“WE MUST FIGHT WITH PAPER AND PENS”: SPANISH
ELIZABETHAN POLEMICS
1585-1598

Freddy Cristóbal Domínguez

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

Adviser: Peter Lake
November 2011
ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines books written by a group of English Catholic exiles who, because of their close ties with the Spanish Monarchy, have been called Spanish Elizabethans. It focuses primarily—though not exclusively—on two major texts in several editions and translations: Nicholas Sander’s *De origine ac progressu scismatis Anglicani* and the anonymous *A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland*. The texts in question were written between 1585 and 1598, a period that saw the escalation of Anglo-Spanish strife and actual war between the two kingdoms. These books were all meant to play a role in anti-Elizabethan efforts by Catholic potentates on the Continent, primarily Philip II, King of Spain.

To the extent that Spanish Elizabethan works have been studied, they have been examined through the prism of an English or English Catholic historiography. This dissertation tells a story with a set of broader implications. Because Spanish Elizabethan books were written on the Continent, often for, or at the behest of Catholic powers there, the perspective taken here is broadly European. Because they were written by a group of exiles who led peripatetic lives, who were wholly dependent on an array of different allies and benefactors in a shifting, multi-polar geo-political environment, these books had to be pliable. Each was tweaked to take advantage of immediate political and cultural contexts. This dissertation is consequently a transnational account of men without a nation actively re-working texts to fit into different discursive spheres. Their works are thus hard to pin down-- they are, to be sure, English Catholic, but they can also be considered Spanish, *ligueur*, and papalist in turn or all at once.
Through a focused examination of textual changes at precise political junctures this dissertation is also an exercise in reading “texts in contexts.” It differs from other such efforts in that it does not seek the types of ideological coherences which are generally at the core of intellectual histories. Instead, the closer we look at polemics from a “ground-level,” the more disorder we perceive and the better we can understand the contingent nature of early modern paper wars.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This project would not have come together were it not for my adviser, Peter Lake. His vast generosity and his unflinching patience are unequaled. His scholarship is a source of inspiration. Just as importantly, his constant good cheer and friendly encouragement have made “dissertating” enjoyable.

I owe a great deal to my dissertation committee members. Tony Grafton has been part of this academic journey since my first timid days at Princeton. To have his eyes peruse my dissertation is a great privilege. To have sat in his seminars confirms there are still towering members of, and ardent believers in, our modern Respublica literarum. Antonio Feros long ago humored me by reading a rambling, rather incomprehensible dissertation prospectus: this alone requires my deepest gratitude--perhaps my deepest apologies as well. For so readily agreeing to be on my dissertation committee, my redoubled thanks. Nigel Smith has been ever-ready to help, and his involvement in this dissertation helps it stand on surer footing.

I must mention at least two mentors who go back to my undergraduate days at Brown. Graduate school would not have occurred to me had it not been for the encouragement and guidance of my undergraduate adviser, Philip Benedict, who turned me on to the French Wars of Religion, a topic I will get back to someday. From Providence to, as fate would have it, Princeton, I have had no more trustworthy guide and friend than Liam Brockey. Among other things, his seminars on Golden Age Spain and the Counter-Reformation have had a deep impact on research paths thus far taken.

Countless faculty members at Princeton have been--directly and indirectly--important throughout my time here. I was lucky enough to be part of T.K. Rabb’s last
graduate seminar. He was also kind enough to read parts of this dissertation. More recently, Adam Beaver and Eleanor Hubbard have been extremely giving with their time and have offered great advice along the way. Ronald Surtz has, over the years, gone above and beyond the call of duty in offering help and support.

There are some scholars I have not met personally, but who have nevertheless been important in this project’s gestation. Early on in my researches e-mails exchanged with Geoffrey Parker and Fernando Bouza led me to vital documentary sources that have made their way into this thesis, and, more importantly, got the ball rolling. The ghost of Garrett Mattingly is somehow present here as well.

Fellow graduate students, past and present, have contributed much to this project and, I must confess, to my general sanity. My thanks to John-Paul Ghobrial, Nick Bomba, Renee Raphael, Vera Keller, Bill Bullman, Manu Radhakrishnan, Rupali Mishra, Valeria Escurriaza-López, Jebro Lit, Nick Popper, Alex Bevilacqua, Paul Davis, and Helen Pfeifer. A particularly warm thanks to Sara Brooks and Matt Growhoski.

The staff at Princeton’s History Department has been kind and patient with me. My heartfelt thanks to Minerva Fanfair, Reagan Maraghy, Judy Hanson, Barbara Leavey, and Doris Kratzer.

Money. Apart from support from the Graduate School at Princeton and the Department of History, this project could not have been completed without assistance from The Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation and the Fundação Luso-Americana para o Desenvolvimento.

My research was facilitated by the individuals who staff several libraries and archives. First and foremost, I have benefitted from the rich collection at Princeton’s
Firestone Library (and, in particular, from the unfailing assistance of Elizabeth Bennett, librarian extraordinaire). My thanks to all at the Archivo Histórico Nacional, the Biblioteca Nacional de España, the Archivo General de Simancas, the Archivo/Biblioteca Zabálburu, the Royal English College at Valladolid (especially Javier Burrieza), the Real Biblioteca, the Real Academia de la Historia, the Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, the Biblioteca de Ajuda, the British Library, the Archive of the Archdiocese of Westminster, the Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu (especially Father Thomas McCoog and Brother Hotkinson), the National Archives at Kew, the Archivio Segreto Vaticano, the Archive of the Venerable English College (especially Iris Jones), the Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu (especially, again, Thomas McCoog, Father Francisco de Borja Medina, and Father James Pratt who was kind enough to find me free lodging during one important research trip), the Bobst Library at NYU, the Butler Library at Columbia, the Hispanic Society of America, and the New York Public Library. Of all the librarians I have encountered Daisy Domínguez, my aunt, is by far my most beloved.

Grad Center, Tower C-- a rather drab specimen of 60’s college architecture in an otherwise lovely New England campus was where I first decided to become a historian. More importantly, it was where I spent some of the most memorable months of my life with Brandon Gordon, Ryan Heath, and Joe Rivera who gave me their whole-hearted support and friendship as I leapt into the past. Though I have, for long stretches of time, dissapeared behind the dust of old books, they have always, somehow, been there with me.

Memorable are those summer days thinking up a dissertation topic, and more importantly, not thinking one up, while cooling off in the air-conditioned home of Terry
Reilly and Anne Hayes, both of whom have become more family than friends. Also like family are the Morrones--Mario, Pat, Kate, and Giulia--who have offered me undeserved warmth and support. Jamila Ephron has watched all this with appropriate bemusement and has remained a great friend through it all.

Three people have made writing and, indeed, breathing (one figuratively, the other two literally) possible. I have loved Ellen Morrone since high school and she has kindly done so in return. She has read chunks of this dissertation and has listened to me ramble about it for far too long (along with all the other things I ramble about). Her patience has been (and is) superhuman. Finally, my parents--Freddy and Lourdes--have given me everything and asked for nothing in return. To them I dedicate everything I do that is the fruit of honest work and serious dedication, including this thesis.
# TABLE of CONTENTS

Abstract........................................................................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................ v

Historiographical Note...................................................................................................................... 1

Part I: 1585-1588

Prelude............................................................................................................................................. 21

Chapter 1: The Origins of the English Schism............................................................................... 27

Chapter 2: *De origine* Redux: Augmenting the Origins of the English Schism....................... 72

Chapter 3: History on the Move: *De origine* in French and Spanish......................................... 114

Coda: Distilling History..................................................................................................................... 165

Interlude

Chapter 4: Surviving Failure.......................................................................................................... 179

Part II: 1593-1596

Prelude............................................................................................................................................. 216

Chapter 5: Spanish Elizabethans and the Spanish Succession..................................................... 222

Chapter 6: A *Conefrence* ............................................................................................................. 245

Chapter 7: The Aftermath of *A Conference*............................................................................. 274

Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 296

Bibliography of Works Cited ............................................................................................................ 311
Note on Text:   Spelling used for quotations in English has been modernized. Transcriptions of original texts found in footnotes have been modified for easier legibility: contractions have been expanded (e.g. itaq.= itaque) and certain mannerisms have been adjusted (e.g. when appropriate, u=v). Otherwise punctuation, spelling, and syntax remain the same. Translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.
A Historiographical Note

Joseph Creswell lived a life of many disappointments.¹ An English Jesuit exiled on the Continent, he would never see home again. Having waged a long-distance battle against heresy, he died in 1622 with England still firmly in its clutches. Still, he never lost hope. God’s will would in time be done; until then he would not rest, nor abide complacency in others. Among his preferred weapons against evil in all its Protestant forms was the printed book. Experience showed heresy’s spread was mitigated and Christendom itself was saved from total “perdition and ruin” by well-inked presses. Only through books could true faith surreptitiously infiltrate confessional red zones, entering where priests could not. Devotional works conserved the “well-intentioned” while other texts exposing “the artifice of heretics” helped win back the errant.² Truth on paper was liberating. Or so Creswell argued in a letter to the king of Spain, Philip III, in the summer of 1617. His were expressions of both the general exuberance surrounding printed media in early modern Europe and a practical assessment drawn from experience. Far from home and subject to seemingly infinite precarities the Jesuit and his confreres had limited resources. Still, they believed a mix of priestly fervor and military force could easily bring England back to the fold. Fervor was had in surfeit, force was not. Wanting in

² Real Biblioteca, Madrid, Mss. II/2225, fol. 77r. Joseph Creswell to Philip III, St. Omer, 10 August 1617. Labeled “Para la provision de libros Catolicos.” Also see Fernando J. Bouza Álvarez, “Contrasreforma y tipografía. ¿Nada más que rosarios en sus manos?” in Cuadernos de historia moderna, no. 15, 1994, pp. 73-88. In English, see his comments on the matter in Bouza, Communication, Knowledge and Memory in Early Modern Spain (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), pp. 31-32.
sword, as one of Creswell’s fellow displaced compatriots put it, battle must be waged “with paper and pens which cannot be taken from us.”

Folios could cut as much as metal, but Creswell was unwilling to admit as much to Philip. Seeking subventions from the king, he insisted English Catholics never wrote “anything that might offend anyone.” Perhaps he meant anyone at the Spanish court; otherwise he was telling a pious lie. From an early seventeenth century perspective, memories of late sixteenth century polemics must have been vivid. Creswell himself helped produce scabrous anti-Elizabethan works to promote and execute Spain’s conquest of England. He was a species of English exile deeply indebted to, and dependent upon, the good graces of Spanish monarchs. He was convinced that for heresy to be squashed, Habsburg leadership (or at the very least assistance) was necessary. Such men gave credence to the myth that, as Oliver Cromwell put it, English papists were fundamentally, almost inherently, “spaniolized.” In truth, the tightness of Anglo-Spanish Catholic bonds have often been overstated. Nevertheless, “spaniolized” individuals and even networks—particularly among exiles—were real. Hispanophilic men (and women) were often little more than pensioners or hangers-on in Spanish territories, but during the late sixteenth century some were important political actors as well. These were years of heated conflict between Elizabeth I and Philip II, years during which Creswell had little

---

4 Real Biblioteca, Mss. II/ 2225, fol. 77r.
5 Most notably a book we shall not be focusing on here: Joseph Creswell, Exemplar literarum, missarum, et Germania, ad D. Guilielmum Cecilium, consiliarum regium (n.p., 1592).
6 Cromwell once said: “The Papists in England—they have been accounted, ever since I was born, Spaniolized.” Speech by Cromwell on 17 September 1656 in Thomas Carlyle, ed., Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches (Boston: Dana Estes and Charles E. Lauriat, 1884), vol. III, p. 72.
choice but to support a foreign king over his putative queen. He was one of many we
might call, following Albert Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans.  

This dissertation is not so much about individuals who fit this sobriquet, but about
some of their books. Simply put, I will discuss Spanish Elizabethan polemical works
produced between 1585 and 1598. There are, of course, important individual players in
the textual games described below. None more so than William Cardinal Allen and the
Jesuit Robert Persons whose links with Spain are undeniable, and whose clout among
English exiles is well known. But the reader will be introduced to such towering figures
only in so far as their stories help elucidate what they tried to accomplish through their
writings. Otherwise, more often than not, individuals disappear.

The following pages will be vague about authorship. Questions about who wrote
what still cause heated discussion and should be taken seriously. That I have failed to
ascertain singular hands behind most works examined here is not due to ambivalence, but
to the fact that, despite best scholarly efforts, deciphering single creators behind most
Spanish Elizabethan texts is impossible. Ambiguities are partly due to changing
definitions of authorship, which, as we know, are culturally contingent. Early modern
Europe was home to an intellectual climate that often favored collaborative efforts to the
extent that even when an author was claimed, attributions hid the work of editors,
researchers, and all sorts of other contributors. Something of this collaborative ethos is

---

7 Loomie, Spanish Elizabethans. For a far more thorough treatment see Loomie’s doctoral dissertation:
“Spain and the English Catholic Exiles, 1580-1604” (Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, University of London,
1957).

8 Thomas Clancy takes for granted the existence of an “Allen-Peersons Party,” though the Spanish bent is
not foremost in his analysis of the texts they produced. For an explanation of the “party” see Clancy, The
Allen-Peersons Party and the Political Thought of the Counter-Reformation in England, 1572-1615

About Peerson’s links with Spain, historiographical tradition is in agreement. There is some
controversy about Allen’s hispanophilic tendencies. On the latter see Eamon Duffy, “William Cardinal
palpable here as groups of men edited, translated, and wrote polemics. However, cooperation was as much the offspring of scholarly practices, as it was of practical need among certain exiled “activists” scattered across Europe leading hectic, unstable lives.

The early modern politics of authorship adds to the confusion. Whose name furnished a frontispiece said something about the book at hand, thus who received credit was sometimes a matter of strategic convenience. Attributions (accurate or not) could endow texts with a certain cachet.

Ambiguous attributions, anonymity, and pseudonimity were also deemed necessary to fend off persecution. As Leona Rostenberg has chronicled, English authorities were on the look-out for what they deemed seditious Catholic books.\footnote{Leona Rostenberg, \textit{The Minority Press and the English Crown: A Study in Repression, 1558-1625} (Nieuwkoop: B de Graaf, 1971).} Not only were writers nervous about actual persecution, but they were also wary of providing enemies with polemical ammunition. They did not want to be linked with books that could be construed as being “seditious.” Thus Spanish Elizabethans often tried to keep their names hidden, and often succeeded at keeping their identities secret.

In general, the works studied here came in the form of aesthetically unimpressive octavos but, as we shall see, they were laced with fiery polemical explosives. The potency of these verbal grenades on early modern discursive battle fields in itself justifies having undertaken this project. But this is only a partial justification.

Because of recent historiographical developments I am saved (or at least partly saved) the unhappy task of mounting a pleading defense of this project’s legitimacy and relevance. To be sure, English Catholic history long suffered neglect from “mainstream” historians, once being the preserve of antiquarians or scholars motivated by confessional
imperatives. These men often produced assiduously researched works, but rarely took part in historiographical discussions outside of their Catholic niche.

Much has changed in recent years. The loser’s tale enticed few until historians realized the losers hadn’t lost at all, or at least had been more tenacious than previously assumed. The rise of Protestantism in England was once taken for granted, deeply tied as it was to English self-definition and national identity. The decrepit carapace of medieval religion, it was thought, naturally succumbed to a vigorous, modern (and to a large extent autochthonous) form of piety more in line with the needs of men who were beginning to think rationally and for themselves.\(^\text{10}\) The work of Eamon Duffy and Christopher Haigh turned many of these assumptions on their head. For Haigh, religious change was no simple bifurcation. “Tudor Reformations had not replaced a Catholic England by a Protestant England: the country was divided, and the Protestants were insecure; popery had not been crushed, the worldlings had not turned to the Gospel.”\(^\text{11}\) In fact—and here Haigh signaled a real historiographical coup—Protestantism, particularly in its “hotter” forms was too rigorous, too demanding, too intellectual, to seep into the general consciousness. Thus England, even late in the sixteenth century, was a mosaic of beliefs and religious practices influenced by various shades of conservatism. Duffy’s magnum opus, \textit{The Stripping of the Altars}, is also a vivid portrait of the endurance and vivacity of medieval (or “traditional”) religious life in England. Well into the sixteenth century England was still a place where creeping to the cross meant something, and where a whole series of beliefs and practices long thought to be the fetish of a clerical elite drained into the subsoil of everyman’s conscience. The eventual ascendance of

\(^{10}\) For such an analysis see A.G. Dickens, \textit{The English Reformation} (London: B.T. Batsford LTD, 1964).

Protestantism was not the story of a placid transformation from the medieval to the modern; seen from the point of view of the common parishioner, the change was violent and scarring.\footnote{Eamon Duffy, \textit{The Stripping of the Altars: Traditional Religion in England 1400-1580} (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).}

Having shown that religious change in England followed a rather more complicated course than had once been assumed, Catholicism has become more pertinent to the annals of early modern English history. Not only did a seemingly congenital fear of Catholics profoundly mark political and religious developments,\footnote{For comments on some of these issues see Peter Lake, “Anti-Popery: The Structure of a Prejudice” in Richard Cust and Ann Hughes, eds., \textit{Conflict in Early Stuart England} (London: Longman, 1989), pp. 72-106.} but \textit{actual} Catholics too, through their religious practices, political maneuverings, and discursive acts were woven tightly into the fabric of English culture.\footnote{For an excellent review of these historiographical trends see Ethan Shagan “Introduction: English Catholic History in Context” in Shagan, ed., \textit{Politics and the ‘Protestant Nation’: Religious Politics and Identity in Early Modern England} (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), pp. 1-21.}

theological works, martyrologies, books of political theory, and slanderous pamphlets been mined thoroughly to understand how English Catholics promoted their cause and attacked the enemy. These historiographical efforts--the works of Peter Lake, Michael Questier, Lucy Wooding, Stefania Tutino, Anne Dillon, and Victor Houliston, for example--have achieved redoubtable sophistication, and, quite often, excellence. It would be more than disingenuous to claim the present work is planted on barren soil.

This dissertation diverges from existing historiography in its framing and focus. Unlike many previous works, this one is not an exclusively English or English Catholic story. Indeed, it started as a Spanish one. I began my researches thinking to write on sixteenth century Spanish diplomacy, particularly during the period of the Armada and the aftermath of its defeat in 1588. Several project-fishing expeditions around Spanish libraries and archives did not lead to a focused research topic, but I did start to ask myself the following: How did Philip and his advisers “sell” their aggressive foreign policy toward the end of his reign? To answer this question, I turned to printed sources. This led

to a series of first encounters with English polemicists who, I would learn, became among Philip’s most active publicists during his waning years. Happily, a primitive, partly intuitive understanding of English involvement in Spanish affairs coincided with my introduction to Peter Lake’s relatively early forays into English Catholic polemics. His work suggested (and suggests) the richness of English Catholic writing and its apparent relevance, not only within British contexts which occupy him, but within broader ones as well. Catholic exiles (of the sorts studied here) often wrote in Spanish Habsburg territories for, or at the behest of, the Spanish king. They wrote for audiences that were often, broadly speaking, European. Thus, it stands to reason that the following pages are of a similar scope.

The Anglo-Hispanic link which is at the center of this dissertation provides a window into an important early modern discourse. Sixteenth century Europe was fundamentally shaped by, as Richard Tuck has put it, “the growth of Habsburg power and by resistance to it.” Historians of the period are well aware that like his father Charles V, Philip II ruled over an ever-expanding empire. During the last two decades of Philip’s reign, the king embraced an increasingly muscular foreign policy: apart from conquering Portugal (thereby gaining its empire) he also attempted to gain control of England and France. Because Philip’s power spread so far, it should be no surprise that Spanish imperialism, or as contemporaries would have it, the quest for universal monarchy, framed important debates. While much of Europe—Protestant and Catholic alike—registered deep suspicion of the looming Spanish monster, others, like our Spanish

---

Elizabethans, defended it. The following pages function as a prism into a pan-European discourse occasioned by Habsburg imperialist policies.

These pages say a great deal about Spanish history itself. Indeed, although it is clear that the “black legend” of Spain was in large part the result of foreign vitriol, this dissertation shows how foreigners played a role in articulating a Habsburg imperial vision, and the textual means used to propagate it.24 Because the Spanish court often co-opted English Catholic discursive tools, we will also learn about how Philip II and his advisors carried out polemical wars, the types of arguments they embraced, and the circumstances under which they were willing to do so. I hope to add nuance to traditional scholarship which emphasizes Philip’s uneasiness with base polemics, or self-congratulatory propaganda. I show that he had little compunction promoting such activities through his English allies. Moreover, while it is well-known that the prudent king was image conscious, there is a lingering tendency to emphasize the religious, messianic elements in his self-imaging projects at the expense of their “secular” aspects. Here we deal with both.

But, again, much like this story is not about England per se, it is not solely about Spain either. The books studied here were written by men on the move, in the same way much of early modern Europe was on the move. Then, as now, there were willing

---


In part, this dissertation supports numerous and well-founded efforts to “deconstruct” the Spanish Empire, and it reaffirms— if it needs reaffirming—that, as Henry Kamen suggests (in typically polemical fashion), “the empire was made possible not by Spain alone.” (Kamen, *Empire: How Spain became a World Power, 1492-1763* [New York: Harper Collins, 2003], p. xxv).

More to the point, this dissertation might be seen as another among continuing efforts to redress antiquated histories that have ignored the role of “foreigners” in Spain. For an important recent contribution on this front see Óscar Recio Morales, *Ireland and the Spanish Empire, 1600-1825* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010).
travellers--adventurers, merchants, pilgrims, missionaries, soldiers--and unwilling ones--prisoners, captives, and, as the protagonists of our story were, exiles.

Exile was obviously no sixteenth century invention. As one contemporary put it, “Infinite are the examples in every age of those driven by exile from city or state.” Surely the author of these words--historian and political theorist Paolo Paruta--understood the phenomenon well, not just because the annals of ancient history gave him plenty of examples, but because Renaissance Italy was also littered with groups of the forcibly displaced.25 As described by Randolph Starn, Italian exiles, especially before the sixteenth century, were victims of political vagaries to be expected in a peninsula littered with small polities at war against each other, and within themselves. Members of losing factions often had to leave home, constituting in foreign lands, literally and metaphorically, a “contrary commonwealth.” With the coming of the Reformation the political exile did not cease to exist, but religion also became an important (often a primary) cause of exodus as groups on the wrong side of the confessional divide tried to avoid forced conversion or execution. Protestant historiography has been particularly adept at showing the cultural and political impact of exile. Hugh Trevor-Roper has suggested that “the dispersal of European talent in the century after the Reformation is surely one of the greatest fertilizing displacements of European history.”26 He was thinking primarily of the benefits reaped from skilled, learned “Calvinists” who moved throughout Europe taking their expertise and knowledge with them.

---

Exile was, of course, experienced by Catholics as well, and their perigrinations too created occasions for mutual benefits between refugee and host. On both confessional sides the exile-host relationship could flourish because they were bonded in hatred of a common enemy. This, in turn, created a context for real polemical fireworks. Writing from abroad, exiles managed to say things that were difficult, if not impossible to say back home, in large part because the wealthy and/or well-connected among them often achieved some level of power and influence in the highest circles of host governments. It is not surprising that, for example, some of the most un-Spanish, Spanish books of the sixteenth century were written in England by exiled Spanish Protestants, or that political malcontents such as Antonio Pérez and the pretender to the Portuguese crown, Antonio, prior of Crato found a congenial setting to spread propaganda against their putative ruler, Philip II, there. Indeed, depending on the circumstances, the Elizabethan regime (or elements within it) were quite happy to support these anti-Habsburg activities on their home turf, in the same way that Philip’s court allowed English Catholics to cause trouble in England.

27 Of late the phenomenon of Catholic exile has received increased, if still modest attention. See, for example, Robert Descimon and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, Les ligues de l’exil: le refuge Catholique Français après 1594 (Paris: Champ Vallon, 2005). Irish and Spanish scholars have, of late, done plenty of work on the phenomenon of Irish exiles. See, for example, Igor Pérez Tostado, Irish Influence at the Court of Spain in the Seventeenth Century (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008); Recio Morales, Ireland and the Spanish Empire; David Worthington, ed., British and Irish Emigrants and Exiles in Europe, 1603-1688 (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Thomas O’Conner and Mary Ann Lyons, eds., Irish Communities in Early Modern Europe (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2006). Classic works on English Catholic exile are Robert Lechat, Les refugiés anglais dans les Pays-Bas espagnols durant le règne d’Élisabeth, 1558-1603 (Louvain: Université Catholique, 1914) and Peter Guilday, The English Refugees on the Continent, 1558-1795 (London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1914).


30 For bibliographic notes on the works produced around Europe, including England, by the prior of Crato see Maria Antonieta Soares de Azevedo, O Prior do Crato, Felipe II de Espanha e o trono de Portugal: algumas notas bibliográficas (século XVI) (Coimbra: University of Coimbra, 1974).
Though they clung tightly to allies and supporters, exiles could rarely feel secure. This dissertation explores how books were influenced by the disquieting ambiguities of exile. Much as members of an intellectual elite in early modern Europe created a republic—the Republic of Letters—that had “no borders, no government, and no capital,” so too did exiles dispersed across Europe maintain strong personal and epistolary bonds that allowed for the formation of an imagined community; indeed, among English Catholics, many thought they formed the “true” English nation. Maintaining this fiction, however, always depended on the kindness of strangers. Leaving behind what wealth they may have had back home, English Catholics sought refuge in Spanish Habsburg lands—in Iberia (Madrid, Sanlúcar, Seville, and Valladolid) and Flanders (Louvain and Douai)—as well as France (Paris, Rheims, and Rouen), and, of course, Rome. Thus exiles had to balance attachments to their ancestral homes with those to their new temporary ones. They needed to be resilient.

This dissertation tells a transnational story. It emphasizes the movement of ideas and arguments across borders by men who themselves led peripatetic existences. It shows how English exiles tried to insert their polemics in various (often shifting) discursive terrains, both because the exile community was dispersed and consequently needed to, and because their anti-Elizabethan plots required coordination among several political powers. Spanish Elizabethans had to appeal to the Spanish crown—in alternating sycophantic and hortatory tones—for aid. If Philip was to save England, he needed help containing potential adversaries, who, on occasion, were also Spanish Elizabethan allies.

32 For a discussion of English Catholic view of the “nation” see Christopher Highley, Catholics Writing the Nation in Early Modern Britain and Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
English Catholics thus served as his apologists before papal, French, and English audiences, though they were careful not to step on too many toes. Individual works needed to be tweaked to accommodate for changing readerships. In the course of this study I reveal concerted polemical strategies used to meet the demands of shifting political and cultural contexts.

Obsessed as they were with helping effectuate the spiritual re-conquest of England, the texts studied here took part in debates spurred on by the Reformation. As is well known, early modern confessional strife helped internationalize paper wars. The fate of Christendom and matters of salvation were all-pervasive. English salvation, as we shall see throughout, was not simply a matter of any one or even two kingdoms, but impinged on the general well-being of Christianity and required the prayers, alms, and arms, of all good Catholics. The specifics of England’s travails provided a platform for general discussions about the horrors and dangers of heresy. Spanish Elizabethan texts thus could (and did) fit snugly amidst various Catholic, anti-Protestant discourses. They all shared a common goal to destroy Satan wherever he ruled.

My research has produced a story about the Counter Reformation in its most reactive, militant form. As is well known, “Catholic renewal” (to borrow Ronnie Hsia’s phrase) was accompanied by a missionary zeal that spread the Church across the globe. Our English Catholics were part of this phenomenon because, although most had not been missionaries themselves, they all actively trained young men for future English missions, and all longed to serve as missionaries after Spanish conquest. To be sure, they were all

spurred on by spiritual objectives, but it was often hard to separate these from worldly politics. No doubt, as Liam Brockey has pointed out in the case of Jesuit missions, religious orders did not always maintain symbiotic relationships with European empires.\textsuperscript{35} However, as Brockey also suggests, there were occasions of “missionary bluster” when individuals tried to promote convergent spiritual and imperialist goals. Case in point: Spanish Jesuit Alonso Sánchez’s quixotic efforts to convince Philip II to take over China.\textsuperscript{36} The following pages reveal such moments of bluster, though in the case of England, conquest was much more feasible.

It is almost a truism that politics and religion cannot be separated when studying early modern Europe, but in some quarters there is lingering discomfort about studying priestly forays into secular matters. No such discomfort can exist if we wish to understand Spanish Elizabethan texts-- most were written by men of the cloth, and were intended as tools of political action, even if their ultimate goals were spiritual.\textsuperscript{37}

As we shall see, the major works studied here were historical. This, of course, is unsurprising during a period which embraced classical notions of history as magistra vitae. Of late, there has been increased scrutiny on ecclesiastical historiography as a key to past theological and ecclesiogical controversies and the construction of confessional identities. Cutting-edge research has also emphasised the broad influences of


\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 36, p. 417. See also Léon Bourdon, “Un projet d’invasion de la Chine par Canton à la fin du XVIe siècle” in \textit{Actas do III colóquio internacional de estudos Luso-Brasileiros, Lisboa 1957} (Lisbon, 1960), pp. 97-121.

\textsuperscript{37} This dissertation is another contribution to a growing literature on radical priestly politics in early modern Europe. Aside from the above-mention books on English Catholic history, some of the most interesting works on this front have, again, dealt with France. See, for example, A. Lynn Martin, \textit{Henry III and the Jesuit Politicians} (Geneva: Librairie Droze, 1973); Barbara Diefendorf, \textit{Beneath the Cross: Catholics and Huguenots in Sixteenth Century France} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Megan Armstrong, \textit{Politics of Piety: Franciscan Preachers during the Wars of Religion, 1560-1600} (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2004).
ecclesiastical history and its methodology on early modern intellectual culture. Less emphasis, however, has been placed on its political uses. The following pages show, in detail, how intertwining worldly and ethereal goals were at the core of Spanish Elizabethan historiographical efforts. It also shows how our authors--again, mostly men of the cloth--were willing alternate between religious and purely secular historical voices for the sake of holy aspirations.

Today an older historiography which assumed Catholics were wary of using print, and were thus less able polemicists than Protestants, has been discredited. Nevertheless, especially when it comes to “lower” forms of polemical literature, there is much work to be done. Of course, many works by English scholars already mentioned deal with the subject, and historians of France in particular have plumbed the depths of sixteenth century printed and manuscript materials to better understand Catholic ideologies or, more broadly, mentalités. This dissertation does not deal with books which most historians would--rightly or wrongly--place alongside of Cesare Baronio’s learned histories or the erudite theological treatises of Roberto Bellarmine. Nevertheless, they do give us insight into early modern Catholic thought. The following pages, however, do not

---

38 Works on all these fronts are plentiful. The most complete monograph on sacred histories and the Counter-Reformation remains Simon Ditchfield, Liturgy, Sanctity and History in Tridentine Italy: Pietro Maria Campi and the Preservation of the Particular (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For comments on the impact of Christian scholarship, particularly as it pertains to history, see Anthony Grafton, The Footnote: A Curious History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), chapter 6; Grafton, What was History? The Art of History in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), chapter 2. From a more longue durée perspective see Grafton and Megan Williams, Christianity and the Transformation of the Book (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

use books as a prism into a Catholic ideology or a mentality. Surprisingly, we shall observe that while Spanish Elizabethans had rigidly confessional goals, their discursive approaches could be quite flexible.

There will be recurrent themes and ideas below, but I do not trace the evolution of any one concept or theory, nor do I spend too much time exploring intellectual pedigrees. Nevertheless, this project is indebted to the Cambridge School of Political Thought and its methodological innovations. I have drawn particular inspiration from the work of Quentin Skinner who long ago laid out a research agenda which remains viable to this day. To understand any given text, he insisted, scholars should concern themselves with what any given author “in writing at the time he did write for the audience he intended to address, could in practice have been intending to communicate by the utterance of this given utterance.”

Skinner and his colleagues, as Richard Tuck explains, believed “the proper way to read a historical text is as a historical product, in which the actual author … should be our principal guide as to why the text took the particular form it did…”

Skinner and his followers have often employed a sensitively contextualized reading of texts to uncover the origins and development of ideologies. To take just two examples, “Liberty” and the “Modern State” have both been terms and concepts that have benefitted from Skinnerian analysis. Nevertheless, as Kristie McClure has rightly pointed out, focus on “the emergence and persistence of…languages and trends” has led to analyses “removed from the welter of polemical struggles at the ‘ground level.’”

---

exchange for the messy, rough-and-tumble, terrestrial view of wordy fights, what we get from Skinner is an elegant explanation of how concepts have changed over time and how this is reflected in the employment of specific words and their changing significance. Especially in Skinner’s *Foundations of Modern Political Thought* we get as refined a satellite image of early modern ideological frameworks as exists to date. What we lose, on the other hand, is a textured sense of all the conjunctions and contingencies which together helped constitute political discourses.

One way of providing a more textured story is by shifting one’s focus from ideas and ideologies to specific books. Indeed, the history of the book, taken broadly, might be of some use to us. Though the methods and aims of this sub-discipline are diffuse, from its theorists and practitioners we have learned the dangers of separating ideas from the means of their propagation. How ideas are (physically and verbally) packaged and the ways they are transmitted, fundamentally affect both message and perception. More broadly—and this is the theme implicitly explored below—historians of the book have reminded us that each individual printed or manuscript object tells its own story, even if it purports to carry the same work. Texts are fundamentally unstable and their meaning often shaped by a mixture of context, form, as well as active and repeated manipulations by authors, printers, and, of course, readers. This dissertation holds as one of its central assumptions that this instability can be exploited, that the manipulations of texts can often be treated as political acts, and that studying these acts can help us better answer

---

questions about, as Warren Boutcher has put it, “the role of textual media in shaping political experience.”

Thus, instead of chasing the scent of an idea this dissertation follows a set of books created by related actors (Spanish Elizabethans) and describes how, through editing and other means, texts were used to their maximal political effect. The result is messy. As we shall see, none of the books examined are saying anything fundamentally new; they are simply employing a set of tropes to fit specific purposes. At times Spanish Elizabethan writings contradict each other, not so much because their ideas are confused, or because they are uncertain of their beliefs (though this might at times be so), but simply because shifting emphases in their argumentation was expedient. Thus this dissertation cannot be about any one ideology, nor can it be a story about English Catholic political thought per se. It is about the supple use of ideological tools, varying languages, and approaches in the name of practicality and a holy end: England’s re-conversion. What follows is partly the story of an organic, osmotic, diffusion and re-appropriation of texts within different cultural and political landscapes. More importantly, however, it is the story of their concerted, painstaking, manipulation.

Doing this brings political texts back into the realm of politics. The point here is not to write a story about a discursive realm, an invisible battle ground of ideas, but to see where real time political imperatives/actions and the imagined world of ideas intersect.

To tell such a story requires something a change in perspective from traditional studies of political thought. To get a real sense of the textual games that were being played by polemicists, the best approach is to start with a focused examination of a

---

limited set of books that will showcase polemical approaches and purposeful textual divergences. This dissertation will not examine every piece of Spanish Elizabethan polemic, but focuses on the study of two chameleon-like texts. In truffle hunting, not parachutist form, the first half will focus on three years--1585-1588--during which several editions of Nicholas Sander’s history of the English schism--De origine ac progressu scismatis Anglicani--were printed. The second half will focus on the varying editions of Robert Persons’ controversial book, A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland, written between 1593 and 1596. Independently, each half of this thesis tells the story of how each text was being “used” politically. But read together, both halves also reveal general tactical and polemical shifts from one crisis point to another which in turn suggests, as mentioned above, the extent of ideological flexibility amidst confessional inflexibility. To better understand these two sides of the story, attention is also paid to Spanish Elizabethan activities during inter-war years. This is the subject of an interlude between Part I and Part II in which the authors of our two main texts are shown coping with preceding failures, and preparing for what they hoped would be future successes. During this time, English Catholic exiles tried to cement a bond with the Spanish Monarchy, a bond which—in all its ambiguities—also unites De origine and the Conference.

The focused nature of this study is due largely to the fact that the marriage of Spanish Elizabethan desire and Spanish Habsburg true intent/ability to conquer England was short-lived. These books were chosen because they show Spanish Elizabethans at work during critical moments when the Spanish monarchy seemed ready to use aggression against Elizabeth. Indeed, the period between 1585 and 1597 not only
witnessed the hope of Spanish intervention in England (which had existed before, and would arise again), but also witnessed the actual preparation of ships and soldiers for combat. So the texts studied here provide a window into polemical production at a time of particular crisis. They provide hints about how controversial writings were deployed and employed during a late sixteenth century period that was war-torn, soaked in human blood and the ink of propaganda.

Because the aforementioned books were linked to both the Catholic Church and the Spanish Empire, and because they were produced by prominent exiles, this dissertation, as should be clear by now, tells a story with varied implications. Moreover, it is worth underlining that the texts studied here played a prominent role in the polemics of the time, and had long, influential afterlives to boot. Sander’s *De origine* became the source for Catholic interpretations of English history on both sides of the Channel in the sixteenth century and well into the nineteenth. The *Conference* was a source of severe irritation to the Elizabethan regime and the Stuart regime in Scotland. It also lived on in several forms throughout England’s eventful seventeenth century. Both texts represent something fundamental about the period that bred them. With *De origine* we have a key to a certain kind of historical imagination produced by confessional strife; with the *Conference* we have an important window into sixteenth century political thought, a window into complicated early modern forms of constitutionalism. What interests me, however, is not the static, iconic text, but the text still in flux, thrust into a political maelstrom well before anyone could have known its long-lasting effects.
Part I: 1585-1588

Prelude

During the summer of 1584 paper was spent trying to enliven the dying embers of anti-Elizabethan conspiracies. More than two years had passed since the first stirrings of a joint Hispano-Papal-Guise enterprise on behalf of the Scottish prince, James, and his mother, Mary. Promising gestures came to nothing. The duke of Guise (linchpin of proposed British escapades) re-focused on French affairs in light of his mounting estrangement from the crown and a growing Protestant threat. Philip II of Spain and Pope Gregory XIII were unperturbed by the anticlimactic end of recent machination. They were ambivalent from the beginning. English and Scottish exiles, on the other hand, awaited action with bated breath and were consequently left disgruntled and disappointed. Nevertheless, they kept faith in the written word and its ability to move efforts against Elizabeth forward. By the end of 1584 two books were printed in France that, according to a contemporary, left enemies at the English court “wonderfully disturbed” (mirabile conturbati sunt adverarii). The books in question were William Allen’s *True, Sincere and Modest Defense of English Catholics* and the anonymous libel, *The Copie of a Letter Written by a Master of Art of Cambridge to his Friend in London*, better known as *Leicester’s Commonwealth*. If hopes of Elizabeth’s forcible removal

---


were at a lull, on the printed page the shift from “non-resistance” to “resistance” was just getting started.\textsuperscript{47}  

*Leicester’s Commonwealth* was written by a group of lay Catholic Exiles connected with the ex-courtier Charles Arundell, including two malcontents, Charles Paget and Thomas Morgan, with the support (and the likely active participation) of Robert Persons.\textsuperscript{48} The book was put together, as Persons described it, “against this Earl relating all his wicked life.”\textsuperscript{49} The authors showed how Leicester duped the queen, usurped her power, and planned to take the crown for himself. Salacious in tone, the book harped on the earl’s moral failings and, as Peter Lake has suggested, relished in depicting him as a “sex monster or addict.” It was, at core, an “…immediate and racy account of the interiority of tyranny.”\textsuperscript{50} Juxtaposed against this piquant world of the evil-counselor is a rather staid discussion of Mary Stuart’s rights to the English throne which echoed the genealogical arguments recently peddled by John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, on behalf of the would-be English queen.\textsuperscript{51}  

Despite its flammable content, *Leicester’s Commonwealth* maintained a veneer of moderation. Fixated as it was on the earl, criticism was deflected from Elizabeth herself. The authors could claim they wrote “nothing repugnant to charity or to our bounden duty

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{47} Holmes, *Resistance and Compromise*, p. 131  
\textsuperscript{50} Peter Lake, “From Leicester his Commonwealth to Sejanus his Fall,” p. 143.  
\textsuperscript{51} It should be noted that Leslie’s polemical efforts in Mary’s favor were also being re-printed in English in 1584: John Leslie, *A Treatise Touching the Right, Title, and Interest of the Most excellent Princessse Marie Queene of Scotlantse* (n.p., 1584).
\end{flushright}
toward our most gracious Princess…” They bore no contempt toward the queen but only lamented “the grief of her most excellent Majesty, whom we see daily molested.”

The book also avoided attacking Protestant foes, seeking instead something of a “middle way” which would, in theory, allow for dialogue between moderates of conflicting confessions. The text was framed as a conversation among three men, one of which “was inclined to be a papist,” a fact that did not preclude his loyalty to England and the crown. Indeed, the Catholic interlocutor was said to have “many friends and kinfolk of contrary religion to himself, so did he love them never the less for their different conscience.”

This moderate Catholic voice openly censured less level-minded coreligionists known to have stood at the edge of treason. All three speakers were sensitive to the perceived need to punish haughty Catholics, “especially in such suspicious times as these.” Still, they suggested these instincts be tempered. England should try to “…live in peace and unity of the state, as they do in Germany notwithstanding their differences of religion.”

Moderates on either side of the religious divide could live in relative harmony were it not for those atheistic machiavels (like Leicester) who used religious divisions to cement their power.

Allen’s Defense was supposed to play, as Lake has suggested, “bad cop” to Leicester’s Commonwealth’s “good cop.” The book was a direct response to Cecil’s Execution of Justice in England (1583), a short pamphlet which argued English Catholic missionaries were treasonous and deserved to be executed. Allen showed that, contrary to the Elizabethan regime’s claim, the persecution of missionaries was not a matter of

---

52 Leicester’s Commonwealth, p. 183.
53 Ibid., p. 64.
54 Ibid., pp. 65-66.
55 Ibid., p. 70.
56 Ibid., p. 72.
sedition, but an effort to punish individual consciences. He argued there was no proof missionaries were involved in rebellion, and that the “bloody questions” used by the regime to elicit confessions intended only to interrogate the defendant’s religious convictions. The author also questioned the legal basis on which Catholics were sentenced. Priests were condemned for violating a law imposed during Edward III’s reign (25 Edw., st. 5, c.2), but Allen argued they “in the time of the said King Edward...should not, nor could not have been convicted of treason, treasonable assertion, or evil affection to prince or country.”

England had not yet been tainted by heresy and Edward’s contemporaries would have shuddered at the thought of killing a Catholic priest.

As with Leicester’s Commonwealth, the Defense tries to maintain some distance between its critique of the Elizabethan regime and the queen herself. The book was written against that “Sir Libeler” (Cecil) and by extension those “few powerable persons abusing Her Majesty’s clemency and credulity.” Nevertheless, if the queen was not the object of Allen’s ire, she was verbally bruised along the way. Allen suggested she was limited by the very nature of her sex. Save for her gender, Elizabeth was “otherwise truly of most excellent gifts,” but as a woman she was “easily seduced and not hardly led and drawn by those whom she either trusteth or feareth.” Worse, gentility made her more susceptible to “the tyranny of such as occupy...principal authority.”

Allen cut closer to the marrow in his discussion of ecclesiastical authority. First, he flatly denied the queen’s powers over the English church, insisting that “as before it was deemed in her father a layman, and in her brother, a child, very ridiculous, so now in

---

57 Allen, Defense, pp. 129-130.
58 Ibid., p. 56.
59 Ibid., p. 141.
herself, being a woman, is it accounted a thing most monstrous and unnatural…”

Worse still (from an Elizabethan perspective) Allen offered a long argument in favor of papal rights to depose errant monarchs. The *Defense* insists on the superiority of the spiritual sword to the temporal one. The Pope had the right (indeed duty) to punish monarchs who put the soul of the commonwealth in danger. To make his point, Allen used of a range of biblical and other historical examples, many of which raised direct parallels to the current English situation. Unwilling to dissolve superficial amity, however, he made these claims behind a thin exculpatory veil. Anything said in favor of Rome “neither hath been nor shall be by us anywise spoken, meant, or applied against our natural princess or country.” He insisted the touchy issue of papal supremacy could be broached without danger of sedition because affirming the queen might be deposed by the Pope as a heretic “doth not at all avouch her to be one; no more than the like assertion of the King of Spain would imply him to be such an one…”

To use more violent language against Elizabeth would have been imprudent. Both *Leicester’s Commonwealth* and the *Defense* were meant mostly for an English audience (though the *Defense* also had a Latin edition) that would have disapproved of any full-throttled attack. Too forward an approach would have been counterproductive. It would only inspire royal rage, which would then be taken out on recusants. Furthermore, without certainty of actual military action against England by Catholic forces, the time was not ripe for a true verbal hazing. At least not in English. Across the Channel the aura of diffidence that barely hovered over these polemical efforts would dissipate with the coming of a new year. In 1585, the same men who had been involved in the polemical

---

60 Ibid., p. 68.
61 Ibid., p. 133.
62 Ibid., p. 131.
efforts of 1584 would take a radical turn, writing an unflinchingly scandalous book for Continental audiences: the first Catholic history of the English schism, *De origine ac progressu scismatis Anglicani*.

The following three chapters will show that *De origine* was a key, perhaps the key instrument used by English Catholics to ensure the prompt removal of Elizabeth from her throne. That the book was a piece of radical propaganda is, of course, not news. Protestant commentators have thought it vicious slander since the sixteenth century itself, and more recent Catholic historians such as Peter Holmes have taken the book for what it is: an effort at textual “resistance.”\(^{63}\) The following analysis confirms these assumptions.

More importantly, however, it reveals something about how the text was used. Between 1585 and 1588 there were several editions, at least five of which were unique. This clearly suggests the polemical potential contemporaries saw in the work, and it provides the historian a window through which to observe early modern polemicists at their métier. It allows us to catch a glimpse of how authors/editors were actively absorbing, molding and re-molding a historical narrative to fit shifting political and polemical circumstances. The following pages suggest how polemicists went about creating the right propagandistic tool to accomplish two interrelated goals: the spiritual re-conquest of England and the total destruction of heresy.

Chapter 1

The Origins of the English Schism and the Radicalization of English Catholic Polemic

To say Nicholas Sander fought with paper and pen would be an understatement. A one-time Oxford professor of canon law broadly recognized for his intellectual gifts, his exile on the Continent could have been relatively peaceful. He might have stayed put in Louvain and led a quaint scholarly life at the university. If restless, he could have continued churning out books of religious controversy which he and his compatriots were writing since the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign. But, like many fellow exiles, his was a more peripatetic and more daring life. Apart from making the necessary trips to Rome, he also took less trodden paths to Cracow, Madrid, and Trent. An able writer of theological controversy, he was deeply entrenched in a bookish world; but he was also a man of action, equally comfortable in a world of high-level politicking and scheming. Much of his life is well documented, and his various activities are well known up to around 1579—he begins to fade from the historical record, however, just when his anti-Elizabethan efforts reached their apogee. That year Sander managed to wrestle a (relative) pittance from Philip II for a small expedition to Ireland on behalf of the Pope. Hounded by various contretemps, Sander left Lisbon on a modest fishing boat, an inauspicious

---

64 On Sander see Thomas McNevin Veech, *Dr. Nicholas Sanders and the English Reformation, 1530-1581* (Louvain: Bibliothèque de L’Université, 1935).
beginning to what was a fatal campaign.\textsuperscript{65} By 1581 he was, in the words of a later chronicler, “miserably famished to death”\textsuperscript{66} deep in the bowels of a war-torn country.

Sander left for posterity a legacy of learned books in print and manuscript, along with an enduring reputation. In Catholic circles he achieved a level of respect both for his untiring efforts against English heresy and his undeniable erudition. \textit{De visibili monarchia} (1571), his magnum opus, is a ponderous book that used heavy theological and historical arguments to rebut the historico-theological efforts of the Magdeburg Centurators.\textsuperscript{67} It pays particular attention to the issue of papal primacy over spiritual and secular matters.\textsuperscript{68} The book was lauded by men like Cardinal Hosius and Jesuits Alfonso Salmerón, Francisco Suarez, and Robert Bellarmine, to name just a few. The admiration of coreligionists was met in equal parts by his confessional enemies’ hatred. Unwilling---in words and actions---to hide his ill-will against the Elizabethan regime, Sander’s name became a byword for Catholicism at its most extreme, its most dangerous. Arousing raw passion, he could not but become a liability to Catholics charting a moderate discursive course. Even the authors of \textit{Leicester’s Commonwealth} and the \textit{Defense} strained to distance themselves from Sander’s brand of activism. They claimed his extremism was idiosyncratic.

Soon, however, the very Catholics who felt compelled (publicly) to (gently) snub him would be the ones to facilitate his literary revival.

\textsuperscript{65} For the expedition see Enrique García Hernán, \textit{Ireland and Spain in the Reign of Philip II} (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008) and a report from the papal nuncio Taberna to the Cardinal of Como, Madrid, 14/24 September 1583 in Johannes Kretzshmar, \textit{Die invasionsprojekte der katholischen Mächte gegen England zur zeit Elizabeths} (Leipzig: Verlag von Duncker & Humbolt, 1892), pp. 198-204.


\textsuperscript{67} On this aspect see José de Orellana y Unzue, \textit{Respuestas Católicas a las Centurias de Magdeburgo, 1559-1588} (Madrid: Fundación Universitaria Española, 1976).

\textsuperscript{68} For a general discussion of the text see Veech, \textit{Sanders}, chapter IV. For a discussion of his ideas on papal powers see Tutino, \textit{Law and Conscience}, pp. 21-28.
Early in 1585, after four years in a London jail, English priest Edward Rishton was quietly thrown onto a sea-faring boat and weathered crashing waves en route to permanent exile in France. Sometime between his arrival in Boulogne in January and his death in June, Allen probably introduced him to a manuscript of *De origine* which Sander wrote largely during his time in Spain (between 1573 and 1579), and may have circulated in fairly restricted circles thereafter. Rishton was commissioned to edit the book and his efforts were eventually printed in Rheims (1585).

He was, to be sure, a somewhat unlikely candidate for the job. A minor figure in English Catholic affairs, he would remain wholly forgotten were his name not associated with this project. Still, his commission was not totally unreasonable. The thirty-five year old priest had proper schooling both in Oxford and later in Douai (at the English College) and had published a couple of short theological works. Perhaps most importantly, he witnessed recent forms of Elizabethan oppression first hand during his time in the Tower.

Others must have also been involved. If Rishton died on 24 June 1585, as attested to in the Douay Diaries, it is difficult to explain how *De origine’s* narrative included events which occurred in August and September. Persons could have been among Rishton’s possible co-editors. Apart from the Jesuits’ penchant for polemic and his unflagging involvement in other English Catholic print campaigns (including those undertaken in 1584), a surviving manuscript of *De origine* contains copious marginal

---

69 Venerable English College, Rome, Liber 1388. *Nicolai Sanderi De origine schismatis Anglicani.*


annotations in his hand. But by the summer of 1585, however, Persons was on business in the Netherlands and surely too busy for consistent involvement.

Aside from commissioning it, Allen may have also helped edit the book. Gravely ill during the summer of 1585, however, he was probably unable to oversee its production all the way through.

There were, of course, plenty other eager Catholic exiles in Rheims who would have jumped at the chance to tell their story. Unfortunately, of their involvement the historical record leaves nothing for us to ponder.

That Persons’, Allen’s and other English Catholics’ participation in the book’s publishing remains obscure is not accidental, but is a testament to their talent for hiding behind the shadows of controversial literature. It sufficed credit was given to two authors deemed knowledgeable, but who were conveniently, at the time of printing, both dead. In Catholic circles Sander’s imprimatur gave the book an air of erudition, while in England the Elizabethan regime could do nothing more than boil over in rage at the news of his momentary literary resurrection. Rishton too, having just been released from prison in London, was a noted Elizabethan enemy. Though a small star in the constellation of recusant politics, as suggested above, years of imprisonment in London gave his account the legitimacy of an insider, a point emphasized in the book itself. Like Sander, he too was but a literary phantom.

---

74 When noted, translations (with occasional minor emendations) will be drawn from Nicholas Sander, The Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, David Lewis, trans. (London: Burns and Oates, 1877). On Rishton as an insider see p. cxliii; Sander, De origine (1585), sig. â iij (r), “nullum autem posse commodius id prestare dicebat, quàm me, qui eiusmodi rerum iam usum aliquem habebam, & ex iis que Londini in carcere ad quatuor fére annos continuos observaveram, non esset mihi difficile, illa supplere de regno Elizabethae, que post D. Sanderi mortem in Anglia contigerunt.”
*De origine*, often choppy and perfunctory in its treatment of events, seems the product of haste. Sander had not left a thoroughly polished manuscript, but it still served as a useful ready-made text. Posthumous editors reproduced his interpretation of Henry, Edward, and Mary’s reigns almost in whole. The real work lay in revising what Sander had left on Elizabeth, which amounted to less than a third of the book.

Despite its immediate usefulness, however, one should note *De origine*’s editors did not consider Sander’s history definitive. Throughout the 1590s Persons and his associates expressed the need for a substantial ecclesiastical history of England that would incorporate elements of Sander’s original work, but which would encompass a much more expansive swath of time (beginning with the death of Christ), and would pay close and critical attention to primary sources. Such a project had to wait centuries; it wasn’t even attempted in 1585. The parties interested in *De origine*’s diffusion were willing to sacrifice scholarly rigor for an immediate polemical punch.

The decision to print *De origine* was clearly linked to intertwined hopes and fears. Between 1584 and 1585 Allen and Persons remained utterly dissatisfied because while winds of war were blowing, there was a troubling cross-current auguring relative peace. Indeed, there was a spirit of inaction across Europe. After Pius V, subsequent popes seemed to vacillate between pious bellicosity and a will to maintain tranquility. No one seemed sure how to deal with the English Question and, at least according to Allen, no one seemed to understand the severity of the problem. Waning support was readily apparent in the weak response to Allen’s fundraising for English Colleges on the

---

Continent. Gregory XIII’s ascent to St. Peter’s throne didn’t bring solace. Papal funding for English seminaries would soon plummet. Worse still, support for missionary efforts in England seemed muted, even among staunch supporters like the Jesuit General, Claudio Acquaviva. Allen alternated between stunned incomprehension and bitterness. In August 1584 he wrote to Alfonso Agazzari suggesting they who lived in “most tranquil peace” couldn’t know how to proceed where the church was wracked by war. A year later Allen bemoaned Rome’s ignorance again. Apart from the Society of Jesus (Agazzari belonged to the order), “which is immediately engaged in…spiritual hunting,” no one seemed to care, and worse, there were “many who scorn such far-off matters….” He was at a loss:

From so many books written about the persecution, the martyrs, the institution of the colleges and the sending of priests, from so many letters written to the Protector, the Cardinal of Como and others, from the testimonies of so many apostolic nuncios and other ambassadors, from so much bloodshed before the whole world, from so many and such cruel writings and public laws published against our and your efforts, these things could have been very well known by leaders of the Church and I do not see what can be added.

Allen wished he or Persons, as the most expert men on English affairs, were in Rome to describe Catholic miseries under heretical rule.

Such frustrations had a long pedigree in English Catholic circles. Sometime in the late 1560s or early 1570s an anonymous English exile-- it could very well have been an angry Sander-- wrote a vituperative attack against Philip II and other Catholic princes’

---

unwillingness to participate in plots against Elizabeth. After describing the queen’s most putrid attributes-- the “stench emanating from her legs”-- the anonymous critic attacked Christian potentates who seemed more interested in placating the modern-day Jezebel than helping Catholics who had been forced by her cruel laws to live in exile. Elizabeth harassed supposed Catholic allies by land and by sea and they responded by “honoring her and offering her gifts.” She paid German soldiers to fight for heretics in France and yet Catholics continued to send ambassadors and honor English representatives in their states. Worse still, princes--mainly Philip--didn’t come through with their promises. Help to the Northern Rebels had not been forthcoming and exiled students in Flanders were not given pledged subsidies. These slights had dire consequences. Otherwise faithful Catholics, seeing supposed allies on the Continent “cared little about them, or more to the point did not care about them at all,” were forced to negotiate with Elizabeth. The disaffected Catholic exile was mystified “that such great princes are so fearful of such a heretical and excommunicated woman.”

More often than not, it was Spain that felt the whip of English Catholic tongues. The history of the relationship between English Catholics and the Spanish monarchy could be told as a history of disappointment. From the days of Henry VIII’s break with Rome it became clear to a certain type of forward English Catholic that English affairs could only be resolved with Spanish help. From those early days, too, some complained about Spanish inconstancy. Years later, little had changed. After Elizabeth’s ascent, Philip seemed unwilling to stand up to her. Some English Catholics, it was said, were so

---

79 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Órdenes Militares, Legajo 3511 no. 27.
80 See, for example, Cardinal Reginald Pole’s exhortation to Charles V in Reginaldi Poli Cardinalis Britannii, ad Henricum Octauum Britanniae Regem, pro ecclesiasticae unitatis defensione, libri quatuor (Rome: Antonium Bladum, [c. 1539]), CXI ff.
fed up with the king’s inaction they were willing to “appeal to the French, or even to the Turks rather than put up with these heretics [in England].”81 In 1577 Sander insisted Philip’s hesitance was not the fruit of deeply rooted pacifism, as some claimed, but the result of ignominious fear. The Spanish king was “as fearful of war as a child of fire.”82

By 1585, however, there seemed to be hints that Spain would finally act. Allen wrote the duke of Parma a letter supporting any future efforts against England. The letter was linked to the news that Hugh Owen (another Catholic exile) had just been sent by Philip to help the duke on English affairs.83 During the summer Allen and Persons went to the Netherlands, a sign that plotting was afoot. Still, though English Catholics began to sense Spain’s growing impatience with Elizabeth, open intervention was not imminent. 1585 would come and go. The same old pleadings for help continued: if immediate action was not taken, Persons wrote in 1586, surely all would be lost.84

*De origine* should be read as an antidote to apathy.85 To be sure, one might, as Peter Lake is currently doing, examine Sander’s history within the context of interconfessional polemical thrusts and parries, but one might just as well study it as a text written primarily for a continental Catholic audience. Sander’s history was first printed in Latin, unlike other recent polemics --*Leicester’s Commonwealth*-- which circulated mainly in English. Latin, of course, did not preclude English readers, but it suggests England was not the book’s primary market.

---

Whether English or continental, the history was not a typical anti-Protestant cudgel. As the authors themselves suggest, they were preaching to the choir. *De origine* was framed as a warning (*admonitionem*) of heresy’s evils,\textsuperscript{86} as an edificatory tool, but not as a direct rebuttal of any particular heretical vision of the recent past. Indeed, there is a sense that those immured in heresy were hopeless. The book’s lessons, however, would be useful to those who were on the verge of straying, so that if they did it would not be for lack of good counsel; to good Catholics, so that they would be hardened in their ways; and to those suffering persecution, so that no human laws might sway them.\textsuperscript{87} Sander’s history was fundamentally about fortitude and defiance. It tried to inspire, as Highley has put it, Catholic militancy.\textsuperscript{88}

Although many threads make up Sander’s historical tapestry, this chapter will explore just three tightly interwoven ones. I will suggest how *De origine* sought to delegitimize both the Elizabethan regime and the “Church of England” after its break with Rome. The book was essentially a smear campaign showing just how putrid England had become and the nefarious origins of its rot. Such descriptive efforts may have intended to elicit shock and revulsion conducive to activism, but in case the point was missed, Sander and his editors also make another more forward pitch for anti-Elizabethan efforts. *De origine*, printed after years of false starts and painful disappointments, suggests how Catholics themselves were complicit in England’s descent. It is thus a

\textsuperscript{86} Sander, *De origine* (1585), sig. Âij (v).
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 205r-v. These were what the authors described as laudible lessons to be taught by books, and refer specifically to Allen’s *Defense*. “Atque ista quidem scimus, nec nostri magna habent spem fore ut pro tantis ac tot peccatis iusto Dei judicio obdurati, priùs cedant quibuslibet sanis sermonibus, quàm prepotenti Excelsi manu conterantur, tamen & illos qui pereunt, ne nostro vitio pereant, admonendos & bonos, ut in veritate & innocentia sua permaneant, hortandos & reliquos ne tentationibus gravissimae persecutionis succumbant, praemuniendos & denique veritatis Catholice professionem publicam, nullis humanis legibus aut terroribus deferendam existiment.”
\textsuperscript{88} Highley, “‘A pestilent and Seditious Book’”, p. 171.
textbook on the dangers of tepidity, which in turn implied the need for rigor. Lest any questions or trepidations remain, *De origine* also provides a series of explicit justifications for deposing heretical monarchs and indeed Elizabeth herself.

In future chapters we shall witness shifts and permutations, but this first one aims to show how in the wake of potential (Spanish) intervention against Elizabeth exiles scurried to put together a book which shamed Catholics into definitive action by both showing their past errors, and by implying that heretical horrors required the ready action of Christ’s good servants.

****

For much of the 1560s and 1570s English Catholic polemics focused on theology and dogma. The most important historiographical efforts up to 1585—-the translation of Bede’s *History of the Church of England*, for example—tried to prove the ancient, pure, provenance of Catholic beliefs and practices, and thus Protestant errors. Sander’s impulse (as gleaned from his surviving manuscript) was to use his book as a vehicle to expose mistaken dogma as well, but his 1585 editors had different intentions. Errors of belief are dealt with, but the primary objective was to prove heresy’s evil by exposing its roots and showing the self-interest motivating those surreptitiously poisoning the commonwealth. Doing this established the falsity of the English Church and showed the distance between it and the true faith.

89 Bede, *The History of the Churche of Englande*, Thomas Stapleton, trans. (Antwerp: John Laet, 1565). 90 As Arnaldo Momigliano has pointed out, ecclesiastical histories were necessarily about origins: “The very continuity of the institution of the Church through the centuries makes it inevitable that anything which happened in the Church’s past should be relevant to the present. Furthermore…in the Church conformity with the origins is evidence of truth.” Momigliano, *The Classical Foundations of Modern Historiography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 136.
It is important that at a critical geo-political juncture, history was the chosen propagandistic medium. History in the aftermath of the Reformation was often an exercise in, as Donald Kelley has suggested, “the search of ideologically useful pasts.”\textsuperscript{91} Still, “good” histories lay claim to veracity and their authors typically flaunted trusted evidentiary fonts as proof of competence. To be sure, \textit{De origine} offers a version of history no Protestant would have recognized, but its authors and editors nevertheless vouchsafed its accuracy. As mentioned above, Rishton accentuated personal experience, he having been subjected to Elizabeth’s stilted justice. In a preface written by Sander, he too, presents his bona fides as a responsible historian. His story was drawn from personal observations, public records, and the testimony (oral and written) of grave men.\textsuperscript{92}

By revealing the ignominy of heretical rule in England, \textit{De origine}’s editors were synthesizing and publicizing information that had been circulating previously in fragmentary form. More often than not memoranda that reached the desks of kings, popes, and potentates, had a historical element to them. They often spoke of past and present prosecution of Catholics and they described, in general terms, the vileness of successive English (Protestant) monarchs. Together these interwoven narratives would, in theory, inspire the appropriate disgust and rage from Catholic readers.\textsuperscript{93} Through \textit{De origine} Sander and his editors wanted to arouse such passions on a broader level than ever before. By doing so, the book occupies a place at the crossroads between a


\textsuperscript{92} Sander, \textit{De origine} (1585), n.f. “Haec mira & stupenda quae post Anglicanum schisma inchoatum, Deus in illo regno, ut filiorum corda ad patrum fidem reducet, operatus est, intellegi perfecte non possunt, nisi perfecta schismatis huius historia, quam mira rerum novitate conspicuam & illustrem, secundum ea quae vel ex publicis monumentis excerpsimus, vel ex gravissimorum hominum tam scriptis quâm verbis hausimus, vel saltem ipsi cognovimus & observavimus, bona fide iam exponemus.”

\textsuperscript{93} A particularly good example of this can be found in the Archivo Histórico Nacional, Órdenes Militares, Legajo 3511, no. 2, labeled “A Su Mjd. De los Catholicos del reyno de Inglaterra”
tempered account of God’s will as revealed through the past, and a worldly exposition of political chicanery and all sorts of dirty corruptions.

English heresy was born of lust. Under the suggestion of Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, Henry first started to question his marriage to Catherine, but it was only his infatuation with Anne Boleyn that hardened his resolve for a divorce. Once ensnared, the king was willing to do anything to get her, even if it meant breaking with Rome completely. This objective trumped any notion of truth or propriety. *De origine* recycles a set of ageing tropes about Henry’s divorce from Catherine (and its validity). These were based largely on the exegesis of biblical passages concerning marriage between in-laws, as well as stultifying discussions about the legitimacy of the marriage’s original papal dispensation. According to Sander and his editors, both biblical and papal diktat clearly showed the marriage was licit and Henry’s arguments for illegitimacy were roundly rejected.

All humans erred, but Henry’s sin was egregiously willful. The king bribed underlings to confect any argument, however false it might be. He abandoned all protocols of decency to satisfy his sexual desires.

In typical overblown Sanderian fashion, *De origine* showed Anne could not be Thomas Boleyn’s offspring, as was generally assumed. She was conceived and born during the two years he spent tending to Henry’s interests in France. When back in England he immediately sought retribution for having been made a cuckold, but discovering the king was the father of his wife’s new child Thomas swallowed his pride.94 Years later, hearing rumors that Henry was seriously considering marriage to Anne, he tried to impede the horrendous match. The king brushed him off, caring little

---

94 Sander, *De origine* (1585), 14v-15r.
for what he had to say, indeed laughing at the predicament. Henry thus *knowingly* married his own daughter. That these were the origins of English heresy was divinely ordained so that the world might understand that the product of an evil deed was evil in itself.

Religious change during the Henrician period was not a matter of principle or even belief, but of expedience. The king was, after all, perfectly willing to remain within the confines of the church and under the spiritual wing of the papacy so long as he got his cherished divorce. When it became clear that Rome would not be swayed, Henry’s descent into schism began in earnest. He first made it illegal for Englishmen to appeal to any foreign power, and ultimately declared himself head of the church, requiring subscription to an oath affirming his new status. Like a modern-day Julian the Apostate, he went against scriptures and the learned counsel of the greatest church fathers. He was a man apart from even the most evil of heretics.

Henry, when you deserted the Roman Church, to what Church did you go? Did you go to the Greek church? Certainly not, for you have not denied the procession of the Holy Ghost from the son. Did you go to the Aethiopic church? No for you have not submitted to the rite of circumcision. Did you go to the Armenians? No, for you have not denied original sin, nor, as they do, the salvation of all who died before the passion of Christ. But at least, then, you went to Wycliffe, Luther, Zwingli, or Calvin? Well, if you found any in your kingdom holding the errors of these men, you persecuted them with fire and sword. Whither, then, did you go when you went out of the Roman church?

---

95 Ibid., 18r-v. “Tace, o stolide (inquit rex)...Cuiuscunque illorum sit filia, certè quidem erit uxor mea.”
96 Ibid., 66v. “Qui quòd haereses vestras non alio modo quàm per tám incestuosas nuptias in lucem exire voluit, eo ipso declaravit illas tenebrarum filias esse, nec aliter quàm per opera tenebrarum procreari potuisse.”
These were damning interrogatives proving the self-serving nature of Henry’s religion. He latched on to no existing doctrine, but simply created his own, on whim.

To Sander and his editors, memories of Henry were nauseating, but maligning the dead king posed some problems. During Mary Tudor’s reign, Catholics were first forced to deal with the difficulties posed by the fact that—whether they liked it or not—Henry was the queen’s father. Her legitimacy depended on him. Especially at the beginning of her reign the instinct was to emphasize, as Eamon Duffy has put it, “continuity with the reign of ‘good King Harry.’”

Indeed, during Mary’s reign, some of her supporters, in exalting the Tudor line were not averse to gilding the dead king with a thick coat of glory. One Marian commentator, Robert Wingfield, wistfully evoked “the splendor, generosity, and formidable reputation of her father.” In De origine glimmers—just glimmers—of Henry’s aureate past can be discerned. There are, for example, hints of his learning. The king’s “understanding was acute, and his judgment solid when he applied himself to the serious discussion of any question, especially in the early part of the day” before he drooped into drunkenness.

More important than intellectual merits was what seemed to be his lingering adherence to important Catholic beliefs.

---

fecerunt) pernegasti. An saltem ad Wiclefum, Lutherum, Zvinglium, aut Calvinum ibas? Imo si quos huius erroris viros in tuo regno reperisti, eos ferro, flammâque persequebaris. Quò igitur ibas cûm ex Romana Ecclesia exibas?”


100 Lewis, trans., *Rise and growth*, pp. 161-162; Sander, *De origine*, 102v-103v. “Ut autem ingenium, studia, & mores Henrici paucis perstringamus, à bonis literis nunquam alienus fuit…Nec ingenij acumen, nec judicij gravitas ei deerat, si quandó alicuius negoicij seriei investigationi seipsum dedisset, maximè horis matutinis. Nam in prando ut inebriaretur sepissimè ei contigit...”
While Sander condemns Henry’s willful break with Rome, *De origine* nevertheless insists the king’s version of schism was less ghastly than what would come after. He, for example, upheld the seven sacraments. To his credit, the most important of these, the Eucharist, “was always held in the highest honor.”\(^{101}\) Even as death approached, the ailing king never failed to take communion (in one kind, as Sander insists), and never ceased rendering proper honor to the host. When once told (by a Zwinglian) he might take communion sitting down because of his infirmity, the king answered, “If I could throw myself down, not only on the ground, but under the ground, I should not then think that I gave honor enough to the most Holy Sacrament.”\(^{102}\)

Private faith aside, the Henrician Church had a few seemingly acceptable features. Some of its servants were worthy of respect. Many of the king’s bishops “were men of learning and very far from bad men; many of them afterwards during the reigns of Edward and Elizabeth suffered bonds and imprisonment as confessors of the Catholic faith.”\(^{103}\) At his death important elements of Catholicism remained firm and visible. Although he had indeed perpetrated all sorts of malevolent destruction, the king left everywhere “a very large number” of Churches untouched, with their riches and objects of worship intact. Moreover, despite his promotion of anti-papal ideas and his assaults on religious orders, he had done well to punish other forms of heresy.\(^{104}\) Sander and his editors were not embracing Henry’s actions, but they seem to have been offering a

---

\(^{101}\) Sander, *De origine* (1585), 103r. “Sacramentum Eucharistiae summo semper in honore habuit.”

\(^{102}\) Lewis, trans., *Rise and Growth*, p. 162; Sander, *De origine* (1585), 103v. “... si me non modò usque ad terram dejicerem, sed & sub ipsam terram submitterem, ne sic quidem satis honoris huic sanctissimo Sacramento mihi viderer delaturus.”

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p.161; Ibid., 103r. “Episcopos...& doctos nominavit & minimè malos: adeò ut plerique eorum postea tām Edouardo quàm Elizabetha regnante, ob Catholice fidei confessionem carceres & vincula subiverint.”

\(^{104}\) Sander, *De origine* (1585), 110r. “...hereses penè omnes, præter illam quae Romani Pontificis Primatum & Monasticas religiones oppugnabat, cohibuit & repressit.”
tempered interpretation of the king’s religious settlement. This approach would have many afterlives. England in this initial stage of schism replicated Catholicism, minus the Pope.

The brand of heresy that took root after the king’s death was less attenuated. The protagonist of heresy’s post-Henrician ascendance was not the king’s successor, Edward, but his protector, Edward Seymour, duke of Somerset. The latter destroyed the tattered remains of English Catholicism, a process marked not only by theological error, but (as with Henry) by self-interest. The dissolution of the mass was, in *De origine*’s analysis, little more than a ploy to filch church wealth, particularly the precious accoutrements of Catholic ceremony.

Heretical insincerity was best perceived in how heretics dealt with matters of supreme ecclesiological and doctrinal import such as the Eucharist and its administration. At first there was a concerted effort to keep things as they had been in Henry’s time, but only “in order that the people might suppose that nothing had been taken away…”

Religion was put at the service of transient needs, even among the church’s highest officials like Thomas Cranmer, archbishop of Canterbury. While Henry was alive Cranmer played the Henrician, but as soon as the king died he became a Lutheran, knowing full well that Henry had detested Luther. In his Lutheran phase he wrote a catechism, which he would soon change after discovering Somerset was a Calvinist.

Elizabeth’s religious settlement was subject of particularly devastating opprobrium. The queen was deemed abhorrent because, by assuming a woman could

---

105 Lewis, trans., *Rise and Growth*, pp. 174-175; Sander, *De origine* (1585), 111v. “Administrandae autem Eucharistiae ritus in illis primis regni comitijis prescripti parum à Catholicorum Missa distabant. Ut videlicet, populus non putaret quicquam sibi ablatum...”

106 Sander, *De origine* (1585), 115r-v.
have religious power, she turned all laws, divine and human, on their head. “It has come
to pass” according to De origine, “that….the highest place in government of the church is
filled by one who not only is not in possession of it--this applies to Henry and Edward
also-- but by one who never can possess it.” Using the words of church fathers and the
apostles Sander and his editors make the, by contemporary standards, unremarkable
claim that “it never can come to pass that Christ should govern God, or any man govern
Christ, so also it can never be that a woman may govern either man or the Church of
Christ...” The, by our standards, misogynistic language was unrelenting. Evoking Eve,
Sander assured women were Satan’s favored tools for teaching “man how to break the
laws of God,” leading to the destruction of the human race. De origine’s editors, going
further than Sander did in his manuscript, continue: “Experience shows that women,
eager in pursuit of anything, especially if that thing be wrong, are more eager and more
dangerous than men in that pursuit, and that men always are most easily and most fatally
ensnared by them.” Elizabeth’s usurpation of ecclesiastical authority was the most

107 Lewis, trans., Rise and Growth, p. 38; Sander, De origine (1585), 142v-143v. “Deus quò istorum
haeresim rebus ipsis confutaret, fecit ut primùm non ad alium laïcum ea gubernatio in Anglia perveniret,
quàm ad impijssimum tyranum & sacrilegum Henricum. Deindè ut ab illo ad puerum Edouardum, denique
ut à puerio ad foemina Elizabetham deduceretur.

Henricus non quidem fuit, sed per sexum atque aetatem poterat fuisse Divini verbi, quo
potissimum Ecclesia regitur, rerùmque ac legum sacrarum, minister. Edouardus nec fuit, nec adhuc per
etatem poterat esse minister verbi, quamquàm per sexum poterat. Elizabetha verò, ne per sexum quidem
poterat verbum Dei, sine quo Ecclesia nullo pacto regitur, administrare. Itaque eò res deducta est, ut
Protestantes dicant illam obtinere sumnum in ecclesia gubernada gradum, què non modò nullum re vera
obtinet (quòd etiam ei cum Henrico & Edouardo commune est) sed nec potest quidem unquàm obtinere...

108 Ibid., p. 238; Ibid., 143v. “...quemadmodum nullo unquàm tempore evenire potest, ut vel Christus
Deum, vel vir quispiam Christum regat: sic neque fieri aliquando poterit, ut mulier in ijs quae Dei & Christi
sunt, aut virum, aut Christi Ecclesiam in qua semper virti sunt, rítè atque ordine gubernet.”

109 Ibid., p. 238; Ibid., 143v. “Diabolus quidem sanction Dei ordinem pertubaturus, mulierem in ijs quæ Dei
erant violandis ducem viris constituit, sacròrùmque magistrum ac praesidem ad totius humani generis
pestem atque interitum fecit.”

110 Ibid., p. 240; Ibid., 145v. “Experientia docet hunc sexum ubi vehemens est in alterutram, praesertim in
peire ore partem, maioribus illecebris ac violentia, quàm viros rem suam persequi, viròsque à foeminas in
omni genere perversissimè facillimèque inescari atque capi.”
horrendous deed ever perpetrated, surpassing the malevolence of even the most dastardly women of the past-- the likes of Jezebel, Herodias, and Selene paled in comparison.

Much of this had been canvassed in Allen’s *Defense*, if in less brusque terms. What changed was the insistence on the queen’s culpability. Throughout much of the 1560s and 70s, it was common for polemicists to express a (condescending) hope that if the queen were to better understand the truth which had been blurred by her evil counselors, she herself would bring England back to the Catholic fold. *De origine*, on the other hand, showed that the queen knew full well what she was doing. From the beginning, ecclesiastical matters had been treated as little more than political tools.

Elizabeth decided, in part upon the advice of certain counselors (Cecil), to feign loyalty to the Catholic Church. She even took an oath to defend the Catholicism and was duly anointed according to ancient customs. The queen went through these motions only to secure her crown. In truth, she disliked the whole affair, and even complained about the stench of the oil used at her anointing.111

To be sure, her advisors played a key role in ensuring the queen--*illa infoelix*112--embraced heresy, but she actively promoted it. Religious change occurred at her will. It was ultimately she who had the political acumen to flatter and bribe the lower and

---

111 Sander, *De origine*, 146v. “Iusiusrandum tamen Christianis regibus lege & more maiorum praescriptum de fidei Catholice defensione, privilegiorumque ac libertatum ecclesiasticarum conservatione, ne fortè de regno minus rièt sibi adepto postèa fieret quaestio, suorum suasu, qui regni causa quidvis simulandum, dissimulandum, iarandum, peiurandum sensorant, in sua inaugurione solenniter praestitit: permisit se quoque oleo liniri, sed non sine irresione & fastidio, nam sub papilionem parumper pro more ad regales induendas vestes divertens, nobilioribus circumstantibus ancillis dixisse furt: Abite ne foetor huius olei vos offendat.”

112 Ibid., 147r.
especially the upper houses of parliament to push through her new religious settlement.\textsuperscript{113}

She increasingly achieved singular and arbitrary control over ecclesiastical matters:

She suspends her bishops when she pleases, she grants a license to preach, either to those who are ordained according to her rite or to simple laymen, and in the same way at her pleasure reduces whom she will to silence. To show her authority of these things she occasionally, from her throne, addresses her preacher, and interrupts him in the presence of a large congregation, in some such way as this: ‘Mr. Doctor, you are wandering from the text, and talking nonsense, return to your subject.’\textsuperscript{114}

These are clearly not the words of a foolish gender-impaired victim.

Elizabeth’s church was an intricately woven web of secular concerns and spiritual lies. Unlike Henry, who had been wracked by guilt, Elizabeth wasn’t plagued by bouts of soul searching. If she seemed willing to maintain aspects of Catholic ceremonial, it was out of political pragmatism. She wanted to maintain the “glory and splendor” of the new church and, more importantly, hoped to dupe Catholics that the English church had not strayed too far from orthodoxy.\textsuperscript{115} In line with this general strategy, Elizabeth allowed known Catholic clerics to remain in their parishes, preferring “at first, the more easily to

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 154v. “Itaque diu restitum est, & in hoc superiori senatu tam difficulter est impetratum, ut nisi Elizabetha tacita nuptiarum suarum spem, uni ex optimatibus suis faciens, alteri in causa coniugij dispensationem, quam à Papa tàm expeditè habere non poterat, offerens: alijs aliter blanditijs, promissis ac muneribus gratificans, tàm eos quàm alios principes istis necessitudine coniunctos, hoc astu in partes suas attraxisset, everti non potuisset catholicà religio.”

\textsuperscript{114} Lewis, trans., Rise and Growth, p. 287; Sander, De origine (1585), 173r   “Episcopos suos ab officio fungendo cum vult, suspendit. Dat facultatem concionandi, vel suo modo ordinatis, vel etiam merè laïcis, & pro arbitrio identidem, quibus vult auftet & ut ostendat in hoc munere meram superioritatem suam, aliquando è solio regio alloquitur, & interrumpit coram amplissimo auditorio, ecclesiasten suum his fèrre verbis: Domine Doctor, tu vagaris, & effuistis multa impertinentia, recipe te ad textum, quem nobis expendendum suscepisti.” (In his translation, Lewis translates “solio” as “closet.” I have chosen to amend his translation to have it read “throne.”)

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 283; Ibid., 170v. “…retinuit, partim ad gloriam & splendorem externum istius novae ecclesiae, partim ut suos & exteròs in eam opinionem induceret, quòd non longè abesset, aut discesseròt à fide Catholica.”
deceive the people, the services of true priests to those of the false.”

Another facet of the queen’s devious strategy was to use quasi-Catholic traditions for secular ends. She kept candles and certain clerical vestments; she allowed chants and other ceremonials. But these were all stripped of any religious significance. She was only interested in having sumptuous, visually stunning clerical corps receive her during royal processions. Similarly, bells remained integral only so they might be rung whenever the queen passed by a church. Her suppression of important holy feasts and her usurpation of others was more troubling still. The celebration of Elizabeth’s ascension to the throne on the eve of the feast of the virgin’s birth seemed to overshadow the following day’s festivities. Days of fast were no longer manifestations of piety, but were said to be observed for economic reasons and “for the good of the state.”

This subversion of religion to politics was what most clearly showed heresy’s errors. Ecclesiological and doctrinal matters were occasionally subject of debate among clerics and divines, but the contours of the English church were molded almost exclusively by the secular arm. Religious change, as already suggested, was often simply a matter of royal will. But this was not, nor could it be, the whole story. Time and again Sander and his editors show religion had become a parliamentary game. During Edward’s reign “Spiritual questions were discussed in Parliament as if the assembly were a synod of bishops…” Later, the Elizabethan settlement was the result of connivance between the queen and her parliament: from beginning Elizabeth bribed her way to legislative

---

116 Ibid., p. 269; Ibid., 162r. “...ab initio, ad faciliorem populi deceptionem, uti veris sacerdotibus, quàm pseudopresbyteris suis.”

117 Ibid., p. 176; Ibid., 112r-v. “Proponebantur etiam in publicis comitijs (tanquam in synodo quapiam Episcoporum) causae spirituales...”
success in both the lower\textsuperscript{118} and the upper houses where “some she flattered, to others she made promises, and some she bribed.”\textsuperscript{119} Men of the cloth were excluded from governance and only lay forces facilitated Elizabeth’s rise to spiritual supremacy, the end of the Catholic Church, and the planting of a church based on deceit and hypocrisy. Sander and his editors lamented that “this is the result whenever divine things are handled in human and secular assemblies which have not received from God the promise of the spirit of truth, judgment, and justice.”\textsuperscript{120}

Heretical rule obviously had profound effects on England’s collective soul, but it also profoundly affected English subjects’ material existence. Economic oppression was symptomatic of Catholicism’s decline and reflective of heretical depravity/tyranny. From Henry’s reign on, \textit{De origine} shows that schism was tightly linked to greed. This must have been what motivated Henry to undertake a systematic theft of church lands during the latter part of his reign. “Even the tenth part thereof might have satisfied the greed of the most covetous king,”\textsuperscript{121} but Henry’s land-hunger abided and his subjects ended up paying for it. Though the king once claimed taking church lands would relieve his subjects from financial burden, “he alone laid heavier taxes upon the people than all the kings together had done during the five hundred years that were past.”\textsuperscript{122} By the time of Edward’s reign all men were required to pay a fifty per cent tax on all their possessions. More troubling than this sort of obvious exploitation was a far more insidious one.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{118} Ibid., p. 254; Ibid., 154r. “Cum ergò adhibita esset opera, ut ex singulis civitatibus & provinciis ij maximè cooptarentur in istam secundam comitiorum curiam, qui novis rebus in fide & religione studerent, faciè obtentum est, ut quicquid Regina proposuisset, in hac secunda curia comprobaretur.”
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid., p. 255; Ibid., 154v. “…alijs aliter blanditiis, promissis ac muneribus gratificans…”
\item \textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 257; Ibid., 156r. “Ita fit, quando res divinae in humanis & prophanis tribunalibus tractantur, quibus Deus non promisit spiritum veritatis, iudicij & iustitiae.”
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid., p. 155; Ibid., 98v-99r. “Cùm enim tot ac tanti monasteriorum in Anglia thesauri essent, ut eorum vel decima pars etiam avarissimi regis mentem explere potuisset…”
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid., p. 156. Ibid., 99v. “Quin ille solus plura tributa & vectigalia civibus suis imposuit, quàm omnes simul Reges per quingentos ante annos fecerant.”
\end{itemize}
enabled by royal monetary policies. Henry was attacked for debasing coinage. This impoverished his subjects who often held in their hands devalued specie. During Edward’s reign, continued debasing made it so in an instant coins lost half their value, and men found themselves poor, “though he had not suffered shipwreck, though he had not been taken by the enemy and robbed, and though no person whatsoever had cheated him.” These dubious practices exemplified the biblical precept “that they who thus rob others of their goods can never be faithful servants of Christ.” Moreover, “they who so wickedly cheated the people in worldly things never could be true and faithful stewards of the mysteries of God.”

All Englishmen-- but Catholics in particular--were victims of Tudor tyranny. The plight of English Catholics was popularized on the Continent through martyrrological works circulating both in print and manuscript. Unsurprisingly, Catholic suffering also filtered through De origine’s pages. Ensconced within a larger narrative, however, episodes of hardships and even pious death receive uneven attention, sometimes amounting to little more than lists of victims. To the extent that Catholic suffering was put on display, it was done to shame the persecutors of innocents and to reveal, as William Allen put it elsewhere, “the shameful subtlety and too foul and broad deceit”

---

123 Ibid., p. 205; Ibid., 125v. “…etiamsi neque naufragium fecisset, neque ab hostibus aut latronibus spoliatus, neque ab alio quopiam deceptus esset.”
124 Ibid., p. 159; Ibid., 101r. “Porrò Spiritus sanctus in sacra scriptura premonuit, eos qui hoc modo aliena bona expilant, nunquàm posse fideles Christi ministros esse.”
125 Ibid., p. 207; Ibid., 126v. “…eos qui populum in ijs quae seculi fuerunt, tâm iniquè fraudarunt, nullo modo potuisse veros & fideles mysteriorum Dei censores existere.”
employed by Protestants.\textsuperscript{127} This was an important theme because in recent years the Elizabethan regime had been flaunting its temperance. As mentioned above, Cecil’s recent pamphlet, the \textit{Execution of Justice in England}, was printed for broad European consumption in hopes of convincing readers that capital punishment against Catholics was only resorted to in self-defense against sedition fomented in continental seminaries. The queen was keen to vaunt her clemency and her unwillingness to delve into her subjects’ consciences. The authors of \textit{De origine} clearly feared that this official line might have some traction, even in Catholic circles. They thus lambasted Elizabeth’s “pretended moderation.” If the queen occasionally forewent the execution of certain missionaries in favor of exile, hers was a false kindness.\textsuperscript{128} If she didn’t always call for the actual death of Catholics, exile itself was just another kind of death. Financial burdens also weighed heavily on recusants. Inordinate fines were inflicted on anyone who refused to attend Protestant services. Those too poor to pay faced harsh corporal punishments. Further fines and cruel imprisonment also awaited those who helped sustain foreign missionaries and smuggled in sacred objects from abroad.

Priests were killed simply because they were priests, though the crown always had other specious excuses. Against frequent Protestant claims that English Catholic colleges mushrooming on the Continent were dens of rebellion, Sander and his editors argued that “while even in Catholic countries there are many who become priests only for honor and gain, the members of these colleges…without any hope of reward, rather with

\textsuperscript{127}William Allen, \textit{A Briefe Historie of the Glorious Martyrdom of XII Reverend Priests...} (n.p., 1582), n.f.  
\textsuperscript{128}Sander, \textit{De origine} (1585), 201r-202r. This is in keeping with the inflections of many martyrlogical works written in the 1570s and especially the 1580s. It should be noted that the sheer horror of martyrdom and Catholic suffering was intended to inspire sympathy, pity, and eventual action from readers. This was certainly Sander’s intention in one of the earliest writing we have from his exile days. See the memorandum, most likely written in 1561: “Dr. Sander’s Report to Cardinal Moroni” in J.H. Pollen, ed., \textit{Miscellanea I} (London: Catholic Record Society, 1905), pp. 1-47.
the loss of their heritage, with the certainty of disgrace, danger, and even death, so
eagerly desire and receive the priesthood.”\textsuperscript{129} Knowing full well that missionaries were
not tainted by political interests, the Elizabethan regime resorted to fabricating evidence
and suborned witnesses. If these tactics somehow failed, the regime still got its way.
Evidence, after all, mattered little since the verdict was always a foregone conclusion.
The best example of this was Edmund Campion’s fraudulent trial. Campion was the
victim of accusations by bribed witnesses whose testimony was incoherent and proven
patently false. Still, he was tortured and killed.

Beyond the priestly caste, laymen too (especially nobles) were victim of obscene
 cruelty. In fact, lay nobles often had a more sorry lot than priests because “they cannot
run away for conscience-sake, nor sell their estates, nor give up their goods to their wives
and children…everything must be left behind for the exchequer and for the use of
heretics: nothing more slavish and miserable can be imagined or described.”\textsuperscript{130} For
wealthy and poor alike, the rise of heresy was akin to a well-plotted heist. Wealth was
stolen with no compunction, and the common-wealth was offered oppressive misery in
recompense.

\textit{De origine} was the story of heresy and its tyrannical discontents.

\textsuperscript{129} Lewis, trans., \textit{Rise and Growth}, p. 299; Sander, \textit{De origine} (1585) 179v-180r. “…cùm ad sacrum
Presbyterium ne in Catholicis quidem Provincijs, nisi emolumenti & honoris causa à multis adeò festinetur,
ab istics tamen…sine omni spe premij, immo cum dispendio haereditatis paternae, cum certa expectatione
ignominiae, periculi, & etiam mortis, tanta animi contentione desideretur ac suscipiatur, ut nullius damni aut
dedecoris metu, nulla parentem aut carnalium amicorum dissuasione, à sancto proposito dimoveri queant.”
\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., p. 323 Ibid., 196r. “…nobles laïci sunt ipsis sacerdotibus infoeliciores, quod nec conscientiae
causa fugere, nec possessiones vendere, nec bona sua vel uxoribus ac liberis relinquere, vel ad sui
sustentationem secum transferre, sed omnia fisco, ac hereticorum usibus ableganda sint. Qua una re nihil
potest dici aut fingi servilius ac miserabilius.”
Descriptions of heretical perfidy and Catholic misery probably inspired sympathy from coreligionists. But so had countless previous reports which, nevertheless, failed to inspire a will to act. Sander and his editors thus offered readers more than a window into English horrors; *De origine* suggests how knowing about these horrors should influence behavior.

The Catholic exile, Richard Verstegan, recognized the popularity of Sander’s history was greatly due to the fact “it contained matter of…curiosity, and novelty in personal affairs.”

The book revealed the secret desires of individuals and the stratagems used to quench them. It was largely the story of a dissolute court and the means used by corrupt courtiers to ascend within its halls. Sander and his editors dwelt on these sordid tales, not out of any voyeuristic fetish, but to show the inevitable failure of power-hungry schemes when divorced from God’s will. Indeed, according to Sander, only history as a genre provided a large enough canvas to portray the complete image of heretical malfeasance, and to better understand Divine Providence.

Though perhaps loath to admit it, *De origine* was a fundamentally Tacitean project wrapped in providentialist cellophane. It is not surprising that in a gloss of Tacitus’s *Annals* by Annibale Scotti, the mention of Tiberius’s influential mother would have invoked thoughts of Elizabeth’s unjust female rule as described in Sander’s history, nor is it surprising that the gloss would predict the queen’s certain defeat. Invariably,

---

132 Sander, *De origine* (1585), Sander’s introduction, n.f.
each of *De origine*’s vignettes demonstrated how individuals who placed the worldly over the spiritual met an unhappy end. The lesson was simple, but important: neglecting the ethereal in favor of the carnal would bring misfortune. By providing negative exempla, *De origine* -- as any early modern history would have aspired to-- gave guidance on actions and behaviors that were best avoided. Catholic should not submit to the logic of political prudence which would only lead to suffering and damnation.

As we have already seen, schism was the result of royal whim. Having broken from Rome to divorce Catherine and marry Anne, God condemned the Henry to a life separated from the Church. God gave the king up “to the service of his passions.”

Despite flirtations with the Catholic Church, he suffered a pathetic end:

...having ruined a most admirable constitution by insatiable gluttony, he was now grown so unwieldy that he could hardly enter doors, and was wholly unable to mount the stairs. They lifted him up, sitting in a chair, by machinery, to the upper rooms of the palace. It was said that he had no blood left in his body, that it was corrupted into fat. When he was told that he was at the point of death, he called for a goblet of white wine, and turning to one of his attendants said, “All is lost!”

Henry may have been lamenting his sorry fate, he may have realized the severity of his sins, he may have also realized, as Sander seems to imply, his legacy was forever tainted.

Nicolaus Sanderus in Historia sua de schismate Anglicano. Sed, ni fallor, tempus prope est, que misericors Deus te e tam duro iugo servitutis, mediante Sanctissimi sui Vicarij Sixto V ope, eripere statuit.”

For a discussion on early modern notions of the art of reading history see Anthony Grafton, *What was History?*

Lewis, trans., *Rise and Growth*, p. 86; Sander, *De origine* (1585), 57r. “Deus ei permisit...ut sue libidini...satisfaceret.”

Ibid., p. 164; Ibid., 105r. “Ex pulcherrima corporis constitutione per ventris insatiabilem curam & expletionem eo deformitatis excrevit, ut vix per ostia ingredi, nullas autem scalas posset conscendere, sed in cathedra constitutus machinis quibusdam in superiora aedium attrahet, Imò nihil sanguinis toto corpore iàm reliquum fuisset, verum omnia in pinguedinem exuberasse dicebatur. De instante mortis articulo admonitus, pateram vini albi poposcit, atque ad unum ex suis conversus, Omnia (inquit) perdimus.” [Lewis translates “pinguedinem” as “humors.” I have translated it as “fat.”]
Though three of his children would sit on the English throne, none would erect a monument to his memory. Mary had thought about it, but her loyalty to Rome prevented it. Edward and Elizabeth inherited their father’s passion for sin, though they seem to have lost any sense of filial allegiance. Perhaps Henry’s descent into oblivion was ordained “by the judgment of God, that a man who scattered to the winds the ashes of so many saints, and who plundered the shrines of so many martyrs, should lie himself unhonoured in his grave.”

Had Henry’s punishment been a matter of one lost soul, Sander and his editors would not have written such a scathing history. But divine retribution manifested itself in post-Henrician affairs as well. Having guided England to ruin, the kingdom as a whole stood condemned. After Henry’s death England was subjected to a boy king who could barely rule himself, let alone a Church.

No one represented evil and its consequences more than Anne Boleyn. Sander and his editors relished in revealing all of her carefully planned schemes to achieve royal prominence. In a way, Anne knew how to play the courtly game all-too-well. From the start she understood the opportunities presented by rumors of a possible divorce. She understood the gain to be made from Henry’s lust-- but she didn’t get carried away. Anne knew Henry had once taken advantage and then flatly discarded her mother and sister. To secure the king’s lasting affections she played hard-to-get. She avoided the king just enough to enflame his passions, claiming that private meetings with him were out of the

---

137 Ibid., p. 165.; Ibid., 105v “...manifesta Dei vindicta est, ut, qui tot Sanctorum cineres dissipavit, & tanta martyrum sepulchra diripuit, ipse omni honore sepulchri careat.”
138 Sander, De origine (1585), 107r, “Deus in sua bonitate progresdiens, tertiò providit, ne alius huic puero succederet, qui Summum caput ecclesie Anglicane dici posset, quàm foemina, quàm neque in ecclesia cum authoritate loqui posse...”
question-- she wanted to maintain her purity until marriage. At the same time, however, she teased her suitor by talking, playing, and even dancing with him. In the short run, Anne succeeded, but her scheming ultimately caught up with her.

*De origine* indulges in crude stereotypes so prevalent in early modern Europe against Elizabeth’s mother. Anne was a whore, known broadly as a “royal mule” (*Mula Regia*). Unable to quell her libidinous instincts, she slept with nearly anything that moved. Her downfall was due largely to her unremitting carnality mixed with incautious efforts to stay a courtly fixture. Unable to produce a male heir with Henry, Anne tried to produce a “king” with another man. To avoid excessive rumors of illicit trysts, she decided to sleep with her own brother, George Boleyn. This effort having failed, she descended into further bouts of debauchery with several other courtiers. Soon enough, Anne, who had such a quick ascent, who had so fundamentally changed the history of England, would be beheaded for her indiscretions.

*De origine* is in large part a story about inadequate counsel. Royal errors were often enhanced by sycophantic minions who placed personal needs over those of the commonwealth and of God. This is exemplified by the life of Cardinal Wolsey who, according to Sander, wielded complete control at court (*totus erat in Volsaei potestate*) and longed for supreme spiritual power in and out of England. He wanted to be pope. Flames of these desires were first fanned by none other than Charles V (Charles I of Spain) who “began to flatter the man” thereby making him “minister to his own designs.”

---

139 Ibid. 17v. “…quanto magis rex eius consuetudinem expetit, tantò vehementiùs preces regias illa repulit, sanctè dictitans, nemini se virginitatis florem, praeterquàm viro suo dedicaturam.”
140 Ibid. “Colloqui, colludere, simul etiam cum Rege saltare nunquàm à sua modestia alienum iudicavit: tantùm à concubitu abhorrere se finxit.”
141 Ibid., 17r.
142 Ibid., 8r.
The Emperor dangled the papal tiara before the cardinal’s eyes in hopes of cementing an Anglo-Spanish alliance, but this was all just a ruse. In fact, Charles was busy promoting the election of Adrian VI. Wolsey hid disappointment momentarily, but grew increasingly impatient and eventually shifted alliances toward the emperor’s enemies. Worse still, noticing Henry’s estrangement from Catherine, he began supporting the idea of a divorce. He believed this “would be advantageous to himself, not unpleasing to the king, hateful to Catherine, and most disagreeable to the emperor...” The results were, from a Catholic point of view, dire. Henry only sank further into the pit of his desires.

Cardinal Wolsey received nothing for all his troubles. His machinations ended in ejection from court and a miserable death. He had never truly believed the king would act on his lust for Anne. When Henry married her, the cardinal’s hope for a French match died, as did his hopes of power. Failing to advocate successfully for the king’s divorce in Rome, Henry turned on his minister. Others at court, ever ready to pounce on a falling star, joined forces, invented damning charges against the cardinal, and quickly sent them to a receptive king. After being arrested for high treason Wolsey is said to have lamented: “Oh that I had been guiltless of treason against His Divine majesty! Now indeed, while intent on serving only the king, I have offended God and have not pleased the king.” In this realization he may have ultimately achieved redemption—

---

143 Lewis, trans., Rise and Growth, p. 15; Sander, De origine (1585), 9r. “Hac ergò ira inflammatus, cùm & Henricum tegem alieniore animo a Catharina, & ambitionem suam sanctissimae foeminae gravem ac molestam esse intelligeret, ratus consilium hoc suum & sibi utile, & Regi non ingratum, & Reginae odiosum, & Carolo molestissimum fore...”

144 Ibid., p. 73; Ibid., 51r. “Quod cùm multi ex principibus viris (qui Volsaeo Cardinali omnia pro eo ac ipse voluit administrandi iamdui invidebant) intellexissent, collatis consilijs, multa criminum capita in illum colgerunt, eaque suis chirographis obsignata Regi tradiderunt.”

“received in this world the reward due to his servility and pride, in order as we trust, to escape the penalties thereof in the world to come.”

Evil counselors like Wolsey (in fact, much worse than Wolsey) played a central role in the story of Edward’s reign as well. Sander and his editors show how the young king was bullied by his overseer, Somerset, who usurped de facto power and ushered in Protestantism. Despite initial successes the king’s courtiers were all ultimately victims of their worldly machinations. In a world so corroded, so given to lust, greed, and self-interest, war broke out among heretics. In England, since all decisions were made based on a calculus of power, even family members were pitted against each other. Somerset used any and all means to do away with challengers, including his own brother, Thomas Seymour, who was eventually executed on spurious charges. Somerset was not as successful at warding off John Dudley, future duke of Northumberland. Dudley, according to *De origine*, had masterminded the protector’s ascendance, though his plans were well hidden. Seeing that Somerset had direct kinship ties to the king, and that he could be easily manipulated, Dudley knew it was in his best interest to become his ally. Having succeeded at turning the Seymour brothers against each other, Dudley then formed an alliance with the duke of Suffolk and his powerful clan. This was all part of Northumberland’s plot to grab the throne by means of a clever matrimonial arrangement—his son, Guilford Dudley married Jane Grey, the presumptive Suffolk heir to the Crown. Dudley’s successes were, however, also fleeting. Though he tried to propel Grey to the throne after Edward’s death, his plans were thwarted by the rightful queen, Mary.

---

146 Ibid., p. 86; Ibid., 56v. “Ac Volsaeus quidem dignam sue praeterite assentationis & superbie mercedem in hoc mundo accepit, idque (ut speramus) ne in aeternum puniretur.”
Divine providence was more than a corrective for individual misbehaviors. God’s wrath was inspired by a broad spread willingness to give secular rulers power over the “visible government of the Church.” Soon after Henry’s death many --especially the learned-- began to recognize their past errors. They should have stood up to the king. However, trails of compunction led to little action. More often than not everyone simply bent to royal whim.

This pattern of Catholic weakness was exemplified by Elizabeth’s successes. Among the powerful, some endangered their spiritual well-being for the sake of royal blandishments. For the commoner, submission was more a result of intellectual simplicity and plain survival instincts. The queen, though she in fact took on more spiritual power than her father ever had, attempted to placate critics by calling herself the “supreme governor” of the church, not the “head.” The change in nomenclature, according to De origine, was as superficial as it was dissembling. The populace, however, convinced itself that the change in title signified a shift in substance, allowing them to justify falsely their submission. Even sturdier Catholics, battered by Elizabeth’s abuse decided to yield “for they were of the opinion that the straits they were in somehow or other might be held to excuse them.”147 Nothing could be further from the truth. Even corporal safety was not a sufficient excuse to neglect spiritual duties.

Outside of England powerful Catholics proved unhelpful. From the beginning those who could have shattered Henry’s schemes were too gentle with the erring king. Even the Pope had been, upon the advice of some possibly self-serving clerics, slow in reacting. While some advisors in Rome noted the corrosive effect of leniency, others

147 Ibid., p. 265; Ibid., 160r. “Praeter istos ergo licet caeteri ferè essent corde catholici, tamen putabant aliquosque in exteriori vita, & obediendum legibus, & regiae voluntati cedendum & si quid in ea re peccetur, tribuendum illi, & non sibi, qui iudicabant se utcumque hae necessitate excusari.”
“fashioning ecclesiastical affairs for political ends, and complaining loudly of the heresies that had lately grown up in Germany, and the tepidity of other princes in the defense of the faith, were of the opinion that Henry, a most zealous defender of the faith, should be gently dealt with….” They insinuated some sort of compromise might make itself evident in time, especially since Catherine was rumored to be contemplating seclusion in a monastery. Those who argued thus also wanted to accommodate the king’s request for legatine adjudication of the divorce under the assumption that royal resolve might be softened with the passage of time.\textsuperscript{148} The Pope was initially swayed, in part because he believed false rumors about Catherine’s interest in monastic life, but also because he \textit{did} want to please the king.\textsuperscript{149} He was seemingly misled and caught unaware; as a marginal gloss put it: \textit{obreptum papae}.

Despite the lessons of long and fruitless negotiations between Henry and the Papacy over the divorce, Rome continued to employ diplomatic means to bring England back to the fold during Elizabeth’s reign. Paul IV was eager to mend past fissures. To this end, he sent a nuncio instructing that “if on account of her doubtful birth she [Elizabeth] was afraid that her title to the throne might be questioned, the matter could be easily settled, for the Apostolic See is indulgent.”\textsuperscript{150} The queen flatly refused papal overtures. Insistent, however, the Pope sent yet another nuncio, this time asking her to

\begin{footnotes}
\item\textsuperscript{148} Ibid., p. 40; Ibid., 27r-v. “…tamen alij, negotia Ecclesiasticae politicis rationibus interpolantes, multis verbis quaesti sunt de haeresibus nuper in Germania obortis, deque ceterorum principum, in propaganda fide, nimia tepiditate quare cum \textit{Henrico} fidei Catholicae acerrimo defensore clementius agendum, praesertim cum dicatur, ipsam Reginam in monasterium ingredi paratam esse. Et sanè illud videri durissimum, ut, ne iudices quidem ij dentur, quos tantus Rex petit, cùm potius, dum lis apud eos agitatur, sperandum sit, Regis animum, si qua in re nunc sit depravatio, ad officium paulatim revocatum iri.”
\item\textsuperscript{149} Ibid.; Ibid., 27v. “Haec autem posterior sententia valuit apud \textit{Clementem}, partim gratie \textit{Henrici} nimium dantem, partim nihil omnino suspicatum, quòd falsa essent illa omnia quae de Catharinæ vel assensu, vel monastica vita obtenderentur.”
\item\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 291; Ibid., 175v. “Ac si quidem esset, de quo sibi propter incerta natalia ab Ecclesia vel Pontifice, quoad ius regnandi, metueret, sedis Apostolicae benignitate facilè transigi posse diceret.”
\end{footnotes}
send representatives to the Council of Trent. The queen’s bishops were promised protection of body and freedom of speech. This second entreaty was also curtly refused.

Secular rulers on the Continent were portrayed in a mixed light. It is striking, for example, that Charles V, otherwise broadly acknowledged as the protector of Catholic orthodoxy, was so intimately linked to the origins of English heresy. The emperor was no heretic, but his willingness to play a courtly game of lies and subterfuge with Wolsey nevertheless helped unleash a chain of actions which led to Henry’s schism. Sander and his editors would have readers believe that engagement on any level with heretical regimes had absolutely no advantages. Charles’s successor to the Empire, Ferdinand, would learn this all too well. As a good Catholic he tried to coax the queen back to the Church by arranging a marriage with his son. To avoid jeopardizing these efforts, Ferdinand prevented the fathers at Trent from making open declarations against Elizabeth; if the marriage were to come through, he insisted, England might yet see better days. But, of course, the queen had only been leading her suitor on, and despite courtesies she “was day by day more obstinate and to the Catholics more cruel.”

More damning still, Sander and his editors suggested continental powers left English Catholics unsupported at critical moments. English Catholics hoped that some Christian prince would rescue them, but they waited in vain for the emperor or anyone else. When the Pope finally excommunicated the queen, loosening Catholic subjects from their obedience, his pronouncements fell flat. There were many reasons for this, key among them was English Catholic uncertainty about where continental princes stood.

---

151 Ibid., p. 293; Ibid., 177r. “Sed & Procum illum sicut ceteros sefellit, & fit indies obstination, ac in Catholicos durior.”
152 Ibid., p. 116; Ibid., 76r. “Sed frustra sanè oculos in Caesarem, aut hominem quempiam coniectos habeant..."
They were fully aware that habitual commercial relations with England continued, suggesting there would be little support for home-grown revolt.\footnote{Ibid., p. 305; Ibid., 185v. “…Catholicis caeteris, vel quia non agnoscebant iuridicè publicatum, observarentque vicinos Principes ac provincias Catholicas ab assuetis cum illa commercijs non abstiner…in ipsius obedientia permanentibus.”}

In arguing thus, *De origine* is simply repackaging oft-repeated tropes. Since the earliest days of the sixteenth century, English exiles were among the most vocal anti-Machiavellians. Reginald Pole (among many others) censured those who favored using any and all means, no matter how immoral, to achieve self-serving ends.\footnote{For comments on this see Sydney Anglo, *Machiavelli: The First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).} Pole and his descendants in exile insisted Machiavellian designs would end in failure.\footnote{Pole’s major anti-Machiavellian statement can be found in his *Apologia…ad Carolum V Caesarem* in Angelo M. Quirini, ed., *Epistolatarum Reginaldi Poli S.R.E. Cardinalis et aliorum ad ipsum collectio* (Brescia: Rizzardi, 1744-57), vol. I, pp. 66-171.} Clearly English history, as Sander and his editors would have it, served as further proof of this tenet.

*De origine* can be read as another volley against a Europe teeming with waverers. Everywhere they looked English Catholics like Persons and his allies thought they saw so-called “church papists” who straddled the line between outward conformity to the Elizabethan regime and traditional (Catholic) piety.\footnote{For a discussion of the phenomenon and its complexities see Alexandra Walsham, *Church Papists: Catholicism, Conformity and Confessional Polemic in Early Modern England* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1993). For more detail on certain theological debates see Ginevra Crosignani, ‘*De Adeundis Ecclesiis Protestantium*: Thomas Wright, Robert Parsons, S.J., e il dibattito sul conformismo occasionale nell’Inghilterra dell’età moderna’ (Rome: Institutum Historicum S.I., 2004).} In print, there had been a push to insist compromise with confessional enemies was unacceptable. Persons claimed there were many reasons why man might sin, but he that did so out of “mere will and malice… sinneth willfully against his own conscience” and was damned.\footnote{Robert Persons, *A Brief Discours Contayning Certayne Reasons why Catholiques Refuse to go to Church* (Douai: Iohn Lyon, 1580), 4v-5r.} Men who knew better—anyone who had been introduced to the Catholic faith—erred when using fear to justify
sin. Regardless of immediate dangers, they were still subject to God’s wrath, for although
the body could, and perhaps would, be placed in shackles, no human power could
alienate man from his free will. While the body might be punished, staying true to the
church secured eternal salvation.\(^{158}\) In a later and immensely popular book of spiritual
guidance, Persons’s *Christian Directory*,\(^ {159}\) the author expanded on this theme, offering
an ample argument for sacrifice as the only path to God. The point was to persuade his
mainly English audience that change was possible so long as it was accompanied by true
spiritual resolution. Although works of casuistry circulating among potential missionaries
(tellingly in manuscript) often suggested ways in which Catholics, when under pressure
and risking death, might give misleading answers to their persecutors, even these morally
ambiguous texts insisted there was *never* an excuse to deny faith.\(^ {160}\)

This absolutist stance was, of course, polemical even among English Catholics,
particularly those across the Channel who had to deal with the reality of trying to survive
in a kingdom inhospitable to non-conformists.\(^ {161}\) *De origine* was yet another snub at
Catholic compromisers. But more importantly it was a lesson that could be readily
embraced by those on the Continent who led more comfortable lives and had the luxury
of easy intransigence.

The trick was to turn unthinking agreement into motivation for action.

\(^{158}\) Ibid., 21v-22r.
\(^{161}\) For a recent discussion of intra-Catholic debates occurring during the 1580s see Peter Lake and Michael
Questier, *The Trials of Margaret Clitherow: Persecution and Martyrdom and the Politics of Sanctity in
If *De origine* showed the dangers of acquiescence, it also sketched possible paths of resistance, and provided a set of implicit justifications for it.

Ideally, of course, one would follow the course of the martyr. Martyrologies typically exemplified commendable behavior, showing that for some valiant souls “no danger, no violence, no torment can remove them from the true faith.” Though, again, martyrrological elements in Sander’s history often come across as pat, the occasional discussion of brutal deaths provided exemplars of morality and virtue.

Special attention was given to Thomas More. More stood as an ideal, a man firmly entrenched in secular politics (he had been Henry VIII’s chancellor) who didn’t let politics interfere with his faith. He refused to support the king’s divorce and was ultimately done in by his even more obstinate refusal to acknowledge Henry’s pretended spiritual authority. But More was no unthinking martyr. He longed for a holy death, but didn’t rush into it. Questioned by Henrician authorities about the king’s role as head of the church, More skirted any direct response, relying instead on able circumlocutions. He favored such tactics, according to Sander and his editors, so that “he might not deny the faith on the one hand, nor on the other hand court his death.” This did not detract one bit from his resolve. While in prison friends and family visited and tried to convince him to compromise. He simply waved them off. When finally sentenced to death, the artifice used to avoid the executioner’s axe was dropped. More explained his unremitting obstinacy: after serious thought, he was unable to deny the authority of the Pope which

---

162 Dedicatory note in *Della persecutione di Catolici nel regno d’Inghilterra* (Bologna: Alessandro Benacci, 1582), 4v.
Henry so rudely rejected. More and those like him who persevered in their faith despite the lure of comfort and the instinct to live were the standard to which good Catholic readers should aspire.

There could also be more active forms of resistance. The Pilgrimage of Grace against Henry emerges from this narrative as a response to his attacks on traditional piety. Much of the old nobility and the common folk were still faithful, abhorred heresy, and were keen on preserving the ancient faith. When they saw the spoliation of churches had more to do with filling royal coffers than with religious convictions, nobles in Lincoln and nearby counties took up arms, making it plain “that they were about to fight for the preservation of the faith of Christ, for on their standard were the Five Wounds, the Chalice, the Host, and the names of Jesus inscribed in the center.”

As during Henry’s reign, during Edward’s the destructive powers of heresy led to legitimate disturbances. In Cornwall and Devonshire, when people realized that rituals such as baptism had undergone radical changes, and worse, when they “saw that the sacrifice of the Mass had been utterly suppressed and the altars, not those of Jupiter or Diana, but of almighty God and the one Mediator Jesus Christ” had been destroyed, they decided to take up arms against the crown. The battle was lost, but those who fought for the Catholic side gained salvation. Unfortunately, according to Sander, “it was not given them to deliver...”

164 Ibid., p. 136-137; Ibid., 88v. “Itaque cùm viderent per speciem superstitionis tollendae, re vera nihil alius agi, quàm ut sacra vasa, Cruces argenteae, calices qui sanguinem Christi portant, caeteraque ornamenta ex templis Dei subducereatur, primùm Lincolniensis populus, deinde Northumbria, Cumbria, Dunelmensis & Eboracensis ager arma sumpsit, adeò ut quinquaginta virorum millia & amplius in aciem prodirent. Insignia horum erant, quinque vulnera Servatoris, calix cum hostia, & nomen Iesu in medio expressum, quibus rebus demonstrabant se ob conservandam fidem Christi bellum gerere.”

165 Ibid., p. 187; Ibid., 117v. “Anno autem sequente circa festum D. Ioannis Baptistae populus Cornubiensis & Devoniensis molestissimè ferens filios suos non avito & patrio, sed novo & inaudito more baptizari, ac Missae sacrificium prorsus auferri, altariâque non Iovis aut Dianæ, sed omnipotentis Dei & unius mediatoris Iesu Christi, passim dirvi ac subverti uno consensu arma pro fide sumpsit...”
their brethren out of slavery of Satan.”166 In Norfolk, too, people rose and destroyed lands deemed to have been wrongfully encroached upon by the crown. The lesson to be learned was that “God showed men in power how wickedly they had done when they withdrew from obedience of the Pope and of their fathers in God; for he who contrary to the law refuses to submit to his superior is most justly disowned by his own subjects.”167

As for more recent events, Sander and his editors were somewhat coy. They dealt with the Northern Rebellion of 1569 perfunctorily, insisting it was undertaken by noblemen “in their own defense against the heretics and the upstarts who had led Elizabeth into her madness.”168 Despite such a platitudinous analysis, the careful reader would have perceived full-fledged support for the ideology underpinning this recent failed rising.

*De origine* questioned Elizabeth’s reign without compunction. Sander had long insisted Elizabeth’s downfall would be facilitated by books showing she was both a heretic and born of an *incestuous* love affair.169 She could neither be heir to the throne, and much less to any spiritual position. Sander’s history argued this unflinchingly. Elizabeth’s illegitimacy was, of course, not news to Catholic audiences. Reams of paper had been spent since Henry’s reign attacking the king’s divorce and showing the dubious

---

166 Ibid., p. 188; Ibid. “Atque ita hoc bellum absolutum est, nullo sané alio fructu, quàm quòd credendum sit aliquos eorum suas animas ab hæresi liberasse. Nam ut fratres è servitute diaboli eíperent, non illis est datum.”

167 Ibid.; Ibid., 118r. “Deus his exemplis admonitos voluit regni Principes, quàm impiè seípsos à Pontificum & patrum suorum obedientia divisissent.”

168 Ibid., p. 295; Ibid. 178r. “…multi ex nobilitate, haereseos ac status presentis pertesi, presertim in Septentrionalibus regni partibus, arma ad sui contra haereticos & homines novos defensionem, qui Elizabetham in istam adduxerunt insaniam, sumpserunt.”

169 Archivo Histórico Nacional, Órdenes Militares, Legajo 3511 nos. 11 and 12
circumstances of his marriage to Anne.\textsuperscript{170} Sander and his editors pushed such discussions further by explaining how these sordid affairs could have practical political implications. Because of her illegitimate birth there was no choice but to admit that the queen ascended by the will of Parliament, and not by right of natural succession. Henry may have once willed Elizabeth his inheritor, but neither she nor the marriage that produced her were ever declared legitimate.\textsuperscript{171} Moreover, still-extant parliamentary statute (instituted during the first year of Mary Tudor’s reign) explicitly rejected Henry’s marriage to Anne and, in turn, their progeny.\textsuperscript{172} This was as clear a rebuke of the foundations of the Elizabethan regime as had been ventured in well over a decade. In the past, even those who supported Mary Stuart’s claims to the crown did not question the rights of the queen regnant, or those of her potential offspring.\textsuperscript{173}

If parentage did not impede the queen’s de facto rule, the Pope could. This was an opinion harbored by many Catholics privately, but which was often thought imprudent to air publicly. One of the most noted missteps in papal policy vis-à-vis England was Pius V’s promulgation a bull of excommunication--\textit{Reganans in excelsis}--against Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{174}

As Arnold Mayer has suggested, the document had lasting effects. “Whenever in later ages men’s minds were stirred up against the Roman Church,” he claimed, “the

\textsuperscript{170} See, for example, Nicholas Harpsfield, \textit{The Pretended Divorce between Henry VIII and Catharine of Aragon}, Nicholas Pocock, ed. (London: Camden Society, 1878), pp. 236-237. Sander, \textit{De origine} (1585), 63v-65r.
\textsuperscript{171} Sander, \textit{De origine} (1585), 140r. “…tamen nec ab Henrico patre, nec seipsa, ulla statuum decreto natalia ipsius, aut matris cum patre coniunctio, fuerunt unquam postea aprobata aut facta legitima.”
\textsuperscript{172} Ibid., 140r-v. “Quin & ordines primo huius reginae Mariæ, lege perpetua approbant coniugium Henrici cum Catharina, & prolem ex eo genitam omni divino & humano iure legitimam esse declarant, omnia contraria acta, processus, sententias abrogantes, ut proinde alterae cum Anna Catharina adhuc supérstite verae nuptiae non fuerint, nec ex illis soboles legitima, aut Anglicani sceptri secundum leges municipales, quae spurious non admissant, vel natura, vel ualla prerogativa capax esse possit.”
\textsuperscript{173} This is true of \textit{Leicester’s Commonwealth} and Leslie, \textit{A treatise touchyng the right, title…}, and of previous works such as John Leslie, \textit{A Defence of the Honour of the Right Highe, Mighty, and Noble Princesse Marie Queene of Scotlant}de (London: Flete Strete, 1569).
\textsuperscript{174} Little has been written about the document and its history. See J.H. Pollen, \textit{The English Catholics in the Reign of Elizabeth} (New York: Longman, Green, and Co., 1920), pp. 147-151.
remembrance of 1570 was enough to justify their implacable hatred.\(^{175}\) The bull provided the Elizabethan regime with ammunition against Catholic enemies. By loosening Catholics from their allegiance to the queen the papal decree proved, from an Elizabethan perspective, that executions of traitorous Catholics were “just and necessary actions, only for the defense of herself [Elizabeth], her crown, and people, against open invaders.” Papal and royal imperatives were fundamentally incompatible. Elizabeth had no choice but to fight against the bishop of Rome who claimed “by his bulls or excommunications… to depose any sovereign princess, being lawfully invested in their crowns by succession in blood or by lawful election, and then to arm subjects against their natural lords to make wars…”\(^{176}\)

Even those who believed in the Pope’s rights to meddle in secular affairs knew the bull posed practical inconveniences. Famously, prior to initiating the first Jesuit mission to England in 1580, Persons and Campion sought counsel as to how it should impinge on their activities. Ten years after its promulgation, was it still in force? If so, should obedience be rendered unto the queen? Responses to such questions were ambiguous. The missionaries were told they (and Catholics generally) were not required to challenge royal authority. The bull had been promulgated when success seemed possible, but since then, the political context had changed. It thus need not be enforced “unless everything has been arranged that hope of victory is certain and ready, in which case the bull binds those who would be able to take any action…”\(^{177}\) These sentiments


\(^{176}\) \textit{Execution of Justice}, p. 21.

\(^{177}\) \textit{Ad consolationem et instructionem quorundam Catholicorum angustiis constitutorum questiones Aliquot} printed and translated in Ginevra Crosignani, Thomas McCoog, and Michael Questier with the assistance of Peter Holmes, eds., \textit{Recusancy in Early Modern England: Manuscript and Printed Sources in Translation} (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010), p. 99.
were echoed in the faculties conceded unto the missionaries by Gregory XIII. The bull could be side-stepped -- *rebus sic stantibus*-- until it could be enforced.\(^{178}\) This hesitance to embrace *Regnans* spilled over onto the printed page. Just a year before *De origine* was edited, Allen tried his best to divorce the bull from “mainstream” English Catholicism. He insisted papal deposition powers were ignored within continental seminaries because it was “incident to matters of state…and consequently might be interpreted by the suspicious to be meant to her [Elizabeth] whose case men liked least to deal in.”\(^{179}\) If certain individuals – Sander and Richard Bristow—had once published books in the bull’s defense, those books had subsequently been emended or taken out of circulation for the sake of moderation.\(^{180}\)

Sander and his editors did not hide their papalism. The ire against heretical rule was rooted in a belief that divine order was being destroyed, that secular rulers were usurping rightful papal rule in matters spiritual. *De origine’s* stance was more than defensive. The book recalls, with great reverence, the pontificate of Pius V, another Phineas who diligently “pursued heretics, Turks, and other unbelievers with a zeal wholly beseeeming the sovereign pontiff.” The same spirit which led him to form a Holy League against the Turk, led the Pope to excommunicate and depose Elizabeth. In a true coup de grace, the full text of *Regnans* was printed. The reader was thus re-introduced to Pius’s effort to “root up and destroy, to scatter and to waste, to plant and to build” in order to keep the faithful “in the unity of the spirit” (Jeremiah 1:10). Elizabeth was attacked for

\(^{178}\) Three versions of the *Facultates concesse PP. Personio et Edmundo Campiano pro Anglia die 14 Aprilis 1580* can be found in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Fondo Gesuitico, 720 A-II/2. Document (based on version found in London) can be consulted in Meyer, *England and the Catholic Church*, pp. 486-488.


\(^{180}\) Ibid., pp. 122-123.
having “monstrously” usurped the Church’s authority, forcing all to take an oath “against church liberty.” Worse, she allowed heretical doctrines to spread through pulpit and print. Regnans concluded that “all who adhere to her … are cut off from the unity of the Body of Christ.” Pius thundered: “We declare that nobles, subjects and peoples are free from any oath to her, and we interdict obedience to her motions, mandates and laws.”

These were fighting words. De origine held within its pages a document which had lain dormant for over a decade. In its new afterlife, the text reminded readers that the queen was no queen at all.

****

The job of convincing Catholic powers to fight Elizabeth was, as suggested above, laborious. It should have been easier. The mere existence of heresy should have been enough to rile all good Christian princes. Philip II would have, of course, wanted to kill off the wretched queen, but he was busy quelling rebellions in his own territories. Various popes could not stand to watch their power, and that of the Church, challenged, but some harbored hopes there might be other means to accomplish England’s re-conversion. Even among those who didn’t have such hopes, the will to do away with the queen was tempered by lack of money and forces. Moreover, the debacle of Regnans had taught against rash action.

English Catholics had to overcome these harsh realities by insisting on two crucial points which were repeated over and over in private memoranda: 1. The Elizabethan threat was such that despite risks, strong action was needed 2. Elizabeth’s removal would

---

actually be easier than generally assumed. Both of these points were canvassed in *De origine*.

Elizabeth posed a danger both to her realm and to Christendom as a whole. Heresy was like a contagion, a pestilence that spread without mercy, and with the queen to incubate it, the danger was even more acute. She knew that promoting Protestantism would trouble many in England and across Europe. To prevent any backlash she needed to disturb her neighbors so that “all the Catholic sovereigns being fully occupied with their own affairs might have no time to attend to those of others.”

In Scotland, she facilitated rebellion against Mary, in France she leagued with Huguenots against the monarchy, and in the Netherlands she contrived against the King of Spain. This was all done, according to *De origine*, “in order that through the misfortune of other sovereigns and other countries, they might themselves live in peace at home, and by the scattering far and wide of the poison of their heretical corruption secure themselves a longer continuance in their sect.”

Though rarely used publicly in anti-Elizabethan polemics leading up to 1585, this was a typical sentiment expressed in private. Memorialists stressed that the destruction of Elizabethan heresy would allow for the amelioration of all Europe’s (and Christendom’s) problems.

Despite its obvious threat, Elizabeth’s power rested on shaky foundations. Clearly, she lacked divine support, or so it would seem from the providential reading Sander and his editors provided of recent English events. It was a matter of time before

---

182 Lewis, trans., *Rise and Growth*, p. 288; Sander, *De origine* (1585), 174r. “Principes omnes, ita rebus ac regnis suis servandis intentos facerent, aliena curandi parum otij haberent.”
183 Ibid. p. 290; Ibid., 175r. “Omniúmque gentium seditionis hereticis ad commune Ecclesiae incendium amplificandum, se socios, antesignanos ac patronos dederunt, ut & aliorum Principiwm ac Provinciarum infoelicitate essent ipsi domi foelices, & haeretice suae infectionis tãm latè propagato veneno, diutius in sua secta permanerent securi.”
she faced her demise. Indeed, if the English schism showed anything, it was that England after the break with Rome was in shambles. Court politics was based on lies and frequent betrayals, internal enmities and fissures. Beyond the court, too, the English Church (as was to be expected of any heretical cabal) was rife with in-fighting. To make this point, Sander and his editors gleefully note the emergence of Puritans as enemies of “ordinary Protestants.” Because of these developments “Catholics grew in number every day, and more resolute in the profession of the faith.”  

English Catholics and their supporters believed demographics were on their side. Time and again in private correspondence anti-Elizabethan agitators insisted that the vast majority of Englishmen remained faithful. Most bishops had initially done their best to resist Elizabeth and, more importantly, the population at large was cool to the regime’s entreaties.

Of the three parties in which Englishmen might be divided, one party was at the time not so very much given to heresy; it neither desired the change of religion nor approved of it after it was made, and it liked it still less afterwards when it had tasted its fruits. For beside the very large number of the nobility, of which I have spoken before, the greater part of the country gentlemen was unmistakably Catholic; so also were the farmers throughout the kingdom… Not a single county except those near London and the court, and scarcely any towns except those on the sea-coast, willingly accepted heresy; and even in those places the heretics were the lazy and luxurious—young men, bankrupts and spendthrifts, women laden with sins, and people of that kind.  

184 Ibid., p. 309; Ibid., 188r. “Quo hereticorum (ut sit) bello, Catholici indies plures constantiorésque in fide fiunt.”

185 Ibid., p. 265; Ibid., 159v-160r. “Divisa enim omni Anglia in tres partes, ex tribus, una non erat tum heretica, nec cupiebat aut probabat mutationem religionis, nedum postea, cum secte perniciem esset experta. Nam preter plurimos ex optimatibus de quibus diximus, pars maior inferioris nobilitatis erat plane catholica, plebei quoque, qui agriculturam per totum regnum exercent (honestum & opulentum in illa insula genus hominum) novitatem istam in primis detestabantur, nec regni illius provincie alie, quam que sunt prope Londinum & aulam, nec civitates fere, nisi maritime, atque in istis preceteris otio & delitijs.
The permanence of Catholic sentiments suggested throughout the book implied the moral duty Catholic powers had to defend throngs of coreligionists. Any assistance rendered would be welcomed with open arms.

****

Would Catholic powers listen? Experience had suggested not. In any case, it wasn’t certain. This may be why De origine ends on a rather weak note. The author would not remain silent were Elizabeth to continue down a heretical track. Sander and his compatriots hoped princely forces would share their animosity, but in 1585 only a cadre of priests, missionaries, and other miscellaneous exiles were ready to fight. Change, however, was afoot. De origine became dated, or at least less useful, before it was first fully disseminated. A book that, as I have argued here, rebuked the Elizabethan regime was too tame in light of not imminent, but actual, Anglo-Spanish war. The subsequent history of De origine, indeed that of English Catholic propaganda as a whole, would soon become intimately linked with Spain’s finisecular imperial impulses.

affluentes, adolescentes, bonorum decoctores, mulieres onuste peccatis, ceterique similis farine socij, ultro heresim amplexabantur.”

186 Sander, De origine (1585), 207r. “…si plura deinceps mala ac monstra mundo pariat, id in posterum non tacibetur.”
Chapter 2

De origine Redux: Augmenting the Origins of the English Schism

On the crest of recent naval victories against Portuguese rebels, the Marquis of Santa Cruz was ready to keep fighting. If God made Philip “such a great king,” he wrote in 1583, “it is only just that this victory be followed by the necessary provisioning so that next year the English enterprise might be carried out.” The king wasn’t quick to heed Santa Cruz’s advice, even though he shared his admiral’s impatience. As early as 1569 Philip expressed an interest in having Elizabeth killed. But only open English aggression would push the prudent king past the threshold of desire.

Events between 1584 and 1585 fundamentally changed Anglo-Spanish relations. Dutch politics was destabilized when Balthasar Gerard shot William of Orange in July 1584, sending a chill down the spine of Protestants across Europe. Though William’s popularity had been waning among his own supporters, doubts about his political acumen ceased after death when he quickly attained the aura of a “national hero” slain by a foreign tyrant. Apart from Elizabeth’s personal horror over the demise of a statesman and ally, she and her councilors were wary of the inroads Philip’s governors made in the Netherlands. Were Spain to succeed, many feared England would be next in its imperial sights. Some of the queen’s favored courtiers—especially the earl of Leicester—were eager to cross the Channel. Others were not. Vigorous debate among councilors ensued,

but by 1585 Elizabeth conceded to the pressures of hawkish advisors and to the exigencies geopolitical realities.\textsuperscript{190} Through the treaty of Nonesuch (August 20, 1585) England openly allied with the Dutch against Spain. What had been a cold war quickly turned hot.\textsuperscript{191}

Word of the Anglo-Dutch alliance must have reached Allen and Persons sometime in September. Buoyed by the news of what must have seemed Elizabeth’s reckless, self-immolating aggression, they set off on a previously planned trip to Rome. As they travelled from France to Italy, we can imagine them trying to predict Philip’s reaction to recent events. Surely, the king would have to fight back. Once in the Eternal City their hopes were reinforced: by October news probably filtered out of papal circles that Philip had decided to go to war.\textsuperscript{192} This news may have, in turn, halted plans to publish \textit{De origine}. Sander’s history might still be useful in the shifting political context of late 1585, but not in its recent form. While there was a full print-run of its first edition, the book seems to have had limited circulation.\textsuperscript{193}

Sometime between November 1585 and May 1586\textsuperscript{194} Allen and Persons produced yet another version. We don’t know how labor was divided, but Allen was probably the


\textsuperscript{193} See the comments in a contemporary document: \textit{Un estratto delle tre libri del cominciamento et progresso dello scisma et heresia en Inglaterra}. Biblioteca Nacional de España, Madrid, Mss. 2058, 130v. “Furono stampati questi libri el ano pasato in Colonia ben che ancora non si ano publicati....”

\textsuperscript{194} By late February the count of Olivares, Spanish ambassador in Rome, sent a précis of an English Catholic book to Madrid (Knox, ed., \textit{Letters and Memorials}, p. 251. Olivares to Philip II, Rome, 24 February 1586). The book is not identified, but it was likely \textit{De origine}. A year later when Persons and Allen were writing propaganda for the Armada, Olivares suggests that in its essentials, the new book was not unlike the third part of the text summarized for the king in February 1586 (Knox, ed., \textit{Letters and
central force behind its revival. Common sense suggests that he, soon to become a cardinal, would have played an important role in getting financial support for the project. Contemporaries assumed as much and Persons attributed additions made to the parts concerning Edward and Mary’s reigns to his colleague. Still, Persons himself surely played an important role since some emendations he made to Sander’s above-mentioned manuscript were included in the Roman edition. Both men, always in close proximity at the English College, probably counted De origine as one among many collaborative projects.

Allen and Persons were impatient. Philip was less so. The king wanted to fight, but he knew success required assiduous planning. A campaign was simply not feasible for the summer of 1586; it would have to wait until at least 1587. Persons and Allen, cognizant of Philip’s past indecisiveness, insisted Spanish efforts move at a quicker pace. So in May 1586 Persons sent a message to the Spanish court through a priest, Miguel Hernandez. He was commissioned to express “all that we feel and desire for the service of God and His Majesty and for the salvation of so many souls that depend on our negotiations.” The messenger was to insist that past dithering had caused serious problems for English Catholics and put them in present danger. He was also to underscore that “we are truly, completely lost unless His Majesty helps us in some way.” Amidst this pleading, Hernandez was instructed to deliver a copy of the freshly printed

Memorials, p. 295. Olivares to Idiáquez, Rome, 10 July 1587). Part III of De origine and the Admonition have plenty of thematic overlap. Even if Olivares was not referring to De origine, we know with certainty that De origine was prepared and sent to Spain by May of that year.

195 Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 2058. A marginal note refers to “el libro del Doctor Alano.”

196 Simons, Certamen, p. 31.

197 cf. Simons, Certamen, p. 100. Simons seems strangely insistent on establishing Allen as the sole editor of the work. In yet to be published work Victor Houliston has suggested that Persons edited sections on Henry VIII and Allen those parts pertaining to Edward VI. My thanks to Professor Houliston for sharing his manuscript.
Roman *De origine*. In it “can be seen,” Persons told Juan de Idiaquez, “what has been said in defense of His Majesty’s interests.” The mix of epistolary rogations, Hernandez’s *viva voce* report, and *De origine* itself would undoubtedly persuade the king. Persons was confident Philip would “not let those men be entirely lost to you, who are serving you so faithfully.”

Under Allen and Persons’ care Sander’s history underwent a certain “hispaniolization.” The book was still in Latin, but some shifts in emphasis suggest that among many authorial intentions the book meant to support, defend, exhort, and advise a Spanish monarchy on the verge of war. This chapter will, at times, read the 1586 *De origine* through a Spanish lens, suggesting the book was an effort to promulgate a specifically Spanish agenda and an effort to promote an English agenda in Spain. However, these goals cannot be divorced from broader objectives. Persons and Allen were not getting rid of the previous year’s text *in toto* because its most basic objectives were still viable. The book was still meant as a call for constancy and action, a message that would be as useful to the Spanish court as it would be to Catholics everywhere.

The following pages will thus show two features of Spanish Elizabethan propaganda. On the one hand, we will observe the subtle interplay between text and context as it manifests itself in tonal shifts and changing content. We will see a willingness to actively re-work history to fit current political and polemical needs. Second, we will observe how Allen and Persons were trying to take advantage of recent Spanish political decisions by fitting their book into a broad discursive terrain which had as its main feature ongoing debates about the nature of Habsburg political activities. To study *De origine*, especially as it emerged in 1586, as simply an English or even an

---

English Catholic text, is to ignore, or misunderstand the nature of the polemical enterprise we are studying here. To be sure, it was written to help promote anti-Elizabethan efforts, but it was also written for a broad, international audience, promoting a clear Spanish agenda, and providing lessons of fortitude which (as before) tried to teach men everywhere, not just England, what it meant to be a good Catholic. What it meant to be a good Catholic was, of course, inevitably linked to thrashing Elizabeth and her minions and ending the threat of Protestantism.

****

The Spanish empire may have already been tearing at the seams, but few inside and even fewer outside the Iberian Peninsula would have noticed. In the years following Philip’s conquest of Portugal (1581), the prospect of Habsburg hegemony across Europe caused trembling fear. In defense, those afraid of Philip produced evermore confrontational anti-Spanish propaganda. The black legend which had been growing since the beginning of Spain’s imperial period, reached its peak toward the end of the sixteenth century, largely thanks to English polemicists. Naturally, when Elizabeth decided to take up arms against the Spanish (or in defense of the Dutch, as she would have it), she ordered pen and paper be taken up as well. In October 1585 Cecil wrote a short pamphlet: A Declaration of the Causes Moving England to Give Aid to the Defense of the People Afflicted and Oppressed in the Low Countries.


The pamphlet survives in French, Italian, and Latin, indicating it was intended for British and continental audiences alike. The decision to aid Dutch rebellion was framed as a necessary consequence of ancient, “natural,” diplomatic and trade alliances long conserved by “Treatises, Transactions, and Confederations of amity.”\textsuperscript{201} England’s recent break with Philip was blamed on evil counsel. The king’s advisors were responsible for blatant abuses of power and rampant bloodshed. They convinced him to “appoint Spaniards, foreigners and strangers of strange blood, men more exercised in wars than in peaceable government, & some of them notably delighted in blood…”\textsuperscript{202} While the king lived in the Netherlands he relied on the help of locals, but when he left, foreigners --the duke of Alba among them--established tyrannical rule shrouded under the false veil of religion.\textsuperscript{203} At first Spanish cruelty was defended as necessary “for the maintenance of the Romish religion, yet they spared not to deprive very many Catholics and Ecclesiastical persons of their franchises and privileges.”\textsuperscript{204}

The English used peaceable means to help their oppressed neighbors. Initially they tried diplomacy by offering frank advice to the Spanish king. They subsequently offered some financial assistance to the Dutch, unwilling as the queen was to engage in open war. But she was finally compelled to use force, a decision necessitated by the increasing threat posed by Spain. Despite England’s warm overtures to Philip, hostility toward England only intensified. In recent years men like Bernardino Mendoza (apparently independent of Philip) were busy plotting rebellion against the queen, and worse, they had fomented actual rebellion in Ireland. Were the Spanish to take control of

\textsuperscript{201} Ibid., p. 4.  
\textsuperscript{202} Ibid., p. 5.  
\textsuperscript{203} Ibid., p. 6.  
\textsuperscript{204} Ibid.
neighboring territories, considering the “precedent arguments of many troublesome attempts against our realm,” England would be open to invasion. The Elizabethan regime’s defense of Dutch liberties had the added bonus of achieving “surety for ourselves & our realm to be free from invading neighbours.”

This attack on Spain changed the discursive landscape. Cecil’s pamphlet was slender, but it spread broadly. Its very existence required a proper response, or at least provided an excuse for one. Thus, expanding on a theme in the 1585 version, the 1586 De origine debunked the myth of Elizabethan peacefulness. The queen feigned friendship with various monarchs, and was especially bent on harassing Philip whom she “hated and feared more than the others” (prae caeteris metuit & odit). Taking advantage of general European ill-will toward Spain, she felt able to drop all pretenses. The queen attacked Philip in Portugal, the Indies, and elsewhere. In Flanders she employed the help of home-grown rebels and the duke of Anjou. Anjou, Allen and Persons lamented, was “worthy of better counsel and fortune” (meliori consilio ac fortuna digni). He had been coaxed and duped by Elizabeth to follow an errant path which he regretted in his dying days. Seeing that the duke of Parma, by God’s will, was succeeding against Dutch heretics, the queen later tried to get the French king himself (Anjou’s brother, Henri III)

205 Ibid., p. 18.
206 Ibid., p. 19.
208 This direct response was underlined for its importance by Persons in communications with the Spanish court and other contemporary summaries of the work did so as well. See for example, Hicks, ed., Letters and Memorials, p. 280. Persons to Idiáquez, Rome, 20 May 1586. See also Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 2058, 130v. “adgionta delle cose fate dalla Reyna de Inglaterra depoi particularmente in holandia e Zelandia con le sesame di quell libro che per sua justificacione ley publico nel ottobre passato delle anno 1585.”
210 Ibid. “…paulò ante mortem bonus Princeps inconsolabili dolore quibusdam familiaribus sui contestatus est.”
to join in her anti-Spanish efforts.\textsuperscript{211} Having failed on this front she decided, upon the
haughty advice of audacious men, to take action herself. To do so, forced tributes were
imposed on all English subjects, especially Catholics to whom the queen promised
freedom of conscience and impunity. Thus duped, they were quick to comply.\textsuperscript{212}

Divine Providence ensured failure. On this there was surety because Elizabeth had
sent the earl of Leicester as head of the Dutch enterprise. The same Leicester who,
according to Allen and Persons, had already ruined his own country, would soon
tyrannize, pillage, and lead rebels across the Channel to certain demise. His terror would
make supposed Spanish oppression look like a joke.\textsuperscript{213}

The editors claimed Cecil’s pamphlet was written to defend Elizabeth from
widespread criticisms. They suggested some of her counselors were voicing concerns
about breaking ancient alliances with Spain and many more abroad censured the queen’s
temper for attacking a king who, while given to peacefulness and patience, always
emerged victorious once he decided to fight. The queen was in no position to brawl. Even
though her forces weren’t negligible, they were not as great as Spain’s. More troubling

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{211} Ibid., p. 490. “Videns enim iam tandem Dei optimi maximi invicta potentia & excellentissimi Principis Parmensis consilio & virtute, omnes penè provincias Belgicas vel Regiae Maiestati reconciliatas, vel in potestatem ipsius redactas, resque illic rebellium ac hereticorum in dies declinare, egit diligentissimè cum Rege Christianissimo [Henri], honorifica ad illum sub specie tradendi Garterij (quae est supræmi ordinis Anglicani tesserâ) institutâ legatione….”
\item \textsuperscript{212} Ibid., p. 491. “…expilat miserè cum ceteros Angliae subditos, tum màximè Catholicos, quibus qualemcunque libertatem conscientiae & impunitatem promittit, modò velint largiter & promptè pecuniam in hoc bellum conferre.”
\item \textsuperscript{213} Ibid. “Ac provincijs his miseric, non sine iusto Dei iudicio, in haeresis & pervacitae suae poenam, eum Gubernatorem primum dedit, qui & patriam propriae perdidit, & istos Hollandos ita tractare coepit, ut ludum iocumque dixeris Hispanicam severitatem, praet huius rabies quae dabit, eam ut provinciam huic homini non ad populi conservationem, ut prætenditur, sed in rapinam & depopulationem concessam agnoscas.”
\end{itemize}
still, she did not have enough internal or external support: Elizabeth was hated abroad, and had only a tenuous grip on her own realm.\textsuperscript{214}

From Allen and Persons’ point of view, these broad spread criticisms were just. Elizabeth was hypocritical in her supposed concern for Dutch liberties (against their legitimate ruler); after all, she was guilty of stripping English Catholics of their ancient rights to free worship and of placing them under Egyptian servitude.\textsuperscript{215} Criticizing Philip for violating ancient liberties when he was simply punishing long-condemned religious sects was ludicrous.\textsuperscript{216} Elizabeth’s claimed penchant for peace was rebuked. Although she supposedly wanted to revive commerce and bring peace to the Netherlands, her intervention only enlivened a war that had been coming to an end.\textsuperscript{217} Though she claimed to crusade against Spanish cruelty, no such holy wars were needed because Philip and the duke of Parma showed nothing but clemency over the vanquished.

Clemency, on the other hand, was noticeably lacking in Elizabeth. Even though Catholic rebellion was easily quashed in England and Ireland, she unflinchingly punished

\textsuperscript{214} Ibid., pp. 491-492. “Sed cum animadvertisset Elizabetha, non solum subditos ac Senatores etiam quosdam suos, eosque prudentiores, ista & periculosi & planè inusti contra Reipublicae antiquissimos confederatos ultrò illati belli consilia non probare verum etiam multò magis ipsa in reprehensionem ac temperatis notam apud exteros incurreret; foemina cum sit regnique domina religione quidem & armis olim nobilis, sed non adeò magni, exerter etiam invisa, nec a suis tuta, tam potentem mundi monarcham in rebus agendis licet Pacificum & patientem, tamen omnibus ferè in bellis victorem, non provocata, non laesa, sola agredi voluerit.”

\textsuperscript{215} Ibid., p. 494. “Mirantur enim omnes, praetextu foederis cum domo Burgundica, rebellantem plebem contra legitimum dominum suum…ab Elizabetha defendi, non ferendum existimant ut illa se vindicem aliene libertatis constituat, quae domi contra fas, ius & iuramentum suum, tam clero quâm populò Catholicò sibi subdito, a primis principibus ac apostolis concessa privilegia ac conscientiae veram libertatem iniquissimè sustulit, miserabilique animorum ac corporum plusquam Aegyptiaca servitude omnes sibi subjectos opprimit.”

\textsuperscript{216} Ibid., pp. 494-495. “Id etiam per ridiculum videtur, vel a Philippo, provinciarum antiqua privilegia & libertates violari, vel dominij in populum Belgicum iure eum excidere, quod effraenem illam novam ac a maioribus damnatam sectarum servitute omnes sibi procurendam ad stabilem provinciarum pacem procurandum & solita belliss interrupta commercia restituenda suscipi, cum omnes videant non alio tempore istas in tutelam ipsius acceptas provincias, quàm tum, cum minimum abfuit ut omnes, se vero Principi ac clementissimo domino suo dedissent, ac proinde non ista moliri bonam Reginam ut misero populo pacem & conditam conciliet, sed ut bellum penè extinctum infidelibus armis restaret, calamitatesque ipsarum uternas reddat.”

\textsuperscript{217} Ibid., p. 495. “Sed multò magis vetustiorum est illud, istud totum ab illa ad stabilem provinciarum pacem procurandum & solita belliss interrupta commercia restituenda suscipi, cum omnes videant non alio tempore istas in tutelam ipsius acceptas provincias, quàm tum, cum minimum abfuit ut omnes, se vero Principi ac clementissimo domino suo dedissent, ac proinde non ista moliri bonam Reginam ut misero populo pacem & conditam conciliet, sed ut bellum penè extinctum infidelibus armis restaret, calamitatesque ipsarum uternas reddat.”
rebels. The Spanish, contrary to English slander, only fought with just cause. Their aversion to war was proved by Philip’s incessant diplomatic efforts with Elizabeth who had repeatedly offended him. While the king’s ambassadors were accused of inciting war in other kingdoms, English representatives were the ones instigating rebellion, not only in the Netherlands, but also in Scotland and France.

Allen and Persons’ analysis is diametrically opposed to that of the Elizabethan regime, subverting the image of the peaceable, put upon queen, and exalting Philip as defender of the true faith and *pax Christiana*.

The rebuttal of Cecil’s pamphlet is the seed of what would become a norm in radical English Catholic polemics. Increasingly, Allen, Persons, and their allies became Philip’s most vocal apologists. By rejecting the *Declaration* the editors were providing a firm justification for Spanish self-defense against illicit Elizabethan assaults, all the while displacing themselves (and English exiles generally) from the narrative of imminent war. Whereas in the 1585 *De origine* the fight against Elizabeth was undertaken (verbally at least) by the author(s), in 1586, the burden was shared with Spain. By selling the Catholic king’s case to a European audience, the looming battle became an affair between two

---

218 Ibid., pp. 495-496. “Eam autem de immani in rebellibus castigandis Ducum aut militum Hispanorum saevitia tam flebiliter conqueri quis non iure miretur? cùm ipsa propter duos tantum in Anglia & Hybernia pro Catholice religionis defensione levissimos motus, eosque sine sanguine aut cede facillimè sopitos, plus stragis etiam in eos qui ex pacta cum ducibus venia se dediderunt, ediderit, quàm in Flandria Brabantia penè uniuersa aliquot annorum gravissimo bello clementissimo domino subiuganda, factam vidimus; ubi benignissimus Princeps Parmensis & naturae suae bonitate, & Regis voluntate, tam incomparabili in victos usus est misericordia...”

219 Ibid., p. 496. “...saepé quidem ille istam, varijs iniurijs ipsum irritantem, Christiani Regis dignissimo exemplo, beneficijs ac benignitate priùs placare, quàm armis repellere studuit.”

220 Ibid., pp. 496-497. “Denique illam totam de illustriissimi Bernardini Mendosij malis in Rempublicam Anglicanam officijjs querimoniam, propter nescio quae quorundam Catholicorum cum ipso communicata consilia, minimè omnium decere illam iudicatum est cuiius Oratores hoc toto dominatus sui tempore id vel solàm, vel sanè improvisis egerunt, in omnibus vicinis provinciis, ut seditiones subditorum contra Reges ac Praelatos, vel excitarent vel forerent. Id enim in primis Gallicis tumultibus Nicolaus Throcmortonus & postea Franciscus Walsingamus & caeteri in Francia, id Randallus in Scotia, id Wilsonus in Flandria, id reliqui ubivis locorum proprio haereticorum more & instituto, semper fecerunt.”
warring kingdoms trying to settle gripes. English Catholics could plausibly deny they were the impetus behind Spanish or any other anti-Elizabethan efforts.

Seen from a less cynical perspective, Allen and Persons engaged in a defense of Spain because they knew that the looming war depended on showing as broad a public as possible who the true heroes and the true villains were. As always, claims of “just war” were hotly contested and Spanish Elizabethans wanted to make sure that Philip’s case was made promptly and efficiently.

Aside from Spanish cheering, the *Declaration* provided Allen and Persons an excuse to assert the rights of the church against evil monarchs. As a preamble to the body of his pamphlet, Cecil claimed his book was an exercise in courtesy. He wrote despite the fact that “kings and princes sovereigns, owing their service only unto almighty God the king of all kings are not bound to yield account or render the reasons of their actions to any others but to God…”\textsuperscript{221} Such presumption deeply disturbed Allen and Persons. To the contrary, they insisted scripture was replete with examples of kings that “yielded account” to the Church. Saul was subject to Samuel’s judgment and David to Nathan’s. King Ozias, because he had usurped spiritual powers, could not escape priestly punishment, and queen Athaliah, whom Allen and Person compare to Elizabeth (*huic nostrae similis*), was punished by the high priest Jehoiadah. Other Old Testament kings were also subject to priestly law when “ambiguous matters” (*causis ambiguis*) came up.\textsuperscript{222} All kings are Christ’s sheep and as such should answer to their pastors. “If they are

\textsuperscript{221} Cecil, *Declaration*, p. 1; Sander, *De origine* (1586), p. 492.

\textsuperscript{222} Sander, *De origine* (1586), p. 492. “Cum tamen Rex in populo Dei fuerit Saul, qui pro re malè gesta debebat subire iudicium Samuelis; Rex etiam David esset, sed rationem facti & peccati sui reddidit Nathan; Rex Ozias, sed sacerdotum iudicio, pro usurpata spirituali potestate, se subtrahere non potuit: Regina etiam Athalia huic nostrae similis, sed a summo sacerdote Ioiada meritò pro sceleribus punita. Reges in veteri lege reliqui, sed in causis ambiguis iudici ac sacerdoti qui pro tempore fuerant, divino mandato subiecti.”
children of Christ, if they be Catholic, they are subject to the Church.” Even kings who stood apart from the Church could be reprimanded. If they do not “want to be taken for ethnics and shunned by their own subjects they should render account to the Church for unjust wars and other iniquities.”

Despite these pointed comments, on matters concerning papal powers Allen and Persons remained purposefully vague. To be sure, De origine contains evidence supporting the Pope’s spiritual authority, and much like the 1585 version, excommunication is shown to be a legitimate means to remove errant kings. But at this key moment, when the discussion of Anglo-Dutch and Spanish relations impinged on real time politics, the authors were unwilling to wave a papalist card. Most of their examples came from the Old Testament and thus spoke to priestly powers, not necessarily papal ones. Of rulers in the Christian era, they only mention Theodosius’s reprimand at the hands of Saint Ambrose, a citation which exalts episcopal power, but, again, not necessarily papal ones. Readers, of course, would have easily read between the lines. But hesitance about conjoining papal and Spanish agendas might be indicative of the enigmatic relationship between Madrid and Rome. We will come to this point again, but for now it is important to emphasize that Hispano-papal relations were always tense. Even as Allen and Persons were re-editing De origine, Spanish representatives were involved in what sometimes seemed to be hopeless negotiations with Sixtus V for moral and financial aid. Allen and Persons couldn’t be sure that embracing too papalist a line would have pleased the Spanish Court, jealous as it was of its own potestas.

---

223 Ibid., p. 493. “Ecclesiae filij sunt, si Catholici sunt, subiecti Ecclesiae sunt, etiam si non sunt Catholici & proinde nisi velint pro Ethnics haberi & a suis etiam subditis vitari, Ecclesiae, iniustorum bellorum & reliquae apertae iniquitatis rationem reddere debent…”
224 Ibid., pp. 492-493. “Et in nova lege Rex erat Theodosius, sed Ambrosio Episcopo suo commissae caedis innocentium poenam luere oportuit.”
Elizabeth’s removal was not simply a matter of priestly and royal concern. Complicating things further Allen and Persons make a brief allusion to the queen’s subjects themselves. Because she was a threat to the Republic and an enemy of Catholicism, Elizabeth should “render account to the estates of the realm” (Regni ordinibus rationem reddere)\textsuperscript{225} for her inefficient governance. How parliamentary, church, and Spanish forces would (or should) coalesce was a matter left unspoken in the 1586 De origine, though it was a problem that would need sorting out in the near future.

****

The importance of pro-Spanish arguments cannot be overstated, but a caveat is in order. The response to Cecil’s Declaration was a relatively brief addition at the tail end of a substantial book. As with the 1585 version, the 1586 was in large part a hatchet-job. It exposed English heretical rule and all its evils, adding, however, much more to the previous year’s assault. This suggests the authors were still in the business of seeking sympathy from its readers. They were also making sure to fan the flames of Catholic (especially Spanish) displeasure with England. Allen and Persons worked to sharpen the polemical edge to Sander’s history, hoping to cut away any excess doubt about the need to rid Europe of English heresy. War time was no time for bland ambiguities.

Though not written at Philip’s request, this anti-heretical screed would have helped promote a Spanish agenda. Spain was yet to throw its polemical weight around against England. That English Catholic polemicists did so would have been greeted with many thanks. Perhaps De origine gave Philip the first clue that he could, as he would do time and again, outsource propaganda to English exiles. By submitting the book to the

\textsuperscript{225} Ibid.
Spanish court, as we have seen Allen and Persons did, they may have been submitting something like a job application for the post of unofficial court propagandists.

On the other hand, the book may have been a Spanish Elizabethan effort to pin Philip into a corner. The worse the Protestant Tudors were made out to be, the less excuse there was for continued dithering.

Unlike the 1585 *De origine*, the 1586 edition didn’t give Henry many breaks. Echoes of the king’s virtue remain, but the Roman version downplays these by accentuating the inexcusability of his actions. Toward the end of his life Henry was evermore preoccupied with finding ways to atone for possible errors. One gesture toward achieving salvation involved church property. Allen and Persons recall that the king, “so it wouldn’t seem he hadn’t done anything good his whole life” (*Ne nihil tamen boni in universa vita fecisse videtur*…), decided to re-open a Franciscan church he once sacked.226 He called on the bishop of Rochester (Nicholas Heath) to give a sermon there in praise of his kingly piety and munificence. That day, Rochester also showed the congregation letters patent confirming Henry’s intentions to give the church, an adjoining hospital, and two other smaller parish churches to the City of London. In a passage dripping with sarcasm Allen and Persons suggest such kindness was done in exchange “for the nearly thousand monasteries demolished, and ten thousand churches which were dissipated and destroyed.” The king’s was a special form of kindness indeed. It was easy enough to be charitable with property that wasn’t his! 227

---

226 Ibid., p. 237.
227 Ibid., pp. 238-239. “Atque haec fuit illa insignis restitutio quam Henricus pro mille plus minus monasterijs dirutis & pro decem milibus Ecclesiarum direptis ac dissipatis, mortis hora adventante fecit. Unam scilicet Ecclesiæ parochialæ erexit alienis ex bonis, nec eam absque duarum aliarum sublatione hospitale quoque adiecit quod suum non erat, atque ita vitae exitus reliquo vitæ curriculo respondit.”
Not only did Allen and Persons add such episodes to emphasize Henrician opportunism and hypocrisy, but they also reject what in 1585 seemed to be the king’s laudable qualities. For example, they were unwilling to emphasize the king’s abiding respect for the sacraments. If his six articles in their defense might seem praise-worthy, the fact that sacramental matters were taken up by secular authorities was not. The editors reminded readers that “human industry is vain, where there is no divine protection” (*Sed frustra sudat humana industria, ubi non adest divina protectio*).228 Indeed, it must have been human folly that led Henry to parrot Luther’s fallacious claim that only three sacraments were instituted by Christ (*cum Lutheranis dicebat, tria esse tantum á Christo institute*). Furthermore, while the 1585 *De origine* complemented the king on his continued veneration of the Eucharist, subsequent editors insisted his acceptance was predicated on the destruction of the Mass and sacred laws. The king would allow the sacrament, but only in a church where the king’s name replaced the Pope’s, and where prayers for the pontiff were prohibited.229 If he still believed penitence/confession was a necessary precondition for the Eucharist, he nevertheless denied Christ instituted the sacrament, and did away with the notion of “satisfaction.”230

Henrician inconsistencies were legion. If he allowed prayers for the dead, he still did away with purgatory.231 Although he thought priestly ordination necessary, he only accepted it on his own terms, creating, for example, new ways of instituting bishops.232 He believed in clerical celibacy, but allowed monks who were not priests to marry, forced

---

228 Ibid., p. 172.
230 Ibid. “In sacramento autem Poenitentiae, etsi Confessionem necessarium esse disceret; tamen à Christo institutam esse negabat, satisfactionis nomen omnino abolebat.”
231 Ibid. “Orare quidem pro defunctis iubebat, purgatorij tamen nomen nullo modo permitebat.”
232 Ibid.
young monks to leave their monasteries, and allowed older ones to do so as well.\footnote{Ibid., p. 175. “Sacerdotes à coniugo prohibebat, Monachis tamen multis qui sacerdotes non essent, uxores permittebat. Votorum castitatis & viduitatis necessarium essem persolutionem volebat, cum ipse nihilominus omnes qui viginti quatuor annis minores essent, à Monasterijs exire & ad seculum reverti cogeret, grandaeuos etiam quoscumque permitteret.”}

Even as Henry claimed to uphold the church, to respect the saints and their memories, he stripped churches of their reliquaries. He stole all churchly possessions, absorbing holy preciocities into the state’s domain.\footnote{Ibid. “Postremo, ut plura huius generis non percurram, cum ipse in sancta sanctosque omnes & in eorum memoriam benevolus ac devotus videri vellet, interesse tamen, Ecclesiarum ornamenta, sanctorum reliquias ac donaria & quicquid erat preciosum, expilabat, & suum in fiscum redigebat...”}

Despoliation was tightly linked to Henry’s battle against history. The destruction of the Church necessitated taking axes to edifices. But this was only part of efforts to scrap historical evidence in all its forms – libraries, manuscripts, ancient texts were subject to the king’s wrath.\footnote{Ibid., p. 204. “Utabumque tamen fuerit de numero, qui sine controversia maximus erat, illud certe constat, monasteria Anglicana eo tempore fuisse ornatissima, non solum monumentorum antiquitate, rerumque sacrarum praestantia, verumetiam opum affluencia & aedificiorum splendore quodam singulari, quae omnia Henricus direpta prius ac devastata, solo aequavit, nec vel Bibliothecis, vel ullis literarum antiquitati sue monumentis pepercit, illud barbarum subinde usurpans...”}

When Henry attacked the Benedictine monks at the abbey of Glastonbury, he attacked a group of pious men unwilling to bend to royal whim. He waged war against a whole region soaked in religious significance. Glastonbury, according to Allen and Persons, was where Joseph of Arimathea arrived after he fled Jewish persecution during Nero’s reign. There he built a small chapel on top of which the Briton king, Lucius, and Ina, prince of Westmorland (who first subjected England to Papal rule), built a great monastery. Princes thereafter adorned and augmented the space, calling it “the first land of saints” (\textit{primam sanctorum terram}).\footnote{Ibid., p. 198.} Henry was thus defiling the first material remnants of English Catholicism.
Worse still, he viciously attacked saints themselves. Allen and Persons mention Henry’s efforts to destroy three men who were particularly famous and broadly venerated. The first was the protomartyr St. Alban, who was killed during the tyrannous rule of Diocletian. The second was King Edward who was “massacred by pagan infidels” for his faith. More attention was paid to the third and most popular of the defiled: Thomas Becket.\(^{237}\) Repeating a line already used in the 1585 *De origine*, Allen and Persons showed that although Becket had been recognized as a saint for centuries, Henry tried to erase his memory in one fell swoop. The king destroyed his shrines, forbid any prayers to him, punished any who dared call him a saint, and had his name scratched out of calendars and other books.\(^{238}\)

In 1585, Henrician atrocities set the stage for a sardonic joke. Since Becket had been censured, a parish in Ireland needed to rename a Church dedicated to him. They thought about re-dedicating it to St. Peter or Paul. The idea was scrapped, however, because one parishioner wondered what would happen “if the king should want to remove him from heaven, too.”\(^ {239}\) In 1586, ridiculing the king mattered less than raising condemnatory parallels. According to Allen and Person, the saint’s first martyrdom occurred for reasons not dissimilar to his second. Both Henry II and VIII killed him in part for defending “ecclesiastical liberties”; his second martyrdom would have the added benefit of reaping immense financial gain as well.\(^{240}\)

---

\(^{237}\) On the uses of Becket for propaganda see Victor Houliston, “St Thomas Becket in the Propaganda of the English Counter Reformation” in *Renaissance Studies*, vol. 7, Issue 1, March 1993, pp. 43-70.

\(^{238}\) Sander, *De origine* (1586), p. 189. “Imò in comitijs publicis sancivit, ut capitale crimen esset, si quis aut diem commemorationis eius sacram celebraret, aut in sacrís precibus mentionem eius faceret, aut omnínó eum appellaret sanctum, nomene ipsius in calendario sanctorum, ullo suo in libro non deletum extare permetteret…”

\(^{239}\) Sander, *De origine* (1585), 92v. “Et quid…si Rex illum quoque de caelo deturbarit?”

\(^{240}\) Sander, *De origine* (1586), pp. 188-189. “ Henricus autem, etsi in omnes Angliae sanctos infestum bellum gereret, loculosque diriperet. Prae caeteris tamen omnibus gloriosissimum Thomam Cantuariensem
Readers familiar with Becket’s story (especially from recent English Catholic redactions) would have immediately thought about the saint’s struggles in terms of papal politics. Propaganda dating back to Henrician times insisted on linking the saint to notions of Catholic tyranny. Conversely, as Victor Houliston has suggested, in Counter-Reformation literature English Catholics like Sander made him out to be a “symbol of papal supremacy.”241 Not surprisingly, the 1586 *De origine* used Henry’s post-mortem re-assassination of Becket as a way to transition into a brief statement on modern papal powers. The authors noted how Becket’s desecration deeply affected Paul III, and how in a bull written against Henry, the Pope censured the king for harassing the saint, his shrine, and other sacred places closely associated with the distant roots of England’s Catholic past.242

Allen and Persons redouble emphasis on the historical rupture caused by Henry’s estrangement from Rome. In 1585 Sander and his editors were keen to show that schism destroyed a working Anglo-papal relationship which had existed since the days of the aforementioned Ina, proof of which was the customary tribute rendered to the Pope, the so-called “Peter’s Pence.” In 1586 this basic premise is held, adding emphatic inflections demonstrating England’s particular affinity to the papacy. The tribute was often given willingly (*voluntariae oblationis*) “in honor of St. Peter, and to show…particular devotion to the Holy See”243 Indeed, such was the longstanding devotion of England to

---

242 Sander, *De origine* (1586), pp. 190-193
243 Ibid., p. 2. “...in honore divi Petri, & peculiarem suae devotionis erga sedem Apostolicam testificationem.”
Rome that it was rightly called the “first daughter of the Church” (primogenitam *Ecclesiae filiam*).\(^\text{244}\)

Devotion to the Papacy was not simply a matter of tradition, but one of proper order. Not only were secular governments naturally beneath the divinely established Church, but English kings in particular were vassals to the successors of St. Peter. This was implicit in monetary tributes given to Rome and certain political arrangements as well. In Ireland, for example, English rule (dating back to Henry II) had been allowed by Pope Adrian, conditional upon good governance and the perpetual recognition that the country was held solely upon papal grant. History showed that at critical moments when the Irish felt the pressure of English oppression, they looked to Rome for help. During Edward II’s reign, they called upon the Pope, much as they would a prince or supreme judge (*principem ac iudicem supremum*). Edward was duly reprimaned and reminded of his contractual duties.\(^\text{245}\)

The Irish Question was brought up both to demonstrate the contractual relationship existing between English kings and the papacy and to underscore English hypocrisy. Henry ungratefully turned his back on the institution-- the papacy-- that legitimized his rule. And yet, although he was willing to break with the Church, he clung to those titles that it invested upon him. Such behavior was of a piece with Elizabeth’s

\(^\text{244}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{245}\) Ibid., pp. 222-223. “Postea vero cum Reges Anglie prescriptas a sede Apostolica conditiones legesque in Hibernia gubernanda non observarent, maxime vero Edouardus secundus... Hibernos varijs modis premeret & affligeret. Illi pro suo iure ad Romani Pontificis auctoritatem recurrebant, querelas apud eum, tanquam principem ac iudicem supremum deponentes; quibus commotus Ioannes Papa vigesimus secundus... circa annum dominii millesimum trecentessimum & vigessimum, hunc ipsum Edouardum Regem gravissime monet, ut ab huiusmodi gravaminibus ac injurijs abstineret, ipsisarumque conditionum exemplar, quibus Angliae Reges, Hiberniam regendam ac moderandam acceperant, ad illum transmisit.”
continued use of the papally given title of *Defensoris fidei* long after the Tudors had ceased meriting it.\textsuperscript{246}

Papal words were used to articulate a full-blown condemnation of the king. Seeing Henry’s inhumane treatment of good men like Thomas More and the bishop of Rochester, and more generally, the king’s descent into tyranny, Paul III, “a man of great courage and utmost prudence” (*vir magni animi summaeque prudentiae*),\textsuperscript{247} had no choice but to excommunicate him. Allen and Persons did not include the actual excommunicatory bull, but summarized it. First, the Pope asserted his divine duty to watch over Christendom as a whole—*omnium Ecclesiarum & animarum*—and in particular his special duty to Henry. He admonished the king and his evil councilors, telling them to recognize their errors and turn a new leaf. Harkening back to bygone eras when kings came to beg forgiveness from the papacy on bended knee, he called on the king (or a representative) and his accomplices to make a prompt appearance in Rome. For non-compliance he would be deprived promptly of his kingdom and all his property. More than this, the document also deprived Henry’s descendants borne of his illicit marriage to Anne Boleyn. It absolved all of the king’s vassals from obedience to him, it ordered (upon pain of excommunication) all commercial relations with England to cease, it commanded prelates to flee the kingdom, and called upon British princes and nobles to rebel. Any and all treatises and alliances with Henry stood nullified, all of the king’s friends and accomplices were to be apprehended and punished. By giving readers a peak

\textsuperscript{246} Ibid., pp. 224-225. “Atque haec quidem hoc loco adijcere voluimus, quo manifestum fieret, non solum quàm ingrâtè Henricus, qui Dominium Hiberniae à Pontifice Romano acceperat, verum etiam quàm iniuste ac insolenter tûm maximè Hiberniae Regem, auctoritate à sede Apostolica derivata...qua etiam impudentia hodierno die Elizabetha Henrici filia, impietae patris secuta, Defensorem se fideii ...apellari vult...”

\textsuperscript{247} Ibid., p. 147.
into past papal policy, Allen and Sander were both underlining Henry’s evil and once again embracing papal rights to disinvest monarchs of their heretically tainted power.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 147-154}

Henry was as untrustworthy in secular as he was in spiritual matters. As the 1586 \textit{De origine} emphasized with special insistence, during his efforts to push for the divorce in Rome, the king “feared peace between the Emperor and the King of France, and all the other Christian princes.”\footnote{Ibid., p. 48. “...timeret etiam ne inter eundem Caesarem & Galliae Regem reliquosque Christianos Principes generalis quaedam pax...componeretur”} The calming of war seemed a real possibility during a 1528 conference at Cambrai, but peace would have severely weakened Henry’s bargaining power regarding the divorce. Naturally, the king sabotaged all peace talks to ensure his plans weren’t thwarted. Even after Catherine’s death, however, Henry seemed allergic to tranquility. He could never look beyond self-interest, and was never a constructive player on the European scene. When Charles V and the Pope tried to settle religious strife at a colloquy in Ratisbon (1541), no amount of encouragement or kind words could get the king to reconcile with the Church. This would have required some admittance of error, something Henry couldn’t do. The whole diplomatic farce came to nothing because he “coveted worldly glory more than that of God” (\textit{gloriam hominum magis quam Dei adamavit}).\footnote{Ibid., p. 218.}

This addiction to “worldly glory” rendered the king more willing (and able) to cause, rather than resolve, strife. One anecdote might serve to encapsulate both Henry’s reign and the danger he posed to his putative allies. The dirty dealing in question involved covert diplomatic ties between England and the Smalkaldic League against Charles V. In the early 1540s Henry, seeing the emperor’s successes on the Continent
both in establishing peace with enemies and establishing his authority over subordinates, thought it wise to establish a truce. But this didn’t stop him from causing trouble surreptitiously. Begged by the duke of Saxony and other German princes to enter an alliance against Charles, the king initially hesitated. He found the proposition enticing, but didn’t want to be seen as a troublemaker. In the 1585 *De origine* Cromwell was cited for entering a league with Charles’s enemies “without consulting the king” (*inconsulto rege, illius tamen foederi subscripsit*). In 1586, this phrase is tellingly omitted. While Henry is still said to have been wary of irritating Charles, he is suggested as having been the impetus for Cromwell’s actions. Of course, when Charles found out about all this, Henry was “terribly ashamed” (*pudore suffusus*) and could come up with no other excuse than to say Cromwell had acted on his own. Subsequently, the king thought it better to get rid of his minister (whose downfall *De origine* claims was linked with this incident) than face the consequences of the Empire’s wrath. Clearly this type of double-dealing showed the hypocrisy underneath the surface of English diplomatic affairs. The king was guided, not by truth or righteousness, but by immediate political expediency.

However bad Henry’s reign, Edward’s was worse. Or perhaps one should better say Edward’s *nominal* reign was worse because, in both *De origines* of 1585 and 1586, the young king was made out to be little more than a cipher. As the 1585 edition argued, the real handy work of deepening the Henrician schism was carried out by Somerset. Adding some color to the 1585 narrative, Allen and Persons even go as far as to claim that Somerset made himself viceroy (*Prorex*), and even vice-Pope (*Propapa*) of

---

251 Sander, *De origine* (1585), 95r-v.
253 For the full narrative see ibid., pp. 209-211.
England.\textsuperscript{254} From the beginning he raised heretics to places of political and ecclesiastical prominence, and surrounded the king with men and women of ill repute.

Somerset understood that for heresy to succeed he would have to carry out a vast re-education campaign which began within the very halls of the court, but which would seep into the general population.

The Protector inflicted most damage upon the English Commonwealth through his educational “reforms.” Indeed, Allen and Persons insisted heretics most desired, “after having poisoned their young King, to destroy and corrupt universities so that the source and fountain of religion and education having been infected, the pestilence [heresy] might more easily remain in the commonwealth.”\textsuperscript{255} Thus began the visitations of universities which led to the destruction of their ancient decrees and their replacement with new ones conforming to heretical precepts. Learned scholars were quickly replaced by young men with petulant tongues and blasphemous mouths (\textit{petulantis lingue & blasphemi oris}) who served only to corrupt youths.\textsuperscript{256} A solid scholastic curriculum heavy on the works of Aquinas and Lombard was hijacked, thus preventing access to learned works which would easily uncover heresy’s fallacies. Their books were ripped

\textsuperscript{254} Ibid., p. 256.  
\textsuperscript{255} Ibid., p. 263. “Sed ut res nostras prosequamur, haereticorum qui rem Anglicanam eo tempore administrabant, proxima post Regis infectionem de Academijs corrumpendis cura erat, ut illis Religionis ac disciplinarum fontibus infectis, faciliùs in universam Rempublicam, maneret, lues & in illa gente prae ceteris multis, ref erre solet in utramque partem plurimum, quomodo universitates sint affectae.”  
\textsuperscript{256} Ibid., p. 264.
out of libraries, their names mocked and defamed. Universities, and then cities, were increasingly stuffed with “new preachers, stupid adolescents, poets, and grammarians.”

During Edward’s first years there were not enough home-grown rogues clever enough to pose a real threat to the true church, so talent was sought elsewhere in the likes of Martin Bucer, Peter Martyr, and Bernardino Ochino, “men who were better exercised in fraud.” They, and lesser heretics, were able to have real effects on English society because they taught, not the brightest and most tried English minds, but essentially anyone who knew some Latin. Such mediocrities imbibed fountains of error poured out of evil books and lectures containing false interpretations of doctrine and history. Students were encouraged to interpret matters as they would and not as they should.

Whereas before only highly educated men would be eligible to move on to theological study, any half-educated impressionable kid was then invited to interpret (or misinterpret) the Bible. The filth radiating from universities had serious long-lasting effects because, as the 1585 De origine also maintained, in Edward’s England everyone--though he may be a “garrulous ass, delirious old man, or verbose sophist”--thought himself an expert in religious matters, capable of “teaching before they learned.”

It is hardly surprising that Allen and Persons placed education, or bad education, front and center in their narrative. They, like many of their contemporaries, were certain

---

257 Ibid. “Libros omnes eorum magistrorum qui vi & ratione Theologiam caeterasque disciplinas tradiderunt, quia istorum solida doctrina & methodica institutione, haereticorum populares fraudes, non difficulter cerni & dispelli sciebant, è studiosorum manibus & ferè è bibliothecis excutient. Lombardi, Aquinatis, Scoti ceterorumque doctissimorum scholasticorum nomina, de barbarie, scripturarum ignoratione, & varia deceptione traducunt, memoriamque quantum possunt damnant.”
258 Ibid., p. 265. “Ergo pro solidè doctis tām Theologis quam Philosophis, impleverunt primum Academias, & postea urbes totius regni precipius, novis oratoribus, sultis adolescentulis, poetis & grammaticis…”
259 Ibid., p. 265. “…homines ad fraudem magis exercitatos.”
260 On this see Ibid., pp. 267-268.
261 Ibid., p. 272. “Iam in omnibus officinis & tabernis, in popinis & fornicibus, de fide inibatur disputatio, sacram scripturam…garrula anus, delirius senex, sophista verbosus, universi denique præsumebant, lacerabant, docebant antequàm discerent.”
of the transformational powers of schooling and devoted much of their lives to founding colleges on the Continent as a counterweights to heresy. Still, they knew the corps of priests trained across the Channel could only serve as stop-gaps during the initial phases of spiritual re-conquest. As they would always maintain, English reform needed to be accompanied by a thorough reform of universities to ensure the spread and maintenance of the true faith.

Allen and Persons showed the disorder, inconstancy, and plain confusion of Protestant beliefs in greater detail than the 1585 De origine did. Even as they worked to disassemble English universities, heretics had yet to (and would never) cohere into a unified sect. They were united by a contrarian stance, otherwise they showed no doctrinal consistency.

In building this case, Allen and Persons accused Bucer of Jewish affinities. They showed the disorder, inconstancy, and plain confusion of Protestant beliefs in greater detail than the 1585 De origine did. Even as they worked to disassemble English universities, heretics had yet to (and would never) cohere into a unified sect. They were united by a contrarian stance, otherwise they showed no doctrinal consistency. In building this case, Allen and Persons accused Bucer of Jewish affinities.262 This, the authors imply, helped explain his ambivalence about the Gospels. According to the recollections of Lord Paget, when asked about the real presence of Christ, Bucer responded that “no one can doubt the real presence of Christ who does not doubt the Evangelists.” However, he neither wanted to argue for or against the notion that everything written in the New Testament should be believed.263 In other matters he followed a more straight-forward Lutheran line, though as always modified to meet “the norm of the English sect” (ad Anglicanae sectae normam aliquantulum modificatum).264

262 Ibid., p. 273. “Bucerus autem, etiam in Judaismum, ut potè ex Iudaeis oriundus, multum putabatur proclivis.”
263 Ibid. “… de vera corporis praesentia nullum merito dubitare posse qui non dubitet de fide Evangelistarum, non tamen is ego sum (subiecit) qui certò ea omnia credenda existimem, quae in novo testamento de Christo & eius actis scribuntur, quamquam nec hactenus apertè negare libuerit.”
264 Ibid., pp. 273-274.
Peter Martyr was no different. He made little more than sport of important ecclesiastical issues, specifically, again, the Eucharist. Before writing a book on the subject he tried to sniff out what Cranmer and Somerset wanted to hear, and ultimately sacrificed his Lutheran instincts to accommodate the Calvinist beliefs of the Protector.\footnote{Ibid., p. 247.}

Miles Coverdale was also lampooned. Realizing that there were variant beliefs on the Eucharist between Catholics and Protestants, and also among Protestants themselves, he wrote a small book on the subject, believing that by leaving behind all “human authority” (\textit{authoritate humana}) he could stumble upon the truth. He insisted that after fourteen years of intense study of the Bible, he alone, could accomplish such a feat. Such presumption infuriated Allen and Persons because it exemplified a common feature of modern heresy. Divorced from the Catholic Church, \textit{individual} heretics felt free to embrace any opinion they pleased (\textit{omnem opinionem licentiam habendis}).\footnote{Ibid., p. 313.}

Much like the 1585 \textit{De origine}, the 1586 showed that when both sides of the confessional divide confronted each other, Catholics easily won. Feeling pangs of remorse after witnessing the rise of Protestantism during Edward’s reign, some Catholics started to set aside fears of challenging the enemy. Such was the case of Richard Smith who called for an open debate with Peter Martyr about the Mass. Little is said about the disputation’s substance, save that despite a clear Catholic victory, Martyr colluded with a corrupt judge to make it seem as though Protestants won. After the event, a print campaign was mounted to perfect the deception: authorities published a partial and wholly inaccurate transcript of the confrontation.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 302-304.}
The level of discourse which had been so debased during Edward’s reign did not improve during Elizabeth’s. At the outset the queen decided to put matters of religion up for debate, but wizened Catholic bishops who survived Mary Tudor’s reign were suspicious. They saw no point in debating things that had been settled in past centuries by many Church fathers, popes, and learned councils. Nevertheless, the dispute took place. It was, of course, nothing more than a farce. The whole affair was arbitrated by Nicholas Bacon, “a layman, a heretic unlearned in divine matters.” The Archbishop of York was named his assistant, but this was only for show (ad speciem tantum). As was customary, the organizers established evil and unjust conditions for debate leading to nothing but disorder. The whole time was spent in useless declamations, Bacon was an awful moderator, and in the end it all came to nothing.268

Knowing that such fraudulent disputations would lead nowhere, certain Catholic bishops started considering Elizabeth’s excommunication. Others— the most prudent, or at least the tamer ones (prudentiores Episcopi, vel certe mansuetiores) -- thought excommunication should be left up to the will of Rome. Were the bishops to act unilaterally, many feared the regime would accuse them of sedition. By and large, Allen and Persons seem to agree. They suggest that princes ill-affected toward the Church invariably interpret excommunications in their darkest light. “As we often read,” say the editors, “many bishops have had their throats cut (iugulatos) on this account.”269 This was a subtle condemnation of the queen who was so blinded by heresy that she could

268 Ibid., p.382. “Dies advenit qui fuit tertius Aprilis, infiniti confluerunt, inique disputandi leges ab haereticis tantum praescribuntur, nihil ordine & ratione factum, declamationibus hinc inde tempus elabitur, prophanus iudex omnia ut volebat moderatur, res ad nihilum redit, haeretici in insania pergunt.”
269 Ibid., p.383. “Cum saepe legamus multos Episcopos propterea à multis Regibus estgestigio iugulatos.”
only see the worst in Catholic actions. It is also suggestive of her powers to bend the truth to her will and the severe limits imposed on Catholics who tried to act and speak freely.

The real debate during Elizabeth’s reign took place on paper. Strangely, the 1585 *De origine* barely mentioned controversies which arose after John Jewel’s (in)famous sermon at St. Paul’s Cross. The Roman edition of Sander’s history doesn’t go into great detail, but it gives the rough outlines of Jewel’s effrontery. At first, many were cool to Elizabethan “reforms,” thinking it best to “keep and honor antiquity.” They were unwilling to contradict “the saintly authority and doctrine of the holy fathers.” To combat these sentiments, Jewel argued it was Protestants who upheld tradition and Catholics who supported “novelty.” Allen and Persons mocked his “great hypocrisy and dissimulation,” ridiculed his theatrics, and derided his challenge to find “one passage, just one example from holy scripture, of any general council, or any ancient fathers” that supported Catholic doctrine. Catholics, of course, had plenty of examples and wrote plenty of learned books in response. Protestants soon regretted their taunts. The regime quickly enacted a series of laws forbidding the printing and publishing of any books responding to Jewel’s call. These interdictions had little effect and people continued to reap the benefits and fruits of such texts.

The patina of triumphalism that tinges this re-telling of print’s power despite Elizabethan efforts is quite different from the dark despair accompanying reports of public debates. Through formal disputations, show trials (Campion’s, for example), and

---

270 This could also be a comment on the inefficiencies of excommunications.  
272 Ibid., pp. 386-389.
other public spectacles the regime and its minions revealed their dexterity at manipulating the truth and in turn “owning” the political and religious “message.” To Sander and his editors the very notion of talking with the enemy seemed dubious and of little profit. The 1586 *De origine* emphasized the incommensurability between Catholics and the enemy both because they had fundamentally different beliefs and because there were no avenues for real, free, open discourse. Not only had the English been brainwashed by Somerset and others, but the Protestant Tudors carried out an on-going campaign of disinformation which had proven successful.

Beyond information control, Allen and Persons also recount other types of coercion. Abusive Tudor behavior is littered--sometimes perfunctorily--throughout the book, achieving most polemical force in the section about Elizabeth’s reign. The queen’s methods were typically more brutal than those of her predecessors. The 1586 version of Sander’s history re-prints or provides thorough summaries of anti-Catholic legislation written in 1571, 1580, 1582, and 1585. More time was spent providing a comprehensive listing of Elizabethan executions, including a long appendix to the history comprised of John Hart’s “Tower Diary.” The diary essentially lists victims of the Elizabethan regime between 1580 and 1585, with a short preface on the jails where prisoners were held and the types of torture perpetrated at the Tower. Perhaps the easiest way to show the horror of living under Elizabeth, however, was to use the words of her victims. Allen and Persons add two key letters describing Catholic experiences during 1581 and 1582. The letters (one anonymous and one by Campion) were re-printed with the clear intent of showing the continental audience real, “unfiltered,” English Catholic life amidst heresy. They were also included as a bit of missionary propaganda, so that “other afflicted and
tormented nations can observe in what ways and for what reasons English priests have been spurred and directed by God’s hand in this most difficult endeavor…”

More than any martyr list, however, a small detail epitomizes the intransigent, radical nature of Allen and Persons’s project. As we have already seen both men did very little to hide their dislike of their putative queen. While in 1585 Elizabeth was occasionally still referred to as “queen,” in 1586 any “regina” was changed to “Elizabetha.” Such a cruel machiavel wasn’t deserving of a royal name. On the printed page at least, Henry’s daughter was dethroned.

****

How Allen and Persons augmented their attack on heretical rulers is perhaps less interesting than how they decided to re-cast their narrative as it pertained to relatively good Catholics. The editors make an obvious effort to emphasize individuals who had been somewhat neglected in the 1585 edition. Still, as in the previous edition they did not skirt the uncomfortable matter of Catholic complicity in heresy’s ascendance. To the contrary, mistakes by Catholics—even well-meaning ones—received further emphasis, again presumably in hopes of helping avoid dangerous missteps in the future.

To be sure, some of Allen and Persons’ editorial decisions seem opportunistic. Written, as we have suggested, with a Spanish audience in mind it isn’t surprising that De origine’s treatment of seminal Spanish figures was re-touched. Spanish monarchs receive special attention and are shown to be perennial defenders of the faith. Thus, whereas the 1585 De origine seemed to take some swipes at Charles V for failing to respond to the

273 Ibid., p. 445. “Sed ad distinctam magis & particularam nonnullarum rerum notitiam, quae hoc ipso tempore & postea in Anglia gerebantur, & ut aliae nationes eadem haeresis calamitate afflictae, perspiciant quibus modis ac rationibus Anglorum sacerdotes in hoc difficillimo opere, Dei manu excitati & directi fuerint, non erit alienum nonulla hic apponere exerptae literis, quas sacerdos quidam ex Anglia, post quàm annum in ea vinea laboraverat…”
English plight, such references are more muted in the 1586 edition. Barely a word is uttered against Philip’s father; instead the editors are careful to evoke many of the emperor’s victories against Muslims and heretics. Catherine of Aragon was also subject to effusive praise. She had previously been noted for her sanctity, but by including letters exchanged with her confessor, John Forest, her saintly aura was augmented. Like a Spanish (and a female) Thomas More, she reveals a longing for martyrdom and a belief that earthly punishment was to be rewarded by eternal salvation. The queen stood for Spain’s deeply rooted Catholicism. From another point of view, of course, both Charles and Catherine may have stood less for what the Spanish intrinsically were, and more for what they could be, what they might aspire to.

As Allen and Persons wrote, they must have occasionally allowed themselves to dream a little about how they would help bring England back to the Catholic fold. If Allen had his way, he would bear much of the spiritual onus for England’s re-birth. Since 1582, perhaps earlier, he (through Persons) had lobbied the Spanish king and the papal Curia to award him a Cardinal’s hat. This was necessary so that English Catholics would have a proper head. One can safely assume Allen, long de facto leader of English Catholic exiles, began to think of himself as heir to the two other Englishmen who had held such high honor during years of schism: John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, and later, Reginald Pole. It is probably no coincidence that both these men receive far more attention in the 1586 *De origine.*

---

274 Note, for example, that phrases such as these were deleted: Sander, *De origine* (1585), 76r. “Sed frustrà sane oculos in Caesarem, aut hominem quempiam coniectos habeant…”

275 For a full account of this see Sander, *De origine* (1586), pp. 157-162.

276 When Allen finally received the cardinalate and prepared for what seemed to be his return to England, he predictably sought to study any documents readily available in Rome about Pole’s time in London. It seems likely that some efforts were made to raise parallels between the two cardinals. Thomas Stapleton recalled having prepared an edition of Pole letters with a dedicatory to Allen. Jeanine de Landtsheer, “The
Since the early days of anti-Henry polemics, the atrocious deaths of More and Fisher were key evidence that the king had followed a devilish path. The 1585 version of Sander’s history followed suit, but, as mentioned above, explicitly chose to emphasize More’s story. In 1586, Fisher regained some lost prominence. In one of the book’s most overtly hagiographical moments, the editors give the reader an ample list of the bishop’s virtues. There was never a “more learned, more saintly, more vigilant pastor” than he. Under his watch, two new colleges were built at Cambridge (where he eventually became chancellor), and he was responsible for instituting new lectures on theology there and at Oxford. He was responsible for attracting prominent scholars from the Continent, and by his labors many in England had achieved a high level of theological achievement. He used his learning for the greater good. It was said he wrote Henry’s anti-Lutheran defense of the sacraments and generally, “in his writings, as in his preaching” (tûm libris quàm concionibus), defended the Church against Protestant attacks. The bishop fulfilled his episcopal duties to near perfection. He visited prisons, hospitals, and every Friday would make house-calls to the sick, offering counsel, consolation, and, when necessary, last rites. He was the perfect Counter-Reformation bishop, avant la lettre. He followed an honest, Godly life devoid of riches or over-indulgences. This was something Henry couldn’t understand. The king, thinking he would be able to make money off of the

---

Correspondence of Thomas Stapleton and Johannes Moretus: A Critical and Annotated Edition” in Humanistica Lovaniensia, vol. XLV, 1996, p. 463. Stapleton to Johannes Moretus, Louvain, 25 July 1591. Their lives were fundamental to Reginald Pole’s discussions of Henrician corruption in his De unitate. Later it seems that their stories had didactic value for some contemporary Catholic readers. See, for example, Antonio Galloni, De ss. martyrum cruciatibus (Rome: Typographia Congregationis Oratorij apud S. Mariam in Vallicella, 1594), p. 199. “Insuper velim te scire, Catholicos aliquos ab haereticis nostrae aetatis capitis damnatos fuisse, inter quos (Sandro teste liber I de schismate Anglicano) fuere praecipue duo Angliae lumina, Ioannes Fuchsers Episcopus Rossensis sacratissimo Illustissimorum Cardinalium Collegio adscriptus & Thomas Morus equestris ordinis, paulo ante Regni totius Cancellarius.” Sander, De origine (1586), p. 133. “Hoc homine nullum, non modo Britannia, sed nec orbis forsan Christianus, tunc, sanctiorem, doctiorem, aut vigilantiorem praesulem, habuit.”
bishop’s demise, had his henchmen search Fisher’s quarters for valuables. All they found were objects of self-mortification and penance, a hair shirt and a whip.\(^{279}\)

Pole also exemplified a righteous way of living. If anyone had reason to abet Henry it was he who had claims to royal lineage and had (not unlike More) developed strong bonds with king. Time after time Henry tried to coax Pole, but the soon-to-be cardinal would not give in. The two finally reached the point of irreversible enmity over a book. Henry hoped Pole would defend his claims to spiritual governance, but instead of supporting the king, the latter wrote *De unitate ecclesiastica* in which he attacked secular claims to ecclesiastical rule.\(^{280}\) More than this, Pole showed his mettle when he returned triumphant to England as papal legate and helped achieve the momentary revival of the true Church there. During Mary’s reign, he worked hard to restore Cambridge and Oxford to its ancient laws, censured heretics, and promoted Catholic professors. He brought to England such foreign talents as the Spanish Dominican Pedro de Soto and perhaps most importantly executed curricular reforms re-establishing Scholasticism.\(^{281}\)

Despite the laudatory tones in which both Fisher and Pole are described, Allen and Persons complicated what could have been plain adulatory fluff. Both men faced serious trials, and both nearly failed. Under constant pressure from the king, Fisher momentarily recognized his pretended ecclesiastical authority, and worse, convinced others to do so. He thought it best to compromise until Henry could be reasoned with. Meanwhile, the bishop quieted his conscience by swearing allegiance to the king only in those things allowed according to God’s word (*Quantum per Dei verbum liceret*).\(^{282}\) Such

\(^{279}\) Full treatment of Fisher found at ibid., pp. 132-137.
\(^{280}\) Ibid., pp. 124-125.
\(^{281}\) For a full account see ibid., pp. 351-352.
\(^{282}\) Ibid., p. 107.
excuses didn’t mitigate the enormous error. To his credit, however, Fisher soon recognized this and expressed deep remorse for not having met his duties as a good pastor. He was supposed to provide guidance and a proper interpretation of God’s laws to save others from error.\footnote{283}

Pole was long wrought by doubt. Fearing the repercussions his family might face were he to reject the king’s entreaties, he was on the verge of giving in. Falling victim to “human prudence” he planned to meet Henry and find a way to compromise on the divorce. When in the king’s chamber, however, his tongue was miraculously tied (\textit{repertè sic hesit lingua, ut aliquandiu nullum verbum effari posset}); once he regained his powers of speech he, by the grace of God, spoke his mind (\textit{omni enim assentatione remota, ut bonum virum ac pium dicebat, suam liberè sententiam, summa tamen adhibita modestia, regi aperuit}).\footnote{284}

Fisher and Pole were not made of stone and their frailties were as much a part of their stories as their heroism. Their momentary debilities showed something of the real struggles that English Catholics had to face, struggles that both Allen and Persons knew well, having both spent time in England during Elizabeth’s regime, and having both at one moment or another tacitly acquiesced to the queen’s demands. Past mistakes, of course, did not preclude reform. In his unpublished life of Campion, Persons made much the same point: he did not omit the martyr’s attachments to worldly things, the “hopes for

\footnote{283} Ibid. “Cuius facti Roffensem posteà usque adeò poenituit, ut publicé se incusans dicere, suas id est Episcopi partes fuisse, non cum exceptione dubia, sed apertè & dissertis vebis caeteros potius docuisse, quid verbum Dei permitteret, quidve prohiberet, quo minus alij in fraudem incurrerent.”

speedy and great preferments,\textsuperscript{285} but despite momentary attachments to Protestantism, his turn toward the right path ensured that his sin “was now fully forgiven, so that he should trouble himself no more with the memory of it…”\textsuperscript{286} In the case of Fisher or Pole the point was not to exalt the struggle itself (however laudable it was) but to highlight the fortitude these men showed, and the spiritual benefits which accompanied their sacrifices. It was a call, as we’ve seen before, for spiritual resolution.

Such valiant men stood in contrast with the many other Catholics who, as Sander’s previous editors also recognized, were partly responsible for heresy’s success. In a particularly revealing moment added in 1586, Allen and Persons contemplate the actions of several “Catholic” bishops during Edward’s reign. If anyone resisted the imposition of heresy by Somerset and his clique it was the likes of Stephen Gardiner, Cuthbert Mayne, and Nicholas Heath. But they, having been instituted by Henry, not the Pope, and having been raised during the initial throes of schism, were still weak. Fearing the loss of their bishoprics and contingent honors, they indulged the boy-king and his advisors, consenting and allowing novelties that did not appear to contain “open heresy” \textit{(apertam heresiam)}. However, on other matters which impinged more directly on the true faith, they were unwilling to give in. Because they would not preach the government’s line fully, initial attempts at accommodation came to nothing. The priests were punished rigorously by Edward’s regime, and during Elizabeth’s reign as well.\textsuperscript{287}

\textsuperscript{286} Quoted in ibid., 112.
\textsuperscript{287} Sander, \textit{De origine} (1586), p. 282. “Cuius criminis gravissimas paulo post penas, primum sub hoc ipso Edouardo, quia in reliquas omnes hereses, seu (ut tunc loquebantur) Regiae Maiestatis in reformanda religione progressiones non sunt assensi, nec blasphema quaedam illis proposita dogmata, pro concione, ut iubebantur, explicare & comprobare voluerunt, deinde multò magis sub Elisabetha omnes luurent: depositionem, & ut postèa dicemus, diuturnos carceres usque ad mortem patientissimè tolerantes, misericordiamque simul & iustissima Dei in se iudicia collaudantes.”
A certain lack of rigor marked Mary Tudor’s reign. To be sure, Allen and Persons perpetuated the image of a saintly Mary already provided in 1585. She remained pious and certain in her faith, even amidst various efforts to make her stray. The new editors went further still. Indeed, as England fell to heresy’s wiles, it seems she alone remained constant. Although Somerset had succeeded at duping the rest of the population, Mary would not budge. She would not close down the oratory in her quarters; she would not celebrate a Calvinist service.288

Fervent adherence to the Catholic Church, however, should not be mistaken for fanaticism. Far from the ogre of the Elizabethan imagination (as perpetuated by Fox’s Book of Martyrs), Mary appears as a clement ruler who often shuddered at the idea of executing confessional enemies, especially those who had been at the top of the Edwardian hierarchy. Even bishops instituted under schismatic regimes seemed off limits to her simply because they bore that sacred title. In any case, since they were ecclesiastics, she thought it wholly inappropriate to adjudicate their cases. Priests could only be tried (as any good Catholic would have argued) in ecclesiastical courts. Still, she did oversee important executions; none more important than that of Cranmer. He was promptly convicted of treason by secular courts, stripped of his archbishopric, and burned at Oxford.

The queen’s greatest achievement was not bloodshed, but her adept moves to abrogate heretical laws against free Catholic worship and to re-institute the Catholic Mass. The Church seemed on track to a swift restoration.

288 Ibid., pp.283-284. “Sola serenissima Maria primogenita Henrici filia, Edouardi soror, que ei in imperio successit, sanctissimae matris suae Catharinae fidel, & constantiam sequuta, non potuit ullis Protectoris aut ceterorum regiorum tutorum precibus aut comminationibus adduci, ut oratorium suum quod domi habebat, vel claudi, vel sacrum Missae officium in coenam Calvinicam mutari...”
However, as we know, this would not be the case. In 1585, *De origine’s* editors had no real answer for why Catholicism’s revival was so brief, save for platitudes about God’s will. In 1586, the book’s editors offered a more nuanced analysis. Failure was at least partly due to errors of governance. From the beginning, Mary knew that the renewal of Catholicism depended on assistance from Rome and so she immediately requested Cardinal Pole be sent as legate. At first he hesitated. He wanted to do some information gathering before plunging in; he wanted to make sure that the ground had been readied for his effective services. It is clear from a letter sent by Pole to Mary (newly printed in 1586) that the cardinal was soon ready and eager to go back home and assume his charge. Politics, however, got in the way. Charles V, who was in the middle of finalizing his son’s, Philip’s, marriage to Mary held Pole back until the deal was sealed, much to the latter’s chagrin. This in itself did not have negative effects on England’s ultimate re-conversion, but the slowness of the proceedings hinted at some potential problems.

Despite good intentions, reform was incomplete. Whereas clemency was a laudable trait in a prince, over-indulgence posed certain dangers. While, as mentioned before, Mary rid England of noted heretics like Cranmer, she was nevertheless too forgiving of clerics who had fallen victim to the wiles of Protestantism during previous reigns. They were absorbed into Mary’s ecclesiastical hierarchy “without taking into consideration their condition, without examining by which Bishops they were ordained or in which manner they were ordained.”289 This was all a piece with a papal policy that tried to cope with the challenge of re-establishing England’s clergy after years of spiritual desiccation. It was decreed that illicit clerical marriages were to be dispensed, illegitimate

---

289 Ibid., p. 334. “…sine conditionis cuiusque sue consideratione, non examinantes a quibus & qualibus Episcopis quovè modo fuerant ordinati…”
children should be legitimized, and bishops instituted under heretical regimes were to be reconciled.\textsuperscript{290} Instead of chastising priests and monks who had gotten married, Pole decreed they should be separated from their wives and stripped of their original benefices only to give them even greater ones soon thereafter.\textsuperscript{291} The result of such leniency, as the authors warn the reader, was corruption. Allen and Persons insisted that the disruption of church discipline can only lead to further errors.\textsuperscript{292}

Marian and papal forces also conceded on matters of church property. Initially Mary and Pole wanted to re-appropriate all the rents and lands stolen from the Church. The history of Westminster was emblematic of Marian Counter-Reformation efforts: it had once belonged to the Benedictine order, but was later turned into a collegiate church by Henry VIII. When Pole tried to restore the property to its “original use” (\textit{pristinum usum}) the secular priests who then held possession didn’t want to give up their rights. Mary and Pole, however, persevered, chasing them away through a combination of force and bribery. This event frightened others who had reaped the benefits of Henry’s treachery. Marian authorities feared malcontents might soon start trouble. To avoid imminent danger, the Pope offered absolution and allowed the secular retainment of ecclesiastical lands.\textsuperscript{293} Allen and Persons didn’t openly criticize the decision, but they made clear that the Church by no means looked kindly upon those who kept its property.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[290] Ibid., p. 350. “\textit{In eodem scripto cum omnibus infra gradus ab Ecclesia prohibitos coniugatis (quia innumeris erant nec sine magna rerum perturbatione separari poterant) dispensat, iubetque matrimonium & prolem esse legitima.}”
\item[291] Ibid., p.351. “\textit{Iam verò Illustrissimus Cardinalis deinceps ad Cleri & maximè Academiarum reformationem animum adiectit. In eo paulò indulgentior, ut à multis observatum fuit, quòd in sacerdotes ac religiosos uxaratos, non animadverterit satis, sed à praetensis uxoribus tantum separatos, atque beneficijs prioribus privatos, mox ad alia maiora sacerdotia nimirí citò admiserit.””
\item[292] Ibid., p. 334. “\textit{... ne & ipse aliquando, ubi disciplina ecclesiae est perturbata, in eiusmodi errores incautè labantur.”}
\item[293] Ibid., p. 349. “\textit{...omnes de huiusmodi bonis ac possessionibus monasticis in schismate acquisitis, quoad poenas & censuras canonicas, in perpetuum secures & absolutos Legatus declararet.”}
\end{footnotes}
They stood to suffer God’s punishment, even if ecclesiastical authorities did not pursue their “canonical rights” (*Ecclesia suum ius secundum canones non persecutur*).\(^\text{294}\)

These brief comments on Marian inefficiencies take on particularly importance in light of hoped-for Spanish efforts against Elizabeth. Though Allen and Persons barely make reference to the fact, Mary’s reign as queen marked Philip’s own stint as English monarch. Spain was thus complicit in past failures, and *De origine’s* new editors wanted to make sure that history did not, as it were, repeat itself. To ensure success, the future executor of reform had to be unflinching. Like a *basso ostinato*, a message of rigor was sounded in equal measure throughout Sander’s history. Allen and Persons seem to suggest at least three important paths to success. After conquest, the clergy needed to be fully re-instituted, church lands needed to return to their proper owner, and universities needed to be fully drained of all Protestant toxins.

One can’t help but think that *De origine* pre-figured ideas that would be more fully articulated a few years later. In 1596 Persons wrote the *Memorial for the Reformation of England*, a text that reached Philip II’s desk. In it, he would criticize Marian Reforms for having gone “as a stage-play, where men do change their persons and parts without changing their Minds or Affection.”\(^\text{295}\) This was just the sort of superficiality Allen and Persons were suggesting in Sander’s re-augmented history.

How the editors tweaked Mary’s reign suggests we can read the history on at least two levels. On one, showing Marian deficiencies the reader might draw general lessons about proper Catholic behaviors--these were universal sorts of messages. On the other,

\(^{294}\) Ibid., p. 350.
the narrative provided a barely coded set of messages to the Spanish monarchy itself, about its duties, as they stood on the brink of giving England’s salvation another try.

****

The 1586 *De origine* was not yet an ideal history as far as Persons and Allen were concerned, but they undoubtedly thought it a more polished, more precise rendering of the English past for present use. As we have seen, it sharpened its attack on heresy and its critique of Catholic inconstancy as well. It also gave the reader a better sense of the tools used by the heretic camp to prolong their success. Providence is still the over-arching analytical framework, but various forms of information control, be it through the university, through print, or good old-fashioned repression are shown to be the earthly means used by the enemy. By exposing this reality further, the editors continued their insistence on the futility of dialogue with heretics, and on, as we have seen throughout, the need for rigor.

Allen and Persons also pushed the book ever closer to the Spanish cause. By including a Spanish-hued rebuttal of Cecil’s *Declaration*, the editors reveal *De origine*’s true combative core. As suggested above, the beauty of using history as propaganda is that polemical intent can remain hidden just underneath the surface of what passes itself off as a level-headed, truthful narrative. To be sure, no one missed the pugilistic intent of early modern confessional histories, but the fantasy of objectivity could be (and often was) invoked. It was thus a sign of truly new and more tumultuous times that in 1586 Allen and Persons felt able to wed history to more bald-faced forms of propaganda. *De origine*’s final pages had only thin claims to historical analysis, reading more like a pro-
Spanish broadside. Indeed, Elizabethan exiles provided a more explicit defense of (potential) Spanish aggression than authorities in Madrid were willing to make.

Sander’s history thus occupied a rather ambiguous polemical space, at once uniquely ultra-English and, in a sense, ultra-Spanish as well. As exiles trying to fight against an evil, oppressive regime, Allen, Persons, and their colleagues lay claim to special knowledge. They had, or so they thought, the key to England’s real history. Writing from a distance, only they had the ability/will to put on display the true demonic depths that their country had fallen to. They held the keys to these verities because they were (contrary to the Elizabethan regime’s claims) model subjects, bearers of England’s pristine Catholic traditions. But, of course, the only hope exiles had of returning home, was through the good will and ready force of an allied, foreign government: Spain. Though they may not have felt Spanish, they felt compelled to pepper their work with flattery. For the sake of their aspirations back home, they also ventriloquized bellicose Spanish sentiments. The success of a strong Habsburg foreign policy would be to England’s benefit, and to the greater glory of God.

The 1586 De origine became the source (indeed, a respected source) for Catholic students of the English schism throughout the early modern period. The Elizabethan regime surely knew about the book’s existence, but made a strategic decision not to respond. Doing so would have invested the book with unwarranted legitimacy. We can

---

296 Although I have not seen proper documentation to the effect, knowing the close watch held by the Elizabethan regime on English Catholic printing ventures, Elizabeth and her counselors must have known about De origine from the start. The first intelligence document I have stumbled across mentioning it, however, comes from September 1589. (“Paper of Intelligence endorsed by Burghley,” September 1589, in Robert Lemon, ed., Calendar of State Papers, 1581-1590 [London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865], pp. 622.)

297 Important members of the Elizabethan establishment expressed ambivalence about responding to Sander before. In 1572, Matthew Parker told Burghley: “As for Saunter’s babbling book (De visibili monarchia), I see few men either able or willing (to respond); not for the invincibleness of it, but for the huge volume;
also assume that the regime saw no immediate need to. *De origine* probably did not infiltrate England, otherwise teams of scholars and propagandists would have been let loose like hounds on meaty pages.

To be sure, *De origine*’s greatest success took place on the Continent. Its message of fortitude and its powerful rebuke of heresy’s dangers played well among throngs of Catholics eager to counter the Reformation. That it was written in Latin would ensure both the book’s longevity and its wide reception across Europe. However, Latin posed some limitations. While the book was absorbed by an ample learned audience, it did not reach “vulgar” audiences that might be important in the upcoming battle against Elizabeth.

By 1587, this would not do. The book would have to be translated.

---

and I think the bishop of Sarum’s (John Jewel’s) book for English men has written sufficiently.” (John Bruce and Thomas Thomason Perowne, eds., *The Correspondence of Matthew Parker* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1853], pp. 409-410. Parker to Burghley, London, 22 November, 1572). As to *De origine* ambivalence can be detected by the fact that there was no real response until 1593: John Cowell, *Antisanderus duos continens dialogos non ita pridem inter viros quosdam doctos Venetijs habitos: in quibus variae Nicholaj Sanderi, aliorumque Romanensium calumniae in haec Anglorum ab excusso Pontifice tempora vaferreme confictae, licet obiter & fortuito, vere tamen candideque refelluntur* (Cambridge, 1593).
Chapter 3

History on the Move: *De origine* in French and Spanish

As 1586 gave way to 1587 the Armada was still far from setting sail. The prodigious fleet was coming together on the docks of Lisbon; men were enlisted, biscuit was procured, rotted, and procured again, but Philip had not arrived at a coherent strategy.\(^{298}\) For over a year the king and his advisors thought intently about all the possible approaches, all the possible risks and dangers. Should England be attacked directly? Should there be a diversionary attack on Ireland? Should the Spanish fleet coordinate an attack with a Netherlandish one? The halting pace of a grand enterprise that implicated all of Western Europe must have surprised few. Not only was the endeavor too big to rush, it was also being masterminded by an ever-cautious king. Would he relent? Probably not, but Allen and Persons couldn’t know for sure. Fragile English Catholic nerves must have been further frayed when news spread in late April that Sir Francis Drake led a team of ships to the port of Cádiz. There he burnt several Spanish vessels, famously “singeing” the Spanish king’s beard.\(^{299}\) Though the material loss suffered by Spain was reparable, many felt, as Philip did, that “the daring of the attempt was very great indeed.”\(^{300}\) For men like Allen and Person, far away as they were in Rome, recent events could have been seen as either a blessing or a curse. A curse because the Armada would be set back. Would it be set back permanently? A blessing


\(^{299}\) For a description of the events see Mattingly, *The Armada*, pp. 93-109.

\(^{300}\) Ibid., p. 108.
because with his reputación spurned, the king might finally feel compelled to take definitive, swift action.

Drake’s attack must have induced Allen, Persons, and their allies to put English history at the service of their militant imperatives again. It is no coincidence that in the summer of 1587 De origine saw several new editions. Two anonymous French translations appeared in print, one of which claimed to have been completed at the behest of “certain English gentlemen, refugees because of the Catholic faith.”301 Who these Englishmen were is unclear, but Allen and Persons probably orchestrated the project. This assumption is plausible in large part because at the same time Pedro de Ribadeneyra was finishing his version of Sander’s history, the Historia ecclesiastica del scisma del reyno de Inglaterra, with Allen’s explicit support.302 That these three translations should have been written at almost the same time suggests some sort of coordination.

This chapter aims to show how De origine may have functioned within French and Spanish spheres. What follows is in part a story about active manipulation, especially in the case Ribadneyra’s Scisma. It is also a story about how transferrable Sander’s history was. The narrative and its central objectives, as we have described them above, worked just as well in France and Spain. The text spoke as much to an English Catholic sensibility as it did French and Spanish ones. As is well known, the confessional battles of the age occasioned shared religious and political anxieties which in turn caused pan-European battles on land, sea, and paper. Because of this, among the patchwork of diplomatic, political, and confessional allies that emerged during the period, it was easy enough to coopt each other’s foliated weapons. Nowhere is something of a shared

302 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Toletum 3, fol. 134v. Acquaviva to Porres, Rome, 22 March 1588.
European culture, or at least a shared early modern European experience, better on display than in cantankerous polemics that easily travelled from one language to another, one kingdom to another. In an age of rampant conspiracy and domino theories, few doubted that their home would be next to suffer whatever horrible fate their imaginations fancied. For Catholics on the Continent, infernal imaginings of a possibly heretical future were undoubtedly stirred by Sander’s book and by England’s sorry history.  

In the two previous chapters have tried to suggest how militant English Catholics responded to shifting geo-political contexts by confecting a history that, by various means, promoted war against Elizabeth. The 1585 De origine was intended to jolt Catholics into action, in 1586 it did much the same, with added layers of acerbity and an added element of pro-Spanish propaganda appropriate for a period of increased bellicosity. In both cases authors and editors were trying to create a text that would have a broad European audience.  

Whereas in both editions we can readily see the international breadth of English Catholic polemic, this chapter wants to explore its transnational facet. Because a multi-centered enterprise like the Armada required it, but also because the English Catholic enterprise against Protestant rule was in itself increasingly multi-centered, with exiles living across Europe, Spanish Elizabethans actively tried to inject their brand of Spanish-tinged propaganda into different political micro-environments. Sometimes they had complete control over this process, sometimes control was given to close allies. In any case, passage into vulgar tongues ensured that De origine attained different resonances as it travelled from one cultural/political sphere to another.
France

On Whitsunday evening, 1587, the duke of Guise sent English exile James Hill to the English College in Rheims. The city was host to an important meeting among leaders of the Catholic League, and the duke wanted to pay a group visit. He requested a disputation be held, and William Gifford, a noted professor at the seminary, was chosen to make a special oration. On Friday, 22 May, around four o’clock in the afternoon the company assembled and it seems English Catholics put on an appropriate show. Gifford’s oration lasted a bit over a half hour and was, as might be expected, replete with sugary words for the Guise clan, especially the Cardinal of Bourbon, the duke’s uncle and pretender to the French throne. He and his family, Gifford claimed, were exemplary of a French nobility that by “the singular grace of God and a certain natural good” had for centuries been defenders of the true faith.

Amidst flagrant flattery, however, Gifford had other intentions. Recalling the evils of English heresy, he spoke about one of Elizabethan’s most atrocious deeds: Mary Stuart’s execution just a few months earlier, in February. The murder of “the ornament of the house of Lorraine, the Phoenix of the North” should serve as inspiration for strong reprisal.

Would that Catholic princes would propose to imitate in the cause of faith what others have done in the cause of heresy, themselves to do rightly what others wrongfully, themselves by example of the best princes what others perpetrated by no example but led by their own lust and will. Would that, taught by the example of heretics, they would place divine Glory and the defense of the Catholic

---

Church before flesh and blood. Would that they might consider the glory of the Church, the propagation of religion, the honor of God and his Christ before the ties of kinship, as is right and as becomes Christian bishops and princes, to the contempt of danger and of life itself.  

The point is made clearer still toward the end of the oration. Thanking the Guise for their support of English exiles in Rheims, he hoped their benevolence might spread to England itself:

….so that at length when this evil persecution against us and our brethren shall cease—a persecution which in these days our ageing Jezebel foments more and more—England which was of old freed by French bishops from pagan darkness, now heretic and worse than pagan, may be won back by the glorious dukes and Princes of the French to its ancient liberty and religion, so that you, destined to receive reward equally for preserving the Catholic religion in France and restoring it in England, shall join the company of your sainted ancestors…

Such pleading reveals just how much English Catholics depended on Guise moral and financial support. But that the duke of Guise should seek out members of the English College to put on this display of reverence suggests an awareness that his cause would benefit from English Catholic support as well. Members of the English College helped establish his (and his family’s) bona fides as Christian protectors. They were effective propagandists for the politico-religious agenda of the Guise-run Catholic League, and as such they became necessary, or at least useful. From the other side, what little leverage English exiles had vis-à-vis their benefactors allowed them to push forward an anti-Elizabethan agenda in France.

The symbiotic relationship between the League and English exiles spilled onto the printed page. In 1587 a full twenty-two per cent of printed ligueur propaganda (91 of

305 Ibid., p. 22.
approximately 416 items) consisted of reports about British affairs.\textsuperscript{307} More than sheer numbers, there is plenty of evidence that the League sought to magnify English horrors to fan flames against Huguenots, Henri III, and the pretender to the throne, Henri of Navarre (future Henri IV). In Paris, Catherine-Marie de Lorraine, the duke of Guise’s sister and de facto head of the Parisian League was a keen supporter of English Catholics. On 24 June 1587 she enabled an exhibition of six prints depicting English martyrdoms by Richard Verstegan at the cemetery of Saint-Séverin. The engravings, which were enlarged and painted for public display, drew crowds of onlookers. Eager to capitalize on the publicity, copies of Verstegan’s martyrilogical work, the \textit{Briefve description des diverses cruautez que les Catholiques endurent en Angleterre pour la foy} were handed out as well. One contemporary anti-Catholic account speaks of the throngs --at least five thousand people a day--and sneered that “some English knave priest…points with a rod,” describing the macabre images and insisting on their accuracy. “Others aposted purposefully for the matter show then how likely Catholics are to grow to that point in France if they have a king a heretic, and that they are next door to it, which is indeed the chief intent that the thing set there to animate and mutiny the people.”\textsuperscript{308} Again, this incident underscores a double-edge to English Catholic propaganda in France. On the one hand it was a way for English exiles to spread news of their horrible plight, on the other it was easily coopted by the League for its own anti-monarchical purposes.


Perhaps the most notable textual marriage between French and English causes was written by a Parisian avocat, Louis d’ Orleans, in 1586. The Advertissement des Catholiques Anglois aux François catholiques is a direct attack against Huguenots in general, and Henri of Navarre in particular. It was framed as a warning given by unidentified Englishmen, thereby channeling a ligueur line through a pretended English voice. D’ Orleans thought this act of ventriloquization advantageous on several fronts. For one, he could spew anti-Protestant venom by proxy, protected by the veil of anonymity. More importantly, warnings from an English perspective endowed the book with greater credibility. This was not the rant of a politically motivated, partisan blow-hard, but the considered warning of someone who had already experienced the ravages of heresy: “Because we have tasted, and continue to taste in England the fruits of such subjection [to heretics], we have decided it is necessary to warn you of those who stir against your religion…” The author writes out of “particular interest,” because the French had provided shelter for English exiles. He also had more universal concerns for the Church, which could not but fare badly should French Catholicism crumble. Further, advice was given in a gesture of amity, as one friendly neighbor would advise another “touched by the same malady.” The text generally has little that is “English” except for occasional references--these will be important in our analysis below. Nevertheless, the very fact that it was an anglicized text is revealing of what must have been a widespread instinct to comprehend French troubles through an English lens.

The connection between English and French affairs was more than a matter of similar anxieties about evil heretics. An English yarn fit well within a French context

309 On the book see Baumgartner, Radical Reactionaries, pp. 71-73.
because English and French politics were tightly bound together. Anglo-French relations throughout the sixteenth century had been tense, but after the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis (1558) open war between the two kingdoms abated. This was partly a function of the fact that a unified France scarcely existed by century’s end. With the onset of the Wars of Religion, Elizabeth negotiated with the French monarchy, and, of course, Huguenots to ward off the threat of the Guise and Philip II. By 1587 rumor had it that Henri III was about to ally with Elizabeth, a promising prospect for Protestants, but a nauseating one for Catholics. Rumor also had it that the French king had been involved in the recent execution of Mary Stuart. Thus, from a radical Catholic perspective, images of French and English monarchies actually started to look like one and the same thing. Just as it had long been assumed that Elizabeth was promoting French strife, Henri too looked as if he was abetting Elizabethan cruelty. Just as the Elizabethan regime absorbed Huguenot and anti-League polemics because they spoke to Protestant mistrust of French Catholicism, the Spanish Empire, and the threat that both posed to national interests, so too Catholic radicals in France absorbed anti-Elizabethan propaganda because it spoke to fears of pan-European Protestant conspiracies and the imminent dangers these posed.

Between 1587 and 1588 at least two distinct translations of Sander’s history were printed. One titled Les trois livres du Docteur Nicolas Sanders, contenant l’origine & progres du Scisme d’Agleterre was prepared in 1587. It bears no imprint nor does it reveal its translator. There were two nearly identical editions of the other translation, Les

---


312 Les trois livres du Docteur Nicolas Sanders, contenant l’origine & progres du Scisme d’Agleterre (n.p., 1587)
by someone identified only by the acronym I.T.A.C. A first edition of this work seems to have been finished by early July 1587. A subsequent edition claims to have been printed in Strasbourg by one Hans Mark. This is surely a false imprint. Enigmatically, the “Strasbourg” edition claims to have been published in “1587 ou 1588.” It seems safe to say that we must date this latter version sometime after 29 November 1587, the date when Cardinal de Vaudémont (of the Guise-Lorraine clan) died. While the first I.T.A.C. edition had been dedicated to the Cardinal, the dedication was removed from the second, suggesting the dedicatee had already breathed his last.

Despite evidentiary paucity, I.T.A.C.’s edition gives us enough scraps to make some informed conjectures about the general milieu which produced it. First, judging from the title page of the first edition, we know that it was translated at the behest of English Catholics, and thus was probably printed in Paris, Rheims, or Rouen, all of these being centers of English Catholic activity and Guise/ligueur strongholds. The dedication to Vaudémont cements the ligueur affinity, and suggests the book was part of a similar propaganda campaign as Gifford’s above-mentioned oration or Verstegan’s prints.

We can’t know with any certainty if I.T.A.C.’s translation and that of the anonymous translator were produced by similar coteries. Nevertheless, one can imagine that both had similar intentions and can assume they were both the fruit of the tension-filled spring, summer, and fall of 1587. Especially after news of Mary Stuart’s death reached France, tempers flared. In Paris the League called the duke of Guise to fight against the king’s evil advisors. By April, Bernardino Mendoza wrote Philip telling that a

---

mix of rising prices, Henri’s lumbering response to the Huguenot threat, and the ever-
growing hatred of the king’s mignon, the duke of Épernon, raised the specter of unrest
(algun alboroto).  

Guise relations with the monarchy had not reached the point of total collapse, but they were barely sustainable. In North East France they openly challenged royal authority by taking control of Crotoy, Doullens, and Pónt-Remy. Increasingly, moral and financial support filtered in from Spain. The duke of Guise was in talks with Philip to finally stamp out French Protestantism and, as he put it to Mendoza, he would “not get off the horse until the true faith was well-established in the kingdom.” As Hispano-
Guise relations warmed, relations with the French monarchy slowly froze. The duke was growing evermore impatient with Henri and his advisors. Increasingly, royal efforts at rapprochement with the Catholic side seemed, as he put it, not unlike “the temptations that the devil made to Our Lord on the mountain.”

By the fall of 1587, Henri III thought he found a way of getting rid of both the duke of Guise and Navarre. Navarre planned to join about two-thousand of his troops with Swiss and German forces which had been procured with English money to aid the Huguenots. The king, on his side, prepared a two-pronged mission. He planned to mount a potent army led by the duke of Joyeuse to attack Navarre’s stronghold in Southern France, meanwhile sacrificing the Guise to German forces entering through Lorraine. The plan failed. At the battle of Coutras, Joyeuse was killed—Navarre had dealt a deadly

---

316 Quoted in Prada, *Felipe II y Francia*, p. 296.
blow to the monarchy. Against the Germans, Guise achieved what seemed like a set of unlikely victories, the celebration of which was cut short, however, by royal connivance with invading forces. The king sent Épernon to cut a deal with retreating Germans. Rumor had it that the mignon himself had the opportunity to strike the enemy down, but didn’t. Guise was outraged. “It is strange,” he complained, “that forces of the Catholics must be employed to recompense heretics for the evils they have inflicted upon France. Every good Frenchman and true Catholic must feel himself offended.”

If Henri had hoped to prevent Guise from attaining longed-for glory, he failed miserably. Preachers in Paris extolled the duke’s valor and demeaned royal incompetence. “Without the prowess and constancy of the duke of Guise the Ark would have fallen into the hands of the Phillistines, and heresy would have triumphed over religion.” After the duke won a battle in the town of Auneau in November 1587, the city of Rouen had a medal struck in celebration with the motto: “Artifice is destroyed by virtue.” More ominous, soon the Sorbonne would draw up a secret opinion that power could be taken away from an ineffectual king “as could responsibility from a suspect guardian.” The ground was being prepared for the League revolt of 1588.

Taking all this into account, we can see the French versions of Sander’s history as useful propaganda against all those forces that threatened the stability of the Catholic state. To get a more precise idea of how this may have worked we need to cling to faint tendrils of evidence provided, again, by I.T.A.C.. We must focus mainly on the translator’s preface.

319 Carroll, Noble Power, p. 207.
320 Carroll, Martyrs and Murderers, p. 271.
He clearly wanted to explore the theme of royal incompetence, not only in the realm of mere politics, but more importantly, in matters of faith. He emphasized issues touching kings “who have very much forgotten themselves, and allow themselves to be guided by their passions, and amorous flames” and revealed behaviors that “have caused marvelous disaster and ruin, not only to themselves, but also to their own subjects.” Kingdoms belonging to such errant monarchs had “been marvelously and very strangely altered, not only in matters of human policy, but, what’s worse, in matters concerning piety and Religion.”

As an example, I.T.A.C. mentioned the case of David’s successor as ruler of Israel: Solomon. Quoting Scripture (Kings 3:3) he showed how Solomon had been agreeable to God because instead of asking for riches and power, he asked for wisdom, prudence, and a docile heart. God gave him these things, together with glory and wealth. Despite divine approval, however, in his old age Salomon “was so depraved by women…that he left the service of God, [and] followed strange gods.” He subsequently gave unto these strange gods the honor and glory that should have been given to the one true lord. Henry VIII followed Solomon’s footsteps. The English king had shown so much promise and hardy faith in his youth, but was ensnared by Anne and descended into a vile mix of Lutheranism and Calvinism, and worse, eventually claimed spiritual authority himself.

In extreme Catholic circles-- and even in not so extreme ones-- Henry’s life must have looked a lot like Henri’s. The similarities went beyond their shared names. As Keith Cameron has suggested, histories often compared the French king with failed monarchs,

---

321 I will be quoting the post-November 1587 version of Les trois livres with the false Strasbourg imprint. It will be cited as Les trois livres (Strasbourg). See quote at sig. a2 r-v.
322 Ibid., sig. a2v.
such as the legendary Polish King Popiel. Not surprisingly Sander’s history could be
taken to imply that Henri, like his English counterpart, might soon lead France to a
definitive schism.\textsuperscript{323} Such a reading can be assumed because French Catholics were
accustomed to thinking about their sorry lot through, as mentioned above, an English
filter. Moreover, few (Catholics) would have been blind to the parallel debaucheries of
their king and England’s dead monarch.\textsuperscript{324} Just as Henry was accused of uncontrollable
lust and even sexual perversion, so too Henri was often imagined as a deviant and
pervert. Though Henri hadn’t willfully pursued incestuous relationships, he was accused
of myriad other early modern sexual taboos; he was a defiler of nuns, a hermaphrodite, a
sodomite, a cross-dresser, and everything in-between. Such rumors were manifestations
of Henri’s descent into a world of Tiberian pleasures. Both kings, then, fit the archetype
of the libidinous tyrant perfectly. Both put their personal (sexual) ambitions -- their
passions--over reason and faith.

Even in the mildest forms of Catholic propaganda, Henri was characterized as
something of a schemer able to “conceal his passions, feign and dissimulate.”\textsuperscript{325} This, of
course, had been Henry’s \textit{modus operandi}, as reflected in dubious dealings with
Catholics at home and abroad before and after the schism. In harsh \textit{ligueur} hands, Henri’s
dissimulation was shown to be put at the service of heresy, much as Henry’s was. In the
most venomous propaganda, the French king was said to be in direct league with the

\textsuperscript{323} Keith Cameron, “Henry III—The Antichristian king” in \textit{The Journal of European Studies}, 1974, 4:152,
pp. 152-163, quote at p. 162.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 162. For a thorough treatment of Henry III’s image as projected through propaganda see David
\textsuperscript{325} “The Personality of Henry III: A Pro-League Account” in David Potter, ed., \textit{The French Wars of
miroir des princes ou grands de France” in A. Dufour, ed., \textit{Annuaire-bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de
France} (1954-55), pp. 95-186.
devil. Henry was made of similar stuff--he was, after all, thought the Antichrist by Catholic enemies.

Henry’s story may have also reminded Catholic readers of that other Henri, the King of Navarre. In the above-mentioned Advertissement -- written before the chasm between the League and Henri III had fully developed--d’Orleans studiously avoided attacking the regnant king, chosing instead to eviscerate Navarre. He was said to be a master dissimulator willing to play on both sides of the confessional field, while truly possessing deeply rooted anti-Catholic feelings. He was also debauched pilferer, a morally depraved rebel against the monarchy. Among many ad hominem attacks, d’Orleans’s English speaker mentions Navarre’s sexual improprieties and especially the disrespect he repeatedly showed his wife. That Navarre was was a bad husband suggested he could not be a good king. Evoking an adage by Cato, he insists that “no one can be a good senator, that is, a good Counselor (Conseillier d’Estat), who is not a good husband.” Further, he who does not love his wife “will be unlikely to love his subjects.” At this point there is a question which is a crucial hint as to how a possible Henry VIII- Henri of Navarre connection may have been made by contemporary French readers: “Who shall think that the king of Navarre will be more chaste and more humane than Henry VIII, our king of England, who was a heretic like him?” Soon after Navarre’s feared ascent he would be as cruel as the English king; his wife would face a fate equal to Henry’s wives, and others like the Cardinal of Bourbon wouldn’t do much better. The kingdom would soon be blood-soaked.

---

326 D’Orleans, Advertissement, p. 87.
327 Ibid., p. 88.
328 Ibid., p. 89.
Beyond the two French Henris, translations of *De origine* also offered an implicit criticism of the French court and its courtiers. The translator notes the fact that Edward VI was too young to have had real control of England, and thus, blame for the spread of heresy should be placed on the shoulders of his advisors who were either heretics, or worse, *politiques*. In one of three sonnets composed by I.T.A.C., he elaborates on this theme. Happy are those princes and kings who are brought up by honest, pious tutors, unhappy are those brought up by ambitious tutors, “brimming with impiety” (*ambitieux, rempliz d’impiété*). The ill-advised prince is soon ruined: “equity is banished/The country is in discord, and the people are left without faith” (*Car le roy est gasté, bannue est equité/ Le pays en discord, & le peuple sans foy*).\(^\text{329}\)

The translator thus points readers into a world of evil counsel. Though League propaganda did not harp much on the king’s tutors, they did harp on the king’s debauched court. Just as Henry VIII’s quarters were filled with dissolute gamblers and worse, so too, as one report put it, Henri’s cabinet was “a veritable seraglio of every lubricity and lewdness, a school of sodomy…”\(^\text{330}\) Especially after the League took form (in 1585), there was a concerted effort to attack royal *mignons*.\(^\text{331}\) Not surprisingly, the evil-counselor trope that was so pervasive in English Catholic writings at the time, was put to French use in the 1580s. Jean Boucher, the impetuous fire-breathing preacher of the Parisian League famously wrote a history of Edward II’s favorite Piers Gaveston in which he made a direct comparison between the much-maligned medieval courtier and

---

\(^{329}\) *Les trois livres* (Strasbourg), n.f.


\(^{331}\) On the *mignon* see Nicholas le Roux, *Mignons et courtisans au temps des derniers Valois* (Seyssel: Champ Villon, 2000).
Henri’s favorite, Épernon.332 Just two years prior to the French translations of Sander’s history, a French version of *Leicester’s Commonwealth* appeared. As Catherine Gibbons has suggested both in its direct translation, and especially in its various French additions, the book had “strong resonances with the developing program of the League.”333

The *Trois Livres* as a whole and, as I.T.A.C. suggested, the section devoted to Edwardian (pseudo)rule in particular, provided plenty of evidence for the corrosive influence of evil counselors. Somerset, as we have already seen, was thought the vehicle of heresy’s spread. But more than the Lord Protector, the machinations of John Dudley might have raised French eyebrows. In a sense, this part of *De origine* provided something of a prequel to *Leicester’s Commonwealth*. As we saw earlier, Dudley -- Leicester’s father-- master-minded the usurpation of protectoral power and planned (like his son) to take royal power itself. He showed his rebellious nature when he headed Jane Seymour’s efforts against Mary Tudor. One can very easily imagine that in such English schemes French readers could see reflected a little bit of their own reality. From a Catholic point of view Henri was (in part) victim of the bad influence of his useless advisors, and worse, he was victim of the seditious activities of hypocritical Huguenots who claimed loyalty even as they eroded monarchical power.

As much as Sander’s narrative served to exploit certain ligueur preoccupations, French and English history weren’t completely interchangeable. After all, French Catholics were still fighting to maintain the true faith while England had already yielded to heresy. Thus while the *Trois livres* might very well offer an implicit attack of France’s

maleficent forces, it was, as we have already noted, primarily a *warning* of what the French body politic would look like if its rotten members were not amputated. This, in the end, was the primary function of telling the story of Elizabeth’s reign. According to I.T.A.C., the *Trois livres* revealed the Queen’s destruction of the Mass, her abuse of Catholics, and how after Edward trammeled the true faith, she “completely uprooted it” (*Elizabeth l’a de tout deplantee*). Recent martyrdoms and anti-Catholic laws painted a bleak picture of what might happen to the faithful should Henri not put his support firmly behind Catholic forces and should Navarre ultimately succeed. Implicit in the Sanderian narrative are the sorts of warnings d’Orleans had raised just a year earlier:

> Turn your eyes toward our England….you will see how they [heretics] have treated us, having promised to protect us [*sous promesse de nous conserver*]….You will not find there any evidence that Jesus Christ and his religion had been there before. Our poor Zion has been violated: the Babylonians have prostituted it, the Temples are polluted, its walls destroyed, and at present she sighs captive under the Tyranny of the Antichrist. We are slaves under one Elizabeth, a hundred times worse that Jezebel.  

Just like *De origine*, its French counterpart castigated lassitude. I.T.A.C. resorted to a common trope in Counter-Reformation polemics which warned the faithful about giving even an inch to heretics. To some, Henry VIII’s initial move away from Rome “seemed a little thing and almost of no importance….” Many thought that the Henrician establishment was fine because the king only asked his subjects to rid themselves of the Pope and to deny him as “chief sovereign of the Catholic Church under Jesus Christ.” Of course, the translator was quick to reject such assumptions. In fact, he claimed, failing to

---

334 *Les trois livres* (Strasbourg), n.f.  
335 D’Orleans, *Advertissement* , pp. 95-96.
recognize papal authority was the “principal source and origin of heresies.”336 By arguing thus, the translator intimated the papalist hue of the whole book, and also confirmed a Catholic truism that heresy could only lead to progressive decline. As one near-contemporary put it, though heresy’s disease might have seemed “curable at the first in the continuance of time the infection did spread.”337

I.T.A.C.’s warning was directed at dissimulators of all stripes. The worst were the teeming hordes of politiques who had recently gained influence in France. Commenting again on Edward’s faulty advisors, the translator showed particular dislike of those who remained “neutral” in the battle over heresy. To underscore the sentiment, he included a poem by one M. de Billy, abbot of St. Michel en Her, in which special hate is expressed for those who cloak their irreligion “under the honest mantle of being sage politiques” (Cachans du Dieu vivant un horrible mesprit/Soubz l’honnest manteau de sages Politiques).338 De origine was, as argued above, essentially a tract against this very sort of man who used heresy to achieve worldly gain, the sort of man who subverted Catholicism in the name of politics.

But even those who weren’t perpetrators of some Machiavellian scheme were also subject of opprobrium in Sander’s eyes. In England, as in France, Protestant successes were thought to follow from Catholic tactical errors. D’Orleans, through his interlocutor showed that, like the French in 1586, the English had been negligent of interior affairs while fighting wars abroad.339 More importantly, he claimed Protestantism

336 Les trois livres (Strasbourg), sig. à3v.
338 Les trois livres (Strasbourg), sig. à4v.
found its way into England because the population, much as in France, was “too asleep” (*trop dormy*). As in England, France was plagued by lethargy. According to Catholic zealots, French perils were caused by insufficient rigor on the battle-field, useless efforts to negotiate with the enemy (the Colloquy of Poissy was prime evidence of irenic stupidity), and a general strategy of appeasement. English history bore out the fruits of such an approach. Efforts to reason with heretical kings only led to more heresy, disputations with the enemy were always shown to be rigged and futile, laxity only led to hardened oppression.

As we have seen, Sander and his editors were not shy about criticizing Catholic leaders. Parish priests, bishops, and even the Pope himself had sometimes proved disappointing. D’Orleans made a direct comparison between inept English and French clerics. He argued that in England “the prelates of the church, the sentry of the army of Jesus Christ, were all asleep….” Bishops were little more than princely lackeys (*servoient aux Princes de laquais*). We can assume that stories of lackadaisical clergymen (and worse) in England must have resonated among *ligueurs* who were increasingly drawing stricter boundaries between true believers and abettors of Huguenot evils.

If we take a step back, we can see that while the *Trois livres* played a *ligueur* game well enough, it also served broader English Catholic strategic needs. On the one hand English exiles were happy to help Catholics anywhere against the threat of Protestantism, but we must also assume that they shared Spain’s interest in stoking flames of French unrest. Henri III proved increasingly untrustworthy, and amidst plans to

---

340 Ibid., p. 29.
341 Ibid., p. 13.
conquer England, Philip II offered support to the League as a way to ensure Huguenots and the French crown would not interfere either in the Netherlands or with the Armada itself. Although English Catholics surely supported French Catholics because they shared a common world-view, they also knew support for radical French activities killed two birds with one stone. Spanish Elizabethans fought both hated Huguenots and cleared a path for England’s spiritual re-birth as well.

English Catholic/League/Spanish polemics coalesced --if momentarily--after the signing of the Treaty of Joinville in 1584. Through this agreement, Philip and the Guise vowed to impede the ascendance of a heretical king, promised mutual support in defending the true faith, and, more specifically, to stamp out Dutch and French Protestantism. Increasingly, anti-League polemics (which were quickly translated into English by Elizabeth’s government) became, in effect, anti-Spanish polemics. They harped on Philip’s imperial lust and his unremitting cruelty. Ligueur propaganda, tied as it was (momentarily) to Spanish aims and goals, responded in kind. D’Orleans, for one, spurned all Huguenots efforts to slander the Guise, the Pope, and, of course, Philip. He argued a Protestant anti-Spanish animus betrayed heretical corruption-- the damned maligned those whose virtue was unsurpassed and unquestionable. D’Orleans created a set of inversions between Spain and the Huguenots, not unlike Allen and Persons had done between England and Spain: “The Spanish are Catholics, Huguenots are heretics. The Spanish have never betrayed Jesus Christ and the Huguenots have crucified him, and

342 For such an interpretation see Jensen, Diplomacy and Dogmatism.
344 D’Orleans, Advertissement, p. 43.
crucify him further every day…The Spanish are good subjects; the Huguenots are rebels. The Spanish conserve Spain’s honor and the Huguenots have betrayed and sold the honor of France. The Spanish make cities subject to the King, and the Huguenots try to take them [cities] from their king.” Rebutting accusations of Inquisitorial cruelty, the author lauds Spanish efforts to restore law and order in the Netherlands. In fact, Spanish rigor there was preferable to French complacency because it produced results.345

Within such a discursive context, Allen and Persons’ defense of Philip in the 1586 De origine as reproduced in the Trois livres seems very relevant to ligueur affairs. Allen and Persons’ emphasis on Spanish clemency, piety, and successes in the Netherlands versus England’s hypocrisy and corruption was useful propaganda for the League’s benefactor and (theoretical) partner at arms.

Underscoring English malfeasance in the Netherlands also shed light on the dangers of allying with Elizabeth. This seemed a real threat during 1587 when Henri, as mentioned above, was in earnest talks with his English counterpart. De origine, and by extension the Trois livres, showed that Elizabeth was the source of French troubles, and the paymaster of Huguenot revolt. Moreover, the reader could interpret the story of England’s efforts in the Netherlands as a story of French betrayal. After all, Elizabeth had been behind the folly of the duke of Anjou’s last days. The queen, through “abuse, pernicious lies, and promises” had coaxed the prince to meddle in Dutch affairs. Anjou, lived to regret his actions, though not to mend his ways.346 With his death--after ignominious failure in the Netherlands--the specter of Navarre’s heretical succession

345 Ibid., pp. 124-131.
346 Les trois livres (Strasbourg), 261v.
began to materialize. D’Orleans (through his English speaker) suggests Anjou’s death put France on the edge of disaster.347

According to *De origine* Elizabeth tried to coax Henri III himself. With notable ambivalence the authors suggest that because he was busy with internal affairs, or because he thought it improper for a Christian king, or because he knew well how Elizabeth had duped previous princes, the king would not cooperate. That he hadn’t fallen to Elizabeth’s wiles was something commendable. In 1587, Catholics hoped he would be prudent enough to reject the English Jezebel yet again.

The preceding pages reveal just one textual episode--and perhaps not the most important one--amidst many which show the intermixing of Anglo-French discourses. That Sander’s history, divisive as it was, and crude as it was in depicting the ravages of heresy, should be propagated in a war-torn France makes plenty of sense for the reasons sketched above. But violent religious conflict was not the necessary backdrop for *De origine*’s vernacular success. Across the Pyrenees Sander’s narrative would soon make its first appearance in Spanish. Like its French counterpart, it too was written with bellicose intentions, paving the way for the upcoming Armada. But *De origine*’s Spanish iteration shared other, more profound parallels with its French translations. As we shall see, although Spain never faced a serious protestant threat, the perceived fragility of Catholic orthodoxy and the ever-present fear of heretics created a context in which English history could be used as a potent tool to warn Spaniards of looming dangers.

---

Spain

Reading Christóbal Acosta’s *Tratado en loor de las mujeres* -- a book on female virtues-- at least one early modern reader’s thoughts may have wandered toward Elizabeth. In an effusive dedication to Catherine of Austria, Acosta made note of the many women who have had the onus of political leadership, of “making war and peace.” The statement inspired a hasty marginal note from a sixteenth century hand: “en Guerra si, y en paz no” (in war yes, and in peace no). It was a sardonic scribble betraying an instinctive wariness of female rule, sentiments likely compounded for our reader as he (perhaps) reflected on Spain’s long battle against England and its queen. Sixteenth century Europe witnessed many powerful women, but Elizabeth towered over most because of her long reign and the audacity of her foreign policy. The image of Elizabeth as Jezebel was deeply set in the Spanish mind, evoking the worst kind of feminine inconstancy-- to many she was, as the poet Luis de Góngora put it, less a queen than a “wild libidinous wolf.”

For historians, the worn tropes, turgid prose, and predictability of anti-Elizabethan works written in Spain can be wearisome. The scholar’s eye can easily glaze over, falling prey to boredom and the sense of futility that comes with laboring through texts re-confirming long-established truisms about Anglo-Spanish mutual disdain. But, on occasion, even unoriginal works prove revealing. Case in point: Pedro de Ribadeneyra’s *Historia ecclesiastica del scisma del reyno de Inglaterra*, a bilious book, lacking in charm,

---

349 Ibid., 1v.
but burning with fervor. In its pages—if we look beyond predictable vitriol—we find a prism through which to observe how the anti-Elizabethan message peddled by English exiles was absorbed into a Spanish landscape. The book was part and parcel of the Spanish Elizabethan project, but in its transmission via a Spanish hand, English woes attained new resonances feeding off of, and in turn helping to feed, the trepidations born of an uneasy fin-de-siècle moment.

****

When Ribadeneyra set sail from Flanders to England in 1558, he did so grudgingly at the insistence of the Count of Feria, Philip II’s envoy in London. He could not refuse a man who had done so much for religion’s sake,351 nor could he neglect a pious double mission to help restore Queen Mary’s health and introduce the Society of Jesus into Britain. The short voyage across the Channel seems to have been a routine affair, but its aftermath miserable. Despite good intentions neither goal was achieved, and nearly fifty years later, in his Confessions, the septuagenarian recalled only one positive outcome of his trip: he managed to get out alive. The dank, chilled London air must have exacerbated a “chest ailment” (enfermedad de pecho) he overcame only by God’s grace.352 Tellingly, though his spiritual autobiography was punctuated by praise for God’s infinite mercy, the account of his English voyage was marked by a mixture of resignation and profound disappointment. It was God’s will, Ribadeneyra sighed, that Mary should die shortly after his arrival “…and that Elizabeth… should succeed her, and

that matters concerning our holy faith should alter and change as punishment for that
kingdom that today still feels and mourns its affliction.”

Despite this harsh reality, Ribadeneyra’s commitment to the English Catholic
cause never wavered. He stayed in contact with leading figures like Sander and insisted
on staying abreast of English matters, pestering confreres such as Persons for news. Ribadeneyra and Persons unsurprisingly became close collaborators during the latter’s
Spanish sojourn, in large part because of their mutual belief in print and its powers to
achieve the re-Catholization of England. Indeed, the Spaniard used books more than most
of his fellow countrymen to advocate for action against Elizabeth, writing two separate
histories of the English schism: the Historia ecclesiastica del scisma del reyno de
Inglaterra in 1588, followed in 1594 by the Segunda parte de la historia ecclesiastica del
scisma de Inglaterra which itself was later translated into Latin and appended to a re-
edition of Sander’s De origine in 1610.

The 1588 Scisma is by far the most important and influential of these projects,
and as such deserves special attention. The book became a standard source for
Catholics interested in English affairs and helped establish Ribadeneyra as, in Quevedo’s

---

354 For a report sent by Parsons to Ribadeneyra see Hicks, ed., Letters and Memorials, pp. 227-235. Persons to Ribadeneyra, Paris, 10 September 1584; In a letter to Agazzari soon after the prior letter cited here, Persons notes that “Havendomi fatto instanza il buon P. Ribadeneira...gli scrissi…” Ibid., p. 244. Parsons to Agazzari, Paris, 15 September 1584.
355 Editions used here: Ribadeneyra, Historia ecclesiastica del scisma del reyno de Inglaterra (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1588); Ibid., Segunda parte de la historia ecclesiastica del scisma de Inglaterra (Lisbon: Manoel de Lyra, 1594); Nicolae Sanderi Angli Doct. Theol. De Origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani libri tres (Cologne: Petri Henningi, 1610).
eulogistic phrase, a Spanish Livy. Contemporaries such as court historian Antonio de Herrera insisted the book was a model ecclesiastical history, the famed Dominican, Fray Luis de Granada, avowed parts of it moved him to tears, and according to an early seventeenth century account, anyone who read it, “even oidores and other well-known personalities,” said “a thousand good things” about it. Positive reception aside, the *Scisma* stands out as a document of particular import for its role in launching the “Grand Armada” of 1588. Its simultaneous printing across the Iberian Peninsula and in Antwerp strongly suggests the Spanish crown helped finance the work, making it the most substantial piece of printed propaganda in support of Philip’s mighty fleet.

We know for certain that sometime in 1586 or 1587, Ribadeneyra leafed through the Roman *De origine* and decided “it should be read by all.” Drake’s attack of Cádiz solidified this belief. We know from correspondence written during August 1587 that such English vandalism weighed heavily on the Jesuit’s mind and spurred him to put the finishing touches on his translation. The product was a text that followed Sander, Allen, and Persons’ version of Henry VIII’s reign closely, with substantial additions thereafter, particularly in the re-telling of Mary Tudor and Elizabeth’s reigns.

---

357 Antonio de Herrera, *Historia de lo sucedido en Escocia e Inglaterra en quarenta y cuatro años que vivió María Estuarda, Reyna de Escocia* (Lisboa: Manuel de Lyra, 1590), 3v.
360 For a list of 1588 editions printed see Robinson and Rogers, *Contemporary Printed Literature*, vol. I, pp. 138-139.
361 Ribadeneyra, *Scisma*, 1v.
Cardinal Allen heartily approved of the *Scisma* and championed the work, even amidst controversies in Spain and Rome. The Jesuit General, Claudio Acquaviva—without whose approval books written by members of the order could not be printed—harbored serious misgivings. Was there real need for a new history on recent English affairs? Perhaps, he suggested, it would be better to publish a new edition, in Spanish, of the Latin original; Sander’s book, after all, had the advantage of being “very accurate, and has been very well received, and it would be better to promote it by making it more readily available…” With time, concerns only increased. After further review, Acquaviva thought even a translation of Sander’s work unnecessary since its content was not appropriate “to be going around in the vulgar tongue.”

Lacking any more explicit comments, we can only imagine what critics were concerned about. On the one hand, they likely wanted to limit the exposure of simple folk to the ways of English heretics as it was widely believed vulgar audiences could be infected by reports of heretical activities. Jesuits must have also been concerned about the effects of such a book on the order itself. Scarcely four decades into their existence the Society of Jesus’ detractors portrayed them as a troupe of scheming Machiavellians. Not surprisingly many, including Acquaviva, were hesitant about using print for what might be construed as “secular” ends. He believed “things touching affairs of states or kingdoms,” were often best avoided because they “offend and are of little use.”

---

365 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Toletum 3, fol. 115v. Acquaviva to Ribadeneyra, Rome, 6 October 1587.
367 Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Toletum 3, fol. 111r. Acquaviva to Porres, 8 September 1587.
doubt Acquaviva and other Jesuits were deeply involved in early modern politics and were often vicious polemicists, but such activities were to be undertaken prudently. The questions surrounding the *Scisma* hinged on—as so often with books on English affairs—whether or not the benefits of the book outweighed the risks posed were enemies to read it.

Lingering trepidation must have seemed wrong-headed to men like Ribadeneyra, Allen, and Persons. For them, with Spain and England at the cusp of war, making an account of English affairs broadly available was imperative. It was a necessary tool for galvanizing wide support for a complicated, international endeavor. Having Ribadeneyra as a spokesperson was likely thought a boon for the English Catholic cause. Though often controversial, he was an esteemed priest and a well-respected man of letters who had in previous years been given the sensitive task of writing an official life of his mentor, Ignatius of Loyola. Flowing from his pen, a Spanish Elizabethan discourse which had long remained the purview of marginal exiles was rendered more current, and perhaps even more mainstream. With the *Scisma*, English history (in its Catholic guise) was no longer the exclusive domain of a deceased radical.

Despite its noted author, there is something rag-tag about the *Scisma*. A pastiche of different texts, for modern tastes it might lack narrative balance. Still, it was written by an impassioned man, and his care for the text may have extended to an interest in assuring proper handling by its printers. This, however, may have been an unattainable

---

desire. Considering the book’s multiple printings across Europe, Ribadeneyra wouldn’t have been fully apprised of most print runs. At the very least, however, we can assume he was involved in the Scisma’s first Madrid edition by Pedro Madrigal. Madrigal had only been in the capital city for two years then, but had already achieved some renown, particularly for his production of legal and theological works. The Scisma was the first collaboration between the two Pedros, and judging from frequent collaborations thereafter, they were both quite satisfied.369

We can imagine both men, amidst wafts of inky air, mulling over an image. Perhaps it was a stock engraving in Madrigal’s workshop; perhaps it was merely a mental image not yet executed of a biblical moment. It was an image one of them--perhaps both of them--thought should be affixed to the history of English demise.

After pages of prefatory material--official approbations, a dedication, and note to the reader--anyone holding Madrigal’s 1588 Scisma would have stopped to inspect the hard lines of a small woodcut. They would have seen a boat with sails drawn, stuffed with men who had just cast a fishing-net into the sea. In the middle-ground, a bearded man seems to have jumped overboard, he runs toward the shore, his body half immersed in water, his arms outstretched, his mouth agape, his eyes showing a mix of melancholy and ecstasy. The wading man is reaching for another standing on terra firme in the foreground, his bearded face is inscrutable, but the hatch marks radiating from his head suggest divine light. His right arm is extended in an inviting, paternal gesture. This man is Jesus; the man clamoring toward him is Peter. The image has no gloss; perhaps none was needed. Anyone privy to the visual rhetoric of the times could have deciphered it.

The picture depicts events found in the Gospels. In John 21 Jesus appears to the apostles at sea, after his resurrection. The group had gone fishing, with little success. Jesus appeared to them, though they, at first, did not recognize him. He tells them to cast their nets and soon fish abound. John soon recognized Jesus, but it was Peter who leapt into the water running toward him.

On first sight, the clamoring Peter intimates the sort of excited devotion that could serve as a pious exemplum. But the evocation of this particular Gospel passage meant much more to the knowing viewer. The evocation of John may have led some—as the Jesuit Jeronimo Nadal once suggested when discussing an image remarkably similar to the one found in the *Scisma*—to think about the Church. To Nadal the fish being netted in the story were allusions to man, the sea represented the world, and the boat signified the Church. By casting the net at Jesus’s command, the apostles (and their descendants in the priesthood) carried out God’s will so that they might save man from the evils of the world.370 As presented in the *Scisma*, however, the real story was not about fish and fishermen, but about the one man who leapt out: Peter. Catholic readers would have understood this specific moment as the editors of the Douay-Rheims Bible did: “Peter’s PRIMACIE is here signified.” Of course the viewer need not have been prisoner to the static instant portrayed in the picture. He could have also though about subsequent events in John 21 which culminated in a poignant exchange between Peter and Jesus. Jesus asks Peter three times: “lovest thou me?” Peter answers in the affirmative, and Jesus instructs him to “Feed my sheep.” The exchange was often cited by supporters of Papal supremacy, believing, again as the editors of the Douay-Rheims bible put it, that the

---

incident was a fulfillment of the promise made in Matthew 16, “that the church should be builded upon him (Peter).”\textsuperscript{371} As Nadal suggested, the Gospel definitively shows how Jesus made Peter “Shepherd of his sheep and vicar of his Church.”\textsuperscript{372}

Were Ribadeneyra’s book intended for an English audience, one could read the image as a polemical move against Elizabeth. But the book was meant for Spanish-speaking audiences for whom papal authority was not, in its most basic form, a source of controversy. The image was thus less polemic, and more affirmation of a Catholic understanding of the history of the Church. It rendered visible the relationship between Christ, Peter, and Peter’s descendants. It showed the Catholic Church, as an institution built upon Peter, emerging from waters, enjoying Christ’s bounty. The image was a visual reminder of what was being challenged by heretics and what Catholics were to defend.

The *Scisma* was an open war cry. As such, however, it was not necessarily a defense of specifically Spanish interests. The issue at hand had little to do with the Habsburgs, and more to do with the institutions and traditions embodied by Jesus and Peter at sea. There are thus few traces of the pro-Philip polemics. Unlike the 1586 *De origine* with its final pages serving as response to the Cecil’s *Declaration*, the *Scisma* makes only vague allusions to “silly books” written in defense of the Dutch: details are passed over, and no counter is offered. Even English foreign policy, so detrimental to Spanish interests, was mentioned only to show Elizabeth assisted the growth of other heretical churches across Europe.\textsuperscript{373}

\textsuperscript{372} Nadal, *Adnotationes*, p. 429.
\textsuperscript{373} Ribadeneyra’s reproach of secular concerns was selective. Around the time his history was being printed, he also wrote the *Exhortación para los soldados y capitanes que van a esta jornada de Inglaterra*,
Ribadeneyra makes his objective quite clear: he wanted to “awaken in our hearts a zeal for the honor of our Lord, and for the well-being of England.”

Who, he asked, referring to Elizabeth, “would not do away with such a barbarous tyrant?” If Philip was once a direct witness (along with Mary) of the momentary re-birth of Catholicism in England, why not try to reclaim what was once won? English heresy posed a threat to all of Christendom, its “poison and infection might spill and spread throughout the world.” What better way to thank the Lord “for the mercy done unto us in conserving these kingdoms [of Spain] in our holy Catholic faith” than by converting or destroying heretics? It would be of no less glory “for Spain to throw the Devil out of England, than it

---

en nombre de su capitán general. (Document can be found in MHSI Ribadeneira, vol. II, pp. 347-360). This manuscript was first sent to Anna de Guzmán in 1588 together with a letter asking that it be forwarded to her husband, the duke of Medina Sidonia, commander of the Armada. The text was at first intended to be, as Ribadeneyra himself asserted, a proper conclusion to the Scisma, though he ultimately decided it should never be published, and that his authorship should remain secret. He thought it would be inappropriate for the arguments contained therein to “pass through too many hands.” (MHSI Ribadeneira, vol. II, p. 93) Although the Exhortación and the Scisma share a common interest in encouraging the polemical tools at his disposal and allowing us to better understand the author’s strategic decisions in writing his history.

Since the Exhortación rehearses many of the basic points found in the Scisma, one can only conclude Ribadeneyra’s discomfort had to do with those parts of the manuscript dealing with political and economic considerations, issues glaringly left out of his book. In both texts the Jesuit maintained the primary objective of any Spanish expedition was to reverse Henry’s schism and save those Catholics savagely oppressed by Elizabeth. Of secondary, but very real importance, however, was Spanish reputación which had been tarnished by Elizabeth’s continued assistance of the Dutch rebellion, and by recent attacks led by Drake in Cádiz and in the Atlantic. More important than burnt ships and stolen treasure, Ribadeneyra was concerned about Spain’s image being sullied and its potential weaknesses exposed. This was troubling because, as he put it, “the world is governed more by opinion than by war” (p. 358).

There were other pragmatic political and economic concerns. Philip was the most powerful Christian king ever and his realms were generally at peace, except of course, in the Netherlands. The only way to end this problem was to attack its root which was found in England. An end to the Dutch revolt was necessary, not just because peace was the imperative of all good monarchs, but because the war was draining Philip’s coffers and his subjects had to pay the price (pp. 359-362). Along similar lines, Spanish financial woes were only exacerbated by English-backed efforts to disrupt the flow of money into Spain from the New World, money that was, Ribadeneyra emphasized, the “nourishment and life of these kingdoms” (p.362). The Exhortación was a call to arms aimed at political beasts and men of war for whom the logic of the coffer and that of Spanish honor would be particularly appealing.

374 Ribadeneyra, Scisma, 371v.
375 Ibid., 372r.
376 Ibid., 371v.
was to have gotten rid of him in the Indies.”³⁷⁷ The kind of activism Ribadeneyra calls for is two-fold. First, he compelled readers to pray--to God, the saints, the virgin--for divine pity on England, for the consolation of English Catholics, and so that tyranny and heresy might be decimated.³⁷⁸ The reader was also urged to give up his life, and possessions, taking it as “God’s mercy (as it truly is) to spill blood for his sacred faith.”³⁷⁹

Ribadeneyra also offered a warning. Efforts against England should not be motivated by a quest “for temporal quietude, or so that our seas might not be infested, nor our Armadas be robbed by English corsairs… but so that our lord might be honored, and his Holy church might prosper.”³⁸⁰

This push for war against the infidel falls easily within a literary tradition proffering Spain’s role as the champion of orthodoxy and the promulgator of the true faith, be it to ignorant Indians, sinful moors, or that heretical queen across the Channel.³⁸¹ But Ribadeneyra’s is not merely an affirmation of some sort of inherent Spanish greatness, it is an exhortation to live up to Spain’s potential and earn God’s grace. By warning against “temporal” interests that might stain potentially pious efforts Ribadneyra reveals his fear that the Armada --as he would expound openly after 1588³⁸²-- was in fact less of a spiritual campaign than a carnal one, that the imperatives of the secular and the spiritual had not been reconciled.

Reconciling both realms was a fundamental objective of the Scísma, one that began before pen was set to paper. While reading De origine Ribadeneyra was struck by

---

³⁷⁷ Ibid., 372v.
³⁷⁸ Ibid., 173v.
³⁷⁹ Ibid., 374r.
³⁸⁰ Ibid., 374r.
³⁸² Memorial printed in Rey, ed., Historia de la contrarreforma, p. 1352.
both its worldly story about kings and queens, and its religious one about “one of the most horrible and roughest tempests that the Catholic Church has suffered in any kingdom.” Although both narrative strands were edifying, only the latter, he suggested, was of true import, and it was the latter he would choose to exploit in his work. Ribadeneyra insisted his book was (as the title emphasizes) an historia ecclesiastica, but one with a political narrative left in to show, invoking a Ciceronian commonplace, what “one should flee, and what one should do.” Or so Ribadeneyra argued amidst solicitous justifications for writing about the “abominable examples of evil men.” If in the Bible, the Holy Spirit provided stories of Abraham’s obedience, Isaac’s sincerity, Joseph’s chastity, and David’s trust and devotion, it also spoke about David’s adultery, Samson’s weakness, and “innumerable examples of cruel kings, and most pestilent tyrants…” In a later edition of the Scisma the point was re-emphasized by printing a letter from Fray Luis de Granada which compared the book to other “sacred histories where… the misdeeds of bad kings are told, as well as the troubles of the faith, as in the time of Manassas and Zedekiah and in the first books of Maccabees.” Political matters—even the nastiest of them—were not harmful if put to good use. The Scisma’s narrative is representative of its author’s efforts to put even sordid political events to the service of the Church. The book tries to balance the political and religious, emphasizing the necessarily spiritual ends of any secular state.

---

383 Ibid., 1v-2r.
384 Ribadeneyra, Scisma, 367v.
385 Ibid., 368v.
Ribadeneyra was, above all, a writer of lives\textsuperscript{387} -- his own life, lives of confreres and friends of the Society of Jesus, and perhaps most famously, a learned compendium of saints lives, the *Flos sanctorum*. His own arduous research and contemplation turned him into one among many contemporaries alive to the dangers of writing about the holy. He proclaimed himself enemy of fabulous accretions which clung to noted lives and was most derisive of those who wasted time perpetuating lies, “as if God needed them,” as if God needed “false miracles.”\textsuperscript{388} This is a reflection of Counter-Reformation sensibilities intertwined with humanistic rigor. Catholics imbued with reforming zeal believed lives of holy men and women (miracles and all) should be written, but only by those with the philological and historical tools necessary to do so responsibly.\textsuperscript{389}

More difficult than writing accounts of far-off and sparsely documented events and personages, was writing books about men and women who had not yet passed into the realm of history. Ribadeneyra was hostile toward the many false prophets (particularly women) who seemed to mushroom across the Catholic world.\textsuperscript{390} It was, he insisted, difficult --if not impossible--to discern wheat from chaff among so-called “living saints.”

Martyrs who had proven their worth through spilt blood were, however, another matter. There were no more exemplary lives than those recently executed by the Elizabethan regime, most notably, as we have already seen, Campion and others involved

\textsuperscript{388} Pedro de Ribadeneyra, *Obras* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1595), 3v.
\textsuperscript{390} See comments along these lines in Ribadeneyra, *Tratado de Tribulación* (Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1589), 209r-229r
in the 1580 mission to England. Their stories had become well known on the Continent, mainly due to the efforts of Allen and Persons who, through epistolary campaigns and printed books sought to emblazon their memories and attack Elizabeth. Notably, however, beyond a basic sketch, *De origine* did not dwell too much on these recent events. Perhaps the plethora of other reports circulating made a fuller account unnecessary. Ribadeneyra, however, thought differently. Apart from incorporating much of *De origine*’s martyrilogical elements he went much further in describing recent executions. In doing so he said nothing original, but borrowed freely from Persons’ *De persecutione Anglicana* and other similar texts. While French and Italian accounts of English martyrdoms could be found, during the 1580s there seem to have been few such printed works in Spanish, save for occasional pieces like account of Carthusian monks killed under Henry VIII.\(^{391}\) Clearly, Ribadeneyra wanted to fill this void.

Catholic blood was a potent tool for “selling” the English Catholic cause. When students at the English College in Rome went on procession throughout the city, they often carried around little books telling of their martyrs, handing them out *gratis* to clamoring crowds. In Spain, as we shall see below, efforts to raise money for an English College in Valladolid were accompanied by a mini-print campaign highlighting those who died for the faith. Early in the seventeenth century during another fundraising campaign for English seminarians in Seville, a printed loose-sheet made its case simply: “He who helps these seminaries sustains martyrs…”\(^{392}\) Martyrs proved the English cause’s righteousness, and its place in a long tradition of Christian suffering. As

\(^{391}\) Cristobal Tanariz, *Historia de los sanctos martires de Cartuxa que padecieron en Londres* (Seville: Alonso de Barreras, 1584).

\(^{392}\) *Breve Proposicion de algunos de los motives que ay para favorecer los seminarios Ingleses, y en particular este de San Gregorio de Sevilla* (n.p., n.d). Sheet found in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Fondo Gesúfico 786.
Catholics avidly unearthed their history “beneath the cross” from archeological remains in Roman catacombs and anywhere else Christian blood had been shed, they also read stories of moderns who followed similar ancient trails. Witnesses—both those who actually saw blood flow, and those who only perceived martyrdom through its literary or graphic representation—were often viscerally affected. Ribadeneyra no doubt hoped he could evoke a sort of pious pity which would be turned into activism. Campion, drawn and quartered, should cause tears that would lead to charity, actual fighting, or prayer. To this end, the Scisma seems to have had some success. Writing to Rome, a papal nuncio assured that, as it had done in Spain, the Scisma “will inspire great compassion for the poor Catholics of England, and a deep desire to punish that horrible Queen.”

Contemplating the lives of holy men could have profoundly transformative effects. More than the perpetuation of antique traditions, the memories of saints and martyrs were imbued with a mysterious, vivacious energy. They taught man “more through acts than through words.” They inspired the ambivalent and even the hostile to follow the true faith. Ribadeneyra was keenly aware that his beloved mentor, Ignatius of Loyola, was once a man lost in worldly things. For him saints lives had once been little more than entertainment as he lay bed-ridden nursing his shattered leg. Despite this initially superficial outlook, the fortitude of saints and their suffering sparked profound spiritual enlightenment which turned wounded soldier into man of God. Could Campion’s death help illuminate other lives? Ribadeneyra hoped so. Through righteous death Campion overcame “all the miseries of this fragile and mortal body, now enjoying

393 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Vatican City, Segretaria di Stato, Spagna 34, Apostolic Nuncio to Cardinal Montalto, Madrid, 6 July 1588.
394 For comments along these lines see Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Flos sanctorum de las vidas de los santos (Barcelona: Juan Piferrer, 1734), sig. ¶ 2v.
the triumphal crown of his fortunate confession.” His travail was to make true faith intelligible to the reader.\textsuperscript{395}

Exemplary lives could be found outside the clerical estate. Of notable ones at the end of the sixteenth century, few were more notable than Mary Stuart’s. Because she was executed a year after De origine’s Roman edition, Allen and Persons did not give her the climactic role she would attain in the Scisma. Surprisingly, the French versions of 1587 didn’t either. Considering that many accounts of the event were already available in France, it may have been thought unnecessary.

Mary’s death, even more than her life, was able to bring Catholic Europe together in a euphonic chorus of outrage and condemnation. The eerily static image shown in Richard Verstegan’s Theatrum crudelitatum of the queen center stage at her execution--resolutely holding on to the final vestiges of her royal dignity, awaiting the hovering axe--proliferated throughout Europe, as did the accompanying gloss attacking Elizabeth, and calling for revenge.\textsuperscript{396} Retelling the story (based on the many contemporary reports), Ribadeneyra described the insidiousness of the Elizabethan regime motivated as it was by fear of what would occur to heresy (not to mention individual heretics) were Mary to become queen of England. Elizabeth and her courtiers retained the frightful memory of what happened to religious deviants during the rule of that other Mary--Mary Tudor.\textsuperscript{397} More than an attack on Elizabeth, however, Ribadeneyra’s narrative--including several letters written by the Queen of Scots--showed the imprisoned queen’s willingness “to die

\textsuperscript{395} Ribadeneyra, Scisma, 294v-295r.
\textsuperscript{396} Richard Verstegan, Theatrum crudelitatum haereticorum nostri temporis (Antwerp: Adrianum Huberti, 1587), pp. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{397} Ribadeneyra, Scisma, 336v
for the Catholic faith.”  The author describes Mary’s repudiation of all things worldly. She set aside her noble lineage, her beauty, her power, her servants, her armies, her people, and gladly accepted an unjust fate. She knew, he tells us, that “this world is but a comedy, and all those that live in it, even if they be kings, are players, and because she loved what was eternal, and desired what she loved, and was dying for the Catholic faith, she did not waver” as she stood before her executioner.

Thus, if English history provided plenty of fodder for those steadfast against female rule, the Scisma offered a corrective. Mary Stuart was part of a queenly triad which also included Catherine of Aragon and Mary Tudor; together they demonstrated that despite Elizabeth, England’s most pious monarchs during the sixteenth century had been women. As a Spaniard, Ribadeneyra took particular relish in lauding Catherine, claiming she represented all that was “honorable and good” about his nation. He added little to what had already been said in the 1586 De origine, it having sufficed to demonstrate her patient sufferance, and longing for martyrdom.

Of course, Catherine existed only in the realm of Ribadeneyra’s borrowed historical memory. Scarcely ten when she died, he most likely had little knowledge of her labors as they occurred. This was far from true regarding the two Marys. Although he never met the Scottish queen her plight was ever-present across Europe, and her death would have deeply affected him. It was only as he wrote about Mary Tudor, however, that English history could have acquired truly personal resonances, true flesh and bone.

By the time Ribadeneyra got to England in 1558 the stern, impenetrable demeanor that marks many portraits of the queen must have been wilting. Nevertheless, what he

---

398 Ibid., 340v.
399 Ibid., 351r.
400 Ibid., 9r.
saw or heard of her must have been impressive, and must help explain the sympathetic tone pervading his account of her reign. Ribadeneyra did not whitewash some of her blunders as presented in *De origine*, but along with these he added a lengthy encomium to her virtues. She is described as an ideal woman of “extreme purity, virginal honesty,” with a particularly fervent relationship to God. Unlike her father, she rejected a lascivious life, instead following a path of true devotion— from her mother’s womb she learned to detest anything redolent of courtly life. Following his Latin template, Ribadeneyra shows how she, like her mother (Catherine of Aragon), was devoted to the Eucharist and attended mass frequently, even when faced with the pressure to stray. Mary transcended any simple feminine stereotype. She was intelligent, resolute, and prudent; a model of temperance, piety, power, and resolve. The queen was noted for her clemency, but also for her moments of stern resolve: she was “very severe and rigorous in punishing those who acted against God, and against the Catholic faith.” Using common contemporary language for exceptional women, Ribadeneyra claimed “her voice was deep, more of a man than a woman.” Unlike Allen and Sander’s Mary who was criticized for lack of rigor, Ribadeneyra used Mary less as a cautionary for England’s potential saviors, than as an example of what virtue and decisiveness could achieve. Mary believed her cause was just and firmly rooted in God’s will, and she had “the spirit and valor to undertake and finish a task which, according to human prudence was very difficult.”

---

401 Ibid., 237r.
402 Ibid., 237v.
403 Ibid., 240r.
404 Ibid., 236r.
405 Ibid., 239v.
Such were the virtues of England’s three “good” queens, that the Scisma could be considered, according to the author, an “espejo de princesas,” a mirror of princesses. If reflections of virtue were dressed in feminine garb, however, its message was intended for a prince: the Infante, Philip. Positive exempla aside, the future king was also asked to gaze upon the effects of evil as a reminder that powerful rulers would be “powerfully tormented, if they do not do what they should.” The story of Henry’s reign was particularly useful for contemplation because through it Prince Philip might see how a king who had once “been just and valorous, and a great defender of the Catholic Church” later went on to “turn his back on God, transformed into a feral and cruel beast, and destroyed his whole kingdom.”

Philip II had not yet fallen into the gout-ridden recumbence that characterized much of his final years, but even as that annus mirabilis of 1588 unfolded many knew they were living at the dusk of his reign. The education of the young prince was thus doubly important, not only because he was successor to the crown, but because his call to duty was, if not imminent, at least not far off. The Scisma should be read as one of the first of many books during the last decade of Philip II’s reign meant to instruct the future monarch. Indeed, the book was in many ways a precursor to Ribadeneyra’s formal mirror of princes, the tremendously influential Tratado de la religion y virtudes del principe cristiano. The Scisma was the author’s first profound articulation of a mantra he would repeat throughout the rest of his life, that “republics, kingdoms, and states could

407 For a good overview of these advisory books see Ronald Truman, Spanish Treatises on Government, Society, and Religion in the Time of Philip II: The ‘de regimine principum’ and Associated Traditions (Leiden: Brill, 1999).
408 Pedro de Ribadeneyra, Tratado de la religion y virtudes del principe cristiano (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1595). This point has been made by some late nineteenth century scholars: Vincente de la Fuente, ed., Obras escogidas del Padre Pedro de Rivadeneira, p. 450 and Prat, Ribadeneyra, p. 585.
not be conserved without conserving their religion.”\textsuperscript{409} The \textit{Scisma}, like the \textit{Tratado}, insisted Christian morality must be the impetus of political action. Both books defended the primacy of spiritual matters in seemingly secular affairs and encouraged readers “not to dissimulate and be soft with heretics, nor to offer them help and liberty, thinking that in this way they might better conserve their states.”\textsuperscript{410} Such a message would have pleased the king\textsuperscript{411} and since the \textit{Scisma} articulated it well, the book quickly became required reading for Spanish princes. It would remain a favorite among Philip III’s books and would serve to educate his own son.\textsuperscript{412}

Despite its prominent place in royal libraries, however, there are ways in which Ribadeneyra’s book could be subject to interpretations less than flattering to its royal readers. As mentioned above, by providing a dichotomous analysis of recent English history—an analysis which provides clear contradistinction between its good and bad elements—the reader was offered a set of options, one leading to salvation, the other away from it. There was, however, no certainty that the right choice would be made. While it is hard to imagine Spain as anything other than the bastion of Catholic orthodoxy, for contemporaries living through violent religious changes, there was no such certainty. For men like Ribadeneyra at least, descent into the netherworld of heresy seemed a distinct possibility. He, according to a near-contemporary, shed “tears of blood” at the thought Spain might stray.\textsuperscript{413} The very existence of nearby Protestantism—in France, England, and elsewhere—augured (as mentioned above) a viral spread. Fears of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[410] Ibid., 5v.
\item[413] Quoted in Rodríguez, \textit{La gracia}, p. 304.
\end{footnotes}
its pestilence were only magnified by the knowledge that some (i.e. Elizabeth) were at the head of an international conspiracy to infect its neighbors. There was no pretence in the worried reports seeping into Iberia warning of English efforts to “introduce Lutheran heresy and schism….” 414
The threat was not only external. As Sander and his editors insisted, dwindling constancy, even among the well-meaning could (and did) elicit divine punishment. As in France, events in England provided a canvas not only for the image of corruption out there, across the Channel, but they provided a very real image of the rot setting in within Spanish Empire as well.

The story of England’s demise was, in its Iberian manifestations, a prophylactic. When pretender to the Portuguese throne, Antonio, prior do Crato and his English allies threatened the Iberian coast, pulpits in Portugal rang out with warnings of the evils that awaited any who fell prey to Elizabeth.415 When French heretics allied with Aragonese rebels against Philip, the king had his court chronicler, Antonio de Herrera, translate a long “sermon,” supposedly written by an English priest for a French audience warning of heresy’s inevitable road to tyranny (the above-mentioned Advertissement).416

These were alarmist tropes meant to deal with the immediate threat of war, but other writers had loftier intentions. Writing in 1592, Spanish cleric Fernando de Herrera used his biography of Thomas More as a vehicle to champion resistance against heretical tyrannies of all sorts, and to warn against priestly laxity and noble luxury. Herrera wanted More’s saintly life to serve as an example for those “who are used to admiring illicit

414 Biblioteca Palacio de Ajuda, Lisbon, Mss. 51-IX-15, fol. 513r.
415 See, for example, an “Oração de um ingles que anda com o arcebispo de Evora.” Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal, Lisbon, Mss. 29, no. 45.
416 Antonio de Herrera, Advertencias que los católicos de Inglaterra escrivieron a los católicos de Francia (Zaragoza: Lorenço Robles, 1592).
things” so they might understand that even the “empire of bad princes” has its great men.\textsuperscript{417} Such universal lessons about virtue and lack thereof were significant, especially in the closing years of Philip II’s reign.

Philip never lacked critics,\textsuperscript{418} and Ribadeneyra could occasionally be numbered among them. During another build-up to war--the conquest of Portugal--the Jesuit raised his voice, not against the enemy, but against Spanish aggression. Along with St. Teresa of Avila and other such luminaries, he thought it imprudent amidst the religious tumults of the time for a Catholic king to quarrel with a confessional ally, especially one so important for spreading Christianity abroad. Unlike St. Teresa, however, Ribadeneyra elaborated on this basic grievance, suggesting all of the structural weaknesses plaguing the Spanish crown which would make the campaign difficult, if not unfeasible.\textsuperscript{419} He suggested the campaign was bound to fail because of a general lack of enthusiasm within Spain. The kingdom had become embittered and showed “little interest in seeing His Majesty’s power grow.” The population at large was severely oppressed by taxes, grandees felt ignored, knights received few benefits, clerics were upset by subsidies required of them, prelates by the selling of church lands, and monks were put off by attempted reforms of their orders. All this led to a situation in which Philip, while still powerful, was not “as well loved” as he had been.\textsuperscript{420} Ribadeneyra only became more

\textsuperscript{417} Fernando de Herrera, \textit{Tomás Moro}, Francisco Lópe Estrada, ed. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2001), pp. 166-168.
\textsuperscript{418} See, for example, Fernando Bouza, “Servidumbres de la soberana grandeza: Criticar al Rey en la corte de Felipe II” in Alfredo Alvar Ezquerra, ed., \textit{Imágenes Históricas de Felipe II} (Madrid: Centro de estudios cervantinos, 2000), pp. 141-180.
\textsuperscript{419} \textit{MHSI Ribadeneira}, vol. II, pp. 22-28, Ribadeneyra to Quiroga, Toledo, 16 February 1580.
\textsuperscript{420} Ibid., p. 24.
morose with passing years; he could not but “fearfully behold the judgment of God hanging over our heads…”

As the *Scisma* was being written in 1587-88, the situation was no better. In Madrid the Crown was suffocating flames of criticism lit by “prophets” who had defamed Philip and his court. Miguel de Piedrola, for example, took his criticisms, quite literally, to the streets. Nobles and commoners alike heard of the dreadful future awaiting the Spanish monarchy, the imminent death of the monarch, and the role he played to usher impending doom. They listened to Piedrola describe the awful fate of many in Spain “who suffered unjustly with no remedy for their pain save their cries to the heavens.”

Ribadeneyra had little sympathy for such harangues by lowly men, but he *did* have close ties to supporters of another prophet, Lucrecia de Léon, whose dreams of Philip’s demise and imminent Armageddon had sent many in and outside of court into panic. These might have been extreme voices, but they are nevertheless representative of a certain desengaño that was setting (or had already set) in toward the end of the sixteenth century. Few were satisfied amidst unending war, economic malaise, famine, and what appeared to be rampant corruption. Opprobrium, in such a context, was naturally hurled at the king who embodied the Spanish monarchy and all its woes.

Some suspected, as Pope Pius V had in the 1560s, that the Spanish court was home to “some devil dressed in flesh that seeks nothing but taking His Majesty along the

---

same road Henry VIII, king of England, was taken.”

The king could do nothing right. Even when preparations for the Armada might have proven the Philip’s religious mettle, grumbling continued. If the Venetian ambassador, Vincenzo Gradenigo, is to be believed, some in and around the Spanish court still blamed the king for not ridding the world of Elizabeth during the years he held the English crown.

Set within this context of discontent, the Scisma attains new resonances. Amidst pages of direct translation from De origine, Ribadeneyra felt compelled to augment his Latin template by articulating specific lessons to be learned from any given episode. This was in part due to a prevalent belief that Latinate readers could understand these independently while vulgar audiences needed more guidance. But Ribadeneyra was surely aware that his asides would have had particular bite in a discursive landscape pullulating with criticisms of the king and rampant national self-doubt. Henry and Cranmer’s schemes to legitimize divorce, for example, were used as a platform to offer the following insight: “the laxity of subjects and the ambition of kings…often cause very bad effects when God, reason, and justice are not involved.” Elsewhere, commenting on the stark differences between Anne and Catherine, Ribadeneyra suggested the reader should understand “how secret and incomprehensible God’s judgments are”: as soon as the good (Catherine) are afflicted by tribulation the bad (Anne) are bereft of their apparent prosperity. By these means God “perfects the gold of virtue” all the while providing a “knife for the sinner.”

---

426 Ribadeneyra, Vida del padre Ignacio de Loyola (Madrid: Alonso Gomez, 1586), sig. ++2r
427 Ribadeneyra, Scisma, 76r-v.
428 Ibid., 210v.
could endow them with deeper meaning if glum about the prospects of their own time and place. One can imagine a reader—perhaps Ribadeneyra himself—shaking his head at the thought that Spain would soon be subject to the same divine disapproval as England.

When the *Scisma* was written, Spain was rife with controversy over royal incursions into religious affairs. Philip’s own efforts to extract money from the Church were subject of heated debate. Thus when it was said that the more Henry “took advantage of the church’s property,” the more his financial troubles deepened, many (especially clerical readers) must have understood this to be a portent.\(^\text{429}\) Ribadeneyra, in the throes of his own campaign against the king’s intervention in Jesuit affairs, must have savored the opportunity to argue, as he did in the *Scisma*, that where clerical might and autonomy was maintained—such as in parts of Germany, for example—the Church withstood the tempests of heresy.\(^\text{430}\)

The Spanish court suffered from the same defects in royal counsel as the rest of Europe.\(^\text{431}\) For Ribadeneyra, who was an avowed enemy of self-serving functionaries at court, it must have been satisfying to attack English iterations of such low figures. The case of Cardinal Wolsey allowed him to elaborate on the well-worn evil minister theme, emphasizing that *privados* should “keep God above all,” and avoid offending Him in order to please men on earth.\(^\text{432}\) Later, after picking Cromwell apart, he urged all “mortals, and particularly ministers to kings to always have before them the eyes of

\(^\text{429}\) Ibid., 146v.
\(^\text{430}\) Ibid., 84r.
\(^\text{432}\) Ribadeneyra, *Scisma*, 65r.
justice, and to pay more attention to God’s will than that of man, even if they be kings…”433

Wolsey’s story may have allowed for oblique commentary on a specific sort of royal indiscretion as well. In retelling his downfall, Ribadeneyra adds an interesting rumor about a “sumptuous sepulcher” that the chancellor had built for his eventual burial. While visiting the mausoleum, a jester (un loco) asked him “Why do you waste so much money in vain? Do you plan to be buried here? Well, I can tell you that when you die, you won’t be able to pay for it.”434 These words were prophetic, indeed. Beyond reinforcing the idea that evil counselors never lived to enjoy their ill-begotten fortunes, for certain Spanish readers the evocation of ostentatious funerary monuments could have seemed topical. The construction of Philip II’s Escorial-- part palace, part mausoleum for the Spanish Habsburgs--was still fresh in the popular imagination. Amidst awe, there were plenty who were hostile to such a rich project and even claimed divine displeasure over it.435

I don’t want to insist that Ribadeneyra’s insertion of such a colorful episode must be read as a commentary on Philip’s excesses. As with the book as a whole, when (and if) readers chose to blur the lines between English and Spanish travails was largely up to them. It seems likely, however, that Ribadeneyra--master of the Jeremiad as he was--may have wanted his readers to.

None of this is to suggest that Philip and his advisers had any qualms about the Scisma. To the contrary, in tone and substance, it seems to have been just what they wanted. The official approbation of the book by Pedro Lopez de Montoya speaks

433 Ibid., 162r.
434 Ibid., 70r.
435 On this see “Papel Curioso” in British Library, Additonal MS 10, 236, fol. 121 ff.
approvingly of Ribadeneyra’s efforts to describe the awful fate of those who “in our times decided to abandon the Catholic faith.” He also underscores the author’s responsible approach: Ribadneyra didn’t say anything that hadn’t been attested to by “grave” English authors. Moreover, Montoya explains that the author moderated “some things I remember having read in Latin histories on this subject,” things which were said “with good zeal, but with some liberty.” Clearly, from the perspective of the Spanish court, part of the Scisma’s appeal was that it framed the forthcoming battle in messianic, crusading terms, just the terms which, according to Gómez-Centurión, Philip wanted to embrace. The politicking that poked its way through the fabric of De origine would not quite do if the whole endeavor was to be kept unsullied from mere secular imperatives.

As with Sander’s history, there was no reason to think twice about the Scisma’s exhortations--good counsel was always welcome, and Philip would have agreed on every cound. Indeed, the king surely believed he was fulfilling all the requisites of a good Christian king, and the Armada was exhibit A. Just as importantly, he wanted his subjects to understand the spiritual importance of the enterprise being undertaken. They should know why a good Christian king should be involved, why a good Christian nation should support the endeavor.

It seems likely Ribadeneyra had serious doubts, but even he would have readily acknowledged Spain was no England. For that would have quickly crossed himself and mouthed an amen. Spain was yet to descend into damnation. The Armada was penance; a Christian duty, a way to expiate Spain’s sins.

436 Ribadeneyra, Scisma, n.f.
437 Gómez-Centurión, “The New Crusade.”
Ribadeneyra would have wanted to board a ship heading to liberate England of its Protestant yoke, but he was old and frail. He embraced the English Catholic cause as best he could: by drawing on *De origine* he helped plant a Spanish Elizabethan discourse deep in Iberian soil. If, however, Ribadeneyra shared with Sander and his like an immediate tactical goal--the conquest of England-- he also shared a set of higher objectives. His was a moralizing tale that superseded immediate political concerns, speaking instead to universal ones about the troubled state of Christendom.

The *Scisma* betrays an uncertainty about how events would unfold. Nevertheless, if readers--eyes reddened by tears of pity and rage--leafed back to that image of Jesus and Peter, meditating on it with renewed understanding and resolve, success might well be near at hand.

****

That *De origine* could be easily embedded in two very different discursive landscapes--those of France and Spain--is not surprising. Sander’s book is paradigmatic of a Counter-Reformation spirit and as such was a perfect text during a time of heightened confessional tensions. It divided the world between “us” (good Christans) and “them”(heretics). It sought to describe, define, and generally sort out the combatants in religious conflict at a time when France was rearing for more internecine strife and Spain was embarking on a crusade to save all of Europe from devilish threats.

But as I have suggested throughout, Sander’s history did more than attack the enemy. It was also tried to protect Catholics themselves from their baser instincts. The book was a subtle argument for the reform of Catholic morality, or perhaps better put, it

---

was an effort to harden Catholic resolve. In France, this was a prime objective of the League as it fought against what must have seemed like platoons of waverers. In Spain, the threat was less obviously present, but some moralists saw signs tepidity and corruption everywhere. Orthodoxy could dissolve at the hands of demonic forces. Danger was ever-present and growing, especially as the specter of the *politique* and the Machiavel seemed to materialize. English history confirmed fears of the godless and helped ready Catholic Europe to fight
Coda

Distilling History

English Catholics entered Spain’s polemical arena through the back door, in the guise of a Spanish Jesuit. But if the Armada was to succeed, the English themselves would have to play a central role as the enterprise’s publicists.

Bernardino de Mendoza, who had accumulated vast stores of wisdom as Philip II’s long-time ambassador, knew military success depended on developing opportune, if often fragile relationships with desperate men. In England and France he had courted Catholics who, finding themselves amidst religious, political, and economic upheaval sought his king’s affection. These men were important because many were unwavering in their loyalty; they were motivated by the firm belief that their lives and property were in danger. Unlike malcontents who tended to be moved “more by the present ills, than by the uncertain future,” the truly desperate were prodded to action by a fatalism which made change within the current regime seem impossible. Malcontents looked for an easy fix; they compromised with whoever was willing to make a deal. The desperate were only interested in revenge at any cost. It was among these men that the seeds of “universal displeasure” flourished, as did the thorns of civil war.439

Still, trusting exiles had its pitfalls. The papal nuncio in Spain was among those wary of “the many exaggerations concerning the great need” experienced by Catholics in England.440 The count of Olivares, Spanish ambassador to Rome, tended to be less cynical. Though no doubt bored by the unending petitions made by the likes of Allen and

Persons, he understood they were moved by Catholic zeal. Any overstatement was not
duplicitous, but colored by the experience of exile. Despite their well-meant optimism,
however, he understood conquering England would not be simple, and that the English--
Catholic, Puritan, or neutral—wouldn’t greet Spaniards with open arms. Philip himself
assumed Catholics in England would be “of little or no help.”

Still, in the short run Allen and Persons were, in the most practical sense of the word, useful. Olivares assured
Philip they were well-versed in English affairs and were guided by “necessity, that great
teacher.” In the long run, they would play an essential part in the aftermath of
conquest.

Allen would mediate between Philip and the English after Spanish victory,
heading what might be called a transition Parliament. In preparation, he tried to publicize
and consolidate his leadership role in England. Naturally, he turned to print: first with
short tract, *The Copie of a Letter Written by M. Doctor Allen Concerning the Yeelding up
of the Citie of Daventrie*, defending Sir William Stanley’s submission to Spanish
forces in the Netherlands. Since, as mentioned before, Catholic leaders often favored
anonymity, Allen’s name on the cover page is indicative of burgeoning insouciance.
Apart from the pamphlet’s open defense of papal deposing powers and (from an
Elizabethan perspective) Stanley’s treason, the book helped define Allen as a fighter.
Although it was his “special trade,” Allen assured he “was not so restrained to student’s
matters.” He would never stop serving the English cause “with heart, prayers and

---

443 William Allen, *The Copie of a Letter Written by M. Doctor Allen Concerning the Yeelding up of the
Citie of Daventrie* (Antwerp: Joachim Trognaesius, 1587).
pen...”444 As mentioned before, it was around this time that a small print campaign was initiated in which parallels were drawn between Allen and Pole.445 Allen wanted to imitate his predecessor, and would, indeed, soon reveal something of his rambunctious spirit. In a pamphlet written to accompany the Armada, *An Admonition to the Christian Nobility*, Allen announced his new role as papal legate “with full commission and commandment to treat and deal from time to time... with the states of the realm, as with his holiness and the king’s majesty.” Lest such a proclamation distress wary compatriots, he reminded them he was of their same “flesh and blood.”

The *Admonition* helps bring to a close the story of *De origine*’s metamorphosis. The connection may not be readily obvious to modern readers, but it was to contemporaries. The count of Olivares, for one, saw clear filiations.446 As he suggested in a letter to Idiáquez, the pamphlet was not much different from the third book of Sander’s history, the part about Elizabeth’s reign. Following this insight we too, like Philip’s ambassador, should read the text as a continuation of the polemical project we have been studying thus far. Still, we should be careful to emphasize that the pamphlet was no longer a historical enterprise per se. Short, direct, unapologetic, the *Admonition* lays bare much of what lay just underneath the veil of history. It uses the past only to the extent that it serves as sturdy armature for a more obviously propagandistic, overtly militant project at hand. The time for delving into a deeply contextualized story of what had gone wrong in England was over. Now, as a companion piece to war, it was time to harp on those things that would facilitate a Catholic take-over of England, to lay bare all those radical inclinations that a proper history only circuitously articulated. While the pamphlet avoids

445 See pp. 102-103, fn. 276 above.
Catholic self-criticisms present in Sander’s history, English Catholic allegiance to hispano-papal forces and their penetrating disdain for the Elizabethan regime had never been articulated so plainly.

There was a yearlong interval between when Olivares first mentioned what must have been a draft of the Admonition (June 1587) and its actual printing during the summer of 1588. The Spanish ambassador was in charge of making sure the launching of English Catholic propaganda was coordinated with the Armada’s launch. If text preceded action, it would do more harm than good. There is little doubt Spanish operatives had complete knowledge of what English Catholics were up to, and that they were supportive.

When news of the Admonition reached England there was uproar. Whatever semblance of peace talks had been taking place between Elizabethan and Habsburg representatives were doomed. Elizabeth warned if Allen’s book was not suppressed “we cannot be in honor satisfied.” Philip, by the summer of 1588, didn’t care.

The Admonition anchored imminent Spanish intervention with the weight of Papal prerogatives. Although tyrannical rule was sometimes a providential punishment that must be patiently endured, this was not to be England’s immediate fate. As Allen wrote, hope flourished. Sixtus V, Christ’s “highest Minister, and our chiefest magistrate and master in earth…doth give us at this time, both better means, more hope, and readier help, than we could ever possibly have either deserved or desired.” The Pope, driven by love for the English, was ready to display clemency for those who erred and “only

---

448 Ibid., p. 529. The Queen to her Commissioners in the Netherlands, 29 June 1588.
449 Allen, Admonition, III-V.
meaneth in Christ’s word and power given unto him, and in zeal of God’s house, to pursue the actual deprivation, of Elizabeth the pretended queen, eftsoon declared and judicially sentenced, by his Holiness’s predecessors, Pius Quintus and Gregory the XIII for an heretic and usurper…\textsuperscript{450} Now that war was near, \textit{De origine}’s subtle embrace of papal powers--obviated by its inclusion of \textit{Regnans}--finally came to the fore.

Linking Spain’s war with papal imperatives had never been a foregone conclusion. If we were able to look into the crevices of Allen’s conscience it seems likely he himself had strong papalist tendencies,\textsuperscript{451} but papal support was always mentioned as one among many justifications for war.\textsuperscript{452} Allen knew that papal supremacy was a thorny issue, even among Catholics. Thomas Stapleton, to take a prominent example, added nuance to the Pope’s pretensions.\textsuperscript{453} In his \textit{Tres Thomae} (1588) he reminded readers that when Thomas Becket confronted the English crown, he did not fight on behalf of Rome alone. Indeed, Becket was not declared a saint because he had defended the Pope’s primacy through his death, but because he had fought for ecclesiastical liberties more generally.\textsuperscript{454}

\textsuperscript{450} \textit{Ibid.}, VI-VI.
\textsuperscript{451} As he read through Nicholas Sander’s \textit{De clave Davide seu regno Christi}, first printed in 1588, Allen left the traces of his excitement in agitated underlining wherever a particularly strong defense of papal powers were being made. On one occasion, however, he felt the need to correct the author. In summarizing the messy events surrounding the Norman Conquest, Sander (and his posthumous editor Filippo Sega) seemed to undermine the Pope’s role in the whole affair. Allen noted it was well worth remembering that William had the Pope’s blessing and indeed fought under his banner. So too, he must have thought approvingly, would Philip. Nicholas Sander, \textit{De Clave divide seu regno Christi libri sex contra Acleri pro visibili monarchia} (Roma: Georgium Ferrarium, 1588), p. 336. Allen’s copy is currently held at the British Library, Shelfmark: 3901.g.27. “nota q’od math. Scribat guliemu approbante pontifice (quoque de tota lex catolica) et illum sacro vexillo donantur bellum hoc suscepisse.” Note also Allen’s contempt for the sometimes harsh treatment of popes found in Platina’s \textit{Lives of the Popes}. Stefan Bauer, \textit{The Censorship and Fortuna of Platina’s Lives of the Popes in the Sixteenth Century} (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006).
\textsuperscript{452} Hicks, ed., \textit{Letters and memorials}, p. 294. Memorial dated 18 March 1587.
\textsuperscript{454} Thomas Stapleton, \textit{Tres Thomae} (Douai: Ioanis Bogardi, 1588), p. 61. “Quamquam tamen D. Thomas non solum pro authoritate propriè Pontifica aut ad primatum Rom. Pont. propriè pertinente sed etiam pro
Besides theoretical matters, English Catholics had to maneuver around the troubling fact that the Spanish always accused the Pope of overextending his authority and in Rome many claimed Philip was more tyrannical than Nero and Diocletian.\(^{455}\)

Practicality trumped all other considerations. Philip understood the need for papal support. Without it the religious aspect of the Enterprise would be undermined. The king wanted to make it seem as though the Armada was launched in response to papal pleas, and in defense of the Church. Image aside, Philip needed money; the sort of money few others, apart from Rome’s head, could or would provide. The Spanish were also aware of the Pope’s feudal links to England. In a revealing document forwarded to Madrid sometime during Elizabeth’s reign an anonymous informant recounted the troubles between Rome and King John in the early thirteenth century, a popular theme among contemporary commentators on the nature of the English monarchy. The document rehearses a well-worn story about how the English king gave in to the Pope on the condition that Rome received “the rights of the English Crown with all the benefits and honors pertaining to it, both spiritual and temporal” and that from then on the English king would rule only “under the hand of Pope…” As indicative of the glee with which this report was received by some at the Spanish court, on the margins one reader drew an upraised hand where papal dominance over the English monarchy was asserted and excitedly noted that documents pertaining to John’s submission “should be in the

\[\text{authoritate ac potestate necessaria totius ordinis sacerdotalis gladijs impiorum occubuit…Neque Rom. Pont. Alexander 3 ideo D. Thomam in sanctos retulit quia authoritatem primates Pontificij usque ad mortem defendit sed quia pro totius ecclesiae libertate adeoque iusta & necessaria authoritate, usque ad mortem dimicavit.} \]

archives of the Roman Court."\textsuperscript{456} Clearly the Spanish took seriously the version of English/Papal history English Catholics were promoting. Though it might not coincide with Philip’s long-term interests, in the short-term hispano-papal amity could be tactfully embraced.

Despite having decided to cast their lot with the papacy, the \textit{Admonition} reflects lingering unease with the discursive implications of doing so. As we’ve seen above, Allen and Persons both used \textit{De origine} to support the Pope, but were occasionally coy about it. When defending Philip II against Elizabethan propaganda in the 1586 version they were unwilling to show their papal colors. Following this strategy, Allen made his \textit{Admonition} less a theoretical defense of papal powers than of clerical powers writ large. \textit{Potestas papalis} was obviously assumed, but more energy was expended proving that all priests had the right to depose heretical monarchs. In a particularly exuberant moment, after unloading a series of biblical examples he rhapsodizes on the “power of Christ’s priesthood in the new testament, so far above the authority of earthly kings, as the sun is clearer than the moon, heaven above the earth, the soul of man better than his body, and the commonweal of the Catholic Church formed by Christ more excellent than any secular society ordained by man.”\textsuperscript{457} It is clear, however, that it was the episcopal ranks that held true authority. He emphasizes bishops had a “…duty to chastise and excommunicate disobedient tyrants.”\textsuperscript{458}

\textsuperscript{456} Archivo Historico Nacional, Órdenes Militares, Legajo 3509, no. 20. “Copia de la desobediencia que tuvo el Rey Juan de Inglaterra a la Iglesia Romana, y de la obediencia que se dio en su vida, sacada de las crónicas de Inglaterra.”
\textsuperscript{457} Allen, \textit{Admonition}, XXXVII.
\textsuperscript{458} Ibid., XXXVIII. Admittedly he does let slip that every good Catholic should renounce his monarch as a heretic at the will of “our lawful Bishops and popes.” Ibid., XLII.
The evidence for these fundamental truths was in the Bible and other ecclesiastical and secular histories. The story of Saul’s deposition was a *locus classicus* for understanding the struggle between religious and secular authority. In Allen’s interpretation, God allowed Saul to reign undisturbed “so long as he was in order,” but when he began to aspire to “spiritual function and other disobedience” God relinquished his support. This was done through the priest, Samuel, who deposed Saul and anointed David as king. Allen’s interpretation of Samuel’s role in secular politics clearly shows the chain of command through which a proper deposition might take place. God, through a mortal priest, called upon a prince to topple a tyrant.

This story is significant because of the parallels Allen claims existed between it and Elizabeth’s reign. Saul, despite priestly fiat, wasn’t deterred by Samuel. Indeed, he was further “invaded by an ill spirit, that provoked him, to kill not only him that was now made the rightful owner of the Crown (as Elizabeth hath by God’s permission accomplished her like devilish desires against the lady Mary Queen of Scotland) but also to seek for Samuel’s death his spiritual governor, yea and to command all the Holy priests of Nobee …to be cruelly slain as traitors of David.” Though David was “lawfully up in arms with one of the principal priests that escaped the foresaid murder,” Saul’s evil prevailed, and even his son continued in the same track after the tyrant had died.

Considering the apparent continued success of Saul and his progeny, Allen suggests the reader should “not now marvel that king Henry or his daughter should so long reign after their deprivation and excommunication and be suffered to their own damnation to execute cruelty upon the bishops and priests.”

This biblical parallel provided a partial, 459 Ibid., XXXII.
providential, explanation of why England’s history was largely a history of heretical persistence.

The tyrant of the *Admonition* was even more dastardly than that of *De origine*, save for one important detail. Elizabeth’s illegitimacy was an important angle of attack in both books. But for an English audience Allen made such claims on the grounds of Henry’s sexual relations with Anne’s sister and mother, eliding the extreme assertion that Elizabeth was the fruit of sexual relations between father and daughter which Sander had suggested. Apart from this, Allen pulls no punches. Whereas in *De origine* Elizabeth was shown to have the failings of any woman, the *Admonition* employs far more carnal language, showing her hyper-sexuality. Not surprisingly, this is done most forcefully with reference to her relationship with Leicester, though Allen also mentioned the “…diverse others [with whom] she hath abused her body, against God’s laws, to the disgrace of princely majesty and the whole nations reproach, by unspeakable and incredible variety of lust, which modesty suffereth not to be remembered.”  

Riffing on the theme of Elizabeth’s several marriage negotiations, Allen goes further than the authors of *De origine*, emphasizing the queen’s pervasive interest, not in the commonwealth, but in the “seeding of her own disordered delight.” Not caring about her duty as queen to produce an heir, she proved not only irresponsible, but she also comes off as being a sadist. Like a new Nero, “she hath been heard to wish, that the day after her death she might stand in some high place between heaven and earth to behold the scrambling that would be for the crown.”

Whereas *De origine* makes a bit more about

---


461 Allen, *Admonition*, XXII.
men like Cecil (a name all but absent from the *Admonition*), Allen marvels at the fact that England’s fall was “achieved by one woman, and her accomplices not so many.”

Allen also evoked the language of “machiavelianism” absent (though implicit) in *De origine*; he lamented the queen’s “machiavellian, godless, and conscienceless course.” In an age when the Florentine’s name was a byword for the most sordid kind of immorality, it was a damning indictment indeed.

Character assassination was not enough to promote rebellion. Allen had to show Elizabeth’s tyranny adversely affected everyday lives; he had to show heresy’s economic impact. Like *De origine*, the *Admonition* showed how Elizabeth leched off her subjects’ wealth. The queen not only burdened the commonwealth with “…more frequent and large subsidies…but also by sundry shameless guiles of lotteries, laws, decrees, and falls of money and such like deceits.” English relations with foreign heretics who *De origine* portrayed as morally and geo-politically problematic were linked to England’s economic malaise. They caused “damage and danger…to our merchants and other travelers.” Similarly, Elizabeth’s willingness to harbor exiled heretics in England is not figured merely as a religious issue; the author underscores how immigrants caused “the great impoverishing” of England.

Elizabeth’s reign destroyed proper order. As *De origine* accused Elizabeth of ruining the nobility, the *Admonition* argued good men were removed “from government offices, and places of honor, thrusting them to shameful and odious offices of inquisition upon Catholic men, to the great vexation of their own consciences, forcing them through

---

462 Ibid., XXV.
463 Ibid., XXIII.
464 Ibid., XVI.
465 Ibid.
fear and desire of favor…to condemn that in others which in their hearts and consciences themselves like of…” If nobles were actively demoted and terrorized, the lowly were given place of honor. Because of Elizabeth’s avarice and her unwillingness to reward worthy men, she made do by “promoting the poor people and so to live and feed on the carcass of the commonwealth.” Moneyless upstarts used their new-found power to institute anti-Catholic laws and extract money from the innocent. By doing this, Allen claimed, “some of her creatures are grown so great and insolent, that all states and degrees within the realm stand in awe and danger of them.”

Using techniques we have already seen in Sander’s history, Allen argued the end of English troubles was easily attainable. Numbers were on the Catholic side. Most Englishmen would fight for the Church’s cause for conscience’s sake. Others would remain neutral and the rest, “pure zealous heretics, which be very few in comparison….shall fly in fear and torment.” Appealing to the historical record, Allen argued Providence ensured the inevitable fate of tyrants and heretics. Allen mentioned Richard III’s downfall and Mary Tudor’s victory over Northumberland as exemplary. He also asked the reader --again echoing De origine – to recall the great, “miraculous” victories of Charles V (in Germany) and recent Catholic victories against Huguenots in France.

A bit--only a bit--of shaming was in order too. If during the past fifty years Catholics had not been able to deal a fatal blow to Protestants, it was because an army had never been put together to do it and so “by mistrusting God, by overmuch trusting

---

466 Ibid., XV.
467 Ibid., XVII.
468 Ibid., XVII-XVIII.
469 Ibid., LVII.
man, by flying or avoiding battle, by yielding or compounding sundry great and Godly attempts have been frustrated.”

Although Allen was writing on Spain’s behalf, Spain itself posed a problem. The 1586 *De origine* was the first public document to align Spanish and English Catholic causes, but it did so mainly for a continental audience. English audiences would be a tougher sell. The *Admonition* is understandably coy at first. Early on, as a parenthetical aside, Allen says the enterprise was undertaken not by “the Pope alone but God himself surely, and other the most zelous and mightiest Princes in Christendom by his induction.” Only later is Allen more direct. Philip was called by the Pope “for his singular love towards the nation whereof by marriage of Holy Queen Mary of blessed memory he once was king, for the old love and league betwixt the said country and the house of Bourgogne, and to conclude for his special piety and zeal towards God’s house and the See Apostolic, together with the consideration of the fresh barbarous murder of his cousin the Queen of Scotland.” The king’s motivations were all benign and conquest was carried out only at English (Catholic) insistence. Only in response to their desperate cries for help did he “consent” to carry out “so holy and glorious an act…” This, as mentioned above, was the tone Philip was eager to take on, not that of conqueror, certainly not that of a tyrant, but of a benevolent king carrying out his Christian duty.

****

The *Admonition* is the culmination of a Spanish Elizabethan project which began scarcely three years earlier with the first printed edition of *De origine*. The militant

---

470 Ibid., LVIII.
471 Ibid., V.
472 Ibid., XLIX.
473 Ibid.
punchline of all these books should be clear enough. Each, in its own way, ushered readers down a path of war against heresy (and more specifically, Elizabeth).

Despite the simplicity of this contention, I hope to have shown that the discursive path taken to war deserves some attention. Because we have been examining texts enmeshed in a rather complicated, often-shifting political moment--the prelude to war--it should come as no surprise that the books themselves should reveal slight shifts, alterations, and ambiguities commensurate with political realities and necessities.

Thus, the history of the English schism as it was developed by Catholics between 1585 and 1588 was more than an intellectual enterprise, it was a set of political moves and actions. Indeed, each of the books studied thus far were not part of the typical theological and ecclesiological disputes which consumed contemporary writers of ecclesiastical histories, nor do they give us one, definitive image of the English schism, but a series of images appropriate for specific contexts.

At every step of the way, all those involved in the “Spanish Elizabethan project” demonstrated polemical dexterity. Standing, as they did, from the edge of everywhere, their approach had to be hyperopic and myopic at once and in turn. In its Latin versions, the exiled authors and editors asserted their position as bearers of a “true” English history, but their audience was continental, not English. Increasingly, although their message seemed to be specific to English Catholic concerns, *De orgine*, in its different forms, contained a message of constancy that spoke well to broad Counter-Reformation sensibilities, and a militantly anti-Elizabethan message which became entwined with a set of Spanish political objectives.
Although political circumstances required pan-European coordination, the benefits of Latin’s universality were, as the Armada loomed, left behind for the local benefits of vulgar tongues catering to specific population centers crucial for the upcoming Armada’s success. In French, *De origine* became a tool of League propaganda. In Spanish, it became both a moralist tract by a nervous Jesuit, and the centerpiece of Habsburg propaganda for the enterprise at hand.

In the end, the efforts to use history to promote sympathy for English Catholics must be seen as a success. *De origine*’s many subsequent printings—in various languages, and in further reformulations—attest to the fact that it became a popular book. More importantly, contemporaries of the versions studied here, were fully aware that English history written from a solidly Catholic point of view would “serve understanding (*servira alla cognizione*), and with the examples of innumerable martyrs, it will invite and help much toward piety and affection.”

Sander’s history could not but open European eyes to the horrors and evils of heresy, and through the valiant struggle of Catholics, the merits of those willing to resist.

The art of the propagandist was one honed perhaps of necessity, but it was one Allen and his allies would exploit to the fullest—at least while heresy threatened. Soon, they might have all been home. Their days as polemicists might have ended.

But winds blew another way.

---

474 Quote found in Giovanni Angelo Ruffinelli’s dedicatory note to Diego de Campo. Reference is being made here to a history of the English Schism by Girolamo Pollini, based largely on Sander and Ribadeneyra. Giovanni Pollini, *L’historia ecclesiastica della rivoluzione d’Inghilterra* (Rome: Giovanni Angelo Ruffinelli, 1594), n.f.

475 For one such gloss see Wolfgang Ederus’s dedicatory letter to the Bishop of Salzburg in his 1587 edition of *De Origine*. Nicholas Sander, *De origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani* (Ingolstadt: Wolfgang Ederus, 1587), sig. *2r-*5v.
Interlude

Chapter 4: Surviving Failure

In the thick of a Lisbon summer, William Arte found himself holed up in a chamber few people, especially an English merchant, would have wanted to be. Suspected of heresy, he stood before the Inquisition. Asked whether Lutherans were right to break away from the Church, he predictably and quickly answered no. In fact, he continued, it seemed that “God punished them [English heretics] by putting together the Armada” which had just set sail. Whether or not Arte actually thought the massive fleet was divine retribution is hard to say: truth sometimes evaded inquisitorial probing. Still, he was articulating sentiments widespread among the enterprise’s supporters. The worthiness of the cause gave reason for unalloyed optimism. Thus, while Arte sweat before his spiritual judges, priests from the Jesuit church of São Roque in Lisbon eagerly joined what one of them called the “beautiful” fleet.

Not all were optimistic. In the monastery of the Anunciada just outside Lisbon’s city walls a scandal erupted surrounding a nun--Maria da Visitação-- with aspirations to holiness who criticized the Spanish king and raised doubts about the English campaign. These rumblings and disturbances were taken seriously; some worried the monastery’s sins would have negative effects on the empresa. More troubling than one warped nun and her rambunctious sisters, was the spread of bleak prognostications. In Castile, Lucrecia de León drew inspiration from Maria and spewed her own dark predictions.

476 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Lisbon, Inquisição de Lisboa, Proceso 2028, fol. 6r.
477 Biblioteca Palacio de Ajuda, Manuscritos Avulsos 54-XI-38, 3d, fol.10v.
478 Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo, Inquisição de Lisboa, Proceso 11.824, fol. 19.
about Spain’s imminent defeat. Elsewhere, in Rome, a “saintly man” told Joseph Creswell the Armada would fail as retribution for controversies between Philip and the Society of Jesus.\textsuperscript{479} One can imagine such episodes were relatively common across Europe where the idea of Spain and its king could just as well evoke awe as disdain.

If the divide between optimists and pessimists was stark, there was general agreement on one count: something spectacular was afoot. 1588 was a year of mixed dread and excitement. On the one hand, astrologers high and low insisted the end was near. As one contemporary put it, many augured “the last judgment and destruction of the universe.”\textsuperscript{480} Others thought such dire predictions foolish on the eve of Philip’s imminent victory over Satan and his heretical minions. Whether glum or ebullient, the Armada itself was a thing \textit{mirabile}. It was a navy of previously unseen proportions, a prodigy to anyone who saw, read, or heard about it. English explorer Richard Hakluyt recalled the fleet was such “as never the like had before that time sailed upon the ocean sea.”\textsuperscript{481} But, he vaunted, despite being “magnificent, huge, and mighty,” it soon “vanished into smoke.”\textsuperscript{482}

Much as any prodigal occurrence in the early modern world, the significance of the Armada’s defeat was contested. While men of Hakluyt’s Protestant ilk invariably saw Spain’s defeat as divine approval, few Catholics would have agreed. Philip himself has left relatively few traces of how he coped with the failed mission. A letter written to bishops requesting masses for the failed fleet seems to be the king’s only public utterance

\textsuperscript{479} Real Academia de la Historia, Madrid, Mss. 9-2320, fol. 5v.
\textsuperscript{480} Félix Labrador Arroyo, ed., \textit{Diario de Hans Khevenhüller, embajador imperial en la corte de Felipe II} (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001), p. 349.
\textsuperscript{482} Ibid., p. 326.
on the subject. He stoically insisted that “since God deserves thanks for everything he
wants to do, I have given him thanks for this, and for the mercy he has used….“ The
outcome could have been worse amidst such inclement weather and such turbulent
times.\textsuperscript{483} Other Spaniards near and around Philip’s court were less restrained.
Ribadeneyra, for example, wrote a whole book, the \textit{Tratado de tribulación}, criticizing
Spain’s moral lassitude in light of recent contretemps.

For English Catholics allied with the Spanish court, it would have been impolitic
to swing elbows at Philip and his subjects. In Persons’ first printed work after 1588 (note,
however, that it bore no author on its title page)-- \textit{The copie of a letter lately written by a
Spanishe gentleman, to his friend of sundry calumnies, there falsely bruited and spred
amonge the people}-- he only went as far as acknowledging recent troubles were
“punishment for our sins.”\textsuperscript{484} He reminded the reader that wars were not won by the
“puissance of man, but by the power of God,” a message meant to encourage Catholics,
who despite defeat should await God’s eventual mercy. Persons looked to the Bible for
solace, pointing to the initial defeat of Israel against the tribe of Benjamin, and in the
secular realm, to Caesar’s initial misadventures in England before ultimate success.\textsuperscript{485}

1588 marked, not an end, but a turning point in Anglo-Spanish hostilities.
Although Elizabeth and some of her advisers were initially unsure about how to proceed,
the more bellicose among them insisted England should go on the offensive. At the very
least what was left of the Armada should be destroyed. In Spain too, “hawks” insisted the
English cause should not be abandoned despite vigorous arguments from others grown

\textsuperscript{483} Quoted in Carlos Gómez-Centurión, \textit{La invincible}, p. 77.
\textsuperscript{484} Robert Persons, \textit{The Copie of a Letter Lately Written by a Spanishe Gentleman, to his Friend of Sundry
Calumnies, There Falsely Bruited and Spred Amonge the People} (n.p., 1589), p. 3.
\textsuperscript{485} Ibid., p. 4.
tired of war. Ultimately, England struck first in the spring of 1589. William Norris and Francis Drake, with Elizabeth’s support, set sail for Lisbon where they were to disable Spain’s fleet and help Antonio, prior of Crato, the quixotic pretender to the Portuguese crown, assert his royal rights. The mission was a failure, though Spain was in no real position to retaliate fully.

In France, the murder of Henri III left a power vacuum and the contest over succession unleashed further religious strife. Philip feared Henri of Navarre’s ascent. The specter of a heretical neighbor refocused Spain’s foreign policy back on the Continent.

In the short term, England’s 1589 failure inspired Persons, in the *Copie*, to thumb his nose at the Elizabethan regime. The pamphlet was mostly a defense of Spain against slander and rumor, as well as an indictment of Elizabethan corruption. Persons made yet another pitch in favor of the Spanish crown, insisting on the benefits Spanish rule bestowed upon its subjects, pointedly arguing that “the Province of Portugal, newly annexed thereunto, remaineth in more better condition than it was in other times afore.” The pamphlet also cheekily rebuts recent Elizabethan propaganda against the failed Armada. In a booklet most likely written by Cecil claiming to be a letter to Bernardino de Mendoza from an English Catholic, the Elizabethan regime sought to accentuate England’s strength and obviate Spanish/Catholic corruption and weakness. In response, at the end of the *Copie*, Persons slyly calls upon the author of said letter to give news about recent events in Lisbon where he implied England had sustained greater

---

488 Copie d’une lettre envoyee d’Angleterre a Dom Bernardino de Mendoza Ambassadeur en France pour le Roy d’Espagne (n.p. 1588).
losses than Spain ever did. Recent Iberian success contrasted with Britain’s gloomy future. The Elizabethan regime had rough days ahead of it as told by prophecies predicting “great confusion” in “the land of Albion.”

Persons wanted to keep violent tempers alive until warfare resumed. Spanish Elizabethans were adamant in their pleas to the Spanish crown during the 1590s, but especially during the early years of the new decade, they were politely ignored. Philip may have wanted to help English Catholics, but they had to wait until war in France was resolved. The frustrations of pre-1588 years re-emerged among exiles who feared a return to less militant days. Aggression should not stop. News from across the Channel continued to speak of reigning disorder, while prodigies and visions--strange moons and floating churches-- implied certain Catholic triumph.

The more Spain seemed unwilling to enter the fray against England, the more Spanish Elizabethans struggled to find ways to strengthen their ties to Spain. The following pages will show how English Catholic exiles used printed texts to lobby the Spanish Court and insinuate themselves into Spanish discursive wars. This brief interlude is fundamental for our purposes because the books examined are the glue that connect both halves of this dissertation. Without these English Catholic efforts to insinuate themselves in a Spanish landscape, it seems unlikely that preparations for the dreamed-of second Armada would have taken the same form. Whereas we have already seen how exiles set forth a Spanish line on an international scale, only in these interwar years did they truly become Philip’s publicists. Once again, the point will not be to find coherence

489 Persons, Copie, pp. 37-38.
490 Ibid., 26.
491 For an interesting collection of reports from England see St. Alban’s College, Valladolid, Serie II, Legajo 6.
among the works examined (though there might indeed be some), but to explain the multifaceted nature of their polemics and how the exiles kept their cause alive. Spanish Elizabethans busied themselves by promoting their political/spiritual objectives, which in turn required a mix of pleading and exhorting the Spanish Crown. They also wanted to make sure they remained Spain’s attack dogs against its primary enemy, which at least from their perspective remained, their own primary enemy: Elizabeth.

**The Problem of English Catholics in Spain**

Life was seldom easy for an Englishman in Spain during the sixteenth century. John Blackfan, Henry Floyd, and John Bosvile learned this the hard way when they arrived in Burgos, were unceremoniously arrested, and put in chains. Spanish eyebrows were first raised when the strangers visited a famous local shrine. It was May 1589 and England had recently attacked Iberian shores. Rumors spread, according to an account written by Blackfan, “that some of Drake’s agents had arrived, who having donned the habit of ecclesiastics in order to conceal themselves, were feigning prayer and devotion.” As they were dragged off by authorities, crowds shouted “these are kinsmen and friends of Drake in our midst!” Such incidents were probably not isolated, nor were they simply the overheated acts of an unruly, lowly mob. One anonymous informant wrote of the “great pity” he felt toward an “English bishop” who had been mistreated at the hands of the Archbishop of Burgos. It was not easy to discern friend from foe, even among English exiles themselves, so it stands to reason that strangers would have been greeted with threatening glances or, at best, cold indifference.

---

English Catholics fared only marginally better at the Spanish court. In a heated letter from Persons to Philip’s secretary Juan de Idiáquez, the Jesuit linked an endemic distrust of Englishmen to recent failures. For success, Persons insisted, the Spanish needed to nurture alliances with Catholics in England. They had failed to do this. Did this betray a Spanish aversion to the English? Perhaps, he suggested, Spain’s recent defeat was a good thing. English Catholics may have been spared Spanish abuse and mistreatment.\textsuperscript{494}

Despite Persons’ ire, as he wrote this letter, things were looking up for English exiles in Castile. Blackfan, who had been shackled just two years earlier in Burgos, was then living comfortably in Valladolid in what, through Persons’s untiring efforts, became the first English College on the Iberian Peninsula. Both this college and a subsequent one in Seville were to become training grounds for missionaries or, put in contemporary terms, were schools for martyrs.

Nevertheless, an English house seemed inopportune to many vallisoletanos. Blackfan, writing decades later, described how some were concerned “…lest perhaps the cancer of the plague of heresy be injected and circulate through the hidden veins of the republic.” “Others,” he continued “feared lest perhaps a traitor conceal himself here beneath a student’s gown.”\textsuperscript{495} The Inquisition seems to have been particularly leery of the newcomers, largely because they were English; but perhaps also because many exiles were Jesuits. Tensions between the Holy Office and the Society of Jesus in Spain were at

\textsuperscript{494} Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu, London, Collectanea P I, 246e. Persons to Idiáquez, 3 March 1591.
\textsuperscript{495} Blackfan, Annales, pp. 13-14.
Eventually city and religious authorities, grudgingly, gave in. They offered the seminarians rooms in the hospital of St. Cosmos and St. Damian as temporary refuge. But more protests ensued. Some complained the hospital didn’t have sufficient resources to take on English exiles. Foreigners would take away from the public services offered, especially those for the poor. When the king got involved in favor of the exiles, some dug in their heels. They questioned whether the king could force assistance without papal approval. By September 1589 the Englishmen left. They procured funds to rent a house of their own—it would become the seed of the seminary which still stands today.

Now congregated elsewhere, finances still dogged. In 1590 Persons and his colleagues seem to have used martyrrologies, as they had done years before, “to stimulate the generosity of the faithful.” A broadside by Juan Lopez Mançano (rector of the fledgling college) listing the martyrs to have come out of English seminaries across the Continent probably had the broadest reach in this mini print campaign. Persons also put together a short book: the Relacion de algunos martyrios, que de nuevo han hecho los hereges de Inglaterra. In it he makes a direct appeal to Spanish crown via the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, to whom the pamphlet was dedicated. He pointed out all the good Philip’s charity to English colleges elsewhere in Europe had reaped, and emphasized the sacrifices English students made in return for Spanish generosity. Most important, he

---

497 Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 166, doc. 136. On the college more generally see Michael E. Williams, St. Alban’s College Valladolid: Four Centuries of English Catholic Presence in Spain (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986).
498 These are Leo Hicks’s words. Hicks, “Robert Parsons and the English Colleges in Spain” in The Month, vol. CLVII, no. 801, March 1931, p. 197.
499 Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu, Anglia A I, fol. 53. Breve catalogo de los martyres que han sido de los colegios y seminarios ingleses que residen en Roma y en la ciudad de Rhemis (Valladolid: Diego de Cordova, 1590).
500 Robert Persons, Relacion de algunos martyrios, que de nuevo han hecho los ereges de Inglaterra. (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1590)
insisted (almost promised) that all who helped English Catholic exiles establish seminaries were assured martyrs’ intercession in heaven.\textsuperscript{501}

Persons’ text--apart from recounting the travails and deaths of various exiles--also includes what must be a reprint of a broadside written when the college first received official support from the crown in September 1589.\textsuperscript{502} In it, Persons mentions the importance of seminaries in the post-tridentine world. Such advertisements may have been necessary, as Leo Hicks has suggested, because the seminary as an institution was still something of a novelty in Spain at the end of the sixteenth century. Persons wanted to underscore the continuities between the burgeoning Spanish school and others like it in Rheims and Rome, which were undoubtedly orthodox houses of learning. The new college was not something exotic or dangerous, but an approved tool for Catholic renewal. Seminaries were, he insisted, fundamental roadblocks to the spread of heresy.\textsuperscript{503}

Though the English cause once seemed lost, seminarian efforts were offering new glimpses of hope. They helped convert heretics and empowered Catholics who had been afraid to express their faith to profess the truth openly. Seeing this, heretics were losing hope. They were wary of engaging Catholic priests in debate for fear their ignorance might show. The most learned heretics “begin to doubt, although for honor’s sake and in order not to lose their property, they do not want to convert.”\textsuperscript{504} These developments, Persons argued, had effects beyond English borders. Catholic fervor in Elizabeth’s kingdom inspired others abroad--in France and the Netherlands--under the yoke

\textsuperscript{501} Ibid., A la Señora Infanta de España doña Ysabel, n.f.
\textsuperscript{502} Ibid., 62r-76r. “Informacion Que da el padre Roberto Personio, de nacion Ingles, de la Compañia de Iesu: acerca de la institucion del Seminario, que por orden de su Magestad se ha hecho en Valladolid, para los Sacerdotes estudiantes Ingleses, que vienen huyendo de la persecucion de los hereges de Inglaterra y de las guerras de Francia.”
\textsuperscript{503} Ibid., 62r-63v.
\textsuperscript{504} Ibid., 67r.
Protestantism. Persons daydreamed: Judging from the proven efficacy of English seminaries on the Continent, a Catholic England could one day be host to similar Danish, Dutch, German, Russian, and Swedish schools!

This may have sounded good. Still, it did little to allay important local concerns about possible heretic infiltration, or about the role an English college would play in a Spanish landscape already teeming with religious houses constantly in competition with one another. Part of what Persons could offer them was plain reassurance that the college would not be a disturbance. The seminarians only wanted to finish their studies and go back to England. If their being English was a real source of angst, Persons argued there should be a distinction made between good and bad Englishmen, for between these two there was more enmity than between any other Catholic kingdom and England. He also underlined the traditional alliances between England and Spain, suggesting (vaguely) their past diplomatic relations, and the recent aid rendered to Spaniards by English Catholics. In the Armada’s aftermath, English Catholics tried to help Spanish prisoners.

Most importantly, Persons outlined a procedural scheme which would prevent the infiltration of heretics. First, there would be a vigorous selection process which would require evidence of each potential student’s faith. Each student would be examined by local Spanish authorities. Second, the students were to have a Spanish rector, would live publicly under the watch of all, and would go frequently to confession. Third, Persons

---

505 Ibid., 68v.
506 Ibid., 69r.
507 Ibid., 71r.
508 Ibid., 71v-72v.
argued Valladolid was an auspicious place for a college because it was a seat of the Inquisition. Surely the Holy Office would be appropriately vigilant.509

Aside from these assurances, Persons appealed to a sense of Catholic duty. Well aware that distrust existed, Spain was, according to Persons, the seminarians’ last hope. The political situation in France and elsewhere being what it was necessitated another center of English Catholic activities. He histrionically claimed English Catholics could only, after God, rely on Spain for help.510

Persons could sometimes be less obsequious. He asked why, if French and Flemish exiles received Spanish aid, English exiles shouldn’t? The reader should recall God was always pleased by works of charity done unto strangers, something that was even more true of aid given to those who were fighting in His name.511

Persons finished by asking the upper echelon of Spanish society (nobles y principales) for money, though he made certain to add that the English had no intention of disturbing “the other pious works” in town.512 The result for local kind graces would be the ultimate victory of Catholicism in England, and peace between the two kingdoms.513

Persons successfully got his message across to those that mattered most: wealthy benefactors who supported his cause with zeal. Englishmen became evermore physically rooted in Spanish soil.

509 Ibid., 73r-v.
510 Ibid., 74r.
511 Ibid., 74r-v.
512 Ibid., 75v.
513 Ibid., 76r.
A Royal Visit

Tensions remained, but by the summer of 1592 the college’s status and permanence was cemented. After some prodding by Philip via his ambassador in Rome, the Pope granted it official recognition. That same year the Spanish king would pay the English students a visit, an event which by various accounts was a success. Indeed, it is a testament to both the event’s importance and the enthusiasm with which Persons and his colleagues pounced on this once in a lifetime public relations opportunity that, though Philip was in town for two months, the description of this one visit is among the few (if not only) surviving printed works about his stay. *A Relation of the King of Spaines Receiving in Valladolid* and its Spanish cognate, translated by seminarian Thomas James, the *Relacion de un sacerdote Ingles, escrita a Flandes*, were both printed in the fall of 1592. If previously Persons and his colleagues used print to beg for mere acceptance, both the visit and its textual reproduction suggest more complex intentions. There is an element of groveling, but the focus shifts to strengthening ligatures between exiles and the Spanish crown, and in turn flaunting them across the Channel, in England.

As was the case with many “relations,” Persons’s account was not a simple redaction of specific events. For him, it was an opportunity to place a set of ritualistic acts in context. In both Spanish and English versions there was a brief commentary on the origins of the English College. To begin with, Persons described the institution’s foundation in providential language. Contrary to claims that the college was part of a concerted anti-Elizabethan plot between the Spanish court and English exiles, he insisted “only God himself, in such special and particular manner began the same and increased

---

514 *A Relation of the King of Spaines Receiving in Valladolid* (n.p., 1592)
Blackfan and others would later say Persons had in fact arranged for English students to leave France for Spain, but at least in these initial years, Persons didn’t insert himself into any foundation narrative, instead claiming that those students “came out of France, by reason of the wars newly there begun, which was peculiar providence of Almighty God.” Although these men were at first chastised, their initial travails were beneficial. Momentary suffering allowed their story spread. The more the seminarians’ plight became common knowledge, the more aid they received from the “principals of this nation.”

This providential narrative was, of course, as useful to rebuff Elizabethan anti-seminary slander, as it was for publicity in Spain. If the Spanish were less vituperative in their language than the English, as we have seen, many were not much more sympathetic.

Both Spanish and English relations reveal a change of tone. Nearly ten years earlier, amidst the turmoil of Campion’s trial and a series of related missionary imbroglios, the Elizabethan regime enacted legislation which was meant to deal with the missionary/Jesuit problem. In response Allen, in a book printed in 1581, tried to prove that missionaries were not “repugning nor resisting” any English laws, even if he argued they could not “be obedient to the pretended laws of religion” there. The central aim of the tract was to underscore purity of intent among exiles and reject anything that implied obvious resistance. Allen encouraged his Catholic reader to follow the example of the missionaries and martyrs, to “be humble, wise meek, peaceable, patient, and

---

515 Ibid., p. 7.
516 Ibid., p. 9.
517 William Allen, An apologie and true declaration of the Institution and endeavors of the two English Colleges (n.p., 1581), 50r.
constant, in all your cognitions, words, answers, doings, and sufferings…‖ Contrary to this placatory approach, describing Philip’s visit to an English speaking audience was not intended to calm an impatient queen.

Philip’s visit was predominated by student presentations. First there was an introductory oration; second, a series of speeches commenting on scripture in various languages; third, dozens of banners and signs hung throughout a hall with images of symbolic import and accompanying explanatory verses. The printed transcription of words spoken and displayed was meant to do many things at once. Again, Persons wanted to show the intelligence, ingenuity, and religiosity of the college’s students against both English aspersions and Spanish suspicions. More importantly, unlike Allen in 1581, Persons taunted English authorities: the event and its concomitant text defended the religious imperatives of their endeavor and sealed a bond with the Spanish king. This all but confirmed all of Elizabeth’s worst fears and would, in theory at least, solidify Philip’s anti-Elizabethan convictions.

After praying before the altar of St. Alban, the king and his family were escorted to a hall where they beheld students and teachers ranked in order of seniority. Out of these emerged “a youth of very greatful aspect” who gave a “pithy oration of gratulation and thanks… to His Majesty and their highnesses, for their coming thither, and [for] many other benefits bestowed upon our nation…” Of course, Persons observed (echoing the orator), pithiness was not easily achieved on a subject that “had no end or limit in itself.” The speech was a bland one which, for the most part, laid praise thickly upon Philip. The English version climaxes with a comparison of Philip to Abadias, the biblical

---

518 Ibid., 105r.
519 A Relation, p. 27.
figure who had done so much to help those afflicted by Jezebel. This was undeniably a stinging jab at the Elizabethan regime, indeed at Elizabeth herself whose name was synonymous with the biblical villain.\textsuperscript{520}

The Spanish version goes further. The speaker subsequently compared Philip to Cyrus, deliverer of the Jews in the Old Testament. If God was so benevolent to a gentile, the orator asked, how much more will a Catholic king be rewarded? If God had given English Catholics Philip as a new Cyrus to help them retrieve their homeland, could they expect anything less than victory? Finally, the king was offered, in the name of all who were present "everything that we are able to, all that we are, and will be." They put in Philip’s hands all their "efforts, desires, lives, and deaths."\textsuperscript{521} The orator (and the text) made no effort to disguise a desperate desire to become, as it were, hispaniolized. They established themselves as loyal subjects to the Spanish king, and in doing so they positioned themselves in direct opposition to Spain’s heretical enemies. They thus asserted the righteousness of their efforts and tried to link their personal missionary ambitions with Philip’s messianic ambitions.

Elsewhere a high pitch is maintained for both English and Spanish audiences. A series of speeches in various tongues--Hebrew, Greek, Welsh, English, French, etc.--commented on Psalm 71. The choice of this particular Psalm was by no means aleatory. It was thought to praise Salomon who himself pre-figured Christ. This textual springboard allowed the students to extol a modern king--Philip--drawing parallels between him and Salomon, and even Christ.

\textsuperscript{520} Ibid., p.30.
\textsuperscript{521} Relacion de un sacerdote, 35r-v. “…omnium nomine, ac postlatione offero hic quicquid possimus, valemus, sumus, aut erimus….Maiestate tuae trado in manus nostrorum omnium conatus, studia, vitas, mortesque….”
The politics of such parallels were complicated. English and Spanish audiences were given slightly different renderings of events. In what might seem something of a paradox, links between Philip and Christ may have been toned down for the latter.

During the Welsh oration, the speaker commented on the following verse: “there shall in his days spring up justice and abundance of peace as long as the moon or element shall endure.” Persons explained that while this was “properly spoken on christ and of his everlasting and ghostly inward peace and justice, as before hath been noted, yet did this man apply it also very aptly to the extraordinary peace and justice within the King’s days, after so many wars of Charles the Emperor.”522 The Spanish version offers a slightly different description. The orator explained that although these words were spoken of Christ “by God’s particular mercy done unto His Majesty [Philip], the same could be said of his days, like the beautiful, clear days God had given his holy church” (emphasis added).523 The version meant for Iberian audiences wanted to emphasize a divine role in consenting to the King’s successes, whereas the English version simply demonstrates a parallel.

When the English version uses particularly effusive language, the Spanish edition appears most muted. In the French speech, as described in English, the speaker comments that Psalm 71 had been “sung in times past by the royal prophet David to his son Solomon, as to him that bare he figure of Christ or Saviour who was indeed, the true Salomon.” But, he continued, “it hath not seemed to us from the purpose this day to apply the same [to] your [Philip’s] royal person, not as a figure of our Saviour to come as

522 A Relation, p. 39.
523 Relacion de un sacerdote, 47v. “Que aunque estas palabras, como las mas deste Psalmo, se avian dicho à la letra de Christo Salvador nuestro, y de aquella eterna y celestial justicia y paz, que à la tierra truxo, como ya estava tocado, pero por particular merced que Dios nuestro Señor avia hecho a su Magestad, se podian decir de sus dias, como de dias hermosos, y claros que Dios avia dado a su santa Yglesia.”
Salomon was, but rather as to a perfect flower, royal minister, & most faithful disciple of our said saviour now in heaven…”⁵²⁴ This rhetorical flourish was excised from the Spanish version.⁵²⁵

For Spanish readers the author may have wanted to add a note of wariness. The first oration (in Hebrew) concerned the following: Deus dictum tuum regi da & iustitiam tuam filio regis. This text was used in English to recall that “as judgment and justice were two principal pearls, and precious stones which among others did adorn and greatly beautify an Imperial crown, and for that, and for that reason were so especially attributed in this verse of the psalm unto the Royal Government of Christ our savior.” He goes on to say that “by the singular goodness & favor of the same our saviour,” despite rampant war and other tribulations, “judgment and justice should flourish in the crown of Spain, as never by any man’s memory was recorded the like.”⁵²⁶ In this case, the Spanish text follows much the same line, though when drawing parallels between God’s kingdom and the Spanish crown, it adds a note of equivocation, asking “our Lord that he always conserve these virtues in her.”⁵²⁷ Both texts, however, go on to express confidence that the fine education being given to the young prince suggests Spain’s perpetual faith.

Was the Spanish text slightly tempered in tone? This is a question more easily posed than answered. The hints suggested here are so miniscule as to be inconclusive.

---

⁵²⁴ A Relation, p. 43.
⁵²⁵ Relacion de un sacerdote, 50r.
⁵²⁶ A Relation, pp. 32-33
⁵²⁷ Relacion de un sacerdote, 42r. “Que el juyzio, y la justicia eran dos perlas, y piedras preciosas: las quales hermoseavan grandemente la corona Real, y por esso las atribuia en aquel verso David, al govierno del Rey de los Reyes nuestro Salvador Jesu Christo. Y que aviendo su divina Magestad hecho esta merced a la corona de España, que en estos trabajosos tiempos, en los quales tantos Reynos estavan tan desordenados, por faltar en sus coronas estas virtudes de juyzio, y justicia, tan llenos de dissolucion, guerras, revueltas, y heregias, campeen, y resplandezcan en ella con tanta hermosura, que en memoria de hombres no se ha leydo cosa semejante; con razón se podian aplicar estas palabras a esta corona, para pedir a nuestro señor conserve estas virtudes siempre con ellas…” (emphasis added).
Could these differences be nothing more than the translator’s idiosyncratic quirks?

Perhaps. Unfortunately, we know little about Thomas James.

If what we are witnessing is more than an editorial tick, we might suggest that the softening of Christological comparisons might be understood through the lens of ideological convictions. To be sure, there was a strand of Spanish thought which embraced notions of divine kingship. During a visit to the university in Valladolid that summer, a professor of canon law expounded on the nature of royal authority, showing that “neither the prince nor the king are established by men, but are chosen by the hand of God…” But others were not as forthright. Thus, perhaps the translator’s words reflected a different animus, which accentuated, as Ribadeneyra (who, by the way, granted permission for work’s printing) did, that kings “are not proprietors of their kingdoms, they are God’s viceroys and deputies.”

As ever, the tone may also coincide with a certain wariness: while the book as a whole extolled Philip’s virtues, it was also an exhortation for vigor on English matters. While celebrating the king, the events at the College also tried to impress upon him the duties of a good Christian monarch, subtly pushing him to live up to that standard.

Perhaps such an interpretation goes too far. Nevertheless, a mix of praise and exhortation seems very much in line with contemporary expectations. Throughout Persons’ description one gets the sense that the young prince (who was there alongside the Infanta) was a secondary but important figure in the day’s proceedings. After the visit, various reports suggest the hieroglyphs hung about the college were collected and

---

shown to him in private.\textsuperscript{530} Clearly, more than simply absorbing praise, members of the court realized that the day had an obvious didactic value. The political context of the visit suggests that Persons and his colleagues may have thought the king himself would benefit from a mirror of royal righteousness. As suggested before, securing sufficient and timely financial support from the Spanish king always seemed like an uphill battle, making periodic pleas for expeditious assistance necessary. 1592 was a peak year for English Catholic war mongering.

For the English reader, Persons wanted to provide an uncomplicated image of the king. Philip as a Christ-like ruler stood in strong contradistinction to the tyrannical ogre of the late sixteenth century anti-Spanish imagination. The English relation was intended to inspire awe and trust in the Spanish Habsburgs. The latter point was seemingly in Persons’ mind at key moments in the English text where he shows Philip’s sincere interest and knowledge of English affairs. Early on the reader is reminded of the king’s “experience of all affairs & especially ours of England.” Later, when describing his reaction to an oration in English, the author insists that though most of the audience could not understand the language, neither the king nor the prince appeared to think the speech “either wearisome or tedious.”\textsuperscript{531}

Both relations fit easily within the specific context framing Philip’s visit to Valladolid. It was only one stop along the way to cortes being held at Taragona in 1592. There Prince Philip (armed, surely, with English Catholic wisdom) was to be recognized as successor. The event would mark the end of a rebellion which had broken out in Aragon scarcely a year earlier, led by Antonio Pérez who was then a fugitive in England.

\textsuperscript{530} Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Hispania 143, fols. 304r- 305v. José de Acosta to Gil Gonzalez, Valladolid, 5 August 1592.
\textsuperscript{531} Relation, p. 36.
Both English and Spanish pamphlets allude to Aragonese turbulence as the catalyst for Philip’s voyage. The English version emphasizes his travels throughout Spanish territories allowed the king’s subjects to express their loyalty “according to the exceeding great love and most hardy devotion” they felt toward him. This is clearly a refutation of the rumors that were being spread by Pérez and others that the Spanish empire was falling apart amidst rebellion.

Philip and his advisors were aware, from the very beginning, that visiting the English College had important public relations potential. As a letter from José de Acosta intimates, they consciously arranged for the festivities to take place on a jubilee day which would be celebrated with “great and universal devotion.” The king wanted to show off his compassion, and perhaps more importantly, his willingness to wage war against heresy. Amidst rebellion, the event allowed him to assert his bona fides as a Catholic king, much as the Guise did when they visited the English College in Rheims.

Witnessing the earnest pleading of the exiles and the proximity of their praise, Philip was surely impressed. More than mere fawning, the seminarians displayed eloquence and learning. Amidst histrionics, they proved sincere devotion to the king. In the visit’s aftermath, powerful courtiers may have been pleased by the polemical acumen displayed. The two pamphlets dealt with here were short and ephemeral, but even they display sensitive attention to detail, and a keen awareness of how to navigate discursive thickets. Especially after Valladolid became a haven for exiles, Persons and his colleagues learned how to manipulate the two faces of their cause. Theirs was both a Spanish and an English project, not just because they often wrote in these two languages.

\textsuperscript{532} Ibid., p. 15.  
\textsuperscript{533} Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Hispania 143, fols. 304r-305v. Acosta to Gil Gonzalez, Valladolid, 5 August 1592.
but because their discursive activities had (often overlapping) Spanish and English agendas. In Spain, Persons and his colleagues were publicists (avant la lettre) of the English cause. They told their stories in hopes of moral and financial support. In England, they hoped to delegitimize the Elizabethan regime. In their hotter moments, this was accompanied by a pitch for the Spanish Crown against its English counterpart. This latter element likely pleased Philip most. At the time, he needed some positive press.

**Philopater and Philip**

The events of 1588 did nothing to abate Elizabethan fears. Many at court could only interpret Spain’s attempted invasion of Brittany in 1590 as renewed efforts to establish universal *monarchia*. But Spain itself was just part of the problem; Cecil and his allies feared Rome just as much as Madrid. Not only did the Pope seem to support Philip’s anti Anglo-Huguenot efforts, but it seemed likely that Clement VIII himself was readying a renewed missionary assault. The perceived nexus of Hispano-Papal activities were those new English Colleges sprouting on the Iberian Peninsula. News brought by a secular priest, John Cecil, who had spent time at one, confirmed the worst. While in Valladolid, he was purportedly employed by Catholics to gauge the level of English support in England for Spain. To fend off papist danger, Cecil argued for aggression. Abroad he pushed for sending troops into France, which was done. At home he argued for redoubled efforts against recusants, which was also done.

---

In 1591, a proclamation against priests and missionaries marked a crucial turning-point in Elizabethan efforts against English exiles. Priests and students at foreign seminaries were described as base and dissolute men “who have, partly for lack of living, partly for crimes committed, become fugitives, rebels, and traitors…” They were said to have found a safe haven in Spain and Rome where they would live in “certain receptacles…there to be instructed in school points of sedition, and from thence to be secretly and by stealth conveyed into our dominions with ample authority from Rome to move, stir up, and persuade as many of our subjects as they dare deal with to renounce their natural allegiance…” Were it not for these seminarians on the Continent, Philip himself might not be on a war-path. Indeed, certain “heads of these dens and receptacles, which are by traitors called seminaries and colleges of Jesuits” were blamed for convincing the Spanish king “that though heretofore he had no success with his great forces against our realm,” he would nevertheless ultimately succeed. These wily Jesuits “by their vain vaunting” were said “to tempt the king hereto who otherwise ought in wisdom and by his late experience, conceive no hope of any safe landing here.” Persons is singled out as Philip’s main, devious, counselor.

More than an anti-seminarian diatribe, the proclamation was also a direct assault on Philip himself. Having more kingdoms “than any of his progenitors, or any Christian prince ever had,” he wanted more. If the king was in part moved by evil Jesuitical

---

536 A declaration of great troubles pretended against the Realme by a number of Seminarie Priests and Iesuits, sent, and very secretly dispersed in the same, to worke great Treasons under a false pretence of Religion, with a provision very necessary for remedy thereof. Published by this her Maiesties Proclamation. (London: Christopher Barker, 1591). Quotes taken from version found in John Strype, Annals of the Reformation and Establishment of Religion (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1824), pp. 78-85.
537 Ibid., p. 79.
538 Ibid.
539 Ibid., p. 80.
540 Ibid.
counsel, he in turn manipulated those around him. In Rome, he engineered Gregory XIII’s— a “Milanoise vassail”—election. The Pope, “hanging at the girdle” of the Spanish king, was seduced “without consent of the College of Cardinals to exhaust the treasures of the Church and therewith to levy forces in Italy…and many other places.”\(^541\) Gregory, still girdling Philip, was also to blame for training missionaries “to move, stir up, and persuade as many of our subjects…to renounce their natural allegiance due unto us…” These efforts were clearly linked to “the preparation of other great forces for the seas, against our crown and dominions, the same be greater for this year to come, then ever before….”\(^542\)

The Proclamation epitomizes the kind of anti-Spanish (or anti-Philip) polemics written in the late 1580s and 90s. During these years Philip tried to effectuate his so-called “messianic” political vision. His attempted conquests of England and France, together with his successful bid for the Portuguese crown underpinned some of the most important polemical battles of the waning century. While supporters saw the king’s foreign policy as a way to save Christendom from heresy, enemies saw it as a ploy to extend Spanish dominion throughout Europe. This back and forth created a pan-European discourse. That a French pamphlet written by an anti-Spanish Portuguese exile, Vasco Figeiro, would be subsequently printed in English as *The Spaniards Monarchie and Leaguers Olygarchie*, was a relatively normal occurrence.\(^543\) While the booklet described Philip’s oppression of Portugal as a warning to French Catholics, its message fit snugly in English. It was part of the same story the proclamation had pithily articulated. “Is not our Island [England] the mark that Philip’s ambitions especially aim at?” asked the editor.

\(^{541}\) Ibid., p. 79.
\(^{542}\) Ibid.
“Nay would he not repute himself an absolute Monarch, if he might but get any interest with us? And have not we a viperous brood of puritan Papists, and reconciled Leaguers, that dream upon a new invasion?”\textsuperscript{544}

Facing rebellion in his own territories and polemical lambasting abroad, toward century’s end Philip became more interested in defending his record and defining the nature of his reign. Advisors insisted a history of “his times” be written, an enterprise that was thought to be, as Richard Kagan has pointed out, “a strategic necessity when the kingdom’s honor and reputation was under attack.”\textsuperscript{545} But the king himself sometimes proved unwilling to support self-congratulatory exercises. He famously refused to have his biography written, saving himself, as Henry Kamen has pointed out, “from adulators, whom he hated.”\textsuperscript{546} As far as an official history of his reign, he dithered, but eventually relented.\textsuperscript{547} As Antonio de Herrera reported, the king ordered him “to investigate how one might write about his glorious life, and, after having discussed various possibilities, modesty suggested that it should take the form of a general history of the world…”\textsuperscript{548}

None of this is to suggest that Philip cared little about image. To the contrary, he believed and wanted others to believe his reign was a benefic force, indelibly linked to providential designs and the well-being of Christendom. As Adam Beaver has recently shown, the king’s impulse to “biblicize” his image was manifest in subventions of biblical studies which had long lasting effects on Spanish self-perception.\textsuperscript{549}

\textsuperscript{544} Ibid.
making also took place in less academically exalted realms. The king was not so much against petty squibs, salacious polemics, and bald-faced propaganda, but was vehement about hiding any royal imprimatur. In this spirit, the king secretly funded anti-
Elizabethan polemics written by English Catholic exiles.

Initial talks about a concerted anti-Elizabethan print campaign must have occurred during Philip’s visit to Valladolid, perhaps even on the very day of his visit to the English College. Just days later the king agreed to subsidize what became the most broadly diffused response to the 1591 proclamation: a book written mostly by Persons (though pseudonymously as Andreas Philopatrum) commonly referred to as the *Responsio ad edictum*.\(^{550}\) Philip wanted the book printed across Europe, though under the veil of complete secrecy.\(^{551}\) Neither author nor funder was to be known. If Persons probably wrote the book before a subvention was secured, there is little doubt its contents were well known, and necessarily approved, by the king, or at the very least key royal councilors. It was subjected to some scrutiny by Juan de Idiáquez, a committee of several Jesuits, including Jose de Acosta, Rodrigo de Cabredo, and William Chrichton, as well as Francis Englefield, all of whom had close ties to the Spanish court.\(^{552}\) The king and his circle clearly understood these book to be, as Loomie judiciously states, “a sympathetic defense of his policy toward England,” and one might add, of his foreign policy as a


\(^{551}\) On this see Albert Loomie, “The Authorship of ‘An Advertisement written to a Secretarie of M.L. Treasurer of England...’” in *Renaissance News*, vol. 15, no. 3 (Autumn, 1962), pp. 201- 207. See also Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Fondo Gesuítico 651, no. 640, Persons to Acquaviva, Valladolid, 11 August 1592. For notes on some of the costs of printing and Spanish subsidy see Archivo General de Simancas, Estado K. 1630, fol. 7.

Moreover, it was a direct attack of Elizabeth and her heretical regime. Thus it was precisely the type of rebuke the king’s advisor’s had been lobbying for to little avail. It was also, perhaps, precisely the type of book Philip himself was eager to print so long as he was not (publicly) implicated in its printing.

1592 marks the consummation of a (textual) relationship that began with in 1586 with De origine. As I have argued above, the intervening years witnessed the intertwining of English Catholic and Spanish discourses, but never had their mutual objectives come together so seamlessly. Spanish authorities were not as involved in the production of Sander’s history as they were of the Philopater tract. De origine was only co-opted by Philip as filtered through a Spanish redaction: the Scisma. When Allen was recruited to be the voice of the Armada in England some distance was still maintained. As we have seen, the Admonition was hesitant about touting too Spanish a line. The Responsio, on the other hand, though pseudonymous, does not hide the fact it was written by an English priest (even if he was a fictitious one) and is unequivocal in its support of Spain.

Despite the tighter bonds Persons’s book might manifest, it nevertheless harkens back to discursive strategies we have already seen. The following pages are not intended to provide in-depth analysis of the Responsio-- Peter Lake is currently doing so-- but only to give a brief sketch demonstrating its basic approach and filiations to works examined above. Expanding on themes first explored in the 1586 De origine, Persons’s narrative was constructed as a set of inversions. Whereas Elizabeth accused Philip of power-lust and corruption, Persons imaged him as the beneficent protector of Christendom. Whereas Elizabeth argued she used military force only in so far as it was necessary for self defense, Persons insisted she (and her advisors) were in fact promoters of violence and

553 Ibid., p. 204.
war in the name of heresy, Christian disunity and, above all, self-interest. The book was also meant to imply the inverted relationship between good and evil subjects, between rambunctious, rebellious Protestants and passive, long-suffering Catholic exiles.

Proof of Philip’s good nature was his long-abiding support England and Elizabeth herself. While Mary was alive, he showed special care for his sister-in-law, saving her from harsh punishment and even impending execution for her part in conspiracies and rebellion.⁵⁵⁴ When Mary died, he showed no less kindness. Personally, he offered the new queen jewels and riches. More importantly, amidst war in France he continued to look after her interests in Calais, even if Elizabeth herself sabotaged any possibility of it returning to English hands.⁵⁵⁵ The king’s patience seemed limitless—he endured more than three decades of constant affronts. Some even suggested he was too scrupulous in maintaining peace with a woman who caused nothing but trouble and was beholden to neither law nor religion.⁵⁵⁶ Occasionally, the king’s benevolence was such, that he missed important opportunities for just retribution. He did not, for example, assist the Northern Rebels; had he done so, they might have succeeded.⁵⁵⁷ At times, Philip bent to the queen’s whim. He even expelled Catholic exiles from the Netherlands to placate her.⁵⁵⁸ One gets the sense that this discussion of princely friendship was a subtle discussion of princely naïveté as well. Still, even misguided amity was proof of the king’s pacificity.

⁵⁵⁴ Persons, Responsio, pp. 120-125.
⁵⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 126-129.
⁵⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 131.
⁵⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 131-133.
This was manifest, not only in England, but all across Europe. His benevolent rule over Italy brought to it peace and tranquility never seen in “human memory” (hominum memoriam).\(^{559}\) His support for the Irish was undeniable, offering them access to ports and commerce, and general friendship, even though they were Elizabeth’s subjects.\(^{560}\) In Scotland, too, Philip had been an unfailing ally. Indeed, King James should remember, lest he be though ungrateful, Philip’s “singular benevolence” during his infancy and youth.\(^{561}\) Franco-Spanish tranquility was of particular note because it was maintained despite traditional and deeply entrenched enmity between both kingdoms.

After peace with Henri II in 1558, Persons insists, the king “conserved it unassailably until the present day.”\(^{562}\)

Persons could not, of course, fail to mention at least a couple of moments when the king turned more aggressive. First, Philip was convinced to give some aid for the Pope’s efforts in Ireland during the late 1570s. He did so grudgingly. Initially, he refused for fear of offending Elizabeth, but eventually conceded, leaving the plotting, however, up to Rome.\(^{563}\) Then there was the Armada, an event which was described as an understandable response to infinite Elizabethan attacks and betrayals both unto the king and the Church.\(^{564}\) In the Netherlands he carried out a similarly defensive war against rebels, and in France he fought only at the request of desperate Catholics fending off

\(^{559}\) Ibid., p.141.
\(^{560}\) Ibid., p.145. “Nunquam enim illi vel portu, vel accessu, vel commercijs, vel amicitia Hispanorum prohibiti sunt quamquam Regiae sint subditi…”
\(^{561}\) Ibid., p. 146. “Imprimis verò Rex Scotiae, si gratus esse voluerit, indicia non paucà nœ neque obscura singularis cuiusdam in se Regis benevolentiae recolere poterit, quam per infantiae, pueritiae, adolescentiaeque suae tempora expertus est.”
\(^{562}\) Ibid., p. 146. “…cum Henrico Rege percussum foedus, tanta Rex Philippus fide, tantaque constantia ad hunc usque diem inviolabile conservavit…”
\(^{563}\) Ibid., p. 134. “Rex iterum negavit, quoad tandem Alexandro Segae Nuncio Apostolico, Pontificis nomine multóties supplicanti, exiguam quandam Cantabròrum ac Gallecorum manum concessit, ea conditione, ut suo etiam arbitratu, quò vellet, in causae Catholicae subsidium transmitteret.”
\(^{564}\) Ibid., pp. 134-135.
Protestants. \footnote{Ibid., pp. 135-140.} Other conflicts not so easily linked to religious imperatives proved more complicated to explain, but were deemed equally justified. Persons had to admit that Portugal (another Catholic kingdom) was acquired through conquest. Nevertheless, he insisted that those Portuguese “expert in their laws” knew that the war was based on strong legal principles, mainly proper succession rights. Even the king’s critics--Persons mentions Geronimo Conestaggio\footnote{Geronimo Conestaggio, \textit{Dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla corona di Castiglia} (Genova: Girolamo Bartoli, 1585).}-- admitted Philip scrupulously investigated his genealogical claims and submitted the matter to the good (and pious) judgment of many advisors. After successfully using force, the king demonstrated nothing but paternal love for his subjects.\footnote{Persons, \textit{Responsio}, pp. 143-145.}

The \textit{Responsio} offers a providential reading of Philip’s reign. The king’s undeniable power obviously frightened Elizabeth, but it wouldn’t make a good Christian monarch flinch. He wielded his might with moderation. His was a God-given power to defend the Church from heretics.\footnote{Ibid., p. 181-182. “Potentiae Regis magnitudo, quam adeò ad invidiam amplificat Edictum, nullo Christiano principi molesta aut formidini est, cùm ea semper moderatissimè eius Maiestas sit usa. Summa autem Dei providentia ac benignitate factum esse interpretantur omnes boni, ut monarchia haec in tantam excreceret temporibus nostris magnitudinem, ut haberet Ecclesia qui eam tuetur, & insolentissimos haereticorum insultus, tanquam insanos hominum furiosorum in matrem impetus compesceret.”} Protestants questioned such a positive, providential analysis by pointing out Philip’s failures in 1588, but according to Persons, they were wrong to do so. The defeat of the Armada was due less to English excellence than to the typical hazards of naval warfare-- inclement weather, inexperience in unknown seas, and perhaps even some negligence. Moreover, God may have wanted to see if “the barren tree of England” could produce fruit before its demise.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 182-183. “Minus omninò causae est, cur tantopérè isti glorientur, de adverso belli successu, quem tulit classis Regia his annis proximis contrà Angliam instructa. Nulla enim ipsorum fortitudine...
previous pamphlets, Persons mentions Caesar’s initial foibles, and the initial losses of
Israelites against the tribe of Benjamin.\textsuperscript{570} The English, Persons warned, should meditate
on this. They should not “become more insolent because the punishment, which is
deserved for their sins, is delayed.”\textsuperscript{571}

Almost in the same breath, then, encomiums to the king were tied to threats
against Elizabeth. This part of Persons’ polemic was problematic. Though written just
four years after Allen had openly and ruthlessly attacked the queen in the \textit{Admonition} and
Philip set to dethrone her, the \textit{Responsio} betrays a nagging discomfort with feisty
polemics. From Philip’s point of view, attacking Elizabeth personally would have been a
breach of protocol. He would have, in theory at least, agreed with Elizabeth that no
“Prince or State should allow any Prince or State, much less an Absolute and Sovereign
one… [to] be defamed by defamatory libels.”\textsuperscript{572} To soothe the king’s conscience, Persons
would have pointed out Elizabeth herself was the one to break with widely accepted regal
etiquette. Indeed, slander against the king were not only said in private, but (through the
1591 proclamation) broadly disseminated, with public royal approval.\textsuperscript{573} Echoing a
sentiment no doubt wide-spread at the Spanish court Persons insisted printed assaults
against the king and the Pope should not be met with silence.\textsuperscript{574} In any case, concern

\textsuperscript{570} Ibid., pp. 183-184.
\textsuperscript{571} Ibid., pp. 184. “Hunc igitur rerum exitum meditentur Angli, ut poenae dilatatione, quae tantis eorum
flagitiis debetur, non insolescunt.”
\textsuperscript{572} Letter printed in “Una Controversia Anglo-Toscana nel secolo decimosesto” in Piero Rebora, \textit{Civiltà
Italiana e civiltà Inglese} (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1936), p. 104. Elizabeth to the Grand Duke of
Tuscany, 6 April 1592.
\textsuperscript{573} Persons, \textit{Responsio}, pp. 175-176. “Quod cum non tantum privatim dici, aut in angulo aliquo affirmari,
sed praet etiam evulgi video…”
\textsuperscript{574} Ibid., p. 5. “…tantae improbitatis atque impudentiae ulterius silentio involueretur, sed palam potius ac
publice confutaretur.”
about royal manners was moot when it came to the *Responsio* because (publically at least) it was not a royally sponsored document.

Persons’s priestly interlocutor was nevertheless left to ponder the propriety of taking part in worldly controversy. He decided the project was inevitable because all other approaches invariably failed. The enemy--Elizabeth-- had long been placated in hopes she would come back to the fold, but she didn’t. In recent years Cardinal Allen wrote sweetly worded books, to little effect. Why not, then, fight evil tyranny? In doing so, the author followed admirable precedents of those early Christians who “through their apologies opposed the fury of tyrants” (*apologijs suis, tyrannorum furoribus se opposuerunt*). Nothing would be held back in defense of the true faith.

Taking on the role of Spain’s attack dog, the *Responsio* guides us back into the polemical world of *De origine*. According to Verstegan, Philopater’s book, contained “many points of curiosity” and “secret histories” not unlike those found in Sander’s history. If both books wanted to expose the nefarious workings of the Elizabethan regime, however, they differed slightly in polemical approach. As argued above, Sander’s history attacked the queen directly, with only gestures at the bad influences of self-serving counsel which had been so prominent in works like *Leicester’s Commonwealth*. The *Responsio* wanted to have it both ways. Just as the 1591 proclamation both deflected blame for Philip’s foreign policy on evil advisors (namely Persons) *and* battered the king personally for greed and tyrannous leanings, so did the *Responsio* play a double-handed game. To be sure, a cast of villains -- primarily Cecil--

---

576 Ibid., 6.
misled the queen, but Persons felt no compunction about comparing her to ancient tyrants. Indeed, she was more inconsiderate, and crueler.  

Elizabeth was synonymous with war. If Philip only showed patience and kindness, the queen had always been hostile, abetting piracy and inciting rebellion among the king’s own subjects in the Netherlands and even Portugal. Her vendetta wasn’t only against Spain, but against all her neighbors. The queen tried to cover her penchant for war under the cloak of justice, but Persons insisted hers were never well-meaning schemes. When she removed Mary from her legitimate throne in Scotland in favor of an infant prince, she did so only to afflict Christendom; when she supported Henri of Navarre in France, she did so only to perpetuate rebellion and heresy across the Channel. There was a logic to her apparent maddened evil. She always followed one rule, she always served her own comfort.

This comparison between good Spanish and bad English monarch is to be expected. The dichotomous reading of Elizabeth and Henry VIII’s reigns less so. As we saw above, particularly in the 1586 De origine, both were considered part of the same narrative of England’s descent. The Responsio, however, accentuates Elizabeth’s sharp break with the past. While the king had maliciously cut ties with Rome, he had never embraced outright heresy as his daughter did. On the whole, Persons insisted Henry remained Catholic, “save for the article concerning the Roman Pontiff.” (This, recall, was a line of argument explicitly rejected in the 1586 De origine). Elizabeth, on the other

578 Persons, Responsio, pp. 102-103. Point is made pithily in a marginal notation: “Elizabatha crudelior antiquis persequutoribus” (p. 102).
579 Ibid., p. 187. “Haec enim mulieris istius ad universas actiones praecipua regula esse videtur, ut tempori commodisque suis inserviat.”
580 Ibid., p. 434. “Henricum ipsum octavum, qui primus a summa illa observantiae sinceritate defecit, excepto uno tantum de potestate Pontificis Romani articulo, caetera omnia pro Catholicis statuisse, tenuisse, defendisse & severissimas leges in Calvinianos omnes sanxisse, tum etiam exercuisse.”
hand, while still styling herself Defender of the Faith, rejected the very Church her father once protected to earn that title. Worse, while her father fought against Lutheranism, she embraced it.\textsuperscript{581} The situation was so dire, the changes wrought in a matter of decades so great, that were the king alive, daughter would have to hang father, or father would have to put daughter to the flames.\textsuperscript{582}

More than a history lesson, the \textit{Responsio} was a direct threat wrapped in a warning. England’s demise, Persons insisted, was inevitable. Internal divisions among dissident Protestant sects with rebellious propensities, as well as competing contenders to the throne signaled further tribulations. Moreover, the regime’s oppressive laws only bred general discontent. Impending travails were of a piece with God’s will. The queen, having strayed from the true faith, and much worse, having tortured and murdered faithful Catholics, invited future misfortunes. Many of her decisions were inspired by the evil counsel of others, but Persons insisted, she would have to bear the lion’s share of the blame.\textsuperscript{583} Thus, just as the 1591 proclamation suggested Philip was too old to follow imperial dreams, Persons insisted the queen was too old to continue inciting trouble both at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{584} History showed repeatedly that God punished at the hour of his choosing. Take, for example, the fate of Julian the Apostate, who Persons explains, died just when he seemed to thrive most.\textsuperscript{585}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[581] Ibid., pp. 366-367. “\textit{...dum Lutheri religionem, quam Henricus pater impugnabat, ipsa propugnet, fide etque Romanam, quam ille tunc temporis defendebat, ista planè demoliatur, & quibusque potest modis extinguere nitatur.}”
\item[582] Ibid., p. 413. “\textit{...si unà hodie ambo viverent, vel filiae Patrem patibulo fore suspundum, vel Patri filiam igne consumendam, nisi leges uterque revocarent suas.}”
\item[583] Ibid. p. 446 “\textit{Cognare tamen ipsa debet, non solum Cecilium, hanc culpam tandem praestaturum, cum calamitates influxerint, sed sibi potissimum creari periculum, cuius nomine, potentia, & authoritate mala nunc exercentur.”}
\item[584] Ibid.
\item[585] Ibid., pp. 363-364.
\end{footnotes}
These forebodings pertained just as much to the queen, as to her partners at arms. The *Responsio* descends into the realm of piquancy and even ribaldry when discussing Elizabeth’s closest advisors, both past and present-- their low births and evil intentions. Among these are Walsingham, Bacon, Hatton, Leicester, and especially the man who reigned supreme in the 1590s, Cecil. Elizabeth’s Lord Treasurer made it almost too easy. Having caught wind of defamatory tracts written against him (which amounted to shortened English companion pieces to the *Responsio*), Cecil wrote to an informer, Michael Moody, to gather information about them. Attached to his instructions was an apology for his policies and a defense of his noble birth. This letter somehow made it to English Catholic hands, and was viciously lampooned by Persons. Cecil’s pretensions to noble Welsh and even Roman stock were more than risible, however, they were cause for concern. Not only had a parvenu (the son of a Stratford hosteller) risen to the highest rungs of English society, but in placing himself among the greatest English princes, he may have been plotting further ascent, indeed he might have had his eyes set on the crown itself. Persons ominously mentions Cecil’s schemes to marry his son to Princess Arabella, a well-known contender to the English throne.

These were the usurping aims once imputed on Leicester, particularly in *Leicester’s Commonwealth*, now transposed to an even more “lowly” figure. Just as Leicester had been less than a decade prior, Cecil became the orchestrator of endless evil: he was author and protagonist of England’s tragedy, he was “the architect of all English

---

587 Persons, *Responsio*, pp. 238-239. “Si enim hoc aut verùm, aut ferendum sit, quid aliud expectandum, quàm ut stirpi quoque Regiae aliquando se ingerat Cecilius, & sordes suas abiectissimas, in principum etiam antiquissimorum genealogias transfundat, quo Regnum tandem sibi aut suis affectet. Quòd iam nunc agitare animo à non paucis eximiatum, per Arbelloae scilicet cum nepote suo ex filio connubium, quae puella ex Reginae Scotiae stirpe progenata, nonnihil iuris ad Regni quoque sucessionem praetendit.”
calamities. This was, of course, not surprising because both men, in a sense, emerged from the same evil seed: John Dudley. As noted in *De origine*, Dudley had attempted (and failed) to take power by supporting Jane Seymour’s claims to the English throne, setting a precedent for his son, Leicester. Dudley also engendered Cecil, who had opportunistically ingratiated himself with him, and was offered in return place of honor at Edward’s court. In the *Responsio* Persons, after years of harsh attacks against Leicester, seemed to shift the object of his ire by re-articulating a notion that had been current in the 1560s: between the two evils, Cecil and Leicester, the earl was the lesser one. It was Cecil who orchestrated the parliamentary coup that allowed the Elizabethan settlement which was at the root of all English troubles, even while Leicester himself dithered between supporting the true faith or heresy.

If Catholics were peaceable, heretics were invariably rebellious. They couldn’t help it. The fissions and divisions within the Protestant camp created an atmosphere of back-biting and fighting—long gone were the days when a unified faith reigned in England! Their violent penchant came through in actions and words. Just look, Persons insisted, at all the sermons and books advocating the disinherinace of Mary Tudor, both because she was a Catholic, and because of her gender. Indeed, whereas Catholic books focused on matters of faith and conscience, Protestant ones were dripping in bloody rage against each other and various monarchs. The best proofs of Protestant inconstancy were, of course, Puritans. Persons showed they were violent critics of the

---

588 Ibid., p. 36. “Restat alicquid de Cecilio dicendum, qui ut primus prodijt in hanc scenam, ità postremus perstitit, author & actor universae fabulae, immò poeta, & histrio, & mimus eiusdem, ac verissimus totius calamitatis Anglicanae architectus…”
590 During the 1560s the Spanish ambassador was thinking about who deserved more blame for England’s problems: Cecil or Leicester. He decided it was Cecil. Pollen, *English Catholics*, p. 69.
591 Persons, *Responsio*, pp. 85-88
592 Ibid., p. 355.
Elizabethan settlement, and often promoted sedition; and yet they were allowed to go free while Catholics were persecuted. Clearly, then, Catholics were not punished for sedition, or else Puritans would face the same fate.

Hearkening back to the Allen/Cecil debates of the 1580s after Campion’s martyrdom, Persons rehashes old argument to show the spurious legal claims made against missionary priests. Colleges were by no means “dens of sedition,” they were places of learning, bound by strict rules, and constant soul-searching. To be sure, many students hoped to return home as missionaries, but they had no rebellious intentions. As usual, Persons insisted missionaries taught their flock to obey their queen in matters of state, and spiritual authorities in matters ecclesiastical as commanded by biblical injunction.  

Priests were by no means puppets of the papacy or Spain, they were not moved by king or potentate, but only by the “emperor of heaven, the king of kings…” If following the dictates of conscience was sedition, then they were guilty as charged. But Persons pointed out, by this logic, the apostles too would have been guilty as charged by their tyrannical oppressors.

****

A re-set button was pressed in 1588. Although Spanish Elizabethans gained much credit with Philip in the years leading up to the Armada, naval disaster threatened the exile cause and their security on the Continent. Their existence, so deeply intertwined

593 Ibid., pp. 304-305. “Hac igitur distinctione moderationeque progressi sunt Sacerdotes nostri in animarum opere prosequendo, ut in rebus ad rempublicam & ad potestatem Regiam pertinentibus, omnem Reginae obedientiam subiectionemque, tum Catholicis persuaderent, tum ipsi quoque fidelissime exhiberent, quae Ecclesiasticae verò potestatis animarumque essent, ea animarum pastori, Christique Vicario reservarent, quod est eiusdem Christi Domini implere mandatum, praecipientis, dari quae Caesaris sunt, Caesari, & quae Dei, Deo.”

594 Ibid., p. 270. “Et si hos vel Alanus, vel Personius, vel alius quispiam pietate ductus colligit, non tam Pontificis, aut Regis Hispaniarum iussu, licet sanctissimo, hoc faciunt, quàm caelorum imperatoris, Regisque Regum, ac Pastoris universalis mandato...”
with Spanish good will, would be rendered precarious should Spain’s interests in English affairs wane and its purse strings tighten. Worse, of course, England itself might be abandoned to its further ruin should Philip simply fold his arms. Not only would hopes of military intervention be dashed, but the hopes of missionary advances would be thwarted without support for continental colleges.

The texts we have studied in this “interlude” each reflect discursive efforts to link English Catholic and Spanish discourses, and as such each taken individually and all taken collectively suggest the many sided nature of the endeavor. The Spanish Elizabethan polemical stew was part defense of exile imperatives, part plea for support, and part attack against a mutual enemy. By picking up a pro-Spanish stance, and -- especially in the Responsio--hurling it across Europe, English Catholics were doing Spain a service. Indeed, they were doing precisely what the Spanish court wanted them to do, what they thought needed doing to gain better footing in an international discursive battle they seemed to be losing. Much as they were serving Philip, however, English Catholics were also serving themselves. Discursively, they tried to make it known that the battle that needed to be waged was between Elizabeth and Philip. By propagating this widely, Persons and his allies wanted to force the prudent king to take the requisit action.

The post-Armada works mentioned above, especially the Responsio, aim to maintain a type of argumentative approach which had been carefully constructed in pre-Armada works. There is thus an air of familiarity among all the books discussed thus far; perhaps these filiations have even led to occasional repetition. If I have risked repetitiveness, however, it has been to set the stage for the discursive break which we shall soon encounter.
Part II: 1593-1596

Prelude

Elizabeth’s flirtation with death at the end of 1562--she had contracted something like smallpox--aroused fears of civil war. Unmarried and childless she was the last of the Tudors. With no clear heir to the throne, many feared endless battles over contested successions and a reprise of the Wars of the Roses. The queen survived her illness, but relief could only be fleeting; concerns about her successor or lack thereof lingered until the very end--not even the growing myth of Gloriana could erase the penumbra of uncertainty. Initially, many thought marriage (and subsequent child-bearing) would be the antidote to England’s uncertain future, but Elizabeth proved stubborn and the politics of marriage fruitless. Indeed, at times it seemed that the succession question caused hand-wringing among everyone except the queen herself. As opposed to royal lethargy, fear of post-Elizabethan disaster seems to have inspired (or necessitated) some political innovation among her counselors, unleashing some “republican” impulses as they designed mechanisms to choose a royal heir. Elizabeth would have, of course, bristled at the thought. Much to the queen’s chagrin, choosing a spouse, which she considered a personal imperative not up to public debate, and choosing a successor, a matter about which she prohibited speculation, nevertheless became issues of public discussion.

As much or more than impending civil war, many at court feared Mary Stuart’s possible ascendance. Protestant eagerness to exclude Mary, and Catholic eagerness to uphold her claims framed a genealogical debate that would continue at changing decibels until 1603. Especially after her imprisonment in 1568, the Stuart line was advocated by Catholic supporters, primarily John Leslie, Bishop of Ross, from his exile in France. The claim was relatively simple. Mary was the eldest legitimate Lancastrian descendent. She was Henry VII’s great granddaughter, via Henry’s eldest child, Margaret (Mary’s grandmother).

Defenses of Mary’s rights were not produced at random, but were generally statements made during times of particular political crisis. After the Northern Rebellion (1569) in which Mary was implicated, Leslie wrote *A defence of the honour of the righte of the highe mighty and noble Princesse Marie Quene of Scotlande*. Polemically the moment was opportune for such a book because, as the author noted, in England “great contention hath of late risen… touching the rights heir apparent of the Crown of England.” The book’s tone is, on the whole, moderate. It didn’t question Elizabeth’s legitimacy and showed how the English commonwealth would benefit by acknowledging Mary’s legitimacy. Doing so would even help buttress English pretensions in France! In 1584, on the heels of the Throckmorton Plot (to kill Elizabeth and raise Mary), Leslie once again printed a short book on the subject, *A Treatise Touching the Right, Title, and Interest of the Most Excellent Princesse Marie, Queene of Scotlande*, this time pushing the envelope further, though again, avoiding direct comment on Elizabeth’s legitimacy.

---

Still, he dangerously argued subjects should know their future ruler to avoid “detestable alterations and subversions of the public state.” Further, the book called for aid from Christian princes everywhere. The Pope was beseeched to “defend her [Mary] as his daughter, which neither by straightness of prison, nor by any kind of affliction could be hitherto seduced from honoring him as her father.” This forward tone harmonizes with Allen’s aforementioned *Defense* and the anonymous *Leicester’s Commonwealth*, both also printed in 1584. Indeed, the authors of the latter slip Leslie’s argument for Mary’s succession into their assault against Leicester.

Despite these public statements, the politics of advocating Mary’s cause on the Continent became increasingly difficult. As Allen, Persons, and their allies became evermore tied to Spain, defending a Scottish succession became a liability; Philip II trusted Mary as much as he trusted any statesman: very little. He trusted her son, James VI, even less, influenced as he was by a host of heretics who had raised him in Scotland. In 1587 Mary--fully aware of Philip’s qualms, and grown more pessimistic about her fate were she to remain prisoner much longer--tried to coax the king by making a false promise. In a letter to Bernardino Mendoza she claimed to have written a testament which excluded her son from the English throne were he to remain a heretic. Further, the Scottish queen left the realm to Philip himself, *if* the king promised her protection. The will was much bruited about, but it has never been found, and probably never existed.

---

599 Leslie, *A treatise*, 10r.
600 Ibid., 3r.
601 For an analysis of these texts and their function within an English landscape we must await the publishing of Peter Lake’s 2011 Ford Lectures.
That same year, 1587, Leslie made one last pitch for Mary in a short pamphlet printed for broad release across Europe. In its Spanish version, aside from demonstrating Mary’s succession rights, he urged Philip to take up her cause because Spanish pretensions through a collater al line would be thus secured. \(^{603}\) Though the pamphlet may have been well-intentioned, it inadvertently (or was it inadvertent?) showed the incommensurability of Spanish and Scottish claims to the English throne. As Philip’s Armada campaign was in preparation the king thought seriously about installing Mary as queen, so long as either through the “phantom will” (Jensen’s phrase) or by papal fiat he could choose her successor. Even as such plans were reviewed, however, Philip was thinking in earnest about his own claims. Indeed, some English Catholics were exploring Philip’s genealogical rights, regardless of Mary’s.\(^ {604}\)

Allen and Persons were in a bind. They struggled to find a way to reconcile both Mary and Philip’s interests. Were he to rescue her, “bestowed in marriage by His Majesty, this same Queen’s authority and acquiescence can…be used in setting up negotiations for the succession of His Majesty…” But such machinations must have seemed increasingly quixotic. Especially as 1587 wore on, they suggested Spanish success was not dependent wholly on Mary’s good graces. Were Philip to conquer England, Elizabeth was likely to have her killed, “believing that the Enterprise is undertaken because of her” (credendo che per causa sua se fa l’Impresa).\(^ {605}\) In this case,

---


\(^{605}\) Hicks, ed., *Letters and Memorials*, p. 291. “Considerationi per le quali pare che in nissun modo convenga che il interesse particolare de sua maesta a la successione de Inglaterra se proponga al papa
Philip’s own pretensions would easily materialize. Allen and Persons considered Mary’s death and Philip’s imperial ascendance a small price for England’s Catholic renewal.

And yet, they urged caution. The Spanish king should not advertise heredity: all claims should be kept secret, particularly from the Pope. Sixtus V would not keep a secret, and worse, he might “for reasons of state…indulge in diverse reflections and conversations and suspicions in reference to His Majesty’s actions.…” No doubt necessary allies such as the French and Mary Stuart herself would be turned off by such talk as well.606

Stuck in the thickets of succession politics, Allen and Persons stood still. In 1584, Persons had supported using genealogical matters in Leicester’s Commonwealth, but with the commencement of the “De origine phase” of their propaganda campaign it became studied policy to avoid the question, save the occasional comment about Elizbeth’s irresponsibility for not producing or choosing an heir.

In 1593 such reticence would end, and a distinct polemical phase would begin. Shying away from the types of ad hominem attacks against the queen and her counselors we have seen up to now, Spanish Elizabethans played with a more neutered discourse focusing on broad political theories and the tangled branches of royal family trees. As in previous years, their efforts were largely historical, but they would no longer channel Tacitean secret histories, or the pseudo-Euesebian ecclesiastical histories of years past. Instead, they would write short comparative histories of political institutions to promote a particular vision of how polities were instituted and taken care of. More importantly, they wrote histories of royal descent or convoluted genealogies, thus occupying

---

avanti l’impresa, 18 March 1587. Hicks translates this a bit differently: “being under the impression that the expedition is being made in support of her cause,” (p. 294).

themselves with yet another important facet of the early modern historiographical tradition.

Spanish Elizabethans tried to render palatable something most would have found repulsive. They took on the rather unenviable task of promoting a Spanish successor to the English throne. Even more than in previous chapters, the exigencies of English Catholic “homelessness” become readily apparent. Nowhere do we see the ideological flexibility, the polemical awareness or, from a more hostile point of view, the trickery of certain English Catholics more than in the textual story which will unfold below. Nowhere can we better observe cameleon-like texts slithering through shifting political circumstances. Nowhere can we better observe ideological suppleness put to use for the sake of turgid confessional goals.
Chapter 5

Spanish Elizabethans and the Spanish Succession

A garden outside Lisbon’s city walls was one of many sites where Portugal’s precarious future was negotiated. Most people believed Cardinal Henrique, who had just ascended to the Portuguese throne (1578) at the age of sixty-six, would die sooner than later. More troubling, both his advanced age and his clerical vows assured he would have no children, leave no heir. Contemporaries well-versed in bloody dynastic struggles braced for the worst, while claimants to the throne prepared for a fight. In September, away from the peering eyes of the Portuguese court, Cristóbal de Moura, Spanish ambassador to Portugal, managed to meet with Lope Centil, a local letrado who amidst forced courtesies and more than one sly promise agreed to write a fool-proof defense of Philip II’s succession rights. The prospect excited the ambassador so much that he could barely sleep that night. 607 His insomnia serves as a reminder that thoroughly reasoned— if not always reasonable— genealogical claims were the armature early modern rulers used to assert (or establish) their legitimacy.

Philip, of course, knew this before he conquered Portugal, but the rigors of ascertaining his claims there brought home the need for reliable, searchable documentary repositories. Just five years after the conquest was complete, with Lisbon’s Arquivo Torre do Tombo in mind, but this time in the thick of potential or actual attempts to assert Spanish rights to the crowns of England and France, Philip ordered sweeping reforms of

---

607 Cristóbal de Moura to Antonio Pérez, Lisbon, 8 September 1578, Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 1930, fol. 74r-v. For more on Centil and his aid to Philip see Don Alfonso Danvila de Buguero, Don Cristóbal de Moura (Madrid: Fortanet, 1900), p. 373.
the Archivo General de Simancas. The king knew that “the memory of antiquity rests in writings”\textsuperscript{608} and was keen that Simancas house “all and whatever rights that belong to us or could belong to us…”\textsuperscript{609}

On the eve of the Armada, when the time came to think seriously about a Spanish succession to the English crown, Philip had his archives scoured. A report resulting from one such investigation--undated, but surely written between 1585 and early 1587-- is revealing.\textsuperscript{610} It suggests Mary Stuart, Henry VII’s granddaughter, was deemed legitimate heir to the English throne, despite the fact that some claimed foreigners were barred. Her supporters argued that because she was British, England would in fact “remain free and not subject to another foreign master.” Other possible claimants descending from Henry VII’s daughters were said to be illegitimate, leaving only one other plausible contender: Philip himself. Regardless of heredity, some were happy to leave their options open, believing that “whoever released them from their captivity should be their king and master.” The report finishes laconically. Brute force would suffice should Philip, or anyone else, want to use it. Rights to the English crown, the report argued, had historically been asserted by arms, “and he who wielded them best became king, justly or unjustly.”

Near the date (March 24) definitive news of Mary Stuart’s execution got to the duke of Olivares in Rome, Allen and Persons sent Philip a report buttressing his claims. Despite not having all the pertinent sources available in “Paris and elsewhere” a


\textsuperscript{609} Ibid, p. 104.

\textsuperscript{610} Biblioteca Francisco Zabalburi, Madrid, Altamira 161, doc. 138. “Por la sucesion de Inglaterra y Escocia sacado de las escrituras que ay en los archivos reales & Simancas con el arbol Della.”
sufficiently sturdy set of genealogical arguments were hurriedly fetched out of readily available old, dusty tomes in Rome.\footnote{Hicks, ed., Letters and Memorials, p.295. Allen and Persons to Philip, Rome, after 24 March 1587.}

In doing this, Persons and Allen parted ways with the Bishop of Ross and his pro-Stuart stance. They explained that while Ross—who they were sure to emphasize was a Scotsman--argued there were claimants from three family lines, there were in fact only two.\footnote{Ibid., p. 296. “Nel primo loco dove per Avanti sempre sono state rappresentate tre line diverse pretendente a la successione de la corona de Ynghilterra (come se vede nel albero de la genealogie stampata questi anni passati dal vescovo di Rosse, Scozzese…”} Previously it was believed there was a Yorkist line, a Lancastrian one, and a third that was mixed. The duke of Huntington laid claim to Yorkist, the kings of Castile and Portugal to Lancastrian, and Henry VII’s heirs to mixed blood. The latter, they insisted, was considered “mixed” because while Henry’s wife was a Yorkist, he was said to be of Lancastrian stock. But, in fact, the king was not. According to Ross, Henry’s claims were based on his familial links to John of Gaunt and Blanche (who was original bearer of the title), but Allen and Persons point out that the king was in fact a descendant of John and Catherine Swynford, his third wife. Henry VII and his heirs thus had no claim on Blanche’s blood. For the true Lancastrians, one needs to follow the descent of her children, in particular Henry IV and his two sisters Phillipa and Catharine both of whom married into Iberian royal families, and who were in effect Philip II’s ancestors. Allen and Persons suggest claims might be pushed by the descendants of Henry IV’s daughters: Blanche who married the duke of Bavaria and Philippa who married the King of Denmark. But this was uncertain. They weren’t sure if the current heads of Bavaria and
Denmark were of the same caste, and they didn’t really want to know. Indeed, they hoped the issue remained “secret and unknown by them” (incognita e non pensata da loro).  

The validity of these arguments are not important for our purposes. What we must be fully cognizant of is that matters of succession appear and reappear at the will of the relevant pretenders when the right moment and opportunity arose. When Philip had his archives examined, surely he was not nervous about whether or not his claims could be supported; he was only seeking to re-affirm long-held assumptions. Three decades earlier, when the Spanish prince was received as Mary Tudor’s consort their Lancastrian pedigree was a matter of open public knowledge. As the monarchs passed through Cheapside they witnessed, according to John Ender, an “excellent” pageant where they were presented with a genealogy “most ingeniously set out, with a great arbor or tree; under the root whereof was and old man lying on his head.” The old man was Edward III from whom, as the chronicler tells us, “both their majesties are lineally descended” and at the very top of the tree were the queen on the right and the king on the left.  

At the beginning of Elizabeth’s reign there were rumors that these claims might be acted upon by the Spanish king, but there was a conscious decision made not to. English Catholics were also perfectly willing to relegate Spanish claims to a secondary realm à la John Leslie, until the axe fell on their hopes of Mary Stuart’s succession.

Much as before Mary’s death, Spanish Elizabethans remained advocates of secrecy. Public discussion of a Spanish succession would only inspire jealousies. Moreover, they argued, genealogical matters were inherently difficult and often unclear.

---

613 Ibid., p. 298.
614 John Elder, *The copie of a letter sent into Scottlande of the arivall and language and most noble marriage of the most Illustre Prynce Phillippe Prynce of Spaine to the most excellente Princes Mary Quene of Inglande* (n.p., 1554), sig. C i(v)-C ii (v).
As we have heard before, only force could secure the succession. Even if the Lancastrian claim was pristine, Allen and Persons insisted that with heretics in power and with Spanish enemies all across Europe, Philip’s ascent could be achieved with nothing other than arms.\footnote{Hicks, ed., \textit{Letters and Memorials}, p. 289. Allen and Persons to Philip II, Rome, after 24 March 1587.}

This harsh reality was no less true in 1593 than it was in 1587. The big difference was that in 1593, Persons and his associates decided that war would be accompanied by a public airing of succession debates. Why the tactical shift? An unanswerable question. All we can be sure of is a changing political context marked by increased French instability and the renewed possibility of anti-Elizabethan aggression.

The fate of Spanish incursions into English affairs depended on political developments in France. Throughout 1592 and 1593 efforts by an array of British (English, Irish, and Scottish) Catholics seeking aid against Elizabeth were politely rejected. Philip insisted a renewed attack was impossible while he was still fighting a long, complicated, and costly war in favor of Isabel Clara Eugenia’s rights to the French throne against Henri of Navarre.\footnote{Francisco de Borja Medina, “Intrigues of a Scottish Jesuit at the Spanish Court: Unpublished Letters of William Crichton to Claudio Acquaviva” in Thomas McCoog, ed., \textit{The Reckoned Expense: Edmund Campion and the Early English Jesuits} (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1996), pp. 215-248.} The progress of the English cause thus depended on either the immediate success of Spain’s French campaign or, conversely, its precipitous failure.

Philip’s war proved difficult and neared total collapse with Henri of Navarre’s conversion to Catholicism on 25 July 1593. More than the Infanta’s French pretensions, Philip’s activities in France had been morally justified as a war against a would-be heretical king. Though many Catholics rejected the conversion as a farce, it nonetheless
allowed Henri to make plausible appeals to rebellious Catholics. He was crowned in Chartres early in 1594. There he would promise, with at least some believability, to “expel from all lands under my jurisdiction all heretics denounced by the church.” By September 1594 a further blow to the Spanish cause came from Rome where Clement VIII, despite reservations, proved willing to accept Henri back into the Catholic fold. In a letter to Philip the Pope insisted: “As to the true or feigned conversion, this is something that troubles us greatly, as it does not only touch on the health of one person, but the whole kingdom, and consequently millions of souls….” Taking this into account, he argued God alone could know man’s heart. Presently, he continued, “…we are forced to follow conjecture and signs (congettura et i segni) which in this case are very important.”

Philip may have been unsurprised by Rome’s decision, but was likely devastated by ligueur “betrayal” in France. In 1593 a radical Catholic assembly proved unwilling to “elect” a Spanish successor, taking away what Philip hoped would be a solid legal justification for his efforts.

In this seemingly glum context Persons and his colleagues in Spain began a new, if modest, print campaign. By 29 August 1594 Pedro de Ribadeneyra gave his official blessing for printing a Spanish translation of a relation written by the nuns of Syon Abbey. The booklet was prepared by Charles Dractan, a priest at Valladolid’s English College. The text tells of the hardships experienced by a group Bridgettine nuns since their expulsion from London during Henry VIII’s reign, their forced peregrinations

around the Netherlands and France, and their recent arrival in Portugal. It was meant primarily as a fund-raising tool for these holy women, but was also a way to offer a Spanish audience an English view, as advertised on the title page, “of the state of things in France, after Vendome [Henri IV] was accepted as king.” 619

The pamphlet fits somewhat awkwardly within a Spanish landscape because of its apparent resignation. Whether the Catholic world liked it or not, Henri was de facto French king. The nuns decided to leave France to avoid involvement in succession politics: they didn’t want to voice their opinion on Henri’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, after his coronation, they seemed to accept him. They even thought he would provide passports for their escape. 620 The king’s governor in Rouen tried to convince the nuns to stay, largely because he wanted to shore up Catholic support. The women were resolute. Despite any possible good intentions on the part of royal governors, they doubted safety could be assured. The nuns’ distrust lingered primarily because of the prevailing threat from Elizabeth and English Protestants. 621 France was too close to home. The further away from England, the better.

The nuns didn’t choose the route of martyrdom, nor did they advocate for Henri’s removal. They instead chose to flee. Could their story indicate the strategy some Englishmen hoped Philip would follow? Indeed, to some, Spanish disengagement from a lost battle would allow for re-focusing on truly important--English--matters.

For the attentive reader, one seemingly throw-away line indicates a new discursive environment. After describing the history of St. Syon’s abbey, the author(s)

619  Relacion que embiaron las religiosas del monasterio de Sion de Inglaterra (Madrid: Viuda de Pedro de Madrigal, 1594).
620  Ibid., 31r-v.
621  Ibid., 34v.
argued providence had brought the nuns to Lisbon. God made it so they found a safe haven in Portugal “under the protection of the descendants of the house of Lancaster and of the royal blood of Henry V, who as mentioned before was second king of this house. For it is known that the kings of the house of Portugal…are direct descendants of the house of Lancaster, because they come from the queen doña Philippa, daughter of John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, and sister of his son king Henry VI of England, who was the wife of John I, king of Portugal.” The Bridgettines had, in a sense, found a path back to their legitimate ruler: Philip.

This aside is important. It demonstrates an (admittedly tame) effort to make the succession a matter discussion. To be sure this was at least the partial the aim of another book, written around the same time, the Raçonamiento y parecer de los letrados ingleses sobre el caso de la sucesión del Reyno de Ingaterra.

The book is something of an enigma. As far as I have been able to ascertain, there is no printed exemplar, and it survives only in seventeenth century manuscript copies housed at the Biblioteca Nacional de España in Madrid and at the English College in Rome. The text is a partial translation of an important English book, A Conference about the Next Succession to the Crowne of Ingland (which we will deal with below), and thus must have been put together after the English version was complete. Still, the Spanish iteration was probably the first version to be scrutinized by people other than the

---

622 Ibid., 11v.
623 Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 23199. Raçonamiento y parecer de los letrados ingleses sobre el caso de la sucesión del Reyno de Inglaterra dividido en dos libros con un arbol de la descendencia de todos los pretensores de aquel Reyno desde Gulielmo llamado el conquistador hasta el dia de oy que son mas de quinientos años. At the English College see a similarly titled manuscript: Venerable English College, Liber 1396
625 Ibid., fol. 1r.
authors. Even before anyone in Rome had a clear idea of what the Conference was about, Persons reported that a Spanish translation had been given to Juan de Idiáquez, presumably to procure funds for the book’s publishing in English.\textsuperscript{626} There is a chance, based on a letter sent from the papal nuncio in Spain to Cardinal Aldobrandino in Rome (March 1594)\textsuperscript{627} that the Spanish book was printed at the command of Philip II. Since no printed copies survive, and since no corroborating evidence exists to support such a claim, however, this seems unlikely. Rumors of a printed Spanish version were probably misconstruals of the fact that Madrid funded the Conference’s printing in Antwerp.\textsuperscript{628}

The text, in its English and subsequent Spanish version was the work of English Catholics in and around Valladolid.\textsuperscript{629} There is no way to identify the translator, but the project as a whole was the work of several regulars at the English College-- Sir Francis Englefield and Joseph Creswell, for example-- as well as occasional visitors like the Anglo-Irish scholar, Richard Stanyhurst.\textsuperscript{630} Common sense also tells us that Persons must have played an important role. Not only was he the capo of English Catholic activities in Spain and a vital presence in Valladolid, but he never quite denied at least partial authorial responsibility. Moreover, I find no convincing reason to assume men like

\textsuperscript{626} Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Hispania 136, fol. 162r. Persons to Acquaviva, Madrid, 16 June 1594.
\textsuperscript{627} Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese III, 94c, fol. 277v. Camillo Borghese to Aldobrandino, Madrid, March 1594.
\textsuperscript{628} I have not discovered any documents referring to Spanish funding of the book. Nevertheless, this can be assumed both because Philip’s court was kept informed about the text, and because in those years Madrid was funding Richard Verstegan who printed the book from Flemish headquarters. On Verstegan and printing generally, see Paul Arblaster, \textit{Antwerp & the World: Richard Verstegan and the International Culture of Catholic Reformation} (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2004). See also Edward Rombauts, \textit{Richard Verstegan: een polemist der contra-reformatie} (Brussels: Alemeene Drukinrichtig, 1933).
Englefield (Persons’ ally) had ulterior motives when they attributed the *Conference* to the Jesuit.\(^{631}\) Still, that authorial hot potato was being played once again with the succession tract is a testament to how controversial its authors understood the text to be.

The *Raçonamiento* is an important text because it helps us tell the pre-history of the *Conference*. It is the text that convinced Spanish authorities that Persons and his allies had created a book worthy of support, one that was in line with Habsburg objectives. Thus, what we have here is a key into how the polemical project was “pitched” to Philip and a window into the types of propagandistic tools the king was willing to employ. Indeed, because the Spanish court subsequently supported the book’s English printing we must assume the text was in line with royal polemical objectives.

As I shall argue here, the *Raçonamiento* can be read as a continuation of a propagandistic program started in the late 1580s that fully bloomed in the 1590s with such books as the *Responsio*, but with different inflections. The authors were providing a broad genealogical justification for Spain’s various imperial projects in Europe. Indeed, the book can be read as a broadside in favor of Spanish *monarchia*, not in the prophetic mode that pro-Spanish fervor could sometimes be expressed in,\(^{632}\) but in a legalistic mode focused on proprietary rights.

Persons and his compatriots strained to frame their work as an unbiased meditation on the English succession. The book was a faux transcript of comments made by a civil lawyer. The reader is witness to a *disputatio* of sorts where the interlocutor expounds on both sides of the immediate question--Who is Elizabeth’s rightful heir?--

---

\(^{631}\) Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese II, 448 A-B, fol. 392r. Englefield to Clement VIII, Valladolid, 2 September 1596.

without, however, coming to a definite conclusion. As I shall argue, the book was in fact not as open ended as the authors suggest. Still, efforts to give all contenders a “fair” hearing sometimes led to making arguments that don’t always follow a typical Spanish Habsburg line.

Indeed, the project as a whole seems, on first glance, very un-Spanish. The English succession was something that the crown did not touch publicly. If anything, the French succession alone was promoted as a subject for broad discussion. Thus, even during 1595-96 when some sort of English action seemed inevitable (another Armada would set sail in 1596), Esteban de Garibay’s elaborate book on Spanish Habsburg genealogical matters pushes French claims while all but ignoring any English ones.\textsuperscript{633} That the \textit{Raçonamiento} (and thus the \textit{Conferece}) received royal approval most likely had something to do with the fact that it demonstrated a set of basic arguments that Philip and his advisors would have promoted in such a way that did not come off as crude pro-Spanish propaganda, even if it indeed was.

After a whole day spent by an “imperial lawyer” expatiating on how monarchies were instituted, the “civil lawyer” was asked by friends and colleagues to deal with genealogical matters specific to the English crown. The first day’s theoretical matters, as we shall see below, were the substance of part I of the \textit{Conference}, though they receive only a thin summary in the Spanish text. In just two pages the authors get to the crux of the matter. Propinquity of blood should not be the only factor in deciding royal succession. Succession was not merely a matter of lineage, but was dependent on the will

\textsuperscript{633} Esteban de Garibay, \textit{Ilustraciones geneologicas de los Catholicos reyes de las Españas} (Madrid: Luis Sanchez, 1596).
of the commonwealth. This argument was enough to justify, indeed necessitate, a cool-headed, neutral, discussion of rivaling claims.634

Despite these attestations to objectivity, however, a close reading reveals a subtle argument in favor of broadly Catholic, specifically Spanish, claims to the throne. These were, however, artfully veiled beneath the cloak of plausible deniability.

The Raçonamiento was meant to resonate with Spanish audiences, or at the very least, to a limited courtly coterie. It is telling, for example, that in summarizing part I of the Conference for Spanish readers, Persons and his colleagues took swipes at Pierre de Belloy, a writer who they claimed falsely defended “Vendome’s” (Henri IV’s) rights to the French throne purely on the grounds of direct lineage.635 The explicit mention of Belloy reflects the French polemicists’ role as the book’s straw man, as well as the authors’ keen awareness of Spanish concerns. By taking aim at him Persons and his colleagues framed their work as an attack on the sorts of anti-League, anti-Spanish polemics being written in France by Navarre’s supporters. By arguing for elective monarchies against Belloy’s insistence on their divinity, the authors were supporting ideas that Philip might find useful against French nemeses.

The king, however, generally preferred to keep the French succession a matter of God and heredity. Even before the League-backed claimant to the throne, Charles of Bourbon, died in 1589 there had been murmurs in Spain about the Infanta’s claims as the last of the Valois dynasty (her mother was Elizabeth of Valois). This was hotly disputed because, apart from her Spanish pedigree which was in itself repugnant, many in France argued that the Salic Laws precluded women from royal inheritance. Spanish supporters

634 Raçonamiento, fols. 5r-7v.
635 Ibid., fol. 2v.
often scoffed at the Law’s validity and Philip believed his daughter’s claims would trump the ancient French legal code which was, in any case, nothing but custom, or worse, mere “invención.” To others, however, it was clear, as Francisco Alvarez de Ribera put it, that since said laws “had been observed in those kingdoms [of France] for so many centuries, it seems that today there is no way to impugn this premise.” While this pesky reality rendered the Infanta’s otherwise obvious claim to the French throne tenuous, he continued, the Salic Law did not extend to all the “estates and dominions” held by the French crown. The duchy of Brittany, where much of the Franco-Spanish war would unfold in the 1590s, was one such dominion. There the Infanta’s claims were certain.

For men like Acevedo the duchy’s independence had remained intact well into the fifteenth century, when--tellingly, through matrilineal inheritance-- it became linked with France proper.

Persons and his colleagues were keen to present the Infanta’s French claims in the *Raçonamiento*, though their emphases were markedly different from mainstream opinion in Spain. While for Spanish legal commentators like Lorenzo Polo Brittany’s primordial English roots-- it had been founded by men who had fled England-- were of incidental curiosity, for Spanish Elizabethans the commingling of English and French genealogical matters were of prime importance. In a general discussion sketching England’s succession since the Norman Conquest, the interlocutor offered a brief excursus on

---

639 Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 18.633-22, fols. 3r-3v.
640 Biblioteca Nacional de España, Mss. 6604, fol. 3r. [Lorenzo?] Polo, *Iuris responsum pro serenissima Principe D. Elizabetha Clara Eugenia catholici Philippi 2 Hispanorum Regis filia, super iure, et successione ducatus et provintie Britanie, sive armorice.*
French affairs because, he insisted, those who defended the Infanta’s English claims based their arguments on the Breton succession. \(^{641}\) Luckily for Spain’s supporters, France and England had become indelibly linked when Henry II married Eleanor of Aquitaine and his son (Geoffrey) married into the Breton clan. The successor to one crown could claim rights to the other.

Arguments for the Infanta’s descent were thus multifaceted. First, the standard regurgitation of what had become dogma in Spanish circles: the eventual descent of Brittany into Valois hands made the Infanta a natural successor.

The interlocutor also provided an argument which established a “direct” link between Philip’s daughter and Henry II of England. \(^{642}\) Henry’s daughter, Eleanor, had married into the Castilian monarchy, eventually gave birth to Blanche of Castile, who in turn married the French king, Louis VIII of France, and so on. So Isabel was both linked to English and French royalty.

Some also suggested England belonged to France. According to Persons and his associates, some claimed the English had once subjected themselves to French rule—having grown tired of King John of England, they chose Louis VIII of France to be their king. This arrangement, however, never came to fruition because upon John’s sudden death, the English changed their mind and elected Henry III. Despite this, some said the Infanta, as Louis’s legitimate heir, could nevertheless claim the English crown. Although never effectuated, Louis had been legally elected and his heirs could legally re-assert

---

\(^{641}\) Raçonamiento, fol. 33r.
\(^{642}\) Ibid., fols. 33r-38r; fols. 178r-180r.
their old rights. As queen of France, Philip’s daughter could very well claim the English throne.

The Infanta’s name had been floated as a possible English successor since the days leading up to the Armada, perhaps because Philip didn’t want the weight of another crown on his aging head. He probably also thought promoting his daughter was a prudent compromise: denials of imperial pretensions might thus ring truer. Nevertheless, at least up to writing of the Raçonamiento, Spanish Elizabethans seemed to lean on the king’s own inheritance, which was subject of the book’s final chapter.

Philip’s claims hinged, as suggested above, on Portugal’s Lancastrian ancestry, going back to Philippa (John of Gaunt’s daughter) who had married João I of Portugal. Philip was born of Princes Isabel of Portugal, and was thus grandson of Dom Manuel to whom several other claimants were also linked. As with the French succession, in discussing the Portuguese one, Persons and his partners were dipping into a series of important contemporary debates in Spain. After conquest, while most other Portuguese claimants relented to Philip’s might, Antonio, prior of Crato, did not. Fancying himself true king, he spent the rest of his life garnering both popular support and occasional aid from foreign powers, mainly the English and French. Philip, on his side, strained to assert and re-assert that his conquest of Portugal was based on the certitude that his claim was “the most just.” Persons and his colleagues echo the Spanish court by taking direct aim at Antonio’s pretensions, pointing out he was ultimately a bastard and thus ineligible for the throne, as opposed to Philip whose claims, were, of course, clear.

---

643 Ibid., fol. 184v.
644 Antonio de Herrera, Cinco libros de Antonio de Herrera de la historia de Portugal, y conquista de las Islas de los Açores en los años de. 1582. y 1583. (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1591), p. 25.
645 Raçonamiento, fols. 203v-206r.
Beyond blood ties, the authors also raised an alternative argument for Philip’s proper descent in Portugal. They suggested, as the crown had also done since the 1570s, that Portuguese monarchs themselves had given succession rights to the Castilians as part of a dowry.\textsuperscript{646} As with the Infanta who possessed dual legitimacy in England and France, Philip had dual claims to England and Portugal.

Even though these arguments all seem to suggest the just and imminent growth of Spanish Habsburg power--were Philip or the Infanta to act on their claims, they would have taken de facto control of all Western Europe--English Catholics were more than Habsburg propagandists, or at least needed to appear to be. The authors’ efforts to maintain a veneer of equanimity and their sincere belief that, in the end, any Catholic successor would do so long as England was set on the track of spiritual reform, led to what appear to be--from a Spanish perspective--several awkward moments.

According to the Raçonamiento there were other plausible successors to the English throne via the Portuguese line.\textsuperscript{647} The duchess of Bragança and the duke of Parma both had claims based on descent from Dom Manuel, and both had articulated them in 1578 when the throne became vacant, if never as vigorously as Antonio. Philip, however, according to the interlocutor, argued that he was closer in degree than Parma (who was only Dom Manuel’s great-grandson) and preceded Bragança (even though they were both direct grandchildren of Manuel) because he was the oldest male heir. Men like Persons and his colleagues did not question Philip’s rights to the Portuguese throne, but


\textsuperscript{647} Raçonamiento, fols. 205v-212v.
they kept the door slightly ajar for these other potential Catholic claimants. Portuguese laws which determined Philip’s rights need not necessarily bind the English to choose him as king. For the English it was more important to come to an independent decision of who could better trace their Lancastrian lineage, regardless of Portuguese laws.\textsuperscript{648} Still, final word was given to those who argued for Philip. He had been legally chosen by the Portuguese and all “dignities and prerogatives” belonging to that crown belonged to him.\textsuperscript{649}

Counter arguments against Spanish Habsburg claims to the English throne are not hidden, but brought to light. Two major objections were raised against the Portuguese claim. First, critics insisted “old and forgotten titles should not be admitted.” Second, they claimed that as a foreigner, Philip endangered the commonwealth because being “a great Prince and powerful monarch, as he truly is, [he] could put English liberty at risk” (…podría ser de prejuicio para la livertad de los yngleses).\textsuperscript{650} Having said this, however, the authors are sure to mention the potential weakness of these arguments. They reject the idea that Lancastrian rights through the Portuguese line have lessened with the passage of time. To the contrary, “no royal title ceases or perishes” but can be justly claimed when “he to whom it belongs can recover possession.”\textsuperscript{651}

Against xenophobic sensibilities, the authors rather lamely reminded readers that most Englishmen don’t really mind foreign rule. They recall the good that came of French-born monarchs like kings Stephen and Henry VII, and even of Philip II’s own stint as prince consort. Many still speculated about the benefits that might have come if

\textsuperscript{648} Ibid., fol. 212r.
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid., fol. 212v.
\textsuperscript{650} Ibid., fol. 213r.
\textsuperscript{651} Ibid., fol. 213v.
Anjou’s failed marriage negotiations with Elizabeth had succeeded! This was a shocking claim that others present at the *Raçonamiento*’s mock-discourse couldn’t let slide. Weren’t Anjou and Philip universally unpopular in England? The interlocutor agreed, but insisted that popular disapproval was unreasonable and unfounded, “raised by some restless, rambunctious, seditious men (*hombres alborotadores ynquietos y sediciosos*) who did not approve of the religion of these princes…” Their logic was not founded on “reason of state,” for reason of state supported accepting a foreign ruler. Knowing they were dipping in all too turbulent waters, the authors cut this discussion short, leaving others to deal with the issue.

The Infanta’s claim was no less complicated than Philip’s. The *Raçonamiento* revealed that her critics also censured Spanish backers for supporting “old” collateral lines over direct ones (*lineas rectas*). Like Philip’s critics, others argued the Infanta couldn’t be crowned because she was a foreigner. Most importantly, the Infanta’s opponents insisted religious strife would only increase were an inflexible, Catholic monarch to reign. As to the antiquity of the claim, the Infanta’s supporters again insisted that no matter how dusty, it could be dusted off. Even if invectives against “collateral lines” were taken seriously, there was no doubt that they should be embraced, and direct lineage rejected, when based on “just causes” (*justas causas*). As with Philip, the foreigner claim was rejected, this time curtly stating that no English laws called for such a prevention (more on this, below). The matter of Isabel’s Catholicism was probably most troubling to Persons and his colleagues. Through the interlocutor they suggest such

652 Ibid., fol. 215r.
653 Ibid., fol. 216r.
654 Ibid., fols. 186v-187r.
655 Ibid., fol. 186v.
fears were overblown. Not everyone in England would be put off by the Infanta’s religion; in fact many would love her more for it.\footnote{Ibid., fol. 187r.}

Philip and the Infanta were just two among many pretenders to the throne. Of the several other claimants discussed, none were more troubling than the two who claimed descendence from Henry VII’s eldest daughter Margaret: James VI and Arabella Stuart. James’s supporters insisted on his unquestionable heredity, the advantages of having a king that would unite Britain, and his ability to bring religious tranquility.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 131v-132r.} Against this, of course, there were those who questioned the validity of his Lancastrian claims and, again, insisted on the indesirability (indeed, the questionable legality) of having a foreign king.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 132v-133v.} Others claimed that the Scottish line was expressly rejected by Henry VIII in his testament.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 133v-138v.} Elizabeth had also implicitly rejected it when she killed James’s mother (Mary) and when conspirators against the queen and their descendents were decreed ineligible for the English throne.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 138v- 140v.} Finally, a series of arguments showed that an attempted union of Scottish and English crowns was detrimental. There was a long history of enmity between both. Scotland would drain England of its resources.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 140v-141v.}

Arabella was favored by some because she was born in England, thus avoiding the problem of being labeled a foreigner.\footnote{Ibid., fols. 142r ff.} However, she also faced opposition from those who (as with James) rejected Henry VII’s Lancastrian claims and who invoked
Henry VIII’s testamentary decree prohibiting her caste. On top of this, detractors said her sex was problematic, and worse, they accused her of being a bastard.⁶⁶⁴

Seemingly interminable claims and counter claims often seem to emphasize the contra stance with everyone except the Spanish claimants, but, truth be told, the authors never openly side with one candidate over another. On the surface, at least, the book seems like a well-tempered analysis. A close inspection of the text and its assumptions, however, inevitably lead the attentive reader back to a Spanish Habsburg option.

Although the Raçonamiento provides a labyrinthine discussion of many claimants’ rights, the broad historical context provided renders most of these claims untenable. The book largely regurgitates arguments that had been discussed privately for years. As Salgado-Rodríguez has suggested about the Conference,⁶⁶⁵ its Spanish version also marks the sputtering end of the Wars of the Roses. Strife that had once been quelled by the ascent of the Tudors-- the marriage of Henry VII and Elizabeth of York-- was revivified by Persons and his colleagues who portrayed English history since the reign of Henry VI as a story of Yorkist usurpation. As mentioned above, in their formulation, the Lancastrian kings all descended from John of Gaunt, though the familial title was in fact not derived from John himself, but from his wife, Blanche. This assertion allowed the authors to argue that Henry VII had no legitimate Lancastrian blood. Since the Lancastrian claim was the legitimate one, it stood to reason that the entire Tudor line was illegitimate, thus precluding (on a purely genealogical basis) the legitimate succession of any contemporary claimants-- James VI, Arabella Stuart, etc.-- who descended from Henry VII’s sisters. Similarly, others like the earl of Huntington and lord Strange, whose

---

⁶⁶⁴ Ibid., fol. 170r ff.
⁶⁶⁵ Rodríguez-Salgado, “The Anglo-Spanish War,” pp. 1-44.
claims were exclusively based on Yorkist lineage were rejected. If indeed the only legitimate Lancastrian claim was to be found in Portugal, the bulk of the Reçonamiento with its dizzying arguments and counter arguments for alternating claimants was largely moot. Only the Infanta, whose roots sink back to a time before Edward III could challenge Philip’s pretensions.

Apart from this genealogical morass, Persons and his colleagues made at least three implicit arguments favoring Spanish (and more broadly, Catholic) pretensions. To begin, conquest was presented as a legitimate means to assert control. The clearest example of this was the Norman Conquest which serves as the starting point for the book’s historical reconstruction of England’s succession. The reader is reminded that William the Conqueror took England by means of “force and arms, although he tried to show (pretendio mostrar) that he had been elected by the will and testament of Edward the Confessor.” The legitimacy of William’s rule was, it seems, of little import to the authors, what mattered more was that “in whatever way this [William’s ascendance] occurred, what is certain is that his line [posterioridad y descendencia] continues until this day.”666 This interpretation of the English monarchy melded with the above-mentioned notion circulating in Spain that force in itself was the ultimate arbiter in all English affairs.

At the risk of further repetitiveness, it is important to emphasize some general points we have seen before, but which appear throughout the text.

The authors insisted regal claimants had a right to defend and pursue legitimate rights no matter how long their rights had been neglected. To be sure, Yorkist Tudors had in fact gained power-- there was little that could be done about this. However, their rule

666 Reçonamiento, fols. 17v-18r.
did not erase older, legitimate lines. It was thus important to underscore that “royal titles and rights that are justly acquired never cease, nor are they lost, but remain forever for the descendants so that when they are able to, they might recover and renew them…”\textsuperscript{667}

The possibility of foreign rule was subject of particular scrutiny. The issue was taken up most when discussing James. Here a disproportionate amount of ink is spent rebutting censures against foreigners.\textsuperscript{668} On the whole, myriad other arguments against the Scottish king are let slide or are perfunctorily questioned, but the authors wanted to make sure everyone knew that being a foreigner did not preclude him from the throne.

Persons and his colleagues recall Leslie’s arguments in favor of Mary Stuart’s claims to underscore this principle. The Bishop of Ross had argued that statutes frequently raised to deny foreign inheritance had been glossed incorrectly. If indeed there was any prohibition on foreigners inheriting land, it applied only to individuals (\textit{personas particulares}), thus excluding royal inheritance which was never mentioned explicitly in any laws. Because “the crown has and enjoys of many privileges” it not subject to laws judging everyday property quarrels. While statute referred to “inheritance of dominion,” the crown was not part of common vassalage schemes because it “is received from God, our lord.”\textsuperscript{669} Ross also appealed to history showing, for example, that Henry II (among others) had in fact not been born in England.\textsuperscript{670}

But again, even in this discussion, Persons and his colleagues seem to favor ambiguity over an overtly partisan stance. While they seem to mount a vigorous defense of foreign rule in principle, they are sure to underline all its dangers as well. They insist

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[Ibid., fol. 184v.]
\item[Ibid., fol. 134r-138v.]
\item[Ibid., fol. 136r.]
\item[Ibid., fol. 136r.]
\item[Ibid., fol. 138r.]
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that seemingly legitimate rulers have, in fact, historically been prevented from succeeding to the throne because of the perceived threats they posed. Interestingly, the authors refer to Iberian examples drawn from Esteban de Garibay’s *Chronicles*, to flesh out this point. They show how during the thirteenth century the Castilian succession was diverted to avoid the French rule of King Louis. In Portugal, too, they recall that although fourteenth century King Fernando I left Beatrice as his heir, she was rejected because she was married to King Juan of Castile. The Portuguese preferred to install Fernando’s bastard son than accept the threat of Castilian rule.

If the *Raçonamiento* was intended for Spanish consumption, talk of deviated successions in Spain, and even worse in Portugal, seem bizarre. Nevertheless, the book may have been quite useful to members of Philip’s inner sanctum because it provided a reasonable assessment of the genealogical morass the king was entering. More importantly, the text provided the Habsburg regime with a plausible piece of propaganda. Its lack of precision and its claims of impartiality together with its undeniably Spanish-hued arguments made the book perfectly suited to the needs of a complex geo-political moment. It catered to the inclinations of a non-committal monarch whose hate for England had not yet excluded the possibility of anti-Elizabethan action, but whose prudence had up to then prevented a repeat of 1588.

Despite the equivocal premise on which Persons and his colleagues based their discussions, however, the *Conference* would soon disturb and shock audience on both sides of the Channel.

---

671 Ibid., fols. 145r-146r.
672 Ibid., fols. 146r-v.
Chapter 6

A Conference

The Conference could not but disturb. Whether Spain was ready or not, it was meant to be war-time propaganda.

As we have already noted, with Philip’s French activities in apparent atrophy, by 1593 some hoped the king’s attention might once again turn toward English affairs. On their part, the Spanish were, as always, sending potential Elizabethan rebels mixed signals. In Ireland, for example, Hugh O’Donnell and Hugh O’Neill signed an alliance, assuming that Spanish aid was on its way. Even though exiles doubted Philip would be quick to act, they must have thought the Conference a useful tool of conquest when it did occur. Sometime around 1595 or 1596 Persons argued Philip could assert his dominion by gathering the “principle Catholics in a sudden parliament (en forma de parliamento repentino) as has often been done in extreme situations.” Once assembled, the group would easily agree with the king’s succession as lobbied for “in the newly published book.”

The political climate in England around 1593 was also propitious for Persons and his colleagues’ publishing venture. London was then ablaze with talk about Elizabeth’s possible successor. In February Peter Wentworth, a prominent Puritan voice in Parliament, placed the matter front and center, planning to go to Westminster, as Neale describes, “equipped with speech, bill, objections and answers, a thanksgiving to queen in

the event of success, a rebuke in case of failure.” He also wrote an inflammatory booklet which remained in manuscript until 1598: *A Pithie exhortation to Her Majestie for establishing Her Successor to the Crowne.* Persons, in a short pamphlet that amounts to a “preview” of the *Conference*, tried to capitalize on the tempestuous climate. The text’s interlocutor tells of a meeting that took place in the Netherlands at which learned men discussed the succession scandal raging across the Channel. The authors of the *Conference* insisted the tumult caused by Wentworth was an important impetus for the Netherlandish soirée. “It was presumed…something would be determined thereof [concerning the succession] in Parliament… but when news that nothing at all had been done therein, but rather that one or two had been checked or committed for speaking the same,” a group of men on the Continent decided to examine the issue themselves.

As we shall see, the *Conference* worked hard to achieve ambidexterity and in doing so indulges in countless ambiguities. The authors were trying to accomplish a seemingly impossible goal. They wanted to push a Spanish line without offending English sensibilities— they didn’t want to reveal the extent of their hispaniolization. Further, while they were involved in a fight for the Catholic Church, they wanted to pretend theirs was not a confessional battle.

This chapter shows how a hall-of-mirrors sensibility which was evident in the *Raçonamiento* is only further elaborated, not just because matters of succession lend

---

677 *Newes from Spayne and Holland Conteyning an Information of Inglish affayres in Spayne with a Conference made thereupon in Amsterdame of Holland* (n.p., 1593).
678 *Conference*, pt. 1, sig. B(r-v).
themselves to confusion and obfuscation, but because the authors wanted to befuddle the reader. Although behind the scenes they were working hard to find some sort of Spanish solution to their very English problems, political circumstances being what they were, throwing a monkey wrench into re-emergent succession discussions sufficed.

****

According to one eighteenth century commentator, in England the Conference was considered a most “heinous and scandalous thing.” Indeed, the book sent Elizabeth into a fury and in Scotland it sent the young King James into cold sweats. Both were disturbed by the genealogical discussion and the authors’ apparent support for Spanish claimants. The book’s disturbing theoretical principles may have even led James to write The True Law of Free Monarchies, or at least helped create the context which produced it.

Both monarchs had ample reason to worry. In its English version Persons and his colleagues never drop the semblance of objectivity, but they expand on certain themes in such a way that could make the text seem more pro-Spanish. The genealogical brambles remain more or less the same, but a whole chapter is added supporting foreign rule. Having adjourned after a day of discussing family trees, the Conference’s civil lawyer is brought back to consider its merits and demerits. Despite qualms he agreed to do so, though again, with no intent of affirming or denying any one position. From the most venerable of ancient authors--Aristotle--to recent critics of Spain and the House of

---

681 Conference, pt.2, p. 194
Lorraine (in France), outsiders had been deemed detrimental. Even “barbarous nations, realms and cities…chose to flee and murder themselves, [rather] than to be under the dominion of strangers…” History showed that peoples fought tooth and nail against foreign rulers, just as the English did against Norman rule and the French did against the English. Biblical precedent justified this distaste: in Deuteronomy Israelites are promised royal government under the condition that they should have as king only one of their own nation.

Others, however, insisted that such critics were moved by some “corruption of nature, wherby men are inclined to think evil of others…” Prejudice should be cast aside in favor of reason. An honest assessment of the pluses and minuses which individual rulers brought to the commonwealth should be made. A good government should be measured solely “by the effects thereof, that redound unto the subjects, for whose good it was ordained….” Where justice is preserved, where subjects live well, where peace is maintained, and above all where the true faith is kept, the good ruler’s provenance matters little. It is much better to live under the yoke of a strange ruler than to live under a local tyrant. Indeed, the home-grown governor becomes a de facto stranger once he falls into tyranny: “little availeth it to me, whether he be of my blood and country or no.”

The problem of “strangeness” was complicated. Who is a foreigner? An easier question posed than answered. Some include those not born under the same government, “though otherwise they be of the same nation, and language…” The Guise in France fall

682 Ibid., p.194-195.
683 Ibid., p. 196.
684 Ibid., p. 197.
685 Ibid., pp.199-200.
686 Ibid., p. 200.
under this category, for though culturally similar, they were despised by many Frenchmen. The authors also note the enmity between Florentines and Sienese despite being of the same “nation,” separated by a mere thirty miles.  

Such tensions were not the norm. Biscayans did not consider Castilians strangers; Bretons and Normans had good relations with the French despite linguistic and cultural disparities. In England, peace with the Welsh went unabated, and foreigners such as Henry VII faced little resistance.

There were three ways to come under foreign dominion--conquest, inheritance, or a mix of the two. The least palatable of these was obviously conquest, for the conqueror could be brutal in establishing dominion over potentially hostile subjects. On the other hand, the conqueror, for the sake of “policy,” often needed to be gentle and sweet, not out of inherent benignity, but to fortify his position. Even doctors after administering “a vehement purgation doth minister levities and soft medicines.”

History showed that invaders resorted to brutalization only against the recalcitrant. While William the Conqueror longed for peace and was eager to grant his new subjects various privileges, he was forced to seek bloody expedients to avoid rebellion. When the conquered accepted their lot, however, foreign rulers--the Romans, for example--were accustomed to clemency. In fact, Roman rule was so admired that it was often sought after. According to some, “the world was never more happily governed, than under the Romans, and yet were they strangers to most of their subjects…” This

---

688 Ibid., p. 203.
689 Ibid., p. 205.
690 Ibid., p. 207.
Roman “sweetness” was a function of “reason of state.” Knowing that distant subjects
could easily rise up against them, peace was used as a tool of empire.

Persons and his colleagues also mention modern examples of what one might call
the contentments of imperialism.

They place particular emphasis on Habsburg activities in the Netherlands,
providing the reader something like an apology for Spain. The authors ask that we take a
broad view of recent Flemish history. For hundreds of years “a man shall read nothing
almost, in their stories, but war, sedition, and blood shed among themselves.” These
internecine wars took many forms—between different states prior unification, in-fighting
after unification, or against external forces like the French, on whom the Flemish
were once dependent. Since the first days of Austrian rule (starting with Philip I, Philip
II’s grandfather) down to the recent outbreak of rebellion it was “incredible how those
states increased in wealth, peace and dignity.” Citing Guicciardini, the authors gush
about the region’s riches.

As far as government was concerned, Spanish Habsburgs demonstrated an
abiding respect for local custom. If they ever tried to implement anything which went
against it, Flemish representatives in Castile would quickly voice concern and “by this
means they obtained lightly what they would…so as in effect they were absolute kings in
themselves…” Of course, since revolt began, the dynamic had changed. But even in
recent years the Spanish showed relative restraint. Philip carried out less executions than
normal in pre-Habsburg days. Some might point with horror at the brutal murders of
great nobles like the dukes of Egmont and Hoorn during the 1560s, but these were carried

691 Ibid., p. 210
692 Ibid., pp. 211-212.
out by the duke of Alva, perhaps against Philip’s true wishes. Moreover, they weren’t followed up by further judicial killings.

Such a bloodless tack differed from Philip’s approach in Iberia. According to the authors, during the Aragonese revolt “many heads have been stricken off…” Clearly, Philip was more aggressive nearer to his seat of power than in distant territories.

Spanish rule in Italy further proved imperial beneficence. Italians were not subject to the same taxes as Spaniards, they weren’t subject to the Inquisition, nor were any laws passed externally. None of their old rights and privileges were eroded. Light-handed rule in Italy was, in part, the result of a buffer system--rule by governors helped mediate what might have been unmitigated oppression. Home-born kings were absolute and could execute their laws forcefully and unremorsefully, having “to give accompt to no man.” Rule under a royal representative was, by definition, not direct and thus required more circumspection. Decisions weren’t made unilaterally, but needed approval of councils and the crown. Bureaucratic necessities aside, governors, knowing they would eventually be private citizens, were wary of antagonizing their momentary subjects-- they “take heed what they do and whom they offend.”

Like the Spanish, the English situation demonstrated a dichotomy between brutal and magnanimous rule at home and abroad. In Ireland those who submitted to English rule paid less taxes and weren’t subject to English laws unless “they be allowed and received by their own parliament” In religious matters, they faced a much easier situation as well. While Catholics were persecuted in England, the Irish were “pressed

693 Ibid., p.212.
694 Ibid., pp. 208-209.
695 Ibid., p. 214.
696 Ibid., p. 209.
much less.” Moreover, punishment for crimes was meted out with relative mildness; thus being ruled by foreigners “seemeth rather a privilege then a hindrance unto them.”

This stands in strong contrast with the violence of English rule across the Irish Sea. The authors focus a good deal of attention on how the nobility was slowly eroded by monarchical fiat in England. Excluding times of war when the execution of rebels is justifiable, during times of peace certain kings proved no less sanguinary. The authors provide a long list of murdered potentates dating back to the reigns of Henry IV and Edward III. However, even these acts were carried out with a modicum of justice, since savage civil disorders had only recently ended. Less comprehensible were those murders perpetrated in times of unquestioned tranquility, beginning with Henry VIII, and continuing under Edward VI and Queen Mary. The extent of Tudor carnage was unheard of “by any strange Prince, state, or common wealth Christian, in any foreign dominion that they possess in many ages together.”

A subtle polemical game was being played here. Clearly the authors tried to distinguish foreign clemency from local tyranny; this they claimed was as true of English rule as it was of Spanish rule. However, England and Spain took different approaches to home rule. The Spanish are shown to be most brutal when putting down open revolt (in Aragon), but the English (or at least the Tudors) tried to mow down their nobility during times of tranquility. Although it is never made explicit, the Conference creates a dichotomy between efficacious, just Spanish rule and its tyrannical English counterpart. Read by those who favored Philip, or by those who most feared him, this would have been

\[697\] Ibid.
\[698\] Ibid., p. 214.
\[699\] Ibid., p. 217.
looked like a swipe at Elizabeth and her ancestors, and an example of flagrant Spanish cheerleading.

The *Conference* goes further. Not only does it provide justifications for foreign rule in general, but for foreign rule specifically in England. According to the interlocutor there could be no better hope for a kingdom than a foreign prince who ascends peacefully. Arriving without his own forces, he will necessarily treat his new subjects well, and because he “hath no kindred or alliance within the land, to whom he is bound, nor enemy against whom he may be enticed to use cruelty, so as only merit or demerit… must move him to favour or disfavor….”700 A foreigner would thus help quell disorder which would arise in England as a result of competing families trying to fulfill their own royal aspirations.701

This is not to say that foreigners posed no dangers. There were definite inconveniences to admitting rulers “to live among us, with forces, either present or so near, as that without resistance he may call them when he listeth….”702 Armed invaders lacked deterrents for tyranny. This is what turned many off to a possible Scottish succession-- James VI alone of “any foreign pretender, seemeth may justly be feared….” He alone would have personal military forces close at hand.703

Consistent support of foreigners, minus James, necessarily leads the reader back to some sort of Habsburg claimant.

There were other furtive pro-Spanish arguments. As to whether it was better to live under a greater or lesser monarch, Persons and his colleagues argued a great monarch

700 Ibid., p. 224.
701 Ibid., p. 225.
702 Ibid., p. 226.
703 Ibid., pp. 227-228
would be best equipped to defend his dominions without squeezing his subjects. The mighty king wouldn’t take but give: he could more easily reward the valorous and virtuous.\textsuperscript{704} The “little king,” on the other hand, needed to maintain his royal dignity, but lacking personal resources would be more dependent on the populace. This premise is supported by showing the deficiencies in Geneva as opposed to kingdoms like France and Spain. Individuals living in a Swiss canton could expect little more than what the “common wealth and state can give.” Thus, if by chance many virtuous and worthy men were born at once, they would have to share relatively meager rewards, whereas bigger kingdoms had both secular and ecclesiastical gifts in surfeit. A perfect example of largesse was provided by the Roman Empire which “had the preferments of all the world to bestow.”

To flesh out this proposition the authors quote an excerpt from the \textit{Life of Antoninus Pius}\textsuperscript{705} by Charles V’s imperial chronicler, Pedro Mexia, which speaks to the security and wealth ensured by imperial forces and the benefits of living under a ruler who possessed far-flung lands. The benefits were more than monetary. There is a touch of irenicism in Mexia’s text. The immense scope of Roman rule spoke of more peaceful times when “a man might have gone over the whole world, or most and best parts thereof, with all security, and without fear…”\textsuperscript{706} By quoting Mexia on this and other ways in which harmony was ensured under imperial guardianship, the authors were no doubt sending a subtle (or not so subtle) coded message about the only true, global European power of the sixteenth century: Spain. Indeed, it is no coincidence that Persons and his

\textsuperscript{704} Ibid., pp. 219-220.
\textsuperscript{706} \textit{A Conference}, pt. 2, pp. 221-222.
colleagues chose to cite this text which was part of Mexia’s collection of imperial *vitae* (from Julius Caesar to Maximilian I, Charles V’s father), and which originally intended to link Habsburg imperialism with a glorious Roman imperial past.

It is important to note that these arguably pro-Spanish elements were *not* present in the *Raçonamiento*. Perhaps the authors simply thought these matters would have been of little interest to Spanish readers. Perhaps they felt that so far as Philip needed to know, the book steered clear of any topics that could be construed easily as support for Habsburg imperialism. This was, after all, precisely the type of argumentation Philip wanted to avoid for fear it would provide fodder for anti-Spanish propaganda.

In any case, while a Spanish agenda was being promoted, it was never done explicitly. Leaving issues unresolved, as suggested above, seems to have been the authors’s primary objective.

Part II of the *Conference* ends by restating the difficulties of sorting out the succession. The problem hinged largely on England’s shattered religious unity because Catholics, Protestants and Puritans would each support the candidate that sympathized most with their way of thinking. The interlocutor ventures to guess on what side the different factions might fall. As for Protestants they *might* side with Arabella Stuart and Puritans with the earl of Huntington. Catholics were altogether more difficult to figure out because they weren’t clearly aligned to any one or two pretenders: they simply favored any co-religionist.707

Such a confessionalized approach to royal selection had not always been the norm. Henry’s descendants, be they of whatever faith, had been accepted by the whole

707 Ibid., p. 235.
commonwealth. But previously the succession was clear; now it was not. The number of
claimants mixed with religious tensions created a context which made war inevitable.  

Incertitude, indeed could not be overcome while the queen was still alive.
Although Persons and his colleagues had spent over two-hundred pages talking about
genealogy, presumably to help clarify matters, the Conference ends by coopting
something of an Elizabethan line. The civil lawyer deterred anyone from coming to any
conclusions, suggesting that doing so would be detrimental. Determining the queen’s
successor would put her in danger, moving the “humors” of competing claimants.
Moreover, even if a selection were to be made by queen or parliament, it “would not end
or take away the root of the controversy, for albeit some that should be passed over or put
back in their pretenses, would hold their peace perhaps for the time present, yet afterward
would they both speak and spurn when occasion is offered.” Even the successor would
be put at risk. English history showed that chosen heirs who were not children of reigning
monarchs, never ascended to the throne. Regardless of what was decided or left
undecided, confusion would remain, and uncertainty would reign. All contenders would
surely seek to arm themselves for the bleakest of eventualities.

And so the Conference conjectures that it was not only war, but a long prolonged
war that lay ahead. It was not just a matter of internal power struggles that ensured this,
but the fact “foreign Princes and states round about us, are like to be much divided in this
matter, some as pretendents for themselves or their kindred…and others as favorers of
this or that party…” and others still for religion’s sake.

---

708 Ibid., p. 239.
709 Ibid., p. 259.
710 Ibid.
711 Ibid., p. 262.
Why expatiate on such a bleak outlook? Perhaps readers were given a dose of harsh realism. Just as likely, however, Persons and his colleagues preferred limbo over damnation. That is, they preferred leaving things unresolved, rather than letting the Elizabethan regime, or even popular opinion, side with any one candidate, especially a heretical one. Persons and his colleagues were particularly concerned about a possible succession by James, whom they had grown to believe was (in matters spiritual) irredeemably lost. In a rather forcefully worded letter to the Scottish Jesuit William Crichton, Persons refers to “the published book” which revealed James’s claim to be flimsy and merely “on a par with that of the others…”\footnote{I am referring to Hick’s translation of the document in Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu 46/12/3, fols. 461-466, quote at fol. 465. Persons to Chrichton, Seville, 10 May 1595.} If, however, as Persons insisted, the Conference was not explicitly against the Scottish king, it was constructed to inspire some sort of reflection, or as he put it to Acquaviva, so that “Catholics don’t run behind just any person who pretends the succession by blood without any other conditions as has been seen in England after Queen Mary’s death and then in France…” The book was intended to remind conformists they were obliged to follow their conscience.\footnote{Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Hispania 136, fol. 162v. Persons to Acquaviva, Madrid, 16 June 1594.} Persons firmly believed that lineage in itself mattered less than religiosity and possessing true faith. As he put it to Chrichton, as long as he was Catholic, let the successor “be of any nation, any race, any tongue under heaven.”\footnote{Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu, 46/12/3, fol. 465. Persons to Chrichton, Seville, 10 May 1595.} The Conference is mostly consistent with these claims, but not fully. First, as I have argued, there is plenty in the text itself that points to a Spanish favoritism, even if the authors would publicly, avidly deny this. Second, while we mustn’t for a second doubt that the goal for most English Catholic exiles was to see a Catholic monarch on the
English throne, the *Conference* doesn’t (as we have suggested before) make this explicit.

Part I, which received a sparse summary in the *Raçonamiento*, mounts a formidable argument against pure genealogy for deciding Elizabeth’s successor, but it is not willing to make the confessional arguments used in private correspondence.

There is a way to see the first half of the *Conference* as a *ligueur* pamphlet. In a relatively little known study, José M. Ruiz identified William Rainolds, an English Catholic exile living in France, as the main source used by Persons for the “constitutionalist” theories propounded in part I. Around 1590 Rainolds wrote *De iusta reipublicae Christianae in reges impios et haereticos authoritate*, a laborious tract against Henry IV’s claims to the French throne. By studying a heavily marked copy at the English College in Valladolid, and comparing it to the *Conference*, Ruiz showed affinities between the two texts which imply more than casual borrowing. However, because the books overlap most on points of broad consensus in Catholic circles, the direct filiations are less important than the fact they both can be linked to a set of discourses related to French affairs. Indeed, the more theoretical parts of the *Conference* reflect affinities to ideas and concepts being articulated in Spain by people like Ribadeneyra in his *Tratado de principes cristianos* and fellow Spanish Jesuit Juan de Mariana in his *De rege et regis institutione*, both of which were being written with the French succession in mind and contain elements of anti-Navarre polemics.

---

717 I am currently exploring the links between English, French, and Spanish Catholic radical thought in the 1590s, and hope to report on the subject in the not-too-distant future.
More than intellectual lineages, what marks the *Conference* as a kind of *ligueur* text is the object of its polemical rage. As with the *Raçonamiento*, Belloy was the book’s straw-man. This worked perfectly in England because he had just become a familiar name there. As Lisa Parmelee and J.H.M. Salmon shown,\(^7\) French polemics seeped into Elizabethan England, and among them (in 1585 or 1586) Belloy’s *Catholicke Apologie against the Libels, Declarationes, Advices, and Consultations Made, Written, and Published by those of the League, Perturbers of the Quiet Estate of the Realme of France*.\(^7\) Persons and his colleagues reject Belloy’s claim that royal succession is directly ordained by God, that lines of succession are unchangeable, and that kings are not subject to human laws.\(^7\) They also rebuke Belloy’s notion that, as understood by the authors, “all temporalities are properly the Prince’s, and that subjects have only use thereof without any interest of their own.” Were this absurd claim true, they argued, all men would be slaves.\(^7\)

To be sure, the authors believed that monarchical governments were best. This, they pointed out, was Aristotle’s wise judgment, and had long been a traditional preference. All people, according to Persons and his colleagues, “commonly made their choice at the beginning of this kind of government [monarchical], so as of all others it is

---
\(^7\) *Conference*, pt. 1, pp. 122-124.
\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 67-68
the most ancient.” With good reason. Monarchies were best equipped to meet the needs of the commonwealth. In form, they most closely resembled divine order, and thus ensured “more unity, agreement, and conformity, and thereby also celerity commonly in dispatching business.”

Despite such advantages, the Conference worked hard to demonstrate the limitations of royal governance. Because it resembled divine hierarchy, a monarchy was most conducive to justice and equity; indeed, the monarch might even resemble God in his good rule. However, kings were not God, and were thus victims of human frailty. To ensure against bad rule, and worse, tyranny, monarchs were assigned a series of “helps.” These came in the form of laws, which were generally the fruit of careful reflection. A king who followed established laws was “more than a man, or a man deified, and a Prince ruling by affections, is less than a man, or a man brutified.” Typically monarchs also had the benefit of counsel. The authors pointed out that most monarchies, far from being “pure,” were mixed, containing aristocratic and democratic elements. The best example of this was, of course, England with its queen and two houses of Parliament.

Monarchical restraint was not simply a virtue, but a duty. Were the king to follow a path of tyranny, he could be removed. A chilling example of dethronement comes from Roman history, from an early episode involving Romulus. The authors recall that “for reigning at his pleasure without law…the senators at length slew him, and cut him in small pieces.”

722 Ibid., p.16
723 Ibid., p.18
724 Ibid., p. 22.
725 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
726 Ibid., p. 27.
The Conference suggested resemblances between earthly and ethereal monarchies, but battled against notions of “divine monarchy” as propounded by Belloy and others. It pointedly mentions St. Peter’s injunction: “Be you subject of every human creature, for God’s cause, whether it be to a king, as the most excellent, or to Dukes sent by God ….”\textsuperscript{727} The reference is crucial. It emphasizes Petrine (from a Catholic perspective, papal) support for royal power, while showing its double roots. The apostle clearly says “that the magistrate’s authority is from God,” but he also “calleth it a human creature or a thing created by man, for by man’s free choice this particular form of government…is appointed.”\textsuperscript{728} The basic premise of the book is that “neither God nor nature prescribeth any… particular forms [of government], but concurreth with any that the common wealth itself appointeth.”\textsuperscript{729} Governments and individual rulers were not instituted by divine mandate, but were chosen and subsequently accepted by God.

The monarch-subject relationship was a reciprocal one. Nowhere is this better borne out than in the coronation ceremonies which typically cemented royal power. Unlike Belloy who argued the coronation was an act of confirmation,\textsuperscript{730} for Persons and his colleagues, such ceremonies actually instituted the monarch and defined mutual responsibilities between him and the commonwealth. Indeed, “the more orderly and organized the Prince commeth to his crown and dignity, the more express and certain these conditions and agreements between him and his people…”\textsuperscript{731} Through such ceremonial contracts the rules of kingship were established--should the king overstep or neglect his rights and duties as agreed upon, he could (as suggested above) be deposed.

\textsuperscript{727} Ibid., p.17
\textsuperscript{728} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{729} Ibid., p. 13.
\textsuperscript{730} Belloy, \textit{Apologie Catholique}, 44v.
\textsuperscript{731} Conference, pt. 1, p. 83.
The book provides several examples of depositions and regicide generally permitted or promulgated by the commonwealth through representative assemblies.

Still, supporting rebellion was not the Conference’s primary goal. It wanted to reveal limitations of consanguineal inheritance, but, it did not reject the notion altogether. The authors (as always, through their interlocutor) readily admit that pure blood succession has its many advantages, and that while “inconveniences want not…yet are they commonly far less and fewer, than would be by mere election, which is subject to great and continual dangers of ambition, emulation, division, sedition, and contention…”732 Knowing that his successor is kin, the regnant king would be inspired to manage his domains well, to leave his estate in good order, to “manure that ground, which is his own…”733 Having a direct successor also limited the amount of change that a commonwealth had to endure—recall, that change during this period was often a dirty word. Beyond continuity, a proper heir also brought with him less “passions of hatred, emulation, anger, envy, or revenge.” Having already accrued standing and wealth he would be less given to the posturing of novices.734 Succession thus helped guard against the dangers of “bare election,” namely “strife, banding, ambition.” On the other hand, election helped guard against the “unapt or cruel prince.”735 And thus, while in an ideal situation the commonwealth would gather around a successor directly related to the current monarch, it should (and did) have the option to deviate heredity.

The Conference mostly avoids the providential tone found in other English Catholics works (e.g. De origine), but it emerges when discussing certain instances of

732 Ibid., p. 126.
733 Ibid., pp. 126-127.
734 Ibid., p. 127.
735 Ibid., p. 130
monarchical selection. Take King Pedro the Cruel of Castile: although he was undoubtedly the legitimate heir to the throne, after eighteen years of dastardly rule, the commonwealth chose to depose him, and raise his bastard brother, Henry. Although King Edward III of England helped restore Pedro, he was eventually defeated for good, “which made show of more particular favor of God in this behalf to Henry, and so he remained king of Spain as doth also his progeny enjoy the same unto this day, though by nature he was a bastard” (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{736}

The authors clearly believed that deposition typically led to subsequent good rule. In England, after King John was deposed, Henry III had a long and benevolent tenure—
an example of a pattern that, according to the authors, the reader should “always note in this narration.”\textsuperscript{737} It should be noted because the successes of deviated heredity suggest divine approval of earthly machinations.

But as a caution, they ask: “Is this worthiness which God giveth commonly to the successors at these changes, perpetual or certain by descent?”\textsuperscript{738} No. The evil ruler could (and one senses, would) appear periodically, despite worthy ancestral exempla.

Had the hereto discussed elements of the Conference been translated into French and disseminated in France, the book would have seemed rather familiar fare, for (as mentioned above) it was of a piece with a League discourse which defended the commonwealth’s rights to choose their monarch. But, unlike De origine and other important Spanish Elizabethan texts, the Conference was never translated into French. A reason isn’t hard to find. Various elements in part I were opposed to the substance and

\textsuperscript{736} Ibid., p. 52.
\textsuperscript{737} Ibid., p. 57.
\textsuperscript{738} Ibid., p. 59.
tone of radical Catholic propaganda in France (not to mention Spanish iterations of ligueur work, particularly Ribadeneyra’s).

First, and most glaringly, the book seems to accept Henri IV’s legitimacy. Consistent with its principal contention, the Salic Law is not treated as mere invention, but as accepted as fact: “the world knoweth, how women are not admitted to succeed in the crown be they never so near in blood….‖ Though the Spanish monarchy and their allies would be quick to dismiss this aspect of French law as spurious, the Conference’s interlocutor needed to accept it because laws, like kings, were at least a partial invention of the people. Having been justly instituted, they were rendered legitimate. Thus, while there might be many a good argument in favor of female succession, all such arguments “prevailed not, with the French as it doth not also at this day for the admission of Doña Isabella Clara Eugenia, Infanta of Spain, unto the said crown of France, though by descent of blood there be no question of her next propinquity for that she is the eldest child of the last king’s eldest sister.” The authors expand on this point when they claim to “doubt not greatly of his [Navarre’s] title by propinquity of blood according to the law Salic…” This admittance, however, is said amidst arguments about the limits of propinquity.

Nevertheless, while seeped in equivocation, both the acceptance of French laws and a (somewhat superficial) acceptance of Navarre’s claims within France’s particular legal context are fundamentally at odds with the propaganda peddled by anti-Navarre factions in France. Such arguments were also at odds with continued Spanish hopes of saving France from devilish rule as well.

739 Ibid., p. 31.
740 Ibid., p. 122.
Despite the commonalities that might exist between the *Conference* and such works as Rainolds’ *De iusta reipublicae Christianae...authoritate*, they betray different understandings of papal politics. Beside the rights of the commonwealth itself, many League writers insisted Henri’s excommunication rendered him illegitimate. The Pope had clear powers of loosing and binding.\(^741\)

Just a couple of years before the *Conference* Persons and his colleagues were willing to riff on such an ultramontane *ligueur* tune. The above-mentioned *Responsio*, which had been translated for French consumption in 1593,\(^742\) contains a series of by now predictable justifications for rejecting Navarre. Civil law, following St. Theodoret, dictated that “a people and a city” (un peuple et une ville) constitute themselves based on “the will of the Republic” (volonté de la Republique) and *not* on any “natural necessity” (necessité naturelle).\(^743\) Kingship itself was not dependent on natural law, but on the laws of nations (*droict des nations*). God only approved choices of government and leaders made by the Republic (la Republique & Dieu qui apreuve quant il luy plaist leur election).\(^744\) When true Christians chose kings, it was invariably conditional on the maintenance and defense of the Catholic Church. Monarchs were bound by a “double oath,” once during baptism and again when christened as kings (l’un au baptesme quand ils sont faicts Chrestiens, & l’autre en leur sacre quant ils sont declarés Roys).\(^745\) The latter oath was publically attested to in coronation ceremonies. If unable to live up to his responsibilities, the king’s loss of power and royal dignity was immediate.

\(^741\) Rainolds, *De iusta reipublicae Christianae...authoritate*, chapter VII.
\(^743\) Ibid., 59r.
\(^744\) Ibid., 59v.
\(^745\) Ibid., 60r.
It is at this point that the role of the Pope becomes important. On the one hand subjects could revolt, even before “the sovereign pastor has pronounced against him [the king].” But such strong and immediate actions are not desirable, especially when clarity was lacking. People should stay put if they do not have sufficient armed support to mount a challenge against tyrannous rule. They should also avoid rash action in cases when the king’s malevolence is still subject of debate, or if his heretical opinions remain secret. They should wait until the king’s evil became matter of public knowledge, when danger became imminent, and when the Pope “has used the power that belongs to him to tend to the assurance and conservation of religion and to separate the healthy from the lepers….”

Pontifical activism was supported by biblical precedent, which had been raised in the 1586 *De origine*. Persons mentioned the “Pontiff of the Hebrews,” Azarias, who, “helped by some brave men,” deposed Ozias “from his royal dignity.” The “Pontiff” Iodiah also ordered Athalia’s death for her tyrannical rule and for worshiping Baal.

Of course, even here Persons preferred to leave matters ambiguous. There is room for the commonwealth to act prior to papal benediction, even if biblical predilection is shown for coordinated action.

The *Conference*, written just a year later, seems to go out of its way to dilute the role of the papacy in secular affairs. There is no prolonged discussion of the matter.

---

746 Ibid., 60v. All theologians and lawyers, Persons claims, “tient qu’un Prince Chrestien qui se servoye & separe de la religion Catholique, ou qui en faict separer les austres se prive de toute puissance & dignité par la droict tant divin que humain & sans attendre que le souverain Pasteur ait prononcé sa sentence contre luy…”

747 Ibid., 62r.

748 Ibid. Note, however, that unlike *De origine*, the men mentioned here were specifically described as pontiffs.

749 Ibid. “Et ne faut douter, que le peuple fidelle ne fust en tout, & par tout obligé d’obeir a ce Pontife pour la correction ou deposition de ces Roys. Aussi la Saincte Escriture loue grandement ceux qui l’ont fait.”
When individual popes appear, they are not so much initiating or encouraging political maneuvers, but, instead, only confirming the people’s will. The dynamic is never discussed explicitly, but must be drawn from occasional historical examples. For example, when the Portuguese king, Don Sancho, was deposed, Persons and his colleagues argue that it was done by “the universal consent of all Portugal” which was in turn approved by a church council and ultimately Pope Innocent IV, “at the petition and instance of the whole realm.”

King John in England was similarly said to be excommunicated and deposed “by sentence of the Pope at the suit of his own people.”

Although religious authorities did help the commonwealth rid itself of tyranny, the emphasis is clearly on the imperatives of the republic.

Consider how Allen’s *Admonition* and the *Conference* each characterize the deposition of Saul, as told in Kings 1:22. Persons and his colleagues simply state that “king Saul though he were elected by God… yet was he slain by the Philistines by God’s order as it was foretold him for his disobedience and not fulfilling the law and limits prescribed unto him.” Allen’s description is more complex. “Though chosen and inspired by God, [Saul] was led and directed by Samuel, so long as he was in order but afterward for aspiring to spiritual function and other disobedience was by God’s appointment and sentence pronounced against him, by the said Samuel deposed of his kingdom.” Allen’s treatment of Saul’s deposition clearly emphasizes Samuel’s role as custodian of faith and as the means by which God worked his will on earth. Such an argument fit well within the papalist argument that formed the backbone of the

---

750 *Conference*, pt. 1, p. 53.
751 Ibid., p. 56.
752 Ibid., p. 40.
753 Allen, *Admonition*. 
Admonition. Persons and his colleagues, on the other hand, opted to gloss over Samuel, emphasizing instead the Philistines as the motor of political change.

Dwelling on the See of St. Peter was unnecessary in 1594. It would have gone against the ethos of the Conference, which branded itself as level-headed and unbiased. It rejected the strict confessional tone of previous Spanish Elizabethan works—starting with De origine and picked up again by the Responsio—and of ligueur ones as well. Instead, it tried to extend an olive branch of sorts to English readers, regardless of faith. Like the moderate Catholic interlocutor of Leicester’s Commonwealth, the Conference’s interlocutor cared less about any one faith than the survival of the nation.

Still, a hint of ecclesiastical potency remains. Despite the secondary role of the papacy, other religious figures play an important role in establishing monarchical authority. Time and again, bishops are said to have been integral in those all-important coronation ceremonies. Since the earliest days of Christianity, the authors insist, monarchs have promised “ecclesiastical Prelates, at their first admission” to uphold the true faith.754 This went for all modern European monarchies, including England, where the Archbishop of Canterbury “doth ordinarily do these ceremonies...as the Archbishop of Rheims doth in France...with the same solemnity and honor according to the condition and state of our country.”755

The role of bishops as a binding element could, but need not be, understood as a nod to a particularly Catholic sensibility. As future research will show, Persons and many of his Jesuit colleagues in Spain seem to have embraced a particularly strong episcopate

---

754 Conference, pt.1, p. 211.
755 Ibid., p. 114.
as part of a general Catholic reformist vision. But this vision was not completely at odds with an English one, or even a Protestant one as Persons and his colleagues understood it. As they described it, clergymen were key “members of the Protestant body…especially the bishops and other men in Ecclesiastical dignity.” Thus, even the idea of strong ecclesiastical authority could be multi-edged.

Perhaps most surprising is the moderation with which Persons and his colleagues discuss the alternating desires of opposing faiths. As mentioned above, it was the mix of hereditary uncertainty and religious strife that ensured eventual civil war. However, the book never truly sinks to the depths of conspiracy theories and slander which had become common during the previous two decades. They forsook the polemical for the analytical. Protestants clearly had the “sway of authority and present power of the state in his favour…” But internal divisions might thwart their ability to make a decisive and speedy selection. Their best hope was keeping the queen’s death hidden momentarily until a choice was made “but this is holden to be either impossible or very hard, for the different judgments and affections which are thought to be wanting in the court council, and Prince’s chamber itself…” Protestant ecclesiastical authorities would clearly play an important role in all this, “though some men think that it be not very certain, which part

---

756 Robert Persons’ *Memorial for the Reformation of England* (1596) argues for a particularly strong episcopate in England after it has been brought back to the Catholic fold, a vision which is likely related to currents in Spanish thought. As Harald Braun has rightly underlined, perhaps the most radical element in Juan de Mariana’s *De rege et regis institutione* was his argument for an ideal “royal-ecclesiastical co-rulership” in which “bishops are to suffuse the whole of secular government with their benevolent authority.” (Harold E. Braun, *Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought* [Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007], pp.146-160.) Ribadeneyra seems to have harbored similar ideas. In the *Scisma*, for example, he intimated successful reform often relied on episcopal power. Those parts of the Holy Roman Empire that remained faithful to the Catholic Church, he argued, had been subject to “the bishops and prelates of the church….” Because priests were powerful, Imperial princes in those regions, they could “bridele (enfrenar) their subjects and vassals, and conserve the Catholic religion in their lands.” (Ribadeneyra, *Scisma*, 84r).


758 Ibid.
of the nobility and council will stick unto them, for many in heart are presupposed to favor the Puritan….”

Puritans were said to be “more generally favoured throughout the realm with all those which are not of the Roman religion… upon a certain general persuasion, that his profession is the more perfect, especially in the greater towns where preachers have made more impression in the artificers, and burgesses, than in the country people. And among Protestants, themselves, all those that are less interested in ecclesiastical livings or other preferments… are more affected commonly to the Puritans….”

This faction was thought to be “most vigorous of any other, that is to say, most ardent, quick, bold resolute….” Catholics were said to be the weakest, largely because of “the laws and tides of the time.”

Still, those “who weigheth things indifferently” would acknowledge that partisans of Rome had plenty of internal and external support. Indeed, it seemed likely that the number of recusants was “not so small”, especially out in the country. Catholics also probably had a fair share of support from miscellaneous malcontents “of whatever religion soever” who wanted to join the common cause of the oppressed.

Numbers aside, papists also had momentum on their side, because of the “sight & remembrance of so many of their seminary priests put to death for their religion.”

Perhaps there is more than a whiff of the overtly polemical in all this. One might say all this is just a re-configuration of past claims of Protestant disunity and Catholic strength as once propounded by De origine and countless other Catholic writings. And

---

759 Ibid.
760 Ibid., p. 242.
761 Ibid., p. 244.
762 Ibid.
763 Ibid., p. 245.
764 Ibid., p. 246
yet these comments are qualitatively different; they are not accompanied by charges of Machiavellianism, immorality, or demonic worship. The book assesses different gradients of power; it describes forces vying against each other within a specific political framework.

Avoiding overtly confessional polemics, however, does not mean that the Conference is not filled with ideas that might be readily confessionalized. Keeping with a common contemporary trope, the authors insisted on the need for religious uniformity. Monarch and subjects must (in a fully functional state) share the same faith. The authors insisted that if St. Paul “pronounced so absolutely and plainly…that even in eating of a piece of meat, it is damnable for a man to discern and yet to eat,” how much worst would it be “for a man to dissemble or do against his own conscience, & judgment, that is to say, to discern and judge that he is an infidel, or heretic, or wicked man, or Atheist or erroneous in religion, and yet further his advancement and government over Christians….” This quotation is a pregnant one as it gestures toward the literature of the early 1580s which forbade Catholics from consorting with the confessional enemy at home, and especially at their profane services. The difference here, however, is that the religious equation is left with undefined variables.

On the level of practical politics, or as the authors put it “reason of state,” it would be “but great folly & oversight for a man of what religion soever he be, to promote to a kingdom in which [he] himself must live, one of contrary religion; for let the bargains and agreements be what they will…yet seeing the prince once made and settled, must needs proceed according to the principles of his own religion…” The authors suspect it might be “impossible for two of different religions to love sincerely” and suggest that the

765 Ibid., p. 216.
animosity between those of the king’s religion and those who were not would break out into open conflict. Those not sharing the monarch’s religious beliefs would be subject to oppression.\textsuperscript{766} Underneath this claim we might detect the lived experience of Catholics under a Protestant queen, but not in any obvious, or explicit way.

Still, this call for religious uniformity might dent claims to impartiality. Despite the proclaimed open mind which allowed the authors to consider equally the concerns and prospects of various confessions, the implication here is that only one of them was right. From a Catholic point of view, this could all be read as an attack on the status quo, a sub rosa argument for selecting a good Catholic king who would end years of Elizabethan tyranny. But this need not have been the case. To be sure, Persons and his colleagues believed England should one day be Catholic again-- the reader, however, could pin his religious biases onto the text (nearly) at will.

None of this is to say that Persons and his associates were objective reporters of political phenomena. It is, however to say that they tried their best to craft a text which appeared to be so. It was a \textit{ligueur} text, but it wasn’t. It was an English text, but it wasn’t. It was a Spanish text, but it wasn’t. It was a Catholic text, but it wasn’t quite that either. The authors wanted the book to remain in an almost phantasmagorical realm of slippery shadows and contested significance.

As Victor Houliston has pointed out this approach is remarkable in large part because it abandoned a previously embraced “satirical style in favour of the studied impartiality of the historian.”\textsuperscript{767} This shift might be read, as Houliston does, as an effort to promote “a historically informed Catholic political conscience.” Perhaps. But it seems

\textsuperscript{766} Ibid., p. 217.
\textsuperscript{767} Houliston, \textit{Catholic Resistance}, p. 77.
these broad considerations were of less immediate importance than present political advantages to be had. There is little doubt that the book was trying to have it both ways; it wanted to have enough anti-Elizabethan ammunition (enough Catholic ammunition), while not alienating a certain kind of moderate or ambivalent (Catholic or Protestant) reader.

The Conference, unlike De origine, tried desperately not to offend anyone. Thus the book marks an important departure from past English Catholic texts. In years past, licentious squibs such as Leicester’s Commonwealth had insisted on Catholic moderation, and had emphasized devotion to country above all, but never had they treaded on such (feigned) neutrality. Surely Persons and his colleagues knew that an openly pro-Spanish, pro-Catholic diatribe would have alienated many English readers. Moreover, they were aware that writing an overtly “Spanish Elizabethan” work, would have helped prove the point Cecil, Elizabeth, and the regime as a whole was trying to make: that English Catholics were foreigners tied to a foreign prince. Christopher Highely has shown the many ways Catholics tried to assert their Englishness against wide-spread criticism, and how they “imagined” the English Nation. The Conference doesn’t speak directly to these issues, but it does suggest the tactical approach taken to avoid exclusion. By following a neutered discursive path, the authors rid themselves of an overtly Catholic, continental identity, in hopes of causing trouble in England and in turn helping pave the way for a Catholic, indeed, quite possibly, a Spanish regime.

---

768 This strategic imperative is made explicit by Creswell in his private correspondence with Aldobrandino where he claims the book might be useful to refute heretics who deceived the simple by claiming that Philip wanted to conquer England. Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese III, 124 g. 2, fol. 76r. Creswell to Aldobrandino, Madrid, 22 October 1595.

769 Christopher Highely, Catholics Writing the Nation.
Chapter 7
The Aftermath of A Conference

If the Conference was supposed to appeal to a cross-section of English society, it failed miserably. Not only were Protestants scandalized, but Catholics were as well. Some saw the book’s printing as a tactical error that would only annoy the queen and elicit retribution. Acquaviva shuddered at the idea of such an overtly political project and the Scottish Jesuit William Crichton famously reminded Persons of an old French proverb: “you don’t catch a hare by a drum.” The book only widened fissures that had emerged between secular priests and Jesuits in England and on the Continent; it became exhibit A in a campaign against English members of the Society of Jesus and their supposed scandalous immorality. In Rome, the Netherlands, and England, some Catholics held the word Jesuit as a curse, and Persons in less esteem than Machiavelli. As one contemporary (obviously sympathetic to Persons and his allies) suggested, the Conference exacerbated these quarrels, for critics said “a thousand bad things…without having yet seen it or read it.”

A new and forceful English Catholic discourse emerged in the years after 1594 aimed directly at those we have called Spanish Elizabethans. Thomas Wright, a one-time Jesuit, was released from the order in 1595 and returned to England as a secular priest. He hoped to convince the Elizabethan regime to grant tolerance toward Catholics. As a prelude to his efforts he wrote a short text on “Whether it is licit for Catholics in England

771 British Library, Additional MS 21, 203, fol. 7v. “Relacion del principio, progresso y fin de la tribulacion del colegio Ingles en Roma....” 22 May, 1597.
to take up arms and use other means to defend the queen and the kingdom against the Spanish.”\textsuperscript{772} The answer was a resounding yes. Spanish conquest would expose Catholics to no less danger than Protestants because Spaniards “thought no Englishman Catholic, but esteemed them all for Lutherans.”\textsuperscript{773} Some Catholics might think that a papally sanctioned Spanish Armada could not be opposed, but Wright insisted it wasn’t that simple. To be sure (much like the \textit{Conference} seems to imply) subjects—“the whole community, or the chief heads”—may call on the Pope to remedy their troubles. However, in the English case this had not been (and would not be) done.\textsuperscript{774} He doubted Spain had Rome’s support, but even if it did, Wright was willing to admit the Pope could be wrong. Indeed, the “common doctrine of the Catholics” held that he might “err in all those decrees which do not belong to faith and the measure of the universal church.”\textsuperscript{775} The pontiff should “carry the bowels of a father, a pastor, Christ’s Vicar; not… expose his son, his ships, his subjects, to so many and so great dangers.”\textsuperscript{776} Leading his flock into danger was obvious proof of error. Wright was so troubled by possible Hispano-Papal plots and tried to show the Elizabethan regime that not all Catholics were cut of the same cloth. “Moderate” Catholics wanted to re-pave paths of compromise they thought were being undone by “radicals” who wrote the \textit{Conference}.

Spanish Elizabethans had to respond to widespread criticisms. Persons defended the \textit{Conference} by arguing it showed the limits of heredity and the rights Catholics had to select a like-minded monarch. An anonymous chronicler lauded the book, saying it was


\textsuperscript{773} Strype, \textit{Annals}, p. 591.

\textsuperscript{774} Ibid., p. 590.

\textsuperscript{775} Ibid., p. 589.

\textsuperscript{776} Ibid., p. 590.
written to trump the queen’s suppression of succession talk, which in turn facilitated heresy’s survival. Joseph Creswell wrote to the papal court insisting the Conference treated matters “indifferently, showing only that which each [claimant] can say for himself, leaving judgement up to the reader.” Only heretics and troublemakers were spreading rumors that Philip wanted England for himself. To be sure, English affairs should be remedied while the king was alive, but only because his intentions were “saintly and good,” not because he sought gain from it.

How would such private pleadings manifest themselves in more public statements?

The issue might be avoided altogether. Persons was in Seville when he wrote a rather long memorial-- A Memorial for the Reformation of England-- describing the version of reform he envisioned after England was brought to the Catholic fold. He was (or so he would later claim) coaxed into writing it by close friends. Having travelled far and toiled hard for the English Catholic cause, they wanted to absorb some of the wisdom he had picked up along the way. More importantly, they hoped his ideas might be put “to public good when time might serve to use them…” True to form, Persons insisted the resulting book was innocent enough, meant “for the author and his nearest

---

777 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese IV, 209b, fol. 200r. “Le differenze che sono tra gli Inglesi Catholici sopra la successione, e il modo della riduttione di quell Regno per sua santita”

778 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese III.g.2, fol. 76r. Cresswell to Aldobrandino, Madrid, 22 December 1595.


friends only.” Among these friends were Philip and his intimates who received a Spanish (or perhaps Latin) version of the document sometime during the summer or fall of 1596. It is true, however, that in Spain only an extremely rarefied group was privy to the book’s existence. The Infanta, for example, was kept in the dark. Writing in 1601 Persons confessed he hadn’t given it to her because he “lacked courage.” Since leaving Iberian lands, he continued, “I have always secretly kept the book ready for whomsoever God should will to take in hand this great enterprise.”

But the sort of secrecy he had in mind was a partially public one. In its English version the book seems to have circulated, not only among Persons’s closest allies, but also among his enemies (Catholic and Protestant). The text became so well known it was used as key evidence of Jesuitical evil for years after the author’s death. In fact, it was first printed as anti-Jacobite propaganda in 1690 by Edward Gee.

Despite its infamy in some circles, the book was an effort to counteract the image of scheming, evil Jesuits by emphasizing points of agreement among Catholic brethren, deemphasizing many of key issues which had become subject of controversy over the intervening years since Elizabeth’s ascendance. To this end Philip is barely mentioned. Most importantly for us, issues of succession and royal “selection” were extremely limited. Heretics, Persons intimated, had “confounded” and rendered matters of succession “uncertain.” Whatever Catholic prince took the throne had to “assure”--by what means remains uncertain--“the succession of the crown by good provision of

---

781 Persons, Manifestation, 56v.
782 Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 839, fol. 126. “Puntos principales para facilitar y asegurar la Empresa da Inglaterra”
783 Quoted in Edwards, Persons, pp. 275-276.
784 Edward Gee, ed., The Jesuit’s Memorial for the Destruction of the Church of England (London, 1690). This is a close transcription of surviving manuscripts. Quotations will refer to this edition.
Laws…and in such a manner must he link the state of Catholic Religion and Succession together, as the one may depend, and be the assurance of the other.”

There is no doubt here that the problems exposed by the Conference could only be solved by a Catholic ruler, but beyond this curt statement Persons felt little need to pursue the matter. It would have been imprudent.

Even as he was avoiding the issue on one front, however, Persons and his allies were picking it up on two other fronts. Echoing claims of impartiality, a Latin version of the Conference began to circulate. Eschewing those very same claims of impartiality, Persons and his colleagues wrote a direct defense of Spanish pretensions.

****

*De regiae successionis apud Anglos iure libri duo* was completed in 1596 and it was presented to the Pope on bended knee in 1597. It was a faithful rendering of part 2 of the Conference, with one additional chapter by the anonymous translator: Persons himself. He wanted to set the record straight, as stated in the preface, amidst all the din, positive and negative (*improbantibus, alijs vero contra vehementer laudantibus*), that the Conference caused. To counterbalance criticisms for its supposedly bold pro-Spanish stance, the translator re-emphasized the text’s equanimity.

For a Roman audience, however, something more than bland objectivity was necessary. Whereas in England discussing papal rights seemed, as we have seen above, extraneous, the opposite

---

786 Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese IV, 103. (Hereafter cited as *De regiae successionis iure*) Folio citations correspond with hand-written pagination, not the printed one.
788 *De regiae successionis iure*, fol. 2r.
789 Ibid., fol. 3r. “...ea vero aequabilitate proponuntur atque discutiuntur omnia, nullam ut in partem feratur sententia, sed indecisa manent singula, idque eo (ut videtur) consilio, quo ijs paenes quos decidendi postea erit facultas, explicata sint omnina, nullo vero modo praejudicata.”
was true in and around the Curia. Talk of papal powers had been omitted intentionally from the English text to avoid ill-will, or to prevent scaring off potential readers. In its Latin form, however, a whole chapter would be devoted to the subject.

As with all the texts we have studied here, this one is remarkably multivalent. As with the Raçonamiento, only a brief overview of the first half of the Conference is provided. A summary was enough, however, to make one important point: methods of governance and administration were not ordained by natural or divine law, but instituted by the commonwealth itself. Thus if, as we shall see, the role of “the people” emerges from this text somewhat diluted, it nevertheless undergirds the architecture of the entire book.

Those parts of the Conference that were reproduced in whole perpetuated the implicit pro-Spanish arguments we have seen thus far. The book might very well be read as a pitch for the Spanish bid, and indeed, it was well-known in Madrid. As before, however, ambiguity remained important. To have it any other way, would be to prove the book’s critics right.

However, elusiveness was more than a defensive strategy. Stefania Tutino brilliantly argues De regiae successionis iure must be understood as part of machinations specific to the mid-1590s. In 1595 Scottish rebels arrived in Madrid hoping to gain support from Philip. Although Scottish interests didn’t wholly align with English Catholic ones, Tutino rightly suggests that men like Creswell were willing to offer partial

---

790 Ibid., fol. 4v. Cum autem libri autor ad vitandam invidiam, caput integrum de supremo Pontificis Romanis in Angliam iure, in impressione anglicana, ne homines scilicet metu a libri lectione arcerentur, studio omisisset..."

791 Ibid., fols. 5v-6r. “Hac tamen vel illa reipublica gubernanda atque administranda iure, ut monarchia exempli causa democratia, olygarchia, vel alia quaevis istius modi particularis regendi forma, non est a natura aut iure divino... sed a uniusque reipub. voluntate.”
support for such machinations, if only to get Philip interested in British affairs again and to encourage a group of anti-James Scotsmen as counterweights to Catholic Stuart supporters. Nevertheless, citing the let-down experienced with the Catholic League in France, Creswell warned the Curia that all hopes should not be placed on fractious Scotsmen. Spanish Elizabethans advocated a wait-and-see strategy to the Pope, they suggested nurturing Scottish schemes, encouraging Philip II to act, but above all, monitoring how things developed, before lending open support to anyone. As Tutino argues, amidst uncertain times and ambiguous political circumstance, among other things, the Latin Conference kept “options for the succession open, to give Rome a pre-eminent leadership in the affair.”

The book was an antidote for endemic confusion. Since its earliest days, important members of the English exile community believed the Church would take the lead against heresy. During the Council of Trent, Sander and his colleagues begged those assembled to strip Elizabeth of her legitimacy, and by 1570--well after Trent--they got their way with Regnans in excelsis. As we have seen, even when Spain was prepared to act, aggression--recall the Admonition--was couched in papalist language. Real (and symbolic) papal intervention was deemed necessary by radicals like Sander because only the papacy could serve as an honest broker, standing above the petty rivalries plaguing individual Catholic kingdoms that would be involved in England’s re-conquest. This is an important assumption behind De regiae successionis iure.

793 Ibid., p. 56.
794 See C.G. Bayne, Anglo-Roman Relations, 1558-1564 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913), chapter IX.
To be sure, some (especially Protestants) in England would reject the legitimacy of papal authority because it failed to represent everyone equally. But this didn’t worry Persons. Papal laws stood, and were just.\footnote{De regiae successionis iure, fols. 123v-124r. “…omnis Pontificis Romani hac tempestate ad regnum Anglicanum actio vel praetensio vehementer invidiosa odijque plenissima apud Anglos habebitur. Cur illi; hoc quidem non de tota republica sed una aliqua de parte (Protestantium videlicet) intelligas oportet. Neque tamen de Protestantibus omnibus, ex his enim ipsis non paucos fore scimus qui facile pro sua prudentia animadvertent, aequitatis et atque iustitiae lege teneri, ut quo caepisti iam exemplo omnia undique atque aequabiler proferas.”} Indeed, there was no more important occasion for papal involvement and arbitration than the looming succession struggle.\footnote{Ibid., fol. 128r. “Quapropter cum eo loco sint hodie regni Anglicani res tam quoad successorum varietatem ac praetensiones, dubias, quam religionis descrimen ut nunquam fuerint fortasse implicatiores, cumque plurimum intersit universi orbis Christiani quis qualsue princeps ad regni Anglicani gubernacula proximus post eam quae modo sceptro fruitur regimen admittatur; non modo non incommunum hoc ius Pontificis ad res temperandas existimant sed necessarium potius et ut per se justissimum et ordinatione divina institutum, etiam summopere utile ac salutare futurum arbitrantur atque haec de primo capite.”}

Papal intervention in secular affairs was given both theoretical and historical support. Spanish Elizabethan approaches to “papal politics” and its underpinning ideologies have yet to receive adequate attention.\footnote{This is part of my current and on-going research. The best reference work on the subject for the period in question remains T. Clancy, S.J., “English Catholics and the Papal Deposing Power, 1570-1640” in Recusant History, vol. 6, no. 3, October 1961, pp. 114-140.} Still, as should be clear by now, it was a complicated matter. Though the early modern period is often (rightly) seen as the (re)ascendence of a potent papacy, its power was always up for grabs. Various shades of conciliarist controversies which had marked the Middle Ages were alive and well.\footnote{For a survey on conciliarism spanning several centuries see Francis Oakley, The Conciliarist Tradition: Constitutionalism in the Catholic Church, 1300-1870 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).} In the years covered by this dissertation, dissension emerged within Catholic ranks largely due to several books by Robert Bellermine, which, at least from Sixtus V’s imperious vantage point, seemed to shuttle papal powers. Bellarmine, who would grow close to English exiles and become a spokesperson for the English against James I in the early seventeenth century, already showed clear affinities by the late sixteenth.\footnote{The essential source on this dynamic (and on Bellarmine generally) see Stefania Tutino, Empire of Souls: Robert Bellarmine and the Christian Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).} Allen would...
take Bellarmine’s side during the 1580s when Sixtus tried to suppress the the *Controversiae*, especially his *De Romano Pontifice*. The English Cardinal had seen theological merit in Bellarmine’s work, as well as its political expediency. As Stefania Tutino has pointed out, Persons, through the Latin *Conference*, also gave his learned opinion on the Bellarmine controversy. The crux of the debate between Bellarmine and papal forces wasn’t about whether or not the Pope could intervene in secular matters, but about how to justify intervention, and its limits. Bellarmine insisted the Pope had indirect, not direct powers (that is *potestas indirecta*, not *directa*), thus any action he took was based, not on inherent political powers, but on his spiritual authority. Persons argued much the same. The Pope didn’t wield imperial force invested through his ecclesiastical office, but he did have a duty to tend to spiritual matters and conserve the true faith. His power was thus not immediate (*immediatum*), but indirect and oblique (*indirectum potius et obliquum vocant*).

According to Persons all commonwealths have two sets of powers and laws, one religious and the other secular. From the beginning these were instituted for more than procuring “political goods” (*bona politica*) and temporal happiness (*ad temporalem...felicitatem*). The goal was more than the “comfort of the body and the senses, but also, and much more importantly, for the eternal well-being of the soul” (*non*...*)

---

802 Ibid.  
803 Tutino, “Conference in Continental Context”, pp. 48-49; *De regni temporis successionis*, fols. 124r-v. “Primum universale quoddam est et ad omnia Christiani orbis imperia regna atque principatus pertinere volunt, non quod Pontifices Romani ex vi officij atque dignitatis suae ecclesiasticae, atque ordinatione Christi imperiorum omnium Domini sint...sed quod boni publici causa atque inprimis religionis tuendae atque conservandae, cuius suprema Pontifici cura committitur ius ei quoque supremum competat in [inserted: quaecumque] respublicae Christianae regna ac principatus, quo videat curetque ne res Religionis detrimentum patiatur.”  
804 Ibid., fol. 124v.
tantum ad corporis, sensuumque commoda, sed etiam idque praecipue ad aeternam animi salutem).  

To be sure, there was a division of labor involved. Secular government should mind things of this world and ecclesiastical government should tend to the hereafter, helping man avoid a corrupt existence that could get in the way of his spiritual health, punishing the errant when necessary. Ideally, both secular and spiritual realms would follow a godly path, as both played a mutually supportive role in this earthly journey. But, in the end, the ecclesiastical realm trumped the secular, because affairs of the soul matter more than those of the flesh. The Pope, as inheritor of Peter’s universal spiritual jurisdiction, had the right to “direct, moderate, repress, and even correct and punish the civil magistrate” who failed to live up to the holy requisites of the commonwealth. Even if the Pope’s power was not direct, then, because spiritual matters were more important than secular concerns, and because his spiritual authority was supreme, he could (must) get involved.

To prove this, the author uses historical precedent. Many of the examples came from part I of the Conference, albeit with occasional emendations. In France, Childeric was deposed by Pope Zaccharia at the request of the commonwealth (petente universa Francorum republica), a point made in English with a slight elaboration: deposition was carried out “at the request of the whole nobility and clergy of France, or rather his...”

805 Ibid.
806 Ibid., fols. 124v-125r. “Hinc nata est duplex illa in repub, potestas sive gubernatio, una civilis quae bona politica, id est humana civibus procurat, ut commode nimirum et copiose et feliciter vivant alia est ecclesiastica quae futurae vitae bona trastat media proponit impedimenta removet, hortationibus incendit paenis ecclesiasticis castigat atque deterret negligentes corripit, malis nascentibus medetur caeteraque praestat quae homines naturae propensione ad terrena deiectos sublevet, excitet, sustentet, atque ad sublimia haec perducat...”
807 Ibid., fols. 126r-v. “…magistratum civilem dirigere, moderare, reprimere, vel etiam corrige...”
deprivation was by them and confirmed by the Pope …” (emphasis added). The Latin and English versions both mentioned the Portuguese king, Don Sancho, who was deposed by Innocent IV at a council in Rheims. This was done at the request of the Portuguese commonwealth, represented by the Archbishop of Braga (Innocenti 4 Pontificis Romani qui in Concilio Lugdunensi petente republicae Lusitaniae per oratorem suum Archiepiscopum Bracharensem decrevit deponendum esse de regni solio…). In the Conference he was said to have been “deprived…by the universal consent of all Portugal, & this his first deprivation …was approved by a general council in Lyon, Pope Innocentius the 4 being there present, who at the petition & instance of the whole realm of Portugal by their ambassadors the Archbishop of Braga, bishop of Coimbra and diverse of the nobility sent to Lyon for that purpose, did authorize the said state of Portugal, to put in supreme government one Don Alonso…”. The differences between Latin and English texts shown here are miniscule, but still significant. The Conference tends to favor a more elaborate description of events, putting more weight on the commonwealth. Their requests are approved or allowed by the Church, while De regiae successionis iure suggests a more active role by ecclesiastical authorities, or at least leaves more room for such an interpretation.

England’s relationship with Rome was special. Again, the Pope should not claim rights to intervene because of any “universal” rights, but because Rome and London had long-established, close, “feudal” links. The English were the Pope’s vassals. To prove

808 Ibid., fol. 127r.; Conference, pt. 1, p. 49.
809 Ibid., fol. 127v; Ibid., p. 53.
810 De regiae Successionis iure, fol. 128v. “non enim…regnum Anglicanum subest tantum Pontifici Romano iure illo universali quod in omnia alia Christiani orbii regna ex officij ratione atque ex praerogativa dignitatis suae supremae atque ecclesiasticae obtinet: sed arctiori quoque vinculo, fiduciae nimirum seu feudi particularis quo reges Angliae ab atiquissimis temporibus sedi apostolicae fiduciarij seu feudatarij aut vassalli ligei…extiterunt.”
this, the author resorts to well-worn evidentiary arsenals. Citing Jean Bodin—generally an enemy of Catholics like Persons—they show that during the thirteenth century, King John had declared himself a papal tributary.\textsuperscript{811} Even before John, going back to the days of Ine of Wessex and Offa of Mercia in the eighth century, English kings had paid taxes to Rome.\textsuperscript{812} Again, none of these arguments were innovative. This was old material which, however, had not been suitable for the \textit{Conference}.

Other historical discussions pertinent to Anglo-Papal relations were also recycled. The English traditionally sought papal assistance when confronted with tyrants. For Latinate audiences, the story of Richard II’s deposition was told as a joint effort by ecclesiastical and secular forces; the Archbishop of Canterbury, together with other ecclesiastical authorities and the nobility asked Boniface IX to censure the king.\textsuperscript{813} When the \textit{Conference} dealt with this same episode, the role of ecclesiastical powers was given short shrift, emphasis being placed on the commonwealth’s role in both institution and deposition.\textsuperscript{814}

King John’s fate was also important. Both the \textit{Conference} and its Latin version tell of how he suffered several papal censures. The latter, however, provides a truncated

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{811} Ibid., fol. 129r-v. “...tum etiam Pontificum Romanorum ob universam Anglicam atque Hyberniam vectigales Ecclesiae Romanae factas, probat copiose, inquinuit isti, inter alios nostri temporis scriptores Ioannes Bodinus quamquam Pontificiae alio quem amplitudinis non admodum studiosus... tractat hoc argumentum lib. 2 De repub. ca. 9 his verbis.” Quote follows thereafter. Cf. Jean Bodin, \textit{Les six livres de la republique} (n.p., 1577), Book I, Chapter IX, pp. 233-234.
\item \textsuperscript{812} De regiae successionis iure, fol. 130r-v. “Deinde alij ab antiquiori ubisque horum regnum principio rem deducunt [inserted: atque hoc praecipue scriptores anglici] Affirmant enim Inam Occidentalium Saxonum regem praestantissimam, regnum suum Romano Pontifici fecisse tributarium ad annum fere Domini 700. Offam vero regem Merceorum quorum eo tempore ditio inter caeteros Angliae populos erat amplissima, Inae regis exemplum secutum idem fecisse de regno Merceorum sub annum 775.”
\item \textsuperscript{813} Ibid., fol. 131v. “Thomas Arundelius Archiepiscopus Cantuariensis... et nobilitatis nomine ad Bonificacium 9 Pontificem Romanum recurrit, a quo excommunicationis sententiam in Richardum obtenta...”
\item \textsuperscript{814} \textit{Conference}, pt. 1, p. 61 “...by diverse acts of parliament...his [Richard’s] title was authorized and made good, and yet no man will say (I think) but that he was lawfully also deposed, again afterward, by the common wealth...”
\end{itemize}
version of history.\textsuperscript{815} Both agree on a central issue. We have already seen \textit{De regiae successionis iure} used his reign to demonstrate English submission to the Pope. The English version also mentions that John made England a perpetual “tributary to the sea of Rome.”\textsuperscript{816} However, while the Latin version stops its discussion with triumph, the English account notes the failure of papal policy. John won an ally in Rome against baronial agitators by able politicking, “yet that stayed not them [the barons] to proceed to his [John’s] deprivation which they did effectuate, first at Canterbury and after at London.”\textsuperscript{817} The Pope had been on the wrong side of history, supporting a mendacious king after some false concessions. Thus, it was ultimately the commonwealth-- not Rome-- that took definitive action.

With the flick of a few words and paragraphs, the \textit{Conference} took on new meanings. The Pope comes off as the ablest arbiter of European dissension, and the legitimacy of the Catholic Church was affirmed in a way neither previous Spanish or English iterations tried. Meanwhile, the text retained its aura of impartiality. The pro-Spanish arguments that were embedded in every version of the text remained, but they could be rejected or embraced by St. Peter’s See at will--and by the commonwealth as well. This worked well enough when the English Question remained in a state of flux, while English Catholics groped for the right stratagem, for the trusted ally that would end Elizabeth.

However, the answer to English troubles was (and had for years seemed) Spanish, and the Spanish Elizabethan propaganda machine would once again turn explicitly in Habsburg favor.

\textsuperscript{815} \textit{Conference}, pt. 1, p. 56; \textit{De regiae Successionis iure}, fols. 132v-137v.  
\textsuperscript{816} \textit{Conference}, pt. 1, p. 57.  
\textsuperscript{817} Ibid.
Tumult in the streets of Cádiz intruded on the tranquility of the city’s Jesuit College. Marauding English and Dutch sailors sacked the place, adding insult to injury by forcing an unfortunate priest to do the unthinkable. They had him stomp on a painting of Sixtus V torn down from the wall.\textsuperscript{818} They forced a man who vowed special papal obedience to enact the fantasies of Protestants who despised the papacy and that Armada-loving Roman Bishop in particular. Outside shouts of “Down with the Pope!” were heard everywhere.\textsuperscript{819}

A more prominent image—a sculpture of the Virgin and Child—was desecrated by the invaders themselves, much to the horror of the devoted. Such iconoclastic fury won no Spaniards over, nor did it transfigure the Spanish landscape permanently. But it was still traumatic. Such acts of vandalism epitomized English effrontery, and sorely spurned Spain’s \textit{reputación}. English exiles in Spain surely understood the opportunities that renewed English aggression brought. They would soon try to bring the desecrated sculpture, the Vulnerata, to the English College in Valladolid. An image hurt by evil Englishmen would be nursed by good ones.\textsuperscript{820} This was a peaceful way of providing English (Catholic) reparation for a heinous English (Protestant) act. There were, of course, more aggressive means as well.

\textsuperscript{819} This, according to Francisco de Quesada, who attributed such chants to the Flemish accompanying English forces. Quoted in Javier Burrieza Sánchez, “Reparando las heridas: el nacimiento de una devoción de ‘contrarreforma’” in \textit{BROCAR}, 26 (2002), p. 109.
\textsuperscript{820} Ibid., p. 111 and more generally see Burrieza Sánchez, \textit{Virgen de los Ingleses}, (Valladolid: Colegio de San Albano, 2008).
Persons and his colleagues quickly shifted into war-mode. The king would have to strike back, or at the very least English Catholics would have to push him to it. By the fall of 1596, Sir Francis Englefield and other prominent exiles asked Philip to support the Infanta’s bid for the English throne.\footnote{Document from Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 839, can be consulted in Martin Hume, ed., \textit{Calendar of State Papers: Elizabeth, 1587-1603} (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1899), vol. IV, p. 636. “Address of the English Catholics in Spain to Philip II” The note is signed by the Duchess of Feria, Francis Englefield, Thomas Stillington, William Seaborn, and Edward Crisp.} Sometime during 1596 or 1597, Persons suggested a short book be written to appease critics who feared the union of English and Spanish crowns. “A little tract,” he said, should be composed “by some person of credit of the same [English] nation” who “as a friend of the common good of the nation” would write on the Infanta’s behalf. The book’s author, “quasi aliud agens,” would show that “it is a certain and well-known thing that your majesty has never pretended nor pretends having this kingdom for himself.” Persons suggested Englefield might be chosen to write such a text. It is not clear that the aged exile did, but the plan bears a resemblance to a short tract that will occupy us here.\footnote{Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 839, no. 126. “Puntos principales para facilitar y asegurar la Empresa de Ynglaterra.”}

In the seventeenth century the Jesuit Christopher Grene noted the existence of a “a censure of Cardinal Allen touching the book of succession written by his secretary (it seemeth) after the Cardinal’s death Anno 1595….”\footnote{Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Anglia 37, fol. 2v (alternate pagination: 203a)} The text in question may have been a text titled \textit{The Censure of C.A. Touching the Succession of England}, written by an author we can only identify as “B.S.” If Grene was right in suggesting the writer as Allen’s secretary, this may have been a mendacious acronym hiding Roger Baynes’ identity. The piece is short and survives in English, Latin, and Spanish in the archives at
the Royal English College in Valladolid and elsewhere.® It is framed as a letter composed by someone close to Allen. While English and Latin versions in Valladolid are undated, the Spanish one is said to have been written on 1 May 1596. This, of course, gives us no definite evidence of when the text was composed, and even less evidence about if/when the idea of publishing it emerged. Because of the pamphlet’s obvious Spanish sensibilities and because several versions survive in Spain, it must be considered part and parcel of a Spanish Elizabethan effort to utilize succession matters to their full polemical potential.®

Although it claims to have been completed before the English attacked Cádiz (1 July 1596), the Censure may have been linked to that summer’s events. At the very least we can say it reflects the more aggressive pro-Spanish stance that would emerge forcefully in their aftermath.

Much like the Latin version of the Conference, the Censure was damage control. It too wanted to rebut criticisms from within the Catholic camp itself. There was no better way to do this than to invoke Allen. After his death, and as divisions between secular English clergy and the Society of Jesus hardened, the deceased Cardinal became emblematic of Halcyon days.® Critics of Persons and his colleagues looked back to Allen’s tenure as head of the exile community longingly. Those were the days, they thought, when our cause was in good stand, watched over by a man of wisdom and

® St. Alban’s College, Serie II, Legajo 12, docs. 11-13. Reference is being made here to the English version, doc. 13. The document remains unpaginated. Another English version is stored in the Archives of the Archdiocese of Westminster, London, Anglia A, vol. IX, fols. 68r-70r. It bears a slightly different title: “The Opinion and judgemente of CA before his deathe concerninge the late printed booke of the succession and certayne poynete thereunto apperteyninge”
® The links with Persons are also underlined in the text. Often Persons is mentioned in the same breath as Allen.
® For a telling account of those great secular priest who had once led English exiles, including Allen, see Archivio Segreto Vaticano, Borghese IV, 252, fol. Iff.
integrity. Not surprisingly, debates over the succession caused some to ask themselves what Allen would have thought. The *Censure* was framed as a response to a correspondent desperate to sort this issue out. The author claimed to have had access to the cardinal’s “most secret affairs” and “knew his meaning fully in the cause.” It must have seemed like a real coup de grace, then, when he explained Allen’s support for the *Conference*. It was a worthy, indeed necessary, book. He had been collecting materials for such a project himself, which he readily sent to “FF. P”–presumably Father Persons.

Allen had seen intra-Catholic dissension coming. During Mary’s reign the succession became a point of contention among putative Catholics. He always blamed a small coterie of dubious advisors for convincing the queen not to select a legitimate Catholic heir. Still, hopes that history would not repeat itself remained. Allen, “…after reading of this Book [the *Conference*]… fell into hope that upon the sight thereof all such of our Nation as are wise and truly Catholic” would stumble upon the truth, that they would recognize “the liberty they have on the one side to make a good choice and the obligation of conscience on the other to favor no corrupted or suspected pretender…”

Allen agreed with the *Conference*’s most important claims. Propinquity of blood was important, but religion was the essential determinant of kingship. Many seemingly legitimate royal inheritors “have been justly barred….in all realms Christian and also deprived…for these [Religious] and far lesser defects, and…this was allowed and ratified by God himself and by all good men, and…all Christian commonwealths had authority (yea obligation) to do and follow the same…” While the *Conference* had argued for the benefits of religious uniformity and the importance of a shared faith between king and subject, it did so (as we have seen) in general terms. It favored no particular confession,
as the *Censure* notes, so as “not to exasperate any party pretendant.” In private, however, Allen descended to the particular. No one should be admitted to the English throne who was an enemy of the Catholic Church “or doubtfully affected towards the same.” Whoever accepted or invited a heretic “ought not to be acqumpted for a true and zealous Catholic.”

There was little doubt about Allen’s own choice for Elizabeth’s successor. Though the options were many, he narrowed them down to three: James, Philip, and the Infanta. Like Persons, the Cardinal wished Tudor successors would have been more like Henry VII who “was once placed in the throne and had showed himself a good Catholic King.” Alas, “it seemeth God’s just judgment that their titles are called into question.” Allen long supported Henry’s heirs “especially so long as the Queen of Scots lived which was a known Catholic and so long as there was any hope of the reduction and reformation of her son.” However, optimism eventually faded. Whoever looked at matters objectively knew “it would be hard to expect any sure or firm reduction in a Prince of his years and liberty and that of this one point [religion] not withstanding depended the whole good or destruction of our country and Realm.” Other practical considerations aside--for example, the unlikelihood of a peaceful Anglo-Scottish union--“conscience did forbid C.A. and all other Catholic men under pain of damnation and of being guilty of all the hurts that thereof might ensue, to favor a pretender of this king’s religion whatsoever title he might have by nearness in blood.” Indeed, even if James “should for a show or any temporal respects upon the persuasion of some politic or Atheist make countenance to be a Catholic for a time yet could there never be any true assurance had thereof, nor hope of any Reformation by his means.”
All this was an implicit response to those who, like Crichton, seemed to soften their stance on the Scottish Prince. Even if James outwardly declared to be Catholic, there was no way to believe him; there was no negotiating or cajoling to be done. Catholics must dispense with any false illusions, and cease advocating for some great Scottish hope.

Portuguese descendants fare better, but not by much. According to the author, Allen believed the Conference provided arguments in favor of Lacastrians over Yorkists. It also argued that legitimate Lancastrian claims lay in Portugal. However, among Portuguese contenders there were several competing claimants, a situation that complicated matters a bit too much. The duchess of Bragança and the duke of Parma did not have sufficient forces to assert their claims. Moreover, “their titles to the succession of Engand may seem in part to be derided against them already in the controversy that is part of the crown of Portugal.” Philip for his part had both the Portuguese crown on his head and mighty military forces to boot. Still, it was unlikely that the English would welcome him and “consequently there might chance follow much wars and bloodshed for establishing of that title.”

The Infanta seemed the most prudent choice. She had claims reaching back to Norman times and met the religious pre-requisite perfectly. Being the daughter of a great king, and sister of a future one “she could not be but very indifferent and amiable to all men neither could she want any sufficient forces either for her establishment in the Crown or for her defense and maintenance.” To be sure, many would be wary of a foreigner, but soon she would marry someone amenable to both Philip and the English. The new monarchs “would be strangers to us for a time, yet would that quickly pass
away, and their children would be English born, and themselves entering not by force but
by love and composition would hold peace and be in fear and jealousy of none…”
Contrary to other pretenders the Infanta wouldn’t have to pander to her subjects, nor
would she need strangers’ help to maintain power. She would help avoid internecine
English battles, and protect against foreign aggression.

Not only was renewed amity with Spain assured, but the Infanta would also
terminate Spain’s Lancastrian pretensions. As the Conference showed, the Lancastrian
claim was potent, and there was no better way to “end that title,” according to the
Censure, than to convince Philip “to pass the same over to his daughter.” Thus the author
manages to back a Spanish succession, while claiming not to do so. The Infanta’s
succession was actually an antidote to Spanish Habsburg imperial aspirations! Some
would still worry that the Spanish and English crown could one day be united, but Allen
believed “in such a case the second child or next of her [the Infanta’s] blood might
remain with the Crown of England and so avoid that conjunction or subordination.”

It is unclear whether this iteration of Allen’s opinion was read by many, but
whoever wrote it clearly intended it to be seen on both sides of the Channel. We can
assume it was meant to be circulated at the very same time as the Latin Conference (not
to mention Persons’ above-mentioned Memorial). Although these works had some
overlapping objectives--they were all coping with backlash against the Conference and
confraternal animosity--the approach was different. Unlike De regiae successionis iure,
the Censure makes only the vaguest reference to the Pope. More importantly, the mask of
equanimitity that Spanish Elizabethans still clung to the Latin Conference was dropped.
Both books waved the banner of the true faith, but only the *Censure* openly backed one candidate.

The *Censure* was able to say exactly what Spanish Elizabethans insisted they were not saying. Again, they did so by resurrecting the dead. Like Sander in the first half of this dissertation, Allen was now used as the spokesperson for Catholic radicals, providing some measure of deniability for the living.

****

The preceding chapters have shown how over the course of a mere three years (1593-1596), the many headed hydra of Spanish Elizabethan polemic was unleashed. The approach had, in many ways, shifted from preceding propagandistic efforts. The brashness of *De origine* and its iterations, or the *Responsio*, were left behind. A conscious decision was made to take a more “moderate” approach, which the circumstances of a post-Armada world required. Not only had the Elizabethan regime heightened its assault on hispaniolized Englishmen, but even Catholics themselves started to look askance at those hispanophilic panderers, those hard-liners that only inspired royal rage, and destroyed hopes of Elizabethan clemency. To make matters worse, Philip and his advisors remained, as ever, noncommittal. Only a direct attack seemed to shake the king out of somnolence when it came to British affairs. In Rome, too, English matters may have been deemed important, but there was no real sense that the Pope was any less lethargic.

Spanish Elizabethans, thus alienated or neglected, tried to come up with a polemical tack that wouldn’t subject them to further deprecations. The succession issue was taken up several times in different works, each with its own take on the subject.
Each, in its way, embraced ambiguities to create a sense of plausible deniability. Each found ways to emphasize or de-emphasize matters of political theory and succession politics to minimize offense and maximize appeal to alternating audiences. Persons and his colleagues wanted to create an autonomous discursive space which may or may not have reflected actual personal convictions. None of these texts spoke to eternal verities; they simply used a set of complicated discussions about political theory and genealogy to create different, multivalent worlds.

If Persons and his associates thought themselves crafty enough to continue printed assaults on the Elizabethan regime without paying the consequences, theirs was a complete miscalculation. Despite denials, their efforts were fundamentally tied with the ebb and flow of the Spanish Empire. Not only did Persons and his associates start and end propaganda projects based on the likelihood of Spanish intervention in England--recall that, as I have suggested, the Conference was born of Spain’s defeats in France--but the book’s substance inevitably propounded a pro-Spanish message. Indeed, despite, or because of its vagueness, the book fit well into Spanish efforts to attack without seeming to attack. There is little doubt that, at every step of the way, Philip and his ministers were well aware of what Persons and his colleagues were writing, and that they readily granted their support.

Links between Spain and men like Persons had become innegable. Not only was there plenty of textual evidence for this, but political acts preceded their words. Persons and his colleagues would always be seen as hispanophiles, and no matter what their books said, this fact would overshadow any attempt to appear fair and balanced. They didn’t fool anyone.
Conclusions

The Last Gasp of War

During the fall of 1596 preparations were underway for another Armada. Philip forwarded strategic memoranda by Persons to Martín de Padilla, the Adelantado of Castile. Naval plans aside, the king also started thinking up ways to win over new subjects. Misunderstandings should be avoided. Philip was no power-hungry tyrant; he only wanted to liberate England from oppression and restore Catholicism. All should be assured of his clemency. Catholics should be promised the maintenance of existing immunities and the tantalizing hope of new low-cost privileges (privilegios barato se comprara).\footnote{Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 176, n.f. Philip to Martín de Padilla, Escorial, 22 October 1596.}

These were, in part, the sorts of perks Joseph Creswell emphasized in a short manuscript sent for the king’s perusal. The text was, as the author implied, in form and function similar to an edict written for the 1588 campaign copies of which, he said, were stored in Dunkirk. We can assume Creswell referenced a broadside printed to accompany the Armada: *A Declaration of the Sentence and Deposition of Elizabeth*.\footnote{Unless, of course, there is another Armada related text which today is regrettably lost.} It would have been easy enough to dust off the barely eight year old text, re-appropriating it with minor changes. At the relatively fast speed the new 1596 campaign developed, such a tack would have been justified. But Creswell understood the imprudence of such a short-cut.
He suggested a new edict should be drafted to accommodate for changing circumstances.\\footnote{829}{Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 839, no. 137. Creswell to Philip, Madrid, 12 October 1596.}

What a difference eight years makes! As seen above, the 1588 Armada set sail after securing monetary and moral support from the Pope. The campaign was purposefully sold as a crusade, and the *Declaration* framed it as a papal intervention. Sixtus, through his divine office, nullified Elizabeth’s reign and *allowed* Philip’s fleet to set sail. Eight years later, the then regnant Pope, Clement VIII, was missing from Creswell’s edict, reflecting a strikingly different set of political realities. The 1596 campaign was a hastily put together affair, a heated reaction to shear humiliation, Philip’s last ditch effort to settle all outstanding accounts across Europe.\\footnote{830}{In the end, we should note that the commander of the Armada set sail in October to win Northern France first, with the hopes that England might follow.} It wasn’t executed under a papal banner, a fact that was in some ways a liability. As far as propaganda was concerned, however, it’s not certain that pushing a papalist line would have been terribly effective anyway. For many English men and women, the mere mention of the Pope boiled blood. For an audience stricken with a fear of foreign rule, the idea that the See of St. Peter, as propagated in the *Declaration*, had fundamental rights to meddle in English affairs— to the extent it had final say in choosing their king— would have seemed odious.

Few liked Philip any better than the Pope, and the king understood this. He knew galvanizing support wouldn’t be as easy as some imagined, but, he insisted, it was worth a try.\\footnote{831}{Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 175, n.f. Philip to Padilla, 22 October 1596.} Creswell wanted to emphasize the ameliorative potential of post-Elizabethan change. The queen and her ministers had in years past destroyed true faith, sowing “sedition and novelties” everywhere, disturbing “universal tranquility and peace.” They
did this to maintain their “unjust authority and the licentious life they profess.” All Catholic princes bore the duty of resisting the spread of tyrannical heresy, particularly Philip, especially after Cádiz. But the Armada wasn’t mere retribution. Philip’s primary objective was to alleviate English Catholic sorrow, removing an oppressive yoke and granting England its “due liberty.” As far as these generalities go, Cresswell was replicating sentiments found in the *Declaration*. They differ, however, in how they imagined reform’s execution.

In 1588 “His Holiness, His Catholic Majesty, and the states of the land” would together see that justice be served. In 1596 there is more of a focus on self-determination. Creswell had Philip say he wanted “they themselves, by their own hand” to take back all that had been evilly taken away from them.832 Keeping foreign hands out of the process would assure the “guilty” would be punished without hurting the “innocent.” Order would be restored by Parliament, and more broadly, by “people who have legitimate rights to remedy” existing ills.

The full force of law should be used against the irretrievably recalcitrant, but rigor should be tempered by clemency and understanding, not only for the ignorant, as the 1588 *Declaration* had promised, but also for dissimulating Catholics. While all were encouraged to join in the fight for their faith, in 1596 Creswell’s text suggests that simply abstaining from regular relations with the enemy sufficed. Staying at home might be enough so long as doing so helped the cause.833 Of course, there were those who couldn’t

---

832 Archivo General de Simancas, Estado 839, fol. 134. “ellos mismos por su propria mano se ponga en la possession que de su honra, de sus personas, de su hacienda y antiguo ser injustamte les a sido quitado…”

833 Ibid. “…o a lo menos se apartaren del comercio y tracto de los enemigos, constando q el quedarse en sus casas es para desde ellas mismas yr ayudando a lo sobredicho prendido…”
help but dissimulate. They were warned to show their Catholic bona fides soon after Spanish victory so that “they will not experience the same risks as the enemies…”

While the 1588 *Declaration* promised to reward those who helped in the “advancement of honor and estate,” Creswell’s newly proposed edict made a special appeal to the nobility. Philip wanted to conserve ancient lineages *and* restore those which had ruined by heresy. Clearly, however, this would not be done at the expense of religiosity. Where the head of a family remained obstinate, he would be succeeded by the nearest kin to take the Spanish side.

Creswell’s edict was never printed, but a similar proclamation on behalf of Padilla was. The rare document survives only thanks to an English sailor, John Billet. On board a Spanish vessel an Italian sailor showed him “a Chest full of such printed papers”-- he grabbed one of the sheets and stuffed it in his shoe. It was an English text hastily printed in Lisbon.834 While not a direct translation of Creswell’s manuscript, they both share the basic purpose of reassurance to a predictably apprehensive conquered population. Some minor shifts might, nevertheless, be noted. Unlike Creswell’s document, it provides no details on how the transition would be effectuated. There was no mention of Parliament, no mention on the succession of noble houses. Most importantly, the printed sheet makes no mention of the Philip’s own affronts at Elizabeth’s hands. The Enterprise was undertaken only because of the “obligation, which his catholic majesty…hath received of God almighty for to defend and protect his holy faith and the Apostolical Roman Church…”835 Philip and Creswell shared this fundamental tenet. Try as they might,

---

835 Ibid., 15.
however, England would not come back to the fold. Even more than 1588, Philip’s last Armadas were abject, embarrassing failures. Any accompanying texts fared no better.

Martín de Padilla saw God’s will in demise. “Even though the intent that was had of reducing England and Flanders to the service of God and your majesty was so virtuous in itself” he told Philip, “it appears that God has not wanted to accept this service, something which would give a lot of comfort, because our Lord is not accustomed to give similar disfavors without just causes.” The king detected divine providence as well: “God punishes us for our sins,” he said stoically.\footnote{Quoted in Paul C. Allen, Philip III and the Pax Hispanica, 1598–1621: The Failure of the Grand Strategy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 14-15.}

A decade of bellicosity that began in 1588 came to a close in the spring of 1598. As Geoffrey Parker has pointed out, toward the end of his reign, Philip was eager to settle the wars he had begun in Northern Europe.\footnote{Geoffrey Parker, Philip II (Open Court: Chicago and La Salle, 2002), p. 195.} Peace talks began with France toward the end of 1597, and by 2 May 1598 the Peace of Vervins was signed. Just days later, Philip officially ceded the Low Countries to Isabel Clara Eugenia as part of a settlement that was supposed to bring the region respite from war. Philip wasn’t eager to negotiate with Elizabeth, but he eventually accepted the idea. He and his advisors realized war had gotten them nowhere. Talks with the queen didn’t go well, but a path (albeit circuitous) was begun toward a peace that would emerge in 1604.

After Philip II breathed his last in September 1598, Spanish Elizabethans placed their hopes on his son, Philip III. There may have been reason for optimism. He had absorbed his father’s Catholic convictions and quickly deployed dead king’s eschatological rhetoric. The young king began his reign by gruffly promising a rigorous
defense of the true faith across Europe, and ineed there were signs of renewed aggressiveness.

English Catholics thus set to work. Elizabeth was growing old, and they insisted the king should support the Infanta’s bid for the crown. Philip III reluctantly agreed.\textsuperscript{838}

Still, the terrain had changed since Philip II’s death. Although the first three years of Philip III’s reign would see renewed combat--at Kinsale, Ostend, and Saluzzo--many at court were against too many foreign engagements. Creswell claimed that some in the Council of State believed “Spain [had] been hurt by giving aid to the English Catholics” and thought it “treason to advise [His] Majesty to try on another occasion to send help there, seeing that it was impossible.”\textsuperscript{839} Even though the young king decided to support Isabel’s English rights, it was done quietly. Such matters were best kept secret. When English Jesuit William Baldwin offered to write yet another book on her claims in time for the 1601 Parliament, the Council in Spain expressly forbade such publication without approval from the Spanish ambassador in Rome, Persons, and other such “qualified people in Italy.” They insisted “such books are only to be approved in so far as they are well founded, otherwise they are harmful.”\textsuperscript{840} Clearly, the polemical tides had changed.

Spanish Elizabethans didn’t stop using print to exhort, support, and promote Spain after Philip II’s death. Indeed, the key works studied in this dissertation--\textit{De origine} and the \textit{Conference} – didn’t fade away with the fading century. Both circulated and were re-used throughout the 1600s. However, they would lose some of their political charge, or they at least attained different valences. Political circumstances changed and

\textsuperscript{838} Allen, \textit{Pax Hispanica}, p. 59.

\textsuperscript{839} Ibid., pp. 25-26.

would never be the same. A sense that a crusading Spanish spirit was on the verge of saving England from its heretical sins never re-emerged in quite the same powerful way it did during the last years of the sixteenth century.

**Some Implications and Explications**

The preceding pages have dealt with substantial issues concerning early modern history from a rather unique point of view. The texts studied here were written by men who were both in the centers and peripheries of political action. They were written by men who had access to the greatest monarchs of the time, but had no monarch of their own. Though they had friends in the highest echelons of society, there was no certainty as to the steadfastness of those friendships. One moment they seemed to be in the door, the next they were knocking again.

From the multi-perspectival position of exile they wrote books reflecting the interests of English Catholics, all the while catering to the needs and predilections of putative allies. Thus, to a point, the writings examined here reflect typical traits of exile protest literature, the work of disenfranchised men trying to destroy the oppressor back home through verbal assaults and by lobbying foreign governments for aid.

Spanish Elizabethans had existential reasons to play complicated polemical games. Although they may have had beds to sleep on, they were, in a sense, homeless. Thought of as traitors and foreigners by many in England, they were looked at with similar distrust by some Catholics on the Continent. Their cause had to be “sold” on several fronts without alienating any of their benefactors, which would have put them in financial/corporal danger. Depending on the temper of the times, they also had to calibrate their assaults on the Elizabethan regime. Of necessity, then, these “nationless”
men (and women) had to confect a nuanced and variegated print campaign which ably
crossed cultural and political boundaries.

As much as their state of exile, the relationship between certain English Catholics
and Spain required polemical flexibility. Spanish Elizabethans believed Philip II could
save Christendom. They recognized the breadth of Habsburg power and, despite
contretemps, men like Persons were grateful to “that prince [Philip II] and people [the
Spanish], unto whom above all others hitherto for our temporal relief and maintenance in
this our banishment, we have been and are beholden.” Still, the relationship was
complex. Aid was never certain, and a lot of energy was spent trying to ensure--in person
and in print-- support from authorities in Madrid.

Often during the period examined here, English Catholic and Spanish goals
melded. Indeed, this dissertation is largely about Spain. First, it shows how Philip’s
muscular foreign policy framed sixteenth century discursive wars. From London to Paris,
Lisbon to Rome, Amsterdam to Dublin, love, hate, and fear of Spanish Habsburg
hegemony influenced local polemical battles, and in turn made sure local polemics were
internationalized. This story is yet to be told in full, but this dissertation uses the pregnant
example of English Catholic writings as a prism through which to observe this
phenomenon. Obviously, the very fact that Englishmen became top order Spanish
propagandists tells us something about the polemical dynamics of the time. More
importantly, that they actively spoke to several different audiences makes clear that

---

841 The strength of this belief is suggested by the fact that these words were uttered by Persons as he spoke
to the students of the English College, many of whom were against Persons and his Hispanic links. See
“The Speech that F. P had to the English scolars at Rome some days after his arrival from Spayne.” 3 April
1597. Transcription found in ABSI 46/12/4, fols. 542-574. Quote at fol. 556.
Spanish Habsburg propagandists--propagandists for a far-flung empire-- had to cast wide nets.

This dissertation is in large part about Philip’s absorption of an extreme Spanish Elizabethan polemical stance. I have shown how English Catholics directly or indirectly helped construct the image of a peaceful, magnanimous, put-upon Christian king, especially in the 1586 *De origine*, subsequent translations, and the *Responsio*. I have also discussed how Philip’s British allies provided juridical support-- in the *Conference*-- for his various succession claims. Although the King may have been temperamentally averse to self-congratulation or somewhat uncomfortable about supporting scabrous libels, during more militant spurts Madrid actively co-opted these polemics to serve its own propagandistic and political objectives. By showing this we get a sense of how the Spanish Monarchy itself operated; how it used polemic and propaganda, and benefitted from the strenuous efforts of foreign guests.

But, of course, men like Persons were not mere Spanish lackeys. Spanish Elizabethans tried to manipulate a political system with more than one center. Their need to navigate through complicated, and often quite different diplomatic landscapes helps explain the kinetic energy I have tried to show above. Wars (and potential wars) of broad European proportions that developed somewhat erratically over the course of little more than ten years required adaptability, creativity, and flexibility; messages changed in substance, tone, and tongue depending on intended audiences.

Indeed, the texts studied here are hard to pin down. One could, of course, categorize all of them as English Catholic, but, in fact, depending on the political moment and the editorial goals, we have seen that they could be considered Spanish, *ligueur*,
papalist, or a mix. We observed *De origine’s* evolution from a purely English Catholic call to arms, to a piece of Spanish propaganda (in Latin and vernacular versions), and a tool for radical French Catholicism, each with its own inflections and resonances. The *Conference* was a tool of Spanish propaganda created in such a way that it might appeal to a broad English audience, and was subsequently transformed into a papalist text, and finally reconfigured to obviate its true “Spanish” nature.

From one crisis point (1585-1588) to another (1593-1597) we have also observed a tactical shift from the ribaldry of Sander’s secret history (and that of the *Responsio*) to the more forensic approach of the *Conference*. The sabre rattling that characterizes *De origine* seemed appropriate in those heady days when the Armada was a likely eventuality. In the aftermath of failure, however, a more muted, nuanced approach was in order. This was, in large part, because English Catholics were writing in the context of Spanish non-committal stance toward England. But it was also because of discontent among Catholic exiles themselves; because of their growing sense that the kind of radical pro-Spanish cheering which had predominated in recent years was not beneficial to the cause. If the *Conference* was meant to cope with burgeoning discomfort, however, it failed and ultimately required its own set of defenses. The second half of this dissertation shows how Persons and his colleagues were reacting to a negative reading, not only of their intransient stance, but of the actual books they produced as well.

This dissertation provides insight into the fissures afflicting Catholic Europe. As I have suggested throughout, some of the texts studied here--take the 1585 *De origine*, for example--were as much scolding fellow Catholics as they were attacking heretics in England, suggesting that there was a perceived chasm between ideal Catholic behaviors
and reality, even among the era’s most obvious Catholic potentates: Philip and the Pope. As I argued above, even the central piece of pro-Armada propaganda--Ribadeneyra’s *Scisma*--has undertones of disenchantment with the king. There was no less unease about the papacy. As noted throughout, the authors examined here articulate slightly different ideas about papal powers and the papacy’s relevance to the English situation. These differences were linked to the ideological rifts within the Curia itself, but also to the differing opinions about the issue in Madrid, Paris, and, indeed, across Europe. As suggested above, rifts among English Catholics were serious, and were on full display throughout this dissertation--in the jabs taken at weak Catholics in *De origine* or in the apologies for the *Conference* against confraternal criticism. Thus, even as the Catholic Church put all its efforts behind uniting its parishioners and spreading its supposed one true faith across the globe, in-fighting was endemic; unity and uniformity were not easily achieved.

The texts studied here all reveal the deep immersion of clerics in a world of crude politics. Most obviously, of course, we have seen authors actively take on the role of Habsburg publicists. Just as important, we should underscore that Spanish Elizabethan books mark a departure from the theological polemic written by English Catholics during the first two decades of Elizabeth’s reign. Indeed, although we have noticed a strong providentialist strain throughout (especially in *De origine* and the *Scisma*), the authors often went out of their way to focus their attention, not on dogma or ecclesiology, but on politics, to the extent that the *Conference* (though, of course, not its Latin version), wanted to be seen as, in a sense, post-confessional.
All the polemicists discussed here knew exactly what they were doing, but even the most rabid had misgivings. There was a real question about whether or not men of God should be involved in politics at all. This became an issue of great contention during the period studied here, especially within the Society of Jesus, to which one key author—Persons—belonged. When it came time to decide the extent to which members of the order could take part in affairs of state during the Fifth General Congregation (1593/94), the response was negative. One decree insisted the Society would hinder the spiritual fruits of their mission “if it were to engage in what is secular and belongs to political affairs and the governance of states.” Not surprisingly, Persons disagreed. He argued such a strict rule could not be embraced by anyone on the English mission because in England religious affairs were “so united and mixed with those of the state, that one cannot deal with one without the other, for there is no other state in England than that of heretics.” Even if one could theoretically (en la speculacion) separate the spiritual from the worldly, in practice (en la practica) it was impossible.

Everyone understood this reality. Although the decrees of 1594 warned Jesuits should not “cultivate familiarity with princes to the detriment of spiritual welfare and religious discipline; and they should not become engaged in other secular affairs,” it also added that exceptions might be made when “in the judgment of superiors charity might occasionally dictate otherwise.” When Persons wrote Acquaviva asking for a dispensation to continue his political activities, Acquaviva felt unable to concede. However, none was needed, he informed Persons, so long as he proceed prudently and

---

842 Quoted in McCoog, ‘Our way of Proceeding?’, p. 279.
843 Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu, 46/12/3, fol. 259. (Original in Archivum Romanum Societatis Iesu, Hispania 136) Persons to Acquaviva, Marchena, 12 May 1594.
844 McCoog, ‘Our way of Proceeding?’, p. 280
religiously.\textsuperscript{845} To be sure, the General’s instinctive misgivings were sincere, but time and again (when deemed necessary) he was willing to bend rules.\textsuperscript{846}

Despite qualms, Spanish Elizabethans surely drew on broad spread learned literary techniques and cultural modalities to execute and justify their brand of polemic and propaganda. Scholastic training ensured their ability to provide arguments on both sides of any given issue before coming to a certain conclusion. Humanistic influences ingrained assumptions about the plasticity of language for rhetorical effectiveness. Both scholarly trends thus provided skill sets necessary for carefully manipulating texts and arguments depending on audiences and contextual exigencies. Casuistry, an art that was taught and thought about in all English seminaries, also provided a moral framework for thinking about language, its shifting uses, and how best to leave things unsaid. Perhaps most importantly, the activities studied here can be seen as natural in a cultural sphere that emphasized Reason of State, be it in its oft-criticized “Machiavellian” forms which eschewed traditional morality for the conservation of the State or in its “Christian” iterations which espoused lies and subterfuge so long as it was for holy ends.

This all made it possible that, as we have seen from beginning to end of this dissertation, there was a continuous interplay between authors and texts, texts and contexts. Anyone who has encountered Spanish Elizabethan books would agree with J.H.M. Salmon that they display “an opportunism in tune with the vicissitudes of Elizabethan Catholicism.”\textsuperscript{847} Although a seemingly obvious point, realizing this has not

\textsuperscript{845} Ibid.
affected ways Spanish Elizabethan texts have been studied. The instinct has been to find
unities in English Catholic thought at the expense of its inconstancies. Thus Thomas
Clancy once argued that despite fissures within English Catholic ranks the “Allen-
Persons party and its opposite number each had its political theory.” In other words they
had more or less cogent, decrivable sets of beliefs and standard arguments. Peter
Holmes, in his seminal researches, argued there were distinguishable patterns in English
Catholic political thought undulating between resistance and compromise with
Protestants. As opposed to those who saw a deep chasm between men of Allen and
Persons’ ilk and other English Catholic factions, Holmes focused on the “chronological
development of the political ideas of the Elizabethan Catholics, taken as a whole and not
divided into groups or parties.” More recently, Victor Houliston’s learned analysis of
Persons’ work has suggested another sort of coherence. Houliston argues against a
tendency “to allow the more aggressive features of Persons’s works of controversy to
obscure the integrity of his vision” (my emphasis).

Instead, he wants to show how the Jesuit’s entire oeuvre was firmly rooted in spiritual ideals articulated in his famed
Christian Directory. The preceding chapters have shown the limits of such inclinations
toward unity, and might be suggestive of complicated stories yet to be told.

Spanish Elizabethans were not unique in their fractiousness, in their polemical
acumen, or in their willingness to create texts which demonstrate a certain ideological
flexibility. Indeed, perhaps the most prominent early modern example of ideological
malleability can be observed in France where changing political circumstances--the rise
of Henri IV --caused a complete volte face. Catholics who had been strong royalists

848 Clancy, Papist Pamphleteers, p. 7.
849 Holmes, Resistance and Compromise, p. 6.
850 Houliston, Catholic Resistance, p. 21.
turned monarchomachs and Huguenots who had been monarchomachs became strong royalists. The micro-stories of how polemics were used and manipulated in France in response to political contingencies have not been fully told, nor has the broader story about textual strategies used during the politico-religious crises afflicting the late sixteenth century. This dissertation has suggested the potential benefits of doing so.

Although the preceding chapters have been very precise in topic and chronology, by showing active Spanish Elizabethan efforts to extend their polemical tentacles throughout Europe I have suggested the pan-European breadth of propagandistic activities, particularly as they were linked to the development of Spanish hegemony. Not only that, but I have made a good start of excavating this still poorly understood discursive terrain by offering a detailed analysis of primary contributors to the era’s polemical fray.

Finally, by suggesting the types of changes and shifts which we can detect in texts when we sharpen our analytical focus I have demonstrated the kinds of stories we can tell when we take propaganda seriously not only as a window into hardened ideologies, but into a textual culture in which written words became political acts sensitive to (perceived) political realities.
BIBLIOGRAPHY of SOURCES CITED

Manuscripts

England

London

British Library: Cotton MS Julius F VI; Additional MS 10,236; Additional MS 28,374; Additional MS 21,203.

Archive of the Archdiocese of Westminster: Anglia A, vol. IX.

Archivum Britannicum Societatis Iesu: Collectanea P I; Anglia A I; Mss. 46/12/3 and 46/12/4 (Leo Hicks Transcriptions).

Italy

Rome

Archive of the Venerable English College: Liber 1388, Liber 1396

Archivium Romanum Societatis Iesu: Fondo Gesuitico 651; Fondo Gesuitico 720; Fondo Gesuitico 786; Toletum 3; Hispania 143; Anglia I; Anglia 37

Vatican City

Archivio Segreto Vaticano: Segretaria di Stato, Spagna, 34; Borghese II, 448 A-B; Borghese III, 94c; Borghese III g2; Borghese IV, 209b; Borghese IV, 103; Borghese IV, 252.

Portugal

Lisbon

Arquivo Nacional Torre do Tombo: Inquisição de Lisboa, Proceso 2028, Proceso 11.824

Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal: Mss. 29, no. 45

Spain

Madrid

Archivo Histórico Nacional: Órdenes Militares, Legajo 3511, Legajo 3509
Biblioteca Francisco Zabálburu: Altamira 161, doc. 138
Biblioteca Nacional: Mss. 1930; Mss. 2058; Mss. 6604; Mss. 18.633-22; Mss. 23.199
Biblioteca de Palacio: Mss. II/2225
Real Academia de la Historia: Mss. 9-2320.

Valladolid

St. Alban’s College: Serie II, Legajo 6; Serie II, Legajo 12.
Archivo General de Simancas: Estado 166; Estado K. 1630; Estado 176; Estado 839.

Unpublished PhD Theses


Bouza, Fernando. “Portugal en la monarquía hispánica” (Universidad Complutense, 1987).


Tenace, E.S. “The Spanish Intervention in Brittany and the Failure of Philip II’s Bid for European Hegemony, 1589-98” (University of Illinois, 1996).
Printed Sources

(*) Denotes primary source

(+) Denotes a secondary source containing primary source material

A declaration of the Causes Moving England to Give Aid to the Defense of the People Afflicted and Oppressed in the Low Countries (London: Christopher Barker, 1585).*

A declaration of great troubles pretended against the Realme by a number of Seminarie Priests and Iesuites, sent, and very secretly dispersed in the same, to worke great Treasons under a false pretence of Religion, with a provision very necessary for remedy thereof. Published by this her Maisties Proclamation. (London: Christopher Barker, 1591).*

A Relation of the King of Spaines Receiving in Valladolid (n.p., 1592).*


Acosta, Christoval. Tratado en loor de las mujeres (Venice: Giacomo Cornetti, 1592).*

Advertissement des Catholiques anglois aux François catholiques (n.p., 1586).*

Alberí, Eugenio. Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato durante il secolo decimosesto (Firenze: Alberí, 1861), Serie I.*


Allen, Wiliam. An Admonition to the Christian Nobility (n.p., 1588).*

---------, A Briefe Historie of the Glorious Martyrdom of XII Reverend Priests... (n.p., 1582).*
An apologie and true declaration of the Institution and endeavors of the two English Colleges (Mounts in Henault, 1581).*


Alvar Ezquerra, Alfredo, ed. Imágenes Históricas de Felipe II (Madrid: Centro de estudios cervantinos, 2000).


Ayre, John, ed. The Works of John Jewel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1845).*


Bede, The History of the Churche of Englande, Thomas Stapleton, trans. (Antwerp: John Laet, 1565).*
Belloy, Pierre de. Apologie Catholique contre les libelles, declarations, advis, et consultations faictes, escrites, et publiees par la ligue preturbateurs du repos du Royaume de France (n.p., 1585).*

----------. Catholicke Apologie against the Libels, Declarations, Advices, and Consultations Made, Written, and Published by those of the League, Perturbers of the Quiet Estate of the Realme of France (London: G. Robinson for Edward Agass, 1586).*

Blackfan, John. Annales Colegii Anglorum Vallesoletanum, Peter E.B. Harris, ed., (Valladolid: Royal English College, 2008).*

Bodin, Jean. Les six livres de la republique (n.p., 1577).*

Borja Medina, Francisco de. “Jesuitas en la Armada contra Inglaterra (1588): notas para un centenario” in Archivum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 58, 1589, pp. 3-42.


----------. “Contrarreforma y tipografía. ¿Nada más que rosarios en sus manos?” in Cuadernos de historia moderna, no. 15, 1994, pp. 73-88.

----------. Imagen y Propaganda: Capítulos de historia cultural del reinado de Felipe II (Madrid: Akal, 1998).

----------. Portugal no tempo dos Filipes: Política, cultura, e representações (Lisbon: Cosmos, 2000).

Braun, Harold E. Juan de Mariana and Early Modern Spanish Political Thought (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007).

Brett, Annabel and James Tully with Holly Hamilton-Bleakley, eds. Rethinking the Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

Breve catalogo de los martyres que han sido de los colegios y seminarios ingleses que residen en Roma y en la ciudad de Rhemis (Valladolid: Diego de Cordova, 1590).*

Breve proposicion de algunos de los motives que ay para favorecer los seminarios Ingleses, y en particular este de San Gregorio de Sevilla (n.p., n.d).*

Bruce, John and Thomas Thomason Perowne, eds. *The Correspondence of Matthew Parker* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1853).*


---------. *Valladolid, tierras y caminos: presencia de la Compañía de Jesús en la provincia de Valladolid, 1545-1767* (Valladolid: Diputación de Valladolid, 2007).

---------. *Virgen de los Ingleses* (Valladolid: Colegio de San Albano, 2008).


Cameron, Annie I., ed. *The Warrender Papers* (Edinburgh: University Press, 1932), vol. II. *


Carlyle, Thomas, ed. *Oliver Cromwell’s Letters and Speeches* (Boston: Dana Estes and Charles E. Lauriat, 1884), vol. III.


Cock, Enrique. *Jornada de Tarazona*, Alfredo Morel-Fatio and Antonio Rodríguez Villa, eds. (Madrid: Imprenta y Fundación de M. Tello, 1879).*


Conestagio, Geronimo. *Dell’unione del regno di Portogallo alla corona di Castiglia* (Genova: Girolamo Bartoli, 1585).*

*Copie d’une lettre envoyee d’Angleterre a Dom Bernardino de Mendoza ambassadeur en France pour le Roy d’Espagne* (n.p., 1588).*


Cowell, John. *Antisanderus duo continens dialogos non ita pridem inter viros quosdam doctos Venetijs habitos: in quibus variae Nicholaj Sanderi, aliorumque Romanensium calumniae in haec Anglorum ab excusso Pontifice tempora vaferrime confictae, licet obiter & fortuito, vere tamen candideque refelluntur* (Cambridge, 1593).*


Crosignani, Ginevra, Thomas McCoog, and Michael Questier, with the assistance of Peter Holmes, eds. *Recusancy in Early Modern England: Manuscript and Printed Sources in Translation* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2010).*


Danvila de Buguero, Don Alfonso. Don Cristóbal de Moura (Madrid: Fortanet, 1900).


Della persecuzione di Catolici nel regno d’Inghilterra (Bologna: Alessandro Benacci, 1582).*


Elder, John. The copie of a letter sent into Scotlande of the arivall and landinge and most noble marriage of the most Illustre Prynce Phillippe Prynce of Spaine to the most excellente Princes Mary Quene of Inglande (n.p., 1554).*


Essen, León van der. *Alexandre Farnèse Prince de Parme Gouverneur Général des Pays-Bas* (Bruxelles: Nouvelle société d’éditions, 1937), vol. V.

Fernandez Duro, Cesareo. *La armada invencible* (Madrid: Tipográfica de los Sucesores de Rivadeneyra 1884).*


Figeiro, Vasco. *The Spaniards Monarchie and the leaguers Olygarchie* (London: Richard Field, 1592).*


Galloni, Antonio. *De ss. martyrum cruciatibus* (Rome: Typographia Congregationis Oratorij apud S. Mariam in Vallicella, 1594).*


Garibay, Esteban de. *Ilustraciones genealogicas de los Catholicos reyes de las Españas* (Madrid: Luis Sanchez, 1596).*


----------. *Irlanda y el Rey Prudente* (Madrid: Laberinto, 2003), vol. II.


Herrera, Antonio de. *Advertencias que los católicos de Inglaterra escrivieron a los católicos de Francia* (Zaragoza: Lorenço Robles, 1592).*

----------. *Cinco libros de Antonio de Herrera de la historia de Portugal, y conquista de las Islas de los Açores en los años de 1582 y 1583* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1591).*

----------. *Historia de lo sucedido en Escocia e Inglaterra en quarenta y quatro años que vivió Maria Estuarda, Reyna de Escocia* (Lisboa: Manuel de Lyra, 1590).*

Herrera, Fernando de. *Tomás Moro*, Francisco López Estrada, ed. (Seville: Universidad de Sevilla, 2001).*


----------. *Catholics Writing the Nation in Early Modern Britain and Ireland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).


----------. *Philip of Spain* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).


----------, ed. *The First and Second Diaries of the English College, Douay* (London: David Nutt, 1878).*


Labrador Arroyo, Félix ed. *Diario de Hans Khevenhüller, embajador imperial en la corte de Felipe II* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la Conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2001).*


Lemon, Robert, ed. *Calendar of State Papers, 1581-1590* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts and Green, 1865).*
Leslie, John. *A Defence of the Honour of the Right Highe, Mighty, and Noble Princesse Marie Queene of Scotlende* (London: Fleet Street, 1569).*

----------. *A Treatise Touching the Right, Title, and Interest of the Most excellent Princesse Marie Queene of Scotlende* (n.p., 1584).*

----------. *Declaracion de titulo y derecho que la serenissima princesa Doña Maria Reyna de Escocia tiene a la succession del Inglaterra* (n.p., n.d.)*


Mendoza, Bernardino de. Theorica y practica de guerra (Antwerp: Platiniana, 1596).*

Mexia, Pedro. Le vite di tutti gli imperadori, Lodovico Dolce, trans. (Venice: Gabriel Giolito de Ferrari, 1560).*


-------. “Peter Wentworth” in The English Historical Review, 1924 XXXIX(CLIII), pp. 36-54 and XXXIX(CLIV), pp. 175-205.

Newes from Spayne and Holland Conteyning an Information of Inglish affayres in Spayne with a Conference made thereupon in Amsterdame of Holland (n.p., 1593).


O’Conner Thomas and Mary Ann Lyons, eds. Irish Communities in Early Modern Europe (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2006).


Pérez Tostado, Igor. *Irish Influence at the Court of Spain in the Seventeenth Century* (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008).

Persons, Robert. *A Brief Discours Contayning Certayne Reasons why Catholiques Refuse to go to Church* (Douai: Iohn Lyon, 1580).*

-------. *A Manifestation of the Great Folly and Bad Spirit of Certayne in England Calling Themselves Secular Priests* (n.p., 1602).*

-------. *Elizabetheae Angliae reginae haeresim calvinianam propugnatis saevissimum in Catholicos sui regni edictum, quod in alios quoque republicae Christianae principes contumelias continent indignísimas* (Rome: Aloysii Zannetti, 1593).*


-------. *Relacion de algunos martyrios, que de nuevo han hecho los ereges de Inglaterra* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1590).*

-------. *Reponse a l‘iniuste et sanguinaire edict d‘Elizabeth royne d‘Angleterre* (Lyon: Jean Pilehotte, 1593).*


Pole, Reginald. *Epistolarum Reginaldi Poli S.R.E. Cardinalis et aliorum ad ipsum collectio*, Angelo M. Quirini, ed. (Brescia: Rizzardi, 1744-57).*
---

Reginaldi Poli CardinalisBritanni, ad Henricum Octauum Britanniae Regem, pro ecclesiasticae unitatis defensione, libri quatuor (Rome: Antonium Bladum, [c. 1539]).*

Pollen, J.H. “Dr. Nicholas Sander” in The English Historical Review, vol. 6, no. 21 (January, 1891), pp. 36-47.

---

---


Pollini, Giovanni. L’historia ecclesiastica della rivoluzione d’Inghilterra (Rome: Giovanni Angelo Ruffinelli, 1594).*


---


---


Rainolds, William. De iusta reipublicae Christianae in reges impios et haereticos authoritye (Paris: Guilielmum Bichonium, 1590)


Rebora, Piero. Civiltà Italiana e civiltà Inglese (Firenze: Felice le Monnier, 1936).

Recio Morales, Óscar. Ireland and the Spanish Empire, 1600-1825 (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2010).

Relacion que embiaron las religiosas del monasterio de Sion de Ingaterra (Madrid: Viuda de Pedro de Madrigal, 1594).*
Rey, Eusebio ed. *Historias de la Contrarreforma* (Madrid: Biblioteca de autores cristianos, 1945).*


Ribadeneyra, Pedro de. *Flos sanctorum de las vidas de los santos* (Barcelona: Juan Piferrer, 1734).*

-------------. *Historia ecclesiatica del scisma del reyno de Inglaterra* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1588).*

-------------. *Obras* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1595).*

-------------. *Segunda parte de la historia ecclesiastic del scisma de Inglaterra* (Lisbon: Manoel de Lyra, 1594).*

-------------. *Tratado de Tribulacion* (Madrid: Pedro Madrigal, 1589).*

-------------. *Tratado de la religion y virtudes del principe cristiano* (Madrid: Pedro de Madrigal, 1595).*

-------------. *Vida del Padre Ignacio de Loyola* (Madrid: Alonso Gomez, 1586).*

Rodríguez de Diego, José Luis, ed. *Instrucción para el gobierno del archivo de Simancas* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Cultura, 1988).*

Rodríguez-Salgado, M.J. “Paz ruidosa, guerra sorda: las relaciones de Felipe II e Inglaterra” in L. Ribot García, ed., *La monarquía de Felipe II a debate* (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para la conmemoración de los Centenarios de Felipe II y Carlos V, 2000).


Sander, Nicholas. De clave Davide seu regno Christi libri sex contra Acleri pro visibili monarchia (Roma: Georgium Ferrarium, 1588).*

---------. Doctissimi viri Nicolai Sanderi De origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani, liber (Cologne [vere Rheims], 1585)*


---------. Les trois livres de Nicolas Sander, touchant l‘origine et progress du schisme d‘Angleterre, I.T.A.C., trans. (Strasbourg: Hans Mark, 1587 ou 1588).*

---------. Nicolae Sanderi Angli Doct. Theol. De Origine ac progressu schismatis Anglicani libri tres (Cologne: Petri Henningi, 1610).*

---------. The Rise and Growth of the Anglican Schism, David Lewis, trans. (London: Burns and Oates, 1877).*


Schaub, Jean Frédéric. Portugal na Monarquia Hispânica, 1580-1640 (Lisbon: Livros Horizontes, 2001).

Scotti, Annibale. In P. Cornelii Taciti Annales et historias comentarii ad politicam et avlicam rationem praeципue spectantes (Frankfurt: Heirs of Andreae Wecheli, 1592).*


Soares de Azevedo, Maria Antonieta. *O Prior do Crato, Felipe II de Espanha e o trono de Portugal: algumas notas bibliográficas (século XVI)* (Coimbra: University of Coimbra, 1974).


Stapleton, Thomas. *Tres Thomae* (Douai: Ioanis Bogardi, 1588).*

Stevenson, Joseph ed. *Calendar of State Papers, Foreign, January-June 1588* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, Roberts & Green, 1931).*


Tanariz, Cristóbal. *Historia de los sanctos martires de Cartuxa que padecieron en Londres* (Sevilla: Alonso de Barreras, 1584).*

*The Copie of a Letter Written by M. Doctor Allen Concerning the Yeelding up of the Citie of Daventrie* (Antwerp: Joachim Trognaesius, 1587).*

*The copie of a letter lately written by a Spanishe gentleman, to his friend of sundry calunnies, there falsely bruited and spred amonge the people* (n.p., 1589).*


Verstegan, Richard. *An Advertisement to a Secretarie of my L. Treasurers of Ingland* (n.p., 1592).*

---------. *Theatrum crudelitatum haereticorum nostri temporis* (Antwerp: Adrianum Huberti, 1587).*


---------. “‘Domme Preachers’? Post-Reformation English Catholicism and the Culture of Print” in *Past & Present*, no. 168 (August, 2000), pp. 77-123.


