THE RAPE OF TOKYO: LEGENDS OF MASS SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND EXPLOITATION DURING THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

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Abstract

Much recent writing on the Occupation of Japan has challenged the traditional picture of a well-disciplined American army laying the groundwork for Japan’s transition to democracy by the example of its behavior. Instead it depicts the Occupation, especially its opening phase, as marred by the widespread rape of Japanese women by American servicemen. In addition, many writers claim the United States encouraged, requested or even ordered the Japanese government to establish brothels for its troops. Copious documentation of American behavior from both Japanese and American sources does not support such claims. Rather, it makes very clear that though there were a fair number of reported rapes of Japanese women by American and other Allied servicemen, stories of mass rape during any period of the Occupation, including its opening phase, are simply not credible. In addition the contemporary record suggests that American authorities regarded prostitution not as a benefit for their troops, but as an entrenched social problem which they tolerated reluctantly. This raises the question of how such stories became incorporated into the mainstream. Part of the reason for this was the psychic environment in which these stories were originally created. There is an innate and deep-seated association between rape and war in the human psyche. The Japanese understanding of war in the mid-twentieth century reinforced this association. Rape also served as a metaphor for the American conquest of Japan. GHQ robbed Japanese men of their control of women’s sexuality. Many women then used their sexual autonomy to consort with American soldiers. To many this seemed like a hypocritical seizure of Japanese women, a rape of sorts. Shortly after the Occupation ended a leftist anti-American propaganda
campaign and a boom in exploitation literature coincided to produce a great number of works purporting to be true exposes of American cruelties. Though these books are wholly unreliable, and contradict contemporary evidence, many have been incorporated into mainstream history. This is an error. Stories of mass rape and organized sexual exploitation during the Occupation are better understood as metaphoric expressions of the humiliation of defeat, occupation and continuing diplomatic subordination, than as history.
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Naturally both the views expressed in this dissertation and any errors in fact that might appear are the sole responsibility of the author.
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Introduction

Within present-day Japan both defenders and critics of the country’s record during the Second World War seem most exercised when debate focuses on two issues: The Nanjing Massacre and the so-called comfort woman system of military prostitution and sexual slavery. The human medical experiments of Unit 731, the bombardment of Chongqing from 1938 – 1943, the Sook Ching massacres in Singapore in 1942, the destruction of Manila in 1945, the construction of the Thai-Burma railway in 1943, the Vietnamese famine of 1944 -1945 and many other issues receive far less attention. There are, no doubt, many reasons for this. Japan’s diplomatic relations with the various victor nations, the interest of foreign scholars, and the availability of records all certainly play a role. However, both Nanjing and the comfort woman system share an element of particular emotional salience: the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) treatment of women. The association of Nanjing with sexual violence is so intimate that many refer to the atrocity as “The Rape of Nanking.” According to estimates delivered to the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE, the so-called “Tokyo Trials”), more than 20,000 women were raped.¹ Indeed the sexual violence during the IJA’s Nanjing campaign proved to be such an international embarrassment that it spurred the establishment of so-called “comfort facilities,” staffed by local women in Nanjing and elsewhere in central China.²

Such widespread and systemic abuse of women flies in the face of traditional masculine notions of martial honor and nobility toward the weak. Thus the idea that this was a defining feature of the IJA is anathema to many nationalist Japanese. They use a variety of methods to deal with the issues of rape and forced prostitution from outright denial to casting aspersions on the sources alleging the crimes. One method they have employed is denial mixed with a *tu quoque* (a sort of we-didn’t-do-it,-and-besides-so-did-everyone-else argument) aimed at foreign critics of Japan’s handling of the issue. In this telling military prostitution was widespread throughout the world in the mid-twentieth century, Japan’s system was not more atrocious than any other, and thus foreign criticism of Japan is hypocritical. Japanese nationalists often single out the United States for particular censure because, the argument goes, contrary to popular American beliefs about the good behavior of U.S. servicemen during their occupation of Japan, GIs in fact used tens of thousands of Japanese women as prostitutes, many of whom they knew to have been coerced into sexual servitude. Worse, Americans perpetrated gut-wrenching atrocities against Japanese women in a storm of sexual violence that began as soon as they landed and continued throughout the Occupation period and beyond. In this view, Americans, who have often put themselves in the role of moral scolds regarding the treatment of women throughout the world, should first look to their own monstrous history of abuse of the women of Japan.³

One of the first examples of such an argument appeared in a book written specifically as a refutation to Iris Chang’s *The Rape of Nanking*. In the book, *Research on The Rape of Nanking*, Fujioka Nobukatsu and Higashinakano Shûdō, seek to establish an

equivalence between the actions of the Japanese army in Nanjing and that of the United States Army in Japan. As part of their efforts, they make the claim: “on just the single day of August 30, 1945, the day on which MacArthur landed at Atsugi Airbase, there were 315 cases of rape by American soldiers in Kanagawa prefecture alone.”

Miyake Hisayuki, formerly a journalist for the Mainichi Shinbun also employed such reasoning during a panel discussion on Yashiki Takajin’s show “Takajin no Soko Made Itte Iinkai.” Yashiki staged a debate about whether there was really a Nanking Massacre or if it was merely a fabrication of Chinese and American propagandists. When the discussion turned to the sexual atrocities perpetrated by members of the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces after the sack of the city, Miyake sought to diminish the significance of the rapes committed in Nanking by asserting that American troops committed 30,000 rapes during the course of the Occupation.

Allegation of widespread and systematic violation of women’s human rights on the part of the occupying American army has also been used as a means to deflect criticism of Japan’s World War Two era comfort woman system. On May 5, 2015 a group of mostly western academics issued a statement concerning the comfort woman issue and the then-upcoming seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II. In response a group of right-wing Japanese academics (none of whom was a historian) convened a press conference to criticize the statement and its authors. One member of the panel, Takahashi Shirō, an education professor at Meisei University, made a special point

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of noting that the U.S. really had no room to be criticizing Japan in light of the “massive” outbreak of rape by American soldiers during the United States occupation of Japan.⁶

In 2008, General Tamogami Toshio, Chief of Staff of Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces, was demoted and forced into retirement after the discovery of an essay he wrote that extolled the rightness of Japan’s cause in the Second World War. Soon thereafter Tamogami became a fixture in right wing and nationalist circles. Appearing on an episode of Takeshi Kitano’s “TV Takkuru (TV Tackle),” Tamogami sought to play down the significance of Japan’s World War II comfort woman system by claiming that the very first order the United States gave the Japanese government at the outset of the Occupation was to set up a brothel for American troops in Yokohama.⁷

Allegation of American misconduct as a means of normalizing the actions of Imperial Japan has also been used by prominent public figures. Ōsaka mayor Hashimoto Tōru has created controversy numerous times with his comments about the comfort women, making oblique and sometimes not-so-oblique references to the behavior of American troops. In May, 2013, Hashimoto had a meeting with an American officer at the Futenma Marine Air Station in Okinawa. Afterward Hashimoto gave a press conference rehashing what he had told the commander. Hashimoto said that the comfort woman system had been necessary for the maintenance of discipline in the IJA regardless of whether the women involved had been coerced or not. He also noted that the Japanese government had set up brothels for Allied Occupation troops and he urged the commander to have the marines patronize the local red-light district as a way of reducing crime. Hashimoto asserted, “There are places where people can legally release their

sexual energy in Japan. Unless they make use of these facilities, it will be difficult to control the sexual energies of the wild Marines.” A year later, he insisted that the practice of setting up brothels was standard for armies during World War II, claiming that Allied soldiers went on a rampage of sexual violence during the Normandy invasion and “‘comfort stations’ were built after things became too much. It is a historical fact.”

Momii Katsuo, shortly after being appointed as head of NHK’s board of governors, gave an interview in which he made similar claims, asserting that the comfort women system was “bad by today’s morals, but this was a fact of those times. Korea’s statements that Japan was the only nation that forced this are puzzling.”

Perhaps the most conspicuous example of this trend comes from the Zainichi Tokken wo Yurusanai Shimin no Kai or Citizens against the Special Privileges of Resident Foreigners, colloquially known as the “Zaitokukai.” The ultra-right hate group holds frequent marches, usually targeting resident Koreans. In one rally in Osaka’s Tsuruhashi district, a junior high school girl shouted that Korean residents should be killed. At another rally, a man carried a sign reading “Good Koreans, Bad Koreans, Kill them all.” On May 18, 2014, the group held a march through Tokyo’s Akihabara district. This time, however, the target of their ire was not Koreans, but Americans, specifically the American servicemen who occupied Japan from 1945 – 1952. Claiming

that Americans had coerced Japanese women into serving them sexually, they called for an apology from the American government and a recognition that similar charges leveled against the Imperial Japanese Government were nothing but a “Korean Lie.”

Marchers carried signs which read:

Shame on America! We will never forgive the anti-Japanese judgment passed down on the fabrications about the comfort woman system! In defeated Japan, the American Occupation army raped an enormous number of Japanese women and ordered the establishment of a system of prostitution to serve its personnel.13

Such views have gained currency and are now widely regarded as a matter of course on the Japanese right. At first blush, this may seem a simple case of psychological projection on the part of nationalist extremists. However, there is a surprising amount of

13 See the sign held by the man in the top right of the frame in the photo above.
support for views like these. Over the last two decades, numerous scholars and writers have essentially corroborated many of these claims about the sexual violence and predation of Americans during the Occupation of Japan. Yuki Tanaka, who has done extensive work on both Japanese and Allied war crimes, writes:

> From the day they landed, U.S. soldiers engaged in the mass rape of Japanese women. . . . After that the incidence of rape spiraled upward throughout the period of the occupation, and the standard atrocities began to occur: young girls raped in front of their parents, pregnant women raped in maternity wards, and so on. Over a period of 10 days (August 30-September 10) there were 1,336 reported cases of rape of Japanese women by U.S. soldiers in Kanagawa prefecture (where Yokosuka and Yokohama are situated) alone.14

This claim seems very much in agreement with another made by Fujime Yuki, now a professor at the Osaka University School of Human Sciences. In her *A History of Sexuality*, an award-winning survey of the evolution of public policy toward sexuality in Japan, Fujime touched on the subject of sexual violence by GIs: “in the first month after landing, American servicemen raped at least 3500 Japanese women.” She then asserted: “The beginning of the Occupation was the beginning of the American military’s sexual despoliation of Japanese women.”15

In his Pulitzer Prize-winning *Embracing Defeat*, historian John W. Dower cited a claim put forth by several authors that American soldiers had become so accustomed to the idea of sexual privilege with Japanese women that when General MacArthur placed brothels off limits to them they went on a rampage, and according to “official records,” “the average number of cases of rape for the entire country leapt from an average of forty

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incidents a day to 330 incidents a day.”16 More recently, in his book on the world in the wake of the Second World War, Ian Buruma wrote: “According to one estimate, forty women were raped every day in the latter half of 1945, which is probably an underestimation, since many cases would not have been reported, out of shame.”17

Many accounts of the Occupation present it as a time of near lawlessness. They claim American soldiers did what they wanted, had their way with Japanese women, murdered civilians indiscriminately and committed innumerable casual cruelties. This allegedly was possible because the American commanders were by and large indifferent to the plight of the Japanese people and made no effective efforts to bring their troops under control. In this telling, Japanese police were helpless in the face of armed perpetrators and American MPs were worse than useless, turning a blind eye or taking advantage of their authority to commit crimes themselves, sometimes against the very women whose cases they were supposed to be investigating.18 Wherever Americans were stationed, the story goes, they destroyed communities, demoralizing the young women by raping them so that in their despair they turned to prostitution and invariably contracted the venereal diseases that were epidemic in the ranks the occupiers.19

In terms of scale, the figure cited by Dower and many others would mean that there were more than 700,000 reported rapes of Japanese women during the Occupation.

19 For example, Yuki Tanaka claims that by March 25, 1946 a quarter of all GIs had a sexually transmitted disease. (See Eric Talmadge, “GIs Frequent Japan’s ‘Comfort Women’,” *Washington Post*, April 25, 2007.)
Thus, judging from the sheer numbers of incidents, the US Occupation of Japan would have been one of the worst occurrences of mass sexual violence in the history of the world, with reported cases being more than ten times the number of estimated rapes in Bosnia during the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and seven times the estimated number of incidents that occurred during the Bangladeshi War of Independence.20

Nor is the critique of sexual predation limited to rape. According to a good deal of recent writing on the Occupation, the United States was complicit in, encouraged, or even ordered the Japanese government to set up brothels exclusively for the use of their own troops.21 Gender theorist and sociologist Hirai Kazuko has asserted that where war rape and military prostitution are concerned, “The mentality of the Occupation Army was astonishingly similar to that of the old Japanese Army.”22 Later she expanded on that point:

When it comes to supporting the army through the sexual control of women, the U.S. Army and the Old Japanese Army were fundamentally the same. When the U.S. House of Representatives [passed its resolution condemning Japan’s wartime comfort woman system] it should simultaneously have directed its condemnation toward America’s own army in Asia during the Cold War.23

Hirai has even explicitly endorsed Hashimoto’s comments insofar as they related to Japan’s actions during the Second World War being fairly standard for militaries of that time.24 Though few writers have gone as far as Hirai, accusations of gross moral turpitude on the part of the United States are quite common. The General Headquarters of the American military in Japan (GHQ, also sometimes referred to by the acronym SCAP,

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20 Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, *Sex and War*, (Dallas, Texas: Benbella Books), 2008, p. 3.
23 Ibid., pp. 218 – 219.
24 Ibid., p. 223.
(For Supreme Commander Allied Powers), an appellation that can also refer to the commander personally) has frequently been accused of depraved indifference to the fates of women who were allegedly forced to serve as prostitutes for United States military personnel. In a 2007 AP article carried in newspapers around the world, veteran Far East journalist Eric Talmadge asserted that Americans were participants in a forced prostitution network of their own:

Japan’s abhorrent practice of enslaving women to provide sex for its troops in World War II had a little-known sequel: After its surrender – with tacit approval from the U.S. occupation authorities – Japan set up a similar “comfort women” system for American GIs.

An Associated Press review of historical documents – some never before translated into English – show American authorities permitted the official brothel system to operate despite internal reports that the women were being coerced into prostitution.25

While such allegations may be shocking to non-specialists, they are increasingly familiar to those versed in the historiography of the Occupation.

Though such views can find a good deal of support in some secondary sources and some “reportage” written shortly after the lifting of Occupation censorship, they find little support in contemporary documents. Moreover, close examination of the secondary sources and “reportage” that many scholars have used in building a case of wide-spread sexual predation on the part of both American troops and their commanders reveals that many of them are of highly dubious provenance and some are proven hoaxes. There is no credible evidence of the mass rape of Japanese women by American soldiers during the Occupation. Nor is there any reliable evidence of GHQ’s collusion or involvement in, approval of, or connivance at any system of involuntary prostitution involving Japanese women.

This is not to assert that the Occupation personnel were beyond reproach in their treatment of Japanese women. On the contrary, it is certain that the U.S. Army in Japan had a criminal element and that numerous Japanese, both women and men, suffered violence at the hands of their conquerors – especially in the days immediately after the first Americans arrived. However, heinous crimes such as rape and murder, though not unheard of, were decidedly uncommon. At no point for which reliable statistics can be found did the frequency of rape even reach one percent of the scale alleged in many sources, both popular and academic. To be sure, vast numbers of American servicemen patronized Japanese prostitutes both during and after the Occupation. Moreover, the presence of American bases in a town was a sufficient condition to ensure the existence of an enthusiastic customer base for prostitution and thus a thriving sex industry. Nevertheless, American policy in Japan did not purposefully encourage prostitution and indeed sought to eliminate the rather well-entrenched practice of involuntary prostitution altogether.

Despite this, over the last twenty years, there has been a proliferation of writing that suggests that mass rape occurred either in the Occupation’s opening stages, throughout its entire duration or, in some cases, even after it formally ended. There has also been a great deal of writing asserting that any difference in the treatment of women in territories conquered by the US Army and those conquered by the Imperial Japanese Army was one of degree rather than kind. The near unanimity enjoyed by these interpretations is not the result of a sudden increase in rigorous research on the subjects. Rather it is the result of the influence that myth, legend, political bias and the popular

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26 Sarah Kovner’s *Occupying Power*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012) and Chazono Toshimi’s *Panpan to wa Dare Nanoka*, (Tokyo: Impakuto Shuppankai, 2014) are notable exceptions to these trends.
imagination can exercise on historians’ judgment when they are allowed to operate unchecked. The currency of these legends has now reached such a critical mass that almost any disinterested observer surveying the literature on the subjects of rape and prostitution during the American Occupation of Japan could scarcely arrive at any other conclusion than those put forth by many Japanese nationalists. Nevertheless, depictions of mass rape and sexual slavery during the Occupation are best regarded not as factual accounts but rather as expression of internalized metaphors for Japan’s defeat in the Second World War and its subsequent and continuing strategic subordination to its conqueror. This thesis will discuss how this situation came to be.

**Structure of the argument:**

This dissertation is composed of three parts of two chapters each. The first part consists of chapters that use contemporary documents to analyze crime, especially rape, committed by U.S. Servicemen during the Occupation, and GHQ’s handling of the issue of prostitution respectively. Chapter One discusses the behavior of American troops during the Occupation of Japan with a particular focus on their treatment of women and on sexual violence. It deals with both the early Occupation, a time about which allegations of mass rape are the most common, and the Occupation as a whole. During the early Occupation the historical record is particularly rich. The Japanese government was especially concerned about rape during this time and so instructed its officials to be vigilant in watching the Americans as they came into the country. This was also the time during which GI crime was at its highest. Relatively few military police entered with the first troops. Japanese police were routinely swept aside and deprived of their weapons by
the American vanguard. Moreover, the Japanese government had succeeded in persuading the Occupation authorities to reverse their decision about using military scrip, with the result that first troops to enter the country discovered that there was nothing there that they could acquire honestly. After American authorities came to believe that the Japanese population presented little danger, they dispatched more MPs and this initial crime wave abated. Even during this time, violent crime like rape and murder was rare.

There is far less documentation about crimes committed by American servicemen, after the first few weeks of the Occupation. There is nevertheless enough so that one can understand the approximate scale of crime during the Occupation as a whole and conclude that accounts stressing mass rape are fundamentally incorrect. There are a number of reasons that the document base for this time is not nearly as rich as it is for the early Occupation. The first is that the Americans introduced a censorship regime with stringent restrictions on press accounts of GI criminality. In addition, due to its relative scarcity, handling GI crime went from being a top priority of the Japanese government to a routine matter. Thus, reports are fewer. To date the author has been unable to discover any comprehensive source covering the entire period of the Occupation. Nevertheless, there are enough sources to convey sufficient information to construct a picture of GI behavior in which confidence can be placed. The picture that emerges is one of occasional criminal behavior on the part of American servicemen. This sometimes included rape. However, contrary to the assertions of some writers, there were no sudden explosions of violence or mass rape after brothels were placed off limits or in the wake of the outbreak of war in Korea.
Finally, GI behavior during the Occupation is compared to the behavior of the troops of other occupying armies in the Second World War. The frequency of rape is compared to that of the Red Army in Europe, the Japanese Army in Asia, the US Army in Germany, and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) of Western Japan. The contrast to the behavior of Japanese troops in Asia is especially instructive as the comparison of these two armies has been frequently made in recent years. Though the data analyzed for the behavior of these other armies is nowhere near as thorough as that for the US military in Japan, it nevertheless provides a good rough understanding of how American troops in Japan compared to those of other occupying forces. Briefly stated, the data suggests that the only army better behaved was the BCOF, though the information in this case may be insufficient to draw any definitive conclusions.

Chapter Two discusses how GHQ dealt with the issue of prostitution in Japan. As was the case with sexual violence, a number of legends have grown up about GHQ’s involvement in the sexual exploitation of Japanese women. As was the case with sexual violence, the more sensational claims about GHQ’s involvement in prostitution do not bear scrutiny. Nevertheless, the story of how the Americans handled the issue is an interesting one. GHQ found the problem vexing from the outset. The spread of venereal disease through American ranks soon made it imperative that some sort of action be taken. In addition, the revelation that many prostitutes were employed without their consent brought the question of personal liberty to the forefront. Finally, many in GHQ that dealt with the problem felt constrained in the actions they thought they could take in a country where prostitution had long been an accepted practice. In this atmosphere GHQ made two major decisions regarding prostitution. First, it decided to abolish the
institution of licensed prostitution as it had been traditionally practiced in Imperial Japan. Second it left the question of whether to outlaw prostitution altogether to the Japanese.

GHQ’s grappling with the issue of prostitution began in the context of dealing with the widespread availability of prostitutes to US troops and the potential that such a situation had on venereal disease control. American officials from GHQ’s Public Health and Welfare (PHW) Section knew very little about prostitution in Japan and they sought information from Japanese public health officials. Learning that there was a system by which prostitutes were licensed, forbidden to operate outside of specified areas, and subject to periodic health examinations, but that regulation had become increasingly lax during the war years, PHW at first sought to reinstate the system and get all Japanese prostitutes into it. Later, however, they discovered that a large number of the women and girls involved in the system had become so without giving their consent. Shortly thereafter SCAP issued an order abolishing the licensed prostitution system and declared all debts used in the indenture of women to be null and void. Though this was intended to eliminate all involuntary prostitution in Japan and emancipate all women wishing to leave the profession, proprietors and Japanese officials largely stymied American intentions.27

In the face of repeated attempts to skirt the order through the use of technicalities, GHQ continually ruled against the validity of any debt, no matter how incurred, that had the effect of binding a woman to the profession of prostitute.

Not long after this GHQ faced pressure to prohibit prostitution altogether. Pressure came from Japanese women’s and Christian groups, and also from within the ranks of the occupiers themselves. The Japanese groups were not successful in their efforts primarily because they did not succeed in mobilizing Japanese public opinion.

27 See
behind them. American military men came much closer to success because their objections were primarily practical and bore directly on the success of the Occupation. To wit, the venereal disease rate among American servicemen remained unacceptably high despite numerous efforts to keep it under control. Health officials and commanders came to a general consensus that an outright ban on prostitution and its related activities was the only way that progress in this struggle would be made. They also shared with the Japanese public an aversion to the proliferation of streetwalkers that had occurred since the abolition of licensed prostitution and SCAP’s order that all brothels in Japan were off-limits to American servicemen. They felt that only prohibition would give enough legitimacy to their efforts to clean up the streets to make them successful. Once the practical reasons for prohibiting prostitution helped to build momentum, prostitution opponents within GHQ began to raise moral objections to the practice as well. In 1947 it appeared for a time that prostitution per se would be abolished. A draft directive to the Japanese government outlawing prostitution was drawn up and appeared on the verge of being issued. Then however, it hit some snags when it was sent to SCAP’s Government Section (GS) and G-2 (Intelligence) for approval. G-2 was opposed to prohibition, believing it would be an exercise in futility that would only bring the US ridicule, scorn and hostility for its actions. GS, on the other hand, was generally supportive of such a prohibition, but thought that it should only be implemented if it had popular backing in Japan. It became clear that it did not. GHQ decided to leave the matter to the Japanese. During the remainder of the Occupation there was never enough support to pass an outright ban at the national level, and prostitution remained legal in many areas until the end of the Occupation and beyond.
Having shown that accounts of mass rape and widespread sexual slavery during the Occupation are not supported by contemporary documentation, the remainder of the dissertation is devoted to exploring how accounts of mass sexual violence and sexual exploitation came to have such currency. Chapters Three and Four deal with the psychological environment in which narratives about mass rape and sex slavery came to flourish.

Chapter Three looks at the intimate association between rape and war in the human psyche and in history and literature. It shows that the fear of rape during wartime is ubiquitous and deeply engrained. It is a major factor in people’s emotions in situations of tense conflict regardless of whether the possibility of rape is remote or acute. There is a (sometimes altogether justified) fear that a nation’s women will become the spoils of an invader. This fear can be a powerful motivator to the men who regard protection of women as one of their cardinal duties. It has frequently been employed by propagandists the world around to motivate soldiers. The chapter then examines how the connection between rape and war was viewed in Japan during the Second World War. Even before the outbreak of war in China, rape was seen as a natural action for conquering troops. Japanese servicemen often regarded sexual privilege with women of conquered territories as a matter of course. The soldiers and sailors of the Japanese empire committed countless rapes. Stories about rape and its prevalence were a concern of the Imperial Army. These actions and perceptions colored the way that Americans were viewed as the war moved toward conclusion. It was widely assumed that Americans would engage in mass rape and the fear of mass rape was prevalent in areas where Americans were likely to invade. Stories of rape were disseminated to keep the population united against the
enemy. In this atmosphere, it should come as no surprise that rumors of impending mass rape or of mass rape carried out in other locations in Japan were rife in the Occupation’s opening days. The universal human fear of rape in wartime was particularly salient in Japan when the Occupation began and in some cases for a considerable amount of time afterward.

Chapter Four deals with the reaction of Japanese conservatives and Japanese men across the political spectrum to the drastically changed position of women in Japanese society as a result of defeat and occupation. The Occupation implemented what political scientist Susan J. Pharr has rightly called a “truly radical set of laws and policies” regarding women. The Occupation enforced on Japan an American ideal of individual liberty that ran counter to traditional Japanese ideas of a male-run household as the fundamental unit of society. As part of that overhaul it sought to restructure sexual and marital relations on the basis of individual autonomy. Many Japanese men resented being deprived of their traditional privileges in these matters. In addition to presuming to dictate to Japanese men how they should deal with the women they considered their own, Americans further embittered many Japanese men with the example of how they dealt with children and women. Their cheerful and apparently happy-go-lucky attitude to dealing with people struck many Japanese conservatives as the opposite of masculine. While Japanese had been taught that military men should be stern and serious, Americans, even when on duty, were sometimes downright playful. If not for the fact of their victory and the attraction so many Japanese children had for them, it would have been easy to dismiss them as frivolous. As it was they seemed to be almost mocking

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traditional Japanese masculinity. While the relations between GIs and Japanese children was galling to many, it was nothing compared to the downright humiliation many felt at the free and easy relations Americans often had with Japanese women. The widespread consorting of Japanese women with American men was infuriating to many Japanese men and to quite a few women as well. In the minds of many, Americans were little more than sexual interlopers who hypocritically used the rhetoric of autonomy and individual rights to take control of Japanese women’s sexuality from Japanese men and exploit it for their own pleasure.

The final part of the dissertation shows how this psychological environment of fear and bitterness toward the conqueror and interloper presented fertile ground for exploitation both commercially and politically. It describes how left-wing forces in Japan capitalized on the resentment of relations between American servicemen and Japanese women to tie issues of sexual violence, perceived racial contamination, and prostitution to campaign against the US-Japanese security treaty and the basing rights it gave to the American military. It also shows how the discourse about rape, prostitution, and the mixed-race children that sometimes resulted appealed to prurient as well as nationalist interests. The result was a subgenre of the exploitation fiction known as *ero-guro nansensu* (erotic grotesque nonsense). This was a movement in literature that had recently reemerged after suppression during the war. This sensational *panpan* (prostitute) literature was widely popular and examples of it were presented as reportage on actual incidents. Many of these works subsequently came to be relied upon in building accounts about the behavior of American troops during the Occupation. They explored widely
shared sentiments of resentment and succeeded in laying the foundations of the myths that permeate Occupation historiography to the present day.

Chapter Six, the concluding chapter, discusses the resilience of the myth and explores the reasons behind it. It demonstrates how Japan’s subordination to the United States in diplomatic and strategic affairs has often been expressed in a metaphor of sexual conquest and domination. Writers and cartoonists from across the political spectrum have invoked the metaphor in denouncing the United States. Many works of panpan literature, some created for a specific political purpose and others that originated as sensational pornography, subsequently came to be seen as nonfiction by a large portion of Japanese society and later scholars. It argues that this literature has had a outsized effect on writing about the Occupation. It shows how these works have been incorporated into the academic and popular mainstream understandings of American treatment of Japanese women. Accounts that stress mass rape and sexual atrocities committed by GIs are best regarded as metaphoric expressions of the experience of defeat, occupation and continued subordination rather than as factual accounts. That metaphor has a great appeal to those who resent Japan’s continuing subordination to the United States on the international scene. Thus the myth of mass rape will likely abide so long as that subordination does.
Chapter 1: GI Behavior During the Occupation of Japan and in Comparative Perspective

The Early Occupation

Many writers allege that American forces committed many crimes, especially rape during the Occupation. Most often they allege this about the opening weeks and months of the Occupation. This would follow as it fits a pattern of rape and war seen elsewhere. There is often an initial period of lawlessness as a defeated regime is ousted but the conquering army has yet to establish a new order. During this period rape is sometimes widespread, even commonplace, and is any case generally more frequent than at later periods. This happened with the Russian army in Berlin, the Japanese Army in Nanjing and (though on a much lesser scale) the American army in Germany.\(^{29}\)

Some writers limit their allegations of mass rape to this period. As discussed at the outset Fujime Yuki and others state that there were 3500 rapes during the first month of the Occupation. However, Fujime also gives the incongruously (and factually) low figure of 30 rape reports for all of 1946.\(^{30}\) Similarly Takemae Eiji asserted that there were 1,336 reported rapes of Japanese women by American servicemen in the first ten days of the Occupation, but that after the initial crime wave, “military discipline took hold” and “the worst fears of both sides of both sides proved groundless.”\(^{31}\) Yuki Tanaka notes that there was a significant drop off in the number of crimes reported after September 19, 1945 but speculates that this may have been “due to the fact that Japanese victims gave up reporting to the police because they soon found their police had no power to

\(^{29}\) See below for details.


investigate the cases let alone arrest the American perpetrators.”\textsuperscript{32} Whatever the cause many (but by no means all) writers acknowledge a conspicuous decrease in the reported number of rapes after the first several weeks of the Occupation, but assert that this was a period during which sexual violence was rampant.

Claims such as these are easily investigated because the behavior of American servicemen during the Occupation was very well-documented by both Japanese and American sources. Rape was a particular concern of those recording that behavior. In fact, one set of reports on the Japanese side listed only three categories of crime: rape, offenses against the police, and “other,” in that order.\textsuperscript{33} Another lists rape, offenses against the police and offenses against ordinary citizens, again in that order.\textsuperscript{34} On the American side, accusations of rape were taken very seriously at the highest levels. On September 2, 1945, just after the surrender ceremony on U.S.S. \textit{Missouri}, Lt. Gen. Robert Eichelberger, commander of the United States Eighth Army and top military lieutenant to Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) Douglas MacArthur, was summoned to report to his chief’s “quarters for a conference concerning some reported rape cases on the part of Marines.”\textsuperscript{35} According to Japanese police records there was a total of six reported rape cases at the time.\textsuperscript{36} On September 11, Eichelberger was visited by Marine Brigadier General Clement who had brought with him a report on the rape cases in his area.\textsuperscript{37} As of

\textsuperscript{35} Robert Eichelberger, diary entry, September 2, 1945. in Robert L. Eichelberger Papers, Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Box 1, Folder titled “Miscellaneous: Diary Photocopies: Diaries: July 23 – October 20; October 24 – December 4.”
\textsuperscript{37} Eichelberger, diary entry September 11, 1945.
the previous day, there had been nine reported cases in the entire country. Both the
Japanese and the Americans took cases of misconduct, and especially of rape very
seriously and they kept detailed records about them, many of which survive.

What those records reveal is that though there is a kernel of truth to accounts of
lawlessness in the Occupation’s opening days, the stories that have sprouted from that
kernel are manifestly false. There was indeed a period of relative lawlessness during the
first few days of the Occupation, as there often is during the transition between regimes.
Moreover, in the particular case of the Americans in Japan the chaos of this changeover
was exacerbated by a poorly timed reversal in the American currency policy for Japan. At
the behest of the Japanese government, SCAP decided to repudiate military scrip after it
had already been printed and distributed to its troops. The result was that the GIs quite
unexpectedly found themselves penniless in a land that had more to offer to men with
money than any of them had previously imagined. Many of them turned to crime. In the
opening days of the Occupation robberies, carjackings, and thefts were common.
Japanese police were especially likely to be robbed of their weapons. Nevertheless,
serious violent crimes like rape and murder were rare during even this time.

The most easily obtained sources on GI crime comes from Japanese media
coverage of the Occupation. A press code was established on September 18, 1945 which
severely curtailed the ability of the vernacular media to criticize the Occupation or call
attention to the behavior of its troops. However, prior to that time the Japanese media was
effectively free of interference (at least from American authorities) and did not hesitate to

pp. 9 - 10.
39 “C.L.O. No. 342: Report on the Misconduct of Allied Soldiers up to the End of September,” October 23, 1945 in
NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).
criticize the United States or its policies. Moreover, the figures that they printed about American crimes make clear that they had well-informed sources within the Japanese domestic security bureaucracy.

The *Ashahi Shinbun*, one of Japan’s largest papers, contains a number of accounts of petty crimes and of some more serious offenses, and a survey of its coverage provides insight into the behavior of GIs during this time. For example, on September 2 an article gave an account of criminal actions that had occurred on the first two days of Occupation. According to this account on August 30 American troops had committed two rapes and had attempted two others. On the 31st, they stole a Japanese sword, several bicycles, robbed a beer truck and committed several other robberies.40

In an article that appeared on September 7 the paper carried the most detailed information about GI crime. It notes that “there was a fair amount of crime in the first two or three days” which caused a good deal of worry. However, due to an increase in the size of the US military police force the number of incidents had drastically decreased.41 Moreover, many of the complaints were registered by the police themselves.42 The figures for crime were as follows:

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41 The US forces, not knowing what to anticipate did not send in many military police in the opening days of the Occupation. The shortage of these forces was so acute that even Eichelberger was obliged to rely on Japanese “gendarmes” (by which he probably meant kempei) to provide for his personal security. See Robert L. Eichelberger letter to Emmalina Eichelberger, August 31, 1945 in Robert L. Eichelberger papers
<table>
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<th>Date</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Involving Japanese Policemen</td>
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<td>August 30</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>196</td>
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<td>August 31</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>167</td>
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<td>September 1</td>
<td>160</td>
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(2) Table of reported crimes committed by American servicemen carried in the *Ashahi Shinbun* on September 7, 1945

Further discussion of GI behavior was carried on September 11 when the paper discussed the actions of troops entering Tokyo. According to this account the Americans had entered the city on the eighth and up through the evening of the ninth things had proceeded relatively smoothly. There were a total of 29 complaints registered against American officers and soldiers. These were mostly petty crimes such as theft, robbery, dining without compensation, and the like. The article made a special point of the fact that there had been no rapes reported. In fact, its title was “No Violation of Women.”

This was the last article in which any concrete information about rape was provided by the *Asahi*.

Aside from press reports, the next most easily obtainable resources are the testimonies of individuals who had first-hand experience of the advance of the Occupation troops. These can be seen in memoirs, latter recollections and, in a more formal manner, in the official histories of the various Japanese police departments.

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assigned the task of overseeing the advance of the Occupation troops. These reinforce the image of a relatively tranquil Occupation. The reaction from Japanese authorities was one of almost universal relief. For example, there is the testimony of Hattori Ichirō. Hattori was a police officer from Aichi Prefecture who was dispatched to aid local law enforcement in Kanagawa at the time of the American landing. He later recalled, “The city was surprisingly quiet. As far as I am aware there was no especially big trouble.”

In Kōchi the arrival of the troops was “extremely peaceful.” In Shizuoka “the advance of the Allied armies was extremely peaceful.” In Yamagata “the strict discipline of the American troops completely allayed the fears of the populace.” The picture was the same almost everywhere: an initial period of uncertainty and anxiety followed by reassurance at the discipline and relatively good behavior of the American troops.

Civilians recorded or remembered the advance similarly. In his diary, the writer Yamada Fūtarō wrote down his conversations with people who had interacted with the American troops. One student remarked that the troops were maintaining strict discipline in Tokyo. A factory manager friend of his, “Old Man Saitō,” was shocked at how

pleasant the Americans were, remarking that from their attitudes one would be hard pressed to even know which side won the war. Yamada himself wrote that though it was hard to admit, he could see why MacArthur was so proud of his troops. By December 1, he was so impressed that he wrote an entire entry about the behavior of the Americans. Recording his own impressions as well as those of people he talked with or overheard, he could barely contain himself, writing four pages of uninterrupted praise. Similarly, the writer Nagai Kafū recorded an encounter at a restaurant where a number of young American officers were also dining. He noted that they seemed quite noble in their bearing and made efforts to communicate with Japanese in their own language. He could not help but feel that they were “far and away more genial than Japanese military men.”

Many years later, ultranationalist Ishihara Shintarō, certainly no fan of the United States, recalled, “Everyone in my neighborhood watched Americans with great fear, but nothing really happened.”

Other sources, more reliable but less accessible, that corroborate such testimony can be found in the records of the Japanese police. For reasons that will be explored in more depth later, Japanese authorities and civilians were consumed with dread that the victorious Americans would go on a rampage. They were especially haunted by the specter of large-scale sexual violence. Throughout the archipelago Japanese people from all walks of life sought ways to stem the expected onslaught. However, of most interest to the historian is that one of the actions taken by the Japanese government was to put its rather formidable domestic surveillance apparatus into service monitoring the behavior of

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50 Ibid., pp. 639 - 642.
the Allied forces. In this endeavor, they were greatly assisted by a generally cooperative and anxious populace. The authorities instructed civilians to report any type of misconduct whatsoever and ordered police officers to investigate and report every allegation, even those that proved to be nothing more than rumors.53

In the early stages of the Occupation, the Home Ministry compiled reports from police departments, the Tokkō or Special Higher Police, and local officials into extensive files on the behavior and misconduct of American troops. These files were widely distributed throughout the Japanese government with copies forwarded to the Home Minister, Vice-Minister, Chief of the Tokkō, the Headquarters of the Kempeitai, the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, Prince Konoe Fumimaro, the Central Liaison Office (C.L.O.), and ten more recipients.54 Copies of some of these reports are currently available in the Japanese National Diet Library, the Japanese National Archives, in the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Diplomatic Records Office and in two published volume.55

The condition of these reports is, as a rule, somewhat poor. Some of them were printed using what was apparently the only typeface available at the end of the war on what one would assume is fairly low-quality paper with low quality ink. As a result many of the more complex characters are almost illegible solid blocks.56 Other reports are

54 “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi,” Japanese National Archive (Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan), Hensei, 3A 15, 11-1, p. 0001.
55 See “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi,” Japanese National Archive (Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan), Hensei, 3A 15, 11-1 Hereinafter “JNA Hensei 3A 15, 11-1,” and “Rengōgun Shinchūgun ni Okeru Jiko Hassei Chōshōyō” Kokuritsu Kokkai Tōshōkan (Japanese National Diet Library (Hereinafter JNDL) MOJ 6 Reel 2 August 30, 1945 - September 25, 1945. MOJ 6 Reel 2 and JNDL MOJ 38, Reel 13, pp. 382940 - 383034; and the files whose first part is for some reason untitled though the section beginning on p. 383035 is titled “Shinchūgun ni tai Suru [mama] Fuhō Kōi Shinpō Tsuzuri.” This second part of this reel is available under the same name in Kokuritsu Kōbun Shokan, Hensei 3-A 15, 32 - 4, pp. 383035 - 383156; See also Diplomatic Record Office, Reel A'-0012; “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi,” reprinted in Seibōryoku Mondai Shiryō Shōsetsu, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Fujuya Shuppan, 2004); In addition, published reports of the Tokkō regarding activities of the Allied Forces during the early Occupation in Iwate Prefecture are reproduced in Awaya Kentarō and Nakazono Hiroshi, ed., Haisen Zengo no Shakai Jōsei, Vol. 6: Shinchūgun no Dōkō, (Tokyo: Gendai Shiryō Shuppan, 1999).
56 See for example, “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, pp. 0031, 0032.
handwritten in idiosyncratic cursive.\textsuperscript{57} Except for the published volume, all of the copies currently available to the author are paper reproductions of microfilm copies produced with varying degrees of success by an anonymous technician. Those caveats notwithstanding, given patience, the vast majority of the material is legible. In some cases, however, some reports in a series are missing and in one case, the number of the surviving report makes it unclear which is missing. Some of the reports reflect information from times when the full extent of the crime was yet unknown and others categorize things somewhat oddly. One report does not include the rape of a prostitute in its tally of rapes.\textsuperscript{58} In another case, recorded as a homicide, an on-duty sentry was approached by a Japanese man who began throwing rocks at him. The soldier yelled at him to leave, at which point the man tackled the sentry and began biting him. The soldier then shot the man.\textsuperscript{59} Another report lists an abduction case whose victim’s fate was unknown as “other” when later information revealed that she had in fact been raped.\textsuperscript{60} Those caveats notwithstanding, when added to newspaper reports and personal recollections, they help to give a clear picture of GI behavior during the early Occupation.

Almost everything the Americans did was observed and reported by the local population—often down to the most trivial detail. For example, in one case, three Americans approached Otohara Shichizō, a roof tile maker in Kawasaki. After offering him a cigarette, they pointed to a phrase in an English-Japanese dictionary that read “I want a red kimono.” After extensive difficulties in communication and an inability to

\textsuperscript{57} See, for example, “Shinchūgun ni tai Suru [mama] Fuhō Kōi Shinpō Tsuzuri,” JNA, Hensei 3-A 15, 32 - 4, pp. 383147 - 383148.

\textsuperscript{58} “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi No. 10,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, p. 0101, 0137.

\textsuperscript{59} JNDL MOJ 38 Reel 13, p. 383093 - 383095. There were other reports filed about on-duty sentries killing Japanese intruders, but the circumstances of these are sometimes more ambiguous. In one case an unarmed woman was shot dead in the act of attempting to harvest vegetables from an area recently claimed by the Occupation forces.

\textsuperscript{60} “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi No. 10,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, pp. 0065, 0082.
procure red kimonos for the three men, a prefectural assemblyman with some knowledge
of English happened by and the men were satisfied with two red kimonos and one white
one. After negotiating over price, the men paid for the garments. Mr. Otohara saw no
reason to report the encounter as the soldiers had paid for what they had procured.
However, apparently the local rumor mill went into action and the police got wind of the
exchange. As per their instructions, they investigated and filed a report on the matter.61 In
recording another encounter, a department chief (部長) of the Morioka police department
thought it necessary to report on the activities of two Allied servicemen who had gotten
their laundry done in town. The men tried to pay for their laundry with 20 yen, but the
man who performed the service requested canned goods instead. They gave him four cans
of food for washing four uniform shirts, two pairs of long underwear, two towels, two
sheets, and four pairs of socks.62 Another report was filed about a group of eleven soldiers
who came to the residence of Mr. Satō Fukuharu and bartered two packs of cigarettes,
two cans of food, five pieces of chewing gum and two bags of bread in exchange for an
unknown number of tomatoes, spring onions and cucumbers. Upon departing the soldiers
used an English-Japanese dictionary and pointed to a phrase that was something to the
effect of “it was nice to meet you.”63

Of course, not all of the encounters between Allied personnel and Japanese
civilians were so innocuous. Contemporary Japanese police reports tend to complicate the
somewhat rosy recollections of later years. There were quite a few instances in which
American troops engaged in criminal behavior. These cases were reported in every bit as
much detail as the more harmless activities of the GIs.

61 JNDL, MOJ 38 reel 13, pp. 382988 - 382990.
63 Awaya and Nakazono, p. 370.
By far the most numerous victims of American lawlessness were the Japanese police. Whether from a desire to disarm a potentially hostile force, humiliate a beaten foe, or simply to procure souvenirs, the most frequent crime committed by GIs in the opening weeks of the Occupation was the robbing of swords and pistols from policemen. This happened so frequently that GHQ authorized the printing of a special flyer to be distributed to policemen that noted that they were armed with the understanding and approval of SCAP. The robbery of arms slowed, but still continued.

![Flyer distributed to Japanese police](image)

(3) Example of flyer distributed to Japanese police in an effort to stop the robbery of their service weapons by American troops

After offenses against police, the second-most frequent crime committed by the occupying troops was the theft or robbery of automobiles, many of them taken for joy rides and then simply abandoned when they would function no more. This pattern became so frequent that at one point the Japanese government forwarded a request from a

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64 See, for example “Re: Forwarding information with regard to the trend of reports on unfortunate incidents,” September 15, 1945, in National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II (Hereinafter “NARA”) RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).

65 Reprinted in Ehime police history, p. 575. Though the order was genuine, the unfortunate mistranslation of MacArthur’s rank in the American Army may have caused some GIs to question its authenticity. MacArthur did hold the rank of field marshal in the Philippine army, but Americans serving under him would have known him as “General” rather than “Marshal.”
company that had suffered numerous auto thefts petitioning GHQ to tell its soldiers to please just return the vehicles to the place from which they originally took them. According to one official memo, in the first twelve days of the Occupation, servicemen stole no fewer than 170 vehicles. By the end of September, they had stolen 222 vehicles, including five fire engines. They also hijacked a tram and two trains and stole two buses. This crime wave came at a time when there was a grand total of 750 serviceable passenger cars in the entire Kantō area (where Tokyo and Yokohama are). Of these only about 225 were gasoline powered and most were “nearly worn out.” Given the G.I. penchant for joy-riding in the opening days of the war, it was inevitable that a disproportionate number of their victims would be high-placed and influential Japanese. Two GIs stole a car from the Japanese Foreign Ministry. In another case, a car being used by the Welfare Ministry was taken at gunpoint. Diet member Kōno Hachirō was robbed of his vehicle as well. Another time, two Americans (the report said it was unclear if they were soldiers or journalists) carjacked a vehicle in broad daylight right in front of the police headquarters in Hibiya. They forced two Japanese policemen to stop a passing car, then ordered the occupants out at gunpoint, whereupon they took the vehicle and drove off. One of the passengers thus deprived of his ride was future prime minister Ikeda Hayato. In perhaps the highest profile case, a GI approached future prime minister

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66 Takemae Eiji, ed. *GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taiō Bunshō Sōshūsei*, vol. 1, p. 298.
67 “Re: Forwarding information with regard to the trend of reports on unfortunate incidents,” September 15, 1945, in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).
70 Japanese Diplomatic Record Office, Reel A'-0012. p. 0429 (Frame 321).
72 Telegram “CLO No. 41. 9th” in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).
73 Takemae, ed. *GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taiō Bunshō Sōshūsei*, vol. 1, p. 181, plate 345.
74 Diplomatic Record Office, Reel A'-0012, p. 0443 (Frame 328).
Kishi Nobusuke, who was watching over the official vehicle of then current Prime Minister Shidehara Kijurō. After feigning illness, he convinced Kishi to allow the Prime Minister’s driver to take him to the hospital. En route, the soldier forced the driver from the car and drove off in it. Though the memo detailing this incident to the Americans was stamped “Immediate Action” in red letters across the top of it, the culprit was never found and the investigation closed.

After car-jacking and theft of arms, the most frequent GI crimes were robbery, forced bartering, dining without compensation and the like. Ironically the Japanese victims of these crimes were in some ways as much victims of their own government’s actions as they were of the occupying army’s avarice and desires.

When the first Americans arrived in Japan they were surprised to learn that Japanese businessmen and police had arranged a special reception for them in the form of a network of brothels, dancing halls and drinking establishments created especially for their use. According to one, possibly apocryphal, account one group of jittery Americans manning roadblock in early September 1945 were approached by a truck, which they ordered to halt. After the vehicle stopped, “from it emerged a Japanese man and a flock of Japanese women,” whom, the man made clear, had been provided for the Americans’ pleasure. The problem, as GIs all over Japan were discovering, was that their money was no good.

76 “Misconduct Among Occupation Troops,” October 25, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).
77 See Chapter 2.
78 Mark Gayn, Japan Diary, (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948), p. 232. Gayn, though a consummate story teller, also was a very murky character who clearly had an agenda. See Harvey Klehr and Ronald Rodash, The Amerasia Spy Case, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) and Gayn’s own account of his meddling in Japanese politics in Japan Diary, pp. 162 - 164. However, whether this particular account is accurate or not, the essential gist of the story indisputably is. On August 18, 1945, the Home Ministry ordered its various
Prior to the surrender, American policy makers had been operating on the assumption that, as was the case in Germany, they would be ruling the country by direct military administration. Accordingly, they began to assume the functions of Japanese government even before they got there. On August 22 the Japanese Finance Ministry received a top secret cable from Dōmei News Agency indicating that a shipment of $100 Million worth of military scrip had been dispatched from San Francisco to Manila.⁷⁹

Realizing that they were in danger of losing control over their economy, the Japanese government sent an urgent telegram to MacArthur in the Philippines the next day:

The Japanese Government wishes to be informed of the currency to be used in Japan by the Forces of Occupation.

We hope that they will use the Bank of Japan notes for this purpose, and are ready to deliver the currency at Atsugi, Yokohama and Yokosuka.⁸⁰

The United States apparently made no response to this request and the time of the arrival of the Occupation troops drew near. Finance Minister Tsushima Juichi proposed having the Bank of Japan print its own currency to hand out to the advancing allies. The cabinet agreed and the currency was printed.⁸¹ On August 28, the day the first American troops were scheduled to land, the government again tried to persuade the Americans to drop their plans for military scrip. They cabled:

Referring to our radio gram number 28 date 23 August, in which we expressed our hope that the Occupation forces would use the bank of Japan notes in Japan, we would like to submit the following to your special consideration, in view of a recent foreign broadcast. We are to deliver the Japanese currency as much as required by your head quarters for the expenditure of the Occupation forces, as informed to you in our radiogram under reference. If they are the military currency in the main island of Japan, it will disturb the monetary and financial

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⁸¹ Iokibe Makoto, Senryōki Shushōtai no Shin Nippon, pp. 52 – 53.
Receiving no reply from the Americans, the government dispatched Lt. Gen. Arisue Seizō to meet the advanced team landing at Atsugi air field with ten million yen in cash. The officer in charge, Colonel Charles Tench, assured the Japanese side that his men had no intention of leaving the base and therefore there was nothing to fear. Though Tench obviously spoke only for his own small group, the Japanese side was reassured after speaking with Tench’s aide, Major Faubion Bowers, who was both fluent in Japanese and appeared relatively well-disposed toward them.

However, on September 2, after the surrender ceremony on Missouri, and after there were many more Americans in the country than Tench’s small group, Suzuki Tadakatsu, head of the newly-established Central Liaison Offices learned that GHQ was planning on issuing a number of bombshell directives the next day. Among other things, these would have established direct military government and decreed that GHQ’s military scrip would be treated as the equivalent of currency printed by the bank of Japan. After a flurry of activity, the Japanese government arranged a meeting between MacArthur and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu Mamoru for the following morning. There Shigemitsu persuaded MacArthur to rescind the orders and let Japan maintain control of its currency.  

While a victory for Japanese diplomacy, this action had the effect of instantly rendering penniless tens of thousands of armed young men on the streets of Japan. Many

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83 Ibid., p. 54. See also, Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ, (New York: Continuum, 2002) pp. 61 - 63. Iokibe and Takemae conflict as to the time of the meeting (10:30 am vs. 8:30 am respectively) but both agree that it took place on the morning of September 3, 1945.
attempted to deal to solve their conundrum by selling things to Japanese. Nagai Kafū related an incident as late as mid-October of 1945 in which an acquaintance saw American soldiers selling chocolate in front of Atami station until they had collected enough money to patronize a nearby brothel. Others attempted to buy things with American dollars or Filipino Pesos. Some attempted to barter cigarettes, canned food and chocolates and other goods. Many others, however, chose more direct methods. Even among those relatively honest men who tried to deal squarely with civilians there was a significant number who lost their tempers and once their initial offers were refused, sometimes made their opposite another offer, a la Vito Corleone. Others simply paid in the currency they had and forced Japanese to accept it. In one case American frustration resulted in a terrifying experience for a group of Japanese women. A group of American soldiers burst into a brothel and while they were robbing the place one of their number climbed the stairs, cornered one of the prostitutes and, brandishing a pistol, raped her. When he was finished, he left her 100 yen in military scrip. Many more simply robbed passersby of their portable wealth, including, watches, cash, and fountain pens. By the end of September, 439 watches had been reported stolen. One particularly intrepid group apparently decided against molesting workaday Japanese and went straight to where the money was, the Yokohama branch of the Sumitomo Bank.

86 “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi”, JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, p. 0193, 0214, 0236-0237; JNDL MOJ 38, Reel 13, p. 383123; Takemae Eiji, ed. GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taiō Bunshō Sōshūsei, pp. 547, 554, 555, 630.
88 Ibid., p. 0101.
89 See for example, Ibid. pp. 0045, 0081, 0105, 0106, 0211, 0230, 0266; JNDL MOJ 38, Reel 13, pp. 383044, 383061, 383066, 383079, 383101, 383106, 383119, 383125.
GIs could be quite brazen about their crimes. In one case a group of Americans patronized a brothel and when the evening’s entertainment was finished and the time came to pay the bill, they opened a black doctor’s case and produced Japanese currency and a ladies’ wristwatch and paid with a combination of the two. GIs also patronized brothels, bars and restaurants without paying and frequently stole any alcohol they could lay their hands on. Alcohol was so fervently sought that some Americans came to grief in their pursuit of it. One GI robbed a miso ration shop of bottled shoyu, and left the shop. Later, apparently realizing his mistake, he tossed it aside, returned and robbed the store of a flag. Another demanded alcohol of the workers in a factory only to be told that they had none. Apparently the GI in question had already acquired some familiarity with Japanese alcoholic beverages because he immediately spotted a beer can. Triumphanty grabbing it, he poured the contents into his mouth. The factory workers had been using it to store exhausted oil. In short order the soldier admitted the correctness of the Japanese claims -- if not in so many words.

After the currency problem was solved and Americans understood that their own troops were more of a threat to order than Japanese civilians, they began more rigorous policing. Robbery and other street crime dropped precipitously. Nevertheless, it was never entirely eradicated. As late as the following June, in an incident that surely must

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92 Takemae Eiji, ed. GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taiō Bunsho Sōshūsei, vol. 1, p. 175, report 22; JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, p. 0151–0153.
94 Ibid. p. 0093.
95 Ibid. p. 0276.
96 “Re: Forwarding information with regard to the trend of reports on unfortunate incidents,” September 15, 1945, in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 14 (1-2).
have set a record of some sort, an American soldier held up and robbed future prime minister Ashida Hitoshi on a train from Tokyo to Kyoto.\textsuperscript{97}

While these reports certainly complicate the picture of an orderly and peaceful Occupation, they also make clear that serious crimes like rape and murder were rare, and it is obvious from them that the authorities were especially concerned with rape. For example, a daily series of crime charts covering the period from Aug. 30 to Sept. 25 shows that there were 9 reported cases of rape and 20 attempts from various precincts in Kanagawa Prefecture.\textsuperscript{98} In a chart covering Kanagawa, Chiba, Hokkaido, and Shizuoka Prefectures from Aug. 30 to Sept. 5 there were 6 reported cases of rape and 4 attempts. These totals do not include one case of abduction near Yokosuka.\textsuperscript{99} Another chart covering the same area from Aug. 30 to Sept. 10 and updated to include a previously unreported case in Yokosuka (most likely the previously discussed abduction) records that there was a total of 9 reported cases of rape and 6 attempts.\textsuperscript{100}

Another file consists of a group of numbered reports including charts and details of various cases, plus one miscellaneous report attached to the end. The first report was filed on Aug 31, detailing events of the previous day and the final report, number 22, was filed on Sept. 29 and covers events up to the 25th. Report number 5 or 6 (the number of the remaining report is illegible) is missing. The surviving reports detail twelve rape cases from the August 30 to September 25 in Kanagawa, Tokyo, and Chiba. (This total

\textsuperscript{97}Ashida Hitoshi, \textit{Ashida Nikki}, vol. 1, (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986), p. 262 (Entries for June 1 and June 2, 1946). Ashida, who despite his misfortune remained resolutely pro-American, described it as the most mortifying thing he had ever experienced. Americans also robbed the compound of former Prime Minister Hideki Tōjō in a search for souvenirs. (Takemae Eiji, ed. \textit{GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taihō Bunko Sōshi}, vol. 1, p. 575).

\textsuperscript{98}“Rengōgun Shinchūgun ni Okeru Jiko Hassei Chōsei,” JNDL MOJ 6 Reel 2 August 30, 1945 - September 25, 1945.

\textsuperscript{99}“Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, p. 0109.

\textsuperscript{100}“Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, pp. 0136 - 0137.
includes one case of rape of a prostitute not tallied and one abduction later determined to be a rape.\textsuperscript{101}

Another collection of reports from various Home Ministry officials (principally from the Governor of Kanagawa Prefecture) details GI crimes during the early Occupation, beginning on August 30. These reports are not regular or well-organized, with some being numbered and others not. In the numbered sequence the file includes reports 2, 17, being filed on September 17, and reports 18 - 33 with the final and 33rd report being filed on October 5. There are many unnumbered reports that deal principally with the beginning of September and there are redundancies in these reports. It is impossible to say with certainty that these reports cover the period in question exhaustively, however, especially when viewed in light of other sources, it is clear that these reports provide a fairly complete picture of GI crime in Kanagawa (and an incomplete picture of some other locales) from the beginning of the Occupation until October 4. They include a total of nine rape cases.\textsuperscript{102}

In addition to the internal Japanese reports on GI crime, there are also the reports submitted by the Japanese government to the American side. In the early Occupation period, the Japanese Central Liaison Office (C.L.O.) submitted a number of missives on American criminality to GHQ. The C.L.O. was the organ set up to transact all business between the Japanese central government and MacArthur’s headquarters. It took the Home Ministry reports, rendered particular cases into English and passed the information

\textsuperscript{101} “Shinchūgun no Fuhō Kōi: Beihei no Fuhō Kōi,” JNA, Hensei, 3-A 15, 11-1, p. 0001-0367, especially, 0002 (3 counts), 0014, 0015, 0041, 0065 (abduction case), 0082 (second report of same abduction case), 0101 (rape of prostitute not tallied), 0128, 0129, 0268, 0296.  
\textsuperscript{102} See JNDL MOJ 38, Reel 13, pp. 382940 - 383034, especially, pp. 382944 - 382946 (contains five cases), 383071, 383082, 383092, 383111. In addition there are redundant reports of earlier cases that appear on pp. 383043, 383051. For some reason the first part of this file is untitled, the section beginning on p. 383035 is titled “Shinchūgun ni tai Suru [mama] Fuhō Kōi Shinpō Tsuzuri.” This second part of this reel is available under the same name in JNA, Hensei 3-A 15, 32 - 4, pp. 383035 - 383156.
along to the Americans. As was the case on the Japanese side, these reports also had wide circulation. Copies were forwarded to the commanders of the troops concerned, sometimes going through multiple levels of the chain of command. In addition, they were wired in the clear to G-3 for action and for information to the Commander-in-Chief, the Chief of Staff, G-2, and one other recipient.

Copies of many of these reports are available in the National Archives in Maryland. In some cases, these reports have been removed from the files in what appears to have been a rather ham-fisted and ultimately futile attempt to prevent the information from becoming public. In addition, much of the correspondence between the C.L.O. and MacArthur’s command, having been returned to the Japanese side, has been collected and edited by Takemae Eiji into reference works of several volumes available in some Japanese libraries. As the Archives requires that when a document has been removed, a notice of the removal be left in the file in its place, the effect of the removal is largely to serve as a finding guide for anyone with access to the Takemae volumes. However, there are cases of documents in the Archives which the present writer was unable to locate in the Takemae volumes. With those caveats notwithstanding, the CLO correspondence serves to provide a reasonably complete English-language record of GI crime in the early Occupation period. This record largely corroborates the Japanese record.

In its records of GI criminal activity between the opening of the Occupation and the end of September 1945, the volumes edited by Takemae list 5 rape cases, 11

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103 See Takemae Eiji, ed. *GHQ e no Nihon Seifu Taiō Bunsetsu*, (Tokyo: Eivisu Shisutemuzu, 1996), esp Vol 1, 5 and NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408 Folder 14 (1-2) for correspondence from the CLO to GHQ concerning misbehavior by Allied Troops.


attempted rapes, 3 women abducted (including two who escaped unharmed), and one attempted abduction.\textsuperscript{106}

Finally, the CLO correspondence with GHQ gives the most definitive figures for GI crimes in the early Occupation in its no. 342, a missive from the Japanese government to GHQ dated October 23, 1945 that covers the total number of crimes committed by Allied servicemen up to the end of September, 1945. It records that there were 14 reported rapes and 30 attempts.\textsuperscript{107}

In short, there was a significant amount of documentation generated about GI behavior during the early Occupation. An abundance of those documents survive and are accessible. They include press reports, recollections of witnesses, police histories and a great deal of police documentation specifically focusing on the issue of rape. These documents make clear that there was a significant amount of petty theft, armed robbery, souvenir hunting, car-jacking and joy-riding. This crime spree was aggravated by GHQ’s decision to reverse its currency policy. Nevertheless, during this time, there was, relatively speaking, very little rape. Numerous writers assert that there were more than 3500 cases of rape between the first large-scale landings on August 30 and the end of September, however the best available records for this time show that the actual figure was 14 cases, less than one half of one percent of the total. Another widely cited figure is that there were 1,336 reported rapes is Kanagawa Prefecture \textit{alone} during the twelve-day period from August 30 to September 10, 1945. The best available records for Kanagawa Prefecture during the twelve day period in question state that the number of rapes

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 1: Rape cases appear on pages 483, 488, 528, 576 (two cases), attempted rapes are documented on pp. 96, 485, 486, 528, 529 (two cases), 530, 561, 568 (two cases), 576 (3 cases), 577; Abductions are recorded on pp. 137, 568 (two victims); Attempted abductions is on p. 96.

reported to the Japanese police in the area was actually seven, just over one-half of one percent of what is often alleged.\textsuperscript{108} The documentary evidence about GI crime in the early Occupation is copious and the conclusion to be drawn from it is clear. There was no mass rape of Japanese women by American soldiers during this time.

**GI Crime during the Remainder of the Occupation and in Comparative Perspective**

After the initial phases of the Occupation there is far less information on GI crime. GHQ imposed press censorship and so after September 18, 1945 the media no longer provides a window into American criminality. The Japanese government seems to have, to a certain extent, lost interest after the initial period went relatively smoothly and there are fewer records on the Japanese side. In addition, during the Occupation and the years immediately following it, the organs of domestic surveillance were deliberately dissolved by SCAP with the Kempeitai ending its existence in November of 1945 and the Tokkō following soon thereafter. The Home Ministry, parent organization to the Tokkō, was itself was broken up in 1947. Prefectural police departments are not required to keep records older than 1965 and many do not. Those that do maintain records sometimes restrict access to them.\textsuperscript{109}

In addition, the reporting of crime became routinized to the point that, with some exceptions, beginning in early 1946, many reports about misconduct of Allied troops no longer include detailed information on cases and simply note that there is a statistical chart enclosed, but these enclosures are not included in the edited volumes.


\textsuperscript{109}This information comes from conversations with Mr. Kawabata at Osaka Keisatsu Jōhō Kōkaishitsu; Mr. Murakami at Kyoto Keisatsu Jōhō Kōkaishitsu; Mr. Tateyama at Hokkaido Keisatsu Jōhō Kōkaishitsu.
Communications directly between the Japanese Government’s Central Liaison Office (CLO) and GHQ began to concentrate on other matters and the reporting of GI crimes assumed a lower profile with organs of the two governments working together to collect and distribute information on GI crime directly between one another at a fairly low level. As a result, the present writer, has to date has been unable to discover any comprehensive source that covers the whole of the Occupation period.

Nevertheless, there is enough surviving information to present a picture in which one may place a reasonably high degree of confidence. By early 1946 Kanagawa Prefecture and GHQ had set up a system of information exchange that was likely standard for other prefectures as well. In the center of this information exchange was GHQ’s Public Safety Division (PSD).

Many of PSD’s records are included in the SCAP/GHQ records in the National Archives (Records Group 331). However, the records were collected before the army underwent a major reform and standardization of its record keeping practices. As a result the SCAP records are not organized in a regular way. In fact, when the army’s Far East Command sought to compile statistics on rape in the Far Eastern Command in March of 1950, the investigators could find no information prior to 1947. Nevertheless, there are still numerous sources that cover the subject. There are reports on GI crime from the Central Liaison Office of the Japanese government, Japanese police reports, and Eighth Army Provost Marshal reports. These sources, however, are not always consistent and sometimes they obscure as much as they enlighten. The task of forming a coherent picture is complicated by the fact that the Japanese police went through major

110 Sarah Kovner, *Occupying Power*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 54; “Rape: Number of Offences Reported or Complaints Received,” March 8, 1950 RG 554 (Records of General HQ, FEC), Box 115; “Statistics in re Rape” March 11, 1950 in ibid. I am indebted to Professor Kovner for sharing this document with me.
reorganizations in the early postwar period, one during the Occupation and others afterward. After the first of these reorganizations there were two major police organizations that collected data on crimes, the National Rural Police and the Metropolitan Police. Both of these organizations submitted monthly reports to GHQ and these figures were then tabulated and put into another report recording the grand totals for the country at large. It is not always clear from the documents which of these three reports one has. Examples of all three are in the Public Safety Division records and

112 Ibid., pp. 381 – 383.
some are not clearly labeled. Sometimes reports refer to “rapes” as including “attempted rape” and sometimes they do not. Complicating matters is the fact that the Provost Marshal, which had the responsibility of prosecuting criminal GIs, kept its own records of GI crime and it is unclear how much overlap exists between Provost Marshal records and those submitted by the Japanese police. Where information is available from both sources, they often do not agree. This may be partially explained by the fact that Japanese records for crimes by Occupation personnel included crimes committed by the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces as well as those committed by the Eighth Army whereas the Provost Marshal’s records sometimes included these figures (for example in nationwide tallies) but not always (for example in tallying cases brought and cleared). Furthermore, criminals arrested directly by MPs would not necessarily generate a report by Japanese police. Finally, one group of statistics refers to “sex offenses” that had been “investigated” rather than “rapes” that had been “reported.” Put simply, apples to apples comparisons of these data are impossible. This limitation notwithstanding, the information they contain provide enough information that one can derive a reasonably complete and coherent picture of the scale of GI crime through the whole of the Occupation and the overall picture does not differ significantly from that of its opening phase. If one assumes that in the months where multiple figures are available (for example from the Japanese Police and the US Eighth Army’s Provost Marshal) that the higher figure is correct, and counts all figures that include attempted rape as rape when the latter figure is unavailable, and finally that the figures for the ten months for which no data has yet been discovered have approximately the same average number of cases as the seventy-one months for which data is available, then one arrives at a figure of about
(5) Reported Cases of Rape of Japanese Women by American or Occupation Forces

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1945 August
September 14 (Includes August)
October
November
December

1946 January
February 61 (Incl. At)
March 14
April 16
May 27
June 29
July 9
August 9
September 17
October 17
November 17
December 9

1947 January
February 11
March 15
April 9
May 14
June 19
July 26
August 29
September 24
October 16
November 7
December 8

1948 January
February 4
March 7
April 9
May 13
June 22
July 17
August 12
September 14
October 19
November 16
December 13

1949 January
February 7
March 6
April 10
May 8
June 23
July 9
August 7
September 5
October 7
November 3
December 8

1950 January
February 9
March 13
April 15
May 5
June 19
July 11
August 9
September 11
October 16
November 18
December 4

1951 January
February 6
March 9
April 16
May 10
June 2
July 9
August 11
September 10
October 9
November 4
December 1

1952 January
February
March
April

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The Sources for this information are as follows:

1,312 reported cases of rape for the whole of the Occupation. This would work out to about 196 cases a year.

Another source of information about rape during the Occupation comes from a report on the subject in the records of the Far East Command. According to this report, in 1947 there were 144 reported rapes and 77 arrests. In 1948 there were 140 reports with 83 arrests in 1949 there were 171 reports with 146 arrests. 104 went to court martial and 53 were convicted (for the whole of the Far East Command). These numbers are on the same scale of those in the Public Safety Division records, but they are not in accord. For example, the crime statistics reported to the Eighth Army Headquarters during 1947 reported a total of 195 cases of rape, as opposed to the 144 cited in the later review by the Far Eastern Command. Part of the reason for this discrepancy might be related to how accusations of rape were understood by those compiling the Far Eastern Command’s 1950 review. In the report are references to reports of rape for the month of January, 1950. The reports are separated into two categories: “Actual” and “Unfounded.” In January, “Actual” was judged to be the appropriate category in 13 of 16 cases for a rate of about

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Column C: “Table of Misconducts Committed by Allied Servicemen” (Typed) for April - August 1946, December 1946 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 290, Folder 16.
Column D: “Offenses By the Occupation Forces” (Handwritten - English) for Sept. - Dec., 1946; Nov., 1947, Jan. - March; May - Dec., 1948; NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP , Box 290, Folder 16.
Column G: “Table of Misconducts by Allied Servicemen During November, 1946,” NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 502, Folder 7 (1-2) 250 - 1 #1.
Column K: (Sex Offenses Investigated) Graph “Major Crimes Investigated 1949,” in NARA RG 338, Entry A1 209, 8th Army Records Annual Histories 1949, Box 1582, Folder 20.

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114 Kovner, p. 54; “Rape: Number of Offences Reported or Complaints Received,” March 8, 1950 RG 554 (Records of General HQ, FEC), Box 115; “Statistics in re Rape.”
80%. A similar standard applied the cases of 1947 would account for much of the discrepancy.

Whatever the cause of this discrepancy, the statistics are in agreement on the scale of crime, if not the exact number. Whether one chooses to use the figures submitted by the Japanese or those recorded by the Americans, at the time or after the fact, what is undeniable is that there is no reliable documentary evidence that suggests that there was mass sexual violence during the Occupation. If one assumes that the highest possible figures from the documentary base are the correct figures, then the rate of rape during the Occupation as a whole was about the same as what occurs in an average mid-sized American city every year. In other words, sexual violence, like all violence in all times and places, was certainly a problem. However it was not, as has been suggested in many sources, an epidemic.

The Behavior of American Occupation Troops in Context

Existing documentation makes clear that there was no mass rape of Japanese women by American servicemen during the Occupation. However, that is a different thing from saying that there was no rape at all. Rape did in fact occur. The crime was not epidemic, and its scale was not even close to as epic as is alleged in many sources. The scale, however, was not trivial. As indicated above, given the size of the Occupation and

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115 For example, in 2009, Charlotte, NC had 303 reported cases; Austin, TX had 266; Memphis, TN had 422; Boston, MA had 263; Alburquerque, NM had 345; Omaha, Nebraska had 194; St. Paul MN had 183. Estimating from national figures according to the latest census, Charlotte, the largest of these cities, had about 176,000 males between the ages of 15 and 49. St. Paul, the smallest of them of about 67,000. (www.neighborhoodscout.com, www.census.gov). The peak number of troops in Japan was 354,675 Americans and 40,236 from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. This decreased to a total troop strength of 192,236 by August, 1946 and to 132,828 in June, 1948 where it remained until the outbreak of the Korean War in the final years of the Occupation. The average total number of troops, the vast majority of whom were aged between 17 and 30, was about 164,000. (John J. McGrath, “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 16, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 28.
its duration, the rate of rape was roughly equivalent to that of many contemporary American cities which are not generally thought of as particularly violent. There are, of course, problems comparing the rate of reported rapes in Japan in the 1940s and 1950s with the reported rate in America in the 2000s. For one, the rate in the United States in the 2000s would reasonably be expected to reflect a rise in reporting after a relative lessening of the stigma of rape. Also Japanese women’s reports of interactions with American men would certainly be more influenced by taboos on interracial sex than would the American figures. Such caveats notwithstanding it is nevertheless clear that rape was not a particularly salient problem during the Occupation. This becomes all the more clear when the behavior of American servicemen is compared with that of other occupying armies during the Second World War.

A detailed analysis such as that provided above for the American army in Japan is outside the scope of this study. Time constraints prevent the collection of the same level of documentation. These constraints are exacerbated by the fact that comparable documentation does not exist in most cases for some of the exact reasons that the incidence of rape was relatively low in American-occupied Japan. In that case, policing never broke down. Transgressors were reported and often punished. During the most chaotic period, the Japanese government’s domestic law enforcement and surveillance machinery remained intact and in operation even if often flaunted or challenged. The American military was duly diligent in reporting crimes committed by its own troops. In many other theaters and regions during the Second World War these conditions did not apply and so the picture presented is necessarily less quantified and more anecdotal. However, published sources make possible at least a qualitative comparison.
The most obvious point of comparison is with the soldiers of Imperial Japan. Japanese supporters of the mass rape legend sometimes assert that the Japanese and American militaries were essentially no different in the treatment of women in conquered lands.\textsuperscript{116} Simply put, such assertions cannot withstand scrutiny. While mass rape was not a problem in American-occupied Japan, it was certainly a problem in Japanese-occupied Asia. The problem is especially conspicuous in China because of the relative abundance of sources for China.

Nevertheless much of the information about rape by Japanese soldiers remains anecdotal. The very conditions that allow mass rape to occur make it very difficult to quantify in even approximate terms. Policing of troops is often inadequate, ineffective or simply not attempted. Members of the occupying army often share a hatred for the conquered enemy. In this situation officers and military police turn a blind eye to crime or even participate in it themselves. In addition, post hoc recollections by survivors are often colored by the terrors they witnessed so that rumored atrocities are repeated as fact.

Nevertheless, there is a good deal of reliable contemporary evidence that mass rape was widespread in China. The most copious evidence comes from the most infamous episode of the war, an incident which has been so closely associated with the crime that it has been remembered by the name “the Rape of Nanking.”

No one knows for certain how many women were raped during the Nanjing atrocity and the number remains a subject of controversy. However, it is beyond dispute that Japanese soldiers treated Chinese women as spoils of war. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East found that “Approximately 20,000 cases of rape occurred within

\textsuperscript{116} For an example of such a false equivalence pushed by the right, see the discussion of the Zaitokukai in the introduction. For an example of a left wing academic doing so see Yuki Tanaka, \textit{Hidden Horrors: Japanese War Crimes in World War II}, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1996), p. 103.
the city during the first month of the Occupation.”117 The methodology by which this number was derived remains obscure. However, contemporaneous evidence makes clear that the estimate is probably of approximately the correct scale.

This evidence comes to us from the writings and correspondence of a number of westerners who remained in the city after its fall and tried to protect Chinese civilians. On December 15, 1937, two days after the city fell to Japan, Robert O. Wilson, an American doctor and the only surgeon available to treat the victims of the Japanese military wrote to his family, “I could go on for pages telling of cases of rape and brutality almost beyond belief.”118 Three days later, in another letter he described the fallen city as a “modern Dante’s inferno, written in huge letters with blood and rape. Murder by the wholesale and rape by the thousands of cases. There seems to be no stop the ferocity, lust and atavism of the brutes.”119 On December 17, German businessman and Nazi party member John Rabe recorded in his diary: “One of the Americans put it this way: ‘The Safety Zone has turned into a public house for the Japanese soldiers.’ That’s very close to the truth. Last night up to 1,000 women are said to have been raped, about 100 girls at Ginling Girls College Alone. You hear of nothing but rape. If husbands or brothers intervene, they’re shot.”120

On December, 19, 1937, The Reverend James M. McCallum an American missionary who, like Rabe and Wilson, elected to stay in the city, recorded in his diary:

Never I have heard or read such brutality. Rape! Rape! Rape! We estimate at least 1,000 cases a night, and many by day. In case of resistance or anything that seems like disapproval, there is a bayonet stab or a bullet ... People are

119 Reprinted in Ibid.
Women are being carried off every morning, afternoon and evening.\textsuperscript{121}

Under the leadership of the aforementioned John Rabe, many of the westerners who remained helped to set up a so-called “Safety Zone” for refugees. This was supposed to be a demilitarized zone in which Chinese civilians were to be free from molestation by Japanese troops. Though through the establishment of the Safety Zone, Rabe and his colleagues have been credited with successfully protecting untold numbers of Chinese civilians, those civilians were still a long way from free of molestation. Japanese soldiers routinely violated the integrity of the zone, sometimes murdering people, or taking them away to almost certain death. They also had a propensity for rape.

Rabe and his associates submitted regular reports to the Japanese Consul-General in Nanjing detailing misconduct by Japanese troops. They reported a total of 444 cases within the zone. 395 of these reports have been located. These reports make very clear that rape widespread and frequent.

Of the surviving 395 complaints against Japanese troops, 124 of them are about rape.\textsuperscript{122} These included girls as young as twelve and women over sixty, including one who was raped more than ten times.\textsuperscript{123} Another twenty-eight concern attempted rape.\textsuperscript{124} Fifty-

\textsuperscript{122} See the various documents entitled “Cases of Disorders of Japanese Soldiers in the Safety Zone” and “Notes on the Present Situation” reprinted in Timothy Brook, ed., \textit{Documents on the Rape of Nanking}, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999). The documents are: Number 8 (pp. 9-11); Number 15 (pp. 28 – 38); Number 17 (pp. 39 – 44); Number 19 (pp. 45 – 48); Number 25 (pp. 54 – 56); Number 30 (pp. 61 – 63); Number 32 (pp. 64 – 66); Number 37 (pp. 77 – 79); Number 45 (pp. 88 – 89); Number 48 (pp. 94 – 95); Number 56 (pp. 116 – 121); Number 57 (pp. 121 – 124); Number 58 (pp. 125 – 134); Number 61 (pp. 137 – 146); and Number 62 (pp. 146 – 151). Hereafter references to these documents will be made by case number and page number only.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., case 222, p. 122; case 301, p. 132; case 302, p. 133; case 303, p. 133; case 436, p. 154; case 428, p. 152, case 307, p. 133 is of the 60 + year old woman who was raped more than ten times.
eight others concern Japanese soldiers demanding young women.\textsuperscript{125} When they were refused or told that the women had been sent away, they sometimes flew into a rage. In one case they shot one man and stabbed four others. In another, a soldier bayoneted a man in “his loin” when he gave a negative answer.\textsuperscript{126} Fourteen more of the reports are about abductions of women whose fates were not known (but hardly difficult to guess) at the time of writing.\textsuperscript{127} There were at least three large-scale organized roundups involving trucks. One was still empty, another had about ten women in it and the third had twenty.\textsuperscript{128} One abduction was carried out by a Japanese MP.\textsuperscript{129} There are also seven cases of attempted abduction.\textsuperscript{130} In addition there are some cases that defy easy categorization. In one case Japanese soldiers forced two Chinese, including an elderly woman, to copulate publicly.\textsuperscript{131} There is one case in which a woman, who had recently given birth was forced to undress.\textsuperscript{132} There is one rape of a 17-18 year-old boy and one case of sexual assault of a 62 year-old woman with a stick.\textsuperscript{133} Altogether some 234 of the 395 surviving reports involve sexual violence or intended sexual violence. This accounting does not count any report twice, though there


\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., case 78, p. 41.

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., case 50, p. 33; case 32, p. 33; case 94, p. 46; case 144, p. 54; case 153, p. 56; case 169, p. 62; case 200, p. 95; case 212, p. 119; case 216, p. 120; case 241, p. 126; case 282, p. 130; case 292, p. 132; case 431, p. 153.

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid. case 172, pp. 62 – 62; case 431, p. 153; case 212, p. 119.

\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., case 212, p. 119; The MP Abduction is case 187, p. 78.


\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., case 382, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., case 409, p. 158.

\textsuperscript{133} Ibid., case 63, p. 36; case 430, p. 153; case 222, p. 123.
are many reports which detail multiple separate incidents and some incidents which could have been included in multiple categories.

Many of the attacks were truly horrific. Some of the rape cases involve a single victim. Others involve multiple women, “many” women, “several” women, “thirty” women “about thirty” women, and “more than thirty women.” The majority of rape cases involve multiple perpetrators. Some of them involve so many perpetrators that the reports resort to quantifying the time that a woman was continuously violated rather than the number of men who raped her. In four cases women were enslaved so that their ordeals persisted for days or even weeks. One survivor reported that the older women from her group were raped about seven to ten times a day, while estimating that the young pretty girls went through the ordeal as many as forty times a day. After days of enduring this ordeal one of the women was taken to a deserted schoolhouse, stabbed with bayonets ten times and left for dead. She gave the account to Robert Wilson while he was treating her wounds. Another who had been abducted by a different group of soldiers was released because after less than a week of service, she had contracted gonorrhea, syphilis and chancroid, and her diseased state had become obvious to all. She may have been among the lucky ones in that she was simply discarded once she had exhausted her utility. Other women were murdered outright. One woman over the age of 60 was raped and then murdered by means of a bayonet thrust into her vagina. Some women were

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134 Ibid., see respectively, case 5, p. 10; case 44, p. 32; case 45, p. 32; case 55, p. 33; case 63, p. 36; case 18, p. 28; case 64, p. 36;
135 Ibid, case 45, p. 32; case 89, p. 43; case 354, p. 145;
136 Ibid., case 178, p. 65.
137 Ibid., case 211, p. 119.
138 Ibid., case 219, p. 121.
139 Ibid., case 303, p. 133.
abducted and did not return.\textsuperscript{140} Two were killed without the use of weapons; they were simply raped to death.\textsuperscript{141} Another was raped so violently that her fate hung in the balance at the time her case was recorded.\textsuperscript{142} Two more, including a twelve year-old girl were raped to the point of disability.\textsuperscript{143} Women were raped before their husbands or, in one case, her mother.\textsuperscript{144} One seventeen year-old who was nine months pregnant was raped, inducing labor. The child was born healthy, but the mother was, understandably “hysterical.”\textsuperscript{145} One woman was forced to “throw away her baby” by three soldiers who raped her.\textsuperscript{146}

The situation was so bad that, for those witnessing it (let alone those experiencing it), rape became something of a new normal. This was reflected in the language they used to describe the crime. One man complained that his daughter was “raped badly.”\textsuperscript{147} In another case, Dr. Wilson, after his initial treatment of a 14 year-old whose ordeal was so grievous that she was going to require extensive surgery, noted in his report that her “body was not yet built for raping.”\textsuperscript{148} Of course no woman should be considered “built for raping” and there is no such thing as being slightly raped, but in the surreal hellscape of the “modern Dante’s inferno” into which they were thrust, such formulations made a perverted kind of sense. In short, the “Rape of Nanking” was indeed about rape. Worse still, what evidence there is suggests that it was exceptional primarily only in that it was recorded in as much detail as it was.

\textsuperscript{140} Ibid., case 89, p. 63.
\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., case 63, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., case 69, p. 38.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid., case 354, p. 145; case 428, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., case 210, p. 119; case 249, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., case 98, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid., case 415, p. 158.
\textsuperscript{147} Ibid., case 63, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., case 179, p. 66.
Documentation on rapes committed by Japanese military personnel in other areas is hard to come by. Moreover, in response to the atrocities at Nanking, Japanese authorities expanded their “comfort woman” system to sate the carnal urges of their soldiers and reduce the incidence of rape.149 Nevertheless, rape remained enough of an issue that the IJA was deeply concerned that its soldiers were undermining the war effort with their free talk about what was happening in China. One directive from an Army Ministry undersecretary issued in February 1939, sought to insure that returning soldiers refrained from loose talk. The directive included examples the sort of thing the Army wanted to avoid. One soldier apparently said, “At XX we took four people captive--parents and daughters. We played with the daughters as if they were whores and killed the parents because they kept on telling us to release the daughters. We had our kicks until the unit was ordered to leave; then we killed the daughters.” “One company commander hinted that rape was OK, saying ‘Make sure no problems arise later on; after you’re finished either pay them off or kill them outright.’ “No one cared about rapes at the front; some guys even shot at MPs who caught them in the act.”150

Despite the claims of some to the contrary, the behavior of American troops in Japan and Japanese troops in China was radically different. While rape was treated as a serious crime by the US Army in Japan, it was tolerated and perhaps even encouraged by the Imperial Japanese Army in China. While Americans did sometimes rape Japanese women, the differences in scale and cruelty between what they did in Japan and the IJA did in China (and elsewhere) were so great as to make the two essentially incomparable.

Indeed, shortly after the Occupation began, Hosokawa Morisada, secretary and son-in-law of Prince Konoye (as well as father of later prime minister Hosokawa Morihiro), made exactly this point, writing that the sexual violence committed by American troops was like a the weight of a single hair compared to that of nine head of cattle when considered in light of Japanese actions in China.  

The case of the Soviet Red Army during World War II provides another marked contrast to the behavior of Americans in occupied Japan. For reasons similar to those enumerated above in the Japanese case, the Soviet case also makes a reliable estimate very difficult. However, as in the Japanese case, what is known makes very clear that mass rape was a massive problem.

During the war, the Red Army’s rampage through Eastern Europe became so notorious for rape that Communist partisans complained that the practice was undermining their position among their countrymen. In the aftermath of the conflict there was a wave of abortions throughout Europe, justified in part as a pragmatic response to the widespread rape during the war. According to the anonymous author of the diary published as *A Woman in Berlin*, after the Soviets captured the German capital rape became so commonplace that women unknown to each other spontaneously shared their ordeals with one another while waiting in line for water. Later she wrote, “Slowly but surely we’re starting to view all the raping with a sense of humor – gallows humor.”

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155 Ibid., p. 121.
Eventually, the “standard question” one woman asked another upon meeting was “How often did they . . . ”

One Russian captain in the Second World War revealed something of the prevalent mentality when he declared: “I have fucked old women and young but what I liked most was fucking small girls in front of their mothers, when the girls were crying, ‘Mutti! Mutti!’ . . . I had gonorrhea but I did not bother about it. But now I have syphilis. I have had enough of fucking.”

Alexander Solzhenitsyn who served as an officer in the Soviet army recalled the atrocities committed by soldiers in his army in the poem Prussian Nights:

A moaning by the walls half muffled:  
The mother’s wounded, still alive.  
The little daughter’s on the mattress,  
Dead. How many have been on it  
A platoon, a company perhaps?  
A girl’s been turned into a woman.  
A woman turned into a corpse.

There can be little question that neither the actions of the Soviet Army in Germany nor those of the Imperial Japanese Army in China can be usefully equated with the actions of the American army in Japan.

Perhaps a more useful comparison is that of the U.S. Army in Germany. In American-occupied Germany, like Japan, mass rape like that described above did not take place. As a result, normal policing of troops was never abandoned. Record keeping was continued. Though a thorough analysis of sexual violence in occupied Germany is beyond the scope of this paper, a brief quantitative comparison is nevertheless possible. Although even here, the comparison is complicated. Unlike the situation in the home

156 Ibid., p. 121.
islands of Japan, in Germany the American troops occupied areas only after they had been militarily conquered. Thus the passions of combat undoubtedly played a role in criminality. As the conflict neared its end, reports of rape by American soldiers increased dramatically, falling off almost equally dramatically as resistance ended and the operation became one of pure occupation as opposed to one of conquest and occupation. In general, the reported incidence of rape was fairly low in comparison to other forces. It was not, however, negligible. There were 18 reported cases in January, 31 in February, 402 in March, and 501 in April. The Germans surrendered unconditionally on May 8, 1945 and the rape rate began to fall. In May there were 241 reported cases, 63 in June and 45 in July, a rate at which the rate approximately stabilized for the rest of the year.159 Although the surrender did not occur until May 8, the American troops did relatively fighting in the first days of May and that month may thus be considered the first month of nearly pure occupation duty in which combat was not a factor. Assuming that half of the approximately three million U.S. personnel in Europe were in Germany at this time, then the rate of rape was significantly higher than it was in Japan. However, considering the rapid fall off in June, it was approximately comparable to the rate of rape in the first month of occupation in Japan.

The last example for comparison comes from the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan. This force, coming to Japan in fall, 1946 was, judging by information currently in the author’s possession, the best behaved of all forces in the Second World War. That information is rather limited, but for the four opening months of the BCOF occupation (September – December, 1946) there were only 13 reported rapes.

in the prefectures they occupied.\textsuperscript{160} Though the BCOF was only about one quarter the size of the American contingent, adjusting for troop strength and extending the four month period over an entire year, this works out to about 156 cases for the BCOF for a comparably sized force over the course of a year. This compares favorably with the 196 average annual cases for the same sized force for Occupation troops as a whole. That allowed, the sample size is too small to make any definitive conclusions.

In summary, American troops in Japan did commit rape. Sexual violence against Japanese women was a problem throughout the Occupation as it is a problem everywhere. Tales of widespread sexual violence at various points during the Occupation – during its first weeks and months, after brothels were placed off-limits to American troops, at the outbreak of the Korean War – find no substantiation in surviving records. Nor is there any reliable evidence for widespread sexual violence during the Occupation as a whole. On the contrary, Americans occupying Japan committed much less sexual violence than was the case with some other armies during the Second World War. The only other large force that present research suggests was as well or even better behaved was the British Commonwealth Occupation Force which also occupied Japan. Tales of widespread sexual violence by either force can reasonably judged to be unfounded.

\textsuperscript{160} NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 290, Folder 16.
Chapter 2: “This Degrading Slavery”: GHQ and Prostitution

The perpetration of mass rape comprises only half, if the most significant half, of the legends about the mistreatment and sexual exploitation of Japanese women that have emerged since the end of the Occupation. Another set of legends, mostly intertwined with those of widespread sexual violence, has grown up around a supposed moral turpitude on behalf of the U.S. military when it came to the issue of prostitution. It is easy to understand why. American servicemen patronized Japanese prostitutes throughout the Occupation. In the lean postwar years, Americans had far more disposable income than the average Japanese man and thus could afford to (and often did) pay more for services than Japanese men.\footnote{Sarah Kovner, *Occupying Power*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 124, 156.} In addition, American policies toward prostitution had the unintended effect of pushing prostitutes from brothels in restricted districts to the streets of large cities. For many Japanese the image of prostitutes soliciting Americans around the bases came to symbolize Japan’s postwar plight and the association of bases and streetwalkers was very strong.

to the issue of prostitution was influenced by a number of factors. It was considered within the contexts of policy toward women more generally, the control of venereal disease, the degree of autonomy that should be afforded to the democratically elected Japanese government during the Occupation, the maintenance of public order, and the prestige and popularity of GHQ. Often these considerations came into conflict as one or another of them gained precedence in the minds of Occupation officials. Policy proposals varied accordingly. The result was that American policy on the issue of prostitution often appeared and indeed often was inconsistent. The largest apparent inconsistency stemmed from a distinction between varieties of prostitution which was of cardinal importance to policy makers in GHQ but which seemed to many interested Japanese as at best intellectually abstruse and at worst both wrong-headed and pernicious. This distinction was between the system of licensed prostitution as it had been practiced in Imperial Japan and prostitution as a general social phenomenon. The first GHQ banned outright shortly after learning about how it functioned. The second the Americans decided to tolerate so long as the Japanese elected to keep it legal. The apparent contradiction in these decisions has led many to accuse GHQ of hypocrisy, cynical self-interest and sexual opportunism.

The actual story is somewhat more nuanced and can be best understood in terms of the struggle that was at the heart of the American project to remake Japan. In large part GHQ, and especially those decision makers at or close to the top of its hierarchy, saw their mission in Japan in not just military, but quasi-religious terms as well. MacArthur saw it as his job to create a new Japan in the image of America. He once declared, “my major advisors now have boiled down to almost two men - George Washington and

163 This distinction appears also to have been too nice for GHQ’s own clerks. Files related to the debate of prohibition of prostitution in the National Archives are included in the folder marked “Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.” (NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”)
Abraham Lincoln.”164 Even allowing for MacArthur’s penchant for melodramatic
overstatement this was an extraordinary assertion of cultural arrogance. While
MacArthur’s subordinates often leavened the project with a healthy dose of European-
style social democracy, there can be little doubt that the essential thrust of many
Occupation reforms was often to make Japan more like America. GHQ wanted the new
state to function more as a guarantor of individual liberty than as a defender of social
order. Most of the Japanese elite, and many workaday Japanese besides, desired just the
opposite. It is in terms of this fundamental difference that GHQ’s involvement in the
issue of prostitution must be understood.

The Abolition of Licensed Prostitution in Japan

Organized and regulated prostitution had a long history in Japan. It had been
codified into something like its 1945 form shortly after the foundation of the Tokugawa
Shogunate in 1600. In contrast to the situation in the West, there was comparatively less
stigma surrounding prostitution. It was openly celebrated in art and literature. Many
Japanese felt prostitution, as it had been traditionally practiced, was a Japanese custom
that deserved preservation. When Occupation officials sounded out Japanese on their
attitudes toward prostitution, they found them to be largely neutral or favorably disposed
toward it. One American, summing up the attitudes of those he had queried on the subject
wrote:

While the Japanese practice monogamy in that they marry only one wife, there
is no condemnation of a husband who seeks sexual entertainment at a geisha

house, or at a house of prostitution. The practice is widespread and enjoyed in openly without suffering loss of social standing.\textsuperscript{165}

Moreover, it was not just the customers, but the sex workers who suffered no real loss of social standing. While there was some social stigma attached to prostitution and it was largely seen as a profession for women of lower classes -- with many if not most of the women involved hailing from impoverished rural backgrounds -- a woman’s former involvement in prostitution did not generally prevent her from finding a marriage partner. According to a survey of 304 prostitutes who had desired to leave the profession and who had succeeded in doing so between 1931 and 1933, nearly half married into or above their own class. Similarly, American ethnographers studying the village of Sue in Kyūshū in the early 1930s found that women who had left to work as prostitutes were able to reintegrate into the village after their work.\textsuperscript{166}

One of the reasons prostitutes were able to rejoin their communities was that most of them hailed from lower classes where traditionally fertility had been valued over chastity and it was expected that a woman would be sexually experienced before settling down with a mate. Another lay in the fundamental values of Japanese society. Self-sacrifice and filial piety were regarded as being among the highest virtues. There was an idealized vision of prostitutes that portrayed them as embodying both. They served a useful function in society, providing an outlet for the passions of men, passions which otherwise might find expression in violent outbursts and the violation of “respectable women.”\textsuperscript{167} Moreover, it was generally believed that the women involved were not there

\textsuperscript{165} Joseph V. Zaccone, Legal Consultant, “MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD; SUBJECT: Proposed Directive to Prohibit Prostitution,” July 2, 1947 in RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”


because of their own deviant passions, but rather because they were dutifully assisting
their families through their work. In 1896 Itō Hirobumi, Japan’s first prime minister,
explained the situation to an English reporter, noting that the prostitutes in licensed
brothels often worked “from a lofty desire to help her poor parents or relations; and when
she forsakes the life, by good conduct she is readmitted to society.” An official in prewar
Japan asserted that one of the great strengths of the licensing system was that the Home
Ministry’s registration procedures effectively screened out any women who personally
desired to be a prostitute. 168

The esteem in which they were held by male Japanese officials must, however,
have been cold comfort to the women and girls ensnared in the system. Their lots in life
were “dangerously insecure” and they died at a rate of about 13 per 1000 per annum in
the period from 1921 – 1923. They were also far more likely than women in the general
population to take their own lives. Many did this with a lover, presumably despairing of
ever finding happiness. 169 Their lot, no doubt, had vastly improved since the Edo Period
(1600 -1868). Between 1743 and 1801 more than 20,000 women working in the
Yoshiwara prostitution district died apparently without family and lacking funds for a
proper burial. Their bodies were simply dumped at Jōkanji, a local temple. 170 Well into
the modern era, they were displayed for customers behind an iron grating in an order
reflecting their status within the brothel. This practice was abandoned in the larger cities
in 1916. 171

168 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, p. 102.
169 Ibid., pp. 96 – 97.
170 Cecilia S. Seigle, Yoshiwara: The Glittering World of the Japanese Courtesan, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1993), p. 212; Telephone conversation, Tomatsu Hideaki, head of Jokanji temple, April 18, 2013. According to
Tomatsu, the total was actually more than 25,000. This number includes all abandoned bodies of the district, not just
prostitutes. Seigle states that there were 21,056 prostitutes without families registered between 1743 and 1801.
171 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, p. 97.
Despite these improvements to their conditions, as long as licensed prostitutes were in debt, they were essentially captives of the brothel owners with no option but to continue working in the sex industry. Historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki, who has done extensive work on the notorious “comfort woman” system of military prostitutes and sex slaves set up in territories Japan occupied during the Second World War, declared “[t]he licensed prostitution system was in reality a system of sexual slavery that amounted to traffic in people, the sale of sex and restraints on freedom.” In fact, Yoshimi and other

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173 Garon, p. 102; “Elimination of Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” (Memorandum for the Record filed by Public Health and Welfare Section), January 6, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9790 Folder 4 “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”
scholars, including his frequent foil Hata Ikuhiko, have characterized the comfort woman system as a “natural” logical extension of the domestic licensed prostitution system.175

When the Americans arrived in Japan, they were unaware of these aspects of the licensed prostitution system. Indeed, they were largely ignorant of both the history and the current state of prostitution in Japan. Because of their concerns with venereal disease, officials of the Public Health and Welfare Section (PHW) of GHQ sought to get as much information about both prostitution and venereal disease in Japan as they could. They dispatched health officials from their own section as well as those of the various military units to visit prostitution districts and obtain information.176 They also used Japanese doctors who dealt with public health or with venereal disease more generally and police officials that handled prostitution as their informants.177

They needed all the information they could get. Prostitutes, it seemed, were everywhere. There have been various estimates made of the number of women working as prostitutes in Japan in mid-century. According to the estimate of Dr. Ishibashi, a venereal disease specialist at the Health Ministry’s Bureau of Infectious Disease, before the war there had been 100,000 women employed as registered licensed prostitutes, approximately another 100,000 working as unregistered prostitutes and 80,000 geisha,

175 Ibid., p. 205; Hata Ikuhiko, Ianfu to Senjō no Sei, (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1999), p. 27. Park Yuha, Teikoku no Ianfu, (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Shuppan, 2014), p. 37. While Yoshimi and Hata agree on this point and quite a few other factual issues about the comfort woman system, the conclusions they draw from these areas of agreement are diametrically opposed. While to Yoshimi it is self-evident that this means a further indictment of the licensed prostitution system, to Hata it is evidence that the furor surrounding the comfort woman issue is anachronistic, hypocritical and overblown.


whose work sometimes included prostitution, especially among the lower-end geisha.\textsuperscript{178} Another estimate put the total number of women working as geisha, public and private prostitutes at the end of the war at 150,000, although it was admitted that this estimate was “not accurate” and did not include street prostitutes, of whom there were at that point very few.\textsuperscript{179} The number of women engaged in sex work had rapidly decreased after so many young men were sent away to fight. It then increased markedly near the end of the war. The American air offensive had destroyed many weapons and munitions plants. Moreover, the naval blockade had denied such industry needed raw materials. As a result, a great number of women who had been employed in war industries, suddenly found themselves without jobs and turned out into the streets to fend for themselves. Many turned to prostitution and all of the women involved in this work found themselves competing over a shrinking number of customers as conscription took ever more men out of the civilian population. An increasing number of women become streetwalkers, a social phenomenon that had not been seen in Japan before.\textsuperscript{180} All that can be said with certainty is that a very large number of women were involved in sex work when the Occupation began. As will be explained in more detail below, some of these women had been organized and employed by brothels that were set up with the express purpose of serving Occupation troops.

Confronted with this situation, PHW officials sought some way to keep venereal disease from getting out of hand. Soon their study of Japanese prostitution presented them with a possible means of doing so. “Public prostitutes,” they learned, were

\textsuperscript{178} James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD; SUBJECT: Venereal Disease Control,” October 22, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 8: “Venereal Disease Control.”

\textsuperscript{179} H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Prostitution in Japan; Contracts; Regulations, Public and Private Prostitutes,” December 29, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid.
“permitted to operate only in fixed houses and subject to periodic examination and compulsory treatment.”\textsuperscript{181} This must have seemed an almost ideal way to keep V.D. from spreading. Learning that the system had largely broken down in the war’s final stages, they urged that it be reinstated forthwith.\textsuperscript{182} In the coming months the more they learned about the system the more they soured on it. They found both the medical inspections and the treatment regimens insufficient. (See below). However, what soon became of greater concern was their discovery of the degree of human trafficking the system used. On December 5, 1945, Lt. Col. James H. Gordon, head of the venereal disease division of PHW and Lt. Col. H.H. MacDonald of PHW met with Dr. Yosano Hikaru, Chief of the Preventive Medicine Section of the Tokyo Sanitation Board and Dr. Ishibashi, a venereal disease specialist at the Health Ministry’s Bureau of Infectious Disease. During the meeting, they discussed various aspects of the venereal disease problem. Finally, they got around to discussing “the advisability of abrogating the regulations for control of licensed prostitutes.”\textsuperscript{183} Judging from the notes made on the meeting, the Japanese left little doubt about the nature of the system. The regulations made “it possible for the girl to be enslaved against her will.” Once she had been “established in a house, the girl, at least until very recent times, was virtually a prisoner.” The district was walled off, the women were “under strict police supervision” and the inmates were not allowed to leave the prostitution districts. The women “were usually kept in locked premises and those who

\textsuperscript{181} James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. H. Yosano and Dr. Fukai,” October 3, 1945, in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 8: “Venereal Disease Control.”

\textsuperscript{182} This suggestion was made repeatedly by PHW officials, including its head, Gen. Crawford Sams. See for example James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference on VD Control with Colonel A.G. Tuckerman, Cav., Exec Off of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Brig. 1\textsuperscript{st} Cav. Div. and Exec. to the Provost Marshal General, Tokyo Area,” September 29, 1945 in Ibid.; James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDS,” September 29, 1945 in Ibid.; James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Major Philip Weisbach, M.C. C.O. 1\textsuperscript{st} Med Squadron, 1\textsuperscript{st} Cavalry Division,” September 30, 1945 in Ibid.

\textsuperscript{183} H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. SUBJECT: Conference on Venereal Disease and Related Legislation,” December 6, 1945 in Ibid. The memo notes that this is the third discussion they have had on this matter, although records of the previous two are not included in the file.
escaped were hunted down by specially hired hoodlums, beaten and brought back.” The proprietors of these places were politically influential, did not scruple at the “bribing of police” and would readily use influence or bribery to “prevent the loss of a girl.” It was noted that the situation had improved in recent years as rural poverty had been alleviated by the need for labor in war industries. Moreover, the position of rural farmers had vastly improved after the war. There had already been public condemnation of the system and women’s organizations had been “particularly militant in demands for reform.” The efforts of these organizations had already contributed to the abolition of licensed prostitution in fifteen of Japan’s rural prefectures. The Japanese informants then stated their belief

that in urban districts, the practice of enslaving girls, while much less prevalent than in the past, still exists and that the following corrective measures should be taken:

1. Entire abrogation of the law, to include all of Japan.
2. Invalidation and outlawing of all contracts by which the parents or head of a family may be financially benefitted and all contracts by which a girl may be brought into such existence without her consent.
3. Provision of a penalty much more severe that the present 3 months or 100 yen for anyone who obstructs or hinders the effort of any woman to abandon such existence.

Finally they suggested that a directive along these lines be written and discussed in detail at a later date.\textsuperscript{184} PHW followed this up by meeting with other experts on the subject including private citizens and police.\textsuperscript{185} In a December 11 meeting with Takanori Shakutoku, Chief of the Peace Section of the Metropolitan Police Board and a Mr. Itoga of the same section, MacDonald suggested the steps recommended by Yosano and Ishibashi. The policemen backed abrogation of the licensed prostitution law and the

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: System of Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” December 11, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP Box 9370, Folder 4; “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”; H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. SUBJECT: Elimination of Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” Jan. 7, 1946 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP Box 9370, Folder 4; “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.” A copy of the same document appears in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 408, Folder 3-12 (1-2) 0005-1.
implementation of a harsher penalty for forcing women into prostitution. However, anticipating what would later be a source of friction between GHQ and Japanese police, they balked somewhat at the nullification and outlawing of indenture contracts, claiming worries that it would “cause probably some hardship” among poor families who had no other recourse for making money.186 The reservations of the police notwithstanding, PHW drew up a draft directive outlawing licensed prostitution, nullifying contracts and imposing prison sentences of two to ten years and/or fines of ¥2,000 - ¥10,000 for any individual found guilty of causing any woman to engage in the practice of prostitution against her will, or of hindering, delaying or obstructing the effort of any woman to abandon the practice.187

On January 7, 1946 MacDonald prepared a memorandum for the record and submitted it along with a proposed order to be made to the Japanese government. While the memo does offer a rather dubious assertion about the measure’s usefulness in battling venereal disease, the bulk of it is concerned with human rights.188 Brigadier General Kermit (Ken) R. Dyke, chief of the Civil Information and Education Section (CIE), praised the proposed action as “commendable,” and averred: “Such action should receive wide and enthusiastic support not only in Japan but throughout the civilized world.” Nevertheless Dyke, normally a fairly activist liberal who had had a hand in abolishing State Shintō, breaking up the Tokkō (Special Higher Police), getting the Emperor to renounce his divinity and in purging ultra-nationalists from positions in schools and the media, expressed reservations as to GHQ’s authority to take the proposed action,

specifically questioning the proposal’s foundation in the Potsdam Declaration. Reflecting Dyke’s objections, specific reference to the Potsdam Declaration and the specific penal provisions were removed.

On January 21, 1946 GHQ issued the amended directive as SCAPIN 642. It directed the Japanese government to order the abolition of licensed prostitution, declaring that its maintenance was “in contravention of the ideals of democracy and inconsistent with the development of individual freedom throughout the nation.” It then ordered the abrogation of all “laws ordinances and other enactments which directly or indirectly authorize or permit the existence of licensed prostitution in Japan.” The directive also ordered the government to “nullify all contracts and agreements” which effectively bound women to prostitution.

A good deal of recent analysis of this decision has sought to explain it, or rather to explain it away, as something motivated by ulterior motives -- either the control of venereal disease or as a public relations move by GHQ. Neither of these suggestions can adequately account for GHQ’s actions. Where the control of venereal disease was concerned, PHW’s early actions made clear that they thought a reinstatement of the system in its prewar form would have been the most effective strategy. The abolition of licensed prostitution made control of venereal disease more difficult, not easier. As for using the measure as a means to improve the image of the Occupation, it would have to be adjudged a total failure. It neither kept stories about prostitution out of the American

190 H.W. Allen for the Supreme Commander, “(AG 726.7 (21 Jan 46)PH; (SCAPIN – 642; MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT. THROUGH: CENTRAL LIAISON OFFICE, TOKYO, SUBJECT: Abolition of Licensed Prostitution in Japan,” January 21, 1946 in in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9730 Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”
191 See John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, p. 130, Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, p. 161; Fujime, Sei no Rekishigaku, pp. 327, 384.
(7) Japanese prostitutes in Yoshiwara celebrate their emancipation as a result of SCAPIN 642, which abolished licensed prostitution and involuntary prostitution.¹⁹²

press nor did it curry favor with the Japanese population generally. As will be seen below it had quite the opposite effect.

So why then, did GHQ decide to abolish licensed prostitution? In this case, the simplest explanation turns out to be the best. Licensed prostitution was abolished for the very reasons that GHQ claimed: It was anti-democratic and was baneful to the development of individual freedom. Where sex slavery was concerned, GHQ’s objection was to the slavery, not the sex. This much was made clear through GHQ’s internal memoranda, personal journal entries and the interactions of American officials and Japanese interested in the prostitution problem.

In August 1946, GHQ drafted a memorandum to local military commanders explaining the meaning of SCAPIN 642 (misidentified as SCAPIN 643). It leaves no doubt about the Occupation’s intentions. GHQ had no patience for technical niceties about whether a business was or was not technically licensed prostitution. It did not care about prostitution per se so long as the decision to undertake the profession was not made under duress. Financial obligation of any kind, whether incurred at the beginning of a contract or undertaken to proprietors since that point was considered duress and all such contracts were declared null and void. The cardinal issues were the volition and autonomy of the women involved. The directive reads, in part:

2. The primary consideration of the directive above is to forbid and to prevent the enslavement of women in prostitution. It applies not only to women who are recognized prostitutes but equally well to other women such as waitresses, geisha, or dance hall hostesses who may be forced to prostitute themselves against their will. . . .

3. . . . The engaging of individuals, of their own free will and accord, in the practice of prostitution as a source of livelihood is not forbidden by this directive.

4. No individual will be made, against her will and consent freely given, to engage in prostitution. Consent, once given, may be withdrawn at any time, for any reason, and no penalty of any sort shall attach to the individual for withdrawal of consent.

5. All contracts, agreements, and debts incurred as a result thereof, binding any woman in prostitution, that are now in existence are null and void. All contracts, agreements and debts which hereinafter may be entered into, shall be null and void.

6. All obligations to pay money, or to render services shall be considered to have extinguished and fully satisfied. Under this provision the debt shall be considered to have been fully paid, whether the debt in question is the original debt, or any debt incurred since the original debt, for such things as clothes, food or housing. The primary consideration is that no woman shall be bound in prostitution to repay any debt, regardless of the source of the debt.193

According to the recollection of Alfred C. Oppler of SCAP’s Government Section (GS), the subject of prostitution and its possible prohibition came up on August 20, 1946 in a meeting between Oppler, GS Deputy Chief Col. Charles Kades and Commander

Alfred Hussey, Oppler argued against the move as he thought it would “impose puritan morality on this oriental nation.” Nevertheless, he was adamant that the Americans should “act severely against forced prostitution.”194

The emphasis on free will and autonomy remained GHQ’s bedrock position throughout the subsequent debates on prostitution. This dedication to liberal principle was consistent with the Occupation’s overall goals. Most members of the Occupation regarded it as axiomatic that involuntary prostitution was anathema to personal liberty and basic human decency and thus licensed prostitution had to be ended. To people who believed the ideal role of government began (although not necessarily ended) with the guarantee of individual liberty to its citizens, this was obvious. To many Japanese, however, the government’s first duty was to serve as the guardian of social order. To them, GHQ’s decree was wrong-headed mischief that did palpable harm.

This attitude extended even to people one would expect to be relatively liberal in outlook. Government Section member and later Deputy Chief Justin Williams recalled that when he was interviewing a lawyer recommended to him as an expert on discrimination against minorities and women in Japan, the latter man suddenly launched, apparently apropos of nothing, into a defense of Japan’s licensed prostitution system. He then complained that the GIs’ high demand for women was ruining many of the country’s good girls, telling a story of how a girl who had worked in their employ for two years had asked for her release so that she could go work in a night club for much higher pay.195

Nor was this attitude peculiar to the expert. Though the Americans had certainly been right that a good number of the women in the licensed houses were there against their wills, it seems that a good and perhaps greater number were also there of their own volition. Many others, no doubt, had grown accustomed to the life and the work and had no way to support themselves aside from prostitution. As a result, prostitution became far more visible, moving from designated brothels in specific districts to the streets of the city -- wherever there were potential customers. Looking back on the move one Occupation official wrote that the abolition of licensed prostitution “unloosed a horde of ‘street-walkers’ and ‘angels of the night’ on the streets,” something that was new to Japan.196

The streetwalkers, or *panpan* as they came to be known, put commercial sexuality out in the open, a development offensive to most Japanese. A survey conducted in 1949 noted that 77% of respondents in the Kantō area (in and around Tokyo) supported legislation outlawing street-walking but 70% opposed similar legislation aimed at organized houses of prostitution.197 One woman in the study asserted, “Organized prostitutes don’t go out so much, they don’t run loose in the streets. They are not as harmful as the *pan-pan* girls.”198 In the summary of attitudes expressed in the survey, it was noted, “The *pan-pan* girl, with her brazen painted face and manners, her frizzy hair, her garish Western clothes, is unfamiliar, obtrusive, conspicuous, an eyesore, a disorderly

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198 Ibid., p. 3.
element.” This sentiment was echoed in letters to the Supreme Commander. In one the writer, along with denouncing Communists and the war crimes trials, complained about “the streetwalkers, because they are too radical a departure from Japanese customs.” In the minds of most Japanese the major effect of the order abolishing licensed prostitution was to create chaos where there had once been order. They clearly preferred getting the women off the streets and back into the houses. Only about three percent of respondents to the 1949 survey mentioned concerns about the human rights of the women employed in brothels.

Japanese police, in many cases, seemed even less enthusiastic than the general public. Having worked together with proprietors to maintain order in prewar Japan, they had close ties with them. Moreover, they had no intention of letting their control over the situation completely disappear. Having obtained information about the impending order to end licensed prostitution, the authorities worked to circumvent the order or at least mitigate its impact. After SCAPIN 642 was issued police remained reluctant to crack down. What GHQ had considered a categorical imperative, Japanese police tended to regard more as a suggestion. A May 1946 report from the Home Ministry’s Police Affairs Bureau to the Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board discussing the actions to be taken in enforcing the abolition order reports: “efforts will be made to persuade the proprietors of brothels to abandon such contracts.” Or again, “efforts will be made to persuade and guide the proprietors of the business to voluntarily abandon all

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199 Ibid., p. 1.
200 Letter from Nakamura Keiichi to General MacArthur, January 19, 1948 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 555, Folder 19 (1-2) 250-1 #1 1948.
202 Garon, Molding Japanese Minds, p. 197.
such contracts as are likely to be binding the freedom of the service girls against their will.\textsuperscript{204} The translated version of this order appears in GHQ’s files with question marks prominently penciled next to the passages cited above.

Part of this may have been the result of police acting on the basis of a 1902 Supreme Court decision about a prostitute who sought her freedom. In \textit{Ōkuma Kin vs. Watanabe Mase}, the Court had decreed that a prostitute was free to quit her profession whenever she wanted, but that she was responsible to repay any debt that she had incurred, which in real terms bound her to the house where she worked.\textsuperscript{205} It seems that the police, operating under the assumption that the debt remained valid whether the sex worker desired emancipation or not, decided to try using moral suasion on proprietors. Aggravating GHQ’s frustration was the fact that the Japanese government did not submit translations of its directives on the subject as they were required to do by SCAPIN 642. This led to official chastisement along with demands of compliance in SCAPIN 1183, issued on September 6, 1946.\textsuperscript{206}

To remove any doubt about what sorts of directives it expected GHQ issued a clarifying statement on the issue in November, 1946. The statement, made “BY COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER,” was very clear:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{KEIHOKYOKU KOAN HATSU KO No. 28; TO: Superintendent-General of the Metropolitan Police Board, Prefectural Governors.; FROM: Director of the Police Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs.; SUBJECT: Guidance and Control regarding Abolition of the System of Licensed Prostitution,” May 28, 1946 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 1416, Folder 18: “Japanese Taxes on Prostitution.” This desire to rely on persuasion and voluntary compliance was foreshadowed by a meeting between H.H. MacDonald and various Japanese officials. The orders they proposed at the time emphasized voluntary nullification of contracts. Though the “Japanese representatives assured that whether voluntarily or not, existing contracts will be cancelled,” it is clear that Japanese side remained reluctant to impose nullification by fiat. See H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Proposed Japanese legislation abolishing licensed Prostitution,” in in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{204} “AG 726.1 (6 Sep 46) PH; (SCAPIN 1183),” in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 4, SCAPIN 1001 – 1700.
The intention of the notification issued to the prefectural authorities by the Home Ministry is to nullify contracts which bind women to prostitution. The annulment of the contract carries with it the extinguishment of the debt.\(^{207}\)

In spite of the unambiguous nature of this directive and its issuance over MacArthur’s name it was necessary for GHQ to issue another directive on January 13, 1947 making clear that both contracts and debts were null and void.

It can be stated as a rule of law that upon a contract being annulled, all obligations imposed on parties to the contract are likewise annulled. Any attempt, therefore, to separate the debt from the contract, coupled with an assertion that the contract is void but the debt is valid is merely an attempt to circumvent the clear meaning of the directive.\(^{208}\)

At almost the same time GHQ issued a memorandum to the Japanese government ordering the issuance of an Imperial Ordinance “which prohibited involuntary prostitution, the sale of human beings and licensed prostitution.”\(^{209}\) The actual ordinance, Imperial Ordinance #9 of 1947 was a somewhat less sweeping directive that provided penalties of up to three years imprisonment or a fine of up to ¥10,000 for forcing a woman into prostitution or one year and up to ¥5,000 fine for concluding a contract that bound her to the same.\(^{210}\)

Despite these attempts to enforce the ban on indentured sexual servitude and to make very clear that any debts incurred in contracts surrounding prostitution were null and void, in practice women and girls continued to be sold into virtual slavery throughout


\(^{208}\) J.V. Saccone, Legal Consultant, “Memorandum for the Record,” Jan. 13, 1947 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”

\(^{209}\) Untitled Handwritten Memo beginning “SCAPIN” in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 334: PSD “Pistols to Prostitution,” Folder 39: “Prostitute Law.” This note summarizes the state of prostitution law then in effect in Japan as its author understood it. The author has to date been unable to locate the actual memorandum on which these notes were based, but there is no doubt that an Imperial Ordinance on the subject of involuntary prostitution was issued on January 14, 1947.

the Occupation and into the postwar era. The question was not settled definitively in Japan until 1955 when the Supreme Court finally ruled on the issue.²¹¹

Though GHQ would maintain the illegitimacy and illegality of all involuntary prostitution throughout the Occupation, it was not ultimately successful in eradicating the practice. The lack of support of the Japanese populace and authorities for this measure made enforcement difficult and it would significantly dampen any enthusiasm for a prohibition on prostitution more generally.

The Debate Over Prohibition: GHQ Declines to Act

Prostitution in Japan became a major issue for the Americans in part because of the actions taken by the Japanese government. In the eyes of Japanese officialdom, “one of the hallmarks of a relationship based on domination was that the males of the ruling or conquering nation marry females of the ruled or conquered nation.”²¹² Initially, however, it was not so much marriage that Japanese officials feared (though in time that issue would become a major concern as well) but rape. Many Japanese of the time regarded rape as a natural part of war and the women of conquered territories as rightful spoils. One of their top priorities was to see that Japanese women were not despoiled by the American conquerors and they went to great lengths to prevent as much of the expected rape as they possibly could. Individual women and local governments took a wide variety of measures.²¹³ However, it was the extraordinary action taken by the central government that would reverberate the longest in Japanese historical memory.

²¹³ See Chapter 3 for more.
Officials in the Japanese government, reasoning that if sex were easily available to them, the Americans would be less likely to rape Japanese girls and women, decided to order the establishment of brothels in order to sate the lusts of the conquerors. The origins of this idea are obscure and have, in the intervening years, become the subject of legends, many of which have been repeated uncritically and have found their way in to academic treatments and the mainstream historical understanding. What is known for certain is that on August 18, 1945, just three days after Emperor Hirohito’s “sacred decision” to accept the demands of the Potsdam Declaration and effectively agree to surrender with virtually no conditions, the Home Ministry sent an order to the various prefectural police departments to establish what it euphemistically referred to as “comfort stations,” or brothels for the Allies across Japan.\textsuperscript{214}

American commanders were already dealing with a rise in the rate of venereal disease. After they had pacified the Philippines, there had been a good deal of fraternizing with Filipino women during an extended period of leisure.\textsuperscript{215} Perhaps because of this, they apparently greeted the Japanese plan with less enthusiasm than the latter had anticipated. Assuming that American coolness toward the proposal was really nothing more than pretense, the Japanese police went ahead with their plan with all deliberate speed. Making certain that the situation was understood, the Home Ministry’s Police Affairs Bureau sent a missive to all prefectural police departments stressing the importance of establishing the brothels: “Even though GHQ superficially refuses


recognition for this type of facility, it is nevertheless absolutely necessary for our defense.”

When confronted with the unconventional hospitality of their new hosts, (and the abundance of less official prostitution) the commanders initially decided on a policy of laissez-faire. On September 11, 1945, just days after American troops had moved into Tokyo, Eighth Army commander Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger recorded the decision in his diary:

Gen. Hall called in the afternoon and discussed the venereal disease situation. It was decided that no attempt would be made to control the usage of houses of prostitution but that strong pressure would be exerted on them through the Japanese police to maintain cleanliness and order. Our MP’s will be stationed in the vicinity of the these establishments for the purpose of maintaining control. However the army will not become involved in any sanction or operation of individual establishments.

This decision proved to be short-lived. American public health officials from GHQ’s Public Health and Welfare Section (PHW) soon began studying prostitution in Japan and what they learned alarmed them. Prior to the war Japanese authorities had struggled mightily to keep prostitution under strict state control and regulation. To the extent that prostitution was considered a social evil, it was a necessary evil and one which the authorities were determined to keep both legal and highly regulated under the supervision of police. However, even in times of peace and good order, they had begun to find this increasingly difficult. During the war, and especially in the chaotic times following the onset of the American bombing offensive, controls broke down almost completely. When war industries were destroyed in air raids large numbers of young

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216 JNDL MOJ 38 Reel 13, p. 382955.
217 Robert L. Eichelberger, diary entry September 11, 1945 in Robert L. Eichelberger Papers, Rubenstein Library, Duke University, Box 1, Folder titled “Miscellaneous: Diary Photocopies: Diaries: July 23 – October 20; October 24 – December 4.”
women, many without families, were rendered jobless and resorted to prostitution to make a living.¹¹⁹ Naturally, this situation was only exacerbated after the surrender and the sudden appearance of hundreds of thousands of single men with money.

Officers of the Public Health and Welfare Section, after learning something of the history of prostitution in Japan, but still unaware of its more sordid details, at first recommended the reestablishment of the licensed system in order to bring some order to the situation.²²⁰ The Americans soon soured on this system and decreed its end shortly after they learned that many of the women and girls who worked as licensed prostitutes were essentially in a state of indentured servitude. However, even before that they had discovered that the perceived advantages of such a system were largely illusory. They found both the inspection protocols and the methods of treatment to be completely inadequate.²²¹ They also determined that a staggering percentage of the prostitutes had venereal infections.

An inspection of 1210 prostitutes in Tokyo on Oct. 4, 1945 found that 373 of them, or more than 30% were infected with some form of venereal disease, mostly gonorrhea. Of these only 15 cases were syphilis, detected by inspection only. In Yokohama, the more accurate Kahn serological test for syphilis was done on 200 of 988 known prostitutes. Of these some 51% tested positive, suggesting that true extent of the

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²¹⁹ Crawford F. Sams, Untitled Memorandum, December 26, 1946 in RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”


²²¹ See for example, James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. H. Yosano and Dr. Fukai,” October 3, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 8 Venereal Disease Control; James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. Yosano, Tokyo Health Department, on Venereal Disease,” October 26, 1945 in Ibid.; James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Visit to Omori, Hakusen, and Mukojima Geisha District,” October 30, 1945 in Ibid.
problem was quite severe. PHW Chief Colonel Crawford Sams reported to MacArthur’s Chief of Staff that sample surveys indicated that between 50% and 80% of prostitutes were infected with venereal diseases. These statistics seemed consistent with what officials were hearing from Japanese experts on the subject. In a conference on the issue on October 3, 1945 Dr. Fukai, superintendent of the Yoshiwara Hospital, which specialized in venereal disease, estimated that about 50% of the prostitutes in his area had a history of syphilis and that 40% of the women coming into red-light districts from the provinces had syphilis. Moreover, there had “been no routine examination for gonorrhea or syphilis in recent months.” Summing up the conference, Lt. Col. James H. Gordon, PHW’s top man on the venereal disease problem, wrote:

the present organization and functioning of the program of venereal disease control is wholly inadequate to prevent the spread of venereal disease in the civilian population. The most pressing needs are for modern drugs and competent personnel of all types.

One problem was the endemic complacency amongst Japanese officialdom. Occupation officials found that there was a widespread belief that venereal diseases were “maladies entirely confined to prostitutes.” Indifference toward the problem went right to the top. On October 16 officials of the Health Ministry including Minister Ashida Hitoshi, met with Lt. Col. H.H. MacDonald of PHW to discuss the issue. Ashida, a normally punctilious diarist, did not even bother to record the event in his journal.

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224 James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. H. Yosano and Dr. Fukai,” October 3, 1945 in Ibid.
225 Crawford F. Sams, Untitled Memorandum, December 26, 1946 in RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”
American anxiety about the situation continued to grow and by mid-October, the initial policy of laissez-faire had been reversed and commanders began placing brothels off-limits to GIs.227 The Japanese reaction to this was intriguing to say the least. Though enough time had passed since the landings of the Americans to see that their fears of mass rape had been groundless, and despite the fact that there was no major spike in crimes after brothels had been placed off-limits, Japanese authorities were very anxious to get the off limits orders rescinded. Possibly they still feared mass rape. Possibly they sought to ingratiate themselves to the conquerors and procure a favorable peace. More likely, as historian Yukiko Koshiro has suggested, the whole policy of establishing brothels had from the outset been an “anti-fraternization project” with the aim preserving the purity of the Japanese bloodline by preventing and controlling intercourse in both its social and sexual varieties. In other words, it was about stopping fraternization “whether in the form of dating, marriage, or childbearing.”228

Whatever the case, it is clear that getting the Americans into brothels was a priority for a number of Japanese officials who seemed to believe they were performing a vital service to their nation and their communities. In Shinhotta, a town in Niigata prefecture officials collected about 2 yen from every household to raise a total of about ¥20,000 for the purpose of establishing a brothel for Americans troops. When the American commander discovered this plan, he ordered the town to return the money. Mayor Hara made a somewhat shamefaced explanation that the brothel had only intended to express the town’s welcome and show gratitude for the peaceful manner of the

American advance into the area. (Presumably the brothel was meant to keep things peaceful).\textsuperscript{229} In his memoir Ikeda Hirohiko, Chief of Police in the city of Tsuchiura in Ibaraki prefecture, recalled his struggles to establish a brothel for the GIs. Like many police officers around the country, he traveled to Yokohama to see bordellos the Kanagawa police had already established for the Americans.\textsuperscript{230} On his return he set out to recruit women for Tsuchiura’s offering to the conquerors. Utilizing an old police dormitory and surplus bedding from the Imperial Navy, he had established a facility in time to welcome the Americans when they arrived on September 20. In early October the Americans insisted on blood tests (presumably testing for syphilis only) for all the women working at the new establishment. Afterward they placed the facility off limits when 16 of the 26 women tested positive. Ikeda wrote that his “biggest worry” was that the Americans who had up to that point patiently “lined up and waited their turns,” would present a danger to the area’s women now that their place of outlet had suddenly been closed to them. Determined to prevent that he headed off to other areas of the country and, after he had collected an additional ten healthy women, reopened at the end of the month. He established another brothel for black GIs and a third for officers, which he says he did at the request of the Americans themselves. Despite his best efforts all three were declared off limits in December and were not subsequently reopened.\textsuperscript{231}

On October 17, Gordon and MacDonald held a conference with Takanori Shakutoku, Chief of the Peace Section of the Metropolitan Police Board.\textsuperscript{232} Ōtake Bungo,


\textsuperscript{230} \textit{Kanagawa Ken Keisatsushi}, Vol. 3, p. 352.

\textsuperscript{231} Hirai Kazuko, \textit{Nihon Senryô to Jendaa}, pp. 45 – 46.

\textsuperscript{232} The memorandum of this meeting (H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference on V.D. Control,” October 20, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 8: “Venereal Disease Control.”) gives the name of the police officer as “Hyakutoku,” however his name is given in Duus Masayo,
his sub-chief, and Dr. Yosano Hikaru. Both Ōtake and Yosano would later somewhat implausibly insist that their involvement in the establishment and regulation of a prostitution system for the Occupation was done at American request or demand.233 Their behavior at this particular conference, however, suggests that they played their roles more proactively than they would later recall. At the conference all of the Japanese attendees “were somewhat concerned over the ‘off limits’ orders affecting these areas and asked when they would be rescinded.” Told that that would depend on the “thoroughness and efficiency” of their V.D. control regime, they suggested that “three best and cleanest districts” in Tokyo be opened on a provisional basis if the police made special efforts to identify and immediately remove all infected workers.234

Shortly thereafter, Japanese authorities reported a significant drop in the rate of infection among Tokyo prostitutes. Occupation medical authorities suspected that their

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233 Ōtake asserted that the U.S. military approached the Japanese government unofficially through American reporters on the 23rd or 24th of August. (Ōtake Bungo, “Nikutai no Bōhatei,” *Diyamondo*, May, 1952, p. 65). At that time the only Americans in Japan were prisoners of war. Reporters would not be allowed in until August 30th. (See Chapter 5). In a 1955 panel discussion Yosano claimed that he was summoned to GHQ on September 14th or 15th. There he met with unnamed American officials who knew the location of all the red-light districts in Tokyo, which were indicated on a map of the city. They wanted to consult with him to establish separate facilities for officers, for white enlisted men and black enlisted men. (“Shūsen Chokugo no Kushin,” *Asahi Shimbun* (morning Tokyo edition), August 15, 1955, p. 4.) American records suggest that at this time the U.S. was still largely ignorant of prostitution in Japan and its officials were seeking all the information they could get, including information from Yosano. Yosano had ample reason to distance himself from his involvement. He had already been roundly criticized on the floor of the Diet on two separate occasions. On the first he was the subject of the ire of Diet members Yamaguchi Takehide a former communist and a member of the Farmer Labor Party and Shiikuma Saburō of the Democratic Party on February 29, 1952. The transcript of the proceedings are available online at: [http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0666/01302290666011a.html](http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0666/01302290666011a.html). Accessed April 12, 2016. On March 4, 1952 he was targeted for criticism by Naito Takashi of the Democratic Liberal Party. See transcript at [http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0666/01303040666013a.html](http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/013/0666/01303040666013a.html). Accessed April 12, 2016. He had also been severely criticized by noted feminist Ichikawa Fusae for his ties to prostitution. Fusae’s criticism was based on Yosano’s testimony of a Tokyo brothel that had been implicated in human trafficking. (Ichikawa Fusae, “‘Dokuritsu’ Nippon no Fujin Mondai (Women’s Issues in ‘Independent’ Japan),” *Tōyō Keizai Shimpō Bessatsu*, May, 1952), p. 53. Many years later Yosano wrote that he was, for a time, deeply worried that if there was a change in the political situation he might find himself hauled before a firing squad for his involvement in prostitution. His concern was such that he borrowed a copy of the Hague Convention from a friend to ascertain whether he could characterize his actions as being required by international law. (Yosano Hikaru, “Haisen Hiwa: Senryōgun Ian Bibōroku (The Secret History of [Japan’s] Defeat: A Memorandum on Comfort Facilities for the Occupation Forces),” *Shinchō* 45, May, 1990, p. 135. 234 H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD: SUBJECT: Conference on V.D. Control,” October 20, 1945 in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 8: “Venereal Disease Control.”
counterparts were cooking the books: “The rapid reduction in prevalence of VD is hardly credible in view of the lack of adequate treatment and facilities.”235 Shortly thereafter such suspicions were confirmed. When a Captain Richmond examined women who had previously been examined by the Tokyo Health Department, he got very different results. In Tokyo’s Shinjuku district he found that 23 of 26 women were infected with gonorrhea as opposed to the three women reported by the health department. In the Shinagawa area some 96% of about 60 women tested were positive. Each of the women was treated with penicillin, but this could have done little to mollify the Americans’ anxieties. In the margins Oscar Elkins, a PHW consultant on venereal diseases, scrawled a handwritten note: “This is more like the true state of affairs.”236

Meanwhile, the Americans discovered that their efforts to control the spread of V.D. within their own ranks had been less effective than they would have liked. They had been carrying out V.D. inspections on their troops on a monthly basis.237 In the case of the Far Eastern Air Forces, these were surprise inspections carried out “at least monthly” early in the morning.238 However, a study done on a brothel that catered almost exclusively to American servicemen discovered a “considerable incidence of re-infection.” The Americans speculated that with the large numbers of troops being moved in and out of Japan there might be “slip-up[s]” in the V.D. control regime.239 To many Occupation officials it became increasingly clear that venereal disease could not be

235 James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Dr. Yosano, Tokyo Health Department, on Venereal Disease,” October 26, 1945 in Ibid.
236 James H. Gordon, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Conference with Colonel Shaw, Executive Officer, Office of the Provost Marshal, Tokyo and others regard venereal disease control,” October 28, 1945 in Ibid.
237 “INFORMAL MEMORANDUM; TO: Surgeon Sixth Army, APO 442, Surgeon Eight Army, APO 343,” December 5, 1945 in Ibid.
239 “INFORMAL MEMORANDUM; TO: Surgeon Sixth Army, APO 442, Surgeon Eighth Army, APO 343.”
controlled by education, moral suasion, the wide availability of prophylaxis kits, or the regular inspection of prostitutes and troops for infection. Some commanders seemed driven almost to distraction by the problem.²⁴⁰

In spite of all of the best efforts of the American commanders and their constant hectoring of Japanese officials and medical personnel, it was clear that little progress was being made in their war on venereal disease. In March 1946, GHQ finally took the final step in a process that had been going on for some time. As discussed above, local commanders with the advice of PHW officials began placing brothels off-limits to their soldiers when they were found to have a large number of infected prostitutes. On December 14 or 15 (accounts vary) GHQ informed prefectural police departments that all brothels would henceforth be off-limits to all American personnel.²⁴¹ It is not clear whether this order applied to Tokyo, which was under the Metropolitan Police Department, and was thus not technically a prefectural police department. At any rate, some Tokyo brothels established for American personnel established by the R.A.A continued operation after this order. In March, 1946, the Pentagon dispatched Assistant Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall to urge MacArthur to be more proactive in dealing with the problem. Shortly thereafter the Eighth Army ordered that all brothels and other establishments providing sexual services were to be off limits to GIs nation-wide.²⁴²

According to its official history, this order reached the Recreational and Amusement

²⁴⁰ See for example Walter L. Weible, “SUBJECT: War Department Policy on Venereal Disease; TO: Commander-in-Chief, AFPAC (thru Commanding General Eighth Army),” March 26, 1946 and the follow up correspondence in NARA RG 338 Eighth US Army 1944 – 1956 Adjutant General Section, General Correspondence, 1946, 721.5 to 726.1, Box 312, Folder “726.1 (V.D.) Jan – March, 1946.


Association, a local private organization (and one much smaller than has often been suggested) managing brothels mostly in Tokyo on March 27th. After this GHQ further tightened restrictions by ordering that because all brothels and similar establishments were off-limits to American personnel, any Japanese in such a place serving GIs would be subject to American military justice.

While this may have mollified the brass in Washington and quelled the anxieties of moralists back home, practically speaking it was ineffective if not counterproductive. The off-limits order seems to have been honored more in the breach than the observance. In May 1946 some 36% of 800 courts-martial of GIs were for violation of the off-limits order. Moreover, judging from contemporary cartoons, this represented by a fraction of the whole as the violation of this order and the resulting encounters with MPs became a subject of merriment, lampooned in the pages of the *Pacific Stars and Stripes*. Cartoonist James Schell’s “Occupation Outbursts” shows an MP approaching an establishment while a winsome Japanese woman in a GI’s garrison cap surrounded by large American combat boots left in the entry way insists “There are no soldiers here.” Schell’s colleague, Ed Doughty, poked fun at soldiers’ attempts to circumvent the order and the MPs charged with enforcing it.

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This winking attitude toward the order continued even after the end of the Occupation. In 1952 souvenir shops catering to the Occupation troops in Yokosuka began stocking novelty panties with the words “off-limits” printed on them.246

(8, 9) Cartoons from the Pacific Stars and Stripes: Left: James Schell’s “Occupation Outbursts.” Right: Ed Doughty’s “Tokyo Joe.”247

The widespread flaunting of the off-limits order was not the only problem that American commanders and health officials had to deal with. As had happened with the abolition of licensed prostitution, the off-limits order had the effect of sending thousands of women to the streets, where they openly solicited customers. Though this trend had

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246 Kanzaki Kiyoshi, “Ruporutaaju Yokosuka: Nihon no Reddo Rain (Reportage Yokosuka: Japan’s Red Line),” Fujin Kōron, Nov. 1952, p. 171. As was his wont, Kanzaki had a rather eccentric interpretation of this item’s significance. (Ibid., pp. 171 – 172) See Chapter 5 for more on Kanzaki.

begun in the war’s final stages, it accelerated as the Occupation took an increasingly strict attitude toward organized prostitution. The trend became so marked that in May, 1946 prostitutes operating out of organized houses availed themselves of one of the new freedoms of the postwar era by organizing a union to help them deal with the competition of proliferating streetwalkers.248

The problem was simple: both Japanese prostitutes and American servicemen had high rates of venereal infection and they actively sought one another’s company. As long as they continued to couple the infections would pass back and forth between the two groups. Prostitution was not against the law in Japan and as a result, there were very few legal means to curb the practice. After the passage of an anti-venereal disease law, the Japanese police abused the authority the law gave them to begin wholesale roundups of streetwalkers and other women who happened to be unaccompanied on the streets in certain areas. In doing so they were often assisted by American military police who were supposed to be going along only to insure that no Americans interfered with the Japanese police. However, the Americans often took it upon themselves to assist in these somewhat indiscriminate roundups.249 Despite the fact that officials in PHW admonished them that such actions were a violation of the women’s human rights and had no basis in legality, some MPs, like their Japanese civilian counterparts, took on the task of clearing out streetwalkers on their own authority.250 However, aside from incurring the resentment of a good number of Japanese women and, somewhat after the fact, a large percentage of the civilian population more generally, such roundups had little effect on the prevention of venereal disease.

Those charged with handling the problem grew increasingly exasperated and support for more drastic measures began surface. On November 6, 1946 the Americans drew up a draft SCAPIN (directive from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government) requiring that the Japanese government “enact a law prohibiting prostitution and its allied activities and providing penalties therefor.”\textsuperscript{251} On November 15, 1946 Colonel Crawford F. Sams, Chief of the Public Health and Welfare Section backed this approach, recommending, “In order to further reduce the venereal disease rate among occupation forces in Japan, to an acceptable level, it is considered necessary that legal steps be taken to suppress prostitution as such.” He further recommended that the Japanese Government be directed to enact “a law making the act of prostitution illegal.”\textsuperscript{252} This was not a step that Sams took lightly. He had a very no-nonsense approach to his job, which in his mind began and largely ended with public health concerns. He considered moralizing about sexuality a nuisance if it was not, in his judgment, “medically sound” and did not support imposing American morals on a foreign population. In fact he considered the approach adopted within the United States itself to be “a comparatively ineffective way to control venereal disease in a large population.”\textsuperscript{253} Nevertheless, he had apparently come to the conclusion that suppression of all forms of prostitution was necessary from a medical standpoint. Once the subject had been broached, a number of others voiced their support.

Just five days later, Major General Thomas D. White, Chief of Staff of the Pacific Air Command made a very similar recommendation, albeit more obliquely, in a memo he

\textsuperscript{251} “D R A F T: MEMORANDUM FOR: Imperial Japanese Government; THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo; SUBJECT: Suppression of Prostitution,” November 6, 1946 in RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”

\textsuperscript{252} Crawford F. Sams, “Suppression of Prostitution in Japan,” December 26, 1946 in Ibid.

sent to MacArthur. After asserting that in order to make progress in combating venereal disease in the ranks “the broad basic problem” of venereal disease in the civilian population and especially “the large reservoir of venereal disease infection that exists in and is spread by commercial prostitutes” would have to be addressed. He found it necessary to point “out that prostitution as such is still legal in Japan.” On December 26, Sams again recommended providing “a legal basis for the suppression of prostitution.” giving the proposed SCAPIN his formal endorsement. On January 4, Eichelberger sent a memo to MacArthur expressing his “enthusiastic concurrence,” a formulation he used twice. He was clear in expressing his frustration with the situation and his understanding that “the passage of such a law will not be a panacea,” but still argued that the best possible step would be for GHQ to declare “any phase of prostitution unlawful.” The following month the staff medical officer of the Commander of Naval Forces in the Far East command, citing the continuing high rates of venereal disease, recommended “that the proposed plan for providing a legal basis for the suppression of prostitution should be adopted.” Health officials from the Navy and the Army Air Force, the top public health official in Japan and the commander of the Eighth Army were now all pushing for a total ban on prostitution.

While this push for prohibition was gaining momentum within the ranks of the Occupation forces, Hiroshima prefecture inadvertently spurred another campaign against prostitution with a proposal to levy an entertainment tax on brothels. The prefecture and

255 Crawford F. Sams, Untitled Memorandum, December 26, 1946 in Ibid.
especially its atomic-bombed namesake capital city were strapped for funds to rebuild after the war. A tax on a luxury expense that was, after all, still perfectly legal, must have seemed just the ticket. The prefecture’s timing could hardly have been worse. With a consensus beginning to form around outlawing prostitution altogether, the last thing many Occupation authorities wanted was another vested interest to overcome.

Feeling the wind at their backs, those in favor of outlawing prostitution no longer felt constrained to limit their arguments to technocratic questions. In addressing the Hiroshima plan PHW’s Elkins responded with extraordinary vigor, openly embracing the sort of moralism that Sams had largely eschewed.258 Elkins bluntly condemned prostitution in uncompromising terms:

> Commercial prostitution should always be exposed for what it is – a filthy racket bringing immense profits to the exploiters who feed parasitically on the degradation of young women. These gangsters and vice lords corrupt the police, the courts, other branches of government and constitute a social evil which threatens the kind of society we are trying to encourage the Japanese people to form.

He went on to denounce the “medieval ideas” of some Japanese officials, lamenting the fact that some in SCAP were being “taken in” by them. “No government,” he asserted, “which purports to be democratic, should ever find the solution to its problems, financial or otherwise, at the expense of its poorest, lowliest, or most exploited people.” In closing he recommended “the enactment of a law to prohibit prostitution and its allied activities.”259

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258 Sams and Elkins did not get along. Elkins’s political sympathies were investigated by the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps. Sams, a staunch anti-communist believed Elkins to be a communist. Elkins eventually had to leave his position and return to the United States. See Sams, Medic, pp. 174 – 182; Duus, Makasaa no Futatsu no Bōshi, pp. 235, 260.

Hiroshima’s proposal was referred to the Government and Legal Sections of GHQ. With obvious reluctance, analysts in the two sections concluded “that from a strict legal point of view, the Japanese Government, under existing directives, could be allowed to collect the tax as proposed.” Nevertheless, they advised rejecting the proposal anyway. They feared that approval would be taken as “an admission that prostitution is recognized as being in the same class as other legitimate amusement enterprises. To do this is also to give it an aura of respectability which it does not possess.” “Also,” they continued, in view of the fact that action is pending to prohibit prostitution in Japan, sanction of the proposed tax measure would be imposing another hurdle to overcome in achieving the elimination of prostitution with all its attendant social and economic evils.260

The following month SCAP’s Government Section, Legal Section and PHW all endorsed this view, approving a statement advising the rejection of the proposed tax and denouncing prostitution as “this degrading slavery.”261 In addition to public health, social and economic issues, moral questions were now subject to consideration and to an increasing number of officials all of these factors clearly pointed to a need to take a stand against prostitution.

However, taking a stand against a revenue scheme in a provincial prefecture was one thing. Using a SCAPIN to prohibit prostitution altogether was, it turned out, quite another. When the idea was sent to Government Section for endorsement, it hit a snag. On issues like the revision of the Japanese constitution, GS chief Whitney brooked no dissent from the Japanese side. It was his way or no way at all. However, on those issues

where he merely had strong desires, he was generally much more hands-off, reasoning that reforms were much more likely to be lasting and successful if they had Japanese input and backing in the first place.\textsuperscript{262} GS’s reply made clear that the prohibition of prostitution was in the latter category. While Whitney wrote that the section “strongly concur[red] in the necessity for immediate action to promote a legal basis for the attack on this problem,” he then asserted: “that the channels of informal approach have not been fully explored and [thus GS] recommends that the proposed action be undertaken through such channels.”\textsuperscript{263} In other words, Government Section believed that though legal prostitution was a problem, it was a Japanese problem and therefore required a Japanese solution. GHQ should not try to solve the problem by fiat.

The proposal was then sent to the G-2 intelligence section, which oversaw the Public Safety Division and thus American policing in Japan. G-2 head Brigadier General Charles Willoughby’s response was a study in bureaucratic doublespeak. Declaring “I concur in Govt Section’s view,” he then made clear that he meant GS’s reservations and not the general idea of taking legal action against prostitution. Paying lip service to controlling venereal disease, he then proceeded to enumerate every conceivable reason that no legal action against prostitution should be taken, or at least not by the Americans. Willoughby argued: “we should not be so simple as to believe that the passage of a law solves the problem in a country where public sentiment in general is non-committal or in favor of prostitution.” He then asserted, “A law making prostitution a crime has never anywhere in the ancient or modern world stamped out or seriously approached the

\textsuperscript{262} Interview between Charles Kades and Iokibe Makoto and Suzuki Akinori, November 2 - 3, 1992.
\textsuperscript{263} Courtney Whitney, “CHECK SHEET” attached to “Proposed Directive, Law to Prohibit Prostitution and its Allied Activities; 2 FROM: Govt Section; TO: PH&W,” June 11, 1947 in RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”
eradication of venereal infection.” Moreover, such a law would “appear to be duplicating the Prohibition [of alcohol] Law [in the United States] which would” corrupt the courts, politics, and law enforcement while it would invite a “flood of professional bondsmen and other know illegal practices that are parasites to prostitution.” Finally, he recommended a vigorous campaign of education and legislation aimed at “primarily at prostitution coupled with venereal infection. [emphasis in original].”264 This was essentially nothing more than an intensification and formal codification of the measures already being taken. Willoughby clearly thought a ban on prostitution to be a quixotic crusade that would waste time and manpower and which would likely be unsuccessful thus inviting defiance and scorn from a Japanese population that was unsympathetic to this American aim.

Government Section, on the other hand, had been sincere in both its reservations and its desire to see Japanese action on the issue. While the debate about prostitution was going on inside GHQ, a new coalition cabinet had been inaugurated under the Christian Socialist Katayama Tetsu. Katayama’s cabinet proved to be the most cooperative that Government Section ever dealt with. Perhaps encouraged by the new cabinet’s attitude Alfred Hussey, one of GS’s top men, met with incoming Health and Welfare Minister, Hitotsumatsu Sadayoshi on July 3, 1947. In line with GS’s plan to use “the channels of informal approach,” Hussey urged Hitotsumatsu to take measures to eliminate commercial prostitution altogether. In response,

The Minister agreed that something should be done but felt that a program of education was necessary in order to secure the support of public opinion. He

In other words, Hitotsumatsu basically wanted to return to the status quo antebellum where the issue of prostitution was concerned. This was out of the question so far as the Americans were concerned.

In 1948, growing resentment of street-walkers, particularly those around American military bases, led the Ashida government to introduce an anti-prostitution bill to the Diet. The bill was a somewhat severe measure that essentially filled the earlier desiderata of American officials, making “any phase of prostitution unlawful.” The bill was subject to almost immediate resistance. On May 28, 1948 a group of Diet members including future Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro submitted a petition to GHQ urging that prostitution remain legal. Indeed, according to GHQ’s informants, the cabinet itself did not favor the bill but was “under the impression that this Headquarters [GHQ] desires or sponsors it.” It was very likely true that at the time of Hussey’s meeting with Hitotsumatsu the previous year, GHQ did desire such a bill and would have given it full backing behind the scenes, and perhaps even openly. However, after considering the problem from a more practical standpoint American ardor had cooled considerably. The possible harm to American prestige and popularity, the difficulty of enforcement and questions about a ban’s actual effects on the venereal disease situation had all worked to undermine support for such a measure within the American camp. By the time the anti-

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prostitution bill was submitted to the Diet, MacArthur had decided that SCAP would take no position publicly. 270 In fact it had been decided to rather publicly take no position.

GHQ’s indifference to the bill’s fate was to be communicated in no uncertain terms:

[N]either the Cabinet nor the Diet should be left in the belief that this Headquarters is pushing or even favoring the proposed legislation. Unless the contrary is stated unambiguously, SCAP will be severely criticized as attempting to impose American moral standards on a nation whose sexual mores are based on essentially different Oriental traditions. . . . After involuntary prostitution has been outlawed, the occupation is concerned only with the health aspect of the problem. . . . the decisive question is whether the Japanese really and sincerely want this law. 271

The Americans suspected that the Japanese people, or at least their elected representatives did not. Col. (or Mr.) Alva C. Carpenter, head of GHQ’s Legal Section reported that the section’s contacts had informed them “that unless considerable pressure is exercised by SCAP, the bill will be rejected by an overwhelming majority of the Diet.” 272 After the bill was introduced, the Diet did what legislatures are wont to do when faced with difficult decisions: they decided the problem needed more study so they would do nothing for the time being. A public opinion survey was needed. The Japanese government conducted just such a survey and SCAP’s Civil Information and Education Section (CIE) released a report on the survey’s findings at the end of June, 1949. 273

The survey found that the Japanese people (as represented by the citizens of the Kantō region and the city of Sendai) tended to look on prostitution much as had GHQ two years earlier:

270 Howard Myers, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Draft Bill for Punishment of Prostitution and Related Activities, Received 21 Jun 1949 from Attorney General’ Office,” June 28, 1949 in Ibid.
271 Alva C. Carpenter “Bill for the Punishment of Prostitution and Related Activities,” June 15, 1948 NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP, Box 1416, Folder 17: “Prostitution, Punishment of.” Carpenter resigned his commission during the Occupation and became one of the few civilian section chiefs of GHQ. See Takemae, Inside GHQ, p. 171.
272 Alva C. Carpenter “Bill for the Punishment of Prostitution and Related Activities,” June 15, 1948 NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP GHQ/SCAP, Box 1416, Folder 17 “Prostitution, Punishment of.”
Many people favor the abolition as an ideal, but feel that practically and realistically there are too many difficulties and that immediate attempts at abolition would either fail completely or bring about even worse consequences than the continued existence of prostitution.\(^{274}\)

Moreover, when it came to question of what practical steps should be taken, the respondents tended to share the attitudes of Japanese authorities, believing that prostitution was a necessary evil and that the biggest problem with it was the current anarchic situation created by postwar social and economic conditions and GHQ’s abolition of the old licensed prostitution system. A very small minority were sympathetic to the idea that prostitution should be so regulated as to be more accommodating of women’s rights, but most Japanese simply did not understand GHQ’s approach to the problem. By and large they preferred to get prostitutes indoors, off the streets and out of sight, working in brothels segregated from the general population in recognized red-light districts. They did not regard prohibition, or at least the anticipated consequences of prohibition, as desirable.\(^{275}\)

With the study now in hand and clearly militating against passage of the bill, it soon died in committee. There would be no further efforts at the national level to prohibit prostitution for the remainder of the Occupation. Local American commanders used military police to round up women who were in violation of local prostitution ordinances, who were suspected of violating the Venereal Disease Control Law or who simply struck them the wrong way. However, GHQ never again pushed for a national ban. Over time, it became increasingly clear that Willoughby’s analysis was essentially correct. A blanket ban on prostitution did not yet enjoy widespread popular support and it had even less support among Japanese officials. The Americans contented themselves with outlawing

\(^{274}\) *The Japanese People Look at Prostitution*, p. 21.

\(^{275}\) Ibid., pp. 1 – 6.
involuntary prostitution and indentured sex slavery with SCAPIN 642. Most probably would not have gone so far as the Economic and Science Section official who blithely argued that in view of the promulgation of SCAPIN 642, “prostitution carried on in established amusement places may be presumed voluntary.” Reports of violations were taken seriously and action was taken against violators. Some attempt to investigate even in the absence of reports was made. Nevertheless, many, perhaps most, Americans tended to act as if these cases were aberrations even when there was ample reason to conclude that they were not. Perhaps the fairest judgment that can be rendered on the Occupation where it came to their attempts to liberate Japanese women from what they had called “degrading slavery,” would be, to borrow the formulation Theodore Roosevelt used to describe the administration of William Howard Taft, his successor and former protégé: They meant well -- feebly. Damning as that faint praise may seem, it is nevertheless praise of a sort. For all their shortcomings in dealing with the issue of prostitution, officials in GHQ certainly did not direct a collaborationist government to set up a nationwide system of brothels for its troops. Nor did they connive in the enslavement of women to work in any such system. Most of those involved with the issue of prostitution favored a blanket prohibition on grounds of both public health and morality. However, in the end Willoughby was probably correct that banning prostitution while it was still perceived in neutral or even positive terms by the majority of the populace and of the elite, was a fool’s errand. Setting the moral question aside for the time being, practically speaking this was probably true even for licensed prostitution, which in the minds of

many Japanese had the advantages of being discreet, well-regulated and largely out of sight whether the inmates of the brothels were there of their own volition or not.

Finally, though it was unintentional, the combination of the abolition of licensed prostitution and the nation-wide off-limits order had the practical effect of totally undermining the plans of Japanese authorities to keep relations between GIs and Japanese women limited to commercial transactions. Though there would remain a good deal of that throughout the Occupation, it would be far less formal and sometimes accompanied by a bit of romance or even friendship. Sometimes these were the only motives for relationships. This unregulated, unsupervised interaction between Japanese women and American men would lead to a host of issues later.
Chapter 3: “Hot and Forcing Violation”:
War, Rape and the Human Psyche

The behavior of the American troops during the Occupation was far better than many Japanese had at first feared it would be. Many remembered this and the impression it made on them well into their elderly years. Nevertheless the psychic environment in the postwar years was ripe for a myth of mass rape to take root, at least among a significant portion of the populace. The reasons for this were manifold. First, the incidence of rape in war is so high as to render a strong association between the two deep into the human psyche, both on the aggressors’ and defenders’ parts. This fact is frequently employed by propagandists seeking to elicit a ferocious last-ditch resistance. The use of these fears was widespread in the word-of-mouth propaganda employed in the areas where Japanese civilians were likely to be overrun by attacking American troops. In addition, Japan’s understanding and conduct of war during the mid-twentieth century were such that they served to reinforce the instinctive fears of humans under attack. Finally, in the years after the war, a large number of Japanese had limited access to mass media and, after years of wartime experience, reduced trust in it. As a result, rumors, especially in the early weeks and months of the Occupation spread quickly and the impression they left sometimes survived direct experience that contradicted their purport. Each of these factors will be examined in turn.

Rape and war have a deep-seated association in the human psyche. The connection has been made countless times in literature and art and has been acted out in the real world with such an appalling regularity that, were it not for the inherent horrors
of the subject, would have long since grown tedious. The abduction or rape of women attendant to warfare is depicted as something like standard operating procedure in the Homeric epics, with one classicist going so far as to assert that all the conflicts in the Iliad and Odyssey stemmed from a shortage of women.\textsuperscript{277} Rape in war is presented as a matter of course in the Bible.\textsuperscript{278} In Shakespeare’s Henry V the king obtained the surrender of Harfleur in part by threatening to loose his troops on the town, subjecting its “pure maidens” to “hot and forcing violation.”\textsuperscript{279}

Nor is rape in war an phenomenon of bygone ages. It was a frequent component of wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries alike. The very state of war seems to act on the minds of men in a way that predisposes them to sexual violence. The philosopher J. Glenn Gray, recalling his experiences in the Second World War described the predatory sexual appetites generated by war: “The conquest of the sexual partner thus becomes very like the conquest of the enemy, who has forfeited any right to human status or equality.”\textsuperscript{280} As discussed in Chapter 2, the Red Army’s rampage through Eastern Europe had political consequences as it undermined the position of Communist partisans.\textsuperscript{281} In 1971 during Bangladesh’s war for independence from Pakistan, the soldiers of what was then West Pakistan routinely killed the men and raped the women. According to the estimate of one doctor who attended to the women afterward, more that 100,000 Bangladeshi women were raped.\textsuperscript{282} In recent years, mass rape has been reported in Bosnia, Darfur and the Congo region, where it has been integrated as both a motive for

\textsuperscript{277} Jonathan Gottschall, The Rape of Troy, (New York; Cambridge University Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{278} Numbers 31: 17-18, 35.
\textsuperscript{279} Henry V, (III.i.21).
\textsuperscript{282} Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, Sex and War, (Dallas, Texas: Benbella Books), 2008, p. 3.
and a weapon in the conflict.\textsuperscript{283} Mass rape has been called a “significant weapon of war” in the ongoing conflict in Syria.\textsuperscript{284}

Rape is so prevalent in war that some studies of hunter-gatherer societies indicate that the desire for sexual conquest, and its attendant reproductive advantages, may itself be one of the primary causes of war in these societies.\textsuperscript{285} Archeological excavation of prehistoric massacre sites often unearth a disproportionately low number of remains of females of reproductive age.\textsuperscript{286} In more recent times, there have been reports that ISIS has turned the enslavement and rape of enemy women into a form of worship and used the sexual opportunities such beliefs legitimate as a recruiting tool “to lure men from deeply conservative Muslim societies, where casual sex is taboo and dating is forbidden.”\textsuperscript{287}

War rape may have evolutionary roots. As a strategy for reproduction it can be shockingly successful. One recent study found that some eight percent of all men in Central Asia are the descendants of Ghengis Khan.\textsuperscript{288} Indeed a chilling report of wartime rape in Bosnia concluded that reproductive advantage was among the conscious motives in constructing a system of rape camps, noting there was “little doubt that the intention is deliberately to make women pregnant and then to detain them until pregnancy is far enough advanced to make termination impossible. . .”\textsuperscript{289}

However, war rape is a phenomenon that is too complex to admit of monocausality. War rape contains elements of hedonistic cruelty that, though often present in peacetime rape, become so prevalent that they seem to be unconnected with or even to

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\textsuperscript{284} International Rescue Committee Commission on Syrian Refugees, \textit{Syria: A Regional Crisis}, January 2013, pp. 6 – 7.


\textsuperscript{286} Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, \textit{Sex and War}, (Dallas, Texas: Benbella Books), 2008, pp. 154 - 156.


\textsuperscript{288} Malcolm Potts and Thomas Hayden, \textit{Sex and War}, (Dallas, Texas: Benbella Books), 2008, pp. 9 - 10.

\textsuperscript{289} \textit{Warburton Mission II Report}, online at \url{http://www.womenaid.org/press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm}
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undermine any direct reproductive advantage conferred upon the attackers. It includes victims that are obviously prepubescent or post-menopausal in a disproportionate number.\textsuperscript{290} Peace time rape is, on average, far less violent than rapes that occur in warfare. In peace time about four percent of rape victims sustain serious injury and less than one in five hundred is murdered.\textsuperscript{291} In war rape, extreme violence is common. In the present conflict in Syria, there are reports of “women and young girls being kidnapped, raped, tortured and killed.”\textsuperscript{292} During the My Lai massacre, a number of American soldiers from Charlie Company became “double veterans,” those who had the experience of raping a woman before murdering her: “Many women were raped and sodomized, mutilated, and had their vaginas ripped open with knives or bayonets. One woman was killed when the muzzle of a gun was inserted into her vagina and the trigger was pulled.”\textsuperscript{293} Obviously such actions confer no direct reproductive benefit to their perpetrators.

It can, however, provide a military advantage. Mass rape, especially, but not only, in traditional societies, produces such psychic trauma in both the women who are victims and their male relatives, that it can break up families and destroy communities. In Iraq, rape was “rampant as an instrument of war during the vicious sectarian reprisals of the mid-2000s.” In the Syrian civil war, rape has likewise been weaponized.\textsuperscript{294} Indeed many refugees have fled the country precisely because of the fear of pervasive sexual violence. One said resignedly, “we surrendered to the reality of rape.”\textsuperscript{295} Likewise, war rape in Dafur was adjudged, “a deliberate strategy with a view to achieve certain objectives, including terrorizing the population, ensuring control over the movement of the IDP

\textsuperscript{290}See Chapter 1.
\textsuperscript{292}International Rescue Committee Commission on Syrian Refugees, \textit{Syria: A Regional Crisis}, January 2013, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{293}Michael Bilton and Kevin Sim, \textit{Four Hours in My Lai}, (New York: Penguin, 1992), pp. 128 - 129.
population and perpetuating its displacement.” The orgy of sadism that is war rape is effective as a military weapon irrespective of whether it confers direct reproductive advantages or not. It can be nothing more subtle than cruelty for its own sake. In other words, to borrow a formulation from Orwell’s O’Brien, in some very real sense, the object of war rape, is war rape.

However, whether war rape is an evolved reproductive strategy or a terror tactic to demoralize the enemy is a question that is largely academic for the victims or those who love them and it should come as no surprise that the fear of marauding rapists is as instinctive a response to aggression as the sexual urge itself is to the attacking soldier. When faced with a hostile group, women often fear rape first and foremost. Sometimes this often adaptive fear can lead to ridiculous extremes of virginitiphobia, an irrational fear of rape. When anti-Vietnam War activists held a protest outside the Pentagon in 1967, the female secretaries inside the office-fortress, surrounded by a ring of armed troops and federal marshals, were reportedly terrified that somehow the unarmed peace protestors would overwhelm the defenders, penetrate the perimeter, enter the building and rape them.

While this fear may be paralyzing to some it can be a source of great motivation to others. As an attack on the community and by extension on the masculinity of the men who regard it as their duty to protect it, it is one of the primary psychological factors that builds solidarity among those men and helps them to repel invaders. Historically, the fear that their mates, mothers and sisters will be forcibly taken from them, that they will fail

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their loved ones in their hour of most desperate need, that they will, when tested, prove to be something less than a man, has been a powerful motivator. Military and political leaders and propagandists have long exploited this (often altogether justified) fear to unite their men and infuse them with passion. In the so-called “Boston Massacre” of 1770 British soldiers fired on an unruly mob of colonists which had been taunting and assaulting them with hand thrown missiles. As early as 1772 colonial agitators spun yarns of “our beauteous virgins exposed to all the insolence of unbridled passion.”

After tensions between the British and their American subjects broke into the open hostilities that would be known as the American Revolution, reports of widespread rape of American women by British soldiers were crucial to undermining British General William Howe’s strategy of reconciliation and pushing many undecided colonists to support the struggle for independence. Patriotic Chinese accounts of the Opium War recounted fictional battlefield glory of Chinese militias as well as accounts of how, after the Chinese people’s valor was undermined by corrupt Qing officials, British and Commonwealth troops, or as they were styled “white and black barbarians” went on expeditions of mass rape every night violating and thus driving to suicide hundreds of Chinese women.

D.W. Griffith’s racist epic Birth of a Nation, which helped inspire the rebirth of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States, depicted black Union soldiers, their brains addled by the supposedly pernicious doctrine of racial equality, as predatory beasts. In one of the movie’s more famous scenes Flora, a young southern white woman, throws herself from a cliff to prevent being violated by Gus, “a renegade negro”.

In the time between the World Wars the German government led a campaign to discredit the Allied Occupation of the Rhineland by sponsoring and publishing fabricated reports of mass rape of German women by French colonial troops.\textsuperscript{301} Though this campaign denouncing the “Black Horror on the Rhine” largely failed in its main objectives it succeeded in providing Nazi propagandists, including Alfred Rosenberg and Adolf Hitler himself, with another grievance to wield against the Versailles settlement.\textsuperscript{302} The Chinese Communist Party used a single rape case as the keystone in a campaign to turn Chinese nationalism from anti-Japanese to anti-American and thus Anti-Guomindang during the Chinese Civil War.\textsuperscript{303} More recently, the intelligence organs of the Gadhafi regime in Libya, in what may have been an episode of projection propaganda, spread tales of rebel


\textsuperscript{302} Ibid., p. 626.

\textsuperscript{303} Robert Shaffer, “A Rape in Beijing, December 1946: GIs, Nationalist Protests, and U.S. Foreign Policy,” \textit{Pacific Historical Review}, Vol. 69, No.1, February 2000, pp. 31 - 64.
forces carrying Viagra into battle so they could more effectively rape women in the territories they conquered.\textsuperscript{304}

The visceral fear of predatory mass rape at the hands of invaders is so potent that propagandists will go to great lengths to incorporate its imagery in their works. Even if the women of a particular nation face no plausible threat from an enemy, attempts are made to identify with groups whose women are so threatened. An American anti-German poster of the First World War enjoined the American people to “Remember Belgium” with a depiction of a conflagration in the background and the silhouette of a German soldier dragging a young girl off to her fate. Such imaginative leaps of sympathy, however, are not always needed. The terror of mass rape is so powerful that propagandists understand that they can freely employ its image even when the threat invoked is patently absurd. One of the most remembered posters of the First World War posters depicts a beastly ape in a Prussian helmet arriving on the shores of America. In one hand he carries a club labeled “Kultur” and in the other, a helpless woman, her dress torn open to the waist. Shortly after the Pearl Harbor attack, American painter Thomas Hart Benton sought, in his words, “to wake up the Middle West to the grimness of our national situation” and produced a series of works collectively known as “The Year of Peril.” One of them, Invasion, depicts a Japanese invasion of the mainland in which a blonde woman is raped while her husband and children are murdered by the invaders.\textsuperscript{305}

\textsuperscript{304} Ben Hubbard, “Libyan Spy Files Detail Gadhafi Regime’s Collapse,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 5, 2011. The same accusation was made against the Gadhafi regime, whose forces have more credibly been reported participating in war rape. (Pascale Harter, “Libya Rape Victims ‘Face Honour Killings,’” BBC News, June 14, 2011).

Other anti-Japanese propaganda invoked the image of a sneaky vermin-like Japanese slinking off with a nude white woman over his shoulder. Another depicts a snarling beastly Japanese seizing a woman from behind, his hand inside the collar of her shirt. It urges the viewer to “keep this horror from your home [emphasis in original].”

Protection of a group’s women against rape by outsiders is just one aspect of a fundamental aspect of masculine group identity, namely a shared pride in the ability to monopolize the sexuality of the group’s own women while simultaneously attracting (or seizing) the favors of foreign women. For the men of the conquered nation this domination can be perceived as an emasculating insult. The loss of women to an enemy is such a singular dishonor, such that any such episode, no matter how peripheral, can be used to goad a belligerent response out of a group’s men. The Trojan War of Homer’s
(13) Thomas Hart Benton: *Invasion*
(16) General Motors poster featuring nurses captured at the surrender of Corregidor being guarded by a bestial Japanese.

*Iliad*, was fought over the abduction of a single woman. Whether that detail was legendary or not, it at least rang true enough to the ancient Greeks to be the plausible
foundation of their greatest epic. In World War II, the very few white nurses seized by the Japanese military in its conquest of Asia became the theme of another anti-Japanese broadside.

“A Relationship Based on Domination”: Japanese Understandings of Sex and War in the Mid-twentieth Century

In mid-twentieth century Japan, the idea that a foreign nation’s women, whether as wives or temporary diversions, were the legitimate spoils of conquest was seen as second nature by many. A wartime study of the Japanese Health and Welfare Ministry put the matter bluntly: “the fundamental principle of a relationship based on domination is that the males of the ruling or conquering nation marry females of the ruled or conquered nation.”306 The notion that taking the women of the conquered land was completely natural can be seen in John Embree’s classic, A Japanese Village. Embree described a carnival-like greeting given to young men returning to the village from military training. The women of the village would dress as soldiers and tramps and, so disguised, engage in behaviors they associated with men and soldiers, one of which was to “try to rape the young schoolgirls.”307

This close association, at least of the behavior of armies at mid-century, seems commonsensical even in contemporary Japan. As recently as 2012, NHK, Japan’s public broadcaster, aired a drama about Yoshida Shigeru, Japan’s most influential postwar prime minister. The first episode in the series depicts a probably legendary meeting held by former Prime Minister Prince Konoye Fumimaro in which Konoye explains the necessity of setting up brothels for the conquering army. Turning to future Prime Minister

Ikeda Hayato, Konoye chides his junior for his apparent naiveté in the ways of war, intoning very seriously: “Ikeda-kun, the occupation of a country means that its women will be violated.”

The strength of the link between sex and war in the minds of many wartime Japanese is also evident in the work of their propagandists. In leaflets aimed at inducing American troops to surrender they included photographs of dark-featured women reclining on a bed or posing nude, with the clear implication that fighting was not necessary to get sex.

(17, 18) Japanese propaganda leaflets urging Americans to surrender, promising an end to their suffering, and (presumably) the sex for which they had been fighting all along.

However, the clearest evidence of the intimate association of sex and war in the minds of many wartime Japanese is in the way the Imperial armed forces conducted themselves in conquered territories. As we saw in chapter 1, the Imperial Japanese Army treated the women of conquered territories as legitimate spoils of war.

This attitude carried over into beliefs about what would happen to the women of Japan if their homeland should ever fall to an invader.

**Rumors and Wartime Images of the American Enemy:**

Prior to the arrival of American forces most Japanese fully expected that their nation would be subjected to mass rape. The Japanese government, and especially the Japanese army wanted to convince Americans of the futility of attacking the home islands. One way they sought to do this was to present them with a populace which adamantly refused to surrender and the easiest way to do that was to convince civilians and soldiers alike that surrender was not an option. In early December, 1945 one Tokyo woman recalled government propaganda that the men would all be killed and the women would be sacrificed to the black soldiers. In the Caroline islands, the Japanese military warned women they would be raped when the Americans came. Sixty-one years after the events, Eiko Goldwater, a resident of Saipan at the time of the American invasion, recalled with evident terror the stories spread by Japanese soldiers. All of the men would be killed and the women would be raped. After they were raped they would be stripped stark naked and strung up with the arms and legs spread on American battleships. Then they would be taken to the United States itself where they would again be subjected to rape until they were finally murdered, with their naked bodies left exposed for all and sundry to see their dishonor. Stories such as these doubtless contributed to an atmosphere in which hundreds of civilians leapt to their deaths in one of history’s most notorious mass suicides.

Horrors like this on a vastly greater scale awaited the Americans who invaded Okinawa. There were rumors that any men who surrendered to the Americans would be

311 Yamada Fūtarō, p. 639.
313 Waga Kokyō wa Saipan, (NHK Nagoya), broadcast November 11, 2005.
run down by tanks while women would find themselves reduced to the mere playthings of the foreign troops.\textsuperscript{314} Such propaganda had its intended effect. It is estimated that upwards of 100,000 civilians perished during the Okinawa campaign. Many of these people perished by their own hands or at those of trusted loved ones.\textsuperscript{315} Many simply refused to surrender. In one instance American interpreters twice entered a cave where a large number of civilians had taken refuge in attempts to convince them to capitulate. Their appeals fell on deaf ears and eighty-two killed one another in a ghastly spectacle of collective self-immolation. One woman killed her own daughter with a kitchen knife after the eighteen-year old begged her to do the deed while “she was still pure.”\textsuperscript{316}

Rumors of the kind that helped inspire these horrors were common in the home islands as well. In Okayama Prefecture police recorded a rumor circulating among the people that the troops that were to occupy their area were particularly short-tempered and vicious and that they would castrate all of the men and rape the women.\textsuperscript{317} People in Yamagata believed that after castration the men would be enslaved at hard labor while the women would be forced to work in brothels for the pleasure of the GIs.\textsuperscript{318} Rumors involving rape, murder, emasculation, slavery and other horrors circulated throughout the country.\textsuperscript{319} The prevalence of these stories is reflected by the frequency with which they appeared in many Tokkô reports. Rumors of mass rape were already circulating five days

before the Americans landed. Another rumor circulated that the Americans would force the town committee to supply them with women from each household. On September 15, Onizawa Yoshio, a plasterer from Itabashi was arrested and fined ¥10 for telling people he had seen GIs in a truck abduct two Japanese girls from a street car stop in Itabashi. The next day, Matsui Kikuji an unemployed woman from Aoyama was taken into custody and given a tongue-lashing by the police for telling people that she had actually seen a member of the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) kill an American soldier who was trying to abduct a Japanese woman.

Rumors of this kind were so prevalent that after the Occupation began one Tokkō report notes matter-of-factly that “the violence and rape that were the subject of rumor has not taken place.” More evidence of rumors is seen in the press. For example on August 19, the Asahi Shinbun carried an article written to assure its readers that despite the many rumors about the barbarity of American troops, there was no reason to expect rape or attacks on civilians. It cited the relatively restrained and disciplined behavior of American troops in Germany as evidence that there was no need for alarm.

Nevertheless, panic, both official and unofficial, was the rule in the days before the Americans landed. In Fukuoka a special train for women ran for three days, evacuating them to the countryside. Those left behind cut their hair, blackened their faces, and did everything they could to look like men or at least make themselves less attractive to the Americans. In Okayama young women were escorted to a cave complex that had

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320 JNDL Japanese Army and Navy Archives Reel 229 T1555, p. 02462.  
321 Ibid., p. 02497.  
322 JNDL Japanese Army and Navy Archives Reel 229 T1554, p. 02446.  
323 Awaya and Nakazono, p. 410.  
325 Fukuoka Police History, p. 519.
been prepared for a last ditch defense in the anticipated battle for the home islands. On August 17, an intelligence officer of an air unit stationed in the area created a great commotion in Gifu averred that all of the women would be raped. Hearing this, the mayor of Gifu City ordered the evacuation of all women aged 15 – 25 years old, telling them to go into the mountains. A later report had it that all the women aged from 18 -

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327 Okayama Ken Keisastushi, p. 487.
328 JNDL Japanese Army and Navy Archives Reel 229 T1555, p. 02450.
30 were sent to remote regions with nothing more than a sake bottle filled with rice.\textsuperscript{329}

Even after the landings, when it became clear that there was no need for the kind of alarm that had swept the country, many women remained in hiding. In Muroto City in Kōchi Prefecture, the situation was so serious that the chief of police had to personally go into the mountains to persuade the town’s young women that it was safe to return to their homes.\textsuperscript{330}

Four days after the surrender Father Patrick Barn, an American Catholic priest who had been resident in Japan during the war, wrote an article for publication in the \textit{Asahi Shinbun}. In it, he sought to reassure Japanese civilians that American troops were well disciplined and they had nothing to worry about. However, the second half of the article seems to contradict the assessment given in the first section. It is an appeal to American troops to comport themselves with dignity and to show kindness to the Japanese people.\textsuperscript{331} The apparent ambivalence in the Barn article may have been more a reflection of ambivalence on the part of Japan’s leaders than on the part of Barn himself.

Many of their fears were caused, at least in part, from their knowledge of the way that Japanese soldiers had behaved in foreign lands. Moreover, this knowledge was not limited to the elite. The persistence of rumors among the general population often was the result of the anxieties of people who had personally observed or even participated in Japanese atrocities abroad.

In his account of the Hiroshima bombing and its aftermath, Dr. Michihiko Hachiya related an exchange he had with Dr. Akiyama, a junior colleague of his. While they were waiting for the arrival of the Allied troops, the younger man was insistent that

\textsuperscript{329} \textit{Gifu Ken Keisatsushi}, Vol. 2, p. 419.
\textsuperscript{330} \textit{Kōchi Ken Keisatsushi}, p. 105.
\textsuperscript{331} Patrick Barn “Joriku Suru Beiheitachi Yo, Mamore Genjū na Kiritsu,” \textit{Asahi Shinbun}, August 19, 1945, p. 2.
he, Hachiya, and Hachiya’s wife should all leave the city. When Hachiya refused, Akiyama repeatedly begged to be allowed to at least take the older man’s wife. He insisted that she was “in danger” and that “I know what I am talking about.” Hachiya relates that “Dr. Akiyama, who had been in China, was afraid the same thing would happen to us that he had seen in North China.”

Similarly inspired fears were seen with far more tragic result during the incident on Okinawa related above. Those who were most adamantly opposed to surrender were those who had served with the Japanese army in China. One twenty-five year old Army nurse who had been with the army on the continent was so terrified of the coming ordeal that she called her family together in a cave and injected all of them with poison.

The combination of Japanese propaganda and rumors begun by China veterans proved a remarkably potent combination and the fear of American soldiers persisted well into the Occupation. Even after ordinary citizens had had ample opportunity to observe and interact with relatively well-disciplined GIs many proved reluctant to abandon wartime notions. Some simply refused to credit the evidence of their senses. For example, Yamamoto Kumatarō, a farmer from Iwate prefecture, testified to police that “even though they have been good-tempered, they get on my nerves every time I see them. I want them to go back as soon as possible. This good behavior must be some sort of a trick.”

Though Yamamoto’s particular reaction was somewhat extreme, it was far from uncharacteristic in its general thrust. Tokkô reports show that there were persistent rumors that the good behavior of American troops was highly unusual and due only to the luck of

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333 Field, In the Realm of a Dying Emperor, p. 59.
the draw. It was widely believed that though the particular group that was currently on
duty in a given area just happened to be a good bunch, the unit that was coming to
replace them was notoriously full of bad characters.335

Press reports echoed these sorts of sentiments. At the outset of the Occupation the
Japanese press is full of alleged encounters with nameless American servicemen or
officers who voice concerns that seem suspiciously consistent with those of the Japanese
reading public.336 In one such report that appeared in the Asahi Shinbun on September 12,
a journalist claimed to have interviewed an unnamed American soldier. Clearly reflecting
the concerns of many of the Asahi’s readers, the journalist specifically asked whether the
next group of GIs would be as well behaved as the current batch. The “soldier” responded
that he “doesn’t know how it will go when the gang that doesn’t have sufficient training,”
came in to replace him and his fellows.337

Evidently, the rumors that had their origins in wartime propaganda or in the
expectations of those who had witnessed the behavior of the Imperial Army had an
extraordinary staying power. While many Japanese greeted the unexpectedly good
behavior of American troops with relief, there were many others who remained
suspicious or who were simply incredulous. Such attitudes are evident even in many of
the official prefectural police histories which assert that GI crime, including mass rape,
was rampant, but it just so happened that there was no such crime in their own particular
prefecture. “The advance of the American army into Hokkaido was more tranquil than in

335 Awaya and Nakazono, pp. 404, 408.
336 One encounter has an American officer stopping at a Japanese police station to inform the officer on duty that
Japanese women should avoid being barefoot and should not wear skirts or simple dresses. He also asked that women
refrain from “tempting us” by dressing up, wearing lipstick or drawing eyebrows as this could become the source of
mistaken ideas. See Asahi Shinbun, September 12, 1945, p.1, bottom (article name is unclear).
other locales.” The Yamagata history notes, “From what we heard afterward, it seems that the troops that came at this time were model soldiers. The people of our prefecture were truly blessed.” Shimane, was apparently blessed with similar luck: “Fortunately the unit that came to our area was composed of disciplined stalwarts who had served in the New Guinea and Solomon campaigns. Just as General Willoughby assured us, they were gentlemanly and caused no trouble.”

Regardless of the behavior of the actual Americans in their midst it is clear that some Japanese, like the Iwate farmer, were clearly looking for any pretext to nurse a grievance against their occupiers. Such people would not have had far to look for there was one conspicuous facet of the occupation that many found distasteful and humiliating. The American treatment of Japanese women and children, whether at levels of national policy or in casual encounters between GIs and civilians was, to many conservative Japanese both a disgrace and an outrage.

338 *Hokkaido Keisatsuushi*, p. 576.
339 *Yamagata Ken Keisatsuushi*, p. 896.
340 *Shimane Ken Keisatsuushi*, p. 442.
“The Absurdity of History”:
The American Occupation as a Denial of Japanese Masculinity

The relatively good behavior of the Americans, while initially appreciated, could not overcome all of the resentment of defeat. Many Japanese, like the Iwate farmer who believed that the apparently benign treatment of civilians by GIs was “some sort of trap,” were looking for reasons to hold a grudge against them. For Japanese men and many of the women who loved them, it would not be difficult to find such reasons. To them, the Occupation came to seem a denial of, or even assault upon traditional Japanese notions of masculinity. Though notions of what is truly masculine, what makes a man a man, vary from culture to culture, there are some basic elements that are common to all. These can be summed up as the three Ps of manhood, the actions men are expected to perform to demonstrate their masculinity, “three criteria of performance.” These are protection, provision and procreation.341 The actions and policies of Americans during the Occupation made Japanese men feel that their masculine performances were challenged in all of these areas. These challenges came in the shape of high policy and everyday interaction. They came from high and low, from MacArthur at the top to buck privates at the bottom. They came in at least four major ways.

The first and most obvious challenge was in the very presence of the Americans. They would not have been there if they had not won the war. Japanese men had manifestly failed in their role as protectors and were reminded of it everyday just by the sight of the Americans. The second major challenge came in the form of SCAP’s

restructuring of relations between the sexes. In the implementation of a new constitution and new laws for the country SCAP enforced an entirely new relationship between men and women. In doing so they presumed to be the true protectors of Japanese women. They also robbed Japanese men of the control over women’s sexuality which had traditionally been theirs. They overthrew a system of explicit patriarchal privilege and replaced it, at least in formal legal terms, with complete equality between the sexes in which Japanese women had sexual autonomy for the first time in history. They also took on Japanese men’s roles as providers, providing food and material aid for the country. Symbolically they did this in more direct ways, showering Japanese children (in some cases almost literally) and women with gifts of chocolate, chewing gum and candy. They often did so in a way that was easy-going and cheerful, unintentionally mocking a traditional Japanese image of men as stern, serious people charged with the business of protection and provision. Finally, in probably the unkindest cut of all from the perspective of Japanese men, they claimed Japanese women as consorts and mates. They cavorted with them openly and expressed both their affections and desires publicly in ways that many Japanese found alien and awkward if not downright offensive. According to the American consulate some 11,000 American military men registered marriages with Japanese women by December 24, 1952. Later studies indicated that unions (of any sort) between American men and Japanese women probably produced about 5,000 children that could be identified as such. Many of these, they subsequently  

abandoned, leaving them to the care of their Japanese mothers or to orphanages. All of these perceived slights contributed to an atmosphere of resentment that would further prepare the psychological ground in which myths of mass rape and sexual predation would take root in the years after the Occupation.

**GHQ’s Sexual Revolution**

Aside from the inevitable cardinal insult of occupying Japan’s sacred homeland, the American action most resented by Japanese men was the imposition of a new social order based on the formal political, social, and economic equality of the sexes. For many Japanese men, women’s suffrage remained a black mark on the Occupation even decades later.\(^{345}\) GHQ overthrew the very well-established social norms that had undergirded Japanese society since soon after its emergence into the modern world. The basic unit of this society was the family or household under the control of a single male head. In its place they established, more or less by fiat, a new polity which had as its fundamental unit the individual. Being defeated was bad enough. Now Americans presumed to mandate how Japanese men could treat the women they regarded as their own. Along with the changes to the emperor’s status, the changes in women’s position were those that encountered the most protracted and stubborn resistance from the champions of the ancien régime. As political scientist Susan Pharr has noted, “Japanese leaders made a persistent effort to dilute, omit, or change the intent of SCAP’s women’s rights provisions.”\(^{346}\)

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It was not just Japanese leaders that took exception to the changes. The supposedly destructive changes that would result from just female suffrage were widely condemned. It was feared that exposure to politics would addle women’s brains and make them something both unfeminine and un Japanese. A cartoon by Ogawa Takeshi from early 1946 clearly shows the discomfort many men felt with the changes GHQ had imposed (though at that point, the changes had only begun). It depicts a decidedly unfeminine, and unpleasant woman neglecting her maternal duties as she tells her

(20) A Japanese woman, transformed by the right of political participation, tells her husband, who holds their baby, apparently crying from neglect, that she is busy because there is a political speech she means to attend.

husband that she is going to go listen to a political speech. Even relatively liberal or progressive men found the changes frightening. During debates on the new constitution, the right-wing Socialist Leader Nishio Suehiro addressed feminist Katō Shizue about the changes which she supported. With what one can only imagine was a mixture of shock


and indignation he berated her, “You’re a terrible person! You’re trying to tear down the family system!”349 When interviewed by Japanese Home Ministry bureaucrats, Christian Socialist (and later prime minister) Katayama Tetsu lamented the change even while he dismissed its practical significance. He said that women would just vote with their husbands and that Japan was not yet ready for such a change.350

Indeed, most American planners were reluctant to tackle something as fundamental as relations between the sexes and it was far from axiomatic that such a radical overhaul would be attempted. According to MacArthur’s partly fictionalized account of his own life, he had decided on his own authority that women would be enfranchised.351 While the Supreme Commander had a penchant for claiming credit for reforms he had actually been ordered by his superiors to take, in this case it seems his recollection was largely accurate. Washington’s initial post-surrender instructions contained no reference to the position of women.352 In fact no document from the State War Navy Coordinating Committee, the precursor to the National Security Council and the body responsible for giving MacArthur his marching orders, even mentions the position of women in Japan.353 The closest it came was in its instructions to MacArthur concerning the drafting of a new constitution. It ordered that elections should be “based upon a wide representative suffrage.”354 Brigadier Courtney Whitney later corroborated MacArthur’s account, writing that MacArthur had announced to his intimates that

350 “Fujin Sanseiken ni tai Suru Kakušō no Ikō Chōshū,” p. 5.
352 See State War Navy Coordinating Committee, “SWNCC 150/4: POLITICO-MILITARY PROBLEMS IN THE FAR EAST: UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-DEFEAT POLICY RELATING TO JAPAN,” September 21, 1945 online at http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryou/01/022shoshi.html accessed February 23, 2016. The earlier versions of this document are available at the same location.
353 Pharr, p. 226.
354 State War Navy Coordinating Committee, “SWNCC 150/4), September, 21, 1945.
women’s suffrage was one of his key goals for the Occupation while they were en route to Japan from Manila on August 30, 1945.\textsuperscript{355}

This seems to bear scrutiny because it is beyond dispute that on October 11, 1945 MacArthur had a meeting with newly inaugurated Prime Minister Shidehara Kijurō. The Supreme Commander made clear that he expected the new government to enact legislation that would fundamentally reform a number of aspects of the Japanese polity. The first thing on his list was the enfranchisement of women.\textsuperscript{356} However, there is no evidence that MacArthur intended to go beyond this in regards to women. Indeed, his stated reason for giving support to women’s suffrage was that he thought female domesticity would have a pacifying effect on the Japanese electorate by “making government directly subservient to the well being of the home.”\textsuperscript{357}

GHQ went from this relatively modest and practical goal to a far more radical and sweeping reform partly because fate had placed an extraordinary young woman in a pivotal position. This, along with the fact that MacArthur had never met a bold dramatic action he didn’t like, led to one of the most extraordinarily rapid and fundamental transformations of women’s formal status in world history. The young woman most directly responsible for these changes was Beate Sirota. Sirota, just twenty-two years old at the time GHQ decided to take on the task of writing a new constitution for Japan, had lived in Japan longer than she had anywhere else. An Austrian Jew by birth, she had moved to Japan at the age of five when her father, a concert pianist, was hired as the head of the Piano Department of the Japanese Imperial Academy of Music in Tokyo.\textsuperscript{358} Hailing

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\item \textsuperscript{356} Takemae Eiji, \textit{Inside GHQ}, p. 240.
\item \textsuperscript{357} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{358} Susan Pharr, “The Politics of Women’s Rights,” p. 230.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
from the polyglot metropolis of Vienna and possessed of a natural talent for languages, Sirota, according to her own later account, learned Japanese (at least to a five-year old’s level) in just three months.359

Living in Japan for the next ten years, she further mastered the language and witnessed first-hand the legal disabilities under which women in Japan lived. Sirota and her family associated with relatively cosmopolitan Japanese and their social circle had no shortage of talented women held in inferior positions because of Japanese custom. Sirota left Japan to study at Mills College in the United States in 1939. She earned a degree in modern languages while concurrently working for the U.S. Government monitoring Japanese radio broadcasts.360 She worked for a time at the Office of War Information and became a U.S. citizen in January, 1945. Having had no contact with her parents since the outbreak of war, Sirota traveled to Washington where she secured a job as a translator for GHQ. She arrived in Japan on December 24, 1945. Six weeks later she was assigned the task of writing the women’s rights sections of a new constitution.361

Both thrilled and intimidated by the magnitude of the task before her, Sirota set to work restructuring the Japanese polity at one of its most fundamental levels.362 In a 1999 interview, Sirota, by that point living under her married name of Gordon, gave a rather blunt description of the position of women in prewar Japan: “Japanese women were historically treated like chattel; they were property to be bought and sold on a whim.”363 While in practical terms this was an exaggeration and Sirota knew it, in form

359 Interview between Beate Sirota Gordon and Suzuki Akinori, Fall, 1992.
360 Ibid.
361 Ibid.
362 Ibid.
terms it was essentially correct – especially where young women were concerned.\footnote{364 Interview between Beate Sirota Gordon and Suzuki Akinori. In this interview Gordon makes clear that she was well aware that women often exercised far more power within the household than they did in public.}

Sirota had the opportunity to eliminate the legal handicaps under which Japanese women had operated and she was determined to do so within the text of the constitution.

Sirota and her Government section colleagues ensured that women’s suffrage was enshrined in the constitution. In addition, in Article 24 they explicitly guaranteed the equal rights of women in marriages and within the family:

**Article 24.** Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis. With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.

Conservatives tried to mitigate these radical statements of equality by qualifying them into irrelevance. Among other things, they had proposed that article 24 be revised to explicitly keep the family as the basis of society, prefacing the article with the statement: “The state guarantees to protect the family in its constitution and authority as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the nation.” In addition they attempted to insert passages promising to “safeguard the institution of marriage and protecting women from having to work outside the home.”\footnote{365 Pharr, p. 232.} In Japan, the basic political unit had been the family or household, under the control of a the eldest male. This, of course, was exactly contrary to the intent of the original Government Section Draft, and GHQ did not permit the changes. The new structure of the family, based on the dignity and autonomy of the individual, became one of the points about the new constitution that GHQ sought to emphasize to the Japanese public. The head of the household in Imperial Japan, as was pointed out in a GHQ-sponsored pamphlet about the
new constitution, was the father. Among his recognized exclusive privileges were the disposal of household assets, participation in public life, control of his wife and the decision about his children’s marriage partners. GHQ’s reforms stripped household heads of the ability to decide their children’s marriage partners and it reformed his former privileges to be rights equally enjoyed by his wife.

(20, 21) The changes in the relative status of women and men under the new constitution as illustrated in a pamphlet produced by GHQ. On the left was the situation before in which the scowling figure labeled “father” was shown with his prerogatives, including the disposal of assets, the ability to live up to his potential as a member of society, to choose marriage partners for his children and to exercise dominion over his wife. On the right is the situation “now,” that is, after the new constitution, in which the man and woman are smiling equal partners who have married based on their own mutual desire, decide things together, and both have the capacity to realize their potential in wider society.366

Along with the abolition of licensed prostitution discussed in Chapter Two, these changes formally stripped Japanese men of the control they had formerly exercised over women’s sexuality. Before the Occupation a man was legally entitled to sexual exclusivity from his wife, while she could not expect the same from him. Adultery was a crime for women, but not for men unless the woman involved was the wife of another man. Citing equality before the law, GHQ mandated that it either be made a crime for both or dropped altogether. The Japanese government elected to drop it. Household heads could also sell their daughter’s into prostitution, which they could no longer do because

366 Michiyo Morioka, *An American Artist in Tokyo: Francis Blakemore < 1906 – 1997 <*, (Seattle, Washington: Marquand Books, 2007) p. 88. The pamphlet featured artwork but together by a team led by Frances Baker nee Wismer and later Blakemore. Baker had lived in Japan for five years prior to the war and produced propaganda pamphlets for the U.S. Military. She worked for the Occupation in the Civil Information and Education Section during the Occupation and would remain in Tokyo afterward, living with her second husband, the lawyer Thomas Blakemore until the infirmities of age compelled their return to the United States.
of SCAPIN 642. In short, GHQ’s changes in the status of women eliminated patriarchal control over Japanese women’s sexuality and assigned it to the women themselves. These changes would be deeply resented by Japanese men.

The Gentle Conquerors: GIs as an Alternate Model of Masculinity

During the Second World War, many Japanese viewed Americans and their British allies as savage, subhuman animals. Kichikubeei, “American and British fiends,” was a standard epithet Japanese used for their enemies. Fears of wholesale massacre, mutilation and rape were rampant.\(^{367}\) In short, the bar GIs had to clear to make a relatively good impression on Japanese civilians was set extraordinarily low. In the early days of the Occupation many Japanese were undoubtedly relieved just not to be physically attacked. For many Japanese the behavior and temperament of the American servicemen was not only better than they had expected, it was better than they had dared hope. For the most part, the Americans were well-disciplined, but more than that they were open and relaxed. The model of masculinity they presented was completely alien to most Japanese of the mid-1940s.

The Japanese ideal of manhood centered on the military man. The military quite consciously sought to instill in its recruits a sense of superiority to their civilian neighbors.\(^{368}\) The military not only considered itself beyond civilian control, it went so far as to assert that all of its members were above civilian authority.\(^{369}\) Military men were accustomed to privilege when they were in uniform among the civilian population,

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\(^{367}\) See Chapter 3.


skipping to the front of lines while their lessers waited patiently. Their training was a brutal and sado-masochistic regimen which emphasized fatal resignation to the whims of superiors and the complete denial of self.370 They were indoctrinated in a cult of bushidō, a martial tradition largely invented by peace time samurai and modern ideological bricoleurs, piecing together a invented tradition of national glory in age-old martial discipline and obedience.371 Stoicism and self-immolation, divorced from context and celebrated for their own sake, were the cardinal virtues.372 Death in battle was the ultimate glory, surrender the ultimate shame.373 The Japanese military and the society which both produced and emulated it created an ideal of masculinity in which men were expected to be dutiful, selfless, stern, and authoritarian. To be sure it was expected that these qualities would be tempered by half-concealed generosity of spirit and kindness of heart, demonstrated by occasional generosity and indulgence of subordinates, inferiors and especially small children. Nevertheless it was generally thought that in most cases men should be distant and unaffectionate.

Superficially, at least, the contrast to American soldiers could scarcely have been greater. The GIs were disciplined and military in bearing to be sure, but they appeared relaxed, and cheerful.374 They seemed at least as happy to have survived the war as they were to have won it. They were full of a joie de vivre that was the very antithesis of the mid-twentieth century understanding of bushidō. Many Japanese no doubt – certainly the military men – would have been wont to dismiss them as frivolous were it not for the

372 Toll, pp. 96 – 98.
circumstances responsible for their presence. They were, after all, victors and conquerors. For years, the rigor of Japanese life, the contumelies of the Japanese military and, to a lesser extent, of Japanese men, had been justified as necessities for handling the serious business of war. Yet Japan’s military had been beaten. It had surrendered – unconditionally – to this army of confident, cheerful men with springs in their steps and smiles on their faces.

From MacArthur on down, the Americans who arrived in Japan impressed the Japanese with an aura of confident, forward-looking optimism. The Supreme Commander embodied this spirit, quite self-consciously, from the moment he first appeared in Japan. Recalling his iconic deplaning at Atsugi airbase, lounge singer Peggy Hayama recalled: “The sight of MacArthur stepping off the plane at Astugi Field was very impressive. With that pipe in his teeth, it was like the director had just yelled ‘action’ and he makes his appearance – just like a movie star.” The image was burned into the Japanese consciousness and remains a symbol of both Japan’s defeat and its subsequent renewal.

(22, 23) MacArthur Deplaning at Atsugi Airbase. Left: The image as it appears in an advertisement run by the publisher Takarajima shortly after the devastation of the March 11, 2011 Earthquake/Tsunami/Nuclear Meltdown Triple Disaster in Northern Japan. The copy translates roughly as “let us make a great country, no matter how many times it takes.” Right: The scene as recreated for the 2007 all female acting troupe Takarazuka’s production of Reimeinokaze.

375 Sherman and Fuhrman.
Though few could hope to match MacArthur for dramatic flair, ordinary servicemen did their best to project confidence and authority and in large part they succeeded. U.S. Navy Chief Yeoman Harold Hopper recalling his first days in the conquered country, said that he and his fellow sailors would walk the streets with only the older people coming out at first. They would greet each other and move on. “We were being seen.” And seen they were. Ultranationalist firebrand Ishihara Shintarō recalled those early days with some bitterness: “Swaggering GIs often walked down the street as if they owned it. To a child’s mind, the sense of Americans as the enemy didn’t disappear overnight.” Others had a more positive impression. Nearly seventy years after the fact, retired publisher Itō Bungaku recalled seeing the well-fed, well-equipped Americans. They were “tremendously good looking,” walking around in polished leather boots at a time when most Japanese wore geta sandals or footwear made of cloth. With their pressed pants and tall statures, they were objects of the young boy’s admiration, something that he would aspire to be. Neither was he alone. GIs left positive impressions with many young Japanese boys.

The well-fed, well-equipped Americans formed quite a contrast to the defeated Japanese servicemen, most of whom were undernourished, unwashed, wearing threadbare uniforms – often their only clothes – and sometimes disfigured or maimed. Many young boys aspired to be like the victors rather than the defeated. In the traditional Japanese Shichi-go-san ceremony, which celebrates children reaching certain points in their childhoods (three and seven years for girls, three and five years for boys) it had been

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376 Sherman and Fuhrman.
377 Ibid.
378 Telephone Conversation with Itō Bungaku, June 10, 2012.
popular for boys to go in replica uniforms of Japanese army and navy personnel during the war.\textsuperscript{380} During the Occupation, however, their objects of aspiration became American soldiers and replicas of their uniforms were worn by little boys as they celebrated their milestones.\textsuperscript{382} However, Americans did far more than simply be seen. They also interacted with everyday Japanese and their relative modesty when compared to the often haughty men of the Imperial Japanese military made a good and reasonably long-lived impression. Recall from Chapter One Yamada Futarō’s friend Old Man Saitō, who remarked that from the way Americans behaved, it was hard to know who had won the war and Nagai Kafū’s observation that they were “far and away more genial than Japanese military men.”\textsuperscript{383} In her autobiography, Christian women’s activist Kawai Michi wrote that the first troops into Tokyo were well disciplined, courteous, kind to children

\textsuperscript{381} Ibid.
and the poor and so solicitous toward the welfare of elderly women as to make the women almost uncomfortable. Like Kafū and Old Man Saitō, she made a special point of noting that they were rarely haughty or condescending.384

To the extent that the Americans were haughty and condescending – and they certainly could be – their arrogance was usually directed toward Japanese men, and particularly toward men in authority. To these men, Americans could be well-nigh insufferable. They made absolutely sure that Japanese men understood they had lost the war and that there was, so to speak, a new sheriff in town. They went out of their way to make Japanese police, in particular, aware of their inferior position. From the first day of their arrival, Americans clashed with Japanese police.385 While such incidents became uncommon after the first few days and Americans increasingly treated Japanese police as partners in keeping order, they also constantly reminded the Japanese that they were junior partners and that the order they were entrusted to keep would be an American order. Japanese police lived in constant anxiety of demotion, dismissal, or disciplinary action at the whim of the conquerors. Japanese police officers were required to salute all Allied officers and their cars when they passed. The police resented this order and resisted it, despite continued American insistence.386 Americans expected obedience from the Japanese. According to later police recollections, some American officers did not

384 Kawai Michi, Nakamura Taeko, trans. Suraidingu Doa, (Tokyo: Keisenjogakuin, 1995), p. 143. Note, this autobiography was originally written in English under the title “Sliding Doors,” and then translated into Japanese. The author only had access to the translation.
385 See Chapter 1.
even hesitate to brandish their weapons to enforce compliance. In one case, an American officer struck a Japanese policeman with a riding crop and then kicked him.  

Americans also dictated how Japanese police were to interact with civilians. The highest profile case of American intervention was in Shikoku. In the Japanese military it had been common for officers and NCOs to discipline their subordinates by ritual corporal punishment. In one such ritual, the offending subordinate was forced to stand at attention and brace himself while the superior beat him about the face and head until he was satisfied that the offending man had been suitably chastised. This ritual had been incorporated into civilian life and Japanese police used it to discipline youths they considered wayward. Upon learning of this, Major General Kenneth F. Cramer ordered all Shikoku police to stop the practice at once on pain of arrest by the American military.

Through actions such as these Americans undermined the prestige of masculine Japanese authority and made very clear to Japanese men that their grasp on their prerogatives was both tenuous and conditional upon American pleasure. While GIs and American authorities did not hesitate to lord it over Japanese men, they were far less severe with women and children. Used to playing subordinate roles, women and children presented no real challenge to American supremacy and so Americans could afford to be, and often were, kind toward them. Whether in high politics, as with the constitution, or daily interaction, as with the order to Shikoku police, Americans frequently presumed to be the champions of Japanese women and children. With the notable exception of suspected *panpan*, Americans were generally respectful and deferential toward women.

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sometimes self-consciously playing the gallant.\textsuperscript{389} Toward children, their attitude was generally one of avuncular indulgence. They were not remote and severe like many Japanese authority figures. On the contrary, many were approachable. Their kindness and generosity toward children was such that soon the children were approaching them without fear and Japanese children with GIs soon became a common theme of American photographers.

One of the most common themes was GIs giving candy to Japanese children. Scenes of Americans sometimes almost literally showering groups of young children with confectionary delights warmed the hearts of many Americans and convinced them that the American mission in Japan was both noble and generous. Indeed they became a staple of American propaganda. Between 1950 and 1975 the US Army produced a television program called \textit{The Big Picture}. Individual episodes focused on various aspects of American foreign policy in particular locales and the Army’s role in advancing it.

During the early days of the Cold War, some time between 1952 and 1954, one of the

\textsuperscript{389} See Chapter 2. Even in the case of suspected \textit{panpan}, Americans tended to be considerably more gentle in their demeanor than Japanese police.  
episodes took Japan as its subject. Portraying the Occupation as a noble and successful mission to spread the gospel of American-style democracy, the film exhorted Americans to look on the amazing strides the people of Japan had made with American help and (implicitly) to continue supporting the American presence there.

(27, 28) Pictures of an American soldier giving candy to Japanese children in September, 1945.\(^{392}\)

The film depicted a scene of an American soldier throwing candy to a large group of cheerful Japanese children. As the film rolled, the narrator droned,

Candy: The universal language of childhood. The common denominator of friendship. Some might call this bribery, the art of buying friendship. Well, perhaps. But a child’s friendship is not easily bought, so perhaps there is another name for it, which the child knows whether the cynic does or not: kindness. It is an art which the GI has practiced for a long time and children the world over have responded. In Japan, the soldiers and children became fast friends immediately.\(^{393}\)

Cynics might well have had another word for scenes like these: staged. The one depicted above was shown from no fewer than six different angles. The image on the left, a photo that is not taken from the film, makes seven. Furthermore, the conceit that the

\(^{392}\) Left: Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, p. 72.

\(^{393}\) Signal Corps Pictorial Center, United States Army, *The Big Picture: Japan: Our Partner in the Far East*, available online at: https://archive.org/details/gov.archives.111-tv-254 (accessed February 2, 2016). The air date of this episode is not given. The series ran from 1950 – 1975. It was produced after the end of occupation and during the time that Yoshida Shigeru was still Prime Minister. The Korean War is discussed as if it is still going on and there is footage of a great flood, perhaps the 1953 North Kyūshū Flood. This would mean it was produced between 6/26/53 and 7/27/53. At any rate, it is certain that it was produced between 4/28/52 and 12/10/54.
soldiers of one’s own country are kind and generous to those weaker than they was hardly unique, nor even original to the United States. Japanese propaganda meant to rally home front support for the war in China featured Japan’s soldiers in much the same

relation to Chinese children as American propaganda suggested applied to GIs and Japanese children.

While one might be tempted to dismiss the Americans as having done nothing more than uphold an international tradition of military propaganda, contemporary Japanese testimony makes clear that positive American interactions with children, especially in the role of candy giver, were far too frequent to have all been done for the benefit of the folks back home. Kawai made reference to scenes very much like that in Our Far East Partner taking place even when no cameras were present. The narrator of

394 The original source of this picture is unknown. It appears on many right-wing Japanese blogs which identify the location as Peiping (Present-day Beijing) in 1938.
the film boasted, “The greatest unofficial ambassador of good will has been the American soldier.”396 This is a judgment in which historian John W. Dower, certainly no fan of American Cold War policy in Japan, essentially concurred, noting that the most effective gifts the occupation gave to the Japanese people were “often the simplest: sweets, cigarettes, and chewing gum, accompanied by offhanded friendliness.”397

The GIs’ kindness toward children, whether or not it was calculated or offhanded, initially had the effect of easing tensions, putting Japanese at ease and helping the Occupation to go smoothly. However, over time, what the GIs and American propagandists deemed to be nothing more than simple kindness began to seem altogether different to some Japanese. As the shock of defeat wore off and the Occupation wore on, patriotic feeling, dormant for a time, began to stir in the hearts of many Japanese. The GIs’ supposed kindness began to seem more like condescending insult. To many women and especially men struggling to provide for their children, the site of those children clamoring for the indulgence of the foreign conqueror was hard to stomach. The envy they felt toward those who could so casually bestow a few moments’ happiness on their children began to grow.

Indeed, even during the early Occupation, when many found GIs’ treatment of children reassuring, there was still a good deal of ambivalence. This much is inadvertently revealed for a split second in Our Far East Partner, with a brief shot of adults looking on as the GI distributes candy. Their postures seem to indicate as much resignation as relief. One Japanese man appears almost openly hostile, standing with arms akimbo as he watches. Among a certain group of Japanese the giving of candy to

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396 The Big Picture: Japan: Our Far East Partner.
397 Dower, Embracing Defeat, picture caption, p. 72.
children came to be among one of the most vehemently resented actions commonly taken by GIs.

By 1953, the leftist teacher’s union Nikkyōso had begun to list distribution of candy to Japanese children among their complaints about American bases and the US-Japan security treaty. In their national convention, a report of the situation near military bases was delivered. One part of the report was about a child going to get candy from an American serviceman and then returning to school with a self-satisfied expression. Seeing this, one of the teachers broke down in tears while yelling at the student. It was clear that sympathy was meant to lie with the teacher rather than the student. Historian Matsushima Eiichi denounced American chocolate, along with Coca-cola and the panpan as symbols of Japan’s descent into a colonial state.

(31) Japanese onlookers to the distribution of candy by an American soldier. Note the postures of the men gathered in the lower center and lower left of the frame.

399 Ibid., 389.
Others opposed to the American military presence in Japan took up the same theme. Shimizu Ikutarō was a sociologist and pundit who first made his name as a leftist before undergoing a tenkō conversion experience and becoming vocal rightist. In his earlier incarnation he edited a volume called Kichi no Ko (Children of the Base-towns), which was a collection of essays purportedly written by children living in base towns about their experiences with Americans. In his introduction Shimizu reveals his thoughts on the essays:

> Possibly readers will be most distraught by images of children pestering American soldiers for chocolate or chewing gum. No matter how you look at it, these children cannot be considered anything but beggars. When I read the essays portraying these children I could hardly hold back my tears. True, Japan’s children are poor, but they are poor not just in material things but in spirit as well. If they were not poor in spirit, but had the ideals of peace and independence engraved in their hearts, then no matter how much they lacked materially, they would not be found playing the beggar.⁴⁰⁰

Later, he opined that the children of base towns were “themselves, however indirectly, parasites living off the bases.”⁴⁰¹ This sort of venom directed at children was nothing but the flip side of a wounded sense of patriotism and masculinity. Thousands of Japanese children had obviously not gotten the memo about engraving the ideals of “peace and independence” in their hearts and were perfectly happy to indulge in the largesse, if not actual kindness of American troops. In doing so they had made all too clear to their elders that the Americans had, at least in a symbolic way, supplanted Japanese men as providers. While this cut a great many Japanese patriots and men to the quick, it paled into insignificance compared to the feeling of humiliation and rage caused by American encroachment into another preserve of traditional masculinity.

⁴⁰⁰ Quoted in Oguma, ‘Minshū’ to ‘Aikoku,’ p. 279.
⁴⁰¹ Ibid.
GIs and Japanese Women

As discussed in Chapter 2, when faced with the prospect with American occupation, Japanese authorities sought to recruit and organize women to provide sexual services for the conquerors. Part of this was, as many testified, that they desired to prevent wide-spread sexual violence. However, even when many police had themselves already noted that the Americans had, on the whole, been well-behaved and well disciplined, they continued their efforts to get the Americans into brothels. Many have noted that the women that had been recruited for these brothels had been seen as a breakwater meant to hold back the waves of Americans’ bestial passions. However, others have suggested that it was also a way to prevent more conventional relationships from developing between GIs and Japanese women.

To the frustration of Japanese officials these plans soon came to naught. On November 10, 1945 Kanagawa Prefectural Assembly member Takahashi Nagaharu (Chōji) addressed the Assembly decrying the money the prefecture’s people had spent in the summer evacuating women to the countryside to protect against American men. When they returned, he claimed, “everyone can see” that they were now proactively seeking American company. Now it had reached the point that they were inviting these foreigners into their homes. Similar frustrations were experienced by the police who had spent the late summer setting up brothels to protect the majority of Japanese women only to find that with the coming of autumn the women approached the Americans of their own accord and would eventually even end up giving birth to mixed-race children.

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403 Ehime Police History, p. 564. See also Tottori Police History, pp. 1099 – 1100.
Americans and their informal relationships with Japanese women presented conservatives with a real challenge. Japanese officialdom had long seen the control of youthful sexuality as part of their purview. When unmarried young women and young men began associating freely during the relatively liberal times of the 1920s and early 1930s in Tokyo’s café culture, authorities reacted by mounting “morals campaigns” to stop the free intermingling of the sexes. This culture with its modern girls (“moga”) and modern boys (“mobo”) had been associated with what were perceived as decadent western influences. Students were forbidden to enter these dens of sin. The order to ban licensed prostitution led to many prostitutes taking their trade to the streets. This trend was further exacerbated by the order placing all brothels off-limits nationwide. Many of these women naturally gravitated to young men with money. And in postwar Japan, a very large number of these men were GIs. Adding to the chaos was that this unregulated mixing of the sexes extended beyond the realm of the purely carnal and many friendly and international romantic liaisons began.

404 Garon, pp. 106 – 108.
American artist Frances Baker (later Blakemore), who had been employed at SCAP’s Civil Information and Education Section and who led the team that produced the pamphlet about the new constitution excerpted above, published a book of prints about life in occupied Japan. One of them was of a castle moat on a moonlit night. All three couples enjoying the evening are mixed-race and two of the men are in uniform.

GI’s with Japanese women was a sight that was all too common for many Japanese males. It often hurt their pride and that injury was compounded by the perceived attitudes of the Japanese women. Sociologist Yamamoto Akira was just twelve years old at the time of surrender. He later recalled with bitterness, “When Japanese women, escorted by American soldiers, would come waltzing out [of the PX], their eyes would happen to fall on a Japanese men, whom they looked at as if they were not even human.” He found it

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“unimaginable” that many of these same women had previously worked in munitions plants making weapons for the Japanese military with hachimaki tied around their heads that read “kamikaze.” It was, he wrote, an image “burned in memory” that he would never forget.

Demographic and economic considerations virtually guaranteed that this would be a sight that was all too common in the Occupation. During the war, while millions of young Japanese men were away at the front, those who were left at home benefited from a terribly skewed sex ratio. In his journal Japanese novelist Nagai Kafu recorded a conversation that he had with a taxi driver in which the ratio became a topic of discussion even before the war with America began. “We haven’t got enough rice, tobacco or gasoline,” the driver lamented. “The only thing of which there is no shortage is women.”

Similarly, Yamada Fūtarō recalled a conversation he had with a factory owner on August 18, 1945 in the anxious interval between the surrender and the beginning of the Occupation. The man was nonchalant about the possibility of rape, noting that Japan had a surfeit of women and thus had plenty of prostitutes to sate the foreigners. His biggest worry was that once the Americans discovered how wonderful Japanese women were, they wouldn’t want to return to their own women and that the Occupation would thus drag on forever.

After the war with the United States the situation became even more unbalanced. In the 1950 census (understandably, no census was carried out in 1945) there were 11,161,212 women between the ages of 25 and 44 (who would have been between 20 and

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39 in 1945). There were only 9,757,091 men, meaning that there were 1,404,121 more women than men for a sex ratio of more than 114 women for every 100 men. For the 25-29 cohort (the survivors of those 20-24 in 1945) the disparity is even worse with 542,324 more women than men for a sex ratio of 119 to 100.409 In addition, it must be remembered that a substantial number of the surviving men had been severely wounded in the war. Nearly 325,000 of them were receiving compensation from the government, and thus presumably unable to provide for themselves, let alone others.410 Even those who were healthy and able-bodied often had no way to support themselves and those that did manage to hold on to a woman sometimes had to endure the humiliation of relying on her attractiveness to Allied servicemen to support him. In some of the early correspondence from the CLO to GHQ there was a missive concerning a Japanese man who had held three American servicemen at pistol point, accusing them of short-changing him after they had procured the services of his common-law wife who was working as a prostitute.411 A survey carried out by the Japanese police and submitted to GHQ in 1950 recorded that almost 10 percent of prostitutes surveyed were currently married another 15 percent were widows living with their children. An additional 18 percent were still living with their families.412

410 Email from Professor Lee Pennington, United States Naval Academy, April 14, 2012.
411 “C.L.O. No. 1415 (1.3) Cases of Murder and Intimidation by Japanese against U.S. Servicemen,” 28 December, 1945, p. 22 in NARA SCAP Records, Box 408, Envelope in front of box.
412 “Investigation reports on the prostitutes and those who have offered them the places of prostitution,” June 1950, in NARA RG 331 GHQ/SCAP Box 334, PSD Pistols to Prostitution, Folder 40: Prostitution.
Japanese women, however, had other options and many of them chose to exercise them. As a result, sex-starved GIs often found it easy to satisfy their carnal desires. Former occupation official Faubion Bowers recalled that “sex was about the only thing the GIs had. They had been in jungles. They had been on islands. And suddenly there were women. And for a bar of chocolate when you’re hungry… There’s nothing these girls wouldn’t do.” The apparent ease with which American soldiers often obtained the women that Japanese men had regarded as their own aggravated the sense of grievance. Compounding the wound to the masculine pride was the shameless and insensitive way that Americans capitalized on their sexual fortunes. Not only did the Americans carry on with Japanese women, but they often did so brazenly and in semi-public venues with little or no regard for propriety or Japanese sensitivities. Bowers recalled that “the moat around the imperial palace was so filled with used condoms that it had to be cleaned out

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(35 – 38) Bill Hume’s “Babysan,” illustrating the often care-free and unserious relations between American servicemen and Japanese women. Many Japanese men did not find the situation funny at all. The author is indebted to long-time resident of Japan, Kurt Hoverson, for bringing these cartoons to his attention.  

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(39) “The Poster Man”: Cartoon illustrating the frustration many Japanese men had with the new sexual politics of occupation and democracy: A disabled veteran finds work posting advertisements for sexual entertainment for GIs. One anonymous Japanese wrote to MacArthur complaining that the Americans in the area and the “‘pom-pom’ girls carry on once a week with big wire scoops.”

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416 Tsurumi et al., p. 70. The cartoon originally appeared in the December 1, 1947 edition of Kumanbachi.
boisterously. They are not embarrassed at all when seen in the act of copulation.”

Others complained of neighbors running brothels or letting rooms in ordinary Japanese neighborhoods for prostitutes and GIs to carry on their assignations. One Japanese complained that the constant noise made by the Americans in one such place kept him or her up all night. Japan became almost synonymous with easy sex and prostitution in the minds of many Americans. The association was so strong that according to one possibly apocryphal story, American comedian Bob Hope listed “Jeanie Rose,” a renowned fellatrix from Kumamoto, as one of the three most famous things in Japan.

Resentment of the GIs and their Japanese girlfriends was everywhere. One anonymous letter addressed to MacArthur complained about an American soldier who took his girlfriend to the Sakeya Hotel at Hatake Hot Springs every Friday, and “The young men of the locale are threatening to burn the hotel if this affair continues.” Many Japanese men resented not only the Americans fraternizing with Japanese women, but also the fact that the Occupation had upset the relations between the sexes that had obtained before defeat. Takami Jun gave voice to this sense of dual grievances in his diary. On October 20, 1945, he wrote of an incident during the day in which he saw a

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417 Bowers in Sherman and Fuhrman.
418 Digest of undated anonymous letter to General MacArthur received on September 23, 1947 in NARA RG 331 Box 502, Folder 7 (1 - 2).
419 Digest of anonymous letter to General MacArthur dated August 3, 1947 in NARA RG 331 Box 502, Folder 7 (1 - 2) 250 - 1 #1. See also digest of letter dated October 3, 1947 from Chiyoda Mikichi to General MarArthur in Ibid.
420 Digest of anonymous undated letter to General MacArthur received on September 23, 1947 in NARA RG 331 Box 502, Folder 7 (1 - 2) 250 - 1 #1.
421 Yamada Meiko, 《禁欲官人況》, p. 188. Yamada gives her name in Katakana as ジニー ローズ, which I have rendered as “Jeanie Rose.” The story may well be a Japanese invention as Yamada is not the most rigorous scholar and the practice of choosing the top three of a given category is very common in Japan, while it is much less so in the United States. However, whether the story is true or not, it is the sort of thing that seems plausible to many Japanese precisely because of how strong they perceive that association to be among foreigners.
422 Digest of anonymous letter to General MacArthur dated Jan. 11, 1947 in NARA RG 331 Box 502, Folder 7 (1 - 2) 250 - 1 #1.
group of female station employees enthusiastically flirting with a GI, concluding that he “shuddered to think that these wretched sluts have the right to vote.”

Others seemed to share the attitude of the elites who first conceived brothels for the conquerors. They didn’t begrudge the Americans their due as conquerors, but resented them when they took it too far. The historical novelist Yoshimura Akira recalled that in his youth during the Occupation it did not bother him so much to see Americans together with unattractive women who were overly made-up, but it pained him greatly to see “pretty, well-bred, inexperienced, and pure-looking women walking happily arm-in-arm with American soldiers.” Thinking that they probably had a sexual relationship, he became bitter about the changes that had come over women since defeat.

Sometimes American men rubbed salt in the wounds of Japanese masculine pride, putting Japanese men into what the Americans regarded as the proper place. Christian women’s activist Kawai Michi recounted an episode in which a “well-built and stern looking” GI boarded a train to discover that the passengers were not meeting his criteria of properly chivalrous behavior. After gesticulating wildly, he managed to convey his displeasure to the passengers and forced the men to stand and then indicated to the women that they should take a seat. After doing so, he looked around the carriage at the new seating arrangement with evident pleasure. In other cases, Americans could not lay claim to enforcing some sense of chivalry. Their actions could be purely malicious. One

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425 Kawai Michi, Suridingu Doa, p. 145.
poor Japanese man had the unfortunate experience of having three American soldiers throw rocks at him while their Japanese dates simply watched as he had to flee.\footnote{Doc No. 33735, Letter form Yokoyama Masayoshi to General MacArthur, August 11, 1947 in GHQ/SCAP Box 502 Folder 7 (1-2) 250 - 1 #1}

Harada Hiroshi, a policeman from Tokyo had a chance to see the new hierarchy from a unique vantage point. Having studied English, Harada was given the opportunity to patrol the capital together with an American MP. As such, he was often afforded the deference reserved for these privileged people from GI and Japanese alike. Nevertheless, as a Japanese man he was pained to see GIs in uniforms, some strolling with their “gorgeous” families and others walking arm in arm with gaudily made-up “ladies of the evening,” while Japanese men in contrast presented an image that was “the picture of wretchedness.”\footnote{Harada Hiroshi, \textit{MP no Jiipu Kara Mita Senvyōka no Tokyo}, (Tokyo: Sōshisha, 1994), p. 61.}

Resentments of fraternization became enough of a problem that eventually Eighth Army Commander Robert Eichelberger issued a directive forbidding public displays of affection between GIs and Japanese women. “The sight of our soldiers walking along the streets with their arms around Japanese girls is equally repugnant to Americans at home and to those in the occupation areas as well as to most Japanese.” Violation was to be treated as disorderly conduct and offenders were to be immediately incarcerated until they received a request for their release “presented in person by the company commander.”\footnote{“Public Displays of Affection,” March 23, 1946. In NARA RG331: GHQ/SCAP Box 433 Folder 250-1 #2.}

Defeat and interracial sex were closely associated in the minds of many and remained so for decades afterward. Peggy Hayama was a lounge singer who got her start performing for GIs in officers’ clubs during the Occupation. Recalling those days more
than fifty years after the end of the war, she talked about the large numbers of women working as prostitutes and how that affected her:

I often rode the bus with prostitutes. I didn’t think they were bad women. They were doing all they could to survive. But when I saw those girls dancing with the GIs, cheek dancing, I thought, well we are all part of the same industry. I said to myself “we really did lose the war, didn’t we?”

Hayama’s self-awareness and empathy toward the women with GIs was exceptional. However her use of the word “prostitutes” (most likely “panpan”) to describe women who were, after all, only dancing was somewhat typical. Many Japanese, especially conservatives and men manifested their resentments not in their expressed attitudes toward the Americans, but rather toward their consorts and the most common way of doing so was to regard and call any woman with an American a “panpan.” This was a tendency shared by women, men, officials and everyday people and it was strongest among those who most resented such relationships.

Women who consorted with or married Americans were frequently denounced in the press as “traitors,” “disgraces,” and, of course, “panpan.” One girl of seventeen married an American soldier, who was himself only eighteen, and was walking hand-in-hand with him when the couple were accosted by several Japanese men denouncing her as a panpan. The men, it turned out had chosen the wrong couple to harass because the soldier grabbed one of men, dragged him off to the police station and forced him to apologize to his bride while on his knees.

Other Japanese men with either less courage or more wisdom waited until the Americans had left. Police were particularly eager to arrest women who were in the company of GIs. According to an interview one young woman gave in 1949, she had a

429 Peggy Hayama interviewed in Sherman and Fuhrman
430 Hayashi Kaori, Tamura Keiko and Takatsu Fumiko, Sensō Hanayome, pp. 1, 10, 11.
431 Ibid., p. 212.
date with a foreign, (probably American) soldier whom she hoped to marry. Afterward, he took her to the station and dropped her off there. Shortly after they parted a policeman appeared and hauled her off to the police station and then forced her to go to the hospital and undergo a V.D. examination.\textsuperscript{432}

Another young woman interviewed at about the same time said she was arrested after a chance encounter with a foreign (again probably American) soldier on the street. The soldier approached her and asked her where she was going. She replied that she was going home. He then asked her where she lived. She told him Kyoto. Then he got on a bus. A plainclothes policeman who saw the interaction emerged and confronted her. She protested that she did not even know the man. The policeman countered that she should not have adopted an attitude that would cause an American to accost her. He said he had caught her in the act and hauled her off to Kawabata police station to await transport for the inevitable V.D. examination.\textsuperscript{433}

The above examples were taken from an academic work on prostitution done by some Kyoto-area professors and their graduate students. They limited their analysis to subjects whom they called \textit{onrii}, from the English for “only-one,” that is a so-called prostitute who had only one customer and was not necessarily remunerated. Their attitude toward both the women and their relationship is perhaps best understood in light of the fact that they titled their work \textit{Street Prostitutes}.\textsuperscript{434} As Chazono Toshimi, a researcher on

\textsuperscript{432} Sumiya Etsuji and Takenaka Katsu, eds., \textit{Gaishō: Jittai to Sono Shuki}, (Tokyo: Yūkōsha, 1949), pp. 224 – 225. See also Chazono, pp. 185 – 186. \textit{Gaishō}, was printed when censorship was still in effect and the soldier’s nationality is omitted.

\textsuperscript{433} \textit{Gaishō}, pp. 235 – 236. See also Chazono, pp. 186 – 187. In this young woman’s case, this was her second arrest. She had been in a relationship with a foreigner while working at a cabaret in Osaka. During that relationship she had been rounded up, examined, tested positive for V.D. and cured after treatment.

\textsuperscript{434} \textit{Gaishō}, pp. 72, 86, 92.
postwar prostitution, has pointed out, this work would actually have been better labeled a
investigation of the lives of GIs’ girlfriends.\textsuperscript{435}

To many Japanese men, and not a few women, there was no such thing as a
legitimate relationship between Japanese women and American men.\textsuperscript{436} For many, the
humiliation was simply impossible to forget. It even affects some who never had personal
experience with Americans and Japanese women. In 1997, a group of so-called “war
brides” (a formulation to which they generally object as they feel it degrades them to the
status of war booty) gathered for a convention of overseas Japanese. Hayashi Kaori a
writer who accompanied some of the women attended as well. After the opening
ceremony, a group of them were waiting for a bus in front of the building. A man in his
fifties, who had the appearance of a bureaucrat came upon them and violently pushed
them aside on his way into the building as if they were “something filthy.” Hayashi
recalled that she had never seen such a look of such contempt on the face of any human
being.\textsuperscript{437}

At about the same time, renowned ultranationalist Ishihara Shintarō recalling his
experiences of defeat and Occupation had the following to say: “You saw so many GIs
with prostitutes everywhere. As a male, I had such a feeling of humiliation – No, more
than that – maybe a reluctance to believe, a sense of the absurdity of history. I still
remember that feeling.”\textsuperscript{438} That reluctance to believe would become soon find expression

\textsuperscript{435} Chazono, p. 172.
\textsuperscript{436} As Sarah Kovner has pointed out, this attitude was shared by quite a few American men in positions of authority in
the Occupation. (\textit{Occupying Power}). For an example of a prominent Japanese woman with this attitude see Ichikawa
Fusae, “‘Dokuritsu’ Nippon no Fujin Mondai (Women’s Issues in ‘Independent’ Japan),” \textit{Tōyō Keizai Shimpō
\textsuperscript{437} Hayashi, Tamura and Takatsu, p. 19.
\textsuperscript{438} Ishihara Shintaro, interviewed in Ibid.
in a myth of mass rape and sexual predation in literature, both overtly fictional and presented as factual, in the post-Occupation period.
GHQ enacted a wide-ranging sexual revolution as part of its reform agenda. Where there had once been a firm order of patriarchal control of sexuality extending to marriage, prostitution and courtship, there was now a system of at least formal equality between the sexes based on the sexual autonomy of the individual. The legal niceties of this new system were lost on a good deal of workaday Japanese. The idea of individual rights was slow to take hold in Japan. According to a Japanese government survey carried out in 1950, some 13% of Tokyo residents had never even heard the term “human rights.” In rural areas, the number reached 45%.439

While the changes wrought in women’s status were little more than obscure abstractions to many, the everyday consequences were everywhere in evidence, as women throughout Japan began relationships with Americans on both romantic and commercial bases. In the eyes of many Japanese all of these women, GI girlfriends and streetwalkers alike, were panan and they were an open challenge to Japan’s once discreet and orderly sexual relations. Unlike the captive prostitutes of the licensed prostitution system, these women were sexual free agents and they often flaunted both their sexuality and their relative material wealth.440 They became ubiquitous as a symbol of postwar Japan and its straitened circumstances.

440 Chazono Toshimi, Panpan to wa Dare Nanoka (Who are the Panpan?), (Tokyo: Impakuto Shuppankai, 2014), pp. 10 - 11, 90 – 95, 254.
Michael Molasky, an expert on occupation-era Japanese literature noted of the

*panpan*:

Despite their vulnerability, the *panpan* were perceived as threatening. Their association with free-flowing sexual desire and especially their control over male desire encroached on Japanese men’s social hegemony. So did their apparent rejection of traditional female domesticity (monogamy and childbearing). Sympathetic narratives about the *panpan* frequently emphasize their inability to get married and to bear children. By emphasizing these women’s exclusion from blissful domesticity, such narratives strive to contain the prostitute’s subversive potential, which derives in part from this rejection of domestic life. 441

When Occupation-era censorship ended narratives such as those described by Molasky became a commonplace of the postwar publishing scene. Many of these were printed solely to fill a niche and make some money, but others had a more overtly political motive. These writings would form the foundation of the myth of mass rape during the Occupation that has recently been incorporated into mainstream history.

*Panpan* literature had a strong focus on rape and it presented most of the women consorting with Americans as having first been the victims of sexual violence. It would soon become integral to an anti-American campaign conducted by leftist activists in Japan as the Cold War heated up. In January of 1950, an anonymous letter, thought to be the work of Josef Stalin, was carried in the Cominform’s official news organ. It criticized the Japanese Communist Party for its strategy of peaceful revolution. The criticism set off an internal struggle within the party that was eventually resolved in favor of the impressionist faction led by Tokuda Kyūichi. On March 24, after consolidating much of the party behind him Tokuda called for a unified front in a nationalist revolution against

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American imperialism. Denouncing the U.S. as a neo-colonial bully bent on using the Japanese people as cannon fodder in future wars of aggression in Asia, he called on all true patriots to unite in order to overthrow the treacherous conservative Yoshida government and expel the foreign interlopers whose interest it served. National solidarity was necessary if Japan was ever to regain its independence and restore the country’s true spirit, now sullied by defeat and occupation. In their campaign to rally the nation behind their anti-American agenda, Tokuda and his allies were ready to exploit any source of wide-spread resentment against the occupiers. The relations between American troops and Japanese women came to many of their minds. Tokuda himself played on this theme when he denounced government policies as “forcing the Japanese people to adopt the character of a supine prostitute.”

In 1951, after another round of internal squabbling, the JCP came together to announce a new program for the party. The party officially rejected “the idea that the liberation and democratic growth and expansion of JAPAN can be attained through peaceful means.” In the coming struggle, the Party would need to lead the establishment of a new “racial democratic system” which would throw off the oppressor. In doing so they sought to raise the consciousness of the average Japanese about the “slavery-like oppression of the Occupation policies.” Of course, with the economy booming, this was

443 Tokuda Kyūichi “Atarashii Jōsei to Kore ni tai Suru Waga tō no Seisaku,” in Tokuda Kyūichi, Nihon Kyōsantō Gojūnen Mondai Shiryōshu, vol. 1, p. 13. Though Tokuda’s use of this term certainly gave his argument rhetorical flourish, it was something he likely did not say lightly. According to a posthumous tribute by his brother, both of Tokuda’s grandmothers were from impoverished families that sold them into prostitution in Okinawa, a profession they both escaped only by becoming concubines of Kagoshima traders. See Tōyō Shokan (ed.) Kaisō no Tokuda Kyūichi, (Tokyo: Tōyō Shokan, 1955) pp. 17 - 18.
445 Ibid.
somewhat difficult and so the Communists made an appeal on something that, while not exactly true, felt that way to many men: “Women are forced even to become prostitutes.”

Other elements of the left echoed this theme. On February 27, 1953 Socialist Diet woman Fujiwara Michiko addressed the House of Councilors and, in a speech that would become renowned, denounced the disorderly and lascivious atmosphere around American bases. Citing an article from the previous summer’s Asahi Shimbun, she asserted that the problem was even becoming a big issue in the United States, with Senator O’Hara grilling Defense Secretary Lovett about the problem. As it turns out, there was no Senator O’Hara in the Congress, the body was not even in session on the date of the alleged exchange. In reality, O’Hara was a House member who had sent a inquiry to Lovett, to which the Pentagon responded months later, stating that the matter was outside the purview of the American forces in Japan. The response was carried in an article in the Asahi which occupied all of about four square inches. In the United States, it made nary a ripple. Nevertheless, Fujiwara demanded to know why the United States had not outlawed prostitution. In the same address Fujiwara asserted that there were 1,878 cases of “outrage” by American soldiers between May 1 and December 31 of that year. In reality, the number she quoted was the total number of allegations lodged against all UN forces, associated personnel, and their dependents for any crime whatsoever during that

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446 Ibid.
448 “Baishun Torishimari Beigun no Kenkatsugai (Outlawing Prostitution Outside Purview of American Military),” Asahi Shimbun, July 24, 1952, p. 1. Fujiwara’s far more dramatic portrayal depiction has come to be accepted by many who write on postwar prostitution in Japan and relations between GIs and Japanese Women. See for example, Hirai Kazuko, Nihon Senryū to Gendaa (The Japanese Occupation and Gender), (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2014), p. 76.
The number of actual rape allegations against American servicemen was twenty-two. During the same period the number of rape allegations against Korean residents of Japan was sixty-nine. The number of Japanese nationals accused of the same crime was 2,735. Thus, the average Japanese woman was 124 times more likely to be raped by a Japanese man than an American soldier. Moreover, assuming that ninety percent of the reported rape cases against Japanese men were committed by males between the ages of fifteen and forty-nine, the rape rate for this demographic was approximately 11.67 per hundred thousand, while that for male Korean residents of Japan was about 23 per hundred thousand. The comparable figure for American servicemen was about 8.46. In other words, there was no single group of young men from whom a Japanese woman had less to fear during the very time Fujiwara railed about. Nevertheless, such details mattered little in the charged atmosphere of the early 1950s. With the outbreak of the Korean War many on the left grew brazen in their assertions about the behavior of American servicemen, denouncing them not only as crass sexual opportunists, but violent criminals as well. The myth of mass rape was born.

One of the earliest examples of such propaganda surfaced shortly after a GI was murdered in a Korean neighborhood. A flier distributed by a man thought to be Korean justified the killing on the grounds of the “barbarous conducts” of the GIs, which were

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451 Ibid.
452 Ibid.
453 Ibid., pp. 10, 44.
454 These figures are derived by using the following figures for populations: For Japanese men the average of 1950 and 1955 census figures for the total number of men between the ages of 15 and 49 in 1952 (respectively 20,117,222 and 22,060,767 to obtain a figure of 21,088,994). Though this is admittedly a rough estimate, given a growing population it can reasonably be assumed that the figures for 1950 and 1955 represent, lower and upper bounds for the population. This would lead to a rape rate of between 11.15 and 12.23 per hundred thousand. The figure for resident Koreans is based on the assumption that all reported rapes were committed by men and that men made up half the population of the approximately 600,000 Korean residents. As for the American servicemen the number is derived by taking the number of reported rapes and dividing it by 2.6 on the grounds that the American troop strength at the time of the return of sovereignty in April 1952 was approximately 260,000. See Takemae Eiji, Inside GHQ, p. 126.
alleged to be “beyond description” including violence, robbery, and rape. Anticipating a theme that would later be a staple of atrocity propaganda, it alleged that these acts which were undertaken “in despair” by Americans who did not want to go to the Korean front.\footnote{A Korean Movement Concerning the Asakusa Murder of GI Case,” Apr. 10, 1951, NARA RG 331 Box 351 Folder 7 (marked “000.5A Crimes”). For other examples of the despairing criminality trope see, for example, Mizuno Hiroshi, “Shi ni Nozonde Uttaeru,” (Tokyo: Tōgosha, 1982), p. 174 - 185; Goō Ben, Kuroi Haru (Tokyo: Tōgosha, 1985), pp. 126 - 131 pp. 150 - 152; Fujiwara Shinji, Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, (Tokyo: Masushobō, 1955), pp. 169, 173, 177, 198; Fujiwara Shinji, Zoku Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, (Tokyo: Masushobō, 1955) pp. 51, 178.}

By the time Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952, tales of American violence had grown in the recounting and were projected back to the beginning of the Occupation. Mass rape was presented as nearly ubiquitous from the time the first Americans landed. In October, 1952, just six months after the formal return of sovereignty, Hessel Tiltman, long-time Far Eastern correspondent for the Manchester Guardian, warned readers of the Washington Post, that due to tales of rape and other atrocity propaganda anti-American sentiment was “seething in Japan.”\footnote{Hessel Tiltman, “Anti-American Feeling is Seething in Japan,” The Washington Post, October 12, 1952.} The following year, he warned of a campaign of “malicious lies” to discredit American forces by sensationalizing or fabricating stories of crime and sleaze connected to US bases. He noted among other things, the trend among “less reputable Japanese publications” seeking to cash in on “lurid stories purportedly written by the Japanese ‘victims’ of alleged American rapes.”\footnote{Hessell Tiltman, “Malicious Lies Stir Japanese Against U.S.,” The Washington Post, July 12, 1953, p. B1.}

This last article was enough to catch the interest of the Japanese Foreign Ministry and they had it translated and issued a report on the issue, concluding that the allegation put forth in these magazines were so far-fetched that they would gain little traction among a populace who had had ample experience with American servicemen.\footnote{See also DRO A-0134/10 0156 - 0157.}

Time, however, has proven the Foreign Ministry’s analysis entirely too optimistic. It cannot be said for certain what “less reputable Japanese publications,” Tiltman had in

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mind when he wrote, however, there are a number of writings that have had an outsized influence on our subsequent understanding of the Occupation period generally and on the construction of the myth of mass rape in particular. None of these sources is reliable. Some are proven frauds. They will be examined in detail below.

**Kanzaki Kiyoshi**

The most prolific writer on the subject of the *panpan* was Kanzaki Kiyoshi. According to John Dower, Kanzaki is the “most widely cited author” on the subject, and indeed a glance at any bibliography on the subject is likely to turn up Kanzaki’s name, usually multiple times.459 His name would become synonymous with agitation against prostitution, miscegenation and the US-Japanese military alliance, causes he invariably linked.460 During his activism against prostitution, he testified before the Diet and served on investigative committees.461 He is most often identified by scholars citing his work as a literary critic or social activist. As the Occupation began, however, he was neither. His association with the topic of prostitution was what brought him into Japan’s social and intellectual elite. Prior to the notoriety he achieved with his work on the topic he was a frustrated literatus. Though he was graduate of the elite Tokyo University and had been an intimate of the renowned writer Akutagawa Ryūnosuke prior to Akutagawa’s suicide, he had manifestly not lived up to his promise. At war’s end Kanzaki, to the chagrin of some of his friends, was making his living writing pulp romances for teenage girls.462

461 Kokkai Gijiroku Tōroku, April 14, 1954; July 7, 1955; March 5, 1957; October 9, 1959; June 6, 1963; March 25, 1965.
After graduation, Kanzaki’s ambition was to become a librarian at his alma mater. The position, however, went to a friend of his and Kanzaki was forced to look elsewhere. Through an acquaintance, he managed to get a job as literature teacher at a girls’ high school. He was terminated there after only two years. According to his son, who contributed to and edited a hagiographic biography and collection of reminiscences about his father shortly after the latter’s death, the reason for Kanzaki’s dismissal was his outspoken opposition to the school administration’s mercenary embrace of the profit motive.\footnote{Kanzaki Takeshi, ed. \textit{Kanzaki Kiyoshi no Tsuioku}, (Tokyo: Uniaato, 1981), p. 45.}

It was at this point that Kanzaki began his literary career. Writing under the name Shimamoto Shizuo, he began contributing short stories to the monthly \textit{Shojo no Tomo}, a magazine aimed at teenage girls. For several years Kanzaki, writing as Shimamoto, contributed to nearly every issue, his byline regularly appearing even when paper shortages drove the magazine to cut its length to about a third. However short his teaching career, Kanzaki put it to good use. The most common story pattern he produced was an intergenerational chaste romance between a high school teacher and one of his problematic students. Typically this girl was wild, troublesome, and untamed, a girl that no other male teacher could reach. However Kanzaki’s hero-teacher (usually named “Shimamoto,” like his nom de plume) is somehow able to get through to her. He is empathetic, young and charismatic, not staid and stuffy like the other teachers. Typically, he gains her trust and helps her to see the error of her ways, showing her the true significance of the values that she so thoughtlessly flaunts. In the end, the girl learns a valuable lesson and is back on track to, presumably, become a responsible member of society. All of this was made possible because of her teacher’s unique ability to
understand her urges to rebellion while simultaneously appreciating the importance of the values against which she rebelled.\textsuperscript{464} This conceit would carry over into Kanzaki’s writing on prostitution.

Politically, Kanzaki became strongly leftist after the war. According to his biography, his attraction to the political left was not entirely new. In his youth he was somewhat brash in his support of unorthodox ideas. Upon entry in the inaugural class of the Osaka Special Higher School, Kanzaki was given the honor of making a speech at the school’s opening ceremony. Hayashi Senjūrō, then commander of the army’s Osaka division and later Prime Minister of Japan, was in attendance. Hayashi was infuriated by the liberal tone of Kanzaki’s speech and the following day Kanzaki was reprimanded by the school’s administration.\textsuperscript{465}

Once the war broke out, however, Kanzaki drank deep from the cup of Japanese militarism. In his Shimamoto persona, he was fulsome in his praise for Japan’s military and its world historical mission to liberate Asia from the yoke of western imperialism.\textsuperscript{466} He was particularly critical of Chiang Kai-shek’s obduracy in not understanding Japan’s benevolent role.\textsuperscript{467} In his short stories, he constantly reaffirmed the value and importance of Japan’s wartime gender roles, lauding the valor and intrepidity of its men, especially its military men, as well as the modesty and chastity of its women. He extolled the virtues of patriotism and self-sacrifice, penning inspirational stories about the sort of young women whose families quartered troops, or schoolgirls who went to Manchuria to

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distribute food and presents to the soldiers there.\textsuperscript{468} In the preface to a collection of short stories he had written about school girls in wartime he wrote:

Now Japan’s schoolgirls must move as one, facing this era of the great war, gallantly, beautifully and with gentle hearts. It is with dreams that this book will accompany thousands upon thousands of the nation’s schoolgirls, their footsteps echoing as they march on the road to victory, that I conclude this preface and put down my pen.\textsuperscript{469}

A corollary of Kanzaki’s embrace of the militarist cause was a loathing and contempt for Japan’s principal antagonist, the United States. In one of his stories, “The English Teacher,” written in 1942, after the study of English had been downgraded to an elective, one student who rather likes English confesses to her teacher that she has obtained an American sewing-pattern book and asks for help in interpreting it. Her teacher then flies into a nationalist anti-American rant, demanding that she destroy the book and reducing the girl to a tearful repentance for her betrayal of Japan’s sacred struggle against “Americanism.” The teacher insists that the student cannot even allow herself to think of imitating “vain American women.” At this point, Kanzaki, writing as Shimamoto inserts his own approving editorial comments:

Kasahara Sensei was completely right. In order to defeat America we must fight them not only in the Pacific, but also in the realms of our culture and customs. At a time when our schoolgirls, burning with patriotic fervor, are sewing parachutes, packing our bombs with explosives and making magnificent contributions to our war effort, it is mortifying that some girls still dress as Americans and cannot rid themselves of their deplorable preoccupation with American movies and fashions. . . . That sound [of the student destroying the pattern book] was nothing less than the sound of a Japanese schoolgirl returning to her true form as a Japanese woman, unhesitatingly throwing off the influence of Americanism.\textsuperscript{470}

As Kanzaki was to discover in the years that followed, it would take a great deal more to throw off the influence of Americanism than the destruction of a sewing pattern


\textsuperscript{469} Shimamoto Shizuo, \textit{Shōjo Kotekitai}, (Tokyo: Jitsugyō no Nihonsha, 1942) p. 3.

book. Soon Americans and Americanism were everywhere and the their arrival on the scene presaged the beginning of a period of hard times for Kanzaki. After Japan’s defeat Kanzaki published little new for four years. Times were lean. He had no regular job and relied on recycled collections of his old Shimamoto stories to makes ends meet.\footnote{Kanzaki Takeshi, ed. Kanzaki Kiyoshi no Tsuioku, p. 30.} According to his own recollection, it was during this time that he watched well-fed and well-dressed Japanese women cavorting with Americans, and it filled him with a deep sense of humiliation and resentment.\footnote{“Amerikagata’ Seikōdō no Dentatsushatachi no Jittai,” Shūkan Posuto, September, 1973, pp. 80 – 81.} He fully reemerged on the literary scene only after the Occupation regime of pre-censorship was lifted in 1949. When he did, he wrote under his own name, retiring “Shimamoto” forever. After defeat, Kanzaki soon forgot his support for militarism and embraced the political left. He abandoned his wartime animosities to the extent that he eventually became a board member of both the Japan-Soviet Friendship Society and the Japan-China Friendship Society.\footnote{Kanzaki Takesi, ed. Kanzaki Kiyoshi no Tsuioku, p. 110.} American intelligence judged both of these organizations to be Communist-front organizations. Of the latter, one analyst wrote: “The Japan-China Friendship Association (JCFA)* is one of the major Communist-front organizations in Japan and a link between the Japan and Chinese Communist Parties (JCP, CCP).”\footnote{“SUMMARY OF INFORMATION; SUBJECT: Japan-China Friendship Association (NIPPON CHUGOKU YUKO KYOKAI),” December 22, 1951 in NARA RG 84 Entry #2828 Tokyo Office of the US Political Advisor Classified General Records, Box 68, File “350.21 Communism Oct. – Dec. 1951.”} While Kanzaki had clearly reevaluated his position on China, he did retain his wartime hatred of America. With the onset of the Cold War, anti-Americanism became the foundation of a new leftist nationalism and Kanzaki was among its chief proponents.\footnote{See Oguma Eiji, “Minshu” to “Aikoku,” (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2002), chapter 7, especially (pp. 255 – 287).}
In his anti-American agitation he spoke to a sense of grievance nursed by many Japanese men who were both nauseated and titillated by the apparently care-free and fun-filled relationships between GIs and the women they had formerly considered their exclusive property.476 During the Occupation anywhere Americans were, there were also Japanese women and to many a Japanese man, like Kanzaki and Ishihara, it was a sight that reminded them of their defeat and served to humiliate them.477 In Kanzaki’s view women consorting with Americans were not just whores, they were traitors. He was more or less explicit about this when recalling an incident that occurred during the May Day Riot of 1952, just days after the return of sovereignty. A mob, seeing an American soldier with a Japanese woman physically attacked the couple, hurling stones at them. Kanzaki wrote of the incident with evident approbation calling the woman a traitor to her country and asserting that the that crowd was demonstrating an awakened national consciousness by its actions.478 It was in this spirit that Kanzaki reinvented himself as a campaigner against prostitution, miscegenation and US bases in Japan.

Beginning in April, 1949 Kanzaki began writing on these subjects and publishing in any venue that would have him. From the sensationalist Shinsō to the relatively staid Chūō Kōron, he wrote articles about prostitution and its attendant evils and it was clear that he was mostly blaming the Occupation authorities and its troops for the situation. Many of these articles have been collected and reissued in book form under various titles over the years.479 Kanzaki was a supporter and sometimes collaborator of the

476 Chazono Toshimi, Panpan to wa Dare Nanoka (Who are the Panpan?), (Tokyo: Impakuto Shuppankai, 2014), p. 63.
aforementioned Socialist Dietwoman Fujiwara Michiko.\textsuperscript{480} Kanzaki became so noted for his advocacy that he was invited to testify before the Education Committee of the House of Councilors on the subject in 1957. There, returning to a favorite theme of his wartime writings, he railed against “Americanism” which he defined as the “delusion that sexual pleasure is life’s greatest purpose.”\textsuperscript{481}

In his writings on prostitutes Kanzaki continually feigns a paternal concern, a la Shimamoto, for these poor fallen girls. He would have his writings serve as a warning to girls not to succumb to the temptations of Americanism. Nevertheless his desire to punish the women about whom he writes, literally if not literally, is never far from the surface. In one place he asserted that to American soldiers Japanese women were nothing but “tools to satisfy their sexual needs.”\textsuperscript{482} Discussing the situation of the bases in Tachikawa, Chitose and Kure, he claimed that most of the women who worked on the base had either been girlfriends of GIs when they got the job or quickly became so. After they were inevitably deserted most fell into lives of prostitution and were without exception, miserable creatures. This applied to all women with any connection to Americans, even those that worked as domesticics, decent paying and desirable jobs for many women in postwar Japan.\textsuperscript{483} His resentment toward what he viewed as Japanese traitors is only surpassed by that he evinces for their consorts, the American sexual interlopers. In his writings, Americans are, without exception, either brutish satyrs, devilishly charming forked-tongued lotharios or both.\textsuperscript{484} In the service of promoting these themes there can be little doubt that Kanzaki put his ample experience with creative writing to good use.

\textsuperscript{480} Kanzaki, 1974, p. 312.
\textsuperscript{481} http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiiin/026/0462/02603050462008a.html
\textsuperscript{482} Kanzaki Kiyoshi, 1974, p. 196.
\textsuperscript{484} Kanzaki, 1974, p. 6, 156.
Kanzaki’s writings contain stories that range from the improbable to the simply absurd. It is impossible to know what, if anything, that Kanzaki wrote on the subject is factual. However, it is very easy to establish that much of it is simply false. Let us begin with what is both demonstrably false and oft-repeated.

In an anecdote that has been widely repeated, he has hundreds of American soldiers finding their way to a “comfort station” in Tokyo on August 28, the first day of the Occupation. The brothel had opened that very day and its employees were barely even set up and thus had nothing but rudimentary curtains separating one prostitute from another, but the GIs had no shame. They engaged in “animalistic sex” with the poor Japanese women who had been shanghaied into serving them, right in the hall, leaving the Japanese police and others involved in the operation in a state of tears as they witnessed the fate of their now defenseless women before the bestial conquerors.485

The problem with this story is that it simply impossible. On August 28 there were, aside from POWs, fewer than 200 (mostly terrified) American troops in the country. Most of them were specialists working overtime to prepare for MacArthur’s landing two days later and none of them left Atsugi, which incidentally was completely surrounded by Japanese police (more to protect the Americans from the Japanese than vice-versa) who would certainly have noticed anyone leaving the grounds.486 As darkness fell, the Americans all retired to their barracks and the only activity from the camp was the

486 Kanagawa Keisatsushi, vol. 3, pp. 48 - 52; Takemae, 2000, p. 53
patrolling of a small security detail. The Americans did not enter Tokyo in force until September 8.

Elsewhere Kanzaki alleges that even before the Americans had officially landed an enterprising pimp from Kure arranged for a boat full of prostitutes to approach an Allied warship in the harbor, where, one can only assume, that military discipline and wartime suspicions alike were instantly dropped, and rather than being gunned down as possible kamikazes or spies, the boats approaching the warships were unmolested and the prostitutes were welcomed aboard with open arms and ushered into the sailors’ quarters, where, one can only assume, all sense of privacy and decorum was again forgotten altogether. Meanwhile in Yokosuka a group of American sailors who, after long years of fighting, simply could no longer wait for the official landing to take place before they, at long last (presumably) realized their life’s ambitions of taking Japanese women from their men, abandoned their stations (and, once again, military discipline and all of their fears of the enemy), commandeered boats of an unspecified kind from an unknown source and came ashore in search of prostitutes.

Kanzaki also, apparently following the lead of police bureaucrat Ōtake Bungo, claims that the “comfort stations” established for Allied troops were not created on the initiative of the Japanese government beginning from August 18 as Home Ministry records show, but rather in response to a specific request from the American military relayed through the good offices of armed and extremely intrepid American journalists

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489 Kanzaki, 1974, pp. 214 - 216.
who somehow made their way into Japan before August 23, some five days prior to the landing of the first meager detachment of American troops.\textsuperscript{490} In fact, no newsmen accompanied the initial party that arrived on the 28\textsuperscript{th} and would not be allowed in until the main body began its landings on the 30\textsuperscript{th}.\textsuperscript{491} Such details, however, mattered little to Kanzaki or apparently, many of his readers. In the same article, Kanzaki claimed that Americans approached Japanese civil police for assistance in procuring women because the latter wore armbands marked “CP” which, native speakers of English naturally interpreted as “communicate party,” which is a well-known term for “town guide,” in itself nothing more than a euphemism, as every native speaker of American English knows, for “brothel barker” or “pimp.”\textsuperscript{492} In another article, Kanzaki further demonstrates his command of GI argot by informing his readers that “GI,” far from being a semi-honorific cherished by America’s “greatest generation” and a formulation commonly used in internal SCAP correspondence, was actually a derogatory term in American slang for someone on the dole.\textsuperscript{493}

Kanzaki named an entire article “Kiioiri Benki,” a term he claimed was the equivalent of the English “yellow stool,” GI slang for Japanese women.\textsuperscript{494} This claim has since become quite common in writing on postwar prostitution.\textsuperscript{495} Setting aside the facts that English for “benki” is not “stool” but “toilet,” and that “stool” in any scatological sense is more likely to be used by medical personnel than military men, according to dictionaries of Japanese slang, the association of prostitution and public toilets had been

\textsuperscript{490}Kanzaki, 1974, p. 128. The Home Ministry order is described in the Kanagawa Prefectural Police History, p. 346.
\textsuperscript{491}Robert Eichelberger, Diary Entry, August 26, 1945. (Robert Eichelberger papers, Duke University Library special collections).
\textsuperscript{492}Ibid. The same story is repeated in Hashimoto Yoshiro, Hyakuokuen no Baishun Ichiba, (Tokyo: Saikō shinsha, 1958), p. 230.
\textsuperscript{493}Kanzaki, 1974, p. 201.
\textsuperscript{494}Kanzaki, 1974, pp. 196-202.
\textsuperscript{495}See, for example, Yuki Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, 2002, pp. 159, 174; Hirai, p. 112, 138, 139.
current in Japan for more than three decades when Kanzaki wrote.496 One officer of the IJA’s 11th Army Signal Corps wrote of brothels set up in the so-called “comfort woman” system that it had been a necessity for the men. The sexual urge, he insisted “is the same as hunger or the need to urinate, and soldiers merely thought of comfort stations as practically the same as latrines.”497 Indeed such a term was used by brothel owners themselves to describe their employees as late as 1958 when they barged into Dietwoman Miyagi Tamayo’s hotel room on the pretense of presenting her with a gift. They argued that she should stop her anti-prostitution activities as their profession was socially beneficial, declaring “Our job is running public toilets for men. We provide a place for them to dispose of their sexual urges.”498 Kanzaki went on to use “benki” to denigrate Japanese women in many different ways. Given his attitude toward panpan, it is hard to believe he would take much exception to such a characterization. Indeed Chazono Toshimi and Tanaka Masakazu, both scholars who have studied panpan, noted the extraordinary amount of antipathy toward panpan in Kanzaki’s writing. Chazono denounced the “sexual violence of language” Kanzaki employed, while Tanaka asserted “in his use of filthy language one can see Kanzaki’s extremely contemptuous attitude


498 Miyagi Tamayo, “Baishun Gyōsha ni Tai Atari Shite,” Chūō Kōron, May, 1958, p. 120 – 123. See also Sanders, p. 166. Another example of prostitutes being referred to as toilets can be seen in a debate of the Shizuoka Prefectural assembly is discussed by Hirai Kazuko in Nihon Senryō to Jendaa (Gender and the Occupation of Japan), (Tokyo: Yūshisha, 2014), p. 176.
toward women.” Chazono detected a desire to monopolize and control Japanese women as the motive force in Kanzaki’s work.

*Nippon no Teisō, Zoku Nippon no Teisō and Gotō Ben: The Chastity of Japan, The Chastity of Japan, a Sequel, and Gotō Ben*

After Kanzaki’s writings, one of the most widely cited works on the subject of GIs and Japanese women and one that prominently features lurid accounts of rape is *Nippon no Teisō,* or *The Chastity of Japan.* First published in 1952 it was undoubtedly the kind of book Tiltman had in mind when he denounced the campaign of “malicious lies” defaming American troops. In fact, its subtitle was “Journals of Women Raped by the Foreign Troops.” It clearly resonated with quite a few people. It was a publishing sensation, going through seventeen editions in short order. It contained so many stories of widespread and sadistic sexual violence that one reader claims to have been nauseated to the point that she vomited.

Michael Molasky, a scholar of Occupation era literature had a very different reaction. The book bore such a striking similarity to the metaphors of eroticized or sensationalized sexual violation that he had seen in the writing of many Japanese men that he concluded that the book was not an edited collection of first-person accounts by Japanese women but rather the work of a single male author. He later managed to confirm his suspicions with Hihara Shigenori who had once worked at the book’s now-defunct publishing house, Sōjusha. Hihara acknowledged that the supposed editor of the

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500 Chazono, *Panpan to wa Dare Nanoka,* p. 67.
501 Molasky, pp. 115 – 117.
502 Ibid., p. 122.
book, “Mizuno Hiroshi” was in fact its sole author. Mizuno was affiliated with the Japan Communist Party, had been living in Yokosuka, and claimed familiarity with “the panpan situation.” Mizuno wrote the book “as part of a broader indictment of American imperialism.” Sōjusha had its own close ties with the Communist Party and approved of the idea of using the work as an attack on American imperialism, but they were somewhat hesitant to go ahead with the project because of the semi-pornographic nature of the book. However, after obtaining the party’s explicit approval for the project, Sōjusha released *The Chastity of Japan*, under their imprimatur. The book was a total fabrication written with a very specific political agenda. Nevertheless, in the psychic environment of post-Occupation Japan it was received uncritically as historical fact by a large number of its readers and it, in Molasky’s words, “exerted a tangible influence on public discussions of prostitution.” Its influence extended into academic circles where it is still frequently cited and accepted uncritically as a primary source.

The financial and political success of *Nippon no Teisō* inspired Sōjusha to bring out a sequel named predictably enough, *Zoku Nippon no Teisō (The Chastity of Japan: A Sequel)*. This one, however was not written by “Mizuno Hiroshi,” but rather was entrusted to a young writer called Gotō Ben. The sole quality that Gotō seems to have had to recommend him was that he worked fast. Molasky learned that Sōjusha “provided Gotō with a pile of data and asked him to write a sequel. As is often the case in Japan, he

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503 Ibid., p. 123., n.48, p. 216. In this note, Molasky gives the man’s name as Hihara Hinenori. In an email exchange he informed the author that this was a mistake and that it should have been rendered as “Shigenori.”
504 Molasky, p. 122.
506 “Mizuno Hiroshi” was almost certainly a pen name. When Tōgosha decided to reprint *Nihon no teisō* as *Shi ni nozonde uttaeru* in the eighties, the new publisher could find no trace of “Mizuno”. However, similarities between *Nihon no Teisō* and its sequel suggest, at least to the present writer, that “Mizuno” might well have been Gotō.
was placed in a hotel room for a week and wrote the entire book in during that time.”

Gotō had no time to check the veracity of the materials handed to him. Contrary to assertions made by some latter day writers, he certainly had no time to do any original research whatsoever. A close reading of his book makes clear that whatever the value of the materials he got, the final product is a pastiche of lies ranging from simple embellishments to outright inventions.

While Kanzaki’s writings were typified by a certain violence of language toward women, Gotō far surpassed him in this respect. If one thing can be said to tie all of Gotō’s stories together in Zoku Nippon no Teisō it is an almost visceral antipathy toward Japanese women and girls. Hardly a woman appears in Gotō’s work who is not raped, beaten, abused, abandoned, forced into prostitution, subjected to venereal disease, driven to suicide, or just plain murdered outright. Rarely if ever are these women lucky enough to suffer only one of these fates. Even where violence is absent, misfortune is fated to befall any woman foolish enough to be involved with an American. In one story he related the fates of the poor unfortunates who had married Americans and gone to live in the United States. There, Gotō asserts, that according to an “unofficial survey” done by the United States immigration authorities, out of 9000 of these women 8300 of them were

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507 Email to author from Michael Molasky, January 18, 2005.
508 See for example Tanaka (2002), p. 149. For some reason Tanaka continually refers to Gotō as “Itsushima Tsutomu,” an alternative reading for the characters in his name, but under which Gotō has not published.
abandoned by their husbands and ended up working in brothels that catered exclusively to black and Chinese men.\footnote{Gotō Ben, \textit{Kuroi Haru}, (Tokyo: Tōgosha, 1985), p. 85.}

\textit{Zoku Nippon no Teisō}, was the first work Gotō published under that name. It was the beginning of a long (and continuing) career. His prolific pen has been drawn to quite a few other topics. In fact, he is better known to readers in Japan for his books about the prophesies of Nostradamus, of which he has penned at least thirteen.\footnote{Japanese National Diet Library Online Catalog, search terms “ノストラダムス 五島勉”.} In one of them Gotō confidently predicted that humanity would become extinct in July of the year 1999.\footnote{See Gotō Ben, \textit{Nosutradamusu no Daiyogen, Semariikuru 1999nen Nanantsuki, Jinruimetsubonohi}, (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 1981).} He has also shown a significant interest in reincarnation and after the failure of his doomsday prophesy he for a time become keenly interested in the psychic predictions of the September 11 attacks, predictions that so unfortunately went unheeded on that tragic day.\footnote{Gotō Ben, \textit{Karuma no Hōsoku: Seimei Tensho no Himitsu anata no Shigo Dōshunraka} (The Rules of Karma: Secrets of Reincarnation: What Happens After Your Death?) (Tokyo: Shoudensha, 1980); Gotō Ben, \textit{Isuramu vs. Amerika: Oavarinaki Tatakai no Hiyogen (Islam vs. America: Secret Prophecies of the Unending War)}, (Tokyo: Seishun shuppansha 2002).} He was the writer that first informed his readers that Japan had actually developed the atomic bomb before the United States, but lost the war nevertheless because the country was forbidden to use such a weapon by its august and humane sovereign, even after the Americans had deployed it against Japan.\footnote{Gotō Ben, \textit{Nihon Gembaku Kaihatsu no Shinjitsu}, (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 2001).} He also detailed how human civilization was initially founded by extraterrestrials.\footnote{Gotō Ben, \textit{Uchūjin Nazo no Isan}, (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 1988).} Another subject of Gotō’s has been Adolf Hitler, of whom Gotō has written admiringly. In Gotō’s telling, the Nazi dictator was a great prophet whose writings and utterances provided the key to understanding the history of the world, especially the role played by the nefarious Jews. Indeed Hitler’s insight was so great that his writings still hold the key to understanding
how the world unfolded since the unfortunate demise of this seer and great leader. This was a subject to which the indefatigable (and apparently ageless) Gotō returned as recently as 2015.516 According to the official website of Hikarinowa, a splinter group from the doomsday cult Aum Shinrikyō, which carried out the sarin gas attacks in Tokyo and Matsumoto, Gotō’s writings had a profound influence in inspiring the theology and worldview of cult founder Shōkō Asahara.517

To put it bluntly, Gotō is at best an unscrupulous sensationalist. This is obvious from the first pages of the very source many scholars cite so frequently. In the third paragraph of his introduction to Kuroi Haru, a republished version of Zoku Nippon no Teisō, he tells his readers of the secret wartime plan of the “elite group of Jews who controlled American leaders” to “completely annihilate” the Japanese people with the use of atomic weapons.518

Kobayashi Daijirō and Murase Akira’s Minna wa Shiranai Kokka Baishun Meirei (The State-ordered Prostitution No One Knows About)

Another source frequently cited in works on rape and prostitution during the occupation era is Minna wa Shiranai Kokka Baishun Meirei or The State-ordered Prostitution that no One Knows About. Published in 1961, the book purports to be an expose of the supposedly unknown world of prostitution during the Occupation, despite the fact that this “unknown world” had been at the center of a national debate and had

517 To Hikarinowa’s credit, they regard Asahara’s reliance on Gotō to have been an unfortunate mistake. One hopes historians can profit from their example: http://hikarinowa.net/kyokun/generalization2/psychology2/04-5.html accessed 7/17/2013. See also Robert Jay Lifton, Destroying the World to Save It, (New York: Metropolitan, 1999), p. 45.
518 Gotō Ben, Kuroi Haru, (Tokyo: Tōgosha, 1985) p. II.
been the subject of countless books, movies and plays. Often cited as it were a sober scholarly investigation of prostitution, the book is nothing of the sort. It is instead based largely on a series of articles that Kobayashi and Murase wrote for The Naigai Taimusu over a period of about five weeks in early 1961.\textsuperscript{519} The Naigai Taimusu was a sports paper that was best known for its coverage of fusoku adult establishments, that is to say cabarets, strip shows, and brothels or their near equivalents.

Published without bylines under headlines like, “The Violated Bud: 16 Year-Old Girl: At Some Point the Pain Became Pleasure” and featuring lurid tales of hyper-virile Americans like the black GI that copulated with a prostitute twenty times in a row, the articles were clearly meant to arouse and entertain rather than to stimulate any sort of debate about a serious social issue.\textsuperscript{520} Though Murase and Kobayashi toned it down somewhat when they published in book form, the writing in the articles clearly reflects the sort of eroticization of rape common throughout panpan literature. The writers’ intention is clearly titillation and not education. The articles appear next to writing about sports stars, tips for bets on horse and boat racing, and salacious pieces about adultery and revenge. The paper also published reviews of cabarets and brothels, some of which advertised in it with photos of topless models. These advertisements appeared alongside

\textsuperscript{519} See the series of articles called “Sengo Baishun Shi” Naigai Times, February 7, 1961 – March 12, 1961.
others for venereal disease cures and clinics, as well as those for penis enlargers. The paper was clearly aimed at young and middle-aged men and it was assumed that whatever interest they had in the subject of GIs and Japanese women was prurient.
Moreover, the research Kobayashi and Murase conducted was minimal at best. As they acknowledge in their book and their articles, they relied extensively on Gotō, Kanzaki and other dubious sources when originally preparing their series of articles.\footnote{Kobayashi Daijirō and Murase Akira, Minna wa Shiranai Kokka Baishun Meirei, (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1992), p. 258 – 260.} What original work they did do consisted largely of interviewing shady figures like Kaburagi Seiichi (see below) or politically connected brothel owners like Suzuki Akira and Yamaguchi Tomisaburō, both of whom ended up in prison on charges of bribing Diet members.\footnote{Kobayashi and Murase, pp. 251 – 252.} Unsurprisingly, these brothel owners portrayed themselves as patriots who had done a great service to their country by helping to slake the sexual thirsts of the libidinous Americans.\footnote{Kobayashi and Murase, pp. 55, 69; See also “Sengo Baishunshi #26,” Naigai Timusu, March 9, 1961, p. 7; “Sengo Baishunshi #29, Naigai Taimusu, March 12, 1961) p. 9. This is one case where the original articles are somewhat toned down when published in the book, as prostitution would probably not be as popular with a general audience as it was with readers of the the Naigai Taimusu.} A good deal of salacious gossip or even downright nonsense finds its way into the pages of Minna wa Shiranai, but it is still treated by a large number of writers as a reputable source and through it the claims of some writers that might otherwise be rejected are accepted, passed on and are given an entirely unwarranted level of credibility through secondary citation. Indeed it was from Kobayashi and Murase that Yoshimi Kaneko got the Gotō story that “official records” indicated that Americans raped Japanese women at the rate of 40 day prior to the RAA being placed off limits after which the number skyrocketed to 330 every day.\footnote{Yoshimi Kaneko, Baishun no Shakaishi, (Tokyo: Yuzankaku shupan, 1984), p. 198. Kobayashi and Murase, p. 69; Gotō Ben, Kuroi Haru, p. 80. See also “Sengo Baishunshi #25,” Naigai Timusu, March 8, 1961, p. 7).} John Dower picked up the claim from Yoshimi and included it in a footnote in Embracing Defeat.\footnote{John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat, (New York: W.W. Norton and Co. and The New Press, 1999), n16, p. 579.} From there it has been used by a number of other writers and it has come to be taken as holy writ by promoters of the mass rape legend.

\footnote{Kobayashi and Murase, pp. 55, 69; See also “Sengo Baishunshi #26,” Naigai Timusu, March 9, 1961, p. 7; “Sengo Baishunshi #29, Naigai Taimusu, March 12, 1961) p. 9. This is one case where the original articles are somewhat toned down when published in the book, as prostitution would probably not be as popular with a general audience as it was with readers of the the Naigai Taimusu.}
Though Kobayashi and Murase are often referenced, their work, like those of Kanzaki, Mizuno, and Gotō cannot be considered reliable.

**Kaburagi Seiichi and Shinchūgun Ian Sakusen (The Secret History of the Comfort Operation for the Occupation Army)**

Kaburagi Seiichi is another extensively cited authority on the subject of postwar prostitution and rape. His 1972 “memoir,” *Hiroku: Shinchūgun Ian Sakusen*, is one of the most influential books on the subject. Some scholars cite it as an inside account of one who worked with the Occupation army on the “comfort” problem. Kaburagi claims to have served as the chief of the information section for the RAA. Calling on his alleged experiences in this capacity he gave numerous interviews on postwar interracial prostitution. Though the book published over his name purports to be a “memoir” written by an insider, it is in fact less a memoir than it is simply a barely reworked version of the 1957 book, *Onna no Bōhatei*, supposedly written by a Tanaka Kimiko, an RAA prostitute. The book also includes a new introduction, parts of which are clearly cribbed from Kobayashi and Murase’s work. Others, like the scene in which an experienced madam instructs neophyte recruits on sexual positions, complete with advice on how to satisfy the deviant desires of Americans, are clearly not intended to arouse the social conscience. As with *Nippon no Teisō, Onna no Bōhatei*, with its relentless series of sex scenes, struck Molasky as the work of a man. Again he confirmed his suspicions,

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528 Kaburagi, pp. 33 – 34.
this time in a conversation with the publisher’s son, Itō Bungaku.\textsuperscript{529} Molasky’s interest was primarily literary, and so he did not follow it up further than to confirm his hunch.

To the historian, however, the source’s general acceptance as a legitimate source requires more investigation, and such investigation makes clear that neither Kaburagi nor his book can be trusted at all. While Mizuno and Gōtō were content to invent their narratives, Kaburagi’s creativity extended to his own biography. In 1957, he claimed he was the president of the Nihon Nyūsu Eigasha but that company changed its name in 1946 to Nihon Eigasha and in 1951 it was reorganized under the aegis of Tōhō and became Nihon Eigashinsha which continued to function until its dissolution in 2009, whereupon its archives became the property of Tōhō Sutera. According to Koizumi Katsurō, custodian of Nihon Eigashinsha’s film archive, there was no record of anyone by the name of Kaburagi Seiichi having ever worked there. Moreover, employees who had entered the company as early as 1960 had never heard of Kaburagi, a fairly uncommon and memorable Japanese name.\textsuperscript{530} Kaburagi’s profile said that he had been an editor at \textit{Bungei Shunjū}. However, just as was the case with Nihon Eigashinsha, \textit{Bungei Shunjū} had neither record nor recollection of anyone by that name.\textsuperscript{531} Kaburagi claims to have graduated from Keiō Gijuku University, and though Keiō, citing “privacy” concerns would neither confirm nor deny that such a person ever attended their school, they did, unprompted, reveal that his name does not appear in a list of notable graduates.\textsuperscript{532} Kaburagi also claims to have been a manager of the \textit{Shinjuku Musashinokan} theater, but

\textsuperscript{529} Though Itō maintains a blog on which he treats the book as if it were a genuine testimonial, he confirmed in a telephone conversation with the present writer that it was nothing of the sort.


\textsuperscript{531} Kaburagi, \textit{Shinchūgun Ian Sakusen}, p. 261; Email from the public relations department of \textit{Bungei Shunjū}, June 10, 2012.

\textsuperscript{532} Kaburagi, \textit{Shinchūgun Ian Sakusen}, p. 261; Email from Watanabe Jin, Public Relations Department, Keiō Gijuku University.
like his other alleged places of employment the theater has neither record nor recollection of anyone by that name ever having worked there.\textsuperscript{533} In short, nothing in Kaburagi’s “profile” can be confirmed, much of it is in doubt, and some of it is demonstrably false. In a conversation with the present writer, Itō revealed that the original text of \textit{Onna no Bōhatei} was delivered to its publisher by a middle man, one Honda Kikuo, and that Itō had never personally met Kaburagi.

Whatever his background, a study of the texts to which he put his name makes that very clear that Kaburagi cannot be adjudged a reliable source. He cannot even keep his story straight, contradicting himself in the two versions of the introduction that serve as his memoir. In the first, he claims the book was written by Tanaka Kimiko, a woman he had never even met. In the second, he claims to have known her quite well from the time that she worked in the RAA.\textsuperscript{534} In the first, he asserted that the RAA had a total workforce (including dancers, singers, waitresses and prostitutes) of about 1800. In the second he asserts the organization employed 70,000 prostitutes.\textsuperscript{535} Kaburagi even has difficulty keeping his story straight within a single work, reporting first that Tanaka’s husband was killed in the Korean War and later that she was expecting him home at any minute.\textsuperscript{536} According to both versions of the story Tanaka became pregnant while working as a prostitute the RAA (whose brothels were disbanded in 1946) but somehow her lover is killed in the Korean War (beginning in 1950) \textit{before} she gives birth.\textsuperscript{537} When asked about Kaburagi, Itō was unaware that the book originally published by his company,

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{533} Kaburagi, p. 261; Email from Toyoda Hiroshi, IT Specialist (“Hōmupeijī Tantō”) Musashino Kōgyō, June 20, 2012.
\textsuperscript{534} Tanaka, 1957, p. 2; Kaburagi, 1972, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{535} Tanaka, 1957, p. 2; Kaburagi 1972, p. 260.
\textsuperscript{536} Kaburagi, 1972, pp. 58 - 59; 255 - 256.
\textsuperscript{537} Tanaka, 1957, pp. 75 - 80; Kaburagi, 1972, pp. 132 - 137
\end{footnotes}
Dainishobō, had been revised and reissued under a different title, or whether a man named Kaburagi ever even existed.\textsuperscript{538}

Considering the number of people who have interviewed someone who used that name it is almost certain that someone calling himself Kaburagi existed. In fact, his name is included in a list of employees in an RAA company history.\textsuperscript{539} However, it is clear that whoever wrote under that name was, like Gotō and Mizuno, a fabulist and consequently his “memoir” can no more be trusted than \textit{Nihon no Teisō} or its sequel.

To put it bluntly, the works of Kanzaki, Mizuno, Gotō, Kobayashi and Murase, and Kaburagi are essentially worthless as historical resources. The problem of these bogus sources is further exacerbated by the immense popularity of \textit{Nihon no Teisō}. \textit{Nihon no Teisō} was a publishing sensation and spawned many imitations, becoming the first in what Molasky has called “a long line of titillating panpan publications during the 1950s,” many of which enjoyed success on a level with Mizuno’s original effort.\textsuperscript{540} Gotō’s and Kaburagi’s works are the most obvious examples, but there are countless others as well. For example, \textit{Minna ga Miteiru Mae de}, a book by erotic novelist Fujiwara Shinji and purporting to be a true expose of life in base towns, was put out by Masu Shobō, shrewdly enough, on August 15, 1955, the tenth anniversary of Japan’s surrender. It went through thirty-six more printings in the next thirty-six days, and writer and publisher had a sequel ready for press by November 20.\textsuperscript{541} As it became clear that panpan literature was, in the words of comedian Tom Leher, “a market they can’t glut,” other writers and

\textsuperscript{538} Telephone conversation with Itō Bungaku, June 10, 2012.
\textsuperscript{540} Molasky, p. 129.
publishers jumped on the bandwagon, producing a flood of panpan books. What all of them share is their outrageous and incredible stories.

Many in the genre would not even qualify as good fiction, suffering as they do from internal inconsistencies, impossible timelines, first-person “testimonies” that slip into the omniscient viewpoint, GIs who suddenly lose their command of the English present progressive as they approach climax (“I come now!”), violent, sex-crazed Americans brutes who somehow acquired enough skill with the Japanese language to articulate their evil passions, Americans fearing deterioration of their eyesight from sex with Japanese women, Americans with names like “Barbary,” “Chart,” or “Captain Proud,” mixed-race children whose fathers’ recessive genes magically become dominant, a suspiciously large number of Americans who resemble movie stars (James Cagney, Bing Crosby and Alan Ladd), and numerous first-person “testimonials” from women who had supposedly died from their ordeals. The transparent fraudulence and poor quality of these books notwithstanding, they met with wild success. In addition to the many prima facie absurdities contained in these books, some involve transparent plagiarism of earlier hoaxes. In responding to skepticism regarding previous works of his, one author admitted in two subsequent works that he couldn’t really say that what he

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542 See for example, Gotô Ben, Kuroi Haru, p. 64; Fujiwara Shinji, Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, pp. 79, 185; Hashimoto Yoshio, Hyakuokuen no Baishun Ichiba, (Tokyo: Saikô Shinsa, 1958) pp. 6, 12, 71, 88, etc.
544 Mizuno, p. 22., Yamada 1992, p. 84.
545 Gotô, 1985, p. 151.
548 Tanaka Kimiko, Onna no Bôhateri, p. 75; Fujiwara Shinji, Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, p. 104; Fujiwara Shinji, Zoku Minna ga Miteiru De, p. 110; Fujiwara Shinji, Hazukashimaretomo, (Tokyo: Tora Shobô, 1952) p. 122.
549 Among numerous examples see, Gotô Ben, Kuroi Haru, pp. 62. - 64, pp. 113 - 115; 127 - 131. Fujiwara Shinji, Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, p. 149 - 184; Fujiwara Shinji, Zoku Minna ga Miteiru Mae De, pp. 3 - 34, pp. 35 - 61
550 See for example the story of the women who committed suicide after being recruited into the RAA in Kaburagi, 1972. A nearly identical story with only minimal changes in detail appears in Makabe. Citing this later source Dower, 1999, introduced it to the English-speaking world.
wrote, was strictly speaking, well, true. In another the “editor” and actual author tries to explain away inconsistencies and absurdities in his story as the result of the “mental instability” of the “women” whose stories he purports to tell. In some cases these books border on pornographic self-parody. In one episode it was alleged that a group of female American personnel from the WAC kidnapped a Japanese police officer, kept him confined for three days, and repeatedly forced themselves on the hapless lawman. One presumes that readers could not help but sympathize with his misfortune.

Despite their patent absurdity, references to such works are nearly ubiquitous and very frequent in journalistic and even scholarly accounts of sexual relations between Japanese women and American men. In his Japan’s Comfort Women, Yuki Tanaka directly cites Mizuno, Gotō, Kaburagi, Kanzaki and Kobayashi and Murase no fewer than fifty-six times in two chapters. In a 2007 AP article carried in papers around the world and purporting to have exposed sex slavery during the Occupation Eric Talmadge relies on Kaburagi extensively repeating, among other things, Kaburagi’s repetition of Kanzaki’s tale of the August 28 rampage at Komachien. The remainder of the article relies on Tanaka and through him, unknowingly incorporates many more legends. Dower cites Kanzaki directly six times and, through intermediaries, both Kaburagi and Gotō. Even the official Kanagawa Prefectural Police History, one of the more comprehensive and generally reliable sources on the involvement of the police in establishing brothels for GIs, quotes Gotō extensively, for more than a full page.

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552 Mizuno, p. 293 – 294.  
553 Yamada, Kokusatsu, pp. 90 – 91.  
554 See Tanaka 2002, pp. 197 - 203  
can usually spot these sources without reference the footnotes simply by the characteristically tragic or sensational nature of their stories.

For example, Kaburagi is very likely the ultimate source of Dower’s tragic tale about a typist convinced to work as a prostitute, which she did only for a day before stepping in front of a train.558

Likewise, Gotō is Tanaka’s source for the “most well-known case” of rape during the Occupation:

an incident that occurred on April 4, 1946, at Nakamura Hospital in Omori district, not far from the RAA’s comfort station quarter. At around 11:30 at night, three military trucks stopped in front of the hospital, throwing their headlights upon the hospital building. Then, at the signal of a whistle, about 50 US soldiers dashed out of the trucks and invaded the hospital from various directions, breaking windows and doors. They raped all 17 nurses on night duty, about 20 nursing assistants, and more than 40 female patients, including a woman who had just delivered a baby. A two-day old baby was thrown out of the mother’s bed onto the floor and killed. There were some male patients in the hospital, but two who tried to protect the women were shot. The soldiers left the hospital after about an hour’s sexual orgy.559

In another Gotō episode passed on by Tanaka several young women orphaned by the atomic attack on Hiroshima were rounded up by an unscrupulous RAA recruiter who apparently had also done yeoman’s work as a pimp in Yokosuka. This man packed them into a truck and took them off to a place where they were gang-raped by a group of GIs. When the Americans were through having their fun, the poor young women were once again corralled into the truck and taken to another building where a different group of soldiers was waiting and they went through the whole excruciating ordeal once again. Finally, they were taken to a “comfort station” where they were examined by a doctor of the Occupation army and every last one of them was diagnosed with V.D.560

559 Tanaka, Japan’s Comfort Women, p. 163; Gotō, Kuroi Haru, p. 30 - 36. See also Yamada Meiko, 1992, p. 42 - 43.
560 Ibid., pp. 139 – 140.
Numerous sources claim that there were 70,000 women working as prostitutes exclusively for the Occupation forces with one asserting that there were as many as 150,000 and that these women served a minimum of fifteen customers a day and sometimes as many as 60.\footnote{The 15 - 60 figure appears in Kanzaki, 1974, p. 138; Makabe, p. 207; Yamada Meiko, Senryōgun lanfu, (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 1992), p. 37; Hashimoto, p. 53; Dower, 1999, p. 129; Tanaka, 2002, p. 147; Kobayashi and Murase claim that the number served ranged from 40 - 60 (p. 47). Tanaka gives the figure of 150,000 in both his Japan’s Comfort Women, p. 162 and in an interview with Eric Talmadge quoted in the latter’s AP article. Tanaka’s ultimate source for this claim is the PHW document referred to in chapter 2 (H.H. MacDonald, “MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD; SUBJECT: Prostitution in Japan; Contracts; Regulations, Public and Private Prostitutes,” December 29, 1945 in NARA RG 331 Box 9370, Folder 4: “726.1 Abolition of Licensed Prostitution.”) that estimates the total number of women working in prostitution in the whole of Japan, not just those catering to American troops. Moreover, it was an estimate that was adjudged “not accurate.”} This would imply that the average American stationed in Japan procured the services of prostitutes somewhere between 2.65 times and 22.7 times every day.\footnote{The maximum number of Allied troops in Japan was 394,911 in December 1945. John J. McGrath, “Boots on the Ground: Troop Density in Contingency Operations,” Global War on Terrorism Occasional Paper 16, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 28.} This all while somewhere between twenty-five and as many as eighty-five percent of them were suffering from at least one venereal disease. The 70,000 figure, like so many others, first appeared in Gotō’s Zoku Nihon no Teisō. Moreover, Gotō’s number, 55,000 to 70,000 was said to apply to specifically RAA prostitutes.\footnote{Gotō Ben, Kuroi Haru, p. 51. Moreover, it is worth noting that Gotō claims the maximum number employed by the RAA was 70,000 but due to the high rate of death, permanent disability and illness, only 55,000 were in condition to work by the time the institution closed.} However, the RAA, despite its notoriety in subsequent panpan literature was never more than a local organization that operated only in Tokyo and the vacation spots of Hakone and Atami.\footnote{A list of the RAA’s facilities appears in Sakaguchi Yūzō, ed., “R.A.A. Kyōkai Enkakushi,” (Tokyo: Nishinsha, 1949), pp. 22 - 52, reprinted in Seibōryoku Mondai Shiryō Shūsei, Vol. 1, (Tokyo: Fujiya Shuppan, 2004), pp. 313 - 327.} Gotō’s figure was then repeated by Kaburagi, among others, and has subsequently been incorporated into the literature on the subject so thoroughly that any researcher who does not consider the implications is bound to encounter it repeatedly and regard it as an
established fact. Indeed Hirai Kazuko has done exactly that, referring to the 70,000 figure as “commonly accepted.”

The nearly ubiquitous and uncritical citation of these sources has created an atmosphere in which they have come to be regarded as authentic. Moreover, it seems that the rising generation of Japanese scholars will regard them as reliable primary resources, accurately recording the time in which they were written. Between 2004 and 2007 the academic publisher Fuji compiled a twenty-five volume reference set on the problem of postwar sexual violence. Its volumes incorporate a number of contemporary primary sources on sexual violence right next to works by Kanzaki, Mizuno, Gotō, Kaburagi, two obvious frauds by erotic novelist Fujiwara Shinji and number of other highly dubious works. The panpan literature of the 1950s, both fraudulent and fictional remains highly influential in how people recall the American Occupation. Part of that was due to the success of a deliberate smear campaign by leftist elements in Japan, but a good deal of it was simply because tales of sexual violence by American men toward Japanese women served as an effective metaphor for America’s conquest, Occupation and continuing diplomatic domination of Japan.


566 Hirai, p. 37.

567 In Fujiwara’s case the fraud was so obvious he was, by his own accounts, inundated with mail denouncing his work as lies. He responded to the charge by asserting that there were some parts that were true and others were the result of his making composite characters so it was “difficult” to say if what he wrote was true, but that people living near the bases had certainly suffered worse.
Chapter 6: Conclusions:

The Sexualization of Defeat and the Mainstreaming of Historical Legends

A society’s sexual mores and taboos are in many ways a reflection of its political organization. Forcible sexual intercourse has been part of human history from its inception—quite possibly it was literally part of its inception. Though that act has a high correlation with various definitions of rape, it is not seen as identical in any culture. In most societies, whether force is involved or not, sex between an adult and a minor is considered rape. In others two women or two men cannot ever unite in intimate congress regardless of their volition. In some, it is no longer rape if the perpetrator agrees to marry his victim. In many cultures it is not the woman, but her male family members who are considered the aggrieved parties when she is the victim of an attack. In some cultures the men consider themselves violated when their daughter or sister has sex out of wedlock regardless of whether she was a willing participant in the act or not. In other words, so far as society, as distinctly opposed to the victim, is concerned, rape is the illegitimate appropriation of another’s sexuality and there is a great deal of variation in what is and is not considered legitimate. The idea that a woman is the absolute mistress of her own sexuality and desires is a relatively recent and historically speaking even a

568 Studies indicate that Mitochondrial Eve is, at minimum, tens of thousands of years younger than Y-Chromosomal Adam, meaning that she was certainly polyandrous. Moreover, the human male penis, unlike the organs of our closest living relatives, is ideally shaped to remove any semen deposited from (a) previous copulation(s) before depositing its own genetic claims. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that our common ancestral mother was the sex-slave of a roving band of, literally (if just), sub-human marauders. See Gordon G. Gallup, Jr. and Rebecca L. Burch, “Semen Displacement as a Sperm Competition Strategy in Humans,” in Evolutionary Psychology, 2004, No. 2, pp. 12 - 23.


570 See for example, Pascale Harier, “Libya Rape Victims ‘Face Honour Killings,’” BBC News, June 14, 2011.
radical notion. It is inseparable from an ideology of liberalism that puts the individual citizen at the center of society as its basic building block. In the mid-twentieth century, this was an ideology that many Japanese found to be alien if not repugnant.

Americans forced that ideology on Japan at the point of, as General Courtney Whitney infamously put it, “atomic sunshine,” and according to Beate Sirota Gordon, the individual most closely associate with the articulation of what that ideology meant in practical legal terms, the threat was not idle. Whitney told his Government Section subordinates that MacArthur, (typically) without consulting Washington, had “already authorized the threat of force and the use of actual force” to win acceptance of the new constitution.571 At the time Americans were themselves but a single generation from establishing women’s suffrage, but the person most closely involved with women’s issues, Beate Sirota, was herself a woman who had grown up in Japan and had not only knowledge of the issue, but a sense of mission about it.572 She sought to elevate Japanese women and give them guarantees of position, healthcare and education for themselves and their children that were unheard in most Western countries, let alone Japan. Though ultimately frustrated in her more ambitious goals, what she managed to achieve was nonetheless remarkable. SCAP had already ordered that women have the vote in December, 1945.573 Sirota and her Government section colleagues subsequently enshrined that right in the constitution. In addition, they guaranteed that women could serve as

571 Beate Sirota Gordon, *The Only Woman in the Room*, (New York: Kodansha America, 1997), p. 105. Some skepticism toward this claim seems to be in order. Gordon’s recollection in her memoir seems to be at variance with an answer she gave to a question in a 1992 interview with the writer Suzuki Akinori. When asked about what was to be done if the Japanese side did not accept the American draft of the Gordon replied that there had never been an intention of forcing the settlement on the Japanese side. It may be that there was some misunderstanding about the question as the interview was conducted entirely in Japanese and Gordon did not address the question as asked the first two times that Suzuki posed it. It may also be that, nearly fifty years after the fact Gordon’s memory was not completely accurate. In any event, it was clear that gist of the story, that MacArthur was not willing to brook substantial dissent about the acceptance and implementation of a constitution very much like Government Section’s draft, is fundamentally accurate.


members of the legislature, and that “Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.” Finally, they insured that “All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.”574 SCAP had not only elevated women’s position, it had forcibly deprived Japanese men of the control they had traditionally enjoyed over their women’s sexuality. Making matters worse, economic and demographic factors guaranteed that a very large number of young Japanese women exercised their sexual autonomy by consorting with the personnel of the conquering military, something that undoubtedly made American platitudes about justice and equality seem like cynical hollow posturing to quite a few people. Many men (and not a few women) considered this an illegitimate appropriation of sexuality, that is to say, a sort of rape, on a national scale.

At first blush, it may seem far-fetched to suggest that such abstract symbolism played such a significant part in shaping the historiography of the post-war U.S.-Japanese bilateral relationship. Perhaps it is. However, it is beyond dispute however that critics of that relationship use metaphors of rape and sexual domination to describe it with astonishing frequency.

Even prior to their arrival, many Japanese thought about the anticipated encounter with Americans in sexual terms.575 Numerous scholars of Japanese literature and cinema have remarked upon this tendency. Relations between GIs and Japanese panpan were

transformed in nature to coercive and violent acts in which the women had no volition.

Rape became so standard as to be cliché. Reviewing Japanese cinema of the period, Ian Buruma noted a pornographic fascination for the seamy side of American military bases: the crime, the prostitution, the raping of innocent Japanese women … the scene of an American soldier (usually black) raping a Japanese girl (always young, always innocent), usually in a pristine rice field (innocent, pastoral Japan), is a stock image in postwar movies about the occupation.576

Reviewing the written fiction of the same time, Michael S. Molasky, an expert on Occupation era literature, wrote, “With remarkable consistency, male writers from both mainland Japan and Okinawa have articulated their humiliating experience of defeat and occupation in terms of the sexual violation of women.”577 This tendency became so marked that one Japanese woman writer remarked in frustration that “it might have been best had the victors raped every woman in Japan.”578

Historian Oguma Eiji made a similar point in his book, *Patriotism and Democracy*, writing “The ‘panpan’ were a symbol of Japan’s subordination to America.”579 Nothing symbolized defeat to many Japanese so much as did the sight of American men with Japanese women. Moreover, it was widely assumed (by American authorities as well as by Japanese generally) that all women who consorted with Americans were, *ipso facto* prostitutes. The idea that some Japanese women would willingly be with Americans for any motive save those that were pecuniary was rejected outright.580 The idea that Americans men might willingly be with Japanese women for reasons other than to satisfy base sexual urges was likewise rejected.

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577 Molasky, pp. 11–12.
578 Kono Taeko quoted in Molasky, p. 12.
When a drama called for expressing Japan’s straitened circumstances after the war, the image of a *pan-pan* with an American served as convenient shorthand. In Takarazuka’s 2007 drama about Shirasu Jirō, an intimate of Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru during the Occupation, Japan’s desperate situation is portrayed in one of the opening scenes. Desperate Japanese seek to eke out a hardscrabble existence amongst the bombed out ruins while Yoshida wails to his daughter in a plaintive voice “Isn’t it wretched Kazuko?” Standing in the center of this pathetic scene is a haughty GI, a Japanese woman at his side pleading him to make her his mistress (*onrii*).

![Scene from the Takarazuka Production *Reimei no Kaze*: Opening depicting Japan’s “wretched” state at the end of the war. A haughty GI looks off in to the distance, indifferent to the suffering around him.](image)

(41) *Shōsetsu Yoshida Shigeru*, was a 1986 film based on a novel depicting the process whereby Prime Minister Yoshida concluded the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, thus restoring Japanese sovereignty. The first part of the film, depicting Japan during the Occupation is shot entirely in black and white. After the successful conclusion of the treaties, the film depicts a now-independent Japan in color.
One of the first color scenes show Yoshida strolling along a beach near his Ōiso villa. As if to serve as a reminder of to him of the price his country paid for its new quasi-independent status, a GI and his Japanese girlfriend embrace and then kiss as Yoshida looks on in evident displeasure.

Sexual violation, degradation and emasculation were, and to a remarkable extent, remain the preferred metaphors for defeat and occupation. It is striking how often they have been invoked to criticize actions taken by the United States or by the Japanese
government in relation to the United States during the Occupation. Though this association was first exploited politically by leftists, it occurred to people across the political spectrum. Shirasu Jirō, after about a week’s negotiation with GHQ over the American-authored draft constitution described his experience to an associate as akin to “being locked up and raped” with the constitution being nothing more than the “bastard half-breed” that resulted.  

Nosaka Akiyuki, the novelist best known in the west for *Hotaru no Haka* or *Grave of the Fireflies*, subsequently made into an animated film by Miyazaki Hayao and Studio Ghibli, recalled GIs working with Japanese medical personnel in an overzealous, but ultimately successful (at least in the short term) campaign to rid Japan of typhus and other infectious diseases by delousing literally anyone they could get their hands on with DDT. In Nosaka’s recollection, the DDT pump was like a horse’s penis, violating him, intruding into his clothes and leaving its humiliating and tell-tale white deposits all over his body.  

Igarashi Yoshikuni a historian at Vanderbilt University extended the metaphor, noting that for Nosaka and many other Japanese the experience was akin to a symbolic rape or castration.  

Metaphors of sexual domination and subordination came to be favored by those critiquing a continuing international relationship in which the United States is clearly the senior partner. From both the left and the right, for nearly six decades, critics of the United States and its security arrangements in Japan have presented their home country as an unfortunate woman (or emasculated man) in a relationship with a domineering,  

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583 Igarashi, p. 110.
violent man. Metaphors of rape, prostitution, subservience, promiscuity and pollution abound. They are a constant of the discourse about the security arrangements.

One writer, referring to the changes brought about by the Occupation reforms, lamented “the spiritual castration called ‘democratization.’”584 In the immediate postwar period, the scholar Maruyama Masao lamented the ethos of “naked egoism” that had seized Japan and asserted that in comparison to other Asian countries, where a spirit of nationalism was awakening the people, Japan had “the broken spirit of a helpless pan-pan.”585 In 1952 Takahashi Shinichi, an activist concerned with education policy denounced the postwar education system introduced during the Occupation as a “panpan education” that would make Japanese forget pride in their history and culture.586 Gotō Ben, for whom the link between sexual domination and American hegemony is a constant theme, asserted that “security pact” was actually English slang for entering into a sexual relationship with another man’s wife after obtaining the understanding and consent of that man.587 Objecting to the possible establishment of an American base in the town of Uchinada, Shimizu Ikutarō asserted that the village was now as a “pure maiden” and should be kept that way rather than allowing itself to fall into the condition of the Yokohama and Yokosuka which had become “parasitic whores living off the American military.”588 As mentioned earlier Tokuda Kyūichi described his countrymen as having been forced into the position of a “supine prostitute.”

Another metaphor critics of the United States are fond of employing is that of mixed-race children. Usually regarded as the unwanted bastard offspring of unbridled

587 Kuroi Haru, p. 197.
lusts between inferior representatives of both races, mixed-race children had long been a staple of anti-American propaganda. Testifying before the Diet concerning the issue of rearmament Kanzaki Kiyoshi referred to recently founded Police Reserve, a body that would eventually evolve into the Self-Defense forces as “the bastard mixed-race child of the Occupation.” Kanzaki later used the phrase “mixed-race child” to describe the organizational structure of the new armed force, which had been based on an American model. Indeed “mixed-race child” was apparently, in Kanzaki’s mind, so self-evidently pejorative that he felt no real need to provide any more argument than that.

More recently figures such as nationalist firebrand Ishihara Shintarō can’t seem to get enough of sexual metaphors. Ishihara is arguably best known for his stock phrase “The Japan that Can Say No,” taken from a 1989 book that he co-authored with then Sony chief Morita Akio. The phrase that gave the book its title was actually taken from an essay by Morita, but in a singular act of unabashed plagiarism Ishihara has long since appropriated it and made it synonymous with himself. Whatever the provenance of the phrase, Ishihara’s explanation of its meaning is telling. When, for the first time, he was asked to describe what he meant by the “Japan that can say no” he described a situation in which America and Japan were married and Japan, as the wife, “can clearly say no when she wants to, unlike a mistress who can be discarded if she says no.” Later, he returned to the same metaphor: “it’s not the mistress is asking her master to have her

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registered officially so that she can formally become his wife. We are the wife, we must be recognized as such.”

Years later, when Japan’s international position did not look as rosy, Ishihara lambasted the relationship between Japan in the United States in less flattering terms:

[The security alliance] is nothing more or less than a scheme by which America unilaterally rapes the very state itself. Japan has become like a teenage prostitute that America uses for its own gratification. What’s worse is that instead of receiving money we are actually paying for this treatment. You can’t call this anything but the apex of masochism.

Later, in Kokka Naru Genei, meant to be his political memoir after his first retirement, he wrote:

When I gave my retirement address to the Diet, I, without thinking much about it, compared this country to a eunuch, something with the form of a man but lacking masculine faculty. The reality is even more atrocious. America, out of an excessive fear of Japan, deliberately and completely demolished the true essence of our country. As a result, our former leaders, who came to loathe the idea of our country standing on its own two feet and treading its own path, reduced us to the condition of a concubine with bound feet.

Shirai Satoshi, a sociologist and best-selling author who advocates a greater degree of autonomy in the bilateral relationship wrote that what America had done to Japan “can only be called castration.”

Another who cannot seem to avoid sexual metaphors is comic book artist and right-wing activist Kobayashi Yoshinori. In one of his books, Kobayashi denounced pro-American Japanese intellectuals and diplomats who support Japan’s security treaty, calling them “yellow cab-men,” invoking a derogatory Japanese slang term he defines as “loose girls who are exclusively used by foreigners.” Castigating “weak-willed women who spread their legs because they are afraid of being disliked,” he compares them to

592 “Playboy Interview, Shintaro Ishihara,” Playboy, October 1990, p. 68.
pro-American politicians who think that “being liked by white Americans” is the key to getting high status.\footnote{Kobayashi Yoshinori, Shingōmanizmu Sengen, Vol 12: Taga tame ni Pochi wa Naku, (Tokyo: Shogakkan, 2002), pp. 108 - 111.}

Such metaphors have been a staple of cartoonists for years, presenting Japan or parts of it as fallen women or the victims of unwanted attention from America. One depicts a woman, naked but for an American flag with the caption “Shōfu Okinawa,” or “Okinawa the prostitute.” Another depicts Okinawa as a woman being fondled by a US servicemen as she sits astride his enormous erection, depicted as cannon emerging from his loins. In the background Japanese men from the home islands fecklessly protest her mistreatment.

The stock image of America as sexual aggressor and interloper has become part of Japan’s national psyche. As Japan’s position relative to the United States has declined, resentment toward the United States has grown and the old mass rape myth has been recycled for another generation that had no direct experience of the Occupation and thus

\footnote{Ibid. pp. 108, 111.}
no personal memory to conflict with. It has reached a point where the myth of the mass rape of Japanese women by American soldiers has crossed the boundary from literary metaphor to popularly accepted historical fact. Even those who did have direct experience or should know better for other reasons seem entranced by it.

![Image](image-url)

(45, 46) Cartoons depicting the ongoing American domination of Okinawa. 599

Such imagery remains a favorite of opponents of Japan’s security relationship with the United States. Hashimoto Masaru, a cartoonist who draws for the left of center news site *Nikkan Berita* seems particularly fascinated with the genitalia of American servicemen. In one cartoon he echoes an earlier theme, showing the silhouette of an American soldier with a massive erection in the shape of a missile pointed at the island of Okinawa. In another, he makes a play on words with cartoon labeled “no osu” with “osu”

being both the Japanese word for “male” and the first two syllables in the transliteration of “osprey” the name of the American tilt-rotor aircraft whose deployment to Okinawa is opposed by many inhabitants on the grounds of safety concerns. In a recurring theme, an American soldier, standing on the island of Okinawa, is presented without pants. In another cartoon, a group of pantless US servicemen is confined with in a circular prison of towering walls equipped with security cameras.

(47 – 49) Hashimoto Masaru Cartoons: American military power represented as the penises of American servicemen

Sexualized imagery and language as an expression of Japan’s subordination to the United States in diplomatic and strategic affairs is nearly ubiquitous. It both reflects and reinforces the historical experiences of defeat, occupation, and subordination in the Japanese popular imagination.

Conclusions

On the whole the behavior the American troops stationed in Japan during the Occupation were well disciplined by the standards of a mid-twentieth century mass conscript army. When American forces were moving into place and order had not yet been established, there was a period of lawlessness during which many soldiers committed auto theft, robbery, and other crimes. This crime wave was exacerbated by the decision to allow Japan to maintain sovereignty over its currency, thus rendering the GIs money worthless. However, even during this relatively chaotic time violent crimes like rape and murder were rare. Compared to many other armies during the Second World War American troops in Occupied Japan comported themselves in an exemplary manner. However, in a conflict that included Nazi Germany and Josef Stalin’s Soviet Union as well as Imperial Japan, the bar is bound to be extraordinarily low. While rape by American soldiers in Japan was relatively rare, it was certainly not unknown.

There can be little doubt that many Japanese women suffered sexual violence at the hands of American troops and something on the order of 1300 of them reported sexual attacks by Allied soldiers during the Occupation. Rape statistics are, of course, always burdened with the inaccuracies introduced by false accusations and underreporting, but assuming the latter to be the larger problem it is beyond dispute that a large number of Japanese women were raped by American servicemen. In addition, the fact that the United States was in Japan as an occupier seems to have contributed to American criminality. As Hessel Tiltman pointed out in one of his articles about the leftist campaign to discredit the United States, after the return of sovereignty the GI crime rate had dropped to about half what it was during the Occupation. While that certainly
spoke well for the discipline enforced after the Occupation, it inevitably raises the question of why Americans had not behaved equally well before. Similarly, Socialist Dietwoman’s misleading speech before the Diet in which she accused Americans of 1,878 cases of “outrage” against Japanese women was in part so absurd because of the time period she chose. The annualized rape rate for that period would have been 33 cases per annum, considerably lower than the average annual rate during the Occupation and in fact lower even than the 37 cases reported during the single month of May, 1946. Though the number of soldiers was quite a bit higher in 1946, that still represents a considerable discrepancy. While sexual violence is a problem in all places and at all times, it was also more of a problem during the Occupation than it was immediately after the return of sovereignty.

Nevertheless, the problem was nothing like what is alleged in many Japanese sources. The best sources available provide no evidence that mass rape occurred and the most reliable figures available suggest that the actual rate of occurrence was well below one percent of that alleged in many sources. Still, accounts of widespread sexual violence are common in Japanese presentations. One estimate quoted in numerous sources would yield a total of more than 700,000 rapes for the period as a whole. Though such figures are simply not credible, they are treated uncritically by many Japanese writers as well as by non-Japanese academics.

American servicemen also frequently availed themselves of the services of Japanese prostitutes and the related problems of prostitution, sex slavery, venereal

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603 “Table of Misconducts Committed by Allied Servicemen” (Typed) for May, 1946 in NARA RG 331 Box 290, Folder 16; “Rengōgun ni yoru fuhā kō” (Japanese - handwritten) for May, 1946 in NARA RG 331 Box 290, Folder 16.
disease and individual liberty greatly vexed GHQ. Their approach to the problem was undertaken primarily from a standpoint of individual liberty and sexual autonomy and appeared (and indeed sometimes was) inconsistent and incoherent to a great many Japanese interested in the problem. Nevertheless, GHQ did not encourage or even connive at the establishment of brothels for its troops. However, as was the case with rape, a number of legends about GHQ’s involvement in prostitution have grown up in the intervening years.

The currency of these legends is best understood to be a result of a postwar legend that grew up in Japan, a legend that has greatly prejudiced the understanding of many who have subsequently studied the immediate postwar period. This legend has its origins in primal fears about conquering armies and their activities, Japanese wartime propaganda, the behavior of Japan’s own military during the war, the humiliation of defeat, and the exacerbation of that humiliation by the intimate relations between American servicemen and Japanese women, a conscious propaganda offensive by leftist anti-American elements, occupation and continuing international subordination. All of these factors led to an environment in which metaphors of sexual domination came to be so common that many people forgot they were metaphors. Consequently, relations between American men and Japanese women that were largely consensual, if often commercial and crass, were transformed in the popular imagination into coercive acts of violence. The legend of mass rape that grew up in the immediate aftermath of the war became a staple of Japanese literature and cinema, as well as of propaganda and was eventually accepted as common sense. From there it soon became regarded as historical fact and found its way into works of history.
Edward Gibbon once observed, “the most incredible stories are the best adapted to the genius of an enraged people.”

At the end of the Second World War rage, suppressed though it may have been, was one of the few commodities Japan had in abundance. The resentment many Japanese felt about defeat in that conflict and their country’s subsequent inability to emerge from the shadow of its conqueror provided an ample foundation of ire upon which to build a number of legends. One of those legends was that mass rape and widespread sexual atrocities were committed by GIs. Such accounts are best regarded as metaphoric expressions of the experience of national humiliation rather than as serious history. They are, in other words, incredible stories adapted to the genius of an enraged people.

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