TO COUNTERBALANCE THE WORLD:
ENGLAND, SPAIN, & PEACE IN THE EARLY 17TH CENTURY

Volume I

Robert Stuart Davis Cross

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To Counterbalance the World – dissertation abstract

What happens when two countries – the universally-acknowledged heads of rival religious traditions, many of whose citizens have come to see the other as the embodiment of all that is evil in the world – decide that after many years of conflict, it is finally time to make peace? As a result of extensive research in European archives, and by reading traditional diplomatic sources through a more culturally focused lens, my work sees the Anglo-Spanish connection in a very different light. Instead of the familiar narrative dominated by nationalistic stereotypes and sharp polarities, I see a complex interchange where cultural, political, intellectual, and commercial elements mixed and influenced each other to a surprising degree.

Peace was neither a late-Elizabethan foregone conclusion nor a fait accompli upon the Stuart accession. A complicated sequence of events needed to occur in order to bring it to pass, and all of this was directly connected to the new strategies and political environments established at the beginning of the reigns of Philip III and James I.

In order to explain how this worked, first I deal with how the opportunity for peace came about, with the change in Habsburg leaders and priorities, and the all-important accession of King James. Next, I look at the darker days when those first high hopes came into direct contact with the bumps and bruises of a factionalizing English domestic sphere and its interconnected, highly oppositional international system. Then comes a detailed section on the actual achievement of the treaty itself. And finally I examine the extraordinary embassies celebrating the peace, with an analysis of how this relationship would develop in the years to come. Politics, culture, religion, and popular perceptions were all at play here, and these moments of contact helped define attitudes in both countries over an entire generation. In the end, it is only by approaching these years from a fundamentally transnational perspective that we can see how it
was that a difficult peace was achieved, and gain crucial insight into the way in which both
countries’ domestic politics and the European international system would play out in the
following two decades.
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<tr>
<td>AGS</td>
<td>Archivo General de Simancas</td>
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<tr>
<td>AGS Estado</td>
<td>Secretarías del Consejo de Estado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akkigg</td>
<td><em>Letters of King James VI and I</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>BL</td>
<td>British Library</td>
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<td>BL, Addl Mss</td>
<td>British Library, Additional Manuscripts</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNM</td>
<td>Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODOIN</td>
<td>Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condestable</td>
<td><em>Relación de la Jornada del Excelentissimo Condestable de Castilla, a las pazes entre España y Inglaterra, que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de Agosto, Año 1604</em> (Valencia, 1604)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNB</td>
<td>Dictionary of National Biography</td>
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<td>doc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Folger</td>
<td>Folger Shakespeare Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMC</td>
<td>Historical Manuscripts Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>HMC Salisbury</td>
<td>HMC. <em>A calendar of the manuscripts of the Most Hon. The marquis of Salisbury, KG, &amp;c, presered at Hatfield House, Hertfordshire</em> (24 vols., London, 1883-1976)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isabel</td>
<td><em>Correspondencia de la Infanta Archiduquesa Doña Isabel Clara Eugenia de Austria con el Doque de Lerma y otros personajes</em> (ed. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, Madrid, 1906)</td>
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<td>leg.</td>
<td>legajo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tassis I</td>
<td><em>Relación muy verdadera del recebimiento y fiestas que se le hizieron en Inglaterra a don Iuan de Tassis, Conde de Villamediana, Embaxador extraordinario de su Magestad del Rey Don Felipe tercero nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Iacobo de Inglaterra. Dase cuenta de la Embaxada, y otras cosas muy notables y dignas de saberse.</em> (Sevilla, 1603)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tassis II</td>
<td><em>La Segunda parte, de la Embaxada de Don Iuan de Tassis, Conde de Villamediana, y Embaxador de su Magestad del Rey Don Felipe tercero nuestro Señor, para el nuevo Rey Iacobo de Inglaterra. Da se cuenta de lo que su Magestad le respondio, y los grandes comedimientos que se le hizieron.</em> (Sevilla, 1604)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA: PRO</td>
<td>The National Archives, Public Record Office</td>
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<td>TNA: PRO SP</td>
<td>State Papers</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Winwood</td>
<td>Memorials of Affairs of State in the Reigns of Q. Elizabeth and K. James I. Collected (chiefly) from the Original Papers of the Right Honourable Sir Ralph Winwood, Kt. sometime one of the Principal Secretaries of State (ed. Edmund Sawyer, 3 vols., London, 1725)</td>
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Acknowledgments

I would like to thank all of the staffs at the various libraries and archives where I have had the opportunity to work over the duration of this project, spread across five countries. If it had not been for their help and encouragement, my navigation through the mountains of source material would have been a much more difficult, and perhaps impossible task. In particular, those at the institutions where I have spent the greatest amount of my time: the Archivo General de Simancas, the Biblioteca Real de Madrid, the Biblioteca Nacional de España, the Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, and the British Library. Thank you also to all those at Princeton’s Firestone Library, particularly Elizabeth Bennett, who went out of her way to ensure that I had access to various sources that I otherwise would not have been able to use. Thank you to Princeton University in general, and the history department in particular, for providing me with the opportunity to pursue my research, and the forum within which to craft my ideas. Warm thanks also go out to all of the students and scholars whose thoughts, questions, and criticisms have helped me refine my work over the years. Though many are deserving, I would like to give special recognition to Thomas Cogswell, John Elliott, Michael Questier, Paul Hammer, Alastair Bellany, Nigel Smith, and Kenneth Mills – as well as Catherine Gallagher, Thomas Barnes, and Robert Middlekauff for their early encouragement to pursue a life in the academy. A special thanks goes to my colleagues and students at Colgate University, who helped provide a fertile intellectual environment for me once I embarked upon the writing stage of the dissertation. And I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee – Theodore Rabb, Antonio Feros, and Adam Beaver – for their work, their inspiration, and their advice over the years. To my primary supervisors, Peter Lake and Anthony Grafton, goes my greatest debt of gratitude. This would not have been possible without their faith in me and my
ideas, and they have taught me so much and pushed me so much farther than I would have been able to have gone on my own. Finally, I would like to thank my fantastic wife Mai’a for sharing this journey with me, for her constant intellectual input, patience, continued support, and love. This work is dedicated to her.
Chapter One: The eyes of all the world

“The affair is great which your majesty is at present to consider of, and the greatest that ever king of England had; for the branches are many, and most weighty; the eyes of all the world behold your majesty herein; and as your majesty shall deal like yourself, so shall your majesty be valued of all nations: if any persuade your majesty to pass it over slightly, he is ignorant, and understands it not.”

– Sir Walter Raleigh

England and Spain of the Reformation and post-Reformation period have traditionally been seen as two monolithic, diametrically-opposed entities: good vs. evil, honorable protestant vs. corrupt catholic, innovating underdog vs. cruelly reactionary superpower, a new Athens vs. a much less new Sparta, etc. ad nauseum. The prevailing view of this historical relationship is still based largely on scholarship from the nineteenth century, with virtually no new work done in decades. A new model clearly needs to be articulated, and it is my hope to be able to help bring this about.

The study of early modern Britain tends to be a rather insular endeavor – both figuratively and literally. On the occasions when historians have actually looked at relations with the continental powers and their inhabitants, it has usually been with an eye to war and the necessary foreign policy decisions and expenditures that bellicose actions entail. This is certainly understandable. After all, the various European powers had been in an ever-shifting but virtually unbroken state of war with one another from the beginnings of the Habsburg-Valois struggle in the 1490s, and for this period war may be said to have been an almost continent-wide natural state of affairs. However, over the course of the sixteenth century, developments in military technology and the consequently exponential rise in the cost of waging such wars, in human and monetary terms, eventually took its toll. So much so that even the Spanish monarchy

– the greatest and richest power in Europe – was forced into the early modern equivalent of bankruptcy on four separate occasions during the reign of Philip II alone. By century’s end, virtually every country in western and central Europe was exhausted or overstretched, and peace was beginning to look like an attractive option to many.

Consequently, rather than replicate the well-trodden path of focus upon periods of war, I have chosen to ask what seemed at first to be a relatively straightforward question: What happens when two countries – the universally-acknowledged heads of rival religious traditions, many of whose citizens have come to see the other as the embodiment of all that is evil in the world – decide that after fighting one another tooth-and-nail for almost twenty years, it is finally time to make peace? It turns out that the answer to this question is a great deal more complicated than at first it might seem.

This dissertation is essentially a political and cultural history of international relations, set in a period of crucial importance to the development of modern Europe. Through extensive archival research in several countries and languages, and by looking at traditional diplomatic sources both with a skeptical eye towards various long-held historical assumptions and through a somewhat more culturally-focused lens, I have come to see the Anglo-Spanish relationship in a very different light. Instead of the familiar narrative dominated by nationalistic stereotypes and sharp polarities, I see a complex interchange where cultural, political, intellectual, and commercial elements mixed and influenced one another to a surprising degree. Instead of an inevitable drive in two societies towards war, revolution, or decline, I see a moment where cooperation and cultural contact were to a certain extent mutually desired, provided a host of positive results, and where peace once achieved can be said to have actually been “working.”

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The first three decades of the seventeenth century were a time of intensive diplomatic activity and almost unparalleled cultural, commercial, and intellectual interchange. And yet, they would also witness Europe slip ultimately into the most destructive war it would see before the twentieth century. As the greatest protestant and catholic powers, respectively, England and Spain played leading roles in all of this. With the death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603, both governments found it in their best interests to negotiate an end to the state of growing conflict and all-out war that had defined their relationship for the better part of forty years. Little needs to be said here regarding the events of that conflict itself, for they have been a fundamental chapter in the traditional story of western civilization, and are seared deeply into the English national consciousness. The ferocious sea battles, English privateers raiding the Spanish main, the several Spanish armadas. Names such as Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, and the earl of Essex are famous to many, and have been used for centuries to frighten Spanish children into obedience. The coming of the “Invincible Armada” of 1588 in itself has been the subject of a vast array of books, articles, television documentaries, and conferences, and it is one of the salient events in the story of both English and Spanish nationalism. And, of course, no one expects the Spanish Inquisition.

Despite all of this, at the turn of the seventeenth century the two countries were not in fact traditional enemies. In both cases this distinction was held quite firmly by the Kingdom of France. Spain and England had been wartime allies against the French as recently as 1558, and

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this shared tradition of rivalry and opposition to their common Gallic neighbor was one that
dated back centuries, and which had only grown more intense over time. And despite all the
conflict between England and Spain over the past couple of decades, despite the deep rifts that
had developed with regard to matters of religion, despite the papal excommunication of
Elizabeth and everything this entailed in the minds of both the hotter sorts of English protestants
and so many fervently catholic Spaniards, by 1603 it had been a long war and many in both
countries were ready to see it end. While this desire was of course a prerequisite, it was going to
take a great deal more than that to bring an end to the war, and understanding why and how the
peace occurred is instrumental in coming to terms with how the relationship developed in later
years. So much so, that this dissertation has ultimately come to be focused firmly on the
achievement of the peace and its immediate effects, while the detailed story of the subsequent
relationship will form the basis of my second book project.

**Changing perspectives**

Over a century ago, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, the great Victorian-era historian of early
Stuart England, essentially dismissed the entire Anglo-Spanish peace process offhand with one
simple phrase: “Under these circumstances there wanted little more to constitute a treaty
between the two Powers than the few lines in which the simple announcement might be made
that hostilities were at an end.”⁴ Ever since then, the widely accepted historical view of the
peace process has remained almost entirely in line with this belief. And this would not be a

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⁴ Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *History of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of
the Civil War 1603-1642* (London: Longmans, Green, and co., 1883), I, 101.
problem if it were not for one rather important detail: there is almost no way that Gardiner’s claim could have been further from the truth.\(^5\)

Despite being both necessary and desired by many, achieving peace was no easy task, and as important as it was, the eventual treaty that was signed was only part of the story. Moreover, looking at how it was achieved not only tells us a great deal about the subsequent Anglo-Spanish relationship, it also gives us crucial insight into the way in which both English domestic politics and the European international system would play out in the coming years. Peace was a new approach with which all sectors of each society had to come to terms. Despite the official end to hostilities, the citizens, merchants, and ruling elites of the two countries nevertheless found the new relationship fraught with a number of new difficulties and contradictory attitudes. As the most powerful state in Europe, the Spanish monarchy was at once a threatening and attractive example to the inhabitants of Great Britain. At the same time, England was a major concern for Spaniards, particularly on the diplomatic, religious, and mercantile fronts. And yet, there still has been very little work on this relationship in decades, and what little focus has been given to the actual achievement of the peace has still been mired in

\(^5\) To be sure, Gardiner does enter into some specifics about how the treaty was ultimately carried out. But he does not spend much time on it, and portrays it as really being all about the Dutch cause and King James’s supposed lack of knowledge or understanding of these issues. For him it is a matter of James making a unilateral choice as soon as he arrived in England, and then leaving it to his ministers to draw up the treaty the following year – of course, only after dealing with a number of apparently more pressing issues, such as devious plots by catholics, the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, the Hampton Court conference, and the beginnings of the Stuart problems with Parliament. And what is given over to the peace is, of course, seen through the lens of a dangerous yet inept Spain bent ultimately on English conversion and/or corruption. See especially: Gardiner I, 101-107, 204-216.
the centuries-old stereotypes and assumptions that, ironically, these very events originally helped to create.  

However, various significant changes in the separate histories of each country and in the field in general offer the historian a number of fresh perspectives. Grand ideological shifts have meant the abandoning of long-cherished stereotypes, while new standards of scholarship have been accompanied by a whole host of heretofore unasked questions and ways of approaching the

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For a short, general overview, see Elliott’s introductory chapter in Jonathan Brown and John Huxtable Elliott, *The Sale of the Century: Artistic Relations between Spain and Great Britain, 1604-1655* (New Haven: Yale University Press in association with Museo Nacional del Prado Madrid, 2002). For some very fine comparative work on the two countries’ empires, see John Huxtable Elliott, *Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). But for relatively recent work on the nature of the Jacobean Anglo-Spanish relationship in detail, the work of Pauline Croft — most notably on the Spanish Company in the first couple years of James’s reign, as well as trading with the enemy during the latter part of the Elizabethan wars — has been about it: J. Pauline Croft, *The Spanish Company* (London: London Record Society, 1973). Pauline Croft, "Trading with the Enemy 1585-1604," *The Historical Journal* 32, no. 2 (1989). I address her most recent piece on the peace itself further down in this chapter. In addition, the Jesuit historian Albert J. Loomie wrote a few articles on somewhat limited connections between Spain and the Britain of Charles I, complementing some of his earlier work and source collections on Spanish religious connections with Elizabethan and Jacobean England, some of which have been bundled together and republished somewhat more recently in facsimile format as: Albert J. Loomie, *Spain and the Early Stuarts, 1585-1655*, Variorum Collected Studies Series (Aldershot, UK: Variorum, 1996). But other than Croft and Loomie, there has been little work since the diplomatic history of the 1950s and 1960s, most notably represented by the following two works: Garrett Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York: Dover, 1955; reprint, 1988). and Charles Howard Carter, *The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964). And even this material seems relatively cutting-edge for the topic, as the last really comprehensive approach to the connection in the period was another work by Gardiner, written in the nineteenth century: Samuel Rawson Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage: 1617-1623*, 2 vols. (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1869). The only real exception to this has been Glyn Redworth, *The Prince & the Infanta: The Cultural Politics of the Spanish Match* (New Haven, Conn. London: Yale University Press, 2004), a recent attempt to address the negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match at the end of James’s reign. But this work offers little that is new beyond the Gardinerian narrative, despite its claims at comprehensiveness only deals somewhat closely with a very short period at the end of the peacetime relationship, and is so deeply flawed in so many respects that it is quite simply of little use. For specifics on why, please see: Robert Cross, "Pretense and Perception in the Spanish Match, or History in a Fake Beard," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 37, no. 4 (2007).
available evidence. Since the 1960s, a number of major developments have revolutionized the way we look at Britain in the seventeenth century. Certainly the most significant of these has been the wave of “revisionist” writings that began to appear in force in the early- to mid-1970s. At this time, historians began to challenge the view that the British wars of the 1640s constituted a major turning point, the climax of a number of long-term, ever-growing, and even inevitable political, cultural, social, and religious conflicts. What had long been seen by many as an overwhelmingly significant and perhaps predestined moment in the grand story of the development of English parliamentary liberty, and by others as a typically Marxist bourgeois revolution, now was shown to have been the result of a number of more avoidable factors. While this move was mainly concerned with explaining the lead-up to events later in the century, by overturning long-held assumptions about a relatively steady progress from at least 1603, revisionism has had a profound impact on the study of every aspect of early Stuart England.

In the wake of the revisionists’ attack on the previously dominant Whig, liberal, and Marxist approaches to the period, the last thirty years in British history have seen a rather severe

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move away from large-scale syntheses and broader canvasses. Despite providing a much-needed antidote to the overly teleological story told by their forebears, revisionist scholars have effectively pushed the entire field much farther in one particular direction than is perhaps helpful. In their rush to underline the roles of contingency and personality in the lead-up to the most turbulent period of the century, the revisionists have been responsible for an overwhelming field-wide tendency to focus on the local and the particular. This has not been in the French tradition of the *Annales* school, where the turn toward the study of localities and individuals was a part of a greater move towards social history, context, and the *longue durée*. Quite the contrary. The historiographical shift in British studies has instead exchanged admittedly imperfect master narratives for a revamped sort of short-term narrative history with its primary focus on the actions and decisions of individuals, particularly in high politics and religion. While there is nothing wrong with this in and of itself—indeed, the present study admittedly owes quite a bit to this approach— one result of this upheaval of the 1970s and 80s has been a significant turn inwards.  

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half of the seventeenth century in particular—have given much focus to its connections with the world across the channel.\textsuperscript{10}

While quite a bit of other exciting work is being done in the field currently, this general lack of a European focus is particularly troublesome. To be sure, historians of early modern Britain have not simply ignored the rest of Europe. But when the continent has been mentioned, it has usually been within a limited perspective. Foreign policy, for example, is most often discussed as an isolated aspect of the domestic political picture, and not for its merits in their own right or for the fundamental interaction between the two. And it is now very rare to find anything involving continental archives or foreign languages alongside a reasoned account of English politics or of the lasting connections between Britain and the other countries in western Europe.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, as newer generations of historians finally recognized the promise of the

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\textsuperscript{10} There has been, of course, a promising move towards a more truly “British” history, attempting to weave the strands of the so-called “Celtic fringe” into the traditional tale of English dominance. This in turn has helped give rise to a very successful move by colonial historians generally of a slightly later period to try to speak of an “Atlantic world,” incorporating metropole and empire, core and periphery. Nevertheless, for the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the story told tends to remain one of England outside of Europe and predominant in its own little world, on its “sceptred isle” with its “protestant winds.”

\textsuperscript{11} A notable exception here is Simon Adams’s 1973 PhD thesis from the University of Oxford, entitled “The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630.” However, while this work is particularly helpful, it still illustrates the overall point, as it is almost forty years old, still
study of traditionally underrepresented segments of the historical population (not to mention, in
the case of Britain, of entire peoples), diplomatic history on the period fell out of style and has
hardly been done at all in more than three decades. And even the most traditional and perhaps
obvious of connections, political thought, has been thrown into doubt by inveterate revisionists
who will have us believe that not only did Englishmen not read Bodin, Mariana, or other
influential continental thinkers, but that the very concept of a conflict between the opposing
ideologies of absolutism, common law, and the rights of the ancient constitution was somehow
inconceivable to them. It is ironic that the very shift in British history that was meant to
dismantle Whiggery and the idea of an English sonderweg would be so embodied in an insular
approach that cares little for the outside world.

unpublished, and consequently not that easy to get ahold of. Jacobean foreign relations has
received very little attention in recent years, and while there has been quite a bit written on
Elizabethan foreign affairs, for historians writing in English this has been almost entirely based
in English archives and English-language sources. For an impassioned appeal to change this
trajectory, itself now fifteen years old, see: Geoffrey Parker, "The World Beyond Whitehall:
British Historiography and European Archives," in The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in
Politics and Political Culture, ed. R. Malcolm Smuts (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University

See, for example, Glenn Burgess, Absolute Monarchy and the Stuart Constitution (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996). J.P. Somerville has tried to correct this imbalance for
political thought, as has Malcolm Smuts to a certain extent for high culture. See, for example: J.
P. Sommerville, "English and European Political Ideas in the Early Seventeenth Century:
(London: Longman, 1999). Smuts, ed., The Stuart Court and Europe: Essays in Politics and
Political Culture. Smuts, Culture and Power in England, 1585-1685. But it is still a pretty small
group, with very little actual work in foreign archives.

This is, of course, less true with reference to events later in the century, particularly with
regard to the rise of English republicanism and the influence that a number of scholars have
shown the works of Machiavelli to have had on this process. See especially: J. G. A. Pocock,
The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition,
2nd paperback ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975); Quentin Skinner,
Foundations of Modern Political Thought: The Renaissance, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 1978); Quentin Skinner, Machiavelli (New York: Hill and Wang,
1981); Gisela Bock et al., Machiavelli and Republicanism, Ideas in Context (New York:
This need not be so. After all, it is precisely the multitude and diversity of connections between Britain and the continent that have always made this period such an interesting and important one in the history of each country, and of Europe as a whole. This was the time of Shakespeare and Cervantes, Bacon, Rubens, Raleigh, and Galileo. Merchants and explorers were sailing all over the globe, and more members of the population at large were becoming exposed to foreign products, cultures, and customs than at any time in their history. To be sure, the remarkable cultural, intellectual, political, and economic interaction at this time did not always produce the most savory results. The slave trade, religious strife, virtually endemic war, and the whole sordid tale of empire all testify as much. Nor is the story of the Anglo-Spanish relationship itself that much different, as in the end contact would prove to be as much a tool of obfuscation as it was of enlightenment. Indeed, as the existence of shadows requires the presence of light, we shall see how the former was in many ways the very product of the latter.

Despite its shortcomings, one of the most positive contributions of revisionism was that it was coupled from the start with a renewed emphasis on the importance of thorough archival research. While many current scholars have quite rightly and eloquently questioned many of the revisionists’ conclusions, they have generally internalized this positive contribution, and have maintained this solid archival base in their own work. Indeed, I agree wholeheartedly with Richard Cust and Ann Hughes when they argue that there were long-term ideological and social tensions in early modern England, and that this does not mean that the tensions led inevitably to

Cambridge University Press, 1990); Vickie B. Sullivan, *Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the Formation of a Liberal Republicanism in England* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Paul Anthony Rahe, *Machiavelli’s Liberal Republican Legacy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). But as welcome as these works are, it should be noted that even in this tradition, a great deal of emphasis tends to be put upon the importance of the later publication of these works in English translations, decades after all of the most prominent and influential English thinkers had begun to read them in Italian, French, or Latin.
the type of conflict that ultimately came about in the 1640s.\textsuperscript{14} But the convincing nature of their argument owes a great deal to the tradition of rigorous scholarship and the willingness to challenge preconceived notions that has been a significant feature of the British historical landscape for the past forty years. Consequently, it is as a result of both revisionist and post-revisionist scholarship that we have come to understand the first several decades of the seventeenth century in a much clearer and very different light.

Of the many changes, one of the most significant has been in our understanding of the nature and importance of the royal court. The works of Neil Cuddy, Linda Levy Peck, Alastair Bellany, and Natalie Mears, amongst others, have all shown as anachronistic the long-standing belief that the “real” work of government and administration could be effectively separated from the ostensibly meaningless leisure, ostentation, and flattery of the court.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, the two were almost indistinguishably intertwined. Ministers, courtiers, secretaries, and favorites all rubbed shoulders constantly, and two or more of these roles were often combined in the same person. Patronage and faction, personal affinity, and contact with the king were all significant parts of the daily governance of the kingdom. In addition, these recent developments in court history have shown a world of both shifting alliances and ideological conflict, in which there were many positions and viewpoints open to and expressed by persons at court and in the culture at large. It is only by taking into account the complex workings and goings-on at court that we can come to

\textsuperscript{14} Cust and Hughes, eds., \textit{Conflict in Early Stuart England}, 17. Also essential here is: Lake, "Review Article: The Causes."

understand the political issues of the day, and it was these political and personal connections that helped define so many of the cultural, intellectual, and societal aspects of international connections and perception.

A similar sort of change has occurred in our understanding of events and processes at the court of Spain. The wide-ranging work of John Elliott and Jonathan Brown has been crucial in establishing how it was that the court operated in the Habsburg realm, not just in high politics but in its nexus with art, architecture, cultural production, and empire. And there has been a great deal of subsequent work that has built upon some of Elliott’s pioneering conclusions about monarchs and favorites in the mid-seventeenth century, and which has argued convincingly for similar sorts of influence and complexity at court in the reigns of the previous kings as well.

Most notably Bernardo García García on the coherent peace policy of Philip III and the duke of Lerma, and Antonio Feros’s groundbreaking book on Philip, Lerma, and the intricacies of political discourse and practice under their rule. As a result of both this and the


17 Bernardo José García García, La Pax Hispánica: Política Exterior del Duque de Lerma, Avisos de Flandes; 5 (Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press, 1996); Antonio Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Also crucial is: Antonio Feros, "Twin Souls: Monarchs and Favourites in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain," in Spain, Europe and the Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott, ed. Richard L. Kagan and Geoffrey Parker (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). In fact, this is a particularly important development for the nature of the Anglo-Spanish relationship, as so much of the narrative – from Gardiner up through the most recent (but still over forty year-old) works of Mattingly and Carter – has based a number of its fundamental assumptions on the traditional views of Philip III and Lerma as inept and corrupt bumbling. For the former, Gardiner describes him as “a prince whose bigotry was only equalled by his listlessness and inefficiency”. Gardiner, I, 205. For the latter, Mattingly has this to say: “Only such incompetents as Somerset, Lerma and Concino Concini could have
aforementioned literature on the English court, not only do we now see the participation of royal favorites in early modern governance in a less negative light, but it is also quite clear that they and their monarchs employed all kinds of complex strategies in order to maintain and extend their dominance both at home and abroad.\(^\text{18}\)

Another crucial and connected development in recent years has been the appearance of quite a bit of work highlighting the significance of the role of royal women in early modern Europe – and not just for queens regnant. In this vein, Leeds Berroll has shown just how much power Anna of Denmark had in the reign of her husband, King James.\(^\text{19}\) Her court was a separate focal point for patronage and political intrigue, and her cultural influence was truly dominant. A similar tale has also been told for Spain, as Magdalena Sánchez has focused on the perhaps even greater influence wielded by three Austrian Habsburg women at the court of Philip III.\(^\text{20}\) Indeed, this was an age of very strong or important queens and queen consorts, from Elizabeth I and Mary Queen of Scots, to Catherine and Marie de Medici, to Henriette-Marie and Anne of Austria.\(^\text{21}\) Various women played a significant political role in each of the major

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countries, and it was understood by most people that they could. But perhaps even more significant for any study of international connections at the time is the fact that, in many cases, these influential women were foreigners. As a result, this literature is particularly relevant for our purposes here, as it underlines the importance of competing interest groups and the nuances of power wielded in ways that have been traditionally ignored or underplayed. It emphasizes just how crucial the more informal aspects of politics and governance were, and reminds us that international dimensions were intertwined with even the seemingly most domestic of issues.

**Regime change**

Focusing on the achievement of peace also tells us a great deal about the nature of early Stuart English government itself. This dissertation is not explicitly about James I. But a close familiarity with these sources makes any attempt to follow the traditional line about the first Stuart king of England a difficult thing indeed. This much-maligned monarch of England and Scotland has had a reputation as a dissolute, cowardly, easily-dominated pedant since the collapse of the Stuart monarchy in his son’s reign. Over the years, James’s court has been shown in an extremely unflattering light by a number of very influential writers, among them the great Sir Walter Scott, and the view has persisted in unadulterated form almost to this day. In fact, this negative perception of James’s abilities and character plays a central role in the works of the most influential writer on the Anglo-Spanish connection to date: the celebrated and aforementioned nineteenth-century historian, Samuel Rawson Gardiner. As thorough as much of his research-gathering was, Gardiner based most of his subsequent analysis of events and the interpretation of his evidence on his own preconceived ideas of who the great men were, and

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22 Perhaps the most famous example of this is: Sir Walter Scott, *Fortunes of Nigel* (London: Dutton, 1910).
who were the fools. Consequently, diplomatic and political setbacks are frequently explained as a result of James’s supposedly feeble mind or of the ease with which he was said to be held in thrall by the Spanish ambassador or one of his own royal favorites. And Gardiner’s view was both a result of the persistence of such stereotypes and historical assumptions over the preceding centuries, and was overwhelmingly influential in its own day and since.\textsuperscript{23}

Over the past few decades, however, this view of the king and his reign has begun to change. Many of the revisionist accounts of the period, anxious to demonstrate the lack of ideological conflict in England before the late 1630s, have shown that James was in fact a much more accomplished monarch than had been previously assumed. Scottish historians such as Gordon Donaldson and Jenny Wormald have definitively shown that he was a very effective king north of the Tweed, and that at least some of these abilities translated reasonably well into his rule of England after 1603.\textsuperscript{24} The work of J. P. Somerville has shown that James was one of the most learned and intelligent individuals ever to sit on a throne in Britain, with a coherent approach to the theory and practice of his kingship,\textsuperscript{25} and a number of relatively recent works

\textsuperscript{23} He approaches Anglo-Spanish relations in a similar way, basing his conclusions largely on his own assumptions about what must have been the case rather than a close look at his evidence. A typical example is in the eighth chapter of the first volume, when he sums up any post-treaty difficulties between the English and Spanish merchants and officials as coming from some sense of natural antipathy between the nations: “arising from the ill-feeling which was the legacy of the long war—a feeling which the Government strove in vain to allay, by repeated attempts to draw the bonds of amity closer than the character of the two nations would warrant.” Gardiner, I, 340. As we shall see in chapter five, there were real reasons for fault lines to show, based not in generalizations about national character, but in events on the ground and attitudes about peace. And as we shall also see in chapters two, five, and eight through ten, there was in fact a great deal of positive interaction between the people of these two nations over the course of these very years.

\textsuperscript{24} Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V-VII (Edinburgh: 1965); Jenny Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?," History 68, no. 223 (1983).

have begun to demonstrate the extent of James’s actual exercise of power, his political shrewdness, and his ability to adjust policies to changing circumstances. All of this means that many analyses of politics, diplomacy, patronage, and public perception need to be reconfigured, and in some cases completely rethought.

While James’s reputation has benefited from a real rehabilitation over the past thirty years, our understanding of him nevertheless has quite a ways to go – both in percolating through to take hold in all segments of the historical community, and in coming to terms with the precise way in which James practiced what he would refer to as his “kingcraft”. Moreover, despite the revisions, historians’ view of his position with regard to the actual achievement of peace and the development of faction at court have not changed much at all, thanks in large part to the lack of

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27 This is certainly the case for the Anglo-Spanish connection, considering the near-total dominance that Gardiner’s view has exerted on those who have examined it over the years. See especially the work of C. H. Carter and Garrett Mattingly for examples.
attention to the Spanish relationship. And this is a real problem – as understanding the peace is crucial in coming to terms with how both domestic politics and foreign policy operated during the years that followed.

There is still a great deal of confusion amongst scholars of these years about the contemporary debate over peace and war, about how the end of Elizabeth’s reign stands in relation to the beginning of James’s, and about how peace was ultimately able to come about at all. The fact that James facilitated his smooth transition to the throne by help from and in secret correspondence with Elizabeth’s leading ministers in the old queen’s final years tends to lead people to assume that there was very little change in the political culture or power structure with the new king’s accession. And this belief in the continuity of personnel and practice is naturally carried over into the discussion of policy. But this fundamental misunderstanding has caused even some of the best historians to have to make some rather convoluted arguments and inconsistent claims in order to paper over the changes that occurred, leading to some real contradiction and confusion.

One welcome exception about attitudes (though not about Spain) has been Tyacke, "Puritan Politicians and King James VI and I, 1587-1604." While not on the same subject as my work, and tending perhaps to overstress the extent to which there was continuity between Elizabeth’s last years and James’s early ones, Tyacke’s article does draw some important, compatible conclusions about the nature of early Jacobean government, pointing out how English policy did seem to change a great deal in that first year of James’s reign, and how opposition quickly developed by 1604. He does, however, see this opposition as essentially a reaction to James’s apparent attempt to get everyone to agree, as opposed to what I argue here throughout about the importance of James’s encouragement of conflict.

Again, Tyacke’s work here is something of an exception, and some of his conclusions regarding James’s lead in the crown’s policy towards puritanism should tell us a little something about James’s role in other areas of policy.

Take, for example, Wallace MacCaffrey’s book on the late Elizabethan regime, which says that the war in Ireland was a main reason to make peace with Spain (232), then says that there could be no stable peace with Spain as long as they could help foment rebellion in Ireland (244). It emphasizes the English moving away from peace by 1603 (237-244), but then says that the war was only just barely alive at the time of Elizabeth’s death, and that the achievement of peace

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Much of this confusion is rooted in the specific nature of the historiography itself. There are essentially two strands of thought that have dominated the view of the peace and James’s role in it, and both grew out of the stereotypes and prejudices formed later in the seventeenth century which were then perpetuated and extended by the Whig tradition exemplified by Gardiner’s quote in the early part of this chapter. In each case, it has traditionally been assumed that peace was an easy step once James came to the throne – that both sides were exhausted, the war was basically over, and the treaty was therefore nothing more than an unimportant formality that just sort of came about.

In the first strand – the traditional view – James is generally seen as the direct cause of this state of affairs. Peace is said to have happened because the king wanted it, end of story. He is portrayed as either naïve, a pacifist, a coward, or some combination of all three, and these qualities are then assumed to have meant that war was out of the question, and therefore peace was quickly concluded, essentially by royal fiat. There was even a tendency lurking at the heart of the traditional Whiggish and Victorian take to suggest that, while being all of these things, James was also in some way personally aligned against the real national interests of his kingdom and its people. That he was, through some mixture of malevolence and credulity, becoming captive to the insidious plots of catholic Spain, and that he may have hoped to be able to emulate their version of continental absolute monarchy in the British isles someday.31

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31 For this, Gardiner’s work is yet again fundamental. But by the middle of the twentieth century, views of this relationship were at least beginning to change, as can be seen especially in: Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy, 226-27. and Charles Howard Carter, "Gondomar: Ambassador to James I," The Historical Journal 7, no. 2 (1964). Had diplomatic history not fallen out of fashion so quickly after this, these viewpoints might have stood a better chance of helping in the re-evaluation of James and the nature of his role in governance. A recent mixture of the inheritances of both of these views of James can be seen in the generally excellent:
In addition to this view, there has always existed alongside it the intellectual underpinnings of a second strand rooted in these negative views of the first Stuart king, but which has gone a step further, emphasizing James’s supposed incompetence and denying royal agency altogether. This is based on a different (though linked) set of stereotypes and assumptions about the king’s character, centered around his perceived laziness, his love of the chase, and as a result his supposed abdication of nearly all of his monarchical responsibilities. In this view, most positive decisions or effective government action are seen as having nothing to do with anything James did or desired, but rather as having been carried out by the king’s much wiser, hardworking ministers (such as Cecil), and all reasonable and insightful points of view are considered to have been the exclusive purview of the period’s traditionally acknowledged intellectual heroes (such as Raleigh or Bacon).32

Both of these strands have continued to inform the historiography of the peace to this very day in some form or another, even with the dismantling of the various teleological master narratives, and after the general attempts at a reevaluation of the reputation of James I. Recent work on the period still assumes that the Whiggish view was correct, that the achievement of peace after James’s accession was a quick, straightforward endeavor – whether as a result of the new king’s royal will, or because it was already a fait accompli upon his arrival. Continued expression of the first strand – assuming James’s responsibility for the supposedly quick and


32 While this was not usually an explicit part of traditional explanations of the peace itself, it was a central tenet in the Whiggish mythology of “James the bad king” when referring to various other episodes, and consequently can be seen throughout works such as Gardiner’s which embrace the first, “a quick peace as a result of royal fiat” viewpoint. The fundamental contradiction inherent in the simultaneous expression of these conflicting viewpoints may help explain much of the continued confusion over the issue amongst modern scholars.
easy peace – can be seen in some of even the most positive voices in support of an appreciation of the king’s talents. Indeed, this appreciation, perhaps understandably, generally leads to an assumption that at least on this issue the traditional view is correct. Consequently, the recent works that most celebrate James’s intellectual ability, political skill, international vision, and even pacific disposition all look directly at this period and pass over the achievement of the peace with little or nothing to say. For example, W. B. Patterson’s otherwise excellent book on James’s ecumenicism, despite being all about James’s attitude towards peace on the continent and politico-religious reconciliation, gives no space whatsoever to the actual achievement of the peace in the first place. And Diana Newton’s recent take on the establishment of the Jacobean regime, while effusive in its praise for the new king and all about the importance of the first couple of years of his English reign, also has no real section on the achievement of the peace, devoting only a few short pages to what amounts basically to a quick retelling of the traditional line.

33 Patterson, *King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom*. It may seem at first glance that my overall view is perhaps closest to that of Patterson. But there is a significant distinction upon which everything turns. For Patterson, everything is about James as a uniter, moderator, and a calming and ecumenical influence. While much of this may very well have been true, it is crucial to understand that this was only after he spent so much time playing sides off of one another, allowing them (and even encouraging them) to fight it out. There is a hint of this early on in Patterson’s book, where he describes James in Scotland [21]. But he then gives no analysis of the process of peacemaking at all, essentially endorsing the traditional view of it as a sort of royal fiat. Pages 29-30 just touch on it, saying generally that international peace was important, but very little else. Page 53 has one short paragraph mentioning James’s truce immediately after the accession, and giving the months when Villamediana arrived, when the conference began, and when peace was signed, but there is no discussion of how any of this played out. After that, there is the occasional sentence mentioning that the peace occurred, such as on pp. 90 and 294. But that is essentially it. And yet, it was these first two years, and the way in which international peace was achieved that is so crucial in understanding James, his reign, his relations with Spain, and the entire “interwar” international system itself.

In the rare case when the peace process actually has been addressed directly by modern scholars, it generally has been in accordance with the second strand of views about the king. This is the case with perhaps the most influential recent work on the topic, Pauline Croft’s chapter in the 2006 volume about James’s English accession, entitled “Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain”.\(^{35}\) Croft sees peace as essentially having been guaranteed by the time of James’s accession, entirely as a result of the work of Elizabeth’s ministers and the events of the preceding years.\(^{36}\) She sees King James as having played little or no role in the decision to make peace, nor in the actual process of bringing peace about.\(^{37}\) She claims that James was not particularly interested in the peace, that what little time he gave to it was against his will, and that he was not even around for most of the negotiations, leaving town the week

\(^{35}\) Pauline Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," in The Accession of James I: Historical and Cultural Consequences, ed. Glenn Burgess, Rowland Wymer, and Jason Lawrence (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). This piece is of particular importance, as it is both the most recent work on this long-neglected subject and written by a major, well-respected scholar – which means that it is undoubtedly considered by many who come to the subject to be the authoritative piece on these negotiations.  

\(^{36}\) The recent and excellent work of Alexandra Gajda on the 1590s, though less about the attempts to make peace than the very public debate about it, should serve as something of an antidote to this. Indeed, she takes explicit issue with the “gradual shuffling towards peace” line that Croft and others such as MacCaffrey represent. Alexandra Gajda, "Debating War and Peace in Late Elizabethan England," The Historical Journal 52 (2009): 852.  

\(^{37}\) Despite portraying itself as a new approach in contrast to the traditional account, Croft’s chapter is really just a return to the Gardinerian tradition, based around a rather hagiographic view of Robert Cecil. What’s more, her take on the events of 1603-04 and on the larger picture of which they are a part – thanks to a bewildering combination of incorrect dates, apparent unfamiliarity with the basic events and people involved, and demonstrably false assertions about a number of crucial points, including but not limited to where James was when, the extent of his participation, and even when the peace conference occurred and how long it lasted – is quite simply wrong on almost every level. And the truly unfortunate thing is that Robert Cecil does not need this kind of over-the-top, distorted case made for him. He was clearly a formidable talent and a central figure. But Croft’s approach and insistence on Cecil’s role seems to blind her to everything else, thus keeping her from seeing how it was that Cecil worked in the system around him, in tandem with other talented ministers, and especially in conjunction with a very intelligent and politically skilled king. For more detail, see the discussion of the treaty negotiations in chapter seven.
after they began for a prolonged hunting trip through the English midlands that would last for most of the summer.\textsuperscript{38}

\textbf{A closer look}

But a closer look at the actual story of the achievement of peace tells a much different, much more complicated tale, as these events were motivated by an entirely separate set of ideas and perspectives than is typically acknowledged. Peace was not some sort of Elizabethan foregone conclusion, but rather required a complex sequence of events to come about. After a fundamental change in Spanish strategy and leadership which I shall discuss in chapter two, foremost among these events was the 1603 accession of James I. If there was ever an opportunity for a new start, this was it. Elizabeth’s death had itself removed a significant impediment to peace, and the Habsburg leaders were quite explicit about this. Both sides immediately declared a truce, James made it clear to everyone that peace was what he wanted, and his direct, personal involvement over the year that followed was instrumental in making sure that it came to pass.

Despite the importance of this, however, and in direct contrast with what the traditional view has argued, the road ahead from here was far from easy. From the very moment of the old

\textsuperscript{38} Croft is not alone in this. Paul Allen also has looked at these negotiations, but it has been largely within an attempt to explain Spanish policy. While this is certainly a welcome move, he has not challenged the traditional take on English perspectives, and his preoccupation with Spanish aims and events in the Low Countries has led him, like Croft, to overemphasize the years before the accession, and to prioritize the thoughts of military strategists at the expense of operations in the political sphere. Allen, \textit{Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy}. Moreover, Allen’s work is fundamentally grounded in a number of assumptions about Spanish aims and the supposed incompetence of Philip III and Lerma that seem to belong much more to an earlier era, before the existence of the absolutely crucial work of Feros, García García, Sánchez, and Schroth. For a more detailed explanation of precisely why, see: Antonio Feros, "Review of Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598-1621: The Failure of Grand Strategy," \textit{Hispanic American Historical Review} 81, no. 2 (2001).
queen’s death, the first contacts between Spaniards and Englishmen were remarkably positive, on both an elite and a popular level. However, as the months dragged on without much apparent movement towards a lasting peace, real tensions began to show, occasionally even leading to violence. Yet even this apparent souring played a significant, necessary role in bringing peace to pass, and how it was achieved sheds some real light on perceptions and strategies that would define the connection throughout the years to come. Moreover, while these tensions eased with the signing of the treaty in August 1604, the early trouble spots indicate where several of the future fault lines in the relationship would ultimately lie. In this way, a complex combination of centripetal and centrifugal forces was evident from the very beginning.

Although the peace was neither a practical inevitability at the time of Elizabeth’s death nor carried out by Jacobean royal fiat, one thing that is important to understand is just how crucial a role the new king of England played in the entire precarious, drawn-out process of getting to peace, how central he would remain to the future of the relationship, and just how much the latter was largely a product of the former. In order to understand how relations worked, we have to understand how peace worked. In order to understand how peace worked, we have to understand how peace came about. In order to understand how peace came about, we have to understand how both sides operated. In order to understand how both sides operated, we have to especially understand the nature of the newly formed Jacobean court. In order to understand the nature of this court, we have to understand how it was formed, and to what ends. In order to understand this, we have to understand the motivations of those who brought it about, and by far the most important person in all of this was King James himself. In fact, we do not merely need to understand James, we also need to understand how other people perceived him, as this played as central a role on the Spanish side of the equation as it did on the English.
This was a time in general and a moment in particular where one man could have an extraordinarily great amount of influence over events that affected large numbers of people. Not merely in what he said and did, but as a direct result of what countless others thought of him, and what they hoped he might say and do. This is not an argument for a “great man” theory of history in general, and it is by no means an entirely positive take on the first Stuart monarch in particular. It is just an acknowledgement that, in these particular circumstances, the role of this one individual was in many ways at least as important as (and indeed directly connected to), the perceptions, opinions, and actions of countless others in several nations. Nor is this acknowledgement antithetical to the study of social or cultural history. Indeed, one of my main contentions is that domestic politics and foreign policy were influenced here disproportionately and simultaneously from two seemingly different directions: on the one hand, by cultural, popular, and even foreign attitudes and perceptions; and on the other hand, by the specific thoughts, strategies, and actions of a few crucial individuals. And the views of the former had an influence on and were influenced by the latter. The two were fundamentally intertwined.

After all, as I will argue, this system established in the first years of the reign would be crucial in bringing peace to pass, but it would also lead in the long run to significant problems for English domestic politics that would play an important part in helping drive these countries even further apart. Consequently, while Croft has certainly gone too far in one direction, Patterson’s and Newton’s work may be said to have perhaps swung a bit too far in the opposite. But the question really is not so much how “good” a king James was, but rather coming to understand precisely how it was that his system operated.

While I give a great deal of focus to the elites and decisionmakers here, I also focus quite a bit on public perceptions, as no history of international connections in this period would be complete without at least some discussion of how these decisions and connections affected the lives and attitudes of regular Britons and Iberians, or how the opinions of these people helped influence events. Much work over the past couple of decades has begun to show the remarkable extent to which ordinary European men and women in the localities were informed of political, cultural, and even intellectual events in the cities, and consequently in the world at large. The work of Richard Cust, Tessa Watt, and Peter Lake has all stressed the importance of newsletters, pamphlets, and various forms of cheap print in the formation of political awareness, popular piety, and questions of identity. See, for example: Richard Cust, "News and Politics in Early
James’s decisions in that first year – regarding the establishment of favor and position in government, the treatment of ambassadors, and the formation of perceptions – created the system that would prevail both domestically and internationally during the entire period. This was a deliberate policy central to his understanding of kingship, and it both helped create the circumstances that allowed for peace to happen and built the foundation for how the peacetime relationships would be carried out. This involved a combination of the encouragement of a polycentric court structure, an internationalization of the domestic political scene, and both indirect and direct action by the king himself. As a result, not only would there eventually be peace, but it would be a peace that could be workable for both sides, promising a great deal of hope for the future without forcing anyone to have to commit to too much.

This was an important process that we need to do everything we can to try to get right, because it directly affected so many other things. For example, the three primary concerns in the first few years of James’s reign were international peace, the state of the English church, and union with Scotland. But the latter two are the ones that have traditionally gotten pored over, examined in great detail, and are taken to be both representative of king and kingdoms, and most influential in the course of subsequent events. However, in the first year or so of the new reign it

Seventeenth-Century England," Past and Present 112 (1986). Tessa Watt, Cheap Print and Popular Piety: 1550-1640 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Peter Lake and Michael Questier, The Antichrist's Lewd Hat: Protestants, Papists and Players in Post-Reformation England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002). For Spain, Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallainá Bueno and others have shown just how pervasive crusader stories, picaresque novels, and works such as Don Quixote were for even illiterate sailors and farmers who could be and were often read to. Pablo Emilio Pérez-Mallainá Bueno, Spain's Men of the Sea: Daily Life on the Indies Fleets in the Sixteenth Century, trans. Carla Rahn Phillips (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998). International connections and perceptions consequently spread far beyond the gates of London and Madrid, Bristol, Barcelona, and Sevilla. So the events that I describe and attempt to deconstruct here – most of which were considered by contemporaries to have been important and newsworthy – had a much more profound and lasting effect on the various publics that encountered them, in both England and Spain.
was actually peace that was the big issue – and I would argue that it remained the real key throughout. This is what tells us the most about how James, his court, and the entire international system operated, and which formed so much of the foundation for future actions and events – not just with regard to politics, but with every aspect of the period, including religious policy, cultural production, and the patronage of both. Indeed, coming to understand the way in which peace was achieved can also give us real, fresh insight into those other two of James’s primary projects, as the king’s approach to all three was motivated by the same fundamental outlook, and many of the same sorts of methods were applied in each case, by all those involved. After all, while in the interest of space and coherence this study can be about only one of these processes, it is important to remember that these events were not happening in a vacuum. The establishment of James’s court and the renegotiation of the English position in the international system were occurring at precisely the same time as the events leading up to and including both the Hampton Court conference on the state of the church and the attempt at an Anglo-Scottish union. These issues were being discussed, debated, and acted upon by many of the very same people, often on the same day, in the same letters, meetings, and conversations. It is natural that the same general approach would apply to all three, and it is natural that their decisions on each would be directly affected by their decisions on, and ideas about, the others. But the fundamentally interconnected process of establishing the court power structure, integrating international actors into it, and traveling the twisted road towards peace was what came first, and what dominated the agenda of England’s political elite in the first year of James’s reign.

The Treaty of London, which was signed at long last in August 1604, laid the foundation for the entire Anglo-Spanish connection in the years to come. This was true in a couple of
different respects. In the first place, the treaty quite literally set the rules for “legitimate” Anglo-Spanish contact over the next twenty years. The text of the treaty itself would be used as a roadmap by consecutive ambassadors from each of the signatories, and its specific clauses would be quoted and interpreted in repeated attempts by them to get justice for their countrymen abroad. Secondly, and at least as important, the embassies and treaty negotiations set the tone and context for the way in which peacetime Anglo-Spanish relations would be carried out. This was true both in informal contacts as well as in royal audiences and at the bargaining table. A great deal had changed in two decades of open war, and the impressions made and precedents set in these first encounters would help determine the ways in which the people of the two nations would interact culturally and commercially in the years to come. The parties were hammering out much more than a treaty here. The very nature of the discourse of contact was being negotiated, and this was in many ways an entirely new thing.

Even after the achievement of peace, a number of geographic, cultural, and religious obstacles continued to keep these erstwhile enemies at relative arms’ length. The two countries were just remote enough, and the Inquisition and recusancy laws enough of a cause for mutual fear, that few people traveled back and forth without good reason. This meant that diplomacy would continue to play a disproportionate role in the future connection, operating as the nexus that brought together virtually every aspect of the relationship. Resident ambassadors articulated the concerns of their countrymen working, traveling, and trading abroad to foreign governments, and their governmental contacts and personal correspondence provide by far the most information available to the historian on this connection. Furthermore, the first embassies set the machinery of contact into motion, laying the foundations for the development of differing
interest groups in each country, and establishing personal connections and attitudes that would grow with time.

These embassies also provided important moments of key interaction, points of contact where a large percentage of the people who would gain first-hand experience in the other country did so. In the most important of these, when England’s Lord Admiral, the earl of Nottingham, traveled to the Spanish court in Valladolid in the spring of 1605 to ratify the peace treaty, he brought some seven hundred Englishmen and Scots with him from all over the economic and political spectrum. These people returned home with new ideas and perceptions about Spain and the Spanish, which then spread through personal contacts and correspondence into the public consciousness. Moreover, the members of Nottingham’s entourage themselves provided an important example, giving many Spaniards a virtually unprecedented, up-close view of a large number of mostly protestant Britons. In addition, these events were not just one-time occurrences, experienced only by the participants and onlookers. Both countries saw a number of printed relations and literary responses to these visits, each of which helped disseminate these perceptions even further. Consequently, the entire process of achieving peace combined with these crucial early moments of contact not just to seal the peace, but to help define attitudes over an entire generation and beyond.

**Organization and implications**

The first part of my project deals with how the opportunity for peace came about, with the change in Habsburg leaders and priorities, the lead-up to the all-important accession of James I, its immediate implications, and how people in both countries reacted to this opportunity. The story then moves from the initial truce at the accession into the darker days when those first high hopes came into direct contact with the bumps and bruises of a factionalizing English domestic
sphere and its interconnected, highly oppositional international system. Then follows a section on the actual achievement of the peace, detailing the lead-up negotiations and the eventual peace conference itself, with some close analysis of what was agreed to, and why it was able to be achieved in the way in which it was. After this, I move on to the extraordinary embassies and festivities of 1604-05, celebrating the peace and finalizing the process through witnessing each monarch’s oath to uphold the terms of the agreement. I give particular focus here to the 1605 Anglo-Scots embassy to Spain, that crucial moment of contact between these peoples that played an important role in completing the foundation of the peacetime connection, and which serves as an instructive example for how the relationship was getting underway. And in the final chapter, I take the foundation established by the analysis of the peace, and trace an outline of the connection forward from there, shining some light on just how important the decisions made in these first few years were for everything that followed over the rest of the reign. With this broadening of focus, I take a look at how the Anglo-Spanish relationship began to move closer together in this period, and yet how the achievement and maintenance of peace simultaneously played a major role in the increasing factionalization of both countries’ political nations and establishments. In the process, I give some final thoughts about the way in which the relationship would eventually come to be tested by the growing international crisis from 1618, and how it would be found wanting.

In the end, the implications for this sort of work have the opportunity to be both broad and deep. As we have seen, even though the achievement of peace was the central, great issue at the beginning of James’s reign, there has been a long tradition of passing over it in silence and focusing on domestic issues. And yet, precisely because of the centrality of the peace, one cannot really have a thorough understanding of the domestic material without getting one’s head
around how it was that the international and foreign policy material worked. For example, as a result of this focus on the peace and an understanding of its international context, events and processes that have traditionally seemed like later developments can now be seen to have begun much sooner than previously thought, and can be identified as central to the very logic of the entire system. While most who have written on faction and politics in early Stuart England tend to look later in the reign for the genesis of much of the complex and competitive environment at court, I maintain that this was not in fact a gradual development. Rather, most of it was there right at the beginning, as would befit the policy of a mature monarch who had already had decades of practice at being a king and crafting his strategies for managing and manipulating men by the time that he finally assumed the English throne in 1603. Coming to understand this then makes us have to reconsider so much about how everything operated, casting the entire reign (especially the early years) in an entirely new light.

And yet, however important these conclusions might be, perhaps more significant are the methodological implications of the approach upon which they rely. After all, the only way one can see so much of what I will be identifying here is if one looks at these events from both sides. It is only in the simultaneous consideration of Spanish and English perspectives and sources (and to a certain extent Flemish, French, and so on) that one actually comes to understand how so many of these processes worked and how everything was tied together. Consequently, what I hope will become clear from all of this is the fundamental importance of a particular kind of transnational history, broad in scope but detailed in objectives, which is just as willing to cross the boundaries between politics and culture as it is ready to cross borders and consider sources from multiple perspectives in various tongues. I believe that this is a crucial approach, for
domestic events as much as for international relations. Quite simply, by doing things in this way, everything looks different.
**Chapter Two: Prelude to peace – the accession**

“Here they show great relief at the death of the Queen of England... And in very truth, owing to the Queen’s death, a few days have sufficed to change the aspect of matters from one of despair to one of hope.”

– Simon Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Spain¹

“Aviendo faltado la persona de la Reyna, con quien fue la guerra, cesa la causa.”

– King Philip III²

There were several attempts at finding an end to the fighting during the final years of the sixteenth century. At this point, the war had been dragging on for more than a decade, and many in both countries longed to see it end. Merchants, fishermen, and coastal inhabitants on each side were getting tired of the devastation and decline that so many years of uninterrupted conflict brought to their lives and their industries. The Spanish monarchy was beginning to show serious signs of being overextended, and yet another state bankruptcy in 1596-97 was only the most recent in a series of events that would ultimately convince its leaders to move away from military endeavors, and towards a policy of retrenchment, or *conservación*. The English crown was bogged down simultaneously by a serious and costly war in Ireland, and the voices for peace in the privy council were growing in number as the years passed with no tangible rewards, and with no end in sight.³

Nevertheless, peace was neither a practical inevitability nor a carryover from the last years of the Elizabethan period.⁴ The eventual achievement of peace would require far more

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¹ Simon Contarini, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate (Valladolid, 14/24 May 1603), CSPVen X, 37.
² BNM, Mss 2347, f.73, “Instruccion que el Rey Phe’.3º. dio a Don Juan de Tassis su correo mayor quando le imbio por Embajador de Yngalaterra año 1603.” (Aranjuez, 19/29 April 1603).
⁴ For the most recent example of the Elizabethan argument, see: Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain." Thankfully, the unhelpful ‘His Majesty Remains at the
than mutual necessity or widespread dissatisfaction with the war. The right people had to be in place to pull it off. Not only did the leaders of each of the countries involved have to be committed to a policy of peace themselves, they also had to be rulers that were acceptable to their counterparts. While a mutual desire or necessity for peace was an important prerequisite, it was a change of leadership in all three places – Spain, Flanders, and especially England – that ultimately allowed the peace to occur. A brief look at the initial, unsuccessful negotiations can give us a better understanding of the context in which relations between the countries stood at the beginning of our period, and also helps explain why peace could not occur until after the Stuart accession in 1603.

Failed attempts

In 1598, the king of Spain made a separate treaty with Henri IV of France at Vervins, and the next several years would see various attempts at negotiation to end the struggle between the Spanish and the English.\(^5\) This was not simply limited to speculation at the council tables of the rival monarchs, but was made manifest in various formal and informal discussions between emissaries and ministers of the two nations. An English embassy had actually been sent to Paris during the Franco-Spanish peace negotiations in early 1598; as much to keep the French from making a separate peace and to gauge the nature of the international situation as to secure a

peace for England in its own right. Even after the French chose to abandon their allies, the English kept the lines of communication open, in the hope that they might be able to secure a general peace. However, neither the Dutch nor the Spaniards were willing to make the necessary compromises or grant the appropriate powers to treat, and the English were not yet ready to pull their support from the Low Countries, thinking as they did that this would leave the field open for likely Spanish dominance there. Consequently, peace remained an elusive aim.

In the meantime, the first steps in a reevaluation of the strategic and long-term interests of the Spanish monarchy were changing the very way in which this unwieldy entity was governed. Also in 1598, just days after peace was achieved with France, Philip II ceded sovereignty of the Low Countries – including virtually all of what are now the Benelux nations, as well as Franche-Comté – to his daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, and her cousin and husband-to-be, Archduke Albert of Austria. It was hoped that by transferring direct sovereign power to new rulers – at least physically distinct from the king of Spain and resident in Flanders – perhaps some of the animosity of the Dutch rebels towards their former masters would be softened, and prospects for a truce or even a lasting solution to the conflict might finally be able to be found. Of course, the king and his closest advisors all expected that the Archdukes (as the new sovereigns were henceforth called), would continue to march in close step with the desires of Madrid, particularly considering the size of the military force still under Spanish command that was resident and fighting in their dominions. To a certain extent, this can be said to have occurred, and would remain the case throughout their reign. Nevertheless, by virtue of their location on the spot, and their somewhat different set of governmental priorities, Albert and

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Isabel were able to exercise a significant level of real autonomy, in many cases providing the initiative in large-scale events when their Spanish counterparts might not have been so quick to act. As we shall see, this autonomy and initiative, albeit limited, would have important consequences for the eventual conclusion of the peace.\(^7\)

In September 1598, Philip II, who had been intermittently ill and considerably weakened for the past several years, finally died. Though he and his ministers had already begun the turn towards a policy of conservación, the accession of his son, Philip III, brought with it a profound ideological shift in the approach to foreign policy, and in the operation of government in general. The new king was quick to install one man, Don Francisco Gómez de Sandoval, marquess of Denia and soon-to-be duke of Lerma, in a position of unparalleled power as valido, or royal favorite.\(^8\) And one of the very pillars of Philip and Lerma’s approach to the management and

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\(^8\) The definitive work on Lerma and his career is: Feros, *Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621*. For Lerma’s foreign policy, see also: García García, *La Pax Hispánica: Política Exterior del Duque de Lerma*. In a more recent piece, Feros points out that there is still some debate amongst historians about Philip and Lerma’s initial attitude toward international war and peace. But he re-emphasizes the extent to which things had changed, and stresses that this turn towards peace was not a tactical move merely to gain time to recover (*a la* Paul Allen), but rather was a profound ideological shift. This fits quite well with everything we shall see below about a Spanish “segundo camino”, and it even matches up well with the supposed evidence to the contrary, as we shall see Philip III and his councilors at various times explicitly
maintenance of the Spanish inheritance would be to pursue a policy of peace and reconciliation with all of its northern enemies. In the words of Antonio Feros:

Departing from the expansionist policy of his father, Philip III upheld the priority of conservation, which meant abandoning territories, such as the United Provinces, considered until then an inalienable part of the Spanish monarchy. The 'pacifist' policies of the new regime, which Lerma was crucial in defining, also meant that the new rulers followed less aggressive policies toward other European powers, especially France and England, than had been the case under Philip II. For the new rulers the changing international circumstances in Europe and the critical financial situation of the Spanish monarchy meant that Spain could no longer afford to act as Europe's policeman and instead had to choose its interventions carefully and to focus on those that seemed most likely to advance the monarch's desires for territorial and political conservation.\(^9\)

Once peace was achieved, Philip and Lerma would be better able to face the most serious threats to the rest of the empire, and to the Iberian peninsula itself: those offered by the Turks in the Mediterranean, various concerns and disputes over their Italian possessions, and the serious economic and domestic problems that had been caused by so many years of war fought on so many fronts.\(^10\)

By the end of the year, the move towards Anglo-Spanish peace began anew. With the initiative of Cardinal Andrew, Albert’s brother and the temporary governor of Flanders while Albert went off to Spain to claim his bride, an extensive correspondence was begun with the key English ministers. Throughout 1599 and early 1600, Jerome Coomans, Thomas Edmondes, Louis Verreyken, and various other Flemish and English agents passed back and forth from Brussels to London, and succeeded in arranging a peace conference to take place in the coming


\(^10\) For the Italian possessions, their place in the policy of *conservación*, and the continued rivalry between the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs over them, see: Magdalena S. Sánchez, "Dynasty, State, and Diplomacy in the Spain of Philip III" (PhD, Johns Hopkins University, 1988).
spring. With a new king in Spain, the Archdukes in Flanders, and very little change in the fortunes of war, many thought that there might finally be a chance for success. In May of 1600, commissioners from each side met in Boulogne, on the northern coast of France, to see if they could come to some sort of agreement. Although both sides were desirous of peace, each wanted it exclusively on their own terms, and these terms were still far from compatible. The various preliminaries to the formal talks and the extended correspondence that led to them had given everyone involved a fairly good idea of what would be asked for in each camp once the negotiations themselves began.\textsuperscript{11} However, no one knew how much of an opportunity there might be for compromise, and real debate over these particulars was never even given a chance. Disputes quickly broke out over the nature of the Spanish commissioners’ power to treat, and intensified over the issue of diplomatic precedence, preventing all substantive negotiation for the duration of the proceedings. By the end of July, the talks dissolved with literally nothing having been achieved whatsoever.\textsuperscript{12}

Although it was clear to all parties involved in the struggle that peace in some form was a mutual desire, the total failure of each of these attempts at negotiation led to disillusion and distrust. To be sure, the Archdukes – becoming more secure in their separate identity as sovereigns in their own right, and increasingly popular with their subjects – attempted to maintain a diplomatic correspondence with the most powerful Elizabethan ministers.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{11} For specifics, see: Winwood I, 186-226.
\textsuperscript{12} Nathan Gerson Goodman, "Diplomatic Relations between England and Spain, with Special Reference to English Opinion, 1597-1603" (PhD, University of Pennsylvania, 1925), 53-62. For a view of the post-1603 explicit Spanish use of the example of the Boulogne talks, see chapter four, below, and: AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 156.
\textsuperscript{13} García García describes the Archdukes’ motivations: “Para los Archiduques y sus principales consejeros flamencos, la Paz con Inglaterra resultaba imprescindible, porque con ella podría emprenderse la reactivación económica de los Países Bajos meridionales, se privaría a las Provincias rebeldes de la asistencia militar y financiera que les prestaban los ingleses, mejorando
Nevertheless, there was no light to be seen at the end of the tunnel. The Spanish armada threats continued to come, with 1601 bringing perhaps the most serious challenge to date, when a sizeable contingent of Spanish troops actually landed at Kinsale in southern Ireland.¹⁴ A fortuitous series of events, involving miscommunication and confusion between the Spaniards and their would-be Irish allies, allowed the English general, Lord Mountjoy, to successfully defeat the invading force. Though the Spanish commander surrendered in January 1602, the invasion attempt merely served to widen the gulf that proponents for peace would ultimately have to cross. Throughout the following year – which would prove to be Elizabeth’s last – the eyes of England’s ministers were turning increasingly away from any kind of imminent reconciliation with Spain, and towards securing a peaceful succession upon the event of the queen’s eventual death.

Indeed, in England there was a real debate over whether there should be peace with Spain at all. At the time of the French talks in 1598, the privy council had been split over the issue. The peace party – headed by Elizabeth’s longtime counselor William Cecil, Lord Burghley – emphasized the benefit of the reopening of trade, as well as the growing financial difficulties of the crown, particularly in light of the simultaneously massive expenditure required to suppress the rebellion in Ireland.¹⁵ The pro-war group, led by the earl of Essex, the queen’s favorite,

las condiciones para lograr también la solución del conflicto y aumentar el grado de autonomía que disfrutaba el gobierno de los Archiduques.” García García, La Pax Hispánica: Política Exterior del Duque de Lerma, 45.  
argued forcefully for the continued importance of providing support to the Dutch, especially since the French had removed themselves from the fray. ¹⁶ Debates in council spilled out into the populace at large, and were supplemented by the circulation of manuscript tracts arguing the case for one side or the other. ¹⁷ The divisive issue of war with Spain was one of many manifestations in a growing polarization of late Elizabethan politics centered on the Cecil-Essex divide, and there was little room left for middle ground. ¹⁸

Moreover, with the deaths of the heads of both factions in the next few years, English support for peace can hardly be said to have grown stronger. In fact, it was quite the contrary. After Burghley passed away in August 1598, Robert Cecil has usually been considered to have been the heir to his father’s position as head of the peace party. In a political sense, at least prior to 1601, this may well have been true. But Essex’s final fall from power early in that year— in a failed bid for control which led to his execution— left the Cecil faction firmly in charge, and Sir Robert with a number of reasons to oppose peace with Spain.

In the first place, as we have seen, the Spanish armadas had not stopped coming. It was a little difficult to take seriously any expressions of intended goodwill from that quarter when they were accompanied by invasion fears and massing armies. And even after the Spanish surrender

¹⁶ For a basic outline of Essex’s views at this time, see the tremendously influential tract typically referred to as “Essex’s Apology”, which originally appeared in manuscript during 1598: Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex (London: For J. Smethwick, 1600).
¹⁷ See, for example: BL, Cotton Mss. Galba D xii, ff.186v-198; BL, Harley Mss. 6798, ff.76-80; BPR, II/2507, ff.12-16v. This pamphlet debate and its resurrection and development in 1603-1604, are discussed in detail in chapter three, below. For a recent take underlining just how extensive this debate was, see: Gajda, "Debating War and Peace." As she quite rightly points out, while many people in England were in support of peace, many were not; there was quite simply “no inevitable trajectory towards the Treaty of London, and Elizabethans expressed varied and complex attitudes towards the war with Spain in the late 1590s.” Ibid., 852.
at Kinsale there was no indication that future attempts would not occur. There had typically been at least two years between such actions, and at the time of Elizabeth’s death it had been only just over a year since the last.\(^{19}\) Through their spies in Spain and Flanders, the English ministers knew that the Spanish monarchy was in a difficult position, but as far as military expeditions aimed at England or Ireland were concerned, there was no telling when they would stop.\(^{20}\)

Secondly, Cecil and his friends had other, more self-serving reasons to avoid peace with Spain as long as possible. Sir Robert, along with his most significant political ally, Lord Admiral Nottingham, had a substantial financial investment in maintaining the status quo. As the work of Kenneth Andrews and that of Roland Hussey has shown, this was an important factor to be considered in the decision to make peace or not, and would later play a role in the treaty negotiations themselves:

Cecil, chief minister of a country at war and never himself a friend of Spain, naturally had close ties with men deeply committed to and engaged in the war, many of whom regarded large commercial concessions in the Spanish empire as an indispensable condition of peace and even argued the benefits of the war and desired its continuance. The influence of this element in the body politic at the end of the war is often underestimated.\(^{21}\)

This influence was, in fact, not merely one of casual connection, but of direct personal

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\(^{20}\) Indeed, the Spaniards were still talking about intervention right up through James’s accession. See, for example: AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 28, “El Consejo de Estado a 2 de Noviembre 1602, Sobre Cossas de Irlanda”, as well as the contents of Villamediana’s instructions in April 1603, as described later in this chapter. English perceptions on this can also be seen by the continued attention to this issue, and to Spanish ship and troop movements by Cecil’s spies throughout 1603, 1604, and 1605, related throughout TNA: PRO SP 94/9-11. For more on these perceptions, see chapters three through five, below.

involvement. Both Cecil and Nottingham were themselves ship-owners and investors profiting from illicit trade and plunder in the Spanish dominions.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, the Lord Admiral, by virtue of his office, received a share of the proceeds from any Spanish prize taken by English men-at-war. As a result, he was the Englishman who profited most from the conflict, and consequently stood to lose the most from any treaty of peace.\textsuperscript{23} No, these were hardly men personally motivated to end the war. They were in fact making a great deal of money from it.

Finally, and of particular importance, was the secret correspondence that Cecil and his closest associates had established with King James VI of Scotland.\textsuperscript{24} James was anxious to secure his accession to the crown of England at the time of Elizabeth’s eventual death. The old queen had still not named a successor, and while James was the most likely candidate, he was not the only one. He had been in touch with Essex before that earl’s rather dramatic downfall, and he had no difficulty establishing a firm relationship with Essex’s erstwhile opponent after the failed rebellion.\textsuperscript{25} The relationship was a mutually beneficial one, which would not only give James a chance to help facilitate a smooth transition to the English throne, but would also secure

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] Indeed, Cecil and Nottingham were even partners in such ventures. They were mutual supporters of the Guiana project from its inception in 1602, and were joint-owners of a ship named the \textit{Truelove}, from at least 1595. See, respectively: Ibid.: 7., and HMC Salisbury XV, 106. Nor was this uncommon. Another close ally of Cecil’s on the privy council, Lord Treasurer Buckhurst (part-owner of the ship “Royal Merchant”), was also implicated, along with his sons, in similar questions of illicit trade in Venetian territory, CSPVen X, 9.
\item[24] For this correspondence, see: James et al., \textit{The Secret Correspondence of Sir Robert Cecil with James VI, King of Scotland. Now First Published} (Edinburgh: Printed for A. Millar, 1766); James, Robert Cecil Salisbury, and John Bruce, \textit{Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth; with an Appendix Containing Papers Illustrative of Transactions between King James and Robert Earl of Essex} (Westminster: Printed for the Camden Society, 1861).
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a place for Cecil and his associates (most notably Nottingham and Lord Treasurer Buckhurst, as well as the long-shunned Henry Howard, the principal go-between in this correspondence) at the center of the new administration. And if there was one thing that James wanted to prevent at all costs, it was an Anglo-Spanish peace before Elizabeth’s death. Peace would increase the possibility of agreement on an alternative claimant to the English throne, which was far from an idle concern. At least as recently as May 1602, the privy council had rejected peace with Spain outright, considering it virtually synonymous with the unthinkable revival of the Infanta Isabel’s claim to the crown of England. Moreover, by the time the queen actually died the following spring, the kings of Spain and France were beginning to move towards agreement on just such an alternative candidate, who would likely be an English native, and probably a catholic.

As Cecil and his supporters had now linked their hopes for the future with the cause of the king of Scots, they were loath to do anything that would cross his desires so strongly, or that would call into question the very possibility of his accession. Indeed, when some in England began to talk again of peace, Cecil asked James directly for instructions, and the king replied in no uncertain terms:

Quhen I haue aduysedlie considderit and deepelie looked in this maitter, I can not surelie but thinke that, the tyme being ueyed, and the present state of things, suche a peace at this tyme must be greatlie præiucidical, first to the state of religion in generall, secondlie to the state, both in religion and policie of this yle in speciall, and lastlie most perrelouse for my iust claime in particulaire.

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29 King James VI of Scotland to Sir Robert Cecil, undated, but 1601-1603. James, Salisbury, and Bruce, *Correspondence of King James VI of Scotland with Sir Robert Cecil and Others in England During the Reign of Queen Elizabeth: with an Appendix Containing Papers Illustrative of Transactions between King James and Robert Earl of Essex*, 30-31.
The future *Rex Pacificus* was explicit: he wanted the war to continue until he was safely on the throne. Cecil had his orders, and was more than happy to comply.

Therefore, when political connections and personal investments are considered alongside the secret correspondence with the king of Scots, and added to the disappointment and distrust engendered by the failed peace negotiations and continued Spanish military action, it is really very difficult to consider Robert Cecil as heading up any kind of peace party. And this is of special significance, since Cecil was, after Essex’s fall, firmly in control of the English government. As a result, the diplomatic emphasis in Elizabeth’s last year of life was actually on the attempt to bring France back into the war against Spain, not to end the conflict. This was undertaken by Cecil and the Lord Admiral in London, by Winwood and Parry in Paris, and repeatedly by the queen herself.30 Quite simply, neither peace with Spain nor a peaceful accession would have been guaranteed had Elizabeth not died when she did.

**Enter James I and VI**

On 24 March 1603, Queen Elizabeth of England, for so long the implacable enemy of the Catholic King of Spain, breathed her last. Elizabeth’s death and the surprisingly smooth and bloodless accession of James I led quickly to a major shift in Anglo-Spanish relations – one which would help define the political climate in Europe for the following two decades. It was because of this event, more than anything else, that after so many years of bitter struggle, there could finally be peace.

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As we have seen, an Anglo-Spanish peace agreement was a difficult proposition. A number of things had to occur in order to pull it off. The gradual development of at least some level of mutual dissatisfaction with war was of course a necessary condition for any discussion of peace in the first place. And the presence of new regimes in Flanders and Spain, both committed to an eventual end to the war, was an equally necessary prerequisite. Nevertheless, considering the international situation and the state of English policy in early 1603, there can be no doubt that the accession of James VI of Scotland as king of England was one of the most important contributing factors to the successful conclusion of the peace. James’s accession quite simply allowed the peace to happen. This was true in a number of different respects, as can perhaps best be seen by dividing the accession into four separate, though not entirely distinct aspects: the accession as an event, James’s skillful diplomacy in the years leading up to it, others’ attitudes towards the new king and situation, and the opinions held by the man himself.

The mere fact of James’s bloodless accession to the throne went a long way towards the possible achievement of peace abroad. To begin with, the accession in itself created a situation where war was a less attractive option for England’s Habsburg foes. As we have seen, foreign policy in both Flanders and Spain had taken a major turn towards conservación with the changes of administration in 1598, and a significant part of the policy that the new leaders espoused relied on achieving peace with England, and eventually with the Dutch. After several years of failed negotiations and no indication that relations were getting any rosier, another way was beginning to present itself. As Elizabeth still refused to name an heir, it seemed likely to many that her eventual death would be followed by a chaotic succession crisis, one that might involve armed conflict or even outright civil war. This would be an ideal situation for Spanish intervention, in which they might back a catholic candidate for the throne, and exercise
significant influence in the post-Elizabethan English political landscape. And by early 1603, France and Spain were finally moving towards agreement on a mutually acceptable candidate to back – a development that, if it were to bear fruit, would not bode well for protestant hopes, nor indeed for James of Scotland.\(^{31}\)

This was, however, not to be. Elizabeth’s timely death – before the catholic powers could come to some agreement and prepare adequately for intervention – made sure of it. The Stuart accession was over and done with before anything could possibly be done to change things, and it had come off without a hitch. Presented with this \textit{fait accompli}, the governments in Valladolid and Brussels suddenly found themselves with what at least appeared to be a much more secure and powerful foe. And when one factors in the nearly simultaneous end of the war in Ireland, the picture becomes even clearer. Practically overnight, where once Spain had faced only a divided England, with an uncertain future and a rebellion on its hands, it now saw the rebellion crushed, the uncertainty ended, and three kingdoms united under one monarch.

If there was ever an opportunity for a new start, this was it. Elizabeth’s death had itself removed a significant impediment to peace, and the Habsburg leaders were quite explicit about this. After all, they argued, the war had been a personal conflict between Philip II and Elizabeth. In their eyes, Elizabeth was an illegitimate, heretical queen who had been excommunicated by the pope. She had for years personally supported the Dutch rebellion against Spanish rule, and had been responsible not only for the near-constant depredations on Spanish shipping and settlements in the Indies, but also for numerous attacks on Spain itself. She was a person with whom it would be difficult to treat (and ultimately forgive) without losing a significant amount

\(^{31}\) This move toward agreement was, in fact, done explicitly to counteract the possibility that James would become king, as both sides were beginning to feel some insecurity about James’s actual opinions, and felt that they might be able to get a catholic on the throne of England. Loomie, "Philip III and the Stuart Succession in England, 1600-1603," 509.
of the reputación that was such an important part of both the real and perceived power of the Spanish monarchy.\textsuperscript{32} Just weeks before Elizabeth’s death (and without knowledge of her illness or imminent demise), Philip III had explicitly ruled out any further attempt at peace for the time being.\textsuperscript{33} However, now things were completely different. As Philip wrote in the instructions to his first ambassador to England, upon hearing of James’s accession: “\textit{aviendo faltado la persona de la Reyna, con quien fue la guerra, cesa la causa.”}\textsuperscript{34} Simply put: with the death of the queen, so died the cause of war.

The queen’s death and the peaceful accession were, however, only part of the story. After all, both would mean very little if the new monarch turned out to be just another Elizabeth, or even worse: an aggressive, warlike king, emboldened by his recent rise in fortune, who saw himself as a protestant champion destined to bring fire and sword to the papal antichrist. No, the particular man who succeeded the virgin queen would be of significant importance to the achievement of peace, a point that was foremost in the minds of England’s opponents.

James VI of Scotland had been a king virtually all his life. In 1567, just after his first birthday, his mother – the catholic, ill-fated Mary Queen of Scots – had been deposed, and she was driven into exile the following year. The baby James had been proclaimed king in her place, 

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\textsuperscript{32} For further discussion of the role of reputación, see: John Huxtable Elliott, "A Question of Reputation? Spanish Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth Century," \textit{Journal of Modern History} 55, no. 3 (1983).
\textsuperscript{33} AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 25, f.1. Albert to Philip III (Brussels, 11/21 March 1603). Here Albert acknowledges Philip’s recent “\textit{resolucion que ha tomado de que por agora no se trate de paz}” – the resolution that he has taken not to to seek peace for now. Although he is almost certainly incorporating the Dutch into the discussion as well, Albert is clear about the king’s resolve. Indeed, discussions of various possible invasions of Britain had occupied the Spanish Council of State at numerous times over the past several months, with the most recent such meeting coming on March 22/April 1, just two days before the queen’s death. See AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 67 and leg. 840, docs 227-230. \textit{Consultas} of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 22 March/1 April 1603).
\textsuperscript{34} BNM, Mss 2347, f.73, “\textit{Instruccion que el Rey Phe’.3o. dio a Don Juan de Tassis su correo mayor quando le imbio por Embajador de Yngalaterra año 1603.” (Aranjuez, 19/29 April 1603).
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and was subsequently raised as a protestant by a succession of rival regency factions. By the
time he had come of age, James had learned from first-hand experience just how difficult it could
be to keep a kingdom together even in years of supposed peace. The bitter factional struggles
that dominated his childhood created in the king a strong aversion to violence and conflicts that
got out of hand, and taught him the importance of finding an end to the bloody strife that was
tearing his native Scotland apart.\textsuperscript{35} During these early years in Scotland, James had developed
into a very effective ruler.\textsuperscript{36} Not only was he able to resolve a number of longstanding Scottish
conflicts, reasserting royal power after years of royal minorities and rebellion, but he also began
to play a role in international politics. He had secured an alliance with Denmark through
marriage in his early twenties, and the following decade would see him focused intently upon his
most cherished ambition: the succession to the English crown.\textsuperscript{37} The way in which he went
about ensuring this had a direct effect on foreign princes’ attitudes towards him at Elizabeth’s
death, and it had a profound influence upon their subsequent judgments regarding the possibility
and desirability of peace.

James’s secret correspondence with key members of the English government for several
years before the queen’s demise had played a crucial role in the ultimate achievement of a
smooth and bloodless transition, one of the foremost responsibilities of any political leader. But
James had not limited his intrigues to negotiations in England. A man of deep intelligence and
remarkable political acumen, James took delight in keeping as many irons in the fire at one time

\textsuperscript{35} The definitive work on James’s life remains: Lockyer, \textit{James VI and I}. For a clear and
concise narrative of his early years, see: Croft, \textit{King James}, 10-21.
\textsuperscript{36} Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?."  
\textsuperscript{37} David Stevenson, \textit{Scotland’s Last Royal Wedding: The Marriage of James VI and Anne of
Denmark} (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1997). Steve Murdoch, \textit{Britain, Denmark-Norway and the
House of Stuart, 1603-1660: A Diplomatic and Military Analysis} (East Linton: Tuckwell Press,
2000).
as he could possibly manage.\textsuperscript{38} In order to secure the English throne, he was willing to promise anyone just about anything. He had various agents dropping hints and entering into negotiations in each of the major European capitals, including Rome itself, and he would continue to do so even after his English accession.\textsuperscript{39} These efforts paid off, as the king of Scots’s skillfully played strategy of trying hard to be everybody’s best friend not only helped secure his peaceful accession in England, but also played a major part in ensuring that this would be followed by peace with Spain.\textsuperscript{40}

\textbf{The opinions of others}

Generally speaking, as a result of James’s varied and secret diplomacy in the years leading up to his English accession, the new king had been able to encourage virtually all interested groups into believing that he was precisely what they wanted him to be. To protestants, in England and elsewhere, he was a Calvinist king who appeared strong in his

\textsuperscript{38} James’s political skill and role in the peace negotiations and later Anglo-Spanish relationship are taken up in much greater detail in subsequent chapters. See, especially, chapters three and four, below. For the best general overview of James’s far-sighted, ecumenical foreign policy, see: Patterson, \textit{King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom}.


\textsuperscript{40} Moreover, this was broadly understood to be the case at the time. As the Venetian ambassador in Paris described it: “The King [James] himself proceeded with great judgement both in his relations towards the Queen [Elizabeth] and in his efforts to obtain the support or the neutrality of foreign princes. With this object in view he negotiated with the Pope through the medium of some private persons, and when exhorted to be converted he replied that for the present he could not. The Pope, besides supplying the King with a certain amount of money, always kept a secret agent at the Scottish Court. The King had understandings with the King of Spain and the King of France, but nothing was more useful to him than his relations with the English Council.” CSPVen X, 7, Marin Cavalli, Venetian ambassador to France, to the Doge and Senate (Paris, 20 April 1603).
support for the reformed church and resistance to papal tyranny. To catholics, he was a politique monarch who was more interested in his succession to the English throne and restoring the peace of Christendom, than in any sort of further reformation. Although many in catholic Europe were wary of his political acumen and distrustful of his motives and ultimate ends, James did manage to convince many of the most prominent individuals of his pacific designs, and that he was a person with whom they could deal. There was even widespread speculation in Spain, Flanders, and Italy about the possibility of his conversion to catholicism, or at least the likelihood that he would grant toleration in all his dominions once he was on the throne in England. For our purposes here, it is the Habsburg leaders’ perceptions of James that are of the utmost significance. After all, they were the ones who were going to have to make the decision whether to treat with him or not. So how did England’s opponents see James, and how did this affect their desire for peace?

In general, the Habsburg response was in line with the rest of catholic Europe. Despite the move towards an alternative English candidate, which would have changed things had Elizabeth held onto life longer, by the time of her death James was still the most likely claimant and had some real support among important Habsburg policymakers. This had been the case since at least 1601, and probably before, thanks in large measure to James’s proactive work on his own behalf, not to mention the Infanta Isabel’s reluctance to be considered for the English throne. Of particular importance here was the Archduke Albert, who wielded significant

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41 Tyacke, "Puritan Politicians and King James VI and I, 1587-1604."
42 Patterson, King James VI and I and the Reunion of Christendom, chapter one.
43 For example: CSPVen X, 7, 43; Antonio Rodriguez Villa, ed., Correspondencia de La Infanta Archiduquesa Doña Isabel Clara Eugenia de Austria Con El Duque de Lerma Y Otros Personajes (Madrid: Fortanet, 1906), 83.
44 Garcia Garcia, La Pax Hispánica: Política Exterior del Duque de Lerma, 42.
influence in this issue by virtue of his threefold position as Isabel’s husband, a sovereign in his own right, and the man closest to events. And he did not hesitate to act.

Indeed, before Elizabeth died, Albert backed James explicitly. In early February 1603 (before it was even known that the queen was ill), the Archduke drew up instructions for a secret agent of his to be sent to Scotland.\footnote{AGS Estado, leg. 622, docs 48-49, Albert’s instructions to Nicholas Scorza, in French and Spanish. Originally dated 1 February 1603, sent by Albert to Philip III on 20/30 April 1603, received in Valladolid on 7/17 May 1603. Enclosed with various letters, Scorza’s reports on his return from Scotland, numerous avisos from London in the days and weeks after Elizabeth’s death, and other material relating to affairs in England.} The man he chose was an Italian by the name of Nicholas Scorza. The primary objective was to convince James to keep his Scottish subjects from crossing the sea to volunteer with the Dutch armies, as they had been doing for years.\footnote{AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 48-49, f.1.} But a key part of the instructions refers to the possibility of peace, and instructs Scorza to impress upon James and the members of his council the extent to which the Archdukes would be willing to consent to a peace with England and the Dutch, if the right conditions could be agreed upon.\footnote{AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 48-49, f.2.}

Moreover, the Spanish ambassador in Flanders, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, was duly informed and had approved of the mission.\footnote{AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 42. Albert to Philip III (The camp above Ostend, 20/30 April 1603). Received in Valladolid on 7/17 May 1603.} Scorza embarked at Saint-Valery on 5/15 March, and arrived at Leith, in Scotland, late in the evening nine days later. His first audience with James was on the twentieth, in which the king assured him that he liked neither the Dutch nor their cause, but recommended that he not breathe a word of this to anyone.\footnote{AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 47. “Relación de lo que Nicolas Escorza negoció en Escoçia.” (The camp above Ostend, 16/26 April 1603). Part of the group of letters to Philip III received in Valladolid on 7/17 May 1603.} News arrived soon thereafter that Elizabeth was ill, and likely irrevocably so. Upon hearing this, but before arrival of the news of the queen’s death, Scorza assured James (in an unofficial interview with the king while he was
out hunting) that Albert wanted to be his friend and would support his accession with money and men, if need be. Scorza repeatedly emphasized Albert’s desires for friendship and peace with James as king of England, and did his best to convince several key Scots ministers (George Home, Thomas Erskine, James Elphinstone, and George Young) of Albert’s pacific intentions.

James responded to these overtures with courtesy and satisfaction, telling Scorza that he was “very grateful to my brother the archduke”. Within the next week, upon receipt of the news of Elizabeth’s death and his proclamation in England, James wrote Albert a letter of thanks for Scorza’s offers, in which he re-emphasized the continued friendship that had existed between Scotland and Flanders, despite the war which he had now inherited as king of England. He insisted that the recruiting of Scottish troops for service with the Dutch had all been done both “without his order” and “without having asked for license”, and that if Albert and the king of Spain wanted to make peace with England now that he was king there, he would do what he could to keep these sorts of things from happening in the future. Moreover, he pointed out that he had been named king of England not just by right of inheritance, but by the “supreme will and consent of all Englishmen”, who have proclaimed him “openly throughout the kingdom”, thus stressing his newfound power, even while indicating his desire to remain on good terms with all the princes of Europe.

For his part, as soon as Albert got the news of Elizabeth’s death, he hurried to congratulate the new king of England and to reiterate his desire for peace. In a letter to Philip III

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51 AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 47, f.1v.
52 AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 47, f.2.
53 AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 47, f.2v.
55 “[P]or su suprema voluntad y consentimiento de todos los Ingleses me llamaran descubiertamente en todo el reyno”, AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 50, f.1v.
of 5/15 April, Albert declared his intention to send an embassy to England, and he insisted that
the king go along with him on this, and quickly.\textsuperscript{56} If not, he warned, James would likely “enter
into suspicion of enmity”, and there could very well be war not only with England and the
Dutch, but also with Scotland, France, Denmark, and the German protestants.\textsuperscript{57} Albert therefore
felt it to be “unavoidable and necessary for the service of Your Majesty and the public good to
treat of nothing at the present other than aiming everything at a well-founded peace with him
[James].”\textsuperscript{58}

Nor was Albert alone in this view or the task of promoting it. His wife and co-sovereign,
the Infanta Isabel, was not only the sister of Philip III, but a regular correspondent with Philip’s
valido, the duke of Lerma. She wrote to Lerma the next day, stressing friendship with James in
similarly urgent terms:

I hope that he [James] will desire and esteem the friendship of my brother [Philip], as he
has done up until now and has shown on all occasions. And thus it is necessary to lose no
time in winning him over, in order that others may not do it first, as they will try, since
having together England and Scotland and at the same time Denmark through his brother-in-law, he has come to be lord of the Ocean sea. And for this cause and others, his
friendship will always be a good thing, and the Indies will remain particularly secure with it, since the Dutch without his assistance will be able to do little and will have to come to
peace, although against their will, which will remove from my brother the heavy charge
of [the war].\textsuperscript{59}

\textsuperscript{56} AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 28, ff.1-1v. Albert to Philip III (Brussels, 5/15 April 1603).
Received in Valladolid 17/27 April 1603. Albert was quick to point out the fact that James had
always been at peace with them, and he was uncompromising in his language of respectful
insistence that Philip follow his lead: “Y he querido apuntar aquí que no me parece que se puede
tratar al presente de otra Resolución diferente de parte de VM\textsuperscript{d}. de la que yo he tomado” (f.2).
\textsuperscript{57 “[P]odría entrar en sospecha de Enemistad.” AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 28, ff.1v, 2v.
\textsuperscript{58 “[A]ssi tengo por forçosso y neçessario para el Servicio de VM\textsuperscript{d}. y el bien publico no tratar al
presente de otra cossa sino encaminarlas todas a una paz muy fundada con el,” AGS Estado, leg.
622, doc 28, f.2v.
\textsuperscript{59} “Yo espero que él querrá y estimará la amistad de mi hermano, como lo ha hecho hasta aquí y
lo ha mostrado en todas ocasiones; y así es menester no perder tiempo en granjealle, porque otros
no lo hagan primero, como lo procuran, pues tiniendo junto á Inglaterra y Escocia y juntamente á Dinamarca por su suegro, viene á ser señor del mar Oceano; y por esta causa y otras siempre
será buena su amistad, y particularmente las Indias quedarán seguras con ella, pues los
For good measure, Albert also wrote to Lerma the same day, backing up his wife’s points, stressing the importance of everything he had said in his letter to the king of the day before, and emphasizing that peace with James was the only way to proceed.\(^{60}\) Two weeks later, after having received James’s letter of thanks and Scorza’s return, Albert wrote to Philip again, informing the king of the mission to Scotland, and advising him of his choice of the Prince-Count of Aremberg as official ambassador to England, to congratulate James on his accession.\(^{61}\) He enclosed copies of all the relevant correspondence and instructions regarding Scorza and his mission, as well as a copy of James’s letter of thanks and friendship. Albert indicated that James was not only favorably disposed towards peace, but also ready to abandon the Dutch rebels, and it was consequently important to seize the moment.

Although Albert was clearly acting on his own initiative, the view from Spain was not that far out of sync. Indeed, the first news of Elizabeth’s death had come to Valladolid in a letter dated 31 March/10 April from the Spanish ambassador in France, Juan Bautista de Tassis, who was operating under similar assumptions:

Señor. This morning I have seen a letter from an Italian businessman, written in London on the fifth of this month with news that the queen of England died on the third, and that the following morning the king of Scotland was proclaimed king of England with great applause, calm, and with contradiction from no one…and that it was the common opinion that with this change the war between that kingdom and Spain will end, a hope that has everyone glad in general.\(^{62}\)
This was accompanied by an “aviso de Londres”, dated the day after Elizabeth’s death, giving a detailed account of the events that had occurred in London. As can be seen in both documents, James’s accession was explicitly linked with peace, both in the minds of the English people and in the pen of the Spanish ambassador.

When Philip received this news, he quickly brought it to the attention of the Council of State, who discussed it in a consulta of 11/21 April. They had yet to receive any of the Archdukes’ letters, and they stressed the importance of thinking this through carefully and waiting for Albert’s opinion, since the subject was “so serious and of such great importance”, and he was “such a close neighbor” of England, and would therefore know the details particularly well. Nevertheless, the Council was already considering what path it would be most prudent for the king to take. As the count of Chinchón described it, there were two different roads (dos caminos) down which they might travel. In the first place, they could use force, fomenting rebellion and domestic disturbance in order to try to keep James from being able to rule his kingdoms peacefully, and therefore preventing him from uniting with the other

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K1606, doc 29, f.1. Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip III (Paris, 31 March/10 April 1603), received in Valladolid 7/17 April.

63 AGS Estado, leg. K1606, doc 27. “De Londres a cinco de Abril 1603, escrito a H. por O.” (London, 25 March/5 April 1603). This same aviso was sent to Albert, who also forwarded it to Philip with his letter of 5/15 April. AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 29. It told of the peaceful response to the queen’s death and the joyful acceptance in London of the proclamation of the new king, and the writer was explicit about the connection of the accession to the possibility of peace, at least for the time being: “y podeys asseguraros que todo modo de proceder en perjuzio del Rey de España y Archiduque cessa por el presente.” Ibid., f.1v.

64 AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, ff.1v-2. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 11/21 April 1603). This consulta can also be found at AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs. 210-211, and AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 68bis.

65 “Y el negocio es tan grave y de tan grande ymportancia que para dar acertado pareçer en el, fuera menester pensarlo mucho, y esperar a Ver lo que el Señor Archiduque scrive y lo que sobre la materia se le ofrece pues es de creer que como tan Vezino havra sabido mas particularmente lo que ha pasado y lo que se puede esperar”, AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.1.

66 “[S]e deve tomar Uno de dos caminos.” AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.1v.
northern and protestant powers in a grand anti-Habsburg coalition. This, however, would bring great danger to both Spain and the Indies, and would require large quantities of men and money.

Chinchón pointed instead to a “segundo Camino,” a second way, “often used by prudent men in business,” in which necessity might be turned into a virtue. They could show James that they were happy he had come to power, sending him an ambassador “to congratulate him and grant him the friendship of the former alliance,” indicating the good that would come of maintaining the relationship, and emphasizing how bad it would be to have the king of Spain as his enemy. Nevertheless, he maintained, “this office must not come directly from Your Majesty nor from your minister, as this would show weakness, but rather by remote ways”, through people close to the king. Though a call was made to make sure that the military forces of the monarchy were put on high alert, the other council members agreed with Chinchón’s basic assessment. Several of them mentioned this path of negotiation, and emphasized the fact that James had always gotten along well with Spain, and that their complaints were with Elizabeth and not with him. The count of Alba de Liste urged that a message be sent immediately to the pope, considering the threat to Christendom (and the English catholics) if James were to unite the protestant nations in a war against catholicism. And the Constable of Castile, Spain’s preeminent nobleman and a veteran commander and administrator, pointed out that if war with “England by itself has put Your Majesty in such dire straits [cuydado], then it should be well

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67 “El segundo Camino es usar del medio que los hombres prudentes suelen en negocios”, AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.1v.
68 “[D]andole la enorabuena y acordandole la amistad y aliança antigua, lo bien que le estara conservarla,” AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.2.
69 “Pero este officio no ha de salir derechamente de VMd ni de ministro suyo porque seria mostrar flaqueza sino por vias remotas de personas confidentes al dicho Rey”, AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.2.
70 AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.6.
understood that the addition of Scotland will only make things worse.” He went on to say that, considering this, as well as the fact that James had always been neutral, desirous of peace, and had not been involved in “the particular offences that the Queen [Elizabeth] had committed against Your Majesty”, there could therefore be “no doubt that you will be able to enter into a treaty of peace with the said King [James] with more reputación than with the said Queen”.

Philip took all of this into account, and responded in depth. In addition to the usual request for the saying of prayers and the exercise of caution, Philip ordered a show of strength, but with an aim at peace: “That which I think is important after all this is to put my forces of sea and land in such order that the King of Scotland and whatever other claimant to the Kingdom of England may see that if they unite with me it will be of much assistance, and if not, much offense.” The idea was to get the military forces prepared for the worst, and then to gauge James’s attitude. If the new king was not already inclined towards peace, the appearance of Spanish power might make him reluctant to continue the war, and either way, they would be ready for whatever might come next.

But that was not all. Perhaps the most interesting part of Philip’s response to the news of the peaceful English accession was his specific and immediate request to see if James was still interested in a marriage alliance with his house.

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71 “Si sola Inglaterra ha puesto a VM en tanto cuidado, bien se dexa entender que añadiéndosse Escoçia podra ponerle en mayor.” AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, ff.6-6v.
72 “[S]iendo el Rey de Escoçia neutral, se desseava y procurava la paz…no aviendo el Incurrido en las ofensas particulares que la Reyna cometio contra VM y asi no tiene duda de que se podra entrar en el trato de Paz con el dicho Rey con mas reputacion que con la dicha Reyna”, AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.6v-7.
73 “Lo que a mi pareçer importa despues desto es poner mis armas de mar y tierra tan en orden que el Rey de Escoçia y otro cualquiera pretensor del Reyno de Inglaterra vean que le pueden ser si se unieren connmigo de mucha ayuda, y sino de mucha ofensa.” AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.1. King’s response in margin.
74 AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.2v. King’s response in margin.
Rome had put forward the possibility of a match between Prince Henry and the Spanish infanta, or at least a daughter of the duke of Savoy, King Philip’s niece. In either case, the plan would be for Henry to be sent to Spain to be raised at court, and the idea was to use such a match in order to help secure James’s accession to the English throne. Now that this end seemed to be no longer an issue, Philip still thought the match might help solidify a peace between their kingdoms, with an explicit aim to counterbalance France, who had no desire “to see the crowns of England and Scotland united”. It had been a longstanding French policy – the so-called “Auld Alliance” – to encourage the friendship of an independent Scotland, in order to keep England at bay. Now it was Spain’s turn to do the same to France, by cultivating friendship with James, to whom many thought “nothing could be so good as union with Spain”. In this way, an Anglo-Spanish match was made an explicit part of the process from the very beginning. And, as we shall see, it would continue to play a prominent and near-constant role in the relationship between the two countries for more than two decades.

One reason that the Habsburg leaders felt more able to work with James than with Elizabeth had to do with religion. James’s approach of trying to appear “all things to all men” had led many to believe that his accession might very well be followed by his conversion to the

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75 AGS Estado, leg. 2511, numerous docs. Indeed, this was a significant part of James’s complicated web of diplomatic maneuvers before his accession was secured, and would remain so long after. For a discussion of these negotiations in detail, in their proper context as the beginning of a near-constant, defining feature of Jacobean Anglo-Spanish diplomacy throughout the coming years, see chapter ten, below.

76 AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.2v. King’s response in margin.


78 “[A]ssi en França parece que al de Escoçia ninguna cosa le puede estar tan bien como la union de España”, AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 1, f.3. King’s response in the margin.

79 For an in-depth account of how this played out, see chapter ten, below.
Roman church, and these hopes did not entirely disappear until several years later.\textsuperscript{80} Despite his public protestantism, he was still the son of the very catholic Mary Queen of Scots, and no one on the continent knew just how serious his religious convictions might be. Moreover, one of the worst-kept secrets in western Europe (perhaps by design) was the catholicism of James’s wife. Queen Anna had privately converted in the previous decade, with help and encouragement from various catholic friends and instruction by Jesuit priests.\textsuperscript{81} Through purposeful ambiguity, encouragement of rumor, and the occasional hint dropped by various Scotsmen abroad, James was able to cultivate the hopes of some of catholic Europe’s most prominent figures. And these hopes for religion were almost always explicitly connected to a desire for peace. For example, in Isabel’s aforementioned letter to Lerma, the need to secure James’s friendship was discussed right alongside the certainty of his imminent conversion and the belief that “his wife is without doubt a catholic.”\textsuperscript{82} Nor did these hopes die quickly. In another letter to Lerma dated 25 June/4 July, Isabel was still praising Elizabeth’s death as a “great thing”, and she reiterated the absolute importance and apparent certitude of James’s friendship. The intervening months and countless reports from England had done nothing to dampen her spirits with regard to the new king’s

\textsuperscript{80} The quote is from: Simon Adams, "The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630" (D.Phil., Balliol College, University of Oxford, 1973), 154.


\textsuperscript{82} “[Y] así se puede tener por cierto que alcançara su conversion, de que hartas muestras, y su mujer es sin duda católica.” Isabel, pg.83, Isabel to Lerma (Brussels, 6/16 April 1603).
religion, and she rejoiced that “every day there are greater hopes that he will become a catholic, or at the least that he will not persecute those that are.”

Not everyone was quite so optimistic about James’s religious intentions, but such skepticism on this subject did not seem to change the initial attitudes toward peace. In another letter from Paris, ten days after he had reported the news of Elizabeth’s death, ambassador Tassis expressed concern that James would no longer feel pressure to convert or to offer toleration to English catholics, now that his accession had been secured. Nevertheless, he informed Philip that he had already taken the initiative to congratulate James’s resident ambassador in Paris on the news of the English accession. He explained that he had done so because James had always been at peace with Spain, repeating the point that Anglo-Spanish enmity had been a merely personal (“solo personal”) concern between individual monarchs, and he reported that even the Papal nuncio had paid the Scots ambassador a congratulatory visit. Although clearly not jumping for joy, Tassis pointed out that “sometimes it is convenient and may be useful to show pleasure at that which you cannot change”. Consequently, he was quick to advise his own master to take this opportunity to make peace, so that they might “in one moment put out the fire that for so many years we have suffered with that kingdom”.

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83 “Gran cosa ha sido esta muerte de la de Inglaterra…y cada día hay mayores esperanzas de que será católico, ó á lo menos que no persiguirá á los que lo son”, Isabel, pg.87, Isabel to Lerma (Brussels, 24 June/4 July 1603).
84 For more on the subsequent development of Spanish perceptions and hopes regarding the English catholics over this crucial first year, see chapters five and six, below.
85 AGS Estado, leg. K1606, doc 30a, f.1, Juan Bautista de Tassis to Philip III (Paris, 9/19 April 1603), received in Valladolid 17/27 April. Another copy at doc 30b.
86 “[A]viendo le VM. y su Padre de gloriosa memoria sido a su madre y a El hasta aqui tan amigos y ser el acto de Enemistad solo personal”, AGS Estado, leg. K1606, doc 30a, f.1v.
87 “[A] vezes conviene y puede ser util mostrar gusto de lo que no se puede remediar”, AGS Estado, leg. K1606, doc 30a, f.1.
88 “[E]n un momento apagar el fuego que tantos años ha nos corre con aquel Reyno”, AGS Estado, leg. K1606, doc 30a, f.2.
Talk of peace in Spain only increased upon arrival of the news of Albert’s and Tassis’s individual initiatives. In a consulta of 19/29 April, the Council of State responded directly to these two letters.\(^89\) In general, everyone at the table was for peace, but each had different concerns. The count of Miranda spoke in definite support of an end to the war, and indicated that it would be more possible with James than with Elizabeth, but he urged caution and the importance of making James think he needed it more than Spain did. The count of Alba de Liste expressed a high opinion of James’s personal valor, since he had “killed by his hand several traitors who had attempted” to end his days, but he thought that James might lack real judgment.\(^90\) Consequently, he suggested that the important thing would be to keep James from being led by his English ministers. The count of Olivares insisted on the absolute necessity of peace, but he also stressed the importance of not appearing to desire it too much, and therefore suggested a wait-and-see approach. Both Miranda and Alba de Liste thought Albert had gone too far on his own, and said that he should not have decided to send an embassy until he had heard from Spain first.\(^91\) Nevertheless, despite being somewhat ruffled by his independent initiative, the council ultimately agreed with the Archduke’s actions, and hurried to do likewise. Indeed, the decision had already been taken to get someone on the scene as soon as possible, and King Philip approved the text of the ambassador’s instructions that very day.\(^92\) The man he had

\(^{89}\) AGS Estado, leg. 622, docs. 246-252, consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 19/29 April 1603). Both letters arrived in Valladolid on 17/27 April, two days before this consulta.

\(^{90}\) “[P]uisqu’il avait tué de sa main plusieurs traitres qui avaient attenté”, Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 144.

\(^{91}\) AGS Estado, leg. 622, docs. 246-252, consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 19/29 April 1603). Also, Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 143-144.

\(^{92}\) The ambassador had already been informed by 15/25 April at the latest, as he wrote a letter to one of the royal secretaries on this date requesting instructions for his upcoming mission. AGS Estado, leg. 2571, docs 5-6. Juan de Tassis y Acuña to Secretary ____ [Franqueza] (Aranjuez, 5/15 April 1603).
chosen for the task was his *correo mayor* (postmaster general), Juan de Tassis y Acuña, nephew of the ambassador in Paris and soon to be named count of Villamediana.\textsuperscript{93}

Philip’s instructions for Villamediana were, of necessity, relatively broad in scope. After all, although James appeared to be securely on the throne, the ambassador was leaving in a hurry – it had been less than two weeks after the first reports of Elizabeth’s death had reached Valladolid. News of James’s entry into England had not even arrived yet, and any number of things might have happened in the interim. But there was no time to waste. Villamediana would have to be updated by further dispatches on the road, and inform himself as he passed through Paris, on his way to Flanders.\textsuperscript{94} At the court of the Archdukes in Brussels, he was to get together with Albert and receive a full report on the current situation across the water, and prepare himself for the journey. He was to waste no time in getting from Brussels to Dunkirk, but he was not to cross the Channel until Philip gave the final word. Nevertheless, in his instructions the king still saw fit to provide for three different contingencies concerning Villamediana’s

\textsuperscript{93} In order to not promote confusion with his uncle in Paris, this Tassis will be referred to in the text throughout as “Villamediana.” BNM, Mss 2347, ff.70-77. “Instruccio que el Rey Phe’3\textsuperscript{o}. dio a Don Juan de Tassis su correo mayor quando le imbio por Embajador de Yngalaterra año 1603.” (Aranjuez, 19/29 April 1603). Loomie somehow portrays this as a delayed response, encouraging the common misperception that the Spaniards had acted with characteristic sluggishness on this issue, and explicitly describes it as evidence of general indifference to James’s accession. The truth was, in fact, quite the opposite. This was actually a very fast turnaround, and the result of some real excitement on the part of Philip and his ministers. After all, Elizabeth died on 24 March/April 3, and it took a couple of weeks for news to go from London to Valladolid. These instructions were drawn up on 19/29 April, only twelve days after the first news reached Valladolid of the Queen’s death, and only eight after it had become common knowledge (see above, 7 and 11 April new style, respectively). In fact, it was precisely because they sent Villamediana *so quickly* that he later needed to wait for firm instructions from Valladolid before crossing over to England from Flanders, and before being able to officially treat for peace after he had arrived. See chapters three through five, below, for discussion of these events. For Loomie’s view, see Albert J. Loomie, ”Toleration and Diplomacy: The Religious Issue in Anglo-Spanish Relations, 1603-1605,” *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society* 53, no. 6 (1963): 5.

\textsuperscript{94} BNM, Mss 2347, ff.71-71v.
ultimate arrival in England. The first and, from all reports at the time, most likely scenario was that he would arrive to find James securely on the throne. The second was that he would get there and find “confusion and division” between James, Arbella Stuart, and any other possible claimants and their partisans. And the third possibility was that someone other than James would be firmly in control. Taken together, two things are most notable about these plans. First, that James’s accession was the possibility they had clearly thought the most about by far. And secondly, the relative similarity of the message even if the situation was to turn out otherwise. So we see again the importance both of the accession as an event, and of Habsburg opinions regarding James as an acceptable candidate.

Before even discussing the specifics, Philip made it quite clear to Villamediana that whatever the case may be, “The end of sending you is to procure that he who would be King of England understands how important it will be for his conservación to be united with me”. If James had been proclaimed without opposition (as they believed, and as indeed he had), Villamediana was to congratulate him, stressing the old alliance that had existed between the Spanish kingdoms and England, as well as the long and unbroken friendship that both Philip and his father had maintained with James as king of Scotland. The issue of James’s possible conversion to catholicism was addressed, as were the interests of both the English and Irish

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95 BNM, Mss 2347, f.73.
96 “[P]odría ser aver confusion, y division entre el de Escozia, Arbella, y otros competidores, y parciales del Reyno”, BNM, Mss 2347, f.75.
97 BNM, Mss 2347, f.75v.
98 “El fin de embiaros es a procurar que el que fuere Rey de Inglaterra entienda quanto le importara para su conservacion estar unido conmigo”, BNM, Mss 2347, f.71v. He returned to this theme at the end of the instructions as well, reiterating the need for convincing James that in order to establish himself securely in his kingdom and ensure domestic tranquility, “the most important [thing] is to be united with me” (“lo que mas le importa es estar unido conmigo”), ibid., f.76v.
99 BNM, Mss 2347, f.73.
catholics, two groups for which the king of Spain felt some real responsibility. The possibility of a marriage alliance was mentioned in a couple of different places, and the ambassador was instructed to see if James’s opinion about it had changed since he had come into his kingdom. Each time, Philip brought up the offer to have Prince Henry raised at the Spanish court, where he would be “instructed, presented with gifts, and cherished.” James was to be told that “religion will open the way to alliances, and it will be on this foundation that marriages will be concluded, and in no other way.” Philip devoted some significant space to Anglo-French relations, telling Villamediana to point out that the French had only been friendly to Scotland as a counterweight to England, and that Henri IV had no desire to see a powerful, united Britain on his doorstep. In the attempt to win James to the Spanish side, Philip authorized his ambassador to show the new king what Henri had recently proposed to ensure that the English throne would go to someone other than the king of Scots. And Philip even went so far as to offer help in winning back England’s extensive ancestral holdings in France, most of which had been lost now for a century and a half.

By far the largest amount of space in the instructions was dedicated to dealing with James, whose accession and apparent opinions, as we have seen, had policymakers in both Spain

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100 BNM, Mss 2347, f.72.
101 “[I]nstruido, regalado, y acariciado.” BNM, Mss 2347, f.74.
102 “[L]a religion abrira camino a las alianzas, y casamientos que sobre este fundamento se podrian concluir, que no pueden de otra manera.” BNM, Mss 2347, f.73v. These two intertwined issues – catholicism in England and negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match – would prove to be the two central issues around which the relationship would continue to turn over the course of the coming years. This was true right from the start, all the way through the negotiations of the first several years, and are consequently mentioned where necessary over the course of the several chapters that follow regarding the achievement of the peace. But for the sake of coherence, most reference to them is is reserved for the chapters in which they are treated specifically in depth, especially from chapter five on (for catholicism) and ten (for the Anglo-Spanish match).
103 BNM, Mss 2347, f.74v.
104 Ibid.
and Flanders optimistic about their prospects for peace. As a result, despite the existence of the other two contingencies, no real viable alternate plans were put forward. Because of their positive opinions of James, and since Elizabeth’s death had come before any alternative candidate could gain enough influence to encourage Spanish military intervention (either in support or opposition), Villamediana’s mission was to be strictly peaceful. Regardless of the situation he was to find in England, he was expected to convey the fact that, since the war had been with Elizabeth, its cause had died with her. The English catholics were to be told of the need to behave themselves, “because violent means will perhaps only speed their ruin.” Indeed, for Philip, domestic quiet and religious toleration were explicitly tied to international peace: “if there is a secure peace between these two crowns, there will be commerce between the two nations, and communication will continue for the good of the republic and the religion.” In each scenario, Philip emphasized his desire for England to have a catholic king, but said that he would settle for one that would at least allow freedom of conscience. In any case, one thing was clear: from this point forward, thanks to Elizabeth’s death and the public perception of the man who was to succeed her, diplomatic negotiation was going to take precedence over military force when it came to Spanish relations with England.

Things were moving apace. By the time that the Archduke’s second letter (relating Scorza’s mission and James’s response) arrived in Valladolid on 7/17 May, Philip had already

105 BNM, Mss 2347, ff.73, 75v.
106 “[P]orque medios violentos quiza apresurarian su ruina”, BNM, Mss 2347, f.75.
107 “[S]i entre estas coronas ay paz segura avra comercio entre los dos naciones; y comunicacion continua para el bien de la republica, y religion”. BNM, Mss 2347, f.75. Peace was to be stressed whatever the situation. Even in the case of a disputed succession, Villamediana was to offer his support to the candidate who would be most convenient to “the Kingdom, and to the public peace, and to the good of Christendom”, (“lo que mas conviniere al Reyno, y a la paz publica, y al bien de la Christiandad”), BNM, Mss 2347, f.75v.
108 BNM, Mss 2347, f.76.
written to Albert, approving of everything he had done so far. He made specific reference to the
decision to send a congratulatory ambassador, since they had always been friends with the king
of Scotland, and only expressed the desire “to know how the [embassy] goes, and what results it
produces”.\textsuperscript{109} It was a good thing that Philip agreed, because Albert had already acted, sending
Scorza back to James on 4/14 May to inform him of Aremberg’s coming and to obtain safe
passage for the ambassador and his entourage.\textsuperscript{110} Philip’s own envoy was on his way, as well,
having left the king’s presence at Aranjuez ten days earlier.\textsuperscript{111} In addition to his instructions,
Villamediana was carrying with him letters for both James I and Arbella Stuart, as well as
generic introductions for all of the important members of the English nobility.\textsuperscript{112} He also had
1,000 escudos to distribute in bribes and pensions to English ministers,\textsuperscript{113} and a letter to the
“estates” (estados) of England (presumably the Parliament), informing them of his desire for
peace, and indicating yet again that Elizabeth’s death had ended any cause for war.\textsuperscript{114}

The ambassadors were on their way, but what kind of situation were these envoys going
to encounter? We have seen what their masters thought of peace. We have seen the importance

\textsuperscript{109} “[S]avoir comment la chose s’est passée et les résultats qu’elle a produits.” Philip III to
Albert (Valladolid, 5/15 May 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour
d’Espagne} I, 145.

\textsuperscript{110} HMC Salisbury XV, 73. Albert to James I (Brussels, 4/14 May 1603).

\textsuperscript{111} Villamediana left Aranjuez on 24 April/4 May, went first to Valladolid to prepare for the
journey, then left from there on 11/21 May. AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 26. Juan de Tassis y
Acuña to Philip III (Valladolid, 10/20 May 1603).

\textsuperscript{112} He had 30 for the barons, 10 each for the viscounts, earls, marquesses, and dukes (even
though there were no English dukes at the moment). He was also carrying letters for his uncle in
Paris, for Albert and Isabel, and various others dealing with the particulars and logistics of his
journey. AGS Estado, leg. 2571, docs. 8, 16, 19, etc. Doc 16 is a list of the things he was
bringing with him.

\textsuperscript{113} BNM, Mss 2347, f.77. 1,000 escudos was roughly £250, a very small sum for such purposes.
From this, and Aremberg’s near-constant expressions of shock and dismay regarding the
amounts required from the moment of his arrival in England (discussed at length in chapter three,
below), it is quite clear that the Habsburgs were not responsible for setting the market price for
influence at the English court.

\textsuperscript{114} AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 22.
of both the accession as an event, and the perception of James in the minds of England’s opponents, thanks in part to his own previous diplomatic negotiations behind the scenes. But there is one factor that must still be considered: the actual opinions of the new king himself.

**The king himself**

James had been very successful before his English accession at convincing the catholic powers that he was a king with whom they could deal, and who had no desire to entangle himself in foreign conflicts, especially over religion. But what were James’s real opinions? After all, even though England’s opponents desired peace, saw the war as a personal conflict with Elizabeth, and had great hopes for the new monarch, none of this would matter if James himself did not reciprocate. Indeed, the importance of the king’s actual attitude towards peace becomes particularly clear when one considers that Elizabeth’s death was coincidentally accompanied by the near simultaneous end of war in Ireland. This meant that one of the most important, long-argued English reasons for making peace with Spain had disappeared. Some have suggested that the end of war in Ireland was actually a condition that encouraged the English to seek peace with Spain.\(^\text{115}\) To be sure, an end to the conflict with Spain would certainly prove beneficial there in helping strengthen the English hold, whether the rebellion had been put down or not.\(^\text{116}\) But the rebels’ surrender made this a much less pressing concern, significantly diminishing the possible effectiveness of any future Spanish incursions there.


As a result, peace in Ireland was not a necessary precondition for peace with Spain, but rather an encouragement to the latter war’s continuance. Both Burghley and Buckhurst had long insisted on peace with Spain mainly as a means to better prosecute the much more costly and troubling war in Ireland.\(^{117}\) With Tyrone’s surrender of 30 March/9 April 1603, this was no longer a problem. There was now a much better argument to be made for war with Spain alone, rather than the precarious and very expensive multi-front conflict that they had been fighting for years. Consequently, at Elizabeth’s death, peace was still far from a guaranteed proposition, and in many English minds it was much less necessary than it had seemed just days before.\(^{118}\) It was into this opening that the new king stepped.

As we have seen, before his English accession, James had assiduously cultivated his relationships with the catholic powers. And yet, while he was indicating his desire to live at peace with all of them, we also know that he was secretly opposing any end to the Anglo-Spanish conflict while Queen Elizabeth was still alive. This opposition changed immediately upon news of his proclamation in London. Elizabeth’s death was – for James no less than for the Habsburg leaders – the key event that removed any objections the new king had to peace with Spain. In his aforementioned letter to Albert of 3/13 April, he emphasized the fact that he had always been at peace with the house of Austria, a common theme he would repeat over and over again throughout the coming negotiations, and indeed until the end of his life. And everyone seemed to get the picture. In addition to the king’s own claims in this regard, and the constant mention of this point on the Habsburg side, James’s English ministers understood it from the


\(^{118}\) For a detailed discussion of these attitudes, see chapter three, below.
outset. In a letter to James, while the king was preparing to come south to take possession of his new kingdom, the lords of the privy council wanted to know their new king’s mind with regard to foreign affairs. They discussed the situation in the low countries and stressed the importance of English levies for the defense of Ostend, but they were also cautious not to commit themselves too far, “because we know not upon what terms your Majesty meaneth to stand with those princes”. They admitted that

your Majesty hath in right of your crown of Scotland amity with Spain and the Archduke; but in the succession to the throne of England a descent cast upon you of confederacy with these provinces, and an interest of great sums of money due from them. The choice of reconciliation of these two considerations is a matter, whereinto we dare not wade any further in respect of the great points of state which require longer consultation and better digested than can be had until we may be helped with the light of your wisdom.

It was indeed a reconciliation that was going to take some time to digest, and “the light of [James’s] wisdom” was going to have a very strong effect on the ultimate outcome. James was to become almost immediately the greatest force for peace in England. He began to speak about it constantly, usually identifying it with his own person. By the time he reached London, he did not hesitate to tell the French resident ambassador, the Comte de Beaumont, exactly how he felt. When Beaumont praised Elizabeth and emphasized the need to continue the fight against the enemies of the English crown, James replied that he had been well-received as king in England, and that “I regard no prince or people as my enemies, but on the contrary I hold them all as friends.” And around the same time he was also to declare to Robert Lee, the Lord Mayor of London, that he was bringing three things to England: maintenance of religion, peace,

\[\text{\footnotesize 119} \text{ HMC Salisbury XV, 38.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 120} \text{ Ibid., 39.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 121} \text{ For more on the specifics of James’s attitudes and actions regarding peace after his English accession, see chapters three and four, below.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 122} \text{ “Je ne regarde aucun prince ou peuple comme mes ennemis, mais les tiens au contraire tous pour amis.” Laffleur de Kermaingant, } \text{L’ambassade de France I, 106. This was in a meeting at Greenwich, on Monday, 16/26 May 1603.}\]
and union with Scotland.\textsuperscript{123} Now that he was king, James was serious about peace, and he wanted everyone to know it.

Nevertheless, all of this does not mean that peace was \textit{a fait accompli} upon the king’s arrival in England – far from it. There was still much work to be done, and it would take more than a year to do it. The continued presence of James, the repeated insistence of his determination to be at peace with the world, and his regular participation in the process, would all be necessary in overcoming a number of serious obstacles and would be decisive in ultimately securing the peace. The crucial first step was complete, but in order to get from the accession to the actual achievement of the peace itself, things were going to have to get quite a bit worse before they could get better.

\textsuperscript{123} Prince-Count of Aremberg to Archduke Albert (London, 14/24 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne} I, 149.
Chapter Three: After the accession – multiple centers of power

“And now that they see, open force cannot prevale, they in shewe retyre and give over Armes; but have prepared a Synons Horse, which cannot enter, if wee cast not downe our walles.”

– Earl of Essex, Apologie

“Noe doubt but his Majestie and Counsell will deeply consyder of the matter; for now is the tyme offered that his highnes may doe what he will. And others Rysinge must be as well consydered of as the Spaniard falling.”

– Richard Cocks, English merchant

As we have seen, peace was not a late Elizabethan foregone conclusion. The accession of James I was, in itself, absolutely crucial in bringing it to pass. But this was still only the beginning. The conclusion of a lasting settlement was going to be a complicated process that would take some real time. There were a number of people both from England and abroad working against the peace, and for a while it seemed to many as if their efforts might succeed. But as we shall see, the process of achieving the peace, on terms that both sides could accept, and which would have some chance of standing the test of time, was actually going to require the experience of these difficulties if it was going to be able to be brought to pass.

So how did this come about? How do we get from the truce to the treaty? The particular experience of the way in which this occurred was central in setting the entire terms of the Anglo-Spanish relationship for the next two decades, and a closer look can tell us a great deal about the way in which politics and government were carried out throughout the entire Jacobean period.

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1 Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, against Those Which Iealovsly, and Maliciovsly, Tax Him to Be the Hinderer of the Peace and Qviet of His Covntry (London: Imprined by Richard Bradocke, 1603), f.9v.
2 Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 23 May/2 June 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.30v. Immediately preceded by a discussion of Spanish weakness, perceptions, and the shifting balance of power in Europe: “Shewrly it is aperant that the Kinge of Spaine doth stand in great feare that ther will be a league made betwixt the Kings Majestie, the King of France, and Denmarck, with the princes of Germany and states of the Lowe Countries (which to prevent) noe doubt but he will condesend unto any Condytions of peace whatsoever knowinge otherwaies it wilbe his utter ruen.” Ibid.
This is true not only of foreign policy, but of domestic politics as well. The king’s approaches to both were fundamentally intertwined, and the peace with Spain would at first be a result of this new system, and then its success would help to keep that system in place.

While James’s skillful playing of all sides in previous years had helped ensure his English accession, and had caused each of the various foreign powers to get their hopes up about what the new king’s reign would have to offer, his continued playing of all sides after the accession would help to dash these various hopes relatively quickly. The first few months would see the establishment of a new political environment at court, based upon the creation of multiple potential centers of power. This was a system that would emphasize the shifting complexities of competition, rivalry, debate, factionalization, and intrigue. And it did not take long for all of this to manifest itself, with the near-immediate revival of the policy debate over the issue of war and peace. This intertwining of domestic politics and international affairs would be a hallmark of the entire reign, and it was further encouraged in that first year by the arrival in London of a remarkable collection of foreign ambassadors and entourages, whose attempt to gauge and win over the new king would help incorporate the very foreign groups themselves into the growing factional system. In this way, James would soon find himself at the top of a multipolar, competitive domestic political system, firmly connected to the similarly multipolar, competitive international system, which would allow him to continue playing the same type of role that he had grown so accustomed to over the preceding years in Scotland. Only now, in England, he would have much greater power and influence, and would be playing for much higher stakes.

But this was a more complicated game even still. For in order to make this system a stable one, which might last for the coming years, a number of things had to happen, and they had to happen in a particular way. In order for James to even become king of England, and in
order to bring the Spaniards to the table, the Habsburg leaders had to think initially that James’s accession would mean an easy path to peace, a potential ally, and even the possibility of a reconversion of the kingdom – or at least a toleration of some kind for its catholic minority. Then, in order to actually bring peace to pass – and to do so in a way that would be acceptable and profitable at home, and which might have a real chance of lasting longer than it took the ink to dry – the English had to disabuse the Spaniards and Flemings of many of their crucial initial hopes. And yet, this had to be handled in just the right way, in order to keep from chasing the Habsburgs away, and to get them invested in playing within the new system, on English turf and according to England’s terms. This chapter will address the first part of this process, focusing on the late spring and the summer of 1603: as the foundation of the system was formed, initial hopes were brought down to earth, and the possibility of peace was put into serious doubt.

**Divisions within and without**

Despite the surprisingly calm and trouble-free transfer of power to James upon Elizabeth’s death, England in 1603 was not a unified place. There were many natural divisions – from the geographical and the social, to the dynastic and the political. Perhaps most importantly, the kingdom was still undergoing the process of religious reformation, and England’s people were lined up all along the spectrum, at various stops from Puritan to Papist, a complexity only compounded by the significantly different religious populations of its new sovereign’s other two kingdoms. But as we shall see, James was very good at taking what at first might look like a liability, and turning it into a strength. His own personal experience was particularly well suited for this, as Scotland had long been a by-word for conflict and division: in matters of religion, in the regional and cultural divide between highland and lowland, in the prevalence of clan feuds,
and in the ongoing conflict over the nature of political power and the position of the crown, which was to a certain extent tied to all of this.³

When searching for understanding here, an important place to start is James’s childhood. There was an inherent dichotomy built into him from the outset, part of the very fabric of who he was, which informed virtually every aspect of his thought and his kingship throughout his life. As both the son and heir of Mary Queen of Scots, and as the child king with whom Mary’s opponents sought to replace her, he was the physical embodiment of a number of divisions within his native land. On the intellectual, educational, and emotional side, this left him a complex legacy: split between the catholicism and monarchalism of his mother on the one hand, and the reformed protestantism and resistance theory of his tutors on the other.⁴ This tore him in different directions, and led him to reach unique conclusions regarding these intellectual and spiritual contrarieties. He owed his very position as king to the actions of those who chased his mother from power, but as a king himself he was quite naturally deeply opposed to the ideas upon which they based their deeds. And while he clearly felt some affection for his absent mother and real pride for the history of his family, he nevertheless rejected their religious heritage and emerged from his youth a convinced protestant. That said, this was not merely a

³ On James’s Scottish upbringing and experience as king, see: Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch, The Reign of James VI (East Linton, UK: Tuckwell Press, 2000). Lee, Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in His Three Kingdoms. Lockyer, James VI and I. Croft, King James. Stafford, James VI of Scotland and the Throne of England; David Harris Willson, King James VI and I (New York: Holt, 1956). Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?." ⁴ James’s two main tutors were both renowned intellectuals, with their own particular emphases opposed to almost everything that his mother stood for, but who themselves encouraged different aspects of the young king’s interests. One was the fiery and overbearing George Buchanan, the great humanist scholar and champion of the theory of resistance to monarchs, who believed that the origin of all political power lay in the people. The other was the much more kind and nurturing protestant scholar Peter Young, who was more concerned with religion than politics, but who also gave James an appreciation for poetry, and for the softer and more aesthetic pleasures of French literature. Willson, King James VI and I, 19-21.
process of choosing one side over the other, but rather simultaneously embracing and rejecting various aspects of each, an approach that required real mental agility and flexibility, and which can be seen not only in his mature intellectual works, but in his love for debate that persisted until the end of his life.\(^5\)

James’s childhood also provided him with strong practical foundations for his complex views. When he was young, his political position and even his very life were constantly faced with threats from both halves of his dynastic and religious inheritance. On the one hand were threats from catholics and supporters of Mary who were opposed to his person and place on the throne. On the other were threats from hotter protestants, who were opposed to his mother, but who consequently wanted to limit the monarchy’s power, and thus sought to manipulate him and limit his power as king. Add to this the clan, factional, and individual rivalries within the various groups in Scotland – which produced a number of changes of regency, high-profile assassinations, and royal kidnappings – and all of this ensured that James’s entire childhood was not only a remarkably traumatic experience, but also a direct lesson in what happens when noble leaders have control of the king. Through his first two decades on earth, James was like a

political talisman – whoever had him in their clutches had the power. So it should be no surprise that the rest of his life would be spent doing everything he could to learn from this experience, and to avoid subjecting himself to any situation even remotely like it again.

Consequently, when he had at last grown up and come to power in his own right, James devoted much of his energy as a mature king of Scotland towards gaining control of this notoriously vicious factional system. He was remarkably successful at this, resolving conflicts and increasing royal power not by eliminating the factions, but by channeling their hostility, limiting their excesses, and playing them off of one another. In Maurice Lee’s words, not only had the “vicissitudes of his youth…taught him the value of eschewing rash initiatives and keeping his options open”, but, quite simply, “his policy worked. James left behind him in 1603 a country that was far more peaceful, orderly, prosperous (in spite of the lean years of the mid-1590s), and obedient than any living person could remember. James had been successful, and he knew it.”

6 Cogswell refers to him as a “political football”, Houston describes him as “being passed around like a trophy” – both are very apt descriptions. Cogswell, The Blessed Revolution, 13. Houston, James I, 2.

7 On this, see the seminal: Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?." For a more recent piece that criticizes some of that work’s conclusions, but which still presents the pre-English accession part of James’s Scottish reign as a factionalized environment where the king, after limiting the edges of the debate, spent his time using the disputes and then positioning himself above them (though still not necessarily seeing this in the most positive of lights), see: Julian Goodare, "Scottish Politics in the Reign of James VI," in The Reign of James VI, ed. Julian Goodare and Michael Lynch (East Linton, UK: Tuckwell Press, 2000).

8 Lee, Great Britain's Solomon: James VI and I in His Three Kingdoms, 89. I do not agree, however, with the point that Lee follows this with (and which Goodare concludes with, and which is one of the main targets at which Wormald takes aim in her article, though not fully turning it on its head): that this largely successful approach in Scotland would simply not translate so well in England, and that James never realized this. On the contrary, it is one of the central contentions of this dissertation that, in the short and medium term, James’s general approach worked remarkably well, he knew it, and this is part of why he continued to use it. However, in the long term – as we shall begin to see in chapter ten – many of these very successes would ultimately play a substantial role in some of the more significant problems that
It was an experience perfect for the European stage as well, since the continent as a whole was at least as divided as his several dominions had been, and in many of the same ways. James had recognized this early on, and for all of his success ruling as king of Scotland, he was arguably even more effective in his foreign policy at that time, using the same sorts of methods to play all sides to his own ends, and eventually securing through this the object of his greatest desire: the English throne. Continued success is of course often the greatest argument against change. Consequently, these successes—and the king’s acute awareness of them—would naturally help define his approach both to domestic rule in his new kingdom, and to his future foreign policy as well.

**Creating multiple centers of power**

From almost the moment of James’s accession, the English court became a much more multifarious and, ultimately, factionalized place. And this did not occur by happenstance. The creation of competing interest groups at James’s court was not the inadvertent product of a bad, lazy, or inattentive king, as the traditional view would have it. Rather, as with the peace (and England and its monarchy would face in the final years of his reign, and in the years and decades that followed.

9 Most of the best recent work takes this traditional approach and quite rightly applies it to the rulers immediately preceding James. In his chapter on mid- to late-Tudor factionalization, Simon Adams identifies factionalization as occurring only during periods of royal weakness, either during a royal minority or elderly female rule: Simon Adams, "Faction, Clientage and Party: English Politics, 1550-1603," in *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics*, ed. Simon Adams (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002). Paul Hammer modifies this, pushing the date of real late Elizabethan factionalization back until later in the reign, but he too sees this as as much a result of royal acquiescence or inattentiveness as anything else: Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: The Political Career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597*. While I believe that Hammer’s take on this is certainly correct, I do not believe that we can then transfer these sorts of reasons and apply them to factionalization at the court of James I, as conventional wisdom and received historical opinion continually seems to insist. There was something quite different going on at James’s court, and the particular way in which he and his court operated are a big part of what makes his reign so
firmly connected to it), this was a *deliberate* policy central to this monarch’s understanding of kingship, and it was exercised right from the beginning. This was entirely in keeping with what we have seen of James’s experience and political practice from an early age: from his faction-dominated childhood in Scotland, his domestic achievements playing all sides off of one another as a mature king there, and his successful, pro-active international diplomacy in the years before Elizabeth’s death: making all interested parties throughout Europe hold out just enough hope that he was who they wanted him to be that none of them made a move to get in the way of his accession.¹⁰ Not only was James temperamentally suited for this approach, but the positive reinforcement received from so much success at applying it for so many years would have been a hard thing to ignore.

So James continued this approach immediately upon his arrival in England. The English government since the very end of the 1590s, and especially since the final fall of Essex in early 1601, had become a remarkably monolithic entity. Policy was firmly in the hands of Robert Cecil and his closest associates, and there was little fundamental disagreement or factional rivalry at court in the aging queen’s final years. One of the first things that James did upon coming to the English throne was to create a number of alternate potential centers of power at distinctive politically and culturally. For perhaps the most concise and straightforward expression of the aforementioned received historical opinion, in a highly influential (and, indeed, generally excellent) work, see: Mark Kishlansky, *A Monarchy Transformed: Britain 1603-1714*, The Penguin History of Britain (London: Penguin, 1996), 68.

¹⁰ This approach and its success was commonly understood by savvy contemporary observers, such as Marin Cavalli, the Venetian ambassador to France, who wrote about James on 10/20 April 1603 to the Doge and Senate: “The King [James] himself proceeded with great judgement both in his relations towards the Queen [Elizabeth] and in his efforts to obtain the support or the neutrality of foreign princes. With this object in view he negotiated with the Pope through the medium of some private persons, and when exorted to be converted he replied that for the present he could not. The Pope, besides supplying the King with a certain amount of money, always kept a secret agent at the Scottish Court. The King had understandings with the King of Spain and the King of France, but nothing was more useful to him than his relations with the English Council.” CSPVen X, 7.
court, by restoring to favor and government office several different groups that had been previously on the outs, and adding them to those he had already accepted from the heart of the late Elizabethan regime. This included a number of intimate followers of Essex, such as his son and heir (Robert, the 3rd earl), his closest companion (the earl of Southampton), and others, such as the earl of Rutland and Sir Henry Neville. In addition to this first group, James also revived the fortunes of several other men who were no longer close to Elizabeth’s favorite at the time of his fall, but who had been tainted by past connections to him and had remained on the outside looking in, such as the earl of Cumberland, the earl of Northumberland, and Sir Robert Sidney. A separate group still, rehabilitated from different circumstances altogether,

11 Robert Devereux, 3rd earl of Essex (1591-1646). Son of the executed favorite, grandson of Francis Walsingham, Elizabeth’s spymaster and fervent supporter of the protestant cause in Europe. Restored to his title in 1604 by King James, he was a strong protestant all his life.
included those such as the brothers Herbert – soon to be earls of Pembroke and Montgomery – who would become longtime favorites of the king, and unswerving champions of the protestant cause. But perhaps the greatest restoration of royal favor overall was reserved for various key members of the traditionally catholic senior branch of the Howard family, spread over three generations. This included, most notably: the elder statesman of the group, Henry Howard, soon to be earl of Northampton; his nephews Thomas Howard, earl of Suffolk, and Lord William Howard, and their nephew in turn, another Thomas Howard, the young earl of


20 Henry Howard, earl of Northampton (1540-1614). Younger brother of the 4th duke of Norfolk. Norfolk was the head of the family who had been convicted of treason under Elizabeth and executed in 1572 for his attempt to marry James’s mother, Mary Queen of Scots, and for his participation in the Ridolfi Plot. After years in the political wilderness, Henry Howard became at first close with Essex, then deftly switched over to Cecil’s group as things went downhill for Elizabeth’s favorite. This brought him some acceptance at court, but he still remained far from the center. However, Howard benefitted greatly from his position as the primary go-between with James VI in the secret correspondence. King James added him to the privy council on 4 May 1603, at Theobalds, soon thereafter gave him precedence due the younger son of a duke, and then made him earl of Northampton on 13 March 1604. Pauline Croft, “Howard, Henry, earl of Northampton (1540-1614)”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [accessed 22 Oct 2004: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13906]. The definitive monograph on Howard remains: Linda Levy Peck, *Northampton: Patronage and Policy at the Court of James I* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982).

21 Thomas Howard, earl of Suffolk (1561-1626). The 4th duke of Norfolk’s second son. He had been restored in blood in 1584, and had served in various of the key actions of the war against Spain, including the Armada campaign of 1588 and the sack of Cádiz in 1596. A member of Nottingham’s and Cecil’s group, not that of Essex. Like his uncle Henry, he was still on the outskirts of power at the time of Elizabeth’s death. James changed this immediately, making him Lord Chamberlain on 6 April 1603, and adding him to the privy council the next day. He was created earl of Suffolk on 21 July 1603. Pauline Croft, “Howard, Thomas, first earl of Suffolk (1561-1626)”, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004 [accessed 22 Oct 2004: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/13942].

22 William Howard, of Naworth Castle (1563-1640). The 4th duke of Norfolk’s third son. Lord William was restored in blood by James in 1603, but remained openly catholic, and thus did not
Arundel. Two of these four were acknowledged catholics, a third not-so-secretly so despite outward conformity, and the fourth was married to a woman who would quickly become perhaps the most powerful pro-catholic voice at the English court. Altogether, when combined with sons, daughters, cousins, and future marriages, this made for a very large family-based interest group, and one naturally inclined towards opposition to the aims of various of the others.

Of course, while Elizabeth had still been alive James himself had already been in contact with several members of some of these groups, dealing secretly not only with Cecil, but also with various Howards, Essexians, and even the late favorite himself. But this was no simple matter of rewarding one’s friends or repaying for a service rendered – this went well beyond that. Upon James’s accession, countless members of England’s traditional elite from across the board who had been either languishing in the political wilderness, in poverty, or even in prison with no hope in sight, suddenly found themselves free men, back in favor, with their incomes, lands, and titles restored. A number of them were then thrust right into positions of actual power throughout the kingdom – even at the very top, as James expanded membership in the privy council itself,


taking it from the thirteen it had been at Elizabeth’s death, to his newly chosen ideal of twenty-four – all within less than two months of coming to the throne.  

Nor was this process limited merely to Englishmen, as James injected another substantial group into this mix by bringing significant numbers of trusted friends and servants from Scotland south with him, many of whom in turn formed their own interest group centered on the king’s bedchamber. This, combined with James’s decision to add five Scots to the English privy council, helped stoke the fires of factional rivalry and intrigue amongst all those competing for favor. The growing conflict between these Scots and many of the English at court would be a notable feature of the early years of James’s English reign, and the role this conflict played in frustrating James’s own plans for a more perfect union of his kingdoms was an early sign that his preferred political approach would be accompanied by some real mid- to long-term costs.

Moreover, unlike his predecessor, James was married, and a married king also meant a separate court for his queen, Anna, which established yet another distinctive and important locus of allegiance and influence, particularly considering that this queen was in fact a catholic.

Before long, this would be added to even further thanks to the existence of one more component

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25 On 22 May/1 June 1603, James wrote to the Council, addressing the membership of the privy council itself, saying that “it have been by us of late augmented in number above the ordinary rate which of late years it hath had, which was necessary for us to do for many respects; yet finding the same now composed of a sufficient number of persons both for their birth, for their experience and for the offices and places they hold in this kingdom meet to be called to it, we shall not hereafter be drawn to exceed that number of four and twenty nor to admit any others except it be by vacation of any place needful to be supplied.” HMC Salisbury XV, 101.

26 Cuddy, "The Revival of the Entourage: The Bedchamber of James I, 1603-1625."


missing from Elizabeth’s reign: a royal heir. The emergence of the household of James and Anna’s eldest son, Henry, prince of Wales (already nine years old at the time of his father’s English accession), would provide still another possible alternative center of power for an already multipolar court.

There was even factional maneuvering within these groups, as can be seen, for example, in Cecil’s moves against his own brother-in-law Cobham, the soon-to-be-manifested moves against Nottingham by his cousin Northampton, and the significant jockeying for position in the initial construction of Queen Anna’s court. This was all, quite simply, worlds apart from the political and cultural landscape of both the central Elizabethan decades, as well as the final few years of the previous queen’s reign. Almost overnight, the government and political elite of the kingdom went from being comprised of a small, relatively monolithic group of councilors and nobles who had managed to retain favor with a notoriously stingy monarch, to being transformed into a large collection of individuals from all over the map, comprising a number of ideological, confessional, political, familial, and even national groupings, all jostling for power with varying degrees of influence, interconnectedness, personal ambition, and mutual loathing.

All of this was accompanied and encouraged by the largesse that James has always been famous for, with the fountain of royal favor – money, gifts, lands, positions, and new titles – flowing freely once more after the exceedingly lean years of the late queen’s reign. Like so many other aspects of Jacobean rule, this approach would have long-term consequences. But

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30 James and his reign have, quite rightly, earned a reputation for financial difficulties, although most recent work tends to moderate the contrast of this with those of other monarchs, most particularly his immediate predecessor. See especially: John Cramsie, Kingship and Crown Finance under James VI and I, 1603-1625 (Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Printed for the Royal
in the short and even medium term, the new king needed to secure his place on the throne and to establish an environment that he could comfortably control or at least negotiate to good effect. By making royal favor so lucrative, James could encourage not only the loyalty that he needed and the flattery that he liked, but also the sort of competition that would allow him to be able to continue to play the game of politics as successfully as he always had, and which would offer him options if anything went awry.31

In this way, James was able to duplicate or re-create in England much of the political environment he had become so good at negotiating and manipulating over the past two decades – both in Scottish domestic politics, and in his approach to the international system itself. By creating or at least allowing the creation of these multiple, competing centers of power, James established for himself room to maneuver, which would then allow him to play his desired role of mediator, judge, and/or dispenser of royal favor to his heart’s content. In this position, he could neutralize or distract any potential opponents by playing them off of one another, while walking his own preferred middle path, and tacking from one direction to another depending on which way the political winds were blowing.

At first glance, increasing the possibility for argument, opposition, and conflict might seem like counterintuitive behavior on the part of a king trying to secure his place on the throne.
and to achieve particular domestic and foreign policy objectives. Especially for a king so temperamentally and politically suited to the *via media*, and so clearly bent on finding compromise in all things. But as we shall see, the immediate creation of alternate centers of power – and the debate, rivalry, and nascent factionalism that it ensured – was of central importance in the ultimate achievement of a lasting peace, and in the king’s ability to govern effectively in the years that followed.

**War vs. peace: the renewed debate**

While many in England and Spain supported peace, the environment when James came to the throne was still tension-filled and uncertain. There was some real question in England even after his accession about whether peace was the proper course to take, and these perceptions would only grow with time. Thanks in large part to the new king’s broadening of royal favor and the continuation of his pre-accession practice of trying to alienate as few groups as possible, the debate that had been at its height in the late 1590s was once again revived, and a number of manuscript tracts on both sides of the issue circulated with renewed intensity amongst the kingdom’s intellectual and governmental elite. Older works from the previous debate reappeared, and were joined by various new pieces in laying out the arguments on both sides. Writers covered a broad spectrum of status and opinion, ranging from various anonymous tracts and relatively humble protestations, to more strongly-voiced opinions openly authored by significant figures at court and in the government, such as Sir Walter Raleigh’s “Discourse Touching a War with Spain”.32 The late earl of Essex’s *Apologie* – a pro-war pamphlet by the hawkish Elizabethan favorite that had been widely circulated five years earlier – appeared in a

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32 Raleigh, "A Discourse Touching a War with Spain, and of the Protecting of the Netherlands," 299-316.
new London print edition, and the salience of its point of view was further emphasized by the new king’s revival of the fortunes of the surviving Essexians. All of this contributed directly to a heightening of friction, and to a broadening of the spectrum of opinion within the political sphere at this crucial moment.

Those in support of continuing the war stressed four largely interconnected points. The first was ideological, and provided the foundation on which everything else rested: that the Spanish monarchy was an evil empire in league with the papal antichrist, and which would never rest until England was conquered and idolatrous catholicism was restored. The king of Spain was accused of attempting the “erecting of a fift[h] Monarchy, to the universall disquiet and disturbance, not onlie of his bordering Neighbour, but of all the Christian Regions through Europe.” Any peace with such a foe was seen as tantamount to a pact with the devil, and would only be a temporary respite in what was, to them, quite clearly a battle between good and evil. Moreover, it was argued, the Spaniards had shown that their pacific overtures could not be trusted, as they had used peace talks as a smokescreen for the Gran Armada in 1588, and their proposals in the 1590s had been accompanied by similarly strong military efforts. As one

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33 Devereux, *An Apologie of the Earle of Essex*. The piece was written in 1598, but this 1603 edition was the first large-run London edition, and was perhaps the first print edition altogether. The Huntington Library has a much different looking edition of the same text, provisionally dated as 1600 – but it lacks a title page, and thus the date, place, and publisher are all a matter of some speculation, though Gajda accepts this date as an “unauthorized edition”. Gajda, "Debating War and Peace," 852.

34 John Atkinson (“J.A.”), “A Discourse against the Peace with Spaine presented to the King in the first yeare of his Raigne over England”, Folger, Mss G.a.1, ff.29-29v. This is the first of three discourses by Atkinson. Another copy of this one, differing only slightly in occasional wording, can be found at BL, Addl Mss 34219, ff.1-10v. For more precise dating, one of these pieces is listed in the Calendar of State Papers as having been presented to King James likely in June 1603, CSPDomestic: James I, v.II, 25.


36 For a good description of how it was that much of this played out in English thought, see: Hillgarth, *The Mirror of Spain, 1500-1700: The Formation of a Myth*. 
writer in the newly revived debate put it: no matter how much Spain might claim it wanted peace, “all the water of Gambia cannot washe the blacke from the Negro.”

A second, and directly related, argument for staying at war with Spain involved economic and military considerations. War had been, it was claimed, quite a lucrative business, in which English mariners had profited, sometimes spectacularly, at Spanish expense. And staying at war kept England’s armed forces sharp, providing an outlet for its more martial, violent, and otherwise less employable citizens, while simultaneously ensuring that the realm would be ready to fend off any future invasion attempts. Why should England give up this source of revenue and military élan, particularly when Spain was clearly starting to feel the pinch, and was suing for peace? Instead, they argued, the new king should prosecute the war even more vigorously, pressing the advantage, in order that Englishmen might take still more for themselves and ultimately deal the knockout blow.

In the words of Sir Walter Raleigh: “The Spanish empire hath been greatly shaken, and hath begun of late years to decline; and it is a principle in philosophy, that omnis diminutio est preparatio ad corruptionem, ‘that the least decay of any part is a forerunner of the destruction of the whole’.” So why give up when you are winning, when you have the hated foe right where you want him? As Essex’s piece put it: “Is this the season he chuseth to recover himselfe by peace? then of all other times, peace should now be least granted him. Now, now is the fittest time to make warre upon the Spaniard.”

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37 “Reasons to induce wherefore yt is more convenient for the State of England as now it standeth to have warre with Spayne rather then peace”, BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, 154v-155. Clearly from 1603-1604, as it speaks of “our late Queene”, f.154v.
38 Atkinson, Folger, f.36v; Devereux, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, f.20.
39 Ibid., f.19v.
40 Ibid., ff.21-22.
41 Raleigh, "A Discourse Touching a War with Spain, and of the Protecting of the Netherlands," 309.
42 Devereux, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, f.21v.
Indeed, some went even further, claiming that if England did not act to defeat Spain, where “wee have layd his wekenes open to the world,” then it was entirely likely that “some other Prince (with the help of the Hollander) will take the advantage thereof, to the utter overthrow of his formall Monarchy, which hangeth by soe slender a twine as the Razer of your Maiesties hand may soon dissever.”

Questions of religious and political solidarity were behind a third and oft-repeated reason offered by proponents of the war: the need to support the Dutch. The two nations had been fighting the Spanish together openly for almost two decades, and many Englishmen were understandably loath to abandon their longtime allies and coreligionists. The French had already made a separate peace five years before, and if England did likewise the Dutch would be left to confront the great power of catholic Spain on their own. This, it was argued, did not bode well for their prospects, as it would allow Philip III to “convert all his forces onlie uppon the States, being nowe freed from warr with Fraunce & England”. As a result, many thought that the people of the Netherlands would hardly be able to hold out for long, prompting Essex to ask: “Is not such a peace, as this in hand, the onely means to assure her [the Infanta Isabel and Spain] of all the Low Countries?” This meant, claimed the hawks, that the Dutch would be forced either to capitulate to the Habsburgs, or to seek help elsewhere. As John Atkinson put it:

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43 Atkinson, Folger, f.28.
44 Devereux, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, f.17.
45 “Consideracions of the cause of peace to be had with Spaine and the warr to be Contynued.” BL, Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.189.
47 “A Short discourse to prove that it is necessary for the service of the King’s Majesty to continew the assistance given by the crown of England to the United Provinces of the low cuntreys”, BL, Harley Mss 6798, ff.135-140v. Anonymous and, from consistent references to “the late Queen” and the current king, written after March 1603.
If your Majesty leave the protection of the Low Countries, they being a people that of necessity must be protected, it consequently followeth that they must needs joyne with some other Prince, as with France, or els they must suffer themselves to be surprized and reposessed by Spaine, with either of whom they being once united, may prove either presently or futurely mighty and, dangerous Enemyes.\textsuperscript{48}

This, in turn, led to the fourth major reason offered by English supporters of continuing the war: that of straightforward reason of state. Neither Dutch outcome boded well for English interests, for if the Low Countries “should be brought to the subjection of the Spanish government, Spayne will make their sedem belli, and him selfe monarche of his neyghbours countries”.\textsuperscript{49} But the introduction of another power into the region (such as the French), might be just as bad, and would certainly change the strategic situation drastically, upsetting the balance of power in northern Europe almost as much as an entirely Spanish-controlled Netherlands.\textsuperscript{50} Anything other than at least \textit{de facto} Dutch independence would mean that a catholic continental power would be in possession of Europe’s largest fleet, right across the Channel in prime position to invade England.\textsuperscript{51} In such a case, to quote Essex, the Low Countries would be “the Rise” by which such a power would “leape into England”.\textsuperscript{52} This effectively tied all four reasons together, casting a separate peace as a very frightful thing indeed, which might very well lead to the downfall of England’s religion, economy, and very state.\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{48} Atkinson, Folger, ff.20-20v.
\textsuperscript{49} Robert Cotton, “A discours Wether yt be fitt for Engelande to make peace wth Spayne”, BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, f.160. This piece is, like the one preceding it, dated 1603, and appears to be a partner to that one, addressed to “my lord Henry Howard”. Another copy of it also follows the previous one at Folger, Mss G.b.8, ff.43-48v.
\textsuperscript{50} Atkinson, Folger, f.21.
\textsuperscript{51} Raleigh, “A Discourse touching a war with Spain”, pp. 306.
\textsuperscript{52} Devereux, \textit{An Apologie of the Earle of Essex}, 14v-15.
\textsuperscript{53} This breakdown of arguments into four major areas is meant merely to emphasize the main points of contention in the debate. Of course, there were numerous minor corollaries to each. For example, in a letter of 3/13 October 1603, the Venetian secretary in England wrote back to his superiors at home, saying that “Twelve points are advanced by the party opposed to peace; the King of Spain is sworn to vengeance on heretics, mere negotiations will give him time to
Pro-peace arguments

As strong a case as this appeared to be, those pushing for peace made their own compelling argument. As with the pro-war pieces, new tracts in support of peace were joined in circulation by older works from the 1598 debate, in slightly updated form. Proponents of peace focused, by and large, on precisely the same questions brought up by their opponents, choosing to tackle the arguments for war head-on, in order to disprove them. In fact, many of these tracts appear to have been based largely on a treatise written by Lord Burghley in 1598, in opposition to Essex’s piece – sometimes paraphrased, sometimes copied almost entirely verbatim. They form a fleet; the demand for peace shows Spain’s weakness, and indicates war, not peace; that the King of Spain will never include the States; the pacification of the States would mean the ruin of England, for all the Dutch forces would be at the disposition of Spain; that the States must be included as a separate power; that the restoration of the guarantee towns would give the key of England into the hands of Spain; that English merchantmen would flock at once to Spain, and might at any moment be confiscated on the plea that with heretics no oath is binding; that Spain will easily find a plea for declaring war again whenever it suits her; they can always make use of the Pope as an excuse, and declare that they are acting in obedience to him; that there is proof that the King of England is more powerful than the King of Spain, for he keeps the war going on only two hundred thousand a year against Spain, which has nine hundred thousand; that the English East Indian trade has become an accomplished fact, for the English have trading houses and factories established there, and cannot give them up; that if peace is declared Spanish Ambassadors will come to England, and will be perpetually plotting with the Catholics and malcontents; finally, that if peace is concluded both the soldiers and sailors will deteriorate.”

CSPVen X, 103.

Often consisting merely of a changing of the royal pronoun, now that there was a king on the throne, instead of a queen.

Burghley, “Rationes in utrumque de pace seu bello cum Hispania tractatae”. Scott, The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, Solicitor-General in Ireland and Master of Requests for the Years 1593-1616, 27-30. This was clearly quite widespread. Various versions of it can be found at BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.145-147; BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.163-164v; BL, Harley Mss 6798, ff.76-79; BL, Stowe Mss 164, ff.86-89. It is also listed in the catalogs of a number of regional archives, such as: “Considerations touching the peace with Spain”, in the Birmingham City Archives, MS 3887/107/1-2, dated August 1598; “Considerations touching the peace”, in a collection alongside Essex’s piece and others from 1598 at the Surrey History Centre, LM/1331/8; and “Considerations touching the peace, now in speech”, in the library of King’s College, Cambridge, cited in Montague Rhodes James, A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts Other Than Oriental in the Library of King’s College, Cambridge (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1895), 65.
too made an ideological argument, but of a different sort: insisting instead that peace was a much more Christian virtue than some kind of ostensibly “holy” war.\textsuperscript{56} Yes, Spain was the great catholic power, but England had fought it to a standstill, and perhaps the cooler heads and open influences of societies at peace would have a greater chance of healing the rift in Christendom, and might one day bring even Spain around to the true faith.

This ideological approach had its own direct strategic and economic corollaries. Peace with Spain would also help the situation in Ireland, where the struggle against the Gaelic-catholic rebels had gone on for years, and was a source of real concern for the maintenance of English rule, the establishment of the protestant faith, and the expenditures of the crown. This had been one of the most prominent reasons for peace in the earlier debate, with proponents claiming that “It is lykely the Rebellion of Ireland shall the sooner be ended because the Rebells shall have noe Countenance nor supporte out of Spaigne.”\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, one of Burghley’s key reasons for wanting to make peace with Spain had been the extent to which it would have freed up resources to finish the job in Ireland,\textsuperscript{58} and his successor as Lord Treasurer, Sackville, had been pushing the same line in council right up through the final year of the queen’s life.\textsuperscript{59} And even though the rebel leaders had at the time of the 1603 debate recently surrendered, stability in Ireland and the threat of foreign influence there would remain a constant concern in the years to come.

\textsuperscript{56}“Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, July 1598, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.196. Again, as can be seen from the close similarity of the titles, much of this is found in “Considerations touchinge the peace”, Stowe Mss 164, cited above. Another of the similar copies – BL, Harley Mss 6798, ff.76-79 – is bound in a volume alongside a number of pieces from both the 1598 debate and the debate in 1603. The Harley and Stowe versions end by leaving out the last page or so of the one at Galba D xii, however, and they are both presented in a different, somewhat jumbled order from this one.

\textsuperscript{57}“Considerations touchinge the peace now in speach”, BL, Stowe Mss 164, f.86.

\textsuperscript{58}Goodman, \textit{Diplomatic Relations}, 13.

\textsuperscript{59}Scott, \textit{The Journal of Sir Roger Wilbraham, Solicitor-General in Ireland and Master of Requests for the Years 1593-1616}, 50.
Consequently, even the newer tracts spent some serious time focusing on the Irish issue, and the possible repercussions were mentioned by virtually everyone.

Not only would peace bring a significant reduction in expenditure, it would also bring a much-needed respite for England’s overtaxed military and citizenry, in which both the crown and “the whole Realme shall have breathinge tyme to be the better provyded of money against all future eventes.”60 This breathing time was typically discussed in direct response to the pro-war argument regarding Spanish exhaustion and how letting up on them would give them a chance to recover.61 After all, with a peace, “The same Comoditie shall followe to this Realme and the Confederates therof who shall ever be in proportion able to encrease for defence as much as he shall for offence.”62 This would remain a particularly common argument right up until the very signing of the treaty.63

Peace would also reopen trade with Spain, and would better facilitate commerce everywhere.64 This was recognized even by supporters of the war, and it was no small matter.65 The Anglo-Spanish commercial relationship was a longstanding one, and it had been quite beneficial for both countries, until its disruption by the coming of war in the 1580s. In fact,

60 “Considerations touchinge the peace now in speach”, BL, Stowe Mss 164, f.86. By reference to “her majesty”, clearly penned during the earlier debate. But this was still relevant and passed around as part of the current debate, expressing the peace position quite eloquently – a position that was only further strengthened in the minds of many by recent events. Moreover, it remained relevant, as it appears here in a collection of documents from later in James’s reign, alongside numerous pieces relating to the attempted Anglo-Spanish match, and its fallout in the 1620s.
61 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.193v.
62 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.193v.
63 See, for example: “A brefe deduction of pointes, by the which it is to bee prooved that the quietnes and assurance of their parts of Europe consisteth in the expulsing the Spaniard out of the Low Countries, As also that this can not be effected for the present, but with the good use to bee made of the intended peace”, 19 January 1604; BL, Cotton Mss Galba E I, ff.276-277b.
64 “Considerations touchinge the peace”, BL, Stowe Mss 164, f.86.
many writers considered this relationship a much more natural one than the current political alliance with their coreligionists in the Low Countries:

And it is likelie that this Realme & Spaine being united once againe shall contynue in firme and stable Amytie it maye be as a thinge contingent probable argued, yea allmost necessarylie concluded for that the Comodities of this Realme and his Domynions doe mutuallie receyve each of other are such as doe drawe a kinde of mutuall necessitie of entercourse.  

As countries with entirely different climates, England and Spain each produced a number of goods that the other could not. From Spain, this included luxury items and commodities from warmer and more exotic locales, such as wines, citrus fruits, and spices, as well as iron from the north coast. From England came various other metals, hides, and occasional foodstuffs, as well as ropes, wax, cables, and other tools of the maritime trade. But more than anything, the central pillar of this economic interdependence was Spain’s status as a major producer of raw wool, and England’s as a preeminent manufacturer of woolen cloth.

In contrast, the Dutch were natural economic and commercial rivals of the English in almost every sense. They lived in a similar clime, therefore producing many of the same goods for export, above all textiles. They were a strong sea power, whose merchants and fishermen had been gradually pushing their English counterparts out of markets that they had traditionally dominated, most notably the carrying trade and, despite the war, even commerce with Spain itself. This had been an issue of some tension between the allies:

Apart from a brief period in 1596, Dutch illicit trade, like English, had gone on throughout the duration of the war, and on a greater scale as it was driven by a greater necessity. Despite the opposition of the English government, the rebels had steadfastly insisted that their clandestine commerce with the enemy was vital if they were to continue to fight for their independence.

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66 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, ff.194-194v.
68 Ibid., 48.
Thomas Edmondes had mentioned this to the Venetian ambassador to France in his succinct yet thorough description of the English predicament regarding peace back in 1598, explaining in detail precisely how this worked:

The people are very desirous of peace, for it is they who live on navigation and trade, and so feel the burden of these times. They are shut out from Spain, and from the ports of the Empire on the ground of their seizure of vessels carrying provisions to Spain. Longer voyages, such as to Italy and elsewhere, are possible only for those who have capital. The English accordingly are reduced to getting their goods through Holland and Zealand.\(^69\)

Not only were English merchants clamoring for the trade with Spain, the crown was suffering from the lost customs revenue. And whose business benefited directly as a result? The Dutch, yet again.

This would prove the beginning of a steadily developing rivalry that would get intense by the 1610s, violent by the 1620s, and would lead to outright war by the middle of the century.\(^70\)

Other areas of significant conflict would be the herring fishery off of the English North Sea coast – a major cog in the economic engine of Holland and Zeeland – and the growing Dutch presence in both the East and West Indies, establishing the footholds of what would lead to major imperial competition with their erstwhile allies.\(^71\) Fellow protestants they might be, but almost every

\(^{69}\) CSPVen IX, 326. Also quoted in Goodman, "Diplomatic Relations", 14.


\(^{71}\) S. E and United Provinces of the Netherlands. Staten Generaal., \textit{Britaines Busse. Or a Computation Aswell of the Charge of a Busse or Herring-Fishing Ship as Also of the Gaine and Profit Thereby. With the States Proclamation Annexed Vnto the Same, as Concerning Herring-Fishing. By E.S} (London: Printed by William Iaggard for Nicholas Bourne and are to be sold at his shop at the south entry of the Royal Exchange, 1615); Robert Kayll, \textit{The Trades Increase} (London: Printed by Nicholas Okes, and are to be sold by Walter Burre, 1615); Alastair
other indicator pointed to the Dutch as England’s most natural rival and, in the long run, perhaps its greatest threat. But what to do about them now?

As far as immediate relations with the Dutch were concerned, proponents of peace argued that they should be invited to participate in the negotiations as well. And even if they declined the English offer and chose to go it alone, several writers pointed out that the Dutch were quite capable of holding their own if need be, and that they were not going to collapse any time soon.72 After all, the rebellious northern provinces of the Low Countries had actually done quite well for themselves during the war against Spain, and most modern historians of the Netherlands consider the conflict in a positive light, as a sort of national wake-up call or catalyst for the foundation of their nation’s great “golden age.”73 The English were well aware of this success, and supporters of peace emphasized Dutch strength. As one writer back in 1598 put it: “Yf the Lowe Countries will not be comprehended in the peace it wilbe a good tyme ere they be reduzed by force and in the meane while this Realme shall gather many advantages.”74 If this had been the case five years before, it was so much more true now. Indeed, throughout the final years of the war there was quite a bit of speculation amongst the English that the only reason the Dutch were still fighting Spain at all was that they had done so much better for themselves during the time of the war, that they feared a return to peace or some kind of truce would see a decline in their

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72 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.194.
74 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.194.
prosperity. In the words of Sir Robert Sidney, the governor of Flushing and an otherwise staunch opponent of peace, the Dutch were still fighting the war because “they knowe not howe to bee better then they ar, and feare that in a peace they should bee worse.”75 And as Edmondes concluded in his aforementioned remarks to the Venetian ambassador: “The Dutch, though at war, are not excluded from trading with Spain, and so they have amazingly increased their wealth while the English treasury is in a bad state.”76 This was hardly some powerless group of persecuted protestants, but rather a rising nation that had already established itself in just a few short years as perhaps the preeminent maritime power in Europe, and a natural rival to its neighbor across the channel.

In this vein, proponents of peace had their own balance-of-power argument to make, and historical hindsight has shown it to have been quite prescient. The central component of this argument was the combination of the resurgence of France under Henri IV, the economic and military success of the Dutch, and the simultaneous perception that Spain had overstretched itself and was beginning to decline.77 This had been alluded to at least as far back as some of the 1598 tracts, just after the Franco-Spanish peace, and as much as any Englishman might enjoy seeing the king of Spain truly humbled, more than a few were concerned about what might happen as a result. While James, as king of England, Scotland, and Ireland, was the most powerful protestant monarch in Christendom, the real struggle for general supremacy was between France and Spain. Keeping the two catholic powers more concerned about one another would keep

75 Sir Robert Sidney’s discourse concerning peace with Spain, Flushing, 26 December 1599; BL, Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.277.
76 CSPVen IX, 326. Also quoted in Goodman, "Diplomatic Relations", 14.
77 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.194v.
either of them from bringing their full weight to bear against England. This kind of thinking anticipated the later British policy of maintaining the balance of power on the continent at all costs, which would come to dominate eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European and imperial relations. And it showed the beginnings of what might be considered a more “modern” outlook with regard to alliances, as economic and long-term strategic considerations began to play as important a role as religious and dynastic concerns. These writers were also fully aware of the actual change in perspective at the Spanish court itself, towards a policy of conservación that included the possibility of acknowledging the fruitlessness of their continued war with the Dutch:

For the wisest Ministers of Spayne have expressed in their privatt relations & discourses which have come to light, that those Countries being nowe utterly lost unto them, it wilbe no dishonor to them, but rather a gayne to yeald to anie thinge that may give hope of drawing againe those lost partes to the acknoweledgement of the Soveraignetie, before the memorie thereof be by further continuance of time too much extinquished.

English supporters of peace with Spain were far from a bunch of simpleminded pacifists, crypto-catholics, or corrupt, would-be Spanish pensioners. Rather, they had their own views about what constituted success for England, and how best to go about obtaining it.

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78 This would take up new relevance in 1610, after the assassination of Henri IV of France, and the subsequently much closer relationship between his Florentine widow, Marie de Medici, and the king of Spain.
79 Which would itself become an issue of particular concern after the 1609 truce between Spain and the Dutch.
80 “The matter either of making a peace, or continuing the former Warre betweene this State & Spayne & the Archduke, coming nowe in consideration, it is to be deliberated”; BL, Harley Ms 6798, f.197. This tract is from either 1603 or 1604, as it refers throughout to the “King” and whether he will make peace with Spain exactly as the French king has, and it refers to the peace as “coming nowe in consideration”.
Two opinions – Raleigh and Sherley

Moreover, the debate itself provides an illustrative example in microcosm of much of the trouble with early Stuart English historiography up until the present day. Take, for instance, two of the more flamboyant of James’s would-be advisors, and what they had to offer. On the one hand, we have Sir Walter Raleigh. A famous seaman, colonialist, and writer of the above cited pro-war “Discourse”, Raleigh was one of the most virulently anti-Spanish of Englishmen. Over the years, he would write numerous tracts regarding England’s relations with the catholic powers, proposed marriage alliances, and matters both commercial and maritime. On the other hand, we have Sir Anthony Sherley. While in many ways a remarkably similar man to

81 In the interests of full disclosure, I should point out that Raleigh also served (at Cádiz) and co-owned a ship (the Little Exchange) with Sir Robert Cross. That was not me. Nor was it any relative of which I am aware.

82 Sherley was the consummate gentleman-adventurer of his generation: a man of relatively modest initial standing who showed up in just about every place that there was some sort of conflict or adventure afoot. Sherley traveled far and wide in the service of various sovereigns, not just in Europe, but in Africa, Asia, and the New World as well. He began his career fighting with the English troops under Leicester in the Low Countries, then with Essex in France and on the high seas, making it as far as Jamaica at one point. Perhaps as a result of this relationship with Essex, Sherley subsequently became a correspondent and trusted agent of King James in the years leading up to and after the English accession. During this time, Sir Anthony also traveled to Persia, where he befriended the great Shah Abbas, becoming the Persian envoy back to the Christian princes of Europe, pushing for common cause against their mutual enemy, the Ottoman Turks. Over the years, Sherley was knighted not just in England, but in France, was made a count of the Holy Roman Empire, and received numerous other honors. In one particularly remarkable episode, Sherley arrived at the Spanish court and managed within days to convince the king to appoint him admiral of the mediterranean galley fleet. He ultimately settled in Spain, where he claimed a pension from the crown, becoming a prolific arbitrista, continuing to write works of political advice on a variety of subjects until his death sometime in the late 1620s or 1630s. He offered his advice yet again in the later negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match, and in the tense international situation in the late 1610s and early 1620s. For more details, see: D. W. Davies, Elizabethans Errant: The Strange Fortunes of Sir Thomas Sherley and His Three Sons. As Well in the Dutch Wars as in Muscovy, Morocco, Persia, Spain, and the Indies. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967); Boies Penrose, The Sherleian Odyssey: Being a Record of the Travels and Adventures of the Three Famous Brothers During the Reigns of Elizabeth, James I, and Charles I. (Taunton, UK: The Wessex Press, 1938); Sir E. Denison Ross, ed., Sir Anthony
Raleigh, with as quick a wit and at least as great a sense of adventure, Sherley was nevertheless entirely different in terms of his standing with the king, and what he had to say. By this time an established agent of James’s on the continent, Sherley was in earnest support of making peace with Spain.

The English historiographical tradition, however, has portrayed these two men in very different lights: a difference largely connected to their views on this particular issue. Raleigh is, of course, the long-praised hero of the fight against the papistical tyranny of the hated Spaniard, a supposedly incorruptible man who had England’s best interests at heart and who ultimately died because of it, after having already spent well over a decade in the Tower for another crime he apparently did not commit. And Sherley, when portrayed at all, is seen as the shiftless adventurer, more mercenary than man of principle, who would work for anyone, no matter what side they were on, and who finished his days in poverty in Spain, begging the king for his daily bread.83 Of course, these are both textbook-case myths, each based to a certain extent upon a central core of real events, but gradually twisted beyond all recognition in the attempt to fit the needs of a nationalistic history and its triumphalist narrative. The two men were, in fact, quite


83 Though it should be noted that, in a brief moment of historical vindication, one Victorian writer claimed that Sherley was quite possibly the writer of Shakespeare’s plays: Scott Surtees, William Shakespere, of Stratford-on-Avon. His Epitaph Unearthed, and the Author of the Plays Run to Ground (London: Printed for private circulation, 1888). While such a conclusion may be a real stretch, the man may very well have had the talent, and Sherley’s particularly close relationship not only to Essex, but also to his closest follower and Shakespeare’s most famous patron/dedicatee – the earl of Southampton – which maintained its warmth even after of residence in Spain, may tell us a little more about his connections and the complex and amorphous nature of foreign and domestic factional alignments in late Elizabethan and early Stuart England. For their contact in later years, see Southampton to Sherley (no date, 1618), BPR, II-2160, doc 1.
And it might be argued that Sherley was at least as talented and well-informed, and acting from as deeply held, consistent, and reasonable principles as was his much more famous and romanticized contemporary.\(^\text{85}\)

So what did Sherley argue at this time? In the first place, he considered the issue of such moment that he wrote his advice to James from a cell in Venice, where he had been imprisoned while on the king’s business.\(^\text{86}\) Though a supporter of peace in this instance, Sherley had no naïve illusions where Spain was concerned:

> I will never say that you should trust a Spaniard, for I know them a people so wedded to their vast and proud designs, which they could never hope to accomplish all honourably, that they have given over themselves to craft, to artifice, to abusing of the world, and to all sort of treachery which may serve their own interest.\(^\text{87}\)

And he understood the difficulty of the situation that Spain found itself in, agreeing with the proponents of war when they claimed that if James lined up against the Habsburgs, the Spanish

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\(^{84}\) In fact, the two men actually knew each other quite well, having served together under Essex (Sherley’s cousin) on the Islands Voyage. Raleigh Trevelyan, *Sir Walter Raleigh, 1st American* ed. (New York: H. Holt, 2004), 298, 313. Moreover, both men were in prominent and equal leadership positions on Essex’s council of war – the other three being Mountjoy (soon-to-be conqueror in Ireland, as Essex’s successor there, and commissioner in 1604 for the Anglo-Spanish peace), Thomas Howard (future earl of Suffolk – main advisor to James I, Lord Chamberlain, and eventual Lord Treasurer), and Sir Francis Vere (one of the foremost and well-respected military men of the age).

\(^{85}\) This comparison also shows just how fluid factional rivalries could be in these circumstances, and how difficult it is to attach any particular ideological motivation permanently to any particular side. After all, while Sherley had been in Essex’s camp, Raleigh had long been a rival of Essex, and had (until quite recently) been an ally of the Cecils. And yet, Raleigh was the one making the pro-war arguments, and Sherley was writing in support of peace.

\(^{86}\) Sherley was clearly in very high favor with James at this point. Within two hours of the king’s arrival into London proper, the Venetian secretary reports that James sent to him to let him know that he would receive his audience as soon as the French resident had had his. But one issue could not bear to be delayed: that of the imprisonment of Sir Anthony Sherley. James had his gentleman messenger plead Sherley’s case passionately, emphasizing just how important his release would be to the king. Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 12/22 May 1603), CSPVen X, 34-35. James and his advisors would plead Sherley’s case repeatedly over the course of the coming months, eventually securing his release.

\(^{87}\) HMC Salisbury XV, 78. Sir Anthony Sherley to James I (Venice, 9/19 May 1603).
monarchy was ultimately doomed to ruin.

But Sherley also understood that such ruin was not necessarily in the best interests of Europe, nor was it even the best outcome for England itself. Instead, he reminded James of a very important perspective: rather than crushing Spain, it might in fact be better to make use of a somewhat weakened Spain within a peaceful but factionalized international system. In his words: “If you please to make any amity with him [the king of Spain] you counterbalance the world. What profit it will be for your Majesty and State your exceeding wisdom best knows.”\textsuperscript{88} And Sherley would have been in a much better position than Raleigh to offer James advice on such matters, knowing as he did James’s policy priorities, and his general approach to governance.\textsuperscript{89} Such a nuanced argument about playing sides off of one another and the importance of balance would be a very appealing one to the new king, and as we shall continue to see, in many ways it perfectly encapsulates his entire approach to both foreign policy and domestic politics.\textsuperscript{90}

So it was that reasonable arguments were put forward by both sides in this debate. It was far from a matter of “realists” versus the naïve, as the supporters of war and peace in this case are often respectively portrayed. Indeed, if anything, the opposite tended to be true: it was the proponents of a continued war who seem to have been operating as much from an idealistic and/or ideologically inspired position, while supporters of peace tended to be motivated much

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid, 79.
\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, while Raleigh was quick to be replaced as Captain of the Guard and would soon be locked in the Tower, Sherley remained in correspondence with both James and Cecil, providing information and policy recommendations.
\textsuperscript{90} Although we do not have James’s response to this letter, he cannot have been displeased by what Sherley had to say. It all fits closely with his subsequent policy, and he kept supporting Sherley consistently after this, repeatedly pushing the Venetians about his status, and was ultimately instrumental in securing Sir Anthony’s release from prison. For more, see Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Sunbury, 20/30 July 1603), CSPVen X, 72.
more by pragmatic concerns, economic arguments, and nuanced balance-of-power thinking. As we shall see, these competing arguments would contribute directly to the ultimate negotiation of the treaty, and they would illustrate what a number of the main concerns over foreign policy would be in England for the rest of the reign.

Still, whatever one might think of the merits of the respective cases, it is clear that contemporaries took the issue very seriously indeed. The resuscitation of the debate over war and peace upon James’s accession was particularly important in and of itself, as its very existence helped further broaden and define the nascent factionalization within the early Jacobean court. As good a case as proponents of peace might make – and as obvious as it was that many people were tired of war – the pro-war pamphlets were nevertheless numerous, vehemently argued, and certainly had plenty of supporters. The appearance of these works and the encouragement of the debate quickly ended the hopes of an easy skate into peace that so many people had assumed would occur as soon as James had come to the throne. It soon became clear that this was not going to be a reign that emphasized political unity, but rather one that thrived on debate, argument, conflict, and intrigue. These differences of opinion over foreign policy would continue to play a powerful role in the interplay of factional relationships that would prevail in English domestic politics over the coming two decades. No matter how the matter was going to be resolved, these opinions against the peace would continue to remain, and would grow stronger with time, even when it seemed that the two kingdoms were growing closer together.

Moreover, this debate was not occurring in a vacuum; the Habsburgs had been paying close attention to everything that was happening in England from the very moment of the queen’s death. Every step of the way, agents, allies, and later ambassadors sent copies of printed
proclamations and translations of key items of news back to Spain. These, combined with quite frequent news reports, or *avisos de Londres*, allowed the Spanish decision makers to remain remarkably well informed. The factionalization at the English court was watched with some real concern, but eventually also with some hope for positive possibilities. The revived debate over peace and war was obviously of special interest, and Spanish translations of new tracts made their way before the council of state almost immediately.\(^9^1\) The changed state of affairs could not have been more plainly represented than in the nature of the authorship of some of the old works, as it seemed as if the ghosts of Essex and Burghley themselves had been resurrected to divide England once more. And the Spanish were, of course, not alone. This debate had a much wider audience than the domestic political sphere, and it was into this factionalizing English environment that international events and influences were themselves quick to join in and further the process begun by the king’s choices, and encouraged by the subsequent debate.

**A year of ambassadors**

The first year of James’s English reign was not just about establishing the political order and trying to achieve peace – it also saw the results of these policies begin to bear fruit. Here James’s approach to foreign policy met his approach to domestic politics face-to-face – and the two were mutually reinforcing. While the traditional focus of the political history after the

\(^9^1\) See, for example, from July 1603: “Razon porque ningún Embaxador o de España o de Flandes del Archiduque en esta coyuntura devia venir en el Reyno de Inglaterra hasta tanto que huviera avido parlamento.” AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 144. Also, from September 1603: “Tocante a la paz o guerra si VM\(^d\) la debe mantener contra el Rey de España, mi opinión es que las siguientes circonstancias se deven considerar.” AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 156. And from January 1604: “Copia de un papel que dieron Al Rey de Ynglaterra. Para emiar a Su Mag\(^d\).” AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 141. For a side-by-side comparison of another of these tracts, see the Spanish: “Advertisimiento sacado de la Comun Voz del Pueblo por Un Leal Vassallo para su Principe”, sent to Spain in October 1603, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 265; and a printed version of the English original: J. D. Mackie, "'a Loyall Subjectes Advertisment' as to the Unpopularity of James I's Government in England, 1603-4," *Scottish Historical Review* 23, no. 89 (1925).
accession has been on religious policy and the attempts at an Anglo-Scottish union, this first year is at least as easily characterized as a year of ambassadors. Extraordinary embassies from virtually every state of at least minor importance made their way to London to convey their masters’ congratulations to the new king, each stressing the importance of his country’s relationship with England, while trying to gain some measure of the man in whose person all of Britain and Ireland were now united under one rule. Many rulers also sent new resident ambassadors to their embassies in London, taking the opportunity to inject fresh blood into what was quite clearly a new situation. This remarkable confluence of envoys has provided the historian with a wide variety of sources that show people of various nations all trying to come to terms with James and his kingdoms. And whether it was a Venetian merchant pressed into service as a temporary charge d’affairs for his embassy, or a group of French noblemen sent specifically to negotiate an alliance with the king, all attest to this time as one of tangible possibility.

One of the first groups to arrive was the Dutch. As the group that stood to lose the most from any possible Anglo-Spanish peace, they made sure to send some of the most powerful and able figures in their government, and they sent them right away. Heading up the embassy were Frederick-Henry of Nassau (the youngest son of William the Silent) and the great Dutch statesman Johan van Oldenbarnevelt, and the group arrived in London even before James did, on

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92 Quite literally every power one could possibly imagine, including: France, Spain, Flanders, the Dutch Republic, Savoy, Venice, Florence, the Count Palatine of the Rhine, Wurtemburg, Pfalz-Neuburg, Brunswick, Brandenburg, Lorraine, the Hanseatic towns, Denmark, and Poland. Add to this James’s own agents sent to Rome and back, and another serving as ambassador to/from Persia, and one gets a sense of how truly all-encompassing this was, especially by early seventeenth-century standards.
4/14 May. Any uneasiness they may have felt at the rumors of the new king’s attitude to their cause was given some real weight as their initial requests for a meeting with the king went unheeded. On 17/27 May, they were finally granted an audience with James at Greenwich, a day after he had received the French resident for the first time, the delay being passed off as a matter of diplomatic precedence. The Dutch envoys did what they could to convince the king to help found a pan-European league against the Habsburgs, but were put off with polite but noncommittal replies. James was clearly going to see what everyone had to say before rushing into any such public commitments, and he had already made it known that he was not necessarily going to be Holland’s best friend.

Hard on the heels of the Dutch was the French extraordinary embassy of congratulation, headed by one of Henri IV’s most trusted advisers, the protestant Maximilien de Béthune, comte de Rosny, but better known to most by his later title, duc de Sully. Sully headed up a large retinue, designed to impress. His mission was quite similar to that of the Dutch: do everything possible to keep England from making peace with Spain. After all, anything that might keep their Spanish rivals tied down, and that would prevent the re-establishment of their ascendancy in the Low Countries, was definitely in the French interest. In line with this, Sully was also to push James to sign a new treaty of alliance with France, in order to prevent any possible shift towards open support of Spain, and to help protect against Spanish aggression in general. As we

94 Laffleur de Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France I, 108.
95 The French ambassador reported that the Dutch were able to address the privy council in late May, and Cecil told them that James was waiting for the embassies of his neighboring princes before making up his mind about the States’ proposal. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France I, 109.
96 He will be referred to throughout by his later title, to avoid confusion. For consistency’s sake, the same rule will be applied to any person with a wing of the Louvre named after him.
shall see, Sully would find mixed success in these aims, and the way in which he was treated by both king and council will tell us a great deal about how politics operated and policy was achieved in the new Jacobean regime.

At the same time that Sully and his entourage were making their way to England, the Flemish ambassador, the Prince-Count of Aremberg, was also en route to offer the Archdukes’ congratulations to the new king.97 In fact, the officials in charge of receiving these ambassadors upon their landing each expressed some real concern about finding accommodation for both entourages simultaneously, particularly if they were to land on the same day, as it looked as though they might.98 Aremberg ultimately beat Sully by one day, though this was just the beginning of a several-decade diplomatic rivalry played out between Habsburgs and Bourbons at the English court over such seemingly trivial issues as who got to go first in line, or where one was to sit at table.

But this was more than just a matter of foreign diplomatic one-upmanship carried out on an English stage. The composition of the entire European power structure was hanging in the balance. Normally, a new monarch meant a possible change in alliances and policies to at least some degree. And the last two regime changes in England had been particularly dramatic ones, at least with regard to religion and eventual international political repercussions. But to all observers, the accession of James appeared to be on an entirely different level altogether. At least with Mary and Elizabeth you had a pretty good idea in what direction things were shifting. With James, nobody was sure quite what to expect, since he had spent the past decade or so

97 He would have been there much sooner, but the state of war meant that he had to send agents over to secure safe passage. Again Scorza was used, as he would be for similar such work over the course of the coming year.
98 Lord Cobham, Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports to Lord Cecil (Blackfriars, 1/11 June 1603), HMC Salisbury XV, 118. Sir Lewes Lewkenor to Lord Thomas Howard, Lord Chamberlain (Dover, 4/14 June 1603), HMC Salisbury XV, 121.
actively pursuing support from almost every quarter. And yet, his relative success at this had
given just about every party some cause to believe that, upon his accession, he would side with
them. So literally overnight, James went from tireless suitor to the object of everyone’s desire.
As Sully himself described it: “Upon the whole, it appeared as though all the princes of Europe
considered the gaining England in their interests to be of the utmost importance to them.”\textsuperscript{99}

The various ambassadors did what they could from the moment of their respective
arrivals to gain information and allies, in the attempt to win the new king over to their particular
positions. Though the Dutch were the first to arrive, the delay in their royal audience left them
with a great deal of time on their hands, and they made the most of it. Despite the apparent cold
shoulder from the king, they nevertheless did what they could to gain partisans, bend the ears of
influential ministers, and spread as much money around as possible. They would set the tone for
much of what was to come.

Meanwhile, the French resident, Beaumont, was equally busy doing much the same, and
the French were quick to recognize who their allies were in this environment. When Sully
arrived in England, he noted just how advanced the factional environment already was even at
this early stage, less than two months after the new king’s arrival in his capital:

The court of London might be considered as composed of four sorts of persons, who
formed so many different factions; and from this circumstance only, one may infer, what
in reality was true, that this court was full of suspicion, mistrust, jealousy, private and
even public discontents.\textsuperscript{100}

Sully was quick to take advantage of this, meeting with various groups before his audience with
the king, including the Dutch agent Oldenbarnevelt and Scaramelli of Venice, in order to gain

\textsuperscript{100} Sully, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 354.
some sense of where things stood.\textsuperscript{101} Such contacts, and those with English ministers and others at court, continued throughout his stay, forming a sort of diplomatic second front below the level of his several audiences with the king. And on both levels, Sully at least appeared to be doing very well indeed.\textsuperscript{102}

In this environment, the Flemish ambassador, Aremberg – representing not only his own masters, the Archdukes, but for the moment standing in for the king of Spain as well – found himself at an immediate disadvantage. Not only was he being at least double-teamed by his political enemies, but a sudden attack of gout upon his arrival removed him further from the heart of the action. It forced him to reluctantly cancel his initial audience with the king, and then to continue to delay it for some time.\textsuperscript{103} And the Habsburgs were already in a difficult position – as they had not had a place in the English court since 1584, and consequently had to play some serious catch-up. Still, while Aremberg could not leave his bed to go see the king, he nevertheless could receive visitors, and he and his agents worked hard at the same sorts of things the Dutch and French were doing. In all of this, despite his infirmity and disadvantages, Aremberg managed to keep himself remarkably well informed. His chambers seem to have been almost constantly occupied by one influential figure or another.\textsuperscript{104} And his letters back to

\textsuperscript{101} Sully, \textit{Memoirs}, II, 361, 363.

\textsuperscript{102} The relationship between appearance and reality will be treated at greater length in chapter four.

\textsuperscript{103} Aremberg to Albert (12/22 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne} I, 148.

\textsuperscript{104} Notable visitors (many several times) included Henry Howard, Robert Cecil, Lord Kinloss, George Home, Thomas Edmonds, Colonel Hackerston, Thomas Erskine, and John Stanhope. Aremberg’s agents, such as Dr. Taylor and Nicholas Scorza, also met with many of these same men, as well as a number of others, such as the very influential secretary Thomas Lake, and both the Earl and Countess of Suffolk. For more on these particular meetings, see the discussions about buying catholic toleration or peace itself in chapter six, below. For numerous citations of specific meetings, see the corresponding chronological sections in Lonchay & Cuvelier,
Archduke Albert are filled with in-depth descriptions of the goings-on at court, giving detailed and perceptive accounts of the ostensibly secret meetings between his opponents and the king or his ministers, usually on the very day that they occurred.

Another aspect of this foreign influence (and Habsburg need to play catch-up) was, of course, financial. Throughout James’s reign, Spanish and Flemish ambassadors and agents would frequently complain about the myriad advantages held by the French and the Dutch at the English court – especially regarding the expenditure of money. And this began right from the start. In Aremberg’s words: “In this country…if one wants to negotiate a matter, it is necessary to name the price.”

For, he said, “everything in England is obtained by way of money”, and here the Habsburg representatives constantly bemoaned the Dutch efforts, which seem to have set the market price for everything. But they need not have worried. There was in fact a great deal of potential for them here too, and they would prove to be quick studies. Before long, the new ambassador, the count of Villamediana, would draw up a long and detailed list of possible

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105 “Dans ce pays…si l’on veut négocier une affaire, il faut y mettre le prix.” Aremberg to Albert (London, 17/27 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne* I, 150.


107 Aremberg had learned that the Dutch had “disbursed 30,000 pounds sterling in England, of which Cecil would have received the largest share.” “Il se confirme que Cecil est gagné aux Provinces-Unies qui ont dépensé en Angleterre 30,000 livres sterling dont Cecil aurait reçu la grosse part.” Aremberg to Albert (London, 17/27 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, *Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne* I, 150. To give some idea of just how vast a discrepancy we are talking about here between initial Dutch and Habsburg expenses on bribes and pensions, remember that Villamediana had been authorized to bring only 1,000 escudos (about 250 pounds) with him for the same purpose.
Spanish allies in English government. Within a year, this would be narrowed to a list of assigned pensions, and it would be a hefty list indeed.  

And so the international situation created by the accession and heightened by James’s portrayal of himself as “all things to all men” helped to reinforce the new king’s approach to domestic politics. James’s multiplication of alternate competing centers of power at court gained an international dimension through the presence of these ambassadors. Not only did they and their entourages begin to establish interest groups and make connections at court that would help broaden English alignments in all directions, these connections and interest groups also helped expand the breadth of ideological and associational possibilities within the English political nation itself. The truce with Spain and Flanders expanded this even further, and the way in which peace was eventually achieved would make this situation permanent.

**Growing difficulties**

Nevertheless, at this point, despite the initial truce and fine-sounding words, all of the apparent conflict and division made it look like an Anglo-Spanish peace was becoming less of a real possibility as the days went by. After all, the Dutch envoys, despite initial concerns about opposition they might encounter in England, had done quite well. While their encounters and formal audiences with James had left a little to be desired, they had clearly shored up their support at court, and Aremberg described them upon his arrival as being very happy because two

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108 “Lista de los Consejeros de estado del Rey de Inglaterra y otros personajes de aquel Reyno calidades y condiciones de cada uno, y de los medios para ganar algunos dellos.” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 118, enclosed with Villamediana’s dispatch to Philip III from Brussels on 24 June/4 July 1603 – also printed at Loomie I, pp.1-10. “Memoria de lo que al Conde Villamediana y al Senador Rovida pareçe que conviene hazer en Materia de Daðivas y pensiones.” AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 99 – also printed at Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy," 54-55.. Also see lists at AGS Estado, leg. 2512, docs 15-16.

109 This is Simon Adams’s phrase: Adams, "Protestant Cause", 154.
of the king’s most influential ministers, Cecil and Suffolk, were both apparently on their side.\textsuperscript{110} And when the Dutch took their leave of the king on 24 June/4 July, they had good reason to smile. For the previous two weeks had seen them in constant conference with Sully and the English ministers, which had produced apparently definitive results. Sully had had several very successful royal audiences, and his final private meeting with James had sealed a defensive treaty of alliance with France against the possible encroachments of Spain, as well as obtaining a guarantee of firm support for the Dutch States’ General.\textsuperscript{111} He left confident of his success, by July 5/15 the Dutch envoys were back in the Hague reporting that all went well in England,\textsuperscript{112} and Beaumont was reporting back to Villeroy at the French court that James was moving even further away from sympathy towards Spain since Sully had left.\textsuperscript{113}

All the while, Aremberg remained in his bed stricken with gout, had not yet had his first audience, and only finally got access to the king on 10/20 July, almost two weeks after the departure of both the French and Dutch extraordinary embassies.\textsuperscript{114} Moreover, the Spanish ambassador, Villamediana, still had not even made it to England. His movements in Flanders were being watched closely, and Lewkenor was waiting in Canterbury from early July for his expected arrival.\textsuperscript{115} It would, however, be another month and a half before he would finally appear, and the continued delay was beginning to make people uneasy. The reason for

\begin{thebibliography}{9}

\textsuperscript{110} Aremberg to Albert (London, 8/18 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne} I, 146. Cf. Sully’s very different perception of Cecil’s and Suffolk’s leanings below, in chapter five.
\textsuperscript{111} The details of this are discussed in chapter five, in a detailed analysis of the way in which the king operated.
\textsuperscript{112} Sir William Broune to Sir Robert Sidney (Flushing, 5/15 July 1603), Collins II, 275-276.
\textsuperscript{113} Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L'ambassade de France} I, 120.
\textsuperscript{115} HMC Salisbury XV, 152-153, 163-164, 191.
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Villamediana’s delay was, in fact, directly connected to all of this. It was not a product of initial Habsburg hesitation – actually quite the opposite. He had been dispatched from the Spanish court almost immediately upon news of James’s accession – so quickly that his instructions were by necessity incomplete, and he was expected to remain in Flanders, keeping an eye on Aremberg’s progress and waiting for further instructions from his king about how to proceed. And the English knew this full well: “By the long lingering of the Spanish Embassador at Brussells, it seemes to me, that he Attendeth to hear the Success of the Archdukes Ambassadours Negotiations, and accordingly either to come or not to come, or els I cannot imagin why he should so longe stay there.”116 And as Aremberg reported on the day of his first audience, the English were getting suspicious, thinking that the Spaniards were just trying to buy time until they took the besieged town of Ostend.117 James himself complained of the delays in his second audience with Aremberg on 29 July/8 August,118 and some people at court were even spreading rumors of a planned Spanish invasion of England, comprised of a squadron of 80 ships, 40 galleys, and 30,000 men.119

As we have seen, the governments in Valladolid and Brussels had been paying close attention to everything that was unfolding at the English court. And they did not like what they

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116 Collins II, 274. (Broune to Sidney, 20/30 June 1603). This seems to have been common speculation throughout the summer, as the Venetian secretary in England, Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, wrote to the Doge and Senate five weeks later (Sunbury, 27 July/6 August 1603; ciphered): “The delay in the arrival of Taxis is due to positive orders from his Catholic Majesty, that he is to wait in Brussels till his Majesty can come to a decision upon information to be rendered by Count d’Aremberg, so as to miss none of those advantages which spring from the deliberation and attention employed by the Spaniards in all of their affairs.” CSPVen X, 73.

117 Aremberg to Albert (10/20 July 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 162.

118 Aremberg to Albert (29 July/8 August 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 169-170.

119 Aremberg to Albert (Staines, 1/11 August 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 170-171.
were hearing. The continued debate over peace and war, the apparent initial diplomatic successes of Spain’s enemies, and Aremberg’s difficulties all worked to create hesitation and doubt in the minds of the key Habsburg decision-makers, and consequently kept Villamediana where he was. If peace was now going to be a difficult prospect, the last thing that Philip or even Albert wanted was to do was to put themselves in a position where they might be seen as begging for peace only to be rebuffed. Such a loss of face would be extremely damaging to their sense of reputación, which was at the core of the soft power that formed so great a part of Habsburg influence in Europe.

In the meantime, the situation in England only seemed to be getting worse for Spanish and Flemish interests. Despite the sharp and distinctive move towards a much more multipolar, competitive environment, the tolerance for intrigue in James’s newly factionalizing court was not boundless. In early- to mid-July, two plots against the crown were discovered and dispatched that underlined this point directly, and which helped bring Habsburg hopes to an even lower ebb still. The first of these was the Bye Plot, also known as the Treason of the Priests. This was a plan by several catholic priests and disaffected lay elites to seize the person of the king and hold him hostage, with the apparent aim to force religious toleration and suppression of the most virulent anti-catholic ministers. When this scheme came to light, the arrest and interrogation of one of the plotters, George Brooke, revealed the existence of an apparent second plot, involving Brooke’s brother, Lord Cobham. Referred to as the Main Plot, this second conspiracy was said to have involved the attempt to obtain large sums of Spanish money from Aremberg, the Flemish
ambassador, in order to organize an overthrow of the government, removing James from the throne and replacing him with his English cousin Arbella Stuart.\textsuperscript{120}

There has been recent debate over the very nature of the plots themselves, with one scholar even going so far as to suggest that they were not really plots at all, but rather fabricated as part of an elaborate plan by those at the heart of the regime to frame and dispose of their political enemies and to shape religious politics in England to their liking.\textsuperscript{121} Despite the disagreement on the nature of these events, it is not within the primary scope of the current study to bridge this gap, to examine in precise detail the intricacies of these particular schemes, or to speculate on the extent to which James or his councilors may have been involved in manipulating them before their discovery.\textsuperscript{122} The important thing to understand in our context here is what the result of all of this was with regard to perceptions in domestic politics and international relations. And in this respect, no matter where one places what percentage of the blame, a number of key aspects remain consistent, and the overall outcome of it all was essentially the same.

Whether they were complicit in these events or not, James and his ministers certainly put the revelation of these plots to good use, and these events played an important role in the

\textsuperscript{120} After receiving some real focus thanks to Whiggish and Victorian interests in both catholic sedition and the life of Sir Walter Raleigh, these plots have been rather understudied in more recent years. The exception is the work of two scholars with very different aims and interpretations: Mark Nicholls and Francis Edwards, SJ. Mark Nicholls, "Treason's Reward: The Punishment of Conspirators in the Bye Plot of 1603," \textit{The Historical Journal} 38, no. 4 (1995); Mark Nicholls, "Sir Walter Raleigh's Treason: A Prosecution Document," \textit{English Historical Review} 110, no. 438 (1995); Francis Edwards, \textit{The Succession, Bye and Main Plots of 1601-1603} (Portland, OR: Four Courts, 2005). For the traditional narrative, see: Gardiner, I, 108-140.

\textsuperscript{121} Edwards, \textit{The Succession, Bye and Main Plots of 1601-1603}.

\textsuperscript{122} Although, even if Edwards is correct, this would only magnify the extent to which the creation of multiple competing centers of power, and subsequent framing of its limits, would have to be seen as a purposeful, well-planned political strategy on the part of James and his closest advisors.
molding of the Jacobean political environment we have examined so far. After all, the very existence of the plots only increased the perception of a factionalized, labyrinthine, and intrigue-riddled English court, in the eyes of both foreign and domestic observers. Despite ultimately providing for a bit of a culling of this field at both ends of the spectrum, the Bye and Main Plots were nevertheless illustrative of—and, in one way or another, were in significant part a product of—the new realities of the Jacobean court, with its resuscitation of numerous careers and the establishment of multiple competing centers of power.

These two plots involved a bizarrely disparate collection of individuals, whose closest common bond appears to have been their frustrated hopes after James’s accession—either from disappointment at the lack of a looked-for policy change, or from a perception of having been elbowed out by the rise of competitors in the new regime. Chief among the Bye conspirators included a couple of anti-Jesuit catholic priests (William Watson and William Clarke), some catholic gentlemen (Sir Griffin Markham and Anthony Copley), a moderate protestant noble’s son (Brooke), and a Puritan lord (Thomas, Lord Grey of Wilton). The primary actor in the treason of the Main was a moderate protestant lord with some real influence under the late queen (Cobham), and he brought down with him one of the most noted anti-Spaniards, intellectuals, and greatest figures of the previous regime (Sir Walter Raleigh).123 While Raleigh was certainly...
the most famous person laid low by the discovery of these plots (and is consequently the main reason for the existence of many of the takes on these events—and thus much of their spin), he was only one of several individuals whose involvement showed just how close this all seemed to the reins of power. Each plot involved a different brother-in-law of James’s most important advisor and privy councilor, Robert Cecil, and one of them was also the son-in-law of the senior member of the Howard clan and great hero of the war against Spain, Lord Admiral Nottingham. Any contemporary acquaintance with these events at all would have left even the most casual of observers with the impression that England was a disparate, divided place, with all kinds of people running about, conspiracy lurking in the highest and most unexpected of places, and faction capable of breaking apart the sacred bonds not only of religion, but of family connection as well.

And this was not just about surface appearances; these differences and divisions did create real friction. Factional maneuvering and intrigue played an important role in all of this. This is clear in the various individuals’ particular concerns and motivations for possible action—including both the plotters and their prosecutors, in whichever interpretation of causality one chooses to believe. And it was clear in all the contemporary perceptions of these events, as would have been natural with the revelation of any plots to control or overthrow the government. Cobham and Raleigh were being pushed from their positions of particular favor by Cecilian and Howard rivals, relatives, and erstwhile allies close to the king. This remains true whether one believes that they acted in order to prevent this, or whether one thinks that they were framed in


124 Cobham was also Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports; while Raleigh had been until very recently Captain of the Guard.

125 Brooke and Cobham’s sister had married Cecil, and Cobham had married Nottingham’s daughter, Frances Howard, the dowager Countess of Kildare.
order to facilitate it. The same goes for the others. Brooke and Markham were certainly frustrated at being passed over by rivals in the competition for honors and positions. And Lord Grey of Wilton was indeed upset by the revival of the fortunes of the Essexians, especially his own great rival Southampton. Whether or not these attitudes would have been enough to motivate each of these men to act, the important thing for our purposes here is that everyone who has written on these events points out that these feelings did in fact exist, that contemporary observers saw them, and that these observers seemed to have little trouble believing them to have constituted sufficient motive. There was even a strong element of personal and factional rivalry at play here amongst the catholic clergy themselves, as a controversy over the future of the leadership of their faith in England was fully underway, and there was no love lost between the seminary priests involved in this particular scheme and the kingdom’s Jesuits. In fact, the Jesuits themselves proved instrumental in betraying Watson and company to the authorities, and thus setting off the events that brought both conspiracies to an end.

126 Pope Clement VIII had only recently resolved an ongoing conflict between the Jesuits and the other seminary priests, generally referred to as the “Archpriest Controversy of 1597-1602”. It centered around the authority granted to Archpriest George Blackwell, who had been chosen by the pope to oversee the administration of the religion in England, and who had particularly close Jesuit ties. The Jesuits and their opponents generally had opposing views of the nature of their task: with the former seeing it as a missionary endeavor planting seeds in an essentially new field, while the latter felt that they were nurturing the shrunken but still resilient vine of the old Henrician and Marian church. These conflicting views have gone on to influence modern historiography on the nature of late Elizabethan and early Stuart catholicism, particularly in the views of John Bossy and Christopher Haigh, respectively. For more on these controversies, see: Penry Williams, The Later Tudors: England, 1547-1603, The New Oxford History of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 472-76. Arnold Pritchard, Catholic Loyalism in Elizabethan England (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979). John Bossy, The English Catholic Community, 1570-1850 (London: Darton Longman and Todd, 1975). Christopher Haigh, English Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Christopher Haigh, "Catholicism in Early Modern England: Bossy and Beyond," The Historical Journal 45, no. 2 (2002).

127 Indeed, if Gardiner is to be believed, the entire motivation for the plot on the part of Watson and Clarke was a personal vendetta between these priests and their Jesuit opponents, in the
These foiled attempts at sedition were also directly connected to other fundamental choices made at the Jacobean accession, consistent with the new king’s repeated refusal to side with any one group or set of definitive policy choices, despite pre-accession promises and his continued practice of telling all sides the sorts of things that they wanted to hear. After all, the Bye Plot in particular was the direct product of unfulfilled religious hopes, as a number of men who had been disappointed by James’s lack of any real progress on the issue of toleration – or at the very least an amelioration of penalties for recusancy – had decided to take matters into their own hands to force the issue. And the Main Plot was at least allegedly an attempt by a foreign power – the very power that was at the center of the current debate over peace and war – to achieve the sort of overwhelming influence at the English court that they had hoped to have quickly achieved with the death of Elizabeth and the accession of James.

Even the particular methods of both plots hearkened back directly to the king’s experience in multipolar, factionalized, religiously divided Scotland – resembling closely the types of events that had dominated James’s upbringing, and which had played such a central role in the very foundation of his political and personal views of the world. The Bye appears to have even been formulated with this precise aim in mind, suggested by Sir Griffin Markham as an explicit attempt to “follow the example which had so often been set by the Scottish nation”, where a disaffected group would kidnap the king and then “keep him in custody till he consented attempt to win back the influence over the English catholic community that they had almost entirely lost to the Jesuits. He claims that even the plans for toleration were secondary to these ends. Gardiner, I, 109-110.

As Mark Nicholls sees it: “The plots of 1603 and 1605 owe everything to the vastly altered conditions of James’s new England – to unrealistic expectations of the king, to the disappointments of men brought low by fortune’s wheel, and to the extinction of hopes nourished through two decades of Elizabethan persecution that the might of Spain would forever support oppressed co-religionists in England.” Nicholls, ”Treason's Reward: The Punishment of Conspirators in the Bye Plot of 1603,” 842.
to give way.”129 Similarly, the Main, as an attempted coup d’état with foreign support, was not unlike the successful one against James’s own mother which had been the very event that had brought him to the throne, but which had also been a constant prod to the formation of his opinions about the power of kings and the importance of preventing threats and sedition from either end of the politico-religious spectrum. The successful revelation and prevention of these two schemes was therefore at once further evidence that English politics under James was beginning to look a lot like Scotland, while simultaneously demonstrating that the king was nevertheless in control, and that there were limits on just how far faction and intrigue would be allowed to go. This was an important message to send in the early months of the new reign, and it was one that the myriad of foreign observers got loud and clear.

The resolution of all of this also matched up well with James’s frequently stated opposition – in person and in print – to radicals at either end of the spectrum, be they Puritan or Papist. The simultaneous suppression of these two plots was a great opportunity to make this point perfectly clear. It showed the crown cracking down not only on seditious catholics (the priests, Markham, and Copley), but also on moderate protestants (Cobham and Brooke), and even on committed anti-Spaniards and firm supporters of the protestant cause (Raleigh and Grey). This synchronicity – the assumed connections between the Bye and the Main, as well as the disparate makeup of conspirators in each individual plot – gave the appearance that not only might radicals of either kind be remarkably similar in their motives and methods, but that they might actually even be working together to foment rebellion, as James had suggested.

In this way, the revelation and prosecution of the Bye and Main plots underlined – for contemporaries and present-day students of the period alike – the wide spectrum of opinion that

existed in the British kingdoms and the factionalized nature of the new regime. But the plots ultimately fulfilled a number of roles at once. For as much as their existence was illustrative of the king’s encouragement of debate, discussion, disagreement, and factional competition around an amorphous center, their abject failure simultaneously marked the boundaries of this creative discord with comparable examples from either side regarding how far was too far, and what simply would not be tolerated.

While, again, it is not within the scope of this particular project to analyze in close detail how or why these plots happened, one particular area of specificity does require some clarification and context here: the Habsburgs’ alleged participation in all of this. Generally speaking, writers on the plots have typically assumed that neither Spain nor the Archdukes likely had any real intentions of giving money, and that they may have just been practicing the sort of intrigue that they have become so famous for over the years, sowing strife and conflict wherever possible. But even this goes too far, and it mischaracterizes the Spanish and Flemish role in these events, making it difficult to properly consider the significance of their reaction to them. From Aremberg’s correspondence it appears that he was as surprised as anyone about the revelation of the plots. And time and time again – in the frankness of letters back home originally in cipher – we see a man doing everything he could to keep up with his rivals: not initiating, but reacting. Reacting to the methods, money, and intrigue of the Dutch and French. Not a man creating the rules, but a man in the process of learning them.

Aremberg had certainly been offering money around, but as we have seen, this was only because he had been led to believe (and quite rightly so), that the only way to obtain anything in

130 See Aremberg’s letters to Albert of 16/26 July 1603, 24 July/3 August, 28 July/7 August: Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne I, 166, 168.
England was by dipping into one’s purse.\textsuperscript{131} Moreover, as to the specific charge, he told the king in a hastily granted audience that he had promised Cobham 30,000 \textit{escudos} if peace were to be concluded with Spain, but that this was back when Elizabeth was still alive, before James had even come to the throne.\textsuperscript{132} He vehemently protested his innocence of involvement in any kind of actual plot, and was clearly believed. The Venetian agent in London was soon reporting that “The King is convinced so far that neither Spain nor the Archduke have had any hand in this conspiracy. D’Aremberg offered to give the King hostages for the innocence of his master.”\textsuperscript{133} And James invited Aremberg to participate directly in his coronation in the immediate days after these events came to light.\textsuperscript{134} Indeed, as late as the following April, Philip III was writing privately to his ambassador in England, thanking him for “disabusing” those at James’s court of any continued “groundless” beliefs about Habsburg participation in these plots that “they imagined”.\textsuperscript{135} Nevertheless, it of course goes without saying that the discovery of a catholic conspiracy, accompanied by another plot that at least claimed Spanish participation in an attempt

\textsuperscript{131} We will take a closer look at the development of Habsburg participation in the matter of pensions, factions, and court intrigue in chapters six and nine, including a discussion of who the real innovators were, and how these talks about money for peace (and even toleration) would actually continue after the plots had been exposed, with people who would remain central figures at the Jacobean court and in its government throughout most of the rest of the reign.


\textsuperscript{133} Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Sunbury, 30 July 1603), this section of original in cypher, CSPVen X, 71.

\textsuperscript{134} Aremberg to Albert (Staines, 24 July/3 August 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne} I, 167.

\textsuperscript{135} “[F]ue muy acertada la diligencia que hizistes para que se entendiesse que ya ni el Archiduque mi hermano ni ministeros nuestros no han tenido parte en esso con que quedaron desengañosados los que imaginavan lo contrario tan sin fundamento.” Philip III to Villamediana (Valladolid, 29 March/8 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 71, f.1v.
to overthrow the government, was not the sort of thing that would help the Habsburg cause in England, or their hopes for an easy or advantageous conclusion of peace.\textsuperscript{136}

Moreover, whether one thinks it was an accident of timing or a deliberate plan for the display of royal power, James’s coronation just days after the plots had been uncovered and the various conspirators had been taken into custody did make a significant statement. What better way could there be to demonstrate that the king had a solid hold on the crown than to have it ceremonially and very publicly placed upon his head?\textsuperscript{137} The overall tone had been set, the foundations built, and now the general boundaries had been delineated. A decisive signal had been sent to anyone that might have still seen an opportunity for encouraging sedition or fomenting rebellion in England that such measures were highly unlikely to succeed. It was now clear that any attempts to influence British policy outside of war would have to be undertaken from \textit{within} this multipolar court, through the winning of friends, distribution of pensions, creation and nurturing of factions, and similar sorts of subtle and painstaking work. For they could see that, for all of the political and religious dissention, competition, and growing factionalization at the English court, the new king was nevertheless quite firmly seated upon his throne.

\textbf{Further doubts, and questioning the messenger}

So instead of arriving in England to find a king and political establishment ready to embrace Spain with open arms, with significant avenues for progress laid open ahead of him, Aremberg had discovered the Dutch and French appearing to make real headway, the court split

\textsuperscript{136} And the very fact that Villamediana had to work diligently in order to continue to disabuse rumors and beliefs to any extent after the fact indicates some of the lingering effect.

\textsuperscript{137} Aremberg sent a description of the coronation in his letter to Albert sent from Staines, 25 July/4 August 1603: AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 108; also mentioned at Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne} I, 167.
amongst various competing groups and individuals, money seeming to rule the day and required to get anything done, and various individuals of some real rank and apparent power suggesting all kinds of factionalized plans. This was a maze, no sure direction seemed definitive, and the subsequent collapse of both the Bye and Main plots – with Aremberg’s hands full protesting his innocence – made things look even worse for catholic and Habsburg interests. Between the gout, the allegations of complicity in the plots, and the continued need to explain and reassure regarding Spanish delays, the Habsburgs’ lone official representative remained in a position of relative weakness throughout the summer, repeatedly complaining to those back home about how difficult it was to get the truth out of anyone in England, and about just how shockingly open the whole court seemed to be about bribes and pensions.\(^{138}\)

Consequently, this intensely competitive environment made the Habsburgs second-guess their chosen messengers. Aremberg himself, after spending some time in England and getting a sense of just how complicated and cutthroat the situation had become, wrote back to Albert urgently requesting the presence of President Richardot in order to have someone able to effectively negotiate this maze, and especially to deal with Robert Cecil.\(^{139}\) Albert, for his part, had already written to Spain in response to Aremberg’s continued concerns, and found special urgency after the arrival of Villamediana in Flanders. Seeing that the new ambassador had not brought with him the proper authority from Philip to treat for peace, but was waiting for further instructions, Albert requested that the powers be sent immediately. Moreover, he suggested to

\(^{138}\) See, for example: Aremberg’s letters to Albert of 17/27 June, 20/30 June, 23 June/3 July, 28 June/8 July: Lonchay & Cuvelier, *Correspondance de la Cour d'Espagne* I, 150, 151, 153, 157-8.

Lerma that if Philip was serious about restoring peace, he needed to send someone a bit more articulate and skilled at negotiating than the count of Villamediana. In his view:

[Although don Juan de Tasis is a very honorable gentleman, and he has sufficiently good understanding and qualities, and I have always been his friend – for that which I owe to the service of His Majesty and to the common cause, I find myself obligated to point out to Your Lordship that he lacks the eloquence [la plática] that is necessary for such business, and [these negotiations] are not of the kind that they can be carried out by someone who needs to learn this.]

In his place, Albert suggested the appointment of one of the monarchy’s most formidable statesmen: specifically either the Constable of Castile, the count of Olivares, or Don Juan de Idiáquez.

Meanwhile, in Spain, these same sorts of questions were being asked as well. On the very day that Aremberg was writing from England about growing irritation and possible misgivings about Spanish delays, the Council of State in Valladolid was preparing a consulta on peace and the importance of doing something for the English catholics. In the process, they were finalizing Villamediana’s powers to treat, and King Philip was deciding who else to send to England. In this consulta, in part in response to Albert’s request, the Constable of Castile raised his own doubts about their ambassador. Like Albert, and in quite similar language, he

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140 “[T]engo por necesario que mande venir luego persona ó personas muy pláticas en tratar de semejantes maneras de negocios”. CODOIN v.42, 461. (Albert to Lerma, 2/12 July 1603).
141 “[A]unque don Juan de Tasis es muy honrado caballero, y tiene harto buen entendimiento y partes, y yo he sido siempre su amigo, por lo que debo al servicio de S.M. y á la causa comun, me hallo obligado á apuntar á V.S. que me paresce le falta la plática que fuera menester para semejantes negocios, y que ellos no son de cualidad que se puedan tratar, por quien haya menester aprenderlo.” CODOIN v.42, 461. (Albert to Lerma, 2/12 July 1603).
142 CODOIN v.42, 461. (Albert to Lerma, 2/12 July 1603).
143 King’s notes to this effect in the margin. AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 2. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 16/26 July 1603).
144 Albert’s dispatch, with letters to Lerma and Philip of 3/13 July, was received in Valladolid on 13/23 July, three days before this consulta. AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 82. Villamediana’s letter from Brussels of 3/13 July was received in Valladolid on 14/24 July. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 173.
emphasized the English ministers’ ability, Villamediana’s inexperience, and the need to have several of the monarchy’s very brightest minds in charge of the negotiations. He also expressed some real concern that the Archdukes’ motivations and ultimate aims might be somewhat different from those of Philip III.

This was a great deal more complicated and significantly less hopeful for the Spaniards than the situation had appeared at Elizabeth’s death, and things were getting more worrisome by the day. By mid-August, rumors of all kinds were abroad in the land, and nobody seemed to know quite what was going on:

Shewerly Mr. Willson heare is soe many flyinge reports of newes that men know not what to beleeeve…for first it was reported that his Majestie was dead, and that the prince of Walles was proclamed King. Others say that ther was som attempte pretended against his Majestie but that it took noe effect. And now last of all it is reported that 3 or 4 great noble men thought to have made some Insurrection in the land, but are tacken and put into preson.

Philip was getting angry, and began to despair that there would be no peace at all. And on 30 July/9 August, there came what appeared to be a crushing blow: James signed the Treaty of Hampton Court, entering into an alliance with France, in mutual guarantee for the security of the Dutch, who both sides agreed to continue helping under the table.

In just a few short months, the situation in England had appeared to have changed dramatically. Upon his arrival – and in keeping with both his domestic experience in Scotland,

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145 AGS Estado, leg. 2557, doc 2. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 16/26 July 1603).
146 Richard Cocks to [(Thomas?) Wilson] (11/21 August 1603) TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.54v.
147 Philip admitted as much in his response to the pope’s letter urging peace (see chapter four, below), saying that Clement’s letter had arrived at a time when he was becoming more inclined to take up arms, AGS Estado, leg. 1857, doc 93.
and his international experience over the past decade – James had set the wheels in motion for
the creation of a domestic system in England emphasizing multiple centers of power and
ensuring the rapid growth of a factionalized environment. This domestic factionalization was
helped along and brought into the realm of foreign policy by a renewed and heated debate about
the merits of war and peace. This debate took physical, practical form with the unprecedented
diplomatic activity associated with the new king’s accession. And before long, battle lines were
drawn, with the domestic and international spheres firmly intertwined, the boundaries of the new
system tested and established, and things were beginning to look not so good for the Habsburgs.
Chapter Four: Back from the brink – the indispensable king

“And as I have counselled you to be slow in taking on a warre, so advise I you to be slow in peace-making. Before ye agree, looke that the ground of your warres be satisfied in your peace; and that ye see a good suretie for you and your people: otherwaies a honourable and just warre is more tollerable, then a dishonourable and dis-advantageous peace.”

– King James I & VI

July 1603 had been a bad month for the Habsburgs in England. Their enemies got the jump on them at court, having come and gone to apparent great effect before the Archdukes’ ambassador could even get up from his sickbed to present himself to the king. The Spanish ambassador was still in Flanders without authorization to cross over to England, and while his hosts were awaiting his arrival with great impatience a couple of major plots against the crown had been discovered that involved a number of catholics and had even implicated the Habsburgs themselves. Then, to cap things off, the month had ended with a treaty between England and France that did not bode well for Spanish interests, and seemed to many to threaten the prospects for a peace at all. Indeed, when Dr. Taylor – an agent of the Archdukes and Aremberg’s confidant – returned to England later in the month and met with several of James’s most important councilors, he found their assurances of continued good faith unconvincing.

According to Taylor, “all the promises of the court in London are lies,” their whole aim being

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1 King James I & VI, Basilicon Doron, 33.
2 Most notably Cecil, Suffolk, and Henry Howard; Taylor and an anonymous companion were in preliminary discussions over the the possibility of peace and of religious liberty for the catholic priests and Jesuits in England, which we will discuss in greater detail in chapters five and six, below. “Rapport du docteur Taylor et de son compagnon au supérieur de la Compagnie de Jésus en Angleterre sur les négociations engagées au sujet de la paix depuis le retour du dit Taylor” (no date, but after his return to England in mid-July), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 164.
merely to gain time.³ Rather than talk, he suggested that the only way to ensure a peace at that
point would be through renewed military action: “If the King of Spain would present himself
with his sword in hand, he would obtain whatever conditions he would like without having need
of a long campaign.”⁴

**The Pope and support for James**

Nevertheless, just when things were looking their very worst, further impetus came from
the outside to keep Philip III from being too quick to change his mind. Upon hearing the news of
Elizabeth’s death, Pope Clement VIII had written to Philip from Rome, and the letter arrived in
mid-July. At this crucial juncture, the pope reminded the king and his council of the big picture:

> In this accident of the death of the Queen of England, it appears that God has opened a
door for us, and given some sign of being able to hope for some improvement in the
affairs of the catholic religion in those kingdoms, if the affair is taken along a good path,
in which we have great need of the counsel and help of Your Majesty.⁵

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³ “[Q]ue toutes les promesses de la cour de Londres son mensongères, qu’elles ont pour but de
la Cour d’Espagne* I, 164.
⁴ “Si le roi d’Espagne se présentait l’épee à la main, il obtiendrait les conditions de paix qu’il
voudrait sans avoir besoin d’une longe campagne.” “Rapport du docteur Taylor”, Lonchay &
Cuvelier, *Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne* I, 164.
⁵ “En este accidente de la meurte de la Reyna de Inglaterra paresçe que Dios nos ha abierto una
puerta, y dado alguna señal de poder esperar algun mejoramiento en las cosas de la religion
cattolica en aquellos reynos, si el negocio se toma por buen camino, en que tenemos gran
necesidad del consejo y ayuda de Vuestra Mag.” Clement VIII to Philip III (Rome, 23 May/2
June 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1 – Spanish translation of Italian original at doc
191. Received in Spain on 3/13 July 1603, as indicated at: Lerma to Secretary Franquesa
(Valladolid, 3/13 July 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 190. Judging from the content of letters
from Philip III to his ambassador in Rome, the duke of Sessa, this *breve* would have been written
right after the pope had found out about Archduke Albert’s decision to congratulate James
immediately upon his accession, which Clement heartily approved. Sessa had already
informed Philip a number of weeks earlier that the pope would support negotiating with James, but it
apparently took some weeks for Clement to come up with his detailed advice. See especially:
Philip III’s response to Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 21/31 May 1603), AGS Estado, leg.
2511, doc 90, f.4v; and Philip III to Sessa (Valladolid, 5/15 September 1603), AGS Estado, leg.
1857, doc 256.
He went on, unknowingly echoing the very phrase that the count of Chinchón had used when arguing for peace in the council debates back in April, claiming that “To us have been shown two paths, the one of force, and the other of negotiation.” 6 The path of force had led only to “so many years” of death, destruction, countless martyrs to the faith, and the potential ruin of all Christendom. 7 Consequently, Clement insisted on the necessity now to change to the second path, the “camino del negocio”, which would be “the most sure.”8 While the use of force would only keep the English catholics in danger and Europe divided, he was confident that the path of negotiation would lead to a relaxation of such concerns. And the pope was explicit about why: the new king of England was, from all of the evidence they had seen so far, a man of peace: of “calm spirit”. 9 A great deal more could be had by not irritating him nor inciting his people to violence. So Clement asked Philip to heed his counsel, and encouraged him to “judge well in this matter, praying to consider that this Prince although a heretic has never acted against Your Majesty nor your states that we know of”, and that peace with England would free them from “a wearisome and costly war” and help “infinitely those Catholics which is our particular aim.” 10 In this way he appealed to both of Philip’s main (and often competing) general concerns: reason of state and the universal good of the catholic church. The pope stressed yet again the need to not

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6 “A nos se nos representan dos caminos, el uno de la fuerça, y el otro del negocio”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1.
7 “[E]l de la fuerça se ha provado tantos años con la muerta, con tanta destrucción”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1.
8 “[H]aviendo considerado bien todo nos paresçe que el camino del negocio sea el mas seguro,” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1.
9 “[E]l qual por las relacio̱nes que tenemos es persona de animo quieto,” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, ff.1-1v.
10 “[J]uzgara bien en este negocio, rogandole aconsiderar que este Príncipe aunque herege no se ha jamas exerçitado contra V.Mª. ni de sus estados que nos sepamos…que V.Mª. nos librara de una fastidiosa y gastosa guerra, y podrá… ayudar infinitamente a los Catholicos que es nuestro fin particular.” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1v.
do anything that might “offend the person of the King [James]”, and he argued that both temporal and spiritual matters would be served by peace – including “the peace of Flanders”, “the security of the Indies’ trade”, and the ability to better turn and face off against the Ottoman Empire – which was, after all, the real enemy of Christendom.

This argument appears to have arrived at precisely the right time, helping Philip to maintain his resolve, and to focus on cultivating James. As he told the pope directly in his response: “Your Holiness’s letter that the Nuncio gave me concerning the affairs of England found me hanging suspended about which path I ought to take in them, more inclined to the path of arms, for the little that could be expected of whomever so obstinately persevered in his errors of heresy.”

Philip and the council had in fact considered the pope’s letter right alongside a copy of “the Testament of the King of England”, and they were not pleased by what they continued to see of James’s religious leanings. However, “having seen that Your Holiness approves more the path of negotiation”, Philip was willing to keep working toward peace, and

11 “Para este efecto creemos ser neçesario tener cuydad de quien escribe libros o otras escrituras que no vayan a ofender la persona del Rey, podiendo irritar con este modo a hazer alguna mala resolucion contra los Catholicos, que con esto paresçe que esperan algun alivio de tantas aflicionces.” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.1v.

12 “[S]iendo principalmente conjunto con el servicio de dios el temporal tambien de V.Mª. por la quietud de Flandes y por la siguridad de la navegacion de Indias, y por la quietud de toda la Xpiandad, para poder despues bolver todas las armas contra el Imperio Otomano”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 192, f.2.

13 “La carta de V.Sª. que me dio el Nuncio sobre las cosas de Inglatera me hallo suspenso con el camino que devia tomar en ellas, mas inclinado al de las armas, por lo poco que se puede esperar de quien tan obstinadamente persevera en sus errores de la heregia”, Philip III to Clement VIII (Valladolid, 13/23 August 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 1857, doc 93, f.1.

14 Consultas of the Council of State, “En la Matteria de Ynglaterra” (Valladolid, 12/22 July 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 223-225: 223 is the consulta, 224 a copy of the pope’s letter, and 225 “Copia de la confesion del Rey de Inglatera”, dated in London, 8/18 June 1603 – a translation of either the pertinent sections of the Basilicon Doron or the unofficial version called “the King’s Testament” that James claims in the Basilicon Doron’s preface to have been the reason for printing the official work.
asked for all the help that the Holy See might provide.\textsuperscript{15} He had been seeking the pope’s advice since the beginning of this process, and so Clement’s definitive stance appears to have held particular weight with him.\textsuperscript{16} Despite lingering concerns about James’s heretical views, Philip would remain firm in this approach, thanks in large part to the continued influence of the pope and of his own ambassadors, each of them in turn as a result of continued contact with the English king himself. It is to that contact that we now turn.

**Telling people what they wanted to hear**

As we have seen in chapter two, peace was not an Elizabethan foregone conclusion; the queen’s death and the accession of James I were absolutely crucial.

And as we have seen in chapter three, getting from a temporary truce to a lasting treaty was not going to be a simple matter. For a variety of reasons, things had to get worse before they would be able to get better; it was going to take a great deal of work from a number of committed and talented individuals on all sides to pull it off, and foremost in this process was King James himself. Indeed, at every step of the way, the particular approach and frequent personal involvement of the new English king were absolutely central.

It is true that, in this environment, things looked bad for Spain, and it was understandable why Philip was so upset. But had the situation really shifted? Despite the factionalized environment at the court in London, and all this apparent movement towards Spain’s rivals and enemies, was English policy actually any different from what James had been supporting all along? Had the new king’s approach to peace changed so dramatically in the months since his

\textsuperscript{15} “[A]viendo visto que VS\textsuperscript{d}. aprueba mas el camino de la negociacion”, AGS Estado, leg. 1857, doc 93, f.1.

\textsuperscript{16} For his continued inquires, see especially: Philip III to Sessa (Burgos, 6/16 June 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 1857, doc 228; Philip III to Sessa (Valladolid, 28 June/8 July 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 1857, doc 235.
arrival in England? First of all, it must be remembered that this was the same man who for years had been emphasizing his Calvinist theological leanings to all of the protestants who could hear, while simultaneously encouraging belief amongst the catholic powers in his support for religious toleration or even his own possible conversion to Rome. This was the man who had no trouble negotiating secretly and simultaneously with both the earl of Essex and the king of Spain. Why would anyone expect this to be any different once he came to the English throne?

In fact, it was not any different at all. James had been at this sort of thing for a long time, and he was very good at telling everybody precisely what they wanted to hear. This worked in a couple of different ways. First, on an indirect level. James’s aforementioned immediate creation of multiple competing centers of power at court helped facilitate this, by bringing as many perspectives as possible into the big tent of acceptable policy options and possible factional groupings. This allowed him to dispatch different groups of surrogates to cultivate different foreign interests at court, without always having to be constantly enthusiastic towards one group and then turn around and say exactly the opposite to their opponents. For example, various hotter protestants around James could pay a visit to the Dutch envoys and lend them both a sympathetic ear and real encouragement, with very little political cost for the king himself. At the same time, more supposedly catholic-leaning or politique ministers and their associates could give similar encouragement to the Flemish and Spanish, trading on the common understanding of their apparent knowledge of and close access to the king.17 In this way, the same room for

17 As we have seen in chapter three, the various ambassadors had quickly become well-connected at court, and their dispatches back home were all filled with descriptions of who it was that each felt was in their corner. As we shall see below with the case of the French and the Spaniards, the various groups were not necessarily consistent, and opposing sides often believed opposite things about certain individuals. For the Spaniards’ thoughts on this at this time, summed up in one place, see “Lista de los Consejeros de estado del Rey de Inglaterra y otros personajes de aquel Reyno calidades y condiciones de cada uno, y de los medios para ganar
maneuver that this diversification of counsel afforded him within the domestic political sphere was also available on this international level.

Even when such visits and connections were not explicitly directed or sanctioned by the king, it still worked to the advantage of the general approach he initiated and embraced. Indeed, this is likely how such things played out most of the time. It would not have been necessary for James to take, say, Lord Zouche aside and ask him to pay a visit to the foreign interests at court who might share his more advanced Calvinist sympathies. To be sure, this might have even been counterproductive in certain situations, leading to suspicion of James’s motives. It was more than enough to let the formation of these interest groups take shape in their own way – after the initial mass restoration of royal favor – and they would accomplish this work naturally.

Especially in this uniquely charged environment surrounded by so many competing foreign interests. As the presence of so many foreign ambassadors at court helped bring an international dimension to the process of factionalization, so too did the multipolar nature of the Jacobean court help James play these various international rivals off of one another.

This indirect level was a natural byproduct of the fundamental structure of the Jacobean court. The creation of multiple centers of power – centered around various competing ideological leanings, patronage networks, and alliances, both foreign and domestic – provided the perfect setting for James to continue his well-honed practice of divide-and-rule. The system practically ran itself. All that this indirect level required on James’s part was the occasional show of favor, well-placed kind word, or public admonition, as everything depended on various ministers’ and courtiers’ claims of intimate knowledge and/or influence with the king. But this

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system was also complemented by the way in which James himself was perceived and how he acted. Which leads us to the second plane on which James was able to tell people precisely what they wanted to hear: the direct level.

The new king was quite adept at acting in his own right.\textsuperscript{18} James’s approach to governance allowed the various competing groups and individual ministers to take care of much of the day-to-day work of the crown, leaving him free to intervene directly when he saw fit. And this suited his own particular interest in foreign affairs remarkably well. In addition to letting the different components of his developing, multipolar regime cultivate the numerous international suitors competing for his favor, he could either intervene when this was proving to be less

\textsuperscript{18} This is another area where the more recent historiography of James as king of Scotland is in marked contrast with the historiography of James as king of England. The Scots-focused accounts tend to emphasize the extent to which James was very good at the practice of personal monarchy, on a face-to-face level. But the English-focused works have traditionally emphasized just how inaccessible, removed, and even aloof James supposedly was – often discussed in pointed contrast with his predecessor’s ostensible mastery of the public and one-on-one activities of a reigning monarch. So why the discrepancy? Bridging this gap was, to a certain extent, the point of Wormald’s seminal article. And her answer – that James acted similarly in both, but that he was less successful at it in England because the two kingdoms were to a certain extent different, and thus forced different political strategies upon the king – tells part of the tale, at least with regard to the conflicting historical perceptions of James. But with regard to the issue of actual practice and immediate success, I would argue that even the sorts of things that historians have criticized about James in England – his supposed laziness, aloofness, going off on progress and hunting rather than sitting behind a desk managing affairs, and the consequent delegation of various political tasks to ministers – can actually be seen as real strengths in the Jacobean political system, at least in the short to medium term. Not only was this behavior not unusual for an early modern monarch, but James was very effective in his use of this distance and delegation as a political tool, and at using it in concert with his continued mastery of personal monarchy, developed over his long experience in Scotland. After all, as Wormald rightly points out: “what a study of early modern Scottish government makes possible is direct concentration on the crucial importance of the art of managing men, which requires two things: room to manoeuvre, and the chance to meet the men who must be managed.” Wormald, "James VI and I: Two Kings or One?," 194. I outline a number of the specifics of James’s direct practice of this in England over the course of this chapter, and deal with the realities of his periodic absence from court and his hunting in depth in chapter seven, as well as in the early part of chapter ten.
successful than he had hoped, or he could set himself up against their particular successes in order to emphasize the other side. And sometimes he did both at once.

**The example of Sully**

In order to understand how this worked, we can take a detailed look at one particularly instructive case: the treatment of Sully, the French minister and extraordinary ambassador sent to James’s court in June of 1603. One of Henri IV’s very closest and most powerful advisors, Sully arrived in London determined to keep James from establishing a peaceful relationship with Spain, or at the very least to ensure that England would continue to provide assistance to the Dutch after peace was signed. Sully was confident about his own abilities, well-connected with various other foreign agents, and he hit the ground running. He met with several groups as soon as he got to London, including the ambassadors of the Elector Palatine, Sweden, Denmark, the Venetians, and the Dutch.\(^{19}\) He was also quick to confer with Robert Cecil and various other important ministers and courtiers, and felt that he had a pretty good view of the lay of the land by the time he had his first public audience with James on 12/22 June, four days after his arrival.\(^{20}\)

Sully even seemed to have known full well going into his visit precisely what James was all about, giving us a detailed account of this in his own words. Upon arriving in England, he tells us that a meeting with the Venetian agent had confirmed to me what I had before strongly suspected of the irresolution of James…that his dissimulation, which his flatterers complimented in him as a virtue had always consisted in giving hopes to all, but accomplishing none; that it was not to be expected he would change his maxims, having frequently been heard to say, that it was to such an artful conduct alone he owed his security when King of Scotland; and therefore it was highly probable that he would again put those arts in practice, and pursue them more steadily than ever, at the beginning of a reign, and at the head of a great kingdom, whose


\(^{20}\) Ibid., 367.
people, affairs, and neighbours, he was utterly unacquainted with; all which were circumstances favourable to his maxim.\(^{21}\)

This is, in fact, a very prescient view of the fundamentals of James’s entire political strategy, if admittedly uttered with an unfavorable spin. Sully knew going in just how James operated, and fully expected him to keep this up now that he was king of England. And yet, despite this knowledge, the French ambassador still managed to get sucked right in.\(^{22}\) Despite everything he said he knew, he quickly started believing that he could influence the king directly and uniquely, and that James could be trusted to follow through on any promises of support he might secure.\(^{23}\) Even by focusing on the most pro-Sully source available – the French minister’s own relation of these events – it is quite clear that it was Sully himself who got played, and a closer look at how this happened gives us a very good view of both the manner and skill with which James – and perhaps his closest ministers – operated.\(^{24}\)

Here is how it worked. Sully arrived in great pomp, established connections at court, and began to get a sense of how these new political surroundings functioned. Meetings with English ministers and several counterparts from other countries helped ease him into the rapidly factionalizing environment: a result of James’s creation of multiple competing centers of power, the revival of the debate over war and peace, and the injection of so many foreign suitors and

\(^{21}\) Ibid., 363.
\(^{22}\) Indeed, if anything, Sully overstated the case about James. For more on his thoughts on this, see Ibid., 356.
\(^{23}\) Oldenbarnevelt also seemed to think that James could be easily influenced, as he indicated to Sully in their meeting of 11/21 June. Ibid., 361.
\(^{24}\) Obviously, Sully’s own writings need to be taken with a very large grain of salt, and need to be assumed to have been portraying their author in the most favorable of terms, particularly since these were later consciously edited and printed for public consumption. But that is precisely why I am relying on them here in this way. For even in this most pro-Sully of takes, it appears quite clear that James was the one doing the manipulating, so much so that Sully did not even seem to realize this after the fact, when he edited these writings and released them for publication. The other aspects of what he has to say still need to be treated as his own biased relation of events, and as his own personal opinion of what people thought and the way in which the court operated.
schemers into this system. Sully’s initial audiences with James went quite well, and unfolded in a steadily more intimate way. The first was a public one, on 12/22 June, which began with all of the proper exchanges of diplomatic protocol, presentation of letters, and so on. But James had the charm turned on from the beginning, and before long he dispensed with the ceremony, and drew Sully aside into a more informal, private conversation in his chambers.

In this encounter, James went out of his way to say all sorts of things that he knew the French ambassador would want to hear. Chief among these was a continued emphasis on just how much he disliked the Spanish, calling them their common enemy, making references to their supposed desire to establish a universal monarchy, and similar sorts of points. Sully was both surprised and pleased at James’s words, as he had arrived in England thinking that the king was fond of Spain and dead-set on peace with them whatever the cost. And Sully himself even tells us that it was James who made these points on his own, from the outset; it was not the result of any kind of gradual influence or remarkable power that the French ambassador exerted over the king – despite the very different conclusions that the ambassador would draw when insisting on the nature and success of his influence by the end of his account. It was quite clear that James went into this knowing exactly what he was doing, and planning on saying precisely what it was that would draw Sully to him.

This meeting was the first step in a progressive, fast-moving process by the king to bring the French ambassador around to believing that James was wholly in his corner. This approach was clearly paying dividends right from the start, as Sully himself was quick to admit, telling us that “[t]he open declaration which the King of England had made against Spain, had given me

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26 He describes James’s comments in great detail, and emphasizes the extent to which he kept harping on this same string throughout: “Thus upon every occasion he inveighed against the Spaniards.” Ibid., 371.
some hopes that the court of London would be insensibly prejudiced against that power. In the interval between my first and second audience, several things happened which increased these hopes.”

He was paying close attention to all the factional maneuverings, and was already speaking of James in terms of opposition to the interests of the clearly worried “Spanish faction”, and what he considered to be the newly uncertain fortunes of Robert Cecil. As his visit continued, his perception of this apparent opposition would grow more pronounced by the day.

Sully’s initial public audience was followed a few days later by his first truly private audience, on 15/25 June, which James expressly described as an opportunity to “confer with [Sully] alone with greater freedom.” Upon the ambassador’s arrival, James quickly led him into a secluded chamber where the two of them were totally on their own, and the king proceeded once more to work on his target. He made a great show of “command[ing] that no one should follow” them, and was in a matter of moments telling Sully that they were clearly on the same page, that he trusted him, and that he was willing to “discover to [him] his most important secrets.”

James then proceeded to discuss the diplomatic relations and balance of power in Europe in depth – which Sully found engaging and even masterful – and how his plans would fit with those of France. Even at this point, Sully was still tempering his admiration with caveats to the reader about what he believed to be James’s true nature, with his supposed “disposition to peace, or rather to indolence and inaction, which in a manner contradicted his words, and seemed to tell me that, having promised a little, he would perform nothing.”

Sully once again made a strong case to the king for the danger of Spanish designs, not just to France and England, but to all of Europe. James understood and sympathized with this, but then

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27 Ibid., 375.
28 Ibid., 382.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 383.
countered with a detailed proposal for a permanently divided Netherlands, very much along the lines of the way in which things ultimately worked out, after forty-five more years of that particular war, and a few more centuries of conflict off-and-on.

Of course, as Sully himself was the one telling the tale, this point gets quickly passed over, and we are told how his mere skepticism of James’s plan’s facility and a couple of doubting questions quickly moved the king to remain “some time in silence”, and then “in a hesitating and irresolute voice” to say that “it must be confessed I [Sully] was in the right, that the affair was of great consequence,” and that “he had waited my coming to determine him in his resolution.” Sully then claims that from that point on he “penetrated into all which this prince refused to tell me, and I thought I ought not to hesitate attacking him in his inmost recesses”. So he pushed James about the relationship with his closest councilors, and suggested that they had different ends and desires than the king in all of this. The king played right along, lamenting about his differences with various of his advisors, making Sully – an ambassador from a foreign country whom James had met for the first time a few days before – actually begin to believe that he was somehow closer to the king and more trusted by him than were the king’s most powerful ministers. Sully describes it almost as if he were some sort of puppet master pulling the strings to manipulate the king, only moments after he had once again described to the reader just how smart James was, and how his assurances about anything could never be trusted. Even reading his very own account of this, it is clear that the French ambassador had taken the bait, and the rest of his stay would be spent in unknowingly being reeled in.

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31 Ibid., 385.
32 Ibid.
In the meantime, Sully was also getting as much intelligence as he possibly could, and was cultivating his new contacts at court.\textsuperscript{33} This process helped reinforce his belief that most of the powerful councilors were not well-disposed to the French cause. With each day, Sully’s perception of the divide between James and his factionalized council and court grew. This was enhanced by his back-and-forth schedule, going from meeting with the king to meeting with his ministers, then back to the king, and so on. Next up, after his private audience, Sully met on 17/27 June with a group of some of the most important English councilors – including the earls of Nottingham, Northumberland, and Mar; Lord Mountjoy; and Robert Cecil – to discuss his proposals for the future of Anglo-French relations.\textsuperscript{34} Despite some basic areas of agreement regarding various general points, such as the necessity of some sort of continued aid to the Dutch, the meeting did not go well – with Sully seeing Cecil in particular as his crafty opponent, bent on alliance with Spain and on “the dissipation” of all of his designs.\textsuperscript{35} Nor were his perceptions a secret, as Aremberg wrote back to Albert that very day, reporting on Sully’s dissatisfaction in his meetings with the English ministers.\textsuperscript{36}

Two days later, on 19/29 June, it was once more back to the king, dining with him in Greenwich, where Sully and the resident ambassador Beaumont were invited to sit at his very table. Here James continued to encourage a belief in the intrigue and faction at his court, and of

\textsuperscript{33} There were exceptions, at least privately, which is where Sully was obtaining much of his information. He claimed to have Mountjoy in his camp, to have gained Northumberland through a pension, and was getting information through Cobham and Raleigh: Ibid., 375, 378.

\textsuperscript{34} In fact, the circumstances of how this meeting came about lend further weight to the idea that this back-and-forth was part of a conscious strategy on the part of James, with the possible participation of his closest councillors. For Sully had requested a direct audience with the king himself for this date, but James said his schedule was full up, and instead told him that he would be happy to “send his ministers” in his stead, “to confer with [Sully] and prepare matters.” Ibid., 389.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid., 392.

\textsuperscript{36} Aremberg to Albert (London, 17/27 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne} I, 149-150.
his own position as the crucial figure in control and above the fray, boasting of his ascendancy over the English councilors even before his accession, in the last years of the late queen’s life. He then followed this with a whispered intention to Sully of eventually sealing his friendship with France by way of a double marriage alliance between his two eldest children and the eldest children of Henri IV.  

The pattern of going back and forth between councilors and king continued, with Sully increasingly seeing the former as his implacable enemies, while finding himself in progressively more intimate and agreeable settings with the latter. On 20/30 June, the day after dining with the king, he met in conference with both the Dutch and English ministers, with Robert Cecil once again the main speaker. The English made their position clear, emphasizing a desire to continue helping the Dutch to a certain extent under the table, but that they could do no more, and would not keep ruining themselves in war on their account. As a result, Sully was beginning to get very frustrated indeed, and he went off about how the “politicians” were all getting in the way, putting forward their own particular designs, as opposed to those of the king. He felt that “the manner in which they had again exposed themselves, and, as it were, 

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37 Sully, Memoirs, II, 393.
38 Once again, these meetings and their difficulties were not kept particularly secret – perhaps purposely so – as Aremberg wrote to Albert about the details the very same day: Aremberg to Albert (20/30 June 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 151. However, the same was not true for the private meetings between Sully and the king. They were certainly known to have occurred, but their contents did not get out – thus further encouraging the belief in conflict between king and council, as well as James’s capacity for independent action. For example, the “Aviso de Londres” dated 16/26 June 1603 claimed that: “Mons. de Rhony [Sully] ha tenido audiençia dos vezes, en la primera no passo otra cosa que cumplimentos ordinarios en darle el para-bien. En la secunda hablaron a solas gran rato, nadie estaba cerca para oyrles. No ha salido aun a luz lo que trataron.” AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 211, f.1.
40 Ibid., 399.
confessed themselves to be liars and impostors, had inspired me with the utmost contempt for them”.

It was at this point, when Sully was most dismayed at his relations with the English ministers, that the crucial moment came. On the following day, Tuesday, 21 June/1 July, Sully secured one more private audience with the king. This would be the real climax of the entire trip, the culmination of the back-and-forth process of the past two weeks that had led the ambassador to believe that the English ministers were firmly aligned against France, that his only hope lay in cultivating James, and that his efforts to do so had been remarkably successful. And according to Sully, this key meeting was a stunning triumph. In fact, so satisfied was he, that he chose this precise moment in his memoirs to outline for his readers his famous “Grand Design” for the total reordering of Europe. So why did Sully feel this way, and what exactly had happened?

In this crucial audience, Sully spent about four hours entirely alone with James. They talked once more about virtually every aspect of European international relations, from the need to check Spanish power in both the old world and the new, to the position of the Dutch and the future of the Low Countries, to religious relations, both within and between the various confessions. By the end of the afternoon, Sully’s efforts to convince the king appeared to have worked. James told him that he would sign off on his proposed treaty before Sully returned to France, after making a few “inconsiderable alterations”. Then, in a fantastic moment of political theater, the king called in a number of his most influential ministers and courtiers – including Nottingham, Northumberland, Southampton, Mar, Mountjoy, and Cecil – and laid out for them in front of Sully precisely what was to be done. As Sully tells it, James

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41 Ibid., 400.
declared to them, that, having deliberately considered my reasons, he was resolved to enter into a close alliance with France against Spain. He reproached Cecil in very strong terms for having, both in his words and actions, acted contrary to his commands; which declaration the secretary received very awkwardly. “Cecil” said James to him, “I command you without any reply or objection, in conformity to this my design, to prepare the necessary writings, according to which, I will then give the dexter, and all assurances to the ambassadors of the States.” [i.e. the Dutch] This was the first time he had distinguished them by this title. Then turning to me, and taking me by the hand, he said, “Well Mr. Ambassador, are you now perfectly satisfied with me?” I replied by a profound reverence, and by making his majesty the same protestations of fidelity and attachment as if it had been to my own king; and I desired he would let me confirm it to him by kissing his hand. He embraced me, and demanded my friendship with an air of goodness and confidence which very much displeased several of his councilors who were present. Upon my departure, he gave orders to the Earl of Northumberland to accompany me to the Thames, and to Sydney to escort me to London.42

Sully was certain that he had won the British king wholly over to his cause, through his own personal skill, despite the chaos and confusion of James’s factionalized court, and in direct, explicit opposition to the desires and schemes of his most powerful ministers.43

Of course, what Sully thought and what was obviously going on were two very different things. Even a basic familiarity with the repeated patterns of James’s behavior throughout his reign – both in Scotland and in England, and with native courtiers and foreign visitors alike – makes it abundantly clear that the French ambassador was falling victim to a very conscious political strategy by the direct actions of a skilful monarch.44

42 Ibid., 411-412.
43 And this is confirmed by the reports of others, as Sully was quick to make it known just how well he believed his trip had gone. For example, see: Anzolo Badoer, Venetian ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate (Paris, 15/25 July 1603): “M. de Rosny declares everywhere that he was not only highly honoured in England but that he has secured the fullest satisfaction in his mission, having obtained more than he hoped for. These actual statements he repeated to me when I went to visit him” [deciphered], CSPVen X, 68.
44 After this grandiose performance and Sully’s dismissal, the next couple of days were spent in drawing up the treaty and making revisions. This was followed by his farewell audience, and by 26 June/6 July, Sully and his entourage were in Dover preparing to cross back to France. HMC Salisbury XV, 152.
Good-cop/bad-cop

James’s strategy, put to use time and time again, was essentially a multifaceted, early modern game of “good-cop/bad-cop,” and he played it to perfection. It was built on the foundation that we have seen above, in chapter three. By creating (or allowing the creation of) a factionalizing system of competing, multiple potential centers of power, and then using the debate on policy and the arrival of so many foreign agents at the English court to encourage this factionalization and tie it into the international arena, James had provided the environment within which he could then act in a way that played to his own political, personal, and intellectual strengths, and which afforded him a great deal of room for maneuver. This allowed him to be able to continue his pre-accession practice of telling all sides precisely what it was that they wanted to hear, and to keep getting away with it. The performance in front of Sully – as the culmination of a two-week process of subtly pushing him towards the king, and then drawing him in – is a quintessential example of James's strategy, emphasizing an opposition between the competing, factionalized interests of the court and council, and the “true” interests of the monarch himself. Cecil and his associates played the “bad cop” role, antagonizing and frustrating the ambassador at every opportunity, while James played the “good cop”, ready to receive Sully with open arms. This process was further encouraged by staggering the encounters, going back and forth between king and ministers every other day or so, which emphasized the difference between the two, pushing the ambassador more quickly and definitively towards James, where the king could put his well-practiced skills at personal monarchy to good use.45 And the final, public confrontation was most certainly staged: a

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45 There are various possibilities for the level of independent action within this approach in general. For example, the climactic performance in front of Sully may have been an entirely
conscious action by the king in order to finish the job of convincing Sully that he had been successful, and perhaps a reminder to anyone who was not in on it that James was, after all, still the one in charge.46

In this way, James was able to get the ambassador’s hopes up and send him away happy, without actually giving away anything beyond what he was already planning to do. As we shall see, despite initial Habsburg fears, the treaty with France would not prove to be an impediment to a subsequent peace with Spain. But by handling Sully in this way, James and his closest ministers ensured that the ambassador (himself one of the French king’s most powerful ministers) would end up feeling a sense of connection not just to whatever factional links he and

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46 The attendance of such key members of James’s councils, representing various different groups, points to it as definitely a conscious performance: planned ahead of time either by the king alone, or in concert with various of his ministers in at least one of these groups, or perhaps even as a spur-of-the-moment, virtuoso finishing touch by a politically savvy monarch. It is very interesting that the people James called in alongside Cecil were all either anti-Spanish, military men, or pro-French. If they were not in on it, he might have called them in there on purpose, “berating” Cecil in front of them as a ploy to neutralize them by keeping them thinking that things could still go their way, while simultaneously reminding Cecil who it was that remained in charge. Even if Cecil (and his close associate Nottingham) were in on it, this would still accomplish the former end. Whatever the case, it was, after all, always good to remind even one's closest advisors that they were neither wholly depended upon nor irreplaceable. Especially for a new king. It seems to me, however, that even if this was an impromptu performance by the king to do just that, it did also fit within the framework of what James had clearly already worked out with Cecil, Nottingham, and some others, and the king likely filled them in on it after Sully left the palace. This would explain James's command to Cecil to neither reply nor object (i.e. “just play along...”), and James’s grand but prompt dismissal of Sully immediately afterwards (before anyone had a chance to ask precisely what it was that was going on).
Beaumont were establishing at the English court, but also to the king himself. This encouraged the French to see James as their friend in England, or at the very least as a person capable of being influenced and therefore worth trying to cultivate. This in turn would lead them to play an active role at the English court, therefore working within the system and according to the rules that James preferred. But that was not all, for it also provided insurance for the future by sowing the seeds for later, believable claims about how James would like to help more but his hands were tied by the intractability and contentious nature of his varied, factionalized subjects.

As we have seen, Sully knew full well how James operated going into this, and the fact that he nevertheless played right into the king’s hands indicates that James’s powers of personal persuasion must have been very formidable indeed. But had Sully ever realized his mistake, he would have had no reason to be ashamed. After all, he was just one of many who would find themselves gradually drawn in by this very same behavior to play on James’s turf, to become relatively unwitting participants in a political system that the king had spent years becoming adept at manipulating, and which suited his needs and those of his kingdoms quite well, at least in the short run.

So not only was James capable of complementing his use of indirect methods by acting in a much more direct way, but doing so was in fact a crucial component to his political success as a monarch – both before and after his English accession, and simultaneously at home and abroad. Moreover, as with the indirect level, this was not always just a matter of personal action. In this

47 Indeed, even those who were to a certain extent predisposed to wanting the French to succeed were not convinced that Sully had achieved everything that he thought he had, even when it was told to them firsthand. Take, for example, the Venetian secretary’s response to what Sully told him upon leaving England: “M. de Rosny spoke very frankly to me; and endeavoured to make me believe that he has obtained all he can possibly desire, though he admits that he must consult his master.” Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 30 June/10 July 1603), CSPVen X, 63.
environment, even the perception of the king’s supposed weaknesses typically played to James’s best interests. From the very beginning, many of the ambassadors who dealt with him thought that, despite his high-sounding words, he was irresolute or easily swayed. The Dutch felt that they had made great strides with the king relatively easily, considering what they heard of his harsh words for their cause early on. We have seen what Sully had to say about his own supposed ability to bring James around in almost no time at all. And when the Spanish ambassador finally arrived one of his first reactions would be to remark that one of two things seemed to be the case: “either that this King is too fond of and resolved on a peace with Your Majesty, or that he is a man of little prudence”. But in each case, all of this just heightened the perception of possibility for everyone involved, and encouraged the belief that James was the key component, the “way in” – which was, of course, precisely how the king wanted to be perceived.

Enter the Spaniards

The key reason why Sully’s example is so important here is because it is illustrative not merely of how James behaved towards the French, but of how he and his court operated in relation to virtually everyone. So when we see the very same sorts of things being done to and being thought by the Spanish and Flemish representatives, we can understand that this was less a result of their own particular concerns and perceptions, and more about the nature of the environment and the specific actors at the English court. Indeed, before Sully had even taken ship back home, this entire approach was already beginning to be replayed with the opposing

48 “Digo que hago uno de dos discursos, o que este Rey este [sic] demasiadamente afficionado y resuelto a Paz con VM⁴, o que sea hombre de poca prudencia”, Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 27 September/7 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 184, f.1. Either of these possibilities would be beneficial for Spanish aims, and both would encourage them to see James as the “way in”.
side. At first, before the arrival of Villamediana, James spent more time using the indirect approach with the Habsburgs. Some of this, of course, had to do with Aremberg’s gout, which gave the king a plausible excuse while Sully was in town to show apparent personal favor to the French. James even took the opportunity to mock the former in the presence of the latter, explicitly in order to effect this: telling Sully in private that he thought much better of him than of Aremberg, “for I will surely make some difference between my good brother the King of France and his [Aremberg’s] masters, who have sent me an ambassador who can neither walk nor speak”. Until September, the Spanish ambassador’s own delay conspired to keep things operating largely at this indirect level, and the personal attention James continued to give the French and the various protestant envoys served to breed jealousy in Spanish and Flemish minds. But in the meantime, numerous key members of James’s court kept the Archduke’s ambassador closely informed of the key goings-on, and they repeatedly assured him of James’s continued interest in peace with Spain.  

Aremberg eventually began to get better, and on 10/20 July finally had his first audience with the king. But the subsequent revelation of the Bye and Main plots, and the fact that he

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49 Sully, Memoirs, II, 371. The comment about not being able to speak was in reference to Aremberg’s inability to speak English, and the difficulties that he encountered when faced with multiple interlocutors speaking to him simultaneously in several languages.

50 See the discussion in chapter three of the various visitors that Aremberg welcomed in his sickbed and who his agents met with during June and July. Once he was finally up and about, he followed the court out of London to Staines, near Windsor, by 28 June/8 July, in order to stay in touch. See especially his letters to Albert of 28 June/8 July and 29 June/9 July, Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 157-159.

51 Aremberg to Albert (London, 12/22 July 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 163. Laffleur de Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France I, 121. Jones & Munck, 244. The king said all the sorts of things Aremberg would want to hear, including expressing a mutual desire for peace and insisting that he had no plans to help the Dutch rebels clandestinely. Aremberg was also continuing to meet with a number of key ministers and people at court, such as the long discussion he had with Devonshire, Henry Howard, and Cecil on 29 July/8 August, in which they talked about peace and friendship with Spain and the Archdukes,
was in England essentially in an information-gathering, relationship-building, and delaying capacity until the Spanish ambassador arrived, ensured that little formal dialogue regarding peace would occur until the end of the summer. Then, once the long-awaited Villamediana finally made it across the channel, an incident at Oxford involving the sudden illness and death of one of his company raised plague suspicions and further postponed his initial audience for another several weeks. Consequently, it was late September before Villamediana’s first formal audience with James at Winchester, and a few days after that before the topic of peace could be pursued in any real earnest, at the Spanish ambassador’s first private meeting with the king.\footnote{First public audience: 25 September/5 October. Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L’ambassade de France} I, 131; Jones & Munck, 246; CSPVen X, 102; AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 184, 259. First private audience: 28 September/8 October. Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L’ambassade de France} I, 131-2; Winwood II, 7; Jones & Munck, 246; CSPVen X, 102-103; AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 252-254. For the details of Villamediana’s arrival in England and journey inland to the king, see chapter five, below.}

At this point, the English were ready to press the Habsburg representatives about their masters’ intentions regarding the future of the relationship. In meetings with both Aremberg and Villamediana, a number of the basic concerns in the event of a treaty were expressed, and the Spanish ambassador continued to insist on Philip III’s good faith and desire to treat.\footnote{Aremberg had gotten the ball rolling a bit, in another audience with James at the end of July, and in meetings with Cecil and various of the other councillors in late July and early August, in which general possibilities and desires were discussed. And he met with them once again in mid-September, when Villamediana had been forced by the events in Oxford to retreat to Southampton. CSPVen X, 97. But as Cecil remarked in a letter to Ralph Winwood on October 3/13, not much had happened regarding the treaty since the initial meetings back in August, since everyone had been waiting on the Spanish ambassador. Winwood II, 6-8.} James once again made it clear that he wanted peace, and actually appointed treaty commission
meet with them in Southampton to hash out these matters in detail. It quickly became apparent, however, that Aremberg and Villamediana did not yet have full powers to conclude a peace, so Aremberg was granted leave in mid-October to return to Flanders to retrieve such powers and, it was believed, to bring Richardot back with him. As Cecil described it in a letter to Sir James Elphinstone:

In this conference we found the ambassador willing to descend into many particulars for a treaty, but having found before that he had no particular commission for his master to treat with his Majesty, we showed unto him the inequality of the conditions between him and us, that whatsoever we should say would in a manner bind his Majesty, who purposely sent us, and whatsoever he should say was but by way of discourse, and might be avowed or disavowed by his master, and therefore till sufficient authority came out of Spain, we held it not fit to proceed any further, whereunto he descended, and promised to hasten the coming of it, and so with many other speeches tending to that which he formerly propounded to his Majesty we brake off. Yesterday the Count of Arenbergh took his leave to withdraw himself for a time to his princes till sufficient power to treat should come out of Spain.

So after all of this time, despite Villamediana’s final arrival after so many delays, the matter was put off yet again, and it looked as if it was still going to be quite a while before peace talks could finally get underway.
Continued factionalization

In the meantime, despite the obvious frustrations, the world kept on turning. With the arrival of Villamediana and his entourage, most of the great continental rivals were now ensconced at court: Florentines, Venetians, and Savoyards; Flemings and Dutch; Frenchmen and Spaniards, amongst various others. Competition, factionalization, and intrigue continued apace, as connections were made, money was thrown about, and international conflicts were becoming further intertwined with domestic rivalries, and being acted out in microcosm in the palace chambers and city streets of England.

These rivalries manifested themselves in countless ways, heightening tensions and encouraging further competition and factionalization still. Even the seemingly most minor of infractions were seen as great affronts, demanding retaliation in kind. For example, when Aremberg left for home to obtain the necessary powers to treat, he did so without paying a farewell visit to the Florentine ambassador, Montecuccoli. This caused a scandal, as it was seen by the Habsburgs’ rivals as a conscious snub agreed to in concert with Villamediana, precisely “because the minister of Florence belonged to the French faction.”

The division at court between the French and Spanish interests was of particular importance, it built quickly, and was helped along by repeated conflicts over precedence. Even though they had been at peace since 1598, France and Spain were still fierce rivals for power and influence throughout Europe, and this competition in the most prominent of neutral sites was an

Ambassador Taxis must bring similar powers, whereupon d’Aremberg replied that he imagined Taxis would only prepare the way for peace—after making suitable congratulations,—and that his Catholic Majesty would vest, if he had not already done so, full powers to conclude it in the person of the Archduke Albert.” Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Sunbury, 10/20 August 1603), CSPVen X, 83.

58 “[C]ar le ministre de Florence appartient à la faction française.” Beaumont to Villeroy (10/20 October 1603), Laffleur de Kermaingant, L’ambassade de France I, 134.
important symbolic and psychological manifestation of their rivalry. One side could never allow their opponents to appear to get the upper hand, or to receive some sort of precedent-setting favor. Before long, the competition at the English court got so intense that the two ambassadors could not be seen at the same court functions, for fear of encountering a situation in which one might be forced or tricked into giving precedence to the other. As a result, the respective ambassadors would often be invited to alternating events. For the more important, singular celebrations and ceremonies, there would be a great deal of consternation over who was invited, in what order, and where each would sit – with final acceptance for either side (if it came at all) determined only after a great deal of back-and-forth from all involved, with agents of the crown negotiating the details, and the king and queen themselves often playing significant roles as go-betweens and advocates.59

The escalation of this conflict over precedence only heightened the depth of factionalization at the Jacobean court even further. Eventually, there were even competing court masques, given by rival patrons, explicitly organized with different factions in mind. For instance, one on New Year’s Day, 1/11 January 1604, presented by the duke of Lennox (himself born and raised for the first nine years of his life in France, and a longtime proponent of the “auld alliance”), saw the French ambassador invited, at the direct behest not just of Lennox but

59 In fact, by the great feast of the Garter on St. George’s Day in April things had gotten so bad that no ambassadors whatsoever were invited to this major event. As Venice’s Molin explained: “The Ambassadors used to be invited, but owing to the question of precedence between France and Spain, his Majesty issued no invitation, he merely gave the Ambassadors a convenient place whence to view the ceremony, and afterwards caused dinner to be served to each of us in separate rooms.” Nevertheless, the Spanish and French ambassadors and their entourages still managed to encounter one another in the hallway that evening, causing something of a standoff and some tense moments. Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 1/11 May 1604), CSPVen X, 149.
also various “friends of France” on the privy council. This was followed almost immediately by a masque presented by Queen Anna (herself a catholic, related to the Habsburgs, and always sympathetic to Spanish interests), to which the Spanish ambassador was invited, much to the consternation of his French counterpart, who tried to do everything he could to get an invitation, but to no avail. Indeed, Beaumont’s objections regarding this issue reached the council table itself, with the king’s ministers proposing to James that they cancel Anna’s masque, in order to smooth over these differences. The king refused, saying that “the will of the Queen was her own”, and that she could have the masque “whenever she might like to”. And as with the scandal caused by Aremberg’s snub back in October, these competitions were not limited to the main antagonists, but continued to play out as well between proxies and allies, as can be seen by the similarly bitter battles over precedence at these and other events between the Savoyards and Florentines, allied with Spain and France, respectively.

60 Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 147-148.
61 “Relación de la Mascara, representada delante del Rey de Inglaterra por la Reyna en 18 de Enero 1604”, AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 149-150. This was originally scheduled for Epiphany (5/15 January), but James decided to move it to whatever day suited Villamediana best, after dealing with the French ambassador’s complaints. So the masque took place on Sunday, 8/18 January 1603. Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 147-148, f. 2v.
62 “Y aunque el Consejo propuso al Rey que por quitar Ynconvenientes y estas diferencias seria bien que no se hiziesse la mascarada de la Reyna, El Rey respondio que la Voluntad de la Reyna era la suya, y que pues ella la havia traydo tan adelante y gustava dello que la hiziesse, y se hallasse a la dicha mascarada quien ella quisisesse”, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 147-148, f. 2.
63 See, for example, “Lo que paso en el banquete que el Rey le hizo a los 5 de Enero y la competencia de precedencia entre los embaxadores de Saboya y Florencía.” Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 30 December 1603/9 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 145-146. This was, ironically, at the banquet that James had ultimately thrown on the original date set for the queen’s masque, before moving it in the aim to help defuse concerns over rivalry and precedence.
Of course, this too was exactly as James wanted it. In this environment, the king could once again string both sides along, encouraging competition and continued mutual antipathy, all while playing the role of the sympathetic confidant and friend to whom appeals could be made to try to get around these unfortunate difficulties.

**Widening the apparent king-council divide**

In this increasingly factionalized environment, the royal game of apparent conflict with his councilors continued. James and his closest ministers were going to do to the Spaniards precisely what they had done to the French, and they succeeded in convincing many observers both in London and abroad of Sully’s view that, in addition to the diverse competing factions at court, there was a second level of conflict mapped on top of the first: that between the king and the most prominent members of his council. As Anzolo Badoer, the Venetian ambassador in Paris, described it:

> The terms of the treaty with France were signed by the King of England’s own hand, and sent back to England when signed by the King of France. But all the same the French ministers are very suspicious of the Spanish, for it has been found out that they are corrupting English ministers with great sums of money. There are complaints against M. de Rosny [Sully] that he left the English ministers in the dark, and dealt with the King only; the result will be that, partly owing to Spanish gold, partly in anger at de Rosny’s neglect of them, they [the English ministers] will prove hostile to this [i.e. the French] Crown.64

This was not, however, a matter of identical perceptions across the board; rather, each group was led simultaneously to believe that the political landscape was oriented towards them. King James himself continued to actively encourage this belief with each ambassador – in each case lining himself up on their side, and casting his key ministers as fundamentally committed to their opponents. Take, for example, his response to Venetian claims about English piracy, in which

64 Anzolo Badoer, Venetian ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate (Paris, 22 September/2 October 1603), original in cipher, CSPVen X, 99.
every aspect of his reply tells us something important about his approach, and about the way in which the king was perceived by many. After hearing the complaints from the ambassadors,

The King replied in substance that none detested such actions more than he did; that while he was King of Scotland his subjects had never committed deeds like this; that he was of the same mind now, but he was still new to the Government of England, and compelled to employ the old ministers, and, therefore, was unable to attend to everything at once, the more so that he feared his naval officers were somewhat interested in the matter; he added, in great confidence, that he had been obliged to give the Lord Admiral something out of his own purse, as the Admiral complained that he was unable to keep up his office, owing to the failure of revenues of this very nature.  

This is precisely the same approach James had used with Sully, and it is a typical example of how he operated with virtually everyone. When speaking to foreign ambassadors and agents, James often emphasized the extent to which he found himself in a situation that he had inherited from the previous reign, or about which he had different opinions than much of his court, including his most powerful advisors and councilors. As with Sully, an important part of his approach was the way in which he would act as if he was taking the ambassador into his special confidence and imparting some sort of privileged information to him. This was at the very heart of his sympathetic routine.

Moreover, in this particular case here, even at this early stage, we also see him following up the “them vs. me” approach in regard to his ministers with what would become a frequent corollary of this point throughout the rest of his reign. That is, his claim that, as a result of this unfortunate opposition to his desires from so many of the English political elite, no matter how much he agreed with the ambassador or wanted to help his country’s interests, unfortunately his hands were tied. In this way, by portraying himself as the sympathetic figure to his ministers’

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65 Piero Duodo and Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassadors extraordinary and resident in England, to the Doge and Senate (Salisbury, 8 December 1603), CSPVen X, 118.
66 This was, interestingly, something that James’s most powerful advisor, Robert Cecil, did frequently to great effect, as well.
hard line, he not only drew foreign governments into believing that he was their greatest ally within England and the man with whom they needed to try to deal, he was consequently also able to keep expectations for his own actual actions and commitments remarkably low.\textsuperscript{67}

In addition, and in direct relation to this emphasis on the supposed conflict between himself and his ministers, James liked to actively encourage the belief in others that he often made his decisions entirely independent of advice from his council. He did this in a number of ways, perhaps most prominently through his private or even ostensibly “secret” audiences with ambassadors (both through what he told them in supposed “confidence”, and through everyone else’s knowledge that these “secret” meetings were occurring), and through related performances such as the climactic moment telling off Cecil and the others in front of Sully. As effective as this practice was with the French and the Venetians, before long it was working on the Spaniards too.

A particularly instructive and influential example of this was the way in which James dealt with the sentencing of the Bye and Main plotters in December 1603. The trials took place in mid-November, and the ministers of the crown handled the proceedings, with Sir Edward

\textsuperscript{67} James used this strategy with everything and everyone, for years, to good effect. For another example among many, see his private discussion with Villamediana in early January over the Savoyard-Florentine battle over precedence. After explaining the issue in detail, and explaining the Florentine ambassador’s instructions from the Grand Duke “not to allow precedence to anyone other than kings, the Archduke, or the Venetians”, James insisted that “if he were a judge” in the matter, he would say that Savoy deserved precedence over Florence, since “he knew that the Duke of Savoy had the blood of all the Christian Kings, and of these Kings [of Spain], and so he had shown in the Banquet that he held him in more esteem, since he had invited him first”. So again he claimed to confide how he really felt, and what he would do if he had the power, and then showcased his capacity for at least some small measure of independent action despite the nature of the situation. Original text: “[Y] que traya orden de su Amo de no se dexar preceder de otro que de Reyes, y del Señor Archiduke, o de Veneçia, pero que si el fuera Juez, bien sabia y conoçia a quien prededia, pues sabia que el Duque de Savoya tenia sangre de todos los Reyes Xpianos y destos Reyes, y assi que havia mostrado en el Combite que le estimava en mas, pues le havia combidado primero”. Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 30 December 1603/9 January 1604; received 1/11 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 145-146, f.3.
Coke managing the prosecution, and Cecil prominent among the commissioners to decide the men’s fate. In the end, everyone brought forward was found guilty of treason and sentenced to die. The king kept himself removed from all of this, and allowed the sentences of the most obviously guilty (and seemingly most rash and radical) conspirators to be carried out. The priests Watson and Clarke were executed on 29 November/9 December, and George Brooke, Cobham’s brother, followed on 6/16 December. It was only at this point that James stepped in. After remaining aloof and telling no one of his mind in these matters, the king issued a last-minute reprieve to the remaining men. Raleigh, Cobham, and Grey were committed to the Tower of London, and the others (including Copley and Markham) were sent into exile. In addition to the demonstration of his power as king, what is particularly key here is how the king kept everyone in the dark – even Robert Cecil, who in a letter to Ralph Winwood swore on his “credit and reputation” that James told literally no one about his decision until he authorized it.

In this case, as in so much else, James was willing to allow things to develop as they would, but was ready to use his power to step in at precisely the moment that he felt it was most useful. His treatment of the plotters is itself in keeping with much of his behavior throughout his reign. He let his ministers and later favorites do much of the heavy lifting and the dirty work, while he stayed aloof and clean, then came in as the sympathetic and reasonable figure at the end, demonstrating his power, benevolence, and apparent control of the system.

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68 Gardiner I, 139.
69 Warrant from the king, “written with his own hand, for stay of the execution of the late Lord Cobham, Lord Grey, and Sir Griffin Markham, at Winchester the 9th of December, 1603.” HMC Salisbury XV, 315.
70 The warrant was received at Winchester the next day, on 10/20 December. Cobham and Grey were only told about it on the scaffold itself, after having given their final confessions. HMC Salisbury XV, 319-322; Gardiner I, 139-140.
71 Cecil to Winwood (12/22 December 1603), Winwood II, 11.
The approach was effective. Cecil, despite his surprise at James’s actions, nevertheless told Winwood that he admired “the excellent Mixture of the King’s Mercy with Justice”. And the Spaniards were paying close attention as well, making a real point about the fact that James did all of this “without knowledge of his council”. This was a significant detail for them, as Villamediana explained in a letter to his own king, expressing his pleasure at such independent action, as he felt it boded very well for the achievement of Spanish aims in England:

And it has not caused me sorrow to have seen the King resolve things without his councilors, because I see more people in this Kingdom so interested in the benefits and proceeds of the War, of which their king has more need, and also some who are aficionados of and beholden to follow the opinions of the King of France and the Dutch, such that it is certain that if the King does not make use merely of his own will, the success [of peace] will be much in doubt.

Philip III agreed, saying in response that he was “relieved to see that that King has resolved such a serious situation without counsel.” Despite all the factional wrangling and apparent ministerial opposition, James nevertheless appeared to be on top of the heap, in a position of independence, able to play things in the direction that he wanted them to go when necessary.

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72 Cecil to Winwood (12/22 December 1603), Winwood II, 11.
73 “Copia de la orden que dio el Rey de Inglaterra sin sabiduría de su consejo, Para suspende la execucion de los Prisioneros condenados por la conspiración” (December 1603). AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 155. See also Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December 1603/8 January 1604; received 31 January/10 February 1604), f.1v, where he refers to this action as “magnánimo y Real” in coming to the conclusion “sin el consejo”.
74 “[Y] a mi no me ha pesado de aver visto al Rey resolver cosas sin consejeros, porque you beo a los mas deste Reyno tan Interesados en el beneficio y Ganançia de la Guerra y en que con ella les aya mas menester su Rey, y tambien a algunos affiçionados y obligados a seguir las opiniones del Rey de Françia y de Olandeses, que çierto si El Rey no dispone de la mera y propia voluntad suya, se puede dudar mucho del susçesso.” Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December 1603/8 January 1604; received 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 142, f.1v.
75 “Su Mª a holgado de ver que aquel Rey se aya resuelto en caso tan grave sin consejo”. King’s response reported on the endorsement page of the same letter: Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December 1603/8 January 1604; received 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 142, f.2v.
This was not only good for the king himself, it also made him an attractive target at which the Habsburgs could aim.

**James’s ideas and his support of peace**

Now that we have looked at methods and perceptions, we need to take a moment to examine motivations and aims. Behind all of this – the indirect and direct approaches, the factionalization of the court, and the creation of the perception of balance between royal-conciliar conflict and the king’s capacity for independent action – James’s own ideas about what constituted good foreign policy were what allowed for all of this to take place. Understanding them can give us a good sense of what the boundaries of the politically possible were early in the reign, allowing us to see the overall approach that animated most of James’s actions for years to come. So what were these ideas, and what were his general foreign policy goals?

As we have seen, several writers in the renewed debate over peace and war felt confident enough to address a number of these tracts, petitions, and arguments to the king himself. And given James’s pre-accession promises which led to hope in virtually all quarters, it was small wonder why. This was a moment of virtually unprecedented possibility in the minds of many throughout Europe, and London was, for a time, the destination of greatest diplomatic importance in the Christian world. From the beginning, people everywhere were desperate to know what James thought about peace, and about foreign policy in general.

In order to help oblige them, James’s book of advice for his son, the *Basilicon Doron*, was reprinted in London immediately after Elizabeth’s death, and it quickly became a bestseller. It was soon translated into several languages, and was pored over by exultant

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76 Sommerville, ed., *Political Writings of King James VI and I*; Jenny Wormald, "James VI and I, *Basilikon Doron* and the Trew Law of Free Monarchies: The Scottish Context and the English
subjects and anxious foreign ministers in the attempt to divine some indication of how the new
king actually felt, so that they might have some insight into how he could be expected to act.\textsuperscript{77}

After all, as James himself indicates in the newly composed prefatory remarks to the reader of
this edition, the book “must be taken of all men, for the trew image of my very minde, and forme
of the rule, which I have prescribed to my selfe and mine”.\textsuperscript{78} He even describes it as explicitly
containing “a discovery of that which may be looked for at my hand, and whereto even in my
secret thoughts, I have engaged my selfe for the time to come.”\textsuperscript{79} Nor was this the only insight
contemporaries were to have into the mind of England’s new king, as James’s treatise on the

\textsuperscript{77} For example, the Venetian secretary in England’s response to the book was quick yet
thorough, using it (amongst many things) to divine the new king’s stance on religious issues,
within three week’s of Elizabeth’s death: “his Majesty’s religion, which is not, as was said,
Calvinist, but Protestant, as may be gathered from a book published by his Majesty in the
English tongue, and sent to press here within an hour of the Queen’s death. In this book he drew
up regulations for the guidance of his eldest son Prince Henry, and incidentally warned him to
beware of the pround Biships of the Papacy, and calls the Puritans a very plague.” Giovanni
Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 14/24 April
1603). CSPVen X, 10. As noted above, the Spaniards would do the same: “Copia de la
confesion del Rey de Inglaterra”, (London, 8/18 June 1603), considered in Valladolid in a
\textit{consulta} of 12/22 July 1603, AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 223-225. The first mention the
Spaniards had of this work came from an “Aviso de Londres”, dated 5/15 April 1603, just eleven
days after Elizabeth’s death and James’s proclamation: “Aqui ha salido a luz un libro, hecho
(segun dizen) por el Rey de Escocia que es de Instrucçiones para su hijo como se comportar y
governar en el qual muestra claramente el gran zelo que tiene para continuar en su secta, sin
mostrar toda via maleçia contra alguna otra que la Puritana.” AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 45, f.1v.
Its appearance was also remarked on by the Venetian ambassadors there, who reported that: “In
London a book with detestable doctrines adverse to the Church of Rome has been published; ten
years ago it appeared in Scotland. Another book called ‘Basilicon,’ the work of the King
himself, is to be seen. It is addressed to his eldest son, and is written in English. It has been
translated into French by some who wished to publish it here. The English Ambassador vetoed
this until he had his master’s pleasure on the subject. The King replied that he was content that it
should appear, but without any additions. It is sure to appear, for the heretics desire to have it.”
Marin Cavalli and Anzolo Badoer, Venetian ambassadors in France, to the Doge and Senate

\textsuperscript{78} Sommerville, ed., \textit{Political Writings of King James VI and I}, 11.

\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 11-12.
divine right of kings, the *Trew Law of Free Monarchies*, was also published in London immediately after his accession.\(^{80}\)

Both works are, to a very large extent, consistent in broad terms with James’s ideas and actions as expressed in the political sphere, both before and after their publication. One thing that is clearly evident throughout the *Basilicon Doron* is James’s embrace of a wide range of intellectual and real-world influences, and his support for a *via media* in all things.\(^{81}\) He rails in both his preface and the body of the work against both extremes of the religious spectrum – a position that matches up well with his subsequent approach to theological and ecclesiastical matters as king. And his advice on foreign policy throughout tends significantly more towards peace than war. He argues that a king must get along with all princes, and must not supply “nor trust not other Princes rebels.”\(^{82}\) War, he says, should be a last resort, and he insists that a successful reign is directly connected to this: “For a good King (after a happie and famous reigne) dieth in peace, lamented by his subjects, and admired by his neighbours; and leaving a reverent renowne behind him in earth, obtaineth the Crowne of eternall felicitie in heaven.”\(^{83}\)

In the final chapter we will discuss the areas of possible disconnect between such fine-sounding

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\(^{81}\) It contains literally hundreds of references to both classical antiquity and Christian scripture, with real-world, positive examples from such divergent and ostensibly unlikely sources as catholic Spain and the Turkish Janissaries. It is about moderation and middle paths literally throughout, but for some particularly explicit references, see Sommerville, ed., *Political Writings of King James VI and I*, 43, 48, 52-53.

\(^{82}\) Ibid., 32. A good example of the difference between the public face James wanted people to see and the actual practice that he would undertake. This very concern would be explicitly stated in the articles of the peace treaty with Spain. And he would publicly pull all official support for the Dutch. But, as we shall see when we discuss the treaty results, he allowed for the continued support of the Dutch from England by “voluntary” and more clandestine, plausibly deniable means.

\(^{83}\) Ibid., 21.
words and the ins and outs of method and actual practice, but it is safe to say that, on a general level, this was precisely the sort of legacy that James aimed to achieve.\textsuperscript{84}

It is often easy for students of history to think in terms of the either/or: someone does either this, or they do that. And early Stuart England has been particularly notable for such thinking, given its own peculiar historiographical traditions. One was either a parliamentarian or a royalist. One supported either the ancient constitution, or divine right absolutism. The gentry was either rising, or it was falling. There was either a great deal of conflict in early Stuart England, or there was none. The same is usually assumed to have held true for Jacobean foreign policy: one either supported a pro-protestant foreign policy, or one desired a close alliance with Spain. The problem is, these sorts of binary assumptions simply do not work when they are applied to King James and his reign. James’s entire approach to governance – and indeed, one might say life in general – was about walking a nuanced and often apparently contradictory middle path, which was fundamentally antithetical to such epistemological and ideational extremes. This can be seen with his upbringing, an amalgam of the seemingly irreconcilable

\textsuperscript{84} A recent writer has quite rightly pointed to how the king’s attitudes on specific points changed and adapted over time: Smuts, "The Making of Rex Pacificus: James VI and I and the Problem of Peace in an Age of Religious War." But this fact itself is not actually at odds with what we see in James’s published works. On the contrary, it merely underlines what James claims in both of these pieces about the reciprocal relationship between sovereign and subject, of a king’s need to observe the needs of his people and to try to provide for them, and of the importance of adapting oneself to the times and to changing circumstances. See, for example, Sommerville, ed., Political Writings of King James VI and I, 21. It should be remembered that these works constituted a very public face that James deliberately put forward in order to sell himself. But in this case, the cultivation of this image did not contradict the king’s general beliefs on the subject. He did support a policy of peace, and of trying to walk a middle path between various extremes – be they domestic, foreign, religious, or anything. Perhaps only the supposed purity of his methods explained in a piece meant for public consumption diverged from the king’s true beliefs – as James was much more of a flexible student of Machiavelli, Botero, and Bodin than he was a straightforwardly righteous Renaissance monarch. And yet, selling oneself publicly as the latter, and even denouncing the methods of the former, was precisely the sort of approach of which Machiavelli himself would have approved.
legacies of Mary Queen of Scots and George Buchanan. This can be seen in his religious beliefs, writings, and policies, which firmly opposed both ends of the spectrum while simultaneously embracing a great deal from each. This can be seen in his political thought, which was not merely about divine-right monarchy, but rather about the reciprocal duties that such a monarch owed his subjects. This can even be seen in his own sexuality, as a man who fathered a large family and who clearly doted on his wife, but who also enjoyed the company of attractive young men and has had whole books written about the nature of these relationships. For James it was almost never about the either/or, and almost always about both and neither.

What we have seen of his methods matched up directly with this as well, for in order to bring this to pass, James had to create and navigate a very complex environment, which was itself perfectly illustrative of his orientation toward both and neither. This required his combination of allowing conflict and competition to grow, while simultaneously encouraging the belief in his own capacity for independent action. It was a difficult task to demonstrate such independence and control while still maintaining the ability to claim when necessary that his subjects’ opposition had tied his hands. After all, one did not want to appear to be totally in control of everything (and thus fully responsible, with no possible excuse for inaction). But neither did one want to seem virtually powerless or unable to direct events (and thus become unnecessary to cultivate and in danger of being ignored). It was a relatively thin line to walk, but James seems to have been quite effective at walking it. The perception that he faced significant opposition from his council and his most powerful courtiers continued all through the year, on through the peace negotiations, and as we shall see in some important respects, carried right on.

through until the very end of his reign. But so too did the belief that James was willing and able to act in his own right if so moved, and that he could be the most effective means of mitigating the opposition of court and/or country, and of making the seemingly impossible at least somewhat conceivable. In this way, this combination of conflict and resolution, of opposition and independent action, helped James to maintain a very useful sort of freedom that would allow him to continue to be “all things to all men” long after his accession to the English throne, which of course had been the objective for which he had adopted his approach in the first place.  

At peace with all men

The way in which James then used his freedom within this perception of him is what made all of this work, and this translated directly to the actual achievement of the peace. From the moment of his accession, despite presiding over the creation of a factionalized system at court, and his effective playing of all sides, James nevertheless remained the most consistent voice for peace anywhere. The examples of this are quite literally endless, and we have already seen some of the first indications of this at the end of chapter two, above. They would keep on coming. But even this support for peace was directly in keeping with James’s approach to both and neither. After all, his immediate declarations upon coming to the throne were not about moving towards an exclusively Spanish alliance. Rather, he had declared his desire to be at peace with all men.  

86 As these events were watched closely by many, his approach here would come to form the backbone of his entire approach to both domestic politics and foreign policy throughout the reign. One need only look as far as James’s subsequent approach to the enforcement of the laws against catholic recusants, in response to Spanish appeals, to see the way in which this would operate in the coming years.  

87 For the king’s initial such declarations, see chapter two, above.
the beginning. Take, for example, Sir Thomas Lake’s view while getting to know the king in Edinburgh just over a week after the accession:

For the matter of the Low Countries, he said he had already, upon divers motions made on the behalf of the States that he would not abandon them, willed them to send Commissioners to meet him at London. I have showed him how much it imports him to hold them in good terms, to make sure to himself the benefit of their contracts with the Queen, and to keep them from the practices of Frances [sic]. He seems to be minded so to do, and yet withal gives, as I perceive by his own speech, good words to one that is here from the Archduke. And I find he will be loath to give the first blow between Spain and him.  

Here we have one of the first things that an important English official said about his new king, and it was to emphasize James’s desire to keep up his pre-accession practice of telling all sides what they wanted to hear.

The same approach continued after his journey south. Just before the arrival of the French and Flemish entourages, the Venetian agent in London was writing back home that “the King of England beyond a doubt is, at present, desirous for peace with everybody”. And despite what then appeared to happen with Sully, or what might have been thought about English policy in general, James’s own actions confirmed this. On 23 June/3 July, the king issued his proclamation that any Spanish ships taken as prizes after 24 April/4 May must be returned or reimbursed. This was just two days after James’s big performance with Cecil in front of Sully had convinced the ambassador that the king was wholly on France’s side. And just ten days

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88 Lake to Cecil (Edinburgh, 4/14 April 1603), HMC Salisbury XV, 30.
89 Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 2/12 June 1603), CSPVen X, 49.
90 James I. Royal proclamation given at Greenwich, 23 June/3 July 1603 (“Imprinted at London by Robert Barker, Printer to the Kings most excellent Majestie”). Begins: “Although we have made it known by publike Edict, That at our entrance into these our Kingdomes of England and Ireland, we stood, as still wee doe, in good amitie and friendship with all the Princes of Christendome”.
91 Scaramelli, at least, seems to have been paying attention, and seems to have known what would happen with Sully even before it played out, writing back to his superiors that James
after that, Aremberg wrote to Albert, telling him that James had declared to the privy council that he wanted to sign peace with the Archdukes, but that the majority of the Council was against it.92 Even through the aftermath of the Bye and the Main, James remained steadfast, with Aremberg reporting on 29 July/8 August that he had had another audience with James, and that the king again proclaimed his friendship to the Archdukes.93

Frustration over the possibility of peace in Spain certainly grew as the summer went on, and opposition in England had been made even worse by Villamediana’s delays, followed by his lack of powers to treat when he finally did arrive. But through all of this, James himself remained resolute with regard to the issue of peace, and this would gradually begin to make everyone realize that, as difficult as things might seem, the king was not going to change his mind.94 As usual, the Venetian secretary seemed to understand what was going on all along, and summed up the situation quite well:

the French are doing all they can to foster the belief that they hold the mind of his Majesty, they say that if England has peace with Spain she will also have an alliance with France. The fact remains that the King has said with his own lips and announced it to the Ambassadors from Flanders, that he desires a perpetual peace with the Spanish, and the

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92 Aremberg to Albert (3/13 July 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 160.
93 Aremberg to Albert (Staines, 29 July/8 August 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 169-170.
94 The lords of the privy council acknowledged as much in their 10/20 August letter to the English ambassador to the Dutch States’ General, Ralph Winwood, telling him that James was making peace because as king of Scotland he had never been at war with anyone, but that they would do nothing that would harm the Dutch. Lords of the Privy Council to Ralph Winwood (10/20 August 1603), Winwood II, 1-2. And Cecil backed this up with another letter a couple of days later: Cecil to Winwood (12/22 August 1603), Winwood II, 2-4.
same with the Archduke, if a means can be found whereby the States can remain separate from Spain.\footnote{Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Sunbury, 3/13 August 1603), original all in cipher, CSPVen X, 81-82.}

James clearly wanted peace with everyone; having an alliance with France alongside a peace with Spain fit perfectly with James’s plans, and was not evidence of some sort of “hold” over the king’s mind. Interestingly, however, the very act of repeatedly making this particular case would gradually convince France’s enemies that they were, in fact, the ones that had a special connection with the British king.

Spanish perceptions of the king’s personal support for peace only grew with Villamediana’s arrival, as James began to put his direct influence to work on the Habsburg side of the equation. One of the first pieces of information the ambassador sent home from England was quite clear about all of this, emphasizing that “[t]here is no question with regard to the Inclination of the King, having at his coming into this Kingdom professed that he was in friendship with all the world, with Resolution of persisting in this, [and going] as far as to speak to the detriment of the Dutch at his table and everywhere calling them rebels.”\footnote{“No ay question en lo que toca a la Inclinaçion del Rey aviendo a su Venida en este Reyno profesado que estava en amistad con todo el mundo con Resolucióon de persistir en ella hasta hablar en perjuyzio de los Olandeses a su mesa y en todas partes llamándoles Rebeldes.” “Advertimientos de un pensionario del Rey nuestro señor que no dixo su nombre.” Enclosed with dispatch from Villamediana to Philip III (Oxford, 4/14 September 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 841, docs 141, 143.} While Villamediana was waiting out a temporary household quarantine in Winchester, James was meeting with Aremberg, reportedly telling him “that in past times the Scottish were French in sympathy, the English Burgundian, but now both were united under him in a general desire for peace with Spain, and that he did not wish to endanger the trade of both.”\footnote{Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Oxford, 18/28 September 1603), CSPVenitian X, 97.}
Villamediana’s own meetings with the king and his ministers, as well as advice from confidants and informants that he was sending back home, continued to back all of this up, discussing in detail not only the fact of the king’s support for peace, but offering all sorts of reasons why. As Aremberg returned home to collect his powers to treat, as the Bye and Main conspirators went to trial, and as fall turned to winter, the king remained steadfast, continuing to speak frequently of his support for peace, and keeping up his longstanding practice of claiming to be everyone’s friend. By mid-December, the new Venetian ambassadors to England were “lay[ing] stress on the King’s declaration that peace with Spain is considered as concluded here”, “that the King of France was his oldest and dearest friend”, and “that his desire was to live at peace with everyone.” The simultaneous development of James’s continued emphasis of his support for peace, alongside his encouragement of the belief that he was at odds with his ministers, as well as his demonstration of a capacity for independent action, was all gradually coming together to have the desired effect on Spain.

**Not just the king**

All of this was further magnified by Spanish and Flemish perceptions of the feelings and possible role of someone else as well – for James was not the only royal that the Habsburgs were trying hard to cultivate. Queen Anna received a great deal of attention from them from the start, and continued to be a focal point of efforts to develop Spanish interests up through the peace and well beyond. Her catholicism was a key consideration here, of course, as the Infanta Isabel had

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98 See, for example: “Avisos dados al Conde de Villamediana por Un Confidente”, enclosed with dispatch of 28 September/7 October 1603, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 188; and “Razones porque dizan ser Inclinado el Rey a la Paz”, enclosed with dispatch of 2/12 October 1603, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 256.

been quick to celebrate at the time of James’s accession.\textsuperscript{100} Although little progress had apparently been made over the subsequent months, it was still hoped that she might be able to influence her husband both in achieving the peace and in religious matters, possibly even securing his conversion, or at the very least having one or several of their children raised to adulthood fully as a catholic. And these were not far-fetched concerns. After all, Anna had converted at James’s court several years after marrying him, James himself had been dropping all kinds of hints over the past several years in his attempt to secure the English succession, and he continued to say intriguing, seemingly non-hardcore protestant things about the need for a general council, the reunion of Christendom, and the possibility of some place in all of this for the spiritual or ecclesiastical superiority of the pope.\textsuperscript{101} Moreover, Princess Elizabeth had indeed been raised and educated by the catholic Lord Livingstone up to this point, and while Prince Henry had long been under the care of the protestant earl of Mar, James had in previous years nevertheless discussed sending the prince to Spain to be raised, as prelude to a royal marriage alliance with the House of Habsburg.\textsuperscript{102}

So one of the first things that Villamediana did upon his arrival in Spain was to appeal to the queen, to try to gauge her intentions and capabilities, and to gradually ingratiate himself with her. Just over a week after his formal first audience with the royal couple on 25 September/5

\textsuperscript{100} See chapter two, above.

\textsuperscript{101} For more on the importance and nature of Queen Anna’s catholicism, see especially: Loomie, "King James I's Catholic Consort." Barroll, Anna of Denmark. Queen of England: A Cultural Biography, 162-72. Whatever the conclusions drawn about the nature of her beliefs and the complexities of this particular queen, what is clear for our purposes here is that she certainly appeared to be a catholic, the Spaniards and all the other ambassadors perceived her to be one, she surrounded herself with catholics at court, she wanted a catholic match for both Henry and Elizabeth (and ultimately Charles), and she continued to favor a policy of friendship with the house of Austria until the very end of her life.

\textsuperscript{102} For more on this, and on Jacobean marriage diplomacy in general, see chapter ten, below.
October,\textsuperscript{103} the ambassador sent the queen a letter, by way of a confidant, in which he stressed the friendship of “His Majesty the Catholic King”, pointedly mentioned the continued and future greatness of her son the prince, and declared his own desire to be “a good go-between” in all things.\textsuperscript{104} The queen responded warmly to this, appeared to get the obvious hints, and Villamediana was able to secure an audience two days later in which they were able to speak more at length.\textsuperscript{105} Although it was a public audience, with a number of the privy councilors present in the hall, the ambassador and his kinsman-interpreter managed to get close enough to the queen so that they might speak “in a low voice in a manner that no one might be able to hear”.\textsuperscript{106} Villamediana came right out and stressed just how important Anglo-Spanish peace would be, and hoped that she might “take her husband’s hand in order that he might neither admit nor give hearing to those with evil intentions and whose particular ends [were to] desire to block the peace.”\textsuperscript{107} Anna responded enthusiastically, assuring him that everything would work out just fine, it was just the French who were trying to cause trouble, and that they would not get

\textsuperscript{103} Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L’ambassade de France} I, 131; Jones & Munck, 246; CSPVen X, 102; AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 184, 259.

\textsuperscript{104} “La M	extdegree{} del Rey Catholico mi señor...yo vengo de valer para ser buen medianero en esto.” Labeled: “Copia de la Carta que Don Juan de Tassis escrivio a la Reyna de Inglaterra a 14 de Ottubre y su respuesta.” Enclosed with his dispatch to Philip III sent by express courier on 13/23 October 1603. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 183, f.1.

\textsuperscript{105} “Copia de la carta”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc, 183, ff.1v-2.

\textsuperscript{106} “[Y] auque fue la audiençia publica y delante de todos los del Consejo de Estado, con todo esso con voz baxa de manera nadie lo pudiesse oyr le dixe lo que basto a enterarme de lo que deseava, y no tan solamente yo pero Juan Bautista de Tassis que me hera lengua en Françes y de cuya mano fue escrita la carta.” Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 12/22 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 181, ff.1v-2.

\textsuperscript{107} “[T]uviese la mano con su marido para que no admitiesse ni disiese oydos a los que con mala Intençion y sus fines particulares desseava estorbar la Paz.” From his report on the audience, “Lo que dixe a la Reyna de Inglaterra en la audiençia que con ella tube a los 16 de Ottubre de 1603,” enclosed with his express courier dispatch of 12/22 October 1603. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 182, f.1v.
their way. Villamediana nevertheless pressed the issue, once again making the point that the war and the king of Spain’s enmity “had been with Queen Elizabeth,” while the Habsburgs had always been friends with James. He stressed the importance of the bad example that would be set in the eyes of “God and their vassals” by continuing to support the Dutch rebels, to which the queen responded that “she saw this very well.” And he insisted on just how much more she and her husband would be able to trust in the friendship of the king of Spain than that of France, to which she also said she readily believed.

As was the case with James, this was the beginning of a relationship that the Spaniards thought would prove very beneficial for them. They quickly came to see Queen Anna as one of their most important friends in England, who might be able both to influence her husband and also play a significant role in her own right in encouraging an even closer friendship with Spain. In Villamediana’s judgment, the queen was someone with “good zeal” for their desired ends, she had personal valor but was also able to practice “dissimulation” when necessary, and she was very much inclined towards friendship with Philip and the “House of Austria”, and towards enmity with the French. Their hopes went beyond the general and long-term, and readily embraced the immediate business at hand, as Villamediana felt that much could be done “through ladies and wives of those that walk with the Queen in the court”, and in the process

108 AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 182, f.2.
109 “Dixele que la enemistad de VM avia sido con la Reyna Ysabel, y justa y siempre la amistad con El Rey su marido, y quan malo hera favoreçer Rebeldes de otros Reyes y quan mal Exemplo para con dios y sus vassallo, dixome que ella lo beya muy bien. Apuntele tambien quanto mas podia fiar en todos cuentos de la amistad de VM que de la de Françia, a que tambien respondio que assi lo creya.” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 182, f.2.
they might even be able to influence “some of the grandes of the court and even the five appointed commissioners” for the peace.\textsuperscript{110}

This approach towards the queen, as well as the Spanish belief in her possible usefulness and important support for the achievement of peace, continued and grew over the course of the subsequent months. Gifts and compliments started heading her direction immediately, and as lists of possible Spanish pensioners were being drawn up, those in positions of influence around the queen would ultimately find themselves to be highly coveted (and as it would turn out, quite willing) targets.\textsuperscript{111} In the meantime, the perception of the queen’s importance had caused virtually all of the representatives of foreign powers to start paying particular court to her, so much so that James soon became suspicious.\textsuperscript{112} The Spaniards were especially concerned about the efforts of the French and Florentines in this regard, and so Villamediana would continue to keep close tabs on their dealings with her, and on her responses to their gifts and advances. It became clear relatively quickly that they had little reason to fear from these quarters, but they still had to be careful. James was beginning to complain that “he did not want his wife to meddle in matters of state or ambassadors,” and so Villamediana made it clear that he and his confidants would need to make sure that they exercised “more tact and caution” in their dealings with the

\textsuperscript{110} “Digo mas a VM\textsuperscript{d} que lo que de la Reyna puedo juzgar es que tiene buen zelo a las cosas, valor de Persona, disimulaçion, amistad interna con VM\textsuperscript{d} y cassa de Austria quanto enemistad con la de França y françeses, y que quando no pueda absolutamente en todo, que podra en parte con su marido, y mas se me va tras luçiendo que por damas y mugeres de las que andan con la Reyna en la Corte se pueden hazer offiçios con ella y con algunos de los grandes de la Corte y aun de los Cinco tratadores nombrados.” Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 12/22 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 181, f.2.

\textsuperscript{111} We will discuss these developments in later chapters, alongside a closer analysis of the specific methods in all of this, and the continued attempts to forge an even closer relationship between the two countries, in which Anna would play (and already was playing) no small part.

\textsuperscript{112} “Pienso que han dado alguna sospecha al Rey de que los embaxadores acudian a ella con negociaciones”, Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 29 October/8 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 152, f.1.
queen from here on out. But their efforts continued, the queen showed herself time and time again to be steadfast in support of the peace and further friendship with the Habsburgs, and the Spaniards’ perception of this would play an important role in what happened next.

**Location, location, location**

In the meantime, Aremberg was not the only one in need of powers to treat. And as we have seen, questions had been raised in both Flanders and Spain about Villamediana’s fitness to handle negotiations of such magnitude. Consequently, on 21 September/1 October 1603, Philip III named Juan Fernández de Velasco – 5th duke of Frias and Constable of Castile, one of the most powerful and experienced men at court, and an influential voice on the council of state – as extraordinary ambassador to negotiate a peace with England. He was to go first to Flanders,

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113 “Y el Rey pienso que se ha dexado dezir aunque familiarmente que no queria que su muger se metiese en cossas destado ni embaxadores, y assi es fuerça yr con ella con mas tiento y recato”, Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 29 October/8 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 152, f.1.

114 One of the better examples of this support can be found in the masque that she put on for the king on 8/18 January 1604 – the second of the two competing masques mentioned above, and the one about which the French ambassador complained so vociferously. It centered on a “temple dedicated to Peace”, featured twelve of the most influential ladies at court representing various goddesses dancing in support of the benefits of peace, and was directed principally by Juno and Pallas Athena, played respectively by the Countess of Suffolk (the Habsburgs’ most powerful ally at court) and the queen herself. “Relación de la Macara, representada delante del Rey de Ynglaterra por la Reyna en 18 de Enero 1604.” AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 149-150.

115 BL, Cotton MSS, Vespasian xiii, ff.2-6. “Décret de Philippe III donnant pleins pouvoirs au connétable de Castille pour traiter de la paix avec l’Angleterre” (Valladolid, 21 September/1 October 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne I, 178. A medieval creation, the title of Condestable de Castilla originally belonged to the second-most powerful person in the entire kingdom, who was the commander of the kingdom’s military forces. While it had been made a hereditary title over a century before the events described here, the Constable nevertheless remained a rank of real significance and honor. And this particular Constable was one of the most experienced and influential members of Philip III’s council of state. He had been a longtime Viceroy in Milan, general of the Spanish armies against France in Burgundy, was the current President of the council of Italy, and was one of the wealthiest grandes with numerous allies and clients at court. By choosing him for this mission, Philip was not only sending a powerful and very competent statesman to handle this business, he was sending a
from where he would correspond with Villamediana in order to prepare the way, then reach agreement on a location for the peace conference, with the hopes of ultimately leading the negotiations that would attempt to secure a treaty.

The Constable set out from Valladolid three weeks later, on 21/31 October, in the company of the new ambassador to the French court, Don Baltasar de Zúñiga, and with a large entourage both of servants and many other men of quality, as befitted their station.\textsuperscript{116} They reached Paris by 4/14 December, and after the appropriate presentations and audiences with Henri IV,\textsuperscript{117} the Constable pushed on, arriving in Brussels on 20/30 December.\textsuperscript{118} In Flanders, his arrival brought real encouragement, with Archduke Albert writing in a letter to Lerma about the state of “English matters, which with the arrival of the Constable I hope will be concluded presently and very well.”\textsuperscript{119}

message to the English and everyone who was watching about the importance and seriousness with which he considered the issue, and the high regard in which he held the English king. James clearly got this message, as Villamediana explained why he would, in detail, in January 1604: Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.5v.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[116] Relaci{ónica} de la Jornada del Excelentissimo Condestable de Castilla, a las pazes entre España y Inglaterra, que se concluyeron y juraron en Londres por el mes de Agosto. Año 1604 (Valencia, 1604), f.2v. Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L’ambassade de France} I, 156. Zúñiga was one of the top diplomatic talents and political minds of his generation. He had been Spanish ambassador to Brussels from 1599 until 1603, would remain in Paris from 1603 to 1608, would then move to the emperor’s court in Vienna from 1608 to 1617, before returning to Spain for good. In 1617-18, he would be instrumental in the maneuvers to bring about the fall of Lerma, and then would proceed to dominate Spanish foreign policy over the final years of Philip III, while establishing his nephew, the Conde-Duque de Olivares, as the new king Philip IV’s all-powerful favorite.
\item[117] Laffleur de Kermaingant, \textit{L’ambassade de France} I, 156. Constable to Philip III (Poyssi, 9/19 December 1603), received on 23 December 1603/2 January 1604, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 143.
\item[118] Isabel to Lerma (25 December 1603/4 January 1604), Isabel 97.
\item[119] “[L]as cosas de Inglaterra, que con la llegada del condestable espero se concluirán presento y muy bien.” Albert to Lerma (26 December 1603/5 January 1604), \textit{CODOIN} v.42, 468.
\end{footnotes}
One of the first things that the Constable did upon reaching Brussels was to contact
Villamediana, in order to advise him of his safe arrival, “with all the powers and funds necessary
for the Peace”. He instructed the ambassador to inform James and his ministers of this, after
which, it would be time to
deal with the conference and its location, which appears more appropriate in these states
than in England for the decorum of His Majesty, and that in a Neutral country for the
sake of precedence, and then for the first there is a very fresh example as I wrote in my
aforementioned last letter of 12 December, His Majesty [Philip III] and that King [James
I] being the principal interested parties in the peace, would be able to hold the Archduke
(although also participating in it) in a certain manner as a Neutral; your lordship must be
very firm about this.

After this, the Constable settled down to await a response, while trying to decide between
crossing over to England or establishing himself in Antwerp. In the meantime, in an audience
of 10/20 January 1604, Villamediana informed James “of the Constable’s coming to Flanders
with the powers” to treat, and discussed a number of specific issues regarding logistics and
specifics about the upcoming talks, ranging from major issues such as bringing the Dutch in to
the negotiations, down through such minor concerns as the form of address and proper titles for
James listed on the powers to treat. Once again, James insisted on his support of peace,
calling the future agreement really a

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120 “No he querido aguardar mas las cartas de VS sino avisalle luego mi llegada con salud, y
todos los poderes y recaudos neçessarios para la Paz”, Constable to Villamediana (Brussels, 24
December 1603/3 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 135, f.1.
121 “[Y] tras esto se podra tratar de la conferencia y lugar della, el qual, parece mas aproposito en
estos estados que en Inglaterra por el décor de Su M[3], y que en Pays neutral por las preçedencias,
y pues para lo primero ay exemplo bien fresco como escrivi en la dicha mi ultima carta de 12 de
Deciembre, y siendo Su M[4] y ese Rey los prinçipales interesados en la Paz, pueden tener al
Señor Archiduque (aunque concurre en Ella) en cierta manera por Neutral, deve VS estar muy
firme en esto. Constable to Villamediana (Brussels, 24 December 1603/3 January 1604), AGS
Estado, leg. 842, doc 135, f.1v.
122 Isabel to Lerma (11/21 January 1604), Isabel 99.
123 Regarding the Dutch (and the view of James’s role in general): “Sobre que el les seria buen
medianero con sus Prinçipes y viendolos presistir en su obstinacion que a El no se le daría nada
confirmation of friendship…more than a treaty of peace, since it was not being made with his person nor with his kingdom of Scotland – which had always [been at peace] with the happy memory of the King our lord who is in heaven [Philip II] and with Your Majesty – but rather for the war that has been had with this kingdom [of England].

Consequently, he said he would like to have this matter resolved with two things: “clarity” and “celerity”, in order to get this important business done right, and “to give no more place to those that do not like this Peace and that were going about sowing discord in these talks [that were already] off to such a good start.” In order to effect this, Villamediana then took the opportunity to suggest that the peace conference might take place in Flanders. He offered precedents from previous times, but rested the bulk of his reasoning on the fact that the Constable had come so very far, and that he was tired and in poor health as a result, and would need some significant time in the Low Countries to recover before he could even think of crossing over to England. After expressing his desire to see this matter resolved sooner rather
than later, James responded to this request by doing what he had done with Sully, with Aremberg, and immediately upon Villamediana’s arrival back in the early fall: by following up his own positive words in an audience by sending in a handful of his most important councilors to take the hard line, and thus allow his oppositional strategy to continue.

So on 13/23 January 1604, the Lord Admiral, Northumberland, Devonshire, Henry Howard, and Robert Cecil all went to Richmond to meet with Villamediana to discuss his proposal. They expressed gratitude that Philip had sent so great a personage as the Constable to treat for peace, but they were quick to suggest that his illness might be seen by others as a diplomatic excuse to keep from having the talks in England. Villamediana claimed that it was not such a difficult situation, and that Flanders was much closer to England than it was to Spain, and that the Constable had already come so far. But the English ministers insisted on the importance of having their king nearby. For while the Constable had full powers to treat in his own right, without need to confer with his far-distant monarch, James was only issuing limited powers to his ministers, as he expected to be consulted on everything and to remain involved in directing events.

Throughout the meeting, Villamediana tried to respond to each of their concerns, insisted that Flanders could be seen as a neutral site, and said he was sure that they could handle the issues of precedence that would undoubtedly arise. But after three hours of intense debate, they had to adjourn, having gotten nowhere. Despite all of Villamediana’s

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127 Levinus Munck also mentioned this meeting, though he seems to have missed Devonshire’s participation: “The Lord Admyrall, Lord Northumberland, Lord Henry Howard, and Lord Cecyll, went to Richmond to conferr with the Spanish Ambassador about his proposition for treating in the Low Countries, in respect of the Constable of Castile, his Infirmary.” Jones & Munck, 250. This is, interestingly, the second iteration of what would ultimately be three groups of five councilors appointed to negotiate the peace. Four of them were constant (the Lord Admiral, Devonshire, Henry Howard, and Robert Cecil), while the fifth spot passed from Mar to Northumberland and finally to Lord Treasurer Dorset.

128 Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.8v.
arguments, both in this meeting and afterwards, James and his ministers would remain insistent that the peace negotiations take place in England. Consequently, upon hearing the news, the Constable wrote back to Spain, asking for further instructions, while giving his opinion on how best to proceed in this matter.

**Something’s got to give**

At this point, it was clear that something would have to give, and this is where everything that we have seen concerning the development of the English political environment really began to make its mark. This is where the simultaneous strands of the various perceived aspects of the English court came together – for these processes were all linked. The encouragement of the belief in conflict between king and council, as well as James’s frequent emphasis on his own independent action, were both repeatedly put to use in direct support of peace. This had gradually developed over the course of the past year, as each of the three perceptions played out alongside one another. While the Habsburgs were coming to believe that King James was frequently lined up in direct opposition to the wishes of his ministers, they were at the same time listening to his repeated declarations of his desire to be at peace with all men. And as had been the case with Sully, the perception of ministerial opposition and James’s apparent support for their cause had often been uttered explicitly in the same breath. The correspondence to and from Spain and Flanders is absolutely filled with examples of this, and we have already seen some of

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129 In Villamediana’s words: “la parte donde ha de ser la conferencia y trato de la paz en que muestran intento firme de que sea en Inglaterra.” Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.12v. In reporting these events, Villamediana had once again cautioned Philip about the continued importance of the king and queen, and how they had to be careful not to push James and Anna away: Ibid., f.4v.
this above. When Villamediana eventually arrived, another one of the first avisos he sent home from one of his confidants/agents claimed – amongst various other observations about the state of the country and the possibility of peace – that the king has said to Cecil, and even in the very council itself, that he did not want to hear so many political reasons, that he wanted to be a good man and try out peace with Spain and see if it will be firm, secure, and good, and that if they deceive him then he will be justly a cruel enemy to them.

In Villamediana’s own dispatches back home – after being in England for a couple of months, having a number of audiences and long discussions with the king and many others, and paying close attention to the political scene at court – he was reporting confidently that “this King desires [peace] more every day”, but that the Lord Admiral was totally against it, and that Cecil was trying to block it for his own benefit. These sentiments and this face-off between the king on the one hand and these and other particular ministers on the other over the very issue of peace shows up time and time again all the way through to the completion of the process. Even the very ministers that James picked to discuss the location of the talks admitted as much and played right along, pointing out in their 13/23 January meeting that, as Villamediana knew full well,

130 See especially Aremberg’s first audiences back in July, with the perception that James was for peace but the majority of the council was against it. Similar examples are repeated everywhere.

131 “Que el Rey oviese dicho a Siçil y aun en el consejo mismo que no queria oyr tantas razones politicas que el quiere ser hombre de bien y provar la paz con España y ver si sera firme segura y buena y que si le Engañaren entonces les sera Justamente Cruel enemigo.” From “Avisos dados al Conde de Villamediana por Un Confidente.” Deciphered copy. Also labeled: “Avisos de Persona Confidente para Embar a su Mº.” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 188, f.1. Enclosed with Villamediana’s dispatch to Philip III (Southampton, 27 September/7 October 1603; received 16/26 October 1603, “por la noche”), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 184.

132 “[L]o va desseando este Rey mas cada dia”, Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 24 October/3 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 153bis, f.1. See also Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 5/15 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 151, f.1v, where he says that “ha me dado que sospechar que ya empiece por aqui El Varon Siçil a dificultar la paz.”

133 For just a couple of examples, see Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 5/15 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 150, f.2; Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 6/16 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 149, f.1v; Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, f.2
James and his queen were the parties “best intentioned toward the peace” in England, and that having the councilors away from their side might not be all that beneficial a move for those in support of peace.\footnote{“[N]o dexando de darme a entender lo que yo me savia que El y la Reyna fuesen los mejor intencionados a la paz”, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.8.}

And in case there might have been any confusion over the issue, James himself made sure to drive the point home repeatedly in explicit terms. For example, in another private meeting [“hablando con este Rey a solas”] with the Spanish ambassador not long after Villamediana’s enthusiastic relation of the king’s independent initiative regarding the fate of the Bye and Main plotters, James went out of his way to tie his capacity for independent action directly to the operation of foreign policy, and specifically to the achievement of the peace. When Villamediana expressed his concerns that the machinations of the various enemies of Spain would hinder [“estorvar”] England’s ability to make peace with Spain, James responded that he need not worry, as “that which in this had been deliberated was [done so] by himself alone and without the vote of anyone on the council, because in matters of state many times he neither asked nor took counsel from anyone.”\footnote{“[A] lo qual me respondió el Rey que lo que en esto avia deliberado era de si solo y sin el voto de nayde del consejo, porque en la materias destado muchas vezes no pedía ni tomava consejo de nayde.” Separate letter of the same date. Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December 1603/8 January 1604; received 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 143, f.1.} And James kept driving the point home, telling the Savoyard ambassador in late January that he [James] was the only one at the English court who supported peace, and that everyone else was against it.\footnote{Isabel to Lerma (31 January/10 February 1604), Isabel 101.}

To be sure, there was the occasional apparent thawing of the ice amongst the councilors, with Cecil and various of his associates temporarily opening up, or appearing to be more...
amenable to the possibility of a peace – allegedly either as a result of the lure of money, or as the periodic admission of this as an uphill battle against the will of the king. But this never lasted long, and conventional wisdom – Habsburg and otherwise – still had James lined up firmly against his most powerful ministers on matters of foreign policy right up to the opening of the formal talks and beyond. One aviso de Londres described the general sentiment perfectly:

Although it appears very likely that they will come to treat for peace, because the King greatly desires it, and the state of the kingdom needs it, nevertheless (according to what I have been able to gather, communicating about this with various people) there will be some that will lay an ambush when it comes time to treat in order to make use of the occasion and resort to their old tricks by means of the difficulties that will arise when entering into particulars, and [they will do] this with the intention of prolonging or breaking off the treaty entirely.

As a result, as late as March 1604, the Fugger newsletters were claiming that “the English Council inclines to war rather than to peace,” and because of this “peace is still very doubtful.”

James as the way in

It was into this environment that the main Spanish push for peace came, and it was in consideration of all of this that the Constable made his arguments to Philip III about what he

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137 See, for example: “Avisos dados al Conde de Villamediana por Un Confidente”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 188, f.1; Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 28 November/8 December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 139, f.1. A detailed reading of Cecil’s correspondence to others at this time (such as Winwood), as well as an understanding of his later behavior, after the peace treaty, shows that these moments of brief thaw were very likely illustrative of how Cecil and his associates actually felt about these matters to a large extent. Even the most consummate actors break character from time to time.

138 “Aunque hay gran aparenta que se vendra a tractar sobre la paz, porque el Rey la desea mucho, y el estado del Reyno la ha menester, todavia (segun que he podido colegir, comunicando sobrello con diversos) havra algunos que estaran de emboscada al tiempo de tractar para valerse de la occasion y hazer de las suyas por medio de las dificultades que se presentaran entrando en particularidades, y esso con intento de algargar o romper del todo el tractado.”


thought they should do next. In a letter of 31 January/10 February, he explained that James was trying very hard to have the conference in England. In this situation, the Constable counseled caution, warning that by going there to treat, it would “appear that we were showing too much desire to agree,” and this would lead to a “damage of reputation.” Moreover, he was concerned about the very real possibility that such efforts would also ultimately prove to be unsuccessful, and that this would have dire consequences:

It is likewise true that in my passing over to that Kingdom to a negotiation of very doubtful success, as a result of the difficulties that it brings with it, and the very unstable position of the king, and the evil offices of our rivals, we will run a great risk of returning in failure, forced to start all over from the beginning [bolverse con la caña al puesto].

The Habsburgs clearly still did not have a rosy view of the political situation in England, or of their prospects within it, which is precisely why the Constable had been urging the use of a neutral site all along. The factionalization, ministerial opposition, and the close intertwining of all of this with the complex and conflict-riddled international system had made England seem like a very dangerous place indeed.

But this letter also shows us the beginnings of what would become the solution, and this too was directly connected to the development of the Jacobean political system that we have been paying such close attention to thus far. As any good advisor would, the Constable

140 “Haze gran fuerça aquel Rey…en que sea la conferencia en Inglaterra”, Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, f.1.
141 “En ir parece que se muesetra demasiada gana de acordarnos, y que se entra con alguna quiebra de reputación”, Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, f.1v.
142 “Así mismo es cierto que en pasar yo a aquel Reyno a negociacion de suceso muy dudoso, por las dificultades que ella trae consigo, y la condicion poca estable del Rey, y los malos oficios de nuestros emulos, se corre gran riesgo de bolverse con la caña al puesto.” The final phrase is an idiom from the time, now no longer in use, which referred to the losing side in a juego de cañas having to return in shame to their posts with their cañas in hand to start all over again. Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, f.1v.
considered the matter from as many angles as possible, and consequently suggested that, despite all of these risks, it might not be such a bad idea after all to hold the negotiations in England, for one very important reason: he suggested that “there could be greater hope of leaving with that which is desired [by] conducting the negotiations close to the King and Queen, rather than far from them, since up until now they may be judged to be the most inclined towards the peace”. 143 They could then deal much more effectively with “their ministers who hated it [the peace]”, as well as with Spain’s enemies. 144 In this way, the entire post-accession process – with James’s creation of a factionalized system at court based around multiple competing centers of power, combined with his own continued insistence that he wanted peace with all men, alongside the simultaneous encouragement of the belief that he and his key ministers were at odds over this, and his demonstrations that he was willing to overrule them and act independently if necessary – all contributed to create the circumstances that would ultimately allow the peace to come to pass, and to do so on English terms, and on English soil.

But this was not all. In order to bridge these opposing perspectives, and to maximize the benefits while minimizing the risk, the Archduke Albert suggested that “the deputies meet in England, where the King is,” but that the Constable should “remain in Gravelines [on the

143 “Considero tambien que se puede tener mejor esperanza de salir con lo que se desea tratandose el negocio cerca de el Rey y la Reyna que lejos de ellos, por ser a lo que hasta agora puede juzgarse los que mas inclinan a la paz,” Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, f.2. It should be noted that this language is nearly identical to that used by the English ministers in acknowledging this fact in their meeting with Villamediana 18 days before.
144 “[S]us ministros que la aborrecen, y a nuestros enemigos”, Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, ff.2-2v.
Flemish coast], from where [he] might advise them about that which was necessary,” and where they could keep him informed with up-to-date accounts of the negotiations every day.145

As the Constable was awaiting a reply to his suggestions with a firm indication of how to proceed, Villamediana’s continued talks with the English king showed James to be dead set in his resolve that the peace negotiations take place in England.146 At the same time, the ambassador’s meetings with the king’s ministers had indicated a real threat of deal-breaking differences of opinion coming to the fore on some of the issues, most notably that of English trade with the Indies.147 As a result, the Constable wrote once again to Philip, explaining these troubles, and coming to an even more decided opinion about the options in front of them:

I fear that they will be firm in this [the resolution to hold the talks in England], and in such case the counsel for Your Majesty is reduced to one of two options. The one is for me to cross over to England, risking a return without accomplishing anything [and] with little reputación. The other would be that the meetings take place there and I remain at the seaside [in Flanders] with the excuse of poor health, from where I might examine the proposals, deciding on them according to the intention of Your Majesty and the talks.148

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145 This is from the letter’s postscript: “Escrito lo que va aqui, me apuntó el Señor Archiduque desean de mucho que se concluya presto la paz, y hallando en mi ida a Inglaterra sin orden de VMd. las dificultades que he dicho, si seria bien que se juntasen en Inglaterra, donde está el Rey los diputados, y que yo me quedase en Gravelingas, de donde les advirtiese lo que fuese menester y me fuesen dado me la quenta cada dia”, Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, f.5v.
146 The Constable wrote of how Villamediana described “quan puesto esta aquel Rey en que la conferencia sea en su tierra excluyendo (con achaque de no apartar de si a Sicil y al Almirante) el medio de venir a lugar neutral”, Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 13/23 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 74, f.2.
147 For a detailed discussion of these issues, the pre-peace talk back-and-forth over them, and the way in which they were (or were not) resolved, see chapters five and six, below.
148 “[T]emo que estaran firmes eneso, y en tal caso se reduze la deliberação a VMd. a uno de dos partidos. El Uno es pasar yo a Inglaterra en que se aventura volver sin hazer nada con poca reputação. El otro seria que la Junta se hiziese alla y yo me quedase a la marina con escusa de poca salud donde se me fuesen consultando las propuestas y yo resolviendo segun la Intención de VMd. y la conferencia.” Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 13/23 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 74, ff.2-2v.
The Spaniards were getting frustrated by English intransigence, with Villamediana complaining bitterly about how “This King and Kingdom and the Council are exceedingly vain, and so much that they think and they give themselves to understand that [the choice between] Peace or the universal discord of the world will be in their hand and power”. But the English would not be budged, and they were making some good points, especially with explicit reference to the failure of the peace negotiations at Boulogne in 1600 – on neutral ground – entirely over issues of precedence. In order to prepare for any contingency, the Constable was still pushing for a neutral site, and had been busy drawing up plans for such a site that would help mitigate somewhat those previous issues of precedence. This included constructing a building with “different entrances” for each side, in the center of which would sit “a round table without a head”. Nevertheless, at this point the picture had become quite clear, and the Spanish ambassadors’ correspondence over the next couple of months was filled with repeated references to the importance of King James’s and Queen Anna’s influence and opinions, as they remained convinced that “these Monarchs are the most well affected towards peace”, and any apparent changes for the better amongst their prominent ministers were nothing more than for appearances’ sake, “to flatter their masters”.

149 “Este Rey y Reyno y el Consejo estan vanissimos y tanto que piensan y se dan a entender que está en su mano y potencia La Paz o la discordia Universal del mundo”, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 18/28 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 73, f.3.
150 Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 18/28 February 1604; received 28 March/7 April), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 73, f.3v.
151 He kept these in reserve for quite a while, as a copy of them was enclosed in Villamediana’s dispatch to Philip III of 7/17 April: AGS Estado, leg. 842, Doc 109.
152 “[P]ienso que se pudiera remediar por la traza que El Condestable da de la cassa o Barraca en la Ray o Junto a Gravelingas que se pueda llamar pays neutral que con hazelle entradas diferentes y una mesa rredonda y sin caveçera”, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 18/28 February 1604; received 28 March/7 April), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 73, f.3v.
153 “[P]orque como tengo scrito a VEx. estos Reyes son los mas bien afetos a la paz y si algunos ministros se han buelto a dezir que la deseean que al principio no lo hazia ninguno, ha sido por
But James was also beginning to get impatient over this new round of Spanish delays, so the Constable decided in mid-March to start heading towards the coast, and told Villamediana to inform the king that he was coming. James was very excited about the news, saying in response that the main reason he wanted the talks to take place in England was indeed so that he could take a close hand in the business to ensure that the negotiations were successful. He said that he did not want “a Peace of one year, but rather [one that would be] very firm and last many centuries”. To this end, he said explicitly that another main reason he wanted to be nearby during the negotiations was so that if any of his deputies did not go along with his desire for such a strong and lasting peace, he would be there to remove them and replace them with those who were willing to toe the line.

So the Constable moved gradually towards the sea, and things looked like they were finally underway. Only one hitch remained: the Constable’s decision to stay on the Flemish side of the channel during the negotiations, in order to prevent the possibility of a significant loss of reputación in case the peace talks were to fall apart. Villamediana had prepared the way for this with James and his ministers, by mentioning the Constable’s poor health from early on in the discussions about the location of the talks. So when he pulled up on 6/16 April in Bergues, a
town just outside of Dunkirk, allegedly suffering from a particularly serious attack of gout, it created disappointment in England but did not come as too much of a surprise. Villamediana understood the reasoning, but was worried about his own ability to handle the negotiations. To remedy this, the Constable declared that he would be sending his right-hand man, Senator Allesandro Rovida, a longtime counselor from his time as Viceroy of Milan, on ahead with the Archdukes’ deputies in order to handle the negotiations alongside Villamediana, to bolster James’s resolve, and to work against the designs of their enemies. So the place was set, the Habsburg deputies were ready to go, and the Constable was resolved to handle things from afar, with no intention of crossing over to England himself until the end, when it was finally time to “sign the treaty articles” themselves.

**Conclusion**

By the summer of 1603, prospects for peace had not looked good. But this was a necessary step; things had to get much worse in order for them to actually be able to get better in the end. Through the creation of multiple competing centers of power, the encouragement of factionalization, the connection of this to the already divided international system, the development of the perception that key ministers and the king were at odds, the king’s

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159 Villamediana to Constable (London, 12/22 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 94, f.1.  
161 He wrote of the need to “edificar bien con este motive el animo del Rey y quitalle las sospechas y reçelos que nuestros enemigos le ponian”, and he was effusive in his praise for Rovida. Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 18/28 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 98, f.1. He had, in fact, prepared for this well in advance, asking that Rovida be sent along to him back in January, in anticipation of such a possibility, and as much out of opposition and concern about their supposedly allied Flemish deputies as about their English counterparts. Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 10/20 January 1604), AGS Estado, let 842, doc 137.  
162 “[F]irmar las capitulaciones”. In the meantime, word had come from the king in Valladolid supporting the Constable’s decision to have the talks in England but to remain behind himself. Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604), AGS Estado 842, doc 95, 1.
demonstration of his ability to act independently, and his maintenance of constant support for peace throughout, James was able to establish the sort of environment at court that he was familiar with, that played to his own particular needs and talents, and which he could turn to his (and his kingdom’s) advantage, at least in the short to medium term. Through the combination of direct royal interactions, visits by prominent ministers and noblemen, and repeated public pronouncements, James was able to portray himself consistently as the greatest friend to peace in England. And he did this while simultaneously helping make the English court look like a highly factionalized and labyrinthine place. Through his constant and skillful portrayal of himself as the sympathetic ear in contrast to his hardline ministers, James managed to convince all parties involved that he was the indispensable figure: the way in, above and often opposed to the machinations and personal interests of his factionalized court and council. This was so successful that he even managed to get the two great continental rivals – France and Spain – both to believe this at precisely the same time. That is, the French thought that James was in their camp, and that Cecil, the Lord Admiral, and other key ministers were on Spain’s side, working against the interests of the king and the English people; while the Spanish thought that James was in their camp, and that Cecil and his associates were working with the French and the Dutch, against the interests of the king, and at least to a certain extent, against the desires of the English people.

These events over the course of this first year of James’s English reign did more than just secure the new king’s position as an independent actor in both the domestic and international arenas. This approach was also crucial in overcoming a number of remaining obstacles, when success in each case would have been hard to foresee had the king acted other than how he did. In the first place, it kept the Habsburgs at the table, helping keep prospects for peace and a
balanced outcome alive through the numerous delays and logistical difficulties that a complex arrangement involving so many different perspectives and problematic variables would necessarily require. James’s approach also allowed him to seek peace without offending Spain’s enemies, or chasing them into actual opposition. It would be one thing if the new king were to simply switch sides – but this was a much more delicate situation than that. In order for England to be at peace with all the world, the French and the Dutch needed to be kept reasonably happy, but not at the price of chasing away the Spanish and the Flemish.

The pattern of events and actions over this first year of the reign also worked to gradually bring Habsburg expectations down to earth. If peace was going to work, and be secured on terms acceptable and even favorable to England, Spain’s high hopes at the accession would need to be scaled back to a much more reasonable level. But again, this had to happen without actually driving them away from the table and giving up on peace entirely. They also had to be encouraged, despite their disappointments, to play within the new English system, to become enmeshed in the tangled web of the newly factionalized Jacobean court, where the king and his ministers could better control events, and consequently overcome the kingdom’s relative weakness as an international power, in comparison with Spain and France.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the success of the eventual negotiations, James’s carefully cultivated public reputation as a committed friend of peace – beset by opposition from his most powerful ministers, who were supposedly in league with the Habsburgs’ international enemies – is what finally convinced the Spaniards that having the peace talks in London would be a good idea. Having the negotiations take place on English soil meant that the hosts would have a distinct advantage, but it also meant that the Spanish would be treated as honored guests, which in one stroke would remove the conflict over precedence that
had derailed the talks in 1600 before they had even gotten underway. Consequently, what has traditionally been seen as an indifferent or weak diplomatic approach by a lazy or incompetent monarch, turns out upon closer examination of the Spanish sources to have been a consistent, crucial, and successful strategy, capped off by a clearly intentional political masterstroke.

The pope had been right to encourage Philip to cultivate James. The “segundo camino” was going to have to go through him, and without James peace simply would not have happened. Despite being a new king, not altogether secure on his throne, and facing unreasonably high expectations from all quarters (albeit in large part expectations of the king’s own making), James managed in that first year to turn the supposed weakness of his position into a strength, by embracing the endemic conflict in both England and Europe, and by using them both to his advantage. And as we shall see, how this occurred was more than merely illustrative of how the new king of England operated. The achievement of peace was itself a fundamental component in the process of establishing the structure of not just Anglo-Spanish relations, but also Jacobean government itself – in both foreign policy and domestic politics.
Chapter Five: First encounters & finding fault lines

“Heer ar such tottering braynes in this contry that it is a thynge impossible to fynd out any certayntye or constancy ether in ther judgments or Speeches. A fewe dayes since the general opinion was that the peace and amity betwixt England and Spayne went on a galphope. Nowe upon the Constables retorne to Antwerp the Spaniards will have it that it is better considred of howe smale dignity it is for ther king to send such persons into England to seek and importune the peace and that Don Juan de Tassis hath passed his commission in goinge soe farr therin and is lyke to have but smale thanks for his labor, having had only order from hence to propound and speake therof a farr of and that nowe they beleve that ther wilbe noe peace.”

– Thomas Wilson, English spy at the Spanish court

So far we have looked at the Anglo-Spanish relationship primarily through a political lens. We have seen what the necessary conditions were that allowed for peace to become a realistic opportunity, and we have begun to see how that opportunity was seized, by whom, and to what ends. We have also seen that this was going to be far from a simple, straightforward endeavor; things were going to have to get worse before they could get better, and the very steps taken to help bring the peace to pass would also help underline and emphasize the cracks and continuing difficulties present in the system. But the achievement of a peace treaty, no matter how difficult the process or momentous the outcome, is itself only one part of the tale. And it is a tale told against the backdrop of whole societies who possessed at least some sense of having a real stake in the ultimate outcome. So before we can understand the dynamics of how the peace itself was finally constructed, we need to examine the first “legitimate” encounters after the Jacobean accession through the lens of public perception.

As the treaty would set the rules, and the negotiations would set the political tone, the first contacts and embassies would help define the ways in which the people of the two nations would interact culturally and commercially. This was about much more than just the creation of

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1 Van Castre to de Veras [Thomas Wilson to Robert, Lord Cecil] (Valladolid, 6/16 May 1604), SP 94/10, f.13.
a treaty. As a result of the tumultuous events of the past few decades, the entire nature of the discourse of contact had to be renegotiated. By taking a closer look at how Spaniards and Englishmen saw each other in these crucial initial moments, we can come to some understanding of how it is that this relationship would actually work and develop in the years to come. We can see the basis for constructive interaction, as well as potential difficulties. This was very much in keeping with what we have seen over the course of the previous two chapters. As with the elite level of high politics – and to a significant extent because of it – initial positive responses quickly gave way to frustrations, frustrations that would only be alleviated to some degree with the eventual conclusion of a treaty, and in many cases only partially or in a temporary sense.

Consequently, how these frustrations manifested themselves, and over what particular issues, would tell us where it was that many of the future fault lines would lie. So how did the people in each country react to this newly defined environment, and what does this tell us about the future?

From the moment that James was proclaimed king of England, the Anglo-Spanish connection began to be seen from both sides in a newly positive light. This was at least as true on the level of the common people as it was in the ranks of the elite, and it would remain generally so at least in these early years of the new king’s reign. The English people were in a peaceful mood, rejoicing that the monarchical transition had been a smooth and bloodless one. As Thomas, Lord Burghley wrote to his younger brother Sir Robert Cecil in late March 1603: “I dare assure you the contentment of the people is unspeakable, seeing all things proceed so quietly, whereas they expected in the interim their houses should have been spoiled and sacked.”

The French ambassador to England, the comte de Beaumont, marveled at how smoothly the accession took place. Despite all the fears of unrest, he described how everyone

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2 HMC Salisbury XV, 11.
continued on calmly, keeping “each to his own craft and his own affaires.”

Indeed, wrote another correspondent: “I do verily believe that no more peaceable quietness came into this land by the conjunction of York and Lancaster than at this present”. Largely as a result of such initial sentiments, James’s accession would always be associated with peace in the minds of his subjects, and for many, the same attitude translated directly to foreign affairs.

This concurrence was also noticed immediately by ambassador Beaumont. Upon hearing the celebratory cannon from the Tower’s batteries and seeing the joyful bonfires throughout London in the days following the queen’s death, he was quick to fear that this jubilation and unity at James’s accession would hurt French interests. After all, James would not have as much need of Henri IV’s assistance and friendship as he would have had things not gone so smoothly in England. And Beaumont noted how these events, this “unexpected prosperity”, would also make it easier for the new king to make peace with Spain, a condition to which he was “more inclined than to war.” Indeed, as we have seen, the eventual progress towards the negotiation of a treaty would be largely a result of King James’s immediate physical existence and his own frequent personal intervention, and this would continue right on through until the agreement was signed. However, as much as James would be responsible for the eventual outcome, he would never have been able to do it entirely on his own. Despite a strong war lobby amongst a number

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4 HMC Salisbury XV, 22.
5 See chapters two and three for more on the direct connection in the minds of the people between James’s accession and the likelihood of peace with Spain.
6 In Beaumont’s words: “Je crains que cette liesse ‘ne se tourne en insollence pour nostre regard, ayant esté plustost à souhaiter, pour le bien de la France, que les choses ne se feussent pas passées avec tant d’union et de douceur, à fin que le roy d’Escosse eust eu plus besoing de Sa Majesté et que, pendant qu’il se feust trouvé empesché à appaiser son royaume, il n’eust peu si facilement faire la paix avec le roy d’Espaigne, au lieu qu’il est a presumer, que ceste prosperité inesperée l’en rendra plus desireux, selon son humeur, que l’on dict y estre plus encline qu’à la guerre.’” Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L’ambassade de France* I, 80.
of the kingdom’s great men, there was nevertheless significant support for peace within England at Elizabeth’s death, extending well beyond the nobility and influential men at court, and was especially evident within the population at large.

**Initial Iberian Contacts**

There had been some notable public desire for peace since at least as far back as the late nineties, and this had certainly been reciprocated in both Spain and Flanders.\(^7\) The war had been a difficult one for many, and when combined with a number of poor harvests and particularly virulent outbreaks of the plague in each country, the past several years had taken their toll. By the spring of 1603, one place where the desire for peace was particularly strong was within the English merchant community, which was chomping at the bit to be able to break back into the Iberian markets from which they had been largely barred during the last years of the war, and which harbored hopes that legitimate trade might even be opened up with the Spanish colonies in the Americas. The thriving English community in Andalucía had been decimated by the coming of war in the 1580s, and while some remained, they were but a small, catholic rump of what had once been a large and diverse group.\(^8\) Even during the course of the war, Anglo-Spanish commerce was so desirable (and to a certain extent necessary), that quite a bit of illicit trade continued despite the conflict.\(^9\) This was not, however, anywhere close to the level that would

\(^7\) Goodman, "Diplomatic Relations", 30-31, 37. For specifics of the abortive negotiations from that time, see chapter two, above. For the manuscript and pamphlet debate begun in 1598 and carrying through to 1603-04, see chapter three.


\(^9\) Croft, "Trading with the Enemy 1585-1604."
satisfy demand, and it really only served as a reminder of how much more might be done.\textsuperscript{10} In any event, by the time the old queen died, a number of the English merchants were poised on the Franco-Spanish border, in towns such as Bayonne and St. Jean de Luz, where they could have better access to Spanish goods, and from where they would be ready to move, on the chance that the wartime embargo might at some point be lifted.

These English merchants were also well-placed to comment on initial Spanish perceptions, often uttering them in the same breath as their own desire for peace. Take, for example, Richard Cocks, an English merchant in Bayonne, France, and also a regular correspondent with and intelligencer for Thomas Wilson, Cecil’s assistant and leading spy. In mid-April 1603, before news had even arrived of the queen’s death, Cocks wrote to Wilson, complaining about the commercial difficulties caused by the war, and exclaiming plainly that, “I would to God ther might som good meanes be found to make peace betwixt England and Spaine, for out of doubt it is as much (or rather more) desyred of them as of us.”\textsuperscript{11}

Most Spaniards were, in fact, at least as desirous of peace as their erstwhile enemies. The war had been a hard one for everyone on the peninsula, particularly in the coastal areas, and the embargo and general wartime hindrance of trade had Iberian merchants clamoring for a return to normalcy.\textsuperscript{12} So when the two countries’ quick establishment of an effective truce upon news of Elizabeth’s death – as we have seen, in explicit terms from both sides as a direct result of that death – it was a real ray of hope for many in each country, and it made a mutually beneficial relationship begin to seem like an actual possibility.

\textsuperscript{10} Loomie, "Religion and Elizabethan Commerce with Spain," 47. For the absolute interdependence of the two countries’ trades, and the overwhelming importance to them of the achievement of peace in 1604, see: Croft, "Trading with the Enemy 1585-1604," 283, 97.  
\textsuperscript{11} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.11. Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 14/24 April 1603).  
\textsuperscript{12} Loomie, "Religion and Elizabethan Commerce with Spain," 47. Loomie looks especially at merchants in Lisbon and Andalucía.
As the second chapter has shown, the Habsburg leaders in both Brussels and Valladolid were quick to seize the diplomatic and political moment when Elizabeth died. The same thing happened with regard to commerce. At the direction of his king, secretary Andrés de Prada issued a letter to regional governors and local magistrates on 11/21 May 1603 ordering that all Britons in Spain, whatever their religion, were now to be treated well. The previous order allowing trade only with “catholic English and Irish” (“los catolicos ynglesees e yrlandeses”) was to be changed to include all subjects of King James:

The King of Scotland having succeeded to the Kingdom of England, and having always been a friend, and on the understanding that he wants to preserve this friendship, His Majesty has ordered that no distinction of “Catholics” be made, and has written that the Kingdoms of England and Ireland be considered under the name of neutrals, as are Scotland and Denmark. And without exception English and Irish will be admitted like the others.

English and Irish protestants were now to be admitted to the Spanish trade, as long as they obeyed the laws of the land. In the process, a sort of “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was hereby established with regard to religion, where they were not to be asked “if they are Catholics or heretics”, as long as they avoided committing any public heretical acts.

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13 As with the political and diplomatic initiatives, the Archduke Albert had taken a leading role here as well, writing to Philip to convince him to make this change as soon as he heard of Elizabeth’s death and James’s proclamation in England. AGS Estado, leg. 622, doc 33, f.1, Albert to Philip III (Brussels, 5/15 April 1603).

14 “Después por haber sucedido el Rey de Escocia en el Reyno de Ynglaterra y aber sido siempre amigo y entenderse que quiere conservar la amistad a mandado Su Magd que no se haga distincion de Catolicos y escrito que debaxo del nombre y neutrals se comprendan los Reynos de Ynglaterra e Yrlanda asico se comprendian los de escocia y dinamarka. Y que sin exception sean admitidos los Yngleses e Yrlandeses como los demas.” TNA: PRO SP 94/9, ff. 20, 21. Andrés de Prada to the Corregidor of San Sebastian (11/21 May 1603). Two copies, second forwarded to “Tomas Honiman marchant a Londres”, f.20v.

15 The exact text reads: “Presupuesto que los unos y los otros en el tiempo que estuvieren en tierras de su magistad han de bivir conforme a las leyes destos Reynos sin piderlos quenta si son Catolicos o herexes. Pero sin publicos cometieren delito de erregia hand de ser catigados como los mismos naturales.” Ibid.
Understandably, after so many years at war, the English greeted this development with some initial skepticism. Richard Cocks, in a letter of 6/16 May, described how some Dunkirkers met two English barks at sea “but let them goe free by reason of the proclamation sett out by the Archducke that in payne of death they shall not meddell with any Englishmen. But for my parte I can’t beleev it to be trew untill I see fether profe.”16

The English were soon to get their proof. In the meantime, Edmund Palmer wrote from St. Jean de Luz, reporting that “dyvers Spaniards out of St. Sabastians as other townes on thes frontiers ar gone to a Cyttie called Vyttoria” to meet the newly appointed Spanish ambassador to England, as he traveled northward.17 There was also news that another nobleman of greater rank would be following him soon, and that “dyvers other greate men woold go if the King would permyte theme”.18 Another Palmer near the Franco-Spanish border, this time William, wrote a few days later that:

Wee doe now dayly expect the coming of a Spanish Embassador that is passed this way to goe for England, whose name is Don Juan de Tassis, coreo maior despania, y camerero del Rey: who departed from the Courte of Spayne the 17th of this present moneth, soe that wee doe suppose that he wilbe heare to morrow. The Spaniards doe greatly rejoyce at the good lickhood [likelihood] thear is of peace, they which giveth noe great content unto the French.19

Not only were the people of Spain clearly excited about the prospects for peace, but the existence of many who wanted to make the journey to England shows the extent to which there was also real curiosity about their supposedly hated foe.

Their apparent goodwill would soon be put to the test. On 20/30 May, a Basque man-of-war came into San Sebastian, bringing with it two prizes, one Dutch and one English. The once-

16 TNA: PRO SP 94/9 , f. 19. Richard Cocks to ____ (Bayonne, 6/16 May 1603).
17 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 23. Edmund Palmer to Sir Robert Cecil (St. Jean de Luz, 12/22 May 1603).
18 Ibid.
skeptical Richard Cocks himself tells us that the local authorities declared the Dutch ship a valid prize, “but the Corigedor would not permyt them to make prise of the Englishman”, deciding “in the Englishmans favour sayinge that the proclamation is made in Spaine that all English Shippinge that hath byn taken after the 24th of March shalbe rendred with marchandis and all thing else taken in them.” Spanish officials were not only publishing the king’s proclamation, they were enforcing it.

This opened the door to trade, and as English merchants began to make their way back into Spain, they were welcomed with open arms. Making good on his desire to see these things with his own eyes, Richard Cocks was one of them:

> The other day I was at Sabastians [San Sebastian] with dyvers other English marchants, wheare we had such extraordinery entertanment that I could not have belyved it would have byn soe except I had made triall. For in passing along every villadg towne the people would cry out heare are Englishmen comen, they are welcome, and we beseek God that this peace may b
> 
> be for many yeares.

And Cocks was not the only one to report such treatment. Both Edmund and William Palmer spoke of similar experiences, the latter again stressing the extent to which the Spanish excitement was matched by French disappointment. He spoke of the residents of San Sebastian, “who did greatly rejoysce to see Englishmen amongst them, and are nott a littell glad to hier of the good likelihood that there is of peace, which giveth small content unto the French.” And this welcome was not merely limited to nobles, merchants or elites, but was widespread throughout all classes. As another merchant, Josias Brugman, told it: “Our contriemen have had good enterpeynment in St. Sebastians and all degreese of people in that contri are veri glad of the

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20 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 30. Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 23 May/2 June 1603).
Ingleshe trade.” Brugman also connected this response directly to the prospects for peace, reporting that “also ther Kinge hym self as by his warant apeareth howbeit in his proud nesessity doth remit whol conclusion of peace unto the archduke.”

Such attitudes and displays of public rejoicing were not restricted to the towns of the Iberian north coast. Various reports indicate that sentiments were similar in other parts of the peninsula as well, especially the coastal areas and ports of Andalucía that had faced the greatest threat from English depredations during the war, and whose merchants stood to gain a great deal from the reestablishment of the English trade with the coming of peace. Protestant Englishmen were now welcomed in ports such as Sanlúcar and Sevilla, and initial relations were quite friendly indeed. William Palmer soon made the trip inland to the capital at Valladolid, where he saw many positive signs as well. According to Cocks, Palmer reported “that every one in generall made full Accompt that we weare shewer to have peace betwixt the two realmes.” The same went for Portugal, part of the Spanish monarchy since 1580, and another major area of combat operations and wartime vulnerability. Reactions there paralleled much of what occurred in the rest of the peninsula, and a quick look at these can be particularly instructive.

Take, for instance, the remarkable journey of the English spy known to us only as Snedall. Late in 1602, before Elizabeth’s final illness and while England and Spain were still very much at war, he crossed the Channel to St. Malo in Brittany, and from thence to Nantes,

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23 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 39. Josias Brugman to ____ (Bayonne, 11 June 1603).
24 Ibid.
25 See, for example, TNA: PRO SP 94/9, ff. 151, 174. The second of these indicates both the original openness, and the growing displeasure amongst the population as a year went by without any solid moves towards the negotiation of a peace treaty. I shall discuss this development later in the chapter.
26 Loomie, "Religion and Elizabethan Commerce with Spain," 47-51.
27 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.55, Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 11/21 August 1603).
where he took ship for San Sebastian, and ultimately arrived in Lisbon.\textsuperscript{28} In the process, he obtained letters of recommendation from a French priest, and was able to pass as a catholic without trouble. When he got to Lisbon, he was quick to obtain an interview with Philip III’s viceroy (Cristóbal de Moura, marquess of Castel Rodrigo), introducing himself and offering all kinds of supposedly authentic intelligence of English affairs, including upcoming naval designs and specifics about the leading ministers, in order to insinuate himself into the viceroy’s service. Around the same time as Snedall’s arrival in Lisbon, word arrived of Queen Elizabeth’s death. Two friars from the convent of English nuns in Lisbon came and asked him if the news was true, and while at first he thought not, the details they provided convinced him otherwise. The viceroy asked him the next day to come and translate the English printed proclamations of the queen’s death and King James’s accession that he had just obtained. And one of the first things on Moura’s mind was the future state of the catholic religion in England. He asked what Snedall thought of James, whether the king was a catholic, and what would happen to the “afflicted Catholicques” under the new king’s rule.\textsuperscript{29} To which the spy answered that no, rather than convert to catholicism, he thought James would probably be even more severe to the English catholics than the late queen had been. Upon hearing such bleak news, the viceroy “seemed to lament and wished hymselfe in heaven”, and then bid Snedall return to England, since there were not currently any positions available for him.\textsuperscript{30} Nevertheless, Moura said that the Englishman might return at any time with any commodities he wished to trade and he would be welcome. And the depth of the viceroy’s concern for his English coreligionists was more than matched by the response of the common people to the news of the queen’s death. As Snedall put it,

\textsuperscript{28} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 40. “Snedall’s relation of his voyage to Lisbon” (9/19 June 1603). This was composed the day of his return to England.

\textsuperscript{29} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 40v. “Snedall’s relation of his voyage to Lisbon” (9/19 June 1603).

\textsuperscript{30} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f. 40v. “Snedall’s relation of his voyage to Lisbon” (9/19 June 1603).
“howessoever hee taks the matter the whole commonaltye of Portugale rejoyce and saye it is the happiest tyme that maye bee for noew they stande in greate hope of peace.”31

This story indicates important major points with regard to peace and initial perceptions. First of all, the viceroy’s overall reaction reiterates a fundamental message of the second chapter here: how the accession of James I was believed by those in positions of power to be a significant turning point in the two countries’ relations, and how, at least partly because of this belief, it ultimately was one. Secondly, Snedall’s account adds to what we have seen so far, stressing the extent to which this belief was shared by the common people as well – both in their joy at the death of their long-feared enemy Elizabeth, and their subsequent belief that as a result there would now be peace. Finally, and this is key, the viceroy’s specific questions and his reaction to the answers provided give us some poignant insight into what would be a major component of Spanish perceptions vis-à-vis England. Namely, just how much the people of the Iberian peninsula, great men included, cared about the state of catholicism in the British Isles, and about the fortunes of their coreligionists there. This was the first thing Moura asked about, and the answer he received determined his entire attitude about the accession. As we shall see, this concern would prove a common refrain over the years to come. It would remain a major difference in the two countries’ perceptions of one another, and it would play an important role in determining the direction of Anglo-Spanish relations in general.

**Spaniards in England**

But perceptions in the peninsula are not our only concern. English attitudes towards the first Spanish visitors in their country were of a similarly positive nature. England’s position as a preeminent maritime power meant that most of the direct commercial contact at this time

31 Ibid.
occurred on Spanish turf. But the circumstances of the accession ensured that there would be important moments of early contact that took place on English soil as well.

When Juan de Tassis y Acuña, first count of Villamediana and Spanish extraordinary ambassador to King James, landed at Dover in the early evening on Sunday, 21/31 August 1603, his coming was greeted by a full salvo of at least 80 guns from three English galleons, and by the responding salute from the massive batteries of Dover Castle. He was met at the water’s edge by Lewes Lewkenor, the newly appointed official master of ceremonies (or conducteur des ambassadeurs) of the crown, with a convoy of carriages, a great fanfare of trumpets, and gifts from the king. But the warm reception had begun from the moment Villamediana embarked in Gravelines, as the English admiral had feasted him aboard ship during the Channel crossing, “and gave him a grand banquet with much music, with viols and other instruments unique to this Kingdom.” Much of this might be expected for any official ambassadorial visit, particularly by the representative of such an important power. However, this was not just any embassy.

Villamediana’s entourage was the first group of Spaniards that most of the English had seen outside of battle in decades, a fact of which the ambassador was well aware. And although he was officially in England to congratulate James on the occasion of his coming to the English throne, it was widely understood by the populace that Villamediana and his group were also there to begin the process of negotiating the peace treaty that would make official and

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32 AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 179, f.1. Villamediana to Philip III (Oxford, 4/14 September 1603). Unciphered original. Received 16/26 October 1603. See also Tassis I, 2, which indicates that it was 120 guns rather than 80.
33 Tassis I, 2.
34 “[Y] le hizo un grande banquete con mucha musica, de Biolones, y otros instrumentos de que son curiosos en este Reyno.” Tassis I, 2.
35 AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 107 (old #140-141), f.10v, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604). Received 26 February/7 March 1604. His attitudes about this are discussed in detail a little later in the chapter.
permanent the state of truce which had been in effect since the accession some five months before. Consequently, his presence was at once a matter of intense curiosity and an opportunity for unbridled celebration for both the English court and the local population. All along the route inland from Dover, the road was thronged with well-wishers and crowds trying to get a glimpse of the magnificent Spanish gentlemen in all their finery. At every stop along the way, they were greeted with great pomp by the local authorities and leading gentlemen. In each place they were lavishly feasted, and put up in fine lodgings for the night. This began in the town of Dover itself, where

the whole place went out to see the Count, and to see Spaniards, and there were so many people that it was impossible to walk. At the entrance of the town, on the bridge over the moat, were all of the magistracy, which is like the regimiento and justicia, and they gave the Count the formal welcome to this Kingdom….In hearing that the Count had arrived, many ladies and gentlemen came from many places just to see him, and to meet Spaniards.\(^{36}\)

After a couple of days in Dover, waiting on the rest of their company and their baggage, the embassy set out on its journey inland towards the king and his court. Along the road, they were greeted by the “Viscount of the province of Kent, who is like a Viceroy, with more than two hundred horse, looking very nice, and with his trumpets, and with him came the most principal gentlemen of the area, all in their livery.”\(^{37}\) The first night was spent in Canterbury, where “upon entering [the town] there was such a crowd of ladies, gentlemen, and other people that one could

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\(^{36}\) “Salió todo el lugar a ver al Conde, y a ver Españoles, y cargava tanta gente, que no se podia andar de ninguna manera. A la entrada de la Villa, en la puente del fosso, estava todo el magistrado, que es como el regimiento, y justicia, y dieron al Conde la bienvenida a este Reyno….En sabiendo que el Conde avia llegado, vinieron de muchos lugares a solo verle, y conoce Españoles, muchos cavalleros y damas.” Tassis I, 2. Villamediana himself described the scene by indicating that “toda la marina” was “cubierta de gente de la tierra”, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 179, f.1.

\(^{37}\) “Vizconde de la provincia de Kent, que es como Virrey, con mas de doscientos cavallos que parecia muy bien, y con sus trompetas, venian con el los mas principales cavalleros de toda ella con libreas”, Tassis I, 3.
not break through the streets.”

The following days were spent in increasing luxury and ever more pressing crowds along the way, stopping for the night first in Sittingbourne, then in Rochester, and finally in Greenwich that Saturday. Sunday was another day of grand introductions and feasting, and the Spaniards were able to attend mass for the first time since their arrival – in secret, of course. On Monday they set out upriver in boats provided by the king, passing by London for fear of the current outbreak of plague that was killing hundreds of people daily. Nevertheless, their continued role in the spectacle remained abundantly clear as they passed “underneath the great bridge, which was very full of people, and all along the river there were a great number of boats with many ladies.” It seems that even the significant threat of serious illness and a painful death did not stand in the way of Londoners’ desire to see the Spaniards.

The rest of the journey continued in much the same way, with thronging crowds, local welcomes, and feasting all along the route. They made nightly stops in small towns along the river such as Kingston, Staines, and Maidenhead, and visited the royal palaces of Hampton Court and Windsor, on their way to Oxford, where King James had moved the court in order to avoid the plague. In Henley, on Thursday, 1/11 September, Villamediana met up with his Flemish counterpart, Aremberg, in the midst of large crowds of onlookers. The next day, he was escorted into Oxford in great pomp by the earl of Devonshire (formerly Lord Mountjoy), Lord Lieutenant of Ireland and recent conqueror of the rebellion there, who had also been the victor over the

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38 “[A] la entrada della avia tanto concurso de damas, y cavalleros, y de la demas gente que no se podia romper por las calles.” Tassis I, 3. See also AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 179, f.1v.
39 Tassis I, 3.
40 “[P]or debaxo de la gran puente, que estava muy llena de gente, y en toda la ribera gran cantidad de barcas con muchas damas”, Tassis I, 4.
Spaniards at Kinsale early in 1602.\textsuperscript{41} Despite all the crowds and the magnificent reception in general, Devonshire assured the ambassador that still more would have been done to celebrate the Spaniards’ coming had the plague not made things so difficult.\textsuperscript{42} Lodgings were provided for Villamediana and his entourage in Christ Church College, where they were to await the coming of the king, who was at the moment on progress in the countryside nearby.

Ensconced in his comfortable rooms in this academic environment, Villamediana had some time to reflect upon what he had seen and heard so far, and to report on this back to his king. One of the first orders of business was, of course, gauging English perceptions with regard to relations with Spain. Despite how bad things may have looked at the ministerial level (and from all of the reports of the events described in the previous chapters), things looked a little different up close and with the common people. From what he had witnessed firsthand, combined with reports from informants within the court, the ambassador’s first impression was that, whatever the difficulties might be, nevertheless it was clear that both “the King and all the Kingdom” were desirous of peace.\textsuperscript{43} The real concerns seemed to be about the nature of opposition at court, and the specific issues that the treaty would require. In all of this, although

\textsuperscript{41} AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 179, f.2. A not-so-subtle reminder of English successes in the war, and a fact that Villamediana remarked upon. Indeed, he pointed out to Philip that he had also been greeted in Canterbury by the baron of “Abies” [Sir Henry Danvers, first baron Danvers of Dauntsey, and future earl of Danby] who had been general of the English cavalry in Ireland, and had served under Devonshire at Kinsale: Ibid, f.1v. He would later refer to Danvers as someone with whom he had remained friends since meeting: “aviendo quedado desto amigos”, although he never seemed to learn to spell his name properly. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, f.2v, Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603). Received 24 January/3 February 1604. King James’s continued policy of sending war heroes to important ceremonial occasions and substantive negotiations between the two countries is discussed at greater length in chapters eight and nine below, which are centered around the extraordinary embassy of Lord Admiral Nottingham, hero of the Armada campaign, to Spain in 1605.

\textsuperscript{42} AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 179, f.2.

\textsuperscript{43} “Estan ynclinados el Rey y todo el Reyno a ella”. AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 140, f.2. Villamediana to Philip III (Oxford, 4/14 September 1603). Received on 16/26 October 1603.
Villamediana was quick to point out that his mission was one merely of congratulation and that he did not yet have full powers to treat for peace at this time, he was very concerned with English perceptions, and was more than willing to discuss the question of the peace in an informal capacity. He made analysis of these perceptions and the possibility and future content of negotiations a central part of his correspondence back home, and as we have seen, once he finally got to meet with the king and his ministers, the ambassador did participate in a number of meetings where he discussed these issues at great length.44 Despite the continued delays produced by these talks in a practical, political sense, what is important for us here is the nature and strength of the ambassador’s initial perceptions. And, as even the most sensitive, ciphered portion of Villamediana’s correspondence shows, his take on how the English as a whole felt about peace was abundantly clear:

And although in that which goes unciphered I give Your Majesty an account of that which is happening to me [me va subciendo] in public with all types of people, nobles and commoners alike, that which with regard to this I am able to judge up until now is that generally I think peace is desired, and more [by] the people than [by] the nobility.45

The extent of this general openness and willingness by the common people and gentry of England to accommodate their erstwhile enemies was further enhanced by an edict issued by the Vice-chancellor of the University of Oxford, George Abbot, the future Archbishop of Canterbury and a committed anti-catholic. Upon explicit anticipation of the Spaniards’ arrival and out of a desire not to offend them, all inhabitants and innkeepers were instructed to “make no provision of meat of any sort on Fridays or on other fasting days, and to not permit that it be eaten in their

44 For discussion of these particular meetings and their content, see chapter four, above. 
45 “Y aunque en la que va en claro doy cuenta a VM de lo que en publico me va subciendo con todo genero de gente assi nobleza como pueblo, lo que a cerca desto puedo hasta agora juzgar es que generalmente pienso es desseada la paz y mas del pueblo que de la nobleza”. AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 141, f.3.
houses”, on pain of criminal proceedings.\(^4^6\) A warm welcome indeed, coming as it did from such an unlikely source.\(^4^7\)

Happy as things seemed, the journey was not fated to end here. After a few days in Oxford, and before the king arrived – repaying the ambassador’s continued delay in coming by making him wait for a while himself – one of Villamediana’s servants fell ill. On 9/19 September he died, from what appeared to be some sort of intestinal trouble (it was referred to as a “dolor de costado” – literally, a side ache).\(^4^8\) Nevertheless, the rumor spread that it was actually the plague, and given the obvious reasons for concern at the time, Villamediana was told to remove himself and his entourage to the south coast, and to catch up with the king when the court made its way down in that direction in a couple of weeks’ time.\(^4^9\) So the road show continued, and the Spaniards set out again, keeping their stately pace, and stopping for the night in the towns of Abingdon, Newbury, and Winchester on the way. On Thursday, 15/25 September, they finally arrived at the south coast port of Southampton, where they were to remain for a week until the king and court arrived in Winchester and sent for them.

\(^\text{46}\) AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 186, f.1. This document is the Spanish translation of the original proclamation: “que no hagan provission de ninguna suerte de carne en dia de viernes ni en otros dias de ayuno ni permitir que sea comida en sus cassas”.

\(^\text{47}\) It should be mentioned that Villamediana was far from some sort of naïve observer, willing to accept everything he saw at face value – as his response to this proclamation clearly shows. As much as he raved about his positive reception, he was nevertheless suspicious of Abbot’s personal reasoning for issuing the edict, considering it to be of little substance, less about concerns for Christianity and the perceptions of foreign visitors, and more about getting rid of an abundance of fish: “El qual juzgo ser de muy poca sustançia pues no consiste en materia de Christiandad sino de gastar su pescado, socolor de dezir causaria escandalo entre los forasteros que estavamos alli”. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 184, ff.2v-3, Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 27 September/7 October 1603). Received on 16/26 October 1603.

\(^\text{48}\) Tassis part II, 1.

\(^\text{49}\) Even Robert Cecil seemed to believe this, writing that “Our Treaty is not begonn, for y’ Sp. Emb. hath yet not had his audience by reason y’ yª Plague fell in his howse. On Sonday he comes to receave it a Wynchester, where the K. means to ly as long as yª Plague can escape us, which drives us and down so rownd as I think we shall come to York.” Lord Cecil to the earl of Shrewsbury (___ September 1603), Nichols, Progresses, vol.I, 272.
Again, Villamediana had a chance to pause, evaluate, and report back home. And once again, his message was overwhelmingly positive with regard to English popular perceptions towards Spain and her people. Amongst other observations, he noted that ever since he had entered the country, various merchants had been coming to him and asking for passports to trade in Spain. He told of how a number of gentlemen had invited him into their homes, and how others had come to him in his lodgings, many of them speaking on behalf of these merchants as well. The ambassador was happy to issue the passports, and his reasoning was directly tied to his perception of English opinion as seen firsthand, and his (and his king’s) desire to make this relationship closer and more beneficial:

And believing that the will of Your Majesty in this part is to open the door of Spanish commerce to them in order to come to the ends that are desired, and judging it to be suitable for the service of Your Majesty that the people sup on the benefits that will be able to follow from it, and [since] the rumor runs amongst them generally, and to earn [their] good opinion as regards pleasing them and establishing friendship with them of which the people are giving indications of having much satisfaction and desire—a thing which in my opinion is more than a little essential in any event— I have given out some passports.

For all of their differences, many in England and Spain were happy about the coming

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50 “Desde que entré en este Reyno han ydo acudiendo a mi algunos mercaderes a que les diesse pasaportes para yr a España”. AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 157, f.1. Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 20/30 September 1603). Received 16/26 October 1603.

51 “Y creyendo yo que la voluntad de VMd en esta parte sea abrirles la puerta del comerçio de España para venir a los fines que se deseen y juzgando convenir al servicio de VMd que el pueble se çene [“sup”] en el benneffito que dello se les puede seguir, y que corra esta voze entre ellso generalmente y cobrar buena opinion en materia de complaçerlos y hacérslos amistad de que el pueble da muestras de tener mucha satisfacion y voluntad, cossa a mí pareçer no poco esençial para todos eventos, he dado algunos pasaportes”. AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 157, f.1. Nor was he alone in this attitude towards the English commercial community. Both Villamediana and Nicholas Scorza, who had remained behind to represent the Archdukes after Aremberg returned to Brussels, were soon also actively encouraging every merchant they could meet to start pushing for the reopening of trade with Flanders. AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 147, ff.2-2v, Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 5/15 December 1603). Received 24 December/3 January 1603/04.
of peace. And many of those in positions of power saw this, and were doing a great deal in order to help bring the two countries closer together.

Indeed, in the more than three weeks since crossing the Channel, the Spanish ambassador and his retinue had done much more than make a standard diplomatic trip into London. They had instead undertaken a remarkable tour through much of the southeast of England. In the process, they had hunted in beautiful parks, visited many magnificent palaces and cathedrals, and dined on several occasions with some of the most influential men in the kingdom. But they had also spoken to countless Englishmen of virtually every rank and every social class, in the attempt to witness the state of the kingdom firsthand. As a result, they had learned a great deal, and these first impressions would go a long way towards establishing Spanish perceptions of England and the English for much of the next two decades.

The Spaniards had seen much of England, but perhaps more importantly, much of England had seen them. As Villamediana himself later explained: “this is a Kingdom where in almost 30 years no Spaniard has entered with his face uncovered, [which is] our enemy by nature and by the war of so many years, and [which has been] covetous of sustaining [the war] through the adventure of gain and little loss in it.” He fully understood the factionalized nature of the court, pointing out that, at his arrival, many Englishmen were “friends of the French,” Spain’s greatest European rival, and that England was a place where “there are many others that are helping to foment their intent and to counterbalance Your Majesty’s greatness.”

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52 “[E]ste es Un Reyno donde ha casi 30 años que no ha entrado Español la cara descubierta en el, enemigo nuestro por naturaleza y por la guerra de tantos años y codiciosos de sustentalla por la aventura de ganar y poca de perder en ella”, AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 107 (old #140-141), f.10v, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604). Received 26 February/7 March 1604.
53 “[A]migos de Françeses y adonde ay otros muchos que ayudan a fomentar su intento y a contrapesar la grandeza de VMd.” Ibid.
Villamediana and his group were consciously trying to make a good showing, and in the process provide a solid foundation for an alternative English view of Spain. In this, they were remarkably successful:

Having entered this Kingdom without knowing who to trust nor reaching out my hand except it be warily and with great modesty, despite it being thus, and Spaniards seen so poorly even in the time of His Majesty who is in heaven when he was King of this Kingdom as you know [Philip II, in the 1550s], I have gone about procuring that I be well received and seen in it.\textsuperscript{54}

And well received and seen they were. On their tour, they had stopped for the night in fourteen different locations, and had stayed over for multiple days in several of these places. Everywhere they went they were greeted by great crowds representing literally every social stratum in the most populous part of England. And the reception at each stop along the way had been a remarkably positive one. As we shall see, these moments of contact in both countries would provide a tangible, concrete foundation upon which much of the future connection would be built. But would this newfound amity really last? We have seen what happened over time with regard to initial hopes and expectations at the elite level. What would happen at the common and commercial level when this still fragile relationship was put under strain? As it happened, neither side had to wait too long to find out.

\textbf{Spanish Tensions}

A truce had been in effect since the moment of Elizabeth’s death, and was proclaimed by both kings almost immediately. But as time went by without apparent movement towards an

\textsuperscript{54} “Aviendo yo entrado en este Reyno sin saver de quien me valer fiar ni echar mano sino a tiento y con gran recato, no obstante que con ser esto assi, y tan mal vistos los españoles aun en tiempo que su M\textsuperscript{d} qu\textsuperscript{e} es de en el çielo era Rey deste Reyno como se sabe, he ydo yo procurando ser bien reçivido y visto en el”, AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 107 (old #140-141), f.10v, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604). Received 26 February/7 March 1604.
actual treaty, doubt gradually spread about the eventual outcome. We have seen what had been happening on the political and diplomatic front over this period, and the same suspicions and concerns gradually began to make themselves known throughout society at large. This was true both in Spain and in England, and it led to some moments of real tension.

Trouble had been brewing in Spain since at least August 1603, when there began to be complaints that some English vessels were disregarding the terms of the truce, and were still taking Spanish prizes. In response, and none too happy about the way things had been proceeding in England so far, King Philip put a hold on some English claims regarding the seizure of questionable goods by local officials. About this time, Richard Cocks also reported the news of a recent occurrence in Zaragoza, where “they of the Inquesytion had condemned a pore Frenchman to death because he was a Lutherano, as the Spaniards tearme all them which are of the [protestant] religion.” He was reportedly stripped to his shirt and stoned to death in the town square by thousands of onlookers. Although the man was French, the event did not appear to bode well for the future of protestant English merchants in Spain, as Cocks was quick to note: “The Lord bles all trew Christians out of the danger of that persecutish Inquesytion, and I beeseke God that we may never have peace with Spaine except we may be free of that hellish fury.”

The English merchants in northern Spain had other reasons to be upset as well. With the recent opening of trade brought on by James’s accession, Englishmen began to make the voyage south in significant numbers. Without proper restriction and organization by the recently reborn

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55 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.55, Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 11/21 August 1603).
56 Ibid, f.55v.
57 Ibid.
but not yet effective Spanish company, these men quickly flooded the markets.\textsuperscript{58} Thomas Wilson, traveling to Spain in late November to spy for Cecil, and writing under an assumed name, spoke of the English merchants’ overwhelming presence “att this towne of Bilbao…also att St. Sebastian, att Castro, Lareda, and other portes of these partes”, where they “complayne much and repent ther cominge”.\textsuperscript{59} But despite these difficulties, the Englishmen were nevertheless still warmly welcomed and were “used with all curtisie of th’es Biscaines who are soe joyfull of this newe trade as may be, and think they shall all become Alcumists in torninge ther iron into gold.”\textsuperscript{60}

The residents of the southern ports of Andalucía were somewhat less receptive than the Basques and Cantabrians. In the town of Sanlúcar de Barrameda, the people were “greatly offended” by English claims to trade in the Indies, and John Rowe reported that Englishmen were now being forced to pay the 30% tariff that had been levied on foreign goods in order to cripple the Dutch, in explicit response to the delay in achieving a full peace: “They saye here that they will not put downe theire new custome which they raised of 30 of the hundred untill the peace be throughelie concluded betweene us and them. And soe they recover yt with great rigour of all goods that are laden out of theire country.”\textsuperscript{61}

Moreover, there were still English prisoners in the galleys at the port of Santa María, “passinge great misserye and necessitie.”\textsuperscript{62} Rowe reported similar news later from

\textsuperscript{58} For more on the company and its role, see: Croft, \textit{The Spanish Company}.
\textsuperscript{59} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.83, Van Castre to M. de Veras [Thomas Wilson to Robert Cecil] (Bilbao, 29 Nov/9 Dec 1603).
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.151. “News from Spain”, from John Rowe (Sanlucar de Barrameda, 2/12 March 1604).
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
Sevilla, where there was “suche polinge and abusinge of our contrynmen, and suche sarchinge of their shippes and lodgings for all such comodities as they saye oweth 30 of the hundred. Yt almost passeth all reason or morall procedings”. So much so, that he had become cynical about the ultimate success of the entire business:

although they [the English merchants] were courtiously used at the first, it was nothing else but a pollocey to fill theire [the Spaniards’] bellies (as they have) with the innumerable quantite of wheat that our countrye men have broughte them this yere, which otherwise might have starved for hunger.

Rowe could only conclude that “These contrynmen doe not love us but after a dessemblinge manner,” and he now despaired of the possibility of peace at all. William Palmer, too, had had enough, and was determined that he was done trading in Spain until the peace treaty was finally concluded, and freedom of commerce was fully implemented:

until which time myself, neither the rest of my friends, will not send any more goods into Spain, for all our nation has felt their rigorous and intolerable bad usage in their extreme impositions, which has bred such a hatred in the hearts of all merchants in England, as they do all rather desire wars than peace with them.

This was, to say the least, a far cry from the initial expressions of joy at the prospect of peace.

In Lisbon, English merchants were also complaining about having to pay the 30% tariff, and many of the locals were themselves beginning to lose faith in the possibility of a real peace:

Concerning the comon opinion here of the peace with England, the better sorte hold it that it will serve to no good conclusion, for here they say that the King of England serves but his turne with it, being resolved not to forgoe the assisting of the Hollanders, neither to loose the benefytt of the trade of the East and West Indies; which two things will not be suffered by this king.

The situation seemed to be deteriorating quickly, and only time would tell whether the

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63 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.174, John Rowe to ____ (Sevilla, 30 March/9 April 1604).
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
67 TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.172, anonymous – document torn, half there (Lisbon, 30 March 1604).
achievement of peace would put this all to right, or whether the damage to this newly
established relationship would prove irreparable.

**Troubles in England**

In England, too, the growing delay in peace negotiations was beginning to create doubt
and suspicion amongst some segments not just of the elite, but of the general populace as well.
This was unquestionably helped along by news of the English troubles on the peninsula, and
things consequently began to get a bit more difficult for ambassador Villamediana. To be sure,
the English dominance of the carrying trade between these kingdoms meant that virtually all of
the commercial contacts took place in Spain or Portugal, so there were few Spaniards actually
present in the country at the time outside of the embassy group. But the initially warm welcome
given to the ambassador and his entourage gradually became much more strained as time passed
without a treaty.

The summer had already seen the discovery of the Bye and Main plots against King
James, though any official Spanish or Flemish connections were relatively quickly discounted,
and Villamediana’s positive reception just over a month later is good evidence that there was
little explicit ill-will amongst the English populace about this by that time. Nevertheless,
suspicions about Spanish intentions still remained, and were gradually encouraged by the
continued delays in what many had originally assumed would be a quick achievement of formal
peace. Moreover, the issue was once again pulled to the front of the country’s political
consciousness when the conspirators were tried publicly in November, and a number of them
were subsequently executed. Add this to the mounting discontent over what many considered

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68 For more on the Bye and Main plots, see chapter four.
were deliberate Spanish delays to the beginning of peace negotiations, and trouble appeared to be fast approaching.

On 17/27 December 1603, the growing tensions boiled over into open confrontation. When the trouble began, Villamediana and his entourage were preparing to leave Salisbury for London, ending the several-month displacement of the court on account of the plague. As the ambassador tells it, he was about to get into his coach when there arose a “disturbance outside my house between some of my servants, among them gentlemen of my company, and some of the natives of the town.” Everything started when one of the Spanish chaplains, in his duty as almoner, bought bread from a local baker. Apparently, rather than give the priest his change, the baker took off running with what the Spaniards claimed was a sizable sum. One of Villamediana’s trumpeters chased the baker down on horseback, and brought him to the ambassador’s house in order to hand him over to the authorities. The baker promptly slipped out the garden door, and proceeded to stir up a crowd of the townspeople, who then converged upon the house “with staves and stones and some swords in search of the trumpeter.” The Spanish gentlemen kept their hands away from their weapons and tried to make an orderly departure, but the crowd charged, the coaches took off, and the rest of the Spaniards fought their way out and followed behind. The whole group managed to escape, although not without a cost. As Villamediana told it, in addition to “five or six minor injuries, all caused by staves (which this

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69 “[E]stando para meterme en mi coche oy rebuelta fuera de mi cassa entre algunos criados meos y destos Cavalleros de mi compañía con algunos de la villa nacida”. AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 111 (old #144), f.1, Villamediana to Philip III (“Rosimund”, 29 December/8 January 1603/04). Received 1/11 February 1604.

70 “[C]onboco algun golpe del pueblo menudo y vinieron con palos y piedras y algunas espadas en busca del tronpeta.” Ibid.
people use a great deal),” the English “knocked down one of the halberdiers that I have brought to guard my wardrobe and house,” and the man later died.\textsuperscript{71}

The count and his household stopped for the night in Andover, some three leagues away, where a justice of the peace and “some honored men of the place” came to apologize and to placate the Spaniards.\textsuperscript{72} That very night, the ambassador sent his kinsman and frequent messenger and interpreter, Juan Baptista de Tassis, with letters for the king and his secretary.\textsuperscript{73} James replied immediately, promising to punish those responsible and to make a great demonstration out of this, and indicating that he would have the privy council send a trusted servant to deal with the situation personally.\textsuperscript{74} The justices at Salisbury were also quick to send to Villamediana, offering their apologies and pledging their cooperation:

Our humble dutes to your good Lordship remembred we doe hereby with hartie sorrowe certifie your Lordship of the deathe of one of your followers whoe dyed this last nighte havinge received some hurts…in the late accidents that fell out at your Lordship’s departure. Hereuppon we have caused that partie (beinge a baker that is supposed to be presente when the first occasion of offence was taken) to be committed to prison. We will also give order that suche inquirey be made accordingly to the Course of the lawe as the partie that hurte hym and the manner of his deathe shalbe founde out as neare as maye be.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{71} “[A]unque de todas partes huvo cinco o seis heridos de poca consideracion con todo eso de un palo (de que esta gente usa mucho) derribaron a uno de los alabarderos que yo traigo para guarda de mi ropa y casa de que otro dia murio.” Ibid., f.1v.

\textsuperscript{72} “La Justícia y algunos hombres honrrados del lugar”, Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73} TNA: PRO SP 94, vol. 9, ff.85-86v, Villamediana to Cecil (Andover, 17/27 December 1603); ff.87-88v, Villamediana to James (Andover, 17/27 December 1603). This Juan Baptista de Tassis was either Villamediana’s son or cousin (all accounts vary on this), and he was not the Juan Bautista de Tassis who was Villamediana’s uncle and the Spanish ambassador in Paris.

\textsuperscript{74} AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 111 (old #144), f.1v, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December/8 January 1603/04). Received 11 February 1604. On 23 December/2 January, Thomas Edmondes wrote to Shrewsbury from Hampton Court that “The Kinge is verie carefullie to see justice donne for the same, and that a Gentellman shalbe sent downe purposelly to attend the care thereof; and it is sayd that for further kindnes we shall feast him and the rest of the Amb\textsuperscript{75} this Christmas.” Nichols, Progresses, vol.I, 303, Edmondes to the earl of Shrewsbury (Hampton Court, 23 December/2 January 1603/04).

\textsuperscript{75} TNA: PRO SP 94, vol. 9, f.92, Edw. Estcourte, W. Blacker, and G. Tooker to Villamediana (Salisbury, 18/28 December 1603).
The justices described the criminal trial process in detail, and asked if the ambassador would like to send someone to witness or participate in the proceedings. Villamediana wrote to James’s council a few days later, informing them of all that had happened, complaining that one of his men was killed when he had offended no one, and emphasizing that it was by a blow from behind. However, he was content to let the authorities handle the situation, saying that he was leaving it in the hands of the king, and that he had “not come to this kingdom to be a criminal prosecutor”.

Although this unfortunate situation was resolved relatively quickly, Villamediana would have to be much more careful over the coming months. Continued squabbles with the French ambassador over precedence, and the difficult situation that the English crown found itself in while trying to resolve the issue, ruffled still more Spanish feathers. And when the news of all this reached Spain, it contributed to the already growing hostility there. As Thomas Wilson reported from Madrid: “by this and many other reasons which I cold alledge it appeers that our nation is very ill welcome hether because it seems that

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76 TNA: PRO SP 94, vol. 9, f.96, Villamediana to the Lords of the Privy Council (Stepney, 22 Dec 1603/1 Jan 1604).
77 For letting the king handle it: TNA: PRO SP 94, vol. 9, f.96, Villamediana to the Lords of the Privy Council (Stepney, 22 Dec 1603/1 Jan 1604). For the quote: “yo no avia venido a este Reyno a ser fiscal de delitos”, AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 110 (old #144), f.1v, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 29 December/8 January 1603/04). Received 1/11 February 1604.
78 The question of precedence would remain an important aspect of diplomatic relations at the English court, and it was a key focal point for the continued simmering state of Franco-Spanish rivalry throughout this period. See, for example: CSPVen X, 126-129; AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 111 (old #145-146), Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 30 December/9 January 1603/04); AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 112 (old #147-150) Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604). For more on the all-important role of precedence in the peace negotiations, see chapters four and five. For its place in the Franco-Spanish rivalry, see chapters six, seven, and nine, below.
the Spaynyards in England report that they are ill used ther.”\textsuperscript{79} As with English responses to news of Spanish injustices, so too with Spanish responses to news of English injustices. It was all reciprocal.

But the feeling was still not all bad. For example, while Wilson reported from the Spanish court that,

\begin{quote}
Since my coming into thes partes, I understand of many things written hither to the King of Spaine by his Ambassador in England concerning the affronts offred him in being invited and disinvented agayne and about the quarell and killing of one of his servants with many circumstances. Yett amongst others he reports something of the contrary qualitie viz that the King of England drinking to the King of Spaine stood up bare headed untill he was pledged upon which ther ar many discourses and divers interpretations.\textsuperscript{80}
\end{quote}

Indeed, despite everything, Villamediana was nevertheless seen by many in the Spanish capital to have been treated well overall, and to be favored by King James. As L. Garvis wrote to Thomas Bruce, an Englishman in Madrid, rumor had it that “The filthy Rebells [i.e. the Dutch] they say growes jeleouse of the good acceptinge of the Spanishe ambassador,” and as Wilson reported in late March, a full year after Elizabeth’s death, “yt shoulde seeme that this Contreye are very dessyrous of peace, a good one God sende”.\textsuperscript{81} Despite the difficulties, the Spaniards most certainly wanted peace, and it was precisely this sort of opinion that helped along the Habsburg decision makers’ all-important thoughts about the nature of King James’s friendship.

Still, the situation would remain touch-and-go right up until the moment the treaty was signed. So much so that Wilson and his contacts were at a constant loss in keeping on top of prevailing public opinion: “Heer ar such tottering braynes in this contry that it is a thinge

\textsuperscript{79} TNA: PRO SP 94, vol. 9, f.149v, “Van Castre to de Veras” [Thomas Wilson to Robert Cecil] (Valladolid, 25 Feb/6 March 1604). It appears that this growing discontent was also responsible for blowing Wilson’s cover, a situation he was however quick to rectify. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} TNA: PRO SP 94, vol.9, f.159v, Van Castre to de Veras [Wilson to Cecil] (9/19 March 1604).
\textsuperscript{81} TNA: PRO SP 94, vol.9, f.168, L. Garvis to Thomas Bruce (Valladolid, 26 March/5 April 1604); TNA: PRO SP 94, vol.9, f.163v, Van Castre to de Veras [Wilson to Cecil] (9/19 March 1604).
impossible to fynd out any certayntyte or constancy eyther in ther judgments or Speeches."82

Nevertheless, in the end, despite all of the rough patches, the desire for peace remained much stronger, on the whole, than the concerns fostered by mutual suspicion.

**Early indications**

Taken as a whole, these first contacts are particularly instructive. They give us some idea of both the constructive and the conflicting elements at work here, and give some hint at the complex interplay between centripetal and centrifugal forces that would come to characterize the relationship as a whole. As much as the subsequent treaty negotiations and articles of peace themselves, these contacts would help create the environment within which the discourse of contact would be carried out. So what do these early encounters tell us about the way in which these peoples were beginning to experience peace? And what does this indicate about the future development of the relationship?

From the very moment of Elizabeth’s death and James’s accession, the first contacts were remarkably positive, on both an elite and a popular level. As the various leaders had seen this as an important opening – a great turning point, if you will – so too did the common people, in both England and Iberia. The possibility of peace was something desired by many, and the initial receptions indicate that the idea that the two erstwhile enemies might actually manage to get along was not so unreasonable after all. The positive nature of these first contacts would also have a lasting effect on the opinions of many, particularly those for whom these contacts would remain unusual or novel. This applies especially to Villamediana’s embassy and tour of southeast England, which would be one of few real points of contact with Spaniards in the lives

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of many of the Englishmen who witnessed it, and which was the all-important first impression that would help color the attitudes and experiences of those who would come to have contact with Spaniards in the future. As we shall see, this did not necessarily mean that the limited nature of such contacts automatically translated into burgeoning support for continued friendship with Spain. Far from it. Nevertheless, these events went into the general storehouse of English experiences, and they did provide positive points of reference that people might recall at a later date.

We have also seen how, as the months dragged on without much apparent movement towards solidifying the peace, real tensions began to show. And these tensions are indicative of where several of the future fault lines in the relationship would ultimately lie. Stress in a situation can always bring out the worst in people, but in the process it will often allow true feelings or deep-seated concerns to come to the surface and manifest themselves in more frequent or more substantial ways. In our case here, these deep-seated concerns would be the sorts of issues that would need to be taken up in the peace negotiations, if at all possible. In fact, most of them would be addressed in some form or another, and several of them would be handled quite effectively. Others would be mitigated somewhat. Still others would end up being passed over entirely, and would remain recurring concerns that would constitute a central part of the way in which the relationship operated for the years to come. So what were some of these concerns?

First of all was the type of peace and the very question of how committed to maintaining the peace each monarch and his government actually would be. It was already quite clear that

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83 For more on how this worked, see the detailed discussion in chapter seven, below, of the Constable’s embassy to England in 1604, as well as chapters eight and nine for the Lord Admiral’s embassy to Spain in 1605.
the simple expression of a desire to be at peace would not be sufficient to bring it to pass, not to mention maintain it over a long period of time. Neither side was going to go through with this if it looked like the other was not serious enough. Despite the general desire for peace, there was bound to be a great deal of distrust and animosity remaining on both sides, lurking under the surface – as was only natural after a long period of war, so often justified in ideological terms.

The respective sovereigns and their ministers were going to have to work hard at bringing peace to pass, if they wanted not only to be successful, but to inspire the sort of trust in their people that would give merchants the confidence to return and establish themselves long term, or to keep the common people enthusiastic in their support for royal policy. And even after the initial proof offered by the eventual achievement of the treaty, only time could provide a further effective balm. There was a certain inertia at work here: the longer one had been at peace, the more it might appear that one was likely to stay at peace.

Directly connected to this was the issue of continued war with the Dutch. If there was to be an Anglo-Spanish peace treaty, how exactly would this play out, given the other conflict? Would this be a simple neutrality, or would it also incorporate some sort of further alliance? Would it be accompanied by – or work as a direct stepping-stone towards – a truce or treaty ending the war in the Low Countries as well? And whatever the conclusion, could each side trust the other to abide fully by the terms of the agreement with regard to the other conflict? Would England’s hotter protestants actually be able to stand idly by while their erstwhile allies in Holland and Zeeland continued the fight against the Habsburg armies? Would there continue to be extensive illicit help – be it in the form of money, men, or matériel – flowing across the Channel to help bolster the Dutch cause? Would Spanish captains now be able to recruit for their own companies from amongst James’s subjects? And what about the Cautionary Towns –
Flushing, the Brille, and the fortress of Rammekins – held by the English in expectation of eventual repayment of the Dutch debts? Would they be neutral ground? Could they be purchased outright by the Habsburgs if the Dutch refused to negotiate a settlement? All of these issues and more would need to be resolved in one way or another in order to ease concerns back home for either side.

Thirdly, there was the issue of English participation in imperial endeavors. English merchants, explorers, and investors wanted badly to be able to trade in and with the Spanish and Portuguese empires overseas, and they were eager to colonize areas of their own that were not yet occupied by their Iberian rivals. But as we have seen, the Habsburgs and their subjects were just as determined to prevent these developments, and Spaniards of every stripe had seemed ready to continue the war whatever the cost rather than allow the English to trade or settle in “their Indies”. This was clearly going to be a major point of contention in the treaty negotiations, and these initial responses showed that it was an area where neither side appeared likely to be willing to give much ground. But for peace to work, this would have to be settled in some sort of way, and as we shall see, the way in which this issue would be handled would say a great deal about the importance of the developments over that first year-and-a-half between truce and treaty, and about the future of the entire relationship.

A fourth area of real concern for the common people and merchants in each kingdom would be the question of legitimate commerce in general. Trade to Spain was the key here, and the English were desperate to get themselves permanently settled back into Spanish markets and ports. The Spaniards were also hoping to revive the Flemish trade to Spain, facilitated by English shipping. All of this brought a number of related concerns for each side. The Spaniards were worried about continued English privateering, which with the coming of peace would now
constitute nothing less than all-out piracy. At this point, it appeared that prizes were still being taken despite the king’s proclamation, and there was no way that this sort of behavior could continue without causing serious damage to the maintenance of peace.\textsuperscript{84} Then there was the issue of the 30% tariff. The Spaniards were still at war with the Dutch, and they were concerned that newly opened trade with England would allow for transshipping of Dutch goods to the Iberian peninsula, thus creating a massive circumvention of the exorbitant duty that had been meant to cripple their enemies’ trade. For their part, the English were worried that their own products would still be subject to the 30%, and that their ships and goods would be left open to seizure by local officials demanding payment or alleging some wrongdoing or noncompliance on the part of the merchants or their men. If they could work around these problems, the English might also be able to reopen the trade from Flanders – to both English and Spanish markets. This brought its own challenges, centered around what would certainly be Dutch opposition to any such attempts, and likely with violence. But this was not necessarily bad in Spanish eyes – after all, if the English were successful at the transshipping of Flemish goods, this would be beneficial for both England and Spain, while harming the Dutch through the introduction of real competition. If, however, the English were not successful, this would be the result of conflict with their former allies in Holland, and the resulting friction between the two protestant nations would also serve Habsburg interests. And even if some or all of these issues were resolved, there would still remain the English internal need to properly regularize the trade with Spain and

\textsuperscript{84} It should be noted that the English were not the only ones engaged in privateering, nor were they apparently alone in continuing to seize vessels after the respective royal proclamations banning further taking of prizes. For example, Villamediana wrote to King Philip just after his arrival in England, seeking a restitution of goods and return of a ship that English merchants claimed had been wrongly seized by Spaniards at sea and brought into port as a prize in Fuenterrabia, in the Basque country, just across the border from France. Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 1/11 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 260-261.
Portugal. It would be in no one’s best interests if the markets were quickly flooded, if prices thus fluctuated wildly, and if the merchants involved in the trade could not make a profitable living. Rules and norms would have to be established, consuls appointed, and perhaps a trading company revived in order to manage this re-opened field, without allowing such a promising industry to collapse under its own weight.

A fifth, and directly related concern, was the freedom of Englishmen from the Spanish Inquisition. Trade with Spain, or any kind of regular contact at all, would be virtually impossible if King James’s subjects had to fear for their lives simply by setting foot on Iberian soil. As with the question of trade to the Indies, this was going to be a particularly prickly issue for the Spaniards in the upcoming peace negotiations, considering the seriousness with which they took perceived threats to their religion. Moreover, the quasi-independent status of church institutions in the Habsburg territories (at least in comparison to their Stuart counterparts), as well as the capacity for intransigence by local officials, seemed destined to make this an issue of continued possible friction no matter what terms were agreed upon in the treaty articles.

It is also impossible to overstate the significance of Spanish concern for their oppressed coreligionists in James’s dominions. The future fate of the English and Irish catholics was something that touched the hearts of virtually every person in the peninsula who considered the issue, at every level of society. While the Habsburg decision makers would do everything they could to try to incorporate catholic toleration or some sort of relief within or alongside the treaty itself, continued concern for this issue would also act as a moderating influence with regard to their stances on all of the other issues. Now that the Spanish monarchy was willing to deal, this would be a truly major bargaining chip for the British king and his ministers. How they used it
would not only have great potential for immediate religious concerns, but it would also have profound political implications both within England and in the international system at large.

Indeed, it was clear that whatever compromises were reached in the upcoming treaty, the question of religion in general would remain, as might seem obvious, an absolutely central consideration in the years to come. Whether it was a matter of influencing the international spread or retreat of the opposing confession, the future fate of one’s coreligionists under foreign rule, or more immediate concerns regarding one’s own freedom of conscience or private worship – religion permeated everything. Even something as apparently innocuous as the right of an ambassador to hold his own private services in the embassy chapel became an issue of significant dispute, and would provide focal points for very public domestic opposition and further diplomatic negotiation in each country.

All told, there were a number of major issues that needed to be resolved, and the peace commissioners clearly had their work cut out for them. Despite the obvious desire in each country for a return to peace, not just any old peace would do. There was going to have to be some serious debate and substantial compromise if the two sides were going to get close enough in order to reach a workable settlement. Even if – thanks to the various developments I have outlined over the course of the preceding year – one believes that by the summer of 1604 some sort of peace was ultimately going to have to be signed, it is still important to understand just how much would depend on the specifics of the agreement. There were so many tensions just below the surface, so many possibilities for future conflict, that difficulties with a few articles here or there, or a particularly unbalanced resolution of any of a number of issues, could have a significant impact on the subsequent peacetime relationship. And so it is to the negotiation of these issues that we must now turn.
**Chapter Six: The peace conference**

“[T]here is now nothing so certaine as a Treaty, and in my Opinion, nothing more likely than a Peace. For as it is most true, that his Majestie’s Mind is most inclinable thereunto, and that in Contemplation thereof, things have been so carryed here, as if a War were now somewhat unseasonable, so you may see by the King of Spain’s great Descent from the heighth of his Formes towards other Princes”.

– Robert, Lord Cecil

If there is one thing that should be abundantly clear at this point, it is that, as important as James’s accession was to the prospects of peace, getting to an actual treaty was a long, complicated undertaking, and one that took a great deal of work to get done. Moreover, as important as it was to get all sides to the table, in a position where the issues of precedence no longer proved an obstacle to real deliberation, the peace talks themselves, once begun, were still not a simple matter of rubberstamping a mutually desired outcome. The negotiations in London, like the long and winding road that led to them, were a complex and drawn-out affair, where real concerns were addressed, arguments and counterarguments made, and significant effort was required on both sides in order to overcome numerous difficulties. Neither the specifics of the negotiations’ outcome, nor even necessarily their success, was preordained.

The peace negotiations at Somerset House quite literally created the rules for the future Anglo-Spanish relationship. The eventual treaty produced would play an important role in determining the actions for both sides in a number of different arenas, both in Europe and in the wider world, for the next couple of decades. And the specific articles themselves would be referred to directly time and time again by merchants in each port and ambassadors in each court, in countless, even occasionally successful, attempts to receive justice, restitution, or some sort of a redress of grievances. So coming to understand what these rules were, and how they were arrived at, is of particular importance.

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1 Cecil to Ralph Winwood (12/22 April 1604), Winwood II, 18.
But this was not just about the creation of hard-and-fast regulations. The making of the treaty was also an important process that helped set the political tone for future relations, establishing the informal connections, perceptions, and ways of doing business that are so important in diplomatic and political relationships. The formal treaty negotiations and the subsequent Spanish extraordinary embassy that they produced took a good four months, and built upon the foundation that had been developing over the previous year, as described specifically in the past four chapters. In this time, opponents were felt out, boundaries were pushed, convictions were tested, and the general nature of the relationship gradually began to take shape.

As with any important set of negotiations, the people involved were of special significance. And we must remember that these were not just ambassadors and agents meeting here. One of the more remarkable things about this first year-and-a-half of James’s reign is just how many major political figures from all over Europe were involved. People of real power in each of the governments were traveling to England (and later from England to Spain), gaining first-hand experience with the inner workings of the court. The French, Dutch, and Flemish representatives sent to London included the men that were the closest thing that each country had to a prime minister, with the Dutch also sending their equivalent to a royal heir. Spain and the Archdukes each also sent one of their very most powerful noblemen – in the case of the Spaniards, a real force at court and on the council, who was a prominent military man, and who had also served as a powerful viceroy in Italy, as the virtual sovereign of the Spanish-controlled Duchy of Milan. What these men saw, heard, said, and did, who they met with, and how they came away feeling about the new king and his court would govern their opinions and actions significantly over the coming years. And these men would, by virtue of their power and
position, have a disproportionate influence back home on policies and perceptions towards the other country.

This also held true with the peace talks themselves. Given just how crucial these talks were in particular, it should come as no surprise that all parties were well represented. On the Habsburg side, since the Constable of Castile had decided to remain behind on the Flemish coast nursing his largely diplomatic illness, the Spaniards sent their current ambassador-in-residence, the count of Villamediana, to the negotiating table. He was joined by Alessandro Rovida, a Milanese senator and longtime advisor of the Constable from his years as viceroy in Milan, who would be the main spokesperson for the Habsburg side, and who would prove over the course of the conference to be a formidable negotiator indeed. But the commissioners for Spain were not alone; alongside them sat the representatives of the Archdukes, who were three of the most powerful men at the court in Brussels. These included the recent extraordinary ambassador, the Prince-Count of Aremberg; the president of the Archdukes’ privy council, Jean Richardot; and their principal secretary, the audiencier Louis Verreyken. The Habsburgs had sent some of their very best, as they were determined to achieve peace on the most favorable terms possible, and in a way that managed to keep from harming their reputation in Europe.

The five English commissioners were similarly eminent, experienced, and able men, all amongst the most powerful members of James’s privy council. They included, in order of precedence: Thomas Sackville, earl of Dorset (the Lord Treasurer); Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham (the Lord High Admiral); Charles Blount, earl of Devonshire (Master-General of the Ordnance and Lord Lieutenant of Ireland); Henry Howard, earl of Northampton (Lord Warden of
the Cinque Ports); and Robert, Lord Cecil (Principal Secretary). These were five of the most influential men at the English court, who all brought with them decades of experience in diplomatic, military, political, and financial matters. This group included not only those who were most responsible for the day-to-day operations of the government, but also the kingdom’s premier commanders of sea and land forces, men who had defeated the Spanish in battle numerous times – most notably in the Armada campaign of 1588, at Cádiz in 1596, and in Ireland in early 1602.

Indeed, one of the reasons that Philip and the Archdukes had sent their best political minds to accompany their ambassadors was in explicit recognition of who it was that they would be facing – both amongst the English and even with their counterparts on the Habsburg side. As we have seen, Richardot and the Constable were sent expressly in order to face off against Robert Cecil and his closest allies, and Rovida was sent as much to balance and rein in his would-be ally Richardot as to fill in during the Constable’s “delay”. The reason that they knew how to prepare for this was because of the extensive experience they had gained over the previous year and, to a certain extent, even before.

**Preparations and lead-ups**

Everything we have seen thus far indicates just how difficult and lengthy the process of achieving peace was, but this does not mean that all of this time and trouble in the lead-up provided no tangible results. While peace was neither a carryover from Elizabethan policies nor an inevitability upon the old queen’s death, the previous attempts at achieving it – both in 1598

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2 This line-up had changed slightly since James’s initial choosing of commissioners back in October, when Villamediana had first arrived. At this point, the earl of Mar had been replaced by Lord Treasurer Dorset. For the original line-up, see: Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L’ambassade de France* I, 131-2; Winwood II, 7; Jones & Munck, 246; CSPVen X, 103, 107.
and in 1600 – did prove useful, as they had helped establish some of the basic ground rules on how matters would proceed, and they had begun to trace the outlines of what it was that each side might expect from the other. Moreover, these meetings and the related and subsequent correspondence created relationships between several of the commissioners and other officials that would ultimately help make the negotiations run more smoothly. Cecil, Dorset, Nottingham, Aremberg, Richardot, and Verreyken had all been involved in these negotiations, either as commissioners on location on the continent, or as ministers dealing directly with visits to England.³

That said, given the inconclusive nature of these previous negotiations – especially the collapse of the 1600 Boulogne talks before anything of substance could even be discussed, as well as the subsequent move by the English away from peace with the Habsburgs, and then the transition to a new monarch – it is clear that the much more intensive (and obviously more recent) post-accession diplomacy was a much bigger influence by far. The year that passed between James’s arrival in England and the beginning of formal peace negotiations in May 1604 was crucial to the formal talks in a number of ways. In the first place, during this period, many

³ Pauline Croft quite rightly mentions this history, but overplays its significance in the attempt to emphasize Cecil and the Flemish commissioners’ supposedly supreme roles in the 1604 treaty negotiations. Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 141-45. Moreover, as much as these later peace talks certainly benefitted from the late-Elizabethan negotiations and the relationships that had been built up since at least 1598, it was however not just Cecil who was involved. What Croft does not mention is that both Lord Admiral Nottingham and Lord Treasurer Dorset (then still Sackville) played an active role, were alongside Cecil as key voices in all of the council meetings dealing with these issues for both conferences, and the special committee that met with Verryken in London in February 1600 included the three of them and Hunsdon. They all also met with Verryken again in May 1600 when he came to England for a fortnight. MacCaffrey, Elizabeth I: War and Politics, 1588-1603, 225, 29. And the two men who served essentially as deputy commissioners for the 1604 talks – Thomas Edmondes and Daniel Dun – had also gained direct experience in these and similar negotiations, with Edmondes having faced off directly with the Flemish commissioners in 1600.
of the people who would be negotiating the peace had gotten familiar with one another, formed new relationships or further developed existing ones, while also gaining extensive experience in the new environment of the Jacobean court – a key concern both for the English ministers and for their opponents. On the Habsburg side, this was especially true for Aremberg and Villamediana who, as the key ambassadors sent after James’s accession, had each spent a significant amount of time in residence at court, making numerous connections and gaining a great deal of information. They had each had countless meetings with James and his ministers, with each side sizing up the other, forming perceptions, feeling out each others’ positions, and in many cases discussing their own concerns and demands in some real detail. They also had spent a great deal of time applying all of this to their specific strategies, and preparing their own arguments for the upcoming negotiations. So by the time the conference at Somerset House began, each side had a reasonably good idea of what the other was hoping to achieve.

In fact, it might even be a bit imprecise to refer to the formal conference sessions that began in May 1604 as having themselves comprised “the peace negotiations”. For in a very real sense, the entire previous year was one big, long set of peace negotiations – and even formally so after the Spanish ambassador had finally arrived at the end of the summer of 1603. At this point, some eight months before the peace talks proper were to eventually get underway, James had actually appointed a group of five specific ministers to negotiate these matters with both Villamediana and Aremberg. Although it turned out that neither ambassador had brought with him powers to treat, this group remained consistent at later key conferences with Villamediana over the months that followed, and four of these five would go on to become commissioners when the formal talks finally began.4

4 The only change was Mar’s replacement first with Northumberland, and ultimately with Lord Treasurer Dorset.
The long history of hard work on this process leading up to the negotiations proper was not limited to the creation of the environment, the establishment of perceptions about England and James, and the process of bringing the negotiations to pass that I have detailed over the past several chapters. There was also a great deal of actual back-and-forth over this entire period about the very issues themselves, significantly before the peace talks began or had even been decided on. After all, each side had been debating the utility of war or peace amongst themselves for years, and had spent some real time planning for this possibility. For the entire year in advance of the talks, the letters of Villamediana, the Constable, Philip III, Aremberg, and the Archdukes – not to mention the meetings of the Spanish Council of State – were dominated by discussions of how they would pursue various of the key issues, with their expectations subtly changing over time alongside developments and encounters in England. And this was true of their various rivals and opponents as well. The correspondence of not just the Spanish and Flemish, but also the English, French, and Venetians, too, is literally filled with references to various of the key issues that would have to be dealt with in the peace. This included detailed speculation of what it was thought each side would be expected to desire, and how serious each player seemed to be about each of the issues. Navigation to the Indies, the fate of the English catholics, the Spanish Inquisition, trade with the Dutch, restrictive tariffs, and possible further alliances – it was all there, and each side was busy marshalling its arguments behind the scenes.

Nor was this lead-up just limited to internal discussions on each side. There was also a significant amount of conversation between the respective groups about the various aspects of a possible peace. This happened in all kinds of settings: in formal meetings with members of the council, in more informal contacts on a day-to-day basis, and even on the docks and in the street. All of the key actors here were feeling one another out, testing the waters, reading each others’
reactions, floating trial balloons, and throwing money around in order to get the most reliable information possible – all so that they might gain some sort of advantage in the process, and have some sense of how things might ultimately play out.

We have already seen to a certain extent how in Spain even merchants and common people had been discussing the possible peace from the very moment of Queen Elizabeth’s death. This, too, had its specific focus on the actual issues, with a sophisticated understanding of the debate and the possible outcomes of peace. For example, as early as August 1603, it was reported that the local governor in Fuenterrabia, in northern Spain, was talking about what he heard that the English would push for when they sat down at the bargaining table, including “many childlike demands…namely trade into the Indies, and to be free of the Inquesytion.” These specifics would be confirmed in late September, when after he had been in England for just over a month, Villamediana listed a number of conditions that the English would be looking for in the coming talks, and this indeed included both of these requirements. Around the same time, Irishmen who had recently been in Valladolid reported that it was being said at the Spanish court that they would expect the English to hand over the Cautionary Towns to them as part of the peace treaty. Public speculation on various of these issues would continue throughout the months that followed, up through the beginning of the negotiations and beyond, with everyone

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5 Richard Cocks to [Thomas Wilson?] (1/11 August 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.50. See also the news report from the same date: “It is generally reported heare that we shall have peace betwixt England and Spaine…The Maistro del Campo whoe is governeur of all the province fell into question with the Englishmen to know what newes he hath from England and after some questions told him We understand that the King of England proposes many articles as trade into the Indes and to be free of the Inquisition which our King will never consent unto althought it cost him his whole Kingdome of Spaine.” “News from Bayonne” (1/11 August 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.51.

6 “Los puntos que al Conde de Villamediana le ha avisado que se han de proponer en las platicas de Paz son los siguientes,” enclosed with Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 27 September/7 October 1603; received 16/26 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 187, 184.

7 Richard Cocks to [Thomas Wilson?] (11/21 August 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, ff.54v-55.
from the Venetian ambassador to the Fugger newsletters to Portuguese merchants at the port and in the taverns of Lisbon offering up their opinions with a surprising amount of detail and confidence.  

Similar sorts of speculation and exchanges were occurring frequently in England as well, and often between people in important positions, including those who would be directly involved in the upcoming negotiations. For example, one day in late November 1603, when out hunting with King James, ambassador Villamediana fell into conversation with one of his new friends at court, Lord Danvers. Danvers indicated that “he desired the peace”, but that there were “two great difficulties” with getting it done. The first was the concern that England’s great source of strength, sea power, would atrophy as a result, and that the only reason Philip III wanted peace was so that he could “overpower” the Dutch, thus leaving the weakened and now solitary English in a position that “would be the Ruin of this Kingdom.” The second main difficulty, according to Danvers, was the question of “free commerce in the Indies”, which he made a strong case for,

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8 The Venetian ambassadors’ views on these issues can be found on just about every page in CSPVen X, but for one example directly connected to this, see Molin’s report from early April 1604 that James had told Villamediana that he had instructed his countrymen sailing in the West Indies to avoid places under Spanish rule, CSPVen X, 141-2. For the Fuggers, see, for example, their claim on 4/14 March 1604 that “the King of England will insist that his subjects have the right to go to East India and other places outside the dominions of the King of Spain”. And if the Fuggers’ reports of 4/14 May are to be believed, James was trying to cut a deal on the side to secure this very capitulation through Portuguese channels, right up through the beginning of the negotiations proper. Klarwill, Fugger News-letters, 337, 339. For Lisbon as late as June 1604, see: “Heare is great brages of a peace and these people ar prowde that they shal have the trade of the Indias to them selves which is all they looke for to make ther kinge able in short tyme to set upp his rest for a monarchy as in anno eighty eight”, “Advertisements from Lisbone,” [from?] to Th. Honyman (Lisbon, 7/17 June 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, f.46.
9 A man who had, interestingly, been raised to the peerage explicitly for his success fighting against the Spaniards at the battle of Kinsale, in Ireland, early in the preceding year.
10 “Juzgan, Temen, y dizên que VM[d] no quiere ni dessea la az sino solo a fin de sobreporsense de hazienda y de fuerças y disminuyr las de olandeses…que dizên seria la Ruyña deste Reyno.” Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603; received 24 January/3 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, ff.2v-3.
and which Villamediana responded to just as confidently in the negative.\(^{11}\) The two men even frankly discussed English fears that the peace would not last because of religious differences, that catholic princes such as Philip would not feel that they needed to keep their word when given “to those that we call heretics.”\(^{12}\) And as Lord Knollys told the ambassador ten days later on yet another hunting excursion with the king, they were all quite concerned that Spain would break off any peace with James if the pope told them to do so. Villamediana was working vigorously to counter such beliefs, and insisted that when it came to matters of “state and peace,” Philip would certainly keep his word and operate in the interests of his kingdoms, above any commandments of the pope.\(^{13}\) Such interactions were typical of this first year’s lead-up to the negotiations proper.

Nor were these sorts of conversations limited to merchants, officials, nobles, and courtiers, howsoever important: they went all the way to the top. In countless royal audiences over the second half of 1603 and the first five months of 1604, King James was straightforward in his meetings first with Aremberg and then Villamediana, not letting their lack of powers to treat stop him from discussing the main issues of concern. In each case, the question of the sincerity of each side’s desire for peace was accompanied by other issues, such as whether the Dutch would be included in the treaty, and if they were not whether the English would continue to support them in any way, or if James would stop his subjects from crossing the Channel to go volunteer to continue the fight against Spain. They even discussed detailed logistics for the

\(^{11}\) “Passamos a la otra dificultad, que es si VM\(^d\) les concedería el libre comerçio de las Indias”, Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603; received 24 January/3 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, f.3.

\(^{12}\) “[Q]ue no deve de ser cumplida la palabra dada a los que nosotros llamamos erejes.” Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603; received 24 January/3 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, f.3.

\(^{13}\) “[P]ero que en las destado y de paz” Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603; received 24 January/3 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148, f.3v.
treaty negotiations right from the start, with James indicating how many commissioners each of
the Habsburg groups would be expected to send, and expressing his desire from the outset to
have the talks take place in England.14 These sorts of discussions continued regularly over the
course of the months that followed, with virtually every issue of any importance being addressed
in some way at some point with both the king and his ministers. Villamediana was consistently
sending back standalone reports indicating what it was that the English would be asking for in
the treaty, and significant portions of his frequent regular dispatches throughout his stay were
also given over to a discussion of these specifics.15 This, in turn, led to a detailed back-and-forth
between Villamediana, the Constable, Philip III, and his councilors of state over the course of the
many months that passed, about what they would be talking about and insisting upon in the
upcoming treaty negotiations.16 This debate was being consistently updated as further
information poured in from Villamediana’s continued encounters with James, his queen, his

14 In James’s first discussions with Aremberg, over the summer of 1603, he got right down to
specifics, dealing with the nature of the peace, detailing how he would try to bring the Dutch into
it too, but if that would not work, he still meant to be at peace with the Habsburgs. He also
stressed just how important it was that the King of Spain send commissioners as well, as
Villamediana had not, as yet, crossed over to England. “Traslado de la Respuesta del Rey de
Inglaterra sobre la propuesta del Conde de Aramberg,” AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 142. Enclosed
with Villamediana’s initial dispatch on arrival at the English court in Oxford, on 4/14 September
1603, ibid., doc 141. For Villamediana’s first audience of substance, on 29 September/8 October
1603, see “Copia de la platica que el conde de Villamediana hizo al Rey de Ynglaterra en la
audiencia Secreta” and “Respuesta que El Rey de Inglaterra dio a voca a Don Juan de Tassis en
la audiencia secreta de ocho de ottubre 1603,” AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 253-254.
15 See, for example, “Relación sacada de avisos dados al Conde de Villamediana por un
confidente”, enclosed with his dispatch of 28 November/8 December 1603, and received on 24
January/3 February 1604, AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 138-140. Also, Avisos de Londres (18/28
December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 138.
16 The correspondence is literally filled with it, but for some examples, see: Consulta of the
Council of State (Valladolid, 29 October/8 November 1603), royal response in margin, AGS
Estado, leg. 961, doc 73; Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 13/23 February 1604), AGS Estado,
leg. 842, doc 74; Constable to Philip III (Ghent, 31 March/10 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842,
docs 100-101; Villamediana to Constable (7/17 April 1604, AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 100;
Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 95-96.
ministers, courtiers, merchants, and just about anyone else he could get his hands on.\textsuperscript{17} And these encounters were themselves two-way interactions, where as much information was being conveyed as received – all of which was enhanced and elaborated upon by networks of spies and informants in each country. So by the time that the peace talks themselves got underway in May 1604, both sides had a pretty good idea of what to expect with regard to the general stances of each group going in. Which was important, considering just how much work was still left to be done in order to get from truce to treaty.

**Managing expectations**

Moreover, this intense period of lead-up and speculation did not stop at merely informing each side of what was to come. Rather, the entire process that we have examined in previous chapters also played a very important constructive role, helping manage expectations, especially on the Habsburg side.\textsuperscript{18} This was true in the broadest sense: that is, the events of the past year had quite simply conditioned the Spanish and Flemish to be prepared to expect much less out of the eventual treaty. From their perspective, the high hopes at James’s accession had been quickly let down, eventually appeared to have been dashed altogether, and it was only through persistence and the support of the new king that they were in a position even to achieve peace at all.\textsuperscript{19} Naturally, they would now be willing to accept a great deal less than they would have had

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{17} For example, see: Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 30 January/9 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 80-82; Villamediana to Constable (London, 25 February/6 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 4-5.
  \item \textsuperscript{18} Though this was not exclusively so, as it is also clear that James’s steadfast commitment to peace gradually brought England’s would-be hardliners around to where they understood that a treaty was eventually going to happen, and they would resign themselves to accepting it, albeit on the best possible terms.
  \item \textsuperscript{19} As we have seen, this was to a certain extent actually true, and to an even greater extent perceived to be true by the Habsburgs – with this perception itself playing an important role in helping bring the events to this point.
\end{itemize}
the talks begun in the immediate post-accession moment. Since they had in the interim become very familiar with the newly factionalized Jacobean court – and had come to believe that strong forces on James’s council and amongst the English political elite were opposed to the king’s plans and that it was all he could do to keep them at bay – the Habsburgs were now much less likely to push quite so hard on several of their most firmly held positions.

Indeed, this managing of expectations had also cut back entire hoped-for topics and lines of argument altogether – issues that had been at the very heart of Habsburg preparations all throughout the process, from King Philip on down. One of these had to do with English catholicism. As we have seen, Iberians at every level were sympathetic towards the plight of their fellow catholics across the sea, and many had believed that the death of Queen Elizabeth would lead to an easing of their burden, up to and including a general toleration and the conversion of the monarch himself. These hopes persisted for a while, but by the middle of the summer of 1603, it was becoming quite clear that not only would James not be converting any time soon, but his most powerful subjects in his new kingdom did not seem any more inclined towards supporting some sort of liberty of conscience than they had been during the reign of his predecessor.

The discovery of the Bye and Main plotters in July did nothing to help matters, and the growing factionalization at court and its concurrent internationalization over the following months made it appear that James had too much on his plate already to consider pushing things any further at this time. Rather than being susceptible to influence from Spain and the other catholic powers on the religious issue, the new British king appeared instead to face significant domestic pressure in the opposite direction. As with everything else, James actively encouraged this belief, and played up his “my hands are tied” approach in order to build the foundation for
future room for maneuver, both at home and abroad. The Hampton Court conference on the state of the church in January 1604 merely served once more to highlight the nature and existence of this opposition. While the results here did not bode well for the Puritans, James did not set himself up as a catholic sympathizer, but rather as a seeker of some sort of protestant middle way – yet again the king of both and neither. By late February, he had even gone so far as to issue a proclamation banishing all Jesuits and other catholic priests from the kingdom – an act which appeared to concerned Habsburg onlookers to have been very well received in England.\footnote{James’s proclamation against Jesuits and catholic priests, Spanish translation (Westminster, 22 February/3 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 3. Enclosed with copies of two letters from Villamediana to the Constable in the following dispatch: Villamediana to Philip III (London, 27 February/8 March 1604; received 28 March/7 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 2-6. For more on the Spanish view of the catholic question during the course of this first year or so, see chapter five, above. For some of its subsequent development, see chapters nine and ten.}

Villamediana, “as ambassador of the Catholic King and in the position that we are currently in” (i.e. about to negotiate a peace treaty), and “as much because of what will be necessary to negotiate with him for the benefit of the Catholics going forward as for what he has done here”, made it quite clear to the king immediately that Philip would not like this particular move.\footnote{“[P]areciendome que conviene y sea fuerza que yo lo haga hallandome aqui embaixador de Rey Catholico y en El punto que estamos, assi por razon de lo que el ha hecho como de lo que se ha de tratar con El en beneficio de los Catholicos adelante,” Villamediana to Constable (London, 26 February/7 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 6, ff.1-1v.} But in his explanation of James’s motives to the Constable (also sent to Philip, and seen by the Council of State), we see once more the belief that James was not acting out of personal conviction or opposition, but rather in response to domestic pressures. Specifically, concerns over his queen’s catholicism and any possible desires that she and James might thus have to lighten the load on the kingdom’s recusants, as well as fears over discord being sown and the
future possibility of rebellion encouraged by the said priests and Jesuits.22 Ultimately, the Spaniards believed this line of reasoning completely, as can be seen from Philip III’s remarkably optimistic response to these events, delivered to both Villamediana and the Constable, in which he emphasized his belief in James’s continued desire to help the catholics, and was relieved to hear that “the proclamation that that King made against the Jesuits was done not for religious reasons, but rather for those of state.”23 So even in this most definitive of moments, where one might expect the Habsburgs to see James as their enemy, the perceptions established over the course of the previous year (and before, with the king’s pre-accession diplomacy) held firm: James’s hands were tied once more, and the influence and pressure exercised by Spain’s enemies at the English court was yet again clearly to blame.

This grand trajectory of changing Habsburg perceptions about the possibilities for their English coreligionists was accompanied all along by a reevaluation of actual strategies and expectations. What one gets, from reading through all of the consultas and correspondence over the course of 1603 and 1604, is a sense of just how quickly Spanish feelings of possibility for catholicism in England at James’s accession came crashing down to earth, and yet how very concerned they remained nevertheless with the fate of their co-religionists under British rule. The changing news from England elicited frequent discussion of these issues in council, and without exception these discussions became lengthy, passionate debates, with opinions of all kinds being thrown around about what this all meant, and where to go from here. A typical

22 Villamediana to Constable (London, 26 February/7 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 6, ff.1v-2.
23 Philip’s thinking here was that Villamediana had had good success in insinuating himself in the English court, and in getting several people close to the king (including the queen herself) to say a number of very encouraging things regarding relief for the English catholics, and about the king’s true mind. From this, Philip reasoned, “se puede tener por buena señal que el placarte que hizo ese Rey contra los Jesuytas no fuesse por materia de religion sino destado.” Philip III to Villamediana (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 83, f.1v.
example of this is the *consulta* of 12/22 July 1603, in which the councilors responded to the pope’s letter urging peace, alongside the new reports of James’s continued heresy and the English catholics’ desperate plight. This was unusually long at over fifteen double-sided folio (entirely given over to councilors’ opinions on the issue, after a very short, one-and-a-half folio recap of the letters and reports they were responding to), and all of the key decision makers were present, including the duke of Lerma himself – something that only happened on the most important of occasions. At this point, the councilors were all upset over James’s religious profession “so blasphemous and diabolical,” and its implications for the future of the catholic faith in England.\(^{24}\) They talked about armed preparation, the relative merits of direct military or monetary support for the English catholics, buying influence at the English court, whether or not to push forward with peace negotiations, what to push for if they did, what should be done if negotiations were to fail, and much more. And yet, all of it was in direct response to the English religious situation, and spoken of almost exclusively in terms of how all of these things would help the cause of their oppressed coreligionists under James’s rule. Ultimately, the most powerful men at the table – including Lerma, Idiáquez, and the Constable – all stressed the importance of following the pope’s advice to walk the path of negotiation for now, and of waiting to see what their ambassador would discover once he arrived in England – mostly because they did not believe that they were in a strong enough position at the moment to do anything else without actually making the situation for the English catholics significantly worse.

From the beginning, Villamediana had been sent north with explicit instructions both to gain more information on the situation on the ground, and to try to obtain relief for the English catholics.\(^{24}\) Idiáquez’s phrase: “la confesión y protestación que aquel Rey hizo...es tan blasfema y diabolica”, *consulta* of the Council of State (Valladolid, 12/22 July 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 79, f.4.
catholics. Philip had tied this directly to political pressure on the English crown, telling his ambassador that he should use Spanish influence amongst this minority community in James’s new dominions as part of a stern reminder that bad things might happen if the new king continued to support Elizabeth’s policies of opposition to the Habsburgs. When it had become clear that James was secure on his throne and any kind of coercive pressure from the catholic direction would prove counterproductive, a plan for buying toleration (and perhaps even peace itself) was then put forward. As Albert Loomie’s work has shown, over the latter half of 1603 and early 1604, Villamediana and various other Habsburg agents at James’s court pursued this objective, establishing a close relationship and entering into detailed negotiations with several influential figures at court – most notably the Countess of Suffolk (wife of the Lord Chamberlain and especially close with Cecil) and Sir Thomas Lake (the king’s Latin secretary and frequent confidant). This continued to be a major concern in both Philip’s and Albert’s correspondence with their ambassadors in England, and its possible success and the current state of the English catholics was a topic of frequent discussion in the Spanish Council of State as the months went by.

But as the continued experience of this first year in England gradually brought with it an understanding of the nature of opposition at the English court – and of James’s apparently difficult position in relation to this – expectations were once more scaled back. The fate of the English catholics was never mentioned in the formal negotiations, and these plans, too, ultimately came to naught. And yet, while the actions of James and his ministers had ensured

25 “Instruccion que el Rey Phe’.3°. dio a Don Juan de Tassis su correo mayor quando le imbio por Embajador de Yngalaterra año 1603.” (Aranjuez, 19/29 April 1603), BNM, Mss 2347, ff.71v-72.
26 I will not go into a detailed description of these particular negotiations here, as this has already been effectively handled in Loomie’s work. See especially: Loomie, “Toleration and Diplomacy.”
that these attempts would prove unsuccessful at least up front, the Habsburgs were ultimately led to believe that the issue was sensitive, not hopeless, and consequently the way was left open for this to become an issue that would dominate relations, motivations, and perceptions over the course of the coming years.

In addition to the English catholic question, there was another key issue that had been expected to play an important role in the negotiations, but which was eventually postponed and would go unmentioned in the talks, thanks to the changed expectations over the course of that first year. This was the possibility of a marriage alliance between the Stuarts and the Habsburgs. As with catholic toleration, Philip discussed this topic in detail in Villamediana’s instructions, and it shows up frequently in his correspondence and the council’s consultas right up through the beginning of the peace talks. As this was a major issue that would carry forward to dominate the relationship throughout the entire period, we will for the sake of coherence and consistency wait until the final chapter to examine it in detail.

It is, however, important to understand here that the talk of a royal marriage was a crucial issue from the very beginning, forming a central part of Philip III’s approach to James and the future of the relationship since well before Elizabeth’s death. It was seen by many on the Spanish side as a means by which they not only might ensure English friendship or at least neutrality in coming conflicts, but also further the cause of the church both in the British Isles and throughout Europe as a whole. It was a frequent topic of discussion in the Habsburgs’ royal, ambassadorial, and conciliar correspondence from the very moment of James’s accession, straight on through the peace negotiations and beyond. And it was being discussed in England right alongside the talk of doing something for the catholics, and even more openly. A match was, in fact, one way in which the Spaniards felt that they might be able to help ease the plight of
their coreligionists under James’s rule, and so the issues were connected from the outset. While Villamediana and James spent much of the first year dancing around the issue (sometimes openly, sometimes much less so), rumors were abroad everywhere, and the ambassador had had countless direct conversations about it with a number of people at court, including frequent conversation with the queen, who consistently indicated her strong support.27

As was the case with the catholic issue, the scaling back of expectations caused by the events of that first year also led the Spaniards to hold off on much further talk of an Anglo-Spanish match at this time.28 At the beginning of the formal treaty negotiations, it became clear quite quickly that the English were not yet ready to discuss any kind of closer alliance beyond a simple end to the war, and so the Habsburgs refrained from bringing it up explicitly in the conference. But the Habsburgs continued to write to each other about the possibility, and the decision to postpone would provide another central issue around which the future of the relationship would continue to turn, consistently. Indeed, both the English catholic and Anglo-Spanish match issues would continue to be seen as fundamentally intertwined, all the way through until the last years of the king’s life.29 And while these issues were briefly shelved for the time being, the initial and seemingly promising discussions of them nevertheless gave

27 For details, please see chapter ten, below.
28 As the Constable explained to Philip in a letter right before the negotiations began, he had told Villamediana not to propose anything regarding the match in the conference, but if the English were to bring it up, he was to say that they were certainly interested, as long as their concerns about religion and the raising of the prince (i.e., in Spain) were fulfilled: “lo del Cassamiento de la señora Infanta en que por agora he escrito al de Villamediana que no les proponga nada, sino que si ellos movieren la platica les responda que la oyra VM[d]. de buena gana estando llano lo de la religion y criança”, Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604), received 3/13 May, AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 95, f.2.
29 They were usually discussed together, or one after the other, in the various ambassadorial and royal correspondence. In Philip’s instructions for Villamediana, for example, they constitute items six and seven, respectively. “Instruccion que el Rey Phe’.3º. dio a Don Juan de Tassis su correo mayor quando le imbio por Embajador de Yngalaterra año 1603.” (Aranjuez, 19/29 April 1603), BNM, Mss 2347, ff.71v-72
various key people on each side something to hold out hope for in the future – which undoubtedly helped in the achievement of the peace, and which would make them that much more inclined towards maintaining it in the years to come.

While most of the managing of expectations took place on the Habsburg side, they were not the only ones to ease off on their concerns over the course of the year leading up to the peace talks. For example, in letters sent on 12/22 and 13/23 October 1603 (and discussed in the Spanish Council of State two weeks later), Villamediana had laid out the three issues that he thought the English would be most likely to ask for in the peace: 1) freedom of conscience for the Dutch, 2) free trade in the East and West Indies, and 3) an Anglo-Spanish match.\textsuperscript{30} And in other dispatches and reports, he described, amongst other things, strong desires for the suppression of English catholic seminaries on Iberian and Flemish soil.\textsuperscript{31} But by the time that the talks began in May 1604, it was widely understood that the Dutch would not be willing to involve themselves in the peace talks unless Philip and the Archdukes not only granted freedom of conscience, but also recognition of the United Provinces’ full independence. And neither of these things was going to happen any time soon. Regarding the match, as we have seen with the Spaniards, so too with the English: much work had gone into this already between the two sides, and James had decided to hold off on such an alliance until a later date. As for the seminaries, the English had gotten the message about Spanish difficulties in restricting ecclesiastical matters, and they knew how to choose their battles. So the major push was made instead on freedom

\textsuperscript{30} Consulta of the Council of State (Valladolid, 29 October/8 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 961, doc 73, f.2v.
\textsuperscript{31} See, for example: “Relación sacada de un papel que un confidente dio al Conde de Villamediana que le funda en seys puntos”, enclosed with Villamediana to Philip III (Salibury, 28 November/8 December 1603; received 24 January/3 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 139-140. The issue is treated at doc 140, ff.3-3v. See also Aremberg to Albert (12/22 July 1603), Lonchay & Cuvelier, \textit{Correspondance de la Cour d’Espagne} I, 163.
from the Inquisition, and the catholic seminaries issue was set aside, to be dealt with subsequently from time to time, as part of the regular business of English ambassadors-in-residence at the courts of Spain and Flanders. And while navigation and trade to the Indies would, as we shall see, become a major concern over the course of the talks, it too would require some real backing off from both groups in order to get the treaty done. As can clearly be seen, the full year between James’s arrival in England and the beginning of the peace conference proper was a crucial period not only for the creation of the system, the formation of key strategies and perceptions, and actually getting the peace talks to occur – it also played a detailed and constructive part in the negotiation of the issues themselves.

**Coming to the table**

After all of this preparation, getting to know one another, and managing of expectations, feelings on the English side had turned towards the optimistic. Heading into the peace conference, hopes were high that all of the necessary steps had been taken, and that they would have a treaty in a matter of weeks. James was very excited when Villamediana informed him that the Constable had finally agreed to have the peace talks in England, and he had the lodgings at Somerset House prepared for the occasion. Cecil shared this optimism, writing to Winwood on March 29/April 8 that “the Constable of Castile hath now resolved to come hither, so as we expect the treaty within twenty days.”

But this optimism was premature, as the road ahead would still be far from easy. These formal negotiations would prove to be a much longer process than the English had anticipated, with a great deal of debate and compromise left to be done. There would, in fact, be moments of real difficulty, where the commissioners on each side appeared ready to abandon the talks

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32 Robert Cecil to Ralph Winwood (29 March/8 April 1604), Winwood II, 18.
altogether. And things began to look bad almost immediately. Not long after getting the British king and his ministers excited about the Habsburg decision to treat in England, Villamediana then notified them of the Constable’s “illness” and its apparent severity, and suggested that they proceed for now without him:

As the conference cannot be put off much longer it is suggested that d’Aremberg, Richardot, and other Councillors should conduct the negotiations. The Constable offers to send his powers by the hands of the Envoys; and begs the King to send his ships to convey them as soon as possible. The King and his ministers are not only surprised, but displeased and suspicious as well. The plea of health is held to be a mere excuse. The King was highly pleased at the prospect of receiving the Constable, and had already gone to great charges in preparing a lodging, but now they feel that they are being trifled with and openly show resentment.\(^{33}\)

After a year of waiting, and with negotiations set to begin, the king was in no mood to wait any longer, and so he ultimately agreed and sent his ships. But the English were clearly put out by this, and this episode did not help get things started on the right foot.

Moreover, the Habsburgs were not entirely confident even at this point that the peace talks would actually end in a treaty, and the English had become aware of this. They understood that the Constable had been in Antwerp looking to purchase “many and sundry jewels of great price”, to bestow as gifts upon his eventual trip to England. But he had refused to purchase them unless the jewelers would agree to refund them at full price if his trip to England were to end in failure.\(^{34}\) This matches up well with the uncertainty we see in the Constable’s own correspondence at the time. In a letter of 19/29 April, he wrote to Philip III indicating that he was resolved to wait in Flanders until the negotiations were done and it was time to sign the treaty articles. Rather than Cecil’s optimistic estimates of a matter of weeks, he assumed that these negotiations would take much of the summer, and that they would be hard fought. He was

\(^{33}\) Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 2/12 May 1604), CSPVen X, 150.

\(^{34}\) Ralph Winwood to Robert Cecil (Isendike, 3/13 May 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 85.
prepared to be involved from a distance, and lamented that he would not have his most capable advisor, Rovida, at his side when it looked like the talks might be in “danger of breaking off”.

But he knew that the senator would be more urgently needed in England at the negotiating table, where Villamediana would have his hands full having to deal alongside Richardot and the others all by himself.\(^{35}\)

Indeed, when Cecil informed Winwood of the decision to send for the Habsburg commissioners and to proceed without the Constable, he indicated his own doubts about the nature of the Spaniards’ excuses, as well as his thoughts about their perceptions of the negotiations’ likely success:

> we are upon the point of Treaty, as now will appear by the arrival of the Count of Arembergh and others, for whom his Majestie’s Ships went five Days ago, and are said to have brought them over, leaving the Constable sick behind them, which is alleadged here to be the only Occasion of his Stay. Though for my own Opinion, I never could conceive that he would absolutely engage himself, before some kind of Judgment might be made of the Success of the Treaty.\(^{36}\)

This was a far cry from his optimism of the previous month, or even of just a couple of weeks before. It was clear that the Spaniards were gearing up for a fight, and were not yet anywhere near ready to begin acting like this was “a done deal”.\(^{37}\)

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\(^{35}\) “[E]n todo caso corra la negoçiaçion y se lleve adelante avisandome a menudo lo que se ofresçe en ella para yrlle adviriendo, lo que fuere aproposito, y en todas maneras procurare entretenellas este verano como VM\(^d\) me manda, quando se descubra algun peligro de rotura, no dexara de tener de buena gana cerca de mi a Robida pero hara menos falta aca que alla, donde estaria mal Don Juan de Tassis sin un hombre como este tan inteligente y seguro, tratando con Richardote a solas”, Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 95, ff.1v-2.


\(^{37}\) In fact, in the Council of State’s *consulta* dealing with this letter, the councilors approved of the Constable’s choices and emphasized that the king had in fact “resolved and ordered” [*resuelto y ordenado*] that he not cross over to England “unless it was a done deal” [*sino fuere a cosa hecha*], because of the blow to Spanish honor “if after having gone over there, peace were not achieved” [*si después de passado alla no se efectuasse la paz*]. But a successful outcome was still important to them, and they did say that if the Constable really needed to head to
Nevertheless, despite this atmosphere of continued uncertainty, on 6/16 May the Habsburg commissioners (minus the Constable) at long last crossed the Channel from Gravelines to Dover aboard a squadron of English ships. Three days later, they arrived in London, and on 12/22 and 13/23 May, they had their first audiences with King James and Queen Anna. Within a week, James had named his commissioners to treat for peace, and the negotiations were finally ready to get underway.

**The people involved: a closer look**

So who exactly were these men that were going to be doing the negotiating, and what kinds of experiences and perceptions did they bring with them to the table? As the king’s principal secretary and most influential minister, Robert Cecil was the most significant voice on the English side. A tremendously talented politician and negotiator with long experience at both diplomatic issues and matters of state, Cecil was such a force to be reckoned with that both the Flemish and Spanish ambassadors had requested the aid of men on their side with similar talents specifically to face off against him. As Burghley’s son and Essex’s rival, he has usually been viewed by historians as essentially pro-peace, and some have gone so far as to consider him the sole architect of it. However, as we have already seen, Cecil stood to lose monetarily from the end of the war, he frequently spoke up about the importance of the Dutch and their cause, and he had been instrumental in carrying out James’s desire to keep England from moving towards peace in the last couple of years of Elizabeth’s life. Moreover, the near-universal perception at England at some point later on in order to help finish the negotiations off, he should do so, and he should accept King James’s hospitable offer to pay for the trip. *Consulta* of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 15/25 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2024, doc 85, f.1v.

38 Before carrying the commissioners across, the English Vice-Admiral and other captains paid the Constable a visit in Bergues, where they were “banquetò y regalô, de manera q uè fueron muy contentos”, *Condestable*, f.3v.

39 The Spaniards went on the first day, the Flemings on the second. *Condestable*, ff.3v-4.
the time by everyone outside of England was that Cecil was a main opponent of the king’s desired policies and natural inclinations.\textsuperscript{40} The Habsburgs saw him as one of the greatest threats to the peace, who if given a chance might very well sabotage the proceedings, and because of this and his obvious power in the government he was considered the most important minister for them to find some way to neutralize, win over, or pay off.\textsuperscript{41}

That said, as key a player as Cecil definitely was, historians have had a tendency to look at his position as the most frequent speaker in the journal of the proceedings and to extrapolate from this that the English position was almost entirely a result of Cecil’s own ideas, centered exclusively on his negotiating skills, which may even have embodied some sort of master plan of his carried forward since Queen Elizabeth’s time.\textsuperscript{42} Despite his unquestionable importance, this tendency certainly overstates Cecil’s role, both in relation to the contributions of his fellow commissioners, and with regard to the opinions and input of his sovereign. And when this overstatement is combined with the misguided assumption that Cecil was a main supporter of peace, and is then added to the lack of awareness of the very different Habsburg perceptions about his motivations, one can see just how easy it is to get off track here rather quickly.

\textsuperscript{40} Explained in detail in chapters two through four, above.
\textsuperscript{41} For the perception of obstruction and the attempt to break off the proceedings, see: “Avisos de Londres” (London, 18/28 December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 138, f.1, quoted above in chapter four. As late as the end of April, right before Rovida and the Flemish commissioners left for England to begin the negotiations, the Constable wrote to Philip III referring to Cecil and the Lord Admiral as being among the “malafectos” opposed to peace, and stressing the importance of winning them over: Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604; received 3/13 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 95, f.2v. And even two weeks later, Villamediana was still writing of Cecil’s opposition to peace and support of the Dutch: “Tambien he escrito a Ve lo que importava ganar a Siçil assi por la duda con que siempre he estado de que no hera amigo de la Paz, como por tenelle no por Franças de naturaleza, pero amigo y estrecho de los Rebeldes,” Villamediana to Constable (London, 3/13 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 62, f.3v.
\textsuperscript{42} Most recently: Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 140.
This was not a matter of the head of the late Elizabethan peace party joining up with the leaders of a newly elevated and pro-Spanish Howard faction in order to negotiate with England’s enemies, as it has traditionally been assumed. Nor was it just Robert Cecil and a bunch of empty tunics. Far from it. However much his colleagues might defer to his talents and influence, Cecil was still technically the lowest ranking member of the delegation, and his fellow commissioners were a very well-respected and accomplished group of individuals. Moreover, the only voice on the English side that can with some certainty be said to have been fully in support of peace with Spain was Lord Treasurer Dorset. And yet, even he was not nearly as outspoken about this as he had been in previous years, as his greatest argument for ending the war with Spain had actually disappeared with the end of the conflict in Ireland.

Previous historians of the peace and of the early Jacobean years have tended to forget just how talented and experienced the Lord Treasurer was. A very able administrator and political thinker, and an accomplished poet to boot, who was cut from a similarly cautious cloth as that of Cecil’s father, the late Lord Burghley, Dorset was quite simply the most experienced diplomatic mind on the English side of the table. He had been dealing with foreign policy in a serious way for almost forty years, and over that time had headed numerous embassies to the continent. He had dealt with the Habsburgs, the French, and the Dutch, both on their ground and in England, and had long been considered an Elizabethan expert on policy in the Low Countries. As Lord Treasurer, he was especially concerned with expenditure, and his own vocal advocacy for peace with Spain had always been expressed specifically in these terms. He had also been, along with the Lord Admiral and Secretary Cecil, one of the principal negotiators with Aremberg,

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Richardot, and Verreyken in the previous years’ attempts at peace. He was no stranger to confrontation, and did not back down when the going got rough, successfully standing up to both of Elizabeth’s preeminent favorites, Leicester and Essex, each time defending himself eloquently. Moreover, we know that peace or war remained for him an issue of particular interest, from a letter he wrote to Cecil in May 1603, in which he indicated that his treasury responsibilities had him too busy to participate much in the various formal ceremonies of the court and council at that point, but that, “When the main consultation shall be touching peace or war, then I desire to be one for discharge of my duty both to his Majesty and my country”.

Dorset was a highly accomplished, talented, and active minister, and the chance to participate in these negotiations mattered to him a great deal.

The same sorts of things can be said for the rest of the English commissioners, and there was no talent drop-off whatsoever as one went down the line. Moreover, in each case – whatever their ultimate positions down the road – they had at this point all been either leading voices against the peace, or were at least perceived by the Habsburgs as having been disinclined towards it in varying degrees. Take, for example, the earl of Devonshire. Usually thought of merely for his prowess as a soldier, he was in fact a very intelligent man quite given to study. A strategic genius with a passion for mathematics, Devonshire’s desire for active service in the field had often been at odds with Elizabeth’s desire to put his extensive talents to use at court and ultimately at the council table. Of course, he did have a point, as he had had tremendous military experience and success over the years, fighting the Spanish in the Low Countries, in the

44 Lord Treasurer Buckhurst to Robert Cecil (May[?] 1603), HMC Salisbury XV, 115.
45 For more, see: Rivkah Zim, "A Poet in Politics: Thomas Sackville, Lord Buckhurst and First Earl of Dorset (1536-1608)," Historical Research 79, no. 204 (2006).
Armada campaign, in the Azores, and in Ireland. In the end he had been willing and able to do what Essex had not: leading the reconquest of Ireland, and defeating a Spanish army in the process, crushing their expeditionary force at Kinsale in early 1602. In addition to being allied with Cecil, he had also been a close confidant of Essex, and from at least the summer of 1603 was believed to have been fully in the French camp. All told, Devonshire was no weak link, and was far from someone one might consider to be friendly to Spanish interests.

Then there was the Lord Admiral, Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham. Perhaps most famous as the naval commander of the English fleet in the fight against the Spanish Armada in 1588, he had also headed up various other successful expeditions against the Habsburgs, most notably as co-commander with Essex of the sack of Cádiz in 1596 – the very performance which had earned him his earldom. This experience and the reputation he had earned from it, combined with his own status as the one individual making the most money off of the war, led the Habsburgs to see Nottingham as one of the greatest opponents to peace in England. He was closely connected to Cecil personally, politically, and financially (they even owned ships together), and the Spaniards and Flemings usually spoke of the two of them in the same breath when referring to ministers opposed to the peace and difficulties that would have to be overcome. As with Lord Treasurer Dorset, historians have had a tendency to underestimate the

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48 And this would continue to bear out, as he wrote to Cecil of his happiness in response to the news of Dutch successes around the time of the fall of Sluys, after the treaty negotiations had been complete for some time: “I am not a little glad of their good success in the Low Countries, for I cannot but still think we have a great interest in their fortunes.” Devonshire to Cecil (Wanstead, 11/21 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 221-2.
49 See, for example: Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 24 October/3 November 1603; received 14/24 December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 153bis, f.1; Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604; received 26 February/7 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.10. Moreover, as Thomas Wilson was reporting back to Cecil, these views were being discussed openly back in Spain at this time: “This weeke I have ben in company wher ther hath
Lord Admiral’s political skills, or even to dismiss him altogether. But Nottingham was also experienced at these sorts of negotiations, having played a major role in English government over the past several years, as well as an integral part in the previous discussions for peace, alongside both Cecil and Dorset. And the Habsburg commissioners’ views of his role in the negotiations, James’s deference to his experience and expertise in his instructions for the subsequent 1605 embassy to Spain, and Spanish perceptions of his behavior while in their country all underscore his apparently high level of political and diplomatic competence, as well as his contemporaries’ belief in this.50

Finally, there was Henry Howard, the earl of Northampton. He was the supposedly pro-Spanish, crypto-catholic rising star, who was quickly becoming one of the king’s closest advisors, and was soon to be the effective head of the Howard family in English politics.

50 For his performance while in Spain, see chapters seven and eight, below. For his instructions from James, see: BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.1-4v. For his participation here, which clearly made a strong impression on the Habsburgs, see the Constable’s margin notes of Villamediana’s 18/28 June 1604 report on possible candidates for a Spanish faction at James’s court, in which he disagrees with the count’s optimism about Nottingham’s possible future support of Spanish interests, given “that which the Count himself wrote of the conference of 28 June” [the same day this report was sent], in which the Lord Admiral was “opposed to that which had already been agreed to regarding the Indies.” Original: “No me parece que Corresponde el Almirante a la opinion que muestra aqui tener el conde del por lo que el mismo Conde scrive de la conferencia de 28 de Junio que en efeto fue oponerse contra o que ya tenian acordado de las Indias.” “Memoria de las personas a quien se deven contentar en este Reyno, assi por su calidad, cargos, ofiçios, y servicios, que han hecho en esta ocassion como por los que adelante se pueden esperar dellos”, AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 118, f.1. There is also an (unfortunately imperfect) English translation of this document published at Loomie, "Toleration and Diplomacy," 52.. For an example of Nottingham’s own preparation for the previous attempt at peace, see: “L. Admirall. A Memoriall of some things to be required when the Treaty shalbe.” [endorsement] “Demandes to be maed by her Majesty’s comissioners in the trete of pece between her Majesty and the K. of Spayne.” [title] BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.372-373v.
Traditionally identified as the epitome of Spanish influence and corruption at James’s court, he
looked nothing whatsoever like that here. In the negotiations, he fought right alongside Cecil,
particularly with regard to the question of trade with the Indies, pushing a hard line throughout,
and speaking up openly and often. He was widely acknowledged as one of the most learned men
in England, and he had come prepared, commissioning beforehand a comprehensive study of the
various issues and precedents from his client, the great intellectual and antiquarian Robert
Cotton, amongst others, from which he borrowed repeatedly in his long Latin orations and
frequent in-session argumentation.\footnote{BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.47-50v, 158-162, 449-452v.}
Also, not only had Northampton not been an outwardly
vocal supporter of peace, it has even been suggested that he may have in fact been the author of
the notable hawkish treatise from 1603, “A Loyall Subjectes Advertisment.”\footnote{Mackie, "'a Loyall Subjectes Advertisment' as to the Unpopularity of James I's Government in England, 1603-4."}
Whatever the
case may be, his fine words and subsequent behavior after the peace was signed notwithstanding,
Northampton’s actions in the lead-up and during the negotiations themselves showed him to be
something other than a simple friend to Spain. As far as explaining motivations goes, it is likely
that at this point Northampton was still trying to prove his credentials to the new king by pushing
hard in directions that people would not expect him to, given his immediate family’s catholic-
and foreign-intrigue-riddled past.\footnote{Northampton’s public approach would not change markedly even after the achievement of the peace, as his enthusiastic behavior demonstrated here would continue on through his significant role in prosecuting the Gunpowder Plotters in 1605-06.}
He had, after all, operated similarly in his appeals to
Elizabeth, and in his support first for the earl of Essex, and then for Robert Cecil and his group.
The peace talks could also be considered something of an audition for the Habsburg audience as
well, given Northampton’s future role as a sympathetic supporter of Spanish interests at the
But if so, his performance did not appear to please them entirely, as he did receive a Spanish pension, but the initial figure proposed was cut by twenty percent after seeing his participation in the negotiations.

Contrary to the way these events have typically been told, these perspectives and all of this experience played a direct role throughout the negotiations themselves. This was a collaborative effort, with full and active participation by everyone on both sides. For the English, it is true that Cecil was the big talker, followed to a lesser extent by Northampton. But this did not mean that they were the sole initiators of the strategies of argumentation, or that the others sat still and did not participate. This was not a free-for-all; people would not have just been speaking up willy-nilly. Each group had its appointed spokesman, who usually conveyed the general opinions of the delegation – but typically only after consultation amongst all the members. And what we know of Dorset’s, Devonshire’s, and Northampton’s experience with diplomacy, policy, and intellectual matters – as well as Nottingham’s political experience, knowledge of naval affairs, and subsequent behavior and success in the embassy to Spain – makes it pretty clear that this would have been far from a matter of Robert Cecil and a group of yes-men.

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54 Indeed, at the beginning of the negotiations the Constable clearly considered Northampton to be favorably disposed towards the affairs of Spain, though not firmly so as Dorset was widely believed to be. Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 9 June 1604; received 12/22 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 51/52, f.1v. See also: Thomas Wilson to de Veras [Robert Cecil] (9/19 July 1604), TNA: PRO 94/10, f.67.

55 He was originally scheduled to receive 5,000 escudos per year, according to the Constable’s report sent off in July 1604 [AGS Estado, leg. 2512, doc 15], based on what he had heard from Villamediana in his report of 18/28 June. But as of July 1605, it had been lowered to 4,000, while several others’ amounts had actually been raised. AGS Estado, leg. 2512, doc 16. In general, Northampton seems to have been cut from a very similar cloth as his own king, and temperamentally suited towards playing to all sides.
The same holds true for the Habsburgs, but the traditional historical view of their representatives has been very different from that of the English commissioners, and thus requires a different correction here. In their case, the tendency has not been to overplay the role of the primary spokesman (as in the case with Cecil), but rather to downplay or ignore Cecil’s actual counterpart on the other side of the table, and to overplay the role of the Flemings.\footnote{Croft repeatedly goes out of her way to emphasize the extent to which the Flemings were supposedly the ones running the negotiations from the Habsburg side. But her only real evidence for this is the fact that the three commissioners for the Archdukes had been involved in the previous peace negotiations and that Villamediana was inexperienced at the time of his appointment in 1603. She does not seem to know anything about Rovida beyond his basic credentials listed in the preface to the treaty articles, dismissing him as simply “obscure”. Croft, “Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain,” 141, 49. While, as we have seen, there certainly were rivalries and some real distrust between the groups, the two Habsburg parties were nevertheless largely on the same page on every issue, and even in the times when there were some feathers ruffled early on, the Spaniards had approved of the decisions taken. The Constable’s distrust of the Flemish commissioners stemmed mostly from his belief that they were too desirous of peace at all costs, and would not negotiate from a position of strength. Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 10/20 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 137, f.1v. Moreover, as autonomous and sovereign as the Archdukes were, and as admittedly concerned as the Constable was that Richardot and his colleagues might have somewhat different ends in the negotiations, there still was a great deal of Spanish overlap within their government. Various of Albert and Isabel’s councils had a number of Spaniards on them, including almost the entire membership of their Council of War. And as for the Flemish Council of State, not only were Aremberg, Richardot, and Verreyken all members, so too was Villamediana’s own uncle, Juan Bautista de Tassis, by 1603 the Spanish ambassador to France. And of course, the Spanish monarchy was still responsible for funding the war against the Dutch. For lists of all those serving on these various councils, see: “Provinces subject to the Infant of Spayne Isabella Clara Eugenia and the ArchDuke Albert of Austria by vertue of a donation made unto them by the ould Kinge of Spayne Philip the 2d and confirmed by the K. that now is ye 3d and accepted and ratefied by the States and people of the particular provinces.” BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.437-440.} While it is true that Aremberg, Richardot, and Verreyken had all played a part in the previous attempts at peace and thus had some direct experience negotiating with some of the very men now seated across from them, they did not in fact play the most prominent role for their side in these meetings. This fell to the Spanish delegation, and most specifically to the main Habsburg spokesman, the Constable’s right-hand-man, Alessandro Rovida. A senator and lawyer from...
Milan, Rovida was the Constable’s personal choice for this position, and he requested him right away, even before setting forth from Spain. The Council of State discussed the request and heartily agreed, making explicit reference in their explanation to their belief that neither Richardot nor any of the other officials in Flanders could be trusted to get this right, and thus sent for the senator. Once in Flanders, the Constable raved about him continually, drawing praise in response from King Philip himself. By late March, his upcoming position in the negotiations had become public enough that the Fuggers were reporting that the Constable was “also taking a very learned and distinguished man from Milan to be his spokesman.”

In the conference, Rovida was the main negotiator and chosen spokesman for their side of the table, more often than not the one to answer directly in the regular flow of the debate, and he played the same role as Cecil in delivering the group response after private conferences about how to proceed. James was very impressed with him, and said after the speech Rovida gave in his first audience that he had “never in his life heard anyone speak Latin better.”

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57 “El Condestable de Castilla puso en consideracion al Consejo que le pareçia que para el tratado de la Paz con Inglaterra convenia que le asistiesse una persona de letras de las partes y Qualidades que para tal efecto se requiere, y que esta fuese de aca o de Italia, pues del Presidente Richardot ni de otro letrado de los que ay en Flandes no se podia con seguridad hechar mano, y advirtio que podria yr uno de los senadores de Milan pues los ay de muchas letras y noticia de negoçios de Estado y podra acudir con mas facilidad que de otra parte. Y aviendo El Consejo platicado sobrello, le pareçe muy conveniente lo que El Condestable propone y advierte y que se podria escrivir al Governador de Milan que quando El le avisare ordene al Senador que El señalare que se parta luego y acuda a la parte que le advirtiere si ninguna dilacion,” consulta of the Council of State (Valladolid, 29 September/9 October 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 77, f.1.

58 See, for example: Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 10/20 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 137, f.1v (Constable’s effusive praise and desire to have him “shine” in the upcoming peace conference), 2v (Philip’s approving response for having sent for “El Senador Rubida por ser tan buen letrado”). See also his similar comments at: Philip III to Constable (Valladolid, 11/21 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 56, f.1.

59 Fugger newsletter (Cologne, 15/25 March 1604), Klarwill, Fugger News-letters, 338.

60 As Villamediana tells it: “Que el Rey huviese dicho que en su vida huviese oyo hablar a nadie mejor en latin”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg.
eloquence and skill shined through over the course of the negotiations, as the Milanese senator routinely matched both Cecil and Northampton at their game each time one of them came out with either a tough bargaining position or a learned speech filled with references to history, law, and precedent. All in all, he was a big reason why the Habsburgs were able to stand firm on so many issues without either giving in or abandoning the talks completely, and why they were ultimately able to come away from the table with as much as they did.

Still, while Rovida and, to a lesser extent, Richardot were the main Habsburg voices heard, we must not go too far in the other direction and suggest that they were acting on their own, or that their colleagues were significantly less involved. After all, Villamediana and Aremberg were the actual ambassadors here, the highest-ranking men in each delegation. They had both lived at James’s court for a significant period of time, and had spent an even longer period involved in direct correspondence with their respective sovereigns, poring over these particular issues in great detail. While they might not have been the most eloquent of speakers or the quickest in a debate taking place in multiple languages at once, they certainly had a wealth of knowledge and experience upon which to draw and from which to inform Habsburg responses.

842, doc 60, f.1v. This was a particularly high compliment coming from James. The speech and the king’s response, both in Latin, are printed at Condestable, ff.3v-4. Spanish translations of both can be found at: BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.33-33v.

61 The correspondence of both Villamediana and the Constable continued to be enthusiastic in their praise of Rovida throughout. For some examples, see: Constable to Villamediana “respondiendo a la carta suya de primero de Junio 1604” (no date or place, but must have been no later than about 1/11 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 53/54; Villamediana to Philip III (Dover, 7/17 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 161, ff.2-2v.

62 In fact, again, this was precisely why the Constable wanted him present, as he was afraid that the Flemish commissioners would be too quick to capitulate on the various issues.

63 While Croft is more than fair to Aremberg, her take on Villamediana is unfortunate. After basing her analysis of his supposedly inconsequential role on initial perceptions of his inexperience, she then totally dismisses his crucial time in England in the nine months leading up to the talks (most of that as the lone Habsburg ambassador at James’s court), and overstates the role of the Archdukes in the same period, making it appear as if the Spaniards did not really want
And despite the early concerns expressed the previous year about Villamediana’s abilities, his hard and thorough work since then had quickly begun to change minds. Even when things appeared at their worst in the summer of 1603, Lerma, the Constable, and Idiáquez all stressed the importance of waiting to see what their ambassador discovered at court before acting. Just a few short months later, the various members of the Spanish Council of State were praising his work, expressing surprise at just how far he had come, and recommending that he be rewarded substantially for the “valor and prudence” with which he had proceeded.\textsuperscript{64} Juan de Borja, count of Ficallo, went out of his way to emphasize that the Constable (then still on his journey northward) should be told just how good a job Villamediana was doing, and that the ambassador needed to be kept in England for the peace talks when they occurred.\textsuperscript{65} This praise continued into the new year, and right on through the negotiations themselves, with Philip, the Constable, and each of the various members of the Council all expressing their pleasure at Villamediana’s performance and the news he reported back to them.\textsuperscript{66} Simply put, as was the case with the peace, and as if those in Flanders spent the entire time from James’s accession right up through the signing of the treaty dragging them into it. Along the way, Croft correctly stresses the important role of Aremberg, but never mentions that this “experienced negotiator,” supposedly so different from “the unimpressive Tassis” (Villamediana), also arrived in England in 1603 with no powers to treat, merely on a mission to congratulate James, and that he had to be sent home in October to get those powers and would not return again until May. Nor does she mention that Aremberg was also quickly overmatched, mocked by James as an “ambassador who could neither speak nor walk”, and was before long writing back to Brussels himself asking that they send someone more skilled at negotiations (specifically Richardot) to help him out.\textsuperscript{64} Consulta of the Council of State (Valladolid, 29 October/8 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 73, ff.3, 4-4v, 5v-6v.\textsuperscript{65} Consulta of the Council of State (Valladolid, 29 October/8 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 2511, doc 73, f.5v.\textsuperscript{66} And they were happy enough with him to keep him in his position all the way through the end of the summer of 1605, despite the explicit admission that the English embassy was their most important diplomatic posting of all. Consulta of the Council of State, “Proponiendo personas para las Embaxadas de Inglaterra y Flandes” (Valladolid, 4/14 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2512, doc 18, f.1v.
English commissioners, this too was a well-rounded and talented team, with no weak link to be found anywhere along the table.

Nor did the personnel involved in the negotiations stop with the official commissioners. For example, we know that Thomas Edmondes was present throughout the conference, and that both he and Daniel Dun – both very experienced in these sorts of matters – were responsible for composing the final draft of the treaty articles once everything had been agreed upon.67 Edmondes had already been the English chargé d’affairs in France, an envoy to Brussels, and had helped set up and served as a commissioner in the failed 1600 Anglo-Spanish peace negotiations at Boulogne.68 He was brought in here to participate explicitly in response to the presence of Rovida: “having seen that the Sentator was a lawyer,” they got Edmondes into the room “under pretext of carrying their pouch of papers”, and he remained throughout each of the sessions, standing “on his feet and behind their councilors”.69 As for Dun, he was another legal


68 Edmondes was one of the top diplomatic talents of his generation, and would serve after the achievement of the peace as the resident ambassador first to the Archdukes, then in France, before ultimately becoming a member of the privy council and exercising real influence back at home. M. Greengrass, “Edmondes, Sir Thomas (d. 1639)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004 [accessed 23 Oct 2004: http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/8486].

69 “Con achaque de llevar la bolsa de sus papeles metieron los Ingleses un secretario del consejo de Estado Ingles, que pienso que fue de los que fueron a Boloñia…aviendo visto que El Senador fuese letrado…y El Secretario estuviesen en pie y detrás de sus consejeros”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.2v. Edmondes’s admission to the proceedings is also mentioned at: Jones and Munck, "The Journal of Levinus Munck," 252. For the Constable’s acceptance of Edmondes’s presence, see: Constable to Villamediana “respondiendo a la carta suya de primero de Junio 1604” (no date or place given), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 53-54, f.1v.
expert with extensive experience working particularly on “delicate and complicated maritime matters, including merchants’ grievances, disputes between English and foreign merchants, and cases concerning doubtful prizes, embezzlement, or piracy.” He had negotiated such matters with French, Danish, and Hanseatic agents, and had only recently returned from dealing with these very issues in Bremen. Both of these men must certainly have been a tremendous help to the commissioners throughout, and both would continue where the English lords left off at the end of the formal sessions, working with Richardot and Rovida on minor details of the treaty articles and their final wording, right up until the moment the king signed his name. And both played a major role afterwards, alongside Rovida once more, in the subsequent negotiations to resolve the Spanish 30% tariff issue with both the French and the Hanse, formally mediated by King James.

Moreover, a number of the most important voices in these negotiations were not even in the room at all. All along, the Habsburgs were sending off frequent couriers to the Constable and the Archdukes in Flanders, who were writing back quickly with their take and with occasional further instructions. Admittedly, they could not be on top of every issue, given this significant-enough distance. But compared to the Spanish court, which was for all intents and purposes simply too far off to be able to play any kind of role at all, Flanders was not really all that distant. Most of the issues were discussed over the course of a number of sessions, and there was often a break of at least a couple of days between meetings, and sometimes longer. So there was certainly time to get some input on any areas of difficulty and to make sure that they were not overstepping their powers at any point.

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But neither the Constable nor the Archdukes were in anywhere near the position as the one person who played perhaps the most influential role of all in these events: King James himself. As James had indicated to Villamediana when the Habsburgs had finally agreed on the conference location, and as the English ministers had emphasized to the ambassador before that, one of the main reasons for having the talks in England was that the king planned on playing a significant part. He made this very clear once more in his instructions to his commissioners, which he issued in two parts. One set was taken out of the previous instructions drawn up for the Boulogne conference. After all, in contrast to the gradual scaling back of expectations on the Habsburg side over the course of James’s first year on the throne, the ultimate aims for the English had not really needed to change substantially, and as we have seen, many of the same people who had done the preparation several years before were the same ones in this room. So James went ahead and took the general instructions and powers to treat from there, to constitute the copy that the commissioners might show parts of to their Habsburg counterparts if and when it might become necessary so to do.71 But James also issued a separate, private addendum to these instructions, secretly limiting his ministers’ ostensibly plenary powers, and laying out in no uncertain terms just how significant a role he planned on playing throughout the talks:

Wherein although we have given you in appearance a plenary power to treat and conclude, because the tenor of the Commyssions must be reciprocally answered on our part, yet being resolved in this occasion to be the director and decyder of all essentail circumstances, which may occure in the Treaty, and therein to use the advice of the rest of our Privy Councill, we have thought good to adde to our said Commyssion this pryvate explanation of our meaning in the use thereof, which is that you shall forbeare (notwithstanding the Commysion visible to those, which are deputed on the behalf of the other prynces) to give any sure assent affirmatively or negatively in bynding maner to

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71 These can be found at: BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.53-61v. Another copy is available at: PRO: TNA, SP 94/10, ff.17v-23. Another piece, a draft preamble to these powers, can be found at: BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.93-94v; with another copy at PRO: TNA, SP 94/10, ff.38-39v.
any mayne point, untill you have first related the same unto us, and receaved our approbation or direction in the same.\textsuperscript{72}

Cecil and his colleagues had been given their powers essentially for show. James was “resolved” to be the “director and decyder” here, and he ordered his commissioners to consult with him about every important issue, and in each case to wait on giving a definitive answer until he had told them what to say. As we shall see, and in contrast to what has been traditionally claimed, this would turn out to be exactly what they did.

The negotiations begin

On Sunday, 20/30 May 1604, the long-awaited peace negotiations between England, Spain, and Flanders finally began. The meetings would be held in Somerset House, right in the heart of London, which was also where the Spanish commissioners, Villamediana and Rovida, were being housed while in the city. What is arguably the single most important passage in the entire journal of the treaty proceedings comes alongside the description of this setting on the very first page:

A fair great chamber, heretofore used for the council-chamber in the said house, was expressly prepared by his majesty for the said meeting, and it was thought fit to give the said commissioners the place of the right hand at the table, in respect of the great honour done to his majesty in sending of the said commissioners to treat here within this realm.\textsuperscript{73}

It simply cannot be stressed enough just how significant it was to the actual success of the proceedings that James had managed to convince the Habsburgs to treat in England. Because of

\textsuperscript{72} BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, f.81. Another copy at TNA, SP 94/10, f.17. Emphasis added. This was signed by the king and dated 22 May/1 June, the same day as the second conference session, when James overruled his commissioners, resolving the issue of proper Habsburg powers to treat.

\textsuperscript{73} “Journal of the Conference”, 245. As Villamediana described it, “there was a long table with ten chairs of cloth-of-gold, five on each side”; original: “estava la mesa larga con X sillas de Tela de oro, cinco por cada vanda”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.1.
this simple but hard-fought solution, the Habsburgs could be given precedence as honored guests, avoiding the months of totally unproductive bickering that had characterized the failed Boulogne negotiations, and which had kept them then from moving forward to deal with any substantial issues whatsoever. The very fact that these men were all together in a room, sitting around a table, ready to talk business, was in itself a remarkable achievement.

The precedence issue was, however, not the only major procedural hurdle that stood in the way of actual progress. The other issue that had helped torpedo the peace conference in 1600 before it had even gotten going was the seemingly straightforward matter of obtaining proper powers to treat. Given the English commissioners’ experience with this issue back then, their subsequent similar experiences when first Aremberg and then Villamediana had arrived ready to talk but without actual powers to treat, and the fact that four of the five men sitting across the table from them now were the actual offending parties from each of these previous occasions – it was understandable that Cecil and his colleagues would be particularly careful this time to make sure everything was handled in an entirely unimpeachable fashion.  

Consequently, the first meeting was given over completely to formal introductions and a close look at the delegations’ credentials. The earl of Northampton began by welcoming their guests with a speech in Latin, “fraught according to the manner of the times, with many quotations and allusions to the sacred scriptures, and the Grecian and Roman literature, among

74 Indeed, Essex had warned against this very issue in his widely read and recently re-published contribution to the war vs. peace debate: “But remember how heretofore the Spanish Kings Lieuetenant and other ministers have pretended Commission, when they had none; yea, have drawn us to treatie, ere they had received power to conclude. Remember also how that the King hath sent a Comission out of Spaine to be openly shewed, that Treatie might bee intertayned, when it is notorious to the worlde, he never meant to conclude any peace.” Devereux, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, f.9v.
other things”.\footnote{“Journal of the Conference”, 245.} This was followed by a “good speech in Latin” by Rovida,\footnote{“[A] lo qual le respondí el Senador Rubida otra oraçion en Latin muy buena”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.1v. While the Journal only mentions the speech, it is printed in its entirety in the orginal Latin at \textit{Condestable}, ff.4v-6.} said to be of “greater length, and more religious, learned, and elaborate than that of Northampton”, in which he “bestow[ed] the highest praises on king James on account of his pacific disposition” and “express[ed] the utmost satisfaction and joy at the general appearance of a pacific disposition throughout Europe”.\footnote{“Journal of the Conference”, 245.} He made particular reference not only to the ancient and long-standing relationship between England and Spain, but also to “the particular friendship” that had existed between Philip II and James’s mother Mary Queen of Scots, as well as that which had always existed between Philip III and James himself.\footnote{In Villamediana’s words: “mostrando el desseo del Rey nuestro señor a la paz, alegando la antigua entre España y Inglaterra, y la particular amistad que huvo entre el Rey nuestro señor que esta en el cielo y la Reyna de Escocia su madre y avia avido entre este Rey y Su M’d. y que por su parte la Conservaria mostrando a nuestro señor y a todo el mundo que no fuesen por su quenta Los Daños y Calamidades de la guerra, el beneficio que se podia esperar de la paz, que si pudiere avellas originales las embiare a VE.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.1v. The entire speech is printed in Latin in the \textit{relación} of the Constable’s embassy: \textit{Condestable}, ff.4v-6.} This was followed by a speech in French by Richardot, representing the Archdukes’ commissioners, and conveying “the affectionate desire of his princes to continue and maintain the good amity which had been ever between his majesty and them”.\footnote{“Journal of the Conference”, 245.}

After the speeches were over, they moved on to their powers to treat.\footnote{For the Constable’s powers to treat from Philip III (Valladolid, 21 September/1 October 1603), and his subdelegation (Bergues, 5/15 May 1604), see TNA: PRO SP 94/10, ff.11-12v; see also BNM Mss 10794, ff.106v-126v. For the English commissioners’ powers to treat from James I, in addition to those cited in the pages above, see: Archives Generales du Royaume de Belgique} Villamediana went first, reading his from Philip III, followed by Lord Treasurer Dorset with that from King
James, Aremberg with the one from the Archdukes, and finally the subdelegation of Rovida from the Constable, with all sides exchanging written copies. The English commissioners did not respond to this immediately, but finding some of what they heard to be irregular, they “did therefore think fit to withdraw themselves to the lower end of the chamber, to advise of the objections that were necessary to be made to the said commissioners; and after some small time of conference among themselves thereupon, they returned to their former seats,” so Cecil could then give their agreed-upon response. He pointed out the inequality here, in that they “themselves representing the quality which they did of principal counsellor to the king’s majesty, should be referred to treat only with commissioners sub-delegated by derived power of the constable of Castile”, himself a subject of the king of Spain. And he indicated real doubt as to whether the specific language of these powers made them in fact sufficient to proceed.

Upon hearing this, the Spanish and Flemish commissioners likewise got up and went down to the end of the hall, talked things over amongst themselves, and then returned to their seats, where Rovida gave their response. After assuring the English that there was no ill-will meant, he cited both Vervins and Boulogne as positive precedents for accepting the particular language of their powers, which was in fact stronger than it had been in the former case, itself a

(AGRB), Papiers d’Etat et de l’Audience, vol. 364, ff.25-26. For the Flemish powers to treat from the Archdukes, see “Albert and Isabella; their commission to the D. d’Aremberg, J. Richardot, and L. Verreyken, to negotiate a peace with England”, (Brussels, 2/12 April 1604), BL, Cotton Mss, Galba E i, ff.260-261, also at ibid, ff.278-280v.
81 Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.2. “Journal of the Conference”, 246.
82 “Journal of the Conference”, 246. Villamediana says that they actually got up two times, presumably once after each set of their opposites’ powers was read. Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.2.
84 The English concern was not only with the subdelegation itself, but also with its particular wording, citing the negotiations for the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Vervin in 1598 as precedent for their skepticism. “Journal of the Conference”, 246.
successful treaty that had been signed and ratified by both sovereigns involved.\textsuperscript{85} This was an issue of enough significance that the English commissioners decided to adjourn for the day, so that they might “acquaint the king with the objections made by them and the answers made to the same, and therein receive his majesty’s resolution, without the which they durst not further to proceed for the present in a matter of so great weight, and so took leave of them for that time.”\textsuperscript{86}

Of course, while at least some of this was political theater, there were in fact real concerns here. While the English naturally did not want to undertake negotiations, expose themselves completely, and then have the rug pulled out from underneath them, the Habsburgs were concerned that something more nefarious might be afoot. After all, the English knew about the subdelegation issue ahead of time, as Cecil and Juan Bautista de Tassis (Villamediana’s kinsman, messenger, and interpreter) had talked about it more than a week before, on 11/21 May, when they were arranging for Rovida’s first audience with James. The conversation had even included discussion of the specific phrase “tratar y hazer tratar” that the English now apparently found so objectionable.\textsuperscript{87} And a couple of days later, on 13/23 May, Cecil had asked if the Habsburg commissioners might send him their respective powers, “in order not to waste time” during the negotiations.\textsuperscript{88} After discussing this amongst themselves, they had declined the request, insisting that this sort of business “was always done in the first meeting”, when each side would exchange their powers at once. As Villamediana explained, James had at that point not even officially named his five commissioners nor had he drawn up their powers, so they did

\textsuperscript{85} “Journal of the Conference”, 246-247.
\textsuperscript{86} “Journal of the Conference”, 247.
\textsuperscript{87} Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.1.
\textsuperscript{88} The request came “del Consejo de parte de Sicíl”, to ask “si holgaríamos de embialle a mostrar nuestros poderes para que no se perdisese tiempo”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.1v.
not want to be put at a disadvantage from the get-go.\textsuperscript{89} Indeed, to the Spaniards and other contemporary observers, it looked very much like Cecil was doing everything he could to try to come up with reasons to block the achievement of peace, as they had been suspecting he might all this time.

Two days after the first meeting, on 22 May/1 June, both sides reconvened for the second formal session, and the Habsburg commissioners asked how things stood. Cecil responded at great length, indicating that they had discussed the matter in detail with King James, and “that thereupon it had pleased his majesty to give them directions” on how to proceed.\textsuperscript{90} While James had several points to make regarding all of this, in the end the king “chose to prefer substance before circumstance”, and was willing to move ahead with the powers to treat as they were.\textsuperscript{91}

Once more, they had encountered one of the main issues that had contributed directly to the failure of the previous peace conference, and yet again James’s direct involvement was crucial in providing a solution and ensuring that the talks moved forward. Moreover, this was accomplished by playing the same game that had proven so successful over the past year, maintaining the public perception that the king and his key ministers were at odds over how to proceed, as can be seen from the Venetian ambassador’s take in his report back home: “Finally, after much discussion, the powers were admitted, though there is no doubt it was only the King’s known inclination towards peace that induced the English Commissioners to yield.”\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{89} Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.2.
\textsuperscript{90} “Journal of the Conference”, 247.
\textsuperscript{91} “Journal of the Conference”, 247.
\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, he underlined the role of the king further, emphasizing that this was in direct opposition to what Queen Elizabeth had chosen to do in the same circumstances in 1600, by pointing out that these powers to treat were “identical with those granted for the Boulogne conference, which the late Queen refused to accept as a basis for negociations”. Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 30 May/9 June 1604), CSPVen X, 155-156.
This first hurdle also gives us a good look at how the negotiations themselves generally proceeded. It was not simply a matter of men sitting across from one another and debating at the table the whole time. While such debate was a big part of the talks, each side would also frequently discuss amongst themselves what needed to be said, often getting up together and going off to the far end of the room to do so in private, before returning and signifying to their chosen spokesman that he might proceed with their agreed-upon line of argument. Every member of each delegation played an active role, both sides showed up ready to push things as far as they might go, and neither group was going to be willing to simply roll over and accept anything.

This also tells us a little something about sources. As informative and evenhanded as the English journal of the proceedings is, just looking at it by itself gives not only a somewhat one-sided view of the negotiations and important perceptions – it also leads the historian to miss out on a number of other key issues that did not ultimately come up during the talks, and to skip over various other meetings and events that would otherwise have gone unnoticed. The formal meetings were not the only time issues were discussed. As had been the case throughout the previous year, there were numerous side meetings amongst the respective delegations, as well as occasional individual encounters between opposing commissioners, their secretaries, and servants. There was constant, exhaustive correspondence on each side with their respective sovereigns (not to mention the Constable in Flanders), and the Habsburgs also had several private audiences over the course of the negotiations with both King James and Queen Anna. Indeed, as important as each of these events was in its own right, the simple awareness of this

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93 There are numerous examples of this throughout both the “Journal of the Conference” and Villamediana’s reports back home. Sometimes each side got up and went off to confer several separate times during just one meeting.
context and environment can also help us better understand the content of the actual conference meetings themselves.

**Getting down to business**

Now that the powers to treat had been accepted, it was time for the commissioners to get down to business. The first question on the agenda was the fundamental nature of the treaty on which they would agree. The Habsburg commissioners began by suggesting a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, where they would be “friends of friends and enemies of enemies.” The English went away from the table once again to discuss it, then came back to have Cecil decline politely, indicating that this would not work, thanks to the twin “impediments of the difference of religion and by their confederation with other Princes, particularly with the King of France.” A closer treaty would have to be saved for a later time; for now, “it would be best to advise to establish a firm amity for the assuring of the liberty of trade and free intercourse between the kingdoms and states.” In response, after going off themselves to confer with their colleagues, first Rovida, then Richardot each indicated the extent to which their respective masters had affection for James, and asked what sort of a peace should be had. Cecil replied with kind words, saying that a firm amity was good. But Rovida continued to press him, saying that they had been told not to push the offensive and defensive alliance too hard, but he wanted to make sure they were all on the same page. So he outlined the three types of treaty: 1) offensive and defensive alliance; 2) just defensive alliance; and 3) simple peace with no further alliance. He

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94 Rovida’s words: “en buena Paz y liga ofensiva y defensiva que era ser amigos de amigos y enemigos de enemigos.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 5, f.5.  
95 “[N]o poderse aceptar tal forma de Paz, por el ympedimento de la diferençia de religion y por la confederaçion con otros Prinçipes y particularmente con El Rey de Françia.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, ff.5-5v.  
then asked which of these three they were going to go for, just to be sure.\textsuperscript{97} Pushed thus into a corner, albeit on an issue that would seem to have been straightforward, Cecil said that they would once again have to adjourn in order to consult with King James:

because they desired, for the avoiding of misunderstanding, to be clearly instructed of the king’s purpose therein, whom it was fit, \textit{his majesty being so near at hand}, to acquaint with a matter of so great importance and weight, their lordships prayed them to give them time to receive his majesty’s resolutions upon that point.\textsuperscript{98}

The Habsburgs had yet again shown that they had come prepared to negotiate, not merely capitulate, and once more a session had ended expressly so that these issues might be resolved by the king, precisely because he had explicitly commanded them to do so, and for this very purpose had remained close by.

It is easy to forget while paying close attention to the progress of these sorts of conference negotiations that the participants were not sequestered away in some building only to come out to speak in the negotiations proper. After each session, they left the room and went out into the world beyond, and they were influenced by what they saw and heard in that outside world. Moreover, as tempting as it is to think of the peace conference as a coherent whole preceded and followed by events, it must also be remembered that time did not simply stop while the negotiations were going on. The world was still turning, the very issues that they were discussing continued to move forward on their own respective timetables, and all of this had a direct effect on what was discussed and ultimately decided upon inside the conference chamber.

For example, right in the midst of his letter to the Constable describing the first two meetings of

\textsuperscript{97}“Journal of the Conference”, 248.
\textsuperscript{98}“Journal of the Conference”, 248. Emphasis added. This is corroborated by Villamediana, who wrote: “respondio el dicho Varon Siçil que avian entendido lo que de nuestra parte se advertia, pero que siendo negocio de tanto momento era menester pensar mas en ello y consultarlo con Su Rey para lo qual pidieron termino de dos dias”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.6v.
the commissioners, Villamediana wrote about how two or three hundred Englishmen had been
seen in recent days out in the London taverns talking about their preparations to head over to
serve with the Dutch or in the English garrisons that remained in the Low Countries.\footnote{Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, ff.3v-4.} And immediately upon exiting the council chamber on the day of the second meeting, it had been
brought to his attention that various of these men had just embarked on the Thames for such
service, with at least tacit support of the government. Consequently, Villamediana wrote to
Cecil in protest, and asked him to appeal to the king so that this kind of activity might be
stopped, not just in London but in all the other ports of the kingdom.\footnote{Villamediana to Cecil (23 May/2 June 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, f.33.}

This was an active summer for the war that was continuing just across the Channel. The
Habsburg forces were nearing success in their several-year-long siege of Ostend, which they had
originally hoped might help to sway the peace talks in their favor.\footnote{This had certainly played a part in their general tendency towards delay in getting the actual peace talks going. And as late as 18/28 April, the Venetian ambassador had suggested as much, writing of how the Spaniards were “anxious to capture Ostend first, which would enormously enhance their prestige in treating for peace.” Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 18/28 April 1604), CSPVen X, 147.} But by the time the
negotiations had finally gotten underway, the Dutch had managed to provide significant balance
to any perception of Spanish gain by closing in on completion of their own siege of the Flemish
port of Sluys.\footnote{Before the commissioners had even gotten to the fourth conference session, the Venetian ambassador was writing about how “There is heavy betting that the Dutch will capture Sluys before the Spanish get Ostend.” Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 29 May/8 June 1604), CSPVen X, 155.} Nevertheless, while this meant that the military actions would largely cancel
each other out, and thus did not end up playing any kind of real role in altering the decision-
making for either side, any discussion of the peace conference needs to acknowledge that this
backdrop would certainly have been a continued presence in the minds of all those involved,
reminding them of the urgency and reality of the issues they were debating. This was as true in English perceptions as it was amongst the Habsburgs. As Villamediana frankly admitted in a letter to the Constable, Spanish fortunes in England were directly tied to the events in the Low Countries, and were to a certain extent inversely proportional to the fortunes of the Dutch. There was even an intensely personal element to all of this that has to be considered, as commissioners on both sides had close relatives involved in the fighting, quite literally facing one another across the field of battle at the same time that the lords were facing one another across the conference table. Given these circumstances, it should come as no surprise that these negotiations would be hard fought, or that emotions would be running high.

But the Low Countries were not the only destination of concern for the Habsburg commissioners. They were also worried about English ships heading out to trade in the East and West Indies. As with the recruitment of soldiers for the Dutch armies, this was happening right then, quite literally as they talked. Just as the conference was about to begin, Villamediana was reporting that a dozen vessels had sailed in the last three months, and another eight were said to be nearly ready to depart, apparently headed for Veracruz in New Spain – the key port of departure for the Spanish silver fleet.

103 The Constable, in a letter to Lerma a month later, insisted that “no es comparable Ostende con la Esclusa”, but he was trying to make light of a difficult situation, and he had no precise idea even when Ostend might finally fall: Constable to Lerma (Bergues, 28 June/8 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 634, doc 40, f.1v.
104 “Y hablando claro en esto quiero dezir a VE que aqui corre mexor o peor nuestro partido segun corren mal o bien los afexes[sic] de esos estados.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.5.
105 When Sluys finally fell in August, it was Sir Edward Cecil (later Viscount Wimbledon, noted soldier, at that point serving as a colonel of horse in the service of the Dutch) who wrote to his uncle Robert, informing him from the field of their success in taking the town, and of the death in the fighting of Don Felipe de Tassis, amongst others. HMC Salisbury XVI, 218.
106 Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.6.
Understanding the way in which the commissioners pushed in the negotiations, and for what, requires a good awareness of all of this. Villamediana indicated the direct relationship between context and content when discussing their aims at the end of his account of the second meeting’s events:

We judge that we have pushed them and caused them some anxiety over deliberating the form of the peace, for if they bear some malice in favor of the Rebels [i.e. the Dutch], they will have to declare this, and there we will understand their Intention, since in whichever of the three forms of Peace they will have to resolve themselves to abandon the Rebels.  

At that point, they had not yet talked about the Dutch issue at the council table, but they were quite literally surrounded by it, and it was at the very front of their minds when dealing with ostensibly separate subjects. This held true for all of the various issues: even when they were not talking about particular topics, they were always still planning for them. For example, on 21/31 May – the day after the first conference session, and right when Villamediana was getting most concerned about the soldiers preparing for service in the Low Countries – all of the Habsburg commissioners got together to discuss how they would proceed about the question of trade to the Indies. This included specifics, such as how to handle King James’s repeatedly stated desire to only go explore and settle in places that the Spaniards had not yet gone.

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107 “Juzgamos que los aviamos apretado y puesto en Cuydado sobre deliberar la forma de la paz, pues si tenian alguna maliciá en favor de los Rebeldes, es fuerça se declaren y de allí comprenderebamos [sic] su Intención, pues en cualquiera de las tres formas de Paz es menester que se Resueltan de abandonar los Rebeldes,” Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, ff.6v-7.

108 James’s particular approach to this would be a major English argument for years to come, and it was one that the Spaniards disputed, thanks to their different ideas about what constituted possession, dating back at least to their claims to all the New World lands as decreed in the bulls of Pope Alexander VI, and the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Zaragoza (1529). For more on these conflicting approaches, see Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France C. 1500-C. 1850 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995); Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1995). and Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World:
though this issue had not come up in the conference yet, and would not for several more meetings, it was going to be a major concern for them, and getting to it in such a way that they might argue from a position of strength was going to require a particular path from one argument through to another. These negotiations were not a simple matter of each side indicating how they felt and quickly reaching agreement in general favor of the party that came in in a stronger position. Rather, the peace conference was one very complicated and drawn-out chess match, with various teams and a number of players, all constantly thinking several moves ahead in the attempt to gain some sort of future advantage in the eventual treaty and beyond.

These moves began to be put into play quite quickly. The third meeting, on Friday 25 May/4 June, opened with Cecil telling the Habsburg commissioners what James had said about the type of treaty, that it was going to be option three: the simple friendship, no further alliance. But true to James’s form, he insisted that this was not because of a want of affection, but rather because his hands were tied: “in respect of being otherwise engaged of honour”.

And yet, he alluded to the future possibility of a closer relationship. Once again, the Habsburgs “conferred sometime among themselves”, and then “the senator of Millan made answer”, saying that they would like a closer alliance, but that the simple amity would have to do for now. He then took this opportunity to move the debate in the direction that they had been planning for some time, asking about the specifics of what it was that was tying James’s hands, and which treaties might get in the way of what they agreed to here. After some diplomatic back-and-forth,

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*Britain and Spain in America, 1492-1830.* As it was, the Spaniards did not even trust that the English meant to abide by their own claims, and Villamediana said that he thought it would just be a cover to engage in piracy and illicit trade [“piratear y a Contratar”] in Philip’s Indies, both east and west. Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, ff.2v-3.

109 “Relación de lo que se trato en la Junta y Conferencia de quatro de Junio 1604.” (London, 25 May/4 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 37.

with both sides dancing around the issue, Richardot joined in, pointing out that neither the Archdukes nor Spain were at war with anyone other than their own rebellious subjects in the Low Countries (i.e. the Dutch). He then suggested that his masters were willing to treat for peace with them, that the “archduke would be very glad, that it would please his majesty [James] to be judge and arbitrator in the cause between them,” and that if the Dutch did not agree, then this would be good reason for James to stop supporting them entirely.  Rovida backed this up, and added the importance of not supporting rebels, and of discouraging trade with them.

This was a key moment, as it would determine where so much more of this was headed. Cecil resisted the idea of calling the Dutch “rebels”, and backed up the decision to trade and treat with them up to this point. He suggested that they push forward with the general agreement to work on a treaty, and asked if the consideration of the Dutch as rebels would be a make-or-break point. But Rovida would not back down, and proceeded to carry on a long and drawn-out debate with both Cecil and Northampton on this issue, with each side trading historical precedents and philosophical points – not the least of which was Northampton’s observation that it was a little difficult for the Spaniards to talk of banning Anglo-Dutch trade when “the king of Spain himself” was busy trading “with those which he called his rebellious subjects”. Cecil added that trade with the Dutch was very important for England, as was the debt that they were still owed by them, and the Cautionary Towns that they possessed in security against this debt: Flushing, the Brill, and the fortress of Rammekins. He pointed out that if the English were to stop trading with them, this would drive the Dutch into others’ arms (read: France), which would

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111 “Journal of the Conference”, 249.
112 “Journal of the Conference”, 249.
be bad for both Spain and England. And so he made himself very clear, and “told the said commissioners, that they were not to expect to receive satisfaction upon that point.”

Things got so heated during this debate that at one point the English suggested that the Dutch cause was justified, and that the Spaniards had brought this situation upon themselves by not originally fulfilling their proper obligations as rulers. “At these words the Spanish took offence, and rose to their feet to withdraw,” and it took everything the English commissioners had to keep them from storming out. This was definitely going to be an issue of some difficulty, from which neither side was likely to back down. Once everyone was calm again they decided to adjourn for the day, as it was growing late, but it was quite clear that these negotiations were going to be drawn out and hard fought as the weeks passed.

114 Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 30 May/9 June 1604), CSPVen X, 156.
Chapter Seven: The Treaty of London

“They have received here some days since that the peace is concluded; which though it was ever expected yet when they heard of it it wrought a great astonishment even in the minds of those who acknowledge herein the respectful care his Majesty hath been pleased to hold, and know will continue for the conservation of their state.”

– Sir Ralph Winwood, speaking of the Dutch

“Had the Crown not been in straits for money on account of the late wars, your Lordship may trust me that peace would not have been signed; but necessity knows no law. The King, it is true, is a lover of quiet, but I don’t know how long he will continue so, time will show.”

– Robert, Lord Cecil

The peace talks were finally underway, but even here things were not as simple as they might have seemed. Not only had the negotiations for the peace begun long before the conference proper, these first few sessions had also made it quite clear that they would continue long past what was initially conceived, at least within the English camp. As had been the case with prospects for peace in general over the course of the previous year, so too with the progress of the conference itself: there were going to have to be some rough patches before things ultimately got better. And as with that previous period, many of the same people and processes would play a significant role here in moving things forward, and ultimately in bringing the peace to pass. Moreover, these various difficulties, hard stances, and ongoing tensions would all provide further opportunities for the British king and his ministers to continue to build upon and solidify the foundational perceptions of their respective roles in English government, and thus to complete not only the “hard” aspects of the peace, but also the “soft” aspects that would drive so much of the subsequent relationship.

1 Winwood to Cecil (The Hague, 2/12 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 200.
2 Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 15/25 August 1604), CSPVen X, 176. He was quoting Cecil directly.
Continued criticisms

After the contentious atmosphere of the third session, the next meeting did not come until nearly a week later, as the English ministers were heavily involved in various other key projects at the same time as treating for peace. Most notably, managing James’s first parliament and undertaking the initial stages of the negotiations for a permanent political union between the kingdoms of England and Scotland. Both of these endeavors were already proving to be more than a handful – a fact that only served to underline the perception of the English court as a highly factionalized, oppositional, and chaotic place. As the Venetian ambassador described it:

The King thought that the concession of full liberty to the constituencies to choose their own members, and his abstention from the methods of his predecessors ought to have disposed his subjects to meet his wishes. But it is obvious now that the policy was a mistaken one, for the Parliament is full of seditious subjects, turbulent and bold, who talk freely and loudly about the independence and the authority of Parliament in virtue of its ancient privileges, which have fallen into disuse, but may be revived, and this will prove a diminution and abasement of the royal prerogative.3

But as it had been so far and would continue to be, these perceptions of dissent actually encouraged the Spanish and Flemish decision makers to support peace with England, and yet at the same time kept them from expecting too much from a king trying to manage such a system.

Moreover, the policy debate on the very issue of war and peace that had blossomed once more immediately upon James’s accession the previous year had not actually gone away, despite the many intervening months and the long-awaited beginning of the conference. Various Englishmen were still writing to privy councilors and others in positions of influence during the negotiations, hoping to help convince them not to make peace. One of these men was Robert

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3 Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 2/12 May 1604), CSPVen X, 150. Villamediana was reporting on this as well, introducing the subject in what was a truly remarkable use of understatement: “El Parlamento va menos bien de los que estos Reyes quisieran”, Villamediana to Constable (London 26 April/6 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 61, f.10v.
Savage, who wrote to Cecil less than three weeks after the peace conference had begun, echoing Raleigh’s opinions in his “Discourse”:

Many say right honorable we must have peace because we cannot have warres, which seemeth strange, for it is not unknowne her late Majestie had warres in Ireland, releeved the French and the States with men and mony and yet healde the Spaniard at the staves end. And therfore now by god’s assistance we may in a short tyme force hym to yeald to any resonable Conditions with good securetie, to hould and keepe the same, otherwise he will at his pleasure stay our men, shippes, and goods as heertofore they have donn to manye undoing.⁴

Or take Richard Hawkyns, the son of the late, great Elizabethan seaman, also making his appeal right in the midst of the peace negotiations:

In the tyme of our deare late Queene, I had a desyre to further the peace betwyxt us and Spaine for that I had some reasons to induce me to judg yt convenient havinge brought our selfes from an offensyve warr to a defensyve, and prosecutinge that so sloly and coldly as gave testymony of want of meanes to execute that was fytinge. Nowe, haveinge a complete kinge and hys monarchy unyted in peace, and knowinge the malice yrreconcylialbe of the Spaniard towards us, our contrarytie in religion, hys weaknes, povertye, and impossebletye to hurt, harme, or annoye us, and our force, Ryches, and meanes to overthrowe their pride and incrochinge ambicions I publish myselfe to hold yt more convenient to have the warr contynued against Spaine then any peace concluded. For they seeke but to serve their toursned and to gaine advantage by tyme of us.⁵

Far from gradually coming around to the idea of peace, here we have an example of someone who had previously supported peace, but since James had come to the throne, had now turned against it.⁶ Similar sorts of concerns were also coming in from the Englishmen in charge of the garrisons in the Low Countries. Not long after the Habsburg commissioners had arrived in London, Sir William Broune, deputy governor of Flushing (one of the Cautionary Towns discussed in the talks), wrote to Robert, Lord Sydney (his newly absentee superior as governor of Flushing and now Queen Anna’s Lord Chamberlain), indicating that, negotiations or not, he was

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⁴ Robert Savage to Cecil (London, 8/18 June 1604), SP 94/10, ff.47-47v.
⁵ Richard Hawkyns to Cecil (Plymouth, 20/30 June 1604), SP 94/10, f.58
⁶ And in both cases we have at least an implicit underlining of the point about Ireland: that now that the war there was over, there was actually less need for the king to make peace with Spain.
not going to pay any attention to the existence of peace until he was directly commanded to do so.⁷ Two days later, Monsieur de Blocq wrote, also from Flushing, reporting that Maurice and the Dutch army were pressing hard on Sluys, and that the “enemy is shaken….It looks as if the hand of God were raised against the Archdukes for by an unexpected change this disaster befals them. If his Majesty would succeed in understanding the procedure of the Spaniards, I think he would not be in too much of a hurry to avoid them.”⁸

The French and Dutch ambassadors were of course also working at their usual intrigues doing whatever they could to try to derail the negotiations. The latter, Caron, was letting it be very clearly understood, and especially by those who have the King’s ear, that he cannot understand how the King can think of a peace, which would be other than honourable and beneficial to his subjects and his friends….He hopes to be able to prevent the peace, for there are many who are working hard to impress on the King’s mind these ideas.⁹

In fact, the opponents of peace even went so far as to address the issue in parliament itself. In one particular pro-war speech, the member made a distinction between “voluntary” and “necessary” alliances, putting Spain, Portugal, and the various Italian states in the former category, and the Russians, German states, Turks, and others in the latter. But the Dutch represented the most important kind of “necessary” alliance, as one not just of “trade”, but also of “safety”, for which he gave the following reasons: 1) their location and naval strength would make them the most dangerous of enemies if they should cease to be friends; 2) war with them would also mean loss of trade with them; 3) alliance with them would make the two nations masters of the sea; 4) the importance of religious solidarity as embattled protestants; and 5)

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⁸ Monsieur de Blocq to Lord Sydney (Flushing, 13/23 May 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 97.
England could not afford to let them fall under the yoke of either Spain or France. He went on at some length, demonstrating a remarkably detailed knowledge of the history of Spanish relations with England, and clearly seemed to respect Spain a great deal. But he was not sure that Philip III’s ministers and advisors could be trusted, and he thought that now was not the time to abandon the Dutch, particularly since they were in the midst of trying to bring about a permanent union between England and Scotland. The public debate amongst England’s elites over the issue of war and peace that had followed so quickly upon James’s arrival in England was still obviously alive and well, and was here being expressed openly, in consistent terms, in the highest public political forum in the kingdom.

Despite the claims of this particular speaker, and his justifications for airing these remarks in the Commons, the Venetian ambassador, Molin, pointed out that parliament was in fact “not the right place for it, as all questions of truce, or war, and such like depend upon the King’s will absolutely.” And the Habsburgs understood this as well. So after the third peace conference session, Villamediana arranged for another personal audience with James and Anna, on Monday, 28 May/7 June. Upon his arrival, after wishing the king a “buenas pasquas”,

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10 CSPVen X, 157-8. Enclosed with letter from Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 30 May/9 June 1604). Despite getting a number of things right, there were also some odd claims here. Such as the belief that “If we support the States we shall not offend Spain” [158], and his seemingly random consideration of the trade of some countries as voluntary and that of others as necessary – particularly considering just how important Iberian trade would become once peace was achieved.

11 Interestingly, this speech appears to have come right after a privy councilor had given a report on these very issues, seemingly inviting the policy discussion: “As to the trade you have recently heard the report presented by a weighty member of the Council, that in Spain the difficulties in the way of recovering monies are so great that no merchant trading there can come back with any profit, and that, on the whole, war is more advantageous than peace.” CSPVen X, 158.


13 And James reminded them of this fact directly: Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.3.
Villamediana explained to James why the Habsburgs wanted an offensive and defensive alliance with England, which essentially boiled down to conquering the Dutch “rebels” and bringing them back to their former obedience. He then suggested that James should stop all commerce with the Dutch, and should prevent his subjects from going to fight in their armies. In response, James said that now was not the time for such an alliance, but rather that that should be saved until later [“hasta la postre”]. Regarding the Dutch, he stood firm, referring Villamediana to what he had said a number of times over the course of the previous year. If the States General wanted to enter into the peace negotiations as well, that was fine. But he could not prohibit their commerce, as that would start a war with them. And with regard to his vassals going to serve in the Low Countries, he again claimed to know nothing about it, other than Lord Sydney’s raising of some 200 men in order to reinforce the now neutral English garrison in Flushing [“Fragelingas”]. After his audience with James, Villamediana went to see Queen Anna, where he found her “dancing with her ladies and all these lords”. He said that he was “very well received by her”, that she danced with him, did him extraordinary favors, and gave him a great

14 “[S]ino para diferido hasta la postre y ser compuestos el punto del Comerçio y otras cossas”. From Villamediana’s relation of the audience, “Copia de lo que se trato en la audiencia del Rey de Inglaterra” (London, 28 May/7 June 1604), AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 38, f.3. This was enclosed with his letter to Philip III of 3/13 June 1604, AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 36.
15 At the Habsburgs’ request, James had asked the Dutch the previous summer if they were interested in participating in the upcoming peace talks. They responded that they would not treat while their army was still in the field, and that if they did participate it would have to be understood up front that any treaty would need to include recognition of their status as an independent state.
16 “Copia de lo que se trato en la audiencia del Rey de Inglaterra” (London, 28 May/7 June 1604), AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 38, f.4v. These were undoubtedly the men that Villamediana had taken such objection to the previous week.
17 “[D]ançando con sus damas y todos estos señores”, “Copia de lo que se trato en la audiencia del Rey de Inglaterra” (London, 28 May/7 June 1604), AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 38, f.4v.
deal to think about.\textsuperscript{18} Overall, although James could not satisfy all of Villamediana’s concerns, he had once again taken the time to meet with him and explain himself, and the entire experience clearly served to continue fostering Spanish goodwill towards the royal couple, in each case encouraging them to hold out real hope for the future.

**Moving things forward**

When the commissioners met again, for the fourth time, on Thursday, 31 May/10 June, they picked up right where they had left off.\textsuperscript{19} But Villamediana’s royal audience in the interim had tempered things somewhat, and the Habsburgs began by asking if there was any middle ground to be had on the issue of trade with the Dutch. To this, Cecil responded that, “their lordships being persons of honour did not desire to marchand the point with them; but thought fit to let them know that there was no possibility of yielding to restrain the trade of his majesty’s subjects into Holland, and likewise of the Hollanders trade unto his majesty’s dominions”.\textsuperscript{20} Richardot pressed the issue, pointing to the example of the French and Vervins, and the English showed that perhaps James’s influence might have softened their resolve on this as well, as they ultimately came around and said that they would be willing to prohibit the trade of war materials with the Dutch. When asked for specifics, Cecil gave a few, but then suggested that they move on to something else for the time being, since the commissioners would need to “receive

\textsuperscript{18}“Fuy muy bien recivido della… La Reyna me saco a dançar Una gallarda que Tambien no pienso que demostracion publica y grande y que tanto se ha mirado y hablado deste favor y merced y la mayor aver me dado la mano sin guante, fuesse resolucion a Casso, sino muy pensada, con que ha dado tanto mas que pensar.” “Copia de lo que se trato en la audiencia del Rey de Inglaterra” (London, 28 May/7 June 1604), AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 38, ff.4v-5. This was his third audience with the queen since Rovida and the Flemish had arrived.

\textsuperscript{19}“Copia de la conferencia de 10 de Junio 1604. Con carta del conde de Villamediana” (London, 31 May/10 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 39.

\textsuperscript{20}“Journal of the Conference”, 250.
informations from the merchants concerning this point, before they did further determine thereof”, and the Habsburgs agreed.21

The discussion then moved to English concerns about the future relationship, chiefly the matter of freedom from the Inquisition, and free trade throughout “all the dominions of the king of Spain and the archduke.”22 Rovida replied that the free trade would be limited to “the king of Spain’s dominions of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, and so likewise in the territories of the archduke”, i.e. not the East or West Indies. And he indicated “that the inquisition took no notice of any fault, but where there was a public scandal given”.23 But Cecil pushed back, saying that it would have to be free trade in all of the king of Spain’s dominions, and he pointed out that the Inquisition in Spain had been historically much more severe to Englishmen than it had been in other places. So, the Spanish Inquisition would have to be moderated, or the English would have to start being just as severe towards Spaniards in England. Once more, Rovida clarified, saying

21 “Journal of the Conference”, 250. The English merchants appear to have had a great deal of input, not just here, but both before the negotiations began, and after the conclusion of the main conference sessions, when Edmondes and Dun were finalizing the form of the agreed-upon articles. The collections of documents concerning the conference include a number of pieces giving their opinions in real detail. See, for example: BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff. 29-30v, 135-142, 314-314v, 449-452v. See also various items from Thomas Wilford, President of the Spanish Merchants’ Company, sent to the English peace commissioners between the first two conference sessions on 20/30 May and 22 May/1 June 1604, at CSPDomestic, James I, vol.8, docs 35-36. For a particularly in-depth representation of the merchants’ concerns, see: “A Note of such matters as the English Marchaunts tradinge Spaine and Portingale doe most humbly offer to the consideration of the Lordes and others of the Kings Małie most honorable privie counsall to be considered of in the Treaty of Amitie betwene our Kings most excellent Małie and the Kinge of Spaine,” BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.95-100v. And the Habsburgs recognized these merchants’ influence as well, as both Villamediana and Scorza had been, since at least December 1603, actively encouraging all the merchants they could meet with to start pushing for the reopening of English trade with Flanders – something that he said he believed Cecil was trying to block. Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 5/15 December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 147, ff.2-2v.


23 “Journal of the Conference”, 251. This would be an important phrase, that would ultimately end up in the articles, and would define the nature of British subjects’ relationship to the Inquisition for a long time to come.
that the English would get free trade “in any place of the king’s dominions where he admitted any other prince to have intercourse with him” – i.e. again: not the Indies. And he blamed any past severity in the Inquisition on wayward judges. After all this back-and-forth, Cecil finally came right out and said that what they wanted was to be able to trade with the Indies. Rovida, just as frankly, “confessed, that their meaning was to restrain us from the trade of the Indies”. The argument given was, essentially, that this was not a restriction or wrong, as no one had ever been granted the right to trade in the Indies. And he said, simply “that it was not in their power to give their lordships satisfaction in that matter.”

Eventually Northampton chimed in, giving a long speech on philosophical and legal generalities, and offering a number of historical precedents that he considered relevant to the case. But the Habsburgs would not back down, rejecting even Cecil’s eventual proposal to put off the question of free trade in the Indies until the Constable’s arrival – this was the proverbial line in the sand, and they insisted that he had no more power to authorize this than they did. So once more, the session ended without any real resolution at all.

The fifth meeting, on Friday, 1/11 June, brought more of the same. It began with Cecil indicating that things were not going quite as smoothly or quickly as they had hoped, and suggesting that the best thing to do in order to bring things to a “more speedy and orderly conclusion”, was to look at previous treaties, “and to select out of the same such rules as were necessary for the present time”. And once again, it fell into the same pattern, with a return to the subject of restrictions on trade with the Dutch, and Richardot introducing the idea of putting

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25 “Lo que se trato en la conferencia de 11 de Junio 1604” (London, 1/11 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 40.  
some sort of “seal and mark” on goods to distinguish what products came from whence. After some back-and-forth, and strong opposition from the English, the Habsburgs changed the subject to the status of the Cautionary Towns, pushing for them to be restored to the ostensibly rightful rule of the Archdukes. This set off an even greater debate than the previous issue, with Cecil insisting that the towns were untouchable as they were pledged in lieu of a debt, Northampton once more citing numerous historical precedents, Lord Treasurer Dorset adding a learned discourse on the distinction between private contracts and contracts between princes, and all the English commissioners appearing to have spoken up at some point. All kinds of hypotheticals were thrown about and Cecil eventually said frankly that there was just no way that James was going to give up the Towns. But Rovida and the others simply would not back down. Things had gotten so heated once more that the English commissioners wrapped things up by issuing warnings in some serious terms. Cecil insisted that while they were willing to deal within reason, this issue needed to be treated very carefully, “with great moderation, lest it might otherwise give interruption to the peace”. And Northampton concluded the meeting by reminding the Habsburg commissioners that he and his colleagues had been very nice to them so far, and that it would not be a good idea to make things contentious, “by way of argument, to receive the remembrance of the old differences”. The English hopes of a quick resolution to the talks were long gone, their opponents were continuing to fight hard, and now everyone’s patience was beginning to wear thin.

So it went, back and forth, as each side felt out just how far the other was willing to go on each of the main issues. These early meetings were illustrative of how it was that many of the

remaining sessions would proceed. On each topic, one side or the other would make an initial request, the two sides would then dance around the issue with largely semantic exchanges until they saw some sort of opening or just became tired of the game and made a move. They would then press until the others insisted loudly enough that this was a line they could not cross. Then they would either move on to a different subject for the time being, or the meeting would end so that the English commissioners might talk things over with their king.

The meetings continued through the entire month of June and on into early July; there were, in the end, eighteen formal sessions in all. The sixth meeting, on Tuesday 5/15 June, continued with the talk of what to do with the Cautionary Towns, included a number of further proposals by the Habsburgs on how to handle it, and ended once more with an English need to run these suggestions by the king.\footnote{“Journal of the Conference”, 254.} The seventh meeting, on Thursday 7/17 June, showed the positive results of that meeting with James, who had accepted the proposal that a deadline be given to the Dutch about when they must pay their debt back by, or James would then reserve the right to dispose of the Towns as he wished.\footnote{“Conferencia de 17 de Junio 1604” (London, 7/17 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 45.} They soon moved back into the issue of trade with the Dutch, Flanders, and Spain, and the English commissioners indicated that they had “had conference with the merchants thereof,” who were all against the restrictions on the transshipping of Dutch merchandise into the various Spanish possessions.\footnote{“Journal of the Conference”, 256.} After some more heated debate, Cecil ultimately suggested a resolution based on the sort of “seal” idea that the Habsburgs had previously put forward. The discussion of trade continued in the eighth session, on Friday 8/18 June, with specific attention paid to the issue of the 30% tariff that the king of
Spain had been levying on foreign goods in the attempt to break the Dutch economically.\textsuperscript{34} This would obviously have to be abolished, and the English indicated that King James was also willing to help mediate the issue between France and Spain, as well.\textsuperscript{35} The ninth and tenth meetings, on Monday 11/21 June and Wednesday 13/23 June, summarized these trade negotiations and added further debate on other imposts, such as an additional 12\% levy that was being charged “upon wines and oyles” shipped from Spain.\textsuperscript{36} This included a long debate about the specifics of what was meant by free trade, the offer of James’s mediation was once more given for Franco-Spanish relations, and Rovida ultimately accepted. In this meeting, Richardot also asked for the return of the crown jewels of the House of Burgundy – which were, like the Cautionary Towns, in English possession as collateral for repayment of the Dutch debt. And like the Towns, James was not going to part with them any time soon.

By the eleventh session, on Monday 18/28 June, the commissioners were ready to start moving towards some concrete resolutions,\textsuperscript{37} and so the English lords, “out of their desire to bring the treaty to an end thought it fit to conceive and frame certain articles agreeable to the points which had been hitherto treated on”.\textsuperscript{38} Each side then read their proposed articles aloud, and everything went well until they got once more to the question of English trade in the East and West Indies. The English felt that the Spaniards meant to completely restrict them, and the debate was once more rehashed along very similar lines to what had occurred a few weeks before, in the fourth session. All of the English commissioners played an animated role in this

\textsuperscript{34} “Conferencia de 18 de Junio 1604” (London, 8/18 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 44.
\textsuperscript{35} “Journal of the Conference”, 257.
\textsuperscript{37} “Conferencia de 28 de Junio 1604” (London, 28 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 60.
\textsuperscript{38} “Journal of the Conference”, 259.
particular discussion, and the two sides went back and forth for some time. The English suggested the precedent of the Franco-Spanish decision at Vervins to simply not mention the issue, with the understanding that those “adventurers into those parts should be left with the peril which they should incur thereby”.\(^{39}\) This was the concept of “no peace beyond the line” – the implicit understanding that the New World, Africa, and Asia were not going to be subject to the same rules of peace that were being decided here.\(^{40}\) And yet, once more, we see the beginnings of what would become standard British colonial policy over the coming decades, and which would ultimately allow for the establishment and growth of their own empire. Namely, that James would “forbid his subjects to trade unto any of the places which were now possessed by the king of Spain in the Indies, so as the said king would not give interruption to our trading to any other places which were not precisely under his obedience.”\(^{41}\) This approach – alongside the desire on both sides to avoid doing anything in the Indies that might ultimately provoke a collapse of the peace in Europe – would be an important aspect of how the relationship played out over the rest of the reign.

At this point, the English commissioners were surprisingly frank about how to move forward with this issue, suggesting a general trade article that both sides could then be expected to interpret in different ways:

\(^{40}\)For more on this concept, and which line(s) in particular, see: Garrett Mattingly, "No Peace Beyond What Line?," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 13 (1963).
\(^{41}\)“Journal of the Conference”, 260. James had been emphasizing this point almost every time that the question had come up since the moment of his accession. This was quite clearly his personal policy, and it was a solution that fit quite well with every aspect of his political and intellectual makeup that we have seen throughout. See, for example, Villamediana’s account of a conversation that he had with James about this back in February: “En lo que toca a la navegación de las Indias el mismo Rey me dixo como scrito a VE que el no queria permitir que sus vassallos fuesen a las de Su M\(^{4}\)d. y adonde sus armas adelante huviesen llegado, sino a otras muchas partes de la America,” Villamediana to Constable (London, 25 February/6 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 4-5, f.2.
Their lordships insisted still to have the article to pass in absolute general terms, without any manner of restrictions, and told them, that if they thought it fit, there might be protestations made thereupon of both sides: of their part, for not intending to allow us the trade of the Indies; and for our part, for our not assenting to be excluded from thence.\textsuperscript{42}

Both sides would, of course, follow this very approach to the final version of the article in practice – and to a certain extent this is how they would handle the entire treaty as a whole. But at this point, on these specifics, the Habsburgs were not willing to make any concessions, as banning English trade to the Indies had been one of their number-one priorities going into the negotiations. Consequently, they “refused to yield” to the English suggestions, “protesting vehemently, that if the said matter should be stood upon, they should be forced, to their great grief to break off the treaty, which they referred to the consideration of his majesty, whereupon their conference ended for that time.”\textsuperscript{43} Even at this point, a month into the negotiations, when articles were being drawn up, they had given very little ground, and were clearly ready to walk away from the table rather than agree to a peace that ran contrary to their most significant interests.

And so, once again, a conference session was concluded explicitly so that they might take the issue to King James, in the hopes that he might provide some resolution to the standoff – which was, as we have seen, in direct accordance with his instructions. But the English ministers were not the only ones who would be going to see the king about something at this time. For in the interim, the Habsburgs arranged yet another personal audience with James, which took place on Wednesday 20/30 June. They were going to speak with him about one of the other sticking points in the negotiations: the continued recruitment of James’s subjects for service in the Dutch armies. As this was being framed as primarily a Flemish concern, involving what the Habsburgs

\textsuperscript{42} “Journal of the Conference”, 260.
\textsuperscript{43} “Journal of the Conference”, 260.
considered to be a rebellion against what was now the Archdukes’ sovereignty, only Richardot and Verreyken went, with Aremberg also remaining behind, once more stricken with gout ["mon indisposition”]. In the audience, they pressed the king about their concerns, indicating that they understood that the Dutch were at that moment working on raising “fourteen or fifteen hundred men” in England with the privy council’s knowledge, and they urged him to look into the matter. Despite some debate over specifics, and the king’s continued insistence that if such things were occurring it was not with his direct knowledge or support, they received a very sympathetic reply. James promised to take care of the matter, and expressed at length once again how he was “at peace with all the world”, but that he was sincere in his desire to go further in this case, “to establish a firm and durable amity with your masters monsieur the Archduke and the Infanta, who are my good relatives and neighbors, and to whom I am obligated by the affection that they have always shown me.” They spoke for a long time, the king assured them that he was “working on it, and working true,” and the two Flemish representatives left convinced of his good will.

44 “Je ne puis cumplier pour mon indisposition.” Aremberg, Richardot, & Verreyken to Albert (Stepney, 20/30 June 1604), Archives Generales du Royaume de Belgique (AGRB), Papiers d’Etat et de l’Audience, vol. 364, f.157. It seems clear that sending the Flemish representatives on their own was a joint decision by all the Habsburg commissioners, as it was Rovida who spoke for them all at the next meeting, explaining that they meant no offense to the English commissioners by going over their heads to speak with James. “Journal of the Conference”, 260.
46 “J’ay paix avec tout le monde, mais celle que Je traitte avice vous n’est pas pour paix simplement, mais pour establir une ferme et durable amitye avec voz maittres monsieur L’Archiduc et l’Infante, qui sont mes bons parens et voysins, et aus quelz J’ay aboligation pour l’affection qu’ilz m’ont tousiours moustré”, ibid., 157v-158.
47 “[E]t assurez vous que Je y travaille, et travaille vray”, ibid., 158.
48 In their words: “And truly, from what can be judged from his face and his words, we see only good inclination and that he has no desire to break [off the negotiations]”; original: “Et de vray a ce qu’oy peut Jugir du visage et des parolles nous n’y voyons que bonne Inclination, et quel n’a volonté de Rompire”, ibid.
The light at the end of the tunnel

The Habsburg commissioners’ continued defiant stance and various direct appeals to the king paid off. In the twelfth conference session, on Thursday 21 June/1 July, the English commissioners declared that they were willing to give some ground, explicitly because their opponents could not budge on this issue, and they did not want such matters to “ruin the conference”. Cecil made it quite clear that this was James’s personal decision, an “answer by the kings commandment, to those things which had been the day before proposed to his majesty by the Archduke’s commissioners in their audience with his majesty”. The king had agreed at their request to issue a temporary stay of any English soldiers going across the channel to serve in the Dutch armies, precisely “because the public passing of them at that time from the city gave scandall to the said commissioners”. He wanted once more to be clear that the troops had gone over without his direct support, and that he would not prohibit such recruiting in the future. But James also gave the Habsburgs another offer: that they too would be free to recruit for their armies from amongst his subjects. The Habsburgs appreciated this movement, and apologized for going over the commissioners’ heads to speak to the king, but they still did not back down from their request. Cecil and Northampton maintained that England simply had to be able to let its superfluous and troublesome men serve abroad in foreign countries, if only to keep the peace at home. But the Spaniards and Flemings did not blink, and insisted on a total restriction of English service with the Dutch. And so, yet again, a meeting ended with the English lords going

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49 “Relación de la conferencia de Primero de Julio” (London, 21 June/1 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 74.
off to speak with James, specifically so that “his majesty’s pleasure might be better known therein.”

The thirteenth meeting, on Wednesday 27 June/7 July, continued this debate about the right of Englishmen to volunteer for the Dutch and/or Archdukes’ armies. The English commissioners reported that they had once more spoken with James and that the king had once more made his same offer, but would go no further. After much discussion, both sides finally agreed to the compromise, redrawing the articles to eliminate any restrictions on where English volunteers might serve.

At this point, the negotiations were finally showing signs of nearing their end. At the beginning of the fourteenth meeting, on Friday 29 June/9 July, Cecil moved that they once more read through the various articles agreed on thus far. This went smoothly, “and after some amendments of the articles given on either part, they resolved upon the draught of the general articles for peace, and in what form the commission for the cautionary towns should pass, and that the garrisons of those places should give no aid or assistance to the Hollanders.” Things got rockier when they came again to the question of freedom from the Inquisition for English merchants. The Spaniards agreed to include a general article ensuring that Englishmen would be safe as long as they “gave no cause of public scandal.” But the English lords did not see this as sufficient protection, since there was a great deal of subjectivity involved in determining what constituted “public scandal”. Consequently, while the Habsburgs indicated that they did not

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54 “Conferencia de 7 de Julio” (London, 27 June/7 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 75.
55 “Artículos de paz acordados en la conferencia de 7 de Julio 1604. Para embiar Al Rey nuestro señor” (London, 27 June/7 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 76.
56 “Conferencia de nuebe de Julio” (London, 29 June/9 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 80.
57 “Journal of the Conference”, 262.
have ultimate authority in this, as it was a Church matter, they nevertheless agreed to supplement
the general article with additional ones that could be worked out later on. Finally, Villamediana
let the English commissioners know that he had heard back from the Constable, showing them
the letter in which the latter had agreed to James’s mediation in the issue of the 30% tariff
between Spain and France.

The fifteenth session, on Monday 2/12 July, picked up the Inquisition question where it
had been left off, and a very animated debate ensued over the exact particulars.59 They were
negotiating specific words at this point, with the Habsburgs eventually agreeing that their main
concern was with “public” issues, and that they had no problem with whatever private prayers or
observances might be made by English merchants within their own ships or discreetly within
their lodgings.60

This brought them to the sixteenth session, on Wednesday 4/14 July, which proved to be
a major wrapping-up point, where a number of the lingering issues were hashed out and
ultimately resolved.61 They began with the Inquisition issue, working out the specifics of the
additional private articles. Next came the question of trade to the Indies, with the Spaniards still
arguing for a prohibition, and the English pushing for a true policy of free trade. Rovida stood
his ground on this, and Northampton went off at great length, citing precedent after precedent,
based largely on the documents prepared for him ahead of time by Cotton and others, as well as
on his own extensive knowledge of history and political thought.62 As with the opening

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59 “Conferencia de 12 de Julio” (London, 2/12 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 85.
60 “Journal of the Conference”, 262-263.
61 “Conferencia de 14 de Julio 1604” (London, 4/14 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 84.
62 See, for particular example here: Robert Cotton, “Reasons for the trade into the East and West
Indians for the Merchants of England gathered for the Treatie between his Majesties
Commissioners and the Kinge of Spainie, and the ArchDukes in Julie 1604”, BL, Cotton Mss,
Vespasian C xiii, ff.47-50v.
speeches, however, Rovida appears to have once more been his match, responding in specific terms to his points, including an obvious familiarity with the work of Ferdinando Vasquières, from which Northampton had “quoted at length...in the original Latin”. Rovida also argued that the pope had long ago ruled on the issue of possession of the Indies, and that the matter was therefore decided. To this, Northampton responded once more in his learned and extremely verbose way, denying papal claims to temporal authority, but doing so in very religious-sounding terms. He even went so far as to assert that papal actions in negotiating these territorial disputes were in fact sinful, and that the singular, restrictive possession of such a place “where the harvest was plenteous” was itself a highly un-Christlike act.

After this extensive tirade, however, Cecil stepped in and got down to brass tacks, asking the Habsburg commissioners “whether by their commission they were so restrained as that they could not pass that article for common liberty of intercourse, without an express prohibition of the Indies”, because if so, that simply was not going to work. Rovida responded carefully that they could not admit an article into the treaty touching on this subject without a full English restriction, but he clearly showed a desire to try to find some sort of solution to this obviously difficult issue. And so, both sides got together and worked out a purposefully ambiguous

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64 “Journal of the Conference”, 265. Northampton seems to have been particularly proud of this speech, and he sent copies along to Edmondes presumably to be used in the drawing up of the final language of the treaty articles: Northampton to Sir Thomas Edmondes, and copy (1604), TNA: PRO 94/10, ff.215-218v.
66 Philip III’s instructions on this point were indeed very clear about not granting trade to the Indies, even if it meant breaking off the peace talks entirely: “Aunque el efecto principal desta paz para ingleses ha de ser el comercio libre en estos Reynos como le solian tener antes de la guerra, y este se les puede conceder, ha de haver clausula expresa que les prohiva, el navegar a las indias Orientales y Occidentales y a todas las islas que estan en estos guajes, pues por la demarcacion, y por los descubrimientos, son tierras que nos pertenescen, como propias nuestras, privativamente a Todos los demas y es punto este tan llano y conocido, Universalmente de...
compromise, with an article providing for free trade “*in quibus ante bellum fuit commercium juxta et secundum usum et observantiam* (in matters wherein there was commerce before the war, agreeably and according to the usage and observance of ancient compacts)”\(^{67}\). In this way, they essentially passed over the issue, neither granting permission nor restricting it, in order to allow the peace to go forward. This would be one of several omissions and deferred decisions that would come to define the relationship in the years that followed.

With this compromise, the framework of the treaty was by and large complete, and just two more sessions of consolidation and ironing out remained. The seventeenth and penultimate meeting was held the following day, on Thursday 5/15 July. At this point, all of the articles proposed by each of the groups were read and various final specifics were negotiated, with some particular focus given to the issue of the future of the Anglo-Flemish trade. The next day after this, Friday 6/16 July, came the eighteenth and final session, wherein this issue of the trade with Flanders was at last resolved to the Flemings’ pleasure, and the formal negotiations were brought to a close:

That article being so agreed, their lordships signified unto the said commissioners, that they conceived to have now resolved of all the principal articles of the treaty, and that the king’s majesty was not willing to tie himself to longer residence within the city at that time of the year, but to go on his intended progress; therefore, they wished that the coming of the constable of Castile might be hastened, with all the speed that might be,\(^{67}\)

Todos, que en quantas pazes se han hecho entre los Reyes mis antecesores y otros Principes, se ha puesto, sin ninguna dificultad, y en particular con Francia: y assi se han de obligar ingleses a la inviolable observancia, desto, en la forma que mas segura huviere, sin consentir otra traça, ni medio, aunque por ello se rompa.” “Capitulo de la instruction de Su M\(^{4}\), para el Condestable,” AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 164, f.1.

\(^{67}\) “Journal of the Conference”, 265. See also: “Copia del Capitulo sobre la navegaçion de Las Indias” (sent with Villamediana’s dispatch to Philip III of 5/15 July 1604; received 25 July/4 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 89. This copy sent to Spain included James’s assurance that his subjects would only navigate and settle to places where the Spaniards and Portuguese had not already settled: “Fiat declaravo qualiter serenisimus Rex Anglia Et\(^{a}\). declarat non posse nec debere subditos suos vasallos ac incolas cuyus cun que condiçionis fuerit Navigare neque ad ire ad indias orientales et occidentales”, etc.
which the said commissioners undertook to do, and that he should arrive within twenty
days; and because there remained nothing else to be further done for the final concluding
of the treaty, than only to consider of certain demands which had been made by our
English merchants for their better assurance, and to reduce the treaty into form; it was
moved by their lordships, that for the speedier accelerating of that business, Sir Daniel
Dun and Sir Thomas Edmondes might resort unto them for the dispatch thereof, with
them in respect of their lordships’ other employments at that time, which was assented
unto.  

And so, after almost seven weeks of serious and often heated negotiation, the articles of the
peace had been agreed to, the final language of the treaty was given over to two talented and
experienced subordinates, and the conference was brought to a close. Within eight days,
Edmondes and Dun had finished drawing up copies of the articles, the Habsburg commissioners
had agreed to them, and at this point everyone was essentially just waiting on the Constable’s
arrival.  

**What was achieved – the treaty results**

Now that we have examined the trajectory of the negotiations, we need to take a look at
what it was that they produced. After all this time and effort, what specifically did the treaty

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68 “Journal of the Conference”, 267. So, as can be seen here, Cecil was explicit that, as anxious
as James was to leave on his progress, he had purposely delayed his departure in order to be on
hand for these negotiations, and he was not willing to leave until their business was complete.
Cecil then ended by moving for the future possibility of bringing the Dutch into the treaty as
well, if at some point down the road, with James’s help, an agreement between them and the
Habsburgs might be reached. Everyone agreed.

69 For the Flemish copies, signed by all the commissioners, dated 14/24 July and sent out to
Albert the next day, see: Archives Generales du Royaume de Belgique (AGRB), Papiers d’Etat
et de l’Audience, vol. 364, ff.242-248v. Villamediana also sent copies off to the Constable,
which he received and forwarded along to Philip on 20/30 July: Constable to Philip III, “En lo
de la negociação de Inglaterra, y embia copia de los capitulos que se firmaron por los diputados
de una y otra parte” (Dunkirk, 20/30 July 1604; received 2/12 August 1604); AGS Estado, leg.
841, doc 112. Albert wrote to Lerma from Bruges on 18/28 July, celebrating the conclusion of
the peace, praising the efforts of both Villamediana and the Constable, and indicating that the
articles were now on their way to Philip in Spain. *CODOIN* v.42, 494-5. See also Levinus
Munck’s journal entry for July 14/24: “Being Saturday, the Lord Commissioners for the Treaty of
Peace mett at Somersett House and there sealed to the Articles of Peace.” Jones & Munck, 253.
contain? First of all, the very completion of the treaty itself was a significant accomplishment. Whatever the details, the fact that these two countries could at this particular time and with all the obstacles and potential pitfalls surrounding them manage to succeed in negotiating an end to this hard-fought and ideologically charged struggle, is nothing short of remarkable. This was, it bears repeating, the first major peace treaty between a protestant and a catholic power in the post-Reformation era, and the simple existence of peace between these countries would have profound implications in the coming years – not just for both countries, but for Europe as a whole. In chapters three to five, we saw the development of a number of tensions over the course of the first year after James’s accession, which emphasized key issues of concern and showed where a number of the fault lines in the relationship would lie. While these initial tensions can tell us a great deal about the nature of future trouble spots, it still remains true that the peace treaty eased fears to a considerable extent. The occasional incidents and demonstrations of frustration and ill will in this first year were for the most part directly related to perceptions about the possible nature of the treaty and whether it would come at all – especially in Spain. And even the moments of greatest friction were much less serious than they could have been, had desire for peace not been so strong in each kingdom. Indeed, what is truly remarkable here is not the difficulties that were left over after two countries with opposing religions agreed to stop trying to destroy one another, but rather the level of positive response that persisted on each side despite these very real causes for concern.

Of course, the treaty did not just end the war. It was also an attempt to establish a coherent set of rules to govern the relationship in the years that followed. After all, what would be the point of achieving peace if one could not then maintain it? As for the formal structure of the agreement, this was neither a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, where both sides
would be pledged to support one another in case of war, nor was it even a defensive pact, where they could count on each other’s aid in case of unprovoked attack. This was merely a treaty of friendship, normalizing relations between two previously warring countries. But to this end, a number of key issues found some mention and resolution in the thirty-four articles that were agreed upon in mid-July and eventually signed and sworn to by King James in the presence of the Constable the following month.

Naturally, one of the most pressing concerns involved the continuation of the war between the Spanish and the Dutch, particularly since this was just a treaty of amity, and not of alliance. James had repeated his offer to mediate that dispute as well, even after his initial attempts to include the Dutch in the treaty had been declined. But that conflict was far from over, and would ultimately require full Spanish recognition of Dutch independence before it could be truly solved – something neither the Archdukes nor Philip III were ready to concede any time soon. In the meantime, however, the treaty agreed to here did provide some important developments. In the first place, Habsburg fears over future English support for the Dutch were eased by the articles preventing support of either king’s “rebels” or “enemies”. And they could take some satisfaction from the treaty’s provision allowing them to raise troops in England as

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The Dutch were clearly concerned as well. As Winwood wrote to Cecil from the Hague in early August: “They have received here some days since that the peace is concluded; which though it was ever expected yet when they heard of it it wrought a great astonishment even in the minds of those who acknowledge herein the respectful care his Majesty hath been pleased to hold, and know will continue for the conservation of their state.” Winwood to Cecil (The Hague, 2/12 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 200. For the specific articles, see: *Articles of Peace, Entercourse, and Commerce, Concluded in the names of the most high and mighty Kings, and Princes James by the grace of God, King of great Britaine, France, and Ireland, defender of the faith, &c. And Philip the third, King of Spaine, &c. And Albertus and Isabella Clara Eugenia, Archdukes of Austrice, Dukes of Burgundie, &c. In a Treatie at London the 18. Day of August after the old Stile in the yeere of our Lord God 1604. Translated out of Latine into English.* (London: Robert Barker, “Printer to the Kings most Excellent Majestie”, 1605). Article 4 deals explicitly with rebels, article 18 with enemies: Ibid., 10, 28.
well. True, they had not succeeded in blocking Dutch recruitment, but there would be no more official support from the crown, and they had now gotten themselves into the game as well. This also eased English concerns regarding possible Spanish aid to James’s own restless and recently rebellious subjects in Ireland, and opening up recruitment to all parties would allow the British king to rid his kingdoms of disaffected spirits on every side.

The Spanish and Flemish had pushed particularly hard on the subject of the Cautionary Towns of Flushing, the Brill, and the fortress of Rammekins. While they had not succeeded in acquiring them, they had gotten King James to agree to a compromise about their future, which would turn the pressure up on the Dutch to either repay the English debt or eventually risk losing these strategic strongholds to their enemies. While James would eventually sell the Towns back to the Dutch (several years after they, too, had stopped fighting with the Spanish, at least for the time being), such a development was by no means certain in 1604, and they would for now remain neutral ground. While this was not all that the Habsburgs had hoped to achieve, this policy was their suggestion, and they were at least happy to have added some pressure to the Anglo-Dutch relationship in the process.

For the English, the most significant and explicit causes for concern were eliminated by the many treaty articles regulating commerce. Free trade was now established with all of the territories of the Spanish monarchy in Europe, as well as with the Archdukes’ dominions. This was celebrated by both sides, and well it should have been, as England would become the peninsula’s most important trading partner in the coming years. The initial causes of tension – the 30% tariff and relative freedom from seizure of goods – were dealt with in the treaty, though

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71 As Croft quite rightly puts it in an earlier piece, once the Treaty of London “had been signed in 1604, the boom in the southbound trades became the single most important feature of English commercial growth in the early seventeenth century”, a fact that was not lost on contemporaries. Croft, "Trading with the Enemy 1585-1604," 297.
effective enforcement of these articles in Spain (and English attempts to take advantage of them) would remain a point of conflict for years to come. And in order to arrive at this agreement, they had had to come up with a solution that would allow the Spanish to continue to restrict trade with the Dutch. The way in which they dealt with this was by banning the transshipment of Dutch goods to Spain by way of England, and vice versa, and then enforcing this through the development and use of a special system of official seals, designating the origin points of the goods in question. The English also agreed to stop providing their erstwhile allies with various types of munitions and materials for war – a decision that the Dutch had already indicated would not actually be a problem for them.72

A key aspect of the treaty that allowed for all of this to occur was the decision to grant James’s subjects a significant measure of freedom from the Spanish Inquisition. Englishmen in Spain would no longer be bothered by the Holy Office if they refrained from giving any sort of “scandall unto others”.73 It was agreed that they would be free to worship as they pleased and read what books they wished, as long as this was done in the privacy of their own ships and lodgings, and they would not be actively pursued by the authorities in these places. Nor would they be forced to attend mass or to go into any house of worship. If, however, they chose to do

72 The Venetian ambassador reported that, when pressed, the Dutch ambassador, Caron, had admitted “that they [the Dutch] are quite able to defend themselves as long as they are not prevented by the powers, especially by England, from raising their provisions and ammunition in their states,” Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 30 May/9 June 1604), CSPVen X, 157.
73 Article 21 reads in its entirety: “And for that the rights of Commerce which doe ensue by Peace ought not to be made unfruitfull, as they would be if the Subjects of the most renowned King of England, Scotland &c. whilst they have recourse to and from the Kingdomes and Dominions of the said King of Spaine and Archdukes, and do remaine there for Commerce, should bee molested in the cause of Conscience: therefore to the intent their Traffique may be safe, and without danger, as well on Land as on Sea, the said renowned King of Spaine, and Archdukes shall take care, and provide, that for the said cause of Conscience they shall not be molested, nor inquieted in using their Trade and Commerce, so as they give not scandall unto others.” Articles of the Treatie, 31.
so, they were expected to behave themselves as if they were catholics. Moreover, if they were to encounter the procession of the Holy Sacrament in the streets, they had two options: either turn down another street to avoid its passing, or kneel down as it approached and give all of the respect traditionally shown to the host. All-in-all, it was a surprisingly reasonable solution, and consequently one which the Habsburgs thought controversial enough to insist that some of its provisions be part of separate articles not published alongside the rest in the Spanish dominions.

Indeed, while these conditions would generally be adhered to, the precise nature of what constituted “public scandal” and just how far the holy office’s jurisdiction was allowed to extend were and would remain hot-button topics for people on both sides over the coming years. Some of the more enthusiastic amongst the Spanish religious authorities were not happy about this capitulation, and would of course do whatever they could to circumvent its provisions.

Protestant Englishmen trading in Spain, on the other hand, were more simply concerned for their lives and property, and would generally do what they could not to rock the boat.

When it came to the worrisome issue of trade with the Indies, both sides had cause to celebrate: the Spaniards because the treaty did not explicitly allow it, and the English because the treaty did not explicitly prohibit it. This was a major compromise from where each side stood going into the negotiations, and without it, the treaty simply would not have happened. Despite this middle way, the decision ultimately favored the English, as it created the environment within which the first permanent settlements in Virginia and New England would soon be established, and within which they would eventually be allowed to flourish. The fact remained that James’s subjects had not been explicitly barred from settling in the New World,

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74 These specifics on how they were to handle themselves were laid out in the subsequent articles agreed upon by Philip III, included in this English edition as “Three Articles concerning a moderation to be had in the proceedings of the Inquisition, toward the Kings Majesties Subjects, in Spaine.” *Articles of the Treatie*, 43-44.
the king repeatedly insisted that they would only settle where the Spaniards had not already done so, and by ensuring that this was indeed how things played out, he would give the English colonial project a real chance of success. For while it was generally understood that there would be “no peace beyond the line”, the respective sovereigns would still have to think long and hard before allowing any excessive conflict in the New World to spill over and endanger their much-desired peace in Europe.\(^75\)

Overall, both groups left the negotiating table with reason to be happy. James and England got the best of all worlds in this. Those who wanted to see an end to the war were of course pleased, not least of all the king, who had long insisted that he desired to be at peace with all men.\(^76\) But even English opponents of peace had reason to be relatively satisfied with the outcome. After all, nearly all of the requirements that they had insisted would have to be met if peace were ever to be considered were in fact addressed or achieved in this treaty. Take, for example, John Atkinson’s list of required conditions from the end of one of his pro-war pieces:

1) That your sujects maie have free accesse to the Indies, either to traffique, or plant, where the Spaniard hath neither conquests, nor signiorie, nor tribute.
2) That he doe pull downe all inquisitions wheresoever ye people shall resort in all his dominions, and the Customs reduced to antient order.
3) That he shall never come with a maine Army of Shipps, and men, into theis seas under cullor to chastize the Hollanders.

\(^75\) As Sir Walter Raleigh would later find out to his ultimate dismay. 
\(^76\) As the English merchants who would be trading with Spain – and who were obviously in support of peace – were consulted repeatedly over the course of the negotiations, they were consequently able to put their imprint on the final result, and for the most part to secure their most important concerns. As Richard Cocks had put it in August of the previous year, “yf my porre prayer may be heard I beseeck the Allmighty God that we never have peace wth Spaine without confrmeration of these two Articles” of navigation to the Indies and freedom from the Inquisition. Richard Cocks to [? Thomas Wilson?] (1/11 August 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.50. And he made similar claims some two-and-a-half months later, insisting that “yf their be noe redres to recall this 30 per Ciento in Spaine, it weare better for us to have noe peace at all.” Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (Bayonne, 17/27 October 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.79. Two of these three were achieved explicitly, and the other was not achieved but was admitted to in practice.
4) That it shalbe as lawfull for your subiects to serve the Statees in theire warres against them, as it shalbe to serve them against the states. These things being accorded you peace may be safe otherwise not.\textsuperscript{77}

All of this was either achieved in the treaty, implicitly recognized, or (as was the case with the third item) would soon prove not to be a practical concern.\textsuperscript{78} From maintaining possession of the Cautionary Towns and the freeing of English prisoners of war, to freedom from the Inquisition and the establishment of free trade throughout Spanish Europe, the voices in the debate against peace found most of their key requirements met.\textsuperscript{79} James's subjects were still free to volunteer for the Dutch armies and to support them privately, and they had even managed to achieve peace without being explicitly banned from the Indies: which would be, in practice, an implicit acknowledgement of their ability to establish their own colonies in the New World.\textsuperscript{80} As Cecil pointed out in a subsequent letter to Sir Thomas Parry, the English ambassador in France, while they had agreed to the lack of an explicit grant of right to trade and settle in the Indies since the Spaniards had agreed not to expressly prohibit it, nevertheless

\textsuperscript{77} John Atkinson, “Concerning Peace with Spaine”, BL, Stowe Mss 159, f.261.
\textsuperscript{78} The treaty explicitly prohibited the Spaniards from using English ports as a base for military operations, limiting the number of ships they could have present in any port to five at any given time, without prior approval of the king. And the feasibility of their very presence in Channel waters would be put to the test very soon, as the following year Spanish reinforcements for Flanders sent by sea would be prevented from landing by the Dutch fleet, and driven to take refuge in Dover, where they would be stranded for most of the summer before being forced to return home.
\textsuperscript{79} For more examples, see: “L. Admirall. A Memoriaall of some things to be required when the Treaty shalbe.” [endorsement] “Demandes to be maed by her Majesty’s comisioners in the trete of pece between her Majesty and the K. of Spayne.” [title] BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, ff.372-373v. Sir Robert Sidney’s discourse concerning peace with Spain (Flushing, 26 December 1599), Galba D xii, f.276. What was achieved was even far beyond what Essex himself had assumed would be the “condicions wee are like to have sor our selves, so that we will forsake our confederates”, given the implicit recognition of trade to the Indies, the retaining of the Cautionary Towns, and a lack of any sort of religious conditions imposed by Spain. Devereux, An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, ff.16v-17..
\textsuperscript{80} As had been frankly discussed in the negotiations themselves, described above, and at “Journal of the Conference”, 260.
wee yielded not as just but as men that knew it in vayn to insist tediously without sucesse…and yet we hope if it be well observed haw the Article is couched, you shall rather find it a pregnant Affirmative for us, then against us; For sir, where it is written that we shall trade in all his dominions, that comprehends the Indies, if you will say, Secundum Tractatus Antiquos, never Treaty excluded it.\(^81\)

This was just one of the first of many examples to come of how the conclusion of the treaty would in fact turn out to be merely the beginning of an ongoing process of negotiation, interpretation, and debate between the two countries.\(^82\)

As for the Habsburgs, they too had reason to be satisfied. After all, they had peeled off one of their main opponents from the fight, and now could turn their entire focus in the war towards facing off against their real foe, the Dutch, be it to push for victory or at least to better their position in any upcoming negotiated end to that conflict. This was a major and much-needed reprieve, as was corroborated by virtually every English observer who spent any time at all in Spain around this time and in the years that immediately followed. Moreover, with the peace, Philip and Lerma achieved an important step in their strategy of conservación, and they did so without agreeing to any unprecedented capitulations, or suffering any truly embarrassing blows to the reputación that was so important in bolstering their position at the pinnacle of the European power structure. As Villamediana proclaimed, despite “having been opposed by all the elements,” and suffering “damage and hindrance” at the hands of “the world, fearful of Your Majesty’s great Power”, none of this was ultimately “enough to impede this good event for Christendom”. He went on to hope that this was just the beginning, since that which had been “denied in the past”, “the door” that had been kept “so closed…God now had opened, and not only to this Peace, but I hope in his mercy to other bigger, perchance greater, things”, as might

\(^81\) Cranborne to Sir Thomas Parry (Whitehall, 5/15 September 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, ff.101-101v.

\(^82\) For more on how this would develop, see chapter ten.
be expected on behalf of “a King so holy and Catholic, defender of the cause and church of God” as Philip III.83

News of the results spread quickly. As Winwood’s reports show, the Dutch were pretty well informed of the agreement and the terms by late July.84 So, too, with Flanders and Spain, as the dispatches detailing the content of the final conference sessions that left the Constable’s hands on 10/20 July had been received and responded to by Philip III on 23 July/2 August, and Villamediana was already acknowledging receipt of the king’s reply back in England by 7/17 August.85 And the Fugger newsletter from as far away as Rome was reporting accurately on the details already by early August as well:

Letters from France confirm the conclusion of peace between Spain and England. The King of England does not after all cede to the Spaniards the three towns occupied in the Netherlands, but retains them for himself because the States General entrusted them to his guardianship. The Spaniard promises the English freedom to trade in Spain, and absence of all future annoyance from the Inquisition. The Customs dues of thirty per cent. imposed in both countries are to be abrogated on both sides.86

The reference to letters from France indicates that the Fuggers likely got their information as a result of James’s letters to Henri IV from mid-July, with which he sent along copies of the general treaty articles, in order to keep his fellow monarch in the loop.87 This fact and the

83 “[Y] aviendo nos contrariado todos los elementos, y el mundo, temerosos de la suma Potencia de VM4 ha nos hecho daño y estorvo…pero todo no ha bastado a estorvar este buen successo para la Christiandad, concedido a la felice hera de VM4 por su Real mano, y en su tiempo, y negado en el passado, que tan cerrada tubo Dios la puerta, y agora la ha abierto, y no solo a esta Paz, pero espero en su misericordia a grandes otras cosas, por ventura mayores, qual las mereçe, y puede esperar Un Rey tan santo y Catolico defensor de la causa y yglesia de Dios,” Villamediana to Philip III (Dover, 7/17 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 161, ff.1v-2.
84 Winwood to Cecil (The Hague, 2/12 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 200.
85 Villamediana to Philip III (Dover, 7/17 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 161, f.1.
87 James wrote to Henri on 13/23 July, letters that were to be carried by one Mr. Keir: Lake to Cecil (Oatlands, 13/23 July), HMC Salisbury XVI, 172. But he and his ministers had been keeping the French king notified of their progress for some time. See, for example, the Venetian ambassador to France’s report from even before these letters had gone out, indicating that “The
reasons for it were also widely understood, as the Venetian ambassador in London reported that this was meant “as further proof of the confidence” that James had in the French king, “and as a guarantee that this treaty contains nothing which can contravene the one concluded with France last year by M. de Rosny [Sully]. This greatly pleases the French Ambassador, as there were rumours of clauses prejudicial to France.”

The French would continue to have reason to be pleased, as another result of the negotiations was James’s offer to help mediate their dispute with Spain over the 30% tariff, and more hard work over the late summer and early fall on the part of Rovida, Edmondes, the Constable, and others, would see this duty lifted, not only for the French, but for the German states as well.

It is true that various of the issues addressed in the treaty were far from being permanently resolved, and concerns over commerce, religion, and empire would dominate much

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King of England has reported to the King of France the articles of the peace with Spain; and has asked if the King of France would like him to mediate on the subject of free trade between France and Spain.” Anzolo Badoer, Venetian ambassador in France, to the Doge and Senate (Paris, 11/21 July 1604), CSPVen X, 169. Indeed, according to Badoer, King James had had his extraordinary ambassador (and personal favorite) James Hay make a promise to Henri back in March that “if the matter comes to a head, the King of England will send the terms of the treaty here [Paris] before taking a final step.” Badoer to the Doge and Senate (Paris, 20/30 March 1604), CSPVen X, 140. As should be quite clear by this point, the Venetians themselves remained well informed over the course of the negotiations and throughout the summer, every step of the way, as can be seen in the frequent reports in this volume.

Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 8/18 August 1604), CSPVen X, 174. This was reporting on knowledge of Cecil’s notification to Beaumont of the terms, done at James’s direction.

For James’s reasons for intervening here, see: “Reasons for interposition between France and Spain” [Edmondes’s hand] (c. October 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, ff.134-135v. For direct credit from the Constable on just how integral English help was here, see a letter from the Constable in early October, in which we read that the French ambassador wanted the Franco-Spanish agreement to be done under the auspices of the Pope’s mediation, but the Constable said no, as the English king and his ministers moved for it and got it done, “it is fitt that the world should understand it so.” Constable to Villamediana, followed by the English translation (27 September/7 October 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, f.107v.
of the future relationship. Some topics, such as the Indies and the Cautionary Towns, were dealt with only by being vague or through key points of omission. Others, such as the plight of the English catholics and negotiations for a closer alliance through an Anglo-Spanish royal marriage, were passed over entirely, in the understanding that they could be dealt with at a later date. And yet, in this way, even the main issues that would not be solved in the peace treaty would have a major impact on the future of the relationship as well. The way in which this occurred, and how these treaty details were later negotiated in practice is, in fact, a central part of the rest of our story. But for now, both sides had seen their specific, immediate, explicitly expressed fears overcome, and a solid peace had been achieved.

**How things were achieved – the treaty process**

But this was really only part of the story. *How* the treaty was achieved is for our purposes here perhaps at least as important as *what* it was that was achieved. For much of what was being negotiated was in fact the process of negotiation itself. The two sides were getting familiar with each other, getting to know each others’ desires and strategies, and getting used to how the system worked. Understanding how this process played out tells us a great deal not only about Anglo-Spanish relations and their future, but also about Jacobean foreign policy and domestic politics, and about how these aspects of early Stuart governance were perceived and negotiated by both foreign and domestic actors. Simply put, the achievement of peace between England and Spain was as much about constructing a discourse of contact as it was about agreeing to a list of rules. It was about establishing norms, roles, and strategies within a political

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90 The Fugger newsletter reporting on the treaty terms went on to indicate that the possible difficulties left open were a subject of relatively common perception: “Notwithstanding this it is thought that the settlement of religious questions between English and Spaniards will give rise to quarrels in the future.” Klarwill, *Fugger News-letters*, 340.
system, about building relationships and factions, learning how to talk to one another, understanding where the boundaries or limits ultimately lay, and really getting a sense for the way in which the game was played. In this sense, the treaty negotiations were an important part of a longer process that had begun in earnest back at James’s English accession, with some roots that went back to a certain extent even before.

As had been the case with everything over the course of the previous year-and-a-half—and as could be expected of any tripartite talks set in a multipolar, factionalizing court—these negotiations were not a one-man show for any of the parties involved. The commissioners on both sides of the table were all men of deep knowledge and experience, and this knowledge and experience was frequently drawn upon throughout the conference proceedings, across the board. Time and time again, each side repeatedly got up as a group, went to the other end of the room, discussed things in earnest, then came to sit back down to let their chosen spokesman deliver their opinion. Each group of commissioners also met periodically in between sessions in order to discuss the negotiations and specific issues. And others beyond the main mouthpieces made their presence felt vocally from time to time over the course of the talks, as the various records of the meetings clearly show. In addition to Northampton’s relatively frequent contributions, Lord Treasurer Dorset weighed in on the issue of the Cautionary Towns with a very learned argument

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91 The Spanish souces describe this in the same terms as well. For example: “Con estos los diputados del Rey de Inglaterra se levantaron y se fueron hazia un rincon de la sala a conferir, y en bolviendo dixo el Varon Siçil que en nombre de Su Rey”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.5.
92 For example, the English comissioners met between the fourth and fifth meetings, in order to discuss the issue of restricting trade with the Dutch, “Journal of the Conference”, 253. And the Habsburg commissioners met on 21/31 May, the day between the first and second sessions, in order to discuss their upcoming strategy regarding the issue of English navegation to the Indies, Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, ff.2v-3.
based on the distinction between private contracts and contracts between princes. And Lord Admiral Nottingham’s contributions in the debate over the right of trade and navigation to the Indies caused enough of a stir on the other side of the table to merit mention when the Constable was assessing the various possibilities for regular pensions to distribute at the English court.

The same held true for the Habsburg side as well, both in getting up and discussing as a group and in the contribution of other members. While Rovida played the dominant role overall, and Richardot made his presence felt when the issue happened to be one that especially concerned the Archdukes, the various accounts clearly indicate that both Villamediana and Aremberg spoke up when necessary. And as even the somewhat Cecil-heavy journal of the proceedings indicates, at numerous points the respective groups of commissioners responded together as a group – likely varying from a look at one another and giving a spot agreement out loud, to the occasional boisterous, unified denunciation of a point, or even speaking up in a multitude of opinions at once, before giving way to their chosen spokesman’s or particular specialist’s take.

We must remember that this was a lively group of strong personalities, speaking a number of languages at once, discussing major issues that went to the heart of each country’s strategic interests and very sense of core identity.

94 “Memoria de las personas a quien se deven contentar en este Reyno, assi por su calidad, cargos, officios, y servicios, que han hecho en esta ocassion como por los que adelante se pueden esperar dellos”, AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 118, f.1.
95 “Journal of the Conference”, 261. See also: Villamediana to Constable (London, 22 May/1 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 59, f.6v.
96 In addition to the many specific indications of which individuals spoke when, there are many references to all of them speaking, such as the following examples from just one page: “It was answered by their lordships…It was alledged by the commissioners…The others insisted…the said commissioners required…utterly refused by their lordships”, and so on. “Journal of the Conference”, 258.
As we have seen, the debate got quite contentious on a number of occasions, occasional threats and warnings were made, and at several points intransigence on either side made future progress look difficult at best. The Habsburgs had arrived fully prepared for the negotiations to end in failure, the entire process took a great deal longer than the English ministers had expected it would going in, and the eventual ability to reach an agreement required some give-and-take and constructive debate over how to solve various issues. In the end, compromises were reached over policies that neither side had initially considered negotiable, either through agreeing to leave a point largely unsaid, or by finding some middle ground, however fleeting or tenuous. The fact that they were able to do this when previous attempts had failed speaks to a number of factors of crucial preparation and experience – especially the understanding of each side’s desires and needs, the familiarity with one another personally, and the appreciation for the situation as a whole – all of which were formed or further developed over the course of the intense and all-important year that preceded these talks. But as had been the case in so many things from the moment of the 1603 accession all the way through, perhaps the greatest single contribution to the success of these negotiations was the continued presence and direct participation of the British king himself.

Surprising as it may seem, these specific events have not traditionally been seen in this light. The same two strands of thought regarding King James that I describe in the general introduction as having been responsible for historians repeatedly passing over the whole crucial first year’s process of diplomacy and negotiation have been at work on these particular events as well. In accordance with the first strand, the peace negotiations proper are typically treated as if they were a mere formality, rubberstamping a pre-ordained outcome, and usually just worthy of a mention for the date on which the treaty was signed. And the most recent work on the topic that
actually addresses the talks in any detail is a classic restatement of the second strand, insisting that it was all about the English and Flemish ministers finishing off old business, and that not only was James I not involved, but that he did not really care about the issue, and even left London shortly after the negotiations began in order to spend most of the summer on an extended hunting trip through the English countryside, far from his capital and these affairs.  

97 Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain." We have encountered Croft’s piece before, in responding to her claims about how this whole process was essentially an Elizabethan foregone conclusion, but it is important to take a closer look here, given her chapter’s likely influence. Croft devotes a significant part of the space available to describing the way in which the negotiations worked, repeatedly making the claim that the whole process was essentially all about Robert Cecil and the Flemish commissioners, and that James did not care about these issues and was consequently not really involved at all. In the process, she passes over the participation of most of the rest of the commissioners on both sides, and repeatedly denigrates the contributions of the Spaniards at every level from King Philip on down. Amongst the most worrisome of these claims is that she does not even seem to realize that Rovida was the main Habsburg spokesman and lead negotiator, referring to him a minor supporting figure and dismissing him as merely “obscure.” Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 149. She claims that James was not particularly interested in the peace, that what little time he gave to it was against his will, and that he was not even around for most of the negotiations, leaving town the week after they began for a prolonged hunting trip through the English midlands that would last for most of the summer. Moreover, most of the dates she gives for these particular events are incorrect. Sometimes it does not matter much to her argument, as when she claims that the Constable landed at Dover on 7/17 August, when he in fact landed on 5/15 August (and not at Dover as planned, but forced by the weather to come ashore several miles up the coast at the Downs, from where he was nevertheless brought by carriage to Dover that very night). But these instances imply an unfamiliarity with the sources and events, and in many cases Croft insists that the dates are crucial to the case she is making – such as her claims about when the Habsburg commissioners arrived, when the treaty negotiations began, when James left London, and when the conference was concluded. All of these are incorrect, and are compounded by a confusion of old style and new style right in the midst of her argument, which makes it look like the talks began ten days later than they actually did, from which she then builds her argument that James quickly left town and was inaccessible once the talks had begun. She writes: “Serious negotiations began on 30 May, but James went to Greenwich the following week, only coming back briefly on 7 July to prorogue parliament.” The two dates given here are technically both correct, but come from two different calendars. The talks began on 20/30 May (30 May, new style), but James prorogued his parliament on 7/17 July (7 July, old style). Setting aside the fact that the move to Greenwich was inconsequential, as I discuss in detail above, the king did not actually go there until ten days after the first conference meeting, eighteen days after the first formal audience, and twenty-four days after the commissioners had landed in England. And it is
But once again, a close look at the sources tells quite a different story indeed. James’s role even here was actually crucial, every step of the way, at both the indirect and the direct levels. Everything that we have seen in detail over the previous chapters led directly up to this, and has to be considered when speaking of the king’s desires and priorities when it came time to finally make the peace. From the importance of the accession, to the subsequent creation and manipulation of a factionalizing system at the English court, its expansion, politicization, and growing interconnection with foreign policy and international relations, on through to the deep cultivation of the perception that James was the indispensable figure in English politics and the greatest friend to peace in England – it was all key. This was the context within which the commissioners on both sides had come to gain their most relevant experience, within which they had considered the issues, and within which they had sat down at the table and negotiated the treaty. The fact that they were getting together to treat for peace at all, that by the time they did so the Habsburgs had already been disabused of a number of previously held but unreasonable expectations, and that the talks were occurring in England where the precedence problem that had derailed the previous attempt at peace had been overcome before the conference had even opened – it was all explicitly because of this foundation built by the new king over the previous year.

James also kept up his direct influence right on through the peace conference as well, playing a frequent and active role in the process of the negotiations themselves – something that early modern kings did not, in fact, typically do. Both he and his ministers had made it clear to

not as if Croft is unfamiliar with the competing British and continental calendars, as at other points in the chapter (even, in fact, on the same page) she refers to various dates using the proper double-style convention with the two dates separated by a slash. Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 149.
the Spaniards in the months of lead-up that a big reason why they should agree to have the
conference in England was because James planned to be nearby and to play an important part.
James was clearly very excited when he learned that the Habsburgs had finally agreed, and he
told Villamediana that this was the right move, as the peace talks would have a much better
chance of succeeding in England than anywhere else. He went on to explain that the reason he
wanted them there was so that he could be nearby “to take a greater hand” in order to make sure
that they ended in success.\footnote{\textquotedblleft[A]via desseado que el tratado fuese en El era por estar asegurado de que tendria aqui mexor
efecto La Paz que en otra parte, y en quanto al ser en su presencia que eso mismo queria El para
tener mas mano en las cosas que se ofreceran,	extquotedblright villamediana to constable (london, 27 march/6
april 1604), AGS estado, leg. 842, docs 88, 90-92, f.2. For more on this reaction and the
various discussions of the king’s expected direct role, see chapter four, above.} And despite the obvious annoyance and disappointment over the
subsequent revelation that the Constable would be staying behind in Flanders for the time being,
the king did not change his approach. He reiterated his desire to play a key role a number of
times, and spelled it out clearly in his special addendum to the English commissioners’
instructions and powers to treat, quoted in chapter six above. These explicit instructions were
then followed quite closely over the course of the conference, with many of the meetings ending
so the English commissioners could speak with the king first. And he made a direct impact right
from the start, overruling his ministers’ objections regarding the Habsburg powers to treat, which
cleared yet another of the major hurdles that had kept the previous peace conference from going
anywhere.

This approach continued all the way through until the end of the conference. The
commissioners adjourned five of the eighteen sessions explicitly in order to consult with James,
and we know for sure that he spoke with them and provided important instruction after at least
three others, and undoubtedly more. Moreover, each of these consultations was substantive, with the commissioners coming back to the table each time with a definitive answer from the king, and in several cases with a policy that had gone against what they had been arguing, granting a request on the part of the Habsburg commissioners, or even proposing a particular compromise to move the process along. After the initial and significant objections of his ministers, James personally agreed to compromises on the Cautionary Towns and on the recruitment of his subjects to fight in the Low Countries. And he offered an approach to the question of navigation in the Indies that the Spaniards did not like, but which they ultimately had to implicitly accept, as it provided a subtle way out of the standoff without losing face. This approach would then become the organizing principle for English colonization and the basis for their claims of imperial possession in the subsequent two centuries.

The Habsburg commissioners themselves also had several personal audiences with James over the course of the negotiations, making appeals to him about specifics, each time receiving what they considered to be a favorable and constructive response. In each case they clearly respected the king’s decisions, even when he did not go nearly as far as they may have liked. They had audiences with the queen as well, which were far more than mere matters of course, as the Spanish ambassador in particular had been cultivating her for a long time, which they all believed was helping provide direct results. After all, the queen was telling them as much

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99 Sessions adjourned explicitly to consult James: 1, 2, 6, 11, and 12. And as we have seen above, there were several other meetings where the commissioners indicated that James had been talked to since the previous one, or which we know this occurred. These were between meetings: 3-4, 5-6, and 15-16. See the description of the negotiations above for specific citations.

100 Villamediana was spending as much time as he could trying to determine which people at court it would be most effective to have “bribed” [sobornados], who might be best to give “gifts” [dádivas] to, and how he might “por alguna indirecta via hazer hechar a la Reyna una pulga en la
herself. For example, in a meeting with Anna on 16/26 May, four days after the audience in which he had presented Rovida to her, Villamediana had asked the queen directly if she might “take the hand of those named [commissioners] to make them understand her desire and pleasure that this peace might take effect.” ⁹⁰¹ To which the queen replied that she had already done so with some of them just the day before, and she swore that she would continue to do what she could to influence them all and help bring the peace to pass. ⁹⁰² Whether this actually had a real effect on outcomes or not, it certainly mattered to Habsburg perceptions, as Villamediana indicated that while James was himself very desirous of peace and remained the most important player, the king nevertheless still had too much respect for, and perhaps even fear of, his privy councilors. ⁹⁰³ Indeed, at this point, the Spaniards’ and Flemings’ biggest concern was that the English commissioners might manage to have a negative influence on the king and find a way to sabotage the peace. So they were doing whatever they could to try to counter this. The Constable was counseling caution when dealing with “the Queen and those that the Count considers confidants”, but both he and Villamediana acknowledged that, from James’s continued resolve on the issue, their efforts were appearing to have some real effect. In this vein, the Constable continued to write to Philip about the importance of “winning over the Admiral and Secretary Cecil,” which now appeared to Villamediana to be going “better [with] these and other

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⁹⁰¹ “De allí fuy yo solo a la Reyna…a suplicalla tuviese la mano con los nombrados a que entendiesen su desseo y gusto de que esta paz tuviese efecto.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.3v-4.
⁹⁰² Ibid.
⁹⁰³ “El Rey estava con gran desseo de la paz, a cuyo proposito dire a VE que la natura deste Rey es juzgada de todos por pacífica y amiga de la Paz, y aun tocan entemeroso y que tema las Incomodidades y daños de la guerra, pero estoy assi mismo reçelosso de que tenga tambien demasiado respecto y aun miedo al Consejo de Estado.” Villamediana to Constable (London, 18/28 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 60, f.4v.
malefectos,” now that they were “seeing the will of their master.” Of course, while the Habsburgs were obviously happy about this, they did not realize that this was part of a conscious English strategy, that the same game of kings vs. ministers was still in full swing, and James was very much in control.

As should be clear from everything we have seen here, James did not in fact leave London right after the talks began, spending “most of the summer” far away from the conference proceedings, “on a lengthy hunting tour of the midlands”. On the contrary, he was either in London itself or very close by for the entire course of the proceedings, and he only left on his progress after the final session had been concluded. Specifically, James was in residence at the palace of Whitehall for the first three weeks that all of the Habsburg commissioners were there, including the first ten days after the beginning of the peace conference proper. Then he moved to the palace at Greenwich on 30 May/9 June, as plague fears were once again making the closer

104 “Con La Reyna y los que se dan al Conde por confidentes sera muy aproposito proçeder con tiento y cautela y assi lo es el averselo ordenado VMº. como yo se lo acordare, y el ganar al Almirante y al Secretario Çiçil, que ya le parece al Conde procéderan mejor estos y otros malafectos viendo la voluntad de su amo,” Constable to Philip III (Bergues, 19/29 April 1604), AGS Estadó, leg. 842, doc 95, 2v.

105 Croft, "Rex Pacificus, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 149. The entire passage: “On the English side, King James was not unlike the Constable, conspicuous by his absence rather than his presence. He spent most of the summer between May and August 1604, not in London where the diplomats were gathered at Somerset House, but on a lengthy hunting tour of the midlands.” This is all, quite simply, not true. Not only did James play a frequent and important role throughout the negotiations, he waited to leave on his progress until after the peace conference was over. And when he finally did leave – not that it mattered at this point – it was not one long progress, but rather two shorter ones, with a return to London in the middle. First was a ten-day trip about twenty miles or so upriver, to the royal palaces at Windsor and Oatlands (11/21 to 21/31 July), followed by several days back in London. Then came a three-week trip through the near midlands (24 July/3 August to 14/24 August), during which time he remained in constant contact with Cecil, by way of Sir Thomas Lake. In the end, out of the four months from May through August, which Croft says James spent “most” of on a “lengthy hunting tour of the midlands”, James’s travels turn out to have really just consisted of one abortive trip for a few days within an easy ride of the capital once the treaty was well in hand, followed by two separate trips together comprising about a month, after the conference was in fact over. For James’s whereabouts on these trips, see CSPVen X, 167, 169, 171, 175.
urban quarters a less-than-desirable setting.\footnote{This was in fact ten days after the negotiations had begun, and three weeks after the Habsburg commissioners had arrived in London, and to a palace that was not substantially farther away in any meaningful way. This was not a case of James skipping town right after the talks began, as Croft suggests.}  He was joined by his queen on the following day, and they remained in residence there for most of the rest of the negotiations, before returning to Whitehall again during the last few days.\footnote{Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 29 May/8 June 1604), CSPVen X, 155. Jones & Munck, 252.}  A move to Greenwich hardly constituted going anywhere at all: it was, after all, just a few miles downriver. The Flemish commissioners made a similar trip themselves every day, commuting to Somerset House from their lodgings in Stepney – and, in fact, James was now likely a little closer to where they were staying than he had been when he was in residence at Whitehall.\footnote{In fact, Whitehall and Westminster were themselves not actually in the City of London either. Whitehall was about two-and-a-half miles upriver from the Tower, while the palace of Greenwich was only about four miles downriver. It is therefore a little difficult to describe a move from one palace to the other as going off and leaving the commissioners behind in London.}  The king was, quite simply, in no way less accessible as a result of the move. Conference sessions were still adjourned explicitly in order to speak with him before proceeding further, we know that the ministers did in fact go to Greenwich to do just that on a number of occasions,\footnote{For example, Cecil went to see the king at Greenwich on 3/13 June, and then came back that night, bearing news of the king’s support of the Habsburgs’ proposal regarding the Cautionary Towns. Jones & Munck, 253. The English commissioners also consulted with James after both the eleventh and the twelfth sessions, when he was still in Greenwich. “Journal of the Conference”, 260.}  and the Archdukes’ commissioners also had an audience with him there on 20/30 June, in order to protest the idea that English volunteers would continue to be able to serve in the Dutch armies.\footnote{See the discussion and citations in the negotiation section above.}  Explicit reference was even made in the conference journal to the fact that James had been remaining close at hand on purpose until
the articles were agreed on, even though the length of the proceedings had far outstripped the original English estimates by more than a month. Through it all, James stayed nearby, weighing in when necessary, playing his determined role of “director and decyder” right until the conference was concluded on 6/16 July, the day before he prorogued parliament. Not only was the king’s presence in Greenwich clearly neither a problem nor perceived to have been so at the time, James’s subsequent progress into the midlands did not occur until after the conference was over, and thus has no relevance whatsoever to a discussion of his motivations, priorities, and participation regarding the peace treaty.

111 “Journal of the Conference”, 267. Moreover, even if one were to suggest that the insignificant move of a few miles to Greenwich somehow said something about the monarchs’ desire or ability to contribute further in the negotiations for peace, and if one were to ignore the fact that James and his queen continued to play a significant role, meeting with ministers, and granting audiences there as well, one would nevertheless still have to be consistent. After all, on the day before James left for Greenwich, the English commissioners for the union negotiations with Scotland were named. So any claim that James did not care about the peace would have to be accompanied by a similar claim that James had no interest in those negotiations either.

112 As we have seen, Cecil and various others had, in late April, expected to have a treaty in hand within perhaps three weeks. That would have been mid-to-late May.

113 BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, f.81. The Venetian ambassador reported that the king and queen did make one excursion while staying at Greenwich, for a couple of days towards end of the negotiations, when most of the key issues of substance had already been agreed upon. They went out in great fanfare, together with Prince Henry and a large group of noblemen, planning to review the fleet at Rochester, and to do a little hunting along the way. But James was injured en route when kicked by the queen’s horse, and so the naval review was canceled, and they went back to Greenwich. This clearly did not interfere with James’s role, nor did it change perceptions of it, as even in the very letter relating the events of this trip, Molin gave the details of the peace articles, indicated how it was nearly complete at that point, and described the king’s important, direct role in proposing the compromise over recruitment. Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 4/14 July 1604), CSPVen X, 167.

114 As most of Croft’s dates are incorrect, it is perhaps helpful to give the actual timeline for the period of the negotiations here: The envoys landed on 6/16 May. The king received them in audience on 12/22 and 13/23 May. The negotiations began on 20/30 May. The king moved to Greenwich ten days later, on 30 May/9 June. James then remained based at Greenwich from that point until 5/15 July, when he returned to Whitehall, where he remained for almost a week. The eighteenth and final peace conference session was held on 6/16 July, James prorogued the parliament on the following day, 7/17 July, and he did not leave on progress until 11/21 July. And as we have seen, even when he finally did depart on his summer progress, it was not really a
And even when he did set out, James still insisted on playing a role, despite the fact that the conference was complete, Cecil and the other commissioners had agreed to the articles and were no longer meeting, and all that was left to do was to have some subordinates finalize some of the formal language, perfect some of the clauses with input from the English merchants, and prepare the various copies of the articles for signature. At this point, even while somewhat further afield on his longer, three-week trip, the king stayed in constant touch through a network of couriers, with Sir Thomas Lake accompanying him and acting as his main secretary and go-between in his correspondence with the privy council. Cecil kept the king updated as Dun and Edmondes finished their work, while James spent time reading over drafts of the final treaty language, and weighing in even on relatively unimportant specifics such as the signatories’ and prolonged progress at all, but rather two separate, shorter trips, the first one not that far from London. 

Croft actually does not seem to be aware of the fact that the conference ended on 6/16 July, given her claims about the importance of James heading off hunting through August, while the commissioners supposedly remained behind, meeting at Somerset House. Moreover, after describing James’s departure for his supposedly extensive and distant hunting trip, she then claims that “Negotiations continued steadily, but there are no known letters from the king to Cecil or anyone else giving any precise royal instructions.” Croft, *Rex Pacificus*, Robert Cecil, and the 1604 Peace with Spain," 150. As we have seen, the negotiations did not, in fact, “continue steadily,” as all sides describe the conference as having concluded, and Edmondes and Dun were just drawing up the final language at this point, with everyone just waiting around for the Constable to arrive. If this were to be taken as proof of James’s supposed lack of interest in the peace, the same sorts of charges would have to be leveled at Cecil and the rest of the commissioners. And as I show above, James did keep up his correspondence right on through August, did continue to pay close attention to even these insignificant details, and did give precise instructions on how to proceed even here. It is unclear why Croft does not seem to be familiar with events, although much of her analysis appears to be based on an unpublished 1975 doctoral dissertation from the University of Durham, rather than on her own reading of the key primary documents. Many of her most important errors might have been avoided with a quick glance at the accounts that she does actually cite: the “Journal of the Conference”, for example. Even Lake had had quite a bit of previous experience with these issues and individuals, as he too had been involved in the negotiations with Verreyken in London in early 1600. Goodman, *Diplomatic Relations*, 42. He was also, as we have seen, one of the key individuals that the Habsburgs had been negotiating with in order to buy peace and/or toleration for the English catholics over the course of the past year, and he would become one of the main Spanish pensioners at the English court in the coming years.
commissioners’ titles of address, the list of other princes to be informed and included in the articles listing each sides’ allies, and subtle nuances in the Latin style of the final articles. Not only was James taking the time to consider and rule on these matters, he thought some of it urgent enough that he insisted on sending it ahead to Cecil by express post, even though Lake was at that very moment preparing to take horse for the journey, and he himself would be back in London soon. Whatever one’s beliefs about the nature of James’s kingship, this was quite clearly an issue that mattered to the king a great deal.

So as we can see, James played an integral and direct part in the success of the negotiations, alongside and in important counterpoint to the contributions of all of the various talents gathered around the conference table. He was not off hunting, ignoring what was going on in London – rather, he was right there, directing the effort, imposing his will upon the result, and finishing off the political and perceptual foundation he and his advisors had spent most of the previous year building. In all of this, the British king and his ministers continued their oppositional game throughout the negotiations, using it to good advantage to be able to push as hard a line as possible, while still managing to keep the Habsburg commissioners from walking away. At the same time, they were helping further encourage the Spaniards’ belief in James’s indispensable role in both the domestic and international political contexts, while getting them to hold out hope for the possibility of his future and continued goodwill. All while continuing to manage expectations by simultaneously reminding them of the diverse, factionalized nature of

117 Lake to Cecil (Apthorp, 11/21 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 223. Levinus Munck recorded the sending of various packets James’s way, including separate morning and evening express posts on 12/22 August, the second of which he described as “A Packett from the Lords Commissioners for the Peace to Sir Thomas Lake, with the relation at large of all that passed that day at their first visitation of the Constable at 9 at Night, by the running Post.” Jones & Munck, 254.
118 Lake to Cecil (12/22 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 225-6.
English politics, and of the ambivalent and even antagonistic attitude much of the kingdom’s political elite felt towards the Spaniards and their religion. They were so successful at this, and this view became so ingrained, that it made its way into print in the official Spanish relation of the Constable’s embassy, published upon his return. Here readers are told that the reason the Constable agreed to have the negotiations in England was explicitly because of “the straightforwardness of the King, and how much his presence would matter, as well as that of the Queen, for the good outcome of the treaty, since both were so inclined to peace”. But also because they needed to keep their commissioners close by, both so no one would think to carry out any “malos oficios” with the treaty without the king and queen looking on, and because their ministers were needed in their positions at home, as James and Anna were “not yet well seated” upon their thrones.119 It was all there: the indispensable king who with his queen were the greatest friends of peace, their untrustworthy, scheming, and all-too-powerful ministers, continued fears of factional strife, and despite the best of royal intentions, hands that were obviously tied.

In general, the process of negotiating peace had been as much about the informal building of a foundation for further discussion, debate, and negotiation as it had been about establishing a set of formal rules. And this “soft” process of relationship building, perception creation, norm foundation, and so forth did not end here. The entire course of the relationship in the years that followed can be seen to a certain extent to have been a direct extension of this, and we will see in

119 “Huvo sobre ello diversas demandas y respuesetas, y al cabo determinó el Condestable complazer al Rey de Inglaterra en que se hiziesse en su reyno, viendo la llaneza del Rey, y lo que importaría su presencia, y la de la Reyna para el buen suceso del tratado, por ser ambos tan inclinados a la paz, y zelosos de que en su ausencia tuviessen mas lugar los malos oficios de muchos: y por la necesidad que tenían de no apartar de si los ministros que pensavan deputar para ella en los principios de su Reynado y sucession, en que no estavan aun bien assentados”, Condestable, f.3.
chapter ten how future attempts to bring the two countries closer together – and the simultaneous
development of forces pushing them apart – were based firmly in the events of these first two
years of James’s English reign, and cannot be properly understood without a solid knowledge of
this particular context. Even that which seems most solid here – the actual treaty articles
themselves – would turn out to be subject to this complicated system and its discourse of contact,
as their contents, meaning, and application would become subject to continued negotiation and
differing interpretations right from the outset.

**The Constable’s embassy**

As important as it was, the completion of the peace treaty did not actually even mark the
end of the peacemaking process itself, as it provided for two particularly remarkable episodes
that would have their own profound effect on the way in which the relationship would develop.
Now that the articles had been agreed to, each king still had to sign the treaty and swear an oath
to maintain it, so each sent an extraordinary embassy with full honors to facilitate this and to
celebrate the achievement. These first embassies set the machinery of contact into motion,
building the foundations for the development of differing interest groups in each country, and
establishing personal connections that would grow with time. These embassies were also key
moments of contact in their own right, giving large numbers of people of all walks of life in each
country an unprecedented view of their long-despised adversaries in an entirely different light.
And the individuals in each entourage likewise experienced the contact. Their opinions and
perceptions were affected by what they saw and did abroad, and they brought these attitudes
home with them, gradually spreading them through the public consciousness at large. We have
already seen this in action on a smaller scale with Villamediana’s arrival in August 1603, but
these oath-swearing embassies were a much bigger occasion still, comprising somewhere over a
thousand visitors between the two groups, lavishly decked out for the occasion, in the attempt to showcase the power and wealth of their respective monarchs to all those watching. In addition, both countries saw a number of highly detailed printed relations and literary responses to these visits, each of which helped disseminate perceptions much farther afield. As a result, such moments of contact helped define attitudes over an entire generation. As the peace talks had taken place in England, the Spaniards went first.

With the conclusion of the commissioners’ negotiations in July 1604, the way was cleared for the Constable of Castile finally to come to England. As we saw in chapter four, his decision to remain in Flanders throughout the talks had been part of a careful strategy to use his real complaint of the gout as a convenient excuse to delay his coming, in the attempt to preserve Spanish dignity and reputación by not appearing overly eager to treat, or getting caught in an embarrassing situation if the negotiations were to fall apart once more. With the articles well in hand, however, these concerns were put to rest. His condition now suddenly improved (at least diplomatically), and the time had come to show England the magnificence and liberality that would come from friendship with the king of Spain.

At four in the morning on Sunday, 5/15 August, after hearing mass with his entire household, the Constable boarded ship in Gravelines to make his way across the Channel. The Dutch had threatened to capture the Spanish retinue, but James had told their agent in London, Caron, that he would take any such action as a direct insult to himself, and so the Constable was able to cross unopposed. Once in England, he meant to duplicate the route and process that

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120 Condestable, f.7. Villamediana to Philip III (Dover, 7/17 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 161, f.1. Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 123, f.1.
Villamediana had used the year before, as Lewes Lewkenor described: “He intends to travel very slowly towards London, the Spanish ambassador here having already ordered his journey in this sort, to-morrow night to Canterbury, Tuesday to Sittingbourne, Wednesday to Gravesend, Thursday to Greenwich, and Friday to London.”

It was to be another stately progress, providing maximum opportunity for ceremony and giving people of all kinds throughout the southeast a chance to witness the trip. Only this time it was on an even grander scale, as the ambassador’s entourage numbered well over two hundred persons.

After some delay due to a contrary wind, the Spaniards were forced to make their landing at the Downs, some five miles up the coast from Dover. They were met there by Lewkenor, who issued the king’s welcome, and by Villamediana, Senator Rovida, and Sir James Lindsay, who brought “as many coaches, horses and wagons as we could get”, to drive them back to town. Upon arrival in Dover, they received a grand ceremonial welcome complete with a “great salvo of artillery from the castle and the port”. The Constable responded by feasting everyone with a “great abundance of food and gifts, and an open table for all types of people”, understanding full well the adage that a way to a man’s heart is through his stomach. It was, from the start, an explicit attempt to show the liberality and generosity of the Spanish king and

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122 HMC Salisbury, XVI, 201, Lewkenor to Cecil (Dover, 5/15 August 1604). See also, Condestable, f.7.
123 “He has in his train 234 persons, whereof 8 of very good quality, some few other gentlemen, the rest all household officers and servants.” HMC Salisbury, XVI, 208, Lord Wotton to Cecil (Canterbury, 8/18 August 1604).
124 Villamediana to Philip III (Dover, 7/17 August 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 161, f.1.
125 HMC Salisbury XVI, 203, Lewkenor to the earl of Suffolk (Dover, 6/16 August 1604).
126 “[S]e le hizo una gran salva de artilleria del Castillo, y del puerto.” Condestable, f.7.
127 “Hospedó a todos su Excelencia, y uvo gran abundancia de comida y regalo, y mesa franca para todo genero de gente.” Condestable, f.7.
his steward, and it was well appreciated. In fact, everything here was calculated to maximize display: “He is all in his Spanish grandeza, permitting no one of his train to stand covered before him, or to sit covered at his table.” But this was formality and ceremony, not arrogance, and Lewkenor was quick to note that “[h]e used us all with great respect and courtesy.”

After taking an extra day to recover from the rather difficult crossing, the Spaniards began their journey towards the capital. They followed their intended route, where great crowds greeted them at each stop along the way, and lined the sides of the road leading to London. Lord Wotton gave them another royal welcome at the head of 500 horse on the road to Canterbury, and the earl of Northampton gave them a similar reception at Gravesend, their mixed entourage of Spaniards and Englishmen growing at each stop. From here, the Constable’s original determination was “to go in gloria patriae through the City, and therefore [he] will not go by water, neither will he the night before lodge far off, to the end he may go

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128 At least one version of the relación includes the line: “mostrando bien en esta occasion cuán liberal y pródigo es el mayordomo Luis de Sarauz, que hasta Lóndres llevó hielo de Flandes, y allí le tuvo algunos dias; cosa nunca vista ni usada en aquella nacion.” “Viaje À Inglaterra del Condestable de Castilla Don Juan Fernandez de Velasco para tratar de las paces entre ambas coronas,” CODOIN v.71, 473.
129 HMC Salisbury XVI, 203, Lewkenor to the earl of Suffolk (Dover, 6/16 August 1604).
130 Ibid., 204. And Lord Wotton described him favorably to Cecil as “a very grave gentleman, courteous enough, his behaviour void of vanity, no tedious complimenter, and, in a word to my thinking, his carriage not unlike yours.” HMC Salisbury XVI, 208.
131 Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 123, f.1.
132 Condestable, f.7v.
133 Ibid. And the Constable made explicit reference of the overwhelmingly positive nature of these receptions in his own later report to the king, saying that he had been “visto y recibido en todas con demostraciones de mucha voluntad y gusto”, AGS, Estado 841, Doc 133, f.1, Constable to Philip III (Gravelines, 2/12 September 1604). Received in Valladolid 19/29 September 1604.
through the City in full day-time.”

However, despite bearing up well enough in public, he had once again taken ill, and there was also news of sickness at Greenwich, serious enough to cause concern. So the Constable agreed to make the last stage of the trip by boat, passing by Greenwich on the way upriver to London, where the Spaniards still received their expected welcome: “By oar and sail they arrived in four hours at London on the Thames, which is a very wide and delectable river, full of an infinite number of both high-sided vessels and small ones, and so great was the reception and the competition of Ladies and Gentlemen that they almost covered the water.”

Amongst these vessels were a number of the most powerful nobles in the kingdom, with the queen herself even making an appearance, though prudently in disguise.

The Constable and his entourage were housed in the finest splendor in Somerset House, where the treaty negotiations had taken place, and which was generally considered “the most splendid house in London, after the Royal palace.” Villamediana described it on this occasion

134 HMC Salisbury XVI, 203, Lewkenor to the earl of Suffolk (Dover, 6/16 August 1604).
135 For the Constable’s illness: HMC Salisbury XVI, 205, Lewkenor to Cecil (Canterbury, 7/17 August 1604). For the sickness at Greenwich: HMC Salisbury XVI, 208, Lord Wotton to Cecil (Canterbury, 8/18 August 1604).
136 “A remo y vela llegaron en quatro horas a Londres por el rio Tamis, que es una ribera muy ancha y [deliciosa], llena de infinito numero de baxeles de alto borde, y pequeños, y fue tan grande el recibimiento y concurso de Damas y Cavalleros que casi cubrian el agua, y entre otras barcas se descubrió, una aunque disfraçada, en que yvan Condestable, f.8. Also, CODOIN v.71, 475. The four-hour trip was from Gravesend to London, a distance of some twenty-five miles.
137 The queen’s boat included: “el gran Almirante, el gran Secretario Cecil, la Condesa de Sufolc, y algunas damas, y con Mascara su magestad de la Reyna.” Condestable, f.8. Even this was significant, as the Lord Admiral and Cecil were the two ministers that the Spaniards considered most opposed to peace, the Countess of Suffolk was the lady with whom their ambassadors had been in negotiations to buy toleration for the English catholics and formed the foundation of their process of establishing a Spanish faction at court, and James’s catholic queen and her ladies had been an intensive target of the Habsburgs’ in these attempts, and in influencing the privy councillors and commissioners for peace. Constable’s meeting with the masked queen also mentioned at Northampton to James (10/20 August 1604), CSPDomestic: James I, vol.IX, 7.
as being “very well prepared with hangings and decorations of the King.”

Moreover, the crown was covering the charges for their stay, an honor for which James was greatly praised by the Spaniards. The king himself was still returning from his progress, and would not arrive in London for a few more days. This was done by design, in diplomatic response to the Constable’s own much-delayed coming, in order to remind the Spaniards and the world that James was a sovereign king who need not wait on any man. After all, the Constable was publicly perceived even still to be delaying things in order to make it appear that the Spaniards were not too anxious or desperate for peace, as Sir Henry Wotton wrote to Winwood from Dover in mid-July, indicating that the Constable was “expected here within eight Days, or if you will somewhat longer, for Spanish Gravity sake, and to cover his Masters Appetite unto this Peace.” But even here, the king’s participation reinforced the good-cop/bad-cop narrative and bolstered Spanish perceptions of James as their greatest friend in England, as Villamediana had been paying close attention to the debate over paying for the Constable’s stay. As he told the

139 “Muy bien adereçada con colgaduras y adereços del Rey.” AGS, Estado 841, Doc 123, f.1v, Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604). Received 16/26 September 1604.
140 “Tambien mandò el Rey hazer el gasto estos dias a la del Conde y Senador, y a los Deputados de sus Altezas, y su gente con gran magnificencia y aparato. Y verdaderamente en todos los Cavalleros criados y ofeciales de la Casa Real se conocia bien el grande amor y gusto con que su Magestad se servia de hazerles este regalo y honor.” Condestable, f.8v.
141 James was at this point understandably annoyed that the Constable was yet again delayed in his arrival. His presence was called for at the final conference session of 6/16 July, and he was expected within three weeks of that date. A month after this, on 6/16 August, he still had not made it to London yet, and Lake wrote to Cecil indicating that “the King inquires often of the Constable’s arrival and is not pleased with the long delay.” HMC Salisbury XVI, 202. Consequently, the king would only stay in London until the day after the swearing of the oath, and would then resume his much-delayed and broken-up progress. In addition to his diplomatic reasoning and oft-expressed frustration regarding Spanish delays, it is certainly true that this gave James a good opportunity to indulge his desire for hunting, while also having the added virtue of saving the expense that several more days of royal celebration would incur. For explicit explanation of James’s intentions regarding his stay in London, see two letters from Sir Thomas Lake to Cecil (Drayton, 8/18 and 10/20 August 1604), HMC Salisbury XVI, 209, 219-220.
142 Wotton to Winwood (Dover, 19/29 July 1604), Winwood II, 24. Also at Wotton I, 319-320.
Constable, while the English privy council did not want the crown to cover any of the trip, King
James himself “wanted to host Your Excellency with great magnificence and cover the entire
cost of it from when you enter this Kingdom until you leave it”.

Once in London, the Constable and his party were royally feasted and were paid
numerous visits by various key members of the court and government. On Sunday, 12/22
August, the treaty commissioners went to Somerset House to formally welcome the Constable in
the name of the king, and to set a meeting for the coming Wednesday to go over some final
details in the treaty articles, now that the Habsburg leader was present. The king arrived in
town on Tuesday afternoon, and granted the Constable a public audience for the following
day. On Thursday, they had a private audience, and the two talked at length about the
remaining difficulties that would need to be overcome now that peace had been achieved. The
deputies also met again, talked business, and offered toasts. The king himself took part in these
negotiations and all sides seemed happy. Friday and Saturday saw the final meetings to look

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143 “El del Rey que queria ospedar a VE con gran manifiçencia y hazelle la costa toda desde que
entrase hasta que saliese deste Reyno”, Villamediana to Constable (London, 12/22 April 1604;
 copy sent with dispatch to Philip III, received in Spain on 3/13 May 1604), AGS Estado, leg.
  842, doc 94, f.2v. The issue of keeping the trip a short one had even come up back then as well,
  for the same reasons: since Villamediana indicated that it would be an expensive trip, if the
  English were going to pay for it, they wanted the Constable’s stay to be brief. Ibid., f.4.
144 In Villamediana’s words: “[E]l Condestable a sido ospedado y Regalado con mucha autoridad
  y grandeza.” AGS, Estado 841, Doc 123, f.1v, Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3
  September 1604). Received 16/26 September 1604.
145 Journal, 267; Condestable, ff.9.
146 Journal, 267; Condestable, ff.9v-10v.
147 Most notably, the fate of the English catholics, and the future possibilities for at least some
  sort of more comprehensive toleration. For the Constable’s relation of his private conversations
  with James, see AGS, Estado 841, Docs 133-136; for his later, more detailed reflections on
  James, and more in-depth discussion of what was needed for the future, see: BNM, Manuscritos
  Varios, tomo 6949, ff.115-125, Constable to Philip III (Bordeaux, 12/22 November 1604). This
  is an eighteenth-century copy, and it has likewise been printed and translated in Albert Loomie,
  Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, Volume I: 1603-1612 (London: Catholic Record Society,
  1973), 26-44. Incorrectly cited there as tomo 6969.
over the treaty and make sure that everything was in order—but these gatherings were more than just about business. As with the celebrations and banquets, they were also a good opportunity for English and Spanish noblemen and gentlemen to spend a great deal of time together, much of which they spent drinking and sharing opinions about weapons, horses, and dancing.\footnote{148} It was upon moments like these that much of the future success of the relationship was founded, at least at the elite level. For many in the nobility and government, this was where attitudes and affections began to take shape, building on what had begun with Villamediana’s arrival the previous year, and what had transpired for the past several months among the commissioners themselves.

And the Spaniards understood full well how this operated. Philip had been very clear in recent letters that it was important for his ambassadors to be fêted in England, indicating that the Constable should certainly accept James’s hospitality, as it would be good for people to see them getting on so well, and it would ease relations with James’s ministers and courtiers, so that he might “better shine” amongst them.\footnote{149} And he told Villamediana that he should keep up the great work he had been doing in trying to win over various people at the English court, “that they may be able to be of use” in the Habsburgs’ cause, and that he should do this especially through participating “in their festivals and indulg[ing] in them as you did in that of the Garter”.\footnote{150}

\footnote{148} *Condestable*, ff.10v-11.
\footnote{149} “[P]odreys aceptar el ospedaje que aquel Rey ha dado a entender que os quiere hazer por que es bien que se vea la correspondencia que hace eso a la mia…y sera mayor y mas sin escrupulo la comunicaçion de los ministros y criados del dicho Rey con vos y lo que se avia de passar en vanquetearlos luzira mas repartiendolo entrellos”. Philip III to the Constable (Valladolid, 1/11 June 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 89, ff.1-1v.
\footnote{150} Referring, of course, to his attendance at the celebration of the Order of Garter, held annually on 23 April, the feast of St. George, patron saint of England. “[E]s muy aproposito para el fin que se lleva procurar ganar voluntades de personas que puedan ser de provecho para faciñitar y encaminar las cosas convenientes y hallaros en sus fiestas y darles gusto en ellas como lo
Public display would indeed be as key a component in London as it had been on the 
journey inland, and there was no shortage of opportunity for this during the Constable’s stay. 
Most magnificent of all was the main reason for the trip: the king’s swearing of the oath to 
uphold the peace, and its associated celebrations, which took place on Sunday, 19/29 August.151 
From the very beginning, the crowds were enormous. During the procession from Somerset 
House to Whitehall, we are told, “there was such a multitude of people that one could hardly 
pass through the streets.”152 The Spanish retinue, always well-dressed, was decked out in 
particularly fine fashion, with rich fabrics and gold, silver, and jewels everywhere. They were 
escorted on horseback and in coaches to the steps of the palace by the Lord Treasurer and a 
number of English lords, where they were greeted publicly by many other great nobles and 
officeholders in the kingdom, including the Lord Admiral, the captain of the guard, and the Lord 
Chamberlain. King James and Prince Henry came out to meet them in the presence chamber, 
and the king personally escorted the Constable and Villamediana into the chapel, along with the 
other commissioners in a great formal procession, complete with macebearers and kings-at-arms.153 As the crowd filed in for the ceremony, the musicians began to play and sing various 
pieces that were especially chosen for the occasion, including “some motets and other verses in 
English that were written for the marriage of Queen Mary and King Philip II, our lord, and others

hiziesteis en la de la Xarretera”. Philip III to Villamediana (Valladolid, 23 June/3 July 1604), 
AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 91, f.1. 
151 The events of this day are recounted in detail in various places, most notably: Condestable, 
152 “[A]via tanta multitud de pueblo, que a penas se podia passar por las calles.” Condestable, 
f.12v. 
153 Condestable, f.12v. Aremberg, however, was not able to attend, as he had suffered yet 
another attack of the gout. AGS, Estado 841, Doc 123, f.2, Villamediana to Philip III (London, 
24 August/3 September 1604). Received 16/26 September 1604.
in praise of the peace."\textsuperscript{154} When the music stopped, the king, Constable, and commissioners all came out, and Lord Cecil produced the treaty articles, which the king kissed, and gave to the Constable. The king then placed his hands on a Latin bible, and confirmed and swore to uphold the peace. After this, “His Majesty took the Constable’s hand in faith and signal of the union and peace established, and they returned to their seats. At this the people cried out, ‘Peace, peace, peace! Long live the King! Long live the King! Long live the King!’”\textsuperscript{155}

The rest of the day was given over to feasting and entertainment all over the city, while the king hosted an elaborate banquet in the palace, with all of the important members of court in attendance.\textsuperscript{156} The atmosphere was truly celebratory, with music from various instruments and large quantities of food.\textsuperscript{157} There was much toasting on either side, including some very direct references to the possibility of a future Anglo-Spanish royal marriage alliance to draw the two countries even closer together.\textsuperscript{158} During dinner, the official proclamation of the peace was made, complete with trumpets and drums, both in the palace and throughout the city.\textsuperscript{159} And at one point, James sent Northampton over to the Constable to tell him that this was a particularly

\textsuperscript{154} “[U]nos motetes y versos en Ingles, que se hizieron al casamiento de la Reyna Maria con el Rey Don Phelippe II, nuestro señor, y otros en alabança de la paz.” Condestable, ff.12v-13.
\textsuperscript{155} “[T]omó la mano su Magestad al Condestable en fè y señal de la union, y paz establecida, y se bolvieron a sus assientos. En esto gritó el pueblo, Paz, paz, paz, Viva el rey, viva el Rey, viva el Rey.” Condestable, f.13.
\textsuperscript{156} For a good description of these events in English, see the translation of the part of the Constable’s \textit{relación} dealing with the banquet and entertainments included in William Brenchly Rye, \textit{England as Seen by Foreigners in the days of Elizabeth and James the First} (London: John Russell Smith, 1865), 117-124.
\textsuperscript{157} Condestable, f.13v.
\textsuperscript{158} Condestable, f.14v. For more on the Anglo-Spanish match, its origins, and how it quickly developed into the central issue facilitating contact between the two monarchies, see chapter six. \textsuperscript{159} Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604; received 16/26 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 123, f.3. For a copy of the proclamation, see Robert Steele and James Ludovic Lindsay, \textit{Tudor and Stuart Proclamations 1485-1714} (Oxford: Clarendon, 1910), vol. I, 999 (English); Condestable, f.14, and AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 132 (Spanish translations).
happy day, not only because he had made peace, but because it was also his daughter’s (the princess Elizabeth’s) birthday: “And therefore he hoped that through her name there might be means of preserving the kingdoms of Spain and England in friendship and union, unlike that other hostile Elizabeth who had caused so much damage.”\textsuperscript{160} The Constable was quick to respond, drinking to James’s children, and making a particularly appropriate comment regarding the Virgin repairing the evil that Eve had brought into the world.\textsuperscript{161}

After dinner, the guests retired to various rooms while the tables were cleared away, and then the whole court reconvened in the audience chamber for the ball. The prince was brought out to show off his moves, and the queen participated in a number of different dances with various nobles of the first rank. When the dancing was finished, everyone moved to the windows to look out “upon a square, where there was a platform, and a vast crowd had assembled to see the King’s bears fight with hounds, which was a real pleasure”.\textsuperscript{162} For the people’s further entertainment, there was also a bull baited by dogs, and acrobats who performed various tricks on a rope and on horseback, after which the king and queen retired, and the Constable’s entourage was led back to Somerset house by more than fifty halberdiers carrying torches.\textsuperscript{163}

True to his word, James took his leave of the Spaniards the following day. This time, the king came himself to Somerset House, as the Constable’s illness had returned and he was once

\textsuperscript{160} “[A]ssi esperava que por el nombre avia de ser medio para conservar en amistad y union los Reynos de España y Inglaterra, al contrario de otra Isabela enemiga, que tantos daños avia causado.” Condestable, f.14v.

\textsuperscript{161} Condestable, f.14v.

\textsuperscript{162} “Con que se acabo el sarao, y se pusieron a las ventanas de la misma sala, que mira a una plaça donde avia tablados y gente innumerable a ver pelear los osos que tiene el Rey con lebreles, que fue de mucho gusto.” Condestable, f.15.

\textsuperscript{163} Condestable, f.15.
more bedridden. After exchanging pleasantries for awhile with Northampton as their interpreter, everyone else was ushered out of the room and the two men talked alone and in earnest for about an hour. Here was the personal monarch once more, using his considerable charisma in a private setting to further develop the relationship and convince the Constable that he was indeed Spain’s greatest friend in England – just as he had with Sully, the Venetians, the various commissioners, and as he would with so many others over the years. Finally, James gave the Constable a beautiful ring (“una buena sortija”), saying that it signified “the marriage and strength of the peace” – itself a not-so-subtle reference to the future possibility of another future marriage that would aim to bring the two countries even closer together. The king then bid the Constable farewell and made his way by river back to the palace, “accompanied by the Count of Villamediana, and the other Spanish gentlemen, to whom he did a thousand favors and courtesies.”

James left that evening to go back to his hunting, and the Spaniards made good use of their remaining time in London. The Constable’s convalescence did not keep him from receiving numerous Englishmen and other ambassadors, or from directing Villamediana in his further endeavors to secure support for Spain at court. As the Venetian ambassador put it:

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164 James paid two such visits that morning, as both the Spanish and Flemish ambassadors were, interestingly, stricken with the same disease and confined to their beds. Although there does appear to be some disagreement and inconsistency over whether the Constable was suffering from gout or from some ailment of the kidneys. AGS, Estado 841, Doc 123, f.3, Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604). Received 16/26 September 1604.

165 “El Rey le dio al condestable al despedirse una buena sortija, dizendiola que hora por el mariaje de la paz y firmeza della.” AGS, Estado 841, Doc 123, f.3v, Villamediana to Philip III (London, 24 August/3 September 1604). Received 16/26 September 1604. For the time spent talking, see Condestable, f.15v. And here the ring is described as “una sortija con un diamante rico para memoria del mariaje, que assi llamò a la paz.”

166 “[A]compañandole el Conde de Villamediana, y los demas Cavalleros Españoles, a quien usò mil favores y cortesias.” Condestable, f.15v.

167 Condestable, ff.15v-16v.
Taxis [Villamediana] is making presents every day, and one hears of nothing else just now. It is said that he has spent upwards of two hundred thousand crowns in jewels, and that money has been given as well. The Spaniards are lauded to the skies; for in fact this is a country where only those that are lavish are held in account; and since my arrival in this Court ten months ago, I have heard of nothing so often as presents.168

As had been the case over the course of the previous year’s lead-up, and once more during the recent negotiations, James knew quite well how to make the most of both his presence and his absence, using his considerable personal skills in order to charm the Constable, and then knowing when to step out of the way in order to let the system he had helped create and had worked to develop do the work for which it was intended.

Both court and country had come out to see the Spaniards and, once again, many of them had liked what they had seen. Indeed, the Constable’s embassy provided a signature moment in what was now a yearlong Spanish presence in England that had done so much in so many ways to help establish this peace on a firm footing – through public display, private interaction, secret correspondence, and lavish giving – and most of what we discuss in the remaining chapters will be a direct development of what was begun over this period.169 When he boarded ship in Dover for Calais, after another several days’ stately progress through southeast England, the Constable and his entourage left behind many favorable opinions amongst commoners and nobles alike.170 These opinions would, over time, grow into more firmly held attitudes that would complicate and

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168 Nicolo Molin to the Doge and Senate (London, 22 August/1 September 1604). CSPVen X, 179. His estimates were likely not far off, as Philip had recently ordered 800,000 escudos to be sent to help pay for the war in Flanders and to better facilitate matters in England, “para que todo se mejore y las negoçiaçion de Inglaterra camine con mas reputaçion”. Philip III to the Constable (Valladolid, 23 June/3 July 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 90, f.1.

169 For more on this, see chapter ten in particular.

170 The Spaniards left London on 25 August/4 September, and embarked at Dover on 31 August/10 September. Constable to Philip III (Gravelines, 2/12 September 1604; received in Valladolid 19/29 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 133, f.2v.
enrich the English political, religious, commercial, and intellectual landscape to a remarkable degree.

**Conclusion**

So after more than a year’s work, the treaty negotiations had finally been concluded, and the king had sworn to uphold the peace. The text of the treaty created the “hard” rules that would officially govern the relationship, and getting to the specifics was a long-fought process that had at many points not seemed certain of success. Indeed, *how* this was all achieved was at least as crucial as *what* was achieved, and a number of people on both sides played an important role in this very process – with King James once more at the top of the list. By getting the peace talks to occur in England, by continuing to portray himself throughout as the indispensable figure, and by continuing to participate directly when necessary, James helped ensure that peace would not only happen, but that it would be on terms which would prove to be favorable to the English, without chasing the Spaniards away. And through the creation of the new environment at court, its steady intertwining with the international system, the many months of uncertain lead-up, the eventual formal negotiations, and on through the Constable’s embassy, we can see just how important the “soft” context of relationships, perceptions, norms, and strategies was to everything that would follow.

These first years of James’s English reign saw the formation of the entire Jacobean system of domestic politics and international relations, of which the Anglo-Spanish peacetime relationship would be a fundamental part. Much of what has traditionally been seen as mere diplomatic formality, typical Spanish bureaucratic delay, or evidence of supposed disinterest on the part of the British king was actually a process of building this foundation and getting the Habsburgs firmly entrenched within the system. There would still be some work left to do,
especially in the establishment of a solid Spanish faction at court. The various possible English friends and pensioners of Spain would still need to be brought around to the level of respect and attraction that would be required, especially since several of the most prominent candidates had played an oppositional role all the way through to the end of the negotiations. But a strong foundation had been built in England that had helped bring this peace to pass, and which would provide the system within which so much of the resulting relationship would play out. And as important as all of this would be for the subsequent development both of the peacetime connection and the Jacobean political environment, everything here was a precedent in another, more immediate way. For after the Constable’s visit, the English now had to go to Spain to return the favor. And that trip, as well, would prove far more important than the seemingly symbolic ritual it represented. It would be a crucial moment of contact that would finish off this entire process, and help define the Anglo-Spanish relationship for the rest of the reign.
Chapter Eight: The British are coming – the 1605 trip to Spain

Y para que todo admire,
Y todo asombre, no hay cosa
Que de liberal no pase,
Hasta el extremo de pródiga.

Milán con sus ricas telas
Allí va en vista curiosa,
Las Indias con sus diamantes,
Y Arabia con sus aromas.

Con los mal intencionados
Va la envidia mordedora,
Y la bondad en los pechos
De la lealtad española.

La alegría universal
Huyendo de la congoja,
Calles, Y plazas discurre
Descompuesta, y casi loca.

In order that all may admire
And all may be astonished, there is nothing
That out of abundance does not happen,
Up to the lavish extreme.

Milan with its rich fabrics
Goes there in curious view,
The Indies with their diamonds,
And Arabia with its aromas.

With the ill-disposed
Goes the snakebite of envy,
And goodness in the breasts
Of Spanish loyalty.

Universal happiness
Fleeing from heartbreak,
Streets, and plazas flow
Out of order, and almost mad.

- Miguel de Cervantes, from the “Romance de la misa de parida de la Reina Doña Margarita,” La Gitanilla, 1613

The final completion of the peace treaty marked the end of a process that had taken several years to bring about, and it almost did not happen at all. But the difficult and drawn-out process of achieving the peace had an important effect on perceptions, and Anglo-Spanish encounters at all levels over the course of time between the accession and the treaty both demonstrate the growth of a basis for constructive interaction, and indicate where many of the future fault lines in the relationship would lie. We have seen what happened when first Villamediana and then the Constable came to England. We have looked at what they thought of the experience, what effect their presence had on the populace, and how they not only helped to achieve the peace, but had begun to lay the foundation for a resuscitation of Spanish influence in

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1 Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, La Gitanilla (Linkgua S.L. Ediciones, 2009), 30. Translation mine. Telling the tale of Queen Margarita’s churching in Valladolid, 21/31 May 1605.
English cultural and political life. This, in turn, was carried out within the context of—and played a crucial role in the construction and maintenance of—James I’s fundamentally intertwined foreign and domestic policies of interdependent factionalization. And it was through this that he created for himself room to maneuver in both arenas, allowing him to walk the *via media* for which he was temperamentally and intellectually suited, and to which the realities of power in both the domestic and international spheres had left him little alternative.

As the Constable had come to England to witness James’s signing of the treaty and swearing of the oath to maintain it, the next step would be for the English to send their own embassy to Spain, to do the same with Philip. As England and Spain had been at war for the better part of twenty years, and were remote enough from one another—both geographically and confessionally—that regular travel between them remained difficult, these embassies exchanged in the first couple years of peace would have an unusually significant role to play. But there is another reason why the 1605 trip to Spain would prove to be a remarkably important and influential event. After all, virtually the entire process of getting from truce to treaty had taken place in England, so now it was time for Spain to make its mark. Philip III and his * valido*, the duke of Lerma, could finally take the initiative—and they would not merely take it, they would seize it with both hands.

**The Lord Admiral goes for Spain**

Once the Constable and his entourage left England, preparations began for the English reply. This was a matter of reciprocation and one-upmanship for both sides. The Constable’s embassy had set an important precedent, and each side wanted to outdo the other’s performance now that positions of host and guest were to be reversed. As a result, while the English embassy to Spain in the spring of 1605 was a conscious attempt on both sides to duplicate punctiliously
the events of the previous summer, it was also to be an event of much greater grandeur and significance. Both countries were on display as never before, and everyone was paying attention. Given the disproportionate importance of this key moment of early contact, a closer look can tell us quite a bit about the way in which many inhabitants of the two countries would see each other and behave towards one another over the coming years. Several of the key issues of any import were first addressed here, and the way in which these early negotiations were handled would establish patterns that would be followed for years to come.

James’s choice as extraordinary ambassador to Spain was a carefully considered one: the Lord Admiral, Charles Howard, earl of Nottingham. Nottingham was not only one of the highest ranking members of the English nobility – a necessary element of diplomatic reciprocation, given the Constable’s status – but he was also one of the five English commissioners that negotiated the peace treaty, as well as the man who had perhaps profited the most of any Englishman from the war with Spain. His presence at the head of the embassy was therefore a strong message of good faith on the part of James, the seriousness of England’s commitment to peace underlined by the apparent willingness of such a man to give up personal profit and his martial occupation at the request of his king. The duke of Lerma would even remark on this very point, telling Nottingham that the continuance of the peace was (as the Lord Admiral himself told it) “much confirmed in that it plesed the King my master to send me to the King in this sarvis. Concederyng that I had ben a prencipall man in all the actions in the Quene my late Mistress’s tyme, and that of all men I had lest cause to desier pece, and that no man lost by it but I.” The sight of such a lion lying down with lambs was surely meant to speak volumes, but there was of course another side to this choice. As the hero of the English fight against the

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2 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
Armada in 1588, as well as the co-commander of the sack of Cádiz in 1596, the Lord Admiral’s presence was a not-so-subtle reminder of English power and Spanish defeat, should the people of the peninsula begin to forget how it was that they got to this point.  

Nottingham’s entourage was designed to impress, consisting of dozens of men of high rank not only in England, but in Scotland as well, among them scions of many of the most important noble houses of both kingdoms. There were several Howards beyond the Lord Admiral himself, including his two eldest sons (Lord Howard of Effingham and Sir Charles Howard, the eventual 2nd Earl) and the son of another of James’s most influential privy councilors, the earl of Suffolk. James Drummond, recently created first earl of Perth and the brother of Queen Anna’s principal confidant, was along, as was James Stewart, third earl of Moray and brother of Lord Admiral Nottingham’s young new wife, Margaret. Also present were William Anstruther (Knight of the Bath, Gentleman of the Bedchamber, future ambassador to Denmark, and undoubtedly one of James’s most trusted eyewitnesses for the trip), Pickering Wotton (son of Edward, Lord Wotton of the privy council, and well-beloved nephew of the famous ambassador to Venice, Henry Wotton), Dudley Carleton (the future ambassador and much-cited correspondent of John Chamberlain), and numerous other men who would figure prominently in Jacobean politics, foreign relations, exploration, trade, and colonization.

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3 As we have seen in chapter three above, James had done the same sort of thing before, sending first Danvers and then Devonshire to greet Villamediana en route to court.
4 Moray and Margaret were also King James’s first cousins, once removed. Their grandfather, the 1st earl, was Mary Queen of Scots’s half-brother, and King James’s first regent as a child king.
5 Among them: Lord Norris, Lord Willoughby, Thomas Roe, George Buck, Richard Leveson, Robert Mansell/Mansfield, Raleigh Gilbert, Thomas Palmer, the brothers John and Sackville Trevor, Amyas Preston, Arthur Gorges, and King James’s first cousin, Sir Robert Stewart. BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C xiii, f.403. Sir Robert Dudley – son of Queen Elizabeth’s great favorite of the same name, nephew of Nottingham, noted sea captain, participant in the 1596 sack of Cádiz, and self-styled earl of Warwick – was supposed to go as well, but presumably
short, this was a very influential collection of individuals, and all would be bringing their opinions and experiences regarding Spain back to England with them.

But it was a diverse group, as well. In addition to this prominent combination of Howards and Scots, crypto-catholics and confirmed protestants, nobles and gentlemen, there were also hundreds of support personnel. It was not just elites who got to see and be seen in Spain, but soldiers, servants, cooks, grooms, doctors, musicians, and ministers to boot. Most estimates of the entourage’s total size run between 650 and 900 persons.\textsuperscript{6} This was no minor traveling party; rather, it was more like an expeditionary force. And as we shall see, there would be conquests on both sides in the coming action.

The Lord Admiral took his official leave from King James on 21/31 March 1605, and set out for the coast five days later. Preparations took just over a week, and the flotilla of six ships set sail from Dover on 5/15 April.\textsuperscript{7} Thanks to their ships “being of that exceeding goodnes in sayle, and by the skilfulnes of our Mariners”, the journey took just a week and a half, making such good time that they beat the bark they had sent on ahead with provisions by a full two

\textsuperscript{6} Treswell, Robert, \textit{A Relation of such things as were observed to happen in the Journey of the right Honourable Charles Earle of Nottingham, &c. his Highnesse Ambassadour to the King of Spaine, being sent thither to take the Oath of the sayd King for the maintenance of Peace betweene he two famous Kings of Great Brittain and Spain, according to the severall Articles formerly concluded on by the Constable of Castilla in England in the Moneth of August 1604}. (London: Printed by Melchisedech Bradwood for Gregorie Season, and are to be sold at his Shop under Aldersgate, 1605), 20.

\textsuperscript{7} There were originally to be seven ships, but the Hoy named the \textit{George} was disabled on the trip down to Dover, and so its load had to be spread among the others. Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 8-9.
days. And so it was that on the morning of Monday, 15/25 April, the embassy of the newly styled King of Great Britain arrived in La Coruña, at the northwest tip of Spain.

This was the first major group of mostly protestant Britons to stand peacefully on Spanish soil since the beginning of the war some twenty years earlier, and it was the first official English embassy to Spain since the expulsion of John Man in 1568, nearly four decades before. What this massive, influential, and diverse collection of men saw on their trip would help inform their attitudes and opinions about Spain for years to come. And they in turn would serve as a unique, up-close example of a remarkably varied cross-section of British life for hundreds of thousands of Spaniards. They were on the ground in Spain for more than two months, seeing much of the country. And three-and-half weeks of that time was spent in the capital city itself, as the talk of the town and at the center of some of the most memorable and remarked-on events in years. How they behaved would have a disproportionate influence on what Spaniards would think of their country for a long time. Moreover, looking at how they were believed to have behaved can tell us a great deal about Spanish priorities, perceptions, and even policy towards the British kingdoms throughout the rest of the period.

It is fitting that this momentous expedition began with what appeared to be a fortuitous mix-up, but for different reasons than one might expect. After setting out from Dover, the British entourage made its way to La Coruña, at the northwestern tip of the Iberian peninsula, in the province of Galicia. This had been the original plan agreed upon with ambassador Villamediana back in London. However, King Philip had ultimately prepared for their arrival at Santander, some three hundred miles to the east along the rugged Cantabrian coast. When the

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8 Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44.
Lord Admiral found out about the Spaniards’ preparations, he was insistent that La Coruña was
the agreed-upon destination, and that it would be the only place he and his sailors would feel
comfortable sailing to.\footnote{He originally found out about the Spaniards’ expectation of his arrival in Santander before setting sail from Dover. His response to the news was to be “pouseled with it and know not what to doo, for the Imbasador did know this 7 months and more that I dourst not Adventure the King’s Majestie’s shyps soo fare into the Bay as S. Anderas.” This had long been an English concern, and was the same reason Drake had chosen to attack La Coruña rather than Santander in the great counter-armada campaign of 1589. Moreover, Nottingham had already sent the horses and carriages ahead to La Coruña, so he was going to continue on as planned. Nottingham to Cranborne (Dover, 5/15 April 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.34. See also Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44, where he says that “he could not find in England either Master or Pilotts that knewe St. Andera, being indeed a crooked and unhappye place to get into.”} So, upon landing, the English and Scots had to spend two and a half
weeks in this provincial port town, waiting for the king’s official welcoming committee, mule
train, and servants to arrive, in order to convey them over the rough Galician terrain inland to the
court at Valladolid.

However, what has always been seen as a simple misunderstanding turns out on closer
examination to have been something else entirely. This is because of a major event that had just
occurred in Valladolid. On Good Friday, 29 March/8 April 1605, Queen Margaret gave birth to
a son and heir, the prince of Asturias and future king, Philip IV. News of the prince’s birth
reached the English on board ship, as they hailed a passing bark recently come from Bayonne.\footnote{An English ship from Barnstaple. April 10/20. Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 9-10.} Little did the Lord Admiral and his entourage know, but this would mean that their visit to the
Spanish court would coincide with a number of extraordinary and fabulously well-attended and
talked-about celebrations, thus greatly adding to the magnificence of what they saw, how they
were seen, and who they saw and were seen by. And this concurrence would be no chance
event, but was rather a conscious attempt on the part of King Philip and his favorite Lerma to
overwhelm their guests with an unprecedented demonstration of Spanish power and wealth, and
to attract them with all of the many tools at their disposal. This was so important, that Philip postponed the infant prince’s original baptism date by more than a month in order that it might coincide with the Lord Admiral’s arrival.\textsuperscript{12}

In fact, it was even more complicated than that. Philip had been planning this for a long time, and had actually first delayed the \textit{embassy’s coming} in order to ensure that they would arrive around the time of the prince’s birth. As he wrote to Villamediana in late February:

For various reasons it would be of much service to me if you might artfully endeavor to ensure that the Admiral of England does not leave there for here until the middle of April, and I will be happy about it in particular because it will be better that when he comes our lord will have delivered the Queen of her child, and he [the Admiral] will be able to see it and also the celebrations that will be made.\textsuperscript{13}

Villamediana appears to have held up his end of the bargain, as the Lord Admiral set sail on precisely the 15\textsuperscript{th} of April, according to the Spanish calendar. Then, when it became clear that various crucial construction projects at court undertaken with this very visit in mind were not going to be ready in time,\textsuperscript{14} Philip sent another letter to his ambassador in England, this time requesting that Nottingham and his company not sail to La Coruña, but make instead for Santander:

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\textsuperscript{12} As Pinheiro describes it: “En este tiempo se comenzó a tratar del bautismo del príncipe; mas, esperando el rey al almirante de Inglaterra, que estaba ya embarcado para España y la venía a visitar de parte de su monarca, ordenó aplazar el bautismo hasta su venida, porque dicen es de los principales personajes de Inglaterra, y viene con gran fausto y setecientas personas en su compañía y muchos títulos; y así comenzaron a preparar el pasadizo y palacios del rey.” Tomé Pinheiro da Veiga, \textit{Fastiginia: O Fastos Geniales}, trans. Narciso Alonso Cortès (Valladolid: Imp. del Colegio de Santiago, 1916), 63-64.

\textsuperscript{13} “Por algunas causas me tendre por servido de que procureys diestramente que El Almirante de Inglaterra no parta de ay para aca hasta mediado Abril, y en particular holgare dello porque sera mejor que quando venga aya alumbrado nuestro señor a la Reyna, y pueda verla y tambien las fiestas que se hizieren.” Philip III to Villamediana (Tordesillas, 16/26 February 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 121, f.1.

\textsuperscript{14} The construction projects had all been originally expected to be complete by the first of May, at the latest. Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de Las Cosas Sucedidas En La Corte de España, Desde 1599 Hasta 1614} (Madrid: Imprenta de J. Martín Alegría, 1857), 238.
\end{flushright}
thus I have ordered that the necessary preparations be made in Santander for the lodging of the Admiral, and it would not be able to be done in time anywhere else…and in any case you need to endeavor that he come to Santander and keep this fixed because the others [i.e. the other ports] would be very inconvenient, and note then only the road from here to Santander will be made ready.  

He had to have known full well that one of three things would happen: either (1) the letter would have arrived too late for them to do anything about it, (2) the English would not have agreed to comply, or (3) that it would take some time to change plans, get a pilot, and make the other necessary arrangements.  

In any of these scenarios, this would give Philip an excuse to buy his carpenters and painters a few more weeks to finish the job – and he did everything he could on his end to get them to pull it off, including having shifts going round-the-clock, and offering a prize if they finished before a certain date.  

Finally, when the child ended up being born at least a week earlier than expected, thus further lengthening the time he would have to go unbaptized, Philip still stuck to his guns, postponing the date of the ceremony until 19/29 May, so that the

15 “A los 26 de Hebrero os escrivi que procurasedes diestramente que el Almirante de Inglaterra no parta para aca hasta mediado Abril por las causas que allí se apuntaron, y lo que agora se ofrezçe que advertiros es que aunque ay se os ha dado a entender que vandra a la Coruña, convendra que encamineys que preçissamente sea a Santander porque me he informado que aquel puerto es fondable para qualesquier navios y esto lo çertifica del todo haver desembarçado en el La Reyna mi Señora y madre que aya gloria, y conviene que assi se encamine por que ya he mandado que en Santander se haga la prevençion necessaria para el ospedaje del Almirante y no podra ser a tiempo en otra parte, por lo qual se despacha a solo este efecto este correo y en todo caso aveys de procurar que venga a Santander y quede fixo esto por que lo demas seria de mucho inconveniente y nota pues solo el camino de aqui a Santander estara prevenido, y avisareys me luego de como quedays de acuerdo en ello con el Almirante.” Philip III to Villamediana (Valladolid, 4/14 March 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 126, f.1

16 Interestingly, while Philip kept the towns along the Galician route in the dark as to the Lord Admiral’s arrival (presumably for the sake of plausible deniability), everyone at court still seems to have assumed right on through that Nottingham and his men would be landing at La Coruña, and even the false alarms of their arrival more than a month early (yet after Philip’s letter to Villamediana switching the sites) had the Galician port as their place of disembarkation. See Francesco Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate (dispatches from Valladolid of 9/19 February, 15/25 March, 27 March/6 April 1605), CSPVen X, 223, 231, 233.

17 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 64. Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 241.
British would be there to see it.\textsuperscript{18} This gives some indication of just how important he deemed
this conjunction of celebrations to be. Apparently, this unprecedented opportunity to display the
power and wealth of the Spanish monarchy to its erstwhile enemies and newfound friends was
just too big to resist, and was worth risking the salvation and immortal soul of his firstborn son.\textsuperscript{19}

Over the subsequent weeks, the British began to get some sense of what was coming. On
28 April/8 May the Lord Admiral was writing that he understood “there be wonderfull great
Triumphes appoynted at the Courte to be donn att my being there”.\textsuperscript{20} It gradually became clear –
and Nottingham’s Spanish hosts freely admitted – that the added delay caused by the British
arrival in Galicia would give Philip III and his ministers more time to finish preparing for the
upcoming events, including the completion of construction on a new banqueting hall and
immense gallery on the Plaza San Pablo in front of the palace, and the installation of additional
seating around the Plaza Mayor in order to accommodate truly massive crowds. And by
dropping these hints, the Spaniards were whetting the visitors’ appetites for what was to come:

I fynd the cause of delay is because the kynge hath newly bylte of pourpos for thees
Tryumphs a gret house but much beger than the banktyng house at Westmynster and
Blasco told me in pryvat that the King ment to be one at the Jogo de Canes.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} Philip had originally planned the baptism to occur on April 21/May 1, about two weeks after
the queen was expected to give birth. Then the prince was born a week early, and yet only after
that did Philip postpone the baptismal date four more weeks, in order to make it coincide with
the Lord Admiral’s arrival. Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas}, 238-239.
\textsuperscript{19} The gap between the young prince’s (future Philip IV’s) birth and baptism was more than
seven weeks: 51 days, to be precise (8 April-29 May). The usual period for Spanish royalty was
about two weeks, or a little less. A quick comparison with the birth-baptism gaps of the other
Spanish Habsburg princes and princesses that preceded him gives a clear idea of just how
extraordinary this was: Charles V – 11 days; Philip II – 15 days; Isabel Clara Eugenia, Philip
III’s sister – 13 days; Fernando, Philip III’s brother – 12 days; Philip III himself – 17 days; Philip
IV’s older sister, the little infanta at the court in 1605 and future Anne of Austria – 15 days.
Even the greatest previous delay – that of the mad prince Don Carlos, Philip III’s eldest brother –
was only 25 days, and that was an unusual event, occasioned by the infant’s sickliness, and the
death of the mother four days after giving birth.
\textsuperscript{20} Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA, PRO SP 94/11, f.44v
\textsuperscript{21} Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 1/11 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.67
By the time they arrived in Valladolid, the city would be in fiesta mode like never before, and the Galician delay helped ensure that three great waves – this monumental embassy, the birth of the royal heir, and numerous significant religious festivals – would all crest at once, coinciding for maximum effect in a perfect storm of public spectacle and intoxicating magnificence.

**La Coruña, Galicia, & the state of Spain**

In the meantime, the unexpected arrival and extended stay in La Coruña was also useful for another, perhaps more obvious reason: it quite simply gave the Britons more time in Spain. This let the English and Scots get that much more familiar with the land, its customs, and its people. And since the return trip would go along the prepared route due north to Santander, the landing in La Coruña did not merely extend the stay. It also allowed for the embassy to see much more of Spain, and for much more of Spain to see the Britons. This really mattered. Since Philip had only prepared the way to Santander, the Galician arrival allowed for some real scrambling, where people, towns, and countryside were seen essentially as they were, not in some carefully coached or artificially enhanced fashion.\(^{22}\) This was not just true in La Coruña, but all the way along the trek inland, through the Galician hinterland, and deep into the heart of Castilla y León. As a result, this “unforeseen” trip gave the British visitors some time to view typical conditions in one of the poorest parts of the country, to get to see how regular Spaniards

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\(^{22}\) The king had had to make it known that Santander was the place the English were going to land, in order to to prepare the way if the English had actually changed things around and headed there after all. Neither logistics nor consistency were going to allow him to be able to prepare both routes or send a welcoming party in both directions. Moreover, as Nottingham pointed out, the entourage ultimately ended up having to go some 100 miles out of their way at one point on their journey inland because of poor conditions, so preparing the way would have been that much more difficult.
lived, and to begin to get a sense of how people actually felt about them and about the peace they
had come to solemnize.

The initial perceptions and reactions to how they began their stay tell us quite a bit, as
this was not only the most unscripted part of the trip, but also one of the places with the greatest
to fear and hate the English. Galicia was one of the areas that had suffered most from the
war, as it was the region most exposed to attack and raids upon their shipping, and many of the
naval losses from the various armadas and conflicts abroad were borne disproportionately by this
strategically-perched maritime province. Indeed, La Coruña itself had even been sacked by
Drake and his men, an event recent enough to be very much alive in virtually everyone’s
memory.23

But the near-universal response to the British arrival in Galicia was nevertheless one of
open-armed welcome, praise, and celebration over the peace. As the Lord Admiral himself
described in a letter back home, the local governor who received them (the count of Caracena)
did so grandly, and made it a point to treat them well, from “the greatest to the meanest
servaunt,” despite knowledge of their arrival coming at the last minute:

And truly my lord, I doe not thinck that ever Ambassador was more honored for the king
his Majestie’s sake then I am, neither better enterteynement affoorded then is donn unto
all my Company from the greatest to the meanest servaunt, in such fashion as I cannot
expresse sufficyently thereof, neither of the joye they conceave by this peace.24

Caracena went out of his way to emphasize just how much the people of Spain needed the peace,
continually expressing this point, and declaring to Nottingham “plainely howe the kingdome was
overpressed with the [wars]” between them.25

23 In the first part of the massive, yet ultimately failed, Portugal campaign of the English armada
in 1589.
24 Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44.
25 Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44.
The overwhelmingly positive Galician response to the British arrival and joy at the coming of peace was corroborated by witnesses across the board. George Buck backed up everything the Lord Admiral said in his own report to Cecil, and indicated that even the old Galician soldiers themselves had fond things to say about their erstwhile opponents. He described two Spanish captains in La Coruña who had been captured by the English in Ireland, who now “enquire much after my Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, & speak very honorably of hym for the honorable usage they receyved in their adversity.”

Robert Treswell had many kind words for Governor Caracena, and told of how the Lord Admiral spent his time while waiting in La Coruña: resting, “sometimes riding abroad to take the air on horseback,” at other times going about in his carriage, “and ever with much applause and admiration of the people; so that it could not but give him much contentment to observe how welcome he seemed generally to the whole country.”

Nor was this reception simply reserved for Nottingham and his entourage as guests of honor; the English merchants were once again enjoying the sort of treatment they had experienced at the first declaration of a truce, before the delay of peace had soured things somewhat.

All kinds of people came streaming in to see their British visitors, and in every case the response was the same, from peasants, townspeople, and elites alike. This was not simply interest in something new, curiosity towards a view of the other, or even excitement over the

26 The Lord Lieutenant of which they spoke was the earl of Devonshire – conqueror of Ireland, and one of the five English peace commissioners. Sir George Buck to Cranborne (30 April/10 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.49v.
27 Treswell, A Relation, 15.
28 As Richard Cocks explained, “And consernynghe the state of this Cuntrey it is very trew we are better used in som matters then heartoefore.” Richard Cocks to Thomas Wilson (San Sebastian-London, 25 April/5 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.39.
opportunity to celebrate. This was an overwhelming, dramatic, and sincere response. As the Lord Admiral described it, within just the first hours of arrival,

I was continually visited with such an infinite multetude of gentlemen, Alcaldes, Coragidores, and other principall officers of the Kingdome of Galizia (whoe came from diverse partes upon the discovery of my shippes) as hardly there was wine on board to sirv. And for fryars there came of all orders, aswell those that came from St. Iago as also those of the Towne. There were not soe fewe as 100 and I must say rejoicing with reverende thanckfulnes and praising god that they did lyve to see this Amytye and peace betweene the Kingses and their Kingdomes. Some of them confessing it was as happye for this kingdome as when they were delivered from the invasion of the Moors.²⁹

Coming from Spanish mouths, that was high praise indeed.

The excitement and joy at their coming was reflected in the celebrations and ceremonies thrown in their honor, even at such late notice. The formal welcome was an elaborate affair, even for such a provincial place. The way into town was decorated with rushes and flowers, the path lined by newly planted trees. A wooden bridge over forty yards long, painted yellow, red, and blue, and bedecked in colorful silks had been specially built for the occasion, in the eight days since word arrived that the English would be landing there and definitely not in Cantabria.³⁰

As the visitors came ashore, musicians on the bridge played a “sweet and delectable melody” on sackbuts and hautboys, and all of the principal men of La Coruña and the surrounding region waited to receive their guests upon it.³¹ The crowd of onlookers included the “whole company of the towne, and many more of the Country, being (as was supposed) drawen thither for this

²⁹ Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44v.
³⁰ On 7/17 April, four English ships arrived, bringing news of the Lord Admiral’s coming, and bearing a letter from Villamediana, ordering that Nottingham and all his men be lodged and provided for. Relación de Lo Sucedido En La Ciudad de Valladolid, Desde El Punto del Felicissimo Nacimiento del Príncipe Don Felipe Dominico Victor Nuestro Señor: Hasta Que Se Acabaron Las Demostraciones de Alegría Que Por Él Se Hizieron. Reimpresión Con Prólogo de Narciso Alonso Cortés, (Valladolid: Imprenta del Colegio Santiago, 1916), 29. This relación, one of a number of pieces about the trip originally printed in 1605, was long thought to have been written by Cervantes himself, even by relatively close contemporaries.
³¹ Treswell, A Relation, 14.
purpose only, all ready to give his Lordship entertainment after the best fashion”. The formal procession into the town followed, accompanied by a great volley of cannon, as the Lord Admiral was led to his richly appointed lodgings in the governor’s own house.

The British entourage stayed in La Coruña for two and a half weeks, where they were well provided for, and where they had sufficient time to get a real feel for the town. From all reports, the English and Scots appear to have gotten out quite a bit, and there seems to have been a good deal of mingling with the locals. The celebrations continued, with Treswell describing two of them in particular detail: the English keeping the feast of St. George on April 23/ May 3, and the farewell games and banquet on May 2/12, the eve of their departure for the royal court. Both of these were a big hit with both guests and hosts, and the latter featured “such fire workes in the Towne, as the like have not been seene, by the report of all which saw it.”

By the time Don Blasco de Alagón, who Nottingham knew from the Constable’s journey to England, finally arrived from Valladolid – followed by the aposentador mayor Gaspar de Bullón with the baggage train, a few litters, hundreds of servants, and nearly a thousand mules provided by King Philip – the British visitors appear to have been fully convinced of the sincerity of Spanish goodwill. As the Lord Admiral told Cecil, this ran the whole gamut, from the highest of the high to the lowest of the low:

Further I must saye to your Lordship that in my life I never sawe soe kinde a people of all sortes. For althoughe great persons here might have cunning to desemble, yet the

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32 Treswell, A Relation, 13.
33 Treswell, A Relation, 18-20, 21-24.
34 The Royal Entertainement of the Right Honourable the Earle of Nottingham, sent Ambassador from his Maiestie to the King of Spaine, Imprinted at London by Valentine Sims, for William Ferbrand, and are to be sold at his shop in Popes-head Alley (1605), 3.
35 George Buck put the size of the mule train at around 900. Sir George Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85.
disposition of the hartes of the Commons would soone be discovered. But I protest I thinck them to be proceedeth hetherto unfainedly from all sorts of them.\textsuperscript{36}

Nor did the enthusiastic welcome stop at the water’s edge. Nottingham’s entourage set out from La Coruña on Friday, 3/13 May, passing through the streets as musicians played and salutes were fired from the guns of both the town and the ships in the harbor. The company went mostly on foot and muleback, for what would be a relatively rough journey across rocky terrain until they reached the \textit{meseta}, or great central Spanish plain. Nottingham reported that they “were dryven by reason of Misserable places” to go some one-hundred miles out of their way, and even still “for six dayes wee passed the most monstorous and daingerous hills that ever men (as I suppose) did passe, which laye full of Snowe, And noe man could see the topps for Clouds of many of them.”\textsuperscript{37} This meant relatively slow going, and they had to stop for the night in a series of small towns and villages along the way.\textsuperscript{38} But this also meant more towns and townspeople to see and by which to be seen. Places such as Cebrero, Villafranca del Bierzo, and Astorga fêted the foreigners in grand style, with the streets decorated for the occasion and the townspeople all turned out to welcome them warmly:

\begin{quote}
Att every place I came I was mett a myle off by the Principall of each Cittie and Towne, with such a Company of People, as it must needs appeare they came from farther places thither to receave me, the number was soe infinite, Rejoyceing and daunceing, aswell women as men, with the best musick the Cuntry could make. As I dare assure your Lordship There was never to any Kingdome a Peace soe generallye welcome, As to this of Spaine.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[36]{Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.45.}
\footnotetext[37]{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132.}
\footnotetext[38]{The route from La Coruña to Valladolid passed through the following towns and villages: Betanzos, Vilalba, Lugo, Triacastela, Pedrafita do Cebreiro, Villafranca del Bierzo, Congosto, Bembibre, Astorga, La Bañeza, Benavente, Villagarcia de Campos, and Simancas. Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 25-29.}
\footnotetext[39]{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132.}
\end{footnotes}
In several places, this included entertainment by “divers Gypsies (as they termed them) men and women dauncing and tumbling much after the Morisco fashion”. At other times, they were presented with displays of local Galician and Castilian folk tradition, dance, and culture carried out by everyone from the most important alcaldes (aldermen or mayors) to the meanest shepherds. Along the way, they visited many churches, castles, monasteries, a cathedral, and even a college of Latin with some six hundred students. They toured libraries, remarked on paintings, and were showered with praise. For many, if not all of these places, their visit would have been one of the most exciting events to occur in years, or even decades. And all along, as George Buck tells it, “his excellency was receyved…very honorably…with dancing and such musike as in these countreys is usuall and great concurse of people from all parts shewing their gladness of this peace.”

But celebrations were not the only things that were noticed. I mentioned that the British were seeing one of the poorest areas of Spain – and the British mentioned this as well. Despite the surprisingly lively entertainment, the occasional opulence, and the open-armed welcome that everyone reports they received along the way, the visitors also made numerous comments about just how barren and poor Galicia was, even though it was the wettest part of the whole country, with the most similar climate to that of Britain. According to Sir Robert Mansell, the

cuntrey of Spayne from the mountaynus cuntrey of Galitia to the coorte at Vleodelidd is generally barren, bearinge more rye then any other corn & thoughe in one place wherof the Countable is Lord ther be good wheat growndes yet the ayre is soe intemperatt as in that place they have not sufficient to serve the inhabitans scarslye one yeer in three.

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40 Treswell, A Relation, 27.
41 Treswell, A Relation, 25-29.
42 Sir George Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85.
43 Sir Robert Mansell to _____ (Valladolid, 20/30? May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.71.
The new resident ambassador, Sir Charles Cornwallis, agreed, referring to La Coruña as “this barren poore Towne”, Galicia as “This Barren Countrie”, and said that “the waye to Valiodalid wee understand to bee very unplesant and excedinge longe.”

Robert Treswell described Nottingham’s frequent acts of charity to “the poor, which in that place abound greatly, many of them being very miserable creatures to see”. And, perhaps at the very height of insult, various of the Scots said that Galicia was “like to the Hilandes in Scotland or rather wourse”.

And yet, even in the poorest places – in Galicia and elsewhere – the people continued to celebrate the arrival of their British visitors, and to express their overwhelming support for the end of war. One observer described their arrival in the “little ragged town called Villa-gratia,” on the plain of Castilla y León, where “the walles were but of mudde, and never a hansome house in all the towne.” And yet, even though the conditions were exceedingly poor, he still maintained that they had “good entertainement.” Ambassador Cornwallis wrote to Cecil of “the universall joy conceaved of this peace, and expressed with all the demonstrations that words, gestures, or actions possible for a people of this condition can performe”. In fact, their

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44 Cornwallis to Viscount Cranborne (La Coruña, 16/26 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.10v-11. Similar language, though not at a loss for synonyms, appears in other of his letters, cf. Cornwallis to Northampton (La Coruña, 19 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.11v; or Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.17, where he says: “yet did the excedinge barrenes of place and the povertie of that whole Countrie inforce us to many many sufferences whereof none had a greater feelinge then my selfe who by meanes thereof for the space of 3 or 4 daies beecame very sicke & hardly able to endure the journey.”

45 Treswell, A Relation, 15.

46 Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44v.

47 Royal Entertainment, 6.

48 Royal Entertainment, 6.

49 Cornwallis to Viscount Cranborne (La Coruña, 16/26 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.10v. He wrote similarly to the earl of Northampton, describing “the universall ioye the people of this kingdome shew for this blessed peace where in your Lordshippe had soe happie a hand. His Excellencie hath in this poore sterrill place received as many arguments of love and
poverty seemed to make them all the more thankful, and left Cornwallis, like Nottingham, convinced of their sincerity:

soe much the more beeleife I give to their words, for that contrarie to the common disposition of the motion they are contented to acknowledge there obligation, concord, and confesse how much detriment they received in times of question, and what more they dayly expected if by this happie peace the same had not beene prevented.\textsuperscript{50}

Perhaps, given the suffering during the conflict, it should come as no surprise that these people were in support of ending it. After all, who would have benefited more from peace than they? But what is remarkable is just how well these Spaniards – from nobles to peasants, soldiers to churchmen – treated the English, and just how overwhelmingly they all appear to have supported the peace. It was clear that the locals were sharing all that they had, and while their poverty was certainly noticed, this only underlined the depth of their thankfulness and generosity.

This tells us quite a bit about how the Spaniards generally felt about their former enemies, and it is clear that there was remarkably little ill will retained, despite the harsh and cruel memories of the recent war. But it also speaks to what the English and Scots were seeing in this relatively unscripted trip through this part of Spain: both a country of regular people who genuinely seemed to welcome them and to support peace, and a supposedly dominant power that might indeed appear to have some real cracks in it. The decision-makers at the Spanish court knew the importance of these perceptions and the possible influence that those doing the perceiving might have back in Britain. And so, when the Lord Admiral’s entourage got to Valladolid, the king and his ministers would do everything they could to continue encouraging respect as were possible to bee expressed by the people or afforded by the Countrie.” Cornwallis to Northampton (La Coruña, 19/29 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.11v.

\textsuperscript{50} Cornwallis to Viscount Cranborne (La Coruña, 16/26 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.10v.
the first of these views, while simultaneously pulling out all the stops in order to give its international visitors an entirely different perspective on the state of Spanish wealth and power.

Indeed, as we have seen with his strategies of delay, Philip III was conscious of this opportunity from the start, and had his officers inform Nottingham in La Coruña that he would be picking up the tab. The cost of these celebrations, lodging, entertainment, and indeed the entire bill for the whole entourage – from the time they landed until the moment they left Spanish soil – was being paid for by the crown. This was his chance to show off the power and wealth of the Spanish monarchy, in a crucial attempt to help bolster the reputación that was such a central part of maintaining their influence in Europe, particularly in the wake of having to negotiate a peace first with France and now with England. Nottingham understood this and, in a second letter to Cecil on April 28/May 8, complained of it, telling him that “the King’s Majestie [Philip] dowth defray me and my Company but I dow assur your Lordship that it had ben better for me to have done it my selfe”, for “I wold have ben glad that my Masters gretnes had bene sene here by his poure mynester”. But there was little he could do. Diplomatic protocol ensured that the Spaniards as hosts would now set the tone for display, and the entire trip would be defined in direct relation to and reciprocation for the Constable’s previous trip to

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51 Nottingham to Cranborne (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.44v. See also Cornwallis to Viscount Cranborne (La Coruña, 16/26 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.10v-11; Cornwallis to Northampton (La Coruña, 19/29 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.11v.

52 The king’s generosity in covering the British entourage’s expenses was itself public knowledge, which played a part in this attempt to bolster the monarchy’s reputación, and the cost would have been orders of magnitude larger than that paid by by James for the Constable’s embassy – because of the length of the stay, the size of the entourage, and the sheer opulence of the entertainment at the Spanish court.

53 Nottingham to Cranborne, 2nd letter (La Coruña, 28 April/8 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.47.
England. As we shall see, the Spanish reception of their visitors would be a conscious attempt to match every detail of the Constable’s reception like for like, and in every case possible go at least three steps further. Now was their chance, and they would milk this for all it was worth.

**The arrival in Valladolid**

On Tuesday, 14/24 May, this massive group of nobles, gentlemen, soldiers, servants, ministers, carriages, and mules arrived at the gates of Simancas – already the site of the royal archives – just outside of the city of Valladolid. The entourage was to stay here for a day to rest, before making its formal entry into the Spanish capital. In the meantime, they were visited by the French and Venetian ambassadors, as well as by a large group of Spanish nobles and gentlemen, led by the newly appointed ambassador to England – Don Pedro de Zúñiga, who would be traveling back with the Lord Admiral to replace Villamediana. Zúñiga was also accompanied by one of the brightest up-and-coming stars at court: Don Juan de Tassis y Peralta, “The Conde de Villa Mediana’s sonne, one of the gallantest and bravest gents of his quallitye in this kingdome”. These sorts of visits from ambassadors and nobles would be a daily feature of

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54 As Cornwallis put it: “Nothing is here omitted that is thought fitt to expresse a deare retribution for that royall and kind entertainement which the Constable and other Comissioners for the kinge here received from the Kinge our Master there”, Cornwallis to Northampton (La Coruña, 19/29 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.13.

55 Nottingham remarked on the man’s noble lineage as a well-connected member of one of the greatest houses in Spain, and upon his high standing with the king. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132.

56 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132. This is the notorious 2nd conde de Villamediana (from 1607), the dashing courtier, poet, satirist, and suspected lover of Philip IV’s queen, who would be murdered for this suspicion in 1622. He had not yet earned his reputation as a rake, but many of the observers of the English visit commented on his comings and goings. For this visit, see also Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 78; and Treswell, A Relation, 29, where the author gets Zúñiga’s and Tassis’s names mixed up; as well as George Buck’s comments: “The coart here is in great bravery, and the son of the Conde de Villamediana is one of the gallantest curtiers and a very handsome gentilman: The Condesa his mother sent him to Simancas to visit my Lord and to thank him for his favors to the Conde hir husband in
the British entourage’s stay in the Spanish capital, and would constitute a subtle but important part of the attempt to impress the visitors, cultivate their interest, and win their support.

The city of Valladolid had only been the Spanish capital for about four years, since Philip III had moved the court from Madrid in 1601. But various building projects had been undertaken immediately upon the king’s arrival, and it had been transformed in no time from a provincial center back into a fitting seat for royalty:

> You may well assure yourself that in this year of 1605 the court of Spain is the most splendid, cultured, entertaining, and happy of all those there are in the world, and that never anywhere was seen a city that outstrips it in the luxury and ostentation of its nobility; the beauty, wit, grace, and discretion of its ladies; and the general disposition of its inhabitants, and especially the people of the court, in order that everything may contribute as much as it can to the splendor and brilliance of the residence of the greatest Monarch in the world.

The city had more than doubled in size in a few short years, and now was home to more than 70,000 souls. Moreover, the city and its rulers were trying very hard to differentiate Valladolid from the sober style of life in the former capital, Philip II’s Madrid. It was, said the Portuguese observer Pinheiro, “as if he [the new king, Philip III] and his favorite, the duke of Lerma, were working in competition to erase that ascetic gravity and aversion to every kind of human

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58 “Bien puede asegurarse que en este año de 1605 la corte de España es la más espléndida, culta, entretenida y alegre de cuantas en el mundo hay, y que nunca en parte alguna se vió ciudad que la aventajase en el lujo y ostentación de su nobleza, hermosura, donaire, gracia y discreción de sus damas y general disposición de sus habitantes, y en especial de la gente cortesana, para todo cuanto pueda contribuir al esplendor y lucimiento de la residencia del mayor Monarca del mundo”. Pinheiro quoted in Pascual de Gayangos, *Cervantes en Valladolid: ó sea, Descripción de un manuscrito inédito Portugués intitulado Memorias de la Corte de España en 1605* (Madrid: est. tip. De El Correo, á cargo de F. Fernández, 1884), 8.
pleasure with which the previous King and his ministers distinguished themselves." As a result, people from all over Spain flocked to the new capital, in order to participate in the pageantry, to embrace the new-found joy and vigor, and to make something of themselves if they could: "Prohibitions were useless. Valladolid was inundated with people of every kind. The pomp and courtly luxury constituted an irresistible attraction. Poets, strolling players, and artists soon multiplied to the smell of the festivities and of the magnates."  

With its sudden growth came some difficulties, most notably hygienic ones. The sharp influx of population was hard to stay on top of, leading to lingering problems with public health and disease. As one anonymous English observer put it: "This is a verie faire Citie, and of the best buildings in all our travailes, onely it is noysome by reason of the uncleane keeping of it." But this was fitting, for in its time Valladolid was first and foremost a city of contradictions. At once bathing in its intoxicating newness, while remaining firmly ensconced in the traditions of the past; where adoration of the pleasures of this world competed with dedication to the world hereafter; and where the flower of courtly courtesy and the bloody length of a picaro’s blade might shine simultaneously in the sun, just streets apart.

We have seen how the embassy’s Spanish experience began, with an outpouring of joy and surprising ceremony in La Coruña. We have seen the arrival of the royal welcome, with its litters, coaches, and army of servants and mules to see to the visitors’ needs. And we have seen

59 “[C]omo si éste y su privado, el Duque de Lerma, trabajasen á porfía por borrar aquella ascética gravedad y aversión á todo género de placer humano con que se distinguieron el Rey pasado y sus ministros.” Pinheiro quoted in Pascual de Gayangos, Cervantes en Valladolid, 8.  
60 “Inútiles resultaron las prohibiciones. Inundóse Valladolid de gentes de toda condición. La pompa y lujo cortesanos constituían un irresistible atractivo. Al olor de las fiestas y de los magnates se multiplicaron pronto los poetas, los faranduleros, los artistas.” Luis Astrana Marín and Mateo de Lisón y Biedma, La Vida Turbulenta de Quevedo (Madrid: Editorial "Gran Capitán", 1945), 76.  
61 Royal Entertainement, 8.
what occurred in town after town as this massive British entourage made its way inland. But the arrival in this shining city teeming with life, the beating heart of Spanish power – at once the seat of so much both decadent and devout – sent everything to an entirely different level.

And so, on Thursday, 16/26 May, the time had come for the formal entrance into the capital. The day started hot and sunny. After lunch, a group of noblemen, led by the marquess of Camarassa, came out to Simancas to escort the English and Scots towards the city. After they had gone several miles, the entourage was led aside into an estate along the way, where they remained for a few hours, enjoying the gardens and meeting with dozens of Spanish nobles who would accompany them from there on in, while the final preparations for the ceremonial entry were completed. This group of men was a real collection of Spanish power, including almost the entire councils of state and war, and numerous other heads and representatives of the most influential families on the peninsula. These included names such as Infanteado, Olivares, Albuquerque, Sessa, Pastrava, Chinchón, and Idiáquez; as well as Lerma’s son the duke of Cea, and the count of Villalonga – Philip III’s “Principall Secretary and a man next to the Duke of

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62 This was a major event, we have many reports of it by observers on both sides, and all but a few of the most incidental of details match up well. See, especially: “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra en Valladolid, de su alojamiento y audiencia publica que tubo de sus Magestades”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.75-78 (79-82 the contemporary English translation). Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.85-85v. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.132-132v. “La recámara del Almirante y Embajador de Inglaterra y equipaje”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 79-84. Royal Entertainement, 7-8. Treswell, A Relation, 29-32. Relación de lo Sucedido, 38-41.

63 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132. Also in attendance were Zúñiga, Tassis, Don Blasco de Alagon, Don Gaspar de Bullón, and various others. Treswell, A Relation, 29. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85.

64 Indeed, Nottingham and Treswell both surmised that this diversion was at least partly to delay things until everything was ready and everyone had arrived. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132; Treswell, A Relation, 30.
Lirma in greatest favor with the Kinge.”

But chief among those in attendance, and most focused on by all of our observers, was the Constable of Castile himself – who was to be Nottingham’s principal escort into Valladolid, and who would continue to play a major part in the British visit right through until the end. The Constable brought with him the gift of “a faire white jennett, which the king used for his owne saddle, furnished with the Kinges furniture,” for Nottingham to ride. Once everything was in order, they all mounted up, and proceeded in grand style on horseback towards the city, with the Constable and the duke of Infantado leading the way, and Lerma’s son Cea at the Lord Admiral’s right hand.

All of Valladolid turned out for the event, and lined up outside the southern approaches to the city, as the entrance was scheduled for the Puerta del Campo. According to Treswell, there were “an infinite number of people”, and “800 coches filled with Ladies were gotten out of the town to meet and see his Lordship and his company”. Nottingham said that “all the waye from my first meeting the Duke of Infantasgo and the rest to[o], it was soe full of people and coaches with gentlewemen as hard it was to passe”. So many coaches and so thick a crowd, in fact, that in the words of our Portuguese observer, “those that went out were not able to turn

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65 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.
66 Some reports have Nottingham meeting with the Constable at length at the estate, others (including Nottingham’s own relation of the events) describe this particular meeting as only happening as part of a second wave of noble arrivals taking place not long after having left the estate in the company of the first great group. But everyone emphasizes its occurrence, most of the visible details of the encounter, and the Constable’s position as chief welcomer and escort into the city. And this was clearly perceived as a matter of conscious reciprocation, as Pinheiro pointed out, emphasizing that the Constable had this role because he had recently been in the same role in England, “y quiso pagar las muchas honras que allí le hicieron”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 81.
67 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.
68 “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.79v.
69 The site of today’s Parque del Campo Grande, and a major gathering place for the people of the city, then as now.
70 Trewswell, A Relation, 31.
71 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.
around, and it was necessary for them to continue onward”.\footnote{“[D]e manera que los que iban no podían volver, y les era necesario continuar adelante.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 80. Pinheiro noticed the multitude of women as well. Which is no surprise, as he was almost constantly talking about the ladies.} Despite the apparent logistical difficulties, it remained an extraordinary sight, with one English witness noting that “the highwayes were so full of Coaches, and people, upon both sides for the length of halfe a mile, that it was wonderfull to see.”\footnote{Royal Entertainement, 7.}

These people all came out to see a spectacle, and they would not be disappointed. However, it would turn out to be quite a different show from what any of them had expected. The procession was indeed a grand one, with the Lord Admiral “apparelled in Crimsen and his cloake of Scarlett”, surrounded by dozens of the flower of Spanish nobility in their most formal attire, and attended by hundreds of his own men dressed in his livery of orange and gold.\footnote{The English and Scots nobles and gentlemen wore the orange only as a lining of their black silk cloaks, the lesser servants wore simple orange cloth, while the “pages and laquayes” wore “orange colored velvett with gold lace”, “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.79v.} But at some point between six and seven o’clock, just as the procession was approaching the city, right as people were beginning to get a glimpse of the Lord Admiral on his fine white horse, all of a sudden everything changed: “The weather being all that time extraordinarily hot, suddenly to the great disordering of all the company, there fell so great a shewr of raine as the like was not seene of long time before”.\footnote{Treswell, A Relation, 31.}

The sudden rainstorm threw everything into chaos. All of the observers agree in their description of how the visual spectacle was marred by the weather. In the words of one,
“although they wer richly apparelled of with juells, medailles & plumes, yett cold they not enioy
the glory of ther entry by reason of the water that fell.” And according to another:

The number of gentlemen and servants, dressed in diverse liveries, was great, and shined
in grand manner, and would have shone more in that beautiful space of the puerta del
Campo and through the city, for the infinite number of people that went out to see this
great reception, if it had not been muddied by a rain so great, strong, and persistent.

As Pinheiro describes it, everyone began to spur their horses forward, but the coaches were
mostly stuck in the great crowd. In minutes “the roads became like rivers, and the mud was
ankle-deep.” The people on foot, in order to escape the downpour, “since the city was so far,
took shelter underneath the coaches and horses”. And according to Cornwallis,

such was the vehemencie of the reine, as his Excellencies traine was enforced to enter
into the Citie in greate disorder, some in Oathes and others to escape the extremitie of the
shewer brake the rankes and galloped soe as the shewe of the Traine which was intended
to have beene performed in the best sorte and with the kinge and Queene in person in
places appoynted for the purpose attended to beehould proved not answearable to
expectation.

Simply put, it looked as if everything might have been ruined.

Except that it wasn’t. For there were two aspects of this event that ensured it would not
be seen as a failure by contemporary Spanish observers, and which help illustrate just how it was
that so much of this embassy was going to go. In the first place, the weather may have marred
the ceremony, but it was itself cause for celebration. For there had been no rain in most of Spain

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76 “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.79v. See also
CSPVen X, 242.
77 “El número de gentileshombres y criados, vestidos de diversas libreas, era mucho y lucido en
gran manera y luciera más en aquel hermoso espacio de la puerta del Campo y por la ciudad, por
la infinidad de gente que salió á este gran recibimiento, si no lo enturbiara una lluvia tan grande,
recia é importuna, que en muchos días tal no se había visto”, Relación de lo Sucedido, 40.
78 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 81.
79 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 81.
80 Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss,
Vespasian C ix, ff.17v-18.
for more than half a year,81 and in this part of old Castile they “had not but seene a dropp of Raine in 9 monethes before.”82 A total drought all through what was normally the wet season. The situation was so serious that there had been numerous processions throughout the city and region praying for rain, and “in a very solemn one carrying to the cathedral an image of Our Lady of San Lorenzo, which is held in great devotion” – a practice that had apparently worked in other droughts, and yet had proved so far this time to be of no avail.83 From at least late February, as the price of bread had gone up because the drought throughout Spain had caused such scarcity, the export of grain had had to be prohibited in a fourteen-league radius around Valladolid, including both Toro and Zamora, in order to ensure provision for the court.84 These were dire straits indeed. But then, at precisely the moment the English arrived, at the highpoint of their ceremonial entrance to the Spanish capital, when all eyes were upon them, the heavens opened and the rain finally poured down. This was a truly remarkable occurrence, several of our observers pointed it out, and as a result, one even went so far as to refer to the Lord Admiral himself as “this good omen of water”.85

81 “[P]ues por cosa notable se puede decir que en parte del año pasado y en el presente se pasaron en España siete meses sin llover en las más provincias della.” Relación de lo sucedido, 40.
82 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.
83 “Tambien da mucho cuidado lo que se detiene el Cielo en llover, habiéndose para esto hecho procesiones y llevado en una muy solemne la imagen de Nuestra Señora de San Lorente á la iglesia mayor, que es tenida en grande devocion, y alcanzado en esta ciudad por su intercesion otras veces agua; pero hasta ahora no se debe de merecer lo que se pide.” Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las Cosas Sucedidas, 236. The image of the virgin also was used when Queen Margaret fell ill after giving birth to the Infanta Ana, back in 1601, and the queen’s recovery was widely attributed to it. Narciso Alonso A. Cortés, La Corte de Felipe III En Valladolid (Valladolid: Imprenta Castellana, 1908), 28.
84 Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 236.
85 “[L]levando con este buen agüero de agua en medio al condestable y al duque de Sessa,” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 82. Moreover, the English did appear to have brought the rain with them, as they had experienced some inclement weather on the last stage of their journey, not far out from the city. Treswell, A Relation, 28.
The second crucial aspect that defined the way in which this event would be received has to do with the way in which Nottingham responded to it. His and his followers’ behavior during the downpour was remarked on by many, and ensured that the British entourage would get off on the right foot in the Spanish capital. So how did he accomplish this? Quite simply, by staying on his horse: “Albeit the rayne wich fell was verry great & that the Constable had taken with him Coches to use if the Admirale pleased, yett he chose rather to enter on horsebacke. Some of his companye (but verry fewe) went into Coches. But almost all entred upon Mules.” And according to Cabrera de Córdoba, Nottingham refused the Constable’s offer of the coaches, “saying that it would do mischief to so many people who had come out to see him”.

So, despite the chaos, despite the rivers of mud, the Lord Admiral forged honorably ahead, with the Constable by his side, and most of his followers keeping in the best formation they could muster. The rain made things treacherous, and the nobles certainly had difficulty keeping in perfect order. But they pushed on nevertheless, “continued along their way, it still raining, until they entered the city.”

And even with the deluge, people continued to watch. Most of the accounts of the entrance that we have actually go into detail describing the entourage only after the rainstorm.

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86 “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.79v. For another similar view, praising Nottingham’s choice, see Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 81. Cornwallis backs this up, as well: Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.17v.
87 “[Y] aunque el Condestable dijo al Almirante que se pusiesen en las carrozas que iban de respeto detrás del acompañamiento, no dio lugar á ello, diciendo que se haria mala obra á tanta gente como habia salido á verle; antes quiso conocer á los que le salian á recebir, y fue hablando á todos, habiéndole dicho sus nombres”, Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 243.
89 Treswell, A Relation, 32; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 82.
90 “[P]rosiguieron su camino lloviendo todavía, hasta que entraron en la ciudad”, Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 243.
began, and they trace the group’s path all the way through the city where, according to Nottingham, “the streetes alsoe were soe full of people and the windowes of everie howse as was wonderfull to behould.”\footnote{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v. As another witness described it: “And when his Lordship came within the Citie, the streetes were so full of people, Coaches, and horses, that he was faine to make manie standes whiles the people made way for him, or else hee could not have passed.” \textit{Royal Entertainement}, 8.} Windows would, in fact, play a particularly important role in this visit, beginning right from that evening. As Pinheiro describes it, the entourage entered “through the Puerta del Campo, Plaza, Platería, and passed by the Palace, where the queen and her ladies [could be seen] through the glass windows”.\footnote{“Así fueron marchando hasta la ciudad por la Puerta del Campo, Plaza, Platería, y pasaron por el Palacio, donde estaba la reina y damas detrás de las vidrieras, y el almirante sombrero en mano, y fueron a las casas del conde de Salinas, donde los aposentaron, y los que no cupieron, en las cercanías de ellas. El rey dicen que anduvo en un coche cubierto con las cortinas echadas, con otros, pero yo no le vi.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 82.} Various others described this as well, stressing different aspects of her presence there: both to see (“to take view of the company”),\footnote{Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 32.} and to be seen (“that wee might easely deserne her”).\footnote{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.}

Windows of course go both ways, and were meant to be looked in, as well as out. Nor was the queen the only one viewing and being viewed in this way on the occasion. According to Nottingham, “in a place under which wee were to passe like a gallery stoode the Kinge, and with him only the Duke of Lirma, which wee might easely perceave.”\footnote{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.} These encounters were not secret occurrences; they were understood to be public acts, meant to be seen. The windows and galleries served as a way of keeping a certain formal distance that was a central part of the way in which the Spanish monarchy maintained its public image. As we shall see in some detail,
windows, screens, and this practice of viewing and being viewed would end up playing an important role throughout the visit, for both sides.

Of course, the entire point of the embassy was about making impressions; Nottingham knew this, and things had begun well. In addition to the obvious respect he earned from the vallisoletanos for his decision to stay on horseback through the downpour, the Lord Admiral also appears to have cut an impressive figure. In one place he is described as a “man of large body, well proportioned,” whose very “person epitomized authority and greatness.” And in another, he comes out very well in an explicit comparison with his Spanish counterpart:

The ambassador appears to be a man of about sixty years of age, but he is much older; large beard, massive, elegant, and genteel, large face and very tall of body, and who well befits his mission – better than our Constable, who it was that guided him, as he had been charged to do, and who looked like an ailing sexton.  

It was clear from the start that the Spaniards in the capital were going to take to the Lord Admiral and his men at least as much as had their countrymen on the road from Galicia.

And so it was that an occurrence which one might have thought to be clear evidence of disaster – or in the eyes of a more cynical or devout student of the traditional interpretation of Anglo-Spanish relations, seen as a sure sign of bad things to come – turns out to have actually been cause for celebration. Moreover, even the potentially troublesome aspects of the event gave the English an opportunity to improve their image, and they seized it. As we shall see, this

96 “Es hombre de gran cuerpo, bien proporcionado…y su persona representaba autoridad y grandeza.” Relación de lo Sucedido, 40.
97 “Es el embajador al parecer hombre de 60 años, pero tiene muchos más; la barba grande, muy abultado, apuesto y gentil, el rostro grande y muy alto de cuerpo y que llena bien su cometido, mejor que nuestro condestable, que fue quien le condujo, según se le había encargado, y que parece sacristán enfermo.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 83.
would be but one of several such moments, where things might have gone sour quickly, but because of the way they were handled and perceived, they ended up better off for it in the end.\(^{98}\)

Nottingham had done well with his entrance, and he and his entourage would continue to impress. But now it was time for the Spanish monarchy to pull out all the stops. Of course, the entrance itself had been a joint venture of its own, just as much a spectacle for the eyes of the English and Scots, seeing the Spanish capital and all of the assorted flowers of Iberian nobility turned out in magnificent display to watch and welcome them. The warmth of that welcome (though not the wetness) only grew from there, beginning with the magnificence of their lodging:

In this manner they crossed...to the corredera de St. Pablo and before the kinges pallas to the house of the Counte de Salynas which was apointed for the lodging of the person of the Admirale, his sones, and some others his kinsmen, wher he alyghted and went to his quarter which is the highest part of the howse of divers romes with a fayre bewtifull galery and a Tarras all very richly furnished and hanged with the best Taperceriye of the pallace. The bedd is one of the richest which cann be seene. His sones wer lodgd in an upper rome of the house hanged also with verry rich tapestryes. In divers chambers therof ther wer verry great store of bedds for servants of all qualityes.\(^{99}\)

\(^{98}\) This episode is, in fact, another perfect metaphor for the Anglo-Spanish relationship in this period as a whole. On the surface, things may appear a certain way, in what would seem to be an unambiguous or at least easily defensible interpretation. But if one takes the time to look just a little bit closer, that first glance turns out to really not be it at all. This has had a profound effect on the historiography of the period, as historians have for so long tended to stop at the first-glance, outward appearance, in order to make it fit into whatever conceptual box they brought to the table with them. Indeed, as we shall see in later chapters, this difficulty can be traced all the way back to the period itself, and the way in which peace was achieved and maintained had a great deal to do with creating and nurturing these misunderstandings.

\(^{99}\) “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.80. Their host was Diego de Silva y Mendoza, conde de Salinas, a major political player and future viceroy of Portugal, and also the second son of the famous advisor and favorite of Philip II: Ruy Gómez de Silva and his wife Ana de Mendoza de la Cerda, Prince and Princess of Éboli. Salinas was, furthermore, one of the great poets and literary lights of Spain’s *Siglo de Oro*, as well as a cousin and close confidant of the famous future ambassador to England (and very recent corregidor of Valladolid), Diego Sarmiento de Acuña (later conde de Gondomar).
Beyond these principal men and their servants, those who could not fit were put up in houses nearby. These were not merely luxurious surroundings “in a verie faire house” of one of the most influential noblemen and literary talents of his generation; they were also centrally located. Salinas’s place was described as being “not farre distant from the Court”, but as one observer pointed out, it might as well have been an extension of the royal palace itself, as it was situated immediately between the old palace and the new, and was connected directly to them both by a purpose-built passageway. This was known as the “pasadizo del rey”, and it was an aerial walkway that stretched from the new palace (on the Plaza de San Pablo), over to the old palace, then down to the river, and across it to Lerma’s villa of La Ribera, in La Huerta del Duque. This pasadizo allowed the king, his family, and his favorite to travel between the various palaces easily, being able to be seen by their subjects if they so chose, but without having to venture down into the street itself – again emphasizing the monarchy’s public formal distance. It also allowed the Lord Admiral and his men to “have private access to the King when hee would”, and to be “served altogether by the officers of the kinges howse, [where] his Majesty

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100 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 82.
101 Royal entertainment, 8.
102 Treswell, A Relation, 31.
103 “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.80.
104 Pinheiro also remarked on this: “Los aposentaron en las casas del conde de Salinas, que quedan entre el palacio viejo y el nuevo, y cruza por ellas el pasadizo del rey, que se posesiona de la cámara y sala por donde le hace comodidad de ir sin salir al exterior.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 83-84.
105 The pasadizo went right down to the river and continued across it by way of a pontoon-type bridge. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 70. The “palacio viejo” referred to the Palacio de los condes de Benavente, which had been the royal residence upon the arrival of the court in 1601, until Lerma sold the king the recently upgraded “palacio nuevo”, situated on the Plaza de San Pablo, also known as the Plaza de los Palacios. The casas del conde de Salinas were halfway between these two palaces, along the Calle de San Quirce, in the place where today stands the 19th-century bullfighting ring-turned park, the Plaza del Viejo Coso. The pasadizo ran quite literally right through Salinas’s house.
106 Royal entertainment, 8.
defratyeth all the charge with great abundance."107 Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, it better enabled Lerma and the king to stage-manage the visit, ensuring that their carefully crafted and overwhelming display of Spanish power and wealth, coupled significantly with the enticing hand of respect and friendship, worked to maximum effect.

**Valladolid – the celebrations**

Thanks to Philip III and his favorite’s careful design, the embassy itself was not the only reason for celebration at this time, as its meticulously planned confluence with the recent birth of the crown prince meant that not one, but two separate once-in-a-generation sets of events would be celebrated during the British visit to Valladolid. And both of these were set against a backdrop of a third set of events, firmly rooted in the liturgical year of catholic Spain, and in the genuine religiosity of its people. This would not be a matter of the occasional state dinner and stiff ceremonial gestures, followed by some diplomatic flattery, forced smiles, a handshake, and a goodbye. Rather, this would be a full-on assault: bombarding their guests from all sides with one fantastic event after another, overwhelming them with the untold wealth of the Spanish empire and its supposedly boundless Indies, and transporting them to a different world – an enticing domain of courtly elegance, spiritual beauty, and unprecedented grace, with their hearts full of the warmth of Spanish friendship and the future possibilities that this might offer. Philip and Lerma may have exchanged war for the council’s and the pope’s *segundo camino*, but this did not mean that they were going to play the game any less hard.108

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107 “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.80.
108 This is not to suggest that they were insincere in their wooing of the English. Far from it – their determination came from confidence in the justness of their cause, and a real desire to be at peace with England. In fact, this very sincerity is likely part of what made their advances so enticing.
The first group of events in the Spanish arsenal consisted of all of the embassy-specific ceremonies. This included anything that dealt with the official reception of the English ambassadors, as well as anything pertaining directly to the business of the trip itself. In addition to the ceremonial entrance to the city, there were several such occasions, beginning on Saturday 18/28 May, just two days after Nottingham’s arrival, with the *besamanos* – the formal introduction or first audience with the king and queen. This was nearly as big a spectacle as the entrance, about as keenly watched, and in many ways perhaps even more important. It began with a grand escort in some twenty of the king’s coaches, led by the Constable and a dozen key Spanish nobles with their men. As they made their way the relatively short distance to the main entrance of the palace, “many people were gathered in the streets to see the passage of his Lordship & his company”. The group was met at the gates by three hundred of the king’s guards in their new livery and many other nobles and *grandes*, who escorted Nottingham and about sixty of his noble and gentle followers inside to the packed royal presence chamber, where the Lord Admiral made his introduction, presented his letters, and proceeded to sit and talk with the king at length, in front of all those assembled. After about an hour, Nottingham rose again and presented each member of his entourage in turn, with each man coming forward to bow low before the king as his name was read. Once this was concluded, everyone moved next door and paid their similar respects to the queen, who was awaiting them with the little infanta at her side, surrounded by all of her ladies.

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110 This infanta was Philip III’s eldest daughter, the future Anne of Austria, queen of France and mother of Louis XIV. At this point she was still three years of age.
Despite its presence in the royal palace, dealing with official business between monarchs, this was an explicitly public affair.\textsuperscript{111} And come the public did, with so many people pushing in, mixed in with the English as they entered, that there was some chaos and confusion right at the beginning.\textsuperscript{112} This level of excitement was matched in the written accounts, giving various perspectives on the event, all of them paying close attention to the words, actions, and gestures in order to faithfully relate what they saw and experienced, and to divine some meaning from what might have seemed like even the most trivial of things.\textsuperscript{113} Many people in each camp remarked on how well this went, and on the favor shown to the Lord Admiral, especially by the king, who had repeatedly insisted that he put his hat back on when speaking to him (a privilege that, as was noted by many, was reserved only for \textit{grandes} in Spain), and who stood up himself when the ambassador resisted his initial repeated attempts to get him to sit in the royal presence.\textsuperscript{114} When Philip finally convinced Nottingham to sit and talk, he had him do so right next to him, at his level, under the canopy of state, “which especiall favour was much observed”,\textsuperscript{115} and “which all men said was never before seene done in Spaine to any Ambassador that ever came, nor not to the Duke of Savoyes owne sonnes being his nephews.”\textsuperscript{116} This same unusual level of courtesy would continue throughout the trip.

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\textsuperscript{111} “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.81v.
\textsuperscript{112} Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 86. See also Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 34: “The care these Lords tooke to give contentment to the English was so great, that we might easily perceive, they spared not to put out of the saide roome all manner of people of what condition soever, of purpose to make way, and give place even to the meanest of the English, which would presse in to see the King, not keeping out any of how meane condition soever.”
\textsuperscript{113} See especially: “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.81v-82; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 85-89; Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.133-133v; \textit{Relación de lo Sucedido}, 42-45; Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 32-35.
\textsuperscript{114} Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128.
\textsuperscript{115} Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 34.
\textsuperscript{116} Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.134-134v.
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As Nottingham was not the only ambassador in the entourage, the following Tuesday saw another formal audience and presentation of credentials to both monarchs, this time of Sir Charles Cornwallis, in his position as the new resident ambassador for England – the first person to hold that position since the 1560s.\footnote{Treswell has this as the previous day, Monday, 20/30 May; Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 38. But it was Tuesday, 21/31 May, after the Constable’s banquet, according to the Lord Admiral’s own letter to Cecil; Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.134-134v.} While, given his rank, this was not nearly as grand an occasion as the Lord Admiral’s initial \textit{besamanos}, it was nevertheless done in good form, with the Constable as escort, a kind reception from their respective majesties, and another chance by both sides to observe and impress. Nottingham also took this opportunity, after introducing Cornwallis to the queen, to present a gift to her from his own sovereign, Queen Anna: “a rich jewel which was an eagle of diamond, crowned, and the Golden Fleece for pendant, with two very rich pearls, all of which was estimated at 12,000 ducados”\footnote{“[U]na rica joya que era una águila de diamonte, coronada, y el tusón por pendiente, con dos requísimas perlas, que toda ella fué estimada en doce mil ducados”. \textit{Relación de lo Sucedido}, 70-71. The crowned eagle and the Golden Fleece being, of course, two of the greatest symbols of Habsburg power.} Margarita was so thankful for this exquisite gift done with the symbols of her house, that Nottingham told Cecil that he would have to wait to reveal exactly what she said until he could do so in person.\footnote{Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134v.}

The giving of gifts was an important part of an embassy of this kind, and the official presentations of the main royal presents from James to Philip were cause for their own special ceremony, held on Friday, 24 May/3 June. James’s offerings were much commented on and appreciated, and included amongst their number “arquebuses and crossbows, and dogs, and six marvellous English ponies, richly harnessed with velvet hangings of the most rich embroidery...
This gift-giving would be reciprocated, as was customary, at the very end of the embassy, when the two great ceremonial bookends to the entrance and besamanos were held: the formal farewell audience, and the grand departure the following day.

All of these embassy-specific events were major ceremonial affairs, accompanied by royal escorts in coach or on horseback, surrounded by crowds of onlookers, featuring all the fanfare and beauty of this formal court which was defining the terms of early baroque display. But the most important of them was of course the main ceremonial reason for the embassy in the first place: Philip III’s swearing of the oath to uphold the peace treaty and to abide by all its articles – which was, after some wrangling, held on Thursday evening, 30 May/9 June, in the new banqueting hall purpose-built for this visit. Once again, the king sent the Constable and the new ambassador, Pedro de Zúñiga, to collect the Lord Admiral and his men, to bring them in state through the streets to the palace, along with “divers other Knights and Lords, whose names, for the sodainnesse of their coming and the number of them being so many, could not be had.”

Nottingham was dressed for the occasion,

verry galently in a whyte sute embroidered with perle, his cloake blacke exceedingly garnished and charged with bottons of gold and with diamants and other stones. His great coller of St. George he ware in the same forme as the knights of the order of the Golden Fleece use to doe thers, and with the Garter, accompaned with more then 60 Cavaliers of his owne companye for whom ther were horses sent out of the Kings stable verry richly fornished and he went in the midst betwixt the Constable and the

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120 “[A]rcabuces y ballestas, y perros, y seis hacas inglesas maravillosas, ricamente guarnecidas con gualdrapas de terciopelo de la más rica bordadura y chapería que se ha visto.” Relación de lo Sucedido, 44.
121 The wrangling was due to a few factors: the Spanish reluctance to hold the ceremony in a church, a last-minute back-and-forth about the nature of the secret articles regarding the 30% tariff and the inquisition, and the finalization of precisely what the king would say and how he would say it. The specifics of this will be addressed in more detail later, in chapter seven, in the discussion of initial English experiences with the operation of Spanish government.
122 Treswell, A Relation, 44.
Ambassador which shal resyde heer from England and soe with his owne Cavaliers and those of the Cort entremixed he aryved att the pallace.  

Once there, they passed through “the Sala, the salitta, and the Anticamara”, before arriving at the king’s chamber, where Philip was waiting with ten of the greatest *grandes* and a host of gentlemen.  

After a warm greeting from the king, the group set out in a grand procession, complete with macebearers, kings-at-arms, and the duke of Lerma holding the ceremonial sword, naked against one shoulder.  

They headed down the *pasadizo*, through a passageway that crossed over the street below, and into the recently completed new gallery along the west side of the Plaza San Pablo, “whose windows were open, through which the passing of His Majesty and the entire retinue could be seen from the plaza, where there was a platform, upon which drums and trumpets were playing continuously.”  

From here, they passed into the banqueting hall, which had been completed literally days before, in anticipation of this event.  This massive room measured some 137 feet in length, 45 feet in width, with an ornate wood-paneled ceiling over 30 feet high.  

It was magnificently decorated with a collection that combined various styles, including ceiling panels by the court painter Vincenzo Carducci, sculptures by the baroque master Gregorio Fernández, and the walls hung with several of the massive, celebrated Flemish painted ceilings.

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123 “A relacion of the solemnitye wherwith his Majestye made the oth of the peace betwixt Spaine and England, and as the Admiral of England receyved it in the name of his Kinge.” Translated “out of Spanish verbatim”. TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.98

124 “A relacion of the solemnitye”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.98.


126 “Delante de su Majestad iba el Duque de Lerma, que llevaba el estoque, como caballerizo mayor, y los cuatro reyes de armas con sus cotas y cuatro maceros con sus mazas en el lugar que les tocaba; se fué caminando por las galerías, cuyas ventanas estaban abiertas, por lo cual se vía muy bien pasar todo el acompañamiento y á su Majestad desde la plaza, adonde había un tablado, en el cual estaban tocando siempre los atabales y trompetas.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 73-74.

127 Jesús Urrea, *La Plaza de San Pablo, Escenario de la Corte* (Diputación Provincial de Valladolid: Valladolid, 2003), 34.
tapestries from the twelve-piece collection on the conquest of Tunis, commissioned by the king’s grandfather, the Emperor Charles V. 128 This was a truly monumental space, one meant to inspire and to overwhelm, a place where the theater of monarchy might be acted out in all its splendor, to whatever ends the crown saw fit. And so the English and Scots were led into this new temple to the display of baroque kingship, accompanied by the combined fanfare of trumpets and wind instruments on either side of the doors, to find set up at one end of the great hall stretching before them, “a rich canopy and a brocade chair, with a large, tall, two-tiered dais, covered in rugs, and there waiting was Cardinal Sandoval, the Archbishop of Toledo.” 129 They took their appointed places on the dais, with Philip seated in the middle on a chair of crimson velvet underneath the canopy of state, the Spaniards and British on opposite sides, and Lerma standing at the king’s right hand with the drawn sword. 130 Once everyone was in place, the cardinal archbishop read the text of the oath in a high voice, and a table was placed before the king with a copy of the gospels and a crucifix. 131 Philip then got down on his knees, laid his hands on the holy items,

128 These tapestries celebrated Charles V’s capture of the North African city in 1535, were commissioned by the emperor from the Flemish artist (and eyewitness) Jan Comelisz Vermeyen in 1548, and were considered one of the real treasures of the Spanish royal collection. They were all put to good use, as some of them show up hanging in various locations of importance in several of the royal buildings. For Carducci and Fernández in the salón, see Urrea, *La Plaza de San Pablo*, 40.

129 “La sala real, que comunmente se dice el salón, estaba colgada de ricas tapicerías y en la frente un rico dosel y una silla de brocado, con una gran tarima de dos gradas en alto, cubierta de alhombra; y allí estaba aguardando el Cardenal de Sandoval, Arzobispo de Toledo.” Relación de lo sucedido, 74.

130 “A relacion of the solemnitye”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.99.

131 Interestingly, the sources all mention the extra articles being addressed aloud, but only the economic article was described in detail, leaving those present to guess on the nature of the other, which Cabrera de Córdoba correctly divined “must touch on religion or some other thing that they wish not to be known.” Spanish: “El uno es de que no hayan de pagar los naturales de Inglaterra el derecho de treinta por ciento, y el otro capítulo se calló, que debía de tocar á la religion ó á otra cosa que no quisieron se entendiese.” Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas*, 248.
Nottingham placed a copy of the treaty articles next to the gospels, and the king gave his oath.\textsuperscript{132} This done, he put his hands upon the treaty articles themselves, “repeated dyvers tymes that he swore to keepe those articles, and the admirall tooke them of his Majestyes hand, offringe to kiss it with shewes of great contentment.”\textsuperscript{133} The trumpets began to sound throughout the hall, celebrating the completion of the act, but Nottingham quickly interjected, also asking for a signed copy of the text of the oath.\textsuperscript{134} The music fell silent while a pen was fetched, the oath was written down, and the king signed it.\textsuperscript{135} Then the trumpets resumed their happy fanfare, everyone rose and exited the hall with the same pomp and circumstance with which they had entered, the king gave the Lord Admiral leave to depart, and the English and Scots returned again with their noble escort to their lodgings. The main purpose for the visit was now complete, and as grand an occasion as it had been, in as remarkable a setting as could be imagined, it had nevertheless taken remarkably little time at all. As we shall see, in many ways, the real importance and influence of this embassy would come from everything else that was going on the rest of the time.

\textsuperscript{132}“A relacion of the solemnitye”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.99v. For the whole ceremony, cf. Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 45; Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas}, 248; Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.112 (another copy in Cornwallis’s dispatch at BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.16v-30v); G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11,f.126.

\textsuperscript{133}“A relacion of the solemnitye”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.99v.

\textsuperscript{134} Cornwallis claimed in his reports home that it was he who interjected. Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.17v-18. This, however, is not substantiated in any of the other accounts, and Cornwallis’s letters all show a real tendency both to exaggerate his own importance and to overstate the extent of his personal difficulties.

\textsuperscript{135} This does not appear to have been taken poorly, as the same writer who is most plain in his indication of the extent of Nottingham’s insistence about getting a signed copy of the oath also indicated that Philip and Nottingham walked side-by-side both in and out of the salón, and “alwaise went talking both going and returning.” “A relacion of the solemnitye”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.98v.
Celebrations II – the birth of the prince

As grand as these embassy-related occasions were, they were more than matched for spectacle by the second group of major events during the visit: the various celebrations over the birth of the royal heir.\textsuperscript{136} Several of these were of particular significance, involving the prince, the queen, the rest of the royal family, and often the entire court. And in each case, they were fantastically well attended, with crowds lining the streets and following in the processions, and people pushing up to get a better view. Perhaps the most important aspect of these events for a modern reader or a student of British history to understand is – despite celebrating what was certainly an unambiguously political event, the birth of an heir to the throne – just how profoundly religious most of these celebrations were, and what this meant for the English and Scots in attendance. This was, after all, staunchly catholic Spain, the greatest power in Europe, and however much its leaders and counselors might practice reason of state, or think in terms of political conservación, the very public religiosity of its royal family was a central part of the image of the monarchy. And yet, at the same time, this does not mean that these events were all or even mostly about religion, or that religious messages were the only things the visitors took from this. Much more was going on here, mixed together all at once, and different things were being seen by different people, as the British were not the only ones doing the perceiving.

The first and perhaps the most important of these events was the ceremony of the prince’s baptism, which, as we have seen, had been delayed by more than five weeks just so the English and Scots could see it. It took place at long last on the afternoon of Sunday, 19/29 May, the day

\textsuperscript{136} Of course, the city had hardly held its breath, and there were several celebrations held in the little prince’s honor in the weeks immediately after his birth. But Philip and Lerma saved the most important ones, and the real splendor, until the British were there. For a detailed description of the events between the prince’s birth and the visitors’ arrival, see: Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 51-79; and Relación de lo sucedido, 7-29.
after the Lord Admiral’s first audience with the king, in the monastery church of San Pablo, where Philip II and a number of other Habsburg children had been christened. The church was opposite the Plaza San Pablo from the new palace, and the recently completed gallery and raised passageway that had provided access from the palace to the banqueting hall (or salón) also finished off the plaza and connected the two key buildings. This was one of the final jewels of Lerma’s massive, several-year reconstruction project, and like the banqueting hall, was built not merely to impress, but to overwhelm. The completion of the gallery created a great enclosed exterior space to match the salón’s interior one, and it gave the royal entourage a direct route from the palace to the church, crossing over the street and running alongside the western and northern ends of the plaza. It was richly decorated with tapestries, brocaded pillars, rugs and white palm mats on the floor, and the sides were covered with illustrations of Apuleius’s tale of the Golden Ass and the story of Noah, presented on gold and silk cloth for all to see. As with the king’s pasadizo, the gallery was high enough up so that those inside could be in full view of everyone in the plaza below, and yet without having to actually come down to the street amongst the masses. And masses there would be.

For this particular occasion, a set of outside stairs had been constructed at the end of the gallery to allow those proceeding from the palace to descend to the main church doors in full view of the crowd. People began to take their places in the morning, and by three o’clock, the

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137 Since the court had moved to Valladolid four years before, he had totally transformed the Plaza San Pablo into what would henceforward be called colloquially the Plaza de Palacios: buying up buildings, tearing down noble houses, and building new structures in order to create a harmonious, enclosed square perfect for public celebrations, with the church and the palace – both of which he also renovated extensively – dominating either side. As with the banqueting hall, this would be its effective public debut.

138 Relación de lo sucedido, 51. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 92.

139 Treswell, A Relation, 36.
square was so packed that no one else could get in. In the meantime, musicians were placed all around the plaza, entertaining the crowd with the sound of trumpets, kettledrums, and various wind instruments. At about four-thirty, the formal processions into the church began, led by the cardinal archbishop of Toledo – who, as the pre-eminent Spanish cleric, would be conducting the ceremony – and followed over the course of the next few hours by the entire court and nobility of Spain, dressed to the nines:

All of this added up to the most beautiful view, filled with all the nobility of Spain and all the gemstone riches of the orient and the indies, because…those who got all dressed up wore, young and old alike, diamond buttons in their capes and clothes, or thick pearls, hats with strings of the same, and heron-feather plumes with medals of equal kind, and chains… – which gave off so many rays of light as if they were mirrors – velvet shoes, and golden swords.

Among those glittering in the sun walked hundreds of grandes, nobles, and “the gentry, which was endless”, all accompanied by blasts from “The Kings Trumpets…placed neere and before the Church”. Given a special place in the procession were all of the members and presidents of each of the royal councils, beginning with the most powerful men in the government: the consejo de estado. In addition to the nobility came long lines of clerics, including the holy inquisitors and royal chaplains, as well as countless pages, attendants, and officers of the court. Then, when the time came, six of the most important grandes walked “con muchas galas” in a

140 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 92.
141 Relación de lo sucedido, 55. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 92.
142 “[R]esultó una vista hermosísima, quedando llena de toda la nobleza de España y toda la riqueza de piedras de todo el oriente y poniente, porque, como llevo dicho, sin exceptión, en estos días, los que se visten de gala llevan, mozoz y ancianos, botones de diamantes en las capas y ropillas, o perlas gruesas, gorras con cintillos de lo mismo y martinetes con medallas de igual suerte, y cadena, o de la misma labor, o de piezas esmaltadas de diversas hechuras, que desprendían tantos rayos como si fueran espejos, zapatos de velludo y espadas doradas.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 93.
143 Relación de lo sucedido, 53.
144 Treswell, A Relation, 36.
145 Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas, 246.
separate group with a special charge,\textsuperscript{146} carrying the various instruments to be used in the ceremony: the ewer, ceremonial towel, salt cellar, candle, baptismal cap, and \textit{mazapán}.\textsuperscript{147}

Finally, the duke of Lerma arrived, bareheaded, dressed in white robes trimmed in gold brocade, carrying the infant prince in his arms: a bundle of white taffeta, little pearls, and splashes of gold. As he walked across the gallery and down the stairs, he turned several times to present the prince to the people, who responded in great enthusiasm each time, with “a thousand blessings” and a “a great and happy cry: God save you!”.\textsuperscript{148} Lerma and the prince were met at the doors to the church by the cardinal archbishop and a collection of the most powerful bishops in Spain, who performed “\textit{la solemnidad de los exorcismos}”, casting out any spirits from the as-yet unbaptized child before entering the church.\textsuperscript{149} Behind the duke and his charge came the prince’s governess (Lerma’s sister, the Countess of Altamira), and his godparents: his cousin the prince of Piedmont,\textsuperscript{150} and his three-year-old sister the infanta Ana, carried in on a little chair. They were followed by numerous others, including a host of stunningly-attired women – among them several of the infanta’s attendants, forty-some wives of the most important nobles, and the twenty ladies of the queen – most with teams of pages, servant girls, or little relatives carrying

\textsuperscript{146} The \textit{grandes} were: the duque de Pastrana (\textit{el jarro or aguamanil}), the conde de Alba de Liste (\textit{la toalla}), the duque de Infantado (\textit{el salero}), the duque de Alba (\textit{la vela}), the duque de Alburquerque (\textit{el capillo}), and the Condestable (\textit{el mazapán}).

\textsuperscript{147} Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 93; \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 52-53. See also Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas}, 246; Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 36-37. The \textit{mazapán} was an ornate confection made out of marzipan, in this case in the shape of the imperial crown, containing inside a lump of breadcrumb, on which the cardinal archbishop would wipe his fingers after anointing the infant prince with the balsam-scented oil (or chrism). For more in English on the use of each of these in Spanish ceremony, see: John Langdon-Davies, \textit{Carlos, the King Who Would Not Die} (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 46-49.

\textsuperscript{148} Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 94; \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 53.

\textsuperscript{149} Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas}, 246.

\textsuperscript{150} Victor Amadeus, Philip III’s nephew and son and heir to the sovereign Duke of Savoy.
the trains of their luxurious dresses, and all accompanied by the brightest young gallants of the royal court to escort them to their places.\textsuperscript{151}

Inside, the church was sumptuously decorated with various canopies, fine hangings, pearls, jewels, gold, crucifixes, sculptures, and finely worked altar cloths. A long set of rails ran down the center, keeping the crowds of people from interfering with the procession and ceremony.\textsuperscript{152} Music continued to fill the air, with various choirs of sackbuts, bassoons, and cornets, and an organ which the \textit{capellán mayor} had brought over from the palace.\textsuperscript{153} The ceremony was carried out at the far end of the main chapel, where there was a high dais of three levels, covered in fine rugs. When the prince was brought up to the dais, the cardinal archbishop took over, assisted by the bishops, and served by the royal chaplains.\textsuperscript{154} Baptism was by sprinkling (“\textit{baptismo por aspersión, como se acostumbra}”),\textsuperscript{155} and the baptismal font used was remarked on by many: a beautiful combination of gold and stone said to be the same one used to baptize St. Dominic of Osma, the founder of the Dominican order.\textsuperscript{156} The ceremony itself was a relatively quick one,\textsuperscript{157} the child was christened Felipe Dominico Victor (for his father, the saint, and his godfather), and afterwards he was taken to a bed on a platform behind the dais, to sleep

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{151} Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 94.
\item\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 50-51.
\item\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 55.
\item\textsuperscript{154} Among them, playing an integral role, was García Sarmiento de Acuña, king’s chaplain and brother of the recent corregidor of Valladolid and future ambassador to England, Gondomar. \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 56.
\item\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 56.
\item\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 50, 56; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 95; Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas}, 246.
\item\textsuperscript{157} Described succinctly in the words of one English witness: “So they carried the childe to the Font, where the Cardinall tooke it, and first he put salt into the eares and nose and mouth of it, then he crossed it upon the forehead and upon the breast, and behinde betweene the shoulders, then hee poured oyle upon it, and crossed it againe, and then he poured a whole bason of water upon the head of it, and then put a waxe candle into the childes hand lighted, and said some words, what they were I know not, but so they made an end.” \textit{Royal Entertainement}, 10.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
while a mass was sung. Afterwards, everyone proceeded out in the same order they had entered, singing the *Te Deum laudamus* “with their accustomed skill and excellence”;158 passing out into the crowded plaza at dusk, into a city lit with luminarias, and streets filled with coaches until late into the night.159

One might notice a conspicuous absence in this description: the child’s parents. This was, again, by design, in keeping with the ceremonial distance reserved for the crown. The king and queen were present but separate, watching from above: first from a set of windows that looked down upon the gallery and plaza, and then they went inside to a balcony in the main chapel to see the ceremony, hidden from view.160 According to Pinheiro, “Neither the king nor the queen appeared in public, but they say that they were crying in happiness behind the glass windows.”161

And what of the English and Scots? Where were they during all of this? Many of them were down in the plaza, and it seems that there may have also been some who made it into the floor of the church itself. But the Lord Admiral and his closest companions were given a prominent position with a great view, looking down upon the plaza from behind the large windows of the palace of the count of Rivadavia, along the east side of the square, near the church doors, where they could easily see every detail of the festivities, and where they could

158 “Acabada la solemnidad, cantó el *Te Deum laudamus* la Capilla con su acostumbrada destreza y excelencia, y se volvió por el mismo camino y orden”, Relación de lo sucedido, 56.
159 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 97.
160 “Estaban los Reyes…en una ventana con gelosia, al cabo de la galería y en el principio de la gran escalera que bajaba á San Pablo, y después se pasaron al balcón de la capilla mayor de San Pablo, para ver el bautismo.” Relación de lo sucedido, 54. See also: Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas, 247.
161 “Ni el rey ni la reina aparecieron en público, pero dicen que estaban llorando de alegría detrás de las vidrieras.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 95.
also be easily seen by those in the crowd.\textsuperscript{162} Then, once the ceremonies outside the church were complete, “in order to see the baptism,” Nottingham and his group went out “through the false door from the house of the Count of Rivadavia to the college of San Gregorio, from which he entered San Pablo and went up to a little gallery which is inside the main chapel, admiring the greatness of this day.”\textsuperscript{163}

This magnificent display of wealth, power, and catholic ritual was followed a couple of days later by the ceremony of the queen’s churching, on her first day “going abroad”, to be blessed after her recovery from childbirth.\textsuperscript{164} Once again, this was a public event on a massive scale. The nobles of the realm came out in force, many grandes and the most powerful members of the government participating directly, and backed by “infinite” numbers of pages and officials in the royal livery, “well signifying the majesty of such a great monarch.”\textsuperscript{165} After a stately procession through the city, described in detail by several of our chroniclers, the mass took place at the church of Nuestra Señora de San Lorenzo, west of the Plaza Mayor, and was accompanied

\textsuperscript{162} Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133v. This was the very building in which the present king’s father, Philip II, had been born.

\textsuperscript{163} “El Almirante de Inglaterra…para ver el bautismo se fué por la puerta falsa de la casa del Conde de Rivadavia al colegio de San Gregorio, desde donde pasó á San Pablo y subió á una tribunilla que está dentro de la capilla mayor, admirándose de la grandeza deste día”; Relación de lo sucedido, 52. Treswell corroborates this: “But so soon as they [the royal group] were passed by, he, with some other[s], were privately conveied through a gallery on the backeside of a monastery into the Church, into a place appointed of purpose for him and the Lords that were of his company.” Treswell, A Relation, 37-38.

\textsuperscript{164} Tuesday, 21/31 May, though some sources have it incorrectly as Monday, 20/30 May. Treswell, A Relation, 38-39. The ceremony was referred to in Spanish as salir a misa de parida. It was normally much later than the baptism (a month later in the case of the young prince’s elder sister, the little infanta Ana), but the delay in waiting for the English and Scots to arrive ensured that these two events would be right on top of one another. Of course, had the delay not happened, Philip certainly would have ensured that both ceremonies occurred during the visit, even if the churching had to happen right at the end of their stay.

\textsuperscript{165} “[I]nfinitos…denotaba bien la majestad de tan gran monarca.” Relación de lo sucedido, 58.
by the presentation of the recently baptized infant prince, in his own ceremony of churching—once again carried in the arms of the duke of Lerma.\textsuperscript{166}

The English and Scots rode out with the king and the entire court in their procession to the church.\textsuperscript{167} Yet again, a place was prepared inside for Nottingham and his company to watch: “at the entrance of the church, behind a lattice window, without being seen, and afterwards Don Blasco took him to the corridors of the church of the Cross, which is in the Platería, from where he saw this royal escort return”.\textsuperscript{168} Duly impressed, he described the order of the procession in close detail as seen from this vantage point in his letter back to Cecil.\textsuperscript{169}

As brilliant an occasion as the prince’s baptism had been, it says something that Cervantes instead chose this event, “the churching of our lady the Queen Doña Margarita,” as the subject celebrated in the song sung by the little gypsy girl in his exemplary novel of the same name.\textsuperscript{170} In it, Preciosa mesmerizes her audience with a tale of “the greatest queen of Europe…an admirable jewel” who “lifted up all the souls of all those who watched”, in an event

\textsuperscript{166} Relación de lo sucedido, 57; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 99. In many places, it is also referred to as “Nuestra Señora de San Llorente”.

\textsuperscript{167} Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 99.

\textsuperscript{168} “El Almirante de Inglaterra, diciendo que tendría por gran favor ver la cerimonia deste día, le llevó D. Blasco de Aragón, por orden del Duque de Lerma, y estuvo a la entrada de la Iglesia, detrás de una celosía, sin ser visto, y después le llevó D. Blasco a los corredores de la iglesia de la Cruz, que es en la Platería, desde donde vió volver este real acompañamiento”, Relación de lo sucedido, 59. See also: Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134.

\textsuperscript{169} Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134.

\textsuperscript{170} Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra, “The Little Gipsy Girl” (originally “La Gitanilla”), in The Exemplary Novels of Cervantes (Fairford, UK: Echo Library, 2007), 138. The Spanish original is: “Si me dan cuatro cuartos, les cantaré un romance yo sola lindísimo en extremo, que trata de cuando la reina nuestra señora Margarita salió a misa de parida en Valladolid y fue a san Llorente. Digoles que es famoso, y compuesto por un poeta de los del número, como capitán del batallón.” Cervantes, La Gitanilla (Linkgua S.L. Ediciones, 2009), 28.
which brought “universal happiness fleeing from heartbreak, streets and plazas flowing out of order, and nearly mad.”\textsuperscript{171}

Of course, she also sang that, “In order that all may admire, and all may be astonished, there is nothing that out of abundance does not happen, up to the lavish extreme”; as well as, “With the ill-disposed goes the snakebite of envy.”\textsuperscript{172} Indeed, political power and wealth were as much on display here as anywhere else. So much so that the Lord Admiral, after seeing this particular ceremony, apparently remained “astonished by so much richness and grandeur, confessing this and many times that the kings of France and of England together would not be able to equal it.”\textsuperscript{173} And this was, after all, the point. So as the king rode back to the palace along the Platería, surrounded by all the assembled beauty of his court and city, with the throngs of people jostling to see, he might have been forgiven for smiling to himself in satisfaction as he passed by the church of the Santa Cruz. Instead, he looked up to where the English ambassador was standing – the very admiral who had led the fight against his father’s armada, and who had sacked and burned Spain’s most important port, now standing in his own capital in a church

\textsuperscript{171} Cervantes, \textit{La Gitanilla}, 28-30:
\begin{itemize}
  \item [“Salió a misa de parida] Como los ojos se lleva, \hspace{2cm} ...La alegría universal
  \item [La mayor reina de Europa,] Se lleva las almas todas \hspace{2cm} Huyendo de la congoja,
  \item [En el valor, y en el nombre] De cuantos miran, y admiran \hspace{2cm} Calles, y plazas discurre
  \item [Rica, y admirable joya.] Su devoción, y su pompa... \hspace{2cm} Descompuesta, y casi loca.”
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{172} Cervantes, \textit{La Gitanilla}, 30:
\begin{itemize}
  \item [“Y para que todo admire,] ...Con los mal intencionados
  \item [Y todo asombre, no hay cosa] Va la envidia mordedora,
  \item [Que de liberal no pase,] Y la bondad en los pechos
  \item [Hasta el extremo de pródiga... ] De la lealtad española.”
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{173} “[Q]uedando el Almirante admirado de tanta riqueza y grandeza, confesando esta y muchas veces que los reyes de Francia y de Inglaterra juntos no la podían igualar.” \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 59.
named for the holy cross, fully engrossed in one of the greatest celebrations in the catholic world – and the king removed his hat in salute, a gesture of great respect for all to see.\textsuperscript{174}

**Celebrations III – religious festivals**

These first two extraordinary groups of events – the celebrations concerning both the peace embassy and the birth of the royal heir – provided the perfect opportunity for Philip and Lerma’s well-coordinated barrage of opulence. But they were also overlaid on top of a strong foundation of important, annually occurring religious festivities in the city, which make up the third main aspect of our trinity of intermingled causes célèbre. Early modern Spain was, of course, known for its religious processions, feasts, and saints’ days. But mid-to-late spring was a particularly fruitful time, and the British visit coincided with a number of the most important celebrations of the liturgical year. Moreover, there were several other extraordinary ecclesiastical events that happened during the trip – some planned, some not – that amplified the experience even further.

Most of these concurrences of events were, of course, purposeful: a crucial part of Philip and Lerma’s carefully designed plans. When the king postponed his son’s baptism, he set the final date more than a month in advance. It was therefore no accident that, when the ceremony finally came, it would be part of an entire day filled with a truly overwhelming series of religious events.\textsuperscript{175} The first of these concerned the day on which it was held: Pentecost Sunday. In early

\textsuperscript{174} Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 102.

\textsuperscript{175} Once Philip had a better idea of when the construction would be completed, he had changed the date of the baptism to Pentecost Sunday, and arranged the arrival of the escort in La Coruña so that the British entourage would make it in time. Even with the delays, the new date was already set by the time Philip left to spend some time in Ventosilla, on 11/21 April, as Cabrera de Córdoba’s report of 4/14 May indicates. Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas*, 241. While the British entourage would still have been in Valladolid for the various religious
modern Spain, this was as important a holiday as Easter (Pascua), and was also known as the “second Pascua” (El Segundo Pascua), or the “Pascua of the Holy Spirit” (Pascua del Espíritu Santo). As Jesus’ death and resurrection gave new meaning to the Hebrew Passover – passing from death to life, from sin to salvation – so too did Pentecost, as it celebrated the arrival of the Holy Spirit after Jesus’ ascension into heaven: the third aspect of the trinity passing into the world, the beginning of the apostles’ ministry, and thus a crucial ingredient in the Christian process of rebirth. Consequently, this festival was traditionally seen as the anniversary of the founding of the church, which was, of course, built upon the rock of St. Peter, whose direct successor was the pope in Rome. So not only were the British going to be in town for the prince’s baptism, this ceremony was also going to be held on the catholic church’s birthday.

But that was not all. In addition to the heightened celebration that came with this major festival in the liturgical year, came another ecclesiastical occasion that was even more unique, and which pushed things to an entirely different level still. For this year, the General Chapter of the Dominicans – the annual gathering of all the heads of this great monastic order – was being celebrated in this very city, on this very day. This meant that over 600 senior Dominican friars from all over Europe were in Valladolid at precisely the same time, holding their own very public celebrations and procession through the city. Consequently, by the time of the events in the Plaza San Pablo described above, the city had already been fully immersed for hours in an festivals even if they had come at the time Philip originally intended – just later in the trip – the extra delays allowed him to coordinate several on this one day.

176 “Pascua” was derived from the Latin “pascha”, the word for “passover”. In Spanish, while “Pascua” is most commonly used to refer to Easter Sunday, it may also refer to any of the holidays associated with Christ’s birth, rebirth, or recognition in the world: Christmas, Epiphany, Easter, or Pentecost.

177 Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 245. Relación de lo sucedido, 45-46.
extraordinary combination of fundamentally catholic religious display, and the Lord Admiral and his entourage were right in the heart of it.

And quite literally so, as they had been led, first thing in the morning, to the well-placed “great window that is on the corner” in the house of the count of Rivadavia that they would return to later in the day, to watch the Dominicans’ procession as it passed from San Pablo down the correrera of the same name, to the cathedral of Valladolid, Nuestra Señora de la Asunción. Don Blasco was there at Nottingham’s side, in order to identify each person as he passed by. As Robert Treswell described it: “First went many Friers singing, bearing amongst them divers crosses, banners, and other ceremomious reliques of the Church, the Sacrament being likewise caried by foure church-officers. Then followed divers Noblemen according to their degrees.”\(^\text{178}\)

The size of the procession was truly remarkable. There were some three hundred noblemen and at least twice that many churchmen, led by Jerónimo Xavierre, master general of the Dominican Order. Also walking in the procession were the cardinal archbishop, the Savoyard princes, the prince of Morocco, the various foreign ambassadors resident at court, and the king himself.

When the king passed below the windows where the British were watching, Nottingham bowed to him, and Philip responded by removing his cap – a significant enough event that a number of our sources make a point of describing it in detail, including the Lord Admiral himself:

> wee sawe aswell the Kinges goeing fourth as his returne, for underneath the windowe the procession came. He saluted me with his Capp twise goeing and as often comeing, being a thing that all the noblemen saye was never seene done by any King of Spaine to any Ambassador or any other before.\(^\text{179}\)

The king passed by twice because, after the mass in the cathedral, the whole procession returned back along the same route, and Nottingham and his company were there to see it both times,

\(^{178}\) Treswell, A Relation, 35-36.

\(^{179}\) Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133v. Cf. Relación de lo sucedido, 48-49; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 91.
waiting patiently for hours, “praising greatly the clothing, the elegance, and the richness of the
court.”\textsuperscript{180} Others in his entourage were not content to simply stand by and watch; we are told
that many of them “walked in the procession with much reverence and composure”.\textsuperscript{181} Indeed,
the behavior of the British was much remarked on throughout the day, and all of the reports are
universal in their praise, particularly with regard to their respect for the images, and for the holy
sacrament when it passed:

That which was most celebrated to see, was that the principal English were all present in
the procession, and entered in the church; and others, around forty, remained at the door
looking in, everyone receiving them very kindly and inviting them to go in the
procession; and, in seeing the images, all of them removed their hats, just as we catholics
that were there did, which is the order that the ambassador gave them, and they do the
same in seeing the Holy Sacrament coming, even if it is far off.\textsuperscript{182}

What might have been a cause for concern on both sides turned out very well, and guests and
hosts alike seem to have quickly become quite taken with one another.

So it was that, on their first Sunday in the city, just days after their arrival and
immediately following their dazzling \textit{besamanos} with the most powerful king and queen in
Christendom, the English and Scots faced not just a mass and the occasional ringing of bells.
Instead, they found themselves right at the heart of the catholic world, in a welcoming city
immersed in the festival commemorating the very foundation of the church, in remarkable
conjunction with the annual gathering and celebration for the entire Dominican order in Europe,

\textsuperscript{180} “[A]labando mucho los trajes, galas y requieza de la corte.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 91.
\textsuperscript{181} “[O]tros anduvieron por la procesión con mucha reverencia y compostura”, Relación de lo
sucedido, 49.
\textsuperscript{182} “Lo que más celebré ver, fue que los principales ingleses acudieron todos a la procesión, y
entraron en la iglesia; y otros, como 40, quedaron a la puerta viendo, haciéndoles todos mucho
agasajo e invitándolos a ir en la procesión; y, en viendo las imágenes, todos se descubrían, como
los católicos que allí estábamos, que es orden que el embajador les dio, y lo mismo hacen en
viendo al Santísmimo Sacramento, aunque sea de lejos, siendo cosa que en un principio dio
mucho que cavilar, mas el embajador se condujo en todo prudentemente.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia},
90-91.
and followed by the baptism of the first male Spanish heir since Philip himself in the 1570s – all set in the Catholic King’s most magnificent theater of monarchy, completed just days before, expressly for this occasion. It would have been difficult for anyone not to have been overcome by this, and it is clear that the king and the duke’s careful preparations were already having their desired effect.

Of course, the day of the baptism was not the only effective combination of major events during the trip. The Spaniards’ delay of the king’s swearing of the oath also maximized and altered the nature of the ceremonial impact. The original date, 26 May/5 June, was already a powerful combination of both Trinity Sunday and the celebration of another highly anticipated event: the queen’s first time dining in public since the birth of the prince.\(^{183}\) So, naturally, the night before the oath ceremony was to have taken place, Nottingham was told that some important papers had been lost for a time, and while Secretary Villalonga had finally found them, it was too late to get everything in proper order, so the ceremony would have to be delayed. Of course, the Lord Admiral had his deputy respond that “this was a busines of great solemnity and the principall cause of his excellencys embassy and not to be dune upon a common day.”\(^{184}\) The Spaniards replied that it just so happened that another major feast day was coming up later that week, which would work out perfectly. And so it was that Philip III would swear to uphold and abide by the first international peace treaty ending a war between protestant and catholic nations, but he would do so on what was perhaps the single most important festival of the catholic year: the day of Corpus Christi.

\(^{183}\) Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 112. This was a major event, and one that Pinheiro says was also well-attended by the English.

\(^{184}\) Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.126.
As the feast celebrating the holy sacrament of the body of Christ, and thus the literal embodiment of the doctrine of transubstantiation, Corpus was certainly the most quintessentially catholic of all festivals. The British knew this full well, describing it as “the greatest day of account in Spaine in all the yeare”, and watching as “[t]here was against this day great preparation made.”\(^{185}\) The king would be marching in the procession through the city, and in order “that he would be seene by the English, the course was appointed by the gate where his Lordship lodged” – which was quite a circuitous route, as it began at the cathedral and ended at the Plaza Mayor.\(^{186}\) Poles of timber were erected all along the route and were covered with awnings, in order to keep out the heat of the sun, and the streets “were adorned with the richest hangings, especially in front of the Palace, where the king’s tapestries were hung, many and of great worth”.\(^{187}\) Once again, the whole city came out to watch and walk, the windows on the shadier streets were all filled with well-dressed ladies, and the Lord Admiral, his relatives, “and many English gentlemen” watched from “the windows of their lodgings, in the house of the Count of Salinas.”\(^{188}\) Yet again, it was quite a sight to behold:

First, came eight great Giants, three Men, three Women, & two Mores with a Taber and Pipe playing and they dauncing. Then followed certaine Pilgrimes clad in blew. After whom came many Crosses, being in number 25 or 26 borne & attended by the officers of the severall Churches to whch they belonged. Amongst whome were also mingled divers pictures of Saints…the picture of Christ in severall formes…Many holy and pretious reliques, Friers Mories dancers, in maner of Gypsies, beasts with fire-works, Wild-men and such like toies, as it should seeme to draw the people more readily with admiration.\(^{189}\)

\(^{185}\) *Royal Entertainement*, 12.

\(^{186}\) Treswell, *A Relation*, 42. A direct route would have been about 400 meters. This was about four times that.

\(^{187}\) “En amaneciendo, se regaron todas las calles y se adornaron con colgaduras riquísimas, principalmente frente a Palacio, donde se pusieron los entapizados del rey, muchos y de mucho precio”, Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 120.

\(^{188}\) “El Almirante de Inglaterra, con sus hijos y sobrinos y muchos caballeros ingleses, estuvieron en las ventanas de su posada, en la casa del Conde de Salinas.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 72.

\(^{189}\) Treswell, *A Relation*, 42-43.
This colorful, energetic, and fantastical scene was followed by a much more solemn group, including numerous other relics, Augustinian and Franciscan friars, and “many Churchmen with lighted tapers in their hands”. Finally, there came the real centerpiece of the procession, described in detail by one of the English visitors:

then came the Priests of the Kings Chappel singing, and close behind them came the Sacrament carried betwenee foure, and a Canopie over it, and it was in manner like a Castle, all of silver, foure square, and a pinnacle over the top of it, and foure white waxe lights standing upon each corner, and one of them was lighted; close behinde that came a Bishop praying and holding up his hands; next after him came the King bareheaded, carrying a white waxe light in his hand lighted and the Cardinal upon the right hand of him, carrying another in his hand lighted, and so they passed by my Lords gate, the streetes being hung upon both sides very richly with cloth of gold.

All told, there were some 600 friars, 300 priests, and a host of nobles, gentlemen, servants, and pages. Once again, all of the members of the various royal councils were present, as well as the foreign ambassadors, the princes of Savoy and Morocco, the cardinal archbishop, and the king himself, everyone holding lit candles as they walked. Great care was taken to ensure that no harm came to the holy sacrament, since there were of course several hundred heretics in town, and we are told that after the procession most of the English either stayed indoors, or went to the outskirts of the city for their paseo, in order to avoid any scandal. But not everyone, as yet again it was noted that several “of the English gentlemen walked in the procession, as curious observers, with great respect,” admiring alongside everyone else “the greatness with which the spiritual and corporal were celebrated in

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190 Treswell, *A Relation*, 43. Indeed, Cornwallis remarked on this juxtaposition, saying: “Much was it to bee noted that they would make soe greate a mixture of things sacred with prophaine, for in the same Procession went alsoe Counterfeite Dragons, Gyants, and disguised morisdancers who danced and sange within the rankes of some of the fryars.” Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.24v-25.
192 Treswell, *A Relation*, 43; Relación de lo sucedido, 71-72; Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 120.
this court,” as well as the “great wealth of tapestries and paintings in the streets”. That afternoon, actors were paid to put on “comedias públicas” throughout the streets of the city, and they continued to do so every day for the following week, celebrating the entire octave of Corpus, and keeping up the festive atmosphere for the rest of their visitors’ stay.  

Moreover, while the grand festivals such as Corpus were themselves celebrated by everyone on their main feast days, the various religious orders also had their own practice of celebrating these particular festivals publicly on separate days, after the fact. For example, one of the religious houses founded by Lerma – the franciscanos descalzos de San Diego de Alcalá – held their own celebration of Corpus on the following Monday, 3/13 June, with a solemn public procession of the holy sacrament that included the king and queen, her ladies all in white veils, and numerous grandes, nobles, and their wives. For this occasion, Lerma had a makeshift street constructed out of beautiful tapestries and other rich hangings all around the edge of the plaza behind the new palace, for all to see. An altar was set up at each of the four corners of the plaza, each one patronized by a different noble or lady, containing various reliquaries of all shapes and sizes, “set with many diamonds and jemstones, admirable crosses, and golden cups, and extraordinary dishes, with the greatest wealth that could be imagined, [such] that one could

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194 “Una parte de los caballeros ingleses anduvieron en la procesión, so [sic] color de curiosos, con gran acatamiento, habiendo parecido á todos notable cosa la grandeza con que lo espiritual y corporal se celebra en esta corte; porque en las calles había mucha riqueza de tapicería y pinturas, y en todas había grandes toldos de lienzo, que con gran gusto puso la Ciudad,” Relación de lo sucedido, 72.

195 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 122.

196 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 142. The author of the Relacion de lo sucedido got the date wrong, saying that it was on Friday, June 3rd, which he says was the “octave of the Corpus”. The octave was, by definition, the eighth day after the festival, including the date of the festival itself, and therefore Thursday, 6/16 June. Interestingly, despite this, the section relating the event is in the correct place chronologically in the text. Relacion de lo sucedido, 94-95.

197 The Plazuela de los Leones, today’s Plaza de las Brigidas, on the calle San Diego, next to the recently completed church for the brothers. Relacion de lo sucedido, 95.
come to the court merely for the sake of seeing these things."198 While this may have been a remarkable experience, it was far from unusual, as Pinheiro tells us that the celebrations of Corpus Christi would in fact last for “more than two months, because of the many churches and convents” in the city, each with their own day fixed for celebration of the feast.199

And as if this was not enough, another major event, this time entirely unplanned, occurred while the English and Scots were in Valladolid – adding an additional level of spontaneous celebration and religious excitement to what was already a remarkable concurrence of events: news arrived from Rome of the election of a new pope. This sent the people of the city over the top, at least partly because the newly elected pontiff, the cardinal de San Clemente, was “a supporter of Spain, where he lived for some time.”200 It was indeed a significant event, as this new pope was Paul V, who would lead the church until the very end of Philip III’s reign. On the night that the definitive news arrived – Thursday, 23 May/2 June – all of Valladolid erupted in celebration: with great torches burning in front of the palace, luminarias lit throughout the city, “shooting of gunnes from the tops of Churches, and fire-workes,” and constables and officials passing through the streets accompanied by musicians playing trumpets, shawms, and kettledrums for most of the night.201 The next day, the king attended a special mass thanking god for the election, and another solemn procession from the cathedral was held in honor of the

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198 “Había en ellos solamente reliquias, de muchas invenciones, formas y figuras, con muchos diamentes y piedras engastadas, cruces admirables y vasos de oro y vajillas extraordinarias, con la mayor riqueza que se puede imaginar, que sólo por ver estas cosas se podía venir a la corte.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 142.
199 “[C]ontiúanse estas fiestas de Corpus Christi, y duran más de dos meses, por las muchas iglesias y conventos que hay, que ya tienen sus días determinados.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 142.
201 Royal Entertainement, 11. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 109. The luminarias would shine for three nights running. Relación de lo sucedido, 64.
new pope. The English appeared to enjoy these celebrations as well, which made their hosts particularly happy, since the Spaniards were explicitly going out of their way to emphasize it even further on their account:

more of a celebration is being made for the Pope particularly because in this conjunction [of the English visit and the papal election] it is good that more demonstrations of respect and veneration be made, since the principal heresy of this people is that of not recognizing the Pope and the roman Church as the origin of the faith and the head of Christendom.

And so, even this unforeseen, momentous event was being used consciously in order to influence and overwhelm their special guests. Philip and Lerma were going to take every opportunity they could, every step of the way, to bring the power of Spain and the strength of the holy church to bear on the Lord Admiral and his men. The addition of all of these sacred and ecclesiastical celebrations to the concurrence of those of the peace with those of the prince’s birth – and added to the regular masses, processions of the holy sacrament, matins, vespers, and so on – worked to infuse every aspect of the entire experience with a tangible religiosity that would have been absolutely impossible for anyone to ignore.

**Celebrations IV – greater and grander spectacles still**

The events described to this point may seem like a truly unbelievable number of goings-on for just a few weeks, but even these three overlapping types of occasions only represented a part of the overall set of celebrations during the British visit. As lively and impressive as these

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202 Pinheiro says that the procession was held on Thursday, but it is clear from his narrative that he meant Friday, especially since the news did not arrive until ten o’clock Thursday night. Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 109-110. *Relación de lo sucedido*, 64.

203 “Por todas las calles anduvieron trompetas, chirimías y atabales, con los alguaciles y oficiales de la ciudad, gran parte de la noche, y los ingleses se contentaron much de esta fieseta; y particularmente hízose más fiesta al papa porque en esta conjunción es bien se haga más demostraciones de respeto y veneración, pues la principal herejía de esta gente es no reconocer al Papa y a la Iglesia romana por origen de la fe y cabeza de la cristiandad”, Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 109.
were, Lerma and the king went well beyond the observance of these intertwining events, taking advantage of the presence of their guests in order to fill out the calendar with every possible spectacle imaginable, each one more remarkable than the last. These did not necessarily deal directly with one particular aspect of the political, dynastic, or religious business of the moment, but all were carefully designed by the crown in order to overawe the visitors and draw close attention from their subjects. Chief among these were a number of sporting and military events that brought the entire city and people from miles around out to watch, and which involved the direct participation of the highest officers in the government and the nobility, including both the duke of Lerma and the king himself.

Two of these events were held back-to-back on the day after the oath, Friday, 31 May/10 June: the juegos de toros y cañas. Both of these were typical Spanish activities that usually went together: the ubiquitous bullfight, and the now undoubtedly less familiar juego de cañas. The toros came first:

The next day being fryday his excellency sawe the Juegos de Toro in a fayre place well built, well representing the old Roman Theaters. Ther were many noblemen on horseback charging thes bulls and I thynck at the least 7000 people on foot within the lists. 3 men were slayn, and more hurt, and the Duke of Alva, and the Conde de Ayala...had their horses slayn.204

The “fayre place well built” was the Plaza Mayor, a public square significantly larger than a football field, and surrounded on all sides by tall buildings designed to facilitate viewing of public spectacles in the plaza below, with every floor of every building filled with windows and balconies in every conceivable space.205 For events, bleachers could be set up in front of the

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204 Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.126v.
205 This was the prototypical plaza in the Spanish-speaking world, and thus the model for those built subsequently in Madrid, Salamanca, and in the Americas. It measures about 400 feet by 266 feet, and was completely surrounded at the time by four- and five-story buildings (including the ground floor), each with a viewing area on the roof as well.
ground floor all the way around, thus quickly turning a public square into something like a modern stadium, complete with countless luxury box suites. On this day, it was packed to overflowing, with perhaps as many as 100,000 spectators looking on.

The second spectacle, the *juego de cañas*, was an aristocratic contest dating far back into medieval Spain that was something like a joust – only played in teams, and with canes rather than lances, which were thrown at one’s opponents. It was a display of superior, fast-paced horsemanship as much as anything, and the objective was to use your shield to block the throws, or to evade the canes altogether. This *cañas* was particularly notable, as it was the first time that the king himself chose to participate directly, a subject of interest for many, and by all accounts he acquitted himself remarkably well.

Interest in this event and in those who participated in it was certainly very high, as coverage of it is quite thorough in all of our sources – English, Spanish, and Portuguese alike – including detailed lists of who it was that filled the

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206 “[A]nd not onely the standings were ful of people as they could stand and sit one by another, but also the tops of the houses, and the ground below was also ful, til such time as the Kings Marshal and the guard, did drive them out.” *Royal entertainement*, 13.
207 Everyone notes that it was packed, though estimates for capacity differ. Both Nottingham and the author of the *Relación de lo sucedido* thought that it held about 100,000. Pinheiro put the crowd at something more than 40,000, although it is difficult to tell if he is referring to the entire crowd with this figure, or just those in the windows. Either way, it was a massive audience, and in the case of many, a paying one. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124; *Relación de lo sucedido*, 79; Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 123 (123-124 for the prices).
208 As Treswell described it: “At their first appearance they came riding in by couples two after two, very swiftly, richly attired with their Targets on their shoulders, holding and shaking long staves such as the Moores or Arabians are described to use. When they were all come, they divided themselves to sides, every side into foure squadrons, every squadron being tenne in number; when they were ready holding their staves in their hands, the Kings side gave the first charge; the other side undertaking the same and charging on them likewise; thus they continued still chasing one another, squadron upon squadron throwing their Canes one after other, by the space of a long houre or better: and so their sports ended.” Treswell, *A Relation*, 50.
209 Both Nottingham and Buck thought that he had carried the day, and even Pinheiro gave him credit, saying that “the king doesn’t look like much on foot, [but] on horseback, or dancing, he looks very well indeed.” Spanish: “el rey a pie no aparenta tanto, y a caballo, o danzando, parece en extremo bien”; Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 131.
ten slots on each of the eight teams, and descriptions of the team colors and outfits.\textsuperscript{210} Once again, in addition to the king, it was a who’s who of Spanish power, with many of the major figures at court mounting up.\textsuperscript{211} Even the Constable tried his hand – although this may not have been the best idea, as he “was hurte on the bake of his hed for [lack] of berying his Target hygh anofe,” and so once again found himself restrained to his sickbed for several days right in the midst of an Anglo-Spanish diplomatic encounter of particular significance.\textsuperscript{212}

During these festivities, Nottingham was placed near the queen, in an apparently unprecedented position of honor, and once again in a place where he could easily be seen.\textsuperscript{213} Indeed, special provision was made so that his entire entourage, “from the meanest to the highest, should have the pleasure of the sights,...every Englishman furnished of convenient roome: which they did; Don Blasco himself taking an especial care and respect thereof.”\textsuperscript{214} Their appearance and actions were closely watched by those in attendance, and it appears that they were enjoying themselves:

And it was a pleasing thing for the foreigners to see the many and good \textit{suertes} that were made with the bulls, admiring the agility of the horses, the dexterity and spirit of the gentlemen, and no less marvel was caused by the good \textit{suertes} made by those on foot,

\textsuperscript{210} Total coverage: \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 80-87; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 123-132.
\textsuperscript{211} Including, amongst others: Lerma and a couple of his sons, the Constable, the princes of Savoy, Pastrana, Infantado, duque de Alba, conde de Alba de Liste, Salinas, Villamediana’s son Juan de Tassis, and every future ambassador to England for the rest of the reign (Don Pedro de Zúñiga, Don Alonso de Velasco, and Don Diego Sarmiento de Acuña [Gondomar]). \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 82-86; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 130-131; Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 48-49.
\textsuperscript{212} Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
\textsuperscript{213} Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128; \textit{Royal entertainement}, 13. Indeed, Don Blasco and various others told the Lord Admiral that this position had him “soe placed as never any of his rancke was beefore in this Kingdome”.
\textsuperscript{214} Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.28v-29.
provoking the bull, and knowing to excuse [themselves from] the encounter swiftly, leaving him frustrated.\textsuperscript{215}

Yet another witness noted that “the English were very delighted, since they do not use these fiestas there”.\textsuperscript{216} The Lord Admiral himself certainly appeared happy enough, as more than one chronicler mentioned that many of the Spaniards in attendance admired his ability “to know how to choose the best” lady to pay attention to during the proceedings: doña Catalina de la Cerda, Lerma’s daughter and the principal beauty of the court, with whom Nottingham appeared a “good gallant and discreet courtier”, and “to whome he gave a jewel of much worth.”\textsuperscript{217}

As the baptism and churching had been as much about the display of power and wealth as they had been about religion, so the toros and the cañas – despite the violence, gore, and even death – were as much about pomp and pageantry as actual sport. All of the accounts spend as much time describing the silver saddles, shining swords, silk coats, kettledrums and trumpets, well-bred horses, and pearl-embroidered black, gold, or crimson velvet as they do the actual substance of the events themselves. The crown was clearly going all out to try and impress their visitors with the extent of Spanish greatness, counting as well on the honor- and competition-bred complicity of the court, and it was most certainly working. Even perhaps our most

\textsuperscript{215}“Y fué cosa agradable para los extranjeros ver las muchachas y buenas suertes que se hacían con los toros, admirando la ligereza de los caballos, la destreza y ánimo de los caballeros, y no menos maravilla cuasaban las buenas suertes que hacían los de á pie, provocando al toro, y sabiendo ligeramente excusar el encuentro, dejándole frustrado.” Relación de lo sucedido, 80. A “suerte” refers to one of the many acts in a bullfight.

\textsuperscript{216}“Los ingleses estaban muy alborozados, por ser fiestas que por allí no usan.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 123.

\textsuperscript{217}“Las damas tenían los nueve arcos de la mano izquierda; y, por más honra, se dio lugar entre ellas al almirante, que supo escoger lo mejor, que es la infanta doña Catalina de la Cerda, a quien dio una joya de mucho precio.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 127. “[N]otándose mucho que el Almirante de Inglaterra se entretenía con doña Catalina de la Cerda, dama de la Reina, nuestra señora, hermosa y de mucha gentileza, y con ella hizo el Almirante demostraciones de buen galán y discreto cortesano.” Relación de lo sucedido, 80.
objective witness here, who was far from afraid to offer criticism when he felt it, was absolutely blown away by the display, understood what was going on, and got the message:

[It] was, as much for the instrument as by reason of the place and conjunction in which it was made, one of the grandest fiestas that has been done in Spain, because in that Plaza – by the uniformity and beauty of it, being so fresh and well adorned – it shines much more; and at the same time by seeing the pleasure which the natives take in those foreigners’ beholding of how they outstrip the other nations, makes one receive more contentment from these great events and [makes] everything appear all the more admirable; and without a doubt, the English are greatly astonished by them.218

Astonished they indeed were. All of the reports back to England, both published and private, were glowing, with perhaps the most frequently repeated word some version of “magnificent.”219

And the Lord Admiral was stunned, telling Cecil that he had never seen any place comparable to the setting, nor any crowd so enormous, and he would have to have the bearer of his letter describe every detail, “for the Sumtiousnes was wonderfull.”220

Nor would the shock-and-awe approach stop there, as the king and his court seemed quite ready to bury the British under wave after wave of grand celebration and naked display of wealth and power. On the very next day after the toros y cañas they were brought out with the royal couple and the entire court to the Puerta del Campo to see the muestra general, the general muster of the Castilian Guard: some two thousand pikemen, light horse, and harquebusiers, under the command of the duke of Lerma, in his capacity as Capitán general de la caballería de

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218 “Fue la entrada, así por el aparato con por razón del lugar y conjunción en que se hizo, una de las grandiosas fiestas que se hicieron en España, porque en aquella Plaza, por la igualdad y hermosura de ella, estando tan fresca y bien adornada, luce mucho más; y juntamente por ver el gusto que tienen los naturales en que vean los extranjeros aquellos en que se aventajan a las otras naciones, hace recibir más contentamiento de estas grandezas y parecer todo más admirable; y sin duda se asombraron los ingleses mucho de ellas.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 131.

219 See, for example: Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.126v; Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128.

220 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
España. From upon a purpose-built set of scaffolding, the English and Scots watched as the troops – gleaming in their brand-new livery and undoubtedly enthusiastic about finally getting paid – divided and executed a number of exercises and mock skirmishes, with Lerma himself on horseback personally leading the charge. Once this was done, the men closed up and marched in tight formation passing in front of the king and his guests – with every company commander once again selected from the now-familiar cast of the greatest nobles in the land. The muster concluded with a march “in armed formation” back into the city, “putting all the streets in flight” all the way back to the palace. As our official chronicler freely admits, this entire show was a direct attempt to impress the Lord Admiral and his entourage with Spanish discipline and military might, “and which showed the power of a great prince in only one part of this kingdom of Castile.”

Even the rehearsals for these events were great spectacles and big draws. On Thursday, 23 May/2 June, all eighty illustrious members of the competing teams in the cañas met up in the huerta del duque to practice, including the king himself. As Philip, his queen, and all the ladies of the court came down the pasadizo and across the river for the event, the banks of the Pisuerga were “covered with every type of person,” all the streets and railings were packed with

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221 Pinheiro pointed out that some people questioned the utility of this display, as this number was far inferior to the sorts of real formations the English and Scots were used to seeing on the battlefield in Flanders. But the Castilians responded that it was understood that this was essentially just the palace guard, and therefore would be really impressive. Pinheiro, Fastiginta, 137. Nottingham knew full well that they were the continual standing force in the capital, as he indicated to Cecil. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.

222 Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.127.

223 “Acabada la muestra, la caballería se entró en Valladolid, y se puso en todas las calles en ala, por donde su Majestad pasó, que tomó casi desde la puerta del Campo hasta palacio, que es un gran trecho, y al Almirante de Inglaterra pareció cosa admirable, por ir tan en orden armada y en tan buenos caballos, que al fin, como dijo, son españoles; y así fué ésta una muestra concertada, con juicio ordenada, conforme á experiencia militar, y que denotó la potencia de un gran principe en sola una parte deste reino de Castilla.” Relación de lo sucedido, 94.
onlookers, and the river itself was chock full with boats.²²⁴ And the military rehearsals, carried out in the Puerta del Campo on Wednesday, 29 May/8 June, may have been an even bigger gathering still. On this occasion, so many coaches and people had come out to watch that it was difficult to actually find space to practice the exercises. Pinheiro estimated the crowd at more than 20,000, and felt that, “for the beauty of the countryside, the great abundance of people, the brilliance of the weapons and the diversity of colors, it was one of the things that I most enjoyed seeing.”²²⁵

The eyes and the ears were not the only senses that would be appealed to during the English and Scots’ stay in Valladolid, as a number of formal banquets were held in their honor as well. Of these, there were two of particular size and note, each hosted by a man of great importance. The first of these was thrown on 21/31 May by the Constable, “in order to show gratitude for the good welcome that they gave him in England.”²²⁶ It was a massive event, lasting all afternoon, and including a number of leading nobles alongside a large contingent of the Lord Admiral’s entourage. This occasion was much remarked upon by observers and participants alike, at length especially in the Spanish sources, mainly for its size and ostentation, with numerous pages devoted to the dimensions of the tables, the people in attendance, detailed descriptions of the decorations on the Constable’s sideboards, and the size and number of the meals served. A couple of sources mention at least 300 guests, Cabrera de Córdoba says more

²²⁴ “Vino el rey y la reina y las damas por el pasadizo y pasaron en sus galeras, estando las orillas cubiertas de toda clase de gentes, y el río de barcos enramados, que era cosa hermosa de ver, y las damas y señores que estaban en las huertas que llenaban toda la baranda y calles, y por entre los árboles y celosías parecían mucho mejor, y retrato de lo que dice Ariosto.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 108.
²²⁵ “Habría mas de 20.000 personas a presenciarlo; y por la hermosura del campo, gran abundancia de gente, brillo de las armas y diversidad de colores, fue una de las cosas que más holgué de ver.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 119-120.
²²⁶ “[P]or mostrar el Condestable de Castilla la gratitud del buen acogimiento que le hicieron en Inglaterra.” Relación de lo sucedido, 59.
than 1,000 plates were served, and Pinheiro points out that even this largesse was yet another opportunity for public display, as the doors were thrown open for anyone who wanted to come and see.227

One week later, on Tuesday 28 May/7 June, the duke of Lerma fêted Nottingham and his men in his quarters at the palace, and outdid his old rival on nearly every level. Many of the same powerful and influential guests were there again, but this time there were over 2,200 dishes served, twelve to a person, in a glittering display of gold plate, elaborate crystal, Venetian glass, and curiously worked Portuguese earthenware.228 Cornwallis reported that “wee were very royally entertained and feasted” and that “two Marqueses and [two] Earles (a matter in Spaine very extraordinarie) attended on the Table, and one of the Marqueses performed the office of a carver”.229 The big hit may have been the empanadas made in the shape of a thousand different gold and silver castles and ships, and there was multi-instrumental, contrapuntal music all through dinner, split into four separate choirs, which when played together “appeared a thing of heaven”.230 This time, the king and queen were in attendance, though separate of course, “seeing everything through a lattice window”.231 After dinner, they all removed to “a faire court, paved with square stone, in the middest whereof was a fountaine of cleare water”, covered above by canvas to keep out the heat of the Spanish sun. A stage had been set up, “with all things fitting for a play”, and the entire company was treated to a production of one of Lope de Vega’s most

227 Relación de lo sucedido, 59-63; Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas, 247; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 102. Apparently a great many people took the Constable up on this, and many of them may have partaken as well, causing some confusion, and perhaps even a shortage of food. 228 Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas, 248; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 118-119. 229 Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.24-24v. 230 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 118; “y juntándose, parecía cosa del cielo”, Relación de lo sucedido, 66-67. 231 “Estuvieron el rey y la reina viendo todo por una celosía que quedaba frente al extremo de la mesa, escondidos.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 119.
recent works, the ultimate story of the *picaro*, “El caballero de Illescas”, with Nottingham and Lerma in two special chairs right up front, and the king and queen once again watching from a private spot.\textsuperscript{232} Afterward, there was much dancing – which Pinheiro suggests many of the English liked more, since “they understood it better than the language” – the Lord Admiral and the duke got along famously throughout, and many toasts were drunk to the kings of the two countries and the continuance of the peace, with Lerma leading the way.\textsuperscript{233} Even though this was a more exclusive event, everyone was talking about it at court, much space was given to it in the published relations, and “[m]any Ladies of great account came privately to see and observe his Lordship and the company as they sate at meat, well allowing and applauding the plenty and bounty used at this feast, being indeed such a one as the like was not seen in Spaine many yeares before.”\textsuperscript{234}

**Conclusion**

So we can see that there was so much more going on here than the simple act of ratifying the peace treaty, or welcoming some ambassadors from a foreign land. Indeed, the specific events concerning the embassy itself – while important moments and in many cases watched by

\textsuperscript{232} Treswell, *A Relation*, 41; Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 119. This was likely meant to impress Nottingham personally as much as anything – as not only did the Lord Admiral understand Spanish, but he was a noted aficionado of the theater, as the main founder and patron in 1594 of the Lord Admiral’s Men, the other London company, competing with Shakespeare’s, which produced most of Marlowe’s plays (and which became Prince Henry’s Men upon James’s accession in 1603). Andrew Gurr, ‘Lord Admiral’s Men (act. 1594–1625)’, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, online edn, Oxford University Press, Sept 2009 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/theme/95598, accessed 23 Feb 2010]

\textsuperscript{233} “[L]os bailes, que entendian mejor que la lengua. Estuvieron hablando el Duque y el Almirante, muy lujoso y lo mismo los suyos.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 119.

\textsuperscript{234} Treswell, *A Relation*, 42. Cornwallis says that the ladies stayed to watch the play, “for whome there was an upper roome [or balcony] provided on purpose.” He himself found the play “of more length then pleasure”. Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.24v.
many – took a back seat to the overwhelming display of everything else. In fact, the very ceremony that was the main reason for the embassy in the first place – the oathtaking – turned out to have been one of the more private affairs, attracting little public interest at the time. Of course, this did not mean that the event was unimportant, or that it would not be used to good effect – just that it was used differently. The campaign to overwhelm and impress was still on, with the remarkable setting and ceremony – but this was, in person at least, a performance basically for the English alone. The privacy of the oath ensured that the focus of the people would be on all of the other ceremonies that emphasized the power, wealth, and magnificence of the Habsburg monarchy and Spanish culture and religion, without emphasizing too visually the physical act of their very formal, almost mythical monarch agreeing to capitulations with admitted heretics.

As we have seen with the day of the prince’s baptism and with that of Corpus and the oath, all of these different sorts of events often ran up against each another, bled over into one another, and used each others’ crowds to good effect, making the combination of spectacles grander than each would have been on its own. And this happened with everything. For example, the Lord Admiral’s besamanos with Philip III followed directly on the heels of another major ceremony: the duke of Lerma’s formal entrance into the palace as the Master of the Horse

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235 Aside from the formal processions to and from the palace, and the view presented to those in the plaza below as the king and the whole entourage passed through the gallery, this was essentially a private ceremony. The only other person outside of the hall who witnessed it was the queen, who was looking down from a window above. Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sudedidas, 249. Even Pinheiro, who goes on at length about every other conceivable event, only wrote one sentence about the oath ceremony, and that only to indicate that he had nothing to say: “Esta noche se hace el juramento de las paces por el Rey, y se hace en privado en el salón nuevo de los sarao, y así no hay cosa notable que referir.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 123.

236 And still, the very act of making this a private ceremony meant that it would be more easily controlled, and would be that much more likely to go off without a hitch. It would still be easy for the crown to use the event in relaciones of the festivities, and they could then better emphasize the aspects of the event that seemed most to support their aims.
(caballerizo mayor), surrounded by hundreds of soldiers, servants, pages, and footmen wearing his livery, newly provided for the occasion of the prince’s baptism, at great cost.\textsuperscript{237} Nottingham and his escort had to wait patiently by, looking on as the entire procession passed, before making their way in state towards the palace. Or take the day of the queen’s churching, where the Lord Admiral and his company rode out with the king and the court through the crowds to San Lorenzo, were then ushered into the church to see the famous ceremony, after which they were taken to Santa Cruz to witness the procession return, then brought back to the banquet at the Constable’s, and finally escorted to the palace to present Cornwallis and the queen’s gift – and still Nottingham found time to receive various noble visitors and to hold an extended meeting with Lerma about substantial matters of state.\textsuperscript{238}

In fact, none of these events was totally isolated or did merely one thing: they were all mixed together. Not just several on the same day, but blurring diplomatic, dynastic, and religious boundaries even within particular events themselves. Occasions that appear to have been primarily or entirely about religion were really as much or more about power and display, and events that appear on the surface not to have had much to do with religion at all turn out to have been subtly infused with it. It was all by design, all part of a package, meant to both overawe and attract, even in ways that the viewers and participants might not immediately have noticed at the time. The king and the duke had seen their opportunity, and they had made the most of it. Their carefully orchestrated onslaught of magnificence would have a significant impact for many on both sides. Moreover, all of this was set firmly in the midst of an extended trip through the decidedly less magnificent Spanish countryside, which added another striking layer of contrast to everything experienced in the capital. The British were seeing two very

\textsuperscript{237} Relación de lo Sucedido, 42.
\textsuperscript{238} Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85.
different Spains here, and these very different Spains were both seeing them – though this would turn out to be as much a matter of complementary reinforcement as it was of jarring juxtaposition. So let us take a closer look at how this worked, what it was that each side saw, and what the implications of all of this were for the future of the Anglo-Spanish relationship.
**Chapter Nine: Seeing, being seen, and being seen to have seen**

“[Y]our Majesty is in this Kyngdom the most honored and beloved kyng of the world and the most admyred of the King, the nobelyte, and all sorts of pepell. The pece is so welcome to them as I am assured that your Majesty is prayed for of the pepell as if you weer theyr owne kyng, bothe for the love of your pece, and the fere of your powre and gretnes.”

– The Lord Admiral to King James, from Spain\(^1\)

“[T]hey [the English and Scots] proceeded with much modesty, respect, and courtesy to all the images and sacraments, as if they were catholics; so much so that the distrust we previously had towards them has disappeared”.

– Tomé Pinheiro da Veiga\(^2\)

Now that we have taken a detailed look at what went on while the English and Scots were in the Spanish capital, we need to spend some time discussing just what it was that was being seen, in order to get some idea of what the guests and hosts thought about all of this, about what they were seeing, and about each other. Then we can begin to say something about what this all meant, and how it would affect the future of the relationship. In all of the events described above, there were several things going on simultaneously, interacting on various levels. The trip to Spain was not a one-sided performance, with one stage, an obvious audience, and a clear set of players. In this, everyone was an actor, everyone an audience, and even the very role of watching was a performance in itself. In order to pin things down, of course, we do need a specific point of reference. As the English and Scots were the guests, we will use them.

**Perceptions I – seeing**

When assessing the perceptions and conclusions drawn, we can think of things from a number of different perspectives. The first of these was *seeing*. Philip and Lerma, with the apparently enthusiastic cooperation of the entire court and city, went out of their way to put

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\(^{1}\) Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128.

\(^{2}\) “[P]rocedieron con mucha modestia, respeto, y cortesía a todas las imágenes y sacramentos, como si fueran católicos; de manera que se ha perdido el recelo con que estábamos.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 161.
on a show for their British visitors the likes of which had never before been seen. Three and a half weeks of constant magnificence, with grand spectacle after grand spectacle, each one bigger than the last, and the combination carefully calculated to overwhelm, entice, and perhaps even convert. Every single event was an opportunity for display, with the fabled wealth of the Spanish empire and the opulence of the Habsburg court surrounding the visitors at every turn. From the official celebrations of diplomatic protocol, to the religious processions and ceremonies, to the sumptuous banquets and balls, everything was designed to impress. As Dudley Carleton wrote to his longtime correspondent John Chamberlain on the day after the muestra general: “Here have bin feasts and triumphs enough for Stoes Chronicle, and some what remaines for every day as long as we stay here.”

Such magnificence did not come cheap, but that was, to a certain extent, the whole point. Consequently, all of our witnesses and chroniclers frequently mention the cost or value of all kinds of things – from jewels to gifts to outfits to entire construction projects – and they do so almost universally in a way that expresses pride, wonder, envy, and respect, and almost never dismay. Similarly, Philip’s decision to cover all of the embassy’s expenses while on Spanish soil was a truly massive expenditure. And yet, this decision is mentioned in our sources time and time again, always in admiration – except of course by Nottingham, but only because he wished that he could have been allowed to do the same. Through this unrestrained display of wealth, the English and Scots could see a great many things, depending upon the individual’s particular inclinations: be it beauty in form and design, luxury in leisure, conspicuous consumption, or incomparable religious fervor, celebration, and visual display. But one thing is true in every

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3 Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain (2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.123.
case: all of this spoke to the realities and possibilities of Spanish power, helping serve as a compelling example, and for many, a significant force for attraction.

But the dresses, diamonds, plazas, and palaces did not shine on their own. They were accompanied and enhanced by a flowering of high culture unsurpassed in the Spanish world even now, and which was the envy of Europe in its day. This was the heart of the Siglo de Oro, and Nottingham and his men were immersed in it from the moment of their arrival. With the court came patronage, and so Valladolid was home to a remarkable combination of literary giants, acknowledged as such in their time. The streets, salons, and courtyards were alive with both the poetry and the presence of Góngora and his bitter rival Quevedo, the playful words and sartorial flair of the future second count of Villamediana, and the stirring verses of the accomplished sonneteer, Salinas, the Lord Admiral’s host. The great Lope de Vega was there as well, writing poems and plays and having his work performed expressly for the visitors, in the very halls of the royal palace. And above all, this was the city of Cervantes, whose Don Quixote had been first introduced to the world just a few months before, and by the time of the British arrival had taken the court by storm. Nearly all of the great lights of the Spanish Golden Age were here, all present in one place, at this very time, and the English and Scots were frequently exposed both to their work, and to many of the authors and artists in person.

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4 Copies of the first part of this masterpiece almost certainly would be headed back to England in the saddlebags of Nottingham’s men, meaning that this embassy likely also marked the introduction of the modern novel into Britain.

5 Books of all kinds made their way home with the English, as well. As Dudley Carleton wrote to John Chamberlain, on the return trip (Paris, 10/20 November 1605): “Whilst I was in Spain I bestowed much in books, because they are rare of that language in England, and the like commodity of carriage happens not in an age. There are many of them para el gusto and amongst others a picara which will be a good Christmas companion for you, and I have written to Mr. Warner if you have any mind to [paper torn] you shall have your choice.” Lee, Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain, 72. Carleton was traveling back to England from Spain by land, on an extended tour in the company of Lord Norris.
The Spanish capital was also the muse for countless other artists, and all of their talents were mobilized in the attempt to overawe the visitors. From the lesser-known poets, dramatists, and actors commissioned to compose and perform in the streets and the festivals; to the painters, sculptors, and gold- and silversmiths who turned the palaces, plazas, and *pasadizos* into a glittering celebration of Spanish power and Catholic glory. Moreover, the royal art collections, and especially those of the duke of Lerma, were unmatched in their scope and magnificence, and they too were put to good use in the attempt to overwhelm and attract. Remarkable works could be seen all over the city, in key locations in various of the palaces and churches, where they might attract the most notice. Particular use was made of tapestries and other rich hangings—such as the aforementioned ones on the conquest of Tunis, spread between the banqueting hall, the church of San Pablo, and even in the very streets and plazas for some of the occasions—as well as Lerma’s collection of paintings and drawings in La Huerta de la Ribera, his villa just across the river. The British embassy arrived precisely at the high point of the duke’s assembly of this collection, and he showed it off to them to good effect. It contained more than 600 pieces, including works by a number of great masters, such as Titian, Veronese, and Rubens, the latter of whom had visited personally just two years before and painted what was perhaps the crown jewel in the collection: the equestrian portrait of Lerma himself, which captured their host and the dominant force in Spanish government at the very height of his power and influence. This collection was so impressive that, almost twenty years later, Prince Charles and the duke of Buckingham would make a point of stopping through the city merely to see it on their return home from their famous 1623 trip to Madrid.\(^6\)

\(^6\) Sarah Walker Schroth, “Charles I, the duque de Lerma and Veronese’s Edinburgh ‘Mars and Venus’”, *The Burlington Magazine*, v.139, n.1133 (August 1997): 548-550. Pinheiro remarks on it as well, saying that its rooms were “llenas de las más hermosas pinturas que hay en España”. 
Of course, the British were seeing not only a showcase of the old, but also a transition to the new. They were witnessing the birth of the baroque style, from the architectural masterworks built for the occasion – the banqueting hall, galleries, palaces, and church façades – to the complex contrapuntal compositions of Victoria, Lobo, and Guerrero played by the musicians at each of the celebrations, both sacred and profane. And while this has traditionally been seen as early for baroque Spanish painting, recent work by Schroth and others has shown that not only was Lerma a great collector, he was also a great patron of current work. Indeed, this period was much richer in this regard than previously thought, and the Habsburg court was in fact home to a number of great artists, including Juan Pantoja de la Cruz, Santiago Morán, and Vincenzo Carducci (Carducho), as well as the sculptors Gregorio Fernández and Pompeo Leoni, all of whom were enlisted to help decorate the capital and celebrate the peace.

**The masque and the sarao**

Nowhere was the conscious combination of this artistic talent, unbelievable wealth, and monarchical purpose more evident than in the one major event we have not yet discussed: the fantastic multimedia performance that was the farewell masque. Perhaps the *pièce de résistance* of the entire trip, the royal masque and farewell *sarao* [banquet, or soirée] was held in the brand-new banqueting house, on the evening of Thursday, 6/16 June. For this monumental celebration, the Lord Admiral and his men had “both to dine and suppe early”, so they would be ready for the festivities, which would last all through the evening and night, and well into the early morning.
hours. They made their way from their lodging, through the *pasadizo*, to the banqueting house at about six o’clock, where they found the hall quickly filling up – with some 3,000 spectators in all. As had been the case at various other events, there was once again some confusion at the five main doors leading in to the place, where in the press to get in, “many rogues entered, resulting in many lords being knocked down,” including the Imperial ambassador, a number of dukes and counts, and Don Juan de Borja – Lerma’s uncle and a key member of the Council of State. This was eventually straightened out, and it never involved the English and Scots, who were well-placed in the crowd: sitting next to the Cardinal-Archbishop of Toledo and the count of Miranda, surrounded by members of all the major councils, important noblemen, bishops, and the other ambassadors. Before long, the house was packed and the festivities were ready to begin.

This remarkable space, purpose-built for these events, is described in great detail (and much praise) by most of our witnesses and chroniclers. On this night, the banks of seats in both the upper and lower galleries were filled with spectators all the way around, and the hall was magnificently decorated, carrying it well beyond its already impressive look during the

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9 Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 155; *Relación de lo sucedido*, 98.
10 In Pinheiro’s words: “entraron muchos pícaros y resultaron muchos señores atropellados, principalmente el embajador de Alemania, que salió el pobre viejo a empujones y hecho un trapo, sin poder entrar; y del mismo modo se volvieron muy maltratados muchos duques y condes y D. Juan de Borja.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 158. This was apparently a common sort of occurrence at court, and Pinheiro emphasizes the fact that the nobles and *grandes* were lenient about such disturbances and maltreatment, preferring rather to “live and let live”: “Cuento estas cosas para que veáis lo que decíamos de cuán grande máquina es ésta y el ánimo de los señores de Castilla, que no matan luego, ni se dan por afrentados, sino viven y dejan vivir a la gente.” Ibid.
11 Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 154; *Relación de lo sucedido*, 98-99;
ceremony of the oath. In addition to the great Tunis tapestries, everything was decked out in the finest fabrics, precious metals, and jewels. And this magnificence was reflected in the participants and spectators, as well: “as the ladies and gentlemen were so brilliant” that it seemed as if there was nothing but “brocade, gold, diamonds, jewels, chains, and feathers,” making them seem a “performance or painting of the Glory”. One thing in particular that everyone marveled at was the lighting. As Treswell describes it, “The room was garnished with three hundred and twenty lights of wax, al set in standerds of silver, of divers fashions, some great and some small.” And those were just the main chandeliers. Various other sconces, lamps, candelabras, and great four-wicked wax hachas (which the English referred to as “torches”) dominated every corner, and were amplified by the presence of a number of mirrors along one gallery, which made the hall seem “as if it had been garnished with [an] infinite number of starres”. This event had been anxiously anticipated, and a great deal of preparation had gone into making sure that it would come off without a hitch.

At nine o’clock, the masque got under way, beginning to “great applause from everyone” with a bugle call from a figure representing Fame, placed on top of the cupola of an ornate little

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13 “[Y], como las damas e hidalgos estaban tan brillantes que no había sino brocado, oro, diamantes, joyas, cadenas y plumas, parecían representación o pintura de la gloria”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 155.
14 Treswell, A Relation, 51.
15 Treswell, A Relation, 52.
16 Cabrera de Córdoba wrote a few days before, in his entry for 12/22 June 1605, that everyone was looking forward to the masque. He described what it would contain, and just how much rehearsing was going into it, especially on the part of the little infant: “[Y] á la noche se hará el sarao en Palacio en el salon nuevo, que dicen será mucho de ver por entrar en él sus Magestades y la Infanta, que la tienen muy ensayada en lo que ha de hacer, y las damas con muchas invenciones, y danzas y mudanzas extraordinarias.” Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 251.
building set up at the front of the hall, styled the “temple of felicity”. Then a choir began to sing, its “angelic voices” coming down from the windows at the center of the great room. This was soon joined by another choir, in contrapuntal call-and-response, from the windows down at the other end, everything sung “by divers voices in parts.” They sang of the glory of this place, passing quickly from its ancient history as the Roman city of Pintia down to the present, “where the river Pisuerga bathes the superior throne [trono superior] of Spain,” and where an “august successor” had come to light, “terror to the unjust”. They celebrated the coming of the prince, who brought with him so much hope, so that “on this day, in order to nurture it, in his palace a temple is dedicated, and with a pious hand peace closes the doors of Janus.” Thus were the various reasons for celebration – the royal birth, the sealing of the peace, and the glory of God – all fundamentally and explicitly intertwined in verse, and sung from on high.

With the theme of the event laid out, then began the masque proper. A great door by the temple opened up to reveal countless elaborately dressed figures in masks, surrounding another choir, which sang once more of the glory of the occasion and the birth of the prince. Then came a large group of musicians, “playing on severall instruments”, including cornets, flutes, sackbuts, and “in particular, a great troupe of masked violists, dressed in wide, loose robes of orange silk, trimmed in gold in the Venetian style,” and wearing great hats with feathers in

17 “[L]a Fama, tocó un clarín, con que llevó á sí con gran aplauso toda la gente”, Relación de lo sucedido, 99; “el templo de la felicidad”, Novoa, “Memorias de M. de Novoa Sobre el Reinado de Felipe III,” CODOIN v.60, 257.
18 “[C]on voces angelicales,” Relación de lo sucedido, 99.
19 Treswell, A Relation, 51.
20 “[D]ecendió adonde baña Pisuerga el trono superior de España…un subcesor augusto salió a la luz, terror del pueblo injusto.” Relación de lo sucedido, 99.
21 “[H]oy, para su crianza, / se le dedica en su palacio un templo, / y con piadosa mano / cierra la paz las puertas del de Jano.” Relación de lo sucedido, 99.
22 Treswell, A Relation, 51.
them. After this “followed six virgins dauncing,” – meninas, or ladies-in-waiting – carrying in their hands various symbolic items, each of which “represented the virtues belonging to a prince”. These were, respectively: “Magnanimity” (with a double-bladed sword with flowers covering the points), “Liberality” (bearing an image of the sun), “Security” (holding a silver anchor), “Prudence” (clasping a shield and a looking-glass that bore a triangle of gold in the middle, “which signified the three times, past, present, and future, of which every prudent man must be considerate”), “Hope” (“with a few boughs of laurel, because as it is always green, so hope is always alive”), and finally “Peace” (bearing in her hands, of course, several olive branches).

This led to the climax of the allegorical part of the masque, centered upon a “triumphal chariot, in the form of a ship, the fender-beam low, the stern high,” all intricately worked in

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23 “Acabando los coros á un tiempo, comenzaron músicas de cornetas y otras, y en particular una gran tropa de violones enmascarados, vestidos con ropones de seda naranjada, guarnecidos de oro al uso veneciano, y somberros con plumas”, Relación de lo sucedido, 100. For the various other instruments specifically mentioned, see Torquemada, “Discurso sobre las fiestas”, BL Addl Mss 10236, f.288v.
24 Treswell, A Relation, 51.
26 “[L]a Magnanimidad…la Liberalidad…la Seguridad…la Prudencia, embrazado un escudo en un espejo, y un triángulo en medio, de oro, que significaba los tres tiempos, pasado, presente y futuro, que de todo hombre prudente deben ser considerados; la Esperanza, con unos ramos de laurel, porque como siempre está verde, así vive siempre la esperanza; y la Paz, que iba sucediendo con unos ramos de oliva.” Relacion de lo sucedido, 101. With regard to Prudence, the Relación de lo sucedido reads “un escudo en un espejo”; Torquemada reads “un espejo en un escudo”, and Matías de Novoa reads “un escudo y un cristal en forma de espejo”. Novoa also says that the mirror was there that we might reflect on our actions before carrying them out: “en que hemos considerar nuestras acciones, antes de ejecutarlas”. Torquemada, “Discurso sobre las fiestas”, BL Addl Mss 10236, f.288v; Novoa, “Memorias de M. de Novoa Sobre el Reinado de Felipe III,” CODOIN v.60, 258.
27 “Luego entró un carro triunfante, de forma de navío, el espolón bajo, la popa alta, levantada 25 palmos, toda la obra de relieve de oro bruñido,” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 155.
relief, with “sirens, signs, emblems of triumph, and other things,” and pulled by “two live horses” which were “exceeding[ly] little.” High up in the center of this great ship sat the focal point of the entire presentation, the little “señora Infanta doña Ana, who represented the single virtue that took in all the others”. The infanta-as-Virtue was masked, dressed fabulously in flesh tones and silver, and carried “a scepter of gold in her hand: with the picture of a dove on the upper end thereof”. She was flanked by ladies and pages bearing torches, and the Duchess of Villahermosa sat nearby, representing “Felicity, bearing the symbols of a cornucopia and the Phoenix”. The ship carried the little infanta and her entourage in state across the full length of the hall down to the other end, where a high gallery had been prepared, bearing the lavishly decorated royal thrones. “[T]he Chariot was drawne up to the Throne, and the Infanta was taken forth, and set in the Queenes Chaire, and the Ladies sate by her.” The ship then made its way back whence it had come, and all the choirs sang out once more, a hymn to the future glory of Philip IV, comparing the newborn prince to Hercules and to Atlas, as he would bear the world on his shoulders, rivaling the work of his great-grandfather Charles V, helping “to uphold heaven on earth.”

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28 “[U]n carro á mode de popa de navío, de veinticinco palmos en alto, con muchas labores de relieve, que eran sirenas, tarjetas, trofeos y otras cosas, todas doradas”, Relación de lo sucedido, 101.
29 Royal entertainement, 17.
30 Treswell, A Relation, 51-52.
31 “[L]a señora Infanta doña Ana, que representaba la sola virtud que comprende todas las otras”, Relación de lo sucedido, 101.
32 Treswell, A Relation, 52.
33 “Tenía el carro seis gradas, y en la popa venía la infanta de encarnado y plata, con máscara y tocas altas de velillos y a sus pies dos meninas con antorchas, que eran doña Sofia Araix y doña Luisa Pacheco, y más abajo la Felicidad, con insignias de cornucopia, y el ave Félix, y era la duquesa de Villahermosa, vestida de tela de oro carmesí y mucha pedrería.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 155.
34 Royal entertainement, 17.
35 “[P]odrá en la tierra sostener el cielo.” Relacion de lo sucedido, 103.
After this triumphal beginning, the performance moved along towards the sarao. Another curtain opened, revealing the principal maskers, displayed as if they were in a cloud. This group of twenty-eight “heroes and nymphs” included most of the principal figures at court, including various counts and countesses, dukes and duchesses, the Savoyard princes, the Constable, and the duke of Lerma. But the place of honor was held by the king and queen themselves, who would play a prominent, direct role in the rest of the evening’s festivities. The choirs then took up another set of call-and-response verses, rejoicing in the occasion and reveling in classical themes, until finishing together in great praise of the newborn prince, wishing him long life, that he might receive the entire world as his subject, and that the sun might “always shine on some kingdom of his empire.” The maskers then gradually proceeded to come down from the cloud, in groups of four, one after the other, dancing to the music of the viols, composed especially for this occasion, a process which the anonymous author of The Royal entertainement referred to as “a verie glorious shew.”

After they all then danced together in “divers daunces and measures appointed of purpose for this shew; the King and Queen, and so likewise all the company, unmasked themselves,” and then took their seats. The original six ladies-in-waiting came back out and did a folk dance with castanets – or as one of the English witnesses called it “a country dance with snappers on

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36 Relacion de lo sucedido, 104-107.
37 At least one English witness found this section particularly impressive, describing how “the ladies were by themselves, behind them was cloth of Silver shining, which made them shine like Angels, being gorgiously and richly attired, both with cloth of golde, of silver, and Pearle.” Royal entertainement, 17.
38 “Viva, pues, viva, viva / el Principe español, y todo el orbe / súbdito le reciba; / que el sol, sin que haya dios que se lo estorbe, / como por ministerio / siempre alumbrá algún reino de su imperio.” Relación de lo sucedido, 106.
39 Relacion de lo sucedido, 106. Royal entertainement, 17.
40 Treswell, A Relation, 53. Much to Pinheiro’s dismay, as he felt that the Venetian masks were “the best invention” of the show, since so many of the ladies were so ugly: “sus máscaras venecianas que fue la mejor invención, porque todas son feas”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 156.
their thumbs.”\textsuperscript{41} All kinds of dances then commenced, one after the other, with the king and queen repeatedly coming down from their thrones to take an active part.\textsuperscript{42} These included such Renaissance court favorites as the pavana and the galliard, as well as other, more obscure forms such as the\textit{cuelín}, the\textit{turdión}, and “another dance very much in vogue at the time, called the\textit{madama de Orliens}.”\textsuperscript{43} Then, “because the King (as one who knows how to attend to everything with much compliment) wanted to honor the English gentlemen,”\textsuperscript{44} he had the earl of Perth brought out onto the floor to dance with the great court beauty, doña Catalina de la Cerda. All of the witnesses mention this, and speak glowingly of his performance, with one claiming that no one could “distinguish who had done it better, the lady or the gentleman.”\textsuperscript{45} Various of the English then came out to participate, and they “all danced very well, principally Milord Willoughby, who danced a galliard”,\textsuperscript{46} and “caused great wonder” with his “jumps and cabrioles so on beat and in time, that after the King, he took second place in excellence at dance.”\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{41}\textit{Royal entertainement}, 18.
\textsuperscript{42} A point remarked on by everyone, especially given the Spanish monarch’s emphasis on distance and seclusion. See, for example, Treswell’s comment that “The King and Queen divers times salied out from their chaires of Estate, and daunced openly.” Treswell, \textit{A Relation}, 53.
\textsuperscript{43} “[O]tra danza muy en boga entonces, la llamada \textit{madama de Orliens}.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 157, n.280.
\textsuperscript{44} “[Y] porque el Rey (como quien sabe acudir á todo con mucho cumplimiento) quiso honrar á los caballeros ingleses”, \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 108.
\textsuperscript{45} “[E]ntrambos lo hicieron con tanta admiración, que no se supo distinguir cuál lo había mejor, la dama ó el caballero.” \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 108.
\textsuperscript{46} “[T]odos danzaron muy bien, principalmente el Milold Gibert [sic on both – the editor correctly identified this as Lord Willoughby], que bailó una gallarda con muchas cabriolas”, Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 157. The English mentioned this praise as well, pointing out that Willoughby “was admired for his capering, and much commended.” \textit{Royal entertainement}, 18.
\textsuperscript{47} “Milort Guillibi, que sacó a doña Antonia de Toledo; pero el Milort causo grande maravilla, porque danzó ó la gallarda, con saltos y cabriolas tan á compás y á tiempo, que después del Rey, tuvo el segundo lugar en la excelencia del danzar.” \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 108-109. This appears to have been a general competition, in which all of the main maskers and their guests participated; as Pinheiro puts it: “y finalmente bailó toda la máscara un torneo, que pareció muy bien.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 157. He also had a bit of a different take on the order of excellence, suggesting that the two English lords danced the bEstado, followed by the Conde de Lemos, and
Finally, they came to what was the traditional culmination of a Spanish *sarao: la danza de la hacha*,\(^{48}\) which the English referred to as the “Torch Dance”:

At last they began a Calling daunce, which was begun by the Duke of Lerma, holding a torch lighted in his left hand. The manner was, every man called forth 2 women, chusing one especiall, conducted the other to her place, and left the chosen to call out 2 men, who, likewise delivering the torch to one especiall, conducted the other to his seat. Thus it passed to and from amongst many of the great Lords and Ladies; at last the King was called, and his Lordship [Nottingham] likewise.\(^{49}\)

Thus it was that the great festival ended around two o’clock in the morning, with each of the principal English and Scots dancing hand-in-hand with the king and queen, Lerma, and the other great figures of the Spanish court, all in front of an adoring crowd of thousands.\(^{50}\)

This final grand celebration had gone very well indeed. All of our witnesses write of this event in the most glowing of tones, with some of them describing it in terms bordering on the hyperbolic. Torquemada referred to it as the “Famous Masque and Sarao that took place in the Salon”,\(^{51}\) and said that “it was one of the greatest *fiestas* that Christendom had ever seen.”\(^{52}\)

Matías de Novoa wrote of the “most magnificent masque and sarao,” which “exceeded the

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\(^{48}\) “Finalmente, pareciendo al Rey, nuestro señor, que ya era tiempo, ordenó que los menestriles que estaban en aquel relumbrante cielo tocasen la danza de la hacha, que es el remate de los sarao.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 109.

\(^{49}\) Treswell, *A Relation*, 53. The *hacha* was not so much a torch as a large, long wax candle with four wicks.

\(^{50}\) The last dance finished at around two o’clock in the morning, but the crowd was so great, and the line of carriages so long, that the Cardinal of Toledo was still there at three, and the place was not fully cleared out until at least four. Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 157-158. *Relación de lo sucedido*, 109. Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas*, 252. And despite the lateness of the hour, Torquemada stressed that everyone left very satisfied: “Y aunque se acabo tarde salieron todos muy contentos.” Torquemada, “Discurso sobre las fiestas”, BL Addl Mss 10236, f.293v.

\(^{51}\) “Famossa Mascara y Sarao que se Hiço en el Salon”, Torquemada, “Discurso sobre las fiestas”, BL Addl Mss 10236, f.286v.

\(^{52}\) “[F]ue una de las mejores fiestas que sean visto en La Christiandad.” Torquemada, “Discurso sobre las fiestas”, BL Addl Mss 10236, f.293v.
greatness of the greatest banquets of Italy”, and he described the banqueting hall as the “marvel and wonder of those times”. Cabrera de Córdoba said it was “much to see and of great majesty”; and the Relacion de lo sucedido devotes fourteen full pages to an in-depth account of the event, going into the minutest detail, not only describing the sights and sounds, but explaining them and their significance to those who had not been in attendance, and including – as did other accounts – the various key passages that were sung by the participants. Even Pinheiro, who was always ready to point out areas of difficulty, tension, and unplanned humor – or to hold his tongue if his information was not reliable or first-hand – was rich in his detail and effusive in his praise: “it was done with the most majesty and greatness that had ever been seen in Spain, for the things that came together in it, as much for the hall and its contraptions.” One writer even openly recognized just how unusually florid his writing had been about this, but argued that the subject matter was, quite simply, so remarkable as to have absolutely required it.

53 “[C]oncluyéronse las alegrías y fiestas del nacimiento del Príncipe con una lucidísima máscara y sarao tal, [sic] que excedió su grandeza á los mayores festines de Italia; fabricóse para su ejecucion un salon, que fué mavavilla y asombro de aquellos tiempos”, Novoa, “Memorias de M. de Novoa Sobre el Reinado de Felipe III,” CODOIN v.60, 257.
54 “[F]ue mucho de ver y de grande magestad.” Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 252.
55 Relacion de lo sucedido, 96-110.
56 “Esta noche hubo sarao real en el salón grande nuevo, que para esto se hizo con la mayor majestad y grandeza de lo que nunca se vio en España, por las cosas que concurrieron en él, como por la sala e invenciones de ella.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 152.
57 “Reparará el inginioso que pasáre por aquí en que hemos excedido en lo que pide la severidad de la historia y en que hemos tratado materias poco usadas en sus narraciones, y algunas dellas humildes; como el describir fiestas, el lenguaje más poético en aquella parte que histórico, cada accion se la ha de vestir y regular, según su naturaleza y dictámen, que no siempre ha de esetar batiendo la pluma sobre las palestras marciales, refiriendo sucesos trágicos, proponiendo ó especulando reglas de estado cuidosas. El nacimiento de Príncipe tan deseado no le habíamos de dejar sin ornamento y con no más de que, nació; en esta manera le celebraron sus Padres y en esta le escribimos; que tal vez se le ha de permitir á la historia el frescor de los verjeles floridos,
As great a performance as this was, it was not all a matter of pomp and circumstance, or humorless court ritual. This is obvious from the way in which each of our witnesses writes about the enthusiastic participation of the king and queen, of the cheering of the crowd, and of the open admiration and clear affection of each side for the performances of the other. There were even a few moments of real levity over the course of the evening, showing just how open and fun-loving an environment it could be at even the seemingly most formal of these occasions. For example, there was what may have been the very definition of bathos, when the little infanta, upon installment in her throne after her solemn and majestic procession in the great ship across the hall, promptly called out to a nearby *mayordomo* in her loud, three-year-old voice: “Make sure that you do not forget my snack, since we have to be here for so long!” Needless to say, the crowd went wild. Or at the beginning of the *danza de la hacha*, where the very well respected, but also “old, fat, and gouty” duke of Sessa was brought out to dance by one of the fresh young *meninas*, sending him “running after her, the poor clumsy old man not being able to move” – which was once again greeted by the massive crowd with “*mucha fiesta*.”

Once again, as had been the case with the Constable at the entrance to the city, the Lord Admiral did very well in the comparison. A much older man still – but in excellent shape, with a reputation for having a way with the ladies, and a new wife a third his age to show for it –

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58 Indeed, the very fact that all three thousand spectators stayed for the whole five hours itself speaks volumes.

59 “*Mirad no os olvide mi merienda, que habemos de estar aquí mucho*”; con lo que hubo mucha fiesta en la sala.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 155-156.

60 “Acabada la máscara, se comenzó la danza de la hacha, y quedando una de las meninas con ella para comenizar, después de muchas vueltas y acometimientos, fue a sacar al duque de Sesa, *mayordomo mayor de la reina*, que estaba detrás de ella, muy viejo, gordo y gotoso; y le hizo salir y andar corriendo tras ella, no pudiendo el pobre viejo torpe moverse, con lo que hubo mucha fiesta.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 157.
Nottingham’s performance with *la hacha* on the hand of the great doña Catalina de la Cerda was admired by everyone, and he showed that “he was as much a noble and pleasing courtier as a great soldier.” And moments like these were important, as this was not only an opportunity for direct participation and physical contact with the most powerful people in Spain, it was also in a vast, public space, in front of an audience of three thousand people hanging on every move. It was, moreover, the talk of the court, and the tales of what occurred there would have spread far and wide long before the *relaciones* of the event could be published, or even before the English and Scots had left town. In fact, so well was this event received, that the following day the *salón* was made open to the public, so that the countless thousands who had not been able to attend the masque and *sarao* might get a chance to come and see its set. And as had been the case with the rehearsals for the *muestra* and the *cañas*, this quickly became an event in its own right, as “the entire court came to see the hall, and there was no person nor lady that could not be found there; so much so, that it was as good a *fiesta* as the *sarao*”.62

**Size, scope, and further magnificence still**

A big part of what made the masque and *sarao* so successful was the way in which they united all of the *siglo de oro*’s strengths: painting, literature, poetry, theater, and multi-part vocal and instrumental music, melding them all together in the magnificent architectural setting of the

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61 “[D]ando á entender que tenía tantas partes de gentil caballero y grato, como de gran soldado.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 109. This *relación* indicates that doña Catalina merely went through the steps, while King Philip was the one who talked with the Lord Admiral and entertained him [“el Rey habló con él y le entretuvo”]. But Pinheiro points out that Nottingham turned on the charm once again towards this universally acclaimed beauty of the court, making her blush by going to kiss her hand, and consequently causing her to miss a step: “tomándola el almirante la mano, que la debía apretar, porque se puso muy colorada y perdió el paso, cuando él hizo demostración de quererla besar”. Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 157.

62 “[T]oda la corte a ver la sala, y no hubo persona ni dama que allí no se hallase; de manera que fue tan buena la fiesta como el sarao”, Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 158.
newly built and lavishly decorated banqueting hall, to create one overpowering sensory experience, at the heart of which were the monarch and his valido, and all the brightest lights of the Spanish court. In this way, the means by which this event used art to convey power epitomized the very nature of Spanish power itself at the beginning of this new period of precarious peace. For it took this well-established form of Renaissance performance, the court masque, and infused it with the newest styles, both in the nature of the artistic expression, and in the standards it set for court display. It was the exclamation point on a visit that would set the tone for monarchical and aristocratic display at the Spanish court for the rest of the reign, and which through Spain’s position of power and influence would have a profound effect on court culture throughout all of Europe for decades to come. This was the baroque court in all its majesty, the template for the visual development of the ancien régime monarchy and its effective use of elaborate and ostentatious display in the service of political ends. Louis XIV’s Versailles had its roots in Philip III’s Valladolid, and later Madrid.

All of this magnificence was emphasized by the size and scope of so much of what the British were seeing throughout their stay. Whether it was in one of the great churches of the city, in the Plaza Mayor, in the Puerta de Campo, or in the newly completed Plaza de Palacios and banqueting hall, these were massive spaces, both interior and exterior, carefully designed by Lerma and the crown to serve as stages for the theater of monarchy. Of course, these architectural and artistic endeavors were produced for one main reason: for people to see them. This was power and wealth displayed not just in terms of beauty and artistic merit, but also in scale and sheer numbers. Hundreds of nobles or friars participating in a ceremony, or coaches
crowding the streets. 63 Thousands of people passing in a procession, or watching from the buildings above. Two thousand soldiers and horses, marching together in tight formation. And various crowds ranging in size from perhaps three thousand at the masque, to the twenty thousand or so that came out to events such as the military rehearsal or the prince’s baptism, to perhaps as many as one-hundred thousand for the toros and cañas in the Plaza Mayor. These spectacles were meant not just to impress the visitors with their magnificence, but also to do so on a public stage, where they could overwhelm them with the setting and with the audience as well.

As remarkable and overwhelming as all of this was, the major planned events did not constitute the total sum of the court magnificence marshaled for the visitors’ view. For the Lord Admiral’s lodgings were the site of near-constant visits from just about every member of the Spanish and foreign elite that was present at court: including princes, grandes, nobles, government ministers, gentlemen, prelates, churchmen, and all of the ambassadors in residence, even that of the pope. On the first day alone Nottingham was visited first by the duke of Lerma himself, alongside several other of the greatest nobles at court, and followed in succession by the Princes of Savoy, the Cardinal Archbishop of Toledo, the French, Imperial, and Venetian ambassadors, and various others of “the principall grandes and nobles here.” 64 And this was only the beginning. Every day saw some important visitor or several, and many of these men

63 The wealth in numbers even impressed in smaller settings, as the English were constantly remarking on the sheer quantity of various noblemen, such as the Lord Admiral describing his escort in leaving the besamanos: “I was brought downe out of the Courte to my coach with 7 or 8 Dukes, and I am sure att the least 20 Marquesses and Earles” – a particularly significant fact when one remembers that at this time there were no dukes in England, one marquess, and only a relatively small collection of earls. Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133v.
64 This was Friday, 17/27 May. Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85.
would pay their respects numerous times, constituting a continuous parade of opulence and power for everyone in the entourage to see. For Nottingham, the other lords in his company, and their closest companions, this went even further, demonstrating the goodwill of their counterparts at the Spanish court, giving them a chance to build relationships, and helping both sides come to understand the various things that they might have in common. And Nottingham clearly encouraged this, as Treswell tells us: “His Lordship ever shewing much affability and curtesie and accompanying them on their way to their coches [this] kind behaviour of his, being greatly observed, caused an extraordinary respect and an exceeding love of all men towards him.”

Even supposedly unscripted leisure time served Philip and Lerma’s ends. The British entourage seems to have been allowed free rein of the city, and they took full advantage of this. Despite the overwhelmingly busy schedule, most days had their down time and there were several days of relaxation that could be devoted almost entirely to exploration and other sorts of observation. Whether it was riding about in coaches “tomando el aire”, or walking through the streets in order to pass the time and see the sights, every time they left their lodgings was a chance for the English and Scots to observe a world different from their own. Here, too, they found greatness and wealth everywhere on display, with elegant coaches passing through the streets and plazas, young gallants on foot or on horseback dressed up to impress the objects of their affection or their rivals, and the frequent practice amongst the various important figures at court of dando la librea. This consisted of dressing up a group of your most impressive retainers or personal guards in uniforms of the finest fabric – in your colors and easily identified by your particular seal, sign, or crest – and then having them march around through the streets.

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65 Treswell, A Relation, 38.
66 See, for example, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 97.
67 Literally, “giving [or] delivering the livery”.
Each noble of any real import, from Lerma and the Princes of Savoy on down through the ranks of dukes, marquesses, and counts, had his own special livery and made sure that it was seen throughout the city. This was a sort of advertisement of that particular noble’s pride, splendor, means, and worth, with great care given by witnesses in describing these liveries in colorful detail, and quite a bit of competition at court over who could impress the most.  

The nobles and grandes themselves also made a habit of riding about the city, usually in coaches, to see and be seen, with favorite locations for such paseos being the more open southern and western parts of Valladolid, especially the Puerta del Campo, the adjoining neighborhood of Sancti Spíritus, and the nearby area overlooking the river, known as el viejo Espolón. On any given day, there might be several hundred carriages in these areas, with everyone who was anyone at court out enjoying the sun. Consequently, this seemingly simple act of pleasure was as remarkable an event as the others, and at least as great an opportunity for show. So much so that Pinheiro referred to these paseos as absolutely the greatest celebrations of all, so filled with “all of the beauty and nobility of Spain” on display, that “it seems like an enchantment or a

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68 For a description of the king’s and queen’s liveries, see Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 87-89. For descriptions of the liveries of Lerma, the princes, dukes, marquesses, and counts, see Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 106-108. Moreover, virtually every account of each of the events described above praises the various liveries, and goes into a detailed description of at least several of them.

69 Modern Valladolid’s Campo Grande, Paseo de Zorrilla, and Paseo de San Ildefonso/Isabel La Católica, respectively.

70 See, for example, Pinheiro’s description of the paseo in Sancti Spíritus on the afternoon of 22 May/1 June, where he says there were more than 400 coaches, together with all the liveries and numerous gallants on horseback. He lists off by name all of the important personages present, which amounts to nearly 100 nobles, dozens of influential gentlemen, and all of the ambassadors and prelates at court. Everyone who was anyone was there, from Lerma and Nottingham on down. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 102-105.
painting of Palmerín, and the first time that it is seen it cannot be believed; and all the other fiestas, cañas y toros, are foolishness next to one afternoon of these.”71

Since the members of the British entourage were out and about so frequently, as in La Coruña, they could not help but to have begun to get to know the rhythm of everyday life in the Spanish capital. The sounds, sights, smells, and tastes of this place so different from home, and yet the frequent contact with so many regular Spaniards – at table and in the street, serving their food, driving their coaches, and just going about their business – reminding them once again that these were people in many ways like any other. Alongside this, and intertwined with it, was one unmistakable aspect of this daily rhythm: the overtly public nature of normal catholic religious life, which permeated quite literally everything else. This was true even on typical, non-festival days, with frequent masses, processions, and the ubiquitous presence of churches and catholic religious symbols – not to mention the sheer number of clergy, especially members of religious orders – everywhere to be seen. As Nottingham described it, “if the pepell of the kyngdom were divided into three parts the one parte are religeous men,” that is, clergymen.72 This was certainly an exaggeration, but was likely not off by as much as one might think.

Of course, unfeigned as it was, even this was part of the show, and it had been so since the moment the Lord Admiral and his men had dropped anchor off the coast of Galicia. The simple exposure of so many Englishmen and Scots – at least some of them catholics or crypto-

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71 From Pinheiro’s detailed description of the paseo on Monday, 20/30 May, the day between the baptism and the churching. “Para mí es la más notable fiesta y la mayor grandeza que ningún príncipe puede mostrar; porque ver toda la hermosura y nobleza de España con tantas mujeres, hijas y hermanas de grandes, duques y señores, tan bien ataviadas, y entre ellas tantos hidalgos en tan hermosos caballos y tan bien aderezados, todo dentro de un tiro de piedra, con tan pocos rebozos ni trabas y tan buena gracia en todo, parece encantamento o pintura de Palmerín, y la primera vez que se ve no se puede creer; y todas las demás fiestas, cañas y toros, son bobadas junto a una tarde de éstas, que son todas las buenas del año.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 97-98.
72 Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128.
catholics – to the people of Spain, who were clearly thankful for the peace and obviously heartfelt in both the welcome that they gave and their devotion to their faith, was a powerful thing, and it would go a long way toward pushing the future perceptions of their guests in a positive direction. In sum, everything that the British saw – from the most elaborate spectacles, finest riches, and greatest crowds in the glittering court, to the simplest acts of kindness, sincerity, and banal existence, both in the capital and in the desperately poor countryside – would play a part in influencing them: bringing at once respect, attraction, and sympathy for the power, wealth, and beauty of Spain, and for its culture, its religion, and its people.

**Perceptions II – being seen**

As profound and targeted an impact as all of this was, it is easy to forget that the English and Scots were not the only ones doing the perceiving. While the visitors were being presented with the magnificence of the Spanish court in all its splendor, they were also being watched by countless eyes, eager to see what they wore, how they behaved, and how they were treated by the king. Our Iberian sources indicate the depth of this interest in a number of ways. In the first place, they all dedicate a significant amount of space to carefully describing these sorts of things for their readers, providing a vivid account of what they saw and thought for the sake of those who were not there. In addition to giving us a great deal of detail about these events, this also tells us something about how they felt about the British, and what they thought the interests of their audience would be. Moreover, all of the sources are also filled with references to the actions and interests of the thousands of other first-hand witnesses as well. And by supplementing this with the frequent English observations of how their hosts were reacting, we can get a real idea of what the Spaniards thought.
Every moment of this visit, in every way imaginable, the Lord Admiral and his entire entourage were on display. The biggest stage was of course at all of the various ceremonies and events, and most obviously so at those celebrations in which they participated directly: such as the formal entry, the various embassy-specific ceremonies, the banquets, and the farewell *sarao*. At each of these occasions, crowd control was an issue, so desirous were the people of getting a close-up view of the visitors – even to the point of impinging upon the performance and enjoyment of the events themselves.  

But the same was true even for the events in which their guests were ostensibly just observing. At every one of these occasions, the English and Scots were placed in prime locations not only so that they might see, but so that they might also *be seen*. As we saw with the queen during the formal entry to the city, windows work both ways, and the various accounts are filled with references to the presence of the Lord Admiral and his men in these places, describing how they looked and what it was that they were doing. After all, even the most magnificent and popular of the ceremonies, be it a religious procession or a *corrido de toros*, were still at least similar to the sorts of things that the Spaniards had seen before, even if at a different order of magnitude. But the British, they were something different.  

These observations were at all levels, both for those watching and those being seen. Everyone from the lowliest servants up through the king himself used this opportunity to observe their former foes up close, for an extended period of time. And what the Spaniards were seeing

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73 This was especially the case with the press of people at the *besamanos*, and later, at the Constable’s banquet and the farewell *sarao*. As marvelous an event as Cornwallis found the banquet, he nevertheless said that “such was the exceedinge number of men and women that stoode on both sides of the Table, and soe greate the presse of men, and unshamefullnes of the women, as the service in my seeminge was performed with noe grace or order.” Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.18v. For the press and confusion at the *sarao*, see Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 155.
was an unusually broad spectrum of British society, in large enough numbers to be operating in a relatively typical way, considering the circumstances. Elites were not just meeting elites here. Soldiers, pages, servants, doctors, musicians, and churchmen were all rubbing shoulders, watching one another, and creating opinions that would remain with them for the rest of their lives.

While the grand public events were certainly spectacular, they were not the only things being watched by the people. In fact, simply going from place to place was, for virtually every member of the British entourage, a public event. Again, this was particularly and consciously so any time that the king’s officers or nobles from court came around to escort the Lord Admiral and his men to any of the main attractions, as in every case the comings and goings themselves were a big production. But even the various meetings for embassy business – discussing the treaty’s articles or in preparation for the swearing of the oath – or seemingly more personal encounters between the Lord Admiral and various members of court, did not go unnoticed. These may have been more private, and sometimes even secretive affairs, but they were still key moments of elite contact, and in many cases were known about and remarked on by the public.

As we have seen, the British were allowed virtually free rein of the city, and this meant that even as they were exploring and observing, they were themselves taking the show on the road. Indeed, Pinheiro’s ultimately favorable conclusions about the visitors were drawn as much from encounters and observations made in the street or in the paseos as they were from watching from afar. And in this, everything was grist for the mill of Iberian curiosity. Frequent comment was made about their style of dress, their mannerisms, and even what and how they ate.74

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74 One thing that apparently further endeared the people to the Lord Admiral and his men was the extent to which he and they dressed in the Spanish fashion. For some examples of this, see the separate descriptions of the besamanos and the prince’s baptism, at: Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 36.
Indeed, perhaps one of the most unexpected yet frequent places for performance and observation was the regular dining of the British entourage. These were surprisingly public events, where Spaniards were eager to get in to watch, or to hear about what occurred there.\textsuperscript{75} Pinheiro himself got in to see them on the night of the Duke’s friars’ celebration of Corpus, and he described everything in detail, noting amongst many other things that they ate and drank less than Spaniards typically did, and that “they did not bless the table, nor did they give thanks to God.”\textsuperscript{76}

As we shall see, the way in which the English and Scots behaved with regard to religious matters would be an object of particularly profound interest for Spanish eyes, and what they saw or thought they saw would be vitally important to the future of the relationship.

One of the areas in which observations and perceptions on both sides intersected the most was when it came to the way in which the British were treated in general. In all of this spectacle and show, the Lord Admiral and his men were received with what appears to have been a truly unprecedented level of courtesy and respect. What had begun in La Coruña and had continued on the trip inland, was turned up to an entirely different level once they were in the capital. We must remember that all of these events described were not merely spectacles that the English and Scots happened to see. Rather, the entire set of concurrent events was carefully constructed with

\textsuperscript{75} For details, see the descriptions at “Relacion de la entrada del Almirante de Inglaterra”, TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.80-80v; Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 244; Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 142-149. See also the descriptions of the Constable’s and duke of Lerma’s banquets, cited in the section above.

\textsuperscript{76} “[C]omen poco y beben menos, y sin comparación menos de los que nosotros bebemos en un banquete...y noté que no bendicen la mesa, ni dan gracias a Dios.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 144. While this might be assumed to have been evidence of disfavor, it was quite likely the opposite. After all, the Spaniards had been worried that their British visitors would be a bunch of stark raving puritans, come to practice their heretical ways right in their midst. This non-religious behavior had to have been seen as something of a relief, and it is not used by Pinheiro as a point of condemnation, but rather to illustrate the extent of confusion that he saw in British religious matters. He had also watched them in person at Lerma’s exclusive banquet, been let in through a back way by one of the duke’s pages, after having been turned away a couple of times by the guards at the front gate. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 118.
them in mind. And in each and every instance, they were either the main guests of honor, or the entire reason for the celebration itself. This alone would have been flattery enough, and likely would have sent the British entourage home with very good things to say about their hosts. But this was much more than that, and the frequency with which this unprecedented treatment was noted by all of the observers – and especially by Nottingham himself – tells us just what kind of an impact this treatment was having. Take, for example, the very night of their arrival, right after the Lord Admiral had ridden Philip III’s own white horse proudly through the rain into the city. Not only was he visited in his lodgings by a large group of the highest-ranking nobles, but he was even brought a royal welcome by the Queen’s own chamberlain (mayordomo), “which was much wondred at by the Spaniards themselves, for that (if they speake true) they never knew the like favour done to any Ambassadour whatsoever.”

The king himself, we are told, would have had Nottingham come to see him immediately, “booted and Spurred”, but the Lord Admiral had to decline, telling Cecil that “I was altogeather unfitt to goe to his presence for there was noe man but was wett to the skinne.”

Such remarkable favor continued throughout the visit, with special notice being reserved for the actions of the king. From the besamanos onward, Philip was always doing things around the Lord Admiral and his principal men that caused a stir: whether it was insisting that Nottingham keep his hat on in the royal presence; making him sit down next to him at his level in the presence chamber, underneath the canopy of state, and talking at length; or taking him by the arm and conversing familiarly with him whenever they walked in public. In every case, these sorts of things were remarked on by all sides as either significant or unprecedented,

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77 Treswell, A Relation, 32. The special nature of this favor is also acknowledged at Relación de lo sucedido, 41.
78 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.132v.
79 Novoa, “Memorias de M. de Novoa Sobre el Reinado de Felipe III”, CODOIN v.60, 253.
especially given the formality of the Spanish monarchy, and of this king in particular. Other exceptional displays of favor included the supposedly “secret” near-presence of the royal couple at Lerma’s banquet and Lope de Vega’s play; the king and queen’s warm treatment and shared admiration while dancing with the English and Scots in the sarao; and the king’s decision to honor his guests by riding in person in the juego de cañas for the first time ever. But perhaps the most frequently reported extraordinary honor shown to the British was how the king removed his cap every time he encountered the Lord Admiral, or even at the mere mention of King James’s name. Just about every source we have goes out of its way to mention this, and many times. Nottingham was clearly moved by such treatment, and he and his men gushed about it in many of their letters home:

> Being brought to his Majesty’s presence he receved me with an Extraordinary favor souch as hath not ben sene the leke of any King of Spayne…I never yoused your Majesty’s name but he put of his cape [cap]. This was never sene don befor nor that ever Imbasador sat by him under the cloth of Estat, ether of the Emperor or the Pope.

When asked about this behavior, Philip was quite frank about his intentions; as the Lord Admiral explained: “The King himself told me hee would have it appeare to the wourld that he made more estimation of the King my Master and his love to him then of all the Kinges in the wourld besides.”

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80 See, for example: Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.29v.
81 For example, at the besamanos: “Despedido el Almirante de su Majestad, que se levantó de la silla y le quitó la gorra”; and the Dominicans’ procession: “y cuando llegó cerca su Majestad, le hizo una gran reverencia, y su Majestad con gran demostración de buena voluntad le quitó la gorra.” Relación de lo sucedido, 44, 48. See also Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 86, 102.
82 Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128. See also Cornwallis’s description of the farewell ceremony: “The King used much speeches to my Lord in very kinde and familiar manner and did diverse tymes put off his Cappe unto him, a matter here very extraordinarie, and noted for an exceedinge favor.” Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 6/16 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.38v-39:
83 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133.
And this was confirmed by the richness of the gifts that Philip gave out at the farewell audience on Friday, 7/17 June. Gifts not just to bring back to King James, but for the Lord Admiral, his principal companions, and every single member of the entourage:

To the Earl of Perth, to the Viceadmiral, the Admiral’s son-in-law, to his two sons, to Sir Thomas, son of the Earl of Suffolk, to the Admiral’s nephew, to Milord Willoughby, to Baron Norris, and to other gentlemen, and to the general overseer of the fleet, he gave many and very rich jewels. And to the captains and lieutenants of the Admiral, to the interpreter, to the king-at-arms, to the doctors and to all his head servants, he ordered be given very nice chains. To the pages, to the musicians, to the valets and trumpeters, and to those of his guard, lackeys and all the lesser people, he ordered money be given, in such a manner that there was no one who might not taste of the liberality of this prince.\(^{84}\)

This was in addition to the gold, diamonds, pearls, horses, saddles, bridles, swords, gloves, parrots, and other exotic gifts from the king and queen, Lerma, the Constable, and various other lords and ladies upon their departure.\(^{85}\) The Spaniards were trying as hard as they possibly could to win these men over, and as we shall see, these remarkable efforts would prove quite successful.

**Moments of tension**

Of course, as well as everything went, there were some moments of difficulty. Several incidents at various times during the trip had the potential to spin perceptions off in a decidedly more negative direction, or even to undermine the whole purpose of the embassy itself. But even these moments of tension are illustrative, giving us a real sense of just how it was that the

\(^{84}\) “Al Conde de Pert, al Vicealmirante, yerno del Almirante, á sus dos hijos, á D. Tomás, hijo del Conde de Suffolc, á un sobrino del Almirante, al Milord Guillibi, al Barón Noris y á otros caballeros, y al Vedor general de la armada, dió muchas y muy ricas joyas, y á capitanes y entretenidos del Almirante, al intérprete, al rey de armas, á los médicos y á todos sus criados mayores, mandó repartir muy buenas cadenas; á los pajes, á los músicos, á los ayudás de cámara y trompetas, y á los de su guarda, lacayos y toda la gente menuda, mandó dar dinero, de manera que no hubo ninguno que no gozase de la liberalidad deste príncipe.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 110-111. Sir Richard Leveson was married to Nottingham’s daughter Margaret.

Spaniards felt about the English, as well as what the possibilities for this relationship might be if handled skillfully. Remarkably, in every single instance, the issue at question was resolved in a timely manner, with each side satisfied, and in several cases actually better off as a result. As with the sudden downpour that marred the ceremonial entry to the capital, each of these areas of difficulty could have gone quite poorly. But like that rain, they also carried with them the chance for the visitors to take a time of apparent adversity and turn it into a strength, to really earn some respect in the eyes of their hosts, and to offer a glimpse of how future areas of difficulty might be overcome.

Take, for example, something that happened soon after their landing in La Coruña. On the evening of 17/27 April, “a certaine mariner” brought some of his friends ashore, and “staying in Towne untill amongst lewd company, he became tipled” and subsequently “gave offence in his behaviour, by violent striking of one of the churchmen of the town”. Now, what is particularly remarkable about this event is not that a British sailor got drunk, nor even that he had then punched a Spanish priest, but rather what happened next. Although none of the Spaniards complained about it, and the incident was not reported to the authorities, Nottingham heard about it and was furious. He had all of his ships searched until the culprit was found, thrown into shackles, and brought before a tribunal of all the admirals and ships’ captains. Even though it was confirmed that the man had indeed been drunk at the time and could not remember what had occurred, and “although the maner of his striking was so slight, and the party said to be stroken so vile in reputation of the whole city, as they generally pitied any man should once be called in question for so base a person”, the sailor was found guilty and sentenced to be hanged. The Lord Admiral had acted quickly, decisively, and had shown his Spanish hosts that no

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87 Treswell, *A Relation*, 16.
misbehavior would be tolerated by any man under his command while in their country. This in itself would have undoubtedly earned him, and the English and Scots in general, a great deal of respect. But the story does not end there. For, in fact, some of the townspeople and churchmen managed to get on board the English ship where the sailor was tried, witnessed the proceedings, and then went to the governor to persuade him to beg for the man’s life. With some further persuasion by his wife and daughter, Governor Caracena agreed and went to Nottingham, who resisted at first, but finally agreed to release the sailor to the governor’s custody, where he was quickly pardoned for his offense. In the end, thanks to this seemingly unfortunate event, the British came across as honorable, swift to justice, and yet ultimately merciful, while the Spaniards showed their compassion, forgiveness, and welcome to strangers.88

Another similar sort of event occurred during the stay in Valladolid, only this time the roles were reversed. Six or seven Englishmen were headed out in one of the king’s coaches, and as one of them was climbing into his carriage, a passing young Spaniard saw a diamond medallion on his hat shining in the sun. In the full light of day, in the middle of a street surrounded by people, the Spaniard snatched the Englishman’s well-endowed hat right off his head and fled. He almost got away, but was cornered by a gentleman on a horse, and the city constables pulled him out of a well into which he had crawled, “clutching the hat like a lizard.”89 That evening he was found guilty of the theft, and scheduled for the gallows, but as soon as the Lord Admiral got word of it, “fearing that they would hang him before morning,” he went

88 Those familiar with these events will know that there was another encounter involving the Christian burial of an Englishman who had gotten sick on board ship and died upon arrival in La Coruña. I will discuss this event in some detail later in the chapter, for reasons that will be immediately apparent there.
89 “[A]garrado al sombrero como lagarto”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149.
directly to the king to ask him to spare the man’s life.90 Despite the late hour, Philip acquiesced, signed the pardon commuting the man’s death sentence, and instead sent him off to serve in the gallies. Now it was the Spaniards’ opportunity to show quick justice and eventual mercy, while the English got to display their compassion and forgiveness, in the explicit attempt “to leave no one complaining in Spain”.91

Other moments of tension and their resolutions, while not necessarily as unambiguously constructive as these examples, nevertheless help to tell us something about the future as well. As we saw in chapter five, the early difficulties that surfaced after the truce but before the treaty were indications of where some of the fault lines in the relationship would lie. In this case, however, the hints are of the operation of Spanish government, as well as the beginnings of the crown’s own political strategy to match that of James I.

One of these areas dealt with King Philip’s swearing of the oath. There was, as has been mentioned, some wrangling over the additional, “secret” clauses agreed to in London by the Constable, and regarding the exact wording of the oath itself. Part of this also dealt with the very location of the ceremony. In his several meetings with the Constable, senator Rovida, and Lerma regarding this, Nottingham had requested that the king give the oath in “some church, chappell, or sacred place”, in order that it might correspond exactly with what James had done in London.92 The Spaniards replied that this simply could not be done, and that it was not their

90 “[T]emien el Almirante le ahorcasen antes de la mañana, fue a pedirle al rey, por no dejar a nadie quejoso en España, y a las once firmó el rey el perdón y le echaron a galeras para siempre.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149.
91 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149.
92 Cornwallis to “Mr. Secretary Cecill” (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, second extract, f.114.
decision to make. After all, they maintained, this was a matter for the Church, and that “noe man of different Religion unconfessed, or that came not with purpose to communicate, might be received into the Church, there to performe any public Act.” The clergy would not allow it, and if Philip went ahead and did so anyway, the consequences would be dire. The Spaniards explained this by coming right out and speaking frankly of the difference between James and Philip with regard to ecclesiastical authority, saying that

the case of the King here did much differ from that of the King of Great Brittayn. That the King there did assume to himselfe, not only Royall, but Papall Authority, and therefore might dispose of the Church at his pleasure. The [one] here tooke to himselfe Authority Royall only, and submitted all Jurisdiction spirituall to the Pope, whom under penalty of Excommunication, he was bound to obey.

Of course, it would have been hard to have improved upon the place where they ultimately held the ceremony, and Nottingham and his men certainly left satisfied. But the way in which this was handled foreshadowed much of what was to come. Another area of concern dealt with a different aspect of diplomatic reciprocation. When the Spaniards crossed over to England to witness King James’s swearing of his oath, the Constable and Villamediana had had the opportunity to dine with the king. But Nottingham’s request that he and Cornwallis be able to do the same with Philip was politely refused, with the explanation that “it agreed not with the

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93 Interestingly, Pinheiro reports that it was the other way around: that it was the English who did not want the ceremony to take place in a church. Given the source, and the relatively private nature of this particular event, it is probable that this was, in fact, the popular perception. “Esta tarde se metió el Duque con el Embajador, encubiertos, en un coche, y fueron a su huerta para enseñársela y para determinar dónde habían de jurarse las paces, porque el embajador no quería que fuese en la iglesia; mas dicen que es muy prudente.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 114.

94 Cornwallis to “Mr. Secretary Cecill” (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, second extract, f.114. Also at: Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.20v (copy of full letter).

95 Cornwallis to “Mr. Secretary Cecill” (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.114-114v. Also at: Cornwallis to the Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.21 (copy of full letter).
Custome of this Countrey, That any should eate at the Kings Table.”

Neither cardinals nor even fellow sovereign princes did so – including close relatives of the king such as the duke of Savoy. The Lord Admiral might have made a bigger fuss about this, but he chose not to. He was certainly irritated about the way in which these sorts of things were handled, complaining in one letter about Spanish delays, and in another that “in those things parteyninge to the oath and in the manner of the oath...wee founde them here soe ignorant in matters of soe great consequence, as hardly is to be beleaved.” But he also found out that the French had asked this very same question in this identical circumstance four years previously, and they, too, had been denied. Moreover, the ceremonial distance reserved for the monarch in Spain was, of course, constantly in evidence, and Nottingham could see that enough norms had been stretched already, so there would have been no need to push things. And he does not seem ultimately to have been too concerned about the matter, as he readily admitted in one of the very same letters in which he expressed his irritation, that “ther was nevar Imbassador of any sorte that ever came into Spayne that hath had the honorable Intertaynmen that I have had and the charges hath ben

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96 Cornwallis to “Mr. Secretary Cecill” (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, third extract, f.116.  
97 Interestingly, while this separation of the king was comparable to the way in which James had positioned himself (or at least portrayed himself) as above and removed from the goings-on of his factionized court, the way in which this was used in practice was in marked contrast to James’s approach. In England, this separation was a way of facilitating monarchical involvement. In Spain, it was a way of denying it.  
98 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.  
99 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134v. This sort of behavior, and the strategies involving its use, will be discussed at greater length in the coming chapters.  
100 Cornwallis to “Mr. Secretary Cecill” (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, third extract, f.116.  
101 He had also already dined in their presence at Lerma’s banquet, as they sat in the their concealed yet acknowledged place observing.
infynyt that hath ben bestoed for the honorying of the King’s Majestie my master.” Indeed, as Cabrera de Córdoba explicitly pointed out, it appeared as if the opportunity to dance with the glorious Doña Catalina de la Cerda at the end of the farewell sarao may have been enough of a “singular favor” in its own right “to compensate for the King not having shared his table with him, as the King of England had with the Constable.”

In fact, when one considers what kind of a city Valladolid had become since the arrival of the court, it is remarkable just how little actually went wrong during this trip at all. As refined, cultured, and religious a place as the capital of Spain was, it was at the same time a violent city of swordplay, duels, pícaros, and vengeance. Where courtly poets fought battles of wit with their bitter rivals, and where partisans of each fought battles to the death over the adjudication of these conflicts. Less than two weeks before the British had arrived, the Persian ambassador – the perhaps appropriately named Don Juan – had been murdered in the streets of the capital. Even the duke of Lerma’s own son, Diego, the count of Saldaña, was under house arrest at the time of

102 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
103 “[A]l almirante de Inglaterra que danzó con ella, el cual lo estimó por singular favor y merced; y así arrodillándose delante de su Magestad le besó las manos por ello, y pudo suplir esto no haberle dado su mesa el Rey, como se la dió el de Inglaterra al Condestable”, Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 252.
104 Guy Le Strange, Don Juan of Persia: a Shi’ah Catholic, 1560-1604 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2005), 10. It should also be noted that Don Juan de Persia was a close associate of the aforementioned English adventurer and sometime agent of King James, Anthony Sherley, with whom he had traveled to Europe upon Sherley’s return from Persia. I say that he is perhaps appropriately named because it came out after his death that he may have been linked amorously to upwards of 130 women. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 77. In fact, he may very well have been an inspiration for the famous tale of “Don Juan”, as celebrated by Molière, Mozart, and Byron, amongst others. After all, the tale of the Persian ambassador’s murder was major news throughout Spain, and the first written account of the Don Juan legend, El burlador de Sevilla y convidado de piedra was penned by a contemporary, Tirso de Molina, and eventually published in 1630.
their arrival for a bloody nighttime altercation with five members of the king’s guard. It is therefore quite simply amazing that the English and Scots did not get into any real trouble during their stay. The Spaniards noted this as well, and they had a direct comparison at the front of their minds the entire time.

For in 1601, the French ambassador, the Count de la Rochepot, had come to Spain for the same reason as Nottingham: to witness Philip III’s swearing of the oath to uphold the peace with his nation, in this case the Franco-Spanish Treaty of Vervins. Things did not go well at all, with the frequent altercations between Spaniards and Frenchmen reaching a head when the ambassador’s nephew and his men were insulted while bathing at the river, and consequently drew their swords and killed and wounded a number of Spaniards in response. They fled to the safety of the embassy, La Rochepot refused to give them up to the authorities, and the alcaldes eventually had to forcibly enter and remove the suspects, on direct orders of the crown. The French complained vociferously of this violation of the sovereignty and diplomatic immunity of the embassy grounds, with La Rochepot and Lerma yelling at each other at the top of their voices, and the French ambassador even forgetting himself in front of the king. An escalation of the incident into something even greater was ultimately avoided, but Sully tells us that this encounter made Henri IV particularly furious, swearing “by heaven” that as soon as he was able to, he would “make so furious a war upon them, that they shall repent of having obliged me to take up arms.”

105 Sir Robert Mansell to _____ (Valladolid, 20/30 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.71v. Cabrera de Córdoba, Relacion de las cosas sucedidas, 242.
106 For a good modern take on exactly what occurred, see: José Luis Cano de Gardoqui Sinobas, “El incidente del embajador francés en Valladolid (1601)”, Investigaciones históricas: Época moderna y contemporánea, n.5 (1985): 37-54.
107 Sully, Memoirs, II, 365. This is the incident which Sully uses to introduce his discussion of the bitter rivalry between France and Spain, and what he saw as the inevitability of conflict.
This was what had happened in this very city, when the other great power in Europe had sent an ambassador on exactly the same mission as the Lord Admiral, just a few years before. And the Spaniards remembered these events well, making frequent comment all through Nottingham’s stay about just how favorable a comparison his entourage made with the French:

The Noble men and gentlemen that it plesed your Majesty to apoynt to atend your Majesty’s sarvis with me hath carried them selves in souch honorable and Cevill sorte as that they have don your Majesty gret honor and gret reputasion to ther Countre, for evry nobleman here wyll tell us of the uncevell yousage of the French that came with M’ Rotchpot and of the quarels dayly between them selves, and it may well apeare here the honor they bere to your Majesty and the love to owre nation, for the Noblemen and Caveleres dow dayly and howerly vyset them and desiereth of ther Companye. Under your Majesty’s Corection I thynk this love cannot be fayned, for it weer unposible that all sorts could put on souch a mask of [deceit], but I protest I thynck this pece here hath brought them from exstrem mesery, hath put love to your Majesty and our nation in ther harts.108

It is quite clear from all of the sources, be they English, Spanish, or relatively neutral observers, that virtually everyone in Valladolid and all along their route was left with an overwhelmingly positive image of the Lord Admiral, and of the English in general. Pinheiro emphasized just how much they deserved this reception and, like everyone else, gave much of the credit to “the prudence of the admiral”.109 The detailed official relación declared that “in sum, he carried himself in everything with great discretion and prudence, and all the gentlemen and their people


108 Nottingham to James I (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128v.
with much care and quietude, without giving cause for scandal in anything."\textsuperscript{110} And all of this was seen, processed, and explicitly remarked on, time and time again, by the people of the city and the members of the court alike, as being in fundamental contrast with Spain’s true greatest rival: the French.

**Nuts & bolts: business and politics**

Of course, in addition to Philip and Lerma’s aims to influence and overwhelm, there was an official reason for this embassy, with business to be done that was not entirely about sensory display. The trip to Spain was a conclusion to the process of making the peace, finishing things off in both the “hard” and “soft” aspects. And yet, any distinction between the game of power and perception that was going on at large here, and the seemingly “nuts and bolts” aspect of business getting done is at its core a tentative one at best. They were all part of the same process, intertwined here as they had been since James’s accession, the lines between “hard” and “soft” blurring as they each came to influence one another. With that said, several points can nevertheless be made.

In the first place, there was the hardest of hard reasons for the trip: the king of Spain was required to seal the peace by taking an oath to uphold the articles that had been agreed upon. As we have seen, this was done in the great, newly-built banqueting hall, and it was accompanied over the course of the several weeks at court by a number of other key ceremonies that served to make this event official. Other important duties included the presentation of a new English resident ambassador, Sir Charles Cornwallis, who was to remain behind in Spain, and the

\textsuperscript{110} “[Y] en suma, se gobernó en todo con gran discreción y prudencia, y todos los caballeros y gente suya con mucho miramiento y quietud, sin dar en nada causa de escándalo.” *Relación de lo sucedido*, 112.
acceptance of a new Spanish resident ambassador, Pedro de Zúñiga, who would be traveling back to England when the entourage left.

More broadly speaking, the entire trip was itself one big, long, official duty for both sides, with virtually every action by definition contributing to an important end. This was, after all, a direct response to the Constable’s embassy of the previous year, and all of the specific forms needed to be met, in order to make sure that the treaty might in fact be considered valid in the future, without any dangerous precedents being set or possible grounds for annulment being created. This meant at least full reciprocation every step of the way. In the words of the new ambassador, Cornwallis, everything was approached with the same consideration: “as the King my Master had done it there to expresse the greatnesse of his Love, and goodwill to the King of Spayne, soe would it be expected, that the like demonstration should be made by his Majesty here.” And so it was. Both sides were very conscious of this, and many of the events were referred to by observers and participants alike as being in specific answer to similar sorts of events that had taken place during the Constable’s trip to England. Seldom does one find an

111 Cornwallis to Lords of the Council, and 3 extracts (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605; received 20/30 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.117.
112 This was true with virtually every event. For some examples, see: Buck describing the oath, and his and the Spaniards’ comparison of it to James’s in London, Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.126; Cornwallis describing these events, and the back-and-forth over the areas on which the Spaniards would not give in, Cornwallis to Lords of the Council, and 3 extracts (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605; received 20/30 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.112-117v, also in the embassy copybook at BL, Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.16v-30v; not to mention the various references by the Lord Admiral and others mentioned above, regarding King Philip’s decision to foot the embassy’s entire bill, and Nottingham’s chafing at his forced position of having to sit back and let the Spaniards outshine them.
account of an event here without some explicit comparison to English hospitality, or some
comment along the lines of “as the Constable did in England.”

The two areas where the Spaniards did not give in on reciprocation – the location of the oath and the Lord Admiral’s request to dine with the king – did cause some distress back in England. But these concerns were more than made up for by the sheer magnitude of the favor shown to the guests in each case. Regarding the former, the magnificent banqueting hall was to possible English critics perhaps an even better location than a royal chapel, not least of all because it was not a catholic place of worship. And with regard to the latter, the king’s direct participation in the cañas for the first time ever, his and his queen’s well-known virtual dining with the Lord Admiral (separated only by a screen) at Lerma’s, and all of the unprecedented favor shown throughout the trip, worked together to soothe any real complaints that the proper forms required in this business might not have been fully observed.

Nor was reciprocation merely concerned with the way the Spanish had been treated in England. It also was in comparison to the way in which the Spaniards had treated other nations in similar circumstances, most particularly with regard once again to the French four years before. Importantly, the Spaniards’ denial of reciprocation with regard to the English dining

113 “[C]omo hizo el condestable en Inglaterra.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 160, in this case describing the Lord Admiral’s farewell audience.
114 Especially the latter. As the Venetian ambassador wrote upon his return: “The High Admiral has returned from his mission to Spain, and ought to be received to-day by the King at Oatlands. He is said to have been highly honoured by his Catholic Majesty; but one point is greatly commented on here, the Ambassador never dined with the King. The Spanish say it is the custom of their Kings to dine alone, but still it is thought extraordinary that while the King of England entertained the Extraordinary and Ordinary Ambassadors of Spain at his own table, the King of Spain should not have used a like courtesy to the English Ambassador.” Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 3/13 July 1605), CSPVen X, 258.
115 Indeed, the common belief amongst regular Spaniards appears to have been that it was in fact the English who had requested that the ceremony be held somewhere else.
with the king had a direct precedent here, as the French had been treated the same way, and had been willing to accept this. And as we have seen at some length above, in every other way the English visit far outshone its French counterpart in 1601.

The official business did not stop there. As had been the case with the lead-up to the signing of the treaty and James’s oath in England, last-minute details were still being negotiated right up until the day that King Philip swore to uphold the peace. This involved, as we have seen, both the place and time of the ceremony, but also getting the final wording down for the oath and the additional, “secret” articles of the treaty itself (regarding the enforcement of the Inquisition and German trade through England to Spain, and vice versa), as well as future progress on issues that had not been fully resolved in the peace negotiations. Of particular concern here were the continued recruiting of English and Scots troops to fight for the Dutch (and the extent to which this was being supported by James), the possibility of the Spaniards buying back the Cautionary Towns in the Low Countries held by the English as collateral for future repayment of the Dutch debt, and the status of that entire conflict and those provinces’ hoped-for future governance.¹¹⁶

Again, even the very concept of the treaty itself being a “hard” set of rules is somewhat misleading, as it would continue to be treated by both sides as a document open to competing interpretations for years to come. Not unlike US constitutional scholars poring over articles and amendments for original intent and implied powers, English and Spanish ambassadors, ministers, and monarchs continually cited specific articles in reference to particular events, in the attempt to

¹¹⁶ For discussion of this see, especially: Nottingham to Cranborne (2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.124v-125. And the Venetian ambassador to Spain was reporting that “They have promised the Admiral twelve and his son four thousand crowns if they succeed in persuading the King of England to restore Flushing to the Archduke.” Francesco Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate (Valladolid, 11/21 June 1605), CSPVen X, 249.
twist the application of the treaty in favor of their own ends. This continued here, with reference to specific treaty articles occurring at various points leading up to and during the Lord Admiral’s trip on a number of occasions. In one example, in preparation for the finalization of the wording of the king’s oath and the extra/secret articles – and likely with the possibility of practical application prominently in mind – the council of state had a number of relevant documents brought to them from the archives in Simancas. These included material from before the war – likely for use as precedent – as well as a letter from Villamediana to Philip from July of the previous year and its enclosures, including the treaty articles regarding the Inquisition, and the detailed description of the peace commissioners’ meeting of 29 June/9 July 1604. After all, the question of precisely what might constitute “public scandal” would be a matter open to interpretation, and all arguments needed to be properly marshaled. As we saw in chapters six and seven, the same sort of thing applied with many of the issues, from the right of the English to trade and settle in the Indies, to the extent to which the English were able to legally provide aid to the Dutch, to the precise nature of the reopened trade, and how it was to be properly regulated. Virtually every aspect of the treaty and its many articles was subject to clarification, citation, petition, and argument time and time again over the course of the many years that followed, beginning from the very moment the treaty had been signed in London, and continuing in earnest right through the Lord Admiral’s stay in Spain.

In all of this, the proper application of the treaty with regard to the Inquisition and the question of religion in general was one of the most pressing concerns, especially early on, with

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117 The letter was: Villamediana to Philip III (London, 30 June/10 July 1604; received 25 July/4 August), AGS Estado leg. 841, doc 79. On the precedent material: “Al secretario mi señor se dieron las copias de lo que se respondio al embaxador de la Reyna de Inglaterra sobre lo de la Inquisicion y lo que tambien respondio El Duque de Alba, an Valladolid a 4 de Junio 1605.” Ibid., f.2v. The enclosures regarding the conference session and articles: AGS Estado leg. 841, docs 80-81.
so many Englishmen and Scots all of a sudden present on Spanish soil, both during the trip and in the inundation of merchant activity that followed close on its heels. For example, not long after Nottingham’s entourage had arrived in Valladolid, the Bishop of Tui – a town on the Atlantic coast of Galicia, just north of the Portuguese border – wrote to Philip III about the many Englishmen who were now coming to the shores of his bishopric, principally in Baiona. He mentioned that many of them were catholics, but that the large majority were heretics, and so he wanted to know what precisely had been capitulated in matters of religion in the peace treaty, and how he should proceed.\footnote{Bishop of Tui to Philip III (Tui, 23 May/2 June 1605), AGS Estado leg. 843, doc 16. Dealt with in a consulta of the council of State on 25 July/4 August 1605, AGS Estado leg. 843, doc 14.} As we shall see in a moment, the people in the capital were wrestling with very similar concerns, as well.

It should be clear from the ambiguous and contested nature of all of this just how “soft” so much of that which was ostensibly “hard” actually was. Questions of how to behave and how exactly to enforce the rules drift easily into the other sorts of areas. Of course, much of what we have seen in this chapter already regarding perceptions and reactions was a central part of what I have referred to as the “soft” aspects of the foundation of the relationship. After all, what these two peoples thought of one another was at the very heart of this, on both an elite and common level. Connections were being formed, relationships strengthened, and the gift-giving, magnificence, hospitality, and mere experience of contact would all work to cement what had been accomplished so far, and would help foster a redrawing of policy lines in each country to a certain extent over the coming years.

But the “soft” side of the connection was not merely about potentialities and the gradual formation of affinity and connection. Here, too, there were some more immediate, “nuts-and-
bolts” lessons being learned as well. The first two years of the connection had been negotiated and experienced almost entirely within the context of the English system. This had allowed the Habsburgs to witness that system first-hand at some length, giving them a chance to get quite familiar with the way in which Jacobean politics and government operated – both in the day-to-day basics, and at the more difficult-to-discern level of political strategies and other more subtle or informal aspects of the exercise of power. And so now it was time for the English to learn the same sorts of things about Spanish government – in particular, about who was in charge, and about how the whole system operated.

**Learning about Lerma**

The first major component of this, which was reported on by virtually everyone, was the extent to which the king’s favorite, the duke of Lerma, held almost absolute power. The Lord Admiral, describing his first meeting with the duke, referred to him as “a man farr above all men in estimation with the Kinge”.

The coorte of Spayne at this present is absolutely swayed by the Duke of Lerma who havinge the government of the prince [now king] & takinge advantage of the late kings straight allowance of money to him then insinuated himself into his favor by supplyinge his wants therof to the extreem exhawstinge of his own estate…all which he hath soe farr emproved as that now he commandeth all.

Mansell went on to describe just how complete Lerma’s infiltration of the patronage system and court had been, enumerating his various children, siblings, close relatives, and creatures, who – when marriage alliances were taken into account – dominated nearly all the key positions around the king, both at court and in the church. These went beyond the traditional positions of a

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119 Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133.
120 Sir Robert Mansell to “Your Lordship” (Valladolid, 20/30 May 1605*), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.71v. *Mislabeled after the fact as 2 May, but could not have been this date, as they had not seen any of the things he describes in the letter yet.
grande’s power base, to include a number of newly made but remarkably powerful men, the favorite’s favorites, specifically:

Roderigo Calderon a yong man of smale desert or worth, son to the liftenat of the garde of Dutch who hath the Dukes ear very mutche. Next is lycenciado Ramiras de Prado, secretary and Justicia Mayor de toda Spannia, but principally Francese Conde de Villa Longa (lately created) being secretary of the cownsell of state and of warr, boath men of base orignalls but such as now handle all dispatches and principall affayres of state.121

The Lord Admiral and others reported back with similar information, and it is clear from the general content of the correspondence that gaining a closer familiarity with those who were the real people in charge at court and with how they operated was a primary concern for many of the visitors.122

As the English also noticed, Lerma held various of the key positions at court in his own right, giving himself a monopoly of the three most important offices that controlled access to the king. These were the 1) sumiller de corps (grand chamberlain or groom of the stole), 2) mayordomo mayor (lord high steward), and 3) caballerizo mayor (master of the horse).123 The British visitors got to watch as he exercised each of these offices, time and time again: whether it was standing at the king’s side waving from balconies, riding alongside him in the cañas, or carrying the ceremonial sword in the key processions.124 Moreover, Mansell also emphasized other key aspects of the duke’s power, such as how his role as caballerizo mayor gave him “the government of all the Kinges pages who are all the great mens sons of Spayne”, which put him

121 Sir Robert Mansell to “Your Lordship” (Valladolid, 20/30 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.72.
122 See, for example, Nottingham’s discussion of Villalonga and Andrés de Prada, referring to the former as “The Duke of Lermas ryght hand and gretly in favor with the King”: Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
123 Feros, Kingship and Favoritism in the Spain of Philip III, 1598-1621, 92.
124 “Account of King of Spain taking the oath of the peace” (30 May/9 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.98v; Cornwallis to Lords of the Council (Valladolid, 31 May/10 June 1605; received 20/30 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.112; George Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.126.
in very good position to influence and indoctrinate many amongst the up-and-coming generation. Of real interest were also Lerma’s important office of “Capten Generall de toda la gente de militia de Spania”, and his personal command of all of the king’s guards, some two-thousand strong.\textsuperscript{125} It was in these roles that they witnessed him making his grand entrance into the palace, as well as commanding the general muster in the fields south of the city, both in rehearsal and performance, in front of the cheering throngs of thousands.\textsuperscript{126}

Lerma was not just the king’s first minister, or an unrivalled member of the royal entourage. He was, as Feros points out, Philip’s alter ego, going beyond even a powerful political or familiar favorite, combining the two and essentially sharing the rule of the monarchy with the king.\textsuperscript{127} Again, the British visitors noticed this, speaking about almost everyone in terms of their favor with the king or closeness to the duke, as if these were virtually synonymous things. Indeed, everything the English and Scots saw confirmed Lerma’s position of total dominance at court. So much so, that in many of the public ceremonies, the duke participated in the role that one would have expected to be reserved only for the king, while the king was conspicuously and purposefully absent from view. It was Lerma who held the infant prince in his arms at both the child’s baptism and the queen’s churching, and who presented him to the people, while the child’s royal parents were hidden far above, on a balcony concealed behind a

\textsuperscript{125} Sir Robert Mansell to “Your Lordship” (Valladolid, 20/30 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.72v.
\textsuperscript{126} I do not mean to suggest that before the Lord Admiral’s trip the English ministers were ignorant as to the fundamental nature of Spanish government, or of the existence of the duke of Lerma in a key position of power. There was enough information passing back and forth, through spies, merchants, and of course many conversations with the Spanish ambassadors to England and their entourages. But this firsthand, in-your-face experience of so many of the kingdom’s elites underlined the extent of Lerma’s dominance, and would have provided the largest amount of reliable information for English policymakers in the future.
screen. It was Lerma who fêted the Lord Admiral and his men at the palace, with the king once more hidden from sight. It was Lerma alone standing beside the king to watch as the Lord Admiral and his men marched into the city, and it was Lerma who was the only man allowed to sit with the king underneath the canopy of state – all the more reason why it was considered so remarkable when Nottingham was granted this singular honor as well. Whatever the circumstance, Lerma was always there, either standing alongside the king or acting in his place.

In fact, so important was the duke and so crucial his position at the head of governance and the dispensing of royal favor, that literally everyone wanted to get in to see him, the lines were long, and access was very hard to come by. Consequently, a popular story was told at this time of one particular soldier who had a matter he needed to take before the duke. After trying unsuccessfully for some time to secure a meeting with Lerma, the soldier had finally gone to see the king. Then, when Philip told the man, as he so often did, to go take the matter up with the duke, the soldier replied, exasperated: “If I had been able to speak to the duke, I would not have come to see Your Majesty.”

The Lord Admiral and his entourage, of course, did not have this problem during their stay: far from it. Lerma set aside everything in order to play a personal role in the crown’s pull-out-all-the-stops effort to influence their British guests. Indeed, other ambassadors and government officials complained about this, with one pointing out that, “All the time that the English Admiral was here affairs have been at such a standstill that even those who are in actual

\[128\] He even was even perceived as fulfilling this role indirectly when he could not do so in person, as it was Lerma’s sister who was responsible for the child the rest of the time, as the new royal governess, as Nottingham pointed out in his reports back home. Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134.


\[130\] “Si yo pudiera hablar al duque, no viniera a ver a Vuestra Majestad.” Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 78.
touch with the Crown have been unable to conduct any business.” Yet another example of just how important the king and the duke felt this visit to be.

Of course, these events were not just for the British to see, but were also meant for domestic consumption. This was an opportunity to show off the power of the monarchy to its people, adding to the various mythologies of kingship, with a special focus on magnificence and formal distance, but directly combined with an intimate portrait of religious piety, supreme courtliness, and a welcome for those who had been enemies of both the church and Spain, and yet might want to return to the fold. In this way, there is a sense in which the British visitors were really making a guest appearance in one of the final acts of a multi-year drama about regime change and renewal. This was political theatre on a grand stage; the culmination of a process that had begun with the death of the previous king, and which sought to redefine the image of the court while reevaluating the nature of Spanish power in Europe. This process was so important that they had actually moved the physical location of the government to a new city, and had rebuilt much of the new capital in specific accordance with these aims.

And as significant as this embassy was for the Spanish monarchy, it was just as key a moment for Lerma personally, in order to showcase his power to all who were watching, be they foreign visitors or Spanish subjects. This would not only bring glory and honor to him and his house, it would also help in the practical ability to maintain and consolidate his control at court, while simultaneously helping sell his foreign policy goals – to both domestic and foreign audiences alike. Lerma’s participation went beyond all the pomp and ceremony to extend into every conceivable aspect of the visit. He made great use of his considerable wealth in hosting Nottingham and those closest to him, at both his palace in the city and in his villa across the

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131 Francesco Priuli, Venetian ambassador in Spain, to the Doge and Senate (Valladolid, 3 July 1605), CSPVen X, 256.
river, and he paid a number of visits to the Lord Admiral in his lodgings. These connections were simultaneously of a social nature, in his shared role of host, and of a more serious bent, conducting the business of the embassy and sowing seeds for the future. And Nottingham had glowing words for the duke, as can be seen for example from his description of the first of these meetings: “hee stayed with me a long half howre, And I find him to be a most honorable gentleman, and one that caryeth asmuch reverence and dutye toward the king my master, as any stranger ever did to a kinge”. Indeed, not unlike King James back in England, Lerma was quick to turn on the charm, using his personal charisma to good advantage, typically encouraging a relaxed, intimate sort of conversation in order to try to foster trust and belief in his friendship. And the sorts of things he said about that friendship were very important indeed.

One particularly telling example of how Lerma carried himself in this can be seen in what transpired when he stopped by the Lord Admiral’s lodgings one day and bade him to come across the river to his villa with him in his carriage, with the ambassador bringing along only a couple of his closest associates. Nottingham wrote back to Cecil in glowing terms about this day: about the duke’s hospitality, his honorable nature and his great power, and of just how happy he seemed to be over the achievement of the peace. But Lerma carried things one step further, explicitly indicating just how much times had changed by emphasizing the errors of the previous reign, and stressing the change in philosophy under Philip III:

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132 Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133.
133 He was so successful at this, and relations had gotten so cordial, that the Lord Admiral went out of his way at the embassy’s departure to intercede with Lerma, and got the duke to start speaking to his second son again. Further evidence of just how important this trip and similar interactions were at building crucial relationships. As Pinheiro tells it: “También en este día habló el duque de Lerma, por intercesión del embajador, a su hijo Diego Gómez, conde de Saldaña, a quien no hablaba, por la pendencia que hizo, porque estuvo preso en casa y no salía fuera sino en coche, disfrazado.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 161.
He began with me with the protestations of his joyfulnes of this pece offereryng all sarvis to the King my master that it shuld plese the King to Comand him. Then he began to declare to me of the Ancyent amyte that had ever ben between the two Relms of England and Spayne and that unkyndnes that had bene in the late Quen my Mistress her tyme cam by ill instruments and playnly that the old King beleved too much in Barnardin Mandose [Bernardino Mendoza], and that his ill councell had made Spayne Smarte for it.  

He took this opportunity to reemphasize his support for continued peace, and for a closer relationship even still between the two countries, to be founded upon a marriage between the monarchs’ children. This idea had been a subject of intense discussion since James’s English accession and even before, and would play a constant, central role in the two countries’ relationship over the two decades that would follow – as we shall discuss in detail in the next chapter. This was the segundo camino in full force, combined with the policy of conservación in explicit repudiation of the warlike ways of Philip II. The Catholic King and his supremely powerful valido would not, of course, give up the cause. But the crusaders had become missionaries, and missionaries preferred to do their work in times of peace. Moreover, the king and the duke’s support of peace appears to have been shared by just about everyone, with sentiment in the capital matching and perhaps even exceeding that of what the English and Scots

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134 Nottingham to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124v. Mendoza was the last Spanish ambassador to the English court before the outbreak of open war in 1585.  
135 This meeting must have been of relatively common knowledge, as Pinheiro also mentions it, indicating that the main reason for having it was to determine the location of the oathtaking ceremony. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 114.  
136 Moreover, it should be added that there is still much we simply do not know about what was said in some of these meetings, as the Lord Admiral indicates in a number of places that he will wait to reveal certain things until he can do so in person, back in England. In this meeting: Nottingham to Cranborne (2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.125. In reference to the things the queen said after receiving her gifts, as well as the content of a private meeting in Lerma’s quarters the day of the queen’s churching and the Constable’s banquet: Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.134v. For reference to the messenger John Trevor filling in the details orally: Nottingham to James I (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.128. And with regard to Trevor in specific reference to “especially of that wych hath passed touchyng the matters of the Trete and the othe”: Nottingham to Cranborne (2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
had encountered in the countryside. As the Lord Admiral wrote back to Cecil at this time: “I protest unto you my Lord, the Kinge my Master is soe much honored and loved in this Country of all sortes of People, from the Kinge himself to the poorest that is, as I am sure never was like love to any king of Forraine nation.” And consequently, he added, this meant that “for the King my Masters sake I his poore servannt and Minister, am used in all thinges more like a Kinge, then the subject of a Kinge.”

Political strategies, Spanish style

In addition to coming to understand the intricacies of who it was that was running the government in Spain, the British visitors also got a good view of how it was being run. This last step in building the foundation for the peacetime relationship saw the final establishment of various political strategies that would show up time and time again over the course of the next two decades, and which would match up well with the sorts of things that the Habsburgs had already witnessed over the past two years in England. Absolutely chief among these was the oft-reported Spanish strategy of delay. The government had long had a reputation for operating at a snail’s pace, this had been one of the big English complaints with regard to the arrival of both Villamediana and the Constable, and this trip would provide many more examples. There was, of course, Philip’s purposeful delay of the entire trip in the first place, in order to get the embassy to coincide with the festivities surrounding the birth of the prince. And there was the subsequent delay regarding the last-minute change in expected arrival port, in order to give the workers and artists time to complete the preparations for these festivities. But there were also other, seemingly more minor instances of delay and excuse, such as Villalonga’s temporary “losing” of

137 Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133.
138 Nottingham to Cranborne (3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.133.
the papers that resulted in pushing the day of the oathtaking back so that it would occur on (and be overshadowed by) perhaps the greatest festival in the Spanish liturgical year: Corpus Christi. This sort of behavior was symptomatic of the way in which nearly everything was and would be handled over the coming years. As the Lord Admiral was quick to remark: “it is trew that hath ben ever sayde that they are tedious and full of delays.”

And the new resident ambassador, Cornwallis, expressed the same frustrations even as he was just settling in, complaining that he could already see that “the dyspatch of busynes ys not lykely to be so expedyte as I hoped”.

Another related strategy took the idea of delay and added to it an absolution of responsibility and freedom from expectations. This involved taking advantage of the multilevel bureaucracy and many overlapping jurisdictions of both the Spanish monarchy and the catholic church in order to keep an issue from being resolved, or to hand it off to someone else. One example of this was the aforementioned Spanish refusal of the request to have the oathtaking ceremony take place in a church, with the excuse that this was not a matter for them to decide, but rather for the pope, who had ruled against such things. They would like to oblige if they could, but the matter was out of their hands.

A further example of this sort of strategy involved something that happened at the very beginning of the trip. One of the English sailors had gotten ill on the voyage and died not long after they had arrived in La Coruña. The Lord Admiral looked into providing for the man’s remains, but “fownd some questyon about the buryall,” with the churchmen denying “that they had any power to doe yt,” since the sailor was a protestant. As Cornwallis explained:

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139 Nottingham to Cranborne (2/12 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.124.
140 Cornwallis to Salisbury (Valladolid, 18/28 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.150.
141 Cornwallis to Cranborne (La Coruña, 27 April/6 May [or] 2/12 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.90. The table of contents for the volume says that this is from 27 May, but that is clearly a mistake, as he wrote this from “The Groyne,” which they left early in the month, and the date
My self had conference with two Francyscan fryers about hys enterrment, and used dyvers reasons unto them to perswade yt. The one of them was the Guardyan of the monastery. The other one of the pryncypall preachers of that covent. They bothe seemed well inclyned to perfoyme that act of charyty, but of themselves had no au thornty to putt yt in executyon.\textsuperscript{142}

Once again, they were essentially claiming “we are totally on your side, and would love to help, but unfortunately our hands are tied.” But to show their supposed good faith, this was followed by an epic game of pass-the-buck, with essentially the same results: “The governor of thys provyne made the lyke answere to hys Excellency, and havynge wrytten to the Kyng to know hys pleasure was advertysed from thence that hys Majesty hathe sent to Roome to draw a resolutyon from the pope.”\textsuperscript{143} As a result, every step of the way, the Spanish officials could claim that they were sympathetic to the issue, and they could appear to take action. But the natural effect of this sort of strategy was the creation of repeated and lengthy delays, which by the time an answer was to be had would often find the issue at hand either moot or changed enough to require a new round of inquiries. In this particular case, there was the obvious time constraint imposed by a decomposing corpse, and so the Lord Admiral “resolved to make a shew to them of embawlmyng the body and sendyng yt into England, which I wyshe for myn owne part wer beleved bothe by them and us. But the trewth was yt was conveyed to the sea and therunto commytted.”\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{142} Cornwallis to Cranborne (La Coruña, 27 April/6 May [or] 2/12 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.90.
\textsuperscript{143} Cornwallis to Cranborne (La Coruña, 27 April/6 May [or] 2/12 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.90v. Compare this response to what happened around the same time in Wales, where a catholic lady, Alice Wellington, had died recently, and was refused burial by the protestant

written at the end looks more like a “2” followed by a scratched out number, then “\textsuperscript{4}th of May 1605.” Plus, the endorsement has it labeled as “2 May 1605.” The same story is told, virtually verbatim, in the postscript to another letter: Cornwallis to Cranborne (La Coruña, 20/30 April 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.12v, 14-15.
This sort of process would play itself out over and over again in the coming years, and the members of each stratum were very adept at passing responsibility or blame off on those at all the other levels, whether above or below. A king or duke or royal secretary might give his word that something would occur, but this did not ensure enforcement at lower levels, and so they could later blame noncompliance on various far-flung scapegoats and underlings. And a local or regional official might take controversial action that he insisted was in keeping with his orders, knowing full well that the appeal process to reverse his decision would take some real time, and would pass the responsibility along to his superiors. Even our little story of the soldier going to the king because he could not get in to see Lerma is evidence of the delays and the pass-the-buck mentality. The king tended to pass off business to the duke, while the duke often hid behind the ever-present waiting list to see him, buried undesirable or uncertain projects and requests underneath the mountain of pressing business, and in the end could always claim that while he would like to help, it was a matter to which the king would not agree.

This does not mean that when business was pressing, and decisions needed to be made in a timely manner, the decision makers of the Spanish monarchy were unable to act quickly. Quite the contrary, as we have already seen with Albert’s actions at James’s accession, as well as the immediate in-depth debate and speedy dispatch of Villamediana after arrival in Spain of news of Elizabeth’s death. But the very fact that they were capable of acting quickly when necessary merely underlines the purposeful nature of the strategy when things moved at a much more stately pace. Indeed, a number of appeals to Rome were made regarding English issues over the course of the subsequent Anglo-Spanish peacetime relationship, but Spanish-expressed concerns minister there. There was a big uproar in response, with various people arrested, who were then set free again as a mob threatened to cut the arresting officers to pieces. Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 5/15 June 1605), CSPVen X, 247.
about the opinion of the papacy were as often as not a way of stalling with their protestant interlocutors when necessary, and of providing a way to back out of something if their minds or circumstances were to change. It was a combination of “killing something in committee” (or in a junta of theologians) and of going into the other room to “speak to my manager”. If Spain appealed to Rome it was usually an attempt to shift the responsibility while simultaneously saving face. This was an effective counterpart to the similar strategy exercised by James in England (though in his case with his purposefully factionalized courtiers, rather than with a supposedly superior ecclesiastical power). In each situation, the crown could plausibly express sympathy and even partisanship for the cause in question, while simultaneously keeping from having to actually act, by claiming that the circumstances in which they found themselves made such action impossible, or that it was simply not their decision to make.

In fact, the question of the protestant sailor’s burial is also a good example of how both sides’ projected perceptions and favored political strategies would be put to use directly against one another countless times over the coming years. For Cornwallis responded to the Spanish passing of the buck and claims of their hands being tied by stressing that many in England did not like the peace, and that King James, who had done so much to secure it, would find his hands tied even further by his anti-Spanish subjects and ministers if they felt that any injustice had been done regarding the burial of this man. He stressed that this would play right into the hands of the enemies of Spain, for to those back in England who “had already conceyved no great lykyng of the peace…yt wold not be unpleasyng to understand that so great demonstratyons of awkward frendshypp wer accompanied with a note of so great dysesteeme”. This argument would become a common one for Cornwallis, put to use every time the Spaniards caused any difficulty

145 Cornwallis to Cranborne (La Coruña, 27 April/6 May [or] 2/12 May 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.90.
or appeared to want to push James farther than he was willing to move. For example, we see it again soon after, regarding the back-and-forth over the contents and location of King Philip’s oath, and later, when Cornwallis was informing James of the state of Spain, and of the people’s continued desire for peace. As he wrote to the king in July: “I assuredly believe that they Carrie a plaine and faithfull intention to your Majestie, and I nourish them in it, by lettinge them know how much bound they are unto you for this peace, soe soveraigne a medicine for their sicke estate.”

And so we can see, the various perceptions cultivated by each side at the time of peace were actively used and would remain effective throughout the course of the relationship. The view of James as Spain’s greatest friend in England, but whose ability to act too decisively was curtailed by pressure and opposition from a number of his most powerful subjects, would not only continue to hold true in the minds of Habsburg policymakers, but it would be actively encouraged over the years by the king’s ambassadors abroad, by his ministers at home, and by James himself. Similarly, the view of Philip and Lerma as great friends of England – who were supportive of the peace, of ensuring the strict enforcement of its articles, and were desirous of even closer relations still – was successfully fostered and rigorously maintained right alongside the understanding that their desires were sometimes frustrated and their options often limited by the behavior of underlings and local officials, and by their necessary consideration of the will of the church. These sorts of complementary perceptions would play an important role both in

146 As Cornwallis described it in a letter to his patron, Northampton: “I thinke that there cannot bee any better intention, then here wee finde in all parts, yet have wee had some rubbe aboute this matter of the Oathe, and other the instruments of ratification, and attestation of this peace, and my selfe have bene infected in some rounde manner to make them knowe how much they owe to the Kinge my master his Sweete and princelike disposition for the Accord that is made, and to wish them correspond it.” Cornwallis to Northampton (Valladolid, 29 May/8 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss. Vespasian C ix, ff.15v-16

147 Cornwallis to James I (Valladolid, 9/19 July 1605), BL Cotton Mss. Vespasian C ix, f.42v.
maintaining the peace, and in creating an environment in which the relationship might become closer – all while simultaneously allowing for the conditions that would eventually help pull it apart.

But for now, as a result of the Lord Admiral’s trip, the English had begun to do in Spain what the Spaniards had spent the past two years doing in England. They had seen (and would report back home on) how it was that this government operated, including who the main men were that ran it, what their priorities were, and what some of their key strategies were in the attempt to achieve those priorities. They had further solidified both the formal rules of the connection, and the informal boundaries of what was desirable and possible. And they had also deepened important personal connections, with a very sizeable number of influential men in England getting to know those in power in Spain quite well – not just who it was that they would be dealing with, but what they might expect from them in the future.

**Perceptions III – being seen to have seen**

This leads us to a final aspect of perspective, which played an important part in changing minds and forming opinions, and helped ensure that the peace policy would be one that would continue to be followed in Spain, and one that would have strong advocates for its maintenance back in England. While the acts of seeing and being seen were of course crucial to the success of the embassy for both sides, it is virtually impossible to overstate the importance in this case of something that combined them both: *being seen to have seen*. What precisely does this mean? Well, the British saw a great many remarkable things in Spain, and the Spaniards saw the British. But the Spaniards also saw the British *in the act of seeing*, watching as their guests reacted to everything that they were presented with. Remember, at all of the events, the English and Scots were placed in key locations, where they could both see and be seen. Any illusion of distance or
separation was quickly shattered, as attention was drawn to them by those participating down below – with everything from the salutes of passing soldiers to specific exchanges and gestures of respect with the king himself. Whether it was on a purpose-built scaffolding for the general muster, in the king’s balcony for the _toros y cañas_, or in the prominent windows of the palace of the count of Rivadavia, the Lord Admiral and his men were in many ways as much a part of the show as if they had been marching with the duke or running with the bulls.

Of course, this too was by design. Philip and Lerma wanted to make sure that the crowds could see the effect that the great shows of calculated magnificence were having on the visitors. After all, the creation and maintenance of the image of the monarch’s power in Spain, as well as Spanish power in Europe, relied heavily not only on others’ perceptions of that power, but on everyone else’s awareness of those perceptions – particularly so in this new time of precarious peace. It was not enough simply to overawe the English; they had to be seen to have been overawed. And the witnesses to this were not only Spanish subjects and nobles – there were also foreign ambassadors, high-ranking churchmen, influential intellectuals, and future sovereign princes present.¹⁴⁸ As we have seen from everything above, it was quite clear to all of those watching that Philip and Lerma’s plans were having their desired effect.

But something else was happening as well, something that would influence not only the perceptions of those in the crowds, but also the opinions and policies of the king and the duke themselves. For not only were the English and Scots well-received and well-admired by their

¹⁴⁸ Amongst these intellectuals in attendance was one of the most influential political theorists in Europe: Giovanni Botero, the author, most notably, of _Della ragione di Stato_ (The Reason of State) (1589). He was the tutor and closest advisor to the princes of Savoy, resident at the Spanish court from 1603-1607 (one of them the eventual sovereign duke of Savoy, Victor Amadeus I), and Botero’s work would have a particularly profound effect on Spanish policy, both in this reign and in the next.
hosts, their actions and reactions were changing the way Spaniards of all kinds viewed the matter of British religion.

As we have seen, the initial enthusiastic hopes for religious change in England immediately upon the accession of James I had been relatively quickly dashed. Then the encouragement of factionalization at the English court, and the simultaneous apparent trouble for the peace process, had let expectations sink to a very low point indeed. By the time that the negotiations for the peace were finally underway, it looked to the Spaniards as if the British king might be not only their greatest ally in the process, but perhaps one of their only true friends in the English political nation at all. This changed over the course of the negotiations, as Villamediana’s and the Constable’s embassies began to make headway in building an interest group at James’s court. But even those members of this nascent faction that the Spaniards identified as being the most inclined toward the Roman church still had to remain very public protestants, and every attempt to make tangible progress on the question of religion, or to secure any measure of toleration for the English catholics as part of the peace process, had met with failure. There were real worries amongst the Spanish that the English and Scots would be bringing heretic preachers with them to corrupt the people of Spain, and there were rumors at court that Villamediana had written back to his wife, asking that she send to him in England “a couple of healthy chaplains, because of the three that they brought with them, one had died, the other two had married, and [consequently] it had been two months since he had heard mass.”

This is the context into which the Lord Admiral and his entourage of some seven-hundred

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149 “Son todos herejes sacramentarios y de diversas sectas rebeldes a la iglesia Roman. Quiera Dios que no dejen alguna simiente en España sus buenos predicadores, de los que me enseñaron un obispo con igual traje que los demás...Y así me contaron que el Correo Mayor, que está en Inglaterra, escribió a su mujer le mandase un par de capellanes de buena vida, porque de tres que llevaron, uno se le murió, y los otros dos se le casaron, y hacía dos meses que no oía misa.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 83.
Britons marched, and this is one of the main reasons why Philip III was so determined to make sure that their visit coincided with the celebrations over the birth of his son and heir.

Nevertheless, from the moment that the English and Scots had arrived in Spain, the Spaniards had been encouraged by their actions. The hosts were putting their best foot forward, clearly demonstrating their overwhelming support for the coming of peace, and doing everything they could to make their visitors understand this and feel welcome. The Lord Admiral and his men noticed this right away, and they reciprocated. Nottingham made it clear from the beginning that he would not tolerate any disrespectful behavior whatsoever, and his example of the drunken sailor in La Coruña drove the point home. Spaniards were also encouraged by the report that, when the Lord Admiral had discovered that one of his company had brought along two Spanish-language bibles that had been printed in Holland, he had had the offending books sent back to the ships, admonishing his men “neither to give occasion of scandal nor bad example in sacred things,” or else they would be punished.150

The encouraging signs continued upon the arrival in Valladolid, as they saw that the Lord Admiral himself understood the Spanish language and could speak it reasonably well.151 They saw how the British visitors behaved themselves amongst the ladies, which Pinheiro found particularly notable, given both his own opinions about the forward nature of Castilian women and the recent rumors of Don Juan de Persia’s alleged conquests.152 In fact, throughout the visit

150 “[L]os admonestó que no diesen ocasión á escándolo ni mal ejemplo en las cosas sagradas, porque de otra manera los haría castigar; y el que tenía las Bilbias afirmó haberlas vuelto á los navíos.” Relación de lo sucedido, 34.
151 Relación de lo sucedido, 44. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 144.
152 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 37, 54-55, 77, 99, 144, 145, 161. He was apparently not alone in such sentiments, as Dudley Carleton would, during his return trip home to England, write to John Chamberlain that Villamediana was bringing back to Spain with him “a whole cartload of English and Dutch whores, which in my opinion is as needless a commodity to carry into Spain.
Nottingham and his men struck exactly the right tone in this, by being playful with the women they encountered, bantering, knowing which to pay court to, and yet never carrying themselves too far.153 This gained them a great deal of outspoken admiration from their Spanish hosts, without leaving any angry fathers or cuckolded husbands in their wake.154 It was these sorts of things that would make Spaniards go beyond the appreciation of their guests’ fine dress and honorable behavior, helping them begin to see the English and Scots as people that they could identify with, which was an important component of where their feelings on the religious question would be headed.

The arrival in Valladolid was also where Philip and Lerma’s carefully calculated plan of magnificence picked up. As we have seen, the myriad religious displays and celebrations into which the Lord Admiral and his men were thrown headfirst worked in many respects primarily on a power and attraction level: showing off the wealth, magnificence, and grandeur of the Spanish monarchy, and drawing those observing them into admiration, sympathy, attraction, and perhaps partisanship. But of course, these displays also operated on a religious level, as they were clearly meant to do, bringing the full force of Tridentine catholic ceremonial to bear, which was a stunning visual, spiritual, and emotional contrast to most of the religious celebrations that they had been used to back at home. Consequently, these events would play a strong role not as to send trees to the wood.” Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain (Paris, 4/14 November 1605); Lee, *Dudley Carleton to John Chamberlain*, 69.

153 Pinheiro goes into great detail about a particular exchange between Nottingham and some ladies of his own acquaintance that illustrates this perfectly: Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 144.

154 See especially the numerous comments about the Lord Admiral in this respect, and their comments on his virility, despite his advanced age. In addition to the frequent descriptions of the figure he cut, his powerful size, and his great nobility and magnanimity, a great deal was made about his apparent way with the ladies, and approving of his choice and behavior. Relación de lo sucedido, 80; Cabrera de Córdoba, *Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas*, 252; Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 127, 157. Both Nottingham and his men seem to have taken a particular fancy to the Countess of Lemos, Lerma’s daughter, “la señora doña Catalina de la Cerda, que es tan hermosa como las demás son feas”, Pinheiro, *Fastiginia*, 87.
only in the subsequent diplomacy of the Spanish monarchy, but also in the intertwined evangelical interests of the catholic church, which were of course abiding, lifelong concerns integral to the foreign policy of both the pious Philip III and his equally devout valido Lerma.

So when the Spaniards – policy-makers, nobles, churchmen, and common people alike – watched the British at their windows looking down upon the ceremonies and processions, they were also looking to see if the spirit would be moving the guests as much as the spectacle. They paid close attention to every aspect of their behavior, and made frequent speculation about what it might mean. This was true even in the places where their guests could not actually be physically seen – such as the “secret” locations within the churches of San Pablo and San Lorenzo where Nottingham and his men were led to in order to watch the ceremonies of baptism and churching. Even here, despite being fully hidden from view, it was nevertheless public knowledge that they were there: their very presence cause for hope, and their actions and reactions discussed openly and in print. And so, over the course of the entire British stay in the city, the Spaniards paid close attention to the well-orchestrated celebratory barrage, and watched as event after spectacular event, the English and Scots exclaimed in wonder at what they saw, threw themselves into the celebrations, and time and time again overturned their hosts’ preconceived notions about what to expect. In sum, the very set of celebrations meant to overwhelm and attract the visitors appeared to be having its desired effect not just on British perceptions of Spanish power and wealth, but also on their hearts and souls.

In fact, in almost every instance, British behavior seemed to give the Spaniards greater and greater hope. They watched as the Lord Admiral entertained a constant stream of noble visitors and even churchmen. They noticed his companions’ interaction with the various Irish exiles, both in Galicia and at court, and they were well aware of their meetings with the English
catholic exile leaders, fathers Creswell and Walpole. It was even said that on their journey towards the city, many of the entourage had stopped along the way to see “an exquisite miracle of the Holy Sacrament,” where wine turned visibly to blood, and the host into flesh. And though some had gone “out of curiosity, and others out of devotion,” many were said to have been moved by the experience.

Nevertheless, Philip and his ministers had been realistic, and had been very careful to prepare for the possibility that this part of their message might fall on deaf ears – or worse, would create tensions and enflame matters, giving them a virtual replay of their experience with the French in 1601. So they took measures to lessen the likelihood of conflict. The British lodgings in the capital were cleared ahead of time of any religious items or images that might have appeared to the visitors as scandalous, and were decorated instead with innocuous “silke hangings, and all kind of pictures both of men and beasts, wrought against his Lordships comming.” And the night before the formal entry to the city, a couple of public proclamations were made. The first of these required all women to have their husbands with them when they

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155 Amongst others, George Buck was in particularly frequent contact with them in each place, as he describes in his letters back to Cecil: Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (La Coruña, 30 April/10 May1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.48; Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85; Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 3/13 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, ff.126v-127.

156 This was at Cebreros: “Allí está un priorato de la Orden de San Benito, y muchos ingleses fueron á ver un exquisito milagro del Santísimo Sacramento, unos por curiosidad y otros por devoción, porque visiblemente, por la divina misericordia, se apareció el vino vuelto en sangre, y la hostia en carne, y los que se edificaron con tan gran milagro mostraron devoción exquisita.” Relación de lo sucedido, 36.

157 Royal entertainement, 8. Cabrera de Córdoba mentions this as well, referring to “tres camas que se habian hecho nuevas para este efecto, sin haber en todos los aposentos pintura ninguna profana ni á lo divino.” Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 243-244.
went out at night, “in order to avoid the communication of heretics.”\textsuperscript{158} And the second dealt with the holy sacrament, requiring that it have sufficient accompaniment, and that it only be brought out into the streets during the night, “in order to avoid inconveniences.”\textsuperscript{159} The treatment of the sacrament was an area of particular concern, which, as we saw in chapter seven, was so serious an issue as to have even occasioned articles in the treaty itself.

But as each of our observers points out at some length, there was no need for such strictures, thanks to “the prudence and modesty of the ambassador, who in everything conducted himself very well.”\textsuperscript{160} Time and time again during the course of the embassy, the English and Scots encountered the procession of the host in the streets, and every single time they responded with the required respect and reverence. Their behavior was clearly changing minds, as Pinheiro noted when describing one such occurrence, on the night of the celebrations for the election of the new pope:

This same night, coming back from la huerta del duque, I saw the Holy Sacrament being carried to an ill person, who was in the same courtyard as the Admiral, and I saw all of the English with their hats off at the windows the entire time I was there, which comforted me greatly for having said the contrary.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{158} “En esta noche se dio pregón que ninguna mujer saliera de noche sin llevar a su marido del brazo, con penas gravisimas, por evitar la comunicación de los herejes.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 78.
\textsuperscript{159} “También se dio orden en cuanto al acompañamiento del Santísimo Sacramento, y que saliese solamente de noche, por evitar inconvenientes”, Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 78.
\textsuperscript{160} “[A]unque después no fue necesario, por la prudencia y modestia del embajador, que en todo se condujo muy bien, como os contaré después.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 78. See also the final lines of the Relación de lo sucedido: “y en suma, se gobernó en todo con gran discreción y prudencia, y todos los caballeros y gente suya con mucho miramiento y quietud, sin dar en nada causa de escándolo.” Relación de lo sucedido, 112.
\textsuperscript{161} “Esta misma noche, viniendo de la huerta del duque, vi llevar el Santísimo Sacramento a un enfermo, que estaba en el mismo patio del Almirante, y vi a los ingleses todos descubiertos a las ventanas todo el tiempo que allí estuve, lo cual me consoló mucho por haberme dicho lo contrario.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 109-110.
Similar scenarios occurred over and over again throughout the trip.\footnote{There are numerous reports of such encounters throughout our sources, as well as a number of similarly approving accounts of the equal respect given to images by these men who it had been thought were going to be strict Calvinists. For the treatment of images, see: Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas}, 244; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 91.} Moreover, some of the English and Scots’ behavior frequently went beyond mere respect or reverence, going straight into full-fledged participation and devotion. The king and his people alike looked on in approval and even excitement as various members of the Lord Admiral’s entourage marched in the processions, entered the churches to participate solemnly in the ceremonies, and even were seen to attend mass and vespers, in many cases repeatedly.\footnote{Cabrera de Córdoba, \textit{Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas}, 245; Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 83. And Pinheiro even noted that the concerns over protestant preachers accompanying the group to try and convert their hosts were in fact overblown, as it quickly became clear that these were just “lazy” or “pleasure-loving” types, “of which there are so many at court.” “[D]espués dijeron que no era sino un clérigo como los otros, que vienen principales, con la libertad y disolución de vida a que siempre se inclina la gente ociosa, de que hay tanta en la corte…En compensación os contaré que me aseguraron que, al llegar a La Coruña esta gente, acudieron muchos a oir misa, y el embajador hizo volver a 30 de ellos a embarcar para atemorizar a los demás. Aquí vi a algunos ir a misa y a vísperas, descubiertos, no sé si or curiosidad.” Pinheiro, \textit{Fastiginia}, 83.} Nor were these just servants or people of lesser standing in the embassy, as they included in their number various of the most prominent lords, such as the earl of Perth and the son of the earl of Suffolk (the Lord Chamberlain and one of James’s very closest advisors).\footnote{“[T]res señores ingleses – que el uno era el Conde de Pert, pariente del Rey de Inglaterra, y al otro D. Tomás, hijo del Conde de Sufolc.” \textit{Relación de lo sucedido}, 47, 49, 64.} The Spaniards also watched as various of the British went to see the college of St. Alban’s, the seminary that had been founded jointly by the Jesuit Robert Persons and King Philip II to train English catholic priests for the mission in their home country. Father Creswell had prepared a great deal for this occasion, with the active aid of the king and his council of state, in order to “dress the seminary students decently and to repair and show off the house somewhat, in order that it might have the
appearance of a College that is under Your Majesty’s protection”. The Lord Admiral himself even paid a visit to the college, apparently at the behest of King Philip, where the students greeted him with orations in Latin praising both the peace and other subjects beneficial to the holy faith – an event which was met with great acclaim. This, too, was a change from initial preparations and guarded expectations, as the council of state had made a point back in March to advise explicitly against this, saying that they “did not see how Your Majesty could invite the Admiral to come see the College” since they “did not know how he would take it” – obviously not wanting to push any of the wrong buttons or make what might already be a difficult situation any more so. But Creswell had argued that “no expense that Your Majesty makes for the Admiral of England’s reception will be of more service to God, nor will serve more for the effect

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165 “[P]ara vestir los colegiales del seminario decentemente y preparar y luzir algo la Casa para que tenga aparençia de Colegio que està bajo de la protection de VMd”. On 16/26 March, Joseph Creswell had written to Philip III, asking for a subsidy for the college in order to prepare for the arrival of Nottingham’s embassy, and had also expressed his desire that the Lord Admiral might come to see the students. This is from the consulta of the consejo de estado three days later, advising that Creswell be given his subsidy, but not explicitly for the coming of the Lord Admiral, rather for the celebrations of the Easter season and the upcoming festivities surrounding the imminent birth of the royal child. Here, too, we see real hesitance on the part of the Spanish authorities, and a remarkably low set of expectations. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 19/29 March 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 624, doc 197, f.1.

166 And Creswell was certainly making a push for it personally: Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 1/11 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.36. For Nottingham and Buck at least, this appears to have been as much of an outreach program as anything else, to win the fathers’ goodwill, encouraging the college to behave itself and help keep the peace. See esp. Sir G. Buck to Cranborne (Valladolid, 25 May/4 June 1605), TNA: PRO SP 94/11, f.85. This also seems to have actually worked to some degree, as Creswell wrote to Philip III on 30 June/10 July, thanking him for his support, and advising him on the necessity of maintaining peace with England. AGS Estado, leg. 624, doc 204.

167 When Creswell had written to Philip III on 16/26 March, asking for a subsidy for the college in order to prepare for the arrival of Nottingham’s embassy, he had also expressed his desire that the Lord Admiral might come to see the students. The council’s negative response came in the same consulta three days later in which they had approved the funds for cleaning up the college: “Que no veo el consejo como VMd pueda convidar al Almirante para ver el Colegio porque…no se sabe como lo tomaría”. Consulta of the Consejo de Estado (Valladolid, 19/29 March 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 624, doc 197, f.1v.
that Your Majesty seeks,” than fulfilling these requests, and a number of Spain’s “principal ministers” thought that it would be a prime opportunity “to earn the goodwill of the King of England, and of others that are contrary to our Holy Religion”.¹⁶⁸ And so, by the time that the Lord Admiral arrived, things were going so well that these voices ultimately won out.

Indeed, as the visit unfolded, expectations were clearly beginning to change. So much so that at least one observer dared to hope that,

just as the sacrament of the former king’s marriage [Philip II to Mary I] was in England the means of reconciliation between the English and Roman churches, [so, too might] the sacrament of the prince’s baptism in Spain, amongst the leading representatives of England, [be] the beginning of the reduction of that kingdom to the union of the Catholic Church.¹⁶⁹

And if the rumors were true, these hopes were beginning slowly to pan out. After all,

Nottingham’s own son, Lord Howard of Effingham, took a well-publicized side trip to Madrid to visit his aunt, Jane Dormer, the dowager duchess of Feria,¹⁷⁰ and on his return it was said that he

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¹⁶⁸ “[Q]ue ningun gasto que VMg haze para el recibimiento del Almirante de Inglaterra será para mas servicio de Dios, ni que mas servirá para el efecto que VMg pretende…que a parecido bien a algunos ministros principales de VMg que será occasion para ganar las voluntades del Rey de Inglaterra, y de otros que son contrarios a nuestra Sª Religion”. Andrés de Prada to Philip III (16/26 March 1605), relating Creswell’s requests: AGS Estado, leg. 624, doc 198, ff.1-1v. The council’s response to these requests is repeated here, as well, added in Prada’s hand on the endorsement page of the original.

¹⁶⁹ “Dispondrá Nuestro Señor que así como el sacramento del matrimonio del rey que está en gloria, en Inglaterra fue medio de reconcilación entre la iglesia anglicana y la romana, así el sacramento del bautismo del príncipe en España, entre la principal representación de Inglaterra, será comienzo de la reducción de aquel reino a la unión de la Iglesia Católica, de que es primogénito.” Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 95. The “sacrament of marriage” refers, of course, to the marriage of Philip II to Mary Tudor in 1554.

¹⁷⁰ He appears to have left for Madrid on either Monday 20/30 May or the following day, and to have returned on Saturday, 25 May/4 June. Royal Entertainement, 11. See also: Relación de lo sucedido, 64. The duchess was a catholic Englishwoman who had been one of Queen Mary’s ladies-in-waiting, had married one of the noble members of Philip II’s court when he was in England, and had returned to Spain with him at the end of Mary’s reign.
had gone to King Philip to declare his intention to convert to catholicism. Rumor also had it that another young noble in the entourage had, amongst much subterfuge and shedding of tears, gone to St. Albans to convert, and had made plans with a friend in the college to leave for Rome. It was even being said that the Lord Admiral himself had, in the house of Lerma’s son the duke of Cea, written to the pope about the possibility of his own conversion. And the one thing that everyone agreed upon, with no doubt expressed whatsoever, was that the new resident ambassador, Cornwallis, was definitely a catholic. Now, whether or not any of these particular stories were in fact true matters little here, as the important thing for our purposes is that they were believed to have been so by many of the Spaniards. And there certainly were conversions at some level, as the leaders of the English entourage themselves admitted.

Cornwallis reported that the Jesuits at court had been trying to influence as many of the young gentlemen as they could, they did “secretly bragge of theirre much prevaylinge”, and “[t]wo of

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171 The king had apparently commended him for this, but encouraged him to return to England to dedicate himself to maintaining the peace and helping bring the English church back into the Roman fold. Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149.
172 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149-150.
173 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149. Of these various rumors, this one seems rather unlikely, considering the following years of Nottingham’s life, spent in apolitical retirement raising a new family, and seemingly uninterested in the offers of a substantial pension from the king of Spain. Though Giles Porter, the interpreter, reported to Cornwallis that Father Creswell was coming to visit the Lord Admiral at his lodgings quite often, which Cornwallis seems to have found suspicious. Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 1/11 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.36.
174 Pinheiro, Fastiginia, 149; Cabrera de Córdoba, Relaciones de las cosas sucedidas, 245. See also Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate, who reported back in March that “The King has at last appointed his lieger in Spain. He is a gentleman of the family of Cornwallis and a Catholic”, (London, 20 February/2 March 1605), CSPVen X, 225. In fact, they were all on to something here, as he was indeed from a catholic family, his patron was the crypto-catholic Northampton, and Cornwallis would, several years after his return to England, eventually petition Philip III to allow him to return to Spain so that he might live openly as a catholic. BPR, Mss II/2185, doc 146.
myne owne followers I have founde corrupted.”175 Indeed, as he wrote in another letter: “How many of this companie that attended his Excellencie have since our cominge into these parts made declaration of themselves to bee Papists I shall not neede to relate unto Your Lordshipe, my Lord Admiral himselfe havinge taken upon him to doe it.”176

And so it was that, in just a matter of weeks, Spanish hopes regarding religion in England had been resuscitated significantly. They had gone in no time from preparing for the arrival of a group of image-denouncing, host-desecrating, wife-converting heretics, to wishing a fond farewell to a large collection of newfound friends, influential advocates, and even converts to the faith.

**Conclusion**

The earl of Nottingham’s embassy to Spain in 1605 was a disproportionately important episode in the history of Anglo-Spanish relations, and was crucial in shaping perceptions, priorities, and ultimately actual policies in both countries in the years to come. As we have seen, things went extraordinarily well throughout the more than two months in the country, including both the three-and-a-half week stay in the capital, and at every stop along the way. Even the rare moments of tension were transformed into well-seized opportunities to change minds for the better, and this goodwill was further amplified by frequent, explicit comparison to the disastrous experience with their previous guests – and generally perceived true enemies – the French. Moreover, the purposeful delay at the beginning of the trip gave the visitors a chance to see much more of Spain and its people, not only giving them a close-up view of the lives of regular

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175 Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 1/11 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.36-36v.
176 Cornwallis to Cranborne (Valladolid, 2/12 June 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.32v-33.
Spaniards, but also providing some deep insight into what their former foes thought of them, and how they felt about peace with England. Contrary to the grand assumptions made by generations of historians to fit their master narratives – based more often than not on the occasional wit of a court satirist or fool, rather than on a close look at what people actually said about what they saw or felt – it is quite clear that peace was an overwhelmingly popular thing in Spain, and that the English were very well thought of by their hosts. This was true both in the countryside and at court, at all levels of society, from the moment they landed in La Coruña in April until their departure from Santander at the end of June.

With regard to the relationship itself, Nottingham’s embassy had two particularly important, long-term effects, and both owed a great deal to the unprecedented show that the king and his favorite put on for just this occasion. In the first place, there was the direct, intended effect of all of this spectacle: the impression left upon the Lord Admiral and his entire company. The perfect storm of concurrent celebrations over the peace, the birth of the heir, and the numerous religious festivals all showcased the wealth and power at the Spanish king’s disposal in an unmistakable way. This had not only a direct effect on those witnessing the events, impressing and exciting everyone in the entourage, but also an indirect effect on those back home: through letters, printed relations describing these events, and the influences on art, music, culture, and behavior that this remarkably varied and influential group of Englishmen and Scots brought back with them. And all of this, combined with the unprecedentedly warm reception and even royal treatment that the Spaniards extended to their guests, ensured that the trip would not only have a profound effect on English attitudes – sowing the seeds of respect for and attraction to Spain – but that it would also firmly secure the foundations of a Spanish interest group at the court of James I.
The second major effect of the trip was on Spanish attitudes towards the English, especially concerning their religion. While they had aimed to overwhelm and impress their guests, hoping through this process to attract admirers and possible advocates for Spain in England, they were also prepared to do everything they could to expose their visitors to the beauty and appeal of Tridentine catholicism in all its splendor. Despite carefully managed expectations and preparations for the worst, these efforts ended up succeeding beyond their wildest dreams. As a result of this trip, a number of converts were made, and many other people with catholic sympathies, families, or pasts undoubtedly moved much closer to both Spain and Rome. But perhaps most importantly, a great many Spaniards saw them do so, watched their reactions, and found real reason to hope for the future of the faith in the British Isles. This would confirm the utility of the segundo camino in the eyes of the people and of their policymakers, thus cementing an approach which would provide the framework for the next two decades of Anglo-Spanish relations, and which would have a significant influence on politics and religion in Europe as a whole.

Indeed, this confirmation of the path of negotiation, and the obvious support of so many Spaniards for the peace that had just been achieved, was an important and desired end of Philip and Lerma’s strategy in all of this. It helped finish off the move towards the policy of conservación that was central to their foreign policy, and distinct from the grand strategy of international war espoused by the previous regime. And we must remember just how much the events of this trip were still to a large extent a show for a domestic (and simultaneously non-British international) audience. This was at least as much about solidifying perceptions of Spanish power in Europe (and Lerma’s power in Spain), as it was about the Anglo-Spanish
relationship. As James and his ministers had been adept at using international events for domestic purposes (and vice versa), so too with Philip and Lerma.

Of course, this was not all about eucharistic bread and circuses. Business was conducted over the course of the stay in Valladolid as well, both with regard to the finalization of treaty details, and to the improvement of future relations between the two countries. Decisions reached on these issues, as well as the foundation, development, and recognition of certain relationships and political strategies, would have a real impact on the future course of this relationship in the coming years, and we will focus on this in some detail in the final chapter. But what is important to understand is the extent to which all of that official business – both the “hard” work of crafting policies and the concomitant “soft” development of relationships at court and the strategies to manipulate them – was influenced by and dependent upon the effects of Philip and Lerma’s meticulously planned onslaught of magnificence, the British reactions to it, and Spanish perceptions of what those reactions signified.
Chapter Ten: Closer together & further apart

“Yf therefore yt shall so seeme fitt unto your Majesties wisedome, that your gratious & kinde usage to the Spanishe Ambassador may bee continued, and your inclination to continue all Amitie and good Correspondence with this King declared; yet withall I conceive it may not be amisse, that the desire allmoste generally of your Majesties Subjects, and likewise of many of your Councell to the contrary bee also intimated to the end that the peace may seeme as yt were to bee maintayned by your Majesties gracious disposition to Peace, & affection to this King. For heerby there shall a double effect bee wrought. First that your Majesties Courtesie, and good usage of them is able to worke. Secondly, what the feare and hazard of a breach (which I esteeme will bee of moste force with them) may prevayle. For when they shall beleve that the peace wholy and singly is uphele by your Majesties will, they will bee very heedy to observe your Majestie are not to give your any distast leaste you mighte thereby bee induced to give way to that your subjects so generally desire.”

– John Digby to James I, 1613

One of the most important reasons for studying the process of making peace is because the foundation established in these first couple of years had a profound impact on everything else that came after, throughout the whole length of the rest of the two kings’ reigns. This included the formation of the entire system of domestic politics and international relations, establishing the various actors’ places within each, and the development of the perceptions and strategies that would govern so much of what was to follow. This was true in a governmental sense, as issues and concerns were laid on the table, limits were pushed, common ground was sought, and, finally, rules were established. This was also true in a political sense, as factions were formed, relationships developed, oppositions created, minds changed, and strategies were put in play that would both keep the peace, and create the very conflict that sought to overturn it. Even those issues that had been passed over in the treaty and saved until later had a strong grounding in what occurred in those first couple of years, and they would then dominate so much of the way these two countries continued to deal with one another. They would govern the attempts to grow

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1 John Digby (English Ambassador to Spain) to James I (Madrid, 31 October/10 November 1613), TNA: PRO SP 94/20, ff.147v-148.
closer together, but they would also form frictions and provide easier outlines for the
construction of division and opposition in the years to come. It was in this combination of
centrifugal and centripetal forces that so many of the later conflicts and stereotypes were
nourished, and it was the opposition created by this polarizing system that dominated the last
years of James’s reign, and that ultimately helped bring an end to the peace that had nurtured it.

So how specifically would this be carried forward? How did the various strategies and
perceptions that were developed and manifested in these all-important first couple of years of the
new relationship play out in both countries over the subsequent years? A detailed look at this
will have to wait for my following project, but it is important here to sketch a bit of the outline of
what would come. Several scholars have done a very fine job of helping us construct the
subsequent internal logic, operation, and motivations of the Spanish system as a result of their
approach to peace in Europe. From Trevor-Roper’s take on the fundamentals of the period as a
whole, to Carter’s insight into Spanish diplomacy, and Brightwell’s look at how the system came
apart in the late teens – to more recent studies of Spanish aims in achieving peace in the first
place by García García and Allen. Add to these the wonderful works by Sánchez, Schroth, and
especially Feros on the internal politics of the reign of Philip III and his valido Lerma, and we
can get a pretty good picture of Iberian perspectives at home and in the international system in

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But the overall view of Spanish operations in England itself remains unchanged, and no one has taken the lessons of the peace process and applied them to our understanding of how the Jacobean system worked, or how it did so both in tandem with these Spanish developments and in Europe as a whole.

As we have seen, not only were the first two years of James I’s English reign especially crucial in coming to an understanding of the two decades that followed – the central issue of these two years was in fact the achievement of peace with Spain. It cannot be stressed enough just how much of the political system, perceptions, strategies, policies, and relationships were hashed out or fully established in this short but disproportionately important period, turning around this particular issue and its connected events. Virtually everything was formed in this crucible, and then carried forward. So what precisely did this entail, and how did it end up progressing from there? It is first worth taking a quick look back at our story overall.

Contrary to modern historical assumptions, peace was neither an Elizabethan foregone conclusion, nor a *fait accompli* upon James’s accession. As we saw in chapter two, a change of ideology and leadership in the Habsburg dominions was key, as was the arrival of the king himself. But as crucial as the accession was, it was merely a necessary cause, not sufficient. It took more than a year after this just to get to the talks, and then several months more to secure a positive result. Its success was due in no small part to the person of James, but not in the way that proponents of this claim have typically assumed. For it took a combination of the king’s multifaceted personal involvement, alongside a deliberately intertwined approach to foreign policy and domestic politics that made it happen at all, not to mention happen in the precise way

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in which it did. James and his approach to his new regime encouraged factionalization in domestic politics right from the start, through the restoration of many groups to favor and the addition of other groups and centers of power into the English political equation. Though many people wanted peace, England was still divided over it. James allowed discussion of this, and a renewed pamphlet debate over the question of war and peace started up upon his arrival in England. This gave the various groups at court an issue to compete over, encouraging further factionalization still, centered around an international dimension.

This process was simultaneously internationalized to an even greater degree by the arrival in England of wave upon wave of foreign ambassadors, eager to congratulate the new king on his accession, and to try to gain information and to influence subsequent policy decisions by establishing themselves in this new environment at court. As a result, a number of ties were formed that developed quickly into competing interest groups, which were intertwined with and enhanced by already established domestic rivalries in this newly multipolar political environment. In this way, foreign policy debate was combined with international relations and domestic politics in order to create a very complex and seemingly troublesome political landscape.

As strange as it might seem for a king newly come to his throne, we then saw how James actually encouraged these divisions. In the establishment of this environment, the king was picking up right where he had left off in Scotland: playing all sides against one another, both at home and abroad. And yet, despite the encouragement of conflict and rivalry, James made it clear that he wanted to be at peace with everyone. His insistence on this, after allowing the growth of factionalization and an apparent decline in Spanish fortunes at court, nevertheless convinced the Habsburgs that he was the only true friend to peace in England – which was
instrumental both in solving the precedence issue and in managing expectations, so that England could get the best conditions in the treaty without causing the Spaniards to pull out. The way the king played this, in turn, made himself appear to be the indispensable actor – again, both in domestic politics and in the creation of foreign policy – and this ultimately put him in a similarly mediational position within the international system at large. This system and the way it developed allowed him to be able to claim that he was the one person who had to be swayed, the possible sympathetic ear, and thus “the way in” for all sides in both foreign and domestic arenas, be they French or Spanish, English or Scots, protestant or catholic. And yet, James was able to do this in a way that made him still look hampered to a certain extent by the conflict and opposition all around him, thus providing himself (and his kingdom) with an excuse not to have to commit to too much.

Thus, by facilitating the development of multiple competing centers of power at the English court, enabling them to become intertwined with the various competing foreign interests, allowing a resuscitation and escalation of debate, and seeming to encourage the belief that peace was not going to be the simple task that the Habsburgs had originally assumed, James and his closest ministers were then able to create the circumstances within which peace could actually be achieved, and ultimately maintained.

And so, perhaps counterintuitively, this approach of encouraging conflict was itself crucial in ensuring that there would be peace. And, conversely, by securing the peace, the Jacobean approach ensured that the conflict and factionalization would continue and grow. Which would then, of course, help the king continue to keep the peace, and to maintain his preferred approach to ruling – it was all reciprocal.
As we have also seen throughout, this was not just about “hard” rules created with a treaty; not just about drawing up a document and getting it signed. It was also all about creating the system, the relationships, connections, perceptions, strategies, and all of the other “soft” aspects that would provide a strong foundation for the relationship and indeed the entire political environment for the coming years and even decades. From here on out, in fact, English domestic politico-religious debates and their resultant groupings and factions would be connected directly to the nature of (and perceptions about) relations with Spain. And as the last three chapters have shown, the foundation begun here was solidified over the course of the embassies witnessing the swearing of the peace, with the Lord Admiral’s journey to Spain in 1605 finishing off this process and redressing the balance of what had been until then a story predominantly played out in England. This helped further connect the domestic and international political divisions, providing the final crucial foundation for the formation of factions and general attitudes of interest in each country.  

**The continued role and perception of the king**

A central aspect of the resulting system in England and beyond would remain the particular habits, position, and others’ perceptions of King James. The creation and maintenance of a factionalized, multipolar, competitive environment at court, where domestic and international interests became fundamentally intertwined, relied heavily on a certain view of the

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4 Of course, this was not just true of the Constable’s and Villamediana’s embassies encouraging Spanish sympathies towards England, or the Lord Admiral and his men on their trip to Spain doing much to further attraction towards Spain and the foundation of a Spanish faction back home. The same sorts of things were happening with each of the major powers with money and influence to be shared, often in the very same ways, such as the duke of Lennox going to France in 1605, repaying Henri IV for Sully’s 1603 visit. And this was understood to be the situation by all the players involved. For Villamediana’s discussion of Lennox’s embassy and of that earl’s high hopes to win support at Henri’s court, see: Villamediana to Philip III (London, 29 December 1604/8 January 1605; received 17/27 January 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 843, doc 1, f.9.
king. As we have seen, James succeeded in portraying himself to virtually everyone at court and abroad as a sympathetic soul, a reasonable and well-meaning voice whose hands were nevertheless tied by the opposition and frequent turbulence of his less enlightened ministers, courtiers, and subjects. This would continue over the course of his reign. In the Jacobean system, everything was polycentric and competitive, debate was encouraged, with the king positioning himself in a convenient or amorphous place along this spectrum, creating for himself substantial room for maneuver. In this environment, he could then use his considerable personal charm and political skills in his cherished role of mediator, confidant, unifier, and advocate. This was just as true of James’s negotiation of his own courtiers and ministers as it was of England’s negotiation (and attempted mediation) of the entire similarly divided European system of international relations.

In order to pull this off, he needed to remain both accessible and distant. Familiar when necessary, and yet perceived as distinct, aloof from, or even in direct conflict with his leading ministers. Contrary to traditional portrayals of James as an inaccessible king, contemporaries often said the opposite. His less formal mannerisms, often comradelike behavior, and frequent progresses throughout the countryside actually were an encouragement to those who hoped to get to see him or even to do him harm. For example, Richard Cocks reported that various catholic English exiles in Spain felt that James was a much more open and accessible monarch than his famously open predecessor Elizabeth was, and therefore would be much easier to plot against if it came to that:

(said they) the Queene kept herselfe still mved [sic] up in her chamber with her duble or treble garde about her. Soe that it was unpossible to attempt any thinge against her. But (said they) the Kinge that now is is in the pryme of his yeares and will abrode the Cuntrey
on progres, and ride out on hunting and hawking, soe that noe doubt ther will not want on or other that will talck with hym yf he followe the steps of the late deceased Queene.\textsuperscript{5}

In addition to this, we have seen that even when James went on more extended progresses and hunting trips, he made sure that he kept himself in position to get a great deal of business done. These journeys were much more of an early modern take on the medieval practice of peripatetic kingship than on that of a more modern monarch abandoning his responsibilities and leaving governance entirely to his ministers. For example, when James left London on progress in the summer of 1603, he took one third of his privy council and half the court with him, and even brought the foreign ambassadors along and set them up in towns along the way.\textsuperscript{6} And we have seen in chapter seven the extent to which James worked while away from London and just how involved he remained in the conclusion of the final treaty details even once the formal conference was concluded and he was out in the field.

Moreover, even the actual process of hunting itself was put to good political and diplomatic use. Each of the various courtiers competing for James’s favor quickly realized the importance of cultivating the king, and naturally hoped to use his love of the chase as a way into his good graces. The foreign ambassadors recognized this as well, and the French were quick to seize the initiative, being familiar with their own monarch’s similar proclivities. Vitry, the extraordinary ambassador who arrived from Henri IV in the late summer of 1603 to congratulate

\textsuperscript{5} Richard Cocks to [Thomas Wilson?] (11/21 August 1603), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, f.54. 
\textsuperscript{6} In the words of the Venetian representative: “Upon this conclusion their Majesties have left for a brief forty days’ hunting, although they call it a progress, which means a visit. The Princes, two-thirds of the Council, and more than half the Court are left behind. The King has reduced his suite as far as possible, because some deaths from plague have taken place among the servants. He has given lodging to the Ambassadors of France and Flanders and to the Agent for the States at Basing, a town about the middle of the district, where he is going a-hunt, so that they may be handy for negotiations.” Giovanni Carlo Scaramelli, Venetian secretary in England, to the Doge and Senate (Sunbury, 20 August 1603), CSPVen X, 83. Other towns of ambassadorial residence on progress that year included Staines in the mid-summer, and Oxford, Salisbury, and Southampton at the end of summer and on into the fall.
James on having uncovered the recent conspiracies against him, headed out into the field with
the king and Beaumont, the resident ambassador, just two days after his arrival.\(^7\) This was an
important attempt to get in with the king, and James let it be known that he was very impressed
with Vitry’s prowess in the field. Similarly, upon his own arrival, the Spanish ambassador
Villamediana realized that he too needed to hunt with James in order to effectively carry out his
appointed duties and keep the French from getting an upper hand.\(^8\) Moreover, this was more
than just a time for personal contact with the king, as we saw in chapter two with Scorza’s initial
attempts to get in with James’s ministers in Scotland, and in chapter six with several of
Villamediana’s important conversations with other nobles, ministers, and courtiers when out on
the hunt. Indeed, any divide between business and leisure – between “official” government in
London and “personal” interactions around the king – is ephemeral at best. And so began a long
tradition at court, where the king’s favorite pastime became not an escape from the
responsibilities of rule, but rather a different environment within which to conduct business, and
where the domestic and international rivalries continued to play out, once more on ground of the
king’s choosing.\(^9\)

Of course, lest we ignore the obvious point about a system like this: it certainly was good
to be the king. For as effective as this arrangement may have been, it also had the added bonus
of allowing James to spend much of his spare time doing something that he loved: hunting

\(^7\) Laffleur de Kermaingant, *L’ambassade de France* I, 129-130.
\(^8\) Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 20/30 November 1603; received 24 January/3 February
1604), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 148.
\(^9\) Indeed, this should help us further revise the traditional view of the famous Spanish
ambassador in the following decade, the count of Gondomar, using hunting with the king as a
means of forming some sort of supposed hold over him. The work of Charles Carter has
effectively challenged this view to a certain degree. Carter, "Gondomar: Ambassador to James
I." But seen from the reign’s beginning, not only do Gondomar’s later actions seem far from
unusual, it looks much more as if James was the one setting the terms of the relationship, making
the various competing groups come to him and play on his turf.
game. But this did come with a cost. There were certainly contemporary criticisms of the king for these practices, as would be expected in any system where conflict and competition is encouraged, and where the king spent some time purposefully appearing to distance himself from his ministers. As the Venetian ambassador reported back home after a year and a half under the new system:

During the last few days papers have been found fixed up in various places; they contained attacks upon the King. The Mayor took one of these to his Majesty. They accuse the King of attending to nothing but his pleasures, especially to the chase, and of leaving all government entirely in the hands of his ministers, as though he had come to the throne for nothing else than to go a-hunting; warning him, too, that unless he changes he will bring himself and the kingdom as well down to the ground.10

As with the various fault lines we saw in chapter five, this gives us some hint of the possible long-term difficulties that might accompany Jacobean strategies at achieving short- and medium-term success. This is a good example of how the very sorts of things that helped James achieve peace and maintain a position of independence could also be the sorts of things that helped in the construction of opposition narratives toward the crown, its policies, and its newfound friends in the international system.

It was perhaps in response to this that James wrote a letter to the privy council a month or so later formalizing and regularizing the arrangement of government when the king was not physically in residence in London.11 This was partially a matter of triage, where frivolous

10 Nicolo Molin, Venetian ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate (London, 21 November/1 December 1604), deciphered, CSPVen X, 195. And James apparently cared a great deal about countering such perceptions, as Molin went on to say: “The King flew into a passion, and ordered the Mayor to use all diligence to arrest the culprits; he declared that he was ready to spend fifty thousand crowns for the purpose; but there are no results as yet.”

11 As James put it: “to give some such directions for the execution of your places in our absence as may supply any lack or inconvenience likely to arise in the managing of our affairs during the short times which we shall think fit to spend abroad from those places which are most commodious for the ordinary residence of our Council and officers of estate”. James I to the Privy Council (Westminster, 9/19 January 1605), Akrigg 246.
concerns and issues of less import could be weeded out or handled by the ministers back in London, while more significant matters could be addressed by the king himself.\textsuperscript{12} James took this seriously, but understood that not all petitions were the same:

Because our meaning is that all our magistrates and officers may know, on the one side, that we intend not to stop our ears to the just complaints of our people; and all other persons may know, on the other side, that wh ensever their own passion or partiality doth so far possess them as to suffer them slanderously or causelessly to forget the duties they owe to lawful authority, that all such insolencies shall be corrected with due severity.\textsuperscript{13}

Once again, the king of both and neither, following his \textit{via media}.

But the extent to which his absences from court did take the king out of the heart of the political maelstrom was itself part of the newly established Jacobean system. It helped maintain the distance required if the king were to portray himself as distinct and somewhat removed from his ministers and courtiers, and if the oppositional strategy were to continue to work. And all of this was consciously done. James addressed it openly in a number of letters to Cecil, and any reasonably attentive reading of this correspondence should make it immediately clear that most of the talk about hunting was actually as much about politics as it was about sport.\textsuperscript{14} James even

\textsuperscript{12} This was, in fact, the main explicit reason James gave for his decision: “considering now that in such a kingdom as this there must both foreign and domestical occasions daily rise which are fit to be considered of and despatched, some by our Council in general, some by a fewer number of them, according to the quality of the occasions, we think it meet, as well for the present as for hereafter, to give you this provisional authority and commandment”. James I to the Privy Council (Westminster, 9/19 January 1605), Akrigg 247. See also his repetition of this division-of-labor approach later in the letter, at Akrigg 248-249.

\textsuperscript{13} Akrigg 248.

\textsuperscript{14} For example: “And since ye have been so much used these three months past to hunt cold scents through the dry beaten ways of London, ye need not doubt but it will be easy for you to harbour a great stag amongst the sweet groves about your house. Only beware of drawing too greedily in the lyam [leash], for ye know how that trick hath already galled your neck. But in earnest, I lose all this year’s progress if I begin not to hunt there upon Monday come eight days, for the season of the year will no more stay upon a king than a poor man, and I doubt if the Constable of Castile hath any power in his commission to stay the course of the sun. Commend me to that other hardill [pack] of hounds that have so truly borne up the couples with you all this year, two of whom helped to hunt the Spanish game, but the third looks like one of my wife’s
made light in his letters to Cecil of the perception of his ministers having an inordinate amount of control, and he routinely and explicitly acknowledged their role doing the dirty work. James appears to have understood fully the important distinction between strategic distancing and the division of labor on the one hand, and an abdication of one’s royal responsibilities on the other. In one of his in-depth conversations with Sully, he went out of his way to demonstrate that his approach was not unlike that of Sully’s master, Henri IV, himself a great aficionado of the hunt and no stranger to effective political maneuvering, tacking from one side to another, and making good use of considerable personal charm. Sully did not disagree in the retelling, but interestingly saw all of this in explicit contrast to Spanish practices – what he referred to as “that blind credulity which the King of Spain had for the Duke of Lerma.” Whether Sully was right or not, the importance again lies in his perception, and in his thought to compare them directly.

countrymen both in colour and quantity. I must not also forget honest Stanhope that hath for our sins hunted all this year in inferno, that is, the lower regions. And so farewell and forget not to drink my health amongst you.” James I to Robert Cecil, Baron Essendon (July? 1604), Akrigg 233.

One particularly colorful example: “Ye and your fellows there are so proud now that ye have gotten the guiding again of a feminine court in the old fashion as I know not how to deal with you. Ye sit at your ease and directs all. The news from all the parts of the world comes to you in your chamber. The King’s own resolutions depends upon your posting despatches. And when ye list ye can (sitting in your bedsides) with one call or whistling in your fist make him to post night and day till he come to your presence.” James I to Robert Cecil, Baron Essendon (5/15 August 1604), Akrigg 234.

See, for example, his reference “To the little beagle that lyes at hoame by the fyre quhen all the goode houndis are daylie running on the feildis” and his subsequent reference to Cecil’s handling of matters with the earl of Cumberland on James’s behalf. James I to Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury (October 1605), Akrigg 260-263.

To demonstrate his point, James responded by showing that he not only kept an eye on his own affairs and ministers, but also on those of France – ticking off a number of things from the top of his head that Sully admitted even he himself had forgotten. Sully was clearly impressed by the king’s intelligence and his command of facts and events, and as we have seen, fully taken in by his charm. Sully, Memoirs, 370. Indeed, James’s claims and his demonstrated perspicacity here are confirmed in his correspondence around the same general period, showing the extent to which he was keeping close tabs on the goings-on about court. There are various letters of an almost conspiratorial nature involving James’s relations with his triumvirate of most powerful
Jacobean governance

Although some of the personnel would change, and the alliances at court and abroad would continue to shift, James would pursue this general approach to intertwined politics and governance throughout the course of his reign, and it operated on several strata. At its base was the factionalized court (and even council), with various offices and favors split between multiple competing centers of power. Above this was a smaller group or junta of key ministers and/or “favorites” that held sway at any given time, the members of which were connected to one or more of the factional groupings, and who James used to do the dirty work and much of the heavy lifting, but also who James played off against directly when necessary, and was willing to fully abandon if circumstances got bad enough. And above it all was, of course, the king himself, always on top, always playing the mediator (both domestic and international, and in each case both secular and religious), and for all parties involved: the sympathetic ear and way in.

To be sure, debate and competition could not be allowed to get out of hand. Internationally, minor conflicts had to be resolved before they could turn into all-out conflagrations, and England would repeatedly have a hand in the mediation and resolution of ministers, his so-called “trinity of knaves”: the “fat Chamberlain” (Suffolk), the “little cankered beagle” (Cecil), and the “tall black and coal-faced Keeper” (Northampton), which seem to deal out praise and chastisement in something of a balanced measure. See especially Akrigg 250-1 and 253-4. At one point in this correspondence, James even makes a direct reference to Northampton’s new Spanish pension [254], basically reminding him who his real master is, and warning him not to go too far. All of this also shows that the grand performance in front of Sully described in chapter four might very well have been at least partly to let them all know who was in charge, no matter how planned the whole episode may or may not have been beforehand. For the first half of the reign, most prominent here were James’s “trinity of knaves” (Cecil/Salisbury, Northampton, and Suffolk), and for the early years Dorset and Nottingham as well. Then a couple of successive royal favorites were added to this mix, connecting with some of these initial figures, and supplanting them as they died or retired from court, while also bringing with them their own favorites and allies. Most notable here were first Robert Carr, Viscount Rochester and eventually earl of Somerset, and then George Villiers, the eventual duke of Buckingham.
such disputes over the coming years.\textsuperscript{19} Domestically, true radicals occasionally needed to be reigned in, made an example of, or ostracized, which then further enhanced the perception of James as a traveler on the \textit{via media}. Nor was the king averse to cutting his ties with even the most trusted of personal servants if the political environment made it necessary or unavoidable.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, as a result of the peacemaking process and the attempt by virtually every European power to try to win over the new king, England became perhaps the most important diplomatic battleground in the entire international arena. As a result of James’s policies, London was the most prominent neutral territory where all of the great rivalries found themselves competing in one place – be they Spanish, French, Dutch, Flemish, Savoyards, Florentines, Venetians, or various others. Consequently, this ensured that both the domestic and international remained fundamentally intertwined here, which continued to fit James’s own political preferences perfectly, as both a monarch and a would-be international mediator. And as we shall see, this in turn was also part of what would allow for a further polarization of the English political nation in subsequent years.

Reasonable disagreement and debate can certainly be held over the nature of both intention and agency here: to what extent was James purposefully and knowingly establishing things in this way? And to what extent was James personally or exclusively responsible for these developments, as opposed to doing so in cooperation with his closest ministers? As in most things, it is quite likely that it was to a certain extent some mixture of both. I do, however,

\textsuperscript{19} This included a varied range of mediations in a number of disputes in 1604-1623. Some examples include: the Franco-Spanish tariff dispute immediately after the 1604 peace conference, continued attempts to help bring the Spanish and Dutch to the table, help in Jülich-Cleves, resolution of the Danish-Swedish war, playing the role of a steadying hand at the head of the Protestant League, and eventually the ill-fated attempt to reign in the conflict that would become the Thirty Years’ War.

\textsuperscript{20} Most notably: Somerset, Suffolk, Bacon, and to a lesser extent Cranfield/Middlesex.
believe that we have to start from the default assumption that James both knew what he was doing and was at least a prime mover in getting it done – rather than just assuming it was all happenstance and/or the work of his ministers by themselves. James’s previous experience in Scotland, his frequent stated preferences, his remarkable intellectual background, his love for debate, and the consistency of his words and actions on through to the end of his life all argue quite strongly for at least beginning any assessment of intentionality and agency by giving James the benefit of the doubt. At least in matters pertaining to his responsibilities, and to his kingcraft, the burden of proof must lie with those seeking to advance alternative explanations.

And with regard to the disagreements, factional competition, various debates and divisions within Jacobean England: it should not be surprising that James was comfortable with allowing them to persist, and even encouraging their competition. Indeed, in many ways James embodied the various complexities and contradictions of his age and the new society over which he ruled. Part of why he allowed the simultaneous coexistence and competition of both the various more reformed and more catholic-leaning groups at court was because he himself identified with (and saw many things to admire in) both. After all, James as both an individual and a king, through his upbringing and his family history, was the direct product of this amalgamated environment, in remarkably equal parts.

So the process that brought peace to pass – factionalization, encouragement of playing all sides off of one another, and James selling himself through it all as the indispensable figure and everyone’s friend – would continue to form the basis for the entire system of political (and with it religious and cultural) interaction over the two decades that followed. And all of this colored virtually everyone’s view of James, his kingdoms, and the limits of the possible for most of the rest of the reign. The Spaniards in particular saw that it was “contrary and repugnant to common
sense that a fortunate king who had recently come to be lord of diverse nations and Kingdoms differing in laws and Humors” would do anything to anger or provoke a great power like Spain. But this very logic was rooted from the start in their understanding of just how fractious and given to conspiracies James’s subjects were, so much so “that he always ha[d] to fear, having such restless spirits and friends of altercation” around him. They believed from the beginning that the new king had his hands full, and this belief would make all the difference.

Another look into how it was that the Spaniards perceived of England and its new king can be seen from Villamediana’s take on James’s speech at the opening of his first parliament.

In his report to the Constable in Flanders, the ambassador stressed the interconnectedness of James’s approach, with peace uniting each of his main concerns: the state of religion, the union with Scotland, and international affairs. It was all part of the same strategy, consistent with the concept of international brotherhood, and each relied upon the other. And yet even here, the belief in James’s place on their side, hampered by opposition from his own subjects, was clearly articulated, as “he said that he had found at his entrance into this Kingdom two Religions and one sect” – the two religions being catholicism and his own form of moderate protestantism, while the mere “sect” was that of the puritans. Villamediana saw James as being much closer in

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21 “Siendo tambien contrario y repugnante al senso comun que un Rey bien abentajado que de nuevo biene a ser señor de naciones y Reynos diversos diferente de leyes y Umore en el qual ayt tantas ocassiones de Divisiones particularmente la de la religion de las que les se puede prevaler un enemigo aya de enojar un tal Rey como el de España antes que aya estableçido su estado emprender una guerra en ninguna manera neçessaria aviendo visto a esta su nueva entrada en el Reyno quien menos ha fomentado la ultima conspiracion que siempre ha de temer aviendo espiritus en el tan inquietos y amigos de alteracions.” From an anonymous informant’s report labeled “Advertimientos de un pensionario del Rey nuestro señor que no dixo su nombre.” AGS Estado, leg. 841, doc 143, ff.1v-2.

22 Again, in this regard my view may seem to be perhaps closest to that of W.B. Patterson. But while Patterson sees James as a uniter, moderator, and a calming and ecumenical influence, I would argue that although he portrayed himself as a uniter, he was in fact a divider, who then used this division to negotiate a middle path. But the creation of division was tempting fate, and despite all its real successes, it would ultimately reap the whirlwind.
his views to the pope and the French and Spanish kings than he was to his more fractious
subjects, and he saw in James’s call for a general council of all Christendom a direct and explicit
connection between his efforts at international peace and domestic union, and his ecumenical
endeavors.23

Nor was this only about the views of the highest policy-makers, as the same sorts of ideas
also formed an important part of the public perception of James and his kingdoms throughout the
Spanish dominions. For example, in describing the duke of Lerma’s banquet thrown for the
Lord Admiral on 28 May/7 June 1605, the Spanish chronicler shows the importance of the claim
that the peace was able to be made because Spain and James, as King James VI of Scotland, had
never been at war. This once again demonstrates the effectiveness of both James’s protestations
of this and the Spanish use of it to save face in a way that they would not have been able to do if
they had tried to sue for peace with Elizabeth.24 And everything we have seen in chapters eight
and nine about the public reception of the British visitors in Spain and the constant
proclamations of love for James bears this out.

This approach would continue, as successive English ambassadors to Spain pushed this
point home repeatedly over the coming years, frequently reminding Philip, Lerma, and anyone

23 “[D]ixo que avia hallado en su entrada en este Reyno dos Religiones y una seta, La Religion
que el profesava que tenia por la çierta, y la Catholica que el la estimava por la antigua y
fundamento de la Suya y la primitiva, y la Seta la de los puritanos, y que assi como el deseava
traelles paz con Estrangeros en los cuerpos teniendola con todos los Reyes Christianos, se la
traya para las almas y que pluguises a Dios que El de España y Françia y todos quisiesen venir a
un Conçilio General de todas naçiones, porque si los Papistas se llegasen a el en algunas cossas,
como el lo haria a ellos en otras que todo se podria acordar y que el de Suyo era Inclinado a La
Paz, y que assi la procuraria en quanto pudiese con todos los Reyes Christianos, y que solo lo
que le haria salir a la guerra seria offensa propia que nadie le hiziese ni a su pueblo, y que quanto
da Prinçipe temporal tenia obligacion al Obispo de Roma.” Villamediana to Constable (London,
27 March/6 April 1604). AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 88, 90-92, ff.4v-5.
24 In describing Lerma’s invitation to the Lord Admiral, he emphasizes “la buena inteligencia
que desde España se tuvo siempre con el serenísimo Jacobo VI, Rey de Escocia, que ahora es
Primero deste nombre en Inglaterra”. Relación de lo sucedido, 65.
who would listen that James was the reason that they had peace, while so many of his subjects had supposedly hated the idea. Sir Charles Cornwallis, for example, put this strategy to use right after his arrival in April 1605 in La Coruña, claiming that despite the will of the king, a majority of Englishmen were in fact against the peace, and so Spain needed to behave itself, if it did not want to see a quick return to war. And we saw how he emphasized this when speaking with the church officials about the denial of burial for the English sailor in that same town. This would indeed become the standard line, used with both church and secular officials, to continue to encourage this perception of the English king, and it worked. So much so, that as we can see in the quote from John Digby (English ambassador to Spain in the 1610s and early 1620s) that opens this chapter, James was actually being encouraged explicitly by those below him to continue to operate in this way, more than ten years after his accession: “For when they shall beleeve that the peace wholy and singly is uphelde by your Majesties will, they will bee very heedy to observe your Majestie are not to give your any distast leaste you mighte thereby bee induced to give way to that your subjects so generally desire.”

**Sketches of Spain**

As we saw in chapter nine, the English were also learning a great deal about how Spanish government worked in the reign of Philip III, which would give them a good idea of what to

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25 Take, for example, Villamediana’s words upon leaving England in September 1605: “I will go to Spain and report to my master the ill-will, not of the King, who is only too good, but of those who rule him. I was the author and the mediator of the peace, but now I see they do not intend to observe it, save in appearance, and it may be that I shall be the cause of my master making reprisals in kind,’ and much else.” As quoted in Nicolo Molin, Venetian Ambassador in England, to the Doge and Senate of Venice (18/28 September 1605), CSPVen X, 275. Italian original, in cipher. Villamediana left on 1/11 Sept 1605, so that is when this quote would have been said.

26 John Digby (English Ambassador to Spain) to James I (Madrid, 31 October/10 November 1613), TNA: PRO SP 94/20, f.148.
expect in the coming years. This included a similar understanding of both central and local government, an awareness of various strategies such as the skillful use of delay and the shifting of responsibility both up and down the ladder, and a political structure not all that unlike what I have just described was taking hold in England. To be sure, at least in the first half of the reign, factionalization in Spain was much less overt, Lerma was in a position of supreme dominance at court, and he appears to have been a much more powerful and active decision maker than any possible English counterparts – however overdrawn the traditional portrait of Philip III has been shown to have been. But this was still a similarly stratified political structure, from king/favorite down through juntas, councils, and lesser offices. This was still an intensely competitive place where rivalries played out both in contests of verse and struggles at arms. And if anything, the monarch, his family, and his valido were all presented as even more distinct and above the fray than the position that James had been busily carving out for himself.

The English were also coming to understand and appreciate the precise aims of Philip and Lerma’s foreign policy. As the English spy Thomas Wilson reported home, this too looked a great deal like the Spaniards’ perception of James’s own approach:

> though the counsell of warr and most of them of state doe inclyne to the contrarye, the Duke of Lerma loves peace, and that makes best for him, both for the aggrandisinge his house and his other deseignes in soe much that when the counsells have deliberated and concluded upon a matter one way, he…persuadeth the Kinge to resolve the contrarye, which beginnes to breed a great Δυσαρέσκεια [resentment] in the state.\(^{27}\)

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\(^{27}\) Van Castre to de Veras [Wilson to Cecil] (4/14 January 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/9, ff.133v-134. Wilson’s take on Lerma from another letter around the same time shows a similarly perceptive view of the king’s valido. He describes the duke of Lerma’s approach to policy as, amongst other things: “The urginge soe earnestly and importuninge Peace with England, Truce with Holland, Holding on with France. Sendinge away about other busines or puttine out of authoritye those which may be opposite to the desiegne, drawing the Kinge to those quarters and houses without the Queen, without any of the counsells save some picked out persons, without the Secretary of State Prada and other principale persons who remayne heer, without any Ambassadors or ministers of Princes because they will have noe l___ eys to prye into actions, and many other thinges done ther which nowe seeme all to drawe from the pointe of this
But the English understood that this was not just about Lerma’s personal motives. After all, for the past several years, they had been paying close attention to the shift towards an attitude of conservación that had marked the policies of the new regime in Spain. It was even explicitly expressed in English arguments for peace as far back as 1598, just before the old king died:

> It is likelie that experyence hath taught him the error of those Counsellors who advised hime to reduce the Lowe Countries to other state then such as his Father held them in, and that he wilbe glade to enjoye them nowe in that manner. And for the humor of Revenge profe of ymposibilitie to effect doth ever appease mens passions.28

And as we saw in the previous chapter, this was confirmed and encouraged by Cornwallis in his take on the lay of the land once he had gotten himself established at the Spanish court, when he spoke of his king’s crucial role in achieving the peace, which was “soe soveraigne a medicine for their sicke estate.”29 Once again, we see not merely Spanish support for a policy of peace, but the ambassador taking every opportunity to link this support to the person of King James, while emphasizing the opposition he faced in his factionalized court. The two regimes’ respective approaches were in this way mutually reinforcing.

This understanding of the policy aims of their former foes was accompanied by a sober awareness of just what the realities of Spanish power were in this newly defined international system. We saw in chapters eight and nine how the English and Scottish visitors witnessed up close at least two dramatically contrasting views of Spain and its power – from extreme dearth

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28 “Considerations for the peace nowe in Speache”, July 1598, BL Cotton Mss, Galba D xii, f.194
29 Charles Cornwallis to James I (Valladolid, 9/19 July 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.42v.
on the one hand, to stunning magnificence on the other. In addition to the combination of sympathy and attraction that these respective views produced, this awareness also helped underscore the seriousness of the Spaniards’ plight, and confirmed their commitment to keeping the peace with the British king. Even for those who had no real affection for Iberia or its advances, this promised some measure of stability in foreign policy. Spain would still project itself as a major power with continent- and even world-spanning ambitions, and it had a great deal to offer to those who would be its friends. But the seriousness of its current circumstances made it clear that unnecessary wars and irresponsible acts of aggression were not going to be part of its foreign relations toolkit any time in the immediately foreseeable future. Cornwallis encapsulated the nature of this Spanish duality perfectly when he wrote to James: “that of noe estate in this world may bee more truly said that it is a proud miserie and a miserable felicitie.”

**Perceptions**

The peace had built a solid foundation, but it had also, importantly, left a number of issues unsaid or undecided for the time being. And yet, perhaps counterintuitively, this seeming failure was in fact one of the peace process’s greatest strengths. For it gave various people on both sides reason to hope for further progress in the future, and the Constable’s and especially the Lord Admiral’s embassies played a particularly important role in aiding these perceptions. As a result, there would be groups in each country pushing for further developments, and now that peace was achieved the relationship would center around various attempts to bring England and Spain even closer together.

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30 Charles Cornwallis to James I (Valladolid, 9/19 July 1605), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.42v.
As we have seen throughout our story, and as is the case with any tale of cultural contact, perceptions were at least as important as whatever we might refer to as “reality” in a given situation. The achievement of peace owed a great deal to certain perceptions that each side had of the other in general, and of specific individuals, and many of these perceptions were carefully constructed and nourished by those being perceived in order to help bring about a desired outcome. This was true of James before his accession, of the Jacobean court from the accession to the treaty, and of the celebrations at the Spanish court in 1605. This would not change, as the subsequent attempts to maintain and even strengthen the peace would rely a great deal on the nature of perceptions, and upon the continued attempt to manipulate them.

When considering perceptions and the relationship as a whole, a definite pattern begins to emerge, even at this early a stage. While relief that the war was over led to celebratory responses in both countries, it can certainly be said that the Spaniards were on the whole ultimately more willing to view the English favorably, than vice versa. This is especially true if one does not consider the opinions of the relatively sizeable English catholic minority, and only talks about comparing protestant Englishmen and catholic Spaniards. Of course, a big part of this had to do precisely with the existence of this minority English religious group, who had no similar counterpart in Spain. Throughout this period, the Spaniards – from commoners to kings – would remain continually aware of the plight of their English coreligionists, making them that much more willing to try to achieve a successful, stable relationship with the English crown that would alleviate the suffering of catholics in England. English protestants had no such emotional ties to bind them in this way.

A second reason why Spaniards were ultimately more willing to see the English in a positive light had to do with the nature of the war. The end of war for the peninsula was a big
relief, particularly on the north coast, in Portugal, and the Andalucían shoreline in and around Cádiz. After all, the Spaniards and Portuguese were the ones having their homes attacked and their harbors raided. They were the ones dying in their own streets, and on their own shores. The same was not generally true for the English. As difficult as the war had been, for most of the English it was more about the fear of what might happen in the future, rather than what already had. The war itself was in a certain sense an external event for them. Even at the moment of greatest apparent threat, in the Armada scare of 1588, the ships did not make landfall. The soldiers did not disembark. Indeed, the very absence of such an event on that particular occasion was central to the creation of a national myth of virtual invulnerability that would only grow with time. So for the English, the Spanish war was nowhere near the hellish experience that changed the very nature of everyday life that it was for so many of the inhabitants of the Iberian peninsula. This allowed for fonder, more glorified memories of the war to develop in subsequent years in England than was the case for their erstwhile enemies.

A third major difference in the two countries’ attitudes visible at this point concerned the realities of the international system itself. While Spain had long been perceived by many in England to be the greatest threat to peace in Europe, and to the very survival of their established religion, this level of hostility was simply not reciprocated. After all, in a political and military sense, despite the real need for peace with England, the Spaniards had bigger fish to fry. Their rivalry with France was characterized by a much more significant, deeply felt, and broadly negative sense of animosity and urgency than any prolonged conflict with England. And their ongoing war with the Dutch – considered by them to be rebels against rightful Habsburg rule and possibly the greatest threat to their empire in the Indies – rated significantly higher as well. There was also the continued struggle in the Mediterranean with the Ottoman Turks, which was a
particularly high priority for some of the most powerful Spanish ministers, most notably the duke of Lerma himself.

In the process of achieving peace, the English had been able to push the Habsburgs as far as possible, arguing a hard line, and yet still managed to keep from chasing them away. And their ability to do so owed a great deal to the presence and participation of King James, and to the Habsburgs’ perception of him. This meant a treaty that the English liked, and yet one which the Habsburgs were willing to accept – because they felt that once peace was signed, they could rely on the goodwill of the man in charge to ensure enforcement of its articles, or at least to supplement what they might be able to achieve from within this factionalizing court. This combination of an apparently friendly king and a growing interest group in his capital would then help ensure that the aspects of the treaty favorable to them would be carried out, and that the less favorable aspects would be mitigated or ameliorated in some sort of way.

And of course, once again, this was precisely the position that James and his ministers wanted to be in. James was confirmed that much further in his position as the “way in”: to be suited, flattered, and his goodwill always sought. While at the same time, the Spaniards could attempt to gain further influence by spending their time and treasure cultivating those of the king’s ministers and courtiers whom they felt might be most amenable to their advances, by means of ideology, money, or both.

All of this, combined with the undeniable truth of Spanish power and reputación, (whatever the difficulties) and the significantly smaller number of Spaniards in Britain than Britons in Spain, meant that Spain was also much more likely to exert a notable influence upon James’s subjects than vice versa. This made a big difference. The English were considered heretics, to be sure, but the attempt to convert the nation by force had been shown to have been
an unsuccessful one, so Spaniards joined their sympathy and religious zeal to the needs of reason of state, and set about trying to win what we might call “hearts and minds”.

Hispanophilia & faction in England

So what about the particular group created most directly by the achievement of peace? The conventional view of a corrupt, catholic, treasonous Spanish faction at the court of James I is badly overdrawn, and the truth about Hispanophilia in England is something much more complicated. With the achievement of peace, in addition to the already strong connection of many English catholics to all things Spanish, a small but strong pro-Spanish interest group developed in various segments of the non-catholic English populace. This included powerful elites, be they crypto-catholic, poliête, or just concerned about other things. But it also included merchants, ship-owners and other naval workers, traveler-adventurers, and various men of learning and cultural refinement. The Spanish monarchy was still the greatest power in Europe, and there were many reasons that Englishmen might find it an attractive and even fascinating influence.

The Spaniards openly encouraged the positive aspects of this attraction, and they did everything they could to use the peace as an opportunity to bring England closer to them. As we have seen, they now spoke of following a “segundo camino” – a second way – which emphasized the attempt to win over the English through persuasion and conversion if possible. Despite some initial difficulties playing catch-up with their international rivals, upon his arrival

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31 For the explicit admission of the failure of the policy of violence, both by the Spanish ministers and by the Pope himself, see the discussion of the political decisions with regard to Elizabeth’s death and James’s accession in chapters two and three.

32 This phrase was used in meetings of the council of state, and was (as described above in chapter two) first proposed by the count of Chinchón, 11/21 April 1603, immediately after arrival of the news of Elizabeth’s death. AGS, Estado, leg. 2557, doc.1, f.1v.
in 1603 ambassador Villamediana was quick to draw up a long and detailed list of possible Spanish allies in the English government. And before long pensions had been assigned. These went not only to people in positions of reasonably important strategic or political access—such as Admiral Monson or Jane Drummond, the queen’s closest confidant—but also to some of the very leaders at court, such as Northampton, Dorset, Suffolk, George Home, and even Robert Cecil himself. While treasonous activity is hard to pin down here, it is clear that this money did help at least to ensure a more open-minded hearing of Spanish interests at the English court. Several of these men had been commissioners for the peace, and they combined to form a consistent group that handled Spanish affairs in the council after the treaty was signed. But in the Jacobean system, these pensions were not in fact unusual, and the Spaniards continually bemoaned their financial disadvantage. As late as 1617, it seems that France may still have been spending more than three times as much, and the Dutch more than six times as much as Spain was in England. Equal-opportunity international bribery: yet another way in which Jacobean foreign and domestic policy continually reinforced one another.

Despite this primary concern for reason of state, the Habsburg leaders also continued to work unceasingly for an easing of the burden on England’s catholics, often to their own apparent strategic detriment. In fact, it is remarkable just how often this issue comes up in correspondence and consultas, in reference to the feelings not only of elites, but of people of every station. Spaniards clearly cared deeply about their English coreligionists, and this found

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33 See both AGS, Estado, leg. 840, doc.118 and AGS, Estado, leg.841, doc.118 (strange coincidence of identical document numbers, but different legajos).
34 AGS, Estado, leg. 841, doc.99; AGS, Estado, leg. 2512, docs.15, 16; AGS, Estado, leg. 2514, doc.3; AGS, Estado, leg. 2557, docs.44-45.
35 AGS, Estado, leg. 2863, doc.34.
36 For some insight on how this played out in the peace negotiations, and discussion of the issue in subsequent years, see the many published works of Albert J. Loomie, SJ., cited above.
expression in everything from their active support of seminaries to their voracious appetite for English news. Even Cervantes, the author of *Don Quixote*, weighed in on this, writing a popular novella called *La Española Inglesa* ("the English Spanish lady"), that immortalized this sympathetic outlook.\(^{37}\)

In addition to the pensions, and in significant part thanks to the doors and minds they opened, the Spanish undertook a conscious and determined path of what we might call early modern “public diplomacy” in order to try to bring England’s elites into sympathetic support for their culture, religion, and interests. This project was consciously elaborated by Philip, Lerma, and various of the other main Habsburg lights from the beginning. It was emphasized in the language of the *segundo camino* both in the council of state and in the papal correspondence. It was put on display in a host of overwhelming and well-attended public events that received a great deal of popular attention and comment in both countries. And it was exercised skillfully by consecutive ambassadors to the English court, whose entourages and embassies brought with them not only priests and chapels, but also Spanish goods, fashions, and literature.

And the Spaniards had real success in drawing English men and women to them – creating something of an epidemic of conversions to their cause and their religion amongst England’s leading classes. Before long, there was even a sort of secret convent for English girls in London, operated by an expatriate noblewoman, María Luisa de Carvajal, a real-life *Española Inglesa* who counted as one of her principal and intensely interested patrons Rodrigo Calderón,\(^ {37}\)

\(^{37}\) Indeed, *Don Quixote* itself, immensely popular in both countries, was one of the first examples of cultural and intellectual interchange after the peace. The first part was published in Valladolid in early 1605, and was the talk of the court and city by the time of the arrival of Lord Admiral Nottingham and his extraordinary embassy of some 700 Englishmen and Scots in May – some of whom brought copies of the book home with them – the great work’s first appearance in England.
the duke of Lerma’s right-hand man.\textsuperscript{38} And while some of those drawn into Spanish orbit had more recent catholic family connections, many of them did not. Take, for example, James Wadsworth, the protestant minister for the English embassy in Spain, who converted to catholicism not long after his arrival in Valladolid in 1605. Or perhaps more prominently, the heir of the Cecils, Lord Roos. This scion of one of the great protestant families of England did not merely flee to the continent as a result of the scandal involving his in-laws as has usually been assumed. He was in fact a secret Spanish agent, who kept in close contact with ambassador Gondomar and the Spanish council of state, writing under the false name of “Don Gonçalo Mexía”.\textsuperscript{39} He fled when he felt he was no longer safe in England, traveling with the Spanish embassy’s confessor to seek refuge at the papal court in Rome, and ultimately died in Naples under further suspicious circumstances. These are just a couple of the host of relevant examples that complicate the traditional explanations given for English support of Spanish ideas and interests. It was, as often as not, attraction to Spain that drew people towards similarities in religion and ideology, as it was similarities in religion and ideology that drew them towards Spain.\textsuperscript{40}

Despite these successes, the Spaniards’ understanding of the way in which English politics worked continued to emphasize the importance of King James as the indispensable figure, as their “way in”. And this was in large part due to James’s own further efforts at

\textsuperscript{38} The most recent take on this extraordinary woman is: Glyn Redworth, \textit{The She-Apostle: The Extraordinary Life and Death of Luisa de Carvajal} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

\textsuperscript{39} See especially the letters in: Biblioteca del Palacio Real, Madrid (BPR), Mss II/2546.

\textsuperscript{40} For a somewhat contrasting view on this, see: Simon Adams, "Spain or the Netherlands? The Dilemmas of Early Stuart Foreign Policy," in \textit{Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Politics and Government}, ed. Howard Tomlinson (New York: St. Martin's, 1983). While I agree with much of his take in general, Adams essentially portrays factional alignments as exclusively a reflection of pre-existing, competing ideas and ideologies. He also tends to describe things in what I would argue are overly simplified terms, as polarized throughout – pro-Dutch vs. pro-Spanish – in contrast to the more multipolar approach offered here.
portraying himself as ruling over a polycentric, factionalized country. He and his surrogates continually emphasized his sympathy with Spain on numerous issues, but claimed that the opposition of his people or important groups amongst them (such as the “puritans”, or the Scots, or the commons) was what was standing in the way and tying his hands. Whatever his true thoughts, James was surely happy for the political cover of factionalization, which allowed him to stay friendly without having to actually commit himself to too much of anything. And the Spaniards continued to believe his sincerity – or at least to say and behave like they did. A fact which James understood full well, and of which he made effective use, from the Constable’s initial observations in 1604, all the way through the collapse of the relationship in the last year of the king’s life.41

**A Spanish match**

Consequently, it makes sense that just as the achievement of peace had provided an issue around which the foundation of this relationship was established, the central issue around which the Anglo-Spanish relationship would turn in the years to come would be one directly connected to the king and to the attempt to make the connection even closer still. After the peace was signed, the attempt to maintain it was dominated by one particular project: negotiations for a closer alliance between the two countries, sealed by a marriage between the monarchs’ children. Contrary to most takes on it up until now, the negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match were not a sideshow, a later development, or an ultimate act of desperation by an apparently overmatched king trying to put the genie back in the bottle in the early 1620s. Rather, they were absolutely

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41 It is true that, from even before James’s English accession, Spaniards expressed their doubts about James. But of course they did. What is remarkable is not this, but rather that despite this, the Spanish and Flemish rulers and leading ministers nevertheless continued to hold out hope for James, continued to negotiate with him, and continued to behave as if he were the most useful potential ally all the way through until the end of his reign.
crucial to the entire connection, from the beginning of James’s reign, right on through until the end.

As the relationship deepened, this particular issue brought together foreign policy and public opinion like nothing before, providing simultaneous forces of attraction and repulsion, and helping articulate both in each country. Many Spaniards, as concerned catholics, saw the match as an opportunity to try to convert the English from above. Puritans and many commoners in Britain saw it as a Popish plot to corrupt their religion. Consecutive Spanish kings saw a marriage alliance as a way to either keep the peace, or at least keep the British kingdoms neutral in any continental conflicts in which Spain might became entangled. And King James saw it as the very cornerstone of his pacific diplomacy: a crucial step in a very real attempt to bring an end to the struggle between catholics and protestants that had been tearing Christendom apart for generations. This was an issue debated at the council table and in the streets, discussed in parliament and pulpit, for a good part of more than twenty years. And yet, as with so much else here, there has been very little work on this topic in decades, and hardly anything truly new written since the Victorian era.42

Typically referred to as the “negocio principal,” or the “great matter,” talk of an Anglo-Spanish match in some form or another had actually begun long before James’s accession to the

42 While various works deal with it to some extent, the last really comprehensive approach to the issue of the match and to the connection as a whole was written in the nineteenth century: Gardiner, *Prince Charles and the Spanish Marriage*. For a significant printed primary source and general overview of the Victorian take on the history of the match, see: Samuel Rawson Gardiner, ed., *Narrative of the Spanish Marriage Treaty: El Hecho de Los Tratados del Matrimonio Pretendido Por El Principe de Gales Con La Serenissima Infante de España Maria, Tomado Desde Sus Principios Para Maior Demostracion de La Verdad, Y Ajustado Con Los Papeles Originales Desde Consta Por El Maestro F. Francisco de Jesus, Predicador del Rey Nuestro Señor. Edited and Translated by Samuel Rawson Gardiner.* (Westminster: J.B. Nichols and Sons, 1869). As for my take on the one recent book that addresses this issue in some detail, please see chapter one, note six.
English throne. When James had been trying to secure his position as Elizabeth’s eventual successor, he had had surrogates in Rome and Madrid participating in active talks about the possibility of marrying at least one of his children off to one of the Catholic King’s closest relatives, with the leading candidates being the princes and princesses of the house of Savoy, who were the children of Duchess Catalina Michaela, Philip III’s sister. These particular negotiations began as early as 1596, when James’s eldest son Henry was just two years old, and continued right on through until Queen Elizabeth’s final illness.  Although this marriage would technically be with Savoy, the Savoyard princes were nephews and grandchildren of consecutive Spanish kings, and this was understood to be a Spanish alliance from the start. It was discussed in this way time and time again in the Spanish council of state, conceived of by both sides as a means of bringing Scotland into the Habsburg orbit, and spoken of directly as such by Philip, who said that it should be attractive to James precisely because in his position “nothing could be so good as union with Spain”.

Marriage diplomacy was, of course, a centerpiece of European politics and international relations of the day. James’s immediate predecessor Elizabeth had used it extensively in the first half of her reign to help balance the various forces that might end up arrayed against her.  And perhaps most famously, the Habsburgs themselves had made the strategic use of royal marriages

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43 For the first reference to any contact of this sort, see “Suma de los Memoriales que Juan Ogleby Baron Escoces embiado por el Rey de Escocia a su Magd Catholica en favor de una liga entre los dos Reyes”, translated as “A Summary of the Memorials which John Ogleby a Scotch Baron, Envoy from the King of Scotland to his Catholick Majesty, for promoting a League between the two Kings, and of what John Cecil an English Priest, on the Behalf of the Earls and other Catholick Lords of Scotland presented in Opposition to the same, at the City of Toledo, in the Months of May and June, 1596”, Winwood I, 1-15.
44 “[P]areçe que al de Escoçia ninguna cossa le puede estar tan bien como la union de España”, AGS, Est., leg. 2557, doc. 1, f.3. King’s response in margin.
such a central part of their construction of a number of interconnected empires that the widely known motto of their house had become: “Bella gerant alii, tu felix Austria nube.”

Marriage diplomacy would be particularly important for King James, given the unique combination of his family history, upbringing, temperament, and the nature of his specific domestic and international political needs. For the king of “both and neither” – always playing various groups off against one another and then searching for the via media – the strategic use of his children as pawns in the on-again, off-again negotiations of this type was a perfect fit. He was well practiced in such methods from his experience balancing the factions in Scotland, and marriage diplomacy would continue to play a prominent role in James’s navigation and portrayal of domestic politics in his kingdoms. Indeed, despite his admonitions to the contrary in the Basilicon Doron, a number of the matches he presided over at court were of mixed protestant-catholic vintage. These were big state occasions, where the king tried to use the connection as a means of expressing his ecumenical message and reveling in the role of uniter. And of course, even though it did not start out as such, even James’s own marriage had provided the king with years of experience dealing with a religiously complicated marriage, and using the public knowledge and various perceptions of that to his political advantage.

A central component of these early, pre-accession negotiations with Spain was the explicit understanding that such a match would include sending James’s heir, Prince Henry, to be raised at the Spanish court. From the frequency with which this is mentioned as a fundamental

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46 Translation: “Let others wage war; thou, happy Austria, marry.”
47 For example: the earl of Mar and his second wife, Mary Stewart (the 1st duke of Lennox’s daughter); Mar’s son and his catholic wife; the earl of Essex and Frances Howard (bringing together the son of the late champion of the protestant cause and the daughter of the traditionally catholic house), and Lord and Lady Hay.
48 For the specifics of one such match, see: Ferrell, "The Sacred, the Profane, and the Union: Politics of Sermon and Masque at the Court Wedding of Lord and Lady Hay."
part of the deal, and as something actually suggested by those negotiating on the Scottish king’s behalf, it appears that this was either something that James considered doing, or at the very least something that he wanted the right people to think that he was considering doing. This is important because in the occasional times that the possibility of a match early in James’s English reign has come up in the historical literature it has been almost invariably dismissed as something that both sides were not serious about, and which was abandoned right away precisely because of the religious question. But in passing over the details here and mapping a later, rigidly protestant viewpoint onto what was in fact a much more flexible, earlier reality, we lose the entire context and fail to understand the nature of perceptions, motivations, and possibilities on both sides.

While the long history of pre-accession negotiations for a Spanish match indicates that talk of such a possibility around the achievement of the peace was far from some sort of fanciful idea quickly dismissed, the long history of James’s behavior with regard to his own offspring gives us even greater insight into just how seriously he may have considered allowing at least one of them to convert in his and his kingdoms’ strategic interest. It also fits in quite well with everything we have seen of the king throughout, and tells us something about his subsequent behavior with regard to domestic factions and international rivalries. For James had already been using his children as pawns to balance opposing domestic factions and religious groupings since the time that they were infants. As we saw in chapter four, Prince Henry had been raised by the very protestant earl of Mar, while Princess Elizabeth had been brought up in the catholic household of Lord Livingstone. This was part of a conscious and public attempt to please all those watching, both at home and abroad, and in typically Jacobean fashion to keep as many options open as possible. So not only had James’s agents been negotiating with the Spaniards
about the possibility of a match that would require his eldest son to be brought up at the Habsburg court, but James had already spent years showing how he was perfectly willing to let at least one of his children be raised a catholic.

Given all of this, it should come as no surprise to us that the Spaniards would have brought the match up again at James’s accession – as we saw in chapter two that they did – nor that they would keep talking about the possibility all through the year’s lead-up to the peace negotiations. It was not unreasonable for the Spaniards – and indeed, everyone else – to believe that a match with the new English king might actually bring about more lenient policies towards catholicism, possible toleration, and perhaps even religious conversion. As with so much else, this helps us understand just how central all of this – marriage diplomacy, factional balancing, the via media, and so forth – was to James’s approach to every aspect of his kingship, from long before he even became king of England. Of course, as with everything else, the continued belief in James’s hands being tied kept the Habsburgs from expecting too much too soon. But there was reason to believe in the possibility of real change down the road, and so the Spaniards were drawn in further, and their continued pursuit of the issue would become the centerpiece around which the relationship turned straight on through the following two decades.

**Closer together**

After the accession, there was a gradual shift towards an awareness of James’s firm establishment in his new kingdom, in what was now a position of much greater power and prestige. As a result, alongside the general ambassadorial inundation of that first year came talk of possible suitors from all over, including almost immediate discussion of a French match, as
well as a serious push for a Florentine one, complete with a formal offer. All of this was a constant feature of court gossip at the time, and the Spaniards factored into it right from the start. Upon his arrival in England, Villamediana found himself giving a great deal of focus to the possibility of what would now (given James’s new position of greater import) be a marriage not just with a scion of Savoy, but with an infanta of Spain. After a summer of speculations from afar, it appears that this new iteration was first formally introduced in conversation with Queen Anna in mid-October 1603, after which point the discussions of a possible Anglo-Spanish match became a regular part of the ambassador’s correspondence back home up through the peace conference and beyond. It was precisely at this time that Villamediana was beginning his conversations with Lady Suffolk, Thomas Lake, and other councilors and confidants about the possibility of a lump sum to help secure the peace. The week after first discussing the match with the queen, several of these people came to see him one night, and suggested that there were three things that the king of Spain could do in order to ensure peace with England. First, promise

49 Villamediana reported on the offer in early November, and reported that neither James nor Anna liked it at all, which caused a bit of diplomatic consternation when Anna refused to even respond when the Florentine ambassador approached her about it. He was taken aback, but as she explained to a third party, “she did not need to respond because her son had no need of becoming a merchant” (“no tenia que responder por que su hijo no tenia necesidad de ser mercader”). Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 24 October/3 November 1603), received 14/24 December 1603, AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 153bis, ff.2-2v.

50 The first serious correspondence back home for him dealing with actual developments on this particular issue appears to have been the three documents he sent by way of express courier on 13/23 October 1603, detailing his mid-October private audience and subsequent exchange with Queen Anna, enclosed with a dispatch to Philip III laying out his thoughts on the matter. In it, he discussed the queen’s catholicism, their conversations about a match, the English commissioners’ questions about whether he had full powers to treat for peace, and his belief that the proposal for a Florentine match was directly connected to the attempt to derail the peace negotiations. As he explains on f.2 of doc 181, f.2, he thought that all of this material was of such import that he sent it by this special courier in order so that it would arrive in Spain before the king and council could respond to his previous dispatches, sent on 2/12 October. Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 12/22 October 1603), received 26 October/5 November 1603, AGS Estado 840, docs 181-183.
the Dutch protestants freedom of conscience if they would agree to join in on the peace treaty.

Second, grant James’s subjects free trade to the Indies. And third, agree to a match between
Prince Henry and the Infanta Ana. 51 In response, the ambassador dismissed the Indies talk as a
thing that they should not even mention if they were serious about peace with Spain. And he
turned the freedom of conscience point on its head, suggesting that, while they were at it, James
should grant the same freedom to the English catholics. But what is perhaps most interesting
here is his response on the question of the match. He dealt with it first, and tied it in no uncertain
terms directly to the importance of the religious situation in England, and to the work that would
need to be done towards its resolution. 52 This is a good example of just how intertwined all of
the key issues between these two countries were, how both sides saw them as such, and how the
continuing negotiations for an Anglo-Spanish match would serve as a unifying thread through
which all of the main concerns could continue to be addressed. Rather than cut off debate, these
talks intensified, and formed a significant portion of much of Villamediana’s and the Constable’s
correspondence with King Philip and each other over the months between the former’s arrival in
England and the beginning of the peace talks proper. 53

51 Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 13/23 October 1603), received 26 October/5
November 1603, AGS Estado 840, doc 264. Although none of the documents indicate as much
explicitly, this must have been part of the same express courier’s package as the previous letters
mentioned [docs 181-183], as they were dated on subsequent days, and all arrived in Valladolid
on the same date.
52 Villamediana to Philip III (Southampton, 13/23 October 1603), received 26 October/5
November 1603, AGS Estado 840, doc 264, f.1v.
53 For some examples, see: “Copia de Villete para El conde de Villamediana escrita de un
confidente” (4/14 November 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 84; Villamediana to Philip III
(Salisbury, 5/15 November 1603); AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 151; “Relación sacada de avisos
dados al Conde de Villamediana por un confidente,” AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 140; “Avisos de
Londres” (18/28 December 1603), AGS Estado, leg. 840, doc 138; Constable to Villamediana
(Brussels, 24 December1603/3 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 135; Constable to
Philip III (Brussels, 26 December 1603/5 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 134 & 136.
So when we add the long pre-accession history and James’s apparent willingness to have his children raised catholics to what we know of Queen Anna’s interests, her encouragement of Villamediana’s advances, and James’s successful portrayal of himself as the sympathetic ear whose hands were for the time being tied, a very different picture begins to emerge about the subsequent relations between these countries, and the possibilities for an even closer alliance. The traditional view, best expressed by Gardiner, holds that the match was mentioned briefly around the time of the peace, but that it was immediately clear that it would be impossible to effect because of difficulties over religion, and that it was therefore quickly shelved, not to be brought up again until 1611, and then only briefly and unrealistically before falling into the background again until later in the decade. In this view, it only became a truly central issue at the end of that decade, when international events made it that much more urgent, and yet consequently so much more difficult. But this is all based on the assumption by later English historians that any possibility of religious concessions or compromise between the leading protestant and catholic powers was absurd, and on their subsequent reading of that assumption back onto the perceptions of the people at the time. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth, and this timeline bears little resemblance to reality.

The match was in fact a central issue throughout the entire reign of James I. When Spaniards spoke of religion as an obstacle standing in the way of a match, it was not in order to dismiss it out of hand as the expression of an insurmountable difficulty that made all talk of such matters useless. Rather, it was expressed as the only thing standing in the way of a closer connection, and as a goal with which to start the negotiations. They were holding this out in hope for what might be accomplished in the future with some work, and as a means to justify further discussion and indeed dogged persistence on the issue for years to come. And they did
this largely in response to and interaction with various significant indications of encouragement from within England, and from the crown itself.

Moreover, the Spaniards were explicit in their internal discussions about just how intertwined these various issues were, and about the positive role that the marriage negotiations would play in helping bring about their desired ends. Take, for example, Villamediana’s letter to Philip in late January 1604, in which he went into great detail about how he saw the state of affairs after being in England for almost five months. Here (just as in everywhere else) we find the match, the goodwill of the English monarchs, and the welfare of their catholic subjects all part of the same discussion, flowing back and forth from one point to the other. Even at this point, Villamediana was speaking of James’s possible future conversion, even if for now the king “did not dare” [no se atreve] to do so. He again emphasized Anna’s catholicism and her continued talk of a desire for a Spanish match, but he now went so far as to say that he believed that James was actually pushing for it actively himself. As a result, he was “certain that by no other way” than through such negotiations could there be “firm hopes” of a reconversion of the kingdom to the catholic faith. And the Constable echoed these sentiments when he wrote to Philip the next month, recognizing it as understood that all of this would be a long process, and that it could be used to great advantage for both Spain and the catholic church:

I believe that Your Majesty would perform one of the greatest services that any King has ever done for the Church, and of equal benefit to your own estates, in going and entering into negotiations [for a marriage alliance with England], since it would be at least fifteen years from now until it actually would be brought about, and that as a benefit of this long time much could be gained, profiting from counting on a promise for the future, which it

54 Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.3v.
55 “Para mi tengo por cierto que por ningun otro camino que esperanzas firmes desta su pretension pueda ser reduzida al estado que se dessea la religion Catolica en este Reyno”, Villamediana to Philip III (Richmond, 20/30 January 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 140, f.4.
would be in the hands of Your Majesty to bring to fruition if things work out as desired, or to leave unfulfilled if they do not.\textsuperscript{56}

Simply put, whatever the difficulties, if they could pull this off it would be worth the effort, and if things were not ultimately to work out, the long process of negotiation would bring its own advantages. As you can see, the continuing negotiations for a match would not only be the centerpiece around which the relationship would operate once peace had been achieved; they were in fact \textit{conceived} as such by the Spaniards ahead of time.\textsuperscript{57}

So rather than abandoning talk of a match upon the clear statement of Spain’s desires for religious policy in England, Villamediana kept pushing, cultivating Anna and others at court, and preparing to consider the match as part of the treaty negotiations. As we saw in chapters six and seven, this did not ultimately end up getting addressed, as both sides decided to secure the peace first, then save attempts at a closer alliance for later. But that wait would not be long, and Villamediana’s advances had clearly been well received by the queen, thus further convincing the Spaniards of the new English sovereigns’ goodwill, and of the possibility of real progress in the future. In addition to what we have seen about Anna in the chapters above, she was also letting it be known that she was not going to let her son marry the daughter of a mere duke (at this point understood to be a clear reference to Florence), and Villamediana was confident of her support on account of her “enthusiasm for the \[catholic\] Religion and the friendship and kinship”

\textsuperscript{56} “[P]ienso que haria VM\textsuperscript{d.} uno de los mayores servicios que haya hecho Rey a la Iglesia, y igual beneficio a sus estados en ir y atar la platica, supuesto que hay quince años por lo menos de aqui a la ejecucion, y que en el beneficio de este largo tiempo se podria ganar mucho, recibiendo provecho de contado por promesa de futuro, que estaria en mano de VM\textsuperscript{d.} cumplir si las cosas se pusiessen como se desea, o dejallo de cumpli en contrario suceso.” Constable to Philip III (Brussels, 31 January/10 February 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, docs 76-78, ff.3v-4. The three sheets of the same letter are listed as separate docs., and should be read in reverse order: 78, 77, 76.

\textsuperscript{57} And from everything we have seen of James and his strategies in the foregoing chapters, conceived as such ahead of time by \textit{both} sides.
with the house of Habsburg. She even went so far on more than one occasion to tell him outright that she hoped to see her son become “son-in-law to the King of Spain” and that she prayed that in seeing “her son favored by the King our lord and being his son-in-law” that they might together “seize back that which France had taken from this crown, and perhaps, she said to me, even win France and split it with His Majesty.” Bold words, and ones that had quite an effect, as both ambassadors continued to insist on the queen’s importance at court and ability to influence her husband, and Philip III repeatedly wrote back to encourage them to keep up the good work.

While the match was passed over in the treaty negotiations, this was clearly understood by all involved to have been a temporary state of affairs. Indeed, it was the subject of a number of toasts at the banquet celebrating the peace on the very day that the king had signed the treaty, and the Constable of Castile brought the issue up in his hour-long bedside visit from King James the next day. At first hesitant about peace with England, and then so reluctant for so long to do anything that might be seen as diminishing the reputación of the Spanish monarchy, the Constable had gradually been won over, and he added his voice to Villamediana’s in support of a closer relationship, or at least in support of what could be gained from trying to achieve a closer relationship. And as it had been before, and would continue to be over the many years to come,

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58 He also had copies of Anna’s letters to the pope in 1603, which he forwarded to Philip in his dispatch of the first of December of that year: Villamediana to Philip III (Salisbury, 21 November/1 December 1603), received 24 January/3 February 1604, AGS Estado, leg. 840, docs 144-146.
59 “[Y]erno del Rey de España… que espera en nuestro señor que ha de ver a su hijo favoreçido del Rey nuestro señor y siendo su hierno cobrar lo que Francia tiene desta Corona, y tal vez me dixo ganar a Francia y partilla con Su M[á]nd.” Villamediana to Constable (no place, 7/17 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 110, f.2.
60 For more examples, see: Philip III to Constable (Valladolid, 11/21 March 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 55, ff.1v-2; Villamediana to Constable (no place, 7/17 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 842, doc 110, f.2.
such talk was once more intertwined within discussion of the goodwill of the English monarchs, and as a way towards a betterment of the religious situation. As the Constable wrote enthusiastically to Lerma after returning to Flanders, he saw this as a real opportunity, saying that he had responded to such talk “with great pleasure”, and had proposed religion as “the door through which” this closer connection might pass. And as Thomas Wilson was writing back to Cecil at about the time that letter would have arrived in Valladolid, Spaniards clearly thought that if their now pregnant queen were to give birth to a boy (which as we have seen, she ultimately did), “liberall talkers saye that the Infanta will prove a wyfe for our prince.”

The same attitude only grew over time, as can be seen both in Philip’s continued correspondence and in the Constable’s detailed report on his embassy in November 1604, and by the end of that year Villamediana was in high spirits about the prospects for the future. He wrote back to his king that he had been very clear about how the key requirement for an Anglo-Spanish match would be a royal conversion. And yet, he said that James still seemed interested in the project, and was very concerned to make sure that the Spaniards had not abandoned the idea. As a result, Villamediana drew some real hope from this for the status of the catholic

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61 “[E]n lo de la Religion, especialmente si pasar adelante la platica de Casamiento en que me hablo la Reyna, yo la oy con mucho gusto, proponiendo que la puerta por donde se havia de entrar era la religion, y en criança del Principe, y para proseguirla he dejado al Conde de Villamediana los apuntamientos que embio con este despacho.” Constable to Lerma (Gravelines, 3/13 September 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 634, doc 55, f.1.

62 Thomas Wilson to Cranborne (Valladolid, 30 September/10 October 1604), TNA: PRO SP 94/10, f.112.

63 For Philip’s continued admonitions to Villamediana to use negotiations over a match as a way to help alleviate conditions for the English catholics, see: Philip III to Villamediana (Lerma, 4 November 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 104, f.1v. For the Constable’s report back home, see: BNM, Manuscritos Varios, tomo 6949, ff.115-125, Constable to Philip III (Bordeaux, 12/22 November 1604).

64 “Desto se mostro holgar El Rey, y yo confieso a VM que me holgue tambien de velle tan cuydadoso en la materia de matrimonio, juzgado por sin duda que haviendo yo passado tan adelante con Beltenebros y aun con la Reyna en dexarme entender que sin que se declarasen
religion in England, and he was actively encouraging widespread rumors at court of an eventual match. Things looked good enough at this point that Philip felt confident standing his ground on the issue for a while, advising his ambassador in March 1605 to leave the door open (“la puerta abierta”), and not to say anything more on the subject at this point in the hope that the English might offer something more in the way of religion. If they did, Villamediana was under instructions to respond enthusiastically, and to let Philip know immediately.

And even if this seems like a bit of a hard stance, one must remember that just a year earlier, right before the peace talks began, Philip had been insisting on having Prince Henry raised in Spain as an essential condition of a match. But Philip had gradually backed off from being so vocal about this point, and the same would go for his most recent instructions to Villamediana. While at first seeming to be a firm line, when looking at the Spanish sources, one begins to realize that this was more of a tactical shift up the chain, from London to Valladolid. For as we saw in chapter nine, just over two months later during the English visit to the Spanish capital, the duke of Lerma himself took Lord Admiral Nottingham out to his estate by the river and broached the idea of a match openly himself. Far from being abandoned, the negotiations were just beginning to pick up steam.

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66 Philip III to Villamediana (Tordesillas, 23 February/5 March 1605), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 124, f.1.

67 Philip III to Villamediana (Valladolid, 29 March/8 April 1604), AGS Estado, leg. 2571, doc 57, f.1v.
And this matters. Think back to the great farewell masque in Valladolid. A whole new depth of meaning gets added when you understand all of this context, and you then think about precisely what might have been meant (and what would have been perceived to have been meant) by a heavily allegorical production centered around the little infanta being delivered across the ocean on a ship with an image of the dove of peace in her hand, to be seated on a queen’s throne, in order to fulfill the promise of felicity and concord. Followed by the ship making its return after having carried the infanta to her destination, with all the choirs belting out a hymn in praise of Philip IV, and of his role as a new Hercules, Atlas, and Charles V – not just putting the world on his shoulders, but explicitly understood to have been helping “to uphold heaven on earth.” All of this with thousands of people watching intently, who then proceeded to see the English lords and the ambassador himself (the very admiral who had defeated the Gran Armada in 1588) matched up with the Spanish royal couple and with the leading nobles in the great partner dance to cap the evening. And what do we make of the scene the following day with the much-talked-about public gift of the ring from Philip III to the Lord Admiral, explicitly reciprocating James’s similar gift to the Constable, in both cases clearly viewed as symbolizing the promise of a deeper connection, and a pretty explicitly matrimonial one at that? This was a well thought-out and mature development of a process that had begun almost a decade earlier, which had taken on increasing importance in the past couple of years, and which was nevertheless just the beginning of a long back-and-forth set of negotiations around which so much of the subsequent peacetime relationship would turn.

68 See chapter nine, note 35.
**Continued negotiation**

In direct contrast to both the traditional and more recent portrayals of events, the foundation built during these first two years would continue to provide the structure around which so much of the subsequent relationship would be built. The marriage negotiations progressed in earnest after the treaty was completed, becoming the centerpiece for Anglo-Spanish relations throughout the following two decades.\(^{69}\) James and his ministers had high hopes that a closer relationship with Spain might provide diplomatic solutions to many of England’s and Europe’s troubles. And one of the most-repeated Spanish maxims on foreign policy at the time remained “*Guerra con toda la tierra y paz con Inglaterra*” – war with all of the world and peace with England.\(^{70}\) Consecutive Spanish ambassadors in London, and English ambassadors in Spain, found themselves in frequent discussion of the issue, and an analysis of the state of the negotiations at any given time goes a long way toward explaining the nature of the entire relationship at that particular moment – politically, culturally, and economically.

The negotiations continued immediately after the Lord Admiral and his massive entourage had departed for home, with Lerma and Secretary Villalonga approaching the English ambassador, Cornwallis, about the match in July 1605. Despite some frank talk from both sides about the religious difficulties that still remained before they could ultimately secure such an

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\(^{69}\) Gardiner treats the negotiations of 1604 only as a fleeting and apparently novel idea that both sides immediately recognized as impossible and largely abandoned until Gondomar’s intervention in 1614. He seems to have based this interpretation wholly upon the narrative of the match by Fray Francisco that he edited, apparently unaware of the truly vast amount of documentation contradicting it in the British Library/Museum, Public Record Office, and Archivo General de Simancas. The most recent historian of the match, Redworth, follows Gardiner’s view almost exactly, devoting only a few dismissive paragraphs to the negotiations prior to Gondomar’s arrival at the English court, and only a few pages at all to events before 1618. Redworth, *The Prince & the Infanta*, 8-10, 15-18.

\(^{70}\) The phrase, “*Guerra con toda la tierra y paz con Inglaterra,*” or some version of it, occurs frequently in the diplomatic correspondence of this period. For its wider context, see J. H. Elliott, “Paz y Guerra con Inglaterra, 1554-1655,” *Reales Sitios*, XXXIX (2002), 2-17.
alliance, continued discussion of this issue and its directly connected corollary (working together with James’s mediation to help find a solution to the war with the Dutch), continued on through the rest of the year and into the middle of 1606. This involved various meetings with Lerma and others, numerous letters back and forth to the council in England (and especially to Cecil [now earl of Salisbury] and Northampton), and even a personal journey back home for Cornwallis’s most trusted secretary, Hawkesworth, in order to speak at length with the king and to bring back James’s and his council’s answers. So it would continue, alternating between these flurries of activity where both sides seemed to be moving closer together on the issue, and cooling-off periods where it looked for a while as if the possibility of a closer alliance had been shelved. But each time, these periods of somewhat strained relations did not last long. For example, the excitement felt on both sides during 1605 and the first half of 1606 was replaced by a “great Coldnes and alteration” in the summer of that year.\(^71\) Cornwallis found himself petitioning the Spanish council for help in the treatment of English merchants, and enthusiastic optimism by all was replaced by a great deal of grumbling.\(^72\) But by the end of that same year, “the winde was Changed” once more, Spain had come back around to the idea of a match, Cornwallis prepared

\(^71\) Salisbury to Cornwallis (17/27 August 1606; went by way of Flanders; received in Madrid 15/25 October 1606), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.480. Some version of this phrase is used in a number of places over the course of this summer, by both Salisbury and Cornwallis, and even in letters to other ambassadors.

\(^72\) See, for example: Cornwallis, “The effect of a speech used to the Lordes of Counsell in Spaine upon occasion of an affirmation by one of them, that his Majestie of Great Brittaine had broken the Capitulations of the Peace,” (undated, but clearly from August 1606), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.495v-501. Also, Cornwallis to Sir Henry Wotton (Madrid, 29 September/9 October 1606, by way of the Venetian ambassador to Spain), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.493-495v.
and circulated a discourse on why such a connection would be advantageous to both parties, and
this was well received.\footnote{Cornwallis “To the Lordes of Counsell…directed to…Dorsett…Nottingham, Suffolk, Northampton, & Salisbury,” (Madrid, 21 November/1 December 1606), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.576-585v. Quote on f.577v; discourse summarized thereafter.}

Moreover, as the relationship developed, the very things that are usually described as
having been obstacles to the connection and causes of friction were in fact repeatedly put to use
to do the very opposite. For example, when Cornwallis wrote his piece on the match, not only
was the matter of religion apparently something less of a concern, he actually used it explicitly to
make the case for why Philip III would be better off sending his daughter to England rather than
France. After all, as he pointed out:

> In England, I make noe doubt but shee shall enjoy the libertie of her Conscience, and
> exercise of her owne Religion. In France shee shall have noe more. In England there is
> probabilitie that in tyme shee maie be the meanes that the Lawes now in force against
> those of her Religion maie either bee mittigated in the letter or softened in the
> Execution.\footnote{Ibid., f.579.}

This was, of course, the very thing that most attracted the Spaniards to a marriage alliance with
England, and here the English ambassador was using it openly not as an impediment, but as an
enticement. Lerma and Philip were paying attention, both ultimately requested a personal copy
of Cornwallis’s discourse, and they seem to have liked what they were seeing.\footnote{“Certaine Passages observed by Sir Charles Cornewallis in his Treatie with the Duke of Lerma, and the Earle of Villa Longa concerning a mariage between Henry prince of Wales, and the Infanta of Spaine.” BL, Egerton Mss 2026, ff.35-35v. Undated, but from tense usage, context, and reference to Digby as the earl of Bristol, must have been from at least as late as 1622. This lapse in time explains why, while useful as a summary of basic attitudes and events, it is not precise with regard to all dates, and slides over a couple of periods in the negotiations that a close reading of his and the council’s actual correspondence shows to have been very important.} Before long, Lerma and Cornwallis were once more sharing remarkable, intimate discussions centering on the
possibilities of a closer alliance, and this approach continued throughout all of 1607 and into
1608.\textsuperscript{76} The same general pattern would continue over the years to come: periods of more intense focus on the possibility of an Anglo-Spanish match, interspersed with brief periods of occasional friction or a bit of a cooling off, and even occasional changes in the plan or the particular princesses offered.

Through it all, James maintained his strategy of balancing all sides and trying to walk a middle path, both at home and abroad. And the Spaniards maintained both their perception of James and his court that had been established over those first two crucial years achieving the peace, and their hope in the possibility of using the relationship not just in the interest of reason of state, but also to help bring about some sort of change in English attitudes towards religion and towards Spain, howsoever gradual. As the duke of Lerma described it in 1607, all of this was tied together with the Spanish policy of \textit{conservación} that we saw at the beginning, with the makings of an ecumenicism not unlike that of James himself. He said that he “was not in any sorte doubtfull of the good Affection of the King himself, but of that some of his Ministers and others that had possessed themselves of his eares, who out of Puritanisme and hatred to the

\textsuperscript{76} These were frank discussions, where both sides came right out and addressed the possible impediments, chiefly of religion. But this was always just a beginning of the conversation, not the end of it. For both sides, it seemed quite clear that this was a process of negotiation and persuasion, where even if one did not get all that one had hoped for in the end, the possibility of the alliance remained nevertheless very attractive. Cornwallis’s letters also give us a wonderfully rich look into the personal and political behavior of Philip’s \textit{valido}, and are filled with remarkable exchanges, such as when Cornwallis spoke to Lerma about “The onely soveraigne medecine for the sick estate of this Garboyld world being a Composition of their Pearle of Spaine with our Diamond of England. At these wordes of myne hee [Lerma] laughed heartile sayeing that as I had touched upon the right string soe I had given it the propper sound, for I had given an apt terme to their litle Princesse, who deserved that name were shee descendened of ordinary Parents.” Cornwallis to Salisbury (undated, but from placement and context, undoubtedly January 1607), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, ff.652-652v.
Religion professed here, diswadeth Contynuance of frendship with Spaine.”

And he also understood that James’s opponents that were tying his hands based their case on two reasons: one religious, one political. For the first, that “the holding of Ametie with Spaine would be a meane to introduce the Catholique Religion and subvert theires.”

And for the second, that the peace was essentially just a time for the Spanish monarchy to catch its breath and finish off the Dutch, before turning its attention back to the conquest of England. But Lerma vehemently denied these charges, saying that they were verie maliciously Contryved and without either foundation or probabilitie of truth. The Kings desire being without respect of difference in Religion to joyn a perpetuall league with his Majestie of Greate Brittaine, To the end that they twoe joyneinge might induce all other the Princes in Christendome (with whome their Conjunction will breed an absolute power) to doe the like. And with one assent and union of forces, they might sett upon the Common Enemye of Christendome, the Turke.

Of course, he came right out and admitted, unprovoked, that yes, it was true that “their desire here was greate, that his Majestie and his Dominions were restored to the Faith of their Auncestors”. But they had seen the futility of trying to force the issue of English religion, and “untill it might please God to worke that good in their harts, they had by many experiences found that it was not to be laboured by the handes of man.”

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77 Cornwallis to Salisbury (undated, but from placement and context, undoubtedly January 1607), BL Cotton Mss, Vespasian C ix, f.646v. Cf. Villamediana’s comments upon leaving England in 1605, above.

78 Ibid., f.647.

79 Ibid., ff.647-647v.

80 Ibid., f.647v.

81 He went on to stress that “the Pope himself was become setled in that Resolution thereof, had determyned to performe all good offices to his Majestie of Greate Brittaine, And for more manystation thereof, had in all his late letters to the Kinge here with greate earnestnes recommended and endeered unto him the Contynuance and increase of his Amety with England, whereof the Secretarie Prada (standinge not farre from us) he called him for a witnes.” Ibid., ff.647v-648.
The on-again, off-again negotiations also helped provide a context through which both governments could effectively communicate, and as such there is a sense in which actually concluding the marriage was not even necessarily the goal. Whatever James’s ultimate hopes for peace in Europe, he seems to have enjoyed playing the vicarious role of perpetually eligible bachelor, as talks of alternative matches kept both foreign suitors and domestic factions competing with one another for the king’s favor for literally his entire English reign.

Consequently, as a result of this approach, England became a negotiating center for Europe, where a number of relatively balanced factions, connected in various ways to the interests of the continental powers (both great and small), competed on a daily basis for favor and influence. And continued talk of an Anglo-Spanish match was right at the heart of this.

And this had more than political implications. It also helped create a broader system of available associations or allegiances, opening wide the cultural and cognitive possibilities at play in England – something reflected in virtually every aspect of the period. The heterogeneity of culture that Malcolm Smuts describes, the wild collection of sexual and social mores that Alastair Bellany describes, and the conflict between a whole host of religious positions that Anthony Milton describes all jibe well with this closer look at the Anglo-Spanish relationship,

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82 Redworth begins to argue a similar sort of point early on in his book about the later match negotiations. But he does not develop it, and indeed quickly followed it with the insistence that both sides were under serious misconceptions about the possibility of achieving the match, which led them to continue negotiating long after they should have stopped, and referring at one point to the process dismissively as an ongoing “diplomatic merry-go-round” being used merely to continually delude King James. Redworth, *The Prince & the Infanta*, 10, 15-16.

83 Of course, perhaps James was right to feel so, as the events that would ultimately lead to the collapse of his policies were a direct result of the actual conclusion of one of these marriages – that of his daughter with the Elector Palatine.
and with the implications that a study of this relationship has for our understanding of factionalization and governance in early Stuart England.\textsuperscript{84}

**Further apart**

How these attitudes and perceptions developed and affected events in subsequent years is part of a separate story, and one that will form the basis of my next project. But it is worth saying a few things in closing here, as all of it rests solidly upon the nature of the achievement of the peace, and yet ultimately provides some surprising results. While peace was for many in both countries a positive and constructive experience, a departure from the more clear-cut, stark simplicities of wartime led as much towards complexity as it did towards cooperation. Responses were not monolithic, and the coming of peace added to the process of factionalization, as groups at court became connected to different foreign interest groups aligned in various places on the spectrum of relative attitude towards the former enemy. This was especially true of England, where one’s stance on foreign policy, and to a certain extent one’s attitude towards Spain, was quite helpful in defining what particular politico-religious group a person belonged to at a given time. But even these positions were not set in stone. As Peter Lake has said about conflict with regard to the causes of the English Civil Wars – that ideologies were like busses that people could and did get on and off of from time to time – so too with these factions and attitudes towards Spain. Nor were the passengers on these ideological busses necessarily

predictable. After all, many of the people who had been originally against peace, who had made a great deal of money off of the war, or who one might figure would be natural opponents of the catholic powers, became hispanophiles and some of the greatest proponents of a closer relationship with the Spanish monarchy. This reached all the way up the social and political ladder to include the scions of many leading families, including both the son of the prominently protestant Elizabethan earl of Leicester, and the heir of Elizabeth’s other great servant (and Leicester’s rival), Lord Burghley. And perhaps nothing speaks to this greater than the English hero of the Armada campaign being fêted in the Spanish capital, and James’s principal secretary and later Lord Treasurer – the man the Spaniards considered to be their greatest enemy in the peace negotiations – becoming the highest-paid Habsburg pensioner in England.85

Indeed, support for one position did not even mean the simple rejection of the views of the other side. Far from it. Even the most anti-Spanish of Englishmen, those who professed an unquenchable hatred for Spanish power and its association with the papal antichrist, found quite a bit to admire in the thoughts and deeds of their ostensibly inveterate enemies. For years, these men had been learning the language of their foe, in order to study and duplicate Spanish achievements in military and imperial matters. Men such as John Hawkyns, Richard Hakluyt, and Samuel Purchas had collected documents, wrote histories, and translated works for official and public consumption that were straightforward in their portrayal of the glory of the Spanish conquest of the new world, and which were quick to emphasize the English need to learn from these successes. And this was reinforced by a great deal of similar Iberian respect for English achievements, most notably maritime, mercantile, and mechanical. Rivalry and emulation in

85 Nottingham and Cecil/Salisbury, respectively.
early modern Europe were quite simply two sides of the same coin, and the English and Spanish were no exception.

The long-held popular, and even scholarly, view has remained one that emphasizes this visceral, fundamental importance of the Anglo-Spanish conflict. And partly as a result of this perception, it has gradually come to be so, at least with regard to the formation of English nationalism and its important myths. But this process, as important as it is, needs to be understood for what it actually was: a self-fulfilling prophecy resulting from a fabrication or exaggeration based on the uncertainties of the time, rather than a relatively straightforward representation of why these kingdoms were at odds or what contemporaries thought about it. When we recognize this, we can then better understand how the relationship later came to be viewed in such stark terms. As it turns out, the growth of this “negative” aspect of English nationalism – along with numerous other stereotypes that have persisted to this day – such as the “Black Legend” of Spanish cruelty, the myth of Gloriana, and the miracle of the “protestant winds” – were all at least as much a product of the years of Jacobean peace as of the years of Elizabethan war that had preceded them.

As cultural historians have shown time and time again, it is to be expected that the same events and their various retellings (be they oral or in print) would produce varied responses. Sometimes drastically different conclusions and perceptions of an event or person, or a series of events or people, would develop simultaneously in close proximity to one another. So it should come as no surprise to understand that the achievement of peace between England and Spain was far from monolithic in its long-term effects and attitudes. As Peter Burke puts it: “The message of the founder is often ambiguous. Indeed, some would say that founders succeed precisely because they signify many things to many people. When the followers try to interpret the
founder’s message, the latent contradictions become manifest.” So it has been with so many things, from early Christianity, to the Reformation, to the classic case of the US constitution. And so it is here as well. One of the great strengths of the Anglo-Spanish peace was precisely its ambiguity: each side (and different groups within each side) could interpret it differently, and each group could focus on what was not spelled out in the treaty as something for which to work in the subsequent years. This helped bring peace about, and then played an important part in the logic of the system that would then work to maintain it. This was also true of James I, his public self-fashioning, and the creation of the early Jacobean court. Carefully crafted ambiguity and the encouragement of a multiplicity of perceptions lay at the heart of all this, which played a significant role in the actual achievement of peace and the subsequent operation of English domestic politics, the Anglo-Spanish relationship, and to a certain extent European international relations in general.

But in both cases – that of the peace itself, and of James and his system – the encouragement of competing interpretations caused by this ambiguity is precisely what eventually exposed, emphasized, and exacerbated the contradictions and conflicts that the original solutions (the achievement of peace and the establishment of the Jacobean regime) had tried to overcome. For all its successes, this was far from an entirely positive affair. Thanks to geographic distance and continuing religious and cultural difference, a re-establishment of peaceful relations did not transform this into a wide-open, frequently traveled connection. As a result, the still-limited nature of the relationship allowed conflicting views of the other nation to develop simultaneously in the perceptions of each country’s inhabitants. Back when England and Spain had been at war, it was particularly easy to paint the enemy as fundamentally different

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and inherently evil. Conversely, the frequent commerce, cultural interchange, and travel that existed between England and other countries (such as France and the Low Countries), allowed a relatively accurate picture of each to emerge. But the case of Anglo-Spanish peace was stuck somewhere between these extremes, and was much more complicated because of it. This limited connection generated a relatively finite set of first-hand perceptions, and Spaniards and Englishmen had to use their imaginations to fill in the blanks. Consequently, conflicting views were allowed to develop alongside one another, based in large part on what it was that the people doing the thinking wanted to believe. These were alternate or competing realities: simultaneously creating at least two different Spains in English perceptions, and various takes on England in Spanish minds.

Getting to know someone better does not inevitably lead to the closest of friendships. Despite short- and medium-term prosperity, as well as rich cultural, political, and intellectual interaction, there is a real sense in which the achievement of peace can be said, ultimately, to have sown the seeds of its eventual destruction. After all, the somewhat familiar “other” can often be much more frightening than that which is kept safely at a distance. The end of war did not just mean the coming of peace. It also freed up intellectual and polemical activity for the critique of domestic issues, and those who seemed in any way unduly swayed by certain foreign influences became objects of gradually increasing derision, especially in England. In the end, it was a masterful manipulation of public opinion and religious sentiment regarding an Anglo-Spanish match and war in Europe – directly resulting from the conditions of peace, and yet explicitly designed to push a political agenda opposed to it – that would help lead to the breakdown of the two countries’ relationship in the early 1620s. And this, in turn, would play a
major role in the subsequent development of the cultural stereotypes and polar opposites that have dominated the historiography ever since.
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