degree of sincerity. Likeness is a factor in our human recognition of a moral reason to interact sincerely with another. First, likeness encourages trust and trust has already been shown to have a crucial role in human calculations of the prudence of baring oneself to another. Second, the more we identify ourselves with another person, the more we experience a moral pressure to treat that person in a way we can comfortably envision ourselves being treated. Likeness plays a role in friendly feelings and, in turn, friendly feelings generate a desire or even a need for interactions based in truthfulness.

**Philoctetes, the Noble Savage**

Philoctetes is a man of contradictions, caught in a hybrid state between man/beast and nobleman/savage. Sophocles portrays the character of Philoctetes as being at once uncultivated in his isolation from society and as more civilized in his treatment of others than the representatives of Greek culture at large. He is a man who vacillates between the extremes of urbanity and savage suspiciousness. There is a disjuncture between his bodily self, marred by the effects of the snakebite and made unfit for civilized company (225-6), and his internal self, which is in many ways more refined and sophisticated than his socially immersed visitors; yet there is also continuity between his external wound and his character, as argued by Nancy Worman, who contends that his wound both

---

178 Roberts 1989, 172. This use of trickery on Odysseus contrasts with Philoctetes’ resistance to trickery: i.e. no trick will ever compel him to help the Atreidae (Roberts 172).

179 See Hamilton 1975.

180 I discuss this aspect of sincerity in the chapter on the *Hecuba*.

181 See also Segal 1999, 296.
affects his personality and stands as a symbol for the state of his soul. Philoctetes turns from naïve, open trusting when he first encounters Neoptolemus and his sailors to inflexibility and an excess of suspicion after learning of their treachery (1095-1100, 1163-8, 1204-9, 1268-72, 1280-1, 1321-3, 1397-1401)). He is a very poor judge of others’ sincerity, believing the visitors to be sincere when they are at their most false and refusing to trust in Neoptolemus even after he has decided on transparency.

Daniel Levine has chronicled Philoctetes’ resemblance to Polyphemus in the savagery of his speech, character and living arrangements. Nancy Worman outlines Philoctetes’ savageness and the effects of his snakebite wound. Philoctetes’ speech, disease and physical form are all characterized as ‘wild’ (173, 226, 265-6, 1321) and ‘terrible’ (147, 218, 755, 756, etc.). Philoctetes has taken on elements of the snake that bit him, becoming a hybrid man-beast. His foot is ἐνθήρου, or beast-infested (697), further, as a result of his wound, Philoctetes himself must creep along like a snake (207, 701). The snakebite has also impacted Philoctetes’ speech, leading him to spew “wild words of ill omen” (9-10), for which he was expelled from the community of the Greek army. His speech, having been infected by the bestial element and vacillating unstably in tone, does not harmonize with the rituals of sacrifice important to civilized Greek life (8-11). Worman argues that, Philoctetes’ body bearing the “wild stamp of the serpent” (267, ἐχίδνης ἀγρίῳ χαράγματι), the bite wound “inscribes on his body his internal disturbance” and that the disruptive element in his character should not be seen as merely incidental to his identity. Certainly, Philoctetes’ wound has caused, in addition to his wildly volatile, stuttering speech, an unstable vacillation between extremes.

---

182 Worman 2000, 6, 11.
183 Levine 2003. Levine notes throughout, though, that Sophocles’ evocation of Odyssey 9 also serves to highlight the differences between Philoctetes and Polyphemus, emphasizing the pathos of Philoctetes’ plight.
185 ibid., 13.
186 ibid., 12.
187 ibid.
188 ibid., 9.
189 ibid., 2.
190 ibid., 13.
191 ibid., 1.
of trust. The bite symbolizes the personal wound he has sustained due to his ill treatment at the hands of his comrades and has deeply impacted his ability to form relationships.

Neoptolemus recruits rational argument to try to persuade Philoctetes to come to Troy, employing several verbal techniques to lend authority to his words: he swears by Zeus, the guarantor of oaths (1289, 1324); he says that his deed, i.e. of returning the bow, will prove his words true (1291); and, lastly, Neoptolemus offers, as a proof of the prophet Helenus’ sincerity, that Helenus has offered to be killed if he is found to be lying (1341-2). In response, Philoctetes wrestles with himself, querying, “How can I distrust the words of this man, who advised me in all goodwill?” (1350-1); yet he cannot bring himself to help the men who originally hurt him, men who, unlike Neoptolemus, have offered no grand gesture of goodwill to make amends. Rational argument cannot win out over Philoctetes’ strong emotion of hatred toward the Atreidae and Odysseus (1392). He is prepared to endure even greater suffering rather than help his enemies: he avers that if only he could see his enemies destroyed, he would consider that he had escaped the disease (1043-4). Philoctetes’ trust in Neoptolemus is partially restored by the return of his bow, but it is still imperfect. In the end, only Heracles, due to Philoctetes’ unbroken trust in his friendship, can sway the stubborn man. Neoptolemus never entirely wins back Philoctetes’ trust on his own, despite a grand gesture, rational argument and proofs of sincerity.

Both Neoptolemus and the chorus portray Philoctetes’ extreme inflexibility as arrogance and vice. They point out that, at this point, his suffering is self-inflicted, now that he has the alternative of coming with them to Troy, being healed and winning glory (1095-8, 1318-20). Later, Neoptolemus responds to Philoctetes’ stubborn resistance, warning him that he must “learn not to be over-bold in misfortune” (1387). Philoctetes, in his arrogance, demonstrates a lack of sophrosune. This is ironic, because it is

192 1350-1: πῶς ἀπιστήσω λόγοις/ τοῖς τοῦδ᾽, ὃς εὔνους ὄν ἔμοι παρῄνεσεν;
193 1043-4: εἰ δ᾽ ἰδοὺ ὀλοκλήρον τούτους, δοκοῦ ἂν τῆς νόσου πεφευγέναι. See also Blundell 1989, 217.
194 See also Podlecki 1966, 244.
195 North (1966, 66) asserts that Philoctetes’ choice of whether or not to go to Troy is plainly an issue of sophrosune. Blundell (1989, 214) argues that Philoctetes also lacks sophrosune when he refuses to restrain himself from killing Odysseus (1299-1301). By contrast, Odysseus explicitly exhibits sophrosune when he backs down from a sword
Philoctetes himself who earlier makes an appeal to Neoptolemus to show *sophrosune*, i.e. to recognize his own status as a frail, vulnerable human being by seeing himself in Philoctetes’ situation (501-506).\textsuperscript{196} Fate, for mortals, is insecure. Neoptolemus should recognize the frailty of his own present good fortune. This perception of the vulnerability of the human condition requires an accurate rational understanding of one’s own situation.\textsuperscript{197} In this play, *sophrosune* takes on an unusual emotional dimension: Philoctetes’ hope is that, through emotional empathy for his pitiable condition, Neoptolemus will experience a rational appreciation of his own vulnerability to misfortune and decide to help. The Odysseus of this play cannot empathize and exhibits a stunted capacity for emotion. His inability to empathize blunts his perception of his own human vulnerability. It is Neoptolemus alone who ultimately demonstrates a commonsensical *sophrosune*. The sensible young man seeks to negotiate a peaceable arrangement between enemies and navigates between the two extremes of rationality and emotion. Philoctetes himself, though capable of compassion and emotion, lacks the rational perspective on his own life that comes from an appropriate balance between the rational and the emotional parts of the self. That is, he fails to make an accurate assessment of his own rational best interest. Philoctetes’ wound has occasioned the flaw of stubborn inflexibility, disrupting his capacity for *sophrosune*. Both Neoptolemus and the chorus perceive more clearly than he that his misfortunes can only be resolved by rejoining his community (see 1165-6, 1329-35, 1378-9, 1391).\textsuperscript{198}

Philoctetes is the character that initially brings to the action the most highly developed moral sense of the three principal actors.\textsuperscript{199} Unlike the representatives of the Greek army who arrive on his island, he is capable of loyalty, genuine friendship and fight with Neoptolemus; he demonstrates this virtue in only a minimal sense, as he fails to apprehend his common humanity with Philoctetes.

\textsuperscript{196} See North (1966, 55f.) for *sophrosune* as a consciousness of the mutability of human fortunes.

\textsuperscript{197} See North (1966, 54f.) for *sophrosune* as an accurate comprehension of one’s situation.

\textsuperscript{198} Rose (1992, 299) rightly observes, though, that he requires the help of a society more characterized by kindness and compassion than the society of the Greek army.

\textsuperscript{199} It is in fact the representatives of external Greek society who are exposed in this play as savages.
altruistic kindness. His moral sense derives from his emotions and is integral to his very nature, to the essence of his identity. That said, Philoctetes’ greatest flaw is his inflexibility and deafness to rational argument. This play points to the difficulty in judging another’s inner intentions regardless of supposed indicators such as noble birth and knowledge of the character of the man’s father. Further, Sophocles examines the problem of “healing” once a bond of trust has been broken; this breach of trust makes Philoctetes wild, or savage (1321), such that his wound could be seen specifically as an external manifestation of his pain at being deceived by putative friends. Philoctetes’ friendship with Neoptolemus will ultimately function as a link between Philoctetes and his society, between the extremes of savagery and civilization, though only Heracles can heal the breach between the rational and emotional elements in his personality. That is, while Philoctetes is patently an emotional hero, he is unreachable by reason until the intervention of Heracles. Though Philoctetes fails to exhibit sophrosyne in several respects, North argues that his acceptance of Heracles’ prophecy represents “that adjustment to reality which is the essence of Sophoclean sophrosyne.”

Philoctetes only demonstrates sophrosyne, a virtue indicating an appropriate balance between the rational and emotional elements of the self, due to Heracles’ interference. This reintegration of the elements of Philoctetes’ self is rooted in the emotional and unbroken trust he has in his friend, who has already materially demonstrated that he knows how to reciprocate (670, 801-3).

Philoctetes represents a strange beast, indeed, in Greek literature: he is portrayed here as both a non-homogenous hybrid between reptile and man, yet also as highly transparent and sincere, a seemingly paradoxical impossibility. This strange, positive portrayal of Philoctetes’ sincerity encourages me to read in Philoctetes’ hybridity a hint at

---

200 Blundell (1989, 217-20) does note, however, the selfishness of Philoctetes’ demand for Neoptolemus to take him home, with his complete lack of consideration of his friend’s self-interest. I would counter that Philoctetes is only holding Neoptolemus to a promise made under a deception, when Philoctetes thought that returning home was in Neoptolemus’ interest.

201 Philoctetes and Neoptolemus also initially exchange personal histories (Whitby 1996, 31) — who someone was in the past is expected to be predictive of who he will be in the future, but, of course, past histories can be fabricated.

202 North 1966, 66.
his resemblance to Athens’ autochthonous ancestors, especially Cecrops, who was part-snake in his lower extremities and part-man in his torso.\textsuperscript{203} Like Cecrops, Philoctetes’ ability to walk like a man has been compromised by the snaky essence that has entered his lower body, causing him to “creep about” in the manner of a snake or reptile (207, 701). That Philoctetes has taken on autochthonous features might go some way toward explaining the chorus’ baffling assertion of his exceptionally noble descent (180-1): “this man, second to none of the first-born houses…”\textsuperscript{204} Snakes are associated with earth and healing and Philoctetes too has a close association with nature and exerts a healing influence on Neoptolemus (just as Neoptolemus will in turn have a role in healing Philoctetes).\textsuperscript{205} Athenian autochthony is both characterized by hybridity and is the source of Athenian purity and sincerity.\textsuperscript{206} Perhaps too, then, Philoctetes’ snakebite wound, responsible as it is for returning him to a more natural existence, is in some way responsible for his moral purity in contrast to the corruption of the remainder of the Greek army.\textsuperscript{207}

\textsuperscript{203} While Worman (2000) is certainly right about what Philoctetes’ disease signifies, I would argue that sickness and hybridity are polyvalent in this play.\textsuperscript{204} The central theme of pity also aligns Philoctetes and Neoptolemus with Athenian civic norms of right conduct. Susan Lape has written on the importance of pity in Athenian civic ideology (go to www.fks.uoc.gr/conferences/InterfaceOct2004/Lape.pdf; cited by permission of author). Philoctetes and Neoptolemus stand apart within their political community as instantiations of democratic virtues and ideals, surrounded by the self-interested corruption of broader society. This represents my one, brief foray into finding in a tragedy a reference to the surrounding historical events, i.e. the failure of the oligarchic revolution of 411 to live up to any expectation of aristocratic moral superiority. This play suggests that virtue requires more than noble birth. Calder (1971, 170-4) goes a bit too far in this direction, though perhaps I am vulnerable to a similar critique.\textsuperscript{205} Carlevale (2000, 50f.) takes up the interesting argument that it is Odysseus here who is infectiously sick: he suffers from a delusion of being free when he in fact, through being literally bound to/by his community, lives and acts under compulsion (e.g. 6, 72-4, 1006, 1024-5); in trying to convince Neoptolemus that heroism and nobility lie in obedience to a higher authority, he seeks to infect him too with this lack of freedom. Philoctetes, by contrast, insists upon moral freedom (1026-8, 1391, 1396-1401). In this sense, he “heals” Neoptolemus, teaching him moral freedom by example.\textsuperscript{206} See also Lape 2010, 124.\textsuperscript{207} Easterling (1978, 36) also comments on the contrasting significance of the snakebite wound (wildness & dignity) and the island (bestiality & purity).
The Integrated Emotional Self

I argue in the chapter on the Hecuba that an experience of overwhelming emotional pain occasions in Hecuba a split in her self. Negative emotion causes a rupture in her identity, generates self-consciousness and allows her to conceal her inner intentions in a deceptive way. This play, on the other hand, dramatizes the divisive potential of rationality: it is rationality here that engenders self-consciousness and facilitates the invention of multiple selves. Odysseus represents such a multi-faceted rational self, as does the immature Neoptolemus, albeit uncomfortably. At the other extreme, Philoctetes is neither self-conscious nor divided, but responds to others in an emotionally transparent, natural and spontaneous manner. These qualities set him apart from his society, which is shown to require a penchant for deception and trickery.

In this play, Neoptolemus is, in a sense, undergoing an initiation into full membership in the group under Odysseus’ tutelage. Odysseus recruits the power of selfish desire to draw the young man in, but then expects the boy to subordinate his own personal moral impulses to the needs of the group. Neoptolemus’ break from his society, dramatized here, is exceedingly painful for him, causing him to suffer in ways that mirror Philoctetes’ disease. The end result of this process, though, is his transformation into a confident man, who attains a healthy integration of the emotional and rational aspects of his self. In Neoptolemus’ case, then, an emotional experience facilitates the reintegration of his rational and emotional capacities after he learns from Odysseus how to be a divided self. As Odysseus’ helper, Neoptolemus must suppress his emotional impulses, relying instead on the rational faculty for the invention of a partially false persona. In the end, though, Neoptolemus’ emotional capacity becomes the dominant aspect in his personality, marshalling the rational judgment in support of its impulses toward caring, affectionate friendship. For Philoctetes, too, the deep affection of friendship toward both Neoptolemus and Heracles puts him on a path toward healing the emotional and physical wounds he has sustained.

---

208 This is particularly nice if we follow Falkner (1998, 35-6, 47-8) in seeing the Odysseus-actor as to some degree lurking behind the figures of both Heracles and the merchant.
During their interchange concerning war (410-55), Neoptolemus and Philoctetes lament that war takes only the good (436-7), leaving behind “the worse man” (456-7, ὁ χείρων) to hold positions of power and influence in society. While Neoptolemus only pretends to be suspicious and scornful of those in power, Philoctetes’ hatred is genuine (e.g. 416-8). Having been betrayed by these very men when he was abandoned on the island, he has arrayed himself against the corrupt political figures of his society. He no longer wishes to engage in the public, political arena: if he can escape Lemnos, he wishes only to return home. Philoctetes is part beast, infected with the snake’s essence (697). In this play, though, this signifies something quite different from Hecuba’s transformation into a beast: here it signals Philoctetes’ connection to the innocence and purity of the natural world, in contradistinction to the corruption of the world of culture and politics. While Sophocles dismisses any idealizing notion of a natural life among the beasts, he does portray this natural existence as uncontaminated by negative rationality and as ethically pure. Since we only encounter Philoctetes as a “natural man”, we are left wondering whether his innocence and ethical purity are in fact made possible by his isolated and “uncivilized” life. Oddly, although he is not homogenous through and through, there is nothing problematic about his sincerity. Rather, his sincerity is problematic for him: his transparent inability to conceal sets him at odds with his community (8-10, 742-3).²⁰⁹

**Emotional Sincerity**

Rose sees in Philoctetes’ triumph over an unscrupulous, savage society and in his awakening of Neoptolemus’ noble nature a “tremendous, utopian affirmation of aristocratic human worth”²¹⁰. Certainly, the model of emotional sincerity dramatized in this play is an aristocratic model that valorizes the instinctive, spontaneous excellence of the wellborn nature. It becomes clear that Neoptolemus cannot rely upon his rational faculty to work out and identify a course of right action; it is his pure and immediate

---

²⁰⁹ Hawkins (1999, 350) notes the unusualness of the dramatic depiction of Philoctetes’ physical suffering. He is uncommonly transparent even by dramatic standards.
²¹⁰ Rose 1992, 323.
emotional response of pity and affection that brings him to an understanding of the appropriate way to navigate the situation before him. Philoctetes asserts that those who have become habituated to using the rational faculty for evil only continue in this trend (1360-1). In a society, then, ruled by men like Odysseus and the Atreidae, without an appropriate alternative role model, the young too will learn to privilege rationality and to be insincere. Philoctetes illustrates for his young protégé the value of loyal, genuine friendship, drawing Neoptolemus toward his own alienated emotional self.

Transparency is a key aspect of this model of emotional sincerity, just as it was for Cleon in Thucydides’ account of emotional sincerity. This model, though, unlike Thucydides’, settles on a positive judgment of the emotions: in a corrupt society that, from Sophocles’ perspective, is moving away from the aristocratic values of reciprocal philia, sincerity and forthrightness, the emotions come to appear central to preserving these values and appear to be more closely allied with the wellborn nature, as opposed to corrupt civilization. This play does not, though, pace Rose, bring us to a full affirmation of aristocratic worth and denunciation of democratic politics. While Philoctetes in his isolation represents the impossibility of returning to a pure, aristocratic existence in the contemporary world, Neoptolemus steers a delicate course between extremes, negotiating a peace between the aristocratic ethos, which privileges loyal, private friendships, and the democratic perspective, which values steadfast allegiance to the broad, political group over private relationships.

By agreeing to transport Philoctetes home against the wishes of the Greek generals, Neoptolemus shows a willingness to cut himself off completely from his society, even accepting that he will become an enemy of his erstwhile friends (1241-58). This indicates a privileging of his private friendship; though, Neoptolemus also exhibits loyalty to his democratic ties when he stays Philoctetes’ hand from killing Odysseus (1300-4). Ultimately, while the play briefly indulges a fantasy of aristocratic purity in a

---

211 Blundell (1988, 144-5) observes that it is Neoptolemus who exhibits a truly new conception of nobility and heroism by the end of the play: he rejects revenge; finds no conflict between being “friends” with two parties who are enemies of each other; finds no conflict in helping the kakoi; agrees to deny personal advantage; and allows compassion to direct his course of action. She goes on to say, “The way in which Neoptolemus actualizes his potential, confirming his phusis in action, is identical with none of the
society of two, the conclusion shows the impossibility of surviving and flourishing outside of society, no matter how imperfect that society may be. Philoctetes needs the Greek army in order to find relief from his suffering and to win eternal glory for himself; Neoptolemus too will win glory from his reconciliation with his societal leaders. Heracles’ prophetic words suggest not only that the pair’s aristocratic friendship will persist, but that it will be beneficial for the broader society, showing a way forward for the two systems, democratic and aristocratic, to coexist in a mutually beneficial relationship. As a pair of heroic lions, Neoptolemus and Philoctetes will establish a miniature society-within-society. They reintegrate not as two individuals, but as a team, locked together in reciprocal defense. The reintegration of this pair of friends reintroduces into the (democratic) society of the Greek army the aristocratic values of transparency, sincerity and reciprocal philia.

Rose terms the ending of the play the “triumph of sincere peithō over both verbal deceit and physical violence”; yet the success of this triumph is mitigated by the need for a deus ex machina. Neoptolemus’ sincere peithō does not win out on its own. This points to the problem with the model of emotional sincerity: the emotions’ imperviousness to rational argument, which is a valuable and necessary aspect of political life. Further, Heracles ominously foreshadows the atrocious impieties of Neoptolemus that come after the action of this play, warning, “But keep this in mind, when you plunder this land, be reverent toward the gods” (1440-1). This hints at the possibility that, rather than reinjecting purity and nobility of emotion into society, the two will themselves be corrupted by a corrupt society.

models available to him. He lives up to his noble phusis in a distinctive manner, combining the best of Achillean honesty and Odyssean persuasiveness, while avoiding the concomitant vices of recalcitrance and treachery” (145).

212 Rose 1992, 308.
213 1440-1: τούτο δ’ ἐννοεῖθ’, ὃταν/ πορθήτε γὰϊαν, εὐσεβεῖν τὰ πρὸς θεοὺς.
Conclusion

This dissertation is intended as a contribution to classical political theory. The literature I specifically see myself engaging and supplementing is Vincent Farenga’s work on the models of self operative in ancient Greece; Steven Johnstone’s and Russell Hardin’s work on political trust; Peter Euben’s use of tragedy for the purposes of political theory; the narrow field of philosophical literature explicitly on sincerity; and the recent discussion of sincerity in ancient sources as begun by Elizabeth Markovits, writing on Plato. In this initial work, I have sought, primarily and quite simply, to advance the understanding of the very meaning of a moral concept that has been frequently and regularly invoked from ancient times down to the present as a crucial aspect of human interactions, both personal and political, but that has nevertheless attracted little direct, explicit consideration. As I began my investigations and ruminations on this topic, I asked myself, given various understandings of the self as divided, what sincerity might mean for a non-unified, non-homogenous self; that is, to what part of oneself ought one be sincere? I found that the sustained ancient discussions of sincerity embark from similar queries: the texts I consider in the foregoing chapters debate whether the virtue of sincerity derives from one’s inborn nature, either in the sense of one’s natural emotional impulses or one’s innate rational intelligence, or from a conscious, rational self-discipline born of nurture and the experience of human life. Within this work, I explore the various conceptions in fifth-century texts of the moral psychology of sincerity. In the accounts discussed above, the elements of the self, i.e. the emotional and rational capacities, are presented as continuous rather than in conflict. Such internal continuity appears to represent a common fifth-century conception of the interaction between the parts of the self. The view of the parts of the self as in conflict is notably associated with Plato’s

---

moral psychology, but this model of the self-in-conflict is also found in fifth-century accounts.²

Throughout the previous chapters, I locate sincerity as a virtue that has relevance only in a social context and that most especially takes on urgency at the junctions where an individual’s competing social commitments and obligations diverge. It is this liminal quality that makes the topic of sincerity salient to political theory: sincerity gains central prominence at times when the interests of the whole are seen as divergent from the interests of either individuals or factional groups. Sincerity at such moments entails the enlightened allegiance to the good of the whole and insincerity the mere pretense of concern for the whole while in fact pursuing private gain (the implication is that such pursuit of private gain is usually at the expense of the public good). In each of the texts considered above, a common feature is the conflict of mixed motives, either between one’s own personal interests and the group interests (Thucydides, Ajax, Philoctetes), or between the interests of one’s private philoi and one’s political philoi (Hecuba, Philoctetes). Another shared aspect of the discussions of sincerity I consider here is the double emphasis, first, on the necessity of sincerity both within interpersonal relations and for a healthy polis and, second, on the great difficulty of achieving and maintaining sincerity within a community and a self throughout all of the variable circumstances of life. Robert Connor outlines the new developments in Athenian politics of the fifth century, when the conflict between speakers’ public and private selves and their varying motives comes to be explicitly enunciated and problematized.³ Thucydides highlights the social and historical pressures that might account for this new emphasis on personal trustworthiness, charting with equal attention both a detailed account of the Peloponnesian War and the strain that war, plague and the loss of the “easy provision of one’s daily wants” (3.82.2, ὑφελὼν τὴν ἐὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν) put on internal political cohesion, leading to increasing factionalization and mistrust between citizens. In the future, I hope to explore more fully and explicitly the connection between the

² As an example, Phaedra in Euripides’ Hippolytus is tormented by the conflict between irrational emotion, ἔρως for her stepson, and the rational awareness of the negative impact on her family and community of the satisfaction of this emotion (411-12, 419-25). The two parts of her self are at odds with regard to their goals.
³ Connor 1971, esp. 105-6.
turbulent historical and political events of the last third of the fifth century and what I would term the fifth-century “crisis of sincerity”.

While most prominently portrayed as a virtue of social life, there is a perspective in each of the texts above from which sincerity is conceived of as undesirable. Thucydides narrates the trickery and insincerity during wartime of several men whom he clearly admires, Themistocles and Hermocrates. Themistocles lies to the Spartans in order to afford the Athenians time to rebuild their city wall (1.90-91); this lie even entails the betrayal of a relationship of *philia* (1.91.1). Later, Themistocles misrepresents the truth in his letter to Artaxerxes, falsely claiming to have personally provided for the Persian retreat by preventing the burning of the bridges (1.137.4, ψευδῶς), and threatens a sea captain whom he hopes will ferry him to safety in Asia Minor that he will impugn him to the Athenians if the ship is caught (1.137.2). Hermocrates too, whom Thucydides presents as an admirable Themistoclean figure, employs trickery against the enemy, the Athenians, to aid his own side (7.73.3-4). In the *Ajax*, the hero finds it necessary to his purposes to employ Odyssean trickery (47) in order to vent his rage and recover his honor; through the intervention of Athena, however, his plans for revenge are thwarted, rendering Ajax’ sneaky attack detrimental in the extreme to the hero’s attempt to save face. In accordance with the maxim that ‘history is always written by the victors’, had Ajax been successful in his murderous intentions, we would more likely interpret his night raid as just vengeance for unjust treatment. In Euripides’ account, Hecuba is confronted with the reality that, in order to accomplish the necessary justice for her murdered son, she will have to employ methods she might previously have thought base as she resorts to insincerity and murder. In this play, Hecuba approaches Odysseus and Agamemnon in turn for assistance. Unexpectedly, Agamemnon’s acceptance of limited insincerity is here morally preferable (at least the play encourages us to feel this way) to Odysseus’ consistent and transparent commitment to the Greek army. And lastly, in the *Philoctetes*, Odysseus is able to claim with some success that the deception of the pitiable castaway is for the common good (50-3, 66-9, 109). So, while sincerity is recognized as

---

4 For Agamemnon’s slight insincerity, see *Hec*. 874. It seems that he did follow through on this plan, for only he arrives in response to Polymestor’s shouts, which must surely have been heard by the entire army (1109-13).
crucial to genuine ties between men, there is a concomitant awareness of the occasionally unavoidable utility of insincerity, particularly in relationships that are or have become hostile.

Peripherally to my main aims here, I hope to have introduced above the mobilization of “sincerity norms” as a way of conceiving of the self that comes to full fruition in the fourth century. That is, the attention given to depictions of sincerity and its opposite in the fifth century offers social actors, especially public speakers, a specific way of conceiving of the moral, trustworthy self, a way of presenting themselves as trustworthy and the terms with which to impugn their rivals as untrustworthy. In the future, I hope to explore how the ideology of sincerity expands and develops moving into the fourth century. From the evidence in Demosthenes’ speeches, it appears that the norms governing political sincerity come to overlap significantly with Athenian citizenship ideology. With Demosthenes as our main source of this development, however, a central question will be whether this is truly a broad trend or simply an idiosyncrasy of Demosthenes’ perspective.
References


Conacher, D.J. (1967) Euripidean Drama: Myth, Theme and Structure. Toronto, University of Toronto Press.


