VERNACULAR DIPLOMACY IN CENTRAL EUROPE:
STATESMEN AND SOLDIERS BETWEEN THE HABSBURG AND OTTOMAN
EMPIRES, 1543–1593

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Abstract

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg-ruled Holy Roman Empire signed eleven peace treaties, exchanged nearly one-hundred ambassadors, and regularly corresponded across their Central European borderland. Earlier scholarly assessments have claimed that the relationship was overwhelmingly antagonistic and that the Ottomans did not participate meaningfully in the European diplomatic sphere until the eighteenth century. This dissertation offers a revisionist history of the interactions between these two empires in the period between the Ottoman conquest of the Danube River corridor in the 1540s and the outbreak of the Long Turkish War in the 1590s. It recovers the cross-border acts of a wide cast of characters, from the small class of ruling elite at the top down to the common soldiers at the bottom. By drawing on secondary literature in three overlapping academic traditions and archival sources in six languages, it reconstructs a profound shift from expansionist practices to diplomatic engagement and relatively peaceful coexistence.

Part one covers the state-centered version of diplomatic history, what I call "official diplomacy." It surveys negotiations and commissioned ambassadors whose operations resulted in the peace treaties signed and sealed by sovereigns in Ottoman Turkish and Latin. Part two examines this relationship from the borderland, what I call "vernacular diplomacy." It explores regional interactions between Vienna and Buda, local interactions between the borderland fortresses of Komárom and Esztergom, and relationships between borderland soldiers, all of whom communicated in the vernacular language of the borderland by the end of the 1570s. A culture of small scale diplomatic practice in the border zones operated somewhat autonomously from the imperial centers that laid claim to them. Each layer had its own strategies for
establishing and maintaining cross-border relations. Taken together, these chapters argue that official and vernacular interactions between Habsburg Europe and the Ottoman world must be seen as working in tandem in order to arrive at a better understanding of early modern imperial diplomacy.
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enough to receive encouragement, advice, and volumes of rare secondary literature from several colleagues in Hungary, including Géza Pálffy, Pál Ács, Sándor Papp, and Pál Fodor. The staffs of the Haus-, Hoff-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, the Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár in Budapest, and the Bağbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi in Istanbul make works like this possible. In particular, I would like to thank Éva Simon and András Oross for introducing me to the core collections in Budapest and Vienna. To my language instructors, both formal and informal, thank you for providing me with the unique foundations that led to this project. For guiding me through my first years of German and Frühneuhochdeutsch, I thank Deborah Horzen and the late Bernd Decker. Also, a special thanks to Yair Mintzker for helping me decode Sütterlin and preparing me for other archival riddles. A wise man once told me it takes twenty years to master Ottoman Turkish. Thank you to those who helped me embark on the first years of this long journey: Nilüfer Hatemi, Géza Dávid, Ali Emre Özyıldırım, and my classmates in courses at Princeton, ELTE, and Koç. To my extended family, including the Hegedüs, Elő, Tóth, Merva, Hennings, and Giusti branches, thank you for your unwavering support and incidental language training. To Imre and Caroline, thank you for proofreading chapters. Most importantly, a great deal of gratitude goes to Jan, whose love, support, and patience have made all this possible. Lastly, to my mother, Dr. Katherine R. Hegedus, who dragged me along to museums and academic conferences as a child, filled my life with books and a love of history as a young adult, and was a critical reader of this dissertation in what was unexpectedly the last year of her life.
A note on proper names, translations, and transliteration

The thorny problem of place names in Eastern and Central Europe has no adequate solution. Each geographic location has a different appellation in Hungarian, Turkish, German, Latin, Italian, Slavic and occasionally even English. Personal names present a similar minefield of linguistic variation. Often, the use of one designation over another communicates a political or cultural judgment. Originally, I envisioned converting all proper names to Latin, just as the historical actors studied here would have done in an international setting. By using the Latin, I thought I could feign my own neutrality and emphasize the cosmopolitan nature of the region. After much experimentation, I realized this attempt at objectivity in nomenclature was much too confusing and awkward to implement. When I returned to “native” names, however, I noticed that sixteenth-century spellings were greatly altered in the secondary literature as an attempt to more “accurately” communicate ethno-linguistic affiliations. As my own research questions the very foundations of these divisions, I felt great discomfort in forcing a modernized and ethnically distinct name onto my historical actors. I also realized that proper nouns in six different languages within the span of a paragraph distract the unaccustomed eye and leave even the most careful reader struggling to follow the narrative. The resulting approach is somewhat idiosyncratic. Thus, I rely heavily on an appendix (J and K) and choose the variant I find least intrusive to the flow of the text and closest to that used by the person themselves. I have also attempted here to reign in the specialist jargon from the three historiographical traditions (German, Hungarian and Ottoman) that intersect in this dissertation. Historians of the Ottoman Empire are notorious for filling their works with supposedly untranslatable terms. I have opted for full translation, keeping only those terms I find necessary for clarity. In these cases, I use a
translation and provide the original in parentheses, as in the case of the regional governor (Beylerbey) and the local governor (Sancakbey). Again, a full concordance can be found in the appendix (Appendix L). Transliteration can be equally controversial. Though I am not a linguist, I find the modernization of sixteenth-century orthography an unnecessary intrusion that often blurs the original meaning or ambiguity of a passage. For this reason, I have translated all quotations and kept them in their original forms in the footnotes, retaining all spelling deviations. The only exception is Ottoman Turkish. All Ottoman quotations are transcribed from the Arabic alphabet using a simplified Turkish spelling, omitting indications of vowel length. Lastly, I should explain my use of the terms “Ottoman” and “Habsburg,” which some readers may rightly question. Though contemporary sources refer to them as the “Turkish” and “German” Empires, these political units were composite entities whose members and agents were neither ethnically nor religiously homogeneous. Therefore, I have chosen to refer to both by the name of the dynasty that ruled them.
Introduction

Around 1572, Martino Rota (1520–83) engraved a series of portrait prints depicting individuals operating along the Habsburg side of the Ottoman borderlands in Central Europe.1 Together with his austere portrayals of fortress captains, mapmakers, and archdukes, he fashioned at least three known portraits of archbishop and diplomat Antonius Verantius (1504–73).2 One of Rota’s portraits shows Verantius in three-quarter pose with weary eyes surrounded by an hour glass,3 compass, and two books (fig. 1). His elongated left hand rests on top of two crossed daggers, an Ottoman curved *hançer* and a European straight *tóre*, tied together with an olive branch, representing successful peace negotiations. The print highlights the Catholic Archbishop’s mission as envoy of Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian II (r. 1564–76) in 1568 to the Ottoman Porte, which culminated in the Peace Treaty of Edirne.4 Rota fashioned his portrait at least three years later, at a decisive moment in European-Ottoman relations. Though Verantius

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1 For a catalogue raisonné of his works, see Milan Pelc, *Život i djela šibenskog bakroresca Martina Rote Kolunića [The life and works of the Šibenik engraver Martino Rota Kolunić]* (Zagreb: Nacionalna i sveučilišna knjižnica, 1997).
3 The hourglass is topped by a sphere, making it impossible to flip over and reset. Similar hourglasses appear in several early modern *momento mori* prints in the hands of figures representing death. See, for example, Raphael Sadeler’s “Cogita mori” of 1617.
united the Holy Roman and Ottoman Empires in peace along their Central European land borders in 1568, the year printed next to him, 1571, marked the defeat of the Ottoman navy by a coalition of Catholic maritime states backed by the papacy at the Battle of Lepanto. Whereas the Austrian Habsburgs continued their ongoing efforts to secure peace with their close Muslim neighbors, the Spanish Habsburgs, allied with the republics, kingdoms, and duchies of the Italian peninsula, were at war with them in the Mediterranean. Rota seems to portray Verantius as he acknowledged this incongruous turn of events through tired eyes and the curious gesture of a protruding middle finger. Both artist and ambassador had once been refugees, fleeing their hometown of Sebenico in Dalmatia from Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. Now they were both affiliated with Maximilian II’s court in Vienna. With Verantius as representative and Rota as representor, they each participated in the Habsburg-ruled Holy Roman Empire’s official relationship with the Ottomans while at the same time having intimate familiarity with everyday interactions that occurred along the borderlands. The print, through both its central theme and the biographies of both artist and subject, presents a comment on Habsburg Vienna and its extraordinary relationship with its Ottoman neighbors.

This dissertation examines the overlap between these two worlds: diplomacy and the borderlands. It looks at exchanges between the Houses of Habsburg and Osman in the first phase of their direct contact following the fall of the Kingdom of Hungary, the second half of the sixteenth century. Rather than building a chronological narrative on the rise and fall of relations between the two empires, it examines how a complex reality closely tied to the wills and motivations of individual historical actors played out in different imperial and regional power

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5 Earlier scholars have noted that the inscription was added after 1571, since Verantius did not attain the title of “Vngarie Primas” until 1572. Willhelm, “Martino Rota,” 159–160.
structures, which are defined here as official and vernacular diplomacy respectively. It looks first at the official relationship fostered through peace treaties and the exchange of diplomats like the 1568 treaty negotiated by Antonius Verantius, then at regional relationships between Vienna and Buda, then at local relationships between the borderland fortresses of Komárom and Esztergom, and finally at relationships between borderland soldiers. In doing so, it argues that daily interactions created a culture of small scale diplomatic practice in the border zones that operated somewhat autonomously from the imperial centers that laid claim to them. Comparing peace treaties and official ambassadorial reports with the correspondence between regional bureaucrats and common soldiers from these lands, it shows how individuals negotiated and traversed religious, ethnic, and political boundaries. While some authorities spent significant time and energy drawing up and defining these boundaries, others devoted their lives to dismantling them.

As a whole, this dissertation seeks to recover Central European interactions across imperial borderlands in multiple registers, from the small ruling elite at the top down to the mass of common soldiers at the bottom. Each chapter could constitute an individual study on its own, but this dissertation contends that early modern diplomacy should be viewed as the sum of all its parts. The only way to truly understand how any one component functioned is to view cross-border interactions of each political layer alongside those that existed above and below it. This dissertation also aims to demystify an important period in a region often closed off to scholars for socio-political and linguistic reasons, thereby dispelling some of the central myths of stark opposition and incommensurability that dominate the narrative of Ottoman relations with the Habsburgs and Europe.

Hungary: From Medieval Kingdom to Early Modern Borderland
This story begins where most histories of pre-modern Hungary end. The medieval Hungarian estates controlled a vast swath of land in Central Europe for much of the eleventh to the early sixteenth centuries, before the Ottoman conquest. The ethnically diverse population occupying a territory the size of modern France was ruled by a succession of dynasties, both regional (houses of Árpád and Hunyadi) and international (Wittelsbach, Anjou, Luxembourg, Habsburg, and Jagiellon). Since the late fourteenth century, the kingdom led the under-financed European resistance to Ottoman expansion in the Balkans. By the 1520s, powerful magnates, internal factions, and financial instability had greatly weakened the monarchy. During a brutal defeat at the hands of Sultan Süleyman (r. 1520–66) and his army on the battlefields near Mohács in 1526, Hungary’s twenty-year old King Louis II (r. 1516–26), drowned in a stream while retreating, leaving behind a crisis of succession. The Ottoman Sultan, himself still an inexperienced ruler at the beginning of a long reign, installed a vassal King to take Louis II’s

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10 He was also crowned King of Croatia and Bohemia. See József Főgel, *II. Lajos udvartartása, 1516–1526 [The Court of Louis II, 1516–1526]* (Budapest: Hornyánszky, 1917). In English, see the exhibition catalogue on his consort and widow, Orsolya Réthelyi, ed., *Mary of Hungary: The Queen and Her Court, 1521-1531* (Budapest: Budapest History Museum, 2005).
11 For a detailed discussion and debates about the consequence of the battle, see Géza Perjés, *The Fall of the Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohács 1526-Buda 1541* (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 1989). See also Megan Kathryn Williams, “Dangerous Diplomacy & Dependable Kin: Transformations in Central European Statecraft, 1526-1540” (Ph.D., Columbia University, 2009).
place: the Transylvanian voivode John Zápolya (r. 1526–40).\textsuperscript{12} Meanwhile, the Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire from neighboring Austria attempted to secure the crown for Louis II’s brother-in-law, Ferdinand (1503–64). The Hungarian estates who survived the bloody battle split into factions, throwing their support behind whichever side provided them with the most financial freedom or religious tolerance, then switching allegiance when circumstances changed.\textsuperscript{13} After maneuvering for years, Ferdinand signed an agreement with the Ottomans in 1533.\textsuperscript{14} Soon afterwards, however, a series of embassy exchanges and negotiations with the Ottoman backed Transylvanian voivode turned King Zápolya led to a deal aiming to reunite the


\textsuperscript{14} There is some confusion around this agreement. Caroline Finkel and Colin Imber both call it a “truce” without detailing its contents. Finkel, \textit{Osman’s Dream}, 125. Imber, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 51. Meanwhile other prominent scholars like Pál Fodor do not even mention it at all when surveying the period. See Pál Fodor, “Ottoman Policy towards Hungary 1520-1541,” \textit{Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae} 45 (1991): 271–345. Despite this, earlier surveys of Ottoman History, like that of Stanford Shaw, and well as many Turkish scholars, state that there was a full peace treaty signed between Ferdinand and Süleyman, the contours of which were related to those they would sign in 1547. This would mean that already in 1533, Ferdinand relinquished his claim to the Hungarian throne and agreed to pay what was effectively a rent of 30,000 gulden to control his portion of Western Hungary. Stanford J. Shaw, \textit{History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), vol. 1, 94. The confusion may stem from a misdated document published in the early nineteenth century. For an overview of published documents related to this treaty, including this misdated one, see Ralf C. Müller, “Der umworbene ‘Erbfeind’: Habsburgische Diplomatie an der hohen Pforte vom Regierungsantritt Maximilians I bis zum ‘Langen Türkenkrieg,” in \textit{Das osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie}, ed. Marlene Kurz et al. (Vienna: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2005), 252–79, here 266.
two halves of Hungary. In the secret Treaty of Nagyvárad (1538), the childless Zápolya named Ferdinand as his successor. It appeared, for a moment, that the crisis had been averted and the two halves of the kingdom would reunite under the house of Habsburg again.

The death of Zápolya in July 1540 coincided with the birth of his first and only legitimate son, leading to a crisis of sovereign legitimacy, the effects of which would continue to plague the Hungarian nobility for the next two centuries. The estates reshuffled their alliances and split again, half of them acknowledging Ferdinand as the rightful heir, the other half supporting the newborn John II Sigismund Zápolya (1540–70) in a last-minute claim to the throne launched by his Queen mother Isabella Jagiellon (1519–59) and her courtiers from Transylvania. The Ottomans, wary of Habsburg expansion in the region, took the opportunity to return to the Carpathian basin, conquer the Danube corridor, and consolidate their power in the center of Hungary. As a result, the Ottomans wedged themselves between the Habsburgs in Austria and the Zápolyas in Transylvania (see map 1). Rather than set up a puppet prince, as they did

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16 On the Queen’s biography, see Alicia McNary Forsey, Queen Isabella Sforza Szapolyai of Transylvania and Sultan Süleyman of the Ottoman Empire: A Case of Sixteenth-Century Muslim-Christian Collaboration (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009). On her son, see Kálmán Szentmártoni, János Zsigmond erdélyi fejedelem élet- és jöllemrajza [The life and character of John Sigismund, ruler of Transylvania] (Cristur-Székelykeresztúr: Globus, 1934).
18 All modern maps of the region are deeply misleading. Each one takes a strong position on legitimate sovereignty and presents it as fact, rather than something constantly negotiated. Instead, I think it is useful to think through contemporary maps, where we acknowledge the imperial gaze and can identify the mental geography with which we are presented. Maps made for the Emperors Maximilian II and Rudolf II (see maps 2 and 3) show the Hungarian royal arms straddling the border, shared by both Habsburg and Ottoman sides, but certainly not a separate entity on its own wedged between the two powers. The Hungarian color of the borderland was everywhere and nowhere at the same time. See chapter one for more on these issues.
following the Battle of Mohács, they chose to establish the cultural and political foundations of Ottomanization and convert the region into a fully functioning province of the vast empire. The medieval Kingdom of Hungary was now divided into three parts: the Kingdom of Hungary (under the Habsburgs), the Principality of Transylvania (a tribute-paying vassal state of the Ottomans under the Zápolya), and the vilayet of Budin (a region fully incorporated into Ottoman structures of power). These divisions would define the region for much of the next 150 years, interrupted only by the bloody and indecisive Long Turkish War (1593–1606), until the Habsburgs led a “liberation” campaign at the end of the seventeenth century which pushed the Ottomans out of the region forever.

This study begins in the 1540s with the installation of Ottoman officials in the central lands of the former Kingdom of Hungary and ends with the outbreak of the Long Turkish War fifty years later. In lieu of the large-scale military action before and after the period between

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19 For the development of Ottoman administration in the region, see the essay collection of Géza Dávid, Studies in Demographic and Administrative History of Ottoman Hungary (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1997).

20 The most comprehensive history of this political unit, long ignored by scholars, is the study by Géza Pálffy, The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 2009).

21 For a survey of its history, see Béla Köpeczi et al., eds., History of Transylvania, trans. Bennett Kovrig, 3 vols. (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs, 2002).

22 No comprehensive study of the 150-year history of the vilayet of Budin has appeared since the chronicle-inspired works of the nineteenth century, such as Ferencz Salamon, Ungarn im zeitalter der Türkenherrschaft, trans. Gustav Jurány (Leipzig: H. Haessel, 1887). A major project from the 1980s which should have reevaluated this tradition fell short by conflating political spheres. See Zsigmond Pál Pach and Ágnes Ruttkayné Várkonyi, eds., Magyarország története 1526–1686 [History of Hungary 1526–1686] (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadó, 1985).


24 These seventeenth-century triumphant narratives have received much more attention than the sixteenth-century defeats and compromises. See, for example, Andrew Wheatcroft, The Enemy at the Gate: Habsburgs, Ottomans and the Battle for Europe (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 2009).
1543 and 1593, the first fifty years of the tripartition of Hungary saw the Ottomans fighting pockets of resistance on either side of the Danube, but never reaching further upstream than the city and fortress of Esztergom, incorporated in 1543.\(^{25}\) While official relations were often strained between the two empires over territorial claims and tribute payments, direct engagement was confined to small-scale raiding and a few notable exceptions launched against parties resisting consolidation. After the 1566 Ottoman campaign, the borders became more or less fixed (Map 2). Instead of constant aggression and warfare, the correspondence of local officials and imperial diplomats, a series of peace treaties, and the diaries and travelogues of individuals passing through the region, all point to growing efforts to maintain the status quo and gradually establish permanent border systems. This period marks a critical juncture, when the Ottoman Empire shifted from expansionist practices to a strategy of coexistence and diplomatic negotiation,\(^{26}\) and is thus worthy of study separately from the different political landscapes that existed before and after it.

The turning point for both empires, in which aggression shifts to reconciliation, can be dated to the mid 1550s. In 1551 and 1552, the Ottomans continued to consolidate their power in Hungary with focused campaigns aimed at containing a rebellion in Transylvania and pockets of resistance elsewhere.\(^ {27}\) By the end of 1552, the Ottoman Empire was saddled with heavy burdens

\(^{25}\) On the capture of Esztergom, see Lajos Némethy, *Miként jutott 1543-ban Esztergom arulással török kézbe* [How Esztergom fell into Turkish hands through treason in 1543] (Esztergom: Laiszky, 1898).
\(^{26}\) Scholars of Ottoman history generally place this shift with the accession of Sultan Selim II in 1566. Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 61. I address this question of shifts from the Ottoman perspective in greater detail at the end of chapter one, in the section titled “Selim the Sot and Murad the Meek?”
\(^ {27}\) Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 55–56.
and suffering from a “crisis of orientation.” Expansion came to a halt as the ruling elite became painfully aware that their global imperial vision, with wars being fought on six separate fronts (Hungary, the Mediterranean, Persia, Iraq, Indian Ocean, and the Black Sea region) was impossible to maintain. Meanwhile, the Habsburgs had also restructured their imperial visions. Signs of strains in the relationship between the Spanish and German branches of the family were visible already in the 1520s and by the 1540s, pressure had mounted both externally from the Ottomans and internally from the Protestant Reformation. Following the abdication and death of Charles V in 1556, Ferdinand, who had been elected King of Hungary in December of 1526 following the disaster at Mohács and had worked closely with the German states throughout his career, became emperor, while the Spanish Kingdom and its vast territories around the globe were inherited by Charles’ son, Philip II (r. 1556–98). The two Habsburg branches and their courts were divided by physical distance, access to financial resources, and a critical divergence in ideology. The grand imperial vision of Charles V’s universal Holy Roman Empire gave way to more practical approaches to governance that took into account the composite nature of

29 See Pál Fodor, The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe - a Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566) (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2015), 121–129. I have added the Black Sea to his list, for which see Brian L. Davies, Warfare, State and Society on the Black Sea Steppe, 1500–1700 (London: Routledge, 2006), 1–20.
30 Ferdinand was elected King of the Romans already in 1531, securing the line of succession. He was also the principal negotiator from the imperial line in most German diets, playing an important role the Augsburg Peace of 1555. See Alfred Kohler, Ferdinand I. 1503–1564: Fürst, König und Kaiser (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2003), 199–206 and 258–264.
31 For a biography of the infamous Spanish King utilizing a trove of recently discovered sources, see Geoffrey Parker, Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2014).
33 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500–c. 1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995).
the empire. From the Iberian Peninsula, Philip would continue to rule the Spanish Empire “on which the sun never set,” while the Austrian Habsburgs would carry on the legacy of the Central European loose conglomeration of states and hereditary lands that Voltaire later famously called “neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire.” For the next half-century, the Ottoman Sultan and the Holy Roman Emperor’s reigns would run parallel, with Ferdinand and Süleyman dying two years apart in the mid-1560s, just as Selim II (r. 1566–74) and Maximillian II (r. 1564–76) would in the mid-1570s, and with Murad III (r. 1574–95) and Rudolf II (r. 1576–1612) carrying the remarkably peaceful empires until they clashed again in 1593. This dissertation tells the story of these years.

The story told here is one of multiple layers of power engaging with each other to form mutually beneficial relationships across Habsburg and Ottoman contexts, both central and regional. Through a study of treaties, correspondence, and objects, it examines several cross-border spheres of contact and exchange. It argues that ambassadors, regional and local governors, and common soldiers all played a role in developing and maintaining (mostly) peaceful relations between the two rival empires. Beginning with those who exercised the most power in the hierarchy and ending with those who exercised the least, it also highlights the tensions between forces of centralization and decentralization. A juxtaposition of official diplomatic exchanges and those of the border region highlights tensions between the fictions of

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34 James Tracy places this shift in 1577, following the military reforms of the newly crowned Emperor Rudolf II, seeing the haphazard approach to the Ottoman borderlands as symptomatic of wider imperial disorganization. James D. Tracy, “The Habsburg Monarchy in Conflict with the Ottoman Empire, 1527–1593: A Clash of Civilizations,” *Austrian History Yearbook* 46 (2015): 1–26. For more on the differences between the timelines proposed here and those of other historians, see chapter one.

35 “Ce corps qui s'appelait et qui s'appelle encore le saint empire romain n'était en aucune manière ni saint, ni romain, ni empire.” Voltaire (François-Marie Arouet), *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations, et sur les principaux faits de l'histoire* (Amsterdam: Chez Jean Neaulme, Benjamin Gibert, 1756), 102 (ch. 70).
empire and the realities and limits of authority. Peace between political units with shared borders was never developed in a courtly vacuum. It required constant renegotiation on all levels. As generations shifted, so too did the languages of communication and the tools of collective memory. Archives and objects came to embody a peace that few could remember negotiating. Central bureaucrats began arguing about the number of diplomatic missions over the years and looked to their archives for proof. Regional and local governors relied heavily on personal relationships and ceremonial displays that both reinforced and redrew the lines between imperial spheres. Soldiers, for whom the concept of dynastic affiliation was more fluid, regularly shifted between spheres, bringing objects of military material culture with them as they pursued opportunities for financial gains and social prestige. In this dissertation, these spheres come together to reveal the rich and multifaceted world of Ottoman-Habsburg relations in the second half of the sixteenth century.

Competing Historiographies

Given the insular nature of the multiple academic traditions that explore this geographic region during the fifty-year period under consideration, a single traditional narrative does not emerge. The divisions of each tradition often run along the fault lines of the imperial struggles they narrate. It will be helpful, however, to outline certain features of German, Hungarian, and Anglo-American academic narratives that discuss Ottoman-Habsburg relations and the border in Hungary in the sixteenth century. The questions asked tend to vary as widely as the criteria for selecting primary sources, due to limited access to secondary literature and opportunities for
research throughout the turbulent twentieth century. As a general rule, continental scholarship has placed a great emphasis on critical source publications and short focused studies, which provide an excellent foundation to work from while leaving both black holes and smaller gaps in larger narratives. Several attempts to compile and synthesize arguments have resulted in histories with a strong national inflection, merging the patchwork of political units and pockets of dynastic loyalties into hybrid narratives of national resistance and emancipation. Only in the last few decades have scholars begun the difficult task of reassessing and rewriting these histories. From outside the region, these antagonistic narratives, largely stripped of the nationalistic undertones and regional specificity, were passed on through an over-reliance on primary sources produced by the central administration (often focused on the military) and the study of propaganda from the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literature. The past ten years have seen a methodological shift towards transnational history, reflecting globalization. As a result, the divisions between continental and Anglo-American traditions have become less stark. At the same time, the continued use of problematic handbooks, outdated textbooks in the classroom, and the politicization of public history have led to some resistance to these projects. Below, I outline how the German and Hungarian historiographies addressed Ottoman-Habsburg relations developed and how they each have changed with the transnational turn. I then turn to the much smaller corpus of Anglo-American scholarship on Ottoman-Habsburg relations. Lastly, I identify

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36 Linguistic barriers are further exacerbated by the limited library distributions and small print runs of key publications.


38 See a recent series of essays on the political uses of “Turkish memories” in contemporary Central European politics: Johannes Feichtinger and Johann Heiss, eds., *Der erinnerte Feind: Kritische Studien zur „Türkenbelagerung“* (Vienna: Mandelbaum, 2013).
three thematic fields that have grown dramatically over the last ten years in which this dissertation seeks to makes interventions: cultural-encounters, borderlands, and diplomacy.

Continental Historiographies

The nineteenth-century Austrian orientalist Joseph Hammer-Purgstall casts a long shadow on the German academic tradition. 39 Hammer-Purgstall, a diplomat and prolific scholar of Arabic, Persian, and Turkish, wrote a ten volume History of the Ottoman Empire between 1827 and 1835 which, despite many factual errors, remains unsurpassed in depth and breadth. 40 The eight-thousand-page text uses an impressive range of sources, covering many episodes that scholars would later neglect. His discussions of Ottoman-Habsburg relations are particularly detailed, though certainly not exhaustive. His perspective on the border is largely that of the imperial bureaucrats he cites, continuously dismayed by the behavior of groups who refused to accept the “legitimate power and well-ordered government” he venerated. 41 To a certain extent, German language historical narratives of the Ottoman Empire contracted after Hammer’s death in 1856, and the focus overwhelmingly shifted to source publications. Meanwhile, histories of the early modern Holy Roman Empire were more concerned with constitutional developments and the divisions between the Habsburg ruling dynasty and the German princes, 42 on the one hand, and confessional struggles on the other. In these studies, events in the Ottoman Empire and

41 For his wonderful manifesto-like introduction, see Hammer-Purgstall, Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches, vol. 1, xxvii–xxviii.
42 For an overview of these debates, see the introduction to Barbara Stollberg-Rilinger, The Emperor’s Old Clothes: Constitutional History and the Symbolic Language of the Holy Roman Empire, trans. Thomas Dunlap (New York, N.Y.: Berghahn Books, 2015)
the Hungarian borderlands were inconsequential, if mentioned at all. Much of the work published in the twentieth century treating Ottoman-Habsburg relations, consistent with continental scholarship on the whole, appeared in the form of article-length, deeply focused studies in essay collections, source editions, and dissertations with a focus on military and economic history. The twenty-first century brought with it major changes in academic funding structures and international outlook, which has resulted in a growth of conference based publications. Several recent examples deal with the Ottoman-Habsburg interactions across the centuries, containing focused studies driven by a methodological turn towards transnational history. These studies are almost exclusively on the Ottoman Empire. Recent histories of the Early Modern Habsburg world remain more limited methodologically.

Hungarian historiography grew directly out of a late humanist tradition of chronicle publication in the eighteenth century, and flowered in the nineteenth century under a group of

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43 This is perhaps best seen in Johannes Janssen, *History of the German People at the Close of the Middle Ages*, trans. A. M Christie and M. A Mitchell, 16 vols. (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trübner, & Co., Ltd., 1896–1910). Originally in eight volumes under the title *Geschichte des deutschen Volkes seit dem Ausgang des Mittelalters* (1878–1894). This divergence is no doubt due to the source materials available to work from. Archival sources for internal conflicts within the Holy Roman Empire are unlimited. Similar sources for the Ottoman Empire were difficult to find and read, thus the body of sources they relied upon were those held in Vienna produced or collected in the context of diplomatic activity.

44 This turn was greatly influenced by the postcolonial critique of Western scholarship, which has led historians to eschew regionally specific studies in favor of raising questions that crisscross the lines drawn by nationally based historiographies and “area studies.” For a successful volume of this type, see the end product of a two-year (2009–2011) *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* project, Andreas Helmedach et al., eds., *Das osmanische Europa: Methoden und Perspektiven der Frühneuzeitforschung zu Südosteuropa* (Leipzig: Eudora-Verlag, 2014). For another example that emerged from Heidelberg’s Cluster of Excellence “Asia and Europe in a Global Context” project, see Pascal Firges et al., eds., *Well-Connected Domains: Towards an Entangled Ottoman History* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

45 I have tried to cite the works of authors published in accessible languages where possible. Most works cited in English, German, French, and Italian originally appeared in Hungarian. In the interest of a lower word count and less confusion, I only cite the Hungarian sources where no translations exist, with an English translation of the title in brackets.
clergymen and nobility who wrote while organizing archival collections in Budapest and Vienna. The resulting primary source editions and translations are still widely cited within and outside of Hungary and remain rich sources of otherwise paleographically inaccessible raw material for political, economic, and social history.\textsuperscript{47} Divisions emerged between a Catholic point of view (pro-Habsburg) and a Calvinist point of view (anti-Habsburg) in the second half of the nineteenth century, closely related to a nationalist narrative seeking a historical precedent in the fight for “liberation” from the Habsburgs.\textsuperscript{48} These religious divisions and nationalist narratives still leave their mark on much scholarship today, largely in terms of the terminology employed to describe events. Political circumstances throughout the twentieth century regulated not only the flow of secondary literature behind the Iron Curtain, but also the emergence of debates. Marxist economic and demographic histories dominated the many academic presses in the country until

\textsuperscript{46} For an overview of this early period see Emma Bartoniek, \textit{Fejezetek a XVI–XVII. századi magyarországi történetírás történetébol: kézirat gyanánt} [Chapters from 16th–17th century Hungarian history writing in manuscript form] (Budapest: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Irodalomtudományi Intézet és a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára, 1975).

\textsuperscript{47} This includes the following major publications: Anton von Gévay, \textit{Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte der Verhältnisse zwischen Österreich, Ungern und der Pforte im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderte, aus Archiven und Bibliotheken: Gesandtschaft König Ferdinands I. an Sultan Suleiman I.}, 3 vols. (Vienna: Schaumburg, 1838–42); Áron Szilárdy and Sándor Szilágyi, eds., \textit{Török-magyarkori történelmi emlékek} [Historical memories from the Turkish period in Hungary], 10 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1863–72); Antal Velics, \textit{Magyarországi török kincstári defterek} [Hungary’s Turkish treasury defters], ed. Ernő Kammerer, 2 vols. (Budapest: M. Tud. Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1886–90); Imre Karácsen, ed., \textit{Török-magyar oklevél tár}, 1533–1789. [Turkish - Hungarian records office: 1553–1589] (Budapest: Stephaneum Nyomda R.T., 1914); Sándor Takáts, Ferenc Eckhart, and Gyula Szekfű, eds., \textit{A Budai basák magyar nyelvű levelezése} (1553–1589) [The correspondence of the Buda pashas in the Hungarian language (1553–1589)] (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915); József Thúry and Gyula Szegfű, eds., \textit{Török történetírők} [Turkish Historians], 3 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1892–1916). These and other scholars contributed regularly to several prominent journals, most importantly, \textit{Magyar Történelmi Tár}.

the collapse of Communism in 1991. These debates focused mostly on ethnic composition, depopulation, and migration. Additionally, institutional structures built into universities, archives, and museums continue to reinforce deep rifts between the fields of Medieval, Early Modern, and Ottoman history. Thus, each field has a distinct vision of sixteenth-century history which sits uncomfortably with the others.

Early modern studies in Hungary were dominated by debates on the decline and fall of the Kingdom of Hungary and development of the Principality of Transylvania until very recently. The study of humanism, long seen as part of a burst of frivolity in the court of a deteriorating monarchy, has been relegated to historians of literature and art. These studies overwhelmingly focus on a golden age under Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458–1490) and on tracing the history of anti-Ottoman propaganda in the seventeenth century. A notable early exception

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49 Works published between World War II and the fall of the Berlin wall were mostly demographic and fiscal histories dealing with incomplete date sets that were easy to manipulate.  
50 In the conclusion to the standard work on Medieval Hungary, Engel wrote “Our story must come to an end at this point. That a new era in the history of Hungary had begun in the year 1526 was clear to later generations… Long accepted as the profound dividing line between the ages that we call medieval and modern, and it is always kept in mind, at least in Hungary, when textbooks are compiled, university chairs and syllabuses are established, archival records are kept or monuments registered.” Engel, Realm of St. Stephen, 370–371.  
51 Take for example the scathing review of outward looking scholarship produced by the academy since 1990 by Sándor Őze, Nemzettudat és historiográfia [Nation and Historiography] (Budapest: Hamvas Béla Kultúrakutató Intézet, 2009), 132–154.  
52 This is, of course, part of a larger trend which new histories of courts aim to rectify. For a detailed discussion of the historiography dating back to the nineteenth-century-founding of the national museum collection, see the four chapters on historiography in Péter Farbaky and Louis A. Waldman, eds., Italy and Hungary Humanism and Art in the Early Renaissance (Florence: Vila I Tatti, 2011).  
53 Ágnes Bakos, Beatrix Basics, and Péter Farbaky, eds., Matthias Corvinus, the King: Tradition and Renewal in the Hungarian Royal Court, 1458–1490 (Budapest: Budapest History Museum, 2008).  
54 The two most widely cited examples are Mihály Imre, “Magyarország panasza”: a Querela Hungariae toposz a XVI–XVII. század irodalmában ["Hungary's Complaint": the topos of the Querela Hungariae in Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-century Literature] (Debrecen: Kossuth Kiadó, 1995) and Géza Galavics, “Kössünk kardot az pogány ellen”: török háborúk és
was Sándor Takáts, archivist in Vienna and Budapest at the turn of the twentieth century. Takáts was a prolific essayist in the antiquarian tradition of the German romantic school of *Kulturgeschichte* whose 600 individual articles on all aspects of life on the border are filled with citations of rich archival materials in Hungarian, German, and Latin. His works, however, are largely ignored by modern scholars because of their markedly literary style and strong nationalist language. His dynamic vision of the borderland stands in contrast to the stark divisions that have traditionally defined the field, and are thus somewhat closer to the view of the borderland presented in the second part of this dissertation.

Only recently have scholars re-visited the sixteenth century, with senior members of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences spearheading efforts to address the lacunae. In the 1990s and 2000s, two historians, Ferenc Szakály and István György Tóth, re-examined the biographies of a handful of individual border crossers. Since then, Géza Pálffy, historian of early modern

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55 For this reason, it is best to go directly to his sources when possible, rather than to cite his work. For his most important collections, see Sándor Takáts, *Rajzok a török világból [Sketches from the Turkish world]*, 4 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915–1919) and the posthumous edited volume including an exhaustive bibliography, Sándor Takáts, *Művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok a XVI–XVII. századból [Studies in the Cultural History of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries]*, ed. Benda Kálmán (Budapest: Gondolat Kiadó, 1961).
56 Founded in 1825, it is the primary research institution in Hungary.
Hungary and the Habsburg monarchy, founded an entire field of study by placing Hungary within its Central European context. Pálffy publishes widely on members of bureaucratic institutions, the nobility, and cartography, while utilizing sources from archives throughout Central Europe. Another member of the Academy, historian of renaissance literature, Pál Ács, has published several studies on late sixteenth-century vernacular writing and intellectual history which has succeeded in crossing disciplinary divides. Ács’ border is fluid and dynamic, with renegades and works of literature crossing boundaries. On a whole, however, change is slow to come. The enduring divisions of Ottoman and Early Modern history in Hungary are best exemplified by the continued use in public history of highly charged terms such as the

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59 His most important book length work to date is Pálffy, *Kingdom of Hungary*. He has also published several dozen important articles.


62 This is true in his excellent works on the development of border defense systems and ransom captivity. The Ottoman Empire is largely an outsider in his Central European context, a political entity against which actions were taken. See Géza Pálffy, “The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century),” in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe. The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, ed. Dávid Géza and Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 3–69 and Géza Pálffy, “Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman-Hungarian Frontier in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders: Early Fifteenth-Early Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 35–83.

misleading “Turkish Empire” or “occupation” rather than “conquest,” and even the outright omission of the one-hundred-and-fifty years of Ottoman rule from historical overviews.

Ottoman studies in Hungary developed in isolation from early modern Hungarian historiography, due primarily to the linguistic and paleographic training they require and the institutional divisions between academic departments mentioned earlier. This has led to a tendency to consult only Ottoman documents produced within the borders of the province of Budin rather than considering regional contexts, a problem enhanced by the ebb and flow of opinion towards Austria and the Turkish Republic in the public sphere. Hungarian Ottomanists engage with a series of established topics built up through six generations of scholarly output, most tracing the roots of their work to the institutional and economic studies of the famous philologist Lajos Fekete and his student Káldy-Nagy; topics include military and political history, biographies of administrators, examinations of individual town records (mostly relating to trade), and a small amount of work on religion. Debates, where they exist, center largely on questions of economic stagnation and demographic losses in the region while under Ottoman

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64 For an overview, see Dávid and Fodor, “Hungarian Studies.”

65 See his early publication of Ottoman documents in Istanbul archives, Lajos Fekete, *Einführung in die osmanisch-türkische Diplomatik der türkischen Botmässigkeit in Ungarn* (Budapest: Königliche Ungarische Universitätsdruckerei, 1926). His most important work, still critical for anyone attempting to read the cypher-like script used by members of the financial chancellery is Lajos Fekete, *Die Siyaqat-Schrift in der türkischen Finanzverwaltung: Beitrag zur türkischen Paläographie mit 104 Tafeln* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1955).

66 For example, see his publication of a detailed (mufassal) register that became a standard format for a subfield known as “defterology,” in which Ottoman administrative codices are transcribed, edited, and published. Lajos Fekete, *Az esztergomi szandzsák 1570. évi adósszeírása [The tax survey of the sanjak of Esztergom from 1570]* (Budapest: Teleki Pál Tudományos Intezet, 1943). See also the joint publication on the Buda treasury registers with his student: Lajos Fekete and Gyula Káldy-Nagy, *Rechnungsbücher türkischer Finanzstellen in Buda (Ofen) 1550–1580; türkischer Text* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1962).
rule. Outside the cataloguing of museum collections and documentation of excavations, little work has been done on the one-hundred-and-fifty years of visual heritage from the Ottoman period.

As in Germany, substantial shifts have occurred in Hungarian academia over the past fifteen years. Scholars have begun to engage with each other across the institutional divisions between Early Modern and Ottoman, particularly under the leadership of Turkologist and historian Pál Fodor, director of the Institute of History in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 2012. This includes several exemplary volumes with articles by Pálffy and Ács, as well as Ottoman cultural historian Balázs Sudár, and the counter-reformation historian, Antal Molnár.

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67 See Dávid and Fodor, “Hungarian Studies” for an in-depth discussion of these fields in the second half of the twentieth century.
68 During his long career, the archaeologist Győző Gerő produced hundreds of descriptive studies of built environments, individual buildings, and one major survey of Ottoman architecture in 1960. In English, see Győző Gerő, *Turkish Monuments in Hungary* (Budapest: Corvina Press, 1976). A small amount of literature exists on textiles (mainly carpets), armor, and inventories of estates. They are often occupied with questions of influence across an imaginary line of difference, and will be discussed in greater detail in the chapter on soldiers. As for architectural history after Gerő, the Turkologist and historian Balázs Sudár has published annotated catalogues of baths and mosques in Ottoman Hungary: Balázs Sudár, “Baths in Ottoman Hungary,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 57, no. 4 (2004): 391–437 and Balázs Sudár, *Dzsámik és mecsetek a hódolt Magyarországon* [Camis and Mosques in occupied Hungary] (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 2014).
69 See Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, eds., *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders: Early Fifteenth - Early Eighteenth Centuries* (Leiden: Brill, 2007). See also the recent polemical work on grand strategy which includes a harsh critique of current trends in Ottoman studies, Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire*.
70 See the edited volume Pál Fodor and Pál Ács, eds., *Identity and Culture in Ottoman Hungary* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2017)
71 Sudár has published on music, religion and architecture as well as the symbolic dimensions of Ottoman literature related to Hungary. See, for example, Balázs Sudár, “Bektaşi Monasteries in Ottoman Hungary (16th–17th Centuries),” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 61, no. 1–2 (2008): 227–48.
Overall, continental scholarship has produced a wealth of source editions and essay length focused studies that provide an excellent foundation. Still, the results remain compartmentalized and largely unused by scholars outside the region.

**Anglo-American Historiography**

While no serious historians have accepted the Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s bloody borders of Islam at face value, a “clash of civilizations” model has largely defined Ottoman-Habsburg relations in the eyes of the few Anglo-American scholars who have examined the topic. This focus on conflict comes from two related models that position the Habsburgs and Ottomans against one another: military competition and ideological incommensurability. In terms of military engagements, studies have appeared on the distribution and modernization of fortresses, the expenses of the border defense system, paths taken by certain technological innovations, and the endless struggle over resources and jurisdiction. If one seeks a collective narrative presented in these studies, the history of the Ottoman-Habsburg

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border in the second half of the sixteenth century is one of central forces building up an expensive fortress system to prepare for current small scale and future large scale clashes. This emphasis on military offense and defense sees these years from the perspective of the violent wars of re-conquest that followed them in the late seventeenth century. They also engaged with general postulations on the role and nature of the frontier in Ottoman history, the second model of ideological incommensurability. Building on the Islamic juridical division between the internal “land of peace” and the external “land of war,” Rifā'at Abou-el-Haj, professor of History at Binghamton University, highlighted the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 as the end of Ottoman expansion in a still widely-cited article. Together, these approaches allowed for a generation of academic inquiries to downplay or overlook the earlier peace negotiations between the two powers.

Outside the small group of scholars mentioned above, studies on Early Modern Europe and the Ottoman world in the Anglo-American tradition largely overlook the vast and complex

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80 Recently, James D. Tracy, historian of Habsburg Europe and professor emeritus of the University of Minnesota, has revisited the topic in a handful of short studies on ambassadors and the conflict on the border. He seeks to make an important point about the differences between the Habsburg and Ottoman organization of the body politic: an Ottoman unity of command under the ruling elite contrasted with a disorganized chain of command under the Habsburgs, who were restricted by cumbersome procedures of consultation with councils and estates. Still, his structural “clash of civilizations” remains focused on questions of military and fiscal policy rather than direct interactions between the two empires. Tracy, “The Habsburg Monarchy in Conflict.”
landscape of East Central Europe altogether. While the Ottoman conquests in Europe played a central role in concepts of the Ottoman state and its periodization, the European lands were treated as a single block of Ottoman territory. Due, in part, to barriers between academic traditions and these complicated local historiographies, the region falls off the proverbial and literal map in general studies. In addition to providing an accessible introduction to the entangled history of the Habsburg-Ottoman borderland in the first period of their direct contact in East Central Europe, this dissertation seeks to make interventions in three historiographical traditions that have been given new life as part of the transnational turn: Ottoman-European cultural encounters, borderlands studies, and diplomatic history.

*Cultural Encounters and Exchange*

Much recent scholarship across the humanities and social sciences works against attempts to reify identity and set cultures in perpetual opposition to one another. The field has largely moved away from studies of influence and image formation between East and West that once dominated a largely one-sided approach to encounters. The kingdoms of France and England, long the focus of studies seeking to place the origins of nineteenth-century orientalism in their early modern encounters with the Ottomans, continue to be reevaluated. For example, Christine Isom-Verhaaren, Professor of History at Brigham Young University, has used a combination of Ottoman and French sources to explore a series of Franco-Ottoman alliances and contemporary reactions to them, in order to show how deeply integrated the Ottomans were in European

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politics of the sixteenth century.\textsuperscript{82} John-Paul Ghobrial of Oxford has examined seventeenth-century information flows in Constantinople through the eyes of English Ambassador Sir William Trumbull to reveal the depth of Ottoman integration into early modern communication networks.\textsuperscript{83} These new works are part of a small but growing field that re-examines the relationship between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire, drawing the latter into conversations on the foundations of modernity and early modern globalization.\textsuperscript{84}

Meanwhile, efforts coming largely from scholars of the Venetian Republic have been most successful in nuancing cross-cultural exchange. \textsuperscript{84} Catherine Bracewell of University College London wrote an influential study on the irregular soldiers in the Croatian borderlands that shows the complex reality of border life in a non-diplomatic corridor, where cultures of honor, heroism, and obligation governed interactions among subjects of three competing imperial worlds.\textsuperscript{85} Her divisions, however, are strongly marked by an East-West divide. More recently, scholars have sought to question these divisions altogether by focusing on individuals who lived their lives across imperial realms. The Toronto historian Natalie Rothman has examined trans-imperial subjects, who existed geographically and ideologically between Venice and the Ottoman Empire. These men consciously constructed Venetian identity through the

\textsuperscript{82} Christine Isom-Verhaaren, \textit{Allies with the Infidel: the Ottoman and French Alliance in the Sixteenth Century} (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011).
\textsuperscript{84} See, for example, Baki Tezcan, \textit{The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), Giancarlo Casale, \textit{The Ottoman Age of Exploration} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), and Tijana Krstić, \textit{Contested Conversions to Islam: Narratives of Religious Change in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire} (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2011).
blurring and negotiating of networks while serving as imperial boundary-markers themselves.\textsuperscript{86} Thus, rather than reinforcing the divisions between East and West, Rothman complicates the notions by confronting them with conscious articulations of difference, thereby deconstructing the very notion of difference for certain segments of the population. Noel Malcom, fellow at All Souls College Oxford, has published a long-distance micro-history of a Venetian-Albanian family with macro-historical importance throughout the early modern Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{87} Others have recently examined itinerant artists,\textsuperscript{88} circulating objects,\textsuperscript{89} and individual border-crossers.\textsuperscript{90}

The Habsburg relationship with the Ottomans is ripe for a similar reevaluation. This dissertation will not be the first such attempt. Carina Johnson of Pitzer College has examined the circulation of Ottoman and Native American people and cultural goods throughout the Habsburg realms to argue for a shift from an emphasis on similitude to an emphasis on hierarchy and difference.\textsuperscript{91} Her conclusions, based largely on a corpus of selected published texts from the sixteenth century, differ from those presented here. This divergence partly comes from the fact that the focus here is on the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty, rather than one that

\textsuperscript{86} E. Natalie Rothman, \textit{Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul} (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2012).
\textsuperscript{87} Noel Malcolm, \textit{Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World} (London: Allen Lane, 2015).
\textsuperscript{88} For example, Tatiana Sizonenko, “Artists as Agents: Artistic Exchange and Cultural Translation between Venice and Constantinople, The Case of Gentile Bellini, 1479–1481” (Ph.D., University of California, San Diego, 2013).
attempts to unite it with its increasingly separate Spanish branch. While Johnson’s study differs in geographic specificity from this dissertation, another recent study by the established Habsburg historian Paula Fichtner differs in temporal specificity. In her sweeping overview of the relationship from the Austrian Habsburg point of view over nearly four centuries, Fichtner repeats stereotypes of the bloodthirsty Turks as heathens and barbarians from contemporary printed media that have little to do with Vienna’s real daily interaction with her Ottoman neighbors in the sixteenth century. The terror and antagonism Fichtner takes as her subject existed, but alongside it was a much more complicated world of compromise, exchange, and understanding. I aim to rewrite this relationship for the period between 1543 and 1593, replacing the stereotypes with conversations and relationships.

**Borderlands**

My second intervention is in the historiography of borderlands and frontiers. Recent interdisciplinary work has explored the limits of a post-structuralist vision of global borderlands. Highly theoretical approaches developed in international relations aim to understand the implications of unnatural borders imposed by political life. For example, Nick Vaughan-Williams of the University of Warwick outlined a concept of bio-political borders as an alternative to geopolitical borders of the state, in which practices of violence, sovereignty, and power create exceptional spaces in which border imaginaries do not fit the cartographic

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92 When she does introduce these real imperial actors, she projects her intellectual history readings onto the documents. See, for example, her opening to chapter 5, on the Ottoman ambassador Ibrahim Bey at the coronation of Maximilian II.

93 Fichtner, *Terror and Toleration.*

94 She is particularly strong in chapter three on the nineteenth century historians of the empire who she argues made a genuine effort at scholarly understanding and appreciation. Had she looked at more primary sources for the sixteenth century, she would have found roots of this interest in some of the works that will be discussed in this dissertation.
representations imposed on them. Of these theory-based approaches, the most influential has been the work of Yale political scientist James C. Scott, who identified entire regions of extreme geography where inhabitants moved to escape the state. Medievalists and modernists have engaged in these post-structuralist debates by examining the relationship between borderlands and contested identities. For medieval historians, this has meant questioning imagined frontiers and pre-nationalist patterns of self-identification. For modernists, this has led to an emphasis on interethnic violence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as empires collapsed and nation-states formed. Historians of early modern Europe engage with these debates as well, though largely from the view of Western European intellectual, institutional, and legal history. New approaches to the constitutional makeup of the Holy Roman Empire in Germany have revealed much about the rituals and symbols that held the confederation of states together. This focus on differentiating between internal borders and assessing the level of real power wielded by the Emperor has led to a number of important studies on the role of Hungarian crown and nobility in this conglomeration. Questions raised in international relations and legal history also had an

100 Stollberg-Rilinger, Emperor’s Old Clothes.
101 Géza Pálffy, “An ‘Old Empire’ on the Periphery of the Old Empire: The Kingdom of Hungary and the Holy Roman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in The Holy
impact on historians of early modern comparative empires like Lauren Benton, who revisited the notion of sovereignty in anomalous legal zones, where the porous fabric of subject and state relationships was incomplete. These approaches have not yet had an impact on the study of Habsburg-Ottoman borderlands. Scholars still build on notions of the ever-expanding empire and examine official policy through periodizations of imperial expansionist ideology. Accepting at face value the notion that the Empire had no hard borders as transfer points from one political realm to the other until the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699), as argued by Abou el-Haj, historians often read the land frontier as a lawless countryside for adventurers. This dissertation seeks to complement these state-centered histories of ideology with a multi-tiered approach in which certain official forces work towards a structured and bounded state while other vernacular forces work to support or undermine these structures.

**Diplomacy**

Lastly, this dissertation joins recent efforts to revisit and re-theorize the history of early modern diplomacy. No book has had more influence for the field than Garrett Mattingly’s

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Roman Empire, 1495–1806: A European Perspective, ed. Robert John Weston Evans and Peter H. Wilson (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 259–79. See the bibliography for further works by this prolific scholar on various facets of the topic.


103 Abou-el-Haj, “Formal Closure.”

Renaissance Diplomacy, which argued that the modern practice of permanent resident embassies and its accompanying developments in foreign relations emerged in northern and central Italy and assumed its distinctive form between 1420 and 1530.105 While some of the generalizations Mattingly made have been questioned, his narrative has remained largely intact until the advent of the new diplomatic history. In 2008, John Watkins published a call to arms outlining a new trajectory for this old and conservative subfield.106 Watkins wanted to replace the crude periodizations, teleological narrative, and restricted European geography with a more holistic approach to interstate relations. Mattingly’s rise of the resident ambassador has become a significant part of a much larger narrative focused less on firsts and influence and more on variation and interaction. This new diplomatic history challenges state-based assumptions through a post-structuralist critique of both political entities and the groups of people representing them by focusing on the actual practice of diplomacy.107 Many scholars have taken part in these developments,108 mostly through a renewed focus on the role of secretaries,109 ceremonial,110 and the development of bureaucratic mentalities.111

108 For an example, see volume 19 of the Journal of Early Modern History, particularly the afterword by Natalie Rothman.
While the study of European diplomatic history has received a great deal of attention over the years, Ottoman diplomatic history is still, in many ways, in its infancy. An old narrative of imperial diplomacy, or more accurately, the lack of it, is centered on basic assumptions about the nature of the Ottoman state that are embodied in the early Islamic juridical division of the world into the *dar ul-Islam* (abode of Islam) and *dar ul-Harb* (abode of War). According to these old ideas Ottoman foreign policy did not exist before the eighteenth century. Attempts to rewrite Ottoman diplomatic history still work within a Eurocentric framework built by Mattingly, putting Ottoman developments in conversation with Italian ones or placing the Ottomans at the center of European dynastic struggles. Thus, the Ottomans are seen as passively accepting influence from the active European courts or merely as pawns in continental power games. Those who have explored earlier Ottoman participation in Renaissance diplomacy tend to argue that reciprocal relations operating in the late fifteenth century were replaced by an anti-diplomatic stance under Sultans Selim and Süleyman in the sixteenth century.

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112 Abou-el-Haj, “Formal Closure.”
Recent work on comparative universalizing rhetoric, border crossers, and shifting imperial contexts has challenged these views and contributed to a fragmentary but entirely different picture of the diplomatic ecology of the sixteenth and seventeenth century Ottoman Empire. Questioning the received wisdom on the Ottoman reluctance to conclude formal treaties with their Christian neighbors, Kołodziejczyk points to several early instances of bilateral agreements in which the precisely demarcated and recognized boundary lines of Abou-el-Haj’s 1699 treaty appear in Amasya (1555) and even fifteenth-century agreements with Venice and Moldavia.115 Although Venice primarily interacted with the Ottomans in the interest of the free movement of merchants or as part of Mediterranean turf wars in conjunction with the Holy League, the complex land border they shared along the Dalmatian coast led to some important similarities with Ottoman-Habsburg relations.116 The Venetian borderlands have been explored by Maria Pia Pedani Fabris,117 whose work building on that of Alessio Bombaci in the Archivio di Stato, resulted in a catalogue of a trove of Ottoman documents exchanged with the Venetian republic.118 Pedani Fabris has intriguingly pointed out the documentation of joint border

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116 For a critical study on the role of imperial agents in the Venetian context who are comparable to some of the individuals discussed in the second part of this dissertation, see Rothman, Brokering Empire.
117 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, Dalla frontiera al confine, Quaderni di Studi Arabi: Studi e testi 5 (Rome: Herder Editrice, 2002).
118 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris and Alessio Bombaci, Inventory of the lettere e scritture Turchesche in the Venetian State Archives (Leiden: Brill, 2010).
commissions tasked with the differentiation of territory in the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries.¹¹⁹

This dissertation steps away from earlier models of Italian influence and European patterns of development to explore diplomatic interaction and exchange on its own terms. It examines the full range of agents involved in over forty Habsburg diplomatic missions and thirty-five Ottoman diplomatic missions and the interactions of regional and local officials in the borderlands. By beginning two decades after Mattingly ends his story, it makes no claims to identifying “firsts” or patterns of “influence.” Rather, this dissertation examines the unlimited raw material in the Habsburg archives to move beyond the mythical figure of the official humanist diplomat working alone in the service of his state and replacing him with a wide range of characters that engaged in the negotiation, definition, and display of sovereign power as part of a multi-layered diplomatic culture that existed between the two dynasties. Recently, the enormous paper trail left behind by the embassies has become a gold mine for microhistory¹²⁰ and the playground of the code breaking enthusiast.¹²¹ Yet no comprehensive attempts have been made to re-examine Habsburg-Ottoman relations for a given period with these documents. As this dissertation will show, rather than seeking the rise of anti-diplomatic stances, scholars should seek its shift to another set of agents in another set of languages.

Official and Vernacular Diplomacy: A Conceptual Framework

This dissertation aims to overcome compartmentalized historiographies, present an alternative geography for the study of cultural encounters, and integrate borderlands interactions into a more holistic understanding of diplomatic history. To do so, it utilizes a dual framework for examining cross-border interactions by introducing the concepts of official and vernacular diplomacy. Official diplomacy occurred at the highest echelons of power. Its participants included rulers, their imperial advisors, and, most importantly, their commissioned ambassadors who documented and thereby created official relations between political entities. The study of official diplomacy concentrates on the correspondence between sovereigns, ambassadorial reports recording meetings and negotiations, and treaties both parties hoped to define their relationships through. It deals with the “paper-reality” of the Habsburg and Ottoman bureaucracies, in which statecraft existed through the production, dissemination, and collection of paper correspondence and registers.\textsuperscript{122} Official diplomacy is conducted in imperial languages (here in Ottoman Turkish and Latin\textsuperscript{123}) and lends itself to a state-centered history.

Vernacular diplomacy, on the other hand, was practiced by a range of political and social actors who wielded less power and influence at central courts, but played key roles in the borderlands. This included regionally and locally stationed bureaucrats, soldiers, messengers, and peasants. This view considers a different set of actors and archival documents to show how multiple layers of political power interacted and existed alongside one another. Importantly, the

\textsuperscript{122} David Dery, “‘Papereality’ and Learning in Bureaucratic Organizations,” \textit{Administration & Society} 29, no. 6 (1998): 677–89.
\textsuperscript{123} Ottoman Turkish, a combination of Turkish, Persian and Arabic, was the official court language of the Ottoman Empire since the fourteenth century. The language politics of the Vienna court was a bit more complicated. Depending on the ruling sovereign and his courtiers, it was either Spanish, Italian, German, or Latin. For the period under discussion here, Latin was the primary language chosen for official correspondence with foreign rulers, whereas internal correspondence was primarily written in German.
central language of interaction shifted from imperial (Ottoman Turkish and Latin) to the vernacular (Hungarian and German), or used the two interchangeably. Rather than a state-centered narrative, the documents of vernacular diplomacy expose borderland activities that created a parallel version of inter-imperial relations. These channels of communication between authorities of the borderlands operated alongside and at times in competition with or in opposition to official actions in the imperial centers throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. As I show in this dissertation, many individuals involved in official diplomacy also engaged in vernacular pursuits before, during, and after their official service, leading to a picture filled with conflicts of interest and contradictions. The paper-reality of state centered history often clashed with the lived-reality of the borderlands. The uneven relationship between these two realities is a central theme in this dissertation, in which imperial words representing fixed systems of sovereign power clashed with the words and actions of the borderland.

The use of the term “vernacular” is also meant to invoke debates on “high” and “low” culture, as well as “bottom-up” decision making processes. Operating in a vernacular language rather than an imperial one also suggests concepts of Sprachgemeinschaft, a term developed in the field of post-colonial and subaltern studies, in which the use of a particular

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126 For the theoretical underpinnings see Karl Vossler, *Sprachgemeinschaft und Interessengemeinschaft* (Munich: Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1924) and Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994).
language or variety of language creates and reinforces a community of interpretation. Instead of communicating in the lingua franca, usually a learned formal secondary language for most of its speakers, this correspondence utilizes the spoken and written vulgar language of a local population. Such a concept only partly applies here. Here, the use of a vernacular was often necessary, due to the difficulty of communicating in two different linguistic registers.

By formulating and engaging with this conceptual framework, this dissertation seeks in part to answer Peter Burke’s call for studies on early modern language chronology and ecology in his Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe. His provisional map of linguistic variation points out that East Central Europe remains a blank space in our understanding of character and change. Just as Burke argued that simple linear stories are inadequate, I too show how “constant conflict between centripetal and centrifugal forces allowed for convergence and divergence, assimilation and resistance, discipline and freedom, unity and diversity.”

Similarly, recent work on Ottoman language practices has opened the door to scholarship on the place of alternative languages and their usage within the Ottoman context. In seeking to bring together the study of language and diplomacy, I aim to recover overlooked contexts of political agency. Thus, by examining cross-border interaction and exchange through the framework of official and vernacular diplomacy, this dissertation considers multiple layers of society usually studied separately, from the sovereign down to the soldier, suggesting that all of them engaged with the principles and practices of the diplomatic process. This framework, I suggest, has the

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127 Peter Burke, Languages and Communities in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 13.
potential to uncover meaningful counter-narratives to a wide range of imperial borderlands on a global scale.

**Sources**

The archival materials dictate the regional focus. The most direct line of travel and communication between the Habsburgs and Ottomans was the Danube river artery, which connected the two empires through their northeastern-most outposts along a 600-mile system of border fortresses. The thirty-miles between Komárom (Habsburg) and Esztergom (Ottoman) are the best documented segment of the border, with ample archival sources from both official diplomats and local administrators. The level of traffic is most evident in the extensive collections of the imperial archives preserved in the Turcica of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, as well as the collections of documents in the Hungarian National Archives, the Military Archives of Budapest, and to a lesser extent, the Başbakanlık in Istanbul. The border both served an elite clientele and was close enough for common peasants and soldiers to interact. Therefore, it provides an exceptional opportunity to explore how power structures operated on and between multiple levels of society.

Documents from a range of genres produced by the five overlapping socio-linguistic or interpretive communities of the borderlands are taken into account in this dissertation: Ottoman Turks (often of Southern Slavic or “Bosnian” background), Magyars (writing in Hungarian), Saxons (and others writing in German), Dalmatians (and others writing in Italian), and humanists with training in Latin. For official diplomatic relations, this dissertation examines the reports of the ambassadors themselves and the documents produced by their imperial scribes in conjunction with the embassies, namely the peace treaties signed between the two empires. The central body
of sources on vernacular diplomacy are the thousands of letters written by the regional governors, local governors, and soldiers that circulated in the region. These are supplemented by the dozens of travel narratives penned by official diplomats and their entourages as they crossed between Habsburg and Ottoman lands, describing meetings, receptions, and audiences that took place in the local court of Esztergom and the regional court of Buda. Over twenty such travelers left accounts of the crossing between Vienna and Buda in the sixteenth century, thus providing important insights into the interaction between official and vernacular diplomacy. Ottoman registers of important decisions taken by the ruling council add layers of context to these documents, buttressing the claims of ambassadors and at times revealing disconnects between official and vernacular diplomatic practices.

In addition to the written sources, this dissertation also examines objects of art and material culture produced and consumed in the context of diplomatic activities. Gifts, which have received substantial attention in recent scholarship, will be addressed on both the official and vernacular levels. So too will cross-border commissions of armor and arms, mechanical devices such as clocks, and textiles goods. A series of sketchbooks and picture albums produced by individuals who lived in and traveled through the border region are also used to facilitate a discussion of shared costume elements and visual vocabularies among artists and soldiers. Together, these rich sources produce multiple competing narratives of denial (chapter one), tension (chapter two), cooperation (chapter three), friendship (chapter four), and play (chapter five) in the diplomatic relationship between the houses of Osman and Habsburg.

129 Of these travel narratives, only two are widely known through their English translations: Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq (on his activities as ambassador between 1554–1562) and Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrovic (on his travels between 1591–1596). Several twentieth-century publications of travel narratives in German are also well known: Hans Dernschwam (1553–1555), Stefan Gerlach (1573–1578), Salomon Schweiger (1577–1581), and Reinhold Lubenau 1587–1588).
Outline

The following chapters, rather than proceeding chronologically through the fifty-year period, are divided into layers of cross border activity. Beginning with the highest echelons of power and climbing down the ladder to the lowest, each chapter explores how one layer of power operated across the two imperial realms. The internal structure of each chapter follows a general pattern: historiography in the beginning followed by a description of the individuals making up the layer and their duties, and, lastly, changes to the relationships between the two sides over the fifty-year period under study. The two chapters that open each section are the longest, with a deeper focus on the chronological overview to make up for the inadequate foundation in the secondary literature (chapters 1 and 3). My contention in these chapters is that even a list divided into periods constitutes a major contribution. Where the secondary literature provides an adequate basis to work from and the primary sources allow for it, the chapter works as a stand-alone micro-history (chapter 2). Where the primary sources are sparse the chapter is more episodic and even more theoretical (chapters 4 and 5).

Section one, official diplomacy, explores the highest levels of negotiation and its breakdown by examining peace treaties and ambassadors. The first chapter presents the paper-reality of relations between sovereigns embodied in the ratifications of peace treaties. In doing so, it outlines the structures of decision making in both Ottoman and Habsburg lands, the circumstances that required interventions in the form of treaties, and presents a chronology of treaties signed. Chapter two examines resident ambassadors and diplomatic missions between the two empires. Plagued by misinformation networks, diplomats were often at the mercy of Ottoman court politics with only a limited amount of control over the peace process. Thus,
laying the groundwork for the following sections, the first two chapters set up a contrast between the fictions that empires told themselves through their official diplomacy, and the complicated realities of the borderlands.

Section two examines the vernacular diplomacy in three chapters, each within increasingly more local contexts. Chapter three examines the diplomatic activities of the regional governors of Buda (Pashas or Beylerbeys) and their Habsburg counterparts, the Archdukes of Austria. This chapter shows how local officials on both sides of the border played a delicate balancing act, juggling their own priorities with those of the imperial ruling bodies. It outlines the development of a system of vernacular diplomacy, dividing the fifty-year period into three generations. It also pays particular attention to moments when these systems break down and officials are reprimanded, demoted, or even put to death. Chapter four looks at the local governors of Esztergom (Sancakbeys) and their counterparts, the captains of the fortress of Komárom. Through a study of border crossing ceremonial and performances of sovereignty by men stationed thirty miles from each other, this chapter examines the rituals and practices of the frontier. Chapter five examines the soldiers populating the fortresses in the region. Through a study of traveling visual vocabularies on the pages of costume books and the surfaces of shields, this chapter asks how subjects of the sultan and subjects of the emperor defy our impulse to categorize them. Soldiers, it argues, intentionally and unintentionally blended identity markers as part of everyday borderland culture. The conclusion brings these layers of power together, from the sovereign ratifying the peace treaty to the soldier donning the armor of his vanquished opponent after a joust.
Part I:

Official Diplomacy
Chapter One

Ratifying the Fictions of Empire in Peace Treaties

In the late summer of 1559, the Habsburg resident ambassador to the Ottoman Porte carefully pried open the seams at the bottom of a sealed fabric bag containing the Sultan’s ratification of the new peace treaty. Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq, a native of Flanders who served as ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire in Constantinople from 1555 to 1562, had spent years trying to coax a favorable agreement for Ferdinand I from Sultan Süleyman and his Grand Vizier, Rüstem Pasha.\textsuperscript{130} In fact, the rulers had already exchanged ratifications that spring,\textsuperscript{131} but the texts differed substantially from each other and were considered invalid.\textsuperscript{132} Busbecq presented his latest modifications for approval at a meeting of the ruling council a day earlier. It appeared as if an agreement had been made, and the final document was delivered to his residence the following morning. He was instructed to send the fabric bag, likely a precious pouch woven from red silks and gold threads,\textsuperscript{133} with an appropriate messenger immediately to Vienna. Yet, experience told Busbecq that agreements reached in person did not always

\textsuperscript{130} On Busbecq’s career, see the dissertation, Zweder R. von Martels, “Augerius Gislenius Busbequius, leven en werk van de keizerlijke gezant aan het hof van Süleyman de Grote: een biografische, literaire en historische studie met editie van onuitgegeven teksten” (Ph.D., Rijksuniversiteit, 1989). He is best known as an avid collector and travel author.

\textsuperscript{131} See appendix A, under 1559.

\textsuperscript{132} It is unclear at this stage who made the final call, but a letter from Sultan Süleyman to Ferdinand mentions that Busbecq found contradictions in the texts that needed to be smoothed over. In the meantime, that peace remained “in force.” See Anton C. Schaendlinger and Claudia Römer, eds., \textit{Die Schreiben Süleymäns des Prächtigen an Karl V., Ferdinand I. und Maximilian II.} (Vienna: Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1983), #24.

\textsuperscript{133} The silk bags used to transport Ottoman documents remain largely unstudied. For a seventeenth century example of such a pouch, of which few survive, see Rijksmuseum, BK-1960-174. These practices differed somewhat from the standard treatment of diplomatic documents by early modern couriers in western Europe, where paper was generally smaller and folded. On courier systems and transportation, see E. John B. Allen, \textit{Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe} (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), particularly 33–37.
correspond to those committed to paper. He hoped by opening the bag and checking its contents, he would alleviate his concerns about the Ottomans forcing the Emperor into unacceptable concessions. His hopes were dashed, according to his lengthy report from November 30. What he found differed substantially from the treaty he had agreed to on the floor of the ruling council’s chamber. Busbecq was now in an uncomfortable position. He was aware of the unfavorable contents of a sealed document. He could not protest directly, yet he also could not, in good conscience, forward the treaty to the Emperor. After the Grand Vizier denied his request to see a copy of the full text, Busbecq hesitated for days and calculated his next move. On September 11, 1559, the ruling council demanded the return of the re-sewn fabric bag containing the Sultan’s ratification and, in a sign of frustration, had Busbecq’s doors locked from the outside. Though the doors were eventually unlocked, the diplomatic stand-off would last until 1562 (fig. 2).

More than two decades earlier, in the summer of 1547, Ferdinand I and Süleyman had signed a peace treaty with words confirming the rituals of ratification: “by the testimony of this letter, furnished with our hand-written signature and our seal appended to it.” These same lines close the Peace Treaty of 1591 between their grandsons, Rudolf II and Murad III. Between the capture of Esztergom in 1543 and the outbreak of the Long Turkish War in 1593, the Ottoman Sultan and Habsburg Emperor would ratify eleven such contracts (Appendix A). Each of these

134 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 14, Konv. 3 (1559 VII-s.d.), fol. 78–117.
135 For a detailed description of this series of events with archival references to other reports of the ambassador and Ferdinand’s chief spy, Michael Černović, see Tracy, “The Ambassador as Third Party.”
137 See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 74, Konv. 2 (1591 I-III), fol. 51–56, here, fol. 55r.
required reaffirmation (which always included an element of renegotiation) following the death of a sovereign on either side. This explains the rapid succession of treaty exchanges in the early 1560s and again in the mid 1570s: in both instances, the deaths of the sovereigns of both empires followed the renewal of a treaty, invalidating their five- to eight-year expiration dates. Thus, technically, there were six stand-alone treaties during this period: 1547, 1562, 1568, 1574-6, 1583, and 1591. These documents, carefully preserved in multiple copies in Vienna, represent the crowning achievement of official diplomatic channels in securing stability in the volatile borderlands of East-Central Europe. Ratifications of treaties by Sultans Süleyman, Selim II, and Murad III in Ottoman Turkish and by Charles V, Ferdinand I, Maximilian II, and Rudolf II in Latin can be listed side-by-side to present a narrative of success. In the intervening years, neither ruler led a campaign directly against the other.138 At two points, this peace temporarily broke down over disputes relating to Hungarian lands to the east in Transylvania (1552) and to the west around the fortress Sziget (1566). Both disputes led to a flurry of military operations ending with substantial territorial gains by the Ottomans, though arguably of fortresses that the Habsburgs had little authority over to begin with. Thus, the half-century between 1543 and 1593, from the perspective of official documents and the bureaucrats involved in their creation, was one of peace and stability reinforced by the signatures and seals of sovereigns.

Much scholarly literature operates under the assumption that “no real peace treaty was concluded in the sixteenth century between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchs.”139

138 The campaign of 1566 led by the elderly Sultan Süleyman might be the one exception, though the goal of the late and somewhat weak push is disputed by historians. See below for a more detailed discussion.
Specialists intimately familiar with the contents of the neatly-filed boxes and folders held in the Vienna archives take for granted the existence of these treaties and the endless paper-trail left behind by the ambassadors and officials charged with their negotiation and implementation.¹⁴⁰ These specialists have produced a limited body of German language scholarship. Others, perhaps unaware of the Vienna collections, write that in the “absence of other types of sources,” relations between the two empires can only be pieced together from a pool of published documents and a small group of Ottoman registers of court orders held in Istanbul.¹⁴¹ The resulting fragmented picture leaves much to be desired. A combination of incorrect dates, misrepresented contents, and overlooked treaties contribute to gaps in even the most-highly regarded surveys of Ottoman and Habsburg history. Of the eleven treaties signed between 1543 and 1593, up to four are typically mentioned,¹⁴² and their importance is often downplayed because “although peace had

¹⁴⁰ Ernst Dieter Petritsch, long-time archivist and director of the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, is perhaps the most well acquainted with its contents. His articles reveal his deep knowledge of the collection, but their focus is generally limited. See Petritsch, “Habsburgisch-osmanische Friedensvertrag.” Also, Ernst Dieter Petritsch, “Dissimulieren in den habsburgisch-osmanischen Friedens- und Waffenstillstandsverträgen (16.–17. Jahrhundert): Differenzen und Divergenzen,” in Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen: das Osmanische Reich und die Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. Arno Strohmeyer and Norbert Spannenberger (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2013), 145–62. The latter article, for example, compares the wording of the cease-fire of 1545 with the treaties of 1547, 1606–1612, and 1664. He is, of course, aware of the other treaties, having partly organized and cataloged them himself when tidying up the Türkische Urkunden in the 1980s and 1990s. On the history of the collections, see Ernst Dieter Petritsch, “Das österreichische Staatsarchiv als Forschungsstätte für die Geschichte der österreichisch-osmanischen Beziehungen,” in Auf den Spuren der Osmanen in der österreichischen Geschichte, ed. Inanc Feigl (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002), 129–44.


¹⁴² See for example, Colin Imber, who mentions the treaties of 1547, 1562, 1565 (as a request made in 1564) and 1568. Imber, Ottoman Empire, 54, 59–60, 62, 125.
officially been made... localized hostilities and skirmishes along the extensive Croatian-Bosnian border had persisted.”¹⁴³

This chapter seeks to set the official record straight by examining the relationship from the perspective of rulers and ratifications, addressing questions of chronology, context, and content. The chapter’s function is to provide a background for the analysis that appears in later chapters of this dissertation. It focuses on peace treaties because such binding contracts between political entities offer ready-made periodizations. Following a historiographical overview, it outlines the issues these treaties meant to address, the general process of negotiations and the agents involved, changes in the process over the fifty-year period, and then surveys all eleven treaties signed by Ottoman and Habsburg sovereigns in the second half of the sixteenth century. The secondary literature is in such a state that even a list of treaties can be considered groundbreaking. At the same time, this chapter stresses that such a list of treaties is inherently misleading. Quick negotiations and the exchange of ratifications often took place without full agreement. Officials creatively tabled the messiest topics to preserve a semblance of peace.

¹⁴³ Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 173. Paula Sutter Fichtner mentions only one treaty from the period (1547) in her history of Habsburg-Ottoman confrontation. Fichtner, Terror and Toleration, 35. She states that diplomatic relations in the sixteenth century between the Ottoman and Habsburg courts “challenged fundamental European conventions of state relations…. rulers and their spokesmen recognized that they had no choice but to adapt to an enemy for whom duplicity was routine.” She goes on to assert that “other than payment of tribute, there seemed to be no way of striking long-term bargains with the sultan and his advisors.” To be sure, the exchange of a yearly sum of cash was not a central part of relations between European powers. However, the idea Ottoman diplomatic relationship challenged fundamental conventions and the continually renewed treaties between the Habsburgs and Ottomans did not constitute a long-term bargain needs to be re-evaluated. For one, continental diplomacy was hardly the world of rosy relations and easy negotiations between Christian sovereigns that Fichtner suggests. Such an assertion ignores the fact that the Ottomans were central to a complex web of continental alliances for centuries, united through ratified contracts and military co-operation with such “conventional” kingdoms as France throughout the early modern period. Secondly, the treaties discussed in this chapter, not mentioned by Fichtner, did in fact provide long-term continuity and stability between the two empires, both before the Long Turkish War (1593–1606) and after it.
These unruly topics will come into focus in later chapters as they reappear in the parallel world of vernacular diplomacy.

**Historiography**

Three interrelated historiographical problems have led to the prevailing incomplete picture of sixteenth-century official diplomatic relations between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans: the availability of primary sources in published editions with corrected dates; the difficulties of reconciling legal theory and practice; and the balance between specificity and generalization when discussing the ever-changing political circumstances between two gigantic empires interacting over four hundred years.

Lists of peace treaties dominate nineteenth- and early twentieth-century literature on Habsburg-Ottoman relations. Following Joseph Hammer-Purgstall’s ten-volume *History of the Ottoman Empire*, in which several peace treaties were discussed and listed among thousands of archival documents, Johann Wilhelm Zinkeisen published a similar multi-volume history of the Ottomans and Europe which included several treaties. Meanwhile Ignaz de Testa, Gabriel Noradoungian, and Reşad Ekrem published diplomatic histories of the Ottomans

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144 Hammer-Purgstall, *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*.
146 Ignaz de Testa, *Recueil des traités de la Porte ottomane*, 10 vols. (Paris: Amyot, 1864–1911), vol. 9, 1–14. Testa covers the history of Austrian and Ottoman relations between the conquest and the Long Turkish War by describing nine *traité de trêve* (1545; 1547; 1553; 1561; 1568; 1575; 1576; 1584; 1590).
which listed treaties by date, while Ludwig Bittner undertook a similar listing project on the
Habsburg side. Each of these scholars expanded on the narrative presented by Hammer-
Purgstall, often repeating his mistakes in chronology. A smaller number of full treaty texts
were also published in nineteenth-century document collections: the Ottoman Turkish edition of
the sixteenth-century scribe Feridun Ahmed Bey’s *Correspondence of the Sultans*, the
multilingual collection of thousands of documents pertaining to Romanian history collected by
Eudoxiu Hurmuzaci, and the Latin ratifications of treaties negotiated by Anton Verantius in a
ten volume collection of his letters. Collectively, these lists and editions formed the foundation
of historical writing on Ottoman and Habsburg relations, remaining the standard reference points
well into the twentieth century for those with access to them.

Beginning in the 1970s, as part of a growing interest in the Ottoman golden age under
Sultan Süleyman, the errors and omissions of the nineteenth-century publications were gradually
corrected. The Turkologist Josef Matuz made an early effort to catalogue documents from the

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(Vienna: Holzhausen, 1903–1917).
150 For the treaties before 1574, these errors are listed and corrected in the catalogue of Ottoman
documents preserved in the Vienna HHStA. Ernst Dieter Petritsch, *Regesten der osmanischen
151 Feridun Ahmed Bey, *Mecmua-ı nóssetat ü s-Selâtin*. (Istanbul: Takvimhane-ı Ámire, 1848–
49). On the editions and their contents as well as other unpublished similar collections see
András J. Riedlmayer, “Ottoman Copybooks of Correspondence and Miscellanies as a Source for
Political and Cultural History,” *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 61, no. 1–2
152 The Romanian aristocrat and nationalist politician’s collection was published posthumously.
Ioan Slavici, ed., *Documente privitoare la istoria românilor cilese de Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki
[Documents concerning the history of the Romanians collected by Eudoxiu de Hurmuzaki]*, 5
vols. (Bucharest: C. Göbl, 1878–1900).
153 Szalay László and Wenzel Gusztáv, eds., *Verancsics Antal összes munkái [The complete
works of Antal Verancsics]*, 12 vols., Monumenta Hungariae Historica: Magyar történelmi
emlékek (Pest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1857–75).

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reign of Sultan Süleyman, which was then followed by a comprehensive and detailed register of Ottoman documents in the Austrian State archives (Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv) to 1574 by the archivist and historian Ernst Petritsch. From these lists, a sharper picture of relevant archival materials has emerged for the mid-sixteenth century. Meanwhile, efforts to expand the variety and quality of published primary sources in full text for the same period have made several treaties available in their original source languages, supported by translations. Most notably, this includes the publications of Ottoman documents by Anton Schaendlinger and Claudia Römer, Turkologists at the University of Vienna and the Latin, German, and Italian documents of Ferdinand I’s ambassadors to 1552 by Karl Nehring, member of the Südost-Institut in Munich.

Despite these twentieth-century advances in cataloguing and editing, there are still no studies that discuss the full range of cease-fires and peace treaty ratifications that brought stability to the relationship between the Habsburgs and Ottomans in the second half of the sixteenth century. The only overview available in English is a two-page discussion by Gustav Bayerle, Turkologist at Indiana University, in his introduction to a series of Hungarian letters from 1590–1593, which is based on the nineteenth-century publications with incorrect dates. Using his own research as long time archivist in Vienna, Ernst Petritsch has published a series of important essays in German looking more closely at the earliest treaties and relationships

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154 Josef Matuz, Herrscherurkunden des Osmanensultans Süleymān des Prächtigen (Freiburg im Breisgau: Schwarz, 1971).
155 Petritsch, Regesten.
156 Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymāns an Karl V.
between their surviving translations.\textsuperscript{159} Still, each researcher is left to comb the archives and compile their own lists to work from, making deeper analysis extremely difficult. The lack of a comprehensive and accessible overview with corrected dates has contributed to two other problems in the scholarly literature.

Historians have struggled with the discrepancies between Islamic legal theory and Ottoman practices of peace. Most notably, Viorel Panaite, professor of Islamic-Ottoman history at the University of Bucharest, argued that Ottoman treaties with Venice, Hungary, Poland, and the Habsburg Empire were unilateral agreements in his influential book, \textit{The Ottoman Law of War and Peace}.\textsuperscript{160} Unilateral agreements, according to Panaite and other practitioners of the field of diplomatics,\textsuperscript{161} were those documents granted directly by the chancery of one sovereign without the input or acknowledgement of the other ruler as a negotiating partner. In such a unilateral relationship, the passive ruler was forced to accept the agreement as the active (and thereby more powerful) sovereign’s favor. Panaite cites examples in Ottoman Turkish of orders containing formulaic phrases highlighting the benevolence and one-sided assertiveness of the Sultan in documents sent to Polish rulers. He explains away the published Italian or Latin translations as proof of “the existence of a specific Western view contrary to the Ottoman

\textsuperscript{159} Petritsch, “Friedensvertrag des Jahres 1547” and Petritsch, “Dissimulieren.”
\textsuperscript{161} The somewhat confusingly termed field of “diplomatics” engages in the close reading of individual historical documents, focusing on the phraseology employed. It has ties to the close reading practiced by philologists, and is still central to academia throughout central and eastern Europe.
His argument rests on a comparison of Islamic legal vocabularies and a series of expressions used in treaties issued to the rulers of Moldavia, Wallachia, Poland and France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These expressions of “unilaterality” do not appear in any of the Habsburg treaties, as he would have seen had he been able to access them when he wrote. This unilateral thesis appears in a great number of standard works on Ottoman governance, and can be proven false, at least regarding the peace treaties signed with the Habsburg court.

The issue with Panaite’s conclusions lies in the third historiographical problem: the balance between specificity and generalization. The Ottoman Empire’s relationships with individual political entities were neither static nor uniform, and such generalization cannot be used to characterize imperial interactions across time and space. Although the ambassadors lived in the same residence in Constantinople as the representatives of the tributary states of Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia, the Habsburgs were not an Ottoman tributary state themselves. While Panaite does not claim that they were, his lumping the Habsburgs together with other political entities obscures their different political positions vis-à-vis the Ottomans. Unlike the French and English trade capitulations that aimed to regulate interactions in the

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162 Panaite, “Peace Agreements,” 289.
163 It seems unlikely that he had access to the Habsburg archive in Vienna as he does not cite any materials from the HHStA.
164 Even Goffman, who argues that Ottomans were at the center of the European development of Renaissance diplomacy, states that all documents issued were “unilateral.” Goffman, “Negotiating with the Renaissance State,” 73.
165 On the shared embassy building, which replaced the house owned by resident ambassador Malvezzi that was confiscated by the Ottoman court when he was thrown into jail, see Şevval Eyice, “Elçi Hanı [The Ambassadors’ Inn],” Tarih Dergisi 24 (1970): 93–129.
Mediterranean and Indian Ocean,\textsuperscript{167} the treaties between the houses of Osman and Habsburg were, in fact, bilateral peace agreements aimed at controlling the tides of war and peace on land borders. What Panaite’s study reveals is the need for even broader comparative work that can only be done as a collaborative project between experts in a variety of geographic regions and academic traditions.\textsuperscript{168}

Scholars who are aware of any number of the peace treaties have a general tendency to discredit them, subscribing instead to a model of the “clash of civilizations,” and basing their claims largely on examples coming from the borderlands to the south-west in Croatia.\textsuperscript{169} Others focus on listing border violations based on the often-exaggerated complaints of regional officials to prove that peace did not exist.\textsuperscript{170} Still others demote the documents to mere truces, because they do not conform to the standards of peace treaties signed in the following century.\textsuperscript{171} Confronted with these historiographical gaps, problems with terminology and specificity, the generally accepted view of the relationship between the Ottomans and Habsburgs is different.

\textsuperscript{167} For non-trade related alliances between the Ottoman Sultans and the French crown which also question the unilateral treaties thesis, see Isom-Verhaaren, \textit{Allies with the Infidel}. For a recent article that builds on Panaite’s conclusions by focusing on two letters announcing military victories sent to England in the late sixteenth century to make arguments about the whole of Ottoman diplomatic history, see Claire Norton, “Iconographs of Power or Tools of Diplomacy? Ottoman Fethnames,” \textit{Journal of Early Modern History} 20, no. 4 (2016): 331–50. Such scholarship is misleading. The only equally powerful political entities to the Ottomans at this time were the Safavids and the Habsburgs. The Ottomans were fully aware of this. To uncover the full scale and character of Ottoman diplomacy in the early modern period, the focus needs to shift to its relations with these entities.

\textsuperscript{168} See my notes in the introduction on the possibilities for comparison with Venice and Poland.

\textsuperscript{169} For more on this, see the Anglo-American historiography section of the introduction.


\textsuperscript{171} See the work of German legal historian Karl-Heinz Ziegler, who claimed that “No real peace treaty was concluded in the entire sixteenth century between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchs.” According to his assessment, only one written treaty (1547) was concluded. He calls other agreements “eight-year truces.” Ziegler “Peace Treaties,” 343.
from what is presented in this dissertation. The beat of the war drum usually drowns out the sound of the celebrations that followed successful negotiations. By focusing on the years between 1543 and 1593, this dissertation amplifies the sounds of the latter.

**Treaties and their Negotiators**

Early modern peace treaties were official documents ratified by two or more hostile political entities which formally brought an end to a state of war between the signatories.\(^{172}\) Such treaties were ceremonially invested with meaning through signatures, seals, and delivery methods.\(^{173}\) Peace treaties differed from cease-fires or truces, which were often oral agreements or written but informal pacts that provided a short-term respite from military engagement with few or no concrete resolutions to address underlying disputes. Throughout the early modern period, the Ottomans issued capitulations and other forms of pledges in imperial charters (*ahd’ name-i hümayun*). Though the peace treaties discussed here are occasionally referred to using this term, they differed from these common imperial charters in three important ways: their negotiation required significant input from both parties, the resulting treaty included significant commitments and compromises on both sides, and most importantly, the Habsburgs (occasionally multiple members of the family) sent their own ratifications in return, furnished with their own signatures and seals.\(^{174}\)

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\(^{172}\) I use this definition of the peace treaty rather than one which implies a permanent end to hostilities or recognizes explicitly the equal rank of the signatories.

\(^{173}\) Between European powers, this always included the participation of the Church during an oath-swearing ceremony. See Randall Lesaffer, “Peace Treaties from Lodi to Westphalia,” in *Peace Treaties and International Law in European History: From the Late Middle Ages to World War One*, ed. Randall Lesaffer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 9–44, here 23–27.

\(^{174}\) These were not sent blindly as a ceremonial reciprocity initiated on the part of the Habsburgs, but rather at the insistence of the Ottomans. For example, see the Mar. 20–29, 1568 letter of
Typical negotiations took place during meetings held between a Habsburg ambassador and the grand vizier in consultation with the Sultan’s ruling council (divan). Records of such meetings were detailed in reports sent back to Vienna. Given the lack of secure and swift communication routes, ambassadors relied primarily on instructions they were given at the beginning of their mission. Thus, such real-time reports were generally not meant to allow the Habsburgs to respond, but rather were meant to help record the events and prepare for future missions. Once the terms were agreed upon by the parties involved, scribes compiled a draft of the text in Ottoman Turkish for the Sultan to approve alongside a secondary text for the ambassador in Latin, Italian, or German. The approved text would then be ratified with the Sultan’s formal signature (tuğra) (fig. 2). These two copies were brought up to Vienna (or later to Rudolf II in Prague), by an envoy, either Habsburg or Ottoman, to be approved by the Emperor. The dynastic affiliation of the individual carrying the letter mattered less than his appropriate rank (a common messenger would never have been used) and the decision appears to have been connected to the need to occasionally relay further verbal instructions and comments. Upon arrival, the versions sent were copied and translated into the other languages

175 The fastest turn-around for communication I observed in the archive was six weeks. Most commonly three months separated the dispatch of a letter and the arrival of its response.
176 These official translations were prepared by the imperial dragomans, interpreters of the Porte who worked closely with the European representatives in Constantinople. These men were renegades and converts with a curious combination of social ties to their native lands, loyalty the Ottoman dynasty, and an appetite for gold. See E. Natalie Rothman, “Interpreting Dragomans: Boundaries and Crossings in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 51, no. 4 (2009): 771–800.
177 In some cases, the tuğra copy does not survive. The explanation for this can be found in Petritsch, “Staatsarchiv als Forschungsstätte,” 130.
178 For example, in 1568, the Ottomans sent Ibrahim Bey to deliver the Treaty of Edirne to Maximilian II, who submitted a petition filled with complaints about the fates of specific
of the Vienna court (Latin, German, and Italian). One of these new versions was then ratified and returned, occasionally accompanied by slight modifications to the text or additional conditions meant to be expressed orally by the envoy as he presented the document at the Ottoman court. Meanwhile the Ottoman copy remained in the Habsburg archive with multiple translations for consultation.\textsuperscript{179}

\textit{Sovereigns and their Realms}

A classic diplomatic history of the eleven peace treaties from the second half of the sixteenth century would present a largely triumphant narrative of ratification exchanges between ostensibly evenly-matched sovereigns. The reality was, in fact, far more complicated. The following comparison of imperial structures is not exhaustive and serves only to highlight how the two monarchs differed from each other. To begin with, differences in their respective approaches to the line of succession meant that the Holy Roman Emperor and Sultan were very different sovereigns with unevenly-matched relationships to the lands they ruled. These relationships also shifted in the decades between the Peace Treaty of 1547 and the Peace Treaty of 1591.

Already by 1547, Charles V’s vision of an ever-expanding empire under one all-powerful sovereign was a memory. As discussed in the introduction, Spain was in the process of splitting from the Central European core of the Holy Roman Empire.\textsuperscript{180} In its place, a coordinated system emerged in which successors were chosen and groomed for office during the lifetime of the

\textsuperscript{179} This overview is based on my examination of the documents in the HHStA, Turcica, Kartons 5–80.
\textsuperscript{180} Frances A. Yates, \textit{Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century} (Boston, Mass.: Routledge & K. Paul, 1975).
previous emperor. This created continuity and provided the space for networks of trust to develop. Habsburg sovereigns replaced each other through a multi-step process with overlaps of rulership within the dynasty that were both strategic and necessary. Emperors did not inherit the vast territories they ruled at once but collected them through a process of election, coronation, and rule in each portion outside their hereditary estates in Austria. This reaffirmed and recommitted the place of each part in the composite whole. These steps could be separated by decades and did not always follow in that order. Other members of the family undertook support roles in different regions as archdukes.\(^{181}\) Thus, though Charles V was crowned Emperor at the time, Ferdinand (emperor elect since 1531, contested King of Hungary since 1526 and ruler of Austria since 1521) also signed a version of the Peace Treaty of 1547. After Charles’ abdication in 1558, the newly-crowned fifty-five-year-old Ferdinand already knew his son Maximilian would follow him on the throne. Four years later, in November 1562, this son was elected in Frankfurt. The following September Maximilian was crowned King of Hungary, and on his father's death in July 1564, he finally took over the empire. The thirty-seven-year-old Maximilian ruled for a decade before his eldest son Rudolf was elected to be his successor in October 1575. A year later, following Maximilian’s death, Rudolf II took over the reins, ruling until his own death in 1612. Such a system of gradual succession protected the House of Habsburg from rival claims.

The Ottoman line of succession operated quite differently. From the fourteenth through the sixteenth century, accession to the throne was decided by a winner-takes-all contest. Sons

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were generally given provincial governorships during the reign of their father. From these provincial courts, they were encouraged to prove themselves and gather support for their claim to the throne. The most capable sons would fight each other, both in the courtly sphere and on the battlefield, frequently coming close to a civil-war. Fratricide was the only way to secure uncontested sovereignty, and it was common for the death of a potential heir to be accompanied by the murder of all his male offspring. This system only worked because the Ottoman family had a clear monopoly on legitimate sovereignty.\textsuperscript{182}

Sultan Süleyman had four highly ambitious sons who reached adulthood. His favorite died following the conquest of Esztergom in 1543. After a perceived threat to his own reign, Sultan Süleyman ordered his eldest son to be executed in 1553. Open conflict broke out between the last two sons following the death of their mother in 1558. An armed altercation in Anatolia forced Prince Bayezid to flee across the Safavid border and seek asylum with Süleyman’s rival, Shah Tahmasp. Three years later, an agreement was made to hand over the prince and his sons, who were then assassinated. Thus, in 1561, the question of the succession was finally settled in favor of Süleyman’s only surviving son, who took the throne as Selim II on his father’s death in 1566.\textsuperscript{183} Unlike the mid-century contest, Selim’s eldest son by twenty years was a clear successor to father in 1574. The new Sultan Murad III had his younger brothers executed on his accession, which led to his uncontested reign until his own death in 1595.

The Ottomans were also at the height of their bureaucratic prowess and ceremonial vocabulary in the mid-sixteenth century. In many ways, their system of power projection and

\textsuperscript{182} Halil İnalçik, “The Ottoman Succession and Its Relation to the Turkish Concept of Sovereignty,” in \textit{The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society}, trans. Douglas Howard (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Turkish Studies, 1993), 37–69.

\textsuperscript{183} Imber, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 59–60.
foreign relations operated like a well-oiled machine compared to the haphazard and incomplete alliances that crisscrossed Habsburg lands. After a few false starts on the border, the asymmetrical negotiations took place in Constantinople. Neither King Ferdinand nor Charles V maintained a sufficiently grandiose and public court setting in which agreements of this sort could realistically be hammered out. The courts of the Habsburgs were less concentrated, international, and rigidly structured in the mid-sixteenth century. The Ottomans had equipped themselves with ceremonial architecture and a centralized bureaucratic apparatus in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. From the Chamber of Petitions, where ambassadors caught a glimpse of the reigning Sultan during their formal first audience (fig. 6), to the Imperial Council chamber where they raised complaints and confirmed details of treaties, the Topkapı Palace was well equipped with backdrops filled with meaning. The Imperial Council (divan-i hümâyûn) served as the executive body of the empire with a set of high-ranking advisors led by

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184 Though Max Weber once characterized the Ottoman state as “sultanism based on arbitrary patrimonialism,” scholars have since shown how supreme authority was limited by juridical and centralist bureaucratic institutions. The most important of such scholarship has argued that continuity had a normative (based on claims to hereditary and divine right to rule often based on fictitious genealogies) and a factual aspect (practical policy to arouse positive feelings of comfort and security among its people via welfare, justice, order). See Hakan T. Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski, eds., Legitimizing the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power (Leiden: Brill, 2005).


the Grand Vizier who held court four days a week. The opulent room in which it operated was equipped with a grille-covered window from which the Sultan could observe meetings. Real negotiation however, often took place in more private settings. Ambassadors report calling on viziers individually, or meeting with interlocutors like court favorites or translators. Imperial Constantinople was also an international stage. A treaty signed here would involve the participation of others, whether active (like the French and Venetian ambassadors who routinely mediated and meddled in Habsburg affairs) or passive (like English and Russian ambassadors who served as witness to performances of diplomatic activity).

The Habsburgs were a much younger ruling dynasty whose bureaucratic arms were still in the process of formation in the sixteenth century. Their developments in foreign policy can be divided into three phases: experimentation with decentralized decision making, a shift towards centralizing tendencies embodied in the founding of the Aulic War Council (Hofkriegsrat) in 1556, and the reorganization of the border fortress system under the Archdukes in Vienna when the court itself moved to Prague in the 1570s. Each of these changes will be discussed in

greater detail below, and had a deep impact on the Habsburg approach to peace treaties and their negotiation.

**Negotiators**

The cast of characters involved in negotiating and signing peace treaties was much larger than the group of sovereigns and ten resident ambassadors to the Porte. Treaty negotiations always took place at the sultan’s court with the participation of the sultan’s most important advisors and multiple Habsburg representatives. On the Ottoman side, the most important agent was the Grand Vizier, whose role changed significantly between 1543 and 1594. Grand Viziers were the presidents of the Imperial Council who presided over rulings made in the name of the sultan. Under Sultan Süleyman, powerful Grand Viziers supported an even more powerful Sultan. For a substantial portion of his reign, this person was his son-in-law Rüstem Pasha. Selim II was known for his neglect of state affairs, which allowed his son-in-law, Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, to effectively govern on his behalf during a remarkably long run as Grand Vizier (1565–79).¹⁹¹ During the reign of Sultan Murad III, the grand vizierate declined and the post changed hands yearly as courtly factions became more powerful.¹⁹²

On the Habsburg side, negotiations included resident ambassadors and special envoys.¹⁹³ The position of resident ambassador to Constantinople was established in 1547 with the first peace treaty. In the second half of the sixteenth century, the post was held by ten different men who came from across the Holy Roman Empire (see appendix C). The resident ambassadors to

¹⁹¹ Imber, *Ottoman Empire*, 323.
1573 were members of the larger imperial community: Malvezzi was a North Italian, and Busbecq, de Wyss, and Rijm were from the Low Countries. Afterwards, they came from the ranks of Austrian nobility: Ungnad, Sinzendorff, Breuner, Eytzing, and Pezzen. The last sixteenth century ambassador was Friedrich Kreckwitz, a German-Czech nobleman whose presence reflected the new Habsburg court climate in Prague under Rudolf II. Special envoys were similarly recruited from wider imperial circles in the beginning and from the Austrian nobility after the 1570s. Such envoys arrived with tribute payments or to negotiate treaties. However, the inconsistent use of terminology and the presence of multiple special envoys led to occasionally complicated webs of representation. Through the 1560s, these men often traveled in the company of an additional Hungarian representative. Such Hungarian noblemen were particularly active in early talks, no doubt because they alone were knowledgeable about local situations and geography. For example, we find Marcus Singkmoser, secretary to Ferdinand I and a member of the Austrian nobility, traveling to Constantinople with the Hungarian nobleman and captain of the Danube naval fleet, Sigismund Posgay to delivered the tribute payment in 1549. The last time such double representation occurred was the in the mid-1560s, when the Habsburgs sent Michael Černović (a nobleman from Ragusa), Ákos Csábi (Hungarian nobleman and captain of the Danube naval fleet), and György Albani Csurdai (secretary of the Hungarian

197 In Oct. 1586 the Aulic War Council discussed the problem of the official title of resident ambassadors to the Porte before deciding on “*legatus*,” which, they wrote, could be translated to “*Botschafter*” in German. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 58, Konv. 1 (1586 IX-X), fol. 219–242.
council) to deliver the tribute payment. By the 1580s, the tribute carrying delegations had developed into a more tightly controlled arm of the Austrian bureaucratic system.

The system had an inherent tension built into it. Was the envoy a representative of the Habsburgs and the Holy Roman Empire, of the German princes, the Kingdom of Hungary, Bohemia, or all of the above? When the Habsburgs sent a Hungarian nobleman to the circumcision festival in 1582, a squabble over precedent broke out with the French ambassador, who considered the Habsburg envoy to be no more than the envoy of the Hungarian King, and therefore below the rank of the King of France. Ottoman registers of imperial decrees (muhamme defteri) called Habsburg envoys the ambassador of the “German King in Istanbul (Nemçe kralı İstanbul'daki elçisi)” or of the “King of Vienna (Beç kralı).” Scholars have argued this problem was not resolved until the end of the Long Turkish War and in the Peace of Zsitvatorok (1606), in which the second article stipulated that both sides were to address each other “Emperor.” The texts of the Ottoman treaties, however, began to call the Habsburg ruler “Emperor of the Christians (hristiyanlar un imberador)” by 1559. Such distinctions were, in fact, rather fluid. Documents produced in the context of vernacular diplomacy, which will be discussed in greater detail in chapters three and four, afforded the Holy Roman Emperor with all the titles he desired.

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198 István Nyáry, who also brought the tribute payment for that year. On the festival, see Derin Terzioğlu, “The Imperial Circumcision Festival of 1582: An Interpretation,” Muqarnas 12 (1995): 84–100.

199 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 45, Konv. 1 (1581 IX), fol. 144–166. Indeed, Nyáry was a nobleman from the Hungarian Council, which was an unusual choice for the Emperor by 1581.

200 For just one example, see an order sent to the regional governor of Temesvár on Sept. 23, 1565. BOA, Mühimme Dęfter 5, #260.


202 See Schaendlinger, Schreiben an Karl, #23.
Imposing Order on the Lands of a Fallen but not Forgotten Kingdom

Treaties between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans aimed to address the chaotic situation along their shared border, which that stretched from the Adriatic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains following the collapse of the medieval Kingdom of Hungary. The central problems requiring the attention of authorities included drawing boundaries between the two empires, regulating the actions of the regional elites, imposing rules on economic transactions, preventing certain dangerous practices of soldiers in the borderland, and providing the foundations for long-lasting stability in relations between the two empires and their allies.

Drawing boundaries was the most difficult task, as it meant dealing with the fractured geopolitical situation that stretched along the borders of today’s Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and the Ukraine. Then, as in the turbulent twentieth century, each swath of land was composed of smaller historical regions which could be further divided into units concentrated around important towns and fortresses. Ethno-linguistic variation and the rapidly evolving splinter reformatations created micro-regions with strong local colors that found creative ways to resist the mechanisms of state control. This resistance was indiscriminately exercised against both Habsburg and Ottoman rule. While maps often show clean lines and sharp borders, the reality of jurisdiction on the ground was far more chaotic. In theory, the everyday upkeep of a fortresses during peacetime required a functioning hinterland with productive arable land. In practice, fortresses were the only stable element with which either empire could attempt to control a given territory. Anything beyond the city walls and within a day’s ride on horseback from a fortress of the enemy was subject to double taxation and rule. This was particularly true outside the lands most directly controlled by the central

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203 On how these divisions played out in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see Marin, *Contested Frontiers*. 

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administrations of either empire studied here. Effectively, the further one got from the Danube corridor, the blurrier the lines between the two empires became.\footnote{For an example of these blurred lines in a region southwest of the one discussed here, see Éva Sz. Simon, \textit{A hódoltságon kívüli “hódoltság”: Oszmán terjeszkedés a Délnyugat-Dunántúlon a 16. század második felében [The “Occupation” Beyond the Occupation: Ottoman Expansion in Southwestern Transdanubia in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century]} (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézet, 2014). Since neither center knew much about the geography of the region in the beginning of their direct contact in the 1540s and the lines were still continually evolving between them, attempts to fortify points deep within each other’s territory were common.

Palmira Brummet of the University of Tennessee has argued that the Ottomans measured frontiers in points where armies met, thereby viewing the empire as a collection of bastions, towers and flags, not blocks of territory.\footnote{Palmira Brummet, “The Fortress: Defining and Mapping the Ottoman Frontier in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries,” in \textit{The Frontiers of the Ottoman World}, ed. A. C. S. Peacock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 31–55.} This was certainly true from the eyes of artists and mapmakers recording warfare. For example, an Ottoman narrative of Sultan Süleyman’s 1543 campaign in Hungary is filled with fortress-based topographical illustrations that render the empire visible in geographic space.\footnote{Topkapı Palace Museum, R. 1608. For a facsimile edition, see Süheyla Artemel, ed., \textit{Tarih-i feth-i Şikloş, Estergon ve Istol(n)i-Belgrad, or, Süleyman-name} (İstanbul: Historical Research Foundation, 1987). For a Hungarian translation, see Thúry and Szegfű, \textit{Török történetírók}, vol. 2, 279–363.} The manuscript presents conquered territory as a line of military encampments huddled around schematic castles culminating in views of Buda (fig. 3) and Esztergom (fig. 4).\footnote{For an interpretation, see K. A. Ebel, “Representations of the Frontier in Ottoman Town Views of the Sixteenth Century,” \textit{Imago Mundi} 60, no. 1 (2008): 1–22.} The text of the manuscript reinforces this view, with an endless list of distances between each station and provisions necessary to maintain the army along the way. But was the border understood exclusively in terms of fortresses? It seems certain individuals at the Ottoman court curated personal collections of European maps as curiosities, but there is no...
evidence to suggest such academic pursuits had any impact within the palace or the military.\textsuperscript{208} Other maps seem to have crossed borders as part of intelligence gathering operations, but their usefulness for plotting the borders of the empire was negligible.\textsuperscript{209} Yet, outside the navigational books covering the Mediterranean and its islands (portolan charts), regional maps seem to have only developed in Ottoman scholarly works of the eighteenth century. In the margins of one such eighteenth-century compendium of geographical texts, a sketched regional map shows the waters of the Danube and its tributaries lined with fortresses, with nothing to suggest where Ottoman lands end and Habsburg lands begin (Map 7).\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{208} For example, Mehmed Bey, a Hungarian-born dragoman at the Porte, asked for copies of the \textit{Theatrum Orbis Terrarum} in 1574. See the petition of Wolfgang Sinnich from 1574 to the Emperor, which included “four books: two copies of the \textit{Teatrum Orbis} filled with landscapes and islands, two in which the cities are printed, and one painted copy, which should be purchased and sent with the next present [tribute] to Constantinople (vier Pücher zwey Teatrum orbis, darinen allerlÿ Landschefften und Insuln, zwey darin die Stett gedruckht, die auch alle mit farben ausgestrichen seÿn erkaufft und mit nechster Present nach Constantinopel geschikht wurden).” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 1 (1574 I-III), fol. 29. In the sixteenth century, the Ottoman interest in terrestrial cartography was confined to individual scholars working against the larger trend of strict adherence to earlier Islamic geographical projections. See Giancarlo Casale, “Seeing the Past: Maps and Ottoman Historical Consciousness,” in \textit{Writing History at the Ottoman Court: Editing the Past, Fashioning the Future}, ed. H. Erdem Cipa and Emine Fetvaci (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2013), 80–99.

\textsuperscript{209} See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 1 (1580 V-VII), fol. 277–287. Published in Géza Pálffy, \textit{Európa védelmében: haditérképészet a Habsburg birodalom magyarországi határvidékén a 16–17. században} [In Defense of Europe: Military Cartography on the Hungarian Frontier of the Habsburg Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries], 2nd ed. (Pápa: Jókai Mór Városi Könyvtár, 2000), 48 and appendix III.

\textsuperscript{210} The only Ottoman map of the Danube I am aware of is this sketch in a collection of geographic texts, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (here on referred to as ÖNB), Cod. H. O. 191 Han, fol. 17v. On the development of Ottoman cartography, see Ahmet T. Karamustafa, “Military, Administrative, and Scholarly Maps and Plans,” in \textit{The History of Cartography}, ed. John B. Harley, vol. 2/1 (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 209–27. Karamustfa provides a brief overview of the corpus of uncatalogued and largely unstudied Ottoman collections. According to his research, military and architectural maps produced under state patronage are overwhelmingly local in scope, while maps contained in scholarly books are invariably world maps until the introduction of European terrestrial atlases in the seventeenth century. Though at least two surviving examples of large-scale regional maps in a traditional style are known to exist, neither one shows territories in Europe.
The Habsburgs were similarly operating without accurate spatial projections through the 1560s. Around mid-century, they relied mostly on scattered city views and a handful of printed but deeply distorted maps of the Kingdom of Hungary.\textsuperscript{211} Then, a pair of Milanese military engineers trained in scientific cartography arrived in Graz and Vienna at the invitation of Maximilian II.\textsuperscript{212} Natale and Niccolò Angielini’s task was to survey the fortresses of the borderlands and develop recommendations for modernization. The resulting burst of mapmaking produced a series of charts and ground-plans which survive in at least five copies.\textsuperscript{213} These activities are acknowledged as the “birth of military cartography” in the Habsburg monarchy. Martino Rota, the Dalmatian born painter and printmaker employed by the court, fashioned a portrait of one of the brothers in the 1570s (fig. 5). Most of their projections covered only individual fortresses held by the Habsburgs, and a few depicted regions within Habsburg territory, which helped those in Vienna trace the steps between themselves and their possessions (map 6). In the few maps covering larger regions that bordered onto the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman and Habsburg lands were separated into color blocks of pink and green respectively (map 4). The presence of the Angielini brothers at the court had a deep impact on fellow artists. A small painting on glass with an inserted compass depicts the Central European borderland with these same pink and green divisions (Map 3). Based on the inscription and use of color in the composition, the fragile hand-held object was likely a comment on the loss of the fortress of


\textsuperscript{212} For a study of these cartographers and their maps, see Pálffy, Anfänge der Militärkartographie.

\textsuperscript{213} ÖNB, Cod. 8609 Han and Cod. 8607 Han; Generallandesarchiv, Karlsruhe, Gebundene Karte und Pläne Hfk. Bd. XV; Hauptstaatsarchiv, Dresden, Karten, Risse, Bilder Schrank XXVI., Fasc. 96. Nr. 5 and 6.
Sziget in 1566. That year, the small protruding section of Habsburg-green at the center fell and became the seat of a newly founded Ottoman governorship. Later wars would spur the production of more detailed renderings. Already in 1594, another Italian cartographer produced a map of the borderland in preparation for the Long Turkish War (Map 5). The view, which looks downstream (thereby oriented towards the East), shows the full line of fortresses on the Habsburg side and some of the Ottoman first line of defense across from it. This rendering of the border shows no indication of where Ottoman territory ended and Habsburg territory began. Instead, after the first row of Ottoman fortresses, only the rivers and major islands were delineated to the edge of the page. It was only in the late seventeenth century that truly detailed projections became widely used as part of the wars of re-conquest.

Scholars have often discounted the repeated calls to draw borders as nothing more than wishful rhetoric. A majority of the visual projections lend themselves to the long-accepted narrative that the two empires had no hard borders until the beginning of the eighteenth century. However, the color-coded maps of the Angielini brothers point to the possibility that the parties did have a concept of a hard boundary. Indeed, from the earliest cease-fire, a central point was the establishment of a shared border-drawing commission charged with negotiating, and when necessary, redrawing lines or razing fortresses altogether. Traces of these meetings

216 Stein, Guarding the Frontier, 14.
217 See the instructions for ambassador Hieronymus Adorno on negotiating the cease fire with Beylerbey Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda, published in Nehring, Austro-Turcica, #12. “De confinibus ponendis iubet illustris dominus Generalis, quod Hyeronimus Adurnus veniat ad hanc conclusionem, quod per ipsum potentissimum Cesarem elligantur aliquot commissarii simul cum bassa Budensi et M.tas R. alios elliget, qui simul unaqimiter et
are scattered throughout provincial documents from the 1540s and 50s. The fruits of their labor, according to the Ottomans, were compiled in a register of towns known as the Book of Halil Bey, named after the chief financial officer (defterdar) of Buda under whom it was produced. This book, which was likely a form of tax register, listed Ottoman political units and the villages belonging to them. Copies were evidently kept in Vienna and Constantinople after 1568, yet adjustments and newly built fortresses led to shifts and disputes. While the Ottomans continued to rely on the Book of Halil Bey through the 1590s (with their own versions of the border adjustments duly recorded in their Constantinople copy) the Habsburgs insisted that the border drawing negotiations never closed and the book’s contents were not final. Regardless of this disagreement, each peace treaty explicitly sought to maintain the status quo embodied in registers like the Book of Halil Bey. Renovations and repairs were allowed on

\[\textit{concorditer decidunt de metis et confinibus ponendis, et nullam aliam instructionem dicat se habere supra hoc. Hec autem omnia teneantur esse decisa in termino sex mensium a die conclusionis factae.}^{218}\]

\[\textit{Several Habsburg missions to Buda (see appendix C) and possibly some of the Ottoman missions to Vienna (see appendix D) were part of these joint-border commissions. For more on these activities, see chapter 3 on the Pasha of Buda and the Archduke of Austria.}\]

\[\textit{Though plenty of documentation exists, no one has yet compiled a full list of the defterdar of Buda or attempted to trace their biographies. An excellent partial list can be found in Fekete, Budapest, 211–213. On the nature of the post, see Bernard Lewis, “Daftardār,” ed. C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and G. Lecomte, The Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1997).}\]

\[\textit{No known copies survive, though there are plenty of scattered lists of towns and several tax registers preserved in Viennese collections. According to ambassadors Rijm and Ungnad, Verantius and Teuffenbach returned to Vienna with a copy in 1568. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 4 (1573 X-XII), fol. 48–62, here 53r.}\]

\[\textit{See James D. Tracy, “The Logic of Kleinkrieg: The ‘Book of Halil Beg’ in Habsburg-Ottoman Diplomacy, 1550 – 1576,” forthcoming in a volume edited by Marija Wakounig. I would like to thank the author for providing me with a copy before it went to press.}\]
existing fortresses, unless they stood in controversial territories. The razing of such disputed fortresses was a central component of treaty negotiations.\footnote{222 Each round of negotiations included both old and new fortresses. Sometimes these arguments made their way into the texts of the treaties. For example, Sultan Selim’s ratification of the 1568 treaty refers to a list of nine fortresses that need to remain dismantled in the frontier between the two empires. HHStA, Türkische Urkunde. Listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #551.}

An important but often overlooked question needs to be considered about border drawing attempts by imperial agents: how much were the dueling imperial consolidations of power in the shattered remains of the Kingdom of Hungary seen as directly at the expense of the other empire’s interests? From the discussion above, it appears that between 1543 and 1593, the Habsburgs and Ottomans were content to give and take a little, particularly when the fortresses in question were not well incorporated into their own structures of rule to begin with. Such a situation could explain the difficult case of the fortress of Sziget (see the center of Map 3). Sziget’s Croatian-Hungarian captain, Nikola Zrinski, completely disregarded the peace treaty for over a decade, a problem regularly noted by officials on both sides.\footnote{223 See Sándor Takáts, “Vizsgálat Zrínyi Miklós ellen [Investigation against Miklós Zrínyi],” in Emlékezzünk eleinkrol [Let us remember our forefathers] (Budapest: Genius Kiadás, 1929), 261–81. See more recently, the important study on aristocratic identity: Pálffy, “Verschiedene Loyalitäten.”} When Sultan Süleyman launched a campaign to take the fortress in 1566, Emperor Maximilian made no moves to protect it. Fichtner finds fault with the Emperor’s intelligence network, but perhaps there was also an element of resignation to fate. Sziget, in the end, was surrounded by Ottoman lands.

The problem of Zrinski brings us to another matter addressed by the peace treaties: the regulation of military actions launched by local nobility whose ambiguous loyalties disrupted the status quo. The factionalism of the Hungarian estates, which many scholars blame for its weakness and downfall, long outlived the collapse of its governing bodies. These nobility, who had recently been dispossessed of their properties and incomes, clung to their own memories of...
the fallen but not forgotten Kingdom of Hungary.\footnote{See, for example, the great number of Hungarian histories written during the period, in which humanists attempted to grapple with the past and present of the “Realm of Saint Stephen.” Birnbaum, \textit{Humanists in a Shattered World}.} This led to articulations of different forms of incomplete sovereignty. Within Habsburg-ruled Hungary, the reigning monarch was forced to cooperate with a Hungarian “lieutenant” (\textit{locum tenens}) and palatine (\textit{palatinus}) stationed in Pozsony.\footnote{Though they were occasionally filled for ceremonial purposes, they were wielded little administrative power. See Pálffy, \textit{Kingdom of Hungary}, 266–89.} Though a subordinate of the monarch, their exact roles beyond ceremonial were not always clear and their presence occasionally led to a collective resistance to the symbols and rituals of imperial legitimacy. In 1562, following the death of the Hungarian nobleman Tamás Nádasdy, both positions lost their powers. The Hungarian Council, when it met, also attempted to exert control, but its members were often more destructive in their individual actions than as a bickering bureaucratic unit.\footnote{For documents on the meetings of the council, see Vilmos Fraknói, ed., \textit{Országgyűlési emlékek: Magyar Királyság [Documents of the Diets of Royal Hungary]}, 11 vols., (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1874–1899).} In the neighboring Ottoman tributary region of Transylvania there was an “uncrowned king” to 1571 (\textit{rex electus non coronatus}), then a “Prince of Transylvania” (\textit{Princeps Transsilvaniae}).\footnote{The status of Transylvania is a major debate in Hungarian historiography. Sandor Papp published a study supported by editions of documents to disprove the long-held assumption that the prince maintained full internal autonomy and freedom if he paid the tribute. See Papp, \textit{Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden}.} Each of these “sovereigns” believed the kingdom had only altered its shape and character temporarily, with the court shifting from occupied Buda to one of the non-Ottoman regional courts.\footnote{An opinion nineteenth-century nationalist historians would cling to as part of their efforts to justify a separate Hungarian nation-state.} The nobility jockeyed for power and influence while moving around from one court to the next. Looking for financial gains and possibilities for promotion, and with an eye on sectarian developments, they hopped between the courts of the Austrian

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\footnote{224}{See, for example, the great number of Hungarian histories written during the period, in which humanists attempted to grapple with the past and present of the “Realm of Saint Stephen.” Birnbaum, \textit{Humanists in a Shattered World}.}

\footnote{225}{Though they were occasionally filled for ceremonial purposes, they were wielded little administrative power. See Pálffy, \textit{Kingdom of Hungary}, 266–89.}

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\footnote{228}{An opinion nineteenth-century nationalist historians would cling to as part of their efforts to justify a separate Hungarian nation-state.}
Habsburgs in Vienna and Prague,\textsuperscript{229} the courts of Transylvania,\textsuperscript{230} the local courts connected to the Hungarian Council based in Pozsony,\textsuperscript{231} and from 1569, the court of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.\textsuperscript{232} Some even tried their luck with the Ottomans in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{233}

This created many problems for contemporaries in assessing dynastic loyalty and makes the historians task extremely difficult today. Take, for example, the convoluted career path of Gáspár Bekes. After staging an unsuccessful attempt to seize the Transylvanian throne from Prince István Báthory, Bekes found himself exiled in Vienna under Habsburg protection, then in Constantinople seeking new allies within the Ottoman court. After refusing to convert to Islam like some of his fellow Hungarian noblemen,\textsuperscript{234} he returned to the far corners of Transylvania and made plans to once again seize power, this time from Báthory’s younger brother.\textsuperscript{235} Following this second unsuccessful attempt, he changed strategies and reconciled with his former arch-enemy István Báthory, now King of Poland, and joined his court in Poland-Lithuania. From here, he played an important role in the Livonian War against Ivan IV of Russia.

\textsuperscript{230} See Horn, \textit{Hit és hatalom}.
\textsuperscript{232} On the court of Stephen Báthory, Hungarian nobleman from Transylvania elected King of Poland in 1576, see László Nagy, ed., \textit{Báthory István emlékezete [In memory of István Báthory]} (Budapest: Zrínyi Kiadó, 1994).
\textsuperscript{233} While there is no comprehensive study of this group, some individuals have been examined in greater detail (and those studies are cited below). For a small overview of the topic, see Ferenc Szakály, \textit{Szigtetvári Csőbőr Balázs török miniatúrái 1570 [The miniatures of Balázs Csőbőr of Szigetvar, 1570]} (Budapest: Európa Könyvkiadó, 1983).
\textsuperscript{234} For example, Pál Márkházy (Ibrahim Bey) and Ferenc Török.
\textsuperscript{235} He had turned to a minority group in Transylvania known as the Székelys.
He eventually died in 1579 as a substantial landholder in the Baltic region.  

Bekes’ trajectory was not unique and such drastic vacillations of allegiance left many loyal imperial agents frustrated. These diverse interest groups caused so much commotion that resident ambassador Albert de Wyss once wrote in a report from Constantinople, “the Hungarians are always inconsiderate and faithless human beings, who cannot suffer peace, and are unable to sustain warfare.”

Though many names of difficult nobility circulated in the correspondence surrounding peace negotiations, only under exceptional circumstances did specific individuals appear in the texts of the treaties themselves. The instability caused by the machinations of these particularly powerful noblemen had great consequences for the unsettled nature of the border region. Historian Paula Fichtner nicely summarized the problem when she asserted that “each of the belligerents had his own idea of where the Austrian dynasty’s Hungary ended and the sultan’s domain began, and held to it tenaciously.” For example, Miklós Báthory and Menyhért Balassi were mentioned in the Ottoman text of the treaties of 1562 and 1565. The pair of Hungarian noblemen, who had vacillated between Transylvanian and Habsburg courts for decades, had a habit of building fortresses without the consent of any ruler. Though neither man was the scion

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237 “Hungaros semper fuisse inconsideratos, et ludricae fidei homines, qui pacem pati non possint et bellum sustinere nequeant.” 26 March 1569 to Maximilian II. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 25, Konv. 2 (1569 I-IV), fol. 113r.

238 Fichtner, Terror and Tolleration, 45.

239 “bu şartlarımıza Palazi Mihal ve Niqola Batori ve sayır begleriniz ki şimdii size itaat etmişlerdir.” See Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymans an Karl V, #25, lines 15–16. For an opinion against their inclusion in the treaty submitted to the Aulic War Council, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 19, Konv. 2 (1564 XI-s.d.), fol. 215–220.

240 See, for example, complaints by resident ambassador Albert de Wyss from Constantinople to Maximilian II from 1564 Oct. 10 about Menyhért Balassi building a fortress near Huszt (today
of the old noble family whose name he carried, their lack of tethers made the Ottomans uncomfortable. By explicitly labeling them as “under your submission” (size itā'at etmişlerdüür) in the Ottoman ratifications of 1562 and 1565, Süleyman hoped to force the Habsburgs into controlling their actions. In return, these names seem to have been omitted in the Habsburg ratifications. Ottoman ruling elites, on the other hand, were never individually named in the peace treaties. Instead, the texts included general blanket statements confirming that their regional and local governors were all bound to observe the agreement.241 This difference has to do with the greater level of control exercised by the Ottomans, who quickly removed anyone from office and stationed him elsewhere if complaints by the Habsburg court pointed out real breaches of the treaty.

Nobility were not the only ones who caused problems. The treaties also aimed to curtail raiding by locally stationed garrison troops, and stateless bandits. Here too, the memory of the fallen Kingdom of Hungary was strong, but it was not the only group to which roaming soldiers could pledge their allegiance. A group of irregular sea and land raiders known as the Uskoks from the Adriatic coast fortress of Seng were often explicitly listed in the treaties, with assurances that neither side would provide them with protection or support.242 Another group were the Tatars, “a fragmented people, who can never sit still in one place in tranquillity,”243

Khust, Ukraine). HHStA, Turcica, Karton 19, Konv. 1 (1564 IX-X), fol. 48a–48b. Neither man has been studied closely.
241 “bu emn u aman ve dostlıq içinde memalik-i mahrumemüzde olan beylerbeyiler ve beyler ve kapudanlara ve sübaşılara ve voyvodalara bi-l-cümle sayir ‘asakir-i zafer-me’asire muhkem tenbih u te'kid olunub.” Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymāns an Karl V, #25.
242 For more on the Uskoks, see Bracewell, Uskoks of Senj.
according to the treaty of 1575. The most problematic bandits of all were the *hajduks* and *martoloses*, stateless outlaws and robbers who moved in groups across the Balkans and whose loyalty was easily purchased. These men, discussed in greater detail in chapter five, were a serious threat to peace treaties, particularly when either side employed them as unofficial agents of the state. For this reason, the treaties included clauses that prohibited the use of for-hire soldiers of this type. They also included promises from both sides to investigate, capture and punish those accountable for losses of life and property.

The lively economic exchanges between the two powers also required regulation. Cattle farming and merchant networks were critical sources of food-stuffs and tax revenue, yet vulnerable to disruption. The most common problem was the disruption of trade by the above-mentioned bandits. Faithless merchants also regularly upset cross-border trade by relocating, leaving behind angry debtors and unpaid taxes. Shared markets, in which both subjects of the Sultan and the subjects of the Emperor participated, were moved by irritated organizers over safety concerns, changing travel routes and thereby customs duties. A lucrative trade in captives often led to disputes. To combat such problems, treaties include provisions aimed at regulating a stable economic environment. Any losses suffered by merchants were to be

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244 See, for example the treaty of 1591, “in dem Castell zu Zenng, die übrigen Uscoken nicht unter halten noch den straiffenden Heỹduckhen undershlaif geben, oder dem friden unnd ainigkhait zur wider unnsrern gebiet, oder underthannen shaden zuefuegen.” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 74, Konv. 1 (1590 X-XII), fol. 240v–243v, here 242r.


246 See the altercation at the Sarló fair in 1591, during which the Sancakbey of Esztergom and his men were attacked in Bayerle, *Ottoman diplomacy*, #37, page 79–80. See also the movement of the Győr market to Óvár in 1581, Takáts et al., *Basák*, #196.

247 On ransom slavery, see Dávid and Fodor, eds., *Ransom Slavery*. 

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Defectors who left debts (of physical labor or capital) in their wake were to be returned immediately. Ransom slavery was strictly forbidden. Though this last prohibition was willfully ignored on the borderland, well documented investigations throughout the period reveal how seriously authorities considered financial misconduct across the border.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the treaties aimed to set up the foundations of peace through officially sanctioned ambassadors, proclamations of friendship between both parties and their allies, and a system of yearly financial incentives to maintain these relations. The treaty text explicitly endowed the Habsburg resident ambassador with the same privileges as any other accredited ambassadors at the Porte. The Sultan’s side always contained his allies of France and Venice, and his “tribute paying non-Muslim slaves” (haraç-güzar kefere kullarum) in Transylvania, Moldavia, Wallachia. From the 1570s, the Sultan’s side also listed Poland. The Habsburg side, rather than expanding over the decades, contracted slightly as the split

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248 For example, the Peace Treaty of 1565 explicitly states that “with this peace, no one from Hungary or any other of our tax-payers is to be taken captive, if they are suddenly taken and detained, they are to be immediately released without the need to pay ransoms and returned to their land of origin safe and sound. [Bu dostlık içinde Üngürüsdan ve gayrídandan hiç re'ayamuz esir olmaya nagah olsa dahi alıkonulub behasız sağ ve salim memleketine gönderilüb.” See Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymāns an Karl V, #32, here lines 29–30.

249 There are endless examples in archival sources, few of which have been studied in detail. For one case that has been studied, see the fifteen-year saga of cross-border debates about the debts of János Trombitás, an antitrinitarian double agent who fled from the market town of Maros in 1579, to a Jewish merchant from Buda, Jacob son of Bereck, see Szakály, Mezőváros és reformáció, 219–351.

250 This included provisions that they could keep their own servant and interpreter, members of the embassy could travel freely, and, in times of tensions, the imperial ambassador would not be confined as a prisoner. If a war were to break out, they would be allowed to return to their homeland without being treated as a hostage. Such details are enumerated only in the Habsburg versions.

251 Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymāns an Karl V, #32, here line 43.

252 See the treaties of 1574–76, citations for which appear in appendix A.
between the Spanish and Austrian branches of the family became permanent. The Peace Treaty of 1547 was the only one to list Spain and North Africa. Such inclusions of family members and allies were meant to keep the two empires from direct and indirect military engagement in the Mediterranean. The Ottomans, conscious of the growing divide between the courts of Emperor Charles V and his brother Ferdinand (elected King of the Romans in 1531, making him designated heir) had both rulers ratify treaties in 1547. These two elements disappeared in the treaties of the 1550s, as the Spanish Habsburgs stopped communicating with Austrian Habsburg ambassadors in favor of sending their own envoys.

The most controversial component of the agreement was the timely payment of a yearly fixed sum, which the Ottomans referred to as a tribute payment (haraç) and the Habsburgs called an honorable present (munus honorarium). The inconsistent use of terminology from the beginning suggests that the exact nature of the payment was purposefully left open for interpretation. Some scholars describe the yearly 30,000 Hungarian ducats (ungerish gulden; 253 On the growing religious and political divides, see Chudoba, Spain and the Empire, 52–55.
255 Charles V ratified the treaty twice: Aug. 1, 1547 and Feb. 4, 1548. Latin copies can be found in the HHStA, Türkische Urkunden.
256 See the forthcoming dissertation by Aneliya Stoyanova from Sofia University.
257 On the debates regarding the terms used and the nature of the gift/tribute, see Ernst Dieter Petritsch, “Tribut oder Ehrengeschenk? Ein Beitrag zu den habsburgisch-osmanischen Beziehungen in der zweiten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts,” in Archiv und Forschung: Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas, ed. Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Vienna: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993), 49–58. Petritsch concludes that the terms were used so inconsistently that not only is it impossible to determine their significance, but that it was left ambiguous purposefully. This constructive ambiguity allowed the yearly payment to function in the interest of both parties.
ducati hungaricales; altun)\textsuperscript{258} as a rent-like system, where the Habsburgs paid to control their portion of former lands of the Kingdom of Hungary in their possession (roughly 30\% of its total territory).\textsuperscript{259} Others see the amount as largely symbolic,\textsuperscript{260} with the costs of sending the yearly embassy (which included “extraordinary” gifts for the viziers, translators, and spies)\textsuperscript{261} itself far outstripping the actual amount to be paid.\textsuperscript{262} For their part, the Ottoman Sultans considered the tribute to be a performance of Habsburg submission to Ottoman nominal overlordship. The payments were delivered twenty-seven times between 1548 and 1593.\textsuperscript{263} The transfer of cash and valuable objects from the ambassador to the Sultan’s treasury was a ceremonial affair with rehearsed steps choreographed by the Ottoman master of ceremonies. It included a processional entry (fig. 7) and audience with the Sultan and his viziers, where the gifts of cash and fine objects were put on display (fig. 8).\textsuperscript{264} Whatever its original character and purpose in the minds

\textsuperscript{258} The 1547 peace treaty (official German translation of Sultan Suleyman’s ratification reads “every year thirty-thousand Hungarian gulden in the beginning of the month of March (alle jar dreissig tausent ungerish gulden in anfang des monat Martz).” The exchange rate for a single Hungarian ducat fluctuated between 150 and 157 Italian soldi. János Buza, “The Exchange Rates of the Hungarian and Turkish Ducats in the Mid-16th Century,” \textit{Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae} 60, no. 1 (2007): 33–54.

\textsuperscript{259} Müller, “Erbfeind."

\textsuperscript{260} Fitchner, \textit{Terror and Toleration}, 35.

\textsuperscript{261} See the register of the tribute payment delegation from 1581, Tobias P. Graf, \textit{Preis der Diplomatie: Die Abrechnungen der kaiserlichen Gesandten an der Hohen Pforte, 1580–1583} (Heidelberg: Universitätsbibliothek, 2016), 23–26 (#3). The 1571 tribute carrying delegation had expenses totalling 71,700 taler. ÖNB, Codex Vindobonensis, 9026, fol. 40. One taler was roughly 1.5 gulden at the time, this means that 45,000 taler were spent on the Sultan’s tribute and the remaining expenses came from extraordinary gifts.

\textsuperscript{262} For example, the embassy of Singkmoser in 1550 listed an additional 42,942 ducats in expenses. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 8, Konv. 4 (1550 VII–IX), fol. 42–51.

\textsuperscript{263} See appendix C.

of those who initially implemented it, when the payment did not arrive in 1592, the Ottomans used its absence to help justify a declaration of war in 1593. These gift-giving missions, which ceased officially with the Peace of Zsitvatorok at the end of the Long Turkish War in 1606, provided Central European noblemen from the Holy Roman Empire with an exciting opportunity to explore the world of their Ottoman neighbors and bring back stories, objects, and images with which to enhance their own social prestige. Records of the missions, both written and pictorial, often celebrated these adventurous aspects of the exchange, rather than its submissive components.

Many questions remained open in the peace treaties. What, for example, constituted a breach that could serve as grounds for a full-scale invasion? What were officials to make of the inevitable border scuffle caused by two drunken soldiers? What were they to do with the depopulation of agricultural lands as peasants escaped double taxation and raiding by relocating? How would the empires deal with the Transylvanian nobility who courted each side attempting to play them off each other? Such questions remained unresolved, causing variable amounts of tension during each renegotiation of the treaty in Constantinople and requiring an element of flexibility in the provinces.

The Fictions of Empire: Cease-Fires and Peace Treaties

The remainder of this chapter provides a chronological survey of the eleven peace treaties ratified by Habsburg emperors and Ottoman Sultans. It is divided into four phases: a first period of false starts and ad-hoc negotiations (1543–1551); a second period of crisis that left relations in doubt or suspended (1551–1562); a third period during which a new status quo formed (1562–

1567); and a fourth period of sustained peaceful relations (1567–1593). While these periods correspond with treaties signed rather than the reigns of individual sovereigns or the tenures of individual ambassadors, this overview aims to highlight the profound impact of certain personalities and dispositions in the success or failure of negotiations.

**Phase One: False Starts and the Beginnings of a Fixed Border (1543-1551)**

A period of false starts, cushioned by cease fires, formed the foundations of peace treaty negotiation practices and indeed the texts themselves already during the early years of direct contact. This initial period set a precedent in terms of negotiations with the Austrian branch of the Habsburg family, the use of monetary incentives, and the establishment of joint borderland commissions to resolve disputes. In 1543, within a month of the fall of the fortress of Esztergom, Ferdinand came to the realization that the costly use of force would not win him the core lands of the Hungarian crown back from the Ottomans, and so, fearing a repeat of the damage caused during the Ottoman siege of Vienna in 1529, he turned to diplomacy. The sovereign contacted the Sultan and Grand Vizier directly, hoping to send an envoy with negotiating powers. His request for a letter of safe conduct was immediately granted, but given that the campaign season had reached an end, his envoy, if he sent one at all, accomplished

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265 For a synthesis of many contemporary sources which describe how captains Francis Salamanca and Martino Lascano forfeited the fortress of Esztergom on August 10, see Némethy, *Esztergom arülással*.

266 Though the fall of Buda was a serious blow in 1541, the fall of Esztergom meant that no major town stood between the expanding Ottoman military and the Habsburg hinterland. Suddenly, the soldiers of the Sultan were dangerously close to Vienna.

267 A set of letter summaries drawn up in mid-September reveals that Ferdinand asked for letters of safe conduct for a negotiator and expressed his interest in a cease fire or peace treaty. HHStA, Türkica, Karton 5, Konv. 5 (1543), fol. 54–58. No doubt he was worried that the army would soon reach all the way to Vienna.

268 See HHStA, Türkischen Urkunden, 1543 September 30–October 9.
nothing.269 This first attempt at borderland diplomacy grew out of necessity, Ferdinand had no recourse to engage in direct contact with the Sultan’s court located over a thousand miles away across hostile land. The acute situation of troops gathered in the Balkans left little time for negotiators to travel first through his brother Charles V then via the Mediterranean Sea to negotiate on his behalf. Ferdinand needed to act quickly to protect at least a portion of his claims in the region rapidly falling into Ottoman hands.

The following February, Ferdinand commissioned the displaced Archbishop of Esztergom and “place-holder” (locum tenens) Pál Várday to act on his behalf. Várday attempted unsuccessfully to secure a cease fire in the name of Ferdinand through his envoy sent to Buda, the Hungarian nobleman János Dessewffy.270 In response, the local governor explained that he could not issue such a cease-fire and urged Ferdinand to send a negotiator to the central Ottoman court as quickly as possible.271 However, this important step meant that the channels of communication had opened with Buda. Várday sent Dessewffy to Buda again in June 1544. There he expressed Ferdinand's aim for an agreement in which the Ottomans would renounce all claims to the Budin province. This request was denied immediately and the 1544 talks ended unsuccessfully.

269 Instructions were drawn up for the secretary Joannes Marsupinus to visit the local governor (Sancakbey) of Bosnia. However, I found no other documentation to suggest the mission was undertaken. See Nehring, Austro-Turcica, #5, pg. 31-36.

270 Dessewffy’s family controlled the Croatian-Slovenia town of Pozega in the Kingdom of Hungary before the Ottoman conquest. Like many Hungarian magnates of the period, he vacillated between supporting Szapolya and Ferdinand in the 1520s and 1530s. In the 1540s he began a career under Várday, then Ferdinand, eventually rising to become the chancellor of the Hungarian council in Pozsony. On Dessewffy’s biography, see Árpád Mikó and Géza Pálffy, “A pozsonyi ferences templom késő reneszánsz és kora barokk síremlékei [Late Renaissance and Early Baroque Funerary Monuments in the Franciscan Church at Pozsony, today Bratislava],” Művészettörténeti Értesítő 54, no. 3–4 (2005): 319–48, here 324–26.

271 For the instructions for the embassy from Feb. 24, 1544, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544), fol. 10–13. For the response, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544), fol. 44 and 46. Both are listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #80 and #81.
Ferdinand’s second attempt to negotiate a cease-fire on the border proved more successful. In January of 1545, through Leonhard Vels as his mediator in Vienna, he proposed a cease fire with the same Ottoman regional governor he had tried to persuade a year earlier.\textsuperscript{272} Vels, a prominent military commander, instructed the Habsburg ambassador Hieronymus Adorno to offer the regional governor of Buda cash for accepting a temporary cease-fire and promises of yearly compensation in the event that a peace treaty proved successful.\textsuperscript{273} Rather than a bribe, this should be read as a payment for services rendered, with the Pasha acting on Vels’ behalf by communicating with authorities whom the Habsburg general had little or no access to.\textsuperscript{274} Adorno’s instructions also stipulated that the border between the two empires be firmly established and marked by a joint commission within six months. The financial incentive and this last stipulation on the hard borders would remain a point in every single peace treaty between the Ottomans and Habsburgs for the next five decades. The Pasha of Buda accepted the offer following Adorno’s audience and immediately issued decrees to the Ottoman judges in the districts under his jurisdiction announcing the truce.\textsuperscript{275} One can only speculate as to why Adorno succeeded where Dessewffy failed. Changes at the imperial level were insignificant between 1544 and 1545. One might look to the detachment of the Italian Adorno as negotiator as opposed to the local (and likely more combative) Dessewffy. One might also view the added financial incentives as a boost. Afterwards, Adorno continued on to Constantinople, where just days after his arrival, on the night before his audience with Sultan Süleyman to begin peace talks on behalf

\textsuperscript{272} Nehring, \textit{Austro-Turcica}, #11.

\textsuperscript{273} Nehring, \textit{Austro-Turccia}, #12, pgs. 44–47). On Vels see Kohler, \textit{Ferdinand I}, 142–145.

\textsuperscript{274} This was also not the first time such an offer was made. The instructions also include a provision offering Sancakbey Ulama Bey of Bosnia, Beylerbey Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda, and the translator at the Porte, Yunus Bey rewards for their successful mediation. Nehring, \textit{Austro-Turcica}, #5, pg. 36.

\textsuperscript{275} A copy of such a decree is preserved in a contemporary Latin translation. HHStA, Staatsvertrage Abschriften 1545 Feb. 5, listed in Petritsch, \textit{Regesten}, #83.
of Ferdinand, he died. His secretary, Johann Maria Malvezzi (who later returned as resident ambassador himself), was sent back to Vienna with promises that a peace would be negotiated with the next incoming ambassador.

As a response to the Sultan’s willingness to negotiate, both King Ferdinand and Emperor Charles V commissioned ambassadors to rush to the Porte from the 1545 diet in Worms. Charles V, though detached from events in East Central Europe, knew that preventing the Ottomans from gaining further territory in the region was in his best interest. Charles’s brother Ferdinand, who embodied the Habsburg hand in the Kingdom of Hungary, was naturally more involved and hoped to secure the return of the conquered lands. This curious move of sending two ambassadors at once has been read as an attempt to cooperate on a relatively secret mission aimed at forging peace against the will of the Hungarian nobility with the help of France. The result of the double embassy was chaotic. Niccolò Secco, Ferdinand’s ambassador, arrived first in August and was promptly thrown into jail, where he was kept until the arrival of Charles’ ambassador, Gerhard Veltwyck. The two envoys struggled as much with each other as they did with the French ambassador and Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha. They negotiated for four months. The Grand Vizier wanted the Croatian magnates, above all the trouble-making Nikola Zrinski, to be left out of the treaty so that they could consolidate Ottoman power in the region. Meanwhile, the Habsburgs wanted Süleyman to give up any claims to Hungary and Transylvania altogether so they could attempt to reunite and rule the lands of the Hungarian crown. Süleyman

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was clearly in a position of greater power. In November 1545, they agreed on an eighteen-month truce which delayed any decisions on the question of Hungarian fortresses. The ceasefire was closed by Veltwyck, and he returned to the Habsburg court to gather instructions for the next round of talks aimed at a more permanent solution.

Veltwyck soon returned with concrete terms for peace between the Holy Roman Empire and Sultan Süleyman. Though he arrived in October 1546, French opposition to the peace project and disagreements on the status of Croatian and Hungarian fortresses stalled negotiations until the summer of 1547.\textsuperscript{280} The Sultan sent his version of the final treaty by June of 1547, with Charles and Ferdinand ratifying separate copies in August.\textsuperscript{281} The resulting five-year peace treaty was the first of its kind.\textsuperscript{282} Both sides reserved their current positions in the lands of the former Kingdom of Hungary, thus confirming the status quo and codifying the tripartition of the medieval kingdom (into Transylvania, Ottoman Hungary under the Pasha of Buda, and Royal Hungary under the Habsburgs). Ferdinand began to pay his yearly “gift” or “tribute” of 30,000 florenos aureos to retain his portion. The text of this agreement provided the foundations for all future peace treaties between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Veltwyck's secretary, Johann Maria Malvezzi, remained in Constantinople as the first resident ambassador to the Porte.\textsuperscript{283}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnoteref{280}
News of Charles V’s victory against the German Protestants at Saxon Mühlberg, the death of King Francis I of France, and the reinvigorated campaigns against Shah Tahmasp were the reasons for the sudden willingness to forge a peace on the Ottoman side. See Severi, “Denari in loco”, 241.
\footnoteref{281}
For a list of ratifications, see the notes compiled in Petritsch, Regesten, #93.
\footnoteref{282}
For a full text publication of the Latin ratification of Ferdinand I compared with a contemporary German translation of Süleyman’s ratification and a modern translation of the version preserved in Feridun’s Munse’at, see Petritsch, “Friedensvertrag des Jahres 1547.”
\footnoteref{283}
1548 with Justus de Argento, 1549 with Sigismund Posgay and Marcus Singkmoser and 1550 with Marcus Singkmoser.
\end{footnotes}
Phase Two: The Crisis of Direction in the 1550s

The Transylvanian question resurfaced quickly and led to an effective collapse of the 1547 peace treaty. Already in 1550, Ferdinand began testing the ground, instructing his tribute carrying ambassador to bring up the possibility of an Ottoman retreat from Hungary. The request was scoffed at in Constantinople, where viziers repeatedly told the ambassador it was unthinkable for regions already furnished with mosques and populated with Muslims to be handed over to Ferdinand.284 In early 1551, Ferdinand saw an opportunity to ally with the Hungarian nobility in Transylvania and began courting them to pledge allegiance to the Habsburgs rather than the Ottomans. This blurred the lines of the treaty and led to a strong Ottoman retaliation accompanied by a sudden land grab in 1551 and 1552. The Ottomans threw Habsburg resident ambassador Johann Maria Malvezzi into prison and confiscated his properties. In two consecutive military campaigns, they filled out their territories in the region, taking control of some 20 fortresses formerly in the hands of the Hungarian nobility in Transylvania to the East or Ferdinand to the West.285 Ferdinand’s inability to financially back the soldiers stationed in the region and his calls on the local nobility to pay for the services of their own family members did not go over well with frontiersmen.286 The battered Hungarian estates gave up any interest in an open expression of alliance.287 The peace was broken and resident

284 “Non permittor de iis locis, ubi non sunt muscettae et sacerdotes mussormanni atque adeo quae nondum venerunt in potestatem plenam principis Turchorum.” Nehring, Austro-Turcica, #186.
285 For detailed notes on this campaign, see Markus Köhbach, Die Eroberung von Fülek durch die Osmanen 1554: eine historisch-quelienkritische Studie zur osmanischen Expansion im östlichen Mitteleuropa (Vienna: Böhlau, 1994), pgs. 22–25 and the corresponding footnotes on pgs. 38–68.
286 This is most evident in the documents preserved in the Budapest Hadtörténemi Levéltár, for example the letter of Ferdinand I in Vienna to Ebersdorf Feb. 23, 1552, Farkas 2000 #1552/1.
287 Oddly, a majority of the correspondence from 1551 and 1552 is missing from Vienna.
ambassador Malvezzi spent two years in deplorable conditions in the imperial dungeons of Anadolu Hisar and Yedikule.

In August of 1553, a Catholic prelate and the captain of the Danube naval fleet arrived in Constantinople to reopen peace talks. Together, Antonius Verantius and Ferenc Zay secured a cease-fire on behalf of Ferdinand as part of negotiations towards a new treaty. Verantius and Zay were men from the borderlands. Though Verantius would return later on a more successful mission, the four years the pair spent together in Constantinople between 1553 and 1557 were a protracted and unsuccessful exercise in official diplomacy. Repeating their desired conditions from earlier negotiations, the Ottomans wanted Ferdinand to give up all claims to the Transylvanian lands of the Hungarian crown in exchange for reduced yearly tribute payments and the promise of stability in the region. Verantius and Zay were trying to convince the Ottomans to hand over Transylvania and all villages that paid double taxes. The negotiations were excruciatingly slow. Officially, the cease-fire was extended for the duration of Verantius' and Zay’s negotiations. This meant that Süleyman expected all parties to follow the peace treaty of 1547 until a new one was signed. Yet continued border violations, including major coordinated attacks by Ottoman governors and rogue Hungarian nobility left both sides hesitant to sign. While Verantius and Zay remained in Constantinople, resident ambassador Johann Maria Malvezzi was released from prison and allowed to return to Vienna to present the new peace conditions. In May of 1554, Ferdinand prepared to send Malvezzi back with new instructions, but just before crossing the border from Habsburg Komárom to Ottoman

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288 In this case, the central administration contacted the regional governor of Buda (Beylerbey Toygun Pasha of Buda) with orders to refrain from any military engagement and to allow for the free movement of ambassadors.

289 This is detailed in Süleyman’s letter to Ferdinand sent after the arrival of Verantius and Zay. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 10, Konv. 1 (1553 1-VIII), fol. 130, listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #238.

290 See Köhbach, Die Eroberung von Fülek, 26 and chapters 3 and 4.
Esztergom, he fell ill. Before his death, Malvezzi shared his experiences and advice with his colorful successor as resident ambassador, the Flemish humanist Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq.291

It would take Busbecq years to secure a lasting new peace treaty. Between March and June of 1559, it appeared that Busbecq had finally met with success. Ratified copies of the treaty were exchanged between Süleyman and Ferdinand (by now Holy Roman Emperor in title following the abdication of Charles V), but the Habsburg ambassador discovered contradictions between the copies.292 Again in the fall of 1559, Busbecq believed he had finally reached an agreement with Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha. After opening the sealed bag to inspect the ratified document, however, Busbecq discovered that the terms committed to paper differed from those he had agreed to in person. The provisional peace continued, as did the raiding on the borderlands.

**Phase Three: Peace under Siege to 1566**

Busbecq finally succeeded in securing a peace treaty in 1562. Though a few minor details were added to the text,293 it remained nearly identical to the unratified version from three years earlier. Busbecq, never one to miss an opportunity for self-promotion, claimed the success came from his skills as a negotiator. Yet the sudden willingness of the Ottomans to sign the peace agreement was also the result of a generational shift in the ruling elite. The impending coronation

293 The treaty also applied to Johan Sigismund Zapolya in Transylvania, and stipulated that a separate agreement between he and Ferdinand over some contentious territories should be made.
of Maximilian II as Ferdinand’s successor coincided with the death of Prince Bayezid, which settled the long-standing question of Ottoman succession on Prince Selim. Grand Vizier Rüstem Pasha, long an opponent of Habsburg peace, also died. Busbecq had cultivated his relationship with Rüstem’s successor Semiz Ali Pasha through years of extraordinary gifts while Semiz Ali was still second vizier,294 writing fondly in his memoir, “[we] became firm friends, and were forever interchanging views with the object of re-establishing peace. He is a Dalmatian by birth, and the only polished gentleman I came across among the Turkish savages.”295 Busbecq went on for pages describing the differences between Rüstem and his friend Ali. When Ali took up the post of Grand Vizier in the summer of 1561, the position of the Habsburgs improved significantly.296 Though Ferdinand continued to dream of bringing Transylvania under his power during his reign,297 his ambassador thought it more prudent to accept the Ottoman conditions. With Ferdinand and Süleyman’s legacies on the line, negotiations were short. Sultan Süleyman sent a treaty ratification (fig. 2) up to Vienna with his envoy, Ibrahim Bey, who would attend the coronation of Maximilian II.298 With that, Ferdinand and Süleyman successfully ratified the treaty of 1562 to replace the expired treaty of 1547.

After the death of Ferdinand I on July 25, 1564, ambassadors Michael Černović, Ákos Csábi, and György Albani Csurdai sought to renew the peace treaty of 1562 in the name of Maximilian II. Negotiations began in March 1564 and continued well past the exchange of

295 Busbecq, *Turkish Letters*, 342.
296 See Tracy, “The Ambassador as Third Party”, 230. According to Busbecq’s memoir “When I sent him a valuable silken robe with my congratulations on his promotion, I received a gracious reply, for he asked me to treat him as a friend on every occasion, and not to hesitate to apply to him if necessary, and indeed he was as good as his word.” Busbecq, *Turkish Letters*, 334.
297 A letter from as late as Feb. 22, 1562 (HHStA, Turcica, Karton 15, Konv. 2 (1562 I-V), fol. 32–36) still expresses this hope.
298 See HHStA, Turcica, Kartons 16 and 17, and Hungarica, Fasc. 84. See also a discussion of Ottoman embassies in the following chapter.
ratifications in October 1564\textsuperscript{299} and February of 1565.\textsuperscript{300} Questions about Transylvania lingered. The Ottomans wanted to negotiate the exchange of certain towns and discuss the forcible inclusion of regional nobility whose raiding expeditions continuously disrupted the peace.\textsuperscript{301} The final treaty was valid for eight years with nearly the same terms as those in 1562.

Almost as soon as the ratification of Maximilian arrived, the Ottomans laid siege to Tokay, under the pretenses of consolidating their own position near the Transylvanian border. The Hungarian nobility, agitated by Habsburg inaction, advanced their causes by launching daily raids on the countryside. It became increasingly dangerous to move beyond fortress walls anywhere near Sziget, which stuck into Ottoman territory like a small peninsula. By the end of 1565, the Ottomans began preparations for a large-scale campaign. In the summer of 1566, the Ottoman army marched with Sultan Süleyman at its head against the fortress. The events that followed would become one of the most widely retold and mythologized stories of Hungarian history. The captain of the fortress and his troops withstood a month-long siege by the massive Ottoman army before finally succumbing to the relentless cannon fire and waves of troops. Meanwhile, the ailing seventy-one-year-old Sultan Süleyman died in his tent just days before the fortress fell. His closest advisors kept his death a secret to prevent a disastrous blow to troop morale. Following the successful capture of the fortress, the Ottoman army, which was already at

\textsuperscript{299} See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 19, Konv. 1 (1564 IX-X), fol. 104–114 and further copies in HHStA, Türkische Urkunden under the date 1564 October 27.
\textsuperscript{300} Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben Süleymâns an Karl V, #32 and listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #440. HHStA, Türkische Urkunden.
\textsuperscript{301} For a discussion of the possibility of excluding Miklós Báthory and Menyhért Balassi from the treaty, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 19, Konv. 2 (1564 XI-s.d.), fol. 215–220.
the end of its campaign season, returned to Edirne where the new Sultan took command. Vienna and Europe had been spared.\textsuperscript{302}

As word of the heroic last stand of the captain Nikola Zrinski spread throughout Europe, contemporaries composed rambling broad sheets, book-length poetic eulogies, and visual depictions celebrating the soldiers of Sziget and Zrinski as the saviors of Europe. The future emperor Rudolf II, then archduke of Austria, compiled an account of the events based on orations addressed to the imperial diet in support of the war against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{303} Popular audiences rapaciously consumed broadsheets, pamphlets and books over the next decades and centuries.\textsuperscript{304} The most famous account of the siege was published nearly a century later by the grandson of Zrinski himself, \textit{Obsidio Szigetiana} (1651).\textsuperscript{305} The fallen hero Zrinski remained central to national myths of resistance against the Ottomans both in Hungary and Croatia.

\textsuperscript{302} It was long assumed that the natural target of the campaign was the Habsburg court in Vienna itself. Vienna was one of the prized “Red Apples” of Ottoman apocalyptic symbolism, widely discussed in the seventeenth century. The legend held that once the Ottoman army captured the “red apple,” it would bring about a series of events leading to the day of judgement. Evliya Celebi’s account is filled with references to Central European cities as \textit{kızıl elmalar}, often translated as “golden apple.” See, for example, Evliya Celebi, \textit{Seyahatnâmesi}, vol. 3, 238 and vol. 6, 73–74. On views of Vienna’s place in Ottoman imagination, see Pál Fodor, “Ungarn und Wien in der osmanischen Eroberungsideologie (im Spiegel der Tarih-i Bec krali, 17. Jahrhundert),” in \textit{In quest of the golden apple: imperial ideology, politics, and military administration in the Ottoman Empire} (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000), 45–70. Given the relatively late start to the campaign and the serious problem posed by Sziget for stability in the region, I am convinced that the central goal was consolidating power near the unruly fortress, with the possible attack on Vienna as a prize dangling in the distance, should they meet with success.\textsuperscript{303} ÖNB, HS Cod. 9103.

\textsuperscript{304} For an early example, see the 1568 narrative of Samuel Budina, \textit{Budina Sámuel históriája magyarul és latinul Szigetvár 1566. évi ostromáról} [Samuel Budina’s History of the 1566 Siege of Szigetvár in Hungarian and Latin], ed. Ferenac Črnko and Imre Molnár (Szigetvár: Vábaráti Kőr, 1978).

throughout the twentieth century. The events around the fortress of Sziget were also important for Ottoman audiences. Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha commissioned his private secretary, Feridun Bey, to compose his own version of events, glorifying his role as military leader and statesman. Feridun informs his readers that the reason for the campaign was the Habsburgs' violation of the treaty of 1562 through their failure to pay their tribute on time and their inability to prevent clashes along the borderlands.

Modern historians mostly look to the shift in the office of grand vizier as the determining factor in the Ottoman decision to go on campaign. In the summer of 1565, the pacific Semiz Ali Pasha, whom ambassador Busbecq had praised highly, was replaced by a more aggressive Sokollu Mehmed, who needed a military victory with which to project his leadership skills. Other interpretations have recently emerged. Pál Fodor has suggested that the growing influence of the Halveti sheikh Nureddinzade on the ailing Süleyman led to a “crisis of legitimacy” and a “need to prove his valor and worth and restore his shattered authority.” James Tracy, on the other hand, argues for a turning point in Ferdinand’s strategy on the borderlands as early as 1558, when he began to step up efforts to safeguard his own frontier. Tracy argues that this set off the Croatian nobility in south-western Hungary, who differed from Vienna in their notions of sovereignty and the role of aggression in frontier politics. Each of these forces contributed to

308 Fodor, Unbearable Weight of Empire, 132.
the agitation resulting in the campaign. Maximilian’s reluctance to directly engage the Ottomans by coming to the assistance of Sziget allowed him to shift towards peace immediately following the campaign.\textsuperscript{310}

After organizing the proper burial of Zrinski’s body,\textsuperscript{311} the grand vizier’s nephew and regional governor of Buda wrote to Eck von Salm, Captain of Győr about a joint effort to encourage peace:

I know that your grace desires peace, but there will only be peace if there is a border there on your side as well as here on ours… If we have a fortress on your borders, we will give it to you, if you have a fortress on our borders, we will take it. This is how good neighbors should act together. You should speak to your emperor about this, and I will beseech my emperor as well. They should reconcile peacefully, and not destroy the land.\textsuperscript{312}

With the elimination of aggression launched from Sziget, the regional governor and the captain of Győr would soon get their wish. The Ottomans and Habsburgs forged a more lasting solution within two years.

\textit{Phase Four: Peace, or, Selim the Sot, Murad the Meek, and the un-Holy Habsburgs}

The decades of successful peace treaties following 1566 coincide with internal shifts and transformations that were once read as the beginning of the centuries-long decline of the


\textsuperscript{311} The first letters of Beylerbey Sokollu Mustafa Pasha of Buda from October and November of 1566 addressed to Maximilian II and Nikola Zrinski’s son reveal the reverence he had for his “good neighbor,” whose death still caused him “great sorrow.” Takáts et al., Basák, #24.

\textsuperscript{312} “az fryg így lezen, hogy ottys egy hatar lezeön, ytyys egy legyen… Ha az ty hatarotokon, my nekwnk, varwnk lezen, tynektek enegyek, az my hatarwnkon ha nektek varatok lezen. azt mys el vesszek de jgy chelekegywnk mynt jambor zomzedok, egymassal, hogy kegis zolyon az ty chazartoknak, Enys keonyergek az my chyazarunknak, bekelyenek megh, ne ronchyak az orzagoth.” Before Dec. 16, 1566. Takáts et al., Basák, #25.
Ottoman Empire. A series of internal financial, military, political, and administrative crises are often connected to the character flaws of the reigning Sultans following Süleyman “the Magnificent.”

Contemporaries commented frequently on Selim II’s proclivity for wine and his sedentary lifestyle. Similarly, Murad III supposedly confined himself deep in the Topkapı palace, taking pleasure in the company of women and allowing affairs of state to be dealt with through competing favorites whose factions dominated domestic and foreign affairs. Selim the Sot and Murad the Meek were the subjects of political tracts, commentaries, satires, and nineteenth-century projections of anxieties about the origins of the Sick Man of Europe.

The Austrian branch of the Habsburg family was dealing with its own series of transformations. As Protestantism continued to spread throughout Germany, legitimized by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, Lutheranism found its way into the Vienna court itself. Maximilian II’s reign was dominated by the effects of confessionalization and attempts to organize and rationalize imperial governing structures. Rudolf II, on the other hand, was a colorful patron of the arts and occult sciences but a weak and unstable ruler. Neither was interested in restarting a costly and complicated war with the Ottomans in Central Europe. Meanwhile the Spanish branch of the family headed by Philip II of Spain was forcibly cultivating a strict Catholicism. With papal support, Philip’s Spanish troops joined a group of Catholic maritime states to defeat

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314 Finkel, Osman’s Dream, 152–164.
317 For his biography, see Paula S. Fichtner, Emperor Maximilian II (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001).
the Ottomans at the Battle of Lepanto (1571). The nominally Catholic Austrian Habsburgs, however, had forged a long-lasting peace with their Muslim neighbors.

Whatever deficiencies these rulers might have had, peacemaking now entered a very successful period. The 1568 peace treaty, known as the Treaty of Edirne, was signed and became the first between the Ottomans and the Habsburgs to remain unbroken until its renewal. Negotiations directly between Antonius Verantius (now Archbishop of Esztergom) and Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha in their shared mother tongue of Serbo-Croatian facilitated a remarkably smooth series of interactions across seven formal audiences. Along with the treaty, Verantius, his co-envoy Christopher Teuffenbach, and the current resident ambassador Albert de Wyss, managed to secure the return of a handful of prominent captives from Ottoman dungeons and work through three disputed points relating to the destruction of problematic fortresses, the marking of the boundary, and the inclusion of Transylvania in the pact (as an Ottoman tributary). By April of 1568, Verantius and Teuffenbach had returned to Vienna along with an Ottoman envoy to deliver the ratified treaty.

The cultural significance of these talks and the resulting treaty was enormous. This is the only peace treaty to be discussed at length in a work of contemporary Ottoman historiography.

319 Although the Ottoman ratification of Selim II sent to Vienna remains unpublished (Türkische Urkunden und Staatsbriefen, Feb. 17, 1568), a version preserved in Constantinople appears in Feridun’s Munse’at vol. 2, 96-100. Maximilian’s Latin ratification appeared in Szalay and Wenzel, Verancsics Antal, vol. 5, pgs. 217–233. For further literature and a summary see Petritsch, Regesten, #551.
320 The trio received several requests to negotiate the release of individuals, most of whom were Hungarian nobility (such as Ferenc Dóczy, László Gusith, and János Gall). See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 23.
321 For a lengthy discussion of these points see the report from Constantinople dated Nov. 22, 1567, published in full text in Szalay and Wenzel, Verancsics Antal, vol. 5, 149–65.
322 For more on the embassy of Ibrahim Bey, see I. Metin Kunt and Zeynep Nevín Yelçe, “Two Polish Ottomans,” in Distant Neighbour, Close Memories: 600 Years of Turkish-Polish Relations, ed. Ayşen Andol (Istanbul: Sakıp Sabancı Museum, 2013), 48–59. For more on this mission, see also HHStA, Turcica, Karton 24 and HHStA, Hungacrica, Fasc. 95, Konv. A.
Feridun Bey’s *Pleasures of the Secrets of Auspicious Men from the News of the Szigetvár Campaign* (*Nüzhet-i Esrarü'l-Ahyar der-Ahbar-i Sefer-i Szigetvar*) records in detail each meeting, reproduces petitions submitted to the court, and surveys the gifts given by the embassy. The 100 pages of text are accompanied by an image of the ambassadors Verantius and Teuffenbach during one of these audiences held tightly by their Ottoman guards, with Verantius forced into a submissive bow by the Sultan’s feet (fig. 6) In both text and image, Feridun juxtaposes the Habsburgs with their Safavid counterparts sent by Shah Tahmasb, who arrived to negotiate with Sultan Selim II following the death of his father. The manuscript, highlighting the role of its patron, sends a clear message: with Sokollu Mehmed as Grand Vizier, two former foes bow at the feet of the Ottomans. Though numerous border incursions led to many formal complaints, the peace treaty of 1568 ran its eight-year course without significant problems.

The 1574 treaty, negotiated by resident ambassador Karl Rijm and his successor David Ungnad two years in advance of the expiration date of the 1568 treaty, was a testament to diplomatic success. Though ambassador Ungnad began talks as early as June, negotiations began in earnest in September and a text of the treaty extension was approved by the ambassadors before November 1. The ratification left Constantinople on December 2 with dragoman Mahmud Bey, who arrived on Habsburg soil on December 22, unaware that the

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323 For a summary, facsimile, and commentary, see Feridun, *Nüzhet-i esrârü'l-ahyâr*.
324 The section covering the talks begins on folio 152a.
325 This treaty remains unpublished, but the original Ottoman ratification and multiple Latin and German copies can be found in the HHStA’s Türkishe Urkunden. For a list of nineteenth-century literature mentioning it under incorrect dates and a summary of its contents see Petritsch, *Regesten*, #763.
326 See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 5 (1574 X-XII), fol. 1–4.
327 The report of ambassador Ungnad from Nov. 30, 1574 (HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 5 (1574 X-XII), fol. 112–113) and the discussions of his letter of safe conduct from Andreas Kiellmann, Captain General of Komárom on Dec. 18, 1574 (HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 5 (1574 X-XII), fol. 130–131).
Sultan whose signature it bore had died the night before. Though Maximilian II intended to send his ratification back quickly, the death of Selim II and accession of Murad III nullified its contents, and thus, a new round of talks began.

With the exchange of a second set of ratifications within months of the last one, all parties involved expected negotiations around the treaty of 1575 to move quickly. The Porte recalled Mahmud Bey and he was immediately recommissioned with a new ratification in January. Though the Grand Vizier continued to express his concerns over certain borderland fortresses and the terminology used to describe the yearly gift or tribute payment, the confirmation process ran smoothly. In March, while handing over the treaty to Maximilian II in Prague, Ottoman ambassador Mahmud Bey died.328 His death allowed Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to continue to argue over details, dragging out talks through the summer. At last, the final version was completed in November and delivered to Vienna, where it was ratified and returned.329

Just one year later, the death of Maximilian II on October 12, 1576 invalidated the treaty of 1575. The treaty of 1576 was the third set of ratifications to be exchanged in three years. There was apparently no need for additional negotiations or the usual ceremonial pomp.330 The Ottoman document was signed November of 1576331 and arrived in Vienna in January 1577332 from where it was forwarded to Rudolf II, who had taken up residence in Prague. The Habsburg

328 There are two dozen documents related to this mission and his death in HHStA, Turcica, Karton 31 and 32.
329 This time carried by the returning tribute-carrying delegation headed by Johann Breuner (later resident ambassador). See the report of Nov. 16, 1575 from resident ambassador David Ungnad: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 32, Konv. 1 (1575 IX—XI), fol. 89–92.
330 See the report of 27 Nov. 1576 from resident ambassador David Ungnad in Constantinople to Rudolf II (HHStA, Turcica, Karton 34, Konv. 2 (1576 XI-XII), fol. 32–37).
331 The messenger was Mihálly Szabó.
332 See the letter of 21 Jan. 1577 from Archduke Ernst in Vienna to Rudolf II (HHStA, Turcica, Karton 34, Konv. 2 (1576 XI-XII), fol. 36–61).
translation, fitted with the usual signature and seal of the Emperor was returned promptly, with notes that it should include all members of his family. As neither sovereign died in the intervening years, the treaty ran its full course before it came up for renewal.

Agents of Murad III and Rudolf II negotiated a new treaty in 1583. The Habsburg resident ambassador, Johann Friedrich Breuner, began meetings with Grand Vizier Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha in March to address two outstanding tribute payments. These meetings were followed by private negotiations between Breuner’s secretary, his dragoman, and the Vizier’s Jewish doctor. Commenting on the character of the later talks, Breuner reported to Rudolf: “My men told me that, at this time, there is no problem too difficult that it cannot be eased with money, since the Grand Vizier is new in his position and requires a great deal of cash to maintain his court.” Breuner promised Siyavuş Pasha an additional 10,000 taler in extraordinary gifts on top of his yearly 3,000 taler portion of the tribute payment to present his case favorably before the Sultan. The ambassador justified these high sums at length in his report, explaining that “so young a man with so many years of life left to rule” would prove to be a good investment. Breuner was correct. The talks were soon followed by the exchange of ratifications. Sultan Murad III’s ratification left Constantinople on March 29 and Rudolf signed his copy on May 26.

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333 For a copy of the Latin ratification of Rudolf II see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 48, Konv. 3 (1583 IV-VI), fol. 177–180.
336 “meinen Leuthen gesagt, Es sey Jeziger Zeit alhie nichts so shwer, das mans mit gelt nicht lindern konnte, der Bassa were new Im Regimens, bedörrfite vil gelt zu erhaltung seines Hofs.” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 48, Konv. 2 (1583 III), fol. 78v.
337 “So ist er ain Junger Man, der viel Jar da Er das Leben hat.” Ibid, fol. 90r-v.
The Emperor’s ratification arrived in Constantinople on August 16, and the unlucky ambassador Breuner died three days later after falling from a horse.

When the time came for the peace treaty to be extended again, the resident ambassador acted quickly. Bartholomaeus Pezzen, who had been a member of the embassy since 1575 and resident ambassador since 1587, was well versed in the methods of negotiation at the Porte and was fluent in Ottoman Turkish. This meant he did not have to rely on intermediaries, as did the ambassadors that had negotiated since Verantius and Sokollu’s talks in 1568. Pezzen, before taking leave from the Porte to return home to Vienna, took care of the matter quickly. He began negotiations in October 1590 and within two months Murad III had sent his ratification to Rudolf II. Pezzen skillfully maneuvered around some key issues. The Ottomans demanded the release of several prominent captives and took issue with the number of tribute payments that had arrived. Long delays by the Habsburgs had confused the scheduled payments. Though Pezzen had convinced the Aulic War Council in Vienna to send a double payment in 1590, they neglected to send double extraordinary gifts. In order to appease Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha, who had just been named to the post, Pezzen offered him a 6,000 taler gift. The career diplomat had judged the situation well. Sultan Murad III ratified the treaty in December 1590, which was delivered by the Habsburg messenger Prackh. A copy was then ratified by Rudolf II on February 1, 1591, and sent back to Constantinople.

The easiest peace treaty to negotiate proved to be the one destined to fail. In 1593, the Ottomans declared war on their Habsburg neighbors. The contemporary court chronicler

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338 1590, tribute carrying delegation of Wolfgang Ehrenreich Strein. See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 72 to 74.
339 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 74, Konv. 1 (1590 X-XII), fol. 62–63.
340 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 74, Konv. 2 (1591 I-III), fol. 9–16.
341 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 74, Konv. 2 (1591 I-III), fol. 59.
Talikizade Sufi Mehmed cited the construction of earthen forts on disputed lands and the incursions of raiders as the central reason for the sudden change of heart.\textsuperscript{342} Christine Woodhead of Durham University also pointed out that the end of warfare on the border with the Safavids in 1590, the late arrival of the tribute, the unruliness of regional volunteer troops, and the death of Governor Hassan Pasha of Bosnia during the siege of a Habsburg-Croatian fortress all contributed to the Ottoman offensive.\textsuperscript{343} Gustav Bayerle also saw the episode with Hassan Pasha’s death in Bosnia as the main \textit{casus belli}.\textsuperscript{344} Unlike the earlier scuffles in 1551–2 and 1566, this proved to be a full-scale military mobilization on both sides. The indecisive struggle outlived the Sultan under whom it began, and the rapid exchange of territories ended with few gains of land by either side. The Long War was followed by another extended period of peace lasting three-quarters of a century. During this seventeenth-century era of diplomatic relations between the Ottomans and Habsburgs, a new cast of characters appeared and new rules were established.

This chapter examined the eleven peace treaties signed between Habsburg and Ottoman sovereigns between 1543 and 1593, introduced the individuals involved in their negotiation, and addressed the problems the treaties were meant to solve. These documents, furnished with the signatures and seals of sovereigns, were masterpieces of early modern diplomacy. They were also intricate fictions that empires committed to paper. From the extent to which they controlled the territories included in the texts to the selective tabling of unresolved disputes, they reveal

\textsuperscript{343} Woodhead, \textit{Ta’liki-Zade}, 22–23.
\textsuperscript{344} Bayerle, \textit{Ottoman Diplomacy}, 8–9.
how the center wrote the unruly peripheries into its paper-reality. These diplomatic successes were often detached from the lived-reality of the borderland. The reappearance of border drawing commissions in the treaties throughout the sixteenth century points to a space for vernacular diplomacy to exist as a legally sanctioned component of official diplomacy. It signaled that the borderland remained in a continuous state of purposeful flux. Rather than an urgent matter requiring immediate attention, this fluidity was productive, allowing the central courts to leave complicated matters unsettled. Thus, the sovereigns could continue to sign and exchange their half-truths, making the official diplomatic narrative one of triumphant imperial power. Yet just below the surface, agents involved in the vernacular diplomacy of the borderlands provided running commentaries and compelling counter narratives, gesturing towards other points of view. Indeed, as the next chapter explores, even the resident ambassadors, the celebrated renaissance figures of diplomatic history, were captive to their own positions. The unruly borderlands interrupted official diplomacy at every turn.
Chapter Two

The Captive Self: The Art of Intrigue and the Resident Ambassador

The captive Mustafa supposedly has three different shackles on his legs, his neck and hands are tied together, and he is fastened on all four ends by large chains. At this, I responded that I hoped my imperial majesty would not have allowed for such tyranny. One knows what is human and how a soldier must treat those in his captivity, and I am sure his imperial majesty will put an end to this.345

On September 3, 1580, the Habsburg resident ambassador to the Ottoman court, Joachim von Sinzendorff, yet again found himself defending the integrity of his majesty, Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II. After months of negotiating his way through an extremely tense anti-Habsburg climate, this latest accusation threatened to push the Ottomans over the edge, breaking the peace treaty of 1576 and declaring war. The official diplomatic narrative of peaceful relations was teetering on the edge. The regional governor of the southern Balkans (Beylerbey of Rumeli)346 had sent the ambassador a report after the weekly assembly of the ruling council in Constantinople to share news of a letter that had arrived from an Ottoman subject in Habsburg captivity alerting the Viziers to his abused state. Accusations of the mistreatment of captives were a perennial thorn in the diplomat’s side and responding to complaints over the behavior of officials from both empires formed the bulk of the resident ambassador’s workload.347 The

345 “des gefangen Mustapha soll drey underschiedlich springer an dem painen haben, am hals und hennden Ring, an allen vier orten mit grossen kelten angeshmidt, heirauf ich zür antwort geben, ich hoffe dem werde mich also sein, Kay. gestattten solche Tyranneý nicht, Man wüsste dannacht was menschliche were, und wie ain kriegsman den andern mit gefännknuß, halten soll.” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 (1580. VII-IX), f. 101v–102r.
346 Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha was in Constantinople filling in for Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha, who was away leading troops against the Safavid army at the time.
347 There were weekly complaints about raiding and disrupting the peace on both sides, which can be seen in the letters sent from the imperial administration in the name of the Habsburg archdukes and emperors to the ambassadors and viziers on the one hand, and letters from the
carefully negotiated peace treaties that had kept the Central European borderlands of the two empires free from full scale war for decades were under constant pressure. The case of Mustafa, however, would prove more remarkable than business as usual. Four months later, in his report of January 18, 1581, Sinzendorff brought up the topic again, enthusiastically announcing to the Emperor that he had gotten hold of the letter sent by the captive Mustafa to the Porte, which he and his secretaries were including in translation. The cyphered report along with a decoded copy made upon arrival was filed in the imperial archive of Turkish affairs in Vienna. So too was the attached translation, along with an Ottoman document purporting to be the original and a small drawing of a man suspended in the air by four chains, legs and arms folded and tied, his grizzly beard and hair framing downcast eyes and a furrowed brow (fig. 9). The note on the back of the translation labels the image as a self-portrait by the captive sent to Constantinople, and the body of the text refers the image that Mustafa “painted himself” to show his brothers in faith what has been done to him, so that they may seek revenge.

Both the episode and the detailed surviving documentation are extraordinary. Initially, Mustafa’s letter and self-portrait offer what seem to be unique windows into an early modern captive under torture. Tracing the scramble for details on the matter as words loop their way from the ear of the ambassador in Constantinople, to the tongue of Emperor Rudolf II in Prague, Ottoman regional governors stationed in Hungary back across the border. Complaints about the mistreatment of Ottoman captives were usually directed at a group of Hungarian nobles. For example, in a letter from 1574 November 16–25, Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha wrote directly to Maximilian II demanding the release of prisoners, in particular Ali, son of Vrasik, a captive of Tamás Pálfy in (Var)Palota. He condemns the torture of Muslim prisoners, who are “men just like the Christians and creatures of God.” Latin translation in HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 5 (1574 X-XII) 51–54. See summary in Petritsch, Regesten, #767. 348 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 2 (1581 I-II) f. 43r. For the “original” and the “translation” see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 272 and 273 respectively. 349 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), f. 271.
reaching the pens of the secretaries of his brother Archduke Ernst of Austria, echoing off the floor of the Imperial War Council in Vienna and back again reveals a great deal about the structure of the Habsburg diplomatic and decision-making apparatus. Upon following this trail and surveying the full range of sources on the Captive Mustafa, however, the most compelling story the episode may tell is actually that of imperial rivalries playing out at the court in Constantinople. Mustafa, in the end, was a pawn in a power struggle that sought to exploit the incident and redirect the mighty Ottoman sword away from the Safavid front, repositioning it in the direction of the Habsburg lands and Europe.

This chapter argues that the captive self may not in fact be Mustafa Çavuş, but instead, the ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff, helplessly struggling against the chains that bind him to a tangled web of lies, rivalries, and courtly intrigue that dominated Constantinople under Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–95). The vulnerability of the peace treaty, and thereby the fictions that empires told themselves, which is here embodied in the figure of Mustafa suspended from heavy chains in a dark dungeon in Vienna, was the product of misinformation networks that plagued inter-imperial diplomacy in the early modern world. His image and the accompanying letter may actually be a forgery, a counterfeit seeking to place the ambassador and the peace he was to uphold in jeopardy. The following pages contextualize the plight of Mustafa and Sinzendorff, both in the history of captivity and in the Habsburg – Ottoman diplomatic missions of the sixteenth century. Thus, this chapter provides an overview of the world of the commissioned ambassadors who documented and thereby created official relations between political entities. It then examines in detail the documents in which Mustafa Çavuş makes an appearance and opens up a dual discussion: one on the possibility that the captive Mustafa suspended in a dungeon for fifteen years and subjected to torture sent out a letter to his brethren seeking revenge; the other
on the possibility that the captive resident ambassador Sinzendorff fell prey to the manipulations of one of a number of power factions (Safavid, Polish, or Transylvanian) in Constantinople seeking to exploit the tangled information networks, as well as loose Habsburg control of the borderlands to incite the two empires into renewed direct military engagement.

Captives

The historiography of Ottoman captivity, focusing largely on Mediterranean examples, tends to contrast European efforts to liberate brethren through formal institutions with supposed Ottoman inaction.\(^{350}\) The Ottoman-Habsburg land borders, in comparison with the littoral Mediterranean borders, saw less involvement from formal Catholic institutions and more of a dialogue between imperial agents who strove for the redemption and exchange of captives on both sides. When negotiations dealing with important captives reached an impasse on the local level between Habsburg Vienna and Ottoman Buda, those who could harness the influence of wealthy friends or relatives made certain that the Ottoman central administration intervened.\(^{351}\) Unusually, the matter of Mustafa Çavuş skipped this local negotiation process and wound up on the floor of the divan before making the usual rounds of negotiations in the borderlands.


\(^{351}\) For a discussion of these differences in relation to the Mediterranean see Pál Fodor, “Maltese Pirates, Ottoman Captives and French Traders in the Early Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean,” in *Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman Borders: Early Fifteenth - Early Eighteenth Centuries*, ed. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 221–33, here 228. Called “major captives” in Hungarian historiography, state involvement in ransom slavery on the Habsburg borderlands occurred primarily through diplomatic pressure on resident ambassadors, who would then weigh in on the issue and its consequences in their reports. Thus, Ottoman Turkish archival materials provide only a partial picture.
Exemplary work on ransom slavery between the two empires has outlined various elements of a system dominated by local customary law, but how this customary law dealt with individuals embedded in imperial power structures and political rivalries requires further study. A few well documented captivity narratives with accompanying visual sources have been published, with the goal of outlining their biographies. This includes the Hungarian nobleman and soldier Ferenc Wathay, who weaves his account of his imprisonment in Galata in the first decade of the seventeenth century throughout an illustrated compilation of lyrics, poetry, and prose. Another subset of captive-narratives appears in the travel logs of embassy members who found themselves imprisoned in Constantinople, such as Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrovic. From the point of view of Ottoman subjects in Habsburg chains, the best-known example is the early eighteenth-century memoir of Osman Ağa on his captivity from 1688 to 1700. All of these men had one thing in common: they wrote book length works about their experiences. To a far lesser extent, the non-literary counterparts have also received attention.

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352 Pálffy, “Ransom Slavery.”
353 Suraiya Faroqhi wrote “...research concerning prisoners of war on Ottoman territory, and on Ottoman captives abroad is still in its beginning stages.” Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 135.
355 Wenceslas Wratislaw, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrowitz. What He Saw in the Turkish Metropolis, Constantinople; Experienced in His Captivity; and after His Happy Return to His Country, Committed to Writing in the Year of Our Lord 1599, trans. Albert Henry Wratislaw (London: Bell and Daldy, 1862).
from scholars. For example, the documentation surrounding the captivity and ransom of Ali Bey of Koppány was used to show how customary law made life in small towns along the frontier increasingly more difficult.\textsuperscript{357} The documentation on Mustafa Çavuş differs from these narratives: the correspondence makes no reference to a ransom, and the letter seeks not to preserve the story of the individual in captivity, but instead to incite prayer and revenge against his illegal and immoral torture.\textsuperscript{358} Word of Mustafa locked in a dark dungeon in Vienna threatened no one more than the ambassador of the Holy Roman Empire in Constantinople.

\textbf{Habsburg Ambassadors in Constantinople}

Following the fall and tripartition of the Kingdom of Hungary after the battle of Mohács (1526), the Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire maintained a more or less constant presence in Ottoman Constantinople (see appendix C). The treaty of 1547 formally established the post of Holy Roman Imperial resident ambassador in Constantinople.\textsuperscript{359} The position was first held by Johann Maria Malvezzi from 1547 to 1552, and became a staple in the cosmopolitan world of agents and representatives that resided in the ancient imperial city. In addition to the resident and his retinue, the Habsburgs continued to send special envoys for the negotiation of treaties, delivery of the yearly tribute payment and discussions of border violations. In the beginning, these envoys were occasionally accompanied by a secondary envoy who was a

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Torture, on the other hand, has received attention mostly from legal and literary historians. For an exemplary study, see Lisa Silverman, \textit{Tortured Subjects Pain, Truth, and the Body in Early Modern France} (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
\end{thebibliography}
member of the Hungarian nobility, usually the captain of the naval fleet from Komárom. This type of diplomacy, based on special envoys, was reciprocated by the Ottomans, who regularly sent their own missions into Habsburg lands. Together they created a system that was remarkably flexible and contributed to many years of stability. Ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff feared the system could collapse as a result of the appearance of Mustafa Çavuş’s letter on September 3, 1580.

As the sixth Habsburg representative to fill the post, Joachim von Sinzendorff took on many roles during his three-year term: representative, negotiator, intelligence gatherer, and mediator. Arriving with the yearly tribute on January 1, 1578, he spent his first five months in Constantinople practicing his duties alongside his predecessor David Ungnad, and his last six months training his successor Friedrich Breuner. In the intervening year and a half he was aided by two special delegations: the 1579 tribute paying delegation led by Ulrich von Königsberg to Constantinople and the smaller 1580 delegation led by Wolfgang Eytzing to the regional governor of Buda to address border violations. A surprising degree of institutional continuity existed across the terms of multiple ambassadors. This can be attributed not only to

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360 For example, Ferenc Zay on the 1553–5 mission and Ákos Csábi on the 1564–5 mission.
361 For his travel log and further documents on the embassy see Andreas Ferus, “Die Reise des kaiserlichen Gesandten David Ungnad nach Konstantinopel im Jahre 1572” (Master’s Thesis, University of Vienna, 2007).
362 (Johann) Friedrich Breuner died in Istanbul after falling off his horse on August 19, 1583. For documents relating to his stay see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 41–49.
363 They had their audience with the Sultan on 15 February 1579. Their mission was described in the travel log of Henricus Porsius, Historia belli Persici, gesti inter Murathem II. Turcarum, et Mehemetem Hodabende, Persarum regem... (Frankfurt am Main: Johannes Wechelus, 1583). For documents relating to his embassy see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 38, Konv. 2.
364 He had an audience with Beylerbey Kara Üveys Pasha of Buda in March. For documents relating to this mission see HHStA, Turcica 41, Konv. 2 (1580 III-IV), fol. 140–141 and 166–177. These smaller missions are not included in Spuler (see footnote 193) and have largely escaped scholarly attention. The fact that Ottoman governors also received European delegations is a little-known aspect of Ottoman diplomatic life, and is addressed in greater detail in chapter three.
their vetting before arrival and periods of on-site training, but also to the presence of long standing embassy staff. Highly trained and linguistically gifted scribes and translators were needed to deal with the range of intercepted mail, as well as to compose and code ambassadorial correspondence. Not surprisingly, the careers of these critical members of the resident’s retinue spanned decades.

During Sinzendorff’s tenure, he and his staff dispatched an average of four cyphered reports per month. Such correspondence was sent in multiple copies along different routes (one through Buda, the other through Ragusa and Venice) with a great deal of repetition, in case one of the letters went missing. Once they arrived at their destination (Vienna or Prague), local secretaries processed the dispatches: decoding, writing out additional copies, and distributing them. Thus, the imperial archive preserves stacks of report summaries, extended excerpts, and originals addressed to Rudolf in Prague, or Archduke Ernst in Vienna, or directly to various members of the Aulic War Council or Hofkriegsrat. Sinzendorff’s resulting 150 reports provide details on the ongoing conflict in Persia, changes in imperial administration, troop movements, negotiations, bribes, renegades, and the imperial family. They also contain descriptions of his own meetings with viziers and petitions the ambassador submitted to the court as well as intelligence on other ambassadors in residence (including the French, Florentine, Moldavian, Russian, Polish, Transylvanian, and the Spanish Habsburg agents). Ambassadors did not limit themselves to imperially sanctioned business. Some served as double agents working for multiple sovereigns at the same time, or stirred controversy locally, as did Joachim von

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365 On the Hofkriegsrat see footnote 189.
Sinzendorff when he engaged in a bit of Lutheran proselytizing during a meeting with the patriarch and leaders of the Greek Orthodox community.\textsuperscript{366}

A majority of ambassadorial correspondence, however, dealt with recurring complaints about and investigations relating to border violations along the Hungarian, Transylvanian, and Croatian borderlands. For Sinzendorff, this included tracking down and prosecuting individuals who had escaped their debts by crossing the border, such as the protracted case of the merchant of Debrecen, Máté Szabó, which began in the mid-1570s.\textsuperscript{367} It also included calculated reactions to and eventually the submission of a formal apology for the sudden death of a local governor in Ottoman Croatia in an uprising in the 1580s, which the Grand Vizier blamed on a group of soldiers under Habsburg control.\textsuperscript{368} These duties were occasionally shared with Ottoman ambassadors to the Habsburgs, to whom we will now turn briefly before focusing on the documents surrounding the matter of Mustafa Çavuş.

\textsuperscript{366} For a report on the talks from April 1580 see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 41, Konv. 2 (1580 III-IV), fol. 214–215 and 220–221. In June of that same year, he denied any such activities, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 44, Konv. 2 (1581 V-VI), fol. 93–100. In July, his successor Breuner exposed the situation, see HHStA, Karton 44, Konv. 3 (1581 VII), fol. 84–89. This was a period of intensive efforts by Lutherans to find common ground with the Greek Orthodox Church and form a union of some sort. From then on, the Habsburgs made a point of sending Catholic ambassadors.

\textsuperscript{367} Szabó, a Hungarian merchant operating in Ottoman territory, left behind debts totaling 13,000 forints owed to the merchant Hasan hoca when he escaped to Kassa, where he was under the protection of the local captain Johann Ruber. If Rudolf II was unwilling to settle the debts, the Pasha of Buda wanted Szabó to be returned and held responsible because such behavior was “bad for business.” For published documents relating to this incident, see Takáts et al., Basák, #s 52, 59, 61, 138, 140, 154, and 157 as well as many more documents in the Vienna archive from the same period. On the merchants and market towns, see Szakály, Mezőváros és reformáció.

\textsuperscript{368} The sancakbey Iskender Bey of Pozsega. On the apology, see the report from Dec. 10, 1580, HHStA Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 151–160.
Ottoman Ambassadors in Vienna and Prague

Ottoman diplomatic missions to Vienna and Prague also dealt primarily with violations of the peace treaties. Their duties ranged from negotiating the exchange of captives to submitting formal protests against large scale attacks launched by rogue captains of fortresses. Other embassies carried ratifications of peace or attended meetings to draw up functional borders and decide on disputed villages. Occasionally diplomats were sent to announce important victories on the Safavid frontier or check on the state of the yearly tribute. Constantinople sent ambassadors rarely, but when it did, their arrival was accompanied by much fanfare. The printmaker Jost Amman commemorated (with much exaggeration) such a lavish event in his large-scale woodcut depicting the entry of ambassador Ibrahim Bey and his retinue into

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369 Unat is the only historian to have published an incomplete list of Ottoman ambassadors, which included 12 ambassadors to the Austrians in the sixteenth century. Faik Reşit Unat, Osmanlı sefirleri ve sefaretnameleri [Ottoman ambassadors and their reports], ed. Bekir Sitki Baykal (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1968). A handful of studies of extraordinary Ottoman diplomats exist, but the institution of Ottoman elçi and its mechanisms in relation to the Habsburgs remains to be explored. The ambassadorial exchange with the Republic of Venice, in turn, has been studied by Maria Pedani. See Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, “Ottoman Diplomats in the West: The Sultan’s Ambassadors to the Republic of Venice,” Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi 11 (1996): 187–202, and most recently Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, “Muslim ambassadors to Venice up to the 16th century,” in La figure de l’ambassadeur entre mondes éloignés (Rennes: Presses Univer. de Rennes, 2015), 151–59. While the Ottomans appear to have been less methodical in their embassy documentation, the collections of the Topkapı archives, should they ever open fully to scholars, might provide more insight. The two Ottoman diplomats to Vienna from the sixteenth century to receive attention both operated in the 1560s: Hidayet Aga (born Marquis Scherrer) and Ibrahim Dragoman (born Joachim Strass). See Karl Vocelka, “Eine türkische Botschaft in Wien 1565,” in Beiträge zur neueren Geschichte Österreichs, ed. Heinrich Fichtenau and Erich Zöllner (Vienna: Boehlau Verlag, 1974), 102–14 and Thomas Conley, “The Speech of Ibrahim at the Coronation of Maximilian II,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 20, no. 3 (2002): 263–73.

370 Such as Ahmed in 1549. See Schaendlinger and Römer, Schreiben an Karl V, #11.

371 Mustafa Çavuş in January 1593. See Bayerle, Ottoman Diplomacy, #90.
Frankfurt for the Coronation of Maximilian II as King of the Romans in 1562 (fig. 6). Mahmud, another ambassador sent by Murad III in the interest of extending the peace treaty in 1575, died during his mission in Prague. Rather than mirroring the resident ambassador approach taken by the Habsburgs, the Ottoman diplomatic system resembled the Habsburg special delegations with one critical difference: they often received their orders from the borderlands, specifically from the regional governor (Beylerbey) of Buda, rather than the imperial center. Thus, while the Ottoman approach to provincial administration was one of tight control from the center, the approach to diplomacy was more decentralized. This should be read as a conscious and delegation of power, in which the Pasha acted as a trusted agent of the imperial center. For this reason, they will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter as part of the world of vernacular diplomacy.

By the time the letter and self portrait of Mustafa Çavuş appeared in Constantinople in the late summer of 1580, Habsburg and Ottoman diplomats had been smoothing over the tensions between the two empires for decades. Sinzendorff, his staff, and their experiences were typical. Addressing grievances relating to captives which could not be resolved in the borderlands formed a key part of his program of information gathering, negotiating, and reporting.

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372 Conley, “The Speech of Ibrahim.” For more on Ibrahim, who was related by marriage to one of the leading European Humanists of the sixteenth century, see Pál Ács, “Andreas Dudith’s Turkish Brother-in-Law,” *Camoenae Hungaricae* 3 (2006): 59–64.

373 On the embassy, see HHStA, Turcica, Kartons 31 and 32. On Murad, the son of a Jewish merchant from Vienna, see Ács, “Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad.”

374 Though this observation is based solely on documents from the region discussed in this dissertation, I have seen intriguing evidence to suggest similar diplomatic spheres on other borders. In October 2014, I organized a panel at CIEPO in Budapest exploring this possibility. Papers were presented on letters written in the vernacular on the Polish (Mariusz Kaczka), Russian (Jan Hennings), and Bosnian-Croatain (Ana Sekulic) borderlands.
The Captive Self: Mustafa Çavuş as a Captive

The initial inquiry into the matter of the captive Mustafa Çavuş arrived at the imperial court in the form of an item of news divulged in Sinzendorff’s official report from September 3, 1580. The three-page overview of recent events in Constantinople covered the final audience of the Safavid ambassador with the Sultan, changes in imperial administration since the death of Vizier Mustafa Pasha, and a discussion of the captives brought into Constantinople by the frontier governors from the Habsburg borderlands. It also addressed the planning of a new Ottoman mission to Transylvania and Poland headed by an Ahmed Çavuş, as well as the latest news on tracking down details of a Hungarian captain in the service of the Habsburgs who supposedly switched his loyalty to the Ottomans. On the last page, before a final word on the arrival of the much disliked former Pasha of Buda back in Constantinople, Sinzendorff brings up a note sent to the embassy from Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha, then regional governor of the Southern Balkans (Beylerbey of Rumeli):

Siyavuş Pasha sent me a report today on a new captive Turk supposedly being held in Vienna who goes by the name of Mustafa Çavuş and who has been in captivity since the siege of Sziget [1566]. He complains greatly of human tyranny, for which the viziers called for retribution in the form of similar treatment of many thousands of Christians. I will send this original letter to you as an attachment when I have the opportunity. The captive Mustafa supposedly has three different shackles on his legs, his neck and hands are tied together, and he is fastened on all four ends by large chains. At this, I responded that I hoped my imperial majesty would not have allowed for such tyranny. One knows what is human and how a soldier must treat those in his captivity and I am sure his imperial majesty will put an end to this. This letter was carried up and down in the ruling council chamber (divan) and greatly offended the community, which I tried my best to calm down.
Upon the arrival of Sinzendorff’s report in Prague, Rudolf II responded that he knew nothing of the matter, but would look into it thoroughly. He rapidly launched an investigation. Though the relevant document does not survive, we can assume he also contacted his younger brother, who had been in charge of the court in Vienna for the past decade. On 28 October 1580, Archduke Ernst responded that he knew of no person in his dungeons matching Sinzendorff’s description. For a few months, Mustafa’s name disappears from the correspondence, and the matter, like many others, seems to be left unresolved. The ambassador continues to report on the state of the war with the Safavids and possible peace negotiations with the Shah, the death of the Sancakbey of Pozsega, the attempts of Pál Márkházy to secure himself the post of Voivode of Transylvania, problems with the regional governor of Bosnia, and preparations for the arrival of his successor as resident ambassador, Johann Friedrich Breuner.

Four months after the report in which the captive Mustafa first appeared, ambassador Sinzendorff writes that he has obtained a copy of the original letter presented at the imperial council (divan) on September 2.

I am forwarding the letter sent here by the captive Turk called Mustafa under the attachment marked with the letter P, which he admittedly sent, so that your majesty can

zūshickhen will, des gefangen Mustapha soll drey underschiedlich springer an dem painen hebben, am hals und hennden Ring, an allen vier orten mit grossen kelten angeshmiedet, heirauf ich zūr antwort geben, ich hoffe dem werde mich also sein, Kay gestatten solche Tyranney nicht, Man wüsste [demcht] was menschliche were, und wie ein kriegsman den andern mit gefănnkhnüß, halten soll, zūm fall dem also, würde es Kay. mit ernst abstellen, diser abriß in den Divanen hin und wider getragen, hat die gemain hoch offendiert welches ich doch bestes gemiltet.”

HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 1580. VII-IX., f. 101v.

378 Oct. 17, 1580, HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 (1580 VII-IX), fol. 221–222.
379 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 1580 (VII-IX), fol. 290–291.
380 On Sancakbey Iskender Bey of Pozsega see footnote 368.
381 The Hungarian nobleman would later convert and rule several Ottoman Hungarian provinces under his Muslim name, Ibrahim Bey. For more see Papp, Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden, 91–107.
also see to it that nothing is taking place against our common laws of war and courtly conduct, while it is unexpected that on your side, someone could hold [to these laws] so little or would imagine dealing in this way. I was also notified that he is supposed to lie captive not in Vienna, but in Ungvár.  

Attachment “P” and the two documents filed with it (an “original” in Ottoman Turkish and a drawing) appear one folder before the report with the following contemporary inscription on the back: “Translation of a letter, from a captive Çavuş, called Mustafa, with a drawing of himself the way he supposedly hung in captivity, which he sent from here to Constantinople.”

The German translation sent by Sinzendorff of the Ottoman letter of Mustafa Çavuş begins with formulaic praises of the Sultan and continues with a narration of how he unluckily encountered a group of non-Muslims, and was held captive for a number of years and months in Vienna in a dungeon where he could not tell if it was night or day. After suffering unlawful tortures, which almost caused his death, he decided to reach out and send this letter to his Muslim brethren, along with an image that he had painted himself, hoping that it would catch someone’s eye. He gave his name, and expressed his hope that if someone were to see him in this state, they would have pity on him. The note on the bottom left of the page translates the exterior

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382 “Es daussen gefangnen Türkhen Mustaffa genannt von Ime here in geshikhten abriss ubersende Eur. Kaÿ. Mt. Ich untertheeigist hiebej under dem Buchstaben P. Und da deme, von Ime fürgegebner maßen, also, hetten Eur Kay. Mt. gnedigin Es einseen zuthunn, damit gemainem kriegs und Ritters Rechten nicht zugegen, ungeacht dise Ires thails es wenig halten oder achten gehandlet wurde. Mir ist hernach angezeigt worden, er soll, wo nicht zu Wienn doch zu Ungwar gefangen ligen.” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 2 (1581 I-II) fol. 43r. Ungvár was on the far reaches of the borderlands near the Kingdom of Poland.

383 “Verdollmetschung aines schreibens, so ain dausst gefangner zausch, Mustafa genannt, neben abgezeichner seiner selbs figur, was gestallt er eingeschnitt unnd gefangnen ligen solle, hieher auf Constantinopol geschickht hat.” HHStA, Turcica 43, Turcica, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 272v.


385 ”in was gestallt ich bin, mich gemallt.”
address: “God have mercy on the person who delivers this figure or image to the Sublime Porte into the hands of the head of the messenger corps (Çavuş Başş).” The page ends with a signature: “Scbeb. Marcus Kerthý.” The Latin term Scbeb., an abbreviation of scribēbat, indicates the act of writing or drawing in the imperfect active indicative, but not necessarily authorship itself. Kerthý might then be the person assisting Mustafa with writing or Sinzendorff’s translator.

The accompanying watercolor image of the captive (fig. 9) was painted by a swift but elegant hand, using a delicate under-drawing in ink to outline the contours of the captive’s body and face. He wears a simple knee length green kaftan, red hose, and black shoes. His widely set eyes and distinct nose are framed by a furrowed brow, light brown hair, and a thick beard. The chains, hooks, and stumps used to suspend him were painted free form, creating a compositionally powerful X with the man at its center resembling an oversized insect caught in a spider’s web. The sheet of paper is of Ottoman origins and is unevenly cut along the top so that half of one of the hooks is missing, suggesting that someone slightly altered the page after it was made. The translation references the image three times. It first appears as the author explains his reason for writing, to show “in what state I am in, I have painted myself, and sent it out to the Muslim community.” The author invokes the image again as a visual memory for prayer: “when they see me in this state of misery, they will not forget me in their prayers.” Lastly, the self-portrait is mentioned on the exterior address, which directly references the handing over of the “figure or image” to the addressee. It remains unclear how these claims to self-portraiture were meant to be understood seeing how the image shows the subject with his hands firmly

387 “derwesen, in was gestallt ich bin, mich gemallt, und In das Musulmanisch gebiedt gesnnt hab.”
388 “Wann sy mich in sollcher gestallt und ellend seh, sy werden meiner mit Irer Benediction nicht vergessen.”
chained in place near his chest. With a stretch of the imagination, one might read the signature of Marcus Kerthÿ as that of a fellow prisoner who helped the bound and helpless Mustafa by wielding a pen. This would, however, be highly unlikely in the drawing up of an original letter in the notoriously difficult language of Ottoman Turkish. Kerthÿ’s signature might then be read as that of the German translator, or even the interlocutor who copied the letter for Sinzendorff. If that is true, Sinzendorff had one of his own scribes, identifiable through certain flourishes of the hand which match the rest of the report, transfer the letter once more onto the sheet of paper forwarded with the report.

The translation and image were filed in the archive with a document in Ottoman Turkish purporting to be the original. Closer inspection reveals that it has nothing to do with the translation.\footnote{HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), f. 273.} The Ottoman letter is addressed to the Holy Roman Emperor (Rudolf II), and announces the capture of a fortress in Persia, the successes of Vizier Ferhad Pasha on the battlefield, and rumors that the Shah of Persia was begging for peace. The only detail the two documents have in common is a name: here, the news was delivered by a certain “Mustafa Çavuş.” In fact, the Ottoman document contains exactly the same news as a Hungarian letter sent from the regional governor of Buda on November 25, 1586 to Archduke Ernst in Vienna. This Hungarian letter makes reference to an Ottoman letter from the Porte,\footnote{Takáts et al., \textit{Basák}, #334.} and we can therefore assume that the Ottoman letter found with the documents relating to Mustafa Çavuş was filed incorrectly sometime after the sixteenth century. The “real” original was lost, or never existed at all.
Upon receipt of the translated letter, Rudolf II ordered further investigation into the matter in light of the new details. Archduke Ernst complained of the difficulties of accessing information on Mustafa Çavuş, if he was indeed sitting in shackles in the far away Ungvár. The Aulic War Council report from March 8, 1581 ordered further investigations as well, attempting to tease out the details and juxtaposing the plight of Mustafa Çavuş with stories of Christian captives under torture whose noses and ears were cut off. Meanwhile, Sinzendorff returned to the Holy Roman Empire at the end of his term as resident ambassador, arriving in Vienna on August 4, 1581 and moving immediately on to meet Rudolf II in Prague to discuss his three years of service in person.

Many questions remain in relation to these three documents. Where did the image come from? Why was it not addressed in the report, even though it was central to the translation? Why was the image not mentioned in any of the surrounding correspondence? Who translated the letter and where did Sinzendorff get it from? Who was Marcus Kerthý? Why did Sinzendorff now say Mustafa Çavuş was captive in Ungvár, while the letter clearly states that he was in Vienna? What happened to the original? Was there ever one? In fact, while instructing Archduke Ernst to look into the matter further in February 1581, Rudolf II raised the possibility that the letter was of dubious origins. In the middle of a paragraph heavily laced with words expressing doubt (“supposedly,” “should,” and “according to our Ambassador”), Rudolf and his advisors

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391 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 2 (1581 I-II), fol. 194–195.
392 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 3 (1581 III), fol. 34, 57–58.
393 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 3 (1581 III), fol. 33–77, in particular, 49r.
394 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 44, Konv. 4 (1581 VIII), fol. 2–12.
395 While this name does not appear again in the records from the 1580s, there was an active Kerty family in Transylvania, some of whom made their way to the Porte in the service of the Transylvanian rulers.
(Viehauser and Obernburger) wrote a one word sentence: “contrefaict.”396 The word contrefaire encapsulated many ideas related to likeness and falsification that were often associated with images and particularly portraiture throughout medieval and early modern Europe.397 The form of the word used here, coupled with the Latin capitals and expressions of doubt all suggest Rudolf meant to invoke the secondary, less common meaning of the word, the possibility that the letter was a forgery. Though the Habsburg inability to track down a real Mustafa Çavuş tortured in captivity is not enough to discount his existence altogether, a closer look at how the self-portrait and letter fit into their respective genres lend further credence to this possibility.

While the genre of portraiture was not entirely unheard of in the Ottoman Empire, such an image would be unprecedented in the history of Ottoman visual production. Portraiture took a prominent place in certain courtly circles, albeit on a much smaller scale and for a different purpose than its early modern European counterpart.398 Although the Venetian Gentile Bellini made the famous image of a seated scribe in the late fifteenth century while in Constantinople,399 portraiture remained a genre exclusively reserved for the males of the Ottoman ruling family, and appeared in the form of books cataloguing the history of the dynasty.400 A series of

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396 Feb. 21, 1581, HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 2 (1581 I-II), fol. 194–195.
397 Archduke Maximilian, for example, used the term “contrafactur” in a letter a few months later when discussing the need for a portrait to help identify a spy. Here the term appears in German sutterlin as part of a sentence, and thus refers to an image. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 44, Konv. 3, fol. 94r–94v. On the history of the term itself, see Peter Parshall, “Imago Contrafacta: Images and Facts in the Northern Renaissance,” Art History 16, no. 4 (1993): 554–79.
399 Münever Eminoglu, Ressam, sultan ve portresi [The artist, the sultan and his portrait] (İstanbul: Yapi Kredi, 1999).
400 It was a dynastic history incorporating portraits, grand viziers had a copy, allowed state officials and the imperial household to be educated in the basic history of the Ottoman dynasty. See Loqman ibn Hosayn al-Ashûrî, Kiyâfetû ‘l-insâniyye fi şemâili ‘l-Osmâniyye [Human
exceptions proving the rule are the free form caricatures made by an artist in the court of Sultan Selim II, Haydar Reis, also known as Nigiri. European artists attached to embassies illustrating costume books and autograph albums produced a corpus of visual materials in the ambassadorial residence around the same time. Ottoman artists themselves became involved, but mostly in the seventeenth century. These small works focused on costume and became popular in elite circles, at first exclusively with non-Ottoman audiences. Moreover, artists outside the imperial court rarely depicted the human form, since doing so was considered to be against the tenants of Islam. Thus, a self-portrait, if Mustafa did in fact draw it, would be unique in the Ottoman tradition.

The German translation of the letter included by Sinzendorff also betrays a few characteristics that point to it being a forgery. The first is the problem of Vienna as his place of captivity. Vienna, the seat of the Archduke of Austria and brother of emperor Rudolf II, had the most well-regulated dungeons on the Ottoman-Habsburg borderland. Archduke Ernst would have been aware, or could have easily found out, if a prisoner were subjected to torture of this nature. The switch to Ungvár in the second letter was a strategic choice. The distant town was nominally under Habsburg control, but in the center of a region where the Hungarian captains of fortresses were notorious for ignoring Habsburg orders and switching alliances or entering into

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negotiations with Transylvanian, Polish, and Ottoman officials. Thus, Ungvár served as the
perfect distraction typical of forgeries, localizing the story to a faraway place known to exist, but
perceived as too distant to verify quickly.⁴⁰⁴ Yet, while Sinzendorff’s verbal interlocutor changed
the story to be more plausible in the second round of information, the text of the German
translation still says Vienna.

Word choice in the “translation” letter supports the view that it is counterfeit. Mustafa
Çavuş appeals to a violation of “rights” rather than the violation of “custom,” which is more
commonly referenced in cross border interactions. The wording used, “ungerechten,” was similar
to that used by Sinzendorff himself in his report accompanying the letter: “kriegs und Ritters
Rechten.” This can be read in contrast to appeals to custom along the borders, which normally
use the Hungarian “az regi zokas zörent,” or the Latin “consuetudo.”⁴⁰⁵ The most important
divergence here is of course in the language itself. Sinzendorff’s reports were always written in
German, while his attachments of translated letters were sent in Italian or Latin. Meanwhile,
letters circulating directly in the borderlands were written in Latin, Ottoman Turkish, and from
the 1550s onwards, predominantly in Hungarian (which was translated into German or Italian on
arrival in Vienna). It is strange then, that Mustafa Çavuş’s Ottoman Turkish letter to the Porte
would be translated into German in Constantinople (as opposed to the usual Latin or Italian
reserved for translated attachments).

⁴⁰⁴ The myriad of tools available to the forger are discussed in Anthony Grafton, Forgers and
Critics: Creativity and Duplicity in Western Scholarship (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1990), 50–68.
⁴⁰⁵ For the customs of noblemen from the region, which were written down see István Werbőczy,
The Customary Law of the Renowned Kingdom of Hungary: A Work in Three Parts Rendered by
Stephen Werbőczy (The “Tripartitum”), ed. János M Bak, Péter Banyó, and Martyn C. Rady
(Idyllwild: Charles Schlacks, 2005).
The Captive Self: Sinzendorff as Captive

If we are correct in calling into question the legitimacy of the letter and thereby the image, then where did it come from and why? What might its motivation have been? Was it an effort to reignite open warfare between the two rival empires? On which level might an intervention have taken place? Was it a forged letter sent to the divan to cause a stir? Had Sinzendorff been tricked, and the letter sent directly from the forger to him? In this case, was it Kanijeli Siyavuṣ Pasha, who had originally sent word of the letter in a summary of the meeting of the divan? Or was someone else involved in between the two? Was it a fabrication of the translators at the embassy? What are the implications of this for the paper reality of official diplomacy? To begin to find possible answers to these questions, we need to delve into the culture of fakes and rumors circulating in Constantinople at the time, as well as to explore the shifting priorities of a new generation of ruling elites at the Ottoman court and their relationships with the Ottoman-Habsburg borderlands.

The early 1580s witnessed a string of imposters and forged letters that made the rounds in Constantinople and the Hungarian borderlands of the Ottoman empire.\textsuperscript{406} The forging of documents was not a new phenomenon, but a series of scandals in the last two decades of the sixteenth century point to a booming “economy of corruption” centered on the falsification of sultanic decrees that distributed grants of land and revenues.\textsuperscript{407} There were, however, problems with authenticity outside the financial sphere as well. Just before the Habsburg Ambassador left for home in March 1581, an individual calling himself the ambassador of a political entity that

\textsuperscript{406} The Spanish Habsburgs were no strangers to forgeries of these types as well, and examples can be found in the dealings of the Spanish Habsburg embassy, where Aurelio’s forged documents made their rounds in Constantinople. Malcolm, \textit{Agents of Empire}, 247.

did not quite exist made Sinzendorff particularly anxious. Benedictus Angelus, who identified himself as the Jewish representative of the ruler of the Swiss nation, gained an audience with Vizier Siyavuş Pasha. In his report on the incident, Sinzendorff refers to the delusions of the oafish fool who introduced himself to the Porte with a story of visions of Ottoman domination over Christianity, and eventually the world. After a series of meetings, Sinzendorff’s informants told him, Angelus received a Latin letter allowing the “Swiss” to send an embassy. Following a worried string of correspondence on the matter, the Habsburgs deduced that the man had once been a captive in Austria and was now acting as some sort of a spy. The story would only be cleared up upon the return of Sinzendorff from his post in Constantinople.

Meanwhile, on the borderlands, letters circulated that were written in the name of individuals who claimed to know nothing of their contents, or had in fact already been dead for years. The most important of these episodes was the case of Péter Andrásy, Captain of Krasznahorka, who supposedly sent an Ottoman official three letters in May 1580 denouncing the German “Soup King” in favor of the Ottoman Sultan, backing a friend as the new voivode of Transylvania, and handing over to the Ottomans a key stronghold in the strategically and economically important center of the mining region. Investigations into this supposed change of allegiance went on for years after Sinzendorff had left his post, since Andrásy remained in Habsburg employment, albeit with strong ties to the Polish-Transylvanian-Hungarian nobility via

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409 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 44, Konv 2 (1581 V-VI), fol. 62. Anhegger, “Agent,” #IV.
410 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 44, Konv 3 (1581 VII), fol. 90–97. Anhegger, “Agent,” #IX.
411 For a complaint about letters “written” by the deceased István Wetskey, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 41, Konv. 2 (1580 III-IV), fol. 9–10.
412 For copies of these three letters see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 263–270.
a secret alliance. In August 1580, Rudolf II obtained Andrássy’s official seal which he wanted to compare with those attached to the letters. The hunt for the original letters continued through 1584, when then-resident ambassador Eytzing suggested the whole episode was just one big misunderstanding.

The detection of forgeries required a great deal of scribal expertise and ambassadors regularly faced the fact that there were problems of loyalty and trustworthiness among the ranks of their own embassy staff. Sinzendorff continually surveyed and reported on the financial and mental faculties of his secretaries and translators. He employed three main secretaries during his stay in Constantinople: Ambrossio Schmeisser (an elderly man entrusted with encoding letters whom he inherited from his predecessor); Dr. Bartholomaeus Pezzen (a young man who had been in Constantinople for years, and who would eventually return as resident ambassador himself); and Philip Hanniwald von Eckersdorf (Sinzendorff’s personal scribe and butler). The secretaries worked closely with the translators, of whom there were many. Mathias del Faro, a Christian from Galata, had been a translator for the Habsburg ambassadors since the 1550s and he worked until the arrival of imperial ambassador Adam of Herberstein in 1608. Domenico Zeffi, worked for the previous ambassador Ungnad, and had secured his son Augerius (whose Godfather was the second Habsburg resident Ambassador, Busbecq) a place by the side of the Sultan’s trusted

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416 Problems with scribal expertise have been studied on the Ottoman side in Christine Woodhead, “Scribal chaos? Observations on the post of re’isülküttab in the late sixteenth century,” in The Ottoman empire: myths, realities and “black holes”: contributions in honour of Colin Imber, ed. Eugenia Kermeli and Oktay Özel (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2006), 155–72.
Jewish doctor and key Habsburg informant, Dr. Salomon. While Zeffi and Farro were the most stable translators, Sinzendorff also employed Aurelio Santa Croce (who was soon locked up in Spain for debts) and Jacomo de Goe (who could not read or write in Ottoman Turkish). Additionally, the Ottoman-appointed dragomans played a key role as translators because they were native speakers of German and Hungarian who had grown up in Ottoman captivity. A lack of translators stationed in Vienna and Prague did little to help. Sinzendorff arrived with an orphan who was to be trained in Ottoman reading, writing, and conversation, in the hopes that the Habsburgs would at last have someone they could fully trust. Back in Vienna and Prague, the Habsburgs relied on János Joó for Hungarian documents, and a handful of former captives for Ottoman Turkish documents.

Problems emerged regularly, particularly in the ranks of Ottoman-assigned house dragomans. Ali Bey, born Melchior von Tierberg, was a convert with multiple allegiances who had served the Habsburgs in Constantinople since he had been made a dragoman in 1571. In September 1578, Sinzendorff complained he was ill tempered, and in October, began questioning his trustworthiness. Suggesting that he delivered news much too quickly, the

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417 Arbel, “Salomone Ashkenazi.”
420 Little is known about these individuals beyond their names. These were Johann Gaudier (Hans Spiegel), who worked from 1541; Callimaco de Casentia in the 1550s; Lukas Drachschutz (Trackschitz) in the 1550s; Siegmund Gentsch from the 1560s; and a Hungarian named István in the 1580s. See Babinger “Türkischen Studien,” 107-108.
421 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 37, Konv 1 (1578 VII-VIII), fol. 150–222.
ambassador sensed the yearly gifts worth over 550 taler were simply not enough to encourage the Ottoman subject to act in the interest of the Habsburgs. Ali was a member of a faction of German and Hungarian renegades in late sixteenth-century Constantinople who sought to influence Ottoman policies from within. While Nedim Zahirović suggests that Ali was sincere in his role as an informant for the Habsburgs and was motivated by a connection to his homeland in addition to financial incentives, I am more inclined to agree with the argument of Gábor Ágoston. Namely, that Habsburg-employed Ottoman subjects, a majority of their “spies,” were selectively feeding information to their rivals in the interest of the Ottoman Empire.423

During this time, Sinzendorff devoted much of his intelligence gathering efforts to attempting to verify information from within the confines of his residence. Some of the agents he relied on for news are listed in his registers of expenses.424 Others are cited in his reports, their letters filled with updated news copied into the attachments, signed only as “undercover person.” It was these agents, who connected Sinzendorff with Ottoman environments he would otherwise never have had access to, that also made him most vulnerable. Sinzendorff occasionally accused some of these informants of colluding with a court faction and delivering false information.425

424 For a selection, see Graf, Preis der Diplomatie, documents 1–4.
425 Such was the case with Ali Bey in October 1578. Turcica 37, Konv. 2 (1578 IX-X), fol. 264–300. In Nov. 1580 he accused a messenger of Sancakbey Ferhad Bey of Fülek (now Fil'akovo, Slovakia) of transmitting “falsch… berichten” not only to him, but also directly the Sultan. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), f. 98r.
Factions and Rivalries in 1580 Constantinople

As the events discussed above suggest, rumors, forgeries, and problems of trust were rampant in Sinzendorff’s Constantinople. Mustafa Çavuş’s letter and accompanying self-portrait could easily have been part of these manipulations and their appearance in 1580 could have potentially lent support to any of a number of factions in their ongoing power struggles, both internal and external. Within the ruling elite, generational shifts were leading to a fitful shift in policy and practice. Related changes in foreign relations made room for the arrival of new ambassadors and fresh peace treaties to be signed with distant and emerging political powers. The Safavid wars, which had reignited in 1578, were dragging on with no end in sight, and many disgruntled participants were doing everything in their power to bring peace to the region so attention could be concentrated elsewhere. The amorphous Hungarian estates (spread across Ottoman, Holy Roman, Transylvanian, and, most recently, Polish territories) conducted secret meetings to form plans for cohesive actions. Before concluding, these struggles in 1580 will be briefly surveyed and suggestions will be put forth for Mustafa Çavuş’ possible place among them.

Although Sultan Murad III ascended to the Ottoman throne in 1574, until 1580 his court reflected the character of his father Selim II and his grandfather Suleiman. Beginning around 1580, a new group of court favorites took center stage. Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who had held the post since 1565, was assassinated in 1579, thus bringing to a close one of the longest running vezirates in the empire’s history. The office quickly lost its prestige and
After falling subject to Murad III’s whim, it changed hands eleven times during the course of his 21-year reign. Sokollu’s death was followed by the death of the two other remaining viziers from the time of Sultan Suleiman: Şemsi Ahmet Pasha died on April 28, 1580 and Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha died on August 8, 1580 (both while serving as Grand Vizier for Murad III). With their passing, a new generation of elites rose in the ranks of the vizierate, the harem, and the provincial governorships. Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha, Sinzendorff’s interlocutor with the divan that supposedly received the letter in the matter of Mustafa Çavuş, was one such rising star. Born in Ottoman Hungary and continually expressing a deep hatred for the Habsburgs, he took his penchant for trouble making with him as he rose through the ranks, filling in as temporary Grand Vizier multiple times while regional governor of Rumeli before being named to the post himself for eighteen months in 1582 and again for three years in 1586. Sinzendorff maintained continuous contact with Siyavuş during his extended stays in Constantinople. He also attempted to sustain good relations with the rest of Sultan Murad’s male favorites, a group of rising stars at the court which included Kara Üveys, who was the source of a great deal of controversy during his two years as Pasha of Buda. Üveys’ removal from the post was prompted by continual outcries from the Habsburgs about his behavior, including his circulation of a list of 367 additional frontier villages he aimed to demand tribute from that were not in the registers of

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427 The office changed hands so quickly that the Habsburgs had a difficult time keeping up. By the time Rudolf II’s letter congratulating Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha on his new post arrived in Constantinople on 24 September 1580, the grand vizier had already been assassinated a month earlier. See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 1580 (VII–IX), fol. 170–173.
his predecessors. This group of new favorites slowly introduced changes in the practice and implementation of imperial policy.

The year 1580 saw a great deal of diplomatic activity in Constantinople that would redraw imperial alliances around the world. The Spanish Habsburgs signed a peace treaty with the Ottomans in 1580, thus ending a long period of warfare in the Western Mediterranean. As Philip II consolidated his power on the Iberian Peninsula and concentrated on New Spain, the Ottomans could focus their attentions elsewhere. The German Habsburgs observed this cautiously, with Sinzendorff regularly reporting intelligence on the moves of the Spanish agent and sending copies of letters exchanged with Philip II’s court. The French sent an ambassador to Constantinople to gather information about the talks between the Spanish agent and the Ottomans. The Florentines and English sent agents attempting to secure safe passage for trade ventures. Sinzendorff observed them as well, often from within the walls of his residence, using his many proxies as his eyes throughout the city. He obtained copies of nearly every piece of correspondence sent by foreign representatives and transmitted them alongside his own detailed reports. Of all these agents, Sinzendorff perceived Persia as most dangerous for Holy Roman interests. Peace on the Ottoman eastern border would leave the military free to return to the European front.

The highly contentious war with the Safavids on the empire’s eastern border had begun in 1578, shattering the quarter century of peace that followed the Treaty of Amasya. The conflict would prove to dominate the agenda throughout the reign of Murad III, and news from the campaign appeared in every one of Sinzendorff’s reports as he catalogued the numbers of

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429 For the list of villages, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 41, Konv. 1 (1580 I-II), fol. 83–86.
troops, names of commanders, victories and defeats that kept the Ottoman armies occupied. Yet, in 1580, serious attempts were made by both parties to reverse the course and forge a new peace.\footnote{On the renewed war with the Shah and attempts to find a diplomatic solution in 1580, see Bekir Kütükoğlu, \textit{Osmanlı-Iran siyasi münasebetleri: 1578–1590} [Ottoman-Iranian Diplomatic Relations: 1578–1590] (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Matbaası, 1962).} Rival factions in Constantinople and misfortunes on the battlefield stalled the talks and the war would drag on for the next decade. At the time Mustafa Çavuş’s letter appeared, the Safavid ambassador charged with initiating peace talks met with the interim Grand Vizier,\footnote{This source lists him as “Hacı Musucazi.” The ambassador in question was Zulkadirlu Hacı Maksud Bey. On his mission, see Kütükoğlu, \textit{Osmanlı-Iran}, 105–6.} Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha. Siyavuş’s predecessor, the elderly Lala Kara Mustafa Pasha who had been assassinated in the petitions chamber just days before this meeting, had been unwilling to give the Safavid ambassador an audience. Siyavuş, a member of the anti-Habsburg faction, arranged for a final audience for the Safavid embassy in which the formerly-shunned ambassador was showered with gifts.\footnote{Aug. 13/20, 1580, HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 2 (1580 VIII-IX), 12–14, 17.} Could it be that the appearance of Mustafa Çavuş was somehow related to these events? Was the document an attempt by the Safavid or Siyavuş Pasha to lend further justification towards a shift in Ottoman martial might away from the Muslim neighbors to the east and reposition the military push towards Christian Europe?

The Safavid envoy was not the only one interested in redirecting Ottoman attention towards the north-west. An alliance of Hungarian nobles spread across political boundaries was brewing quietly on the sidelines, and a group of old noble Hungarian families in Habsburg-ruled Hungary seem to have been negotiating an alliance with their kinsmen in Transylvania and Poland. No clan was more active in this than the ruling Báthory family in Transylvania. Stephen Báthory had tried to incite a war between the Ottomans and Habsburgs in the early 1570s while...
Voivode of Transylvania. In 1580, as King of Poland, he worked together with his younger son, Christopher Báthory, who had taken his place as Voivode of Transylvania, to form a network of Hungarian nobility with political ambitions. In February of 1580, Sinzendorff reported that two other Hungarian noblemen, Simon Forgách and Ferenc Mágóchy were among them. The archives are filled with attempts by Archduke Ernst and Rudolf II to determine which of their Hungarian captains along the borderlands switched their loyalties or corresponded directly with enemy potentates. Lists of suspicious names charged with scheming against the Habsburgs were regularly circulated. In July 1580, Sinzendorff got word from one of his informants that there were large scale efforts underway as the Poles and the Transylvanians attempted to excite the Ottomans to attack the Habsburgs. The Ottomans sent Ahmed Çavuş on a mission to Poland and Transylvania in September, while the Transylvanians kept their ambassador, Péter Rácz, in Constantinople. In 1581, Voivode Christopher Báthory died, putting any plans for attack on hold. His underage son Sigismund was made the new Transylvanian Voivode, with his uncle in Poland controlling his court from a distance until 1586. Could it be that the appearance of Mustafa Çavuş was somehow related to these events? Was the document an attempt by the Báthory, once again, to incite a war between the Ottomans and Habsburgs? The Hungarian estates had already become mixed up in the series of possibly counterfeit letters

434 These moves have largely been read by historians as part of a larger ongoing effort of Transylvanian noblemen to push the Ottomans out of Hungarian lands in the name of Christian Europe. See Tamás Kruppa, A kereszt, a sas és a sárkányfog. Kelet-közép-európai törökellenes ligatervek és küzdelmek a Báthory-korban (1578–1597) [The cross, the eagle, and the dragon tooth: Plans for an anti-Ottoman league in East-Central Europe and battles against the Ottomans in the Báthory era (1578–1597)], (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 2014). The fact that they spent more time not only cooperating, but also colluding with the Ottomans, and that their brand of antitrinitarian beliefs fell far from those sanctioned in Rome seem to be afterthoughts.
436 See, for example, HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 113, Konv. A (1580, I-VI), fol. 1–2.
of Péter Andrássy, Captain of Krasznahorka.  

Could the inability of the Habsburgs to follow up on Mustafa’s fate also have something to do with the fact that Christof died in early 1581?

Christopher Báthory’s death in 1581 had been rumored as early as 1580, when attempts were made by another Hungarian nobleman with close ties to the Ottomans to secure the position of Voivode of Transylvania. Pál Márházy, former captain of Ajnácskő and his retinue were beginning to cause trouble between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. Upon hearing rumors of his death (Christof had fallen ill and his wife died in 1580) Márházy sent envoys, then traveled himself to Constantinople to convince the Ottomans to grant him the post. Sinzendorff regarded him as highly suspicious and watched his every move carefully. Many of Márházy’s attendants remained in Constantinople and converted to Islam, which he would do himself later in the decade. He appears in the documents supposedly sent by Péter Andrássy, Captain of Krasznahorka, in which Andrássy lends his support to Márházy’s candidacy in Transylvania. Was it possible that while Márházy was in residence in Constantinople, he somehow became involved in the creation of a series of falsified documents relating to Mustafa Çavuş to be presented to the Porte? Knowing little about the way the Habsburgs ran the empire, he originally considered Vienna as the perfect central location to place a captive, only to change his story when he realized that Archduke Ernst could easily refute such a claim.

Conclusion: The Captive Ambassador

Sinzendorff was himself a captive in this environment of lies, rumors, false news, impersonations, and counterfeits. As the official Habsburg representative to the Porte, he found

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438 See footnote 412.
440 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 41, Konv. 1 (1580 I-II), f. 63v.
himself continually pulled in multiple directions by other agents and Ottoman officials, and because of the machinations of those around him, sometimes even physically imprisoned in the ambassadorial residence. In September 1578, Sinzendorff repeatedly complained in his reports that the guards boarded up his windows. Terrified of the possibility that the sultan would throw him into the dungeons in 1580, he prepared his staff. His secretary Dr. Bartholomaus Pezzen was to accompany him, if possible, and his second secretary Schmeisser was to stay home and burn the cypher and all other important ambassadorial documents.

This would not have been the first time a Habsburg ambassador was imprisoned. Niccolò Secco, who negotiated a temporary cease fire between Ferdinand I and Sultan Suleiman in 1545, found himself sitting in a cell for short time upon his arrival in Constantinople, blaming the French ambassador Aramon for his unfortunate circumstances. The first resident ambassador of the Habsburgs, Johann Maria Malvezzi spent a miserable two years in the notoriously brutal prisons in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople, Anadolu Hisar and Yedikule. The last resident ambassador of the sixteenth century, Friedrich Kreckwitz, spent months confined in his own residence at the outbreak of the Long Turkish war in 1593 before being transferred to

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442 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 37, Konv. 2 (1578 IX-X), fol. 102–109.
443 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 1 (1580 V-VII), fol. 171v–172r.
444 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 6, Konv. 2 (1545 V-XII) fol. 90–91.
another prison along the Bosphorus, *Rumeli Hisar*. Ambassadors Ungnad and Eytzing both expressed fears of being imprisoned. Scribes, translators, and messengers also frequently found themselves at the mercy of guards in the imperial dungeons. When these essential members of his staff were unable to perform their duties, the ambassador himself became crippled.

The resident ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff’s struggles with rival Ottoman factions, deceitful agents, and the transformation of attitudes towards the Habsburg rulers of the Holy Roman Empire, were not unique. The appearance of the captive Mustafa Çavuş’s letter and self-portrait can be read as evidence of a particularly acute moment of tension between the two great empires in the second half of the sixteenth century. While it may be impossible to determine for certain the truth behind the rumors, the documents and the possibility of their falsification point to multiple environments of captivity: dungeons in the borderlands, the ambassadorial residence, the Ottoman court, and the historian’s early modern archive with its layers of cyphers, languages, paleographies, and mistranslations.

While the peace treaties in chapter one represent the fictions that early modern empires told themselves for the purposes of maintaining an official stance of diplomatic success, microhistories from the archives of imperial ambassadors, such as the one explored in this chapter, reveal the fragile foundations of official diplomacy. Courtly intrigue exercised a strong hold on imperial agents. The ratified sheets of paper that defined the official relationships between sovereigns in a paper-reality were enveloped in unverifiable information networks. Dangerous games, fake documents, and imposters swirled around the courts and presented a constant threat to stability. Yet, official peace, however loosely it may be defined and controlled,

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446 See the travelogue of the young Czech nobleman who accompanied Kreckwitz, Wratislaw, *Adventures*, ch. III. Also see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 79, Konv. 3 (1593 I-II), fol. 116–180. He was eventually taken on the campaign and died outside of Belgrade after being severely beaten. See Loebl, “Schlesier Friedrich von Kreckwitz.”
continued until the outbreak of the Long Turkish War in 1593. What did this loosely defined peace look like? How did it function? Who was involved in its implementation and who mediated between the papers of sovereigns and the soldiers of the borderland? For answers to these questions, we need to turn away from the official diplomatic programs of the houses of Habsburg and Osman and examine the parallel world of vernacular diplomacy.
Part II:

Vernacular Diplomacy
Chapter Three

The Regional Diplomacy of Archdukes and Pashas

On September 28, 1583, Kalaylikoz Ali Pasha of Buda sent a letter to Archduke Ernst, his long-time correspondent and Habsburg counterpart, curiously offering him military assistance:

We heard that now, in German lands, the things pertaining to religious belief have caused great warfare... I know that you and the Roman Emperor [Rudolf II] are friends with the Sultan [Murad III]. That is why, if you want, we will write to the Sultan, and he will loan you the frontier soldiers of Sziget, Fehervár, Koppány, Filek, Szécsény, Hatvan, Vereb, Szolnok and others to help, with whom you can stand against those [who are causing the religious tensions], because, we are thinking, where we have them, we would like to keep good neighbors.447

Surely the Archduke had no interest in having roughly eight thousand Ottoman soldiers come help with his Protestant problems.448 Even the suggestion that a regional governor employed by the Ottomans might offer such assistance to the Holy Roman Emperor seems outright preposterous. Was this offer serious, or was the Pasha merely poking fun at the Habsburg inability to stop rising internal religious tensions?449 Ali Pasha seemed to be bragging about the

447 “Hallottuk hogy most Nemeött orszagban az hitt dolgabol nagy haborusag es had volt, valakik az hatalmas csaszarnak hiwseggel voltanak, kiralyoknak cszasrokoknak eö feölsege minden segetseggel volt romay czaszar penig eö feölsege az hatalmas csaszarual minemw baratsagban vagyon iol tudom, azertt ha eö feölsege akaria, mi az hatalmas csaszarnak megh iriuk, eö feölsege az szigetuary, feiruary, koppany, fileky, szeczenny, hatuany, bereby, szolnoky es teöb vegebli vitezitt segetseggw aggya, kiuel feölsegteök azoknak ellene alhatt, mert mi azon terekeödünk, hol mi ioul lehetünk ez szomszedsagban.” Takáts et al., Basák, #272.
intelligence his spy networks had gathered\(^{450}\) and the number of troops he could mobilize at a moment’s notice. The letter continued with complaints about a fortress built too close to the border and addressed a dispute between a certain Deli Mustafa (Ottoman) and György Ördög (Hungarian under Habsburg rule) over the exchange of a horse for a captive. After explaining that the two had a falling out over a breach of a ransom agreement which was accompanied by a series of harshly worded letter exchanges, Ali Pasha concluded with the following words:

… when the frontiersmen drink wine and get drunk, in their drunkenness they send angry and shameless letters. Then, when they recover, they regret it, and to cover up their sins, they complain to you. This is how you heard about what György Ördög plotted… As you know, since the beginning and in the days of the kings, all the Magyar lands belonged to Buda. Now too, according to our laws as well as your laws, Magyar lands belong to us. But today's Magyar gentlemen do not belong to Buda, nor do they belong to the Roman emperor.\(^{451}\)

Placing the blame on the excessive drinking habits of soldiers and the ambiguous loyalties of Magyar men, Ali Pasha sidestepped the fallout of a clear breach of the standing peace treaty. Though ransom slavery was officially outlawed, Ali accused neither side directly, pointing instead to a third element present in both Habsburg and Ottoman fortresses, thereby neutralizing the tension.


\(^{451}\) “de az vegbeliek bortt isznak reszeögeöskööödnek, reszeöög korokban egy feleis innak mas fele, bozzu es rutt ektelen leueleke, ha megh ãozanodak megh bannak teteõiet, hogy az eõ magok bënew neminemwkeppen el feodeohessek vgy panaszoñak feöösegeööödnek, es ezeöökre haritanak vitkeööket, Eööööögh Gyeööögy ezeonkeppen czelekeöödeöö… Tuggya feöösegeöööd mind eleiteõl foguan kiralog ideieebennis, egész Magyar orszagh Budahoz tartozo volt, mostis penig mind az mi teööruenwöölnk szerer smind penig az feöösegteöök teööruenye szerent Magyar orszagh ide tartozo volna de ez mostani magyary vrak, sem Budahoz, sem romay czaszarhoz eõ f. nem tartnak.” Takáts et al., *Basák*, #272.
The excerpts quoted above come from one of thousands of sixteenth-century letters exchanged between the provincial governors of Buda and Habsburg officials across the border. These sources are unique for their linguistic variation and high rate of survival. No other collection of provincial correspondence on this scale is known from the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Original letters and drafts of their responses can be supplemented with travel narratives, ambassadorial reports, and visual depictions to bring to life the world of borderland interactions between the two empires. This chapter uses these documents to examine regional correspondence and exchange as part of a system of vernacular diplomacy. The sources reveal the creative ways in which imperial agents sought to maintain peaceful relations and overcome the challenges and questions left unresolved by official diplomatic exchanges. In attempting to establish a mutually beneficial fixed border system, locally stationed representatives made extensive use of personal relationships and tokens of friendship to traverse liminal spaces and thus skillfully alter the tense political landscape. These men frequently concentrated their attentions, pens, and tongues on softening the blows of centralized diplomatic failures, sidestepping the fallout of unsanctioned attacks, and curtailing the troubles that followed pesky localized squabbles. Importantly, the ceremonial considerations of precedence that were central to official diplomacy would not have allowed for the same amount of flexibility and compromise expressed in the documents of vernacular diplomacy. Thus, real peace, though signed in the center by agents of official diplomacy, could not exist along the lengthy land borders of the empires without these vernacular interventions discussed here.

452 The only other large collections I am aware of are the letters in Cyrillic from the Croatian-Bosnian borderlands. Lejla Nakaš, *Jezik i grafiya krajščinskih pisama [Language and Orthography of Krajinan Letters]* (Sarajevo: Slavistički Komitet, 2010).
This chapter sketches the contours of a secondary regionally based world of diplomacy and exchange between the two empires. It begins with an overview of relevant historiography, then describes the post of the Pasha of Buda and Habsburg attempts to organize themselves in response, culminating in the 1570s reconceptualization of the role of the Archduke of Inner Austria in Ottoman policy. In defining the two sides, it proposes a chronology of vernacularization, suggesting that changes in the use of language and provincial decision making were connected to generational shifts in the ranks of bureaucratic and local scribal culture. While on the Habsburg side, this coincided with an increase in centralization, for the Ottomans, such a correlation was less clear. This borderland diplomacy can be divided roughly into three phases: ad-hoc direct contacts, provincial outsourcing, and then, from 1568, a fully formed system of borderland diplomacy. The chapter then goes on to examine selected components of this vernacular diplomacy: the material aspects of written communication; the practice of sending regional embassies; the written rhetoric of friendship; and the strategy of blaming the “Magyars” for border transgressions. Collectively, these components facilitated the continuation of peace between the two contiguous empires, reinforcing the fictions embodied in peace treaties with real world compromises on the borders.

**Historiography**

The regional governors of Ottoman Buda were first systematically studied by the Hungarian orientalist, archivist, and historian Antal Gévay. His annotated list of ninety-eight office-holders published in 1841 is still regarded as the standard overview of the topic,\(^453\) with

only small adjustments made to dates of appointment and arrival. At the turn of the twentieth century, Sándor Takáts wrote longer biographical essays on twelve of the Pashas. Since then, articles have been published on the financial reforms under Kasim Pasha and Sokollu Mustafa Pasha, the properties and Hungarian letters of Arslan Pasha, and the patronage of Sokollu Mustafa Pasha. A few general treatments have contributed to outlining the role of the governors in Buda and beyond, which tend to view them as a collection of self-serving bureaucrats locked in a culture of systemic violence. Additionally, the Hungarian Turkologist Lajos Fekete published a monumental local history in 1944 which included discussions of the administrative, religious, and cultural history of Ottoman Buda. On a whole, it can be said that

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455 These were collected and published in the fourth volume of Takáts, Rajzok.
460 For a short study on a selection of letters in Ottoman Turkish from 1548–66 from the HHStA, see Claudia Römer and Gisela Procházka-Eisl, “Raub, Mord und Übergriffe an der habsburgisch-osmanischen Grenze: Der diplomatische Alltag der Beglerbege von Buda abseits von Zeremonien,” in Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der frühen Neuzeit, ed. Ralph Kauz, Giorgio Rota, and Jan Paul Niederkorn (Vienna: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2009), 251–64.
461 Lajos Fekete, Budapest a Törökkorban [Budapest in the Turkish Period] (Budapest: Királyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1944). For an abridged English version that omits many of the
the regional governors of Buda are some of the most well-studied provincial statesmen of the
Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{462}

Their Habsburg counterparts have received comparatively less attention from scholars. This is partly because they do not form a coherent group of individuals filling a specific post, but rather the rank and station of correspondents fluctuated over time. Councils have been examined separately in institutional histories, but often with only a passing reference to their roles in regional diplomatic activities.\textsuperscript{463} Biographies of individual secretaries and council members occasionally reference letters exchanged with the governors of Buda, but mine them for content rather than raise questions about the nature and significance of their correspondence. The Habsburg Archdukes, who were critical counterparts to the Pashas after 1562 have received limited attention. The career and character of Archduke Ernst (fig. 17) and his court in Vienna remain largely unexamined.\textsuperscript{464} Studies have appeared on Ernst’s childhood at the Spanish Habsburg court,\textsuperscript{465} and on his extensive artistic patronage during the last two years of his life in

\textsuperscript{462} Regrettably, these studies are almost entirely inaccessible to scholars without a working knowledge of Hungarian.
\textsuperscript{463} Literature on the Aulic War Council (\textit{Hofkriegsrat}) will serve here as an example. The basic character of the institution still requires research, as is pointed out in Pálffy, “Akten und Protokolle.” The secondary literature available to researchers offers only partial institutional histories, such as Friedrich Firnhaber, “Zur Geschichte des österreichischen Militärwesens. Skizze der Entstehung des Hofkriegsrathes,” \textit{Archiv für Kunde österreichischer Geschichts-Quellen} 30 (1864): 140–47. Others provide short overviews of the dynamics that drove the institution, but are filled with facular errors, such as Martin A Reif, “\textit{Dignity and Obedience}”: \textit{Social Prestige in the History of the Austrian Hofkriegsrat} (Wichta, Kan.: Wichita State University, 1964).
Brussels as Governor General of the Spanish Netherlands.\textsuperscript{466} The single essay on Ernst’s Counter Reformation activities in Vienna from 1901 by Austrian historian Victor Bibl paints a portrait of a young and ambitious Archduke attempting to balance his political ambitions with the confessional fractures in Vienna and beyond.\textsuperscript{467} Bibl’s Ernst is dynamic and selectively pursues his larger goals while remaining pragmatic with Protestantism within his own intimate circles at court.\textsuperscript{468} This same dynamic pragmatism characterizes his role as the “good friend” of the Pasha of Buda. Other family members who played a smaller part in cross border relations have received comparatively more attention,\textsuperscript{469} but their participation in borderland diplomacy remains unexplored.

By far the most work that has been done is in the form of primary source publications. In the nineteenth century, several periodicals devoted to providing printed editions of paleographically and philologically difficult documents included letters to and from the regional


\textsuperscript{467} Bibl, “Erzherzog Ernst.”

\textsuperscript{468} For more on the diversity of the Habsburg court and evolving attitudes towards difference around this time, see Howard Louthan, The Quest for Compromise: Peacemakers in Counter-Reformation Vienna (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

governors of Buda. Many individual letters also appeared in book-length projects with philological aims. Over 450 Hungarian letters, mostly sent by the Buda governors to their Habsburg counterparts, were transcribed and published in 1915. Another 107 letters from 1590 to 1594 were published in 1972. Further correspondence can be found in publications of Ottoman Turkish official and private letters. Finding aids point to the vast trove of surviving primary source materials, of which only a small percentage have appeared in print.

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470 Most notably, this was the Történelmi Tár [Historical Collection], which ran from 1855–1934 and published thousands of documents, occasionally with commentaries.


472 Takáts et al., Basák.


475 Early finding aids include János Buzási, A Birodalmi levéltárak magyar vonatkozású iratai [Documents relating to Hungary in the Imperial Archives] (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 1900). Summaries of documents written by subjects of the sultan (through 1574) containing many Hungarian letters appear in Petritsch, Regesten. Lists of documents in the HHSTA Turcica collection can be found online here (in Hungarian): https://archives.hungaricana.hu/en/lear/search/results/?list=eyJmaWx0ZXJzIjogJGSSUVMRF MiOiBbIzVHVWViXX0sICJxdWVyeSI6ICJUDXJaWNhIn0&per_page=20. I would like to thank András Oros for providing me with finding aids for the Hungarica collections and the Türkischen Urkunden. For the collections of the Hungarian National Archives, see the unpublished and error filled (but still indispensable) register of documents sent by Ottoman subjects kept in the archive. A second copy of the register can be found on the finding aids shelf of the Istanbul Başbakanlık Arşivi. I would like to thank Éva Sz. Simon for providing me with these registers. For the military archive see Gyöngyi Farkas, A török kor, a kuruc kor, a nemesi
Collectively, these studies, editions, and lists provide an important foundation for research in the archives, but limited library distribution and a lack of translations from the uncommon source languages make them inaccessible for many would-be researchers.\footnote{Where they can be consulted, researchers face inconsistencies in publications and the documents they reproduce. Such inconsistencies include misread dates and contents, and incorrectly dated and filed documents. There are also a number of contemporary forgeries. This chapter cannot attempt to address these problems, though it points to them in the footnotes where necessary.}

**The Pashas of Buda**

The provincial governor of Buda was an important member of the Ottoman ruling elite with the honorific title of “Pasha.” High-ranking civil officials were endowed with the title of Pasha since at least the fourteenth century.\footnote{On the nature of the title see J. Deny, “Pasha,” ed. C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and G. Lecomte, *The Encyclopaedia of Islam: New Edition* (Leiden: Brill, 1997). Contemporary primary sources all use variations of “Basha” instead of “Pasha.” The variation is related to the voiceless pronunciation of nasal consonants, common throughout early modern Europe. Thus, “P” and “B” were interchangeable.} In the sixteenth century, all Viziers of the central ruling council (*divan*) were Pashas, as well as the provincial governors of each of the more than thirty districts that made up the Empire.\footnote{These numbers changed throughout the sixteenth century. See Metin Ibrahim Kunt, *The Sultan’s Servants: The Transformation of Ottoman Provincial Government, 1550–1650* (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1983).} These provincial governors, called *Beylerbeys*, were “commanders-of-the-commanders” with their own small-scale courts and ruling councils that reproduced the structures of governance in Constantinople.\footnote{For an overview of the development of these posts in relation to the Hungarian province, see Ágoston, “Defending and Administering the Frontier.”} As *Beylerbey* of Buda, they oversaw Ottoman rule in fourteen sub-districts (*sancaks*) in the lands that once formed the core...
of the Kingdom of Hungary, each headed by their own local governor (sancakbey). The post came with significant cultural capital and regional autonomy. By 1566, the Pasha of Buda’s collective revenues were substantial (around 1,000,000 akçe a year), and he had become a prominent and powerful figure in Ottoman politics. Reports from Constantinople revealed that by the 1580s, the governorship was highly coveted and elites were offering large sums of money to the sultan for the honor of leading the province. For example, in 1592 resident ambassador Bartholomaus Pezzen wrote that the incoming Pasha, who was the son of the Grand Vizier, had promised the Sultan 100,000 gulden in exchange for the post. With an agent at the central court in Constantinople (kapi kethüda) always ready to act on his behalf, the Pasha of Buda exercised pressure on enemies and boosted friends in empire-wide networks of patronage from his distant outpost.

During the one-hundred-and-forty-five-year history of the Ottoman province of Budin, the Pashas of Buda represented the Ottoman state in the divided lands of the former Kingdom of

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480 These districts took a generation to become fully formed and integrated into the Ottoman structures of possession and taxation. They were the sancaks of Estergom (Esztergom), Novigrad (Nógrád), Secen (Szécsény), Filek (Fülek), Hatvan, Solnok (Szolnok), Segedin (Szeged), Istolni Belgrade (Fehérvár), Simontorna (Simontornya), Seksar (Szekszárd), Sekcuy (Szekcső), Koppan (Koppány), Pecuy (Pécs), and Siget (Szigetvár). For details on dates of occupation and numbers of soldiers based on Ottoman administrative records see the monumental work by Hegyi, Hódoltság várai.

481 Dávid, “Török közigazgatás Magyarországon,” 198–99. These numbers are difficult to determine and evaluate as required expenses were also high, but their revenues were at least double that of the salary given to the local governors or sancakbeys below them.


483 Beylerbey Sinan Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda. On his biography, see Sándor Takáts, “Színán pasazade Muhammed basa [Sinan Pashazade Mohammed Pasha],” in Rajzok a török világból [Sketches from the Turkish world], vol. 4, 4 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915), 253–71.

484 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 77, Konv. 1 (1592 I-II), fol. 11–26. This extraordinary amount, which was over three times the amount of the Habsburg yearly tribute, is unverifiable.
Hungary. As such, their titulature included such phrases as “the Turkish Emperor’s chief lieutenant in Buda and guardian of the land of Hungary,”485 “Lieutenant of the Turkish Emperor in the Kingdom of Hungary, Buda,”486 and even “Lieutenant and duke of Buda, the Emperor’s faithful servant.”487 Between the capture of Buda during the campaign of 1541 and the outbreak of the Long Turkish War in 1593, the regional governorship changed hands twenty-four times among nineteen different men, the shortest tenure lasting only five months and the longest lasting twelve years. An elaborate game of musical chairs orchestrated by the central administration meant that although the Pashas came from a variety of backgrounds, most of them had served as local governors in the region before filling the post.488

Their geographic position on the periphery, far closer to the Habsburgs' centers of power than the Ottoman capital, meant that the Pashas regularly served as the conduit of communication with the Porte. This included facilitating the exchange of post between Habsburg officials and their ambassadors as well as between sovereigns. They also maintained steady communication with their Habsburg counterparts. To do so, the Pashas relied on scribes and

488 For example, as Sancakbey of Belgrade, Hatvan, Mohács, or Szendrö or in the neighboring region of Temesvár. Their parameters of financial and executive power have been studied by Géza Dávid, who worked extensively with administrative document registers (defters) to outline how Constantinople determined the spatial boundaries and monetary compensations of the distant post. Importantly, Dávid has shown the unpredictable and contingent nature of such a career in the region, emphasizing that paths to political power along the borderlands included family patronage, bribery, and unique language skill sets. For English translations of some of his most important early works see Dávid, Studies in Demographic and Administrative History. See also Géza Dávid, “A 16–17. századi oszmán közigazgatás mőködése: a beglerbégek és szandzsákbégek kiválasztása és kinevezése [The Workings of 16th–17th Century Ottoman Administration: Choosing and Naming Beylerbeys and Sancakbeys],” in Tanulmányok Szakály Ferenc emlékére, ed. Pál Fodor, Géza Pálffy, and István György Tóth (Budapest, 2002), 111–19.
translators attached to their retinues, as well as several men of letters who remained in the city after its conquest in 1541. Yet for all the prestige and autonomy they enjoyed, the Pashas of Buda were still subjects of the Sultan in a distant and vulnerable outpost. Of the nineteen men who held the position between 1541 and 1593, eight died in residence in Buda. Half of them perished of natural causes or the plague, while the others suffered unnatural deaths: two were strangled on orders from the Sultan, one was poisoned, and one was killed by his own soldiers in an uprising.

Captains, Councils, and Archdukes: Disorganized Habsburg Responses

In many ways, it was the very presence of the highly-organized Ottoman bureaucracy next door that forced the Habsburgs to develop and define councils and captaincies in the region. The Habsburgs, not known for their bureaucratic prowess in the mid-sixteenth century, found it difficult to exercise control over their newly annexed subjects in the lands of the former Kingdom of Hungary. In theory, councils and captaincies allowed for the participation of the

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489 The scribes writing in Slavic and Ottoman at the Buda court during this early period remain unidentified, but were likely the ones who arrived in the Pasha’s large retinue. On the lower ranks of the Buda administration, including lists of judges (kadis) and chief financial officers (defterdars) and a mention of 50–80 messengers (çavuşes), see Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban, 170–220.

490 On scribes writing in Hungarian and Latin in Ottoman Hungary, see the summarized translation of the most important study on the topic by Sándor Takáts, “Ungarische und turkische Berufsschreiber im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert,” Ungarischer Jahrbucher 1 (1921): 204–14. For the original with footnotes, see Sándor Takáts, “A magyar és a török írődeákok [Hungarian and Turkish scribes],” in Rajzok a török világból [Sketches from the Turkish world], vol. 1, 4 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915), 1–104. On the large number of people who remained in the city, see Fekete, Budapest a Törökkorban, 145–169. On translators of Hungarian at the Porte, see Ács, “Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad.”


492 Güzelce Rüstem Pasha in 1563.

493 Both Arslan Pasha and Sokollu Mustafa Pasha were put to death.

494 On the poisoning of Hacı Mehmed Pasha, see footnote 569.

495 Ferhad Pasha was killed by his own soldiers in an uprising, see footnote 588.
Hungarian estates, harvesting their knowledge and connections to their territories to facilitate Habsburg rule in the region with a light touch. In practice, the dizzying jurisdictional maps and rapidly changing list of names was almost impossible to compile and comprehend, let alone control. Géza Pálffy has taken great steps in filling in the map and timeline of local captaincies. His work reveals not only the contours of a class of regionally prominent nobility but also a culture of unfilled, unpaid, or unsanctioned posts. A comparison between Pálffy’s lists of office holders and the communications of the Pashas reveals much inconsistency. Just because a predecessor in a Habsburg-appointed post interacted directly with the Pasha of Buda, it did not guarantee that the new holder of the office would continue to do so. Personal relationships were paramount.

The Pashas corresponded with over thirty different officials of the Holy Roman Empire throughout the second half of the sixteenth century. In the beginning, they communicated directly with King Ferdinand I and his secretaries. Seeing the need for stability following the first Peace Treaty in 1548, Ferdinand wrote to the Pasha of Buda to introduce the newly founded Captaincy of Lower Hungary (Map 1), which he said would examine all complaints and try to fend off any situations that would endanger the peace. Such captaincy positions, which multiplied over the years, were filled from the ranks of imperial noblemen who came from across the Empire’s vast territories, including in their ranks Germans, Italians, Spaniards, Croatians, Bohemians, and Hungarians. Through the 1550s, these captains participated to varying degrees

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497 This refers mostly to Beylerbey Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda, who interacted directly with Ferdinand and via Archbishop Pál Várday of Esztergom (Hungarian locumtenens) as well as generals Leonhard Vels and Niklas von Salm.
498 Oct. 12, 1548, Budapest, Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Farkas, Levéltári segédlete, #1548/11.
in Ottoman negotiations and correspondence. For example, both Nikolas Eck von Salm and Pallavicini Sforza were active and lively counterparts to the Pasha from their posts in Győr. Still, the primary contact seems to have remained Ferdinand I and his court.\textsuperscript{499}

The system was inefficient. In an attempt at further centralization, Ferdinand founded the Aulic War Council (\textit{Hofkriegsrat}) in 1556. With its seat in Vienna, the council was made up of five members and a president who, in theory, controlled appointments, finances, and the numbers of soldiers in each border fortress.\textsuperscript{500} In practice, the group of German speaking Austrian nobility often had difficulty in tracking (and little chance of guiding) developments on the Hungarian and Croatian borderlands.\textsuperscript{501} The regional nobility was highly suspicious, seeing the council as a Habsburg attempt to force them out of power and establish direct rule. Though some Aulic War Council members were deeply involved in diplomatic communications with the Ottomans (like council president and former resident ambassador David Ungnad), others were completely absent from cross-border interactions.\textsuperscript{502} By the mid-1560s, communication with Buda began shifting to

\textsuperscript{499} This view may be the result of the way archives formed. Original letters from Pashas in the 1550s are often located in collections outside of Vienna and are therefore difficult to compile. Further research in regional archives might uncover more correspondence. Compare, for example, the original copies of Latin letters and drafts of responses in HHStA, Turcica, Karton 13, Konv. 3 (1558 I-V) with the Latin correspondence of Beylerbey Hadim Ali Pasha scattered in MOL, E 204 – Missiles and HHStA, Hungarica.

\textsuperscript{500} Regele, \textit{Österreichische Hofkriegsrat} and Reif, \textit{“Dignity and Obedience.”}

\textsuperscript{501} Even their record keeping in the sixteenth century is difficult to follow, as it is spread across several collections. Most recently, see the survey of source materials and prospects of rewriting a military history of the early Aulic War Council in Pálffy, \textit{“Akten und Protokolle.”}

\textsuperscript{502} The presidents of the council in the sixteenth century were Ehrenreich von Königsberg (1556–60); Gebhard Freiherr von Welzer (1560–66); Georg Teufel, Freiherr von Guntersdorf (1566–78); Wilhelm Freiherr von Hofkirchen (1578–84); David Ungnad, Freiherr von Weißenwolf (1584–90). Most of their names appear in other contexts, most notably David Ungnad himself served as resident ambassador in Constantinople before taking up the presidency. Others were heavily involved in official correspondence, like Hofkirchen, or had relatives who served as tribute carrying envoys to the Porte, like Königsberg and Teufel.
the Archdukes of Austria. With this shift, the captains of Hungary were effectively demoted to dealing with local governors, the tier of power discussed in the next chapter.

The first time a Habsburg archduke became deeply involved in Ottoman diplomatic activities was when Ferdinand’s put his twenty-two year old son Charles in charge of coordinating the journey of an Ottoman embassy to the Frankfurt coronation of his eldest son and heir to the Empire, Maximilian II in 1562.\textsuperscript{503} If this was a conscious shift in centralizing policy, Maximilian was shrewd enough to begin with a ceremonial event tied to the dynasty, during which the regional nobility would not protest. Charles took care of the travel needs for the fifty-four-member delegation led by Ibrahim Dragoman (a Polish renegade born Joachim Strass), even traveling with them part of the way.\textsuperscript{504} The coordination of travel and ceremonial required an attention to detail that the disorderly tangle of captains and councils could not provide. Archduke Charles became acquainted with several individuals who would prove important later during his long career. The significance and opulence of the embassy was not lost on contemporary observers. Jost Amman, a renowned Swiss-German printmaker, fashioned a large format woodblock print to commemorate the exotic well-wishers (fig. 10).\textsuperscript{505} Amman, who worked from descriptions rather than his own observations, chose to depict the embassy’s arrival

\textsuperscript{503} In the late 1558, Archduke Maximilian (future emperor Maximilian II) corresponded briefly with Beylerbey Kasim Pasha of Buda. See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 13, Konv. 3 (1558 I-V), f ol. 12; 27–28; 32–35; 49. Their correspondence deals mostly with the exchange of complaints.
\textsuperscript{504} On Ibrahim, see footnote 372.
at the gates of Frankfurt. His view of the over-crowded procession (with far more members than the real delegation) begins in the foreground with five camels and winds its way into the distance. Ambassador Ibrahim is nearly swallowed up by the sea of attendants on horseback and foot, appearing in center near the final bend and distinguished only by his silk robes and servants on foot. Ibrahim’s “Slavonischer” (probably Polish) oration on friendship was widely published by contemporaries in German translation,\(^{506}\) forming the centerpiece of many first-hand accounts.\(^{507}\) Though the embassy met with some problems in the beginning,\(^{508}\) the imperial visit was a major diplomatic success.

From then on, the Habsburg Emperors began to rely more heavily on relatives in matters relating to the Ottomans. The Archdukes, who were brothers, uncles, cousins, and nephews of reigning Emperors, were loyal and trustworthy extensions of the house of Habsburg. They alone could be counted on to always serve the interests of the dynasty. In 1564, Archduke Charles moved to Graz and set up his own court as Archduke of Inner Austria (Innerösterreich).\(^{509}\) From here, until his death in 1590, he ran a secondary and largely separate sphere of cross-border interaction on the Croatian borderlands. Charles filled his Graz court with members of the Austrian nobility, who collectively struggled to maintain a level of control over the regional Croatian-Hungarian magnates.\(^{510}\) They also cooperated (and occasionally clashed) with Vienna’s

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\(^{506}\) See Conley, “The Speech of Ibrahim.”

\(^{507}\) See, for example, a manuscript account of the coronation bound with contemporary printed accounts in the Pierpont Morgan Library Deptartment of Printed Books: PML 195542.5.

\(^{508}\) They had to meet in Enns and then travel through Czech lands in order to avoid an outbreak of the Plague near Linz, thus they were arrived late in the evening, after the gates had been closed.

\(^{509}\) Styria, Carniola and Carinthia. On the court in Graz, see Alexander Novotny and Berthold Sutter, eds., *Innerösterreich 1564–1619* (Graz: Steiermärkisches Landesmuseums und Landesbibliothek, 1968).

\(^{510}\) The military border described by Rothenberg is predominantly based on the sources produced about and around the Innerösterreich region. Rothenberg, *Austrian Military Border*, 40–51.
Aulic War Council until 1578. That year, the administration of the Croatian-Slavonian military border was completely transferred to the newly established Inner Austrian War Council, giving Charles direct control of regional appointments and finances (see map 2).

This split of the war councils of Vienna and Graz effectively led to the Habsburgs developing an administrative unit that could counter that of the vilayet of Bosnia on the Ottoman side, freeing up Vienna’s attention to deal with the vilayet of Budin.

Meanwhile, in 1571, Maximilian II’s teenage sons (and Archduke Charles’ nephews), Rudolf and Ernst, returned to Vienna after spending the last eight years at the Spanish court of their uncle, Philip II. The Emperor called a meeting of the Hungarian Council that year, with the unofficial aim of introducing his eldest son Rudolf as his potential successor. When Maximilian excused himself from the meeting because of a painful attack of gout, he sent the pair of young men to nearby Pozsony in his place. This 1572 meeting of the Hungarian Council gave the future Rudolf and Ernst first-hand experience with the Hungarian estates. They sat through long sessions where the Hungarian nobility aired their grievances about financial burdens, land disputes, personal law suits, and the ongoing threat of religious and political

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512 This did not mean that there was no overlap. In many cases, complaints about actions in the Bosnian borderlands reaching the ear of the Pasha of Buda was the only way actions could be taken against rogue Ottoman officials. For example, in October of 1591, the Pasha of Buda and Archduke Ernst coordinated their complaints about the Pasha of Bosnia in Constantinople to make them more convincing. See Bayerle, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, #62.

513 On their time at the Spanish court, see Mayer-Löwenschwerdt, *Aufenthalt der Erzherzoge Rudolf und Ernst in Spanien*.

514 Election protocol and ceremonial would not allow him to suggest it outright, but it was clear enough from the beginning. See the summary of the proceedings and publication of relevant documents in See Fraknói, *Országgyűlési emlékek*, vol. 5, 279–312.

515 For letters written from Pozsony by a secretary assigned to them, see HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 98, Konv. B (1572 III), fol. 182–183 and (Apr. 12, 1572) Konv. C, fol. 76, 79.
defectors to both the Ottomans and the Transylvanians. Though bound by the peace treaty of 1568, the victory of the Catholic maritime states in the Battle of Lepanto had reignited the desire of some to unite against the Ottoman conquerors. The printmaker Martino Rota may have fashioned his curious portrait of Archbishop Verantius, president of the Hungarian Council and negotiator of the 1568 Ottoman peace treaty, during this meeting (fig. 1). Official council records leave no indication that such desires to reopen the war with the Ottomans were expressed, let alone debated. Instead, Maximilian’s not-so-subtle coronation-hint (of sending his sons in his place) was a success, and a few months later, the council met again to elect and crown Rudolf as King of Hungary.

Maximilian continued to rule until his death in 1576 while his sons took an increasing number of active roles in the empire. Though the Hungarian estates had expressed their desire for Rudolf to move to Pozsony and live among them, it was the Bohemian nobility who successfully pressured Rudolf to move his court to Prague instead, completing the complicated process of relocation in 1583. Meanwhile, in 1574, Ernst became the Archduke and ruler of Lower Austria (Niederösterreich) and set up his court in Vienna. Together with the Aulic War Council, Ernst’s secretaries perfected a system of consultation procedures where the opinions of regional nobility and the Hungarian council could be processed, considered, compiled, and sent to Rudolf with Ernst’s recommendations. This allowed multiple points of view to be consulted.

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516 For the full minutes in the original Latin, see Fraknói, Országgyűlési emlékek, vol. 5, 338–406.
517 We know this from contemporary correspondence between some of the council members. See Fraknói, Országgyűlési, vol. 5, 279–280.
518 Fraknói, Országgyűlési emlékek, vol. 5, 407–426. Meanwhile Maximilian unsuccessfully launched a bid to have Ernst elected as King of Poland.
519 Evans, Rudolf II and His World, 22.
520 Rudolf had held the post since 1571.
521 This was during a failed attempt to be elected as King of Poland.
documented, if not always taken into account, and gave Ernst a great deal of autonomy. Much like Archduke Charles’ direct control of the Croatian borderlands from Graz, Archduke Ernst sought to force the borderlands near Vienna to function as an imperial unit. While Charles’ regional court had certain administrative features that mirrored the regional governorship of Bosnia, Archduke Ernst’s court mirrored that of the Pashas of Buda. Thousands of letters exchanged between the Pashas and Ernst attest to this, dated between 1576 and 1593. After taking over the management of Inner Austria following Charles’ death from 1590 to 1594, Ernst left the region to become Archduke of the Spanish Netherlands where he died in 1595. Under Ernst’s leadership, Vienna and the fortresses of Lower Austria became hubs of a well-functioning system of peace and coexistence with the Pashas of Buda just 100 miles downstream.

The Three Generations of the Vernacular Diplomacy Between Vienna and Buda

Vernacular diplomacy on the regional level between the Pasha and his Habsburg counterparts can be roughly divided into three generational shifts viewed through language usage. The first phase, which lasted to 1552, was an ad-hoc period during which both sides tested the limits of regional diplomatic activity in Latin and Ottoman Turkish. The second phase, through 1566, was when provincial statesmen outsourced their communications in multiple languages. The third and final phase, from 1566 to 1593, was an extended period of fully formed vernacular diplomacy conducted mostly in Hungarian. This final phase reached full maturity on

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522 This period of Ernst’s life has received the most attention from scholars. See Joannes Bochius and Petrus van der Borch, *The ceremonial entry of Ernst, archduke of Austria, into Antwerp, June 14, 1594* (New York, N.Y.: B. Blom, 1970).
the Habsburg side in the mid-1570s, when Archduke Ernst took full control of Vienna’s interactions with Buda.

**First Phase: Testing the Limits**

The first three Pashas were all long serving and prominent members of the Ottoman ruling elite nearing the end of their lengthy careers. The first person assigned to the post following the capture of Buda in August 1541 was Süleyman Pasha, an experienced provincial governor said to be of Hungarian origins who had previously served as regional governor of Tripoli, Diyarbakır, Baghdad, and Anatolia. Süleyman, who was also a member of the Sultan’s central ruling council as a vizier, died after just five months in the post. The second regional governor of Buda was Küçük Bali Pasha, from an influential Albanian-Ottoman family with ties to Jagodina. He served for fourteen months before he too died in office. During Süleyman and Bali’s tenures, Buda was the center of a “province without a hinterland” and was constantly under threat from the Habsburg military. It was not until the longer and more stable period under the third Pasha, Yahya Pashazade Mehmed (in office 1543–48), that the province began the long process of imperial integration. Early in Yahya Mehmed’s tenure, a campaign led by Sultan Süleyman in 1543 led to the capture of a ring of fortresses around the provincial center in Buda.

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523 Though no known Ottoman Turkish sources reinforce this claim, several contemporary Latin sources from Transylvania and Italy mention it in passing, including Brutus, Istvánffy, Bethlen Farkas and Jovius. For example, Paolo Giovio, Historiarum sui temporis, vol. 2, (Venice: Gaulterum Scottum, 1553), book XL, 284–85. For further citations, see the footnote in Thúry, Török történetirők vol. II, 29.


(Esztergom, Székesfehérvár, Siklós and Szeged). With Buda now comfortably surrounded by Ottoman outposts, the Pasha began consolidating power, setting in motion the Ottomanization of a region that was geographically, culturally, and linguistically removed from the core lands of the empire. Unlike the cities of the Ottoman Balkans, where large populations of Orthodox Christians became subjects of the Sultan unwillingly as entire regions fell into Ottoman hands, the Budin province was a peninsula that protruded deep into non-Ottoman territory (Map 1). These Christians were not Orthodox but overwhelmingly Catholic, with increasingly more Protestants in their ranks.\footnote{On Catholics and Protestants, see István György Tóth, “Old and New Faith in Hungary, Turkish Hungary, and Transylvania,” in \textit{A Companion to the Reformation World}, ed. R. Po-Chia Hsia (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 205–20. On Muslim institutions, see Gábor Ágoston, “Muslim Cultural Enclaves in Hungary under Ottoman Rule,” \textit{Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae} 45 (1991): 181–204.}

Those who remained in Ottoman lands did so largely by choice, hoping to try their luck under a different dynastic and political system, rather than fleeing across the border into equally uncertain circumstances.

The new subjects were collectively ambivalent about Muslim law. Orders sent to the Pashas from Constantinople reveal a constant struggle between local and imperial interests. For example, in 1545 the Ottoman judge (\textit{kadi}) of Szeged had a disagreement with the local judges because he wanted to forbid the ringing of the church bells according to Muslim laws.\footnote{The order comes from Mar. 29, 1545 (Topkapı Palace Museum, E 12321, 188a). For transcription and Hungarian translation, see Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, \textit{“Az ország ügye mindenek elott való” : a szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei, 1544–1545, 1552 [“The country’s affairs come before everything else”: the Sultan’s advisor’s orders related to Hungary, 1544-45, 1552]} (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2005), 168–170, part 1, #113. The local Christian judges would not hear of it, arguing that the tax payers would leave or an uprising would occur. When the local governor (\textit{Sancakbey} of Szegedin) left town for meeting in Buda, the Ottoman judge punished a Christian for breaking a Muslim law, and was promptly attacked.
by a mob who warned him that “Hungarians do not stand beatings.” The complaint, submitted to Constantinople by the Ottoman judge, went on to mention that the Christians were still carrying weapons, which was strictly forbidden. In response, Constantinople sent the following order to the Pasha:

The region was conquered by the sword of the Sultan, and with the help of God is now in the land of Islam (dar ül-islam). The Muslim judge knows local attitudes, so that is why he needs to decide what needs to be done. He is ordered to begin the gradual process of change, and when the circumstances allow it, he can outlaw the tolling of the church bells, and if he needs to he can move the local judges to another place. Weapons should not be in the hands of infidels under any circumstances. Do everything that can be done so that no agitation or tension occurs.

This reaction to the introduction of Muslim law reveals tensions between expectations on all sides. The order indicates that the dual-judicial system typical of Ottoman jurisprudence (of judges for each religious community), struggled over the limits of authority. The central officials saw the primary task as safety and pacification, not the observance of religious law. It highlights the existence of parallel interpretive communities willing to stand up against their Ottoman administrators, threatening to simply walk across the border and leave if they were unsatisfied. Hints of similar struggles towards Ottomanization are peppered throughout the early administrative documents of the 1540s and 1550s as the Ottomans continued to consolidate their

529 “Macar dövülmeğe razi değildir.” Ibid.
power. This self-assuredness of the conquered inhabitants of towns became increasingly important, and as we will see at the end of this chapter, the Pashas learned to capitalize on this strong sense of community for their own benefit.

Already in the earliest years of Ottoman rule in Hungary, the court of the regional governor of Buda was a destination for Habsburg diplomatic correspondence aimed at keeping peace in the region. Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda received his first embassy (legatio) in 1544. János Dessewffy, sent by Archbishop Pál Várday of Esztergom on behalf of King Ferdinand I, attempted to negotiate a cease fire with the Pasha and thereby the Ottoman Empire. As mentioned in chapter one, the Pasha responded by explaining that he was not authorized to issue such a document himself, but encouraged the Habsburgs to send an embassy directly to the Porte. This exchange followed the pattern that official diplomats would soon take, complete with detailed instructions for negotiations sent by the Habsburg court (in Latin) and the issue of a letter of safe conduct by the Pasha (also in Latin). The Buda Pasha’s response to the embassy was compiled by ambassador Dessewffy himself based on his talks conducted through an interpreter. Despite Dessewffy’s failure in 1544, the Habsburgs would send him three more times to undertake successful regional negotiations with the Pasha of Buda in 1546, 1547, and 1548. In 1545 the Habsburgs sent another local envoy, Sigismund

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531 For further examples, see Dávid Géza and Fodor Pál, “Magyar ellenállás a török berendezkedéssel szemben [Hungarian resistance in the face of Turkish Settlement],” Keletkutatás, 2002, 271–76.
532 See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6.
533 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5 Konv 6 (1544) fol 46. Listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #81.
534 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544), fol. 24–31.
535 Dessewffy made two trips that year to Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda, one in April and the other in September. See HHStA Turcica, Karton 6, Konv 3 and 4.
536 HHStA Turcica, Karton 7, Konv. 1 (1547 I-VII), fol. 21–24.
537 See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 7, Konv. 4.
Posgay to the Pasha.\textsuperscript{538} This time, his instructions came from the military commander Leonhard Vels on behalf of Ferdinand I. Meanwhile, the Pasha of Buda occasionally sent his own envoy in return. For example, in 1548, Dessewffy returned with Buda Pasha Kasim’s envoy, Husrev Çavuș. Husrev informed Ferdinand that the Pasha would be unable to take part in meetings with the captain general on border negotiations. Presumably, Husrev was meant to take his place in what was likely a meeting of the joint-border-fixing commission established by the Peace Treaty of 1547.\textsuperscript{539}

These early borderland diplomacies tested the flexibility and limits of the inter-imperial relations in an effort to land on a language and a working system of interaction and exchange. A first generation of scribe-translators were critical for the continued success of this early correspondence. The language of written communication remained predominantly Latin, as it was under the Kingdom of Hungary before the Ottoman conquest. Many letters from the Pashas of Buda also arrived in Ottoman Turkish and South Slavic.\textsuperscript{540} The presence of South Slavic letters composed in Cyrillic point to the peculiar linguistic ecology of the Ottoman Balkans where most ranking members of the administration and nearly all soldiers were native speakers

\textsuperscript{538} See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 6, Konv. 1 and 2.  
\textsuperscript{539} Latin copy in HHStA, Turcica 7, Konv. 4 (1548 VII-XII), fol. 139–142.  
\textsuperscript{540} For an example in Slavic, see the letter of Oct. 7, 1544 from Yahyah Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda to Ferdinand I: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544) fol 47–48. Listed in Petritsch, \textit{Regesten}, #82. Other letters from this Pasha surviving only in Latin translation may have also been originally written in Slavic because the hand on the Latin translations differs from the hand that translated letters from Ottoman Turkish. Note that I have opted here to use the catch all term South Slavic rather than one or more of the modern linguistic distinctions “Bosnian and Serbo-Croatian.” On the problems of dealing with variation in South Slavic languages during this period with further references, see Snježana Kordić, “Moderne Nationalbezeichnungen und Texte aus vergangenen Jahrhunderten,” \textit{Zeitschrift für Balkanologie} 46, no. 1 (2010): 35–43. On other letters from the Croatian borderland region in a similar language and script, see Nakaš, \textit{Krajišničkih pisama}.  

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of a form of Slavic language. The names of several Latin scribes come down to us from signatures, spy reports, and regional historical works. One notable example was Andreas Litteratus, a holdover from the fallen Kingdom of Hungary who had once served as a clerk in the Esztergom court of Archbishop Pál Várday. Following the fall of Esztergom, he became a Christian fief-holding cavalryman (sipahi) and relocated to Buda, where he continued to work as a scribe and left a deep impact on the form and rhetoric employed by the chancellery. Andreas was a Habsburg informant and scribe in the service of three consecutive Pashas (Kasim, Hadım Ali, and Toygun) whose letters reveal that he had previously worked in the chancellery of Royal Hungary because he reproduced the formulas perfectly, even abbreviating the same words as those usually abbreviated in similar documents before the conquest. Andreas was not the only such holdover from the pre-Ottoman bureaucratic ranks. Andreas' own son-in-law, János Magassy, also became a scribe for the Pashas. Another was István Tétényi, judge of Buda and notary of the Pasha. Each scribal hand is distinct and patterns are easy to detect, making

541 Such letters continued to be used along the Croatian borderlands long after the Buda chancellery stopped producing letters in Cyrillic.
542 Ferenc Szakály, “A Hungarian Spahi in the 16th century: the Mysterious ‘Andrea Litteratus’ of Esztergom,” Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae 47, no. 1/2 (1994): 181–96. Other Latin scribes working for the Pashas in the 1540s included the Christian judges István Thetemy (of Buda), and Laurentius Thetey (of Pest). In the 1550s, the name A. Salmary appears on a handful of letters. For a signed letter to ambassador Malvezzi, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 11, Konv. 3 (1554 X), fol. 44.
543 Or, as Szakály argued, a disinformant, since it was “as if they were passing along information with the blessing of the people they worked for.” Szakály, “Hungarian spahi,” 185.
544 For the earliest known example of his letters dated Aug. 30, 1543, see the letter written the name of Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda to the mining towns of Lower Hungary in the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Munich, Codices Latini Monacenses, No. 965, 309. Published in Szakály, “Hungarian spahi,” 186.
545 According to a letter from Miklós Ólah to Tamás Nádasdy on Sep. 25, 1557, Magassy was by that time working as the Ottoman Turkish scribe of Bishop György of Pécs. Takáts, “Íródeákok,” 28–29.
The targeted use of language also provides some insights. For example, Yahyah Mehmed, who generally corresponded in South Slavic, sent his letters of safe conduct in Latin. This meant that he used Latin as his formal language for ceremonially invested documents while he used Slavic as his conversational vernacular.

On the Vienna side, readers of Slavic languages were common currency while Ottoman translators were more rare. The former group consisted of scribes from the Croatian and Slovenian parts of Habsburg territories, while the latter group consisted of escaped captives or renegades. We do not know the names of the Vienna scribes dealing with regional correspondence in these early years. We do, however, know the name of the translator dealing with letters which arrived in Ottoman Turkish from Constantinople: Johann Gaudier (called Hans Spiegel), who translated letters from Ottoman Turkish to German from 1541 also became involved in the early academic study of Ottoman Turkish and Persian. Shortly after 1551 he even translated a history of the Ottoman Empire brought back by a tribute carrying ambassador. Though Spiegel had attained a high level of fluency, he never composed letters in

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547 I hope to fully reconstruct this scribal culture in a future publication with colleagues from Vienna and Hungary that will include handwriting samples.

548 See, for example, his letter from Oct. 7, 1544 to Ferdinand I: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544) fol 47–48.

549 See the safe conduct for the embassy of János Dessewffy from May 22, 1544, with his Ottoman Turkish signature and seal: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544), fol. 17–20.


551 For some examples of his hand, see the Oct. 12–21, 1551 letter of Sultan Suleyman to Ferdinand I, the German translation of which can be found at HHStA, Turcica, Karton 9, Konv. 3 (1551 VI-XII), fol. 97.

552 On the academic study of these languages in Vienna, see Babinger, “Studien.”

553 That was then given to Ferdinand I and published a decade later in Frankfurt. Hieronymus Beck von Leopoldsdorf brought Muhammad Muhyi-al-din ibn “Ala”-al-din al-Jamali, Chronica Oder Acta von der Türckischen Tyrannen herkommen, und gefürten Kriegen: aus Türkischer

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Ottoman Turkish himself, and all outgoing official correspondence was sent in Latin. Spiegel belonged to a first generation of scribes whose role in the chancellery depended on the languages which they happened to read and not on their training. This chance knowledge of the scribes determined the linguistic expertise of the chancellery in the first phase of ad-hoc borderland interactions between the Ottomans and Habsburgs.

Second Phase: Provincial Pashas and Habsburg Outsourcing

The first three regional governors were followed by a series of Pashas from less illustrious families, many of whose careers played out in the provinces rather than Constantinople. This included regional notables and two children of earlier Pashas who spent their formative years in Buda. The most prominent of these regional figures was Kasim Pasha, whose thirty-year career in Ottoman Hungary has been studied as it appears in official records by Géza Dávid. Dávid argued that a system of personal dependence and freer forms of possession promoting individual progress within provincial court cultures emerged under Kasim. Kasim Pasha should also be credited with developments in vernacular diplomatic relations. Though his predecessors had written letters in Ottoman Turkish, South Slavic, and Latin, the surviving corpus of materials suggest that these exchanges were irregular. In contrast, Kasim Pasha communicated more regularly in Latin. Over twenty-five letters survive in his name and further drafts of responses reinforce the view that he had a very active chancellery in which Andreas

Sprachen vordeutschet, trans. Johann Gaudier (Frankfurt an der Oder: Eichorn, 1567). Lowenklaau used his translation to make his own (which was then widely published in multiple editions) as did Verantius in his Codex Verantius.

Litteratus still operated alongside János Magassy and others. Most correspondence was addressed to King Ferdinand and his designated successor, Archduke Maximilian. Others were addressed to captain Nicolas Graf zu Salm, captain of Győr. The letters are filled with complaints, requests to release captives, and even requests for a pocket watch in 1558. Kasim’s successor, Hadım Ali, though more aggressive in terms of consolidation and conquest in the region, continued the steady communication of his predecessor.

Translators were critical, but those who could understand and reformulate text accurately in the language of correspondence and that spoken by the regional governor were difficult to come by. The Budin province inherited by the Ottomans had once conducted all business in the politically neutral lingua franca of Latin. The diversity of vernaculars present in the region meant that speakers of Hungarian, German, Wallachian, Czech, Slavic languages, Italian, and Yiddish used Latin to communicate with each other, particularly in and around urban environments. As the Pashas established their channels of vernacular diplomacy, the languages on the streets around them in Buda rapidly evolved. Most importantly, scribes, who

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555 Andreas served the Pashas of Buda until at least July 1554. Takáts, “Íródeákok,” 419.
556 Takáts, “Íródeákok,” 418. Takáts cited sources from the HHStA Turcica, 1551 which are no longer in that location.
557 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 13, Konv. 3 (1558 I-V), fol. 12. Listed in Petritsch, Regesten, #357.
558 For an overview of the scant literature on his career, see Köhbach, Eroberung von Fülek, 46–7 (footnote 45).
were previously trained in Latin, began to train in Hungarian as well. This development was spurred by an increase in the number of local Protestants and the establishment of several printing presses in Transylvania and Habsburg ruled Hungary that published books and pamphlets in the vernacular.\(^{563}\) In an Ottoman Turkish letter from 1552, Hadım Ali Pasha’s scribe wrote that “we sent this in Turkish, because we cannot read the writing of a letter written in Hungarian.”\(^{564}\) Within a few years, however, the Buda scribal corps was comfortable writing in a combination of Hungarian, Latin, Italian, and even German.\(^{565}\) Hadım Ali’s mixture of languages should be seen less as a sign of aptitude than as a sign that he struggled to find the right staff to maintain communications with his wide circle of correspondents.\(^{566}\) The first Hungarian letters sent in the name of a Pasha appeared in 1554.\(^{567}\) Within a decade, the Hungarian letters produced in the name of the Pashas became examples of the highest art, stylistically and orthographically defining the language for centuries to come (appendix G).\(^{568}\)

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\(^{563}\) Though Hungarian was recorded on paper as early as the thirteenth century, the first printed text appeared in 1527, the first printed grammar in 1539, and the first printed Hungarian translation of the Bible in 1590. On the reformation's relationship with the development of the written Hungarian language, see Zoltán Csepregi, *A reformáció nyelve: Tanulmányok a magyarországi reformáció első negyedszázzadának vizsgálata alapján [The Language of the Reformation: Studies on the first quarter-century of the Reformation in Hungary]* (Budapest: Balassi Kiadó, 2013).


\(^{565}\) This was the only letter of a Buda Pasha written in German from the second-half of the sixteenth century that I have found. HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 76, Konv. A (1556 I-VII), fol. 89–92.

\(^{566}\) This included Hungarian nobility and fortress captains (László Gyulaffy, Gáspár Mágóchy, Tamás Nádasdi, János Krusith, Nikola Zrinski, and János Paksy), Italian generals (Sforza), and King Ferdinand.

\(^{567}\) HHStA, Turcica, Karton 11, Konv. 1 (1554 VI-VII), fol. 22–23.

\(^{568}\) This was noted by several nineteenth-century linguists. For a collection of letters that provides easy comparisons and notes on linguistic variation, see Döbrentei, *Magyar iratok*. Common deviations included missing “l”s and replacing “ő” with “é.” The variations used by the Ottomans became standard spelling.
After the short governorship of Hacı Mehmed Pasha, who was supposedly poisoned with a toxic sherbet by his Jewish doctor soon after his arrival, Toygun Pasha dominated the 1550s. Toygun was the first regional governor for whom a substantial corpus of letters survives. He led the province of Budin from 1553 to 1556 and again between 1558 and 1559, sending up to twenty letters a month. He was also the patron of substantial building projects in Ottoman Buda. It was only during his tenure, a decade after the conquest of the region, that the Buda cityscape began to display a truly Ottoman character. This attention to the built environment ushered in another component of vernacular diplomacy: the display of the renaissance Christian city turned Ottoman provincial capital through performances of provincial rulership. During Toygun’s years as Pasha, both Hans Dernschwam, a Fugger merchant, and ambassador Busbecq left descriptions of formal audiences with Toygun and city tours led by his men. Dernschwam, who had vivid memories of the city from its pre-Ottoman period, interspersed his description with comments about the changes to specific buildings. He also left a lengthy description of Christian services held in the Church of Mary Magdalene, which was shared by Catholics and Protestants. Busbecq mused more on the nature of Turks and Hungarians and less on the local architecture.

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569 According to the sixteenth-century Ottoman historian İbrahim Peçevi, “As they say, because of his illness, they brought in a Jewish doctor before he died. He gave [the Pasha] a poisoned sherbert, and by eating this, he died. After they questioned the Jewish doctor, they arrested him. (Anlatıldı ğına göre, hastalığı sırasında elmezden evvel yahudi bir hekim getirmişler, o da zehirli bir şerbet vererek ölmüne sebep olmuş yahudi yakalanarak soruluğu zaman).” İbrahim Peçevî, Peçevî tarihi, ed. Murat Uraz, 2 vols. (İstanbul: Neşriyat Yrudu, 1968) vol. 1, 23.
Fewer letters were written by Toygun’s successor, Güzelce Rüstem, also in a combination of Hungarian, Latin, and Ottoman Turkish. Güzelce seems to have occupied himself predominantly with internal affairs, including renovations of fortresses, the reorganization of administrative districts, and establishing charitable endowments. His letters across the border were written by at least three different scribes: Marcus Rascy, Hidayet, and Süleyman (born József Etyek). Interestingly, even though Güzelce Rüstem was familiar with the region, having served as governor of Temesvár and before that as local governor of Szendrő, the Ottoman registers of imperial decrees reveal that many important decisions were made by one of the local governors working for him, Derviş Bey, son of the second Pasha. Following Güzelce Rüstem, Ottoman central authorities attempted to place two individuals with less long-term connections in the region in the governorship whose time in Buda was short-lived and unsuccessful. The first was Zal Mahmud Pasha, who was charged with treason following an uprising a few months after his arrival and the second was Iskender Pasha, who took months to arrive and left almost immediately.

During these first two phases, the Pashas communicated with over thirty different individuals on the Habsburg side. Most letters were exchanged directly with sovereigns Ferdinand I and Archduke Maximilian, once it was clear he would be his father’s successor. This meant, of course, that it was often the secretaries and bureaucrats of the court who would process and respond. This is evident from the mixture of various hands in the drafted responses and notes

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573 See the contents of BOA, Mühimme defterleri 3 and 4. For a publication of a selection of these orders in Hungarian translation see Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor, “Ez az ügy főlöttébb fontos: a szultáni tanács Magyarországra vonatkozó rendeletei (1559–1560, 1564–1565) [“This is a matter of great importance”: the Sultan’s imperial decrees relating to Hungary (1559–1560, 1564–1565)] (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2009), particularly orders 663 and 704. For more on the career of this fascinating figure who never made it to the post of regional governor, see Dávid, “A Life on the Marches.”
on the margins. Other correspondents included captain generals (Nicolas Salm and Pallavicini Sforza), a few members of the Hungarian nobility, and the imperial ambassadors after their return to Vienna. In this system of dispersed exchanges, complaints sometimes took convoluted routes to reach their intended eyes and ears. The corps of Vienna based Ottoman translators continued to expand over the years: Callimaco de Casentia and Lukas Drachschutz (Trackschitz) joined in the 1550s and Siegmund Gentsch in the 1560s. Regional correspondents of the Pashas had their own Ottoman translators as well.

After over two decades of steady communication with Vienna conducted primarily in Ottoman Turkish and Latin, a major shift took place in the scribal culture of Ottoman Buda in October 1565. The new Ottoman regional governor, Arslan Pasha, writing to Maximilian II, requested that the language of communication be changed to Hungarian. A critical member of his Buda court, the scribe Hidayet Aga who oversaw Latin correspondence for decades, was tied up in negotiations in Vienna, thus leaving Arslan and his chancellery working at diminished capacity.

Furthermore, I ask your grace, as my most merciful lord, that when your grace writes to me, your grace writes in the Magyar language, because there are few of those who understand Latin (deák) writing here and sometimes it is very difficult to have your grace’s letters explained to me.

Arslan, who had been experimenting with writing in Ottoman Turkish since taking up the post in May, was not telling the whole truth. A large pool of merchants well versed in Latin and Italian

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574 Mentioned in HHStA, Turcica, Karton 16, Konv. 2 (1562 X-XI), fol. 191.
575 See the reference to a renegade from Buda and Turkish translator sent to replace someone (Gentsch?) mentioned in a letter from Eckh Graff zu Salm from Greifenstain to Maximilian II on 1568 Jun. 6. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 24, Konv. 3 (1568 VI), fol. 146–147.
576 “Towabba ezenis kerem te felsd mint kægielmes vramat hog mikor te felsd ennekem leuelet jr tehát magyar nieluen jrasa felsd mert deak jråst az ky jol twd jr nalk jgen szwık es neha neha nag nehezen magaraztatom meg az felsd leuelet”. Published Takáts et al. Basák, #18.
lived just outside of his palace in the medieval core of Buda.\textsuperscript{577} Perhaps he felt he could not trust any of those around him, or possibly, he wanted to understand the letters himself. Arslan, son of the third Pasha of Buda, Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha, was raised in the region and likely spoke Hungarian himself. For years, he had moved through a series of local governorships throughout Ottoman Hungary with the hopes of proving himself to Sultan Süleyman, and thus securing the position of regional governor once held by his father. Fourteen months after finally reaching the position he so coveted, following an unauthorized attack on the fortress of Palota, he was assassinated on the order of the Sultan. Contemporaries speculated that Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, who had long despised Arslan, had a hand in the assassination. Arslan’s death converged with the death of Sultan Süleyman on the final large-scale campaign against Hungary. The year 1566 brought about the end of active hostility in the region, ushering a very different political climate. The switch to the vernacular that he initiated, on the other hand, long outlived him. Pashas would continue to write letters, primarily in Hungarian, throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

\textit{Phase Three: Mature Vernacular Diplomacy}

The third and most advanced phase of vernacular diplomacy began in the mid-1560s with the arrival of the regional governor Sokollu Mustafa Pasha in Buda, nephew of the famous grand vizier, Sokollu Mehmed. During this time, regular correspondence maintained in Hungarian between Vienna and Buda facilitated remarkable peaceful relations in a way official diplomatic relations could not: through daily cross border conversations, compromise, and exchange. Grand

\textsuperscript{577} For more on these merchants see Antal Molnár, \textit{Eine Handelsgesellschaft aus Ragusa im osmanischen Ofen: Geschichte und Dokumente der Gesellschaft von Scipione Bona und Marino Bucchia (1573–1595)} (Budapest: Budapest Főváros Levéltára, 2009).
Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha was a shrewd and skillful statesman who embedded members of his large family across the empire, creating a unique network family of patronage.\textsuperscript{578} For twelve years, Mustafa in Buda supported his uncle Mehmed in Constantinople. This created a system of borderland diplomacy that was directed by individuals with close personal connection to central authority, operated in vernacular languages, and was maintained through regular and stable communication. Most of the provincial letters revolved around upholding the peace treaties.\textsuperscript{579}

With the death of Hidayet Aga in 1566, the first generation of Ottoman scribes born in the Kingdom of Hungary and trained in Latin had disappeared. In their place, a new scribal corps was waiting to take over. These fresh scribes had been trained in local Protestant schools that taught in Hungarian.\textsuperscript{580} Quite suddenly, the language of vernacular diplomacy shifted exclusively to Hungarian. By the end of the 1580s even the letters sent by the Habsburg side were arriving primarily in Hungarian at the insistence of the Pashas. The spread of Protestantism, schools, and notaries working in the vernacular meant that Hungarian scribes were much easier to come by on both sides of the border in administrative, military, and ecclesiastical posts. In Vienna, the Archdukes employed János Joó. David Ungnad, former ambassador and president of the Aulic War Council had a Hungarian translator (Tämpl) and eventually seems to have learned Hungarian himself. In the 1580s, Archduke Ernst employed Baranych and Lämbl. By now, Vienna had also become a hub for the academic study of Ottoman Turkish, which was no longer

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\textsuperscript{579} See chapter two.
\textsuperscript{580} Such schools were located in towns throughout the region, with more documentation surviving about those in Habsburg and Transylvanian territories. For a mention of the Buda school operating out of the Church of Mary Magdalene (called the Christian church), see Melchior Besolt's description published in Saad Ed-Din et al., \textit{Neuwe Chronica Türckischer nation}... (Franckfurt am Mayn: Wechel, 1595), 519. Those who learned how to read and write in Hungarian at these small schools were allowed to add the term “deak” to the end of their name. See Takáts, “íródeákok.”
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necessary for the daily communications with the border but still important for reading letters from Constantinople and decoding intercepted mail. The polymath Jacobo Strada used his position at court to acquire dictionaries and grammar books in the 1560 and 1570s.\textsuperscript{581} Strada even sent his son Paolo from Vienna to Constantinople to learn Ottoman Turkish, who returned with the tribute carrying delegation of David Ungnad in 1572.\textsuperscript{582}

Correspondence multiplied exponentially over the years. Most commonly, the letters addressed the perpetual lateness of the yearly tribute, and when it was finally en-route, the logistics of its crossing. Other topics included the exchange of captives, complaints about raids and the recovery of losses sustained during them, the building of new bridges and fortresses, debts owed by individuals who have crossed the border, and disputes about which towns could be taxed by which authorities. Though they were formally tasked with taking care of these negotiations on the local level and reporting back, the agents often kept central authorities in the dark about many of their activities. Frequent mention was also made of postal exchanges, economic opportunities in personal business ventures, and news about current events within each empire.

Sokollu Mustafa’s long career in Ottoman Hungary ended similarly to most Ottoman statesmen who fell out of favor: he was assassinated on the orders of the Sultan. The end of

\textsuperscript{581} See the reference to three dictionaries in the Sept. 1, 1569 report of resident ambassador Albert de Wyss to Maximilian II. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 25, Konv 3 (1569 V-IX), fol. 119–138, 123r (“tria dictionaria Turcica pro Jacobo Strada Caesareae Maiestats Vestrae antiquario”). See also the 1574 (?) letter of Johann Weber, vice chancellor to Peter Obernberger on acquiring “ain Vocabularumm... alda Turckhishe die Arabische unnd Persienshe Sprech transperim zulassen.” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 6 (s.d. c. 1574), fol. 198r.

\textsuperscript{582} See the undated petition submitted by Strada, which discusses Paolo’s Ottoman tutor and suggests he had been in Constantinople for longer than Ungnad. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 28, Konv. 2 (1571 s.d.), fol. 126–127. See also the reference to his return with books from Aug. 14, 1572 report of resident ambassador Karl Rijm to Maximilian II: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 28, Konv. 5 (1572 VII-X), fol. 51–64, here 62r.
Sokollu’s rule corresponded with a significant Habsburg reorganization and new divisions of power. Rudolf II moved the central court to Prague. The Aulic War Council split into two halves, one controlling the southern borders from Graz, and the other controlling the central Hungarian borders from Vienna. This ushered in the long period of Archduke Ernst’s Vienna. Meanwhile, in Buda, Sokollu was replaced by Kara Üveys Pasha, a favorite of Sultan Murad III. Üveys Pasha had more aggressive tactics, and immediately on arrival he attempted to annex 359 villages. Still, he maintained the channels of communication carved out by his predecessors, sometimes sending multiple Hungarian letters in a single day. Within two years, Üveys was removed from his post and soon attained a prestigious position in Aleppo.

The next regional governor was Kalaylikoz Ali Pasha, who called himself the “good friend” of Archduke Ernst. Ali was an extremely prolific correspondent who contacted his counterpart regularly to exchange complaints about the actions of groups of Hungarian soldiers, rogue captains in the borderlands, merchants’ debts, and captives awaiting ransom. He also regularly kept the Archduke and Emperor Rudolf II informed of developments in Constantinople and of the Ottoman wars in Persia. Overall, his correspondence with Archduke Ernst stands out as remarkably affectionate at times, even sending him an invitation to his 1583 wedding, where he would marry the Sultan's sister, Esma Han.

The next Pasha was Frenk Yusuf (who called himself Sinan) Pasha, a Florentine renegade from the Visconti family who became known for his elaborate receptions of Habsburg ambassadors. In 1584, he hosted the tribute carrying delegation of Heinrich von Liechtenstein

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583 Sándor Takáts, “Kara Ovejsz Pasa [Kara Üveys Pasha],” in Rajzok a török világból [Sketches from the Turkish World], vol. 4 (Budapest: Magyar tudományos Akadémia, 1915), 133–50.
585 Published Takáts et al., Basák, #277.
with great pomp: showering the ambassador with gifts and honorary processions, taking the retinue on long tours of Buda's finest architectural marvels, and even treating his guests to a fireworks display.\textsuperscript{586} He too continued to struggle with finding a balance between acting as a friendly neighbor and responding to misbehaving officials on both sides of the border.\textsuperscript{587} Sinan was followed by Ferhad Pasha,\textsuperscript{588} who spent much of his short time in office coaxing the Habsburgs to send the late tribute carrying delegation. Ferhad Pasha has also been credited with forcing the Archdukes in 1587 to stop writing their own letters in Latin and instead respond only in Hungarian.\textsuperscript{589} The year 1590 marked the beginning of a “time of troubles” in the Ottoman Empire. Continuous warfare on the eastern borderlands of the empire led to social unrest and strained resources.\textsuperscript{590} Even in far-away Buda this led to severe shortage of grain. On September 12, 1590, a group of frustrated janissaries broke into Ferhad Pasha's Buda palace and killed him and several notables from his retinue.\textsuperscript{591} The next three regional governors were Sufi Sinan,\textsuperscript{592}

\textsuperscript{586} See the description of Liechtenstein's embassy written by Melchoir Besolt: published in Saad Ed-Din et al., \textit{Chronica}, 515–520.
\textsuperscript{587} A month after the Liechtenstein embassy departed, the Pasha wrote a letter complaining that he had removed several local governors from their posts after Habsburg complaints while the Habsburgs had done nothing to address the problems caused by their own frontier captains. Published: Takáts et al., \textit{Basák}, #293.
\textsuperscript{588} Sándor Takáts, “Ferhát basa halála [The Death of Ferhad Pasha],” in \textit{Rajzok a török világából [Sketches from the Turkish world]}, vol. 4, 4 vols. (Budapest: Magyar Tudományos Akadémia, 1915), 215–35.
\textsuperscript{589} Takáts, “Ferhát,” 193.
\textsuperscript{590} Imber, \textit{Ottoman Empire}, 66–67.
Sinan Pashazade Mehmed (son of Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha), and his son Mohammed Pashazade Hasan Pasha, each of whom spent less than eighteen months in Buda. By the time the Long War broke out in 1593, the Pashas were writing frequently, often sending multiple letters a day, and vernacular diplomacy had reached its full maturity.

**Some Components of Vernacular Diplomacy**

To this point, this chapter has examined the actors and timeline of vernacular diplomacy on the regional level between the Habsburgs in Vienna and the Ottomans in Buda. The remainder of this chapter examines three practices in greater detail: the written rhetorics of friendship, the regional ambassadorial exchanges, and the strategy of blaming the Hungarians as a third element present on both sides in an effort to avoid direct conflict. Together these three practices created a functioning diplomatic ecology that operated on a separate register from official diplomacy. This allowed regional peace to be reached through compromises and concessions that official protocol in Constantinople would not have allowed.

**Archduke Ernst as Most Notable Friend: Written Rhetorics of Friendship**

By far the most significant component of vernacular diplomacy was the correspondence itself: an endless trail of creased paper and looped ink. Collections of these documents are preserved in Vienna and Budapest which together allow researchers to reconstruct nearly complete conversations through originals and drafts. Even in their material composition, the

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letters are the products of a culturally mixed borderland. They are composed mostly on watermarked double folios of European origins folded down the center. Letters began on the exterior of the folded sheets and continued onto its interior, with additional folded sheets inserted as needed so that long letters resembled small books. The address always appeared on the center of the back, and the entire letter was folded in one of a dozen ways into a palm size package for easy transport, with the original creases still visible. The ink, on the other hand, was a distinctly Ottoman type which produced heavy black lines filled with large flecks of gold. Many letters were signed and printed with seals, either on bits of red wax or directly onto the paper. Most Pashas used standard almond shaped or circular seals filled with Arabic inscriptions that were common across the empire. Others had their own unique stamps, such as Kalaylikoz Ali Pasha’s lion holding the legendary two-pronged sword of Ali (zul-fikar).

Documents of official diplomacy were drafted to reproduce a hierarchical structure in which the Habsburgs were symbolically below Ottoman sovereigns. The Holy Roman Emperor was always called King of Germany or Vienna, and occasionally emperor of Germany, as opposed to the Sultan, whose lengthy titulature included several universal claims. Documents

595 The papers range from mid-fifteenth century Italian sheets to contemporary Viennese ones. In a few cases, they wrote on paper used by the Habsburg court. Many watermarks can be identified in the classic collections of Charles-Moise Briquet, Les filigranes: dictionnaire historique des marques du papier (Geneva: A. Jullien, 1907). Others can be compared with those watermarks on Habsburg documents.
596 For examples of some of these seals, see Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban, plate LXXXVI.
597 See, for example, HHStA Turcica 43 Konv 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 1.
598 For example, the 1565 treaty used the phrase “Maximilian, distinguished and respected King of the people of Rum, and emperor of the district of Germany and King of the Czech, Slovenian, and Croatian and other lands (Maksimilyanus qiralsın Rim halkmun güzide ve hüremetliği ve Alaman vilayetimin imberdori ve Ceh ve Islovin ve Hirvat ve sayır nice vilayetlerinin qiralısın.)” This was the most generous title afforded to the Holy Roman Emperor by the Sultan, who was himself given a titulature that filled three folios. For the full citation and translation, see Appendix B. 1575 ratification refers to the Emperor as only King Maximilian “Kyral Maximlians.” Quite naturally, these titulatures did not match exactly in the Habsburg translations.
of vernacular diplomacy were far less rigid, often referring to the two sovereigns using the same terms, thereby leveling the rhetorical playing field and allowing both sides to speak as equals.599

The letters followed the same general format, whether they were sent by a Habsburg Archduke, a Hungarian captain, or an Ottoman official. They began with the *intitulatio* of the issuer, followed by a greeting and statement of friendship. The official writing then acknowledged that they received and understood the last letter, and answered any questions or accusations it put forth. They continued with further statements emphasizing their peace keeping and friendly goals, then presented new complaints and suggested solutions. The letters all closed with “God bless you” or “May God keep you in good health” and the date in the Christian calendar. Additionally, beginning in the 1560s, the letters included references to oral communications, which the readers were told to trust above the lies of all others.

Terms for friendship, friendliness, being a faithful friend, offering of friendship, and asking for favors in the name of friendship appear throughout the letters. For example, in another 1583 letter to Archduke Ernst, Ali Pasha of Buda wrote:

Your Highness Prince Ernst, our esteemed and noble friend. We send our greetings and regards to you. By the grace of almighty God, according to our laws, the Sultan gave us his aunt to marry, and the wedding date is fast approaching. At times such as these, those who are friendly with each other customarily seek out their friends and, since for many years we have been neighbors and great friends to each other, we did not want to forget to inform your Highness. That is why we ask your Highness, our esteemed and noble friend, if your Highness would come and be present at the wedding, since, may God bless, next

and ratifications. We cannot know how the Ottomans reacted to these discrepancies, or if they even noticed at all, since no known ratifications survive in Ottoman collections.

599 Most of the Hungarian letters refer to the Holy Roman Emperor as “your Emperor” or “Roman Emperor” and the Sultan as “our Emperor” or the “great Emperor.” When writing in Ottoman Turkish, Arslan Pasha also addressed Maximilian II as “Roman Emperor and most illustrious King, your highness (Rim Çasari devletlu Kral hazretlerine).” Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. A (1565 I-VII) fol. 89. Such terms would not have have been used in official diplomatic correspondence.
to the Sultan, we want to be the most friendly with your Highness. God Bless your Highness.\textsuperscript{600}

While it was highly unlikely that Ali Pasha sincerely expected the brother of Rudolf II to attend his wedding to Sultan Süleyman’s granddaughter, Esma Han Sultan, the respectful tone was quite clear. Roughly half of the letters also addressed the reader as their “good neighbor and friend” and “beloved neighbor.” Both of these concepts, friendship and being a good neighbor, have a long history in Ottoman-European diplomacy. An interesting study by Güneş Işiksel in relation to fifteenth-century Latin correspondence between Bayezid II and King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary reveals that the exact same terms were in use a century earlier in official diplomatic correspondence. Işiksel’s study seeks to dismantle the idea that the empire always possessed an anti-diplomatic stance by suggesting that it developed under Selim I and reached its full formation under Süleyman.\textsuperscript{601} The reappearance of the rhetoric in this secondary world of vernacular diplomacy suggests that rather than seeking the development of an anti-diplomatic stance, scholars may want to read Ottoman diplomatic history through shifts from the official to the vernacular.

\textsuperscript{600} “Feolsegeös Ernestus herczegh, nekwkn tiszteölendeo vr barátunk. Keöszeönetwkn es magunk ayanlasa vtn. Az hatalmas Isten kegyelmessegebeöl az mi teörüenyönk szerentt az hatalmas czaszar nennyet nekwkn atta házasságra, az menyegeöy lakodalomnak napia hamar való napon megh leszeön, illyen szwksegeös dolognak ideien, az kik egymással baratsagossak, szoktk barattyokat megh találni miuel egynehány eztendeötwl foguan ez szomszédságban nagy barátságban voltunk, nem akartuk hogy feölsegeödnek meg nem ieleöntenen. Keriwk azért feölsegeödett mint tiszteölendő vr barátunkott, feölsegeöd az lakodalomnak ideien legyen ieleön, kiért ha az Isten eltett az hatalmas czaszar mellet teöb barátsággal akarunk feölsegeödnek lenni. Isten éltesse feölsegeödet.” Takáts et al., Basák, #277.

\textsuperscript{601} Işiksel, “Friendship.”
Habsburg Missions to Buda

A panoramic aquarelle from the late sixteenth century preserved in the Budapest History Museum depicts the arrival of a Habsburg tribute carrying delegation in Buda (fig. 11). Two ships outfitted for noblemen carrying the ambassador and his retinue approach the shores of the Danube, flanked by further ships carrying supplies, staff, and Ottoman guides. The town in which they are about to disembark is filled with life. Small figures in turbans walk uphill towards the city walls barely containing a jumble of chimneys and rooftops in the surrounding countryside on both sides of the river; men on horseback appear to make their way towards the arriving ships; a pair of cavalrymen proudly prance across the pontoon bridge connecting Buda to the city of Pest. Adjacent to the ships, a lively stream of musicians and a janissary with open arms welcome the Habsburg representative (fig. 12). The retinue of the Pasha stands nearby, waiting to receive the esteemed guests. The festive multi-day reception would no doubt include large feasts, lavish audiences, and city tours during which the ambassador was encouraged to marvel at the magnificent halls and elaborate fountains of the renaissance palace, the hundreds of illustrated manuscripts in the royal library, and the numerous churches and mosques of the

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602 The image is in the collection of the Budapest History Museum (BTM), Kiscelli, inv. # 38.199. On the image, see János Jajczay, “Császári követ fogadása Budán a török idők alatt a Fővárosi Könyvtár egy vízfestményén [The Reception of the Emperor’s Ambassador from the Turkish period in a Watercolor in the Capital City Library],” A Fővárosi Könyvtár évkönyve 1934 (1934): 73–87. For other images of the city, see György Rózsa, Budapest régi látképei, 1493–1800 [Old city views of Budapest 1493–1800] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963). A second image by the same hand showing the embassy’s arrival at Mohács came on the art market together with this one before 1934.
603 For a detailed register of the meals provided for ambassador Dr. Bartholomaus Pezzen and his retinue during their four-day reception in May 1587, see Fekete, Siyaqat-Schrift, #27 (Table LI-LII).
604 On the palace in Buda and renaissance art in Hungary, see the exhibition catalogue Bakos, et al., Matthias Corvinus, the King.
605 For a list of volumes collected by the king, see Csaba Csapodi, Klára Csapodiné Gárdonyi, and Tibor Szántó, Bibliotheca Corviniana: The Library of King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary
This watercolor was likely painted by one of the members of the delegation, the ranks of which always included craftsmen and artists.  

All Habsburg missions to Constantinople stopped in Buda for an audience with the Pasha when they traveled to and from the Sublime Porte. Additionally, over twenty missions left Habsburg lands with the audience in Buda as their main objective during the second half of the sixteenth century. Every mission began with a request for a letter of safe conduct (salvus conductus, see appendix G). The arrival of the necessary documents signaled that the Pasha was ready to host and that he had instructed the local governor of Esztergom to organize the border crossing and accompany the visitors to Buda. After a ceremonial crossing followed by celebrations and tours of Esztergom, the missions arrived in Buda. Here they remained on their boats or quartered with a local Christian merchant. Usually the morning after their arrival, the Pasha sent finely outfitted horses and a janissary guard to the lodgings of the embassy to lead the delegation through town towards the waterfront palace of the governor. There the embassies took part in an audience and feast, followed by tours of the town and upper castle.

The panoramic water color is not the only visual representation of an ambassador’s arrival in Buda. A small sketchbook preserved in Leiden with views of twenty-six towns on the road from Vienna to Constantinople provides a similar reflection on the encounter with the Ottoman world in Buda (fig. 13). The delicate black ink sketches, once thought to come from

(New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1969). For a readable introduction to the topic, see Marcus Tanner, The Raven King: Matthias Corvinus and the Fate of His Lost Library (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2008). These and other studies generally assume that the Ottomans destroyed the library. This was not necessarily the case, at least not before the Long Turkish War.

On the mosques, see Sudár, Dzsámik és mecsetek, 170–230. On the churches, see Fekete, Budapest a törökkorban, 156–164.

For more on these artists, see chapter five.

the hand of Melchior Lorck during his journey to Constantinople in the 1550s, have since been
dated to 1577–85 based on architectural details.⁶⁰⁹ Here, rather than the turbaned figures and
hints of the lively celebrations to come, the focus is on the architectural shifts in the urban
landscape as Christian Europe morphs into Ottoman Europe. Unlike the cities of Christian
Europe preceding this image in the drawings, Buda had sprouted minarets and windowed domes
covering thermal baths along the waterfront. Another remarkably similar sketch of Buda can be
found pasted into the costume album of Johannes Lewenklaw (fig. 14),⁶¹⁰ who accompanied
Heinrich von Liechtenstein on a diplomatic mission to Constantinople from October 1584 to
April 1585. It is very likely that all three images are closely related.

These city views highlight a central component of Ottomanization: the visual
transformation of cities to reflect their new cultural and religious character. Changes to the urban
fabric of Christian majority cities in the Balkans followed basic patterns, and Buda was no
exception.⁶¹¹ The layout remained largely intact with the gradual addition of neighborhood
facilities (fountains, baths, soup-kitchens, schools) and a trade quarter. The first mosques were
always converted churches, where mihrab niches were carved into the wall and minarets were
added. These were then supplemented over time with newly built mosques as needed.⁶¹²
Construction work was funded through charitable endowments, with the donor attaching his or

⁶⁰⁹ See Ludá Klusáková, “Leidenský skicář: Města podél cesty z Vídně do Cařihradu (1577 –
1585) [The Leiden Sketchbook: Towns along the Road from Vienna to Constantinople (1577 –
⁶¹⁰ For more on the costume book, see chapter 5 on soldiers.
⁶¹¹ On Ottomanization and Balkan urban environments, see Pierre Pinon, “The Ottoman Cities of
the Balkans,” in The City in the Islamic World, ed. Salma Khadra Jayyusi et al. (Leiden: Brill,
2008), 143–58.
⁶¹² For a detailed overview of the mosques of Buda, see Sudár, Dzámik és mecsetek, 170–230.
her name to the institution and providing properties in their wills that produced the revenues required to maintain them, theoretically in perpetuity. For newly conquered lands, the first endowments were established by the Sultan and his court. In Buda, such Sultanic endowments were central to Ottomanization during the 1540s.\textsuperscript{613} Deli Husrev Pasha, second vizier, also endowed a pair of mills, a mosque, and other facilities before his death in 1545.\textsuperscript{614} The Pasha built a palace for himself on the banks of the Danube, near the garrisoned soldiers.\textsuperscript{615} It was only during the 1550s that these types of charitable endowments began to appear under the names of local Pashas.\textsuperscript{616} The first significant endowments seem to have come from Toygun Pasha. Later Güzelce Rüstem and Arslan Pasha would leave behind commissions in the city. However, none rivaled the extensive patronage of Sokollu Mustafa Pasha of Buda.\textsuperscript{617} By the 1580s, when these images were drawn, Buda was visually part of the Ottoman world.

The 1608 publication of Salomon Schweigger’s travel log includes further images of the approach to (fig. 15) and audience (fig. 16) with the Pasha from a mission in November 1577.\textsuperscript{618} The first image shows the ambassador, Joachim von Sinzendorff, on horseback following his

\textsuperscript{613} For the full range of Ottoman architectural commissions in Hungary based mostly on surviving endowment records and visual depictions, see Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi, Avrupa’da Osmanlı mimarı eserleri [Ottoman monuments in Europe] (İstanbul: İstanbul Fetih Cemiyeti, 1978), vol. 2. For a study based primarily on archaeological excavations, see Gerő, Turkish Monuments in Hungary.

\textsuperscript{614} Sudár, Dzsámik és mecsetek, 78–9.


\textsuperscript{616} Beylerbey Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha established charitable endowments in Belgrade during his time in Buda. Fotic, “Yahyapaşa-Oğlu.”

\textsuperscript{617} Imre Karácson, “A sztambuli mecsetek magyar vonatkozású kéziratai [Istanbul mosques’ documents related to Hungary],” Századok 42 (1908): 79–83.

\textsuperscript{618} These same images were re-used to represent the meeting with the local governor (sancakbey) of Esztergom. For more on these woodcuts, see chapter 4. Salomon Schweigger, Ein neue Reyßbeschreibung auß Teutschland nach Constantinopel und Jerusalem... (Nürnberg: Lantzenberger, 1608).
retinue through the stone courtyard of the Pasha’s residence. The retinue, each member dressed in identical long cloaks and caps, proceeds through a corridor of soldiers dressed in fur capes and feathered hats. They move from right to left, following four turbaned men towards the stairs that lead up to a doorway, beyond which three further turbaned men wait in the audience chamber. The second image shows the ambassador seated in a *curule* chair across from the Pasha as they converse through an interpreter. The ambassador’s retinue huddles in the bottom right corner, no longer wearing their hats, while the Pasha’s six council members sit on either side of the room on simple wooden benches. According to the text, Schweigger was hardly impressed with the dark and poorly built residence of Sokollu Mustafa Pasha. Though it would be tempting to see these images as accurate depictions of the events, the publisher reused the same woodblocks when describing the audience with the local governor of Esztergom. Nevertheless, this is the only contemporary depiction of an audience with the Pasha of Buda from the sixteenth century. It provides a rare window onto the formal reception that would have recreated in miniature that which took place in Constantinople. After the formal audience, they took a tour of the Renaissance palace atop the hill overlooking the Danube. Schweigger remarked on the intact beauty of certain elements and copied down Latin inscriptions while frowning upon walled up windows and neglected rooms filled with horse manure. In the famous library of Matthias Corvinus, Schweigger begged the old Muslim caretaker of the collection to let him take an illuminated Latin legend of the saints. The librarian responded he was not allowed to give anything away that was a possession of the Sultan. After a few days of receptions and tours, the embassy departed for their next stop on the river highway.

During the first phase of vernacular diplomacy, borderland missions with Buda as the main destination were very common. Dessewffy, Posgay, and Tranoczy all made trips to hammer out details of the border drawing initiatives.\footnote{For example, see the May 24, 1550 instructions to the ambassadors Mihály Mutnoky and István Mekchey for their meetings with Beylerbey Kasim Pasha of Buda and Sancakbey Mustafa Bey of Szeged. After recounting earlier successful negotiations, it details a disastrous meeting that occurred in Gyöngyös just days earlier during which the Turkish side said it would not accept the testimony of Christian witnesses because it was against Islamic law. The Kadi of Buda even insulted the King’s representative, and negotiations were broken off. Ferdinand sent this new party to continue negotiations and threaten the regional statesmen with complaints against them at the Porte. Published in Nehring, ed., Austro-Turcica, #168, 442–7.} Later missions to Buda were undertaken by Csábi and Hosszútóthy. As the list of Hungarian surnames suggests, the Habsburgs had a tendency to send local noblemen for regional negotiations rather than members of the nobility from across the empire (which was the way they chose their official ambassadors). Most of these men were captains of the Danube Naval fleet, or secretaries of the Hungarian Council. Many were experienced in negotiations at the Porte, having accompanied official missions in the past. Others who undertook local missions were connected with the Croatian borderlands, like Franz Jurkovich.

These local missions were generally quick and productive. Rarely, the semi-formal diplomatic events devolved into heated exchanges. During a regional mission in June 1587, the frustrated Pasha had the ambassador’s sword broken into pieces moments after he and his retinue stepped into the regional ruling council (divan). According to Sinan Pasha, he broke the sword of ambassador Jurkovich because it was inappropriate for him to step into the council wearing one. The real reason, it turned out, after two long and tense audiences, was that a day earlier, two Hungarian noblemen employed by the Habsburgs had ordered three-hundred soldiers to ride below Buda to attack the Ottomans. The soldiers caused much damage before they were brutally...
defeated by the Pasha’s men, who took many of them captive.\textsuperscript{622} When Jurkovich arrived on June 30, he was taken immediately to the infuriated Pasha. After breaking Jurkovich’s sword, he paraded the captives in front of him as proof of the raid. Jurkovich wrote a detailed description of the audiences.\textsuperscript{623} They had a lengthy discussion of raiding, the coming tribute payment, and the careers of certain noblemen who were endangering the peace, in particular Tamás Nádasdy. Two months later, Jurkovich returned on another mission. This time, his audience with Sinan Pasha went much more smoothly.

\textit{Ottoman Diplomatic Missions to Vienna}

Of the more than thirty-five Ottoman embassies to Habsburg lands between 1543 and 1593, two-thirds were sent by the Pasha of Buda rather than Constantinople (see Appendix D). Even most of those missions originating from central authorities in Constantinople were supplemented with additional staff in Buda sent by the Pasha. Though some of these official missions have received attention from scholars,\textsuperscript{624} these local missions are almost entirely unknown in the secondary literature.\textsuperscript{625} As with the Habsburgs, inconsistencies in terminology make it difficult to determine each envoy’s exact status. Habsburgs often referred to them with the same terms as their own ambassadors, including \textit{orator} and \textit{botschafter}. Such local missions began during the first phase of vernacular diplomacy with envoys like Husrev Çavuş. In the 1550s and 1560s, an Ottoman messenger of Hungarian origin, Bali Çavuş “Ungarus,” undertook

\textsuperscript{622} The raid was planned by Tamás Nádasdy and Miklós Pálffy.
\textsuperscript{623} HHStA, Turcica, Karton 62, Konv. 1 (1587 VII), fol. 12–26.
\textsuperscript{624} Unat, \textit{Sefirleri}.
\textsuperscript{625} This is partly because it appears that the only sources on them are to be found in the Vienna archives with no trace of them in the Ottoman Imperial Archives. Many of these embassies are well documented, and their itineraries and missions can be fully reconstructed. Below, I will only cite the most important sources for each embassy discussed. These citations are by no means exhaustive.
several missions. Both of these men carried the title of Çavuş, which meant that he was a
member of the corps of Ottoman messengers. Though little evidence survives, the fact that he
accompanied a Habsburg messenger to Vienna rather than handing over letters suggests that the
missions were more than just transportation of correspondence. Less important letters would
have been handed over to a boatman in Komárom.\textsuperscript{626}

The most extraordinary of these Ottoman ambassadors was Hidayet Aga, scribe of the
regional governors of Buda who acted as a go-between several times before spending five
months in Vienna on a diplomatic mission in 1565. Hidayet, born Marcus Scherer in the
Transylvanian county of Szeben, converted to Islam and became a scribe in the Buda court
before 1562,\textsuperscript{627} and possibly as early as 1544.\textsuperscript{628} He served four consecutive Pashas and even
married one of their daughters.\textsuperscript{629} He composed letters in Latin, Hungarian, Ottoman Turkish,
and German while serving as an oral interpreter that regularly fed information to the
Habsburgs.\textsuperscript{630} Hidayet accompanied the tribute carrying delegation of 1564–5 from Buda to
Constantinople and then returned with them directly to Vienna.\textsuperscript{631} While there from May to

\textsuperscript{626} See, for example, a letter from Nov. 21, 1573 from Andreas Kielman, Captain of Komárom to
Maximilian II, in which he complains about how a letter from the resident ambassador was sent
slowly with peasants from one village to the next. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 4 (1573 X-
XII), fol. 71.
\textsuperscript{627} See the letter for Beylerbey Güzcel Rüstem Pasha of Buda to Maximilian II on July 23,
1562: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 16, Konv. 1 (1562 VII-IX), fol. 32.
\textsuperscript{628} According to a document in the Topkapi Archives cited by Unat, a certain Hidayet (then at
the rank of Çavuş) was sent to Ferdinand to discuss the maintenance of peace following the siege
of Esztergom in 1544. Unat, Sefirleri, 222. For a Habsburg summary report on the talks
conducted, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 6 (1544), fol. 66–69. We cannot be sure if
these two Hidayets were the same person, but it seems possible.
\textsuperscript{629} Takáts, Íródeákok, 75–7.
\textsuperscript{630} His handwriting is fairly distinct and he used the same script when writing in Latin,
Hungarian, and German, making his letters fairly easy to identify.
\textsuperscript{631} The letter of safe conduct was requested by Iskender Pasha of Buda on Mar. 24, 1565:
HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. A (1565 I-VII) fol. 34
November, he wrote personal letters,\textsuperscript{632} communicated regularly with the Pasha of Buda\textsuperscript{633} and even with the local governor of Esztergom to raise complaints in Vienna on their behalf.\textsuperscript{634} Both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs referred to him with the same words as they did the official Habsburg ambassadors: \textit{elçi} and \textit{Botschafter}.

Though occasional embassies from Constantinople also continued,\textsuperscript{635} a majority of the missions during the third phase of vernacular diplomacy came from Buda.\textsuperscript{636} Sokollu Mustafa Pasha was particularly active with these regional embassies, sending Kurt Aga\textsuperscript{637} with gifts for the Emperor, as well as Saban Çavuş for an audience with the imperial council (\textit{supremum

\textsuperscript{632} For example, see the German translation of a curious letter from May 12, 1565 from Hidayet to his father inquiring about the health of the family, asking them to respond to his earlier letters, and referencing a falling out he had with his mentor (\textit{hoca}) who was “insincere and disloyal (\textit{falsch und untrew voller})” with regard to a certain man named Kaytas. HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. A (1565 I-VII), fol. 49–50.

\textsuperscript{633} I am familiar with six letters from Beylerbey Arslan Pasha of Buda to Hidayet Aga in Vienna.

\textsuperscript{634} I have found three such letters from Mehmed Bey of Esztergom to Hidayet Aga. Each provides a detailed update on border raiding and attacks on merchants, asking Hidayet to present these issues to the Habsburg court on his behalf. Two of them survive in the original and translations into Italian and German (HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. B (1565 VIII-XII) fol. 82–83 and HHStA, Turcica, Karton 20, Konv. 4 (1565 s.d.) fol. 30–32), and one survives just as an Italian translation (HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. B (1565 VIII-XII) fol. 82–83.)

\textsuperscript{635} For example, an embassy led by Ibrahim Bey (the same Ottoman agent who was hosted by Archduke Charles for the 1562 coronation of Maximilian II discussed in chapter 2) brought the Peace Treaty of 1568. See the original Italian petition submitted by him directly to the ruling council before May 23: HHSA, Turcica, Karton 24, Konv. 2 (1568 V), fol. 95–98. The Habsburg note on the back of the petition calls him the “envoy Ibrahim, ambassador of the Turks (\textit{Legatio Ibrahimi oratoris Turcici}).” Even on this mission, Ibrahim Bey acted on behalf of the Pasha of Buda as well, submitting a separate petition a week later on which he called himself “the ambassador of the Pasha of Buda to his Majesty (\textit{Le ambassiaria dello seniore bassa di Buda alla sua Sacra cesarea Maiesta}).” HHSA, Turcica, Karton 24, Konv. 2 (1568 V), fol. 109–114.

\textsuperscript{636} See appendix D.

\textsuperscript{637} See Sokollu Mustafa Pasha's letter of introduction for "our envoy Kurt Aga (\textit{nostro legato Kwrth agae})" who was bringing unspecified gifts for Maximilain II: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 23, Konv. 2 (1567 VII-IX), fol. 50–51. Kurt Aga had a long interview with Eck Graff zu Salm, captain of Győr while handing over his gifts. During this interview, which Eck recounted in detail, the Ottoman envoy mentioned that he had a “mandate from the Buda Pasha to present his complaints and requests directly to the Emperor himself (\textit{bevelch von dem Basha mit Ir gnade zu peden selbst}).” HHStA, Turcica, Karton 23, Konv. 2 (1567 VII-IX), fol. 64–69, here 65v.
curiae magistrum)\textsuperscript{638} within the first two years of his arrival in Buda. In 1572, he sent Ibrahim Aga with further presents\textsuperscript{639} and his Hungarian translator Mehmed Çelebi as his ambassador (Botschafter) to Johann Rueber, Captain General of Kassa to discuss Polish matters and the unsettled debts of a certain Máté Szabó of Sárospatak.\textsuperscript{640} When Rudolf moved to his court to Prague in the mid-1570s, the Pashas continued to send their envoys to the Vienna court of Archduke Ernst. Kara Üveys Pasha of Buda tried multiple times to send his envoys further to Prague, but met with little success. On one such occasion, the Pasha complained relentlessly about the treatment of his envoy Memi, who was carrying a letter from the Sultan and a list of border violations committed by soldiers working for the Habsburgs.\textsuperscript{641} Astonished, Üveys wrote that never had there been a Pasha who sent a letter that was stopped and persecuted on your side in a way that resulted in the Emperor not getting the letter of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{642} From this exchange it seems as though the Habsburgs began differentiating between those envoys of higher standing who came from the Porte, who could go on to Prague,\textsuperscript{643} and those sent by the Pasha, who were to be allowed no further than Vienna.

\textsuperscript{638} For a description of this audience, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 24, Konv. 5 (1568 IX), fol. 128–131.
\textsuperscript{639} See the letter introducing the envoy: Takáts et al., Basák, #47.
\textsuperscript{640} See the short report on the embassy by Rueber, which consisted of the ambassador, a fifteen-member retinue, and four regional notables who stayed between October 17 and 21: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 28, Konv. 5 (1572 VII-X), fol. 126–127.
\textsuperscript{641} For the petition submitted by Memi listing complaints about Habsburg violations of the standing peace treaty, see the Ottoman Turkish original HHStA, Turcica, Karton 39, Konv. 3 (1579 VII), fol. 33–34, and German translation 18–26.
\textsuperscript{642} Takáts et al., Basák, #163.
\textsuperscript{643} For example, Mahmud Bey went to Prague in 1575 to extend the peace treaty of 1574. See the set of petitions and notes submitted: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 31, Konv. 1 (1575 I-II), fol. 174–178. Ali Aga also traveled to Prague in 1581 in order to invite Rudolf II to the circumcision festival of Prince Mehmed. For a description of the audience and translation of the invitation, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 45, Konv. 1 (1581 IX), fol. 40–44.
Language and Identification: Switching out the Hungarian Soldiers

This chapter began with a letter in which Ali Kalaylikoz Pasha of Buda placed the blame for a series of border violations on the Hungarians, who considered themselves neither subjects of the Ottomans nor subjects of the Habsburgs. The last element of vernacular diplomacy this chapter addresses is this strategy of labeling and blaming a third group that was present in and yet separable from both sides of the border. Such a strategy, I argue below, allowed regional statesmen to deflect any tensions arising from the frequent peace treaty violations that occurred.

Who were these men that belonged neither to Buda nor to Vienna? After the fall of the Kingdom of Hungary, both empires attempted to lay claim to a continuation of Hungarian history under their rulership. The divided nobility of the “Natíó Hungaríca,” who had once formed a political unit with little ethnic or linguistic elements binding them, also tried to stake claims for continuity from their new residences and courts in Transylvania, the Lower Mining Towns, and the Kingdom of Poland. The subjects of the kingdom were more ethnically diverse than its nobility, though perhaps less aware of being so. As vernacular literacy rates rose, a new class of soldiers and townsmen began developing and expressing a sense of collective identity based on language and historical misfortune. Folk songs, humanist tracts, and printed texts flowing from Transylvania and Habsburg ruled Hungary did much to keep the memory of

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645 This is a hotly debated topic in Hungarian, Slovakian, and Romanian historiography. On the problems of ethnicity in medieval Europe (which applies to early modern Europe as well) see Walter Pohl, “Strategies of Identification: A Methodological Profile,” in Strategies of Identification: Ethnicity and Religion in Early Medieval Europe, ed. Walter Pohl and Gerda Heydemann (Brepols: Turnhout, Belgium, 2013), 1–64.

646 There was even a Protestant school teaching reading and writing within the city walls of Buda through the end of the sixteenth century. For a description of the school, see the travel narrative of Melchior Besolt, published in Saad Ed-Din et al., Neuwe Chronica, 519.
the former kingdom alive, and gave groups a vocabulary with which to speak about their community.\footnote{See Imre, \textit{Magyarország panasza} and Marianna D. Birnbaum, “Latinity or Vernacular - Sharing Some Concerns with the Literary West: Pamphlets, Plays and Poems Against the Turks,” in \textit{Humanists in a Shattered World: Croatian and Hungarian Latinity in the Sixteenth Century} (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1986), 353–71.}

Under these circumstances, the meaning of the term “Magyar” and its various translations was not entirely clear. The romantic nationalist historian Sandor Takáts wrote with pride about the Hungarian blood that coursed through the veins of noble and valiant heroes leading the local resistance to Ottoman rule. Even after we put aside such outdated renderings of history, scholars must still confront the continued use of ethno-linguistic modifiers and their shifting meanings over time and place. Was this a concrete self-identification of a large segment of the regional population? If so, when did it develop in the linguistically and ethnically diverse region? How did one identify an individual from the borderlands as a Hungarian, or, for that matter, a Turk, a Serb, a Croat, or a German? Was it clothing? Language? Parentage? Geography? Who was included and who was left out? Could anyone outside the Hungarian Council (composed of two

chambers of nobility) call themselves a Hungarian? Could one become a Hungarian? Could a merchant, a miller, or a peasant be a Hungarian? These questions are all difficult, if not impossible, to answer. What can be examined more closely is the way in which such terms were employed at the time. Identifying terms have always been situational and dialectical. To do a survey of the meaning of an identifying term like Hungarian requires one to “systematically historicize it and confront its plasticity, and study its different meanings over time and place.” Terms like Hungarian, Turk, or German cannot mean the same thing across the entire span of a political unit's existence, and across dozens of languages and dialects. People identify themselves and are identified in relationship with the context.

In the context of the third phase of vernacular diplomacy, the Pashas of Buda learned to capitalize on these ethno-linguistic communities. They wrote repeatedly that the Emperor should put German captains and soldiers in place of the Hungarian ones around the borders. Such requests became a refrain, routinely appearing wherever there was trouble. In 1575 Sokollu Mustafa wrote to Maximilian II,

as long as you have Hungarian captains in the borderland, who do not cease from instigating a fight, wandering, spying, and all sorts of aggressive behaviors day and night, your grace had better believe that they will not stand for the peace and will not keep it.

649 In fact, there was a process in which noblemen could become Hungarian: honfiusitas. See the documented proceedings of the “naturalization” of two German noblemen (Hanns Rueber and Ladislaus Poppel) in 1572: Fraknói, Országgyűlési emlékek, vol. 5, 400–1. For a list of those who went through the process, see Géza Pálffy, A Magyar királyság és a Habsburg monarchia a 16. században [The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg monarchy in the 16th century], 2nd ed. (Budapest: MTA Történettudományi Intézete, 2016), 295–6. According to Géza Pálffy, only Hungarians could be captains of certain fortresses: Pálffy “Kerületi és végvidéki,” 258. Rueber was, however, captain of Kassa already in 1568, four years before he became a member of the Hungarian Council. Most recently, see the edited volume of conference papers on the topic: M. István Szijártó, ed., Az indigenák (Budapest: ELTE BTK, 2017).


651 For Maximilian's response that neither the Hungarians nor the Germans are at fault, see HHStA, Turcica, Karton 23, Konv. 2 (1567 VII-IX), fol. 83–84, here fol. 83r.
But, if you replace them with German captains and German soldiers, we believe that both sides would remain in peace, and the peace treaty would be sustainable.\textsuperscript{652}

The Pashas were not the only ones adopting such an attitude against “Hungarian” soldiers. Around the same time, Salamon Schweigger, Protestant preacher for the resident ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff, wrote in his travel log from the border fortress of Komárom that “the fortress is manned by a German garrison, hence every Hungarian who wants to enter must leave his sword by the gate, presumably because they are not to be trusted.”\textsuperscript{653} Such declarations were an attempt to downplay violations of the peace treaty by writing them off as the actions of a restless third group. By explicitly naming the Hungarian soldiers, Ottoman and Habsburg officials fashioned a productive frontier between the two contiguous empires. This group was at once wholly separable and yet fully integrated into both sides. Though the contact zone looked more like a classic borderland, with vast expanses of overlapping sovereignty and double taxation, officials attempted to write and draw a buffer zone or a cushion between the two empires by naming and blaming the Hungarian soldiers as the problem. It mattered little if these troublesome men were in fact native Hungarian speakers. What did matter was that such terms were used constructively, allowing regional statesmen to maintain the peace defined by the agents of official diplomacy, even while many of their subjects raided and pillaged as if no such agreement existed.

\textsuperscript{652} “migh az vegeken magiar kapitanokat tarth fölsefeööd, kiknek sen eiel sem nappal ciataiok ragadozasok, koborlasok, leselködesök, es myndön ellenköző dolgay meg nem sz önnek, byzonnial higgye fld, hogy soha azok myatt az fryg alhatatossan meg nem tartattatik, de ha azok helieben nemőt kapitanokat, es nemőtöket valaztanatok vgy el hinnük oztan hogy, mynd az ket fel bekeuel maradna, es az frigys alhatatossan meg maradhatna.” Takáts et al., Basák, #76.
\textsuperscript{653} “Die Festung ist mit einer teutschen Besatzung belegt, daher ein jeder Unger, der in die Festung gehen will, der muß unter dem Tor sein Säbel von sich legen, daraus abzunehmen, daß man ihnen nicht traut.” Schweigger, Reyssbeschreibung, 8.
Chapter Four

The Local Governor of Esztergom and the Captain of Komárom

The well-trodden path connecting the borderland fortresses of Komárom and Esztergom was the safest and most direct route between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Habsburg Komárom, a strategically important stronghold at the confluence of the Danube and Wag rivers, lay roughly one hundred miles downstream from Vienna (see maps 5 and 6). Ottoman Esztergom was an equally well positioned fortress at the Danube bend, where the enormous river took a ninety-degree turn southward, towards Buda and the Ottoman hinterland (Map 7). The two fortresses were connected by a thirty-mile stretch of wooded shoreline and the swift waters of the Danube, making them the perfect gateways into their respective empires. This setting provided the stage for adventurous first encounters and an opportunity to reflect on the transition from Christian Europe to the Muslim world in word and image. The border also operated as a daily crossing point for messengers and merchants, who left behind faint traces of their travels in archival sources. For military engineers and cartographers, the two fortresses served as focal points in scientific spatial projections (Maps 3–

654 The portion from Belgrade to Constantinople was known as the Heerstraße (army-road). See Konstantin Jirecek, Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe: Eine historisch-geographische Studie (Prague: F. Tempsky, 1877).

655 It is also the point at which two branches of the Danube rejoin after flowing around the large island of Csallóköz (today Žitný ostrov, Slovakia). Changes in water management have substantially decreased the width of the “Little Danube” so that it no longer creates the dramatic divisions seen on map 6.

656 For the best overview of travelers with detailed information on routes of the sixteenth century ambassador see Stéphane Yerasimos, Les voyageurs dans l’Empire Ottoman, XIVe–XVIe siècles: bibliografie, itinéraires et inventaire des lieux habités (Ankara: Société turque d’histoire, 1991). Working from published and unpublished travel narratives, Yerasimos listed eighteen travel narratives of embassy members who crossed between Esztergom and Komárom in the second half of the sixteenth century. In addition to these, I have consulted the reports of ambassadors themselves in the HHStA, all of whom departed from Komárom.
Together, these primary sources provide an unparalleled amount of detail for a small but important section of the lengthy borderland that ran from the Adriatic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains. Given their proximity, it is not surprising to find that the local governor (sancakbey) of Esztergom and the Habsburg appointed captain of Komárom interacted regularly in the service of the state and of their own accord.

This chapter demonstrates how local officials facilitated the operation of official and vernacular diplomacy while simultaneously crafting their own unique diplomatic practices. In doing so, these lesser statesmen occasionally took what the central imperial court saw as inappropriate liberties in their cross-border interactions. For the Habsburg captains of Komárom, this meant balancing Habsburg dynastic loyalty with the interests of the Hungarian Council (Hungarorum consilio), in which many captains were active. For the Ottoman local governors of Esztergom, this meant unorthodox and at times unauthorized uses of public and private space. Both sides staged performances of the imperial units they represented, but their displays were filled with mixed messages and appropriated architectural structures. The chapter begins with an overview of the small amount of secondary literature available on the two fortresses and their administrations. It then examines the nature of each position within its respective imperial structure, highlighting their roles in the diplomatic process and moments when this process broke down or the rules of the game temporarily changed. Through this overview, the chapter also reconstructs a full list of the captains of Komárom and a partial list of local governors of Esztergom. This results in a clear periodization for the Habsburg side and only a sketch of

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657 See the maps collected by (and likely drawn by) the Angielini brothers (maps 4 and 6). See also the collections of maps in Stockholm, Karlsruhe, and Dresden. On the circumstances surrounding their creation, see Pálffy, Anfänge der Militärkartographie.

658 This approach is informed by Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012).
practices and personalities on the Ottoman one. By putting local cross-border interactions in conversation with official diplomacy, this chapter offers a glimpse of how the paper-reality of official diplomacy embodied in peace treaties played out in the every-day interactions of local officials.

**Historiography**

There is little secondary literature from which to build a narrative of the history of either Habsburg Komárom or Ottoman Esztergom. Most of what is known about these fortresses comes from century-old local histories. For Komárom, biographical works have illuminated the careers of several fortress captains, such as Andreas Kielman and Miklós Pálffy. Published lists of relevant documents help fill in details for others, such as János Paksy, and Ferranto Samaria de Speciacasa. Two short essays written by the nineteenth-century archivist-historian Sándor Takáts describing local tournament practices and diplomatic activities and one article on

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660 For his biography, see Pál Jedlicska, *Adatok erdődi báró Pálffy Miklós, a győri hősnek életrajza és korához, 1552–1600 [Documents on the life of Miklós Pálffy, baron of Erdődi and hero of Győr and his times, 1552–1600]* (Eger: Az Erseki Lyceum Könyvnyomdája, 1897).
662 Much of these short articles were collected and published as a separate volume in 1996. See Sándor Takáts, *Fejezetek Komárom művelődés- és gazdaságtörténetéből [ Chapters from the Cultural and Economic History of Komárom]* (Tatabánya: Komárom-Esztergom Megyei Önkormányzat, 1996). This volume includes an essay on duels, a short description of an altercation with Esztergom in 1583, and a collection of anecdotes about Komárom’s diplomatic activities.
trade\textsuperscript{663} are all that point scholars towards the vibrant exchanges between this critical stronghold and its Ottoman counterpart. The sum of these studies still leaves only an impressionistic view of sixteenth-century Komárom. Institutions like the Danube naval fleet and their participation in diplomatic interactions have received no attention, nor have their captains, who were based in the town just outside the fortress walls.\textsuperscript{664} The most important recent contribution to the topic was Géza Pálffy’s re-evaluation of towns like Komárom within their Habsburg context.\textsuperscript{665} While highlighting a number of important archival collections waiting to be examined, Pálffy also showed how the fortress captains were appointed directly by the Aulic War Council and were chosen increasingly from the ranks of Austrian and German nobility rather than Hungarian nobility (which became standard practice in the seventeenth century).

For the history of Ottoman Esztergom, there is also very little to work from. The standard work is Lajos Némethy’s chronicle-inspired local history, published in 1900.\textsuperscript{666} Némethy, a Catholic priest and librarian, narrated the surrender of the fortress by a group of Italian soldiers employed by the Habsburgs in 1543 based on contemporary investigations and confessions. He also compiled a partial list of Ottoman office holders. Unlike the case of Komárom, where regional archival materials provide an endless supply of unexamined sources from which scholars can reconstruct biographies and micro-histories, very few personal documents survive from the local governors. The historian's task is complicated by the fact that throughout the

\textsuperscript{663} On the Orthodox merchants who settled in Komárom and sold carpets, textiles, leatherwares and cloths produced in the Ottoman Empire, see Lajos Gecsényi, “‘Turkish Goods’ and ‘Greek Merchants’ in the Kingdom of Hungary in the 16th and 17th Centuries,” \textit{Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae} 60, no. 1 (2007): 55–71.

\textsuperscript{664} On the river vessels fitted with guns (naszád) used by both Habsburg and Ottoman navies, see Károly Csonkaréti, \textit{Hadihajók a Dunán} [\textit{War ships on the Danube}] (Budapest: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1980), chapter two.

\textsuperscript{665} Pálffy, \textit{Kingdom of Hungary}.

\textsuperscript{666} Lajos Némethy, \textit{Emléklapok Esztergom multjából} [\textit{Postcards from Esztergom’s Past}] (Esztergom: Buzarovits Gusztav Könyvnyomdaja, 1900).
Ottoman Empire, most local governors went by less distinct names than those holding higher offices. Thus, for example, the name Mehmed Bey is mentioned by name in over thirty sources across three decades, and may refer to two to six different individuals. This makes it extremely difficult to compile a timeline of office holders (Appendix G). The few accessible administrative sources (mostly tax registers) have been studied by philologists interested in questions of demography and economic history. Géza Dávid has written a short article on the administrative history of the city and highlighted its importance in Ottoman historical imagination. Several other studies have illuminated specific architectural elements and archaeological finds from the town. Still, research on Ottoman Esztergom generally reflects the state of secondary literature on similar local governorships throughout the Ottoman Empire.

667 Kunt, Sultan’s Servants, xvi-xxi.
668 For example, see Fekete, Esztergomi szandzsák and Klára Hegyi, “Esztergom török örsége 1554-ben [Esztergrom’s Turkish garrison soldiers in 1554],” in Az értelem bátorsága: tanulmányok Perjés Géza emlékére, ed. Gábor Hausner and Ferenc Csákváry (Budapest: Argumentum, 2005), 261–68.
The letters sent by the local governors in Ottoman Turkish, Latin, and Hungarian have received no attention at all.  

Some scholars have proven quite successful in establishing the careers of certain local governors operating in Hungary. For example, Géza Dávid has traced the remarkable career of Derviş Bey, the son of the second Pasha of Buda, Küçük Bali, who served in the districts of Szeged, Székesfehérvár, Pécs, and Avlonya. Pál Fodor has also examined the way these men participated in regional “political families” in the mid-sixteenth century. Though neither study touches directly on Esztergom, together their work questions some of the general assumptions about the nature of these local governorships in the Ottoman Empire. Namely, earlier scholars considered the position of local governor to be held for terms averaging decades. The findings of Fodor and Dávid suggest that only exceptional individuals held the same post for a long period and the average was, in fact, closer to two years. For Esztergom, the only local governor to receive a dedicated study was Osman, a prominent tax farmer who served as

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671 Though some have been published. See Procházka-Eisl and Römer, Osmanische Beamtenbriefe, #7, 14, 47, 53, 59, 60, 62, 64, 83, and 84.
672 See Dávid, “A Life on the Marches.” Similarly, he also studied the career of his equally illustrious contemporary, Kasim Bey in Dávid, “An Ottoman Military Career.”
674 20 to 30 years, according to H.A.R Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), 145. 10 to 12 years, according to M. Tayyib Gökbilgin, Osmanlı müesseseleri teşkilati ve medeniyeti tarihine genel bakış (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1977), 116.
Sancakbey from May 1586 to September 1588.676 This chapter contributes to these studies by placing the local governors of Esztergom within their cross-border context.

Captains of Komárom

The captain of Komárom’s primary task was to maintain the fortress and lead its one-thousand-strong garrison. The soldiers were a mixture of infantrymen, light cavalrymen, and sailors of the Danube Naval Fleet (called nassadists after the type of river-boats they manned).677 Each military division had its own internal structure, with the first two composed of units of soldiers from across Habsburg territories falling under the leadership of the captain, and the predominantly local naval fleet falling under the leadership of a Hungarian vice-captain. Whenever the captain of Komárom was away from his post, this vice-captain took over the leadership of the fortress.678 The captain oversaw the flow of communication between the two empires, organized the logistics of crossing the border for embassies,679 and was heavily involved in gathering and disseminating intelligence on developments in Ottoman Hungary.680

677 In 1556, this garrison was 928 soldiers, of which 528 Hungarian boatmen (naszados) and 400 German infantrymen (landsknecht). Pálffy, “Origins and Development,” 27.
678 Such absences ranged from a few months to as many as three years.
679 For example, see the preparations by captain Andreas Kielmann for the arrival of Mahmud Bey in 1575, whose embassy included twenty-five horses, six coaches, and a sizeable retinue. See HHStA, Turcica, Karton 30, Konv. 5 (1574 X-XII), fol. 130–131, and Karton 31, Konv. 1 (1575 I-II), fol. 62–63.
680 On spying practices of the borderland in general, see Gábor Ágoston, “Információszerzés És Kémkedés Az Oszmán Birodalomban a 15-17. Századból [Intelligence Work and Spying in the Ottoman Empire from the Fifteenth to the Seventeenth Century],” in Információáramlás a Magyar És Török Végvári Rendszerben [Information Flow in the Hungarian and Turkish
He was also a diplomatic host-in-chief, since his fortress served as the gathering place for Habsburg delegations before their departure to the Porte and the first stop for Ottoman delegations on their way to Vienna. Captains also negotiated the exchange of captives, tracked stolen goods, and, on at least one occasion, sent wood and roof tiles for building mosques in Esztergom.\footnote{681}

The relationship between the central administration and the captaincy of Komárom was unique within the borderland system. Unlike the captaincies that lay on either side of the Danube, which fell into evolving regional structures of military leadership,\footnote{682} the captain of Komárom always remained under the direct control of Vienna and the Aulic War Council (\textit{Hofkriegsrat}).\footnote{683} Accordingly, the Council was cautious to appoint only those commanders they considered to be both loyal to the Habsburg dynasty and able to command local respect. There were six holders of this office between its founding in 1552 and the outbreak of the Long Turkish War in 1593 (see Appendix I).\footnote{684} The first captain, János Paksy, was assigned to the post for a decade. Paksy was a local Hungarian nobleman, from the town of Paxs just below Buda on

\footnote{681}{See the Sept. 5, 1582 letter of Beylerbey Ali Pasha of Buda to Andreas Kielman Captain of Komárom, published Takáts et al., \textit{Basák}, #230, pgs. 258.}
\footnote{683}{Pálffy, “Origins and Development,” 48–9.}
\footnote{684}{Before 1552, the fortress was lead by the commanders of the naval fleet or higher-ranking officers sent from Vienna during times of warfare.}
the banks of the Danube. He was well experienced in dealing with the differences of opinion that often emerged in the diverse groups of soldiers assigned to his fortress. In 1560, he was made a baron in recognition for his services. Following Paksy’s death in 1562, the post remained empty for two years while the vice-captain took over his duties. In 1564, the Habsburgs named another nobleman from the Hungarian Council to the captaincy, János Pethő. Pethő met with far less success than his predecessor in dealing with the internal dynamics of the diverse fortress. His tenure started off on the wrong foot because of a bitter feud with a Spanish officer of the Habsburgs, Melchior Robles de Pereira. The dispute, which required the intervention of Ferdinand I, only resolved itself with the death of Robles during the Siege of Malta (1565). Pethő served for two years before being removed from the post, after the Pasha of Buda raised serious accusations against him. Apparently, Pethő had repeatedly disrupted the critical line of communication between the two empires by refusing to forward post and messengers. The Pasha of Buda went as far as accusing him of “seizing my letters, throwing my messengers into prison,

685 See, for example, the instructions of Ferdinand I to Ehrenreich von Königsberg (representing the Germans), Francesco de Salamanca (representing the Spaniards and Italians) and Paksy from Apr. 26, 1554: HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 73, Konv. C (1554 IV-VI), fol. 14–15.
686 Pálffy, Kingdom of Hungary, 83.
687 See the letter of his widow Sára Csúzy to Archduke Charles from Jan. 25, 1563: HHSa, Turcica, Karton 17, Konv. 1 (1563 I-II), fol. 96.
688 This appears to have been another Hungarian nobleman by the name of István Nagy. See his letter on transportation and communication with Güzelce Rüstem Pasha of Buda: HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 87, Konv. B (1563 V-VIII), fol. 9–10.
689 Though not before a colleague tried to acquire it first. See the petition of Ferenc Jakosith, vice-captain of Győr from 1562 in which the author presents his list of achievements. HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 86, Konv. D (1562 XI-XII und s.d.), fol. 76.
690 Captain of Kassa from March to August 1559. See Pálffy, “Kerületi és végvidéki,” 272. The feud was detailed in a manuscript that disappeared during World War II, during the bombing of the Königliche Landesbibliothek (Stuttgart). One should be able to reconstruct the details of how and why the two called each other to duel with the help of a series of documents in HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 87–9.
and casting my letters to the ground so that he could stomp all over them with his feet.”

He went on to advise Maximilian II that “this type of selfish person should not be posted on the frontiers, for you have enough worthy servants to replace him.”

Pethő, who had married into the Austrian nobility in 1559 when he wed Elisabeth von Sinzendorff, was removed from Komárom but continued to serve as head of the Hungarian Council until his death in 1578.

As a result of these complaints, the Habsburg court decided they would now actively seek out a German captain, rather than one so closely connected to the Hungarian Council. The next captain was Andreas Kielman, who served from 1567 to 1577 and again from 1580 to 1584. His long and largely uneventful career in the fortress can be read as a testament to the success of the peace treaties and Kielman’s own mild manner. His first decade in the post lined up with the tenure of Sokollu Mustafa Pasha in Buda, Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed in Constantinople, and the period of peace following the treaty of 1568. During his time in Komárom, Kielman hosted many Habsburg and Ottoman ambassadors while ensuring the fortress served as an efficient clearing house for all mail that traveled to and from the Ottomans via Buda. Only once was Kielman involved in a serious border violation. On October 11, 1583, eight Ottoman ships appeared near Komárom just as Habsburg ships were distributing long overdue pay to its

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692 “meg fogya leweloket el vezy twlok. w magokat zidalmazza tomloczre hannya wket es az en leweleymet laba alá topoggya.” See the original Hungarian letter of Nov. 1, 1566 from Sokollu Mustafa Pasha of Buda to Maximilian II, published by Takáts et al., Basák, #24.

693 “Ez fele maganak walo embert nem swkseg wolna vegbe tartany, mert felsegednek elég hyw jambor zolgay vannak.” Ibid.

694 On the expansion of his coat of arms in 1572, see István Csízi, “A Gersei Pethő Család Címerének Változásai Az Évszázadok Folyamán [Changes in the Coat of Arms of the Gersei Pethő through the Centuries],” TURUL 85, no. 2 (2012): 46–55. On his property in Vienna, see Pálffy, Kingdom of Hungary, 79. He was named to the captaincy of Kassa for a short time (1557–9) before arriving in Komárom. After spending years in Vienna, he was briefly made supremus capitaneus partium regni Hungariae Transdanubianarum (1576–8), but did not fulfil the duties of the post. See Pálffy, “Kerületi és végvidéki,” 272.

695 Pálffy, Kingdom of Hungary, 100. This applies mostly to the seventeenth century.
soldiers. Seeing the unwelcome neighbors, the soldiers took to the boats and chased them down, hoping to sink or capture the ships that had been snooping. In their zeal, they did not notice how far downstream they had gone, and wound up being attacked by a larger fleet, with both sides suffering serious losses. 696 According to a newsletter circulated by the Fugger merchant family, even Kielman himself was shot in the scuffle, though his wound was not life threatening. 697 In 1584 Kielman left Komárom to become a counselor in the Hofkriegsrat and remained a member of the Vienna court until his death in 1590.

Unlike his predecessors who had used the post in Komárom to improve their standing from the ranks of the lower nobility, Miklós Pálffy (fig. 18) was one of the highest ranking Hungarian noblemen in the Habsburg court when he took over the post from Kielman in 1584. 698 The Habsburgs had some reservations about putting him in Komárom because of his lack of experience and connections to the Hungarian Council, but they thought his loyalty to the dynasty and sway with the council made him a good candidate. After spending fifteen years in the entourage of the future Rudolf II, Pálffy began collecting properties of his own and ventured out of Vienna into the provincial court of Pozsony where he was captain from 1580. In 1582, he married Maria Fugger of the wealthy merchant family of Augsburg. At first, Pálffy followed his predecessor in dutifully overseeing the day-to-day business of the border: he negotiated the release of illegally seized captives, hosted embassies, and managed communication. Regional correspondence reveals that by 1587, he had taken a more aggressive stance, with large groups of

697 “der herr Kyelman obriste geschoßen worden, yedoch (wie man hoffen will) ohne gefahr seines lebens.” ÖNB, Cod. 8956 Han, fol. 241r–v (report from Oct. 25, 1583).
698 For his biography, see Jedlicska, Pálffy Miklós.
soldiers raiding and dueling with his blessing. The Habsburgs, hoping to prevent further problems, elevated Pálffy to post of Captain of the Mining Towns, though apparently, that did not stop him from traveling south when he felt the desire to take part in a raid.

On April 23, 1590, the regional governor Ferhad Pasha of Buda wrote an angry letter to Archduke Ernst in Vienna about a recent altercation between Pálffy and his counterpart in Esztergom, Memi Bey. According to the Pasha, Pálffy had gathered a substantial group of soldiers and made his way downstream to Esztergom where he was provoking the locally stationed soldiers. The Pasha asked if the Archduke had given Pálffy permission to encroach on Ottoman territory, and if not, expressed his hope that Pálffy will be properly punished for violating the peace treaty. He wrote further,

We heard that Pálffy was raised at your court. Therefore, we know that he studied how to be a gentleman and that he is aware of how a courtier should behave. But, as we see it, he was surely not raised in a royal court. Rather, an executioner must have been the master under whom he studied. A few days ago, he sent us a handful of teeth pulled from the mouths of poor captives, as only a butcher could.\(^{699}\)

Whether or not Ferhad’s accusations were true, there was little that Archduke Ernst could do. After a similar incident the year before, Pálffy had technically been reassigned. The current captain of Komárom was an Austrian nobleman by the name of Erasmus Braun, and not Pálffy (see appendix I). Clearly, this detail did not prevent Pálffy from commanding troops and launching military actions from Komárom. In 1587, Andreas Kielman had warned the Archduke that Pálffy’s influence with the Hungarian nobility was a double-edged sword. Pálffy, along with members of the Nádasdy and Batthyány families should not be punished for any missteps.

\(^{699}\) “Aztis hallottuk hog’ Palfy kiral eö feölsege Vduaraban neuekeödeöt feöl, ennek okaert azt tuttuk hog’ embersegeöt tanult, es az uitezleo dologhoz tud, de az mint lattyuk nem kiraly Vdvaraban lakot, Hanem Hohar uolt mesteöre kiteöl tanult, mert ez el mult napokban eg’ marok fogat hozanak eleönkben, kiket Hohar mogg’ara az szegen’ rabok szaiaabol szedeteöt ki.” Bayerle, *Ottoman Diplomacy*, #14.
because they had great influence at the meetings of the Hungarian estates.\textsuperscript{700} The last thing Ernst would want was for them to decide as a group that loyalty to the Habsburg dynasty was no longer in their best interest.

Pálffy’s successor, Erasmus Braun von Pielachhag (1589–94), caused fewer problems. Braun fulfilled his duties in facilitating communication and hosting ambassadors. Very little is known about his life and career, but his years in Komárom seem to have passed uneventfully until the outbreak of the Long Turkish War. In 1594, Braun died from injuries sustained during a battle,\textsuperscript{701} and Pálffy, ready to take part in the newly reopened war with the Ottomans, returned to Komárom.

**The Sancakbey of Esztergom**

The Ottoman counterpart of the captain of Komárom held a prestigious though not particularly lucrative post that lay at the north-western-most border of the Empire. Local governors were *sancakbeyys*, a term referring to their role in the military as standard-bearers for the soldiers of their district (*sancak* or *liva*) within a given province.\textsuperscript{702} The local governor of Esztergom fell under the jurisdiction of the regional governor of Buda, reporting to him regularly for meetings of the regional ruling council, and ensuring the 1500 garrisoned soldiers stationed

\textsuperscript{700} HHStA, Turcica, Karton 63, Konv. 1 (1587 IX first half), fol. 153.

\textsuperscript{701} See the Nov. 19, 1594 report in the Fugger Newsletters of Vienna, ÖNB, Cod. 8967, 125r.

in his fortress were trained and well equipped. The large yearly incomes of the local governors were spent primarily on salaries, equipment, and construction works. From the mid-sixteenth century onwards, it was customary for newly appointed local governors to pay a large sum in exchange for the post. This left local statesmen constantly seeking out new sources of revenue, which included ransom slavery, robbery, and soft-conquest through the expansion of taxation territories.

Between the capture of Esztergom and the outbreak of the Long Turkish War there were at least twenty-eight different local governors of Esztergom (Appendix H). Their names are primarily known from registers of imperial decrees and descriptions of travelers. As with the Pashas, many of the local governors had served in the region for a significant portion, if not their entire careers. Some were active trade brokers, like Abdulrahman Bey in the 1590s. Others went to great lengths to increase their revenues, like Hidris Bey who in 1585 who built a pontoon bridge across the Danube to connect his fortress to a recently fortified outpost on the opposite side and the taxable towns and villages north of it. At least nine of the men filling the post wrote letters across the border to Habsburg lands in Ottoman Turkish, Latin, and Hungarian.

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703 On the number of soldiers in Esztergom, see Hegyi, Hódoltság várai, vol. 2, 686–774.
704 On the incomes, see Dávid, “Esztergom szerepe,” 92.
705 Géza Dávid provides a detailed summary of a sixteenth-century list of guidelines based on a manuscript in Atif Efendi Kutuphanesi that lists gifts to the flag bearers and musicians of the court totaling 3,300 akçe alone which were to be distributed upon receiving the post. Géza Dávid, “A 16-17. századi oszmán közigazgatás működése.”
706 At times, they made quite audacious claims from far-away territories. See the letter of Hassan Bey of Esztergom to Garamszentbenedek (today Hronský Beňadik, Slovakia), which was fifty miles north of his seat: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 18, Konv. 1 (1564 I-II), fol. 101–104. On these tax territories, see the publication of the 1570 tax register, which reveals that the local governors were collecting taxes from a wide swath of territory, coming very close to Komarom itself. See Fekete, Esztergomi szandszáli, map insert.
707 Abdulrahman Bey of Esztergom participated in the Bucchia wine trade. See Molnár, Handelsgesellschaft, 329.
708 See the initial complaints of Rudolf II sent to his ambassador Eytzing on the matter: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 54, Konv. 2 (1585 II-III), fol. 49–51, here 50v.
Some of these letters come from short interregnums in Buda, when the local governor filled in for the Pasha.\footnote{For example, in the period between the dismissal of Hadim Ali Pasha and the arrival of Toygun Pasha of Buda, the local governor Halil Bey of Esztergom provided letters of safe conduct for ambassadors. See his letter to captain János Paksy in Komarom from Mar. 11, 1553: HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 70, Konv. A (1553 III), fol. 114. At other times, this role was taken on by the chief gatekeeper (\textit{kapucibaşı}) of Buda.} Others letters come from the lively exchanges of governors and their counterparts, in which they confirmed the arrival of traveling ambassadors, exchanged captives, and sent formal lists of complaints.\footnote{See, for example, the letter of Sancakbey Hassan Bey of Esztergom to Georg Ghyczy, Captain of Újvár: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 19, Konv. 2 (1564 XI-s.d.), fol. 212–214.} For example, as local governor, Ahmed Bey corresponded in Latin with the Archbishop, whose residence he occupied, about border violations in 1553.\footnote{See his letter to Archbishop Miklós Oláh of Esztergom: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 10, Konv. 3 (1554 I-V), fol. 1–2.} Further references to correspondence can be found in the travel narratives recounting border crossings, in which frequent mention was made of exchanges between the Komárom captain and the Ottoman local governor as they agreed upon a date and time to meet for the border crossing.

Of all these men, the most active one was a certain Mehmed Bey, likely one individual that rotated through the post several times in the 1550s and 1560s.\footnote{Unfortunately, it is very difficult to establish this with certainty, but others have identified them as the same person. See Némethy, \textit{Emléklapok}, 41–42.} Mehmed, for whom more letters survive than any other local governor of Esztergom in this period, was in contact with Antonius Verantius (then bishop of Eger), Maximilian II, an Ottoman ambassador to Vienna, and several noblemen from the Hungarian council. His letters, composed in Hungarian, Latin, and Ottoman Turkish, reveal that Esztergom had a sophisticated chancellery of its own that could wield imperial languages and the vernacular as necessary. In 1565, Mehmed corresponded in Ottoman Turkish with the Pasha of Buda's ambassador Hidayet Aga during the latter's lengthy stay in Vienna. He wrote about raiding soldiers, aggression towards merchants, and the debts of a
group of men who had fled to Habsburg territories. Mehmed even asked Hidayet to purchase a decorative boat for him to use during future ambassadorial visits. Hungarian, however, seems to have been his language of choice. In 1557, Mehmed Bey sent a Hungarian letter to the captain of Gyula to extol the benefits of pledging allegiance to the Sultan rather than remaining the servant of Ferdinand, “from whom you get no help whatsoever.” In 1561, while Mehmed was temporarily recommissioned to lead the district of Hatvan, he received a letter from Verantius in which the bishop took issue with Mehmed's refusal to pay an agreed upon ransom. In addition to admonishing Mehmed for his unwillingness to follow through on a promise, Verantius also wrote:

We read in the scriptures, how in heaven, sons are not punished for the sins of their fathers and neither are fathers punished for the sins of their sons. In the same way, in our laws on this earth, it is not customary to punish one person for another person's sins... If you continue to deal with us in this way, do not call me your father any more, because we can give you choice words as well, but we usually do not cheat.

Such intimate letters across the borderland were rare, suggesting that the Catholic bishop and Ottoman statesman had regular contact, with a certain pastoral element. As I argue below, this

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713 Sancakbey Mehmed Bey of Esztergom wrote at least three letters to Hidayet: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 20, Konv. 4 (1565 s.d.), fol. 30-32; HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. A (1565 I-VII), fol. 84-86; and HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 91, Konv. B (1565 VIII-sd), fol. 82–83.

714 “az Ferdand kyraltul the k. semmy segetsegh nynchyen.” Szalay, Négyszáz Magyar Levél, pg. 220–221, #238.

715 “Azt olwassok zentirasban, hogy mikepen menýorzagban az apýth fia bewneerth, sem az fiath apýaýerth nem bintetýk, azon modon ez vilagi Teorwenbenis nem zoktak sohwlt senkýt mas ember vetkeert, es bewneert... ha igi akaiz ennek vtannais mi velewkn chelekeodny, apadnak minket tewbe ne newez, mert mi es zep zoth twdwnk adny, de senkýt chalni nem zoktwnk.” The letter is published in Döbrentei, Magyar iratok, 6–38 (#39) and in Szalay and Wenzel, Verancsics Antal, vol. 3, 209.

716 This is a topic requiring further attention. There is, in fact, plenty of evidence to suggest that another important component of cross-border interactions was religious. The previous Archbishop of Esztergom, Pál Várday had a very complex relationship with the Ottomans as well.
same Mehmed Bey was involved in other activities that unexpectedly blur the lines between the religions of the two empires.

The First Audience: Vernacular Diplomacy in Esztergom

Formal border crossings for imperial embassies between Habsburg and Ottoman Europe were elaborate and well-rehearsed affairs orchestrated by the local governor of Esztergom in coordination with the captain of Komárom. After months of preparations, the two sides met in the woods on the southern bank of the Danube or on the decks of anchored river vessels half way between the two fortresses. A high-ranking representative of the local governor of Esztergom greeted the delegation and their Komárom guides with hundreds of Ottoman soldiers outfitted in their finest clothes. Following a splendid meal, heavy drinking, and much socializing, the two sides parted, with the Ottomans escorting their guests to their lodgings in a suburb of the bustling border town of Esztergom downstream (map 3). The following morning, the governor sent elaborately fitted horses covered in gold and jewels for the ambassador and his attending noblemen to ride through streets, which were lined with garrisoned troops whose ranks increased as the embassy made their way along a processional route to the door of the governor’s house for their formal audience. The 1608 publication of Salomon Schweigger’s travel log used the same images to depict the approach (fig. 15) and audience (fig. 16) in Esztergom as it did for the meeting with the Pasha of Buda. One such visitor, a member of a tribute-carrying delegation of 1572, described such a reception in his travel account:

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717 This was the delegation headed by David Ungnad, Baron of Sonnegk and Preyburg and Edoardo de Provisionali, which carried the late tribute payment for 1571.
As we came to the top [of the tower], we saw the bey in a room, which was adorned with graceful figures\textsuperscript{718} of the crucifixion and the twelve Sibyls. The gentlemen went up to the door, and saw a long table covered in red and white (on which stood many plates and all sorts of fine food stuffs) and they spoke of all sorts things.\textsuperscript{719}

After presenting the governor with a 300 taler gift, they sat down to have dinner while politely discussing ongoing border negotiations. Once the delegation had their fill of food and wine,

...he gave us permission to see the church, which was completely ravaged, except for one chapel, which was built from red marble in the Roman style with the following gilt inscription in Roman letters: ‘Thomas Backotz de Erdeut cardialis Strigoniensis, almae dei genitrici Mariae virgini extruxit, anno 1507.’\textsuperscript{720}

Following their tour, perhaps after a day or two of rest (with further audiences and meals), the soldiers of Esztergom arranged festive displays and bid farewell to the travelers as their guides led them to their next stop, the regional capital of Buda.

Several elements are worth noting about such first encounters between Habsburg and Ottoman subjects at the border. The appropriation of pre-existing architecture and interior decorations by a mid-level Ottoman official seems curious, if not outright blasphemous. The author of this narrative explained the series of events without commenting on the oddity of the

\textsuperscript{718} The use of “\emph{lustigen figuren}” suggests that the author thought highly of these paintings. For a recent (albeit questionable) attribution of other frescoes from the same palace, see Mária Prokopp, “Gli affreschi quattrocenteschi dello Studiolo del Primate del Regno d’Ungheria a Esztergom: Una nuova attribuzione,” in \emph{Italy and Hungary Humanism and Art in the Early Renaissance}, ed. Péter Farbaky and Louis A. Waldman (Florence: Vila I Tatti, 2011), 293–315.

\textsuperscript{719} “Als wir hinauff kommen, ist der beeg uff einem sahl, welcher mit lustigen figuren als kreutzigung urstand, auch der zwolff Sibillen gezieret, gesessen. Dem herrn biß zu der thür entgegen gangen, und bey einer langen, mit roth und weiß gedeckten taffel (daruff viel teller von allerley speccerey gestanden) nidergesessen, und also von allerley geredet.” Franciscus Omichius’s edited volume of travelogues from the delegation of David Ungnad that transported the tribute in 1572 provides scholars with the most detailed description of a formal reception within the palace walls in Esztergom. Franciscus Omichius, ed., \emph{Beschreibung Einer Legation und Reise...} (Güstrow: Ferber, 1582), 12.

\textsuperscript{720} “… hat er uns erlaubt die kirchen zu sehen, welche alle verwüstet, ausser einer capellen, welche vom roten marmorstein auff die römische art gebaut, in der volgender verß mit vergülen römischen buchstaben angeschrieben ist…” Omichius, \emph{Beschreibung}, 12.
Christian symbolism that cloaked the local governor as he sat on his throne in the Sybaline chapel. Indeed, such an appropriation was extremely unusual. The Pasha of Buda himself lived outside the royal palace in a new construction on the waterfront, and it seems as though no other local governor in the region resided in a pre-existing palace. Central authorities at the Ottoman court were fully aware of the symbolic significance of architecture, particularly in diplomatic contexts where they strictly controlled the dynastic image on display. Perhaps as a way to maintain this control, provincial governors (both regional and local) seem to have been discouraged from moving into and thereby appropriating the symbolic architecture of its previous inhabitants.

The tour, though less jarring, recalls other instances of Ottoman officials allowing humanists access to ancient ruins. One can imagine that both sides found the sightseeing excursion pleasant. The erudite visitors would be enthusiastic about showing off their antiquarian skills and copying down the inscriptions while the Ottomans could boast about their possessions and entertain their guests. The author’s description is particularly interesting given the fact that he is silent on other matters of great importance. He does not mention, for example, the fact that the chapel was being used as a mosque, nor does he comment on the condition of the figural decorations in the chapel. The chapel, with its renaissance vaulted dome, was built in 1506 for archbishop Tamás Bakócz (1442–1521) and was a splendid early example of the Florentine classical revival that had spread north of the Alps to the courts of Hungarian King Matthias

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721 As mentioned in the previous chapter. See Gerő, “Residences of the Pashas.”
723 Very little is known about domestic architecture in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire, but travelers frequently commented on the gloomy interiors of residences they entered and the neglected palaces just steps away from them.
Corvinus. Other visitors would dwell on their first glimpse of Muslim worship in action in the small chapel filled with carpets and lanterns and make snide remarks about the appallingly gouged-out eyes of the angels, the Virgin, and even Christ himself in the Carrara marble altarpiece. The tours took other turns as well in the large palace, some being lead though a expansive banquet hall with a gold ceiling filled with rows of painted portraits of the kings of Hungary and then an arcaded marble gallery with sweeping views of the Danube. In each of these settings the Ottomans inhabitants had inscribed their acquired renaissance forms with layers of symbolic meaning. In some places, they added layers of textiles, lights, and scented oils, in others, they carved their marks into the marble and plaster. Such provocative displays of material culture blended past and present, Christian and Muslim, Ottoman and Hungarian into one. How did such cultural appropriation displayed to Habsburg ambassadors sit with Ottoman central authorities? Would they ever notice?

In fact, the castle warden (dizdar), who was one of the few officials directly appointed by the central administration, made sure Constantinople was aware of the peculiar move. He wrote a letter of complaint which resulted in a resolution by the ruling council. On May 26, 1560, the

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728 For an Ottoman description of the chapel, see Evliya, *Seyahatnâmesi*, vol. 6, 164–166. Evliya says “And in this world, there is no other mosque that exists that has been praised by more tongues and more pens than this one (Ve bu dünyâda dahi bu câmi' bir câmi'dir kim diller ile ta'bîr ve kalemlerle tahrîr olunmaz).” Ibid, 164.
Ottoman imperial chancery in Constantinople sent an edict to the Pasha of Buda questioning the apparently recent move of the local governor of Esztergom from his humble abode by the water up to the hilltop former palace residence of the Bishop. The letter ordered the Pasha to look into the move and report back on why and for how long the governor and his men had occupied the once deserted palace. It expressed concern over the simultaneous use of the citadel as a residence and storage facility for the treasury, gunpowder stockpiles, and armory. Warning that living in close proximity to these rooms might lead to an accidental fire or other damage, the administration stated that if the move was found to be essential for the governor, then the treasury needed to be relocated, as it was “improper” for them to be in the same place. They concerns expressed many related layers of discomfort: economic insecurities in relation to the treasury, safety concerns regarding the gunpowder facility, and political anxieties over spatial relations. Despite these concerns, travel narratives like the one from 1572 discussed above, reveal that the governors remained in the upper castle for at least a decade, occasionally making use of its elaborately decorated rooms during diplomatic receptions. Even after the governors returned to the lower town later in the sixteenth century, they continued to provide members of their retinues as guides to the upper castle, utilizing its spaces as part of a larger program of vernacular diplomacy.

At least thirty descriptions by non-Ottoman participants survive detailing various elements of these Esztergom audiences across the fifty years this dissertation covers. The first description of the governor residing within the upper palace comes from a report written by Anton Verantius as he made his way down to Constantinople on July 12, 1567. The report

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stated that the local governor (then Mehmed Bey), who lived up in the castle, sent word with his messenger (who also lived there) that he desired to see the ambassadors before they left, but could not receive them because he was ill. The ambassador Verantius was Bishop of Eger at the time of his 1567 visit, but two years later he would be appointed Archbishop of Esztergom. Had the Ottomans not captured and settled in Esztergom in 1543, Verantius would have moved into the very palace he observed from the deck of his ship. Verantius’ description of this near encounter with the palace and bey does not reveal any hint of his own feeling towards the situation, instead he describes his interactions in a digestible and sparing format befitting the ambassadorial context.

Another description of the local governor living in the castle comes from ambassador Karel Rijm's and his brother Levinus Rijm’s journey to the Constantinople written three years later. On April 22, 1570, a member of the retinue recalls how the ambassador presented his letters and gifts to the bey, and then ate in a dark room with only one window, while the servants ate in another in the Turkish manner (i.e. seated on the floor, probably without utensils). This lack of detail suggests that the rooms in use were not the grand reception halls with painted interiors, but rather unassuming and poorly lit spaces, of which there were plenty within the four-hundred-year-old castle. The pomp and elaborate ceremonials of the reception were confined to spaces largely outside the palace walls: the two parties took part in greeting rituals at a fixed point in the countryside and processions through the town on the arrival and departure of the delegation.

732 Ibid., 153.
The following year, David Ungnad again transported the tribute along the Danube River corridor, this time with Stefan Gerlach, Lutheran chaplain to the retinue, writing the following description of the Esztergom reception: “On the 17th [of June 1573] at 7 in the morning we found ourselves going to the bey or governor of Esztergom. Sir Ungnad, as his Imperial Majesty’s directions indicated, presented him with 300 talers, a beautiful clock, and a gilt vessel.”

After discussing the exchange of prisoners and the situation of villages along the border, Gerlach recalls how

A notable Turk, from the retinue of the governor, took us up to the castle above the city, in their possession for 30 years. It is still magnificent, but the whole thing is destroyed. Long ago, this was where the bishop lived. Now you can still see a room on the Danube side, inside of which are paintings of Christ on the Cross, the Virgin Mary and the Sibyls on the walls, but some have their eyes cut out. Next to it is a large hall with a gold ceiling. The room has wall paintings of the kings of Hungary, but some of the eyes are cut out here too. In front of this is a beautiful walkway with views of the Danube. The most distinguished thing you can see is a high-quality chapel covered in red marble, polished like a mirror, it is a noble work. The castle today, however, is filled with mercenary soldiers and weapons.

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734 It is by now well known that the supposed fanatical iconoclasm of Islamic cultures is often more complicated in practice. In an Ottoman courtly context, figural imagery could be found in nearly all of the fine arts, most notably manuscript illustrations but also individual painted sheets with portraits, non-circulating medals, and a wide range of art objects collected from the far reaches of the globe. This existed alongside the much less studied visual programs of inherited monuments and objects in a post-Byzantine context. Drawings were common outside the courtly context as well. See footnote 403.

Here, just one year after the 1572 audience in front of the merry figures of medieval Christendom and renaissance revival of classical antiquity, the official reception did not occur in the palace at all. Instead, a notable Turk from the retinue of the governor showed them around the palace above the town after they conducted their negotiations. The description of the Sibyl chapel was more detailed, including not just the crucifixion scene and the Sibyls, but also a Virgin Mary and an attached grand hall with portraits of the Kings of Hungary.

None of the subsequent travelers refer to their official receptions in the grand hall. Instead, the young nobleman Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrovic had a typical experience as he accompanied the tribute-carrying embassy in 1591 from the court of Rudolf II. The first formal Ottoman reception of the trip occurred in the bey’s “common unpretending house” in Esztergom. Following of letter and gift exchanges, the embassy was given permission to explore the upper castle. He describes the Bakócz chapel and its use as a mosque, a staircase leading to a private chapel with images of the saints, and the hall of kings. He also describes a renaissance loggia. Thus, while still making the sightseeing a part of the ambassadorial layover in Esztergom, the governor seems to reside no longer in the renaissance halls or conduct the increasingly elaborate rituals in rooms surrounded by Christian paintings.

The travelers who left descriptions of these scenes did not experience a sense of rage, resentment at loss, or nostalgia like other sixteenth-century observers of decay expressed elsewhere. Few embassy members who wrote descriptions had tangible connections to the

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736 Of the subsequent travelers, the famed Ottoman adventurer Evliya Çelebi and his ten volume Seyahatname (Book of Travels) is worth mentioning. In volume 6, he describes Esztergom when he traveled there in 1663, curiously claiming that his jeweler father had helped Sultan Suleiman’s mosque in the border fortress. Evliya Çelebi, Seyahatnâmesi, v. 6, 164–180.

fallen but not forgotten Kingdom of Hungary. Those who would have cultivated deep connections to the architecture and visual programs of Esztergom kept their comments brief. This silence may in part relate to their point of view as mostly Protestant observers of repurposed Catholic spaces. Those who did comment on the state of the renaissance buildings saved their strongest condemnations of Ottoman neglect for their descriptions of the royal palace in Buda. Romantic lamentations about the awful fate of the Hungarian renaissance would only appear in nineteenth-century historiography.

From this overview of audiences in Esztergom, it can be reasonably assumed that the local governor of Esztergom occupied the palace of the former Archbishop between 1560 and 1572. Even though he received an order to abandon this lavish setting in 1560, he continued to conduct his affairs in rooms brimming with dynastic figural representations and Christian iconographic programs for twelve years. Abruptly, in 1573, he moved down to the lower castle again, continuing his duties in a house more suited to his station. While the exact intentions of the local governor with his move cannot be known with any degree of certainty, three possible motives provide us with more context.

The first possible motive relates to the local governor's experimentation with projecting a more inclusive definition of Ottoman imperial culture. Ottoman statesmen generally had an accommodating imperial vision in which all the world would one day subject themselves to Ottoman rule, regardless of religion. This vision took many forms and directions throughout the six-hundred-year history of the empire. In the fifteenth century, Mehmed the Conqueror

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738 Most historians use the descriptions to try to reconstruct the interiors of the Buda castle, which was destroyed several times over the centuries. See András Végh, “A Budai Királyi palota Michael von Saurau utleirasaban [The royal palace of Buda in Michael von Saurau’s travelogue (1567)],” in Várat nyomában: tanulmányok a 60 éves Feld István tiszteletére [On the trail of castles: studies in honour of István Feld on his 60th birthday], ed. István Feld and György Terei (Budapest: Castrum Bene Egyesület, 2011), 297–306.
displayed a calculated flexibility towards Christianity, even courting the pope with subtle hints that he considered converting in order to get Christian Europe to submit to his overlordship. During the early reign of Sultan Süleyman, Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha was the head of a court faction that continued this projection of flexibility towards Christian Europe. In a famous short-lived example, the group commissioned a composite crown for the Sultan which combined elements from the pope's tiara, the emperor's mitrecrown, and Habsburg parade helmets with Islamic motifs. The piece was meant to be an intelligible statement of universal Ottoman claims for a European audience. As generations shifted following the assassination of Ibrahim Pasha in 1536, so too did the focus of the loose group of statesmen who continued this tradition of orienting the empire towards a definition that included Western Christendom. A new faction emerged in the corps of court translators that had a markedly Central European character. Though there is no evidence that the local governor of Esztergom had any contact with the Central European faction in Constantinople, the move into the palace could easily be read as a continuation of this broader message. By appropriating the religious and secular spaces of the Christian past, the local governor projected a vision of the empire as one in which Christian and Muslim alike could co-exist. This would have been a particularly powerful message on the first stop of a long journey to Constantinople, where each town became progressively more foreign. Participants could observe the familiar palace and renaissance religious architecture of the

742 Ács, “Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad.”
governor, reflecting on its similarity to their own institutions back home and imagining how one could accommodate the other.

The second possible motive for the move was the competitive appropriation of both Christian religious space and, more broadly, the history of the Kingdom of Hungary as a whole. Such competitive appropriations would view the local governor's actions in a more sinister light. The Ottoman statesman staked a claim on his possessions through small transformations in interior decorations (such as carpets, hanging lanterns) and irreversibly marked them by deforming certain elements (gouged out eyes). They were both recognizable and deformed. By introducing these changes and showing them off to his guests, he projected a message of domination. This competitive appropriation would correlate with similarly contested spaces of the Balkans studied by Tijana Krstić of Central European University, in which syncretism is read as a site of fierce competition and politicized difference.743 Balázs Sudár has also recently argued that the Ottomans actively sought to usurp the power of pre-existing institutions in Ottoman Hungary in an attempt to locally legitimize their rule.744 His argument put forth five categories of appropriation: the conversion of churches into mosques; the blurring of lines between dervish and mendicant orders; the adoption of graves and memorials from pre-Ottoman times and inscribing them with new meaning; the rewriting of Hungarian history to accommodate an Ottoman past in the Tarihi-i Ungarus; and the adoption of the symbols of sovereign legitimacy inherited from the Kingdom of Hungary (including a pilgrimage to Székesfehérvár to visit the tombs of previous Kings of Hungary and a re-imagination of the crown jewels with a Persian

743 Krstić, Contested Conversions.
provenance). The appropriation of the upper castle in Esztergom easily fits into this competitive narrative.

The third and final possible motivation was that the local governors of Esztergom were using their distance from Constantinople and shifting imperial dynamics to carve out a more important role for themselves in the region. Sudár’s short article does not attempt to provide any one individual with agency in this imperial project, but it is implied that it was taken on with the full knowledge and consent of central authorities. What if this process was not a fully worked out plan on the part of the Ottoman central government, but instead it was a provincially designed and executed legitimization project with different agents participating at different stages, sometimes without the knowledge or consent of others? The exact dates of his move from the riverside house to the upper castle fell at a moment of profound shifts within the Ottoman Empire and in its relationship with its neighbor. The period between 1560 and 1572 saw the death of the Sultan Süleyman and Emperor Ferdinand I, the fall of the fortress of Sziget, and the negotiation and signature of the first unbroken peace treaty between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. It was the moment both empires stopped jostling for power and land and began in earnest their peace-seeking initiatives. The regional governorship also went through a period of adjustments, as several Pashas were replaced in quick succession and the language of communication shifted to the vernacular. In 1567, the Grand Vizier installed his nephew to the post of regional governor in Buda, who held the post for twelve years. In the midst of these transformative changes, the local governors of Esztergom were also swept up in the whirlwind of movement. Documents suggest that a small group of individuals cycled through the post during this twelve-year period. Of these, Mehmed held the post for the long stretches before being deposed and then renamed local governor of Esztergom within a few years. This Mehmed was
the same person who communicated regularly with ambassadors in Vienna and the Archdukes of Esztergom.\footnote{See footnote 713.} Given all this movement and chaos, it is reasonable to assume that one local governor of Esztergom took it upon himself to move to the castle to project a sense of importance. Those who showed up at the threshold to the Ottoman world in Esztergom were often new to the intricate courtly ceremony. Though they would have studied for their trip by reading the works of their predecessors, nothing could prepare them adequately for their first taste of Ottoman reception at the Esztergom court. Perhaps this is why the local governor sought to move into the upper palace and create a sense of grandeur at the first stop across the border. A reception in a former bishop’s palace displays a sense of power that is much more fitting for the symbolic weight of the first stop after the border crossing than a humble abode. After 1572, the new local governor Ali Bey vacated his palatial surroundings. While some of the practices continued, such as the processions through town and tours of the renaissance chapel, the bey himself retired to less ostentatious settings in a humble abode by the water.

The veranacular diplomacy of the local governor of Esztergom and the captain of Komarom was a critical component of cross-border interactions. As statesmen who lived thirty miles away from the gates of their counterparts employed by the neighboring empire, they were responsible for the logistics of border crossings and the management of postal routes. Usually, these exchanged flowed smoothly. In their capacity as hosts-in-chief, they created a diplomatic environment far removed from the centers they represented. This envirnoment cannot be understood without the layers of diplomatic activity that operated on a higher level in Constantinople and Buda, nor can it be understood without acknowledging the difficult task
these agents of the state faced with the diverse body of soldiers they employed, to which we will now turn.
Chapter Five

Soldiers Muddling Material Culture:
Costume and Identification in the Ottoman-Habsburg Borderlands

On September 21, 1588, the Habsburg Archduke in Vienna reminded his Ottoman counterpart in Buda of the insufficiency of costume descriptions in establishing the personal identities of a group of rogue soldiers whose recent raids had endangered the longstanding peace treaty between the two imperial rivals. Accusations of violence by ambiguously clothed soldiers were a regular topic of discussion in their extensive surviving correspondence. This time, a group of unidentified armed men in “Turkish clothing” had set fire to the earthen fort of Szentmárton. The matter would be properly investigated and reported on, however, Archduke Ernst concedes that their attire accounts for little. Csákány fortress, he reminds Sinan Pasha, was attacked recently by a group of Ottoman soldiers not only wearing “Hungarian hats” (pileis Hungarias) and “wigs” (capillamento ficticio), but also “German clothing” (vestimenti Germanics). The usual identity markers could not be trusted.

This exchange between Ernst and Sinan highlights a recurring problem in the Ottoman Habsburg borderlands: how could one tell the subjects of the Sultan apart from the subjects of the Holy Roman Emperor? Individuals living along the borderlands, after all, were not confined by walls, patrolling soldiers, or checkpoints. Only members of official imperial delegations or merchants with permission to trade in the area possessed identity papers. These letters of safe conduct, which included signatures and seals of local imperial representatives, did not exist for the common soldiers and villagers of the region. Here, as elsewhere in the early modern world,

746 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 67, Konv. 3 (1588 IX), fol. 37–41.
identity ultimately came down to the interpretation of a set of signs and symbols in the form of articles of clothing. Yet as the exchange between Ernst and Sinan shows, this reliance on the material culture of the body as an identification marker was fraught with complications. Much ink and blood would be spilled over the confusion caused by costume related anxieties of status. Groups moving across geopolitical realms, commissioning wearable arts across the border, exchanging textile gifts, and forging multiple self-images in conversation with their surroundings muddled these distinctions beyond recognition.

This chapter examines the vernacular language of the border by exploring the relationship between dress and identification practices using archival sources, travel narratives, and visual materials. How do you tell the subjects of the Sultan apart from the subjects of the Emperor? I argue that subjects both knowingly and unknowingly played with these distinctions, rendering them almost meaningless. The chapter begins by looking at the travelers and officials who posed such questions as “who are you?” as they sought to identify and follow dress protocol while traveling from Vienna through Buda on their way to Constantinople. Using images of soldiers in contemporary costume books, it highlights a few complicated elements of costume that appear in the border region, focusing on the winged hussar shield. Exploring the history of the shield shape and decoration through textual and visual descriptions alongside surviving examples in museum collections, I suggest that such shields were rare items, primarily used at the Habsburg court to represent the exotic half-wild Ottoman enemy rather than in the actual battlefield. Then, the chapter goes on to examine circumstances of both purposeful deceit and the unintentional mixing of costume elements to show how practices of clothing, draping, and arming the body were just as fluid and permeable as the border itself.
Thus, this chapter contributes to ongoing debates about sites of identity producing encounters, in which verbal and visual acts defined and delimited groups in conversation with each other. Recent scholarship has interrogated Ottoman identity by examining ships at sail in the Red Sea, Venetian port cities along the Aegean coast, the maze of food stalls in bazars, tables of caravansaries, and courts of Albanian born viziers. The elusive subject of the Sultan has been shown, time and again, to be contingent and relational, far from fixed. Subjects of the Holy Roman Emperor have received similar attention in recent scholarship, thanks to the survival of ego documents. These studies have illuminated how individuals negotiated self-representation in a world that was rapidly changing around them. The men and women of German cities have been explored to examine the inner psychic landscapes of renaissance self-fashioning. Those who moved beyond the city-walls have been studied to

747 Casale, “Ethnic Composition of Ottoman Ship Crews.”
reveal the nature of identification technologies.\textsuperscript{755} By focusing here on identification, through word and image, rather than some illusive and primordial “identity,” I follow the example of Austrian historian Valentin Groebner.\textsuperscript{756} Here, in a place one might expect to find the starkest differentiation and mechanisms of control, we find the distinctions between Ottoman and Habsburg, between East and West to break down into a series of loose signifiers.

The Spaces Between the Teeth: Soldiers Beyond the Fortress Walls

Nestled between pages eight and nine in the 1608 edition of Salomon Schweigger's travelogue chronicling his 1577 trip from Vienna to Istanbul, the woodcut image of the border between Habsburg and Ottoman Europe seems peculiar and rather modest (fig. 19). The tripartite fold-out landscape depicts the Habsburg controlled fortress of Komárom on the far right, an island in the middle of the Danube with bubbles of smoke emitting from the cannons positioned along the ramparts as they salute the delegation. A fleet of eighteen oared ships with flags waving above allow the water to carry them towards the Ottoman realm. A cluster of ships on the far left indicates a time lapse, with the delegation’s arrival at their first and most critical destination: the encounter with their Muslim neighbors. The image encourages the reader to sink into the landscape of the frontier, the central panel of the triptych highlighting the unsettling aspects of the crossing, with tufts of vegetation doting a desolate landscape and the meandering lines of the choppy Danube waters leading the eye from right to left and back again. In 1591, Baron Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrovic narrated a similar crossing:

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{755} Groebner, \textit{Who are You?}
\textsuperscript{756} This means focusing on recording speech acts as “pragmatically deployed political instruments.” Groebner, \textit{Who are You}, 167. On speech acts as a concept, see R. B. Le Page and Andrée Tabouret-Keller, \textit{Acts of Identity: Creole-Based Approaches to Language and Ethnicity} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). For a measured application of this theory, see Burke, \textit{Languages and communities.}
Thus, we voyaged some hours down the Danube, till we espied the Turkish boats, which were ten in number. The Turkish boats were exactly similar to ours in all respects, except in carrying only one gun each. On land about one hundred very fine-looking and well-appointed Turkish horsemen rode towards us, and, on perceiving us, set spurs to their horses and galloped to the very brink of the Danube. Herr von Kregwitz then ordered the boats to cast anchor. We disembarked in the bank and welcomed and were welcomed by our Turkish friends, and ere long partook of dinner together in the boats. It was certainly matter of wonder, to a person who had never beheld anything of the kind before, to see the beautiful horses, the lances with streaming pennons, the sabers inlaid with silver, gold, and precious stones, the magnificent cloths of blue and red, the gilded saddles and caparisons of the Turks; and I think they must have equipped themselves in this manner on purpose.  

By 1591, when Mitrovic wrote his description of the embassy’s crossing of the threshold of the Ottoman Empire along the thirty-mile stretch of the Danube between Komárom and Esztergom, the processional motions were already fixed in tradition. At least eighteen travelers before Mitrovic had composed descriptions of the journey between the two fortress-cities in the second half of the sixteenth century. The first to record the expedition after the Ottoman conquest of the Danube corridor was Hans Dernschwam, an agent of the Fugger merchant family of Augsburg. His short description of the riverboat voyage recalls the moment he encountered the 200 Turkish escorts and his impressions of the old city of Esztergom, remarking on the Christian visual elements of the cloister and church visible from the water. One year later, Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq made the journey as ambassador, crossing the borderlands in November of 1554 and returning at the same time as Dernschwam in August of 1555. Busbecq provides a more detailed and nervous account of how he expected the Habsburgs and Turks to

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758 Dernschwam, *Tagebuch*.
759 Ibid., 3.
attack each other and did not allow them to get too close, only to discover later that his enormous Turkish escort was fully dressed for a ceremonial procession, and not war.  

These ceremonial crossings reveal a functioning border seen from an imperial point of view. They describe two cultural spheres separated by a frontier zone, which could theoretically be mapped onto a geographical projection. But modern historical maps of the region are deeply misleading (map 1). Each one takes a strong position on legitimate sovereignty and presents it as fact, rather than something constantly negotiated on the ground. Instead of the thick black lines marking these boundaries on modern maps, the borderlands remained remarkably flexible. Inhabitants of the frontier fortresses and villages lived just a few hours' ride on horseback away from one another and remained in regular and stable contact across the mythical dividing lines that zigzagged throughout the countryside. A constant trickle of border crossers from all ranks of society appear in the archives. Some resided in disputed settlements, paying taxes to both sides while those in power sent lists of villages and negotiating agents back and forth to evaluate and inscribe borders in their record books.

The light cavalry on both the Ottoman and Habsburg sides were hired men with local ties who often had more in common with each other than the side they fought for. These men, who existed not in-between empires as some scholars have discussed them but rather across them, regularly changed their identity markers out of convenience. These groups spoke their own mixed languages and operated outside traditional legal systems with their own codes of honor. Such men were characteristic of early modern borderlands globally. They remind us that the

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762 On the record books see Tracy, “The Logic of Kleinkrieg.”
terms Habsburg (German) and Ottoman (Turkish) represented dynastic affiliations that came mostly with monetary repercussions. These affiliations were not hard and fast. Neither, as we will see, were the identification markers. The absence of sumptuary laws regulating the dress of these soldiers was connected to the dire financial situation of the borderlands. Central authorities struggled to feed their garrisoned soldiers. Captains regularly submitted petitions urging the court to settle years of unpaid salaries. Any attempt to regulate what was worn would have likely been met with shrugs of indifference or resistance. Without formal protocol, costume related anxieties of status found their way into nearly every situation; a fact frequently noted by those who passed through the region on official business.

Costume Books: Registers of Informal Dress Protocol?

It was the imperial ambassadors and their retinues who had a vested interest in identifying and following dress protocol as they entered the spaces where Ottoman hierarchical

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764 Sumptuary laws were popular with soldiers in wealthy cities. For more on the cultural dynamics behind sumptuary laws throughout history, see Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary Law (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
766 During the period between 1543 and 1593, there were no peasant uprisings in Habsburg Hungary. There were however multiple smaller incidents in Transylvania. See Géza Pálffy, “Ewige Verlierer oder auch ewige Gewinner? Aufstände und Unruhen im frühneuzeitlichen Ungarn,” in Die Stimme der ewigen Verlierer?: Aufstände, Revolten und Revolutionen in den österreichischen Ländern (ca. 1450–1815), ed. Peter Rauscher (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2013), 152–75.
society was put on display. Many of them turned to the new medium of costume books to visualize and organize the social fabric of their surroundings as they stepped across the border. The sixteenth-century costume book tradition compiled images of people, costumes, and customs from single events or cities, regions, and continents into one handheld volume. The earliest identified costume book in manuscript form was that of Christoph Weiditz from 1529, famous for its representations of indigenous men from New Spain. The first costume book in print was the “Collection of the Various Styles of Clothing” which appeared in Paris in 1562. It was quickly followed by countless editions, translations, and similar projects published in Venice and Amsterdam. In addition to these printed volumes exclusively devoted to costume, a growing number of regional historical works included sections on costume. The widespread copying and borrowing of images produced complex iconographic genealogies often based on imagination rather than the actual clothing of or encounter with the represented figure. With the ever-increasing early modern awareness of the vastness and diversity of the world, the genre of

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771 For example, see Wilhelm Dilich, Ungarische Chronica (Kassel: Wilhelm Wessel, 1606).
costumes books mapped perceptions about differences in clothing and manners, using geographic place names as markers and focusing on situating subjects in definable spaces.\textsuperscript{772}

A subsection of this larger tradition focused on the Ottoman Turks and the city of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{773} These wildly popular volumes served many functions for consumers from the upper and emerging middle classes. Armchair travelers and real travelers alike treasured them as handheld exotic commodities while others examined them from an antiquarian interest, or used them to engage with contemporary discourses on proto-ethnography. Some scholars have suggested they served as moralizing didactic tools to foster a critical self-awareness of one’s own extravagances and simultaneously, if not paradoxically, as justifications for the ultimately superior social position of the viewer.\textsuperscript{774} Other scholars suggest that costume albums both built on and complicated the stereotypical rendering of the Turk as a barbaric warrior to be tamed through conversion.\textsuperscript{775} Artists across Europe also made use of costume albums as model books to “accurately” represent exotic peoples from neighboring and distant lands in other media such as paintings and woodcarvings.\textsuperscript{776}

While most surviving examples covering the Ottoman Empire are copies for collectors of the curious, the core group of sixteenth-century costume books dealing exclusively with the Ottoman world were actually made for ambassadors of the Holy Roman Empire to the Porte and

\textsuperscript{773} On Ottoman costume books, see Atasoy, “Birth of Costume Books.”
\textsuperscript{774} Jones, “Habits Holdings, Heterologies.”
their retinues. At least seven of the earliest sixteenth-century examples can be directly connected to Habsburg embassies: Melchior Lorck’s drawings, Lambert de Vos’ album for Karl Rijm, the album for Jacques de Bracle, the album for Lambert de Wyts, the album for David Ungnad, the album for Johannes Lewenklaus, the album for Bartholomäus Schachman, and Heinrich Hendrowski's album for Bartholomäus Pezzen. This connection between costume albums and Habsburg embassies to the Porte has not received enough attention.

777 This is often obscured in the literature on Ottoman costume books because of a focus on the large number of seventeenth century examples and questions of repetition and influence. See the list of 117 albums listed in the appendix of Rudolf H. Stichel, “Das Bremer Album und deine Stellung unterhalb der orientalischen Trachtenbücher,” in Das Kostümbuch des Lambert de Vos: vollständige Faksimile-Ausgabe im Originalformat des Codex Ms. or. 9 aus dem Besitz der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen., ed. Hans-Albrecht Koch and Armin Hetzer (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1991), 31–54.

778 This project was conceptualized while Lorck was in the embassy of Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq between 1555 and 1559. Lorck turned his drawings into woodcuts in the 1570s, though the project remained unpublished until a century later. See the study by Erik Fischer, Ernst Jonas Bencard, and Mikael Bøgh Rasmussen, Melchior Lorck, 5 vols. (Copenhagen: Royal Library, 2009).

779 This manuscript was made for resident ambassador Karl Rijm in 1574 and has underdrawings and notes beneath the paint suggesting it was produced in collaboration with Ottoman artists. See the study and facsimile edition, Hans-Albrecht Koch, ed., Das Kostümbuch des Lambert de Vos: vollständige Faksimile-Ausgabe im Originalformat des Codex Ms. or. 9 aus dem Besitz der Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Bremen (Graz: Akademische Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1991).

780 From the Ungnad embassy of 1572. This set of images is currently on the art market, for sale in Vienna at Antiquariat INLIBRIS Gilhofer Nfg. GmbH. It is bound with de Bracle's travel narrative and the illustrations are identified with Italian inscriptions, possibly added by Edoardo de Provisionali.

781 From the Ungnad embassy of 1572, ÖNB, Cod. Vindobonensis Palatinus 3325.


783 ÖNB, Cod. 8615 Han. From the tribute carrying delegation of Heinrich von Liechtenstein and based on the lost album of Ungnad.

784 Member of the 1589 tribute carrying deegation of see the exhibition catalogue Olga Nefedova, ed., Bartholomäus Schachman (1559–1614): The Art of Travel (Milan: Skira, 2013). A very similar album is in the Landesbibliothek, Kassel, 4° Ms. hist. 31.

785 Circa 1590, from his time as resident ambassador (1587–91). ÖNB, Cod. 8626 Han. See the partial facsimile edition Alberto Arbasino, ed., I Turchi: Codex Vindobonensis 8626 (Parma: F.M. Ricci, 1971). For the attribution, see the introduction to the same volume by Unterkircher.
partly because so little was known about the diplomatic context in which they were produced. Though this group of objects is connected to these Europe-wide trends, the fact that they were produced for embassy members sets them apart. Why were they commissioned? Who made them? What were they used for? What was the role of the borderland in the costume book? Most importantly for this chapter, what do they reveal about the exchanges between the official diplomats commissioning them and the vernacular worlds they represented?

Little is known about the artists who made the seven ambassadorial costume books produced in the sixteenth century. All were likely members of the embassies themselves, some of whom worked closely with local artists in Constantinople. Many were experienced heraldry painters, who were otherwise occupied with copying the coats of arms of friends into autograph albums, such as the *album amicorum* of Johann Prackh and that of Leonhard Lang of Durach, both attached to the Habsburg embassy to Constantinople between 1587 to 1591.

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786 Above all, Lorck has received the most scholarly attention. Lambert de Vos' name is attached to another album of drawings in Trinity College Library, Cambridge (MS Freshfield O. 17.2). Nicolaus Andrea, a pupil of Lorck's who remained in Constantinople remains unstudied. Others included Michal Fischer and Heinrich Hendrowski. For a discussion of some of the artists, see Ulrike Ilg, “Bebilderte Reiseberichte aus dem Osmanischen Reich in deutscher Sprache (16. bis 17. Jahrhundert),” in *Das Bild des Feindes: Konstruktion von Antagonismen und Kulturtransfer im Zeitalter der Türkenkriege: Ostmitteleuropa, Italien und Osmanisches Reich*, ed. Eckhard Leuschner, Thomas Wünsch, and Daniel Lalic (Berlin: Gebr. Mann Verlag, 2013), 55–76. See also Klusáková, *Road to Constantinople*, 20–26.

787 The de Vos album, for example, contains what appears to be notes in Ottoman Turkish underneath the paint. These seem to relate to the color to be applied to each image. These notes seem to appear on the right edge of certain color blocks (frequently red, brown, and yellow). See, for example, several notes on folio 35r.


789 This manuscript is on the art market, currently for sale in Vienna at Antiquariat INLIBRIS Gilhofer Nfg. GmbH.

These autograph albums were filled with sumptuous collections of Ottoman marbled and silhouetted papers covered in signatures and sketches, sometimes including single costumed images. They reveal that the costume albums were just one element of a diverse shared visual culture in early modern Constantinople. While in the seventeenth century, such albums were widely available in the bazaar, the sixteenth-century group seems to form a coherent set ranging in quality. In each of these costume books, the accompanying text above and below each image identifies the costumed type drawn on the center of each page (see figs. 20-22). The faces are stereotypical, in many cases identical: an endless procession of eunuchs, groomsmen, women headed towards the baths, street vendors, water sellers, and foreign visitors to the city. Unless they belonged to a group that received imperially issued uniforms, the figures are sewn, draped, and armed in a wide range of materials and styles. Paging through the manuscripts, the viewer was meant to internalize the types, making present and future encounters less foreign, and able to fit into registers of recognition.

Artists attempted to create comprehensive volumes on Ottoman life, often including the border region. The costume book made for ambassador Dr. Bartholomaus Pezzen, for example, begins with an image (fig. 20) of five notables from the border region (Granitzer Beuelchs haber). The men wear yellow heeled boots, tightly fitted pants stitched to reveal the muscular contours of the legs beneath the fabric, short robes with belts and a range of furs, capes, and caps or turbans. At first glance, they appear foreign, an impulse reinforced as the viewer turns the

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791 For an early costume book example that combines these two traditions, see the 1570 album of Balázs Csőbőr of Szigetvár in the Herzog August-Bibliothek, Wolfenbüttel, (Cod. 206). See Szakály, Szigetvári Csőbőr.
pages further, browsing through mounted horsemen covered in furs and a series of men with metal implements imbedded in their skins. Yet, when one covers the headgear of the five notables from the border region and examines only their clothing, arms, and shoes, they morph into something more familiar. Those familiar with early modern European fashion will notice that the figures are dressed exactly like contemporary Central Europeans: tight European hose, loose mail shirts, carrying battle axes, hammers, and curved sabered and straight daggers. Though they wear Ottoman dolman robes, they are cut at the top of the thigh in a form typical of those tailors imitating Ottoman styles in Central Europe.

Lambert de Vos’ album for ambassador Karl Rijm contains a similar figure (fig. 21) that appears among a series of pages devoted to ethnic minorities and individuals from the provinces. Surrounded by images labeled “Moors,” “Jewish doctors,” “Kurds,” and “Armenians,” is a “Gazi or Knight from the Frontiers,” the only one in the series to lack an ethnic marker. His costume elements are filled with the same socio-cultural ambiguity as the men in Pezzen’s album. Along with his captivating expression, he wears a floppy hat, a thigh length dolman, a leopard skin cape, tight European hose, heeled yellow Ottoman boots with Western European rowel

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796 Fol. 97r, “Casi seu Eques ex Limitibus.”
spurs, a saber, and he carries a Central European wooden shield known as a targe with a panoply of protruding feathers. Each of these costume elements has a complicated history on its own, deserving more detailed individual studies. What I want to highlight is that here, rather than being identified with a geo-political or ethnic terms as the figures surrounding them, they are labeled as people of the border. This ambiguous description suggests a tension between what artists and audiences sought to understand about the differences between Habsburg and Ottoman subjects and the realities that existed on the borderland.

**Borderland Soldiers and the Hussar Targe**

The third panel of Pieter Coecke van Aelst the Yonger’s *Moeurs et fachons de faire de Turcz* (Customs and Fashions of the Turks, 1553) (Fig. 22-23) includes a turbaned figure carrying a curved trapezoidal shield sprouting feathers. He wears a shield decorated with a winged eagle foot embellished with a protruding row of quills down the centre, and two circular bolts and a star to fasten the leather handles on the other side. Melchior Lorck’s (1526/1527-after 1583) sixteenth-century woodcuts for his *Turkish Publication* includes four similarly feathered shields. Yet the type of wooden shield these figures carry is very different from the classic Ottoman *kalkan*, which was a convex disc made of metal or woven reeds and painted

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798 See, for example, Metropolitan Museum of Art, acc. no. 14.25.1713.
800 There are several copies of this work preserved in its entirety in museum collections, among others in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam RP-P-OB-2304D; the Bibliothèque Royale de Belgique in Brussels, S II 32364; the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, 28.85.1-7a, b.
silks. The angled shield is a hussar targe, often labelled as a “Hungarian type” by curators. Composed of a convex piece of wood lined with leather, then gessoed and painted, the shield enables full mobility of the right hand while providing protection of the left side and back through the shoulders. While the technique and tradition is clearly Central European, in the sixteenth century, this type of shield, often with feathers attached, appears in countless Northern European images of Ottomans. Yet an examination of contemporary surviving objects, textual descriptions, and visual representations suggests that the shield was embellished upon by artists, publishers, and viewers as they attempted to draw boundary markers where they did not exist in the overlapping borderlands of Ottoman Europe.

An object-based approach traces the corpus of extant shields by developing a typology, and teasing out when and where such shields were used. My survey of the extant examples suggests that not one single authentic shield of this type is preserved in any collection of Ottoman arms and armour. Shields with real feathers pasted onto them, such as the ones in Pieter Coecke’s and Melchior Lorck’s woodcuts, do not exist at all. Instead, at least eleven

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802 The “Hungarian” label appears to come from a monumental exhibition held at the end of the nineteenth century in which a several of these shields were on display. János Szendrei, ed., Magyar hadtörténelmi emlékek: az ezredéves országos kiállításon, a hadtörténelmi csoportbizottság megbízásából [Relics of Hungarian Military History: at the national millenial exhibition, under the direction of the military history commission] (Budapest: Franklin-Társulat, 1896).
803 A colleague at the Hungarian National Museum has convincingly argued that such shields developed out of the fifteenth century version with a lance rest. See Kovács, Huszár fegyverek, 255–63.
804 Two later (early twentieth-century?) copies are on display at the Askeri Museum in Istanbul.
805 Nor do any survive with signs of once having real feathers attached. The only feathered hussar targe known to exist is aesthetically very different from these, and can be found in the Kunsthistorisches Museum’s Hofjagd- und Rüstkammer, Inv. Nr. B188. Used during the wedding celebrations of Archduke Ferdinand II and Anna Caterina Gonzaga in 1582, the painted
examples have feathers painted onto their surfaces and can be traced back to Imperial Habsburg collections (fig. 24-25). Their dramatically sweeping angles place them in the second half of the sixteenth century, and recent research has connected them to hussar tournaments held at the courts of Central Europe, where jousts were staged between contestants dressed up as Turks and Christians. The motif of the eagle talon was a stock symbol of heraldry painters who were in charge of decorating shields. The fact that these craftsmen were also involved in the decoration of autograph books and costume books reveals a possible transfer point, in which a European symbol morphs into an Ottoman one. Working from the objects, one is tempted to suggest that such shields were never in use in the Ottoman Empire, and in this case, belong to an imagined Turk.


These include the Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna, Schloss Ambras Collection, Inv. Nos. WA 494, WA 2783; Hofjagd- und Rüstkammer, Inv. Nr. RB 185; Hungarian National Museum, Budapest, 55.3550; and at least four examples in the Forchtenstein Castle of the Esterházy family, Austria.


The study of heraldry is a popular field for amateur historians, particularly those interested in genealogy. These studies, though methodologically problematic, are often all that a scholar has at their disposal. Academic studies have primarily examined the coat-of-arms in relation to the person being represented rather than the artist or craftsman representing them. For a fascinating example of what can be done with such materials when asking new questions, see Monica Dominguez Torres, “Emblazoning Identity: Indigenous Heraldry in Colonial Mexico and Peru,” in Contested Visions in the Spanish Colonial World, ed. Ilona Katzew and Luisa Elena Alcalá (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press and Los Angeles County Museum of Art, 2011), 96–115.

On other examples of tropes associated with the imagined Turk in Northern European printed media, see Charlotte Colding Smith, Images of Islam, 1453–1600: Turks in Germany and Central Europe (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2014).
A second approach to studying these objects involves examining contemporary descriptions of light cavalry divisions employed on both sides of the border. Developed in the region for their speed and stealth, frequent mention is made of these hussars, and the deli branch of the akıncı, who attack quickly, pillage, and retreat. Scholarly research on them is scant, with their later manifestation in the Polish military receiving the most thorough treatment.810 Evliya Çelebi (1611-1682), when comparing Hungarian to Ottoman soldiers in the seventeenth century, remarked that “they are no different from our frontier soldiers, wearing the same dress as they, and riding the same thoroughbred horses.”811 He was not the only one to note this phenomenon, but did this similarity in costume extend to the use of the same shield? And if so, can we find descriptions of shields with wings and feathers? Yes and no.

In Mustafa Celalzade Çelebi’s description of deli soldiers from his history of the reign of Sultan Süleyman,812 the historian describes a group of men participating in the Battle of Mohacs (1526) cloaked in leopard skins, crying out loudly, and carrying “teknese kalkanlar.”813 Teknese designates a shape, made by scooping out one side of a log longitudinally like the hull of a ship.814 Thus, it seems that some form of curved shield was in fact used, but feathers do not appear. The Central European hussar and the Ottoman equivalent, the deli branch of the akıncı

811 “Ve serhadli askerimizden fark olunmaz, eyle esbâb geyüp küheylân at binerie…” Evliyâ Çelebi, Seyahatnâmesi, vol. 7, 87)
developed organically in the region as a type of early modern guerrilla soldier. These branches of irregular light cavalry were known for their speed, stealth, and dramatic costumes. While scholars often speak of them separately today, many contemporaries simply called them “your hussars” and “our hussars.” Reinhold Lubenau (1556-1631), a pharmacist to the tribute-carrying delegation of 1587, mentions the deli or wild-men at the court of the local governor of Esztergom. During their formal reception, he notes a group men in feathered costumes with decorated armours standing behind the governor. Many other travellers note men with feathers, but they usually refer to the ubiquitous Balkan Sufi dervishes who pierce their skins during rituals and insert metal instruments and feathers into the wounds. In fact, the most explicit descriptions of feathered soldiers come from descriptions of hussars in Komárom rather than those in Esztergom or Buda. In 1587, Jakob Fürer von Haimendorf, wrote the following about his encounter with Komárom's cavalrymen: “On May 17, the captain of the fortress Miklós

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815 For a study of the development focused of this type of soldier focused on Hungary, see János B. Szabó, A honfoglalóktól a huszárokig: a középkori magyar könnyulovasságról [From the migration to the hussars: light cavalry in Medieval Hungary] (Budapest: Argumentum K., 2010).

816 Often within a national context such as Polish or Hungarian hussars and the Turkish deli. For examples of imaginative renditions on both sides, see Zoltán Barcy and Gyozo Somogyi, Magyar huszárok [Hungarian Hussars] (Budapest: Móra Könyvkiadó, 1987) and David Nicolle, Armies of the Ottoman Turks, 1300–1774 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1983).

817 For example, Melchior Besolt refers to the Turkish soldiers as hussars when description of a procession to a sporting event in honor of the Habsburg ambassador (Heinrich von Liechtenstein) in 1584, “Nach dem Basscha ritten uber die 400. Hussarn mit iren Copien und Dartschen.” See his travel narrative published in Saad Ed-Din et al., Chronica, 519. Wenceslas Wratislaw of Mitrovic even mentions that “While the principal Turks were dining with the ambassador the hussars of both parties walked on the plain and conversed together in a friendly manner, their horses and lances being held by hermeks or grooms.” Wratislaw, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas, 2.

818 Lubenau and Sahm, Beschreibung der Reisen, 95.

819 For just one example, see Busbecq, The life and letters, 396. On dervish culture in the border region, see Gábor Ágoston and Balázs Sudár, Gül Baba és a magyarországi bektasi dervisek [Gül Baba and the Besiktas dervishes of Hungary] (Budapest: Terebess K., 2002). More generally, see Ahmet T. Karamustafa, God’s Unruly Friends: Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period 1200–1550 (Oxford: Oneworld, 2006).
Pálffy held a military exercise with his hussars and rode out with flags, which I wanted to watch, because these knights mostly wore tiger pelts and covered themselves with eagle and heron feathers and carried lances.”

Thus, written sources indicate the presence of feathers as decoration and curved shields, but not necessarily combined into the shield. However, feathers seem to have played a role in military exercises on the Habsburg side of the border.

The third approach involves sifting through depictions of these shields by both European and Ottoman artists, viewing them not as factual representations of costume, but as reflections of the artist’s visual vocabulary. The feathered shield became a conventional way of depicting the half-wild Ottoman soldiers. The wide-ranging corpus of visual evidence suggests that in the European imagination, Ottoman troops regularly utilized these angled wooden shields, often with wings attached. The angled hussar shield appears in the hands of Ottoman figures as early as the 1530s, in works such as the *Commemorative Medal of the Battle of Mohacs* (fig. 26), which includes two rows of turbaned forward attacks carrying examples with crescents and stars decorating them. The feathered version of the shield seen in *Moeurs et fachons*... (fig. 23) becomes prominent with the rise of the costume book tradition. For example, Melchior Lorck’s set of prints includes over ten figures from all parts of the empire wielding the shield (fig. 27). Work on these prints began a decade after his trip, but the project remained incomplete at the time of his death, with titles and text added to his images in 1646, 1683 and 1688.

821 Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Münzkabinett, inv. nos. 2639b, 2640 b.
822 Fischer et al., *Melchior Lorck*, 12–20. They suggest these descriptions were based on a now lost manuscript that accompanied these woodcuts. I find this argument unconvincing. These later
Costume Book of Lambert de Vos (fig. 21), working for Ambassador Karl Rijm, also includes a “Commander from a Border Province.” The image is remarkably similar to the image of a “deli” from 1577 attributed to Abraham de Bruyn (fig. 28). This image and others like it were made in Flanders without any contact with Ottoman soldiers. This case highlights a wider phenomenon that would continue to leave traces in printed media through the twentieth century: artists recycled these stock images, both within the costume book genre and outside of it.

It was not only German and Dutch artists that depicted Ottomans with these shields. Several Ottoman manuscripts also include them in images of campaigns against the Kingdom of Hungary. In an illuminated copy of Celalzade’s Tabakât ül-Memâlik ve Derecât ül-Mesâlık from 1575, rows of turbaned Ottoman soldiers holding these shields appear during the siege of Belgrade (fig. 29). This intriguing manuscript, copied by a certain Ibrahim bin Ali of Szolnok (who signed and dated it on folio 369b), reflects the projections of a middling officer from the Hungarian provinces where it was most likely made. Its amateur illustrations offer a rare glimpse of provincial artistic practices. The crudely drawn fortresses, rivers, and flags appear as large blocks of solid colours with their paint layer crackling and peeling from the surface of the page. They stand in stark contrast to the refined heading atop the opening page in blue and red additions by seventeenth-century publishers, who had no direct experience with the Ottomans were motivated by financial interests and had a proclivity for exaggeration. This includes one of the first descriptions of a deli soldier with a winged shield.

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824 ÖNB, Osm Hist 41.
825 In her survey of the surviving examples of Celalzade’s work, Petra Kappert writes that along with several omitted parts of the text, the edition has an unusually high number of careless mistakes. Mustafa Çelebi Celâlzade, Geschichte, 49–50. Szolnok was an important border fortress near Transylvania that was captured by the Ottomans in 1552. Ottoman bureaucrats traditionally added the name of a town to their signature if they were either born there or if they served there at the time they wrote. The 1575 date of the manuscript makes the latter possibility more likely for Ibrahim bin Ali, since his name suggests he was not a convert (otherwise he would have called himself bin Abdullah).
ink embellished with gold leaf and two of the illustrations. The folios depicting the siege of Belgrade (45a) and the battle of Mohacs (103b-140b) contain more delicate underdrawings and details in a wide range of hues to depict soldiers and the surrounding landscape. They include several out-of-place details: scale armour shirts that reach mid-thigh not used by Ottoman soldiers, spade shaped flag-ensigns found in seventeenth-century Transylvania, and the sharply angled hussar shields decorated with painted foliage. Six further blank pages, some ruled in preparation for illustrations, reveal that the manuscript remained incomplete. The two illustrations of higher quality likely underwent restoration in the nineteenth century, when a copy of the Mohacs image was made for the Hungarian National Library in preparation for a publication.

But the shields appear in other manuscripts as well: sometimes carried only by troops fighting for the Habsburgs and the Kingdom of Hungary (fig. 30), in others only by the Ottomans (fig. 31), and in a few, both sides carry them (fig. 32). Importantly, the shields only appear in images of Ottoman operations in the province of Budin and its surrounding area. What is more, these manuscripts were often worked on by artists of Central European origin, such as painter E in the Süleymanname of 1558. This painter E also worked on the only two Ottoman

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826 Often called “Sarmatian”, this style of armor was widely produced in the nineteenth century as part of the romantic revival to satisfy the tastes of collectors.

827 The Museum of Applied Arts in Budapest contains the only known example of the shape currently dated to the seventeenth century from the Esterhazy collection (E 71.5). A Hungarian inscription identifies it as that which was captured from the Pasha of Bosnia, Ibrahim Sokolovics, in 1623 by Nicolas Esterhazy. I believe the dating of this piece should be adjusted. Szendrei, Magyar hadtörténelmi emlékek, #534. The misplaced costume details and the possibility of heavy nineteenth-century interventions during a restoration make the manuscript problematic for ascertaining the trajectory of individual details.

828 Süleymanname (Book of Süleyman), Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1517. See Esin Atı, Süleymanname: The Illustrated History of Süleyman the Magnificent (Washington, D.C.: National Gallery of Art, 1986). Painter E’s identity is not certain, but the hand was identified in a thorough analysis of the images in the introduction of this edition of the work.
manuscripts (that I am aware of) which include hussar shields with wings painted onto their surfaces. Thus, taking a representation-based approach, we see that while European artists depicted widespread usage of the feathered hussar shield, Ottoman artists (possibly of Central European origin) depicted them only in narrow borderland contexts. When taking these observations into account alongside those made examining textual and material sources, we can conclude that shields of this shape were part of a shared Central European tradition and the lively feathered versions were part of the imaginary Turk.

Similar inquiries into other costume elements of the figures from the borderlands produce similar results. Certain hats, shoes, overcoats, and weapons used in the borderland by local populations found their way into representations of Ottoman Turks across Europe. The remainder of this chapter explores archival and written evidence of various methods for costume elements to travel across borders and be used in contexts that might have led to misunderstanding and confusion. It is divided into intentionally deceitful dress and unintentional consequences of everyday practices that allowed for the muddling of traditional identification in the border region.

**Intentionally Deceitful Costumes**

The Ottoman raiders with which we began, whom Archduke Ernst finds difficult to identify because of their ‘Hungarian hats’ (*pileis Hungarias*), ‘wigs’ (*capillamento ficticio*), and ‘German clothing’ (*vestimenti Germanics*), were among those who sought to intentionally blend

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830 The feathered shield appears in the *Süleymannname* discussed above and in the *Fütiḥät-i Cemīle*, TSM, Hazine 1592. For more on Central European and Hungarian painters in the palace workshops see Nurhan Atasoy, “1558. tarihli ‘Süleymannname’ ve Macar Nakkaş Pervane [The 1558 Süleymannname and Pervane the Hungarian Painter],” *Sanat Tarihi Yıllığı* 3 (1970): 167–96.
costume traditions. Though individuals were aware of the notion that “clothing did not actually represent something real and led to misidentification rather than the identification of a person,” costume description continued to be the primary marker of identification throughout the early modern period. At the same time, this problematic reliance on sight and appearance was widely debated in wide circles in early modern Europe. Archduke Ernst draws his Ottoman counterpart into this dialogue in which clothing served as a means of misidentification more commonly than as an accurate mode of ascertaining ethnic, political, and dynastic loyalties. This was far from a one-off exchange.

Raiding was regularly undertaken by soldiers and bandits dressed in culturally ambiguous clothing. For example, Archduke Ernst complained in 1580 to the Pasha of Buda about four Ottoman subjects dressed in Hungarian clothes (Turcas quatuor Hungarico habito) who had attacked a small garrison and captured fifteen soldiers. In August 1555, Habsburg ambassador Busbecq’s Ottoman escorts on his journey across the border between Komárom (Habsburg territory) and Esztergom (Ottoman territory) were attacked because of a misidentification of costume:

When the men had ridden forward for the space of one hour, they noticed four horsemen under the shade of a tree, which stood at a little distance from the road. As they were dressed in Turkish fashion, they took them for Turks, and rode up. On coming nearer, they inquired whether the country in that direction was fairly quiet. The four horsemen made no reply, but charged on them with drawn swords, and slashed one of the Turks over the face, cutting his nose nearly off so that the greater part of it hung down on his chin. One of the Turks was leading his horse by the rein. This the horsemen seized, and one of them mounted on its back, leaving his own scurvy jade in its place…. The fellows, who were far more anxious to carry off their booty than to bandy blows, were already galloping back to Raab, a town which our people hold, and of the garrison of which they

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831 Rublack, Dressing up, 25.
833 Letter from May 6, 1580 May, Archduke Ernst in Vienna to Beylerbey Kara Üveys Pasha of Buda. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 42, Konv. 1 (1580 V-VII), fol. 9.
formed a part. The Turks pointed them out to us, as they rode across the neighboring hills on their way to Raab.  

Identifying raiders was difficult from a distance, but even after bandits were caught, identifying their dynastic affiliation could be problematic. Outlaws and highwaymen, commonly referred to in the region as hajduks were a cause for complaint on both sides. These stateless men were occasionally hired by either side, but they most often appear in archival documents as a common enemy. Peace treaties between the Ottomans and Habsburgs explicitly stated that support was not to be given to these raiders.

Spies also dressed in purposefully deceitful ways when gathering intelligence. The Ottoman court routinely sent out informants from Constantinople, such as the agent heading towards Venice in 1579 in “Jewish clothes.” Similar practices were in use along the borderlands. In 1574 Maximilian II received reports of a group of spies based in the suburbs of Bratislava who were dressed in Hungarian clothes (habitu Hungarico). In 1579, Kara Üveys Pasha of Buda sent a Swabian born renegade as his spy to report on the mining towns and the imperial court of Rudolf II in Prague, also dressed in Hungarian clothes. The Habsburgs had their own spies who undertook similar missions. These practices led to at least one case of mistaken identity. In October 1565, members of the Habsburg embassy to the Porte were

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834 Busbecq, Life and Letters, 170.
836 They appear in the texts of peace treaties, the complaining letters of the Pashas of Buda, and the protocol of the Hungarian Council.
837 See the report of report of Resident Ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff in Constantinople to Rudolf II, July 4, 1579.
839 Born Caspar Fahrer, his Ottoman name was Schaban. See HHStA, Hungarica, Fasc. 112, Konv D. (1579), fol. 8–10.
traveling across the border after a year in Ottoman lands when “the watchman and others, while we were partly dressed in Turkish clothes, took us for scouts and brought the four of us to the captain of the encampment…”

Luckily for Betzek and his men, this case of mistaken identity led to their being questioned on nothing more than recent news on the state of affairs in Ottoman lands. It is important to note here that the authors of these texts were usually not soldiers themselves, but rather outside observers who had been informed of events orally, or visitors who adopted the vocabulary used by their guides. Thus, what they meant by the differences between “Hungarian,” “German,” and “Turkish” was unclear. The ambassadors' costume books may have helped them differentiate between ranks once in the Ottoman hinterland, but they did little to distinguish between everyday soldiers of either side of the border region.

Unintentional Mixing of Costume

While purposefully deceptive practices of dress make for wonderful narratives of intrigue and adventure, most of the individuals who wore what might be considered mixed clothing did so unintentionally, or without a deceptive motive behind their actions. Elements of costume were often picked up throughout an individual’s life, even passed on as movable properties with substantial monetary value from one generation to the next. A man purchased a hat at a shared borderland market. A wife stitched together a shirt from a used piece of cloth acquired in a second-hand shop. A soldier wore a robe picked up after a skirmish on the battlefield. A member of the Buda court wore leather boots made by a cobbler who once lived on one side of the


imperial dividing line, and now lived on the other. Each costume element had its own history, sometimes separate from the person who wore it. Sometimes the soldiers themselves switched sides, carrying their draped and sewn body coverings with them as they changed political and occasionally religious loyalties. The migration of costume elements across imperial borders can largely be divided into five categories: religious conversion, shifts of dynastic loyalty, looting, commissioning, and gifting.

Conversion was the most direct form of costume exchange. In 1591, a member of the retinue of the newly appointed Habsburg resident ambassador to Constantinople made a theatrical show of his conversion, which observers described through a metamorphosis of fabrics. According to one of the observers, a subject of the Emperor went drinking with his janissary guard one night when he

… gave them to understand that he wanted to become a Turk, by taking his hat from his head, treading it under foot, cutting it to pieces, and finally throwing it into the Danube; he also tore his collar to pieces. As soon as he had done this the janissaries brought him a turban or round Turkish cap, placed it upon his head, and conducted him into the town.

His transformation continued the following day, during which he took part in a procession ‘wearing a scarlet pelisse lined with fox skins, and a Turkish cap with several cranes’ feathers in it.’ Another observer mentioned a set of silk garments given as a conversion gift from the Pasha. The Turkish cap was most probably a white turban wound around a tall red felt cap, the

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842 This phenomenon has been studied in reference to the new clothes acquired by converts. See Anton Minkov, Conversion to Islam in the Balkans: Kisve Bahasi Petitions and Ottoman Social Life, 1670–1730 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), particularly 127–136.
843 Mitrovic, Adventures of Baron Wenceslas, 11.
844 Ibid., 17.
trademark of early modern Muslim elites. Yet underneath his new furs, silks, and linens, this new subject of the Sultan was probably wearing the shirts, pants, and shoes in which he arrived. Conversion went in the other direction as well, of course. The use of pre-conversion clothing by renegades is recorded in Ottoman chronicles as a means of potentially carrying out covert operations. For example, in the daybook of Sultan Süleyman’s campaigns from 1521 and 1526, a Christian convert living in Belgrade during the siege donned his earlier Muslim clothes and attempted to leave the fortress in the middle of the night to deliver a letter to the Hungarian King.

Articles of clothing were routinely carried across socio-political borders on the backs of other types of defectors as well. They arrived with soldiers seeking adventure or steady incomes, farmers looking for better working conditions, Protestants looking for looser control over Christian services, and many other individuals looking for material and social benefits only the Ottomans were prepared to provide. These shifts in dynastic affiliation undoubtedly facilitated the movement of entire wardrobes. For clues, one need only look at inventories of estates from

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847 For the Hungarian translation, see Thúry, Török történetírók, vol. 1, 296. For the German translation, see Anton C Schaendlinger, ed., Die Feldzugstagebücher des ersten und zweiten ungarischen Feldzugs Suleymans I (Vienna: Verlag des Verbandes der wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften Österreichs, 1978), 47.

the period. With a substantial amount of an individual’s wealth tied up in textile movable property, these articles of clothing were then passed on from one generation to the next.

Military actions also propelled elements of costume across the imperial borderlands. Outside of livestock, horses, and human captives, the most common spoils of raids were weapons and clothes. Such widespread practices are highlighted in Celalzade’s description of the Battle of Mohacs, where soldiers gathered furs and textiles alongside arms (explicitly listing Hungarian and German sabers) and the usual horde of gold and silver.⁸⁵⁰

Commissions also played a major role in these exchanges. Ottoman textiles were highly valued and regularly traded throughout Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Venice was well known for its large volume consumption and local imitation fabrics used to upholster furniture, line books, and sew Venetian style garments. However, the largest market for Ottoman silks was East of Venice,⁸⁵¹ and something very different was taking place here. Courts throughout Central and Eastern Europe used Ottoman fabrics to fashion local items such as priest’s vestments,⁸⁵² and they also refined their own sewn style of dress that directly referenced

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⁸⁵² This was a common practice in Orthodox churches within the empire. For some Central European examples, see Corinna Kienzler, Evelin Wetter, and Agnes Ziegler, Liturgische Gewänder in Der Schwarzen Kirche Zu Kronstadt in Siebenbürgen (Rigisberg: Abegg-Stiftung, 2015). See also Emese Pásztor, “Ottoman Turkish Textiles in Christian Churches: Particularly in Transylvania and Royal Hungary,” in The Ottoman Orient in Renaissance Culture Papers from the International Conference at the National Museum in Krakow June 26–27, 2015, ed. Robert Born, Michał Dziewulski, and Kamilla Twardowska, 2015, 193–214.
that of their Ottoman neighbors.\(^5\) The dolman and mente combination was well known and frequently commented upon by contemporaries, even if very few early examples survive. This style had its roots in medieval practices that Gabor Klaniczay identified as “ostentatious barbarism”: a conscious effort on the part of noblemen to identify with mythical Scythian origins.\(^4\) Perhaps the most complicated aspect of this phenomenon was that, by the 1570s, Habsburg ambassadors and their retinues often wore these orientalizing “Hungarian clothes” as they crossed the border and for their formal audiences with the Sultan.\(^5\) The highest echelons of society continued to have clothes tailored in such fashions, while written sources reveal a great deal of trade and gift exchange of sewn, draped, and armed goods in completed form made available to less elevated circles. For example, the Buda based Ragusan trading company regularly sent textiles and completed objects.\(^6\)

While Ottoman textiles were prized in Habsburg ruled Europe, Ottoman Europe appears to have taken a liking to certain elements of armor produced in Habsburg lands. This led to an early modern version of arms trade with conflicting moral implications. Helmets as well as mail shirts were commonly commissioned across the border. For example, in 1560, the Janissary Aga

\(^5\) Gervers, *Influence*.
\(^5\) I would like to thank Szabolcs Szerfőző of the Museum of Applied Arts in Budapest for raising this important point following my talk at Central European University in 2017. It appears that by the seventeenth century, this was generally accepted practice. In the sixteenth century, however, the shift in dress practices of the ambassadors seems to correlate with several other shifts discussed in this dissertation (in the 1570s). Ambassadors and their retinues occasionally dressed in “clean Hungarian clothes and robes of red satin and silk (saubern Ungarischen Kleidern und Rocken von Schatlack roten Samat und Atlaß)” as they crossed the border and had their formal audience with the Sultan. See fig. 7 and 8 from the tribute carrying delegation of 1572 (led by David Ungnad) and the travel narrative of a member of the 1587 delegation accompanying resident ambassador Bartholomaus Pezzen: von Haimendorff, *Reis-Beschreibung*, 367.
of Buda wrote in a letter to the Hungarian captain of a fortress in Habsburg ruled Hungary thanking him for taking care of the commission on his behalf: “They gave me the two helmets (Zischägge) which your grace sent me for my money. Thank you for your most honorable service. I promise your grace my services for the future, and should you ask for anything of this type from me, I will acquire it for you.” Commissions of this sort occurred with some regularity. In 1616, the Pasha of Buda ordered a total of sixty mail shirts from the Habsburg Imperial War Council (Hofkriegsrat). Orders for mail shirts were commonly placed by viziers in Constantinople as well, usually through the Habsburg resident ambassador. While descriptions of objects commissioned by central authorities were more detailed, and occasionally accompanied by sketches, written records of objects commissioned on the borderlands are concise and general.

The fourth and final category of transfer is perhaps the one most commonly studied, that of gift exchange. A culture of gift giving persisted on all levels of society in the borderlands, from the Pasha of Buda down to the poorest soldiers of Esztergom. It was part of an empire wide

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857 “Meg attak a kett sysakot kiket keg ennekem küldött penzemre Köszönöm kegdnek szolgalattyait mynt vrammnak: yghyrem ismeg magamat hog kegmed valamire engemet ker e fele dolognak meg szerzesere meg szerzem kegdnek.” MOL, Dobó levéltár, I csomó. Takáts et al., Basák, #10.
858 May 28, 1616, See its transcription in Bayerle, Ali Pasha, 243.
859 For example, see the Apr. 23, 1569 report of resident ambassador Albert de Wyss in Constantinople to Maximilian II in which he discusses the request of Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha for armor and a shirt of mail (armaturam et loricam) in the size sent to Vienna a year earlier with the ambassador Christopher Teuffenbach and the Ottoman ambassador Ibrahim Dragoman. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 25, Konv. 2 (1569 I-IV), fol. 134v.
860 Such as the sketches of a decorated mail shirt to be sent as part of the tribute dated 1590 in the Hofkammerarchiv. See Matthias Pfaffenbichler, “Orientalische und orientalisierende Waffen,” in Im Lichte des Halbmonds: das Abendland und der türkische Orient (Dresden: Staatliche Kunstsammlungen, 1995), 96–100.
system of Ottoman demonstrative consumption, reciprocity, and redistribution. Letters often accompanied gifts of all sizes. In 1560 the Janissary Aga of Buda sent a blue *mahraman* tablecloth as a wedding present to István Dobó of Léva. In 1582, Kalaylikoz Ali Pasha of Buda sent a woven gold caparison for a horse to Archduke Ernst. Meanwhile, in 1583, he sent Emperor Rudolf II enough red and blue cloth to fashion two outfits. A 1569 letter from Sancakbey Mehmed Bey of Esztergom to Maximilian II thanking him for the presents brought by the tribute carrying delegation shows the range of ranks involved in this circulation of objects. Mehmed Pasha of Buda sent a horse with trappings of the highest quality in 1592 to the Captain of Győr. Meanwhile, Constantinople continually sent reminders that horses were prohibited from crossing the border for any reason at all. These gifts appear as “tokens of friendship,” ransom for captives, and as part of elaborate invitations to joust.

Perhaps the most fascinating form of gift exchange was that which took place between common soldiers who exchanged small objects of military paraphernalia as part of the call to joust. Under cover of night, groups of adventurous men seeking adventure and local fame would sneak up to the gates of nearby frontier fortresses and leave lances, forks, and hammers with

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862 See footnote 857.

863 Published in Takáts et al., *Basák*, #219.

864 Published in Takáts et al., *Basák*, #252.


866 Bayerle, *Ottoman diplomacy*, #88.

867 For example, see Dávid and Fodor, *Fölöttébb fontos*, pt. 1, #24, 33, 35, 88, and 158.

868 Takáts et al., *Basák*, #272.
letters attached to them calling for a duel. The poorest soldiers, unable to part with weapons, would exchange feathers. The jousting itself was often discussed in the Pashas’ letters. Frequently justified “as a celebration of knightly values” and a “chance for us to get to know one another better,” it was strictly prohibited by central officials in Vienna and Constantinople, not only in orders against it from the Divan and Imperial War Council, but even in the texts of the peace treaties themselves. Officials rightly feared that these mock battles and the lively letter exchanges that preceded them would lead to larger clashes with bloody consequences. Yet, despite these prohibitions, jousts and duels occurred regularly.

Here, on the sports pitch, the victor often took home the military equipment of the vanquished. A scene painted into the autograph album of Johann Joachim Prack von Asch, courier of ambassador Bartholomäus Pezzen between 1587 and 1591, shows the muddling of costume elements in action (fig. 33). The two swords, hussar shield, and armor of the subject of the Sultan on the right would have gone home with the victorious subject of the Emperor on the left. Here, the Ottoman soldier can be identified by the crescent painted onto his shield and

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871 “az ty vytezitök bay viadalra hiutak uolt, meg az hatuani bekőt vendégségben hiutak volt, az io zomzedsag kedueiert, lakozzunk egïwnk jgiunk, az vitezökis egi mással mulassanak, leueletis jrtanak uolt az beknek” Published in Takáts et al., Basák, 190–191.

872 See article 16 in the Treaty of Edirne (1568), where a detailed explanation of the dangers of the practice for any number of participants is followed by “ut ex aequo omnia hujusmodi genera duellorum omnibus interdictione sint et prohibita.” Szalay and Wenzel, Verancsics Antal, vol. 5, 216–233).

873 Traces of Prack’s routine movements across the border are sprinkled throughout HHStA, Turcica, Kartons 66–68 and 74–76, which show that he routinely acted as “currir” in 1587–88 and 1590–91. It seems he remained in Ottoman lands between Nov. 1588 and Dec. 1590 as a member of Pezzen’s retinue.
the horsetail decoration attached to the neck of his steed. The man with the feathers on his back and tiger skin draped across his horse on the left, then, was a hussar of the Habsburg side. Such cross-border sporting events were described by contemporaries as spectacles rivaling the finest wedding celebrations. Nicolaus Gabelmann wrote a lengthy celebratory poem recounting in detail his own observation of one such event, in which Ferenc Dobó jousted with the local governor of Esztergom in May 1581. During the festivities, sixteen soldiers from the Ottoman side and one soldier from the Hungarian side were mortally wounded, after which they celebrated “according to the ancient traditions and had feast on the spot of the tournament, and with peace they went home to cannons and gun salutes.”

This description made it clear that while most jousts ended with the victor taking home the armor and weapons of his opponent as his trophy, jousting was a dangerous sport, and just as many meetings ended with the man who lost the match also losing his head.

This chapter examined the vernacular diplomacy of borderland soldiers through a study of the relationship between dress and identification practices. Telling the subjects of the Sultan apart from the subjects of the Emperor was often impossible because individuals both knowingly and unknowingly played with these distinctions as part of their every-day lived-reality of interaction and exchange. Soldiers carried objects and wore clothes that challenge the notion of a hard border marking an East-West divide. They highlight the complexities of a borderland filled with individuals who lived their lives across and in-between empires in sixteenth-century Central Europe. Their identification markers cannot be read as static polar opposites, nor can they be

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read on a sliding scale of East and West, Muslim and Christian, Ottoman and Habsburg. Instead, groups commissioning wearable arts across the border, exchanging textile gifts, and forging multiple self-images in conversation with their surroundings muddled these distinctions beyond recognition. This vernacular diplomacy, farthest removed from the ratified peace treaties produced in the imperial centers, was perhaps the most human form of peace.
Conclusion

The relationship between the Houses of Habsburg and Osman can only be understood as the sum of all of its parts: not just the treaties signed and resident ambassadors commissioned, but also the embassies and correspondence at the regional level, the border crossings and audiences at the local level, and the every-day meeting and mixing of soldiers and subjects in the overlapping borderlands. Official diplomacy provides a ready narrative of inter-imperial relations organized by papers bearing seals of sovereigns and separating the territories they claimed. The eleven peace treaties ratified suggested that the Sultan and Emperor had an amicable relationship on somewhat equal footing. This friendship (dostlık) began with a period of false starts, got a boost from internal crises in both empires, and reached its peak after the transformations that occurred around 1566. Yet peace was only a paper-reality. At every turn, the fallen but not forgotten kingdom that straddled the border hindered the drawing of boundaries, confused the assessment of loyalties, and prevented either empire from attaining full control of land and subjects along their contiguous border. A series of ten commissioned resident ambassadors to Constantinople were charged with generating this paper-reality and keeping the Habsburgs informed of court dynamics. They found themselves restrained by factions and rivalries at court and occasionally unable to perform their duties.

Vernacular diplomacy provided alternative contexts for political agency that stretched across and between borderlands. With every flourish of the pen, every gesture during a formal audience, and every stich added to an old piece of clothing, these agents of vernacular diplomacy reinforced or rewrote the relationship forged by the agents of official diplomacy. By the 1570s, the regional governors of Buda and the Archdukes of Austria had become partners in
maintaining the peace embodied in the treaties. Regional officials exchanged a remarkable number of letters in South Slavic, Latin, Ottoman Turkish, German, and eventually settled on Hungarian as their *lingua-franca*. They maintained the peace by employing several elements borrowed from official diplomatic practices and developed their own strategies unique to the region. The local governors of Esztergom and the captains of Komárom maintained the two most important border fortresses, which stood thirty miles from each other along the swift waters of the Danube River. As facilitators of communication and diplomatic hosts-in-chief, they occasionally overstepped boundaries of conduct set by the imperial centers. The soldiers of the borderland, with their ambiguous loyalties on display through their mixed costumes, provided lively counterparts to the imperial fictions embodied in the peace treaties. They formed their own dangerous and playful version of peace as they intentionally and unintentionally played with identification markers.

Together, these layered diplomacies confirm that the Ottomans participated in an important dialectical relationship with early modern Europe. Not only did they actively participate by sending their own ambassadors and correspondence, they also had an effect on administrative developments in Vienna. Scribal cultures and individual scribes themselves crossed borders and joined new contexts. Architectural settings once made for royal families and archbishops became stages for Ottoman rituals of welcome. This was not a European environment set against an external Ottoman Turkish threat. Rather, the events addressed in this dissertation reveal how a European center’s role evolved once it fell into Ottoman hands.

Over time, the imperial archive became an important vehicle of institutional memory. By its very nature, this archive privileged the paper-reality of official diplomacy over the lived-reality of the borderland. In 1588, a dispute emerged between the Habsburg ambassador and the
Grand Vizier about the number of tribute payments that had arrived in Constantinople. After combing the collection of papers in Vienna, the Aulic War Council drafted a list of tribute carrying delegations since the peace treaty of 1568. The secretaries of the council counted nineteen transactions where there should have been twenty, with the twenty-first theoretically on its way. After much back and forth, they decided to send a double payment in 1590, to make up for the one that was overlooked. Such archival research became increasingly necessary as those who participated in the earliest interactions with the Ottoman Empire retired from service and new generations of bureaucrats tried to understand the diplomatic relationship. Of the thousands of papers collected, the documents of commissioned ambassadors were the most organized. This was because they were sent immediately to the chancellery upon arrival so that they could be decoded and copied for distribution. These documents were also the ones most often consulted by the Aulic War Council and later generations of bureaucrats who left annotations in the margins and summaries for sets of documents.

Letters of vernacular diplomacy entered the collection in a more haphazard manner. In the early years of Ottoman rule in Hungary, only a portion the correspondence of the Pashas arrived directly into the Habsburg archives. Other letters remained in family collections which eventually found homes in Vienna, Budapest, and elsewhere. By the time the Pashas and Archdukes had established their mature vernacular diplomatic channels in the 1580s, much of this communication also channeled directly into the imperial archive in Vienna. These papers have far fewer annotations and no summaries of later bureaucrats. The letters of local governors and soldiers only found their way to Vienna's archives by chance, where they sometimes sat for centuries without a translation to assist the tired glance of the passing scholar. Together, these

875 HHStA, Turcica, Karton 65, Konv. 1 (1588 I), fol. 241–244.
876 Petritsch, “Staatsarchiv als Forschungsstätte,” 129.
sources have shown how the multi-layered diplomatic relationship between the two empires functioned.

Official and vernacular were not the only layers of diplomatic activity operating across the Habsburg-Ottoman border. Other layers that can be observed in archival sources, but could not be covered in this dissertation, include the universal languages of trade, religion, and scholarship. Financial transactions across the border were primarily related to trade in cattle, leather goods, wine, horses, and captives. Market towns in southeastern Ottoman Hungary were semi-autonomous cultural centers, while a Ragusan trading company operated within the city walls of Ottoman Buda, and certain villages even contained mills that were co-owned by Habsburg and Ottoman subjects. Merchants and businessmen had a vested interest in peace, since raiding and military maneuvers disrupted their workflow. Religious elites also interacted regularly across the border, particularly as the reformation took radical turns in Transylvania. Scholars and their written works also regularly crossed the border. Some traveled with the hope of learning a new language or gathering rare botanical specimens. Vienna became a center of Ottoman historical and linguistic inquiry. Yet another chapter could have also been devoted to the perspective of the magnates from the Hungarian Council and their families, who navigated multiple hostile climates after losing their estates. Peasants too, crossed the border to escape overwhelming tax and labor burdens. Women seeking social and financial mobility offer yet another avenue for exploration. Each of these important lines of inquiry will have to wait for future studies.
Appendix A

List of Habsburg-Ottoman Ratifications of Peace Treaties and Ceasefires, 1543 to 1593

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaty</th>
<th>Ottoman Ratification</th>
<th>Habsburg Ratification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1545 February</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-month ceasefire negotiated by ambassador Hieronymus Adorno for King Ferdinand and</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>HHStA, Turcica, Karton 6, Konv. I (1545 I-IV), 46-47. (By Leonhard Vels, 1545 February 11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1545 November</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-month ceasefire negotiated by ambassador Nikolaus Sicco acting for King Ferdinand, closed by Gerhard Veltwyck as envoy of Charles V</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1547 June</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-month ceasefire negotiated by Gerhard Veltwyck acting for Charles V and King Ferdinand I</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1547</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-year peace treaty, negotiated by Gerhard Veltwyck for Charles V and King Ferdinand I</td>
<td>1547 October 14 Sultan Süleyman, German translation: HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
<td>1547 August 1 Charles V, Latin copy: HHStA, Türkische Urkunden. 1547 August 26 King Ferdinand, Latin copy: HHStA, Türkische Urkunden. 1548 February 4 Chaires V (2nd ratification): HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1553</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/A 881</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

877 Where possible, the date and location of the original Ottoman Turkish treaty and any official translations made in Constantinople are listed. When such a document could not be located, translations imbedded in ambassadorial correspondence or made upon arrival are noted.
878 No original copies of Habsburg ratifications sent to Constantinople are known to survive, but the Topkapı Palace Archives might contain them. The copies listed here are all drafts from Vienna, some of which contain notes and revisions.
881 See the order from May 15–24, 1553 from Sultan Süleyman to Beylerbey Toygun Pasha of Buda in which he announces that he has granted Ferdinand I a cease-fire for the duration of his embassy. HHStA, Türkischen Urkunden. Published in facsimile with transcription and German translation in Schaedlanger and Römer, *Schreiben Süleymâns an Karl V*, #31.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date of Event</th>
<th>Sultan Süleyman’s Turkish Original</th>
<th>Maximilian II, Latin Copy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1559</td>
<td>Extension of the 1547 peace treaty for 8 years, negotiated by resident ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq and Grand Vizier Rustem Pasha (ratifications differed substantially)</td>
<td>1559 January 31</td>
<td>HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
<td>HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1559</td>
<td></td>
<td>1559 April 29</td>
<td>King Ferdinand of Hungary, Latin copy:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562 (valid from 1562 June 1)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty negotiated by resident ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq and Grand Vizier Semiz Ali Pasha</td>
<td>1562 August 2</td>
<td>HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
<td>HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564 (invalid, no official Ottoman version)</td>
<td>Confirmation of the 8-year peace treaty of 1562 following the death of Ferdinand I on 1564 July 25, without negotiations</td>
<td>(1564 October 17-26)</td>
<td>Sultan Süleyman’s Ottoman Turkish letter confirming the order to extend the treaty:</td>
<td>HHStA, Türkische Urkunden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565 (valid immediately)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty, negotiated by resident ambassador Albert de Wyss and Grand Vizier Semiz Ali Pasha</td>
<td>1565 February 16</td>
<td>Sultan Süleyman’s Ottoman Turkish original, Türkische Urkunden</td>
<td>Maximilian II, location?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568 (Treaty of Edirne/Adrianople)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty negotiated by ambassador Antonio Verantiumus and Grand Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>1568 March 20-29</td>
<td>Sultan Selim II’s Ottoman Turkish original, Türkische Urkunden</td>
<td>Maximilian II, Latin copy: Türkische Urkunden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574 (valid from 1576 January 1)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty negotiated by resident ambassadors Karl Rijm and</td>
<td>1574 November</td>
<td>Sultan Selim II’s Ottoman Turkish</td>
<td>Never signed by Maximilian II, word of Sultan Selim’s death</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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884 Published in facsimile with transcription and German translation in Schaendlinger and Römer, *Schreiben Süleymâns an Karl V*, #32. A version in Istanbul was also preserved in Feridun.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (valid from)</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1575 (valid immediately)</td>
<td>confirmation of the 8-year peace treaty following the death of Sultan Selim II on 1574 December 21, negotiated by resident ambassador David Ungnad and Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>1575 November 5 - 14 Sultan Murad III. German translation: HHStA, Türkische Urkunden, Konv. 1 (1575 IX—XI), fol. 246a-d. Location ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576 (valid from 1577 January 1)</td>
<td>confirmation of the 8-year peace treaty following the death of Maximilian II on 1576 October 12, negotiated by resident ambassador David Ungnad and Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha</td>
<td>1576 December 6 Sultan Murad III's Ottoman Turkish original: Türkischen Urkunden; German translation by Ali Bey: HHStA, Türkica, Karton 34, Konv. 2 (1576 XI—XII), fol. 105-108. 1577 February Rudolf II, location ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1583 (valid from 1584 January 1)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty negotiated by staff of resident ambassador Johann Friedrich Breuner (secretary Pezzen, dragoman) and Grand Vizier Kanijeli Siyavuş Pasha (alongside Dr. Salomon Ashkenazi)</td>
<td>1583 March Sultan Murad III’s Ottoman Turkish original is likely uncatalogued in HHStA, Türkischen Urkunden. 1583 May 26 Rudolf II Latin copy: HHStA, Türkica, Karton 48, Konv. 3 (1583 IV-VI), fols. 177-180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591 (valid from 1592 January 1)</td>
<td>8-year peace treaty negotiated by resident ambassador Dr. Bartholomaeus Pezzen and Grand Vizier Koca Sinan Pasha</td>
<td>1590 December Sultan Murad III copy of a German translation: HHStA, Türkica, Karton 74, Konv. 1 (1590 X-XII), fols. 240v-243v. 1591 February 1 Rudolf II Latin draft: HHStA, Türkica, Karton 74, Konv. 2 (1591 I-III), fols. 51-56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix B

Peace Treaty of 1565

Original in HHStA, Türkische Urkunden. For a published facsimile, transcription, and German translation, see Schaendlinger, *Schreiben an Karl V*, #32.

With the good and eternal help of God, who is beyond comparison, with His blessed unceasing support, and under the guidance of the blessed miracles of Mohammed, the Sultan of the throne of Heaven, the prince of the throne of kingdoms, the glory of the human race, the reason for the creation of all the world, the signate for all the messengers and prophets, the model of purity, the close confidant of Allah, a messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and his family, and give salvation as long as the throat spills and speaks.

[Signature]

I am the Sultan of Sultans of the East and West, sovereign of the lands of Rome, Persia, and Arabia, hero of the cosmos, Neriman of space and time, Padisah and Sultan of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the distinguished Kaaba, the magnificent Medina, of Jerusalem, the throne of Egypt, the praised of ages, the lands of Yemen, from 'Aden and San'a, from Bagdad, the brave, from Basra, Lahsa, from Ktesiphon, the lands of Algier, of Azerbaijan, the Kipcak Steppe, the lands of the Tatars, of Kurdistan, of Luristan, and of all of Rumeli and Anatolia, of Karaman, of Moldavia and Wallachia, Hungary and many other lands and territories, Sultan Süleyman Han, Son of Sultan Selim Han.

You, who are the glory of the great Christian princes and the chosen one of the honorable Grandees in the Christian world, King Maximilian, and the chosen one of the people of Rome, and Emperor of Germany and King and ruler of the lands of the Czechs, Slovenians, Croatians, and many others.

At my sublime threshold and my Porte, the refuge of Sultans, kissed by the lips of the Caesars of our time, your ambassador, Albert de Wyss, the representative of the princes of the Christian community, the example of the Christian faith community, arrived at our sublime porte to renew this contract in your name, that we had with your father, Emperor Ferdinand I, and to include the archdukes Ferdinand and Charles in this contract. We announce as follows:

Each year, 30,000 Hungarian ducats are to be sent to my sublime threshold, so that beginning with June 1, 1562 from the birth of our glorious prophet Jesus, blessings and salvation be upon him, to ensure for eight years the peace and security for our subjects, country, territories, and to secure the friendship between us, as before. There is also the yearly 30,000 Hungarian ducats which were agreed upon in the five year treaty before this, of which two years remain outstanding, and of which you agree to pay one year's worth.

With this armistance of eight years, you agree to end all hostilities and demands enforced with arms with regard to all lands outside of Transylvania, which are de facto in the possession of the
son of King John, weather they are in Hungarian lands or on either side of the Tisza river. Under the condition that, as soon as they enter his property, no one should prevent the king's son from respecting the conditions of this friendship in any way during these eight years. And that we should be free from enmity, oppression of our subjects, incursions into our country, plundering and taking fortifications, rebuilding of raised fortification, the taking cattle or other food, free of our people's subjects being enslaved, of oppressing them with the threat of "we will scourge you, and plunder you," and of taking away their possessions. As necessary we will ensure that the armistice in accordance with the law.

If he is not cautious and unable to exercise patience, and if in that region you are in dispute with the King's son, then the intention with this treaty is to make a reasonable and joint correction to the border.

Menyhért Balassi and Miklós Báthory and your other governors, who are your subjects at the present, are included in your conditions in this peace and in this agreement, together with their possessions and those localities which are in their hands from the day the King's son's treaty came to you.

If, moreover, people who were under your command or that of the King's son, should become involved in hostile actions, and if some places are captured or taken, and if it is still in their hands, they are to be levied. Where there is a matter that occurred before this armistance, their cases will not be heard. But if there should be a quarrel between them after this peace, and if they should not settle it unanimously, let them not fight with each other, and your subjects shall turn to you and ours to us.

After the signature of this peace and friendship, if one of our governors or one of our other people is captured by another subject, he is to be released without delay and without any claims for compensation, without harm or losses.

Your ambassador has submitted at the foot of our sublime porte the following requests:

In order that the conditions of friendship and the armistice should be respected and secured on both sides by the date mentioned for a period of eight years, a contract would be issued by the sublime Porte, and the regional governors, local governors, kapudani, subasi, voivodes, and the victorious armies of our well-protected domains be informed and instructed to keep the friendship and restrain themselves from any offensive actions. We should also include the voivodes of Moldavia and Wallachia, and no harm whatsoever may be inflicted on our lands in the territories of Hungary, Slovenia, Bosnia, and the lands of our countries, whether from the land or from the sea, or from islands.

And if anyone takes one of our fortresses, castles, or cities, he shall be punished, and the place shall be returned to its owner.

And if any one of the subjects of either side flees, then not only his entire possession shall be confiscated, but he himself shall be sent back or punished, so that he is made an example to the others.
If, in the course of this peace treaty, we are to repair some of our places, to make provisions for them, and to guard them, as long as we do not cross our boundaries, the necessary fortresses and localities will be improved and restored on both sides, and no one will be hindered.

The villages and places in the area around Tata, which have traditionally belonged to Komarom, and which were captured, are to remain with Komarom. And these villages should not be attacked, regardless of whether the people living in Tata are Christians or Muslims.

Our subjects and people in Hungary, and the people in our villages, should not be subject to any duty or obligation, nor should any demands be made. Each one is to serve the castle owner to whom he is a member, and to give him his taxes. For they often frighten them and say if they do not pay their taxes "We will light fire to your village and plunder it, and make you all captives." And the subjects of some places have so far served both sides, and delivered taxes and tithes. In the way in which they have so far paid taxes, they are to continue to pay taxes on both sides. And there are some villages which have been subject to customs duties that cost ten or more times the original tax they were charged, and they have become impoverished and begin to leave their lands. Those who raise the tax should be informed that they should only collect the taxes imposed at the time of the subjugation of the population, and no more.

Within the framework of this friendship, none of our Hungarian and other subjects are to be made prisoners. If it happens unexpectedly, they are to be released and sent to their homes without a ransom. They are also not to be sold and given away.

If it is necessary for some of your people, ambassadors, and peace-makers to be at our sublime porte, they should be treated as well as the ambassadors of others. The desired interpreters are to be appointed, and they may have as many interpreters as they wish. Their use is not to be denied by anyone.

Our people will not attack or bother anyone coming to the Sublime court, rather they should be given support.

If necessary, in order to set the boundaries and arbitrate other disputes in the border area, trustworthy people may be sent from both sides to investigate the previous legal matters and to punish those who act against the treaty. Since the country is often full of thieves, robbers, and wanderers, no such damage is to be caused by them. And, as far as is possible, efforts should be made to punish those who do. If they should not be found at the scene of their crime immediately, and they should not be in the possession of whatever they stole, they shall be sent to the competent authorities, wherever they go, and they shall punish them according to their crimes.

The frontiers have made a habit of challenging and killing each other in duels. It is therefore imperative that they should not fight and kill themselves.

These conditions, which form the basis for the armistice on our part, and the peace of the subjects, and for the strengthening of friendship, are to be announced to our district commanders,
in order that they may be observed in the necessary form by our side. We have committed ourselves to this end. They should also be announced by your side. No harm will be done to this friendship in the agreed time.

And as you have asked, we have given you this great treaty. The remaining two years worth of 60,000 ducats were brought to our sublime porte and paid into our treasury by your ambassador Michael [Czernowitz], the representative of the princes of the Christian community, the example of the Christian faith community. As it was stated in your letter, he set out the situation of the castles taken by Balazs Menyhert, and the King's son's claim to possess those castles. The castle of Bana will remain in his hand, and the rest will be returned to their owners according to my ethical contract.

As before, according to my sublime treaty, the aforesaid condition of friendship shall be respected according to the cease-fire, so long as yours and your brethren, and your bequests and other military forces, are not the cause of the dissolution of the treaty and alliance and the cause of the destruction of the promise and faith. I also swear by my majesty's majesty, and by firm oaths, for the sake of God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and for the sake of the miracles of our sublime and beloved prophet, within the time limit of this treaty of our conquests, officers, and governors, and of all the victorious military men. Within the borders of the Islamic countries and on the part of King Stefan of Siebenbürgen conquered by my victorious troops and my radiant power, on the part of the voivodes of Wallachia and the Vltava, and my other tributary unbelieving servants who are included in this friendship. The countries, territories and subjects which belong to you, all the places and the boundaries which are under your domination shall in no way be attacked or harassed. Damage and mischief, oppression and loss shall not occur. In short, as it is your wish that within this period, this peace be respected, which strengthens the rules of friendship and affection, it is also our wish. It will be observed and, if God the Merciful will, nothing will happen against this treaty and the alliance.

This sublime treaty was written in the house of the sublime Sultanate and the high caliphate in the well-guarded Constantinople, on the fifteenth day of the blessed month of Receb in the year 972, after the birth of our great prophet, the refuge of divine revelation.
Appendix C

Habsburg Envoys and Ambassadors to the Ottoman Empire, 1543 to 1593
(including those to the Pasha of Buda)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ambassador(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1542</td>
<td>Andronico Tranquillo negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1544</td>
<td>János Dessewffý to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1544</td>
<td>Eduardus Cataneus negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Hieronymus Adorno negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Niccolò Secco negotiated first treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Gerhard Veltwyck ambassador of Charles V negotiating the first treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545</td>
<td>Sigismund Posgay to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>János Dessewffý to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>Erasmus von Scheyer and Sigismund Posgay to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546</td>
<td>Vitus Ugrinovic to Buda to negotiate, then to the Porte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546–1547</td>
<td>Gerhard Veltwyck negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1546–1552</td>
<td>resident ambassador Johann Maria Malvezzi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>János Dessewffý to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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886 This list includes all those sent by the Habsburgs who required letters of safe conduct to travel and who sent reports on their missions. This means regular messengers are not included unless they took part in a formal audience that resulted in a report.

887 The dates given here are based on the year they crossed the imperial border on behalf of the Emperor.

888 The inconsistent use of titles makes distinctions between rank unnecessary here. Resident ambassadors are highlighted in bold.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Person or Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1547</td>
<td>Justi de Argento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brought the ratification of the treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548</td>
<td>Justus de Argento</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>tribute</em> carrying ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548</td>
<td>János Dessewffy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to Buda to negotiate cease fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1549</td>
<td>Sigismund Posgay and Marcus Singkmoser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>tribute</em> carrying ambassadors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1549</td>
<td>András Tarnóczy, captain of the Danube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Fleet to Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Marcus Singkmoser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>tribute</em> carrying ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550</td>
<td>Mihály Mutnoky and István Mekchey OR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sigismund Posgay and János Szentpétery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to Buda and Szeged for negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1553–1557</td>
<td>Anton Verantius and Ferenc Zay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to negotiate peace treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1553</td>
<td>András Tarnóczy, captain of the Danube</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naval Fleet to Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1554–1555</td>
<td>Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to negotiate peace treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1555–1562</td>
<td>resident ambassador Ogier Ghiselin de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Busbecq arrived to negotiate peace treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1559</td>
<td>Albert von Wyss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to negotiate peace treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562–1569</td>
<td>resident ambassador Albert von Wyss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563</td>
<td>Paulus de Palina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>tribute</em> carrying ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564–1565</td>
<td>Michael Černović, Ákos Csábi, György</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Albani Csurdai <em>tribute</em> carrying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>delegation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1565</td>
<td>Michael Černović and Ákos Csábi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>treaty negotiations</td>
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<tr>
<td>1565–1566</td>
<td>Michael Černović and Ákos Csábi</td>
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<td>treaty negotiations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1566</td>
<td>György Hosszútóthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>tribute carrying ambassador and treaty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>negotiations, only made it to Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Ottoman campaign)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567–1568</td>
<td>Anton Verantius and Christof Teuffenbach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>treaty delegation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>Ákos Csábi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569</td>
<td>Kaspar Minkwitz and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edoardo de Provisionali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1569</td>
<td>György Hosszútóthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1570</td>
<td>Ákos Csábi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1570–1574</td>
<td>resident ambassador Karl Rijm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1571</td>
<td>Kaspar Minkwitz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>David Ungnad and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Edoardo de Provisionali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573–1578</td>
<td>resident ambassador David Ungnad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574</td>
<td>György Hosszútóthy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574</td>
<td>Philibert de Bruxelles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>Johann Breuner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Wolfgang Sinnich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578–1580</td>
<td>resident ambassador Joachim von Sinzendorff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578–1579</td>
<td>Ulrich von Königsberg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1579–1580</td>
<td>Wolfgang Eytzing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580–1584</td>
<td>resident ambassador Johann Friedrich Breuner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>István Nyáry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1583</td>
<td>Paul Michael Eytzing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>Heinrich von Liechtenstein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584–1587</td>
<td>resident ambassador Paul Michael von Eytzing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Resident Ambassador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587–1592</td>
<td>resident ambassador Dr. Bartholomaus Pezzen (and tribute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1587</td>
<td>Franz Jurkovich</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1588</td>
<td>Karl Tetauer von Tetanow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>Johann Mollart von Reineck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1590</td>
<td>Wolfgang Ehrenreich Strein</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591–1593 [1595]</td>
<td>resident ambassador Friedrich Kreckwitz (and tribute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Poppel von Lobkowitz</td>
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### Appendix D

**Ottoman Envoys to the Holy Roman Empire, 1543 to 1593**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sent from</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1544</td>
<td>Hidayet Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1548</td>
<td>Husrev Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1549</td>
<td>Ahmed</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1549</td>
<td>Mahmud Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1554</td>
<td>Bali Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<td>1555</td>
<td>Bali Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1558</td>
<td>Behram Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562</td>
<td>Hassan Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1562–1563</td>
<td>Ibrahim Bey</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564</td>
<td>Bali Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565 Aug.</td>
<td>Mustafa Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565–1566</td>
<td>Hidayet Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople  / Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1566</td>
<td>Bali Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567</td>
<td>Kurt Aga</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>Ibrahim Bey</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568</td>
<td>Saban Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>Ibrahim Aga</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572</td>
<td>Mehmed Çelebi</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573</td>
<td>Saban Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1573–1574</td>
<td>Mehmed Bey</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>Mahmud Bey</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1576</td>
<td>Saban Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>1577</td>
<td>Saban Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1579</td>
<td>Memi Aga</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>Gazanfer Aga and Divani Faslij</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580</td>
<td>Saban Bey</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1581</td>
<td>Ali Sarabdar</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>Halil Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<td>1582</td>
<td>Saban Bey</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>1583</td>
<td>Hassan Aga</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
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<td>1584</td>
<td>Saban Bey</td>
<td>Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>1584</td>
<td>Targut Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
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<tr>
<td>1585</td>
<td>Saban Çavuş, Mustafa Çavuş, and Kamber Çavuş</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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889 This is a working list that includes all those who required letters of safe conduct who took part in documented formal audiences. Some of these individuals were heads of large retinues, others may have only traveled with a few assistants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>Mustafa Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1592</td>
<td>Ahmed Aga</td>
<td>Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Mustafa Çavuş</td>
<td>Constantinople</td>
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### Appendix E

**Regional Governors (Beylerbeys) of Buda, 1541 to 1593**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Term Start</th>
<th>Term End</th>
<th>Name</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>1541 Sep. 2 – 1542 Feb.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Vizier Süleyman Pasha of Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>1542 mid-Feb. – 1543 May 1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Küçük Bali Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>1543 May 16 – 1548 end of Jan.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Yahya Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>1548 Feb. 1 – 1551 May 16</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Kasim Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>1551 May 16 – 1553 Feb. 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Hadim Ali Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>1553 Feb. 28 – 1556 Feb. 22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Toygun Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>1557 Feb. 14 – 1557 Aug. 5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Hacı Mehmed Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>1557 Aug. 19 – 1558 Nov. 4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Kasim Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>1558 Nov. 4 – 1559 Jun.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Toygun Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI.</td>
<td>1559 Jun. 21 – 1563 Nov.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Güzelce Rüstem Pasha of Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>1563 Nov. 18 – 1564 Jun.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Zal Mahmud Pasha of Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1564 Jun. – 1564 Oct.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Temporarily Sancakbey Arslan Bey of Semendire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>1564 Oct. – 1565 May 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Iskender Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>1565 May 19 – 1566 Aug. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Arslan Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
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<td>XV</td>
<td>1566 Aug. 3 – 1578 Sep. 30</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Vezir Sokollu Mustafa Pasha of Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>1578 Sept. 20 – 1580 May</td>
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<td>Beylerbey Kara Üveys Pasha of Buda</td>
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<td>XVII</td>
<td>1580 May – 1583 Oct. 9</td>
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<td>Beylerbey Kalaylıköz Ali Pasha of Buda</td>
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<td>XVIII</td>
<td>1583 Oct. 9 – 1586 May</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Frenk Yusuf (Sinan) Pasha of Buda</td>
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<tr>
<td>XIX</td>
<td>1586 May – 1587 Feb. 22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Kalaylıköz Ali Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XX</td>
<td>1587 March – 1588 Nov. 28</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Frenk Yusuf (Sinan) Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXI</td>
<td>1588 Nov. 28 – 1590 Sep.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beylerbey Ferhad Pasha of Buda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>日期</td>
<td>领事官</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XXII</td>
<td>1590 Nov. – 1592 Jan. 31</td>
<td>Beylerbey Sufi Sinan Pasha of Buda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XXIII</td>
<td>1592 Jan. 31 – 1593 Jan. 27</td>
<td>Beylerbey Sinan Pashazade Mehmed Pasha of Buda</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XXIV</td>
<td>1593 Jan. 27 – 1594 Aug. 31</td>
<td>Beylerbey Mehmed Pashazade Vizier Hasan Pasha of Buda</td>
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### Appendix F

#### Archdukes of Austria

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Archduke</th>
<th>Region/Rights</th>
<th>Reigns</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Archduke Charles II</td>
<td>of Inner Austria (&quot;Inner-Österreich&quot;)</td>
<td>1564–1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archduke Ernst III</td>
<td>of Lower Austria (“Niederösterreich”)</td>
<td>1576–1590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of Inner Austria (&quot;Inner-Österreich&quot;)</td>
<td>1590–1593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governor of Spanish Netherlands</td>
<td>1593–1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archduke Ferdinand</td>
<td>of Further Austria (&quot;Oberösterreich&quot;)</td>
<td>1564–1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archduke Matthias</td>
<td>of Lower Austria (“Niederösterreich”)</td>
<td>1590–1608</td>
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</table>
Appendix G

Example of Vernacular Diplomatic Correspondence

November 1, 1580, Beylerbey Kalaylikoz Ali Pasha of Buda to Archduke Ernst
Letter of safe conduct for secretaries Johann Fernberger and Philipp Hanniwald. HHStA, Turcica, Karton 43, Konv. 1 (1580 X-XII and s.d.), fol. 1.

Image removed to avoid copyright issues.
Transcription:

Mű Alÿ Passa az Hatalmas Istennek io Akaratiabol, török Cyzazarnak fő heltartoia Budan es gond výselőie magiar orzagnak,


Translation:

We Ali Pasha, by the will of the almighty God, place-holder of the Turkish Sultan in Buda and governor of Hungary,

Your grace, Prince Ernst, we send greetings and offerings of our services to you. They gave us your letter in which you wrote about the ambassador and the delivery of the honorable gift; we understood it. We understood all of it. We also understood that your grace would like to send the two honorable men, Johann Fernberger and Phillip Hanniwald with post to the Porte to your grace's head ambassador, in order to share some news, who will relay specific details about many topics, and for whom your grace requests a letter of safe conduct. That is why, whenever your grace desires to send them, they can come and be assured that we will receive them on our faith, humanity, and honor, and that they can come and go as they please and they will not be injured by others or by boats, nor will anyone be injured who is traveling with them. While they are on our properties, no one will abuse them, and to ensure this we are giving you our usual seal and signature.

May God bless your grace,
Buda, November 1, 1580
Appendix H

Local Governors (Sancakbeys) of Esztergom, 1543–1593

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1543 – 1544</td>
<td>Mehmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1547 – 1550</td>
<td>Süleyman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1550 – 1551</td>
<td>Veli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1551 Nov. – 1552 Mar.</td>
<td>Derya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1552 Jul. – 1553 Mar.</td>
<td>Halil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1553 Jul. – 1554</td>
<td>Ahmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1555 Jan.</td>
<td>Mustafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1555 Nov. – 1557 Jan.</td>
<td>Velican</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1557 Oct. – 1558 Mar.</td>
<td>Hamza</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1558 Nov. – 1561 Jan.</td>
<td>Mehmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1563 Nov. – 1564 Dec.</td>
<td>Hasan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565 May, before</td>
<td>Hızır</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1565 May – 1566 May</td>
<td>Mehemed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1566–1567 July</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1567 Aug. – 1567 Sep.</td>
<td>Hassan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1568 Feb. – 1572 Apr.</td>
<td>Mehmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1572 Aug.</td>
<td>Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1574 – 1575</td>
<td>Mustafa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577 Nov. – 1582</td>
<td>Sinan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582 Apr. – 1584 Jan.</td>
<td>Piri</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hidris</td>
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<td>1586 May – 1588 Sep.</td>
<td>Osman</td>
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<tr>
<td>1588 Sept. – 1590 Dec.</td>
<td>Memi</td>
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<tr>
<td>1590 Dec.</td>
<td>Hidris</td>
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<tr>
<td>1591 Sep. – Oct.</td>
<td>Mohammed</td>
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<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Ömer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593 Jun.</td>
<td>Abdulrrahman</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

890 This is a working list. The dates here reflect the documentation examined here and should be understood as “dates of documented operation as Sancakbey” rather than as dates of appointment and dismissal.
Appendix I

Captains of Komárom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1552 – 1562</td>
<td>János Paksy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1564 – 1566</td>
<td>János Pethő</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1567 – 1577</td>
<td>Andreas Kielman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1577 – 1578</td>
<td>Ferranto Samaria de Speciacasa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1580 – 1584</td>
<td>Andreas Kielman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1584 – 1589</td>
<td>Miklós Pálffy(^{891})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589 – 1594</td>
<td>Erasmus Braun</td>
</tr>
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</table>

\(^{891}\) Served again 1594–1600.
### Appendix J

**Place Names in Sources**  
(with versions used in this dissertation in *italics*)

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*892 United with Pest in 1873.*

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Appendix K

Names of Individuals

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<td>Czernovics Mihály</td>
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This list includes individuals whose translated names appear frequently in primary sources and secondary literature. The versions used in this dissertation are marked with italics.

Hungarian name order puts the family name before the Christian name. This is usually reversed in an English context. Where I have opted to use the Hungarian name in the text, I have also reversed the form that appears on this list.
Appendix L

Translated foreign terms

*beylerbey*: regional governor or governor general
*defterdar*: chief financial officer
*divan*: ruling council
*dizdar*: castle warden
*kadi*: judge
*muhimme defteri*: registers of imperial decrees
*sancakbey*: local governor
*tercuman*: translator

*Hofkriegsrat*: Aulic War Council

*helytartó*: place-holder (governor)
Maps

*Image removed to avoid copyright issues.*

Map 1. Tripartition of the former Kingdom of Hungary, c. 1550

*Image removed to avoid copyright issues.*

Map 2. Jurisdictional divisions along the Habsburg-Ottoman borderlands, c. 1572
Map 3. Central European Borderlands, for Maximilian II, c. 1566, reverse-glass painting
Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Kunstkammer (KK3020)

Map 4. Nicolo Angielini, Danube River between Komárom (Comar) and Esztergom (Gran), detail from map of the “Captaincy of Mining Towns” in a geographical survey of the border region, c. 1572, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 8609, fol. 5
Map 5. Giovanni Jacopo Gasparini, Map of the borderland fortresses facing downstream (North is to the left), c. 1594, Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Kartensammlung U/II/4/8
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Map 7. Danube River, from a collection various geographical texts, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, c. 1700, H. O. 191 Han, 17v
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Fig. 1. Portrait of Antonius Verantius, Martino Rota, c. 1572, Magyar Nemzeti Múzeum, Budapest Történelmi Képcsarnok

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Fig. 2. Sultan Süleyman’s formal signature (tuğra) on his ratification of the Peace Treaty of 1562, Vienna, HHStA Türkische Urkunden
Fig. 3. Buda and Pest, from the *Tarih-i Feth-i Şikloş, Estergon, ve İstol-Belgrad* also called the *Süleymannname* of Sinan Çavuş, illustrated by Matrakçı Nasuh, 1543, Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, R. 1608, 89b-90a
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Fig. 5. Geographer (Niccolò or Natale Angielini?), Martino Rota, c. 1572
Vienna, Albertina
Fig. 6. Audience of Habsburg ambassadors Anton Verantius and Christopher Teuffenbach with Sultan Selim II during peace treaty negotiations in 1567-1568 in the Chamber of Petitions (third court), Nüzhet-i esrârü l-ahyân der-ahbâr-i sefer-i Sigetvar of Feridun Bey, illustrated by Nakkaş Osman, 1569, Istanbul, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1339, fol. 178a
Fig. 7. Procession of the tribute carrying delegation to the Topkapi Palace (1572 embassy of Ungnad and Provisionali), *Iter factum e Belgio-Gallice* of Lambert Wyts, 1574, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (Cod. Vindobonensis Palatinus 3325), fol. 163r

Fig. 8. Transfer of tribute payment and gifts (1572 embassy of Ungnad and Provisionali), *Iter factum e Belgio-Gallice* of Lambert Wyts, 1574, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek (Cod. Vindobonensis Palatinus 3325), fol. 164r
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Fig. 10. Ottoman delegation's arrival in Frankfurt for the Coronation of Maximilian II as King of the Romans, Jost Amman, c. 1562, Oxford, Ashmolean Museum of Art and Archaeology (LO 2130A.1 — WA 1863.3069)
Fig. 11. Arrival of a tribute carrying delegation in Ottoman Buda, artist unknown, c. 1590,
Budapesti Történeti Múzeum, Kiscelli, inv. # 38.199

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Fig. 12. Arrival of a tribute carrying delegation in Ottoman Buda, detail of fig. 11

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Fig. 13. Offen (Buda) and Pest, from the *Leiden Sketchbook*, artist unknown (formerly attributed to Melchoir Lorch), c. 1584, Leiden University Library, Collection of Old Prints and Manuscripts, Bibliotheca Vossiana, VLO 50, fol. 20v–21r

Fig. 14. Ofen (Buda) and Pest, from the *Costume Album of Johannes Lewenklaw*, artist unknown, c. 1584, Vienna, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 8615 Han, fol. 155r
Fig. 15. Arrival for audience with the Sancakbey of Esztergom (and reused for Pasha of Buda), from Salomon Schweigger, *Ein neue Reyßbeschreibung auß Teutschland nach Constantinopel und Jerusalem...* (Nürnberg: Lantzenberger, 1608), page 12 (and 20).

Fig. 16. Audience with the Sancakbey of Esztergom (and reused for Pasha of Buda), from Salomon Schweigger, *Ein neue Reyßbeschreibung auß Teutschland nach Constantinopel und Jerusalem...* (Nürnberg: Lantzenberger, 1608), page 13 (and 19).
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Fig. 20. “Granitzer Beuelchs haber,” from the *Costume Book of resident ambassador Bartholomaus Pezzen*, attributed to Heinrich Hendrowski, c. 1590, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Cod. 8626 Han, fol. 1r
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Fig. 22. Third scene from *Customs and Fashions of the Turks [Ces Moeurs et fachons de faire de Turcz]*, Pieter Coecke van Aelst the Younger (and his widow Mayken Verhulst), 1553, Rijksmuseum, RP-P-OB-2304D

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Vienna, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Munzkabinett, np. 2639bβ
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Fig. 28. "Delli" from Equitum descripcio..., attributed to Abraham de Bruyn, 1577, Amsterdam, Rijksmuseum, RP-P-OB-26.992

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Fig. 29. Conquest of Belgrade from the *Tabakat ül-Memalik ve Derecat ül-Mesalik* of Celalzade Mustafa Çelebi, artist unknown, after 1581, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek. Inv. No. Osm. Hist. 41, fol. 45a

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Fig. 30. Battle below Temesvár from the *Füıtihat-ı Cemile* of Arif Fethullah Çelebi, artist unknown, 1558, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1592, 18b, detail

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Fig. 31. Siege of Belgrade from the *Hünername I* of Seyyid Lokman, illustrated by Nakkaş Osman, 1585, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1523, fol. 165a, detail

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Fig. 32. Duel of forward attacks, from the *Süleymanname*, illustrated by 5 separate hands from imperial workshops, 1558, Topkapı Palace Museum, H. 1517, fol. 212a, detail

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Fig. 33. Joust, from the *Album Amicorum* of Johann Joachim Prack von Asch, various artists, 1587–1612, Getty Research Institute, 2013.M.24, fol. 120v, detail
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