THE DILEMMA OF PEACE OPERATION DESIGN:

POWERFUL DEMOCRACIES AND THE DOMESTIC POLITICS OF CIVILIAN PROTECTION

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Abstract

A peace operation’s capacity to protect vulnerable civilians against devastating political violence depends on a series of choices about how it is designed. Yet in response to today’s worst conflicts, the powerful Western democracies with the greatest capacity to design these missions for effective civilian protection do so only occasionally. Often they do not contribute at all. Yet they also regularly participate in ways that primarily gesture toward civilian protection, notably by creating gaps between the protections that soldiers are asked to provide and that they have the capacity to deliver.

What explains this variation? What determines when and how powerful states use peace operations to protect – and appear to protect – vulnerable civilians? This dissertation argues that the relationship between competing domestic pressures to save lives while limiting costs and casualties can help to answer these questions. Specifically, the stronger the pressure to protect civilians is, relative to the difficulty of doing so for a reasonable cost, the greater a leader’s incentive to pursue robust civilian protection. Likewise, the greater her anticipated costs of action relative to demands for civilian protection, the less incentive she has for anything more than token action. The greater the tension between these pressures, however, the greater the dilemma she faces about how to balance them. Gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection can foster unjustified optimism about a mission’s true protection capacity among concerned citizens who are not experts in the design of peace operations and who struggle to recognize these gaps. Leaders confronting a stark political dilemma may thus use these gaps to promote an illusion of doing more for civilians than they really are.
I test these ideas both quantitatively and through case studies. The quantitative analysis employs extensive original data, including a list of the most devastating post-Cold War conflicts (or complex emergencies); contributions to peace operations in response by the U.S., UK, France, and – regionally – Australia; and a new measure of public concern about these conflicts in these four states. The case studies include Australian responses to three regional complex emergencies and U.S. responses to war in Darfur from 2003-07. The empirical analyses offer strong support for my expectations, and the case studies provide considerable evidence of the anticipated causal mechanisms.

The project contributes to literatures on peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and the influence of public opinion over foreign policy. My findings have implications for both future research and the practical problem of designing better peace operations.
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**Acronyms**

ACFOA – Australian Council for Overseas Aid

ADF – Australian Defence Force

ALP – Australian Labor Party

AMIS – African Union Mission in Sudan

AU – African Union

BCL – Bougainville Copper Ltd

BRA – Bougainville Resistance Army

CE-DAT – Complex Emergencies Database

COW – Correlates of War

CPA – Comprehensive Peace Agreement (re: Sudanese civil war)

DPA – Darfur Peace Agreement

DPKO – Department of Peacekeeping Operations (United Nations)

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States

FALINTIL – Forças Armada de Libertação Nacional de Timor Leste (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor)

FDP – Forcibly Displaced Person

GAM – Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)

IASC – Inter-Agency Standing Committee (United Nations)

ICISS – International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Center

IDP – Internally Displaced Person

IMF – International Monetary Fund
INTERFET – International Force East Timor

JEM – Justice and Equality Movement (A Darfur rebel movement)

MONUC – United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

MSF – Médecins Sans Frontière (Doctors Without Borders)

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO – non-governmental organization

OAU – Organization of African Unity

OCHA – Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (United Nations)

ONUSAL – United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador

PITF – Political Instability Task Force

PNG – Papua New Guinea

PNGDF – Papua New Guinea Defence Force

ROE – Rules of Engagement

SMH – The Sydney Morning Herald

SLM/A – Sudan Liberation Movement/Army

SPKF – South Pacific Peacekeeping Force

TNI – Tentara Nasional Indonesia (the Indonesian military)

UN – United Nations

UNAMET – United Nations Mission in East Timor

UNAMID – United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur

UNAMIR – United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

UNHCR – UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNITAF – Unified Task Force (Somalia)

UNMIS – United Nations Mission in Sudan

UNOSOM I and II – United Nations Operation (I & II) in Somalia

UNPROFOR – United Nations Protection Force

UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USCR – United States Committee for Refugees (after 2005, USCRI – United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants)

WRS – World Refugee Survey (produced by USCR)
Chapter 1 – Civilian Protection and the Design of Peace Operations: An Introduction

1. The Design of Peace Operations Matters

On the night of September 27, 1999, in the village of Com, East Timor, a heavily armed group of militiamen herded a frightened crowd of several hundred East Timorese civilians onto a dock. The militia intended to load their captives onto ships, most likely to transport them against their will across the border into the Indonesian province of West Timor. Over the previous three weeks, militia violence had been responsible for the destruction of nearly three-quarters of all buildings and houses in East Timor and the murder of perhaps 2,000 civilians (Dunn 2009 p.280), as well as the forcible displacement of the majority of the territory’s 800,000 inhabitants. Thousands of East Timorese had been kidnapped and taken to West Timor by militia members opposed to independence from Indonesia. Under the circumstances, the militia members had good reason to believe – and the terrified civilians huddling on the dock to fear – that the evening’s abduction would go as planned.

Two hundred kilometers away, however, Australian soldiers at the headquarters of the International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) were busy examining recent air reconnaissance photos. Suspicious of the large gathering at the wharf, Commander Peter Cosgrove ordered a Special Forces squadron to investigate. The Australians piled into their Blackhawk helicopters and flew off into the night. When they landed near Com, locals informed them that the civilians on the dock were being held against their will. The soldiers moved forward in the darkness and surrounded the militia, ordering them to surrender. When they sought to escape, the Australians’ superior training and clear willingness to use force allowed them to capture and disarm the
militia, all without firing a single shot. Thanks to this daring rescue, the militia’s intended victims were able to return to their homes, rather than being taken to West Timor – or worse.¹

Over the course of the next several months, INTERFET continued to protect civilians and restore order and security throughout the territory of East Timor, allowing hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians to begin returning to their homes and resuming their lives.

Several years later, residents of the village of Hamada in southern Darfur, Sudan, were not so lucky. In mid-January 2005, a vicious attack by Sudanese government planes and government-supported Arab militia destroyed the town, displacing about 9,000 people and killing over 100, mostly women and children.² This was just one of many such attacks over the previous two years in a war characterized by ethnic cleansing and repeated accusations – including by the U.S. government – that Khartoum was engaged in genocide. At the time, some 2.5 million conflict-affected people were in need of assistance, and estimates of the civilian death toll ranged from 63,000 to 380,000.³

Although troops from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) were deployed in Darfur in early 2005, they did not reach Hamada in time. Instead, over the following days and


³ For a useful table summarizing the available estimates, see Olivier Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir, "Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict," The Lancet 375, no. 9711 (2010), p.295. For other sources and a more extended discussion see also Chapter 7 of this dissertation, Section 2.1.2.
weeks, their role was limited to documenting the destruction. AMIS was mandated, in part, to protect civilians it discovered in its immediate vicinity, and individual AMIS commanders sometimes went beyond this mandate, sending soldiers to locations where attacks were believed to be imminent in an effort to deter violence against civilians. Yet the mission was hampered by extraordinary challenges, and lacked many of the attributes that contributed to INTERFET’s success in saving the villagers of Com. Insufficient numbers, unclear and restrictive rules of engagement, limited intelligence collection capacity, inadequate ground and air transport, and the inability to fly or patrol at night – among other limitations – left the mission poorly prepared to meet Darfuri civilians’ security needs and unable to deliver even the limited amount of protection it was asked to provide (see, eg, International Crisis Group 2005 p.50-58; O’Neill and Cassis 2005).

***

Civilians suffer in all kinds of large-scale political violence, but conflicts like those in East Timor and Darfur – which generate severe civilian suffering that local authorities cannot or will not control – are sometimes referred to as complex humanitarian emergencies. Complex emergencies may arise out of inter-state or civil wars, inter-communal violence, or one-sided violence against civilians. Often, but not always, civilians are the intended targets of at least one party to the violence. Sometimes, the majority of deaths are violent. More often, however, disease and malnutrition related to physical insecurity and displacement are the primary killers. More than other conflicts, complex emergencies generate calls for external military efforts to help end the violence, create a secure environment for the delivery of relief aid, or protect innocent victims. As civilians have borne an increasing share of the burden of armed conflict
over recent decades – representing, by the 1990s, some 75% of war-related casualties\(^4\) – such conflicts have repeatedly challenged the international community to decide how much effort to devote to these endeavors. Recently, atrocities in the Congo, chaos in Somalia, the awful 2009 conclusion of Sri Lanka’s civil war, and the fallout of uprisings in Libya and Syria suggest that this challenge is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.

In complex emergencies, the design of such military missions, or *peace operations*, is critically important.\(^5\) Recent research shows that their prospects for saving lives depend on whether forces deploy in a timely fashion, with political goals and military strategies that reflect civilians’ security and protection needs, with sufficient and well-trained personnel and equipment, and with the will to take significant military risks (Bellamy and Williams 2009; Holt and Berkman 2006; Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006; Krain 2005; O'Hanlon 1997; Seybolt 2008). Yet in practice, peace operations range from small observer missions limited to monitoring a ceasefire – like AMIS when it was first conceived in 2004 – to large and ambitious civilian protection missions like INTERFET.

A few of the most powerful Western democracies largely determine why some of these missions are better suited to addressing civilians’ security and protection needs than others. With some limitations, these states have the unique combination of military capacity and political clout required to ensure that a peace operation occurs, and if so, that it puts civilians’ needs first. Regularly, they take no part in any operation at all, and only occasionally – as Australia did in East Timor – do they deploy quickly, commit sufficient resources, and accept significant risks to shield civilians from severe violence.

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\(^5\) Throughout the dissertation, I use the term ‘peace operation’ to refer to military actions that seek to encourage or provide security for local actors in response to a complex emergency. For further discussion, see Chapter 2.
Commonly, though, the states with the greatest capacity to design peace operations for effective civilian protection instead contribute to these missions, but do so in ways that are incompatible with addressing civilians’ most pressing needs. Sometimes, even where violence is or recently has been extreme, they support traditional monitoring or peacekeeping missions without the authority or capacity to provide any real security. Often, however, they participate in ways that *gesture* toward protection, without doing much to actually provide it.

In the case of Darfur, for example, a number of major Western democracies provided financial and logistical support to AMIS (and eventually, to its similarly hapless successor, UNAMID), but did not deploy their own soldiers. Because this support was unable to overcome the African Union troops’ lack of capacity to provide the level of protection they were asked to deliver, several of the world’s most powerful countries found themselves helping to enable a mission whose civilian protection goals outpaced its means for achieving them.

To provide another example, toward the end of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, France sent about 2500 troops to Rwanda in a mission known as Operation Turquoise. Armed with a United Nations (UN) mandate to protect civilians and well-trained French soldiers with the technology, training, and know-how to do so, they nevertheless chose military strategies that were poorly suited to this end. As Nicholas Wheeler explains, France deployed “a well-armed and equipped fighting force at the expense of the logistics needed for a successful *rescue* mission,” thus saving fewer lives than it could have had it “selected military means that were appropriate to its humanitarian claims” (2000 p.235, 239). French commanders also refused to take actions that would have been consistent with improving security for civilians, from arresting suspected war criminals to shutting down the radio station that urged continued genocidal violence. Thus,
French soldiers’ latent potential to protect civilians exceeded the protection they were actually expected to provide, despite the ostensibly humanitarian nature of their deployment.

In both of these cases, the major Western democracies helped to enable what I refer to as a gap between soldiers’ *instructions* and *resources* for civilian protection. In the first case, despite the outside help, AMIS continued to lack the resources to carry out the aspects of its mandate that included such protection. In the second, French soldiers had plenty of physical capacity to provide more protection, but weren’t asked to make this their priority.

### 2. Puzzle and Significance

In this dissertation I seek to explain this variation in the ways that the most powerful Western democracies use peace operations to protect civilians, or alternatively, to create the illusion of doing so. Why do these states sometimes respond to complex emergencies with peace operations that are designed to meet civilians’ needs for security and protection, and at other times lend their support to missions that are poorly suited to meet these needs, or to no peace operations at all? In particular, and most puzzling, why do they help to enable the kinds of gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection that I have just described?

These questions have significant implications for the much-discussed problem of how to generate political will for better peace operations, and for our understanding of international politics more broadly. First, robust and well-designed civilian protection missions such as INTERFET are few and far between. Identifying instances in which states with the necessary capacity are willing to design and carry out such operations and investigating what distinguishes them from mere gestures toward civilian protection, therefore, would be a major step toward improving our understanding of the conditions that encourage and hinder high-quality missions where they are most needed.
In addition, for leaders of these powerful states, contributing to peace operations in ways that facilitate gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection is a remarkably common alternative to more robust civilian protection efforts. In fact, the data I collected for this project suggest that among post-Cold War complex emergencies, about 40-45% of all contributions to peace operations by the four states that I focus on – the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and in its own region, Australia – have helped to do so.\(^6\)

Yet such policies are problematic for multiple reasons. First and most importantly, on the ground in a complex emergency, gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection can, tragically, “raise civilians’ hopes and alter their behavior, leaving them vulnerable to attacks” (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.186; see also Seybolt 2008 p.277; United Nations 2000 p.x). Civilians are likely to expect soldiers to help provide for their security, and to be unpleasantly surprised when they either will not or cannot do so. The infamous 1995 massacre at Srebrenica in Bosnia – which was possible because Bosnian civilians had flocked to a ‘safe zone’ manned by Dutch soldiers without the authority to protect them – is just one grisly example. As it attests, contributions that enable such gaps can exacerbate civilian suffering, and may even be worse than doing nothing or than making a more transparently limited contribution.

Second, as various scholars and policy practitioners have pointed out, missions with ambitious goals but inadequate resources are unlikely to be successful, and may threaten the credibility of peace operations and civilian protection as an enterprise altogether. For these reasons, scholars of humanitarian action have repeatedly argued, in effect, that civilian protection

\(^6\) This calculation is based on the set of events identified in the Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies dataset introduced in Chapter 4, which includes conflicts that began after or continued until at least the end of the Cold War (that is, 1989). Data on the contributions to peace operations, and the calculation of this statistic, are in Chapter 5, Section 2.2.4.
efforts “should be timely and robust or shunned altogether” (Weiss 1994 p.122; see also Walzer 1995 p.57; Natsios 1994 p.139-140).

In addition, by creating the appearance of greater commitment to civilian protection than actually exists, policies that facilitate resources-instructions gaps can confuse and deceive a leader’s own constituents at home, making it difficult to hold her accountable (as I explain below, this is precisely what can make them politically attractive). Finally, such policies are puzzling from the perspective of traditional rational unitary actor theories of international politics, which would not expect leaders to knowingly waste resources or to risk their credibility by appearing incompetent.

But while many scholars and policy-makers have bemoaned the recurrence of peace operations that do not reflect civilian needs (eg, Walzer 1995; Evans, Sahnoun, and International Development Research Centre 2001; Jakobsen 1996; MacFarlane and Weiss 2000; Seybolt 2008; Wheeler 2000), systematic efforts to explain such missions are sorely lacking. Scholarly debates about when peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions occur and what motivates the leaders who initiate them have largely ignored questions about the details of operational design, even though such details are critical for effective civilian protection. As the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) put it in their report, The Responsibility to Protect, “the trouble with most discussions of ‘political will’ is that more time is spent lamenting its absence than on analyzing its ingredients, and working out how to use them in different contexts” (Evans, Sahnoun, and International Development Research Centre 2001 p.71).

This dissertation seeks to fill this void by examining how ordinary citizens and civil society in four major Western democracies influence their leaders’ contributions to, and
implementation of, peace operations in complex emergencies. I focus on the U.S., UK, France, and Australia as states that have consistently demonstrated the capacity to make the kinds of decisions about the design of these missions that I seek to explain. I also focus primarily on the post-Cold War period, when protecting civilian victims of devastating conflicts – and indeed, peace operations more generally – began to receive increasing international attention.

Finally, my emphasis on the role of public attitudes and civil society draws on, and allows the project to contribute to, an important literature in international relations concerning the impact of public opinion and public advocacy on foreign policy and the use of force. In the context of peace operations, numerous scholars have contended that these domestic political forces exert considerable influence over leaders’ decisions about whether and how to participate, especially where there are humanitarian justifications for doing so. At the same time, their arguments betray a sharp distinction – also evident in the broader literature – between two quite different views of just how everyday citizens and activists matter. While some scholars emphasize that concerned citizens can pressure their leaders into pursuing humanitarian military action (eg, Kennan 1993; Bass 2008; Jakobsen 1996, 2002; Finnemore 2003), others deplore the constraining influence of the broader public in limiting responsiveness to civilians’ needs (eg, MacFarlane and Weiss 2000; Power 2002). I build on and contribute to this literature by bringing these two views of the public’s role together. Recognizing that citizens can both motivate and constrain their leaders at once, I develop and test a theory that explains how a leader’s need to balance these competing pressures influences her incentives to protect – and to appear to protect – civilians threatened by devastating violence.
3. **Overview of the Argument**

In brief, I argue that a democratic leader may face a political dilemma created by competing incentives to satisfy both the demands of citizens who favor robust efforts to protect civilians, and the expectations of the broader public that any such efforts remain relatively low-cost. Two things, in turn, determine the intensity of this dilemma. First, the pressure for humanitarian action generated by everyday concerned citizens and activists (whom I collectively refer to as the ‘humanitarian public’) determines how politically important it is for the leader to respond to their demands. Second, the operational environment associated with a particular complex emergency informs the leader’s expectations about the feasibility of protecting civilians for a cost that would be acceptable to the broader public. The more challenging and dangerous the operational environment is, the lower the odds that the leader can expect to protect civilians effectively while maintaining the support of the general public.

To conceive of the intensity of the leader’s political dilemma in terms of these two forces, it makes sense to think about them in relative terms. While more political pressure increases the importance of responding to the humanitarian public’s demands and a more challenging operational environment limits opportunities to do so for an acceptable cost, it is the relationship between these pressures that matters.

In particular, the greater the potential costs and risks reflected in the operational environment, *relative* to the pressure the leader faces to save lives, the more we might say that her cause for concern about costs *dominates* her incentives for humanitarian action. Conversely, the greater the pressure she faces to protect civilians relative to the difficulties and challenges represented by the operational environment, the closer we might say her incentives to save lives come to dominating her reasons to worry about costs (Because military action is always at least
somewhat costly and risky, pressure for humanitarian action may never truly dominate concerns about casualties and budgetary outlays, but in relative terms this logic works in both directions). Finally, the less that one of these two pressures dominates the other, the more difficult the dilemma the leader faces, and the greater her need, politically, to find a way around it.

Contributing to peace operations in ways that help to enable gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection can be a promising way to resolve such a dilemma. As the French government did in Rwanda, a leader might simultaneously provide substantial military resources to a peace operation, but hamper their effective use through inappropriate rules of engagement or military strategies. Or, as the U.S. and others did in Darfur, she may provide limited financial or logistical support to troops from countries that lack the training or equipment to effectively protect civilians, while encouraging these troops to pursue ambitious protection goals.

Crucially, members of the humanitarian public are typically not experts in the design of peace operations, and for various reasons tend to face significant obstacles in accurately monitoring the quality of efforts to protect civilians. In particular, concerned citizens may well be unable to identify gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection, especially if they cue off of only the more impressive of these. A leader, meanwhile, can encourage this outcome by strategically calling attention to the information she wants these citizens to have, and not to the information she doesn’t.

Thus, by facilitating a resources-instructions gap, a leader’s odds of convincing the humanitarian public that she is doing more to address civilians’ security and protection needs than she really is are fairly high. If she is successfully able to create this illusion of civilian protection, she can expect to benefit from all the political rewards of a more robust policy while
limiting her state’s exposure to serious costs and risks. This, in turn, should increase her chances of maintaining broad public support as well.

The examples from Darfur and Rwanda, in fact, are both suggestive of how leaders can create this illusion in practice. In the first case – the subject of Chapter 7 – the Bush Administration faced a serious dilemma driven by the combination of strong public pressure for civilian protection and an extremely unfavorable operational environment. As James Traub has put it, under these circumstances U.S. support for AMIS allowed it and others who offered similar assistance “to say that they were addressing the problem without having to commit anything save money” (2007 p.346). As I discuss at length later on, many U.S. Darfur activists indeed believed that by supporting AMIS (and subsequently UNAMID), their leaders were doing more to meet civilians’ needs in Darfur than they really were.

In the second case, despite the major limitations of Operation Turquoise, French leaders described the mission as a humanitarian triumph. Several weeks after the initial deployment, on July 12th 1994, French Prime Minister Édouard Balladur declared that “France has sent its soldiers out of a moral duty to act without delay in order to stop the genocide and provide immediate assistance to the threatened populations” (quoted in Prunier 1995 p.296). Ten days later, Defence Minister François Léotard claimed that the mission had “stopped the violence, cared for the victims and prepared the way for those who deserve the beautiful name of humanitarians” (quoted in Prunier 1995 p.302).

Operation Turquoise’s design flaws reflected the fact that the French government wanted to use the mission not only to save lives, but even more so, to show that it could continue to project power in Africa (Wheeler 2000 p.235). That Turquoise deployed at all, however, in no small part also reflected strong pressure by angry citizens who wanted to rectify what they
perceived as France’s role in and partial responsibility for the genocide (Wheeler 2000 p.235-7; Melvern 2009 p.217, 234; Prunier 1995 p.281-2). French officials thus needed to convince this domestic audience that the mission had succeeded in playing the role they expected of it. As Gérard Prunier describes, their “laborious displays of truth rectification” had the desired effect, prompting citizens to forget “the mechanics of Turquoise on the ground” (1995 p.297).

Likewise, Nicholas Wheeler points out, “the majority of the public focused on the gratifying pictures of French soldiers rescuing Tutsis, convinced that France had discharged its duty to common humanity” (2000 p.237).

As these examples attest, contributing to and facilitating peace operations characterized by gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection can give the impression that a leader is doing more to address civilians’ security needs than she really is. Still, doing so could be politically costly if concerned citizens catch on, and despite their informational disadvantages, this remains a real possibility. As a result, leaders do not have an equal incentive to pursue this strategy at all times. Instead, the political risks involved are most worth taking when the potential payoff of creating the illusion of civilian protection is greatest: when a leader faces substantial political pressure to save lives, along with formidable challenges to doing so for a reasonable cost.

Together, these insights about the relationship between a leader’s competing incentives to protect civilians while keeping costs low, and about how she might skirt the dilemma these incentives create, generate clear empirical implications about when and how powerful democracies are likely to contribute to peace operations in complex emergencies. In broad strokes, I expect, first, that the more challenging the operational environment is relative to the public pressure a leader faces for humanitarian action – that is, the more her political calculus is
driven by concerns about costs – the more likely she is to make a token effort to address civilians’ security needs, or none at all. Second, the closer the humanitarian public’s demands come to dominating her calculations – that is, the more pressure she faces for civilian protection relative to the risks inherent in the operational environment – the more likely she is to engage in serious and well-planned efforts to put civilians’ needs first. Third and finally, the less that one of these two forces dominates the other – and thus, the starker the leader’s political dilemma – the more likely she is to engage in the kind of gesture politics reflected in decisions to facilitate resource-instructions gaps and efforts to create an illusion of civilian protection.

I test a variety of empirical implications of this argument, both statistically and through case studies. Across both quantitative and qualitative analysis, I find strong support for my expectations, and also for the mechanisms through which I anticipate that the theory operates. At the same time, I do not intend this argument to be exclusive: clearly, other factors influence when and how leaders contribute to peace operations, and non-humanitarian forces might also be able to provide an incentive for protecting civilians. Still, although I carefully consider the influence of forces such as strategic relationships and leaders’ own moral imperatives, I find that where they compete with the expectations of my theory, my own argument fits the data most consistently. Finally, while I can think of no other plausible motive for decisions to facilitate gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection, it is certainly possible that leaders pursue such policies unintentionally and unknowingly. I consider this possibility carefully where possible, and return to it at greater length in the concluding chapter. In general, I find little support for this idea.
4. Structure of the Dissertation

Accounting for the variation that motivates this dissertation requires something of a different approach to the study of peace operations from that pursued by the literature on either peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention. As a consequence, the project pushes numerous conceptual boundaries and introduces several sources of original data. The first part, Chapters 2 – 4, presents the main theoretical and conceptual arguments, as well as an original dataset of post-Cold War complex humanitarian emergencies. Chapters 5 – 7 then introduce the remainder of the data and test the theory empirically. Chapter 8 wraps up by reviewing my findings and discussing some of their implications.

Chapter 2 lays much of the conceptual groundwork for the rest of the dissertation. The first half of the chapter explains how my focus on civilians’ security and protection needs as the standard for judging peace operations differentiates this project from much of the existing literature and drives three key research design decisions. These include my use of complex humanitarian emergencies as the relevant universe of conflicts, examination of a wide range of different types of peace operations, and selection of the U.S., UK, France, and Australia as the states whose policy decisions I examine.

The second half of the chapter then reviews the state of current knowledge about how the design of peace operations affects the prospects for civilian protection, and analyzes how we can apply this knowledge to assess these missions in the context of complex emergencies. The relevant literature finds that effective civilian protection depends primarily on the selection of appropriate goals and proper military strategies to meet them; on the deployment of sufficient resources to pursue these goals; and on operational timing. I use these findings, along with the defining characteristics of complex emergencies, to define precisely what I mean by civilian
protection and to develop some simple standards for assessing how these key aspects of peace operations reflect their capacity to provide it.

Chapter 3 develops the theoretical argument introduced above in detail, offering an explanation for several aspects of the quality of powerful democracies’ contributions to peace operations. First, I draw on the arguments from Chapter 2 to define two key components of these contributions, their instructions and resources for civilian protection. Each of these reflects the potential capacity to address a certain portion of the security and protection needs generated by a given complex emergency. The less ambitious one determines the first key aspect of a contribution’s quality, what I call its true protection capacity. The more ambitious one, in turn, determines what I call its apparent protection capacity, and any difference between them reflects the instructions-resources gap discussed above. Such a gap diminishes the contribution’s quality, I argue, precisely because of its ability to promote the illusion that its true protection capacity is higher than it really is. Finally, I use these two aspects of a contribution’s quality – its true protection quality and resources-instructions gap – to identify three basic types of contributions: those that are primarily limited, robust, or dominated by a gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection.

The remainder of the chapter explains why leaders can expect to benefit from enabling such resources-instructions gaps, and predicts when they are most likely to facilitate them – or, alternatively, to engage in more limited or more robust civilian protection efforts. First I introduce the idea of the political dilemma a leader faces when pushed both to protect civilians and to limit the costs of doing so, representing it as a function of the relationship between concerned citizens’ demands to save lives and the operational environment for a peace operation in a complex emergency. Next, I explain how a leader may be able to overcome this dilemma by
creating the illusion of doing more to protect civilians than she really is. Opportunities to create such an illusion are plentiful, I argue – though not without some political risk – because of the considerable challenges that members of the humanitarian public face in accurately distinguishing between high and low-quality policies. A simple decision-theoretic model illustrates the combined impact of these forces on a leader’s incentives and identifies specific, testable hypotheses about how she is likely to contribute to peace operations.

Before testing these ideas in the remainder of the dissertation, in Chapter 4 I explain and justify the procedures and data sources I used to construct an original list of complex humanitarian emergencies, the *Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset*. This dataset consists of 61 separate conflicts that were ongoing between 1989 and 2009. It fills a notable gap in existing data concerning the impact of conflict on civilians, identifying the conflicts that have been worst for civilians regardless of whether they were the primary targets of violence and regardless of the source of the political dispute. It thus facilitates my quantitative empirical analysis by capturing the range of theoretically relevant conflicts – those that might have reasonably prompted a civilian-centric peace operation in recent decades – better than other existing data sources.

Chapter 5 employs this and other original data to test several of the theory’s core empirical implications across a range of conflicts and all four Western democracies. In addition to the list of complex emergencies, I collected detailed information on the involvement of these states in each peace operation that responded to these conflicts. This information reflects both whether they participated, and if so, the key components of their contribution – soldiers’ protection instructions and resources committed. I also devised an original measure of public
concern about these conflicts based on elite media coverage, and an index representing the relative difficulty of the operational environment.

Using this data, I operationalize the relationship between public concern or pressure for humanitarian action and the operational environment as a spectrum reflecting the ratio of the relative amount of the former, to the relative difficulty of the latter. At low values of this spectrum, the operational environment dominates public concern, and at the highest values, such concern comes as close as it ever can to dominating cost-related considerations related to the operational environment.

The chapter tests four hypotheses concerning the potential interveners’ propensity to contribute to peace operations, and to design them in ways that are suited to meeting civilians’ security and protection needs. I show, first, that in general, powerful democracies contribute to peace operations in ways that involve greater capacity for civilian protection as values of this ratio increase. Likewise, they become less likely to make no contribution to a peace operation at all, and more likely to engage in the most robust forms of civilian protection. In addition, I show that there is a curvilinear relationship between the value of this ratio and the probability of facilitating a gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. This finding confirms my expectation that such gaps are most likely when leaders face a serious political dilemma in which neither public pressure for humanitarian action nor concerns about costs clearly dominate their political calculations. My results are robust to different statistical techniques and a variety of variables that might also affect how powerful democracies contribute to peace operations. Most notably, these include a number of indicators of strategic relationships that could theoretically provide additional, non-humanitarian incentives to provide civilian protection.
Chapters 6-7 supplement the quantitative analysis through detailed case studies of individual responses to complex emergencies by the United States and Australia. These case studies permit a more detailed test of the theory’s causal mechanisms by allowing for a more nuanced assessment of such key details as the composition and political strength of the humanitarian public; its members’ ability to observe resources-instructions gaps and to judge the quality of their leaders’ policies; leaders’ perceptions of demands for humanitarian action; and the forces that can affect the anticipated operational environment for a peace operation.

Just as importantly, they allow me to assess in much greater detail the role of other influences over the decision-making process besides those highlighted by my theory. As in Chapter 5, these include the role of strategic relationships, but they also include leaders’ own moral imperatives and – most critically for the argument about gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection – the possibility that leaders simply don’t know how to design peace operations for effective protection particularly well. Finally, these case studies also allow me to analyze a series of issues that, out of necessity, I overlook in the quantitative work. These include questions of operational timing; whether a peace operation is the best strategy to protect civilians in a given complex emergency; how leaders’ use of peace operations interact with the other strategies they employ for responding to complex emergencies; and the conditions that contribute to the emergence of an influential humanitarian public.

The case studies reflect the full range of variation I seek to explain, including one very robust civilian protection mission, two instances of facilitating a resources-instructions gap, several limited operations not focused on protection or security, and two instances of no involvement in a peace operation at all.
Chapter 6 compares Australian responses to three recent complex emergencies in the Southwest Pacific, a volatile region where Australia is the major power and possesses the military capacity and political influence to make the kind of operational design decisions I seek to explain. The three conflicts include the one-sided violence against East Timorese civilians by pro-Indonesian militias in 1999 briefly outlined above; a separatist civil war in the Indonesian province of Aceh from 1999 – 2004; and a civil war on the Papua New Guinea island of Bougainville from 1988 – 1997.

In East Timor, strong pressure from a large and very influential humanitarian public with close personal ties and in many cases, intimate knowledge of East Timor, helped to produce a robust and effective military response, despite countervailing strategic interests. A relatively favorable operational environment was also critical to this outcome. In Aceh, the operational environment was effectively irrelevant, as the Australian public expressed virtually no interest in the conflict. Consistent with the expectations of the theory, Australia remained uninvolved in the conflict. Finally, in Bougainville Australia facilitated three small regional peace operations not oriented toward civilian protection. These actions were associated with some limited public pressure for Australia to take a more active role in resolving the conflict, and an operational environment whose dangers varied over time. Overall, variation in the political influence of concerned citizens and the nature of the operational environment goes a long way toward explaining the disparity in Australian responses to these conflicts. Other influences, though relevant, do not predict the outcomes as clearly.

Chapter 7 examines decision-making by the U.S. toward war in Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and 2007. Initially, and during the worst of the violence in 2003 to mid-2004, U.S. officials faced no Darfur-related public pressure, and although they began to provide relief aid
for the displaced, did effectively nothing to address the security situation. Thereafter, the U.S. supported the two peace operations mentioned above, AMIS and UNAMID. As noted earlier, this and other Western support was insufficient to overcome the clear gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection that characterized these missions. Decisions to facilitate them, however, were perfectly consistent with the theory. Despite the emergence of an extraordinarily large, well-organized, and influential U.S. advocacy movement devoted to the cause of “saving” Darfur, the considerable pressure U.S. leaders faced to do so was pitted against an extremely formidable operational environment, which included the threat of armed Sudanese opposition to the deployment of any non-African troops. Under the circumstances, the Bush Administration had a considerable incentive to create the illusion of doing more to protect civilians than it really was willing to do.

The evidence suggests that support for AMIS and UNAMID allowed them to do so. At critical junctures, the Darfur advocacy movement – largely first-time activists and followers with little or no prior knowledge of Darfur or Sudan – failed to perceive both important changes in the nature of the conflict, and in related tensions in U.S. support for AMIS and UNAMID. As a result, they often pursued advocacy strategies and policy demands with little potential to improve U.S. efforts to provide for civilians’ security needs. Throughout the period examined here, then, U.S. Darfur policy is consistently in line with my theoretical expectations. At the same time, neither strategic considerations, a lack of official understanding about how to protect civilians, or U.S. leaders’ own humanitarian sentiments can so consistently account for developments in U.S. policy.

The final chapter summarizes the dissertation’s conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions, and discusses two primary types of implications for the relevant scholarly
literature and for the challenge of encouraging better peace operations. First, while they are not
the whole story, my findings confirm the conventional wisdom and raison d’état of advocacy
organizations: that the amount of public pressure leaders face for humanitarian action matters for
the policies they choose. In Chapter 8, therefore, I discuss some insights drawn from the case
studies about conditions that may encourage the kind of empathy for complex emergency victims
that makes such pressure possible, and about possible avenues for related future research.

Perhaps more important, though, is the underlying assumption on which my arguments
rests – and which numerous details from the case studies suggest is a reasonable one – that
concerned citizens are typically at a fundamental disadvantage when it comes to monitoring the
quality of their leaders’ civilian protection efforts. Although I treat this disadvantage as a
constant, some of the most pressing questions and issues raised by this dissertation concern
possibilities for changing this reality, or at least for recognizing it and incorporating it into the
development of future advocacy strategies. Most importantly, leaders’ incentives to create the
illusion of civilian protection create a catch-22 for the humanitarian public. While allowing
leaders the flexibility to respond to civilian protection needs as they think best leaves concerned
citizens especially vulnerable to falling for this illusion, making detailed policy demands in order
to better hold them accountable is a gamble as well. For the same reasons that most members of
the humanitarian public are vulnerable to the illusion of civilian protection, they are also quite
likely to miss details of critical importance to the development of an effective policy response.
This leaves them at considerable risk of making ill-considered policy demands that could have
their own negative consequences. The remainder of Chapter 8 develops these ideas and their
implications for contemporary advocacy movements.
Chapter 2 – The Devil’s in the Details: The Design of Peace Operations in Complex Emergencies

With its focus on civilian protection and the design of peace operations, this dissertation differs from much of the related peacekeeping literature that seeks to account for the incidence and characteristics of these missions. The first half of this chapter explains how the relevant differences drive several core research design decisions and major concepts that I use throughout the project.

First, investigating variation in civilian protection requires a focus on conflicts both where such protection occurs and where it does not, but might have been justified based on the extent of civilian suffering. A variety of different kinds of political violence – civil and inter-state wars, crimes against humanity, and inter-communal violence – can generate severe civilian suffering, but none of them does so all the time. Therefore, none of these concepts alone captures the full range of theoretically relevant conflicts, and together they include many that are relatively less devastating. The concept of a complex humanitarian emergency, however, reflects a conflict’s effects on civilian life. Because this concept has not been widely used in the social science literature, a significant contribution of this dissertation involves adapting it for this purpose. In this chapter, I describe limitations of existing definitions and develop a new one. Chapter 4 then uses this definition to create an original dataset of these events in the post-Cold War period.

Second, I briefly explain why I examine a wider range of military operations than much of the related literature, including traditional peacekeeping operations, humanitarian
interventions, and others. Here, I also define how I use the term *peace operations* throughout the dissertation.

Third, I argue that explaining variation in the quality of peace operations’ civilian protection efforts requires a focus on the decisions of actors with the capacity to shape these outcomes. Specifically, it requires explaining why the states with the capacity to conduct robust civilian protection operations sometimes do so, and other times make very different choices, including facilitating missions characterized by gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for protection. It is primarily a few Western democracies – the U.S., UK, France, and regionally, Australia – that possess this capacity, and this justifies the project’s focus on them.

Last but certainly not least, the second half of the chapter prepares the way for the theoretical argument by building on the key motivating observation of this dissertation. As noted in Chapter 1, the details of peace operation design play a key role in these missions’ capacity for civilian protection. As a result, explaining variation in the quality of efforts to provide such protection requires a way to assess the appropriateness of specific aspects of operational design. Thus, I draw on the relevant literature to identify the characteristics of these missions that are most critical to their life-saving potential. In brief, this literature suggests that peace operations are best-suited to meeting the security and protection needs civilians consistently face in complex emergencies when they employ appropriate goals, military strategies suited to achieving them, and sufficient resources to address the extent of the threats civilians face on the ground. Earlier deployment is also preferable to later. Finally, drawing on these arguments and my definition of a complex emergency, I develop some guidelines for evaluating how well peace operations meet these standards. These, in turn, serve to guide the theoretical argument and empirical analyses that comprise the rest of the dissertation.
1. Why Complex Emergencies?

The literature on peace operations is vast and varied. This dissertation seeks to contribute, above all, to the extensive body of scholarship that attempts to explain these operations – both their incidence, and individual states’ contributions (e.g., Bellamy and Williams 2009; Perkins and Neumayer 2008; Bobrow and Boyer 1997; Gaibulloev, Sandler, and Shimizu 2009; Khanna, Sandler, and Shimizu 1998; Lebovic 2004; Neack 1995; Bass 2008; Jakobsen 1996; Snyder 2008; Bove and Elia 2011). While some studies focus on traditional, consent-based peacekeeping, others highlight the most coercive and ambitious civilian-protection operations (known variously as humanitarian interventions or coercive protection operations). As I explain in the next chapter, this literature offers important insights into why leaders are (or are not) motivated to pursue these missions.

In terms of research design, however, this project’s goal of explaining variation in the quality of civilian protection distinguishes it from most related scholarship. First, since all conflicts that might justify such protection are relevant to understanding variation in efforts to provide it, such conflicts must be identified in terms of their impact on and threat to civilian life. The idea of the complex humanitarian emergency – in wide use by policymakers and the international humanitarian community but not, so far, by political scientists – meets this standard better than other commonly used concepts.

1.1. The Limits of Other Concepts

Most efforts to account for traditional peacekeeping examine responses only to wars (usually civil wars), while studies of humanitarian intervention and notorious failures to initiate it often focus only on the very worst cases of mass atrocities (e.g., Power 2002; Wheeler 2000; Bass 2008). These approaches have two key limitations for my purposes. First, various kinds of

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political violence – civil and inter-state wars, one-sided violence and mass atrocity crimes, and inter-communal violence – are capable of generating very severe civilian suffering. Thus, studies that focus exclusively on responses to either civil wars or various kinds of atrocity crimes exclude conflicts that might potentially justify efforts to provide civilian protection. Second, there is considerable variation among civil wars, among cases of one-sided violence against civilians, and among inter-communal conflicts. Thus, simply combining all instances of each would generate a list including at least some conflicts of questionable relevance to the project. A brief discussion of these different kinds of violence illustrates these points.

1.1.1 Wars

As Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay have pointed out, “Civilians are killed in virtually all wars, but they suffer much more in some conflicts than in others” (2004 p.376). Indeed, war can be devastating for civilians whether or not they are intended targets of violence, and suffering varies significantly even when they are not.

First, when civilians are not the intended targets of violence, they may become direct victims when they are caught in the crossfire of battle between warring groups. The indirect consequences of war-related social and economic upheaval, however, often generate even greater suffering. When people are displaced from their homes as they flee ongoing violence or as part of a government counter-insurgency campaign, they are often forced to seek shelter in overcrowded and unsanitary camps, or to live in the open, where they face the risk of exposure and marauders. Shortages of food and medicine – and related crises of malnutrition, starvation, and disease – are common problems. Thus, for example, hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians died in the early 1990s of famine “that was exacerbated by warfare between north and south” (O'Hanlon 2003 p.31).
Some populations are also more vulnerable to the consequences of social and economic upheaval. In more developed countries, people start off less vulnerable to many of war’s most pernicious effects and are less likely to become victims of an epidemic or to die of preventable diseases (Burkle 2006). Such societies are also more likely to have a government with at least some capacity to attend to the particular needs of a war-affected population. Finally, shorter, less destructive wars are also less disruptive of the basic necessities and rhythms of life. As wars become longer and costlier, however (such as when at least one side’s war goals include conquest or regime change), more civilians tend to die (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006).

On the other hand, when civilians are the intended targets of violence in war they face all these risks and more, including heightened chances of becoming the direct victims of violence or of being systematically denied access to emergency aid. For example, Sierra Leone’s 1991–2001 civil war was notorious for mass rape, the abduction of children to fight as soldiers, and the widespread mutilation of civilians by the rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front. The war “by one estimate killed 70,000, left 20,000 surviving amputees, displaced 2.5 million people – half the population of Sierra Leone – and involved 27,000 child soldiers” (Fortna 2008 p.61). Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) argue that civilians are especially likely to become the targets of such violence in insurgency wars, due to incentives for counterinsurgency forces to separate insurgents from their bases of support. Downes (2006; see also Downes 2007) adds that civilians are more likely to be intentionally victimized in prolonged wars of attrition and in wars in which one side seeks to conquer and annex enemy territory.

1.1.2 Atrocity Crimes and One-Sided Violence

As Sierra Leone’s civil war indicates, often the most egregious suffering occurs when civilians are the targets of violence. ‘Mass atrocity crimes’ is a term sometimes used to refer
collectively to a variety of different patterns of large-scale rights abuses including “genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity” (see, eg, Evans 2008 p.11-12). Among these crimes, genocide and politicide involve the intentional application of policies “that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicized non-communal group” (Harff 2003 p.58). Mass killing and state-sponsored mass murder are conceptually similar, though identified by the successful effort to kill large numbers of people, rather than to destroy a group in whole or in part (Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006; Krain 2005, 1997; Valentino 2004).

These crimes include deaths due directly to violence as well as those that occur indirectly through “starvation, exposure, or disease resulting from the intentional confiscation, destruction, or blockade of the necessities of life,” as long as civilians are the intended targets (Valentino 2004 p.10-11). More broadly, a ‘crime against humanity’ may include murder, extermination, enslavement, forcible displacement, sexual violence, torture, or other inhumane acts, “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack” (Article 7, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998).

Critically, these crimes occur both during war – as in Sierra Leone – and as one-sided violence against civilians outside of war. For example, the Indonesian-supported militia violence against East Timorese civilians described in Chapter 1 occurred months after active hostilities between the Indonesian army and the pro-Timorese independence forces had ended. At the same time, as with wars, not all atrocity crimes or cases of one-sided violence are equally disruptive to civilian life.
1.1.3 *Inter-communal violence*

Finally, inter-communal violence refers to conflict between identifiable social groups (usually based on religion or ethnicity), often arising out of competition over land or other resources. It is distinguished from war in that it is carried out largely or entirely by civilians against one another. It does not involve the government as a primary party to the conflict, and may not even involve multiple organized armed groups. Like mass atrocity crimes, it can occur either within or outside of a full-blown war.

Although most inter-communal conflict does not generate extensive social upheaval and civilian suffering, it certainly can do so, as violence in places such as Indonesia, India, and Nigeria in recent decades attests. For example, beginning in January 1999, fierce fighting broke out between Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas Islands and Sulawesi, Indonesia. Members of both communities perpetrated and were victimized by the violence. In the Moluccas, within 18 months over half a million people had been displaced, and by the end of 2000 some 5,000 were dead (United States Committee for Refugees (USCR) 2001 p.133; 2002 p.122). Indonesian government efforts to restore order were unsuccessful, while assistance from aid organizations like the Red Cross failed to forestall death and disease in the squalid displaced persons camps. Indeed, the government never significantly improved living conditions for the displaced, and many continued to suffer from disease and malnutrition throughout the conflict (USCR 2001 p.135). By the time the fighting ended in 2002, up to 10,000 Moluccans had died in the violence (USCR 2003 p.119), and it is uncertain how many more may have died of hunger or disease. Meanwhile in Sulawesi, over 2,500 people had been killed and several hundred thousand displaced (see USCR 2002 p.123; 2003 p.119-121).\(^1\)

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\(^{1}\) For more information, see the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR)’s World Refugee Survey 1999 p.108; 2000 p.139, 145; 2001 p.133-36; 2002 p.121-123; and 2003 p.119-121.
In sum, severe civilian suffering can be generated by multiple kinds of political violence that do not always overlap, and there is considerable variation in destructive power among conflicts of each type. Thus, an approach to the study of civilian protection that focuses on explaining international responses only to wars, or only to various kinds of atrocity crimes, would exclude clearly relevant events. At the same time, a focus on all events of each type would include many limited conflicts of questionable relevance.

1.2 A New Definition

Given these limitations of prominent conceptual frameworks, what this study requires instead is a concept that captures the worst wars, atrocity crimes, and instances of inter-communal violence. The idea of a complex emergency offers a promising way to define and identify this set of events, but existing definitions are for the most part not appropriate to the needs of empirical social scientific research. The remainder of this section reviews some of these and then draws on them to develop a new definition more in keeping with the goals of this project.

1.2.1 Limitations of Existing Definitions

Most definitions of complex emergencies have been developed by and for the international humanitarian relief community. The most well-known, from the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), describes a complex emergency as “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single agency and/or the ongoing United Nations country program” (1999). OCHA adds that complex emergencies are typically
characterized by “1) extensive violence and loss of life; massive displacements of people; widespread damage to societies and economies; 2) the need for large-scale, multi-faceted humanitarian assistance; 3) the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints; [and] 4) significant security risks for humanitarian relief workers in some areas” (1999).

The Complex Emergency Database (CE-DAT) project at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the Université catholique de Louvain, which collects epidemiological data on these conflicts, offers a similar definition. According to CE-DAT, complex emergencies are “All crises characterized by extreme vulnerability that display a combination of the following features: 1) The government is unwilling or incapable to effectively respond, resulting in a need for external assistance; 2) political oppression or armed conflict; 3) displacement; 4) increased mortality.”

Andrew Natsios, former director of the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance, describes complex emergencies as “catastrophic crises characterized by ethnic conflict, the deterioration of central political authority, massive displacement of population both within and outside the borders of a specific country, macroeconomic collapse, and widespread food insecurity leading to mass starvation” (1995 p.9; see also Natsios 1996 p.150). Finally, Raimo Väyrynen distinguishes between relatively “simple” and more “complex” humanitarian emergencies, according to the combination of war, disease, hunger, and displacement that they exhibit. For him, a complex emergency is “characterized by the simultaneous appearance of war, displacement, and disease, and in the most serious cases also by hunger. In simple

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humanitarian emergencies [emphasis in original] only two of these problems have appeared” (Väyrynen 1996 p.37).

Together, these definitions point to a number of core characteristics of complex emergencies, but also reflect several problems. First, their references to specific causes and characteristics implicitly exclude other equally devastating events. For example, both OCHA and Natsios claim that a complex emergency involves a breakdown in central political authority. Yet severe civilian suffering may result not only from a breakdown in authority, but also from the harnessing of authority to perpetrate violence against a civilian population (Keen 2008 p.3). Similarly, Natsios suggests that complex emergencies are characterized by ethnic conflict, but similar levels of suffering can be generated by ideological wars and violence directed against a group due to its political affiliation (what Harff (2003) calls politicide). Meanwhile, Väyrynen considers an emergency ‘complex’ only if it displays at least three core features, even though equal suffering might occur in a conflict without one or more of these.

CE-DAT’s definition, meanwhile, betrays the opposite problem: insufficient specificity. By identifying four features of complex emergencies without noting which, if any, are necessary, it implies that any one or two of these are sufficient to constitute a complex emergency, even though displacement and mortality reflect the extent of civilian suffering while violence and the failure of government response reflect its causes.

Finally, both OCHA and CE-DAT reference the appropriate solutions to complex emergencies by stating that they require a particular kind of international response. Although this dissertation accepts that reducing the suffering associated with these crises may indeed require a certain response, for my purposes including such information in the definition conflates
the unit of analysis (the complex emergency) with the dependent variable (the response by outside actors).

1.2.2 A New Definition

Despite their limitations, these definitions agree on three key themes that can form the core of a new definition. First, they emphasize that complex emergencies occur as the result of political violence, and that they are distinct from humanitarian emergencies arising from natural disasters. Second, they highlight the disruption to normal civilian life caused by such violence, and in particular the heightened risk of death – both direct and indirect – that such violence generates. Third, they emphasize that such disruption occurs at least in part because local authorities are unwilling or incapable of meeting the conflict-affected population’s needs.

Drawing on these three points, I define a complex humanitarian emergency as an episode of political violence that severely disrupts civilian life, killing or threatening the survival of a large number of civilians; and in which the government responsible for public welfare is unable or unwilling to shield the population from the consequences of violence or to effectively facilitate outside efforts to do so.

This definition reflects the basic insight that a complex emergency is generated by ongoing political violence and involves severe civilian suffering, but is agnostic as to its causes. Whether civilians are the intended targets is irrelevant, while civilian suffering may occur during war, one-sided violence, or inter-communal violence. Critically, deaths may occur either directly – when civilians are killed violently – or indirectly, due to starvation, disease, or exposure caused by social upheaval and displacement.

This last point reflects the reality in many of today’s worst conflicts, where civilian mortality often results primarily from these indirect causes. For example, in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), over a decade of war and crimes against humanity have cost millions of lives. Despite intentional targeting of civilians – notably through a massive campaign of sexual violence – the vast majority of these deaths were caused by disease or malnourishment associated with civilian flight from warring militias. Indeed, as of 2006, available mortality estimates suggested that only about two percent of deaths had been caused by violence directly. But as Holt and Berkman (2006 p.167) explain, violence nevertheless remained a central cause of death:

“Where militias no longer operate and civilian displacement has abated, mortality [sic] rates have declined roughly to their pre-war level. Thus, insecurity is central to the cause of the crisis, even as disease and malnutrition claim more lives than direct violence. ‘The number one humanitarian problem is security,’ explained a senior MONUC official in 2005.”

Although the conflict in the DRC is, in terms of lives lost, the worst complex emergency in recent decades, in this respect it is not unusual. Indeed, even in Darfur, which the U.S. Government referred to as genocide, more than 80% of conflict-related deaths were not a direct result of violence (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.297).

By incorporating the indirect and even unintentional effects of violence, my definition of a complex emergency is able to incorporate not only conflicts like the DRC and Darfur where civilians died in large numbers from both direct and indirect causes, but also those like Somalia, where direct violence against civilians has generally been low but its indirect effects have been catastrophic. Finally, it excludes conflicts in which a competent government is able – alone or with help from relief organizations – to shield its civilians from the worst effects of violence. It thus distinguishes between conflicts in which violence generates significant hardship from those where it results in catastrophe.³

³ One possible limitation, however, is that it excludes some events that are in certain ways similar to those it includes. In particular, it omits non-violent events that are otherwise comparable in the scale of civilian suffering and role of the responsible government. Occasionally, natural disasters and famines can be generated or exacerbated by government policies. The government-exacerbated famine in North Korea in
2. Peace Operations

The second main distinction between this project and the related literature is my focus on the characteristics of peace operations that affect their ability – and reflect their efforts – to protect civilians. This, in turn, determines the set of missions that I consider relevant to our understanding of these efforts, and that I examine in this project.

For various reasons, the existing literature does not seek to explain variation in the design of peace operations. First, studies of traditional peacekeeping are not explicitly concerned with issues of civilian protection, and thus pay little attention to the ways in which operational details affect outcomes for civilians. Second, efforts to explain humanitarian intervention – which are concerned with civilian protection – also overlook variation in operational design because they typically define humanitarian intervention to include only operations conducted without the consent of the target state (see, eg, Arend and Beck 1993 p.113; Holzgrefe 2003 p.18; Seybolt 2008 p.5-6; Weiss 2007 p.5-12). This creates a tendency to examine only the most coercive, ambitious missions, while ignoring less robust operations deployed in response to similar conflicts. Such studies also tend to ignore variation in how well even coercive missions are designed to meet civilians’ needs.

I contend, however, that differences between less and more ambitious operations, as well as differences among relatively consensual or relatively coercive ones, reflect important variation in the costs and effort expended to protect civilians. By ignoring these differences, studies of peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention leave some of the most interesting and puzzling

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aspects of variation – notably, the kinds of half-measures and resource-instructions gaps that can create an illusion of protection – unexplored. Only by recognizing and investigating missions that are obviously imperfect – as well as those that are more robust – is it possible to explain these outcomes.

In order to do so, I define the relevant set of missions as broadly as possible, using the term *peace operations* to include all international military operations intended to promote peace or protect civilians during or immediately after a complex emergency. Peace operations may or may not have the consent of all parties to a conflict, and may or may not be authorized by the UN (though most are). They include missions led by the UN, by other international or regional organizations, and by ad hoc groups of states. Most importantly, they range from the most limited and traditional efforts to monitor a ceasefire to the most ambitious and coercive civilian-protection missions.

Unlike studies of only peacekeeping or only humanitarian intervention, I assume that such disparate operations are actually related events that policymakers who initiate and implement them may, at times, treat as potential substitutes for one another. This is not to suggest that they *should* do so. When a coercive protection operation offers the only real hope to protect civilians from violence, a traditional peacekeeping operation is not an *appropriate* substitute. Rather, recognizing that there are actors with both the capacity and the incentive to substitute among different amounts of civilian protection in this way is a critical first step toward explaining how they make these choices. The next section of this chapter makes the case that the U.S., UK, France, and (regionally) Australia do indeed reliably have this capacity.

Finally, because traditional peacekeeping operations typically (though not always) occur after the worst violence is over, treating them as potential substitutes for more coercive missions
requires an examination of operations launched both during and immediately after complex
emergencies. This, too, contrasts with prominent peacekeeping studies, where the focus is
skewed toward operations that occur after the violence is over (eg, Doyle and Sambanis 2000,
2006; Fortna 2004, 2008). When it comes to the most significant security and protection needs
generated by a conflict, however, such missions are often too late. As Micah Zenko has put it,
“Although long-term solutions are necessary to stabilize post-conflict countries, without an
initial strong show of force to shape the situation on the ground, follow-on phases may never
occur, or they may be irrelevant in terms of saving lives” (2004 p.16).

3. The Centrality of Powerful Democracies

The literature that I review in the final section of this chapter argues forcefully that a
peace operation’s ability to meet civilians’ security and protection needs is primarily a matter of
choice by those who initiate and design it. As Taylor Seybolt puts it, “how to intervene with a
reasonable prospect of success is fundamentally a question of strategy…the process of selecting
goals and choosing appropriate means to achieve them within the resource constraints faced”
(2008 p.23). Zenko concurs, arguing that an operation’s efficacy in saving lives “is largely
dependent on factors under the interveners’ control: motivation, capabilities and response time”

But such comments reflect important assumptions about interveners’ capabilities. If the
critical aspects of peace operation design are a matter of choice for some, this is by no means
true of all the states that participate in these missions. Indeed, most have no – or at most limited
– control over the decisions that determine whether a peace operation occurs, and if so, what
goals it pursues, what military strategies it employs, and what resources (besides their own
contribution) are available to it. Given the key role of these decisions in the outcomes I seek to
explain (as discussed in detail below), I focus on the policies of a small subset of states with the greatest capacity to make them – the United States, United Kingdom, France, and – within its own region – Australia.

In this respect, this project is akin to studies of humanitarian intervention (eg, Bass 2008; Finnemore 2003; Wheeler 2000), but not to most studies of traditional peacekeeping, which often examine contributions by a wider range of states or even explore explanations for these missions without examining individual state decisions at all. But as Neill MacFarlane and Thomas Weiss explain, “Those who determine the politics of humanitarian action are the leaders of states and state-like authorities. They act on the basis of calculations of political interest” (2000 p.141). Thus, I also focus on state-level decision-making because of the prominent place in the literature – and thus, in my theory – of domestic politics in these decisions.

Although a number of other actors possess some capacity for civilian protection, the U.S., UK, France, and (regionally) Australia are unique in their influence over the variation I seek to explain. 5 These states are able to choose from a variety of different moments to intervene, a range of political goals and military strategies, and – most uniquely – whether to send their own forces to ensure a robust operation or to support troops from other countries who may have the necessary authority but limited physical capacity to handle a difficult mission. Because they have the unique capacity to substitute among various policies in ways that affect these key mission characteristics, the choices that they do make in turn help to explain why peace

operations reflect certain characteristics rather than others.\(^6\) While peace operations might still prove prohibitively expensive – where they involve intervening against a powerful state, for example – for these states this is generally a choice rather than a hard constraint.

First and most importantly, these states have the greatest capacity to lead ambitious operations, and in practice the commitment and direct participation of at least one is usually necessary for the pursuit of the most ambitious civilian protection goals (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.74; O’Hanlon 1997 p.11; Zenko 2004 p.15). Although a variety of advanced Western militaries have the capacity to carry out many of the core tasks these operations require, the most significant limiting factor is their ability to transport and sustain troops far from home through strategic air and sealift.\(^7\) While forces in traditional peacekeeping operations can generally meet many of their needs through the local economy, these ambitious operations require a large amount of specialized equipment. Because few states have the capacity to sustain such resources far from home, “The participation of the United States, or at least France or Britain, is…generally a prerequisite to establishing and continuing any major operation of division size or greater overseas” (O’Hanlon 1997 p.43).

Indeed, this helps explain Australia’s inclusion alongside these other, more powerful states. Unlike Australia, other states with advanced militaries that regularly make significant


\(^{7}\) This may be changing with recent EU efforts to acquire greater shared strategic airlift capacity, but at this time there is little evidence to suggest it has significantly increased the capacity of states other than France and the UK to contemplate major leadership roles in distant operations.
contributions to peace operations – such as Canada and the Netherlands – are not typically geographically close enough to complex emergencies to contemplate a major leadership role. Over long distances, such a role requires the kind of strategic airlift and sealift capacity traditionally only possessed by the U.S., UK, and France. Because it has significant military capacity for its size and is located in a volatile region affected by multiple debilitating conflicts in recent decades, however, Australia has had a wider range of choices about how to respond to conflicts there than other Western democracies typically do, and in particular, is able to contemplate leading peace operations within the Southwest Pacific and parts of Southeast Asia.

Second, these states also have extensive influence even over those operations they do not lead. As Permanent UN Security Council members, the U.S., UK, and France can each veto or help to bring about UN missions. At the same time, since the Security Council determines the major characteristics and timing of all UN operations, they directly help to determine these missions’ potential for effective civilian protection.

Likewise, they provide critical financial and logistical support to operations run by regional states or actors such as the African Union (AU) or Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This support in some cases helps to determine whether these operations can deploy at all, and in other cases influences the number and quality of soldiers available for these missions, as well as the availability of the military equipment needed to carry out their core tasks. When their support is necessary to transport troops to the theater of operations, they also affect the timing of these deployments. Again, Australia has proved that it has similar capacity and influence in its own neighborhood by providing critical training, transport and logistics support to regional operations conducted primarily by South Pacific nations (see, eg, Breen 2009 p.96-7).
In sum, because their support or participation is required for the deployment of so many missions, both the incidence and key characteristics of peace operations in complex emergencies depend in large measure on the support, participation, or leadership of these four states. More often than not, their willingness to commit their own forces or to provide some combination of diplomatic, financial and logistical aid determines whether such operations occur and the extent and quality of any efforts to protect civilians. In contrast, other contributors typically make their commitments once these states have already decided how much they want to do and thus once many of the major contours of peace operations have already been set.

4. Peace Operation Design: Criteria for Civilian Protection

Thus far, this chapter has argued that by overlooking the details of peace operation design, the existing literature has missed much of the interesting variation in international efforts to protect civilians, and that this variation largely reflects the decisions of a few powerful democracies. To explain it, both the universe of conflicts and the range of responses that I examine differ somewhat from most related studies.

In addition, however, explaining this variation requires a framework for evaluating it. Critical questions include: Which aspects of a peace operation are most critical to its life-saving potential, and exactly how do they work together to determine outcomes for civilians on the ground?

Although previous efforts to explain peace operations have not emphasized these questions, a small but important literature has identified numerous aspects of these missions that enhance, or alternatively inhibit, their potential for effective civilian protection. Like this project, this literature begins from the premise that where a population is severely threatened by violence, peace operations should be judged by their ability to meet civilians’ most pressing
needs. It points to the relationships between a mission’s core goals and tasks, military strategies, resources, and timing as most critical to its life-saving potential. This section reviews these arguments and draws on them, as well as the nature of the security deficits that define complex emergencies, to develop a series of criteria by which to assess peace operations’ efforts to provide security and protection in these conflicts. In subsequent chapters, I employ these criteria to theoretically characterize – and then to develop original empirical measures of – the quality of the most powerful democracies’ contributions to these missions.

3.1 Goals and Tasks: Emphasis on Civilian Protection

First, the goals and tasks that a peace operation pursues constitute a critical component of its life-saving potential. No matter how well an operation stacks up in other respects, if it pursues goals and tasks that are too modest to meet civilians’ most pressing needs, its life-saving capacity is limited as a result.

Goals and tasks are typically laid out in a mission’s authorizing mandate, where one exists. Occasionally force commanders may seek to do more for civilians than their mandate officially permits, as Lt. General Romeo Dallaire of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) did during the genocide there in 1994, and as various commanders of AMIS

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in Darfur have done more recently. In general, though, the goals and tasks for which an operation is authorized serve as a key indicator of what soldiers are asked to try to achieve.

Peace operations that deploy in response to complex emergencies vary a great deal in the extent to which their goals and tasks reflect efforts to protect civilians. Where some place little or no explicit emphasis on civilians’ needs, others focus exclusively on meeting their most immediate requirements for physical protection.

In scholarly writing and in practice, the meaning of civilian protection has often been fraught with ambiguity. Holt and Berkman (2006 p.37-42), for example, identify six different ways in which military, human rights, and humanitarian actors think about the concept, and note that the human rights and humanitarian communities have not traditionally seen protection as the responsibility of military forces. As I use it here, however, civilian protection encompasses the provision of security by military forces in order to eliminate or counteract violence-related threats to civilians. In terms of Holt and Berkman’s six meanings of civilian protection, this definition includes three. First, at the low end, it encompasses a role for military actors in providing ‘humanitarian space’ by providing security to humanitarian actors in order to facilitate the delivery of relief aid. Second, it incorporates the idea of civilian protection as a set of tasks in peace operations, in which peacekeepers take on protection duties as one of several tasks in a mission with broader goals. Finally, it includes military intervention whose primary goal is to protect civilians from large-scale human rights abuses.

This definition reflects both my focus on military actors and the kinds of needs typically generated by complex emergencies. As described above, in these conflicts ongoing violence generates a clear and present threat to civilian life, and the restoration of a secure environment is
critical to alleviating this threat. Thus, as used here, ‘civilian protection’ implies at least some effort to accomplish this end.

With this concept of civilian protection in mind, it is clear that many operations make no special effort to protect civilians. At one extreme are those whose official goals and tasks make no reference to addressing civilians’ needs at all. Most of these are deployed to help negotiate, or more often keep, a peace agreement or truce. Thus they are often, though not always, deployed in the aftermath of the most severe violence. For example, the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was deployed in 1991 to verify implementation of a series of agreements to end the decade-long civil war between the Government of El Salvador and the rebel group, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). Although one of these committed the parties to respect human rights, ONUSAL was authorized only to monitor whether they did so, but not to intercede if they did not. ONUSAL had less than 400 military observers and a similar number of civilian police for its monitoring and verification tasks.9

Other operations pursue some civilian-oriented tasks, such as mine clearance, helping with the return of refugees, or helping to deliver humanitarian aid. These missions do not, however, try to provide physical security, except for the mission’s own personnel. Thus, they do not address either the security concerns of humanitarian actors seeking to deliver aid or civilians’ direct physical protection needs.

For example, after the Rwandan genocide, in the summer of 1994, the U.S. military initiated an operation to deliver humanitarian relief to the thousands of Rwandan refugees then congregating around Goma, Zaire. Operation Support Hope provided aid directly to refugees and helped humanitarian assistance organizations reduce deaths from lack of food and disease

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caused by poor sanitation in the camps. It did not, however, make any effort to address the serious security deficit in the camps, where Hutu genocidaires continued to use violence to control the refugees for political ends.\textsuperscript{10}

Like ONUSAL, many missions whose goals do not include civilian protection are led by the UN. Often their core tasks include monitoring, observing, and reporting on progress in implementation of peace agreements, and perhaps facilitating their implementation. They may be monitoring/observer missions, traditional peacekeeping operations, or multidimensional peacekeeping operations (see, eg, Doyle and Sambanis 2000 for discussion of this distinction). Others, like Support Hope, may be led by individual states or focus exclusively on aid delivery. Like Support Hope, moreover, they often follow the worst of the violence, but at other times deploy, inappropriately, in conditions where there is no peace to keep. Though they do not address the security deficit, they may still save lives, either by helping to prevent the renewed outbreak of violence or providing critical emergency relief.

Many operations go further, however, making at least some effort to provide the physical security so critical to saving lives in complex emergencies. These missions each reflect the definition of civilian protection laid out above, but differ considerably in meeting civilian needs, and in whom they actually protect.

First, operations that protect aid delivery do not address the needs of civilians threatened \textit{directly} with violence, but can contribute to providing the humanitarian space aid agencies need to save lives. Thus, they are likely to save more lives than any of the operations discussed above when security conditions threaten to prevent aid from reaching its intended recipients, as they regularly do in complex emergencies. In response to the famine brought on by war and instability in Somalia in the early 1990s, for example, both the UN-led operations – UNOSOM I

\textsuperscript{10} For an account of Operation Support Hope see Seybolt (2008 p.76-77).
and UNOSOM II – and the U.S.-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) sought to protect aid delivery.

Tasks involved in these missions may include protecting buildings (often where aid supplies are stored), escorting humanitarian convoys, or guarding safe areas where civilians are congregated. The operations in Somalia focused on the first two of these tasks. UNITAF, for example, “guarded the airport, seaport, warehouses and distribution points in Mogadishu. They provided convoy escorts within the city and from the city to points inland. Forces stationed inland guarded warehouses and distribution points and provided escorts for regular forays outside of the main towns” (Seybolt 2008 p.151).

Operations to protect aid delivery also require at least some willingness to expose soldiers to danger, because when belligerents benefit from violence against humanitarian relief organizations they are unlikely to consent to external efforts to protect them. Thus, if intervening forces are unable to deter belligerents from attacking relief organizations, they must be prepared to defend them with force (Seybolt 2008 p.137). One reason why the initial UN operation in Somalia, UNOSOM I, was relatively ineffective at protecting aid operations and led to the deployment of UNITAF was that its rules of engagement permitted the use of force only in self-defense.

Second, peace operations may offer direct protection to civilians, either as one task in a mission with other primary goals, or as the central purpose of the entire operation. In the first scenario, protection-related tasks may include “providing support to law and order, escorting convoys, protecting camps, establishing safe havens, breaking up militias, demilitarizing refugee/IDP camps, organizing disarmament, and intervening on behalf of an individual or community under threat” (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.41-42). Such missions typically involve
supporting some kind of peace process while recognizing that the environment on the ground is likely to be volatile and, probably, violent. As Seybolt has noted, “protection is dangerous. It is needed only where violence is ongoing” (2008 p.219). Still, these operations must typically rely, at least, on the acquiescence of the local government. For example, in Darfur, AMIS had Khartoum’s official consent, but on the ground the ceasefire it was mandated to monitor did not really exist.

Although such missions have repeatedly been authorized to ‘protect civilians’ over the last decade, these mandates typically contain substantial restrictions and caveats. When its mandate was expanded to include civilian protection in October 2004, for example, AMIS was authorized only to “Protect civilians whom it encounters under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within resources and capability, it being understood that the protection of the civilian population is the responsibility of the government of Sudan” (mandate quoted in O’Neill and Cassis 2005 p.26). Such language is also common in UN operations, but as Holt and Berkman (2006 p.90) have pointed out, at best gives force commanders the option to protect civilians, and at worst constrains them from doing so where they perceive a clear need. This can result in civilian protection that is insufficient relative to the need, especially where civilians are the intended targets of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses.

Finally, peace operations can make civilian protection their primary goal. These missions seek to “prevent or stop mass killings, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, or genocide” (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.42). They are usually led by regional organizations or ad hoc coalitions of states, rather than the UN, and may employ different strategies to protect civilians.

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11 The UN Security Council first began to insert language about protecting civilians as an explicit goal in operational mandates in 1999, with the deployment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). Earlier operations with other primary missions had, however, authorized civilian protection tasks such as the creation of safe areas and protection of convoys.
12 A later update to the mandate removed the reference to the responsibility of the Sudanese Government.
Interveners may focus on the civilian victims of violence, in which case they must typically compel perpetrators “to stop and possibly reverse actions they have already taken,” through strategies such as the construction and defense of save havens where civilians can congregate without fear of attack (Seybolt 2008 p.180). Operation Provide Comfort, which created a safe area in Northern Iraq to protect its Kurdish population from Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War in 1991, serves as a successful example.13

Alternatively, interveners may pursue the more difficult path of defeating the perpetrators of violence against civilians, which requires strategies of offense or compellence (Seybolt 2008 p.179). In East Timor, INTERFET pursued and disarmed the pro-Indonesian militias that were targeting civilians, disrupting their ability to perpetrate further violence. If otherwise designed well (and where appropriate, in combination with a political solution to the conflict), operations that aim to defeat perpetrators of violence are more likely to provide a long-term solution to the worst threats against civilians.

Figure 2-1 arranges operations in a spectrum that reflects these distinctions among their core goals and tasks. Those to the right of the dotted line incorporate at least some efforts at protection, as defined above. Those to the left do not.

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13 For details, see Seybolt (2008 p.191-4).
This discussion points to one of the most-remarked-on deficiencies of many peace operations. All too often, their core goals and tasks are clearly insufficient to meet civilians’ security and protection needs. As others have observed, deploying military observers during genocide or protecting aid organizations when civilians are threatened by mass killing is clearly inappropriate to the circumstances (see eg, Holt and Berkman 2006 p.48; Seybolt 2008 p.228). As Michael Walzer puts it, for example, “it isn't enough to wait until the tyrants, the zealots, and the bigots have done their filthy work and then rush food and medicine to the ragged survivors” (1995 p.66).

Such judgments, however, are often ad hoc, and understandably so. Which goals and how much protection are needed to save the most lives – and whether deploying a peace operation is a promising possibility at all – depends on the circumstances on the ground. Still, explaining why some peace operations do a better job than others requires at least some more consistent measure of what better means.

Here, my focus on the narrowly defined set of conflicts consisting of complex emergencies provides at least a partial solution, allowing for a systematic assessment of which goals are potentially sufficient – or clearly inadequate – to address the shared threats these
conflicts pose. First, since a more secure environment is a consistent unmet need in these conflicts (even where most civilian suffering is caused by an intentional campaign of atrocity crimes), peace operations should at minimum recognize and respond to this reality by making an effort to provide for a secure environment in which emergency aid can be delivered. In the terms of Figure 2-1, this suggests a first guideline for assessing operational goals and tasks in complex emergencies: Unless they follow an earlier, more security-oriented mission, peace operations to the left of the dotted line cannot meet civilians’ basic needs for a secure environment.

Still, as noted above, even some operations on the right-hand side of Figure 2-1 will be insufficient in the context of certain complex emergencies, especially where civilians are the primary victims of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses. Identifying these thus requires more information about a particular complex emergency. At the very least, however, it seems wise to heed Holt and Berkman’s argument (2006 p.50-51) that where civilians are the targets of a campaign of atrocities, “forces need to have a central goal of protecting civilians, with that objective driving their strategy and tactics.” This suggests a second guideline for operational goals: only operations that pursue a primary goal of protecting civilians are potentially sufficient to address a campaign of atrocity crimes.

In sum, many peace operations pursue goals that are insufficient to address civilians’ protection needs in complex emergencies. The two guidelines developed here do not cover every possible circumstance, but they do suggest the foundation of a more systematic way of assessing operational goals and tasks in these conflicts. Accordingly, I draw on them in coding decisions about leaders’ contributions to these missions in Chapter 5.
3.2 Military Strategies: Suitability to Goals and Tasks

As this discussion has hinted, a peace operation’s potential for effective civilian protection depends not only on its goals and tasks, but also on the suitability of the military strategies selected for pursuing them. Many decisions about military strategy can affect a mission’s prospects for civilian protection, but two in particular stand out.

First, an operation’s rules of engagement (ROE) define the conditions under which forces are allowed to engage in hostile fire in carrying out their mandate. They thus effectively determine troops’ ability to use the strategies – whether offense, compellence, or deterrence – appropriate to their assigned goals and tasks. ROE that are too restrictive – that is, that do not authorize troops to use force when violence threatens – can limit an operation’s ability to protect civilians or aid operations, even if this is one of its goals. In such cases, the mission’s mandate is effectively meaningless.

Second, the kinds of military forces and assets that an operation deploys are critical. Although naval, air, and ground forces can all play a role in providing civilian protection, the major risk is that leaders will deploy naval or, more commonly, air forces instead of ground troops where the latter are needed to afford effective protection.

Air forces might be used in three main ways: to deliver humanitarian aid, to enforce a no-fly zone, or in offensive action to coerce or defeat the perpetrators of violence. To serve as an appropriate alternative to ground troops, air power must pass a two-pronged test. First, it must provide effective protection from the air, and second, it must not cause unintended harm that is inconsistent with a humanitarian mission.

An operation solely to deliver humanitarian aid by air fails this test because it does not seek to provide any security or protection. An operation to enforce a no-fly zone, on the other
hand, risks being unable to provide effective protection any time that the threat to civilians comes, even only in part, from violence committed by armed parties on the ground. In such circumstances, only ground forces can interpose themselves between civilians and those who threaten them. In Darfur, for example, the U.S. government put forward a no-fly zone as a possible strategy. But since Darfuri civilians faced concurrent attacks from the air by Sudanese government planes and on the ground by government-backed militia, such an approach would have addressed only one aspect of their protection needs unless accompanied by an effective ground force. Moreover, without a credible threat of ground troops, perpetrators of rights abuses may simply change tactics to attack civilians on the ground (rather than from the air).

Finally, the use of air power in offensive, coercive action risks failing both parts of the test. As with a no-fly zone, such an operation cannot place itself between perpetrators on the ground and their victims, and may have difficulty locating targets. As Zenko puts it, “defeating – or even identifying – tactical forces in the field or loosely organized groups of killers from afar is very difficult” (2004 p.8). In addition, these missions risk killing civilians in their efforts to save lives.

Both of these problems plagued NATO’s 1999 air campaign to coerce Serbia into halting its campaign of terror and ethnic cleansing against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. As Seybolt (2008 p.248) describes, NATO’s lack of a ground component drew the focus away from the task at hand and limited attacks on the Yugoslav military by requiring the campaign to focus a great deal of energy on eliminating Yugoslav surface-to-air missile systems. At the same time, “to stay out of the effective range of FRY air defences, NATO aircraft flew at altitudes of at least 4600 metres. From that height it was difficult for pilots to identify targets and hit them, even on the few days where there was no cloud cover. Not only was high-altitude bombing less effective against military targets, but it also endangered civilians on the ground more than low-altitude operations would have done” (Seybolt 2008 p.248).
Finally, the lack of a ground component also left NATO without a way to oppose increased Serb attacks against Kosovar civilians that began during the air campaign and that led to the displacement of some 90% of the population (Seybolt 2008 p.249). Because of these limitations of air operations, deploying ground troops – or possibly ground troops and air assets – is usually a better strategy to ensure effective protection.

This discussion suggests a simple guideline for relating these two aspects of military strategy to the mission goals and tasks discussed above: *Because permissive ROE and ground forces are critical to the most ambitious forms of protection, the greater the emphasis on protection in a mission’s core goals and tasks, the more important it is to employ these strategies.*

### 3.3 Resources: Sufficient Capacity to Meet the Need?

A peace operation’s resources and physical capabilities constitute the third set of key inputs to its protection potential. Maximizing this potential requires sufficient troops with the training, preparation, and equipment needed to carry out whatever protection goals and tasks are most appropriate to the circumstances, while employing suitable military strategies. Unfortunately, insufficient or poorly prepared troops have prevented many operations from protecting civilians as well as they otherwise might.

First, force size matters because more soldiers are able to carry out both more ambitious goals and more total tasks, and to deploy over a larger geographic area. More troops thus give peace operations greater leeway to include protection as one goal among others, or to make it a mission’s primary goal. The ability to deploy over a larger area is generally useful to any operation that hopes to create a secure environment.
How many troops are enough? Scholars and analysts have offered a variety of suggestions. Typically, the answer depends on expectations about whether the force will have the consent of the local government, the source of the threat to civilians, and the geographic, population, and military profile of the country. There are two well-known rules of thumb. First, according to O'Hanlon (2003 p.32), “experiences with counterinsurgency and stability operations suggest that in difficult missions an intervening force may need at least 2 to 3 soldiers – and possibly even 10 or more – for every 1,000 members of a country’s civilian population” (see also Dobbins, et al. 2005). Alternatively, a force entering a potentially non-consensual environment should be at least as large as its strongest possible opponent (O'Hanlon 2003 p.31).

Such guidelines can lead to very large estimates of troop requirements. For example, “A mission in Congo to monitor and enforce a cease-fire line and simultaneously maintain order throughout much of the country could easily require 100,000 troops itself, using the force-sizing criteria noted above and making reference as well to the sheer magnitude and challenging topography of that country” (O'Hanlon 2003 p.42). Even a mission with less ambitious criteria could require 30,000 – 50,000. Similarly, in a 2004 assessment of requirements for potential operations in Darfur, the Pentagon came up with some very large numbers. A consensual operation to provide security for displaced persons camps inside Darfur, it estimated, would require 35,000 U.S. troops. But for a non-consensual operation, Pentagon planners worked on the assumption that success would require a ratio of 3:1 intervening to opposing forces. Based on an estimate of 30,000 Sudanese troops in Darfur, plus an additional number of government-supported Arab militia, they estimated that at least initially, such a force would require some 120,000 troops (Hamilton 2011 p.76).
Still, while some analysts echo the argument that a large force is critical to success, especially in a non-consensual environment (see, eg, Seybolt 2008 p.22; Zenko 2004 p.9), others claim that even a small force may be capable of doing a great deal of good and that such large estimates can serve as an excuse for inaction (eg, Dallaire and Beardsley 2003). Holt and Berkman note that the answer may depend on the nature of the threat: “If missions aim to provide physical protection to civilians with military force, then those operations may require large or highly mobile forces to protect individuals dispersed over large, ill-defined areas… Alternately, if the threat to civilians does not come from general lawlessness and numerous roving militias operating over vast areas, fewer forces might be sufficient” (2006 p.75-76).

Collectively, these arguments suggest that while an inability to deploy a large force should not necessarily serve as a reason not to deploy, more troops are generally better suited to meeting more ambitious civilian protection goals. The numbers used in these analyses are minimum suggested requirements, which peace operations often fall far short of meeting in practice. Thus, it is rarely the case that more forces could not be put to better use. The deployment of some 50,000 NATO troops to stabilize Kosovo – a small region of some two million people – after Operation Allied Force in 1999 serves as the exception that proves the rule. Practically speaking, then, a general but reasonable guideline by which to judge force size is: More is generally better, but the fewer the troops relative to those needed to pursue the protection goals most appropriate to the circumstances, the lower the operation’s anticipated protection capacity.

In addition to force size, troops’ preparation, training, and equipment substantially influence their ability to perform demanding civilian protection tasks. It is difficult to defeat the perpetrators of violence against civilians, defend civilians against concerted attacks, and protect
threatened aid operations, and these tasks requires extensive resources (Seybolt 2008). Troops must be willing and able to fight off any attackers who challenge them, and “to deploy quickly, to seal off potential enemy avenues of reinforcement, to locate and target opposition, and to attack in a coordinated and concentrated manner” (O'Hanlon 1997 p.39). These tasks also require considerable intelligence and surveillance capacity and effective command and control strategically, operationally, and tactically. Soldiers from “at least one top-notch western military” are typically needed to carry them out effectively (O'Hanlon 1997 p.44; see also Zenko 2004 p.11). Likewise, advanced technologies common only to developed-country militaries, such as night-vision goggles and secure communications, provide informational advantages in responding to attacks and pursuing perpetrators (see, eg, Zenko 2004 p.9).

Above all, these arguments suggest that who deploys and how much outside help they receive to enhance their capabilities play a key role in generating effective civilian protection. As discussed in the next chapter, moreover, they also suggest that through decisions about how many and what kind of their own resources to contribute, the powerful democracies I examine in this project have particular influence in this area.

3.4 Timing

Finally, timing is a critical element of a mission’s ability to address civilians’ security needs. But while successful protection depends on the interplay between goals, strategies, and resources, timing plays a partly separate but nevertheless significant role.

Briefly, operations that occur earlier can save more lives because they have the opportunity to prevent more future violence (and deaths) that would otherwise occur. This logic applies equally to operations that deploy during an ongoing complex emergency, and to those that deploy afterward to support some kind of peace process.
In the latter case, for example, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) have found that early intervention is more likely to promote durable peace in the aftermath of war. Meanwhile, O’Hanlon points out that waiting to deploy a peace operation in the aftermath of a cease-fire or peace agreement with the consent of belligerents may mean waiting for belligerents to first endure a protracted military stalemate and “carries the risk that much of an entire country will be destroyed in the meantime” (1997 p.5). Consequently, he claims, “it is highly desirable to intervene as soon as possible in a conflict that seems destined to be severe” (O’Hanlon 1997 p.8).

Likewise, Zenko argues in favor of sending robust, rapidly deployable forces to halt instances of mass violence as quickly as possible, as “motivated and well-organized bands of thugs can kill at a rate that makes delayed response to save lives futile” (2004 p.5; see also Seybolt 2008 p.183). Natsios adds that when intervention is delayed, it increases the chance that food will become a weapon of conflict and thus that belligerents will try to use violence to control emergency aid, while also reducing the prospects for successful eventual reconciliation (1994 p.134).

It is in the choice between operations that deploy during or after the height of the violence, however, where it is most possible to clearly assess an operation’s protection capacity. Since it is the ongoing violence in a complex emergency that generates a need for civilian protection, waiting until it is over entails waiting until the clearest need for such protection is past. Thus in practice, this distinction often reflects the relative priority interveners place on civilian protection as a goal, as operations deployed in the aftermath of violence obviate the need for the most ambitious protection goals.

This discussion of timing has two important implications. First, it suggests a final guideline by which to judge peace operations: earlier is better, but deployment after a complex
emergency cannot address the most pressing protection needs it generates.\textsuperscript{14} Second, it suggests that decisions about operational timing and goals are inextricably linked, with timing closely related to the ambitiousness of the civilian protection goals that potential interveners are willing to pursue. For this reason, despite its practical importance I do not consider timing as a separate aspect of operational quality in the theory I develop in Chapter 3, but do return to it in the case studies in Chapters 6 – 7.

5. Conclusion

In sum, neither the peacekeeping nor the humanitarian intervention literature has paid significant attention to explaining the details of peace operation design, which reflect important variation in the quality of these missions’ efforts – and capacity – to protect civilians. To do so, this dissertation employs a series of concepts and research design choices that depart from those used by most related studies.

In this chapter, I justified and defined two of these concepts, complex humanitarian emergencies and peace operations. In addition, accounting for this variation requires a focus on the decisions of states with the capacity to influence it – in particular, to substitute between policies capable of meeting civilians’ security and protection needs and those capable of less. While this creates an important scope condition for the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 3, it also explains the dissertation’s focus on decision-making by the U.S., UK, France, and Australia. Finally, I require a way to characterize and measure the variation in civilian protection efforts that I seek to explain. To this end, this chapter reviewed the relevant literature, explained how I use the term ‘civilian protection,’ and developed some guidelines for evaluating

\textsuperscript{14} Such missions may well be suited to address the needs prevailing at the time that they are deployed in the aftermath of the violence. This guideline is intended to reflect their use as an alternate, or substitute for, an earlier mission that could have made an effort to counteract the more serious protection needs prevailing during a complex emergency.
these missions’ goals and tasks, military strategies, available resources, and timing.

The following chapters draw heavily on this discussion. First, Chapter 3 uses the concepts of goals and tasks, military strategies, and resources to build a framework for characterizing the quality of a powerful democracy’s contribution to a peace operation. Together, these mission characteristics form two key components of such a contribution, its instructions and resources for civilian protection. The relationship between these, in turn, determines what I refer to as its true protection capacity, apparent protection capacity, and the gap – or mismatch – between them. In Chapter 5 I use these concepts, along with the guidelines developed in this chapter, to code the dependent variables used in the quantitative analysis. Finally, I apply them in the case studies to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Australian and U.S. policies I analyze there.
Chapter 3 – A Theory of Contribution Quality

1. Introduction

In this chapter, I develop a theory to explain the quality of the most powerful democracies’ efforts to provide security and protection for civilian victims of violent conflict. Chapter 2 laid out some important concepts and scope conditions that pertain to this theory. First, it applies in the context of complex emergencies, severe conflicts in which civilians are seriously threatened by ongoing violence and the insecurity associated with it. At the very least, their security needs include a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. Where they are the targets of violence, they also need to be shielded from attacks. As used here, ‘civilian protection’ implies at least some effort by outside military forces to meet these needs.

In response to these conflicts, peace operations can be judged by their ability to address civilians’ most pressing security needs. Although operations that do not tackle these needs can help to deliver life-saving relief or prevent renewed violence, the goal of shielding civilians threatened by ongoing violence is equally valid, and requires a focus on the security challenges they face.

As described in Chapter 2, the relevant literature explains that a peace operation’s capacity to deliver effective civilian protection depends on a variety of characteristics that are, primarily, matters of choice by those who initiate and design these missions. Drawing on this discussion, in this chapter I divide these into two basic categories. First, together an operation’s goals and military strategies reflect what I call soldiers’ instructions for civilian protection – that is, what they are told to do and not to do. These instructions effectively determine the extent to which troops attempt to meet civilians’ security and protection needs, or the amount of
protection they are asked to provide. Second, the number and quality of the troops deployed reflect their resources for civilian protection. These, in turn, determine the level of civilian protection that soldiers are physically able to provide, which may be either more or less than their instructions reflect. Thus, an operation’s ability to provide for civilians’ security needs – what I call its ‘protection capacity’ – depends on whether soldiers are instructed to pursue goals and military strategies appropriate to conditions on the ground, and whether they have the numbers, training, morale, and equipment to do so.

This generates an additional scope condition for the theory. As discussed in Chapter 2, it only makes sense to examine the decisions of states with the ability to affect the variation that I seek to explain – that is, those who can ensure that soldiers are both asked to address civilians’ security needs, and able to do so. Because this is true primarily only of a few powerful and influential Western democracies, the theory assumes a democratic leader – presumed to be the national executive – who has the capacity to ensure that a peace operation meets these standards. Her state’s own military is composed of highly-trained, well-equipped soldiers, but her broader political influence typically allows her to substitute between sending her own troops and supporting those from other countries. Thus, any contribution she makes to a peace operation can generally be assumed to reflect her preferences, rather than hard constraints on her ability to act.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I develop the dependent variable of contribution quality, drawing on the concepts of resources and instructions for civilian protection. I define a leader’s contribution to a peace operation in terms of two core components derived from these concepts. The first of these is simply the idea of the soldiers’ protection instructions, or the extent to which they are asked to address civilians’ most pressing security needs. The second is
the leader’s resource commitment, which affects the number and quality of the forces she enables to deploy, and in turn, the mission’s overall available resources for civilian protection.

The quality of the leader’s contribution, in turn, depends on the potential for civilian protection represented by each of these components, and critically, on the relationship between them. First, if the two are not balanced – that is, if one represents greater potential to address civilians’ security needs than the other – then the less ambitious one represents a hard constraint on the contribution’s overall protection capacity. Second, it is these unbalanced contributions that can help to facilitate a gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. Since such a gap can have perverse consequences, confusing both conflict victims and concerned citizens at home, I argue that it reduces contribution quality, independent of protection capacity.

Second, I briefly review the literature that I seek to build on and explain how I bring together two distinct arguments about the influence of public opinion on humanitarian intervention and the international use of force more generally. This literature points to two primary motives for leaders’ contributions to peace operations: public pressure for humanitarian action and strategic considerations that might provide either an incentive to protect vulnerable civilians or, more generally, to help safeguard peace in the aftermath of war. A focus on these motives alone, however, cannot explain why leaders frequently contribute to these missions in ways that facilitate gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection. Doing so, I argue, requires bringing together an understanding of leaders’ motivations for action with an appreciation for the political constraints they face. To this end, I draw on the extensive literature emphasizing democratic publics’ constraining role in the use of military force.
The third and fourth sections develop the causal story. The leader at the heart of this story, I argue, may face a dilemma brought on by competing domestic incentives both to help the civilian victims of the complex emergency, and not to pay too great a price in doing so. The intensity of this dilemma depends on two key forces: the political influence of the concerned citizens that advocate humanitarian action – whom I collectively call the ‘humanitarian public’ – and the potential operational environment for a peace operation in the complex emergency, which informs the costs the leader expects to bear for a given contribution. To the extent that one of these forces dominates the other, the leader’s contribution is most likely to reflect this influence. Thus, she is least likely to make more than a token contribution when the operational environment dominates the demands of the humanitarian public, and most likely to ensure that a mission is designed for robust and effective civilian protection in the opposite scenario.

When neither of these forces dominates the other, however, the leader’s dilemma is more intense. This tends to occur when she feels compelled to respond to significant public pressure for humanitarian action, but lacks opportunities to do so for a reasonable cost because of a challenging operational environment. In such circumstances, contributing to a peace operation in a way that facilitates a gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection may offer her a way around her dilemma. Because members of the humanitarian public may not be able to identify such gaps or their own state’s role in enabling them, this strategy may allow the leader to create an illusion that she is doing more to address civilians’ security needs than she really is. If she succeeds – an outcome she can promote by calling attention only to her contribution’s more robust aspects – she can expect to reap all the political rewards of a higher-quality policy for a fraction of the cost. If she fails, however, the political price may be high, which explains why this strategy is most attractive when her political dilemma is most intense.
Section 4 illustrates these ideas with a simple decision-theoretic model and discusses implications for the circumstances in which we should expect to observe leaders contributing to peace operations in different ways.

2. Dependent Variable: The Quality of Contributions

As noted above, a leader’s contribution to a peace operation has two basic components: soldiers’ instructions for civilian protection, as represented by the goals and military strategies they are told to pursue; and the resources the leader commits, which determine the number and quality of the forces she enables to deploy. Each of these components can be thought of in terms of its potential capacity to address civilians’ security needs. The less ambitious one, if any, is less suited to meeting these needs, and thus determines the first of two key aspects of the contribution’s quality, its true protection capacity. The more ambitious one, in turn, determines what the contribution may at best appear able to achieve. Finally, any gap between them represents the second key aspect of the contribution’s quality: the disparity between its apparent capacity to meet civilians’ security needs and its lesser, true capacity to do so.

2.1 Protection Instructions: Bringing Together Goals and Strategies

As Chapter 2 described, peace operations vary considerably in the extent to which their core goals and tasks reflect civilians’ security and protection needs. Where some place no emphasis on civilians whatsoever, others focus exclusively on meeting their most immediate requirements for physical protection. Many fall somewhere in between, perhaps by helping deliver humanitarian relief or attempting to provide some (but still a less-than-adequate) level of protection. Meanwhile, the military strategies these missions employ – including but not limited

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1 As discussed in Chapter 2, for practical reasons I omit the added element of operational timing.
to their rules of engagement and use of land, air, or sea power – can either limit or enhance their ability to pursue their core goals and tasks.

Together, then, we can think of a mission’s goals and military strategies – that is, what troops are told to try to achieve, and how they are to try to do so – as a reflection of the level of civilian protection that soldiers are instructed to provide. Troops who are asked on the one hand to pursue a certain set of goals, but forbidden, for example, from using force when it is the only plausible way of achieving them, are effectively being instructed to provide less protection than their professed goals alone would indicate.

Thus, collectively, I describe a peace operation’s political goals and military strategies as its protection instructions. These, in turn, are ambitious to the extent that they tell soldiers to pursue both adequate protection goals (given the circumstances in a complex emergency), and to use military strategies suited to carry them out. Regardless of the resources she commits, the ‘protection instructions’ component of a leader’s contribution to a peace operation reflects its overall goals and military strategies.

2.2 Resource Commitment

Similarly, as Chapter 2 discussed, the resources at a peace operation’s disposal determine its physical ability to respond to civilians’ most pressing protection needs in a given complex emergency. In this regard, we can think about the protection potential these resources represent in terms of their capacity to carry out the set of goals and military strategies that could best address these needs (as opposed to the goals and strategies that actually comprise the mission’s protection instructions). This capacity, in turn, depends on issues like the number of troops that deploy, their training and morale, and their access to necessary military equipment.
Similarly, the resource component of a leader’s contribution influences its potential to deliver effective civilian protection, and reflects the number and quality of the troops whose deployment the leader facilitates. In particular, this potential depends on the way that the leader substitutes between sending her own state’s troops and supporting the deployment of soldiers from other countries. In Chapter 2, I argued that for the most powerful and influential democracies this kind of substitution is usually a viable option, and I make this assumption here.

For this purpose, the leader has two basic strategies. First, she can deploy her state’s own military assets – that is, ground forces, air forces, sea forces, support personnel, and equipment – to participate directly. Because of their high quality, deploying them typically enhances an operation’s capacity to deliver on the kind of security and protection goals commonly appropriate in complex emergencies.2

Alternatively, the leader can provide financial and/or logistical support to troops from other countries, either directly or by voting to authorize an operation to which she must contribute financially (as in the UN Security Council). The more she relies on this strategy, however, the less capacity her contribution typically has to provide effective protection, since UN or regional forces are more likely to lack sufficient training, discipline, or equipment; or intelligence, communications, and planning capabilities.3

2 In practice, the extent to which a commitment of the leader’s own troops enhances a mission’s overall capabilities can vary depending on the capabilities of other contributors (see note 17). Still, because of their high quality and the fact that more troops are generally better than fewer, in general a more ambitious resource commitment improves a mission’s physical capacity to meet civilians’ protection needs. This is especially true where the most ambitious goals and strategies that few other militaries can carry out – notably, protecting civilians directly or defeating perpetrators of violence against them (see Chapter 2) – are required to meet these needs.

3 A limited number of exceptions occur in operations led by another highly capable democracy. In such cases, a large resource commitment may indeed enhance the prospects for effective protection, but a more limited commitment does not necessarily limit the operation’s protection capacity as long as the lead state is capable of providing the necessary forces. I account for this empirically in Chapter 5, but for simplicity, assume here that the leader’s chooses between providing her own troops or supporting less capable ones.
Thus, the leader’s resource commitment may range from doing nothing, to support for very few troops from other countries, to the deployment of a large number of her own forces. It is more ambitious and reflects greater potential for effective protection the more that it provides for sufficient, well-trained troops with the capacity to carry out the goals and military strategies needed to address civilians’ most pressing needs.

2.3 Characterizing Contribution Quality: Protection Capacity and the Instructions-Resources Gap

Since a peace operation’s ability to provide for civilians’ security depends on both the resources at its disposal and its protection instructions, any significant imbalance (or gap) between these limits its protection capacity. Similarly, a powerful democracy’s contribution may facilitate this outcome in either of two ways.

First, its protection instructions component may be more ambitious than its resource component. Such a contribution enhances the prospects that the troops who deploy will lack the training and equipment needed to provide the level of protection they are asked to deliver. For example (as discussed at length in Chapter 7), in Darfur the U.S. and major European countries provided financial and logistical support to AMIS and then the AU-UN hybrid, UNAMID. This support helped to sustain the deployment of under-prepared troops mandated to provide a level of protection that they had little hope of delivering. Although these missions’ mandates were not as ambitious as they might have been, in practice it was the AU’s limited capacity (despite the outside help) that constrained the effectiveness of the U.S. and European contributions.

Second, a contribution’s resource component may be more ambitious than its protection instructions. In this case, the leader deploys troops that are capable of providing more protection than she asks of them, constraining her contribution’s protection capacity by refusing to put the
soldiers’ ability to meet civilians’ security needs to the test. Operation Turquoise, discussed in Chapter 1, is one example. Operation Support Hope, mentioned in Chapter 2 and which responded to the same complex emergency, is another. In that mission, several thousand U.S. soldiers deployed to Africa’s Great Lakes region to deliver relief supplies to refugees in Zaire following the Rwandan genocide in the summer of 1994. Though the American forces had the training, equipment, and intelligence capabilities to address the serious security problems in the refugee camps controlled by Hutu genocidaires, they made no effort to do so. Although they saved lives, they were put to less effective use than they might have been because of strict instructions to limit their activities to aid delivery. Still, without lying, President Clinton was able to say that he had sent U.S. soldiers to save endangered civilian lives.4

As these examples illustrate, where there is a gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection, the less ambitious of the two represents a hard constraint on the mission’s overall protection capacity. The greater the incongruity, moreover, the greater the chance that the operation either does not achieve its announced protection goals for want of sufficient, well-prepared troops, or does not employ the available soldiers for civilian protection as effectively as it might.

Likewise, since any contribution a powerful democracy makes influences these mission characteristics, its protection capacity is similarly constrained by the less ambitious of its two components. Specifically, what such a contribution actually has the capacity to achieve is reflected either in its resource commitment or in its protection instructions, whichever is more

4 For Support Hope’s limitations and an assessment that it could have done more, see Taylor B. Seybolt, Humanitarian Military Intervention: The Conditions for Success and Failure, Paperback ed. (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), p.120-22; Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide, 2nd ed. (London, UK: Zed Books, 2009), p.245. Most troops stayed across the border in Uganda, but could have deployed into Zaire had the Clinton administration decided to provide security.
limiting. For this reason, a contribution’s less ambitious component determines the first key aspect of its overall quality, which I refer to as its true protection capacity. In contrast, an observer who does not recognize the constraint represented by this less ambitious component may cue off of the potential for civilian protection represented by the more ambitious one. Thus, we can think of this more ambitious component (whether the resource commitment or protection instructions) as reflecting what a contribution may, at best, appear able to achieve.

The presence and size of any gap between the ambitions of its two components constitutes the second key aspect of a contribution’s quality. In particular, I argue, such a gap reduces its quality relative to one with the same true protection capacity but no gap. Such gaps are problematic for all the reasons discussed in Chapter 1: they may threaten the credibility of peace operations and civilian protection efforts, put vulnerable civilians at greater risk of attack, and make it more difficult for a leader’s constituents to hold her accountable for her policies by distorting their perceptions of her commitment to protecting vulnerable civilians.

As I argue below, it is precisely this capacity for deception that makes these gaps politically attractive. First, however, bringing together all of these arguments allows me to represent the two key aspects of a contribution’s quality visually, in two-dimensional space. In Figure 3-1, the vertical axis represents soldiers’ protection instructions, and the horizontal axis represents the leader’s resource commitment.

The closer a contribution is to the upper right, the closer it comes to ensuring that the mission has both adequate protection instructions and sufficient, well-prepared forces to carry them out. Here, the relatively less ambitious component is still quite impressive, and the size of any gap is small. Thus I refer to contributions as more robust the closer they are to this corner.
Examples include INTERFET as well as Operation Provide Comfort, which sought to protect Iraqi Kurds from Saddam Hussein’s army in 1991.

Second, the closer a contribution is to the bottom left, the more limited it is. Here, the less ambitious component may be quite minimal, but so is any gap. Though not geared toward civilians’ security needs, such contributions are, at least, not deceptive. Examples include ONUSAL in El Salvador as well as Australia’s peacekeeping involvement in the civil war in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea (covered in Chapter 6).

Finally, the farther it is from the diagonal line, the more we can say that a contribution is dominated by a resources-instructions gap – that is, that such a gap is a highly salient feature of the commitment. Contributions that facilitate a situation in which soldiers lack the ability to do as they are asked – such as U.S. involvement in AMIS, UNAMID, and MONUC in the DRC – fall at the upper left. Those in which soldiers could do more than they are asked, but where their protection instructions make insufficient use of their latent physical capabilities, fall at the lower right. As noted earlier, examples include Operations Turquoise and Support Hope in Rwanda/Zaire, as well as the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia in the early 1990s.
3. Literature Review

Existing studies of leaders’ motives for initiating and participating in peace operations point to two primary reasons for doing so. First, much of the peacekeeping literature focuses on powerful states’ strategic incentives for initiating these operations (Bennis 1996; Wesley 1997; de Jonge Oudraat 1996; Diehl 1993; Durch 1993; Gibbs 1997; Schachter 1974), or highlights strategic relationships – based, perhaps, on regional or colonial ties – to explain their contributions (Bellamy and Williams 2009; Neack 1995; Perkins and Neumayer 2008). Even accounts of humanitarian intervention sometimes credit such relationships (e.g., Natsios 1996; Snyder 2008).
Insofar as they can be applied to civilian protection in complex emergencies, these arguments suggest that where strategic considerations dictate providing such protection, leaders will make more robust efforts to do so. In contrast, where such considerations do not require ambitious protection efforts – but might instead suggest a more traditional peacekeeping operation or some other kind of military involvement in the conflict, leaders may contribute to such a mission but will not exert significant effort to provide protection. Finally, where no strategic incentive is invoked, such arguments offer no particular reason to expect leaders to participate in peace operations at all.

At the same time, these arguments are based in the realist tradition, where strategic interests are king. Where such interests are deemed sufficiently important to prompt involvement in a military operation, therefore, they should also be sufficiently important to ensure that it is designed to be effective, whatever its specific goals. These arguments, then, would not predict the kind of resources-instructions gaps we often observe. Instead, they predict contributions that fall on the diagonal line in Figure 3-1, where a peace operation involves political goals and military strategies commensurate with the leader’s strategic interests, and the leader ensures that it has the necessary resources to carry them out. Strategic incentives as a motive for action, therefore, serve as a possible explanation for certain contributions – including the most robust and the most limited – but not for those characterized by a mismatch between means and goals.

On the other hand, a number of scholars and observers argue that pressures associated with public and media concern for civilian conflict victims can motivate ambitious humanitarian action by generating domestic political costs for leaders who fail to respond. George Kennan (1993), for example, deplored what he saw as the inappropriate influence of media-driven public
pressure in prompting U.S. intervention in Somalia. Jakobsen (1996 p.213) asserts that the lead state in a peace enforcement operation is likely to be “the power most susceptible to domestic pressure” (see also Jakobsen 2002). Kaufmann and Pape (1999) argue that states take “costly international moral actions” when the minority group that advocates them at home is relatively powerful. Bass (2008) has chronicled how press reporting of some of the 19th and early 20th centuries’ most devastating conflicts led to the emergence of politically potent constituencies for humanitarian intervention.

Like the claims about strategic incentives, however, these arguments alone cannot account for decisions to facilitate instructions-resources gaps. Although they imply that leaders may undertake robust civilian protection efforts in response to strong public pressure, they do not address the question of why a leader who gives in to such pressure would not seek to protect civilians as effectively as possible.

To explain such contributions, then, requires an appreciation both of leaders’ motivations for action, and of the constraints they face. A third set of arguments provides significant insight into one major source of these constraints. In the context of humanitarian action, a number of authors have suggested that the general public’s limited cost tolerance serves to constrain ambitious peace operations. According to Nicholas Wheeler, for example, “Liberal-democratic governments will seek to avoid taking risky decisions that could erode their support at home” (2000 p.310). In her Pulitzer Prize-winning book, A Problem From Hell (2002), Samantha Power argues that the United States has failed to stop genocides because of limited public concern for their victims. Taylor Seybolt, meanwhile, claims that leaders “deliberately choose an easier type of intervention than they know it will take to tackle the central problem” because they “do not want to incur the risks and costs associated with more difficult interventions” (2008.
Such claims are consistent with a much broader set of studies emphasizing the constraining influence of public opinion on decisions about the use of force and foreign policy more generally (eg, Baum 2004; Merom 2003; Isernia 2001; Foyle 1999; Hinckley 1992; Key 1961; Powlick 1991; Sobel 1993, 2001).

Together, these arguments suggest that domestic political pressure and support are integral to the political will needed to carry out robust efforts to protect civilians in complex emergencies. Although a number of authors have recognized that leaders may face competing incentives both to protect civilians and to limit the costs of doing so (eg, MacFarlane and Weiss 2000 p.128, 137; Jakobsen 1996 p.213; Wheeler 2000 p.32), to date scholarly attention has generally overlooked the key questions raised by this reality.

In particular, under what conditions are these competing pressures most difficult to resolve, and what explains how leaders attempt to do so? Why do politically powerful constituencies for humanitarian action sometimes successfully encourage their leaders to design robust peace operations, but at other times fail to do so? Why might a leader sometimes respond to a more limited amount of pressure for action by making some kind of contribution to a peace operation, and in other instances by avoiding one entirely? These questions are not only central to understanding the variation in civilian protection efforts that motivates this project. They also bear on important public policy concerns about the allocation of limited resources for humanitarian action and about how concerned citizens might improve the outcomes of their advocacy efforts. But because the existing literature focuses primarily on either a leader’s motives for action or on the constraints she faces, it offers no way to answer them.

The theory I develop below does answer these questions by accounting for interaction between the public’s motivating and constraining roles, and for leaders’ expectations about
concerned citizens’ ability to identify gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for
civilian protection. A simple decision-theoretic model clarifies important assumptions and
generates specific empirical implications of ideas that the existing literature has thus far only
hinted at, predicting when leaders are most likely to choose different kinds of contributions.

4. Theoretical Framework

The remainder of the chapter develops the causal story in detail. In this section I argue
that the leader may face competing incentives to appease two domestic constituencies with
divergent priorities and policy preferences – the general public and the ‘humanitarian public.’
The tension between these incentives, in turn, determines the intensity of the dilemma she faces
in trying to balance them, and depends on the relationship between the pressure from the
humanitarian public and the operational environment for a potential peace operation in the
complex emergency. Contributing to such an operation in a way that facilitates a gap between
soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection may help the leader to overcome her
political dilemma, and is most attractive when it is most intense. The next section formalizes the
argument and generates specific empirical predictions.

4.1 The General Public

The general public represents the majority of citizens, who have little knowledge of
complex emergencies and limited tolerance for the costs of efforts to protect their victims. It
primarily constrains the leader from making robust contributions.

The leader seeks to maintain the general public’s approval for any contribution she makes
to a peace operation because public assessments of her foreign policies contribute to overall
assessments of her competence (Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990). These, in turn, influence her
electoral prospects (Nincic and Hinckley 1991) and, possibly, her ability to achieve other policy goals (eg, Marra, Ostrom, and Simon 1990; Ostrom and Simon 1985; Russett 1990). Meanwhile, unwanted public attention to an unpopular contribution may distract her from other priorities. These pressures apply across democracies, although they may vary by institutional context, and grow before elections (Auerswald 2000; Gaubatz 1991, 1999; Risse-Kappen 1991).

Public approval of a military operation depends, primarily, on perceptions of its success, which in turn depend on the relationship between its inherent merit and its costs (Eichenberg 2005; Feaver and Gelpi 2004; Gartner and Segura 1998; Gartner, Segura, and Wilkening 1997; Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009). Thus, members of the general public can be expected to approve of peace operations and judge them successful if the satisfaction they take from the belief that the nation is contributing to a good cause exceeds the costs they perceive in doing so.

Substantial survey evidence from the post-Cold War period suggests that Western publics, in theory at least, do take satisfaction from the idea of using force for humanitarian ends (Isernia 2001; Everts 2002; Kull and Ramsay 2001; Kull and Destler 1999; La Balme 2001). For everyday citizens who are not especially interested in and attentive to the plight of complex emergency victims, however, there is little reason to pay close attention to the particulars either of the conflict or of any peace operation that responds to it. Members of the general public, therefore, are unlikely to observe operational details or understand how they affect a mission’s protection capacity. Instead, operations as disparate as intervening to stop mass killing against civilians during a war and helping to institutionalize peace in its aftermath may appear as equally valid and similar efforts to promote peace and save lives. Thus, because they do not care enough

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5 This is notably true in weak presidential systems such as the United States and in coalition parliamentary systems. See David P. Auerswald, Disarmed Democracies: Domestic Institutions and the Use of Force (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000).
to pay close attention to these details, members of the general public are unlikely to take more satisfaction from more robust efforts to meet civilians’ protection needs.

On the other hand, these citizens *are* likely to observe – and react negatively to – higher costs from contributing to a peace operation (see eg, Baum 2004). As Russett has remarked, in military operations, “Governments lose popularity in proportion to the war’s cost in blood and money. Of the two, blood…seems the more important” (1990 p.46). Citizens tend to estimate such costs mostly through their impressions of the total number (Mueller 1973, 1994), rate (Gartner and Segura 1998), or trend of military casualties (see also Larson 1996). Casualties among their own state’s troops – more than among those their leader’s contribution may support – are likely to be especially salient.

The costs that the general public observes, I argue, are primarily a function of three things: the goals and military strategies the soldiers pursue (their protection instructions), the leader’s resource commitment, and the operational environment. Specifically, the more of her own troops the leader deploys, the more ambitious the level of protection they are asked to provide, and the more difficult and dangerous it is to deploy in the particular complex emergency, the greater the financial costs and politically salient casualties that a contribution is likely to produce.

This assumption reflects Chapter 2’s argument that both more robust contributions and more challenging operating conditions produce greater expected costs and risks. Briefly, troops that pursue the most ambitious protection goals must be prepared for challenges to their presence and, moreover, must employ more risky military strategies – such as ambitious rules of engagement – to be effective (see Seybolt 2008). Likewise, more ambitious resource commitments also involve higher costs. More troops – one’s own or someone else’s – cost more
to send. More importantly, relative to supporting troops from other countries, deploying the leader’s own forces is costly and risky. Western soldiers are more expensive than those from developing countries, so the financial costs are higher per soldier, while sending her own troops – especially ground forces – exposes them (rather than someone else) to the dangers of deployment, and thus to the risk of casualties the public is likely to notice.

Finally, for a given resource commitment and set of protection instructions, a more dangerous or difficult operating environment can be expected to increase both the financial costs of deploying and maintaining the soldiers, and also the rate at which they may be injured or killed. As discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, in general the greater the level of violence, the more challenging the terrain, the stronger the local forces that might offer resistance, the greater the local opposition to the mission, and the larger the population, the more costly any contribution is likely to be.

Together, these arguments suggest that for the leader, with the general public there is only potential risk – but no potential gain – in anything more than a token contribution to a peace operation, and that this risk is greatest when the operational environment is most challenging. Because the general public can be expected to react negatively to higher costs, but not positively to greater civilian protection capacity, they are more likely to punish the leader for the mistake of an excessively costly contribution than to reward her for more successful civilian protection (Baum 2004; Russett 1990). As a consequence, a forward-looking leader will see the general public as a constraint on robust action (see eg, Powlick 1991; Hinckley 1992).

4.2 The Humanitarian Public

I refer to the second group that may influence the leader’s incentives as the humanitarian public. This group includes activists belonging to NGOs and advocacy organizations, outspoken
members of the media and public figures, and everyday concerned citizens, many of whom follow – and are influenced by – these groups. These citizens pay attention to the leader’s policies and encourage her to save threatened civilians through efforts such as writing letters and staging demonstrations. Like the general public, they eventually experience the costs of such policies. Unlike the general public, however, they are also more satisfied with policies they believe are able to save more lives.

As with the general public, the leader may have good reasons to heed the demands of this “issue public” (eg, Converse 1964; Krosnick 1990). In particular, these citizens’ beliefs about the quality of her efforts to protect threatened civilians may influence both their votes and their willingness to contribute to political campaigns. In addition, the more intense these citizens’ preferences for civilian protection, the more likely these preferences are to affect their behavior and, thus, the more their preferences should matter to the leader. Thus, as Kaufmann and Pape (1999) have argued, the larger, more vocal, better organized, and generally more politically influential this constituency is, the more its members’ opinions are likely to matter to the leader. This is especially true if they represent either a diverse swath of society, and/or a group that has the capacity to withhold critical votes or campaign support.

Still, organization only goes so far, and there is some evidence to suggest that it can make a stronger impression on leaders to hear from concerned citizens who are not activists and who are not participating in an activist-led campaign. As one former Australian foreign minister from the conservative side of the political spectrum told me, for example, it is important to judge not just the volume of noise but also its source. When faced with a demonstration of people demanding government action, “when you look at those people you can see that they’re student activists and trade unionists, and you know, political activists of one kind or another and you can
ignore them. They don’t matter. They’re not going to vote for you anyway, and people probably just think they’re a lot of excitable people making noise.” On the other hand, he added, when “the mainstream of the society” goes out into the streets and calls your office or political radio programs in significant numbers, “then that’s something you’d focus on.”

While the view that activists do not matter may be unusual among political leaders, the idea that everyday citizens can have an impact by expressing their concerns is certainly not. According to U.S. Congressman Frank Wolf (R-Virginia), for example, in today’s era of mass-produced advocacy material and email, it stands out when a constituent takes the time to write something in his or her own words. Likewise, according to former U.S. Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wisconsin), “It makes a big difference when my constituents raise issues at the listening sessions I hold throughout Wisconsin…Personal letters and phone calls also let me know that people care about these issues and want to see specific actions.” As these views attest, contact with everyday concerned citizens can help signify to leaders that public desire to respond to a complex emergency extends beyond a small and narrowly defined activist constituency.

At the same time, concerned citizens face serious challenges in obtaining and analyzing the information needed to hold their leader accountable for the quality of any contribution she might make to a peace operation, or her efforts to address civilians’ security needs more broadly. To assess these efforts, they must be able to analyze the adequacy of a peace operation’s goals (and indeed, to assess whether such a mission is the most sensible response to a given complex

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8 Indeed, it is for this reason that I treat the body of concerned citizens who generate pressure for humanitarian action as an issue public (albeit one with a shared policy preference) rather than simply as a set of advocacy organizations who otherwise function like interest groups.
emergency), decide whether the military strategies employed are suited to meeting these goals, and determine whether the troops provided are sufficient in number and quality.

These tasks are challenging, first, because they require access to extensive information about conditions on the ground, the details of operational goals and military strategies, and the kinds of goals and tasks that soldiers from other countries are realistically capable of pursuing. They also require an understanding of the international political context in which peace operations are designed and of the political groundwork that needs to be laid before any operation can be deployed.

Yet often this kind of information is not easily available to government outsiders. Conditions on the ground can be difficult to assess, especially early in a conflict or where journalists are absent, putting concerned citizens at a disadvantage vis-à-vis a leader that is reluctant to act (see eg, Western 2005 p.19). Perpetrators of violence can also thwart the efforts of NGOs, human rights organizations, and others to collect the relevant information themselves, either by attacking them physically or by denying them entry to the conflict-affected country or region. This tactic was widely used among the handful of complex emergencies I examine in Chapters 6 and 7, by governments in Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, and Sudan. For example, when an ambitious U.S.-based advocacy organization called The Enough Project sought to investigate conditions in Darfur, Sudanese concerns about how it would use any information it collected “led Khartoum to restrict its access, making on-the-ground research a challenge” (Hamilton 2011 p.122).

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9 Western argues that unless opposition groups and members of the public have an independent source of information about the conditions in a state where their government wishes to intervene militarily, they “are seriously hindered in their ability to refute the ruling group’s position.” The same logic applies here, except that the relative preferences of the government and the humanitarian public are reversed.
The information necessary to assess a peace operation’s capacity for protecting civilians can be similarly elusive. Critical aspects of military strategy, such as rules of engagement, are typically classified. Contingents from different countries may interpret them differently, and “For missions not led by the United Nations, NATO, or nations with advanced militaries,” mission-wide rules of engagement may not even exist (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.92). Confidential status of forces agreements and memoranda of understanding can restrict where forces from particular contingents deploy and what kinds of activities they engage in.

Even if they are able to access all the relevant information, however, holding leaders accountable for the quality of their policies requires an ability to synthesize it quickly and effectively, and a familiarity with military operations, that non-military experts are unlikely to have. Even if full-time activists are able to surmount these obstacles, the wider group of concerned citizens – including those that belong to and support their organizations – typically have limited time and energy for activism and even more limited exposure to the design of military operations and the intricacies of international diplomacy. They may also lack a clear understanding of the political context in which a complex emergency occurs.

Together, these realities can encourage concerned citizens to advocate for “quick and visible actions” (Hamilton 2011 p.194). Because boots on the ground are more obvious than some other responses, this can encourage demands for peace operations devoted to civilian protection even when these may not be the best – or only – way to respond to civilians’ security needs in a particular complex emergency. At the same time, if leaders find it easier to explain a military deployment than, say, the niceties of diplomatic negotiations, it may seem politically expedient to devote more energy to such operations than to other policies that could also help to address civilians’ security needs.
Thus, although the humanitarian public has a clear preference for policies that save more lives, these challenges translate to serious informational disadvantages vis-à-vis the leader. As a result, concerned citizens represent a catalyst to humanitarian military action, but not one whose influence is as clear-cut as the constraining force represented by the general public. On the one hand, the more politically important the humanitarian public and the stronger their preference for civilian protection, the more the leader will fear the political costs of ignoring their demands.10 On the other hand, as ever in politics, it is these citizens’ perceptions of the leader’s policies, rather than the reality, that matter. Because of the tremendous challenge of assessing any contribution she makes to a peace operation, moreover, there is a good chance that the two may diverge.

4.3 Balancing Competing Pressures

These arguments suggest that where concerned citizens are able to create meaningful pressure for humanitarian action, the leader has an incentive both to pursue policies they will perceive as high-quality efforts to meet civilians’ needs, and to limit the costs of doing so. The challenge of balancing these competing pressures, in turn, creates a political dilemma, which is most acute when neither force clearly overshadows the other – that is, when it is important to satisfy the humanitarian public, but not particularly easy to do so for a cost the general public would find acceptable.

A contribution to a peace operation in which one component is more ambitious than the other, however, may offer a way around this dilemma. As noted above, if judged by the more

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10 This argument differs from (and is more complex than) the argument that leaders simply respond to media pressure (the so-called ‘CNN effect’). Here, though members of the media may help to generate pressure by providing information to those who are inclined to care, media coverage also reflects public interest and advocacy efforts to publicize the plight of complex emergency victims. See Ch. 5 for further discussion.
ambitious of the two, such a contribution’s protection capacity appears higher than it really is. Thus, if the leader can convince the humanitarian public to focus only on soldiers’ protection instructions or on the troops her resource commitment enables to deploy – whichever is more impressive – she may benefit from all the political advantages of a more robust contribution while paying only a portion of the costs. This, in turn, limits the risk of a backlash by the general public. Such a strategy can be politically costly if discovered, but if not, can allow the leader to strike a politically optimal balance between the risks of being punished by the humanitarian public for doing too little and of being punished by the general public for doing too much.

Because of concerned citizens’ informational disadvantages, moreover, there is good reason to think that a careful leader may be able to execute this strategy successfully. In particular, these disadvantages may encourage misunderstandings that can benefit the leader. Inexperienced activists might, for example, interpret an operation’s use of civilian protection language as implying more extensive protection capacity than is actually intended (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.50). Or, as was the case with many Darfur activists’ perceptions of AMIS in 2004-05, they may perceive some, but not all, of a mission’s limitations, and thus remain unjustifiably optimistic about its potential to protect civilians. More generally, they may underestimate the complexity of civilian protection as an enterprise and, thus, the information required to assess an operation’s protection capacity (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.6).

Given the obstacles, even attentive, influential members of the humanitarian public often cannot distinguish a robust contribution from one dominated by a resource-instructions gap, and so “critics and advocates often end their discussion at whether or not to ‘send in the troops’” (Holt and Berkman 2006 p.192). This opens the door for a powerful democratic leader with the proper incentive to benefit from their naïveté. In contrast to the humanitarian public, she
typically has access to high-quality military analysis and information about conditions on the ground in a complex emergency that bear on the operational goals, military strategies, and troop capabilities required to provide effective protection (and on the existence of any non-military policies that may have a better chance of addressing civilians’ protection needs). Since the humanitarian public struggles to collect and evaluate this same information, the leader has an opportunity to strategically supply them with information she wishes them to have, without increasing their access to information she does not. Specifically, if she contributes to a peace operation, she can guarantee that they are aware of the apparent protection capacity reflected in her contribution’s more ambitious component by calling attention to only this aspect of her commitment.

Of course, the humanitarian public may still come to realize that there is an added, hard constraint on such a contribution’s protection capacity. Less expertise may be required, for example, to recognize a larger resources-instructions gap than a smaller one. Likewise, the persistence of attacks against civilians or a high death rate following deployment may serve as an indicator of a peace operation’s failure to provide effective protection. At the same time, the leader can never be sure whether concerned citizens will reach this conclusion, how long it may take them to do so, or whether they will still be able to sustain significant pressure on her to improve the mission if and when they do catch on. As one activist put it, for example, sustaining an advocacy movement over time is a major challenge because “It’s harder to sell the lasting solution and keep people excited about that.”\(^1\) Thus, generally, it makes sense for a leader to anticipate that by publicly highlighting the more ambitious aspect of her contribution, she can

improve the odds that the humanitarian public will latch onto only this information, and thus that they will believe (falsely) that it reflects the contribution’s true protection capacity.

5. A Model of Contributions

This section develops a simple decision-theoretic model to formalize these arguments and predict when and how powerful democracies are most likely to use peace operations to protect – and appear to protect – civilians in complex emergencies. In the model, the leader of such a democracy makes a two-part contribution to a peace operation consisting of a set of protection instructions and a resource commitment. First, I let $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ represent the less ambitious of these two components, which determines the contribution’s true protection capacity. Second, I let $\tau \in [0, 1]$ represent the more ambitious one, which reflects the protection capacity that the leader wishes concerned citizens to perceive. The model thus accounts for both key aspects of the contribution’s overall quality: the hard constraint on its protection capacity and any difference it helps to enable between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection.

For simplicity’s sake, I refer to $\lambda$ as the contribution’s true protection capacity and to $\tau$ as its announced capacity, since this is the aspect to which the leader seeks to draw attention. In both cases, 0 implies no contribution and 1 implies a highly ambitious commitment with extensive potential to address the security threat to civilians. In addition, I require that either $(\lambda, \tau) = (0,0)$, or $\tau > 0$ and $\lambda > 0$. That is, a contribution requires two positive components, since a peace operation must both deploy some troops, and give them some instructions about what to do.
5.1 Utility Functions

5.1.1 General Public

I assume that the general public forms expectations about the benefits of a peace operation based on members’ general attitudes toward using force for humanitarian purposes, which imply a positive but low valuation of such efforts. Specifically, these citizens observe whether $\lambda$ and $\tau$ are positive – whether the leader makes a contribution – but not their actual values. I let $b$ represent the general public’s satisfaction from any positive contribution. I assume $b$ is non-negative and that if $(\lambda, \tau) = (0,0)$, then $b = 0$.

I also assume that the general public’s utility decreases as the costs that these citizens observe rise. Initially, members of the general public form ex ante expectations about a prospective contribution’s costs based on their assessments of the average costs of past operations, and then update their beliefs as information about the actual costs of the leader’s contribution becomes available. I let $c_1$ represent their ex ante expected costs, and $c_2$ represent their ex post observed costs.

Collectively, these assumptions reflect a general public that believes peace operations can sometimes be worth participating in, but that is more interested in the specifics of what they cost and in the sense of satisfaction that comes from contributing to a good cause, than in what they actually achieve. The ex ante utility function is $U_{G1} = b - c_1$, and so $U_{G1} > 0$ as long as $b > c_1$. Similarly, the ex post utility function is $U_{G2} = b - c_2$, and for any positive contribution, $U_{G2} > 0$ as long as $b > c_2$.

5.1.2 Humanitarian Public

Unlike the general public, the satisfaction members of the humanitarian public experience from a peace operation is directly tied to their perception of its capacity to save lives and provide
protection as needed. I assume that although they understand that a more robust contribution is likely to save more lives, they may not be able to distinguish between the contribution’s true protection capacity and its announced one.

Specifically, because the leader always announces τ, I assume that the humanitarian public always observes τ. In addition, they may also observe λ, and thus, whether there is a gap between τ and λ. I assume that their ability to observe such a gap grows as it increases in size. Thus, the probability that members of the humanitarian public perceive a gap = τ − λ, and the probability they do not = 1 − (τ − λ) = 1 − τ + λ.

If members of the humanitarian public do not perceive a gap between τ and λ, they give the leader credit for the announced capacity, τ. If they do, however, I assume that they punish her by giving her credit for the true capacity, minus the difference between τ and λ. That is, they give her credit for a contribution of λ − (τ − λ), or 2λ − τ. Finally, I also assume that because the humanitarian public is specific to the particular complex emergency and because its members may not have any experience with previous complex emergencies, they are unable to estimate in advance the probability or extent to which the leader is likely to implement a gap between τ and λ. Thus they do not discount for this possibility.

Together, these assumptions imply that the humanitarian public’s expected benefit from (λ, τ) is the probability that they do not observe the gap times their benefit from the announced protection capacity (that is, τ(1 − τ + λ)), plus the probability that they do observe the gap times
their benefit from the true capacity minus the punishment for being deceived (that is, 
\((\tau - \lambda)(2\lambda - \tau)\)). Together, this = \(\tau + 4\lambda\tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2\).\(^{12}\)

Finally, I assume that, like the general public, the humanitarian public also dislikes the costs of contributing to a peace operation. But although these citizens observe at least some information about the quality of the contribution, I assume that they, too, simply observe its final costs. Thus, as with the general public, I let \(c_1\) represent their ex ante expected costs and \(c_2\) represent their ex post observed costs.

We can now characterize the humanitarian public’s utility function. First, if \((\lambda, \tau) = (0,0)\), then like the general public, they experience neither benefits nor costs, and their expected utility equals zero. But if both \(\lambda\) and \(\tau\) are positive, their ex ante utility is \(U_{H1} = \tau + 4\lambda\tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2 - c_1\), while their ex post utility is \(U_{H2} = \tau + 4\lambda\tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2 - c_2\).

5.1.3 Leader

The leader’s expected utility function is a weighted average of the expected ex post utilities of the general and humanitarian publics, where the weight on the humanitarian public is represented by \(\alpha\), and the weight on the general public by \((1 - \alpha)\).\(^{13}\) Thus, \(\text{E}[U_L] = \alpha\text{E}[U_{H2}] + (1 - \alpha)\text{E}[U_{G2}]\).

I assume, first, that the leader has perfect information about how many and what kind of forces are needed, and what they need to be told to do, to effectively meet civilians’ protection

\(^{12}\)A possible extension of the model would allow for the humanitarian public to update its beliefs about the contribution’s protection capacity based on evidence about continued civilian suffering following the mission’s deployment. Here, however, I assume a one-shot game and focus only on the leader’s initial decision. It often takes a long time (and many more civilian deaths) for the humanitarian public to become aware of a contribution’s limitations, so getting the mission right the first time is important in its own right. In a multi-round game, however, it would also make sense to allow the humanitarian public to discount for the possibility of a gap between \(\tau\) and \(\lambda\) after the first round.

\(^{13}\)Thus, another possible extension would assume that the leader sometimes bases her utility on one or both of the ex ante utility functions, in cases where her political interests do not leave sufficient time to wait for her constituents to update their views of an operation’s costs. I save this for future work.
needs in the complex emergency. Second, I assume that she has additional information about the eventual costs – primarily casualties, but also financial costs – that the general and humanitarian publics observe. As noted above, these depend on the number and quality of the troops the leader enables to deploy, what the soldiers are asked to do, and the operational environment. I let \( \omega \) represent the operational environment, and assume \( \omega \in (0, 1] \). That is, it ranges from the most benign to the most challenging possible environment, and reflects how likely a given soldier is to be injured or killed, and how much it costs to deploy him, given the particular complex emergency.

Based on these assumptions, I model costs as an increasing stochastic function of both components of the contribution, \( \lambda \) and \( \tau \), and \( \omega \). Specifically, I let \( c_2 = \omega \lambda \tau + \varepsilon \), where \( \varepsilon \) is the stochastic term. This yields that: \( E[c_2] = E[\omega \lambda \tau + \varepsilon] = \omega \lambda \tau \). Thus, if the leader asks the troops to pursue goals and military strategies that are twice as dangerous, she should expect to see twice as many casualties. Similarly, if she deploys twice as many soldiers, the costs of deploying them and the dangers inherent in the protection they seek to provide and the operational environment should increase her costs accordingly.

These assumptions produce a two-part utility function. First, \( E[U_L(0,0)] = 0 \). That is, if the leader makes no contribution, her expected utility equals 0. Second, if \( \lambda \) and \( \tau \) are both positive, then:

\[
E[U_L] = \alpha E[\tau + 4\lambda \tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2 - c_2] + (1 - \alpha) E[b - c_2]
\]

\[
= \alpha(\tau + 4\lambda \tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2 - \omega \lambda \tau) + (1 - \alpha)(b - \omega \lambda \tau).
\]

Table 3-1 summarizes the model’s primary parameters.
Table 3-1: Summary of Model Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \tau )</td>
<td>Max (Soldiers’ Instructions, Resources for civilian protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \lambda )</td>
<td>Min (Soldiers’ Instructions, Resources for civilian protection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>Relative political influence of humanitarian public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \omega )</td>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2 Preferred Contribution and Gap

Next I solve for the combination of \( \lambda \) and \( \tau \) that maximizes this utility function, which I denote as \((\lambda^*, \tau^*)\). Assuming the leader makes a contribution, I solve for the positive values of \( \tau \) and \( \lambda \) that maximize \( E[U_L] \) in terms of \( \alpha \) and \( \omega \). Details are provided in the mathematical appendix. I find that, subject to the constraint that \( \alpha > \frac{\omega}{4} \), \((\lambda^*, \tau^*) = \left( \frac{4\alpha^2 - \alpha \omega}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2}, \frac{4\alpha^2}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2} \right) \).

This implies that the leader’s preferred gap, denoted \( \tau^* - \lambda^* \), equals \( \frac{\alpha}{8\alpha - \omega} \). The expressions for \( \lambda^*, \tau^* \), and \( \tau^* - \lambda^* \) are each positive under these conditions.

In contrast, when \( \alpha \leq \frac{\omega}{4} \), the leader is best served by making no contribution, and \((\lambda^*, \tau^*) = (0, 0) \). This finding implies that, the more challenging the operational environment, the higher the level of pressure and concern the humanitarian public must generate in order to convince the leader to make any contribution at all.
5.2.1 Comparative Statics

Assuming that the leader makes a contribution, how do its true and announced protection capacities (and the gap between them) vary with the political influence of the humanitarian public and the riskiness of the operational environment? To investigate this question, I differentiate the expressions for $\lambda^*\tau^*$ and $\tau^* - \lambda^*$ with respect to $\alpha$ and $\omega$. The results of these derivations are provided in the mathematical appendix.

Briefly, the derivatives of $\lambda^*$ and $\tau^*$ with respect to $\alpha$ are positive whenever the leader contributes to a peace operation, while the derivative of $\tau^* - \lambda^*$ is negative. Thus, holding the operational environment constant, both components of the contribution become more ambitious as the humanitarian public becomes more influential, but the component that represents true capacity, $\lambda^*$, grows faster than the one that represents announced capacity, $\tau^*$. The risks of trying to strategically deceive the humanitarian public grow more quickly than the expected benefits, and so the leader’s preferred gap between $\lambda$ and $\tau$ falls.

Furthermore, the derivatives of $\lambda^*$ and $\tau^*$ with respect to $\omega$ are negative, while the derivative of $\tau^* - \lambda^*$ is positive. Thus, holding the political influence of the humanitarian public constant, both components of the contribution become less ambitious as the operational environment becomes more challenging, but $\lambda^*$ shrinks faster than $\tau^*$. In other words, the leader’s incentive to deceive the humanitarian public grows faster than the political risks of doing so. Thus, the size of her preferred gap between $\lambda$ and $\tau$ grows.

5.3 Empirical Expectations

By illustrating how the leader’s incentives vary as a function of the relationship between the humanitarian public’s political influence ($\alpha$) and the operational environment ($\omega$), this model
generates a series of non-obvious predictions about when she is most likely to make different kinds of contributions to peace operations.

To interpret these, I describe the relationship between $\alpha$ and $\omega$ as the ratio of the former to the latter – that is, of the relative pressure for humanitarian action that concerned citizens are able to generate to the relative difficulty of the operational environment for a peace operation. This ratio creates a single spectrum, where low values reflect the dominating influence of the operational environment over the leader’s incentive to respond to the demands of the humanitarian public. At very high values, on the other hand, we can think of these concerned citizens’ demands as a major – if not the dominant – political preoccupation. In the middle, the leader’s political dilemma is most intense – the need to respond to the humanitarian public’s demands is significant, but not overpowering relative to the available opportunities to do so for a reasonable cost.

With this spectrum in mind, the model’s first and most simple implication concerns the concept of true protection capacity. Together, the positive sign of $\frac{\partial \lambda^*}{\partial \alpha}$ and the negative sign of $\frac{\partial \lambda^*}{\partial \omega}$ imply that $\lambda^*$ should increase with the value of $\frac{\alpha}{\omega}$. In other words, the true protection capacity of a leader’s contribution to a peace operation should increase as the political influence of the humanitarian public grows relative to the difficulty of the operational environment.

Second, it is also possible to derive a series of implications that integrate both aspects of contribution quality, true protection capacity and the resources-instructions gap, by dividing contributions into the three basic types discussed at the beginning of the chapter. Although Figure 3-1 depicted the full range of variation we might observe, for simplicity’s sake I distinguish between contributions that are primarily limited, in which both components are
relatively minimal and there is no significant gap between them; those that are dominated by a substantial instructions-resource gap; and those that are most robust, where both components are relatively ambitious and there is no significant gap between them. In Figure 3-2 (below), the horizontal axis labeled “Public Concern/ Operational Environment” in all three panels represents the spectrum described above. The vertical axes represent the probability of observing the different contribution types.

First, Panel A reflects the probability that the leader will make either no contribution or a limited contribution, outcomes I lump together here because the model effectively fails to distinguish between them. The key insight from its expectation that the leader chooses

\[(\lambda^*, \tau^*) = (0, 0) \text{ when } \alpha \leq \frac{\omega}{4}\]

is that there is a threshold at which public pressure becomes sufficiently meaningful relative to the operational environment to create a distinct political dilemma for the leader, and at which it makes sense for her to seek to convince the humanitarian public that she is doing more to protect civilians than she really is. Since the leader’s response to the complex emergency does not involve a significant resources-instructions gap either when she makes a limited commitment or when she makes none at all, it makes sense that we would observe these outcomes in roughly the same circumstances, before this threshold is reached.

Moreover, since the specific threshold of \( \alpha = \frac{\omega}{4} \) is arbitrary, probabilistically it makes little sense to think of it as a hard break. Thus, I expect that the leader is most likely to make either no contribution or at most a limited one where the challenges of the operational environment clearly dominate concerns about satisfying the humanitarian public. As her political dilemma becomes more difficult, the probability of both outcomes should decline.
Second, Panel B shows the probability that the leader will make a contribution that is dominated by a gap between its two components. When pressure from the humanitarian public is insignificant relative to the challenges of the operational environment, this probability is low because the leader is likely to contribute not at all or in a limited way. Once public concern becomes meaningful relative to the operational environment, however, the probability of this outcome grows and reaches its peak where the tension between the leader’s competing demands
is most intense. Finally, it decreases as public concern comes closer to dominating concerns about the operational environment and the size of the leader’s preferred gap falls. Finally, as shown in Panel C, the probability that the leader makes a robust contribution steadily grows with the relative importance of responding to the demands of the humanitarian public.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

What, then, explains variation in the quality of powerful democracies’ efforts to provide effective security for civilian victims of complex emergencies? Leaders of these states have the capacity to ensure that a peace operation combines both political goals and military strategies that are suited to meeting civilians’ most pressing needs with sufficient resources to pursue them. Sometimes they do so, but often they do not. Indeed, these leaders regularly help to enable gaps between the protection that troops are asked to provide and that they have the ability to deliver. In doing so, they may actually increase the risks to civilians in the world’s worst conflicts.

Why do leaders ever contribute to peace operations in ways that facilitate such gaps? When are they most likely to do so? When are concerned citizens who would prefer more robust action most likely to succeed in bringing it about? The theory and model developed in this chapter answer these questions by bringing together an analysis of leaders’ motives for action with an understanding of the political constraints and opportunities they face. I expect that leaders are most likely to facilitate resources-instructions gaps when they face a difficult political dilemma about how to balance conflicting domestic pressures both to appear to provide effective protection, and to limit the costs of their efforts. This, in turn, occurs when the humanitarian public is able to generate enough pressure to overcome a leader’s disincentives to acting at all, but is too weak to overpower concerns about the risks inherent in the operational environment.
In contrast, leaders are more likely to pursue either token (if any) or robust protection efforts when one of these incentives clearly dominates the other.

This argument both confirms some of the basic intuitions of the existing literature and popular perception, and raises doubts about some of their conclusions. On the one hand, it agrees that, all else equal, leaders are likely to do more to address civilians’ security needs when they face more public pressure for humanitarian action, and also that broader public apathy about complex emergencies can act as a powerful constraint on their efforts. According to Samantha Power’s (2002) influential argument, together these two insights suggest that the mobilization of mass constituencies for humanitarian action is necessary to induce robust civilian protection efforts. Indeed, drawing directly on Power’s work, American activists in the recent Save Darfur movement reasoned that “if they created a loud enough outcry, they could generate the political will needed to get their political leaders to save Darfuri lives” (Hamilton 2011 p.53).

Critically, however, all else is rarely equal, and the theory and model presented here suggest that even massive public pressure alone is not enough to guarantee robust civilian protection efforts. Instead, a reasonably favorable operational environment is also likely to be critical. Without this, the costs and risks of robust action are likely to be too high for even a very motivated and influential humanitarian public to overcome.\footnote{One might add, as well, that in the most challenging environments the assumption that it is possible to design an operation that does more good than harm for threatened civilians may also break down, thus raising ethical questions as well as practical ones about the potential for intervention.}

In addition, the argument relies on the assumption that concerned citizens may be unable to effectively monitor the quality of their leaders’ civilian protection efforts. Although the evidence I present in the coming chapters tends to confirm that this assumption is generally a sound one, it implies that if citizens were better able to hold their leaders to account, the potential benefit of facilitating a resources-instructions gap – the opportunity to create an illusion of
civilian protection – would go away or be reduced. This has important implications for the strategies that activists use to push for more effective humanitarian action. On the one hand, it gives them an incentive to make specific demands whose implementation they can verify relatively easily. On the other, because of their informational disadvantages, this strategy may encourage activists to unknowingly push for problematic policies. This is one of the key lessons of the Darfur advocacy experience, and it reflects a problem that may be particularly thorny to address. I return to this issue in the concluding chapter.

In the chapters that follow, I use statistical analysis and case studies to test the theory’s core empirical implications, while accounting for the influence of other forces such as strategic interests, leaders’ moral values, and the possibility that leaders are ignorant either about civilians’ protection needs in complex emergencies or about how to effectively address them.

Finally, the theory itself generates many questions. In particular, it suggests that the empirical conditions that drive variation in the configuration of domestic political pressures should play an important role in the quality of civilian protection efforts. What mechanisms, then, might generate a larger or more vocal humanitarian public, or one that contains many members of easily identifiable voting groups? When, if ever, is the humanitarian public able to overcome the challenges of effectively monitoring their leader’s policies? What conditions determine operational risks and dangers on the ground? Existing scholarship offers some guidance on the operational environment, which I employ in the empirical analyses. The other questions have received less attention, however, and in the case studies I examine available evidence about sources of variation in the size, political influence, and monitoring capacity of the humanitarian public. I discuss patterns in this evidence and their implications for the potential of concerned citizens to more effectively encourage robust civilian protection in the final chapter.
7. Appendix 3.1 – Mathematical Supplement

1. Contribution and Policy Gap

1a. First Order Conditions

Recall that \( E[U_L] = \alpha (\tau + 4\lambda\tau - 2\lambda^2 - 2\tau^2 - \omega\lambda\tau) + (1 - \alpha)(b - \omega\lambda\tau) \).

1) \( \frac{\partial E[U_L]}{\partial \lambda} = 4\alpha\tau - 4\alpha\lambda - \omega\tau \).

Setting equal to 0, solving for \( \lambda \), and simplifying yields: \( \lambda = \frac{\tau(4\alpha - \omega)}{4\alpha} \).

2) \( \frac{\partial E[U_L]}{\partial \tau} = \alpha + 4\alpha\lambda - 4\alpha\tau - \omega\lambda \).

Setting equal to 0, solving for \( \tau \), and simplifying yields: \( \tau = \frac{1}{4} + \frac{\lambda(4\alpha - \omega)}{4\alpha} \).

1b. Critical Point

Combining these expressions reveals that \( \lambda = \frac{4\alpha^2 - \alpha\omega}{8\alpha\omega - \omega^2} \) and \( \tau = \frac{4\alpha^2}{8\alpha\omega - \omega^2} \). This critical point maximizes the leader’s utility and satisfies the constraint that both \( \lambda \) and \( \tau \) are positive as long as
\[ \alpha > \frac{\omega}{4} \].

Only when \( \alpha > \frac{\omega}{4} \) is \( \lambda > 0 \), and the critical point is a local maximum under these conditions. Specifically, \( \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \tau^2} \right) = -4\alpha < 0 \) and \( \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \lambda^2} \right) = -4\alpha < 0 \), while
\[ \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \tau \partial \lambda} \right) = 4\alpha - \omega \]. Thus,
\[ \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \tau} \right) \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \lambda} \right) - \left( \frac{\partial^2 E[U_L]}{\partial \tau \partial \lambda} \right)^2 = (-4\alpha)(-4\alpha) - (4\alpha - \omega)^2 = 8\alpha\omega - \omega^2 \]. Since \( 8\alpha\omega - \omega^2 > 0 \) whenever \( \alpha > \frac{\omega}{4} \), the second derivative test is satisfied.
1c. Preferred Policy & Gap

Thus, subject to the constraint that $\alpha > \frac{\omega}{4}$, $(\lambda^*, \tau^*) = \left(\frac{4\alpha^2 - \alpha \omega}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2}, \frac{4\alpha^2}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2}\right)$.

This implies that $\tau^* - \lambda^* = \frac{\alpha \omega}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2} = \frac{\alpha}{8\alpha - \omega}$.

2. Comparative Statics

Where $(\lambda^*, \tau^*) = \left(\frac{4\alpha^2 - \alpha \omega}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2}, \frac{4\alpha^2}{8\alpha \omega - \omega^2}\right)$, we find the following partial derivatives:

1) $\frac{\partial \lambda^*}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{32\alpha^2 \omega - 8\alpha \omega^2 + \omega^3}{(8\alpha \omega - \omega^2)^2} > 0$

2) $\frac{\partial \lambda^*}{\partial \omega} = \frac{-32\alpha^3 + 8\alpha^2 \omega - \alpha \omega^2}{(8\alpha \omega - \omega^2)^2} < 0$

3) $\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{32\alpha^2 \omega - 8\alpha \omega^2}{(8\alpha \omega - \omega^2)^2} > 0$ for $\alpha > \frac{\omega}{4}$

4) $\frac{\partial \tau^*}{\partial \omega} = \frac{-32\alpha^3 + 8\alpha^2 \omega}{(8\alpha \omega - \omega^2)^2} < 0$ for $\alpha > \frac{\omega}{4}$

5) $\frac{\partial (\tau^* - \lambda^*)}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{-\omega}{(8\alpha - \omega)^2} < 0$

6) $\frac{\partial (\tau^* - \lambda^*)}{\partial \omega} = \frac{\alpha}{(8\alpha - \omega)^2} > 0$
Chapter 4 – Complex Humanitarian Emergencies: An Original Dataset

As Chapter 2 discussed, I use the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies to describe the set of conflicts in which severe violence might, on humanitarian grounds, most reasonably prompt peace operations to protect civilians. In his attempt to identify conflicts that might have been potential candidates for humanitarian intervention, Wheeler argued that “it is important to distinguish between what we might call the ordinary routine abuse of human rights that tragically occurs on a daily basis and the extraordinary acts of killing and brutality that belong to the category of ‘crimes against humanity’” (2000 p.34). The idea here is similar, if somewhat broader. I seek to distinguish between the many conflicts that are bad for civilians and those that are the most devastating, where it makes the most sense to study variation in international efforts to shield civilians from the effects of violence.

As pointed out earlier, however, this concept has not been widely used in the political science literature. Instead, most studies of peace operations, humanitarian intervention, and third party intervention focus on responses exclusively to civil or inter-state wars, or to genocide or other atrocity crimes (see, eg, Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Krain 2005; Wesley 1997; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2004, 2008; Power 2002). Thus, a significant contribution of this dissertation involves adapting the idea for use in empirical – and particularly quantitative – research. Chapter 2 initiated this process by developing a new definition. This chapter builds on that definition to compile an original dataset of these events in the post-Cold War period. First, I highlight the need for this endeavor with a review of the limitations of existing data sources. The next part of the chapter identifies empirical indicators and explains and justifies the operational criteria, data sources, and processes I used to create the
dataset. The full set of coding guidelines is included in an appendix at the end. Finally, the last section of the chapter briefly describes the resulting list of complex emergencies and compares it to several existing ones in order to confirm that it indeed reflects contemporary ideas about what distinguishes these conflicts from other violent events.

1. Limitations of Existing Data

To empirically test the theory laid out in Chapter 3, I require not just a conceptual definition of complex emergencies, of course, but also an actual list of these events. Unfortunately, existing datasets are not suited to the needs of this project.

As with existing definitions, several of these have been put together by and for the humanitarian relief community, and were not compiled with a clear and consistently applied set of criteria. The list used by the CE-DAT project (see Chapter 2), for example, is not even limited to conflicts that meet its definition of a complex emergency. Instead, it includes countries of interest to partner organizations and relief groups, such as states that may potentially experience a humanitarian crisis, states that host large refugee populations, and fragile states. Moreover, it includes only conflicts for which CE-DAT has been able to collect health and mortality data.¹ This represents a source of potential bias, as the collection of such data is most difficult in the worst security environments.

Similarly, the list available through OCHA’s ReliefWeb, an online resource about both natural disasters and complex emergencies, reflects the needs and interests of the humanitarian organizations with which it partners. ReliefWeb usually includes emergencies covered by a UN Consolidated Appeal for relief funding and designated by the United Nations Inter-Agency

¹ David Hargitt, CE-DAT Data Manager at the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université catholique de Louvain. Personal communication by email, 04/21/2009.
Standing Committee (IASC), the UN body responsible for the inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance. The introduction of a UN Consolidated Appeal, however, is dependent in part on the interests of aid organizations about where they wish to devote their time and resources.\(^2\)

The timeframe covered by existing datasets is another problem. As Chapter 1 explained, this project focuses primarily on the post-Cold War period. Given the substantial changes in the number and ambitions of peace operations following the end of the Cold War, there are good reasons for this. However, analyzing all post-Cold War peace operations in response to complex emergencies requires examining responses to some conflicts that began during the Cold War, but that continued after its end. Yet ReliefWeb includes emergencies beginning only since the late 1980s (which includes most, but not all, large-scale conflicts that persisted into the post-Cold War period), while CE-DAT has collected data only back to 2000. Third and finally, neither ReliefWeb nor CE-DAT provides any guidance on the temporal boundaries of the complex emergencies they identify, so it is impossible to determine when these conflicts have been sufficiently devastating to qualify as a complex emergency.

Other lists of complex emergencies betray similar problems. Väyrynen (1996) focuses only on the period from 1993 – 1995. Similarly, when the Central Intelligence Agency compiled a list in the mid-1990s, it provided little information on the selection criteria, other than that the events identified represented the humanitarian emergencies most deserving of international attention as of 1996 (see Väyrynen 1996 p.39). Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) come closer, operationalizing complex emergencies according to different combinations of battle deaths, refugee flows, malnutrition, and disease. Still, they only cover the 1980 – 1994 period, and their

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\(^2\) Shuichi Odaka, ReliefWeb. Personal communication by email, 04/14/2009.
data sources are at the national level (though many conflicts are sub-national) and for various reasons are unlikely to capture certain kinds of conflicts with severe effects on civilian life.

2. Indicators of Complex Emergencies

Given these limitations of existing data sources, I developed a new list of complex emergencies, the *Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset*. This section describes and justifies the main indicators used to create it. To identify them, I build on the typical features of complex emergencies highlighted by the definitions discussed in Chapter 2, and that chapter’s discussion of how wars, one-sided violence, and inter-communal conflict can each generate severe civilian suffering.

2.1 Indicators of Disruption to Civilian Life

As discussed in Chapter 2, a complex emergency is defined by the combination of political violence that severely disrupts civilian life and the inability or unwillingness of the responsible government to provide for the affected population’s needs. The existing definitions discussed in that chapter highlight a series of both quantitative and qualitative potential indicators of the scale of a conflict’s disruption of civilian life.

First, by emphasizing the importance of loss of life and increased mortality, they suggest that the number of civilian deaths is the most obvious – and probably the single best – indicator of the suffering a conflict generates. Second, they repeatedly emphasize the prevalence of large-scale population displacement. Civilians displaced from their homes by conflict are commonly known as *forcibly displaced persons*, and may include refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). Both refugees and asylum seekers cross international borders to escape persecution, war, or political conflict, but only refugees have been legally recognized by
their host country. IDPs share many of the same characteristics, but do not benefit from international legal protection because they have not crossed an international border. According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees, “Many are attacked by their own governments and inaccessible to outside monitors and humanitarian assistance” (2004 p.8). Thus, IDPs are often even more vulnerable than refugees.

Forcible displacement is also often associated with various life-threatening, but indirect, consequences of violence. Indeed, according to Frederick Burkle, in most complex emergencies it is displacement-related issues such as “the migration of populations, separation from food supplies, and destruction of the public health infrastructure—that eventually [cause] the greatest mortality and morbidity,” because fleeing populations “suffer almost immediate food, shelter, fuel, water, sanitation, and basic healthcare insecurities” (2006 p.91). In addition, especially among populations already compromised by mediocre health, the presence of large numbers of displaced people can contribute to the spread of infectious disease and complicate delivery of emergency relief (Burkle 2006 p.91). Indeed, this helps to explain why, as noted in Chapter 2, so many civilian deaths in the most severe conflicts are non-violent. As Burkle notes, they result primarily “from diarrheal disease and dehydration, malaria, measles, acute lower respiratory infections, and malnutrition. Despite ongoing violence, trauma deaths usually account for only 4-11% of mortality” (2006 p.91-2).

Thus, the scale of forcible displacement can serve as an indicator of the size of the civilian population exposed to these risks. What is more, at least some displacement-related information may be more readily available than information about deaths or other effects of

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conflict. When a state cuts off access to its territory for journalists or aid workers, for example, refugees can provide one of the few sources of information about what is going on inside.

Still, estimates of civilian deaths and displacement are not always available, especially as conditions change over time in a conflict. This can generate uncertainty about the extent to which certain conflicts, and certain years within them, disrupt civilian life. In these circumstances, a variety of supplementary indicators – mostly qualitative – may provide additional information about conditions on the ground. Such indicators can offer either confirming evidence of significant disruption to civilian life, or mitigating evidence that such disruption may not, in fact, be as dire as it looks. For example, an outbreak of infectious disease, deteriorating health and nutrition statistics, poor sanitation conditions at displaced-person camps, or a shortage of basic necessities such as food, health care, or shelter, can provide confirming evidence of a serious threat to civilian life. On the other hand, evidence that most displacement is temporary may mitigate our impression of the disruption to civilian life, since temporary displacement is less likely to contribute to outbreaks of infectious disease and the disruption of the food supply.

2.2 Indicators of Government Unwillingness/Inability to Respond

The clearest indicators of governmental ability and willingness to shield civilians from the worst effects of violence are generally qualitative. Like the supplementary indicators of a

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4 Of these indicators, health and nutrition statistics are inherently quantitative, while the others are qualitative. However, across the period and conflicts of interest here, such statistics are not readily available in comparable, quantitative form. Auvinen and Nafziger (1999) use country-level changes in them as one indicator of complex emergencies, but this precludes the identification of complex emergencies at the sub-national level and thus excludes a number of severe but localized conflicts. Thus, I use evidence that health and nutrition statistics have deteriorated as a confirming indicator of disruption to civilian life, but do not assess the extent of such disruption based on quantitative information about them.
conflict’s disruption to civilian life, they may provide either confirming or mitigating evidence concerning the presence of a complex emergency.

First, evidence that civilians are the intended targets of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses is probably the single best confirming indicator of a government’s unwillingness or inability to respond. In such cases, the government is either the perpetrator – and thus unwilling to protect the population – or the abuse provides evidence of the government’s failure to protect its victims. Likewise, evidence that a government initiates large-scale hostilities in densely populated areas without attempting to remove or protect the population can indicate its lack of concern for civilian welfare.

Further confirming evidence that a government is unable or unwilling to meet civilians’ needs often relates to the accessibility of emergency relief. As OCHA’s (1999) definition of a complex emergency notes, these events tend to involve “the hindrance or prevention of humanitarian assistance by political and military constraints” and “significant risks to humanitarian relief workers in at least some areas.” Relief organizations typically play a vital role in ministering to the needs of conflict-affected populations. Thus, efforts to hinder them, or the failure to effectively protect them, can indicate that a government is unable or unwilling to ensure that civilians’ basic needs are met. Evidence may include official denial of access to external relief organizations; the inability to deliver aid because of fighting, attacks against aid workers, or infrastructure devastation; or aid agency evacuation from conflict regions due to insecurity.

In contrast, evidence that a government is able and willing to respond to a conflict-affected population’s needs may mitigate the effects of disruption to civilian life (and thus potentially indicate that a complex emergency is not occurring). Such evidence may include
international praise for the efforts of the responsible government to respond to the humanitarian crisis, swift and successful efforts to end inter-communal violence, or indications that most displaced persons are adequately cared for.

3. Operational Criteria

Using these indicators, I developed a set of operational guidelines to identify complex emergencies. The fully detailed set of criteria is included in the appendix, but this section briefly discusses the basic questions they address. First, how much disruption to civilian life is required to determine that a complex emergency has begun, is continuing, or has ended? Second, what constitutes an episode of political violence? How do I distinguish one from another when there is a break in violence, a change in belligerents, or multiple conflicts in the same country? Third, is the government unable or unwilling to act on behalf of conflict-affected civilians? Fourth, how do I deal with uncertainty in the information I use to answer these questions?

3.1 Disruption to Civilian Life: Quantitative Thresholds

First, I employ a baseline quantitative threshold to judge a conflict’s disruption of civilian life. To qualify as a complex emergency, a violent political episode must either kill at least 20,000 or forcibly displace at least 500,000 civilians within 5 years or less. I use these two separate thresholds because it is not always possible to obtain reliable information on a single one of these indicators, either overall or in a given year.

Second, I create rules based on proportions of this threshold to determine the onset, continuation, and termination of each complex emergency on an annual basis. For example, for a year to count as the beginning of a complex emergency, it must produce at least 10% of the
baseline of 20,000 deaths or 500,000 displaced persons. A lower proportion (6%) is required for a complex emergency to continue in subsequent years.

These thresholds necessarily exclude some smaller conflicts that otherwise meet my definition of a complex emergency. Such conflicts may include shorter but, on average, equally intense episodes of violence, as well as devastating conflicts in small societies. Therefore, such thresholds require a tradeoff between clarity and inclusiveness.

Other scholars have employed various approaches to dealing with such tradeoffs. Sambanis (2004), for example, has argued in favor of measuring the magnitude of civil wars in per capita terms in order to avoid overlooking significant conflicts in small countries. By contrast, in his work on mass killings, Valentino (2004 p.10-12; see also Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006) intentionally sets a high threshold of deaths to avoid debate about which cases truly reflect the kinds of events he seeks to understand.

Given the limited use of complex humanitarian emergencies in the field to date, I follow Valentino’s approach, emphasizing clarity over inclusiveness. The high quantitative threshold for deaths or displacement should encourage agreement that the events identified as complex emergencies truly involve large-scale civilian suffering. However, while I employ the Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset for statistical analysis in Chapter 5, the case studies offer an opportunity to verify that the theoretical story outlined in Chapter 3 also applies to smaller-scale conflicts. For this purpose, in Chapter 6 I examine Australian responsiveness to a small but devastating civil war centered on the island of Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, between 1988 and 1997.
3.2 Operationalizing Episodes of Political Violence

Additional guidelines operationalize the concept of an episode of political violence. Their purpose is to provide direction on how to distinguish one complex emergency from another where this is not immediately apparent, and on how to determine when apparently related but potentially distinct conflicts should be coded as one, or more, complex emergencies. These guidelines follow largely on coding rules developed by scholars of civil war (eg, Sambanis 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003) for how to deal with issues such as changes in combatant groups or the presence of multiple conflicts in the same country at the same time. Details are in the appendix.

3.3 Incorporating Qualitative Indicators and Accounting for Uncertainty

These quantitative thresholds and guidelines for distinguishing among complex emergencies provide the basic building blocks for identifying these events. Alone, however, they are insufficient. First, they do not incorporate any specific information about a government’s willingness and ability to respond to civilians’ needs. Second, they provide no path for how to proceed where there is uncertainty about whether the quantitative thresholds are met. Third, even conflicts that displace a large number of people do not always generate a severe threat to civilian life.

To address these issues, I developed an additional set of coding schemas to reflect my confidence in the extent to which each conflict I identify as a complex emergency, and each year thereof (or ‘emergency-year’), fully reflects the definition. These schemas integrate both the quantitative thresholds and the available confirming and mitigating qualitative evidence. Overall, given the difficulty of obtaining accurate annual data, this seems a reasonable way to acknowledge and measure the unavoidable uncertainty that remains in the dataset.
These schemas reflect both the extent to which a coding decision depends on supplementary qualitative information, and the extent to which this information either confirms or mitigates a conflict’s severity and the government’s inability or unwillingness to respond to civilians’ needs. In general, where there is significant mitigating evidence, this is reflected in less certainty that the emergency or emergency-year in question truly belongs in the list of complex emergencies. (In some cases this information was clear enough to leave a conflict out of the dataset entirely). Where there is clear confirming evidence, this is reflected in a higher level of certainty that the emergency or emergency-year belongs in the dataset.

In order for interested readers to judge the coding reliability themselves, the associated, online Complex Emergency Coding Notes present the information – quantitative and qualitative – used to make all of the coding decisions, and also describe ambiguous cases, point out missing or contradictory information, and identify the level of certainty for each emergency and emergency-year.\(^5\) The overall coding for each complex emergency is also included with the list of these events later in the chapter.

4. Sources and Identification Process

A wide variety of data sources and a two-step process helped identify the list of complex emergencies. First, I used a number of datasets that provide at least some information about ongoing violence or disruption to civilian life to generate a list of potential complex emergencies. Second, I employed more detailed reports on the extent and nature of the violence in each of these conflicts to determine which ones – and in which years – met the full set of operational criteria.

\(^5\) These coding notes are modeled on Nicholas Sambanis’ “Civil War Coding Notes” (2004).
4.1. Potential Complex Emergencies

Since a complex emergency may occur as part of various kinds of political violence – civil and inter-state war, one-sided violence, and inter-communal violence – available lists of these events served as my starting place in identifying potential complex emergencies. For civil wars I referred to datasets from Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004). For inter-state wars, I referred to the most recent version of the Correlates of War (COW) Project (Sarkees and Schafer 2000). I also referred to several datasets that record certain kinds of atrocity crimes. These included the Political Instability Task Force’s (PITF) Genocide and Politicide Problem Set, with annual data on all genocides and politicides from 1955 to 2009 (Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010); and lists of mass killings by Valentino (2004) and Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat (2006).

In addition, I relied heavily on the Forcibly Displaced Populations (FDP) dataset (2008). This dataset is based primarily on information compiled in the United States Committee for Refugees’ (USCR) annual World Refugee Survey (WRS) series, which since 1965 has reported statistics on populations of refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs based on country of origin and country of asylum or exile.

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6 For Fearon and Laitin’s list of wars, see “Additional Tables for ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,’” available at http://www.stanford.edu/~jfearon/. Accessed 04/01/2009. Sambanis’ list of civil wars is available at http://pantheon.yale.edu/~ns237/index/research.html#Data. Accessed 04/01/2009. Although their criteria are similar, Fearon and Laitin require that to qualify as a civil war, a conflict must have “killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100” (2003 p.76). In contrast, Sambanis requires that a civil war cause at least 500 deaths in the first year and involve sustained violence throughout, with no 3-year period characterized by fewer than 500 deaths (2004 p.829-30).


9 Since 2005, the organization is called the U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI). Where a year is not specified, I use USCR. In addition, the name of the annual report has varied over time, from the World Refugee Report in the 1960s and 1970s, to the World Refugee Survey since 1980. I refer to these reports as the World Refugee Survey, or WRS, regardless of publication year.
The FDP dataset identifies the total number of forcibly displaced persons originating from a given country by year. Because it records stocks, rather than flows, of such persons, it does not reflect the amount of new displacement generated by a conflict in a given year, and some or all of the people it identifies as FDPs in individual years were actually displaced in previous years. Still, the presence of a significant number of displaced people is a strong indicator that violence probably either is or recently was occurring. Thus, the FDP dataset was very useful for identifying potential complex emergencies, especially those not identified by the other datasets because they were very recent or involved inter-communal violence.

Drawing on these datasets, I classified each conflict-year between 1989 and 2009 (or before 1989 if it was part of a conflict that continued thereafter) included in any of the lists of wars or atrocity crimes as a potential complex emergency. For the FDP dataset, I identified

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10 Data are available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. Accessed 02/24/2009. Since 2006, the FDP dataset uses data on IDPs available from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) because the WRS reports stopped reporting this data at that time.

11 Data on stocks of forcibly displaced persons are also available from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). I relied on the FDP dataset for several reasons. First, UNHCR focuses primarily on refugees and so its information on IDPs is not as extensive as USCR’s. Second, although the principal source of statistics on displaced persons in the WRS reports is the UNHCR, USCR supplements UNHCR data with a variety of other sources, including official government data and assessments made during the frequent visits of USCR staff to conflict areas. UNHCR generally only reports on populations to which it has access and provides support—which in turn depends on the willingness of the state hosting the refugees to permit a UNHCR presence. Thus USCR is able to estimate displacement for more countries than UNHCR. Moreover, since 1981, the numbers reported by USCR are systematically different from those reported by UNHCR because the USCR editors have made concerted efforts to separate refugees and asylum seekers in need of a permanent home from those who have been successfully resettled (but may still be recorded in UNHCR statistics). The USCR also weighs the credibility of the various sources of information available to it in making its estimates. While the accuracy of these estimates is still subject to data availability, USCR’s impressive efforts to obtain accurate information from as many sources as possible, about as many refugee situations as possible, make these the better data for my purposes.

12 Although it is more current, I did not use the UCDP/PRI Armed Conflict Dataset to identify potential emergencies because of its low annual threshold of violence (25 battle deaths per year). I did, however, briefly examine this list to verify that the other sources I consulted had not overlooked any major conflicts.

13 Although I focus on the post-Cold War period, some of the Cold War’s worst conflicts persisted and inspired peace operations in the 1990s. To capture these, I include all conflicts that meet the other criteria and were also ongoing in 1989 or later, following the logic described in Michael Gilligan and Stephen John Stedman, "Where Do the Peacekeepers Go?," *International Studies Review* 5, no. 4 (2003).
any country-year that produced 15,000 or more forcibly displaced persons as a potential complex emergency.

There is good reason to have confidence that this process effectively identified all events that meet the definition and basic quantitative criteria of a complex emergency. First, by including all events from two civil war and one inter-state war datasets, three datasets on mass atrocity crimes, and all country-years recognized by the USCR as producing at least 15,000 forcibly displaced persons, the list of potential complex emergencies was purposefully redundant. Encouragingly, most of the events included in the final dataset were identified as potential emergencies by multiple of these sources.

Second, the use of the low threshold in the FDP dataset, in particular, limited the risk of missing any complex emergencies by ensuring that even questionable and borderline cases received consideration. The low threshold identified a significant number of potential complex emergencies that were not included in the eventual list, but it also identified a smaller number of true complex emergencies that were not reflected in the other datasets. Finally, the FDP dataset also helped identify several instances of significant post-war violence that were not captured by the other datasets. ¹⁴

¹⁴ Still, there were some minor drawbacks to using the FDP dataset in this way. First, it records refugee and IDP numbers at the end of each calendar year. Thus, any conflict not identified by the other datasets, and in which significant displacement occurred but fell to fewer than 15,000 at the end of the year, may have been overlooked. Second, it occasionally recorded 0 displaced persons when the associated WRS report noted that people were displaced, but that it was unable to estimate their numbers. Third, when USCR had limited information about an ongoing conflict, it sometimes underestimated the true number of displaced persons, but then updated its estimate in subsequent reports. These updates, however, are not reflected in the FDP dataset. The effect of these limitations should be negligible, however, both because of the redundancy in the process of identifying potential complex emergencies and because I typically read the WRS reports for each potential complex emergency for additional years both before and after those indicated above, as an additional check on the scale and timing of the violence.
4.2. Identifying Complex Emergencies

For each potential complex emergency, I sought additional information about its impact on civilians, and about governmental willingness and ability to shield the population from the worst effects of violence. A variety of sources allowed me to compile the list of actual complex emergencies, and to code my certainty about each one.

First and foremost, I relied on the USCR’s WRS reports (the basis for the FDP dataset). These reports contain yearly country summaries that provide a wealth of detailed information on the political conflicts that generate displacement and on their effects on civilian populations. Across a wide range of countries, these summaries proved to be the most consistent source for information on the key indicators of complex emergencies: annual estimates of civilian deaths and new displacement, the conditions of life for displaced persons, and evidence of government efforts (or lack thereof) to provide for civilians’ basic needs and to facilitate aid agencies’ efforts to do so.

More specifically, these reports discuss such critical information as government and rebel-led campaigns of rights abuses against civilians; shortages of food, water, shelter, and medical care; outbreaks of infectious disease; and elevated malnutrition and mortality rates. They also record government denials of access to relief organizations; attacks on relief workers; and evacuations of aid agencies. Sometimes, they also provide information that indicates that a conflict may not be a complex emergency, such as when most displacement is temporary or most IDPs and refugees are able to quickly integrate into the local economy in their new places of residence—factors that reduce their vulnerability to life-threatening malnutrition and disease. Finally, these reports often provide detailed data about even low-level violence, and report when they are unable to obtain information about the conditions of life for displaced persons.
My second main source of information, especially for the most recent years, was the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC), established in 1998 by the Norwegian Refugee Council. In 2006, USCR stopped reporting information on IDPs in order to focus on refugees and asylum seekers, and began referring readers to the IDMC, which claims to be “the only provider of comprehensive information on all situations of conflict-induced internal displacement worldwide.” Since 2006, the IDMC’s IDP estimates have been incorporated in the FDP dataset, and IDMC’s online database provides comparable information to that contained in the WRS reports prior to 2006.

Finally, for some conflicts, I supplemented the WRS reports and IDMC database with other sources. These included case studies, reports of truth and reconciliation commissions, Human Rights Watch reports, Amnesty International reports, U.S. State Department Human Rights Reports, and Sambanis’ (2004) “Civil War Coding Notes.”

5. Dataset Overview

This process identified 61 complex emergencies that began after or were already ongoing during 1989, for a total of 496 emergency-years. Ten of these (16%) were ongoing at the end of 2009 and 18 (30%) began before 1989. The earliest start year was 1975 (the first civil war in Angola). The 61 complex emergencies occurred in 38 countries, with Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Angola each experiencing at least 3. Finally, while most complex emergencies affected an entire country, a number were limited to a sub-national region such as a province or island, as in Indian-controlled Kashmir or Aceh, Indonesia.

Table 4-1: Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CE Name</th>
<th>Start Year</th>
<th>End Year</th>
<th>Overall Certainty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan II / Civil War</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan II / OEF &amp; After</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India / Kashmir</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India / Northeast</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / Aceh</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / East Timor</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / Moluccas &amp; Sulawesi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar / Burma</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan / Govt. vs. Taliban</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines / Govt. vs. NPA</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines / Govs vs. Islamist Insurgents</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka II</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia / Kosovo</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey / PKK</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR / Azerbaijan - Armenia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia / Chechnya I</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia / Chechnya II</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola III</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda I</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda II (LRA)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire / DRC I</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / North-South civil war</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Southern violence</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia / Civil War</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria / Inter-communal violence</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya / Post-election violence</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru / Shining Path</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds I</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/ Shites</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / US-led coalition</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil war &amp; Israeli invasion</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks I</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks II</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4-1 (above) lists the complex emergencies, along with my certainty from 1 (low) to 3 (high) that they fully reflect both the definition and quantitative thresholds laid out above. Fully 50 of these events meet the highest standard. In the eleven other cases, the uncertainty most often arises from mitigating evidence suggesting that even a conflict that displaces half a million people may not severely threaten civilian life, or that a government has made a serious effort to provide for the civilian population’s basic needs (rather than from uncertainty about the scale of death or displacement). In contrast, the annual coding decisions required much more fine-grained information about yearly deaths and displacement, about which there is much greater uncertainty. There is, therefore, much more variability in these, and much higher reliance on qualitative information. These coding decisions are provided and justified in the Complex Emergency Coding Notes mentioned above.

When compared to the existing datasets of recent complex emergencies discussed at the beginning of the chapter, this list identifies most of the same conflicts, and then some. Compared to the CIA’s list from 1996 (see Väyrynen 1996 p.39), it does not identify Haiti, Georgia, Armenia, Cambodia, or Eritrea as ongoing complex emergencies at that time (though it does identify the last three of these as complex emergencies either previously or later). Compared to Väyrynen’s (1996 p.37) list for the 1993 – 1995 period, it includes all except Mozambique and Ethiopia/Eritrea (both of which I code as complex emergencies until 1992) and also includes all but one of his war-induced ‘simple humanitarian emergencies.’ Of the conflicts identified by Auvinen and Nafziger (1999 p.274) as producing both battle deaths and refugees between 1980 and 1994, it identifies all but one of those (Nicaragua) that continued to do so after 1989. Finally, compared to a list of 14 conflicts with an annual death rate of 1,000 or

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16 The conflict between Ethiopia/Eritrea was part of the Ethiopia/Civil War complex emergency that ends in 1992. When conflict re-erupted in the late 1990s it constituted an inter-state war, since Eritrea had become independent from Ethiopia in 1993.
more as of mid-1996 (O'Hanlon 2003 p.28-29), it includes all but Tajikistan (which, again, is included in previous years but fell below my threshold before 1996). Overall, these comparisons provide validation that the process employed to generate the Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset was consistent with existing ideas about what defines these events.

In conclusion, the ability to identify conflicts characterized by severe civilian suffering that might reasonably prompt a military response is critical to testing the theoretical arguments laid out in Chapter 3 and to answering the questions of interest to this dissertation. The concept of the complex emergency is suited to this purpose because it reflects a conflict’s disruption of civilian life, without reference to who committed the violence or with what intent, and while accounting for its indirect effects.

Since this concept has not been widely used in political science, however, employing it for this purpose required a considerable data collection effort. Other datasets employed in the quantitative political science literature focus either on the direct effects of violence, even though most civilian suffering is caused by starvation and disease, (Eck and Hultman 2007; Lacina and Gleditsch 2005) or exclude devastating conflicts in which civilians were not the primary intended victims of violence (eg, Downes 2007; Easterly, Gatti, and Kurlat 2006; Marshall, Gurr, and Harff 2010; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006; Valentino 2004). They also exclude inter-communal violence, and do not always distinguish between civilian and combatant deaths. Thus, although the list of complex emergencies described in this chapter is subject to certain limitations – as with any significant data collection project – it represents an important contribution to existing data on the effects of conflict on civilians. The next chapter employs this dataset – along with a variety of other original data – to test several of the dissertation’s core theoretical arguments.
6. Appendix 4.1 – Operational Guidelines

1) Ongoing Violence & Disruption to Civilian Life

A) Baseline Threshold

A complex emergency displaces at least 500,000 civilians or generates at least 20,000 civilian deaths due to a combination of the direct and indirect consequences of violence within a period of 5 or fewer years.

B) Annual Thresholds

i) Onset

A complex emergency begins in the first year in which it reaches 10% of the overall threshold – either 50,000 persons displaced or 2,000 civilian deaths, during the year, as a direct or indirect consequence of violence.

ii) Continuation / Termination

A complex emergency continues through each year in which the number of newly displaced civilians or civilian deaths reaches 6% of the overall threshold – either 30,000 newly displaced or 1,200 civilian deaths. Thus, the last year of a complex emergency is the last year that meets either of these criteria, although lower-level violence may continue. This requirement ensures that a single complex emergency is characterized by persistent, sustained violence.

2) Episodes of Political Violence

A) Change in Actors / Political Issues

Since it is defined as an episode of political violence, a complex emergency is identified in part by the actors involved and the political issues at stake. Thus, when there is a fundamental change in the basic political issues or the major actors, a new complex emergency is coded thereafter (as long as all the other characteristics are met by the ensuing violence).

For example, although Afghanistan has experienced no significant break in violence since 1978, 3 identifiable complex emergencies occurred during this time:

1) 1978 – 1992: The basic conflict was between the USSR and its Afghan puppet regime on the one hand, and the US-supported Mujahideen on the other.
2) 1992 – 2001: The basic conflict was between different Afghan groups vying for power with one another.
3) 2001 – Ongoing 2009: The basic conflict was between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the Taliban on the other.
**B) Breaks in Violence**

If a complex emergency experiences a break in violence, a new one begins thereafter if the break in violence lasts a full calendar year (assuming all other criteria are met when violence resumes). If the break in violence is shorter, only a single complex emergency is identified.

**C) Multiple Complex Emergencies in a Country**

When a single country experiences multiple concurrent conflicts, separate complex emergencies are coded if it is possible to identify separate actors in distinct geographical regions, and uniquely identifiable political issues generating the violence (if each conflict also meets all the other criteria). Otherwise, only one complex emergency is coded.

For example, multiple Burmese ethnic groups distributed in different geographic areas have concurrently fought the Burmese government for greater autonomy or independence. These conflicts generate only one complex emergency, however, because a single, consistently applied policy of heavy-handed government treatment of civilians in these regions is primarily responsible for the extent of disruption to civilian life (see the *Complex Emergency Coding Notes* for more information).

In contrast, in Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, the province of Aceh experienced a separatist civil war (1999 – 2004), which – on its own – met all the criteria of a complex emergency. Meanwhile, far away in the Moluccas (1999 – 2002), inter-communal violence between Muslims and Christians separately met all of these criteria. These events are coded as separate complex emergencies.

**D) Cross-Border Violence**

Because complex emergencies are defined in terms of a government’s responsibility to its own citizens, evidence used to identify them must reflect this criteria. Thus, although inter-state conflicts or cross-border insurgencies are in some sense single episodes of political violence, such conflicts are coded as separate complex emergencies if all of the other criteria for a complex emergency are met on each side of an international boundary. Otherwise, a complex emergency is coded only where the conflict’s effects on the population of a single state meet these criteria.

For example, although the Lord’s Resistance Army has attacked and displaced civilians in northern Uganda, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, only in Uganda did this conflict clearly meet the quantitative threshold for a complex emergency (at least, through 2009). Thus only one complex emergency is identified related to this group’s activities, in Uganda.

**3) Incorporating Qualitative Information and Measuring Uncertainty**

To incorporate qualitative information about disruption to civilian life and governmental willingness/ability to respond to the threat to civilians, each complex emergency receives a numerical coding based on a combination of the available qualitative and quantitative
information. This coding measures my certainty about whether each complex emergency fully meets both the quantitative thresholds and the overall definition of a complex emergency. As described below, it goes from 1 to 3, where 1 reflects the greatest uncertainty and 3 reflects the least uncertainty. A second coding – ranging from 1 to 5 – performs the same function for each individual year of each complex emergency.

A) Types of Information

Qualitative information incorporated in these coding schemas is of four basic types. The first two provide either mitigating or confirming evidence about whether or not the responsible government appears to be unwilling or unable to shield civilians from the worst effects of violence, and the last two provide similar information about whether a conflict generates severe disruption to civilian life. Here, where it is clear that the quantitative threshold is met, mitigating evidence can suggest that a complex emergency is not ongoing. Where there is insufficient quantitative evidence to determine whether a conflict (or a given year within it) met the relevant quantitative threshold, confirming qualitative evidence can increase our confidence that it is likely to have done so.

In general, the more the available confirming evidence, and the less the available mitigating evidence, the more likely it is that a complex emergency is occurring. The coding schemes below reflect this basic insight.

i) Governmental Inability/Unwillingness

Mitigating Evidence:
The responsible government’s reaction to the violence appears adequate and appropriate to meet civilians’ needs. Evidence can include international praise for the responsible government; government success at swiftly ending inter-communal violence; or indications that most displaced persons are adequately cared for.

Confirming Evidence:
A concerted campaign of rights abuses directed against the physical security of civilians serves as confirming evidence of a complex emergency. If carried out by the responsible government, we can infer that this government is unwilling to protect civilians. If carried out by another actor, we can infer that the government is unable to protect civilians. Similarly, evidence that a government initiates large-scale hostilities in densely populated areas without attempting to remove or protect vulnerable civilians; or that aid operations are subject to attacks or serious disruption due to insecurity, can serve as confirmation that a government is unable or unwilling to mitigate a conflict’s effects on civilians.

ii) Disruption to Civilian Life

Mitigating Evidence:
Occasionally, a conflict that displaces 500,000 civilians in 5 years may not truly represent a severe threat to civilian life, for reasons other than effective government response. Typically, this occurs where civilians are able to flee large-scale violence of which they are
not the primary targets and also do not experience significant shortages of basic necessities. Evidence that the vast majority of displaced people find housing with individual families (thereby avoiding overcrowded, unsanitary conditions in displaced-person camps) or that almost all displacement is temporary (a few weeks or a couple of months), can thus mitigate a judgment about whether a complex emergency is ongoing.

**Confirming Evidence:**
Evidence of a widespread and potentially life-threatening shortage of access to the basic necessities of subsistence – food, water, health care, and shelter – can serve as confirming evidence that the quantitative threshold for a complex emergency is likely to be met, even if clear quantitative estimates are unavailable. Evidence of widespread malnutrition; starvation; outbreaks of disease related to overcrowding and unsanitary conditions; substantially elevated child or maternal mortality or significantly decreased life expectancy; a large population without shelter; or a large population unreachable by humanitarian aid organizations indicates extensive exposure to the dangerous indirect effects of ongoing violence.

**B) Measuring Overall Uncertainty**

**Coding of 1:** A conflict meets the overall quantitative threshold for a complex emergency, but there is significant mitigating evidence – either about the government’s ability / willingness to respond to civilians’ needs, or about the extent of disruption to civilian life – to suggest that it may not truly reflect the definition.

*Example:* Israel’s 2006 war against Lebanon, in which the vast majority of displaced people were able to return home quickly (see Complex Emergency Coding Notes).

**Coding of 2:** Quantitative estimates are unclear about whether the overall threshold for a complex emergency is met. There may be multiple competing estimates, or available ones may be slightly below the threshold. However, there is confirming qualitative evidence to suggest that the available quantitative estimates may significantly underestimates the true extent of disruption to civilian life. In general, these events appear to be consistent with the definition of a complex emergency, and there is good reason to suspect that the quantitative threshold is met.

*Example:* Iraqi suppression of Shiites, 1990s (see Complex Emergency Coding Notes).

**Coding of 3:** There is clear evidence that civilian deaths and/or displacement met the quantitative threshold, and no significant mitigating evidence. This represents the highest level of certainty that a conflict reflects the definition.

*Example:* Sierra Leone’s civil war, 1991 – 2001 (see Complex Emergency Coding Notes).

**C) Measuring Annual Uncertainty**

**Coding of 1:** There is evidence that the quantitative threshold is met, but there is significant mitigating evidence – either about the government’s ability / willingness to respond to
civilians’ needs, or about the extent of disruption to civilian life – to suggest that it may not truly reflect the definition.

*Emergency-years coded 1 may not truly reflect the definition of a complex emergency.*

**Coding of 2:** There is *either* some quantitative, *or* some confirming qualitative evidence of an ongoing complex emergency, but it is unclear whether the quantitative threshold for onset or continuation is met. Specifically, there is at least one major confirming qualitative indicator, or at least one of two kinds of quantitative information:

1) There is some new displacement and/or civilian deaths, but it is unclear whether they exceed the relevant threshold (such as when ‘Tens of thousands were displaced during the year’).

2) There is a single estimate for deaths or displacement over multiple years that include the year in question, where the average number displaced or killed over this period exceeds the relevant quantitative threshold. For example, if there are an estimated 50,000 deaths over 5 years (including the emergency-year in question), the average is 10,000 / year, well over the threshold for onset (2,000) or continuation (1,200). If this is the only information for any of these years, they are coded ‘2.’

*Emergency-years coded 2 reflect good reason to suspect a complex emergency is ongoing, but the clarity of the available evidence is limited.*

**Coding of 3:** There is at least *some* quantitative evidence of a complex emergency, *and* this is supplemented with at least some confirming qualitative evidence. Specifically, there is at least one of the two kinds of quantitative information just described, *and* at least one confirming qualitative indicator.

*Emergency-years coded 3 reflect considerable evidence of an ongoing complex emergency, but there is some doubt about whether the relevant threshold is attained.*

**Coding of 4:** There is at least *some* quantitative evidence that a complex emergency is ongoing, *and* this is supplemented by multiple forms of confirming qualitative evidence. Specifically, there is at least one of the two kinds of quantitative information just described, and at least two confirming qualitative indicators.

*Emergency-years coded 4 reflect strong evidence of an ongoing complex emergency.*

**Coding of 5:** There is clear evidence that the relevant quantitative threshold (for onset or continuation) is met and no significant mitigating evidence. Thus, the onset year is coded ‘5’ if there is clear evidence of 50,000 newly displaced or 2,000 civilian deaths. Each subsequent year is coded ‘5’ if there is clear evidence of 30,000 newly displaced or 1,200 civilian deaths.

*Emergency-years coded 5 reflect a very high level of confidence that a complex emergency is ongoing.*
Chapter 5 – Quantitative Evidence

This chapter employs several sources of original data to test core elements of the theory laid out in Chapter 3. In addition to the Post-Cold War Complex Humanitarian Emergencies dataset described in Chapter 4, I collected detailed information on contributions to all of the peace operations that responded to these complex emergencies by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and – regionally – Australia. I also devised an original measure of public concern about these conflicts in these four democracies that harnesses changes in elite news coverage to proxy for public reactions to the outbreak of violence.

The first section of the chapter reviews the empirical expectations described in Chapter 3 and identifies the four key hypotheses that I test here. The second section introduces the data, in particular explaining and justifying the construction of the key aspects of the dependent variable and the measure of public concern. The first two of the chapter’s three appendices contain coding notes that clarify the specific coding decisions associated with these variables.

The third and fourth sections of the chapter present and assess the evidence in support of the hypotheses, first through a preliminary review of bivariate patterns in the data and then through a series of statistical tests. The results provide strong support for the theory’s main predictions. First, I find that the “true protection capacity” of powerful democracies’ responses to complex emergencies increases as the challenges of the operational environment become less dominant relative to the concern that citizens express about the conflict.

I also find considerable evidence to support my expectations about the conditions under which leaders are most likely to make different types of contributions to these missions. First, the curvilinear relationship between the probability of contributions dominated by a resources-
instructions gap and the extent of public concern (relative to the operational environment) anticipated by the theory is clearly evident. This finding supports my claim that such contributions should be most likely when leaders’ competing incentives to protect civilians while keeping costs low are most at odds.

In addition, the data support my prediction that prospects for the most robust, protection-oriented contributions will increase as a function of this same relationship between public concern and the operational environment. Indeed, I find that such contributions become far more likely where public concern is greatest relative to the operational environment’s challenges and perils. Finally, the chapter’s third appendix presents some additional graphs and robustness checks that further support these findings.

1. Hypotheses

Chapter 3 outlined my expectations about the relationship between the competing domestic political pressures faced by a powerful democratic leader and her decisions about when and how to contribute to peace operations in complex emergencies.

First, I defined such a leader’s contribution in terms of two key components – soldiers’ protection instructions, and the resources she makes available to pursue them. I use these components, in turn, to describe two core facets of the contribution’s quality (at least as regards its capacity to contribute to effective civilian protection). These include 1) its true protection capacity as represented by its less ambitious component and 2) the gap – if any – between the two. Based on these characteristics, I divide contributions into three basic types: limited, dominated by a resources-instructions gap, and robust.

Second, I identified two key variables that together define the essential domestic political dilemma that a leader confronts in trying to decide whether – and if so, how – to contribute to a
peace operation. These include the political pressure generated by the concerned citizens I refer to as the humanitarian public, and the operational environment, which determines how costly and dangerous contributing is likely to be in a given complex emergency. The leader’s dilemma is least stark when one of these two forces clearly dominates the other, and most stark when the tension between them is greatest.

To represent this idea, I conceived of a spectrum defined by the ratio of the amount of public concern about a complex emergency, to the relative difficulty of the operational environment for a peace operation there. For the lowest values of this ratio, the challenges of the operational environment are greatest relative to pressure from the humanitarian public, and thus most likely to dominate. For the highest values, pressure from the humanitarian public is greatest relative to the anticipated costs of intervening. Because peace operations are always at least somewhat costly and risky, in practice it is more difficult for public concern ever to truly dominate the operational environment. At the highest values on this spectrum, however, it comes closest to doing so. Finally, the tension between competing domestic political pressures is greatest between these extremes, and the leader’s dilemma about how to resolve them is thus most difficult.

In this chapter, I investigate four hypotheses about the relationships between a leader’s domestic political dilemma as represented through this spectrum (which I call Public Concern/Operational Environment), and her contributions to peace operations. The first of these concerns the idea of true protection capacity, as determined by the less ambitious of the leader’s resource commitment and soldiers’ protection instructions. As noted in Chapter 3, I expect to observe a positive relationship between true protection capacity and the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment.
The remaining hypotheses concern the conditions under which we should be most likely to observe the three basic types of contributions, or alternatively, none at all. As indicated in Chapter 3, I expect to find a generally negative relationship between the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment and the probability that a leader makes either a limited, or no, contribution. I expect to observe these two outcomes under similar circumstances, among lower values of Public Concern/Operational Environment.

Second, I expect to observe the most sizeable resources-instructions gaps when the humanitarian public generates substantial but not overwhelming pressure about a complex emergency, relative to the difficulties of the operational environment. If this is correct, as also illustrated in Chapter 3, there should be a curvilinear relationship between the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment and the probability that a leader makes a contribution dominated by such a gap. This hypothesis thus speaks directly to the second core aspect of contribution quality as defined here.

Finally, robust contributions with both adequate protection instructions and resource commitments with significant capacity to pursue them should be most likely where pressure from the humanitarian public is greatest relative to concerns about anticipated challenges in the operational environment. Thus, I anticipate a positive relationship between the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment and the probability of observing these contributions.

2. Data

2.1 Observations

The dataset I use to assess the evidence for these hypotheses includes 167 observations defined by one powerful democracy (or ‘potential intervener’) and one complex emergency.
Although it is based on the list of 61 complex emergencies identified in Chapter 4, it excludes a number of potential observations.

First, I exclude cases in which the potential intervener clearly lacked the capacity to lead a peace operation, or in which its military actions helped to generate the complex emergency. These restrictions help to ensure that for each observation, the potential intervener is truly responding to a foreign crisis that it did not create, and has the capacity to substitute among a wide range of responses and choices about the design of any potential peace operation. Practically, the first restriction means that the only observations for which Australia is the potential intervener involve the seven complex emergencies that occurred in its own region. As discussed in Chapter 2, I operate on the assumption that the other three states could, though with varying degrees of difficulty, lead a peace operation in response to any of the complex emergencies. The second restriction, meanwhile, leads to the exclusion of certain potential observations involving complex emergencies in Afghanistan after 2001; Iraq after 2003; and Pakistan beginning in 2004.\(^1\) I also exclude observations involving Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait.\(^2\)

Finally, it was not possible to construct the measure of public concern for 14 otherwise relevant observations involving France as the potential intervener, and so these observations are also excluded due to missing data (see discussion of Public Concern below). I do, however,\(^1\) Specifically, because the U.S., UK, and France all contributed to Operation Enduring Freedom, all observations involving Afghanistan post-2001 are excluded from the analysis; likewise, because the U.S. and UK initiated the war in Iraq, observations involving that complex emergency are excluded for both of them; and finally, because the U.S. urged the Pakistani government to go to war with the Taliban in 2004, the observation involving that complex emergency is excluded for the U.S.\(^2\) Although Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait prompted sufficient displacement to qualify as a complex emergency and the potential interveners played no role in causing it, their subsequent involvement in the Persian Gulf War does not meet my definition of a peace operation. Although observations involving this complex emergency are excluded from the analyses below, including them does not alter the results.

---

1. Specific details of the restrictions are as follows:
2. Additional details on the restrictions include:
include them in my description of the universe of contributions to peace operations below (where there are thus 181 observations).

Once these restrictions are accounted for, the remaining observations I use to assess the hypotheses include 57 for the United States, 58 for the UK, 45 for France, and 7 for Australia.

2.2 Dependent Variable

2.2.1 Peace Operations

To construct the different elements of the dependent variable, for each observation I collected information on the two key components of contributions to peace operations – the resources committed and soldiers’ protection instructions (as reflected in their operational goals and military strategies).

To initiate this process, I identified all the military missions that meet the definition of a peace operation laid out in Chapter 2 and that deployed no later than the year after the end of a complex emergency. Operations to evacuate foreign nationals, protect national assets, or intervene on behalf of one side in a conflict were excluded unless they also met these criteria, as were civilian peace support missions. In addition, personnel did not need to be deployed to the territory where a complex emergency occurred, as long as they responded to its effects. For example, because it was deployed largely to help protect refugees from Darfur, the EU’s 2008-09 mission in Chad and the Central African Republic (EUFOR Chad/CAR) counts as a response to that complex emergency. Finally, a few peace operations were already deployed at the outbreak of a complex emergency (in response to previous violence). I included these as long as they continued to encourage peace and security in response to the changing circumstances.

Table 5-1 lists all the operations I identified, by complex emergency. Those to which none of the potential interveners contributed (and which are thus not directly relevant) are
identified in italics. Missions authorized after a complex emergency ends include the year in parentheses. Just over half the complex emergencies (32 out of 61) experienced at least one peace operation. Of these, in only two cases – the Philippine government’s struggle against a series of Islamist insurgent groups (most notably the Moro Islamic Liberation Front), and the first civil war in Sri Lanka – did the four potential interveners play no role, at least through 2009.³

2.2.2 Components

Next, for each peace operation, I coded each potential intervener’s resource commitment and the soldiers’ protection instructions on a scale of 1 to 3. As Table 5-1 reflects, a number of complex emergencies involved multiple peace operations and thus, generated multiple separate contributions by certain potential interveners. I coded each such contribution separately, but as discussed below, only examine one contribution per observation in the statistical analysis. Where there is no contribution to a peace operation, I code both components as 0. Appendix 1 contains the information, sources, and analysis used to make each of these coding decisions.

³ Though see Appendix 1, part A for details on other involvement in the Philippines and post-2009 developments.
Table 5-1: Peace Operations by Complex Emergency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CE Name</th>
<th>Start year</th>
<th>End year</th>
<th>Associated Peace Operations*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan II / Civil war</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan II/ OEF &amp; after</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Excluded from Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>UNAMIC; UNTAC (1992)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India / Kashmir</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India / Northeast</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / Aceh</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / East Timor</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>INTERFET; UNTAET (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / Moluccas &amp; Sulawesi</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar / Burma</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan / Govt. vs. Taliban</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 Excluded from Analysis for USA only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines / Govt. vs. NPA</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines / Govt. vs. Islamist Insurgents</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 IMT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>IPKF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka II</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>UNPROFOR/NATO support; Deliberate Force; IFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia / Kosovo</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia / Chechnya I</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia / Chechnya II</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ECOMOG; UNOMISIL; UNAMSIL; Op. Palliser (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ECOMOG; UNOMIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>UNMIL; ECOMIL; JTF Liberia (US)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>OM9; AMIB; OMUB; SAPSD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>UNAVEM I; UNAVEM II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola III</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 UNOSOM I; Provide Relief; UNITAF; UNOSOM II; AMISOM; Anti-Piracy efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda I</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda II (LRA)</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire / DRC I</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 MONUC; Artemis (EU); EUFOR RD-Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ECOMICI; MINUCI; UNOCI; Op. Licorne (Fr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>MOG/NMOG I, II; UNOMUR; UNAMIR; Op. Turquoise (Fr); Support Hope (US) UNMIS (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / North-South civil war</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 AMIS; UNAMID; EUFOR TCHAD/RCA; MINURCAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Southern violence</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 UNMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War w/ Ethiopia</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia / Civil War</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria / Inter-communal violence</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya / Post-election violence</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru / Shining Path</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds I</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Provide Comfort; UNGCI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Shites</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Southern Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Excluded from Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / US-led coalition</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>2009 Excluded from Analysis for USA &amp; UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil war &amp; Israeli invasion</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>MNF, UNIFIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks II</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Protection Instructions

To code each operation’s protection instructions, I drew on the guidelines developed in Chapter 2 as well as specific information about the complex emergency to assess both the mission’s goals and the suitability of the military strategies it used to pursue them. For the former, I examined operational mandates and, where these were unavailable or inconclusive, case study accounts for evidence about the tasks soldiers actually pursued. To assess military strategies, I considered available information about the kinds of forces that were deployed and how they were used.

Where a potential intervener contributed to a peace operation, I identified three categories of protection instructions: 1 represents little to no effort at civilian protection; 2 represents some, but still insufficient, effort; and 3 represents an operation that employs both protection goals appropriate to conditions on the ground and military strategies suited to achieving them.

More specifically, I coded protection instructions as 1 for any mission with goals that fall exclusively to the left of the dotted line in the “Spectrum of Civilian Protection” from Chapter 2 (Figure 2-1). These generally fit the description of an observer mission or traditional peacekeeping operation, and do not authorize troops to provide security or protection for either the delivery of humanitarian relief or for civilians directly.

Second, I coded protection instructions as 2 in two sorts of cases. I did so, first, if a mission’s goals involved at least some protection (to the right of the dotted line in the “Spectrum of Civilian Protection”), but nevertheless appeared clearly insufficient to address civilians’ most pressing needs. As noted in Chapter 2, such cases might involve authorizing soldiers only to protect aid organizations or only to protect civilians encountered in immediate danger, in an environment of mass killing.
I also coded some protection if a mission’s goals were ostensibly ambitious enough to meet civilians’ protection needs, but if it employed inappropriate military strategies for meeting those goals (such as restrictive rules of engagement or the exclusive use of air power where civilians were threatened by attacks on the ground). For example, missions with Chapter VI UN mandates that purported to undertake ambitious protection tasks (such as UNPROFOR in Bosnia) were coded 2 for lack of appropriate rules of engagement, as were those with Chapter VII mandates that were nevertheless designed to restrict soldiers’ capacity to protect civilians (such as UNAMID in Darfur – see Chapter 7). Such strategies effectively reduce the protection that soldiers are asked to provide, relative to the goals they announce.

Finally, I coded protection instructions as 3 wherever a mission’s goals appeared ambitious enough to meet civilians’ most pressing security needs, and where I found no evidence of military strategies that restricted soldiers’ ability to pursue these goals. In most cases, this required that protecting civilians directly or defeating the perpetrators of violence was a main goal, and that soldiers were authorized to pursue the most ambitious kinds of protection tasks. In some instances, however – notably where civilians were not the primary targets of a campaign of atrocity crimes and their primary security and protection needs revolved around access to humanitarian relief – operations with other goals also met this standard. For example, the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) that deployed to Somalia in 1992-93 pursued a primary goal of providing security for aid operations, a choice that was perfectly sensible given the prevailing conditions in Somalia at the time.4

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4 For more on UNITAF, see the discussion in Appendix 1, part B.
Resources

To code potential interveners’ commitments of resources to these missions, I developed three categories that are intended to reflect, as far as possible, approximately the same capacity to contribute to civilian protection as the three levels of protection instructions. I identified each resource commitment as 1 if it involved at most logistical or financial support to troops from other countries or a token contribution of up to 50 military observers or liaison officers; 2 if it involved up to 1,000 of the potential intervener’s own personnel; and 3 if it involved 1,000 or more of its own personnel.

These distinctions, though somewhat rough, reflect important differences in the level of security and protection that the potential interveners considered here can anticipate helping to promote through their choice of resource commitments. With a few exceptions (discussed below), when they contribute at most financial or logistical support or a few observers, the high quality of their own troops can do relatively little to enhance an operation’s protection capacity. Certainly this is true when they provide financial support alone. Such support – though it may be used for necessary equipment, to pay soldiers, or for a number of other important purposes – can typically only alter many other critical aspects of a mission (such as soldiers’ preparedness for ambitious protection tasks, command and control, and operational planning and intelligence capabilities) at the margins, if at all. The same is typically true of logistical support, such as aid with transport and strategic lift. Training and technical advice may have a bigger effect, but even so, it is difficult to achieve significant changes in a short time. For all these reasons, assistance that does not engage a powerful democracy’s own personnel directly in a peace operation’s core tasks typically has at best limited capacity to overcome any significant limitations of the troops it
is intended to support. As Chapter 7 discusses in depth, Western support for AMIS in Darfur offers an excellent example of the limited impact of such forms of assistance.

In contrast, by contributing a limited number – identified here as up to 1,000 – of its own forces to participate in a peace operation, a powerful democracy can expect to substantially enhance the mission’s capacity to provide at least some security. Units of this size can help to protect narrowly defined geographic areas or humanitarian relief facilities. They can also augment the capabilities of a larger number of troops from other countries, including by playing critical roles that other force contributors cannot in areas such as intelligence and communications. They are, however, typically too few to implement the most ambitious protection strategies, such as the creation and defense of safe zones or the defeat of the perpetrators of violence against civilians.5

Finally, when a potential intervener contributes over 1,000 of its own personnel, this typically indicates an even greater capacity to contribute to ambitious protection, even if only in a limited geographic area. Although far more than 1,000 troops would be needed for this purpose in many complex emergencies, this seems a reasonable minimum for the top contribution level for two reasons. First, as above, 1,000 troops from a highly capable democracy can play a major role in augmenting the capabilities of a larger force that includes troops from other countries. Second, on their own or in combination with a small number of similarly well-prepared troops, they can sometimes be sufficient to carry out even the most ambitious protection tasks. In recent years, contributions of approximately this size – such as the UK’s Operation Palliser in Sierra Leone in 2000 and the French commitment to Operation

5 The distinction between up to 50 observers or liaison officers (coded 1) and slightly more (coded 2) may seem arbitrary, as the difference in capabilities between, say, 50 and 100 soldiers is not large. In practice, however, the distinction works well, as the vast majority of contributions of less than 1000 personnel are nevertheless much greater than 50. There is, for example, only one between 50 and 100 (Australia in UNAMIC – see Appendix 1).
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 – have indeed represented the minimum for operations entrusted with fairly ambitious protection instructions.

2.2.3 Coding True Protection Capacity and Contribution Type

After coding the two key components of each contribution, I used the information they contain to construct the key facets of the dependent variable discussed above and in Chapter 3. First, for each contribution True Protection Capacity ranges from 1 to 3 and reflects the less ambitious of its two components. Thus, it is only coded 3 when both protection instructions and resources are coded 3. Contributions with True Protection Capacity of 1 or 2 may be balanced – with each component equally ambitious – or there may be a gap between the two.

Second, I created a variable called Contribution Type by identifying each contribution as one of the three basic kinds discussed in Chapter 3 – limited, robust, or dominated by a resources-instructions gap. Where both resources and protection instructions were coded 1, or where both were coded 2, I labeled a contribution as limited. In the first case, soldiers neither seek to offer civilian protection, nor does the potential intervener provide sufficient resources to substantially enhance their capacity to do so. In the second case, soldiers both seek to offer some protection (though less than would be adequate given civilians’ most pressing needs), and the potential intervener offers enough resources to provide at least some security.

I identified contributions as dominated by a resources-instructions gap when there was a difference between my coding of their two components. Although a few contributions involve gaps of 2 (that is, one component is coded 1 and the other 3), most involve gaps of 1 (one component is coded 1 and the other 2, or one is coded 2 and the other 3). Given this limited variation, the analysis below treats all of these gaps equally. Finally, I identified contributions as
robust if both components were coded 3. Such contributions overlap exactly with those that have a true protection capacity of 3.

It is important to point out here that though it incorporates information about both aspects of a contribution’s quality, *Contribution Type* cannot be taken as an ordered measure of such quality. In particular, contributions dominated by a resources-instructions gap may or may not be of higher quality than limited ones, depending on their true protection capacity (and how we might decide to weight the relative importance of protection capacity and resources-instructions gaps in determining quality).

Next, since potential interveners often contributed to more than one peace operation in response to the same complex emergency, for each observation I identified what I call the ‘defining’ contribution, which I then used to code a single value of *True Protection Capacity* and *Contribution Type*. As noted above, where the potential intervener made no contribution to any peace operation, both equal 0. For the remaining observations, I used two rules of thumb to identify defining contributions for *Contribution Type*, plus one more for *True Protection Capacity*.

First, wherever a potential intervener made both a limited contribution and one that was either robust or dominated by a resources-instructions gap, the defining contribution(s) are based on the latter. For example, in Croatia each potential intervener sent troops to participate in UNPROFOR/UNCRO, and then financially supported two follow-on UN missions. The defining operation in each case is UNPROFOR/UNCRO.

Second, wherever a potential intervener made both a robust contribution and one dominated by a resources-instructions gap, I used whichever came first. For example, in Kosovo

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6 Where multiple contributions have the same coding, this may actually be a defining group of contributions, rather than one.
all three potential interveners contributed first to Operation Allied Force (gap-dominated, true protection capacity of 2) and then to KFOR (robust, true protection capacity of 3). The defining contribution in each case is Allied Force.\(^7\)

Third, these two rules provide no guidance for coding *True Protection Capacity* in the small number of observations where a potential intervener made multiple, separate gap-dominated contributions with different levels of protection capacity. To do so, I use whichever has the greatest protection capacity.\(^8\)

### 2.2.4 Overview: True Protection Capacity and Contribution Type

Figures 5-1 and 5-2 show the distribution of *True Protection Capacity* across the observations. Figure 5-1 includes all observations, while Figure 5-2 includes only those for which the potential intervener made at least some contribution to a peace operation (89 out of 181, or nearly half). Among these, about two-thirds involved the lowest level of protection capacity, and only 11% involved the highest level.\(^9\)

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\(^7\) An alternative plausible rule would be to choose the more robust contribution as the defining one. This would affect the coding of 4 observations: the three involving Kosovo, plus France’s response to Darfur. For each, the switch to a more robust operation was a response to the failure of the initial policy to address civilians’ security needs. For testing the theory, I believe it makes more sense to focus on the initial (but still significant) effort. Nevertheless, I created versions of *True Protection Capacity* and *Contribution Type* that change the value for these four observations, and which I use as a robustness check.

\(^8\) For example, the UK made a gap-dominated contribution with a true protection capacity of 1 to MONUC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as one with a true protection capacity of 2 to Operation Artemis. I code *True Protection Capacity* = 2 for that observation.

\(^9\) These figures are based on all 181 observations, including the 14 involving France for which there are missing data on the key independent variable and that are excluded from the analysis below. The distributions for the 167 observations that exclude those cases, however, are practically identical.
Figure 5-1: *True Protection Capacity* (All Observations)

![Bar chart showing the distribution of True Protection Capacity for all observations.]

- No Contribution: 51 observations
- True Capacity = 1: 31 observations
- True Capacity = 2: 12 observations
- True Capacity = 3: 6 observations

Figure 5-2: *True Protection Capacity* (Observations with Contributions)

![Bar chart showing the distribution of True Protection Capacity for contributions.]

- Capacity = 1: 64 observations
- Capacity = 2: 25 observations
- Capacity = 3: 11 observations
In addition, Figures 5-3 and 5-4 show the distribution of *Contribution Type*. As above, Figure 5-3 includes all observations while Figure 5-4 includes only those that saw some contribution. As these graphs suggest, gap-dominated contributions are remarkably common, occurring in over half of all observations involving at least one contribution to a peace operation. What is more, if we consider only observations in which the potential intervener made at least some gesture toward civilian protection (in the two right-hand columns), those where the defining contribution is gap-dominated occur at nearly five times the rate of those where it is robust.¹⁰

**Figure 5-3: Contribution Type (All Observations)**

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¹⁰ What is more, given the relatively rough coding schemas I employ, smaller differences between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection not identified here are surely even more common.
Still, there is reason to think that in practice, perhaps not all of these gaps actually enable a difference between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. In particular, when a powerful democracy supports a peace operation where one of the other three potential interveners has taken a lead role, any contribution she makes seems more likely to enhance the mission’s protection capacity than to help enable a gap between its means and goals. For example, when France and the UK contributed to the Australian-led INTERFET in East Timor in 1999, even the relatively limited resources they committed helped to augment the otherwise capable Australian force.

To locate contributions that might have played this more useful role, I identified all of those where another potential intervener made a concurrent robust commitment to the same peace operation or to another one that was cooperating with it. Of all the observations labeled as
dominated by a resources-instructions gap, 17% of them (8 of 47) fit these criteria. Among these, we cannot be confident that a gap between a contribution’s components is likely to enable a resources-instructions gap on the ground.

To account for this issue, I created an adjusted version of Contribution Type that I use for much of the analysis below, and which recodes these contributions as limited or robust. Even so, the defining contribution remains gap-dominated 44% of the time.

Finally, another way to assess the frequency of gaps between protection instructions and resource commitments, of course, is to examine all contributions to peace operations, rather than only one per observation. Doing so reveals that gap-dominated contributions occur at rates very similar to those discussed above: 55% (100 of 182 total contributions) if we do not adjust for those in support of another potential intervener, and about 42% if we do.12

2.3 Independent Variables

2.3.1 Public Concern

To proxy for public pressure to respond to a complex emergency I developed a measure

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11 Among the 167 observations included in the statistical analysis, this is 8 out of 44 (18%).
12 To calculate these numbers, I proceeded as follows: First, to arrive at 182 total contributions, for each peace operation I counted a single contribution for each potential intervener that participated in some way, with two exceptions. First, for the few operations that spanned multiple complex emergencies (UNMIS, UNAVEM II, and UNIFIL), I counted separate contributions for each complex emergency. Second, for operations whose protection instructions changed in the middle of a complex emergency, I counted separate contributions before and after (this applied, notably, to UNAMIR and MONUC). Although such missions retain the same name, when their basic contours shift, continuing to participate is an explicit choice that can affect a contribution’s status as limited, gap-dominated, or robust. In this sense, such a change is comparable to a choice to replace one operation with another of a different name.

Second, to adjust for gap-dominated observations that may not truly promote resource-instructions gaps on the ground, I considered not only whether another potential intervener made a robust contribution, but also whether 1) the same state previously or concurrently made a more robust contribution (this affected UNTAET in East Timor and French contributions in Côte d’Ivoire) or 2) a mission focused on the most ambitious protection tasks was unnecessary, and a major contribution to civilian protection with less than 1,000 personnel thus possible (this primarily affects recent NATO and EU naval operations near Somalia). Together these circumstances affected 24 of 100 contributions, and redistributing these as limited or robust leaves 76 gap-dominated contributions out of 182 total, or 42%.
called Public Concern, based on elite media coverage of these conflicts in the potential interveners. In quantifying this concept, I seek to overcome a limitation of the existing literature, whereby quantitative studies of peacekeeping – including those that focus on individual states’ contributions – have neglected the influence of domestic political pressures that has featured prominently in qualitative work on humanitarian intervention. One reason for this oversight, presumably, has been a lack of appropriate data. Although organizations like the Pew Research Center conduct polls on attitudes toward the use of force in particular conflicts, such polls are only conducted for conflicts that attract considerable public and media attention. They thus do not provide a good source of data on public concern across the full range of conflicts where civilian protection might be justifiable on humanitarian grounds.

A measure based on media coverage represents a reasonable alternative, but requires attention to some important methodological concerns. In brief, the literature on media, public opinion, and the use of force emphasizes that when foreign conflicts are covered in the news, this coverage can reflect one of two basic patterns. First, it may echo official policy or interest among elite decision-makers (e.g., Mermin 1997). In the present context, such coverage may reflect a leader’s efforts to generate public support for a mission she already plans to undertake.

Second, and in contrast, under certain conditions groups and individuals who are opposed to official policy can use the media to advocate for alternatives. For example, armed with credible information about a conflict, they may be able to challenge a leader inclined toward intervention (Powlick and Katz 1998; Western 2005). Opportunities to do so are greatest when journalists are able to frame the issue in a compelling and culturally resonant way, such as when the policy issue is ambiguous and when opponents of official policy are motivated and politically influential (Entman 2004 p.18).
These arguments similarly imply that in the context of a complex emergency where a leader is otherwise reluctant to intervene, informed and motivated activists and journalists can use the media to make a case in favor of a vigorous response. Indeed, Entman (2004) sees such conflicts (citing Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as examples) as precisely the kind of ambiguous issues where opportunities for non-governmental actors to oppose official policy through the media are relatively great. Moreover, Bass (2008) has documented this very pattern of media coverage in some of the 19th and early 20th centuries’ worst humanitarian crises. American advocacy on Darfur provides a more recent example: the growth of U.S. media coverage of the conflict tracked the mounting strength and outreach efforts of the Darfur advocacy movement, peaking well after the worst of the violence (eg, Hamilton 2011 p.101-2; Cockett 2010 p.215). Finally, these findings also resonate with various claims and evidence that media coverage is an important indicator of public concern about foreign conflicts (eg, Regan 2000), and that leaders perceive it as such (Entman 2000 p.21; Holsti 2004 p.302; Kull and Ramsay 2000 p.105; La Balme 2002 p.86-90, 96).

In sum, where a government plans to contribute to a peace operation, media coverage is likely to reflect its efforts to generate public support. But when activists, journalists, and other concerned citizens mobilize to push for civilian protection, we should see more media coverage that reflects pressure on a reluctant government to act. Using media reporting to proxy for public concern about a conflict thus depends on the ability to separate these two patterns of coverage. This is precisely what my measure seeks to do, isolating news coverage during periods when it is likely to reflect such concern and not a leader’s efforts to generate support for an interventionist policy agenda.
Specifically, I used headline news searches from one major elite newspaper in each potential intervener to measure the natural log of the ratio of average annual news coverage during a complex emergency (but before any decision to intervene) to average coverage of the same place over the five years before the complex emergency. That is,

$$Public\ Concern = \ln \left( \frac{\text{Average annual headline hits during CE}}{\text{Average annual headline hits, 5 years before CE}} \right)$$

I then transformed these values to range from 0 at the low end to 1 at the high end.\(^{13}\)

Insofar as possible I exclude coverage during the lead-up to a decision about contributing to a peace operation in order to eliminate active discussion of anticipated military action. Still, I try to include coverage from key periods in a complex emergency that might have influenced public concern. Finally, by constructing the measure as the ratio of coverage during to before a complex emergency, I seek to avoid having more geopolitically significant conflicts appear to generate more concern simply because they occur in places that tend to receive more coverage.

*Public Concern* thus reflects public reactions to the violence associated with complex emergencies while taking precautions against reflecting the influence of leaders’ efforts to sway public opinion, coverage of ongoing or upcoming operations, or the geopolitical importance of the places where these conflicts occur. If anything, it likely under-estimates public concern where leaders contribute to peace operations by excluding a considerable amount of the news coverage that reflects such concern in order to avoid also reflecting these other issues.

A brief investigation suggests that *Public Concern* appears to do a fairly good job of reflecting the forces it is intended to capture while excluding those it is not. First, many of the complex emergencies known for attracting extensive interest and generating pressure on leaders

\(^{13}\) To eliminate excessive (and unrepresentative) high values caused by very low pre-complex emergency coverage for some observations (in some cases, less than 1 hit per year), I also added 5 to the annual average in the denominator. See Appendix 2, part A, for further discussion.
to respond – including in Darfur, Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, and Northern Iraq in 1991 (Iraq/Kurds II) – take on some of the highest values. Figure 5-5 shows this for all observations involving the United States as the potential intervener, but the pattern is similar for the others.\footnote{Also, comparable results across slightly different search terms suggest that the results are not highly sensitive to the specific term used. For more information see Appendix 2, part B.}

Figure 5-5: Public Concern (United States as Potential Intervener)
Still, it could be that *Public Concern* largely reflects other forces – such as various strategic and geopolitical issues – that could prompt both increased news coverage of complex emergencies and contributions to peace operations. In general, however, this does not appear to be the case. In Figure 5-5, for example, Northern Iraq’s high rank could be related to the fact that it invoked not only significant public concern, but also important strategic interests for the U.S. Complex emergencies in several other places that invoke similar interests, however – such as in Turkey and the Philippines – rank quite low.

More generally, Table 5-2 presents the correlation coefficients for *Public Concern* and several strategic relationships that might have such an effect, as well as for average annual news coverage before the outbreak of a complex emergency (the denominator of *Public Concern*). The strategic relationships include indicators for whether the potential intervener and the state where a complex emergency occurs 1) shared a colonial relationship, 2) are in the same geographic region, or 3) are allies; and 4) for whether the potential intervener has an ally contiguous to the complex emergency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Concern</th>
<th>Former Colony</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Contiguous Ally</th>
<th>Pre-CE Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-.1304</td>
<td>.1880</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.2574</td>
<td>-.0466</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In no case are these correlations high and in several cases they are actually negative. In addition, if more strategically important locales receive more overall news coverage, then the small negative correlation between *Public Concern* and pre-complex emergency coverage should provide confidence that the former is not primarily picking up on a conflict’s geopolitical or strategic significance.
Finally, as the construction of Public Concern was quite complicated, but also critical to the credibility of the findings presented below, Appendix 2 contains both a more detailed discussion and specific information about (and justifications for) the search terms used and the dates covered for each observation.

2.3.2 Operational Environment

Any number of forces may affect the operational environment for a peace operation in a particular complex emergency. Still, the relevant literature points to a series of conflict characteristics that are particularly influential in determining the difficulties and dangers that troops must expect to face.

A number of these characteristics reflect the will and/or the capacity of local actors to resist a peace operation, and are thus especially relevant to expectations about casualties. First, Michael O’Hanlon (1997 p.51) argues that in several kinds of conflicts – in particular, “revolutions, guerrilla struggles, and highly ideological conflicts” – casualties among international troops are likely to be higher because of the considerable risk that at least one local actor will object to their presence. The same is true where local actors have greater capacity to resist – whether because they are numerous, well-equipped, or dedicated, or because local conditions such as difficult terrain favor them relative to foreign troops (O'Hanlon 1997 p.12). These arguments appear consistent with findings that conflicts in states with stronger militaries (Fortna 2004, 2008; Gilligan and Stedman 2003) or in or next to permanent UN Security Council members or major powers (Fortna 2008; Mullenbach 2005), are less likely to receive peacekeepers.

Finally, an additional set of characteristics may or may not affect the risk of casualties (perhaps by influencing local actors’ opportunities to take advantage of international troops), but
certainly affect the challenges and financial costs of designing a mission for effective civilian protection. A larger population, a larger conflict-affected area, poor infrastructure, inhospitable climate and terrain, and even a remote location can all add up to greater difficulties and higher costs (see eg, O'Hanlon 1997 p.51; Perkins and Neumayer 2008).

Drawing on these arguments, I created an index variable – *Operational Environment* – that reflects the relative difficulty and anticipated costliness of deploying a peace operation. While this measure is, of course, not able to account for all relevant considerations, it does include quite a few of the important characteristics.

The primary version of this index is constructed from seven different components. First, *Army* is the natural log of the size of the army in the country where the complex emergency occurs, during the year it begins. Data are from the International Institute for Strategic Studies’ *The Military Balance*. Second, *Guerrilla* indicates whether a complex emergency is characterized by guerrilla war, as coded by Valentino, Huth and Balch-Lindsay (2004), with missing observations filled in using their operational guidelines. Third, *Russia/China Contiguity* indicates whether a complex emergency occurs in, or in a state contiguous to, Russia or China, using data from the Correlates of War (COW) project (Stinnett, et al. 2002). Fourth, *Population* is the natural log of the population (in thousands) of the conflict-affected region or country, measured where possible as the complex emergency begins. These data come primarily from the UN’s *World Population Prospects* (2009). Fifth, *Area* measures the natural log of the

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15 As discussed below, however, several alternate versions performed similarly.
16 Where prior conflict made it impossible to identify a single national force at the beginning of a complex emergency, I used the earliest available army size during the complex emergency. Unfortunately, I am not aware of a source that consistently records opposition group strength.
18 Where *World Population Prospects* was missing data (India, Russia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Indonesia), I used the World Bank’s *World Development Indicators 2010* (largely based on *World Population Prospects*). I generally preferred *World Population Prospects* because of its longer time-series and
total area in square kilometers of the country or sub-region where the complex emergency occurs. Data come primarily from the CIA’s World Factbook (2009). Sixth, Mountains accounts for the mountainousness of the terrain in the state where the complex emergency occurs. Data are from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Finally, Paved Roads measures the percentage of paved (vs. unpaved) roads in the country where the complex emergency occurs, and thus reflects on the infrastructural challenges a potential intervener is likely to encounter. Data are from the World Bank.

To construct the index, I first placed each component on a 0 – 1 scale ranging from the least to the most challenging conditions for potential interveners. I then added together the values for all seven components (using 0 or 1 for the two dichotomous variables). Finally, I transformed this sum back onto a 0 – 1 scale, so that for the final measure, 0 represents the most favorable operational environment and 1 represents the most challenging. Figure 5-6 shows the variation in the measure.

imputation of missing data. For complex emergencies in sub-national regions, a variety of sources identified population size.

19 For the complex emergencies that represent particular regions rather than entire countries, I also used a variety of other sources to determine the appropriate number of square kilometers.

20 Because Mountains is measured at the national level, it may not accurately reflect the terrain in the area of potential deployment for complex emergencies that affected only one region of a country. Versions of Operational Environment that exclude it, however, generally perform comparably (see robustness checks).

21 Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2010, available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog. Accessed June 24, 2010. As with Mountains, estimates for Paved Roads were only available at the national level. Thus, again, for subnational complex emergencies the measure does not reflect any differences in infrastructural conditions between the region of potential deployment and the nation as a whole. What is more, data on the percentage of paved roads is often only available once (sometimes much later than the beginning of the complex emergency). Still, typically these figures do not change quickly and are indicative of general infrastructure conditions. Wherever there are multiple estimates, I used the one taken closest to the beginning of the complex emergency. Finally, as above, versions of the index that exclude Paved Roads perform comparably (see robustness checks).

22 For all components except Paved Roads, the lowest value represented the least challenging scenario and the highest value the most challenging one. For Paved Roads, since larger numbers represent less of a challenge, I calculated 1 – Paved Roads, and then transformed this to a 0-1 scale like the others.
2.3.3 Public Concern/Operational Environment

Finally, I created the ratio central to the theory and hypotheses, Public Concern/Operational Environment, by dividing Public Concern by the square root of Operational Environment. The choice to use the square root reflects the observation that while
some complex emergencies may generate no politically relevant public pressure for civilian protection, even the most favorable operational environment for a peace operation presents some difficulties, challenges, and risks. In other words, there is good reason to suspect that the range of politically relevant variation in Public Concern is larger than that in Operational Environment. Dividing Public Concern by the square root of Operational Environment incorporates this insight.  

3. Bivariate Analysis

This section offers a first cut at using these data to assess the available evidence in support of the hypotheses, focusing first on True Protection Capacity and then on Contribution Type.

3.1 True Protection Capacity

Figures 5-7 and 5-8 show two ways of representing the relationship between Public Concern/Operational Environment and True Protection Capacity. First, Figure 5-7 plots the individual distributions of observations involving no contribution, low/no protection capacity, some protection capacity, and extensive protection capacity across the values of Public Concern/Operational Environment. Second, Figure 5-8 breaks Public Concern/Operational Environment down into 5 categories. Here, the panels show how the percentages of total observations represented by each level of true protection capacity vary as Public Concern/Operational Environment ranges from more than 1 standard deviation below its mean to more than 2 standard deviations above it. A quick glance at these figures suggests that the

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23 Confirming the validity of this approach, the data are distributed more evenly across the 0-1 range than when dividing simply by Operational Environment. Nevertheless, the basic results still hold when simply dividing by Operational Environment (see robustness checks).
data indeed bear out my expectation of a positive relationship between the values of *True Protection Capacity* and *Public Concern/Operational Environment*.

First, in Figure 5-7, observations involving no commitment, or one with little or no protection capacity, are concentrated among the bottom half of the spectrum of *Public Concern/Operational Environment*, while observations involving some or extensive protection capacity are concentrated at higher values. Each panel includes a line representing the normal distribution and centered at the mean of *Public Concern/ Operational Environment* for that level of protection capacity. Table 5-3 lists these means, along with 95% confidence intervals. The average value of *Public Concern/ Operational Environment* is more than twice as large for observations involving some or extensive protection capacity as for those involving no contribution. Two-tailed T-tests of the differences in means are statistically significant for No Contribution vs. Low/No protection (T = -4.59, p = 0.00), and for Low/No vs. Some protection (T = -5.33, p = 0.00), but not for Some vs. Extensive protection (T = -0.16, p = .88).

**Table 5-3: Mean Public Concern/Operational Environment by Protection Capacity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protection Capacity</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contribution</td>
<td>.3171589</td>
<td>.2914927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low/No Protection</td>
<td>.4231707</td>
<td>.3817117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some Protection</td>
<td>.6534785</td>
<td>.5588527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extensive Protection</td>
<td>.6664377</td>
<td>.5018244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Still, although Figure 5-7 generally supports my expectations, there are some differences from the theory. First, the difference between observations with Some and Extensive true protection capacity is not particularly large, nor is it statistically significant. Given the small
number of observations, however (22 in the former group and 10 in the latter), this may not be particularly surprising. What is more, the theory does not necessarily predict the statistically significant difference between No Contribution and Low/No protection capacity. A close look, however, suggests that the reason for this difference is theoretically consistent. While values of *Public Concern* tend to be a little higher among observations involving Low/No protection capacity (and this difference is statistically significant), values of *Operational Environment* tend to be much lower (also statistically significant).\(^{24}\) Thus, any difference between observations involving No Contribution and Low/No protection capacity primarily reflects the more challenging operational environments among the former, rather than any substantial increase in public pressure for humanitarian action among the latter.

Second, in Figure 5-8, the percent of observations involving No Contribution falls from 80% down to 0%, and the percent of observations involving Some or Extensive protection capacity both increase substantially with *Public Concern/Operational Environment*. Each of these trends is as expected. On the other hand, the portion of observations involving No/Low protection capacity first rises before falling as anticipated, reflecting the higher values of *Public Concern/Operational Environment* among these observations than among those involving No Contribution.

In sum, then, despite a few minor differences, the data are quite supportive of the expected positive relationship between *Public Concern/Operational Environment* and *True Protection Capacity*.

\(^{24}\) Specifically, the mean of *Public Concern* for No Contribution = .54, and for No/Low Protection Capacity = .61 (T = -2.30, 2-tailed p-value = .023). In contrast, the mean of *Operational Environment* for No Contribution = .78, and for No/Low Protection Capacity = .67 (T= 4.71, 2-tailed p-value = .00).
Figure 5-8: % of Observations by Capacity (over Public Concern/Op. Environment)
3.2 Contribution Type

Similarly, Figures 5-9 and 5-10 support the hypotheses concerning the relationships between Public Concern/Operational Environment and the three basic types of contributions. Like Figure 5-7, Figure 5-9 plots the individual distributions across the values of Public Concern/Operational Environment. (Appendix 3 includes a similar figure using the version of Contribution Type that adjusts for contributions in support of a robust operation by another powerful democracy, which shows an even higher concentration of the most robust contributions at the top of the spectrum). Figure 5-10 is comparable to Figure 5-8, showing how the percentages of different types of contributions vary with Public Concern/Operational Environment. (Again, Appendix 3 includes the same figure using the adjusted version of Contribution Type).

Again, the data generally conform quite closely to the theory, although limited contributions are something of an exception. In Figure 5-9, these contributions are concentrated at somewhat higher values of Public Concern/Operational Environment than those involving no contribution. As with Low/No protection capacity, this appears to be due primarily to significantly more challenging operational environments among limited contributions. Observations dominated by resources-instructions gaps are concentrated above both of these types, but below the bulk of the most robust contributions.
Figure 5-9: Public Concern/Operational Environment by Contribution Type
Table 5-4 lists the mean (and its 95% confidence interval) of Public Concern/Operational Environment by Contribution Type. Here, two-tailed T-tests of the differences in means are at least marginally statistically significant for No Contribution vs. Limited (T= -4.29, p = 0.00), Limited vs. Gap (T = -1.71, p = 0.09), and Gap vs. Robust (T= -1.91, p = .06).

Table 5-4: Mean Public Concern/Operational Environment by Contribution Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution Type</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Upper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Contribution</td>
<td>.3171589</td>
<td>.2914927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>.4440843</td>
<td>.3751595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gap</td>
<td>.5250159</td>
<td>.4620479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust</td>
<td>.6664377</td>
<td>.5018244</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Figure 5-10, evidence of most of the anticipated relationships is even clearer to see. The percent of observations involving No Contribution falls, of course, exactly as in Figure 5-8, since these observations are the same as for True Protection Capacity. In addition, the bottom two panels clearly support my expectations concerning gap-dominated and robust contributions. The former displays the anticipated curvilinear relationship, with gap-dominated contributions becoming more common throughout most of the distribution of Public Concern/Operational Environment, and less common at the highest values. Meanwhile, the percent of robust contributions increases steadily, reaching its maximum at the top of the spectrum. In contrast, the anticipated fall in the proportion of limited contributions is not evident. Indeed, there appears to be little if any relationship between such contributions and Public Concern/Operational Environment. (Finally, all of these same patterns are evident for the adjusted version of Contribution Type, as shown in Appendix 3.)
Figure 5-10: % of Observations by Type (over Public Concern/Op. Environment)
4. Statistical Tests

The bivariate analysis offers considerable support for my hypotheses relating Public Concern/Operational Environment to True Protection Capacity and Contribution Type. This section provides further evidence, using regression analysis to examine how these patterns hold up while accounting for the influence of other forces that might affect leaders’ contributions to peace operations.

4.1 Controls

A series of control variables reflect these other forces. First, the existing literature employs a litany of measures to represent strategic relationships that might promote peace operations. Of these, I focus on several that seem likely to generate an interest in stability and thus potentially provide a motive for helping to promote peace and/or provide civilian protection. These include the presence of regional, alliance, and former colonial ties between potential interveners and the states where complex emergencies occur. First, Former Colony indicates whether the country where the complex emergency occurs received its independence from the potential intervener. Data are from Hensel (2006). Second, Region indicates whether a complex emergency occurs in the same region as the potential intervener. Third, Alliance indicates whether the potential intervener and the state where the complex emergency occurs share, at any time during the complex emergency, an alliance identified by the ATOP project (Leeds, et al.

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25 Regional definitions are from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, with one exception. The UN considers Asia and Oceania separate continents, which places Australia outside the same region as the complex emergencies for which it is a potential intervener. But given Australia’s immediate proximity to much of Southeast Asia and historical treatment of the region as its strategic ‘backyard,’ I code Australia as in the same region as complex emergencies in this region. Using the UN’s original regional classification did not affect the results.
2002) as, at minimum, a defense pact. Finally, Contiguous Ally indicates whether the potential intervener has an ally contiguous to the complex emergency that may provide an interest in regional security and stability. I coded this variable again from alliances recorded by Leeds et al. (2002) as, at minimum, defense pacts in force at any point during the complex emergency, and using COW’s Direct Contiguity Data version 3.1 (Stinnett, et al. 2002). As shown above, the correlation between these variables and Public Concern is quite low.

Besides strategic relationships, a number of other controls reflect circumstances that might influence True Protection Capacity or Contribution Type. First, Mass Killing indicates whether any year of the complex emergency was part of an episode of mass killing as coded by Valentino (2004), with missing observations filled in according to his guidelines. Such episodes involve the intentional killing of at least 50,000 civilians within 5 years and serve, at least, as a blunt indicator of the complex emergencies where civilians’ protection needs are likely to be greatest.

Second, several scholars claim that states contribute to peace operations in order to promote democratization in conflict-ridden countries (Andersson 2000; Fortna 2008; Marten 2004; Paris 2004). If so, they may be more likely to tackle the protection and security challenges needed to institutionalize peace and, eventually, democratization. To account for this possibility, I include the Polity IV Project’s polity2 variable, measured the year before the complex emergency begins (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2010).

Third, Pre-1989 indicates complex emergencies that began during the Cold War. Except

---

26 Data are from version 3.0 of the ATOP dataset, May 2005, at http://atop.rice.edu/home. Accessed June 15, 2010. Alliances not known to have expired since then were considered in force for the ensuing years. 27 I also tried a variable, Genopoliticide, which records whether the complex emergency was part of a genocide/politicide as coded by the Political Instability Task Force: Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Barbara Harff, "Political Instability Task Force (PITF) Genocide and Politicide Problem Set, 1955 - 2009," (2010). This produced comparable results (see robustness checks).
perhaps for Australia, the potential interveners’ status as members of the Security Council may have made them not only less likely to contribute to peace operations in these earlier conflicts, but also limited the civilian protection they sought to provide.\footnote{Of course, a number of peace operations that responded to these complex emergencies occurred after the end of the Cold War, and such missions may have become not only more likely at that time but also more representative of a post-Cold War focus on civilian protection. Unfortunately, because I do not use time-varying covariates, it is not possible to identify the timing of individual missions. \textit{Pre-1989}, which accounts only for the timing of the start of a complex emergency, is at best a partial indicator of the relevant conceptual distinction, but is better than nothing.}

Finally, the type of political violence that generates a complex emergency could potentially influence contributions. Therefore, I divide the complex emergencies into five categories based on the primary political dispute that provokes the violence. These distinctions are based on the variable ‘\textit{type}’ in UCDP/PRIO’s Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch, et al. 2002), with the addition of categories for one-sided and inter-communal violence.\footnote{I use Version 4 (2009), at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/Armed-Conflicts-Version-X-2009/. Accessed June 20, 2010. For a description of ‘\textit{type},’ see the Codebook, p.7.} Wherever possible and sensible, I use UCDP/PRIO’s coding.\footnote{In a few cases I adjusted UCDP/PRIO codings to reflect conflicts that were \textit{primarily} inter-communal or one-sided violence. I also coded Israeli airstrikes in Lebanon in response to Hezbollah provocation in 1996 and 2006 as internationalized conflict (PRIO codes them as internal), because the shelling’s effects occurred in another state.} First, I code a complex emergency as \textit{International Conflict} if the violence is either inter-state war, or is carried out primarily by an actor in one state against an entity in another state. In \textit{Internationalized Internal Conflict}, the conflict is based in one state, but there is extensive international military intervention in a non-peace operation capacity.\footnote{Complex emergencies coded by UCDP/PRIO as internal conflict, but then as internationalized internal conflict due to the actions of any of the potential interveners in a peace operation are coded by their original designation (these include Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Sierra Leone).} \textit{Internal Conflict} involves the state and at least one organized opposition group and does not involve substantial external intervention. \textit{Inter-communal Violence} identifies conflicts where the primary fault line reflects inter-communal tension. Here, 1) the government is not a primary party to the violence, 2) victims are chosen based on their...
perceived membership in a religious, ethnic, or kinship group, and 3) members of at least two communities participate in the violence. Finally, a complex emergency is primarily One-sided Violence against civilians if it occurs without ongoing concurrent conflict among at least two organized parties.

4.2 True Protection Capacity: Method and Analysis

4.2.1 Model Choice

To investigate the first hypothesis involving True Protection Capacity, I use ordinal probit models. This choice reflects the ordered nature of this dependent variable as well as the theoretical assumption that a single set of considerations determines the costs a powerful democratic leader is willing to accept to help provide security in a complex emergency, and that this in turn determines her policy choice. Although this is not the case for countries that lack the capacity to substitute between robust and less ambitious civilian protection efforts, it is typically a reasonable assumption for the potential interveners considered here. As noted in Chapter 2, these states have a unique capacity to determine how much they wish to do in response to a complex emergency, and then decide on that basis whether they prefer to support an operation that uses troops from other countries, or to send a significant number of their own forces.

4.2.2 Results & Analysis

Table 5-5 presents the results of several of these models. Given the relatively limited number of observations, Models 1 - 2 include different combinations of controls, while Model 3 includes them all. Additional variants produced comparable results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.837)</td>
<td>(0.910)</td>
<td>(0.921)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mass Killing</strong></td>
<td>1.242***</td>
<td>1.033***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.297)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Former Colony</strong></td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
<td>(0.375)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contiguous Ally</strong></td>
<td>-0.357</td>
<td>-0.443</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.329)</td>
<td>(0.352)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance</strong></td>
<td>-1.273</td>
<td>-1.355</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.833)</td>
<td>(1.082)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td>-0.317</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.361)</td>
<td>(0.343)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-1989</strong></td>
<td>-0.076</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.371)</td>
<td>(0.462)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity</strong></td>
<td>-0.081**</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Conflict</strong></td>
<td>-0.734*</td>
<td>-0.686*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.389)</td>
<td>(0.415)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Conflict</strong></td>
<td>-0.703</td>
<td>-0.282</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.493)</td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>One-sided Violence</strong></td>
<td>-1.066*</td>
<td>-1.119*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.555)</td>
<td>(0.590)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cutpoint 1</strong></td>
<td>2.569***</td>
<td>1.497***</td>
<td>2.231***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
<td>(0.504)</td>
<td>(0.580)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cutpoint 2</strong></td>
<td>3.985***</td>
<td>2.801***</td>
<td>3.702***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.527)</td>
<td>(0.589)</td>
<td>(0.658)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cutpoint 3</strong></td>
<td>5.130***</td>
<td>3.859***</td>
<td>4.834***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.660)</td>
<td>(0.726)</td>
<td>(0.748)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pseudo R-squared</strong></td>
<td>0.307</td>
<td>0.264</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered by complex emergency in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Models 2 – 3 omit observations involving inter-communal violence because there were no contributions to peace operations in these cases. For these models, internationalized civil conflict is the reference category.
The results provide convincing evidence in favor of my hypothesis: while accounting for multiple other possible influences over a leader’s policy choice, Public Concern/Operational Environment has a consistent and statistically significant positive influence on the expected value of True Protection Capacity. More importantly, the substantive impact of this effect is substantial.

Figure 5-11 (below) illustrates how the predicted probabilities of different values of True Protection Capacity vary with Public Concern/Operational Environment. Confirming the bivariate analysis, it shows that higher values on this spectrum are associated with more contributions involving greater protection capacity. First, over the range of Public Concern/Operational Environment, the predicted probability of making no contribution falls from about 99% to 0%. The probabilities of contributions involving little/no or some protection capacity both initially rise (from close to 0% to 52% in the first case, and to 43% in the second) and then fall, with the latter peaking at a higher value of Public Concern/Operational Environment. Finally, the probability of contributions involving extensive protection capacity increases, growing most rapidly where Public Concern/Operational Environment exceeds 2 standard deviations above its mean (at about .81). The predicted probability of these contributions reaches a high of 76% where Public Concern/Operational Environment = 1.

\[32\] Brant tests of the ordinal probit’s parallel lines assumption revealed that overall, it does not hold for these models (the tests return a significant Chi-Squared statistic). Tests of the individual coefficients, however, reveal that these failures are caused by the controls (in particular, strategic relationships and indicators of complex emergency type). In contrast, there is reason for confidence that Public Concern/Operational Environment does have a comparable effect at each level of the dependent variable, and that for this key variable at least, the basic assumption of ordinal regression holds. Since I do not discuss the effects of the controls in detail, I use the ordinal models for the sake of simplicity. Any analysis primarily concerned with the strategic relationships or other controls, however, would need to use generalized ordered regression.

\[33\] Figure 5-11 is based on Model 1, with the other covariates set at their means, but other configurations produced similar results. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5-11: Effect of P. Concern/Op. Environment on True Protection Capacity
4.3 Contribution Type

4.3.1 Model Choice

The results presented above clearly support the hypothesis concerning *True Protection Capacity*. Next, I test the hypotheses concerning *Contribution Type*. Further discussion and additional results are available in the section on robustness checks below, and in Appendix 3. Here, I present the results of several multinomial logits, which treat a leader’s decision as a set of four non-ordered choices between No Contribution, Limited, Gap, and Robust. These models use the same controls as above. In addition, to test my hypothesis about the curvilinear relationship between *Public Concern/Operational Environment* and the probability of gap-dominated contributions, I follow standard practice and include the square of this ratio, \((Public\ Concern/Operational\ Environment)^2\), as an additional covariate. Table 5-6 summarizes all of the covariates included in these models, as well as in the ordinal probits from above.

### Table 5-6: Summary of Covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Covariate</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Concern/Operational Environment</td>
<td>.4141194</td>
<td>.1958233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Public Concern/Operational Environment)^2</td>
<td>.209612</td>
<td>.1995813</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mass Killing</td>
<td>.3652695</td>
<td>.4829538</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Colony</td>
<td>.1616766</td>
<td>.3692612</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>.0538922</td>
<td>.226484</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous Ally</td>
<td>.3413174</td>
<td>.4755777</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>.1197605</td>
<td>.3256577</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-2.426829</td>
<td>5.611186</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1989</td>
<td>.257485</td>
<td>.4385638</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td>.6121212</td>
<td>.48875</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Conflict</td>
<td>.0606061</td>
<td>.2393327</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationalized Civil Conflict</td>
<td>.1575758</td>
<td>.3654519</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>One-sided Violence</td>
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<td>.2393327</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inter-communal Conflict</td>
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<td>.3127023</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.3.2 Results & Discussion

Table 5-7 presents the models. For the controls, Models 4 and 5 include Mass Killing, Polity, and the various indicators of strategic relationships, while Models 3 and 4 include Pre-1989, Polity, and the indicators of complex emergency type (again excluding observations involving inter-communal violence).\textsuperscript{34} Models 4 and 6 are based on the basic version of Contribution Type, while Models 5 and 7 are based on the adjusted version that treats contributions in support of other potential interveners’ robust operations as either limited or robust.

These models present separate coefficients for Limited, Gap, and Robust, which are interpreted individually as compared to observations involving No Contribution. This, combined with the fact that the magnitude and statistical significance of each covariate’s effect depends on both its own value and those of the others, makes the coefficients and their statistical significance difficult to interpret. This is especially true for the key variable of Public Concern/Operational Environment, given the inclusion of both the linear and quadratic terms. Thus, Figure 5-12 (based on Model 5) presents predicted probabilities for each outcome, along with their 95% confidence intervals, as they vary over the range of Public Concern/Operational Environment. The trends it illustrates are comparable for the other models, though with some differences (see Appendix 3 for additional graphs and discussion of Models 4 and 7), and also for a version (not shown) that includes all of the controls.

\textsuperscript{34} One difference from the ordinal probits for True Protection Capacity is the exclusion of the control for Alliance, as there are no observations in which Alliance = 1 that involved either a gap-dominated or robust contribution. In contrast, Models 6 and 7 do include International Conflict despite the absence of robust contributions in these complex emergencies, because there are a number of gap-dominated ones. This, however, explains the large negative coefficients for this variable on robust contributions.
Table 5-7: Multinomial Logits, Contribution Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4 (Contribution Type)</th>
<th>Model 5 (Contribution Type, Adjusted)</th>
<th>Model 6 (Contribution Type)</th>
<th>Model 7 (Contribution Type, Adjusted)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>Gap</td>
<td>Robust</td>
<td>Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.966)</td>
<td>(0.957)</td>
<td>(1.429)</td>
<td>(0.937)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Colony</td>
<td>-1.103</td>
<td>-0.483</td>
<td>0.343</td>
<td>-1.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.753)</td>
<td>(0.564)</td>
<td>(1.298)</td>
<td>(0.727)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contiguous Ally</td>
<td>-3.047***</td>
<td>-2.691***</td>
<td>-1.545</td>
<td>-3.135***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.072)</td>
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<td>(1.431)</td>
<td>(1.052)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Region</td>
<td>-1.882</td>
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<td>-1.065</td>
<td>-2.023</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.320)</td>
<td>(0.664)</td>
<td>(0.874)</td>
<td>(1.365)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polity</td>
<td>-0.163**</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.112)</td>
<td>(0.086)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1989</td>
<td>-0.196</td>
<td>-0.751</td>
<td>1.449</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.146)</td>
<td>(0.936)</td>
<td>(1.490)</td>
<td>(1.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Conflict</td>
<td>-3.781**</td>
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<td>0.079</td>
<td>-3.240**</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.476)</td>
<td>(1.287)</td>
<td>(1.779)</td>
<td>(1.302)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Conflict</td>
<td>-2.214</td>
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<td>-44.081</td>
<td>-2.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.308)</td>
<td>(1.977)</td>
<td>(0.000)</td>
<td>(2.317)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.026)</td>
<td>(1.726)</td>
<td>(2.646)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.663</td>
<td>-2.304</td>
<td>-6.971**</td>
<td>-2.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R-squared</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.351</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robust standard errors clustered by complex emergency in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As above, and as expected, the probability of No Contribution falls as Public Concern/Operational Environment increases, plummeting from about 85% at the low end to less than 1% at .7 (the value for the observation involving the UK in Bosnia). Unlike in the bivariate analysis, the predicted probability of a limited contribution rises and then falls (from under 5% to about 30%, and then to under 5% again), and is statistically different from 0 from about .4 to .7. As noted above, this initial rise primarily reflects the less difficult operational environments here than among observations involving no contribution. Both this rise and fall are statistically significant: the peak of 30% at .62 (just below the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment for the U.S. and Liberia I, or for France and Rwanda) is distinguishable at the 5% level from the predicted probabilities for values between .02 and .43, and above .95. As discussed below, though, this result is quite sensitive to model specification and the values of the other covariates.

Significantly, gap-dominated contributions behave as expected, displaying a clear and statistically significant curvilinear relationship. It is also notably more pronounced than among limited ones: the predicted probability of a gap-dominated contribution rises from about 5% when Public Concern/Operational Environment is less than .2 to about 55% when it equals .62, before falling back to less than 5% again. Thus, while the predicted probabilities of limited and gap-dominated contributions peak together, the latter are nearly twice as likely at this point.35 For the latter, these values are statistically different from 0 when Public Concern/Operational Environment is between about .4 and .8. Again, moreover, both the rise and fall are statistically significant: the peak of 55% at .62 is distinguishable at the 5% level from the predicted values when Public Concern/Operational Environment is either below .45 or above .81.

35 And indeed, the U.S. and France made gap-dominated contributions in Liberia and Rwanda.
Figure 5-12: Predicted Probabilities by *Contribution Type* (Model 5)
Finally, predicted probabilities for robust contributions also behave as expected, remaining below 1% until nearly the mean of Public Concern/Operational Environment and then rising sharply, to about 80% for an observation like Australia and East Timor (.91), or 95% for France and Croatia (which takes the highest value of 1). They are statistically different from 0 at values above .75.

For the graphs in Figure 5-12 I set the control variables equal to their means, but I also investigated how the patterns just described vary with different values of some of the covariates. As the coefficients in Table 5-7 suggest, the variables representing strategic relationships have, if anything, a negative effect on the probability of limited, gap-dominated, and robust contributions, relative to none. Indeed, the negative coefficients for Contiguous Ally and Region achieve statistical significance (in the former case, for limited and gap-dominated contributions, and in the latter, for robust ones in Model 5).

Setting any one of these variables equal to 1 and the others to 0, however, has little impact on most of the results in Figure 5-12. While either a former colonial or regional relationship does eliminate any statistically significant relationship between Public Concern/Operational Environment and limited contributions, the core findings for no contribution (sharp drop-off as Public Concern/Operational Environment increases), gap-dominated contributions (a curvilinear relationship), and robust contributions (steep upswing at high values of Public Concern/Operational Environment) persist, and remain statistically significant in all cases.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{36}\) More specifically, Contiguous Ally = 1 causes the predicted probability of a robust contribution to be statistically different from 0 at a lower value of Public Concern/Operational Environment (about .6), while Former Colony and Region each cause this threshold to move a little higher. In all cases, for gap-dominated contributions both the initial increase and the final decrease in predicted probabilities remain statistically significant.
Finally, since Table 5-7 suggests that Mass Killing has a consistently significant positive effect on the probability of all types of contributions (relative to none), I also investigate how setting it equal to 1 affects the patterns evident in Figure 5-12. First, as with Region and Former Colony, doing so reduces the impact of Public Concern/Operational Environment on limited contributions, with a smaller range of predicted probabilities statistically different from 0. Second, the positive effect of Public Concern/Operational Environment on robust contributions becomes statistically significant earlier (at about .62). Finally, while the curvilinear relationship for gap-dominated contributions persists, wider confidence intervals at the lower values of Public Concern/Operational Environment eliminate the statistical significance of the initial increase in the probability of these contributions (though the subsequent decrease remains significant).

4.4 Robustness Checks

While the results presented thus far provide considerable support for the hypotheses, it is also clear that some of them do depend on the values of the other covariates. This is particularly true for those involving limited contributions in the models involving Contribution Type. The additional graphs presented in Appendix 3 confirm this basic pattern: most of the results just discussed remain clearly in evidence, but those for limited contributions – and to a lesser extent, for gap-dominated ones – are sensitive to model specification.

In addition to these analyses, I also performed a series of robustness checks for both True Protection Capacity and Contribution Type. Among others, these included trying different measures for some controls (such as an indicator of genocide or politicide rather than mass killing, and a different measure of regional ties); clustering the standard errors by potential intervener (rather than complex emergency); dropping observations for complex emergencies
whose status as such is at all tenuous (those coded 1 for ‘certainty’ as discussed in Chapter 4); and dividing Public Concern by the full 0-1 range of Operational Environment (rather than its square root). I also used two other versions of the Operational Environment index, constructed from different subsets of variables.37

The results of these robustness checks confirm the findings discussed above. None of them had any material impact on the statistically significant positive relationship between True Protection Capacity and Public Concern/Operational Environment. For Contribution Type there was some variation. Dividing Public Concern by Operational Environment rather than its square root, for example, actually strengthened the curvilinear relationship between this ratio and gap-dominated contributions. As discussed in Appendix 3, so did running Model 4 without the observations whose values were adjusted for Models 5 and 7. On the other hand, setting genocide or politicide equal to 1 had the same effect as with Mass Killing, producing wider confidence intervals at the low end of Public Concern/Operational Environment and eliminating the statistical significance of the increase in the probability of gap-dominated contributions. The alternative measures of Operational Environment had a comparable effect, except that they created wider confidence intervals at the high end of Public Concern/Operational Environment, thus leaving only the initial increase in the probability of gap-dominated contributions statistically significant. As above, some of these robustness checks also eliminated any statistically significant findings for limited contributions.

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37 These versions of the index were constructed from fewer indicators of the potential costs and risks of intervening, in one case using only Guerrilla, Population, Area, and Army, and in the other adding Russia/China Contiguity.
5. Conclusion

This chapter has provided important support for the theory laid out in Chapter 3. Despite the considerable challenges of quantifying many of its central concepts, I collected several forms of original data that reflect them quite closely, and used these data to find supporting evidence of my hypotheses across many conflicts and several powerful democracies. While the chapter provided an overview of this data, Appendices 1-2 offer further discussion and justification of the associated coding decisions.

The analysis and results presented above support all four of the hypotheses laid out at the beginning of the chapter. First, the potential interveners’ responses to complex emergencies display what I call higher “true protection capacity” as the challenges of the operational environment become less dominant relative to public concern about the conflict. Leaders are much less likely to contribute to peace operations at all where the operational environment is especially difficult relative to public concern for its victims (at least as expressed through elite media coverage). At the same time, they become substantially more likely to devote real energy and attention to civilian protection as such concern becomes relatively more pertinent. While public concern probably never completely overshadows considerations about potential costs reflected in the operational environment, I do find that serious efforts at civilian protection are most likely among the highest values on the spectrum of Public Concern/Operational Environment.

Second, the evidence also provides considerable support for my expectations about Contribution Type. First, as expected, the probability that a potential intervener will make no contribution to a peace operation at all falls as the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment increases. On the other hand, I anticipated that a similar trend would be evident for
limited contributions, and here the evidence is much more mixed. In general, the predicted probability of these contributions increases among low values of *Public Concern/Operational Environment* before dropping off as expected at higher ones. This pattern is rarely statistically significant, however, and primarily reflects less challenging operational environments among these observations than among those involving no contribution, rather than any major difference in public concern. Thus, the circumstances that tend to favor limited contributions may be at least somewhat distinguishable from those that favor not contributing to a peace operation at all.

Most notably, however, the results for gap-dominated and robust contributions are in line with my expectations. The predicted probabilities for the former clearly display the anticipated curvilinear pattern, while those for robust contributions reliably increase among higher values of *Public Concern/Operational Environment*.

As noted above, the statistical significance (and peak) of the curvilinear effect for gap-dominated contributions does show some sensitivity to model specification and to the values of the covariates, but is much more consistent (and the peak more pronounced) than among limited contributions. Finally, the increase in the probability of robust contributions is consistently statistically significant: only the values of *Public Concern/Operational Environment* at which the predicted probabilities of these contributions become statistically different from 0 vary with model specification. Notably, moreover, the primary alternative explanation for leaders’ choices explored here – the possibility that they are driven by strategic relationships that might prompt leaders to provide civilian protection where it is most needed – does not find any notable support, nor does the presence of such relationships appear to diminish the impact of the political dilemma represented by *Public Concern/Operational Environment*. 
Considering the obstacles to obtaining statistically significant results in this context – the limited number of observations for certain types of contributions; the need to adjust for correlation among the error terms for observations involving the same complex emergency; and the challenges of constructing reasonably accurate measures of Public Concern and Operational Environment – these results are quite impressive.

Still, in some sense they only scratch the surface of the many interesting and important questions we could ask about the design of peace operations and the politics of civilian protection in the powerful democracies with the greatest influence over these missions. I have not, for example, examined how change over time in public concern about a conflict affects the timing of civilian protection efforts, or how such dynamics might influence decisions to shift to more or less extensive civilian protection efforts. Such issues leave plenty of room for future work, and an additional role of my findings is to hint at the feasibility of using similar techniques to investigate these even more complicated and dynamic questions.

Of course, these questions need not – and should not – be explored only quantitatively. The case studies of Australian and U.S. policy presented in the next two chapters supplement and build on the findings presented here by conceiving of the theory’s core variables in a more detailed way. They look at more indicators of both public concern and the operational environment, for example (as well as leaders’ impressions of these), while also exploring some of these critical temporal dynamics and other possible sources of influence over leaders’ choices in greater depth.
6. Appendix 5.1 – Coding of Peace Operation Contributions

This appendix provides detailed justifications and sources for the coding of the two key components of contributions described in the chapter: soldiers’ protection instructions (as reflected in the operational goals and military strategies they are asked to pursue), and the resources that the potential interveners contribute to each mission. Complex emergencies that received no peace operations are not covered here. For the remaining observations, the appendix is divided into two parts.

First, Table 5-8 (below) lists the full names associated with each of the acronyms used to describe the various peace operations. After this, Part A covers resource commitments, and lists and justifies the coding for each potential intervener’s commitments to each operation. Second, Part B covers protection instructions. Since these are the same for each potential intervener for a given peace operation, there is one entry per operation. There are a few exceptions to this general rule where protection instructions changed significantly over the course of an operation and where I include a separate entry for each period in which protection instructions received a unique coding.

Full reference information for sources cited is included in a separate bibliography at the end of the dissertation, except where citations are provided here for webpages.

Notes: Throughout this appendix, 1) “MB” stands for IISS’ Military Balance; 2) Gray shading indicates the potential intervener(s) did not to my knowledge contribute to a particular operation.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS/PKF</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Independent States Collective Peacekeeping Force (Tajikistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMICI</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>ECOWAS Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Military Observer Group (ECOWAS, Liberia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>West African Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOWAS, Sierra Leone)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Tchad/RCA</td>
<td>European Union Mission in Chad and the Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>European Union Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force (Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMT</td>
<td>International Monitoring Team (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>International Force East Timor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF Liberia</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td>Indian Peacekeeping Force (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multinational Force (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOG</td>
<td>Military Observer Group (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC (I, II)</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (I, II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMOG (I, II)</td>
<td>Neutral Military Observer Group (I, II) (Rwanda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMIB</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity Mission in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUSAL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>South African Protection Support Detachment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMIR (I, II)</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (I, II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNCRO</td>
<td>United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation (Croatia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>United Nations Guards Contingent in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (I, II)</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (I, II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITAF</td>
<td>United Task Force (Somalia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOT</td>
<td>United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda–Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM (I, II)</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia (I, II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>UN Protection Force (Croatia &amp; Bosnia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Authority In Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAET</td>
<td>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Part A: Resource Commitments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Emergency</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Resources: US</th>
<th>Sources/Justification: US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNAMIC was authorized late in 1991 and contributions do not show up in <em>Military Balance</em> for that year, but given that the US contributed only 17 observers to UNTAC in 1992 (see below), I code it as 1 for UNAMIC also.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / East Timor</td>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Schwartz (2001, p.3): &quot;According to unclassified records drawn from the author's personal files, the United States reached its maximum presence in East Timor on November 11, 1999, when we had 235 troops in Timor; on November 27, the U.S. reached its maximum in Australia, with 353. The maximum total complement, which included a marine expeditionary unit off shore, was just over 3000 in early October. The United States provided strategic and tactical fixed wing airlift, tactical helicopter airlift, intelligence, communications support, a civil-military operations center, a logistics planning cell, and other support. The Australians particularly valued the off-shore presence of an amphibious readiness group, which included the marines and served as an important demonstration of U.S. interest and resolve, as well as alliance solidarity.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / East Timor</td>
<td>UNTAET (2000)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2000: Token (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines / Govt. vs. Islamist Insurgents</td>
<td>IMT</td>
<td></td>
<td>Beginning in 2003, the U.S. provided diplomatic support and funding for the peace process between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). I found no evidence, however, that this extended to direct support for the IMT. See Martin and Tuminez 2008. In addition, as of mid-2010, the State Department page for the Philippines mentioned the IMT, but there was no mention of any direct U.S. involvement. See “Background Note: Philippines,” <a href="http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm">http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2794.htm</a>, accessed July 3, 2010.</td>
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<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
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<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>CIS/PKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
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<td>Country</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Notes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNMOT (1994)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>NATO Support to UNPROFOR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The US did not contribute directly to UNPROFOR, but it did contribute to all of NATO's various support efforts (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1993: Does not say how many are deployed, but p.15 clearly says US aircraft are part of Deny Flight, that US aircraft have participated in Provide Promise since 1992, and that the Navy contributes to Sharp Guard; MB 1994: Provide Promise, 29 aircraft; Deny flight, 2600 personnel, 74 aircraft, 1 ship; Sharp Guard, about 9 ships and some aircraft; MB 1995: Provide Promise, 1 C-130; Deny flight, 2000 Air Force personnel, 87 aircraft, 1 ship; Sharp Guard, 4 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Deliberate Force</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>US supplied about 141 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>UNTAES (1996)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1996: 41 civilian police (not military personnel, and “token” size contribution in any case)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>UNMOP (1996)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia / Kosovo</td>
<td>Allied Force</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The US deployed over 700 aircraft (Peters et al 2001, p.23). MB 1999 (p.30-31) also notes that the US Navy was the dominant power for the sea-based portions of the operation (though without specifying precise contribution). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that such a large number of aircraft combined with a sizeable Naval contribution is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia / Kosovo</td>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 2000: 5500 in Yugoslavia (+450 in Romania); See also Gerstein 2005, p.212.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Berman and Labonte (2006 p.151), in 1998 the US “contributed $3.9 million...to fund improvements in ECOMOG logistics, although this exhausted all State Dept funds available at the time for peace operations in Africa.” They also note (p.152) that, "In early 1998, the United States agreed to transfer American-supplied vehicles, in service with Nigerian units in Liberia, to Sierra Leone.” Assistance continued in 1999. See also Kabia 2009, p.117.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Involvement</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>No involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Operation Palliser (UK)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>According to Adeleke (1995, p.589), &quot;The United States preferred to limit its contribution to finance and logistical support, providing, by April 1994, $28.7 million to ECOMOG, $270 million for humanitarian assistance, and a further $30.83 million to the Liberian Trust Fund established by the UN Secretary-General in September 1993 to support the expanded ECOMOG.&quot; Adebajo (2004 p.294) adds that, “Washington contributed $500 million in humanitarian assistance to Liberia during the civil war, but did not support ECOMOG substantially until near the end of its mission, when it provided crucial logistical support for disarmament” (see also Whiteman and Yates 2004 p.373). Finally, Kabia (2009 p.82) points out that early U.S. aid was support for the Senegalese contingent from 1991-93.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>To facilitate its deployment, &quot;The United States contributed roughly $26 million to ECOMIL from the time it was deployed until October 1, 2003&quot; (See Murphy 2004, note 12).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>JTF Liberia (US)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>The U.S. deployed some 4,350 military personnel to the region in June 2003 as part of operation JTF Liberia, most of whom remained on warships off the coast as a deterrent force. Only about 200 went ashore to assist ECOMIL in providing humanitarian assistance and providing security in Monrovia. They departed in October on the arrival of UNMIL (See eg, Murphy 2004; Adebajo 2004 p.300).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>OMIB</td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission Code</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The United States provided funding for the troop contingent from Ethiopia (Svensson 2008 p.13).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1994: Token (5), but not until over a year after end of complex emergency (would not affect coding even if earlier)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM II (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
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<td>Angola II</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
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<td>Angola II</td>
<td>UNAVEM III (1995)</td>
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<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
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<td>Angola III</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
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<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The force involved a total of about 20 planes from the US, Canada, &amp; Germany (see Seybolt p.112-113). They &quot;worked with the UN World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on a purely logistical operation which moved supplies from Kenya to the interior of Somalia where the famine was worst&quot; (Seybolt p.54).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNITAF / Restore Hope</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1992 p.14: &quot;At its peak the US force numbered some 25,000 men, including naval units offshore.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1993: 4,100 (+ unspecified # of Marines offshore).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All three NATO anti-piracy missions (Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, & Operation Ocean Shield, which I group together along with EU NAVFOR Atalanta because of their close coordination and same purposes) were conducted by NATO’s two Standing Maritime Groups, which means that the particular assets deployed at different times were a function of which states were contributing to which group (and which assets they were contributing), as well as which group was responsible for the missions at different times. Still, the US consistently contributed ships to these missions. In 2009 it provided ships for both Allied Protector and Ocean Shield. See http://www.afsouth.nato.int/organization/CC_MAR_Naples/operations/allied_provider/forces.html and also NATO’s page on “Counter-Piracy Operations,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Note</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Anti-Piracy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1999 - 2009: UN vote / financing only; MB 2010: Token (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>Operation Artemis (EU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOMICI/ECOFORCE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The US provided officers to help with mission planning and “provided support towards strategic transportation within the mission area and two-thirds of the force’s food requirements” (Kabia 2009 p.145).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Operation Licorne (France)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Contribution</td>
<td>Notes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Op. Turquoise (France)</td>
<td>No Contribution.</td>
<td>Several sources provide different figures for the size of the US deployment to Operation Support Hope, but all of them place this deployment at greater than 1,000 troops (with the lowest at 1210 and the highest at 3,600). Only about 200 of these personnel were actually deployed on the ground in Kigali, Rwanda or Goma, Zaire, with the rest deployed in supporting roles elsewhere. The mission headquarters was Entebbe, Uganda. See MB 1994: US deployed “225 engr, cargo handling at Kigale and Goma (Zaire); 985 elsewhere in Africa.” In addition, Seybolt (2008 p.120) notes that the U.S. deployed 3600 people to the region in support of the mission. Finally, a DoD estimate says they deployed 2100 personnel to the region as part of the operation: United States Department of Defense, “Summary - Report to Congress on U.S. Military Activities in Rwanda, 1994 - August 1997.” <a href="http://www.dod.gov/pubs/rwanda/summary.html">http://www.dod.gov/pubs/rwanda/summary.html</a>. Accessed July 8, 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Support Hope (US)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>See extended discussion on contribution in Chapter 7. Briefly, according to Ekengard (2008 p.18), the State Department “agreed to fund a contract with Lockheed Martin subsidiary Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE) to handle camp construction, water and food provision, and laundry. During the period June 2004 to December 2005, PAE built 32 camps around Darfur. In November 2006, total costs for PAE’s work amounted to 7.8 million U.S. dollars per month.” Also, NATO “agreed on 8 June 2005 to support the AU’s efforts in Darfur by assisting with intelligence, strategic airlift and command and control training” (MB 2005 p.360). Also, MB 2008: Token observers (2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / North-South War</td>
<td>UNMIS (2005)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>See extended discussion on contribution in Chapter 7. Briefly, according to Ekengard (2008 p.18), the State Department “agreed to fund a contract with Lockheed Martin subsidiary Pacific Architectural Engineers (PAE) to handle camp construction, water and food provision, and laundry. During the period June 2004 to December 2005, PAE built 32 camps around Darfur. In November 2006, total costs for PAE’s work amounted to 7.8 million U.S. dollars per month.” Also, NATO “agreed on 8 June 2005 to support the AU’s efforts in Darfur by assisting with intelligence, strategic airlift and command and control training” (MB 2005 p.360). Also, MB 2008: Token observers (2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
<td>No Contribution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2010: Token contribution (2, deployed in 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Southern Inter-communal Violence</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2008, 2009: None -- Thus UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region/Crisis</td>
<td>UN Mission</td>
<td>MB Year</td>
<td>MB/UN Vote/Financing Only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War with Ethiopia</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2003: Token (7), but not until over a year after end of complex emergency (would not affect coding even if earlier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ONUSAL (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Shiites</td>
<td>Southern Watch</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>According to Global Security, the US deployed over 6000 Air Force personnel in support of the operation (though it does not state the number that participated directly or for how long this number were deployed; it may have only been for a short time early on). In addition, US aircraft and crews flew some 28,800 sorties by the end of January 1997. (Global security, “Operation Southern Watch.” <a href="http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/southern_watch.htm">http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/southern_watch.htm</a>. Accessed July 9, 2010.). The MB reports are not terribly clear about the numbers deployed over the years. MB 1993 notes that the Air Force had units on rotation in Saudi Arabia, and that numbers varied (incl: F-4G, F-15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, U-2, J-STARS). 1 Patriot bn.) MB 1995 notes essentially the same (“Southern Watch: USAF units on rotation, numbers vary (incl F-15, F-16, F-117, C-130, KC-135, E-3)”. It also notes several thousand Army and Air Force personnel deployed in Turkey on Provide Comfort, who may have also played a supporting role for Southern Watch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil War &amp; Israeli Invasion</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In September 1982 the US deployed about 1200 Marines; this number would reach about 1800-2000 over the following year (see O'Ballance 1998 p120; Caligaris 1984 p.266).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil War &amp; Israeli Invasion</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Emergency</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Resources: UK</td>
<td>Sources/Justification: UK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNAMIC was authorized late in 1991 and contributions do not show up in <em>Military Balance</em> for that year, but given that the UK contributed only 38 observers to UNTAC in 1992 (see below), I code it as 1 for UNAMIC also.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The UK deployed a contingent of Royal Gurkhas (around 290 personnel) on the ground as part of the peacekeeping force. It also provided several C-130 aircraft, which, &quot;as well as transporting the Gurkhas to Dili, played a major part in the logistic effort to establish and sustain INTERFET.&quot; In addition, a destroyer (the HMS Glasgow, whose complement numbered slightly under 300) also briefly deployed to help the Gurkhas with humanitarian tasks, and the ship's medical team helped to establish a clinic. I could not find evidence that these contributions exceeded 1000 personnel. See &quot;British Troops Withdraw From East Timor.&quot; 2nd December 1999. <a href="http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/british_troops_withdraw_from_east_timor/49512.html">http://www.gov-news.org/gov/uk/news/british_troops_withdraw_from_east_timor/49512.html</a>. Accessed July 7, 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>CIS/PKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNMOT (1994)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UK also contributed to all of NATO’s efforts to support UNPROFOR (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).

MB 1993: Provide Promise, 35 personnel + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 400 + 13 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 9 ships; MB 1994: Provide Promise, 41 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 580 + about 30 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 7 ships + 2 aircraft; MB 1995: Provide Promise, 20 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 540 + about 24 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 6 ships + some aircraft. Though total personnel are not listed, I assume that they reached over 1000 including those on the ships.

### Bosnia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NATO Support to UNPROFOR</td>
<td>MB 1993: Provide Promise, 35 personnel + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 400 + 13 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 9 ships; MB 1994: Provide Promise, 41 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 580 + about 30 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 7 ships + 2 aircraft; MB 1995: Provide Promise, 20 + 1 C-130; Deny Flight, 540 + about 24 aircraft; Sharp Guard, about 6 ships + some aircraft. Though total personnel are not listed, I assume that they reached over 1000 including those on the ships.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>MB 1996: 10,500 (deployed 1995)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Deliberate Force</td>
<td>UK supplied about 28 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTAES (1996)</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOP (1996)</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Allied Force</td>
<td>The UK deployed 45 aircraft, in the second largest contingent after the United States &amp; France (see Peters et al 2001, p.22). The Royal Navy also deployed 2 submarines, 1 aircraft carrier, 6 destroyers/frigates, and 3 other vessels. For a full list of deployed assets see the Defence Department report, &quot;Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis,&quot; which also lists a large number of Army assets but leaves it unclear whether they deployed as part of Allied Force or only as part of KFOR. Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel, but the assets listed in the report are clearly equivalent to at least 1000 personnel.</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>MB 1999 p.31: The UK deployed just over 10,000 initially in the summer of 1999; MB 2000: 3,500 still deployed in 2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Berman (2003 p.209), "UK assistance to ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone included materiel. Three distinct assistance packages were provided during 1998 and 1999, including vehicles, communications equipment, uniforms, rations, small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. Lethal equipment included rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). London earmarked materiel specifically for Ghanaian troops serving in ECOMOG, but also allowed the ECOMOG force commander to allocate equipment as he saw fit."

Also, Berman and Labonte (2006, p.152) report that in 1999 the UK provided $18 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|             |              |      | materiel included materiel. Three distinct assistance packages were provided during 1998 and 1999, including vehicles, communications equipment, uniforms, rations, small arms, light weapons, and ammunition. Lethal equipment included rifles, mortars, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). London earmarked materiel specifically for Ghanaian troops serving in ECOMOG, but also allowed the ECOMOG force commander to allocate equipment as he saw fit."

Sierra Leone | UNOMSIL      | 1    | MB 1998, 1999: Token observers (2-5) |

Sierra Leone | UNAMSIL      | 1    | MB 2000: 18 observers; MB 2001: 24 observers |

Sierra Leone | Operation Palliser (UK) | 3 | Sources are inconsistent on the size of the British contribution to Operation Palliser: According to Pentland (2005) and Whiteman and Yates 2004 (p.369), it sent 1 battalion (about 800 troops) in 2000. But MB 2000 claims it was 1000, and Kabia 2009 (p.128) claims there were 2500 British troops involved in the operation in May 2000. Berman & Labonte (2006 p.181) note that, "All told, some 4,500 British soldiers, sailors, and marines participated...on land and offshore." This is sufficient to code a 3. |

Liberia I | ECOMOG | No evidence of involvement. |

Liberia I | UNOMIL | 1 | UN vote / financing only |

Liberia II | UNMIL | 1 | MB 2004: Token (3) |


Liberia II | ECOMIL | 1 | |

Liberia II | JTF Liberia (US) | No evidence of involvement. |

Burundi | OMIB | No evidence of involvement. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>No of Missions</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM II (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>UNAVEM III (1995)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola III</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNITAF / Restore Hope</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>The UK contribution to UNITAF consisted of two Royal Air Force (RAF) transport aircraft (C-130 Hercules), which helped deliver relief supplies into Somalia. See “Britain ends mercy flights into Somalia.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All three NATO anti-piracy missions (Operation Allied Provider, Operation Allied Protector, & Operation Ocean Shield, which I group together along with EU NAVFOR Atalanta because of their close coordination and same purposes) were conducted by NATO's two Standing Maritime Groups, which means that the particular assets deployed at different times were a function of which states were contributing to which group (and which assets they were contributing), as well as which group was responsible for the missions at different times. The UK consistently contributed ships to these missions. It also had the headquarters for EU NAVFOR. See NATO's page on “Counter-Piracy Operations,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48815.htm, and the EU's Atalanta “About Us” page at http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Anti-Piracy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>Operation Artemis (EU)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOMICI/ECOFORCE</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Operation Licorne (France)</td>
<td>No Contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU)</td>
<td>No Contribution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UK Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Financial/logistical, as evidenced by its UN vote/financing only. In the summer of 1994, however, it sent some 650 soldiers to be part of UNAMIR (deployment July 30 to November 1, 1994). They played a primarily humanitarian and logistical role in support of UNAMIR’s mandate. See ParaData’s UNAMIR page at <a href="http://www.paradata.org.uk/events/rwanda-operation-gabriel">http://www.paradata.org.uk/events/rwanda-operation-gabriel</a>. Accessed July 10, 2010. (ParaData provides information about “The living history of The [UK’s] Parachute Regiment and Airborne Forces”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Op. Turquoise (France)</td>
<td>No contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Support Hope (US)</td>
<td>No contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Token (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>MB 2008 reports none, but MB 2009 reports a token contribution (4) deployed with EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>MB 2008 reports none, but MB 2009 reports a token contribution (4) deployed with EUFOR TCHAD/RCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Ekengard (2008, p.22): "In December 2004, the British government provided 143 vehicles. In 2005, British contractor Crown Agents was set to provide another 476 vehicles. The company also provided communications equipment, in particular Thuraya satellite phones and satellite data transfer systems (VSAT). All in all, Crown Agents delivered over 1,000 vehicles to AMIS." The UK’s Foreign & Commonwealth office later reported that it had "allocated almost £32 million to the AU mission" in "significant logistical assistance...including delivery of over 600 vehicles, support for the airlift of Nigerian troops, and rations packs and maps" and "military planning expertise to the AU and...a British observer...The UK has also been heavily involved in securing €92 million of support for the AU mission from the EU peace Facility for Africa." See "Support to African Peacekeeping Missions," http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080205132101/http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1094236371951. Accessed July 7, 2010.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region / Conflict</th>
<th>Force</th>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Southern Inter-communal Violence</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2008, 2009: Token contribution (3-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War with Ethiopia</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only up to 2001; After this MB 2002 shows 6 observers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ONUSAL (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil War &amp; Israeli Invasion</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Reports of the UK contribution are somewhat inconsistent, but point to a coding of 2. MB 1983 says they had 87 people deployed (1 reconnaissance squadron), and Calgaris (1984 p.266) cites a similar figure of about 100. O’Ballance (1998, p.120), however, claims that the UK contribution eventually reached about 600 soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil War &amp; Israeli Invasion</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Emergency</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Resources: France</td>
<td>Sources/Justification: France</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC (1992)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1992: 1400 ground + aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>UNTAET (2000)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2000: Token observers (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>CIS/PKF</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>UNMOT (1994)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1993 (p.257) says 4 total infantry battalions deployed to Bosnia in Oct 1992, and that in 1993 one French one reinforced them; MB 1993 p.30 also says in 1993 France has 3 infantry battalions in Bosnia. Thus I infer that 2 French battalions were sent as part of the initial 4 total in 1992. Also, MB 1993: 3096; MB 1994: 4872; MB1995: 3826 (and this last estimate does not include their contribution to the Rapid reaction force that year). So contribution was at the level of 3 every year from 1992.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UK also contributed to all of NATO’s efforts to support UNPROFOR (which I treat as a single mission given that they shared the same purpose and are regularly discussed together in my sources).

MB 1993: Provide Promise, 3 C-130; Deny Flight, 160 personnel, 10 Mirage 2000C, 4 Mirage FI-CR, 1 DHC6; Sharp Guard, 2 frigates;

MB 1994: Provide Promise, 3 C-130; Deny Flight, about 35 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 2 frigates and 1 naval air squadron; MB 1995: Provide Promise, 1 C130; Deny Flight, about 33 aircraft; Sharp Guard, 1 frigate + 1 other ship.

It appears that between the aircraft and ships, personnel involved exceed 1000.

MB 1996 (p.56): 7,500 in Bosnia, plus an air component in Italy of 4 Mirage 2000C, 2 Mirage2000D, 5Mirage FI-CR, 1C-135, 1 E-3F,5 Jaguar, 3 SA-330,1 C-262 (deployed end 95). Elsewhere (p.32, IFOR discussion), it says the total deployment was 10,500.

France supplied about 47 aircraft (Sargent 2000 p.204). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that this is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel.

France deployed over 100 aircraft (primarily fighters, but also support), in the second largest contingent after the United States (see Peters et al 2001, p.18-21). Nowhere could I find reference to the total number of personnel. I operate on the assumption that such a large number of aircraft is at least equivalent to 1000 personnel.

UN vote / financing only

UN vote / financing only

No evidence of involvement
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>UN Vote/Financing Only</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNOMSIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2000, 2001: Token (1-3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Operation Palliser (UK)</td>
<td>No contribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>UNOMIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2004: Token (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>JTF Liberia (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>OMIB</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>SAPSD</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>AMIB</td>
<td></td>
<td>No contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>UNAVEM II (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Year(s)</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>UNAVEM II</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola III</td>
<td>MONUA</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1998: Token (3); Nothing noted for 99 b/c MONUA was removed in Feb 99, but they almost certainly stayed until the mission’s departure in 1999.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM I</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Provide Relief</td>
<td></td>
<td>No Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1993: 1083; No longer listed in MB 94 because the mission departed early in the year (before MB's tally). However, Wheeler (2000 p.199) notes that European forces withdrew with the United States in early 1994.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>According to its UN website, France spent 3 million Euro training 5,000 men to participate in AMISOM. The site also references contributions to the UN trust fund for additional support (at least some of which may have been funneled through the EU, the trust fund's largest donor). See Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations, &quot;Somalia,&quot; at <a href="http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article3820">http://franceonu.org/spip.php?article3820</a>, Accessed July 7, 2010.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Organization/Operation</td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1999 - 2009: Token</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC II</td>
<td>Operation Artemis (EU)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB 2003: 900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>ECOMICI/ECOFORCE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>France provided logistical / communications support for contingents from Senegal, Togo, and Niger (Kabia 2009 p.145).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB 2005: 186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>Operation Licorne (France)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>According to Whiteman and Yates (2004 p.366), they had 2,500 deployed by January 2003, later increased to 4,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>MOG/NMOG I, II (OAU)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Support Hope (US)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / North-South Civil War</td>
<td>UNMIS (2005)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>AMIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I have not seen any references to bilateral French support for AMIS, but both the EU and NATO played significant roles, and France contributed through them (beginning in 2004 in the case of the EU). See eg, Ekengard 2008, US GAO 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Note</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2009: Token (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>EUFOR TCHAD/RCA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 2008: 1500; MB 2009: 1711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan / Darfur</td>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only (for 09, only relevant year)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/ Southern Inter-communal</td>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 2008: Token (1); MB 2009: None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War with Ethiopia</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB 2001: 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>ONUSAL (1991)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>MB 1993: Deployed civilian police (but not till 93), so deployed no military personnel and nothing until well after the end of the complex emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>Provide Comfort</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 1992: in Turkey, 150 personnel and an air unit with 8 Mirage F-1CR, and 1 C-135; MB 1993: 100 personnel in Turkey; 4 Mirage F1-CR, 4 Jaguar, 1 C-135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq / Kurds II</td>
<td>UNGCI</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UN vote / financing only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Civil War &amp; Israeli</td>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>In September 1982 France deployed about 1500 troops (O'Balance 1998 p.120); Caligaris (1984 p.266) notes that the contingent, like those of the US and Italy, was &quot;about 2000&quot; men.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invasion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex Emergency</td>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>Resources: Australia</td>
<td>Sources/Justification: Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>MB 1996: 245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks</td>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>MB 2007: UNIFIL, 208, plus UNIFIL II, 1445; The UN's Lebanon background webpage notes they arrived by 15 Sept 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution was 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>According to Horner et al (2009), the Australian contribution was 5500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines/Govt. vs. Islamists</td>
<td>IMT</td>
<td></td>
<td>No evidence of involvement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part B: Protection Instructions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Emergency</th>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Instructions</th>
<th>Justification &amp; Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan I / Soviets</td>
<td>UNGOMAP</td>
<td>May 1988 – March 1990</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>UNGOMAP’s purpose was to oversee the implementation of the 1988 Geneva Accords (more formally, the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan). These included, inter alia, a non-interference and non-intervention pact between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a plan for the return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan, and provisions for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. According to the UN’s summary of the mission, “The mandate of UNGOMAP was derived from the Accords and included the monitoring of (1) non-interference and non-intervention by the parties in each other’s affairs; (2) the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and (3) the voluntary return of refugees.” In this context, UNGOMAP monitors were tasked with investigating and reporting on any violations of the Accords, and observing the progress of refugee return to Afghanistan. They engaged in no civilian protection activities as defined in this project. See the UN’s UNGOMAP mandate and background pages at <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/mandate.html">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/mandate.html</a> and <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/ungomap/background.html</a>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNAMIC</td>
<td>October 1991 – March 1992</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>According to the UN, UNAMIC was established to “assist the Cambodian parties to maintain their ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and to initiate mine-awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged to include training in mine-clearance and the initiation of a mine-clearance programme.” The mission thus engaged in no civilian protection activities as defined here. See the UN’s UNAMIC pages at <a href="http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamic.htm">http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamic.htm</a>.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>UNTAC</td>
<td>February 1992 –</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia / East Timor</td>
<td>INTERFET</td>
<td>September 1999 – February 2000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNTAC was established with the primary purpose of implementing the Paris Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict. Its mandate included numerous civil and military tasks related to "human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and resettlement of the Cambodian refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure during the transitional period" (see the UN's UNTAC mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untacmandate.html). According to the text of the mandate as laid out in the Paris Agreements, UNTAC's military functions were purely those of a traditional peacekeeping operation, emphasizing supervision, monitoring, verification, and liaison tasks, along with confiscating weapons and assistance with mine clearance and mine awareness. See also UN Security Council Resolution 745 and the text of the Paris Agreements, available from the United States Institutes of Peace's Peace Agreements Digital Collection at www.usip.org/files/file/...agreements/agree_comppol_10231991.pdf

In September of 1999, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a multinational force (which became INTERFET) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, “to restore peace and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET [the UN civilian mission] in carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate humanitarian assistance operations, and authorizes the States participating in the multinational force to take all necessary measures to fulfill this mandate.” Although these tasks do not explicitly mention civilian protection, in the context of the resolution it is clear that this was the purpose of the goal to “restore peace and security in East Timor.” Within the authorizing resolution, the Security Council emphasized the humanitarian nature of the security work to be done, including “the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian assistance and the importance of allowing full, safe and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations and calls upon all parties to cooperate with such organizations so as to ensure the protection of civilians at risk, the safe return of refugees and displaced persons and the effective delivery of humanitarian aid.” What is more, this is how the Australian-led force interpreted the mission. For the text of the mandate see UN Security Council Resolution 1264. For further discussion, see the East Timor case study in Chapter 6.
Established by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII in October 1999, UNTAET was to take over from INTERFET once the latter had fulfilled its mandate of restoring peace and security in East Timor. This handover occurred in late February 2000. UNTAET was mandated to provide the main civilian administration in the territory, and in the security arena, "To provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory of East Timor." It was authorized to take all necessary measures to full its mandate. This mandate authorized it to provide the same level of security and protection as INTERFET before it, although in practice the security situation had improved sufficiently by UNTAET's deployment. For the text of the mandate see UN Security Council Resolution 1272.

Though none of the potential interveners contributed to the IMT through 2009, its mandate is to observe and monitor the implementation of the Tripoli Peace Agreement of June 2001 between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Government of the Philippines. It is organized under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). According to Mays (2011, p.145), the mission consists of about 29 unarmed observers. In addition, the text of the Tripoli Agreement is available from the United States Institute of Peace's Peace Agreement Digital Collection at www.usip.org/.../peace_agreements/implement_guide_08072001.pdf

None of the potential interveners contributed to the IPKF, which was conducted exclusively by India. Cursory research was insufficient to determine the protection instructions that would have applied. A brief summary is available in Mays (2011, p.133). In addition, following the end of the complex emergency in 2001, from 2002 until 2008 a Scandinavian-led civilian mission known as the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) oversaw the ceasefire between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). For more information see http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/negotiations/monitoring-mission or http://www.norway.lk/Embassy/Peace-Process/Sri-Lanka-Monitoring-Mission/ (both accessed February 22, 2012).
The CIS/PKF is another force to which none of the potential interveners contributed. It was composed of soldiers from Russia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Uzbekistan. It engaged in at least some civilian protection as defined here, by protecting humanitarian convoys (as well as strategic installations, foreign diplomats, and the personnel of international organizations). For information on the mission see Goryayev (2001) and Mays (2011 p.82).

At the same time, Russia was also directly involved in the war on the side of the Tajik government, with troops deployed in the country and border guards stationed to oppose cross-border raids by Tajik opposition forces encamped in Afghanistan. Indeed, it was in considerable part the heavy casualties suffered by Russian forces in 1993 that prompted Moscow to pursue the possibility of a regional peacekeeping force. Even once the CIS force was deployed, Russian border guards continued to act against the opposition forces, in defiance of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. This led the Tajik opposition forces to perceive the CIS peacekeepers as hostile as well (see Dubnov (1996), and MB: 1994 p.118, and 1995 p. 106, 151).

One might argue that these realities disqualify the mission as a peace operation. On the other hand, it was separate from the other Russian forces. I code it a 2, although this has no bearing on the results presented in the chapter given the non-participation of the potential interveners in the mission.

UNMOT’s purpose was to monitor the temporary ceasefire agreement (aka the Tehran Agreement) signed by the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition in September 1994, and its subsequent extension. The main tasks laid out in UNMOT’s mandate involved assisting the Joint Ceasefire Commission in monitoring the implementation of the agreement and investigating and reporting on ceasefire violations. In November 1997, after the signing of a general peace agreement in June, UNMOT’s mandate was expanded, and its size increased, to allow it to help oversee implementation of this new accord. Its responsibilities, however, remained limited to monitoring and investigation, providing advice and facilitating coordination among the parties, and coordination of UN assistance to Tajikistan. Thus, at no time did UNMOT monitors engage in any civilian protection activities as defined in this project. See the UN’s UNMOT mandate and background pages at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotM.htm and at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmot/UnmotB.htm.
While UNPROFOR was initially established in Croatia in February 1992, it first began to operate in Bosnia and Herzegovina in a sustained fashion that summer, with a primary role of helping to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian relief at Sarajevo airport. In September, its primary goal became the protection of humanitarian relief operations, and it was also authorized to protect convoys of released civilian detainees under the care of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (see the UN’s UNPROFOR background page at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_b.htm and Security Council Resolution 776). In 1993, the Security Council also asked it to protect and oversee several ‘safe areas’ for Bosnian civilians (see UN Security Council Resolutions 819 and 824).

But despite its orientation toward civilian protection, UNPROFOR’s rules of engagement and traditional peacekeeping authorization under Chapter VI of the UN Charter effectively undermined the basic goals for which it was ostensibly authorized. As Seybolt explains, “while the resolution [776] enlarged UNPROFOR’s mandate and authorized an increase in the number of troops to protect aid operations, it severely hobbled the UN force by maintaining a consensual peacekeeping approach. The central assumption of the operation was that the mere presence of UN troops would constitute a sufficient deterrent. Aid convoys were to be escorted in a ‘benign way’ and force was to be used only in self-defence. In effect this meant that aid only got through when the warring parties agreed to let it through” (2008 p.160-61). In addition, he notes, national contingents differed in their willingness to use force, but “all were constrained by their peacekeeping mandate to use minimal force and only use it in self-defence. The rules of engagement did not allow them to pursue hostile militiamen or permanently dismantle roadblocks” (Seybolt 2008 p.161). These same restrictions applied even under Resolutions 819 and 824, which authorized troops only to threaten force in defense of the safe areas, rather than to actually use it. As Seybolt (2008 p.198) points out, “Self-defence, of course, was not the same thing as defending civilians or defending territory.”

In sum, UNPROFOR was on the one hand asked to protect civilians directly, primarily through the use of safe areas, but on the other hand, these instructions were effectively negated because it was not allowed to use force to do so. As a result, I code the mission’s protection instructions a 2 due to the use of inappropriate military strategies.
During the war in Bosnia, NATO undertook a series of coordinated operations – Provide Promise, Deny Flight, and Sharp Guard – whose primary roles were to provide support to the UN mission. Because of their shared basic purpose and coordination in support of another mission I treat them as one operation. Beginning in 1992, Operation Provide Promise helped to deliver relief aid (by airdrop), while Sharp Guard was a naval operation to help enforce UN sanctions. Neither contributed directly to civilian protection as defined here, and both would be coded a 1. Beginning in 1993, however, and until the deployment of IFOR in 1995, the aerial mission Operation Deny Flight played a three-fold role: “1. To conduct aerial monitoring and enforce compliance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816, which bans flights by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the "No-Fly Zone" (NFZ); 2. To provide close air support (CAS) to UN troops on the ground at the request of, and controlled by, United Nations forces; 3. To conduct, after request by and in coordination with the UN, approved air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN-declared safe areas” (see NATO, “AFSOUTH Factsheets: Operation Deny Flight,” at http://www.afsouth.nato.int/archives/operations/DenyFlight/DenyFlightFactSheet.htm. Accessed July 10, 2010).

Through Operation Deny Flight, then, NATO support to UNPROFOR helped contribute directly to UNPROFOR’s civilian protection goals beginning in 1993. Still, because it acted from the air in an environment involving ethnic cleansing on the ground, and in coordination with a ground force whose own rules of engagement left it unfit to effectively protect civilians, the mission’s protection instructions are best coded as a 2. As Seybolt (2008 p.198) put it, in this context air power “could be used for punishment but was inadequate by itself for defence [of civilians].”

Operation Deliberate Force was a NATO bombing campaign intended to coerce Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to end the war in Bosnia. Although it was intended primarily to protect civilians from continued Serb aggression, I code it as a 2 because the military strategies used – the exclusive use of an aerial bombing campaign in the face of mass killing and genocide on the ground – were not well suited to providing for civilians’ security and protection needs (for discussion see eg, Seybolt 2008 p.238-39).
IFOR was a large ground-based peacekeeping operation that followed Operation Deliberate Force and the signing of the Dayton Agreement, or General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in December 1995. Although authorized under UN Chapter VII, IFOR’s mandate made clear that its primary role would be that of a traditional peacekeeping force, above all involving monitoring and enforcing compliance with the terms of the agreement. In addition, though, it would be authorized to pursue supporting tasks within its available capabilities, to include helping to create secure conditions for the activities of humanitarian relief operations and “to observe and prevent interference with the movement of civilian populations, refugees, and displaced persons, and to respond appropriately to deliberate violence to life and person” (See UN Security Council Resolution 1031 and, for the quote, Annex 1-A of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Clearly this authorized the force to provide some civilian protection as the term is used here, but relative to the needs generated by a war that involved mass killing and genocide, it can at most be coded a 2.

UNPROFOR in Croatia is a difficult mission to code. The force was initially authorized in February 1992 following six months of war and then a November 1991 cease-fire – affirmed in January 1992 – between the military representatives of the Republic of Croatia and the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). In this context the force was “to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.” In practice, it deployed in a series of regions known as United Nations Protected Areas (and later, some additional areas), “in which the United Nations Security Council judged that special interim arrangements were required to ensure that a lasting cease-fire was maintained.” Specifically, these were areas in which Serbs comprised a significant portion of the population and inter-communal tensions had led to conflict that, the Security Council feared, might flare up again. The mission’s mandate was “to ensure that the UNPAs are demilitarized, through the withdrawal or disbandment of all armed forces in them, and that all persons residing in them are protected from fear of armed attack. To this end, UNPROFOR is authorized to control access to the UNPAs, to ensure that the UNPAs remain demilitarized, and to monitor the functioning of the local police there to help ensure non-discrimination and the protection of human rights. Outside the UNPAs, UNPROFOR military observers are to verify the withdrawal of all the JNA and irregular forces from Croatia, other than those disbanded and demobilized there. In support of the work of the humanitarian agencies of the United Nations, UNPROFOR is also to facilitate the return, in conditions of safety and security, of civilian displaced persons to their homes in the UNPAs.” As in Bosnia later on, it was authorized under UN Chapter VI and could use force only in self-defense. (For all of the above quotes see the UN’s UNPROFOR
The difficult question to answer here is whether UNPROFOR’s instructions made ‘some’ or ‘adequate’ provision for civilian protection given the circumstances of the war itself. On the one hand, there were clear ethnic dimensions to the conflict, which on the government’s side had involved “brutal military and police actions against Serbs living in Croatia” (Seybolt 2008 p.62). On the other, overall, ethnic cleansing and other large-scale rights abuses were a much smaller problem in Croatia than in the other complex emergencies where I judge a similar commitment to civilian protection as inadequate in the face of the threat to civilian life. The threat of attacks against the protected areas for the purpose of harming civilians seems legitimately to have been lower. As a result, it is far more difficult to argue here that the conduct of the war or conditions on the ground clearly required more robust protection than UNPROFOR was asked to undertake. As a result, I code the mission a 3, but there may also be an argument for a 2.

UNCRO was deployed to replace UNPROFOR in Croatia, although the two forces are often considered together. Its mandate involved “(a) performing the functions envisaged in the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994; (b) facilitating implementation of the economic agreement of 2 December 1994; (c) facilitating implementation of all relevant Security Council resolutions; (d) assisting in controlling, by monitoring and reporting, the crossing of military personnel, equipment, supplies and weapons, over the international borders between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) at the border crossings; (e) facilitating the delivery of international humanitarian assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the territory of Croatia; and (f) monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula” (see the UN’s UNCRO page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/uncro.htm). It does not appear to have engaged in any civilian protection activities.

UNTAES was established as a transitional administration to govern the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, beginning in January 1996. The mission had both military and civilian components, the former of which was authorized to “supervise and facilitate the demilitarization of the Region; monitor the voluntary and safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes of origin in cooperation with UNHCR; contribute, by its presence, to the maintenance of peace and security in the region; and otherwise assist in implementation of the Basic Agreement” (which provided for the peaceful integration of the region into Croatia). It engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See the UN page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untaes_p.htm.
As the UN’s website states, “In accordance with its mandate, the Mission monitored the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula and of the neighbouring areas in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and held regular meetings with the local authorities in order to strengthen liaison, reduce tensions, improve safety and security and promote confidence between the parties. The Chief Military Observer also maintained contact with the authorities in Zagreb and Belgrade.” Thus, it was a traditional monitoring mission, and pursued no civilian protection tasks. See the UN’s mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmop/mandate.html.

Like Deliberate Force before it, Operation Allied Force was a NATO bombing campaign intended to coerce Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to halt violent attacks against civilians – this time, in the majority-Albanian province of Kosovo. As British Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson described in March 1999, “The military objective of these operations is absolutely clear cut. It is to avert an impending humanitarian catastrophe by disrupting violent attacks” (quoted in Seybolt 2008 p.249; see also p.246 for the full list of NATO’s publicly articulated objectives). But although the mission’s primary purpose was to protect civilians, I code it as a 2 because the military strategies used – the exclusive use of an aerial bombing campaign in the face of an ethnic cleansing campaign on the ground – remained, as it had been in Bosnia, poorly suited to providing for civilians’ security and protection needs. What is more, explicit efforts to limit risks to NATO pilots and crew made this situation worse. In particular, the requirement that all NATO flights be conducted above 15,000 feet made the bombing campaign not only “less effective against military targets, but it also endangered civilians on the ground more than low-altitude operations would have done” (Seybolt 2008 p.248). What is more, in practice the campaign helped encourage Serb forces to intensify their attacks, leading to a mass exodus of Kosovar civilians and the subsequent deployment of KFOR in order to ensure their safe return (see eg, Seybolt 2008 p.249).

KFOR was a large NATO ground operation that followed Operation Allied Force. As Seybolt describes, it was “designed to protect civilians and aid operations” (2008 p.215) and was “intended as a deterrent to protect the safe zone that had just come into being” (p.216). Its mandate was “to deter renewed hostilities, enforce the ceasefire, demilitarize the KLA and establish a secure environment for the implantation of the four pillars” of humanitarian assistance, democratization and institution building, economic development, and civil administration (Seybolt 2008 p.216). On the ground, KFOR soldiers “helped in the
transport of relief material through unsafe areas, guarded warehouses and provided a general security umbrella for the repatriation of refugees. The presence of NATO troops made Kosovar Albanians feel safe” (Seybolt 2008 p.217). In sum, the mission’s main purpose was civilian protection, and in effect it turned the entire province into one large safe zone in the aftermath of Allied Force (though with some initial difficulty protecting ethnic Serb residents). I code its protection instructions as a 3.

In 1991, rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched a war to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone. Initially, under the guise of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Nigeria deployed troops in a force known as the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to help Sierra Leone’s army defend the government. Although the army then overthrew the government the following year, the RUF continued to fight. At this time the force cannot be considered a peace operation as defined here.

Other international involvement in the conflict was slow to develop. Along with other diplomats, the UN Secretary General’s special envoy helped mediate a November 1996 peace agreement – the Abidjan Accord – between the government and the RUF. Another coup in May 1997, however, destroyed the agreement: the army and the RUF joined to form a ruling junta, while the democratically elected president – Ahmad Kabbah, who came to power following February 1996 elections marred by widespread RUF abuses against civilians – was forced into exile.

According to John Kabia (2009 p.110), after this coup “Hundreds of [Nigerian] ECOMOG troops stationed in Liberia were moved to bolster the skeletal ECOMOG force based in Freetown’s Lungi Airport,” where they began operations against the junta (see also MB 1997 p.230; Berman and Labonte 2006 p.154). Following these events, in August 1997 ECOWAS foreign ministers formally imposed sanctions and an oil and weapons embargo on the junta and mandated ECOMOG to “monitor the ceasefire, enforce sanctions and embargo and secure the peace in Sierra Leone” (quoted in Kabia 2009 p.111). As Berman and Labonte put it, “ECOMOG’s principal focus was to stabilize the country. The force was to deploy throughout Sierra Leone, control select entry points into Sierra Leone in connection with the embargo, and monitor roadblocks and the movement of arms and ammunition. ECOMOG was to oversee the disarmament of ex-combatants at designated areas, and to conduct patrols with an eye toward establishing freedom of movement and governmental authority. The peacekeeping mission was to provide security for key individuals, including UN and nongovernmental organization (NGO) personnel, and to assist in protecting refugees and internally displaced persons” (2006 p.150). In October, the Security Council also imposed sanctions, and authorized ECOMOG to enforce them (see Resolution 1132). To do so, it used “regular naval patrols off the shores of Freetown and
reconnaissance flights of Nigerian alpha jets” (Kabia 1999 p.112), but was also criticized for shelling ships carrying relief supplies to the region (Kabia 2009 p.113). Although it is difficult to decide when the mission transformed to a peace operation, I designate May 1997, since at this point it began defending a government that lacked the means to defend itself. Alternatively, one could argue that its role as a peace operation began in August, when a clear mandate was authorized.

Also in October 1997, at Conakry, Guinea, ECOWAS helped to negotiate another ceasefire with the junta (known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, or AFRC), which ECOMOG would theoretically monitor. In practice, it was never actually implemented, but allowed the junta to remain in power for several more months while completely ignoring the agreement (see Kabia 2009 p.111-12). Then, in February 1998, after being attacked by the RUF/AFRC, ECOMOG drove them from the capital, Freetown, and reinstated President Kabbah in March. After this, with the RUF and AFRC running amok in the countryside and attacking civilians at will, the force began to engage in substantial civilian protection activities. During this time, as Kabia describes, it “was forced to deploy in major towns and cities across the country to protect civilians from AFRC/RUF violence. In these difficult circumstances, ECOMOG was able to provide military deterrence to the RUF and use robust action to bring a semblance of security and stability to the traumatised civilians. This achievement earned them the respect and admiration of Sierra Leoneans which is evident to this day. Just like they did in Liberia, the troops facilitated the resumption of normal services in their areas of deployment like schools and hospitals...the troops have also been credited for evacuating “to safety and medical facilities some of the hundreds of victims of amputations and other injuries” (2009 p.118). The mission also attempted to develop and protect safe havens, but again as in Liberia (see below), faced a severe lack of the resources and support to deploy across the entire country and reach less populated areas (Kabia 2009 p.119). As in Liberia as well, the troops “were reported to have shared their rations and even assisted with the reconstruction of key infrastructure like roads, schools and bridges” but these activities were primarily ad hoc and unplanned, again largely due to inadequate resources (Kabia 2009 p.118-19).

Partly because of ECOMOG’s insufficient resources, the RUF/AFRC rebels were able to launch a major offensive in December 1998 that allowed them to retake Freetown in January 1999. This offensive was terrible for the city’s civilian population, involving “massive loss of life and unspeakable human rights abuses” (Kabia 2009 p.120), including some 5,000 civilian deaths (Berman and Labonte 2006 p.155). The same month, ECOMOG retook the city and reinstated the Kabbah government, but Berman and Labonte (2006 p.155) note that human rights advocates criticized this campaign for excessive use of force and human rights abuses.

After this, international pressure for new negotiations led to the July 1999 Lomé
agreement which, among other things, provided for the establishment of a new, larger UN
peacekeeping mission to replace ECOMOG. The new force, UNAMSIL, was authorized in
October 1999 (see discussion below). ECOMOG continued to operate alongside UNAMSIL
until May 2000 (Kabia 2009 p.127). As Berman and Labonte note, during this period,
“ECOMOG continued to play the lead role on the ground. It was responsible for the
security of government officials, UN staff, and humanitarian agency and NGO personnel, as
well as cantoned ex-combatants awaiting demobilization...The West African force also
established safe corridors and suitable locations for refugee and IDP resettlement,
conducted security patrols, and guarded strategic locations, including weapon storage sites
associated with the DDR process” (2006 p.163).

I code ECOMOG a 2 for protection instructions, although a case might be made for
either 2 or 3. On the one hand, the force engaged in ambitious civilian protection activities
that were appropriate to the needs civilians faced (even if it lacked the resources to do so
more thoroughly). On the other, it had additional duties related to overseeing the
sanctions and to participating in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. But
while these duties are not sufficient to code it a 2 rather than a 3, the force also faced
serious allegations that some of its activities undermined humanitarian outcomes (more so
than in Liberia, as discussed below). In addition to shelling the relief ships and the
excessive use of force already mentioned, it was also accused of “summary torture and
execution of suspected RUF combatants and their sympathizers and the harassment of
civilians at check points,” and was also criticized for “its inability or unwillingness to stop
the reprisal killings of rebels and their sympathisers by civilians after the restoration of
democracy in February 1998” (Kabia p.121). For these reasons, I code it a 2. [In practice,
however, this has no effect on the results reported in the chapter, as no potential
intervener contributed more than financial support].

UNOMSIL was authorized “to monitor the military and security situation in Sierra Leone,
as well as the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was also asked to
assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law.” All of its tasks were
monitoring-related, and it engaged in no civilian protection. See the UN’s UNOMSIL pages
at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unomsil/unomsil.htm and
As noted above, after the signing of the Lomé Agreement, in October 1999 the Security Council authorized a new force, UNAMSIL, to help implement its provisions. The mission’s mandate consisted of traditional peacekeeping tasks, primarily focusing on facilitating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of combatants and monitoring of the ceasefire, as well as facilitating humanitarian assistance and elections, and providing support to UN officials (See UN Security Council Resolution 1270). In February 2000, the Security Council asked the mission to engage in a series of additional related tasks (see Security Council Resolution 1289). Finally, in March 2001 (Security Council Resolution 1346), it again revised the concept of operations. According to paragraph 58 of the relevant report of the Secretary General [S/201/228 of 14 March 2001], “The main objectives of UNAMSIL...remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections.”

From the beginning, UNAMSIL was also authorized secondarily, under Chapter VII of the UN charter, to protect civilians under “imminent threat of physical violence.” Although Sierra Leone’s civil war is not coded as associated with mass killing or genocide, the brutality of the RUF’s campaign of violence and atrocities against civilians has been widely recognized. As Seybolt (2008 p.177) put it, “murdering and torturing civilians was the main occupation of the Revolutionary United Front.” What is more, the RUF had by no means been defeated by 1999 or early 2000. Thus, a peace operation with a more ambitious protection focus would have been reasonable in the context of the war, and I code UNAMSIL’s protection instructions as a 2.

In May 2000, UNAMSIL came under attack from the RUF and was unable to protect itself, let alone carry out its other duties or provide security for civilians (see eg, Seybolt p.182). The UK swiftly deployed troops to evacuate noncombatants, but as Berman and Labonte describe, soon decided “to formally extend its deployment and assist the government of Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL in shoring up security until troops from other countries arrived to reinforce the mission...” (2006 p.181). According to MB (2000 p.254), “By July 2000, this effort had helped to obtain the release of the UN hostages and to stem the RUF offensive.” After this, the UK maintained a presence in the country to help train Sierra Leone’s armed forces and as a deterrent to the RUF. This included an offshore, over-the-horizon force, which came ashore periodically to engage in visible patrols, at least through 2003 (see Berman and Labonte 2006 p.181 and UK National Archives, “The UK’s Strategy Toward Sierra Leone,” at http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/
This is another difficult mission to code. The UK force participated directly in improving security, but its main purpose was to support UNAMSIL, and I have not seen evidence of extensive direct civilian protection activity or intent. On this basis, I code its protection instructions the same as those of UNAMSIL itself, as a 2.

ECOMOG’s name, the ECOWAS Military Observer Group, is a misnomer, as the force engaged in extensive civilian protection activity, which appears to have comprised its main role in Liberia.

As Kabia describes, “ECOMOG landed in Liberia on 24 August 1990 with the stated mandate of ‘keeping the peace, restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease fire is respected’” (2009 p.74). The operation coincided with a series of diplomatic efforts to initiate a successful peace process and bring about a negotiated end to the fighting. In practice, however, “this mandate was very ambitious as there was no peace to keep neither was there any cease-fire to observe” (Kabia 2009 p.74). For the first two years the force lacked any UN authorization, but Security Council Resolution 788 of November 1992 commended the mission, and in particular asked that it continue its efforts to implement the (at that time) most recent agreement, the Yamoussoukro IV Accord from October 1991. In practice, though, the forceful restoration of law and order appears to have been the aspect of the mandate that received the greatest emphasis.

As Kabia outlines, the mission undertook extensive humanitarian and civilian-protection tasks, taking on these roles “by default” even though they were not clearly spelled out in the mandate (2009 p.80). Despite immense challenges, “ECOMOG was able to establish a de facto safe haven in Monrovia and its environs between 1990 and 1997, with the zone coming under attack in 1992 and 1996. As well as protecting the perimeter of the security zone from external NPFL attacks, ECOMOG also took on internal policing roles aimed at maintaining law and order within the zone. This ensured that there was a semblance of security and safety, some basic facilities like water supply, shelter, medical care and education. Another positive outcome of ECOMOG’s safe haven was the cessation of reprisal ethnic killings...In sharp contrast, areas outside ECOMOG control and under factions were considered high risk with high incidence of rape, torture, hunger and

*Liberia I ECOMOG August 1990 – 1999*  

I have not found a source that clearly dates the departure of the last ECOMOG troops, but MB 1998 (p.236) notes that ECOWAS retained a residual force and MB 1999 (p.246) notes that there was still a small ECOMOG training mission in place. Clearly by this time, however, ECOMOG was no longer engaging in the extensive civilian protection efforts of earlier years.
insecurity. A study carried out by Outram (1997) shows a vast difference in the quality of life between people living in the ECOMOG zone and those without” (Kabia 2009 p.80). More directly still, “At the height of the fighting in Monrovia in 1990, ECOMOG reportedly evacuated civilians in their naval boats to the relative safety of neighbouring countries” (Kabia 2009 p.81).

ECOMOG also provided important security for humanitarian efforts, escorting and protecting organizations outside Monrovia and providing security in the capital that allowed aid agencies that had left to return (Kabia 2009 p.82-83). In addition, although the mission did not itself have an official planning mechanism for the delivery of humanitarian aid, “individual units were able to share their rations with the deprived people of Monrovia” (Kabia 2009 p.80). (As Kabia also describes, the force could have provided even more protection had it not suffered a critical lack of key resources, troops, and intelligence capabilities (2009 p.81-82)).

Despite its many good works, ECOMOG did nevertheless come under fire for the anti-humanitarian outcomes of some of its actions. Some troops committed human rights violations, and as relations with the international relief community deteriorated over time, on occasion ECOMOG troops even attacked aid convoys traveling through rebel areas because they suspected them of assisting the rebels (see Kabia p.86-87). Despite these problems, which seem less severe than those involving the ECOMOG force in Sierra Leone (see above), I code the operation a 3 because it made extensive efforts to protect civilians and had the authority to use force to defend them against attacks. Kabia does not, however, provide sufficient detail to differentiate between possible over-time differences in the level of protection the mission sought to provide.

UNOMIL was initially established to support ECOMOG in implementing the 1993 Cotonou peace agreement, and subsequently, a series of supplementary ones. More specifically, according to the UN it was “to exercise good offices in support of the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States and the Liberian National Transitional Government to implement peace agreements; investigate alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and verify elections” (See the UN’s UNOMIL page http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomil.htm). Consistent with a monitoring mission, its tasks revolved around monitoring, investigation, observation, and verification, as well as providing technical assistance and training in humanitarian fields (See the UN’s UNOMIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomilM.htm). It engaged in no civilian protection activities as the term is defined here.
Over the first half of 2003, the second war in Liberia deteriorated badly, with devastating effects for civilians. International pressure led to a ceasefire in June and a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in August. In addition, on August 1 the UN authorized a Multinational Force – together comprised of ECOMIL and JTF Liberia (see below) – to deploy to “support the implementation of the 17 June 2003 ceasefire agreement, including establishing conditions for initial stages of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities, to help establish and maintain security in the period after the departure of the current President and the installation of a successor authority, taking into account the agreements to be reached by the Liberian parties, and to secure the environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and to prepare for the introduction of a longer-term United Nations stabilization force to relieve the Multinational Force” (see UN Security Council Resolution 1497). This mandate clearly allowed the force to provide at least some civilian protection, in particular by ensuring a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief. At the same time, it is not totally clear about the relative emphasis the force might place on the other aspects that could be interpreted as authorizing civilian protection, including ‘establishing and maintaining security.’ In practice, moreover, it is difficult to distinguish the extent to which such protection was either seen as the mission’s primary purpose or to which the activities it undertook were adequate to the needs raised by the war in Liberia. On the one hand, according to the Military Balance (2004 p.202), the main idea was for ECOWAS “to provide troops to bring about a separation of forces” to prepare the way for President Charles Taylor to leave the country. On the other, as Kabia points out (2009 p.159), the force was able despite limited numbers “to stabilise the fluid security situation in Monrovia, provide protection for hundreds of thousands of civilians and establish safe corridors for the delivery of humanitarian aid. ECOWAS foot patrols and visible presence also resulted in the decline of general lawlessness and restored public confidence. Besides its policing role, the mission also established a weapons-free zone in and around Monrovia.” While the force’s failure to deploy outside Monrovia meant that “rebels continued to terrorise defenceless civilians” (Kabia 2009 p.159), this was a problem of resources rather than protection instructions.

I code the mission’s protection instructions a 2 given the war’s severity and combatants’ blatant disregard for civilian life (for more see the Complex Emergency Coding Notes), as these conditions might reasonably have justified an even more protection-focused mission. Still, there may also be an argument for coding a 3. [As with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone above, this would not affect the coding of all of the potential interveners’ contributions as gap-dominated].
JTF Liberia’s UN authorization was the same as for ECOMIL, as discussed above. Statements by U.S. officials about the force’s primary goals and tasks — which mainly involved support to ECOMIL, and mainly emphasized the mission’s role in helping promote a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian relief — suggest that it should be coded a 2. For example, President Bush pointed out that the job of the small contingent of the U.S. force that actually went onshore was “to help secure an airport and a port so food can be off-loaded and the delivery process begun to help people in Monrovia...our mission there is to help ECOWAS, help ECOMIL provide humanitarian aid” (see Africa News, August 18, 2003). Likewise, Pentagon director of operations General Norton Schwartz told reporters in mid-August that JTF Liberia “is in place to assist (West African) forces to achieve a stable environment so that humanitarian assistance can be provided to the people of Liberia, and also to facilitate the transition to a U.N.-led international peacekeeping operation” (Tom Squitieri, USA Today, August 14, 2003).

UNMIL was established in September 2003 under UN Chapter VII as the follow-on UN mission to ECOMIL and JTF Liberia. In the security sector, its primary purpose was to support implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in August, through various observation, monitoring, and liaison tasks, and by providing practical support for the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR). It was also to help “establish the necessary security conditions” for humanitarian assistance and to protect UN personnel, facilities and civilians, “under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities” (see UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and the UN’s UNMIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/mandate.shtml). In 2005, it was also authorized to apprehend and detain former president Charles Taylor should he return to Liberia (Resolution 1638).

Thus, the force was clearly authorized to provide some civilian protection, but this was not its primary purpose nor was it authorized to engage in ambitious civilian protection tasks. I code its protection instructions as a 2. Although it was deployed after the worst of the violence and after the combination of ECOMOG and JTF Liberia had helped to stabilize the security situation, relative to the prevailing conditions during the war the limited level of protection it offered was clearly insufficient. The war in Liberia — though not coded as involving mass killing — was very severe and involved civilians as the clear and intended targets of violence, along with blatant disregard for civilian life by the combatant parties. For more see the Complex Emergency Coding Notes.
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<td>ONUB</td>
<td>May 2004 – December 2006</td>
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I did not use OMIB for coding for any of the observations associated with this complex emergency because none of the potential interveners participated or contributed directly. The mission was deployed in early 1994 in response to OAU concern that civil war in Rwanda could spread to Burundi. The organization sent about 47 observers (originally envisaged as about 400) to monitor the situation and help prevent conflict spillover. They engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See eg, Mays (2011, p.204-5).

Like OMIB, the SAPSD was not relevant to my coding of any of the observations associated with this complex emergency because none of the potential interveners participated. Nevertheless, according to Svensson (2008 p.11), it was "to act as a protection force for politicians, mainly Hutus, returning to the country to take part in the peace process." Thus, because it did not attempt to provide civilian protection as defined here, its protection instructions would be coded 1.

AMIB’s OAU-approved mandate primarily included traditional peacekeeping activities related to monitoring implementation of the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi signed on 8 October, 2003. In addition, although quite restrictive, the rules of engagement allowed troops to “protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (For full text of the mandate as well as discussion of the ROE see Svensson 2008 p.11-12). Since protection was not the primary goal, but the mandate reflected some authority to protect civilians in an environment characterized by mass killing (where more robust protection could thus have been justified), I code protection instructions as a 2.

Like AMIB, ONUB’s mandate primarily included traditional peacekeeping activities, but also allowed the force to protect civilians under imminent threat of violence and to help create the security conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance. Thus, like AMIB, I code the mission’s protection resources a 2. The full text of the mandate is available at the UN’s ONUB mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onub/mandate.html.
ONUMOZ’s purpose was to help implement the October 1992 General Peace Agreement ending the Mozambican civil war. Its responsibilities were limited to monitoring, investigation, and other general forms of assistance that did not include any civilian protection activities. Full text of the mandate and additional information are available at the UN’s ONUMOZ mandate and overview pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozM.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozF.html

UNAVEM I’s purpose was to monitor and verify the departure of some 50,000 Cuban troops from Angola. It engaged in no civilian protection activities. See the UN’s UNAVEM I pages at http://www.un.org/depts/DPKO/Missions/unavem1/UnavemIB.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavemi.htm.

UNAVEM II’s mandate underwent several iterations over the course of its deployment. Initially, and for the period applicable to this complex emergency, it was “to verify the arrangements agreed by the Angolan parties for the monitoring of the ceasefire and for the monitoring of the Angolan police during the ceasefire period.” This refers to the Peace Accords for Angola (also known as the Bicesse Accords), signed in May 1991 between the government of Angola and Jonas Savimbi, leader of the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Like UNAVEM I, it engaged in no civilian protection activities. See the UN’s UNAVEM II page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIM.htm.

In March 1992, before the outbreak of renewed war, UNAVEM II’s mandate was expanded to include oversight of Angola’s upcoming presidential and legislative elections. Once fighting resumed in October, the mission’s size was reduced and its mandate was adjusted “in order to help the two sides reach agreement on modalities for completing the peace process and, at the same time, to broker and help implement ceasefires at the national or local level.” Finally, in December 1994 it was authorized to verify the first stages of a new peace agreement, the Lusaka Protocol, signed in November. As before, it engaged in no civilian protection tasks. Again, see the UN’s UNAVEM II page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIM.htm.
In February 1995, the Security Council set up a new mission – UNAVEM III – to monitor and verify the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. This new mission was assigned a long list of monitoring, verification, and good offices tasks, none of which constitute contributing to civilian protection. See the UN’s UNAVEM background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unavem_p.htm.

MONUA was originally established in 1997 to follow on and help consolidate the progress in the peace process made under UNAVEM III. Its overall mandate was “to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country.” Civilian personnel carried out various political and humanitarian tasks, while MONUA’s military component was assigned various monitoring and investigative tasks. (See the UN’s mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monua/monuam.htm).

Thus, the mission was assigned no civilian protection activities, and given the relatively peaceful state in the country when it took over from UNAVEM III, this made sense. By mid-1998, however, UNITA violence resumed, and soon spread across much of the country. The humanitarian situation deteriorated dramatically and the progress made in the peace process was severely threatened. By this time, the UN had already begun a gradual drawdown of the force. This was temporarily suspended in response to the renewed violence, while the UN began to consider terminating the mission if the security situation did not improve. Still, the Security Council extended the mandate for several weeks at a time in August, September, and October. Another extension was granted on December 3, 1998, through February 26, 1999. After this, however, as fighting continued to intensify and UNITA repeated assaulted UN personnel – six UN-chartered aircraft were lost or shot down over UNITA territory between late 1998 and January 1999 – it became clear that there was no longer any place for a monitoring mission in Angola. The mission was terminated when the mandated expired in February. In sum, MONUA was purely a monitoring and verification mission, which never engaged in any civilian protection tasks. This reflected the context of its initial deployment, but not the violence and complex emergency situation it faced in late 1998. Because the UN did extend its mandate on several occasions during this time in the hope of resuming the peace process, however, it counts as a response to the new complex emergency and is coded as a 1. See the UN’s background page on MONUA, at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/monua/monuab.htm.
In April 1992, following a March ceasefire between the leaders of the two main parties to the violence in Somalia, Interim President Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Chairman of the United Somali Congress, General Mohamed Farah Aidid, the UN Security Council authorized UNOSOM I. Its intended purpose was to monitor the ceasefire and—as laid out in Resolution 775 from August 28—to provide security for the delivery of humanitarian assistance by protecting convoys and aid distribution centers throughout the country. In practice, the force “did not become operational until September because member states were reluctant to commit troops and equipment” (Seybolt 2008 p.149).

As in Bosnia, moreover, “The operation’s mandate itself prevented effective protection of aid operations. Under Chapter VI of the UN charter, soldiers were allowed to fire their weapons only in self-defence. The UN force interpreted the self-defence rule of engagement narrowly, rendering soldiers helpless onlookers when bandits threatened to shoot but did not actually do so” (Seybolt p.151). In addition, because Aidid opposed UNOSOM’s presence, the Secretary General’s Special Representative Mohamed Sahnoun negotiated an agreement with him that “severely limited what the soldiers were permitted to do and where they were allowed to go” (Seybolt 2008 p.150). Due to these restrictions, the force’s military strategies were poorly suited to its announced protection goals. It can at best be considered to have aimed to provide some of the protection needed, and I code it a 2. See Seybolt (2008 p.149-51) and the UN’s background and mandate pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1mandate.html, and.

As Seybolt describes Operation Provide Relief, “On 27 July 1992 the UN Security Council passed Resolution 767, authorizing member states to use military assets to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid by UN agencies and international NGOs in Somalia. The US military and its allies interpreted their mission to be an airlift of food and other supplies to Somalia from neighbouring Kenya…Once it was up and running, the operation flew supplies daily to…towns…in the hard-hit interior of southern Somalia” (2008 p.112). In practice, the mission was a purely logistical operation to provide humanitarian relief and engaged in no civilian protection activities. I code it a 1 for protection instructions.

Somalia  UNOSOM I  April 1992 – March 1993  2

Somalia  Provide Relief  July 1992 – February 1993  1
The humanitarian situation in Somalia continued to deteriorate through October and November 1992 despite UNOSOM I’s presence. UN troops and humanitarian relief workers came under attack, with the result that, “while relief supplies were ready and in the pipeline, only a trickle was reaching those in need” (see the UN’s UNOSOM I background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unosom1backgr2.html). On December 3, under UN Chapter VII, the Security Council authorized Member States to form the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), which would be mandated to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia” (see Security Council Resolution 794). In practice, UNITAF coordinated with UNOSOM I to secure major population centers and ensure the delivery and distribution of humanitarian assistance. But although the two missions shared the same primary purpose, a key difference was that UNITAF’s rules of engagement and military strategies were actually suited to creating a secure environment for humanitarian assistance operations. As Seybolt describes, “UNITAF successfully deterred attacks on aid operations because it communicated with the warlords, had military capability far in excess of anything the Somalis possessed, and demonstrated a willingness and an ability to use its power when deterrence was challenged” (2008 p.153; for more details on the tasks the force carried out see p.151-53). The rules of engagement reflected a delicate balance between using force too liberally, and using it when necessary to demonstrate the force’s resolve and ensure its effectiveness. As Seybolt describes, they “emphasized the non-combat nature of the operation and the importance of two fundamental principles of international and humanitarian law with regard to war: proportionality and minimal use of force. At the same time, the rules allowed soldiers to take the initiative in challenging individuals and groups whom they considered threatening and to use deadly force when they or their commanders deemed it appropriate” (2008 p.154). Within the context of the security environment in Somalia at the time, the goal of creating a secure environment for the delivery of relief aid was an adequate and appropriate response to civilians’ primary security needs, since the population was not being threatened by direct attacks on a significant scale. For these reasons, I code the mission a 3.
In March 1993, the UN Security Council authorized the considerable expansion of UNOSOM (referred to as UNOSOM II) in preparation for the departure of UNITAF. Concluding that the security environment in Somalia was not yet stable, the Council authorized the new UN force under Chapter VII of the UN charter, giving it broad powers to use force in pursuit of its mandate “to take appropriate action, including enforcement measures, to establish throughout Somalia a secure environment for humanitarian assistance.” To this end, the force was authorized to monitor the continued cessation of hostilities, take appropriate action to prevent the resumption of violence, maintain control of the militias’ heavy weapons, seize unauthorized small arms, secure “all ports, airports and lines of communications required for the delivery of humanitarian assistance,” protect UN and humanitarian agency personnel, engage in mine-clearance action, and assist in the repatriation of refugees and the displaced (see UN Security Council Resolution 814).

As with UNITAF, given the prevailing circumstances in Somalia the goal of restoring a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid seems to have been adequate. At the same time, however, Seybolt criticizes the mission for being too aggressive. In practice, UNOSOM II commanders sought to attack and defeat Aidid. Yet as Seybolt points out, from a humanitarian perspective this strategy “favours violence over peace in the short term. Since the potential cost in civilian lives is high, offensive action can be justified on humanitarian grounds only when the civilian mortality rate due to violence is already very high. Aidid was not a mass killer, so that going after him with force did not meet the criterion of proportionate response” (2008 p.236).

In some sense, then, the military strategies UNOSOM II employed were not appropriate given the mission’s goal of providing a secure environment for humanitarian relief and the circumstances of the complex emergency. Yet, this was not for the typical reasons: rather than being too weak, they were too strong. In this sense, the mission is difficult to fit into the coding scheme used here. Because of the similarity of its mandate to UNITAF’s, I code it a 3 for protection instructions. Still, it is worth noting that given these complicating factors, neither of the possible options (2 or 3) fully capture this unusual mission.

Finally, in February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II’s mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods, although its responsibilities still included, among others, protecting facilities and installations “vital to the provision of humanitarian relief and reconstruction assistance,” as well as the staff and equipment of UN agencies and NGOs providing humanitarian relief (See Security Council Resolution 897). This change in mandate, then, returned the force to essentially to the same protection instructions of UNOSOM I. After this point, it should be coded a 2.
In 2006, Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG) faced a serious threat from hardline Islamist groups who wanted to run the country under Sharia law. Two rounds of peace talks in Khartoum mediated by the Arab League were unsuccessful in resolving the political tensions. In December 2006, Ethiopian troops launched a major offensive against the Islamist forces and in support of the TFG. While this offensive was able to break up the Islamist forces, some of the fighters undertook guerrilla actions against the Ethiopians until they withdrew from the country. According to the AU, “Concurrently, as the international community called on Ethiopia to withdraw its troops from Somalia it also recognized the fact that Somalia will relapse into a state of anarchy without a strong force replacing the Ethiopians to assist the TFG consolidate its position” (see the African Union’s page on “Background and Political Developments” related to AMISOM at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_Background.htm).

In response to this situation, in January 2007 the AU’s Peace and Security Council mandated AMISOM to “conduct Peace Support Operations in Somalia to stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)” (see the AU’s AMISOM mandate page at http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/, accessed 02/23/2012). In practice, the force helped protect humanitarian assistance, such as by providing escorts to humanitarian convoys, and also provided it directly, such as by offering medical treatment to those in need (see “Burundi Deploys Third Battalion,” http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/AMISOMPRESS_WEEKLY.htm and “Amisom Partners Supports,” http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/auc/departments/psc/amisom/AMISOM_PARTNERS_SUPPORTS.htm).

As I am unaware of any restrictions on the rules of engagement that might limit the force’s ability to provide a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, and as this role seems appropriate to the security conditions in Somalia, which did not involve civilians as the targets of a large-scale campaign of rights abuses, but instead primarily threatened their access to humanitarian relief, I code the mission a 3.
In the latter half of the 2000s, piracy off the coast of Somalia represented a major threat to the delivery of humanitarian relief – in particular, to shipments from the World Food Programme (WFP). This phenomenon was therefore relevant to international efforts to respond to the ongoing complex emergency in Somalia.

Beginning in November 2007, several NATO countries began independently providing naval escorts for WFP ships in the region, though these escorts were not coordinated by NATO, the EU, or any other entity. To harmonize these efforts, two formal missions were launched in 2008: first, in response to a request from the UN Secretary General, NATO’s Operation Allied Provider deployed from October to December; then the EU’s NAVFOR Somalia (aka, Operation Atalanta); and then two more NATO operations, Allied Protector (March – August 2009) and Ocean Shield (August 2009 – present).

NATO’s first mission, Operation Allied Provider, escorted and provided protection for WFP vessels delivering aid to Somalia. By patrolling the waters off the Somali coast, it also helped to deter attacks against merchant ships. Similarly, Operation Allied Protector “helped to deter, defend against and disrupt pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa” (NATO, “Counter-Piracy Operations”). Operation Ocean Shield built on these missions, also expanding NATO’s anti-piracy approach by offering assistance to other states in the region in order to help them develop their own anti-piracy capabilities.

The EU mission Operation Atalanta primary tasks include “the protection of vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) delivering food aid to displaced persons in Somalia” and “the protection of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) shipping.” It also helps deter and prevent piracy off the Somali coast more broadly, to protect vulnerable shipping in the area on an ad hoc basis, and to monitor fishing activities (See the EU’s Atalanta “About Us” page at http://www.eunavfor.eu/about-us/mission/).

Given the inter-related efforts and coordination amongst these missions, I treat them all as a single operation, as with the various NATO support operations for UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia. Because these missions engaged in providing protection for the delivery of humanitarian assistance, they clearly qualify as providing civilian protection as defined here. In addition, because the security situation in Somalia did not involve large-scale attacks against civilians, but instead remained primarily a problem of insecure access to relief aid (as evidenced by the growing piracy problem), protecting aid operations was a reasonable way to address this threat. Thus I code the missions a 3.

MONUC’s initial mandate was laid out in UN Security Council Resolution 1291 of February 2000. At this time, its primary functions were those associated with traditional peacekeeping, emphasizing monitoring, liaison, and verification tasks. In addition, it had the authority, under Chapter VII, to “take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions and as it deems it within its capabilities, to protect United Nations and co-located JMC personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” Over the ensuing years, this mandate was revised several times. In October 2004, the Security Council clearly moved toward greater emphasis on responding to civilians’ needs, listing the goals of deploying and maintaining “a presence in the key areas of potential volatility in order to promote the re-establishment of confidence, to discourage violence, in particular by deterring the use of force to threaten the political process, and to allow United Nations personnel to operate freely, particularly in the Eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” and of ensuring “the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence” as the mission’s first two tasks (See Security Council Resolution 1565). Another, minor revision was made in January 2008 (Resolution 1797). In December 2008 the Security Council clearly made civilian protection the mission’s top priority (see below). While the initial mandate from 2000 should clearly be coded a 2, since it authorized the force to provide some protection in during a campaign of mass killing, and the mandate beginning in December 2008 should clearly be coded as a 3, the period from October 2004 to December 2008 might arguably be coded either way. Still, I code it as a 2 until December 2008 because, until this point, it is not clear that it meets the standard laid out in Chapter 2, that in the face of mass killing peace operations should have a primary goal of civilian protection.

+ Though note that a civil and military liaison mission including up to 90 military liaison officers was authorized under the name MONUC in Resolution 1258 of August 1999. Its functions did not meet those of a peace operation as defined here, however, until the Security Council authorized the deployment of troops with tasks directly related to the promotion and provision of security.
As noted above, in December 2008, the Security Council made another major revision to MONUC’s mandate, which remained under Chapter VII of the UN charter. While civilian protection remained one aspect of a mission with several additional tasks, it was also clearly and explicitly made the top priority. From this point forward, the mission’s primary tasks were to “1. Ensure the protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict; 2. Contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided, and assist in the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons; 3. Ensure the protection of United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment; 4. Ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel; [and] 5. Carry out joint patrols with the national police and security forces to improve security in the event of civil disturbance.” (It would also continue to contribute to “disarmament, demobilization, and monitoring of foreign and Congolese armed groups,” as well as “training and mentoring of the FARDC in support for security sector reform”). Thus, from this point forward I code the mission’s protection instructions as 3. See UN Security Council Resolution 1856.

Operation Artemis was authorized by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII to deploy to the town of Bunia in the DRC and to “take all necessary measures” in order to “contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation...to ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town” (See UN Security Council Resolution 1484). Although the mission’s area of deployment was very small relative to the scale of the violence in the DRC, the mission was deployed in order to support MONUC, which had a much wider area of operations. Within Artemis’ area of operations, however, this mandate gave it wide leeway to protect civilians. Here, the meaning of the goal of contributing to the ‘stabilization of the security conditions’ is comparable to the phrase used in the authorizing mandate for INTERFET in East Timor, in both cases indicating a responsibility to respond to a chaotic and insecure situation in which civilians were being intentionally targeted with violence.

# Since July 2010 the force has operated under the new name, MONUSCO. Its mandate, like MONUC's, makes civilian protection its top priority.
EUFOR RD Congo deployed to the DRC for a brief period in 2006 to support MONUC in providing security for national elections. While this was its primary purpose, it was also authorized under UN Chapter VII “to take all necessary means” in order to “contribute to the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence in the areas of its deployment, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (see Security Council Resolution 1671). I code it a 2.

ECOWAS organized an initial ceasefire on October 17, 2002. In an October 26 meeting, it established ECOMICI “to monitor the cessation of hostilities; facilitate the return of normal public administrative services and the free movement of goods and services; contribute to the implementation of the peace agreement; and guarantee the safety of the insurgents, observers, and humanitarian staff” (Kabia 2009 p.145). In addition, retrospectively (after both ECOMICI and Operation Licorne had been deployed in Côte d’Ivoire for several months), on February 4, 2003, the UN Security Council authorized a single Chapter VII mandate for both ECOMICI and Operation Licorne. Together, they were “to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement of their personnel and to ensure, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Government of National Reconciliation, the protection of civilians immediately threatened with physical violence within their zones of operation, using the means available to them” (See the UN’s mandate page for MINUCI at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/mandate.html).

Thus, these missions were authorized to protect civilians, but not as a primary goal, and not through any of the more ambitious protection tasks discussed in Chapter 2. In the context of many complex emergencies this would result in coding protection instructions as 2. Yet, as discussed in both Chapter 2 and in the body of this chapter, there are some complex emergencies in which such tasks may be sufficient given the protection needs on the ground (such as Somalia, as discussed above). The civil war in Côte d’Ivoire (at least during the period when it was identified as a complex emergency in the early 2000s) appears to have been such a case, involving no sustained or major campaign of violence directed intentionally against civilians. See the Complex Emergency Coding Notes for further discussion. Thus I code protection instructions a 3 for both missions.

See discussion of ECOMICI above. The justification for coding a 3 is the same here.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
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<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>May 2003 – April 2004</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>February 2004 – present</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>UNOMUR</td>
<td>June 1993 – September 1994</td>
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MINUCI was a UN political mission with a small military component (which reached a maximum of 76 observers) whose purpose was to complement the operations of the French and ECOWAS forces and facilitate the implementation of the January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The tasks assigned to the military component were exclusively limited to monitoring, advice, and liaison, with no civilian protection activities. See the UN’s mandate page for MINUCI at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/minuci/mandate.html.

UNOCI was designed to take over the responsibilities of MINUCI and ECOMICI/ECOFORCE. Like the French Operation Licorne, ECOMICI, and MINUCI before it, it was intended to monitor the ceasefire and engage in a series of disarmament and demobilization tasks. Like them, it was also authorized "without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of National Reconciliation, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment" (See UN Security Council Resolution 1528). Though these tasks are not primarily civilian-protection oriented, I code the mission's protection instructions as 3 for the same reasons discussed above for ECOMICI and Operation Licorne.

None of the potential interveners made any contributions to any of these three small Military Observer Group missions, which were run by the Organization of African Unity (OAU). I have seen no evidence that any of the three engaged in anything more than standard monitoring and verification tasks. For an overview see Mays (2011, p.166, 178-9).

UNOMUR was deployed along the Uganda-Rwanda border in 1993 to monitor the border in order “to verify that no military assistance reaches Rwanda, focus being put primarily in this regard on transit or transport, by roads or tracks which could accommodate vehicles, of lethal weapons and ammunition across the border, as well as any other material which could be of military use.” It was, then, a small traditional observer mission that engaged in no civilian protection tasks. See the UN’s mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unomurmandate.html

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<td>UNAMIR I</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>UNAMIR II</td>
<td>May 1994 – April 1996</td>
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UNAMIR's initial purpose was to help implement the August 1993 Arusha Peace Agreement, which was supposed to bring an end to the Rwandan civil war. Its mandate was “to assist in ensuring the security of the capital city of Kigali; monitor the ceasefire agreement, including establishment of an expanded demilitarized zone and demobilization procedures; monitor the security situation during the final period of the transitional Government’s mandate leading up to elections; assist with mine-clearance; and assist in the coordination of humanitarian assistance activities in conjunction with relief operations.” Thus, at first, it played no civilian protection role. During the initial weeks of the Rwandan genocide, it took some actions to try to shield civilians from violence that exceeded its official mandate at the time. Since there was a clear mandate whose guidance did not include civilian protection, however, I use the mandate rather than the troops' actions during the last few weeks of this period as evidence of the intent of the Security Council and the potential interveners. See the UN’s UNAMIR mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm

UNAMIR’s mandate was adjusted on numerous occasions between April 1994 and December 1995 (specifics are available at the UN’s webpage dedicated to UNAMIR’s mandate). Most importantly, Security Council Resolution 918 of May 17 1994 expanded its scope to allow the force to engage in at least some civilian protection tasks, to include the establishment and maintenance of “secure humanitarian areas” and the provision of security for relief operations (to the extent possible within its capabilities). Although the mandate was subsequently adjusted, it was still allowed to contribute, at least, to providing security and protection for humanitarian relief operations. Overall, the new terms of the mandate authorized the force to provide some civilian protection, but still an amount that was clearly insufficient given the prevailing conditions of ongoing genocide and mass killing in the country. The mission remained under UN Chapter VI, and thus retained traditional peacekeeping rules of engagement. See the UN’s UNAMIR mandate and background pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirM.htm and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unamirB.htm
Operation Turquoise is an example of a mission whose mandate would have been sufficient for effective protection, but where inappropriate military strategies effectively limited soldiers’ protection instructions relative to what might be inferred from the mandate alone. First, France obtained Chapter VII UN authorization for the mission to contribute “in an impartial way to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda…” and to use “all necessary means to achieve [these] humanitarian objectives” (See UN Security Council Resolution 929). Yet, although it deployed plenty of troops, France made decisions that limited their ability to carry out this mandate, either in the safe zone it set up (covering about 20% of the country) or more broadly. First, it left about half of its soldiers at a military base in Zaire. Second, it brought equipment with extensive capacity for firepower, but it “was not prepared to police the safe zone to prevent small-scale attacks” against civilians (Seybolt 2008 p.166). This was in part because it left so many troops in Zaire and in part because it did not bring the trucks and other small vehicles needed to rescue people under threat in the area (see Seybolt 2008 p.166-67; Melvern 2009 p.237-41; Prunier 1995 p.292-93; and Wheeler p.234-35).

Thus, the coding for Operation Turquoise’s protection instructions is based on the fact that they had more troops but chose to leave them sitting in Zaire, and that they deployed the wrong equipment to protect civilians. Based on the mission’s stated goals alone it would be a 3, but these choices about military strategy reduce it to a 2. Critically, I treat this as a question of military strategy rather than a simple lack of available resources precisely because these were choices that were not rooted in hard limitations on the available resources. As Nicholas Wheeler tellingly puts it, “In highlighting these limits of the French rescue mission in Rwanda, it is apparent that what was lacking...was the ‘right means.’ The means employed were not consistent with French humanitarian justifications and this severely compromised the outcome in humanitarian terms...” (2000 p.235). See also the discussion in Chapter 1 of the dissertation.

Operation Support Hope’s purpose was to save lives by delivering aid and providing critical logistical assistance to UN and international relief agencies seeking to combat the outbreak of disease among Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire in the summer of 1994. Although the mission saved lives by pursuing these tasks, it did not make any effort to address the serious security deficit that persisted, with Hutu genocidaires continuing to use violence to control the refugees for political ends. It engaged in no civilian protection activities and is thus coded a 1. See discussion in Seybolt (2008 p.76-77).
UNMIS was established following the January 2005 signing by the Sudanese Government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, an accord intended to end more than two decades of war between north and south Sudan. Its primary role as foreseen at the time would be to support the implementation of the agreement. For this purpose, it was mandated to pursue a variety of monitoring and verification tasks and to provide various forms of assistance to the formerly warring parties. In addition, it was authorized to help facilitate the return of refugees and IDPs and to help establish the necessary security conditions for the distribution of humanitarian assistance; to assist in providing humanitarian demining; and to contribute to and coordinate international efforts to protect civilians and human rights in Sudan. Finally, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, UNMIS was also authorized, “in the areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities, to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations, and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, joint assessment mechanism and assessment and evaluation commission personnel, and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” (See the UN’s UNMIS mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/mandate.shtml). Although it was deployed after the end of the complex emergency in an environment in which its limited civilian protection responsibilities were probably adequate for the needs foreseen on the ground at the time, they were clearly insufficient relative to the greatest protection needs produced by the war itself, which involved mass killing and genocide. Thus, I code protection instructions a 2. See also the UNMIS background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmis/background.shtml.

As discussed in Chapter 7, AMIS was not initially envisaged as a force to provide civilian protection at all. At its initial authorization in May 2004, it was mandated to observe the implementation of the so-called Darfur humanitarian ceasefire, and to protect itself (See the 10th communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, May 25, 2004). In October, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized AMIS to protect aid operations and civilians encountered “under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity” and to conduct patrols and establish outposts for the purpose of deterring attacks against civilians (See the 17th communiqué of the AU Peace and Security Council, October 20, 2004). From this point forward, AMIS had the authority to provide at least some civilian protection, though still less than the circumstances warranted given the mass killing that occurred in Darfur. Thus, I code it a 2.
According to the UN, the core mandate and primary purpose of UNAMID is to protect civilians. Authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is also tasked with “contributing to security for humanitarian assistance, monitoring and verifying implementation of agreements, assisting an inclusive political process, contributing to the promotion of human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR)” (see the UN’s UNAMID background page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.html. The mandate is also available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/mandate.html).

But despite its emphasis on civilian protection and Chapter VII authorization, the specific conditions under which soldiers were allowed to use force were highly restrictive: in self-defense and to protect civilians “under imminent threat of physical violence” within its physical vicinity. These limitations undermine the announced goal of making civilian protection its core purpose. As a report from the Geneva-based Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre puts it, UNAMID’s mandate – in part because of its breadth – “was designed in a manner that dilutes and diminishes the peacekeepers’ presumed basic role and primary objective of providing physical protection to the civilian victims of violence and military action in Darfur” (Jibril 2010 p.15; see also Flint and de Waal 2008 p.269-70).

As a result, I code protection instructions a 2.

EUFOR Tchad/RCA was deployed in response to the spread of the war in Darfur across the border into neighboring Chad. By 2006, both Darfuri residents of refugee camps in eastern Chad and the Central African Republic as well as Chadian residents of the border region were seriously threatened by violence carried out by Sudanese Janjaweed militia and Chadian rebels. Meanwhile, the presence of some 250,000 Darfuri refugees in Eastern Chad contributed to regional tensions (MB 2009 p.278). In response to this situation, the European Union deployed EUFOR Tchad/RCA to the border region in Chad and the Central African Republic. The force was authorized in October 2007, and deployment began in January 2008. Its objectives were “to contribute to the protection of refugees and displaced persons, to facilitate aid delivery by improving the overall security situation, and to help protect UN personnel and facilities” (MB 2008 p.104; see also MB 2009 p.278) until a UN force could deploy to take over these tasks. To my knowledge, the mission took no decisions about military strategy that would call into question the conclusion that its protection instructions were adequate to allow it to address the most extensive protection needs. Thus I code it a 3.
MINURCAT was the UN force that took over the role of protecting civilians and refugees in Eastern Chad and the Central African Republic from EUFOR Tchad/RCA. At the time of EUFOR’s authorization, the UN Security Council also authorized a small MINURCAT force to deploy alongside it. This force was to be composed of at most 300 police, 50 military liaison officers and associated civilian personnel. At that time, in September 2007, it was authorized to engage in liaison and training tasks related to civilian protection and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (See UN Security Council Resolution 1778). Before EUFOR’s withdrawal, in January 2009, the Security Council expanded MINURCAT’s size and mandate, authorizing a military component that would allow it to take over from the EU force. In its area of operations in Eastern Chad the force was authorized – in coordination with the Government of Chad – “to take all necessary measures... To contribute to protecting civilians in danger, particularly refugees and internally displaced persons” and “To facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and the free movement of humanitarian personnel by helping to improve security in the area of operations.” In its area of operations in the CAR, in coordination with the government, it was authorized “To contribute to the creation of a more secure environment” and “To execute operations of a limited character in order to extract civilians and humanitarian workers in danger” (See UN Security Council Resolution 1861). Given its primary orientation toward civilian protection, authorization to use “all necessary means” to pursue this goal, and that I have seen no other evidence to call into question the military strategies employed, I code the mission a 3 for protection instructions (based on the 2009 mandate).

As discussed above, UNMIS was deployed following the north-south civil war in Sudan with a mandate that included protecting civilians encountered in imminent danger of violence, and more broadly to help ensure a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the coordination of international efforts to protect civilians and human rights in Sudan. This mandate applied equally to the violence that subsequently broke out in its area of operations beginning in 2008 and that created a new complex emergency in the region beginning in that year, although the force did little in the way of responding (see eg, Human Rights Watch 2009). As above, I code it a 2 with respect to this new complex emergency as well.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country / Conflict</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Start Date</th>
<th>End Date</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea / War with Ethiopia</td>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>July 2000 – July 2008</td>
<td>8 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNMEE was deployed in order to help implement the June 18, 2000 Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea. On July 31, the Security Council initially established UNMEE as a small observer mission with up to 100 military observers, with the intention of expanding to a full-scale peacekeeping operation thereafter. Initially, the mandate primarily involved a series of liaison tasks that would serve to prepare the way for the establishment of the full-scale peacekeeping operation to come. On September 15, the Security Council authorized the mission’s expansion to some 4,300 troops and gave it a traditional peacekeeping mandate involving a series of monitoring, verification, and coordination tasks. The mission was at no time authorized to engage in any civilian protection activities. See the UN’s UNMEE background and mandate pages at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/background.html and http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/mandate.html. (The mission’s mandate was further adjusted on August 14, 2002, but this adjustment is irrelevant here because it occurred more than a year after the end of the complex emergency.)

| El Salvador | ONUSAL | July 1991 – April 1995 | 4 years | 1 |

ONUSAL’s purpose was to verify the implementation of a series of agreements aimed at ending the civil war between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). These included “a ceasefire and related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues.” Although the war was not formally ended until December 1992, the associated complex emergency ended in 1990 because of the considerable reduction in hostilities thereafter. Thus, ONUSAL was deployed in the aftermath of (but within the first year after) the complex emergency. On initial authorization in 1991, ONUSAL was to verify compliance with the July 1990 Agreement on Human Rights. In this context, “the tasks of the Mission included actively monitoring the human rights situation in El Salvador; investigating specific cases of alleged human rights violations; promoting human rights in the country; making recommendations for the elimination of violations; and reporting on these matters to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council.” Thus, the mission was at no time authorized to engage in any civilian protection activities. (See the UN’s ONUSAL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onusalmandate.html).
As Seybolt (2008 p.49; see also p.50) describes, Operation Provide Comfort "addressed the immediate and proximate causes of death by bringing assistance to displaced people along the Iraq-Turkey border and pushing the Iraqi military out of Kurdish territory so that people felt secure enough to return home." The mission's primary purpose was to address the threat to civilians from the Iraqi Army, and by deploying a large ground force in the initial phase to establish a safe zone for Kurdish civilians it employed appropriate military strategies to do so. Thus I code it a 3. In addition, this ground phase was followed by a second, aerial phase known as Operation Northern Watch (following the official end of Operation Provide Comfort, a restructured US-UK version of Northern Watch continued to operate in the area – see Seybolt p.148).

According to Seybolt (2008 p.49; see also p.51-52), UNGCI "was a small unit of UN troops intended to protect aid organizations operating in northern Iraq. Its ability to deter small-scale banditry was only limited." See also description in Mays (2011, p.286). Note: the two sources disagree on the month of initial deployment -- Mays cites May and Seybolt cites June of 1991. In either case, since it was authorized to protect aid operations in an environment of large-scale violence intentionally targeted against civilians, it is coded a 2.

Operation Southern Watch consisted of enforcing a no-fly zone over Southern Iraq in order to protect the Shi'a community from brutal attacks by the Iraqi army. Although its primary purpose was to provide civilian protection, the decision to rely on the no-fly zone alone was a military strategy that reduced the mission’s protection instructions relative to what could be inferred simply from the basic intention of protecting civilians. Thus, I code it as a 2. See eg, Byman and Waxman (2000 p.48).

UNIFIL was established in 1978 on the heels of Israel’s March invasion of southern Lebanon. Its initial threefold mandate was to “Confirm Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon; Restore international peace and security; and Assist the Lebanese Government in restoring its effective authority in the area” (see the UN’s UNIFIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml).

This mission was adjusted after UNIFIL positions were effectively overrun in the course of Israel’s subsequent, June 1982 invasion of Lebanon. From this point forward, UNIFIL was no longer able to pursue the tasks for which it had initially been mandated and soldiers found themselves “endeavoring, to the extent possible in the circumstances, to extend their protection and humanitarian assistance to the population of the area” (see UN
Security Council Resolution 511). In October, the Security Council formalized these efforts by authorizing it “to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the security of all inhabitants of the area” (UN Security Council Resolution 523). Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how this constitutes civilian protection as defined here, as the troops remained able to use force only in self-defense and were given no civilian protection tasks. Thus I code the mission a 1.

The Multinational Force in Lebanon (MNF) is difficult to code, and requires a somewhat lengthy discussion. In June 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in response to provocations by the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian guerrillas who had made the area their base of operations. Following this invasion, the United States sought to help restore peace in the region by negotiating a plan for the PLO’s departure from Beirut. The plan included provisions for a multinational peacekeeping force to assist in and oversee this process, in part by providing a buffer for the safe departure of the Palestinians. This force deployed in late August, and has sometimes been known as MNF I. It lasted several weeks and withdrew by mid-September (see eg, Weinberger 1983 p.356; O’Ballance 1998 p.117; Kelly 1996).

Within days, however – from September 16-18th – some 700-800 Palestinian civilians were brutally massacred by Lebanese Christian militia at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in Beirut (see eg, Kelly 1996). Immediately thereafter, as Edgar O’Ballance describes, “On 20 September 1982 the Lebanese government suggested that a US, French and Italian peacekeeping force should be deployed in Beirut to maintain order” (1998 p.120). All three governments agreed and the MNF was formed. A smaller UK contingent joined the force later that fall.

The MNF lacked a single, coherent mandate we can look to in order to judge its protection instructions, and this necessarily complicates the task of coding them. Instead, each member negotiated a different status-of-forces agreement with the Lebanese government. What is more, these agreements referred to the mission in different ways, and were themselves not always clear about what the mandate entailed. For example, Kelly quotes the September 25 American-Lebanese exchange of diplomatic notes: “The mandate of the MNF will be to provide an interposition force (emphasis Kelly’s) at agreed locations and thereby provide the Multinational presence requested by the Lebanese Government to assist it and the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) in the Beirut area”” (1996). Yet the idea of an interposition force is vague to say the least. As Richard Nelson points out, it does not clearly spell out what the force would do or how it would assist the Lebanese government (1991 p.34 (note 19)). According to Nelson’s own reading of the same diplomatic notes, the mandate was “to ‘provide an interposition force’ which would
establish ‘an environment which will permit the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities’; assist the efforts of the Lebanese government to ‘assure the safety of persons in the area and bring to an end the violence’; and ‘facilitate the restoration of Lebanese government sovereignty and authority over the Beirut area’” (1991 p.12). This is also consistent with the interpretation of Luigi Caligaris, who describes the MNF’s initial purpose as “to prevent further massacres and to assist the Lebanese Government in restoring law and order” (1984 p.262) by providing a buffer between the Israelis in southern Lebanon and other forces. In contrast, the French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson took issue with the word ‘interposition’ and declared, “this is rather a mission of maintaining peace and protecting the civil population” (quoted in Kelly 1996). Despite the confusion, based on all of this the MNF’s initial purpose and framing appears to have been consistent with other civilian protection operations I identify as robust. The contributors used the language of providing security in an environment that was threatening to civilians to indicate an intention to shield them from violence.

Thus, it seems reasonable to infer that the mission’s primary purpose, at least initially, was to help provide security for the civilian population by deterring attacks and supporting the Lebanese government’s ability to meet its responsibilities toward its citizens. At the same time, the mandate’s vagueness proved problematic. As Kelly puts it, “In many respects there was no clear policy – nothing but immediate tactical objectives and a mission never clearly enunciated for the troops who went ashore” (1996). Thus, to code protection instructions I also examine the activities the force actually engaged in.

Initially, the MNF did primarily strive to provide security in and around Beirut, although the different contingents played somewhat different roles and – another complicating factor – were under separate national command. As Nelson describes, “At the beginning, the MNF troops encountered few obstacles and seemed to be a welcome addition to Lebanon’s complex political landscape, providing the presence assigned them. The two French battalions were deployed in and near the port of Beirut; two Italian battalions in the southwest sector of the city; the U.S. marine amphibious unit at the international airport; and later, the British company east of the airport. Among the functions they began to perform were clearing the thousands of pieces of unexploded ordnance buried and strewn about; protecting civilians…; guarding certain installations, including the airport; and operating routine patrols and security posts. In February 1983, the MNF conducted emergency rescue operations beyond Syrian lines during a severe blizzard” (1991 p.13; see also O’Ballance 1998 p.123, Kelly 1996). On the contingents’ different roles, Caligaris adds, “The Americans…remained in an essentially static but tactical profile, designed to deter direct attacks against the airport. By contrast, the French, British and Italians tended to operate according to internal security requirements, patrolling both by vehicle and on foot, not only their own areas but also in other parts of the city” (1984 p.263). Shortly after
their arrival, as O’Ballance points out, “A joint French-Italian detachment entered the Shatila and Sabra camps to assume responsibility for security” (1998 p.120).

Over time, however, the MNF became more and more involved in the politics driving the war. This shift was driven by the perception that the force’s effectiveness at helping the Lebanese army to reassert its authority and provide security in Beirut would depend on securing the departure of Israeli and Syrian troops from Lebanon (Nelson 1991:13-14). Thus, the U.S. contingent began in the late fall of 1982 to provide training and equipment for the Lebanese army. Then in the spring of 1983, it became explicit Reagan Administration policy that the Marines would not depart before the foreign forces from Israel, Syria, and the PLO left Lebanon (seeKelly 1996). These actions damaged perceptions of the MNF as a neutral party, and led to attacks against the force from Lebanese factions opposed to the government.

These attacks grew over the course of 1983. Nelson (1991:p.14) describes some security incidents during the first half of the year, but it appears that the force basically pursued the same tasks and roles during this period. Its first combat casualties in the end of August, however, prompted it to begin using force more liberally. In particular, whereas previously they had been authorized to use force only in self-defense, in mid-September the rules of engagement for the U.S. contingent were adjusted to allow the Marines to fire both in self-defense and in support of the Lebanese army. U.S. warships subsequently fired on the mainland in response to attacks by Lebanese militias against both government and U.S. installations, although the Reagan Administration insisted there had been no change to the mission (Nelson 1991 p.15-16). As Kelly put it, though, U.S. actions increasingly took the form of intervention “on the side of the Christians and the government” (1996; for a detailed discussion see also O’Ballance 1998 p.129-38). Following the October 23rd attacks on the U.S. and French contingents’ barracks that killed 241 American and 58 French soldiers, this process only accelerated until the force’s departure in early 1984 (see eg, Nelson 1991 p.16-17; Kelly 1996).

Given the complexity of the war in Lebanon and the MNF itself, deciding on a single value for the mission’s protection instructions is perhaps more challenging than for any other operation in the dataset. It seems very clear that the force engaged in at least some civilian protection as I define it, but also that it is possible to make an argument for coding it either 2 or 3. As with UNPROFOR in Croatia, I code it a 3 despite the initial authorization to use force only in self-defense. As discussed above, it seems clear that the basic purpose was to prevent future attacks against civilians, partly through the means of supporting the Lebanese government and army in providing order and security. What is more, although the Sabra and Shatila massacres represented one terrible incident, the war in Lebanon is not coded as involving mass killing or genocide. Typically I have sought to make these coding decisions based on the most extensive protection needs generated by a particular...
complex emergency, but given the war’s long time-frame, major shifts over time, and lack of sustained campaigns of severe rights abuses directed intentionally against civilians, to make such an argument for the entire complex emergency here seems impossible (for more see the Complex Emergency Coding Notes). If we focus on the needs in southern Lebanon at the time of the Israeli invasion, however, the MNF’s rules of engagement and strategies for helping to provide protection – at least initially – do not seem unreasonable. The force was deployed to support a government that wanted to provide a secure environment for its citizens and had specifically requested this international help in order to do so, and in an environment in which the Muslim opposition factions also approved because they “thought the main objective of the MNF would be to protect civilians” (Nelson 1991 p.24). What is more, none of the sources I have consulted suggested that the ROE were inappropriate to the situation on the ground.

Finally, one might argue that by 1984 the U.S. contingent, due to its more extensive role in using force to support the Lebanese government, had become merely a participant in the conflict and could no longer be considered a contributor to a peace operation. On the other hand, it is also possible to see the developments in the force’s activities – however poorly they turned out – as a move toward enforcement action that still qualifies the mission as a peace operation as long as it also continued to try to contribute to peace and security in the country. And as Nelson points out, although the MNF’s activities changed over time, “some continued to be helpful for much of the duration of the operation” (1991 p.24). Thus, it seems reasonable to consider the MNF a peace operation certainly through 1983, and possibly for its entire deployment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lebanon / Israeli air attacks I</th>
<th>UNIFIL I</th>
<th>March 1978 – August 2006</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

UNIFIL’s mandate and tasks did not change in response to the Israeli attacks and associated displacement in 1996. The coding of its protection instructions thus remains the same.

| Lebanon / Israeli air attacks II | UNIFIL II | August 2006 – present | 2 |

In response to the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, the Security Council made a number of significant adjustments to UNIFIL’s mandate. While its primary tasks remained various forms of monitoring and coordination, it was also authorized “to take all necessary action in areas of deployment of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities... to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers and, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (see the UN’S UNIFIL mandate page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unifil/mandate.shtml).
Under the circumstances prevailing in Lebanon, one might reasonably argue that this could be coded as either a 2 or a 3. While the Israeli bombing campaign in certain respects did not resemble most severe campaigns of rights abuses intentionally directed against civilians, on the other hand civilians were its primary victims and elsewhere in the dissertation (in creating the list of complex emergencies) I have treated evidence of governments inflicting intentional violence on heavily populated urban areas within their own state as a knowing failure of the responsibility to shield civilians from violence. Given the similarities to that scenario here, I code protection instructions as 2, rather than 3.
7. Appendix 5.2 – Public Concern

For the interested reader, this appendix offers a much more detailed accounting of the
decisions that went into the construction of the variable *Public Concern* than I provided in the
main body of the chapter. It is divided into three parts. The first reviews the variable’s purpose
and construction in greater depth than in the chapter text. The second provides the search terms
used to measure the volume of public concern about each complex emergency, for each potential intervener. Finally, the third part explains and justifies the dates covered by each set of searches.

**Part A: Overview**

As discussed in the chapter, *Public Concern* seeks to isolate real public interest in and
concern about complex emergencies from a series of other forces that might influence the
volume of news coverage of these conflicts – in particular, leaders’ efforts to influence public
opinion in favor of their policy preferences, coverage of ongoing peace operations, or a conflict-
afflicted nation or region’s geostrategic importance. Two key aspects of the variable’s structure
seek to minimize these sources of influence.

First, it reflects the ratio of annual average media coverage during a complex emergency
to average annual coverage over the 5 years beforehand. Media searches are based on coverage
in one major newspaper for each potential intervener: the *New York Times* for the U.S., the
LexisNexis served as the main source for most searches.¹

¹ I made exceptions, however, where this allowed me to increase the number of years of full-text coverage
that I could access, and thus to avoid what would otherwise be missing values. For observations
involving France, I primarily used the search engine available on *Le Monde*’s website
(http://www.lemonde.fr), and in some cases also used average annual coverage for fewer than 5 years
before a complex emergency as the denominator in *Public Concern*. This helped me avoid a number of
missing values, because full-text coverage of *Le Monde* begins on LexisNexis in 1990 (later than for the
The variable’s construction as a ratio is intended to eliminate the potential influence of country or region-specific characteristics (such as geostrategic importance) that might affect the media’s propensity to cover the outbreak of one complex emergency more than another. As long as the outbreak of violence in a generally more ‘newsworthy’ place does not cause new coverage to increase *proportionately more* than the outbreak of violence in a less ‘newsworthy’ place, this format eliminates the risk that *Public Concern* reflects, to any significant extent, variation in conflicts’ broad geostrategic importance.

There is, however, a downside to this ratio format. In particular, *Public Concern* cannot really distinguish between large and small volumes of coverage. As noted in the chapter, adding 5 to the annual average number of hits in the denominator does help to avoid very large values of *Public Concern* for observations that received almost no coverage before a complex emergency. Despite this drawback, however, the ratio format is necessary both to avoid simply reflecting geostrategic importance and to facilitate comparison across newspapers of different sizes and the use of different search engines.

Second, for each observation involving a commitment to a peace operation, the numerator of *Public Concern* is based only on the period *before* the decision to participate in the mission, and to the extent possible, excludes coverage in the immediate lead-up to this decision. Thus, the dates of coverage vary by complex emergency, and section C of this appendix provides full documentation for each. As discussed in the chapter, I took a cautious approach, eliminating other three papers), but is available directly through *Le Monde* beginning in 1987. Through these exceptions, I was able to obtain values of *Public Concern* for all observations involving France where the complex emergency began in 1988 or later. Unfortunately, values are still missing for observations involving France where the complex emergency began before 1988. I was able to avoid a similar problem for the other potential interveners for the earlier complex emergencies, by using Google News to conduct searches in the *Sydney Morning Herald* before 1986; ProQuest’s *Historical New York Times* to conduct searches involving complex emergencies that began before 1980 for the *New York Times*; and the *London Times Digital Archive 1785-1985* for *London Times* searches before 1985 (each of these represents the earliest year of full-text LexisNexis coverage).
coverage as far in advance as was reasonable before each intervention decision, while trying to include key periods.

For example, consider Croatia’s war of secession from Yugoslavia. War broke out in June 1991, and UNPROFOR was approved in February 1992. To capture coverage from before the complex emergency, I searched for “Croatia” between 1986 and 1990 and took the yearly average to represent the volume of coverage prior to the war. I then used a search for “Croatia” in 1991 to represent the volume of coverage during the complex emergency. Since the U.S., UK, and France each contributed to UNPROFOR or various NATO support operations in 1992, I used this timeframe for all three of them.

Likewise, in Kosovo, significant violence by the Serb army against Kosovar Albanians began in March 1998. Initial public discussion of force began in September, while NATO’s air campaign to evict the Serbs began in March 1999. Although extensive coverage of the humanitarian crisis continued throughout 1998, I use coverage between January and August 1998 as the basis for an annual estimate of coverage that would have occurred during the entire year, had coverage continued at the same rate. This eliminates the possibility that the measure reflects increased coverage generated by the discussion of force after August, but ensures that the ratio compares two measures of ‘annual’ coverage. Here, the denominator reflects annual coverage of “Kosovo” from 1993-1997. As this example attests, in some instances Public Concern must end its estimate of the coverage a complex emergency receives before the emergence of a significant amount of the public attention it eventually attracts, and thus underestimates such concern.
Part B: Search Terms

As noted in the chapter, *Public Concern* is based on headline news searches – that is, news searches in which the relevant search term must be present in the title (or headline) of an article. Wherever reasonable, I searched simply for the name of the country (or region) in which the complex emergency occurred. Tables 5-9 and 5-10 present the search terms for each complex emergency, noting and justifying necessary exceptions to this guiding pattern in the associated footnotes.

Table 5-9 is for the English-language newspapers, and Table 5-10 presents the terms for *Le Monde*.

### Table 5-9: English-Language Search Terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Emergency</th>
<th>Headline Search Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Soviets</td>
<td>“Afghanistan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Civil war</td>
<td>“Afghanistan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>“Cambodia” OR “Kampuchea” ¹ ² ³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Kashmir</td>
<td>“Kashmir” in the title AND “India” anywhere ⁴</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Northeast</td>
<td>“Northeast India” or “India's Northeast” or “Northeast of India”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Aceh</td>
<td>“Aceh”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/East Timor</td>
<td>“Timor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Moluccas and Sulawesi</td>
<td>“Moluccas” OR “Sulawesi” OR “Maluku” OR “Malacca” ⁶</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>“Myanmar” OR “Burma” ⁷</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

² I also created several alternate versions based on both slightly different search terms and on full-text (rather than headline) news searches. For example, in one version I searched for the country name in the title, and – where different – the regional or other identifying term anywhere in the text of the document. Robustness checks using these alternate versions generally produced comparable results to those presented in the chapter. Although not listed here, the alternate search terms on which these versions of the variable are based are available on request.

³ Thus, complex emergencies excluded from the analysis for reasons discussed in the chapter (eg, Afghanistan/OEF & After and Iraq/US-led coalition) are excluded from these tables.

⁴ Both terms referred to what is now Cambodia during the relevant search period, so I used both.

⁵ I broke with the basic pattern of using just the region in the title here in order to avoid capturing a significant number of articles exclusively about the Pakistan-administered part of Kashmir. Requiring a reference to “India” anywhere in the document seemed a reasonable way to do so.

⁶ This is a difficult complex emergency to label. I use multiple terms because Moluccas in the plural of the various Indonesian provinces ending in “Maluku” (North Maluku, Maluku, etc), and because the complex emergency also encompassed the nearby province of Sulawesi.

⁷ As with Cambodia, both terms referred to the country during the relevant search period.
| 8 | The war between the Pakistani government and the Taliban occurred primarily in these two regions, the Northwest Frontier Province and South Waziristan. |
| 9 | This complex emergency is not best identified by coverage of the Philippines, since it did not affect the entire country. Still, since it was defined primarily by its ideological aspect and not by one particular region, both terms need to be in the title for the search to make sense. |
| 10 | The situation here is very similar to the NPA conflict in the Philippines, except that the primary identifying feature here is religion (violence was centered on the island of Mindanao, but spanned a number of other areas). Again, both terms need to be in the title for the search to make sense. |
| 11 | Here, I include both Turkey and Kurd to distinguish the Kurdish population of Turkey from that of Iraq. In addition, given Turkey’s relationship to the complex emergency involving the Kurds of Northern Iraq in 1991, for the denominator of the CE News Coverage ratio for these observations, I average 1987 – 1990 (rather than 1987 – 1991) in order to exclude the increased number of hits that year that reflect coverage of that entirely separate complex emergency. |
| 12 | Because this was a war between these two regions that occurred while they were part of the USSR and before they became independent countries, using the name of either region is the most obvious way to capture the attention paid to them at this time. |
| 13 | The country changed names in 1997, so the search reflects both the original and new names. |
Congo-Brazzaville  | “Brazzaville” anywhere and “Congo” in the title  
Ivory Coast  | “Ivory Coast”  
Rwanda  | “Rwanda”  
Southern Sudan/civil war  | "Southern Sudan" OR "Sudan's South" OR "South of Sudan"  
Sudan/Darfur  | “Darfur”  
Southern Sudan/inter-communal violence  | "Southern Sudan" OR "Sudan's South" OR "South of Sudan"  
Ethiopia/Civil war  | “Ethiopia”  
Eritrea/War w/ Ethiopia  | “Eritrea”  
Nigeria  | “Nigeria”  
Kenya  | “Kenya”  
Zimbabwe  | “Zimbabwe”  
South Africa  | “South Africa”  
Peru  | “Peru”  
Colombia  | “Colombia”  
El Salvador  | “Salvador”  
Iraq/Kurds I  | “Kurd” in the title and “Iraq” anywhere  
Iraq/Kurds II  | “Kurd” in the title and “Iraq” anywhere  
Iraq/Shiites  | (“Shiite” OR “Shia”) in the title and “Iraq” anywhere  
Iraq/US-led coalition  | “Iraq” (France/le Monde only)  
Kuwait  | “Kuwait”  
Lebanon I  | “Lebanon”  
Lebanon II  | “Lebanon”  
Lebanon III  | “Lebanon”

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14 When Zaire became the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1997, this complicated designing a search term that would capture articles about the DRC but not about Congo-Brazzaville. To get around this, beginning in 1997 I required the full name of the country to be somewhere in the document while allowing the title to include only “Congo” or “Zaire.” Since many articles about the DRC now only included “Congo” in the title, this allowed me to capture these articles without also capturing those about Congo-Brazzaville.

15 This helps to distinguish events in Congo-Brazzaville from events in the neighboring DRC.

16 For all complex emergencies in Iraq involving either the Kurds or the Shiites, I include both the community in the title and “Iraq” anywhere in the text. Because neither Kurds nor Shiites live only in Iraq, this allows the searches to focus (as much as possible) on these communities in Iraq.
Table 5-10: French-Language Search Terms¹⁷

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Complex Emergency</th>
<th>Headline Search Terms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Soviets</td>
<td>“Afghanistan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan/Civil war</td>
<td>“Afghanistan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Kashmir</td>
<td>Both “Cachemire” AND “Inde” in the title¹⁸</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India/Northeast</td>
<td>“Nord de l’Inde” or “Inde du Nord”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Aceh</td>
<td>“Aceh”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/East Timor</td>
<td>“Timor”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia/Moluccas and Sulawesi</td>
<td>“Moluques” OR “Sulawesi” OR “Maluku” OR “Malacca”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar/Burma</td>
<td>“Myanmar” OR “Burmanie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan/Govt. vs. Taliban</td>
<td>(“Pakistan” AND “Nord-ouest”) OR “Waziristan”¹⁹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines/NPA</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines/Muslim insurgents</td>
<td>“Philippines” AND “Musulman” in the title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka I</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka II</td>
<td>“Sri Lanka”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>“Tadjikistan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>“Bosnie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>“Croatie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>“Kosovo”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey/PKK</td>
<td>“Turquie” AND “Kurd”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR/Azerbaijan-Armenia</td>
<td>“Azerbaïdjan” OR “Arménie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan/Nagorno-Karabakh</td>
<td>“Azerbaïdjan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya I</td>
<td>“Tchétchénie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chechnya II</td>
<td>“Tchétchénie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>“Sierra Leone”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia I</td>
<td>“Libéria”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia II</td>
<td>“Libéria”</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>“Algérie”</td>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>“Burundi”</td>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola I</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola II</td>
<td>“Angola”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola III</td>
<td>“Angola”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>“Somalie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda I</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text Le Monde pre-1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda II/LRA</td>
<td>“Ouganda”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaire/DRC I</td>
<td>“Zaïre” OR “République démocratique du Congo”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁷ Most exceptions to the basic search rule are the same as for the English-language sources, as noted above. Only those particular to the French are justified here.

¹⁸ Because of the search engine on Le Monde’s website, I had to use both Inde and Cachemire in the title rather than the former in the title and the latter in the text, as in the other searches.

¹⁹ “Northwest Frontier Province” does not translate cleanly, so I use “Nord-ouest” and “Pakistan.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zaire/DRC II</td>
<td>Pre-1997: “Zaïre” OR “République démocratique du Congo” in the title;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-1997: (“Zaïre” OR “République démocratique du Congo”) anywhere in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the document, AND (“Zaïre” or “Congo”) in title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo-Brazzaville</td>
<td>“Brazzaville” anywhere and “Congo” in title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>“Côte d’Ivoire”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>“Rwanda”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan/civil war</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan/Darfur</td>
<td>“Darfour”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Sudan/inter-communal</td>
<td>“Sud-Soudan”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>violence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Civil war</td>
<td>“Ethiopie”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea/War w/ Ethiopia</td>
<td>“L’Érythrée”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>“Nigeria”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>“Kenya”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>“Zimbabwe”</td>
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<td>South Africa</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kurds I</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Kurds II</td>
<td>“Kurde” in the title and “Irak” anywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/Shiites</td>
<td>“Chiite” in the title and “Irak” anywhere</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq/US-led coalition</td>
<td>“Irak”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>“Koweit”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon I</td>
<td>(Missing – no full-text <em>Le Monde</em> pre-1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon II</td>
<td>“Liban”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon III</td>
<td>“Liban”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part C: Dates Covered by Public Concern

As noted above, the portion of each complex emergency on which Public Concern is based varies according to whether an observation involves a contribution to a peace operation, and if so, when. This is necessary to minimize the measure’s reflection of official efforts to influence the news or coverage of an ongoing operation, but required great care in constructing the variable. This section deals with the specific decisions involved in identifying the period covered by Public Concern for each observation.

For this purpose, I break observations into three basic categories: those involving no commitment to a peace operation; those involving a commitment that occurs well into a complex emergency and with no significant change in the conflict in the immediate lead-up to the operation; and those involving an early commitment to a peace operation, or where major changes in the complex emergency shortly before the commitment begins may affect public attention, concern, and news coverage. These three categories of observations require increasing degrees of care in determining the periods of time that can reasonably be used to construct the numerator of Public Concern.

1) No Commitment

For observations involving no commitment to a peace operation, there is little reason for concern about the possibility that news coverage reflects official efforts to drum up support for a contribution to which a leader is committed. Nor does such coverage reflect an already-ongoing commitment. Thus, I use coverage from the entire complex emergency for the numerator of Public Concern for these observations.²⁰

²⁰ This approach does necessarily include any coverage of other policies toward a complex emergency – such as funding for one of the belligerent parties or active military involvement in a non-peace operation capacity (such as recent U.S. participation alongside the government in counter-insurgency operations in...
2) Commitments After Years of Ongoing Complex Emergency

For observations in which the complex emergency persists for an extended period before the potential intervener’s contribution to a peace operation, the sheer length of the complex emergency makes it relatively easy to construct the numerator of Public Concern from coverage spanning most of the conflict while still eliminating a sizeable period prior to the commitment itself. This approach does not work in the most difficult and complicated cases, which I discuss below, but here I describe and justify the dates used for news searches for such relatively straightforward observations.

i. Afghanistan /Soviets: Provisional UN approval of UNGOMAP and the mission’s initial deployment both occurred in April 1988, after the USSR’s February announcement of its intention to draw down its troops in Afghanistan. The process of planning for UNGOMAP thus took place between February and April. For all observations involving this complex emergency, I use news coverage through 1987 to estimate the numerator of Public Concern, which cannot reflect coverage of the upcoming mission or any efforts by governments to prepare their publics for it.21

ii. Cambodia: The previously struggling Paris Peace Process took off at the Paris Conference in July 1989. Over the next two and a half years, it produced a roadmap for political power-sharing and a plan for a UN peacekeeping operation to oversee its implementation. Since these plans were laid well before the official commitment to deploy UNAMIC and UNTAC was unveiled in October 1991, the governments involved in the peace process (which included all the potential interveners) certainly knew in advance that they would be making some commitment to a peace operation in Cambodia. Thus, in theory, they could have sought to prepare their publics for this in advance. To be cautious and avoid including coverage of any such efforts, I use average annual coverage of Cambodia from 1979 – 1988 as the numerator for Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency.

the Philippines). To the extent that it does so, it may create the appearance of more public concern about a complex emergency than actually exists, where there is no commitment to a peace operation. Since this should bias any statistical findings away from finding an effect associated with Public Concern, and since the same effect should occur in observations that do involve contributions to peace operation prior to such commitments, however, there is little reason to suspect any problematic threat to inference.

iii.  **Tajikistan:** The complex emergency ended in 1993 and UNMOT was authorized in December 1994. Thus, it is straightforward to use coverage from 1992 – 1993 for the numerator of Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency.

iv.  **Sierra Leone:** In Sierra Leone, the ‘defining’ peace operation contribution occurred at different times for the different potential interveners. The U.S. began by offering financial assistance to ECOMOG and supporting the installation of UNOMSIL in 1998, and followed this by voting for (and contributing financially to) UNAMSIL in 1999. France voted for UNOMSIL in 1998 and then both voted for and contributed a small number of personnel to UNAMSIL in 1999. The UK also contributed financially to ECOMOG beginning in 1998 and supported UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL, but then also sent a substantial number of its own forces in 2000, in support to UNAMSIL. To capture as much of the complex emergency as possible without including coverage of the policy shifts of 1999 - 2000, I use coverage through 1998 for each of the three observations. Given that UNOMSIL was a much smaller and less ambitious operation to support than UNAMSIL, this seems a reasonable compromise in order to capture any public responsiveness to the collapse of the peace process in 1997 and the subsequent deterioration of the war.

v.  **Liberia I:** The U.S. supported ECOMOG financially beginning in 1991, but provided much more significant logistical support toward the end of the operation (see, eg, Kabia 2009 p.82; Adeleke 1995 p.589; Whiteman and Yates 2004 p.373; Adebajo 2004 p.293-4). The UK and France, in contrast, made virtually no commitment, although the UK provided some spare vehicle parts (Berman 2003 p.208). All three voted to authorize (and thus financially supported) UNOMIL in September 1993. Given the greater U.S. involvement later in the war, I use coverage from 1990 – 1992 for all three observations involving this complex emergency.

vi.  **Burundi:** The complex emergency began in 1993, but it was not until 2003 that any of the potential interveners contributed to a peace operation. Both the U.S. and UK financially supported AMIB in 2003, while the U.S., UK, and France all voted for (and thus financially supported) ONUB in 2004. A complicating factor, however, is that much of the news coverage mentioning Burundi early in the war, from 1994 – 1996, primarily concerns the Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. It is preferable not to include this spike in coverage here, since it does not represent actual public interest in Burundi itself. And since the complex emergency is a long one, it is relatively easy to make this adjustment by using other years of coverage to represent interest in the war in Burundi. Thus, I use news coverage between 1997 and 2002 to create the numerator of Public Concern for all three observations.

vii.  **Mozambique:** The complex emergency began in 1982 and ONUMOZ was authorized in December 1992. I use coverage from 1982 - 1991 for all three observations.

viii.  **Angola I:** The complex emergency began in 1975 and the first peace operation, UNAVEM I, was authorized in December 1988. I use coverage from 1975 - 1987 for all observations involving this complex emergency.
ix. **Sudan/North-South Civil War**: The complex emergency ended in 2004, and the only peace operation associated with it, UNMIS, began in 2005. To avoid significant coverage of the Naivasha Peace Process during 2003 and 2004 (see Chapter 7 for a detailed discussion), I use coverage from 1983 - 2002 to generate the numerator for *Public Concern* for all observations involving this complex emergency.

x. **El Salvador**: The complex emergency ended in 1990 and ONUSAL was authorized in July 1991. Thus, it is straightforward to use coverage from 1980 – 1990 for the numerator of *Public Concern* for all observations involving this complex emergency.

3) **Complicated Cases: Commitments Following Shortly After Complex Emergency Onset, a Major Change in Circumstances, or Other Peace Operations**

At least three complicating circumstances that affected a number of observations require an even more careful assessment of the periods that can reasonably be used to estimate the numerator of *Public Concern* without creating significant threats to inference. For some observations, there are not multiple years during the complex emergency but before the initiation of a peace operation. For others, there is a major change in the complex emergency that could (and sometimes does) affect public concern about and news coverage of it in the period shortly before a commitment to a peace operation. In still other instances, one peace operation follows another, in which case the first operation might affect news coverage during the period before the second.

In such cases, it remains important, as far as possible, to avoid coverage of a leader’s effort to ‘sell’ a contribution or of decision that have already been made. On the other hand, this imperative must be balanced against the need to include coverage of key periods that might affect both public concern and decisions about peace operations. Below I describe and justify how I balance these imperatives for such observations (the *Complex Emergency Coding Notes* contain further details on dynamics of the conflicts).
I used two strategies to prevent the need to estimate news coverage over what was in some cases quite a short period of time from artificially inflating the volume of such coverage and thus over-estimating public concern. First, for a number of these observations I use coverage from only a portion of a given calendar year. In these cases, I extrapolate what average annual coverage would have been for the entire year if it had occurred at the same rate. Wherever I did this, I compared the extrapolated estimate with the true volume of coverage over the entire year and used whichever was smaller to construct the numerator of Public Concern. Where coverage is greater during the estimated period than the remainder of the year, this strategy serves to limit the volume of news coverage estimated.

Second, when a complex emergency broke out suddenly in the middle of or late in a calendar year, I used coverage for the whole year (thus, including coverage from before the violence). This avoids measuring coverage only during the most intense periods of the year for these complex emergencies, while measuring it as an average of both more and less intense periods of violence for the others. While these strategies may have the effect of under-estimating the true amount of public concern about a conflict prior to a contribution to a peace operation, they help to avoid the much greater threat to inference that would follow from over-estimating it.

i. **East Timor**: Considerable violence and displacement occurred throughout 1999 in the run-up to the August 30th referendum on East Timorese independence, but escalated dramatically and immediately thereafter (see discussion in Chapter 6). Because the decision to deploy INTERFET was announced by September 14th, this leaves less than two weeks of the most severe violence in which to assess the public response. Given the extremely short time span, it seems critical to include as much of the September coverage as possible. For all observations involving this complex emergency, therefore, I use coverage from the beginning of 1999 up until the day before INTERFET was announced. Since the Australian response to

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22 This has little practical effect where the complex emergencies involve no peace operations or a peace operation only after considerable time has gone by, but can have a non-negligible impact in the more complicated observations discussed here.
this complex emergency is one of the case studies in the next chapter, I have also looked in
great depth at the Australian (and to a lesser extent, American) coverage of the crisis during
this period, and found no evidence that these governments tried to generate public support for
intervention. On the contrary, the Australian government faced the considerable challenge of
trying to calm a public that was clamoring for unilateral military action.

ii. **Croatia**: Low-level violence in early 1991 led to full-scale war in the second half of the
year. UNPROFOR was approved in February 1992. For each observation involving this
complex emergency, I use coverage from the whole of 1991. A search for ‘peacekeepers’
and ‘Croatia’ yielded no hits in 1991, suggesting that even coverage at the end of the year
most likely did not reflect significant discussion of a potential upcoming operation.

iii. **Bosnia**: The war started early in 1992 and intensified in May. On June 8 the UN Security
Council decided to extend the mandate of UNPROFOR to include Bosnia, and this was the
first major decision involving a peace operation related to the war. Given the short period of
time in which to estimate the reaction to the war, for all observations involving this complex
emergency I use coverage from the beginning of 1992 through May, and extrapolate from
this the amount of coverage that would have occurred in the whole year if it had continued at
the same rate. In practice, public concern about the plight of Bosnia’s civilians rose
throughout 1992 and later in the war, and so this cautious approach most likely undercounts
the true extent of public concern about the conflict.

iv. **Kosovo**: Significant violence by the Serb Army began in March 1998, and intensified as
the year progressed. As noted above, initial public discussion of – and NATO threats to use
– force began in September. Security conditions briefly improved, but deteriorated again in
December. It was not clear during the year that there would be an absolute commitment to
the use of force, and Operation Allied Force did not begin until March 1999. Still, out of
cautions I use news coverage only between January and August 1998 as the basis for an
annual estimate of coverage that would have occurred over the entire year, had it continued at
the same rate. This eliminates the possibility that Public Concern reflects increased coverage
generated by the discussion of force after August, and captures primarily the attention paid to
violence itself before the height of the diplomatic campaign that led to Operation Allied
Force. As in Bosnia, the measure may well under-estimate the eventual amount of public
concern about the conflict in Kosovo. Nevertheless, the observations associated with this
complex emergency take on some of the highest values for Public Concern.

v. **Liberia II**: The war in Liberia escalated dramatically in the first half of 2003 as the war
spread to new areas and a new rebel group, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia
(MODEL), emerged. The worst of this violence occurred in June and July, as the rebel
organization Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) advanced on and
repeatedly attacked Monrovia. These major changes make it unreasonable to estimate public
concern about the conflict based only on events from 1999 – 2002. At the same time, July
was a period of intense international diplomatic activity, involving preparations for a peace
agreement and the deployment of international troops. On August 1, the Security Council
authorized the deployment of a multinational force to be led by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) and followed by a UN stabilization force. The mission,
ECOMIL, began to deploy in late August, supported by the U.S.’ Joint Task Force Liberia, and was followed by UNMIL in October. Given the rapid pace of these developments, I use news coverage through the end of July 2003 as the basis for the numerator of Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency. In The New York Times, for example, coverage at the end of this period does include some discussion of the emerging plans for an ECOWAS mission and the possibility of deploying U.S. troops, but it also strongly reflects both the continued violence and the growing pressure on the Bush Administration to take action to stop it. Thus, it seems critical to include this last month in the calculation of Public Concern.

vi. **Angola II**: In Angola, UNAVEM II was already deployed when renewed war broke out in the fall of 1992 following the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)’s rejection of the results of the country’s September election. Given this situation, a decision to contribute to a peace operation in response to the new complex emergency could be evident either in a decision to extend or to alter the ongoing mission. While UNAVEM II’s mandate was extended for short periods during the fall of 1992, this was done in the belief that it might yet be possible to avert a return to full-scale war. In late January 1993, however, the Security Council adjusted the mission’s mandate to reflect the new reality and support the Secretary General’s peacemaking efforts. For all intents and purposes, this decision to remain involved in the peace operation at a comparable level as before represents the point at which leaders in each of the potential interveners made their most extensive peace operation commitments. To capture the period leading to this decision, I use coverage from all of 1992 as the numerator for Public Concern.

vii. **Angola III**: As in the second Angolan civil war, observations involving this complex emergency are complicated by the fact that a peace operation supported by all three potential interveners – in this instance, MONUA – was already on the ground when violence erupted again in mid-1998. The Security Council renewed – but did not change – MONUA’s mandate for the remainder of the year, but decided on December 3 to terminate it as of February 1999. As a result, there is no way to assess the public and media reaction to the renewed violence in 1998 without also including whatever coverage there was about the extension of MONUA. At the same time, since the mission’s mandate did not change, such coverage is likely to have been minimal. Thus, for all observations involving this complex emergency, I use coverage through 2002 to construct the numerator of Public Concern.

viii. **Somalia**: The complex emergency in Somalia began in 1988 and the first ‘defining’ peace operation contribution for each potential intervener occurred by the timing of the deployment of UNITAF in late 1992. It is critical to include news coverage from 1992, however, because the severe famine that year represented a major development in the

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23 For information on the background and events leading up to the deployments of ECOMIL, UNMIL, and JTF Liberia, see the UN’s page at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unmil/background.shtml.
25 For information on MONUA, see the UN’s page on the mission’s background at http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Monua/monuab.htm.
complex emergency that is integral to understanding subsequent events. Based on Mermin’s (1997) analysis, in the United States news coverage of Somalia helped convince the Bush administration to initiate the emergency airlift of food aid (Operation Provide Relief) beginning on 14 August 1992. Between mid-August and the November 26 decision to deploy UNITAF, much of the news coverage concerned this airlift, including criticism of its failure to address the needs of starving Somalis. Thus, although so may undercount true public concern about Somalia at the time of the UNITAF decision, for all observations involving this complex emergency I use news coverage only through August 13, 1992.

ix. **DRC II**: This complex emergency involved multiple peace operations, with the most extensive contributions by the potential interveners occurring in different missions and at different times. The first operation, MONUC, was initially authorized on November 30, 1999. Its size was increased significantly in 2000, and both its mandate and size were revised in October 2004, and again in December 2008. MONUC is the only operation to which the U.S. ever contributed in response to this complex emergency. The second peace operation, the EU’s Operation Artemis, was approved at the end of May 2003 and deployed from June – September. It was followed by EUFOR RD-Congo in 2006. France contributed troops to both of these latter operations, and the UK did to Operation Artemis as well. Given all this, I use news coverage through April 2003 to produce the numerator of Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency. This compromise allows me to include some coverage beyond 1999 (which was quite early in the complex emergency and well before much of the eventual international attention it has received), and in particular allows me to include initial coverage of the violence that preceded Operation Artemis. At the same time, it excludes coverage from the several weeks immediately before the decision to deploy that mission.

x. **Rwanda**: The beginning of the Rwandan civil war in 1990 represented the start of the complex emergency, but circumstances changed drastically during the genocide in 1994. While the U.S., UK, and France each voted for (and financially supported) UNAMIR in 1993 and early 1994, their most extensive contributions followed the genocide, and were made between June and July of 1994 (see Appendix 1). Because it is critical to include coverage of the genocide, for each potential intervener I use coverage from 1990 through June 15, 1994 (a week before the first of these contributions, France’s Operation Turquoise on June 22).26

xi. **Sudan/Darfur**: This complex emergency is particularly complicated. All of the potential interveners contributed to two peace operations – AMIS, beginning in mid-2004, around the same time as initial public concern about the war took off – and then the follow-on hybrid AU-UN peace operation, UNAMID. UNAMID was authorized at the end of July 2007 and deployed on December 31. The potential interveners provided logistical and financial support to both AMIS and UNAMID, each of which was authorized to provide some protection for civilians. Thus, their contributions to these missions were comparable, with neither notably more ‘defining’ than the other. In addition, beginning in 2008 France

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26 For the U.S., this excludes coverage from July of the exodus of Rwandan Hutu refugees into Zaire that has been widely credited with prompting Operation Support Hope (See eg, Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide.) As a result, Public Concern is probably undervalued for the U.S., but at least does not reflect any additional increase in coverage due to the ongoing French operation.
contributed troops to the EU mission to protect Darfuri refugees (and others) in Chad, EUFOR Tchad/RCA. In order to reflect the emergence of strong public concern about the war that was at least partially responsible for the shift to UNAMID in 2007 (see detailed discussion in Chapter 7), I use coverage from 2003 through the end of 2006 in constructing the numerator of Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency. Although this necessarily includes much coverage of AMIS, it also includes much coverage of public and activist frustration with AMIS’ inadequacies, which helped to explain activists’ push for a switch to UNAMID. Indeed, if anything, since public concern continued to grow through 2007, using coverage only through 2006 may still under-represents the level of concern that emerged by the time of UNAMID’s authorization.

xii. **Côte d’Ivoire**: Following the outbreak of violence on September 19, 2002, France committed forces immediately, within 3 days. Initially, however, Operation Licorne was only tasked with assisting foreign nationals and did not constitute a peace operation as the term is used here (The U.S. also sent about 200 special forces to protect American citizens in the initial outbreak of the violence). Once a cease-fire was agreed on October 17, however, the French force expanded and was tasked with overseeing the cease-fire, thus becoming a peace operation. It represents France’s most significant commitment in response to this complex emergency. For the U.S. and UK, the most extensive contributions were financial support to ECOMICI (the ECOWAS peacekeeping force deployed alongside the French beginning in late 2002) and then UNOCI, the UN operation authorized in February 2004. Thus, for each potential intervener, the decision representing the ‘defining’ peace operation contribution came in the fall of 2002. Given this, I use coverage through October 16, 2002 as the basis for the numerator of Public Concern for all observations associated with this complex emergency. This has the downside of covering quite little of the emerging war, but is necessary to avoid extensive coverage of ongoing operations.

xiii. **Ethiopia/War with Eritrea**: Important developments in the war during 2000 – namely, the resumption of fighting in mid-May – make it unreasonable to use news coverage only from 1998 and 1999 to assess the development of public concern about the war in advance of UNMEE, the only peace operation supported by any of the potential interveners. This bout of fighting lasted through mid-June and led to significant new displacement. Its humanitarian consequences generated considerable international concern. On June 18th, the parties signed an Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities, which called on the UN to establish a peacekeeping operation to assist in its implementation. Thus, the first serious discussions of a possible peace operation occurred in June. Still, most of the planning work was done thereafter. The Security Council authorized an initial small deployment of military observers on July 31 and the full UNMEE force on September 15. Thus, I use coverage from 1998 through June 2000 (excluding the period of intense planning in July and August) to create the numerator of Public Concern for all observations involving this complex emergency.

xiv. **Iraq/Kurds II**: The flight of Iraqi Kurds that prompted this complex emergency began in earnest in March 1991, and peaked in April. The initial decisions that led to Operation

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27 For this information on UNMEE, see the UN’s page on the mission’s background at (http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmee/background.html).
Provide Comfort were taken the first week of April. Thus, there is very little time in which to assess the public and news media response to the crisis before the beginning of the peace operation. Although there was extensive coverage of the humanitarian situation in April, I use news coverage only through March as the basis for the numerator of Public Concern. This may under-estimate the true extent of such concern because it uses an average over January – March 1991 to extrapolate for the whole year and excludes April coverage that may have contributed to a sense of urgency to respond.

xv. **Iraq/Shiites:** As with the Kurds, Saddam Hussein’s harassment of the Iraqi Shiite population and the associated complex emergency began in 1991. The no-fly zone enforced by the U.S., UK, and France in Operation Southern Watch, however, was not announced until August 26, 1992. I use the period between 1991 and July 1992 to calculate the numerator of Public Concern for all relevant observations.

xvi. **Lebanon/Civil War & Israeli Invasion:** Like several others, this complex emergency is complicated for many reasons. Here, I am only able to calculate Public Concern for the U.S. and UK, both of which contributed to multiple peace operations over a number of years. The first of these, UNIFIL, was initiated in 1978. For both, however, the ‘defining contribution’ was the Multinational Force (MNF) following Israel’s June 1982 invasion of South Lebanon. President Reagan announced, in principle, the intention to contribute U.S. troops on July 6, 1982. The MNF then deployed for a few weeks in August to help oversee the evacuation of the PLO from South Lebanon, but was redeployed shortly thereafter when the PLO’s departure was followed by the mass murder of Palestinian refugees by Christian Phalangist militia in mid-September. Given all of this, I use coverage from the outbreak of war in 1975 through June 30, 1982 to construct the numerator of Public Concern. Any coverage after Reagan’s July 7 announcement could (at least for the U.S.) reflect Administration efforts to generate support for the planned deployment before August. In addition, although there was considerable public uproar over the massacres in September that played a role in the decision to send forces back to Lebanon, including coverage from September would also require including coverage of MNF I. Ending the period covered by Public Concern in June avoids both of these problems, while allowing for coverage of the immediate reaction to the Israeli invasion. It also means including coverage of UNIFIL from 1978 – 1982, but this is unavoidable in order to include coverage of the events most relevant to the 1982 MNF deployments.

xvii. **Lebanon/Israeli Airstrikes I:** The Security Council made no changes to UNIFIL following the Israeli bombing campaign in April. The mission remained deployed and continued trying to help civilian victims. Because there was no change in the peace operation that might have prompted news coverage of it (either in advance or once implemented), I use coverage for all of 1996 to calculate the response to the violence for all observations involving this complex emergency.

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xviii.  **Lebanon/Israeli Airstrikes II**: The Israeli-Hezbollah war broke out in July, and the Security Council significantly increased the strength and mandate of UNIFIL on August 11 (UNSC Resolution 1701). I use coverage only through the end of July to calculate the numerator *Public Concern* in order to avoid reflecting coverage of the decision to expand the mission.
8. Appendix 5.3 – Additional Results & Robustness Checks

This appendix presents a series of additional graphs and the results of some of the robustness checks referred to in the main body of the chapter.

Part A: Extra Graphs, Bivariate Analysis of Contribution Type

In Section 3 (Bivariate Analysis), I noted that Appendix 3 contains graphs comparable to Figures 5-9 and 5-10, but using the version of Contribution Type adjusted for contributions in support of another highly capable democracy’s robust civilian protection efforts. These graphs, Figures 5-13 and 5-14 below, indeed reflect very similar distributions of the different contribution types across the spectrum of Public Concern/Operational Environment, and similar changes in the portion of observations that fall into each category of Contribution Type as values of this ratio change. The key difference is that robust contributions are concentrated even more heavily among the top values of the spectrum in the adjusted version of the variable, and represent an even greater portion of total observations among these values of Public Concern/Operational Environment. Although some of the gap-dominated contributions that were redistributed for the adjusted version of Contribution Type were re-coded as limited (rather than robust), the effect of these observations on the distribution of limited contributions is less noticeable because there are many more total limited than robust contributions.
Figure 5-13: Public Concern/Op. Environment by Contribution Type (Adjusted)
Figure 5-14: % of Observations, *Type (Adjusted)* (over *P. Concern/Op. Environment*)
Part B. Additional Results, Table 5-7 (Contribution Type)

In Section 4.3, I noted that this appendix contains graphs such as those presented in Figure 5-12, for Models 4 and 7 from Table 5-7. Figure 5-15 shows these graphs for Model 4, and Figure 5-16 shows them for Model 7.

First, as with Figure 5-12, Figure 5-15 is calculated with the covariates other than Public Concern/Operational Environment set at their means, so together they represent a direct comparison of the basic and adjusted versions of Contribution Type.

As noted in the chapter, the general pattern of results is quite similar, but there are some relevant differences in statistical significance. First, since nothing changes among observations involving no contribution, there is no difference in the first panel. Among limited contributions, the maximum predicted probability is somewhat lower here (about 22% compared to 30% in Model 2), and predicted probabilities are statistically different from 0 for a slightly smaller range of Public Concern/Operational Environment (beginning at about .46 rather than .40, and ending at about .70). Most importantly, the difference between the maximum of 22% and the predicted probabilities for other values of Public Concern/Operational Environment is only significant at the 5% level for values between .07 and .39. Thus, the increase in the probability of limited contributions seen here is statistically significant, but the anticipated decrease is not. In general, these results reinforce the basic message of Model 5, that there is relatively little we can safely discern from the data about the circumstances that tend to promote these contributions.

For gap-dominated contributions, the curvilinear relationship evident in Model 5 remains, but as with limited contributions the particular values – and to some extent the statistical significance – of the relationship changes. Here, the peak is much higher (about 69% at .69), but doesn’t fall as far (hitting 43% when Public Concern/Operational Environment = 1). Moreover,
as with limited contributions, the difference between these two estimates – and thus the drop-off in the prospects for these contributions at the top values of Public Concern/Operational Environment – is not statistically significant at conventional levels. The difference between the peak of 69% and the lower values to its left, however, is statistically significant at the 5% level for values of Public Concern/Operational Environment below about .48.

Robust contributions follow the same basic increase as in Model 5. Still, although the predicted probability of these contributions once again rises most quickly among the highest values of Public Concern/Operational Environment, the maximum is much lower – only about 50%. It becomes statistically different from 0 at the 5% level at about the same value of Public Concern/Operational Environment – .83 – as in Model 5.

Finally, it is worth noting that by dropping the 8 gap-dominated contributions that supported robust operations by other interveners (those whose values are ‘adjusted’ for the version of Contribution Type in Models 5 and 7), the results for gap-dominated contributions fall even closer into line with the theory, with the anticipated curvilinear relationship even more pronounced than in Model 5, and both the initial increase and the final decrease still statistically significant at the 5% level. Otherwise, the pattern for limited contributions remains comparable to that shown here, and while the predicted probability of robust contributions still increases, it is statistically different from 0 only for the very highest values of Public Concern/Operational Environment, beginning at about .95.
Figure 5-15: Predicted Probabilities by Contribution Type, Model 4
Figure 5-16 is based on Table 7’s Model 7, and shows the results of using the second set of controls along with the adjusted version of Contribution Type. Here, however, since several of the controls represent different types of complex emergencies, it makes very little sense to set them all at their means. Accordingly, since Civil Conflict is the most common type, I set it to 1 and the other complex emergency types to 0. The other covariates remain at their means.

Again, the results are similar to those for Model 5, but with some relevant differences. Most notably, any statistically significant results for limited contributions disappear. This finding simply reinforces the message that any predictions about these contributions are highly sensitive to model specification, and that there is relatively little we can safely say, based on these data, about the circumstances that promote them.

Second, for gap-dominated contributions, the curvilinear relationship evident in Model 5 persists (peaking at about 41% where Public Concern/Operational Environment = .6), but again the decrease from this peak is no longer statistically significant. Differences between the peak of 41% and the lower values to its left, however, remain statistically significant at the 5% level for values of Public Concern/Operational Environment between .22 and .3.

Finally, robust contributions follow the same basic increase as in Model 5, rising from less than 1% to over 90%. Here, though, they become statistically different from 0 at the 5% level at a notably lower value of Public Concern/Operational Environment, around .6.
Figure 5-16: Predicted Probabilities by *Contribution Type (Adjusted)*, Model 7
Chapter 6 – Australian Responses in East Timor, Aceh, and Bougainville

1. Introduction

This chapter analyzes Australian responses to three complex emergencies in the Southwest Pacific. These include large-scale violence against East Timorese civilians by pro-Indonesian militias in 1999; a separatist civil war in the Indonesian province of Aceh from 1999 – 2004; and a civil war on the Papua New Guinea (PNG) island of Bougainville from 1988 – 1997. Figure 6-1 is a map of the region that highlights the locations of these three conflicts.

Figure 6-1: Map of the Southwest Pacific
For each of these complex emergencies, I examine whether and to what extent Australia led or participated in peace operations, and if not, what other policies it pursued and why. Where it did participate in one or more operations, I focus on the resources it contributed and soldiers’ instructions for civilian protection (as a function of the mission’s operational goals and military strategies), as described in Chapter 3.

The case studies in this chapter and in Chapter 7 represent an important complement to the quantitative analysis. Together, they reflect wide variation in efforts to meet vulnerable civilians’ protection needs and provide important support for the theory. Whereas Chapter 7 examines U.S. contributions to two recent peace operations in Darfur, Sudan that facilitated a significant gap between the protection that soldiers were asked to provide and that they had the capacity to deliver, none of the Australian responses examined in this chapter helped to enable such a gap. Instead, they provide supporting evidence for the theory’s expectations about the circumstances in which we should observe other forms of involvement in these missions.

First, in East Timor Australia led a large and robust operation – INTERFET – focused exclusively on civilian protection and the restoration of a secure environment. I find that strong pressure from concerned Australians with close ties to the territory, along with a reasonably favorable operational environment, provide the most credible explanation for this outcome. This case provides evidence for the theory’s expectation that even without any other motive for action, sufficient public pressure to alleviate civilian suffering can combine with a relatively benign operational environment to inspire ambitious efforts to address civilians’ security and protection needs.

Second, in Aceh Australia took no part in any peace operation and made no other significant effort – diplomatic or otherwise – to address security threats to civilians (although it
did provide extensive disaster relief following the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami). Given that the Australian government faced no pressure to act, this outcome, too, is consistent with the theory. Third, in Bougainville Australia helped to arrange several small and limited peace operations, each of which took place relatively late during, or after, the war. Its direct participation was quite limited and initially focused only on providing logistical support for other contributors. These actions were associated with some limited public pressure to help resolve the conflict, but also reflected Australian leaders’ changing perceptions about what policies would best support the nation’s strategic interests in a politically stable Papua New Guinea. Significantly, public pressure for a proactive Australian response to Bougainville – though greater than for Aceh – never reached the threshold at which Australian leaders felt they faced the kind of political dilemma that I expect to encourage efforts to generate an illusion of civilian protection.

In exploring these cases, I am also able to investigate causal mechanisms and alternative explanations in greater depth than was possible in the quantitative analysis. Thus, I examine multiple indicators the strength and sources of public pressure for humanitarian action as well as leaders’ perceptions of this pressure, concerned citizens’ ability to identify high-quality effort to address civilians’ security needs, and a wide range of forces affecting the riskiness of the operational environment. Likewise, I look for evidence that leaders’ efforts to address civilians’ needs are driven by perceptions of strategic imperatives or by a sense of personal responsibility for suffering civilians. Where relevant, I also consider the possibility that leaders are uncertain about what policies would effectively address these needs, or that a peace operation might not represent the best way to do so. In addition, I analyze how both official responses and the theory’s core variables and relationships changed over time.

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1 In terms of Chapter 3’s Figure 3-1, the Australian response in East Timor falls at the upper right corner; the response in Aceh falls at the lower left; and the responses in Bougainville fall essentially along the diagonal line, somewhere toward the lower left of the figure.
There are also a number of strong reasons to conduct an in-depth study of Australian policy in the Southwest Pacific. Australia is both the major power in the region and – due to its proximity to this volatile area – the only Western democracy besides the U.S., UK, and France that consistently possesses the military capacity and political influence needed to make the kind of operational design decisions that this project seeks to explain. It has initiated or provided crucial support for several highly regarded peace operations, and its actions have been relatively understudied. The case studies in this chapter thus provide a unique opportunity to examine the validity of the theory outside the context of the American, French, and British policies that provide the basis for so many studies of humanitarian military action. At the same time, comparing Australian responses to multiple complex emergencies in its region holds constant a number of factors that might influence variation in efforts to protect civilians but that are not integral to the theory, such as the potential intervening state’s (in this case, Australia’s) political institutions. In addition, the same Australian government – under Prime Minister John Howard – was responsible for policy toward two of these three conflicts, and partially so for the third.

Finally, Australia’s response to the war in Bougainville represents an opportunity to examine how the theory performs in the context of a lower-magnitude complex emergency. As defined in Chapter 2, a complex emergency is a qualitative concept, but I use a high quantitative threshold to operationalize it in the Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies dataset. This approach excluded some very devastating but smaller-scale conflicts from the quantitative analysis. Although there are valid reasons for this, the suffering of civilians threatened by severe conflicts in smaller societies is no less than that experienced by the victims of larger emergencies. The civil war in Bougainville was precisely this kind of severe but relatively small-scale conflict, and it is partly for this reason that I examine Australian policies toward it here.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section describes the main sources of data I use to evaluate the theory in these cases. After that, I briefly introduce the Australian political system, foreign policy process, and capabilities for the conduct of regional peace operations. The remaining three sections contain the case studies.

2. Data Sources

Although I employ a wide variety of sources in these case studies, several types of data provide the primary evidence I use to evaluate my core theoretical claims. First, following existing literature and in line with the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5, I rely on the volume and content of elite newspaper coverage as one indicator of the extent of Australian public concern and activism about each conflict. I use the volume of coverage primarily to assess broad patterns in public interest – and access to information – about the different conflicts, and as an indicator of changing concern over time within each conflict. As Patrick Regan has pointed out, “gross variation in the amount of reporting on a conflict should reflect the extent to which the…public is informed and concerned about a particular conflict” (2000 p.98; see also Powlick and Katz 1998). An in-depth examination of news content provides additional information about these same issues, and also helps to shed light on important considerations such as the activities of the humanitarian public, the intensity of their attitudes, and their information about the conflicts and Australian policy.

Available evidence suggests that in Australia, newspapers remain a major source of the average citizen’s political information. A July 2009 poll asked respondents about their sources of information about international news. In response, 49% claimed that they “Often” get international news from printed newspapers, while an additional 40% claimed to do so “Sometimes.” 28% claimed to read online newspapers “Often” while an additional 22% did so
“Sometimes.” While 93% of respondents claimed to get international news from television either “Often” or “Sometimes,” this was only marginally higher than the 89% reported for print newspapers, the next most popular medium.\textsuperscript{2} Moreover, circulation data for the major Australian papers suggests that, in contrast with the trend in some countries, Australian newspaper readership remains strong. Figures for 2008 “showed 12.1 million people, or 69 per cent of the population, read the national metropolitan and large regional papers at least once a week.”\textsuperscript{3} For my news analysis, I rely primarily on coverage in \textit{The Sydney Morning Herald} (SMH).\textsuperscript{4}

Still, as pointed out in Chapter 5, using media coverage as an indicator of public concern does have certain limitations. In particular, it is possible that an official preference for an interventionist policy could generate public attention that might appear to be responsible for subsequent action. Therefore, I explicitly look for evidence of this dynamic, but I do not find it in these cases. In East Timor, the Australian government faced the challenge of taming and constraining public sentiment, rather than convincing it to support military action. In Aceh, I find a lack of both government and public interest. Finally, in Bougainville, the emergence of limited public concern about the war occurred while the government was committed to remaining uninvolved, and before its subsequent adoption of a more hands-on approach to the conflict.


\textsuperscript{4} Australia has four primary quality newspapers: \textit{The Sydney Morning Herald}, \textit{The Age} (Melbourne), \textit{The Canberra Times}, and \textit{The Australian}, in addition to a number of tabloid papers. As in Chapter 5, I use the SMH for two main reasons. First and most importantly, full-text coverage in the LexisNexis and Factiva search engines is available for considerably more of the relevant time period. Second, of the SMH, \textit{The Australian}, and \textit{The Age} (the three non-tabloid papers with the largest circulation), the SMH is generally viewed as the most politically centrist. Although its editorial bent may differ from the other papers, there is no reason to suspect that the relative volume of coverage should vary from them in any significant way.
In addition to news coverage, I use a variety of other sources of information on public attitudes and activist demands. First, I rely on petitions submitted to the Australian Parliament. In Australia, citizens have the right to petition either house of Parliament – the Senate or the House of Representatives – with a request for government action on any subject on which the relevant legislative body has the power to act. These petitions are recorded in the official parliamentary record of the relevant house. In the Senate, each petition must be presented by a Senator, and “While there is nothing in the rules of the Senate to compel a Senator to present a petition, most Senators take the view that they should seek to present any petition forwarded to them, even if the views represented in the petition do not reflect the views of the Senator presenting it.”

Thus, the number and content of petitions entered in the official records can be taken as an indicator of the extent – and nature – of public pressure on the Australian government.

Second, the results of available polling data on public attitudes toward participation in peace operations support the assumptions about the attitudes of the general public underlying the theory developed in Chapter 3. In the abstract at least, Australians are – like other Western publics – quite supportive of the use of the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for humanitarian purposes and for regional peace operations. Indeed, as one Australian defense expert put it,

military activities in the Southwest Pacific “don’t seem to be too concerning to the public; they seem to expect that’s what we ought to be doing.” 7 This suggests, as the theory assumes, that when contemplating a military response to a complex emergency in the region, Australian leaders can probably anticipate initial public support as long as they are able to make a reasonable case for the operation, and that their primary concern is likely to be with how the public will react once the costs are revealed.

To assess the available information about what these costs are likely to look like, I use many of the same indicators employed in the quantitative analysis – terrain, population and territory size, and the local military forces with which soldiers could have to contend. In addition, expectations about local consent for any deployment – both officially by the relevant government, and de facto on the ground – play a major role in influencing prospective costs.

Finally, for all of these core theoretical concerns as well as for information about alternative explanations, I rely on the views and impressions expressed to me in interviews with former politicians, policy advisers, academic experts, and activists regarding their reasons for the actions they took; the strategic imperatives they perceived; their understanding of the circumstances on the ground in the conflicts; and their impressions of public concern about and activism toward the different conflicts. In combination, these varied data sources provide a rich picture of the domestic and international political contexts surrounding Australian policy.

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7 David Horner, Interview with the author. August 21, 2008. Canberra, Australia. Dr. Horner is an official historian for the Official History of Australian Peacekeeping project, and Professor of Australian Defence History at the Australian National University. For a similar view of Australians’ permissive attitudes toward peace operations, see also John Connor, "Intervention and Domestic Politics," in Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field, ed. David Horner, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.60.
3. Foreign Policy Making and Defense Planning in Australia

3.1 The Australian Political System and Foreign Policy

Australia has a Westminster political system with two primary political blocs, the Australian Labor Party (ALP, or Labor), and the Liberal-National Coalition (the Liberals, or the Coalition). Parties are highly disciplined, and Parliamentarians rarely cross the aisle, giving the majority party strong control over both domestic and foreign policy.

Although major policy decisions are subject to the approval of Cabinet, Australian prime ministers have a great deal of authority within their cabinets. The prime minister takes advice from Cabinet, but makes the final decision on the deployment of military force. In addition, the Australian constitution places virtually no constraints on the Government’s ability to use armed force abroad. As one former senior Defence Department official described it, “The prime minister must have the confidence of Cabinet, Cabinet must have the confidence of the party room, the party must have a majority in the House of Representatives, and if they do they can do whatever they want.” In effect, then, it is the preferences and decisions of the national executive – in particular, the prime minister and foreign minister – that require explanation.

There are thus two primary political components of foreign policy decision-making in Australia. The first is party room politics: the Government must convince the party caucus to support what it wants to do. The second is public politics. Although the Government need not garner support from outside its caucus in the short term, it must concern itself with whether and how its decisions will affect the next election, and therefore, with public opinion. As in all

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8 Technically, this is a coalition of the Liberal Party and the National Party of Australia. The Coalition is dominated by the Liberal party, but effectively functions as a single party.

democracies, the Opposition may seek to score political points or affect policy through its influence in public debate.

3.2 Defense Planning and Capabilities for Regional Peace Operations

Because of the volatile region in which it is situated, Australia is – besides the three democratic permanent UN Security Council members – a rare Western democracy that has oriented defense planning around the need to be able to lead peace operations in the post-Cold War period. Although it does not possess nor seek to acquire the capacity to do so globally, successive Australian governments have sought to ensure that Australia can serve as the lead state in lower-intensity operations – including peace enforcement, peace-keeping, civilian evacuation, and others – in its own neighborhood.

Indeed, in recent years this has been an explicit goal in long-term force planning. Violence and instability in the region throughout the late 1980s and 1990s first generated serious attention to the need for military forces that could help to stabilize neighboring states. In 1994 the first post-Cold War defense review noted that, “The Australian Defence Force’s capabilities and readiness levels enable Australia to make substantial contributions to a range of peace operations, sometimes at very short notice,” but did not expect the demands of such operations to significantly impact force development.”

By 2000, however, Australia had already led several peace operations in the region, and more clearly anticipated the possibility that this might occur again. The strategic objectives and anticipated roles of the ADF emphasized in the 2000 defense review, Defence 2000, reflected both the primacy of the region and the lessons of the 1990s. Australia would generally plan to make larger contributions to peace operations that were closer to home, and would be unlikely to

lead any coalition operations “that were focused beyond Southeast Asia or the South Pacific.”\(^{11}\)

It would, moreover, be concerned not only with the possibility of external threats to any of the major nations – Indonesia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the island nations of the Southwest Pacific, and, after the 1990s, East Timor – but also with major internal challenges to their stability.

*Defence 2000* therefore anticipated the need to be able to participate in military operations to help these states manage internal threats: “This might require the ADF to contribute to regional peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations and help evacuate Australians and others from regional troublespots. We should be prepared to be the largest force contributor to such operations. Our planning needs to acknowledge that we could be called upon to undertake several operations simultaneously, as we are at present in East Timor, Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.”\(^{12}\) To ensure the nation’s ability to meet these objectives, the review outlined plans to place greater emphasis on the development of logistics and deployment capabilities for land forces, and decided to increase the size of the ADF from 51,500 full-time personnel in 2000 to 54,000 today.\(^{13}\)

4. East Timor

4.1 The Complex Emergency

A former Portuguese colony, East Timor comprises the eastern half of the island of Timor, some 240 nautical miles across the Timor Sea from northern Australia. Following its 1974 revolution, Portugal withdrew from the territory, which Indonesia then invaded and annexed in December 1975. A bloody 23-year occupation and war between Indonesia and


\(^{12}\) Ibid, p.31-3.

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p.52-3, 62.
Timorese resistance forces followed. This war involved extraordinarily brutal violence by the Indonesians against the civilian population, especially during the late 1970s and early 1980s. By the early 1980s, up to 200,000 East Timorese had died due to violence, disease, or starvation associated with the occupation, out of a population of no more than 800,000. Over the next two decades, East Timorese and their allies abroad advocated for independence from what they saw as a cruel and illegitimate occupying power.

The first signs that they might someday succeed in this quest came with the dramatic political changes of the late 1990s within Indonesia. After the fall of Suharto in May 1998, the new Indonesian president, B.J. Habibie, was eager to rid Indonesia of the constant international pressure about East Timor, whose incorporation into Indonesia had never been recognized by most of the international community. Although Habibie did not want to see the territory go, he announced in January 1999 that the East Timorese would be allowed to vote on whether they wished to remain in Indonesia or to become independent. A UN-supervised referendum was scheduled for the following August.

Habibie’s decision to permit a vote on independence was highly unpopular with the Indonesian military – TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia) – and with a portion of the local population who benefited from association with Indonesia. Throughout 1999, as planning and preparation for the referendum progressed, local militia supported by elements of TNI instigated violence in a bid to delay or cancel the vote, or at least to frighten the East Timorese into casting their ballots against independence. Tens of thousands of East Timorese were uprooted, and

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several hundred died. The militia held civilians hostage and cut them off from access to humanitarian aid in an effort to influence their votes, and threatened the UN personnel who were preparing for the ballot. TNI – which retained responsibility for security – failed to take any effective action to prevent the escalation of violence.

After a delay due to the violence, the referendum was held on August 30, 1999. The nearly 99% turnout indicated to many who had remained uncertain about the likely outcome that the result probably favored independence, and the militias immediately escalated their attacks against civilians, further accelerating their efforts following the announcement of the ballot result on September 4th – 78.5% in favor of independence.

The scale of the violence wreaked in East Timor over the following weeks was extraordinary. According to one estimate, “In less than three weeks 72 percent of all buildings and houses were destroyed or damaged, and hundreds of East Timorese were killed…More than 250,000 people were deported to West Timor [the neighboring Indonesian province]. The casualty rate would have been much higher had not hundreds of thousands of Timorese fled to the mountains where they faced severe food shortages” (Dunn 2009 p.280). Indeed, some 600,000 people – around three-quarters of the total population – were displaced by the violence during this period. The number of Timorese that died in the violence in September 1999 is

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18 See Don Greenlees and Robert Garran, *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom* (Crows Nest, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 2002), p.276. For an in-depth account of the violence after the vote, including some of the same statistics cited by Dunn, see Chapter 11.
uncertain, but was probably between 1,000 and 2,000 people (Dunn 2009 p.280). Some of those who went to West Timor were supporters of Indonesia who feared the prospect of remaining in an independent East Timor. Most, however, were forced across the border against their will by militia in an effort to convince outside observers that the vote had been rigged.

4.2 The Australian Response: Pre-Ballot Policies

I divide Australian involvement in these events into two phases: first, the period leading up to the conduct of the referendum, December 1998 through August 1999; and second, the period after the ballot, during the rapid escalation of violence in September.

In December 1998 the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, sent President Habibie a letter urging him to think about ways in which Indonesia might develop more progressive policies toward East Timor. Howard knew that Habibie was already contemplating various liberalizing reforms and wished to encourage this process. He did not, however, wish to see East Timor become independent in the near future, and his letter focused on suggestions about how Indonesia might best prevail on the people of East Timor to accept an agreement for political autonomy within the Indonesian state. Habibie’s subsequent announcement that East Timor would be permitted to vote on its future within the year therefore came as a considerable – and unwelcome – surprise to the Australian government, which nevertheless felt that it had no choice

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19 Others cite comparable estimates. For example, see Hugh White, "The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor, December 1998-September 1999," Security Challenges 4, no. 1 (2008), p.81. White estimates the number killed during these weeks was around 1500.

20 For a detailed account of these events, see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (Australia), East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge (Canberra, AU: Commonwealth of Australia, 2001), Ch. 3. For the text of Howard’s letter to Habibie, see p.181-82. For a shorter but comparable account, see White, "The Road to INTERFET," p.71-3.
but to support the process. It did so, however, with trepidation regarding the prospects for violence and the viability of a potentially independent East Timor. \(^{21}\)

In response to the new reality, during February and March 1999 the Howard Government developed four key policy objectives with respect to East Timor. First, they wanted East Timor to remain within Indonesia. Second, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia would take priority over the future of East Timor, and therefore they would seek to avoid policies that might damage that relationship. Third, because they expected TNI to continue to play a prominent role in Indonesian politics, maintaining a positive relationship with it was judged of special importance. Finally, Australia would – if at all possible – prefer to avoid having to deploy a large military force to East Timor. The Government recognized, however, that there was a good chance that a UN peacekeeping force would be needed in the event of a sudden Indonesian withdrawal from East Timor following a vote for independence, and that Australia would need to be prepared to play a major role in such an operation. In March, therefore, they began the process of bringing an additional ADF brigade up to 30 days’ notice to move (only one was normally maintained at this state of readiness), and shortly thereafter began consultations with the UN on what such a peacekeeping force might look like. \(^{22}\) At the same time, they hoped that the operation would not prove necessary.

Given subsequent events, it is important to emphasize that at this time, the Australian government anticipated that at least three things would need to happen before any peacekeeping


\(^{22}\) For an account of the Government’s policy adjustments, see White, "The Road to INTERFET," p.74-6. See also Peter Cole-Adams, "Downer Denies Rift on Peacekeepers," The Sydney Morning Herald, August 2, 1999; ———, "Downer's Pledge For Timor Peace Force," The Sydney Morning Herald, April 1, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, p.110-11.
operation could occur. First, the Timorese would have to vote for independence. Second, the Indonesian Parliament would have to ratify this result. And third, the TNI and other Indonesian personnel would have to withdraw from East Timor. A peacekeeping operation would, therefore, occur no earlier than November 1999, and only as part of a broader UN effort to prepare the new nation for independence.

In the meantime, however, maintaining security in East Timor during the months before the vote posed a major challenge. In March and April, Indonesia, Portugal, and the UN negotiated a Tripartite Agreement that laid out the provisions for implementing the referendum. A UN civilian operation, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), would oversee the preparations for and conduct of the election, while Indonesia insisted that TNI – which strongly opposed independence – would take responsibility for maintaining security.

By late March, while the Tripartite Agreement was being negotiated in New York – and certainly by the time its terms were announced in late April – it was clear to Australian officials that TNI could not be trusted to maintain a secure environment for the vote. Australian intelligence indicated that TNI’s relationship with President Habibie was shaky and that, despite the new policy, TNI was providing active support to the militia’s violent efforts to influence – or preferably cancel – the vote.23 In an effort to preserve positive relations with TNI, Australian officials were not always forthcoming about this information in public. As time passed, however, Prime Minister Howard, Foreign Minister Alexander Downer, and others increasingly criticized the high-level TNI involvement in the pre-ballot violence, and the Government reached

23 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Hugh White on East Timor."; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, p.164-70; White, Interview with the author (August 15, 2008); ————, "The Road to INTERFET," p.77.
out repeatedly behind closed doors to encourage senior Indonesian civilian and military officials to bring security under control.  

Australian ambivalence about participating in a major peacekeeping operation, however, appears to have influenced the Government’s handling of the intelligence at its disposal. On the one hand, in late March, Canberra proposed to a visiting UN official that UNAMET should include peacekeepers, in order to keep a watchful eye on TNI during preparations for the referendum and to ensure the safety of the East Timorese and UN civilian staff. Australia, it suggested, would be willing to participate in such an operation. Subsequently, however, the Howard Government did nothing more to ensure that the Tripartite Agreement would include provisions for peacekeepers within UNAMET, instead assuming that the UN would do so (White 2008 p.78).

The provisions of the Tripartite Agreement were announced in late April, following weeks of escalating violence. To the Australians’ surprise, there were to be no peacekeepers in UNAMET. Shortly thereafter, Howard flew to Bali to encourage President Habibie to do more to provide security, and to seek his consent to revise the Tripartite Agreement to include peacekeepers. Habibie refused, and Howard later admitted that this was the last time he raised the issue with the Indonesians until the day before the ballot, when it was too late.

The extent to which the Australian government did or did not – and should or should not – have tried harder to gain Habibie’s acquiescence for peacekeepers before the referendum has

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24 Craig Skehan and Peter Cole-Adams, "We Won’t Give In To Thugs: Downer," The Sydney Morning Herald, July 6, 1999; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, p.111, p.64-70; White, "The Road to INTERFET," p.77; Michael Wagner, "Terror Now a Delaying Tactic in East Timor," The Sydney Morning Herald, June 14, 1999.

25 Although Howard and Downer decided not to press further for a pre-ballot peacekeeping force after this experience, in early August they did press successfully for a plan to increase the number of UN civilian police and military advisers in order to tighten security in the aftermath of the vote. See Mike Secoome, "More Chamberlain Than Churchill," The Sydney Morning Herald, September 22, 1999; Mark Riley, "UN Backs Downer Plan to Beef Up Timor Force," The Sydney Morning Herald, August 6, 1999.
become the subject of some controversy. At issue in this debate is the degree to which
Australian officials were, during these critical months, placing a priority on the well-being,
safety, and aspirations for independence of the East Timorese or on the maintenance of
strategically important relationships with Indonesia and the TNI.

On the one hand, Downer defended the decision not to press harder for peacekeepers
before the vote, arguing that Habibie was firmly resolved not to permit them before the
Indonesian Parliament could ratify the results of the referendum.\textsuperscript{26} That Australian officials
repeatedly urged Indonesia – both in public and in private – to do a better job in providing
security does provide some support for his position that the safety and political aspirations of the
Timorese were Australian priorities. On the other hand, then-Deputy Secretary for Strategy in
the Department of Defence Hugh White concludes,

\begin{quote}
“It was clear…that there would have been huge resistance in Indonesia to the deployment of a
major PKF [peacekeeping force] to East Timor before the ballot. But it was also clear that no
sustained and focused effort was made either by Australia or, it seems, by the UN to overcome
that resistance. We can never now know whether, if pushed harder, Indonesia would have
acquiesced. But it may well be that by not pushing harder at this time…we missed the last best
chance to avoid the disasters of September” (2008 p.80).
\end{quote}

Although this debate cannot be resolved here, at the very least it does point to the critical
importance – if not the predominant role – of Australian strategic priorities regarding the
relationship with Indonesia in the development of policy toward East Timor during the period
before the referendum.

\textbf{4.3 Post-ballot policies: The deployment and design of INTERFET}

As noted above, following the vote on August 30\textsuperscript{th} – and particularly following the
announcement of the result on September 4\textsuperscript{th} – the security situation deteriorated rapidly, with
militia attacking the civilian population and UN personnel. Since TNI obviously refused to

\textsuperscript{26} For Downer’s comments on this see, eg, Cole-Adams, "Downer Denies Rift on Peacekeepers."
control the militia, an international peace-enforcement operation appeared to be the only way to do so. The Indonesian government, however, adamantly opposed this option (see eg, Greenlees and Garran 2002 p.232-35).

For a critical period of shortly over a week following the September 4th announcement of the ballot result, the Howard Government devoted itself to convincing Indonesia to accept a peace-enforcement operation, both directly and by engaging the efforts of the United States, the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and a multitude of other governments. On September 7th it announced that Australia would be willing to lead such an operation, if Indonesia could be prevailed on to consent. An initial offer of 2,000 troops was two days later increased to 4,500. After U.S. suspension of military ties with Indonesia on September 9th, Australia followed suit.

During this period, the Howard Government and its international partners used every diplomatic measure they could conceive of to pressure the Indonesian government. The crippling of its economy in the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98 left Indonesia particularly vulnerable to the threat that it would lose access to international loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) if Habibie refused to accept a peace enforcement mission. Late in the evening of September 12th, therefore, Habibie conceded and announced that an international force could deploy as soon as possible. Although his preference was for a UN force, and one that consisted primarily of contributions from Asian nations, only Australia had both the

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27 There were several other conditions that proved easier to meet, as well, including a UN Chapter VII mandate for the force, active involvement by regional countries, and the logistical and political support of the United States. See White, "The Road to INTERFET," p.83; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, p.239; Mark Riley, "UN to Consider Force in Territory," The Sydney Morning Herald, September 7, 1999.

willingness and the capacity to lead the operation – which became known as International Force East Timor, or INTERFET – on short notice.\textsuperscript{29} Although the Australian government had not previously considered the possibility of leading this kind of enforcement mission, the preparations it had made for contributing to the anticipated UN operation allowed INTERFET to deploy very quickly, beginning on September 20\textsuperscript{th}, only three weeks after the vote and a week after it became clear that the mission would occur.

Australia’s leadership of INTERFET clearly qualifies as a highly robust civilian protection effort based on the standards laid out in Chapters 2 - 3. The operation’s political goals were, first, to re-establish peace and security, and secondarily, to facilitate humanitarian aid and reconstruction. In this context, the re-establishment of peace and security involved both directly protecting civilians under threat of violence, and more broadly, neutralizing the threat represented by the militia.

Core aspects of the military strategies employed were equally ambitious. The operation was approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – assured through Australian diplomatic efforts at the UN – with a mandate to “take all necessary measures” to fulfill the operation’s tasks.\textsuperscript{30} Permissive rules of engagement allowed soldiers to pursue and disarm militia engaged in violence against civilians. As force commander Peter Cosgrove later described, the rules of engagement “would actually have excused any soldier who, in fearing for his or her life, had fired their rifle” while participating in these activities (quoted in Birmingham 2005 p.46). In addition, they “would have allowed him to open fire on the militia because they were threatening our troops directly by pointing their weapons at them” (Cosgrove 2007 p.210).


What is more, the operation’s core protection tasks were carried out by ground forces, who were supported by air and sea-based personnel. This ground presence allowed soldiers to interpose themselves between militia and civilians, to create a credible threat, and thus to serve as a deterrent to the militia. As Cosgrove put it, “Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of violent rhetoric” (quoted in Birmingham 2005 p.23). This allowed for aid workers (who had been evacuated after the vote) to return and provide desperately-needed help to the uprooted population, who began to emerge from their hiding places in the mountains.

In addition to appropriate operational goals and military strategies, Australia provided an impressive array of resources given the limited size of the ADF. In the end, Australia contributed some 5,500 personnel, and was supported by contributions from the United States – which, in particular, played a critical role in logistics, communication, and intelligence – and some 22 other countries. The Australian soldiers, the bulk of the force on the ground, were highly trained and exceptionally well equipped. As Birmingham (2005 p.23) describes, “Using the aggressive mobility provided by Blackhawk choppers and Light Armoured Vehicles to act on intelligence gathered by INTERFET’s vastly superior surveillance net, the Australian-led forces were able to create the impression of overwhelming presence from the moment of their arrival.” Thanks to these high-end mobility and surveillance capabilities, Cosgrove later noted, “we were able to seem ubiquitous” (quoted in Birmingham 2005 p.23). There was, therefore, no gap between INTERFET’s instructions and resources for civilian protection.

31 The incident in Com described in Chapter 1 was just one example of this at work.
32 David Horner, Peter Londey, and Jean Bou, eds., Australian Peacekeeping: Sixty Years in the Field (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p.279. For coalition size, see also Cosgrove, My Story, p.257.
33 For information and discussion on the resources available, see eg, ———, My Story, Chs. 7-12; Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, Ch.14.
In sum, INTERFET deployed very quickly following the dramatic escalation in violence in East Timor, and was designed in a robust way that reflected a priority on meeting the physical security and protection needs of uprooted civilians. These facts, along with Australia’s willingness to accept the considerable expense and political risks of leading the operation, reflected the Howard Government’s commitment to achieving a positive humanitarian outcome.

On October 20th, the Indonesian parliament officially recognized the result of the referendum, and the last of the TNI troops departed on November 1st. In February 2000, INTERFET handed over authority to the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which included peacekeepers and civilian administrators to help East Timor transition to independent statehood. Australia provided about 1,650 troops (and some civilian police) to the force, whose military component focused on maintaining law and order.

4.4 Core Variables: Public Concern and the Operational Environment

4.1.1. Pre-existing public interest in East Timor

By foreign policy standards, the events in East Timor in 1999 generated enormous concern – and tremendous anger against Indonesia – on the part of the Australian public. This manifested itself in extensive and well-organized activism by a variety of civil society groups, and by spontaneous outpourings of emotion by thousands of everyday Australians from across the political spectrum. During the period leading up to the August 30th vote, efforts to influence government policy came primarily from organized groups with a long history of advocacy on Timorese self-determination and human rights. In September, large numbers of everyday concerned Australians began to publicly express a desire for military action.

35 Ibid, p.113 (Ch 7.1: Self-Determination).
A variety of historical factors combined to produce this outcome. First, during World War II, Australian soldiers were stationed in East Timor, where the local population aided them (and a large number gave their lives as a result) in the fight against Japan. Consequently, Australia possessed a large community of veterans with an interest in – and personal experience of – East Timor. Many in this community felt intense gratitude toward the Timorese for their help during the war, and used their considerable political clout and organizational capacity (based in the Returned Services League, Australia’s foremost veterans’ association) to express their concerns about the violence there in 1999. Indeed, many veterans had already taken an active interest in Timorese suffering following the Indonesian annexation, and thus had an established base of knowledge and emotional involvement, as well as a network of East Timor connections. What is more, they tended to be more politically conservative – and thus more likely to be supporters of the Howard Government – than many other Australians interested in the Timorese cause. This helped to ensure that there was not only a broad range of concern across the political spectrum, but also a core constituency among likely Liberal Party voters. Many of these veterans had also returned to East Timor in the years after the war as vacationers with their families, reinforcing their bonds and increasing the number of Australians with personal experience of the society and people under threat.

36 For one brief history of these events, see Cosgrove, My Story, p.260-61.
37 These ties came up repeatedly in my conversations with Australians about East Timor, including among others: Richard Chauvel, Discussion with the author. August 17, 2009. Melbourne, Australia; Bu Wilson, Discussion with the author. August 3, 2009. Canberra, Australia; and Horner, Interview with the author (August 21, 2008). Chauvel is a scholar of Indonesian history and politics, Australian-Indonesia relations and Australian foreign policy. He is Senior Lecturer at the School of Social Sciences and Psychology, Victoria University. Ms. Wilson has worked on East Timor for Oxfam and Caritas Australia.
39 Chauvel, Discussion with the author (August 17, 2009).
The Indonesian occupation also helped to lay the groundwork for the outpouring of support for East Timor in 1999, in three ways. First, it spawned a sizeable diaspora. According to East Timor’s Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, “Australia was the destination for the first East Timorese refugees from the civil war, a development which in time greatly strengthened the campaign for Timor-Leste in Australia and the region.”

Second, and relatedly, the annexation spawned a large international activist movement that advocated on behalf of Timorese independence and human rights throughout the following 25 years. Australia was one of the primary centers of this movement, partially due to the diaspora and its proximity to East Timor. In the 1970s, the movement attracted the attention of “academics, human rights activists, journalists, politicians, aid agencies, churches, returned soldiers, students and trade unionists, a good number of whom had already visited the territory” as well as a few parliamentarians. Major organizations included the Campaign for an Independent East Timor and the Australia East Timor Association.

In addition to these solidarity groups campaigning for the cause of Timorese independence, a range of development, church and human rights NGOs adopted a less party-political and more human rights-oriented approach, which was more appealing to a wider public. Aid agencies such as the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), the umbrella organization for some 70 Australian NGOs, delivered humanitarian aid following the Indonesian annexation, an experience that led to long-term advocacy.

Following a number of setbacks, the activism of the 1970s gave way to a more subdued level of activity in the 1980s. For several reasons, however, the 1990s was a period of renewed

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41 Ibid, p.96-97 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination).
42 Ibid, p.99-100 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination).
43 Ibid, p.97 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination); Wilson, Discussion with the author (August 3, 2009).
attention to – and increased activism on behalf of – the Timorese cause, both in Australia and elsewhere. The Indonesian government’s 1989 decision to admit foreigners into East Timor for the first time since 1975 led to visits by thousands of concerned individuals and civil society representatives. In addition, the Santa Cruz Massacre of 12 November 1991, in which Indonesian security forces were caught on film murdering several hundred funeral mourners, “was a turning point in world opinion on the territory…due to the presence of international observers…and their projection of the tragedy through print, radio and television to the world.”\textsuperscript{44} Moreover, in 1996 two Timorese – Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo and José Ramos-Horta, the face of the Timorese resistance campaign’s international diplomatic efforts since 1975 – received the Nobel Peace Prize. This proved a boon to the activist community: “The global media coverage it attracted…generated new public interest and support for the civil society campaign in many countries.”\textsuperscript{45}

Buoyed by these events, “In Australia, new organisations and initiatives continued to emerge. These included Australians for a Free East Timor (AFFET)…a Sydney branch of the Australia East Timor Association in 1992, Perth-based Friends of East Timor, the Mary McKillop Institute of East Timorese Studies (MMIETS) established in Sydney in 1993…the East Timor International Support Centre in Darwin…in Melbourne the University Students for East Timor and the East Timor Human Rights Centre…[and] Action in Solidarity with Indonesia and East Timor (ASIET).”\textsuperscript{46} Australians concerned about East Timor also submitted no fewer than 93 petitions to Parliament between 1991 and 1997. These called on the government to undertake such actions as supporting UN resolutions on East Timor, supporting Timorese self-

\textsuperscript{44} Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, "Chega! The CAVR Report," (2005), p.107-08 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination).
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid, p.112 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination).
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid, p.111 (Ch. 7.1: Self-Determination).
determination, working for the release of Timorese political prisoners, and ending military cooperation with Indonesia.\footnote{Parliament of Australia, "Parlinfo," http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/search.w3p;adv=yes. This is the website of the official records of the Australian Parliament. Strangely, no petitions were entered in 1998-99, perhaps reflecting the change in government policy and/or political changes in Indonesia.}

The third and final impact of the Indonesian invasion and annexation was that the Australian government’s response to these events had, by the 1990s, generated widespread feelings of remorse and guilt in the Australian public – and among some politicians – for their failure to have done more to prevent or to halt Indonesia’s actions. In 1975, Australia – preoccupied with a dramatic political crisis at home – had acquiesced in the Indonesian annexation. Three years later, in 1978, it became the first and only Western government ever to officially recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, a policy that continued unbroken through the 1990s. Thus, during the worst of the Indonesian occupation in the late 1970s and ever since, the Australian government had placed a higher priority on good relations with Indonesia than on any significant efforts to aid the Timorese. A belated understanding of the scale of the violence wreaked on the Timorese during that time now fueled the conviction among many Australians that their government must not repeat the mistakes of the past.

**4.4.2 Public Reaction: Pre-Referendum Period**

Prior to the August 30\textsuperscript{th} vote, Australian independence-oriented solidarity groups and development-oriented NGOs were very busy preparing for the referendum and the prospect of an independent East Timor. The long-standing history of advocacy made it easy for these groups to mobilize quickly in support of the ballot process, as existing organizations had considerable
standing and contacts with relevant groups in Australia, such as the East Timorese diaspora.\textsuperscript{48} Indeed, Habibie’s decision to permit the referendum, combined with unprecedented media coverage of East Timor, “invigorated civil society like never before.”\textsuperscript{49}

Members of the media and the Labor Party joined these groups in urging the Howard Government to do all it could to ensure that the ballot process would be fair and secure. This included advocating for strong pressure on Indonesia to admit a peacekeeping force following Howard’s failed effort to do so in Bali in April.\textsuperscript{50} Labor’s foreign affairs spokesman, Laurie Brereton, pushed hard on this issue, noting in August that “it was a disgrace that there was no Australian commitment to peacekeepers, nor any Australian campaign to press Jakarta to accept them, during the most dangerous stage of the process.”\textsuperscript{51} Although these efforts to encourage stronger pre-ballot pressure for peacekeepers were unsuccessful, the sustained mobilization of civil society groups in the months leading up to the ballot played an important role in helping to galvanize broader public concern very quickly once the violence escalated in September.

\textbf{4.4.3 Public Reaction: Post-Referendum Period}

Australian public attention to and concern about events in East Timor exploded in the aftermath of the vote, as violence spread. Whereas prior to the vote, the Howard Government faced the demands of the established activist community, now it also came under pressure from a larger and more diverse set of concerned citizens. This pressure, moreover, now focused on convincing Howard to send the ADF to restore order. These developments generated a serious

\textsuperscript{48} Andrew Hewett, Interview with the author (by phone). August 18, 2009. In 1999 Hewett was in charge of Oxfam Australia’s political advocacy efforts, and coordinated the organization’s response to the crisis from 1999 - 2001.


\textsuperscript{50} For example, see Michael Wagner, "Army in the Way of Freedom," The Sydney Morning Herald, April 29, 1999. (Wagner was the chair of the East Timor Foundation).

\textsuperscript{51} For Downer’s comments on this see eg, Cole-Adams, "Downer Denies Rift on Peacekeepers."
dilemma given the Government’s continued insistence that it would not send troops without Indonesian consent.

The explosive growth in public interest can be seen, for example, in changes in news coverage in *The Sydney Morning Herald*. Figure 6-2 shows the monthly count of articles in 1999 in the SMH that mention “Timor,” with a striking increase in September.

![Figure 6-2: Monthly SMH Coverage of East Timor, 1999](image)

**Note:** Bars reflect the results of full-text searches conducted in Factiva using “Timor” as the search term.

A closer look reveals that coverage not only increased dramatically in September, but did so in response to the escalating violence, *prior* to the decision to deploy INTERFET. The critical period was between the vote – especially the announcement of the result on September 4th – and President Habibie’s September 12th decision to allow INTERFET to deploy. During this time violence was rampant, but it was not yet clear whether any international force would be deployed to stop it. Figure 6-3 shows the daily volume of reporting, beginning August 30th. Coverage
shot up dramatically over the next two weeks and was actually higher than later in the month, once INTERFET was announced and deployment began. This suggests that the increase was a response to the violence in East Timor, and not simply to the decision to deploy INTERFET.

Figure 6-3: Daily SMH Coverage of East Timor, September 1999

Note: Bars reflect the results of full-text searches conducted in Factiva using “Timor” as the search term. Numbers for Sundays (09/05, 09/12, 09/19, 09/26) are from the Sun Herald, the Sunday paper associated with the SMH, which may explain any systematic differences in Sunday coverage (in particular, the absence of any articles on 09/19). The other figures, which do not show daily changes, exclude Sundays.

An examination of concerned citizens’ and civil society groups’ actions and demands, however, offers clearer evidence of the pressure the Howard Government faced. During the critical week following the announcement of the ballot result, calls for military action came from all directions. Prominent Australians with ties to East Timor, such as James Dunn, former Australian consul, publicly urged intervention. So, too, did the Australian Green Party, many members of the media, and the long-standing East Timor solidarity groups described above.

Many of these calls for action urged the use of military force even without Indonesian permission. Even organizations and groups not normally associated with militaristic attitudes favored military action. These included development NGOs such as ACFOA and Oxfam, as well as leaders in the Catholic community, which maintained close ties with overwhelmingly Catholic East Timor. On September 6th, the Archbishop of Sydney warned that a failure to send troops “would leave a scar on Australia’s reputation.” A Sydney nun stated, “This is a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportion, and if the world and Australia doesn’t do something now we will never, never be forgiven.”

Australian unions organized protests and boycotts – notably against the Indonesian airline, Garuda – in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Darwin and elsewhere.

Critically, however, during this time an unusually large number of ordinary Australians who had not previously been involved in trying to influence government policy added their voices to the call for military action. Partly, they expressed their views through spontaneous outpourings of emotion in letters to newspapers and calls to radio stations and to their parliamentary representatives. Partly, however, they participated in demonstrations and events organized on very little notice by the many civil society groups who had been following events in East Timor for months. In this sense, these groups’ high level of activity over the previous months was critical to the speed at which the Howard Government came under pressure to act.

56 Ellen Connolly and Greg Bearup, "Protesters Storm Sydney Airport, Block Passengers," The Sydney Morning Herald, September 11, 1999; McDonald, "Australia's Guilt Rising by the Hour."
Prepared for the possibility of violence and mobilized for action, East Timor solidarity groups and other civil society organizations were able to provide concerned citizens who suddenly wished to express their views with public avenues for doing so on practically no notice.

The media devoted considerable coverage to this phenomenon of public concern. As one article noted, “the vast majority of Australians are outraged and are demanding action. Indeed, we are more united in our anger and concern then [sic] at any other time since World War II.” 57  Another marveled that “East Timor dominated Letters last week…There were many, many calls for a UN peacekeeping force to be sent to end the violence and bloodshed and deaths, and calls for Australia to adopt a harder line with the Indonesian Government. It is a topic that attracts very few opposing positions, unlike most other controversial subjects.” 58  One especially telling article outlined reports from members of Parliament about the activities of their constituents:

“Federal MPs across Australia…reported a flood of phone calls and e-mails from constituents, with the Liberal member for the Sydney seat of Cook, Mr Bruce Baird, saying ‘my phones have gone crazy’. In Bathurst, 200 people attended a candle-light vigil, called at less than a day's notice, and passed a resolution calling on the Government to send in troops…Mr Baird said his largely Anglo-Celtic, Australian-born electorate had deluged him with calls on East Timor, more than on any other issue. ‘To a man and a woman, they are saying, ‘go for it’, that we've let the East Timorese people down before and we just can't do it again.’” 59

The same article reported that calls to political radio programs, popularly known as talkback, had exploded. “This week…there's been more than 1,000 calls, and many say we have to return the favour after what the East Timorese did for us in World War II. The last 72 hours has completely galvanised public opinion.” 60

Such attitudes prompted their own reaction. One SMH contributor wrote, “The most unexpected fact of the week: that so many Australians seriously believe we should land troops in

57 Dunn, "Courage to Call the Shots."
60 Ibid.
East Timor without Indonesian permission…there seems a real lack of caution among those who
tell our Government to ‘just get in there’…The mood seems to be to shame all those Australians
who have tried to establish a dialogue and cordiality with our most important neighbour.”61
Another wrote that, “Only after a few days did it apparently dawn on the callers to talkback radio
that our military capacity was not even remotely up to unilaterally mounting some sort of
presence in East Timor.”62

These calls for military action created a real quandary for Australian leaders. While
engaged in a full-court diplomatic press against Indonesia, Howard and Downer faced the
difficult task of convincing “an emotionally charged domestic electorate…that over-reacting to
the atrocities in East Timor would be counterproductive and dangerous.”63 They repeatedly
emphasized, during this week, that there were 26,000 Indonesian troops in East Timor, that
sending forces without Indonesian permission would be tantamount to declaring war with
Indonesia, and that Australia could not unilaterally save the Timorese.

Finally, available survey evidence confirms the impression that many Australians wanted
to see strong action from the government, and also suggests that the broader public was favorable
toward the possibility of military action. A poll conducted from September 10th – 12th, prior to
Habibie’s decision to permit INTERFET to deploy, asked two relevant questions. First, “Do you
personally think the Australian government is currently doing too much, doing enough or should
they do more to help the situation in East Timor? If do more – do you think the Australian
government should do a lot more or only a little more?” Fully 31% of respondents felt that the
Australian government should do “A lot more” for East Timor, while an additional 10% felt it
should do “A little more.” The Australian government was “Doing enough” according to 45% of

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respondents, and only 6% thought it was “Doing too much.” Second, the poll asked: “Are you personally in favour or against Australia sending troops to East Timor as part of an international peace-keeping force? If in favour – is that strongly in favour or partly in favour? If against – is that strongly against or partly against?” Fully 54% of respondents answered “Strongly in favour,” and an additional 23% answered “Partly in favour,” for a total of 77% in favor. Only 15% answered either “Partly against” or “Strongly against.”64 Given that it was unclear at the time whether Indonesia would consent to such a force, this high level of support is especially impressive.65 More subtly, a pollster for the Howard Government, who had access to far more polls than are publicly available, later recalled of this period that, “The imperative there politically was to do something.”66

In sum, the message the Australian government received from its citizens during this critical period was that, not only were a great many of them extremely concerned about the Timorese and willing to offer strong support for military action, but that many of these – from activists to church leaders to the average citizen – believed they should send the troops even without Indonesian consent. As evident in the surveys, moreover, even members of the general public who were not expressing these views in public at least appeared to support the possibility of military action.

Howard and others involved in the decision-making at the time have recognized the intensity of this pressure. Some years later Howard recalled that, “the reaction in Australia got

64 Newspoll Market Research/The Australian, (1999). The poll is available at http://www.newspoll.com.au/index.pl?action=adv_search. The survey “was conducted on the 10 -12 September 1999 on the telephone by trained interviewers among 1200 adults in all states of Australia and in both city and country areas. Telephone numbers and the person within the household were selected at random. The data has been weighted to reflect the population distribution.”

65 A second poll in October showed continued support for the deployment. See Michelle Grattan, "UN Mission Lifts Howard's Popularity," The Sydney Morning Herald, October 13, 1999.

increasingly alarmed as the result of the ballot was known and the violence and the apprehended violence increased, people got more and more concerned and more and more demanding that we do something." Joe Hockey, Minister for Financial Services, remembered: “It was an extraordinary period. The reaction right across the electorate was you’ve got to do something. And even when you said ‘Look, do you really want to invade our nearest neighbour?’ they’d say ‘Yes, do it.’” According to Foreign Minister Downer, “The Australian public were screaming out, everybody was—I mean it wasn’t a party thing, a Left-Right thing—screaming out to do something to stop it. People were ringing up, crying over the phone, we had more calls on that issue than I’ve ever had in my life on anything” (quoted in Greenlees and Garran 2002 p.245).

4.4.4 Operational Environment

In addition to public concern as a potential motivator for action, the theory laid out in Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of the operational environment in driving the costs—physical, and thus political—a leader must expect to face when contemplating a contribution to a peace operation.

INTERFET deployed in an operational environment that was challenging, but still relatively favorable by the standards of complex emergencies. Despite Habibie’s reluctant consent for the operation, Australian officials did expect the situation to be dangerous. For one thing, there was real concern about the possibility that INTERFET soldiers could be drawn into fighting with Indonesian forces. Although TNI was supposed to withdraw from the territory,

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67 Ibid. For a statement Howard made at the time, see Grattan, "PM Cool as Emotions Flare."
68 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Program Transcript – Episode 2."
69 For another, similar quote from Downer see also Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, "Chega! The CAVR Report," (2005), p.114 (Ch 7.1: Self-Determination).
70 For concern about this among senior decision-makers, see White, "The Road to INTERFET," p.84. For more on the risks, and details of efforts to minimize them, see the account of the force commander, Cosgrove, My Story, especially Chs. 7-10; as well as Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance, Ch.14.
there would be some time during which both Australian and Indonesian soldiers were on the ground and during which tension or misunderstandings could have led to violence. Likewise, there remained some uncertainty about Habibie’s control over TNI. 71 At the same time, Australian leaders fully expected the militia, who were well armed but not particularly well trained, and who had the advantage of excellent knowledge of the mountainous terrain, to resist INTERFET’s efforts to end their attacks against civilians. They therefore did not expect to have de facto consent on the ground, and faced the real possibility of even more resistance than they anticipated.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the operational environment were fairly auspicious. The total civilian population requiring protection was quite small – less than 1 million people – as was the size of the territory. Moreover, with official Indonesian consent for the operation, Australian officials were at least able to anticipate that TNI would mostly cooperate. While there was legitimate reason for concern, the situation still compared favorably with that faced by potential interveners in other conflicts. In Kosovo, for example, NATO faced the certainty of concerted Serb opposition, and in the case that I discuss in the next chapter – Darfur, Sudan – any U.S. participation in a peace operation appeared certain to prompt armed Sudanese resistance. As in those cases, the anticipated operational environment would have been far more dangerous if Australia had been faced with the prospect of intervening without Habibie’s consent, in which case INTERFET would certainly have faced fierce resistance from TNI. The problem with that possibility, at least in part, indeed reflected concerns about limited public tolerance for the resulting costs. As Greenlees and Garran note, “Aside from the political unacceptability, the number of casualties would be intolerable” (2002 p.239).

71 For Habibie’s relationship with the military at this time, see ———, Deliverance, p.248-51.
4.5 Accounting for INTERFET

In this section, I argue that the events and decisions described above, though entirely consistent with the theory laid out in Chapter 3, are largely inconsistent with several possible alternative explanations for the deployment of INTERFET.

Specifically, I consider the possibilities that Australia’s strategic interests might have helped to motivate INTERFET, or that Australian officials might have been driven by a sense of personal responsibility for the welfare of the Timorese population. Given INTERFET’s responsiveness to civilians’ security needs, there is no evidence to suggest that Australian leaders did not know how to design a robust operation.

First, the presence of strategic imperatives to aid and protect threatened civilians is a possible explanation for robust efforts to do so. For example, such incentives played a major role in motivating Operation Provide Comfort, which protected the Kurdish population of northern Iraq from attacks by Saddam Hussein after the Persian Gulf War. In this case, however, they cannot explain Australian policy, as INTERFET defied the most sacred tenets of decades’ worth of Australian strategic doctrine.

Indonesia is Australia’s largest and most powerful neighbor. Consequently, as the policy objectives developed by the Howard Government in March and April of 1999 suggest, Australia has extremely strong strategic interests in maintaining good relations with Indonesia and TNI. It has, moreover, pursued these interests enthusiastically and – some critics would say – single-mindedly since Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in 1949. When Australia failed to protest Indonesia’s original annexation of East Timor in 1975 and then officially recognized its incorporation in 1978, maintaining these relations was a good part of the motivation for its silence. Australian strategic planning has, moreover, consistently emphasized the importance of
these relations to Australian security. Efforts to promote close defense ties with Indonesia included several decades of extensive military cooperation programs, including regular meetings between defense ministers, combined military exercises, and considerable Australian training assistance to the Indonesian military.\textsuperscript{72}

These policies, moreover, had never been popular with the Australian public, which has a long history of suspicion toward Indonesia. Indeed, Paul Keating’s Labor Government negotiated a 1994 defense cooperation agreement with Indonesia in secret because, although Keating deemed it critical to Australian strategic interests, the expected public opposition in Australia was so strong that this appeared the only means to ensure its passage. In sum, despite Indonesia’s authoritarian regime, Australia valued – and sought to encourage – the stability engendered by Suharto’s reign, and this remained a priority throughout the 1990s despite public skepticism.

Australian policies during the pre-ballot period in 1999 largely followed in this tradition, but were also partially consistent with the messages the Howard Government was receiving from the activist community. At this time, its decision not to push the Indonesians harder over the issue of peacekeepers before the vote reflected – in part, if not entirely – the desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia and the TNI. On the other hand, decisions to raise the issue of peacekeepers with Habibie in April, to call attention to Indonesia’s failure to maintain adequate security, and to call for the deployment of more civilian police, were generally consistent with both the desire not to be forced into a large and dangerous military deployment and the preferences of concerned Australians. Still, the Government did not push as hard for peacekeepers before the ballot as some would have liked, although it was well aware of the

\textsuperscript{72} See eg, Department of Defence (Australia), \textit{Defence 2000}, p.41; Department of Defence (Australia) and Ray, \textit{Defending Australia}, p.86-88.
strength of latent pro-Timorese and anti-Indonesian sentiment in Australia. By failing to press
harder for peacekeepers early in the year, it may have increased the probability of an outcome –
highened post-ballot violence – that officials knew would generate widespread anger among
Australians.

This history of efforts to maintain good relations with Indonesia, right up through 1999
and even in certain aspects of the conduct of INTERFET, illuminates the extent to which the
operation represented a break with long-standing Australian strategic priorities. Thus as White
concluded, notwithstanding its operational success, in launching INTERFET “the Australian
Government completely failed to achieve the strategic objectives it had set itself at the start of
1999” (2008 p.69). As described in the case study of Australian responsiveness to the war in
Aceh below, the operation indeed created a serious rift with the Indonesian government and TNI
that persisted for years afterward, just as Australian officials had feared.

There is, therefore, no reason to believe that traditional Australian strategic interests
helped to motivate involvement in INTERFET. Another possibility put forward by some on the
left, however, is that the Howard Government was motivated by the opportunity to increase
Australian revenues from the Timor Gap oil and gas fields – located between East Timor and
Australia – if East Timor were to become independent. This, too, however, is inconsistent with
the available evidence. First, as noted above, the Howard Government’s policy objectives as of
early 1999 included keeping East Timor within Indonesia. As these objectives were set after the
Australian government had sponsored a 1998 study of East Timorese preferences toward
independence or autonomy within Indonesia, Australian officials already knew that the likely
result of any vote in the near future would be independence (Greenlees and Garran 2002 p.110).
Their preference for East Timor to remain within Indonesia, therefore, suggests that they made
no effort through the spring or summer of 1999 to capitalize on any potential that an independent East Timor would represent.

Even if East Timor were to become independent, however, it was by no means clear at the time how this would affect Australian revenues from the Timor Gap fields. As a reward for its status as the sole Western power to recognize Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, in 1989 Australia and Indonesia had negotiated a treaty over drilling rights that was already highly favorable to Australia, and indeed the Timor Gap fields had served as a partial incentive for Australian recognition of Indonesian sovereignty in 1978 (Cotton 1999 p.244). While Australia could reasonably expect – and indeed would later have – considerable leverage with a newly independent East Timor on the negotiation of a new treaty, the Howard Government could hardly have predicted in 1999 how such negotiations would progress. According to international law, an independent East Timor would have a strong territorial claim to areas that Australia controlled under the current treaty with Indonesia. Had East Timor decided to press the boundary issue in the International Court of Justice, Australia could very well have ended up with a worse deal than it already had. INTERFET, moreover, was a very expensive mission. The Howard Government actually planned to institute a special tax to pay for the budget deficit it was expected to cause. Given this, and given the threat to the relationship with Indonesia that it represented, it stretches the imagination to believe that Australian leaders would have initiated the operation for the uncertain benefits represented by a new and more favorable treaty governing the Timor Gap fields.

Another possible explanation for the deployment of INTERFET, and the one preferred by members of the Howard Government in its aftermath, is that it was ‘the right thing to do.’ Indeed, Howard and Downer repeatedly raised this argument in their justifications for the
operation afterward. This argument suggests that a sense of responsibility both to protect the East Timorese and to help them realize their aspirations for independence – possibly related to the Government’s role in encouraging President Habibie to pursue more liberal policies toward the territory in December 1998 – may have played some role in their ultimate decision-making process.\textsuperscript{73} It is not, however, especially consistent with Australian policies before the August 30\textsuperscript{th} vote. The fact that the Government was well aware of the prospects for the rapid escalation of violence suggests that, had avoiding such an escalation taken a higher priority than maintaining good relations with Indonesia, they might have devoted greater effort to convincing the Indonesians to accept peacekeepers before the ballot. And as Hugh White has noted, subsequent claims that official support for East Timorese independence had developed by late 1998 or early 1999 are “simply inconsistent with the [sic] all of the Government’s words, and most of its deeds, until at least the middle of 1999” (2008 p.73).

After the ballot, however, Australian policy was generally consistent with this ‘personal responsibility’ explanation. Ultimately, the Howard Government did decide to expend considerable effort and expense on behalf of the Timorese. It is possible that the sudden upsurge of violence in September exceeded even their worst expectations and prompted the same kind of emotional response in Howard and Downer as among large swaths of the Australian public. The idea that this drove the deployment of INTERFET, however, is at the very least inconsistent with their priorities as expressed through the policies of the preceding months.

Finally, and in contrast, both the deployment and design of INTERFET are highly consistent with the theory laid out in Chapter 3. First, a very large and politically diverse set of

\textsuperscript{73} Although Howard’s December 1998 letter did not push for independence, it is thought to have had considerable influence over Habibie’s decision to hold the referendum. As a result, Howard and other ministers – particularly Downer – are thought to have felt, or have expressed feelings of, considerable responsibility for the way that events played out.
concerned citizens – which notably included a core Liberal Party constituency – had very intense preferences for Australian military action. These preferences were so strong, in fact, that a number of Australians who were either involved in the process or very knowledgeable about it believe that the Government’s decisions were strongly driven by public opinion. Likewise, Howard and Downer were forced to take time out from their diplomatic efforts in order to explain that without Indonesian consent, the public’s demands would amount to a declaration of war and an invasion of a much larger country. The demands for unilateral action by both some advocacy groups and other concerned citizens also betrayed a lack of understanding about military realities – here, about their own state’s force projection capacity – of the kind described in Chapter 3.

Given that Habibie did eventually consent to INTERFET’s deployment, however, the Howard Government had not only strong reason to heed the demands of these concerned citizens, but also the opportunity to do so for costs they expected to be tolerable. These are precisely the circumstances in which I expect that a leader motivated by public pressure might be willing to launch the most robust civilian protection efforts: the humanitarian public is sufficiently influential relative to the operational environment that facilitating a gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection in the hope of creating an illusion of civilian protection would simply not be worth the political risks involved. In this case, as well, despite evident misunderstandings about the consequences of sending troops to East Timor

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74 As White later put it, the decision to deploy INTERFET “was to a significant extent out of the government’s hands: the violence that followed the ballot had so galvanised Australian public opinion that by the time the decision was made the government seemed to feel that it simply had no choice, whatever the costs and risks.” White, ”The Road to INTERFET,” p.86. This view was also prevalent in several of my interviews, including: ———, Interview with the author (August 15, 2008); Horner, Interview with the author (August 21, 2008); Ian McAllister, Discussion with the author. August, 2008. Canberra, Australia. (Dr. McAllister is an expert on Australian public opinion and Professor of Political Science at the Australian National University).
without Indonesian consent, the history and ties between Australians and East Timorese meant that a mission with limited protection capacity was probably at fairly high risk of being quickly discovered.

Finally, it is worth noting that it would have completely changed the balance between public concern and the difficulty of the operational environment had Habibie not consented to INTERFET’s deployment. In these circumstances, any intervention would have faced the certainty of concerted TNI resistance, and therefore, of significant Australian casualties. Howard and Downer’s repeated insistence that they would only intervene with Indonesian consent, therefore, also supports the theory.

5. Aceh

5.1 Complex Emergency Description

In 1999 a long-running conflict between the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, or GAM) and the Indonesian government erupted into full-scale civil war. Although low-level fighting had plagued the province since the 1970s, the worst of the violence occurred between 1999 and 2004. The roots of the conflict lay in resentment by the local population at perceived exploitation by the Indonesian government and the arrival in Aceh of some 160,000 Javanese settlers during the previous decades as part of the government’s so-called ‘transmigration policy.’ The renewed outbreak of violence in 1999 was associated with the broader upheaval in Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, which included the violence in East Timor. Moreover, the aspirations of the GAM were influenced by the Timorese quest for

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independence. Prior to 1999, unrest in Aceh had never generated calls for a referendum on the province’s future, but such calls emerged in the wake of the decision to grant East Timor a vote.

Both sides perpetrated human rights abuses – including extrajudicial killings, forced disappearances and torture – although the Indonesian security forces were the bigger culprits. The war is thought to have directly affected a majority of the province’s population, forcibly displacing from one- to two-thirds of residents at some point in time, up to 700,000 people between 1999 and 2004. Both sides used forcible displacement strategically: the rebels to draw attention to the conflict, and the government during counter-insurgency operations. By the end of 2002, the U.S. Committee for Refugees estimated that over 10,000 people, mostly civilians, had died since the beginning of the conflict. Then, during a single year of martial law and Indonesian military offensives between May 2003 and May 2004, TNI claimed to have killed nearly 2000 GAM members, although human rights groups argued that most of these were civilians. Ironically, the December 2004 tsunami that devastated Aceh and other parts of Southeast Asia helped pave the way for peace. A Memorandum of Understanding providing for demobilization and disarmament of GAM and the removal of Indonesian forces was signed in August 2005, and peaceful elections were held in December 2006.

5.2 The Australian Response

The Australian government, still under Prime Minister John Howard, showed no interest in any significant involvement, military or otherwise, in the conflict in Aceh. Instead, Foreign

76 Ibid.
Minister Downer consistently asserted that Aceh’s claim for independence was distinctly different – and less valid than – East Timor’s, because Aceh had been part of Indonesia since independence in 1949.\(^7^9\) Although he urged both Indonesia and the GAM to respect human rights and noted that a diplomatic solution to the conflict would be preferable, Downer left no doubt about Australian support for Indonesia’s “right to deal with organisations that mount militant acts against their own people,” calling attention to the atrocities also committed by the GAM and noting that they “should not be seen as some sort of honest and honourable victims.”\(^8^0\)

But the GAM’s pursuit of independence was not the only relevant issue. More pertinent from a humanitarian perspective were the violence and human rights abuses committed as part of the Indonesian counter-insurgency campaign. Beginning in 2000, a small Swiss NGO called the Henry Dunant Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue took charge of coordinating a three-year long peace process. Initial negotiations led to a ceasefire, known as the ‘humanitarian pause,’ which ended with the launch of major military operations in April 2001. On December 9\(^{th}\), 2002, the parties signed a more wide-ranging Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, but following repeated ceasefire violations over the next few months, in May 2003 the Indonesian government launched the most extensive offensives yet in the province.\(^8^1\)

Over time, the Henry Dunant Center “increasingly reached out to key states, including Norway, the US, and others, to secure financial support and political backing for its dialogue efforts.”\(^8^2\) The Australian government did provide some funding to this process, but it was less than that provided by the United States, the Europeans, or Japan, and Australian diplomats were

\(^7^9\) For a statement to this effect, see Australian Broadcasting Corporation, "Downer steers clear of violence in other parts of Indonesia," *ABC AM News*, September 29, 1999.
\(^8^1\) For more on this process, see Konrad Huber, *The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation* (Washington, DC: The East-West Center, 2004).
\(^8^2\) Ibid, p.viii.
less involved than those of other donors. Moreover, by 2002, the Henry Dunant Center recognized its limited capacity, as a small NGO, to bring about a sustainable peace and sought to encourage donor states to take a more active role in the peace process. It found, however, that after East Timor, “Jakarta opposed any formal role for an international organization, and donor countries side-stepped direct responsibility for implementing the peace process.”

In sum, not only did Australia fail to lead or participate in a peace operation in Aceh, but avoided all involvement other than token political and financial support for the peace process. Moreover, during this period the Howard Government sought assiduously to repair relations with Indonesia damaged by the intervention in East Timor. At the height of the renewed Indonesian offensives in Aceh in 2003, Australia resumed joint military exercises with Kopassus, TNI’s special forces branch, for the first time since September 1999, despite its reputation for rights abuses in Aceh, East Timor, and elsewhere.

5.3 Core Variables: Public Concern and the Operational Environment

5.3.1. Public Concern

By all accounts, Australian public concern about events in Aceh was exceedingly low. In stark contrast with East Timor, Australians lacked strong personal connections with the people of Aceh. Aceh is not only located farther from Australia, but the Acehnese population in Australia numbers in the low hundreds, most of who have arrived since 1999. In addition to their lack of long-term ties in the Australian community, most tend to be poorly educated and lack the language skills necessary for effective communication and liaison with the Australian media and

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83 Edward Aspinall, Discussion with the author. August 12, 2009. Canberra, Australia. Dr. Aspinall is an expert on Indonesian politics, particularly on the Aceh conflict. He is a Senior Fellow in Indonesian Politics in the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University.
84 Huber, The HDC in Aceh, p.ix.
85 Matthew Moore, "Indonesia, Australia Exercises on Again," The Sydney Morning Herald, August 1, 2003.
NGOs. Consequently, they tend to be poorly organized and were – unlike the Timorese – unable to conduct effective advocacy efforts within Australia. Occasionally the Acehnese community held protests in Sydney, but these failed to attract many non-Acehnese participants, and always remained very small. The institutional connections that helped connect Timorese and Australians – such as veterans’ organizations and churches – were also lacking.

According to Hugh White, the absence of such connections played directly into the low public concern about the conflict, and in turn, the government’s lack of interest:

“The political oxygen that was available in Australia in relation to Indonesia’s treatment of separatist movements was entirely absorbed by East Timor and to a lesser extent West Papua. There was none left over for Aceh. If you wanted to bitch and moan about what those bloody Indonesians were doing you’d focus on East Timor. Aceh just seemed like a lesser case, from the public’s point of view and from the government’s point of view. Why, having put this huge investment in East Timor, would you then go and focus on something that nobody in Australia cares about?”

Other policy makers shared this impression of low public interest in Aceh. Foreign Minister Downer, for example, claimed never to have seen a demonstration in Australia on the human rights abuses in Aceh. In stark contrast to East Timor, moreover, between 1999 and 2004 not a single petition was filed in the Australian Parliament concerning the conflict in Aceh.

Paradoxically, Australia’s involvement in East Timor may actually have served to limit Aceh-related pressure on the Howard Government, as the activists and development organizations who might otherwise have urged it to take a more active role in promoting human rights there were extremely busy with Timor-related work during and after 1999. These organizations were closely involved not only in the preparation of the ballot and its immediate aftermath (as noted above) in East Timor, but also in the two-and-a-half year transition period of UN administration, which involved both development and reconstruction work as well as

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86 Aspinall, Discussion with the author (August 12, 2009).
87 Ibid.
89 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
extensive political groundwork to lay the foundations for independence. This left them less time than they might otherwise have had for Aceh-related activism. Religious affiliation may also have played a role in this lower level of NGO activity. The Catholic Church and Catholic charities had played a significant role in drawing attention to events in East Timor in part because Timor is a strongly Catholic society. In contrast, as Downer rather bluntly put it, these groups “didn’t care about human rights abuses in…Aceh because that was Muslim on Muslim.”

The lower level of public interest in – and access to information about – Aceh can be seen through the volume of related media coverage, both prior to and during the conflict. During the years before the renewed violence of 1999, the number of articles mentioning Aceh was less than 10 on an annual basis between 1991 and 1997, and reached 33 in 1998. In contrast, there were typically between 100 and 200 articles per year mentioning Timor during this period.

Figure 6-4 shows the number of stories in the SMH containing the word ‘Aceh’ on a monthly basis between 1999 and 2004. During this period, the number of articles per year ranged from 51 in 2002 to 124 in 1999. In this figure, the red represents articles that include both ‘Aceh’ and the phrase ‘human rights,’ while the green represents articles that contain ‘Aceh’ but do not contain ‘human rights.’ This distinguishes, albeit imperfectly, between articles likely to be focused on – and provide the Australian public access to information about – the human rights or humanitarian situation in Aceh, and those unlikely to do so.

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90 Aspinall, Discussion with the author (August 12, 2009).
91 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
The larger volume of coverage in 1999 and 2000 reflects the fact that what public discussion there was of Aceh followed to some extent from interest in the situation in East Timor. First, a number of journalists who reported on the crisis in East Timor in 1999 subsequently turned their attention to the conflict in Aceh. In addition, because it was another separatist conflict within Indonesia and therefore had a bearing on broader political developments there, Aceh was often mentioned in passing in articles that mainly concerned developments in East Timor or the Indonesian political landscape more generally. Yet despite being mentioned in so many articles that did not primarily concern it, not once in the five year period shown here did the number of articles that mentioned Aceh reach the number of articles that mentioned East Timor in any month of 1999.

92 Aspinall, Discussion with the author (August 12, 2009).
In terms of content, several aspects of this coverage are striking. First, in contrast with the many articles that urged various actions on Timor, such efforts to influence government policy were noticeably absent among articles mentioning Aceh. This may have been because, whereas with East Timor there was a sense that Australia both could and should do something, this simply was not the case with Aceh. Second, in contrast to East Timor, the coverage of Aceh attached blame to both sides in the conflict. Although most articles placed greater emphasis on rights abuses committed by the Indonesian military, they also reported on abuses committed by the GAM, and on its role in sinking the peace process. Finally, reflecting the lower government interest in Aceh as well, the coverage was striking for the rarity of reports on Australian policy. Articles mentioning Aceh included few statements by government officials over the five-year period, and the occasional mentions of government policy were generally references to its lack of support for the GAM’s political objectives.

One reason for the limited coverage of Aceh, which also served to limit the potential for significant growth in Australian public concern about events there, was that at various times the Indonesian government introduced a number of restrictions on foreign journalists that severely limited their access to the conflict zone. For example, in June 2003, shortly after the start of its renewed military offensives, it introduced regulations that “effectively stopped all foreign aid workers and journalists from visiting most parts of the province.” Human Rights Watch claimed that these restrictions, as well as threats against Indonesian reporters, prevented information about rights abuses committed during the offensives from being examined or publicized and had “stopped most serious reporting of the conflict.” In November 2004 the

93 Ibid.
Indonesian government officially barred all foreign journalists from Aceh for the first time in four years. As shown in Figure 6-3, however, the volume of coverage of the war in Australia was low even before these restrictions were put in place.

**5.3.2 Operational Environment**

The operational environment for a potential peace operation in Aceh never became an issue because there was never any consideration by the Australian government of leading or otherwise contributing to one. Had there been, however, the considerable capacity of the TNI to resist would have made Indonesian consent the most critical consideration in any assessment of expected costs. Although it is impossible to know for sure, in the wake of East Timor it seems especially unlikely that such consent would ever have been forthcoming. In addition, depending on how such an operation would have been perceived to affect GAM’s political objectives, it is possible that any force would also have had to contend with the possibility of attacks by the guerrilla group.

**5.4 Accounting for Australian Inaction**

Australian inaction in the face of civil war in Aceh is consistent with my theoretical expectations. The total lack of domestic pressure for any kind of engagement with Indonesia over the issue of human rights in Aceh – let alone a peace operation to protect Acehnese victims of brutality by Indonesian forces and the GAM – would predict precisely the kind of Australian disengagement that occurred.

At the same time, this outcome is also somewhat over-determined, as Australia’s perceived strategic interests also pointed against any significant involvement in the conflict.

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Following the breach over East Timor, Australia’s two primary strategic imperatives with respect to Indonesia were, first, to repair the severely strained diplomatic relationship, and second, not to do anything that might encourage the further disintegration of the Indonesian state.

Australian actions in East Timor had fostered the belief among many Indonesians that Australia secretly longed for the disintegration of the country. This generated considerable suspicion and ill will at a time of tremendous political upheaval within Indonesia, and Australian elites were well aware of this sentiment. As White put it, for example, “It’s very widely believed in Indonesia today, certainly it was five years ago, that what happened in 1999 was that Australia set about to humiliate Indonesia and to take East Timor from Indonesia…and make East Timor an Australian military base.” Given these suspicions, the goal of repairing relations with Indonesia necessitated, more than ever, the careful avoidance of any statements or activities that could be construed as encouraging the break-up of the Indonesian state. Political support for the aspirations of the GAM, or any actions that might have been construed as such, would only have exacerbated the already troubled relationship. Thus, “Australia had good diplomatic reasons not to make a fuss about Aceh.”

Aside from the quality of diplomatic relations, however, the Howard Government also believed Australia had a strong strategic interest in a stable and united Indonesia. The prospect that multiple small, weak, poor, and potentially non-viable states could splinter off from Indonesia seemed a real possibility in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and these were not the kinds of states that Australian policy-makers wished to see in their immediate neighborhood. In a typical statement, in 2000 Downer remarked that the Government and the bureaucracy believed

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97 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009); see also, eg, Hamish McDonald, "Indonesian Clouds Gather on Our Horizon," _The Sydney Morning Herald_, February 14, 2001.
98 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009). This point was repeated by others as well: eg, Chris Ballard, Discussion with the author. August, 2009. Canberra, Australia.
“without exception that the break-off of parts of Indonesia…would be a strategic disaster for Indonesia’s neighbours, including Australia.”99 However, it was not clear that Australian diplomatic involvement in the conflict in Aceh could help to prevent this outcome in any significant way, given Australia’s total lack of credibility in Indonesia at the time. It made more sense, therefore, to entrust any peace negotiations to other actors who were willing to try to help resolve the conflict, and whom Indonesia would see as more neutral.100

In sum, then, Australia had two strategic interests related to the conflict in Aceh. One of these clearly pointed away from any involvement. The other might have pointed toward some kind of role in the peace process had Australian officials believed this would be helpful in achieving a negotiated solution in which Aceh remained in Indonesia. Since they did not, however, there was no reason to undermine relations with Indonesia any further for this purpose.

5.5 A Footnote: the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami

Australia’s response to the conflict in Aceh makes for an interesting comparison with its reaction to the December 26, 2004 tsunami. The tsunami, though terrible in much of the region, was especially devastating in Aceh, where it killed some 170,000 people, a strong majority of the total number of Indonesian victims.101 In response, Australia spent $42 million in relief aid in Indonesia alone within the first six months, and made a commitment of $1 billion over the next five years – the country’s largest international aid package.102

100 Aspinall, Discussion with the author (August 12, 2009); White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
Because the scale of the disaster was too great for the Indonesian government to cope with alone, it also permitted Australia – among other countries – to send both military and civilian teams to Aceh to provide emergency relief. The ADF provided a field hospital, medical personnel, a naval amphibious transport ship carrying earth-moving equipment and other vehicles to help with reconstruction, and a 150-man contingent of army engineers. Australian soldiers played a strictly humanitarian role and were unarmed throughout their deployment.103

These relief efforts were, moreover, extremely popular with the public, whose generosity in response to the tsunami was stunning. Over the following six months, Australians donated $330 million to relief efforts through NGOs, vastly exceeding the funds they had donated for East Timor in response to the events of 1999.104 Ironically enough, it was this Australian aid – including the military contribution – that, more than anything else, helped to repair relations damaged by INTERFET, and to re-establish trust and broken connections between the Australian and Indonesian militaries.105 Even with its extensive involvement in humanitarian assistance to Aceh in 2005, however, Australia did not play a key role in the renewed peace process that put a final end to the war later that year. Given the critical role of preexisting ties between Australians and Timorese in contributing to the decision to deploy INTERFET, however, these events do prompt the question: would Australian public concern – and government policy – toward the conflict in Aceh have been any different had the tsunami occurred before the war?

105 See, for example Australian Associated Press, "Howard to Visit Aceh."
6. Bougainville

6.1 Complex Emergency Description

In November 1988, residents of the Papua New Guinea (PNG) island of Bougainville attacked and closed down a large copper mine located on the island. Their motivations included dissatisfaction with their share of royalties from the mine – which was operated by an Australian company, Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL) – and with what they perceived as economic domination and exploitation by the PNG government. Whereas the PNG government received some 60% of the revenues from the mine, the Bougainville Provincial Government received only 5% and the landowners from whom the land for the mine was leased only .2%.\(^{106}\) The majority of the economic benefits the mine produced, therefore, went to people on mainland Papua New Guinea, nearly 1000 kilometers away. Meanwhile, the people of Bougainville were left alone to cope with the severe environmental devastation it had wrought.

As proceeds from the mine represented some 16% of the PNG government’s total annual revenues during the 1970s and 1980s, it could ill afford to lose this income.\(^{107}\) It responded to the attack by sending in riot police and later the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF) in an attempt to forcibly reopen the mine. The brutal tactics used in these efforts alienated the Bougainvillean population and soon helped to bring about a full-blown insurgency and calls for independence from Papua New Guinea (see, eg, Breen 2009 p.95; Regan 2007 p.100-01). Through 1997, the PNG government (supported by part of the population) and the rebels, the Bougainville Resistance Army (BRA), alternately fought and engaged in a series of failed peace negotiations.


\(^{107}\) Ibid, p.94.
During the war, both sides committed rights abuses against civilians, although the PNGDF did so to a greater degree. The BRA threatened and sometimes attacked Bougainvillean who opposed it.\(^{108}\) Most of the suffering and the majority of deaths, however, were caused by a PNG blockade that left much of the island without doctors, medical supplies, and other necessities for extended periods of time. In July 1996, PNG government figures showed that up to 10,000 people had died since the fighting began, of whom some 7,640 were civilians. An additional 7,070 civilians had been injured, while some 200 PNG troops and police had died, along with a similar number of BRA fighters.\(^{109}\) Up to 40% of the population were left with no option but to live in government-controlled care centers, which often offered insufficient food and medical care.\(^{110}\) Among a population of only 170,000 to 200,000 people, these figures are indicative of a war that was, in relative terms at least, every bit as devastating to civilian life as the conflicts in East Timor and Aceh, although smaller in absolute terms.\(^{111}\)

After years of failing to achieve either military victory or a negotiated peace, in 1997 the PNG government hired mercenaries from the private military company Sandline International to defeat the BRA once and for all. As described in detail below, the so-called Sandline Affair eventually led to a renewed peace process headlined by New Zealand. An interim truce was signed in October 1997, which was supported by a small New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group. This was followed by a permanent ceasefire in January 1998, which was monitored by


\(^{109}\) Up to 2,000 members of pro-PNG Bougainvillean militias fighting against independence had also been killed. Greg Roberts, "PNG's Agony: 10,000 Dead," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, July 13, 1996.


an Australian-led Peace Monitoring Group over the next several years of negotiations for a political settlement. Finally, an August 2001 peace agreement provided for a high level of constitutionally protected autonomy for Bougainville within Papua New Guinea and a constitutionally guaranteed referendum on independence to be held ten to fifteen years thereafter. The final elements of the Peace Monitoring Group departed in 2003.

6.2 Australian Responses

Because this was a nearly decade-long conflict that saw a series of peace efforts, multiple separate deployments of PNGDF forces, and the leadership of three separate Australian prime ministers from both sides of the political aisle, this section provides a more extensive and integrated account of both developments in the conflict and changes in Australian policy and perceived strategic imperatives over time.

For approximately the first year and a half after the attack on the mine, the violence was limited, as were its effects on civilians. Some 20 civilians were killed, for example, between February and mid-July of 1989. During this period, the PNG Government pursued several policies to prevent news about its actions in Bougainville from reaching the outside world. Australian journalists were expelled from the island in preparation for a PNGDF offensive in March 1989, and visits by all foreign media and diplomats were banned.

A March 1990 ceasefire led to the temporary withdrawal of PNG troops, but in May the BRA declared independence from Papua New Guinea. The PNG government responded by imposing a total military blockade on the island, “which effectively cut off all food, medicine

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112 For further details of the peace process see eg, Regan, "Development and Conflict: The Struggle over Self-Determination in Bougainville."


and other goods and services...”\textsuperscript{115} It was at this point that the severe disruption to civilian life that characterizes a complex emergency, and that would persist for large portions of the next several years, began. As a consequence of the blockade, the island lost most of its doctors, and deaths due to lack of medical care began to mount. The blockade was lifted as part of a short-lived January 1991 peace agreement known as the Honiara Declaration, but following the BRA’s rejection of the accord in April, the PNG government abandoned plans to pursue an outside peacekeeping force and sent PNGDF troops back to the island.\textsuperscript{116} In October 1991 the PNGDF again began preventing aid agencies from engaging in relief programs, and re-imposed the complete blockade in January 1992. In October, as part of another new offensive on the island, the PNGDF also re-imposed a complete news blockade.\textsuperscript{117}

Australian policy early in the war was highly supportive of the PNG government’s campaign to suppress the BRA. At this time the Australian government – under Labor prime ministers Bob Hawke and then Paul Keating – perceived strong strategic reasons to oppose Bougainvillean independence. Since the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, Australian strategic doctrine has aimed to ensure that no potentially hostile power gain access to the islands of the Southwest Pacific. This goal has translated into a long-running concern with the stability of neighboring states, including Papua New Guinea. According to the 1994 defense review, for example, “Australia’s interests continue to be served best by a stable, self-reliant and cohesive Papua New Guinea, able to exclude hostile external powers and well-disposed towards its neighbours.”\textsuperscript{118} As the former

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\textsuperscript{115} \textit{———}, "The Blight on Bougainville."
\textsuperscript{118} Department of Defence (Australia) and Ray, \textit{Defending Australia}, p.92.
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colonial administrator of Papua New Guinea, moreover, Australia maintained close relations and a keen interest in its political stability, and had provided extensive budgetary, military, and other support to the PNG government since the country’s independence in 1975.

The war in Bougainville thus threatened perceived Australian strategic interests in several ways. First, the prospect of Bougainvillean independence threatened the stability of PNG as a whole. The closure of the copper mine removed a significant portion of the PNG national budget, which the Australian government worried that PNG could not function effectively without. At the beginning of the war, moreover, Australia was “still providing 25% of their budget on an annual basis, so we had a real stake in PNG national finances.”119 In addition, Australian officials worried that Bougainvillean independence might encourage the secessionist aspirations of several other PNG islands, potentially prompting the collapse of PNG as a whole. Finally, they were also concerned about the strategic consequences of adding another potentially unviable microstate to a region that had already seen instability in both Fiji and Vanuatu during the 1980s.

Thus, in 1989, before they were fully aware of the brutality of the PNGDF’s conduct on Bougainville, the Hawke Government contemplated intervening militarily on behalf of the PNG government to suppress the BRA or reopen the mine.120 Instead, however, it decided to support the PNGDF by providing it with additional weapons and by accelerating the delivery of four helicopters it had previously offered.121

119 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
121 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009). See also Breen, "Towards Regional Neighbourhood Watch," p.95.
Although Australia provided these helicopters on the condition that they not be used as gunships, the PNGDF later used them to attack Bougainvillean villages and civilians, prompting some opposition within Australia to its continued support for the PNG government. Later, once the extent of PNGDF misconduct on Bougainville became clearer, Australia continued to provide significant aid and support for the PNGDF as a whole, but not for operations on Bougainville. As Hugh White, at that time senior defense adviser to Prime Minister Hawke, noted, “We didn’t provide cash; we had advisers, people helping with other areas not on Bougainville and not in combat related roles… So we were doing a lot to support the PNGDF but we weren’t doing a lot to support them on Bougainville.”

During these early years, despite their support for the PNG government, Australian officials also condemned atrocities by both sides, provided funding to Australian aid agencies for relief work, and pressed the PNG government on the issues of humanitarian and media access to the island. Yet these efforts were not all that they could have been. Regarding the blockade, the Australian government “had a fairly systemically ambivalent attitude. It deplored the consequences of the blockade for the people of Bougainville, but it didn’t ever…argue against maintaining it…It’s a legitimate question whether we did meet our obligations there.”

Several considerations contributed to this failure to accord the humanitarian situation on Bougainville a higher priority or to push harder on the PNG government. First, Australian officials felt they lacked a credible source of leverage. Although Australia provided PNG with a great deal of aid – both military and non-military – the government was sufficiently committed to maintaining a strategic relationship with PNG that any threat to withdraw this aid would have

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122 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
123 See eg, O'Callaghan, "Bougainville: PNG Still Stopping Vital Medicines."
124 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
been seen as non-credible. Second and third, it took time for the full effects of the blockade to become apparent, and partly as a consequence, it was relatively easy to give in to a sort of policy inertia. As White put it,

“Having decided against military intervention ourselves; having decided against sustained support for the PNGDF once the PNGDF started misbehaving; having decided that we supported the PNG government in the broader objective of keeping Bougainville in PNG; and having decided by default to leave it to PNG as to how to manage all of that, it became a very sustainable policy for us to just sort of stand back and say, you know, you guys look after this your own way, and don’t be too inhumane.”

In 1993, the human rights situation on Bougainville attracted greater attention than it had in the past, for several reasons. In March, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted three resolutions on the Bougainville crisis. In November, Doctors Without Borders decided to leave Bougainville, protesting that the PNG government had continually thwarted its efforts to provide medical care to the population and that most Bougainvilleans still were not receiving adequate care. The same month saw the release of an Amnesty International report, which provided detailed evidence of rights abuses – including torture and rape – by both the PNGDF and the BRA, and called for Australia to suspend military aid to PNG.

At this time, the Keating Government continued to urge PNG to permit greater humanitarian access, in particular for the Red Cross, and increased its funding for relief aid in Bougainville. At the same time, the long-standing official position that the war was strictly an internal matter to be solved by the PNG government was beginning to soften. In May Gordon Bilney, Minister for Pacific Island Affairs, announced that Australia would consider mediating in

125 Ibid.
the crisis if both sides wished for it to do so. And in response to inquiries from a number of concerned parliamentarians, the Government sought PNG permission to send a parliamentary delegation to Bougainville, a decision that was seen as “a significant shift in Australia’s policy on the conflict.”

The delegation traveled to Bougainville in April 1994. In June, it released a report on its visit, declaring that “Australia has an obligation to help resolve the crisis on Bougainville and a role in securing the peace there…But the delegation has been careful to limit Australia’s role to one of encouragement during peace talks and of assistance in reconstruction and development on Bougainville after a peace plan has been agreed.” In May, the PNG government requested Australian support for the creation of a South Pacific Peacekeeping Force (SPKF) to oversee peace negotiations. Foreign Minister Gareth Evans responded that Australia would be willing to host peace talks and provide support for the proposed peacekeeping force, but that it would not seek a primary role in brokering peace.

Two factors drove Australian reluctance to play a larger role. First, as the former colonial power, it did not wish to be seen dictating policy to Papua New Guinea. Second, given its support for the PNG government, it was not trusted by the BRA, which consistently opposed Australian involvement in the peace process. Still, despite BRA opposition, Australia provided training for the 200 troops from Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu deployed for the October peace

conference, and provided the transport and logistical support needed for their deployment. This contribution involved some 648 personnel.134

In the end, security concerns prevented the BRA from showing up for the conference. In the aftermath of this failure, the PNG government reached out to Bougainvillean leaders who were not part of the BRA, and established a Bougainville Transitional Government in early 1995. The BRA, feeling threatened, launched new attacks.135 Additional peace talks failed later in the year, and in 1996 the PNGDF launched new military offensives, including in June and July the two largest of the war to date.136 These offensives generated considerable discussion of the role played by Australian military aid and equipment, and led to tensions with the PNG government over whether Australia would continue to provide the same volume of aid in future.137

In March 1996, John Howard’s Liberal Party came to power in Australia. The Howard Government shared its predecessor’s assessment of the critical importance of political stability in Papua New Guinea, seeing the country as “core business for Australia” because of its proximity, status as a former colony, and because of the extensive money and training Australia had

provided over the years. It believed, however, that the conflict could not be solved militarily, and soon called for a policy review on Bougainville.

When the Foreign Affairs and Defence bureaucracies argued that there was essentially nothing Australia could do about the war, Howard suggested that they needed to begin thinking about alternative approaches. White, now Deputy Secretary for Strategy in the Defence Department, recalled that, “We started to become much more interested in the evolution of peace deals on Bougainville… we were, so to speak, on the lookout for opportunities to contribute our support to Bougainvillean actions which would lead to some kind of settlement.” To begin with, they opposed PNG’s renewed military offensives. Foreign Minister Downer argued that only a negotiated solution could provide a durable resolution to the conflict and repeatedly offered to mediate. This ‘interference’ angered PNG officials. Australia’s new resolve to help encourage peace thus failed to yield any significant results in 1996.

Then, in late February 1997, news broke that the PNG government had hired the private military company, Sandline International, to defeat the BRA. This decision was taken, in part, out of frustration by what PNG Prime Minister Julius Chan felt was insufficient Australian help in the war effort. The Howard Government immediately moved to discourage this course of action and again offered to facilitate peace talks.

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138 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
139 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
The Sandline Affair sparked concerns on a number of levels. Strategically, the introduction of mercenaries into the Southwest Pacific would be destabilizing. Politically, there was a concern that Australian aid money would be used to pay for them. The Australian government therefore launched a campaign to pressure PNG to call off the mercenaries and considered calling in the UN to help end the conflict. Promises of extra aid for training the PNGDF as well as ships to patrol the Papua New Guinea – Solomon Islands border, repeated offers to facilitate peace talks if PNG gave up the planned use of mercenaries, and the threat of ‘serious consequences’ if it did not, failed to achieve their intended effect. A mutiny led by Jerry Singirok, Chief of the PNGDF, who called for Chan to resign in protest over the mercenaries, led to fear of a military coup. Ultimately, Chan resigned, the mercenaries departed, and a caretaker government took over until elections could be held.

After this, Australia took a more active role in pressing for a peace agreement. Still, Bougainvillean concerns about Australian ownership in the mine and its role in supporting the PNGDF continued to limit Australia’s diplomatic position. According to Downer, “Australia’s name was mud,” and consequently the Howard Government encouraged New Zealand to take the lead in organizing the renewed peace process. This allowed for the signing of an interim agreement, the Burnham Truce, in October 1997, along with plans for the deployment of a New Zealand-led Truce Monitoring Group. A January 1998 summit led to a permanent cease-fire.

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147 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
During this time there were repeated suggestions that Australia should, or might be asked, to play a peacekeeping role on Bougainville.148 But given BRA sensitivities, Downer seemed determined to avoid direct Australian involvement.149 In the end, Australia did contribute some personnel – initially, 25 civilians and 65 ADF personnel and later up to 120 at a time – to the Truce Monitoring Group, which deployed in November 1997. Their role, however, was limited to the provision of logistical support.150 Because the entire operation was unarmed, an Australian Special Forces ship also deployed offshore to ensure that they could be removed quickly if necessary.151

The Truce Monitoring Group remained in place until the January 1998 ceasefire came into effect in May. That month, the Howard Government agreed to lead the subsequent Peace Monitoring Group, which would oversee implementation of the ceasefire during negotiations for a political settlement. It provided some 240 – 250 unarmed personnel, again split between military and civilian.152 The Peace Monitoring Group helped pave the way for the final 2001 autonomy agreement, and Australia oversaw the operation through its conclusion in 2003.

In sum, early in the war Australia supported the PNG government’s efforts to solve the conflict in Bougainville militarily. As time passed, humanitarian conditions deteriorated and Australia’s provision of military aid became more controversial. The two Labor Governments

149 When it was suggested at the July 1997 peace talks that Australia might play such a role, Downer responded that Australia was “willing to help facilitate the Bougainville peace process, but would not play an interventionist role.” Paul Ruffini, "We Are Not Big Brother: Downer," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, August 25, 1997. See also Peter King, "PNG Mood Opens Way to Peace," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, April 28, 1997; Craig Skehan, "Howard Comment Almost Derails Island Peace Talks," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, September 30, 1997.
151 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
deplored human rights abuses, but exerted only limited effort to bring about a change in PNGDF behavior. Gradually, they came to believe that the conflict could not be resolved militarily. The Liberal Government elected in March 1996 shared this opinion, and repeatedly offered to mediate the conflict. Beginning in 1997, it more actively sought a negotiated solution.

Likewise, over time the conviction that Australian strategic interests would be seriously threatened by Bougainvillean independence lost some of its force as the PNG government failed to collapse without the mine revenues and no other regions sought independence. According to White, “It took us until about 1994-95 where we started saying, yeah, we can envision circumstances in which Australia might acquiesce in Bougainville independence simply because PNG was having such difficulties resolving the problem.”

Although neither the Keating Government nor the Howard Government ever publicly expressed support for this outcome, the evolution in thinking was evident in their increasing willingness to encourage and contribute to a negotiated solution, even though this could have resulted in independence for Bougainville.

Australia contributed to three peace operations related to the conflict. In the first case – the SPKF in 1994 – it provided training and support for peacekeepers from several Pacific island nations, but no Australian personnel deployed to Bougainville. This was a short, small and relatively low-cost operation intended to provide security for a peace conference that never materialized, and did not purport to protect civilians from ongoing violence, starvation, and disease. The other operations – the Truce Monitoring Group and the Peace Monitoring Group – were also small, and were limited to helping monitor the implementation of existing agreements. Although these two operations were relatively lengthy, they occurred after the end of the conflict.

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153 White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).
Finally, it is important to note that in respect to Bougainville, the most promising potential Australian effort to meet civilians’ security and protection needs probably would not have required a peace operation at all. Although civilians faced violence on the ground – including rape, torture, and extrajudicial killings – the most devastating aspect of the PNG’s military campaign was the blockade, which was applied to even the most basic of relief items. Convincing the PNG government to abandon the blockade would therefore have gone a long way toward easing the worst of the suffering.

Australia could, potentially, have accomplished this outcome through the use of military force. Given the nature of its overall relationship with PNG, however, diplomatic pressure – backed by a credible threat to withdraw aid if PNG did not halt the blockade – might have had the desired effect. It is true that such a threat might not have appeared credible, and – given PNG’s desperation to hold on to Bougainville – could well have failed in any event. Still, successive Australian governments did virtually nothing to test the strength of PNG’s resolve, diplomatically let alone militarily. This, even more than their limited involvement in the various peace operations, is a sign of the limited costs they were willing to bear for humanitarian ends.154

6.3 Core Variables: Public Concern and Operational Environment

6.3.1 Public Concern

Australian public concern about Bougainville fell somewhere between concern about the conflicts in East Timor and Aceh, although considerably closer to the latter. Despite certain historical experiences that might have promoted ties between Australians and Bougainvilleans, these simply did not emerge as they had with East Timor. While Australian soldiers had also

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154 In the context of the peace operations, the argument that Australian involvement could have done more harm than good seems a legitimate justification for the cautious approach given anti-Australian sentiment in Bougainville.
been deployed on Bougainville during World War II, this did not produce the same sense of identification with the local population. If anything, given their history as the colonial power and aid donor status, Australians probably felt closer ties to Papua New Guinea as a whole than to Bougainville specifically.

A small group of activists devoted to the cause of Bougainvilean independence and human rights did emerge in Australia, in contrast to the total lack of such groups devoted to Aceh. This group centered around one organization, the Bougainville Freedom Movement, which staged small periodic protests against Australia’s military support for the PNGDF. In stark contrast to East Timor, in all the coverage of the war in Bougainville in the SMH between 1988 and 1998, I found no references to any other such organizations. Although its efforts probably had some impact, the group’s tactics and focus on the cause of Bougainvilean independence may have limited its reach. In contrast to the clearly one-sided nature of the violence in East Timor, because both the PNGDF and the BRA were responsible for rights abuses (and portrayed this way in the mainstream Australian media), it was not clear that the causes of independence and human rights necessarily went hand in hand. Likewise, the group tended to engage in activities, such as blockade-running, that may have appeared fanatical to—and therefore alienated—its potential Australian audience.

As with East Timor, a number of Australian humanitarian and development-oriented NGOs also advocated on behalf of Bougainvilean civilians. In 1991, for example, ACFOA

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155 Chauvel, Discussion with the author (August 17, 2009).
157 For an account of her blockade-running and other activities, see the self-published memoir of the Bougainville Freedom Movement’s leader: Waratah Rosemarie Gillespie, Running With Rebels: Behind the lies in Bougainville’s hidden war (Waratah Rosemarie Gillespie, 2009).
appealed for Australian intervention, calling PNG’s blockade a policy of ‘germ warfare.’ However, these organizations were often hampered in their efforts to appeal widely to the Australian public by their lack of access to the conflict zone.

The 12 petitions submitted to Parliament concerning Bougainville – 5 in 1990, 1 in 1992, 5 in 1993, and 1 in 1997 – most likely reflected the efforts of these groups. This is considerably fewer than the number of petitions concerning East Timor in the years prior to the conflict there, but obviously exceeds the total lack of petitions relating to Aceh. The changes in the content of the petitions over time are, moreover, suggestive of the changing public debate as the conflict progressed. In 1990, the petitions asked the government to urge PNG to seek a negotiated political solution, to lift the blockade, and to protect human rights in Bougainville; and also to provide funding and diplomatic efforts for relief assistance and to offer refugee status to Bougainvilleans in Australia. By 1992 - 1993, they urged Australia to withdraw military aid for PNG, to demand that the PNGDF withdraw from Bougainville and lift its blockade, and to recognize the right of Bougainvilleans for self-determination. The final petition, filed in March 1997 in response to the Sandline Affair, asked the Australian government to refrain from using military force, and to promote a referendum for Bougainvilleans to vote on independence.

Despite the generally lower level of public interest in Bougainville, changes in the level of public concern were also evident in the waxing and waning of media coverage over the course of the war. Figure 6-5 shows the monthly count of articles in the SMH containing the word ‘Bougainville’ between January 1988 and June 1998. Once again, the red represents articles that also contained the phrase ‘human rights,’ while the green represents those that contained ‘Bougainville’ but not ‘human rights.’ As above, this distinction is intended to give a basic sense

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159 Parliament of Australia, "Parlinfo."
of the extent to which coverage of the war focused on human rights and humanitarian conditions. The figure suggests – and an in-depth look at the content of coverage over time confirms – that somewhat more attention was paid to these issues in 1993-94 and 1996-97, precisely the periods during which the Australian government played a relatively more active role in seeking to end the conflict.

Figure 6-5: Monthly SMH Coverage, Bougainville, 1988-1998

Note: Bars reflect the results of full-text searches conducted in Factiva using “Bougainville” and “human rights,” or “Bougainville” without “human rights,” as the search term.

Initially, media coverage of Bougainville was dominated by the influence of the violence on the fortunes of Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), the Australian mining company, and of the prospects for reopening the mine in the near future. As it became clear that the mine would not reopen any time soon, articles in the Business section gave way to greater coverage of political developments, including revelations of human rights abuses by the PNGDF and BRA. There
was effectively no criticism of the Australian policy of helping PNG to defeat the rebels. Given the low death count early in the war, this is probably unsurprising.

The volume of coverage picked up considerably in early 1990, and what is more, began to draw some attention to human rights abuses, the military blockade, and the use of Australian-provided military equipment in the war. Given the tightening of restrictions on media access to Bougainville, however, coverage soon dropped off and by the latter half of the year, the SMH was devoting only a few articles a month to Bougainville, a pattern which continued for the next several years. Thus, at the height of the blockade and throughout much of the worst civilian suffering on Bougainville, the volume of SMH coverage on a monthly basis was, on average, lower than during the early period of low-level violence and limited civilian suffering. In February 1991 an Australian television crew smuggled its way into Bougainville despite the blockade, but after this there were no extended visits to the island by journalists for over two years, until another Australian television crew received permission to visit in June 1993.160 As a result, opportunities for most Australians to learn about the suffering on Bougainville during several of its peak years were quite restricted. At least in the SMH, calls for the Australian government to do more for Bougainvilleans were also generally quite limited.

Coverage increased somewhat during 1993 and 1994 and was relatively more focused on human rights issues, humanitarian conditions, and prospects for peace. What is more, there was a noticeable shift in tone. In previous years, there had been little effort to blame one side or the other, but probably due to the blockade, journalists increasingly placed the majority of the blame on the PNG government and suggested that Australia should do more to help alleviate the humanitarian crisis. The April 1994 visit of the Australian parliamentary delegation reflected

160 O'Callaghan, "PNG Govt Angry Over SBS Visit to Rebels."; ———, "ABC Reveals PNG Rebels As Killers."
these changes and, in turn, called attention to Australian involvement in the copper mine and to
the wish of many Bougainvilleans for Australian help in resolving the conflict. Through the
rest of 1994, coverage primarily concerned the peace process, but remained lower than in the
first year and a half of the war, despite Australian participation in the SPKF.

Following the failed 1994 peace conference, coverage remained low in 1995 and early
1996. Beginning in late spring – during PNG’s major offensives that year – SMH coverage
reflected an increase in complaints about Australia’s ‘hands-off’ policy toward Bougainville, and
greater interest in a more active approach, including, potentially, military involvement. These
developments were consistent with the new Liberal Government’s interest in doing more to solve
the conflict, but inconsistent with Downer’s statements that Australia did not intend to play an
active military role.

The Sandline Affair – which broke in late February 1997 – received extensive coverage
in the Australian press, more than the humanitarian conditions in Bougainville had ever
attracted. Still, interest dropped off quickly once the mercenaries were gone. The subsequent
peace process and deployment of Australian personnel to help enforce the truce, and then to lead
the Peace Monitoring Group, received far less coverage. What coverage there was regularly
mentioned the possible risks of deploying Australians on Bougainville unarmed.

What is more, in stark contrast to its emphasis on Australians’ strong feelings about the

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161 See eg, ———, "Australia Must Help Solve Crisis, MPs Told," The Sydney Morning Herald, April 21,
162 See eg, Stewart Firth, "Why We Must Offer Ex - Colony More Than Words and Money," The Sydney
Morning Herald, March 27, 1997; James Griffin, "Time for Action on the Island of Lost Causes," The
Sydney Morning Herald, September 30, 1996.
163 See eg, "PNG Folly," The Sydney Morning Herald, February 25, 1997; Lucy Palmer, "Hiring the Rent
164 See eg, Greg Roberts, "Troops in PNG 'Could Be Shot',' The Sydney Morning Herald, November 22,
1997.
tended to emphasize the absence of significant concern. In reviewing nearly 10 years of coverage in the SMH, I found seven references to Australian public interest. One January 1990 article commented on the lack of letters to the SMH in response to a recent series of articles on Bougainville. Two months later, shortly after a massacre in which Australian-supplied helicopters were used to dump the bodies of several victims into the ocean, another commented that, “In the course of a stupefyingly dull election campaign it seems odd that no-one among the numerous protest groups has, so far as I know, sought to needle either Government or Opposition politicians about two savage human rights violations in Indonesia and Papua New Guinea a few weeks ago… Considering that both incidents were pretty horrific, they seem hardly to have aroused more than a protesting shake of the head from the Australian electorate.”

In 1996, an article reported that the BRA spokesman in Australia was “dismayed by the apparent lack of interest Australians have in the plight of his island home of Bougainville.” Finally, a 1997 article compared the lack of Australian coverage of and interest in Bougainville unfavorably with coverage of the Northern Ireland peace process, the wars in Bosnia and the Middle East, and even Nigeria’s treatment of its Ogoni minority. The author argued that, “Despite all the danger signals, Australia's politicians, media, academics and artists remain collectively silent.” He asked:

“How do you explain no Bougainville documentary ever running on Australian television despite the best efforts of local film-makers willing to risk their money and their lives? For four years, Sydney film-makers…sought funding from the ABC, SBS, Film Australia and the Australian Film Commission to visit Bougainville. Rejected, they paid their own way last May. Their footage, not just of gunmen, but of a people reviving bush medicine, converting cars and generators to run on coconut oil, is fascinating. No Australian broadcaster has looked at it.”

167 Macey, "Despair as War on Our Doorstep Goes Unnoticed."
168 Cockburn, "The Crime of an Unreported War."
The two exceptions to this pattern occurred in the period when human rights concerns received the greatest amount of coverage in the Australian press. First, in November 1993 the SMH pointed out that Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, “regularly receives letters from people urging him to withdraw Australia’s troops on Bougainville…In fact Australian troops have not been based on Bougainville since World War II but in politics it is perceptions not the reality that count. Unfortunately for the Australian Government the perception, both domestically and within the region, is that Australian hands are not a little bloody from the dirty little war that is going on in Bougainville.”

Second, a February 1994 article cited the role of “Growing public concern over alleged human rights abuses on Bougainville” in raising questions about the role of Australia’s defense cooperation arrangements with the PNGDF.

Critically, Australian leaders responsible for policy toward Bougainville agreed with this overall picture of relatively low public concern. Moreover, they argued that the small humanitarian public interested in Bougainville did not generate significant political pressure. According to Paul Keating, “There was no particular public opinion about Bougainville, other than that it was nasty and shouldn’t be happening… So I never had the thought that there was any real pressure for us to do anything. It wasn’t a preponderant issue…nothing like Timor.”

Foreign Minister Downer noted that although he believed many Australians would have heard of Bougainville, most of them knew very little about it; consequently, the Howard Government received no political benefit at home from its diplomatic and military efforts in helping to solve the conflict.

172 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
In contrast to the situation in East Timor, moreover, there was no significant concern by either party that its position on Bougainville might provide an opportunity for the other to gain significant political points. In advance of the 1996 election, the Liberals criticized the Keating Government for failing to solve the Bougainville problem, but according to Downer, this wasn’t something they expected to gain any real political traction with. And although there was some public criticism of Australian support for the PNGDF – indeed, from about 1992 to 1994 the Minister of Defence received more letters on Bougainville than any other issue – this was always manageable because most Australians weren’t especially interested in what was happening and would have tended to agree with official policy even if they disapproved of PNGDF brutality. In addition, Hugh White explained, among those who did seek to influence official policy, there was “a general misunderstanding of the extent of Australia’s engagement with the PNGDF on Bougainville. We did provide a lot of training for the PNGDF in general, so there was a general assumption that we were there on Bougainville up to our necks whereas in fact we were…strict about not having ADF personnel on Bougainville.”

In sum, although many Australians heard about Bougainville during the course of the war, relatively few took a strong interest in what was happening there. The ‘humanitarian public,’ such as it was, was both small and politically weak, and tended to come off as uninformed, fanatical, or both. Together, these realities made it relatively easy for Australian officials to ignore any demands they did not want to meet.

At the same time, public debate over the content of Australian policy primarily concerned the issue of whether to continue to provide aid to the PNGDF, rather than what Australia might do more proactively to help the civilians of Bougainville. In addition, concerned citizens did not

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
\[\text{White, Interview with the author (August 11, 2009).}\]
all speak with one voice about their policy preferences. Some accepted the need to support PNG as long as Australia avoided direct involvement in the war, while others advocated withdrawing all military aid and focusing on humanitarian aid instead. A few called for increased Australian efforts to train the PNGDF in order to improve discipline and curb their tendency to engage in human rights abuses.\(^{175}\)

On the other hand, there were certain times during the war – notably in 1993 and early 1994, and again during the PNG offensives of 1996 – when public concern seemed to peak, and when there appeared to be a general sense of agreement that Australia should take a more active role in helping solve the conflict. I found no evidence, however, of a desire for military efforts to protect endangered civilians, and even more tellingly, no sustained pressure on the Australian government to do something about the blockade.

6.3.2 Operational Environment

The operational environment Australia faced for any potential peace operation varied over time, although it was never especially challenging. First, both population size and geography were reasonably favorable. At only about 3500 square miles, the territory was smaller even than East Timor, and contained only around 200,000 inhabitants. Though the island is covered in jungle, the ADF is known for its prowess in jungle warfare. On the other hand, during the conflict there would have been a considerable risk that any Australians deployed to the island could have been the targets of attack. The BRA distrusted Australia, and so even with PNG consent for their deployment, Australian forces might have become BRA targets. The BRA, however, would have been no match for the ADF, and so the physical threat would likely have been small.

Had the ADF instead sought to protect civilians against violence on the ground without PNG’s consent, it might have faced opposition from both the BRA and the PNGDF. As noted above, however, such an operation would have been highly unlikely given PNG’s dependence on Australia for military and economic aid. A diplomatic effort to convince the PNG government to abandon the blockade or to end abuses against civilians, on the other hand, would not have required the use of Australian troops at all. For this, the traditional notion of the operational environment would have been irrelevant.

Conceivably, however, the publicly observable costs of such a diplomatic campaign could still have helped to deter this outcome. Most obviously, these costs would have involved deterioration in the relationship with Papua New Guinea. This would probably have been perceived as more of a problem by strategists in the Australian Government and bureaucracy than by the general public, however, and so it seems unlikely that the public’s constraining influence played any significant role in preventing Australian officials from pressuring PNG on the blockade.

Finally, after the 1997 cease-fire, both sides appeared legitimately committed to a non-violent political solution. The operational environment was considered benign enough that the Howard Government consented to participate in two unarmed operations (although not without some trepidation, given the anti-Australia sentiment in the BRA).

6.4 Accounting for Australian Responses

Overall, Australian policy toward Bougainville appears consistent with the theory laid out in Chapter 3. A generally low level of public concern was associated with limited Australian effort to meet civilians’ security needs by helping end the war. These efforts involved relatively limited resource contributions to several peace operations not oriented toward providing security
or protection, in a relatively benign operational environment. Australian leaders did not, however, devote much effort to convincing PNG to drop the blockade, a policy that could have had an earlier and greater impact on civilian suffering. Their reasons had nothing to do with the operational environment, but followed instead from a belief that political stability in PNG depended on the PNGDF defeating the BRA. Finally, other factors besides those highlighted in the theory also came into play. Given the limits of public concern, it is unsurprising and not inconsistent with the theory that these factors had an overall greater impact on Australian policy.

Although public concern over the conflict was always limited, this was especially true during the early years. Violence during the first year and a half was relatively low, and for at least three critical years thereafter, news out of Bougainville was difficult to come by. Thus, the Hawke and Keating Governments did not come under any significant pressure over their continued political and military support for the PNG government. During this time, moreover, several of the demands they did face were easy to address without threatening perceived Australian strategic interests. Since some concerned citizens thought that Australia had troops on the ground helping the PNGDF, addressing this concern only required explaining that it was not true. It was clear to Australian officials that playing too large a role in supporting the PNGDF on Bougainville directly could generate a serious backlash, but this, too, was easy to avoid by simply providing more general forms of budgetary support, training, and equipment.

At this time there were also some calls for policies that were inconsistent with perceived strategic interests, including taking a greater role in a negotiated solution and pressuring PNG on the blockade and access for relief groups. The Keating Government believed that pressing the PNG government hard on the blockade or on human rights abuses would not bring about a change in PNG behavior unless accompanied by a threat to withdraw aid. Such a threat would
only have further threatened the stability of PNG, and thereby, Australia’s strategic interests. Concerned citizens did not push these demands strongly, however, and so a few official statements deplored the blockade and promoting access for relief efforts, which did not represent any serious pressure on the PNG government, were deemed a sufficient response to their concerns.

Thus, during the early years the Hawke and Keating Governments were easily able to pursue the policies they considered most consistent with Australian strategic interests – supporting the PNG government’s political and military goals – because few citizens were both concerned about the conflict and focused on promoting the policies with the greatest potential humanitarian impact. These leaders took care, however, to avoid becoming too closely involved in PNG’s war effort, which they knew could generate a serious backlash.

An increase in public concern in 1993 and 1994, however, was followed by decisions to send a parliamentary delegation, facilitate peace talks, and contribute to the SPKF. These decisions, more than any others during the war, appear to reflect a growing perception of the inadequacy of Australian policy, although worries about BRA opposition to Australian participation helped keep the overall commitment quite limited.

At the same time, changing perceptions of the threat the war in Bougainville represented to Australia’s strategic interests improved the appeal of this new approach. By this time, although Australia’s interest in a stable and secure Papua New Guinea never diminished, the Keating Government’s views about how best to promote this interest had changed. Gradually, Australian officials had come to believe that the PNGDF could not produce a military victory and that the war itself was damaging PNG’s stability. Still, at least some of the impetus for these new policy initiatives appears to have come from increasing public and parliamentary concern.
Without this concern, it seems likely that inertia and the constraining effect of BRA opposition to Australian involvement would have prevented these changes. That the Keating Government made no further efforts to reach a negotiated solution after the failure of the 1994 peace conference lends credence to the argument that its 1994 peace initiatives reflected a temporary increase in public concern about the conflict, rather than a sustained commitment to a new policy approach.

When the Howard Government came to power in 1996, it placed greater emphasis on achieving a negotiated solution than the Keating Government had, but it was not until after the Sandline Affair – an event that shocked it into a fuller realization of the threat Bougainville represented to overall stability in PNG – that it began to play a more active role, and even then reserved its greatest efforts for ensuring the departure of the Sandline mercenaries. Thus, although calls for Australia to play a larger role in resolving the conflict – including through peacekeeping – mounted again in response to the PNG offensives of 1996 and after the Sandline Affair in 1997, they played little if any role in motivating the Howard Government’s decisions. Instead, Howard came to power already inclined to take a more active role in promoting peace in Bougainville, but only devoted real effort to achieving this outcome a year later, after the Sandline Affair.

Australia’s various contributions to peace operations in Bougainville were prototypically limited: in no case did it help to facilitate any notable gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. According to the theory, if Australian officials had been seriously concerned about the views of the humanitarian public, they might have found it desirable to give the impression of doing more than they were for Bougainvillean civilians. However, the combination of limited public concern; misinformation among many concerned
citizens about the actual state of Australian policy; and a perceived strategic incentive not to become too closely involved together prevented any pandering they might otherwise have been tempted to engage in.

Finally, statements by leaders from both the Labor and Liberal Governments about their reasons for undertaking the efforts that they did make to resolve the war indicate that a sense of Australian responsibility also played a role in their thinking. According to Prime Minister Keating, “If we are not a respondent in respect of places like PNG which was a direct responsibility of ours after Versailles…Who is? Who is? It’s something for which we have some kind of world-allocated responsibility. And graft and corruption and poverty…is important in its own right in absolute terms whether or not it’s important to us in national terms. But it’s increasingly important to us in regional terms.”176 Explaining the Howard Government’s increased involvement in the peace process and subsequent participation in the peacekeeping operations, Downer claimed: “We did it because we thought it was right to do it. And if we didn’t do it, it wouldn’t happen…and Bougainville was just crippling Papua New Guinea, sucking up an enormous amount of money and a ton of lives… It was just a case of doing the right thing.”177 As in East Timor, however, these statements are at least to some extent at odds with the main thrust of years’ worth of policy, especially for the Keating Government.

Thus, overall Australia’s efforts to resolve the conflict in Bougainville were consistent with the limited level of public concern, and generally followed periods of relatively greater public interest in the war. Public pressure to pursue policies more oriented toward humanitarian needs, however, (such as pressing Papua New Guinea to eliminate the blockade) was never very strong and had a limited impact on the decision-making process. For much of the war the policy

176 Keating, Interview with the author (August 20, 2009).
177 Downer, Interview with the author (August 26, 2009).
direction preferred by concerned citizens, such as it was, reflected perceived Australian strategic interests. In 1994, in particular, public concern helped prompt the Keating Government to bring its policies into line with its changing perception of strategic reality. Where humanitarian policies and strategic perceptions conflicted, however, as on the blockade, the latter took priority.

7. Conclusion

This chapter has compared Australian responses to three post-Cold War complex emergencies in the Southwest Pacific. My findings generate considerable support for the theory laid out in Chapter 3.

First, across the different cases the relationship between public concern and the operational environment was associated with the expected kinds of policy commitments. In East Timor, strong pressure from a large, diverse, and deeply motivated humanitarian public combined with the prospect of a reasonably favorable operational environment to produce a robust military response dedicated to improving the humanitarian situation, despite countervailing strategic interests. In Aceh and East Timor, in contrast, public concern was sufficiently limited that it never created a real dilemma for Australian leaders about how to balance public demands with the costs of protecting civilians. In Aceh, there was no public pressure whatsoever for an Australian response to the conflict, military or otherwise. In Bougainville, Australia’s participation in three limited and delayed peace operations was associated with some public pressure for Australia to take a more active role in resolving the humanitarian situation, but this pressure did not begin to approach the level applied in East Timor. Participation in these operations was consistent with – and influenced by – limited public concern, but largely driven by Australian interests in encouraging a stable and secure Papua New Guinea. Indeed, that the differences in Australian responses to Aceh and Bougainville were
driven only in part by disparities in public concern for their victims supports my expectation that where public concern is low enough relative to the challenges of the operational environment, we are likely to see both limited and no contributions to peace operations at similar rates.

Second, the same expected patterns are evident within these conflicts as the relationship between public pressure and the operational environment varied over time. In East Timor, the Howard Government’s initial policies before the vote were only partially consistent with the demands of the community of pre-existing activists and NGOs, who preferred for Australian officials to push harder for the early deployment of peacekeepers than they actually did. The deployment of INTERFET, however – which occurred after the explosion of public activism in response to the violence – was very consistent with the demands of this larger body of concerned citizens. At the same time, it was only after Habibie’s consent to the operation’s deployment fundamentally changed expectations about the operational environment that Howard actually committed to leading the mission. Similarly, in Bougainville the Australian government’s greatest efforts followed periods of relatively high public concern. In particular, Keating’s decisions to send a parliamentary delegation and then to participate in the SPKF in 1994 followed increasing public concern about human rights abuses in the conflict.

Third, in none of these cases would we have expected to see any sizeable gap between Australia’s commitment of resources and a peace operation’s instructions for civilian protection, as represented by its goals and military strategies. Consistent with this expectation, no such gaps were apparent. In Aceh and Bougainville, public concern was simply too limited – at least relative to the operational environment – to motivate any serious efforts to create an illusion of civilian protection. In Bougainville, moreover, for much of the war the way that Australia could have best promoted civilians’ security and protection needs – by urging the PNG government to
abandon the blockade – would not have involved a peace operation at all. Even so, Australian officials perceived little public pressure to pursue this course of action and thus never confronted a real dilemma about how to balance public demands to eliminate the blockade against such a policy’s possible threat to PNG’s stability.

In East Timor, in contrast, public pressure for action was very strong relative to the operational environment once Habibie consented to INTERFET’s deployment. Under the circumstances, the theory predicts precisely the kind of robust response we observed. At the same time, this balance between public concern and the operational environment would have been quite different absent Indonesian consent. It is impossible to know what the Howard Government would have done in that situation, but the theory suggests that an operation involving a resources-instructions gap would have been far more likely.

Finally, although other considerations clearly influenced Australian policy toward the conflicts considered here, no alternative explanation appears to provide an equally compelling – let alone better – account of the patterns observed. First, since none of the Australian policies examined here involved a gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection, they provide no evidence that leaders simply do not know how to design missions to adequately address civilians’ security needs. Indeed, the robust design of INTERFET directly contradicts this argument. Relatedly, there is little evidence that Australian leaders lacked the information needed to identify the threats to civilian life these complex emergencies represented. A partial exception may have occurred in Bougainville at the very beginning of the 1990s. Even here, though, it appears that the government’s tardiness in recognizing the effects of the PNG blockade followed at least in part from the lack of incentives to pay close attention to humanitarian conditions on the island at the time.
Second, perhaps strategic incentives are the most important driver of efforts to respond to civilians’ security and protection needs. Indeed, these case studies provide considerable evidence of these incentives at work. Australian policy in both Aceh and Bougainville – though also consistent with my theory – was clearly strongly influenced by perceptions of Australia’s strategic interests. Even so, the evidence also suggests that in Bougainville, increasing public concern about the conflict in 1993-94 helped prompt officials to overcome the policy inertia of the early 1990s.

More importantly, Australian leadership of INTERFET in East Timor highlights the limitations of arguments that assert the primacy of strategic considerations. Australia had a clear strategic incentive not to upset relations with Indonesia, but nevertheless initiated a robust, civilian-oriented peace enforcement mission that had the anticipated effect of seriously straining these relations for at least half a decade. As this outcome highlights, there are circumstances in which sufficient domestic political pressure and an operational environment that provides an opportunity to act at a reasonable cost can overcome even significant strategic disincentives for humanitarian action. In the end, all three cases are consistent with my theoretical story, while only two are consistent with the dictates of Australia’s strategic interests.

Third, perhaps Australia’s responses to the conflicts in East Timor and Bougainville were driven by its leaders’ sense of personal responsibility, or the view that helping resolve these conflicts was ‘the right thing to do,’ as their statements after the fact suggest. Although these leaders may indeed have felt such a sense of responsibility when they decided to contribute to the various peace operations, overall this explanation is unsatisfying because it appears inconsistent with policy during long and important periods in these conflicts. Why did a sense of Australian responsibility play a significant role in driving policy only after months in which the strong risk
of violence was known in East Timor, and only after years in which the Hawke and Keating Governments might have done something more about the ruinous blockade of Bougainville? Assertions about Australian responsibility do not answer these questions.

Finally, as a prelude to the final chapter, these case studies provide some interesting insights into the sources of public concern for humanitarian action, especially regarding the kind of public concern that can be mobilized quickly in response to an outbreak of violence. First, because of news coverage’s role in providing information, media access to the conflict zones – or lack thereof – proved critical to the emergence of public concern. Thus, media restrictions in Bougainville and Aceh may well have hindered the development of greater public interest.

But the story also appears more complex than this. In East Timor, the pre-existing ties between Australians and East Timorese appear to have driven an underlying propensity toward interest in events there. The relatively high level of Australian media attention to preparations for the referendum throughout 1999 and the presence of Australian journalists in East Timor to witness the post-ballot violence appear to be a function of this pre-existing interest. The high level of coverage throughout 1999, meanwhile, meant that more people had recently been thinking about and exposed to information about East Timor when the most devastating violence erupted in September.

A comparison with Aceh and Bougainville appears to support this idea that the presence or absence of pre-existing public interest can influence future opportunities to learn and express concern about a conflict. Figure 6-6 (below) provides a direct comparison of the media coverage of the three different crises, both while they were ongoing and beforehand. There are several striking aspects of this figure. First, the levels of public interest in the different conflicts described above (high in Timor, less in Bougainville, and even less in Aceh) show up clearly in
the volume of coverage *both during and prior to the crises*. While East Timor was mentioned in 100 – 200 articles per year over the decade prior to 1999, over the same period Aceh was barely mentioned at all. It generally received less than 10 references on an annual basis (hence the barely visible bars until 1998) despite the fact that it, too, had a long history of political conflict.

Second, throughout the 1990s East Timor received more coverage than either Aceh or Bougainville *at the height of their respective complex emergencies*. The factors that contributed to the pre-existing propensity for public interest in East Timor are thus clearly evident in the volume of media coverage. The final chapter considers some of the implications of these observations for concerned citizens who hope to promote better, more robust efforts to respond to the protection needs of complex emergency victims.

Figure 6-6: SMH Coverage of E. Timor, Aceh, & Bougainville

Note: Bars reflect the results of full-text searches conducted in Factiva using “Timor,” “Aceh,” and “Bougainville” as the search terms.
Chapter 7 – The United States in Darfur

1. Introduction

This chapter analyzes U.S. policy toward – and contributions to peace operations in – Darfur, Sudan between 2003 and the deployment of the hybrid United Nations-African Union peacekeeping mission known as UNAMID at the end of 2007. U.S. Darfur policy is a particularly compelling context in which to examine the theory’s causal mechanisms in depth and over time, both because the U.S. supported two peace operations – each characterized by a gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection – and because it is a rare example of a complex emergency that generated an extraordinary level of American public concern over multiple years. Thus, this chapter is an important complement to both the quantitative analysis in Chapter 5 and the case studies of Australian policy in Chapter 6.

During the period examined here, both the conflict itself and the U.S. response changed significantly. The latter can be divided into three distinct phases. Initially – and during the worst of the violence – the U.S. provided humanitarian assistance without seeking to address the severe physical threats the war posed to Darfur’s civilian population. Beginning in mid-2004, the U.S. also began to provide significant logistical and financial support to the newly-formed African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was mandated to provide some protection for civilians it encountered under threat of violence. But despite this assistance (and similar aid from other wealthy nations), AMIS lacked a number of the core capabilities that it would have required to carry out its mission effectively. Finally, the third phase of U.S. policy began in earnest in early 2006, with an effort to find a replacement for AMIS. Though the U.S. continued to provide support for AMIS, American diplomacy concurrently focused on supplanting it with a
new UN mission. This eventually led to the deployment of UNAMID, which took over from AMIS on December 31, 2007. The diplomatic process that produced this new mission, however, was deeply flawed, and actually heightened insecurity in the region while limiting the prospects for long-term peace. Meanwhile, UNAMID itself ended up facing largely the same limitations as AMIS. Thus, America’s support for both AMIS and UNAMID helped to facilitate a substantial gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection. In both cases, the troops on the ground clearly lacked the resources to deliver the level of protection they were asked to provide.

To explain these outcomes, as in Chapter 6 I examine information about the variables and assumptions that are integral to the theoretical story: public pressure for humanitarian action, concerned citizens’ understanding of the conflict and awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of different possible policy responses, and the potential operational environment for a peace operation. Although I find much support for the theory, I also assess how these forces interact with and compare to several other sources of influence over the policies I examine. Among others, these include U.S. strategic imperatives; senior officials’ understanding of what policies could best address Darfuris’ security needs; and the president’s personal concern about Darfur. Because U.S. Darfur policy has already received considerable attention from scholars and journalists, I rely much more heavily on secondary sources than in the case studies in Chapter 6.

I find, first, that during the initial and most severe phase of the war, the Bush Administration faced a situation comparable to what the Australian government experienced toward the war in Aceh. There was essentially no public interest, and thus no political dilemma about how to balance competing policy demands. The tepid U.S. response during this period is
thus consistent with my theoretical expectations, but also reflects several strategic and domestic political reasons for not taking stronger action.

Second, beginning in mid-2004 the Bush Administration faced considerable public pressure for humanitarian action from an emerging advocacy movement devoted to the cause of protecting civilians in Darfur. Given the tremendously difficult operational environment for a potential peace operation, the movement’s growing political clout created an increasingly severe dilemma about how to respond to the violence. Under the circumstances, the kinds of policies that the U.S. pursued in supporting AMIS and then UNAMID are precisely what the theory would predict.

Finally, the causal mechanisms highlighted by the theory were clearly evident in the decision-making surrounding U.S. involvement with these missions. In particular, supporting two such similarly constrained operations in close succession proved politically feasible, and even attractive, for the Bush Administration in large part because of the challenges that many concerned citizens faced in analyzing their potential to provide effective civilian protection. Although many activists came to understand that AMIS faced intractable problems, this realization was slow to develop and did not lead to a realistic appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of various alternative policy strategies. As a result, even after concluding that AMIS was inadequate, the Darfur advocacy movement was largely unable to see the risks and limitations of making a replacement UN force the highest U.S. policy priority. Thus, for the Bush Administration, both providing logistical and financial support to AMIS, and then advocating for and providing similar support to UNAMID, had the important benefits I expect leaders to hope for from such policies. Although relatively low-cost, these contributions were –
at least for a time – able to create a public perception that the Administration was doing more to improve security in Darfur than it really was.

The chapter is divided into three primary sections according to the three main stages of U.S. policy. Each section, in turn, does three things. First, I review the state of the complex emergency and any changes in the nature of civilians’ security and protection needs over time, assessing what kinds of policies might have been most (or least) suitable for dealing with them. Second, I detail the primary U.S. policy initiatives that defined the period. Finally, I analyze the causes of these policies in terms of both the theory and the impact of various other possible influences. A brief final section ties these analyses together, makes a short comparison to the East Timor case study from the previous chapter, and concludes.

2. **2003 – Spring 2004: Humanitarian Aid, but no Protection**

The Bush Administration’s initial response to the war in Darfur reflected conflicting impulses. On the one hand, beginning in 2003 it provided considerable humanitarian aid to alleviate the emerging humanitarian crisis. On the other, at first it sought to deflect international attention from the war, only moving to support a limited and ineffective diplomatic campaign to halt the violence in the spring of 2004. Thus, despite the fact that this period was characterized by the most severe violence of the entire war, U.S. policy followed in a long tradition of treating the war’s consequences without addressing their causes. This approach reflected two key realities: first, the lack of public concern about and awareness of the conflict during this period, and second, the presence of significant strategic and domestic political incentives to avoid a deterioration in U.S. relations with Khartoum.
2.1 The Complex Emergency

2.1.1 Overview

The origins and many complexities of the war in Darfur have been laid out in detail elsewhere (eg, De Waal 2005; Flint and De Waal 2008; Prunier 2008; Cockett 2010; Hamilton 2011). For reference, Figure 7-1 below shows a map of Sudan with Darfur – the large Western region bordering Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic – highlighted. Briefly, repeated droughts beginning in the 1970s contributed to the gradual breakdown of traditional land-sharing mechanisms between the region’s pastoralist groups – typically referred to as Blacks, Africans, or non-Arabs – and its nomadic, livestock-herding groups – typically identified as Arabs. Violence erupted in the 1990s as the nomadic groups began to attack the farming communities in pursuit of greater access to water and grazing land for their animals. At the same time, Darfur’s African communities had long been denied a fair share of political power and national resources, and lacked government support in finding adequate ways to deal with the new tensions and the collapse of traditional mechanisms for resolving land-related disputes.

Frustrated, and encouraged that ongoing negotiations appeared poised to end the nation’s long-running and bitter civil war with a power-sharing deal addressing the grievances of the similarly marginalized South Sudanese, they launched an insurgency campaign in early 2003. Initially, the movement centered around two main rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (or SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality Movement (or JEM). While the former had “a broad base of support across Sudan’s major ethnic groups,” the latter had links with the country’s political Islamist movement (De Waal 2007 p.1040). In part, these groups hoped to have their own grievances addressed as part of the civil war negotiations, which had been taking place in Naivasha, Kenya since 2002. In addition, the JEM was most likely
influenced by Hassan al-Turabi, a hard-line Islamist and former head of the ruling National Congress Party with dreams of unseating the national government (see eg, Cockett 2010 p.181-83). Thus, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir saw the Darfur rebels as a threat to both the ongoing peace process and his own hold on power, and resolved to end the revolt as quickly as possible.

Figure 7-1: Map of Darfur, Sudan

The war that followed, however, proved anything but quick. With respect to its impact on civilian life, it can be broken into two main stages, the first of which is the focus here. This initial phase of the war was dominated by a government-led counter-insurgency campaign,
characterized primarily by large-scale attacks against civilians in their villages and homes. It was followed by a longer, more complex period of growing chaos and anarchy, during which the rebel groups fragmented and violent attacks were increasingly directed against displaced persons’ camps and international relief workers.

2.1.2 The worst time for Darfur

While clashes between the government and the Darfur rebels began in earnest in February of 2003, it was the escalation of Khartoum’s counter-insurgency campaign that summer that sparked what would soon become a large-scale complex emergency. This campaign targeted Darfuris in their homes and villages, making no effort to discriminate between civilians and rebels. Khartoum exploited the existing ethnic tensions and the nomadic communities’ desire for land by employing Arab militias – known as the Janjaweed – to carry out most of the attacks, typically in coordination with the government’s air forces. The Janjaweed were allowed to pursue their own agenda of territorial control, and their own methods for achieving it, in return for putting down the rebellion. The tactics they employed are by now well known. Entire villages were destroyed with the intent of preventing the inhabitants from ever returning, both through the physical destruction of the means of survival – such as the poisoning of wells and destruction of homes and belongings – and through traumatizing violence, including the killing of men and boys and the widespread rape of women and girls.

The height of this campaign occurred between July of 2003 and the spring of 2004, coinciding with the period examined here. In the words of former UN peacekeeping chief Jean-Marie Guéhenno, this was “the worst time for Darfur” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.23). What is more, in addition to the direct effects of the violence, during this time Khartoum largely refused to allow humanitarian relief organizations access to the displaced population. Refugees who
reached neighboring Chad, where large-scale relief operations were underway by early 2004, were relatively lucky. Although Khartoum did begin to authorize some visas for relief workers during that year, restrictions often prevented them from entering the territory, while strict limits on what could be imported seriously hindered their ability to deliver much-needed aid (see eg, Prunier 2008 p.133-34; Slim 2004 p.818).

A variety of individuals and organizations have estimated the number of civilians killed, displaced, or otherwise affected by the war, and a number of these estimates speak to conditions during this initial, most severe phase. Almost immediately after it began, the government’s escalation of the war produced “a massive explosion in the numbers of people affected,” with nearly 500,000 displaced by mid-September 2003 (Prunier 2008 p.131). Over time, more and more of the population became internally displaced within Darfur or fled over the border into Chad. Fewer and fewer villages were left intact. By August 2004, the UN estimated, there were some 1.8 million war-affected people in need of international assistance (United Nations Security Council 2004 p.8).

Most of the available mortality estimates that cover this period extend into 2005. Nevertheless, they paint a stark picture of the war’s initial impact. Deaths due to war-related violence and disease through early 2005 may have been as low as 63,000 (calculated by the U.S. State Department) or as high as 380,000. Analyzing some of these estimates, Gérard Prunier concludes that a figure of about 280,000 – 310,000 civilian casualties for the first two years is

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probably most accurate (2008 p.148-52). In addition, a retrospective survey-based mortality analysis published in the Lancet in 2010 provides some more fine-grained insight. This study estimated that there were approximately 43,289 to 45,137 excess deaths (those above and beyond what Darfur could have been expected to experience under normal circumstances, and that are thus conflict-attributable) between September 2003 and March 2004, and an additional 70,451 to 76,539 between April and December 2004 (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.298).

The government’s mass targeting of civilians had important implications for the kinds of policies that would have been best suited to protecting them and meeting their security needs. During this period, these needs revolved primarily around an end to the large-scale attacks against villages, and secondarily, an end to Khartoum’s restrictions on humanitarian relief. Critically, halting the counterinsurgency campaign in a timely fashion would have gone a long way toward preventing much of the eventual death and displacement. As discussed in the next section, for example, the war-affected population doubled between April and December 2004 (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.296). Preventing this and subsequent expansions of the affected population during 2003 or early 2004, therefore, would have obviated the more difficult job of trying to reverse the mass displacement later on. There were, moreover, two basic strategies that the U.S. government might have pursued with a chance of achieving this outcome at this time – a diplomatic effort to convince Khartoum to end its counter-insurgency campaign, or a military intervention that would deny it the option of continuing.

2.2 U.S. Policy: Humanitarian Aid and Diplomacy, but no Protection

During 2003 and the first half of 2004, U.S. policy largely treated Darfur as a humanitarian problem, rather than a security issue. To their credit, in the summer of 2003 Andrew Natsios and Roger Winter, senior officials in the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), began what would be a long campaign to improve access for aid organizations, and committed $40 million of food aid that fall. Their efforts over the following months played a major role in convincing Khartoum to lift restrictions on aid workers and in bringing relief to the region, including some $300 million from the U.S. government by the summer of 2004 and nearly $1 billion by 2006. Through these efforts, they most likely saved tens of thousands of lives (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.168-70; U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006 p.3).

Although there was indeed a tremendous need for humanitarian assistance, this need followed directly from the counter-insurgency campaign and attacks against Darfuri villages. Humanitarian relief did nothing to stop these attacks or the associated growth of the population in need of help. But when it came to responding to the violence, U.S. policy signaled the Bush Administration’s unwillingness to accept any significant costs – military, diplomatic, or domestic political – to address the heart of the crisis in Darfur.

Initially, in fact, the Bush Administration took a number of actions that explicitly sought to avoid bringing attention to the war or putting pressure on Khartoum to end it. Upon his arrival in Sudan in the fall of 2003, for example, the new U.S. envoy to Khartoum, Gerard Galluci, received instructions “to focus solely on concluding the negotiations to end the war against southern Sudan and on building counterterrorism cooperation” (Hamilton 2011 p.20). U.S. officials even went so far as to pressure aid workers arriving in the region not to talk about what they saw (Cockett 2010 p.195). Finally and perhaps most significantly, Jan Egeland, head of the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), began pushing to have Darfur placed on the agenda of the Security Council by December 2003. But although he “pestered everyone about it,” he “got no reaction from anybody and no media interest either”
(quoted in Cockett 2010 p.198; see also Traub 2007 p.244). Despite Egeland’s entreaties, the U.S. continued to resist addressing Darfur at the UN – a path that might at least have signaled to Khartoum the possibility of negative consequences for its actions – until March of 2004.

Indeed, that month became something of a turning point in U.S. policy, with senior State Department officials publicly acknowledging for the first time that the war could not be addressed through humanitarian assistance alone (Hamilton 2011, p.31). At the same time, the Administration began supporting initial international diplomatic efforts to halt the violence by pressuring both Khartoum and the rebels to take the Chadian government and AU’s ongoing mediation efforts seriously. The U.S., for example, paid to fly the rebel leaders to talks in N’Djamena, Chad, and then persuaded them not to walk out once they arrived. These efforts helped to produce, on April 8th, an agreement between the Government of Sudan, the SLM/A, and the JEM providing for a 45-day ‘humanitarian ceasefire,’ plans for further negotiations on a more permanent peace, and a Ceasefire Commission to monitor the deal (see eg, Flint and De Waal 2008 p.169; Slim 2004 p.825; Hamilton 2011 p.33; African Union Peace and Security Council 2004). But although this agreement paved the way for AMIS’ subsequent deployment, it was “fatally flawed” from the beginning (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.174). With no maps and two different, contested versions of the text, military officers on both sides warned that it would be impossible to monitor.

But despite its move to support these mediation efforts, there were a number of other actions that the Administration could have taken, either at this time or earlier, that it did not pursue. In particular, there is some reason to think that committed diplomacy might have convinced Khartoum to call off its counter-insurgency campaign. At this time, the war was not

2 For the full text of the agreement see "Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur," (N’djamena, Chad: 2004).
yet as complex as it would later become and the Bush Administration had a significant source of leverage over Khartoum. Thus, in the judgment of two senior UN officials as well as the chief negotiator at Naivasha, Kenyan General Lazaro Sumbeiywo, “early in 2004, the conflict might have been easily contained, or even stopped, by concerted pressure and action” (Cockett 2010 p.199).

Since 2002, the U.S. had been a key player in the Naivasha negotiations for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to resolve the Sudanese civil war. U.S. officials had assured Khartoum that an agreement would bring normalization of U.S.-Sudanese diplomatic relations, and with it a host of desperately wanted benefits. In particular, the country’s removal from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terror list would open a path to the lifting of economic sanctions and access to international finance through the IMF and the World Bank. What is more, as Richard Cockett notes, “Many northern Sudanese were also exhausted and frustrated by the endless years of war with the south and were therefore anxious to end the conflict—something they hoped the USA could help them achieve” (2010 p.157; see also Hamilton 2011 p.18-19).

With such valuable carrots to bestow, the Administration might have sought to exact a higher price for them. In particular, it could have insisted on addressing the war in Darfur as part of the Naivasha negotiations. Although the CPA would thus have taken more time to complete, this would have provided a clear mechanism for making peace in Darfur a prerequisite for the benefits Khartoum anticipated from a peace agreement. More generally, U.S. officials could

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3 It is worth noting, however, that there was some concern that calling attention to Khartoum’s actions in Darfur in this way could have derailed the deal entirely. This point is significant, given the importance of the unique opportunity to end one of the world’s worst civil wars. See eg, James Traub, The Best Intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the Era of American World Power, 1st Picador ed. (New York: Picador, 2007), p.240. Still, given Khartoum’s strong incentive to get a deal, it probably made sense to try, and the strategy could have been abandoned if it became clear that it would prevent – rather than simply delay – an agreement. Yet, as Flint and de Waal explain, U.S. officials appear to have been deterred more by concerns about timing than futility: “There was a momentary waver when there was
have indicated clearly in 2003 or early 2004 that continued attacks against civilians would threaten these benefits or lead to punitive actions such as referral to an international tribunal. Later, they might have said the same things about respecting the humanitarian ceasefire.

As it was, Khartoum carried on its attacks with impunity, and both government and rebels ignored the humanitarian ceasefire almost as soon as the ink was dry. Of course, there is no way to know for certain whether more diplomatic pressure would have induced Bashir to rethink his brutal counter-insurgency tactics. If not, coercive military action was probably the only other hope of stopping the attacks. What is most telling, however, is that the Administration was unwilling even to test the extent of its influence.

2.3 Accounting for the limited U.S. engagement

Why, then, did the Bush Administration do so little to address the security needs of Darfuris during this time? In particular, why was it unwilling to attempt even seemingly low-cost diplomatic actions to try to halt the severe violence against civilians?

First, the policies described above are entirely consistent with the theoretical story. At this stage in the war, American public concern about Darfur was effectively nonexistent. News coverage of Sudan was dominated by the Naivasha negotiations, and Darfur received just a few periodic mentions in the American press before March and April of 2004. Indeed, although Darfur was the subject of a small number of reports by the International Crisis Group and Amnesty International, in general even activists and organizations with a history of working on Sudan paid little attention to the conflict during 2003 (Prunier 2008 p.126; Hamilton 2011 p.21).

discussion of prioritizing Darfur over the North-South talks, but the rebels’ lack of preparedness and the prospects of a long drawn-out peace process persuaded diplomats…to consummate Naivasha first.” See Flint and De Waal, Darfur: A New History, p.192-3.
Thus, Khartoum’s counter-insurgency campaign was largely completed out of the American public eye. Lacking any public pressure for a vigorous response, the Bush Administration faced no real domestic political dilemma and no serious incentive to appear to be protecting Darfuris from the ongoing violence. Thus, barring some other reason for action, the potential operational environment for a peace operation was hardly relevant, and a limited U.S. humanitarian and diplomatic response was to be expected.

At the same time, the Bush Administration’s active efforts to deflect attention from Darfur in 2003 and early 2004 suggest more than a simple lack of incentive to help stop the violence. Indeed, two other priorities – one strategic and one domestic political – influenced U.S. decision-making by providing reasons not to press Khartoum too hard on its activities in the region. First, as hinted above, in the post-9/11 era U.S. officials were very desirous to maintain good relations with the Sudanese government in order to benefit from its extensive intelligence on Al Qaeda (eg, Flint and De Waal 2008 p.192). To the extent that making a fuss over Darfur (let alone threatening punitive economic or military action) would have impeded intelligence cooperation, this was a powerful incentive for restraint.

Second, the primary reason for the Administration’s involvement in the Naivasha negotiations was to repay a core domestic constituency of Christian evangelicals with a long-standing concern about the plight of South Sudan for their support in the 2000 U.S. presidential election. When the war in Darfur flared in 2003, the negotiations appeared to be making real progress, and the Administration’s desire to conclude them before its 2004 election “conditioned the way that everyone reacted to the Darfur insurgency” (Cockett 2010 p.178). Specifically, the

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4 For a longer discussion of the history of the U.S. evangelical community’s activism on Sudan, see also Richard Cockett, Sudan: Darfur and the Failure of an African State (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), p.146-56.
Naivasha process was under no circumstances to be compromised for Darfur’s sake (Cockett 2010 p.195; Hamilton 2011 p.24; Traub 2007 p.239-40).

The Administration’s priority of completing the negotiations in time for the election was also quite apparent to its African interlocutors. As Kenyan General Sumbeiywo put it, “The Americans knew about Darfur – I knew that. And they did sacrifice the people of Darfur for the CPA, for a success for Bush” (quoted in Cockett 2010 p.199). Likewise, according to one senior Sudanese official, this domestic political motive combined with the desire for counter-terrorism cooperation to explain U.S. caution on Darfur. As Cockett summarized, “they were as eager as the Sudanese, if not more so, to clinch the politically valuable CPA and to get more intelligence on al-Qaeda” (2010 p.180).

But although it is clear that these incentives helped limit the Administration’s initial engagement with Darfur, another possible explanation – that officials were simply unaware of how dire the situation was, or of what might be done to stop it – appears to hold little water. First, as USAID’s relief efforts make clear, senior U.S. officials were well aware of the growing conflict in Darfur at an early stage. What is more, those paying closest attention clearly understood the futility of humanitarian relief as a strategy to address it, and advocated un成功地 for more robust diplomatic action. Roger Winter, of USAID, testified before Congress as early as May 2003 that the war was not being adequately addressed (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.168). Meanwhile from Khartoum, Gerard Galluci sought to convince his superiors “to act on anything other than the provision of food aid” (Hamilton 2011 p.29).

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5 Along with Natsios, Winters also sought to convince Khartoum that normalization of official relations with the United States would depend on developments in Darfur. See Flint and De Waal, *Darfur: A New History*, p.169. Their message was contradicted, however, by the Administration’s evident desire for a quick resolution to the Naivasha negotiations.
In addition, reports of the violence accelerated along with the counter-insurgency campaign, and Darfur became a regular topic of conversation in diplomatic circles in Khartoum by the fall of 2003 (Hamilton 2011 p.20). After a disturbing visit to the region in September, the UN’s top official in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, began sounding the alarm with both powerful governments and at the UN (Cockett 2010 p.170). But the U.S. was ahead of him – the CIA and other intelligence agencies had been “taking satellite photographs…that clearly showed villages before and after they had been destroyed by janjaweed attacks” (Cockett 2010 p.195), while USAID had “produced charts estimating death tolls reaching into the hundreds of thousands” (Hamilton 2011 p.20).

Nevertheless, it appears that it took more time for many officials to see these events in the proper political context. According to Lorne Craner – then Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor – even in late 2003 it was not clear that Darfur was a situation that would require the government “to shift into the ‘no Rwandas’ mode of action” (Hamilton 2011 p.29). Indeed, only after participating in a fact-finding trip to Darfur organized by Roger Winter in February 2004 did a number of other senior State Department officials fully internalize the need for Darfur to be treated as a human rights crisis, and not merely a humanitarian one (Hamilton 2011 p.30).\(^6\)

The timing of this trip just prior to the shift in U.S. policy described above does suggest that what these officials saw over the winter of 2004 influenced their subsequent calculations and actions. At the same time, it is important not to overemphasize this learning process. First, it is difficult to see how prior efforts to deflect attention from the conflict – notably, refusing to allow

\(^6\) Indeed, the account of Brian Steidle, one of three U.S. members of AMIS’ monitoring team, suggests that U.S. embassy personnel on the ground in Darfur continued to be surprised by emerging evidence of the extent of Khartoum’s support of the Janjaweed even late into 2004. Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback: Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur*, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2007), p.186.
the UN Security Council to discuss it and asking aid workers not to speak about what they saw – could simply reflect a limited understanding of the war. Second, as noted above, even the policies the Bush Administration pursued beginning in March and April of 2004 were cautious and limited. While the U.S. was now willing to lean on Khartoum over Darfur, it remained unwilling to lean very hard.

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In sum, the Bush Administration’s initial engagement with the atrocities in Darfur was very restrained, beginning with its efforts to limit international attention and moving to its toothless diplomatic campaign to encourage Khartoum and the rebels to end the violence. But although this campaign had little if any effect, it laid the groundwork for the next major phase of U.S. policy in Darfur – financial and logistical support for AMIS.

As in the case of Australian policy toward Aceh, moreover, these actions were somewhat over-determined. One the one hand, they were entirely consistent with the theory, since a lack of pressure from concerned citizens at home provided no motive to help protect Darfuris from the violence engulfing them. At the same time, additional strategic and domestic political priorities provided good reasons not to ‘rock the boat’ with Khartoum at this time.


From June of 2004 through the end of 2005, the United States pursued a number of policies that aimed to save lives and pursue justice against the perpetrators of atrocities in Darfur. In terms of halting the continued violence or mitigating its effects on civilians, the Bush Administration followed its backing of the humanitarian ceasefire with limited diplomatic support for the nascent peace process and – more significantly – financial and logistical aid for AMIS. As noted earlier, this mission was characterized by a significant gap between the level of
civilian protection that soldiers were asked to provide, and that they had the capacity to deliver. Upon inspection, it is clear that U.S. support for AMIS played the role anticipated by the theory, allowing the Bush Administration to create the perception among concerned citizens that it was doing more to address civilians’ security and protection needs in Darfur than it really was.

This illusion of civilian protection was possible, moreover, in large part because members of the politically influential Darfur advocacy movement that emerged at this time in the United States faced important informational disadvantages that limited their ability to assess U.S. policies and possible alternatives. In particular, they did not see either the full extent of the obstacles the African Union faced in trying to steer a complex peace operation, or the importance of the peace process for addressing the various security challenges with which Darfur’s population was now confronted. As a result, during this period the Bush Administration was able to use its support for AMIS to balance two starkly competing political imperatives. These included, on the one hand, satisfying these concerned citizens; and on the other, limiting costs in responding to their demands while attending to the domestic and strategic incentives for restraint highlighted in the previous section. Thus, U.S. policy at this time supports both the theory’s empirical expectations and the causal mechanisms associated with them.

3.1 Developments in the War

In an important sense, the period considered here was a transitional phase in the war. With much of what Khartoum sought to achieve already accomplished and the height of its counter-insurgency campaign past by the time AMIS began to deploy, the basic contours of the conflict began to change. Two key trends are most important here.

First, government-sponsored attacks on villages – which continued at a lower level of intensity – gradually gave way to new forms of violence. This period was characterized by an
upswing in direct clashes between the Sudanese army, the Arab militias, and rebel groups (United Nations Security Council 2004 p.9). Intra-group conflict – with Arab militias competing with one another for land, and growing infighting among rebel groups – was also an important source of hostilities (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.162-66, 187). As these groups sought resources to support their operations, moreover, banditry surged, and was often directed against international relief operations.

Thus, the situation on the ground was becoming increasingly complex, if somewhat less severe, and the violence that civilians did experience was less often directed from Khartoum. Indeed, by 2005 most violent civilian deaths were caused “by fighting among rebel groups and competition for pasture land among Arab militias” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.187). Although insecurity remained rampant, the reduction in large-scale attacks on villages also meant that total violent deaths during this period fell significantly (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.298).7

The second key trend was the growth in the conflict-affected population, and their increasing concentration in dangerous and unhealthy IDP camps. During the second half of 2004, Khartoum was more cooperative with international demands to accommodate relief organizations. This improved access to remote areas and allowed the international humanitarian community to collect new information about the war-affected population. They quickly found far more internally displaced and otherwise conflict-affected people than had previously been recorded (United Nations Security Council 2004 p.8-9). Largely as a result of this, estimates of the war-affected population grew rapidly during this time, doubling between April and

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December (Degomme and Guha-Sapir p.296). By February 2005, the UN estimated that there were 2.5 million in need of international assistance (United Nations Security Council 2005 p.6).

The IDP camps in which many of these displaced Darfuris were now taking refuge, however, were themselves profoundly hazardous places. During this time, IDP camps became frequent targets of attack for Janjaweed militia, with civilians who ventured outside – typically, in search of firewood or other basic necessities – at high risk of being raped or killed. In addition, camp residents faced conditions that were often over-crowded and squalid, and became totally dependent on humanitarian assistance for their survival. By 2005, hunger and disease-related mortality associated with disruptions in international relief and unsanitary conditions in IDP camps – rather than direct killings – had become the primary causes of death in Darfur (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.294; Flint and De Waal 2008 p.187).

Together, these trends in the war had profound implications for the nature of the security threats that many, if not most, Darfuris now faced. In particular, they created a catch-22 for Darfur’s growing displaced population. On the one hand, rampant insecurity and destruction outside the IDP camps – and the threat of renewed violence against anyone who dared to leave – made finding safety or the means of subsistence outside their borders extremely difficult. As Rebecca Hamilton describes, “The insecurity that prevailed across the region meant that the displaced could not return to what did—or mostly did not—remain of their homes. The result

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9 One effect of these higher estimates of the affected population was that, despite the expansion of relief operations, during the second half of 2004 “the proportions of IDPs and war-affected persons who could be reached by humanitarian help regularly declined, thereby leading to a steady increase in estimated mortality rates.” Prunier, Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide, p.138; see also United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan pursuant to paragraph 15 of Security Council resolution 1564 (2004) and paragraphs 6, 13 and 16 of Security Council resolution 1556 (2004)," (2004), p.8.
was a stranded population of two million primarily non-Arabs who, while not currently under attack en masse, knew themselves to be defenseless should those who had forced them to flee in the first place decide to attack again” (2011 p.108). On the other hand, life within the camps was clearly dangerous and uncertain as well.

This reality, in turn, altered the strategies that would be most appropriate to respond to civilians’ changing needs. As time wore on and the security situation became more complex, focusing primarily on convincing Khartoum to halt its large-scale village attacks made less and less sense. By the latter half of 2004, it was far too late to prevent mass violence and displacement. What was needed now, therefore, was a security environment that would allow Darfuris to leave the IDP and refugee camps where they were increasingly concentrated and begin rebuilding their lives. This would also improve the odds of survival for those who had been displaced but remained outside the camps.10

With civilians’ security and access to relief threatened by a widening array of actors with various motivations and demands, however, achieving such an improvement was an increasingly complicated political problem. Although Khartoum remained frustratingly intransigent, only a political settlement acceptable to all the major parties – Khartoum, the rebels, and Darfur’s Arab community – could hope to end the dangerous limbo in which a large portion of Darfur’s population now found itself.

10 Observers have disagreed about the severity of the situation that civilians faced at this time. On the one hand, Julie Flint and Alex De Waal note that during 2005, “mortality rates in Darfur came down to levels comparable to those before the war – levels ‘normal’ for a desperately poor and under-serviced region” (p.173), and by 2007 were “well below emergency thresholds” (p.188). In contrast, although Degomme and Guha-Sapir accept that mortality began falling in 2005 before increasing again by mid-2006, they claim that this did not mean that death rates had returned to normal: “Crude mortality rates remained high until at least the end of 2007, and probably until the end of 2008” (p.297). See Flint and De Waal, Darfur: A New History; Degomme and Guha-Sapir, "Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict.” Either way, the numbers they cite remain well above the complex emergency threshold used here and in no way negate the need for a solution to the problem of the massive displacement that had already taken place or the very real security challenges the displaced continued to face.
Given the complex political tensions and long-standing grievances that lay behind the war, such a settlement would take time and care to negotiate. In the meantime, civilians and relief workers remained vulnerable. Ideally, therefore, an international effort to broker a credible peace agreement would have been combined with a peace operation with the capacity to protect IDPs and aid workers during the negotiations. In the short term this strategy could make survival in the IDP camps more likely, and life more bearable. Over the long term, it held the best hope of helping Darfuris to leave and begin rebuilding their lives.

3.2 U.S. Policy: Supporting AMIS, Flaws and All

Unfortunately, U.S. contributions to these outcomes during this period would prove to be more apparent than real. As noted above, the humanitarian ceasefire agreement of April 2004 laid the initial groundwork for both peace negotiations and the deployment of AMIS. During this time the U.S. supported the peace talks, but its backing of AMIS was the mainstay of its response to the security crisis in Darfur.11

The Darfur peace negotiations began during the summer of 2004. Over the next two years, 6 rounds of talks – co-chaired by the African Union and the Chadian government – were held in Abuja, Nigeria. Through 2005, these talks made little progress. The first five rounds “were consumed by government ceasefire violations, recrimination and procedural issues,” and

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involved very little discussion of what the contents of a deal might actually look like (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.210).

During 2004-05, the Bush Administration lost an opportunity to bring the full force of its influence and resources to bear in support of this peace process. As Julie Flint and Alex de Waal put it, “only the Americans could provide the leverage needed” to bring the parties together and craft a workable deal (2008 p.210). Yet during 2004 – the last chance to tie political progress in Darfur to the Naivasha negotiations before the CPA was signed in January 2005 – U.S. involvement in the negotiations was poorly coordinated. It was only when former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick became Deputy Secretary of State in early 2005 that the Abuja negotiations began to receive sustained U.S. attention. Nevertheless, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that even Zoellick “saw Darfur as a distraction from the bigger issues like China – something that should be fixed with a short, sharp injection of attention and pressure” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.193). As a result, the Administration still did not devote the level of energy or resources that would have given it a real chance of brokering a sustainable agreement.

Instead, the Administration made its support for AMIS the centerpiece of its Darfur policy during this period. Initially, AMIS was not envisaged as a force to provide civilian protection at all. At its deployment in June 2004, it was composed of a mere 120 military observers mandated to observe the implementation of the humanitarian ceasefire, along with 350 troops to protect them.

It was not until October that an initial expansion of the force’s size and mandate authorized it to begin addressing the population’s security and protection needs, albeit in a limited way. At that time, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized AMIS to protect aid operations and civilians encountered “under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity” and
to conduct patrols and establish outposts for the purpose of deterring attacks against civilians. It also expanded the mission’s size to 3,320 civilian and military personnel. From this point forward, AMIS had the authority to provide at least some civilian protection (though still less than the circumstances warranted).

The AU relied on international donors to fund every aspect of AMIS’ deployment and to provide critical logistical support. The United States helped to make the mission possible by contributing in several ways. Beginning in the summer of 2004, it provided funding to build, support, and maintain camps for AMIS troops. Some $280 million was allocated for this purpose over the next two years, and a small number of U.S. military observers were sent to participate in the monitoring aspects of the mission and to advise and coordinate with the African Union (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006 p.45, 54-55). In October, the Bush Administration used its position on the UN Security Council to help direct the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to provide AMIS with technical assistance and training. At the same time, along with its international partners, it pushed to expand AMIS further, prompting the AU to authorize another increase in the force to 6,171 troops and 1,560 civilian police in April 2005.

13 The GAO notes that between 2004 and 2006, the number of U.S. military observers in Darfur ranged between about 4 and 16 (p.55). Brian Steidle’s book The Devil Came on Horseback (see note 7 above) is based on his experiences as one of (at the time) three U.S. observers.
After this, NATO agreed to provide additional logistical support, primarily in moving the new
troops into Darfur. The U.S. contributed to these efforts through the establishment of a logistics
and transport base in Kigali, Rwanda, and by providing training, equipment, and transport for
AMIS battalions from Rwanda and Nigeria (O'Neill and Cassis 2005 p.64; U.S. Government

Despite the international support, however, for a multitude of reasons AMIS faced
extraordinary challenges in providing meaningful civilian protection and security. On the one
hand, it was constrained by the limited circumstances in which its mandate allowed it to protect
civilians. Frustrated by these restrictions, initially some commanders sought to do more by
pushing the boundaries of, or even exceeding, their instructions (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.176;
see also O'Neill and Cassis 2005 p.28-29, 35).

More importantly, however, the AU lacked many of the key resources and capabilities
needed to fulfill (let alone exceed) even its limited mandate. First, despite AMIS’ small
authorized size, it deployed at a glacial pace. Even with extensive international help, for

"Report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the hybrid
15 For these purposes, in July President Bush authorized the Pentagon to spend an additional $6 million in
emergency funding on ‘commodities and services.’ See eg, William G. O'Neill and Violette Cassis,
Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced: The Successes and Shortcomings of the African Union in
Darfur (Washington, DC and Bern, Switzerland: Brookings-Bern Project on Internal Displacement,
2005), p.63; Donna Miles, "Airlift Support for Darfur Continues Strong as Rice Visits Region," American
16 Based on two common rules of thumb for determining force requirements in a civilian protection
mission, some 10,000 - 60,000 troops would have been required given Darfur’s population of around 6
million. The first rule assumes 2 to 10 soldiers are needed per 10,000 population, while the second
assumes a protection force should be at least as large as the largest local force against which they might
be arrayed. See Paul Williams, "Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in
Sudan," International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006), p.176-7. This range is, moreover, in line with a
2004 Pentagon estimate that in a consensual environment it would take about 35,000 U.S. troops to secure
the IDP camps in Darfur (or in an operation opposed by Khartoum, some 120,000). This assessment
assumed a 3:1 ratio of intervening to opposing forces, with about 30,000 Sudanese troops in Darfur, plus
the Janjaweed. See Rebecca Hamilton, Fighting For Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop
example, it took a year to bring the force up to the full strength authorized in April 2005 (Hamilton 2011 p.74; see also O'Neill and Cassis 2005 p.27). Second, these difficulties were mirrored on the ground. Among other problems, limited intelligence collection and communication capabilities, inadequate ground and air transport, and the inability to fly or patrol at night often meant that AMIS arrived at the scene of an attack too late to protect endangered civilians (see eg, International Crisis Group 2005; O'Neill and Cassis 2005 p.50-58; Flint and De Waal 2008 p.173-79). The troops’ poor night mobility, in particular, limited their responsiveness to attacks against villages, which often occurred in the pre-dawn hours.17

AMIS’ biggest problems, however, were in organization and operational planning. As Flint and de Waal put it, “The fundamental problem was neither numbers nor mandate, but organization – lack of it… The AU was so weak in capacity that it did not have the ability even to recruit essential staff. It ran its Darfur operation with fewer personnel than the Sudan desk of a small NGO—and frequently diverted them to other tasks” (2008 p.194). Citing the mission’s apparent inability to request desperately needed telephones as an example, one Western military officer who liaised with AMIS for a number of years concluded that the mission “neither had the capacity to ask for what it needed nor the ability to manage what it had” (quoted in Flint and De Waal 2008 p.177; see also U.S. Government Accountability Office 2006 p.59-62).

U.S. assistance, then, proved insufficient to overcome AMIS’ inability to implement even its limited civilian protection mandate, and thus contributed relatively little to improving security in Darfur. While AMIS was successfully able to intervene to prevent violence against civilians

17 I have seen several references to the regular occurrence of night attacks, including at least one detailed description of the typical pattern. See eg, Cockett, *Sudan*, p.186. On the other hand, one credible source also calls this pattern into question. Former U.S. Marine captain and AMIS monitor Brian Steidle noted that in his experience of investigating such attacks, “The militias almost always attacked during daylight hours because they often were reinforced by GOS [Government of Sudan] troops using helicopter gunships and Antonov prop planes.” Steidle and Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback*, p.148.
in some cases, nevertheless the U.S. largely helped to sustain the deployment of under-prepared troops mandated to provide a level of civilian protection that they had little hope of achieving. Critically, moreover, there was little reason to hope that more financial and logistical aid could have significantly changed this outcome, as long as the U.S. stood by the basic strategy of bolstering AMIS under the AU’s leadership. While more assistance might have alleviated certain difficulties, it could not solve the AU’s basic lack of organizational capacity. As one State Department official remarked, “You can’t run a peacekeeping operation on voluntary contributions and have your partners do all the logistics for you” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.75). What most fundamentally constrained the U.S. contribution to civilian protection in Darfur during this period, therefore, was American willingness to rely on the African Union to do the bulk of the work on the ground.

3.3 Accounting for the Emphasis on AMIS

Despite the mission’s troubles, U.S. support for AMIS reflected greater effort to address Darfuris’ security needs than the Administration had been willing to make during the initial phase of the war. But why direct U.S. resources and energy toward such an evidently flawed operation? And why not do more on the other key front, by working hard to promote a peace agreement?

First, once again U.S. policy closely matches the expectations of the theory, due to a key change in the domestic political environment. After a year of suffering out of the public eye, Darfur now became the object of a deluge of public concern and led to the rise of what has been

As one AU official pointedly suggested in August 2005, “Within three months we will not be able to pay the wages of our troops who are on the ground there...The international community, UN, European Union and NATO can’t ask us to increase our force in Darfur and then not come up with the money.” O’Neill and Cassis, Protecting Two Million Internally Displaced, p.63.
widely cited as “the largest American civic activist movement on Africa since the anti-Apartheid campaign” (eg, Flint and De Waal 2008 p.184).

The spark that ignited this transformation was the ten-year anniversary of the start of the Rwandan genocide on April 6th, 2004. In the lead-up to and during the official commemorations of that event, explicit comparisons between Darfur and Rwanda by high-level UN officials resonated broadly. On April 7th, President Bush released his own first statement on the conflict, calling on Khartoum to stop the atrocities.19

After this, Darfur received an explosion of public and media attention, with the number of articles in English-language media increasing from 50 in March to 1300 in August (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.184; see also, eg, Cockett 2010 p.207). From the spring onward, media coverage and public advocacy grew in tandem, with the former both attracting concerned citizens to the emerging advocacy movement and reflecting the efforts of new advocacy groups to heighten public awareness.

The founding of the Save Darfur Coalition by the U.S. Holocaust Museum and American Jewish World Service over the summer laid the foundation for the considerable political influence the movement would muster over the next several years (see eg, Hamilton 2011 p.32, 37; Flint and De Waal 2008 p.184). Save Darfur quickly found itself helping to connect the many Darfur-related organizations that formed on college campuses and through community and church groups during the fall and beyond. As David Lanz describes, this strategy of coordination and coalition building among groups from across the political spectrum was highly effective in ensuring that they reached a wide audience: “They created a movement, whose cause was sufficiently vague and non-menacing to allow it to become a catch-all for various civil society groups. They managed to tap into traditional Christian advocacy for Sudan, Jewish

preoccupation with genocide, human rights groups’ support for international criminal justice, the conflict resolution community’s enthusiasm for R2P [Responsibility to Protect], student idealism, and the philanthropic impulse of celebrities” (2009 p.671).

From the beginning, the activists were concerned primarily with the need to protect Darfuri civilians from violence, a focus that derived from the analogy to Rwanda. Initially, they sought to convince Congress and the Bush Administration to call the events in Darfur ‘genocide,’ in the belief that this would legally commit the U.S. government to military intervention (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.181). The result of this effort was, then, semi-successful. In July, both houses of Congress passed resolutions declaring that genocide was happening in Darfur. On September 9th, the Bush Administration joined in with a public statement by Secretary of State Colin Powell. According to Gérard Prunier, moreover, this was a direct response to the public outcry: Powell had “practically been ordered” to refer to Darfur as a genocide, while adding that this did not obligate the U.S. to intervene military (2008 p.140).

Rather than placating the activists, however, the Bush Administration’s declaration of genocide actually contributed to the continued growth of their movement, and a trend toward increasingly critical media coverage of U.S. Darfur policy (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.183-4). Indeed, over the next few years, activists assiduously used the media both to press their policy demands and to publicize their growing numbers and political clout. In 2005, for example, the Genocide Intervention Network (GI-Net) and the Center for American Progress created an online petition to increase reporting on Darfur, while the Save Darfur Coalition asked its followers to write letters-to-the-editor and op-eds in their local papers in order to boost awareness of the conflict (Hamilton 2011 p.101-2). As a result, following the burst of coverage in mid-2004,
“media interest was not only sustained but actually grew; by 2007-2008, Darfur attracted 48% more coverage in the U.S. print media than it had in 2004-2005” (Hamilton 2011 p.102).

After convincing Congress and the Bush Administration to call Darfur a genocide, activists soon turned their energies to the goal of bolstering AMIS, an aim that formed the core of the movement’s strategy for over a year. Their reasoning drew on an argument by Romeo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR in Rwanda in 1994, that if he had simply had more resources, his forces could have stopped the slaughter there. Analogizing to Darfur, throughout 2005 activists “persisted in arguing that AMIS would be capable of protecting civilians if only they had more resources” (Hamilton 2011 p.74). Save Darfur pushed for a stronger mandate, more troops, and more logistical and financial aid. Student groups formed during the fall of 2004 took the novel approach of raising money for AMIS directly. Their idea was that “by funding peacekeepers, American citizens would demonstrate their desire to protect Darfuris and shame the U.S. government into increasing its own funding of AMIS” (Hamilton 2011 p.64).

Given the considerable gap between AMIS’ capabilities and the security and protection that it was being asked to provide in Darfur, it is not terribly surprising that activists were able to recognize a number of the mission’s problems, including its deplorable lack of resources. But as anticipated in Chapter 3, they did face some important informational disadvantages. Not only were AMIS’ greatest hurdles – its operational planning and organizational capabilities – extremely difficult to observe from the outside as a non-military expert, but the African Union had little prior experience in peacekeeping that activists could use to judge its strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps more importantly, the members of the movement were typically new not only to Darfur, but also to the problems of Sudan more broadly and often to advocacy work in general (Cockett 2010 p.207; Hamilton 2011 p.52). Especially at the beginning, there was little
overlap between them and the more seasoned community of South Sudan activists who had lobbied President Bush to help end the civil war.

These disadvantages had three key consequences. First, the AU’s dearth of operational planning and organizational capacity was initially lost on most members of the advocacy movement. As a result, they failed to see that simply giving AMIS more resources would not transform it into a capable and effective protection force.²⁰ Rebecca Hamilton records an incident that starkly illustrates this lack of familiarity and experience with peace operations and the AU. In late 2005, an activist from one of the student organizations that had been raising money for AMIS, the Genocide Intervention Network (GI-Net), went to visit mission headquarters to discuss how to disperse the funds the group had collected. The trip proved an eye-opening experience. After a year of focusing on raising money for AMIS, he realized that “They had 12 guys trying to coordinate a 7,000-person mission. They were maxed out. We had $300K to offer, and it was a billion dollar project” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.73-74). After this, GI-Net gave up working with the AU directly.

Second, the movement’s focus on the genocide label and tendency to analogize from Rwanda kept members narrowly focused on military options, and made it difficult for them to see the importance and potential of a political settlement. As Hamilton explains, “Viewing the conflict as a largely one-sided massacre is what drove advocates to focus on security rather than aid, punishment rather than negotiation” (2011 p.110). Given the large-scale attacks that dominated the year leading up to the emergence of the advocacy movement, this was

²⁰ As in any movement so large and diverse, however, there were of course exceptions. These included both individuals such as long-time Sudan activist Eric Reeves and NGOs including the International Crisis Group and Africa Action. See eg, Eric Reeves, ”The Failure of the African Union in Darfur,” The Sudan Tribune, September 7, 2005; International Crisis Group, ”The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps,” (2005); Africa Action, ”Zoellick confirms Bush administration's duplicity on Darfur [Press Release, June 22],” (2005).
understandable. But even by the summer of 2004, James Traub notes, the analogy was too simple: “the increasingly provocative behavior by the rebels blurred the moral clarity of the situation” (2007 p.252). The new activists, though, gave little if any thought to the complicated political tensions underlying the violence.

Third and finally, the movement’s lack of background in Sudanese politics made it difficult for activists to see the connections between events in Darfur and the rest of Sudan. As one of the few long-time South Sudan advocates who did become involved with the Save Darfur coalition at an early stage found, “What was astounding to me was that people didn’t know so much [about the south] and weren’t making the connection…People weren’t getting that you couldn’t siphon off Darfur” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.51-2). Because they did not think critically about Darfur’s relationship to Sudan as a whole and to the issues at stake in the north-south peace process, the activists saw no reason to ask themselves whether the U.S. might have policy levers available that could allow it to use these connections to Darfur’s advantage.

Taken together, these realities contributed to a situation in which the advocacy movement saw much sense in promoting AMIS, but missed the brief window of opportunity that existed in 2004 to urge the Administration to tie Darfur to the Naivasha negotiations. More broadly, never during this period did most activists push the Administration to devote itself to the peace process.

For the Bush Administration, this created a substantial and growing incentive, beginning in mid-2004, to at least give the impression of helping to protect Darfuri civilians. Although much of the advocacy movement’s initial activity was directed at encouraging Congress to open the federal pocketbook on behalf of AMIS (and to provide humanitarian aid), the pressure it generated was clearly relevant at the executive level as well. Major aspects of the various policies the U.S. either could have or did engage in – such as diplomacy at the UN and Abuja,
and decisions about directing U.S. logistical support for AMIS – required executive leadership. What is more, Darfur even became a topic of conversation in the 2004 presidential election contest. In this context, U.S. support for AMIS allowed President Bush to respond to questions about Darfur by pointing to the aid the government was committing and highlighting its cooperation with the AU. Congress’ role in appropriating the funding for this support did not diminish the Administration’s ability to take credit.

At the same time, the Administration had no interest in pursuing high-cost policies that could become a political liability. Its earlier reasons not to disrupt relations with Sudan persisted during this period: the desire for counter-terrorism cooperation remained strong, and until the CPA was signed in January 2005, it still had an incentive not to compromise on the Naivasha process. For the reasons discussed above, these realities made tying Darfur to the Naivasha negotiations an undesirable outcome. In addition, however, deploying U.S. troops – as a few activists and members of Congress advocated – looked like a very risky policy.

Although it was not yet clear to most Darfur activists, any successful military effort to protect civilians would require a more robust peace operation than AMIS. As UN Secretary General Kofi Annan pointed out explicitly to the U.S. and other Security Council members in early 2005, continuing to strengthen the AU, though politically easy, had a low probability of success. A UN-approved multinational force like INTERFET in East Timor was, in Annan’s view, the only military option with a real chance of accomplishing what was needed (Traub 2007 p.343-44).

Yet the operational environment for any kind of peace operation in Darfur was extraordinarily difficult given the territory’s large size (roughly comparable to France), dispersed

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population, poor infrastructure, and terrible, muddy roads. In addition, Khartoum clearly indicated that it would not consent to a more ambitious peace operation, warning the U.S. and UK against interfering in Sudan’s internal affairs when they briefly raised the possibility of such action in mid-2004.\textsuperscript{22} Meanwhile, senior U.S. officials feared that American troops could also be vulnerable to attacks by “bloodthirsty, cold-hearted” terrorists who might flock to Darfur from Somalia or other regional trouble spots in search of U.S. soldiers to kill.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, any U.S. deployment looked certain to face not only a dangerous environment and a high probability of significant casualties, but also would have destroyed relations with Khartoum.

For the Administration, these conflicting pressures threatened to create a serious dilemma: how to placate the activists without being pushed to pursue such objectionable policies? Fortunately for them, however, the activists’ optimism about supporting AMIS offered an opportunity to resolve this dilemma in a highly favorable fashion. In particular, the Administration was able to limit the costs of its Darfur policy while creating the impression that by supporting AMIS financially and logistically, it was doing more for Darfur’s civilians than it actually was.

First, because the activists generally believed that AMIS could be fixed, for the most part they did not push for the U.S. to commit its own troops. Instead, by advocating for more and more support for AMIS, they gave the Administration an opportunity to create the impression of heeding their desire for civilian protection. Thus, although its effect on the ground was quite limited, U.S. support for the mission had the benefit of keeping both the political and strategic costs of U.S. military involvement in Darfur low. Unlike committing troops, supporting AMIS—which had Khartoum’s official consent so long as it remained small and under the leadership of


\textsuperscript{23} See eg, report of Zoellick’s congressional testimony in George Gedda, "U.S. opposes Western troops in Darfur, official says," \textit{Associated Press}, June 22, 2005.
the African Union – did not fundamentally challenge the Administration’s perceived interests in counterterrorism cooperation or concluding the Naivasha negotiations.

Likewise, if in 2004 the advocacy movement had generated the same level of pressure to tie the Naivasha negotiations to a political resolution for Darfur that it did to support AMIS, the Administration would have faced a direct choice between the imperative to heed activist demands and the political credit it hoped to receive from completing the CPA in a timely fashion. Thanks to the activists’ focus on AMIS and civilian protection, however, the Administration was able to continue negotiating the CPA without bringing Darfur into the equation. Thus, to the extent that supporting AMIS distracted activists from recognizing the need for a peace agreement or making a mental connection between Darfur and Naivasha, it was useful for this reason as well.

But in addition to allowing the Administration to resolve this dilemma, activists’ focus on the military aspects of Darfur’s security crisis may also have distracted it from focusing on certain policies to which it had no fundamental objection. In particular, once the CPA was signed in January 2005 the risk of derailing the Naivasha negotiations disappeared. From this point forward, the Administration had no particular reason to avoid putting greater effort into the Abuja peace talks. Thus, with the difference in public interest representing the only real distinction between the Administration’s incentives to focus on Abuja versus AMIS for the rest of 2005, the advocacy movement’s failure to see the importance of a political settlement may well explain the relatively limited U.S. engagement with the Abuja negotiations during this time.

Thus, the Administration was able to dodge demands for policies that would have been more costly in terms of blood and political capital. What is more, according to one mid-level State Department official, at least some of those involved with Darfur policy were quite aware
that U.S. support for AMIS might give activists a false impression of what was being accomplished. In his telling, the particular forms of support offered were selected, at least in part, to maximize their political visibility. As Hamilton describes,

“for those under political pressure, airdropping in an additional 400 AMIS troops, with pictures to show for it, was a better way to manage advocacy demands than coming out with a statement that they were working to improve AMIS management techniques. ‘Those of us working closest to the AU realized that you could expand ten times over and they still wouldn’t have the capacity,’ the same official recalls…”

Thus, in line with the activists’ focus, the emphasis in Washington turned toward numbers and away from the most fundamental issues of the AU’s organizational and operational planning capabilities. If anything, this may have further limited the U.S. ability to help the AU overcome its most serious limitations. Still, as Traub has put it, supporting AMIS was valuable because it allowed the U.S. and other Western powers “to say that they were addressing the problem without having to commit anything save money” (2007 p.346).

Finally, a plausible competing explanation for the Administration’s strong support of AMIS during this period is that it was – like the activists – excessively optimistic about the mission’s potential to protect civilians. Certainly, in public senior officials professed considerable faith in the AU’s potential.24 But while it is conceivable that they were initially unaware of some of AMIS’ limitations, overall the available evidence tends to support the opposite view – that they understood that the AU was not up to the task, but continued to make their support for AMIS the centerpiece of U.S. policy for nearly a year, if not longer – after reaching this conclusion.

For example, in 2004 the Defense Department provided the State Department with an estimate that it would take at least 35,000 U.S. troops to protect the IDP camps in Darfur, assuming a consensual mission that had Khartoum’s permission (see note 16 above). From the

24 See, for example, Robert Zoellick’s Congressional testimony from June 22, 2005. Ibid.
very beginning, it was clear that the AU could not possibly deploy anywhere near this large of a force, so this was one early indication of its fundamental limitations. Second, in late 2004 high-level UN officials had begun actively discussing possible solutions to what they perceived to be the AU’s obvious inability to handle the security situation in Darfur. Critically, they understood what the activists had not – not only that AMIS had too few soldiers and could not realistically deploy even the small number of troops it promised, but also that “the AU didn’t seem to know how to use” the money it had (Traub 2007 p.340).

U.S. diplomats at the UN may have been exposed to these conversations at that time, but as noted above, at the very latest the Secretary General’s views on the problem were laid out for the Security Council in March of 2005. Finally, Annan’s message about the AU’s lack of capacity was further reinforced when Robert Zoellick visited AMIS that April and observed the effects of the mission’s limited organizational capacity firsthand (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.194). Such experiences appear to support Kofi Annan’s later claim that, from an early date, “The Security Council and the international community were very happy to say African peacekeepers could go in, when everybody knew they did not have the capacity or resources” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.127).

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In sum, from mid-2004 through 2005 the Bush Administration’s signature effort to address the continuing violence against civilians and general insecurity in Darfur was its support of AMIS, and to a lesser extent, the Abuja negotiations. Unfortunately, however, AMIS lacked the capacity to consistently deliver even the limited level of civilian protection it was asked to provide, while the Abuja negotiations stalled.
Supporting AMIS, however, was politically attractive. In the face of an emerging but powerful Darfur advocacy movement without the knowledge and experience to notice the African Union’s most fundamental limitations, being seen to help AMIS allowed the Administration to give the impression that it was contributing in a serious and meaningful way to the goal of improving civilian protection in Darfur. At the same time, it was able to avoid several more costly – and thus less attractive – policy options. In addition to the operational environment for a U.S. deployment, the costs the Administration expected from these policies reflected several strategic and domestic political concerns. Thus, as during the initial stage of the war, U.S. policy at this time was consistent with the theory, but also influenced by these other forces.

4. 2006 and Beyond: The Fight for UNAMID

The third and final phase of U.S. policy toward Darfur considered in this chapter occurred between the beginning of 2006 and the official transition from AMIS to UNAMID on December 31st, 2007. During this time, the U.S. approach to securing Darfuri civilians’ immediate and long-term security needs shifted significantly. While continuing to provide material support for AMIS, the Bush Administration led a two-year diplomatic crusade to replace it with a UN force that, it claimed, would be better able to protect civilians and aid workers.25

25 Different authors cite different points in time at which this shift occurred. For example, Hamilton (p.79, 86) suggests that serious efforts to bring about a UN operation began in early 2006, but also that officials had been thinking about the possibility for some time. She notes that the U.S. was tired of paying for AMIS by late 2005 and convinced of the need to replace it with a robust UN force by 2006, but also that American officials had by that time already been discussing the issue with the UN ‘for months.’ On the other hand, de Waal suggests (p.1042) that the commitment (in principle) to a UN force occurred significantly earlier, with the idea being “adopted as a priority by the US government in the early summer of 2005.” That President Bush was promoting a NATO force as late as February of 2006 (see discussion below) appears to support Hamilton’s designation of early 2006 as the breaking point. Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur; Alex De Waal, "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect," International Affairs 83, no. 6 (2007).
This campaign would occupy “the greater part of US diplomatic energy and political capital” during this period (De Waal 2007 p.1042).

Once it deployed, UNAMID – like AMIS before it – asked soldiers to provide more protection for civilians than they had any reasonable hope of doing. What is more, UNAMID not only failed to improve substantially on AMIS, but in addition the compromises made in securing its deployment actually increased the war’s complexity while reducing the prospects for a comprehensive political settlement.

To a considerable extent, these outcomes were the predictable results of choices U.S. policymakers made in their efforts to replace AMIS. Practically all the relevant players – the UN, AU, and Khartoum – opposed the idea of a UN force. To overcome the UN’s resistance, the Bush Administration helped to revive the floundering peace talks at Abuja, leading to the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May of 2006. By hurrying to conclude an agreement as quickly as possible, however, it gave up the chance to negotiate a settlement that could last while ignoring signs of Khartoum’s opposition to a UN force. After this, obtaining Khartoum’s consent for the new mission required an additional year – during which AMIS was largely neglected – as well as severe limitations on its form and composition. These, in turn, stymied UN efforts to use its resources and experience to improve significantly on AMIS.

The Administration’s hurry at Abuja played a key role in setting the stage for UNAMID’s delayed deployment and limited capabilities, and for the subsequent deterioration in security. For this reason, the months leading up to the DPA represent the most critical part of this two-year period, and receive the greatest emphasis here.

Despite its downsides, however, there were political benefits to the U.S. strategy. Most importantly, once again the Administration was able to create the illusion that through its efforts
to secure a UN force, it was doing more to address Darfuris’ security and protection needs than it really was. Once again, too, this was attributable to the same kinds of misunderstandings that had prevented the advocacy community from seeing the full extent of AMIS’ limitations.

In particular, while activists now finally gave up on AMIS, they failed to see that in their haste to replace it, they were encouraging the Administration to forego an opportunity to secure long-term peace in exchange for a new mission that was very likely to share AMIS’ core vulnerabilities. By focusing on delivering a UN force, meanwhile, the Administration was able to benefit from the activists’ false impression that it would solve all of AMIS’ problems. While it seems clear that most U.S. officials did not foresee all the consequences of this strategy, their failure to heed the plentiful warning signs reflects the activists’ pressure to deliver a UN force as quickly as possible.

4.1 Developments in the War: Political Context and Policy Implications

During the first half of 2006, the security situation in Darfur resembled that of the previous year, but was beginning a downward spiral. Meanwhile, the trend toward an increasingly complicated political environment continued. After what would become the sixth and final round of peace talks commenced in Abuja in November 2005, fighting intensified as all sides jockeyed for political advantage. During the next six months, rival SLA factions fought amongst each other in pursuit of international recognition. Khartoum invited Chadian rebels into Sudan, supporting their efforts to oust the Chadian government in the hope of ending its support for the Darfur rebels (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.205-7). Attacks against aid operations and AMIS by rebels, Arab militias, and government agents increased.

Clearly, a peace operation that could provide more effective protection around the displaced persons’ camps and remaining villages, and for aid workers, remained an immediate
need. At the same time, a political settlement that could halt these disturbing trends, restore the flow of relief, and allow the displaced to begin rebuilding their lives had never been more essential. As Hamilton put it, such an agreement would need to be “the primary piece of a solution” to the security vacuum in Darfur (2011 p.111). Given AMIS’ limitations and the deplorable state of the peace talks, moreover, in principle a U.S. effort to improve on these initiatives made a great deal of sense. Ideally, a more robust peace operation could have provided security over the short term, while concurrent negotiations for a credible peace treaty could help clear a path toward long-term peace.

Given several important political constraints, however, in practice the U.S. faced a tradeoff between opportunities to contribute to both of these goals in a timely fashion. The first of these constraints was self-imposed. Having ruled out direct U.S. military action on the grounds that it would inflame anti-American sentiment and Al-Qaeda activity in the Muslim world, President Bush was then rebuffed in a February 2006 request to NATO to play a major role in a new mission (Hamilton 2011 p.77-79). Thus, unless the Bush Administration was willing to revisit its decision not to send U.S. troops, the UN appeared to offer the only viable military alternative to the African Union.

This led directly to the remaining constraints. The UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) is poorly equipped to conduct coercive missions that lack the consent of the local government. Typically such operations are led by an individual state, ‘coalition of the willing,’ or regional organization such as NATO. Not wishing to be saddled with a mission that they knew would be out of its depth, UN officials emphasized that they would act only if and when the trappings of a traditional peacekeeping force – a peace agreement and Khartoum’s consent – were in place (see eg, Flint and De Waal 2008 p.199; Hamilton 2011 p.112).
Given these constraints, there were two basic policy strategies the U.S. might have pursued. First, it could place a priority on short-term protection needs and on deploying a new peace operation as quickly as possible. To do this through the UN, the Bush Administration would need to help arrange a peace agreement. Given the UN’s poor record in coercive peacekeeping, however, a new UN mission – even if it could be deployed rapidly – was unlikely to improve significantly on AMIS without a real commitment to peace by all parties. But while a hurried peace process probably represented the best chance to deploy a new force as soon as possible, it would also limit the prospects for bringing all the belligerents on board. This strategy, therefore, would run the considerable risk that the peace deal would fail, and therefore that any new force would be ineffectual. In short, it risked contributing little to either short-term protection or long-term peace.

Second, the Bush Administration could have chosen to place a priority on arranging a political settlement that would lay the groundwork for a sustainable peace and be acceptable to Khartoum, the rebel groups, and the Arab population. Despite the lack of progress in the negotiations thus far, there was at least some reason to think that such a deal was there to be done, with sufficient U.S. engagement and patience. First, it seemed that the right agreement could offer something for all the belligerent parties. Khartoum wanted an agreement that would help it to gain international legitimacy and forge a winning coalition for elections in 2009 (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.225). At least some of the rebels seemed genuinely committed to the welfare of the population and to securing peace if at all possible. The Arab community, too, asked to be part of the negotiations, reasoning that because they were part of the problem they should also be part of the solution (Hamilton 2011 p.85). A greater U.S. commitment might thus have proved to be the oil that could finally grease the wheels of the Abuja talks.
At best, then, a strategy focused on the peace talks represented a real opportunity to help solve Darfur’s long-term political tensions. At the least, it would avoid the mistake of rushing – and possibly undermining – the peace process just to deploy what would in all likelihood be a comparably constrained UN mission. This approach, however, would certainly delay the deployment of such a force.

As discussed below, the Administration chose the first strategy, pushing through the Darfur Peace Agreement – signed May 6\textsuperscript{th}, 2006 – on a tight and unrealistic timetable. In the wake of this supposed triumph, however, violence only accelerated. The rebels fragmented further, with new groups vying for resources and attacking relief operations in search of loot, and to a lesser extent, to intimidate distrusted foreigners (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.188; Hamilton 2011 p.104). Meanwhile, Khartoum progressively lost control of the Arab militias that had helped it to prosecute its counter-insurgency campaign (see Flint and De Waal 2008 p.259-62).

Predictably, these trends resulted in reduced services and relief for Darfur’s displaced. Some areas were completely cut off, while aid agencies curtailed their operations in others. By August 2006, humanitarian access had already reached its lowest point since 2004.\textsuperscript{26} At the same time, the displaced population grew rapidly – by 40% between July 2006 to September 2007 – and this period saw the most conflict-related (though not violent) deaths of the entire war, with up to 98,187 civilian fatalities (Degomme and Guha-Sapir 2010 p.294, 298).\textsuperscript{27}


\textsuperscript{27} The high number of deaths primarily reflects the growth of the conflict-affected population, rather than an increase in the crude mortality rate during this period. On the other hand, there are once again differences in interpretation of mortality trends. On the one hand, Flint and de Waal claim that from mid-2006 to mid-2007, “Mortality rates from hunger and disease did not rise” (p.191). On the other, Degomme and Guha-Sapir argue that “Crude mortality rates for this period are similar to those of the previous period, but this continuity masks a divergent pattern in cause-specific mortality” – whereas the rate of violent deaths continued to fall despite the increase in insecurity, the rate of non-violent, disease-
4.2 U.S. Policy: The UN as Savior

The Bush Administration began the process of pushing for a UN force to replace AMIS by addressing the opposition of the AU itself. In January 2006, along with other AMIS donors, it threatened to cut off all funding for AMIS beyond March unless the AU consented to transfer the mission to the UN (Hamilton 2011 p.80). But although the AU had little choice under the circumstances, President Bashir lost no opportunity to express his own intense opposition to this plan. In February, for example, he declared that Sudan would “refuse all attempts to transfer the African Union forces’ mission in Darfur to forces from the United Nations” and that Darfur would become a “graveyard” for UN troops (Hamilton 2011 p.80).

Despite these troubling signals, the Bush Administration pressed ahead with the next step – securing a peace deal so that the UN would agree to deploy. Like the previous rounds, the talks that had begun in November 2005 appeared to be getting nowhere (see eg, Hamilton 2011, p.85). Impatient with the lack of progress, the U.S. and other international players began making demands that were counter-productive without a greater commitment to following through. As Flint and de Waal relate, “They repeatedly set deadlines and sent senior figures to Abuja to demand that the process be expedited. Each new deadline gave only a few weeks’ grace, making it impossible for the mediators to craft a strategy” (2008 p.210). As a result, “Deadlines came and went, with each failure bringing only new demands for speed” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.211).

Finally, however, in March, “the whole dynamic changed, as the U.S. government displayed genuine interest in the nitty gritty details of peace negotiations for Darfur” (Hamilton 2011 p.85). At this time, the U.S. was relying on Ali Osman Taha, the Sudanese vice president related deaths grew (p.298). Flint and De Waal, Darfur: A New History; Degomme and Guha-Sapir, "Patterns of Mortality Rates in Darfur Conflict."
who had been Khartoum’s chief representative at the Naivasha negotiations, to help deliver a
deal on Darfur (see eg, Hamilton 2011 p.86-87). In early March, Taha offered to personally
make the case to Bashir for a UN mission, once an agreement had been signed (Flint & de Waal
secretary-general Salim Ahmed Salim redoubled his efforts, preparing a text covering all the
major points of contention to use as a basis for further negotiation. Progress stalled when
Khartoum agreed to Salim’s draft agreement and the rebels felt they were being pushed to accept
too quickly. On May 1st, Salim asked Zoellick to come in person to help seal the deal. With his
arrival, the talks “were about to become jet-propelled” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.219).28

The U.S. goal, however, “was never to negotiate a sustainable peace,” but to obtain a deal
that would allow the UN to deploy as soon as possible (Hamilton 2011 p.98). Although Zoellick
was able to broker an agreement within a matter of days, the concessions he made in doing so
were compatible with neither of these outcomes.

First, the DPA failed to attain the consent and participation of all the major parties to the
violence. Despite their pleas to be included in the negotiations, Darfur’s Arab population – who
had their own distinct local political interests and whose support would be needed for any lasting
peace – were left out entirely. In addition, only one rebel leader signed on to the deal. As de
Waal explains, the tight deadline “meant that the text of the agreement was substantively
deficient in important respects and, more significantly, that the process was too rushed to carry
the armed movements along with it” (2007 p.1047). Given that little real dialogue had taken
place over the previous year and a half, there was little progress to build on, and this outcome is
hardly surprising.

28 For an extended discussion of the Abuja negotiations see Flint and De Waal, Darfur: A New History,
p.200-29 (Chapter 8).
By this time, the SLA had broken into two factions, led by Minni Minawi and Abdel Wahid. Wahid – who had the support of the majority of Darfur’s African population – legitimately wanted to end the war and help people escape the IDP camps. Along with JEM, however, he refused to sign the proposed text without stronger guarantees concerning the distribution and transfer of political power and resources. Arranging the guarantees demanded by Wahid and including the Arabs in the negotiations would have required more time than Zoellick was prepared to take. As a result, the Administration gave up on the outcome that Khartoum most wanted – “an alliance with Abdel Wahid to forge a winning electoral base for itself in 2009” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.225) – and the only one that might have induced it to act in good faith, make real concessions, and abide by the agreement. In exchange, they were left relying on Minawi – “the rebel leader whom Khartoum least desired to have on its side” (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.225) – to bring peace.29

In taking this path, U.S. officials ignored or downplayed numerous warnings about the risks involved, and in some cases their own better judgment. First, the AU, UN, and Darfuri leaders all argued for more time and predicted dire consequences if the agreement were rushed. The AU’s mediation team and the DPKO advised that a credible peace agreement should be the first priority, and that this would require a “longer process of capacity-building and confidence-building among the commanders in the field” or at least “a longer time to develop the basic concepts for advancing security in Darfur and obtaining the agreement of the parties” (De Waal 2007 p.1053). Both the AU’s security advisers and Darfuri tribal leaders warned, moreover, that an unsound agreement would make things worse, with the latter predicting a ‘war of all against all’ (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.205, 229).

29 As Flint and de Waal (p.267) later note, it was the priority of getting UN troops into Darfur that “determined Abuja’s deadline and drove the American compact with Minawi.”
Second, at least some U.S. officials saw the dangers as well. In late April, a State Department representative stationed in Darfur circulated a memo to the Secretary of State and the heads of all the relevant bureaus. His assessment was that the process, at least as currently being conducted, had little chance of reducing violence, in part because of the lack of Arab representation (Hamilton 2011 p.89). In addition, according to Flint and de Waal, “Some American diplomats privately recognized the problems of short-circuiting the long and tortuous process of negotiation,” but nevertheless hoped that an agreement “would bring the rebels into the Government of National Unity and a UN mission to Darfur, at which time the real issues of security and conflict resolution could be properly addressed” (2008 p.204-5). Finally, U.S. officials also understood that relying on Minawi to help enforce an agreement would be risky: his forces were growing weaker, not stronger, during the negotiations, while Minawi himself was concerned primarily with the material gains and political position he hoped to acquire by signing the agreement. Nevertheless, “the Americans refused to see his decline,” backing him because they believed he could “deliver an agreement” without thinking too hard about what might happen afterward (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.204; see also p.216).

In the end, the various pleas for more time “were overruled by the politicians’ demand for protection first and peace second” (De Waal 2007 p.1053), and the prophesy of the tribal leaders who had predicted a war of all against all came true. Rather than improving the security situation, the DPA had the perverse effects of undermining AMIS’ already limited ability to provide any kind of effective civilian protection, while increasing both the level of violence and the complexity of the political environment.

First, the U.S. pressured the AU to enforce the agreement by cracking down on the non-signatories (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.232-3). This put AMIS on the side of Khartoum and
Minawi, and at odds with the remaining rebels and the Darfuri population. Violence grew, with Minawi trying to defeat the other rebels. Meanwhile, AMIS suffered ever more frequent attacks, and lost the trust of the displaced people it was trying to protect (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.233, 239; Ekengard 2008 p.24). While the Bush Administration sought to secure approval for a new UN force, AMIS was neglected and dwindled in size (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.199). Unsurprisingly, morale and effectiveness fell (De Waal 2007 p.1046).

Second, during the months and years after the DPA was signed, the disagreements among the rebels exposed at Abuja deepened. The movement fractured further, and the number of groups ballooned (Hamilton 2011 p.97). As noted above, this increased looting and attacks on aid workers, but it also added to the obstacles to reaching any future agreement. Finally, it made it “virtually impossible for any peacekeeping contingent to build the relations needed to facilitate operations” (Hamilton 2011 p.97).

In addition to arranging a treaty signed only by Khartoum and Minawi, however, the Administration’s haste led to a second key omission at Abuja. By failing to provide specifically for a UN peacekeeping operation in the text, Zoellick may well have missed an opportunity to deploy UNAMID more quickly. Although Khartoum opposed a UN mission, Bashir might have consented if Zoellick had made this a clear prerequisite for an agreement – especially if that agreement had included Abdel Wahid. Instead, however, according to UN special representative for Sudan Jan Pronk, the U.S. and UK opposed his pleas to specify the transition to a UN force because this would “complicate matters” – in other words, because it would create an unwanted delay (Hamilton 2011 p.97).

Again, this required U.S. officials to ignore multiple warning signs. In addition to Bashir’s clearly stated opposition to a UN force, Zoellick himself had learned months earlier – in
January – that Ali Osman Taha was out of favor in Khartoum and that any decision on a UN deployment would fall to Bashir and his other, more hard-line representative at Abuja, Majzoub al Khalifa Ahmed. Even after this, Zoellick retained faith in Taha’s ability to deliver on a UN force once an agreement was signed, despite credible information that he lacked the authority to do so (Hamilton 2011 p.87-88).

What followed, therefore, was a long diplomatic struggle that resulted in major limitations on the design and composition of UNAMID. Once the DPA was signed, the U.S. moved quickly to get UN Security Council approval for a new peacekeeping mission. But when Khartoum objected, U.S. diplomats were surprised to find that it was under no obligation to accept a new mission. In August, President Bush promised Bashir a personal meeting if he acceded to a UN force (Save Darfur Coalition 2006). When he refused, the Administration enlisted the Security Council to pressure him into changing his mind. Resolution 1706, approved on August 31st, “invited Sudan’s consent to a UN force—implying that if consent was not forthcoming, such a force might be dispatched without it” (De Waal 2007 p.1042).

Bashir quickly declined this “invitation,” however, and progress stalled. In 2007, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan suggested the idea of replacing AMIS with a hybrid AU-UN force. Again seeking to pressure Sudan into accepting this newest proposal, the U.S., UK, and France threatened to present a Security Council resolution proposing new sanctions on Sudan. China, normally Khartoum’s ally on the Security Council, was mindful of its international image in advance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and wished neither to accept nor veto such a resolution. Beijing therefore suggested that Bashir should accept the new plan, which he did on June 17th – nearly 10 months after resolution 1706. On July 31st, Resolution 1769 authorized UNAMID to take over from AMIS on December 31st (Hamilton 2011 p.143-44; De Waal 2007 p.1042).

As a condition of its consent, however, Khartoum was able to dictate terms and chose to set strict limits on the composition of the new force. In particular, it largely blocked the deployment of more capable soldiers from non-African countries, effectively refusing “any troops or equipment that would give UNAMID the strength to actually protect civilians” (Hamilton 2011 p.173-74; see also Prunier 2008 p.182). As former DPKO chief Jean-Marie Guéhenno put it, “The Sudanese government used the hybrid concept to exclude armies that had capacities that the AU did not have” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.174). Partly for this reason, UNAMID was slow to reach its authorized capacity. Even though many of the soldiers were transferred directly from AMIS, barely 15,000 of the mandated 26,000 personnel had deployed by the end of 2008, and not quite 20,000 by the end of 2009.31

As a result, the transition to UNAMID had little effect on the mission’s capabilities, especially at first. As Prunier describes, “the AMIS soldiers solemnly took off their green berets and put on blue ones. Apart from this ‘re-hatting’ they were still as unmotivated, as inefficient and as under-equipped as they had been under their previous name” (2008 p.178).32 Indeed, in the worsening security environment UNAMID’s troops were often unable to protect even themselves.

Given the new mission’s limitations, it suffered – like AMIS before it – from a clear gap between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection. UNAMID’s mandate, in fact, was very similar to AMIS’: soldiers could use force in self-defense and in response to

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32 An additional difficulty was that the countries – including the U.S. – that had pushed so hard for UNAMID’s deployment did not provide all the resources it would have needed to become more effective. According to Hamilton, “From one end of the global system to the other, there was a dearth of serious commitment to the operation. For example, the operation has never had the tactical helicopters it requires.” Still, as she notes, like AMIS, “even if UNAMID had had the helicopters they needed, this would not have turned them into” an effective protection force. Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, p.174.
imminent threats to civilians encountered in its vicinity. Thus, although it was authorized under
Chapter VII of the UN charter, which is often employed to allow soldiers considerable leeway in
the use of force, UNAMID’s mandate was actually quite constrained in this regard. In this sense,
it was more restrictive than it might have appeared to anyone who shares the “popular
perception” that a Chapter VII mandate authorizes troops to use force at their discretion (Flint
and De Waal 2008 p.269). Still, the mission’s primary limiting factor remained its lack of
capacity to deliver the level of protection it was asked to provide.

4.3 Accounting for the Policy Shift

What explains the shift in U.S. policy in early 2006? By the end of 2005, the U.S. and
other AMIS donors had grown tired of paying for a mission that appeared to be achieving little,
and had begun looking for ways to share the financial burden. Although they were not yet
committed to a UN deployment, they were leaning in that direction, as this would obligate other
states to provide much of the funding for future peacekeeping in Darfur (Hamilton 2011 p.79).

But even if the Administration was inclined to switch policies, why did it embrace the
strategy of pushing to replace AMIS with a UN force as quickly as possible, given Khartoum’s
opposition and the risks to long-term peace of hurrying the Abuja negotiations? Once again, the
theory provides considerable insight into this choice. Indeed, the conflicting political pressures
the Administration faced – from activists, to focus on immediate security and protection, and
more broadly, not to accept tremendous costs – provide the best explanation for its decision to
pursue this particular path.

First, given a desire to escape the commitment to a failing AMIS, why not focus on
getting a credible peace agreement at Abuja? If successful, this would have reduced violence
and made the job AMIS faced easier, and could still have been followed by a UN force. The primary obstacle to this plan, as it turned out, was the Darfur advocacy community.

Having finally lost its enthusiasm for AMIS, at the beginning of 2006 the advocacy movement turned the full force of its attention to promoting precisely the goal the Administration now pursued – a UN force to replace it. By this time, the movement’s size and influence had reached new heights, with the Save Darfur Coalition boasting 165 member organizations as of May. Thus, when activists began pushing the Bush Administration to send the UN into Darfur if the U.S. or NATO could not go, they were immediately a force to be reckoned with. In the first half of 2006, the Save Darfur Coalition organized to send one million postcards to the president, urging him to use “the power of your office to support a stronger multinational force to protect the civilians of Darfur.” On April 30th – the day before Zoellick traveled to Abuja to make the final push for the DPA – thousands of Americans gathered in 30 different locations around the country to press for UN troops (Hamilton 2011 p.83). The subsequent delay in achieving the desired deployment only spurred them on. On September 16th, in yet another

33 There appears to be some disagreement on the timing of this transition. Lanz suggests that replacing AMIS with a UN operation became the movement’s highest priority by 2005, but Hamilton emphasizes that it was not until 2006 “that the U.S. government and advocates alike began putting their utmost into getting the UN deployed to Darfur.” See David Lanz, “Save Darfur: A Movement and Its Discontents,” African Affairs 108, no. 433 (2009), p.673; Hamilton, Fighting for Darfur, p.80 (see also p.82).
35 Efforts to influence Congress continued to yield fruit during this period as well. First, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006 – signed into law by President Bush on October 13th – imposed sanctions against those found responsible for genocide and war crimes in Darfur and included support for relief operations and AMIS’ civilian protection efforts. Second, the 2007 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act forbade companies wishing to do business with the U.S. government from doing so in Sudan. See eg, ———, "Save Darfur Coalition Praises President's Signing of Darfur Bill [Press Release, October 14]," (2006); U.S. Government Accountability Office, "Darfur Crisis: Progress in Aid and Peace Monitoring Threatened by Ongoing Violence and Operational Challenges," (2006), p.20.
36 For the full text of the postcards, see Save Darfur Coalition, "Faith-based Coalition Praises Senate Committee for Passing Amendment to Add $50 Million to President's Emergency Funding Request for Darfur Peacekeeping [Press Release, April 05]," (2006).
series of rallies, demonstrators wore blue berets to symbolize their demand for a UN force (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.191).

But as in the past, the volume of political pressure these activists were able to generate did not always reflect an in-depth understanding of the conflict, or of the likely consequences of different possible responses. During this time, at least two key misunderstandings informed their advocacy approach and prevented them from seeing the risks of pursuing a UN deployment above all else.

The first of these carried over from the previous phase of the war. Despite some 18 months of advocacy work, activists continued to compare the conflict to the Rwandan genocide, overlooking the ways it had changed and the importance – in addition to short-term protection – of achieving a political settlement. They paid little attention to rebel violence, and argued that the situation was ‘getting worse’ all the time (Flint and De Waal 2008 p.187-91; Hamilton 2011 p.103-6). These misperceptions prompted one observer to note that the movement’s biggest predicament was its “disconnection with the realities on the ground” (Lanz 2009 p.676; see also Flint and De Waal 2008 p.191).

The activists’ vision of the conflict mattered, however, because it drove them to remain focused on the problem of immediate civilian protection – and on a military solution to that problem – while deflecting attention from the need for a political settlement (Hamilton 2011 p.105, 110). As one activist recalled his reaction to the announcement that Zoellick would travel to Abuja, “We were all on the lawn calling for peacekeepers. [A peace agreement] was not at all the policy we were talking about” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.85-86). After the DPA was signed, the same activist was skeptical: because the advocacy movement had never been closely
involved with the peace process, the agreement “didn’t change our calculations much” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.95).

After several months of pushing for a UN force, such statements suggest the activists’ failure to see not only that a peace agreement was a prerequisite for such a mission, but more importantly, the significance of such an agreement and its contents for Darfur’s long-term stability. As a result, the risks of rushing the DPA did not occur to them, and they lost valuable opportunities to hold the Bush Administration accountable for helping to arrange a solid peace deal. Activists meeting with the president in April 2006, for example, pushed for a special envoy for Darfur and a protection force, but did not raise the peace process (Hamilton 2011 p.91).

The advocacy movement’s second major misunderstanding also resembled a previous one – its initial faith in AMIS’ potential as a protection force. Now, however, activists displayed excessive optimism about both what a UN force could accomplish and when it might deploy. Two forces contributed to this misplaced confidence.

First, the activists had little grasp of the UN’s relative strength in traditional peacekeeping and poor record in peace enforcement. As Flint and de Waal relate, when they began pushing to replace AMIS, “The high expectations for what UN peacekeepers would do was frankly astonishing to those in the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations and others who had witnessed UN peacekeeping operations from Sierra Leone to Congo” (2008 p.196).

Second, activists did not understand the practical implications of the need for Khartoum’s consent for a UN mission. Despite Bashir’s public statements of opposition, the possibility that he could delay the longed-for deployment simply did not occur to them until after he rejected

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37 Initially, Darfuri civilians shared the activists’ optimism. As they had when AMIS first deployed, Darfuris at first had high – indeed, “hopelessly exaggerated” – hopes for UNAMID’s ability to protect them and disarm the Janjaweed. Flint and De Waal, Darfur: A New History, p.269; see also De Waal, "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect," p.1043.
Resolution 1706 in August 2006. As one remembered, the assumption had been that “If the Security Council authorizes it, then we’ve overcome the big barrier. What are they doing to do? Not accept the peacekeepers?!” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.114). In addition, they failed to anticipate Khartoum’s power to dictate decisions concerning operational design and force composition, and thus to limit the UN’s ability to improve on AMIS. The idea that the gap between AMIS’ resources and capabilities for civilian protection could thus be transferred to a new UN force appears never to have crossed their minds.

The primary effect of this optimism about the UN was to discourage the advocacy movement from considering alternative strategies for addressing Darfur’s persistent security needs. After all, if the UN would be deploying soon, surely any political tensions could be resolved once civilians were protected from violence. And if the UN would have no problem providing such protection, what harm could there be in waiting?

Together, the advocacy movement’s political clout combined with these misunderstandings to provide the Bush Administration with a powerful incentive to heed its demands. Quite simply, it was advantageous to be seen making progress toward a UN force, but not toward a peace agreement. For example, in September 2006, after President Bush spoke at the UN about the need for a new force, Save Darfur released a statement applauding his “commitment to get UN peacekeepers into Darfur.”38 What is more, given the strong connections that activists had made between Darfur and Rwanda and the extent to which they had demonized Khartoum while lionizing the rebel groups, seeking to correct their misperceptions would have been a herculean task, and as Andrew Natsios noted, a “politically

38 See Save Darfur Coalition, "Coalition Applauds President's Call for UN Peacekeepers and Appointment of Andrew Natsios as Special Envoy [Press Release, September 19]," (2006).
dangerous” one as well (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.106). In the face of these realities, any
decision to take more time for the peace process would have been politically difficult.

In addition, as Save Darfur’s commendation of President Bush indicates, the activists’
misunderstandings and optimism about a UN force contributed to a situation in which they
believed that by acceding to their demands, the government was doing more to provide for
civilians’ security needs than it really was. As long as they did not understand the implications
of the compromises that were required to do as they asked, moreover, the political risks to the
Administration of making these compromises would remain low. In particular, the
Administration could reasonably anticipate that, at least in the near future, these concerned
citizens were unlikely to discover the gap between their perceptions of its efforts and the more
complex and unfortunate reality. Finally, for the Administration, supporting the move to
UNAMID provided a way to limit the political risks even further in the event that the activists
did eventually discover this gap. As Flint and de Waal point out, “If the UN succeeded, the US
could claim credit; if it failed, the UN could be blamed. This stratagem, in playing to the gallery,
cynically ignored the UN’s poor record in coercive peacekeeping and civilian protection” (2008
p.196).

In sum, the Administration had considerable motive to help deploy a UN force as quickly
as possible, little if any reason to focus on getting a credible peace agreement, and excellent odds
of avoiding accountability for any perverse consequences that might follow from its efforts to
heed the activists’ demands. The outcome – “that UNAMID was designed to satisfy western
public demand for military intervention,” even if this did not reflect the needs on the ground
(Flint and De Waal 2008 p.270) – is precisely what the theory would predict. Nevertheless, it is
possible that other forces also drove Washington’s decision-making process.
First, U.S. officials may have engaged in the full-court press for a UN force without themselves fully understanding the risks involved. On the one hand, it is clear the Administration anticipated, from the very beginning, at least some of the problems UNAMID faced. As Flint and de Waal point out, for example, “from the earliest discussion of a UN force, its ‘predominantly African’ character had been agreed” (2008 p.269). Thus, the Administration knew that, at the very least, any new force would be composed primarily of troops that shared the limitations of AMIS’ contributors. What is more, President Bush’s effort to secure significant NATO involvement, before turning to the UN alone, suggests that he understood this.

On the other hand, at least some U.S. officials were surprised at the way events played out, or were more optimistic about the direction of U.S. policy than was warranted. For example, in a series of State Department interviews, Hamilton found that the need for Khartoum’s consent for a UN mission “was a fundamental point that many U.S. officials were either unwilling or unable to absorb…The possibility that their demands would be met by the word ‘no’ was never seriously factored into the calculations of many U.S. bureaucrats” (Hamilton 2011 p.112).

If we ask why these officials failed to anticipate their policies’ limitations, however, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that advocacy pressure played a key role. As noted above, Administration officials repeatedly ignored relevant information. Thus, to the extent that they did not consider important tradeoffs and risks, it was not for lack of warnings. Instead, they chose not to think critically about possible consequences, and discounted information that was inconsistent with what they wanted to believe. In some instances, they consciously overlooked their own reservations in the hope that all would turn out well. Given the political incentives to engage in precisely such wishful thinking, it seems most likely that, whatever its effects, they
primarily reflect the intense pressure to quickly respond to activists’ demands for greater civilian protection.

A second possible explanation for this policy shift, which has sometimes been discussed in the context of U.S. Darfur policy, is the president’s own personal concern about the lack of progress in the region. Accounts differ, however, on the impact of this sentiment. According to Flint and de Waal, “At the end of 2005, Bush was asking his advisers whether the US military could shoot down Sudanese military aircraft or ‘send in helicopter gunships to attack the militias’ if they attacked IDP camps. A senior official familiar with the episode said, ‘He wanted militant action, and people had to restrain him…He wanted to go in and kill the Janjaweed’” (2008 p.199). In this telling, Bush appears to be personally anxious about the plight of Darfuris in asking for more effective military action. According to Hamilton, however, his demands appear to have been more instrumental. As she relates, it was a desire to respond to media accusations that he had “only a passing interest in Darfur” that prompted the president’s failed February 2006 effort to secure greater NATO involvement in the region (Hamilton 2011 p.78). Thus, while the president probably was personally concerned about Darfur, he also felt compelled to respond to the advocacy pressure.

Finally, while the advocacy movement’s demands provide the best explanation for the Administration’s focus on deploying a UN force, and for its hurry, why did it make more sense to support the UN than to deploy U.S. troops? After all, although most activists did not explicitly demand U.S. boots on the ground, in theory this would have satisfied their desire for a more effective force, and could have deployed more quickly.

As in the previous period, however, concerns about costs played a key role in deterring the Administration from pursuing this route. Given Khartoum’s continued opposition and the
otherwise very difficult operational environment, expectations about the price of any potential U.S. military action remained very high. Indeed, despite the popular perception and statements of some officials that the U.S. was constrained by limited military capacity due to its deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, at least two senior officials have asserted that cost was the more important consideration. According to one from the Defense Department, “It would have meant taking resources from elsewhere. So for us, institutionally, it was a relief [not to be asked to deploy to Darfur], a weight off the nation in terms of sweat and blood. But we were ready to take that step if that is the step we were told to take” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.76). UN Ambassador John Bolton agreed. With two wars going on in Iraq and Afghanistan, he noted, the primary issue was, “how many dead Americans can you have at any given time?” (quoted in Hamilton 2011 p.76). Though implicit, these references to casualties suggest the important constraints imposed by the operational environment in Darfur.

Finally, the view that a U.S. deployment could have negative consequences was also an important consideration. The argument – put to the president by regional allies – was that “if the U.S. deployed it would be a lightning rod for al-Qaeda,” drawing foreign fighters into the region and possibly worsening the conflict and security situation (Hamilton 2011 p.77). According to National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, it was this argument that convinced President Bush not to send U.S. forces. As noted in the previous section, however, the potential presence of foreign fighters also had implications for expectations about prospective U.S. casualties, and so it is most likely that these concerns about costs and efficacy reinforced one another.

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In sum, the choice to make the pursuit of a UN mission the centerpiece of the U.S. policy agenda in early 2006 contributed to a deteriorating security environment in Darfur and led to the
deployment of a new force that shared many of AMIS’ vulnerabilities. Because the Bush Administration placed a higher priority on short-term protection than on long-term security, it accepted a hastily constructed and untenable agreement at Abuja that effectively sacrificed the possibility of a political resolution to the conflict for the possibility of a new peace operation that had little hope of improving significantly on AMIS. As Hamilton succinctly puts it, “From the outset, Sudan was clear it would not accept an effective peacekeeping force, and the rest of the world was clear it would not back a non-consensual deployment. Given these fundamentals, the likelihood of peacekeepers being able to act effectively in Darfur was minimal” (2011 p.175).

As we have seen, in practice they were not able to do so.

Despite its consequences, this strategy played the politically useful role of balancing the Darfur advocacy movement’s demands for an improved protection force with the need to avoid either significant numbers of U.S. casualties or the (not unrelated) possibility of drawing Al Qaeda into Darfur by deploying American troops. Again, both the outcome and the mechanisms are entirely consistent with the theory. U.S. officials desperately needed to give the appearance of providing for Darfuri civilians’ security, but could not afford to take the risks that doing so themselves would involve. In an unfortunate twist, moreover, the activists’ limited understanding of the conflict and the realities of UN peacekeeping also made it politically infeasible for the Administration to take the time needed to help craft a credible agreement to provide for long-term peace.

In this context, it was sensible for the Administration to ignore the warnings and push for a UN force as fast as possible while reaping the rewards of being seen to do more for Darfur than they really were. Although other forces contributed – in particular, U.S. officials’ own blinders
and President Bush’s personal interest in the plight of Darfur – even these reflected the influence of the advocacy movement.

5. Conclusion

This chapter has examined variation in U.S. military and diplomatic efforts to address the severe violence against civilians and prolonged insecurity in Darfur, Sudan that began in 2003. Over the next five years, the George W. Bush Administration pursued a series of policies, including support for two peace operations, that had varying prospects for addressing Darfuris’ needs for both physical protection and a political resolution to the war. Both on their own and in comparison to the Australian cases considered in the previous chapter, the three phases of U.S. Darfur policy investigated here illustrate the power of the theory to help us understand the ways that powerful states respond to civilian protection needs in complex emergencies.

First, they represent a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of a change in one of the theory’s key variables – in this case, a rapid expansion of public concern about the conflict and pressure to protect Darfuris from violence. Both before and after this expansion, the Administration’s policies strongly supported the theory’s expectations.

During the initial and worst phase of the war, a near-total absence of public attention or pressure left the Administration with no incentive to take either diplomatic or military action to halt the violence against civilians. In the face of significant strategic and domestic political incentives not to upset a delicate relationship with Khartoum, the limited U.S. engagement reflected both this absence of the theory’s core incentive for humanitarian action as well as these other motives for restraint. When an initial burst of public attention to the war blossomed into a powerful advocacy movement, however, U.S. policy evolved in the direction the theory anticipates. Because Darfur represented an extremely difficult operational environment for a
peace operation – and especially for one involving U.S. forces – the Administration now faced powerful conflicting incentives to give the impression of protecting civilians while keeping costs low and maintaining a working relationship with Khartoum.

The theory expects leaders to contribute to peace operations in ways that enable a gap between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection as a means of seeking to balance such competing incentives. If concerned citizens do not notice this gap, they may give a leader credit for doing more to protect threatened civilians than she really is, thus obviating the need for more costly and risky policies. As the chapter illustrated, this is precisely what happened during the latter two phases of U.S. Darfur policy. From mid-2004 through 2005 the U.S. provided increasing support to AMIS, despite its inability to deliver the level of civilian protection it was mandated to provide. Then, beginning in earnest in 2006, the Administration launched a campaign to replace AMIS with a UN force. The deployment of UNAMID two years later, however, represented at most a very limited improvement on AMIS, and the Administration’s hurry to deploy a UN force as quickly as possible actually contributed to a decline in the security environment in Darfur. Like AMIS, UNAMID’s soldiers simply were not able to deliver the level of protection they were asked to provide.

But in addition to the correlation between the theory’s expectations and these outcomes, the last two phases of U.S. Darfur policy illustrate the relevance of the mechanisms that, I hypothesize, make contributing to such missions politically attractive to leaders. In particular, the informational disadvantages that I expect to limit concerned citizens’ ability to identify gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection were abundantly evident in the U.S. Darfur advocacy movement. Initially, activists were unable to see the AU’s most serious weaknesses, resulting in a belief that U.S. support for AMIS could salvage it as an
effective civilian protection operation. Later, they were excessively optimistic about the potential of a UN mission. In response, the Administration’s support for both AMIS and UNAMID played the role the theory anticipates, building an impression among concerned citizens that these policies were better suited to address Darfuris’ security and protection needs than they really were.

That the Administration was able to promote a new operation destined to be so similar to AMIS without the activists seeing the connection, moreover, is powerful evidence of the extent of the challenge that even the most attentive citizens can face in seeking to hold their leaders accountable for the quality of their policies. In turn, this case offers a striking example of why leaders may decide that the potential political benefits of such sub-optimal policies are worth the risks involved, even in the face of an influential and concerned domestic audience.

Relatedly, the last two periods of U.S. Darfur policy illustrate how domestic politics can affect leaders’ use of peace operations versus other policies to address civilians’ security needs in a complex emergency. In particular, they demonstrate how a peace operation’s visibility can enhance its appeal for a leader even when it is not the only – or necessarily the most promising – means to address civilians’ security needs. As several of the officials and scholars cited in this chapter suggested, it is relatively easy for politicians to point to boots on the ground as evidence that they are responding to a complex emergency. Whose boots they are, what they are authorized to do, and whether a different, non-military policy would make more sense (either as an alternative or a supplement) are details whose implications it is more difficult for most concerned citizens to understand. As the U.S. experience in Darfur indicates, this reality can either shield leaders from demands to engage in policies they are uninclined to pursue, or – as with the issue of the peace negotiations at Abuja – take attention away from policies that they
have no other particular incentive to avoid. Either way, it sheds light on the theory’s expectation that public concern about complex emergencies should be associated with the deployment of peace operations, despite the great variation in these conflicts and the extent to which such operations represent the most sensible responses.

Finally, as a comparison to Australia’s response to the 1999 violence in East Timor, the latter two phases of U.S. policy in Darfur suggest how two quite similar popular movements can produce very different policy responses – in one case, a peace operation designed to be effective and in the other, multiple missions intended to give the appearance of effectiveness – because of differences in the operational environment. In particular, Australia was able to intervene in East Timor in the expectation that, although potentially dangerous, the operational environment was nevertheless manageable. In contrast, by the time the Darfur advocacy movement became a serious force in U.S. politics, any deployment of American troops to Darfur appeared extremely hazardous. For the Australian leadership, therefore, the political risk of being seen to do anything other than its utmost on behalf of the East Timorese population outweighed the physical risks and deterioration in relations with Indonesia that the Howard Government anticipated would follow from the use of force in East Timor. As a result, it made sense to design the best operation possible. In the U.S., in contrast, even powerful public pressure for humanitarian action was not enough to compensate for the Administration’s many reasons not to send U.S. forces to Darfur. Instead, the best the Administration could do politically was to give the strongest possible impression of helping to protect civilians in Darfur and hope that the advocacy movement would be reasonably satisfied.

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39 As de Waal points out, “It is possible that more concerted international pressure could have brought a bigger and better-equipped international force to Darfur earlier.” By this time, though, any window of opportunity that had been available for the U.S. to use its diplomatic leverage to convince Khartoum to end its counter-insurgency campaign and permit a robust peace operation was over. See De Waal, "Darfur and the Failure of the Responsibility to Protect," p.1054.
Chapter 8 – Conclusion

Over the more than two decades since the end of the Cold War, the challenge of protecting vulnerable civilians from devastating political violence has inspired a multitude of peace operations, loud and persistent hand-wringing over their regular failure to do the job, and the rise of new advocacy movements devoted to generating political will for more effective efforts. The regular eruption of new conflicts that produce a clear need (and even, as in Syria in 2011-2012, explicit local demands) for civilian protection suggests that this problem is here to stay, despite growing attention to the development of strategies for prevention.

In most cases, however, the response of the most powerful and influential Western democracies to these needs has been less than inspiring. Only rarely have these states designed and conducted peace operations that reflect our best understanding of how to address the serious security deficit civilians consistently face in the world’s most severe conflicts. More often, they have played no role in such operations, or contributed to them in limited ways that reflect a willingness to help institutionalize peace in the aftermath of conflict, but not to take the greater risks involved in protecting civilians threatened by ongoing violence. On a regular basis, however, these states have also gestured toward addressing civilians’ security needs by designing and contributing to peace operations in ways that facilitate gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for protection. That is, they either encourage a situation in which soldiers lack the resources needed to provide the level of protection they are asked to deliver, or in which troops’ latent capacity to provide such protection is wasted because they are, in effect, not asked to do so. Such policies are not only puzzling from the perspective of the rational unitary actor theories of international politics that have long dominated the study of military
force, but more importantly, are troubling for the goal of democratic accountability. Most significant of all, they can have perverse consequences on the ground, even aggravating—rather than alleviating—civilian suffering.

This dissertation has aimed to improve our understanding of this variation in how the most powerful democracies contribute to and use peace operations in the context of complex emergencies, focusing on the quality of their civilian protection efforts. In particular, I have sought to answer a series of questions with important implications for the survival of some of the world’s most vulnerable people, and for the concerned citizens who push their leaders to aid and protect them. When are leaders most likely to choose policies that facilitate these instructions—resources gaps? When are they instead more likely to do nothing or make a transparently limited contribution, or alternatively, to design a robust operation with extensive civilian protection capacity? What determines the true level of protection capacity they are willing to support?

In answering these questions, the project makes conceptual, theoretical, and empirical contributions to our understanding of an important contemporary problem, and to the literatures on peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and the influence of public opinion and public advocacy on foreign policy. This chapter first reviews these contributions and then discusses a few of their most significant implications for both future research and the future of human rights advocacy.

1. **Overview of Contributions**

1.1 The Concept of Complex Emergencies

This dissertation began with the observation that a peace operation’s capacity to protect civilians depends in predictable ways on a series of choices that affect the details of how it is designed—particularly, the relationships between its core goals, military strategies, and
available resources. As discussed in Chapter 2, my goal of explaining variation in how powerful democracies make these choices required a series of research design choices that depart from those employed by much of the related literature. Most importantly, I developed the concept of complex humanitarian emergencies – commonly employed by the international humanitarian community, but not by political scientists – as a way to identify the set of conflicts where the extent of civilian suffering might most plausibly justify external efforts to provide civilian protection. Likewise, I identified a list of 61 recent conflicts that most clearly reflect the ideas that define this concept. This Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset represents an important addition to existing sources of data concerning the impact of violent conflicts on civilians, isolating those with the most devastating impact without reference to the political tensions or disputes responsible for them.

1.2 Theory

Theoretically, this dissertation’s most significant contribution is the argument that competing domestic political incentives can interact to explain why powerful democracies often contribute to peace operations in ways that facilitate gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. Although scholars, activists, and other concerned observers have widely criticized such policies, our understanding of what makes them attractive – and of when leaders are most likely to select them – has remained limited. As noted earlier, while some scholars have recognized that leaders can face competing imperatives to both protect civilians and control costs (eg, MacFarlane and Weiss 2000 p.128, 137; Jakobsen 1996 p.213; Wheeler 2000 p.32), they have not devoted significant attention to exploring either the theoretical or empirical implications of the political dilemma that this situation creates. By addressing this
problem, therefore, this dissertation represents an important theoretical addition to the literature on humanitarian military action.

In brief, I argue that if possible, leaders presented with the dilemma of balancing these competing pressures would prefer not to choose between them, but instead to seek even greater political advantage by creating the impression that they do not, in fact, have to do so. By creating the illusion of doing more to address civilians’ security and protection needs than they really are, they may hope to have their cake and eat it, too, keeping both the concerned citizens advocating for civilian protection and the broader public relatively happy. Because these concerned citizens face significant obstacles to accurately monitoring the quality of their leaders’ policies and identifying resources-instructions gaps, moreover, leaders have good reason to expect that they may be able to encourage this illusion. At the same time, because it can be politically costly if they are caught, the incentive to do so is strongest when the dilemma they confront is most severe: that is, when they face notable pressure to protect civilians, along with an operational environment that poses significant challenges to doing so for a reasonable cost.

This argument bears a certain resemblance to the old refrain that sending humanitarian aid to complex conflicts is like placing a band-aid on an open wound – it doesn’t solve the problem, but serves a useful political purpose. As Gérard Prunier put it, for example, giving humanitarian aid without dealing with the political situation “leaves the field free for a whole range of political manoeuvres and diplomatic moves while public opinions in rich countries is given [sic] the impression that something is being done without that ‘something’ being political” (2008 p.130). In effect, I claim, for leaders facing strident public demands for civilian protection, creating the illusion of providing such protection serves a similar purpose.
This argument thus provides a cohesive explanation for a much maligned but under-explored problem. In addition, however, it generates clear expectations about how different configurations of domestic political pressures should lead us to expect powerful democracies to contribute to peace operations in other ways (or not participate at all). Most notably, it suggests that when public pressure for humanitarian action is greatest relative to a leader’s cause for concern about costs related to the operational environment, the political risks of trying to create an illusion of civilian protection may exceed the benefits and make robust protection politically attractive. Significantly, this implication provides a theoretical rationale for the most ambitious protection missions that questions the popular notion that leaders must have strategic incentives in order to initiate them (see eg, Seybolt 2008; Abramowitz and Power 2004). At the same time, it suggests that the alignment of the circumstances that can prompt them to do so without such incentives are likely to be both specific and rare.

This argument also brings together ideas from a diverse literature on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy and the use of force. Much of this literature sees the public as a constraining influence (eg, Baum 2004; Merom 2003; Isernia 2001; Foyle 1999; Hinckley 1992; Key 1961; Powlick 1991; Sobel 1993, 2001), while a largely separate set of arguments about humanitarian military action emphasize that it can also play a motivating role in demanding positive policy initiatives (eg, Kennan 1993; Bass 2008; Jakobsen 1996, 2002; Finnemore 2003; Kaufmann and Pape 1999). This dissertation contributes theoretically to these literatures by emphasizing the importance of bringing them together and pointing out what we can learn by doing so. In particular, there are certain foreign policy arenas – perhaps most notably those related to human rights, but potentially others as well – where it is clear that public opinion can play multiple roles at once and where we might expect the interaction between these roles to
influence leaders’ policy decisions in ways not predictable by focusing on them individually. What is more, it may well be at the micro-level – among decisions about policy details and specifics – where we are most likely to see the effects of these conflicting pressures at work.

1.3 Empirics

The empirical sections of the dissertation tested a series of hypotheses derived from the theory, and provide strong support for both the patterns I expected to observe and the mechanisms through which I anticipated that they work. While the evidence confirms that other forces also affect when and how the U.S., UK, France, and Australia contribute to peace operations in complex emergencies, it does not call into question the explanatory power or added value of my own theoretical argument.

1.3.1 Main Findings

Chapter 5 tested four hypotheses concerning the incidence and nature of the four powerful democracies’ contributions to peace operations in the complex emergencies identified by the Post-Cold War Complex Emergencies Dataset. To do so, it also introduced additional new data on the details of these contributions and on public concern about these conflicts. The latter, in particular, contributes to ongoing discussions about the role of media in influencing humanitarian military action, emphasizing the importance of thinking beyond the CNN effect to understand how domestic pressures may emerge through, and in turn influence, news coverage of complex emergencies.

First, as expected, I found that the ‘true protection capacity’ of the potential interveners’ responses to complex emergencies increased with the value of the variable representing the relationship between their competing political pressures, Public Concern/Operational Environment.
The remaining three hypotheses incorporated information about both of two key aspects of contribution quality – true protection capacity and the presence of any resources-instructions gap – by dividing them into three basic types: limited, gap-dominated, and robust. For the most part, the results supported my expectations. As anticipated, I found a consistently significant negative relationship between the probability that a leader made no contribution and the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment, and a consistently significant positive relationship between this ratio and the probability of the most robust contributions. Consistent with the idea that such contributions are really only likely when leaders face very strong public pressure in relation to the operational environment, the latter result is only statistically significant for the highest values of Public Concern/Operational Environment, typically about two standard deviations above the mean. Most notably, the results confirmed my expectation of a curvilinear relationship between the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment and the probability of contributions facilitating gaps between soldiers’ resources and instructions for civilian protection. This finding is supportive of the notion that leaders are most likely to make such contributions when the dilemma generated by competing domestic political pressures is most intense. Finally, I expected the probability of limited contributions – those characterized by little or no civilian protection capacity but also no notable resources-instructions gap – to decrease along with the probability of making no contribution. Instead, however, there was no consistently significant relationship between these contributions and the value of Public Concern/Operational Environment.

Collectively, the case studies in Chapters 6-7 offer further strong support for my argument, both by providing added support for the hypotheses tested in Chapter 5 and by confirming the relevance of the anticipated causal mechanisms. Between Australia’s responses
to three complex emergencies in the Southwest Pacific and American responses to the war in Darfur between 2003 and 2007, these case studies cover the full range of variation I seek to explain. First, for both the U.S. in Darfur until mid-2004 and Australia in Aceh, the failure to participate in any peace operations – or for that matter to otherwise seriously address the security deficit in these conflicts – reflects and is consistent with my expectations, as there was effectively no public pressure for leaders to do so. Second, Australia’s three limited and delayed contributions to peace operations in Bougainville, involving little to no protection capacity, are similarly consistent with the generally low level of public concern about that conflict.

Third, beginning around mid-2004, the emergence of a large and politically powerful American advocacy movement devoted to the cause of protecting Darfuri civilians was not enough to overcome the extremely difficult operational environment that any more direct U.S. involvement in a peace operation would apparently have faced. The Bush Administration thus pursued a series of policies, first by supporting AMIS and then by pushing for its replacement with a UN force, that facilitated the deployment of troops without the capacity to provide the level of protection they were asked to deliver. What is more, especially after 2005, by emphasizing peacekeepers rather than the peace process, it also placed a priority on short-term protection at the expense of long-term security solutions, even though the prospects for the latter were probably better.

Finally, in East Timor, Australia’s deployment of the highly robust and well-designed INTERFET confirms the theory’s expectation that under very specific circumstances, leaders may indeed be willing to conduct such missions without the presence of strategic incentives for doing so. In this case, strong historical ties between the two societies and the preexisting presence of a large and well-connected East Timor advocacy community produced tremendous
pressure on the Howard Government to intervene immediately following the eruption of violence in September 1999. The fact that Howard made Indonesian consent for the operation a prerequisite to INTERFET’s deployment – a condition with profound implications for the operating environment that Australian soldiers would expect to face – confirms the importance of the relationship between public pressure and expectations about the costs and difficulties of intervention.

These case studies also provide important support for a key assumption of the theory, that concerned citizens typically face significant challenges in monitoring the quality of their leaders’ policies. Most importantly, in the United States, at key points in time the Darfur advocacy movement failed to perceive the tensions in U.S. policy or important changes in the nature of the security threat to Darfuri civilians. As a result, they accepted the wisdom of – and even advocated for – policies that allowed the Administration to appear to be doing more to address Darfur’s security problems than it really was. What is more, the fact that many concerned citizens were no better able to see the downsides of pushing for a UN force than they were to recognize some of AMIS’ most fundamental problems, further reinforces the apparent validity of the assumption.

Finally, although the policies pursued were different, there is some evidence from both East Timor and Bougainville to support this assumption as well. First, many of the Australians who professed to be most concerned about their government’s response to the war in Bougainville were in fact shockingly misinformed, believing that Australia had deployed troops to support the PNG government. While it is difficult to see how this particular misperception reflects the structural obstacles and informational disadvantages highlighted by the theory, it nevertheless confirms the broader point that misinformation can be rampant even among citizens
who claim to care about particular complex emergencies. Likewise, with East Timor, the concerned Australians urging intervention without Indonesian consent clearly underestimated the prospective costs of doing so, the additional military capabilities that would have been required, and the negative humanitarian consequences for the Timorese of starting a full-scale war in the territory.

1.3.2 Other Influences and Alternative Explanations

My argument by no means excludes the possibility that forces aside from leaders’ potentially competing domestic political pressures influence their contributions to peace operations, or the efforts they make to protect civilians. According, in Chapters 5 – 7 I explored several of the most likely candidates, including strategic relationships that might create incentives to foster stability or protect civilians, and leaders’ own morals as a possible incentive for humanitarian action. In addition, as a possible alternative explanation for contributions involving resources-instructions gaps, I considered the possibility that leaders themselves may not know how to design peace operations effectively for civilian protection.

In exploring how these forces interact, complement, and compete with my own argument, I found that they clearly exert an influence on the policies I examine, though not always the one we might anticipate. Where they do compete with my theoretical story, moreover, the evidence provides greater support for my account.

Strategic Relationships & Incentives

First, I investigated the influence of leaders’ strategic interests and incentives. In Chapter 5, I examined a series of strategic relationships that might theoretically provide an incentive to contribute to a peace operation or protect civilians, but found that if anything, they tended to
deter contributions to peace operations. In addition, controlling for their presence had little impact on the evidence for my core hypotheses.

The case studies, however, may help to shed light on the reasons for these results. For each, I was able to identify a clear set of strategic interests as well as the policy response that would have been most consistent with them. In all cases, this response pointed away from contributing to peace operations or civilian protection (though in Bougainville, perceptions of Australia’s strategic imperatives changed mid-way through the conflict, leading it to take a more active approach to helping resolve the war). While it is also possible to identify complex emergencies in which strategic relationships have pointed toward these actions (Northern Iraq in 1991, for example), at the very least these findings suggest that the presence of such relationships alone does not yield clear expectations about the kind of impact they might have. This, in turn, points to the difficulty – and in my view, questionable validity – of drawing conclusions about the impact of such relationships based on the kinds of indicators commonly employed in the quantitative peacekeeping literature.

Still, the case studies provide clear evidence that such relationships do matter, though they do not always end up driving policy. In several cases – Australia in Aceh and Bougainville, and the U.S. in Darfur before mid-2004 – policy was basically consistent with what we might expect based on perceived strategic imperatives alone. In none of these circumstances, however, does this contradict the expectations of my theory, since public pressure for humanitarian action was nonexistent or low.

In the remaining cases, where such pressure was very strong – Australia in East Timor and the U.S. in Darfur after mid-2004 – policy clearly contradicted the dictates of pure strategic interests, although to differing degrees. In East Timor, these interests were completely overruled
and contradicted by the deployment of INTERFET. In Darfur, while the U.S. incentive to maintain counterterrorism cooperation with Khartoum provided a reason to avoid contributing to peace operations that could upset a delicate relationship, the Bush Administration supported both AMIS and then the shift to UNAMID. By limiting its involvement, however, it sought to avoid not only the greater casualties and costs of more direct participation, but also the complete disintegration of relations with Khartoum. In this sense, we can think of U.S. strategic interests in Darfur as an added reinforcement to the need to limit the physical costs of civilian protection, to be balanced against the strong public pressure for action.

leaders

The structure of the quantitative analysis did not lend itself to testing the impact of individual leaders’ morals or sense of personal responsibility to protect vulnerable civilians. Insofar as possible, therefore, I considered the impact of such sentiments in the case studies. In Aceh, Bougainville, and Darfur before mid-2004, I found little if any evidence to suggest a positive influence on leaders’ ultimate policy decisions.

In East Timor and Darfur after mid-2004, however, I encountered credible claims that such sentiments indeed help to explain the policies pursued. While it is impossible to establish exactly how much influence they may have exerted, a careful examination suggests that in neither case were they the only force motivating the responses to these conflicts. In Australia, claims about John Howard and Alexander Downer’s sense of personal responsibility are consistent with their actions beginning with the decision to deploy INTERFET in mid-September, but not with their policies during the first eight months of 1999, when they clearly anticipated the possibility of much more severe violence. What is more, although they argued that they launched INTERFET because it was the right thing to do, they also publicly recognized
the strength of the public pressure they faced to do so. In the U.S., the evidence suggests that President Bush was not only personally concerned about Darfur, but was also anxious about accusations that he was not doing enough to respond to the conflict.

*Do powerful democracies really know how to protect civilians?*

Finally, I consider the possibility that, rather than responding to a set of political incentives and opportunities to create the impression of protecting civilians, leaders facilitate instructions-resources gaps because they and their military advisers are uncertain about how to design peace operations more effectively. Unlike strategic incentives or a leader’s personal morals, which might affect decision-making in *addition* to the incentives highlighted by my theory, this is an alternative explanation that necessarily competes with my argument.

Once again, however, it was not possible to test this possibility statistically with the available data. Nevertheless, there are two relevant kinds of evidence that we can examine both through the cases discussed in Chapters 6-7 and more broadly through a brief discussion of some other missions. First and most simply, the fact that robust civilian protection missions have occurred (albeit occasionally) calls into question the idea that leaders do not know how to design them. INTERFET, of course, is one example, but one could argue that it followed a decade of post-Cold War peace operations in which leaders had time to discover what worked and what did not. By this logic, they may have learned over time, and resources-instructions gaps from earlier in the 1990s may have been unintentional.

Yet the evidence does not support this argument, either. In fact, one of the most robust civilian protection missions of the post-Cold War period was Operation Provide Comfort, which deployed in April 1991 to protect Iraqi Kurds from attack by Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army. UNITAF, which deployed to Somalia in late 1992 (but not its ill-fated follow-on,
UNOSOM II), is another mission that was designed to reflect civilians’ security and protection needs. That such operations deployed prior to the debacles of Bosnia and Rwanda seriously undermine the idea that the leaders of the world’s most powerful democracies lacked the knowledge and understanding needed to design peace operations for effective protection in the 1990s, let alone more recently.

The second relevant kind of evidence comes from investigating what leaders know and understand in instances where they do facilitate gaps between soldiers’ instructions and resources for civilian protection. In the only one of my case studies that allowed for such an investigation – the U.S. response to Darfur – I did find some evidence that policymakers did not fully understand the implications of and potential tradeoffs among their various policy options. At the same time, it also appears that this situation reflected a failure to think critically and to carefully consider the possible consequences of different choices that was related to the political pressure they faced to ‘save Darfur’ as quickly as possible.

Finally, although not covered in depth in this dissertation, there is clear evidence that leaders understood – or at least had access to analysis indicating – the limitations of other recent operations in which they helped facilitate resources-instructions gaps. For example, a French military briefing paper leaked shortly after the beginning of the EU’s Operation Artemis in the DRC, in June 2003, reflected considerable pessimism about what the “short-lived and localised” mission could accomplish, anticipating that it would “have a negligible impact on tribal conflict.” One European military planner described the document as “the most cynical military briefing I’ve read in my entire life.”¹

¹ See James Astill, "French admit their Congo mission will have little impact on fighting," The Guardian, June 12, 2003.
NATO’s Operation Allied Force, conducted in 1999, is another well-publicized example. In that mission, NATO sought to compel Serbia to halt ongoing attacks against Kosovar Albanians through the exclusive use of air power, and declared that all sorties had to be flown from an altitude of at least 15,000 feet in order to limit the risks to NATO aircraft. Yet there are clear indications that political and military leaders understood beforehand that this approach was poorly suited to the circumstances on the ground. Months in advance, for example, British Prime Minister Tony Blair had argued for the deployment of ground troops if intervention in Kosovo were to occur (see eg, Blair 2010 Ch. 8). Shortly before the mission began, moreover, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff publicly doubted the efficacy of using air power alone, with Air Force chief Michael Ryan testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee that, “I don’t know if we can do it without ground troops” (quoted in Lambeth 2001 p.222).

In sum, there is little evidence to suggest that a lack of the information and skills needed to design effective civilian protection missions provides a more convincing explanation for the phenomenon of resources-instructions gaps than my own argument.

2. Implications

On the one hand, my findings confirm the conventional wisdom of human rights advocacy that public pressure for humanitarian action matters. But while Morton Abramowitz and Samantha Power (2004) were right to point out that the ‘righteous clamor’ has to be very loud in order for leaders to invest the energy and accept the risks needed to protect civilians effectively, I find that such clamor alone is insufficient. In addition, the operational environment and a leader’s expectations about the humanitarian public’s ability to identify mere gestures toward civilian protection are critical.
These arguments generate two key kinds of implications. The first concerns the significance of, and possibilities for, future research related to the origins and sources of public concern about complex emergencies. The second concerns the challenges and responsibilities confronting citizens and activists who wish to change the incentives their leaders so often face when presented with demands for civilian protection.

2.1. Promoting Public Concern

Although already widely accepted within the human rights advocacy community, the idea that public pressure for humanitarian action matters for leaders’ policy decisions nevertheless raises many interesting avenues for potential future research. As noted in Chapter 3, it suggests that the forces that determine the strength of public pressure for humanitarian action should, albeit indirectly, affect the quality of civilian protection efforts. Why, then, do people tend to care about some complex emergencies more than others, and when will they express that concern in politically relevant ways? While the role of media in informing citizens about these conflicts is one part of this equation, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that it is not the only one.

One common view emphasizes the importance of personal connections and experiences. Certainly, activists and politicians who have taken an interest in the kinds of human rights crimes often associated with complex emergencies regularly cite such connections as motivation for their own involvement (see, eg, testimony in Prendergast and Cheadle 2010). Australia’s experience with East Timor – especially the roles of the Timorese diaspora, veterans’ organizations, development NGOs, independence activists, and many everyday Australians with preexisting ties to the territory – strongly supports this perspective as well.

To the extent that such personal connections indeed matter, this is probably a good thing for those seeking to build public concern about complex emergencies, as modern technologies
make it easier than ever not only to obtain information about foreign conflicts, but also to interact with the people affected by them. Today, for example, Americans can not only exchange letters with and sponsor war survivors from around the world, but can even chat with them online. Thus, while the victims of devastating violence and atrocity crimes may still largely reside in faraway countries, they are increasingly unlikely to be the “people of whom we know nothing” that Neville Chamberlain once found it so easy to dismiss (Chamberlain 1939 p.174).

Human rights advocacy organizations have increasingly invested in developing and fostering these connections, but there remains much that we do not know about their impact and about how they function in practice. Perhaps personal interactions matter more or in different ways than appeals to historical responsibility rooted in shared ties between societies, for example. Perhaps certain kinds of connections tend to inspire short-term activism, while others are more likely to produce the sustained interest needed to solve the complicated political problems often underlying complex emergencies. Such questions offer fertile ground for future research of relevance to our understanding of how to build the kind of timely public outcry that East Timor received in Australia, and about the prospects for and feasibility of contemporary advocacy efforts to build a ‘permanent constituency’ to oppose these conflicts.2

Another possibility is that certain kinds of conflicts or complex emergencies tend to encourage greater outpourings of public concern. Certainly, the importance of the word ‘genocide’ to the Darfur advocacy movement suggests that the manner in which these events are portrayed can make a difference. More generally, we might expect campaigns of one-sided violence and atrocity crimes to inspire such concern more easily than conflicts where it is

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2 See, for example, the websites of Humanity United (http://www.humanityunited.org/learn), STAND (http://www.standnow.org/about/join), and Genocide Intervention Network (http://www.genocideintervention.net/network).
possible to portray multiple parties as culpable (even if, in practice, one is far more responsible for civilian suffering than the other). In fact, anticipating this problem, in 1999 FALINTIL – the East Timorese guerrillas who had resisted the Indonesian occupation for the past twenty-five years – refused to take up arms when pro-Indonesian militias threatened their communities. Despite the provocation, this was a strategic choice to avoid having the violence labeled as civil war, in the expectation that such a label would dampen international sympathy and the prospect of intervention (Greenlees and Garran 2002 p.230-231). In contrast, in Australia the war in Bougainville was seen – especially at first – as the responsibility of both the PNG government and the BRA, and this may well have limited calls for the Australian government to do more for its victims.

If indeed certain conflicts arouse public sympathy more easily, this may help to explain why some kinds of complex emergencies – notably, those centered on inter-communal conflict – do not receive peace operations at the same rate as others. As I argued in Chapter 2, it is not that the need for physical protection and security does not exist in such conflicts. For example, in the violence between Christian and Muslim communities in Indonesia’s Moluccas Islands and Sulawesi from 1999-2002, members of the Christian community called for the deployment of an international peacekeeping force when the government failed to control the violence and meet the needs of the displaced population.\(^3\) More generally, this possibility suggests the potential value of more in-depth research into the relationships between sources of political violence, the sympathy of outsiders for their victims, and international responses (military and non).

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In sum, in confirming the importance of public pressure for humanitarian action, this dissertation also affirms the relevance and importance of understanding what promotes it, and the existence of numerous avenues for related future research.

2. The Modern Activist’s Catch-22

One of the central claims of this dissertation – that the leaders of powerful democracies often care more about the appearance of saving civilians threatened by devastating violence than about actually doing so – is deeply cynical. But while such leaders certainly can be as calculating and callous as the theory describes (the example of French politicians justifying Operation Turquoise described in Chapter 1 appears to be a relatively pure case), in practice of course, they are not always this malevolent. From John Howard and Alexander Downer on East Timor to George W. Bush on Darfur to Tony Blair on Kosovo, leading politicians in the four countries I examine have repeatedly expressed a sense of personal commitment or responsibility to protect civilians threatened by complex emergencies, and such sentiment is probably genuine.

But such leaders always face competing demands not to allow the costs of humanitarian action to become too high, and they need not intend to deceive in order to be affected by the political dilemma I describe. As the Darfur case study in particular suggests, there are subtle ways in which this dilemma can affect leaders’ actions – through limiting their attention to the potential consequences of different policy options, for example – without requiring that they intentionally seek to mislead their constituents. For this reason if no other, recognizing not only the existence of leaders’ often perverse incentives, but also the circumstances that facilitate opportunities to give in to them, is potentially a first step toward making such opportunities more rare.
Changing the structural conditions that create this problem without causing new ones, however, is a tall order that requires improving concerned citizens’ abilities to hold leaders accountable for the quality of their responses to complex emergencies. In recent years some U.S. advocacy organizations – at least partly in response to the Darfur experience – have accepted this challenge. The Enough Project, the leader in this trend, devotes considerable effort to popularizing complicated concepts and making more informed advocacy feasible for a wider audience. As co-founder John Prendergast and actor-activist Don Cheadle describe,

“The Enough Project and other groups are attempting to create foreign policy literacy and trying to move the discussion beyond just getting involved to actual participation in tactics and strategy…The objective is to not just shed light on the big policy solutions but to also help people understand why, and give people the tools for participating in an informed way. We want a smarter movement because compassion and dedication have exponentially more impact when they are applied strategically” (2010 p.21).

More broadly, by creating a more informed core of concerned citizens, they hope to improve the prospects for combining mass advocacy with specific and promising policy demands derived from research and expertise.

Through such strategies, today’s most innovative human rights organizations are actively testing the feasibility of building an advocacy movement with both broad appeal and the knowledge and expertise to hold leaders accountable for the quality of their policies. While it is fair to say that the jury is still out, this dissertation suggests that there are reasons for both optimism and caution. On the one hand, smart, flexible, carefully tailored policy demands backed by informed citizens with the knowledge to recognize whether they are being pandered to would be the ideal response to the problem of leaders’ perverse incentives. Specific demands serve as benchmarks by which citizens can hold leaders accountable, making them less vulnerable to the kind of manipulation highlighted by this dissertation.

On the other hand, in certain respects the goals of attracting more followers and developing sensible policy demands may be incompatible. As we have seen, identifying
appropriate and promising policies that will not make a bad situation worse requires considerable skill and expertise, including a firm grasp of political context and an appreciation for subtlety and tradeoffs among policy options. While some elite human rights organizations, such as the International Crisis Group, have invested heavily in these skills, they are the exception rather than the rule. Yet while it is always challenging to produce and disseminate high-quality policy analysis, there are reasons to think that larger advocacy movements or organizations may have a more difficult time doing so.

First, for example, the ability to adapt to changing circumstances over the course of a conflict – and to recognize and adjust when the policies appropriate to deal with them change – is critical to making responsible policy demands. Yet educating followers in the reasoning behind such demands is a complicated undertaking. As Hamilton puts it, “If you want to build a mass movement you must, by definition, attract people who are not already specialists in the issue you are advocating. When your issue is complex… you have to simplify the issue to make it accessible to people who have no background knowledge” (2011 p.103). As a result, a large advocacy movement faces a considerable barrier to shifting gears. In contrast, fewer supporters allow for more flexibility.

Second, obtaining the information and knowledge needed to develop smart policy demands is vastly easier with the ability to do on-the-ground research. Yet because a larger audience or group of followers makes an advocacy organization more politically potent, it might also produce more pushback from those guilty of violence against civilians that can limit its investigative capacity. As noted in Chapter 7, for example, when The Enough Project sought to conduct research in Darfur, its mass advocacy led Khartoum to obstruct its efforts (Hamilton 2011 p.122).
These challenges are all the more significant because making specific policy demands that are not consistent with civilians’ security needs may be worse than making none at all. As they did for the U.S. in Darfur, such demands can generate considerable pressure on policymakers to give in rather than pointing out potential problems or the benefits of other policies. Likewise, they may limit a leader’s flexibility in ways that can make it more difficult for her to act effectively even if she wishes to do so. The risk that they will have these effects, moreover, is almost certainly greater the more concerned citizens are involved in making such demands. In this sense, the potential consequences of mistakes grow with the size of the advocacy movement.

Given the importance of both generating meaningful pressure on leaders and also developing the skills, knowledge, and flexibility needed to hold them accountable, this creates a catch-22 for activists seeking to do so. While more followers may represent greater potential for good if they advocate sensible policies, they may also make such policies more difficult to promote. Likewise, a movement wedded to ill-informed or inflexible demands may actually do more harm the larger it is.

None of this is meant to suggest that advocacy organizations should abandon the goals of promoting foreign policy literacy, spreading awareness and generating public concern about complex emergencies, or making smart and specific policy demands. But it does suggest the importance of a cautious approach, recognition of potential pitfalls, and the prospective value of developing strategies to counteract them. These might include developing mechanisms to promote the mantra of ‘do no harm’; exploring possibilities for a collaborative division of labor between organizations that specialize in mass advocacy and those that specialize in the development of policy expertise; or developing better metrics for assessing policy quality based
on conditions and events on the ground, rather than just the specifics of policy initiatives. Just as it is useful to recognize leaders’ incentives to create the illusion of protection and the conditions that facilitate their opportunities to do so, it is important to recognize both the promise and the risks of potential strategies for changing them.

3. Conclusion

Peace operations are not the only, nor always the most promising, way to save civilians threatened by devastating violence. Others may include diplomatic interventions, sanctions targeted against the perpetrators of rights abuses, or the delivery of relief aid. Likewise, as diverse observers have emphasized, long-term approaches must include the institutionalization of peace in post-conflict situations and the creation of strategies to prevent future atrocity crimes and other threats against civilians.

Nevertheless, debates over whether, when, and how force can and should be used for civilian protection have assumed a prominent place in public and scholarly discourse. I contend that a better understanding of the political conditions that influence both the incidence and, more importantly, the quality of military efforts to provide such protection will enhance these debates. At the same time, in the most devastating conflicts, determining how to ensure that force is deployed effectively may be a more pressing problem than determining whether it is justified. For affected civilians, the need for a secure environment in which violence neither threatens them directly, nor disrupts their access to food, shelter, and medical care, is very real. When peace operations are deployed to complex emergencies, they should strive to meet these needs.

Sometimes such missions achieve this standard, but often they do not. This dissertation has demonstrated theoretically that leaders of the powerful Western democracies with the greatest capacity to design peace operations for effective protection may have domestic political
incentives that encourage them to do so. More often, though, they face incentives that stand in the way, and that encourage them to create an illusion of protection with potentially perverse effects both for complex emergency victims and for their accountability to their own concerned constituents at home. In practice, moreover, these leaders’ incentives also influence how they contribute to peace operations and respond to vulnerable civilians’ security needs. For concerned citizens who hope to change these incentives, recognizing the multiple ways that they help to create them is an important place to start.
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