DOES URBAN REGIONAL COLLABORATION MAKE A DIFFERENCE? EVIDENCE FROM NORTH AMERICAN METROPOLITAN AREAS

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Abstract

Three decades ago, Danielson and Doig (1982) asked an important question: to what extent do the actions of governmental organizations have a significant independent influence on urban development within the metropolitan sphere? Since then, the focus of most scholars in the field has shifted from the structure and influence of formal government to that of civil society and informal modes of governance, more generally. This shift can be explained, partly, by the rise of the “new regionalist” school, which emphasizes the importance of informal and voluntary regional collaboration between both local governments and private, non-governmental actors.

Given that voluntary collaboration has become the modus operandi of a large number of North American metropolitan regions and that the scholarly community has generally been more interested in the determinants of collaboration than in its effects, this dissertation asks (echoing Danielson and Doig): to what extent does regional collaboration have a significant independent influence on urban development within the metropolitan sphere (whether by giving weight to existing policies, facilitating policy implementation or fostering the development of new regional policies), as opposed to having no influence or influencing governance capacity without influencing policy outcomes? In other words, this research seeks to discover whether regional collaboration makes a difference – and if so what type of collaboration, under what conditions and in what ways.

More specifically, this dissertation concentrates on the effect of three types of collaboration (bottom-up, state-mandated and functional) and the moderating role of three factors (regional awareness, governmental initiative and civic capital) on three main outcomes (environmental preservation, socio-economic integration and economic competitiveness). This research uses a mixed-method approach, with a large-N quantitative analysis of the 110 largest metropolitan regions in Canada and the U.S. as well as a comparative, historical analysis of the Greater Montreal and the San Francisco Bay Area focused on collaborative efforts in the fields of environmental protection and economic development. The results suggest that state-mandated collaboration tends to be more effective than other collaboration types, but that higher government initiative can both increase and decrease the effectiveness of collaborative regional initiatives. From a methodological perspective, the findings herein suggest that regional collaboration may, at times, initiate a domino effect whereby one collaborative effort leads to another, which leads to yet another, which finally bears fruits; hence, the results of regional collaboration may or may not be observable in the short term. However, the research also underscores the fact that regional collaboration without vertical power can lead into a trap – a “collaborative trap” of sorts – wherein collaboration produces intrinsic, but not necessarily extrinsic, changes in the environment and gives participants a false sense of efficacy.
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<tr>
<td>ABAG</td>
<td>Association of Bay Area Governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACAPAL</td>
<td>Association pour la conservation et l'aménagement plein-air Laval</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACIR</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Intergovernmental Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Bay Area Council</td>
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<td>BART</td>
<td>Bay Area Rapid Transit</td>
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<td>BCDC</td>
<td>Bay Conservation and Development Commission</td>
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<td>BRR</td>
<td>Building Resilient Regions</td>
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<td>BUC</td>
<td>Bottom-up collaboration</td>
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<td>BVAC</td>
<td>Bay Vision Action Coalition</td>
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<td>BV2020</td>
<td>Bay Vision 2020</td>
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<td>CBCO</td>
<td>Congregation-based community organizing</td>
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<td>CCII</td>
<td>Community Capital Investment Initiative</td>
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<td>CMA</td>
<td>Census Metropolitan Area</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>Council of governments</td>
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<tr>
<td>CoV</td>
<td>Coefficient of variation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI</td>
<td>Collaborative regional initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDA</td>
<td>U.S. Economic Development Administration</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>Economic Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>GMP</td>
<td>Gross Metropolitan Product</td>
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<td>HUD</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>Industrial Areas Foundation</td>
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<td>ICA</td>
<td>Institutional Collective Action</td>
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<td>IMRDC</td>
<td>Island of Montreal's Regional Development Commission</td>
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<td>JAJQPC</td>
<td>Joint Air Quality Policy Committee</td>
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<td>JPC</td>
<td>Joint Policy Committee</td>
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<td>JV:SV</td>
<td>Joint Venture: Silicon Valley</td>
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<td>LNA</td>
<td>Large-N analysis</td>
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<td>MCM</td>
<td>Montreal's Citizen Movement</td>
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<td>MI</td>
<td>Montréal International</td>
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<td>MICCS</td>
<td>Montréal International Conference Center Society</td>
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<td>MIREC</td>
<td>Mille-Île River Enhancement Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIRP</td>
<td>Mille-Île River Park</td>
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<tr>
<td>MMC</td>
<td>Montreal Metropolitan Community</td>
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<td>MPO</td>
<td>Metropolitan Planning Organization</td>
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<td>MSA</td>
<td>Metropolitan Statistical Area</td>
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<td>MTC</td>
<td>Metropolitan Transportation Commission</td>
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<td>MUC</td>
<td>Montreal Urban Community</td>
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<td>NOAH</td>
<td>Northeast Ohio Alliance for Hope</td>
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<td>OEE</td>
<td>Office for Economic Expansion</td>
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<td>OLS</td>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
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<td>PDA</td>
<td>Priority Development Area</td>
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<td>PPÉAM</td>
<td>Partenaires pour le parc écologique de l'archipel de Montréal</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCSD</td>
<td>President's Council on Sustainable Development</td>
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<td>PQ</td>
<td>Parti québécois</td>
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<td>RACC</td>
<td>Regional agencies coordinating committee</td>
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<td>RCI</td>
<td>Resilience Capacity Index</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Regional Development Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>RHNA</td>
<td>Regional Housing Needs Allocation</td>
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<td>RPAA</td>
<td>Regional Planning Association of America</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>Regional Transportation Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>s.d.</td>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td>Social Equity Caucus (spinoff of the BAASC)</td>
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<td>SCS</td>
<td>Sustainable Community Strategy</td>
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<td>SFBA</td>
<td>San Francisco Bay Area</td>
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<td>SFBCSC</td>
<td>San Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission</td>
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<td>SGS/RLF</td>
<td>Smart Growth Strategy / Regional Livability Footprint</td>
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<td>SMC</td>
<td>State-mandated collaboration</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
<td>Small-N analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPG</td>
<td>Special-purpose government</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSFBA</td>
<td>Save San Francisco Bay Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFGM</td>
<td>Task Force on the Greater Montreal</td>
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<td>2SLS</td>
<td>Two stage least-square</td>
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Chapter 1

Regions and regional collaboration: an introduction

1.1 The case for studying metropolitan regions

On issuing forth from the village [Hochelaga] we were conducted by several of the men and women of the place up the above-mentioned mountain, lying a quarter of the league away, which was named by us “Mount Royal”. On reaching the summit we had a view of the land for more than thirty leagues round about. Towards the north there is a range of mountains, running east and west, and another range to the south. Between these ranges lies the finest land it is possible to see, being arable, level, and flat. And in the midst of this flat region one saw the river [St. Lawrence] extending beyond the sport where we hade left our longboats.
- Jacques-Cartier’s travel logs, October 1535

City-regions are no more “natural” than nation-states or world regions; they are produced by history, geography and culture and, as such, are continuously being redefined and reshaped – sometimes intentionally, through civic boosterism, but mostly by forces that are beyond the control of government and the business community. They are usually understood from within, but sometimes perceived primarily (if not exclusively) from without. Moreover, the way they are designated at one time may or may not make sense a generation later, as former “metro regions” become the center of ever-growing urban agglomerations. City-regions are, in short, an imperfect human creation and, as such, they should not be reified or fetishized. They are first and foremost, from the point of view of the scholar, a “tool for thinking” about place.

That being the case, city-regions (and ecological/cultural regions more generally) are seldom defined arbitrarily, in part because their boundaries are generally of little political consequence. Lewis Mumford, who in many ways embodies the ecological and cultural 20th century project of regionalism and made it almost an ideology, himself described geographic regions as a “non-political groupings with respect to soil, climate, vegetation, animal life, industry and historic tradition” (Mumford cited in Critchley, 2004, p. 62). It suffices to think of such urban regions as “the Bay Area”, the “Delaware Valley”, the “Great Golden Horseshoe” or the “Lower Mainland” (to name only a few) to conjure up
geographic images based on physical reality. Hence, the city-region describes something that has empirical resonance even though it may be politically and administratively inexistent.

Jacques Cartier’s vivid depiction of (what is now) Montreal and its surroundings, as seen from Mount Royal, is a case in point: he described, in his travel log, a place made up of rivers, valleys and woodlands, bounded on both sides by mountains on the horizon, with, in between, “the finest land is it possible to see, being arable, level and flat”. Thus he described, simultaneously, the place as he found it as well as the inhabited region it could become. One could argue that Jacques Cartier both discovered and, somehow, invented a region.

From the perspective of someone interested in the relationship of humans to their environment, this blurriness of the concept of “region” – which describes both the physical and human characteristics of the land, and refers to something that is simultaneously observable and unobservable – is precisely why it is of interest. It speaks to the past, the present and the future; it presents us with an opportunity to discover new relationships in the world around us as well as imagine what the world could be.

In the words of Critchley (2004), Lewis Mumford “sought to contextualise the city, relating problems and possibilities to entire environments of regions, to the ecological history of regions.” (p. 62). Nearly a century after the creation of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) by Mumford and others, the region has not lost its appeal as an alternative to formal and official spatial categories. This is indicative, I think, of its usefulness as a heuristic for understanding the relationship between the city, its hinterland and what lies beyond.

As a scholar, planner and dreamer of a world that is more ecologically balanced, I am drawn to the region because it allows me to intellectually confront both the limitations and the possibilities of urban life in the 21st century. Indeed, despite the fact that we draw resources from further and further away to sustain our urban lifestyles, cities cannot easily delocalize the byproducts of their economic activity, namely air and water pollution, poverty and inequality and residual matter. However, these “issues” cannot be addressed strictly at the local level; they necessarily require a broader view and a larger scope. It follows that some form of regional thinking and acting is crucial to achieving urban sustainability.
I have been advised, by some of my colleagues, to work on something more tangible, easier to define and "operationalize". While I am fully aware of the difficulties I will face when trying to circumscribe my object of study, I am also convinced that this work needs to be done. The region is not a neat category, but it is an essential one.

In what follows, I attempt, first, to clarify important concepts (such as “metropolitan region”, “regional sustainability” and “regional awareness”) and answer important preliminary questions (why are metropolitan regions worthy of study and why should regions be studies comparatively?). The next section follows the same structure, but focuses regional collaboration and its outward effects. I then proceed, in the last section of this chapter, to specify the inter-relationships between the theoretical concepts that form the basis of my research and lay out my research questions and hypotheses.
1.1.1 Concepts and definitions

Defining the region

Any serious inquiry into the nature and functioning of metropolitan regions must necessarily start by addressing the basic definitional issue around the concept of region. The region is, by definition, a fuzzy concept, with approximate and fluctuating boundaries. However, because the concept is blurry and does not lend itself very well to measurement and quantification does not lessen its empirical value.

Kathryn Foster, who has dedicated her research career to better understanding the region and is one of the most respected scholars in the field, gives a succinct but illuminating definition to the concept: the region, in her view, designates “the space between” legally determined smaller and larger geographies (2000, p. 2)\(^1\). Simply put, then, metropolitan regions are larger than their smaller local government subunits (i.e., villages, towns, cities and counties) and smaller than their larger states, provinces or nations. There exist other “types” of regions, of course, such as the “Mid-Atlantic”, the “Midwest” or the “Sunbelt”, which fit the general definition of a region, but our concern is with urban areas and their surroundings. Therefore, we are interested in the geographical scale that lies (in most cases) between the city proper and the State(s) or Province(s).

This definition does not, of course, tell us how regional boundaries should be drawn. Indeed, there are a number of criteria that can be used to delineate the region, and each criterion results in a different “regional geography”. Bio-regionalism, for instance, defines the region as an ecological entity, based on “natural” features of the landscape such as watersheds, basins and other river formations, micro-climates, soil and geological regions, the distribution of plant and animal species, etc. In contrast, economic regions are usually defined or described by commodity flows, labor markets and “commutersheds”.

Significantly, the territories of biological and economic regions often do not correspond to those of administrative and political regional units. The New York

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\(^1\) As noted by Foster, the etymology of the word is informative: region comes from the Latin word *regere*, which means to direct or rule, and the region basically designated, in Roman times, the territory controlled by a *regent* and his *regiment*. Hence the indeterminate nature of the concept.
metropolitan (or Tri-State) area, for example, includes such varied and ecologically distinct landscapes as parts of the Allegheny (or Appalachian) Plateau, the Lower Hudson Valley and the New Jersey Pine Barrens. Conversely, the Greater Montreal Area as defined by the Montreal Metropolitan Community (MMC) does not nearly cover Montreal’s commutershed, which extends 75 kilometers or more in almost every direction.

For the purposes of this research, several definitions of the region will be used. For instance, while it may be the case that the census definitions of metro regions do not always concord with ecological, economic or cultural delineations of the same regions, the “census metropolitan area” (or CMA, as used in Canada) and the “census statistical area” (or CSA, as used in the U.S.) are the only consistently comparable units across the Canada-U.S. border. The quantitative analyses in this research will therefore be based on these definitions of the region.

In the third and fourth chapter of the dissertation, however, I will pay attention to the different ways in which a given region is defined and make that part of the analysis. In other words, I will not impose an artificial definition of the Greater Montreal and the San Francisco Bay Area at the risk of excluding interesting sub-regional efforts (or conflicts) that may be illuminating of each region’s own internal dynamics.

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2 A “census metropolitan area” (CMA), according the definition used by Statistics Canada, is comprised of an urban core with a population of 50,000 or more as well as the neighboring census subdivisions (that is, incorporated towns and municipalities) where more than 50% of the labor force commutes to the urban core of the CMA. In the United States, a “metropolitan statistical area” is comprised of an urban core with a population of 50,000 or more as well as the neighboring counties (or “county-equivalents”) where the employment interchange measure (the sum of the percentage of workers living in the smaller entity who work in the larger entity and the percentage of employment in the smaller entity that is accounted for by workers who reside in the larger entity) is 15% or more. This difference in definitions effectively means that metro areas in the U.S. should be comparatively larger than Canadian metro areas; however, given the fact that Canadian metro areas are more compact, concentrate a relatively higher percentage of employment in their urban core and are relatively less fragmented (Razin, 2000), the difference in terms of population may or may not be significant.
Regional sustainability and resilience

Sustainability is what most metropolitan plans and policies are aiming for – as of the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century; as such, it has become a near synonym of “virtue” – that is to say, a word without precise meaning. The notion of “metropolitan sustainability”, in particular, is one that is interpreted differently by different groups and that, depending on its definition, has widely diverging policy implications. From the perspective of Public Choice Theory, for example, achieving sustainability at the regional level is simply a matter of “internalizing externalities” or reducing spillover effects, which implies that we need only put in place the “right” incentive structure for individuals and organizations to use resources efficiently.

At the other tend of the spectrum, the bio-regionalist and eco-city schools – following Patrick Geddes, Lewis Mumford and more recently Peter Berg and Richard Register – conceive of regional sustainability as the harmony between city (or human culture) and nature. As described by Spann (1999):

Geddes taught Mumford how to view the city, with all of its seemingly disparate diversities, as an organism, as a dynamic whole that drew its energies from its diversity. [...] And he encouraged the development of what was central to Mumford’s regionalism, the habit of viewing humankind in ecological perspective, emphasizing the dynamic relationship between human beings and their natural environment (p. 46).

Mumford’s (and the bio-regionalists’) view of the region, then, is one where “the natural environment permeates the city’s spaces and embraces the city, while the city and its hinterland provide a major proportion of its food needs” (Kenworthy, 2006, p. 68).

In between these two particular conceptions lie a great number of alternative views and formulations, which it would be fruitless to try to reconcile. Indeed, given the wide range of meanings that have been ascribed to the term “sustainability”, the very use of the word elicits more questions than answers.

To avoid fruitless definitional debates, the approach taken here is to focus on one particular aspect of regional sustainability that has been well theorized and that has empirical resonance, a concept called regional resilience (RC). RC refers to “the ability of a
place to recover from a stress, either an acute blow, as in the case of an earthquake or major plant closing, or a chronic strain, as may occur with longstanding economic decline or unremitting rapid population growth” (Institute of Governmental Studies, UCBerkeley, 2012). While the concept offers some malleability – resilience is understood differently by ecologists and economists – it is still more precise and meaningful than sustainability, in part because it can be tested.

As argued by Christopherson and colleagues (2010), the question of resilience is also fraught with methodological and philosophical difficulties – how, for instance, to deal with adaptive processes that are only visible in the longue durée and how to decide what state a region should revert to in order to be considered resilient? However, they note, the concept of resilience “can provoke a debate among economists, political scientists, planners and geographers in a way that concepts closely tied to a disciplinary discourse [...] cannot” (p. 4). Moreover, regional resilience can be thought of as a continuum, or a series of continua; in other words, there are many ways for a region to recover, and a region may recover only partly from a specific shock. Hence, when taking both its adaptability, heuristic usefulness and direct policy relevance into account, the concept of regional resilience seems to offer a more fruitful path to go down than that of regional sustainability.

Finally, the concept of regional resilience is useful in assessing the effectiveness of regional collaboration in that the resilience of a metropolitan region very much depends on its capacity to self-organize and respond to regional problems and crises in a coordinated fashion – what Barnes and Foster (2012) have called “regional governance capacity”. According to these researchers, this capacity of regions to self-govern depends, in turn, on the ability of regional institutions to bring together stakeholders from different sectors, jurisdictions, functions and levels of government. In theory, then, effective regional collaboration should make regions better able to adapt and respond to challenges, thereby making them more resilient (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of the link between collaboration and resilience).

Regional awareness
Another important concept to introduce at the onset of this discussion is that of “regional awareness” (or “regional consciousness”), which refers to the “internal sense of place felt by those living within the region” (Foster, 2000, p. 7) and encompasses, according to Foster, both a shared cognizance of and a sense of belonging to the region.

Despite the fact that the majority of residents in North American metros live regional lives, few of these metropolitan areas have a strong “regional identity”. In most cases, regional identity is but one of the multiple place-based identities that people have, and it is often one of the least important. Yet, as demonstrated by Nelles (2009) and others, the ability of civic and business leaders to organize effectively in a given region is partly related to that region’s “self-awareness” and cohesion.

One might think that regional awareness is simply a function of geography (e.g., physical features separating communities), social organization (e.g., racial and socio-economic segregation) and politics (e.g., the relative political weight of the central city vs. its suburbs) and that the concept is uninformative. However, there is evidence that commuting to and from the city center is not necessarily what creates a sense of belonging to the region, as commuting is increasingly dominated by local or sub-regional trips; other connections, such as those generated by occasional consumption activities, sporting events and other “weak ties” seem to bind regions together (Shearmur and Motte, 2009). Foster (2000) also remarks that regional awareness is partly dependent upon a given region’s reputation or the “external sense of place held by people outside the region” (p. 7). Regional awareness cannot therefore be reduced to the demographic and economic weight of the central city relative to its suburbs and the level or any other set of geopolitical or socio-demographic variables.

For all these reasons, and so as to understand what makes regions work, regional awareness deserves our attention.
1.1.2 Why study metropolitan regions?

This question can be answered from three different perspectives: a policy perspective, a theoretical perspective and a philosophical and ethical perspective. In the present section, I will describe, in turn, why the study of metropolitan regions is important from each of these perspectives.

The policy perspective

The policy perspective can be explained and illustrated based on several important North American developmental trends. The first trend relates to the diffusion of power within metropolitan regions, as measured by the relative spending capacity of cities and the political representation of “core cities”, suburban municipalities and rural counties. There is strong evidence that on both counts, power in metropolitan regions is becoming more and more diffuse (Miller, 2002; Orfield and Luce, 2009). This implies that important decisions regarding infrastructure development and land-use are not necessarily made by the so-called “downtown elites” who are the subject of Regime Theory. Rather, understanding regional development requires, more than ever, an understanding of metropolitan power dynamics – or what Orfield calls “metropolitics”.

The second trend concerns the competitiveness of urban economies and urban labor markets. Municipalities within urban regions can no longer afford to compete with one another to attract new development in a zero-sum game; the exigencies of the new global playing field, where metropolitan economies are in competition with one another, require regions to function economically as such (Atkins, 2008; Foster, 2000; Hamilton et al., 2004; Pastor et al., 2009). One might question whether there is, in fact, a “global playing field” and argue that the use of this expression denotes a neo-liberal bias in the research (or the researcher). However, what it implies here is that municipalities within urban regions have become economically interdependent and that the “region” has become a significant economic unit from both a national and an international perspective (Malecki, 2004). One clear manifestation of this, as reported by Pastor and colleagues (2009), is the slowing

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3 For the purposes of the following argument, a metropolitan region is defined loosely as a city, its suburbs and its hinterland.
convergence of metropolitan economies, as measured by the simple regression of the change in per capita income over a certain period on the initial per capita income (i.e., at the beginning of that period). Standard economic theory would predict a convergence of metro regions’ economic output over time, so that a regression of economic performance during a certain period on the economic output at the onset of that period should yield a negative coefficient (\( \beta \) or beta). However, the evidence reported by Pastor and colleagues (comparing the 1980s and 1990s) is that the rate of convergence is diminishing with time, and that region-specific characteristics are becoming increasingly important in determining economic output. In other words, regions are becoming more economically differentiated. In the same paper, the authors note that the coefficients of variation (CoV) for per capita income, median household income and earnings per worker have also increased during the 1980s and 1990s, indicating that the variance in economic performance is increasing even as regions are converging more slowly.

A somewhat different pattern has been observed by these and other authors (see for example Orfield, 2002; Massey et al., 2009 and Rae, 2011) with respect to social inequalities in US metropolitan areas: while there is no clear sign that regions are converging or diverging to the same levels of poverty and income inequality, poverty is becoming more concentrated within urban regions (i.e., inside the boundaries of certain jurisdictions within a metropolitan area). One explanation for this trend is the suburbanization of poverty, which generally takes place in suburban municipalities without strict density regulations (Rothwell and Massey, 2009). While this indicates a convergence of metro regions in the spatial distribution of poverty, it makes the region more – and not less – important as a geographical unit from the perspective of equity advocates. Indeed, the concentration of poverty within urban regions entrenches the inequality of opportunities faced by children in jurisdictions where property values are low and, as a result, schools and other municipal services are underfunded (Lee, 2011; Lewis & Hamilton, 2008). This concentration of disadvantage, in turn, often results in what Hayward and Swanstrom (2011) call “thick injustice”, a set of conditions that cannot be easily undone locally as they are the result of metropolitan-wide processes, as opposed to discriminatory local government policies. Given the regional nature of the problem, the remedy must necessarily also be regional.
The trend toward the concentration of poverty intra-regionally also reinforces the importance of the region from the perspective of regional competitiveness, as it is becoming clear that high levels of inequality have an impact on a region’s economic performance (Pastor, 2009); the reasons for this are not entirely understood, but according to Pastor they may be related to under-investment in basic education, the impact of social tensions on economic decision-making, and the erosion of the social capital and social cohesion at the regional level. In sum, regions that are more equal seem to be better able to deal with economic shocks and formulate coherent regional economic policies – they are, in other words, more economically resilient (Foster, 2012).

The third major trend that has unfolded in recent decades is urban sprawl, defined here as the outward expansion of the city into its hinterland through low-density residential development combined with the decentralization of employment and the rise of inter-suburban commuting. While there is little agreement as to the best policy approach to “curbing” sprawl (see Brueckner and Mills, 2001, Cheshire, 2006 and Neuman, 2005 for summaries of the “sprawl controversy”), there is general agreement that, as a mode of development, it is environmentally and economically unsustainable. Indeed, unchecked and unregulated sprawl poses a threat to the provision and long-term preservation of regional environmental public goods – whether regional biodiversity, open-land for agriculture or recreation, clean drinking water or unpolluted air. As with the provision of other public goods, there is little incentive for a particular municipality or jurisdiction to provide environmental goods (such as clean air) if such goods are essentially non-excludable. This, as Frug and others argue, militates in favor of some form of regional governance, whether formal or informal (Frug, 2002; Dreier et al., 2004; Knudson, 2011).

Thus, as Hamilton and colleagues (2004) point out, the region is “an amorphous entity with no legal standing or political constituency but is fast becoming an important economic and governing unit” (p. 149). As such, it deserves our attention.

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4 By “governing unit”, Hamilton means “a unit that must be governed” and not “a unit that has a government”.
The theoretical perspective

As described in the foregoing section, the region as a geographical unit is gaining importance from a policy perspective, since many of the most pressing issues facing urban regions today are metropolitan in scope – in Canada, the U.S., and throughout the world. Yet, there are also compelling theoretical reasons to study the region, the most important of which is the fact that “regional science” is a field where empirical developments seem to continually outpace theory-building. As expressed by Pastor and colleagues (2009), “while the salience of regions was being debated by academics [in the 1990s], practitioners were moving more rapidly” (p. 272). In other words, the region is interesting as an object of scholarly inquiry precisely because it not merely a philosophical concept.

Indeed, a significant number of urban-based environmental, equity groups and other community groups in the U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, in Canada) have become regionally focused in the last two decades (Kleidman, 2004; Swanstrom and Banks, 2009). For instance, both environmental and equity groups in the San Francisco Bay Area have started to advocate “smart growth” as a way to conserve nature and make urban living more affordable (Allen, 2011; Madsen, 2011, personal communication), thereby expanding the geographical scope of their advocacy work. Other examples of community partnerships or grassroots initiative that are regional in scope include several Californian efforts such as Joint Venture: Silicon Valley (JV:SV), the San Diego Dialogue and the Sierra Business Council, but also initiatives from other parts of the U.S. and Canada, such as 1000 Friends of Oregon in Metro Portland, the Partners of the Montreal Archipelago Ecological Park (PPÉAM) in the Greater Montreal Area and the Friends of the Greenbelt Foundation in Southern Ontario (also referred to as the “Greater Golden Horseshoe”).

In the field of equity advocacy, Pastor, Benner and Matsuoka (2009) describe something they call “social movement regionalism”, which is community-based and aims to promote regional equity. This movement, they argue, is distinct from “community development regionalism” (which is usually business-led) and “policy reform regionalism” (which is led by political reformers) and is indicative that civil-society actors have awakened to the importance of the region, despite the fact that many politicians have not.
Examples of community-based regionalist efforts include the “Justice for Janitors” movement that started in California in the 1990s, but also a number of efforts that originated in “congregation-based community organizing” (CBCO), such as the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) and the Northeast Ohio Alliance for Hope (NOAH) (see Kleidman, 2004, for a detailed description of the origins and evolution of CBCO; and websites for the other listed above.).

Considering these (relatively recent) developments, the first question that comes to mind is the following. Accepting for purposes of argument Neil Brenner's (2002) thesis that the “rescaling” of the city is a process driven by global capital, why then is the regional agenda in the United States promoted first and foremost by community groups, environmental NGOs and local business leaders? In the same vein, since metropolitan job markets in North America are becoming more fragmented, with sub-regions within metropolitan regions becoming more autonomous (Jastremski et al., 2011; Shearmur and Motte, 2009), how can we explain the business community's renewed interest in regionalism? Clearly, the interest of community organizers, civic leaders and business people in regional issues cannot be fully explained by current theories of the region. Empirical work is needed to help form a better understanding of the way regions work and to strengthen our theoretical constructs, and the research proposed here endeavors to do just that.

The philosophical and ethical perspective

Above and beyond the policy and theoretical perspectives on the region, there exist philosophical and ethical arguments for privileging the region as a sociological, ecological and economic field of inquiry. Indeed, the past, current and future development of the urban region confronts us with several important ethical and moral questions:

1) Given the increasing concentration of poverty within urban regions and the known impacts of this concentration of disadvantage, what responsibility do we have to ensure that everyone has access to the same basic opportunities?
2) Given the rapid pace of urban sprawl in the urban periphery of large metropolitan regions and the ensuing destruction of natural habitats, what responsibility do we have toward non-human species and other natural entities (such as ecosystems)?

3) Given that the actions of any one municipality or government unit within a metropolitan region, especially as relates to land-use and zoning, impacts the development of neighboring municipalities, what responsibility do higher levels of government have to steer, coordinate and/or constrain the policy decisions of local governments?

These questions are of ethical importance because of the well-respected (but often misapplied) “equivalence principle”, which states that the boundaries of a decision-making unit should concord with the boundaries of the financing unit, both of which should equal the area affected by a decision. By extension, the interests of all those affected by a decision should be represented when a decision is made.

In practice, it is difficult to treat adequately all the relevant interests – as many of the externalities or “spillover effects” that come from the destruction of a wetland to build a new housing subdivision, the siting of power plant or that of a landfill are unpredictable and may evolve over time.\(^5\)

That being said, many of these spillover effects can be dealt with, or at least mitigated, at the regional level. Some of these effects might not be perceived as “policy relevant” from the perspective of government, as those affected may not constitute a clear “constituency”, but the policy relevance of a particular issue (e.g., the destruction of the last remaining habitat of a particular amphibian species) does not diminish its moral importance (given our moral responsibility to take the interests of “all those affected” into account). Whether or not existing regional governance arrangements can provide greater benefits in solving these problems than they do at present is a different matter, but there is no question that the regional scale cannot be ignored if we are serious about achieving sustainability. Indeed, we have the moral obligation to look at the impacts of own actions

\(^5\) Doubtlessly, many more “known” interests could be taken into account in most such cases than usually are; however the fact remains: it is extremely difficult to geographically “bound” the impacts of an urban development project.
beyond the borders of our jurisdictions. It follows that regionalism can be thought of as an *ethical* perspective, and not just an ideological or “practical” one.

Complementary to this argument is the view that regionalism opens up the possibility of reconciling environmentalism – which situates humanity within a larger ecological context – and cosmopolitanism – which states as its fundamental premise that all humans belong to a single community and have moral obligations to one another. As pointed out by Mignolo (2000), cosmopolitanism is limited in its application precisely because it does not take “place” and geography into account. Likewise, environmentalism is fraught with difficulties relating to scale – how, for instance, to reconcile local environmental concerns with global environmental issues? The regional scale, I suggest, can mediate between the local and global, forcing us to consider what lies beyond our immediate surroundings while developing a sense of belonging to a larger community. If to be cosmopolitan is to “be of the wider world”, going regional may be an important step toward this goal.
1.1.3 Why study regions and regional governance comparatively?

Despite the fact that a large share of the scholarly literature on the subject of regionalism comes from the U.S., interest in the form and governance of metropolitan areas is not limited to this country. Indeed, there has been in the last two decades a wave of metropolitan governance reform in Western Europe, East and South-East Asia, Latin America, South Africa and the Middle East (see for example Brenner, 2003; Kim and Smith, 2006; Razin, 2006; Rojas, 2008). In Canada, there was a wave of metropolitan reform in the 1990s and 2000s, more or less at the same time as that which took place in its neighbor to the south. Not surprisingly, the Canadian reforms were seen, at the time, as following the precepts of new regionalism and, more generally, as belonging to the same “regional movement” as contemporaneous developments in the U.S. (see for example Frisken, 2001 and Sancton, 2001). Hence, it appeared to observers at the beginning of the 21st Century that Canada was more or less following (or mirroring) the U.S. in terms of metropolitan reform.

However, given recent policy developments in Ontario and Quebec, it is becoming clear that the “regional movement” in Canada is very different from the U.S. equivalent. Not least among the differences is the fact that in the U.S., regionalism was and continues to be promoted (both locally and nationally) primarily by non-state actors, such as the Alliance for Regional Stewardship (a private non-profit promoting the regional business-based collaborative model, now a part of the American Chamber of Council Executives) and PolicyLink (a national research and action institute promoting equity). In contrast, metropolitan reform in Canada has been promoted and carried out almost exclusively by Provincial governments and governmental arm’s-length organizations (such as Metro Vancouver, the Friends of the Greenbelt Foundation in Toronto or the Montreal Metropolitan Community).

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6 Despite what its name might suggest, the Friends of the Greenbelt Foundation was established by the Government of Ontario following its passage of the Greenbelt Act in 2005. The Foundation received a grant of 25 million dollars from the Province to carry out its grant-making and operational activities. Hence, even though it is now formally a non-for-profit corporation, its existence is entirely due to the Government of Ontario’s initiative.
This poses an interesting – and important – puzzle: if regionalism is essentially the same movement across the 49th parallel, why then is it primarily led by non-state actors in the United States and by state actors in Canada? Also importantly, why does it vary within each country? The hypothesis proposed here is that these differences are due, in part, to differences between and within the two countries in the way federalism is practiced – and to the differing role of States and Provinces, in particular. The next section outlines some of these differences and lays out the rationale for studying metropolitan governance comparatively.

Why does federalism matter in the metropolitan context?

How does federalism (defined broadly as the constitutional and legal division of power among different units of government within the state\(^7\) ) relate to regional governance and why does it matter at all? It is important to ask this second preliminary question, as a number of political scientists have raised doubts about the usefulness of the concept. Most prominently, William Riker argued more than 40 years ago that the concept of federalism is fundamentally unwieldy and imprecise. After reviewing the most recent work in the field, he concluded: “Does federalism make any difference in the way are governed? And the answer appears to be: Hardly at all” (Riker, 1969, p. 145). As a result of this and other similar assertions made by political scientists over the last three decades as to the “idiosyncratic” or else purely formal nature of federalist regimes (Burgess, 1988), federalism as a mode of governance has generally been under-studied, under-theorized and more generally relegated to a minor subfield of comparative politics (Erk, 2006).

Yet, in the wake of the decentralization and “governance” movements, which have called for deeper public involvement in decision-making and better coordination among different levels of government, the question of federalism has come back to the fore. Indeed, there is a growing recognition that “multi-level governance” is not coterminous with two-level federalism – but also that federalism is the best model we have for understanding the

\(^7\) The definition of federalism used here diverges from its traditional definition in that it includes municipalities and special-purpose governments in relation to senior levels of government that have constitutionally defined and (at least a some) non-overlapping jurisdictional authority. That said, the article focuses on the actions of federal, state and provincial governments (in relation to municipalities and regional governance) and as such it is in continuity with previous research efforts in the field.
policy-making process where jurisdictional authorities overlap, power is diffuse and the responsibility for policy implementation is shared. There is also a growing recognition that sub-state/sub-provincial units of government can no longer be ignored in discussions of governance – as they are responsible for delivering an increasing number of services and are often the main point of contact between the government and the citizenry (Bradford, 2004). More to the point, localism is not indifferent to federalism; that is to say, both the expression and representation of local interests are shaped, if not constrained, by federalism and the particular ways it is institutionalized in Canada and the U.S (Hills, 2005).

Interestingly, in the U.S., the members of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) identified more than 40 years ago the problem that metropolitanism poses for federalism (ACIR, 1966), but they had little to say about the limits and opportunities that federalism presents for metropolitan governance.

In sum, the region may not have a clear “place” in the structure of intergovernmental relations that is unique to each state and province; yet, as argued by Hamilton and colleagues (2004), it is effectively “overlaid” on this system and shaped by it. Hence, we need to pay attention to what lies “underneath” the regional overlay to understand why regional governance structures take the form they do – and why they differ from one place to another.

Political culture and the practice of federalism

As outlined above, the comparative approach is particularly interesting when studying regional governance, as there are both striking resemblances and contrasts across the 49th parallel North that can help illuminate the way federalism has shaped regional governance in each country. The most fundamental of these differences is probably best captured by the term “political culture”.

The explanation of this difference is usually couched in historical terms. Lipset (1989), for instance, traces the origin of each political culture to the founding of each state:

“The very organizing principles that framed these nations, the central cores around which institutions and events were to accommodate, were different. One was Whig and classically liberal or libertarian – doctrines that emphasized distrust of the state [...]. The other was Tory and conservative in the British and European sense –
accepting of the need for a strong state, for respect for authority, for deference.” (Lipset, 1990, p. 2)

Although, as acknowledged by Lipset, both cultures have changed in important ways over time and continue to change, I argue here that the central difference between the two countries politically speaking – which concerns the “proper” role (and size) of government and, by extension, the way public policy ought to be made – remains the same. My main contention is that the attitude of distrust that is entrenched in the U.S. political culture has actually strengthened localism, while the institutions of executive federalism in Canada have contributed to “neutralizing ” local units of government. Hence, the difference in political culture between Canada and the U.S. has resulted in two very different local – and therefore regional – contexts.

As argued by Radin and Boase (2002), the political institutions of the two countries reflect this difference markedly. In their own words, “the political institutions in the U.S., wherever they are found and whatever they are called, are constructed to minimize or, if possible, avoid exertion of concentrated power” (p. 67) whereas “the Canadian system was predicated upon a strong faith in government, a top-down approach to the development of policy, and an historical acceptance of government intervention” (p. 69). In effect, despite the fact that the specific form of sub-state institutions was not constitutionally predetermined and that states had "extraordinarily wide latitude... in creating various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them” (Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 43 9 U.S. 60, 71 1978 cited in Barron, 1999, p. 488), these institutions have come to mirror those of “senior” levels of government (with the separation of powers and a series of "check and balances”, such as property tax caps, varying from one state to the other). In contradistinction, Canadian municipalities are managed much the same way as the provincial and federal governments: from the executive down.

One might think that the ability of Canadian municipalities to speak with one voice (due the concentration of power, in most cities, in the person of the Mayor) gives them an advantage over their U.S. counterparts in representing their own interests in front of higher levels of government. However, as alluded above, the reality is otherwise. The first reason that U.S. municipalities have traditionally occupied a more important place in the political landscape is because of the Cooley doctrine of "home rule" (outlined in 1871 by Michigan
Supreme Court Judge Thomas Cooley in *People vs. Hurbult* which states that “local government is a matter of absolute right; and the state cannot take it away” (excerpt taken from Silva, 2004, p. 53). Notwithstanding Barron’s calling into question of the effectiveness of home rule in practice (Barron, 2003) and the many objections raised against it over the last few decades, a number of observers have argued that it is worth protecting because, as paraphrased by Barron, “it ensures that governmental power is exercised closest to the people” (2003, p. 2259). Thus, as argued by McGoldrick (1933), the case for home rule is centered not only in the assumption and popular belief that state legislatures are incompetent, but more importantly in the so-called “simple wisdom” of leaving local affairs in the hands of local government (p. 299).

Keil and Boudreau (2005) have justly remarked that strong popular opposition to amalgamation in Toronto (in the 1990s) and Montreal (in the early 2000s) was evidence that the inhabitants of the municipalities “under threat” were attached to their local polity. That said, in Canada there is in reality no equivalent to the doctrine of home rule – which became clear over the last couple of decades, as provincial governments across the country unilaterally took away the “right” to local government⁸ from hundreds of thousands of people with the forced amalgamations of Winnipeg, Toronto, Montreal and Halifax. Thus, while both Canadian and U.S. municipalities are creatures of their respective state/provincial government, U.S. municipalities have a *legal and perhaps a moral claim* to existence and legitimacy, whereas Canadian municipalities do not. This situation is changing, as evidenced by British Columbia’s recognition of municipalities as a “as an order of government within their jurisdiction that […] is democratically elected, autonomous, responsible and accountable” (British Columbia, 2003). However, by and large, this distinction between the two countries remains.

The second reason why municipalities in the U.S. are better able to represent their own interests comes from the fragmentation of the U.S. political system. Indeed, because of

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⁸ To be clear: no such right exists constitutionally in Canada, nor is it implied in Canada’s constitution. However, given the strong influence of the British local government tradition on the country’s institutions, there is a strong attachment to local institutions in many parts of Canada and one could argue that there exists a “perceived right” to local government, especially among linguistic minorities. Sancton’s (1985) description of Montreal’s western English-speaking suburbs and their staunch opposition to annexation would certainly support this claim.
the “overlapping” character of jurisdictional authority in the U.S., power is often diffuse and responsibility for the implementation of “national” policies is shared among the three main levels of government. As a result, it is very difficult for senior levels of government in the U.S. to act unilaterally and to impose their will on the governed, as they usually need the cooperation of local governments to effectively implement policy. In Canada, this kind of bullying of municipalities by the federal or provincial governments is unpopular, but has become customary (Bradford, 2004).9

Having outlined the impact of political culture on the way federalism is practiced, I will, in the following two sections, explore the effects of federalism on regional governance in each country.

Regionalism under the U.S. federal regime: a complex political dynamic

The first and most important feature of U.S. federalism that affects regionalism is, of course, home rule. As explained in the preceding section, local government as a form of self-government in considered a legitimate right in the United State and it is, in the words of Silva (2004), “ingrained in the U.S. psyche” (p. 53). Compounded with the fact that local government law in the U.S. is currently structured to protect local freedom and choice, it follows that localism can enter in direct conflict with regionalism – which is perceived by some as taking away municipalities’ inalienable right to self-government (even if a regional authority does no more than identify planning priorities for the region).

The opposition of so-called “localists” to regionalism is most evident in the debate around sprawl and growth control: “For opponents of anti-sprawl reform, the home rule idea of local power is undeniably powerful. On this view, the fragmentation of our metropolitan areas into sometimes hundreds of separate local governments - each blessed with home rule - is something to be cherished rather than changed” (Barron, 2003, p. 2259, describing the localist view). Hence, the already fragmented nature of authority within the

9 Although the federal government in Canada does not have jurisdiction over municipal affairs, it is a large landowner in several Canadian municipalities, thus playing an important role in urban development. Port and airport installations and telecommunication infrastructure (e.g., cell towers) are also under federal authority. Hence, even though provinces have complete legal jurisdiction over local affairs (different from States), the federal government can still “bully” municipal governments in the few but significant areas where it does have jurisdiction.
American political system and the “tendency of the culture to associate liberty with limited government and to venerate (indeed, sometimes romanticize) the concept of ‘local control’” (Radin and Boase, 2000, p. 67), would seem to militate against regionalism – which is associated with more “external” government, and less local control.

Silva (2004), in his analysis of the documents produced by the Speaker’s Commission on Regionalism in California in the early 2000s, notes that many of the same arguments are made in favor of regional autonomy as are made in favor of home rule (e.g., about the state’s inability to tackle so-called “local” issues), and suggests that these two lines of argument could eventually converge. However, it appears that this possibility has not yet been borne out.

The second feature of U.S. federalism that has an impact on the potential for regionalism is that of overlapping authority and shared responsibility. Policy-making at all levels of government requires bargaining and negotiation with other units of government, and most major domestic programs and policies provide an implementation role for states, localities and often non-governmental organization as well. Indeed, the overlapping authority model “focuses on the development of interorganizational networks that include both governmental and nongovernmental actors” and must necessarily proceed along a path of cooperation involving many actors (Radin and Boase, 2000, p. 80).

The result is a three- or four-level game (to use Putnam’s analogy) where localities are truly “embedded” in the state/federal political system – hence the expression “marble cake” or “fruitcake federalism” to describe intergovernmental relations in the U.S. (Grodzins, 1968). Here the consequences for regional policies, programs or projects are starker: on the one hand, such policies require a large number of people to be on board and can be easily be derailed by one stakeholder, as usually no one unit of government can impose its will10. The proposal for the ARC commuter-rail tunnel under the Hudson River is a case in point: a regional project which took nearly a decade to put together was postponed overnight when the new Governor of New Jersey decided it was “not in the State’s interest” (Bloomberg News, 2010). On the other hand, regional policies (or

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10 There are important exceptions to this. Federal and State environmental agencies (such as the Federal Environmental Protection Agency or the State of California’s Bay Conservation and Development Commission), for example, have considerable power and are often able to either impose regulations that local governments must abide by, or block development projects approved by local governments.
authorities) under this regime might be more stable once they are in place, as changing them also requires a large number of actors to agree. The case of the Port Authority (PA) of New York and New Jersey is illustrative: although State politicians from either State might be reticent to defer to the PA’s policy preferences, they cannot unilaterally take away the source of its power.

The third feature of U.S. federalism determining the place of cities – and by extension, that of regions – within the political landscape is the direct involvement of the federal government in urban affairs. It is interesting to note that regional planning in the U.S. was “instated” as a national policy as early as the 1920s and that most regional planning authorities were funded almost exclusively by the federal government until the 1980s (APA, 2003).

In effect, regional planning efforts in the U.S. began in earnest with the passage of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (SCPEA) in 1928. This legislation authorized the planning commission of any given local unit of government to ask for the establishment of a regional commission to oversee the harmonious “physical development of the region” and to locate (among other things) forests, agricultural and open areas “for purposes of conservation, food and water supply” (Department of Commerce, 1928, p. 44-49). Hence, it effectively made regional planning possible.

Further evidence of the importance of the Federal government in municipal affairs is laid out in an exhaustive review of Federal-Municipal relations in the U.S. published in 1954 by Daniel R. Grant; this report concludes that “Federal influence upon the degree of metropolitan integration or disintegration has been considerable” and that the federal government does have the tools to promote metropolitan integration (p. 267).

The federal government has since then scaled back its involvement in regional affairs, but it still requires metropolitan regions to have a functional regional transportation planning agency in order to access federal transportation funding. More recently, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) created the Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grants to support “metropolitan and multijurisdictional planning efforts that integrate housing, land use, economic and workforce development, transportation, and infrastructure investments” (HUD, 2013); the approach in this case is different in that it encourages “bottom-up” collaboration as
opposed to requiring it. Nevertheless, there is no question that federal involvement, in the U.S., has historically favored “the taking of a regional view” by local government officials – whether through law-making or the funding of metropolitan transportation infrastructure and regional planning efforts.

Regionalism under Canadian federalism: a provincial prerogative

The Canadian federal system is many ways simpler than that of the U.S.: there is no separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branches, there are only two areas of public policy where provincial and federal jurisdictions overlap, and sub-provincial units of government are entirely under the tutelage of the provinces, with little or no recourse to the federal government.

The first feature of Canadian federalism that impacts the political salience of regional interests is the all-important role of the provincial government in determining the form and fate of sub-provincial units of government. As forcefully remarked by Clarkson (2001), “Canadian cities are so completely controlled by their provincial masters that they have scant opportunity proactively to take up the economic challenge of competing with cities abroad as investment locations. At the same time they have no choice about having to cope reactively with responsibilities that are unilaterally downloaded on them by provincial governments” (p. 518).

This utter dependence upon the provincial government creates a situation where policies and programs with a regional scope, if and when they are devised, are usually created by the province at its own initiative and implemented however the province sees fit. It is true that Canadian cities have often had strong mayors who were well-connected to the political elites and able to influence provincial policies (Siegel et al., 2001). However, in the absence of accountability from individual members of parliament, provincial politicians tend to cater to those local interests that suit their electoral needs, with little or no regard to the needs of metropolitan regions as a whole.

It should be noted that strong provincial leadership in regional affairs does have the potential to advance the regionalist agenda; the creation of Greater Vancouver Regional District (GVRD – now Metro Vancouver) in British Columbia in the 1967, the creation of the
Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM) in Nova Scotia in 1996 and the adoption and implementation of the Greater Golden Horseshoe Growth Plan by the Province of Ontario since 2003 are all examples of this. In other words, strong provincial involvement can, and often does, lead to stronger *formal* regional governance. However, the regionalist policies put in place by one provincial government can easily be undone by the next. Moreover, strong provincial involvement in metropolitan affairs has not necessarily fostered a “sense of regionhood” in Canadian metro regions. In fact, the opposite seems to be true in several instances, as in Montreal and Halifax (Collin, 2000; Poel, 2000).

Cameron and Simeon (2002) argue that Canada has undergone in the 1990s a transition from executive to collaborative federalism, whereby “national goals are achieved, not by the federal government acting alone or by the federal government shaping provincial behavior through the exercise of its power, but by some or all of the 11 governments and the territories acting collectively” (p. 54). Significantly, this newfound spirit of collaboration has apparently not trickled down to metropolitan regions – and Canadian politics still resemble a classic two-level game, with municipalities and regions generally subsumed by the province.

I have highlighted, in the first part of this chapter, the reasons why the study of regions – and regional governance, in particular – is pertinent from the perspectives of policy, theory and ethics. I have also made the case for studying regional governance comparatively and explained why, in particular, North America provides an interesting terrain for understanding the way government shapes regional policy-making. Finally, I have argued that the practice of federalism in the U.S. has generally been more favorable to regionalism than its equivalent in Canada.

In the next section, I first define and explain important concepts required (in my view) for undertaking a study of regional governance. In turn, I make the case for (re)examining regional collaboration and explain the puzzle that motivates this research endeavor.
1.2 The case for studying regional collaboration

Can a region that is undoubtedly a common geographic and economic area also serve as a sociological community? In other words, can... [citizens] think in terms of a region as they would of a city – or state – identifying with it and accepting it as a natural unit for political and governmental action? Will they in future tackle their urban and environmental quality problems on a regional basis?
- Delbert C. Miller, 1975, Leadership and Power in the Bos-Wash Megalopolis

It is instructive to read Miller's 1975 landmark study of the so-called “Bos-Wash Megalopolis”, as many of the questions and issues raised by its author are still very topical today: how is regional leadership exercised in the absence of regional government? How do societal actors in a large urban region, with or without formal ties to one another, decide on common policy priorities? Under what conditions, and toward what common goal, are individuals and organizations likely work together in the metropolitan context? More importantly, from my perspective, what makes regional collaboration work? The fact that these questions mattered in 1975, and still matter today, is indicative that we have not advanced very much in understanding and solving the “problem” or “puzzle” of regional collaboration.

That being said, it is important to distinguish between the intrinsic and extrinsic importance of regional collaboration. Innes and Booher (2010), in a recent volume on the subject of collaborative rationality, make a convincing case that collaboration is important in and of itself as it allows agents to form new relationship, learn from one another, develop shared meanings and identities and “discover the reciprocal nature of their interests” (p. 54). While these effects of collaboration are clearly of importance, they are by and large intrinsic to the collaborative process; that is to say, they help structure the behavior of participants and build legitimacy for the collaborative institution itself, but they do not necessarily drive policy changes and changes on the ground11.

11 Albeit, Innes and Booher (2010) also argue that “collaborative processes can lead to changes in the larger system that help make our institutions more effective and adaptive and make the system itself more resilient” (p.27), but their focus is much more intrinsic than extrinsic, in the sense that they are more interested in the effects of “collaboratively rational processes” on the institutions taking part in these processes than on the changes taking place at “ground level".
The question (and therefore puzzle) that is central to this project concerns primarily the *extrinsic importance* of regional collaborative institutions, which refers to the *outward* effects that these institutions have on the rest of society. As described by Lane and Ersson (2002), the question of extrinsic importance “is not a question of whether the norms are complied with or not, but whether the operation of the institutions brings about outcomes that go beyond the mere institutionalization of the norms” (p. 235). Stated differently, a policy effort is extrinsically important if it produces results *that go beyond mutual learning and social capital building* by those directly involved in said effort.

The aim of this research is therefore not to prove or call into question the intrinsic value of collaboration; rather, I seek to understand why certain collaborative regional initiatives make a difference in terms of providing regional public goods, while others seem to have no effect beyond the confines of the collaborative process itself. In other words, we have good reasons to believe that collaboration *does matter* to those who are in engaged in a collaborative process; the question is, does it matter to rest of us?

In the following sections, I first define a few key terms and concepts, after which I explain why regional collaboration is important to “the rest of us” and what the contributions of this research are.

### 1.2.1 Concepts and definitions

**Regional collaboration**

There is little agreement in the literature over such terms as “collaboration”, “cooperation”, “partnership” and “inter-organizational relations” and, as noted by Huxham (2003), there tends to be little mutual recognition of research on these topics across disciplines and paradigms. As a result, there is no definitive “group of experts” on the subject and not much in the way of a “common ground” upon which to build a parsimonious, internally coherent and empirically sound theory of regional collaboration.

The aim here is not to build such a theory, but instead to acknowledge the range of meanings that are associated with collaboration and clarify the important concepts that enter into the definition of regional collaboration. In the urban field, Feiock uses cooperation rather loosely to describe any agreement, alliance or partnership involving
two municipal governments or more, but his work focuses almost exclusively on inter-local agreements and contracts, i.e., partnerships between municipalities or public agencies that allow for clear efficiency gains (2004; 2007; 2008). Ansell and Gash (2007) and Innes and Booher (2010), in contrast, are interested in collaboration initiatives that bring “multiple stakeholders together in common forums with public agencies to engage in consensus-oriented decision making.” (Ansell and Gash, 2007, p. 543, emphases added).

For reasons that will explained in the remainder of this section, I think there is value in putting these different types of collaboration on an equal footing – even though they may belong to different “classes” of phenomena. That said, I also think it is important to differentiate clearly between them, which is why I want to introduce, here, a distinction between “cooperation” and “collaboration” and suggest that regional collaboration initiatives can be placed along a “collaborative scale” going from one to the other. At one end of the scale is consensus-based collaboration (as espoused by Susskind and most recently theorized by Innes and Booher, 2010), which describes the concerted effort by different actors to reach a single, shared goal and usually involves some degree of coordination (and therefore hierarchy). At the other end of the scale is pure cooperation (in the sense understood by Axelrod), which implies that people are working together on selfish yet common goals and usually involves horizontal relationships that are essentially non-exclusive in nature. In short, collaboration and cooperation essentially represent different ways of “working together” that are mutually exclusive but can complement one another (Polenske, 2004). Also importantly, a given collaborative initiative or institution may shift in one direction or the other over time; therefore, “collaboration” and “cooperation” should not be understood as essential qualities “owned” by particular groups of people or by particular institutions; rather, they should be conceptualized as transitory “states” within or between such groups and institutions.

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12 Lawrence Susskind is the originator of several important ideas and concepts relating to collaborative decision-making, including the mutual-gains approach to negotiation. His approach to collaboration (described in Susskind, 1999) emphasizes the importance of identifying common interests and working toward a single objective.

13 Robert Axelrod’s main theoretical contribution (laid out in Axelrod, 1984) is to have demonstrated, using Game Theory, that self-interested individuals have an incentive to cooperate and that cooperation is advantageous from an evolutionary standpoint.
In this research, I use the expression “regional collaboration” to describe all forms of collaboration – whether consensus-based or cooperative – as long they involve two or more entities working together within the same region but across jurisdictional boundaries. Hence I include, under the broad category of “collaborative regional initiatives” (CRI), both inter-municipal arrangements and contracts and inter-organizational partnerships, which may involve businesses, non-profit and community organizations.

**Putting metropolitan governance in theoretical context**

Following the definition of regional collaboration laid out above, the expression “metropolitan governance” is used in this text to describe any arrangement that 1) aims to coordinate policies or actions across municipal and/or jurisdictional boundaries and 2) involves governmental and non-governmental actors collaborating directly. This arrangement might be formal or informal, temporary or permanent, functionally narrow or open-ended; and it might cover a sub-region of the metropolitan area or the entire region. Participation in this arrangement might also be voluntary or not.

As noted by Feiock (2004), *governance* differs from *government* precisely in that it “encompasses more than city or county governments; it includes voluntary, not-for-profit, and private organizations as well as intergovernmental linkages” (p. 3). Hence, the notion of governance as understood here necessarily involves actors that sit outside of government. However, some arrangements that exclude either state or non-state actors (whether intentionally or circumstantially) will also be considered in the research. The aim is therefore not to exclude regional arrangements that “do not fit the bill”. Rather, the definition I propose includes a very wide range of actors in a region and I will differentiate clearly between those regional initiatives that involve civil society and the private sector and those that do not.

As for the rest of the definition, it is minimalist and non-specific for two main reasons. First, because I want to capture a wide variety of attempts to coordinate policy and action at the regional level, regardless of how they originated, how long they lasted, how successful they were and, more importantly, whether or not they were collaborative in nature. As explained earlier, regional collaboration is understood here as a governance
modality, i.e., as a type of governance mechanism (which means that governance includes more than collaboration). One way to conceptualize this broad definition of metropolitan governance is to define it along two axes: the collaboration-cooperation scale defined earlier and a scale representing the degree of centralization in decision-making, to reflect the diversity of ways in which regions are organized.

The other reason why I chose a minimalist definition is because I want to make no theoretical assumption as to why the actors involved in a given regional governance arrangement have decided to take part in this arrangement, and why other actors have been excluded or have excluded themselves. In other words, this research does not concern itself primarily with the determinants (political, social or otherwise) of collaboration; rather, it seeks to understand whether and how collaboration works (or does not work) in practice. This is a crucial point that sets the present study apart from most others on the same subject.

That said, it is important to situate the open-ended definition of metropolitan governance given here within the field of urban politics, so as to understand what paradigms inform the approach taken in this research. Indeed, as argued by Thomas Kuhn, paradigms provide us with a set of assumptions and a way of seeing the world; what we observe is therefore “predisposed” by what the paradigms we are working within. Hence, it is important to survey the main theories that inform current discussions of regional collaboration.

The paradigms that are of interest to us here – as way of background – are the ones explaining the micro-foundations of metropolitan governance, that is to say, why individuals and institutions come together in the absence of formal regional government or, in slightly different formulation of the same problem, how regional actors overcome the collective action problem that characterizes and defines the governing of most metropolitan regions.

The first such paradigm is what Stone (1989) calls the “economistic” paradigm, which pictures the world as a market and views city governments as responding to market pressures and facilitating economic development. In one of its early formulations, Public Choice Theory, the economistic paradigm posited that individuals are rational, value-maximizing voter-consumers, that the political market is more or less competitive and that
distributive and other outcomes are the product of strategic interactions in a fluid political game. More recently, a number of researchers have applied rational choice analysis (RCA), transaction cost theory, game theory and institutional collective action (ICA) theory to the problem of inter-local collaboration, focusing specifically on the benefits and transaction costs associated with inter-local agreements (e.g., Steinacker, 2004; Feiock 2007, 2008; Hawkins, 2009). In short, these “second-generation” public (or rational) choice analyses have argue that voluntary cooperation depends on service costs and benefits as well as transaction costs, which can be reduced by “formal and informal institutional arrangements that increase the availability of information, reduce obstacles to bargaining, and reinforce social capital” (Feiock, 2007, p. 59).

While the economistic paradigm provides some insight into the conditions that may facilitate or hinder regional collaboration, it does not explicitly consider the importance of civic capital or civic trust and lacks an explanation for the fact that some regions are more self-aware than others. It also reduces the role of the political leader to that of facilitator and allocator of resources. In the words of Feiock, “policy entrepreneurs have an incentive to promote institutional collective action when they expect to receive a disproportionate benefit from the product of collective action” (p. 7). The “problem” of power, within this theoretical framework, is therefore not one of compliance or conflict mediation, but rather one of efficiency maximization. Given the importance of political initiative and regional awareness in my understanding of the region as a socio-political entity (as described earlier and in the following section), it is clear that my definition of “regional governance” is broader than that proposed by Feiock and other theorists working within the economistic paradigm.

Urban regime theory, which was developed partly in reaction to the economistic paradigm, set out to describe the concentration of power in cities in the absence of a centralized command-and-control structure. Because of its explicit focus on the mediation of public and private interests through the formation of “governing coalitions”, regime theory allows us to overcome some of the shortcomings of economistic paradigms. However, it makes important assumptions that render it difficult to apply at the regional level: first, regime actors within regime theory always seek regime stability; second, regimes have the ability to formulate and implement policies. A large number of region-
wide coalitions exist in U.S. and Canadian metro areas, but these are not “governing” coalitions in the sense employed by Stone (1989), as regional coalitions do not generally make policy per se.

The basic premise of regime theory, which is that political leaders at the local level cannot govern effectively without the tacit or explicit support of business and other community leaders, is transferable to the regional context; however, the conception of power behind regime theory, which involves among other things “taking initiative” and “framing proposed actions as collective responses”, is not transferable to the regional scale. In Hamilton’s own words:

“Governing regimes at the regional level are different from city regimes. The city governing regime cannot simply transform itself into a regional regime. [...] The downtown mindset of the business sector collaborating with a powerful city mayor to develop a governing regime does not translate to the regional level. The public sector efforts are tentative and there in no regional constituency, although there is an increasing interest to solve regional problems” (2002, p. 420).

Hence, the notion of regional governance I propose draws from regime theory but is, once again, broader in its scope as it is not limited to regional governance arrangements that include the power and/or resources to take initiative directly.

A third paradigm has emerged which neither takes for granted that collaboration is strictly of matter of efficiency (or lack thereof), nor that regional coalitions have the ability and clout to make policy: the New Regionalism. In short, the new regionalist agenda is, first and foremost, to promote cross-jurisdictional coordination within metropolitan regions through other means than the establishment of a metropolitan government14. As described by Savitch and Vogel (2009), “New regionalists emphasize that metropolitan governance arrangements15 are the result of a long-term negotiated process of structuring governance among and between local, state/provincial and central governments and private actors” (p. 119).

The definition of metropolitan governance proposed above concords with that of new regionalists, but it differs in one important way: the new regionalist perspective on metropolitan governance is (at least in its original formulation) fundamentally a normative

14 A more detailed description of the tenets of the New Regionalism is provided in the next section.
15 These include both formal and informal arrangements.
one. In effect, most new regionalists see inter-municipal collaboration and public-private partnerships at the regional level as different \textit{means to an end}, whether that end is regional equity, economic competitiveness or smart growth (see for example Rusk, 2000, Kanter, 2000 and Yaro, 2000, all in the same volume). As a result, scholars in the new regionalist school have not, until recently, paid much attention to the collaborative process itself or its outcomes. In other words, the new regionalists have been more interested in formulating a policy agenda than in describing the terrain of metropolitan governance.

I expect, in this research, to look at all forms of metropolitan governance that involve governmental and non-governmental actors, without making assumptions as to their nature (e.g., formal vs. informal) or goal (e.g., equity and/or environmental preservation). The definition I propose is therefore \textit{inspired} by Regime Theory and New Regionalism, but it also extends their respective conception of regional governance to include a wider array of “regional arrangements”.
Governmental leadership and initiative

Descriptive and normative theories of metropolitan governance differ on many counts, including in what they posit as the “proper” role of government. However, despite their differences, the main theories agree on one thing: the incentive structure put in place by higher levels of government (i.e., State/Provincial and Federal), which is made up (among other things) of rules, constraints and rewards, is crucial in shaping collaboration. Moreover, scholars and policy activists on all sides recognize that “higher” governmental initiative is often required to initiate, mediate or facilitate collaboration.

For the new regionalist scholars and activists interested in regional equity, the need for initiative by higher levels of government is clear and unequivocal: only if aided by such government action can regions address the issue of entrenched social and racial inequality (Orfield, 1997; 2002; Weir, 2000). In the words of Weir and colleagues (2005): “states are critical players [in promoting or inhibiting regional interaction]: they set the terms and conditions under which regionalism occurs” (p. 732). They cite, as evidence, the cases of Portland and the Twin Cities, where new state laws were instrumental “in altering the terms” on which cities and suburbs interacted.

Public choice and ICA theorists have also recognized the need for action by higher governments. In the words of Feiock (2004): “[...] state actions that constrain local choices and reduce uncertainty may be valuable because regional policy problems are characterized by strategic interaction, multiple equilibria, and analytic uncertainty. Efforts [by higher governments] to promote regional governance and cooperation must be able to influence the strategic actions of jurisdictions with competing interests” (p. 244).

Approaching the question differently, Regime Theory\(^\text{16}\) describes governmental initiative in terms of the “leadership tasks” that a governmental organization must carry outs. Citing Elkin (1985), Stone (1989) describes the task of governing at the local level as “putting together arrangements that cope with the division of labor between state and economy” (p. 146). More specifically, he suggests that governmental leadership involves

\(^{16}\text{As described earlier, Regime Theory is not, formally, a theory of metropolitan governance, but I believe its understanding of the role of government in coalition-building is informative and can be applied, at least tentatively, in the metropolitan context.}\)
both “deciding particular policy questions” and “creating, maintaining, and modifying the \textit{de facto} governing arrangements of the community” (Stone, 1989, p. 147). Government, in short, seems to act as the “glue” that holds together the governing coalition (or regime) in place in a particular urban setting at a particular time. Clearly, if we apply Regime Theory at the regional level, some higher government authority must play that role – whether by simply enabling collaboration or by actually convening regional actors.

Finally, it appears as though higher-level governmental initiative might have the potential to “force” local jurisdictions to act with a broader view in mind. Indeed, while Gainsborough (2001) finds that some state laws can hinder cooperation, her analysis suggests that State rules that create incentives for local politicians to look beyond the boundaries of their municipalities and that “make more visible the shared fortunes of city and suburban localities” (p. 509) actually improve the prospects for regional cooperation. Recent regional developments in Toronto, where the Provincial government has imposed a strict growth management regime, also suggest that rules imposed from above can facilitate the “upscaling” of collaboration efforts (Keil, 2011). Conversely, Collin (2000), Hétu (2009) and many others\textsuperscript{17} have noted that the lack of regional autonomy in Montreal is due in part to the reluctance of Québec's provincial government to give more power to a political entity which could potentially question or counter its authority.

To sum up, there is a growing consensus that horizontal collaboration by itself is not enough. In the worlds of Weir and colleagues: “For regional efforts to be effective, they must be backed by political power sufficient either to prevail in competing decision-making venues or to block challenges from them. [...] No matter how inclusive and collaborative the networks or innovative the plans for regional transportation, they will produce little real change if not backed by vertical power” (p. 485).\textsuperscript{18}

There is no question, then, that State/Provincial governmental initiative and leadership, whatever form it takes, has a significant impact on the prospects for regional collaboration. Following a similar logic as for the definition of “regional collaboration” and “metropolitan governance” – and in an attempt to capture the different forms of

\textsuperscript{17} Including this author, in a forthcoming chapter (Thibert, 2013)

\textsuperscript{18} That is not to say vertical power is always "enabling"; the manifestation of vertical power in a given region may be residual from State/Provincial actions taken long ago – such as creation of the Port Authority in NY/NJ – that now constrain the ability of state and local governments to set interstate or even agendas.
governmental intervention in the metropolitan context – I include in the definition of higher governmental initiative all rules, programs and punctual interventions by State/Provincial governments that explicitly aim to steer regional development and/or encourage policy coordination and program delivery across jurisdictional boundaries.

Civic capital

The last important concept that I want to define may appear to be somewhat elusive, yet it is key to understanding why collaborative regional initiatives (CRIs) “work” in certain regions and not in others. In the words of Potapchuk and Crocker (1999), “civic capital, the collective civic capacities of a community, is the currency supporting collaborative strategies that pursue innovative programs and forge new relationships among stakeholders” (p. 175). It is what a community (or group) produces when it shares a common vision of the future, has deep “reservoirs” of trust to draw upon, and is able to create an infrastructure for collective action and public engagement.

Interestingly, despite the fact that civic capital is, by nature, difficult to operationalize and quantify – and therefore difficult to study empirically across a large number of cases – it is often cited (either explicitly or implicitly) as one of the main factors of success in those regions that have been able to “act regionally”. Most recently, Nelles (2012) developed the argument that other factors are of secondary importance in understanding the emergence of regional governance networks and that, all things considered, civic capital is a better predictor of inter-local cooperation than structural or institutional variables.

In a similar line of argument, Wolfe and Nelles (2008) argue that civic entrepreneurship and the concomitant building of civic capital are key ingredients to the success of economic clusters. Interestingly, their finding that informal networks of business and civic leaders enable cooperation among regional actors is not new: Sabel (1989) and Amin (1999) have argued, in earlier studies, that social institutions within urban regions – whether business-based or community-based – help foster trust, which in turn encourages cooperation, risk-taking and innovation. They may not have used the expression “civic
capital” to describe this “glue” that holds the region together, but the phenomenon they describe is clearly of the same kind.

It is important to mention that the concept of civic capital, as defined by Potapchuk and Crocker (1989), Henton and colleagues (1997) and most recently Nelles (2012), draws explicitly on theories of social capital, civic culture and policy networks. However, it is important to note that the concepts of social and civic capital are not interchangeable. Feiock (2007), for instance, describes the importance of social capital and reciprocity norms in increasing the “credibility of commitment” of individual actors and decreasing the transaction costs of joint action; however, as pointed out by Nelles (2009), the transactional perspective (of which ICA is an iteration) does not explain the role that policy networks seem to play in “extending the potential boundaries of cooperative relationships” (p. 55) and creating an attachment to place. More importantly, perhaps, civic capital differs from social and cultural forms of capital in that it is owned not by individuals, but by groups or networks of individuals. In other words, civic capital refers to a group’s ability to leverage the strength of inter-personal relationships within the group to act as one – rather than to the credibility that individuals within a community derive from their commitment to it (as is the case with social capital) or from the knowledge, skills and other advantages they have at their disposal (as is the case with cultural capital).

Civic capital, then, is more of a collective trait than an individual one; rather than saying that a person “has civic capital”, as one would with social and cultural forms, one will say that civic capital “is at work” when a group of individuals rally around a cause and act together to make something happen. That said, social, cultural and civic capital are obviously mutually reinforcing, and may manifest themselves in similar ways.

In sum, if we are interested in what makes a particular region “work”, we have to understand not only how regional cooperation and solidarity are established, but also how they are, in turn, used by regional groups, coalitions and partnerships to push agendas

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19 These theories will not be described here in detail, as it would not add much to the rich genealogy of the concept of civic capital that Nelles (2012) has laid out. It suffices here to mention that civic capital is an extension of the concept of social capital and it

20 A number of researchers have operationalized the concept by applying it to large groups; as a matter of fact, some of these researchers have given countries or sub-national regions “civic capital” scores, which are supposed to reflect the collectivity’s “values and beliefs that help cooperation” (Guiso et al., 2010). In present research, we apply the concept to smaller collectivities, but the concept remains more or less the same.
forward (or, in certain, resist change that is deemed undesirable). This is precisely what our focusing on civic capital allows us to do.

1.2.2 Why study regional collaboration?

In North America, a long-standing feud has opposed so-called “traditional regionalists”, who advocated territorial consolidation to solve metropolitan problems, to “localists” who – bolstered by public choice theory – favored multiple, autonomous and competing local governments. As described by Kong (2011), the former have usually stressed intra-regional equity and inter-regional competitiveness, while the latter have highlighted the importance of democratic legitimacy and intra-regional effectiveness (as measured by the extent to which the provision of public goods matches consumer preferences). However, given the irreconcilability of their normative stances and the fact that neither hypothesis is supported by strong empirical evidence (Carr and Feiock 1999; Morgan and Mareschal, 1999), the debate has not been solved. As a consequence of this stalemate, many scholars have concluded (or continued to assume) that metropolitan governance (or the absence thereof) does not have much of an impact.

Enter “New Regionalism” in the 1990s, which (as explained earlier) posited voluntary inter-local cooperation as a way to “solve” the regionalist-localist debate. In the words of Heinelt and Kübler (2005) “new regionalism […] focuses on the emergence of metropolitan governance through the interaction between a variety of actors rather than through state hierarchy” (10). Hence, the New Regionalism is seen by some scholars as “the best of both worlds”, i.e., a policy and research agenda based on the recognition that regional issues must be addressed at the regional level but that regionalism cannot be imposed from above (Hulst and van Montfort, 2006). To use the expression employed by Nelles (2012), New Regionalism as a mode of governance sits (not always comfortably) between “centralized engagement” and “functional fragmentation” (p. 12). Also importantly, “New Regionalism” is both a normative and a descriptive concept; hence, it assumes different guises in different contexts.

In some of its recent iterations, new regionalist governance resembles the kind of arrangement proposed by public choice theorists in the 1970s insofar as service provision
is decidedly no longer the reserve of government; local governments can decide to “produce” a good or service in-house, contract with another public entity or with a private entity or simply regulate the activities of private actors and "let the market work it out". New Regionalism differs from Public Choice formulations in that it promises more public participation, more deliberation and metropolitan solutions that are better adapted to the specific problem at hand. In essence, the New Regionalism aims to move beyond inter-local cooperation, which primarily concerns inter-municipal agreements for consolidated service delivery, by promoting new forms of voluntary collaboration among government organizations, the private sector and civil society.

At the beginning of the 21st century, New Regionalism as a policy approach was vigorously debated in the academic literature (see for example Frisken and Norris, 2001; Gainsborough, 2001; Swanstrom, 2001); today, however, it has become a state of fact (or an article of faith) in much of North America. In effect, the new regionalist “principles” have so percolated into the policy realm that the expression “regional governance” is now, in much of the contemporary literature on the subject, synonymous with “new regionalist governance”. It is interesting to note, for instance, that very few metropolitan regions in Canada and the U.S. have formal regional government institutions that either 1) have coercive power over all jurisdictions within a particular region and/or 2) cumulate more than one function (e.g., transportation planning, air quality management, water and sewage, etc.). More importantly, civil society organizations and business organizations (such as metropolitan chambers of commerce) in particular have taken on an important role in several U.S. metropolitan regions as conveners of regional dialogue – in line with the new regionalist stance.

Also, given the nature and complexity of area-wide social and environmental issues and the difficulties involved in community organizing at the metropolitan level, advocacy groups have often taken on a less confrontational and more collaborative stance, leading to joint initiatives with local governments and/or the private sector. One could argue, then, that the new regionalist paradigm has permeated not only the economic field, but the fields of social and environmental advocacy as well.
In sum, what was originally described as “a wave” in U.S. regionalism (Wallis, 1994a, 1994b) has become the de facto modus operandi in much of metropolitan North America. As a consequence, collaboration in the North American metropolitan context is not seen as an option; on the contrary, it is understood by regional actors as a necessity, whether to achieve economic competitiveness, environmental preservation or equality of opportunity within metropolitan areas.

To summarize the foregoing discussion, scholars are becoming less interested in the form and/or structure of government, and more interested in governance capacity – the capacity of a given institutional arrangement to deliver “regional” public goods (Foster and Barnes, 2012). In this context, and given the rise of new regionalism as a mode of governance, it is crucial that we gain a firmer grasp of the dynamics of regional collaboration.

1.2.3 What is the contribution of this research?

Three decades ago, Danielson and Doig asked an important question in their book New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development: to what extent do the actions of governmental organizations have a significant independent influence on urban development within the metropolitan sphere? The book was, among other things, a response to Public Choice interpretations of urban regional development, which generally downplayed the importance – and, indeed, the necessity – of government policies and programs to steer, encourage or constrain urban growth. Their findings were unequivocal: governmental influence is frequently important and in many cases “public programs significantly modify or amplify development trends” (p. 3).

Needless to say, much was written on the subject of regional urban development and regional governance since the publication of the book in 1982: first, in the 1980s, a number of authors continued to study regional governance “structures” in terms of efficiency and equity, in the tradition of the “metropolitan reform school”; then, progressively, the focus of most scholars in the field shifted from the structure and influence of formal government to that of civil society and informal modes of governance,
more generally. As explained earlier, this shift corresponds to (or, at least, is concomitant with) the rise of the new regionalist school.

Unlike Raymond Vernon, Robert C. Wood and their colleagues who concluded in the 1950s that public policy was “of little consequence” in shaping regional development, the new regionalists believe that government action is necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve the goals of regional equity and economic competitiveness\textsuperscript{21}. The new regionalist perspective is shared not only by academics but also, importantly, by practitioners and professionals in regional organizations\textsuperscript{22}. Illustratively, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Bay Area Council emphatically declared, in an interview I conducted in August 2011: “collaboration is now the name of the game”.

Given the tacit acceptance of the tenets of New Regionalism by a large number of scholars and policy-makers, one would expect there to be solid evidence that regional collaboration is, indeed, the most promising avenue for metropolitan regions – i.e., that collaboration regional initiatives (CRIs) in metro areas have had concrete, positive results and that they are, in fact, “filling the gaps” of metropolitan governance. Yet, what evidence exists is partial and mixed, at best. Indeed, the social and political determinants of regional

\textsuperscript{21}The “first wave” of new regionalist scholars and activists (in the early to late 1990s) were primarily concerned with issues of regional equity, which became the movement’s main normative goal at the time (see for example Rusk, 1993 and Orfield, 1997). However, other formulations of the New Regionalism, such as that of Donald Parks and Ronald Oakerson (1989, 2000), are in fact reinterpretations of Public Choice Theory emphasizing primarily the need for decentralization. In recent years, a third “strand” of New Regionalism has emerged that envisions regionalism as a response to the exigencies of the “global economic playing field” where metropolitan regions are in competition with one another (see for example Ohmae, 1995; 2001 and Ward, 2004). Regardless of its intellectual guides, however, the New Regionalism remains a normative framework (i.e., a set of arguments in support of a particular policy agenda) and it retains its focus on decentralization and voluntary collaboration.

\textsuperscript{22}In addition to the examples of community-based and congregation-based forms of regionalism cited by Swanstrom and Banks (2009) and Kleidman (2004), there is another more recent regional initiative in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area that is clearly new regionalist in spirit, called Region Forward. In the document’s opening statement, Sharon Bulova, who chairs the regional coalition that has pressed for the initiative, states: “The Greater Washington 2050 Coalition has developed Region Forward, a planning guide that reflects our shared, regional goals, helps us measure regional progress, and demonstrates the many benefits of working together more closely. Region Forward is not a one-size-fits all vision. It accepts the differences among our cities and counties. But it also embraces something that residents of the District of Columbia, suburban Maryland and Northern Virginia understand: our futures are interconnected.” (2010, p.i, emphasizes mine). New regionalist governance can take many forms and may not always be recognizable as such, but the wording of Region Forward’s opening statement leaves no doubt as to the new regionalist spirit of the initiative.
collaboration have received much scholarly attention; however the effects of such collaboration efforts have not been studied systematically.

First, while some researchers have indeed found that CRIIs can have a positive impact on outcomes such as biodiversity and natural habitat protection, farmland preservation, the integration of smart growth principles in development practice, the retention of firms and local economic development (Innes and Rongerude, 2005; Pastor et al., 2000), the bulk of the evidence comes from case studies, which are often selected on the dependent variable (and therefore cannot be relied upon to give us a sense of the overall effectiveness of CRIIs). The most striking evidence of this is that a handful of cases turn up in an inordinately large number of studies – Joint Venture: Silicon Valley Network, for instance, is mentioned in no fewer than 600 books, articles and reports, while the Toronto Food Policy Council is referred in more than 350 such documents.

Second, there have been a few quantitative studies seeking to assess the effectiveness of regional collaboration, but these studies have focused almost exclusively on the perceived benefits of inter-local agreements, contracts and partnerships. In the words of Feiock (2007): “ICA focuses on how local government officials perceive and weigh the various costs and benefits of cooperation as they contemplate interlocal service agreements and other forms of intergovernmental cooperation” (p. 48, emphases mine). While it is informative to understand the motivations of those who participate in collaborative institutions, their perceptions as to the costs and benefits of collaboration may or may not be accurate. Indeed, as argued by Lubell (2004), the distinction between perceived policy effectiveness and the effectiveness of policy is not trivial; in his own words, “collaborative institutions indirectly increase levels of consensus by changing collective-action beliefs, but may not change levels of cooperative behavior” (p. 565). Hence, the need to study the effects of collaboration specifically and explicitly.

Third, a number of critics of the New Regionalism have presented evidence to the effect that special districts (which usually result from inter-local agreements and are generally seen by ICA scholars as promoting efficiency) are not necessarily more efficient

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23 These estimates are based on a search for each CRI in the Google Scholar search engine, conducted on October 26th, 2012. Note that Google Scholar searches through all online documents in pdf format that have one or more authors, a title and a bibliography; it therefore includes all peer-reviewed articles, digitalized books and reports published online, but excludes all popular media articles, blog posts and web pages.
and may in fact steer policy away from redistribution by focusing resources on service delivery. In effect, this is what Foster (1997) argues in her seminal work on special-purpose governments: not only do district-reliant metropolitan areas spend significantly more per capita on public services overall than do less district-reliant metro regions, they also (and perhaps, consequently) spend significantly less on non district-provided services – i.e., on welfare functions, neighborhood revitalization and the like. In other words, inter-municipal service delivery agreement – which constitute a form of regional collaboration – may work against the goal of regional equity and thus against “regionalism” as understood by such scholars as David Rusk, Todd Swanstrom and Margaret Weir. It has also been argued that special-purpose governments can effectively increase the degree of fragmentation in the governance of metropolitan regions and impede more ad hoc forms of collaboration (Mullin, 2007; Frug, 2002).

However, these findings have been contradicted by other studies (see for instance Leland and Smirnova, 2008, on the efficiency of SPGs for bus transit) and there is general agreement that the “jury is still out” on whether SPGs are more efficient – and if so for the provision of what particular public good and under what condition. In the words of Martin and Bradshaw (2007): “No general rule can be applied to when it is, or is not, appropriate to utilize a special district government” (p. 13). It is also important to note that research measuring the effectiveness of CRIs deal almost exclusively with special districts – which, as explained earlier, represent only one form of collaboration (a form that is in fact closer to our definition of cooperation). We cannot, therefore, conclude much about the effectiveness of collaboration based on these analyses.

Finally, a number of scholars have taken an interest in the conditions under which regional collaboration is likely to succeed. On the one hand, Gatrell and Spiker (2001) remark that regional policy networks are unlikely to be effective if the region in question is an artificial construct that does not resonate with the identity of the actors involved. In their own words: “The success or failure of new regionalism and related economic development efforts is fully dependent upon the legitimacy of a shared policy agenda” (p. 7). In other words, according to the hypothesis put forward by these scholars, new regionalist governance must take root where old regional ties exist, or where “regional awareness” can be nurtured. On the other hand, Weir and colleagues (2009) argue that
horizontal collaboration is no substitute for vertical coordination; in other words, policy networks cannot be effective unless higher government is involved. Although these studies differ in their conclusion, they both underscore the importance of forces exogenous to the collaborative process itself.

This uncertainty as to the actual benefits of collaborative governance leads me to ask two interrelated questions, echoing Danielson and Doig:

1) To what extent does regional collaboration have a significant independent influence on urban development within the metropolitan sphere (whether by giving weight to existing policies, facilitating policy implementation or fostering the development of new regional policies), as opposed to having no influence or influencing governance capacity without influencing policy outcomes?

2) Under what social and political conditions is regional collaboration more likely to succeed?

In other words, the research proposed here seeks to discover whether regional collaboration matters beyond the confines of the collaborative process itself – and if so what kind of collaboration, under what conditions and it what ways.

To summarize, then, the main contribution of this research is four-fold: first, it seeks to describe and measure the outcomes of collaboration instead of looking at its determinants; second, it focuses specifically on the extrinsic effects of collaboration, as opposed to its intrinsic effects, while still taking into account the internal dynamics of the collaborative process; third it aims to consider all forms of collaboration on an equal footing so as to understand whether certain forms are more effective than others; finally, the analysis will explicitly look into the role of governmental leadership, regional awareness and civic capital in facilitating policy coordination and implementation.
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Chapter 2

Conceptual and methodological framework

2.1 Conceptual framework, questions and hypotheses

In what follows, I first explain the way I have operationalized the concept of regional collaboration for the purposes of this research. In turn, I describe the main variables included in the analysis, followed by a detailed description of the main research questions and hypotheses. Finally, I lay out the general methodological approach and the specific research design used in this study, as well as my choice of case studies.

2.1.1 Toward a conceptual model of regional collaboration

As detailed in Chapter 1, metropolitan governance in North America relies significantly and increasingly upon public-private, collaborative efforts; hence, the effectiveness of urban regional governance depends on our understanding of the causal pathways between collaboration and regional outcomes. The present analysis concerns itself with three of these outcomes, namely: economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability and socio-economic and racial segregation.

Given that regional collaboration takes different forms that are likely to affect regional outcomes differently, it is important to distinguish among them. For the purposes of this research, three main types of regional collaboration will be studied, from the “collaborative end” to the “cooperative end” of the scale:

1) **Bottom-up regional collaboration** efforts. These collaborative initiatives may be initiated by local governments, business organizations or non-governmental organization. They are not subject to higher government oversight and generally tackle regional issues that cannot be easily bounded (such as air pollution, traffic congestion, affordable housing, etc.), such as when non-governmental and governmental organizations work together on their own initiative on a specific issue
that is of "common interest”. This type of collaboration differs from the two others in that the costs and benefits of participation are not known in advance; in other words, participants in these kinds of collaborative efforts usually do not expect an immediate “return” on their investment in time and energy. Food policy councils, regional planning exercises that are not mandated by the state and business coalitions would fall under this category. Most collaborative initiatives that have received a regionally focused grant from either a private source (such as the James Irvine Foundation) or a public source (such as the Government of Alberta, which has a Regional Collaboration Program, or the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, which had until 2011 a Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program) would also be included here.

2) **State-mandated regional collaboration** efforts. These include those cases when States or Provinces require municipalities in a given metropolitan areas to agree on a regional transportation or land-use plan in order to receive funding from them, or require different government agencies and non-governmental stakeholders to work out a common strategy to deal with a regional problem (e.g., the protection of estuaries, as with the CALFED program). Note that state-mandated collaborative efforts may result in an enforceable plan or regulation, or require only that participants agree voluntarily on a common strategy; the difference between the former and the latter is the degree of forcefulness of the government’s mandate (e.g., forcing municipalities to make provisions in their local plans for the creation of affordable housing vs. withholding funds from municipalities failing to build sufficient affordable housing vs. providing financial incentives for municipalities agreeing to build more affordable housing). Although state-mandated collaboration is often organized around (and motivated by) the distribution of higher government funding, it does not necessarily have funding attached; under the TEA-21 legislation, for instance, metropolitan planning organization (MPOs) in the U.S. are assigned a mandate to become the pivot point of meaningful inter-agency collaboration, but there is no clear “enforcement mechanism” whereby the federal government can withhold funds from MPOs if they do not fulfill their collaboration mandate. Funds
may be withheld if the MPO fails to adopt a regional transportation plan, but the formulation and adoption of this plan may or may not be collaborative. In the case of the Places to Grow Act, in Ontario, local municipalities within each regional municipality in the Greater Golden Horseshoe have to agree on densification targets and present a growth plan to the Province’s Growth Secretariat, but the consequences for not doing so are administrative (e.g., delayed official plan approval) as opposed to monetary.

3) **Functional regional collaboration** efforts. These efforts are usually formalized through the establishment of special-purpose governments (SPGs) or inter-local agreements and may take the shape of so-called “taxation districts” or contractual inter-local “alternative service delivery” agreements. One could argue that these inter-municipal agreements, which are generally enabled or directly established by State/Provincial statute, constitute a form of inter-local cooperation and not a form of regional collaboration, as they do not require participants to work on a common objective; indeed, the costs and benefits of participation in these kinds of arrangements (and their distribution among participants) are usually well-known and easier to measure (and therefore monitor) than in bottom-up collaboration initiatives (e.g., an increase in the efficiency of service delivery is most easily measurable than a better coordination of housing policy region-wide). However, functional collaborative efforts still require some form of coordination across jurisdictional boundaries, which is at the core of the regional collaboration task. Moreover, while SPGs may differ in kind from most collaboration efforts mentioned previously in that they are governments, the literature suggests they may affect the efficacy and efficiency of regional governance as well as the allocation of resources within regions. Hence, I believe it is important to include them in a study of the effects of regional collaboration.

Given that past collaboration between local officials, civic leaders and other regional actors facilitates future collaboration efforts involving the same individuals and/or groups (Feiock, 2007; Lubell, 2007), it is reasonable to expect that inter-municipal collaboration
efforts in any given area (i.e., waste management, air quality, environmental preservation, housing affordability, etc.) will increase the overall level of cooperation in the region (as the civic and business leaders called upon in one instance are likely to be the same in another). In other words, regional collaboration appears to be – at least partially – path dependent.

This does not change the fact that certain forms of collaboration may be better adapted to deal with certain problems or provide certain public goods; however, it does mean that the overall level of each type of collaboration may have an impact on the resilience of the region as a whole and not simply on the policy areas for which these collaboration efforts were designed. For example, it is conceivable that state-mandated collaboration in the policy area of air quality will have an impact on collaboration in other policy areas and, by extension, on the region’s ability to deal with economic shocks and environmental change. Thus, in addition to being path dependent within a given policy area, collaboration in one area may spill over across policy areas.

Keeping these considerations in mind, I seek to develop a theory that specifies, first, the nature of the relationship between each type of collaboration and each of the three regional outcomes that I have previously mentioned, namely economic competitiveness, environmental sustainability and socio-economic and racial integration. In other words, each type of collaboration becomes an explanatory variable and each outcome becomes a dependent variable.

Note that I am mainly preoccupied with regions’ overall reliance on each type of collaboration (measured by the number of regional initiatives as well as the total number of organizations involved in collaborative initiatives regionally), but this research also deals with the specific subjects (or areas) of collaboration within each category (e.g., State-mandated collaboration efforts dealing with air quality vs. watershed management). Where possible, the strength of “overall reliance” is measured in relative terms (i.e., as a z-score), such that the intensity of collaboration can be thought of as a continuous variable (going from low relative reliance to high relative reliance).

In addition to estimating the impact of each type of collaboration on each regional outcome, I also attempt to describe the causal mechanisms that connect the intensity of collaboration (in its different guises) at time 1 to economic competitiveness,
environmental quality and socio-economic integration at time 2 by studying the role of three potential moderators, namely regional awareness, governmental initiative\textsuperscript{24} in metropolitan affairs and civic capital\textsuperscript{25}. Indeed, the literature suggests that these three variables may have both an independent effect on regional outcomes (see for example Abbott, 1997 and Nelles, 2012) as well as a moderating effect on the relationship between collaboration and each of them (as suggested by Gatrell and Spiker, 2001). It is important to note that the moderating effect may be different for each pair of explanatory and dependent variables; however, the important point is that we expect each of these relationships to be at least partially moderated

The basic conceptual model, including the precursor variables (at time 0) that will be described in the next chapter, is represented in Figure 2.1 on the next page.

\textsuperscript{24} The distinction between “state-mandated collaboration” and “governmental initiative”, as understood here, can be described as such: state-mandated collaboration refers to the presence or absence of a federal, state or provincial “framework” for regional collaboration and to the degree of enforceability of these governmental frameworks; higher governmental initiative, on the other hand, refers to higher government’s willingness and/or propensity to intervene in metropolitan affairs by delegating planning powers to regional agencies or imposing some form of growth management. They are, of course, related, but they are not the same: a State or Provincial government may well impose some form of collaboration without also imposing growth management or sponsoring the creation of regional economic development agency. As one interviewee told me, imposing regional collaboration may in fact be a way for higher governments to shed responsibility for metropolitan affairs by letting local governments “figure things out on their own” (Bossé, 2013).

\textsuperscript{25} The moderating role of civic capital is not examined in the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 3, but it is examined in the case studies presented in Chapters 4 and 5.
Figure 2.1 – Conceptual model of the moderated relationship between regional collaboration and economic, environmental and socio-economic outcomes

Notes:

1) As indicated by the two-way arrow between the moderators and the explanators, I allow for the possibility that causality between them may run in both directions. Reverse causality between explanators and precursors or between moderators and precursors should not be an issue, however, as precursors are measured at Time 0.

2) The dotted arrow between the precursors and the moderators is an acknowledgement that some of the precursors may affect both the explanators and the moderators; however, by controlling for the moderators we ensure that the precursors and not directly related to the outcomes.

3) To reduce the risk of spuriousness, the outcomes will be measured as the change in each of the variables from the beginning to the end of the period, controlling for that variable’s baseline level.
2.1.2 Research questions and general hypotheses

As explained in the previous section, relatively little scholarly attention has been paid to the effects of regional collaboration and most of the empirical research on the subject concerns functional forms of cooperation. As a consequence, the hypotheses below are fairly general and exploratory; they are based on the findings from a small number of quantitative analyses and detailed case studies.

**Q1:** Does a particular type of regional collaboration (functional, state-mandated, bottom-up) in a given policy area (environment, housing, economic development) facilitate or hinder collaboration of other types and/or in other policy areas?

**H1.1:** There is strong empirical evidence that past collaboration in a given area is a strong predictor of future collaborative efforts in the same area (Feiock, 2004, 2007, 2008; Lubell, 2004, 2007); however, we know little about the potential “spill over effect” of a specific type of collaboration in a specific area onto other forms of collaboration in other areas. Based on the work of Nelles (2012) and others, it does appear as though there are transferable “lessons” from regional collaboration initiatives and that work in one area may facilitate future work in different areas through a building of regional awareness and regional civic capital (as defined earlier).

**Therefore, I hypothesize that there will be moderate spillover effects from earlier forms of collaboration (functional and state-mandated) onto more recent collaborative initiatives (mainly bottom-up).**

**Q2:** What impact does each type of collaboration have on each of the three regional outcomes identified (i.e., economic competitiveness, environmental quality and racial and socio-economic integration)?
**H2.1:** Based on Foster’s findings (1997), we should expect higher overall reliance on SPGs to steer public policy away from the provision of non-district provided public goods – which usually includes economic development, environmental preservation and welfare functions. That said, as mentioned earlier, Feiock (2007) and Lubell (2007) have both emphasized the path-dependency of collaboration (in the sense that past collaboration increases the likelihood of future collaboration), such that higher reliance on SPGs at time 1 may have an impact on the intensity of collaboration/cooperation in other policy areas during the same period. Reliance on SPGs may therefore simultaneously decrease the policy attention paid to the specific regional outcomes that I have identified, while increasing overall collaboration intensity. Lastly, Feiock (2004; 2007) notes that inter-local partnerships (such as SPGs) tend to function better when the costs and benefits of collaboration are clear, which tends not to be the case with the particular public goods that I have identified. In sum, there is no reason to believe that reliance on SPGs (in the aggregate) will have much an impact on regional outcomes, except through the reinforcement of other forms of collaboration.

Given these considerations, I hypothesize that total the number of functional inter-municipal agreements (or SPGs) in a given region, controlling for population and geographical size, will have only a weak significant and independent effect on the economic, environmental and social performance of metro regions. Likewise, the number of SPGs in each policy area (environment, housing26 and economic development) will have little or no effect on the outcome(s) linked to that policy area.

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26 As explained more fully in Chapter 3, the main policy lever affecting socio-economic integration is housing policy and the provision of affordable housing, in particular. In the quantitative analysis, therefore, I have measured collaboration tackling socio-economic segregation by measuring the intensity of state-mandated, bottom-up and functional collaboration in the area of housing. Indeed, policies in this area are more easily comparable than revenue sharing policies (of which there are too few examples) or zoning regulations (of which there are too many variants).
H2.2: On the one hand, as noted by a number of scholars, collaboration mandated by states or provinces creates a clear framework for collaboration, establishes “ground rules” that apply to all players in the same way and may bring local government officials and other actors to “see beyond the horizon” (Feoick, 2004; Gainsborough, 2001; Keil, 2011). Also importantly, some of the most important levers affecting the provision of economic, environmental and social public goods are only within reach of state and provincial government (e.g., inclusionary zoning for socio-economic integration, tax breaks to attract certain industries and transferable development rights to facilitate conservation). On the other hand, bottom-up and grant-based forms of collaboration, which always require some form of voluntarism, may have better “regional fit”, in the sense that they are more likely to fill a gap left by existing institutions and draw on the strengths and practices of the region while trying to compensate for its deficiencies (Innes and Rongerude, 2005), but they are also more likely to suffer from collaborative inertia (Huxham, 2003), wherein no individual or organization has the legitimacy to take the lead.

Hence, I advance the hypothesis that collaboration mandated by the state or province will have a greater impact on the three regional outcomes than bottom-up forms of collaboration.

Q3: Is regional collaboration better suited to the provision of certain public goods? If so which ones?

H3: Given how little we know about the effectiveness of collaborative governance mechanisms, there is no a priori reason to believe that regional collaboration will have a strong effect on the provision of economic, environmental and social public goods. That said, we know that the debate on the provision of public goods is more politicized in the case of racial and socio-economic integration (and therefore affordable housing), whereas environmental preservation tends to be somewhat less controversial. Indeed, Foster (1997) suggests in her work on “regional impulses” that natural resource-based concerns can facilitate the
establishment of regional ties because it is easy for communities or jurisdictions to see that they have a common interest in natural resources. In contrast, Weir and colleagues (2005) note that regional equity concerns may very well preoccupy both suburban and city elites, but they do not generally garner widespread popular support. What is more, equity advocacy groups that become involved in regional coalitions may find it difficult to reconcile the realities of local community organizing and regional policy-making (Allen, 2011). These findings suggest that it should be relatively easier for regional actors to agree on environmental preservation goals (compared with socio-economic integration or redistribution goals). If regional actors can reach an agreement as to what needs to be done, it is more likely, in turn, that they will carry through with the actions agreed upon.

The case of economic competitiveness is somewhat more complex. As described by the Beacon Hill Institute (2007), which has attempted to quantify regional competitiveness, the concept is multi-faceted and depends on both governmental policies, the existing mix of skilled labor (which is inherited from the past) and the openness of businesses to other markets. In effect, regional economic competitiveness depends on the quality of a region’s transportation and research infrastructure, which itself depends on public sector investment; however, it also depends on private sector openness and innovation, which is less dependent upon governmental policy per se. In short, improving competitiveness through collaborative mechanisms requires both government and private-sector involvement – and both state-mandated and bottom-up forms of collaboration.

Considering these factors, I advance the following hypothesis: regional collaboration will be most effective at providing environmental public goods (such as higher air quality), relatively ineffective at providing social public goods (such as socio-economic integration) and somewhat effective at providing economic public goods (such as economic competitiveness). More specifically, regional collaboration will be most effective at providing infrastructure for economic development and business incubation, but relatively less so at facilitating openness or innovation. Also, regional
collaboration for economic development will be generally more effective if different forms of collaboration are employed concomitantly.

Q4. What impacts do public policy frameworks and governmental rules have on the effectiveness of collaboration and how does the impact of governmental initiative differ across national contexts in North America?

H4.1: Keil (2011) notes that the Places to Grow Act and the Greenbelt Act in Ontario have led to an “upscaleing” of local policy conversations about growth management, conservation and economic development in the Greater Golden Horseshoe (which encompasses the Greater Toronto Region as well as Hamilton and Niagara). These policies have raised awareness of the region and the challenges it is facing, which in turn has made regional policy coordination easier. Similarly, Feiock (2007) and Lubell (2007) have found that “strong-tie intergovernmental relationships” tend to increase mutual trust and conformance to the provisions of an agreement. Likewise, Nelles (2012) concluded in a more recent work that “[...] government involvement is not necessarily a bad thing. In regions where cooperation is slow to emerge or has failed to materialize at all, senior levels of government can table [i.e., introduce] ‘coercive’ legislation, as was the case in the Frankfurt region, to stimulate partnerships.” (p. 311).

However, Nelles also remarks in this same work that the imposition of a regional municipal structure in the Kitchener-Waterloo (KW) region in the 1970s has had little effect on inter-municipal cooperation. She posits, in fact, that the KW regional municipality may have initially posed an obstacle to voluntary regional collaboration in the KW region as it created more rifts than bridges between municipalities.

As to the differential influence of higher governmental initiative in the U.S vs. Canada, the history of regionalism in Canada and the U.S. suggests that local governments in the two countries may indeed respond differently to pressures and/or incentives from higher governments than their Canadian counterparts. Whereas regional collaboration has generally been incentivized (to more or less
effect) by the federal and/or state governments in the U.S., it has (in most cases) been imposed by provincial governments in Canada. Consequently, although higher governmental initiative may be more politically feasible in Canada, it may also have less of an impact as it may or may not respond to the wishes and aspirations of local government leaders.

Hence, governmental initiative, as measured by the presence of coercive, regional public policy frameworks, may hinder collaboration at first, especially when they are imposed from above without prior consultation. However, they may create over time a de facto framework for regional collaboration, which may in turn facilitate inter-agency, inter-municipal and inter-actor coordination – and hence regional policy effectiveness. This influence of governmental initiative is expected to be observed in both Canada and the U.S., but to be stronger in the U.S. than Canada.

Q5: How does regional awareness or a sense of “common plight” among local residents and other actors in the region affect the realization of regional objectives?

H5.1: Regional awareness may or may not have an independent effect on the three regional outcomes of interest, after controlling for various socio-demographic characteristics. Indeed, the determinants of regional thinking (or “thinking like a region”) include “population stability, geographic isolation or distinctiveness, cultural homogeneity, frequency and strength of intraregional networks and relations, and the presence of vernacular building types, dialects, literatures, and foods” (Foster, 2000), many of which are also determinants of collaboration. However, it is hypothesized based on the work of Abbott (1999), Wolfe and Nelles (2009), Nelles (2012) and others that regional awareness or cohesiveness may facilitate or reinforce collaboration both at its onset and during the policy implementation phase.

Therefore, I hypothesize that regional awareness will indirectly increase the impact of all forms of collaboration. I also expect its interaction
with each of the independent variables to evolve over time, as regional collaboration and regional awareness may reinforce one another. xf

**Q6:** How can the effectiveness of regional collaboration be maximized?

**H6.1:** Nelles (2009) has developed a set of detailed case studies focusing specifically on the determinants of - and results from - inter-municipal cooperation for economic development. These four cases – two Canadian urban regions (Toronto and Kitchener-Waterloo) and two German regions (Frankfurt Rhein-Main and Rhein-Neckar) – suggest that the effectiveness of regional collaboration can be maximized by cultivating regional civic capital or civic capacity as well as by creating clear ground rules for collaboration. As Nelles points out, “civic capital cannot be directly created by public policy”; however, she notes, “it can be encouraged through public support of engagement of regional associations and networks” (p. 311) and stimulated by governmental initiative. While there are no other studies using the same conceptual apparatus and asking the same questions, which would allow us to put her conclusions in perspective, Nelles’ findings are generally consistent with those of researchers in the “collaborative rationality” school, such as Innes and Booher (2010), who emphasize the importance of “authentic dialogue”, reciprocal relationships and shared meanings – all things associated with civic capital.

**Based on these observations, I hypothesize that a combination of strong governmental initiative and strong civic capacity will be associated with more effective regional collaboration. In other words, collaborative initiatives are more likely to have a significant impact on regional outcomes if and when there is both state or provincial governmental initiative and high civic capacity.**

Figure 3 and Table 1, below, specify which relationships are expected to be significant and in what direction.
Figure 2.2 – Positive associations expected between the four types of collaboration and the three dependent variables.

**Note:** The width of the arrow represents the relative strength of the relationship. The vertical double arrow on the left side represents the cooperation-collaboration scale. Note that the orientation of the scale (with functional collaboration at the bottom, and bottom-up collaboration at the top) bears no particular meaning.
Table 2.1 – Interaction (X) effects expected between the two main moderators\textsuperscript{27} and the four independent variables during the initiation and implementation phases

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<tr>
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<th>Initiation phase</th>
<th>Implementation phase</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>State / Provincial initiative</td>
<td>Regional awareness / cohesion</td>
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<tr>
<td>State-mandated collaboration</td>
<td>Reinforcing (positive X effect)</td>
<td>Reinforcing (positive X effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collaboration</td>
<td>Weakening (negative X effect)</td>
<td>Reinforcing (positive X effect)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional collaboration</td>
<td>No effect</td>
<td>Weakly reinforcing (smaller, positive X effect)</td>
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\textsuperscript{27}The moderators included in Table 1 can be measured quantitatively, such that it is possible to test for interaction effects between each of them and each of the three explanatory variables. The effect of the third moderating variable, which I have called “civic capital”, will not be measured quantitatively, but observed throughout the historical tracing process (see next section).
2.1.3 The “implementation link” of the causal chain

As one ponders the questions “does regional collaboration work?”, one is immediately confronted by another essential question: if and when regional collaboration produces tangibles results, how does it do so? Indeed, to answer the foregoing question, it is not enough to test whether “new regionalist” governance delivers on its promises, and if so to what extent; it is also crucial that we identify how regional collaboration functions (or not) and allows (or not) for the delivery of regional public goods. In other words, if my aim to make some causal inference about the effect of a particular type of regional collaboration on a particular outcome, I must have some way of describing the causal mechanism that connects the two.

That is not to say that a given causal mechanism always produces the same result; in the worlds of Tilly (2001), “although mechanisms by definition have uniform immediate effects, their aggregate, cumulative, and longer-term effects vary considerably depending on initial conditions and on combinations with other mechanisms” (p. 25). But without a plausible explanation of the way in which a given variable affects another – whether or not the “chain of events” is the same in every instance – it is perilous to affirm that a causal relationship exists between them.

In order to be able to test the hypotheses outlined above – and as a guide for conducting and interpreting case studies (from the researcher’s and the reader’s perspective, respectively), I describe below the three main ways in which regional collaboration can lead to tangible results (i.e., the three main causal mechanisms that, logically, could connect regional collaboration to each of the outcomes described in the preceding section). More specifically, I have identified three main “modes of implementation” by which policies formulated collaboratively may be put into practice, from the least to most coercive:

*Self-directed implementation*

In a number of instances, collaborative efforts result in the formulation of policies and/or plans, the implementation of which is left up to the participants. A
number of the regional plans drafted and adopted in U.S. metro regions are of this sort: they set out regional goals (such as an increase of a certain percentage in transit ridership or the creation of so many affordable housing units regionally) but leave it up to individual local governments and agencies to act on these goals. The Washington D.C. metropolitan area’s Region Forward plan is a case in point: the plan calls for 50% and 75% of all new residential and commercial constructions (respectively) to be concentrated in the region’s existing “activity centers” so as to reduce sprawl, but it leaves it up to individual municipalities to 1) define what those centers within their borders are and 2) determine how to concentrate growth in these activity centers (i.e., to choose what planning tools they want to use, if any).

The U.S. EPA’s National Estuary Program (NEP) similarly relies on voluntary compliance, as described by Lubell (2004):

“States nominate estuaries for inclusion into the NEP, and those estuaries that meet EPA criteria are authorized to form a Management Conference consisting of private and public stakeholders from all levels of the federal system with an interest in a particular estuary. The Management Conference is a 3- to 5- year planning process that attempts to forge consensus about the causes and consequences of estuary problems, the policy actions needed to address those problems, and in many cases the public and private stakeholders who are expected to implement the policies. [...] The product of the Management Conference is a Comprehensive Conservation Management Plan (CCMP) that outlines action items for addressing estuary problems. Implementation of specific aspects of the CCMP is voluntary and normally left to specific public and private organizations, often using existing programs.” (p. 551, emphases added).

In sum, the self-directed mode of implementation includes all those cases where a policy or plan is formulated collaboratively, but where compliance to said policy or plan is non-coercive. The fact that compliance is voluntary does not mean that there is no follow-up or monitoring of the policy’s implementation; however, it does mean that the cost of non-participation or non-compliance is largely symbolic.

Incentivized implementation

The implementation of a policy or plan is said to be incentivized when one of two conditions is fulfilled: 1) compliance to the plan or policy gives the individual
participant a monetary benefit some other advantage or 2) compliance to the plan or policy is required in order to obtain core or essential funding. The Bay Area’s FOCUS program, which provides financial incentives for municipalities to concentrate growth in “priority development areas” (PDAs)\textsuperscript{28}, is an example of the former. Highway funding from the U.S. Federal Government, which is considered “essential” by a great number of municipalities and is predicated upon there being a regional transportation plan, is an example of the latter. In both cases, compliance is, in theory, voluntary; however, the cost of non-compliance is much more significant.

*Regulated implementation*

The implementation of a policy or plan is said to be regulated when there is a formal, statutory requirement that participants (in most cases, municipalities) formally “conform” to said policy or plan (i.e., that they change their own rules and/or regulations in accordance with the established policy) or when a regional agency or commission made up of different local representatives has the statutory authority to approve or disapprove local planning decisions. It is important to note that such regulating institutions may or may not be collaborative in nature; thus, for the purposes of this research, we consider only those regulating institutions wherein 1) those affected by the decisions (e.g., municipalities) are represented on the decision-making body (as is the case, for case, with the Bay Area Conservation and Development Commission) and 2) there is the possibility that no decisions will be made (e.g., if there exists the possibility of a stalemate or if decisions can be vetoed by one side or the other, thereby forcing both sides to collaborate).

\textsuperscript{28}PDAs, as described by the Association of Bay Area Governments, are “locally identified, infill development opportunity areas near transit” (ABAG, 2008, p.1). They are, essentially, areas where growth should be concentrated to optimize the use of existing transportation infrastructure and limit new greenfield development.
2.2 Research design

2.2.1 Nested analysis as a research philosophy

Nested analysis: from theory to practice

One of the great difficulties that we, social scientists, face in conducting sophisticated social research and communicating its results is that our method of presentation rarely, if ever, follows our method of inquiry. That is to say, we are pressured to come up with a “good story” and present our results in a straightforward fashion, using a well-structured narrative that has a clear beginning and ending; yet, in reality, the research process is seldom rectilinear and is much more iterative and – let’s admit it – messy.

Lieberman (2005) has formalized the iterative, inductive and often intuitive social scientific research process and given it a name: nested analysis. In his own words:

“The promise of the nested research design is that both LNA [large-N analysis] and SNA [small-N analysis] can inform each other to the extent that the analytic payoff is greater than the sum of the parts. Not only is the information gleaned complementary, but also each step of the analysis provides direction for approaching the next step. Most prominently, LNA provides insights about rival explanations and helps to motivate case selection strategies for SNA, whereas SNA helps to improve the quality of measurement instruments and model specifications used in the LNA.” (p. 436)

Said differently, nested analysis makes explicit – and adds some rigour to – what a great many researchers were already doing, that is, using the insights from one type of analysis (in this case, a large-N quantitative analysis) at a particular stage of the research process to inform and refine further analyses (and subsequent steps of the research process) using other methods (such as detailed case studies). For instance, the large-N analysis served, in the present research, to highlight
conceptual errors (e.g., regarding the difference, or the lack thereof, between so-called “grant-based” and other bottom-up collaboration initiatives), which were then be confronted by going back to the empirical foundation of the conceptual model (i.e., by checking whether grant-based initiatives are, in fact, of a different “class”). Likewise, new hypotheses can then be formulated based on the results of the small-N analysis, some of which can be tested again using large-N quantitative methods (e.g., a few of these “midway hypotheses” are identified at the end of Chapter 3).

It is important to mention that nested analysis is used here as a general guide, or research philosophy, rather than as a strict set of rules (which is not, in any case, what it is intended to be). I have attempted, as much as possible, to let the reader know when I have changed course and why – that is, I have attempted, as much as possible, to present the results in the order in which they were “found” so as to give the reader a sense of the logic behind this research approach.

However, I should mention that the questions and hypotheses presented earlier were not – as it were – derived strictly from theory; the original questions and hypotheses were, but the ones above have been reworked in light of the data I have collected and some of the preliminary findings of the next chapter. More specifically, the questions were adjusted so as to be answerable given the data I have access to and the hypotheses were, in turn, modified so as to answer the research questions directly. Finally, I have omitted a few of the conceptual and empirical “dead-ends” that I have encountered along the way so as to concentrate on the essential parts of the problem at end.

*A mix-method approach*

Following the precepts of nested analysis, the research reported on here uses two different research methods to test the hypotheses that are outlined in the previous section, namely:
1) a large-N quantitative analysis of the relationship between collaboration and three outcomes of interest in the 110 largest metropolitan regions of North America;

2) a comparative historical analysis of the evolution of “regionalism” in two North American metropolitan regions, the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal region, selected so as to maximize variation on the “regional awareness” and “higher governmental initiative” moderator variables (see next section).

As noted above, this mixed-method approach allows me to increase explanatory leverage and to make inferences about both the impact of each type of collaboration on each of the three outcomes and the underlying causal mechanism that connects each independent (i.e., explanatory) variable and each moderator variable to each outcome.

Note that the small-N (or case study) approach is important for several reasons: first, it will give me the opportunity to test some of the preliminary conclusions from the large-N analysis; second, it will allow me to specifically and rigorously study the impacts of variables that are not easily quantifiable, such as regional awareness and civic capital; lastly, it will make it possible to see what effects higher-government initiative, regional awareness and civic capacity have at different moments during the collaborative process (i.e., how the interaction between each form of collaboration and each of the three moderating variables evolves over time). However, it is important to mention that the case study work (in chapter 4) mainly describes collaborative efforts around environmental protection and economic development; hence, the small-N analysis is especially important in understanding what makes certain regions better at protecting the environment across municipal boundaries and working collaboratively to strengthen economic development.

The large-N quantitative methodology will be used to answer the first two questions (regarding the impacts of each type of collaboration on the relative...
“changeability” of each outcome and regional resilience more generally), while the case study analyses will focus specifically on the third and fourth questions (regarding the moderating effect of regional awareness, governmental initiative and civic capital on the relationships established between collaboration and the provision of regional public goods). The last question (about the maximization of collaboration effectiveness) will be tackled using both methods and addressed in the conclusion.

The results from each type of analysis are reported in separate chapters. The third chapter explains the large-N methodology in detail and reports its results; the comparative historical analysis of regionalism in the SFBA and the Greater Montreal is contained in the fourth chapter and the conclusion forms the last chapter. The criteria for the selection of the case studies are outlined in the next section.

2.2.2 Case study selection: most similar and most different

The theory behind the selection of case studies

Cities and urban regions are notoriously difficult to compare, as they appear (on the surface at least) to be made up mostly of idiosyncrasies and irreducible differences. Indeed, how can we ever isolate a particular set of variables and study the relationships between them when so many forces – environmental, economic, cultural and geopolitical – intersect and interact?

Clearly, the aim of the comparative case study method in the urban field cannot be to establish causality by simply comparing and contrasting two, four or even six different cities or urban regions at a given time – no matter how similar or different the cases are. Instead, case studies should be used to trace a process over time so as to understand the nature of causality (if there are strong empirical and/or theoretical reasons to believe that a causal relationship exists).

But how to select specific case studies, other than by selecting cases where such a given “causal chain” could plausibly be observed? The first principle, following King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and others (Brady and Collier 2004), is to
select cases that differ on the explanatory variable so as to increase variance – and the possibility that the effect of X on Y (or lack thereof) will actually be observed. The second precept, which is derived from John Stuart Mills’ “method of difference” is to select cases that are identical or very similar on the main covariates that may vary with treatment and be confounding. In sum, then, I have chosen cases that differ widely on one or more of the explanatory variables of interest, but are similar in many other ways.

The San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal region: different yet similar

As explained in more detail in the following chapter, the Bay Area and the Greater Montreal differ widely on one of the main explanatory variable of interest, which is: bottom-up regional collaboration. Indeed, although both regions have a long history of state-mandated and functional collaboration (albeit in different policy areas), the regional institutions carrying out these mandates (with more or less success) have originated in very different ways – namely, through bottom-up mobilization in the Bay Area and top-down intervention in the Greater Montreal. Over time, the same pattern has repeated itself: collaborative regional initiatives in the Bay Area generally come from below (i.e., civil society), while in the Greater Montreal they are initiated by government (whether provincial or local).

This difference, I argue, is in part attributable to the different ways in which federalism is practiced in the State of California and the Province of Quebec. In effect, the former has a very strong home rule tradition and a relatively weak State government, whereas the latter has a highly interventionist provincial government coupled with a relatively weak local government tradition (in the Greater Montreal area in particular).

That said, the two regions are similar on many accounts: neither region encompasses the State/Provincial capital (which means that both are vying for the attention of legislators in an environment where other cities/regions are doing the same); both are ethnically and socially diverse, with large minority groups (English speakers and immigrants in Montreal and Hispanics and Asians in the Bay Area);
both have natural barriers separating important municipalities from one another
(the St. Lawrence river, Des Prairies River, Milles-Îles River, St. Louis Lake and Deux-
Montagnes Lake in Montreal and the San Francisco Bay in the Bay Area) both are
considered to be relatively politically progressive or politically left of centre (the
Greater Montreal has been stronghold of the Liberal Party of Canada for decades
and was overtaken, in 2011, by a political party further to the left, while according
the Public Policy Institute of California (see McGhee and Krimm, 2012) the
Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the Bay Area is upwards of
70% and most Bay Area residents are “loyal liberals”) 29.

Also importantly, both regions have a long history of failed attempts at
in the SFBA took root as early as the 1920s (which is also when the Regional
Planning Association of America was founded on the East Coast), but the region was
never federated politically and its regional planning movement died in its infancy
when the Regional Plan Association was disbanded in 1928, due to lack of political
support. It failed again in the 60s and early 1970s, when successive attempts were
made to reform the SFBA’s regional governance through the State legislature. A
comprehensive regional plan was approved in 1970, but as noted by Scott (1985),
“it was... more of a symbol of progress toward regional unity than a plan all
communities in the region intended to consider seriously as they made
controversial decisions on development proposals” (Scott, cited in Jones and
Rothblatt, 1985, 405).

Similarly, there was talk in Montreal of regional restructuration starting in
the 1910s and a regional body in charge of controlling municipal borrowing in the
Montreal area was actually created in 1921, but it was dismantled after WWII
(Collin, 2000). Concomitantly and subsequently, several attempts at regional
“consolidation” were made and several “study commissions” were created to devise

29 Albeit, the expression “liberal” does not have the same meaning in Canada and the U.S. – Canadian
liberals are affiliated with the Liberal Party, which has traditionally been liberal in the British sense
of the word, whereas American liberals support a number of socially progressive principles without
necessarily being affiliated to a party. However, the fact remains that there is no conservative
movement to speak of in either of the two regions, which sets them apart from most other large
metropolitan regions in North America.
a metropolitan governance framework, but such a framework was not put in place until the early 2000s. As in the SFBA, the Greater Montreal has had a regional plan (adopted in 1944), but this plan was never actually implemented.

The last thing to note about the choice of those two regions is that in both cases, the main conditions that usually motivate regional coordination are found, namely: a single body of water that all cities depend upon, natural areas of great ecological value constantly under threat, traffic congestion due the presence of several bridges and a vibrant civil society.

These important similarities and differences lead me – and allow me – to ask a number of questions. For instance, how does the mode of initiation of a collaborative regional institution influence its functioning? Does collaboration (or does a “collaborative spirit”) spill over from one institution to the other? If so, how? Most importantly, how does higher governmental initiative facilitate or hinder the implementation of policies formulated collaboratively?
Works cited – Chapter 2:

Association of Bay Area Governments. 2008. *Focus: a development and conservation strategy for the San Francisco Bay Area*. Published by ABAG. Available online at http://www.bayareavision.org/initiatives/PDFs/FOCUS_Brochure_12-08.pdf [Last access on March 8, 2013]


Chapter 3

When does regional collaboration make a difference?  
An empirical inquiry into the effects of regional collaboration on regional resilience

3.1 Introduction

Separating the causes and effects of collaboration

It seems evident, from a cursory survey of the field, that collaboration matters to some degree, whether intrinsically or extrinsically. That being said, there is a related question that has received relatively little attention, and which begins this chapter: why have collaborative regional governance arrangements proven to be more effective in some regions and less so in others? How, for instance, did the Tech Triangle (in Canada’s Waterloo region) or the Research Triangle (in North Carolina) become successful economic regions, while countless other attempts at “economic clustering” have failed? How have governmental and non-governmental regional actors been able to conserve thousands of acres of privately-owned open space and ecologically sensitive habitats through collaboration in some regions, while others have let the ecological resources of their regions be squandered? In other words, what internal and external forces influence the outcome of regional collaboration?

Some researchers have attempted to answer this question empirically by developing measures of “urban regional success”, which allow us to rank metropolitan regions according to specific “performance” indicators. Two examples of such measures are the Resilience Capacity Index (RCI), developed by Kathryn A. Foster who was until 2012 director of the University at Buffalo Regional Institute, and the Innovation Index, developed by the Purdue Center for Regional Development and the Indiana Business Research Center at Indiana University. The first index is a single statistic summarizing 12 equally weighted indicators of a given region’s “resilience capacity”; among these indicators are income equality, economic diversification, educational attainment, the proportion of the population out of
poverty and without disability, and voter participation. The second index includes four component indices: human capital (30%), economic dynamics (30%), productivity (30%) and employment and economic well-being (10%) that are themselves made up of five or six sub-indices, including such things as the job growth to population growth ratio, the average poverty rate, the average number of small establishments, the average number of patents per 1000 workers and the growth rate of the young adult population.

While these indices do provide some insight as to the performance of metropolitan regions relative to one another, they are not well suited to the task of understanding the effects of a particular set of conditions. Indeed, each index includes factors that are very likely to be endogenously determined – that is to say, determined by factors that are both causes and effects of that which we observe. They are also likely to be path-dependent, in the sense that many of these regional “traits” cannot easily be changed, and are probably strongly predictive of the same traits in future time periods. In other words, these indices do not make interesting dependent variables, precisely because there are so few independent variables (or exogenous sources of variation) that are unaffected by any of the sub-indices included in each index.

In the case of regional collaboration, for instance, it is difficult to think of a context where collaboration would be unaffected by the economic well-being of a region’s population, its educational attainment or both. It is also difficult to think of an exogenous source of variation (or instrumental variable) that would affect collaboration but not any of the sub-indices included in the RCI and Innovation Index. In sum, the empirical work on the economic and social performance of city-regions in North America is certainly of interest as a diagnostic tool for policymakers, but it is of little use to researchers interested specifically in the effects of regional collaboration.

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30 The other indicators that comprise the RCI are business dynamics, the proportion of a region’s residents with health insurance, homeownership, organizational density and metropolitan stability. See Appendix 2 for more detail.
A response to the New Regionalism

As outlined in the previous chapter, there are several well-established theoretical explanations of what makes regional cooperation work and most of these theories point to voluntary regional collaboration as a highly effective mechanism for achieving regional objectives. Indeed, whether one considers Richard Feiock’s institutional collective action framework or Innes and Booher’s “collaborative rationality”, the main conclusion is more or less the same: bottom-up, voluntary collaboration is the most promising form of urban regional governance. It is interesting to note that this view is widely shared both within the urban field as well as outside of it: Agranoff and McGuire (2004), both public administration scholars, have affirmed in their 2004 book that cities have resolutely entered “an age of collaboration” (p.20). Scholars in the fields of environmental conservation and business administration have also taken an interest in regional collaboration, as more and more non-governmental organizations are becoming involved in formal and informal collaborative regional initiatives. This is consistent with the tenets of the New Regionalism, which posited more than two decades ago that inter-municipal collaborative governance involving was the most promising path to regionalism.

Hence, we now have a fairly good understanding of the determinants of collaboration, and we have a number of theories affirming that regional collaboration is the most promising form of urban regional governance. It is interesting to note that this view is widely shared both within the urban field as well as outside of it: Agranoff and McGuire (2004), both public administration scholars, have affirmed in their 2004 book that cities have resolutely entered “an age of collaboration” (p.20). Scholars in the fields of environmental conservation and business administration have also taken an interest in regional collaboration, as more and more non-governmental organizations are becoming involved in formal and informal collaborative regional initiatives. This is consistent with the tenets of the New Regionalism, which posited more than two decades ago that inter-municipal collaborative governance involving was the most promising path to regionalism.

Hence, we now have a fairly good understanding of the determinants of collaboration, and we have a number of theories affirming that regional

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31 A number of scholars have noted that both governmental and non-governmental actors increasingly have a stake in regional collaboration. On the one hand, in the field of environmental conservation, state and provincial agencies can offer strategic incentives and protections to communities and regions that protect land, but NGOs also play an important role in promoting land conservation at the regional level. Knudson (2011), for example, notes that NGOs often help foster cross-jurisdictional communication and maintain the momentum of a given conservation initiative as they are not subject to the same budgetary constraints as government organizations. He also remarks that land-use preservation is often the work of public/private coalitions. On the other hand, businesses are not excluded from regional coalitions and collaborative initiatives; indeed, Fontan et al. (2009), Gainsborough (2003) and Kanter (2000) have found that many businesses have an interest in regionalism, especially if it is seen as an avenue for economic development. Hence, despite the fact that regionalism per se (or regional coordination broadly speaking) is not a major priority for local politicians (Briggs, 2000), there is evidence that it is becoming a preoccupation among other regional actors, thus supporting the tenets of the New Regionalism.
collaboration *should* be able to deal effectively with policy problems at the urban regional scale. What we are missing is an empirical study of the effects of regional collaboration *not on collaboration itself, but on the regional outcomes* that are indicative of urban regional resilience in the environmental, social and economic spheres.

In what follows, I test some of the hypotheses developed in the previous chapter using a large-N quantitative methodology. I then outline some preliminary conclusions and propose new hypotheses to be tested in the case studies that follow.

### 3.2 Measurement strategy

In order to measure the effect of each type of regional collaboration on each outcome, I use a large-N quantitative methodology on a dataset composed of North America’s largest 110 metropolitan regions\(^{32}\). The total population of the metro regions within the dataset ranges between 457,720 (in the census metropolitan area of London, Ontario) and 18,897,109 (in the case of the New-York – Newark – Edison metropolitan statistical area).

The rationale behind the choice of each variable is described below, but in general I have followed three main criteria for selecting measures of the constructs described in the previous chapter:

1) **theoretical soundness**, making sure there is a sound theoretical reason to expect a particular variable a) to be a measure of the construct in question and b) to be related to other variables included in the dataset;

2) **reliability**, ensuring that each chosen variable can be measured reliably so that its values are consistent;

3) **comparability across regions**, in order to maximize the number of observations in each analysis, obtain meaningful results, and be able to draw general conclusions about the sample of regions included in the dataset.

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\(^{32}\) As explained earlier, the definition of the region is defined here either as a “census statistical area” (CSA) – as identified by the U.S. Census Bureau – or as a census metropolitan areas (CMAs) – identified by Statistics Canada.
These criteria are meant to increase the validity of the measurement strategy. Another important concern when measuring the effect of a construct as broad as “regional collaboration” is that of endogeneity, i.e., a situation when it is impossible to determine the causality or directionality of an observed statistical relationship between explanatory and outcome variables because said relationship is either spurious or bidirectional. In order to deal with this particular issue, I employ a two-state least-square regression methodology, using precursor variables as instruments.

Finally, given the difficulty of measuring some of the theoretical constructs that I am working with (e.g., “urban ecological resilience” and “regional awareness”), they have been measured in different ways. A complete list and description of the variables included in the dataset, including all controls, can be found in Appendix 1. Table 1, below, gives descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the model. Finally, the rationale for selecting each of the main variables is explained in what follows.
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, moderating, instrumental and main control variables (before standardization)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Metro-level dataset</th>
<th></th>
<th>State-level dataset</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dependent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct change in NO₂, 1990-2010</td>
<td>-0.359</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>-0.590</td>
<td>0.180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct change in family income segregation, 1990-2010</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>-0.170</td>
<td>0.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct change in the # of small establishments, 2001-2010</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>-0.108</td>
<td>0.341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in % of employment in knowledge clusters, 2001-2010</td>
<td>-0.005</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.060</td>
<td>0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct change in # of utility patents granted, 2006-2010</td>
<td>0.123</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>-1.330</td>
<td>0.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SPGs per 100 000 people, 2007</td>
<td>6.528</td>
<td>6.230</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>43.220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of environmental SPGs within region, 2007</td>
<td>5.310</td>
<td>4.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of housing SPGs within region, 2007</td>
<td>7.555</td>
<td>14.540</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of economic SPGs within region, 2007</td>
<td>1.673</td>
<td>4.236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated regional collab. index, overall</td>
<td>0.636</td>
<td>0.974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated regional collab. index, environmental</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.335</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated regional collab. index, housing</td>
<td>10.509</td>
<td>17.882</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, overall # of initiatives</td>
<td>2.255</td>
<td>1.694</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of env./land-use initiatives</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>1.105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of housing/equity initiatives</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0.423</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of economic dev. Initiatives</td>
<td>0.963</td>
<td>0.902</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, total # of yrs of collab.</td>
<td>25.709</td>
<td>22.926</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of yrs of collab. in env./land-use</td>
<td>11.291</td>
<td>16.334</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of yrs of collab. in housing</td>
<td>5.036</td>
<td>7.676</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index, # of yrs of collab. in econ dev.</td>
<td>9.382</td>
<td>11.379</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moderators</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth management)</td>
<td>10.745</td>
<td>18.167</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness index (# of Google results)</td>
<td>405196</td>
<td>868309</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>7110000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Precursor (instrumental) variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index, 1987</td>
<td>6.684</td>
<td>3.579</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of major physical barriers to urban expansion</td>
<td>1.090</td>
<td>1.097</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of years since each flooding incident</td>
<td>4.636</td>
<td>4.251</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro region spans State/Provincial lines</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.395</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Resilience Capacity Index (standardized score)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.464</td>
<td>-1.52</td>
<td>1.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% visible minority</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation Index (# local governments / 100 000 pop.)</td>
<td>14.321</td>
<td>11.582</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td>59.860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total population in 2000 (one unit = 100 000 people)</td>
<td>1985418</td>
<td>2521698</td>
<td>457720</td>
<td>1.89E+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro GDP growth rate 2000-2010</td>
<td>0.133</td>
<td>0.107</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>0.418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State-level dataset</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct of perm. resident bird species with a neg. trend, 2000-2010</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct of urban bird species with a neg. trend, 2000-2010</td>
<td>0.260</td>
<td>0.144</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of SPGs in 2002</td>
<td>661.396</td>
<td>676.540</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated environmental collab., total # of yrs of collab.</td>
<td>7.821</td>
<td>15.189</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of acres preserved through land trusts as of 2000</td>
<td>108305</td>
<td>194060</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1155800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Instrumental variable</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidences of major flooding since 1900 (total #)</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>0.667</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of years since each flooding incident</td>
<td>8.411</td>
<td>22.437</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth, 1990-2000</td>
<td>0.135</td>
<td>0.115</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth, 2000-2010</td>
<td>0.100</td>
<td>0.072</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth, 1991-2005</td>
<td>1.116</td>
<td>0.356</td>
<td>0.370</td>
<td>2.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density, 2000</td>
<td>350.821</td>
<td>1317.605</td>
<td>1.069</td>
<td>9316.922</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.1 Dependent variables

As explained in the introduction of this work, I have opted to study the effect(s) of regional collaboration on regional resilience – or, as defined by the members of the Building Resilient Regions (BRR) research network, on “the ability of a place to recover from a stress” (Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley, 2012 – see Chapter 1 for a more thorough definition). Although this research draws extensively upon both the data and the insights gleaned from the research that fed into the creation of the “resilience capacity index” by the researchers of the BRR, the operationalization of the “regional resilience” concept used here differs somewhat from that of the BRR.

One important difference is the fact that every outcome here is measured as the change in some variable (describing the environmental quality, level of socio-economic integration or economic activity in a given region) over the last decade, controlling for the level of this variable at the beginning of the period. In other words, I am not interested in the effect of collaboration on the absolute level of environmental quality, socio-economic integration or economic competitiveness; rather, my goal is to study the effect of collaboration on the change in each of these variables over the most recent decade (i.e., 2000-2010). Indeed, one observable implication of resilience (whether ecological, social or economic) should be the collective ability of regional institutions, firms and other actors to continue making progress, or at least to slow down the rate of decline, when faced with slower growth or an economic crisis such as that of 2008-2009. The outcomes I have chosen are, therefore, indicative of resilience in two ways: first, because they measure some quality that is itself associated with resilience and second (more importantly) because they measure the ability of a region’s economic, social and/or ecological infrastructure to cope with population and economic growth (or the lack thereof), both of which are controlled for in the statistical model. Measuring each

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33 It is important to note that resilience, like sustainability, cannot be (in most cases) measured directly in a strict sense as it may not be observable directly; indeed, resilience may not manifest itself immediately and it may act slowly, almost imperceptibly. Hence, we must draw on the hypothesized relationship between resilience and other “manifest” variables to link our theoretical and empirical ideas.
outcome in this way (as the % change in some variable in the most recent decade, while each predictor is a measure of collaboration in the decades prior) also allows us to further reduce the risk of reverse causality (since we are not predicting absolute levels of environmental quality, socio-economic integration or economic competitiveness, but rather recent changes in these regional characteristics).

In what follows, I describe each of the three outcomes and explain the way(s) it is measured.

*Environmental quality and ecological resilience*

An important difference between the methodology used here and the RCI methodology is the addition of a “regional ecological resilience” dimension, which does not figure into the RCI calculations. Indeed, I believe that the natural environment’s ability to recover from an earthquake, flood or toxic spill is equally as important as a regional economy’s ability to recover from a foreclosure crisis, the closure of a major plant or some other economic shock. According to Alberti and Marzluff (2004), “resilience in urban ecosystems is a function of the patterns of human activities and natural habitats” (p. 242) and can be measured by both the amount and the connectivity of natural land cover. The effect of haphazard urban development (or urban sprawl) is typically “to reduce and degrade natural land covers by conversion, fragmentation, perforation and appropriation” (p. 245), which reduces the capacity of ecological functions to support human functions. From an environmental perspective, then, the main negative consequence from a lack of coordination and collaboration at the regional level is a pattern of land cover – which could be described as haphazard development or “urban sprawl” – that “breaks up” and degrades natural areas. However, sprawl is notoriously difficult to define, measure and compare across regions, both because no one definition captures the complexity of the phenomenon and because we lack a methodology for
measuring sprawl consistently. What is more, sprawl may or may not be haphazard.

That being said, we know that urban development has a direct effect on both species biodiversity and traffic congestion – and we can hypothesize that uncoordinated, haphazard development has more of an effect on these outcomes than coordinated, planned development (to the extent that the plan in question makes provisions for protecting natural areas with high ecological value). On the one hand, there is evidence that the level of fragmentation caused by urban development – which is a function of the urban development pattern in a particular urban region – negatively affects the biodiversity of both plant and animal species (Donelly and Marzluff, 2004) and that of birds, in particular (Marzluf, 2001; Blair, 2004). On the other hand, traffic congestion results in higher levels of air pollution and is associated with higher levels of nitrogen dioxide, among other pollutants. Conversely, a reduction in congestion is associated with a significant reduction in NOx, including nitrogen dioxide (Beevers and Carslaw, 2005).

Given these considerations, and following Alberti and Marzluff, I use the diversity of permanent breeder bird species (or the % of such species with a negative trend) as a first measure of ecological resilience, since bird biodiversity is correlated positively with ecosystem services (Loreau, 2000) and resilience (Naeem, 2002). Permanent bird species are also, typically, more affected by changes in land-cover as compared with migrant species as they nest in the same environment as they forage in.

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34 There is an ongoing, politically and ideologically laden and often acrimonious, debate as to the nature of sprawl, its impact on the economy, public health and the environment and, also importantly, about our ability (or inability) to establish a causal link between sprawl and these various outcomes. See Burchell et al., 2000, Kelly-Schwartz et al., 2004, Neuman, 2005 for a summary of this controversy.

35 Although, as mentioned above, sprawl is difficult to measure in a meaningful and consistent way, there is evidence that low density development, which is often associated with haphazard development or sprawl, results in greater landscape heterogeneity and fragmentation, as compared with more compact forms of development. See for example Torrens and Alberti (2000) for a discussion of the impacts of sprawl and other land-use patterns on habitat fragmentation.
However, given that bird biodiversity can only reliably be measured at the state and provincial levels\textsuperscript{36}, I have also measured the effect of uncoordinated urban development (which directly affects ecological resilience, our theoretical construct of interest) by \textbf{computing the change in nitrogen dioxide (NO$_2$) levels between 1990 and 2010} for each of the regions under study. Indeed, NO$_2$ concentrations in urban areas have been found to be strongly predicted by traffic congestion and land-use patterns, with locations in closer proximity to or downwind from a major highway having higher NO$_2$ concentrations, while locations in proximity to and/or downwind from open, contiguous and undeveloped land have lower concentrations (Kirby et al., 1998; Sahsuvaroglu et al., 2006).

Note that both variables have been consistently measured for several decades using the same methodology\textsuperscript{37}; therefore, that they are both highly consistent measures. Note further that the \textit{quantity of development} – which of course will affect the change in land-use cover in a given region – is accounted for by controlling for both population growth and economic growth.

\textit{Socio-economic integration and social resilience}

Socio-demographic capacity, or the ability of a region’s population to cope with and recover from stress, is perhaps the most difficult theoretical construct to measure quantitatively (see Appendix 2 for a description of its component indicators). I have chosen to measure this aspect of regional resilience capacity by using \textbf{the change in income segregation within U.S. metropolitan areas}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{36}] The information on bird biodiversity comes from the North American Breeding Bird Survey, a cooperative effort between the U.S. Geological Survey’s Patuxent Wildlife Research Center and Environment Canada’s Canadian Wildlife Service to monitor the status and trends of North American bird populations. The survey, which uses the same methodology on the same routes since 1966, allows us to measure the evolution of different bird species within a particular region over time. However, most routes are located in the countryside outside of urban centers, and not all major urban centers have routes in their vicinity. Even so, most states and provinces are well covered and the survey allows us to identify specific groups of species, such as permanent and urban species, which are directly affected by urban sprawl and changes in land cover.
\item[\textsuperscript{37}] The North American Breeding Bird Survey has used the same methodology for counting birds on the same routes since 1966, while the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency measures on a yearly basis since the early 1990s the levels of different air pollutants, including nitrogen dioxide, using a nationwide network of monitoring sites. Both sources of data are publicly available online.
\end{itemize}
between 1990 and 2009. Indeed, as hypothesized by Cutter et al. (2010) – and based on the BRR’s definition of the same concept for the RCI – the more equal the distribution of economic resources within a given region, “the more cohesive the response to disturbance, an element of resilience” (BBR, 2012b). However, given the close relationship between income inequality and income segregation in both Canada and the U.S. (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011; Ross et al., 2001; Watson, 2009) and the known deleterious effects of income segregation on population health (Ross et al., 2000; Lynch et al., 1998; Kaplan et al., 1996), I believe it is more meaningful to measure the change in income segregation directly (as opposed to measuring the change in income inequality, the effects of which are less well established).

Business incubation, high-tech jobs, patents and economic resilience

Regional resilience in general, and regional economic resilience in particular, depend on the actions of numerous individuals, institutions and organizations – and, crucially, on their collective ability to innovate. In the words of Weir and colleagues (2012):

Strains and stresses, whether from economic, demographic, or natural sources, will inevitably pose challenges to regions. Responses to those challenges come not from a single entity called “the region” but from the myriad institutions that populate the region—firms, school systems, and transportation agencies, to name just a few. Regions will be only as resilient as those institutions are flexible and innovative. (p. 22, emphases mine).

In this research, I have opted to measure innovation in two ways: first, as the change in the number of jobs in technology-based knowledge clusters38 between 2001 and 2010 and second as the change in the number of utility

38 As part of a project on regional innovation funded by the U.S. Economic Development Administration (EDA), a team of researchers executed as special analysis of technology-based knowledge clusters, including clusters in information technology, engineering, health care and medical science, mathematics and statistics, natural sciences and environmental management and postsecondary education. There is of course innovation outside of these clusters; however, as reported by the project’s researchers, there is a high correlation between the six tech clusters they identified and Richard Florida’s “creative class” variable (EDA, 2009). Hence, the percentage of jobs in these particular clusters in a particular region is thought to be indicative of that region’s “innovation capacity".
patents granted in a given region between 2006 and 2010. Note that in both cases, I am interested in measuring the ability of firms and individuals in U.S. metropolitan regions to maintain jobs in the technology-based knowledge industry and continue to innovate in spite of a major slow-down in the country’s economy since 2007.

The third measure of economic resilience that I have included is a measure of regional economic dynamism: the change in the number of small establishments per 10,000 workers between 2001 and 2010, which is a measure of business incubation and, according to the researchers of the “Innovation in American Regions” project, a predictor of increases in worker productivity. Once again, I am interested in measuring the capacity of a region’s economy to foster the creation of new businesses even in the face of a major national economic slow-down. Note that all three variables are based on statistics collected by the U.S. Federal Government, and should therefore be consistent.

3.2.2 Independent variables

As affirmed by Weir and colleagues (2012), “interactions among diverse institutions—across sectors and across levels of government—are the critical backdrop for the feedback and experimentation that supports adaptive governance” (p. 22). This is why I am specifically interested in measuring the effect(s) of different forms of regional collaboration – which are thought to be opportunities for interaction – on the aforementioned outcomes. The three types of collaboration studied here are: 1) functional (or sectoral) collaboration, which is usually more cooperative than collaborative in nature and comprises most special districts, economic- development corporations and other special-purpose governments (SPGs); 2) state-mandated collaboration, which may be collaborative (as understood by Innes and Booher, 2010) but is not voluntary; and 3) bottom-up collaboration,

Whenever possible, outcomes were measured as a % change in the unit of interest between 2000 and 2010. However, the data for the number of patents granted per region was only available for 2006 and subsequent years. However, given that I am specifically interested in the ability of the metro regions included in my sample to withstand the economic downturn of 2007-2009, the two data points I have selected are adequate as they provide a “before and after” picture of the situation.
which is both voluntary and collaborative in nature, and may take many shapes and forms.

While it is relatively easy to compile a list of all SPGs per area of activity within a metropolitan region, as this information is available in the U.S. Census of Governments, it is more difficult to identify all those mechanisms put in place by state and provincial governments to encourage regional collaboration, as these mechanisms may or may not be explicit in legislation. The real difficulty, however, has been in the compiling of all major voluntary, bottom-up, inter-municipal collaboration initiatives that started before 2000 (but no earlier than 1950) in all 110 Canadian and U.S. metro regions included in the dataset. As will be explained below, I have had to rely on several different sources to acquire the needed information, and I have made every effort to cross-check every piece of information gathered. Nevertheless, some measurement error must have occurred in the data collection process, which is why I have also measured each type of collaboration in several different ways.

First, each type of collaboration was measured as an overall index (including all forms of collaboration of that type regardless of topic), but also as three different indices measuring the intensity of collaboration in each of the three topic areas under study (environment, housing, and economic development). Second, in order to give this analysis more explanatory leverage, I have coded all bottom-up collaboration (BUC) and state-mandate collaboration (SMC) indices in two different ways: first, as an index representing either the number of collaborative initiatives (for BUC) or the intensity of collaboration (for SMC) in a given region; second, as the number of years since the beginning of each particular collaborative initiative, summed over all such initiatives. I have also carried out the analysis for certain types of collaboration at both the metropolitan and state or provincial levels, to check whether the results are consistent across geographical scales.
**Functional regional collaboration**

Based on data obtained from the 2007 Governments Integrated Directory (GID), I have measured functional regional collaboration in five ways:

1) as the per capita number of SPGs in a given region\(^{40}\), irrespective of what a particular SPG does;

2) as the per capita number of environmental SPGs in a given region, which includes some (but not all) of the SPGs listed under “Parks and recreation”, “Soil and water conservation”, “Natural resources and water supply” and “Other natural resources” as well as other SPGs whose names made explicit reference to their conservation role;

3) as the per capita number of SPGs falling under the category “Housing and community development” and dedicated to the provision of affordable housing;

4) as the per capita number of SPGs with an economic function, including most economic and industrial development and redevelopment authorities, corporations and improvement districts, the majority of which fell under the “Other multi-function” or “Other and unallocable” categories;

5) as the sum total of all SPGs comprised in measures 2), 3) and 4), i.e., as the total number of SPGs working the fields of environmental conservation, affordable housing provision and economic development.

It is important to note that the total number of SPGs is usually considerably higher than the sum total of environmental, housing and economic development SPGs; indeed, most SPGs in most regions fall under the categories of “Fire protection”, “Water supply”, “Sewerage” or “Libraries” – all public goods that are unlikely to have a direct impact on environmental conservation, affordable housing, and economic development. However, the first measure of functional collaboration (which is simply a measure of the total number of SPGs in a given region, including water districts, fire protection districts, etc.) is still of interest as some researchers

\(^{40}\) Special district governments in the GID are listed by counties; for the purposes of this exercise, I have defined each region as the sum of the counties that it comprises, based on the 2009 definition of U.S. metropolitan areas.
have suggested that the very presence of a large number of multi-jurisdictional special districts and special-purpose governments works against regional coordination (Frug, 2002). What is more, SPGs working to coordinate water supply and highway building may have an impact (directly or indirectly) on residential development patterns, so it makes sense to include a measure of the overall number of such governmental entities.

Finally, in part to ascertain whether the presence of SPGs in other policy areas actually has an impact on the dependent variables described above, I have also measured the total number of SPGs in the three fields of interest (thus excluding water, fire protection and sewerage districts as well as all the SPGs that do not fall under the categories identified above).

*State-mandated collaboration*

As outlined in the first chapter, regional collaboration in metropolitan areas is not always entirely voluntary, nor are civic, business leaders and community leaders always the initiators of such collaboration efforts. Hence, it is important to include as one of the independent variables some measure of the strength of state or provincially mandated\(^41\) regional collaboration\(^42\).

However, given the sheer number of state and provincially mandated forms of regional collaboration (in such diverse areas as higher education, waste management, transportation, workforce development, etc.) and the lack of an already existing inventory of such collaboration “frameworks”, I have measured the strength of state-mandated collaboration strictly in the fields of environmental conservation and housing. Based on a number of different sources, including a

\(^{41}\) For the purposes of this quantitative analysis, I did not consider federally-mandated regional collaboration, even though it has arguably played, and continues to play, an important role in shaping regional collaboration. The main reason for this is that every metropolitan region in the U.S. is subject to the same requirements (such as the creation of a Metropolitan Planning Organization or MPO for deciding priorities in regional transportation), whereas the federal government in Canada does not impose any such requirement; hence, there is little variability in federally-mandated collaboration.

\(^{42}\) Note that I make a difference here between the creation of an SPG by the state or province for the purpose of regional coordination, which I do not consider to be a form of state-mandated collaboration, and the creation of a policy framework for collaboration by the state or province, which usually takes the form of an *obligation to plan* at the regional level.
survey sent out to regional planners in all 110 regions (see Table 3 for a complete list), I have identified **state and provincial policy frameworks enacted before 2000 in the fields of regional environmental conservation and regional housing allocation** and evaluated their collaboration requirements (or lack thereof). I have then measured the strength of state/provincial policy frameworks in each field using an ordinal variable coded as such: 0 = no state/provincially mandated collaboration; 1 = collaboration is mandated or encouraged, but its results are not coercive; 2 = collaboration is mandated, and its results are enforceable.43

As for state-mandated economic collaboration, I have found too few examples of such collaboration to include it as a variable; indeed, the variable's lack of variability across regions would it give little or not explanatory power. Furthermore, most instances of regional economic collaboration either take the form of economic development corporations (EDCs), which are considered to be SPGs, or of voluntary coalitions or partnerships, which I consider to be instances of bottom-up collaboration.

Finally, I measured the level of overall state-mandated collaboration by adding the two ordinal variables, which produces another ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 4.

**Bottom-up collaboration**

43 The case of regional housing provision in Minnesota and the Twin Cities Region is a case in point of a regional collaboration effort that is mandated, but which does not have coercive power; indeed, the state's Land Use Planning Act requires the Metropolitan Council to determine the region's affordable housing needs and each city's fair-share allocation, but it does not include any enforcement mechanism. What is more, the 1995 Liveable Communities Act (LCA) has actually created an incentive-based program that provides grants to municipalities agreeing to participate; this program, some have argued, further weakens the regional affordable housing allocation mechanism that existed in the Land-Use Planning Act by focusing on voluntary participation, and hence collaboration, as opposed to focusing on allocation, and its enforcement. In contrast, California’s Housing Element Law requires each city and county to adopt a “housing element” as part of its general or comprehensive plan, and this housing element must be based on the regional housing needs allocation prepared by the regional council of government (COG) in a particular region. Even though the enforcement provisions of this statute are weak, the fact that each municipality is forced to include a housing element based on the allocation of regional housing needs prepared by its respective COG creates a strong incentive for municipalities to participate in the process of housing needs allocation (Chion, 2011).
Bottom-up collaboration is no doubt the most difficult type of collaboration to measure, for several reasons. First, bottom-up collaborative regional initiatives (CRIs), as defined in this study, take many shapes and forms, and have not been inventoried as such (certain types of bottom-up CRIs have been, as shown in Table 3, but they represent a minority of cases). Second, given that I am specifically interested in measuring BUC prior to 2000, many of the initiatives of interest did not have an online presence at their outset and may, in fact, have left few traces online if they have been discontinued since. Third, bottom-up CRIs are sometimes hard to distinguish from other forms of regional collaboration as they sometimes turn into special-purpose governments (e.g., a regional economic coalition becoming an EDC), while at other times they are triggered by state intervention, even though they are not formally mandated (e.g., regional planning grants). Note, finally, that I have only included here those bottom-up collaboration initiatives that explicitly seek to advance the goals of economic development, environmental protection and socio-economic integration; however, there may be bottom-up regional collaborative efforts whose goals are different from (or in contradiction with) these.

As a consequence of these difficulties, I have had to use a multi-pronged strategy to measure bottom-up collaboration. First, in February 2011, I sent out a survey to three actors in each region: 1) a regional planner in the designated metropolitan planning organization (MPO); 2) a public policy advisor (typically the person holding the title of Vice-President, Public Policy) in the metropolitan chamber of commerce (or someone with similar responsibilities in the metropolitan IDC, if there was no metropolitan chamber) and 3) a central-city planner with responsibility for sustainable development. This survey (reproduced in Appendix 4), which included two questions on bottom-up collaboration and a question on state-mandated collaboration in environmental and/or land-use planning, was sent out electronically and received a response rate of 60% (including responses received after a follow-up e-mail was sent a few weeks later). These responses were triangulated with extensive documentary and web research, as well as a number of informal interviews, and information regarding every initiative identified was cross-
checked and validated. As an illustration of what I have found, my measure of bottom-up collaboration in the field of environment/land-use included greenways, parkways and greenbelts (when and if they were created through bottom-up collaboration) as well as bottom-up regional land-use planning efforts. Bottom-up collaboration in the field of affordable housing consisted mainly of housing trust funds (when they were established through collaboration), regional housing coalitions (which are mainly advocacy groups) and other private-sector initiatives (such as Metropolis 2020 in Chicago). Finally, economic bottom-up collaboration efforts included regional “growth coalitions” and a range of regional economic development partnerships.

Bottom-up collaboration in each field (environment/land-use, housing and economic development) was measured in two ways: first, as the number of bottom-up, collaborative regional initiatives in each field within each region and second as the sum total of the number of years of collaboration within a particular region.

Finally, for the state-level analysis, the number of acres preserved through land trusts (as of 2000) was used as an indicator of bottom-up environmental collaboration. Indeed, as argued by Mason (2008), the land trust movement exemplifies in many ways the best existing practices in collaborative land use management; as such, they are indicative of a bottom-up environmental collaboration.

3.2.3 Moderators

As explained in the foregoing chapter, the relationship between each form of regional collaboration and each outcome of interest is likely to be moderated (i.e., strengthened or weakened) by the degree of state/provincial initiative in metropolitan affairs, the degree of regional awareness both within and outside a given metropolitan area, and the level of civic trust within a particular region. Needless to say, these constructs are not easy to measure quantitatively or at the level of the region; thus I have opted, for the purposes of the quantitative analysis
carried out here, to measure state/provincial initiative and regional awareness using proxies, but not civic trust. The role of civic trust will be studied in subsequent chapters, but it is not included here.

*Higher governmental initiative*

As an indicator of higher governmental initiative\(^{44}\), I have used the instatement of growth management and measured the **number of years since the implementation of growth management**, more specifically. I have chosen to measure the higher governmental initiative construct in this way for two main reasons. First, growth management policies in both Canada and the U.S. are generally politically divisive; the enactment of a growth management regime is indicative of a certain political will and a certain degree of state/provincial involvement in local affairs. Second, the number of years since the instatement of growth management is positively and significantly related the existence of a regional food policy council in a given region (see Appendix 3); hence, the instatement of growth management seems to be related to collaboration in other policy areas, whether directly or indirectly.

One disadvantage of this measure is that it probably affects environmental preservation and socio-economic integration both directly and indirectly. However, insofar as we are interested solely in its moderating role (rather than its explanatory role), this does not pose a methodological problem.

*Regional awareness*

As argued by Foster (2000), regional identity (and thus regional awareness) has to do both with the perception that a region’s inhabitants have of their own region and the perception that outsiders (from surrounding areas) have of the same entity. In the absence of a national “regional identity” survey, I have opted to

\(^{44}\) In theory, I am interested in both State/Provincial level initiative and Federal level initiative (hence the use of the expression “higher governmental initiative), but for the purposes of this analysis, I have only looked at State and Provincial mandates.
measure regional awareness by searching for regional expressions (adding “metro” or “region” after a city's name and in quotation, as in “Atlanta metro” and “Atlanta region”) on Google and taking note of the number of search results for each expression, limiting results to pages in English and hosted in the United States for U.S. metros, and to pages in English and French and hosted in Canada for Canadian metros. Also, using the Google trends tool, I was able to work backwards and compute the number of searches for the same expressions in January 2004 (the earliest date).

Although the use of Google search results and other web-based metrics is still relatively new in social science results, there is mounting evidence that they are highly correlated with the prevalence of real-world phenomena, such as flu outbreaks, unemployment, consumer spending, citations in peer-reviewed articles or racial animus (Eysenbach, 2011; Hubbard, 2011; Stephens-Davidowitz, 2012). As pointed out by Hubbard, the main reason Google data are reliable is because of their sheer volume; moreover, research shows that Google data are also unlikely to suffer from major social censoring and that individuals are more forthcoming with Google than they are in surveys (Kreuter et al., 2009; Conti and Sobiesk, 2007, both cited in Stephens-Davidowitz, 2012). For all these reasons, I believe the use of Google search data is appropriate for measuring an elusive real-world phenomenon such as regional awareness or regional identity.
3.2.4 Precursors

The last category of variables is that of precursors, that is to say, of regional traits or characteristics that affect the propensity for collaboration in some way, but that are not directly related (whether theoretically or empirically) to the outcomes identified earlier. As explained in the foregoing chapter, these precursor variables will be used in the present analysis as instruments; therefore, they should be either stochastic and completely exogenous or nearly permanent (i.e., unlikely to be affected by changing socio-economic conditions).

Flooding as an exogenous precursor to collaboration

There is convincing evidence that in the aftermath of natural disasters, and flooding events in particular, improvements are made in the social and physical infrastructure that go beyond reconstruction and flood protection (Kahan et al., 2006). Enduring regional collaboration does not necessarily follow region-wide flooding; however, large-scale flooding events in urban regions usually require some form of temporary inter-municipal collaboration. Some of these collaborative arrangements have, historically, become permanent, such as with the Greater Vancouver Regional District. Hence, there are both theoretical and empirical reasons to use the number of incidences of flooding in a given region before 1990 and the total number of years since each flooding incident as instrumental variables for measuring the effect of regional collaboration on the dependent variables.

Physical barriers and metropolitan power diffusion as near permanent regional features affecting collaboration

The two other precursor variables included in the present quantitative analysis are: 1) the number of major physical barriers to urban expansion\(^{45}\) in

\(^{45}\) Major physical barriers to expansion as understood here include: large lakes and bays, oceans, wetlands and mountain ranges. Rivers were left out for two reasons: first, because they are usually much easier to overcome as barriers than the other ones mentioned; second, because a river may
a given metropolitan region and 2) the metropolitan power diffusion index (MPDI)\(^{46}\) within each region. These regional features can be used as instruments as they both theoretically have an influence on regional collaboration, at least theoretically. On the one hand, physical barriers to expansion may force municipalities and other regional actors to work together if they are forced to share the same infrastructure, or if a municipality’s development causes negative externalities that cannot be contained within its own territory. On the other hand, the diffusion of power within a metropolitan region will likely affect the dynamics of collaboration, as it is hypothesized that government decentralization and fragmentation (both of which are related to metropolitan power diffusion) have an influence on inter-local competition and cooperation (Hamilton et al., 2004; Feiock, 2007).

Finally, both variables are relatively stable and therefore can be thought of as “precursors”. In effect, some major physical barriers can be overcome, but most cannot and the MPDI changes very slowly as municipalities in North America tend not to disappear or dramatically change size relative to one another (with the exception of Toronto and Montreal, where the forced mergers of 1997 and 2002, respectively, have somewhat changed the power dynamics within each region). Tellingly, the correlation between the 1987 and 2007 MPDI values for all U.S. core-based statistical areas (N = 942) is 0.985.

### 3.2.5 Empirical models

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, I estimate the effect of each type of regional collaboration (functional, state-mandated and bottom-up) on each outcome (recent trends in bird biodiversity, air pollution, economic segregation, business incubation, high-tech employment and the granting of utility patents) using a two-

\(^{46}\) Devised by David Y. Miller (2002), the MPDI is a measure of the diffusion of fiscal power within urban regions, which is related to the degree of governmental fragmentation. It is calculated as the sum of the square roots of the percentage contribution of each government in a given metro area in terms of government expenditures relative to the metro area’s total government expenditures.
stage least squares (2SLS) regression method, starting with ordinary least squares (OLS) in the first stage. Given that I am measuring all outcomes at one point in time (i.e., over the 2000-2010 decade) and that I have data for only 110 metropolitan regions (comprised of 100 U.S. MSAs and 10 Canadian CMAs), I cannot use metropolitan-level fixed-effects or year fixed effects models, as would be possible in a panel time series. I did account for a region-fixed effect in the first round of analyses to account for potential continent-wide regional variations (e.g., Midwest vs. Northeast vs. South vs. Canada), but I have decide to omit these regional dummy variables in the revised model as they did not add any explanatory power to the model. That being said, there is a considerable amount of data at the metropolitan level for both the U.S. and Canada, which allows me to include a number of controls in the estimation of the OLS and 2SLS models, holding constant a number of variables that might be correlated with either the outcome of interest or the particular form of regional collaboration in question.

To avoid overidentification in estimating the causal 2SLS model, I first estimated an OLS regression with an exhaustive list of controls; this allowed me to identify and retain the most significant among them and then specify a more parsimonious 2SLS model. The general form of the OLS equation is:

$$ Y_{r_t} = \alpha + \beta_1 c_{r_t} + \beta_2 X_{r_t} + \beta_3 X_r + \beta_4 P_{t_0} + \beta_5 m_{g_i} + \beta_6 (m_{g_i} \times c_{r_t}) + \beta_7 m_{rd} + \beta_8 (m_{rd} \times c_{r_t}) + \mu $$

where $Y_{r_t}$ indicates the % change in one of the six regional outcome variables over the most recent period (referred to as $t_2$), whether representing the last decade or the last two decades; $c_{r_t}$ (the main independent variable) is the intensity or degree of a particular type and form of regional collaboration ($C_r$) in the period preceding the most recent period ($t_1$), corresponding roughly to the second half of the 20th century; $X_{r_t}$ is a vector of control variables measured over $t_2$; $X_r$ is a vector of control variables that are permanent or slow-changing features of each region; $P_{t_0}$ is a vector of variables I call “precursors” in that they theoretically affect the main
independent variable \((C_{r_t})\) but not the outcome; finally, \(m_x\) and \(m_{ra}\) represent the moderating variables, i.e., the higher governmental initiative \((m_x)\) and the regional awareness \((m_{ra})\) indices.

In the basic, full metro-level model, I included the following control variables: total population in 2000, growth in gross metropolitan product (GMP) and population growth over the 2000-2010 decade, metropolitan government fragmentation, an index of three indicators I have called the civic-capital index, median household income and the % of the population the belongs to a visible minority (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description of each variable). Note that I have included the precursor variables in the full model to ascertain that they are, indeed, non-significant in the OLS regression analysis on the outcome \(y_{r_t}\) (and therefore uncorrelated with the error term \(\mu\)). I have also used, in some of the metro-level regressions, an adapted version of the resilience capacity index that includes Canadian CMAs (see Appendix 2 for a detailed description of the indicators included in the revised RCI); however, given that the RCI includes some of the controls, I have not used it concomitantly with these controls. In general, the inclusion of these controls allows us to account for the quantity of development that has occurred in the period of interest, the socio-demographic makeup of the metropolitan region in question and the degree of governmental fragmentation in said region (both of which reflect the region’s history and are informative of present day socio-political conditions).

The full state-level model is somewhat more parsimonious to start with, given that it has fewer observations \((N = 55)\) and estimates the effect of regional collaboration on only one outcome: bird biodiversity. It includes, as controls, the following variables: total population, population growth between 1990 and 2000, population growth between 2000 and 2010, economic growth between 1991 and 2005 as well as population density in 2000.

Given that, at the metro-level, I have three different independent variables (each corresponding to a type of collaboration) and that each independent variable is measured in different ways (as an overall index as well as an index of
collaboration in each of the three areas of interest), and considering that I am estimating the effect of each type of collaboration on four metro-level and two state-level outcomes using both OLS and 2SLS methodologies, I am in fact estimating a total of more than 30 models. That said, the basic equation remains the same for all models; what changes is the specific form of the simplified (or parsimonious) model, as different control variables were used for each combination of predictor and outcome.

Finally, as explained earlier, I have included a “baseline” control variable for each outcome, e.g., the level of NO₂ in 1990 when estimating the effect of regional collaboration on the change in NO₂ over the 1990-2009 period or the number of patents granted in each region in 2006 when estimating the effect of regional collaboration on the change in the number of patents granted between 2006 and 2010.

---

47 Controls were added or removed based on two criteria: 1) the contribution of a given control variable to variance explained and 2) the effect of a given control variable on the exogeneity of the instrument(s).
3.3 Results

As explained in the first chapter and reiterated in the beginning of this chapter, the quantitative analysis presented here is not envisaged as the final test of the hypotheses that were presented earlier; rather, it yields an initial and preliminary approximation of the many (presumed) relationships among the precursor, independent, moderating and dependent variables I have identified. Regardless of the strengths and weaknesses of the identification and measurement strategies I have used, therefore, I do not see these results as conclusive; rather, I think of them as suggestive of further questions and hypotheses.

Table 3.2: Extensive models of OLS regressions of the three collaboration types\(^1\) on the four metro-level outcomes\(^2\) (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables(^3)</th>
<th>NO(_2) pollution</th>
<th>Income segregation</th>
<th>Num. small establish.</th>
<th>High-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ordinary Least Squares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SPGs per capita</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.024(^*)</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated collaboration index</td>
<td>-0.074(^**)</td>
<td>-0.067(^***)</td>
<td>0.050(^***)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index1 (# of initiatives)</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.016)</td>
<td>(0.009)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index2 (# of years of collab.)</td>
<td>-0.062(^**)</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgmt)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.076(^***)</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results)</td>
<td>-0.063(^*)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.037)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, govt init. and total # of SPGs</td>
<td>0.034</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.013)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, regional awar. and total # of SPGs</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>-0.029(^*)</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.026)</td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.410(^***)</td>
<td>0.081(^***)</td>
<td>0.104(^***)</td>
<td>-0.013(^***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.042)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.039(^*)</td>
<td>0.000(^***)</td>
<td>0.010(^**)</td>
<td>0.021(^**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted (R^2)</td>
<td>0.352</td>
<td>0.503</td>
<td>0.305</td>
<td>0.265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^*\) \(p < 0.10\), \(^**\) \(p < 0.05\), \(^***\) \(p < 0.01\)

\(N = 110\)

\(^1\) Functional, state-mandated and bottom-up

\(^2\) Outcome 1: change in NO\(_2\) concentrations (1990-2010); Outcome 2: change in income segregation (1990-2009);

Outcome 3: change in number of small establishments (2001-2010); Outcome 4: change in % high-tech employment

\(^3\) All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients
Table 3.2, on the previous page, presents the results from the extensive OLS models of the three collaboration types of the four metro-level outcomes. From looking at this table it immediately appears as though state-mandated collaboration is the most effective of three types; indeed, each level of SMC\(^{48}\) is associated with a 7.4% decrease in nitrogen dioxide over the 1990-2010 period, a 6.7% decrease in income segregation over the 1990-2008 period as well as a 5% increase in the number of small business establishments between 2001 and 2010. Strikingly, functional collaboration seems to have only a weak positive relationship with the number of small business establishments, while BUC and regional awareness seem to be related only to the environmental outcome (with a one s.d. increase in each variable being equivalent to a 6.2% and 6.3% decrease in nitrogen dioxide, respectively). Higher governmental initiative, finally, appears to be positively associated with income segregation; this is not entirely surprising given that it is measured by the number of years since the earliest statutes mandating growth management, which have themselves been associated in some analyses with a decrease in the production of affordable housing within the growth-managed area (Son & Kim, 1998).

The OLS models of regional collaboration on state-level environmental outcomes yield somewhat different results; in effect, as is apparent is Table 3.3 (on the next page) the number of SPGs per capita in each state is strongly and negatively associated with the proportion of urban breeder bird species whose numbers are declining (one s.d. increase is equivalent to a 7.6% decrease in bird species showing a negative trend). In contrast, BUC (measured at the state-level by the % increase in the number of acres preserved through land trusts between 2000 and 2005) is only weakly related to the same outcome, while higher governmental initiative (or growth management) seems to have a significant but small impact on the proportion of permanent breeder species showing a negative trend.

\(^{48}\) There are five levels of SMC, coded as such 0 = no SMC; 1 = one form of SMC (in either environment/land-use or housing) with no enforcement mechanism; 2 = one form of SMC with enforcement or two forms of SMC without enforcement; 3 = one form of SMC without enforcement, and one form of SMC with enforcement; 4 = both forms of SMC with enforcement.
In sum, each collaboration type appears to be related to at least one of the three outcomes of interest; however, the OLS models suggest that SMC is more strongly and consistently associated with environmental conservation and socio-economic integration.

Table 3.3: Extensive models of OLS regressions of the three collaboration types on the two state-level outcomes (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary Least Squares</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SPGs per capita in 2002</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.076***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years since adoption of growth mgmt.</td>
<td>-0.024**</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.011)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% increase in acres preserved, 2000-2005</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.056*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.150***</td>
<td>0.280***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.012)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.003***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.338</td>
<td>0.434</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

1 Functional, as measured here by the number of SPGs per capita in 2002; state-mandated, as measured here by the number of years since the instatement of growth management; and bottom-up, as measured here by the % increase in the number of acres preserved by land trusts between 2000 and 2005.

2 The two state-level outcomes are the 1) proportion of permanent, breeder bird species with a negative trend for the 2000-2010 decade in a given state and 2) the proportion of urban, breeder bird species with a negative trend for the same period in a given state.

3 All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients.
3.3.1 Does a particular type of regional collaboration in a given policy area facilitate or hinder collaboration of other types and/or in other areas?

Spillover effects across types of collaboration

The very first hypothesis advanced in the first chapter concerned the existence of so-called “spillover effects” from one type of collaboration to another. In order to test this hypothesis, I fitted two models: one of functional and state-mandated collaboration to the first index of BUC, and the other with the same predictors and the second index of BUC as the outcome. I have looked at the impact of the first two types of regional collaboration on BUC for two reasons: first, because functional collaboration and SMC are both temporally prior to BUC (in most regions, at least); second, because “bottom-up” collaboration is more likely to emerge from “forced collaboration” than the other way around49.

49 Albeit, there are well-known cases where citizen groups have succeeded in forcing the government to act about a particular issue; however, the data I have collected suggests that higher governments will usually only mandate collaboration if local actors (usually local governments) do not collaborate out of their own accord. Indeed, most state-mandated forms of collaboration are in the areas of housing, transportation (not included in this research) and land-use planning (and residential development density, in particular), where it is notoriously difficult to get them to agree.
The results, presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, are concordant: functional collaboration seems to have a strong positive impact on both the number of collaborative regional initiatives in a given region and the increase in the number of acres preserved through land trusts in each state; hence, there appears to be a definite spillover effect from one type of collaboration to another.

One interesting and unexpected result is that the number of small establishments in a given region in 2001 (which was inputted as a baseline control) was found to be strongly and negatively associated with BUC – which might be indicative that it is more difficult to “get started” with BUC when there is a larger number of potential stakeholders. It is also possible that business communities made up of a large number of small businesses behave differently from those comprising a small number of large businesses.

Table 3.4: Extensive models of OLS regressions of functional and state-mandated collaboration on bottom-up collaboration\(^1\) and the presence of a regional food policy council (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables(^2)</th>
<th>Number of collab. regional initiatives</th>
<th>Total number of years of collaboration.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ordinary Least Squares</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of SPGs (controlling for population)</td>
<td>0.715***</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.239)</td>
<td>(0.232)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated collaboration index</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.443)</td>
<td>(0.231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgmt)</td>
<td>0.016</td>
<td>0.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.307)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results &quot;... region&quot;)</td>
<td>0.467</td>
<td>0.508**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.304)</td>
<td>(0.230)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.208***</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.250)</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.385</td>
<td>0.358</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^* p < .10, \, ** p < 0.05, \, *** p < 0.01\)  
\(N = 110\)

\(^1\) As measured by the two bottom-up collaboration indices, i.e., the total number of collaboration initiatives and the total number of years of collaboration

\(^2\) All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients
However, as explained earlier, identifying possible causal mechanisms (linking, for example, functional collaboration and business dynamics to BUC) is not the aim of the present analysis; rather, it is a task for the next chapter.

Table 3.5: Model of OLS regression of functional and state-mandated collaboration on state-level bottom-up collaboration

| Independent variables | Coefficient | Robust s.e. | t    | P>|t| |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|------|-----|
| Number of SPGs per capita in 2000 | -0.165 | 0.155 | -1.06 | 0.293 |
| % increase in number of SPGs, 1992-2010 | 0.489 | 0.137 | 3.57 | 0.001*** |
| Number of years since inst. of growth mgmt | 0.210 | 0.139 | 1.51 | 0.138 |
| Constant | 0.016 | 0.125 | 0.13 | 0.897 |
| Model significance (Wald chi2, prob > chi2) | 0.014** |
| Adjusted R² | 0.228 |

* p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
N = 49

1 As measured by the % increase in the number of acres preserved through the establishment of land trusts in a given state between 2000-2005
2 All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients

Spillover effects across policy areas

Although the evidence presented in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 does not explicitly support the hypothesis that spillover effects occur across policy areas (e.g., from economic development to environment conservation), it does so implicitly. Indeed, the fact that BUC in the areas of environmental conservation, housing and economic development is affected by the total number of SPGs – most of which are active in unrelated areas of policy or service delivery – suggests that service-sharing agreements between municipalities and other “functional overlapping competing jurisdictions” may facilitate other types of collaboration. This is consistent with previous research showing that the propensity of individuals and institutions to collaborate in the present is strongly and positively influenced by the frequency, intensity and duration of their past collaboration.
Independently of that, an OLS regression of the different area-specific types of collaboration on environmental BUC shows that both economic functional collaboration and economic development BUC are weakly and positively related to environmental BUC ($p = 0.60$ and $p = 0.84$, respectively); although one might question the significance of each individual result, taken together they suggest two things with regards to the “workings” of regional collaboration: 1) the “propensity to collaborate”, whatever its determinants, is similar for functional and bottom-up types of collaboration; 2) collaboration initiatives in the areas of economic development and environmental conservation are not independent of one another.
3.3.2 What are the effects of each type of regional collaboration on each regional outcome? Which type of collaboration is most effective?

In this section I test the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 2 using a 2SLS methodology and fitting four different models (corresponding to each metro-level outcome) for each of the four predictors (functional, SMC, BUC #1 and BUC #2). While this methodology allows me to eliminate the possibility of reverse causality (when applied properly\(^{50}\)), it is important to note that no research methodology completely removes the risk of omitted variable bias. Hence, it is important to treat these results with caution, even when they are significant, as the causal mechanism linking a predictor to an outcome may yet be obscured by the absence of an important variable.

### Table 3.6: Parsimonious models of 2SLS regressions of functional collaboration on the four metro-level outcomes\(^1\) (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables(^2)</th>
<th>NO(_2) pollution</th>
<th>Income segregation</th>
<th>Num. small establish.</th>
<th>High-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-Stage Least Squares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SPGs per capita</td>
<td>-0.297</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.183)</td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.076)</td>
<td>(0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgnt)</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.014**</td>
<td>-0.016**</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.056)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results)</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.416</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, govt init. and # of SPGs per capita</td>
<td>0.055*</td>
<td>0.092*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, regional awar. and # of SPGs per capita</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.121</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.492***</td>
<td>-0.061***</td>
<td>0.108***</td>
<td>-0.001***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin chi2</td>
<td>4.481</td>
<td>5.379</td>
<td>5.006</td>
<td>5.379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
<td>0.025**</td>
<td>0.020**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.067*</td>
<td>0.030**</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.030**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{1}\) Outcome 1: change in NO\(_2\) concentrations (1990-2010); Outcome 2: change in income segregation (1990-2009); Outcome 3: change in number of small establishments (2001-2010); Outcome 4: change in % high-tech employment

\(^{2}\) All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients

\(^{50}\) I can eliminate the possibility of reverse causality only if I am confident that my instruments are, indeed, unrelated to the outcome of interest and that I cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are exogenous after conducting a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.
Functional collaboration

The results of the 2SLS regressions of functional collaboration on the four metro-level outcomes are presented in Table 3.6 (on the previous page). Based on the 2SLS models, it does not appear that the number of SPGs per capita is statistically related to any of the four outcomes.

However, there appears to be a weak and positive interaction between the number of SPGs per capita and State/Provincial governmental initiative for the first two outcomes, such that higher governmental initiative would seem to moderate the effect of functional collaboration on the reduction of nitrogen dioxide and income segregation (see section 3.4.4 for a more in-depth discussion of this).

State-mandated collaboration

Table 3.7: Parsimonious models of 2SLS regressions of state-mandated collaboration on the four metro-level outcomes1 (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables2</th>
<th>NO₂ pollution</th>
<th>Income segregation</th>
<th>Num. small establish.</th>
<th>High-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two-Stage Least Squares</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State-mandated collaboration (SMC) index</td>
<td>0.140</td>
<td>-0.170*</td>
<td>0.174*</td>
<td>-0.008***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.145)</td>
<td>(0.094)</td>
<td>(0.096)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgnt)</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.122***</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.035)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results)</td>
<td>-0.070**</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, govt init. and SMC</td>
<td>-0.061</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.040</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
<td>(0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, regional awar. and SMC</td>
<td>0.074**</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.468***</td>
<td>0.053</td>
<td>0.082*</td>
<td>-0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.054)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi², prob &gt; chi²)</td>
<td>0.030**</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.050*</td>
<td>0.005***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin chi²</td>
<td>4.112</td>
<td>4.010</td>
<td>4.673</td>
<td>6.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.021**</td>
<td>0.045**</td>
<td>0.031**</td>
<td>0.011**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.079**</td>
<td>0.084*</td>
<td>0.044**</td>
<td>0.016**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Outcome 1: change in NO₂ concentrations (1990-2010); Outcome 2: change in income segregation (1990-2009); Outcome 3: change in number of small establishments (2001-2010); Outcome 4: change in % high-tech employment
2 All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients
Table 3.7 summarizes the findings of the 2SLS models of state-mandated collaboration on the four outcomes. The first thing to note is that SMC seems to be negatively associated with the change in income segregation and positively associated with the change in the number of small business establishments in a given region; significantly, both these results concord with the results from the OLS models. Note further that the effect sizes of the SMC independent variable in the 2SLS models are considerably larger than in the OLS models: -17% and 17.4% respectively, compared with -6.5% and 5%.

The first result suggests that SMC in the area of housing affordability seems to work, which may be due to the success of California’s RHNA policy (supplementary analyses would be needed to ascertain that). As for the second result, it may be indicative of the fact that state-sponsored economic development programs often prioritize business incubation (as opposed, for example, to prioritizing the growth of existing small businesses).

Second, SMC appears to have a very small (but highly statistically significant) negative impact on the number of high-tech jobs in a given region, with an increase in one unit in the SMC index associated with a 0.008 standard deviation decrease in the number of high-tech jobs. Notably, OLS coefficient of SMC on the number of high-tech jobs is of the opposite sign.

Finally, there is a positive interaction between SMC and regional awareness, which suggests that high regional awareness may counteract the impacts of low state-mandated collaboration, but not those of high state-mandated collaboration (see section 3.3.5 for more details).

**Bottom-up collaboration**

Strikingly, the 2SLS models of bottom-up collaboration yield very different results from the extensive OLS models presented in Table 1. Indeed, whereas BUC seemed to be associated (in a statistically significant way) only with the first outcome in the OLS models, both measures of BUC are associated with both economic outcomes in the 2SLS models. In effect, both measures of BUC are associated with a decrease in the number of small business establishments (-38%
and -74% for a one unit increase in BUC index 1 and BUC index 2, respectively) and an increase in the percentage of total employment in technology-based knowledge clusters (0.6% and 1.0% for a one unit increase in BUC index 1 and BUC index 2, respectively).

The first result, combined with the fact that the baseline number of small business establishments is negatively associated with BUC, is not easily explainable and suggests that the causal mechanism at play is more complex than it appears. The second result, however, supports the New Regionalist view that bottom-up collaboration (whether or not it is focused exclusively on economic development) may help local political and economic actors compete for jobs in the so-called “knowledge economy” (assuming this is not a case of reverse causality, which it theoretically shouldn’t be given the use of a 2SLS methodology).
Table 3.8: Parsimonious models of 2SLS regressions of bottom-up collaboration (index #1) on the four metro-level outcomes* (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables**</th>
<th>NO₂ pollution</th>
<th>Income segregation</th>
<th>Num. small establish.</th>
<th>High-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Stage Least Squares</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. (BUC) index 1 (# of initiatives)</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.067*</td>
<td>-0.038***</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgmt)</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.084**</td>
<td>-0.073***</td>
<td>0.008**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results)</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, govt init. and BUC (index 1)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.021*</td>
<td>-0.013*</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, regional awar. and BUC (index 2)</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.221*</td>
<td>-0.075</td>
<td>0.193***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.001***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.017***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-Hausman F</td>
<td>0.034**</td>
<td>0.048**</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
<td>0.069*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Outcome 1: change in NO₂ concentrations (1990-2010); Outcome 2: change in income segregation (1990-2009); Outcome 3: change in number of small establishments (2001-2010); Outcome 4: change in % high-tech employment
** All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients

Table 3.9: Parsimonious models of 2SLS regressions of bottom-up collaboration (index #2) on the four metro-level outcomes* (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables**</th>
<th>NO₂ pollution</th>
<th>Income segregation</th>
<th>Num. small establish.</th>
<th>High-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Stage Least Squares</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up collab. index 2 (# of yrs of collab)</td>
<td>0.056</td>
<td>0.082</td>
<td>-0.074***</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt initiative (# of yrs since inst. of growth mgmt)</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.140***</td>
<td>-0.049***</td>
<td>0.006**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional awareness (# of Google results)</td>
<td>-0.047</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, govt init. and total # of SPGs</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction, regional awar. and total # of SPGs</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>-0.037</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.353***</td>
<td>0.057**</td>
<td>0.104***</td>
<td>-0.007***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000**</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.049**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin chi2</td>
<td>4.316</td>
<td>3.967</td>
<td>4.282</td>
<td>3.685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-Hausman F</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
<td>0.046**</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
<td>0.055*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Outcome 1: change in NO₂ concentrations (1990-2010); Outcome 2: change in income segregation (1990-2009); Outcome 3: change in number of small establishments (2001-2010); Outcome 4: change in % high-tech employment
** All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 bring to light one other important finding: State/Provincial governmental initiative, as defined here, is associated positively with the change in income segregation (which is consistent to the findings of the OLS models), negatively with the change in the number of small business establishments and positively with the change in the proportion of total employment in technology-based knowledge clusters. In that respect, it mimics almost exactly the two measures of BUC described above.

Note, finally, that I will not consider the other significant results that were obtained in the 2SLS regression models of BUC as they were not consistent across the two measures.

*Area-specific types of collaboration*

Generally speaking, the 2SLS models of area-specific forms of collaboration measured at the metro-level did not yield statistically significant results. In other words, even though the four aggregate measures of collaboration are statistically related to one or more of the outcomes of interest here, most of the area-specific measures at the metro-level do not appear to be.

There are two exceptions. The first exception concerns state-mandated collaboration in the area of housing\(^51\), which was strongly and negatively related with income segregation (\(\beta = -0.748, p = 0.039\)). The second concerns bottom-up economic collaboration as measured by the total number of years of collaboration, which was weakly and positively associated with the change in the number of small business establishments (\(\beta = -0.038, p = 0.081\)). Note that the instruments were deemed exogenous in both cases (i.e., the null hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous could not be rejected).

Analyses at the state level produced somewhat different results. In effect, the measure of bottom-up collaboration employed was specific to the area of

\(^{51}\) Like environmental SMC, housing SMC is measured by an index coded as such: 0 = no SMC in the area of housing; 1 = existence of SMC in the area of housing, but no enforcement mechanism in place and 2 = SMC in the area of housing with some form of enforcement mechanism in place.
environmental conservation and it was strongly and negatively associated with the proportion of urban breeder bird species showing a negative trend between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 3.10, below).

### Table 3.10: Extensive models of 2SLS regressions of bottom-up environmental collaboration on the two state-level outcomes (robust standard errors in parentheses)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Two-Stage Least Squares</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of acres preserved as of 2000</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>-0.081**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.041)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.189**</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.055)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model significance (Wald chi2, prob &gt; chi2)</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
<td>0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durbin chi2</td>
<td>0.149</td>
<td>5.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.222</td>
<td>0.017**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu-Hausman F</td>
<td>1.023</td>
<td>7.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.322</td>
<td>0.013**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p < .10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
N = 49

1 Measured here by the total number of acres preserved through land trusts in each state as of 2000
2 The two state-level outcomes are the 1) proportion of permanent, breeder bird species with a negative trend for the 2000-2010 decade in a given state and 2) the proportion of urban, breeder bird species with a negative trend for the same period in a given state.
3 All continuous independent variables have been standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients
3.3.3 Is regional collaboration better suited to the provision of certain public goods? If so, which ones?

Based on the analyses presented here, it is difficult to give a definite answer to this question. All three public goods I have identified as being likely targets of regional collaboration – namely environmental conservation, socio-economic integration (in the form of affordable housing) and economic development – appear to be at least somewhat affected by regional collaboration.

Table 3.11: Summary of findings from OLS and 2SLS regression models of regional collaboration (all types) on the six outcomes under study (m = metro-level x or y variable, s = state-level x or y variable, OLS = stat. significant in OLS model, 2SLS = stat. significant in 2SLS model, (+) = positive association, (-) = negative association)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Change in NO$_2$ concentration (m)</th>
<th>Change in income segregation (m)</th>
<th>Change in num. of small estab. (m)</th>
<th>Change in high-tech jobs (m)</th>
<th>Prop. urban species with neg. trend (s)</th>
<th>Prop. perm. species with neg. trend (s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total # of SPGs per capita (m)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of env. SPGs per capita (m)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of housing SPGs per capita (m)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total # of econ. SPGs per capita (m)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
<td>OLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC index (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMC index, env. (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 1 (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 1, env. (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 1, housing (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 1, econ. development (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 2 (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 2, env. (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 2, housing (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUC index 2, econ. development (m)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (−)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
<td>2SLS (+)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of SPGs per capital in 2002 (s)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Num. yrs since inst. of growth mgt (s)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct increase in acres pres. 2000-2005 (s)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
<td>OLS (−)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, the presumed impact of regional collaboration on income segregation and the increase in the number of small business establishments is somewhat ambiguous; indeed, some forms of collaboration seem to have a positive effect on these outcomes, while others have a negative effect. Given the existence of spillover effects between the different forms of collaboration, the fact that different forms seem to have different (contradictory) impacts makes it somewhat difficult to say how the relationship between collaboration and these outcomes will play out.

Hence, it appears that the impacts of regional collaboration (writ large) on environmental outcomes and the proportion of total employment in tech-based knowledge clusters are more easily predictable – which may be indicative that regional collaboration is better suited at providing these particular goods.

3.3.4 What impacts do public policy frameworks and governmental rules have on the effectiveness of collaboration?

*Simple effect of higher governmental initiative on regional outcomes*

As shown in Table 12 (on the next page), which summarizes the findings of OLS and 2SLS models with regards to the simple effects of the State/Provincial governmental initiative variable, the number of years since the enactment of growth management seems to be *directly* related to the change in income segregation, the change in the number of small establishments and the change in high-tech jobs. However, it is important to note that these simple effects were obtained in models where an interaction term between governmental initiative and regional collaboration was also present. When taking out the interaction term from the extensive OLS models, it turns out that governmental initiative is only directly (and positively) associated with income segregation. This suggests that for all other outcomes where governmental initiative interacts with the main independent variable, governmental initiative is clearly the mediator as it is not directly related to the outcome of interest. However, in the case of income segregation, given that governmental initiative is directly related to the outcome *and* interacts with the main independent variable, it may be the case that governmental initiative is *being mediated*, and not the mediator (see next section).
Table 3.12: Simple effects\(^1\) of governmental initiative on the four metro-level outcomes from OLS and 2SLS models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Change in NO(_2) pollution</th>
<th>Change in income segregation</th>
<th>Change in num. of small estab.</th>
<th>Change in high-tech jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governmental initiative (# of yrs since the instatement of growth management)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.014 – 0.140</td>
<td>-0.073 – -0.040</td>
<td>0.006 – 0.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance(^2) ((P &gt;</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>) or (P &gt; \text{chi2}))</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>0.000 – 0.022</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Simple effects of the governmental initiative variable in models where the interaction term is also present; expressed as a range of coefficient values, given that a significant simple effect was found in several models
2 Expressed as a range of \(p\) values, given that a significant simple effect was found in several models

Interaction effects of governmental initiative on regional collaboration effectiveness

As alluded to above, there is evidence that governmental initiative acts as a moderator of the relationship between regional collaboration and at least three of the metro-level outcomes. As illustrated below in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the effects of functional and bottom-up collaboration vary depending on the level of

**Figure 3.1** Interaction effect between governmental initiative and functional collaboration, 2SLS model of functional collaboration on NO\(_2\) pollution
governmental initiative. Specifically, governmental initiative seems to \textit{attenuate} the effects of functional collaboration on the change in nitrogen dioxide and the change in income segregation (see Figures 3.1, 3.2.1 and 3.2.2). In contrast, it appears to \textit{accentuate} the effect of bottom-up collaboration on the number of small business establishments in a given region (see Figure 3.3).

Two notes of caution are in order. First, perhaps unsurprisingly, governmental initiative does not interact with state-mandated collaboration in the OLS and 2SLS models I have built; this is perhaps because the two variables are in fact measuring the same construct. Whatever the case may be, the fact that they do not interact does not rule out the possibility that higher governmental initiative and state-mandated collaboration might interact in some way. We simply cannot make an inference about this, based on the analyses presented here.

Second, as mentioned earlier, it is important to remember that the direction of a moderation effect depends on which of the presumed predictor or moderator is statistically related to the outcome. In this case, functional collaboration seems unrelated to income segregation (whether or not the interaction term is included), whereas there seems to be a direct relationship between governmental initiative and the change in income segregation. Hence, it would appear as though the mediation effect shown in Figure 3.2.1 (and originally hypothesized) actually runs in the opposite direction. In effect, it would seem that governmental initiative is the predictor, and functional collaboration the mediator, as shown in Figure 3.2.2.
**Figure 3.2.1** Interaction between governmental initiative and functional collaboration, 2SLS model of functional collaboration on income segregation (hypothesized interaction)

![Graph showing interaction between governmental initiative and functional collaboration.]

**Figure 3.2.2** Interaction between governmental initiative and functional collaboration, 2SLS model of functional collaboration on income segregation (actual interaction)

![Graph showing interaction between governmental initiative and functional collaboration.]

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Figure 3.3  Interaction effects between governmental initiative and bottom-up collaboration, 2SLS model of bottom-up collaboration on business incubation
3.3.5 How does regional awareness or a sense of “common plight” among local residents and other actors in the region affect the realization of regional objectives?

Simple and interaction effect of regional awareness on regional outcomes

The interpretation of the simple effects of regional awareness on metro-level outcomes is at once more simple and more complex than that of governmental initiative and its effects. On the one hand, when excluding the interaction terms from the OLS and 2SLS models, regional awareness is directly and weakly related \( (p = 0.098) \) only to the total employment change in tech-based knowledge clusters – which could be a sign that tech clusters are “metropolitan integrators” or indicative of some other relationship. On the other hand, regional awareness is both negatively and statistically associated with the change in nitrogen dioxide over the 1990-2010 period and it interacts with SMC, which is also negatively and statistically related to income segregation. Mathematically, then, it is impossible to say which of SMC and regional awareness is the predictor and which is the mediator.

**Figure 3.4** Interaction between regional awareness and state-mandated collaboration, 2SLS model of state-mandated collaboration on NO\(_2\) pollution
That said, there are both theoretical and mathematical reasons to believe that regional awareness is, indeed, the mediator and that SMC is the main predictor. In effect, there is no ready-made theoretical explanation as to why regional awareness should have a direct impact on air pollution; in contrast, there are numerous potential causal mechanisms linking SMC and the concentration of nitrogen dioxide. As for the mathematical reasons, the association between SMC and the change in NO$_2$ concentration is both stronger and more robust than that between regional awareness and the same outcome.
3.4 Discussion

Although the results outlined above may seem somewhat modest, the evidence suggests that the identification and measurement strategies were adequate; indeed, the analysis showed significant variability within each collaboration type, but also and more importantly between types. Moreover, different types of collaboration affected the outcomes of interest in different ways under different conditions, which supports one of the fundamental premises of this research, which is that *different forms of regional collaboration work differently*.

That said, not all of the predictions made in Chapter 1 based on theory or case study evidence were borne out; some of the results were unsurprising, while others suggest that further research might be needed to understand a particular causal relation that is only hinted at here. In what follows, I review briefly the hypotheses laid out in the first chapter in light of the findings from the quantitative analysis and formulate further research questions and hypotheses to be tested in the case studies.

*Review of hypotheses*

The foregoing analysis allows us to partially address and answer some of the research questions and hypotheses posed in Chapter 1. The first important finding relates to the presumed “spillover” effect of collaboration, which I suspected does take place and has indeed been found. This raises interesting and important methodological and theoretical questions; for instance, one might ask whether the lessons of collaboration are transferable only to the extent that the same individuals take part in both collaboration initiatives, or whether past collaboration with outside stakeholders becomes part of an institution’s memory. In any case, the mechanism through which the spillover takes place merits further study.

In terms of the effects of each collaboration “type”, the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1 were confirmed in several instances, but disconfirmed in a few cases. As predicted, functional collaboration did not have much of a direct impact on any of the six outcomes; in fact, it was only found to be directly positively associated with
the change in the number of small business establishments in the extensive, metro-
level OLS model, as well as negatively associated with the change in the proportion
of urban bird species showing a negative trend in the state-level OLS model. In other
words, the functional collaboration variables were not statistically significant in any
of the 2SLS models – making it more difficult to make an inference as to the effects
of this type of collaboration. Conversely, SMC was found to have the strongest
effect of all three collaboration types on the regional outcomes of interest, and
particularly on air pollution and income segregation, which is concordant with the
hypothesis put forward in Chapter 1.

One major difference between what was predicted and the findings presented here concerns the effects of SMC and BUC on the two economic development outcomes, namely the change in the number of small establishments and the change in the share of total employment in tech-based knowledge clusters. Indeed, whereas SMC seems to encourage business incubation, BUC seems to have the opposite effect, whether measured as the number of collaborative initiatives in a given region or the total number of years of collaboration. Admittedly, it is hard to explain why the overall level of BUC would discourage entrepreneurialism; the only obvious explanation (assuming the instrumental variable design was implemented correctly) is that the relationship between BUC and business incubation is partially or fully mediated by some other variable not included in the model.

It is also interesting to note that BUC seems to have more impact on economic development than on environmental quality. This underlines another major difference between what was predicted and what the data shows: regional collaboration does not appear to be more effective at providing environmental goods than social or economic goods; in fact, it is not clear from the data that regional collaboration is better suited to the provision of a particular public good (or kind of public good) over others.

Note that this lack of a significant effect may be due to the fact that I did not distinguish in this analysis between SPGs covering an entire metro area and those covering only a few municipalities. In effect, although the approach taken here is theoretically sound – and akin to that used by Foster (1997) – it may be that different types of SPGs work differently. In future research, it might be interesting to control for the “territorial coverage” of SPGs or count each SPG “type” separately. This, however, would require extensive research and would be a research undertaking of its own.
Finally, regarding the governmental initiative and regional awareness variables, it does appear as though they play a moderating role – albeit, based on the results of this analysis, a somewhat different and less important role than what was originally hypothesized. On the one hand, governmental initiative seems to attenuate the association between functional collaboration and air pollution, while regional awareness appears to attenuate the effect of SMC on the same outcome. On the other hand, governmental initiative seems to accentuate the effect of BUC on the incubation of small businesses and appears to be moderated by functional collaboration.

*Further questions and hypotheses*

This short review of the hypotheses advanced in Chapter 1 raises a number of further questions, which merit being explored in more detail in the next phases of this research. The first question concerns the role of SPGs in facilitating regional collaboration; as hinted at earlier, although the intensity of functional collaboration seems to have no direct discernible effect on the outcomes of interest, there is evidence that it affects both bottom-up forms of collaboration and the relationship between governmental initiative and income segregation. In other words, functional collaboration may not affect regional outcomes directly, but it may do so indirectly. If that is the case, then what exactly is the mechanism linking functional collaboration to bottom-up collaboration? Does functional collaboration between local actors pave the way for wider-scale and wider-scope forms of regional collaboration? In other words, is functional collaboration a way to “break the ice” and establish trust among stakeholders and other participants, which then allows for bottom-up collaboration to emerge?

The second question concerns the role of state-mandated collaboration and governmental initiative; the data suggest that SMC has a direct and significant impact on at least two of the three outcomes, but this does not tell us how state and provincial rules mandating collaboration actually produce results in different settings. Do these mandates usually take the form of strict rules/regulations? If so,
do these regulations facilitate the provision of regional public goods by establishing ground-rules and creating a “framework” of sorts for regional collaboration? Does SMC simply bring attention to problems that would otherwise be ignored? Does SMC work because it addresses only urgent problems? Or does state-mandated collaboration only work when the carrot – or the stick – is big enough to warrant it?

These questions bring us back to the comparative premise of this research, which is that U.S. and Canadian metros differ significantly on some of the most important independent and moderating variables included in our theoretical model and that we can learn from these differences. Based on the foregoing quantitative analysis, I find that this premise is reinforced for two reasons: first, because functional collaboration is much less common in Canada, for both legal and historical reasons, which suggests that the path to regional collaboration may be different in Canadian and U.S. metros; second, because state-mandated collaboration is generally more common – and higher governmental initiative stronger – in Canada than in the U.S., which allows us to test the hypothesis that state and provincial rules and/or interventionism facilitate collaboration.

With regards to these differences between Canadian and U.S. metros, it is worth noting that Canadian metropolitan areas seem to have much lower-level levels of bottom-up regional collaboration than U.S. metros\(^\text{53}\); this suggests that regional collaboration does indeed take different forms in the U.S. and Canada. However, the question remains: does it work differently? That is the central question to be answered in the following chapter.

\(^{53}\) They have, on average, 1.93 fewer collaborative regional initiatives and -0.758 s.d. fewer total years of collaboration than their U.S. counterparts.
Works cited – Chapter 3:


Chion, M. 2011. Regional Planner, Association of Bay Area Governments. Personal communication. Interview conducted on August 11th, 2011.


Conservation Biology 18, 733–745.


Chapter 4

Following regional collaboration from cradle to cradle: A historical perspective on collaborative processes in the Greater Montreal and the San Francisco Bay Area

4.1 Introduction

“[...] At some point during the discussion, everyone around the table saw that everyone else was well intentioned, and quite abruptly the climate changed, everyone put aside their narrow local political interest and we collectively decided to act. A shift, something imperceptible had happened [...]”

- Hubert Simard, former President of the Montreal Urban Community’s Planning Commission (2013, personal communication)

Form, process and transformation within collaboration

The landscapes that surround us are the product of natural and human forces interacting over time and in space. The form of a landscape at a given time influences the process of change (e.g., the presence of trees on a slope will determine, in part, the rate of soil erosion), but the land is also transformed by the processes that take place in time and space (e.g., the amount of rainfall, the movement of tectonic plates, the occurrence of fire). The formation of a landscape is an evolutionary process, and is the outcome of a long series of interactions; so, I believe, is the establishment of collaboration among individuals and institutions. Collaboration is not merely and strictly the form or the process, it is the interaction between them and the result of this interaction is some transformation – whether perceptible or not.

In effect, collaborative processes always take shape in a particular way; in other words, they always have a specific form, which may be more or less inclusive, more or less hierarchical and may involve professional facilitation or not. By their very nature, collaborative efforts also take time – whether two hours, a half-day, a full day or hundreds of hours spread out over several months or years – and they unfold in a particular manner, that is to say, they may involve more or less open
dialogue and be more or less adversarial. In all cases, therefore, collaboration can be described in terms of form and process and, more importantly, the interaction between them.

The analogy has heuristic value, I believe, because it illustrates an important fact: collaborative processes cannot be easily broken into “inputs” and “outputs” as the inputs and outputs are intertwined; for example, the output of one stage of the collaboration often becomes the input of the next stage. Moreover, the process itself may be transformative, whether or not we can point to particular and concrete changes in the environment that resulted directly from it. Thus, the results of collaboration may be small, cumulative and only appreciable over time.

That is why a statistical investigation into collaboration and its effects can only take us so far – as we have seen in the previous chapter. Understanding how regional collaboration transforms those who take part in it and/or the regional environment, how one form of collaboration morphs into another and how the actions of higher and local government entities are affected by regional collaboration requires us to carefully trace the process from “cradle to cradle” – and not, as it were, from “cradle to grave”. Voluntary collaborative processes rarely maintain a particular “form” for a long time, but seldom disappear without planting some other seed.

Weaving the many strands of collaboration into a narrative

In what follows, I have “strung together” the events that unfolded before, during and following important “collaborative moments” in the metropolitan histories of the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal so as to trace as clearly as possible the process of regional collaboration from initiation to implementation and, in some cases, on to formalization or institutionalization. To be clear: what I offer here is a selective – and therefore incomplete – history of urban regional collaboration in the two regions of interest. My intent was to identify important collaborative moments in the recent history of each region and “dissect” each of these moments so as to shed light on the events and relationships within
each and untangle some of the important threads connecting these events and relationships through time.

The three moments of interest I have identified in the recent history of San Francisco are the collaborative processes surrounding the creation of the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) in the 1960s, the work of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission in the late 1980s, and the formation in the early 1990s of the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Communities (BAASC). It is important to point out that each of these historical moments has been extensively studied (in part, at least); the last two initiatives, in particular, have been made into case studies by Victor Jones (1993) and Judith Innes (1994; 2005; 2010). However, while these case studies are quite detailed and provide a solid basis upon which to construct a narrative about each period, they did not explicitly connect these initiatives to previous or subsequent efforts; rather, they were focused on specific collaborative initiatives (Bay Vision 2020 and BAASC). Hence, my aim is not to duplicate, replace or cannibalize the work of these scholars, but rather to enrich the narrative they have laid down by following different threads and using other types of evidence.

One thread that is of particular interest to me – and that has received relatively little attention – is the evolution of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG) throughout this period and in relation to these events. Given that ABAG’s primary purpose has always been to “foster cooperation” between and among local governments, its response to region-wide collaborative initiatives is of particular interest. In order to follow this thread, I have relied on a variety of sources, including ABAG internal documents and oral histories by individuals who were actively involved in these events as well as government reports and academic literature.

54 In commemoration of ABAG’s 50th anniversary and the Metropolitan Transportation Commission’s (MTC) 40th anniversary, MTC and ABAG jointly launched an oral history project, which resulted in the recording of oral histories with 24 figures who played key roles in the history of either one or both of the agencies. In addition, I have conducted 16 interviews (some of which recorded as oral histories) over the course of two years with both actors and close observers of the region’s collaborative processes.
In the case of the Greater Montreal, the task of identifying key collaborative moments was at once easier and more difficult, and essentially for the same reason: there currently exists no historical narrative about regional collaboration in the region, in part because scholars and observers of Montreal’s recent metropolitan history have either focused on the political struggles leading to the formation and/or dissolution of regional institutions (Sancton, 1985; Tomas, 2012) or else described these institutions in terms of their structure (Lafortune, 2010). There certainly have been phases in the Greater Montreal’s recent metropolitan history during which regional collaboration was more intense; however, these instances of collaboration have generally been overshadowed by the heavy-handed intervention of Quebec’s provincial government.

Despite having received little or not attention, however, a number of these collaborative moments are worthy of study, including: the 1982-1990 period at the Montreal Urban Community (MUC), and the creation of the regional park system, in particular; the protection of the Mille-Îles river starting in the mid-1980s and up to the present time through the formation of a multi-stakeholder partnership; and the creation in the mid-1990s of the Island of Montreal’s Regional Economic Development Council (“Conseil régional de développement de l’île de Montréal” in French, hereafter referred to as IMRDC), followed by that of Montréal International (MI), the region’s first metropolitan economic development agency. In this case also, I have traced the process of collaboration from cradle to cradle by carefully reading press reports, MUC, IMRDC and MI internal documents, advocacy publications and memoirs, in addition to using the oral histories I have collected and the interviews I have conducted over the past two years with individuals who took an active part in these happenings55.

See Tables 4.1 and 4.2, on pages 188 and 234 respectively, for a chronology of the events the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal.

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55 To put together this case study, I have relied on the testimonies of eight former MUC members about their own experience trying to “make the organization work”; these testimonies were collected by Yves Bélanger during a colloquium about the MUC’s future, which took place in March 1998, and was published in the form of a book the same year. In complement to these testimonies, I have myself conducted 15 interviews (some of which are recorded as oral histories).
Seeing regional institutions for what they enable

At the beginning of this introduction, I have insisted upon the fact that collaboration – as understood here – refers neither to a particular form or process, but rather to the interaction between them. In other words, collaboration cannot be reduced to an organizational form or structure, but neither can it be fully described in terms of the way it proceeds. It follows that the setting for collaboration matters, but only to the extent that it shapes and informs the collaborative process. Indeed, it is of little importance whether a regional agency is of the “limited-purpose” type or the “general-purpose” type if its role is simply to be that of a regional convener. However, if said agency is also responsible for the implementation phase of a given collaborative decision-making process, then its “form” will be of some import.\textsuperscript{56}

I reiterate this point here because the two organizations whose evolution I have decided to follow in order to trace the collaborative process in each of the two regions over time – namely ABAG and the MUC – differ in many important ways. First, the MUC was imposed by the provincial government and was at first given a clear, if limited, mandate (fixing up fiscal inequities on the Island of Montreal); ABAG, in contrast, always was and still remains a \textit{voluntary} association of governments with a broad mandate (promoting inter-municipal cooperation), carrying out only a small number of very specific (and rather technocratic) state-mandated tasks. In the language used above, ABAG is therefore closer to being a “convener” than to being an “implementer”, whereas the MUC was designed to implement a number of reforms. Second, ABAG and most other regional agencies in the Bay Area cover the entire nine-county Bay Area region (as they have done since their creation), whereas the MUC covered (during its three decades of existence)

\textsuperscript{56} It is important to recognize that the roles of “convener” and “implementer”, as referred to here, are ideal-types; in reality, the roles played by regional agencies is neither strictly that of convener, nor that of implementer. That being said, I believe it is a useful distinction to make when thinking about the differences between ABAG and the MUC, which do not correspond exactly to these ideal-types but do resemble one or the other (ABAG being closer to the “convener” ideal-type, and the MUC to the “implementer” ideal-type).
only the territory of the Island of Montreal\textsuperscript{57}; as such, it can best be described as a sub-regional (but still supra-local) organization. Third, ABAG was created in 1961 “from the bottom-up” and still exists today, whereas the MUC was imposed “from the top-down” in 1970 and was disbanded – also “from the top-down” – when the \textit{Montreal Metropolitan Community} (“Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal”) was established in 2001; hence, we are following the evolution of two organizations whose fates were, in the end, very different (judging from this particular point in time). Finally, the City of Montreal has played a prominent role in the history of the MUC, whereas the Bay Area’s two largest cities (San Francisco and San Jose) have each played a relatively minor role in the history and evolution of ABAG (as will be made clear in the following pages). According to Rahaim (2013) and Lydon (2013), this is because there existed and still exists a perception – among elected officials from San Francisco and San Jose – that the region’s large urban centers have little to gain or lose from participating in the organization.

That said, both narrative threads allow us to do the same kind of investigative work and bring evidence to bear on the same question. Indeed, it is not ABAG and the MUC that we are comparing, but the way in which collaboration within each organization was initiated, unfolded and, eventually, unraveled.

\textsuperscript{57} As noted by Collin (1998), the Island of Montreal was, in the 1920s, a better approximation of the city’s commutershed than it is now; however, the territory of the Island never corresponded to the functional metropolitan region, as the South Shore of Montreal was already a part of the city’s commutershed in the late 19\textsuperscript{th} century (Collin and Poitras, 2002).
Figure 4.1 – Map of the nine-county Bay Area region

Source: Wikipedia Commons
Figure 4.2 – Map of the Montreal Census Metropolitan Area (CMA), pre-merger

Source: Sénécal et al., 2005
4.2 When being like a region is not enough: the San Francisco Bay Area

[...] every inch of the greenbelt, even the air we breath and the water we drink, vibrates with history and politics.  

As pointed out by Victor Jones in a 1973 report of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) on regional governance, “the governance of the Bay Area is a mixture of public and private actions” (p. 76). While the same could be said of most metropolitan areas, the importance of private organizations (whether for profit or non-profit) in influencing public policy and the multiplicity of limited-purpose, single-function regional agencies are particularly striking in the so-called “nine-county Bay Area” region. Most of these organizations have played a role, whether big or small, in the region’s development and some of the Bay Area’s most important amenities – including the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART) system, the Bay and Bay Ridge trails and the San Francisco Bay itself – would not exist today if not for the concerted action of governmental, business and other non-governmental organizations.

Another striking feature of the history of regional governance in the Bay Area is the fact that its principal regional planning agency is a voluntary association of cities and counties, with no real power, that was not created in order to meet Federal requirements \(58\) and that had no specific mandate from higher level governments during the first few years of its existence. Hence, despite its weaknesses, ABAG was – and to some degree remains – a true “bottom-up” collaborative institution. Indeed, the cities and counties of the Bay Area have had

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\(58\) Most council of governments (COGs) and regional councils (RCs) in the U.S. were created to meet the specific requirements of either the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1963 or those of the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Act of 1966. Notably, ABAG was created in 1961, “before the avalanche of regional planning agencies was started by federal action” (Bort, cited in Jones, 1973, p.83)
every opportunity, over the last 50 years, to experiment with – and test the limits of – voluntary regional collaboration.

The multiplicity of “regional actors” in the Bay Area and the fact that the purported goal of its main regional agency was originally precisely to promote inter-local collaboration makes it an interesting terrain for testing theories of regional collaboration. That being said, there is another reason why the Bay Area is worthy of study, despite all that has already been written about it, and that is the fact that there exists in the region a statutory regional agency with the power to regulate land-use, albeit in a restricted area – the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC). The history of BCDC, which is both intertwined with and parallel to that of ABAG, provides an interesting “counterfactual” to ABAG’s evolution. This is so for two reasons. First, because BCDC also started as a bottom-up, collaborative initiative, but one that followed a very different course, which led to the creation of permanent government agency. Second, because many of the same local elected officials have sat on the boards of both ABAG and BCDC and – according several observers, including some of these officials – they have acted differently relative to the local interests they represent when in one place vs. the other.

In what follows, I trace the process of regional collaboration throughout ABAG’s history, touching upon the history of BCDC at different times and focusing mainly on three periods (as described earlier). I should mention, once again, that my aim is not to focus strictly on ABAG’s successes or failures or try to demonstrate that the Bay Area’s particular governance “structure” is effective or deficient; rather, I am interested in following the process of regional collaboration through time so as to understand what its effects might be, and how it is influenced by both internal and external forces.
4.2.1 1958-1969: regional collaboration for better or worse

Tracing ABAG and BCDC back to their origins

The foundation and early years of ABAGs

It is important to say a few words about the origins of ABAG and BCDC, as the historical context surrounding the creation of each agency sheds light on their respective evolution. Both originated in the 1950s, at a time of rapid economic, demographic and technological change. ABAG came into being because industry leaders after World War II worried about the region's ability to transition from a defense-related to a peacetime economy and formed the Bay Area Council (BAC)59, which quickly became interested in regional transportation and land-use planning and “provoked” the coming together of local elected officials when it proposed the creation of a regional agency to “acquire, manage and operate the Bay Area's major airports, seaports and bridges” (Tranter, 2001, p. 1). In contrast, BCDC was created after the U.S. Corps of Engineers became concerned with the rapid pace of Bay filling, which threatened the movement of ships in and out of the Bay, and commissioned a study to determine how much more of the Bay was “susceptible to reclamation”60 (Scott, 1963). Significantly, there was in both cases a “sense of crisis” (if not actual crisis) that prompted the “rallying of forces” within a particular constituency; however, in the case of ABAG, the threat dissipated quickly, whereas, in the case of BCDC, it is to some extent still present today.

59 The Bay Area Council was formed in 1945 to “coordinate the region's efforts to whip crucial transition problems, and cash in on industrial, commercial and foreign trade opportunities” (BAC, 2013) during the transition from a war to a post-war economy. It has traditionally represented “big business” in the industrial and financial sectors (Wells Fargo, Bank of America, Transamerica, Standard Oil of California, Pacific Gas and Electric, Bechtel, Kaiser Industries, Clorox are all founding members) but its membership now also includes technology companies, law firms and real estate development corporations.

60 The Army Corps of Engineers, responsible for dredging the channels used by freighters and small crafts in and out of the San Francisco Bay, needed places to dump the large quantities of silt that were the by-products of their dredging activities, and started to realize that there were fewer and fewer tidelands left where such dumping could be done. Concerned with finding a long-term solution to the problem of maintaining navigation in the bay, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was commissioned by Department of Commerce to look at the future of the Bay given its current rate of filling.
ABAG’s story begins with a – seemingly innocuous – proposal by the Bay Area Council in 1957 to create in the Bay Area an agency modeled after the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which would manage and operate the region’s major airports, seaports and bridges. This new agency was to be called the Golden Gate Authority (GGA) and take the place of existing single-purpose agencies such as the Golden Gate Bridge and Highway District. Most significantly, from the point of view of the region’s local elected officials, it was proposed that this agency have a “corporate management structure” with no formal local government representation on its board. Unsurprisingly, the region’s mayors and county supervisors were nonplussed by this particular provision.

In her recent work on the defeat of the GGA, Louise Dyble recounts the movement against the creation of the Authority and argues (following Banks, 1977) that the coming together of local governments in the Bay Area was a reactionary move to stop the “progressive” planning vision espoused by reformers such as State Senator John F. McCarthy and Bay Area magnate Edgar F. Kaiser. In her account, the impetus for the creation of ABAG was not the need for regional cooperation, but rather the resolve of local governments to protect their own autonomy and authority against the imposition of a regional government agency not controlled by them. In other words, following Dyble’s interpretation (which is widely shared⁶¹), the creation of ABAG had one principal aim: permanently thwarting any real attempt at regional planning by creating a locally controlled regional agency that could take on regional planning functions without actually imposing any change on local jurisdictions. The result, in her own words, is the following: “Formed specifically to undermine regional planning, ABAG became the most viable organization to perform that function in the Bay Area” (p. 303).

As evidence that the creation ABAG was indeed reactionary, Dyble cites principally two events: first, the meeting called by Claude Hutchison (Berkeley's

⁶¹ This particular interpretation of ABAG’s founding moment seems to have percolated down to many non-historians, as it was mentioned to me on several occasions while collecting oral histories and conducting interviews with Bay Area regional actors. On three separate occasions, the person offering this interpretation seemed convinced that ABAG had been created to thwart regional planning, yet did not know anything about the context of ABAG’s creation, which seems to indicate that this view of ABAG is part of the organization’s folklore.
Mayor and ABAG’s founder and first President) on March 20, 1959, to discuss the League of California Cities’ “statement of principles on metropolitan problems” and the GGA proposal; second, the hearings of the Golden Gate Authority Commission, held in Berkeley in June 1960, during which Mayor Claude Hutchison denounced the GGA proposal as politically irresponsible and suggested that ABAG could be a viable alternative to it.

While the text of John D. Philips’ presentation at the 20th annual conference of the Western Governmental Research Association in October 1960 corroborates part of Dyble’s reading of these events, it also adds important nuances to the overall storyline. Phillips, who was at the time City Manager of the City of Berkeley, retells the creation of ABAG in the following terms:

For the past ten years in the San Francisco Bay Area we have been developing intergovernmental cooperation and communication through organizations known as ‘Mayor's Conferences’ [and] the actions we have taken in the San Francisco Bay Area to achieve cooperation among governmental units on regional affairs would not have been possible, had we not had the prior experience with the mayors’ conferences. [...] Thus, when the League of California Cities approved a statement of principles on metropolitan problems [...] , many of the cities in the San Francisco Bay Area were ready to put the action program into operation. [...] The essence of the program was the formation of a metropolitan council on a formal basis, by a contract under the Joint Exercise of Powers Act. [...] This appeared to many of our cities as merely an extension of the principles of our well-established mayors’ conferences to a regional organization for the purpose of meeting regional problems (Phillips, 1960, p. 1-2)

Phillips adds that the Alameda County Mayors’ Conference's calling of a meeting of the (then) 81 cities in the region “was also prompted by the fact that there was pending before the State legislature a proposal to establish a Golden Gate Authority” (emphases added), but he adds that discussions about the GGA were inconclusive, while those regarding the formation of a metropolitan council led to an agreement authorizing Mayor Hutchison to appoint a study committee to propose the composition, method of organization and bylaws of such a council in the Bay Area.
This detailed narrative of ABAG’s coming-into-being suggests that the actors involved in its creation did not see themselves only as *opponents* to the GGA, but also as *proponents* of an alternative governance model, one which was – at that – not entirely new. In fact, a number of historical documents\(^{62}\) seem to indicate that ABAG’s creation was both “actionary” and reactionary in spirit. Also importantly, it appears that the formation of the Association was in large part made possible by the existence of the “mayors’ conferences”.

This (somewhat more) nuanced view of ABAG’s beginnings is further supported by the fact that the unification of local governments in the Bay Area was not done in isolation. Indeed, even though ABAG was the first Council of Government (COG) recognized in the State of California, similar organizations had already been created in Detroit in 1954 as well as in Salem (Oregon) and Washington DC in 1957. By 1961, there was a nation-wide movement toward “voluntary regional cooperation”\(^{63}\), so much so that six years later there were more than 350 “Regional Councils” (including a large number of COGs) in the United States (NARC, 2013).

What is more, the arrival of ABAG on the Bay Area’s metropolitan stage was seen by many observers at the time as a definite sign of progress. For instance, it is

\(^{62}\) The minutes from ABAG’s foundational meeting on May 5\(^{th}\) 1960 make no mention of the GGA proposal, even though the hearings of the GGA Commission were going on at the same time. Similarly, the minutes for the first official General Assembly held on February 24\(^{th}\) 1961 again make no mention of the GGA. Finally, in September of the same year, the General Assembly votes that ABAG should study uniform building codes, Bay Area tidelands development, water pollution, solid waste sites and open space, as reported in the ABAG’s document “The emergence of a regional concept 1910-1976”, which seems to indicate that ABAG delegates had plenty of issues to discuss other than the GGA proposal. One might question whether opposition of the GGA, if voiced at any of these meetings, would have been recorded; however, considering Claude Hutchison’s personal and very public involvement in trying to block the GGA proposal, and given that opposition to the GGA was supposedly ABAG’s *raison d’être*, it is difficult to imagine why such opposition would have been censored during ABAG meetings or deleted from the minutes after the fact.

\(^{63}\) As reported in the 1961 ACIR report titled *Government Structure, Organization and Planning in Metropolitan Areas*, President Kennedy himself highlighted the need for cooperative metropolitan planning in his housing message to congress on March 9, 1961: “The city and its suburbs are interdependent parts of a single community, bound together by the web of transportation [...]. Increasingly, community development must be a cooperative venture toward the common goals of the metropolitan region as a whole [...]. This requires the establishment of an effective and comprehensive planning process in each metropolitan area embracing all activities, both public and private, which shape the community. Such a process must be democratic - for only when the citizens of a community have participated in selecting the goals which will shape their environment can they be expected to support the actions necessary to accomplish these goals [...]”
interesting to note that the Bay Area Council, which had strongly supported the creation of the GGA and later supported the creation of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC), also supported the creation of ABAG (BAC, 2005). As described by Angelo Siracusa (2011), who joined the Bay Area Council in 1966 and served as its president for more than 20 years, ABAG was perceived by the leadership of the BAC as the organization’s “government counterpart” (a role which no organization had played before).

There was also support for ABAG (and the voluntary association of local governments, more generally) within the academy. Victor Jones, who was Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of California (Berkeley) at the time, described voluntary metropolitan associations in 1962 as “the most promising development in our American federal system.” Although he saw ABAG and COGs in general as a first stage in the “emergent federalism of metropolitan communities”, he also thought that ABAG alone was in a position the make “the concept and practice of home rule into a viable government for the Bay Area that can work with cities and counties and with the state and federal governments” (Jones, 1962, p. 307).

In contrast, T. J. “Jack” Kent (who was himself a delegate to ABAG’s General Assembly from Berkeley) described ABAG, a mere four years after its creation, as a “voluntary association” which can “never perform the painful acts of government” (cited in Hamilton, 1965, p. 53). Mel Scott (who incidentally was the first one to propose the creation of BCDC in his influential 1963 study titled The Future of San Francisco Bay) was equally skeptical:

If 70 or more city and county governments comprising the Association of Bay Area governments truly wish to control regional affairs and to provide strong leadership in regional planning and development, they will seek to wrest more of the power of decision from the state and federal governments [and] integrate multi-county special districts. [...] Since the cities and counties of the Bay Area do neither of these things, their professions of dedication to the principle of home rule are unconvincing. (interview with Mel Scott published in Hamilton, 1965, p. 54).
Yet, the conclusions of a 1965 report by the Institute for local self-government are more in line with those of Victor Jones; indeed, the report concludes that “the Association is well on the way to developing into an effective device for dealing with regional problems” and has “conclusively demonstrated that it can stimulate and guide factual analyses which are essential first steps to reasonable regional action” (Hamilton, 1965, p. 59).

In sum, the view that ABAG was created for the sole purpose of thwarting regional integration and regionalism more generally is not entirely borne out by the historical data. Evidently, there always existed tensions within ABAG, chiefly between members but also between delegates and staff, and despite the fact that the organization was often protective of local autonomy, it has also been an important promoter of regionalism, as will be made clear in the sections to come.
The fight to Save the Bay and the creation of BCDC

As alluded to above, BCDC originated at about the same time as ABAG and was also prompted by a crisis of sorts, but one that had been unfolding slowly for more than a century, surreptitiously: the filling of the San Francisco Bay. As described by Odell (1972), “San Francisco Bay was taken for granted, and so were the things being done to it” (p. 10). However, everything changed when a single citizen, Catherine Kerr – who happened to be the wife of the University of California’s President, Clark Kerr – became sufficiently concerned with the Bay’s future to take action to preserve it.

By her own account, the single most important event that galvanized Catherine Kerr to rally support for her cause was the printing, in the Oakland Tribune, of a series of maps from the 1959 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers report on the Bay Area’s future (titled Future Development of the Bay Area, 1960-2020)64. This series of maps (shown in Figure 4.1), which would be used many times in the years to come by those trying to stop Bay filling and which has become somewhat of an icon, made it graphically clear that there would be no Bay left to speak of by about 2000 if Bay filling continued at the same pace.

The history of the first few years of the Save San Francisco Bay Association is described in detail both in Rice Odell’s 1972 book as well as in Blatman’s documentary, and I shall not repeat it here in its full length. In the fall of 1960, Catherine (Kay) Kerr enlisted the help of two of her friends, Sylvia McLaughlin and Esther Gulick, to rally support for the conservation of the Bay.

64 Catherine Kerr was interviewed personally both by Rice Odell, in preparation of her 1972 book, and by Ron Blatman, producer of the documentary Saving the Bay and she underscores in both accounts the importance of the maps’ publication in the Oakland Tribune in awakening her to the crisis at hand.
After meeting with some of the most prominent conservationists in the Bay Area, the three women realized that none of the existing groups gave high priority to preserving a natural amenity in the middle of a dense – and rapidly growing – urban area\textsuperscript{65}. Hence, Kay Kerr and her two acolytes – all of whom were well-connected through their husbands and well-known in the elite circles of the East Bay – decided to take the matter into their hands in 1961 by creating an organization dedicated to

\textsuperscript{65} Interestingly, despite the fact that several of the nation’s most influential conservationist lived and worked in the Bay Area, most of their efforts were concentrated on conserving “wild places” far away from the city (following the example set by John Muir himself). Incidentally, the vast majority of these conservationists were white men.
saving the Bay: the Save San Francisco Bay Association (SSFBA). Over the next few years, the three women were able to realize significant achievements: first, they rapidly enlisted several hundred people – most of them also members of the East Bay elite – to become members of the SSFBA⁶⁶; second, they convinced Mel Scott at the University of California’s Institute of Governmental Studies to undertake a comprehensive review of the bay and its problems, which was published in 1963 and eventually served as BCDC’s “factual basis”⁶⁷; third, they convinced first Assemblyman Nicholas C. Petris of Oakland and then State Senator Eugene McAteer of San Francisco to carry the ball politically. As explained by Joseph E. Bodovitz, who was Executive Director of BCDC from 1964 to 1973, convincing Senator McAteer was no small feat:

I think what people tend to forget now is how unusual it was to have anybody of McAteer’s stature interested in an environmental issue in the sixties. It would be common now, but part of what was intriguing about it at the time was, here was a person who had not been identified with environmental causes at all – part of the establishment in the state senate – suddenly taking up a brand-new and obviously glamorous, important kind of issue. (Bodovitz, 1985, p. 6)

As described by Odell (1972), McAteer decided to take on the issue personally (after Assemblyman Petris’ failure to get a bill through), thanks to Kay Kerr’s influence and determination, but he did not know how to go about it. He therefore asked for “a little money for a study”, a legislative tactic to deflect opposition. On February 4, 1964, he introduced a bill to set up a temporary nine-member, temporary San Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission (SFBCSC) and was able to get $75,000 from the legislature to fund it. As chairman of the temporary commission, McAteer became suddenly personally involved in the issue; after only 12 weeks of weekly public hearings and a month to write up the results, the Commission published a 64-page report which recommended, unequivocally

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⁶⁶ Odell (1972) reports that at the height of the “battle to save the bay”, in 1969, more than 18,000 people were members of the SSFBA

⁶⁷ As noted by Odell, “it was a landmark report, filled with ammunition, and it provided a solid base of information – and a beacon – for conservationists, planners and government officials during the crucial years of conflict over the bay.” (p1972, p.15)
and with McAteer’s full support, that legislation be adopted to establish a temporary San Francisco Conservation and Development Commission to follow up on the work of the study commission. This new temporary commission would be given the task of preparing a “comprehensive and enforceable plan for the conservation of the water of the bay and the development of its shoreline”. It would also be empowered to “issue or deny permits, after public hearings, for any proposed project that involves placing fill in the bay or extracting submerged materials from the bay” (SFBCSC, 1965 cited in Odell, 1972, p. 23).

The political battle that ensued – to get a meaningful bill through that would establish the BCDC and impose a de facto moratorium on bay filling, except where permitted by the commission – was probably the most important development in the history of BCDC, but it is of relatively little import to our story, since it was passed over the objections of most local governments and several large corporations (which owned part of the Bay) using McAteer’s sheer political influence (though reinforced by a well-orchestrated media campaign68). Worthy of mention is the fact that ABAG proposed, in July 1964 (approximately 14 months before BCDC was created), its own “voluntary” moratorium on the filling and development of the San Francisco Bay. The then President of ABAG and Alameda County President, Kent D. Pursel, presented the issue to his colleagues in these terms in his letter accompanying the model moratorium (dated June 25, 1964):

> Several State Legislators have indicated that moratorium bills would be introduced next session unless some positive controls were established by then. *It is important, therefore, that we move ahead rapidly with a coordinated approach to providing for a planned and proper development of the shoreline.* [emphasis added]

> While the model fill moratorium prepared by ABAG staff and submitted to its delegates proved ineffective, as nobody would sign it without reserving the right to fill (Odell, 1972), the fact that ABAG attempted to propose an alternative and

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68 The well-known radio show host Don Sherwood played a major role in raising awareness about the Bay fill issue. According to Bodovitz (1985), McAteer had specifically asked Sherwood to help him put pressure on Governor Brown; however, Sherwood soon took on the issue as his own and made it his mission to keep the issue alive in the public arena.
coordinated approach to the bay’s development is itself instructive. Indeed, it confirms, to some extent, the fact that ABAG was both negative and positive in its approach. It also underscores another important point that will be further illustrated in the coming pages: it is in part because of ABAG’s failure to act that other limited-purpose region agencies were created in the Bay Area, thus further increasing the disintegration of regional planning functions and, ipso facto, weakening ABAG. This, in turn, raises an important question: how can a regional agency – or any governmental agency – establish its credibility and legitimacy if it does not have the power or the means to act? As we will see in the case of BCDC, but also in that of the MUC, it is easier for regional agencies to promote effective regional collaboration when they are themselves perceived as effective, which itself depends on their having a clear mandate and the ability to carry it out.

**ABAG’s “regional planning” moment**

As it happens, the year 1965 was a watershed year in the history of both ABAG and BCDC. Both organizations became, so to speak, “active” during that year, in that they started doing in earnest what they had been created to do – respectively promoting regional policy coordination (albeit mainly through the elaboration of functional regional plans) and developing a public policy framework for ensuring the “proper development” of the San Francisco Bay (while, the same time, exercising its permitting power).

In the case of ABAG, the federal *Housing and Urban Redevelopment Act* of 1965 made financing available to metropolitan planning organizations such as ABAG for a variety of regional programs and it also made federal financing to local jurisdiction for water filtration plants, underground storage basins, housing, health facilities, airports, and other infrastructure conditional upon these investments being

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69 Bodovitz, in his 1984 oral history (published in 1985), reports the following regarding ABAG’s reaction to McAteer-Petris Act of 1965: “I think the opponents were somewhat off guard. One of your questions was about ABAG saying ‘We can do it all.’ McAteer thought that was ludicrous, and he thought the same about their threats that if he didn’t do things their way they would kill his bill. He was both amused and annoyed at the presumption of ABAG’s telling him that if he didn’t do something they wanted they’d kill his bill” (p.10).
consistent with regional goals. The federal law therefore required that all applications for federal construction funding be reviewed by regional bodies known as “councils of government” (COGs). Thus, after having opposed the creation of the GGA and that of the BCDC, the ABAG General Assembly voted (albeit not unanimously) in 1966 to request designation as the Bay Area COG – a request which was granted. Jones (1973) has argued that, following ABAG’s assumption of this new role, it was no longer a truly voluntary association, as local governments needed to be members of ABAG to be eligible to receive Federal grants. In any event, ABAG’s new responsibilities certainly did “jumpstart” its planning activities.

In effect, ABAG started its regional planning activities in earnest in the mid-1960s and had accomplished a number of things by the decade’s end: it had adopted a Uniform Building Code in 1964 and requested that all cities and counties adopt it; it had published a Preliminary Regional Plan in 1966, the precursor to the region’s first open space plan (published in 1971) as well as a housing study (the same year) that emphasized the need for over a million new housing units by 1990 (an important public policy issue that had never been brought up until then). However, as pointed out by Jones (1973), much of ABAG’s planning between 1965 and 1970 was both functional and state-mandated in nature, that is, it was meant to meet HUD requirements for open space, sewage and water facilities grants. As a result, despite a flurry of activity at ABAG during these years, the Bay Area’s voluntary association of local governments did not spend much time developing “policy and actions recommendations” to solve “metropolitan area problems of mutual interest and concern”, as it originally intended. Rather, it helped establish – through the publication of about a dozen studies70 - a factual basis upon which to plan comprehensively. As pointed out by Innes and Gruber (2001), this process of “amassing facts” about the region had mixed results:

If ABAG’s initial purpose was indeed obstructionism, did the attitudes of Council members change after a half decade of exposure to regional issues or was the COG designation a planned move to effectively thwart regional decision making? Possibly both answers are correct. The record indicates that in the sixties and early seventies ABAG was an organization in which members were simultaneously pursuing two radically different ends. ABAG regionalists, led by Alameda County Supervisor Joseph Bort, worked tirelessly to bring regional government to the Bay Area [...]. A coalition on the Council, however, fought attempts to erode the power of local governments (Martin 1973). The end result was organizational paralysis for ABAG. (p. 17)

In short, to paraphrase Victor Jones’ own conclusions in his 1973 appraisal of ABAG, the Association’s first decade illustrates the way in which an organization such as ABAG can evolve in response to the changing “perceptions of needs” of its members and learn to become more effective. ABAG’s research and planning activities did not have much impact “on the ground” during this period, in part because of the Association’s so-called “organizational paralysis”71, but also because it never had any coercive power over its members. That being said, according to Jones – who was probably ABAG’s closest observer at the time – the Association’s foray into actual planning helped transform the organization by exposing its members to a myriad of regional issues, which in turn set the stage for ABAG’s “regionalist turn” of the late 1960s72. In other words, ABAG’s first decade provides evidence that collaboration around specific issues can lead to other forms of collaboration as more and more participants start to adopt a regional view that transcends the organization’s narrow functions.

71 In the words of former ABAG president Jack Maltester, ABAG’s paralysis manifested itself as a “disinclination to provide a regional point of view or take a stand that may be disagreed with by some member jurisdictions on major issues”, which resulted in ABAG acting as a “do-nothing group who want [sic] to pre-empt the field but not act on the difficult issues” (cited in Innes and Gruber, 2001, p.16-17).

72 Among other “signs” of this regionalist turn, let us mention the fact ABAG General Assembly voted (albeit, again non unanimously) in 1967 to ask the State legislature to change ABAG from a voluntary association into a regional agency with mandatory membership and the statutory authority to implement its own regional plan – a move that would have been unthinkable five years earlier. Another important sign was ABAG’s Regional Home Rule Proposal of 1969, which called for a closer working relationship with the Air District and the deepening, more generally, of both vertical and horizontal inter-governmental relations.
BCDC in action: the unfolding of the interim commission

In contrast to ABAG’s planning activities, which yielded no noticeable results in the short or medium terms, the concomitant planning and permitting activities of the interim commission, which lasted a little over three years, resulted in something much more concrete: the BCDC’s grant of permanent status by the legislature in 1969, *along with the power to enforce its plan*. The process that led to the creation of a permanent BCDC was, again, described in great detail by Rice Odell in her 1972 report. However, I do believe it is interesting to highlight those aspects of the process that made the commission’s *collaborative endeavor* successful.

Planning process

It is important to mention first the planning process itself, which was crucial in getting agreement – generally unanimous – about specific policy proposals. As reported by Bodovitz (1985), “What we had in 1965 was a temporary commission. This means if you don’t score a touchdown the ballgame is over” (p. 12). Everyone involved knew that the Commission would eventually recommend some form of legislation, and that the chances of this (future) bill passing depended on how the Commission’s work would be looked upon (whether its conclusions were unanimous, whether the hearings had been conducted appropriately, etc.). As a result, in Bodovitz’ own account (1985), a number of things had to happen:

1) *The commission needed to produce a plan that was unambiguous* and specific in its recommendations, so that the legislators and the public could see what would happen if the plan was carried out (or not carried out);

2) *There needed to be a continuing permitting operation* – throughout the process and concomitantly with the elaboration and determination of the plan’s policies – so
as to protect the bay, one the one hand, and show that you were able to exercise this permit power responsibly during the interim period, on the other.

3) *The commission needed to maintain the public support* that had made the creation of the study commission possible in the first place, which means it had to make sure the process didn’t appear to be “rigged” in any way.

Given the political inflammability of the issue and the commission’s great visibility in the media, nothing could be left to chance by those leading the effort. Joseph E. Bodovitz, who was hired as Executive Director, and Melvin B. Lane, who was appointed Chairman by Governor Edmund G. (Pat) Brown, set a firm (and ambitious) timetable at the very start and made every effort to adhere to it. They also made sure that commissioners would “share in the planning” – as opposed to simply argue about the planning made by some “master consultant”, as was and still often the case – so as to get them to take some responsibility for the plan and its recommendations. In order to do that, Bodovitz and Lane insisted that every consultant’s report be written in clear and unambiguous language (without avoiding controversial opinions and topics), that BCDC staffers summarize each report to make it readable for the commissioners and that each report be summarized orally at the beginning of each meeting. In addition, discussions about the plan and permit hearings were held during the same meetings, with the planning issues being

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73 In the words of Bodovitz (1985, p.12): “if you’ve shown, over the four years, that people were fairly treated, that rational, necessary development was encouraged, not discouraged, and that the values of the bay were protected, you make a case for continuing.”

74 The commission’s timetable, as reported by Odell, was divided in six “steps” as follows: 1) inventory and evaluation of existing information about the bay (four months); 2) development of policies, including the establishment of criteria for future uses of the bay and the evaluation of the existing plans of cities, counties, governmental agencies and property owners in light of these criteria (15 months); 3) preparation of a tentative, detailed preliminary plan for specific parts of the bay and its shoreline based on the criteria identified in step 2 (seven months); 4) public hearings, review and amendment of preliminary plan (six months); 5) adoption of final plan (three months) and 6) preparation and printing of commission’s final report to the governor and legislature (four months).

75 Master planning exercises of the kind that was undertaken during BCDC’s interim phase are often outsourced to consulting firms, which come up with a ready-made plan that is submitted “for comments” to the governing board of the hiring entity. When the planning process is akin to this, those who are asked to comment have no personal stake in making the plan work, as they did not participate in its elaboration; as a result, the result is often an expensive and frustrating back-and-forth between the client and the consultant.
discussed first, which made certain that commissioners wouldn’t show up only to vote on permits. The goal of this planning method was for everyone (commissioners and staffers alike) to learn about the issues and “understand the total problem”.

Bodovitz, reminiscing in 1984 about the importance of ending up with a “product” that could be turned into a bill, which then stood a chance of being passed by the legislature, describes the planning process in this way:

When you reasoned that way, it seemed to me you just came to the inevitable conclusion of two things: One, the planning had to be done in an open, public way so that two audiences, the commissioners themselves and the public, would understand the planning. Secondly, that meant you couldn’t commission one of these great big plans and just turn it all over to consultants, because no one would understand what they were doing, and no one would have a stake in it. A third consideration was, it seemed to me the report of the commission had to be as unanimous as we could make it. To go to the legislature with a divided report, with big dissenting opinions at the end of it, would make it very difficult to legislate because there would be such a strong dissent, that you would just have a foretaste of what was going to happen in the legislature. It didn’t seem to me that that meant we had to homogenize everything down to the lowest level that everybody could agree to; it meant that it really had to be the commission’s plan. All kinds of people had to say, "Yes, we didn't get everything we wanted, but this is a good deal for this region and we're going to support it." That meant, we had to give the commission understandable chunks of the plan one at a time, and they had to vote on them. This was a new and novel idea. (pp. 12-13)

What is most significant about this process, from the perspective of this research, is that it was truly collaborative in nature; the members of the commission did not only educate themselves, but also and more importantly they participated actively in defining the issues and formulating the policies to address them. The process was quite formal (and strictly formatted), with little room to maneuver when a new topic was brought up; however, it allowed the commissioners to identify their “common interest” in the bay and work together toward protecting that interest. As described by Melvin B. Lane in his 1984 oral history, “it’s really the concept of common ownership of the problem [...] if you get other people to accept some of the responsibility for something, then it’s easier for them to go along with you” (Lane, 1985, p. 36).
Membership of the commission.

As described by Bodovitz, “The goal [of the commission] was a plan for the bay similar to a charter for a city or a constitution for a nation” (cited in Odell, 1972, p. 29). Hence, the commission was thought of as a kind of “constituting assembly”, which – given its role as both a planning and regulating agency – had to include representatives from both governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as representatives of the general public. As result, the BCDC was uncommonly large for such a body, with 27 members (including nine county representatives, each a resident of one of the nine counties and appointed by the board of supervisors of that county, and three representatives of cities, appointed by ABAG).

As it turns out, the exact composition of the commission was crucial. The regulatory provision had been designed specifically as to prevent the “casual granting” of permits; indeed, only 25 out of the 27 members had the right to vote (neither of the two federal representatives could vote on permits) and the approval of a permit required an affirmative vote of at least 13 commissioners, regardless of the number of commissioners present at a given meeting. Given the typical turnout of 21 or 22, it effectively took a “supermajority” to approve a permit, while it took only 9 or 10 votes to block one. However, thanks to the great diversity of the commission’s membership, and the fact that city and county representatives, taken altogether, numbered only 12, no “group” could impose its will – and, as a result, members did not vote in groups or “blocks” (Lane, 1985).

With regards to the city representatives appointed by ABAG, Bodovitz (1984) and May (1976) report that they were initially handpicked by ABAG’s Vice-President (from San Mateo County) specifically to oppose any restriction on bay filling. According to May (1976), all three original representatives were from the West Bay (one from San Francisco and two from San Mateo) and all of them were “within the sphere of influence of Leslie Salt” (p. 450), who had been one of the most vigorous opponents of the act creating the interim commission. However, these appointments apparently created some commotion within ABAG as other members of the organization, and some representatives from the East Bay and North Bay in
particular, felt that ABAG’s stance was counter-productive and that ABAG’S appointments to BCDC should better reflect its membership. As a result, the original appointees were eventually replaced by local elected representatives from the North and East Bay76, who took a more active interest in the affairs of BCDC.

*Clear mandate and authority*

The mandate of the commission, as alluded to earlier, was well defined, and its authority well circumscribed. As summarized by Odell (1972), its basic responsibilities were to answer three inter-related questions:

1) For what purposes, if any, should further filling of the bay be permit?
2) To what purposes should the bay be put and what benefits should it provide?
3) How can a plan for the bay be implemented?

It may appear, from our contemporary perspective, that the answers to these questions were largely pre-determined and the conclusions of the commission’s final report were essentially foregone; however, in reality, numerous compromises were made and neither the developers nor the conservationists were completely satisfied in the end.

In spite of that, all members of – and participants in – the interim BCDC took the commission’s planning process seriously as they knew well in advance that all the important issues (or “management chunks”, as Bodovitz put it) were going to be covered. More importantly, the commissioners knew that *policy* would eventually be made on everyone of these subjects and they were keenly aware that the planning process undertaken by the commission was not a theoretical one. They knew that the planning decisions made by the commission would have real-world consequences and therefore paid attention77.

76 After the replacement of the original three West Bay appointees, the two most important ABAG appointees were Bernice May (then councilor from the City of Berkeley) and Michael Wornum (then supervisor from Marin County), both of whom are described in Bodovitz’ 1984 oral history as having played a constructive role as the conduit between ABAG and BCDC.

77 Bodovitz reports, in his 1984 oral history, that most the commissioners seemed to have read the summaries prepared by BCDC staff ahead of time (admittedly, to his own surprise): “People did read
Concomitantly, the members of the commission were given the responsibility and the authority to regulate development in the Bay during the “interim”, which effectively forced them to consider “real-world cases” as they were developing the plan. It also made the commissioners “accountable” to the process, as they actually had to “walk the walk” of their convictions when asked to approve or deny a permit. In the words of Bodovitz:

The hearings had great value because not only ought people to have a fair hearing on a permit application, but the danger of planning agencies obviously is that the planning isn’t rooted in reality. When you’re hearing somebody arguing the case for a permit, and you’re hearing the argument against the permit, you have some understanding of what is going on not only in that part of the shoreline which the whole commission might or might not have been familiar with but you begin to get some idea of what issues you’re dealing with in the planning. So, I felt and feel very very strongly, that the plan benefited from the permit process, and the permit process benefited from the knowledge we were acquiring through the planning. (Bodovitz, 1985, p. 11, emphases added).

In summary, the fact that the process was taken seriously by the members of the interim BCDC in is no small way due to the commission having both a clear mandate (with a set of concrete “deliverables”) and real authority (to issue or deny permits for all bay fill projects) from the start – in stark contrast to ABAG delegates.

**Leadership and civic capital**

In 1965, over the objections of Senator McAteer, Governor Pat Brown appointed Melvin B. Lane, a notable Republican and a respected businessman, as Chairman of the interim commission. As remarked by Odell (1972), his chairmanship of the interim BCDC is generally regarded as of one of the most important factors in determining its success.

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78 In Lane’s (1985) account, McAteer was opposed to his nomination not because he thought Lane was incompetent or did not fit the bill, but rather because he felt the chairmanship of the commission should have been his to hand out, given the political capital he’d invested in passing the legislation that created BCDC.

79 Odell (1972), who interviewed both members of the commission and staffers, reports that Mel Lane was considered by many (after the fact) as the “whole key to success” (p.34) because he was
In effect, he “ran a taut ship” but remained informal and did not insist on rigid parliamentary procedures; he was determined, but never arrogant; and the fact that he was independently wealthy meant that he could devote a great deal of time working (unsalaried) as chairman of BCDC. In short, even though many assumed he would have a natural inclination to side with the pro-development camp, he actually presided over meetings “in an fair-minded manner that prevented polarization of BCDC into factions” (Bodovitz, cited in Odell, 1972, p. 34)

As important as his leadership might have been, however, Melvin B. Lane brought something else to the commission: a formidable and powerful social network. Indeed, he was himself of member of the blue-ribbon elite of the Bay Area and, as pointed out by his Executive Director, “Mel obviously met all the business criteria anybody could look for” (Bodovitz, 1985, p. 25). As it happens, Lane’s father (who was also a Republican) had been friends with McAteer (who was a Democrat) and his family relations included a great number of business executives in region. In fact, he was himself a member of the Bay Area Council and had regular contacts with a great number of the businesspeople who opposed the creation of BCDC. Needless to say, he put his relations to good use:

Well, one of the things I ‘milked’, took advantage of, was the fact that I did know most of these people, or at least had entree to the president of Standard Oil Company, or whatever. I think I made them more responsible, just in terms of their own self-respect. Once I got them into a public meeting with other people there, they couldn’t just have the company lobbyist and public relations man fire away at us with total ease. I’d write them back and send copies to everybody, so I think I kept them a little more on track. (Lane, 1985, p. 38)

In his 1984 oral history, Lane mentions several instances when he made use of his personal contacts to either ease tensions between the BCDC and some company with a stake in the bay or else convene an informal meeting between commission members who disagreed about something. Most significantly, from the perspective of this research, two of Governor Reagan’s cabinet members in 1969, Norman Livermore and Verne Orr, were personal friends of his; in Lane’s words, credible and diplomatic, but he was not a politician, had no political axe to grind and no personal ambition.
“They didn’t carry my flag, but they would see that I got a hearing. That made a lot of difference” (Lane, 1985, p. 82).

The commission, as mentioned above, was made permanent in 1969 after intense and prolonged political maneuvering, but as pointed out to me by Bodovitz (2013) and Travis (2013), the two most important battles had already been won by the time the commission reported back to the legislature. The first battle, within the commission itself, ended (and was won) when the final plan was approved in a dramatic 19 to 1 vote on September 20, 1968. Significantly, all three ABAG representatives voted to approve to plan (even though, as noted earlier, the first three representatives sent by ABAG were clearly pro-development). The second, and most important battle, was that of public opinion and that one, too, had been won, but not just by the BCDC. As reported by Odell (1972), “the public [in 1969] was already keyed up to a feverish environmental pitch” and this put enormous pressure of legislators, who eventually passed a revised version of the original McAteer-Petris Act (authored primarily by Assemblyman John Knox) granting BCDC permanent status.

As explained by Will Travis (2013), who first joined BCDC in 1970 and eventually became Executive Director of the organization in 1995, the immediate effect of BCDC’s grant of permanent status was not to freeze development in the bay, but rather to decrease the number of bay fill project proposals – and, in particular, of project proposals which did not conform to the objectives of the San Francisco Bay Plan80. The most important impact of BCDC may therefore have been to change people’s minds.

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80 The legislation that granted permanent status to BCDC also gave it the authority to carry out the provisions of the Bay Plan, which serves as the guide for determining whether a proposed use of the bay or the bay’s shoreline is appropriate. The Bay Plan (which can be consulted online) is quite detailed and very specific in the policies that it puts forth. That said, the second recommendation of the original San Francisco Bay Plan, which has been integrated verbatim in the adopted (and therefore legally-binding), summarizes its intent: “2. Uses of the Bay. The most important uses of the Bay are those providing substantial public benefits and treating the Bay as a body of water, not as real estate.” (BCDC, 2013).
That said, there is no question that the commission was successful in achieving its "on-the-ground" mission: the rate of bay fill went from about 2,300 acres annually to only a few acres per year on average in recent decades, the loss of which is more than compensated by the opening of diked areas; as a result, the Bay is about 22 square miles larger than it was in 1965. BCDC also contributed to the restoration of degraded marshes and wetlands around the bay and to the permanent protection of the 85,000-acre Suisun Marsh (for agriculture use, duck hunting and through the establishment of wildlife refuges).

The foregoing analysis suggests that the “success” of BCDC is due to a host of factors and cannot be reduced to a single cause or individual. However, there is one important factor that was crucially important throughout the fight to save the bay and that is the visibility (and, indeed, "imageability") of the issue at hand, which made it much easier to communicate it to the public. Indeed, as many have observed before me, it was possible to rally support for the cause in large measure because there was an object – the San Francisco Bay – that lay in the center of the region and was integral to the region’s very identity, and there was a threat – the bay’s filling – that everyone could see. The leadership of particular individuals (and that of Kay Kerr, in particular) was obviously crucial, but one may speculate that important characters such as Eugene McAteer (a politician in search of a cause), Don Sherwood (a popular radio show host) and Melvin Lane (a Republican businessman) would not have given their full weight to defend an issue that had little or no public appeal.
4.2.2 1989-1993: revival of the regionalist dream

The events leading to the creation of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission

Between 1973 and 1989, there was a hiatus of sorts in ABAG’s pursuit of voluntary regional collaboration. This, as explained by Revan Tranter in his Concise History of the organization, is due to mainly three events (or series of events). The first of these events is the establishment of a permanent BCDC in 1969, which created another single-purpose regional agency and further limited ABAG’s potential scope of work\(^81\). The second event was the creation of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) by the State Legislature in 1970, which was to obtain the MPO designation from the U.S. Department of Transportation instead of ABAG (in part because of the mismanagement of public funds by a member of ABAG’s staff two years prior\(^82\)). This meant, among other things, that it could not access the substantial annual “core funding” available to most other COGs\(^83\) in California that, unlike ABAG, had received the federal MPO designation. Third, after ABAG received a large grant in 1975 to assume new responsibilities under the Water Pollution Control Act, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development eliminated (in 1978) its annual regional planning grant, which ABAG had depended (and relied) upon since 1965.

As pointed by Tranter (2011) and Leong (2011) and described by the CCEEB (1978), the work program and planning process leading to the adoption of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP) – which contained, among other sections, an Air Quality Maintenance Plan (AQMP) – was collaborative in nature (or at least

\(^{81}\) The Bay Area Rapid Transit Commission was created in 1951, while the Bay Area Air Quality Management District was created by the State legislature in 1957. It follows that ABAG already coexisted with other single-purpose agencies when it was created in 1961.

\(^{82}\) In 1968, the Assistant to the Executive Director Warren Schmid, Tom Truax, embezzled a half million dollars of ABAG’s funds. Truax was eventually put in jail, but the event gave ABAG bad publicity and, according to Tranter (2001), put an end to ABAG’s “quite reasonable expectation of receiving the new federal designation as the Bay Area’s regional transportation planning agency” (p.3).

\(^{83}\) Among other effects of this lack of core funding was ABAG’s completed inability to undertake a systematic analysis of the consistency of local plans with its Regional Plan: 1970-1990 (published in 1970). This has resulted in the regional plan having only symbolic value.
purported to be). However, the whole effort was mired in controversy, in part because local government representatives on the Environmental Management Task Force (EMTF), which led the process, refused to include land-use control measures (which would have restricted development) in the Plan and because there was general confusion as to what the effects of the Plan would be on local jurisdictions. Thus, in addition to being essentially "legally non-enforceable", the EMP was not well understood by those chiefly responsible for its implementation, that is, local government officials. Lastly, with the passage of California's Proposition 13 in 1978, the funding necessary to implement the EMP was never made available.

As a result of all of these things, ABAG became more of a "service organization" starting in the early 1980s and less of a regional planning agency. In other words, it shifted from promoting "bottom-up" regional coordination to encouraging "functional" regional cooperation. It also refrained, after Knox's repeated (unsuccessful) attempts to create a single regional agency, from openly seeking the creation of a such an agency (which would have included, at the very least, MTC)\(^{84}\); in fact, given its precarious financial situation after the EPA grant money ran out, many people thought ABAG would "go under" and cease to exist altogether\(^{85}\). Hence, during the 1980s, ABAG focused on promoting functional collaboration (i.e., service-sharing) among its members, which it did quite successfully\(^{86}\).

However, in the late 1980s, a group of locally elected representatives led by Santa Clara County Supervisor Rod Diridon became concerned with the "problem" of

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\(^{84}\) Assemblyman John Knox introduced a series of bills in the legislature, starting in the late 1960s, to create a single Bay Area Regional Organization (BARO), which would have annexed MTC, the BAAQMD and, in some, other regional agencies as well. The BARO bill which was discussed in the 1972-1973 almost passed but, as reported by Tranter (2001), all of the bills ultimately failed (usually in the Senate) for two main reasons: "the fear of conservatives from southern California that this idea might spread to their part of the state and somehow result in domination by Los Angeles of their suburban territory; and the unwillingness of Bay Area groups to compromise on the composition of a governing board (local government appointees, directly elected representatives, or a mixture of both)." (p.4)

\(^{85}\) Revan Tranter recounts, in his 2011 oral history, that a few years after ABAG, MTC and BART moved together into the newly built Metro Center,

\(^{86}\) Among services, ABAG offered a credit pooling services (in 1983), a member-owned insurance cooperative (in 1986) to protect members against the peaks and troughs in insurance premiums, a workers' compensation program (in 1987) and a web hosting platform (starting in 1994).
governmental fragmentation of the Bay Area, which had been increasing (as in the rest of the country) with the creation of new single and multi-jurisdictional special districts. Diridon, in particular, felt that “single-agency regionalism” was self-defeating; this was driven home to him at a time when he was sitting both on the MTC and the board of the BAAQMD and was compelled (for good reasons, each time, from the perspective of that agency) to vote for and against the same project.87 Diridon, in his 2011 oral history, describes his view of regionalism in the Bay Area and these terms:

> When the regional organizations were created back in the late 1960s and 1970s [...] they were really created to thwart regionalism. They were really created to protect local jurisdictions’ authority and protect local control over one single issue [...]. It look some real effort on the part of regionally-oriented elected officials [...] to force a consideration of true regionalism and mixed-jurisdictional regionalism

> “Forcing a consideration of true regionalism” is precisely what he intended to do when he and other elected officials joined forces with Angelo Siracusa, who was still President of the BAC at the time, and Larry Orman of the Greenbelt Alliance (GA), a broad coalition of environmental groups well respected in the Bay Area, to form the Bay Vision 2020 Commission (BV2020) in 1989. In Diridon’s own words, “It was an attempt [at] using a private commission, chaired by the President of the University of California, and with the top leaders of various organizations throughout the region [...] to try and put together legislation that would, in effect, merge MTC, ABAG and the Air Quality Management District” (Diridon, 2011).

> There exist at least three detailed case studies of the Bay Vision 2020 process, by Lydon (1993), Jones and Rothblatt, (1993) and Innes (1994) and these cases describe in great detail both the way the commission proceeded and the political battle to get a bill passed that would implement its recommendations – a battle that was ultimately lost. My aim, therefore, is not to duplicate their efforts, but instead to connect Bay Vision 2020 to previous and subsequent efforts and examine those

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87 Let us mention that Rod Diridon, by 1989, had already spent 15 years as a Supervisor, and chaired both the ABAG and the BAAQMD. In the Fall of 1989, he became chairperson of the MTC.
internal and external forces that might have influenced the outcome of this collaborative process.

A summary of the Bay Vision 2020 process

As alluded to above, the BV2020 was formed in 1989 when local government officials, representatives of the business community and environmental and equity groups joined their efforts to develop a common vision for the development of the region. More specifically, the commission aimed to reach consensus on a “growth management vision”, which could then be turned into legislation. The effort was initially funded by MTC, through Rod Diridon (which is ironic, given that most MTC staff did not look upon a merger with ABAG favorably), but was eventually financially supported by private foundations and corporations as well.

In the summer of 1989, the conveners began to select “leading citizens” of the Bay Area to become members of the commission. As pointed out by Innes (1994), they were not envisioned as “stakeholders”, in the sense that they did not formally represent a particular interest or organization. Hence, the commission was not “stakeholder-based” and resembled more what Innes (1994) calls a “blue ribbon committee” – that is, a committee made up of “group leaders” and people with influence, “good citizens who seek a public interest” (p. 230).

The first meeting of the commission was held in December 1989 and the conveners hoped to complete its activities by January 1991 “so that legislation could be on the desk of the new governor” shortly thereafter (p. 231). In 1991, the commission issued a report that advocated (unsurprisingly) the consolidation of ABAG, the MTC and the BAAQMD into a single regional commission. As remarked by Wannop (2002), the overall concept behind the Bay Vision was that “the key to improved management of regional issues would be democratic and accountable regional governance, not ‘vertically’ arranged as in the established single-purpose

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88 Lydon (2013) recalls that the commission’s overall strategy rested in part on the hopeful presumption that Dianne Feinstein would be the new governor and that she would “carry the ball” politically for the reform proposed.
agencies, but horizontally organized in a consolidated commission” (313). The issue, therefore, was not growth management per se, but regional governance.

The Bay Vision 2020 Commission became dormant after it submitted its report, and its proposal was eventually defeated at the November 1991 general assembly of ABAG. However, a group of local governments, along with the Greenbelt Alliance and the Bay Area Council (two groups who had traditionally been on different sides of the regional debate) formed the Bay Vision Action Coalition (BVAC) that same year to “fine tune the commission’s recommendations and develop legislation for the 1992 session” (Jones and Rothblatt, 1993).

BVAC was a “coalition of the willing” of sorts, integrating representatives from diverse segments of society, the functioning of which was based on bargaining – between, for example, the Greenbelt Alliance and the Bay Area Council – and deliberation – about the proportion of elected officials on the interim regional commission, among other subjects. It provided a setting for cooperation among local governments as well as between local governments and non-state actors; it created the possibility for political leadership within the region by giving all cities the opportunity to join in the second stage of the process; finally, it had some authority and the legitimacy to propose legislative change, given that it brought together a broad range of stakeholders – including local elected officials, this time. The BVAC succeeded in helping introduce two bills (SB 153 and AB 398) in the State legislature, both of which reflected the conclusions of the Bay Vision 2020 report. However, both of them were eventually defeated.

**ABAG’s role in Bay Vision 2020**

The Bay Vision 2020 Commission did not formally include local elected officials, as it was thought that their participation would make it impossible to reach any meaningful consensus.\(^{89}\) A number of county supervisors (and other local

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\(^{89}\) Innes (1994) reports that it was Rod Diridon - himself an elected official - who had insisted (along with others in his group) on excluding sitting elected officials, even though Angelo Siracusa and Larry Orman both would have preferred to include them. In her own words, “Diridon’s reasoning was that
government officeholders) did take part in the process, but they did so through a loosely knit organization known as the Locally Elected Conveners of Bay Vision, composed primarily of local officials who had acquired a “regionalist interest” by sitting on one or more of the Bay Area’s special-purpose agencies (Lydon, 1993). In the words of Innes (1994), these elected officials acted as “shadow members” of the commission and, although they were not always physically present, they clearly exerted influence on those who were.

Consequently, ABAG as an organization was not directly involved in Bay Vision 2020, but it was indirectly involved through the “silent” participation of its delegates. ABAG also became involved toward the end, when a group of local elected officials decided to form a committee to oppose the “merger” bill and craft competing legislation. In short, there was both substantial support and substantial opposition to the conclusions of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission among local government officeholders, but the ABAG General Assembly ended up opposing the merger (as did MTC and the BAAQMD), even though the ABAG staff and leadership had supported it.

Bay Vision 2020 in historical perspective

Interestingly, the premise of BV2020 was not so different from that of the BCDC interim commission 25 years earlier: in both cases, the basic idea was to bring together representatives of the region’s most important interests, encourage them to identify their common interest, develop recommendations that everyone could agree on and that could form the basis for successful legislation. In both cases, the theory of change was the same: build consensus around an issue, develop recommendations based on that consensus, get a bill drafted that reflects these recommendations and use political influence to get the bill passed in the state legislature. Significantly, Joseph E. Bodovitz, who had played a key role as the

local officeholders were limited by a short time range and narrow perspective and that this attitude would conflict with the commission’s long-range perspective and freedom of action” (p. 230)
Executive Director of the interim BCDC, was hired as project director for BV2020 and facilitated the process throughout.

However, the Bay Vision 2020 process – in contradistinction to the process that led to the formulation and adoption of the San Francisco Bay Plan – lacked both a clear mandate and any kind of authority. The commission’s lack of a clear objective – other than reaching some form of consensus which could then be turned into legislation – may explain the lack of clear rules about what constituted consensus. The process of BV2020 differed from that of the interim BCDC in other important ways: first, it was not convened by government and in fact excluded local elected officials from formal participation; second, whereas the members of BCDC had to agree on planning principles for guiding the future development of the bay, the members of BV2020 worked primarily on identifying the issues that a future regional agency should address and did not spend much time on developing a vision; third, and most importantly, the BV2020 lacked a clear and visible “issue” (or “threat”) around which to rally support. In the words of Joseph E. Bodovitz (2013): “One was about something you could visualize, the other was about reinventing government”. Needless to say, the BV2020 did not capture the imagination of the public, nor was there a popular radio show host who followed the process closely and reported on it daily.

In summary, the most important distinguishing feature of BV2020 (compared both to preceding and subsequent collaborative efforts) is that it was formed around the objective of reforming government rather than that of tackling a perceptible regional issue or problem. I would argue that its lack of mandate and authority were a direct consequence of that, as policymakers (at least the ones

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90 According to Lydon (1993), who attended all the meetings, Bodovitz’ insistence on reaching consensus meant that a number of items were included in the report even though one or a few of the commissioners didn’t agree. He also writes that insisting upon the importance of reaching consensus resulted in the “muting of disagreement” which had a “reductionist effect on the depth and sharpness of the commission’s deliberations” (p.26).

91 As noted by Innes (1994), “there was a continuing tension between those who wanted the product to be a “vision” of the future that would inspire wide support, and those who wanted the task to be a more pragmatic one, identifying common ground and changes that could, as a practical matter, win political support” (p.231-232).
studied here) tend respond to public perceptions more than to the admonitions of civic and business leaders.

4.2.3 1997-2008: regional collaboration as both a means and an end

The push toward inter-regional collaboration

The mid to late 1990s saw a shift in the approach toward the promotion of regionalism in the Bay Area, away from concerted efforts by civic and business leaders to lobby for regional consolidation – as had been attempted a number of times since the 1950s, most recently by the BV2020 commission – toward a multiplicity of (mostly independent) regional initiatives targeting specific policy issues. In a very real sense, the ultimate failure of BV2020 to create a regional government (through the merger of ABAG, MTC and the BAAQMD) seems to have marked the transition in the Bay Area from the “Old Regionalism” to the “New Regionalism”, and this came with a new way of promoting regionalism.

This new approach has manifested itself in different ways. First, a number of groups such as Urban Habitat, the Greenbelt Alliance and TransForm, became more directly involved in the regional land-use/transportation debate (which used to be the reserve of MTC and ABAG). Indeed, the Greenbelt Alliance started campaigning, in 1996, to convince local elected officials in municipalities around the Bay to adopt urban growth boundaries. In the following year, twenty local organizations came together to launch the Bay Area Transportation and Land Use Coalition (later renamed TransForm) to ask for better funding of regional transit and promote “smart growth” in the region. As for Urban Habitat, it was founded in 1989 to build “bridges between environmentalists, social justice advocates, governmental leaders and the business community” (Urban Habitat, 2013) and was, by the mid-1990s, leading a region-wide effort for environmental and social justice.

Second, there were renewed efforts, in the wake of BV2020’s failure, to increase inter-agency collaboration and coordination. The Bay Area’s three main regional agencies had already established the Joint Air Quality Policy Committee
(JAQPC) in the late 1980s to streamline the air quality planning process. However, with increasing pressure coming from elected officials sitting on various regional boards (and seeing obvious contradictions among their respective policies/proposals), and given the interdependence of air quality, land-use and transportation, which became more evident with time, the regional agencies began working together more closely, voluntarily or not\textsuperscript{92}. As noted by an ABAG staffer, “there were still discussions within ABAG about the need for a merger with MTC [in the late 1990s], but most of us were focused on other things” (Scandone, 2013).

**The Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Communities**

It is in this context that the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Communities (BAASC) was formed, in 1997, by a small group of civic leaders representing economic interests, equity groups and environmental organizations with the (broad) mission of changing the patterns and practices of land use in the region to achieve a more compact, transit-friendly form of growth. The whole initiative, which was modeled after the *President’s Council for Sustainable Development* (PCSD) and co-founded by two of its former members\textsuperscript{93}, was based on the premise that the region could be made more sustainable simply by “working together” (see Innes and Booher, 2010, for a detailed analysis of BAASC).

\textsuperscript{92} A close observer of ABAG who witnessed the early 1990s reports that the working relationship between ABAG and MTC improved as a result of both formal contacts (e.g., through the governing board of the San Francisco Bay Trail project) and informal contacts (e.g., ABAG’s planning director spending time in MTC offices trying to align ABAG’s work on residential growth and future housing demand and MTC’s long-range transportation planning. ABAG also became more involved in air quality planning, and published in 1994 a guide titled *Improving Air Quality Through Local Plans and Programs* in conjunction with the BAAQMD. As for the relationship between MTC and the BAAQMD, it evolved dramatically after the passage of the California Clean Air Act of 1988, which required MTC to elaborate a Transportation Control Measure plan as part of the BAAQMD’s air quality planning. According to a BAAQMD staffer who has worked there since the mid-1980s, this new state requirement forced the agencies “to learn to work together” (Roggenkamp, 2013); by the mid-1990s, as a consequence, they had a much closer working relationship.

\textsuperscript{93} These two former members of the PCSD were Michele Perrault, International Vice President of the Sierra Club, and Richard Clarke, Chairman and CEO of PG&E. Together, they approached Carl Anthony, co-founder and then Executive Director of Urban Habitat, about starting a version of the PCSD for the Bay Area.

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Significantly, the co-founders succeeded in enlisting the Bay Area Council (representing the business community), Urban Habitat (representing the environmental justice and equity fronts) as well as ABAG (representing the five regional agencies, namely, ABAG, MTC, BAAQMD, BCDC and the Regional Water Quality Control Board) and 45 other civil society organizations. However, as described by Innes and Booher (2010) and other close observers, BAASC was carried for the first two years by a small number of charismatic and hard-driving individuals, including Michele Perreault, one of the co-founders of BAASC, and Sunne Wight McPeak, a former county supervisor who had become President of the BAC. According to an ABAG staffer who took part in the process at the very beginning, it was Sunne McPeak who called the first meeting of the Regional Agencies Coordinating Committee (RACC), and it was she who found grant money to allow the five executive directors to continue meeting (Scandone, 2013).

In its early phase, BAASC served more as a (closed) forum for regional leaders to educate – and learn from – one another. As described by Alameda County supervisor Mary King (2013), who had attended a number of BV2020 meetings a decade earlier, “it was a continuation of the same conversation, with a lot of the same people”. As a result, a number of participants – including Mary King, who was ABAG President at the time – were reportedly skeptical as to what the Alliance could actually achieve. However, as she reports, “everyone just played along” as everyone felt that it was “the right thing to do”. There was in this case no real sense of crisis, but there was strong leadership and a true willingness on the part of former adversaries to work together (Scandone, 2013).

In its second year of existence, the Alliance set up working groups to work on specific tasks, namely the formulation of a vision, the determination of a footprint for development and finally the creation of a set of sustainability indicators and best practices, which were eventually tied together in a document entitled The Compact of a Sustainable Bay Area (published in November 2003). However, as pointed out by Innes and Booher (2010), the Compact did not include an implementation plan and “there was little discussion about how the players were to be motivated to act
on the Compact’s wish list” (p. 93). As a consequence, BAASC officially continued to exist until 2008, even though it has already ceased its activities.

From alliance, to program, to legislation: the unexpected unraveling of BAASC

As alluded to above, BAASC did not end abruptly; rather, it “fizzled off slowly”, as one person close to process has reported to me, without a clear ending point94. Also, its significance cannot be explained solely by referring to its form and/or process; in effect, BAASC is described (by those who took part in it) more as an “event” that lasted for several years than as an organization or a formal collaborative process. Perhaps as a consequence of its amorphous nature and gradual petering out, BAASC is perceived by most of the people I have interviewed – whether or not they took an active in the process – as neither a definite success, nor a complete failure. On the one hand, similarly to BVAC, BAASC created a setting for deliberation, bargaining and mutual exchange among regional actors from both the public and the private sectors. It effectively filled the void left by the disbandment of BVAC and allowed – to a larger degree than the Bay Vision 2020 Commission – for stakeholders to learn about each other’s concerns. On the other hand, also similarly to BVAC, it actually achieved little in terms of direct policy outcomes. In the words of Innes and Rongerude (2005), who have followed its progress closely:

Efforts to influence legislation at the state and local levels have not borne fruit. The Compact is made up of lowest-common-denominator concepts that remain vague. Expressions of support by jurisdictions were fraught with caveats and, overall, cannot be said to represent real commitments. The Alliance’s work is not recognized by a larger public. The indicators do not appear to have had an impact, particularly since BAASC has not had sufficient funding to use them for educational efforts as planned. The Alliance forums and meetings have mostly preached to the converted and have not had a wide impact on public opinion (Innes and Rongerude, 2005, 14).

In spite of its failure to influence policy directly, BAASC allowed for the creation of an enlarged network of regional actors (albeit with little participation of

94 Even though the BAASC officially concluded its work in 2008, and ended most of its activities in 2005, the website of the alliance was still online as of April 2013.
local governments, other than through ABAG), which is significant. As described below, it also had important indirect effects.

Impacts on organization capacity

As acknowledged by Innes and Booher (2010) and pointed out by a number of interviewees (Scandone, 2013; Travis, 2013), one important results of BAASC was its impact on the region’s governance capacity – i.e., the opportunity of local actors to meet formally or informally and their ability to identify regional issues of common interest and tackle them jointly – in both the short and medium term. The creation (and initial funding) of the Social Equity Caucus (SEC), in particular, is considered a major achievement; indeed, even though the original SEC did not survive the departure of its first figurehead, Carl Anthony, the concept of a “regional equity coalition” not only survived, but flourished. Today the SEC has become the de facto regional voice of the social justice movement in the Bay Area. Indeed, working regionally has given local organizations – as well as the issue of regional equity itself – much more visibility.

In a very real sense, then, the BAASC contributed to making the Bay Area more resilient by creating and strengthening ties between prominent individuals and organizations working in similar or entirely different fields and facilitating future collaboration (see next two sections).

Impacts on economic development

BAASC’s main “action project” was something called the Community Capital Investment Initiative (CCII), which was an ambitious and innovative effort designed to attract investments into disadvantaged neighborhoods. These investments, which were made possible thanks to the raising of millions of dollars by the BAC, were supposed (in theory at least) to meet a double-bottom line – i.e., profitability (as determined by investors) and community benefits (as determined by the Community Council, spinoff of the SEC).
Although the CCII did not succeed in establishing a dialogue between would-be investors and social justice advocates, it did generate quite a bit of investment as the Bay Area Family of Funds – managed by the BAC – grew out of the CCII and still exist to this day (Nixon, 2013). Among the accomplishments of the Bay Area Family of Funds (and, indirectly, the CCII) let us mention the following: over 215 million dollars were raised by four separate funds, all dedicated to double bottom line (DBL) investing; about 230 news jobs have been created and approximately 870 for-sale homes have been built or renovated (with about a third of them considered “affordable”).

It is interesting to note that this is the only example (encountered in this research) of a bottom-up collaboration initiative that has had – and continues to have – measurable external effects independently of the state95. In a different line of argument, a careful and critical assessment of the outcomes of the CCII would have to consider the impacts of rising land values and gentrification following these investments and include a discussion of the measures taken (if any) to mitigate these impacts.

*Impacts on policy*

BAASC was a multi-form and multi-faceted initiative from the start and its results, in terms of policy changes, are also multi-form and multi-faceted. First, the Regional Agencies Coordinating Committee (RACC) – which was formed, as described above, at the impetus of Sunne McPeak, who sat on the Alliance’s steering committee – took on the responsibility in 1999 of developing a regional smart growth strategy. Although not formally a part of BAASC, the RACC was an off-shoot of the Alliance and the two groups worked on similar issues. In effect, BAASC had embarked, at about the same time, on an effort to develop public consensus and support for a “regional livability footprint” (i.e., a preferred “sustainable” land-use pattern). In 2000, the two projects converged into one: the “Smart Growth

95 Social equity groups often advocate for government solutions to problems of socio-economic segregation, following the strategy laid out by Myron Orfield (1997), which calls for the establishment of tax-sharing arrangements in metropolitan areas through legislative action.
Strategy/Regional Livability Footprint Project”, which led to the publication of a final report in October 2002 and to the adoption of the *Smart Growth Preamble and Policies* by four of the five regional agencies that were originally a part of the RACC in 2003.\(^96\)

The first concrete policy change that was made following the adoption of the *Smart Growth Preamble* was ABAG’s decision (the same year) to officially adopt so-called “smart growth policy-based projections” and base its *Regional Housing Needs Allocation* (RHNA)\(^97\) on these projections. MTC and the BAAQMD, in turn, committed to using these policy-based forecasts as a basis for the demographic and economic assumptions for their official plans. In 2005, the recently formed Joint Policy Committee (JPC), comprised of ABAG, MTC and the BAAQMD, tasked the executive directors of the three main regional agencies with organizing inter-agency resources to pursue “integrative regional planning” in the spirit of the *Compact for a Sustainable Bay Area* (published by BAASC in November 2003). This led to the adoption, in the spring of 2005, of a shared work program (titled “A Consolidated Work Program for Implementing and Refining the Bay Area’s Smart-Growth Vision”), which calls on the three regional agencies to strategically focus on housing.

A few months later, in April 2006, the JPC adopted another policy document, titled *Focusing Our Vision*, which was an attempt at operationalizing the region’s smart growth strategy – and was made possible in part because of a regional planning grant program at the state level.\(^98\) In this document, three parallel initiatives are introduced, including the designation of “priority development areas” (or PDAs), which are – according to this document – to be determined in

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\(^96\) The Regional Water Quality Control Board did not adopt the *Smart Growth Preamble and Policies* document, although it did participate in the elaboration of the Regional Smart Growth Strategy.

\(^97\) The Regional Housing Need Allocation (RHNA) is a state-mandated process in California whereby the California Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) first identifies the total housing need for every region for an eight-year period and then mandates regional planning agencies (such as ABAG) to identify the total number of housing units (by affordability level) that each local jurisdiction must accommodate in its Housing Element. Before 2002, the number of units “assigned” to each local jurisdiction was determined based on mathematical projections of future growth, rather than on policy-based projections of where growth should happen.

\(^98\) *Focusing Our Vision* was developed as a direct response to the Caltrans Regional Blueprints program, which “supports collaborative regional planning efforts across California through grants, support services and interagency coordination” (Caltrans, 2013)
collaboration with local jurisdictions and “constitute the core of a basic, first-cut regional plan, owned jointly by the regional agencies and by local governments” (ABAG, 2006, p. 3). Over the next two years, Focusing Our Vision evolved into a program called FOCUS, which sought to attract development into PDAs by giving local jurisdictions financial incentives to prioritize infill development.

While the Bay Area’s regional agencies never received the funding necessary to actually “roll out” the FOCUS program, the policy development work that fed into FOCUS did not go to waste. Indeed, an important piece of legislation was passed in 2008 which, according to close observers of the policy-making process, was heavily influenced by the regional agencies’ Smart Growth Strategy/ Regional Livability Fooprint and the FOCUS program: the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008 (hereafter referred to as Senate Bill 375 or SB 375). This new legislation essential requires that each region adopt an integrated transportation, land-use and housing plan, called a “Sustainable Community Strategy” (SCS), which explains and demonstrates how the region will reduce it greenhouse gas emissions.

As expressed by several informants who have been involved in the Bay Area SCS planning process in recent years, this new regional planning framework has the potential to be a “game changer” as it brings much more “power and authority” to the process, but it has (so far) been “just another step” in the region’s slow and very gradual change. Whatever the case may be, the Regional Transportation Plan (RTP) of a given metropolitan region – which is an important planning document due to the funding that is attached to it – must now (under SB 375) be consistent with the region’s Sustainable Community Strategy. The law also requires that the RHNA conform to the SCS – a provision which was no doubt inspired by ABAG’s pioneering work on “policy-based projections”, which have served as the basis for the Bay Area’s RHNA process since 2003 (that is, five years before SB 375 was passed). The region’s first integrative plan (jointly prepared by MTC, ABAG, BAAQMD and BCDC), Plan Bay Area, has been – at the time of writing of this – released for less than a year (even though the law was passed in 2008); it is therefore too early to say whether it’ll make any difference.
In any case, there is also general agreement that SB 375 – because of its connection to climate change and, possibly, because the SCS planning exercise comes with money attached – has attracted more visibility than either BV2020 or BAASC (Lydon, 2013; Travis, 2013). There is also a sense, among ABAG’s staff members, that ABAG is playing a more decisive role now that the RHNA process is connected to the region’s land-use planning framework, which is itself supported by state funding. However, ABAG’s role as “integrator” of the region’s different functional plans is relatively new; once again, it is too early to say whether these changes will significantly increase the region’s regional governance capacity.

See Figure 4.4. on p. 190 for a diagrammatic representation of the policy diffusion process in the recent history of the SFBA.
Table 4.1 - Chronology of recent events in the Bay Area’s history of regional collaboration

1945 – Foundation of the Bay Area Council (BAC) by the Bay Area’s large business interests

1957 – Creation of the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD)

1958 – Proposal by Senator John F. McCarthy and Edgar F. Kaiser to create an organization similar to the NY/NJ Port Authority, to be called the Golden Gate Authority

1959 – Publication by the US Army Corps of Engineers of Future Development of the Bay Area, 1960-2020

1961 – Creation of the Association of Bay Area Governments (ABAG)

1963 – Publication by Mel Scott of Berkeley’s Institute for governmental studies of The Future of San Francisco Bay

1964 – Creation of the San Francisco Bay Conservation Study Commission (SFBCSC)

1965 – Creation of the interim Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC);

1966 – Request by ABAG to be recognized as the Bay Area’s council of government (COG) and granting of this designation; publication by ABAG of its Preliminary Regional Plan;

1969 – Granting of permanent status to BCDC by state legislature; issuance of the Office for management and budget’s (OMB) circular A-95, which made ABAG the clearinghouse for coordinating federal grants in the Bay Area

1970 – Creation of the Metropolitan Transportation Commission (MTC) by the state legislature;

1978 – Publication by ABAG of the Environmental Management Plan (EMP);

1986 – Creation of the Joint Air Quality Policy Committee (JAQPC);

1989 – Creation of the Bay Area 2020 Commission;

1991 – Publication of the Bay Area 2020 Commission report, advocating for the consolidation of MTC, ABAG and the BAAQMD.

1997 – Creation of the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Communities (BAASC); first meeting of the Regional Agencies Group, composed of the five main regional agencies, under the auspices of the Bay Area Alliance for Sustainable Communities (BAASC)

2002 – Completion of the Smart Growth Strategy / Regional Livability Footprint project

2003 – Four or the five regional agencies adopt the Smart Growth Preamble and Principles; a total of 114 governmental and non-governmental organizations sign or take action to support the Compact for a Sustainable Bay Area which came out of the BAASC effort; ABAG starts to base its population projections on the region’s smart-growth vision

2004 – Senate Bill 849 requires that ABAG, MTC and the BAAQMD form a Joint Policy Committee and coordinate their major planning initiatives; Assembly Bill 2158 encourages consolidation of the
information base for ABAG’s regional housing needs allocation (RHNA) and MTC’s regional transportation plan (RTP)

2005 – The State of California makes funding available for metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) to produce, in cooperation with Councils of governments (COGs), regional ‘blueprint’ planning documents to promote sustainable growth.

2006 – ABAG and MTC develop and adopt *Focusing Our Vision* as a program to implement the region’s smart-growth vision

2008 – Enactment of the California *Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act*, giving new responsibilities to the Joint Policy Committee
Figure 4.4 – Diagrammatic representation of the Bay Area’s recent history of regional collaboration (1987-2013)
(the left-to-right order is more or less chronological – refer to the list of abbreviations for complete names)

Legend:

- Governmental or non-governmental entity
- Regional initiative involving several distinct entities
- Relation of influence, continuity and/or causation
  (width of arrow = strength of relation)
4.3 Putting faith in the wrong place: the case of the Greater Montreal

The geography and hydrography of Montreal are at the origin of its history, of its foundation as well as its vocation, of its development potential as well of its planning challenges
- Décarie and Boileau, 1983, *Le projet Archipel: une réflexion et une discussion géographiques*\(^99\)

Montreal is an extremely difficult city to govern. Within it the two major races [sic] in Canada, aloof in their two solitudes, must somehow live together

The word “Montreal” refers to many things: a city of approximately 1.8 million people that was founded in 1642 and that was considered, until the 1970s, to be “Canada’s metropolis”; an island of approximately 500 square kilometers (or 193 square miles) that sits in the middle of the St. Lawrence river and which is the world’s most populous island situated in fresh water; the mountain (or hill) around which the city developed, Mount Royal, from which it took its name; and the archipelago comprised of approximately 300 islands, many of them inhabited, within which the island and the city are located. Interestingly, however, the name “Montreal” does not evoke an urban region – as do for example “New York”, “Philadelphia”, “Los Angeles”, “Chicago”, “Vancouver” or “Toronto”. For historical, linguistic, cultural and administrative reasons, Montreal lacks a “sense of a region”\(^100\).

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\(^99\) Translation from all French sources by the author unless otherwise noted.
\(^100\) I have argued elsewhere (Thibert, 2013, forthcoming), that Montreal’s lack of a regional sense of identity is due to a number of factors, including: 1) the linguistic divide, which has been well-studied by Sancton (1985) and others and creates a situation where almost none of the electoral ridings on the island are competitive, which in turn has resulted in a relative lack of interest in the city’s problems on the part of the province’s political parties and elites; 2) the Government’s deliberate fragmentation of the region’s administrative structure after 1987, when the Greater Montreal administrative region (or “région administrative” in French) was subdivided into five such regions; 3) cultural representations of Montreal by French Canadian authors, novelists and intellectuals as a “city of commerce” and a “city of sin”, and a converse representation of the Quebec countryside as the repository of “true” Quebec culture; 4) finally, the lack of any region-wide political leadership coming from the City of Montreal since the end of Mayor Drapeau’s era (in 1986).
Yet, according to historical geographer Sherry Olson and her colleague Patricia Thornton, *Montreal was always a region* in a geographic sense because the fertile and productive valley in the middle of which it is nested was settled *at the same time* as the city was, and because there were always exchanges – including a form a seasonal commuting during the winter – between the city and the villages that speckled the land along the many rivers flowing into the St-Lawrence upstream and downstream from the Island of Montreal (Olson and Thornton, 2011). Indeed, Montreal was always well connected to its hinterland through various waterways, and the management of Montreal’s hydrography and hydrology (in response to floods, to facilitate shipping to and from the Great Lakes or for the production of hydro-electricity) have long been issues of regional concern. In the words of a long-time observer and active participant in Montreal’s water debates: “Water, here as elsewhere, has been a constant source of conflict”, but it has also provided governmental actors at different levels and in different sectors with “an opportunity to meet face-to-face, learn to know each other and learn to work together” (Décarie, 2013).

Despite the historical significance of waterways as regional integrators, however, there has been in the Greater Montreal region comparatively little voluntary regional collaboration (whether concerning water or other issues) over the past several decades. As a matter of fact, there has been a notable absence of appropriate fora for such regional collaboration to take place. The Montreal Urban Community (MUC), as we will see, was first and foremost a redistributive agency and it also became, with time, a regional service-sharing organization; however, despite its potential role as a regional convener, it served that purpose only for a short time and on a very limited number of issues. As for the region-wide agency that has replaced the MUC in 2001, the *Montreal Metropolitan Community* (“Communauté urbaine de Montréal”, hereafter referred to as the MMC), it has played even less of a role in promoting inter-local collaboration, focusing instead on the elaboration of regional planning documents, which have been characterized as
political compromises with little or no immediate impact on member municipalities or the region’s governance capacity\textsuperscript{101}.

We might be tempted, once again, to blame geography: the fact that half of the region’s 82 municipalities are located along one of the three main rivers (the St. Lawrence, the Rivière-des-Prairies and the Mille-Îles river) running along or between the two main islands (the Island of Montreal and Jesus Island or Île Jésus) means that they are also separated from some of their neighbors by one or more bodies of water; as a result, the Greater Montreal is saddled with over 30 bridges, and these (oftentimes congested) links divide as much as they unite, as they create a false sense of distance and isolation in parts of the region that are, in fact, almost contiguous. This is certainly true of the Island of Montreal itself - which some recent immigrants leave more often by plane (to visit friends and relatives abroad) than by car\textsuperscript{102}.

But geographical explanations, as we have seen, have their limits: rivers and bridges are both unifiers and dividers, and these characteristics may or may not be exacerbated (or made relevant) by other, more important factors. In Montreal, one such factor is language: the first few waves of suburbanization were of English-speaking Montrealers “taking refuge” in nearby island suburbs from the increasingly French and Catholic-dominated central city (Collin, 1998). Although the Montreal French-English divide is not the main subject of this research, and is treated here only peripherally, as it relates to other issues, it simply cannot be avoided. Indeed, given the coincidence in time (in the 1960s) of Montreal’s metropolitan crisis, with sprawl, congestion and air pollution coming to a head, and of Quebec’s so-called

\textsuperscript{101} As such, the MMC is not exactly analogous to ABAG in the sense that membership in the Community is not voluntary and that its main purpose is to carry out the planning functions delegated to it by Quebec’s government. There have certainly been collaborative moments in the MMC’s recent history, for example during the elaboration of the region’s Metropolitan Planning and Development Plan between 2009 and 2011. However, its general mode of functioning has generally been, and remains, more adversarial than collaborative. See Lafortune (2010) for a detailed analysis of the MMC and its impact on the Greater Montreal’s regional governance capacity.

\textsuperscript{102} This was reported to me by someone who immigrated from Oman and settled in Montreal’s central city in 2005; this young man has since left the island by plane twice as often as he has crossed one of the island’s bridges to visit either a suburb or another town. He recounts that many of his immigrant friends are in the same situation, which, admittedly, is partly due to the perception that English is not widely spoken in the rest of Quebec.
Quiet Revolution, marked by the political affirmation of the majoritarian French-speaking group and the expansion of the provincial governmental apparatus, the two were unavoidably enmeshed\textsuperscript{103}.

From the perspective of this research, the language divide matters for two reasons mainly. First, because it impacted the provincial government’s willingness to meddle with local institutions on the island of Montreal; as noted by Sancton (1985), “The peculiar force of the language division [...] is best seen in the provincial government’s inability, after many years of study, to achieve some degree of rationality in municipal boundaries” (p. 193) – and not, as many people believe, in the struggle between the central city and its immediate suburbs, which is not at all unique to Montreal\textsuperscript{104} and did not necessarily pit one language group against the other as many near suburbs of Montreal were French-speaking. Hence, the case of Montreal is interesting \textit{precisely because} the Government of Quebec – in an era of radical reform, where no stone set by the previous “regime” was left unturned – did not radically alter the island of Montreal’s local governance framework.

\textsuperscript{103} Sancton’s (1985) retelling of these events, and of the effects of the Quiet Revolution on the scope and pace of metropolitan reform, is extremely detailed and very instructive (see Chapters 5 and 6, in particular). It suffices, for our purposes, to underscore one aspect of the Quiet Revolution, as described by Sancton, which was particularly influential in the metropolitan debate: the expansion of Quebec’s governmental apparatus. In the words of Sancton (1985, p.59): “While these dramatic political changes were taking place, the provincial civil service in Quebec City was changing from a patronage-ridden collection of clerks, engineers and lawyers to a modern government bureaucracy complete with economists, planners, and well-trained managers. In numbers alone, the civil service expanded from 21,000 to \textit{66,000} between 1959 and 1979. In the same period the total provincial budget went up from \$546 million to \$13 billion (a 24-fold increase). This meant to people living in Montreal [and its English-speaking suburbs] that the provincial government \textit{had acquired the ability to intervene in hundreds of matters previously controlled privately or by autonomous local institutions}” [emphases added]. To put these numbers in perspective, the State of California total budget increased from \$2.2 billion in 1959 to about \$21.5 billions in 1979 (an approximate 10-fold increase), according to government documents (State of California, 1959, 2010).

\textsuperscript{104} The history of Île-Jésus, located immediately north of the Island of Montreal, provides an interesting counter-factual to the history of Montreal and its island. In the 1964, three separate commissions were established by the provincial government to study “intermunicipal problems” on Montreal’s South Shore, the Island of Montreal and Île-Jésus, respectively. Whereas the Blier Commission on Montreal’s situation proposed a set of compromises that satisfied no one, including the creation of a new layer of regional government, the Sylvestre Commission on Île-Jésus proposed a solution that was even more unpopular: the amalgamation of the island’s 14 municipalities into one. Significantly, Lesage’s government did not follow – or even respond to – the recommendations of the Blier report, but it did exactly as Sylvestre had recommended in 1966 and unilaterally created Ville Laval out of the 14 municipalities on Île-Jésus, “thus demonstrating that the government could act if need be” (Fischler and Wolfe, 2000, p.99).
The second reason why the language issue is of interest in the context of this research is because of its potential impact on the creation of personal ties between civic and business leaders and maintenance and use of civic capital in a collaborative setting. Given that the French-speaking and English-speaking economic and political elites of the 1960s lived and worked separately, it stands to reason that collaborative regional initiatives spearheaded by “leading citizens” seeking the public interest would either be limited in their geographical scope (i.e., limited to either the French-speaking or the English-speaking parts of the region) or be simply less common.

I have attempted to show, in this introduction, that both the possibility for – and the prospects of – regional collaboration in the Greater Montreal have been affected by geography, as in the Bay Area, but also importantly by language divisions and a political culture where state intervention is generally not only tolerated by also expected (though not often carried out in the case of Montreal). The reader will have observed that these “moderating forces” are quite different from those present in the Bay Area, where there existed, even before the bay fill issue was popularized, a relatively strong “sense of the region”, coupled with a culture of civic entrepreneurialism and a (relative) lack of state initiative.

In the following three sections, I first follow the development of two regional collaborative processes that unfolded in parallel: that which took place within the MUC and its Planning Commission during the 1982-1990 period and led to the creation of the Island of Montreal’s regional park system, and the multi-stakeholder process that stretches from the mid-1980s to the late 1990s and led to creation of the Mille-Îles River Park. I then turn to the mid-1990s, a period of continual stalemate and inaction at the MUC and political turmoil in the province of Quebec, which nevertheless saw the establishment of two important regional economic development agencies, the IMRDC and MI.

See Table 4.2 and Figure 4.7 for a chronology and diagrammatic representation of these events.
4.3.1 1982-1990: from coercion to collaboration

As described by Hubert Simard, who was President of the MUC’s Urban Planning Commission (Commission d’aménagement) from 1986 to 1994 – and as confirmed by other actors and close observers of the MUC – there were three very distinct “phases” in the development and evolution of Montreal’s first (and only, to date) multi-purpose and multi-function regional agency. Only the second one of these three phases, which lasted from 1982 to about 1990, can be described as a “collaborative moment”, during which the local elected officials forming the MUC went above and beyond the original (and limited) mandate that was given to the organization by the Government of Quebec in 1970; hence, it is this collaborative period that is the focus of this section.

The tracing of the collaborative process “from cradle to cradle” requires that we not only study the collaborative process itself, but that we also pay heed to the origins and unraveling of the particular collaborative period or initiative that is of interest. In what follows, therefore, I first trace the origins of the MUC and then describe the beginnings and unfolding of the organization’s so-called “collaborative moment” in detail. I focus more specifically on the 1986-1990 period and on the work of the MUC’s Planning Commission. The collaborative moment’s disentanglement as well as the disbandment of the MUC itself are discussed in section 4.3.3, covering the 1991-2001 period.

A stalemate, a crisis and the ensuing creation of the MUC

Although the specific event that precipitated the creation of the MUC was the police strike of 1969 – which underscored the need for a regional police force – the principal political objective of the MUC (as noted by Collin, 1984 and Sancton, 1985) was not actually to promote inter-local cooperation, but to impose fiscal

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105 Although the MMC has planning responsibilities in different policy areas (including land-use, economic development and the distribution of affordable housing), it has only one function, namely planning. In contrast, the MUC was also responsible for providing direct services, including public security, property assessment and public transit.
redistribution (or a fair-share approach to the funding of municipal services provided by the central city, but benefiting residents of the whole island).

To understand the reasons that led to the creation of the MUC, one must take into consideration the many regional reforms that preceded it. The first regional “institution” to appear in Montreal was the Montreal Metropolitan Commission (Commission métropolitaine de Montréal) and its sole responsibility was to monitor and control the suburbs’ level of borrowing. However, in 1935, the Commission becomes responsible for administering the region’s tax-base sharing program and – soon thereafter – a joint (City of Montreal and Metropolitan Commission) Department of Urban Planning and Research (Service d’urbanisme et de recherche) was established, which laid the groundwork for a regional plan (but fell short of ever adopting or publishing one, having no formal prerogative to plan). The Commission continued to exist until 1959, but became nearly dormant after the abolition of its planning unit in 1939 and the end of the region’s fiscal-sharing program in 1941. The fact that a fiscal-sharing program existed on the Island of Montreal in the 1940s is significant as there was a not-so-distant precedent to refer to when the MUC was established in 1970.

Nevertheless, the regional planning process undertaken jointly by the Commission and the City led to the creation, in the 1942, of a “permanent collaboration forum” known as the Greater Montreal Economic Council (Conseil économique du Grand Montréal). This regional forum, which convened both elected officials and civic leaders from across the region (defined, at that time, as the City of Montreal and its immediate suburbs) held regular meetings until 1958 and became, according to Collin (1998), an “advisory council” of sorts where projects with a regional scope would be submitted by the City of Montreal for information and/or review. As for the regional planning functions of the Metropolitan Commission, they were absorbed by the City of Montreal, which effectively became the only regional

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106 The main fiscal tool used to tax-base sharing which benefited the central city was an income tax on every individual having his/her residence or place of business within the territory of the Montreal “metropolitan district”; however, the municipal income tax was abolished in 1941 to allow the Province to levy its own income tax, which rendered the region’s tax-base sharing arrangement ineffective.
player in the region, despite its lack of formal extraterritorial jurisdiction over its suburbs.  

It is interesting to note that the project of creating a “confederation of towns” on the island of Montreal was first evoked in 1927 and was discussed throughout the existence of the Metropolitan Commission and that of the Economic Council, without ever coming to fruition. Collin cites the growing linguistic divide between the central city (which became more francophone with time) and its suburbs (where the English-speaking minority “took refuge” from the French-dominated central city) as the most likely explanation for this; yet, he also recognizes that the language issue is only part of the explanation (as does Sanction, in his 1985 book on this very question).  

By 1959, the context was ripe for reform. First, there was no longer any “revenue-sharing” between Montreal and its suburbs, yet Montreal assumed (as it always had) the financial responsibility for collective amenities (such as streetcars, major arterials, downtown museums and parks) used by an increasing number of people not paying taxes in the city (as suburban expansion continued apace, both on and off the island). Second, two separate commissions had been created by the City of Montreal (with the authorization of the provincial government) in the 1950s to study the city’s “metropolitan problems” and both had urged the government to create a new regional agency. Third, the tensions between the central city and its suburbs were on the rise, in part because of the City of Montreal’s threat to force annexation votes in its immediate suburbs. It is in this context that the Montreal Metropolitan Commission was awakened by Duplessis’ government, given a new name (the Montreal Urban Corporation) and a new responsibility: that of coordinating property assessment on the island. The Corporation was also empowered to provide and/or coordinate whatever other services the majority of

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107 Collin (1998) and Fischler and Wolfe (2000) both reach the conclusion that immediately prior to the creation of the MUC, Montreal was – de facto – the region’s only regional player.
108 The Paquette Commission was created by the City of Montreal in 1952, and recommended in its 1955 report the creation of a new metropolitan organism with augmented responsibilities and authority. The Croteau Commission was set up in 1958 by then Mayor Fournier to follow-up on the recommendations of the Paquette report, but Duplessis imposed its own weak reform before the City of Montreal could react to the Croteau report.
municipalities on the Commission wished to collectively receive. However, despite the fact that this new regional body had, in effect, no power, it was rejected outright by Mayor Drapeau, who was elected for the second time the following year, and his companion-in-arms Lucien Saulnier. In the words of Sancton (1985):

In order to offend neither the English-speaking suburbs nor his political allies in the French speaking suburbs, Duplessis had established equality of representation between the corporation’s central city and suburban members. When Drapeau inherited this arrangement in 1960 he found it intolerable. In making the city’s case for increased representation, Drapeau’s main political lieutenant, Lucien Saulnier, explained why: ‘The Montreal Metropolitan Corporation - and all other systems of metropolitan government [like it] - are unthinkable and out of the question because they imply a decrease in the influence of the French language group’. Because the suburbs had more metropolitan representation than their population entitled them to, Saulnier’s remark was undoubtedly accurate. (p. 95)

Given the wholesale rejection by Mayor Drapeau’s administration of the very notion of a regional body not controlled by the City of Montreal, the various proposals floated by the Blier Commission and its final recommendations, which called for the creation of an independent regional government, were soon abandoned. Indeed, as pointed out by a number of scholars (Sancton, 1985; Collin, 1998; Fischler and Wolfe, 2000), the three successive provincial governments that attempted to tackle Montreal’s metropolitan problem from the late 1950s to the late 1960s were all confronted with the impossibility of finding a political compromise that was acceptable to both the City of Montreal and its suburbs.

Hence, as argued by Jean Corbeil, a suburban mayor who joined the MUC in 1973 and played a key role in its evolution, the government’s decision to create the

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109 Lucien Saulnier occupied the post of Executive Committee President from 1960 an 1969 and is credited for establishing the pivotal role of the EC President within the City of Montreal’s administrative apparatus. It was he him who participated in governmental commissions about the city’s metropolitan problems; he was also on the frontlines during the 1969 police strike (see below) and it was he who pressured Union Nationale government to finally act in 1969 and establish a tax-sharing system on the Island of Montreal. Finally, he was the MUC’s first President, and occupied that post from 1970 to 1978.

MUC in December of 1969 was the result of a “circumstantial political and financial compromise” (p. 18) and this foundational act had long-lasting impacts. Indeed, the administration of Jean-Jacques Bertrand seized the opportunity provided by the unilateral general (16-hour long) strike of the Montreal Police in October of 1969 to rush the adoption of Bill 75 – creating the MUC – under the pretext that the City of Montreal could not financially afford to pay for the city's increased (and increasing) police costs by itself\textsuperscript{111}.

Despite there being an opportunity for meaningful metropolitan reform, the government settled for a weak solution, which did not change (or “rationalize”, to use Sancton’s expression) the Island’s municipal boundaries, but which did (re)establish a form of tax-sharing on the Island of Montreal. Importantly, Lussier largely gave in to Saulnier’s demands, which ensured City of Montreal dominance of the MUC’s Executive Committee and gave the suburban mayors only a weak form of veto. Indeed, The adoption of a motion in the MUC council, composed of 52 City of Montreal councilors and a representative from each of the 28 other municipalities on the island, was to require the majority of the votes cast as well as at least one-half of the Montreal councilors present and one-half of the suburban mayor present. This effectively gave the suburban mayors a form of veto power, but that required at least half of them to oppose a given motion.

As for the MUC’s functions, they were quite wide-ranging \textit{on paper}, but the organization was “little more than a legal shell” (Sancton, 1985, p. 116), with little or no capacity to do carry out any of what it was “enabled” to do. Indeed, the MUC was

\textsuperscript{111} Before the 1969 strike, the City of Montreal’s police officers were paid considerably less than Toronto’s police officers ($7300 vs. $9200 a year as starting salary), despite the fact that their job was considerably – and demonstrably – more difficult and dangerous. Indeed, the social and political turmoil of the late 1960s manifested itself sometimes violently, and according to an article published in \textit{The Gazette} on October 3\textsuperscript{rd} of 1969, citing police statistics, two officers were killed on duty and more than 250 were injured between June 1968 and October 1969.

Given the extensive damage that resulted from the police’s withdrawing from the streets on October 7, following a pay raise offer from the City that the officers’ union rejected outright, and given the public outrage that ensued, the provincial government was better able to make the case (which the City's Saulnier had himself made) that the City of Montreal’s financial situation was unsustainable and that some of its financial burden should be shared with its immediate suburbs – whose residents undoubtedly benefited from the protection of the City of Montreal’s police in the downtown core. Hence, reversing his September decision to postpone any metropolitan reform until the following year, then Minister of municipal affairs Robert Lussier decided to act swiftly.
formally assigned both “heavy” operational duties (the unification of the island’s police forces, the treatment of wastewater, the improvement of air quality and the operation of public transit) and a number of “lighter” administrative responsibilities (regional land-use and economic planning as well as property evaluation). However, other than to serve as a tax-sharing mechanism, most of the MUC’s legislated functions were only “potential functions”, and “until the MUC acted concerning any of [them], the member municipalities were to retain their existing jurisdiction” (Sancton, 1985, p. 117). Significantly, the legislation made it possible for the MUC to “assign itself” new functions in various policy areas, including recreation, regional parks, public housing, fire protection, and libraries. In a very real sense, then, regional collaboration within MUC was more “enabled” by higher governmental action than it was forced. Note that this is in contrast to the functioning of most regional agencies in the Bay Area, where collaboration is either entirely voluntary or else clearly mandated by higher governments.

The MUC in action: from coercion, to gridlock, to collaboration

The creation of the MUC created a forum where regional (or island-wide) problems could be discussed and where inter-municipal solutions could (theoretically) be found and in turn, implemented (if and when a majority of both central city councilors and suburban mayors agreed). However, the mere existence of this new “collaborative setting” did not, in fact, translate into regional collaboration – at least not for the first 12 years of the MUC’s existence. On the one hand, the organization was led, during its first two years of existence, by Lucien Saulnier himself – a divisive figure identified with the “municipal imperialism” of Mayor Drapeau (as described earlier). Drapeau – and by extension Saulnier – clearly saw the MUC as an instrument to be used for expanding the City of Montreal’s control over the Island – and for easing the City’s financial troubles. On the other hand, as reported by the former mayor of Anjou, Jean Corbeil (1998), the suburban mayors were hopeful for the first few years after the creation of the MUC that it would, one day, be undone; consequently, they had every incentive not to
collaborate with the City of Montreal and to make apparent that the MUC simply could not work\textsuperscript{112}.

According to Corbeil’s own account, the suburban mayors who were leading the Inter-municipal Coordinating Committee (ICC) – the organization representing the interests of the Island of Montreal’s suburban municipalities, created in 1964 as a response to the creation of the Blier Commission\textsuperscript{113} – started to realize by the mid-1970s that the MUC was there to stay. Under the influence of Pierre Desmarais II, then mayor of Outremont (a nearby suburb of Montreal), and that of Jean Corbeil, Anjou’s newly elected Mayor, Montreal’s suburban mayors created a new organization to represent their interests – the Suburban Mayor’s Conference (“Conférence des maires de banlieue” in French, hereafter referred to as the SMC\textsuperscript{114}). In contrast to the ICC, whose sole purpose was to defend local autonomy, the SMC was to become “an effective research organization” with the means to maintain a constant dialogue with governmental authorities (and the legitimacy to speak in the name of Montreal’s suburbs).

This change of attitude on the part of Montreal’s suburban mayors is thought to have “softened” Mayor Drapeau’s own stance vis-à-vis the island’s suburban municipalities (Ryan, 2013); this, in turn, might have led to his agreeing, in 1978, that the MUC’s next President be drawn from the SMC\textsuperscript{115}. Sancton’s (1985) own

\textsuperscript{112} Among other examples of the suburbs’ lack of cooperation, Sancton (1985) cites the MUC’s attempt in its first year of existence to standardize property assessments among the various municipalities on its territory, which failed because of the suburbs’ lack of cooperation (see the MUC’s 1970 Annual Report for more detail). Divay and Collin (1977) also report, based on a detailed analysis of the organization’s minutes, that Montreal’s dominance in the first few years of the MUC created a state of “permanent conflict” between the City of Montreal caucus and the suburban caucus.

\textsuperscript{113} The Blier Commission was created by the Government of Quebec in 1964 to study “the problems of the Island of Montreal”. The suburban mayors, concerned that the Commission might recommend some form of annexation to Montreal, formed a lobby group, the ICC, to represent them formally before the Commission and before Quebec’s National Assembly.

\textsuperscript{114} It is important to note that several of Montreal’s immediate suburbs were majority French-speaking, which explains, at least in part, why no provincial political party has wanted to meddle with Montreal’s metropolitan politics as all parties potentially had something to lose by alienating suburban voters. It also explains why two of the most prominent suburban leaders in the 1960s and 1970s were francophone.

\textsuperscript{115} Although Mayor Drapeau never formally agreed to it (and therefore it never became a formal, written rule), it became a tacit rule of the MUC, after 1978, that the presidency would alternate between the City of Montreal and the SMC every eight years. Notably, the rule was not broken from then until the MUC’s disbandment in 2001.
interpretation is that by 1978, “Mayor Drapeau had enough experience to realize that as far as the City of Montreal was concerned the MUC had already delivered all the benefits it was designed to provide” (p. 124) and therefore did not need to “extract” anything more from it. Whatever the case may be, Pierre Desmarais II’s election – to which Drapeau had clearly consented, since he was elected on first ballot with the support of his party’s councilors – was a turning point in the evolution of the MUC’s mode of operation from adversarial to collaborative.

Many commentators concur in saying that Pierre Desmarais II was instrumental in changing the culture of the organization. Indeed, he and other prominent mayors in the SMC thought the time was ripe to fundamentally change the way the MUC operated and improve its functioning; hence, they decided to press on with the reform of the organization and ask the government to change its formal governance structure. After three years of intense lobbying, they finally succeeded, in 1981, to convince the provincial government to act. Indeed, despite Mayor Drapeau’s staunch opposition and despite the fact that the party in power in the province of Quebec at the time had nothing to gain politically from strengthening Montreal’s suburbs vis-à-vis the City of Montreal, the Quebec National Assembly approved a bill in 1982 that would significantly alter the MUC’s “ground rules” and pave the way for what was to be the MUC’s “collaborative moment”. Among these changes, three are especially important from the point of view adopted here: first, the depoliticization of the chair’s function, who from then on would have to leave elected office in order to preside over the organization’s executive committee; second, the establishment of city-suburban parity on the MUC executive committee, which effectively instated a “double majority” requirement for the passing of any

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116 In addition to Sancton (1985) and Corbeil (1998), Yves Ryan, former mayor of Montreal North, André Gamache, former attaché of Pierre Desmarais II, and Michel Hamelin, who was first a City of Montreal councilor under Pierre Desmarais II and then replaced him as President in 1986, all agree that Pierre Desmarais II’s leadership was a key factor in the establishment of a collaborative mode of functioning at the MUC.

117 It is historically significant that this reform was undertaken by the Parti québécois, a nationalist and separastit party whose political base was almost exclusively francophone, which held only a handful of ridings on the Island of Montreal and had little or no hope of making any gains there.
motion\textsuperscript{118}; third, the creation of five permanent commissions (on finance, public security, public transit, environment and planning), whose meetings were to be open to the public and which received the mandate to formulate policy recommendations to the EC based on careful consideration of particular issues and files.

Tellingly, Pierre Desmarais II did not seek to reform the organization from within, which he saw as hopelessly dysfunctional (Ryan, 2013); instead, he sought legislative change in Quebec City as he thought it was the responsibility of the provincial government to undo the mess it had created. This, I argue, is indicative of a pattern in Quebec wherein local politicians “expect” the provincial government to step in and arbitrate between local interests. However we will see, in the next section, that local politicians can and do take regional matters into their own hands when a regional issue comes up that strikes the public’s imagination.

The creation of the regional park system: an opportunity for collaboration

A new mode of functioning

There is a general consensus among those who have witnessed the change that the adoption of the “double majority” procedure, in conjunction with the establishment of the permanent commissions, transformed the MUC’s mode of operation in fundamental ways. In the words of Michel Hamelin, who witnessed the evolution of the MUC as a City of Montreal councilor starting in 1974 and who became chair of the organization in 1985:

The MUC’s golden age started at about that time, in 1982-1983. Starting then, city councilors and suburban mayors had no other choice but to work together to get anything done and this created a much stronger regional view.

\textsuperscript{118}There is no reference, in Bill 46, to the a “double majority” procedure, but the effect of the law was that suburban and city representatives on the 13 (12 plus the chair) member EC would now be in equal number (i.e., six). The law also provided that opposition from four or more of the city or suburban representatives would result in a motion being deferred (or, after being deferred twice, referred to the council). As a result, any motion would necessarily require a majority of both city and suburban representatives to be able to pass, hence the name “double majority” used by former MUC members to describe this requirement.
It was a forced regional view, but a regional view nonetheless. (Hamelin, 2013)

Another important change that the double majority procedure brought along was a definitive acceptance among suburban mayors and councilors that the MUC was there to stay. As reported by Léa Cousineau, who co-founded the Montreal Citizen Mouvement (Rassemblement des citoyens de Montréal in French, hereafter referred to as the MCM) in the 1970s and was a City of Montreal councilor from 1986 to 1994, there ceased to be any calling into question of the MUC’s relevance or legitimacy after 1982; “the dominant attitudes during this period were realism and conciliation” (Cousineau, 1998, p. 28)

This newfound spirit of collaboration led to many important policy developments in the years following the 1982 reform; however, some tension subsisted between the City of Montreal caucus and that of the SMC as Drapeau was at first resentful of the changes made to the MUC. However, with the arrival of a new administration at the City of Montreal in 1986, after 26 years of uninterrupted rule by Mayor Drapeau and his Civic Party, the change was unmistakable: a new era had begun. Indeed, the MUC’s functioning up to that point was sometimes cooperative, but never collaborative in the sense understood by Innes and Booher (2010). With the arrival of MCM, the formal structure of the MUC did not change, but a newfound “spirit of collaboration” was instilled.

*The provincial government takes the lead*

There is one policy area, in particular, that had virtually been abandoned by the MUC since the mid-1970s and which suddenly re-gained prominence: regional planning. Indeed, the planning department of the newly formed MUC, composed primarily of former City of Montreal planners, had released a draft regional plan in 1973, the main provisions of which were to concentrate urban growth in three centers (the downtown core of Montreal and two other “satellite centers”, respectively in Pointe-Claire in the English-speaking West Island and Anjou in the French-speaking northeastern end). Significantly, the plan also called for the
creation of four major new suburban parks\textsuperscript{119}, which would include several large tracts of privately owned land.

By 1976, it became clear that most provisions of the plan would never be adopted, as the satellite center idea was rejected outright by the suburban mayors, who by then were well-organized through the SMC and had even formulated a regional planning proposal of their own (SMC, 1976). What was adopted, however, was an interim control bylaw that put a 10-year freeze on the development of those privately owned lots that were viewed as necessary to create the regional parks identified in the plan proposal.

Even as the MUC council quietly dropped the “satellite center” idea, which effectively resulted in the shelving of the regional plan (Hamelin, 2013; Ryan, 2013), the newly elected Parti québécois (PQ) government began, as soon as it came into power in 1976, to take an active interest in urban development – and the development of Montreal metropolitan area, in particular. The PQ’s administration made public, in 1978, its “preferred planning option” for Montréal (or “option préférable d’aménagement”), which called for a more concentrated pattern of development within the region’s urbanized core\textsuperscript{120}. The following year, the government adopted the Land-Use Planning and Development Act (“Loi sur l’aménagement et l’urbanisme” officially), requiring that the MUC (eventually) adopt a regional plan, which it had just failed to do on its own.

The seed of regional collaboration was planted the same year, when the PQ government announced that the MUC would receive an – unsolicited – $10,540,000 grant for the establishment of a network of metropolitan parks. Although different accounts of these events differ in their interpretation of what motivated the government’s gesture, there is general agreement that the MUC had little to do with it\textsuperscript{121}. In effect, Mayor Drapeau had little or no interest in sponsoring regional parks

\textsuperscript{119} These four parks were: Rivière-des-prairies (in the East end), Bois-de-Liesse (in the middle of the island, north of the city) and Anse-à-l’Orme and Cap-Saint-Jacques (in the West Island).

\textsuperscript{120} The government’s preferred planning option for Montreal, released publicly on February 22\textsuperscript{nd} 1978, read as follows: “The consolidation of the urban fabric within the current urbanized perimeter and the accelerated redevelopment of the Island of Montreal so as to promote the quality of life” [as reported by Divay and Gaudreau, 1982, p.191, translation from French by author].

\textsuperscript{121} Namely, the accounts of Sancton (1985), Oljemark (2002), MUC’s own planning staff (Limoges,
outside the city limits and suburban mayors were concentrating their lobbying efforts on changing the MUC’s mode of functioning.

*The MUC takes on the realization of a regional park system*

Despite the fact that the creation of the regional park system was *not* its own initiative, the MUC did commit to this project in April 1979 by officially giving itself the power to establish such parks and by adopting, in November of the same year, a borrowing by-law of $35,000,000 to allow for the acquisition of the land necessary for the creation of eight regional parks along the northern bank of the Island of Montreal. Following Michel Hamelin’s own account, the initial investment made by the MUC for the acquisition of land in view of creating regional parks “was not the source of much controversy” (2013) and the acquisition process was more of a technocratic exercise carried out by bureaucrats than a collaborative planning effort involving elected officials and members of civil society. Hence, from 1979 to 1982, the establishment of the regional park system proceeded apace without much involvement of local elected officials – and consequently without relying upon or promoting regional collaboration. By the mid 1980s, the MUC had acquired (or was in the process of acquiring) 913 hectares (or about 2,256 acres) of land with a price tag of about 44 million dollars for the creation of seven regional parks – all of the parks identified in 1979 except for the Bois-de-l'Héritage (MUC, 1989). Let us note that these acquisitions were partially funded, but not mandated, by the provincial government.

1985) and three interviewees who were at the MUC at that time (Line Morand, Michel Hamelin and Yves Ryan, contacted and/or interviewed by author in the spring of 2013). Oljemark, Limoges and Morand place considerable emphasis on the role of citizen groups in pressuring the government into action - following what Oljemark calls “the furor over Bois-de-Saraguay” (2002, 11.6) when the City of Montreal announced a zoning change in 1977 that would have allowed for the razing of the woods, which supposedly “piqued the interest of Quebec” and led the government to grant the MUC the mandate to acquire and manage regional parks. Sancton, Hamelin and Ryan, in contrast, insist on the government’s own political will, as expressed in its 1977 *Green paper on recreation* (“Livre vert sur les loisirs au Québec”), and that of Jacques Léonard, then minister of municipal affairs. A more likely explanation is that mounting public pressure and the government’s own policy agenda happened to coincide and reinforce one another.

122 The eight sites selected in the end included the four parks originally identified, in addition to four others: Bois-de-Saraguay, Île-de-la-Visitation, Bois-de-l'Héritage et Bois-de-la-Réparation.
Interestingly, after the Planning Commission was given official responsibilities and formally integrated into the MUC's governance structure in 1982, the City of Montreal councilors and suburban mayors sitting on the commission began to take a more active interest in conservation (and the consequences of conservation on future development). Indeed, the minutes from the Planning Commission show that between 1983 and 1985, more than 80% of the motions adopted by the commission concerned the identification of natural sites to be protected (through a new interim control bylaw) or the improvement of existing park space. Although about half of these motions originated with municipalities asking that a specific lot (or a specific portion of a lot) be removed from the proposed interim control bylaw, a significant number originated with municipalities asking that the Planning Department study the possibility that a site not previously identified and considered to be of ecological or heritage value be added to the bylaw (MUC Planning Commission Minutes, 1983-1985).

The fact that these new regional (or inter-municipal) parks had to be delineated precisely and named was also an opportunity for collaboration (though in a fairly weak sense of the word); indeed, the Planning Commission recommended, during the session held on November 9, 1983, that the MUC's planning department “make all necessary efforts [...] to consult with municipalities where regional parks are located with regards to the park’s limits and to ask these municipalities to make proposals for the official naming of the park” (MUC Planning Commission minutes, November 9th 1983, p. 28). Hence, though fairly technocratic in nature, the planning tasks that the MUC was required to perform to establish the regional park system provoked a number of discussions among the members of the Planning Commission, which led to what Simard describes as “the beginning of a coming-into-awareness” of the MUC's mayors and councilors about the importance of conserving what was left of nature on the Island of Montreal.

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123 It is important to mention that the MUC borrowed an extra 51 million dollars in 1984, when the regional park system was officially established as such, for the improvement and development (“aménagement”) of the existing parks. Significantly, the adoption of this borrowing bylaw did not stir up much controversy, even though it would have to be reimbursed (as all other MUC capital expenditures) directly from the MUC's shared tax base.
A new administration calls for citizen participation

The full realization by local elected officials that the Island’s few remaining natural areas were disappearing did not happen until there was a change of guard at the City of Montreal – and by the same token, at the MUC – and the public became involved. After the MCM took over Montreal’s city hall in 1986, a number of things happened which led to the re-opening of the regional park system file.

First, there was the nomination of Hubert Simard as chair of the Planning Commission. Simard was a young and idealistic MCM councilor who had recently graduated from the University of Montreal’s graduate planning program and had spent four years in the opposition closely watching the progress of the Planning Commission. Importantly, he was able to devote his full attention to the issue of regional planning as he held no other positions of responsibility as a City of Montreal councilor.

Second, the MUC was about to adopt its first-ever regional plan (as required by law) and there was a sense, among both MUC staff and newly elected MCM councilors, that the document was more akin to a “state of the region” report than to a visionary planning proposal (Divay, 2013; Simard, 2013; Trudeau, 2013). Seeing as it was too late to radically change the plan when the MCM took office, Simard and the other MCM councilors interesting in regional planning focused their energies almost exclusively on the MUC’s conservation efforts. Their conviction was reinforced when several municipalities announced that they would have no other choice but to develop some of the most important natural sites included in the 1983 interim control bylaw and slated for acquisition. Notably, this change of stance was a

124 Yves Ryan, the former mayor of Montreal North who witnessed the takeover of the City of Montreal (and of the MUC) by the MCM and was known to be very critical of his colleagues at the MUC, said the following about Hubert Simard during our interview: “Simard was a pure-hearted young man, a pure urbanist. He was never aggressive and always tried to convince others to follow along. It didn’t always work, but always tried” (2013, translation from French by author).
125 Under Civic Party rule, members of the MUC executive committee were always also members of the City of Montreal executive committee; this meant that they had little time to devote to the regional files for which they were responsible.
direct response to the provincial government's reneging on its prior commitment to fund these acquisitions.\textsuperscript{126}

Third, and perhaps most importantly, the MCM – which had run in the 1986 election on a platform of increased citizen participation in decision-making – brought to the MUC a culture of participatory governance (as opposed to a culture of behind-closed-doors governing). This “new way of running the show”, as Hamelin (2013) described it, manifested itself most starkly in two ways: first, in the party's willingness to walk “across the aisle”\textsuperscript{127} and, second, in its firm commitment to engage with the public.

It is this last commitment that was most disruptive – for better or worse – of the MUC's “business as usual” mode of functioning. Indeed, a mere eight months after he has appointed Chair of the Planning Commission, Simard announced that the Commission would be holding public consultations on the future of the island's regional park system. In preparation for these consultations, which were held between November 18\textsuperscript{th} and December 2\textsuperscript{nd} of the same year, Simard produced – together with a few key members of the planning staff – a 60-page document (or “white paper”) underscoring – without any political rancor – what had been achieved in the 1979-1986 period, but also emphasizing the work that remained to be done, in particular to make the parks more usable and accessible and to connect them to other parks and recreational facilities (CUM, 1987).

Although the MUC did not advertise the public consultations to be held a few weeks later, 53 position papers were formally presented in front of the commission by citizens and community groups from all over the island and by a total of nine municipalities. Not surprisingly, most participants supported the objectives of the

\textsuperscript{126} These municipalities had expected funding for these acquisitions in the context of the National Archipelago Park Project (“projet du Parc national de l'archipel”), a cross-sectoral, multi-stakeholder, inter-governmental initiative developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s by the Government of Quebec which aimed, among other things, to develop the Montreal archipelago’s recreational potential by increasing public access to the region’s many rivers. When the Archipelago Park Project was abandoned because of internal fighting within the government bureaucracy, the funding dried up.

\textsuperscript{127} In addition to allowing suburban mayors to chair any of the six permanent commissions (for the first time), the MCM did not remove Michel Hamelin – a former Civic Party councilor – from the post of MUC chairman. As is clear from the minutes, MCM councilors were also allowed to vote freely on most important issues.
MUC’s white paper, which called for significant investments in the improvement of existing parks; however, those same participants also overwhelmingly asked the MUC to continue with its acquisition program – a demand that was not foreseen by MUC staff and elected officials\textsuperscript{128}.

\textit{A citizen movement responds}

Equally as surprising to members of the Planning Commisision, including Hubert Simard, was the fact that public pressure did not recede after the public consultations ended; quite the contrary. As recounted by Oljemark (2002), the consultations had come at a crucial time, a few months after the Saraguay Citizens Group (SCG) launched its “Toxic Alert” campaign, following the discovery by West Island citizens that the two main creeks in Saraguay woods were heavily polluted. In addition to their concerns over toxicity, members of the SCG (including Oljemark herself) also learnt a few weeks prior to the MUC hearings that the southern portion of another forest, Bois-Franc (which was adjacent to the Saraguay woods), was slated for development\textsuperscript{129}. This further galvanized the pro-conservation citizen groups and the MUC public consultations actually contributed to giving them a voice. It also contributed to the formation of an island-wide, English-French alliance of environmental, recreation and citizen groups: the Green Coalition or Coalition verte.

At first, the coalition was an informal network, but as a collective sense of urgency set in over the termination of the MUC’s interim control bylaw, the coalition became more organized and started to apply pressure where it mattered most: in city halls across the region during municipal council meetings as well as during MUC council and Planning Commission meetings. In the words of Oljemark (2002):

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{128} According to the official MUC document summarizing the results of the consultation, published in 1990, more than half of the participants specifically asked that the 1983 interim control bylaw be maintained, which was in direct contradiction to the plan adopted earlier that year (and which called for the lifting of the interim control bylaw). Simard himself admits that he had not “seen it coming” (2013).
\textsuperscript{129} In Oljemark’s (2002) account, the news were given to them cavalierly, in the midst of discussions about the polluted creeks, by the then mayor of Dollard-des-Ormeaux Ed Janiszewski. The mayor’s attitude, which was perceived as verging on spite and sheer disregard for the environment, gave the citizens even more of a reason to fight back.
\end{flushright}
By the end of 1988, with seemingly boundless energy, the activists were mobilizing crowds of green space enthusiasts to attend the monthly MUC council meetings[...]. Through the spring and summer of 1989, phalanxes of green space supporters attended each and every meeting of MUC Council and of the Planning Commission, tying up question periods and pressing vigorously for green space action. The media was agog and constant coverage of the Coalition’s exploits helped to fuel the debate. (pp. 11, 13)

This, as recounted by Hubert Simard (2013) and Sylvia Oljemark (2013), was exactly the kind of public pressure that pro-conservation MUC officials needed in order to advance their cause. Simard, Hamelin and Ryan recall that several important members of the SMC, including Dollard-des-Ormeaux’s Mayor Ed Janiszewski, were displeased by the media spotlight suddenly turned on them. Thus, having learnt of the activists’ intention to attend in large numbers the Planning Commission’s meeting on September 19th, 1989 – during which the MUC’s Green Space Policy (Politique des espaces verts) and the borrowing of 500 million dollars to complete the regional park system were to be discussed – the SMC motioned during its September 14th meeting to postpone any discussion of the policy until “after the mayors have been adequately consulted on this question” (SMC, 1989)\textsuperscript{130}. However, everyone understood that if the mayors waited long enough, the interim control bylaw would cease to take effect\textsuperscript{131} – which signified that all efforts to conserve the island’s remaining green spaces would have gone to naught.

But the suburban mayors misfired. In effect, the SMC’s furtive move only strengthened the environmentalists’ – and Simard’s – resolve. After dominating the Planning Commission question period and grilling the members of the commission for two hours that night, the members of the Green Coalition went home but did not give up; rather, starting the very next day, “Throngs of Green Coalition supporters redoubled their attendance at local council meetings, calling for municipalities to delay their urban plans past the same fateful December 31 due date” (Oljemark, 2002, p. 14)

\textsuperscript{130} Importantly, the motion also mentions in its preamble that new investments in the regional park system by the MUC and its member municipalities would put undue financial burden on its taxpayers. Also importantly, the suburban mayors blamed the Government of Quebec for not putting up the money for acquiring the natural sites protected under the interim control bylaw.

\textsuperscript{131} The interim control bylaw was due to expire on December 31st, 1989, a few weeks.
As remarked by Oljemark (2002, 2013), a number of suburban mayors “turned green” over the next couple of weeks and reversed their original opposition to fund the acquisition of the remaining natural sites under temporary protection. The Coalition kept the pressure on until the very end, so that when the full MUC Council convened on December 20th to adopt – unanimously – a $200 million borrowing bylaw for the acquisition of the island’s most important remaining natural sites, its members gathered to “cheer on” the council as it passed the resolution.

What the Green Coalition’s narrative leaves out, however, is what happened behind closed doors in the day preceding the fateful December 20th MUC council meeting. Indeed, all motions moved during MUC council-at-large meetings had to be discussed and pre-approved by the MUC’s executive committee, whose meetings were not open to the public. In Simard’s own account, there is no question that the Green Coalition had carried the day in the media, but the MUC’s internal political battle still had to be fought. Two things happened internally that tilted the balance of forces in favor of Simard’s plan.

First, Simard asked that the Planning Department obtain information about the existence of heat islands\(^{132}\) on the Island of Montreal. After some time, MUC planners were able to obtain two satellite photographs (see Figure 4.2) of the island, one showing the island’s concentration of biomass and the other showing the island’s concentration of mineralized surfaces – which were spatially correlated with heat islands. Gérard Divay, who was Director of the MUC’s Planning Department at the time and attended the meetings of the Planning Commission, recalls that some of the most important members of the SMC were also members of the Planning Commission and that they were “shocked” to see the island’s dearth of biomass when they saw the photographs the first time during a meeting of the Planning Commission. In his own words:

\(^{132}\) In the urban context, heat islands are generally areas with a high concentration of mineralized surfaces having high heat absorption capacity and, conversely, a low concentration of green surfaces acting as temperature regulators. As a result of the absence of heat reflecting surface, these micro-environments can be several degrees hotter than the surrounding urban environment, hence the expression “heat island”.
Figure 4.5 – Satellite images of the Island of Montreal showing the concentration of biomass (first image) and mineralized surfaces (second image), presented by the MUC’s Planning Department to the Planning Commission in 1989
The fiscally conservative suburban mayors did not want to buy up green space just to satisfy the environmentalists, whose demands seemed capricious to them. However, if they could see some tangible, concrete benefit to preserving green space, then they could be convinced (2013).

The other event took place during the EC meeting on the eve of the fateful December 20th MUC council meeting. The EC had still not reached a consensus on the issue, as a number of elected officials were still unconvinced that a few hundred hectares of green space were worth the investment of several hundred million dollars and the Government of Quebec, at that time, seemed unwilling to participate financially in this effort. After a long discussion that seemed to lead nowhere, something very unusual happened: the MUC’s Executive Director and former Deputy Director, Conrad Cormier, who had attended hundreds of meetings without ever offering an opinion, spoke up. He was considered to be fiscally conservative (he was an accountant); therefore, his suggestion that the MUC invest $200 million of its own money, without waiting further for the support of higher governments, suddenly seemed reasonable. He further argued that buying up land could be seen as an investment and that these newly acquired green spaces would become assets; as noted by Simard (2013), “because the proposal came from him personally, and not from a MCM councilor, it convinced everyone around the table”. Seizing what he felt was a fragile consensus, Simard asked Divay to draft an “action strategy” for protecting the island’s natural spaces that clearly laid out the issues and justified the $200 million commitment from the MUC. This document, which also included the two satellite photographs and was released on December 5th, turned out to be crucially important in forging consensus among the MUC members – the same way the maps showing the gradual filling of the San Francisco Bay helped raise awareness of that issue in a different time and place.

It turns out that only a portion of the money borrowed in 1989 was spent, as the suburban mayors, led by Town Mount-Royal Mayor Vera Danyluk, successfully

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133 The original proposal, rejected by the suburban mayors, had called for a $500 million investment in the regional park system, most of which was to come from the provincial and federal governments.
forced a moratorium on the acquisition of new natural sites on October 21, 1992\textsuperscript{134}. However, in the two years that the MUC’s green space acquisition program lasted, the MUC invested over $100 millions, resulting in the addition of more than 600 hectares (or about 1500 acres) of green space – virtually all of which was slated for development – to the MUC’s regional park system. Divay describes the two years of the program in these terms:

As soon as the acquisition of green space started up again and that citizens could see the results, everyone was happy. Even those who had opposed the program saw that it was having a positive effect on people’s perceptions of the MUC. It was a real moment of grace [...] But when the Government of Quebec started making cuts to transit funding, everyone got scared and the green space file was put aside (2013).

Arguably, the MUC acquisition program’s unraveling and ending was due primarily to exogenous forces – the start of an economic recession, the government’s funding cuts, etc. However, as expressed by several of the people I interviewed, the fact that the acquisition program was strongly identified with a small number of MCM councilors may have rendered it vulnerable. Additionally, the Island of Montreal’s regional park system did not exist for long enough under the MUC to become a marker of regional identity. Indeed, the very expression “regional park” has now been dropped from the official name of the network, to be replaced by “large park” (as in the Large parks network or “Réseau des grands parcs” in French) – masking the fact that a regional effort was necessary to create them in the first place.

This concise history of the Island of Montreal’s regional park system illustrates vividly the way in which higher governmental action can both enable regional collaboration (e.g., by giving regional agencies the authority and discretion to act in specific areas), but also stifle or derail it (e.g., by forcing regional agencies to absorb budgetary cuts, thereby pitting local interests against one another). The

\textsuperscript{134} The main reason cited in the minutes of the October 21\textsuperscript{st} MUC council meeting is the “economic conjuncture”; however, closer observers have mentioned the importance of the growing suburban anti-tax movement, which apparently had considerable influence on the final outcome of the MUC’s Green Space program.
history of the protection of the Mille-Île river, in the next section, again shows the key role that higher governments can play as “enablers” of regional collaboration, but also the possible deleterious effects of forceful “top-down” governmental initiative.

4.3.2 Collaboration from the grassroots up: creating the Mille-Îles River Park

The exceptional fate of an unexceptional river

The Mille-Île river stems from Deux-Montagne Lake, which is itself the endpoint of the Ottawa River, and it flows northward and eastward along the northern bank of Jesus Island (Île-Jésus) for about 42 kilometers, separating it from the mainland north of the Montreal archipelago (colloquially known as the North Shore). The river itself is quite shallow, dotted with 101 small islands, bordered by a number of wetlands and marshes and harboring no fewer than 250 bird species, 60 fish species, 40 mammal species and 25 amphibian and reptile species. It was, and to this day remains, a place teeming with life.

What distinguishes the Mille-Île river from most others, however, is not its beauty or biodiversity, but its location. It runs between the region’s first and second ring of suburbs, with approximately 800,000 living within 10 kilometers of its banks on both sides, in eight different municipalities. More importantly, it is the fact that a significant portion of it is included in the Mille-Île River Park (“Parc de la rivière des Mille-Îles”, hereafter referred to as MIRP), a conservation area that straddles the river and covers approximately 300 hectares (or about 741 acres) of natural habitat\(^\text{135}\) (most of it off-land).

The park itself is rather unexceptional as far as the surface area of land protected (about 26 hectares or 64 acres) and the connectivity of these areas are concerned. What is particularly interesting about it – and the reason it is the object of a short case study in this research – is *the way it was created*, which stands in sharp contrast to the way the MUC’s regional park system was established only a

\(^{135}\) Approximately 300 ha (about 741 acres) have received an official “conservation status”, but a total of approximately 1230 ha (about 3039 acres) have been protected in one way or another.
few years prior. It provides, so to speak, an interesting contrast (and, possibly, counterfactual) to the government-initiated conservation of natural sites on the Island of Montreal. As mentioned above, it also helps illustrate the way governmental initiative both fosters and discourages collaborative regional (or inter-local) initiatives.

**Figure 4.6 – Plan of the Mille-Îles River Park and of summer recreation opportunities in and around the park (permanently protected areas are in green)**

![Plan of the Mille-Îles River Park](image)


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136 All that said, a short disclaimer is in order: the narrative I have reconstructed below is not meant to be exhaustive and cannot do justice to the rich story that is the creation of the Mille-Île River Park. It is meant, rather, to highlight the role of inter-local and inter-municipal collaboration in its establishment.
1985-1990: out of the woods and into the weeds

The MIRP, unlike any other regional (or sub-regional) initiative in the Greater Montreal, actually grew from the grassroots up. It was a project of Éco-Nature, an environmental non-governmental organization that grew out of another organization called Association for the conservation, planning and development of the outdoors in Laval ("Association pour la conservation et l’aménagement plein air Laval", hereafter referred to as ACAPAL) in 1985. The ACAPAL had received, in the early 80s, a grant to develop a regional open space and recreation plan for Laval (which occupies the entirety of Île-Jésus), but there soon appeared to be two distinct groups within the ACAPAL: those interested in preserving woodlands, and those interested in protection and environmental education writ large. Jean Lauzon and Michel Aubé were in the latter category, and decided to form an organization distinct from the ACAPAL that would be dedicated precisely to the larger mission. In December of 1985, Éco-Nature was born.

In Lauzon’s own account (2013), the organization started out as a loose collection of environmental education projects, such as an eco-museum and a puppet show for children in parks and schools. In 1987, Lauzon and Aubé discovered the Mille-Île river by chance (through one of their environmental education activities) and had the idea of starting a day camp coupled with a canoe rental service to help bring people back to the river. Indeed, the Mille-Île river used to be a place where vacationers from all over the region came during the summer, but as the river became more and more polluted, the flow of vacationers stopped and nature eventually reclaimed a number of sites along its banks. By the mid-1980s, Lauzon recalls (2013), the river smelled like “an open sewer” and had been all but abandoned as a site of recreation; however, given its gradual re-naturalization, it was also a marvelous place from the point of view of two environmental educators in search of urban nature.

Jobless and without access to governmental aid programs, the two young men approached the City of Laval’s mayor, Ulysse Lefebvre, to ask for a small
subsidy allowing them to organize a day camp and rent out canoes and kayaks, all to the benefit of Laval residents. Coincidentally, Lauzon had studied in university with Lefebvre’s son, Daniel Lefebvre, and it was he who made it possible for Lauzon and Aubé to meet with his father, the city’s mayor (who was notoriously pro-development and allegedly had little or no sympathy for environmentalists). Mayor Lefebvre agreed to give Eco-Nature a small amount of seed and core funding, which allowed it to start its operations. The activities they organized on the river attracted the attention of local residents, schools and nature-lovers, and soon their services were in high demand. In the words of Lauzon (2013), “The movement that we started became unstoppable [...] and we were able to re-create the kind of interaction between people and nature that used to exist here” (translation from French author). By the late 1990s, a mere decade later, the park was attracting more than 100 000 people per year.

The significance of this first “chapter” of the MIRP story is that Éco-Nature was able to continue its conservation efforts for one reason only and that is: the vast popularity of its recreation activities. Indeed, the mayor who succeeded Ulysse Lefebvre, Gilles Vaillancourt, was notoriously pro-development (and therefore opposed to environmental conservation) and authoritative in his management style (meaning he generally did not consult the public unless obliged to by law). Yet, try hard as he may have, he was never able to close down Éco-Nature because its recreation program was one of the most popular in Laval. Lauzon and Aubé, like Catherine K. Kerr, Sylvia Oljemark and others before them, had succeeded in striking the public’s imagination.

1990-1996: from recreation to conservation

Soon after their project began, Lauzon and Aubé became increasingly interested in conserving the remaining natural spaces in and along the river, as Eco-Nature’s activities depended upon continued access to privately owned islands and wetlands along its banks. They also realized that real estate development presented a real threat that nature’s remnants would disappear – and with it Eco-Nature’s raison d’être.
The first concrete action taken by Êco-Nature was to hire Pierre Valiquette, a conservationist who had worked with the federal and provincial governments, to lobby their respective ministries of the environment so that the Mille-Île River could be included in the 1988 *St. Lawrence Action Plan*, which “was designed to address the need for the conservation and protection of the St. Lawrence River ecosystem” (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2013) and came with funds attached. Êco-Nature was successful in its lobbying efforts and the Mille-Île River was officially included in the plan a few months later.

In 1991, Êco-Nature officially adopted the name “Mille-Île River Park” to designate its conservation program and incorporated a new legal entity so as to facilitate its conservation efforts: the *Mille-Île River Park Protection Fund* (“Fonds de protection du Parc de la Rivière-des-Mille-Îles”), which is essentially a land trust. That same year, the organization formed an official partnership with the City of Rosemère, a municipality located on the other side of the river; in a sense, this marked Êco-Nature’s transition from a local environmental organization to a regional player. Between 1991 and 1994, the organization’s Protection Fund amassed enough money (from both private donors and higher governments) to be able to make its first acquisition. During that period, Êco-Nature also released its first development plan, strategic plan and community stewardship program, establishing itself as the entity responsible for the conservation and restoration of the Mille-Île River (Valiquette, 2013).

In an unexpected turn of events, the mayors of the municipalities abutting the river, led by Mayor Élie Fallu of the City of Ste-Thérèse, formed an organization in 1996 called the *Mille-Île River Enhancement Corporation* (“Corporation de mise en valeur de la rivière des Mille-Îles”, hereafter referred to as the Enhancement Corporation) whose membership was made up strictly of local elected officials and whose mission was more or less the same as that of the Mille-Île River Park. According to all of the people I interviewed, all of whom were directly involved in the events described, the creation of the Enhancement Corporation was an overt attempt by suburban mayors to “assert control” over conservation activities on the Mille-Île River – and over the funds coming from higher governments that Êco-
Nature had, so far, been able to access directly (Bédard, 2013; Richer, 2013; Valiquette, 2013; Lauzon, 2013).

Valiquette (2013) recalls that Éco-Nature had actually received, a few months prior, assurances from a prominent cabinet member of the provincial government that a fund for the acquisition of green space in the Greater Montreal region would be set up and be accessible to organizations like Éco-Nature. However, when the program was announced, it was addressed to municipalities only. According to most observers, Mayor Fallu most likely had something to do with it: he was of the same political family as the provincial government of the day, had personal connections with several members of cabinet and was staunchly opposed to having a non-governmental organization meddling in what he perceived to be a sacrosanct municipal prerogative: land-use. It is also important to remember that this was the beginning of the era of municipal reforms in Quebec; consequently, there was political will in Quebec’s government to reassert and strengthen the role of municipalities.

Whatever motivated the government’s change of attitude toward Éco-Nature, this change would have long-lasting impacts on Éco-Nature’s capacity to fulfill its conservation mission; indeed, subsequent governmental programs have also been targeted strictly at municipalities, effectively barring non-governmental conservation organizations from accessing conservation funds. Clearly, the provincial government in this instance listened only to the voice of local elected leaders and ignored the voices of those who had actually done the work. Also importantly, there was no public debate about this policy and its implications as the decision was taken by cabinet, behind closed doors.

Inspecting the results of grassroots vs. inter-municipal conservation efforts

The creation of the inter-local Enhancement Corporation had a number of positive consequences: first, it effectively created a regional forum where Éco-Nature representatives could access and have contact with local elected officials from all eight municipalities abutting the river; second, it forced Éco-Nature to diversify its conservation strategy, which led to its successful campaign in 1998 for
the creation a Wildlife Refuge ("Refuge faunique") comprised of 10 islands totaling approximately 26,2 hectares (or about 65 acres); last but not least, it was instrumental in getting a firm commitment from the provincial government to inject money into conservation (Richer, 2013).

However, while Lauzon and Valiquette today both applaud the fact that the provincial government has committed important sums of money over the last 15 years to protect and restore what is left of nature in the Greater Montreal region, they also deplore the fact that the Enhancement Corporation, and subsequently the Montreal Metropolitan Community (now responsible for allocating the government’s conservation funds), have completely delegated the responsibility to conserve to individual municipalities without regard to Éco-Nature's long-range conservation planning efforts. Indeed, despite the fact that Éco-Nature had produced a master plan ("plan directeur") for the park identifying priority conservation areas based on its biodiversity inventory (which was largely funded by government programs) and expertise built-up over a decade, neither the Enhancement Corporation nor the Metropolitan Community has made any use of the plan. As a result, conservation projects undertaken by municipalities over the last 15 years have generally been disconnected from the previous conservation efforts and have placed much more emphasis on beautification or increased access than on conservation. As for the Enhancement Corporation, it more or less stopped all its activities once government funding started to be channeled through the MMC, which suggests that the Corporation was more of a vehicle for extracting funds than a true collaborative forum.

In sum, the government’s decision to channel funds directly to municipalities through the MCC ironically undid much of the collaborative work that Éco-Nature had undertaken with the municipalities abutting the river. In this case – as in the case of the MUC’s disbandment – it is the forcefulness of higher governmental action and politicians’ lack of consideration for the work already done that had deleterious effects on regional collaboration.
4.3.3 1991-2001: collaboration in the midst of reform

The last decade of the MUC was filled with turmoil – both because of external factors, such as the recession of the early 1990s and the political upheaval surrounding the PQ’s municipal reform, and because of internal dissension among members of the MUC – as well as among members of the SMC. As described by Cousineau (1998), the equilibrium reached between 1986 and 1990, during the MCM’s first term, begins to falter in 1991; in a matter of months, the existence of the Montreal Arts Council was called into question, the regional parks’ acquisition plan was slowed down and then stopped and even the financing of public transit by the MUC – about which there was consensus a few years earlier – came under the close scrutiny of suburban mayors as the MUC faced government funding cuts.

Arguably, the first reason there started to be a rift between the MUC’s two caucuses was the pressure generated by the anti-tax movement of early 1990s; these pressures have certainly influenced local elected officials’ view of the MUC – which many of them saw as being ultimately responsible for the Island’s comparatively higher level of real estate taxation (Danyluk, 1998). In Cousineau’s (1998) and Bossé’s (2013) accounts, the other reason why things started to fall apart at the MUC was the revival by mayoral candidate (and soon-to-be-mayor) Pierre Bourque of the “one island, one city” (“Une île, une ville”) project. In Cousineau’s own words, “the old demons of the suburban mayor’s conference came back to haunt their ancient abode” (Cousineau, 1998, p. 28, translation from French by author) when the word annexation was pronounced.

Yet, despite the inability of local elected officials in the MUC to speak clearly and loudly with one voice and the (near) absence of voluntarism on their part during this period, the MUC as an organization continued to play a regional

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137 Cousineau (1998) and other close observers (Hamelin, 2013) have noted the fact that, starting in the early 1990s, dissension started to appear between the suburban representatives on the MUC’s EC and the SMC at large. This dissension may or may not be due to the MUC’s mode of functioning, however; it may be due, instead, to the SMC’s internal mode of functioning (where each mayor had one vote and where, consequently, the residents of populous suburbs were underrepresented). It may also have resulted from political dissension in reaction to Quebec’s municipal reform or related to Quebec’s political issue of the day, that is, Quebec separation.
convening role and served as the launch pad for other important collaborative regional initiatives – two of which have since been made permanent and have consequently survived the merger-dememerger upheaval and metropolitan reforms of the early 2000s, even though the MUC itself has not.

In what follows, I trace the unraveling of the MUC and the creation of two other agencies, the IMRDC and MI. Once again, this narrative not meant to be comprehensive and should not be interpreted as a history of either one of these organizations. I am simply following, in each case, a particular thread that connects the MUC to these organizations, both of which aim to promote regional collaboration. What is significant here is not so much that the creation of these organizations was collaborative (which it was, to some degree); rather, it is the fact that MUC officials were able to plant the seed of collaboration in these organizations even though the MUC's own functioning was no longer collaborative.

Inter-municipal cooperation gives way to inter-governmental collaboration

The early 1990s: a difficult context for regional collaboration

A few months after the MUC - under the influence of Mayor Danyluk – imposed a moratorium on new green space acquisitions, two things happened which set MUC on the particular course that it took – and that arguably led to its demise\(^\text{138}\). The first was the creation, in April of 1992, of the Task Force on Greater Montreal (Groupe de travail sur Montréal et sa région, hereafter referred to as the TFGM), whose mandate was to “offer a precise diagnosis of the problems pertaining to territorial organization in the light of Greater Montréal’s evolution and its particularity in the past 10 years” (TFGM, 1993). This task force, which was established by the province’s most senior – and perhaps most respected – politician,

\(^{138}\) It is important to remember that, by the early 1990s, the MUC was assuming a number of important functions on the Island that individual municipalities, including Montreal, no longer had to assume directly. These include property assessment, the control of air quality, the treatment of water, public transit, policing, regional economic development (limited to Island of Montreal) and the funding of cultural events. Consequently, the MUC was no longer perceived as an instrument of the City of Montreal, as during the 1970s; it had acquired a kind of legitimacy in the public’s eye, despite its obvious shortcomings (Bossé, 2013).
Claude Ryan (then Minister of Municipal Affairs), and led by a neutral and credible figure, Claude Pichette (former Principal of the University of Quebec in Montreal), was to provoke many reactions among the region’s local elected officials and initiate a period of uncertainty as to the future of the MUC (Bossé, 2013; Divay, 2013; Gamache, 2013).

According to Simard (1998), the creation of the task force had a direct impact on the suburban mayors’ attitude toward the MUC. He argues that the Suburban Mayors’ Conference (SMC) – which was firmly established by the early 1990s as the political counterweight to the City of Montreal – attempted to “reduce the MUC to the level of an inter-municipal service-sharing organization” (p. 50), leaving all political (and therefore planning) decisions to the Mayor of Montreal and his/her counterpart at the SMC. Although there is some disagreement as to whether the MUC “functioned well” during this period\textsuperscript{139}, all observers tend to agree that the climate between Montreal city councilors and suburban mayors was tense and that there was no voluntary regional collaboration to speak of that involved the City of Montreal and its suburbs.

\textit{State-funded regional collaboration and the creation of the IMRDC}

Despite the MUC’s apparent inability to move forward in the midst of municipal reform, the fact remained that it was the only legitimate “regional convener” – and the only governmental organization in the Greater Montreal with a regional view (albeit limited to the Island of Montreal). In 1992, when the Government of Quebec abolished the province’s central economic planning and development agency (“Office de planification et de développement du Québec” in French), in view of “regionalizing” the province’s economic development functions, it opted to redistribute the funds that were managed by the agency to the province’s various \textit{regional development councils} (“conseils régionaux de développement” in French).

\textsuperscript{139} Among the people I interviewed, a few (e.g., Georges Bossé, who was mayor of Verdun and became President of the SMC) said that the MUC worked well as service-sharing organization, while others (e.g., Divay and Trudeau, who both worked in the MUC’s Planning Department) emphasize the organization’s incapability to come to any sort of consensus about the revised regional plan, which was, in the end, never adopted.
French). However, given that Montreal did not have such a regional development agency at the time, the government turned to the Mayor of Montreal, Jean Doré, to ask him to create one that would cover the territory of Montreal’s administrative region (i.e., the Island of Montreal) so that Montreal could receive its share of the funds. Mayor Doré, naturally, turned to the MUC to undertake this task – it being the only regional organization on the Island with the capacity and legitimacy to set up another regional agency covering the same territory.

André Chabot, who was hired by the MUC to work on establishing Montreal’s regional development council, recalls (in his 2013 interview) that Mayor Doré was in a difficult situation. On the one hand, he of course wanted the money, as Montreal’s economy was in shambles after the recession and the city desperately needed a “boost”. On the other hand, the funds came with a string attached: the Island of Montreal would have to have its own regional development agency in order to receive the funds. Doré, who had presented a brief to Quebec’s National Assembly in June 1991 making the case that “no public institution seemed to be able to look at Montreal’s situation from a regional [by which he meant metropolitan] perspective” (TFGM, 1993, p. 1) was now asked to participate in the creation of a yet another sub-metropolitan organization. He hesitated, but not for long: he asked his colleagues at the MUC to work with him on establishing Montreal’s regional development agency, and a few months later, in 1993, the Island of Montreal’s Regional Development Council (“Conseil régional de développement de l’île de Montréal” in French, hereafter known as the IMRDC) was created.140

As noted by Gamache and Chabot (2013), it is of some significance that the “starting-up” of the IMRDC within the MUC posed no difficulty, despite the fact that the MUC was itself mired in political gridlock and more or less dysfunctional at the time. In other words, the MUC would have been incapable of taking on the responsibilities of this new agency (i.e., making grants to projects of regional significance), but it was able to serve as its launch pad. In the words of Gamache (2013), who became the IMRDC’s first Executive Director a few months later: “The

140 Note that the IMRDC was formally recognized in the summer of 1994.
MUC was the facilitator that made it possible for the IMRDC to come together; we needed a neutral connector to make it happen, an entity larger than the City of Montreal and the MUC played that role”.

The IMRDC rapidly became the true (and only) “regional forum” on the Island of Montreal – in part because the MUC was no longer seen as a forum for regional dialogue; in part because the IMRDC actually had money that it could use as seed funding for economic and social development projects; and in part because its governing board included – and still includes – a diversity of stakeholders. The impact of the IMRDC on economic development would be difficult to measure, as it has funded numerous small projects over the years; however, one of its most obvious and important impacts has been to allow for – and sometimes force – various organizations, often from different parts of the Island of Montreal but working in the same field (e.g., the tourism or cultural sectors), to meet, identify their common interests, collaborate on a given project and even join forces (as opposed to duplicating their efforts). As explained by Gamache (2013), this kind of regional brokering is only possible because the IMRDC is endowed with a recurrent regional development fund. This fund, which was only about $3,000,000 a year in the beginning and has increase somewhat since, gives the IMRDC the power to convene – and member organizations (whether governmental or non-governmental) the incentive to partake in the collaborative regional process brokered by the multi-stakeholder council.

141 The original composition of the board was: three members from the Montreal City Council, three members named by the SMC, two members named by the Montreal Metropolitan Board of Trade, two members named respectively by the CSN and the FTQ (Quebec’s two most important unions), one representative from the community sector, the chair of the board of directors of the regional health agency and the chair of the Montreal Island School Council.

142 One notable case of different organizations with the same basic mission and working in the same sector that came together as result of the IMRDC’s brokering was the fusion of the Mouvement pour les arts et les lettres and Culture Montréal which became one organization thanks to the financial support and mediation of the council. The unified organization, Culture Montréal, has since contributed significantly to the positioning of Montreal as Canada’s cultural metropolis.
From inter-municipal cooperation to inter-governmental collaboration: the launching of Montréal International

Montreal’s slow but steady relative decline starting in the late 1960s prompted a number of governmental actors at different levels to study the Greater Montreal’s economic woes and municipal fragmentation and propose any number of grand plans (such as Drapeau’s “Horizon 2000” megalomaniac vision of Montreal’s future), governmental reforms (from “one island, one city” to the creation of an elected regional government) and economic development strategies (from building new highways through the city to concentrating growth in the city’s urbanized core). As we have seen, most of these plans were never acted upon and are now considered to be interesting cultural artifacts, fit to be displayed in museums, rather than serious policy proposals to be studied and learnt from143.

The 1986 report produced by the federal Interministerial Committee on the Development of the Montreal Region (Comité interministériel sur le développement de la Région de Montréal), hereafter referred to as the Picard report, is clearly an exception to this rule. Indeed, several of the Picard report’s recommendations were acted upon, and there is one in particular, calling for the strengthening of Montreal’s “international vocation”, that provoked direct governmental and non-governmental action and generated, in turn, both vertical and horizontal inter-governmental collaboration (i.e., between levels of government as well as between municipalities). The direct results of the Picard report were manifold: first, the City of Montreal organized an ideas’ contest in 1989 for the “Cité internationale” and the city’s efforts eventually led to the realization of the Quartier international de Montréal project (Demers, 2005)144; second, the Government of Quebec made it easier for non-

143 The TFGM’s report mentioned earlier, which is usually referred to as the Pichette report, has certainly had an impact insofar as it established the fact that the status quo was detrimental to Montreal’s development and could no longer be tolerated; that said, only a few of its recommendations were actually followed and the report’s central proposition of creating an elected regional government is now looked upon as having been utopian.

144 The Quartier international project was initiated in 1999 by the Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec, Quebec’s public pension fund manager, and the three levels of government; it main goal was to revitalize the public domain in the district where international organizations were located (by covering the trench highway going through this area and creating new public spaces, among other
governmental organizations to establish themselves in the province by simplifying administrative procedures; third, the federal government, through its Federal Bureau of Regional Development – Quebec, put up some money in the early 1990s for starting up the Montreal International Conference Center Society ("Société du centre de conferences internationales de Montréal", hereafter referred to as the MICCS), whose original mandate was to create a conference center in Montreal that could host international, multi-lateral events such as UN, OECD or NATO conferences.

In 1991, the Federal Bureau of Regional Development hired a high-ranking bureaucrat called Guy Coulombe to lead the agency. Coulombe was a skillful bureaucrat who had already occupied the posts of Secretary for the Government of Quebec’s Treasury Council and Executive Committee (the highest bureaucratic posts in Quebec’s governmental apparatus) and that of CEO for Hydro-Quebec. He also had a reputation for working across party lines, which was crucially important in political climate of the early 1990s in Quebec. According to Robert Smith (2013), who was lent by the City of Montreal’s International Affairs Bureau to help start-up the MICCS, Coulombe quickly realized that the MICCS’s original mandate could not be fulfilled, for both financial and other reasons. However, seeing as there was political will at all three levels of government, Coulombe seized the opportunity of having all three governments at the table and proposed to give MICCS a new core mission: that of attracting international organizations to Montreal (and working to retain those already there). In Smith’s (2013) account, Coulombe had no difficulty convincing all three government representatives as he had already formulated a strategy ready to be implemented – and was held in very high esteem both by bureaucrats and politicians alike.

Over the next two or three years, the MICCS concentrated on attracting international organization to Montreal and did so quite successfully with only

interventions) so as to attract new development, create “prestigious addresses” and consolidate the district’s international function. Notably, the project won more than 30 prizes nationally and internationally, including the Project Management Institute’s Project of the Year award in 2005.
handful of employees. In the mid-1990s, the representatives of a number of regional organizations – including the MUC and the Montreal Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce (MMCC) – started to speak publicly of the necessity to give the mandate of attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) in the metropolitan region to one agency (as opposed to 5 or 6 representing the Island of Montreal, Laval, Longueuil and other individual municipalities). Although the MICCS was an obvious candidate for this, it did not have the financial resources or the personnel to take on such an important role.

Pierre Bourque, who was then mayor of Montreal, and others floated the idea that the MUC’s Office for economic expansion (“Office d’expansion économique”, hereafter referred to as the OEE) be merged with the MICCS, and that the organization resulting from this merger take on the role of attracting direct foreign investment for the entire metropolitan region (given the financial participation of suburban municipalities outside of the MUC). In an interesting twist of fate, the MUC’s suburban mayors initially opposed the move, arguing that the MICCS should concentrate on attracting foreign direct investment to the Island of Montreal (Bossé, 2013) and forget about the larger region. There was a temporary political gridlock, but Guy Coulombe was able to convince all parties – including the Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec – that it was in the interest of Montreal and its suburbs to join forces with off-island municipalities such as Laval and Longueuil. Following the meeting between federal ministers Paul Martin and Martin Cauchon and Quebec’s minister responsible for the Greater Montreal, Serge Ménard, on May 21st 1996 (the first meeting of this sort since the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty), an announcement was made and Montreal International (MI)

145 About half of Montreal 70 odd international organizations have received help from the MICCS or MI since 1993. The exact number of organizations that came to Montreal under Guy Coulombe’s tenure is not known, but the initial success of the MICCS is widely recognized by those who gravitated around Montreal’s regional institutions in the mid 1990s (Chabot, 2013; Gamache, 2013; Simard, 2013), including by some of its original detractors (Bossé, 2013).

146 It is important to mention that the creation of Montréal International was in large part made possible by the federal government’s and the Government of Quebec’s financial participation. Indeed, as described by Maltais (2002), the federal government’s willingness to increase its presence after the 1995 referendum, as evidenced by its “Federal Action Strategy for the Greater Montreal”, and Quebec Premier Bouchard’s commitment to working closely with the federal government, were key factors in the formation of MI.
was born out of the merger of the MICCS and the MUC’s own economic development agency, the OEE.

Although the MUC played a relatively small role in the creation of the MI, its participation was nevertheless crucial. Indeed, though the MUC could not have created an agency representing the larger region on its own (as it lacked both the clout and the legitimacy to do so), it could have easily preempted its creation. According to Smith (2013), MI was created at a time of political dissension and its creation was in part made possible because of that dissension; indeed, the region’s political actors were looking for a project that could bring together former political as a way to move beyond the Quebec separation question, and the creation of MI provided them with precisely that kind of an opportunity.\footnote{Robert Smith (2013) recalls that there was much discussion around the organization's logo, which – out of common agreement between the federal and provincial parties – was to symbolize the collaboration between the two levels of government – hence the blue (for Quebec) and red (for Canada) arch that connects the words "Montréal" and "International".}

Since the creation of MI, the organization has attracted more than $9,4 G of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the Greater Montreal, as well as 560 foreign companies and about 8,000 so-called “strategic workers”. It was also directly involved in the creation of two industrial clusters (around the life sciences and video game industries) and has supported the development of five others, thus contributing to the creation of several thousand jobs (MI, 2012). As for the MUC, it was disbanded in 2001, in the midst of the Parti québécois’s municipal reform, which saw the creation of a new regional agency covering the entire metropolitan region and charged with adopting a metropolitan land-use and development plan, the MMC. The MUC is nowadays seldom mentioned, referred to or publicly discussed – despite having cleaned our air and our water, protected more than 2000 hectares (or about 4942 acres) of natural and open space on the Island of Montreal and served as the launch pad for the region’s two most important economic development agencies.
Table 4.2 - Chronology of recent events in the Greater Montreal's history of regional collaboration

1935 – Creation of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission ("Commission métropolitaine de Montréal") and concomitant establishment of a metropolitan revenue-sharing scheme;

1939 – Abolition of the Commission’s planning unit;

1941 – Ending of the region’s revenue-sharing program;

1942 – Creation of the Greater Montreal Economic Council ("Conseil économique du Grand Montréal");

1969 – City of Montreal Police general strike during 8 hours, causing chaos and damage throughout the city;

1970 – Creation of the Montreal Urban Community in direct response to the policy strike and the City of Montreal’s financial troubles;

1975 – Creation of the Suburban Mayors’ Conference (SMC) to replace the discredited Inter-municipal Coordinating Committee (ICC);

1977 – Publication of Quebec’s Green Paper on Recreation ("Livre vert sur les loisirs qu’Québec"), which announced the Government’s intention to invest in open space protection; backlash in Saraguay over the City of Montreal’s plan to develop the woods surrounding the old village, beginning of Montreal’s grassroots open space protection movement;

1978 – Election of the MUC’s first chair coming from the suburbs, instatement of a tacit rule according to which the MUC’s chairmanship will alternate between the City of Montreal and the SMC; granting of $10,540,000 by the Government of Quebec to the MUC for the creation of a regional park system;

1979 – Reclaiming by the MUC of the joint power, provided in the bill that created it, to create regional parks; borrowing of $35,000,000 by the MUC to allow for the creation of a “land bank”;

1982 – Enactment of Bill 46, instating a "double majority" procedure in the functioning of the MUC’s executive committee;

1986 – Election of the MCM at the City of Montreal, Hubert Simard becomes President of the MUC’s Planning Commission; publication of the Picard report recommending that Montreal strengthen its international function;

1987 – Holding of public hearings on the future of MUC’s regional park system, at the initiative of Hubert Simard; as a result of the hearings, a large number of citizen groups become mobilized around the issue of open space protection on the Island of Montreal;

1989 – Creation of the Green Coalition; passage of a $200,000,000 borrowing bylaw by the MUC to consolidate the regional park system after an intense lobbying campaign by citizen and environmental groups;

1991 – Adoption by the MUC of a moratorium on new green space acquisitions; testimony by Mayor Jean Doré in front of Quebec’s National Assembly of the need for a public entity capable of adopting a
regional view in the Montreal metropolitan region; creation of the Montreal International Conference Center Society ("Société du centre de conférences internationales de Montréal" or MICCS);

1993 – Creation of the Greater Montreal Task Force, in part as a response to Jean Doré’s testimony; creation by the MUC of the Island of Montreal’s Regional Development Council (“Conseil régional de développement de l’Île de Montréal”) after funding for sub-regional development became available;

1995 – Quebec referendum on sovereignty;

1996 – Creation of Montreal International with the participation of all four levels (federal, provincial, regional, local), following the merger of the MICCS and the MUC’s Economic Expansion Office (“Office d’expansion économique”);

2000 – Creation of the Montreal Metropolitan Community (MMC) and disbandment of the Montreal Urban Community (MUC).
Figure 4.7 – Diagrammatic representation of the Greater Montreal’s history of regional collaboration (1979-1996)
(the left-to-right order is more or less chronological – refer to the list of abbreviations for complete names)

Legend:

Governmental or non-governmental entity
Regional initiative involving several distinct entities
Relation of influence, continuity and/or causation
(width of arrow = strength of relation)
4.4 Conclusion: of facilitators, public policy entrepreneurs and the tide of ideas

A region, someone has wryly observed, is an area safely larger than the last one to whose problems we found no solution
- Jane Jacobs, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*

I have followed, in the foregoing pages, the long, sinuous and sometimes convoluted process of regional collaboration since the 1960s in the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal region. I have not written a history of regional collaboration for either of the two regions, and so I have no doubt left out some important characters and important events. However, I have been able to trace collaboration from cradle to cradle in both these complex regions: I first described ABAG’s reactionary beginnings in the early 1960s, through its metamorphosis into a service-sharing agency over two decades starting in the early 1980s and its participation in the BAASC in 1997, which itself eventually contributed to the Association’s own transformation (as well as that of the other regional agencies) by making inter-agency collaboration inescapable. I then turned to the Greater Montreal region with the Government of Quebec’s creation of the MUC in 1970, followed its members’ voluntary collaborative effort to safeguard the Island of Montreal’s last remaining natural sites throughout the 1980s, described the formation of the Green Coalition in 1989 in reaction to the MUC’s inability to deliver on its promises as well as that of the Mille-Île River Park, and finally recounted the creation of in the mid-1990s of the IMRDC and Montreal International.

I offer, in the paragraphs below, a few observations and preliminary conclusions based on the historical data presented above. As explained in the introduction to this chapter, I have no pretense to being a historian and my aim in examining the different collaborative moments I have identified was not to shed new light on the official histories of ABAG or the MUC (although I may have done so unintentionally). Rather, I have tried to underscore the role played by three distinct (but not necessarily independent or orthogonal) forces in “making regional collaboration work”, namely: the initiative of higher governments, the civic capital
shared by individuals involved in a given collaborative regional initiative and finally the awareness of region in a given context at a given time.

Before describing the influence of each of the three moderating forces I have identified above on regional collaboration and its effects, I briefly review the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 2 briefly and take up, in turn, the questions posed at the end of the last chapter.

Review of hypotheses and further questions

The first striking result that comes out of the careful tracing of regional collaboration in the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal region is the confirmation of our first hypothesis, which is that collaboration begets collaboration. Indeed, whether in the cases of the MUC and the MIRP in the Greater Montreal, or those of BV2020 and BAASC in the San Francisco Bay Area, there is unequivocal evidence that the relations formed in one context have facilitated and sometimes even provoked other forms of collaboration. However, it does not appear that any ostensibly collaborative structure will generate more collaboration; the Bay Area’s JAQPC, for instance, existed for nearly 20 years before the four regional agencies seriously undertook to work together (at the behest of Sunne McPeak, first, and because of the initiative of State Senator Mark DeSaulnier, second). As Innes and Booher (2010) would have easily predicted, it is not so much that collaborative institutions by themselves generate other forms of collaboration, but that genuine, voluntary, open and sustained collaboration generates more of the same. In other words, process matters.

The second result, which is much less striking but still significant, is that the effects of regional collaboration are actually diffuse and often difficult to pinpoint. Collaborative regional initiatives often lead to other initiatives (e.g., the Alliance for Sustainable Development, which led to the Community Capital Investment Initiative) some of which lead to the enactment of new rules, some of which lead to direct investments (e.g., the Community Capital Investment Initiative, which led to the creation of the Bay Area Council’s Family of Funds), many of which simply fizzle
out after some time (e.g., the Bay Vision Action Coalition). Hence, it is difficult to say whether one type of regional collaboration is more effective; all types seem to produce concrete results (however modest) if and when deployed under the right conditions. In support of that claim, note that the only spinoff of the BAASC that yielded short-term concrete results was a bottom-up collaboration initiative aiming to channel investment in underprivileged communities while improving the lives of residents (i.e., the CCII). Contrary to what I hypothesized, then, bottom-up collaboration can have an impact on socio-economic integration, when certain conditions are met (in this case, strong leadership from both the business community and equity groups).

Another problem with differentiating one type of collaboration from another is that collaborative institutions tend to evolve with time; consequently, what was initially a bottom-up collaborative effort (e.g., ABAG) might get into the business of service-sharing and become (by virtue of its activities) more akin to a special-purpose government. Likewise, a state-mandated collaborative process carried out by a voluntary collaborative forum might become an official “function” of that institution (e.g., the RHNA process and ABAG). Finally, a limited-purpose agency might be created by the state to foster regional collaboration in a specific area (e.g., the BAAQMD and air quality). That is not to say that the distinction among the three types of collaboration I have identified is meaningless; what it means, instead, is that regional collaboration is a dynamic process and that it is only possible, when studying a specific collaborative process, to identify the results of the process as a whole (as opposed to identifying the results of each of its phases).

A finding of this research that was not anticipated is the striking observation that the initiation, sustainability and effectiveness of regional collaboration very much seem to depend on the nature of the particular regional issue at hand. Hence, it is not so much that environmental regional issues are more likely to be tackled effectively through regional collaboration (although, one might observe, the most remarkable “collaborative successes” described above are in that field); rather, it seems to be the case that regional problems that are more easily communicable and imageable tend to attract more public, and therefore political, attention. The next
subsection, which deals with the influence of regional awareness of the effectiveness of collaboration, expands on this idea.

Finally, the transnational (U.S.-Canada) comparative approach did yield some interesting insights and raise questions that could be addressed in future comparative research involving U.S. and Canadian metropolitan regions. First, the hypothesis that higher governmental intervention promoting regional collaboration may be more feasible but less effective in Canada is only partially supported by the data presented in this chapter. On the one hand, the regional governmental structures imposed by Quebec’s provincial government in the Greater Montreal have not been very successful as far as facilitating regional cooperation is concerned, and one might argue they have in fact made voluntary collaboration more difficult. Conversely, the lack of intervention by the State of California seems to have, at times, provoked collaborative efforts in the Bay Area. On the other hand, most successful regional collaboration initiatives that I have studied in the context of this research were the result of one of two things: forceful higher governmental initiative (e.g., the creation of the interim BCDC and that of Montreal International) or higher governmental incentives (e.g., the Sustainable Community Strategy process in the Bay Area and the initial “seed” funding for the MUC’s green space acquisition program). In other words, it appears as though California’s “hands-off” approach to regional collaboration may have promoted regional collaboration more than Quebec’s interventionist stance; however, the outcomes of regional collaboration are not so different from one place to the other, as collaboration effectiveness in metropolitan regions seems to depend more on higher governmental rules and incentives than on collaboration intensity.

All that said, it is important to recognize that the policy-making process – as described in the preceding pages – differs widely between the U.S. and Canada, which significantly impacts the way ideas “trickle up” from local and regional organizations. For instance, the inclusion (almost textually, in some cases) of important elements of ABAG’s and MTC’s internal policies and programs (e.g., ABAG’s "policy-based housing projections" and the PDA concept coming out of the joint FOCUS program) in SB 735 is testimony to the fact that legislators in the U.S.
often “take their cue” from what local and/or regional organizations are already doing. This does not necessarily mean that collaborative regional efforts in the U.S. are more likely to influence policy; cabinet ministers in Canada are also likely to be influenced by undergoing policy experiments and/or the views of local politicians. The important difference, from the perspective of this research, is that the progression of ideas from the bottom up is somewhat more transparent in the U.S.: there is no ambiguity as to who is working on whose behalf.

Regional awareness: between the eyes of the beholder

In the words of Jeremy Madsen (2011), who echoes the words of many others before him, “the regional identity of the Bay Area is the main facilitator of regionalism [...] and this regional sense of identity certainly comes in part from having stark geographical features that are always present”. However, the tracing of regional collaboration through time – whether in the San Francisco Bay Area or in the Greater Montreal – suggests that “awareness of region” (thought of as the importance of the regional concept in framing social, environmental and economic debates in a given place) varies with time, even though the environment’s “stark features” do not.

Importantly, not only does the *strength* of regional awareness vary (e.g., before and after the public debate on bay filling took place), but its scale varies also (e.g., from the Island of Montreal to the Montreal “functional” metropolitan area) and both are influenced, but not necessarily determined, by the regional institutional arrangements in place at a given time (e.g., the MUC vs. the MMC). It appears, then, that regional awareness is more of a mindset – contingent upon the specific conditions in which one finds himself/herself – than a quality inherent to place. Consequently, regional awareness as a “shared” characteristic may exist – and may have an influence on stakeholders’ willingness to act jointly when faced with a regional problem at given time – but it is almost certainly endogenous to a
particular situation. Hence, trying to assess the moderating influence of regional awareness on collaboration numerically may be pointless.

Yet, that is not to say we should abandon the concept altogether. First, because regional awareness is difficult to estimate numerically does not mean it cannot be gauged in a given context; the impact of a particular regional problem on the "wider" environmental awareness of a region’s inhabitants can certainly be perceived through media and is definitely of interest to policy-makers. Second (and following from this), the importance of representing regional issues graphically – whether by using maps, as in the case of BCDC with the U.S. Corps of Engineer maps illustrating the future of the bay, or satellite imagery, as did MUC’s planners to show the negative correlation between greenery and heat on the Island of Montreal – cannot be overstated. Indeed, it appears as though the “imageability” or communicability of a given metropolitan problem has a strong positive influence on actors’ motivation to act. This may explain why local actors seem more willing to collaborate voluntarily and make sacrifices of their own accord when working to protect a natural amenity that can be easily visualized (e.g., the Mille-Île river wetlands). The finding that a given issue’s communicability will influence policy-makers’ ability to “frame” it as a public problem is not, in and of itself, surprising; this phenomenon has been well described by scholars in the fields of communications and public policy. Beyond reiterating what is already known, this research underscores the fact that regional issues must be easily communicable if they are to be seen as issues of public interest at the regional scale. This is perhaps

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148 I do not imply, here, that regional awareness is a “mindset” that is either present or absent; rather, what I mean here is that the regional awareness construct cannot easily be measured numerically (e.g., through the number of Google hits for a certain expression) without also measuring many other things at the same time which may or may not be of interest to the researcher. Regional awareness is most definitely a continuum, but not of the kind that can be measured directly and consistently.

149 In the field of communication, the role of mass media in setting the "public agenda" was described more than 40 years ago by McCombs and Shaw (1972). More recently, Brosius and Kepplinger (1990) investigated the influence of television reporting on agenda setting and found that it significantly increases problem awareness of several prominent issues, including environmental protection (whereas problem awareness of other issues, such as public debt and public security, caused media coverage as opposed to being caused by it). Many other studies have since confirmed that an issue’s “communicability” by the mass media plays a crucial role in whether it becomes seen as being of public interest.
because the regional scale is more “abstract” to most people than the local, state/provincial or national scales.

Civic capital: in action or inaction?

The “collaborative moments” that are examined in this chapter were, for the most part, initiated by individuals who were strongly motivated to act and were able to convince others of the “urgency” of a given situation. Claude Hutchison (who convened the Bay Area’s local elected officials to form ABAG), Catherine Kerr (who convinced Eugene McAteer to carry the ball politically for protecting the bay), Rod Diridon (who personally brought together business, civic and community leaders to discuss regional reform), Sunne McPeak (who was instrumental in getting the five regional agencies to work jointly and in moving BAASC forward), Robert Lussier (who decided to seize the opportunity provided by the police strike to create the MUC), Hubert Simard (who used up all the political capital he had to convince Montreal’s suburban mayors to support his green-space acquisition program), Sylvia Oljemark (who galvanized environmental activists from all over the Island of Montreal into action) and Jean Lauzon (who convinced Mayor Ulysse Lefebvre to fund Éco-Nature’s operations) all shared a common characteristic: the unwavering belief that their cause was just.

Yet, upon closer examination of these different cases, it appears that those collaboration efforts that resulted in something concrete – and were therefore successful in effecting change beyond transforming the institutions involved in the collaborative process itself – were not necessarily those with the strongest or loudest champion. Indeed, the key to success seems to lie not only in a policy entrepreneur’s ability to sell his or her idea, but also – crucially – on the presence of a neutral broker who is respected both by the proponents and opponents of a given initiative. Indeed, would the interim BCDC have produced a (near) unanimous report had the commission’s first chair not had Melvin Lane’s credibility? Would the five agencies’ executive directors have heeded Sunne McPeak’s demand had she not been an “insider” (i.e., a former County Supervisor in addition to being the President
of the Bay Area Council)? Would the suburban mayors of Montreal have voted in favor of the $200 million borrowing by-law had the MUC's respected and neutral Executive Director not intervened? Would MI exist had Guy Coulombe not brokered the deal that led to its creation? Needless to say, we do not have answers to these questions, but we can surmise that many of these concrete outcomes would never have been produced had there been no facilitator – i.e., someone with whom people on all sides (or most sides) of the issue can see eye-to-eye or at least appreciate as having a disinterested or neutral view toward the various participants.

Clearly, the presence of civic capital in a group – i.e., when a group is cohesive enough that group members feel they can trust one another – can help move the collaborative process along (from collaboration for its own sake to the operationalization of ideas and, in turn, their implementation). However, civic capital in a group may also be used to resist change and protect the status quo, as opposed to the reverse; the failure of the Golden Gate Authority in the 1960s was in no small way due to the well-coordinated and well-funded opposition to the proposal, led by Senator Randolph Collier and a group of men who shared similar values and a similar passion for highway construction. Hence, the fact that civic capital holds a group together (however loosely) denotes only that group's potential to take action; it says nothing about that group's potential to “do good”. 
Governmental initiative: for better or worse

It should come as no surprise to students of local government that municipalities tend to consider the protection of their autonomy as a higher priority than the solving of metropolitan problems through functional cooperation or voluntary collaboration. With the risk of stating something that most observers would consider self-evident, there are specific tasks and objectives that municipalities will not carry out or work toward voluntarily, such as tax-base sharing, because the political costs for wealthy municipalities to financially support less wealthy municipalities will always outweigh the political gains they could make from doing so. In other words, if there are no favors to be exchanged over the adoption of particular regional policy or shared interests between member municipalities, then there will be little motivation on anyone's part to move that policy along. Jones' observation, dating back to 1973, is particularly instructive:

Observation of the behavior of city and county officials in regional organizations with statutory authority and operating under statutory standards supports Moguloff’s assertion that the voluntary structure of councils of government such as ABAG is inherently conducive to ‘a log rolling style of decision making’. However, the same city and county officials who sit on ABAG have not hesitated to act contrary to the interests of individual cities and counties when they sit on statutory regional bodies such as BCDC (p.104)

There is no question, then, that the government must sometimes “equilibrate” the benefits and costs of regional development; however, this is not to say that governmental initiative only serves to “force” inter-municipal collaboration on such topics as fiscal equity and affordable housing, quite the contrary. As the cases described in this chapter demonstrate, higher governments can: 1) initiate regional collaboration by “provoking” the encounter of regional players with potential interests in common without requiring that they jointly perform any specific task (as when the state legislature in California first created the Bay Area Joint Policy Committee); 2) enable regional collaboration by giving an association of government or regional agency the power to regulate in specific policy areas and enforce its own
rule if and only if its members decide to do so of their own accord (as with the MUC, which voluntarily took on the responsibility of creating and maintaining regional parks on its territory); 3) provide financial incentives for inter-local collaboration (as with the California Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008) and 4) lend credibility to a particular regional collaborative process by taking part in it, affirming its importance publicly (as with the State of California’s participation in the interim BCDC) or funding it in part or wholly. In short, higher governments can intervene constructively in different and at different stages of the regional collaborative process. Policy entrepreneurs (e.g., Catherine Kerr and Mel Scott in the case of BCDC or Pierre Valiquette with the MIRP) clearly have an important role to play, but the state is frequently required to act (e.g., through political means, as in the case of BCDC, or through bureaucratic channels, in the case of the MIRP) for a particular policy to take effect – and to effect change.

However, governmental initiative can also be deleterious to regional collaboration when it is rushed, improvised or ill fitted to the problem at hand. One example cited by Jones (1973) is the funding that was provided by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development in the 1960s to regional organizations such as ABAG to do functional planning on a regional scale (for airports, water and sanitation, etc.); while these grants have helped organizations without core funding (like ABAG) to survive, they have also – sometimes – contributed to the abandonment of comprehensive regional planning by these same organizations. In a somewhat different line of argument, Assemblyman John Knox denounced in the early 1970s the federal government’s support for regional planning; it resulted, he argued, “1) in the production of so-called regional plans which the COG formally adopts [sic], but which has no real effect and 2) the misleading representation by COG’s that they are determining regional priorities and are implementing regional plans, when in fact they are not” (cited in Jones, 1973).

Although these observations were both made four decades ago, they are both still relevant today. Indeed, one of the risks in establishing regional agencies with no power to enforce the plans that they produce is that it encourages local jurisdictions
to jointly plan, thereby giving local elected officials partaking in these joint planning exercises the impression that they are actively “collaborating” and therefore tackling the region's metropolitan problems and making a difference - even if in reality nothing has had happened.
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Chapter 5

A few modest conclusions for a modest policy proposal

5.1 The promise of regional collaboration: then and now

"By creating incentives to encourage communities to work together, state and federal governments can improve the decision-making process and promote long-term, holistic solutions to regional problems. Building stronger links among people, communities, and the decisions that affect them can revitalize grassroots democracy and thereby strengthen communities, regions, and the nation"

- President’s Council on Sustainable Development, Sustainable America: A New Consensus for the Prosperity, Opportunity and a Healthy Environment for the Future, 1996

When taking a moment to reflect historically upon use of the expressions “regional collaboration”, “regional partnership”, “collaborative governance” and the like, one is struck by the way in which they have become, very rapidly, embedded in the language and discourse of policy-makers. They seem to have – in part, at least – taken the place of expressions and concepts such as “regional planning”, “metropolitan government” and “growth management”. In short, whereas coercion and state intervention have both become nearly taboo, incentivized voluntarism has become the norm.

Notably, the “collaborative turn” of the 1990s in the United States (and to a lesser extent Canada) was partly provoked by the need – perceived by a large number of progressives of all stripes – to respond to the global and national calls for a shift toward “sustainable development” following the 1992 Rio Conference. The 1996 report of the President’s Council on Sustainable Development (PCSD), cited above, calls on the government to empower and encourage local communities to work together and, essentially, figure out by themselves how to solve the many problems that spillover from one locality to the next\textsuperscript{150}.

\textsuperscript{150} The PCSD’s progress report, published in 1997, states very clearly that “progress must come from below”: “While many people and institutions have the power to affect decisions made in America’s cities and counties, local elected officials and local governments play a central role. Not only do
Also worth noting is the fact that HUD’s\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant} program (established in 2010), which makes small amounts of money available for communities across the U.S. to develop comprehensive regional plans collaboratively, is in clear continuity with the PCSD’s 1996 report and its recommendations\textsuperscript{152}. In a very real sense, HUD’s regional planning grant program fulfills the vision laid out in \textit{Sustainable America}, which was that higher governments should promote and encourage collaboration by creating incentives for inter-local coordination, and that local communities, in turn, should be in charge of finding and implementing the appropriate policy solutions to environmental, social and economic problems affecting more than one jurisdiction.

The shift in emphasis in policy discussions from the \textit{necessity of structural reform} to the \textit{importance of voluntary inter-jurisdictional collaboration} may well be reflective of a more fundamental shift – which operated over several decades – in our attitude toward, and expectations from, government. But considering that governmental policies encouraging regional collaboration are, generally speaking, “all carrot, no stick”, one certainly wonders whether these policies are more indicative of higher governments’ reluctance to regulate than of their confidence in the ability of local governments within metropolitan areas to effectively deal with region-wide problems.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{151}] The program was actually initiated by the \textit{Partnership for Sustainable Communities}, a collaborative effort between the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that was established in 2009 and seeks (among other things) “to integrate housing, transportation, water infrastructure, and land use planning and investment” by making comprehensive regional planning grants available (HUD-DOT-EPA, 2009).
\item[\textsuperscript{152}] It is described on HUD’s website as such: “The Sustainable Communities Regional Planning Grant Program supports metropolitan and multijurisdictional planning efforts that integrate housing, land use, economic and workforce development, transportation, and infrastructure investments in a manner that empowers jurisdictions to consider the interdependent challenges of: (1) economic competitiveness and revitalization; (2) social equity, inclusion, and access to opportunity; (3) energy use and climate change; and (4) public health and environmental impact.” (HUD, 2013).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Indeed, the mere fact that politicians of all levels and stripes agree about the importance of voluntary regional collaboration (over and above other ways to deal with regional problems), in an era of bitter political battles over seemingly anodyne policy issues, is bound to raise serious questions as to its effectiveness (in the environmental and social fields, at the very least, where there are always conflicting interests). If politicians cannot agree on the causes – let alone the existence – of climate change, how could they possibly agree on the “need for regional collaboration”?

Consensus, it is sometimes said, is the enemy progress. Governmental and non-governmental actors on the regional scene have been sold to the idea that regional collaboration “benefits everyone”; consequently, a near consensus seems to have developed in North America about the promise of regional collaboration. But this faith in the power of collaborative governance remains largely unsubstantiated – because relatively few researchers have actually examined the basis upon which upon this consensus is built. This is why the central question of this research – “does collaboration matter?” – is an important one. The question is clearly not answerable by a single “yes” or “no”. What I have tried to find out, rather, is when and under what conditions regional collaboration actually makes a difference.

Before synthesizing the results of this research, there is one important caveat that needs to be mentioned: the large-N and small-N analyses are both historical in nature, meaning, they are both centered on past collaboration efforts in the U.S. and Canada’s metro regions. In effect, the collaborative regional initiatives included in the dataset and those studied in Chapter 4 all took place before 2007 – that is to say, before the beginning of the social media and open government revolutions. Most of them actually took place before 2000, in a different technological age.

I do not mean by this that the results presented before have no external validity, or that the conclusions drawn from these results concern only the past, quite the contrary. There is ample evidence that regional collaboration will continue to be high on the list of policy priorities, and there is no reason to believe that technology will make metropolitan problems disappear. City-regions will need to be
governed somehow, with or without the use of new technological tools. But it is important to recognize that collaboration might operate differently in the future, and that the “politics of place” might also change as a result of technology. Hence, the conclusions that follow should not be interpreted as a “recipe for regional collaboration”; instead, they underscore the forces that are likely to influence the effectiveness of regional collaboration either positively or negatively.

In short, my goal in this concluding section is not to come to a definitive answer as to whether collaboration makes a difference; rather, I aim to offer a perspective – informed by the quantitative and qualitative data collected, analyzed and presented in the foregoing chapters – on the promises and limits of collaborative planning and policy-making.

5.2 The results of regional collaboration: a view from the ground

A systematic review of the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 1 would have produced a myriad of small conclusions, many of them seemingly contradictory, and probably left the reader more confused than enlightened. Consequently, I have opted for a more synthetic approach, grouping the most important findings into three conclusions, as follows.

The collaborative process matters, but collaboration is not enough

Process matters...

Although studying the collaborative process itself was not explicitly a goal of this research, it imposed itself as a topic of interest as I was tracing and retracing the process of regional collaboration in the San Francisco Bay Area and the Greater Montreal. In effect, the importance of having ground rules that are both fair and unambiguous, a clear mandate, a flexible yet structured collaborative process and the opportunity for all participants to share their own expertise, knowledge and/or experience and learn from others was made abundantly clear by the cases studied
(most notably, the functioning of the BCDC interim commission and the 1982-1991 period at the MUC).

This, of course, will come as no surprise to those readers who are familiar with the literature on this topic. Indeed, one of the main arguments posited by Innes and Booher (2010) is precisely that “it very much matters how the collaborative process unfolds” (p. 26, original emphasis) and that the adequacy of a given collaborative process can only be judged by “unpacking” it to see if it meets the conditions of collaborative rationality. I should mention that I did not set out, in this research, to test Innes and Booher’s (2010) DIAD (diversity, interdependence, authentic dialogue) theory of collaborative rationality; however, my findings support the basic premises that collaborative processes yield better results if and when the participants represent a diversity of stakeholders (e.g., the BCDC interim commission vs. the MIRC) and the overlap in their interests (or their interdependence) is somehow made clear (e.g., using effective communication tools, such as the maps illustrating the shrinking of the San Francisco Bay or the satellite photographs showing the impact of the absence of vegetation on the Island of Montreal’s temperature).

This research also brings to bear another important factor affecting the collaborative process that is not specifically identified by Innes and Booher (2010), but which is central to Jen Nelles’ work (2008; 2009): civic capital. In short, my findings are largely consistent with hers, in that civic entrepreneurs – and the networks they belong to – often play a key role in making collaboration happen. The role played by Kay Kerr and her social network in raising awareness of the bay fill issue comes to mind, but that of Melvin Lane in rallying civic, business and political leaders to the cause of conservation is perhaps an even better illustration of the importance of civic capital in moving from mobilization to collaboration to action. Guy Coulombe, similarly, played a key role in creating and maintaining political support for the creation of an organization representing the interests of the Greater Montreal internationally. All three had extensive and powerful networks they could draw on to “provoke” the meeting of unlikely allies. Each in their respective contexts and in their own way, Kerr, Lane and Coulombe were what Nelles calls “bridge-
builders”, bringing in contact individuals belonging to entirely different worlds. In her own words:

Civic capital is embodied in local and regional networks that, while perhaps substantively unrelated, share a common conception of territorial identity, expectations, and goals. [...] Leaders, or civic entrepreneurs, are critical in constructing this regional orientation and intensifying and formalizing these collaborative networks within and between communities. Civic entrepreneurs are bridge builders and help to connect localized networks and different communities of actors with one another. *These leaders understand the importance of collaboration and coordination and through their leadership bring various groups of actors together to negotiate regional goals.* (Nelles, 2009, pp. 305-306, emphases added)

This conclusion has several potential implications, but there is one in particular that is of interest from the perspective of this research: given the importance of *the way in which collaboration unfolds* and the role played by a few key individuals and their social networks, the inferences derived from a large-N cross-sectional analysis of collaborative regional initiatives cannot stand alone; they must necessarily be processed alongside with other kinds of data.

More generally, the findings of this dissertation suggest that regional collaboration does have the potential to increase a region’s *governance capacity* in that it provides (when and if it is well designed) a forum where governmental and non-governmental actors can meet, define and discuss the regional issues that are of common interest to them – and possibly work together on tackling them. This increased governance capacity, in turn, may translate into greater regional resilience; arguably, the MUC’s “collaborative moment” in the late 1980s and early 1990s facilitated the creation of the Island of Montreal’s Regional Development Council (and to a lesser extent, that of Montréal International) precisely at a time when the region’s economy was hit by the recession and needed a boost.

*But collaboration is not enough…*

All that being said, because *the collaborative process itself matters* does not imply that a well-designed collaborative process will necessarily produce concrete
results. One the one hand, the quantitative data presented in Chapter 3 casts doubt on the effectiveness of bottom-up, voluntary region collaboration taken in isolation; indeed, bottom-up collaboration was found to be largely ineffective in reducing air pollution and income segregation and promoting business incubation, whereas state-mandated collaboration does appear to have a non-negligible impact on these same outcomes (in the expected direction each time). This raises questions about the usefulness of collaboration “for its own sake”.

On the other hand, the tracing through time of regional collaboration in the Greater Montreal and the Bay Area suggests that having a “collaboratively rational” process may be necessary but not sufficient for inducing policy changes that will have an impact on the ground. This is especially true if those ultimately responsible for implementing the policies proposed are not formally a part of the process; for example, the fact that local governments were not formally represented on the Bay Vision 2020 commission is – according to several observers – directly related to ABAG’s rejection of the commission’s recommendations in 1991, which event might have had an influence on the ultimate defeat of the two bills introduced in the legislature the following year by the Bay Vision Action Coalition.

Likewise, a well-designed collaborative process might fail to produce concrete changes if those taking part in it do not have a clear mandate or if it is unclear how the outputs of the process will be used. The BAASC is good example of this. Although, as pointed out by Innes and Booher (2010), the process of the BAASC was not “consensus-oriented” (and therefore not collaboratively rational), the work of some of its caucuses was. The Equity Caucus, for instance, emerged out of BAASC, stayed active after the Alliance became dormant and has been hailed (by Innes and Booher, among others) as one of the few truly collaborative fora in Bay Area; yet it is unclear what policy (or other systemic) changes were precipitated by the caucus. In the governmental context, the Bay Area’s Joint Air Quality Policy Committee (JAQPC) is another example of an institution designed to promote collaboration that has produced, according to several close observers, little or no concrete result in terms

153 See next section 3.3.2 for a detailed description of these results and the next section for more detail on the “undesirable” effects of bottom-up collaboration.
of policy – despite the fact that it existed for almost 20 years before being folded into the Bay Area’s Joint Policy Committee in 2004.

In contrast, the collaborative process that took place during BCDC’s interim phase and led to the elaboration of the San Francisco Bay Plan was clearly oriented – the Commission had a little over three years to cover all the aspects of the bay fill issue and come up with recommendations – and it “fed into” a larger policy process – it was known in advance that the Commission’s recommendations would form the basis of a plan, which would ultimately be voted on by the legislature. A more recent example of a collaborative process feeding directly into policy is the elaboration of Plan Bay Area (the region’s “sustainable community strategy”, as mandated by the State of California) by the Bay Area Joint Policy Committee.

While it is too early to say (as of 2013) whether the first iteration of Plan Bay Area will produce significant changes on the ground, there is no question that it has the potential to do so in the future. However, based on the findings of this research, one can surmise that this potential will only be realized if both higher and local governments are on board – and if the Bay Area’s regional agencies set the bar high enough.

Regional collaboration may not always be a “good”

The second conclusion might seem to follow naturally from the conclusion just above and might appear somewhat trite. Nevertheless, I believe it is important for it to be stated independently of what precedes: not only does regional collaboration sometimes have little or no extrinsic value (in the sense that it does no significantly contribute to the provision of regional goods), but it might also have extrinsic disvalue when and if collaboration is seen as a way to avoid dealing with the complexity of a problem, as opposed to an opportunity to engage with it. In other words, regional collaboration has extrinsic value when it allows us to better understand that which we are trying to change or protect and compels us to act accordingly, but it has extrinsic disvalue when it promotes complacency and/or serves as a way to avoid conflict.
On the one hand, the data presented here makes it quite clear that “collaboration begets collaboration”, in part because the collaborative process itself allows for the formation of civic capital both within and across networks, which facilitates further collaboration. This “weaving of ties” among people is of course generally a positive outcome, in that it removes the first few hurdles that participants face when entering a collaborative process, namely establishing rapport and trust with other participants. The creation of ties among members (and close observers who were not formally members) of the Bay Vision 2020 Commission is a case in point: many of the same individuals were still around when the BAASC was formed, and this, according to a close observer who took part in both (King, 2013), is part of the reason why the Alliance was off to a quick start.

On the other hand, there is some evidence that voluntary regional collaboration (whatever form it takes) can sometimes become a near-permanent fixture of the city-region’s self-governance (as with the JAQPC in the Bay Area). As such, it might simply generate what appears to be more collaboration – without actually producing any concrete changes – and begin to embody the status quo – as opposed to serving the cause of progress. What is more, as described by Lubell (2003, 2004), the participants in voluntary collaborative processes often perceive the process as being effective when in fact it is not. Such a situation – where there is an obvious disconnect between perceived and actual policy effectiveness – can become a “collaborative trap” of sorts, wherein large amounts of time and energy are dedicated to working “in collaboration”, to no real effect, even as the pressing regional issues that provoked collaboration in the first place go unattended. In other words, regional collaboration can be a trap if it distracts us from the real problems requiring our immediate attention.

One might argue that the process which led from BV2020, to the creation of BAASC and that of the Regional Agencies Coordinating Committee, to the formulation of a regional “Smart Growth Strategy”, to the creation of the JPC and the establishment, in close succession, of the FOCUS program (by the JPC) and the Regional Blueprint Planning program (by the State) resembles the above depiction of a “collaborative trap”: collaboration that generated more collaboration and
produced few concrete results (at least until the passage of SB 375). Likewise, the Mille-Île River Enhancement Corporation, whose aim was to promote inter-municipal collaboration, similarly achieved little other than funnel government funds away from the Mille-Île River Park and its conservation activities, “trapping” municipalities in a process that benefited each one individually but did not benefit the region as a whole.

That said, the most striking evidence that voluntary regional collaboration may sometimes be counter-productive came from the large-N analysis presented in Chapter 3. Indeed, bottom-up collaboration (as measured by the number of collaborative regional initiatives in a given region, controlling for population size) was found to have a small but statistically significant positive impact on income segregation and negative impact on the number of small business establishments. In other words, if we rule out the possibility of reverse causality — as these results were obtained using an instrumental variable design — it appears as though voluntary bottom-up regional collaboration may actually make things worse, even if ever so slightly.

Albeit, the measure of bottom-up collaboration I use is crude and could no doubt be refined. Moreover, these results in and of themselves cannot tell us whether a region’s focus on bottom-up collaboration took resources away from other regional efforts. That said, these results should still make us ponder the role of collaboration within the larger context of metropolitan governance.

In order to foster successful collaboration, higher governments must tread lightly

There is no question, based on the data presented and analyzed in the foregoing chapters, that higher governments have played and continue to play a key role — whether positively or negatively — in the initiation and implementation phases of regional collaboration. As noted in the concluding paragraphs of Chapter 4, federal, state and provincial governments can play different roles and different times and their actions can both facilitate and hinder collaboration and increase or decrease its effectiveness.
On the one hand, as aptly formulated by Weir and colleagues (2009), “Without multilevel political capacities, the new ideas and incipient alliances that emerge from regional collaborations can be easily undermined from below or from above. No matter how inclusive and collaborative the networks or innovative the plans [...], they will produce little real change if not backed by vertical power.” (p. 485). This is in many ways a reiteration of the first conclusion, stating that “collaboration is not enough”. On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 4, governmental initiative can sometimes undo the collaborative work undertaken by local governments or other local actors, as when the Government of Quebec decided that all conservations funds should be allocated to and managed by municipalities exclusively, thereby effectively undoing the painstaking work of Éco-Nature to develop and implement a region-wide conservation plan.

The finding that higher governmental initiative can “cut both ways” is to some extent corroborated by the large-N analysis, which suggests that state-mandated collaboration might help reduce air pollution, decrease income segregation and increase the number of small business establishments but also reduce (or slow the increase in) the number of high-tech jobs within a given metropolitan area. What is more, the simple effect of governmental initiative on business incubation seems to run in the opposite direction as that of state-mandated collaboration, which tells us that different forms of state/provincial initiative might affect collaboration differently.

One might conclude hastily from these results that the effect of higher governmental initiative on regional collaboration is a basically a toss-up; however, that is not the case for two reasons. First, a clear pattern emerges when taking the inter-governmental variable into account and revisiting the comparative premise of this research. Indeed, perhaps the single most important and significant difference between the two case studies forming the core of this research is the way in which higher governments – and the governments of California and Quebec, in particular – have traditionally confronted metropolitan problems.

In effect, the State of California has generally responded or reacted to the will expressed by local political representatives and/or civil society, as when it created
BCDC, granted ABAG the status of COG, or “forced” the creation of the Joint Policy Committee. As justly pointed out by Jones, “much so-called imposition by the State is actually policy developed by local groups and interests, and implemented through the machinery of State government” (Jones, 1973, p. 85, emphasis added). Notably, the pattern described by Jones in 1973 is still visible – and dominant – today in California.

In contradistinction, the Government of Quebec seems to have acted in the metropolitan sphere mostly unilaterally, sometimes in response to the concerns raised by the City of Montreal or other local institutions, but usually out of its own initiative, following its own policy agenda. Fischler and Wolfe (2000), describe this state of affairs quite clearly, noting that “governmental reforms [concerning Montreal’s metropolitan problems] do not proceed merely because the various parties agree on the problems at hand; they occur when the authorities experience a sense of urgency about one or another issue, be it infrastructure provision, environmental preservation, municipal solvency or economic competitiveness (p. 90).

These different modes of inter-governmental interaction have created different "sets of expectations" on the part of local governmental and non-governmental organizations and these expectations – in turn – influence the way the governmental initiative is perceived. This seems to be one of the keys in trying to understand what types of governmental actions strengthen regional collaboration, and what types of actions render it useless, toothless and sometimes even senseless. Indeed, if a governmental rule or government-imposed incentive program is perceived as legitimate by those affected by it (e.g., the inception of BCDC by the State of California or the Province of Quebec’s mandate to create a regional park system), its effects are much more likely to “ripple out through the system” than if it is perceived as arbitrary or as flowing out of the government’s own agenda (e.g., California’s Regional Housing Needs Allocation process or the creation of the Montreal Metropolitan Community to replace the Montreal Urban Community). In that sense, the Sustainable Communities and Climate Protection Act of 2008, which is
the end result of an elaborate process involving local governments that unfolded over many years, has the potential to actually “make regional collaboration work”.

There is another simpler lesson to be drawn from the results of this research regarding the “proper” role of government in promoting collaborative effectiveness (which is the other reason why I believe the effect of state/provincial initiative on regional collaboration is a not a toss-up): higher governments, and state/provincial governments in particular, are naturally positioned to 1) facilitate the collaborative process, by providing the setting and the resources required for regional collaboration and 2) enforce the rules, plans and other arrangements reached or agreed upon by local actors through the regional collaborative exercise.

To use an analogy that is familiar to everyone, one could think of the state/provincial government in the metropolitan region as a teacher in the modern classroom, whose role it is to facilitate learning – as opposed to “transmit knowledge” – and enforce basic rules of conduct – as opposed to dictate a particular way of being. In the classroom as well as the region, the challenge is not to create a factual basis for different local interests to find a common ground, but rather to stimulate engagement.

Regional collaboration may be an outcome rather than a driving force of regionalism

This last concluding remark may seem somewhat anodyne and a restatement of previous conclusions, but it is in fact a crucial point and perhaps the most important finding of this research: we should not assume that regional cooperation is a self-propelled engine or that it will, like a tide, inevitably “raise all the boats”. If there is one clear recognizable pattern across all the cases studied here, it is the way regional collaboration efforts are initiated in response to a crisis and/or as a consequence of some decisive governmental action.

It is worth reiterating that this research was not primarily concerned with the determinants of regional collaboration and that its main thrust was to determine its extrinsic influence. However, the tracing of the collaborative process across federal contexts (i.e., in the Greater Montreal in the Province of Quebec and in the San Francisco Bay Area in the State of California) makes it clear that the
effectiveness of collaboration at the regional scale depends on the nature of the issue (and, concomitantly, the perception of an impending crisis) as much or more than it does on the social and political context. The two most striking examples are perhaps the protection of the San Francisco Bay, the creation of the regional park system on the Island of Montreal and that of Montreal International: in all three cases, it was a “sense of crisis” that catalyzed regional actors (local elected officials, citizen groups, non-governmental organizations and the media) and higher governments into action. In short, whether in Quebec or California, effective regional collaboration seems to require more than higher governmental incentives, strong civic leaders and a forum where metropolitan problems can be discussed.

This is not to diminish the importance of the inter-governmental context: clearly, the State of California, the Province of Quebec and the federal government in the U.S. have all played important roles in facilitating or posing barriers to regional integration and/or collaboration. One could argue, for instance, that the creation of the Bay Area Council and ABAG were facilitated by the absence of an interventionist state government and that the MUC was dysfunctional for the first 12 years of its existence because it was designed by the provincial government to be so and because its suburban members expected the provincial government to step in and correct the situation (which it did in 1982), and so did not take it upon themselves to reform the organization from within. One could further argue that the entrepreneurial nature of the U.S. political system, wherein a single (influential) legislator can sponsor a bill and see it passed (as with Senator McAteer and the bill that created the interim BCDC), has a profound influence on the way policy is made.

However, insofar as environmental protection and economic development are concerned, the cases presented here suggest that these factors are secondary to the sense of an impending crisis, which itself depends on the imageability and communicability of the issue at hand. It is interesting to note, as a counterpoint, that the regional collective action problem in the field of socio-economic integration (or justice) appears to be surmountable without this sense of crisis; indeed, the Community Capital Investment Initiative (CCII) was the only concrete outcome of the BAASC process and support for it seems to have built up over time. The process
that led municipalities in the Minneapolis-St.Paul metropolitan area to adopt at tax revenue sharing system, as described by Orfield (1997), was likewise much more gradual (despite following the traditional “entrepreneurial” U.S. policy-making model). It would be interesting, in future research, to study more specifically what leads to state-mandated and other forms of regional collaboration in this area, as we might find a somewhat different pattern from the one just described and interesting differences between Canada and the U.S.

Notwithstanding the likely possibility that successful collaborative efforts to stave off income segregation may be catalyzed differently, the bulk of the evidence presented here seems to suggest that effective regional collaboration needs a crisis. Thus, the future of regionalism may depend, first and foremost, on the ability of policy-makers (and other interested groups) to communicate to the public the impending sense of crisis that they may perceive (and not on the intensity of regional collaboration per se). Speaking of the need for Bay Area businesses, local politicians and regional agencies to act collectively to mitigate the impacts of the impending “sea level rise crisis”, Will Travis (2013) made this remark, which summarizes the foregoing discussion:

This is what Hurricane Sandy is going to do for us. [Otherwise], we will see the first evidence for [sea-level rise] either when we have a king tide at the same time we have a heavy rainstorm or an atmospheric river flow through here, something like that. It will probably be some sort of catastrophic event like that that will stimulate us to think about this [and act].

In sum, the prospect for continued regional collaboration may be better in the San Francisco Bay Area (and U.S. metro regions) than in the Greater Montreal (and Canadian metro regions), especially considering the U.S. federal government’s renewed interest in the integration of metropolitan transportation and land-use planning and its continued funding for such efforts. However, the prospect for strengthening metro regions’ governance capacity may not be so different across the 49th parallel as it may unfortunately depend on the occurrence of natural and man-made catastrophes in the years to come.
The conclusions presented above may seem rather modest, but so are the results of regional collaboration – when looking at its immediate effects. One lesson that can be drawn from this research is that collaborative regional efforts are rarely self-contained; they are usually made up of relations already formed and their results are generally not discernible until after the collaboration itself has ended. This poses a challenge to researchers, as the results of a given initiative are generally diffuse, but also to policy-makers interested in promoting and fostering effective regional collaboration. Indeed, if we cannot predict what the outcome of collaboration will be (or whether there will be one), how can we convince local actors to take part in these processes? How can anyone know whether working collaboratively and on a voluntary basis at the regional level will be worth their time and energy? Why would anyone do it?

The only possible answer to these questions seems to be: trust and good will. In the end, no collaborative process can work if either of these is missing. And neither can be imposed by the state.
Works cited – Chapter 5:


## Appendix 1 - Description of and measurement strategy for independent, mediating, dependent, control and instrumental variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of variable</th>
<th>Variable name</th>
<th>Measurement strategy</th>
<th>Data source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Independent variables** | State-mandated collaboration | • Presence of state/provincial rules or policy frameworks mandating or requiring collaboration  
• Number of years since the inception of the region's growth management regime (for state-level analysis) | • Survey of regional organizations  
• Anthony, 2004  
• New Jersey Office of State Planning, 1997  
• Meek et al., 2003 (APA report on regional approaches to affordable housing) |
| | Bottom-up collaboration | • Number of bottom-up collaborative regional initiatives (CRI)  
• Number of years since the onset of each CRI (or total CRI duration, if ended before 2002) summed over all CRI since 1970 and until 2002  
• Total number of acres preserved through the establishment of land trusts in a given state as of 2002 (for state-level analysis) | • Survey of regional organizations  
• Green Plus, 2012  
• Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2012  
• Land Trust Alliance, 2012  
• Foundation Center, 2012  
• Google searches of the expressions "regional collaboration", "regional coalition" and "regional partnership" with the names of each central city and/or metropolitan region |
| | Sectoral collaboration | • Number of special-purpose governments within a metropolitan region per 100,000 inhabitants as of 2007  
• Increase in the number of special-purpose governments in each state between 1992 and 2012 | • U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2007 Census of Governments  
• U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2012, *List and Structures of Government, Number of Special Districts* |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moderating variables</th>
<th>Regional awareness</th>
<th>• Number of results turning up for Google searches of the expressions “[name of central city] region” and “greater [name of central city]”</th>
<th>• Google</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government intervention (or State/Provincial rules)</td>
<td>• Variable for obligation to have a regional land-use plan or growth management program (0=no obligation, 1=obligation to have non-coercive regional land-use plan, 2=obligation to have coercive land-use plan or growth management program) • Number of years since the onset of each CRI (or total CRI duration, if ended before 2002) summed over all CRI’s since 1970 and until 2002</td>
<td>• Survey of regional organizations (partially completed) • Anthony, 2004 • New Jersey Office of State Planning, 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variables</td>
<td>Environmental quality and conservation</td>
<td>• Change in the concentration of nitrogen dioxide in a given metropolitan region between 1990 and 2010 (or metro-level analysis) • Proportion of permanent breeder bird species showing a negative trend for the period starting in 2000 and ending in 2010 (for state-level analysis) • Proportion of urban breeder bird species showing a negative trend for the period starting in 2000 and ending in 2010 (or state-level analysis)</td>
<td>• U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), <em>National Trends in Nitrogen Dioxide</em> • North American Breeding Bird Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Socio-economic integration</td>
<td>• Change in metro-level income segregation between 1990 and 2009</td>
<td>• US 2010 program website (supported and hosted by the Russell</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Economic competitiveness | • Change in the number of small business establishments in a given metro area between 2001 and 2010  
• Change in the percentage of total employment in technology-based knowledge clusters | • U.S. Commerce Department, Economic Development Administration. 2013 (Innovation in American Regions – Innovation index) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control variables</th>
<th>Size of metropolitan area</th>
<th>Total population of census metropolitan area</th>
<th>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population growth</td>
<td>Growth of the population in a given MSA or CMA between 2000 and 2010 (for U.S metros) or between 2001 and 2011 (for Canadian metros)</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>Number of municipal governments per 100 000 people in a given MSA or CMA</td>
<td>DiversityData project, School of Public Health, Harvard (for U.S. metros) and Statistics Canada (for Canadian metros)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross metropolitan product (GMP) growth rate</td>
<td>Growth of the GMP during the 2000-2010 period</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income</td>
<td>Median household income in a given MSA or CMA in 2010</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital city status</td>
<td>Variable indicating whether MSA or CMA contains the State or Provincial capital (dummy variable “switched on” when metro region contains state/provincial capital)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic capital index</td>
<td>Index (expressed as a z-score) composed of three indicators: 1) percentage of population 18+ turning out to vote 2) Ratio of population with college degree/without high school diploma (25+ in the U.S., 15+ in Canada) 3) Avg. Percentage Population Living In Same Metro Annually, 2005-2009 for U.S. and 2001-2006 for</td>
<td>Results from 2008 presidential election (U.S.) and 2011 Federal elections (Canada)</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada (see Appendix 2 for more detail)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Baseline level of each metro-level dependent variable (total of four control variables) | Canada                                                                 | U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), *National Trends in Nitrogen Dioxide*  
|                                                                                      | • For each metro-level dependent variable, a control was created to account for the baseline level of the variable in question, as such: 1) concentration of nitrogen dioxide in 1990  
|                                                                                      | 2) income segregation in 1990; 3) number of small estab. in 2001 and 4) percentage of total employment in tech-based knowledge clusters in 2001 | • US 2010 program website  
|                                                                                      |                                                                                     | • U.S. Commerce Department. Economic Development Administration. 2013  
<p>|                                                                                      |                                                                                     | (Innovation in American Regions – Innovation index) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental variables</th>
<th>Physical barriers to expansion</th>
<th>Exogenous trigger to regional collaboration</th>
<th>Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index</th>
<th>Bi-state or tri-state regions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total number of major physical barriers to metropolitan expansion (ranging from 0 to 4)</td>
<td>Total number of major flooding events since 1900 and until 1990</td>
<td>Sum of the square roots of the percentage contribution of each government in a given metro area in terms of government expenditures relative to the metro area's total government expenditures.</td>
<td>Variable indicating whether a given metropolitan region spans the boundaries between two or three states, codes 0 = does not span, 1 = spans one boundary, 2 = spans two boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Google Maps</td>
<td>Miletì, 1999; Pielke and Downton, 2000</td>
<td>DiversityData project, School of Public Health, Harvard (for U.S. metros) and data collected by author from various sources (for Canadian metros)</td>
<td>U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada, Google Maps</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Instrumental variables**
- **Physical barriers to expansion**
  - Total number of major physical barriers to metropolitan expansion (ranging from 0 to 4)
  - Google Maps
- **Exogenous trigger to regional collaboration**
  - Total number of major flooding events since 1900 and until 1990
  - Number of years since each major flooding event, summed over all flooding events since 1900 and until 1990
  - Miletì, 1999; Pielke and Downton, 2000
  - Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 2013, *The International Disaster Database*
- **Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index**
  - Sum of the square roots of the percentage contribution of each government in a given metro area in terms of government expenditures relative to the metro area's total government expenditures.
  - DiversityData project, School of Public Health, Harvard (for U.S. metros) and data collected by author from various sources (for Canadian metros)
- **Bi-state or tri-state regions**
  - Variable indicating whether a given metropolitan region spans the boundaries between two or three states, codes 0 = does not span, 1 = spans one boundary, 2 = spans two boundaries
  - U.S. Census Bureau and Statistics Canada, Google Maps
Appendix 2 – Comparison of Resilience Capacity Index (RCI) indicators used in the original U.S. and revised Canada-U.S. versions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RCI Dimensions</th>
<th>RCI Indicators</th>
<th>U.S. version</th>
<th>U.S.-Canada version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socio Demographic Capacity</td>
<td>Income Equality</td>
<td>Inverse of regional GINI Coefficient</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic Diversification</td>
<td>Deviation of metro from all-metro average for goods-producing, service-producing, and government jobs</td>
<td>Deviation of metro from all-metro average for goods-producing, service-producing, and government jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Affordability</td>
<td>Percentage: Households spending less than 35% of income on housing over total number of occupied housing units</td>
<td>Percentage: Households spending less than 30% of income on housing over total number of occupied housing units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Economic Capacity</td>
<td>Educational Attainment</td>
<td>Ratio of population 25+ with college degree/without high school diploma</td>
<td>Ratio of population with college degree/without high school diploma (25+ in the U.S., 15+ in Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Without disability</td>
<td>Percentage of Population Without Disability</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Out of Poverty</td>
<td>Percentage of population above poverty line</td>
<td>Median Household Income(^{154})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health-Insured</td>
<td>Percentage of Civilian Non-Instit. Population with Health Insurance Coverage</td>
<td>Percentage of Civilian Non-Instit. Population with Health Insurance Coverage (100% for Canada)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Connectivity Capacity</td>
<td>Civic infrastructure</td>
<td>Percentage: Population adhering to a religious faith</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Homeownership</td>
<td>Percentage of Owner Occupied Housing Units over Total Occupied Units, 2009</td>
<td>Percentage of Owner Occupied Housing Units over Total Occupied Units, 2009 for U.S. and 2006 for Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Voter Participation</td>
<td>Percentage: Pct. of population 18+ turning out to vote, 2008 presidential election</td>
<td>Percentage: Pct. of population 18+ turning out to vote, 2008 presidential election (U.S.) and 2011 Federal elections (Canada)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{154}\) Canada does not have a poverty line and there is no way to compute a statistic for Canada based on the American poverty line. Given that median household income is highly correlated with poverty rates (0.744 for the 525 metro and micro statistical areas of the U.S. in 2010) and the lack of another direct measure of poverty, we opted to use median household income as a proxy measure for the rate of poverty.
Appendix 3: Model of ordered logistic regression of socio-political characteristics of metro regions on the FPC outcome

| Variable                                                                 | Standardized Coefficient | z    | P>|z| |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------|------|-----|
| Independent variable                                                     |                           |      |     |
| Years since inception of growth management regime                        | 0.024                     | 2.97 | 0.003** |
| Controls                                                                 |                           |      |     |
| Regional Resilience Capacity Index                                       | 1.341                     | 3.10 | 0.002** |
| % visible minority                                                       | 1.257                     | 1.08 | 0.281 |
| Metropolitan Power Diffusion Index                                        | 0.170                     | 2.46 | 0.014* |
| Fragmentation Index (# local governments / 100 000 people)               | -0.020                    | -1.14| 0.255 |
| Metro region spans State/Provincial lines                                | -1.065                    | -2.88| 0.004** |
| Canada                                                                   | -0.073                    | -0.14| 0.891 |
| Total population in 2000 (one unit = 100 000 people)                     | -0.016                    | -1.90| 0.057 |
| Metro GDP growth rate 2000-2010                                          | -0.552                    | -0.48| 0.633 |
| Rate of childhood obesity                                                | 3.157                     | 0.91 | 0.360 |
| Distance from CBD to closest agricultural field                           | 0.046                     | 1.14 | 0.255 |
| Cutpoint 1                                                               | 2.137                     |      |     |
| Cutpoint 2                                                               | 2.558                     |      |     |

Likelihood Ratio Chi-squared (11) = 32.22
Model significance = 0.0007

* p < .05, ** p < 0.01
N = 110

1 Measured as an ordinal variable and coded as such: 0 = absence of a regional food policy council; 0.5 = presence of local food policy council with variable interest in regional issues; 1 = presence of a regionally-focused food policy council
Appendix 4 – Survey questions sent out to regional organizations

1) Are there currently active collaborative regional initiatives (CRI s) in your region, which bring together representatives of three or more local governments as well as of civil society organizations and which are not mandated by the State of Federal governments? If so, which ones?

2) How many organizations (municipalities, counties, school districts, environmental and/or equity groups, businesses, etc.) are involved in each one?

3) Is there a regional land-use, open space preservation or growth management plan in your region? If so, is it binding of local government action in any way?

4) What forms of state-mandated collaboration exist in your state/province? Are these mandated collaborative efforts accompanied by an enforcement mechanism, whether formal or informal? If so, which one?

5) How else is the state/province involved in land-use, affordable housing provision or economic development at the metropolitan level?
Appendix 5 – List of interviewees with relevant titles and/or functions

San Francisco Bay Area

Bob Allen, Director of Transportation Justice (as of 2011) at Urban Habitat


Gary Binger, former Planning Director at the Association of Bay Area Governments (interviewed twice)

Brian Brennan, Vice President for Membership and State and Federal Coalitions (as of 2011) at the Silicon Valley Leadership Group

Miriam Chion, Planning Director (as of 2013) at Association of Bay Area Governments (interviewed twice)

Michael Cunningham, Vice President Public Policy (as of 2011) at the Bay Area Council

Larry Goldbeck, Deputy Director (as of 2013) of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission

Larry Goldzband, Executive Director (2010-2013) of the Bay Conservation and Development Commission and former Commissioner

Mary King, former supervisor (1988-2001) of Alameda County and President (1998-2000) of ABAG

Peter Lydon, close observer of the Bay Area's regional agencies since the early 1990s and chronicler of the Bay Vision 2020 process

Jeremy Madsen, Executive Director (as of 2011) of the Greenbelt Alliance

Dan Marks, former Planning Director (retired in 2011) at the City of Berkeley, former Planning Director at the City of Fremont and former staff member at the Greenbelt Alliance

James Nixon, former Business Council Manager of the Community Capital Investment Initiative (CCII)

John Rahaim, Planning Director (since 2008, current as of 2013) at the City of San Francisco

Jean Roggenkamp, Deputy Air Pollution Control Officer (as of 2013) and long-time staff member (more than 30 years), BAAQMD

Ceil Scandone, Green Business Coordinator (as of 2013) and long-time staff member (since 1990), Association of Bay Area Governments

Will Travis, former staff member (1970-1972), Deputy Director (1985-1995) and Executive Director (1995-2011) of the Bay Conservation and Development
Commission, former Senior Advisor (2011-2012) of the Bay Area Joint Policy Committee

Greater Montreal

Geneviève Bédard, Research Councillor (as of 2013) at Metropolitan Secretariat for the Enhancement of Blue and Green Spaces (part of the Montreal Metropolitan Community) and former Executive director at Éco-Nature

Georges Bossé, former mayor of the City of Verdun (1993-2001) and former President of the Suburban Mayor’s Conference

André Chabot, Director of strategic development (as of 2013) at Montreal International and former staff member, Island of Montreal Regional Development Council (1993-2005) (interviewed twice)

Gérard Divay, former Planning Director (1987-1993) and former Executive Director (1993-1997), Montreal Urban Community as well as former City Manager (1997-1999), City of Montreal.

André Gamache, former Executive Director (1994-2003), Island of Montreal Regional Development Council and former CEO (2003-2010) of Montreal International

Michel Hamelin, former city councilor at the City of Montreal (1974-1985) and former chair (1985-1993) of the Montreal Urban Community

Jean Lauzon, co-founder and Director of enhancement programs (as of 2013) at Éco-Nature

Sylvia Oljemark, board member (as of 2013), past president and co-founder of the Green Coalition


Yves Ryan, former mayor (1963-2001) of the City of Montreal-North and founding member, Suburban Mayors Conference


Jacques St-Laurent, CEO (as of 2013 and since 2010) of Montreal International

Alain Trudeau, planning staff member (as of 2013) at the City of Montreal and former planning staff member of the MUC (1989-1993)

Pierre Valiquette, environmental activist, close collaborator of and part-time staff member at Éco-Nature since 1990