BUDDHIST MONASTIC EDUCATION: SEMINARIES, ACADEMIA, AND THE STATE IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

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Abstract

This dissertation examines Buddhist monastic education in contemporary China, analyzing the relationships between seminaries, other monastic institutions, the secular education system, and state institutions and policies. The Buddhist seminary did not emerge in China until the twentieth century but has since developed into a central component of monasticism. This study argues that to understand the impact of seminaries on Buddhism, we must also understand how seminaries are influenced by the state and academia. In short, this project shows that Chinese Buddhist responses to modernity transform institutions and doctrinal understandings, and that such developments are reflected and enacted within seminaries.

In analyzing contemporary Chinese Buddhism, I draw on seminary curricula and related documents as well as observations and interviews conducted during eighteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in China. I focus on institutional history and leadership. I argue that the growth of seminaries in China is a case of a general spread of schooling throughout various social sectors. Therefore seminaries are part of a larger story of the spread of formalized training and credentialing in modern societies. Yet the distribution, structure, and curricula of seminaries reflect the vicissitudes of Chinese history.

The dissertation argues that seminaries have already cemented their place alongside monasteries as key sites for training and producing Buddhist leadership. But how seminaries should respond to state-sanctioned, secular modes of studying Buddhism, which challenge traditional understandings, is still debated. Thus I show, in China and for Buddhism, how academic religious studies not only elucidates religion but also shapes the history of religion.

Seminaries today generally adopt a balance of responses, from accommodation to resistance, toward the state and academia, promoting institutional reform on the one hand and doctrinal conservativism on the other. Accommodation adapts Buddhism to contemporary norms yet risks subordinating Buddhism to secular institutions; resistance protects Chinese Buddhism’s unique character yet isolates it from broader intellectual and social currents. Forecasting religious change is difficult, but the utility, mutual compatibility and long-term viability of these various responses within seminaries will in large part determine Chinese Buddhism’s future.
# Table of Contents

Abstract… iii

Table of Contents… iv

Acknowledgements… v

Conventions… vii

Chapter 1: Introduction… 1

Chapter 2: The Birth and Proliferation of Buddhist Seminaries… 13

Chapter 3: Contemporary Seminaries and Their Institutional Environment… 38

Chapter 4: Seminaries and the Academic Study of Buddhism… 52

Chapter 5: Buddhist Responses to Skeptical Inquiry… 78

Chapter 6: Conclusion… 107

Appendixes… 110

Works Cited… 170
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Finally, I thank family and friends who have sustained me over the past several years. In this regard, special thanks are due to my wife Liyu Wang, who took most of the responsibility for raising our daughter during her first year of life while I was in China for fieldwork.
Conventions

Abbreviations
I have tried to keep abbreviations to a minimum; nevertheless I found the following necessary to avoid repetition of certain proper names. I use the less common abbreviations only when the full term has recently appeared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td>Buddhist Association of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRIBC</td>
<td>Beijing Research Institute of Buddhist Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBETA/T.</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association/Taisho canon number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBETA/J.</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association/Jiaxing canon number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Cultural Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td>State Administration for Religious Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFD</td>
<td>United Front Department (full title: United Front Work Department)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XDFX</td>
<td>Xiandai Foxue (i.e., the journal Modern Buddhist Learning)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1: Introduction

It would be difficult to specify which of the characteristics of Old China is likely to be so tenacious of life as to be still in a position, a century hence, to excite either sympathetic interest or disdainful censure... There is reason to believe that the outlook for Buddhism is not hopeless, provided the developments in secular education are met by a revival of learning in the monasteries.

—Reginald Johnston (1913, 124, 229)
Scottish tutor to the last emperor of China

Buddhism is booming, he states enthusiastically. The chair of a departmental search committee is explaining why his university authorized a search for a tenure-track position in Buddhist studies. Eight pairs of eyes scrutinize me from around the hotel suite. I smile and nod in agreement. Of course Buddhism is booming.

And yet for the past century Buddhism has faced unprecedented challenges and difficulties. Throughout Asia, where the vast majority of Buddhists live, Buddhist institutions and belief systems face severe strain. In many countries the condition of monasticism, the core institution of Buddhism, has grown precarious. Recruits to the monastic order have declined and the prestige of the order has suffered. This has occurred in countries that have been colonized (e.g., Sri Lanka), that have industrialized (e.g., South Korea), that have not industrialized (e.g., Laos), that have undergone Communist revolutions (e.g., China), that have recovered from Communism (e.g., Mongolia), and that have never been colonized or subject to Communism (e.g., Thailand). Therefore we must be cautious about attributing too much explanatory power for decline to common suspects such as colonialism, Communism, or capitalism. Furthermore, other indicators suggest challenges for Buddhism are not limited to its monastic orders. For example, according to a 2015 survey by the Pew Forum, Buddhism is the only major world
religion whose adherents are predicted to decline in both absolute and relative numbers by the year 2050.¹

According to many popular, Western conceptions, Buddhism is a religion uniquely adapted to modernity.² If these conceptions were true we should expect Buddhism to be thriving almost everywhere. But while in some ways Buddhism is flourishing in other ways it seems to be slowly imploding. I will examine, and attempt to explain, some aspects of the challenges to Buddhism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), home to half of the world’s Buddhists.

At a general level this study examines the impact of modernity on Buddhism. The term modernity points to a wide range of processes and concepts that need not be discussed in detail here. Within this wide range of themes, I am mainly concerned with institutional change, doctrinal change, and the relationship between these two kinds of change in contemporary Chinese Buddhism. Institutionally, I am interested in how monasticism, central to traditional Buddhism, has been affected by modern schooling, a central institution in Chinese society. Doctrinally, I am interested in how understandings of Buddhist teachings, always important to some strata the monastic order, have been affected by modern academic approaches to the study of Buddhism, which reflect epistemic norms different from traditional Buddhist norms.

The short answers to these questions are that in response to the general schooling of society Buddhists have established schools of their own, and that monastics have

¹ See Pew Research Center (2015, 102-111) on the rates of decline for Buddhist affiliation and the distribution of Buddhists in various countries. Much of the predicted decline in Buddhists is attributed to low fertility rates, but Buddhists are also predicted to lose more adherents to defection than they are to gain adherents through conversion.
developed a range of strategies to accommodate, resist, avoid, and engage with academic approaches to Buddhism. In China Buddhist schools take the form of seminaries for the education of monastics. These seminaries are increasingly important for the training of Buddhist monastics. Seminaries are also sites where monastics are subject to influences from academia and where monastics formulate responses to that influence. As will be discussed, all of these dynamics are mediated by the Chinese state.

I largely take an institutional approach in my analysis of contemporary Chinese Buddhism. Here an institution is understood as a formalized, prescriptive pattern of organized practice or discourse. Often institutions appear as nested sets. For example, in China Buddhist monasticism is an institution. Central to monasticism is the monastery, also an institution, which itself may comprise institutions such as the Chan mediation hall and the abbacy, which may depend on still more institutions such as Dharma transmission. As organized patterns of collective behavior, institutions—or more

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3 In many Asian countries, Buddhists have also established schools for the education of primary and secondary school pupils, as well as Buddhist universities. In the PRC, owing to state restrictions against mixing religion and education, such schools are almost entirely absent. (Article 8 of the PRC’s 1995 Education Law is the legal basis for such separation.) The only exceptions I know of are the several dozen Buddhist schools, both primary and secondary, in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, which operates on a separate legal framework from the rest of China. (In the 1930s, a Buddhist school for indigent children was founded in Macau by Clara Ho—a member of the same Ho family from Hong Kong that sponsored part of the writing of this dissertation. But Clara Ho’s school in Macau did not last long. See Wong 2010.)

4 In Dharma transmission, a monk or nun participates in a ritual and acquires a special scroll of paper that qualifies him or her to hold monastic offices such as abbacy. See Welch (1963; 1967) on such Dharma scrolls (fajuan 法卷) in modern China. According to my fieldwork, transmission of Dharma scrolls is still practiced in China today in the ways described by Welch; a common term is “to receive Dharma [scroll]” (jiefa 接法). See Schlütter (2008, 58-69) for the development of the idea of membership in Dharma transmission families, in Song China. Such scrolls were originally called inheritance certificates (sishu 割書), which point to the family metaphors surrounding them (i.e., by receiving a scroll one joins a “lineage”).
concretely, the instantiations of institutions or organizations—require resources and legitimacy. Established institutions in turn reproduce legitimate patterns of practice and allocate resources. For example, in the traditional Buddhism monastery in early twentieth century China, the meditation hall reproduced traditional practice, consolidated the prestige of monasteries that sponsored them, and qualified monks who had trained in them for the higher offices in the best monasteries.

In this study I examine the seminary as a new institution in Chinese Buddhism monasticism. As a relatively new institution, no more than a century or so old, the seminary must struggle for resources and legitimacy both within and without Buddhism. I will show how the seminary has established itself in part because of state policies toward Buddhism. I will then demonstrate that seminary is both a vector for secular influences upon Buddhism and a site for the negotiation with those influences. In short, I examine monastic education both as a process transforming Buddhism and as a node responding to forces in the larger institutional network in which it is enmeshed.

**Buddhism and Seminaries in Modern China**

Depending on what one reads, Chinese Buddhism in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is undergoing renaissance, revival, decline, or crisis. A scholar in Beijing claims it is a Golden Age for Chinese Buddhism, whereas a scholar in Shanghai writes that it suffers from a “crisis of three deficiencies” and that a growth bottleneck caused by a dearth of qualified teaching personnel has persisted for decades.\(^5\) Schooling for monastics has often been proposed as the solution to the actual or potential crisis. Consequently, whereas no seminaries were operating in 1979, since 1980 fifty-some Buddhist

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\(^5\) Huang Xianian 2012; Wang Leiquan 2013.
seminaries for Han Buddhism (that is, traditional Chinese Buddhism, outside of Tibetan and Theravada traditions) have been established, in which some three thousand students are enrolled and from which about ten thousand students have graduated.

For the first time in its 1800 years of history, seminaries now complement monasteries as central institutions in Chinese Buddhist monasticism.\(^6\) Originally associated with marginalized, reform-oriented monks in the late Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and early Republic of China (1912-1949), seminaries are now part of the Buddhist mainstream. State policies to convert religious properties into schools in 1904 first induced Buddhist monasteries to found their own school as a prophylactic measure against expropriation. Anti-religious state policies twice led to the closing of all seminaries in China (from 1949 to 1956 and from 1966 to 1979), whereas state efforts to utilize and shape Buddhism led to the founding of seminaries (from 1956 to 1966 and from 1980 to the present). Furthermore, state policies indirectly encouraged monastics to invest in seminaries. For example, state sponsorship of public schooling led to an increasingly literate public. To keep up educationally with mainstream society and lay Buddhists, monasteries were pressured to educate their monastics in similar ways.

Yet the forms seminaries have taken and their proliferation throughout China owe as much to internal Buddhist dynamics as to state policy. Influential Buddhists such as Taixu (1890-1947) in the Republic and Zhao Puchu (1907-2000) in the PRC were crucial to the promotion of the seminary. Equally crucial to the success of seminaries has been their congruence with traditional Buddhist goals to educate monks in the Dharma. In

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\(^6\) It is difficult to assign a precise date to the beginning of Chinese Buddhist monasticism, but the year 200 CE is a reasonable date. Buddhist monastic orders consisting of foreigners existed in Chinese territory a century or more prior, but by the year 200 CE there were also native Chinese monks such as Yan Fotiao (Zürcher 2007). Also see Kieschnick 2009 for a general introduction to Chinese Buddhist monasticism.
many ways seminaries have aimed to accomplish the same goals as traditional educational institutions such as lecture halls and vinaya schools. Therefore relatively conservative monastics also eventually came around to promoting seminaries. More controversially, seminaries differ from and partially replace such traditional institutions.

Seminaries thus occupy a central place in monasticism and yet still have ambiguous roles in Chinese Buddhism. Graduation from seminary is now one important route to authority within the sangha, and according to documents released by the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), graduation from seminary is a requirement for holding important offices in a monastery. For example the monk Xuecheng (1966-), the current president of the BAC, received all of his secondary and tertiary education in seminaries. At any given time there are almost certainly more monastics studying in seminaries than there are in all the monastery lecture halls, vinaya schools, and meditation halls in China.

While some Chinese view seminaries as key to reviving the fortunes of Chinese Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism survived for some 1800 years without seminaries. Seminary study is not required for either tonsure (becoming a novice monastic) or ordination (becoming a fully qualified monastic). Earlier institutions for educating monastics persist, such as those mentioned above as well as informal apprenticeships and other on-the-job training. Traditional methods of imparting prestige and credentialing monastics for the important office of abbot, through the transmission of Dharma scrolls, persist as well. It would hypothetically be possible for all seminaries to be closed and for Chinese Buddhist monasticism to return to functioning largely as it did in the nineteenth century. Such a possibility is unlikely as much of the top Buddhist leadership now not only promotes seminaries but also comes out of seminaries.
The ambiguous role of seminaries stems not only from the fact they are relatively new but also because they straddle two fields, the religious and the educational. On the one hand Buddhists support seminaries in hopes they will serve traditional Buddhist goals. On the other hand the state and academia push Buddhism to serve other goals, including maintaining of the Communist Party’s power and increasing of academic knowledge. This tension can be detected in ways of glossing the common word for Buddhist seminary in Chinese, fo-xue-yuan, which is comprised of three Chinese characters, “Buddha”- “study or learning”-“institute,” respectively.Parsed as foxue-yuan, the term means “institute for Buddhist learning,” suggesting a traditional, religiously-oriented mission.Parsed as fo-xueyuan, it means “Buddhist academy,” which suggests the seminary fundamentally belongs to the category of school like other schools or colleges.7

Academics, state officials, and sympathetic Buddhists have frequently argued that since seminaries are schools for education, they should adopt more features of secular schools. For example, as discussed in the next chapter, the senior historian Chen Yuan 陈垣 (1880-1971) argued as early as 1961 that the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in Beijing, since it was an “academy” (xueyuan 学院), should like other schools have “basic 基本” courses including politics, contemporary affairs, and culture. Not coincidentally, he even called the seminary by the term fojiao xueyuan, which (unlike foxueyuan) unambiguously means “Buddhist academy.”8 More recently a foreign-educated monk and a Chinese official working in the Buddhist Association of China have argued that seminary curricula should follow the educational framework called the five kinds of education (wuyu 五育), first promoted in China by the French-influenced educator Cai Yuanpei

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7 For instance, fa-xueyuan means “law school,” shang-xueyuan means “business school,” etc.
8 See Chen Yuan 1982.
Monastics recognize that seminaries are relatively new institutions in Chinese Buddhism but many insist seminaries should focus on traditional Buddhist goals to teach clergy the Dharma and to cultivate preachers or “Dharma masters” (fashi 法师), a term now also used for monastic instructors within seminaries. According to many of the most important promoters of seminary education, by the early twentieth century Chinese Buddhist monasticism had grown too isolated from society. Seminaries were therefore necessary to revive doctrinal teachings within the monastic order as well as to train larger numbers of preachers who could teach the Dharma to lay Buddhists. The promotion of seminary education has thus been an integral part of the modern movement called Buddhism for the Human Realm (renjian fojiao 人间佛教) advocated by the monk Taixu (1890-1947).

Within monastic circles, the rhetoric of seminary pedagogy emphasizes restoring the best parts of Buddhism, not creating a new kind of Buddhism. This is clear even from the writings of Yinshun (1905-2005), a student of Taixu and an influential scholar-monk. Today Yinshun is probably the most controversial figure in Buddhist seminaries. He is accused of using secular academic approaches to undermine traditional Chinese Buddhism for the Human Realm (renjian fojiao 人间佛教) advocated by the monk Taixu (1890-1947).

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10 The term fashi is sometimes used, especially in Taiwan, to refer to monastics in general. Within PRC seminaries, however, fashi refers to the monastic teachers and xueseng 学僧 to the seminarians.

11 On the origins and contemporary manifestations of Buddhism for the Human Realm, see Pittman 2001, Bingenheimer 2007, and Ji Zhe 2013a.
Buddhism and even to destroy Mahayana Buddhism in general. Yet even Yinshun presents himself as restoring rather than reconstructing Buddhism. For example, Yinshun describes the Buddhism for the Human Realm he advocates as

...something that Buddhism in the past originally had. Now we are just synthesizing and clarifying its important theories. Therefore it is not creating something new, but taking the intrinsic [parts of Buddhism] and “scraping off the filth and polishing it so it shines.” The Buddhadharma can only be said to be discovered; unlike in secular academic studies, one cannot make [new] inventions. This is because the Buddha already realized the true nature of all dharmas. The Buddha is the only great master to discover enlightenment.

The Buddha’s disciples just follow him and carry out his teachings, reviewing what is old to learn something new [for themselves], and nothing more.

In reality, despite the prevalence of the rhetoric of restoration, Buddhists today are involved in a complex process of both recovering and reconstructing Buddhism. They are also deeply conflicted about how such so-called restoration should be conducted. First, to use Yinshun’s language, they disagree about how Buddhist doctrines should be synthesized and clarified. Most crucially, they disagree about which parts of Chinese Buddhism are filth to be scraped off and which parts are intrinsic. What is extrinsic to one party is essential to another. Some reformers merely want to decrease the importance of funerary rituals; others want to eliminate centuries of monastic regulations and

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12 Yinshun will be discussed more later, especially in chapters two and five.
13 From Yinshun’s The Buddha in the Human Realm 佛在人間, chapter 5, “The Essentials of Buddhism for the Human Realm,” available online at http://yinshun-edu.org.tw/Master_yinshun/y14_05. 為古代佛教所本有的，現在不過將他的重要理論，綜合的抽繹出來。所以不是創新，而是將固有的「刮垢磨光」。佛法，祇可說發見，不像世間學術的能有所發明。因為佛已圓滿證得一切諸法的實相，唯有佛是創覺的唯一大師；佛弟子只是依之奉行，淪故知新而已。
emphasize seventh-century vinaya texts; others regard the most influential Chinese Buddhist doctrines since the sixth century as inherently flawed; and others such as Yinshun assert that much of Indian Buddhism was seriously distorted even before it reached China.

It is often within seminaries that these controversial issues are debated or, more often, implicitly decided upon by seminary policy or individual instructors. For example, some seminaries ban seminarians from conducting funerary rituals, while others require them to do so. Some seminary instructors teach the monastic rules in the fourteenth-century *Pure Rules of Baizhang*, whereas an instructor of monastic regulations at a major seminary looked nauseated when the text was mentioned and shook his head, saying it “was not instituted by the Buddha 不是佛制.”14 A seminary administrator told me he hoped to train seminarians to successful Dharma teachers such as Yinshun, whereas another seminary reportedly bans the reading of Yinshun’s works.

Since seminaries are now central to the education of ordinary monastics and the formation of monastic leaders, if and how seminaries resolve such crucial pedagogical issues will also determine how Chinese Buddhism evolves. But seminaries do not confront such issues alone, in a social vacuum. Rather, they are enmeshed in networks of relationships with other institutions, some internal and some external to Buddhism. In general, other Buddhist institutions, often involved with ritual practices and income generation, push seminaries in a more traditional direction. Non-Buddhist institutions such as universities and state agencies push seminaries in less traditional directions.

A basic contention of this dissertation is that ultimately non-Buddhist institutions are more powerful than the Buddhist institutions. For example, seminaries face pressure

14 For an introduction and translation of the *Pure Rules of Baizhang*, see Ichimura 2006.
to adopt elements of state ideology and academic historiography into their teachings. But on the contrary, academic institutions feel little pressure to adopt traditional Buddhist ideas or norms of historiography, and state institutions face no pressure to integrate Buddhist teachings into the training of Communist cadres. For example, I have heard discussion in a seminary on the academic theory that Mahayana Buddhism originated in lay stupa cults. But I have never heard academics seriously consider whether Mahayana Buddhism originated with the recovery of scriptures hidden in an underwater palace of divine snakes (Skt. nāgas), as per Buddhist tradition.15 This does not necessarily mean that seminaries are mainly shaped by non-Buddhist institutions rather than other Buddhist ones. Seminaries may be able to resist such secular pressures if they choose to do so. What it does imply is that, in case of direct conflict in the public sphere, non-Buddhist institutions will usually trump or subordinate the Buddhist institutions. While academia gains authority to state what Buddhism is and has been, the Communist Party appropriates authority to declare what Buddhism should be.

Fieldwork and Limitations

Research for this dissertation was conducted in China over eighteen months during the summers of 2009 and 2010, and from late August 2012 until early September 2013. I also did exploratory fieldwork on my own during a two-week trip to northern China in summer 2007. During these periods I visited fifteen of China’s thirty-one provincial-level divisions and did fieldwork in thirteen seminaries, including four for nuns and nine for monks. I was hosted inside three seminaries and was housed in an adjoining hotel (two of which were owned by the monastery that housed the seminary) in three others. I was able

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15 See Liu Ming-Wood (1979, 36-37) for such accounts of mythological scriptural origin.
to attend classes in five seminaries (all of which were for monks), and I attended a weekly class in one seminary for six months. I also visited several dozen monasteries and attended both Buddhist and academic events where I met seminarians, seminary graduates, and seminary instructors or administrators. So while I have not conducted fieldwork in the Hebei Province Buddhist Seminary, the Qixiashan Buddhist Seminary, the Lingdong Buddhist Seminary, the Tiantaizong Buddhist Seminary, or the Yunmen Buddhist Seminary, I have visited some of those sites and have held conversations with graduates, teachers, or administrators of those seminaries. I have also been able to interview all four monks who are also professors in Chinese universities (i.e., Zhanru, Shengkai, Weishan, and Jingyin), and to meet with all of the famous “five bhikṣus” originally sent to Sri Lanka during the 1980s and important for Buddhists education (i.e., Jingyin, Guangxing, Yuanci, Xueyu, and Jianhua).16

As both a foreigner and a layperson, it was sometimes difficult to arrange visits and interviews in seminaries. One seminary leader warmly welcomed me to stay in his seminary but then had me stay in a nearby hotel after he checked with the guest prefect about state restrictions on hosting foreigners.17 Once I was in a seminary, I was

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16 The “five bhikṣus” were recent graduates of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary sent to Sri Lanka in 1986. All five went on to acquire doctoral degrees and continue to make contributions to Buddhist education and scholarship. Xueyu (or Xue Yu) and Jianhua (or Cheng Jianhua) have since disrobed, but continue scholarship on Buddhist history and philosophy.

17 This monastic muttered, with irritation directed toward the local religious affairs bureau, about requirements to be a “harmonious monastery” (hexie siyuan 和谐寺院). Irritated myself about having traveled across two provinces to visit this seminary, I muttered something about how perhaps this monastic wanted a special “enfeoffed title” (fenghao 封号) for exemplary behavior from the government. This was not my best demonstration of the rapport and empathy one should develop for informants. The monastic then explained that the “harmonious monastery” regulations forbade foreigners from staying on site, and that qualifying as a “harmonious monastery” was a matter of minimum compliance to avoid trouble with
sometimes told to stop taking notes when sensitive issues involving factional politics or finances were raised. No one had to tell me not to take notes when seminary leaders chatted with state officials over tea. Sometimes I would subsequently call a low-ranking religious affairs official to help me decipher fragments of conversations about what, for example, counted as too Leftist (*tai zuo* 太左).

It was difficult to predict how much access I would have at a particular site. In one seminary, on the basis of an informal personal introduction, the top seminary leader gave me extended access and even copies of internal seminary records. At another seminary, despite a formal letter of introduction from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and a personal introduction from a monastic administrator at a nearby seminary, I was only granted a tour of the facilities and a two-hour talk with the two top administrators. As these two administrators noted, technically they were under the control of the local religious affairs agency, so my permission from other agencies, even a ministry-level academy in Beijing, was not relevant.

However, I never acquired such permission from local religious affairs agencies. In practice it was either too troublesome or not necessary, I was told. In one seminary I ended up interviewing a vice rector, who was wearing Buddhist beads on his wrist, in his office. When I received his business card I learned he was also head of both the local religious affairs agency and the local United Front department. ¹⁸ He said nothing about applying for permission for research. At another seminary, which seminary officials told

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¹⁸ These organizations are discussed in chapter two. In brief, the United Front monitors the government’s religious affairs agencies. It is common for several administrative offices, such as minority affairs and religious affairs, or even government related Party offices, to be combined at the local level.
me is not officially registered as a religious school, one day I had lunch next to the
highest ranking government official for Buddhist and Daoist religious affairs in China.
No one made a fuss about permission to conduct research then, either.

In short, the research I conducted was a compromise between what I aimed to do
and what conditions permitted me to do. My aim was to gain an overall picture of how
seminary education in China functions, not write an ethnography of a single seminary. I
suspected that if I could gain extensive access to a seminary, it would probably be a low-
ranking, peripheral one of little national importance. Nevertheless, one goal was to
conduct regular fieldwork, at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in Beijing, as this is the best
seminary in China (in terms of entrance requirements) and the training ground for future
monastic leaders. Ideally I would be able to attend classes there, or even offer classes or
tutorials in something such as Buddhist English. Yet after several attempts to arrange this,
including a meeting with an important gatekeeper, I realized this would not happen.19

Therefore I conducted research wherever possible. If time limitations demanded a
choice be made, I prioritized interviewing seminary administrators over teachers and
teachers over seminarians. This strategy matched my goal to achieve a broad, systematic
view of how seminary education works. Furthermore, it was often the path of least
resistance; cautious seminary officials were less comfortable having foreigners bother

19 Another foreign researcher attempted to conduct research at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary through a
formal application rather than through informal contacts with gatekeepers. After spending many days
completing the required application, including essays in Chinese about research methods and goals, he was
granted one-and-a-half hours of meetings with several seminary instructors, who also gave him a few
documents not much different from what one can find online. Then his official time to conduct research
was officially terminated. I found a better approach was to arrange informal meetings with seminarians and
seminary instructors and administrators. Sometimes these were conducted in seminary dorms and
sometimes outside the seminary, in a teahouse, in a private apartment, over a short day trip, and over a five-
day tour of cultural sites.
their seminarians. Such strategies involve costs as well as benefits. While I visited many sites, my understanding of some sites is impressionistic. While sometimes I learned how seminaries were supposed to function, at places where I didn’t interview seminarians, I gained little understanding of how they might actually function for those at the receiving end of such education. Ideally this research kind of research would be combined with more focused, participant-observation fieldwork at a single seminary.

**Terminological Notes**

There are several terms in this study that require clarification, including *monastics*, *state*, and *tradition*.

By *monastics*, unless noted otherwise I mean all tonsured Buddhist clergy. Therefore the term includes both monks and nuns, whether they are ordained or merely tonsured.20 There are also Daoist monastics in China, but they are not discussed in this study.21 Common Chinese terms for Buddhist male and female monastics collectively include *chujiaren* 出家人 (left-home person), *sengren* 僧人 (sangha people), and *sengni* 僧尼 (monks-nuns). Buddhist monastics are expected to be celibate and live in communities of other monastics.22 See appendix 9 for more on the categories and numbers of Buddhist monastics in China.

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20 For the important distinction between tonsure and ordination, see Welch 1967, 269-296.
21 In contemporary Daoism there are monastics (*chujiaren* 出家人), including monks (*qiandao* 乾道) and nuns (*kundao* 坤道). See Herrou (2012; 2013), whose research also includes discussion of the term monasticism and its applicability to Chinese contexts. In Chinese Catholicism there are priests, nuns, and seminarians, but evidently no monks and no monasteries. See Madsen (1998, 101-106) and Herrou (2013, 11 n. 7).
22 Daoist monastics in the Quanzhen 全真 order are also normatively supposed to be celibate, but Herrou’s (2012, 2013) research indicates these norms are often only weakly enforced. My own limited fieldwork in
When I discuss the state, unless otherwise qualified I mean the Chinese Communist regime in general, at the national level, i.e., both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, or Party) and the government. Chinese terms for state in this sense include dangju 当局 (authorities), dangzheng 党政 (Party-government), and guojia 国家 (state—but which can also just mean “the country”). Although the government is controlled by the Party, there is a distinction between the Party (dang) and the government (zheng). For example, every government agency is under the direction of a specific Party agency.

Precisely where the state ends is debatable. Sometimes Chinese people use the term “government” (zhengfu 政府) or “state” (guojia 国家) to refer not only to Party and government agencies, but also to government-controlled organizations that are in theory supposed to be non-governmental organizations. For example, one monastic seminary instructor said that Fayin, the official journal of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), “of the government” (zhengfu de 政府的). Technically the BAC is not a state agency, but its members are state-vetted and its leadership state-appointed. The BAC Daoist monasteries confirms this impression; one Quanzhen Daoist monk confided to me that meat-eating and sex were both natural and since Daoism advocated what is natural he enjoyed both of these proscribed activities. In contrast, despite much more fieldwork in Buddhism, I have never heard Buddhist monastics discuss their own sexual activity, and they rarely mentioned their own infractions of other important rules. One Buddhist monk, however, bragged about how he ate meat outside of the monastery, and told me next time I visited as a gift he would prefer a bottle of cognac (alcohol is also a proscribed item for monks) to a canister of tea. He didn’t intend to drink the cognac—it just had a pretty color and would look nice on his shelves, he stated.

Some authors prefer to call the regime the party-state, but I find that term awkward and unnecessary. Furthermore, if state is understood as the institution that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, in China the Party has a better claim to be recognized as the state than the government does. For example, technically speaking the PRC has no military. The Ministry of Defense exercises no direct control over the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which answers to a Party committee (see McGregor 2010). Both the government and the PLA are best understood as parts of the machinery of state, which the Party operates.
The president is a Buddhist monk, but the previous and the current secretary-generals of the BAC are both former state cadres. In short, the BAC is a government-organized non-governmental organization (GONGO) which functions as an extension of the state but which also represents Buddhist, and today particular monastic, interests.\(^\text{24}\) When I use the term state I do not include in this category the BAC or any of the regional Buddhist Associations throughout China.\(^\text{25}\) But it is important to remember that some monastics regard such associations as state agencies and that in many ways they do function as such.

The term *tradition* (and adjectivally, *traditional*) appears frequently in this study and its meaning depends on context.\(^\text{26}\) Usually it either modifies Buddhism or education. Here traditional Buddhism is understood as the authoritative, mainstream Buddhist institutions that were in the past—usually meaning around the late nineteenth century, but it depends—relatively unquestioned.\(^\text{27}\) The explicit identification of such as “traditional” often implies that they are no longer unquestioned, and are contrasted with other options. Often the full meaning of traditional can only be understood in relation to its contrast. For example, when Buddhist seminaries were first established, they often reflected a

\(^{24}\) On GONGOs see Naim 2007. On the BAC as an organization between state agency and monastic interest group, see Ji Zhe 2008.

\(^{25}\) To simplify, there are three levels of Buddhist associations in China, the BAC, province-level associations, and local associations. Higher-level associations have, in theory, the authority to guide the lower-level associations within their jurisdiction. But this authority is not, in theory much less in practice, anything like direct control. As one senior BAC official told me of the various Buddhist associations,

\(^{26}\) In this dissertation, sometimes the binaries liberal/conservative, or reform/conservative, are used rather than the modern/traditional binary. The standard term for tradition in Chinese is *chuantong* 传统, a term which like the English word tradition is used in both scholarly and popular discourse. For an influential theoretical discussion of tradition, see Shils 1981.

\(^{27}\) That such institutions changed over time and were questioned in the distant past is irrelevant for my usage. For example, the doctrine that all sentient beings can attain Buddhahood is traditional in Chinese Buddhism, even if this doctrine was vigorously debated prior to the eighth century.
reformist faction in Chinese Buddhism, and contrasted with traditional monastery institutions. Just as a successful social reform creates a new establishment, seminaries today are central to Chinese Buddhism and now it is possible to speak of a mainstream or even “traditional” seminary which contrasts with “alternative” seminaries, which often incorporate more elements of the “traditional” monastery into their pedagogy.

Another traditional institution I discuss is traditional Chinese education or schooling—which is contrasted with modern schooling. In brief, modern schools in China are schools whose features resemble Western schools more than they resemble the kinds of schools common in China before the twentieth century. Premodern Chinese schools focused on preparing students for the civil service exam, a roughly 1350-year-old institution abolished in 1905. The curriculum in traditional schools centered on classical literary texts written in a literary language that no one spoke. In contrast, modern schools aim to impart basic knowledge and skills such as literacy, to socialize students as citizens, and to prepare students for various occupations. First established in the nineteenth century, modern schools taught what were then new subjects, such as physics, dentistry, and geometry, and they taught old subjects such as history in new ways. New tools (blackboards, notebooks), modes of assessment (examinations, grades), teaching materials (textbooks), and personnel (teachers trained in teaching colleges) distinguished the new schools from the old. Crucially, the textbooks and teachers in new schools were formed in state-sanctioned institutes of higher education. Textbooks and teacher training had to be regularly updated to meet current state interests and the academic consensus for constituted valid knowledge in a given field. Schools were thus formally incorporated into a new institutional network and were, as previously, located “downstream,” at the receiving end of decisions made within that network. In contrast, until the late nineteenth
century, in the traditional Chinese education system the basic teaching materials (such as primers, the Four Books, and the Five Classics) were basically fixed and even the commentarial framework to interpret them had remained stable for over four hundred years.28

Buddhist seminaries were monastic, modern schools first established in the early twentieth century in response to state policies. But as will be discussed and unlike secular schools, seminaries have been ambiguously located between traditional monastic institutions and modern state/academic institutions.

**Chapter Overview**

In the following chapter, chapter two, I describe how seminaries originated in early twentieth-century China and outline how they have developed. I show how seminaries developed differently in three distinct periods of time, which were punctuated by two periods when no seminaries were operating (i.e., 1949-1955 and 1966-1979). I show that the state has been important for shaping seminaries and that starting in the PRC the state formally enlisted secular academia to help guide seminaries. I also argue that politically it is the philosophy of the United Front that determines the broader trends in PRC religious affairs policy, which in turn explain many of the vicissitudes seminaries have faced.

In chapter three, I describe the various components in a contemporary seminary and show how seminaries continue to be shaped by the state. I also show how seminaries are intricately linked with but remain distinct from the monasteries with which they overlap physically. I demonstrate that other, new monastic institutions are integrally

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linked to seminaries, and that the state continues to encourage seminaries to develop along the lines that schools and academic programs have developed.

In chapter four, I address the question of how academia and Buddhism, particularly academic Buddhist studies and Buddhist seminaries, relate to one another. I describe the relationship as a mix of both cooperation and competition. In terms of their relative social power, academia has in advantage in its relationship with the state but Buddhist institutions often have more financial resources at their disposal. I suggest that in effect if not intentionally, Buddhist institutions can shift academic research priorities so their research is less threatening.

In chapter five I consider the influence of academia on contemporary Buddhism and particularly the influence of academic Buddhist studies on seminaries. I argue that essential features of academic discourse challenge traditional Buddhist learning and that institutional structures discussed in the previous chapters partly determine how the resulting dynamics play out. The resulting tensions between these two fields are thus not an optional, adjustable result of prejudice or Communist ideology, but are inherently rooted in the gap between different modes of justification and inquiry. I argue the justificatory pressure academia places upon Buddhist learning is mediated through seminaries and that responses to this pressure will partly determine the future of Chinese Buddhism.
Chapter 2: The Birth and Proliferation of Buddhist Seminaries

This chapter outlines how Chinese Buddhist seminaries originated and have developed. It describes seminaries during the three periods they existed, 1904-1949 (late Qing and Republic), 1956-1966 (Maoist PRC), and 1980-present (post-Maoist PRC).

Three points should be clear from the following presentation. One, for more than a century the role of the state has been decisive, but not absolute, in the fortunes of seminaries. Two, seminaries have in the past two decades grown to become one of the most important institutions in Chinese Buddhism. Three, the vicissitudes of seminaries reflect a complex crossover of both Buddhist and secular projects. To paraphrase Teiser’s (2005) description of Chinese Buddhism, seminaries are evolving hybrids of various elements, foreign and Chinese, Buddhist and secular. While the present chapter focuses on how these hybrids have evolved, other chapters focus on the broader institutional ecology in which seminaries find themselves and the diverse adaptations these still-evolving hybrids make.

Historical Backdrop to the Establishment of Seminaries

In the early twentieth century, like modern schools in China, seminaries were new to Chinese Buddhism but education and schooling were not (chapter 1). That is, until the twentieth century monastics did not attend full-time schools in which they were given broad overviews of Buddhist teachings and history and with an aim of making them better, more educated monastics. But Buddhist monks had traditionally been trained in monasteries, including through lecture series, informal and formal apprenticeships, courses in ritual performance and comportment led by senior monks, and contemplative
practices taught in master-disciple relationships. Similarly, state policies in the twentieth century to expropriate monastery properties to use for modern schools were new, but similar tensions and policies date back centuries.

Internal turmoil and foreign political pressure encouraged China to adopt modern schooling. China’s interactions with the West and with a Westernized Japan brought unprecedented pressure onto Buddhism, just as they did to other elements of traditional society. The prospect of national humiliation, colonization, or collapse haunted Chinese elites. Military defeat by Japan (1895) and the Eight-Nation Alliance (1901) highlighted China’s need to reform its institutions. In 1905 the Qing empire abolished the civil service examination, which for over 1200 years had been central to Chinese education. The termination of the examinations rapidly eroded the authority of the Cheng-Zhu Neo-Confucian orthodoxy that had dominated intellectual life for five centuries. In the first decade of the twentieth century, as Elman puts it, “a social, political, and cultural nexus of classical literati values, dynastic imperial power, and elite gentry status was unraveling before everyone's eyes” (2000, 586). Chinese reformers adopted Western-style

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29 For traditional modes of monastic education that persisted into the twentieth century, see Welch (1967, 310-16) and Welch (1968, 103-107). For a broader historical overview, see Ding Gang 2010. For Chan Buddhist education in the Song dynasty (960-1279), see Yü Chün-fang 1989.

30 See Schneewind (2006, 76-86) for fifteenth and sixteenth century cases of local officials equating a proliferation of religious buildings with inadequate support for schools, and the destruction of temples (including Buddhist ones) to build schools. For instance, in 1522 an official serving in central Yunnan province admonished local leaders, stating “family schools and village schools are the system of our dynasty modeled on the perfect Zhou dynasty. How can you instead have spirit halls and Buddhist quarters?” (2006, 84).

31 Elman (2000; also 2001) shows there were signs of weakening in Chinese confidence in Confucianism at least two centuries prior to the twentieth century. Also see Chow (1994) on the rise of skepticism toward the authenticity of classical Confucian texts in the seventeenth century, and then the eclipse of this sub-tradition by the mid-eighteenth century by a perspective regarding the classics as scriptural, i.e., produced
schooling to fill gaps left by the ruin of older educational and credentialing systems. The idea was that modern education could strengthen China; a common slogan was “reviving the nation through education” (jiaoyu xing guo 教育興國). Given these disturbances, the turn of the twentieth century was a time of unprecedented challenges and—what is often overlooked—unprecedented opportunities for Chinese Buddhism. One slogan Buddhists adopted to resonate with the national emphasis on education was to “revive the Teachings with education” (jiaoyu xing jiao 教育興教). 32 In this Buddhist context, the term Teachings is still ambiguous, but it means either Buddhism as a whole or the doctrinal schools of Buddhism, or both simultaneously—the basic idea being that doctrinal study would revive the whole of Buddhism.

In the face of existential threats to the nation, leading Chinese intellectuals proposed new, expanded roles for Buddhism. For example in 1900 Cai Yuanpei (1868-1940) composed an essay advocating a reformed version of Buddhism be combined with parts of Confucianism to form a new national Teaching (jiao 教)—something like a national religion or ideology—to replace traditional Confucianism. 33 China needed a unified Teaching for guidance and unity, Cai argued, or it would perish. For Cai a

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32 See Lai Rongdao (2013), which takes this slogan as a central theme in Republican Buddhist reform.
33 Cai was influential at the highest levels of society, and his theories of education shape schooling in China to this day. He was later to become the first minister of education, the president of Peking University, and a founder of Academia Sinica. Other Chinese intellectual elites, such as Tan Sitong (1865-1898), attempted to fuse elements of Confucianism and Mahayana Buddhism into a new political philosophy; others, such as Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), took elements of Chinese Buddhist scholasticism to supplement Confucian philosophy. For an overview of these political/intellectual movements, see Chan 1985 (which focuses on Tan), and Clower 2010 and Clower 2014 (which focus on Mou).
modernized version of Buddhism was vastly preferable to the other option he thought was available, Christianity. 34 Cai’s new version of Buddhism drew on Japanese Buddhist precedents and included the following five recommendations to change Buddhist practices. 35

1. Ritual services should be abolished and the focus of Buddhism should be on teachings.

2. This second proposal is crucial and amenable to concise translation:

“[Monasteries] should imitate the bylaws of the Japanese [Higashi] Hongan-ji temple and set up general schools and specialized schools 當仿日本本願寺章程，設普通學堂及專門學堂.”

3. For the sake of protection of the nation, monks should undergo physical training and then advance to military studies.

4. Prohibitions on eating meat should be abolished.

5. Prohibitions on monks taking wives should be abolished.

34 My translation of the first paragraph in Cai’s essay conveys what he meant by a Teaching: “Mencius said: When people carry out the Way, if they are well fed, warmly dressed, dwelling in tranquility and yet without a Teaching, then they are similar to birds and beasts. A ‘nation’ is that which is formed by the accumulation of people. A ‘Teaching’ is that which illuminates people and the way for them to treat one another. If a nation lacks a Teaching, then its people are similar to birds and beasts, and the nation will perish. Therefore there is no Teaching that does not take protection of the nation as a central tenet.”

35 For Cai’s 1900 essay, see Cai Yuanpei (1991 [1900]); for analysis of the Japanese influence on Cai, see Houteng Yanzi (1999), who finds evidence (beyond what is already stated in Cai’s essay) that Cai’s ideas about Buddhism, nationalism, and monastery schools were influenced by Japanese Buddhist philosopher Inoue Enryō (1858-1919) and the Jōdo Shinshū institutions of the Ōtani-ha sect and Higashi Hongan-ji temple. For more on Inoue’s and Ōtani-ha’s ideas about Buddhism, schooling, curricula, and academic research, see Josephson 2006, Godart 2006, Bodiford 2014, and Sasaki 2013 [1924]. I thank Micah Auerbach for help finding relevant sources on Inoue and Ōtani-ha.
Cai’s essay did not directly shape Chinese Buddhist ideas about schooling, but it reflects the sort of discourse common in intellectual and monastic circles in the early twentieth century. The essay also points to the influence on Chinese Buddhism of Japanese Buddhist modernism, which was in turn indebted to European philologists such as Max Müller (1823-1900), founder of what evolved into the academic field of religious studies.\(^3\) However, some of these specific issues, including vegetarianism and celibacy, more directly reflect Japanese developments and are only indirectly related to Western influence.\(^3\) Thus, to foreshadow the analysis in the fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation, by 1900 there were connections between the idea for Chinese Buddhist schools and secular religious studies, even before Buddhist seminaries existed.

Then in 1911 the Qing empire collapsed and the following year the Republic of China (1912-1949) was established. The curtain fell not only on the largest Chinese empire in history, but on over two thousand years of the imperial system. The empire’s downfall was cause, effect, and reflection of the various societal and cultural upheavals in early twentieth century China.

Cai’s proposal and similar efforts to make Buddhism into a new national Teaching never succeeded. In general, the prominence of Buddhism as a potential resource in mainstream Chinese intellectual endeavors receded by mid-century.\(^\text{38}\) Instead,

\(^3\text{6}\) For more of Müller in relation to Chinese religions, see Sun (2013).

\(^3\text{7}\) See Jaffe (2001; 2005) on modern Japanese Buddhism and clerical marriage and vegetarianism, respectively. The reasons for the spread of such practices in Japan are complicated, but one factor was their decriminalization by the state in 1872. This decriminalization measure was in turn indebted to Western ideas of the separation of church and state.

\(^3\text{8}\) In the early twentieth century, other Chinese turned to Buddhism, including newly discovered Buddhist texts from Japan, hoping that Buddhism offered intellectual resources that could be integrated into a new epistemological framework incorporating and surpassing Western science and logic (Hammerstrom 2015).
Republicanism and Communism, sometimes draped in traditional Chinese garb or mixed with Fascist elements, filled the gap left by the collapse of Confucianism. Cai himself would later famously advocate that religions were obsolete and should be replaced by education in aesthetics. Cai’s concrete proposals for Buddhism also did not for the most part materialize. More than a century later, it is clear that ritual performances, vegetarianism, and celibacy have remained central features of Chinese Buddhist monasticism.\(^3^9\) And monks have only rarely been pressed into military service, often as non-combatants and only during periods of extreme duress such as invasion, threatened invasion, or civil war.\(^4^0\) But Buddhist schools are a different story.

Besides new opportunities, in the early twentieth century Chinese Buddhists faced challenges from multiple directions. Schools in monasteries were first established in response to threats to Buddhist property. Proposed in 1898 and then partially implemented in 1904, state policies to expropriate temples and convert them into schools threatened Buddhism.\(^4^1\) Such policies were periodically revived in certain localities into

\(^{39}\) See Gildow 2014 for the prevalence of ritual activities in contemporary PRC Buddhism.

\(^{40}\) For the military activities of Chinese Buddhist monastics during the twentieth century, such as during the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), the Chinese Civil War (1946-1949), and the Korean War (1950-1953), see Xue Yu 2005 and Xue Yu 2015.

\(^{41}\) By “temple” I mean any religious building in the traditional Chinese religions/teachings of Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, and popular religion, including those labeled in Chinese by terms such as \textit{miao} 庙, \textit{simiao} 寺庙, \textit{siyuan} 寺院, \textit{gong} 宫, \textit{guan} 观, etc. Thus in this study the category \textit{temple} includes “monastery” (in Chinese, usually \textit{si} 寺 or \textit{siyuan} 寺院), i.e., complexes of religious buildings in which
the 1930s. A more subtle challenge came from newly imported categories, philosophies, and academic methods. For example, after 1900, in China it became possible to call Buddhist practices “superstition” (迷信); to label Buddhism a false ideology reflecting class contradictions; or to delegitimize Buddhist sacred histories with modern scholarship rather than with the rhetoric of rival teachings. Finally, over the course of the twentieth century, the spread of mass education changed the relative cultural level of the Buddhist monk. At the beginning of the century, Buddhist monks were more educated than the average Chinese person; at the end of the century, they were probably less educated. These momentous changes in the history of Chinese Buddhism largely 

clergy, i.e., monks and/or nuns, reside. All monasteries in this dissertation, unless noted otherwise, are Buddhist monasteries.

42 This policy was called “construct schools using temple properties” (miao chan xing xue) and sometimes “destroy temples to establish schools” (huimiao ban xue). It echoed the policies and proposals of Confucian officials during the fifteenth to the seventeenth centuries. But this time the policy was to be implemented nationally, and sometimes Confucian academies, and not just Buddhist, Daoist, and other popular religious establishments, were also targeted to be converted into modern schools. See Welch (1968, 10-15) and Goossaert (2006); also see Schneewind (2006) for the fifteenth and sixteenth century precedents. See Ouyang and Zhang 2010 for a study on the extent to which the policy was actually implemented in various localities.

43 For temple appropriations in relation to anti-superstition campaigns in the late Qing, see Goossaert and Palmer 2011, 44-55. See Jiang Canteng 2001 for a review of debates about the historiography of Buddhism during the twentieth century, including the writings of Hu Shih (1891-1962) and the reception of his critical scholarship. Skeptical scrutiny of Buddhist history was only one facet of a much broader trend to re-evaluate received texts and historical narratives. For example, Hu Shih and especially his student Gu Jiegang (1893-1980) were also know for founding the Doubting Antiquity School, the historiographical movement in China to demythologize traditional Chinese history (see Schneider 1971).

44 Representative data on the average level of education, which I take to mean literacy rates prior to the PRC and years of schooling during the PRC, for Buddhist monastics are not available. But compare Welch (1967, 257-58) and Pittman (2001, 54) for the literacy level of monks during the Republic, with Jingyin and Zhang Qi (2009) for piecemeal evidence about the level of schooling of monastics in the contemporary PRC, with Treiman 2013 for longitudinal data on levels of schooling in the PRC. In conversation, several
occurred outside of Buddhist circles. That is, changes in how Buddhism was viewed and positioned in society pressured Buddhist institutions to change as well. To summarize, Chinese Buddhism faced a threefold challenge: institutional (appropriation of monasteries), knowledge-related (accusations of superstition), and personnel-related (declining prestige of monastics). Establishing seminaries was one Buddhist response to this threefold challenge. Many Buddhists came to think that seminaries could simultaneously prevent their properties from being seized, revive and reform Buddhist learning, and create a new kind of monastic whom everyone would respect.

So Cai’s second recommendation, that monasteries establish schools, became a reality. Today in China there are some fifty monastic seminaries educating several thousand monastic seminarians.45 The birth of monastic schooling can partly be attributed, ironically, to the fact that at the beginning of the twentieth century monasteries were being seized to make schools. Seminaries, i.e., schools attached to monasteries for the education of monastics, successfully integrated themselves into the configuration of monastic institutions because, unlike many other proposed reforms to Buddhism, there was sufficient support for them among both monastics and others, including lay Buddhists and the state and cultural institutions that interacted with Buddhism.

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45 See appendix 5. For more on what seminaries are in China today, see chapter three.
Monastic Schools and Seminaries in the Late Qing and Republic, 1904-1949

In this section I discuss the origins, development, and impact of seminaries in the first half of the twentieth century. I suggest that seminaries contributed to the institutional and doctrinal transformation of Chinese Buddhism, but that doctrinally they were more involved in defending traditional Chinese Buddhism than changing it. For more data on seminaries during the Republic, see appendix 11.

Buddhist responses to establish schools were initially defensive strategies to avoid expropriation of their property. And the first modern schools in monasteries were not seminaries but rather ordinary schools for primary education, either for uneducated monks or local residents. Welch (1968, 10-15) has documented how the idea for the first monastic school in China, the Hunan Sangha School, began with the suggestion of two Japanese priests in China. The school was founded in 1904 with their assistance, under the correct assumption that the state would not confiscate monasteries to build schools if the monasteries themselves already provided schooling. When the threat of expropriation was high such schools usually provided a basic education to the general population; when the threat was lower the schools tended to provide Buddhist education for monastics (Welch 1968). Over the next forty-five years, monasteries founded and operated a variety of schools on their premises.  

While the early motivations to establish Buddhist schools were defensive, and the shadow of expropriation for secular schooling continued to impel the establishment of seminaries, there soon appeared monks who themselves actively promoted the education

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46 Terms used for such schools included academy (xueyuan), research society (yanjiushe), school (xuexiao), Buddhist school (fo xuexiao), study society (xueshe), lecture hall (jiangtang), and Buddhist seminary (foxueyuan), among others.
of clergy through modern schooling. Taixu (1890-1947), a divisive figure who emphasized doctrinal learning over other religious practices, is today the most famous of these educator-monks. In 1912 he engineered the takeover of Jinshan monastery, which epitomized monastic tradition and had the most famous Chan meditation hall in China, and he attempted to turn the monastery into a school for monks. Shortly after Taixu’s successful takeover, his faction was driven away by an armed rival faction. The conservative monastic establishment of central-east China never forgave Taixu for this “invasion.” Nevertheless, Taixu succeeded in founding or running five seminaries, and his students founded more.

Taixu’s first seminary was the Wuhan Buddhist Seminary (Wuhan foxueyuan), founded in 1922 and the first Buddhist school to call itself a “Buddhist seminary” (foxueyuan). It became a prototype for similar schools. By the end of the Republic (and today), most monastic schools called themselves Buddhist seminaries. The correlation

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47 For example Xiamen University was built on rice fields expropriated in 1921 from the Nanputuo Monastery in Xiamen, Fujian. To prevent further expropriations, the monastery founded the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, which became one of the most influential Buddhist seminaries during its two incarnations (1925-1939 and 1985-present) during the past ninety years (Welch 1968, 110-111; Travagnin 2015).

48 On the invasion of Jinshan and Taixu, see Welch 1968, 28-33 and 51-71.

49 As discussed above, foxueyuan could be translated “Buddhist academy” (as in Lai Rongdao 2013) or “institute for Buddhist learning.” Following Welch (1968), I translate foxueyuan as “(Buddhist) seminary” to emphasize that such schools are usually exclusively concerned with the formation of Buddhist clergy. Also, during fieldwork (2013) I also found that at least one Buddhist school in China today intentionally chose not to call itself a foxueyuan because that term implied a curriculum that was too restrictive and traditional, and instead called itself a fojiao xueyuan, a term better translated as “Buddhist academy.”

50 In Welch’s chart (1968, 285-87), of the forty-two Buddhist schools during the Republic for which dates of operation are available (and hence whose existence is better attested), thirty-one, or 73.81%, were called seminaries (foxueyuan). For the history of Buddhist seminaries during the Republican period, see Welch (1968), Li Ming (2009), and Lai Rongdao (2012).
between a school’s name and what it taught was not absolute, but in general schools that called themselves seminaries differed from other kinds of Buddhist schools in two respects. First, they were mainly established to teach monastics about Buddhism. In contrast, monasteries also founded schools to promote basic literacy among monastics or local residents. Second, seminaries were more apt than other monastic schools for teaching Buddhism to adopt features of modern secular schools. In contrast to traditional modes of monastic education and other monastic schools, the early seminaries were liberal.

The following chart summarizes the contrasts between these early “liberal” seminaries and other “conservative” monastic schools. But since eventually even the more conservative monastic schools called themselves seminaries, the chart also shows contrasts between two kinds of seminaries, liberal and conservative. The contrasts point to tendencies, not fixed traits; most schools included a mixture of both conservative and liberal features.51

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>teacher status</td>
<td>all monastics</td>
<td>included laity</td>
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<tr>
<td>student status</td>
<td>all monastics</td>
<td>included laity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student gender</td>
<td>only for men</td>
<td>separate seminaries sponsored for women (nuns and laywomen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>teacher’s clothing</td>
<td>wore traditional red robe of a</td>
<td>teacher did not wear red robe; stood</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

51 Lai Rongdao’s current research on the Tiantai Dharma lineage (tiantai zong 台天宗) promises to show in more detail how seminaries combined traditional and modern elements. The members of the Tiantai lineage founded more seminaries than Taixu did and their seminaries were generally more traditional than Taixu’s were. See Carter (2011) for a biography of a leading member of this lineage, the monk Tanxu 倓虛 (1875-1963). See Li Ming (2009, 88-97) on seminaries and other activities of the Tiantai lineage in modern Chinese Buddhism. According to Li Ming’s data, the Tiantai lineage founded as many as twelve seminaries between 1921 and 1949; nine were founded, at least in part, by Tanxu.

52 This chart mainly draws on information from Welch 1968, Li Ming 2009, and Lai Rongdao 2013.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Conservative Seminaries</th>
<th>Liberal Seminaries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>and posture</td>
<td>Dharma master; taught seated on a platform while teaching</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instruction</td>
<td>more ritualized; more traditional religious practices</td>
<td>less ritualized; fewer traditional religious practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student responses in class</td>
<td>focus on repeating correct answers to questions</td>
<td>focus on explaining answers in one’s own words</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>curriculum</td>
<td>classes concerned Buddhism</td>
<td>some classes on secular topics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist subjects</td>
<td>focused on important sutras—the same scriptures emphasized in monastery lecture halls</td>
<td>Buddhist classes focused on treatises and commentaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist traditions and schools of thought</td>
<td>Buddhist classes aimed at teaching the viewpoints of a single Chinese doctrinal school, such as Tiantai or Huayan, or centered on a single sutra, such as the Śūraṃgama Sutra.</td>
<td>Buddhist classes aimed at teaching doctrines of many schools of Buddhism, sometimes with an emphasis on the Consciousness-only school. Occasionally classes covered Hinayana or Tibetan Buddhism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>non-Buddhist subjects</td>
<td>if taught, focused on traditional Chinese learning</td>
<td>included modern topics such as psychology and sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technology</td>
<td>no notebooks, blackboards, examinations, or diplomas</td>
<td>students used notebooks, teachers used blackboards, entrance examinations required, regular graded examinations given, diplomas awarded at graduation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>languages</td>
<td>only Chinese taught</td>
<td>foreign languages taught</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>student discipline</td>
<td>physical punishment common</td>
<td>physical punishment uncommon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>academic calendar</td>
<td>semester and vacation days set according to traditional calendar</td>
<td>semester and vacation days set according to the Western calendar</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, conservative and liberal seminaries differed in terms of instructional focus, pedagogical techniques, and institutional practices. All seminaries incorporated practices from monasteries, conservative seminaries more so than liberal ones. There appears to have been an overall convergence among seminaries over the Republican period. For example, conservative seminaries adopted liberal features, especially their use of technology (see chart). On the other hand, liberal seminaries, such as the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, increasingly focused on the study of Buddhism and de-emphasized secular subjects.

All seminaries in the Republic were single gender institutions. Virtually all research on seminaries describes seminaries for monks. But Li Ming (2009, 138-146) has uncovered records of thirteen seminaries for women, founded between 1924 and 1948,
which operated during the Republic, some for both nuns and laywomen, others for nuns only. Nuns studying in such seminaries were often called xueni 學尼, student-nuns, in contrast to the xueseng 學僧, student-monks. But in China today the term xueseng is generic for monastic student, i.e., it refers to both monk and nun students, and so I translate it as student-monastic.\textsuperscript{53} Since today virtually all students in Chinese Buddhist seminaries are monastics and hence xueseng, I often translate xueseng as seminarians.

Seminaries had a major impact on Chinese Buddhism during the Republic. Many famous monks founded or taught at seminaries. As Lai Rongdao argues (2013), seminaries fostered new forms of student-teacher relationships and new forms of community. Dongchu (1974, 204), a student of Taixu, writes that seminaries “led Buddhist education to change from a monastery/sectarian style of education to a school-based style of education—a major transition in sangha education in Chinese Buddhist history.”\textsuperscript{54} Furthermore seminary-affiliated monastics were involved in publishing Buddhist periodicals, which fostered new platforms for discursive communities (Scott 2013). As Hammerstrom (2015) shows, such periodicals were among the sites for Buddhist responses to important topics such as modern science.

Seminaries were new institutions in Chinese Buddhism but the doctrines they taught were often traditional. To demonstrate this point I will consider the doctrinal orientation of Taixu, who was often considered a radical reformer within the sangha.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{53} Rarely, today Buddhists use the term xueseng to mean “scholar-monastic,” i.e., a prolific writer on technical Buddhist subjects. Another term for scholar-monastic is xuewenseng 學問僧.

\textsuperscript{54} Original text: 使佛教教育由叢林宗派式教育，進入學校化之僧教育，這是我國佛教史上的一大轉捩點.

\textsuperscript{55} For example, Welch 1968 characterizes Taixu as radical, as does Birnbaum 2003. Even in terms of institutional reform, this characterization of Taixu as a radical is often exaggerated. For example, at his
On the one hand Taixu was more ecumenical than many Chinese Buddhists. For example he thought all eight schools of Chinese Buddhism were equal and worthy of study. He even promoted the teaching of Hinayana and Tibetan Buddhism at some of his seminaries. And he applied Buddhist doctrines to analyze new topics in China, such as science, democracy, and Communism.

Yet as others have shown, in other ways Taixu was conservative or even reactionary. This is easily seen in the debates between Taixu and his students on the one hand and the lay Buddhist Ouyang Jingwu (1871-1943) and his students on the other. Like Taixu, Ouyang had been a student of the lay Buddhist Yang Wenhui (1837-1911). But Ouyang was more critical of traditional Chinese Buddhism, and was more open to influence from secular academic Buddhology. Yu Lingbo (1995, 371-385) shows that during the 1920s Ouyang or his students criticized several core Chinese Buddhist beliefs. The objects of their criticism included: the monastic vocation in general; the Chan, Huayan, and Tiantai schools; the commentaries of famous Buddhist figures; and the historical authenticity and philosophical coherence of central Buddhist texts such as the Treatise on the Arising of Mahayana Faith and the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. On all of these crucial issues, Taixu and his disciples defended traditional Chinese Buddhist viewpoints. Thus Taixu and his followers were relatively modern or liberal in the sense that they led

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first seminary, the Wuchang Buddhist Seminary, students were still required to participate in morning and evening liturgical services, as they would if living in a monastery. And after the second year of running the seminary, Taixu requested that new students be limited to fully ordained monks—excluding not only laity but even novice monks—as if the school were a traditional public monastery (shifang conglin 十方叢林). When the board of directors did not agree to this and other demands, Taixu quit his position as rector (Lai Rongdao 2013, 149-154).

monastics to adopt new institutions from secular society. But doctrinal speaking, they were conservative relative to other, especially non-monastic Buddhists and scholars. Such issues will be discussed more fully in chapter five.

Just as it is easy to overstate how modern seminaries were, it would be easy to overstate the impact of seminaries during the Republic, when seminarians were always a small percentage of the monastic sangha. Welch (1968, 287), whose research considered monks only, estimates that Republican seminaries produced about 7500 graduates between 1912 and 1950—a relatively small number for the 500,000 or so monks in China. Arguably a more revealing number for the impact of seminaries is the number of seminarians as a percentage of the sangha at any given time. Based on the data Welch provides for monastics and seminarians (1967, 414; 1968, 287), and considering that seminary nun-students were a much lower percentage of nuns than monk-students were of monks, I estimate that monastics studying in seminaries were never more than 0.2% of the total monastic population of China, and that for most of the Republic the percentage was much lower. In contrast, today monastic seminarians constitute about 3% of the monastic population—a percentage roughly equal to the percentage of US citizens enrolled in full-time higher education (see appendixes 5, 9, and 11). Therefore, per capita

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57 From another perspective, as Birnbaum (2003, 435) argues, it was the more traditional Buddhists who, if the contrast is with mainstream society, were truly “radical.” But in comparison with traditional Chinese Buddhism, the contrast I make here, Taixu was “liberal” and other leading monks (such as those listed in Birnbaum 2003, 433) were “conservative.”

58 The number 7500 includes non-monastic laymen but excludes women (both nun and laywomen). The number also assumes all students graduated, whereas accounts of seminaries indicate many students did not complete their studies. Furthermore, there were certainly more than 500,000 monks over the years from 1912 to 1950; 500,000 is an estimate for the number of monks at one time (see Welch 1967, 414).
to the total monastic population, today there are at least fifteen times more seminarians than during the peak of seminaries during the Republic.

Seminaries in the People’s Republic under Mao (1949-1976)

The fate of Buddhist seminaries during the People’s Republic of China (1949-) is integrally linked to state policies toward Buddhism as a whole, which were largely determined by general state policies toward non-Party social organizations. The Communist concept of the United Front, according to which all non-Party organizations must either accept the leadership of the Communist Party or be eliminated, was crucial to determining such policies. The metaphor behind the concept is military; the social transformation and economic development of society is likened to a military campaign run by the Party in which allied factions, participants in a “united front,” are permitted to join. The other option to United Front policies has been for the Party to dispense with partners, which then become targets to be transformed rather than allies in transforming China. When Party leadership favored United Front policies, such as in the early 1960s, select Buddhists who submitted to state directives were provided with resources. In the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), when the Party leadership decided the United Front policies were more likely to corrupt than to assist the Party, former allies in the “front” were disbanded and repressed, sometimes violently.

The Communist Party’s early policy toward Buddhism was to weaken it, to selectively preserve it, and to transform it. To a degree these were mutually exclusive goals, and periodically the emphasis shifted between them, resulting in cycles of repression followed by liberalization. Fluctuating state policies during the Maoist period

59 The best study of United Front policies as applied to religious affairs policy is still Wickeri 1988.
resulted in the closure of all seminaries shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949. Then one new, tightly-monitored seminary, the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in Fayuan Monastery in Beijing, was opened from 1956 to 1966. Finally, even this one seminary was closed from 1966 to 1979.60

Upon gaining power in 1949, the Party first undermined Buddhism’s economic basis by expropriating monastery property and making it increasingly difficult for monastics to perform rituals for pay. At the same time Party propaganda presented monastics as economic parasites and encouraged them to disrobe; for monks, joining the People’s Liberation Army was often presented as a better career. By about 1957, some 90% of the Chinese monastic order of 1949 had been eliminated.61 Many monastics left the order quietly, and the top leadership was sometimes publicly humiliated or even executed. Remaining monastics were forced to participate in productive labor, usually agricultural or light industry. In numerical terms the monastic order was devastated, probably permanently. Today in 2016, after three and a half decades of relatively liberal religious policies, the Han Buddhist monastic order of about 100,000 monastics is still far smaller than it was even in 1957, much less in 1949 (see appendix 9).

It is unclear how and when the seminaries still operating in 1949 were closed. Since seminaries depended on income from land and ritual performance to operate, probably most of them were forced to close when these sources of income were cut off. I have seen brief mention of seminaries as late as 1952, but little evidence that they were still operating as seminaries at that time. For instance, in Shanghai City archives, Xue Yu

60 For overall histories of Buddhism during the Maoist period, see Welch 1972 and Xue Yu 2015.
61 The number of monastics in 1949 is unclear, but commonly cited estimates range from 500,000 to 800,000. See Welch (1972, 80-84, 502-504) for such estimates and for evidence of massive decline in the number of monastics by 1957.
(2015, 171) found the Jing’an Monastery Buddhist Seminary mentioned briefly: the monk Dangding led the seminary students to eat meat openly so as to demonstrate their break with tradition.\(^62\)

Eating meat was not the only break with tradition some monks made in the early 1950s. According to the same archives, monks in Shanghai at that time no longer wore monastic robes when they left monastery complexes. Other sources show that monks were mobilized to raise funds for military hardware, and that monks openly cohabited with women in monasteries and called for changes to the monastic codes so their marriages would be recognized.\(^63\)

The Chinese Buddhist Seminary (Zhongguo foxueyuan 中国佛学院) was founded in Fayuan Monastery in 1956 to preserve and transform Buddhism rather than to weaken it. It was one of several national Buddhist institutions that were established under the supervision and with funding from the state. Its personnel and operations overlapped considerably with two other institutions, the journal *Modern Buddhist Learning* (Xiandai foxue), established in 1950, and the Buddhist Association of China (BAC: Zhongguo fojiao xiehui), founded in 1953.\(^64\) Only men, both monks and non-monks, attended the

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\(^{62}\) Although it was not strictly speaking a seminary, according to its director Lü Cheng, the China Institute of Inner Learning did not close until 1952. Lü had worked to transform the institute from a “religious” to an “academic” institute: “After liberation, I did my best to transform the Institute into an academic institute,” Lü wrote. Yet despite his efforts, the school was still forced to close in 1952 because, according to Lü, “the state is in charge of academic plans and projects, and hence there is no need for the existence of private institutions” (Lin 2014, 352-353).

\(^{63}\) Welch 1972; Xue Yu 2015.

\(^{64}\) In official Chinese publications, many English translations have been used for the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (see Welch 1972, 540 n39). Today the seminary usually calls itself the Buddhist Academy of China, yet recent internal publications also call it the Chinese Institute of Buddhist Studies. Given this lack of consistency, I use Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS) rather than Buddhist Academy of China because
Proposals by Buddhists to establish more seminaries, including those for
nuns or for focused training in the vinaya, were not realized until after Mao’s death.

This seminary conformed to a new, more secular model for religious education.
The seminary trained not only monks but also secular cadres and scholars. State policies
and Communist ideology, as well as Buddhism, were taught. This two-tracked education
echoed the CCP’s position that cadres needed to be trained to be both “red 红”
(ideologically and politically orthodox) and “expert 专” (technically competent). The
question of the appropriate balance between redness and expertise—if not always in these
terms after the 1960s—has been central to Chinese education policy. During the Party’s
Great Leap Forward Campaign (1957-1961), redness was emphasized over expertise.
Then in 1961, after the Great Leap Forward caused economic depression and mass
starvation, expertise was emphasized over redness. The emphases in Buddhist
education shadowed the patterns of emphasis in other schools.

The state had several purposes in funding the seminary. It furthered the PRC’s
effort to use Buddhism in cultural diplomacy with neighboring Buddhist countries and in
United Front policies with Buddhist populations (notably Tibetans) within China. The
seminary also trained cadres about Buddhism so they could better regulate it. In terms of
the sangha, the seminary trained an elite corps of monks who were expected to be
politically reliable and familiar with state policies. Finally, the seminary was involved in

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CBS agrees with the translation Welch used, and also because it allows me to distinguish the corresponding
acronym from that of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC).

65 The non-monastic men were not necessarily even Buddhist, so they were not “laymen” in the common
religious sense of lay member of a religion.

66 On redness vs. expertise in the 1950s and 1960s, see Baum 1964.
projects to publish academic works in the study of Buddhism.\textsuperscript{67} In short, the seminary’s political and academic aims partially overshadowed the traditional seminary goal of training monks in Buddhism.

Using the seminary as an asset for diplomacy was always central, but the emphasis in the seminary shifted. Prior to 1961 the emphasis had been on training administrators and on indoctrinating monks in Communism. The monk Jinghui (1933-2013), whom I interviewed in 2012, joined the first class in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in 1956. His statements on the seminary reflect its emphasis during the 1950s:

\begin{quote}
The sole goal of the seminary was to conduct thought reform… in those times [learning to be] patriotic involved being re-made; now [learning to be patriotic merely] involves being trained.\textsuperscript{68}
\end{quote}

The Party’s push to conduct thought reform on people mired in the ways of the “old society” was universal during the 1950s and monks were parts of the old society that needed to be reconstituted. Information on the seminary curriculum during this first phase is scarce, but in addition to book learning it involved physical labor.

Beginning in the fall of 1961 the seminary’s curriculum became more academic. Zhao Puchu (1907-2000), secretary-general of the Buddhist Association of China and the most powerful Buddhist in China in the second half of the twentieth century, indicated the source of this shift: direction from unspecified leadership, during a meeting at the end of 1960, which “clarified” the goal of the seminary as follows: “to cultivate Buddhist

\textsuperscript{67}See Welch 1972 and Xue Yu 2015 on the state’s use of Buddhism and for scattered references to the seminary’s role in these efforts. For example, foreign leaders from Buddhist countries were frequently taken on tours of the seminary to showcase the PRC’s alleged support for Buddhism.

\textsuperscript{68}佛学院唯一的目的是进行思想改造…那时爱国是改造，现在爱国是培养. See appendix 3 for the interview with Jinghui.
intellectuals who walk the socialist road and who possess a significant level of Buddhist learning.‘69 What was new was the focus on Buddhist learning. Political education was mentioned less frequently and a new research division for graduates of the basic course of study was established, comprising two groups, the “religious doctrines” group 教理组 and the “religious history” group 教史组. According to this source, students in both the basic course and the research division were to focus on Han Chinese Buddhism (hanyuxi fojiao 汉语系佛教, lit. “Buddhism of the Han-language lineage”) and the “theories of each of the schools” 各宗学说.70 The students in the basic course were to take courses in three categories, Buddhist learning 佛学, culture and languages 文化语文 (including foreign languages), and politics 政治. The structure of the curriculum in seminaries today largely derives from this system at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in the 1960s, including the three categories of courses and the focus on Han Chinese Buddhism, which

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69 XDFX 1961.2, p. 14. It is unclear who in the Party leadership advocated this shift, but it is relevant that while Mao was still probably the most powerful man in China in 1961, he was nevertheless relatively weak owning to the failures of his Great Leap Forward (1958-61), and Liu Shaoqi (1898-1968) with assistance from Deng Xiaoping implemented certain policies Mao opposed (Dittmer 1974). Yet as we will see, Mao Zedong approved the shift in seminary education in late January 1961. Unfortunately the details of religious affairs policy and official Buddhist policy from 1959-1961 is particularly vague, which makes speculation about the meeting in late 1960 difficult. For example a two-volume collection of official Buddhism-related documents includes a gap from 1958 to 1961 (BAC 2005), and a detailed history of religious affairs work in the PRC has very little to say about the 1959-1961 period other than the conflict in Tibet (Duan Dezhi 2013).

70 A newspaper article in the Guangming Daily reported on the curriculum of the religious doctrine group of the research division, emphasizing that students learned Theravada Buddhism, the Pali language, and Buddhist logic (Sourcebook 1974, pp. 360-362).
is still parsed according to eight separate schools (bazong 八宗). Later in 1961 the monk Juzan, the second most influential Buddhist in Maoist China after Zhao, revealed a few more details about the seminary’s curriculum. According to Juzan the basic course was four years and study in the research division three years; in both divisions, sixty percent of class time was spent on Buddhist doctrine and history. In 1962 a branch of the seminary was established for Tibetan Buddhists in the Yonghegong Monastery.

The Chinese Buddhist Seminary’s shift in emphasis to academics was still intended to serve political goals, and the basic structure of the curriculum probably originated in the suggestions of a high-ranking historian and a Party member. After March 1959, political uprisings in Tibet were a major issue in national politics. In January 1961 Mao Zedong made six proposals to resolve recent political turmoil in Tibet, one of which was to cultivate Buddhist intellectuals in Buddhist learning (Xue Yu 2015, 311). Then in response to the Panchen Lama’s request to organize lamas to study

71 Zhou Shujia (1899-1970), vice rector and dean of academic affairs of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during the Maoist period, used extensively the system of eight schools 八宗 in his analysis of Chinese Buddhism (Zhou Shujia 1991), which suggests the same system was used in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary prior to the Cultural Revolution. A news article on the seminary published in 1964 notes that the curriculum includes the “the theories of China’s eight major Buddhist sects 中國八大佛教派別的理論” (Sourcebook 1974, 359). Zhao Puchu also used basically the same system in his later writings (see for example Zhao Puchu 1983). Both Zhou and Zhao appear to have taken the system from Taixu, whose eight-school formulation as presented in essays such as his 1922 “Source and Diffusion of Each Buddhist School 佛教各宗派源流” drew on various earlier formulations ranging from that of his own teacher Yang Renshan (1983-1911) to that of the medieval Japanese monk Gyōnen 凝然 (1240-1321). See Lan Richang 2004 for some of the sources of the early-twentieth century invention of the eight schools system in Chinese Buddhism. Chapter 3 also discusses the Eight Schools in contemporary Chinese seminaries.

72 XDFX 1961.6, p. 18.

73 In trying to use Buddhism as a bridge between Tibet and China Proper, Mao was following established Qing and Republican precedents. See Tuttle 2007.
scriptures, Mao replied that he supported several thousand people undertaking such work, but not more. In context, what Mao meant was that over 95% of Tibetan monks should be laicized or forced to perform productive labor, but that a small number of intellectual monks could continue to study Buddhism. Such intellectuals needed to learn ordinary knowledge such as social sciences and natural sciences, but also Buddhism, said Mao. It was in this context that Mao then mentioned the Chinese Buddhist Seminary:

> We have established a Buddhist seminary, with a two-year course till graduation, which has focused on doing politics. I feel this is improper—it should be for four years, plus two more years to specialize in research in Buddhist learning. If [students learn] politics well, but don’t have erudition in Buddhist learning, this is unacceptable.\(^74\)

Less than a week later Chen Yuan (1880-1971), a leading historian, university president, and member of the Communist Party, voiced his opinions on how education at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary should be structured. According to Chen, courses should include basic courses such as politics, cultural affairs, and culture. In addition, specialized Buddhist courses should be offered in three areas, (1) Buddhist doctrine 佛教教義, (2) Buddhist history 佛教史, and (3) Buddhist historical materials 佛教史籍. Chen emphasized training that would allow Buddhists to make contributions to academic projects such as clarifying the role of Buddhism in traditional Chinese thought. Chen stated that China’s Buddhist heritage needed to be clarified, criticized, and then used, but he was vague about the concrete applications of such knowledge. However, for research

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\(^{74}\) Xue Yu 2015, 312: 我們辦了個佛學院，兩年畢業，專搞政治。我看這個辦法不行，得搞四年，在拿兩年專門研究佛學。政治上好，在佛學方面卻沒有學問，這是不行的.
on Buddhist doctrine, students in the seminaries would eventually have to coordinate with political and academic authorities, he wrote.⁷⁵

In sum, during the Maoist period the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was founded to serve political rather than religious ends. I suggest that Mao’s support was decisive in leading the seminary to change its curriculum and to establish a separate program for Tibetan Buddhism. And probably Chen Yuan’s proposals set the parameters of the curriculum. Yet the state’s use of Buddhism in diplomacy and the United Front required that Buddhists trained at seminaries appear respectable to other Buddhists. Furthermore, Party leadership thought part of China’s Buddhist heritage was worth preserving on its own merits, not just as a political tool. But the Party leadership trusted scholars rather than monastics to ascertain how to recover, preserve, and shape Buddhism for the new society.

What most Buddhist monks thought of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during this time period is unclear, and more research remains to be done.⁷⁶ Jinghui, a seminarian during this time, stated that the monks attempted to use the seminary to foster Buddhism, even though they were aware that the state had established the seminary for other reasons (interview; see appendix 3).

Today for political reasons it is often impossible to conduct research on Buddhism during the Maoist era. Purportedly seminary archives were damaged during the Cultural

⁷⁵ Chen stated that for such scholars in the Seminary, “it would be very necessary to later coordinate with the ideological sector and academic sector 然後與思想界、學術界相配合，也是很必要” (Chen Yuan 1982 [1961], 378).
⁷⁶ The exception is the public opinions of the monk Juzan, a leading, strongly pro-Communist monk who served as vice rector of the seminary, among other positions. See Welch 1972, Shi Xinrong 2006, Xue Yu 2009, and Hou 2012a for more on Juzan.
Revolution, and much of the information about the seminary comes as rumor or hearsay. For example, one Chinese scholar told me of a confidential file of documents discovered in the library of the seminary after the Cultural Revolution. Someone supposedly made copies of this file, and such-and-such a scholar purportedly has a copy; perhaps I could convince that scholar to show it to me, I was told. Another Chinese scholar revealed he has conducted extensive interviews with elderly monks who had been in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during the 1950s and 1960s. He reported that uncovering case after case of brutal struggle between Buddhist monks caused him “mental trauma.”

Then when he finished the research, after consulting with a more politically connected scholar, he realized that owing to the present-day political climate he could publish none of his findings.

In the build-up to the Cultural Revolution (CR), which began in August 1966, the Chinese Buddhist Seminary and the broader Buddhist Association of China were closed. The mechanics behind their closing are still unclear. The Chinese Buddhist Seminary had run from September 1956 until sometime in 1966, and claimed to have produced 384 graduates, including those in both the administrative and academic courses (BAC 2003, 240). Before being closed down, in January 1966 a news report based on a tour of the seminary and a meeting with vice rector Zhou Shujia was published. This report, possibly arranged as desperate bid to avoid closure, praises the seminary effusively and even calls it the first Buddhist seminary in China:

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77 This figure exceeds the figure Welch cites by five graduates. Welch cites a report stating that in 1966 there were 361 graduates plus 18 who were still continuing advanced studies; if those 18 were graduated, this would be 379 total (1972, 159). Both numbers include the non-monastic administrators who graduated from the early program.
Before liberation [i.e., 1949], there weren’t any Buddhist seminaries in China. Locally there were a few temples that established so-called “Buddhist seminaries,” but they were seminaries in name only. Therefore, the current Chinese Buddhist Seminary can be said to be the first Buddhist seminary in Chinese history.  

解放前，中國沒有什麼佛學院，地方上的幾個寺廟裡成立的所謂「佛學院」，實際上有名無實。因此，現在的中國佛學院可以說是中國歷史上的第一所佛學院。

As we have seen there had in fact been over seventy seminaries with a variety of orientations and resources during the Republic.

During the early 1960s Chinese efforts to employ Buddhism in diplomacy had disappointing results. But the main explanation for the closure of Buddhist institutions lies in intra-Party disputes. The philosophy of the United Front had been under periodic attack since 1962, and the Party’s main organ for implementing such policies, the United Front Work Department (UFD), had ceased to function by 1964. Party Leftists reviled the UFD as revisionist, feudal, and bourgeois, cursing it as the “command center for revisionism” 修正主义司令部,” the “sanctuary for cow ghosts and snake spirits  牛鬼蛇神的庇护所” and the “ministry for the restoration of capitalism 资本主义的复辟部” (Duan 2013, 153). Attacks did not stop at curses and job loss but sometimes led to physical abuse and execution. In short, cadres responsible for managing the ideologically impure (non-Party political groups, minority ethnic leaders, and religious leaders) were portrayed as tainted by the ideological impurities of those they managed. Previously political differences, ethnicity, and religions were regarded as superstructural epiphenomena.

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78 Sourcebook, 1974, p. 363.
79 On the failures of Buddhist diplomacy and the suppression of Buddhism during the Cultural Revolution, see Welch 1972 (esp. pp. 355-56) and Xue Yu 2015.
destined to wither away as the economic base of society shifted and social class was abolished. But during the CR, the reigning view was that such impure identities and ideologies had to be actively extirpated. That is, in Marxist terms, abnormalities in the superstructure could derail efforts to shift the economic base along its supposedly inevitable path of historical progress. Like the Party’s UFD which supervised it, the government’s Religious Affairs Bureau that had supervised the (now defunct) official Buddhist institutions also ceased to function.

Many observers during the Cultural Revolution wondered how much longer Buddhism would survive in China.\textsuperscript{80} During the CR all religions, not just Buddhism, suffered severe persecution.\textsuperscript{81} Yet not long after Mao’s death in 1976, the Party revived United Front policies and related organizations. In 1980 the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was reborn with much of the same leadership and orientation it had during the early-mid 1960s. It became the training ground for leading monks in both monasteries and in newly founded seminaries for which the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was often the model. Not only were the much-feared policies of the CR reversed, but certain restrictions on Buddhist development since 1949 were ended.

\textit{Seminaries in the Post-Mao Period, 1980-Present}

This final section outlines the history of Buddhist seminaries after the Cultural Revolution period (1966-76). As little research has been done on seminaries in this period, and since there have been dozens of seminaries, this outline will be rough and

\textsuperscript{80} See Bush 1970 and Welch 1972.

\textsuperscript{81} On the persecution of Christianity during the CR, see Bays (2011, 184-187), who makes the surprising conclusion that Protestants actually increased fivefold or sixfold from 1966 to 1978.
will emphasize the foundational developments in the early 1980s. The state continued to be decisive in allowing and guiding seminaries, as in previous periods. Furthermore the state abjured policies to eradicate religion and has remained committed to this policy of relative tolerance. This stable political environment, combined with popular religious revivals on the one hand and the expansion of formal schooling into more social sectors on the other, have facilitated the proliferation of Buddhist seminaries for the training of monastics.

During the Cultural Revolution Buddhism came under heavy attack: monasteries were closed, monastics were forced to laicize, and public worship was forbidden. By the end of the Cultural Revolution probably every monastic community in China had been disrupted and the Chinese Buddhist Seminary had been closed for a decade. But after the CR, Buddhist monasticism revived and the number of seminaries grew even faster than the monastic order. Today in 2016 there are about 100,000 Han Buddhist monastics in China, of which about 3000 are seminarians in about fifty seminaries (see appendixes

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82 For research that includes sections on particular seminaries in post-Mao China, see Ruanshi 2008, Yang Xiaoyan 2011, and Long Darui 2013.

83 See Welch 1972, Xue Yu 2015, and Hou 2012 for Buddhism during the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was extremely disruptive to religions in China. Yet the degree of devastation is sometimes exaggerated, in part because the Cultural Revolution sometimes refers only to the 1966-69 period (when repression was strongest) and sometimes to the entire 1966-76 period. Also, repression was strongest in the urban areas where outsiders could observe religious policy being implemented. See Welch 1969 and Nichols (2011, 171-181) for evidence of a semi-intact monastic community through the CR; see Welch (1972, 361) on public Buddhist worship in rural monasteries as early as 1968; and see Strong and Strong 1972 and Zhu 2004 for state-sanctioned Buddhist activities, including those of the Buddhist Association of China, during the early 1970s. Sun Yanfei (2010, 78) also mentions someone allowed to remain a monk throughout the CR in the Jinhua region of Zhejiang Province.
Buddhism is by many measures the largest religion in China. This section will discuss the expansion of Buddhism, monasticism, and seminary education in the Reform (1978-) period.

The revival of Buddhism in general and the expansion of seminaries in particular were facilitated by political and social developments, including the cadres who gained power. In short, by the early 1980s many top state officials were the same officials who had originally held office during the early 1960s and were then sacked during the Cultural Revolution. Such officials included Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997), the paramount leader in China from 1978 onwards, who had been the third most powerful man in the early 1960s before he was purged in the Cultural Revolution. In the early 1960s Deng and his allies had been constrained by Mao and other Leftists from expanding economic and social reforms. But after Mao’s death and the arrest of the Gang of Four in 1976, the Leftists were removed from authority. Given the purge of Leftists as well as a reaction against the Cultural Revolution among both the military leadership and the general population, Deng and his allies were increasingly able to push through policies unthinkable even before the Cultural Revolution.

United Front policies were revived, giving sanction to groups such as religions, provided they played roles as subordinate and compliant allies (Wickeri 1988; Duan 2013). The newly appointed key personnel of many of state and quasi-state religious affairs organizations were officials who had suffered during the CR but were then reinstated. As such they were naturally allied with Deng’s broadly reformist wing of the

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84 See Ji Zhe 2013b for the numbers Buddhists, monastics, and monasteries in the PRC. See Palmer 2012 for more on recent estimates of religious affiliation in the PRC. One survey Palmer cites indicates that 18% of the adult population self-identifies as Buddhist and 3.2% identifies as Christian, the second-largest religion.
CCP and had been associated with pro-United Front Party leaders such as Liu Shaoqi (1898-1969), Zhou Enlai (1898-1976), and Li Weihan (1896-1948). These included Ulanhu 乌兰夫 (1906-1988), an ethnic Mongolian general purged during the CR, who was appointed director of the newly constituted United Front Department, and Xiao Xianfa 肖贤法 (1914-1981), director of the Religious Affairs Bureau in 1961 and then again director in 1979 (Duan 2013; Whyte 1980, 7). 85 Zhang Zhiyi 张执一 (1911-1983), deputy director of the United Front Department before the CR, was re-appointed to the same position after the CR. The Buddhist Association of China (BAC) began regular operations and Zhao Puchu and Juzan, the two most powerful figures in the BAC prior to the Cultural Revolution, were restored to leadership positions within it. 86

The United Front had always conducted cultural diplomacy, including through religion—the Communist leadership fostered groups within China that appealed to groups in foreign countries being courted by China. As early as 1978 Deng Xiaoping showed he was receptive to using China’s shared Buddhist heritage with neighboring countries to forge closer foreign relations. 87 In January while visiting Burma he visited famous Buddhist temples, and in November during a visit to Thailand he attended a Buddhist ceremony (Vogel 2011, 277, 284). More symbolic of a policy reversal toward

85 Note that the Religious Affairs Bureau was renamed the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) in 1998.
86 Jinghui, editor-in-chief of the BAC’s flagship journal Fayin (1981-) during the 1980s, told me that if he had doubts about what he could write or include in the journal, he would first have the matter cleared with either Zhao Puchu and/or Juzan (see appendix 3). Juzan died in 1984, so this arrangement must have ended within a few years.
87 Mingshan’s diary (2002) shows Zhao Puchu and others were preparing Buddhist sites and monastics for Japanese visitors as early as 1978. Buddhism was also seen as an asset in the new national priority to develop the economy through tourism.
Buddhism, in an October visit to Japan, Deng visited the Japanese monastery Tōshōdai-ji唐招提寺, which had been founded by the Chinese monk Jianzhen鑒真 (Japanese: Ganjin) in the year 759. On this occasion, Deng indicated he would welcome a “visit” from the monk Jianzhen from Tōshōdai-ji to China.

By a visit from Jianzhen, Deng meant that Chinese Buddhists would be able to receive a statue of Jianzhen as a gift from Japan. This seemingly obscure event used religious and diplomatic language to signal a reversal of CR period policies toward Buddhism. Jianzhen, the Chinese monk who brought the orthodox Chinese vinaya tradition to Japan, had long been the most important figure symbolizing friendly Sino-Japanese relations through Buddhism. The year from May 1963 to May 1964, the 1200-year anniversary of his death, had been declared the “Jianzhen Year” during which four Japanese Buddhist delegations visited China. In October 1963, Chinese and Japanese clerics held joint commemorative rituals for Jianzhen in Yangzhou, where the cornerstone for a planned memorial hall to Jianzhen was laid. All of these planned events were cancelled in the buildup to the Cultural Revolution. Liu Shaoqi, formerly the second-most powerful man in the country after Mao, and his faction were accused of being pro-religious for their support of a memorial hall for Jianzhen (Welch 1972, 155-56, 539). Thus when a Japanese delegation finally did visit a completed memorial hall to

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88 On this occasion, Japanese expressed their thanks to China for having given them much of their traditional culture, including Buddhism (Vogel 2011, 299). It is likely that Zhao Puchu, the president of the BAC who also headed the Sino-Japanese friendship association, had suggested a visit to this temple.

89 Xuanzang (602-664), a Chinese monk who visited India, today plays a similar role in Sino-Indian relations.
Jianzhen in April 1980, bringing with them a statue of Jianzhen to install, it signaled a return to the pre-CR mode of integrating Buddhism with diplomacy.90

To employ Buddhism in diplomacy China needed to rebuild Buddhist institutions, including monasteries, state-sponsored associations, journals, and seminaries. In the late 1970s and early 1980s the important meetings were held and documents were released that clarified the status of the United Front, religion, Buddhism, and Buddhist seminaries. Probably the public meetings were preceded by private meetings and informal consultations in which most of the real decisions were made.91 Sometimes seminaries even started to operate informally before the official documents rationalizing their existence were released. By the end of 1983 much of the framework for policy toward Buddhism was in place. This framework, in theory and to a significant degree in practice, treated all state-recognized religions in China (Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism) equally through the same regulations.92 Key terms defined in such documents included “venues for religious activities” (zongjiao huodong changsuo 宗教活动场所) and “religious personnel” or “clergy” (zongjiao renshi 宗教人士 or jiaozhi 教士).

90 A Buddhist publication claims the memorial hall had actually been completed in November 1973—providing more evidence that Buddhism had not been entirely defunct during the CR (BAC 2003, 490). The memorial hall and statue from Japan is still present today, in Yangzhou’s Daming Monastery, whose webpage describes Jianzhen and his symbolic role in Sino-Japanese relations: http://www.damingsi.com/jianzhen.asp (last accessed 1 June 2016).

91 Once again, Mingshan’s diary (2002) provides examples of informal meetings among Buddhists and with state officials.

92 These five religions are recognized at the national level. In official documents they are usually presented in this exact order, which according to the state reflects the historical order in which they entered or emerged in China. Other religions such as Orthodox Christianity or folk religion are sometimes formally recognized at provincial or local levels.
renyuan 教职人员). Here I briefly outline such developments, focusing on the most important documents for Buddhism and seminaries.

Many accounts of China’s post-CR religious affairs policy begin with Document 19, the On the Basic Viewpoint and Basic Policy toward Religious Issues during Our Country’s Socialist Period,⁹³ released by the CCP Central Committee in March 1982. Yet Document 19 is best understood as the formal conclusion, rather than the beginning, of China’s foundation of current religious affairs policy. Other important documents and meetings led up to Document 19, including Report with Recommendations on Two Current Policy-Related Questions in Religious Work in Need of Urgent Resolution (October 1978); the Report Recommending the Ending of the Label “Capitulationist” for All United Front, Nationalities, and Religious Affairs Work Offices in the Country (March 1979); and the Fourteenth National United Front Working Assembly (March 1979), the first national United Front meeting held since 1963 (Duan 2013).

Most relevant for seminaries was the document Opinion on the Restoration of Religious Academies⁹⁴ (December 1980), drafted by the Party committee of the Religious Affairs Bureau and approved by the United Front Department.⁹⁵ This document advocated the re-establishment of religious seminaries that had operated before the CR for Islam, Buddhism, and Protestantism, and went further in recommending the

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⁹³ 关于我国社会主义时期宗教问题的基本观点和基本政策.
⁹⁴ 关于恢复宗教学院的意见.
⁹⁵ The fact that this document was merely an “opinion” and not approved or distributed by the Central Committee indicates it had a lower level of authority than some of the other documents released around this time. Most religious affairs policy in China is formalized through regulations whose degree of authority depends on which agencies drafted, approved, or distributed them. Not one of the documents specifically concerned with religious affairs in China is a national law (guojia falü), i.e., legislation approved by the National People’s Congress.
establishment of seminaries for Catholicism and Daoism, so as to “cultivate according to a plan some clergy and researchers who in terms of politics are patriotic and who have a certain level of religious knowledge”96 (Duan 2013, 165). This goal is virtually identical the stated goal for Buddhist seminary education in the early 1960s. Through the 1980s, religious seminaries for each of the five major religions recognized at the national level were restored or newly established, starting in the years indicated: Buddhism (1980), Protestantism (1981), Islam (1982), Catholicism (1983), and Daoism (1990).

Numerous Buddhist institutions were revived or newly established in 1980 and 1981. Two Buddhist seminaries officially began classes in December 1980. The first was the Lingyanshan Branch of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, in Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. The second was the main Chinese Buddhist Seminary in Beijing. Mingshan (2002) describes how Zhao Puchu wanted to try running the Lingyanshan branch before opening the main school in Beijing.97 In December 1980, the Buddhist Association of China also had its first formal national meeting since 1962. Then in 1981, the BAC held the first public ordination of monks in almost twenty-four years. Forty-seven monks, aged 19 to 69, were ordained at Fayuan Monastery, the site of the seminary in Beijing. Many of the ordinands were affiliated with the re-established Chinese Buddhist Seminary (Mingshan 2002, 125-29). The BAC’s new official journal, *Fayin*, began publication, with Jinghui designated editor. This journal was a successor to *Modern Buddhist Learning*, the BAC journal that had been terminated in 1964. Seminaries, provincial and local Buddhist

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96 有计划地培养一些政治上爱国，有一定宗教知识的神职人员和研究员。

97 Informants have also told me that the Lingyanshan Seminary had actually been holding classes for about a year prior to its public opening.
associations, ordinations, and Buddhist journals—have all proliferated throughout China since 1981.\textsuperscript{98}

Unlike during the 1950s and 1960s, state-sanctioned Buddhist institutions such as seminaries have not been subjected to the radical shifts in state policy toward religion experience previously. United Front policies have remained intact. In 1980 during the first meeting of the BAC in eighteen years, United Front Department deputy direction Zhang Zhiyi criticized earlier policies to convert religious personnel to Communism. Zhang indicated that political education in seminaries should instill compliance in seminarians, not indoctrination in Marxist theory. The following statement by Zhang is an explicit expression of this shift in policy as it relates to seminaries:

\begin{quote}
Our running a Buddhist seminary, that’s showing concern for the people’s religious faith. If after graduating even Buddhist seminarians oppose religion, then we have failed. In the past our Buddhist seminary had a major defect, namely there were people who opposed their having faith in religion. In 1958 there was that kind of situation, and that was a failure. Buddhist seminaries are for cultivating the talented who are politically patriotic, walk the socialist road, have Buddhist knowledge, and who love their work and love their faith. Only cultivating that kind [of people] is a success.\textsuperscript{99}
\end{quote}

In effect, Zhang indicated that Buddhist personnel were more useful to the state if they remained believers. If on the contrary they left the monastic order or were shunned by ordinary Buddhists, the investment in their education would be wasted.

\textsuperscript{98} See Welch (1968; 1972) and Ji Zhe (2013b; 2016) for more on some of these and other institutions in modern and contemporary Chinese Buddhism.

\textsuperscript{99} From Zhang Zhiyi 2005 [1980], 199.
In 1982, more developments in Buddhism followed. Another seminary was established in Nanjing. Classes for the regular four-year course opened in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary. Buddhist delegations were sent to and/or received from Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and above all, Japan. Also in 1982, three important documents formally establishing the framework for religion in general or Buddhist education in particular were released.

In 1982, Document 19 (in March), another new document on seminaries (in September), and a new national constitutions (in December) were released. Document 19, released by the Central Committee of the CCP, remains central to religious affairs policy to this day. It affirmed that Chinese citizens had freedom of religion, but also that religion was destined to disappear from human history, was incompatible with Communism, and was proscribed to Party members. The document placed religious venues (zongjiao huodong changsuo 宗教活动场所) under the administrative control of Religious Affairs agencies, which were established at national, provincial, and local levels. Religious personnel (zongjiao zhiye renyuan 宗教职业人员) could live in and perform religious services at religious venues, it specified. Buddhist religious

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100 See MacInnis 1989 for a translation of Document 19.

101 Sometimes nested levels of local administration include more than one office for religious affairs. For example, a city may have a religious affairs office, and one or more of the various counties under the city may also have religious affairs offices.

102 The term for ordinary believers is “believing masses” (xinjiao qunzhong 信教群众), which like “religious personnel” is a legalistic word not in ordinary usage in China. In later documents the term for “religious personnel” changed from zongjiao zhiye renyuan to zongjiao jiaozhi renyuan, or to jiaozhi renyuan 教职人员 for short.
professions were identified as “monks, nuns, and lamas 僧、尼、喇嘛.” Such personnel had social value but needed to be educated, Document 19 argued:

…they [religious personnel] safeguard Buddhist and Daoist temples and churches and protect historical religious relics, engage in agriculture and afforestation, and carry on the academic study of religion, and so on. Therefore, we must definitely give sufficient attention to all persons in religious circles, but primarily professional religious [i.e., religious personnel], uniting them, caring for them, and helping them to make progress. We must unrelentingly yet patiently forward their education in patriotism, upholding the law, supporting socialism, and upholding national and ethnic unity.

In other words, religious personnel were mainly important because they could solidify popular support for the state, but also for other reasons, including their academic studies. Through such regulations the state also formally recognized, and hence strengthened, the position of monastics as Buddhist leaders.

A document directly addressing religious schools was released by the State Council on 10 September 1982. This document had been drafted by the Religious Affairs

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103 Later official documents have almost always defined Buddhist religious personnel as ordained monastics (i.e., biqiu and biqiuni). For example, in the collection of PRC religious regulations in Xingzhengyuan 2002, there are twelve sets of provincial-level and two sets of city-level religious regulations that define Buddhist personnel as biqiu and biqiuni (and sometimes including other terms not used in Han Chinese Buddhism, such as lama). In contrast, the terms shami and shamini, for novice monk and nun, do not appear in any set of regulations. Only one set of regulations, those for the religious affairs in Guizhou Province released in the year 2000, define Buddhist personnel with the potentially ambiguous terms seng 僧 and ni 尼 (i.e., monk and nun).

104 Quotation from MacInnis (1989, 16). In the quotation, notes in square brackets were inserted by Gildow.

105 Another important reason religious personnel were important in the eyes of the state, also mentioned in Document 19, was their responsibility to manage religious cultural sites and artifacts. Welch 1972 describes the importance of Buddhism as a repository of traditional culture during the Maoist period. See Fisher 2011 and Nichols 2011 for more on the “curatorial” role of Chinese Buddhism, a role sometimes in conflict with contemporary religious practice.
Bureau and was titled *Recommendations on Opening Religious Schools* 关于开办宗教院校的请示 (Duan 2013, 166-67). It made detailed proposals on religious schools, recommending that a total of six Buddhist seminaries, five Islamic seminaries, five Protestant seminaries, and five Catholic seminaries be established. The curricula at each seminary should be 70% on religion, 20% on culture, and 10% on politics. Instructors for politics were to be drawn from local religious affairs offices. Other suggestions in this document suggest that Buddhist religious professionals were more male dominated and less educated than in some other religions. The document stated in the new schools, students should be men aged 18 to 25, but that there could also be a small number of women in Protestant seminaries. It also specified that students should have a high school degree, but that this standard could be lowered for Buddhist seminaries.

Finally, in December 1982 a new national constitution was promulgated. Article 36 of the Constitution summarizes in condensed form some of the main ideas in Document 19. By the end of 1982, the main policies for religious affairs in the Reform era were set. The leadership in the Buddhist Association of China affirmed rather than challenged these new policies, and sometimes even reformulated narratives about Buddhist tradition to conform to them. 106

But seminaries proliferated beyond the initial proposals for them, and specific regulations formulated in the early 1980s have been adjusted. For example, the proposal that there be six seminaries for Buddhism and that seminarians be limited to men aged 18 to 25 has become obsolete. By 1990 at least eleven seminaries in the Han Chinese

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106 Ji Zhe (2013a) argues persuasively that in 1983 BAC president Zhao Puchu formulated parts of his influential new vision for Buddhism directly from passages in Document 19. That is, he re-presented state policies in a Buddhist idiom, and then promoted them as venerable Buddhist traditions.
tradition had been established, including four seminaries for nuns. Ten of these eleven seminaries—all except for the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in Beijing—were founded in the south (i.e., below the Yangzi River).\textsuperscript{107} Counting only the seminaries classified as medium-level or high-level in Jingyin and Zhang’s (2009) research, thirteen more seminaries were founded in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{108} Then eleven more were established between the years 2000 and 2012, but a few seminaries also closed during this period.\textsuperscript{109} Most seminaries are still in China’s south but now there are several in the north as well. The required age range at some seminaries has been adjusted upwards, often to age 28, and even up to age 35 in some seminaries in the last several years.\textsuperscript{110}

\textsuperscript{107} The south has long been the heartland of Buddhism in China. See Welch 1967 on the concentration of Buddhist institutions in the south during the early twentieth century, and Ji Zhe 2013b on the relative density of Buddhist monasteries in the PRC.

\textsuperscript{108} Jingyin and Zhang were commission by the CCP’s United Front Department to conduct a survey of Buddhist seminaries. Several other scholars were also hired to work under them. Some of the results of that research has been published (Jingyin and Zhang 2009), but much remains private. I have acquired some of their unpublished research data and I have used their classification of seminaries into elementary, middle, and high levels (as of 2007). The current standards for such classifications are unclear. According to one purported standard, seminaries are elementary, middle, or high level depending on whether they are regulated by a local, provincial, or national state agency, respectively. According to another purported standard, any seminary with a graduate-level program is a high-level seminary.

\textsuperscript{109} Many smaller, elementary-level seminaries appear to have been founded only to quickly close, or they were proposed but never formally opened. It is difficult to trace the development of the smaller seminaries. Of the more prominent seminaries, two have closed, in fact if not formally: the Wuchang Buddhist Seminary (Hubei) and the Jiuhuashan Buddhist Seminary (Anhui Province). See appendix 5 for data on contemporary seminaries.

\textsuperscript{110} As this dissertation nears completion in summer 2016, recent news reports and announcements in the online Chinese Buddhist media show the continuation of two relevant trends. First, new seminaries continue to be established and plans for future seminaries continue to be made. Second, the maximum age for seminarians continues to be pushed upwards. For example, Jiaoshan Buddhist Seminary is being re-established and plans to offer classes beginning in 2017 (see http://www.fjnet.com/jjdt/jjdtmr/201607/t20160704_240882.htm), and the Fujian Buddhist Seminary will soon offer a course of study for monks aged 35 to 45 (see http://www.fjnet.com/kuaixun/201606/t20160617_240641.htm).
In short seminaries have expanded rapidly. This expansion occurred not only because it was sanctioned by the state. There were other social developments that facilitated it. For example, formal schooling was re-appraised positively and promoted throughout society. Also Buddhist institutions generated wealth due to a revival of popular interest in sponsoring Buddhist rituals—so they had the funds to sponsor seminaries as well.\textsuperscript{111} Finally the BAC leadership, particularly the BAC president Zhao Puchu, energetically promoted seminaries. Under Zhao the BAC held two national conferences on Buddhist education, in 1986 and 1992, respectively. At each conference Zhao pushed for more seminaries. Using official language, Zhao’s main point was that Buddhist religious venues (i.e., monasteries) had been restored, but that more Buddhist religious personnel still needed to be trained. Similar concerns have persisted till the present.

By many accounts among my informants, the overall growth in monastic Buddhist institutions slowed down around the year 2000.\textsuperscript{112} More specifically to seminaries, around the year 2000 seminary graduates also began finding it harder to find

\textsuperscript{111} With so much wealth being generated by rituals, however, many monastics have decided that ritual performance is a more practical occupation than being a seminarian. See Shi Jingyin 2006, Lijing 2007, and Gildow 2014.

\textsuperscript{112} Document 19 stated that in 1982 there were 27,000 “monks, nuns, and lamas” in China; then official press releases in 1997 stated there were about 70,000 monks and nuns in the Han Buddhist tradition, indicating impressive growth during the 1980s and 1990s. But then in 2014, official press releases stated there about 72,000 Han Buddhist monks—virtually the same as seventeen years earlier. The estimates for the number of Tibetan monastics rose, and for Theravada monastics fell, so the numbers were not necessarily frozen out of inertia or political considerations. See appendix 9 for more analysis of these numbers. Supplementing such numbers are the accounts of my monastic informants, which agree with the trends such statistics convey. One monastic remembers how his tonsure master was extremely strict with novice monks in the early 1990s; there were so many novices that his master did not mind scaring away half of them. Now, stated this informant (in 2013), no monks are so strict with disciples; they are afraid of scaring away the precious few novices under their charge.
positions in other seminaries or monasteries. A senior Dharma teacher in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary told me it was harder to place graduates in good positions after the year 2000. Lijing (2007) writes that seminaries now have to absorb the same monastics they graduate—that is, other monastic institutions no longer want seminary graduates. Another seminary instructor, during class with seminarians, mentioned that most offices in monasteries are now filled and furthermore that the monastics holding such offices tend to retain them for many years. Whereas during the Republic monastic officials regularly rotated their offices, and abbots often served for only three years, today the situation is different, he claimed. Now monastic officials acquire and retain their positions with support from local state officials, and state officials are happy to see cooperative monastic officials stay in the same position year after year. If the monastic official changed, it would complicate arrangements, many of which are informal, between Buddhist institutions and religious affairs offices.

113 The past decade seems to have seen a downturn (and not just a slowdown, as in China) for Buddhism in Taiwan, including for monasticism in general and seminary enrollment in particular. This story remains to be written, although Yü Chün-fang (2013) alludes to it in her study of one nuns’ community in Taiwan.

114 “It’s happy cooperation 合作愉快,” chimed in one of the seminarians.

115 Such arrangements include the payment of registration fees and—according to informants—even informal “taxes” on ritual performances, which religious affairs offices keep for themselves. In short, religious affairs agencies and cadres sometimes enrich themselves through rent-seeking from Buddhist institutions. The prevalence and details of such arrangements are not easy to acquire. Other rent-seeking arrangements I have heard discussed include the division of income from entrance tickets to historical religious sites (50% to 80% going to the religious affairs agency, in the cases I heard), and the sale of offices in Buddhist associations. See Sun Yanfei (2010) for evidence that religious affairs agencies support Buddhist groups that generate income for them and suppress competitors that do not help them generate income. See Nichols (2011) for analysis of competing parties that control monasteries and for more on another tension in monasteries, between profit-driven promotion of cultural heritage on the one hand and religious practices on the other.
In summary, seminaries in the post-Maoist period in China share some features with seminaries in both the Republican period and the Maoist period, but they are also distinctive in other ways. As during the Republic, there are dozens of seminaries with a wide range of orientations, broad, narrow, traditional, and liberal. As during the pre-CR PRC, seminaries are tightly regulated by the state and generally follow a curriculum with three broad divisions: Buddhism, Culture, and Politics.

On the other hand there are many more seminaries in the PRC operating now than there ever were at any time during the Republic, and they serve a much smaller monastic body. Therefore seminarians and seminary graduates constitute a much larger proportion of the sangha. Seminaries are also more closely regulated than during the Republic, and they must express loyalty to a political party that in theory regards religions as false and destined to vanish as society under socialism inevitably progresses toward an egalitarian and prosperous utopia. In contrast to the Maoist period, when only one seminary operated, seminaries now may devote more time to the study of Buddhism and less time to political study.

Within seminaries today, some of the underlying questions include what to study, how much to study (how broadly or narrowly), and how to study (with traditional or modern approaches). In the context of their institutional histories and the changing environment around them, including the hard power of the state and the soft power of broader intellectual trends, seminaries implicitly answer such questions each semester they operate.
Conclusion

In this overview of the history of Chinese Buddhist seminaries, I have shown that the state has always been decisive in the establishment or forced closure of seminaries. After 1956, the state became closely involved in regulating or even running seminaries. Yet seminaries have proliferated not only because of state policies, but also because of general social trends such as the spread of literacy and schooling, and the interest among some Buddhists to adapt in response to such trends. Relative to their own earlier history, seminaries today have been extremely successful in educating more monastics in doctrinal teachings. Questions remain about whether they have been as successful as other, more traditional institutions were in earlier periods, and whether seminaries have succeeded relative to the rising level of minimum expectations in society for education. I have suggested that while seminaries have won a degree of authority within Buddhism, the position of Buddhist monasticism in society remains precarious and even stigmatized. Therefore Buddhists are reflecting on whether seminaries are helping or hindering their efforts to bring Buddhism back to its rightful place at the center of Chinese culture.

In addition to training monastics and reflecting state political projects, seminaries are also closely connected with the broader humanistic project to preserve and develop parts of China’s cultural heritage. This project, while connected to cultural nationalism and even instrumental state objectives, is not limited to such uses. Which parts of Chinese Buddhism are worth keeping is up for debate both inside and outside of Buddhist circles. As I argue in this dissertation, two of the most important external parties for their influence on seminaries are the state and academia. The next chapter will examine contemporary seminaries and discuss the impact the political field has on them, and later chapters examine the impact of academia.
Chapter 3: Contemporary Seminaries and Their Institutional Environment

We have seen how over the past century seminaries emerged, spread, disappeared, and re-emerged. The role of the state has been crucial in such processes. But support for seminaries within the sangha has also been essential in the expansion of seminaries when permitted by political conditions. While seminaries remain controversial in monastic circles, critics often establish alternative kinds of seminaries rather than alternatives to seminaries, and even alternative institutions can resemble seminaries. Thus seminaries are now central for educating the Chinese sangha.

This chapter examines contemporary seminaries in the PRC. The first part describes contemporary seminaries. It sketches a composite picture of a generic seminary, with supplementary details from specific seminaries. Loose networks of seminaries and a related national institution, an annual conference for seminarians, are also described. The second part of the chapter describes state institutions that shape seminaries.

Contemporary Seminaries

The generic seminary described below is a composite of the thirteen seminaries where I did fieldwork and several others from which I obtained information. In particular, in sketching the generic seminary I have in mind the more established or larger seminaries for monks, such as the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, the Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary, or the Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary. Thus the seminarians in the generic seminary described below are monks.

Physical Setting
The generic seminary is part of a monastery complex, but it has buildings or rooms of its own within this complex. Sometimes the seminary overshadows the rest of the monastery in which it is located, and sometimes the reverse occurs, but other times both are equally important. Although both are usually located in the same complex, below I distinguish “seminary” (foxueyuan 佛学院) from “monastery” (siyuan 寺院) facilities according to the following standard: seminary facilities are understood as resources mainly or exclusively used by seminary personnel and which are not found in a typical monastery. But seminary faculty and students make extensive use some monastery resources, including the main shrine hall (fodian 佛殿, fotang 佛堂, or daxiong baodian 大雄宝殿), where daily morning and evening liturgy is held, and one or more refectories (wuguan tang 五观堂 or zhaitang 斋堂), where collective meals are held. Seminarians join with the other monks for such services and meals, as they do for many regularly scheduled rituals, such as the bi-weekly recitation of monastic precepts (busa 布萨; Skt. poṣadha), monastery-specific rituals such as commemorations of the death-days of former abbots, and general Buddhist festivals set according to the traditional Chinese calendar.

Most essential for seminaries are two kinds of rooms, classrooms (jiaoshi 教室), sometimes in a separate teaching building (jiaoxue lou 教学楼), and dormitories (sushe

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116 The Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary is unusual in that it has two campuses for monks, an older one located in part of a monastery, and another in a separate complex which is a fifteen-minute walk from the monastery. Even more unusual, the new campus is the site for classes on Buddhist art, among other classes.

117 For breakfast and lunch, meals are held according to a ritualized protocol called “procession through the hall” (guotang 过堂). Like many Chinese Buddhist monastic rituals (see Yifa 2002), the name of this protocol for formal meals seems to have derived from imperial state rituals. See Shengkai (2001, 54-57) on the guotang ritual in monasteries, and see Moore 2004 for guotang in Tang imperial ritual.

118 See Gildow 2014 on the main monastic festivals in contemporary China.
宿舍) for monastic students and teachers, sometimes located in a separate building as well (sushelou 宿舍楼). Other seminary rooms include a library and offices for administrators. Teachers rarely have separate offices, and but they have individual dormitory rooms, where they conduct their regular activities, including research, class preparation, individual religious practice, and reception of students and visitors. Seminarians, in contrast, live in dormitory rooms with several students per room, which often feature bunk beds and desks. Seminarians may post items such as personal reminders or inspiring writings by famous monks in their rooms.119

Somewhere on the seminary grounds are two or three flagpoles, each with a different kind of flag. One is the national flag of the PRC. The other is the international Buddhist flag, a six-striped, five-colored rectangular piece of fabric shaped like most national flags, originally designed by Ceylonese Theravada Buddhists and the American Colonel Henry Steele Olcott (1832-1907) during the 1880s (see Prothero 1996, 116-117). Occasionally on Chinese seminary grounds there is a third flag, the flag of the individual seminary. The national flag is always placed in the position of honor, in the Chinese understanding, relative to the other flags—in the middle, highest pole if there are three flags, or stage-left if there are only two flags. This placement instantiates the Communist Party’s requirement that religious clergy “love the country and love [their respective]

119 One seminarian posted his current study plans and goals. Another posted a picture of the eminent monk Xuyun (c. 1964-1959) and one of Xuyun’s poems on practice. Yet another posted, in Chinese calligraphy, a large rendition of the Chinese character for death (si 死)—a practice recommended by the monk Yinguang (1862-1940) to remind one of the impermanence of life. Teachers had more room for personal items in their rooms, including large collections of books, canisters of tea, and religious images.
religion” \( \text{aiguo aijiao 爱国爱教} \). Inside seminary buildings, flags are less common, particularly national flags, and sometimes Buddhist flags appear unaccompanied by national flags. I have seen no national flag inside a seminary classroom or dormitory.

The heart of the seminary is its classrooms, whose design parallels those in secular schools. Each classroom belongs to seminarians of one class \( \text{ban 班} \) of the ten to fifty monks—typically thirty-five or so—who entered the seminary in the same year and same level. Each seminarian has his own desk, where he keeps his school supplies such as textbooks, notebooks, and writing implements. The desks, chairs, blackboard, and teacher’s desk or lectern at the front of the classroom look like those in secular schools. Sometimes there is a screen in front of the blackboard which the instructor can pull down for slide presentations. As in Chinese secular schools, except for universities, the teachers move from classroom to classroom, whereas the students stay fixed, except for classes such as physical education and meditation. Students take all their classes with the same group of classmates. There are usually no elective courses.

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120 As usual in China, the order of the terms in this mandate—with “country” coming before “religion”—is intentional. It reflects the state’s expectation that state trumps religion if necessary.

121 Old photographs of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during the Maoist period show national flags and even images of Mao Zedong inside. And Lam (2016), in part two of an interview with the author, shows a seminary classroom with both a national flag and a Buddhist flag in the front, with the national flag in the ritually superior (i.e., stage-left) position.

122 In the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, several students in at least two classes have had constructed special desks with a boxed seating area that allows them to sit in lotus position while attending class. I spoke with the seminarian who started this practice. He wanted to distinguish the seminary from an ordinary school, and felt that the administration was not very supportive; all of these new kinds of desks were bought by the seminarians themselves, for example. I have seen similar desks in Tibetan monasteries.
Front and center in the classroom, directly above the blackboard, is a Buddhist image—typically a rectangular picture of a Buddha.\textsuperscript{123} This Buddha image is a photograph of a statue or an illustration. Sometimes such images are not Chinese in style. The illustrations are done in a modern, semi-realistic style which, like the Buddhist flag, may have originated in Theravada Buddhism. Some of the photographs display Tibetan-style Buddhas. Such Buddha images indicate that the seminary regards Buddhas as the ultimate locus of authority for what is taught in the classroom.

Other important seminary rooms include a library (\textit{tushuguan} 图书馆), typically one room; offices for top administrators such as vice rector(s) (\textit{fuyuanzhang} 副院长) and the dean of academic affairs (\textit{jiaowuzhang} 教务长); and possibly a reading room (\textit{yuelanshi} 阅览室) separate from the library. There is also an auditorium (\textit{dalitang} 大礼堂), sometimes shared with the rest of the monastery, for ceremonies and important lectures. There are also areas for sports at some seminaries, such as rooms for martial arts or table tennis, or outdoor courts for badminton or basketball.\textsuperscript{124} Finally, some seminaries

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{123} The exception I saw was the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, where there were no Buddha images above the blackboards. I asked the seminarian who was disgruntled that the seminary was not specifically Buddhist enough—the same monk who wanted new kinds of desks, if he thought the lack of such images was a problem. He did not think so: whether there were Buddha images in classrooms was a superficial issue. What the school needed was a more fundamental reconceptualization of its Buddhist aims, he claimed.\textsuperscript{124} Seminaries with athletic facilities are considered liberal in comparison to those that do not allow monastics to engage in sports. Instructors in the Hangzhou Seminary explained they were particularly liberal in this sense; students were actively involved in martial arts classes and extracurricular badminton. Similarly, seminarians at the Putuoshan Seminary have a room for table tennis and organize competitions, including with other seminaries. But seminarians spoke of some monks, often elderly, who thought that the only appropriate physical exercise for monks was making prostrations—sometimes hundreds in succession—to Buddhist images.
\end{footnotesize}
include a meditation hall, although this may be part of the general monastery’s facilities.  

_Seminary Personnel_

Like the physical facilities, seminary personnel partially overlap with monastery personnel. In particular, seminary administrators may also be officers in the monastery in which the seminary is located. But the overlap is more limited for personnel than it is for physical facilities. Seminary personnel, identified by a term such as the “collective teachers and students of the seminary” (foxueyuan de quanti shisheng 佛学院的全体师生) are mostly distinct from the regular monastery monks, the collective permanent residents (quanti changzhu 全体常住).  

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125 In the Chinese Buddhist Seminary there is a meditation hall (chantang 禅堂) where seminarians may meditate if they wish; former seminarians spoke of having organized informal meditation groups there. Nanputuo Monastery, site of the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, contains both a Chan meditation hall (chantang) and a Buddha-recitation hall (nianfo tang); some seminarians use the latter during the bi-weekly recitation of precepts. At Putuoshan Seminary, meditation classes (involving meditation practice for one and half hours, without instruction when I attended) were held on platforms along the walls of the main auditorium. At Hangzhou Seminary, there was a Chan meditation hall, normally locked, where seminarians had to meditate for one hour each Friday night.

126 In monasteries with affiliated seminaries, there are different terms for identifying the different types of monastics, but the categories are consistent. For example, the Putuoshan Seminary addresses its monks in the following manner in a recent notification about regulations: “Seminary Dharma teachers and student-monastics, as well as permanent resident monastics, may not use motorcycles, electric bicycles, or bicycles when leaving [the seminary] 学院法师、学僧及常住僧众出行不得使用摩托车、电瓶车、自行车” (see http://www.zgpts.com/index.php?_m=mod_article&_a=article_content&article_id=1512). The monastic permanent residents are also divided into groups, such as the monastic officers (zhishiseng 执事僧) and the rank-and-file monastics (qingzhong 清众). Such distinctions among the monastery monks are less important to the seminary monks, except for complaints heard within seminaries that even rank-and-file
Seminary personnel include two main categories of monks, the Dharma teachers (fashi 法師), which broadly defined include monastic administrators, and the student-monks or seminarians (xueseng 學僧). Most of the Dharma teachers and all of the seminarians also reside in seminary dormitories. Less central, non-monastic, and often non-resident seminary personnel include teachers (laoshi 老師) and sometimes non-monastic administrators.127

The most important seminary administrators are the rector (yuanzhang), vice rector(s) (fuyuanzhang), and dean of academic affairs (jiaowuzhang). The rector is theoretically the top seminary official, but often in name only. Sometimes the rector is the head of the local or provincial Buddhist association who takes the title rector but has little to do with running the seminary. Sometimes he is the abbot of the monastery in which the seminary is located. The rector may, however, play an important role in arranging permission from the government to run the seminary and in funding the seminary. In the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, the rector is always that head of the Buddhist Association of China, and is not usually very involved in running the seminary.128 Often the most important administrator for regular operations is the dean of academic affairs, who may also hold the title of vice rector. Usually there is one person whom everyone can identify as the de facto leader of the seminary. During my fieldwork in 2012-13, for example, the following administrators were commonly identified, without exception among both

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127 The Dharma teachers and non-monastic teachers are sometimes categorized together, under the category of instructors (jiaoshi 教师).
128 This parallels the practice of the Communist Party. For example, the nominal president of the Central Party School is a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, but has little to do with running the school.
faculty and students, as most important in running the following seminaries.\textsuperscript{129} None were the rectors of their respective seminaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seminary</th>
<th>Monk</th>
<th>Official</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>Zongxing</td>
<td>vice rector and dean of academic affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>宗性</td>
<td>副院长兼教务长</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>Gangxiao</td>
<td>standing vice rector and dean of academic affairs\textsuperscript{130} 常务副院长兼教务长</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>Huixian</td>
<td>standing vice rector 常务副院长</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The most important instructors at the seminary are the Dharma teachers, who usually reside at the seminary. Usually classes on Buddhism are taught by Dharma teachers, who are the same gender as the seminarians. One administrator told me his seminary used to employ laymen to teach certain classes on Buddhism, but no longer did so. This was not because of a prejudice against laymen teaching monastics, as at many seminaries; rather, the laymen were unable to teach classes in a manner suitable to monks, he said. Besides courses in Buddhism, I have met Dharma teachers who instructed students in English, martial arts, and calligraphy. Often the Dharma teachers of a given seminary are graduates of the highest course of study in that same seminary. Dharma teachers are not formally divided into ranks according to status as are professors.\textsuperscript{131} Pay for Dharma teachers is considered low within the sangha, especially since monks who

\textsuperscript{129} At the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, authority seemed to be more divided among several administrators.

\textsuperscript{130} The term “standing” (\textit{changwu} 常务) parallels the terminology in Communist Party committees, which include a standing committee (\textit{changwu weiyuanhui}), comprised of standing members (\textit{changwei}) whose authority is greater than that of ordinary members. For example, the most powerful state organ in China, the Politburo, comprises twenty-five members, only seven of whom are standing members. Similarly, China’s highest legislative body, the National People’s Congress, has about 2900 members, of which only about 170 are on the standing committee.

\textsuperscript{131} This may change; see the next section in this chapter. In Chinese universities, there are four ranks of instructors, in descending order by rank: professor (\textit{jiaoshou}), associate professor (\textit{fu jiaoshou}), lecturer (\textit{jiangshi}), and teaching assistant (\textit{zhujiao}).
focus on performing rituals can earn much more. A senior Dharma teacher at one of the best seminaries said he earned 5000 yuan per month—about US $800. Because of low pay and allegedly low prestige, within a decade or so many Dharma teachers at the better seminaries eventually move on to administrative positions, either within a seminary or as the abbot or other high-ranking officer in a monastery.\(^{132}\)

The other instructors in seminaries are the non-monastic teachers (laoshi 老师). Teachers are hired for their expertise and are not necessarily Buddhist. Teachers rarely live on site and are paid per hour of instruction.\(^{133}\) Seminaries prefer to hire male teachers for teaching monks and female teachers for teaching nuns; sometimes teachers of the other gender are hired, but regulations or informal norms may place a minimum age on such teachers.\(^{134}\) I have seen non-monastic instructors teaching seminarians in courses such as Buddhist history, Chinese language, English language, Chinese philosophy, calligraphy, and politics. Politics courses are often taught by an employee of the local Religious Affairs Bureau; at one seminary I visited this course was taught by a retired high school teacher of politics.

Finally, the most numerous people in the seminary are the seminarians (xueseng 学僧). With a small numbers of exceptions at a few seminaries (see below), seminarians

\(^{132}\) See Lijing (2007) for an insider’s perspective on Dharma teachers in Chinese seminaries.

\(^{133}\) One instructor in a good seminary told me he was paid 500 yuan, or about US $80, per hour of class time.

\(^{134}\) The Sichuan Nun’s Seminary only hired men aged sixty or over (Long 2002, 185). A monastic instructor at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS) told me they preferred women instructors, if necessary at all, to be over age fifty. But there are exceptions. I mentioned that I had seen a young Japanese woman teaching the tea ceremony (chadao 茶道) at the CBS. This was a special case, the instructor told me; it was for Sino-Japanese cultural exchange, and the funding for the tea ceremony courses was paid for by a private firm.
are always monks or nuns, but they include both the ordained and the merely tonsured (i.e., novices, *shami* and *shamini*). However, at many seminaries, by the third year seminarians normally take a course in the vinaya (monastic code) for ordained monastics. Since in Chinese Buddhist tradition the study of such vinaya is limited to the ordained, the seminary will arrange for its novice seminarians to undergo ordination before they attend such courses. There is often a maximum age limit for seminarians, usually between twenty-five and thirty-five.\(^\text{135}\)

Potential seminarians must have the approval of their local Buddhist association, and must also take competitive entrance examinations to be accepted. The entrance examinations test basic knowledge in the same categories as the classes taught in seminary, i.e., Buddhism, Culture (i.e., Chinese, English, history/geography), and Politics (i.e., contemporary affairs, religious regulations). At the least prestigious seminaries, virtually everyone who takes the examination is accepted.\(^\text{136}\) But the ratio of examinees to accepted students (usually about forty per class) is important for the prestige of the seminary. For example, according to one monk, at one point the ratio of examinees to accepted students at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was 7:1.\(^\text{137}\) Thus it caused some concern when in 2013 the ratio fell to a little over 2:1 for the entering class of 45

\(^{135}\) For example, at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, in 2012 the maximum age (other than monks in the graduate program) was 28, but instructors hoped this could be raised in order to accommodate increasing numbers of potential older students, some of whom were better educated than the average seminarian and had professional working experience.

\(^{136}\) One vice rector told me he accepted anyone willing to study, unless they had some important moral defect. Yet normally seminarians at his seminary still needed to take the entrance examination.

\(^{137}\) Other informants, seminarians at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during the late 1990s, recall the ratio was 4:1 or 5:1, and are unable to confirm that it was ever 7:1.
Seminarians at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary have allegedly all graduated from high school or a lower-ranked seminary equivalent to high school, and a growing minority has graduated from a college or university. In contrast, at a mid-ranking seminary for nuns, I was told that forty students are accepted annually out of about fifty applicants, among whom about forty are middle school graduates and about ten are high school graduates. The high school graduates always pass the entrance exam, I was told, but about ten of the remaining forty other applicants fail the entrance examination.

The vast majority of students in seminaries are monastics, and most seminaries do not even accept non-monastic students. There are several exceptions, but few laity in such programs, where the expectation is often that students should live like monastics or plan to become monastics. For example, the Jiechuang Institute for Buddhist Learning (in Suzhou) accepts laymen who are considering becoming monks. The Buddhist arts program in the Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary, a much smaller program than that for Buddhist doctrine (教理学院) used to accept laymen students. There were about ten lay students in the program in 2013, but it appears that laymen are no longer...

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138 One informant suggested this was less worrisome than others made it out to be. Monks are simply better informed today about the difficulties of examinations at various seminaries, and so monks who are less qualified do not bother to take the examination at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, which is the most difficult to enter.

139 This information, from the year 2010, was also repeated to a visiting nun interested in enrolling at the seminary.

140 Also see appendix 10 on seminarians in China.

141 This is according to seminary’s personnel, including the dean of academic affairs.
The Putuoshan Seminary started a separate class for Buddhist laity (jushi 居士), both men and women, in 2015. It claimed to be the first seminary to offer classes for laity. Lay students at this seminary must provide a copy of their certificate of conversion to Buddhism (i.e., a “refuge-taking certificate”: guiyzheng皈依证) with their application. Unlike monastic students who receive housing and a stipend, the lay students must find their own housing and transportation to the seminary. Another seminary, the Benhuan Institute (in Shenzhen), accepts both monks and laymen, aged 18 to 35. I am not personally acquainted with the Benhuan Institute, but photographs on the seminary website indicate that virtually all of the students are monks. Finally, an instructor at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary shared with me plans for massive expansion after the seminary re-locates to a larger location on the outskirts of Beijing. According to this instructor, certain seminary personnel would like to increase enrollment from about 90

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142 One of these lay students told me he joined the program due to his interest in calligraphy, not Buddhism. There was some tension in the seminary over whether the lay students should be devout Buddhists and especially if they should lead a semi-monastic lifestyle or not. This student was not secretive about his complaints about not being able to openly have a girlfriend. According to the seminary’s website, the most recent arts class in 2015 only accepted monastic students. The fourth of the five requirements for prospective students was now that they “be between 18 and 35 years old, and not married or in a romantic relationship. ” (See http://www.hzfxy.net/article/2014-9-24/728-1.html; last accessed 2 June 2016).

143 See http://www.zgpts.com/index.php?_m=mod_article&_a=article_content&article_id=1885. I recall discussing lay Buddhist education with a vice rector of this seminary in 2013. He was preparing to leave for Beijing to discuss permission for beginning such a program with the SARA, and he asked me about lay Buddhist education in the US. Precedents of lay Buddhist education abroad could help convince the SARA to permit similar programs in China, he said. He later thanked me for sending him an article in Chinese that discussed Naropa University in Colorado.

144 Construction on the new campus adjacent to the Longquan Monastery is ongoing. Opinion is divided in the seminary as to whether the move will be beneficial. The new campus will be much more spacious, but harder to access. Instructors who do not live at the seminary, including professors from local universities, will be less willing to make the long commute for their hourly teaching wage.
students to 800 or so, including laymen. However, to attract laymen, the seminary would need to offer academic degrees recognized by the Ministry of Education. As discussed later in this chapter, no seminary is able to offer such degrees.

In short, Buddhist seminaries sometimes discuss offering education for laity, but rarely do so, and when they do so the scale of such programs is small. I estimate that there are at most three dozen lay students, out of some 3000 total students, in China’s Buddhist seminaries. Thus in many respects, such as its emphasis on monks and nuns, seminary education is conceived as a modernized extension of traditional monastery education.

**Curriculum**

The basic structure of seminary curricula was established in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary during the 1960s. There are three categories of classes, Buddhism, Culture, and Politics. In the document *Recommendations on Opening Religious Schools* 关于开办宗教院校的请示, released in September 1982, it is stated that the curricula in seminaries for

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145 The instructor at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary is confident that many more seminarians would attend his seminary if they could, in part because the seminary is in Beijing. Part of the incentive of attending the CBS may be the chance to change one’s official household registration (*hukou* 户口) to Beijing. More research is necessary to clarify the current policies regarding household registration transfer and seminary attendance (some seminaries explicitly state that seminarians are not able to do such transfers). It is common knowledge that people with rural household registration generally prefer to change their registration to an urban area when possible. An administrator at another seminary expressed concern about the Chinese Buddhist Seminary’s plans for expansion. Given the limited number of seminarians in China, many seminaries would be left without students if the Chinese Buddhist Seminary succeeded in its expansion.
all religions should be 70% on religion, 20% on culture, and 10% on politics.\textsuperscript{146}

According my observations and the class schedules I have collected, Buddhist seminaries basically follow this guideline.

The best study of seminary curricula is Jingyin and Zhang 2009.\textsuperscript{147} According to this study, most seminary courses on Buddhism are structured according to the Eight Schools (bazong 八宗) formulation, according to which most of traditional Chinese Buddhist teachings can be classified as pertaining to one of the following eight schools: Three Treatise, Consciousness-Only, Tiantai, Huayan, Chan, Pure Land, Vinaya, and Esoteric.\textsuperscript{148} At a typical seminary, students learn from a sampling of these various schools. Seminarians who go on to the research-level (equivalent to Master-level) studies then focus on one of these eight schools as their concentration.

However, some seminaries focus on just one of these eight schools. Furthermore, several instructors told me that no seminaries in China actually taught anything from the Esoteric school (mizong 密宗). One instructor told me this was a good thing, because a lot of superstitious elements have crept into Buddhist Esoteric teachings, which are now monopolized by Tibetan Buddhists; Chinese esoteric teachings (he called them “Tang-

\textsuperscript{146} As discussed in chapter 2, according to one seminary administrator during the 1960s, only 60% of class time was supposed to be devoted to Buddhism.

\textsuperscript{147} Also see Sueki and Cao (1996, 170-77, 191-97) for the curricula at two Chinese Buddhist seminaries.

\textsuperscript{148} The schools comprising the Eight Schools are fixed, but the specific names to identify them and the order in which they are listed vary. For instance, sometimes the Three Treatise school is identified as the Madhyamaka school (zhongguan zong 中观宗), a term which point to the school’s Indian origins rather than its Chinese developments.
dynasty Esotericism” 唐密) are now extinct, he claimed. Therefore even seminaries that try to teach many schools of thought teach at most seven rather than eight.

While the Eight Schools framework is sometimes criticized, many Dharma teachers and seminarians praise it. Many see it as encapsulating the best of Chinese Buddhism. One Dharma teacher from a seminary that supposedly focused on the doctrines of the Tiantai school emphasized that seminarians needed a broad education in all the schools. Otherwise, a seminarian whose spiritual practice might have blossomed with a different school of thought might fail to progress. Many seminarians also supported the broad, Eight Schools approach, at least until graduate-level study. A monk needed to be able to answer questions from laypersons, two seminarians told me. If a layman asked a monk for guidance about one particular school and the seminary-graduate monk could not answer him or even knew less than him, it would be embarrassing and a dereliction of duty. The Eight Schools framework may be expanding within seminaries. At one seminary I visited, a vice rector who emphasized only one school of thought had been fired and was replaced by two Dharma teachers who supported an Eight Schools approach. And according to a Chinese nun studying in Thailand, the Sichuan Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary, which formerly emphasized integrating Chinese Buddhism with Tibetan Gelukpa Buddhism, has moved toward the Eight Schools model.

149 In several seminaries, the Extended Treatise on the Stages of the Bodhisattva’s Way (菩提道次第广论; Tibetan: Lamrim) is taught in Chinese translation. The Tibetan origin of this treatise is recognized, but it is not understood to be Esoteric, since it does not involve Tantric rituals.

National Institutions

There are several annual, national events for Chinese Buddhists, including a preaching competition and a Chan-style debate competition. In both of these events, many of the participants are seminarians or seminary teachers, and they win glory for their respective seminaries if they win prizes. For many monastics, seminaries are therefore more important institutions for signaling affiliation than monasteries or lineages. Some of the advisors and judges as such events are university professors. Thus elements from very traditional monastery lecture halls and Chan discourse records are being re-cast in new forms resembling a scholastic speech or debate club.

A third national event, held annually since 2012, is held specifically for seminarians.151 This is the National Academic Conference for Students at Buddhist Schools.152 At such conferences, seminarians and a small number of graduate students at secular universities present papers on Buddhism. A debate that occurred at this conference in 2013 will be discussed in chapter five.

Here my concern is analyzing which seminaries are most active in academic endeavors. Below I present data from the second dissertation conference on the participants and the schools they came from. My data is based on the conference volume

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151 In 2016, a fourth national even, for debating the meaning of scriptures (bian jing 辩经) was held for the first time. The Chinese monks organizing the event had both academics and Tibetan monastics, who have a long-established tradition of debate, on the panel of judges.
152 全国佛教院校学生论文联合发表会. The title of the conference is literally “conference for the united presentation of academic papers by students in Buddhist religious schools throughout the whole country.” This long-winded title seems to derive from the name of a similar, much older annual conference in Taiwan, now in 2016 on its twenty-seventh iteration. See: https://sites.google.com/a/ddbc.edu.tw/conference/li-jie-fa-biao-hui
and includes the two participants who did not actually show up at the conference, which I attended.\(^{153}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Seminary</th>
<th>Presenters</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing Research Institute of Buddhist Culture (BRIBC)</td>
<td>5 monks</td>
<td>A conference organizer, Shengkai, runs this seminary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caoxi Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS)</td>
<td>5 monks</td>
<td>A conference organizer, Zhanru, is a vice rector at the CBS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 nun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guangdong Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 nun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>2 monks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan Buddhist Academy</td>
<td>2 monks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hongfa Monastery Buddhist Seminary(^{154})</td>
<td>2 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiechuang Institute for Buddhist Learning</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konglin Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>7 monks</td>
<td>This seminary sponsored the conference, which took place in the seminary’s auditorium.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qixiashan Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan Emeishan Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>1 monks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>2 nuns</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunmen Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>2 monks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>16 seminaries total</strong></td>
<td><strong>31 monks and 4 nuns total</strong></td>
<td>During most of the conference proceedings, the nuns remained in the back corner of the auditorium.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other Schools Attending</th>
<th>Presenters</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delhi University, India</td>
<td>1 monk</td>
<td>This monk was a former instructor at the CBS and was visiting China during a vacation from PhD studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peking University</td>
<td>2 men</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>2 men, 1 woman, 1 monk</td>
<td>This monk had previously been a student at BRIBC, but had left to study at Renmin University.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{153}\) See the following website for coverage of this conference in the Chinese Buddhist media:

\(^{154}\) This seminary, founded in 2011, was renamed the Benhuan Academy in 2014. Benhuan 本焕 (1907-2012) was a famous monk who was rector of the Hongfa Monastery Buddhist Seminary before his death. The Benhuan Academy is one of the few seminaries named after an individual rather than after a geographic region or a monastery.
From this chart, it is clear that nuns are not well represented in such events. We can also see that seminaries active in this conference, like seminaries in general and other Buddhist institutions, are highly concentrated in the south of China. Only three of the sixteen seminaries on the list above (BRIBC, CBS, and Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary) are in the north.

Which seminaries attended and how many seminarians they sent reflected the prestige of the seminary but also the organizers and sponsors. The conference organizers sent participating seminaries a quota for the number of students to send. The seminaries themselves then decided which students to send. This iteration of the conference had been spearheaded by two monks who are also professors at top universities in Beijing, Zhanru (Peking University) and Shengkai (Qinghua University), and who are both graduates of the CBS. Whom they invited depended on the prominence of the seminary, but also on internal Buddhist factional politics. For example in 2013 no monks from the Minnan Buddhist Seminary (MBS), widely regarded as the second-best in China for monks and the best in China for nuns, were invited. I have detected tension between the CBS, widely considered to be the top seminary, and the MBS. One CBS graduate agreed that the MBS is the second-best seminary, but said with disapproval that it sometimes acts as if it is the best seminary in China.

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155 I heard one conference organizer comment on a seminary which received no quota: “it has too little influence,” he stated.
156 An MBS administrator told me their seminary had received no notification about this conference.
157 Such tensions extend beyond seminary issues and relate to the open clash in 2006 between Shenghui, formerly the most powerful monk in the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), with several more senior monks such as Jinghui, Foyuan, and Benhuan, who allegedly appealed directly to the SARA to have Shenghui removed from his position as secretary-general of the BAC. Shenghui is currently
Internal Critique and Prospects

Seminaries have established themselves as core institutions in Chinese Buddhism. Yet support for them remains divided. A few leading monastics are opposed to seminaries as a whole and forbid their disciples from attending them. More commonly, monastic leaders debate about how seminaries should be oriented. For example, in the year 2000 the monks Jiqun and Jingyin, leaders in Buddhist education, published articles in Fayin about how seminaries should be changed. Jiqun advocated that seminaries narrow their focus of study and emphasize character education more. Seminaries were too much like secular schools, Jiqun argued. Instead, seminaries should be more like traditional Chinese schools were before being Westernized, he argued. Jingyin critiqued the Eight Schools framework in many seminary curricula and argued that seminaries need to train students in the practical skills connected with future jobs. In effect, Jingyin argues that seminaries should be more like professional or vocational schools.

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158 For example, Zhimin Shangshi 智敏上师 (1927-), a monk based in Zhejiang Province, allegedly forbids his disciples from attending seminaries, and has established his own teaching system based on traditional monastery lecture halls (jiangtang 讲堂) (thanks for this information from Wu Wei, who has conducted fieldwork on Zhimin Shangshi during 2014).

159 See Zongshun (2001) for a broad overview of the various viewpoints on seminary education.


161 Jiqun runs his own seminary and has implemented some of his ideas there. See appendix 4 for more on Jiqun’s views.

162 Jiqun’s ideas about traditional Chinese schools are highly idealized. He writes as if the focus in such schools was self-enrichment and ethical formation, whereas the actual focus was often more instrumental, i.e., passing civil service examinations (see Elman 2000).
In sum, during the Reform era, seminaries have expanded rapidly. Recently this expansion has slowed down, but seminaries show no sign of decreasing in their importance within Chinese Buddhist monasticism. If more seminaries begin to close rather than open, this will probably be either because of consolidation, i.e., larger seminaries expanding enrollments, or because of an overall decline in numbers of recruits to the monastic order.

Seminaries are also experimenting with different kinds of pedagogy and curricula. Such experimentation is subject to limits set by the state and pressures from the state, academia, and other monastic institutions. The remainder of this chapter briefly sketches some of these pressures coming from the state. The impact of academia is the topic of chapter four.

**The State’s Impact on Contemporary Seminaries**

As we have seen, the role of the state in establishing seminaries has been fundamental. Today the state continues to monitor and shape seminaries. The nature of state influence can be seen in three ways: political enforcement of orthodoxy, political study, and providing incentives to imitate university programs.

The first kind of influence is subtle and surprising: the state in effect underwrites many traditional Buddhist hierarchies and orthodoxies. For example, in defining only fully ordained monastics as Buddhist religious personnel, the state supports monastic authority within the Buddhist community and reinforces ordination as a marker of such authority within the sangha. The state organized Buddhist Association of China today also promotes the leadership of monastics over lay Buddhists, and connects this with
education. In financially sponsoring the Chinese Buddhist Seminary but limiting its students to monks, the state also supports male monastics over nuns. Even in limiting the number of legally permitted religions at the national level to five (including Buddhism), the state thereby blocks the development of new religious movements which may fuse Buddhist elements but not be recognized as Buddhist by the traditional Buddhist monastic hierarchy. In Taiwan for example there are several extremely active lay Buddhist movements, one of which includes a laywomen who leads an organization that includes monks. Given the state’s role in enforcing what counts as Buddhism, a task for which it also considers the current Buddhist hierarchy’s opinions, development of such organizations in China range from unlikely to impossible. I suggest that such structural factors also deter the development of creative, new understandings of Buddhist doctrine within the seminaries.

The state shapes seminaries more directly by requiring them to teach politics. Usually such courses are taught by an employee of a local religious affairs agency. The main point of such education is to foster loyalty in seminarians toward the state and to keep them abreast of recent policies, especially toward religion. Seminarians are taught the correct things to say about state policies in Tibet and toward Taiwan, for example.

The state has also shaped seminaries recently by sponsoring an internal degree program among Buddhist seminaries. In November 2012 the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) released two documents giving seminaries the ability to grant

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163 For instance, current BAC president Xuecheng in an interview stated that the fourth of five priorities for the organization was “the cultivation of Buddhist talent,” which he defined as follows: “According to the line of thinking that ‘the sangha is regulated by the vinaya, and the laity is guided by the sangha, and the sangha and the laity cooperate,’ [we will] make great efforts to cultivate talented sangha and the laity in both study and practice and in spreading the Dharma” (China Review News Agency 2016). An implication is that Buddhist education is intended to solidify monastic leadership over lay Buddhists.
diplomas for BA, MA, and PhD degrees, and to recognize certain seminary instructors as equivalent to their secular counterparts in universities, i.e., as teaching assistant, lecturer, associate professor, and professor. Only certain seminaries, and also only certain teachers and students who met various requirements within those seminaries, would be eligible. This new system has yet to be fully implemented, but in July 2014 the first batch of three graduating students from the Chinese Buddhist Seminary were granted MA degrees, and several instructors were certified. This new program is run through an office of the BAC, which is subject to direction from the SARA, which thus far has required conventional academics, i.e., secular scholars from universities and research centers, to assist in setting up the program. But since these new degrees are ultimately regulated by the SARA, rather than by the Ministry of Education, such degrees are only recognized within Buddhist circles.

It is evident that the state continues to profoundly shape seminaries to this day, in ways that are both obvious and more subtle. In many ways the state pushes seminaries to become more like conventional schools, e.g., through the requirements to offer politics classes and the incentives to mimic secular schools in order to offer diplomas.

164 See the following webpage on the BAC website for the regulations on degrees: http://www.chinabuddhism.com.cn/gg/2014-10-27/7189.html
165 On the CBS website, see http://www.zgfxy.cn/Article/2014/07/19/1552521484.html for a press release about the students’ thesis defense, and http://www.zgfxy.cn/Article/2014/07/19/1720511485.html for the ceremony in which the degrees were given. In a room decorated with small Buddhist flags, this second ceremony began with the national anthem and concluded with the singing of a Buddhist song composed in 1929 or 1930, the “Three Treasures” (sanbao ge 三宝歌) (see Lin Pei’an 1992). In the later webpage, the three Chinese monks granted MA degrees appear in Western-style academic regalia, i.e., in colored gowns and square academic caps with tassels. That is to say, in the process of receiving credentials sanctioned by a state agency of an Asian atheist regime, Chinese monks dressed up like medieval European Christian monks. Such a ceremony is certainly modern in that it is an innovation, something not passed down from previous generations of monastics.
Conclusion

This chapter has described contemporary seminaries. It shows that seminaries are evolving hybrids shaped by Chinese Buddhist history and their contemporary institutional environment. This chapter demonstrates how seminaries fuse elements of traditional Chinese monasteries and modern schools. It also focuses on the continuing effects of state regulation on seminaries, including state incentives for seminaries to model themselves after universities.

The following chapters will focus on the impact of academia on seminaries. As we will see, such influence is often mediated by the state and yet largely independent of state ideology. I will contend that it is academic projects to understand Buddhism, rather than state projects to use Buddhism for instrumental purposes, which have more potential to radically change Chinese Buddhism.
Chapter 4: Seminaries and the Academic Study of Buddhism

The absurdity of the theory of the seven Buddhas and twenty-eight [patriarchal] ancestors in India is clear and easily seen, and does not require detailed investigation.  
—Du Jiwen and Wei Daoru (1993, 21) 
Senior scholars of Buddhism 
Institute of World Religions, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

One cannot pretend that critical studies have no impact on religious life or the life of the religion. 
—Luis Gómez (2007, 337-338) 
Professor of Buddhist Studies, University of Michigan

In little more than a century seminaries have proliferated to become one of the most important institutions in Chinese Buddhism (chapter 2). Seminaries have partially replaced traditional institutions such as apprenticeships and monastery lecture series, and they have transformed other institutions such as the vinaya school. Seminaries also offer credentials and networks for ambitious monastics to rise in the monastic hierarchy in the state-sponsored Buddhist associations. But as we have seen, the very existence of seminaries is subject to state approval. When the state did not see the need for seminaries during 1949-1956 and 1966-1979, all seminary operations ceased. Then after the state resurrected the United Front system and religious affairs work, Buddhist institutions were allowed to revive and dozens of seminaries were established.

Whereas the last chapter sketched the institutional environment in which seminaries operate, this chapter examines a central issue within seminary education and the institutional underpinning of this issue. Namely, I will argue that the relationship between traditional Buddhist learning and modern secular scholarship is a core tension within seminaries, and that this tension challenges Chinese Buddhism’s authority in society. First I show how Chinese Buddhists describe such tensions. Then I show

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166 西天七佛二十八祖说的荒诞，显而易见，勿须详考
responses to such tensions in monastic settings and discourse. Central to monastic/academic tensions is a question of power: who speaks with authority, and for whom, about Buddhism—monastics or scholars? An inherent conflict of interest between academia and Buddhist institutions over jurisdiction to speak about Buddhism stems from the fact these two sets of institutions are independent—and neither is formally subordinate to the other—and yet share overlapping social mandates. The tensions are exacerbated because the goals, interests, and practices of each field do not fully coincide. Such tensions are therefore universal in societies with both Buddhist clergy and secular scholars of Buddhism, but the content of the tensions depends on local conditions.

After describing a range of Buddhist responses to secular scholarship, I analyze Buddhist studies in China, including its modern history and institutional dynamics. I show how academic programs and Buddhist institutions have influenced one another, and how their relationship has been both cooperative and agonistic. This chapter closes by considering how Buddhist institutions, often through financial power, sometimes influence academic institutions. The next chapter will focus on influence in the other direction, from academia to Buddhist institutions such as seminaries. In both chapters, an underlying concern is how academic approaches to the study of Buddhism transform Buddhism, both directly, through influencing Buddhists, and indirectly, by shaping how the state and mainstream society understand Buddhism.

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167 For analysis of the concept of “jurisdiction” and analysis of the shifting professional hierarchies, especially among different kinds of mental health professions (including psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, and clergy) in the United States, see Abbott 1988.
Labeling the Problem: Study/Practice

Chinese Buddhist authorities worry about the relationship between study and practice in Buddhist education. Questions of how study relates to practice have been important in Buddhism throughout its history. Chinese Buddhists have long been concerned that studying too much or in the wrong way can inhibit the realization of Buddhist teachings. But in recent decades, this question has acquired a new dimension: seminary leaders themselves have asserted that study can weaken faith in Buddhism and lead seminarians to disrobe. Rather than enhancing confidence in the Dharma and in the monastic vocation, some monastics claim study in seminaries can undermine the monastic order it is meant to strengthen. Monastics raise doubts about seminaries in general or, more frequently and without naming specific seminaries, about certain kinds of instruction within seminaries.

The claim that studying Buddhism can undermine Buddhism is relatively new in Buddhist history. But it was not new to the PRC, nor was it limited to monks who

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168 For discussion of the study/practice problem in South Asia, see Strong (2008, 228-232), which includes two Pali texts that discuss the relationship between learning and practice, and which come to opposite conclusions regarding which is more valuable. In his discussion of Indian Buddhism, Ray (1994, 15-36) identifies behavioral purity, learning, and meditation as the three most valued pursuits for monastics, and likewise discusses tensions between learning and meditation. For discussion of the relationship between textual study and meditative practices in Tibetan Buddhism, see Cabezón (1994), Dreyfus (1992), Jackson (1990), Jackson (1994), and Gold (2008).

169 For example, Brose (2015, 83) cites a tenth-century Chan monk who claims that reading Buddhist sutras can both cause and resolve mental disturbances. Jiang Wu (2006) discusses how the Śūramgama Sūtra considers excessive scriptural learning an obstacle to practice. And Welch (1967, 310) writes that Jinshan, the foremost Chan meditation monastery in early twentieth-century China, never held formal Dharma lectures, as they would conflict with Chan claims to be a wordless teaching. But Jinshan’s policy was exceptional, and most major monasteries held Dharma lectures. In addition, in Chinese Buddhism, common ritual practices, such as recitation of scriptures, as well as ascetic practices, such as copying scriptures using one’s blood as ink, integrated book-study and bodily practice (Welch 1967, 303-56).
opposed seminaries per se. For example as early as 1924, even Taixu, the most famous promoter of seminary education, mentioned the problem to monks at his Wuchang Buddhist Seminary. In his speech Taixu exhorted his soon-to-graduate students to promote “Buddhistic education 佛化教育” rather than secular Western education, which he described as “animalistic education 動物教育,” i.e., ultimately driven by ignorant desires. In addition, Taixu claimed that due to carelessness, much of the sangha education in China used secular textbooks that “usually vilify the Buddha-Dharma, with the result that many monastics [in such schools] return to secular life—how could one hope to promote the Buddha-Dharma in this manner? 多攻詆佛法，故其結果，至僧人多有反俗者，如是奚望其宏昌佛法哉” (Taixu 1980, 23:1408, “Lun jiaoyu 論教育”). Precisely which textbooks Taixu refers to is unclear, but he could have meant Japanese or Japanese-influenced books on Buddhism. 170

The novel situation of Buddhist schooling allegedly undermining Buddhism results from secular, academic approaches to study that contrast with traditional ways to study Buddhism. Thus the study/practice “problem” is really a category consisting of overlapping issues, including the practical (such as how, what, how much, and when to study) and the theoretical (such as the relationships between language and reality, knowledge and experience, etc.), all of which have both premodern and modern inflections.

First we will examine how recent or contemporary Buddhist authorities in the PRC have approached this problem. Zhao Puchu (1992, 5), in one of the most influential

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170 For more on Taixu’s criticism of both secular and monastic schooling in China, as well as his mixed feelings about Buddhism in Japan, see Lai Rongdao (2013, 129-140).
statements on seminary education in the post-Mao era, lists “the relationship between
practice and study 修与学的关系” as the first of three problems to resolve in formulating
policies for Buddhist education.171 Zhao states that in the past, the guiding formulation
for seminary education had been “while taking study as primary, to emphasize both study
and practice.” Later, this had been shortened to “emphasizing both study and practice,”
but in fact, Zhao contends, study was still primary. Zhao states that through experience,
Buddhist leaders such as himself have learned that if the relationship between study and
practice is not “grasped 掌握” or “resolved解决,” then:

This is a major reason that the faith of some student-monas is dampened and their
[adherence to] the vinaya is slack. They leave the religion and disrobe after graduation,
and so cannot have an impact serving Buddhist institutions. 这是一些学僧信仰淡化、
戒律松弛、毕业后离教还俗，不能在佛教事业中发挥作用的重要原因 (Zhao 1992,
5).

Zhao writes that after investigation, the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) addressed
this problem with a new formulation for seminary study, namely “integrating study and
practice, and making the student-monastic’s lifestyle like that in a monastery.”172 Zhao
asserts this means seminaries should aim both to transmit Buddhist knowledge and to
solidify faith in Buddhism.

What Zhao’s discussion leaves unstated is whether some kinds of knowledge and
faith are mutually incompatible, and if so, whether transmitting knowledge or solidifying

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171 The second was “the relationship between general studies and specialized studies,” and the third was
“the relationship between long-term and short-term [study]”; Zhao 1992, 5. For an introduction to Zhao
Puchu and his role in twentieth century Buddhism, see Ji Zhe 2013a.

172 学修一体化，学僧生活丛林化： more literally, “the one-entity-ification of study and practice, and
the public monastery-ization of student-monicstic lifestyle” (Zhao 1992, 5).
faith should take precedence. For example, should ideas that potentially destabilize faith be taught? Or should instruction be designed to strengthen faith, and if so, then faith in which specific traditions and beliefs? This issue strikes at the heart of seminary education, and begs the question of what sort of Buddhism seminary leaders aim to promote. Should, for example, seminary instruction aim for a new reconstruction of Buddhism, or should it aim for a revival of a past golden age? And if the latter, then which “golden age” should be its aim? As we have seen in chapter two, revival rather than reconstruction tends to be the main objective. The goal is often to re-establish the glory of Tang dynasty Buddhism, albeit with assistance from later monastic authorities (especially from the late Ming and the Republican eras), and through modern institutions such as seminaries.

Evidence from the very terms used to identify the study/practice problem suggests that new concerns about academic versus religious approaches to study outweigh traditional ones such as the relationship between verbal teachings and religious realization. I suggest the current prevalence of secular terms that lack distinctive Buddhist colorings points to the fact that what is crucial in the “problem” are tensions between Buddhism and academic discourse, and that the intra-Buddhist doctrinal discussions are less crucial. Contemporary Buddhist discourse includes sets of terms drawn from scriptures and that point to a study/practice contrast, and which posit “study” (i.e., listening/teaching, understanding, teachings) as part of a course of development that occurs prior to practice. Such terms include the following:

1) listening-thinking-practicing (wensixiu闻思修; Skt. śrūta-cintā-bhāvanā)
(2) understanding-doing (jiexing 解行) \(^{173}\)

(3) teachings-contemplations (jiaoguan 教观)

The specific terms used to identify this general problem vary and have distinct connotations which need not, however, be discussed here. How many of these and related terms are employed in recent Chinese Buddhist discussion of the study/practice problem in PRC monastic education can be found in Zongshun (2001), which provides a broad overview.\(^{174}\) What I want to highlight is that today it is terms such as “study-practice problem 学修问题” and “the relationship between academics and spiritual cultivation 学

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\(^{173}\) These two terms jie-xing appear in Buddhist commentaries as part of a longer, four-term phrase that summarizes an approach to Buddhist cultivation: believing-understanding-doing-verifying (xinjiexingzheng 信解行证). The first three terms in this set (believing-understanding-doing) roughly correspond to the terms in the first set (listening-thinking-practicing), but in a more affirmative key, i.e., the first stage is not simply “listening” (i.e., learning), but “believing.” The term “believing-understanding 信解” is the title of the fourth chapter in Kumārajīva’s translation of the Lotus Sutra, which is among the most important scriptures in Chinese Buddhism.

\(^{174}\) The monk Zongshun (2001, 6) identifies many “contradictions 矛盾” (a Marxist-inflected term for tensions) in PRC Buddhist education, including three “most central 最核心” contradictions. The first is “the contradiction between study and practice 学与修的矛盾,” and the other two are research versus faith (yanjiu 研究 vs. xinyang 信仰) and monastery versus academy (conglin 丛林 vs. xueyuan 学院). In addition to summarizing previous research, Zongshun analyzes the problem and advocates the harmony of study and practice. For Zongshun, belief or faith (xinyang 信仰) is part of Buddhism’s core (hexin 核心) and should be a precondition (qianti 前提) for research (yanjiu 研究); at the same time, Zongshun approvingly cites the monk Yongming Yanshou’s (904-975) claim that belief (xin 信) and understanding (jie 解) should develop in conjunction (2001, 7, 9). Thanks to Jessica Zu for suggesting I reflect on the significance of the specific terms “study 学” and “practice 修” in the study-practice problem.
术与修行的关系” that are more common, and such sets of terms are not found in traditional Buddhist formulas.175

During fieldwork I found that the relationship between study and practice continues to be a central point of contention within seminaries. For example, Jiqun, rector of the Jiechuan Buddhist Research Institute (a seminary in Suzhou) and advisor to graduate-level monks in the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, complained that most seminary instruction is far too broad to be useful for spiritual practice. Instead of learning so much Buddhist history and studying all eight schools of Buddhism, an approach that mirrored secular schooling, seminarians should focus on learning and practicing the teachings of just one school, Jiqun claimed.176 Jinghui (1933-2013), founder of the Hebei Buddhist Seminary, echoed Zhao’s language: “faith has been dampened 信仰淡化了,” he claimed, owing to the overly academic approaches of scholar-monks such as Yinshun (1906-2005).177 Ordinary seminarians mentioned related problems. A seminarian in Beijing confided that he could not read Yinshun’s books lest his Pure Land practice be disrupted.178 A seminarian in Fujian asserted that although teachers claim that all eight schools are ultimately compatible, in actual class instruction they still seem to be

175 Other premodern Chinese terms that point to a similar distinction include zhixing 知行 (knowing/doing), used by Neo-Confucians, and a distinction between two unbalanced and hence improper methods of meditation practice, namely the doctrinally uninformed “darkly verified Chan 暗證禪” and the overly intellectual “literary Chan 文字禪.” For illuminating discussion of the term “learning 學” in Neo-Confucianism, in which there were parallel tensions between book-learning and introspective realization, see Bol 2008, 153-193.
176 I interviewed Jiqun in his retreat quarters on the mountain slopes behind the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, Xiamen, Fujian (13 June 2010). See appendix 4 for a section of my interview related to breadth of monastic studies.
177 See appendix 3 for extracts from my interview with Jinghui on 16 December 2012.
178 Yinshun was critical of traditional Chinese Pure Land practices (Jones 1999, 126-133).
mutually incompatible. For example, he noted, Madhyamaka and Consciousness-Only
doctrines seem contradictory, and Chan and Pure Land ideas about practice seem
opposed. This seminarian claimed dissonance from the instruction in different classes—
including assertions without demonstrations of ultimate compatibility between different
Buddhist schools—undermined seminarians’ confidence.

I found other points of tension over study and practice in seminaries were, on the
surface, more prosaic. One practical issue was whether or not seminarians should be
required to attend the daily morning and evening liturgical services in the monastery’s
main hall. In most seminaries attendance at these daily rituals, which involve worship,
repetition, and rote memorization of liturgical formulas, is required. The liturgies
incorporate diverse elements such as prostrations, musical performance, recitation of
doctrinal formulas and vows, praise of scriptures and deities, esoteric spells, and
offerings to Buddhas and ghosts. Morning and evening liturgical services each typically
require one to one and a half hours, and begin around 4am and 4pm, respectively.

Several seminary instructors told me they wished seminarians could be exempt
from such daily rituals so they had more time for studies or even just for sleep, and that
most seminary instructors in China shared this sentiment. However, for many traditional
monastics, attendance at daily liturgies is a mandatory part of monastic life. Furthermore,
the abbot of the monastery in which a seminary is located, on whose facilities and funds

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179 Among Chinese Buddhist monastics, performing the morning and evening liturgy is the most common
formal Buddhist practice. For a study of contemporary Chinese Buddhist morning and evening liturgies,
which are highly standardized throughout China, see Chen Pi-yen 1999; for more on the historical
evolution of the manuals for such rituals, see Günzel 1994. For analysis of similar tensions in a
contemporary Chinese Daoist seminary between training in ritual skills and book learning, see Yang Der-
Ruey 2011, which also contrasts the different kinds of consciousness and embodied knowledge cultivated
in ritual training and modern schooling, respectively—topics beyond the scope of this chapter.
the seminary usually depends, usually wants seminarians to attend daily liturgies. Partly as a result of attendance at the morning liturgy, in my observations in seminaries throughout China, many student-monastics are exhausted during class. Many seminarians are quick to take naps on their desks during the break between class periods, and some appear dazed or even doze off during class.\textsuperscript{180}

In Chinese Buddhist seminaries, clearly not all debates about study and practice concern the appropriateness of academic approaches to Buddhist studies. Yet an important current of debate addresses how to respond to critical academic claims and approaches.\textsuperscript{181} Often such responses are implicit, with direct criticism of academia muted. I suggest monastics withhold critical responses because they are afraid they would not be able to win in public debates with academics, and also because monastics suspect, with good reason, that the state officials who regulate religious affairs ultimately trust scholars more than religious figures.\textsuperscript{182}

It is therefore difficult to find open discussion of academic/Buddhist tensions, much less extended analysis. But several important monastic seminary leaders discussed

\textsuperscript{180} Tuzzeo notes that students in a Taiwanese Buddhist seminary (Dharma Drum Sangha University) and a Buddhist college (Dharma Drum Buddhist College) also had conflicting opinions over the right balance between study and practice. His surveys indicate students spent much of their time performing morning and evening liturgical services, and that they slept an average of only five hours per night (2012, 138-149).

\textsuperscript{181} The specific issues under debate are discussed later in this chapter and in chapter five. See the table Traditional Chinese Buddhist Beliefs Challenged by Academia in chapter five for a list of important beliefs challenged by academia.

\textsuperscript{182} Some officials in religious affairs work are themselves graduates of religious studies programs. Furthermore, academic scholars of religious studies are frequently hired by state agencies to work on confidential research projects whose findings are never made public. For example, I recently attended an academic conference in which a Chinese university-based professor of Buddhist studies presented an abstract of his recent findings (Dec. 2015). Yet when pressed about the details of his research, he said he was unable to reveal anything more, since the project was confidential and funded by the Communist Party’s United Front Department.
such tensions in public discourse. For example Zongxing, a vice rector and the dean of teaching affairs of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS), discusses Buddhist education and mentions tensions over academic research in a recent article posted on the CBS website (2013). Since Zongxing is directly responsible for overseeing the instruction at the top seminary in China, it is worth describing his analysis of this issue. Zongxing admits monastics are generally not enthusiastic about academic research because “in the Buddhist sector there are discrepant understandings about the real meaning and value of ‘academic research.’” For Zongxing, the extensive writings of monastic saints of yore, the “eminent monks of great virtue 高僧大德,” prove that Chinese Buddhists have their own tradition of academic research. In short, Zongxing argues that academic research often damages Buddhism, but that such damage can be ameliorated if seminaries expand the scope of research to include traditional, faith-friendly modes of Buddhist scholarship. In modern times, Zongxing states:

The reason that the Buddhist sector does not universally identify with “academic research” today is probably highly connected to the narrowness of the methods, direction, and results of modern and contemporary “academic research”… Because of influence from Western academic research methods, academic research clearly emphasizes historical and textual criticism, and also shows an inability to understand the world of faith. Therefore for Buddhist believers, many of the results and conclusions of research create an impact on their emotional worlds. Under such impact on their emotional worlds, the Buddhist

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183 See Zongxing (2013); the translated sentence is the following: 佛教界对“学术研究”的实际意义和价值的认识存在分歧.
sector naturally gives rise to doubts about the fairness of “academic research,” and hence does not identify very much with “academic research.”\textsuperscript{184}

In other words, today academic research damages the religious sentiments of believers. But in fact, Zongxing continues, “academic research and the practice of faith are not contradictory or opposed 学术研究与信仰修持并不矛盾或对立的.”\textsuperscript{185} In traditional China, Zongxing claims, academic research worked in the service religious practice, and today that sort of research, including editing and commenting on traditional texts, should be revived in Buddhist seminaries.

Zongxing implicitly answers how to resolve the tension between knowledge and faith that I identified in Zhao Puchu’s presentation of issues in seminary education. Research, Zongxing implies, should be tailored so that it produces knowledge consistent with religious sentiment. In case of conflict, preserving faith should trump producing new knowledge. Nowhere in his essay does Zongxing suggest possible adjustment in the other direction, i.e., that Buddhist beliefs and emotions should be adjusted in light of knowledge. Zongxing’s identification of traditional Buddhist scholarship with academic research also blurs what I will argue are important differences between the two activities (chapter 5). Yet he stops short of recommending that monastics develop apologetics against critical academic writings.

\textsuperscript{184} 当今佛教界对“学术研究”的认同度之所以不具有普遍性，大概与近现代“学术研究”的方法和方向及其成果的狭隘性有极大的关联……由于受西方学术研究方法的影响，学术研究明显有注重历史考据的色彩，同时又表现出难以理解信仰世界的倾向，是以有不少研究成果或结论对佛教信仰者来说，造成了情感世界的冲击，在情感世界的冲击下，佛教界自然对“学术研究”的公正性产生质疑，从而对“学术研究”工作本身的认同度也就不高 (Zongxing 2013).

\textsuperscript{185} Notice here, Zongxing no longer places the term “academic research” in quotation marks.
Zongxing’s approach to academic research in seminaries is widespread throughout China and yet rarely stated explicitly. Seminarians and seminary instructors I spoke with echoed these sentiments: academic and traditional Buddhist knowledge are different. Yet they often went one step further: traditional Buddhist knowledge is not just different, but better. In one seminary, two seminarians told me the research I was doing would produce “cultural knowledge 文化知识,” which was of limited use; it would not produce the liberating “wisdom 智慧” which is the main point of Buddhism. In other words, academic knowledge is merely “cultural” and is less fruitful than specifically Buddhist knowledge. Three seminary instructors at another seminary stated that in cases of conflict, they trusted Buddhist masters over academics, because only the former had achieved spiritual realization, the same goal these instructors aspired to reach.

While official seminary publications usually elide rather than address the conflict between traditional and academic modes of study, I believe this may be changing. The recent self-introduction of the Lingdong Buddhist Seminary in Guangdong Province, in a draft prepared for a forthcoming volume on Buddhist education in China, alludes to such tensions and demonstrates a different sort of apologetic for a less academic approach.

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186 This distinction between kinds of knowledge, with a hierarchy between inferior and superior forms, has ancient roots and a complex modern genealogy, with modern inflections that even include Chinese interpretations of Henri Bergson’s (1859-1941) views on intuition. In Mahayana Buddhist texts this type of distinction is common and appears in various forms, such as in the contrast between “mundane prajñā 世間般若” and “ supra-mundane prajñā 出世間般若” in the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom (Da zhi du lun; see for example CBETA/T. 1509: 25.516b). Note also that whereas in state and academic discourse the term “cultural 文化” generally carries a positive valence, in internal Buddhist discourse the positive valence of “cultural” is more qualified. In contrast, in state discourse the term “religion 宗教” has only limited positive connotations (i.e., religion is not “feudal superstition 封建迷信,” but it is still “idealism 唯心论” and hence “superstitious,” albeit potentially useful), whereas Buddhists today use the term “religion” in a strongly positive sense.
(Guangdong sheng 2013). The basic argument is that traditional Buddhist learning is foundational knowledge for monastics, whereas academic knowledge is secondary, yet also more advanced in some sense. But the implications are the same as for Zongxing’s approach: seminaries should limit exposure to critical academic research. Since this seminary expresses common sentiments that are rarely made explicit, it is worth quoting sections of its literature.

The self-introduction of the seminary, titled “General Situation of the Lingdong Buddhist Seminary,” begins as follows:

The Lingdong Buddhist Seminary, under the leadership of the Party and government, under the sponsorship of the Guangdong Provincial Buddhist Association, and under the delegated administrative leadership of the Chaozhou Municipal Religious Affairs Bureau, is a mid-ranking Buddhist seminary of Chinese-language lineage [of Buddhism],\(^{187}\) in which the Buddhist transmission of knowledge and cultivation of monastic virtue are mutually integrated.\(^{188}\)

Here we see a formulaic expression of loyalty to political authorities, and a distinction between two kinds of learning, “knowledge” and “virtue,” a binary set that closely corresponds to the study/practice distinction discussed earlier. Later the text describes general policies and regulations, including the following:

“Integrating study and practice, and making seminary lifestyle like that of a monastery” is the guiding policy of our seminary.\(^{189}\)

\(^{187}\) “Chinese-language lineage” translates汉语系(hanyuxi, lit. “Han-language lineage”).

\(^{188}\)岭东佛学院是在党和政府领导下,由广东省佛教协会主办,委托潮州市宗教事务局行政领导的,以佛教知识传授与僧德培养相结合的汉语系中级佛学院

\(^{189}\) “学修一体化，学院生活丛林化”是我院的办学方针
[Student-monastics] should proactively accommodate the [monastery] permanent residents and participate in the various major Dharma assemblies.\textsuperscript{190}

We can see this seminary, like many others today, still foregrounds the study/practice problem that Zhao Puchu identified decades ago. This introduction also shows that seminarians are expected not only to do their studies, but also participate in the ritual activities of the monastery in which they stay.

The next section, “Special Characteristic of the School,” contains an apologetic countering a demand for academic-style learning. It states that the purpose of the seminary is religious training first and academic training second.\textsuperscript{191} Study focusing on traditional sutras and treatises is necessary lest discontinuities develop between older and younger generations of monastics, and training in “religious rectitude 宗教情操” should be emphasized.

The following passage in this section negotiates between Buddhist virtues and pressures to adopt modern academic methods.

In recent decades… research methods have been influenced by new methods of scholarship from Japan, Europe, and America, and gradually modern academic methods of studies have been emphasized…. But these kind of piecemeal approaches… inevitably create distortions. Monastery-led education of the Sangha should, in the preliminary stage, through the reading and the perfuming\textsuperscript{192} by the traditional major sutras and major treatises, train [seminarians] in [various traditional virtues such as] precepts,

\textsuperscript{190}积极配合常住参与各类重大法会活动

\textsuperscript{191} For discussion of parallel, related anti-intellectualism in contemporary Confucian movements, which are often linked to Buddhist movements, see Billioud and Thoraval 2015, esp. 76-106 and 117-121.

\textsuperscript{192} To be “perfumed” (xunxi) is a technical term from the Consciousness-Only school of Buddhism. It basically signifies that one’s consciousness is transformed through exposure to subtle, often imperceptible influence.
concentration, and wisdom… [and in] a religious aspiration toward the Way [as a monk or nun]… and generation of bodhi mind, walking on the way of the bodhisattvas, and cultivating the compassionate vows of the Mahayana. Then later with these as a basis, transcendent, newer interpretations should be proposed.193

This passage distinguishes between academic Buddhist studies and traditional Buddhist learning. The underlying contention is that monastic Buddhism first needs to re-build its own traditions, not import foreign ones. Only later, when there are numerous well-trained, respected monastics who are both spiritually realized and proficient in traditional scriptural exegesis, will monastics be able to do proper academic research, which will include effectively responding to critical secular research. At this future time, monastics will be able to prove certain academic claims wrong (in some views), or create a higher synthesis that incorporates academic studies and yet still preserves the essentials of the tradition (as implied in the passage above).194

193 近十几年来,佛教学院的发展演变,又进入新的领域,比如说接触到国际佛教的互动,视野更宽广;研究方法也受到日本、欧美等新的治学方法的影响,逐渐注重现代学术方法的学习,并注重方法论与经典语言基础的培养。但这种将经典支支节节、片断割裂地研究,若学习的份量太重,难免造成偏差。寺院主导的僧众教育,在初级阶段,要先透过对传统大经大论的研读薰习,培养戒定慧、慈悲喜舍、宗教的道心、信念与情操,对生死、无常、世间是有漏法,这种深刻痛切的生命砥砺;出离心、解脱道等修行理念;以及发菩提心、行菩萨道、大乘悲愿的长养,然后在此基础上,提出一个更超越、更新的诠释。

194 For one example of the type of discourse this passage argues against, see Ye Qingchun (2014), who argues that Buddhist seminaries should follow Western modes of schooling; that Buddhist saints and teachers should be fully open to criticism; and that in the contemporary globalizing world, traditional Chinese culture such as Buddhism must make these and other transitions to modernity or be marginalized, homogenized, deconstructed, and dissolved. Ye is a professor in the teaching division of ideology and politics at Putian University, Fujian, and his article appeared in the August 2014 issue of Fayin, the flagship journal of the BAC. Traditional Buddhists would probably consider such “modern transitions” as constituting, rather than preventing, the homogenization and deconstruction of Buddhism.
Notice the labeling of modern academic methods as foreign. In communities of discourse concerned with reviving traditional Chinese culture, the goal is often to rediscover native traditions that are unadulterated by Western influences. Such discourse often portrays Western influence as pernicious. Chinese Buddhists frequently frame their efforts to revive Buddhism as one component in the revival of traditional Chinese culture. A related classical phrase for this orientation, which seminary leaders employ and which is engraved on the walls of at least one seminary I visited, is “to take antiquity as a mirror,” i.e., to use the lessons of [Chinese] history to help chart a course for the future. Yet since Buddhism itself ultimately has a foreign origin, Buddhists cannot emphasize their Chineseness to the extent Confucians and Daoists sometimes do. Throughout Chinese history, Buddhism has itself been periodically attacked due to its foreignness.

Chinese Buddhists strongly dislike viewpoints in academic Buddhist studies that are critical of traditional Buddhist understandings. Such critical viewpoints include rejection of the traditionally attributed authorship of important Buddhist scriptures. For

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195 Among Chinese Buddhist, for instance, Taixu assumed there were inherent differences between Western, Chinese, and Indian cultures, and argued that Western culture was harmful and was infecting Chinese and Indian cultures. During World War Two, Taixu even implied that Japan was the unfortunate victim of Western influences (Pittman 2001, 110, 140, 163, and 327 n. 85). The monk Xuecheng (1966-), president of the Buddhist Association of China, continues this kind of discourse. Speaking in November 2015, Xuecheng claims that modern Western culture is characterized by “a worldview and a rationalism in which there is antagonism between self and other, and a value system of [selfish] utilitarianism,” which results in “antagonism between self and other, ethnic strife, and a clash of civilizations.” The solution to such ills, for Xuecheng, can be uncovered by “re-examining tradition” and rediscovering “long-forgotten wisdom” (Xuecheng 2015.12, 4). Unlike Taixu in his later years, Xuecheng refrains from extending such critical analysis to socialism and Communism.
instance, scholars claim that the Śūraṃgama Sutra and Awakening of Mahayana Faith, among others, were composed in China and are hence apocrypha rather than translations of Indian texts. And scholars question whether any Mahayana Buddhist scriptures were spoken by the historical Buddha.\textsuperscript{196} Even the very concept of a “historical” Buddha, if contrasted with some other, perhaps less real Buddha, is contentious. For many Chinese Buddhists, these and other academic claims undermine Chinese Buddhism, and discussing them is taboo. Such issues are discussed in chapter five.

Debates over seminary education have idealistic and pragmatic dimensions. On the one hand, monastics contend over how to transmit Buddhism, which will determine the future of Buddhism as a social reality. On the other hand, Buddhists argue that secularized Buddhist studies, including the kind found in some seminaries, leads monastics to disrobe. We have already seen that monastics are concerned about attracting and retaining monastic recruits. As Zhao Puchu claimed in his famous speech, the wrong kind of education leads seminarians to “leave the religion and disrobe after graduation” (1992, 5). I found monastics are still concerned about this possibility. But does evidence show that schooling causes disrobing?

I am not aware of any study establishing a correlation between monastic education (of any sort) and laicization. Monastics rarely assert in public that education corrupts monastics, although Shengkai writes that monastics educated abroad often do not return to China or do not continue to work in the Buddhist sector (2010, 268). When

\textsuperscript{196} In some ways Western influence merely strengthened and extended pre-existing Asian discourse. For example, Japanese scholars in the Edo period (1603-1868) had already argued that Mahayana Buddhist texts were not spoken by the historical Buddha (Liang Mingxia 2015). But in terms of their social impact, the mere existence of ideas is less relevant than their repeated and institutionalized demonstration, promotion, and dominance. It was through Western influence that such critical ideas gained the powerful imprimatur capable of transforming Buddhist institutions themselves.
questioned explicitly, several people involved in Buddhist education denied such
correlations. A senior seminary instructor in Beijing told me the claim needed further
research to verify. Less educated monks disrobe as well, he said, but they are often not
prominent members of the Sangha. In contrast, he claimed, when monks educated in
seminaries laicize, they attract more attention, and thereby create the wrong impression
that education leads to disrobing.197 Similarly, Zhang Fenglei, a professor at Renmin
University who runs short-term educational programs for monastics, in a magazine
interview denies allegations that modern-style education corrupts monastics.198 Seminary
instructors and directors of programs for monastic education have vested interests to be
skeptical of the potential harm education might have on monasticism. But we also lack
data that shows a correlation between schooling and laicization. Others claim that monks
who spend most of their time performing rituals often disrobe after they earn enough to
start families.199 My impressionistic sense is that seminaries per se are not positively
correlated with disrobing. But neither are they correlated with retaining monastics, and

197 From interviews, fall 2012. In the recent past, many prominent monks who pursued monastic education
abroad disrobed. All five of the Chinese monks Taixu sent to Sri Lanka for studies in 1936 eventually
disrobed, as did the two he sent to Sri Lanka in 1945 (Welch 1968, 62-63). Of the five Chinese monks the
Buddhist Association of China sent to Sri Lanka for studies in 1986 (Jingyin, Guangxing, Yuanci, Xueyu,
and Jianhua), all of whom I have met, two have since disrobed (Xueyu and Jianhua).
198 See Lan Xifeng 2013. In this interview with Zhang, those who oppose academic education are left
anonymous, which I propose indicates that they rarely enunciate arguments publicly, and that their
viewpoints are being delegitimized in this interview. Zhang is also a member of the twelfth Chinese
People’s Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), in which he serves on a committee for ethnic and
religious affairs. This interview was conducted in March 2013, when Zhang was attending the annual
plenary session of the CPPCC (see http://news.xinhuanet.com /2013lh/2013-03/13/c_115015492_2.htm for
an official listing of all seventy-one members of that committee in 2013).
199 For discussion of tensions between ritual practice and seminary education, see Gildow 2014, 86-91.
While I was traveling with him during his lecture tour on monastic education, the monk Jingyin 净因 also
cast doubt on the widely purported connection between seminary education and disrobing (May 2010).
this failure to help retain recruits despite the resources invested in them is still damning in
the eyes of monastic authorities.

I have shown that a central issue in seminary education is the relationship
between study and practice. While there are different understandings of this relationship,
it involves basically two sets of tensions. One tension, between studies *qua* book learning
versus ritual/meditative practices, dates back centuries. The other tension, between
modern academic and traditional religious modes of study, is new. Furthermore,
monastics sometimes unintentionally or strategically misrecognize this second tension for
the old tension between discursive and embodied knowledge. It is this second tension that
today many argue undermines Buddhism and leads people to leave the monastic order.

This academic/religious tension, and the disruptive power of academia, does not
derive from socially unmoored ideas clashing in a stew of collective representations.
Rather, it stems from distinct institutions with different research traditions, which
continue to generate discrepant ideas about Buddhism. Academic Buddhist studies is
socially powerful partly because it largely follows persuasive standards of argumentation
common to other human sciences, and it is integrated with other modern disciplines such
as history, philosophy, and archeology. In addition, the academic study of Buddhism is
not merely an avocation, but is institutionalized with full-time personnel working in
formal organizations such as universities, which are often better positioned to distribute
their ideas than Buddhist organizations are. This academic/religious tension is to some
degree unavoidable because academic Buddhist studies and traditional Buddhist learning
are each embedded in their respective larger institutional networks with distinct logics.
That is, the field of Buddhist studies risks marginalization within universities if it is seen
as too “religious,” and monastic scholars who are seen as too “academic” risk being shunned within the Buddhist community.\textsuperscript{200}

I have already described Buddhist monasteries and seminaries (chapter 2 and 3). To understand how academia and Buddhism influence one another, we must also have a better understanding of the institutional composition of academia. The next section briefly describes the history and institutional settings for academic Buddhist studies in the PRC.

**History and Institutions for the Academic Study of Buddhism in the PRC**

The study/practice problem within Chinese Buddhism has been exacerbated by academic studies of Buddhism. In China as elsewhere over the past century, new kinds of academic experts have extended the scope of their authoritative judgments into more areas of the natural and social worlds. Academic authority expands its territory by creating entirely new niches of study or by subordinating the previously dominant inhabitants of old niches.\textsuperscript{201} This process of subordination has also been occurring in the study of Buddhism. For most of Chinese history and in the PRC prior to the 1980s, Buddhists (particularly monks) published most of the research on Buddhism.\textsuperscript{202} But today, secular universities

\textsuperscript{200} See Foulk (1993) for arguments along this vein for Buddhist studies in the West. Monastics who are shunned for being too academic are discussed in chapter five; also see appendix 3.

\textsuperscript{201} See Shipman and Shipman 2006 for an interpretive overview of the expansion of the authority of university-based knowledge throughout Western societies.

\textsuperscript{202} An overview of the history of Buddhist studies in China during the twentieth century is beyond the scope of this chapter. For studies of research on Buddhism in Republican China, see for example Welch 1968, Scott 2013, Hammerstrom 2010, Aviv 2008, and Makeham 2014. For the early PRC period, see Welch 1972, Hou Kunhong 2012a, and Xue Yu 2015. For the history of the founding of the discipline of religious studies in Republican China, which points to precedents and continuities with later developments in the PRC, see Meyer 2015.
are the dominant institutions for research. Scholars spend their professional lives studying Buddhism, but they are not necessarily Buddhists. Regardless of whether they are pious believers, detached skeptics, or hostile critics, they can remain members in good standing in the community of Buddhologists.

This situation is historically unprecedented in China prior to the twentieth century. Premodern Confucian scholars sometimes studied Buddhism, but not as their primary focus and often at a superficial level, to show Confucian teachings were correct and Buddhist teachings defective. Cheng Yi (1033-1107), one of the most influential Confucians of the past millennium, even warned Confucians not to waste time studying Buddhism, lest they become Buddhists. In contrast, most academic scholars in the PRC were not or are not Buddhists, yet they were or are recognized experts on Buddhism, including founders of Buddhist studies such as Ren Jiyu (1916-2009) and Fang Litian (1933-2014). Thus in China as elsewhere in the modern world as never before, many of those who know the most about Buddhism do not necessarily find its claims convincing.

The Chinese state has played a decisive role in shaping the academic study of religion in general, including Buddhist studies, with shifts in state policies resulting in the institutional founding, elimination, and expansion of such study. During the PRC (1949-) and prior to the Cultural Revolution (CR, 1966-76), secular scholars published research

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203 Worldwide, the intensive, professional study of religions by those who do not adhere to the religion they study is also generally new to the twentieth century. On a related note, Aukland (2016) has recently proposed the term “academization” to describe processes through which religions reformulate themselves in interaction with the secular academy. Similar to the analysis I present here but in the context of modern Jainism, Aukland argues that academization undermines monastic authority.

204 For instance, Cheng Yi states that “the doctrines of Buddhism are not worthy of matching the doctrines of our Sage. One need only compare them and having observed that they are different, leave Buddhism alone. If one tries to investigate all its theories, it is probably an impossible task. Before one has done that, he will already have been transformed into a Buddhist” (Chan 1963, 581).
on Buddhism, most often from a Marxist perspective, in an environment in which leading scholar-bureaucrats argued that academic freedom was no longer desirable and that scholarship should serve political ends. Much of this research was conducted within departments of philosophy, with Peking University’s philosophy department continuing to play a central role as it had during the Republic. This subordination of scholarship to politics paralleled Mao Zedong’s (1893-1976) view that literature and the arts (wenyi 文藝) reflected class consciousness and thus should be led by politics. Quoting Lenin, Mao stated that literature and the arts should serve as “a screw in the whole machine” (McDougall 1980, 75) of the proletarian revolutionary cause.205

Mao was instrumental in reviving the study of Buddhism in secular institutions. On 30 December 1963, he released “Enhance Research on Religious Questions 加强宗教问题的研究,” a memorandum which decried the dearth of Chinese research on the “world’s three great religions 世界三大宗教” (Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism). Such research was important, Mao wrote, because these religions were influential and because “without critiquing theology, the history of philosophy cannot be written, and the history of literature or of the world cannot be written 不批评神学就不能写好哲学史，也不能写好文学史或世界史” (quoted in Li Shen 2014, 5). He also judged the quality of the BAC’s journal Modern Buddhist Learning 现代佛学 to be low; this was apparently the only journal on religion that came to his mind. Mao’s memorandum mentioned only one

205 See McDougall (1980) for translations and analysis of Mao’s Yan’an Talks of 1942, in which Mao outlines his most influential views on culture policy. The Yan’an Talks widely distributed in 1943, 1953, and 1966, were cited as an authoritative source for culture policy throughout the CR.
person, Ren Jiyu任继愈 (1916-2009), a professor of philosophy at Peking University, as someone who studied religion from the proper perspective of historical materialism.206

The following year (1964), the journal *Modern Buddhist Learning* was terminated and a formal institution dedicated to studying religion was founded, headed by Ren Jiyu.207 This was the Institute of World Religions 世界宗教学院, established within the Academic Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences 哲学社会科学学部 of the Chinese Academy of Science 中国科学院. This institute included the Office for Research on Buddhism 佛教研究室. Like Ren Jiyu, many affiliated researchers came from Peking University, where the institute was located during its first year (Li Shen 2014, 7).

Chinese scholarship on Buddhism during the early to mid-1960s was dominated by a Marxist-Leninist framework. Kenneth Ch’en (1965) provides an overview of such scholarship that focuses on Ren Jiyu’s work in the early 1960s.208 Ren argues that Buddhism is false because it promotes idealism rather than historical materialism, and that in Chinese history, Buddhism has usually been a tool of the ruling class to oppress the lower classes. Hou Kunhong (2012, 161-190) has a more recent overview of Chinese scholarship of Buddhism during the 1960s which focuses on the writings of Fan Wenlan (1893-1969), a powerful Marxist historian whose 1965 book *Tang Buddhism* foreshadowed the suppression of Buddhism during the cultural revolution. Fan also

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206 Li Shen 2014 is an overview of Ren Jiyu’s career, whose emphasis is clear from its title: “Ren Jiyu: Pioneer and Founder of Chinese Marxist Religious Studies 任继愈—中国马克思主义宗教学的开创者和奠基人.”

207 Mao’s unfavorable appraisal of this journal probably contributed to the decision to terminate it, a point Welch does not mention (1972, 355).

208 On Ren Jiyu’s scholarship, also see Bush 1970, 329-333.
argued that Buddhism was false because it was a form of idealism and pernicious because it served the interests of the ruling class, but he further argued that Buddhism would not die off on its own accord and so needed to be forcibly extirpated.\textsuperscript{209} In short, Ch’en and Hou argue that scholarship in the 1960s was often sloppily done within an orthodox Marxist framework. Yet He Jianmin (2013) argues that Hou’s portrayal of Buddhist scholarship in the Maoist era is one-sided, and ignores the careful, enduring contributions to scholarship on Buddhism produced by people such as Lü Cheng during that period, who like Ren and Fan was affiliated with the Chinese Academy of Sciences. On the other hand, He states that “how it was that in that kind of era Mr. Lü was able to succeed in ‘alone being sober while everyone else was drunk’ [with Marxism-Leninism] is a question quite worthy of investigation” (2013, 230). That is, even in his critique of Hou, He implicitly concedes that Chinese scholarship in the 1960s was almost totally dominated by a Marxist framework.

The World Religions institute became inactive during much of the Cultural Revolution (CR) period (1966-76), and its facilities saw more use as dormitories for Red Guards than as centers of research. Virtually no research on Buddhism was published during the CR.\textsuperscript{210}

After the Cultural Revolution, institutions for the academic study of religion revived and proliferated in step with the Buddhist institutions and state regulatory organs.

\textsuperscript{209} On other scholars of Buddhism during the Maoist era, including Fan Wenlan’s scholarship, also see Welch (1972, 351-360). Unlike other scholars discussed here, Fan was not primarily a scholar of Buddhism.

\textsuperscript{210} Wang Leiquan calculated the number of academic articles in China written on Buddhism each year. He found that not a single article was published from 1967 to 1974 (Wei Daoru 2011, 241).
The philosophy/social science division of the Chinese Academy of Science was separated from the Chinese Academy of Science to form the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) in 1977, and the Institute of World Religions was established as one of the original thirteen institutes of CASS.\textsuperscript{211} Ren Jiyu was re-appointed director of the World Religions institute, a position he held until 1985.\textsuperscript{212} Other religious studies institutions were founded within several years. In 1979 the Chinese Religious Studies Association 中國宗教學會, dominated by members of the CASS Institute of World Religions, was established, and in 1980 the first national academic conference on Buddhism, attended by thirty-two participants, was held in Xi’an.\textsuperscript{213} The revival of religious studies was thus concomitant with the state-sanctioned revival of religion and the revival of the state organs to control religion, and was propelled by popular reactions against, and the Party’s calibrated responses to, the policies of the Cultural Revolution.

The scale of the post-CR growth in religious studies programs has been comparable to the growth in the number of Buddhist seminaries. As of 2016, there are several dozen professional and academic institutions for the study of religion, including research centers within universities. Academic conferences, journals, and international exchange have also proliferated. But research centers are not limited to academic institutions, and have also been established by administrative state and religious organizations. According to Wei (2011) and Hua (2008), institutes for research on

\footnote{See Zha 2013, 177-181.}

\footnote{On the institutional history of CASS through the 1970s, see Sleeboom-Faulkner 2006, 33-53.}

\footnote{See Wei Daoru 2011 and Hua Fangtian 2008 for overviews of these institutional developments and related research, and Jin Ze 2008 for a thematic overview of religious studies research.}
religion in general or Buddhism in particular have been established in four kinds of institutions:

1. CASS and provincial-level academies of social science
2. Higher education institutes, mainly (and now exclusively) universities
3. State organs for the management of religion, including religious affairs agencies, the United Front Department, the State Administration of Cultural Heritage 文物局 in the Ministry of Culture 文化部, and Tibetan affairs agencies
4. Buddhist-run research institutions under the Buddhist Association of China or various regional Buddhist Associations

Universities have come to dominate research on Buddhism and represent the academic domain, as opposed to institutions that are closer to the state domain (category 3 above, and to a lesser extent category 1) or the Buddhist domain (category 4 above). CASS still plays an important role in publishing two of the top journals for research in religious studies, and in compiling semi-yearly collections of recent research as well as analysis of trends in religions. Some university-based research on Buddhism is conducted in institutions not specifically dedicated to the study of religion, in departments such as history, philosophy, ethnology, Dunhuang studies, and South Asian studies. But on the whole, the most common interface between contemporary Buddhists and academia occurs with institutions for the study of religion.²¹⁴

²¹⁴ This is reflected in the composition of the editorial board of the journal *Buddhist Studies Research* 佛学研究, which is probably the most influential academic journal concerned exclusively with Buddhist studies (see Lai and Yinchun [2008, 37] for quantitative data that supports this claim). The editorial board of this journal, published by the research division of the BAC, is comprised of monks, academics, and two monk-academics, with the academics mainly affiliated with religious studies programs. See appendix 1 for details.
To summarize the data on institutions comprising academic religious and Buddhist studies in China: there are roughly three dozen university research centers or social science academies for the study of religion, with Buddhism the most common religion for study at such institutes. In addition, dozens of other universities or research centers include at least one faculty member who publishes research on Buddhism. Programs for graduate student education in Buddhism are more common than those for undergraduates. Yet despite this prodigious growth the field of religious studies is small and weak compared with many other academic fields. For instance, there are no fully independent degree-granting religious studies departments in China; all are in some manner combined with or institutionally subordinated to a philosophy department or division. For data on religious studies and Buddhist studies programs in China and the structural position of religious studies within Chinese higher education, see the appendixes 8 and 12, respectively.

The thirty-some academic institutes in which Buddhism is studied are thus roughly comparable in number to the fifty or so Buddhist seminaries for monastics (chapter 2). But the quantity of research produced by academics dwarfs that produced by the Buddhist seminaries, which as we have seen focus on teaching Buddhist doctrine to monastics. In addition, academic research is published in journals available throughout China, sometimes through Qinghua University’s online China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) database. In contrast, most publications in which monastics publish are registered for internal publication (neibu faxing 内部发行), and so they cannot be sold in regular bookstores. Of some sixty Buddhist magazines printed in China today, only two have licenses from the General Administration of Press and Publishing.
Partly reflecting this situation, during my fieldwork I both observed and interviewed monastics who complained that in public discussions of Buddhism, monastics lack the “right to speak” or “discursive authority.” Even popular Buddhist news websites include short pieces by scholars and also serve as sites for the distribution of state press releases.

In summary, there is tension inherent between academia and the sangha simply because both claim to speak with authority about Buddhism—a tension exacerbated by the fact that what they say and why they say it tend to differ. And the state generally views Marxists or professional scholars as more trustworthy guides for managing Buddhism. This remains true even though confidence in Marxist views of culture and

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215 This is according to Huang Xianian, a senior scholar at the CASS Institute of World Religions, who has probably edited more collections of modern Chinese Buddhist texts than anyone (interview, fall 2012). These two are the magazines Fayin (http://www.fayin.org/fayinzazhi/) and Buddhist Culture (http://www.fjwhzz.com.cn/about.aspx). Both are published by divisions of the BAC, and sometimes include articles of a more academic nature. Wei (2011, 239) writes that there are or have been around sixty or seventy journals or magazines on Buddhism in the PRC and lists forty-six of them. Ji Zhe, a Chinese scholar based in Paris, compiled in 2010 and has shared with me a list of the titles of 138 Buddhist periodicals published at one time or another in the Reform era (1978-). Ji’s list includes newsletters in addition to journals and magazines.

216 Prominent Buddhist media websites include the following: Buddhism for Cultural Chinese (http://fo.ifeng.com/), Buddhism Online (http://www.fjnet.com/), Bodhisattva Online (http://www.pusa123.com/), and Network for Chinese Buddhist Culture (http://wh.zgfj.cn/). The former executive editor of one of these websites told me only 10% of their news stories were written by their own journalists, whereas other stories were largely press releases from Buddhist and state organizations. Such websites are monitored: I also heard accounts of one website being promptly notified, fined, and censored for violating state policies.
religion has weakened. The state and some scholars often portray Buddhism as a cultural resource with both valuable “positive elements” to be “excavated” and yet also contaminated by “negative elements” to be discouraged or discarded. Between the lines of such discourse is the assumption that monastics are part of Buddhism in much the same way monasteries are, as passive cultural resources, to be developed for national heritage, economic development, social stability, and diplomatic initiatives.

Thus with state support, secular academics produce much more research on Buddhism than monastics do, and the research they produce is better distributed through mainstream channels more readily accessible to the broader academic world and to religious affairs agencies. On the other hand monastics communicate among themselves and with other Buddhists through word of mouth, limited distribution publications, websites, and blogs, where for many Buddhists, monastic leaders retain much of their authority to define Buddhism.

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217 In 1982 the Party disavowed Mao’s doctrine that literature and the arts are subordinate to politics but reaffirmed Mao’s basic views as the guiding ideology for culture (Mackerras 1983, 171). Then in 1983, Deng Xiaoping and conservative Party leaders decisively rejected theories that some culture was a manifestation of a “universal humanism” and transcended class ideology. Instead, Party elders labeled such theories with the pejorative terms “abstract humanism” and “bourgeois liberalism” (Wang Jing 1996; Baum 1994, 57, 156-161), and the Party has continued till the present (2016) to vociferously reject similar concepts, notably the notion of “universal values.” The current Communist orthodoxy on religion in training manuals for state employees is still that religion will eventually disappear in the wake of educational and economic development, but that this process will take a long time and should occur naturally, because administrative measures to extirpate religion are counter-productive.
We now turn to consider the research and social position of the Buddhist studies academic community in China today, and interactions between academia and Buddhist institutions.

**Interactions between Academic and Buddhist Sectors**

Within Buddhist communities, monastics more often than not retain the authority to define Buddhism. But in other sectors of society such as state, educational, and media institutions, secular scholars of Buddhism have greater authority than monastics. While academia and other secular institutions are ultimately more powerful than Buddhist ones, there is still significant bidirectional influence between the scholars who study religion and the religion they study.

In China today religious studies is a powerful set of institutions with the ears of the state, or an obscure field in the increasingly marginalized humanities. Religious studies is also religion’s greatest ally or its most dangerous foe. The truth lies somewhere between these characterizations.

Focusing on the study of Buddhism, this section clarifies the social position of religious studies and its relationship to religions. Academic religious studies, of which Buddhist studies is a part, has helped de-stigmatize religion and promotes its value in the eyes of the state, even as it arrogates the right to speak for and judge religion. Yet because religious studies is weak relative to other academic fields, its ability to lobby for liberalized religious policies is limited and it is susceptible to influence from religious organizations. Furthermore, many scholars are sympathetic to the religions they study.
and some are even believers. Thus the sources of funding and recruitment in religious studies cause research on a religion to be shaped by the religion studied.218

In general, scholars stand midway between government officials and Buddhists in their evaluation of Buddhism. They evaluate Buddhism more positively than the state does, but more critically than Buddhists do (also see Goossaert and Palmer 2011, 321). The status of such scholars is tied to both the humanities and social sciences and also to the objects of their study, religion and Buddhism. Scholars were instrumental in pushing to have the “opium thesis”—the idea that religion is merely an opiate for the masses suffering under class society—reinterpreted or displaced, an effort that has succeeded within academia and partially succeeded within state circles. In its place, scholars have proposed that religion be studied as culture (wenhua 文化), a term that, like its English correlate, has positive connotations of cultured learning and valued tradition, as well as neutral connotations of systems of symbols and behaviors (Yang Fenggang 2012, 49-64).

Scholars have won significant but partial victories in their efforts to redefine religion as culture rather than as false ideology. By their own accounts, they have thereby contributed to more lenient state policies toward religion, which may also stem from the reportedly increasing number of state officials in the religious affairs system who are

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218 The very process of studying a religion can also shape the way scholars think, which in turn will influence how they analyze the religion. Francisca Cho (2004), for example, argues that her studies of Buddhist philosophy have led her to pay more attention to how language constructs the objects it purports to represent. Then again, Cho’s interest in critical theory, not to mention broader critiques of representational theories of language prevalent in the Western academy, may have influenced her focus and interpretation of Buddhism. Ultimately it can be difficult to establish directions and degrees of influence.
graduates of religious studies programs. But the fact that scholars continue efforts to have religion recognized as culture points to their only limited success.\textsuperscript{219}

Whereas academic religious studies contributes to milder state policies toward religion in post-Mao China, it also challenges religious beliefs. I will cite the important work \textit{General History of the Chinese Chan School} 中国禅宗通史 (1993) to illustrate this point.\textsuperscript{220} The \textit{General History} was co-authored by Du Jiwen, former director of the CASS Institute of World Religions, and Wei Daoru, the director of that institute’s Office for Research on Buddhism when I was based there in 2012 and 2013.

This book exemplifies how academia strives to produce new knowledge rather than to preserve traditional Buddhist narratives. In his self-assessment of the book, Wei states that the impetus for writing it was to demystify how Chan is represented. The book argues that Chan Buddhist approaches to its own history are narrow and that its historical narratives are frequently false.\textsuperscript{221} It implies that for an accurate representation of Chan history, academic historians rather than Chan lineage members are authorities today. For instance, the introduction states that the book intends

\textsuperscript{219} For example, Fang Litian (1933-2014) reported emphasizing that religion is culture at a meeting with senior officials, including Premier Wen Jiabao, in 2008, but claimed that the “opium thesis” remains influential (Liu Yuping 2014).

\textsuperscript{220} I take this book as representative of important trends in Chinese Buddhist studies for two reasons. One, several overviews of research agree that in terms of approaches, the strength of Buddhist studies in China is historical studies, and that the best research has been done on the Chan school. Second, an impact study based on Chinese Social Science Citation Index data states the \textit{General History} was the most cited Chinese book in Chan studies from 2000 to 2007 (Ma and Wang 2009, 96).

\textsuperscript{221} For analysis contrasting the historical narratives in traditional Chan and in modern academia, see Maraldo 1985 and Wright 2007.
to pull back the curtain that the Chan school has fabricated for itself, and to clarify some truths. One such truth is that we absolutely must not let our investigative vision be limited by the lineage framework that the Chan school has delimited for itself.

The introduction continues with dismissive remarks about the Chan school’s approach to its own history (also see the first epigraph in this chapter). The book exemplifies how Chinese scholarship, like the Japanese and Western scholarship with which it forms an increasingly integrated network, highlights its contributions to the production of knowledge by contrasting its new claims with traditional Buddhist beliefs. The book also reveals how Chinese scholarship, even after Marxist frameworks and rhetoric have receded, can still be grating for Buddhists.

Academic Buddhist studies gains social prestige and power owing to its institutionalization in universities and think tanks such as CASS, and yet its social influence should not be overstated. Despite growth in religious studies programs (see appendix 12), relative to many other fields it has grown smaller. It is hard to overstate the explosive growth of the Chinese higher education system, especially since 1998. A few statistics will suffice. Total enrollment in higher education doubled between 1998 and

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222 Ji and Feng (2011, 119-120) argue that Chinese Buddhology is increasingly influenced by Western and Japanese Buddhology.

223 I am not arguing that all scholars of Buddhism in China produce research that is critical of traditional Buddhism, only that critical research is central to academia (more on this point in chapter 5). Some senior I academics even complain of “apologetic scholars” who steer conference discussions away from sensitive topics and who, in the words of one frustrated scholar, “make it so we can’t discuss matters.” Other academics told me about the research topics they avoided pursuing and the data they avoided publishing out of religious considerations.
2004, and in terms of absolute enrollment, it is now the largest higher education system of any country (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011). Merely the total growth in enrollments in Chinese higher education institutions from 2002 to 2009 was about equal to total US higher education enrollment in 2009 (British Council 2012, 15; National Center for Education Statistics 2013). By 2008, China was annually producing more doctoral graduates than the US, and had about 29 million students enrolled in higher education, including 23.3% of the age 18-22 cohort (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011, 27, 468). Most growth in Chinese higher education has been in natural science and professional programs such as business, engineering, and medicine, which (along with law) tend to be the most prestigious programs. At the Chinese universities surveyed in a recent book, total enrollments in the humanities, of which religious studies is a part, have grown at a moderate pace and comprise a smaller percentage of total enrollments than they did prior to the rapid higher education expansion of 1998-2005 (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011). Evidence even suggests that the traditional core of Peking University, including the humanities departments of history, Chinese literature, and philosophy (including religious studies), is being preserved as a historical legacy and is being literally ghettoized:

In a sense one can see a core tension in the decision to protect and further sequester the classical low rise buildings that form the heart of the campus, on the one hand, while developing whole new campus areas that connect to public transport and have high rise buildings for new professional programs, on the other hand. While the aura of mystery and distance emanating from the Unnamed Lake and the surrounding architecture in Royal Palace style is maintained and enhanced, the periphery of the campus is more firmly connected to the main arteries of the city and the dynamic changes that have overtaken it (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011, 129-130).
The prestige of researchers in scientific and technical fields is also generally higher than that of social science or humanities scholars. One concrete manifestation of this fact is that the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) and the Chinese Academy of Engineering (CAE) have had prestigious honorific societies of academicians (yuanshi 院士) since the mid-1990s, yet no equivalent honorific society has been established through the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.\textsuperscript{224} As of 2016, there were over a thousand academicians total in the CAS and CAE, each with life-long membership and a generous stipend.

Religious studies in China is also weak structurally, in ways that numbers of enrollments or departments do not capture. For example, religious studies is classified as a controlled discipline, whose departments and number of students are strictly regulated by the Ministry of Education (see appendix 8). A recent newspaper article notes that majoring in philosophy (which includes religious studies) is unpopular and many undergraduate students agree to major in it only because otherwise they would be denied enrollment in their preferred university. This decision, also used to boost enrollments in other unpopular majors, is euphemistically called “complying with adjustments服从调剂” (Hong and Fang 2014). And while Peking University’s philosophy department is ranked the highest in China, today philosophy and Peking University’s other traditionally strong humanities departments struggle to attract good students (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011, 125). Likewise, Fang Litian commented on difficulties recruiting undergraduate students to religious studies at Renmin University (Hong and Fang 2014), and he opined that “there is still a long way to go before an atmosphere of respect for religion will take shape throughout society在全社会形成尊重宗教的氛围还有很长的路要走” (Liu

\textsuperscript{224} Cao (2004) analyzes these honorific societies in detail.
2014). Fang’s latter statement, spoken in the context of recruitment difficulties, points to a bond tying religion and religious studies together: their social relevance partly rises and falls in unison.

He Guanghu, a senior scholar of religion at Renmin University, agrees with several of the above assessments of religious studies in China. He writes that on the one hand religious studies influences society through its publications, and mentions academia’s relative strength in research compared to monastic institutions. On the other hand, as an academic field, he writes that religious studies suffers from various problems, including a lack of financial resources and young researchers. He concludes that “the prospects for the further growth of religious studies in China would seem to be quite poor” (He, Chung, and Lee 2008, 174).

In short, while the growth of academic Buddhology has been rapid relative to the pre-Reform period, compared with many other disciplines its recent growth is moderate and its position weak. At the same time, new Buddhist institutions are relatively wealthy but have lower intellectual prestige. This situation encourages academic institutions that research Buddhism to seek financial support from Buddhist institutions, who in turn can gain respect and strategic connections with state officials through their association with scholars.

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Today funding from Buddhist institutions facilitates research and academic exchange, but the question of whether it also leads to conflicts of interest has rarely been openly

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225 Ruanshi (2008, 161-65) also describes the strength of secular research institutions and the weakness of the Sangha in terms of the impact of the research they produce.
broached. In China, common types of funding include academic book series and conferences. Sponsoring academic conferences—with room, board, and honoraria for each presenter—is especially common. I myself gave a presentation at a conference in China, for which the round-trip airfare plus room and board for dozens of participants were covered by the sponsoring Buddhist organization, and with presenters receiving generous honoraria. Sometimes such conferences are integrated into Buddhist rituals held at a monastery, with the conference scheduled as one component of a Dharma assembly.

Less common but maybe more significant is Buddhist funding for academic programs located within universities, including research centers and lecture series. Sometimes the funds are given directly by the Buddhist groups, and sometimes the Buddhist group directs wealthy donors to donate directly to the academic organization, which involves less red tape than donating to a PRC religious organization if the donor is a “person from abroad.” Buddhist seminaries also hire academics to give guest lectures, to serve as regular instructors, and to serve as academic advisors for graduate-level

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226 Harrison (2003), in his capacity as president of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, does discuss relations between Buddhology and the Buddhist sangha, and briefly touches on financial matters.

227 Xuan Fang (2008), a professor at Renmin University, writes about academic conferences sponsored by Buddhist organizations. He claims that the frequency and generous honoraria of such conferences causes the conferences to drive much academic research, and that they “have produced significant corrosion in the academic community” (574 n. 1).

228 On Dharma assemblies in contemporary China, see Gildow 2014.

229 “Persons from abroad” refers to foreigners, to PRC citizens of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau, and to citizens of Taiwan, a de facto sovereign state the PRC seeks to annex.
students. However, PRC Buddhist organizations do not endow professorships in universities, nor do they establish Buddhist universities and colleges.230

The monk Jinghui (1933-2013), founder of a seminary in Hebei, is a prominent Buddhist who has been a generous donor to Buddhist studies in the PRC, sponsoring numerous conferences, academic book publications, and a lecture series at Peking University.231 In 2014, following Jinghui’s premortem plans, the Wuhan University Huangmei Chan Culture and Jingchu Buddhist Learning Research Center were formally established within Wuhan University’s School of Chinese Classics (Huang Jiahui 2013).232

What are the effects of Buddhist funding on academic Buddhist studies? While I lack verified, public evidence that Buddhist funders of Buddhist studies in China dictate the contents of the research they fund, the circumstantial evidence above suggests a degree of such influence exists. With resources now coming from Buddhist organizations,

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230 A wealthy Buddhist layperson, who has played a crucial role in establishing Buddhist websites in the PRC, told me Buddhists in China now had sufficient resources to start a Buddhist university. He then complained that this would be impossible under current state policies (summer 2010). For a dissertation on the historical and legal difficulties on establishing Buddhist universities in China, see Shi Naiyu 2008.

231 The Xuyun Lecture Series 虚云讲座 at Peking University is sponsored by a Buddhist organization in Hebei Province, the Hebei Chan Studies Research Institute 河北禅学研究所, which was founded by Jinghui (see http://www.phil.pku.edu.cn/news.php?newid=30000002263; accessed 30 Dec. 2014).

232 Also see the Wuhan University webpage on the formal establishment in 2014 (http://guoxue.whu.edu.cn/index.php/news/show/id/248). Jingchu is a combination of what were originally two names, Jing and Chu, which both referred to a single, ancient state that collapsed in the year 223 BCE. The area comprising the modern province of Hubei, which contains Wuhan, was once mainly Chu/Jing territory. Two Wuhan University informants told me (personal communication, 2013) that a businessman from Hong Kong wanted to make a donation directly to Jinghui, but that as a person from abroad it was difficult for him to donate to a PRC religious organization. Jinghui then directed him to make the donation in Jinghui’s name to Wuhan University to establish a Buddhist studies research center.
some of which have strong opinions about academic topics, academic programs may
censor themselves or adjust their research projects to increase the possibility of donations
from the Buddhist sector. In the case of Jinghui, for example, I have no evidence that
he has dictated approaches to study within the university research center he helped found.
But Jinghui made remarks at Wuhan University advocating uniquely Chinese approaches
to scholarship, which among advocates of reviving traditional culture can be a coded way
of discounting the value of “Western” (i.e., critical) scholarship. And I discovered that
Jinghui was strongly opposed to raising sensitive issues in seminary education that have
long been central to academic studies, such as the authorship of the Treatise on the
Arising of Mahayana Faith and the origins of Mahayana Buddhism (see chapter five and
appendix 3).

Another prominent monk who has funded academic endeavors is Xingyun (1927-),
founder of the Taiwan-based organization Buddha’s Light Mountain (foguangshan 佛光
山). Xingyun and his organization may be the most important donor for Buddhist studies
programs in the Chinese world. His organization has founded four universities (two in
Taiwan, one in the US, and one in Australia), and has made donations to various
academic institutions in China, notably to Buddhist studies research centers in Nanjing
and Hong Kong, as well as to the Qixia Monastery (Jiangsu Province), the site of an

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233 A senior Chinese scholar based in Shanghai told me (spring 2012) that scholars in the Shanghai area are
loath to publish anything displeasing to local Buddhist organizations, since many academic conferences in
the area are funded by these organizations.

234 A former philosophy PhD student at Wuhan University recounted Jinghui’s claims “that Chinese culture
cannot rely on Western science and reason, that Chinese culture has its own special characteristics, and its
own road [to travel]中国文化不能靠西方的科学与理性，中国文化有自己的特色，有自己的路”
(Huang Jiahui 2013, 96).

235 For a study of Xingyun and the organization he founded, see Chandler 2004.

126
important Buddhist seminary.\textsuperscript{236} I am not aware of public controversies over Xingyun’s influence on academia in the PRC, but a Taiwanese scholar has made allegations of religious intrusion into academic freedom within Buddha Light Mountain’s main university, Fuguang University (in Ilan, Taiwan).\textsuperscript{237} This scholar, Gong Pengcheng (1956-), is the former president of Fuguang University. Gong was pressured to resign in 2003 after he wrote several essays, delivered a keynote speech, and sponsored cultural events that provoked the religious sentiments of students, devotees, and donors. After Gong resigned, numerous Taiwanese public figures wrote in his support, including the minister of education, the director of the Ministry of Education’s Department of Higher Education, and scholars and journalists (Gong 2004, 212-315). Ostensibly at stake was the question of the degree to which religious organizations sponsoring universities may impose their religious beliefs on administrators and faculty.\textsuperscript{238}

\textsuperscript{236} See appendix 12 for a note on the research center in Nanjing, which credits Xingyun specifically, rather than the broader Buddha’s Light Mountain organization, with providing funding. The center in Hong Kong is the Centre for the Study of Humanistic Buddhism at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. According to the center’s website, one of its three areas of research is “Humanistic Buddhism in the Mode of Xingyun 星雲模式人間佛教,” and one of its three research projects is “The History of Humanistic Buddhism: From the Buddha to Xingyun 人間佛教史：從佛陀到星雲” (http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/arts/cshb/research.html, accessed 1 January 2014).

\textsuperscript{237} On Taiwanese television talk shows, the scholar Jiang Canteng has mentioned cases of Xingyun’s influence upon PRC Buddhist studies, including on individual scholars (who have been paid by Xingyun’s organization Fuguangshan to translate scriptures into modern Chinese) and on academic programs (includes those at Renmin University, Peking University, Nanjing University, and Chinese University of Hong Kong).

\textsuperscript{238} Gong might have been testing boundaries: as president of a university founded, controlled, and supported by Buddhists, he must have realized the sensitivity of having a goat slaughtered on campus (for a Mongolian cultural event) and giving a keynote speech challenging monastic norms of celibacy. See Tsai (2011, 131-37) for an overview of this incident.
Jinghui and Xingyun are or were among the most influential Buddhist monastics in the world, including for their funding of Buddhist studies. Yet less prominent figures are able to provide more concrete evidence of pressure to block or re-frame academic views and practices. When clashes of opinion occur such as in the cases described below, I suggest that the scholars come away thinking the monastics are willfully ignorant, and the monastics think the scholars are disrespectful if not hostile.

The observations of the professor Chen Jian 陈坚, who teaches in the philosophy department at Shandong University, demonstrate religious, state, and commercial pressures on Buddhist studies.239 In an article titled “Apologetic Studies or Religious Studies?” (2008), Chen reviews what he claims are prominent tensions between the practice and academic study of Buddhism in China, including the comment by Buddhist seminary rector Jiqun 济群 that many Buddhists who pursue secular scholarship “gain an academic degree but lose their fruits of practice 得了学位丢了果位.” In the cases of friction Chen mentions, Buddhists apparently gain leverage over scholars due to their financial resources, for example their ability to offer subventions for publications, to generate tourist-related income, or to pay wages.

For instance, Chen alleges that scholars of Buddhism and other religions are frequently warned not to harm the religious sentiments of believers in their research. While writing for a Buddhist studies book series, he was warned not to mention the issue of apocryphal scriptures, because in the eyes of Chinese Buddhists, all scriptures

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239 Chen’s profile online indicates he directs the Center for Buddhist Studies at Shandong University and teaches Tiantai Buddhism at the Zhanshan Buddhist Seminary (in Shandong). See http://www.sps.sdu.edu.cn/sps70/team/member/cj.htm (23 March 2016). I also spoke with Chen Jian in his office in September 2012.
translated into Chinese are genuine.240 On another occasion, in 2008, he was invited to a
meeting to investigate the authenticity of a certain Buddhist relic, yet after arriving he
was told not to judge it as fake, even if there were sufficient evidence, because that would
hurt the feelings of pious Buddhists.241 Finally, he recalls that after teaching classes in a
Buddhist seminary, the seminarians complained to the dean of teaching affairs, saying
that Chen had harmed their religious sentiments by referring to Buddhist saints directly,
without titles: namely as “Huineng” and “Zhiyi” rather than as “Great Master Huineng”
and “Great Master Zhiyi.” Following the demands of the seminary’s dean of teaching
affairs, Chen agreed to refer to such saints with their honorific titles, and he also agreed
not to teach about a certain Tiantai school of thought on the “inherent nature of evil 性惡”
since Buddhism is supposed to be all about goodness.242

240 For historical analysis of spurious or apocryphal scriptures in Chinese Buddhism, see Buswell 1990. The
book series Chen mentions might be the Juequn fo xue boshi wenku 觉群佛学博士文库, which is funded
by the Shanghai Buddhist Association. Chen Jian and other scholars at mainstream universities have
published in this series, whose publisher is the Religious Culture Press 宗教文化出版社, an organ of the
State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA). Thus this book series is an instantiation of the
interaction between three institutional sectors, religion, state, and academia. Another scholar who published
with the Religious Culture Press told me he was forced to remove the offensive references a nineteenth-
century Christian missionary made about Muslims, lest such scholarship disturb the religious sentiments of
contemporary Muslims. Other publishers in China allegedly submit their book manuscripts on religion to
the SARA for inspection. So such censorship is not unique to the Religious Culture Press, which reportedly
allows for the fastest time to publication, owing to its expedited, in-house censorship abilities.
241 The relic Chen refers to is probably the alleged relic of the Buddha’s ʋusna 佛顶舍利, a unique
biological feature on the crown of a Buddha’s head, which was discovered in Nanjing in 2008. Should this
or other relics be judged inauthentic, state and monastic officials would experience a downturn in income
from related pilgrimage and tourism. I saw this relic on display in Nanjing during summer 2010. If I were
unaware that Buddhist relics in China are known to change their appearances based on the spiritual level of
the observer—something like a spiritual inkblot test—I would say this sacred relic resembled a chunk of
pumice.
242 For philosophical analysis of this and related Tiantai doctrines, see Chen Jian 2007 and Ziporyn 2000.
Chen’s accounts illustrate that academics and traditional Buddhists often have different norms regarding how Buddhism should be studied. These distinct norms, discussed in the next chapter, distinguish the academic from the Buddhist sector.

**Conclusion**

This chapter argues that a fundamentally new element has been added to the matrix of social factors shaping the historical development of Buddhism, namely the rise of formal institutions for the secular study of Buddhism. In China, roughly concomitant with the rise of this new academic institution has been the rise of a new Buddhist institution, the seminary. The proliferation of both of these kinds of institutions is ultimately connected to broader social changes, including the spread of literacy and public schooling. Without a highly literate, schooled population, Chinese society would be unable to devote so many resources to research on Buddhism.

Monastic Buddhist and secular academic institutions are intimately connected to one another and yet retain distinct traditions and goals. Buddhist seminaries in particular interact with scholars from academic centers for Buddhist studies. To a large extent relations between seminaries and academia are mutually beneficial. But as we have seen, these two domains also have frictions, the resolution of which involves extra-theoretical considerations. In general, programs in academic Buddhist studies have stronger connections to the state whereas Buddhist institutions have stronger financial resources.

This chapter also shows how Buddhist institutions shape or could shape academic research and discourse on Buddhism. In short, the superior financial resources of Buddhist institutions provide them with the leverage to potentially influence academic scholarship. Yet there are limits to this potential influence, not only from academic
tradition and state regulation, but even from monastic self-interest. If Buddhist studies programs were to accommodate monastic sensibilities too much, Buddhist studies would lose credibility in the eyes of the state and other academic disciplines. Since monastic institutions fund Buddhist studies programs partly to gain prestige, too much accommodation on the part of academia would ultimately undermine such goals.

The following chapter focuses on the influence in the other direction, that of academia on contemporary monastic Buddhism, particularly as mediated through seminaries. I will argue that academic Buddhist studies, through its distinct claims and modes of assessing evidence, places pressure on traditional, monastic Buddhist learning. Ultimately, I argue, proponents of traditional Buddhist learning are left with two basic choices: marginalization through retreat from the intellectual mainstream, or partial subordination under academia and the state as components of cultural heritage.
Chapter 5: Buddhist Responses to Skeptical Inquiry

*Scientific methods can only corroborate the Buddhist doctrine; they can never advance beyond it.*\(^{243}\)
—Taixu 太虛 (1890-1947), Chinese monk and promoter of seminary education

*The Buddha has already realized thoroughly the truths of the universe and human life and has described these truths in detail in Buddhist scriptures.*\(^{244}\)
—Xuecheng 學誠 (1966-), monk and president (2015-), Buddhist Association of China

*Our condition arises from the simultaneous collapse and the unprecedented growth of knowledge… as we discovered that we knew so much less than we had previously supposed, we also found that we knew much more… The miraculous growth of knowledge… is notoriously… a threat and a mystery. How does it really work, what is its price, morally, conceptually, ecologically? … To understand this change and its implications is the real problem.*\(^{245}\)
—Ernest Gellner (1925-1995), Czech-British philosopher

Over the past century in China, Buddhist seminaries have become integral to monasticism. We have seen that the number of seminaries has grown dramatically since the Cultural Revolution (chapter 2) and that their roles within Chinese monasticism have expanded relative to traditional institutions (chapter 3). I have argued that seminaries shape Chinese Buddhism, and are themselves shaped by the state (chapter 3) and academia (chapter 4), and that academia both influences and is influenced by the religions it studies. In China, seminaries are windows showing and conduits conveying the academic influence on Buddhism. This chapter explores the nature of this academic influence and how Buddhist monastics respond to it. In short, I argue that academia undermines core features of traditional Chinese Buddhism and that the variety of monastic responses to academic discourse fosters new forms of diversity within Chinese Buddhism.

\(^{243}\) Taixu 1928, 48.

\(^{244}\) Xuecheng (2008, 37): 佛陀已经彻证了宇宙人生的真相，并将这些真相在佛经里做了详细的描述。

\(^{245}\) Gellner 1974, 203.
The last chapter argues that academia, specifically Buddhist studies, both supports and challenges monastic Buddhism. On the one hand, scholars speak to the state and general society on behalf of Buddhism, often with more weight than Buddhists themselves speak. Academic projects to recover, catalog, edit, digitize, and translate Buddhist texts produce useful resources for Buddhist communities. Seminaries hire scholars as advisors and instructors, and use academic works for textbooks. Universities and related institutions also grant the study of Buddhism a niche, albeit a marginal one, in the intellectual centers of contemporary society.

Yet these benefits to Buddhism come at a cost. The fields of academic Buddhist studies and monastic Buddhism share the same object of study (Buddhism), and their respective personnel, concepts, goals, methods, conclusions, and institutional interests overlap but by no means coincide. Because of the differences between these two fields, and academia’s widely recognized authority to assess and produce knowledge, academia seriously challenges the sangha’s authority and self-representations.

As this chapter will show, these dynamics indicate Buddhist studies is not neutral in relation to Buddhism. In the first place, Buddhist studies does not necessarily practice *epoché*, the suspension of judgments of truth or falsity recommended in phenomenology, in relation to important Buddhist claims. Second, the academic study of Buddhism does not leave contemporary Buddhism untouched, but rather transforms Buddhism, both

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246 The term neutrality in religious studies has a range of potential meanings and applications; see Donovan 1999 for an overview. *Epoché* (Greek, literally “abstention”) is a key concept in phenomenology. For its use in the phenomenology of religion, see Allen 2005. Note that I am claiming that academic knowledge is not “neutral” or inconsequential in its effects upon religion. I am not making broader claims that, for example, objective knowledge is impossible.
directly, through influence on Buddhists, and indirectly, through molding public discourse about Buddhism. To draw from language from the sociological literature on organizational ecology and professionalization, Buddhist studies transforms the social environment in ways relevant to Buddhism’s survival, pressuring Buddhism to adapt.\textsuperscript{247} Under such pressure, Buddhist institutions can either try to hold a place in the intellectual mainstream while accepting partial subordination to academia, or they can retreat to the social margins and retain independence. The academic study of religion worldwide has produced similar effects for other religions, and more than a century of religious studies has irrevocably transformed the prospects for religions worldwide. At a more fundamental level, the global diffusion of modern academic modes of knowledge has arguably destabilized the plausibility of other, incompatible or competing types of knowledge such as those rooted in religious traditions.

In this chapter I continue analysis of tensions between seminaries and academia, focusing on how seminary leaders respond to challenges to traditional Chinese Buddhist beliefs. I argue that these responses fall along a gamut from accommodation to resistance. How seminary leaders respond is in turn shaped by their conceptions of the appropriate way to learn Buddhism, and the degree of congruence between religious conceptions and academic ones. I group these religious and academic practices together under the category of norms of inquiry.\textsuperscript{248}

\textsuperscript{247} In organizational sociology, I am influenced by Aldrich and Reuf (2006) and Popielarz and Neal (2007); in the professionalization literature, I am indebted to Abbott 1988.

\textsuperscript{248} My analysis of social norms is influenced by Tranoy 1977, from which I take the term “norms of inquiry.” Tranoy (1977, 12) credits Roderick M. Chisholm for the term. For an alternative approach to scientific standards, focusing on rhetorical boundary-work to defend professional interests, see Gieryn 1983.
At the end of the chapter, I contend that Buddhist responses to academia both reveal and produce distinct approaches to Buddhism that explain contemporary intra-Buddhist dynamics. In contrast, indigenous typologies of Chinese Buddhism such as the Eight Schools system often obscure the truly contentious issues in Buddhism today.249 Finally, I predict that to the extent that Chinese Buddhism has social relevance, pressure from academia will be unrelenting. The underlying ethos in Buddhist monasticism may shift, but in the foreseeable future it will remain distinct from that of the ivory tower. In fact, while academia fosters diversity within the sangha, the aggregate effect of academic influence may even be to produce a self-consciously distinct, reactive identity among monastics. At the same time, academia will continue to produce novel, potentially disruptive claims about Buddhism. Academia in China will thus continue to shape Buddhism through contact with Buddhist institutions such as seminaries and indirectly through its influence on broader society.

A Note on Diversity and Relational Concepts

The diversity I am most concerned with in this chapter is the variety of understandings of Buddhist doctrine and history among Chinese monastics. One way to describe diversity is to create a binary contrast between two basic orientations, such as “conservative” and “reformist.” Chinese Buddhists use similar terms to describe other Buddhists and themselves. Such binaries can be misleading if they are taken as discontinuous categories rather than as positions along a spectrum. But if we bear in mind that such binaries are

249 Welch makes a similar observation for an earlier period, i.e., that traditional Buddhist schools were less relevant to monastic divisions in Republican Buddhism. Welch argues that Buddhists were instead more divided by regional loyalties as well as by a series of binary contrasts, most of which could be incorporated into a broad conservativism/reformism contrast (Welch 1968, 200-221).
issue-dependent (i.e., one is conservative regarding certain issues) and relational (i.e., one is conservative relative to others), such binaries can be useful. Whether someone is conservative changes depending on which issues and which opponents are considered.

To illustrate the contextual nature of the terms conservative and reformist, I will show how either term could appropriately label both Taixu and Yinshun, probably the most important monks for Chinese monastic education in the twentieth century. During the Republican period, Buddhists generally regarded Taixu as a reformer. Taixu promoted institutional innovations in monasticism and argued that monastics should be educated in seminaries and should sponsor more charity work. He also argued for more resources to be spent on monastic education. In short, Taixu mainly argued that Chinese Buddhism needed to rebalance how Buddhism was learned and practiced: more schooling and social work, less ritual and meditation. Many monastic leaders, including leaders of the wealthiest monasteries, opposed Taixu’s reforms. Some opposed his efforts to turn practice-oriented monasteries into schools, and disagreed with his efforts to emphasize education over practice. They also disapproved of his plans to reorganize monastic institutions. Yinguang (1862-1940) was a prominent monk who publicly disagreed with Taixu’s proposed institutional reforms. Relative to one another, and mindful that the labels may not hold for every issue, we can label Taixu an institutional reformer and Yinguang an institutional conservative.

In China today, however, some of Taixu’s views have carried the day and are now mainstream rather than reformist. Buddhist seminaries and charities, for example, are widespread and less controversial. Leading advocates of Chan meditation such as the monks Yicheng (1927-), Jinghui (1933-2013), and Benhuan (1907-2012) have even

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250 Also see similar discussion in chapter two. On Taixu as reformer, see Welch 1968 and Pittman 2001.
founded their own seminaries. Furthermore, views of reformers such as Taixu and conservatives such as Yinguang are often integrated. For instance, Yinguang’s writings are popular teaching materials in seminaries organized according to Taixu’s doctrinal system of the eight schools.251 This might be surprising given common representations of Taixu as a radical reformer. But as William Chu argues, even in his day Taixu was sometimes reactionary rather than revolutionary when modern scholarship challenged traditional Buddhist doctrines. Thus even during the Republic, Chu argues, Taixu and more conservative Buddhists formed a united front against modern Buddhist scholarship (2006, 231).

Now, arguably the most important kind of diversity in Chinese Buddhism concerns doctrine rather than institutional structures. What one finds “important” in a set of social-cultural phenomena depends on how one sets the parameters for that phenomena and the criteria for relevance one projects into the data as much as the data itself. Here, following longstanding priorities in the academic discipline of religious studies, I regard as important Buddhism understood as a more or less integrated set of beliefs, values, and practices. Changes to this partially integrated set therefore change what is central to “Buddhism.” One could also focus on, for example, Buddhist cultural heritage sites or Buddhist economic activity. With such orientations, United Nations’ recognized Buddhist sites in China, or the total contribution of Buddhist rituals to China’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), could be plausibly presented as more important aspects of Buddhism. I do not see any objective way of deciding whether Buddhist influences in the interrelated domains of cultural heritage, economic activity, or worldviews and related practices are

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251 For example, Chuanyin 2008, a commentary on a treatise by Yinguang, is used as a textbook at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary.
most important. Importance is a normative concept and norms cannot be derived from facts.

My criteria for importance also accord with those of many Buddhist elites and other Chinese concerned with Buddhism as a living cultural system, including many academics. Among Buddhist leaders and their students concerned with Buddhism as an integrated set of beliefs and practices—a group which largely overlaps with seminary-affiliated monastics—today certain kinds of doctrinal differences give rise to more contention than different approaches to learning or practicing Buddhism do.252

In other words, today the main issue among many Buddhist monastics, especially those affiliated with seminaries, is what genuine Buddhist doctrines are, not how they should be taught. The most significant contrast is between those who accept and those who resist modern academic influences. The monk Yinshun (1906-2005), a student of Taixu at the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, is the most influential Buddhist who has partly accepted academic methods and conclusions. In the doctrinal dimension, Taixu’s views resonate with the conservative majority of monastics whereas the views Yinshun accord with those of a reformist minority.253 While Taixu looked to eminent Chinese monastics

252 This is not to say that most Chinese monastics are personally preoccupied with doctrinal debates. Many if not most Chinese monastics, whose primary source of income is performing rituals, are probably more concerned with practical issues such as the degree of state enforcement of laws against ritual performance outside of registered religious venues. But such Buddhist monastic ritual workers are less relevant than seminary-affiliated monastics are to the perpetuation and transformation of Buddhism understood as a set of beliefs and practices.

253 Chu 2006 is the best source for showing doctrinal contrasts between Taixu and Yinshun. Also see Pittman (2001, 263-270) and Jiang Canteng (2014, 45-51), who describes Yinshun as “critically inheriting 批判性继承” ideas from Taixu. Hurley (2001) analyzes Yinshun’s innovative interpretations of the important doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha, but is not concerned with showing the contrast between Taixu and Yinshun. Also see appendix 3 for a recent critique of Yinshun.
of yore for his doctrinal guidance, Yinshun considered all traditional schools in Chinese Buddhism deeply flawed, and thought that it was the Indian monk Nāgārjuna’s viewpoint that were most consistent with earlier Buddhist scriptures such as the Āgamas, which for Yinshun were foundational for Mahayana Buddhism rather than merely simplified, expedient teachings as traditional Chinese Buddhism ranked them. Taixu’s mode of doctrinal classification favored the Tathāgatagarbha framework, which is consistent with the mainstream of Chinese scholastic Buddhism for some thirteen centuries, but Yinshun argued the Tathāgatagarbha framework was an expedient teaching for the weak-minded.²⁵⁴ Yinshun thus reversed traditional doctrinal classification systems by valorizing the Āgamas and the Madhyamaka school as interpreted by Nāgārjuna and by downgrading the Tathāgatagarbha.

Moreover, Yinshun even argued that Buddhism had been distorted in India, and not just in China as other early twentieth century Buddhist reformers claimed. Chu argues persuasively that twentieth century Chinese Buddhist reformers who partially incorporated secular academic approaches to the study of Buddhism warrant the label “Critical Buddhists” like their Japanese counterparts.²⁵⁵ Among the major Chinese Critical Buddhists, Yinshun was the first in the Chinese Buddhist world to question that assumption and to point out that Buddhism was first and foremost transformed beyond recognition in India and Central Asia, then consequently suffered the misfortune of having been doubly disfigured

²⁵⁴ On traditional Chinese doctrinal classification systems, see Mun 2006 for an overview and Gregory 1991 and Swanson 1989 for detailed analysis of the two most influential systems, those of the Huayan and Tiantai schools, respectively. See Vorenkamp 2004 for a translation of the commentary crucial to establishing the Tathāgatagarbha as the doctrinal framework central to Chinese Buddhism, the monk Fazang’s (643-712) commentary on the Arising of Mahayana Faith treatise.
in China. Not only did he implicate many of the Chinese derivative schools like Pure
Land and Tantric Buddhism, Yinshun argued that even their Indian origins were already
significant departures from early Buddhist ideals and spiritual orientation (Chu 2006,
213).

Yinshun thus argued that Chinese Buddhism needed to be critically reconstructed not
only doctrinally but also in terms of its historical self-narrative, and that such critical
scrutiny should extend beyond China into ancient Indian history. Today Yinshun
represents a challenging, reformist vision of Buddhism which, if it were to become the
mainstream, would alter Chinese Buddhism’s self-understanding.256

Yet consistent with an issue-dependent, relational understanding of the terms
conservative and reformist, from other perspectives Yinshun remains conventional or
even conservative. Marcus Bingenheimer (2009) has argued that Yinshun’s
historiography is largely continuous with traditional Chinese Buddhist historiography.
The very fact that Yinshun endeavored to formulate a normative doctrinal classification
system marks him as a traditionalist and insider relative to secular scholars. Yinshun
almost totally ignores historical evidence beyond scriptural writings, and he even ignores
scriptures written in languages other than Chinese. Consonant with Buddhist tradition but
unlike secular scholarship, Yinshun states that the ultimate purpose of his writing is to
achieve nirvana (Chu 2006). Finally, and most crucially for the structure of his
argumentation, Yinshun affirms the omniscience of Buddhas and the qualitatively
superior knowledge of enlightened individuals (Yinshun 1998, 62-64).

256 Other twentieth-century Buddhists active in the Republican period, including monastics, pushed for
radical reforms to Buddhist doctrines. But in the long term, such Buddhists have not proven to be very
influential within the sangha. See Welch (1968, 217-221) for discussion of conservativism versus reform
and examples of monks who wanted to reform doctrine, not just the mode of teaching doctrine.
In short, whether someone is conservative or reformist depends on context. For our purposes the following sets of individuals hold conservative or reformist views, relative to one another, respectively:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>monastic institutional innovations</th>
<th>inherited doctrinal frameworks</th>
<th>goals and normative orientation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(conservative:reformist)</td>
<td>Yinguang:Taixu</td>
<td>Taixu:Yinshun</td>
<td>Yinshun: secular scholars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below I discuss the relationship between traditional and academic approaches to the study of Buddhism, a variant of the conservative/reformist contrast concerned with beliefs and modes of study. That such terms are issue-dependent and relational should therefore be born in mind. For most seminary leaders and seminarians in the PRC, Yinshun’s position is ambiguous, but he is seen as relatively (or even excessively) academic. Therefore, depending on context and the issue, traditional sometimes includes and sometimes excludes approaches such as Yinshun’s. As we will see, today the range of orientations between traditional learning and academic Buddhist studies is a divisive, consequential form of diversity in the Chinese sangha.

The following three sections show how academia and monastic Buddhists tend to differ and how this difference engenders a range of responses in the sangha. The first section, “Contrasting Norms of Inquiry,” illustrates and explains why academics and monastics differ in how they both select and assess topics in Buddhism for study. The following section, “Guiding Beliefs Challenged by Skeptical Inquiry,” lists some of the concrete, crucial issues over which academics and monastics disagree. After having set up a contrast between monastics and academics in terms of their approaches and views, I then qualify this dichotomy. Then the third section, “Monastic Responses to Academic Challenges,” disaggregates monastic seminary leaders depending on their responses to
academic challenges. This section demonstrates that modern academic institutions have a powerful and asymmetrical impact on Buddhist institutions. This third section concludes with analysis of a dispute among seminarians, showing that secular academic studies influence not only the top monastic leadership but also rank-and-file seminarians.

Contrasting Norms of Inquiry

The first universities emerged as Christian institutions in twelfth-century Europe and drew on Muslim and maybe even Buddhist precedents. Yet from the beginning there were tensions between universities and other religious institutions. Today universities are typically no longer religious but tensions persist between academia and religion, including between academic Buddhist studies and monastic Buddhist institutions in China. I contend that tensions arise because academic and Buddhist practices are both sufficiently similar and sufficiently different to generate conflict. This section analyzes the relevant similarities and differences in terms of basic modes of inquiry in both fields.

257 Like monastics, scholars of Buddhism are of course not a monolithic group but include people who range from pious Buddhists to strident anti-religious secularists. As I have explained in chapter four, academic Buddhist studies is enmeshed in networks of affiliations with state, Buddhist, and other academic institutions, and ultimately the secular state and other academic institutions are more powerful than the Buddhist ones. Therefore Buddhist institutions are unable to effectively challenge academic modes of studying Buddhism in the same way academic institutions challenge traditional Buddhist modes of study.

258 On the history of universities worldwide but focusing on Europe, see the four-volume set History of the University in Europe (1992-2011). For Islamic institutional and possible Buddhist methodological contributions to European universities see Beckwith 2012. For ancient Indian institutions sometimes called universities and their relationship to monasteries and temple schools, see Scharfe 2002, 131-193.

259 Tensions between academic and the traditional approaches to the study of Buddhism in contemporary China are mentioned in the following: Xuan Fang 2003; Xuan Fang 2008; Shengkai 2010; Zongxing 2013; Sangji Zhaxi 2010 (comments by Zhanru); and Chen Jian 2008. For discussion of related tensions in the early and mid-twentieth century China, see Welch 1968; Aviv 2008; and Aviv 2014.
Tensions arise first of all because of a similarity: academic and monastic areas of concern intersect. Through producing accounts of Buddhism, scholars and monastics influence how people conceptualize Buddhism. Metaphorically speaking, scholars and monastics play major roles in constructing representations of Buddhism. Journalists, novelists, actors, state officials, tourist guides, and others also play roles in forging what society recognizes as Buddhism. As for practice, monastics take the lead in “doing” Buddhism (conducting rituals, practicing meditation, etc.). But there is less social consensus about whether monastics or scholars should take the lead role in conceptualizing or studying Buddhism, including Buddhist history.

Today Chinese society implicitly grants both scholars and monastics authority to answer the following question: What is Buddhism? In actual speech, Chinese rarely raise this question. Rather, the question is an abstraction for specific questions about Buddhist history, practice, and teachings. Monastics and scholars also ask different specific questions about Buddhism. In general monastics focus on ascertaining authentic Buddhism, i.e., what Buddhism is for the Buddha and for his true successors. They furthermore assume that authentic Buddhism is unsurpassed, internally coherent, and

260 Here I am influenced by the sociological literature on professionalization, according to which different occupational groups vie with one another for authority or “jurisdiction” over certain activities (see Abbott 1988).

261 In the eyes of general society, today most occupational groups have less authority to write their own histories than professional historians do. A comprehensive history of chemistry, divination, or warfare written by a practitioner of one of these occupations would have little credibility unless the writer were also a competent historian. Generally only occupational groups such as the Buddhist sangha, whose legitimacy is closely tied to its history, make strong efforts control their history. In contemporary China, Communist cadres constitute another occupational group struggling to control how its history is represented.

262 In native discourse terms such as “Buddhādharma 佛法,” “correct Dharma 正法,” and “that which was instituted by the Buddha 佛制的” can stand for “Buddhism 佛教.”
profoundly relevant. Academics, in contrast, focus on reconstructing the history of Buddhist thought and practice, and are open to the possibility that Buddhist concepts are wrong or contradictory.

In a nutshell, scholars and monastics differ in their answers to the procedural question, “How do we collectively determine ‘what is Buddhism’”? That is to say, practices for studying and speaking about Buddhism—and not merely the content of their representations of Buddhism, vary systematically for academia versus monastics. To understand how these two institutional domains interact, we need to look not only at their different ideas about Buddhism but also at their underlying modes of selecting questions and assessing claims.

I will argue that the two groups follow distinct norms of inquiry, namely pious inquiry for monastics and skeptical inquiry for academics. I describe these different approaches in terms of practices and then re-describe them as generalized norms. Next I show the implications of such norms for the content of beliefs about Buddhism. Then I analyze how these norms play out when Chinese monastics respond to skeptical inquiry.

First I will elaborate on the distinction between pious inquiry and skeptical inquiry and their respective implications. In short, following pious inquiry, monastics typically assume the truth of sacred texts and then extract their meaning, whereas academics, following skeptical inquiry, typically try to clarify the meaning of texts and only then, if ever, assess whether or not statements in the texts are true.

Pious Inquiry

In general, monastics examine scriptures and much of Buddhist tradition (including histories and commentaries) with a pious orientation, assuming the truth and coherence of
such writings. In other words, based on their source, monastics assume the truth of certain statements prior to determining their meanings. This orientation is consistent with various rituals of veneration and deference Buddhists perform toward religious texts. The Buddhist verse called the “gāthā for opening the scriptures” (kai jing ji) exemplifies this pious frame for reading scriptures. This verse, frequently recited at the beginning of seminary classes and printed at the front of Buddhist books, reads as follows:

The utterly profound and wondrous Dharma
Is difficult to encounter in a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand kalpas.
Now that I hear it and am able to receive and uphold it
I vow to understand the true meaning [preached by] the Thus-Come One.

This verse aims to put the reader in a grateful and humble frame of mind. It also suggests that the text about to be read is profoundly difficult to understand, and that if parts of it seem trivial or contradictory, the reader has failed to penetrate the true meaning.

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263 I found that this verse was recited at the beginning of seminary classes even if they focused on commentarial literature rather than sutras, for example in a class on the Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom (Da zhi du lun), a work traditionally attributed to the Indian monk Nāgārjuna (c. 200 CE).

264 無上甚深微妙法/百千萬劫難遭遇/我今見聞得受持/願解如來真實義. Popular Buddhist tradition today attributes this verse to the empress Wu Zetian (624–705), but its earliest attested appearance in Buddhist texts appears to be in a commentary by the twelfth-century monk Daochuan 道川 (see Jingang jing zhu, CBETA/X. 461: 24.536a). The verse also appears in the anonymous liturgical text Scriptures for Daily Recitation (Zhujing risong 諸經日誦), whose contents Chen Pi-yen (1999, 14) argues date to the twelfth century. The appearance of this verse as part of “ritual for opening the scriptures” (啟經儀式) (see Zhujing risong, CBETA/J. B044: 19.129a) in the influential Scriptures for Daily Recitation, which formed the basis for later widely distributed ritual texts that are prevalent to the present, probably amplified the popularity of this verse. See Yü Chün-fang (2013, 166) for an alternative translation and discussion of this verse in the context of contemporary Taiwanese Buddhist education.
Adhering to the norm of pious inquiry, monastics typically assume Buddhist teachings are not only true but unsurpassed, i.e., supremely valuable. Since the Dharma is the most important knowledge in existence, monastics are typically less interested in academic projects such as the social history of Buddhist folk practices. But monastics worry that the Dharma is difficult to comprehend and its meaning easily lost. Given their assumptions that the Dharma is often abstruse and easily misunderstood, monastics aim to preserve the Dharma—or if necessary to recover it—and then to understand, spread, and practice it.

Monastics assume the truth and ultimacy of the Dharma in virtue of its origin in the words of an omniscient Buddha. But since the Buddha spoke long ago, his message is susceptible to decay. Therefore monastics also frequently argue that their particular tradition, in addition to originating with the Buddha, includes an unbroken transmission of the Dharma, or special events verifying the realization of the Dharma (such as dreams or visions). Thus the truth of Buddhist teachings is vouched for on the basis of multiple alleged sources: supramundane origin, pure transmission, and/or miraculous recovery.

A number of scholars have researched Buddhist methods for reading texts and speaking about the Dharma. For similar approaches, see for example Nance (2012), Cabezón (1994), Dreyfus (2003), Griffiths (1999), and Cohen (2006).

Occasionally, scriptures include words that the Buddha merely approved rather than spoke personally. And in Mahayana Buddhism, some scriptures were spoken by Buddhas other than Śākyamuni.

Such ultimately source-based criteria for assessing knowledge are common in premodern cultures. For example, in pre-Buddhist China, occupational groups traced their expertise to a legendary sage whose revelations had been passed down through lineages of textual transmission (Lloyd and Sivin 2002, 205). And source-based criteria persist in modern societies even in formal settings when other evidence is lacking (for example, in legal cases in which the only relevant evidence comes from the testimony of witnesses). But in modern societies, knowledge claims are more commonly assessed as true in virtue of their content (i.e., reasons) rather than in terms of their source (i.e., a privileged speaker who need not provide reasons).
Monastics further assume epistemic hierarchies among beings, hierarchies that determine the reliability of judgments. Buddhas, bodhisattvas, and enlightened masters possess perceptual powers beyond the ken of ordinary humans and so have privileged access to truth. Therefore, ordinary, unenlightened humans should defer to the judgment of those with such supramundane perception, especially regarding interpretation of the Dharma. Enlightened beings are themselves ranked in a hierarchy with Buddhas at the top.\textsuperscript{268} Given the limitations of reason, establishing that certain ideas are Buddhadharma, and hence true, cannot be reliably achieved only through rational scrutiny and external standards. Most people simply lack the requisite spiritual insight to fully understand the Dharma.\textsuperscript{269} At best, most people can assess questionable ideas by comparing them to what has already been recognized as the Buddhadharma.

Because for monastics the Dharma is unsurpassed in virtue of its supramundane sources and not fully amenable to rational scrutiny, what monastics write about Buddhism is, in theory and to varying degrees in practice, ultimately constrained by scriptures. That is, monastic writings about Buddhism are, as an implication of the rhetoric of the Buddhist tradition, in a sense all derivative, secondary literature. Such writings may aim to correct misunderstandings of the Dharma, or work out its full

\textsuperscript{268} For example, in the \textit{Lotus Sutra} the Buddha tells Śāriputra, his wisest arhat disciple, that some teachings exceed Śāriputra’s capacity to understand and must be taken on faith: “Even you, where this scripture is concerned, gained entry through faith. How much more so the other voice hearers!... It does not fall within the range of their knowledge” (translation from Hurvitz 2009, 71).

\textsuperscript{269} As mentioned previously, even Yìnshùn, a monk many monastics believe is too academic, firmly supports a sharp distinction between ordinary worldlings and enlightened beings. For Yìnshùn, people who “thinking themselves smart, use their worldly knowledge to judge everything… are so ignorant” (Yìnshùn 1998, 62-63).
implications, but they cannot present themselves as correcting or going beyond scriptures.  

Pious inquiry thus guides monastic studies of Buddhism. Such inquiry presumes the truth and ultimacy of Buddhist teachings in virtue of their sources, and entails that other expositions of the Dharma are partially derivative of, and would be trumped by, scriptural teachings. Academic practices, in contrast, tend to follow the norm of skeptical inquiry, which I will describe in the next section immediately after a brief evaluation exemplifying it.

The value of a practice is one issue and its logical coherence another. Some scholars assert great value in pious inquiry.  

Here I limit my comments to its logical cogency. In my analysis, assumptions integral to pious inquiry suffer from logical difficulties. For example, arguments for the purported ultimacy of the Dharma and of epistemic hierarchies are often circular. Buddhists know sacred scriptures contain profound truths because they were spoken by an omniscient Buddha, which they know is true because the scriptures say so. Likewise, in social practice, enlightened Buddhists are people who convincingly embody and speak in accordance with what a given community recognizes as the Dharma. As there is no public evidence for enlightenment outside of

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270 In some ways, the Chinese Chan tradition is an exception: it represents itself as conveying a “separate transmission outside the [scriptural] teachings” 教外別傳.” Yet as Albert Welter (2011) and others (such as Brose [2015, 104]) have argued, in actual practice the Chan tradition often adhere to scriptural teachings, and is in effect “a special transmission within the teachings.” Analysis of the sermons of the modern Chinese Chan monk Xuyun (d. 1959) likewise reveals that his teachings remain within the orbit of conventional doctrines and often simply paraphrase common scriptures (Sollien 2002).

271 Paul Griffiths (1999), for instance, develops a similar concept called religious reading, which he contrasts favorably with what he calls consumerist reading and what most people would call critical reading.
fulfilled expectations of enlightened behavior, in practice the criteria for (recognized) enlightenment are jointly determined by tradition and shifting social expectations.\footnote{The point here is orthogonal to the questions of whether individual religious experience is “essentialist” and so transcends acquired concepts, or “contextualist” and so shaped by local concepts (see Katz 1983). Whether or not distinctly religious experiences even exist (see Proudfoot 1985 and Boyer 2010) is also irrelevant here. Rather, the point is that, even if Buddhists do have distinctly religious experiences transcending local concepts, a Buddhist community would not accept such experiences as “Buddhist” if their representations explicitly contradicted what the community insists to be the Dharma. So allegedly special Buddhist experiences verify or clarify Buddhist scriptures, but do not falsify them. An implication of this analysis is that modernist Buddhist claims that meditative experiences prove doctrinal teachings in the same way experimental results prove scientific theories is fundamentally incoherent. There are simply no Buddhist “facts,” much less “experiences,” that could contract Buddhist doctrine in the same way a pipet reading could contradict a scientific hypothesis.}

\textit{Skeptical Inquiry}

Unlike traditional monastic learning, scholarship in Buddhist studies is based on ordinary modes of reasoning and is in principle open to anyone with the requisite training regardless of their moral character, religious experiences, or attitudes toward Buddhism. Adhering to skeptical inquiry, academics do not typically assume Buddhist teachings are true, consistent, or supremely valuable. Their professional responsibilities focus on producing new knowledge about Buddhism rather than preserving or practicing it. They are frequently more interested in explaining Buddhist history, which includes interpretive investigation of (for example) what different Buddhists believed the Buddha thought and did, as well as positivist projects to recover what the Buddha actually thought and did. Producing new knowledge frequently involves critically probing, rather than reverently internalizing, inherited knowledge.
In contrast to monastics conducting pious inquiry, scholars do not assume sets of statements are true because they originated in a sacred source. Rather, following skeptical inquiry, each claim should, when possible, be considered individually, on the basis of its content and, to the extent it is part of the research project, through logical criteria (i.e., does it cohere with other relevant statements) and empirical investigation (i.e., does external evidence support it). Blind peer review is an institution instantiating the academic ideal to separate assessment of claims from the person making them. There is no parallel anonymizing institution in Buddhist monasticism. Prefaces to Buddhist texts, even when they introduce a human historical figure rather than a Buddha or deity, often imply the writer should be esteemed if not worshipped.

Scholars also do not assume that, at least for the topics they research, there is a sharp epistemic gap between enlightened cognoscenti on the one hand and ordinary humans on the other. Academic knowledge is public, i.e., justified on the basis of ordinary logic and accessible evidence. Academic knowledge is also discursive—expressed through linguistic signs, and is not something which sometimes purports to be transmitted through ambiguous actions such as the raising of a flower or the imparting of a “mind-seal.”

Finally, in academic writing the important distinction is not between canonical scriptures and other works. Rather, original research (or “primary literature”) is valued over less prestigious, derivative writing such as reviews and summaries of original research (or “secondary literature”). Scholars contribute to their field’s primary literature and may falsify claims in the primary literature. In contrast, monastics may not directly compose works in the most authoritative genre of Buddhist writings, the canonical scriptures conveying the words of the Buddha (foshuo佛說; Skt. buddhavacana), unless
they do this furtively through fraud. Important academic writings continue to be produced, but not long after the birth of printing in seventh-century China, the Buddhist scriptural canon in China has been basically closed.\textsuperscript{273}

\textit{Norms of Inquiry}

I have sketched differences between two norms for reading and writing about Buddhism, namely skeptical inquiry, more typical of scholars, and pious inquiry, more typical of monastics.\textsuperscript{274} These differences are summarized in the chart below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms of Inquiry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skeptical Inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) The truth, consistency, and value of authoritative Buddhist writings are not assumed, and are irrelevant to many research projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) The truth of statements is to be assessed primarily according to their content, not their source.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) A growing archive of primary literature, which is expected to be critiqued and extended, constitutes the truth claims in the field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Personal characteristics of the scholar such as religion and gender are irrelevant to the assessment of his or her research.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{273} See Wu Jiang (2016) on the Chinese Buddhist canon and its relative closure from the mid-eighth century. As far as I am aware, the most recent case of a text being incorporated into a Chinese canon as a scripture spoken by the Buddha was allegedly received in a dream by Ming empresses in the year 1398. This scripture (\textit{Daming renxiao huanghou menggan foshuo diyi xiyou gongde jing}, CBETA/X. no. 10) was incorporated into several Buddhist canons starting with the fifteenth century \textit{Yongle Beizang}. Its title indicates it was perceived in a dream (\textit{menggan} 夢感) and was spoken by a Buddha (\textit{foshuo} 佛說; Skt. buddhavacana) (Yü Chün-fang 1998, 913).

\textsuperscript{274} My formulation of pious and skeptical inquiry has been influenced by Robert Merton’s formulation of the norms of scientific inquiry. In particular, in the chart below, items (1) and (3) under Skeptical Inquiry roughly correspond to Merton’s concepts of Organized Skepticism and Universalism. For foundational essays on the norms of science, see Merton (1968, 591-615). For overviews of Merton’s work on norms, see Panofsky 2010, Calhoun 2010, and Kalleberg 2007. For a recent book arguing that Merton’s formulation of norms remain common throughout academia (not merely in the sciences), see Ziman 2000.
Throughout Buddhist history, many debates have taken place within a framework of pious inquiry. Pious inquiry does not determine the exact contours of the formal canon, the degree to which the canon influences practice, which works in the canon should be the focus of study, or which interpreters, revivers, or contemporary representatives of the tradition should be privileged. Yet academic skeptical inquiry is a more radical challenge to Buddhist traditions than internal Buddhist debate. Rather than proposing a shift in the canon, skeptical inquiry questions—sometimes simply by ignoring—the very notion of a canon and the source-based criteria for legitimizing claims.

Guiding Beliefs Challenged by Skeptical Inquiry

We now turn to examine the specific impact of academic inquiry on contemporary Buddhist beliefs in China and the patterns of Buddhist response. In this section I identify specific guiding beliefs in traditional Buddhism that academic approaches challenge.

In my observations, conflicting ideas on at least five basic issues foster disputes within the sangha. Positions on such important issues are guiding beliefs, i.e., fundamental assumptions structuring discourse, which are not necessarily directly debated. More often than not, one position or another is simply assumed. The differences in such beliefs stem from distinct underlying values and norms of inquiry. Thus more evidence will not necessarily resolve such disputes, which are rooted in contrasting modes of selecting what counts as evidence and how to evaluate it. I have displayed the

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275 Scholars of Buddhism distinguish between the formal canon and a smaller subset of canonical works in common use in a given time and place, which they label a ritual-, practical-, or actual canon. Variant conceptions also extend the notion of canon to influential Buddhist writings that claim to be consonant with the formal canon, or even to any influential Buddhist text. See for example Collins 1990, Blackburn 1999, and McDaniel 2008.
contrasting traditional Buddhist and academic positions toward the five issues, not intended as an exhaustive list of important disputes, below.\textsuperscript{276}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Academic Position</th>
<th>Traditional Chinese Buddhist Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhas</td>
<td>The historical Buddha was a human being whose teachings are debatable. Other Buddhas are literary constructions.</td>
<td>The historical Buddha is a transcendent being, some of whose teachings surpass human reason. Other Buddhas also exist and interact with beings in our universe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scriptures</td>
<td>Earlier scriptures are more historically attested than Mahayana scriptures, which appeared centuries after the Buddha. Earlier doctrines are thus the foundation of Mahayana doctrines.</td>
<td>Mahayana scriptures comprise a self-sufficient system that totally surpasses Hinayana teachings. Mahayana scriptures were spoken by the historical Buddha.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>saints</td>
<td>All historical Buddhist figures may be critiqued, and if warranted, even dissolved as pseudo-historical fabrications.</td>
<td>Important Buddhist leaders throughout history are enlightened beings with special powers, whose existence and teachings should be accepted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doctrine</td>
<td>Doctrines central to Chinese Buddhism are subject to scrutiny and may be labeled as incoherent or as incompatible with other strata of the tradition.</td>
<td>Doctrines central to Chinese Buddhism through most of history, such as the Tatāhāgatagarbha, should orient doctrinal studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relics</td>
<td>The alleged bodily remains of Buddhist deities and saints, including bones and mummies, may be investigated through ordinary (historical, medical, etc.) methods.</td>
<td>Relics of deities and saints prove the sanctity of such figures. Some relics may resist objective scrutiny because their properties are observer-relative.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These academic positions challenge core Buddhists beliefs, and so many Chinese sangha members view academic inquiry as a threat.\textsuperscript{277} The Chinese monk Shengkai (1972-), discussed later in this chapter, captures this sentiment of the Chinese sangha toward certain academic practices: “We of the Buddhist sector greatly dislike essays of

\textsuperscript{276} Other important guiding beliefs include attitudes toward the use of deception in teaching and the authority of the sangha to represent Buddhism. I heard discussion in a seminar regarding the sangha’s status framed in terms of whether and how the traditional Chinese Buddhist practice of “venerating the monastic [status] and deprecating the secular [status] 僧尊俗卑” should be upheld. Consequential for many specific beliefs is the question of whether Buddhist representations of history are authentic.

\textsuperscript{277} Beliefs are “core” relative to other beliefs which are “peripheral.” By core I point to beliefs that, in the minds of Buddhists, are necessary for other, peripheral beliefs to be true. That is, belief centrality is a function of how many other beliefs depend on a given belief, with core beliefs having a high degree of centrality relative other Buddhist beliefs. So for example that Amitābha Buddha actually exists is a core belief relative to whether there are actually nine ways of being reborn in his pure land.
textual criticism, because we fear they will expose the sacredness of our beliefs to attack
我们佛教界非常不喜欢那些考证的文章，这是因为害怕自己信仰的神圣性遭到攻击”
(2010, 264). Shengkai’s essay is relatively short and informal. Since in China today there are few if any influential, systematic essays arguing how Buddhist monastics should relate to secular scholarship, I have pieced together observations, interviews, and the occasional essay such as Shengkai’s to reconstruct monastic approaches.278

Shengkai’s admission of nervousness shows that Chinese Buddhists do not, in practice, embrace skeptical inquiry. Modernist presentations of Buddhism, including those of the monk Taixu, promote the idea that Buddhism encourages critical inquiry and is hence consonant with modern science and superior to Christianity. The book What the Buddha Taught, composed in English by the Sinhala monk Walpola Rahula (1907-1997) and later translated into many Asian languages including Chinese, has been particularly influential in disseminating such characterizations of Buddhism (Walpola 1974).279 Many modernist presentations single out the Pali Kālāma Sutta as a charter for free inquiry consonant with modern scientific rationalism. Yet as Peter Jackson notes, while the Kālāma Sutta does grant skeptical listeners the right to evaluate teachings, it actually critiques the use of reason and logic in such evaluation (2003, 40-48). Furthermore, the Chinese parallel to the Kālāma Sutta, which could be closer to the original stem-scripture from which the two extant versions (i.e., one in Pali, one in Chinese) derived, denies that ordinary humans have the power to judge Buddhist teachings. Instead, in this version the

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278 Yinshun’s “Taking the Buddhadharma to Research the Buddhadharma” (1992) is a possible exception, but this essay is more influential in Taiwan than in China. See Chu 2006.

279 Bond 1988 describes Buddhism in twentieth-century Sri Lanka, including the role Walpola played in the Buddhist revival there. Soucy (2012, 48-49) mentions a Vietnamese translation of this work being cited by his informant, a contemporary Buddhist modernist in Hanoi.
Buddha tells the Kālāmas: “You yourselves do not have pure wisdom with which to know whether there is an afterlife or not. You yourselves do not have pure wisdom to know which deeds are transgressions and which are not transgressions” (translation from Bodhi 2012, 74). Even in this scripture, the Buddhist norm of hierarchical authority is invoked to limit rational inquiry, because only those with pure wisdom can pass judgment.

Most often, however, these tensions between beliefs and their underlying norms are not discussed directly but instead are played out internally, i.e., within the sangha, between monastics who accept academic understandings to differing degrees. When the sangha does engage with academic viewpoints, it often does so only indirectly, by considering the opinions of other sangha members (such as Yinshun) who have partially incorporated approaches from academia into their writings. Thus the skirmishes are largely conducted within the sangha’s territory. At the level of intellectual self-legitimation, it is academia which does most of the challenging, and Buddhism which does most of the responding. Thus there is an important asymmetry in how the two fields engage with one another. The following section outlines the variety of responses monastics make to critical academic discourse.

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280 For English translations of the Kālāma Sutta, see Bodhi (2012, 279-283) for a translation from the Pali, and Bingenheimer (2013, 89-96) for a translation from the Chinese. For a Pali sutta consonant with the claims in the Chinese version of the Kālāma Sutta, see the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta (translation in ṇāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 164-178). In this latter sutta, the Buddha repeatedly states that those who assert the Buddha’s knowledge is based on mere reasoning rather than on transcendent superpowers will certainly end up in hell. Modernist presentations thus clearly draw from a biased sample of scriptures and passages, selected to cater to modern tastes, in their characterizations of Buddhism. For similar claims about Buddhist modernism worldwide, see McMahan 2008.
Monastic Responses to Academic Challenges

I have argued that monastics and academics overall adhere to different guiding beliefs and norms of inquiry, and that monastics face stronger challenges from academic beliefs and norms than vice versa. In this section I propose a typology to chart how monastics respond to such challenges. Then I give examples of monks whose responses exemplify the categories in the typology. Next I discuss part of a monastic conference in which a debate over academic approaches to the study of Buddhism erupted. Finally I consider whether different responses to academia will lead to new forms of Buddhism.

Monastic responses can be understood as falling along a spectrum from accommodation to resistance to academia, as follows:

accommodation—compromise—resistance

As I have formulated it, underlying this typology is a single criterion, which can be encapsulated by one question: Does the response accept or reject academic methods and conclusions? As ideal types, accommodation means acceptance, and resistance means rejection, of academic viewpoints. Compromise means a response between these two poles.281 This typology can be understood to categorize on two levels of abstraction, either (1) responses to specific academic challenges, or (2) general approaches (orientations and sets of responses) to academic challenges. And the typology is intended to categorize the responses monastics make, not the monastics who make them.

281 This typology of responses/approaches has been informed by scholarship on responses to suspected cognitive error or contradiction, including Gellner’s collaboration/resistance binary (1974, 14-19), and Festinger’s distinction, in his theory of cognitive dissonance, between avoidance strategies and negotiation strategies (1957). For related approaches see Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973 (accommodation and resistance to modernity in general) and Witten 1993 (accommodation, resistance, and reframing as protective responses within religious discourse).
To measure monastic responses to academia, conducting anonymous surveys would be ideal, but this would be virtually impossible. Not to mention state regulations against foreigners conducting surveys, seminaries themselves tend to resist such research. One experienced seminary instructor told me about his unsuccessful efforts to survey seminarians at his own seminary. His seminary is widely considered to be relatively “academic” among seminaries. Another seminarian laughed at my idea to conduct a survey. He recalled that in middle school, his teacher had distributed a survey. As the students were filling it out, the teacher wrote the “correct answer” to each question on the blackboard. This seminarian opined that likewise, even if I were able to distribute a survey in seminaries, the leadership might tell seminarians how to complete it.

The examples given below of monastic responses to academia are drawn from my fieldwork and reading. Since quantitative data is unavailable and space for citing examples limited, I have prioritized documenting the responses of the most influential monastics in seminaries, the seminary leadership (founders, administrators, and teachers).

Accommodation

Accommodation involves accepting academic viewpoints on Buddhism. The acceptance can be either proactive or grudging. Monastics are more willing to accept changes to established Buddhist beliefs if other monastics have accepted them. Therefore academic viewpoints promoted by a critical mass of respected monastics have the best chance of being widely accepted.282 Furthermore accommodation does not always occur due to rational consideration of the evidence. Rather, the institutional power of academia relative to monasticism (chapter 4) can facilitate accommodation.

282 See Schelling (1978, 91-110) for a classical description of how critical mass works in social change.
Thus academic viewpoints can be mediated by other institutions, and political expediency sometimes encourages accommodation. For example during the early twentieth century, most Chinese monastics believed the Buddha was born in the year 1027 BCE. But by the late twentieth century, many or perhaps most monastics believed he was born in the year 623 BCE. One event that ultimately changed the prevalence of the traditional Chinese belief was the first meeting of the international World Fellowship of Buddhists in Ceylon in 1950, during which an agreement was reached that the year 623 BCE would be considered the year of the Buddha’s birth. That date accorded with one tradition of Theravada Buddhism and was close to the contemporaneous academic consensus.283 Accepting that date facilitated relationships with Buddhists beyond China, and since the Chinese Buddhist Association was supposed to conduct people’s diplomacy by Buddhist means, it adopted the revised dating. The revised dating was then officially promoted within China and is now widely accepted in Chinese Buddhist circles. But the eminent Chinese monk Xuyun (ca. 1864-1959) opposed the change and the dating remains disputed within the Chinese sangha.284

283 In international Buddhist studies, the more recent consensus is that the Buddha was born roughly a century or more later than previously believed. See Gethin (1998, 13-16) for a summary and Bechert (1991; 1992; and 1997) for exhaustive studies.
284 See Xuyun (1957, 249-252) for his opposition to the new dating system. See Campo (2013) for more on Xuyun, whose own date of birth is disputed. See Welch (1972, 210-14 and 427-37) for more on the World Fellowship of Buddhists and China’s participation in that organization. While today most monastics probably accept the revised dating of the Buddha, some prominent monastics do not; the monk Miaoxiang is a nationally famous Buddhist abbot who insists on the traditional Chinese date. During a monastic conference I heard a seminarian complain about the revised dating, which another seminarian had used in a presentation. The complaint was that the revised system was incorrect because Xuyun had said so. No one addressed this complaint. Xuyun is probably the most respected monk in twentieth century China, so it would have been difficult for a monastic to state Xuyun had been wrong.
I will present an example of a seminary leader whose approach to the study of Buddhism can be characterized by accommodation. This monk, Xinxi*, was the vice rector and de facto top administrator in a seminary in central China. With several of his teachers present, I interviewed him in his seminary office in the summer of 2013.

Xinxi characterized his approach to seminary education with terminology that resonates with liberal academic and political movements. “We belong to the Enlightenment faction,” he told me, using the term for enlightenment (qimeng 启蒙) that in Chinese refers to the eighteenth century European Enlightenment and is also associated with the Chinese May Fourth Movement of 1919. It is entirely different from Buddhist words for enlightenment or awakening (juewu 觉悟 and kaiwu 开悟). A different faction in seminary education, Xinxi claims, promotes “obscurantism 蒙昧主义,” which is associated with “dictatorial authority 专职权威.” To control seminarians, Xinxi claimed, obscurantism can be useful because “capital expended in management is low,” since through “techniques to beguile the people” it is easier to maintain discipline, but these are only “limited-term effects.” In the long term, Xinxi argued, seminarians subjected to such pedagogy become too passive. Students who only “do what they are told” become “benighted,” which inhibits their seeking of enlightenment (qiu juewu 求觉悟). Contrasting himself with a former classmate and current leader of a major seminary, Xinxi advocated against

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285 The name Xinxi is a pseudonym.
286 Here Xinxi uses the traditional Chinese Buddhist word for enlightenment. Xinxi seems to accept the premise, advocated by nineteenth-century European Orientalists, that the Buddha’s special experience of awakening (bodhi in Sanskrit) is comparable to the enlightenment advocated by eighteenth-century European intellectuals.
taboos in the study of Buddhism. If you find you are able to “deconstruct” an object of faith, he claimed, this proves it was not a suitable object of faith in the first place. But Xinxi clarifies the focus in Buddhist seminaries should be on learning useful Buddhist teachings, not on deconstructing Buddhism.

Other evidence in his seminary exemplified Xinxi’s liberal, non-traditional approach to the study of Buddhism. The seminary bookstore, for example, included the largest selection I have seen in any seminary bookstore of Buddhist English-language books translated into Chinese. None of these books dealt with traditional Chinese Buddhism, and they included works by authors such as Jack Kornfield, Pema Chodron, and Thich Nhat Hanh. The seminary had even invited a Theravada Burmese monk to give classes, and seminary personnel had studied Theravada Buddhism in Yunnan province.287 During our interview one of his monastic teachers questioned Xinxi’s viewpoint that Western, critical approaches to the study of Buddhism were suitable for China. The fact that this teacher challenged the vice rector actually exemplified the open, academic atmosphere at this seminary, as did this teacher’s appeal to Leo Strauss (rather than to Buddhist authorities) to argue that one could be critical but should still have “respectful veneration” for Buddhist masters of yore.288 Seminary classes I attended included a

287 Xinxi claimed that he and the seminary leader Yanzhen 衍真, vice rector of the Jiangxi Buddhist Seminary, had been involved in the 1989 student democracy movement and turned to Buddhism after it was suppressed. At the same time, the Jiangxi Buddhist Seminary was even more focused on Theravada Buddhism than Xinxi’s seminary was. In China there appears to be a correlation between accommodation to academia, pro-democratic sentiments, and interest in Theravada Buddhism.

288 In Chinese academia, arguments appealing to Leo Strauss (a German-American political philosopher, 1899-1973) are common, but they are virtually unheard of in monastic circles. See Callick (2013, 141-45) on the prevalence of the (arguably ironic) appeals among Chinese nationalist intellectuals to Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt in order to block certain Western influence.
few lay Buddhists, and some of the monastic seminarians openly intended to disrobe after completing their studies. In contrast, at most seminaries, classes are only open to monastics, and the expectation is that one should remain a monastic for life.

Xinxi still distinguished seminary education from university education. For instance, in Xinxi’s class on the Ágama scriptures I attended, he emphasized to seminarians that in studying Buddhism one should focus on topics that bring them spiritual benefit. Similarly, in a class I attended on the Consciousness-Only school of Buddhism, the monastic instructor emphasized a distinction from Western epistemological inquiry: one should seek to answer the question “how is the fabricated world formed虚妄的世界是如何生成的,” and one must avoid the Western epistemological question “how is true knowledge acquired真实的知识是如何获得的.”

This instructor stated that the Buddhist texts they studied do not show what kinds of things are real; rather, they show how people mistakenly take certain things to be real.289 In short, leaders in this seminary regard academic and seminary studies as different but compatible.

The approach to responding to secular scholarship at Xinxi’s seminary can be characterized as accommodation. Xinxi assumes a rough division of labor between seminaries and academia, but grants that Buddhists can adjust their beliefs when there are conflicts with academia. On the other hand, Xinxi states Buddhists should mainly aim to

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289 At the point in the class when he made those statements, the instructor had just given an overview of Xuanzang’s 玄奘 translations of Consciousness-Only texts, with emphasis on Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only (weishi sanshi song 唯識三十頌; Skt. triṃśikā). This way of describing Consciousness-Only thought accords with Jonathan Gold’s (2015) interpretation of Vasubandhu’s (4th/5th c. CE) Yogācāra thought, namely that it explains the creation of the fabricated world (through the storehouse consciousness), but does not claim to explain reality (which is ineffable).
learn and apply Buddhist teachings rather than to falsify Buddhist beliefs; skepticism per se is not a virtue. We might label this approach “focused spiritual inquiry” rather than skeptical or pious inquiry. In contrast, the next approach I describe explicitly limits the potential accommodation with academia.

Compromise

Compromise involves accepting some academic viewpoints while rejecting others. A typical compromise position is to consider certain issues beyond debate. A related, compatible kind of compromise is less explicit, and involves employing academic methods to argue against mainstream academic conclusions. By adopting academic conventions, such a monastic compromises by accepting secular rules of debate. What distinguishes such compromise from standard academic argument, i.e., ordinary challenges to claims, is that the proponent is not engaged in an inquiry whose conclusion is theoretically open. Rather, the proponent already knows the truth about a controversial issue, which is found in Buddhist scriptures or tradition. He supports his viewpoint with rational argumentation if possible, but appeals to authority or avoids debate if not.

Below I introduce the viewpoints of a monk who exemplifies an explicit compromise approach. This monk, Shengkai, is the vice rector of a small seminary in Beijing. He is also one of only four monks in the mainland PRC who is also a university professor (see appendix 1). Thus Shengkai’s jobs require him to regularly adjudicate the competing logics of Buddhist monasticism and academia. As he writes in his article “Academia and Spreading the Dharma” Shengkai feels he “lives in the ‘cracks’ or ‘margins’ between Buddhism and [secular] society 生活在佛教與社會的‘夾縫’與‘邊緣’” (2010, 260).
This article is Shengkai’s attempt to reach a compromise between the Buddhist and academic institutions in which he operates. Shengkai’s compromise approach can be summarized in two points. First, the answers to most questions about Buddhism should be open to revision. Second, some issues are exceptional and have pre-determined conclusions, at least for Buddhists and especially for monastics. In short, the truth of certain special claims must be taken on faith. In Shengkai’s words (2010, 264-265):

When Buddhists conduct Buddhist studies research, we should emphasize the religiosity of our faith, namely the special nature that the Buddhadharma does not share with the mundane.

佛教徒從事佛學研究，必須重視我們信仰的宗教性，即佛法不共於世間的特性

These [special claims] pertain to facts within our faith and religious domain, and cannot be regarded as “myths” or “legends” on the basis of the way we contemporary people think, or through research based on an attitude of non-belief. 這是屬於我們信仰與宗教領域內的事實，不能以我們現代人的想法，或者已無信仰的態度去研究，認為那是一種 “神話”、“傳說”

[Conclusions about] these [special issues] cannot be reached through ordinary assessment of evidence. 這不是通常考證所能得出的

In essence, Shengkai argues that academic critique about certain issues is invalid. Shengkai lists seven beliefs that Buddhists should accept on faith. The table below includes Shengkai’s exact terminology in the left column, and my categorization of those issues in the right column.
We see that the issues Shengkai identifies as sacred pertain to three of the five sensitive traditional guiding beliefs mentioned earlier in this chapter, namely the nature of Buddhas, the power of saints, and the origin of relics (in this case, mummies). Shengkai repeated this same list in a seminary class and at a monastic conference.  

But Shengkai was not always consistent in his approach. He often seemed be exploring different ways of teaching Buddhist doctrine, both in terms of pedagogy and content. More than once in class he commented that Chinese Buddhists were in a stage of “crossing the river by groping for stones,” i.e., figuring out how to proceed in a pragmatic, step-by-step way. In one seminary class he claimed that another

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290 For lists of the first four terms listed in the left column of the table above, see Buswell and Lopez (2014, 1085, 1070, 1073, and 1077, respectively) s.v. “six superknowledges.” See Gildow and Bingenheimer 2003 and Welch (1967, 342-45) on incorruptible flesh bodies (mummies) in modern Chinese Buddhism. See Wangsheng xifang jingtou ruizhuan (CBETA/T. no. 2070) for Chinese Buddhist accounts of the auspicious signs of those destined for the Western Pure Land at death. See Sharf (2002, 77-133) on sympathetic resonance in Chinese Buddhism.

291 I attended Shengkai’s weekly, all-day seminary class from October 2012 to April 2013 as well as the conference for monastics he co-organized in April 2013.

292 The expression “crossing the river by groping for stones” was popular among top Chinese Communist officials in the 1980s such as Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) and Chen Yun (1905-1995). It signaled, in the formulation of state policy, an emphasis on pragmatic flexibility over doctrinaire adherence to Communist ideology.
method to deal with tensions between scholarship and Buddhist practice was to split oneself into two parts, with the part that did research not influencing the part that did religious practice. He implied that if one could divide oneself successfully, one could even question sacred beliefs. In another class he suggested that certain beliefs taken on faith required no verification because the word “faith” signified belief without an appeal to reasons. In a statement his students apparently did not follow but with a glance at me, he said this was Kierkegaard’s view of faith. For Shengkai as an individual as for Chinese Buddhists more broadly, there are many ways to negotiate responses to academic discourse.

Shengkai also encourages debate both within monastic circles and between Buddhist and academic ones, even on contentious issues. In this respect his approach is less typical. In class he stated that monastics should tolerate and even welcome debate with academics, even on non-negotiable issues, and even if the academics persist in holding opposing views. Once he even tentatively broached the question of whether Nāgārjuna had actually authored the text they were reading in class. But usually monastics should only respond to, rather than initiate, skeptical discourse, Shengkai claimed. The worst response, he said, was for monastics to lash out angrily at academics for their views. Another bad response was no response at all. His article elaborates why debate is beneficial and warns against the danger of silence. Unless monastics voice opinions on contentious issues, he claims, they will lose their right to speak on them (2010, 264, 267-268).

The compromise approach toward academia is common in Chinese Buddhism. Most monastics would probably agree that some Buddhist beliefs are debatable and others are not. But precisely which beliefs are adjustable is contested. One seminary
leader I interviewed, Gangxiao 刚晓 (standing vice rector and de facto head of the Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary), did not hesitate to dismiss traditional beliefs about mummies.293 Another Buddhist leader I interviewed, the monk Mingzhuang 明奘, even denied the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth over multiple lifetimes.294 This latter position is rare in Chinese Buddhism, and some Buddhists accused Mingzhuang of being a non-Buddhist (waidao 外道).

Next I will discuss explicit resistance to academic approaches. Chinese monastics often employ their strongest critical words—non-Buddhist, pseudo-Buddhist (fufo waidao 附佛外道), and worm in a lion’s body (shi shen zhong chong 獅身中蟲)—for other Chinese monastics advocating controversial viewpoints, including those taken from academia.

Resistance

Resistance involves rejecting academic viewpoints about Buddhism or how to study Buddhism. Resistance can signify a response to specific issues or a general orientation toward academic contributions. To qualify as resistance, the rejection of academic claims must involve assumptions or methods not commonly employed in academia. Below I introduce two cases of resistance. The first is resistance to specific claims and comes

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293 I interviewed Gangxiao in April 2013. Gangxiao has publicized these views in a preface to a book on mummies. In the printed version of the book, Gangxiao told me, he was not able to include his controversial preface because the publisher would not allow it. Gangxiao then make it available online (Gangxiao N.d.).

294 I interviewed Mingzhuang in summer 2010. Mingzhuang’s views of rebirth had been influenced by the Thai reformist Buddhist monk Buddhadasa, whose monastery Mingzhuang told me he had visited. See Jackson 2003 on Buddhadasa’s views. Mingzhuang disrobed in 2013.
from the monk Jinghui (1933-2013). The second presents examples of general resistance to academia in online blogs.

Jinghui, founder and rector of the Hebei Provincial Buddhist Seminary, was among the most influential Buddhist monks in China.295 During my interview with him on 16 December 2012 (see appendix 3), Jinghui expressed support for four of the five traditional Chinese Buddhist guiding beliefs I listed earlier in this chapter. The table below summarizes Jinghui’s views on such issues, and select quotations from the interview show some of his argumentation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Jinghui’s Main Claims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buddhas</td>
<td>Important Buddhas and bodhisattvas exist in a literal sense; they are not metaphorical constructions. Academic viewpoints presenting such deities as metaphors undermine Buddhism.296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>scriptures</td>
<td>In Chinese Buddhism, the authenticity of Mahayana Buddhist scriptures and the validity of Tathāgatagarbha doctrine should be assumed, not debated.297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doctrine</td>
<td>See above.298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>relics</td>
<td>The preservation of the authentic mummy of the monk Huineng [which assumes traditional beliefs about relics] supports the claim that the received version of the Platform Sutra is also authentic [which also supports scriptural tradition].299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

295 Jinghui was also discussed in chapter four. For scholarship on Jinghui, see Yang and Wei 2005, Wei Dedong 2008, and Ji Zhe 2011.

296 Representative quotation (Chinese text in appendix 3): “In China since Reform and Opening, in Mainland Buddhism, he had an extremely bad influence. Because of his academic way of looking at things, he took many things, such as the world of the Medicine Buddha, the world of Amitābha Buddha, Mañjuśrī, Universal Worthy [bodhisattva], the four great bodhisattvas—and he changed them from actually existing entities into fictional characters.”

297 Representative quotation (Chinese text in appendix 3): “In Chinese Han Buddhist circles, these questions cannot be discussed——this is because the core of Han Buddhism, the content of its faith, is Mahayana Buddhism, and the core of its faith is Tathāgatagarbha thought.”

298 Representative quotation: see the quotation above for “scriptures,” specifically the insistence on the Tathāgatagarbha doctrinal framework.

299 Representative quotation: “Basic Chan scriptures and commentaries——[he] made chaotic the basic understanding of the Chan school and Chan scriptures among the academic sector. Currently academia
Jinghui argued against the views of academics and Yinshun on these sensitive issues. The main thrust of his argumentation was twofold, and focused on doctrinal coherence and the effects of ideas. First, Jinghui argued that all Buddhist doctrines are ultimately coherent, and implied this was a basic assumption in studying Buddhism:

For Jinghui, the deep coherence of Buddhism meant that doctrines such as emptiness and Tathāgatagarbha could not possibly conflict with one another, as some people claim.

Second, Jinghui argued certain academic ideas about Buddhism were wrong because of their negative effects on Buddhists and Buddhist institutions. For example, Jinghui stated that a real monk who practices meditation in the Han Buddhist tradition knows that he must adhere to traditional teachings such as the Tathāgatagarbha: “A real monk, someone who works hard in Chan practice, would not leave behind these doctrines.” But because of monks such as Yinshun who introduced academic ideas into Chinese Buddhism, Buddhism has become chaotic and faith in Buddhism weakened:

[Buddhist] doctrines have become disordered, and faith weakened… In China since the Reform period, in mainland Buddhism, [Yinshun] has had an extremely bad influence.

300 See Griffiths 1999, Cabezón 1994, and Nance 2012 for arguments that traditional Buddhist scholastics take the ultimate coherence of Buddhist teachings as a fundamental article of faith.

301 思想搞乱了, 信仰淡化了。这跟信仰淡化, 从学问上来讲, 印顺法师起了极不好的作用。改革开放以后的中国，大陆佛教，起了极坏的影响
In his argumentation, Jinghui also drew on a common theme in contemporary Chinese Communist Party discourse, namely that it is acceptable to question peripheral issues in Communist ideology but that it is forbidden to question fundamentals.\textsuperscript{302} Thus monks such as Yinshun were wrong because through their writings

...something fundamental was destabilized. The doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha is fundamental. The \textit{Treatise on the Arising of Mahayana Faith} is [also] fundamental.

根本东西动摇了。所以这个如来藏的思想，这是个根本。起信论是个根本。

Similarly, in the Chinese state-run media, warnings that public discourse cannot “destabilize 动摇” the national foundations are common. Thus in his argumentation about fundamentals, Jinghui employs state mandated norms of discourse. In topics such as economic and political theory, even academics cannot breach such norms with impunity. Of course, the scope of the public norm against criticizing fundamentals pertains to Communist ideology, not Buddhist doctrine, and so Jinghui’s use of such argumentation is directed at other Buddhists rather than at secular scholars.

Jinghui has also sometimes drawn on a related type of rhetoric, common in Chinese cultural nationalist discourse and sometimes employed by the Communist Party, asserting China’s uniqueness. In such discourse, assertion often substitutes for argumentation, and the basic template is that certain foreign ideas are unsuited to China because China is unique. For example, according to a former philosophy PhD student at Wuhan University, Jinghui asserted “that Chinese culture cannot rely on Western science

\textsuperscript{302} In current Party orthodoxy, the most famous of the fundamental dogmas are the Four Cardinal Principles 四项基本原则, which were first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979. These principles are that China must persist in (1) socialism, (2) people’s democratic dictatorship, (3) leadership of the Communist Party, and (4) Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism (Baum 1994).
and reason, that Chinese culture has its own special characteristics, and its own road to travel” (Huang Jiahui 2013, 96). 303

Chinese Buddhists also employ other generalized apologetic responses to reject academic viewpoints. While Jinghui uses various kinds of arguments, his last statement cited above about the limitations of Western science and reason also alludes to a more generalized approach, according to which the academic enterprise of Buddhist studies is inherently and incorrigibly flawed. The basic premise of this approach is that any research scholars do is dubious because they are ordinary, unenlightened humans. A corollary of this approach is that scholars might rightly understand Buddhism, but only if they conform to Buddhist scriptures, traditions, and enlightened masters.

Examples of this omnibus apologetic approach are easy to find on Chinese blogs, some of which are affiliated with Buddhist seminaries. A blog for alumni of the Minnan Buddhist Seminary, for example, includes a webpage with the following heading: “How is scholarship produced? It is through a device of non-Buddhists!!!” 304 The basic argument of the blog entry is that secular scholarship is wrong because the European founders of Buddhist studies lacked faith in Buddhism. The seminary blog appears to draw from another blog post attributed to a Taiwanese Buddhist, which states its core argument as follows: “Actually, as long as he is not Buddhist, the research of any scholar is problematic—why is that? [Because he’s] an ordinary worldling! 其实，只是不是佛

303 中国文化不能靠西方的科学与理性，中国文化有自己的特色，有自己的路. See chapter four on Jinghui’s funding of an academic program at Wuhan University.

304 This post is available at http://nanputuo.com/nptcls/ViewThread.asp?TopicID=170 (last updated 30 Dec. 2005; last accessed 13 June 2015). The term “non-Buddhist” translates waidao 外道, which has negative connotations similar to the English word “heretic.”
The author of this second blog expresses his or her hope that all scholars who teach Buddhism be Buddhists.

A third post in the Chinese blogosphere, which has also been re-posted on multiple websites, exemplifies an extreme in suspicion about secular scholarship on Buddhism. This author evinces no hope that secular Buddhist studies could benefit Buddhism:

Many people think that the conclusions reached through Buddhist studies research are scientific and progressive, and accord with academic standards. But personally, I think that contemporary Buddhist studies is a shortcut for sentient beings to go straight to the Hell of Torture without Respite; it is the butchering grounds for the wisdom heritage of Buddhist disciples; it is the brutal verdict of atheists upon religion; and it is the most arrogant distortion, through the knowledge and views of ordinary worldlings, of what the sages have personally verified.

This third author blames Western scholars and the Japanese clerics they “brainwashed” for the spread of pernicious ideas about Buddhism, and identifies Yinshun as a monk whose advocacy of such ideas has led novice Buddhist practitioners to their spiritual demise. Drawing on scriptural Buddhist terminology, the author calls those who advocate such ideas “Dharma-slanderers” and compares their words to narcotics:

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305 This blog posting is available on many different websites. See for example: http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_4899c61801008uld.html (posting dated to 2008).

306 See for example: http://tieba.baidu.com/p/1038028247 (posting dated with appended date to 30 March 2011; last accessed 6 March 2015)

307 很多人都认为，通过现代佛学研究所得出来的结论，是科学，是先进的，是具有学术水准的。但是我个人认为，现代的佛学研究是众生通往无间地狱的捷径，是佛子慧命的屠宰场，是无神论者对宗教残酷的裁决，是以凡夫知见对圣人证量最狂妄的曲解。
If you don’t have the necessary strength of character, if you consume illegal drugs you’ll be poisoned to death. If you don’t have the necessary wisdom and you go read Dharma-slandering speech and perverse views, your affinity with wisdom, and your life of spiritual practice, will also be terminated.\textsuperscript{308}

It is difficult to know how widespread such anti-academic views are in the Chinese sangha. It is not clear whether the author of this blog is associated with a seminary or is even a monastic. The practical imperative, however, is simple and well known to seminarians: do not read materials that might undermine your faith in fundamental Mahayana Buddhist teachings. For example, the conclusion of a paper presented by the monk Changzhao 常照 at a conference for seminarians was that Mahayana scriptures should be pre-selected as unfalsifiable and superior.\textsuperscript{309} If reading “external” (non-Buddhist) writings or Hinayana Buddhist scriptures causes one to falter in one’s faith toward the Mahayana, one should stop reading them. Changzhao’s argument is buttressed with support from vinaya texts, sutra commentaries, and major sutras. Furthermore, Changzhao argues, with a scriptural citation, those who are “stupid, of little wisdom, and unable to distinguish things clearly 愚痴少慧不分明者” should not be allowed to read non-Buddhist writings (\textit{Di’er jie} 2013, 236-37).

I suggest that in some Buddhist circles, the operational definition of being “stupid” or “of little wisdom” is being at risk for losing faith in central Buddhist beliefs. From this point of view, and following the approach of resistance, for safety purposes the knowledge imparted to junior seminarians must be filtered. One may teach them

\textsuperscript{308}你没那个素质你吃毒药你会被毒死，你没那个智慧你去看谤法言论看邪见，你的慧命修行生命也就会终结。

\textsuperscript{309} In his oral presentation, Changzhao introduced himself as having studies as a seminarian at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary for the past six years.
dangerous academic knowledge only if one can convincingly show them it is false. Otherwise it is best to remain silent.

If academic knowledge about Buddhism continues to grow, those who resist it will require more responses to such scholarship. Otherwise the scope of their silence will grow, too.

*Debate and Diversity*

I have demonstrated the diversity of monastic responses to academic discourse. The viewpoints presented above largely come from the lectures or interviews with seminary leaders. But ordinary seminarians also express the same range of opinions. The monastic conference mentioned above, the annual Research Conference for Chinese Buddhist Schools (chapter two), is a venue in which debate over academic viewpoints can be observed.

The monk-seminarian Guoci’s presentation at this conference exemplifies accommodation, and his critical questioning by a monk-seminarian from the audience exemplifies resistance. For a summary of Guoci’s presentation and a partial translation of the critical exchange with the audience member, see appendix 2.

The main thrust of Guoci’s presentation is that scriptural accounts of the Buddha can be divided into two classes, one historical, one figurative. Earlier scriptures tend to be more historical and Mahayana scriptures are more figurative. Guoci argues that to do historical research, one must use the historically accurate passages and exclude the figurative, mythological passages. Guoci does not mention Yinshun, but Guoci’s de-mythologizing approach to Buddhist history is consistent with Yinshun’s controversial
agenda.\textsuperscript{310} In short, Guoci’s presentation challenges the traditional guiding beliefs about Buddhas and scriptures discussed earlier in this chapter, according to which scriptures are literally true and Mahayana scriptures are superior to earlier scriptures.

The monk questioning Guoci rejects the distinction between historical and figurative kinds of scripture, and challenges Guoci for apparent his lack of faith. This opponent appeals to the authority of Mahayana Buddhist saints:

If you do not have faith in the Mahayana, then may I ask you, why is it that the great virtuous patriarchs, who achieved spiritual realization, those from both East and West [=India], how is it that they had faith?

In my fieldwork observations, this contention—that traditional Chinese Buddhist beliefs must be right because authorities (both historically famous saints and respected senior monastics) believed them—is extremely common in the Chinese sangha.

The conference audience of about one hundred people, mainly monks, was very engaged during this exchange of views. Judging from the volume of the applause, the audience was also equally divided in its support for Guoci and for his opponent.

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\textsuperscript{310} Yinshun’s views have already been discussed. Jiang Canteng (1996, 495) argues that the essence of Yinshun’s demythologizing project is encapsulated in the following passage Yinshun published in 1984: “This pantheistic [interpretation of the] Buddhadharma (a repackaging of primitive religious animism) cannot deceive my intelligence nor my resolution to make selective decisions through the use of historical verification based on the Buddhism of this world… Assured that the decline of the Buddhadharma is connected to its deification and vulgarization in the course of its evolution, we should vigorously rise against the bondage of tradition and against our mystified hypnotized state, and make efforts for the sake of the pure and correct Buddhadharma!”

泛神化（低級宗教「萬物有靈」的改裝）的佛法,不能蒙蔽我[印順]的理智,決定要通過人間的佛教史證加以抉擇。……確認佛法的衰落,與演化中神化、俗化有關,那麼應從傳統束縛, 神秘催眠狀態中,振作起來,為純正的佛法而努力!
I have argued that the Chinese sangha is divided in how it responds to academic discourse, and that such divisions are especially clear among seminary-affiliated monastics. The responses of accommodation, compromise, and resistance can be mutually incompatible. It is not possible, for example, to advocate the critical demythologization of a scripture and to also advocate the scripture’s literal truth. Another division within the Chinese sangha is how to respond to other forms of Buddhism, especially Tibetan and Theravada Buddhism. There appears to be an overlap between Chinese monastics who accommodate secular scholarship and those who express an interest in Theravada Buddhism. This elective affinity derives from the fact that certain modernist streams of Theravada Buddhism appear to be more compatible with secular scholarship than traditional Chinese Mahayana Buddhism is.

From a broader perspective, I suggest that Chinese Buddhism is facing two forces, the centrifugal force of globalization and the centripetal force of nationalism. Academic knowledge and different Buddhist traditions are being globalized and appeal to some members of the Chinese sangha. On the other hand, Buddhism appeals to many Chinese who seek a return to Chinese traditions and for whom cultural nationalism is appealing. The net impact of these various forces is difficult to chart.

The strength of academic Buddhist studies does not mean that Chinese Buddhist monastics on the whole will necessarily become more accommodating of academic viewpoints. Rather, the net result depends on if accommodating monks become more numerous and influential within the sangha, or if on the contrary they become marginalized or even defect from the monastic order. Welch (1972) described a similar dynamic earlier in the People’s Republic through which the sangha, under intense pressure from the Communist state, actually became more traditional and conservative. In
short, Party-mandated thought reform induced the more liberal, “progressive” monastics to leave the monastic order entirely. Remaining in the sangha were the traditionally minded monastics for whom Communist ideology was unconvincing.

I suspect that a similar phenomenon partly explains why monastics in the PRC are probably more conservative toward academic approaches to Buddhism than monastics in Taiwan. Monastics in the PRC, especially the senior leadership, have needed to make a firm decision, consciously or unconsciously, not to accept the Party’s ideology, which in the final analysis is inimical to religion. If they had fully accepted Communism, they would no longer be monastics. The potentially secularizing challenge of academic discourse partly resembles the secularization efforts of the Communist Party. In the PRC, it is mainly those with strong resistance to such discourse, whether academic or Communist, who have remained in the monastic order for long.

**Conclusion: The Expansion of the Academic Jurisdiction and the Diversification of Chinese Buddhism**

The growth of modern schooling in multiple sectors of Chinese society stimulated Chinese Buddhists to establish schools of their own, and encouraged the post-Cultural Revolution Chinese state to facilitate the proliferation of such seminaries. At the same time, modern schools in tertiary education, especially universities, have incorporated Buddhism as a subject of research. Since academic institutions have different goals, norms, and interests from Buddhist institutions, academics also reach different conclusions about Buddhism. And academic viewpoints on Buddhism often have greater social purchase than the Buddhist monastic interpretations.
I suggest this power differential can be attributed to at least three causes. For one, the Chinese state, particularly at the national level, tends to make policy on the basis of academic rather than religious conceptions of Buddhism (chapters 3 and 4). Thus some academic ideas are indirectly linked to the hard power of the state, whose ideology is ultimately inimical to religions. A second reason is that universities are accepted as places where genuine knowledge is produced, whereas religions are still suspected of preserving not only knowledge but also “superstition迷信.” A third, closely related reason is that academic ideas (including values and norms) are more widely accepted as legitimate in mainstream society. Therefore academic claims about Buddhism also tend to be more persuasive than traditional Buddhist claims, except to Buddhists who maintain faith in the authority of sangha and scripture.

Buddhists have never had a monopoly on speaking about Buddhism in China. For centuries, Confucians, Daoists, authors of fiction, and others have contested Buddhist self-representations. But today this situation is qualitatively different from the past. Now a secular field, academic Buddhist studies, legitimates its very existence on its ability to produce authoritative, critical discourse on Buddhism. Extensive knowledge about Buddhism is thus formally delinked from believing in Buddhism or being a Buddhist. Seminaries are the Buddhist institutions with the most frequent contact with academic knowledge.

Seminaries respond to academia in a variety of ways. One way is to model themselves after universities, a process encouraged by state regulatory agencies. Some practices—adopting certain institutional forms of universities, such as dissertation committees, final oral exams, and diplomas—are not so controversial (chapter 3). More divisive is the question of how to respond to academic ideas, including substantive
conclusions about Buddhist doctrine and history, and at a deeper level, the procedural rules for debate and canons of judgment for reaching such conclusions.

This chapter takes skeptical inquiry as central to academia and has described the range of Buddhist responses to it. Focusing on skepticism about guiding Buddhist beliefs, I have shown that monastic Buddhists respond to academic discourse in a variety of ways, which can be conceptualized along a spectrum ranging from accommodation to resistance. I also suggested that monastics who partially accept academic approaches tend to engage with academia more, whereas those who reject such discourse altogether tend to disengage from academia. Thus there are few critics of academia within the sangha expending effort to show why such scholarship is wrong. Opponents of academia would rather delegitimize academic approaches to Buddhism by not broaching them. Some seminary teachers think academic approaches are useful for limited issues, while other leaders view academic work as distracting or dangerous.

In closing, I suggest the diversity of Buddhist responses to academia points to differentiated schools of thought within Chinese Buddhism that are more salient than traditional divisions such as the eight schools in Chinese Buddhism (chapter 2). Sectarian debates within Chinese Buddhism, such as the differences between Tiantai and Huayan conceptions of Buddha nature, are not crucial issues in the sangha. Today no monastic would be shunned by fellow monastics for his views on such doctrinal issues. Still less relevant to intra-Buddhist debate are the explicit fusions of Buddhist and Marxist doctrines that were promoted before the Cultural Revolution. Instead of incorporating Communist doctrine into Buddhism, Buddhist leaders manage with ritual affirmations of loyalty to the state, often through vague formulas stating that Buddhist doctrine accords
with and can support the latest Party-sponsored slogan (chapter 3).\textsuperscript{311} Nor are the natural sciences salient topics of discussion within monastic Buddhist institutions today. To the extent they pay it any attention, monastics manage to muddle through the relationship between Buddhism and science with arguments, pitched at high levels of abstraction, that Buddhism and science are inherently different and yet somehow still compatible.\textsuperscript{312}

Rather, today one of the most divisive issues in Chinese Buddhism is how to respond to academic knowledge deriving from the field of Buddhist studies. At stake are which questions to engage with, which texts and authorities to consult, and how to interpret them. Another problem is how to respond to non-Sinitic forms of Buddhism, such as Tibetan and Theravada Buddhism.\textsuperscript{313} Here, attitudes toward academic knowledge and schooling also influence Chinese Buddhist responses. For example, Theravada Buddhism gains much of its contemporary legitimacy because some scholars support its claims to be closer in time to the teachings of the historical Buddha.\textsuperscript{314} And Tibetan

\textsuperscript{311} See for example the monk Xuecheng’s (2015) recent statements that Buddhism can support the “core value system of socialism 社会主义核心价值观,” one of the Communist Party’s slogans since 2012.

\textsuperscript{312} Again see the writing of Xuecheng (2008), current president (2015-) of the Buddhist Association of China and the rector of its flagship Chinese Buddhist Seminary. Xuecheng was quoted in the second epigraph in this chapter. In my observations, the kind of blatant Buddhist triumphalism over science, such as that expressed by the monk Taixu (1890-1947) in the first epigraph of this chapter, is on the wane. Instead, the different purposes but complementary nature of science and Buddhism are stressed.

\textsuperscript{313} See Zhihua Yao 2009 and Jones 2011 on the spread of Tibetan Buddhism among Han Buddhists emphasizing the alleged superiority of Tibetan Buddhist rationality. See Dan Smeyer Yü 2012 for more on the spread of Tibetan Buddhism among the Han in the PRC, but with an alternative approach emphasizing the charisma of Tibetan clerics. A study of the spread of Theravada Buddhism among Han Chinese in the PRC has yet to be written. See the Chinese website “觉悟之路” (www.dhamma.org.cn) for resources for Chinese people on Theravada Buddhism, including Buddhist centers in Myanmar for doctrinal study and meditation practice.

\textsuperscript{314} For example, a Chinese webpage advocating Theravada Buddhism states that Chinese monks should be able to accept a Theravada viewpoints on Buddhism “as long as they discard later, man-made elements that
Buddhism gains part of its appeal from its seemingly systematic presentation of teachings which accords with school learning more than Chinese Buddhism does.

Academic knowledge presents a challenge; whether Chinese Buddhists can or will respond effectively is a separate issue. Buddhists have attempted to keep up with social change by establishing seminaries for more than a century. While seminaries largely mimic the form of the modern school, what is taught in seminaries remains an unstable combination of traditional Buddhist knowledge and modern academic knowledge, with traditional approaches predominating. Since seminaries are increasingly important in the formation of Buddhist leadership, how seminaries respond to this challenge will determine the future shape of Chinese Buddhism.

were mixed into Buddhism, and narrow sectarian prejudices; in actuality, there is no such thing as Southern Transmission or Northern Transmission, or Mahayana or Hinayana, there is only one Buddhism—the teachings of the Buddha! 只要抛开后期混杂进佛教中的人为因素，以及宗派的门户偏见，确实没有所谓的南传北传、大乘小乘，佛教只有一种——佛陀的教导！(http://dhamma.sutta.org/books/mahinda/mxd-do%20you%20know%20buddhism.html)
Chapter 6: Conclusion

This study has examined the rise of seminaries in Chinese Buddhism and institutional dynamics that have shaped the forms they take. I have highlighted the role of the state in all of these dynamics. Yet my focus has been on showing the ways in which seminaries are located at the nexus of traditional Buddhist institutions and modern academic institutions. I then analyzed the interactions between these two fields and argued that the academic study of Buddhism challenges and undermines traditional Buddhism.

In chapter one I suggested that some of the difficulties faced by contemporary Buddhism in general and monasticism in particular are not unique to China. Rather, they have a universal aspect, which stems from the challenges of modernity. Modern societies are characterized by the increasing specialization of occupational roles, a process which is reflected by and encouraged by the spread of modern schooling. Throughout the Buddhist world monastics are challenged by occupational specialization and new ways of education, and they have established schools of their own in response. Schooling is promoted within Buddhism both for new forms of training and simply so monastic communities appear legitimate according to new social standards.

In chapter two I showed how this process of establishing schooling within Buddhism has worked in China. I demonstrated that in China schooling, in the form of seminaries, has always been closely connected to state policies. I argued that the degree of state control increased during the PRC (1949-) and that the state also began to use secular scholars to help guide seminaries. I also showed that after the death of Mao Zedong, the proliferation of seminaries has outpaced the growth in monastic recruits.
Seminaries are now central to Chinese Buddhist monasticism, both for the production of newer generations of leaders and the training of average monastics.

In chapter three I introduced the basic components of the seminary, and I showed how seminaries relate to monasteries. I also showed how current state policies are affecting Buddhism and seminaries. Surprisingly, the Communists state’s policies actually consolidate the position of monastics as authorities within Buddhism. In official regulations, only ordained monks and nuns are clergy (jiaozhi renyuan 教职人员) and only clergy may accept religious donations and operate certain kinds of religious establishments. This in turn places more pressure on monastics to be trained and credentialed in ways acceptable to the state and academic authorities with whom they interact. Finally the state offers incentives for seminaries to become more like secular institutions of higher education. Some seminaries follow such incentives, while others experiment with mixed traditional and modern forms of training. On the whole, seminaries seem to be balancing between adapting to modern secular educational forms on the one hand and wanting to develop a unique niche for monastic education on the other.

In chapter four I outlined the history of academic Buddhist studies in the PRC. Like seminaries, Buddhist studies has been closely connected to state policies. I argue that the academic study of Buddhism is now an essential component in the set of institutions that will determine the future of Buddhism. I show that in contrast to Buddhist institutions, academia is generally more powerful and legitimate in the eyes of the state and mainstream society. But I also argue that monastic institutions remain authoritative within the minority of the population that is strongly Buddhist. I also show
how monastic institutions, particularly through financial incentives, encourage academic institutions to pursue certain kinds of research.

In chapter five I highlight the pressures that academic Buddhist studies produces for seminaries and the traditional Buddhist learning seminaries promote. I argue that while seminaries have adopted the form of the modern school, the knowledge they teach is still largely traditional, and is founded on norms of inquiry different from those in the modern academy. I argue that this gap in norms of inquiry, and the resulting gap in conceptions of Buddhism, challenges seminaries to accommodate, resist, or negotiate with academic Buddhist studies.

Furthermore I suggest that different responses to academic understandings of Buddhism produce new forms of diversity within Buddhist communities. To use a term from physics, Buddhist studies has powerful observer effects on Buddhism. Just as journalists not only passively report on political events but also fundamentally shape political dynamics through their very reporting, scholars of Buddhism inevitably influence Buddhist institutions and teachings. Complicating these dynamics is the fact that Chinese Buddhists incorporate elements of other Buddhist traditions, including Tibetan Buddhism and Theravada Buddhism, in formulating their responses. Even in this cross-fertilization among Buddhist traditions, scholarship plays a central role as mediator and arbitrator. Chinese Buddhists often learn more about other Buddhist traditions through academic works and sometimes appeal to scholarship when they adjudicate between the mutually incompatible claims between such traditions.

In sum, I have discussed certain institutional changes, the causes of such changes, and the implications of such changes in Chinese Buddhism. That is, I have argued that seminaries now supplement and partially replace monasteries, that the expansion of
seminaries derives from both specific state policies and broader social dynamics favoring the schooling of society, and that these institutional innovations alter the conditions under which Buddhist doctrinal understandings are assessed and distributed. In the last two chapters, I emphasize how seminaries relate to their secular counterparts, academic institutions for the study of Buddhism. Here a central argument is that academic Buddhist studies is a special case of increasing institutional specialization and the partial divesting of religious institutions of their traditional roles. Such increasing specialization is twofold in modernity: secular institutions study Buddhism, and Buddhist monastics themselves are educated about Buddhism in a wider variety of institutions, including monasteries, seminaries, and universities.

Broader social changes force institutional change within Buddhism which in turn exacerbates pressure on traditional Buddhist doctrinal understandings. Some challenges are subtle. For example, the expansion of modern medicine is probably partially responsible for the decline in forms of folk medicine that used to boost monastic recruitment (i.e., the belief in central China that making a young boy a monk would save him from serious illness, or the belief in Manchuria that possession by evil spirits is cured by becoming a monk). In contrast, scholars of Buddhist studies challenge monastics in ways that are central to monastic cultural prestige and self-understanding.

Worldwide, scholars have acquired varying degrees of authority to proclaim on what Buddhism has been and what it means. In China, given the Confucian heritage of its intellectuals and the Caesaropapist ideology of its rulers, academics are additionally empowered to proclaim on what Buddhism should be. Furthermore, scholars have professional incentives to continually make such pronouncements, many of which disrupt traditional Buddhist conceptions. Monastics must decide how to respond to this new
reality—not just to the new ideas about Buddhism in isolation, but also to the new institutional realities in which the ideas are embedded.
Appendixes

The following appendixes are included in this dissertation.

Appendix 1 Editorial Board of the Journal *Foxue Yanjiu*

Appendix 2 Conference Presentation by Guoci

Appendix 3 Interview with Jinghui (1933-2013)

Appendix 4 Interview with Jiqun (1962-)

Appendix 5 Han Buddhist Seminaries

Appendix 6 Organizational Charts of Buddhist Seminaries

Appendix 7 Seminary Entrance Examinations

Appendix 8 Religious Studies in the Nomenclature of Academic Fields

Appendix 9 Number of Han Buddhist Monastics

Appendix 10 Graduates of Two Seminaries

Appendix 11 Buddhist Seminaries during the Republic of China (1912-1949)

Appendix 12 Religious Studies Institutions

Appendix 13 Educational Principles and Curriculum in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary

Appendix 14 Glossary of Chinese Terms
## Appendix 1: Editorial Board of the Journal *Foxue Yanjiu* 佛学研究 (Buddhist Studies Research)

Source: *Foxue Yanjie* (2013), cover page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lay/Monk</th>
<th>Primary Affiliation(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shengkai</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Qinghua University</td>
<td>Executive editor (<em>zhixing zhubian</em> 执行主编) of the journal. Received his PhD from Nanjing University. Also executive vice rector of a small seminary in Beijing, the Beijing Institute for Buddhist Culture.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiangxue</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>Vice rector at Chinese Buddhist Seminary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li Silong</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Peking University (religion)</td>
<td>Professor of religious studies at Peking University. Advisor for curriculum issues for the Benhuan Academy seminary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wu Xianlin</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Buddhist Association of China, research division</td>
<td>See <a href="http://www.dadunet.com/106-111-view-111-201110-48938-1.html">http://www.dadunet.com/106-111-view-111-201110-48938-1.html</a> (中国佛教文化研究所研究员)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hua Fangtian</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>CASS (religion)</td>
<td>Name removed from the editorial board in the next issue of the journal. I never saw him at CASS. Presumably deceased.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yuanci园慈</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td>One of the five monks that Zhao Puchu sent to Sri Lanka in 1986. He went on to earn a PhD from SOAS in the UK, just like Jingyin, another of the five monks sent to Sri Lanka.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Song Lidao</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Buddhist Association of China, head of the academic division</td>
<td>Main editor (<em>zhubian</em> 主编) of the journal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yang Zengwen</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>CASS (retired) and Renmin University</td>
<td>See <a href="http://iwr.cass.cn/zj/txxz/yzw/grjj/200912/t20091229_1641.htm">http://iwr.cass.cn/zj/txxz/yzw/grjj/200912/t20091229_1641.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Renmin University (religion)</td>
<td>Organizes religious studies classes at Renmin University for religious studies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Title/Status</td>
<td>Institution/Role</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fenglei</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Buddhist Association of China, member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Congress, Nationalities and Religions Committee</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhang Qi</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Former abbot of several monasteries; founder of the Hebei Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jinghui</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Deceased, 20 April 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zongxing</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Vice rector and dean of teaching affairs at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang Xianian</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Advisor for curriculum issues for the Benhuan Academy seminary. Son of another prominent scholar of Buddhism in China, Huang Xinchuan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhanru</td>
<td>monk</td>
<td>Peking University (South Asian studies), Nankai University (philosophy), Head of the education committee of the BAC. Spearheading efforts to gain state-recognized degrees for seminaries. Vice rector of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lou Yulie</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Peking University (religion), Professor of religious studies, Popular guest lecturer at Buddhist seminaries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lai Yonghai</td>
<td>layman</td>
<td>Nanjing University (religion), Former PhD advisor of Shengkai, the executive editor of this journal, Director of the Chinese Culture Research Institute, described in appendix 12. Rector of the Jiangsu Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All eighteen board members are men, six of them monks. From this table, it is apparent that the editors are drawn from a mixture of institutions, including universities, seminaries, and state-related academic and religious institutions. Many of the professors on this editorial board also interact closely with Buddhist seminaries, giving advice on curricula to them (ex., Huang Xianian, Li Silong), being invited to give lectures at them (ex., Lou Yulie), and even serving as rector of a seminary (ex., Lai Yonghai). Others, including Zhang Fenglei, have also served as instructors in courses financed by the United Front Department or by lay Buddhist donors for monastics at universities, notably at Renmin University, Beijing.

Two of the four monastics in mainland PRC who work as university professors are listed on the editorial board of this journal (Shengkai and Zhanru). The other two are Weishan 惟善, a professor at Renmin Univeristy, and Jingyin 净因, a professor at Nanjing University.

The 2014 edition of *Foxue Yanjiu* deleted the names of Hua Fangtian and Jinghui, and also added Nengren 能仁, presumably a monk, to the board.
Appendix 2: Conference Presentation by Guoci

Occasion: Question and answer session during conference
Location: Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary, Zhejiang Province
Date: 20 April 2013

Introduction

The monk Guoci 果慈, affiliated with the Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary in Zhejiang Province, made a presentation at a conference for Chinese Buddhist seminarians called the Second Annual Student Thesis Research Conference for Chinese Buddhist Schools. Titled “A Preliminary Investigation of Chinese-language Biographies of the Buddha in Documents and Scriptures” (Di’er jie 2013, 1-12), Guoci’s paper in the pre-circulated conference volume opened with a de-mythologizing agenda, claiming that one can “…distinguish two senses of [the term] World-honored One [=Buddha]; one is the historical, actually existing and human World-honored One, and the other is the World-honored One as an [object of] faith. 世尊示现于世,可分为两种意义上的世尊: 一历史上真实存在的人类的世尊, 另一方面即作为信仰上的世尊.” (Di’er jie 2013, 1).

His paper then compared different versions of the Buddha’s biography, mainly in Chinese but also with mention of Pali and Tibetan versions. Guoci’s main point, in both his paper and verbal presentation, was that there were many discrepancies between different accounts that remain to be resolved. An important subtext was that the Hinayana texts that present a more human Buddha were historically prior to, and probably more accurate than, later Mahayana texts presenting the Buddha as a transcendent divinity. He still hedged his critical arguments with ambiguous claims that, for example, in constructing a complete biography of the Buddha from available sources, people should take care to “have both religious faith and have objective historical facts 要有宗教信仰又要有客观史实” (2013, 12).

A monk in the audience noted that Guoci’s presentation challenged centuries of Chinese Buddhist tradition. During the question and answer session after the panel, this monk questioned Guoci’s claims. Below I have transcribed parts of both the monk’s critical questions and Guoci’s response.

Transcript of Part of the Question and Answer Session.

Monk from the audience:

Amitābha Buddha! Good day, Dharma masters! I have a question I would like to ask Ven. Guoci. In your description you divided the World-Honored One in two ways, one was truly existing, one was existing in faith, the former was as objective history, the latter was as a theoretical [spiritual] realizer… As for the wording in these various distinctions… [you state] that in the scriptures narrating the events in the Buddha’s life, there are not only historical materials, but also variously recorded, faith-[based] miraculous stories, as well as human-derived legends with mythological elements. [You claim that] some scriptures describe [the Buddha’s] life in simple, plain language, whereas other scriptures describing the Buddha’s life are replete with elements that make him into a divinity…
After technical remarks about Guoci’s use of evidence from different versions of the *Nirvana Sutra*, the monk continued with his main criticism. This opponent, but not Guoci, began and ended his comments with a traditional Chinese Buddhist greeting, “Amitābha Buddha!” I suggest the use of this greeting ritually signals one’s adherence to Chinese Buddhist tradition.

Can we infer that, as for the Buddha preached in Mahayana Buddhist biographies … [as for the] Ten Powers, Four Fearlessnesses, and Eighteen Distinct Characteristics and various other such shared and distinct virtues of the Buddhas, is it that you cannot fully accept them? If you have faith in Mahayana, then the type of claims and methods just described should not have appeared. If you do not have faith in the Mahayana, then may I ask you, why is it that the great virtuous patriarchs, who achieved spiritual realization, from both the East and the West [=India], how is it that they had faith? Why don’t you believe? Could it be that I have misunderstood your arguments—could you please correct me. Amitābha Buddha!

The panel moderator spoke a few words, and then Guoci responded as follows.

**Guoci:**

In the section on the Buddha’s biography in the *Nirvana Sutra*, I already [in my paper] made my distinctions clear. For example, in Mahayana scriptural texts, what is emphasized are the highest levels of spiritual attainment as the Buddha describes them. I’m not sure if you already read what I wrote on this or not. And [I write] that Hinayana scriptures describe historical facts…

After describing some historical issues, none of which address the pointed questions of the monk questioning him, Guoci concluded his response as follows. Guoci seemed to be nervous in this part of his response.

…[regarding] the expressions “faith in Mahayana or in Hinayana,” I feel that in these times, these days, I feel that, if the distinction is made between Mahayana and Hinayana, this is already not too, not too excessively reasonable. I feel that we should say “Southern Transmission Buddhism” or “Northern Transmission Buddhism.” If [spoken] in this way, perhaps it would be a bit more, relatively, reasonable. As soon as you put it in terms of the distinction between Mahayana and Hinayana, you are already discriminating, I feel. I feel that we should discriminate… and I feel that we should doubt this discrimination. I feel that we should doubt the distinction between Mahayana and Hinayana. I feel that we should doubt the distinction between Mahayana and Hinayana.
This debate between Guoci and his opponent highlights the fact that it is often impossible to be neutral when discussing other forms of Buddhism. For example, traditionally in Chinese Buddhism, the forms of Buddhism in contemporary South and Southeast Asia are called Hinayana. The term Hinayana is inherently deprecating. But alternative terms such as Southern Buddhism (nanchuan fojiao 南传佛教, lit. “Southern Transmission Buddhism”) are neologisms. By using such terms, one implicitly challenges the traditional view, reflected in major Buddhist scriptures and histories, that the Mahayana is a vastly superior tradition of Buddhism.

In short, the traditional Chinese Buddhist view is that the Mahayana and Hinayana are separate and unequal traditions. The modernist, ecumenical view in China is that the Mahayana and Southern Buddhism are historically separate yet complementary. Most Chinese Buddhists probably adhere to the traditional view and most Southern (i.e. Theravada) Buddhists regard the Mahayana as non-canonical at best or even as heretical. Such stark differences of opinion curtail the prospects for regional Buddhist ecumenicalism, in spite of efforts, often state sanctioned, to promote Asian unity through Buddhism.
Appendix 3: Interview with Jinghui (1933-2003)

Below are sections from an interview with Jinghui, founder and former rector of the Hebei Provincial Buddhist Seminary. Jinghui was one of seventy-some monks who enrolled in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in 1956. From 1980 until his death, Jinghui was among the most influential monks in China. In 1981 he became an editor (then chief editor from 1983 to 2002) of the flagship journal of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC), Fayin. In 1988 he organized the first conference attended by representatives from both academic and monastic circles and was selected as president of the Buddhist Association of Hebei Province.

Then in 1993 Jinghui was selected as a vice president of the BAC and began the first in an annual series of Buddhist summer camps, whose participants have included students from China’s top universities. Several of his monastic disciples have attained positions of regional or national leadership, including Minghai 明海, Mingjie 明杰, Mingying 明影, and Mingzhuang 明奘 (Mingzhuang laicized in the year 2013).

Abbreviations
JH: Jinghui
GILDOW: Douglas Gildow
PROFESSOR: One of the two professors present throughout most of the interview who spoke. (Two other professors attended parts of the interview but did not speak.)

xxx Words are unclear on the recording
X Word has been deleted to protect confidentiality
汉字 Dotted underline indicates unusual usage or ambiguous wording in the transcribed text
[= ] Emendations in the Chinese transcription by Gildow; English translation reflects such emendations
[ ] Additional gloss added by Gildow
…… ellipsis
— sharp break/transition in the dialog
—— pause in the dialog

The excerpts below appear in the order they were spoken.

I ask Jinghui about the differences between Buddhist seminary education before and after the Cultural Revolution, and he emphasizes the difference in the kinds of political indoctrination.

GILDOW: Actually, I’m also interested in these differences, the emphases in education stressed before and after the Cultural Revolution (CR), and also in the transitions in issues such as the curricular content and the underlying educational philosophy.

JH: Basically, as for the training before the CR, although there were curricular requirements, we in that batch of people were all born before Liberation, born before ‘49, so as for those of us in that batch? They had to adapt [us] to this [new]
system, because in those times, in the general background there was the issue of though reform. In those times there was the problem of learning and being re-shaped according to the Chinese Communist Party’s [requirements]. That is one difference [from today].

PROFESSOR: That is, changing from the Old Society to the New Society.

JH: So for their generation, there wasn’t the problem of thought reform. They were all born after Liberation. Within the [shared] background [requirement] of “love the country and love the religion,” the [specific content in this requirement to] love country and love religion was two completely different things. Thought reform was a painful process, completely changing your concepts of life and the world. For them, it was [just] a process of training. For us, it was a process of being re-formed. [Understanding] these two distinct characteristics is extremely important.

Jinghui describes the different requirements for the state inspection (i.e., censorship) for the two official BAC journals, *Modern Buddhist Learning* (1950-1964) and *Fayin* (1981-present).

JH: So, basically there was no freedom; when the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) was publishing *Modern Buddhist Learning*, there was basically no freedom. Then in the period of *Fayin*, there was relative freedom. In the *Fayin* period, I was running *Fayin* from the start.

PROFESSOR: [So when] the BAC was [publishing] *Modern Buddhist Learning*, there was very little freedom.

JH: Very little—the draft for every issue had to be sent to the State Religious Affairs Bureau for inspection.

GILDOW: Prior inspection[before publication]?

JH: Yes.

GILDOW: What about *Fayin*?

JH: *Fayin* didn’t have to be inspected. The government’s Religious Affairs Bureau didn’t have to inspect *Fayin*, the regulations were not to [have to] inspect it, and we ourselves would finalize the draft. Drafts of important articles would be sent to the [BAC] president to take a look, and sent to the [BAC] deputy secretary-general who was a Party member at the time, and that would be all. [For important articles] in Dharma Master Juzan’s time, they would take a look, and that was good enough.

315 At this point, Jinghui glances at a professor in the room who was a seminarian in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary beginning in 1980.
JH: 所以...基本的没有自由，《现代佛学》佛协时期基本没有自由，到了《法音》时期就有相对的自由，《法音》时期，《法音》一开始就是我在办。

PROFESSOR: 《现代佛学》佛协自由很小
JH: 很小，每一期稿子都送到国家宗教局去审。
D: 先审？
JH: 先审。
D: 《法音》呢？
JH: 《法音》不用审。《法音》政府宗教局它不审，规定不审，就是我们自己定稿。
       有重要的稿子送给会长看一下，送给当时党员的副秘书长看一下就可以了，
       xxx 方面巨赞法师的时候他们看一下就可以了。

Jinghui claims that from the perspective of the pre-CR state, the main point of sponsoring Buddhist institutions was to facilitate diplomatic initiatives.

JH: Back then patriotism meant being re-formed, now patriotism means being trained.
PROFESSOR: But in that time, wasn’t the intention in running the Buddhist seminary to raise the level of quality [of the monks]?
JH: Yes, there was also that, from the perspective of us within Buddhism, there was that; from the government’s perspective these people [in the seminary] were to be re-formed. After re-forming them, because there was still religion in foreign countries, you had to deal with it.

PROFESSOR: Dealing with foreigners.
JH: 那时爱国是改造，现在爱国是培养。
PROFESSOR: 但是那时办佛学院的初衷还是想把风台的水平质量提高。
JH: 那也是有的，从我们教内人讲它的目标那是有的，从政府的人来讲这些人的改
       造，改造完以后因为外国还有宗教，你必须要应付这个。

PROFESSOR: 应付外面。
JH: 外事。

Jinghui reviews early religious affairs policies in the Reform (1978-) period. He indicates that a shift in state policies Buddhism occurred around 1985.

JH: What was called implementation of religious [affairs] policies occurred in 1979.
Implementation of religious policies could be said to consist of two aspects. One involved religious activity venues; there had to be religious venues. Yet what was primary was [religious] people; people included two kinds, one called “religious personages” and another called the “believing masses.” Religious personages meant the upper level persons within the religious sector, and the believing masses were the ordinary ones. There were these two kinds of people [specified in policies]. The new religious policies let them [all] have religious freedom. Next was the issue of venues. There were two problems to resolve. The first involved [policies on] religious personages, for these religious personages, one [issue] was having them resume their religious work, and most of them had been accused of various crimes either during or before the CR. For example, I was [labeled] a Rightist. So [the new policy also] included redress for religious personages.
JH: 1979年就叫做落实宗教政策，落实宗教政策应是包括2个方面。一个是宗教活动场所。要有这个宗教场所。因为首先是人，人分两种，一种叫宗教人士，一个叫信教群众。宗教人士是指宗教界的上层人士，信教群众指的是普通的。这两部分的人。新的宗教政策让他们有宗教自由。接下来是场所的问题，要解决是两个问题，一是落实宗教人士，这些宗教人士，一个是让他们恢复他们所从事的宗教工作，大部分都在文革中或更以前打成了各种各样的罪名。比如说我是右派，这就包括对宗教界人士进行平反。

JH: Now [with] South Korea and Japan there have been some bad [developments?], and the Three Country Golden Bond\(^{316}\) of Buddhism is not necessarily so important. Tears have appeared in this golden bond, so there is some difficulty in continuing that project. This is because the BAC involves two kinds of work, one foreign affairs, the other domestic affairs. For a period of time foreign affairs dictated domestic affairs; that is, if foreign affairs required something, the domestic affairs would follow accordingly. Later, someone proposed domestic affairs be the foundation—only if your foundation is stable can your foreign affairs activities be [successful], and you can have real content. So then it was reversed, and internal affairs became foundational.

PROFESSOR: This was after Reform and Opening?
JH: Yes, after Reform and Opening. At the beginning, foreign affairs still dictated internal affairs.
GILDOW: When did this transition occur?
JH: This transition, must have been from ‘85 and after.

Like other informants I have spoken with, Jinghui indicates that a branch seminary was in operation before the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was officially opened late in 1980.

JH: Regional Buddhist seminaries began starting in 1980, when [the revival began with] establishing a regional Buddhist seminary. The branch of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, the Lingyanshan branch, they began with that one. First there was the

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\(^{316}\) The “three-country golden bond” refers to a slogan Zhao Puchu (1907-2000) promoted during the 1990s, advocating the use of Buddhism in cultural diplomacy between China, South Korea, and Japan. Recently (in 2016) Chinese have used the term “golden bond” to refer to Buddhism’s possible role as a link between China and ASEAN member states.
Like most of my informants, especially among seminary administrators, Jinghui identifies insufficiently qualified instructors as the weakest part of contemporary seminaries.

PROFESSOR: What do you think of contemporary Buddhist education? What are your thoughts? Or suggestions?

JH: The capacity of the faculty, raising the level of the teachers, that’s a key issue, because now the teachers in the Buddhist seminaries, most of them were trained in the same seminary in which they teach. They’re young Dharma teachers, and so their abilities are relatively limited, and they are too young, how could they teach by personal example? They’re not really able to serve as exemplary models in terms of either studies or religious cultivation. This is among the most essential problems. This is an issue not only within Buddhist education, but also in secular education—teachers are unable to serve as exemplary models.

[Looking at a professor present in the room] Sorry, Teacher X!

PROFESSOR: I don’t mind, I don’t mind at all, not at all, ha ha, certainly this is a problem.

JH: It’s extremely important [for teachers] to serve as exemplary models, it’s been like this from ancient times to the present.

Jinghui responds to questions about whether or not monastics who pursue advanced degrees in secular universities are helpful to Buddhism. His evaluation is surprisingly negative considering the funding Jinghui has provided to academic institutions.

JH: It depends on how you look at it. From my perspective, I feel that their intentions are just to become gilded!

PROFESSOR: Back then [when I was teaching a class for monastics in a secular institution], I had various thoughts about it.

JH: Being gilded by getting a diploma, and then after one has a diploma? Then one’s real status and living conditions are different. I feel that this has nothing to do with the development of Buddhism per se, and is just [a monastic’s] private business. Of course, there might be individual cases of those who really want to learn, this should depend on [individual cases?]. Teacher X, do you feel that my estimation [of the value monastics pursuing advanced secular degrees] is too negative?

PROFESSOR:我那时候，各有心思。
Jinghui responds to Gildow’s questions about how Chinese Buddhists should respond to sensitive questions such as the authenticity of Mahayana scriptures, and of the doctrine of Tathāgatagarbha. He implies that viewing various Buddhist doctrines as non-contradictory should be a guiding assumption, rather than a conclusion, of Buddhist studies. He also begins a critique of Yinshun (1906-2005), one of the most controversial monks in contemporary China.

JH: In Chinese Han Buddhist circles, these questions cannot be discussed——this is because the core of Han Buddhism, the content of its faith, is Mahayana Buddhism, and the core of its faith is Tathāgatagarbha thought. So, no matter what, in Han Buddhism, even if you want to break through these, you will not succeed. Um, in Han Buddhist thought, prājña and dependent origination, emptiness of nature and the Tathāgatagarbha, these are not contradictory. It’s only that the academic sector still wants to see these [distinct] things as contradictory. Because in Buddhism, lots of scriptures reflect the content of such ideas in the same scripture. So, how can you say things like they are contradictory, that these contradictions need to be harmonized. Right? So, in Han Buddhism, these problems arise from the perspective of looking at texts. Scholars approach these problems based on the sources of such ideas. [But] Han Buddhism looks at these as [parts of] an integral whole. These scholars, they take up these things as if they were isolated from one another. They feel that these things are mutually incompatible. But actually, this is not true. There are no dharmas in the world that are independently established. They are all mutually encompassing. But they [scholars] feel these are all completely different, [saying things like] “this isn’t Buddhism,” “this is Buddhism.” Such ideas are those of Japanese people, such ideas were influenced by the Japanese. Later, Dharma Master Yinshun, in regards to this issue, he was influenced by the Japanese. Great Master Taixu was not like that. Therefore, his—Dharma Master Yinshun [’s ideas] are not truths. [I mean] the Yinshun in Taiwan.317

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317 In China there is currently another prominent monk named Yinshun (1974-), who succeeded the venerated monk Benhuan (1907-2012) as abbot of Hongfa Monastery in Shenzhen. This younger Yinshun also attended this interview for about twenty minutes, and happened to be in the room when Jinghui was criticizing the older (and deceased) Yinshun, hence the need to distinguish between the two Yinshuns.
Jinghui continues with his criticism of Yinshun, who Jinghui accuses of being too academic and therefore damaging Chinese Buddhism. Jinghui argues for a literal rather than a figurative understanding of various Buddhist teachings.

JH: A real monk, one assiduous in Chan practice and spiritual cultivation, cannot leave behind these ideas, or he would not have a core thing [for practice].

PROFESSOR: He [Yinshun] destabilized the foundation.\textsuperscript{318}

JH: Something fundamental was destabilized. So, the ideas of Tathāgatagarbha, this is a foundation. The \textit{Treatise on the Arising of Faith} is a foundation. In Yinshun’s later years, I feel he had some ideas that cannot be followed. His earlier ideas were quite good. In his later years, he totally—he betrayed his teacher, we should say—that is, Great Master Taixu.

PROFESSOR: He brought up a lot of controversy, he brought up a lot of controversy.

JH: [Yinshun] threw the thinking of the Buddhist sector into chaos. He made [Buddhist] thought chaotic, and faith weaker. As for dampening of faith, from the perspective of scholarship, Dharma Master Yinshun had an extremely bad influence. In China since Reform and Opening, in Mainland Buddhism, he had an extremely bad influence. Because of his academic way of looking at things, he took many things, such as the world of the Medicine Buddha, the world of Amitābha Buddha, Mañjuśrī, Universal Worthy [bodhisattva], the four great bodhisattvas—and he changed them from actually existing entities into fictional characters. This fundamentally destabilized the root of Mahayana Buddhism. Later, he had a book called the \textit{Origins and Development of Early Mahayana Buddhism}—— This book, have you read this book? This book is extremely important.

JH: 真正的和尚, 用功参禅修行, 离开这些思想不行。你没有一个核心的东西。

PROFESSOR: 根本动摇了。

JH: 根本东西动摇了。所以这个如来藏的思想, 这是一个根。《起信论》是一个根。印顺法师晚年, 我觉得他有一些东西不可取。早年思想, 还是不错。晚年他完全就—背叛了他的老师应该就是—太虚大师。

PROFESSOR: 他引来了很多争议, 也引来了很多争议。

JH: 佛教界的思想搞乱了。思想搞乱了, 信仰淡化了。这跟信仰淡化, 从学问上来讲, 印顺法师起了极不好的作用。改革开放以后的中国, 大陆佛教, 起了极坏的影响。因为他把许多的东西, 要用学术的眼光去看待, 药师佛的世界, 阿弥陀佛的世界, 什么文殊、普贤, 四大菩萨, 他都是把他这些人从一个实际的存在, 变成了一个虚拟的人物。这从根本上动摇了, 这个大乘

\textsuperscript{318} This kind of language parallels common political discourse prohibiting “destabilizing the foundations” of the current Communist Party rule.
Jinghui tells how the term *renjian fojiao* [Buddhism for the Human Realm] became accepted as the official slogan of the Buddhist Association of China. Contradicting accepted understandings, Jinghui indicates that an early essay on *renjian fojiao* was actually ghost-written for BAC president Zhao Puchu by the scholar Guo Yuanxing (1920-1989).

Jinghui also argues in support of this older slogan *renjian fojiao* rather than an alternative, new slogan, *renben fojiao* [Human-rooted Buddhism]. I suggest that state recognition of the slogan *renjian fojiao* gives leverage to Buddhists to argue in favor of adopting practices from Republican China (1912-1949), when the slogan was formulated. In contrast, the newly proposed slogan includes the term *renben* (“human-rooted”), a word advocated in another context by the highest authorities of the Communist Party. Officially promoting this newer slogan would compel the BAC to adhere even more closely to Communist rhetoric, which could constrain the BAC’s ability to argue for more liberal policies for Buddhism.

**JH:** As I’ve once discussed with Mr. X, when Mr. X was interviewing me that time, he wanted to promote Human-rooted Buddhism, but I urged him, you must absolutely not promote that. On the issue of Buddhism for the Human Realm, or Human-Rooted Buddhism versus Buddhism for the Human Realm. This is——the state recognizes Buddhism for the Human Realm as a direction for Buddhism to develop along, this was not easy to achieve. Because the first time [the phrase] Buddhism for the Human Realm came out, it was in Zhao Puchu’s *Answering Questions about Buddhist Common Knowledge*, in a section in the back of the book. Who is it that wrote that section? Guo Yuanxing was ghost writing [for Zhao Puchu] and he added Buddhism for the Human Realm into the book, and then he sent it along to Zhao Puchu. Zhao Puchu looked at it and didn’t reject it, and then included this section on Buddhism for the Human Realm in *Fayin*, where it was published as the seventh installment in the “Answering Questions about Buddhist Common Knowledge” [column], and that’s how the four Chinese characters *Ren Jian Fo Jiao* [i.e., Buddhism for the Human Realm] became legalized.

**PROFESSOR:** So, that’s how it happened.

**JH:** [Discussing possible objections from the state]: How could it be legalized, wasn’t that beautifying religion, for the purpose of dulling people’s caution about religion, and thereby extending the lifespan of religion? There were many hats [discriminatory labels]. So, it was a great achievement to propose Buddhism for the Human Realm. Other people don’t know about this great achievement.

**PROFESSOR:** If you hadn’t told us, no one would know.

**JH:** Only I know about this great achievement.
赵朴老的这个《佛教常识答问》第七讲公布出来，就人间佛教这四个字才合法化。

PROFESSOR: 原来——
JH: 怎合法，这是美化宗教，美化宗教目的就是想要这个，这个奴蔽人们宗教的警惕，就是延长宗教的寿命。这个很多帽子，很多的帽子。所以这个人间佛教重提出来就是一件大事，这件大事别人都不知道

PROFESSOR: 您不说都不知道。
JH: 只有我知道这大事。
Appendix 4: Interview with Jiqun (1962-)

The following translated passage are from an interview with the Jiqun 济群, a prominent monk involved in Buddhist education. The interview was conducted on 13 June 2010, in Xiamen, Fujian, China, in the respondent’s private quarters in Nanputuo Monastery 南普陀寺.

In this extract we can see the beginning of an argument for a more narrowly focused, practice-oriented approach to Han Buddhist seminary education. In some ways, Jiqun may be seen as advocating a more traditional approach in Buddhist education. Premodern Buddhist scriptural learning involved extended study, and sometimes memorization, of one or at most a few scriptures. But Jiqun does not advocate rote memorization of long texts, and his advocacy of student choice and learning in nature resonates more with an alternative education movement that developed in Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, the “forest primary school” (senlin xiaoxue) movement, which like Montessori education stresses student autonomy and self-direction.

Debates over breadth versus depth of study are also not new in Chinese traditional education. For instance, in late imperial China there were similar debates about whether the civil service examinees should be tested on all of the Five Confucian Classics (wujing 五經) or on just one Classic of their choice (see Elman 2000, esp. pp. 280-285). And the term for specialized study of one Classic (zhuanjing 專經) in premodern China is parallel to the terms Buddhists still use today for specialized study of one school of Buddhism (zhuanzong 專宗).

In this interview we can also see the basic terms through which this monastic leader parses Buddhism, in three nested categories as follows:

Buddhism >> traditions/transmissions >> schools
(Tibetan, Han, Southern) (five Tibetan schools, eight Han schools)

Abbreviations
xxx Words are unclear on the recording
[ ] Additional gloss added by Gildow
—— pause in the dialog

* * *

[Responding to my question about how I should study Chinese Buddhist education.]

Jiqun: Go to Dharma lectures in all sorts of places, such as in education for lay devotees. Because that is, that is to say, as for education319 in Buddhism, when we want to discuss Buddhist

319 The speaker clearly said jiàoyì (which could mean 教义, doctrine), but he almost certainly meant jiàoyù (教育, education). Many southern Chinese speakers (Jiqun is from Fujian) pronounce yu as yi, and in Chinese words doctrine and education differ by a single phoneme.
education, it involves Buddhist tradition. [That is], education belongs under [the category of] Buddhist tradition. So it needs to be informed by Buddhism. Because, like, for example, in Buddhism today there’s Tibetan transmission [Buddhism], as well as this Han transmission, and Southern [Theravada] transmission. These represent the Buddha-Dharma in different times and different places, which then forms different traditions. These traditions are then expressed in various schools. Each and every school, in fact, then forms its own individual set of modes for spiritual practice. Education, in fact, does not merely comprise a transmission of knowledge; education actually includes both study and practice/cultivation, these two aspects. So in a tradition there has to be included a relatively complete study-practice [system?]. In different regions, there will be different kinds of practices. For instance, we talk about the eight schools of our Han transmission. And likewise in the Tibetan transmission, there are five schools—what are they, the Gelug, Kagyu, Sakya, Ningma, and Jonan—they have five schools. [That there are] different schools indicate that they [each] take certain [different] sutras and commentaries to form a complete system of spiritual practice. Because Buddhism is very broad and deep, and the Buddha in saying the Dharma didn’t say that everyone should renounce! Or that you should study every sutra and commentary. Or that you need to learn well every sutra and commentary! And that only then can you——only then can you have attainments.

[So] actually, it’s not like this. It’s possible that when the Buddha was in this world speaking the Dharma, he might [speak] just a few phrases, or speak a certain sutra for a particular person, and this person would thereupon realize the Way—he [the Buddha] needed to have many [things he could say, i.e., a large repertoire?] Then, later these ancestral masters and people of great virtue, they would, based on different sutras and commentaries, for example, based on individual Prajña-sutras, they would establish the Three Treatise school. [Or] based on Consciousness-only sutras and commentaries, they could establish the Consciousness-only school, this system of [spiritual] cultivation. So, in the past, cultivation was actually quite simple.

For example, if you renounced within one school, [if you] renounced in a Consciousness-only school monastery, you would then diligently practice [according to] the Consciousness-only school and you would be fine. By means of studying [under] the Consciousness-only school, you could then complete your liberation or achieve unsurpassed [enlightenment]. And if you were under a Tiantai school monastery you would diligently learn [under] the Tiantai school and you would be okay, as it [that school] itself has a [set of] graduated steps, precisely [as it] has a [set of] graduated steps...

Well, as for us today——studying in a seminary is relatively chaotic, there’s too much content. For example, it will involve [studying] the entire historical arising of Buddhism and the arising of Buddhist teachings.

济群：到各地去弘法讲座，像——信众的教育…因为这个…就是说这个佛教的教育，我们要讲佛教的教育他是牵涉到佛教的传道。它是隶属于佛教的传道。所以它要对佛教的认识。因为像…比如说，我们今天的佛教，有藏传，有这个汉传，南传。它这个代表佛法在不同时期不同地区，然后形成不同的传统。这个传统表现出一个个宗派。那一个个宗派事实上呢！形成一套套自己修行的模式。教育其实它不只包含一个知识上的传道，教育其实包括学和修两个方面。所以一个传统里面它应包含它一个比较完整的修行 xxx 在不同的[地域?]里边他会有不同的修行 xxx。比如说我们讲我们汉传有 8 个宗派，像藏传也有 5 个宗派。什么格鲁啊，什么噶举啊，萨迦啊，宁玛啊，觉囊啊，它有 5 个宗派。

不同的宗派代表者他们依据某一部份经论形成了一个完整的修行系统。因为佛教很博大精深，佛陀说法也不是说每一个出家啊！你把每一个经论都学好啊！你才能够…你才有成就。

其实不是这样子。可能佛陀在世的时候说法，他可能就几句话，或对某一个人讲一个经，这个人当下就悟道了，它必须要很多。那么后来这些祖师大德们，他们会根据不同
In this interview, Jiqun raises two issues that are central to discussions about Buddhist seminary education. The first is the question of in which ways contemporary Buddhist education should be treated as an extension of Buddhist tradition and in which ways it should be treated as part of modern schooling. Here Jiqun emphasizes the link to tradition. The second major issue raised here is the assumption that Buddhist education was historically and should be systematic. Jiqun stresses that the teachings and practices a beginning Buddhist learns should form an integrated whole and should not be excessive. Contemporary Buddhists might claim that Buddhist teachings are context-specific and surpass language, and therefore cannot be systematic (i.e., mutually compatible with other Buddhist teachings). But few if any Buddhists affiliated with seminaries, or even outside of seminaries, make such arguments. Rather, the basic assumption is that teachings ultimately form a coherent, ordered whole. Some of the anxieties within seminaries stem from the fact that traditional Chinese Buddhist teachings do not seem to form a systematic whole, as (it is expected) they should.
Appendix 5: Han Buddhist Seminaries

Calculating the number of Buddhist seminaries in China depends on which institutions count as seminaries and whether or not institutions that are nominally branches of other institutions count as separate entities. I estimate there are about fifty Han Buddhist seminaries in China, with an average enrollment of about sixty seminarians each, for a total of 3000 seminarians—comprising about 3% of China’s Han Buddhist monastic population.

Kinds of Buddhist Schools
In official state documents, the most general term for Buddhist schools is 佛教院校 fojiao yuanxiao. This is a sub-category of 宗教院校 zongjiao yuanxiao, “religious schools,” so Buddhist seminaries can also be called 佛教类宗教院校 fojiaolei zongjiao yuanxiao, “religious schools in the Buddhist category.” This official term can be applied to a wide variety of schools (almost exclusively for monastics), or it can be applied more narrowly to refer to those Buddhist institutions officially registered with the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) as 宗教院校 zongjiao yuanxiao.

The most common term among Buddhists for Buddhist schools is 佛学院 foxueyuan, a term I translate as “Buddhist seminary.” This term can be used to refer to a broad range of Buddhist schools, or to a narrower range of such schools with relatively “academic” features such as entrance examinations and graded coursework, or to a slightly narrower set of schools whose names include the Chinese characters 佛学 in them.

Branch Schools
There are two kinds of branch schools for Buddhist seminaries in China. One includes a set of seminaries in which one seminary is the theoretically the main seminary and others are branches. I only know one set of this nature in China, namely the following three seminaries:320

1. Chinese Buddhist Seminary 中国佛学院
2. Qixiashan Branch of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary 中国佛学院栖霞山分院
3. Lingyanshan Branch of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary 中国佛学院灵岩山分院

The second case, of which there are about half a dozen in China, are two seminaries with the same name but one for monks and another for nuns respectively, such as:

320 The official name of the Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary is the Putuoshan Academy of the Chinese Buddhist Academy 中国佛学院普陀山学院, but senior instructors at the Chinese Buddhist Academy in Beijing assure me there is no official connection between the two seminaries. For some reason—perhaps it looks more official or high status—the leadership of the Putuoshan seminary preferred a reference to the Chinese Buddhist Seminary in their title. I was also told by knowledgeable insiders, including the rector of a seminary in Guangdong Province, that according to the Guangdong Buddhist Association all the Buddhist seminaries in Guangdong were theoretically branches of one Guangdong Buddhist Seminary, but that this theoretical distinction had no bearing on the independent operations of the seminaries.
Informants tell me that financially, “branch” seminaries are mostly or entirely independent of one another, and that they operate as independent entities. Therefore, I treat “branch” schools as separate schools.

**Number of Buddhist Schools**

A BAC publication (BAC 2003, 238) claimed there were the following number of Buddhist schools (fojiao yuanxiao 佛教院校) in mainland China as of 2003:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of School</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Han-language tradition:</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High-rank seminary:</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium-rank seminary:</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary-rank seminary:</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A more recent source (2014), currently posted on the SARA website and attributed to the Center for Theoretical Study of the Party Committee of the SARA, states there are thirty-eight “religious schools in the Buddhist category 佛教类宗教院校.” This same document lists the number of religious schools for other religions, which come to total of eighty-six (if the small Catholic schools are excluded).

The number eight-six, in turn, is close to the number of religious schools most recently cited in a document attributed to the United Front Department, which states that:

The number of religious schools has increased from seventy-four ten years ago to eighty-five. 宗教院校由 10 年前的 74 所增至 85 所

There is no listing of the religious schools, or any further breakdown of the schools by tradition, in either of these recent documents. From these various documents, we can conclude that according to certain official state standards, there are at most thirty Han Buddhist religious schools.

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321 See http://sara.gov.cn/llyj/63734.htm (last accessed 28 May 2016; posting dated 1 April 2014; post title: “我国宗教的基本情况”)


323 My attempts to acquire an authoritative listing of SARA-recognized seminaries were unsuccessful, despite several contacts I had within the SARA. The person most responsible for such matters in my understanding is the director (chuzhang 处长) of the Office for Schools (yuanxiao chu 院校处) within Division Four (sisi 四司) of the SARA. SARA employees informally call Division Four the division for “religions outside the [recognized] religions” (jiao wai jiao 教外教), and was meant to concern itself with popular religion (official web page for Division Four: http://sara.gov.cn/nsjg/ywss2/index.htm). The story is that the Office for Schools was established in that division because Division Four ended up not having enough things to do.
In contrast, Zhang Qi and Jingyin (2009), in a Party funded study of Buddhist schools, list fifty-one Han Buddhist schools operating in 2008. They list branch schools as separate schools, and include institutions which seminarians distinguish as alternatives to seminaries, such as vinaya schools (lüxueyuan 律学院 and xuejietang 学戒堂). At least one of the seminaries Zhang and Jingyin list, the Wuchang Buddhist Seminary (monks’ division), is known to be defunct.

However, there are a number of Han Buddhist schools that Buddhists consider seminaries (foxueyuan), some newly founded, which are not listed on Zhang and Jingyin’s list, including the nuns’ division of the Putuoshan seminary, the Beijing City Buddhist Culture Research Institute, and the Benhuan Academy (in Shenzhen).324

It seems safe to say there are about 50 Han Buddhist seminaries in China, and about 30 of them are registered as religious schools with the SARA.

Number of Seminarians
In 2010 the monk Xuecheng, an official in the BAC, stated there were 57 Buddhist schools (fojiao yuanxiao 佛教院校) with over 4500 students. He did not break down this number by Buddhist tradition, and so this number includes seminarians in the Tibetan and Theravada traditions.

I have visited seminaries in which the enrollment varied from seven students to well over two hundred. I would estimate that the average is about sixty students—one higher at the beginning of the semester, before some of the students drop out. If there are about fifty Han seminaries with an average of sixty students each, that would make 3000 seminarians, or about 3% of the Han monastic population.325

Major Seminaries
For monks, some of the larger or best-regarded seminaries included the Chinese Buddhist Seminary 中国佛学院, the Minnan Buddhist Seminary 闽南佛学院, the Putuoshan Buddhist Seminary 普陀山佛学院, the Hangzhou Buddhist Seminary 杭州佛学院, and the Fujian Buddhist Seminary 福建佛学院. All informants stated the general consensus was that the Chinese Buddhist Seminary was the best and the Minnan Buddhist Seminary the second best. One informant described the Fujian Buddhist Seminary as an “alternative” (inglei 另类) kind of school, because it emphasized religious practice more than most seminaries.

For nuns, the larger or best-regarded seminaries include the Minnan Buddhist Seminary (nuns’ division) 闽南佛学院（尼众部）, the Sichuan Nuns’ Seminary 四川尼众佛学院, and the Guangdong Nuns’ Seminary 广东尼众佛学院. Most informants stated the Minnan Buddhist Seminary was the best seminary for nuns. There were

324 For a promotional video of the Benhuan Academy, featuring Party, state, and Buddhist officials from two provinces, see http://www.hongfasi.net/index.php?a=show&m=Video&id=315 (last accessed 29 May 2016).

325 A prominent lay Buddhist, who is responsible for running many of the Buddhist websites in China, partially confirmed my estimate. He told me in 2013 that in his estimate there were “not more than 3000” (不超过 3000 人) seminarians in Han Buddhist seminaries.
discrepant opinions regarding the current quality of the Sichuan Nuns’ Seminary after recent developments there.

For both monks and nuns I spoke with, the most prominent alternative to study in seminary was study in what they called vinaya academies (lűxueyuan 律学院). Of these vinaya academies, the two most prominent were those at Pingxing Monastery 平兴寺 in Fujian and the summer program at Pushou Monastery 普寿寺 in Shanxi. The first time I went to China in 2006, the word was that these vinaya academies were growing in popularity; the last time I was in China in 2013, the word was that they were losing popularity. In contrast, seminarians rarely mentioned extended meditation practice, whether of the Chan (canchan 参禅) or Pure Land (nianfo 念佛) varieties, as practices they had considered other than seminary studies.

New Seminaries, Old Names
Many of the seminaries founded in the PRC have been founded at the same site as Republican seminaries. Many of these seminaries take similar or identical names as these Republican seminaries, which closed decades ago. Such seminaries in the PRC even claim to be newly revived versions of the Republican seminaries, despite little or no institutional continuity. Such seminaries include the Minnan Buddhist Seminary 闽南佛学院, the Lingdong Buddhist Seminary 岭东佛学院, the Zhanshan Buddhist Seminary 湛山佛学院, and the Wuchang Buddhist Seminary 武昌佛学院, and at least five others.
Appendix 6: Organizational Charts of Buddhist Seminaries

This appendix displays the organizational charts for two seminaries, the Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary and the Chinese Buddhist Seminary.

The Famen seminary is smaller and newer, and its simple organization chart shows the essential officers in most seminaries: (1) a rector, who may have little to do with seminary operations or concerned with funding and political issues, (2) a vice rector in charge of teaching affairs—often the most important person in the seminary, and (3) another vice rector in charge of practical operational matters. This organization chart is taken from page 124 in an internal publication of the Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary, the *Shaanxi Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary: Memorial Publication for the First Graduating Seminarians* (Shaanxi famensi foxueyuan: shoujie xueseng jiye jinian kan 陕西法门寺佛学院首届学僧毕业纪念刊) (2009).

The Chinese Buddhist Seminary’s (CBS) organizational chart is more complicated. It is taken from the webpage titled “Organizational Chart 机构设置” on the seminary’s website (see http://www.zgfxy.cn/xyzl/jgsz.html; last accessed 30 June 2016). The CBS’s formal organization includes division-level research and internet organs, which do not exist in most seminaries. The library, which in the Famen seminary is merely a section under the general office, is also a division-level organ in the CBS. Also less common in seminaries, in the CBS, above the rector’s office there is an organ called the Committee for Seminary Affairs. The membership of this committee is unclear. My understanding is that, unlike other seminaries, the Chinese Buddhist Seminary is closely integrated into the chain of command of the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA).

While visiting the CBS, once I heard a city mayor state that the CBS was “equivalent to being under the SARA nomenklatura 相当于宗教局的编制底下.” A high ranking seminary official corrected him. The CBS is not equivalent to being under the SARA nomenklatura, he stated. Rather, he claimed, the CBS “precisely is under the SARA nomenklatura 就是在宗教局的编制底下” [emphasis in the original spoken words].

During the Maoist period, Welch’s (1972) informants also stated that the CBS was run by the Religious Affairs Bureau, the organization renamed the SARA in 1998. Therefore the Committee for Seminary Affairs might refer to a group including members from the SARA or even the United Front Department, which manages the SARA. On the other hand, this committee could simply refer to the important officers in the seminary, such as the rector, vice rector, and general office director, who meet to reach consensus.

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326 Other seminaries also have such an organ. For example, the Sichuan Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary has a Committee for Seminary Affairs at the top of its organizational chart (see Yang Xiaoyan 2011, 43).

327 The CBS website includes a blank webpage where the membership of this committee should be: http://www.zgfxy.cn/xyzl/bmjs/2012/05/07/1112061153.html (last checked 30 June 2016).
on important issues. The control from the SARA and United Front may be exerted less explicitly.  

While the Chinese Buddhist Seminary firmly remains under state control, it should be noted that, according to several informants, this seminary has become progressively less dependent on the state for funding. That state has even encouraged (one informant implied that “pressured” would be a better word) the seminary to seek funding from private sources, including wealthy individuals and foundations. While I was attending one seminary class, the instructor listed the names of recent donors for the new campus, currently under construction, of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary. These donors, who included prominent businessmen in Hong Kong such as Li Kashing, often pledged a certain amount for the construction of a specific building (e.g., the library) within the new seminary.

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328 A 1981 document grants the United Front department authority over the key personnel in the broader United Front “system” (xitian 系统), which incorporates the People’s Consultative Congresses (zhengxie) , Democratic Parties and Groups (minzhu dangpai), nationalities affairs agencies, and religious affairs agencies. Such authority includes, in the words of the document formalizing this arrangement, the “investigation and understanding; cultivation and training; transfer, appointment, and dismissal; political screening; maintaining the dossiers; and other related management matters” (Burns 1989, 36). Those leaders related to Buddhism include the BAC leadership, namely the president, vice-presidents, and secretary-general (Burns 1989, 39).

329 Other sources indicate that Hong Kong businessmen and foundations have long been an important source of funding for the Chinese Buddhist Seminary.
Organizational Chart of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary

Committee for Seminary Affairs

Office of the Rector

Teaching Affairs Office

General Office

Research Division

Library

Information and Internet Center

Training Division

General Affairs Section

Security Section

Finance Section

Transportation Section
No title is given for this chart, but it is located on the webpage labeled “organizational chart 机构设置,” which is under the webpage “general condition of the seminary 学院概况.”
Appendix 7: Seminary Entrance Examinations

This appendix displays information on two different seminary entrance examinations, the 2007 entrance examination for the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, and the 2011 entrance examination for a seminary in central China.

2007 Chinese Buddhist Seminary Entrance Examination

Below are included the excerpts from the Buddhist Learning (foxue 佛学) component of the examination. There were six sections in this category of the exam, numbered by roman numerals in the translation below. I preserve the exact format from the examination, but I only reproduce the first question from each sections. Additional explanations and the proper answers to each question, as given in the official answer key, are included in square brackets. Note that in several sections, the questions tended to progress from early to later historical periods, and mainly included questions about Indian and Chinese Buddhism (including Buddhism up to the PRC period). So the examination is much less focused on early Indian Buddhism than one might surmise based on the questions translated below.

* * *

Testing Area         Examination Card Number           Dharma Name
考区__________          准考证号__________          法名__________

Stapled Line for Sealing (Do Not Answer within Sealed Line)
密封装订线（密封线内不要答题）

2007 Chinese Buddhist Seminary Recruitment Examination

中国佛学院 2007 年度招生考试

Buddhist Learning Test Booklet

佛学试卷

I. Fill in the blank (0.5 points per blank, 35 points total)
一、填空题（每空 0.5 分，共 35 分）

1. According to the “theory based on Aśoka’s Accession to the Throne,” the Buddha was born in the year [565 BCE] _, and was quiescently extinguished [=deceased] in the year ___486 BCE____.
1 根据“阿育王即位说”，佛陀诞生于__[公元前 565]__年，寂灭于__[公元前 486]__年。

II. Multiple choice (0.5 points per question, 10 points total)
二、选择题（每题 0.5 分，共 10 分）

1. The four castes in Indian society, from highest to lowest, are the following.
1 印度社会的四个阶级种姓，由高到低分别是_[a]_（ ）
a. brahmin, kṣatriya, vaiśya, śūdra  b. kṣatriya, brahmin, vaiśya, śūdra  c. vaiśya, śūdra, brahmin, kṣatriya  d. kṣatriya, śūdra, vaiśya, brahmin
婆罗门、刹帝利、吠舍、首陀罗

刹帝利、婆罗门、吠舍、首陀罗

吠舍、首陀罗、婆罗门、刹帝利

刹帝利、首陀罗、吠舍、婆罗门

III. True/false (make a check mark for correct, make an X for false) (0.5 points per question, 7 points total)
三、判断题（正确的打√，不正确的打×）（每题0.5分，共7分）

1. Each time the primitive Indian Sangha had a schism, the two sects were the Mahāsāṃghika-nikāya and the Sthavira-nikāya. [correct]
1 印度佛教原始僧团每一次分裂出来的两个部派是大众部与上座部。（ ）

IV. Simple explanations (3 points each, 15 points total)
四、简释题（每3分，共15分）

1 判教:
1. Classification of Teachings: [no answers given on answer key from here on]

V. Answering questions (5 points per question, 15 points total)
五、问答题（每题5分，共15分）

1. Briefly describe the reasons for the arising of Mahayana Buddhism.
1 简述大乘佛教兴起的原因。

VI. Essays (Choose one question from each set of two questions, and mark a check next to the question you choose to answer, and answer in the blank area) (18 points)
六、论述题（两道题中随选一题，在所选题的序列号上打√，在空白处回答）（18分）

a. Analyze the current condition of Chinese Buddhism, and describe the future prospects for Chinese Buddhism.
a 试分析中国佛教的现状，并描述对中国佛教未来的展望。

b. What is your view regarding the tradition of vegetarianism in China’s Han Buddhism? What is the significance of the tradition of vegetarianism for contemporary Buddhism?
b 你如何看待中国汉传佛教的素食传统？素食的传统对当今佛教具有哪些意义？

* * *

At the end of the examination answer key, there is an analysis of the test questions according to five categories, question type, content, level, emphasis, and purpose. I translate and reproduce the content in the first of these five categories, below:

I. Question Type 一、题型
1. Fill in the blank: 37 questions, 70 blanks (35 points)
   （×） 填空：三十题 七十空（35分）
2. Multiple choice: 20 questions (10 points)
   （×） 选择：二十题（10分）
3. True/false: 14 questions (7 points)
   （×） 判断：十四题（7分）
4. Simple explanations: 5 questions (15 points)
2011 Anonymous Buddhist Seminary Entrance Examination Categories and Scores

I acquired data on the 2011 entrances examination scores for prospective students at one seminary. Based on this data, originally in one undifferentiated list, I divided the students into two groups (monk and lay), and I calculated the averages and ranges of their scores.

At most seminaries, only monks are allowed to take the entrance examination, much less enroll. But this seminary was unusual. Among examinees, ten were monks and sixteen laymen. After beginning the course of study, some of the laymen took tonsure as novice monks, some with the intention of disrobing after their course of study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Examination Categories</th>
<th>Buddhist learning</th>
<th>(Chinese) language</th>
<th>General Liberal Arts</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>average, all students</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>72.28</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>245.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average, monks</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>211.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>average, laymen</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td>79.56</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>278.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within Buddhism, monks are supposed to be the elite group that leads others, including nuns and laity. But in a modern school setting, monastic status does not necessarily correlate with higher abilities. According to the data above, the average examination scores of the laymen were, in every category, higher than the corresponding scores for monks.

Several of my informants in China, both scholars and monastics, claimed that monastics in general tend to be less academically competitive than non-monastics. Given the roughly equal numbers of monastics and non-monastics who tested at this seminary, the data above provide one way to measure the differences between these two groups.

On the other hand, this seminary is not typical. First, it is only a mid-ranking seminary, so it might not attract the top monastic students. Second, it is one of the few that admits laymen for study, so unlike most seminaries it might have attracted people interested in studying Buddhism who did not aspire to a long-term career as a monk.

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330 “General Liberal Arts” (wenzong 文综) typically includes politics, history, and geography. But at many seminaries, politics is graded separately.
More research is required, but this is a sensitive area of study. There is rarely comparable data of this nature for monastics and laity. When such data exists it is not usually available, and when it is acquired one is often obligated to keep it anonymous.
Appendix 8: Religious Studies in the Nomenclature of Academic Fields

In the PRC, the Ministry of Education regulates the names of official academic fields and majors. The document *Catalog of Undergraduate Majors in Ordinary Higher Education Schools* 普通高等学校本科专业目录 (2012) lists 506 official academic majors, which fall into ninety-two categories and twelve meta-categories. Below is my translation of the section of this document that lists religious studies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>一、基本专业 (1) Basic Majors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 学科门类: 哲学 Academic Disciplinary Meta-Category: Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0101 哲学类 Philosophy Category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010101 哲学 Philosophy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010102 逻辑学 Logic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>010103K 宗教学 Religious Studies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A fourth major under the philosophy category, ethics 伦理学, is listed separately from the “basic majors,” under “specially established majors 特设专业,” which tend to be newer and less established. The letter K in the code number for religious studies indicates the field is controlled (Kongzhi 控制) at the national level in terms of where programs may be established and how many students they may accept. The reason for such control, states the official source mentioned above, are the limited employment opportunities available for graduates with such degrees.

It is obvious from this catalog that officially, religious studies is deeply embedded within the field of philosophy. Also notice that that “philosophy 哲学” is listed as a term on three levels in this official nomenclature: as a meta-category 门类, as the one and only category 类 under that meta-category, and as one of the four majors within that category. For recent overviews of religious studies in China, arguing that it should be established independent of philosophy, see Yang 2013 and Zhuo 2013. For a recent overview of students who major in philosophy, logic, or religious studies, and comments on their potential employment prospects, see Hong and Fang 2014.

Additional Note
The terms “level one discipline 一级学科” and “level two discipline 二级学科,” which are used for graduate study, in most cases correspond to the undergraduate “categories 类” and individual “majors 专业,” respectively.

For discussion of the position of religious studies within Chinese academia, special thanks are due to Prof. Zhang Fenglei, director of religious studies at Renmin University (interview, summer 2010), and Prof. Li Silong, director of religious studies at Peking University (interview, fall 2012).
Appendix 9: Number of Han Buddhist Monastics

There are probably about 100,000 monastics in the Han Buddhist tradition in the People’s Republic of China. By monastics I refer to all Buddhist monks and nuns, including novice monks and nuns, i.e., bhikṣus, bhikṣunīs, śrāmaṇeras, śikṣamāṇās, and śrāmaṇerīs.\(^{331}\) I do not include postulants, i.e., laymen and laywomen living in monasteries and considering the monastic life.\(^ {332}\)

The figure 100,000 is an easy-to-remember round number, which should arouse suspicion. The suspicion is warranted, as the estimate is based on a variety of unreliable sources, including official statistics from the state, the Buddhist Association of China, and province-level Buddhist associations; the estimates of monastic informants I interviewed (mainly during 2012-13); and hearsay among academics.

Ji Zhe (2009) has already analyzed many sources of data on monastics in China, and also arrived at an estimate of about 100,000 monastics, although through different considerations. In this appendix, I will mention new sources of information as well as various problems in determining who is a monastic and how many there are in China. Even if the final estimate for the number of monastics is less than ideal, this appendix discusses the important initiation rituals and categories of monastics.

**New Sources of Information**

Since 1997 and until recently, the most publicized official statistics on religion indicated there were slightly over 70,000 monks and nuns in the Han Buddhist tradition, out of a total of 200,000 Buddhist monastics total (see Ji Zhe 2009).\(^ {333}\) Recently a slightly updated version of these statistics appears on official websites, such as that of the State Administration for Religious Affairs. The most important sentence in this new document, which is dated to April 2014, is the following:

Currently, in the whole country there are 33,000 open Buddhist religious venues, among which over 3600 are Tibetan tradition Buddhist monasteries, and over 1700 are Southern

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\(^{331}\) Because of a vinaya revival movement in modern China, some nuns in China now receive the śikṣamāṇā precepts. By śrāmaṇeras and śrāmaṇerīs, I include those who have received the corresponding precepts in a formal ritual novices “in the Dharma” (*jatong* 法同), as well as those who have merely received tonsure, novices “in form” (*xingtong* 形同). That is, in accord with common Chinese Buddhist understandings of these terms, I include novice monks and nuns even if they have not yet formally received corresponding precepts, which in many cases are not ritually received until a week or two before ordination as bhikṣus or bhikṣunīs. On śikṣamāṇās or nun probationers in the contemporary PRC, see Chiu and Heirman 2014, 285-262.

\(^{332}\) In my experience, the most common term for postulants in the PRC is “pure persons,” i.e., jingren, 净人. Another term is “practitioner,” i.e., xingzhe 行者.

\(^{333}\) Sometimes lower estimates between 50,000 and 70,000 have been published. For example, in 2003 the Buddhist Association of China stated there were “more than 8400 monasteries” and “over 50,000 monks and nuns” in Han Buddhism (BAC 2003, 199).
tradition Buddhist monasteries. There are a total of 222,000 Buddhist religious personnel, including about 148,000 in the Tibetan tradition, about 72,000 in the Han tradition, and about 2000 in the Southern tradition. In the whole country there are 38 religious schools in the Buddhist category. There are many believers in Buddhism, but their numbers are difficult to calculate.\textsuperscript{334}

An important term in this document is “religious personnel” (\textit{jiaozhi renyuan 教职人员}), hereafter “clergy.” State documents consistently define only bhikṣu and bhikṣunī—i.e., fully ordained monks and nuns—as officially recognized clergy in Han Buddhism. Early official documents were sometimes less explicit about who was included in the term “monks and nuns,” but according to my reading—and all of the several senior Chinese monks I questioned agreed with me—these earlier numbers also referred only to fully ordained monks and nuns.\textsuperscript{335}

So even if the number 72,000 is basically accurate, the real number of monastics would be higher if novices were included. My best informants estimate that novices are probably ten to twenty percent the number of ordained monks and nuns, in which case there would be 80,000+ monastics in China.

But there are still a number of difficulties with this number, as follows.

1. It is unclear how the number 72,000 was calculated. But I have seen or heard of reports with province-level data that make the number 72,000 plausible, and these reports themselves appear plausible.\textsuperscript{336} Furthermore, the reported changes in the numbers of monastics from 1997 to 2014 appear plausible to me as well.\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{334} Source: http://sara.gov.cn/llyj/63734.htm (last accessed 28 May 2016). 目前，全国共有开放的佛教活动场所约 3.3 万处，其中藏传佛教寺院 3600 多所，南传佛教寺院 1700 多所；全国共有佛教教职人员约 22.2 万人，其中藏传佛教约 14.8 万人，汉传佛教约 7.2 万人，南传佛教约 2000 人；全国有佛教类宗教院校 38 所；信仰佛教的人数众多，但难以统计

\textsuperscript{335} Following Welch’s (1967) conventions, in China, one becomes a novice monk or nun through tonsure (\textit{tidu 梯度}) and a regular monk or nun through ordination (\textit{shoujie 受戒}). But since some scholars call \textit{tidu} “novice ordination” (or even “ordination”) and \textit{shoujie} “full ordination,” so I sometimes call \textit{shoujie} “full ordination” for clarification.

\textsuperscript{336} For example, the journal \textit{Hebei Fojiao} 23 (2012, 9) stated that there were a total of 1247 registered Buddhist clergy in Hebei Province, although more remained to be officially registered. The journal has even listed these monastics by their monastery of residence, ordination numbers (all are fully ordained), and national identification numbers (excluding the last four numbers). A Chinese scholar at a conference (December 2015), based on internal data, stated there were some 7200 monastics in Zhejiang province. These numbers are about what one would expect for Hebei and Zhejiang provinces if the national total is about 70,000.

\textsuperscript{337} According to these numbers, the number of Han-tradition monastics has remained about the same and the number native Southern (i.e., Theravada) monastics has declined significantly. Estimates of Theravada monastics used to be “nearly ten-thousand” (from 1997: Ji Zhe 2009) or “more than eight thousand” (BAC 2003, 199). Such trends agree with the trends informants among both Han monastics and Dai people (who
2. Probably the number 72,000 is based on a combination of province-level surveys plus numbers of ordinations that are officially sanctioned by the Buddhist Association of China (BAC). However, estimates based on numbers of ordinations are problematic for the following reasons.

(1) Some ordination sessions are still held unofficially, without sanction from the BAC. These are called “internal ordinations” (neibu chuanjie 内部传戒). The monk Mingshan even implies in his diary that internal ordination was practiced between 1957 and 1981, during the twenty-some years in which no public ordinations were held. It is uncertain how many monks who undergo internal ordination today also receive BAC-sanctioned ordination.

(2) Even at some BAC sanctioned ordination sessions, some of the ordinands are not included in the list of official ordained monastics. According to informants, such monks and nuns go through the full ordination procedures and receive an ordination certificate (jiedie 戒牒), but the certificate lacks the official ordination number from the BAC. Such monks and nuns choose not to receive the official ordination certificate for a number of reasons, including: (1) they do not plan to ever leave the province in which they were ordained, and so have less need to have an official certificate; and (2) the number of ordinands exceeded the official quota for the session, but the monastic leadership would like to be generous in ordaining everyone who is qualified. Informants tell me such monastics tend to be older, such as retirees (mainly are traditionally Theravada Buddhists) have told me. I have less information regarding such trends in Tibetan Buddhism.

338 Today internal ordinations are not necessarily secretive events. One of the best regarded ordination centers in China, Pingxing Monastery, has posted photographs and ordination records (tongjielu 同戒录) of the nine ordination sessions it has sponsored from 1999 to 2013. Only the BAC-sanctioned sessions include an ordination record. See for instance photographs from the 2008 internal ordination at Pingxing Monastery, in which more than 150 monks were reportedly ordained: http://www.pxs.cn/fellow/2008/photos/ (last accessed 29 May 2016).

339 Mingshan mentions an ordination held at the beginning of 1981 as “the first public ordination held in more than twenty years 廿多年来第一次公开传戒 (emphasis added; 2002, 129). Mingshan also mentions discussion of an internal ordination to be held in Sichuan in 1987 (Mingshan 2002, 535). Also see Welch 1972, 117-124 on the restrictions and ending of public ordinations during the PRC, that last of which was held in 1957.

340 Since late 1994, the ordination certificates indicate how many ordination certificates have been distributed. For instance, an ordination certificate from 1998, labeled (using traditional Chinese characters): “中佛戒證編號：980798,” i.e., “BAC ordination number 980798,” indicating that in 1998, 797 ordination certificates had already been labeled prior to this one.
According to Buddhist standards, such ordinations are fully legitimate—they are “in accordance with the Dharma” (rufa 如法), but they are not recorded in BAC archives. Since such monastics would also lack a BAC ordination number, they would probably not be recorded in local surveys, either.

(3) Ordination numbers show entry into the sangha but tell us nothing about exit. Besides death, reportedly many monks and nuns—reportedly a higher percentage of monks than nuns—leave the order. According to informants, the rate of defection from the order has increased significantly over the past five to ten years. For such reasons—and knowledgeable informants are divided on this issue—I think that the number of nuns in China is actually about equal to the number of monks, rather than only half the number of monks as Ji Zhi (2009) estimates.

(4) Some monastics who are already ordained attend ordination sessions to be re-ordained, and so they could be counted more than once. The procedure, called “patching the precepts” (bujie 补戒), can be done for a number of reasons, including when one wants to re-commit to the monastic precepts, or fears that the ritual procedures of one’s previous ordination was defective, or if one has broken important precepts. So some ordinations may double count the same monastic.

(5) Finally, from an emic perspective, ordained monks and nuns who have broken major rules of the monastic code (having sex, stealing, killing, or certain kinds of lying) are not in fact even monastics.

It is impossible to know the number of novice monastics, unofficially ordained monastics, and multiply-ordained monastics. Among my informants estimates of their numbers vary, although everyone agrees they are fewer in number than official ordinations.

Therefore, based on what is clearly insufficient data, my estimate of 100,000 monks and nuns in China is meant to include the following:

(1) All novice monks and nuns who have received tonsure.
(2) All ordained monks and nuns, even if their ordination was not BAC-sanctioned.

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341 Although it is not representative data, in his ethnography of lay Buddhism in Beijing, the one informant Fisher (2014) notes who became a monastic was a retired woman.

342 One senior scholar of Buddhism, with extensive connections to monastic communities, rolled his eyes skeptically when I discussed ordination numbers: “over half disrobe 半多以上都还俗,” he stated.

343 See Welch (1967, 334-35) for the custom during the Republic, and Jiqun (2014) for a critique of the custom (http://www.jiqun.com/dispfile.php?id=35). Mingshan (2002, 116) also critiques the custom, without naming it. Probably Mingshan is subtly critiquing monks who married during the Cultural Revolution, such as Jinghui (1933-2013), whose identity Mingshan implies is ambiguous by using three different names to identify him, one monastic, one lay, and one mixed (i.e., 净慧法师, 黄建东, 黄净慧: 2002, 118, 226, 235).
Assuming that the official statistics are basically accurate, and since the official statistics do not include such monastics, my estimate is thus higher than the official number of 72,000. Finally, my estimate includes monastics regardless of their adherence to the vinaya, as the number of monastics who have broken core monastic rules would be impossible to calculate.

A Note on Emic Understandings of Monastic Categories
Initially I thought that Chinese Buddhists would agree with me that novice monks and nuns should be included in the official numbers of monastics in China. As Birnbaum stated, most (ordinary) people do not distinguish between novice and ordained monastics.

I discovered that among monks my assumption was questionable. Within the sangha, monastics are very sensitive to the differences between tonsure and ordination, and they can, for example, tell the difference between the five-striped robes of novices and the seven-striped robes of the ordained. Monastic informants repeatedly emphasized that novice monks and nuns were not fully qualified monastics; among the various terms they used, they claimed ordination was mandatory to become a “true monastic 真正的僧人,” “formally a monastic 正式的僧人,” or a “complete monastic 完整的僧人.” Therefore, some informants agreed with government statistics that include only the ordained as monastics, or at least they thought that such statistics were acceptable.

344 As Birnbaum states, “‘monks and nuns’ are understood to include both novices and their seniors, the fully ordained members of the clergy” (2003, 428). There are four or more plausible ways to translate the term “monks and nuns” into Chinese. Evaluation of Birnbaum’s claim depends on the specific Chinese term and whose understanding is being evaluated.
Appendix 10: Graduates of Two Seminaries

This appendix displays data on graduating seminarians at two seminaries, the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (in Beijing) and the Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary (in Shaanxi Province). Both seminaries only enroll monks. Whereas the Chinese Buddhist Seminary is widely considered the best in China and was re-established in 1980, the Famen Monastery Seminary is considered average and only began classes at the end of 2004.

There are many similarities among seminarians at both seminaries. We can see that the average seminarian is in his twenties. Regulations on tonsure appear to be weakly enforced; seminarians at both schools include monastics tonsured prior to the state-mandated minimum age of eighteen. Seminarians at both seminaries are drawn from provinces across China, but neither seminary includes students from Special Autonomous Regions (Hong Kong, Macau), from three of four province-level municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin), from four of five province-level autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, and Tibet), and from three of twenty-two provinces (Guangdong, Hainan, Qinghai). In sum, these seminarians come from almost every province but from very few of the other kinds of province-level administrative entities.

In the original data, for dates sometimes months as well as years are provided. In the charts and calculations below, months have been eliminated. A limitation of this data is that it does not include seminarians who did not graduate. According to informants, few monks at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary fail to graduate, but at other seminaries there is a high drop-out rate.

Data on Seminary Graduates from the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (2013)
The following charts display data from an internal publication of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS), whose title on the cover is *Resplendent Fruits of Wisdom: Graduation Memorial of the 2009 [Entering] Year Students of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary* (Zhihui huaguo: zhongguo foxueyuan erlinglingjiu ji tongxue biye jinian 中國佛學院二00九級同學畢業紀念). This book was printed in 2013, as the class of students in the basic course (*benke* 本科, equivalent to university-level undergraduates) that entered in 2009 graduated. According to American conventions, this would be the Class of 2013.

From this information we can see that at the CBS, the age limit of 28 for seminarians was enforced with two exceptions, including one foreigner. Unusual for many seminaries I visited, most seminarians at the CBS were ordained prior to seminary enrollment and those that were not did so shortly thereafter. Although not related to the CBS per se, from this data we also see that the supposed minimum age of twenty for ordination is not strictly enforced. Also rare for a seminary in China, this class included a foreign monk, in this case from South Korea. This monk came from the Korean Cheontae Order (Chinese: Tiantai zong 天台宗), which is institutionally separate from the better-known South Korean Jogye and Taego orders.345

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345 In the Chinese Buddhist online media, frequent news reports about the Cheontae Order suggests this order has a close relationship with the Buddhist Association of China (BAC). Other news reports indicate
Chinese Buddhist Seminary, Class of 2013 Data (2009年纪毕业生, i.e., entered the seminary in 2009)
Rank of Class: University-Level (benke)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Tonsure</th>
<th>Ordination</th>
<th>Home Province</th>
<th>Age at Tonsure</th>
<th>Years between Tonsure and Ordination</th>
<th>Age at Entry to the Seminary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0 (3 months, the shortest gap listed)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
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<td>5</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>17</td>
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<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1988</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>25</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
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<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>1987</td>
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<td>2006</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1988</td>
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<td>2006</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
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<td>21</td>
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</table>

there was a falling out between the BAC and the dominant South Korean monastic order, the Jogye, in 2012. The monk Jinghui may allude to such issues in his interview (see appendix 3).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>32</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>1986</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
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</table>

**AVERAGES:** 18.4 3.1 22.6

Additional foreign student:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Origin of Seminarians by Provincial-Level Administrative Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces that sent seminarians</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>Provinces that sent no seminarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Beijing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Chongqing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guangdong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Guizhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Hong Kong SAR(^{346})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Macau SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jilin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ningxia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Qinghai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
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<td>Shanghai</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(15 provinces)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**

**Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary**

**Data from Three Classes Graduating in 2009**

The following data comes from an internal publication of the Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary, titled the *Shaanxi Famen Monastery Buddhist Seminary: Memorial Publication for the First Graduating Seminarians* (*Shaanxi famensi foxueyuan: shoujie xueseng biye jinian kan* 陕西法门寺佛学院首届学僧毕业纪念刊). This publication includes data on three classes of students that graduated in July 2009.

In contrast to the CBS, seminarians here are more typical of the monks at less elite schools in several ways. First, although the average age is still in the twenties, there is a wider age range and higher average age. Second, the location of the seminary matters for the students it attracts. Many of the seminarians here were born and/or tonsured in Shaanxi Province or nearby provinces. In contrast, although the CBS is located in Beijing, none of the seminarians listed above came from Beijing and few came from nearby provinces. Third, the Famen Monastery Seminary offers several levels of classes for

\(^{346}\) SAR: Special Administrative Region
monks, which allows less academically qualified students to study there. These class levels are named after the purported levels of education they correspond to in secular schools: “university level,” “junior college level,” and “vocational secondary school level.”

In contrast, the CBS offers only the university-level (*benke*) course and a small graduate program. Seminarians at the CBS are supposed to have graduated from high school or the equivalent in secular vocational or seminary education (i.e., through graduation from a lower ranking seminary).

**Seminarians in the University-Level Class 本科班僧 (a three-year course)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Home Province</th>
<th>Province where Tonsured</th>
<th>Age at Presumed Entry to the Seminary (in 2006)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>Shandong</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Guizhou</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Chongqing</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>24</td>
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</table>

**Average Age:** 27.9

**Seminarians in the Junior College-Level Class 大专班学生 (a four-year course)**

<table>
<thead>
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<th>#</th>
<th>Birth</th>
<th>Home Province</th>
<th>Province where Tonsured</th>
<th>Age at Presumed Entry to the Seminary (in 2005)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
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<td>Hunan</td>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Henan</td>
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<td>22</td>
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<td>Henan</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Age:** 25.1
### Seminarians in the Vocational Secondary School-Level Class 中专班学僧 (a two-year course)

<table>
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<th>Province where Tonsured</th>
<th>Age at Presumed Entry to the Seminary (in 2007)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Henan</td>
<td>Henan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>Fujian</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Henan</td>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Age:** 25.2

### Origin of Seminarians by Provincial-Level Administrative Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces that sent seminarians (by place of birth)</th>
<th>Number of Seminarians</th>
<th>Provinces that sent no seminarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Henan</td>
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<td>Anhui</td>
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<td>Gansu</td>
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<td>Heilongjiang</td>
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<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
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<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fujian</td>
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<td>Hainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
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<td>Chongqing</td>
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<td>Guizhou</td>
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<td>Jilin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
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<td>Liaoning</td>
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<td>Shanxi</td>
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<td>Sichuan</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Shandong</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Tibet</td>
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<td>Zhejiang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Average Age at Presumed Entry to Seminary, All Thirty-four Graduating Seminarians:** 26.2
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces Where Seminarians Were Tonsured</th>
<th>Number of Seminarians</th>
<th>Provinces that did not tonsure seminarians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shaanxi</td>
<td>8</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Henan</td>
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<td>Chongqing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gansu</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>Guangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Guizhou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anhui</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hebei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hong Kong SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heilongjiang</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Inner Mongolia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hubei</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jiangxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Jilin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jiangsu</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Macau SAR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liaoning</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ningxia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shandong</td>
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<td>Qinghai</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhejiang</td>
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<td>Shanghai</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tianjin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Tibet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Xinjiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 11: Buddhist Seminaries during the Republic of China (1912-1949)

Three sources on Buddhist seminaries before 1950 are Welch 1968, Dongchu 1974, and Li Ming 2009.

Welch (1968, 285-287) lists seventy-one seminaries that operated in China between 1912-1949. The existence of some of these seminaries is extensively documented, but the names of others he merely found mentioned. Of the forty-two seminaries which include at least partial dates of operation and whose existence is hence better attested, thirty-one (i.e., 73.8%) were called foxueyuan, or “Buddhist seminary.” Based on the dates of these forty-two seminaries, we can see that there was at least one seminary operating somewhere in China between 1918 and 1949 (in 1917, no seminaries were in operation). The charts below, based on the data from these forty-two seminaries, show the number operating in each year. Although incomplete, this data gives a sense of when seminaries were most active.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seminaries</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seminaries</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>1937</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1941</th>
<th>1942</th>
<th>1943</th>
<th>1944</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seminaries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seminaries</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Welch estimates the seventy-one seminaries on his list produced about 7500 graduates during the Republic.
Dongchu (1974, 203-216) list thirty-four seminaries that operated between 1914 and 1944. He limits his list to the relatively large and successful seminaries (1974, 204). Of these thirty-four, eighteen actually called themselves *foxueyuan*, “Buddhist seminary.” Dongchu notes that only three of the thirty-four were established independently of monasteries. Most seminaries were established within monastic complexes, using existing parts of the monastery for classrooms; others were newly established within or adjacent to a monastery complex and relied on monastery income.

Dongchu’s list of seminaries largely overlaps with those on Welch’s list. But he includes nine seminaries (numbers 2, 5, 11, 12, 3, 14, 19, 24, and 27 on Dongchu’s list) which are not on Welch’s list of seventy-one seminaries. Five other seminaries in Dongchu’s list are shown with different names, but appear to be the same as seminaries on Welch’s list (i.e., numbers 15, 17, 23, 32, and 33 in Dongchu 1974). Dongchu also includes one seminary established outside of China, in Hong Kong (number 29).

Dongchu claims that seminary operations were seriously impacted by the Japanese invasion of China (1931 invasion of Manchuria and 1937 invasion of China Proper). From the data on the number of seminaries in operation from Welch 1968 shown above, it appears that the second civil war with the Communists (1946-1949) had a much larger impact on seminaries than war with Japan. The Japanese were not anti-Buddhist per se, and sometimes cooperated with (or co-opted) Buddhist institutions to consolidate their rule. A few seminaries were even founded under the Japanese occupation, and at least one such Buddhist seminary was founded with both Japanese and Chinese on the board of directors (Xue Yu 2005, 164). More research is necessary to determine the overall impact of the Japanese occupation on Chinese Buddhism.

Note that both Welch 1968 and Dongchu 1974 include the China Institute of Inner Studies (*zhina neixueyuan*) in their lists of seminaries. While this institution was undoubtedly influential, it was not very involved in the education of Buddhist monastics. As Welch notes (1968, 118) it was mainly run by and for Buddhist laymen.

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347 For the content of a secret file of the Japanese Foreign Office during the war, in which the basic cultural policy of the occupying Japanese military is outlined, see Conroy 1952. According to this file, the Japanese were to present themselves as guardians of traditional Chinese culture, including Confucianism and Buddhism, which the Chinese Nationalist Party was allegedly destroying. The file includes the proposal to establish a Buddhist university with a faculty of thirty professors in Datong, Shanxi Province.

348 This seminary was called the Chinese Buddhist Seminary and may very well have served as the inspiration or model for the important seminary of the same name and in the same city (Beijing) founded in the PRC in 1956. The historical links between the two seminaries with the same name, both founded in Beijing but under the Japanese and Chinese Communist regimes, may have been suppressed for political motivations. This specific institutional history, and the question of the extent to which Communist religious policies may have been modeled on Japanese military policies to utilize Buddhism to consolidate its rule, would be a good subject for future research.

349 See Xue Yu (2005, 151-76) and Carter (2011, 154-173) on Chinese Buddhism under Japanese occupation, an important topic that Welch’s trilogy on twentieth century Chinese Buddhist history mainly neglects.
A third source of information on Buddhist seminaries in the Republic is Li Ming (2009, 237-258). Drawing on Welch 1968, Dongchu 1974, and an archive of Republican Buddhist journals (Huang Xianian 2006), Li Ming found evidence of, or at least mention of, 157 “organizations for monastic education 僧教育机构” during the Republic.

Li Ming’s list is useful for showing the broader education-related activities in the Chinese Buddhist sangha. Her discussion on seminaries for nuns, although limited, is something Welch and Dongchu do not discuss and so is particularly useful. A number of the women’s seminaries Li Ming describes were established outside of the Republic of China, in Hong Kong or Macau. Yet Li Ming’s data has several limitations. For example, her list includes several institutions that were sub-divisions of the same institution. Also, it includes institutions much smaller than seminaries, including for example short-term classes for monastics held in monasteries. Also, while more extensive than other lists, Li Ming only drew on data from one of the three important archives of Republican Buddhist literature now available. There are now two other comparable archives available (Huang Xianian 2008 and Huang Xianian 2013).

More research remains to be done on the development of monastic education during the Republic.
Appendix 12: Religious Studies Institutions

This appendix includes information on the religious studies programs in Chinese higher education. All of the programs listed here are currently located within universities, which belong to the broader category of higher education institutes (gaoxiao 高校), which also include colleges and higher vocational colleges. Only one non-university higher education institute established a center for the study of religion, namely the Shanghai Normal College, which was incorporated into Huadong Normal University in 1998. All higher-education institutes are accredited by the Ministry of Education.

The best source for Chinese religious studies programs is Di Yuanyuan (2005), an MA thesis written at Minzu University. The following table listing religious studies in China (excluding Hong Kong and Macau), founded between 1979 and 2003, is based largely on data from Di’s thesis.

Abbreviations
B=batchelor’s degree  D=doctoral degree  
M=master’s degree  IHE=institute of higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year established</th>
<th>Name of IHE</th>
<th>Research Institute</th>
<th>Affiliated institute for student instruction</th>
<th>Degrees Conferred</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Nanjing University</td>
<td>宗教研究所</td>
<td>宗教学系350</td>
<td>M, D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Sichuan University</td>
<td>道教与宗教文化研究所</td>
<td></td>
<td>B, M, D351</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Minzu University</td>
<td>宗教研究所</td>
<td>哲学与宗教学系</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Renmin University</td>
<td>佛教与宗教学理论研究所352</td>
<td>宗教学系</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Huazhong Normal University</td>
<td>中国教会大学史研究中心</td>
<td></td>
<td>D</td>
<td>Replaced by 华中师范大学东西方文化交流研究中心 in 2001, which carries on and expands the research of the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

350 Full name now: Nanjing University Philosophy Department and Religious Studies Department 南京大学哲学系·宗教学系 (http://philo.nju.edu.cn/; 2 Aug. 2014). But it is just called the Philosophy Department on the department website.

351 On the school website, I could not find evidence that this school still offers Batchelor degrees: http://www.taoism.cc/index.php?do=news&class_id=003 (2 Aug 2014), although they do discuss Master’s and doctoral student programs.

352 http://isbrt.ruc.edu.cn/isbrt/Article/Index.html
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>University</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Shandong University</td>
<td>研究中心; 犹太文化研究所</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Peking University</td>
<td>宗教学研究所</td>
<td>This college was incorporated into the Huadong Normal University in 1998.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Shanghai Educational College</td>
<td>宗教学研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Dongnan University</td>
<td>佛教文化研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Fudan University</td>
<td>基督教研究中心</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Xibei Minzu University</td>
<td>宗教研究中心</td>
<td>M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Nankai University</td>
<td>宗教文化研究中心</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Wuhan University</td>
<td>宗教研究所</td>
<td>B, M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Zhongshan University</td>
<td>宗教文化研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Shaanxi Normal University</td>
<td>宗教文化研究中心</td>
<td>M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Xiamen University</td>
<td>宗教研究所</td>
<td>M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Zhejiang University</td>
<td>宗教学研究所</td>
<td>M, D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Suzhou University</td>
<td>宗教学研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Huadong Normal University</td>
<td>宗教文化研究中心</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Tsinghua University</td>
<td>道德与宗教研究中心</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Huaqiao University</td>
<td>宗教文化研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Beijing United University</td>
<td>民族与宗教研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Beijing Normal University</td>
<td>宗教学研究所</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparable and more recent list of institutions that conduct research in religious studies is available on the website of the Institute of World Religions of CASS (http://iwr.cass.cn/jg/). It lists twenty-five institutions with religious studies programs, including twelve located in either CASS or provincial-level social science academies, and ten in Chinese universities, among which the following four are not included in the chart above:

234
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year established</th>
<th>Name of IHE</th>
<th>Research Institute</th>
<th>Degrees Conferred</th>
<th>Website/Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Shandong University</td>
<td>宗教、科学与社会问题研究所</td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://iwr.cass.cn/jg/201202/t20120216_9567.htm">http://iwr.cass.cn/jg/201202/t20120216_9567.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Xinan University</td>
<td>宗教研究所</td>
<td>D (as of 2011)</td>
<td><a href="http://iwr.cass.cn/jg/201305/t20130523_14908.htm">http://iwr.cass.cn/jg/201305/t20130523_14908.htm</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Lanzhou University</td>
<td>伊斯兰文化研究所</td>
<td>Website indicates there are graduate students, but relevant links are inactive:</td>
<td><a href="http://iccs.lzu.edu.cn/">http://iccs.lzu.edu.cn/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><a href="http://iics.lzu.edu.cn/iics/main-edu.htm">http://iics.lzu.edu.cn/iics/main-edu.htm</a> (checked 18 March 2016)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another academic institution that focuses on the study of Buddhism was founded within Nanjing University in 2010. Much of the funding for this institute has been provided by a Taiwanese Buddhist organization and a Hong Kong Buddhist philanthropist, who also are important funders for Buddhist studies programs in Hong Kong.³⁵³

³⁵³ Initial funding for the Chinese Cultural Research Institute was provided by the monk Xingyun (founder of the Taiwanese Buddhist organization Fougangshan) and by Yang Zhao (a member of the founding family of Glorious Sun Enterprises, Hong Kong), at 30,000,000 renminbi each (about $4.39 million by the exchange rate of 15 March 2010, which was shortly before the institute was founded). Current funding mechanisms of the institute are unclear, but Xingyun is listed as the honorary director. Much of the institute’s research focuses on Buddhism, especially “humanistic Buddhism” (renjian fujiao 人间佛教), the kind of Buddhism Xingyun advocates. Faculty member Jingyin 净因 formerly directed the Centre for Buddhist Studies at Hong Kong University, which is similar in that its funding largely derives from sources outside the university in which it is located. Fougangshan and Glorious Sun are major funders of Buddhist studies programs at Chinese University Hong Kong (see http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/arts/cshb/) and at the University of Hong Kong (see http://www.buddhism.hku.hk/), respectively.
Summary
The data in the three charts above, which is still incomplete and only lists university-based religious studies, can be summarized as follows:

- Twenty-eight programs are listed. At least one is no longer operational.
- Key terms in the official names of these institutes include “religious research 宗教研究” (nine cases), “religious studies 宗教学” (six cases), and “religious culture 宗教文化” (five cases).
- The titles of most programs indicate they do research on multiple religions (19 cases), but some programs focus only on a single religion (six cases). In addition, the titles of the Renmin University and Sichuan University programs indicate focus on one religion (Buddhism and Daoism, respectively) but also study of other religions. It is unclear from its name that the Nanjing University’s Chinese Cultural Research Institute focuses on the study of Buddhism.
- Only seven universities offer religious studies undergraduate degrees, all of which were established between 1980 and 1997.
- The growth in the number of religious studies programs is rapid in comparison with earlier periods in the PRC but moderate in comparison with popular academic programs in fields such as business, law, and engineering. In China the years 1999-2005 experienced what by some measures was the largest expansion in higher education in human history (Hayhoe, Lin, and Zha 2011), but very moderate expansion of religious studies programs, and none offering degrees (on these charts).

An alternative method to gain perspective on the scope of religious studies is to examine which institutions publish religious studies research. For example, three lists of institutions whose employees publish articles on religious studies are provided in Shengkai 2009, 70-72. But such lists are not comparable to those I provide in this appendix, as they are not specific enough (for example, they list “Sichuan University” rather than the particular institution within Sichuan University that focuses on the study of religion), and they include institutions not primarily dedicated to the study of religion. For example, all three lists include the Institute of Dunhuang Studies 敦煌研究院 and the China Tibetology Center 中国藏学研究中心. Some of these other lists even include government, Party, and religious organizations, such as the State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA 国家宗教事务局), the CCP Central Party School 中共中央党校, and the Chinese Islamic Scriptural Study Academy 中国伊斯兰教经学院. Nevertheless, Shengkai (2009) is useful to show the wide range of institutions whose research is sometimes labeled “religious studies” on the Chinese Social Science Citation Index.
Appendix 13:
Educational Principles and Curriculum in the Chinese Buddhist Seminary

Buddhists throughout China widely regard the Chinese Buddhist Seminary (CBS) as the best and most influential seminary in China. Graduates of the CBS have often found important positions in monasteries or other seminaries, although such job placement has become more difficult starting around the year 2000. A small number of graduates have continued studies of Buddhism in secular universities or abroad; some of these graduates are today leading figures in Chinese Buddhist seminaries. Generally there are ninety to one hundred seminarians studying at the CBS, including eighty-some in the undergraduate (benke 本科) program, in two classes of forty-some students each, and about ten students in the graduate (yanjiu 研究) program.

Based on the CBS’s official website, below there are translated parts of two webpages, on the seminary’s educational principles and curriculum, respectively.

For the curriculum and related data on the CBS during the 1990s, see Sueki and Cao 1996, 164-189. For academic publications displaying the curricula at other Buddhist schools, see Sueki and Cao (1996, 189-197: Jiuhuashan Buddhist Seminary) and Yang Xiaoyan (2011, 39-43: Sichuan Nuns’ Buddhist Seminary and Wutaishan Nuns’ Vinaya Studies Academy).

Educational Principles of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary
This first webpage includes an introductory paragraph followed by a list of five general principles, each of which is explained through another paragraph. Below I have translated the introduction, the list of five principles, and the content of the fourth principle, “embodying harmony.” This fourth principle shows the kinds of balancing acts, between various policies and other institutions, that the seminary administration deems important. In general, this webpage combines Buddhist ideas with state slogans and policies. The language here, with its emphasis on unity, discipline, and a strict chain of command, often resembles the educational principles of military academies and Party schools more than those of universities. Not coincidentally, at least two of the top administrators of the CBS are former officers of the People’s Liberation Army.354 Below, content in square brackets and the footnotes are added by Gildow.

* * *

Educational Principles355
教育理念

Last Updated: 17 January 2012
更新时间：2012 年 01 月 17 日

354 For a chart showing the seminary’s current leadership, see http://www.zgfxy.cn/xyzl/ldjg/ (last accessed 29 June 2016). I know of the background of the seminary leadership through fieldwork.

355 Content for this section was taken from the webpage http://www.zgfxy.cn/jyjx/2012/01/17/222322523.html (last checked 5 June 2016).
As the first institute of higher education of [Chinese] Han Buddhism since the founding of the new China,\textsuperscript{356} the Chinese Buddhist Seminary has been showered in resplendent glory. With the sincere solicitude of the Party and government, and under the correct guidance of the Buddhist Association of China, it has received its mission from the more than 2500 years of the historical lineage of Buddhism and it carries on Buddhism’s noble tradition of loving the country and loving the [religious] teachings. Taking advantage of the unparalleled historical and cultural resources of its location in the capital Beijing as its deep cultural foundation, the school actively works to create an educational environment with a fine religious climate, a strict academic climate, and one that produces in succession large numbers of talented monastics. For the modernization of Buddhist education, the school has searched for a route from confusion to clarity, and has formed its own, relatively unique educational philosophy.

1. Precise guiding educational policy
   一、明确的办学方针
   [content not translated]

2. The educational methods of “making the academy like a monastery, making the monastery like an academy, and unifying study and practice”
   二、“学院丛林化、丛林学院化、学修一体化”的办学方式
   [content not translated]

3. Assiduously creating a proper school climate that is collegial, energetic, strict, and self-sacrificing
   二、努力营造和合、精进、严谨、奉献的纯正校风
   [content not translated]

4. Embodying harmony
   四、体现和谐
   Concretely speaking for the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, harmony is embodied in cordial relationships with other people and in correctly managing various kinds of relationships. [The CBS aims to] correctly manage the relationship between study and practice; correctly view the relationship between the three great language-lineages of Buddhism\textsuperscript{357}; correctly view the relationship between Mahayana and Hinayana; correctly manage the relationships between the Eight Main Schools of the Mahayana; correctly manage the relationship between the uniqueness of religious schools and the general norms for education; correctly manage the relationship in education between tradition and the current age; and correctly manage the relationship to modernize so as to better transform modernity. [The CBS aims to] train seminarians who are truly able to [1] have an open-minded consciousness; [2] proceed from an integral conception of Buddhism; [3] see from a higher perspective of the entirety of Buddhism; [4] harmoniously integrate the close relationships between different schools [of

\textsuperscript{356} That is, since 1949, the founding of the PRC.

\textsuperscript{357} That is, Pali-language Buddhism (Theravada), Tibetan-language Buddhism, and Han-language (i.e., Chinese) Buddhism.
Buddhism]; [5] break down narrow sectarian views; [6] voluntarily understand the current developments in the Buddhism in other regions or countries; [7] proactively study the strong points of others; [8] truly shoulder the responsibility, in a world of pluralistic cultures, to uphold and maintain the Three Treasures, to spread the correct Dharma, to bring in believers, and to purify the minds of secular people; and [9] possess the required character and monastic talents to revive all aspects of Chinese Buddhism.

和谐，具体到中国佛学院来说，就是体现出融洽的人际关系，正确处理各种关系。能够正确处理学与修的关系，正确看待三大语系佛教的关系，正确看待大乘与小乘的关系，正确处理大家宗派的关系，正确处理宗教院校的特色性与教育规律普遍性的关系，正确处理办学的传统性与时代性的关系，正确处理佛教办学的现代化与更好化现代的关系。使培养出的学僧真正成为有开放意识，能从佛教的整体观念出发，能从整个佛教全局的高度着眼，能融通宗派与宗派之间密切关系，打破狭隘的门户之见，能自觉地了解其它地方或国家佛教的发展情况，主动学习对方的长处，能够真正担负起在多元文化的世界护持和住持三宝、弘扬正法、接引信众、净化社会人心责任和具备全面振兴中国佛教必备素质的僧才。

5. The school motto to Recognize Kindness and Repay Kindness

五、知恩报恩的校训

[content not translated]

* * *

Curriculum of the Chinese Buddhist Seminary

The following curriculum shows the courses offered for undergraduate students at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary. Although the actual courses and textbooks differ slightly, they seem to basically follow this outline. Two texts considered fundamental are worth noting: (1) the Essentials of the Eight Schools (by the seminary’s former dean of teaching affairs, Zhou Shujia) and (2) the Treatise on the Awakening of Mahayana Faith. Also notice that whereas books by a Taiwanese monk (Shengyan, 1931-2009) and a Japanese historian (Kamata Shigeo, 1927-2001) are important in the curriculum, no textbooks authored by the controversial monk Yinshun (1906-2005) are listed. The influential scripture Śūraṅgama Sūtra, despite the academic consensus that it was composed in China (and would hence be apocryphal by Buddhist standards) also continues to have a place in this curriculum.

Conspicuously absent are any courses on Tibetan Buddhism, despite the course on Southern (i.e., Theravada) Buddhism and despite the growing popularity of Tibetan Buddhism among Buddhists in China today.

For comparison with the (stated) curriculum at Taixu’s (1890-1947) Wuchang Buddhist Seminary in the year 1922, see Lai (2013, 180-81). In general, in contrast to Taixu’s seminaries, one can see that the Chinese Buddhist Seminary is more narrowly focused on Chinese Buddhism. Unlike in Taixu’s seminaries at certain periods of time, at the CBS today there are no language classes in Pali, Sanskrit, or Tibetan, nor are there secular classes in biology, sociology, or psychology.

The original Chinese text follows the English translation.

* * *
Curriculum for Undergraduate Classes at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary

Duration and Structure
Duration of study is four years, or eight semesters total. Including review and testing periods, each semester is twenty weeks long.

Curriculum
1. Foundational Classes:
   1. Pre-modern Chinese (semesters 1-4)
      Textbook: *Pre-Modern Chinese* (4 vols.), edited by Wang Li
   2. Foreign languages (semesters 1-8)
      (1) English (required)
         Textbook: *New Concepts in English* (vols. 1-4)
      (2) Japanese (elective)
   3. General history of China (semesters 1-4)
      Textbook: *A Concise History of Pre-Modern China*, edited by Zhang Chuanxi
   4. History of philosophy (semesters 5-8)
      (1) History of Chinese philosophy
         Textbook: *A Concise History of Chinese Philosophy*, by Feng Youlan
      (2) History of the religious philosophy of ancient India (philosophy of the six schools)
         Textbook: *Lecture Notes on Indology*, prepared by Dharma Teacher Chuanyin
      (3) History of Western Philosophy
         Textbook: *A History of Western Philosophy*, by Bertrand Russell [in translation]
   5. Composition (semesters 1-4)
      Textbook: *Composition in Chinese*
   6. The study of documents and library science (semesters 1-4)
      (1) Introduction to the study of [historical] documents
      (2) The study of Buddhist documents
      (3) Library science
   7. Contemporary politics (semesters 1-8)
      Lectures on the basics of law, religious affairs policies, temple management institutions, materials from assemblies of Buddhist representatives, and directives of the Buddhist Association of China
      Textbook: *Questions and Answers on Religious Affairs Policies*
   8. The basics and applications of computers (elective)

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358 Content for this section was taken from the following webpage, whose heading was “Education for Undergraduates 本科生教育”: http://www.zgfxy.cn/jyjx/2012/01/17/222206522.html (last checked 5 June 2016). My translation often replicates the formatting in the original Chinese, which is sometimes unusual (for example, when a book title is listed as the name of a course).

359 The term “pre-modern” (gu 古), here and below, often simply means prior to 1840 or so (the first Opium War). Another possible translation of gu is “ancient,” but here that translation is misleading.

360 According to a former teacher at the Chinese Buddhist Seminary, the textbook by Russell is too difficult for the seminarians, and a simpler textbook, composed in Chinese, is now used (personal conversation, fall 2012).
II. Foundational Buddhist Learning Courses

9. Foundations of Buddhist Learning (semesters 1-2)
   (1) Basics of Buddhism
       Textbook: *Essentials of the Eight Schools*
   (2) *Treatise on the Awakening of Mahayana Faith*

10. Buddhist history
    (1) History of Indian Buddhism (semesters 1-2)
        Textbook: *History of Indian Buddhism*, by Dharma Teacher Shengyan
    (2) History of Chinese Buddhism (semesters 3-6)
    (3) History of Southern Buddhism (semesters 1-2)
        Textbook: *History of Southern Buddhism*, by Dharma Teacher Jinghai

III. Specialized Buddhist Courses

11. The study of monastic discipline (semesters 1-8)
    (1) *An Outline of Monastic Discipline*
        Textbook: *An Outline of Monastic Discipline*, by Dharma Teacher Shengyan
    (2) *Precept Manual in Four Divisions*
        Textbook: *Lecture Notes on the Fourfold Monastic Discipline*, by Dharma Master Chuanyin
    (3) *Precept Manual of the Bodhisattvas*

12. Middle View Studies (semesters 1-8)
    (1) *The Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises*
    (2) *One Hundred Theses*
    (3) *Treatise on the Middle*
    (4) *Treatise on the Twelve Gates*
        Textbook: *An Interpretation of the Treatise on the Twelve Gates*, by Liu Feng
    (5) *Vimalakīrti Sutra*
    (6) *The Treatise of [Seng] Zhao*

13. Consciousness-Only Studies (semesters 1-8)
    (1) *Thirty Theses on Consciousness Only*
    (2) *Treatise on Distinguishing the Central and the Peripheral*
    (3) *Compendium of the Greater Vehicle*
    (4) *Sutra on Understanding the Profound Mystery*

14. Chan Studies (semesters 1-8)
    (1) *History of the Chan School in China and India*
    (2) *The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch*
    (3) *History of the Thought of the Chan School*
    (4) *Śūraṅgama Sutra*

15. Tiantai Studies (semesters 1-8)
    (1) *Outline of the School’s Teachings and Contemplations*
    (2) *A Primer on Concentration and Contemplation*
    (3) *Ten Gates of Non-Duality*

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361 Note that from the following list of courses, in items 11 through 17 we can see that only seven of the eight schools of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism are taught; the Esoteric school (mizong 密宗) is neglected.
(4) *Lotus Sutra*

16. Huayan Studies (semesters 1-8)
   1. *Opening and Awakening to the Five Teachings*
   2. *Underlying Meaning of the Huayan Sutra*
   3. *Chapter on the Five Teachings*
   4. *Chapter on the Golden Lion*

17. Pure Land Studies (semesters 5-8)
   1. *A History of Chinese Pure Land Teachings*
   2. *Treatise on Rebirth; or, Understanding the Essentials of Amitābha*
   3. *Sutra of [the Buddha of] Infinite Life*

18. Buddhist Logic (semesters 5-8)

IV. Arts Education
19. Calligraphy (semesters 1-4)
20. The Way of Tea (semesters 5-8, elective)
   Taught by distinguished Japanese instructors of the Urasenke [tea ceremony lineage]
21. Buddhist Music
   To be taught by an instructor from the Central Music Academy

V. Academic Lectures
22. Specialized Academic Lectures
   Regularly and sporadically, the school will sponsor academic lectures by experts from both China and abroad, and by both Buddhists and others.

中国佛学院本科班课程设置

学制设置

学制四年，共计八学期，包括复习和考试在内每学期二十周。

课程设置
一、基础教育课程：
1. 古代汉语，1－4学期开设
   教材：《古代汉语》（全四册），王力主编。
2. 外语，1－8学期开设
   （1）英语（必修），
   教材：《新概念英语》（1—4册）
   （2）日语（选修）
3. 中国通史，1－4学期开设
   教材：《简明中国古代史》，张传玺主编。
4. 哲学史，5－8学期开设
   （1）中国哲学史
   教材：《中国哲学简史》，冯友兰著。
   （2）古代印度宗教哲学史（六派哲学）
   教材：《印度学讲义》，传印法师编著。
   （3）西方哲学史
教材：《西方哲学史》，[英]罗素著。
5、写作，1—4学期开设
教材：《汉语言写作》
6、文献学与图书馆学，1—4学期开设
（1）文献学概论
（2）佛教文献学
（3）图书馆学
7、时政，1—8学期开设
讲授法律基础、宗教政策、寺庙管理制度、佛代会材料和佛协指示。
教材：《宗教政策问答》
8、计算机基础与运用（选修）

二、佛学基础课程：
9、基础佛学，1—2学期开设
（1）佛学概论
教材：《八宗概要》
（2）《大乘起信论》
10、佛教史学
（1）印度佛教史，1—2学期开设
教材：《印度佛教史》，圣严法师著。
（2）中国佛教史，3—6学期开设
教材：《中国佛教简史》，[日]镰田茂雄著；《中国佛教史》，黄忏华著。
（3）南传佛教史，1—2学期开设
教材：《南传佛教史》，净海法师著。

三、佛学专业课程：
11、戒律学，1—8学期开设
（1）《戒律学纲要》
教材：《戒律学纲要》，圣严法师著。
（2）《四分戒本》
教材：《四分律戒本讲义》，传印法师著。
（3）《菩萨戒本》。
12、中观学，1—8学期开设
（1）《中论玄义》
（2）《百论》
（3）《中论》，教材：《中论》，鸠摩罗什译，《藏要》本。
（4）《十二门论》，教材：《十二门论释义》，刘峰著
（5）《维摩经》
（6）《肇论》。
13、唯识学，1—8学期开设
（1）《唯识三十论》
（2）《辨中边论》
（3）《摄大乘论》
（4）《解深密经》
14、禅学，1—8学期开设
一、宗教类课程:  
1、天台学，1－8学期开设  
   (1)《教观纲宗》  
   (2)《童蒙止观》  
   (3)《十不二门》  
   (4)《法华经》  
15、天台学，1－8学期开设  
   (1)《教观纲宗》  
   (2)《童蒙止观》  
   (3)《十不二门》  
   (4)《法华经》  
16、华严学，1－8学期开设  
   (1)《五教开蒙》  
   (2)《华严经旨归》  
   (3)《五教章》  
   (4)《金狮子章》  
17、净土学，5－8学期开设  
   (1)《中国净土教理史》  
   (2)《往生论》或《弥陀要解》  
   (3)《无量寿经》  
18、因明学，5－8学期开设  
四、艺术类课程:  
19、书法，1－4学期开设  
20、茶道，5－8学期开设（选修）  
   邀请日本里千家高级教师授课。  
21、佛教音乐  
   邀请中央音乐学院教师授课。  
五、学术讲座:  
22、专题讲座，1－8学期开设  
   定期和不定期邀请海内外、教内外大德和专家来校作学术演讲。
Appendix 14: Glossary of Chinese Terms

The following lists my translations of technical terms, particularly those related to modern Chinese Buddhism or state control of Buddhism, and which cannot be found in standard Buddhological reference works.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Main Translation</th>
<th>Alternative translation, abbreviation, or notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bianzhi 編制</td>
<td>nomenklatura</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changwu fuyuanzhang 常务副院长</td>
<td>standing vice rector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chu 处</td>
<td>office</td>
<td>an official rank in the PRC nomenklatura, below bureau (ju 局) but above section (ke 科)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chuji 处级</td>
<td>office-level</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dasheng) qixin lun (大乘)起信论</td>
<td><em>Arising of Mahayana Faith</em></td>
<td><em>Treatise on the Arising of Mahayana Faith</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fashi 法师</td>
<td>Dharma teacher (monastic teacher in a seminary context)</td>
<td>Dharma master; Venerable, Ven. (as a title for a monastic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foxueyuan 佛学院</td>
<td>Buddhist seminary</td>
<td>seminary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fojiao xiehui 佛教协会</td>
<td>Buddhist association</td>
<td>BA (can refer to an association at)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fojiao xueyuan 佛教学院</td>
<td>Buddhist academy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>foxue 佛学</td>
<td>Buddhist learning</td>
<td>Buddhist studies (in some academic contexts); Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fu mishuzhang 副秘书长 (BAC)</td>
<td>deputy secretary-general</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fuhuizhang 副会长 (BAC)</td>
<td>vice president</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fuyuanzhang 副院长 (seminary)</td>
<td>vice rector</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(guojia) zongjiao shiwuju 国家宗教事务局</td>
<td>(State) Bureau of Religious Affairs; (after 1998): State Administration for Religious</td>
<td>SARA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Pinyin</td>
<td>English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>汉传佛教</td>
<td>hanchuan fojiao</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>汉语系佛教</td>
<td>hanyuxi fojiao</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>会长 (BAC)</td>
<td>huizhang</td>
<td>president</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>教务</td>
<td>jiaowu</td>
<td>teaching affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>教务长 (seminary)</td>
<td>jiaowuzhang</td>
<td>dean of teaching affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>律学院</td>
<td>lüxueyuan</td>
<td>vinaya academy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>秘书长 (BAC)</td>
<td>mishuzhang</td>
<td>secretary-general</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>现代佛学</td>
<td>xiandai foxue</td>
<td>Modern Buddhist Learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>学尼</td>
<td>xueni</td>
<td>student-nun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>学僧</td>
<td>xueseng</td>
<td>seminarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>院长 (seminary)</td>
<td>yuanzhang</td>
<td>rector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中观</td>
<td>zhongguan</td>
<td>Madhyamaka (school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中国佛教协会</td>
<td>zhongguo fojiao xiehui</td>
<td>Buddhist Association of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中国佛学院</td>
<td>zhongguo foxueyuan</td>
<td>Chinese Buddhist Seminary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>宗教局</td>
<td>zongjiaoju</td>
<td>Religious Affairs Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BAC</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>RAB; can refer to a province-level state organ, as opposed to the SARA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Works Cited

CANONICAL SOURCES IN CHINESE

ABBREVIATIONS

CBETA/T. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association edition of the Taishō shinshū
daizōkyō (Version 2014).

CBETA/X. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association edition of the Manji zokuzōkyō
Supplement to the Canon (Version 2014).

CBETA/J. Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association edition of texts in the Jiaxing
zang (Version 2014).

NOTES
Attributions below are made according to the collection in which the text is cited. Such
traditional attributions are sometimes contested.


Daming renxiao huanghou menggan foshuo diyi xiyou gongde jing 大明仁孝皇后夢感佛說第一希有
大功德經. A scripture allegedly received in a dream by the empress Renxiao (1361-1407) in
the year 1398.364 CBETA/J. no. 10.


Wangsheng xifang jingtu ruiying zhuang 往生西方淨土瑞應傳. Anon. CBETA/T. no. 2070.

362 See Foguang 1988, s.v. "道川."

363 Chen Pi-yen (1999, 10-14) argues the rites within this text were complete by around the twelfth
century, and adduces evidence that this compilation was complete some time prior to the year 1600.

NON-CANONICAL SOURCES IN ALL LANGUAGES


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Ye Qingchun 叶青春. 2014.08. "Dangdai zhongguo fojiao jiaoyu de xiandaixing shijiao 当代中国佛教教育的现代性视角." Fayin 法音: 38-44.


———. 2013. *Passing the Light: The Incense Light Community and Buddhist Nuns in Contemporary Taiwan*.


264