Notes

1. DCAF, 2007
7. President Thabo Mbeki was appointed by the AU in November 2004 to mediate in the Cote d’Ivoire conflict. For more on the grounds for rejecting his recommendations, see, *Africa* (Weekly Magazine), 12 October 2006.

15. This categorisation is taken from The Challenges of Restoring Governance in Crisis and Post-Conflict Countries, published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), for the 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Governance Vienna, 26-29 June 2007. See pp. 14-17.


17. This Centre has subsequently been named the Kofi Annan Institute for Conflict Transformation.


25. While Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000, its new political dispensation which resulted from the August 2005 military coup and transition, and the pronouncements of its new leaders strongly suggests that it will soon return to the regional organization. Besides, as this author has argued all along, withdrawing from ECOWAS never meant that Mauritania left the neighborhood, since any crisis in that country was bound to – and did – affect its immediate neighbor-members of ECOWAS, hence the entire organization.


27. Schwab, 135.
34. Copson, 76.
37. Copson 78.
46. Copson, 104.
47. That is the epithet ominously attached to one of the most worrisome external dimension of conflict in the sub-region in a recent study. See Nicholas Florquin and Eric G. Bergman, eds., Armed and Aimless: Armed Groups, Guns, and Human Security in the ECOWAS region, Geneva, small Arms Survey, 2005.
48. Copson, 104.
49. Quoted in Ero and Temin, 106.
52. The Licorne Force is the battalion of Marines France kept at Port Bouet in Cote d’Ivoire following defense agreements signed since independence. After the beginning of the crisis, the UN security Council resolution (January 10, 2007) 1739 integrated it to the other UN forces charged with peacekeeping in Cote d’Ivoire.
56. Ibid, p. 16.
57. I have decided to break mineral resources into solid mineral and oil to enable a detailed exploration of how both classifications are linked to conflict.
58. It needs to be pointed out though that although the listed conflicts had cases of rivalry over claims to portions of land, there are also other issues that underlined their conflicts.
59. For more on the conflict, see *African Research Bulletin*, (Political) February 1994, p. 11342
60. With a grant from the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID), the Conflict, Security and Development Group (CSDG) at the King’s College London is undertaking a major study on Youth Vulnerability and Exclusion in West Africa.
61. The Konkumbas youth formed the Konkumba Youths Association (KOYA) and it was this group that was at the forefront of the group’s cause.
62. See, Omon Julius Onabu, “Edo, Kogi Deputy Governors meet over land dispute”, *This Day*, (Lagos) July 15 2003

65. I have discussed this in my book, “Natural Resources and Conflict … *op-cit*. The contract signed by the company and the Liberian Government was anonymously sent to me.

66. It is, of course, widely known that Taylor had contacts with countries such as Burkina Faso and Cote d’Ivoire, and these countries were believed to be some of the conduits through which he was able to gain access to international market.

67. Reno, in his book on Warlords pointed out that there was a time when Taylor was responsible for a significant percentage of logging coming to France. See, William Reno, Warlords.

68. Garba was Jetley’s deputy, Kpamber and Khobe were both ECOMOG Commanders, and Adeniji was the UN Secretary General's Special Representative.

69. In 1953, the derivation formula was 100 per cent, as recommended by the Chucks Commission. This changed at independence, where the constitution stipulated 50 per cent, later reduced to 45 per cent under the Gowon administration. A retrogressive slide ensued after 1970, with the Murtala/Obasanjo administration reducing it to 20 per cent and the Shagari administration dropping it to 2 per cent (and later 3 per cent after a court ruling). By 1984, it had been reduced to 1.5 per cent by the Buhari administration.


72. The situation of human rights in Africa is generally poor, and typically seen as an area of grave concern by the UN, governmental, and non-governmental observers. After the Cold War, the increase in civil strife and authoritarian rule, therefore, contributed to an
explosive growth of human rights commissions on the continent in the 1990s. See
Human Rights Watch, “Protectors or Pretenders? Human Rights Commissions in Africa,”


74. See Africa Recovery, July, 2003, p. 4; For detailed discussion of this, see Fawole Alade, W.,
“ECOWAS and the Crisis in Cote d’Ivoire: The Politics and Problems of Peace-Making
Capabilities for Managing Conflict: The Role of the US,” in Smock, D.R., and Crocker,
Institute of Peace Press, 1995), pp. 95ff; and also Pfaff, W., “A New Colonialism: Europe
2003, p. 4.

75. Proponents of this argument include Valerie Hudson and Andrea den Boer. See Hudson,
Valerie, & Andrea den Boer, Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia’s Surplus Male

76. Huntington, S. P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, (New York:

and Civil Conflict after the Cold War, (Washington D.C.: Population Action International,
2003.), p. 32.

78. Ibid, pp.13ff.


80. See Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler.


82. Several historical studies lend credence to the argument that in periods when young
adults comprise an abnormally large proportion of populations have tended to coincide
with rebellions and military campaigns. In modern European history, rise in the number
of young men entering adulthood have contributed to cycles of rebellion. Based on
such observation, Herbert Moller hypothesised that a bulge in the population of elite
young adults is a potential destabiliser of countries. In his view, rebellions and religious
movements of the 16th and 17th centuries were led by young men who, upon arriving
at adulthood, decided to force their ways into social affluence and relevance upon realising
the non-existence of opportunities to advance their goals and also reward their efforts.
See Moller, H., “Youth as a Force in the Modern World” in
Comparative Studies in Society
44ff.; Goldstone, op. cit.

83. Christian Mesquida and Neil Weiner argue that youth-laden populations in conflict-torn
regions such as the Balkans and Central Asia are more likely to experience highly intense
conflicts (measured in battle-related deaths per thousand people) than less youthful
populations. See Mesquida C.G., Wiener N.I., “Human Collective Aggression: a
Mesquida C.G., Wiener N.I., “Male Age Composition and the Severity of Conflicts”,


91. Gourevitch, P., We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow we will be Killed with our Families: Stories from Rwanda. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998).


93. See also population pyramids available from the U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base. Further reading see www.census.gov/www/idbpyr.html, accessed 05/02/2007.

94. Herbert Moller argues that wars in pre-modern and present-day Europe, including the rise of the Nazi party in Germany, corresponded with increases in the proportion of young men in the population. Similarly, High rates of youth contributed to the Bolshevik Revolution, the Iranian Revolution, and the current unrest in the Middle East. For more on this argument, see Moller, H., “Youth as a Force in the Modern World” in Comparative Studies in Society and History, 10: 1968, pp. 237–260.


97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.

99. Ibid.


108. The onset of the political instability in Côte d’Ivoire distorted migration patterns in three major ways: It (a) influenced the patterns of internal displacements by forcing people to move towards the more peaceful south of the country, (b) the extent of atrocities associated with the civil war led to the movement of Ivorians as refugees into neighbouring and other countries, and (c) the extent of insecurity in the country had implications on the migration patterns into the country as insecurity generally influences the decisions of migrants into any country and hence Côte d'Ivoire.


110. Ibid, p.15.

113. These statistics were taken from the August 2, 2007 edition of UNHCR’s chart on displaced people in West Africa. http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Af.nsf/luFullMap/AB115AB0C46233DE85257356004DACFD/$File/ocha_IDP_afr070913.pdf?OpenElement
114. UNFPA, http://www.unfpa.org/profile/liberia.cfm?Section=1
116. Ibid.
118. Leighton, M., op.cit., p. 21ff.
126. See R. M. Nkandawire, “Experience in Youth Policy and Programme in Commonwealth Africa”, Policy Document prepared for the Commonwealth Youth Programme Department (Unpublished), 1996. It is doubtful if ‘legal marriage’ is the right term to use here, because while marriage is a key feature of adulthood, not all adults are interested in it. These authors would rather prefer ‘independent life’.
128 Ibid.
136. Ibid.
141. This Republic has just been declared with Agedes as Capital on September 20, 2007.
142. The National Pact was signed in April 1992 was the climax of the Accords of Tamanrasset signed in January 6, 1991 under a mediation brokered by Algerian government.
143. While Mali had moved quite faster in implementing the content of the pact signed with the young Touareg rebels in its northern territory, Nigerien authorities have simply dumped its agreement with Nigerien Touareg rebels and even refer to the rebels as arm bandits and criminals.
149. This loss continues to translate into a needless budget deficit with a snowballing effect on not only the people of Niger Delta, but also on the Nigerian population as a whole.
150. This is defined in the series of historic documents as: Ogoni Bill of Rights, Kaima Declaration of the Ijaw, Oron Bill of Rights, Ikwerre Charter of Demands, Akula Declaration of the Egi People, Urhobo Economic Summit Resolutions, etc.
151. There are numerous militia groups, such as the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force, the Niger Delta Vigilante Service, the Bush Boys, the Membutu Boys, Movement for the Emancipations of the Niger Delta, the Martyrs Brigade and the Coalition for Militant Action in the Niger Delta. Besides these, there are numerous community, clan, ethnic, sub-ethnic and regional militias, armed militant groups, armed gangs, armed cults, pirates, armed networks and warlords and private armies in the region. See Ikelegbe 2005B, 2007A; 2007B, Op Cit.

152. The Geneva Convention was declared in 1949 to protect and guarantee the lives and rights of civilians in war times.


154. Dr. Adedeji Ebo, former Coordinator of Africa Working Group at the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), is the Chief of the Security Sector Reform Team at the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. He has used this expression several times at the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) programmes for Liberian Legislature and Security Agencies on which one of the present authors, Dauda Garuba, represented the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD).

155. LTRC-DP, Online.

156. hearings (Twin Cities Daily Planet [online] Friday October 19, 2007).


158. Often however, women are ‘pushed’ into taking up arms as a result of abuses they have suffered or in order to protect their children. For example, in the case of the ‘Black Diamond’ phenomenon during the Liberian civil war, young girls took to arms as a result of being gang raped by undisciplined soldiers. See ‘Liberia's Women killers’; available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3181529.stm accessed on 30 July, 2007, 12.00 GMT.


162. Ibid.


165. It is estimated that as many as 40 per cent of Liberian women were raped during the 14 year civil war. See Liberia: Major Effort Needed to Address Gender Based Violence, Refugees International, 16 January, 2004. Available at http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/932

166. The three women currently on the ECOWAS Council of the Wise are Ms Theresa Leigh Sherman (Liberia), Honourable Elizabeth Alpha-Lavalié (Sierra Leone) and Mme Sira Diop (Senegal).

167. Tsejeard Bouta et al, 'Gender and Peacekeeping In the West African Context', Report of the Stakeholders' workshop, held at KAIPTC, Accra, 1-3 December, 2004...op cit. p.19


172. The components of the ECPF are Early Warning; Preventive Diplomacy; Democracy and Political Governance; Natural Resource Governance; Cross-Border Initiatives; Security; Women in Peace and Security; Micro-Disarmament; Youth Empowerment, ECOWAS Standby Force, Human Rights and the Rule of Law; Humanitarian Assistance. See Draft ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECOWAS), ECOWAS Commission, Abuja, as revised at the Experts' Meeting on the ECPF, Banjul, Gambia, 24-28 June, 2007

173. See http://www.peacewomen.org/1325inaction/index.html


176. See http://www.wacsof.org/background.html

177. Other programme areas are Peace & Security, Food, Agriculture & Environment, Youth, Regional Integration, Economic Development, Trade & Investment, Democracy, Good Governance & Human Rights.

178. See Recommendations of The West African Civil Society Forum (WACSO) To The ECOWAS Council of Ministers’ Meeting In Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, 18th - 19th December, 2006. Available at http://www.wacsof.org/info/WAFSOC%20FORA%20COMMUNIQUE/WACSOF_4th_Forum_Communique%5B1%5D.doc


185. I acknowledge the subtle differences between core realism and neo-realism, but I use the two terms interchangeably. I am also aware of more than one version of the realist/neo-realist theory with important methodological and theoretical divergence amongst the various versions; however, I restrict my analysis to the dominant Waltzian version formulated by Kenneth Waltz (2001). See Waltz, K. (2001) Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press.


191. Robert Jackson coined the term to describe the difference between states in Western Europe and the Third World. He defines juridical statehood as externally validated or legitimised statehood wherein the mere membership of the international system, as opposed to the developed capacity to carry out governance tasks, became the basis of statehood. See Jackson, R (1993) Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, UK: Cambridge University Press.


193. These include critical Security Studies, Post-Modernist security perspective and Feminist security perspectives.

194. The contestation surrounding human security is evidenced by the almost complete divergence of views expressed by over twenty leading scholars, advocates, and practitioners of security in a 2004 (Vol. 35, No, 3) Special Edition of the influential Security Dialogue journal.
Now, New York, p. 274.
196. See for example, Buzan, B. (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International
198. This view is encapsulated in Canada’s (a leading advocate of human security) policy
framework, which limits human security to the protection of people from armed
Dialogue 30 (September), pp. 265-276.
199. Alkire, S. (2004) “A Vital Core that Must be Treated with the Same Gravitas as Traditional
Monograph, p. 11.
201. See report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
Washington: World Bank Group, p. 33. Also, see Cincotta, R., Engelman, R. &
Generational Transition, and Ideas of Leadership in Buganda”, Africa Today Vol. 51.3,
p. 115.
of Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Paper presented at a workshop on Youth
at conference on Human Security in West Africa: Challenges, Synergies and Action for a
Regional Agenda, organised by Sahel and West Africa Club/OECD, Lome (Togo),
26-28 March 2006, p. 49.
208. For a detail discussion of the advent of PMCs in Africa, see Musah, A. and Fayemi, K
209. Human Rights Watch (January 2007) “They Came Here to Kill Us”: Militia Attacks and
212. All cited data relating to disasters are from World Disaster Report, 2006.
social roots’. Paper presented at conference on Human Security in West Africa: Challenges,
Synergies and Action for a Regional Agenda, organised by Sahel and West Africa Club/
219. I acknowledge that Chad is officially not a member state of ECOWAS; however, it shares contiguous borders, similar socio-political (ethnic and religious) formations and dynamics with a number of ECOWAS member states. Perhaps, the lack of a framework for dealing with insecurity in neighboring (non-ECOWAS) states is also a limitation of current human security regimes.
224. For details about WACSOF’s mandates, mission and activities, see http://www.wacsof.org
225. Phone interview with the ECOWAS Conflict Advisor, 24 September 2007.
233. Interview with Abass Bundu, former Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, 20 July 1998 London, UK.
237. See Article 2 of the Mechanism, 1999.
243. Rocky Williams, p. 46.
244. Rocky Williams, p. 61.
245. Rocky Williams, p. 62.
246. Adedeji Ebo, 79.
247. Adedeji Ebo, 79.
248. Ebo Adedeji, p. 69.
249. Caroline Thomas, in Globalization and Human Security, p. 3.
250. Caroline Thomas, p. 3.
252. Caroline Thomas, p. 11.