THE DEMOCRACY ESTABLISHMENT

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Abstract

This dissertation is about how and why the United States and other developed countries turned to democracy promotion at the end of the Cold War, and what the impact of doing so has been on the conduct of politics in developing countries across the world. Newly assembled quantitative data, archival records, and extensive field research in Jordan and Washington, D.C., show that many government programs to aid democracy abroad today are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels. Instead, today’s template of democracy assistance activities emphasizes technical programs that do not threaten the non-democratic regimes of the countries where the programs take place. That template contrasts with the more confrontational aid projects to dissidents, political parties, and trade unions that dominated the early era of democracy assistance in the 1980s.

What explains the taming of democracy assistance? Previous research suggests that donor countries’ self-interests and target states’ characteristics drive patterns of foreign assistance. In contrast, this dissertation focuses on the people linking the democracy promoting countries and the target states. These people, who conduct democracy assistance programs, form the democracy establishment. The democracy establishment’s ideas and incentives, which have their genesis in the funding structure of democracy assistance and have subsequently become institutionalized over time, matter greatly for the design of democracy assistance programs. In turn, the types of political practices and institutions that the democracy establishment promotes matter greatly for the conduct of politics in de-
veloping countries. Developing countries such as Afghanistan have, for example, adopted quotas for women’s minimum representation in legislatures despite women’s otherwise poor station in society; such countries adopt quotas because the democracy establishment has encouraged them to do so.

The dissertation shows that the democracy establishment significantly influences politics in developing countries, and that its priorities come from incentives created by its funding structure. The theoretical and policy implications of these findings involve our understanding of the anatomy of foreign influence, non-state actors in world politics, principal–agent relationships, and current debates about how best to promote democracy abroad. In order to reward democracy assistance programs that are most likely to advance democracy, the funding structure of democracy assistance should be reformed.
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List of Abbreviations

AED        Academy for Educational Development
ARD        Associates in Rural Development, Inc.
CEDAW      Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
CIPE       Center for International Private Enterprise
DAI        Development Associates Inc.
DG         Democracy and governance
DRL        Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. State Department
EC         European Commission
EU         European Union
FH         Freedom House
GDP        Gross domestic product
GPRA       Government Performance and Results Act
IDA        International Development Association
IFES       International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF        International Monetary Fund
IREX       International Research and Exchanges Board
INGO       International non-governmental organization
MCC        Millennium Challenge Corporation
MENA       Middle East and North Africa
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<td>MEPI</td>
<td>Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<td>NED</td>
<td>National Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>NDI</td>
<td>National Democratic Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Open Society Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>RONGO</td>
<td>Royal non-governmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SUNY</td>
<td>State University of New York</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
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Part I

Introduction and Argument
Chapter 1

Introduction

The global spread of democracy is among the most remarkable transformations in world politics during the twentieth century. Democracies represented but a small minority of the world’s states in 1900. The number of democracies declined during the interwar years with the spread of European fascism and increased once more after the Allied victory in World War II. But the greatest sustained transformation in the nature of countries’ governments began with Portugal’s democratization in 1974. Portugal’s revolution marked the start of the so-called “third wave” of democratization. The third wave swept across states in every region of the world other than the Middle East in the 1980s and 1990s. Now, over half of the world’s states are democracies according to most measures.¹

The third wave of democratization coincided in part with the end of the Cold War and a stunning shift towards democracy promotion in the foreign policies of the United States and other advanced democracies. American leaders from Woodrow Wilson to Bill Clinton and George W. Bush have stressed the United States’ commitment to aiding democracy abroad. For many years, however, the United States’ actions contradicted its rhetoric. The “re-

alpolitik” of American security and foreign economic interests overwhelmed “idealpolitik.” Cold War geo-politics encouraged the United States to ally itself with authoritarian states and occasionally even support the overthrow of democratically elected governments. The rise of democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War altered that balance. Democracy promotion takes many forms, including economic sanctions and rewards, diplomatic pressure, and military intervention. Democracy assistance, aid explicitly given with the goal of advancing democracy in another country, is another tool and is one of the most visible examples of the rise of post-Cold War democracy promotion.

Today, the United States government spends billions of dollars annually with the stated aim of advancing democracy, human rights, and good governance abroad, whereas it spent nothing on this goal in 1980. It does so through programs that, among other things, teach civics, support civil society groups, train the media, and encourage women to run for political office. Other countries and international institutions sponsor such programs, too, and in fact increasingly lead the way in aiding democracy abroad.

Although democracy promotion continues apace, it is under fire. The rocky attempts to promote democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan, setbacks to democracy in the post-Soviet states despite considerable international support for democratization there, and the rise of Islamist parties in the Arab world have all led policymakers to question democracy assistance’s efficacy and even democratization’s desirability. Furthermore, many observers have noted a recent resurgence in authoritarian regimes around the world and some fear that liberal democracy is on the decline. In response, the Obama administration reined in American rhetoric about democracy promotion, and democracy assistance institutions have rushed to adopt new strategies, document their positive influence, and justify their existence. In this context, a lively debate has taken place about the ethics and efficacy of democracy promotion.

How and why democracy assistance spread at the end of the Cold War and what impact democracy assistance has on the conduct of politics in countries across the world is the topic
Chapter 1

of this dissertation. Why are developing countries from a variety of regions increasingly converging on a set of domestic political institutions and practices that includes inviting international election monitors and setting quotas for the minimum number of women in parliaments? Advanced democracies seem unlikely to advocate for such policies directly since they often lack the policies themselves. Meanwhile, many of the countries that adopt such institutions lack the democratic preconditions, such as free and fair elections or laws and norms that support women’s political participation, that we might expect would accompany such practices. Thus, we need an explanation for developing countries’ convergence on certain seemingly liberal political practices and institutions that developed democracies do not often share.

Furthermore, and despite considerable attention to democracy promotion in the popular discourse, we still do not understand what types of goals international democracy assistance programs pursue and why. How do democracy promotion efforts vary across donors, target states, and time? Careful study of democracy assistance programs suggests that, contrary to expectations, many projects today are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels. Instead, today’s template of democracy assistance activities includes many highly technical, measurable programs that do not directly threaten the regimes of target countries—in contrast to the more confrontational aid projects to dissidents and trade unions that dominated the early era of democracy assistance. Why has democracy promotion changed over time in this way? Research on how developed countries seek to influence other countries through foreign assistance suggests that developed countries’ self-interests and target states’ particular characteristics are the two main factors that drive patterns of influence. Do those two factors explain patterns in democracy promotion, as well?

My dissertation answers this cluster of questions by focusing on a set of actors that I call the democracy establishment. The democracy establishment comprises the people and organizations linking the democracy promoting countries and the target states; they
are the actors that conduct democracy assistance. In my framework, the democracy establishment’s ideas and incentives matter greatly for the design of democracy assistance programs. Those ideas and incentives grew out of the funding structure of democracy assistance and have spread over time through competition and norms within the democracy establishment. In turn, the types of political practices and institutions that the democracy establishment promotes matter greatly for the conduct of politics in developing countries. Actors in the democracy establishment enter into a strategic game with the leaders of target countries, who want to signal their democratic credentials to various audiences and who use the dimensions of democracy emphasized by the democracy establishment in order to do so. For that reason, Afghanistan adopted a quota for women’s legislative representation despite women’s otherwise poor station in society; countries like Afghanistan adopt gender quotas because quotas have been encouraged by the democracy establishment.

My core argument about why the democracy establishment promotes, among other things, quotas for women’s representation comprises two steps and draws on both economic principal–agent models and sociological theories of professions. I first argue that the funding structure of democracy assistance rewards democracy assistance programs that have clear, quantitative impact measures and that maintain access to target countries. Such programs are the most likely ones to succeed at gaining funding. Given those incentives, rational actors in the democracy establishment prefer to design programs that are measurable and that facilitate access; the extent to which they do so in a particular time or place depends, however, on how free they are to pursue their preferences. Yet people in the democracy establishment are not wholly rational or funding-driven. They are also committed to their organizations’ missions and the principles of human rights and democracy. I argue that the balance between ideals and organizational self-interest varies over time. As democracy assistance has developed as a profession, actors in the democracy establishment have become more likely to pursue programs rewarded by the field’s funding structure. Both competition and norms have institutionalized such programs over time.
If it can show that the democracy establishment has a significant influence over the conduct of politics in developing countries, and that the democracy establishment’s priorities for influence originate in the funding structure of democracy assistance, then this dissertation will make a significant contribution to theories about world politics as well as to the practice of democracy promotion. The dissertation draws on insights from literatures on delegation, transnational networks, and foreign aid and influence to show that in order to understand international attempts to influence other states’ domestic politics, we need to look not just at the sending states and the target states, but also at the non-state actors that inhabit the space in between them. The evidence draws on diverse methods. First, I use statistical methods to analyze a broad sample of countries and twenty-five years of new data on democracy assistance projects. Then, I draw on extensive field research in Washington, D.C., and Amman, Jordan, as well as archival organizational records, to qualitatively analyze several organizations and countries in depth. In the end, the project sheds new light on the debate about democracy promotion’s effectiveness. The evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that rewarding the programs that are most likely to advance democracy may require reform to the funding structure of democracy assistance.

1.1 What is Democracy Assistance?

Before proceeding further it is important to clarify what exactly democracy assistance is and what it is not. One recent U.S.-funded democracy assistance program in Jordan purchased an electronic voting system for the parliament. Another trained female candidates on how to run successful political campaigns. Another worked with the Ministry of Education to establish parliaments in public schools. And yet another supported a union’s minimum wage campaign. What is democracy assistance? Why are these programs examples of it?

Democracy assistance is a tool of democracy promotion that is used by state govern-
ments acting alone and together, as well as by some private foundations. *Democracy promotion* is any attempt by a government or group of governments to encourage democratization in another country. These attempts may promote transition from autocracy to democracy, or they may promote consolidation in a new or unstable democracy. Democracy promotion often involves some form of inducement (“carrots”) or punishment (“sticks”). Its methods are various: shaming and socialization; economic sanctions and rewards; political conditionality; diplomatic measures; and even military intervention. *Democracy assistance* is another tool of democracy promotion. According to Carothers (1999, 6), a key expert on democracy promotion, democracy assistance is “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening.”

But defining ex ante the projects that are likely to foster a democratic opening or further a democratic transition in a target state is difficult. First, some researchers have argued that democracy assistance has no impact on democratization or even a negative one. In fact, this dissertation argues that some democracy assistance programs are designed deliberately so that they will not challenge the incumbent regimes of target countries. Furthermore, the conceptual boundaries between aid for democracy, human rights, and development are ambiguous and contested (Burnell, 2000, 19). My approach, therefore, is to define democracy assistance as the aid that states and international organizations explicitly give to promote democracy in another country in the form of overseas projects. Thus, I consider support for a union’s minimum wage campaign in Jordan democracy assistance because it was funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, a United States government-funded foundation that is “dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world.” In this way, I distinguish democracy assistance from other types of foreign

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2For the debate about the effects of democracy assistance on democracy levels, see Carapico (2002), Carothers (1999), Collins (2009), Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007), Hyde (2007), Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2010), Mendelson (2001), McFaul (2010), the National Research Council (2008), Scott and Steele (2011), and Traub (2008).

3See National Endowment for Democracy, “About NED.” Available at http://ned.org/about (ac-
assistance, such as development aid and military aid.

Democracy assistance donors such as the United States Agency for International Development typically group their programs into four sectors. These sectors are aid for: civil society (including the media and a variety of civic organizations); elections and political processes (including political parties, legislatures, and women’s political participation); governance (including conflict resolution and decentralization); and rule of law (including constitutions and human rights). The recipients of democracy assistance include foreign governments, multilateral institutions, and non-governmental organizations, both international and from the target state. The defining characteristic of a democracy assistance project is that the recipients take the funds with the stated goal of fostering democratic transition or consolidation.

Defined as such, it is clear that democracy assistance is a relatively new phenomenon and also that it has significantly expanded in the past twenty-five years. The rise of democracy assistance has been part of an overall growth in American democracy promotion since the end of the Cold War (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000). Yet other countries and international institutions have increasingly joined the United States in promoting democracy abroad. Figure 1.1 below shows the rise of democracy assistance in the United States and in the world between 1985 and 2008. What in the early 1980s consisted of a few foundations with limited budgets is now an international, professional field. Western governments spend billions of dollars each year to promote democracy in nearly one hundred countries. Figure 1.2 below is a map that illustrates the large number of countries in the world that have been the targets of democracy assistance from the United States between 1985 and 2009. The rise of democracy assistance does not simply reflect an overall increase in foreign assistance since the end of the Cold War. In the United States, for example, democracy assistance at USAID increased from 8 percent of the annual foreign aid budget in 1990 to

[cited February 26, 2010).
Figure 1.1: **The Rise of Democracy Assistance, 1985-2008.** Data Source: AidData (Findley et al., 2010). Includes aid from the category of “government and civil society.”

16 percent in 2009.\(^4\)

My approach to defining democracy assistance includes programs that certain readers may view as unlikely to cause democratic transition or consolidation in the target countries. After all, shouldn’t something called “democracy assistance” always be designed to foster short- or medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels? Yet the inclusion of programs that are not so designed in donors’ explicit funds to promote democracy abroad is precisely the puzzle that this study seeks to explain. Why are democracy assistance programs ever, let alone increasingly, compatible with the regimes of undemocratic countries? To answer that question, I look first to the existing literature on foreign influence and then propose my own argument.

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1.2 The Anatomy of Foreign Influence: What We Know

What do we know about the anatomy of foreign influence? Gourevitch (1978) once wrote about the “second-image reversed,” or the international sources of domestic politics. A growing literature expands on his insights to show how international actors promote or otherwise encourage the spread of various forms of domestic liberalization. The underlying question addressed by that research is this: Under what conditions can states and international institutions successfully influence a target state’s domestic political institutions and practices? In addition to work directly on the subject of democracy promotion, the literature that seeks to answer that question includes research on human rights, political conditionality, and compliance with international law.5

5For examples of this literature, see Levitsky and Way (2005), Pevehouse (2002), Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006), Simmons (2009), and Stone (2002).
Research on the “anatomy of foreign influence” generally falls into two groups. Each group suggests that the preferences of a particular set of actors cause foreign actors’ attempts to change target states’ behavior to succeed or fail. The first group of research highlights the importance of the ideologies and self-interests of the sending states. A number of studies on foreign aid effectiveness show that security and economic interests shape how donors give foreign aid. Rather than targeting or conditioning aid on the quality of the target state’s governance, donors generally use foreign aid as a reward or a bribe for policy concessions from recipient countries. Similar self-interested concerns can play out in multilateral institutions’ attempts to influence target states, such as through International Monetary Fund loans and World Bank grants. For these reasons, scholars argue that we should expect foreign aid and conditional loans to fail at their stated goals, such as promoting economic growth or improved governance. Sending states did not design such efforts in order to achieve growth or better governance in the first place.6

The same research finds, however, that donors vary in how much they use foreign aid as a strategic tool of foreign policy. Some states and international institutions are relatively more “sincere” and less “strategic” than others in the ways that they seek to influence target countries, and the balance between sincere and strategic interests may vary over time. Sending states’ preferences generally account for such differences in strategies of foreign influence. Certain donors may, for example, seek to export a particular political or economic model abroad because of their ideological commitments or domestic political coalitions at certain moments.

The second body of research highlights how the characteristics of the target states affect how likely foreign influence is to succeed. Political environments in the target states affect how likely those states are to resist or accept the goals of the sender and thus can condition the effect of foreign influence. Foreign influence is more likely to succeed in countries

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that have, for example, “good” economic policies and liberal political intentions; it may backfire and lead to corruption or repression in countries that do not. Although many studies have documented how sending states’ strategic interests affect their tools of foreign influence, other research suggests that those states also take into account the target states’ characteristics. How well-governed a country is and how much it needs humanitarian assistance, for example, are relevant factors for foreign donors when making aid allocation decisions. There is evidence, furthermore, that donors have become “smarter” and more “sincere” over time in terms of targeting foreign aid. In other words, target states’ likelihoods of resisting foreign influence and thus the likelihood of foreign influence’s success depend on how well sending states tailor their efforts.

Research on the anatomy of foreign influence therefore suggests that we can understand variations in the allocation and effectiveness of international democracy assistance by looking at two sets of factors: the political or strategic interests of donor countries and the characteristics of the target states. First, we might expect democracy promoting countries to send less democracy assistance, or friendlier types of democracy assistance, to target states that share their preferences or possess strategic value. Changing geo-strategic interests could explain the rise of democracy assistance programs that are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in target states’ democracy levels, programs that I call regime compatible. Second, we might expect that democracy promoting countries would consider the target states’ democracy levels and regime types when designing democracy assistance programs. Changes in the modes of governance of countries around the world could also account for the spread of regime compatible programs.

This dissertation shows that those factors offer at best an incomplete picture of how democracy assistance works on the ground. Instead, in order to understand the variations in democracy assistance across time and space that we can observe, we must pay attention

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7See, for example, Burnside and Dollar (2000, 2004) and Wright (2008b).

8For examples of research in this tradition, see Bermeo (2008), Lumsdaine (1993), Winters (2010a), and Wright and Winters (2010, 63-65).
to a third set of actors and their preferences: the democracy establishment. Borrowing from economic and sociological theories, I argue that this group of people and organizations has its own, distinct preferences and that it enters into strategic games with both the donors (for funding) and also the target states (for access). It is as a result of those games that we observe democracy assistance programs designed in the ways that we do today and convergence in political practices and institutions across a variety of developing countries. In addition to clarifying several puzzles about democracy assistance, the argument also suggests new ways to think about the anatomy of foreign influence.

1.3 The Argument in Brief

What explains variations and convergence in international democracy assistance programs across time and space? My argument about democracy promotion has two parts: a principal–agent argument about the structure of democracy assistance and a sociological argument about change in the democracy establishment over time. In this section, I briefly develop each aspect of the argument.

1.3.1 The Funding Structure of Democracy Assistance

Donors delegate democracy assistance through a long transnational chain. Consider an example. In the United States, the process begins with the public, which elects the President and representatives to Congress to govern on its behalf and make foreign policy decisions using tax dollars. Congress, whose median member wishes to promote democracy, in turn delegates authority and funding for democracy promotion to a variety of institutions, including the Department of State, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Congress delegates because

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9In making this “principal–agent” argument, I draw on other recent work on delegation in world politics, including Gutner (2005), Hawkins et al. (2006), Johnson (2010), Nielson and Tierney (2003), and Weaver (2008).
it lacks the capacity to run democracy assistance programs and because some separation from the government serves democracy promotion well. The NED, a quasi-governmental American foundation, then awards grants to organizations such as the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). Although CIPE has a Middle East program office, it delegates funds to local organizations, such as the Al Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, Jordan, to implement projects, such as a dialogue on Jordan’s national budget. The Jordanian government is the final actor, and although it receives no funding, it monitors democracy assistance projects that take place in Jordan.

What are the preferences of the actors in the transnational delegation chain? At least some officials in democratic donors, such as the United States Congress, genuinely want democracy abroad. But they also seek reelection without upsetting the public and jeopardizing their reelection chances. The American public only tepidly supports promoting democracy; the difficult and controversial efforts to promote democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq shrank support further. A skeptical public, however inattentive, means that officials want results. Therefore, officials need to document democracy assistance’s efficacy in order to justify the public money that is spent on it.

Aid recipient organizations—such as the NED, CIPE, and the Al Quds Center—differ, but they share general preferences as aid recipients. They too want greater democracy abroad. But in order to continue working, they must secure funding and access to target countries. Aid recipients thus seek readily measurable results that they can report to their principals, even though programs with quick results may not generate long-term change. Furthermore, aid recipients seek access to the countries where they work. Most target countries prefer democracy assistance programs that do not challenge their political authority, and many have imposed legal and extralegal restrictions on democracy assistance. As a consequence, aid recipients seek programs that are compatible enough with the target countries that they can continue to gain access and report progress to their principals. Principal–agent problems ensue because the projects that best generate funding and access
are not necessarily the best at democratizing countries.

The preferences of donor governments, aid recipients, and target governments meet in a limited information environment that exacerbates these problems. With each step that a “principal” (i.e., funding organization) takes away from the program as it is implemented overseas, it becomes harder for that organization to know what happened on the ground. At least three traits of democracy assistance foster such information problems. First, the delegation chains in democracy assistance are long, and longer chains mean greater information problems. More aid recipients have the opportunity to shift their tasks away from the original descriptions. Second, the intended “beneficiaries” of democracy assistance—the citizens of the target countries—play no formal monitoring role, which prevents principals from monitoring and effectively motivating their agents. Finally, since democracy assistance is a field with multiple donors, capable aid recipient organizations can pick among their favorite donor calls-for-proposals. Having multiple funders drives outcomes towards agents’ preferences and away from the funders’ preferences.

Given the actors’ preferences and limited information, there are structural incentives for aid recipients to promote democracy in two specific ways. First, the structure rewards democracy assistance programs with measurable outputs—programs linked to clear, neutral, and ideally quantitative indicators. Agents want to show their principals that they are meeting the principals’ objectives, which measurable programs help them do. Although subjective and unmeasurable dimensions of democracy matter, they do not form clear signals to principals. Even with measurable programs, practical, ethical, and methodological limitations impede assessments of the causal impact of democracy assistance programs. Still, at least measurable programs have concrete indicators that measure their associated outputs, which are plausible, if minimal, barometers of success.

Second, the structure rewards democracy assistance programs that are at least partially compatible with the regimes of the target countries. Regime compatible programs do not threaten the imminent political survival of incumbents. If an authoritarian ruler blocks
access to actors in the democracy establishment, they cannot attempt to foster democratic change there—nor can they obtain funding. Democracy practitioners therefore prefer to support programs that target countries will at least tolerate. Doing so allows them first, to obtain access, and second, to make some progress.

It is these incentives, I argue, that help explain the spread of certain types of democracy assistance programs, such as support for women’s political participation, and the decline of other types, such as support for dissidents and political parties. Actors in the democracy establishment choose democracy assistance programs that match the funding structure’s incentives. Long transnational delegation chains with severe monitoring problems reward agents that pursue measurable programs. Furthermore, when the delegation chain makes it harder for donors to monitor their agents, aid recipients will be more likely to pursue their preferred regime compatible programs to gain access to target countries.

1.3.2 The Development of the Democracy Establishment as a Profession

People and organizations in the democracy establishment have responded differently to the structural incentives over time. As democracy assistance grew, a transnational network of people and organizations working in democracy assistance emerged. The network shared ideas about the appropriate institutions and practices for developing democracies. Drawing on a more sociological logic, I expect actors in the democracy establishment to promote democracy in increasingly similar ways over time due to processes of competition and professionalization.

The democracy establishment comprises a variety of forms of organizations: intergovernmental, governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental. In the United States, it includes bureaus at USAID and the State Department, non-profit organizations such as Freedom House and the Carter Center, and for-profit contractors such as Chemonics and ARD. In Europe, the government-affiliated actors include Germany’s political party
foundations (*Stiftungen*) and Great Britain’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The democracy establishment also includes offices at the major inter-governmental organizations, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Other inter-governmental organizations, such as International IDEA, specifically focus on democracy. Over time, this group of organizations formed a field, united by common ideals and also divided by market competition. Today, the democracy establishment’s members share common normative and cause–effect beliefs.\footnote{See Goldstein and Keohane (1993).}

That the democracy establishment today shares common ideas about promoting democracy is puzzling for at least four reasons. First, in many policy areas, experts disagree about the best ways to achieve a goal. Second, as discussed above, research on foreign aid finds considerable differences in aid allocation across donors. Third, in contrast to some writings about the export of democracy, actors in the democracy establishment commonly promote practices and institutions that donor countries lack. Elections in developing democracies, for example, should be managed by independent electoral management bodies and monitored by international observers—rare occurrences in advanced democracies. Finally, since earlier approaches to democracy promotion differed from today’s model, the model was likely not inevitable. Earlier approaches used more ad hoc and overtly political strategies, such as overhauling countries’ educational systems and promoting economic justice (Smith, 1994, 18, 45, 169).

Two simultaneous processes of adaptation fostered convergence within the democracy establishment.\footnote{Here I draw on canonical sociological research by Weber (1978 (1922)) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and applications of their work to the study of world politics by Barnett (2005, 2009).} First, a Weberian process of competitive learning has winnowed the democracy establishment’s strategies. Democracy practitioners have learned about effecting democratic change and also about attaining funding. The rise of democracy assistance encouraged organizations to enter the increasingly lucrative field, and thus competition was
heightened. Competition in turn focused democracy practitioners on monitoring and evaluation and thus reinforced the structural incentives towards measurability discussed above. The organizations that survive today successfully adapted to the structural incentives. Certain characteristics of democracy assistance—such as the field’s short-term projects and concentrations of democracy assisters in particular countries—especially fostered information sharing and adaptive learning. Practitioners can quickly replicate models that they have seen succeed elsewhere.

At the same time, professionalization spread and institutionalized what the field learned. Certain programs and goals now have a taken-for-granted quality. A program that an organization in the democracy establishment initially pursued for funding or access reasons could subsequently be viewed as the appropriate or “right” program to pursue for non-instrumental reasons. This normative process is typical of professions, since professionals share common ideas about the appropriate practices for their fields. Associations, university programs, and an elite spread and reinforced the field’s body of knowledge. Conferences—such as the NED’s World Movement for Democracy—also diffused common values and ideas. The democracy establishment’s reliance on state funding, transfers of people across organizations and countries, and concentrations of professionals in post-conflict countries have especially fostered professional convergence. As expected, for organizations that focus on vague and complex goals, the means (i.e., funding or organizations) gradually became the ends.

Has the democracy establishment abandoned its ideals? Perhaps such ideals never really existed as more than rhetoric; perhaps the democracy establishment is solely funding-driven. I test this alternative perspective empirically. I find that treating the democracy establishment as an idea-driven and incentive-driven set of actors generally fits the evidence best. Even though the original goals have diminished in the democracy establishment, they do remain. Competition and norms have pressured the democracy establishment to respond to the structural incentives in the transnational delegation chain, but some idealism endures.
Democracy assistance programs must still promote democracy. In this way, my research corroborates other recent research on transnational networks with moral motives, which generally finds that some mix of self-interest and idealism does the best job at explaining their actions.\textsuperscript{12}

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation

This dissertation has three parts. The first part motivates the project and provides a theoretical framework for what follows. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the dissertation by exploring one substantive trend that represents the broader significance of the democracy establishment: More than one hundred countries have now adopted some form of quota for women’s representation in legislatures. I show that developing countries where women have an otherwise low status have adopted quotas because of the influence of the democracy establishment.

Promoting gender equality, including through gender quotas, has become a key part of democracy promotion. Gender quotas’ international legitimacy affects domestic politics in two ways: by directly influencing post-conflict constitutions via peace operations and by indirectly encouraging aid-dependent countries to signal their commitment to democracy by adopting quotas. A cross-national statistical analysis that controls for other relevant factors shows that the hypothesized relationships exist. The 2004 quota in Afghanistan illustrates the causal mechanism at work. That various developing countries have adopted quotas while few donor countries have done so suggests that the democracy establishment significantly affects countries’ political practices and institutions. But why does the democracy establishment promote gender quotas and women’s political participation more generally? Subsequent chapters explain why the democracy establishment emphasizes the practices and institutions that it does.

\textsuperscript{12}See Carpenter (2007), Cooley and Ron (2002), Ron, Ramos and Rodgers (2005), and Sell and Prakash (2004) for exemplars of research in this new tradition.
In Chapter 3 I develop a two-pronged argument to explain variations in democracy assistance programs across time and space. The argument draws on economic principal-agent and sociological theories of organizations. Following a discussion of the key actors’ preferences and the information environment, I first argue that the transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance rewards promoting democracy in ways that are measurable using quantitative indicators and that maintain access to the countries where the programs take place. Rational implementing organizations thus seek out programs that are measurable and that facilitate access, although the extent to which they do so depends on how closely donors can monitor them. I then argue that competition and professional norms have fostered convergence among democracy practitioners on incentive-compatible approaches over time. In this way, actors in the democracy establishment are “normal” organizations and bureaucracies, despite the field’s ideological origins and grand rhetoric. I derive testable hypotheses from the argument about democracy assistance that I contrast with hypotheses from the foreign aid literature, which emphasize donor countries’ preferences and target countries’ characteristics.

In order to test this argument, I develop a novel typology of twenty categories of democracy assistance projects in Chapter 4. The presence and use of quantitative indicators for certain democracy assistance programs suggests that they are measurable; insights from the authoritarianism and democratization literatures suggest that certain categories are generally regime compatible. I then use this typology to classify thousands of democracy assistance projects in a new data set specifically designed for the purpose of testing the argument.

Part II of the dissertation turns to testing the two-pronged argument about democracy assistance. The four chapters of Part II represent the dissertation’s empirical core. In them, I track variations in how measurable and how regime compatible democracy assistance programs are across time and space. The chapters in Part II rely on a combination of empirical research methods. I draw first on existing and new cross-national, over-time
data sets of democracy assistance projects. I examine these data sets statistically in order to identify general correlations and make some counterfactual inferences. I then draw on detailed case studies in order to validate my assumptions, provide context, and show the intermediate causal steps that are necessary to have more confidence in the statistical causal inferences. The data for these case studies come from 120 interviews, archival materials, and extensive fieldwork in Jordan and Washington, D.C.

Chapter 5 begins the analysis by testing the proposition that the more severe the monitoring problems in the transnational delegation chain are, the more practitioners will pursue programs that are measurable and that maintain target country access (i.e., programs that are regime compatible). The hypotheses are tested using data on more than 130,000 democracy assistance programs funded by sixty bilateral and multilateral government donors between 1985 and 2008. Using a variety of statistical methods, I show that several indicators of the degree of monitoring problems—the use of implementing agencies, the involvement of multilateral donors, the wealth and size of the donor, and the proximity of the program to the donor—are strongly related to how much measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance target countries receive. My findings are robust to statistical matching techniques and the inclusion of a number of variables that we might also expect would influence the outcomes of interest, including measures of shared preferences between the donor and target country, indicators for the Cold War and post-September 11 eras, the level of democracy and regime type of the target country, and indicators for the regions where programs take place.

Chapter 6 then tests the proposition that competition and professional norms fostered convergence on measurable and regime compatible programs over time across countries. To do so, it analyzes a random sample of 5,000 democracy assistance projects from an original dataset of projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy, a U.S. government-funded foundation that seeks to advance democracy abroad. After explaining why the NED’s projects provide a useful test of the argument from a research design per-
spective, I use an empirical set-up similar to that in the previous chapter. I show that the relative amounts of democracy assistance in a given country–year that are regime compatible and measurable clearly increase over time, even after controlling for a number of other relevant factors. These factors include the amount of American military aid received by the target countries, indicators for the Cold War and post-September 11 eras, indicators for changes in American domestic politics, the level of democracy and regime type of the target country, and indicators for the regions where programs take place. I also show that the over time trend holds even among democracy assistance projects sent to “hard cases,” or those countries that are consistently unfree. It also holds among projects funded by the other main American democracy donor, USAID.

Chapter 7 is the first of two qualitative chapters. Chapter 7 is about change and convergence in several key American democracy assistance organizations, or “principals” in the transnational delegation chain. It begins by describing the democracy establishment as a network that is dominated and linked together by a few key donor “hubs.” This network structure, documented through organizations’ Internet connections, supports an account of convergence in which donor–grantee relationships are key. I then provide evidence in favor of several observable implications of my argument about donor organizations: that they are competitive, increasingly professional, idealistic, and funding- and access-driven. The chapter focuses on the historical development of several American hubs, since these centrally-positioned actors are powerful agenda-setters for the entire field. The core of this analysis is an organizational history of Freedom House. I draw on interviews, secondary sources, and a rich archive of the organization’s administrative records. I also broaden my analysis by considering a government donor (the U.S. Agency for International Development), a non-governmental donor (the National Democratic Institute), and a private foundation (the Open Society Institute). Interviews show how competitive learning and professionalization have fostered convergence across these organizations about how to promote democracy. Organizational culture and funding patterns, however, affect the rapidity
Chapter 8 examines democracy assistance on the ground in Jordan among the final “agents” in the transnational delegation chain. After discussing my selection of the Jordanian case and providing some context about liberal authoritarianism in Jordan, five key findings emerge. First, there is strong competition over democracy assistance funding in Jordan, and organizations want to demonstrate programs’ efficacy and maintain good relationships with the Jordanian government. Second, people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment are both idealists and pragmatists. As a consequence, they feel conflict between their ideals and their incentives to please both their principals and the Jordanian government. Third, people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment share professional norms, identities, and ideas. Fourth, measurable and regime compatible projects in Jordan are associated with lower levels of monitoring by principals, as we would expect. Finally, even though Jordan’s geo-strategic importance to the United States and Europe affects democracy assistance in Jordan, donor governments do not seem to dictate a regime compatible approach to democracy assistance. These conclusions are reached primarily on the basis of more than seventy semi-structured interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan, between 2008 and 2010.

Chapter 9, which constitutes Part III, concludes the study. It summarizes the findings and discusses the project’s implications for designing effective democracy assistance programs and for the study of world politics. In showing the “anatomy of influence” of wealthy democratic states over developing states, the study marries insights from literatures on delegation, the international sources of domestic politics, and transnational networks in order to better understand democracy promotion. This dissertation shows that although donor governments’ political preferences impact the design of democracy assistance programs, the preferences of the people working in the democracy establishment often matter more. Those preferences can have far-reaching consequences, such as the spread of gender quotas to more than one hundred countries, many of which sharply restrict women’s social and
political freedoms.

In the end, are the consequences of the democracy establishment’s influence ultimately positive or negative for democracy? There is much that remains uncertain about democracy promotion’s effectiveness. But my findings that democracy assistance programs increasingly prioritize quantitative measurement and—more problematically—compatibility with the target countries’ regimes are troubling. At a minimum, important democracy assistance programs that aid dissidents, political parties, and unions are disappearing because they fail to generate fast, measurable results. At a maximum, some democracy assistance programs today may inadvertently reinforce strategies of authoritarian survival in the drive for access. Although my conclusions are necessarily cautious given the challenges of making causal inferences with observational data, a rigorous series of tests suggests that the incentives fostered by the transnational delegation chain have prompted people in the democracy establishment to increasingly pursue measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance. Advancing democracy worldwide remains a noble goal. Yet our tools to accomplish this goal are weaker than they might otherwise be because of the way that government donors fund democracy assistance. Institutional reforms can get the incentives right in order to reward democracy assistance programs that challenge authoritarian rulers.
Chapter 2

The Democracy Establishment and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures

Prior to the 1970s, only five countries in the world had adopted quotas to promote women’s representation in politics.¹ Today, more than one hundred countries have done so. With women’s representation still lagging far behind men’s—women made up only 18 percent of the members of the world’s national legislatures in 2008—quotas have become a prominent way to promote women’s representation in politics.² Yet the global spread of gender quotas poses a puzzle since they have often been adopted in developing countries where women seem to have an otherwise low status. As an Economist article wryly noted, the list of countries with gender quotas has been “joined in recent years by such feminist-friendly places as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan.”³ Why have quotas to ensure women’s representation in politics so often been adopted today in the developing world?

¹A version of this chapter appeared in International Organization in January 2011. See Bush (2011).
This chapter argues that the democracy establishment has been key to quotas’ global diffusion. As shown in the previous chapter, international democracy assistance has exploded since the end of the Cold War. Promoting women’s political participation is a key aspect of aiding democracy abroad and gender quotas have gradually come to be seen as an important and legitimate part of democratization. The international legitimacy of gender quotas causes developing democracies to adopt them through two mechanisms. First, there has been significant international involvement in post-conflict countries since the end of the Cold War via liberalizing peace operations. Through such operations, the democracy establishment promotes gender quotas when countries write new constitutions. Second, internationally legitimate ideas create resources that political leaders can use strategically. Since the end of the Cold War, important benefits (from foreign aid to international legitimacy) have been tied to democratic governance. Leaders adopt gender quotas as a signal—sincere or insincere—to the international community or to domestic actors of their commitment to liberal democracy. Because quota laws demonstrate countries’ intentions, at least on paper, to include different groups in the political process, they appeal to regimes that are less than fully representative in other ways.

To preview the chapter’s main conclusions, I find strong evidence that international incentives are positively and significantly related to a country’s likelihood of adopting a gender quota. I measure international incentives by the presence of a United Nations (UN) peace operation that supports political liberalization, foreign aid dependence, and whether a country invited international election monitors to its last election. Such factors are significantly more likely to be related to the likelihood of quota adoption than are measures of gender-related development, democracy levels, transnational civil society presence, and the adoption of related laws. This conclusion is supported by a nested research design that combines cross-national statistical analysis to establish correlation (Section 2.3) and a case study of Afghanistan’s 2004 quota to trace the causal process at work (Section 2.4).

The findings matter for at least two literatures. First, they add to recent research on the
international sources of domestic politics since the Cold War. A topic of particular interest has been how international actors help spread a variety of forms of domestic liberalization.\textsuperscript{4} It was not obvious, however, that gender quotas would be part of the phenomenon. This chapter provides a causal argument about the international sources of gender quotas by focusing on the actors involved in democracy promotion and their ideas about legitimate institutions for developing democracies. It suggests that there may be an even wider range of domestic policies that international forces influence than scholars realized. Furthermore, by outlining the direct and indirect mechanisms through which international actors encouraged the spread of gender quotas, it offers a general framework through which we might study policy diffusion. The chapter shares constructivist scholars’ interest in the development of ideas about appropriate political conduct (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Finnemore, 1996). But its findings on the impact of those ideas—that international influence and inducements prompt countries to adopt quotas—have more in common with recent research on the coercive dimensions of international impact on domestic human rights practices (Hafner-Burton, 2005).

Second, the findings offer a new way of thinking about gender quotas, a subject of considerable interest in a rich literature in the subfield of women and politics. Much of the extant literature examines the domestic political incentives for quota adoption, especially in response to grassroots women’s mobilization and party leaders’ strategic calculations (Beckwith, 2003; Caul, 2002). More recent research has emphasized international and transnational dynamics, such as norm diffusion, emulation, foreign imposition, and transnational support for domestic quota campaigns (Krook, 2006; Ellerby, 2009; Dahlerup, 2006). In the leading study of gender quotas’ global diffusion, Krook (2009, 207-208) emphasizes causal heterogeneity when evaluating those processes, finding that the same causal factors operate differently in different instances. By looking at a theoreti-

cally relevant subgroup of countries—developing countries—we can improve the clarity of our theory by identifying the most relevant causal pattern within this more homogeneous set. This chapter attempts to do so by developing a new theory of international incentives for adopting quotas. It also raises important questions about quotas’ impact. Previous research indicates that gender quotas affect the quantity of women in politics as well as public attitudes and public policies. But do the effects change when countries adopt quotas principally because of international incentives rather than domestic politics?

The chapter’s findings also set the stage for the rest of the dissertation. In this chapter, I show that widespread gender quotas in the developing world are the outcome of a strategic game between the democracy establishment, which has defined such quotas as a component of democracy promotion, and developing countries, which view quotas as an attractive way to signal their democratic credentials. It is the democracy establishment, rather than powerful countries or foreign aid donor governments per se—which generally have not adopted gender quotas—that directly influences developing countries’ political practices and institutions. Given the democracy establishment’s influence, the rest of this project seeks to describe the the democracy establishment in more detail and explain why it prioritizes goals such as women’s political participation in its efforts to transform developing countries’ political systems.

2.1 What Are Gender Quotas?

Gender quotas are one of the key institutional innovations in politics of the late twentieth century. They come in three forms. Reserved seats set aside a certain number of seats for women in parliaments. Legislative quotas require women to make up a certain percentage

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5This chapter also focuses on a theoretically relevant subset of quotas, legal quotas, as I explain in the next section, whereas Krook (2009) focuses on the full spectrum of quotas.


7See Krook (2009), who also provides a more comprehensive discussion of the varieties of gender quotas.
of political parties’ nominees. Voluntary party quotas involve individual parties promising
to nominate a certain percentage of women. Collectively, the first two categories are called
*legal quotas* and usually require amendments to constitutions or electoral laws. Quotas
can apply to the local or national level of a political system. Quotas can be large (South
Korea’s 50 percent legislative quota in 2004) or small (Nepal’s 5 percent legislative quota
in 1990), although the most common size is 30 percent. Finally, legislative quotas can
be weakly enforced (France reduces non-compliant parties’ public funding) or strongly
enforced (Brazil requires non-compliant parties to leave seats open).

Figure 2.1 charts quotas’ spread by decade. A handful of countries adopted some type
of quota prior to the 1970s. The earliest adopters included both consolidated democracies
and other countries. The first quotas were sometimes small, such as Pakistan’s, which set
aside 10 out of 310 seats in the National Assembly in its first Constitution in 1956, or vague,
such as China’s, which in 1955 stated that “an ‘appropriate’ and increasing proportion of
women should be elected” (Krook, 2009, 237). In the 1980s, left-leaning political parties in
consolidated democracies such as Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland,
and Sweden began to voluntarily adopt gender quotas. Subsequently, dozens of countries
in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Asia adopted legal and
voluntary party quotas in the 1990s and 2000s.

Figure 2.2 charts types of quotas, by region. Regions with developing countries, which
are the significant majority of post-Cold War adopters, favor legal quotas much more than
the consolidated, advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe. It is largely in
Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and North Africa, the regions that perform lowest on
most other indicators of women’s status, that quotas have ever taken the form of reserved
seats.\footnote{8}{Please note that Canada is counted as part of Western Europe in this figure for simplicity.}

\footnote{8}{Consider, for example, countries’ scores on the Gender-related Development Index (GDI), which mea-
sures a country’s achievement in terms of health, knowledge, and standard of living through the lens of
gender equality. The average GDI scores for 2005 are Africa=0.49, Asia=0.72, and the Middle East and
North Africa=0.72, as compared with OECD=0.94. See UNDP, \textit{Human Development Report 2005}, 2005,}
Figure 2.1: Countries that Have Adopted Gender Quotas, by Decade. Quotas of all types are included in this graph. Definition of consolidated democracies provided in Section 2.3. Data sources: Krook (2006, 312-313) and QuotaProject.org.

Figure 2.2: Types of Gender Quotas Adopted, by Region. Regional classifications come from the United Nations. Data sources: Krook (2006, 312-313) and QuotaProject.org.
This chapter develops a theory to explain national legal quota adoption in developing countries. Previous research on gender and politics illustrates the benefits of separately examining developed and developing countries; for example, the determinants of women’s representation in high- and middle-income countries have little explanatory power in low-income countries (Hughes, 2009). Incumbents in advanced industrial democracies may benefit politically from adopting quotas, especially if local women’s movements demand them (Caul, 2002; Beckwith, 2003). Such political incentives are, however, less apparent in countries where women have lower status and public opinion opposes women leaders. The next section presents the international environment as a source of incentives to adopt legal quotas after reviewing the existing literature for plausible alternative explanations.

2.2 Why Adopt Gender Quotas?

2.2.1 Structural and Sociological Insights into Quota Adoption

Revised modernization theory posits that the bundle of societal transformations that accompany economic development and democratization includes progress towards gender equality (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). As countries industrialize, women enter the work force, fertility levels decrease, female literacy and education increase, and gender attitudes shift. Countries also democratize. As countries then move towards the post-industrial stage of development, new social policies that promote gender equality in the workplace and the public sphere follow the attitudinal changes. Women’s movements play a key role in demanding those policies. The process of economic, political, and social change depends, however, on cultural heritage. In particular, Muslim countries may have significantly more patriarchal social orders (Fish, 2002; Inglehart and Norris, 2003).

Revised modernization theory suggests at least four hypotheses about a country’s like-
lihood of adopting gender quotas, holding all else equal. First, more developed countries should be more likely to adopt gender quotas. Second, more democratic countries should be more likely to adopt quotas. Third, improvements in direct measures of women’s socio-economic status—such as women’s education levels, life expectancy, or literacy levels relative to men’s—should also increase countries’ likelihoods of quota adoption. Fourth, Muslim countries should be less likely to adopt quotas than non-Muslim countries.

World polity theory offers another plausible explanation of quota adoption. It states: “Many features of the contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated through global cultural and associational processes” (Meyer et al., 1997, 144-145).\(^{10}\) International organizations play a key role in spreading “policy scripts,” or models for legitimate action by states. One relevant study in this tradition examined the cross-national spread of women’s suffrage between 1890 and 1990. It found that women’s suffrage was initially brought about by pioneering women’s movements in particular countries but later was the result of the remaining countries’ desires to adhere to emergent international citizenship norms (Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan, 1997).\(^{11}\) Eventually, almost all states adopted universal suffrage, which became taken for granted as a feature of modern statehood.

Gender quotas could be viewed as appropriate features of modern statehood since the 1980s. The world polity logic predicts that as a country’s ties to the world polity increase, its likelihood of quota adoption should also increase, all else equal. Scholars often measure ties to the world polity by the presence of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), which diffuse and promote human rights principles globally (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Women’s INGOs may be especially significant for quota adoption since they provide organizational and informational resources for domestic activists (True and Minnstrom, 2001). Another indicator of a country’s world polity ties is the previous adoption of a re-

\(^{10}\)See also Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006, 799-801) on “emulation.”

\(^{11}\)Since women’s movements play a role in both theories, there is some overlap between modernization and world polity approaches to studying quota adoption.
lated “policy script,” such as extending suffrage to women or ratifying the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) (Wotipka and Ramirez, 2008; Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan, 1997; Hughes, 2009). World polity theory also implies that as the percentage of quota adopters in a country’s region, in the world, or both increases, it should be more likely to emulate the world polity’s model and to adopt quotas.

The patterns of quota adoption across world regions and over time illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 present some prima facie evidence against modernization and world polity explanations of quota adoption, although I systematically test the theories’ observable implications below using regression analysis. Poorer, less democratic countries adopt reserved seats and legislative quotas more often than richer, long-term democracies. Contemporary states are not converging on a legitimate, universal world model. Instead, they are diverging: Many developing countries have adopted legal quotas even as legal quotas remain beyond consideration in developed countries such as the United States.

2.2.2 The Democracy Establishment and Quotas’ Legitimacy

I argue that the international legitimacy of gender quotas as part of democratization creates incentives for developing democracies to adopt them. Although this argument shares an affinity with world polity theory’s emphasis on appropriate policies, as we shall see, it offers a unique account of how quotas became appropriate as well as different predictions about which countries will adopt quotas. This section establishes the international legitimacy of gender quotas by focusing on the democracy establishment. Who are the main actors? What do they do? How and why do they legitimize gender quotas? Although subsequent chapters describe the democracy establishment in considerably greater detail, this chapter offers a preview in order to better understand the effects democracy establishment’s ideas about gender equality.

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12 These variables may also measure women’s ability to advocate for quotas since CEDAW improves women’s rights (Simmons, 2009, 202-255) and the number of years since female suffrage affects the number of women in parliament (Reynolds, 1999, 568).
As the previous chapter discussed, democracy assistance has rapidly expanded in the past twenty-five years. What in the early 1980s consisted of a few political party foundations with limited budgets is now an international, professional field that spends billions of dollars a year promoting democracy in nearly one hundred countries. The explosion of democracy assistance is part of an overall growth in democracy promotion since the Cold War’s end, when democracy became viewed as a “panacea” to achieve security and development objectives (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000; Youngs, 2004, 27). The people and institutions that carry out democracy assistance form what I call the democracy establishment. The democracy establishment is a network of inter-governmental, governmental, quasi-governmental, and non-governmental organizations in the United States, Europe, and beyond.

Members of the democracy establishment share a common set of normative and cause–effect beliefs. In an ethnographic study of democracy assistance in the Balkans, Coles (2007, 238), for example, noted that OSCE election observers had to pass a test emphasizing the link between peace and democracy. Although there are many definitions of democracy, a common international recipe for democracy assistance—focusing on the rule of law, elections, civil society, governance, women’s participation, and local political development—has emerged. Many practices and institutions that are atypical in consolidated democracies are now hallmarks of developing democracies. Elections, for example, should be managed by independent electoral management bodies, marked by indelible ink, and monitored by international election observers (Kelley, 2008; Hyde, 2011a). Furthermore, countries should legislate equality in political representation between women and men via gender quotas.

Why does the democracy establishment prioritize women’s political participation as one of the central components of democracy? I delve into this question more fully and in the context of other issue areas later in the dissertation, but an initial investigation suggests that the focus has several sources, including democracy promoters’ principled beliefs, the
efforts of female activists, and practical considerations of what can be accomplished. First, consistent with democratic expansion in consolidated democracies, democracy promoters have a principled commitment to gender equality. Some democracy promoters had personal experiences with quotas, being familiar with them from their home countries. For example, in 1989, the Ebert Foundation (a German political party foundation that is part of the democracy establishment) sponsored seminars, assemblies, and training booklets in Argentina on the German Social Democratic Party’s experience with quotas (Crocker, 2009, 6). Argentina later passed a quota in 1991. Second, female activists also lobbied international organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, including the UN, to pay attention to women’s rights (Joachim, 2003).

Finally, working with women was a democracy assistance strategy that seemed achievable and successful. The democracy establishment often (although not always) found partners in local women’s groups, helping the persuasive task of democracy promoters. Promoting women’s political participation also had the advantage of being less threatening to leaders of countries where projects took place than other types of democracy assistance (e.g., aid to support a free press or elections) because it did not directly challenge their hold on power (Ottaway, 2005a, 116); thus it was more likely to succeed. Furthermore, if authoritarian rulers deny access to actors in the democracy establishment, they cannot obtain the funding necessary to survive. Supporting gender quotas and women’s political participation more generally is, as we shall see later in the dissertation, just one of several activities favored by the democracy establishment for instrumental funding purposes.

The democracy establishment’s professionalization subsequently spread common ideas about appropriate democratic institutions, such as quotas. Three mechanisms of professionalization during the 1990s were key for the quota norm. First, democracy assistance involves frequent turnover, or shifts and transfers of people across organizations and countries (Coles, 2007, 24, 42). Such shifts cross-fertilize ideas and practices. For example,

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13Here I draw on the concept of “normative isomorphism” in DiMaggio and Powell (1983).
USAID launched a Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) project in Serbia and Montenegro in 2001 that was modeled on a program the mission director previously oversaw in Lebanon. Turnover created a multi-national group of experts in managing elections, supporting political parties, fostering independent media, and so on. Second, democracy assisters have learned over time. Since CRDA projects were viewed as successes in Lebanon and Serbia, similar programs were launched in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan (Merritt, 2006, 29-30, 40-41). The concentration of democracy assisters in countries with international peacekeepers helps foster information transmission and thus learning. Third, creating neutral, quantitative standards—such as the number of women that participated in a training session or that serve in parliament—is a survival strategy for actors in the democracy establishment in the competition to secure government funding. Since democracy assistance organizations receive government grants through a process of delegation, it is crucial for them to find de-politicized and, where possible, numerical indicators that they can use to demonstrate progress to their funders.

Such processes of professionalization cemented the democracy establishment’s idea that gender quotas should be part of democratization. Today, according to one long-time democracy practitioner who has worked in Afghanistan and Kosovo, in the countries where he has given advice on constitutions and election laws, gender quotas have become something that “the international community pushes really hard for...[as] just one of the expectations.”¹⁴ In 2000, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 affirmed women’s role in post-conflict reconstruction and “the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”¹⁵ Shared beliefs about the appropriateness of gender quotas for developing countries came to reflect both a

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¹⁴Interview 91, with international election expert, by telephone, January 30, 2008. Interviewees’ names are listed in Appendix B.

world view—or a general orientation in favor of gender equality—as well as a set of causal beliefs—or ideas about the efficacy of gender quotas at achieving equality in transitional countries (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993, 8-10).

Interestingly, donors do not generally or explicitly condition foreign aid on gender quota adoption. In fact, quotas are sometimes controversial among donors. Although the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), for example, enacted quotas for the civil service and the quasi-legislative National Council, some UN officials opposed having quotas for the Constituent Assembly. Still, after the National Council voted against quotas, UNTAET supported women’s political participation by providing special funds for female candidate training and giving political parties with at least 30 percent female candidates extra time on the UNTAET radio and television (Pires, 2002; Krook, 2006, 321). Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that equal participation between men and women in decision-making was necessary for peace in East Timor (Ballington and Dahlerup, 2006, 252-253).

2.2.3 How International Incentives Explain Quota Adoption

This section offers a theory of how the democracy establishment’s ideas about gender quotas impact domestic politics. The international concern with women’s political participation as part of democratization and the acceptance of quotas as an appropriate means to bring it about generate incentives for leaders in developing countries to adopt quotas. Doing so demonstrates their countries’ commitments to gender equality and democracy. When international involvement is highest—in post-conflict countries with international peacekeeping forces—the adoption mechanism is closer to imposition (Krook, 2006, 311-315). When international involvement is lower but still strong—in countries that want to increase or maintain their levels of foreign aid, foreign direct investment, international legitimacy, and the like—the mechanism is closer to inducement. Although the activism of domestic
women may be necessary for quota adoption, we shall see that it is not sufficient.\footnote{Women activists do, of course, matter. As discussed above, they focused international organizations’ attention on women’s issues. Furthermore, empowering local women is one way that the democracy establishment encourages leaders to adopt quotas. The cases discussed below, however, caution against assumptions that women activists or women in general will automatically support quotas or that such support is necessary for quota adoption.}

The democracy establishment’s ideas lead to quota adoption both directly and indirectly. First, its ideas about gender quotas directly impact developing countries’ laws through the democracy establishment’s presence in post-conflict countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has led more than two dozen post-conflict peace operations that have promoted liberal democracy (Paris, 2004). Although such operations’ efficacy at promoting democratization has been debated, they do encourage countries to adopt at least some practices and institutions from the international model. In particular, international experts influence new electoral laws. Aid for writing or rewriting constitutions is a key form of democracy assistance. It involves expert advice as well as funds for constituent assemblies, constitutional commissions, and disseminating constitutions. Contrary to the stereotype of democracy assisters taking books on the U.S. constitution to transitional countries, however, legal quotas are a policy that many democracy assisting countries themselves lack (Carothers, 1999, 160-163).

Thus, countries hosting a liberalizing UN peace operation will be more likely to adopt gender quotas, all else equal. The presence of a UN peace operation has causal status since it leads to heavy involvement in the country by the democracy establishment, which transmits ideas and exercises influence over new laws. Actors in the democracy establishment do not control transitional countries’ constitutions, but their preferences matter. At a minimum, the high degree of foreign dependence in post-conflict countries creates a strong incentive for leaders to adopt female-friendly policies and follow internationally legitimate models. Furthermore, actors in the democracy establishment try to empower local women through special funds and training sessions; in so doing, they may enhance the domestic incentives to adopt quotas. At a maximum, actors in the democracy establishment push
gender quotas in post-conflict societies despite an absence of local support.

**Hypothesis 1:** Countries where a democracy-promoting UN peace operation is present will be more likely to adopt gender quotas than other countries, all else equal.

Kosovo illustrates this causal mechanism. Actors from the democracy establishment were part of a large international presence that included a UN mission, bilateral donors, and non-governmental grantees from the National Endowment for Democracy, among others. They emphasized gender equality as part of their programs to support democracy. For example, women-only meetings and special debates for female candidates ensured female participation in community programs (Morin and Stinson, 2001, 17). UNMIK (the UN Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo) Regulation 39 in 2000 also established a 30 percent quota for women among the first fifteen candidates on all party lists for local and national elections.\(^1\)\(^7\) But the quota provoked a domestic backlash. Local elites argued that there were insufficient numbers of competent women candidates. After the first election, some elected women resigned in protest of what they said was an unfair international imposition (Krook, 2006, 314-315).

Second, the democracy establishment’s ideas about what is appropriate for developing democracies indirectly create incentives for quota adoption. The democracy establishment’s menu of appropriate practices and institutions for developing countries provides shortcuts for international and domestic audiences to tell if a country is liberalizing.\(^1\)\(^8\) Thus, new and pseudo-democracies adopt gender quotas in order to demonstrate their commitment to liberal values. The process parallels the diffusion of inviting international election observers, in which Western states’ rewards for democratization after the Cold War encouraged first sincere and then insincere states to signal their commitment to liberal democracy.


\(^1\)\(^8\)Hurd (2007) also shows how internationally legitimate ideas create resources for political action.
by inviting observers (Hyde, 2011a; Kelley, 2008). Developing countries’ tendency to adopt more legalized forms of gender quotas than developed countries lends credence to a signaling theory. But why do countries choose the particular signal of quotas? First, since quotas enhance representation, they demonstrate that citizens’ voices are being heard. Second, they may satisfy the demands of female activists. Third, in certain electoral systems, such as the single non-transferable vote (SNTV), reserving seats for women without increasing the total number of seats in parliament is a way to take away seats from opposition parties, sometimes quietly.

This chapter uses two indicators for the types of states that are likely to signal of their commitment to liberalism by adopting quotas. First, they should be countries that depend on the West. National political leaders in such countries want to maintain good will and to demonstrate their good governance and liberalism, since foreign aid donors’ stated commitment to democracy became more credible after the end of the Cold War (Dunning, 2004). One indicator of dependence is foreign aid. As countries’ foreign aid dependence increases, they will be more likely to adopt gender quotas. Foreign aid dependence is causally related to quota adoption since it directly measures material dependence.

**Hypothesis 2:** The more foreign aid that a country receives, the more likely it is to adopt a gender quota, all else equal.

Second, the type of state that will adopt gender quotas for signaling purposes should also adopt other practices or institutions that the democracy establishment views as appropriate. Beyond foreign aid dependence, other incentives—both normative and strategic—also encourage leaders to perform democracy according to an internationally-approved script. They include reputation, legitimacy (domestic or international), foreign direct investment, tourism, and foreign debt relief. Such motives are difficult to directly measure, especially in a cross-national framework, but my theory predicts that they should be evidenced both by inviting international election monitors and also by adopting quotas. Thus, inviting international election monitors serves as a proxy variable (not a causal variable)
that captures countries’ incentives to adopt quotas as a signal of liberalism that are not directly observable or measurable.

_Hypothesis 3_: Countries that invite international election monitors to their most recent election will be more likely to adopt gender quotas than other countries, all else equal.

Jordan, a case I return to in more detail later in the dissertation, illustrates the indirect influence mechanism of quota adoption as a signal to foreign aid donors. King Abdullah II, who ascended in 1999, “has actively pursued stronger alliances and aid ties with the United States, Britain, and the European Union as well as international financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank” (Clark, 2006, 546). Jordan’s continued economic development hinges on privatization, foreign investment, and, especially, Western aid. For example, since 1964, Jordan’s central government annual current expenditures have closely tracked external aid receipts (Peters and Moore, 2009, 271). Over the same time period, foreign aid as a percentage of Jordanian central government budget expenditures hovered at around 25 percent (and never below 10 percent). Jordan’s ties with the West strengthened after September 11, 2001, when Jordan became a key supporter of the United States’ “war on terror.” In this context, Abdullah sought to improve the status of women in society and thereby burnish Jordan’s image abroad. One way to accomplish this was by setting aside six of the 110 seats in parliament for women in 2003 (Clark, 2006). The quota resulted in six female MPs but also some opposition. In the past, Jordanian women had campaigned unsuccessfully for a quota.19 When Abdullah endorsed the quota by royal decree, however, he angered both the Higher Committee for the Coordination of National Opposition Parties, which issued a statement rejecting it, and also some female activists, who found that the quota’s implementation discriminated against the urban areas where they lived (Clark, 2006, 555). As one female former MP in Jordan put it:

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I think the international community is really committed to gender quotas. I have really met this global sisterhood and they’re very sincere. Quotas can be really good elsewhere in the world... [But] the regime just takes the quota as a form of make-up to put on the face of the regime—it’s like a facelift and no one notices that the main parts of the face are still there.20

It is worth underscoring how this theory differs from previous research on the impact of norms in world politics.21 Constructivist approaches argue that norm entrepreneurs socialize global audiences to new principled ideas that then become accepted and institutionalized. The mechanisms are first, persuasion, and then, socialization, institutionalization, and demonstration (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 898). For example, in a study of the influence of norms on state behavior, Finnemore (1996, 24-25) found that the social structure of the state system caused a convergence across all states in the creation of science bureaucracies, the acceptance of new rules of war, and the definition of development. This chapter develops a theory, however, of how norms impact states differentially due to international inequalities. Reserved seats for women proliferate in developing countries even as they remain “off the table” politically in many developed countries. Indeed, actors in the democracy establishment eschew the informational techniques of transnational activists, such as symbolism, leverage, and accountability tactics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Instead, their ideas wield influence because they enjoy a privileged position in post-conflict countries via peace operations and because of their perceived linkages to foreign aid, foreign investment, and international and domestic legitimacy. Table 2.1 below summarizes the causal argument.

20Interview 102, with Jordanian political activist, in person, Amman, June 30, 2010.
21Hafner-Burton (2005), however, takes a more similar approach.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causal Step</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Stage 1: Emergence of Quota Ideas</td>
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<td>-Democracy Assistants’ Principled Beliefs</td>
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<td>quotas when under international authority</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Indirect Impact: Inducements for states to adopt</td>
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<td>quotas when seeking foreign aid, legitimacy, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Correlates of Quota Adoption</td>
<td>Causal Variable: Liberalizing peace operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Causal Variable: Foreign aid dependence</td>
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<td>Proxy Variable: Invited international election</td>
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<td>monitors to last election</td>
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Table 2.1: The Emergence, Acceptance, and Impact of the Democracy Establishment’s Ideas about Gender Quotas. The table draws on Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 898).

2.3 Cross-National Analysis of Gender Quota Adoption

2.3.1 The Sample

I begin by testing the argument quantitatively using cross-national, time-series data on gender quota adoption. The unit of analysis for the quantitative analysis of the determinants of quota adoption is the country-year. The sample covers the years from 1970 to 2006 and contains all countries except long-term consolidated and developed democracies.\(^{22}\) I removed long-term consolidated and developed democracies because they are subject to different causal processes; they are neither under UN authority nor desirous of signaling their liberalism to the international community, and in fact, they promote democracy abroad.\(^{23}\)

\(^{22}\)The analysis excludes Pakistan, which first adopted reserved seats in 1954, since data for most variables of interest are missing prior to 1970. Pakistan is, however, likely an outlier that involves different causal processes.

\(^{23}\)In the results presented here, I included countries that the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 2001) coded as not having legislatures because several of these countries actually adopted gender
I followed Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007, 414) and removed thirty advanced industrial, long-term consolidated democracies, which resulted in a sample of 165 countries for at least some amount of time.24

2.3.2 The Data

I compiled data on quota adoption between 1970 and 2006 principally from the Global Database of Quotas for Women.25 Because of my theory, I restrict my focus to national legal quotas—the quotas the democracy establishment encourages and that signal a country’s commitment to gender equality. I do, however, include a few voluntary party quotas in which the adopting party was the incumbent in a non-competitive system. In 1994, for example, the FRELIMO party adopted a 30 percent quota in Mozambique while it ruled as a single party for more than a decade after the country’s civil war.26 Such countries have de facto legal quotas. I measure quota adoption dichotomously: 0 if a quota has never been adopted and 1 if a quota was adopted that year. The year of adoption refers to the year of ratification of the electoral laws or constitution.27 I focus on the first time that a country adopted a gender quota. Although the dichotomous measure obscures some interesting variation in terms of types of quotas, it offers a good first cut for a cross-national hypothesis

quotas for their national legislatures, such as Afghanistan in 2004 and Mauritania in 2006. In robustness checks, I excluded these countries, and the results held. Data available at http://go.worldbank.org/2EAGGLRZ40 (accessed July 21, 2010).

24Countries were excluded if they met the following criteria that define consolidated democracies: they were classified by the World Bank as high income; they scored below 3 on Freedom House’s scale; they received no aid from USAID between 1990 and 2003; and they were not newly independent states.

25Available at http://www.quotaproject.org (accessed July 21, 2010). I also used Krook (2009) and additional primary and secondary sources, which are available upon request.

26Single party states were identified using the Database of Political Institutions’ legislative index of electoral competition score (Beck et al., 2001). The other cases of single party states with de facto legal quotas were: the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia, which adopted a quota in 1997; the Congress for Democracy and Progress in Burkina Faso, which adopted a quota in 2002; the People’s Democratic Movement in Cameroon, which adopted a quota in 1996; and the African National Congress in South Africa, which adopted a quota in 1994.

27Legal quotas do not tend to affect elections until the legal change occurs. For example, Afghanistan’s parliamentary quota was ratified in law in 2004 and first affected the 2005 parliamentary elections.
test. Appendix A lists the countries with legal or de facto legal quotas.

I measured international incentives as follows. First, countries are more likely to adopt quotas when a UN peace operation that promotes liberal democracy is present. The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides peace operation mandates and mission summaries that were used to identify if the operation included support for elections or democracy.\textsuperscript{28} It is a dichotomous variable: 1 if a UN peace operation with support for democracy took place in a country that year and 0 otherwise. 29 out of 45 UN peace operations between 1989 and 2006 were coded as liberalizing.\textsuperscript{29} Second, countries that are dependent on foreign aid are more likely to adopt quotas. To capture foreign aid dependence, I used the natural log of the amount of official development assistance that a country received from OECD countries during the previous year in 2007 U.S. dollars.\textsuperscript{30} Finally, the countries that are likely to signal their commitment to liberalism via quotas are likely to also do so by inviting international election observers. For this variable I used the National Elections in Democracies and Autocracies’ database, which contains information on international election observation, to create a dichotomous variable, which assumes the value of 1 if international election observers monitored the country’s last election and 0 otherwise (Hyde and Marinov, 2010).\textsuperscript{31}

I next collected annual data to test world polity theory. First, the United Nations De-

\textsuperscript{28}Documents available at http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping (accessed July 21, 2010). I searched each operation’s mandate and mission summary for the words “election” and “democracy”; if either word appeared, I read the document to confirm that the UN was providing assistance for transitional elections, democratization, or both.

\textsuperscript{29}Countries with liberalizing UN peace operations do not differ markedly from countries with non-liberalizing UN peace operations in terms of pre-existing gender equality. For example, the average country with a liberalizing peace operation gave women suffrage in 1955, whereas the average country with a non-liberalizing peace operation did so in 1957 ($p = 0.80$). For this reason, there is little evidence that the UN selects countries for liberalizing peace operations based on their likelihood of adopting quotas.

\textsuperscript{30}Available at http://www.oecd.org/dac (accessed July, 21 2010). Negative numbers, which indicate that the amount a country repaid on its outstanding loans was greater than the gross disbursements it received that year, were transformed to zero. All skewed variables were transformed by taking the natural log after adding one.

\textsuperscript{31}Available at hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda (accessed May 10, 2011). I thank Susan Hyde for sharing her data with me prior to the database’s public release.
development Programme’s Human Development Report indicates the number of years since women obtained suffrage in a country as well as whether a country ratified CEDAW.\textsuperscript{32} Second, I took the natural log of the number of INGOs and women’s INGOs in each country in the previous year according to the Yearbooks of International Organizations.\textsuperscript{33} Third, I calculated the percentage of countries in the world and in a country’s region that had adopted quotas in the previous year in order to create diffusion variables.\textsuperscript{34}

Finally, I collected annual data to test modernization theory, which argues that women’s socio-economic standing, democracy levels, economic development, and female-friendly public policies co-vary. The World Bank provides relevant yearly measures on women’s socio-economic standing; however, the data contain many missing values, which are not missing at random.\textsuperscript{35} Thus, I present results here using the previous year’s levels of democracy and economic development to capture modernization dynamics, although including variables such as the percent of the total labor force that is female does not alter the results substantively. Data on countries’ real GDP per capita in logged current U.S. dollars came from the World Bank.\textsuperscript{36} I used two measures of democracy: (1) an average of Freedom House’s measures for political rights and civil liberties, which were rescaled so that 1 represents the least free countries and 7 the most free, and (2) the Polity2 variable from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2007), in which a score of 10 represents the

\textsuperscript{32}2008 was the baseline year for recording suffrage years; Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates were coded as 0 although they in fact deny women the right to vote.

\textsuperscript{33}Data on INGOs are from Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007). Data on women’s INGOs are from the extension by Wotipka and Ramirez (2008) of annual data collected by Berkovitch (1999). I linearly extrapolated values from 1999 to 2006. In robustness checks, I instead used the 1999 value for 2000-2006; the results held. I thank Emilie Hafner-Burton and Christine Min Wotipka for sharing their data with me.

\textsuperscript{34}I used the UN’s regional classifications. Available at \url{http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm} (accessed July, 21 2010). This variable may introduce some endogeneity, since according to world polity theory, a country’s neighbors are influenced by their neighbors, which include the original country. New techniques are being developed to study spatial interdependence but unfortunately have not yet been developed for event history models (Franzese and Hays, 2009).

\textsuperscript{35}For example, data on women’s primary school enrollment levels, life expectancy, and literacy levels relative to men’s are all missing for well over half of the observations in the sample.

\textsuperscript{36}Available at \url{http://data.worldbank.org} (accessed July, 21 2010).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Freedom House)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Heritage</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Female Suffrage</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Women’s INGOs</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>4,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Quotas in Region</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing UNPKO</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally Observed Election</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid (Millions of Dollars)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10,820</td>
<td>4,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. DG Aid (Millions of Dollars)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>1,987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables, Quota Analysis. Note: The non-logged version of variables are provided in this table for ease of interpretation.

most democratic and -10 the most autocratic countries. Since the effects of INGOs on the likelihood of gender quota adoption may depend on the level of democracy in a country, in robustness checks, I interacted that variable with an indicator of democracy in robustness checks. I also created a dichotomous variable that indicates Islamic cultural heritage. Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables.

2.3.3 The Model

I used an event history model to estimate the likelihood of a legal quota being adopted in a country given that it had not already been adopted. This method is common in studies of policy diffusion because it can incorporate both internal and spatial dynamics, deal with rarely occurring, one-time events (countries rarely repeal quotas), and gives us the probability of policy adoption at a given time (Berry and Berry, 1990, 411). If a quota was not adopted by 2006, then the observation is right-censored. I used the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model because it makes no assumptions about the shape of the base-

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38Forty-seven countries qualify as predominantly Islamic. I use the definition in Fish (2002, 6).

39See also True and Minstrom (2001) and Ramirez, Soysal and Shanahan (1997) for uses of event history analysis in related studies. Only two countries have repealed legal quotas: Colombia in 2001 and Egypt in 1986.
line hazard except that it does not vary across observations and because the model easily accommodates time varying covariates.\textsuperscript{40}

2.3.4 The Results

Table 2.3 summarizes the results of the event history analysis.\textsuperscript{41} Event history analysis yields hazard ratios; ratios significantly less than one indicate that a variable reduces the “hazard,” or likelihood, of adopting a gender quota, while ratios significantly greater than one increase that likelihood.

The variables suggested by modernization theory generally are not related to quota adoption in developing countries. Model 1 (Modernization) uses lagged democracy levels as measured by Freedom House and a country’s Islamic heritage to predict the likelihood of quota adoption. Not only are the variables statistically and substantively insignificant individually, but the model also fails the likelihood ratio test; that means that the variables are not jointly significant.\textsuperscript{42} If included, a variable measuring countries’ lagged, logged gross domestic product per capita is, however, positively and significantly related to quota adoption. I omit it from Table 3 in the interest of comparison across models because this variable loses statistical significance when included in the fuller models and is missing a considerable number of observations.

\textsuperscript{40}That assumption was tested by calculating the scaled Schoenfeld residuals (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 2004, 120-122).

\textsuperscript{41}The Zelig software implemented the analysis (Imai, King and Lau, 2007, 2008).

\textsuperscript{42}Polity2 generates similar results although it is statistically significantly related to quota adoption in bi-variate regressions. I use Freedom House because it covers a larger number of observations for the sample.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Modernization</th>
<th>Model 2 World Polity</th>
<th>Model 3 Intl. Incentives</th>
<th>Model 4 Full Model</th>
<th>Model 5 Full Model w/ DG Aid</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy (Freedom House)</td>
<td>0.99 (0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.00 (0.08)</td>
<td>1.01 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Heritage</td>
<td>0.95 (0.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.01 (0.33)</td>
<td>0.93 (0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years Since Female Suffrage</td>
<td>0.99 (0.01)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.99 (0.01)</td>
<td>0.99 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Women’s INGOs (log)</td>
<td>1.87** (0.26)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.37 (0.33)</td>
<td>1.36 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Quotas in Region</td>
<td>2.51 (1.42)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6.99 (1.67)</td>
<td>4.94 (1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing UNPKO</td>
<td>2.05* (0.43)</td>
<td>2.33* (0.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.40 (0.58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internationally Observed Election</td>
<td>2.37*** (0.33)</td>
<td>2.35** (0.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.98* (0.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid (log)</td>
<td>1.44*** (0.12)</td>
<td>1.40** (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.17 (0.15)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. DG Aid (log)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.38* (0.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( N )</td>
<td>4518</td>
<td>4822</td>
<td>4358</td>
<td>4158</td>
<td>1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-253.8</td>
<td>-253.3</td>
<td>-236.7</td>
<td>-229.1</td>
<td>-196.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood Ratio ( \chi^2 )</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>10.2***</td>
<td>31.1***</td>
<td>36.9***</td>
<td>27.2***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3: Event History Analysis of the Correlates of Legal Quota Adoption. Notes: Exponentiated hazard rates were estimated from Cox proportional hazards regressions with the Efron method for ties. Robust standard errors, clustered on country, are in parentheses. Ratios significantly less (greater) than one indicate that a variable is estimated to reduce (increase) the likelihood of adopting a gender quota. * indicates \( p < 0.10 \); ** indicates \( p < 0.05 \); and *** indicates \( p < 0.01 \).
The variables suggested by world polity theory fare better. Model 2 (World Polity) uses the number of years since women attained suffrage, the natural log of the number of women’s INGOs, and the percentage of countries in the region with quotas to estimate a country’s likelihood of quota adoption. Although the number of years since women attained suffrage and the diffusion variable mattered little, the number of women’s INGOs in a country is positively and statistically significantly related to the likelihood of quota adoption. Since a country’s number of women’s INGOs is correlated with its number of overall INGOs ($\rho=0.77$), it is difficult to conclusively separate the impact of countries’ general ties to the world polity from the demands of female activists.

Variables that measure international incentives are positively and statistically significantly related to quota adoption. Model 3 (International Incentives) uses the presence of a liberalizing UN peace operation, the presence of international election observers at the last election, and lagged foreign aid dependence to estimate a country’s likelihood of adopting a quota. All three variables have strong positive relationships with quota adoption. Model 4 (Full Model) re-introduces the variables from the other models. When included in a larger model with international factors, the number of women’s INGOs ceases to attain statistical significance at conventional levels ($p < 0.33$). The strong, positive relationships from Model 3 between quota adoption and international election observers, liberalizing UN peace operations, and foreign aid dependence all persist, although the statistical significance levels are somewhat dampened.

My theory predicted that countries where the democracy establishment influences domestic laws via a democracy promoting UN peace operation would be more likely to adopt gender quotas. Another way to measure the democracy establishment’s influence and presence in a country is by the amount of democracy assistance that country receives. USAID—one of the most important donors in the democracy establishment—provides data on its democracy and governance (DG) outlays to each country between 1990 and 2003 (Finkel,
According to my theory, this variable should also be positively and significantly related to a country’s likelihood of adopting quotas. The U.S. government does not promote gender quotas as a policy. But democracy assistance programs, including U.S.-funded ones, are designed and implemented by actors in the democracy establishment, who transmit ideas about gender equality and the legitimacy of quotas through those programs.

Model 5 includes the natural log of the amount of DG aid received by a country in the previous year in the Full Model. This model should be interpreted cautiously since the complex relationships between variables such as democracy and DG aid raise concerns about its functional form. But we can still observe some interesting correlations. First, DG aid is positively and statistically significantly related to a country’s likelihood of quota adoption. Second, countries that invited international election observers are still more likely to adopt quotas, while countries with more linkages to the world polity or greater “modernization” are not. But the presence of a UN peace operation is no longer a statistically significant determinant of the likelihood of quota adoption. This finding suggests that DG aid is indeed another measure of the underlying concept of the democracy establishment’s presence in a country. At the same time, Model 5’s reduced sample, which covers years only from 1990 to 2003, excludes many observations with neither liberalizing UN peace operations nor quotas as well as several observations (for example, Sudan in 2005) with both liberalizing UN peace operations and quotas; the change in the sample also accounts for the decreased magnitude of the estimated hazard ratio for the liberalizing UN peace operation variable. Model 4 therefore serves as the baseline model for this study.

A good way to interpret the results is to simulate the percentage change in the hazard rate that is associated with a unit change in an independent variable. I shifted one inde-

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43 Available at http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html (accessed July 26, 2010).

44 The estimated hazard rate for foreign aid dependence also loses its statistical significance. Since the amounts of foreign aid and DG aid that a country receives are positively correlated, this finding is not surprising.
dependent variable at a time from the 25th to the 75th percentile, while holding all other numerical independent variables at their means and qualitative independent variables at their medians. The results for Model 4 are presented below in Table 2.4. We see that a country with a liberalizing UN peace operation is 157 percent more likely to adopt a gender quota than one without. Meanwhile, going from a last election that was unobserved to one that was internationally observed is associated with a 147 percent increase in the likelihood of adopting a gender quota. Finally, an increase from 14 (25th percentile) to 155 million (75th percentile) 2007 U.S. dollars in foreign aid results in a 214 percent increase in the likelihood of quota adoption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Mean Increase in Hazard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Women’s INGOs (log)</td>
<td>from 25th to 75th percentile</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalizing UNPKO</td>
<td>from 5 to 24 Women’s INGOs</td>
<td>(-31%, 286%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from 0 to 1</td>
<td>157%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intl. Observed Election</td>
<td>from no operation to an operation</td>
<td>(-9%, 457%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from 0 to 1</td>
<td>147%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from unobserved to observed</td>
<td>(13%, 347%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid (log)</td>
<td>from 25th to 75th percentile</td>
<td>214%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>from 14.0 to 155 million U.S. dollars</td>
<td>(22%, 664%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4: Changes in Simulated Hazard Rates of Gender Quota Adoption. Notes: Simulated hazard rates estimated by shifting one variable at a time from Model 4 in Table 2.3, while holding all other numerical variables at their means and qualitative variables at their medians. 95% confidence intervals for the simulated first differences are in parentheses. Results were based on 1,000 simulations from an asymptotic normal distribution. * indicates $p < 0.10$; ** indicates $p < 0.05$; and *** indicates $p < 0.01$.

### 2.3.5 Robustness Checks

A potential confounding variable is a country’s post-conflict status. Previous research found that armed conflict predicts women’s representation in developing countries due to the structural, political, and cultural changes that accompany civil war (Hughes, 2009, 180). Post-conflict countries’ populations skew female, for example, which may make quotas politically advantageous. To test for this possibility, I replaced the UN peace operation
variable in Model 3 with a dichotomous variable indicating whether a country is within five years of the end of a civil conflict. A country’s post-conflict status is not, however, statistically significantly related to quota adoption at conventional levels although the estimated hazard ratio is greater than one.\(^{45}\) This suggests that international involvement in post-conflict countries is the key factor influencing quota adoption, rather than the post-conflict setting in general.

A final consideration is the robustness of the results when we analyze each region separately. Since different regions have different cultural and political traditions, we might expect patterns of quota adoption to vary by region. This section’s main finding—that liberalizing UN peace operations, foreign aid dependence, and inviting international election monitors are strongly related to gender quota adoption—still largely stands for each region. Latin America, however, is an outlier.\(^{46}\) Specifically, liberalizing UN peace operations are negatively and significantly related to a country’s likelihood of quota adoption. Inviting international election observers and foreign aid dependence—measures of the democracy establishment’s indirect influence—continue to be positively and significantly related to quota adoption. Prior democracy and women’s INGOs, however, are also strong positive predictors of quota adoption.

What explains Latin America’s difference? First, the international “supply” of quotas was weak. Many liberalizing UN peace operations in Latin America took place in the early 1990s. For example, ONUCA (the UN Observer Group in Central America) supported elections in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua between 1989 and 1992 and ONUSAL (the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador) did the same in El Salvador between 1991 and 1995. I argued that the democracy establishment, and its ideas about the appropriate practices and institutions for developing democracies, emerged after

\(^{45}\) The estimated exponentiated hazard ratio for the post-conflict variable is 1.56 and the robust standard error is 0.32 (\(p < 0.17\)). The data on civil conflicts came from Gleditsch et al. (2002).

\(^{46}\) One other finding of interest is that in Africa, democracy levels are negatively and statistically significantly associated with the likelihood of quota adoption.
the Cold War. The democracy establishment’s norm of gender quota adoption was therefore still in its infancy during many Latin American UN peace operations. In this sense, Latin America may be the exception that proves the rule.

Second, research on human rights shows that transnational human rights advocates have been unusually successful in Latin America. In other words, the domestic “demand” for quotas was strong. A recent review noted the large number of Latin American INGOs, the prominence of Latin America in U.S. congressional debates over human rights in the 1970s, and the early intellectual and religious roots of the region’s human rights discourse (Hafner-Burton and Ron, 2009, 366-367, 377-379). Especially in the area of women’s rights, Latin America has been at the “vanguard,” with Evita Perón advocating for informal candidate selection quotas in the governing party in Argentina as early as 1951 (Jones, 2009, 56). Subsequently, regional organizations, such as Parlatino (the Latin American Parliament), aided female advocates for quotas (Araújo and García, 2006). The historical legacy of quotas in Latin America as well as the relative efficacy of regional human rights actors there encouraged the region’s early adoption of quotas.

### 2.4 Afghanistan: A Case of International Incentives?

The quantitative results confirmed my hypotheses, but the analysis has limitations. First, the relationships between UN peace operations, international election observation, and quota adoption could be spurious since these phenomena have become increasingly prevalent over time. Second, some measures for key concepts, such as women’s advocacy via INGOs, are blunt. A case study can check the results’ robustness through process tracing. Since the preliminary large-N analysis generated satisfactory results for my theory, I chose to focus on Afghanistan—a country that was well-predicted by the statistical model (Lieberman, 2005, 442-443). Since women’s political participation in Afghanistan has

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47 The average residuals for Afghanistan from Model 4 in Table 2.3 were -0.03.
been the subject of considerable attention in the past decade, the case study can make use of a relatively large amount of data and at the same time contribute to our understanding of a substantively important country for the study of women in politics. The analysis used published primary and secondary accounts, news articles, and seventeen key informant interviews. The interviews were used primarily to reconstruct events, as well as to corroborate existing sources and to establish what international and local elites thought. Thus, I identified the names of key international and Afghan people from published sources and then gathered a larger sample via snowball methods.48

Afghanistan adopted a gender quota on January 4, 2004, as part of a new constitution. The constitutional process began on December 5, 2001, after the United States’ invasion of Afghanistan, with the so-called Bonn Agreement, which called for “the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive, multiethnic and fully representative government.”49 Gender sensitivity was of vital importance to the international community given the extraordinary repression of women under the previous Taliban regime. UNAMA (the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) began in March 2002 to support the constitutional process. The constitution was first drafted in October 2002 by a nine-person commission appointed by Interim President Hamid Karzai, then reviewed in May 2003 by an appointed thirty-five-person constitutional commission, and finally approved by the elected and appointed 502-person Loya Jirga that met over three intense weeks starting in December 2003. The constitution reserves 27 percent of seats for women in the lower house, the Wolesi Jirga, and 17 percent in the upper house, the Meshrano Jirga. My theory predicts that without pressure and encouragement from actors in the democracy establishment working with foreign aid donors and the UN peace operation, there would have been no quota. We can look for

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48Interviews were conducted in English due to practical limitations; this factor should be borne in mind when interpreting the results. See Tansey (2007) on non-probability sampling methods for elite interviews. Interviewees’ names are listed in Appendix B.

evidence of three observable implications from the theory. First, did international experts influence Afghanistan’s constitution through assistance and technical advice? Second, did actors from the democracy establishment, drawing on experiences from other transitional countries, view a quota as appropriate and necessary? Third, to the extent that Afghan women advocated for quotas, were they empowered by international actors? I examine each question in turn.

First, international actors did influence Afghanistan’s constitutional process, although the interim government leaders’ political concerns often drove the process. One high-level diplomat said that at the early stage of the nine-person drafting commission, one of the only concessions that was made to the international community was to include two women representatives. The “signature” of UN special representative Lakhdar Brahimi had “been a ‘light footprint’”; but once the constitution reached the stage of the 35-person review committee, international experts Barnett Rubin, Yash Pal Gai, and Guy Carcassonne were enlisted to ensure that the text met “basic international standards.” Vigorous debate took place over presidentialism, the qualifications for office, the place of Islam in the constitution, and the electoral system. But international experts’ greatest influence is said to have been on articulating the need for a women’s bill of rights and for assurances that the gender equality be properly reflected in the constitution. Even after the constitutional process was over, the international influence remained strong; for example, in interviews conducted by the Heinrich Böll Foundation in 2007 and 2008, MPs complained that they have limited influence over Afghanistan’s budget because the international community was sponsoring upwards of 90% of it (Fleschenberg, 2009, 18-19).

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50 Interview 85, with former diplomat to Afghanistan, in person, Princeton, N.J., April 29, 2009.
53 The Heinrich Böll Foundation is part of the democracy establishment and has worked in Afghanistan since 2002 to support, among other things, the Women and Children Legal Research Foundation, civic action songs, the Afghan Women’s Network, and the Tribal Liaison Office (Fleschenberg, 2009, 7).
Second, members of the democracy establishment, especially at the UN, favored a gender quota for Afghanistan due to the belief that mechanisms to support women’s political participation are appropriate in constitutions. Statements to this effect from key participants are especially suggestive because international actors in Afghanistan were keenly aware of the political importance of avoiding the perception that they had imposed Afghanistan’s constitution. A quote from a former UNAMA political officer in Kabul and Bamain is illustrative:

[T]he last thing you [the UN or other outsiders] want to show is your involvement because then they will not accept this constitution, saying that it’s foreign, imported, and so on. It was a very, very sensitive issue. We had to keep as low a profile as possible. We had to not get involved in the essence of the issue but try to guide them… We were not necessarily deciding, but through intensive consultations only certain things could be approved, not necessarily with the stroke of a pen from my side, but if, for instance, they had to have a quota or proportional representation from all factions and they didn’t have that, I had to be alarmed and I had to tell them, “No, we have to have proper representation.”

As predicted by the theory, members of the democracy establishment often treated their work on gender, peace, and development as a technical project rather than as a political enterprise, to the frustration of some Afghans, according to Abirafeh (2009, 64-65), who worked in Afghanistan for several organizations in the democracy establishment.

Various events illustrate the international support for quotas in Afghanistan. U.S.-based

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54This belief was reiterated in a number of interviews, including: Interview 90, with constitutional advisor to the UN, by telephone, August 24, 2009; Interview 100, with legal advisor to the UN, by telephone, May 4, 2009; Interview 85, with former diplomat to Afghanistan, in person, Princeton, N.J., April 29, 2009; and Interview 96, with international election advisor to Afghanistan, by telephone, June 5, 2009.

efforts such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction Project provided technical advice about how women’s rights fit with Islamic law and Afghanistan’s legal traditions and how best to implement gender quotas (Nawabi, 2003; Norris, 2004). When Interim President Karzai decided to switch the electoral system from closed-list proportional representation to single non-transferable vote due to concerns over public confusion and his distrust of political parties, “[m]any international organizations, foreign diplomats, UNAMA, and emerging progressive Afghan political and civil society movements” objected due to its potentially malign consequences for women’s representation (Reynolds, 2006, 107, 110). There was some debate within the international community over the form that the quota ought to take, with one suggestion to assign women’s seats via a special election. But despite different opinions about implementation, one international official said that some sort of quota was “clearly something that we lobbied for.”56 The quotas for the appointed and elected members of the constitutional commissions and the Loya Jirga facilitated agreement over the eventual reserved seats. Indeed, as early as February 2002, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for “temporary special measures, including targets and quotas, targeted at Afghan women” to accelerate women’s participation in decision-making.57

Finally, Afghan women played an important role in the constitutional process. Women made up almost 20 percent of the constitutional commissions as well as the Constitutional Loya Jirga. Groups of these women, drawing on the example of quotas in Pakistan, advocated for reserved seats as well as other provisions.58 Indeed, they successfully campaigned to double the proposed lower-house quota to 27 percent during the chaotic final constitutional negotiations with the support of U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Loya Jirga Chairman Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, and international representatives.59 Female advocates

56 Interview 85, with former diplomat to Afghanistan, in person, Princeton, N.J., April 29, 2009.


58 Interview 84, with former diplomat to Afghanistan, by telephone, April 29, 2009.

59 See Rubin (2004, 15); and Interview 87, with Loya Jirga representative, by telephone, September 24, 2009.
during the constitutional process were able to advocate, however, in part due to international assistance. For example, donors in the democracy establishment, and specifically the United Nations Development Programme and UNIFEM, helped establish, fund, and provide technical expertise to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs in order to facilitate gender mainstreaming in the government. This Ministry later helped press for the quota. Furthermore, U.S. officials and the National Endowment for Democracy convened meetings for Afghan activists with women from other regions and constitutional experts to prepare them for advocacy.\(^{60}\) Karzai and international officials also promoted gender equality by selecting elite women’s advocates to participate in the constitutional process.

National and international organizations mobilized urban Afghan women to lobby for quotas.\(^{61}\) But other Afghan women, especially in rural areas, were not aware of the quota and some even expressed displeasure with it. A journalist interviewed 80 Afghan women in 2002 and found them generally unsupportive or unaware of the place gender quotas would likely have the constitution: “[W]ith the exception of the feminist Soraya Parlikar, a member of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, no woman in Afghanistan voiced open support for a women’s quota to ensure women’s participation in politics. Many women were even surprised that one might demand such a quota” (Bauer, 2002, 32). Among elite women that participated in the constitutional process, there was also some disagreement; one leader at Bonn said that the quota should be temporary, stating, “We do not want charity.”\(^{62}\) Although women have achieved some stunning successes since 2004—for example, nineteen women were elected to the Wolesi Jirga in the 2005 election without the aid of the quota—they still lag considerably behind men politically. Forty-nine of the sixty-eight female members of the Wolesi Jirga that were elected in 2005 “owe[d] their election to the quota mechanism,

\(^{60}\)In 2003, the NED funded conferences, training sessions and meetings to “draft recommendations on the status of women in the new Afghan constitution” and help women in Kandahar “prepare a detailed response to the draft constitution” (National Endowment for Democracy, 2004, 86-87).

\(^{61}\)Interview 93, with Afghan gender and development specialist, by e-mail, August 18, 2009.

having leaped over 422 male candidates who outpolled them” (Reynolds, 2006, 115).

Subsequent events in Afghanistan continue to illustrate the difficulty facing female advocates without the international community’s inducements and threats behind them. In April 2009, both houses of Afghanistan’s parliament passed the Shia Family Law, which formalized practices such as bans on married Shia women leaving their homes without their husbands. 300 Afghan women protested the law in Kabul, but they faced “an angry throng three times larger than their own.” After signing the law into effect, however, President Karzai later promised to amend it; the final version, which still retained many elements that international observers and local women found objectionable, came into force on July 27, 2009. Some Afghans suspect that the international furor over the law, which prompted U.S. President Obama to decry the law as “abhorrent,” influenced Karzai’s reversal. At the same time, Afghan human rights activists express frustration at how the international community champions them selectively. International actors exerted pressure only after the passage of the Shia Family Law despite activists’ earlier pleas. The international community tends to focus on women’s legal standing—rather than responding to some activists’ more passionate concerns about safety, security, and economic opportunities. After Karzai nominated no women to the Supreme Court and only one women in his cabinet in 2006, one female MP remarked with disappointment, “For now, women are more of a symbol, to impress the foreign aid donors.”

In sum, the Afghanistan case helps confirm the quantitative analysis of quota adopt-

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65Interview 93, with Afghan gender and development specialist, by e-mail, August 18, 2009. Many of the bill’s practices were already regular parts of life for women before the law officially sanctioned them.

66Interview 89, with Afghan civil society leader, by telephone, May 6, 2009.

tion. First, the democracy establishment’s advice, pressure, and encouragement influenced Afghanistan’s constitution. Second, a key focus of that advice, pressure, and encouragement was for the inclusion of a gender quota, a policy that the international community (especially members of the democracy establishment) believed was appropriate. Finally, although many Afghan women argued in favor of an increased quota, they were selected and empowered by the democracy establishment. What continued events suggest is that the leaders of Afghanistan have few incentives to listen to women activists, but they have strong incentives to care about international “carrots and sticks.” Although Afghan women provided crucial local “buy-in” for the quota, they would have been unable to successfully demand it on their own. Their key concerns are, furthermore, not always what the international community chooses to champion. Thus, Afghanistan offers a plausible account of how the democracy establishment promotes quotas for women in post-conflict countries’ new electoral laws. At least some degree of domestic demand for quotas exists in many countries today; however, it is the international incentives for leaders to adopt quotas that tip the scales in women’s favor.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that many developing countries adopt gender quotas principally because of international rather than domestic pressures. Modernization does not produce quotas, nor do states’ ties to the world polity generally do so. Instead, developing countries adopt quotas because of the direct influence of the democracy establishment in post-conflict societies and the indirect influence of the democracy establishment in countries that want foreign aid, foreign investment, international esteem, and legitimacy. The shared belief that quotas are necessary and appropriate for developing democracies within the field of international democracy assistance thus makes a significant impact on countries’ domestic politics. I have presented quantitative evidence from a cross-national event history analy-
sis and qualitative evidence from a case study of Afghanistan to show that this argument generally does a better job of explaining quota adoption than alternative theories.

Gender quotas are part of a broader story about the international community’s promotion of liberal democracy in the post-Cold War era that should interest scholars of world politics. Gourevitch (1978) once wrote about the “second-image reversed,” or the international sources of domestic politics. A growing literature now examines how international actors and laws promote or otherwise encourage the spread of a variety of forms of domestic liberalization. This chapter makes a contribution to our understanding of such phenomena and expands our conception of the sort of policies that might be included. It also suggests a theoretical framework—of direct international influence and indirect international inducements—and an important latent measure of leaders’ desire to adhere to international norms—inverting international election monitors—that can be used to study other diffusion processes.

This chapter also raises important normative issues. The under-representation of women in the world’s democracies raises major concerns about political equality. Gender quotas, however, remain a controversial solution. My findings suggest that local gender equality is, in part, brought about by international inequalities, which help generate the incentives that are key for quota adoption in developing countries. Leveraging international inequality to bring about local equality is not a new phenomenon to students of human rights. Quotas, however, bring this dynamic into particularly sharp relief since they explicitly seek to overcome domestic power imbalances. Although legal quotas may yet spread to more developed democracies, the present study, which finds policy convergence among developing democracies, illuminates how international norms impact states differentially due to states’ varying incentives to adhere to them.

Further research could proceed along several lines. First, in addition to international

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election observation and gender quotas, two internationally legitimate policies that have been shown to go together, we could examine additional policies and institutions that the democracy establishment supports. Such a study might investigate if liberal democratic policies can serve as signaling substitutes for each other, some policies are “worth more” internationally than others, or policies tend to aggregate together or occur in certain sequences. Second, the politics of the international actors in the “second-image reversed” have thus far received little attention. Future research might probe more deeply the variations in the democracy establishment’s actors and how they relate to the emergence of common ideas such as gender quotas. Finally, we might explore whether findings that gender quotas have a significant effect on women’s representation, public policies, and political attitudes hold up in cases where quotas are mostly adopted for international reasons. Research on the strategic adoption of human rights treaties and the ambivalent relationship between treaty adoption and human rights practices should give us some pause (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, 2007).

The rest of this project picks up several of these threads, while leaving additional questions for future research. Actors in the democracy establishment play a strategic game with the leaders of developing countries, who want to show that they are democratic. Furthermore, actors in the democracy establishment help foreign aid donors define which countries are and are not democratic; the democracy establishment emphasizes inviting international election monitors and adopting gender quotas, for example, rather than encouraging donors to reward countries that simply mimic the institutions and practices of developed democracies. Having shown that indicators of the democracy establishment’s direct and indirect influence are associated with the widespread adoption of gender quotas across a diverse group of developing countries, I will now seek to understand the origins and changing nature of the democracy establishment’s ideas in more depth. Gender quotas are but one

69 But see Kelley (2009) and Brown (2006) for exceptions.
example of a broader template of practices and institutions promoted by the democracy establishment for reasons relating to its funding structure as well as normative change within the field.
Chapter 3

Structure, Agency, and Democracy Promotion

What explains variations and convergence in international democracy assistance programs over time and across countries? Why are many government-funded democracy assistance programs today not designed to foster short- or even medium-term improvements in target countries’ democracy levels? This chapter develops a novel answer to those questions. Conventional wisdom focuses on how donors’ preferences and target countries’ political and economic characteristics shape democracy assistance and foreign aid more generally. I instead focus on the ideas and incentives of the actors linking the donors and the target countries: the people and organizations that conduct democracy assistance projects, who I refer to collectively as the democracy establishment. I develop a two-pronged argument that draws inspiration from both economic principal-agent models and sociological theories of professions.¹

I first argue that the transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance rewards people and organizations that pursue certain types of democracy assistance programs. The typical delegation chain begins with a democratic donor government that gives aid to a

¹In so doing, I follow Weaver (2008) and Nielson, Tierney and Weaver (2006), who also combine principal–agent and sociological approaches to international relations.
series of intermediary organizations that eventually give aid to the groups that enact the projects abroad, which they do under the watchful gaze of a pseudo-democratic government. In order to gain funding, aid recipient organizations seek to satisfy donor governments’ concerns about efficacious programs by pursuing programs that have clear, quantitative impact measures. Aid recipients also seek to satisfy their host governments, who generally prefer to give access to programs that are compatible with their regimes’ survival. Given those incentives, rational implementing organizations seek out measurable and regime compatible programs; the extent to which they pursue such programs in a particular time or place depends, however, on how closely donors can monitor them. The extent of monitoring problems affects both how much donors reward measurable programs as a way of gauging programs’ efficacy and also how much slack aid recipients have to pursue programs that are likely to facilitate access.

Yet the people working in the field of international democracy assistance—the democracy establishment—are not wholly utility-maximizers. They are also idealists motivated by commitments to their organizations’ missions and the principles of human rights and democracy. Sometimes, pursuing their organizations’ missions means pursuing programs that lack clear quantitative measures or that are not compatible enough with their host countries’ regimes to gain easy access. I argue that the balance between ideals and organizational self-interest varies over time. As democracy assistance has developed as a profession, actors in the democracy establishment became more likely to pursue programs rewarded by the field’s structure regardless of their ideals. Both competition and norms institutionalized those practices such that today they seem taken-for-granted. Given the process of professionalization, aid recipients will seek out measurable and regime compatible programs increasingly over time across all types of countries. In developing this argument, I make the case that democracy assistance today is largely a “normal” government program, despite the field’s ideological roots. The process whereby democracy assistance’s funding structure translates into incentives and actions could occur in any government assistance
My explanation of how an idea-driven network changes over time helps account for hitherto unexplained domestic political outcomes. Considerable convergence has occurred across the developing world in terms of countries’ political institutions and practices. Levitsky and Way (2010, 19) argue that the “minimum standards for regime acceptability” for competitive authoritarian rulers increased after the end of the Cold War. What are those minimum standards and where do they come from? As shown in the previous chapter, one of them is adopting some form of quota for women’s representation in legislature, which more than one hundred countries have done and I attribute to pressure and support from the democracy establishment. Other examples include holding national elections, inviting international election monitors, and signing international human rights treaties. But why are gender quotas an appropriate institution for developing countries to adopt? This chapter explains why democracy assistance emphasizes the dimensions of democracy, such as women’s political participation, that it increasingly does.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describes the transnational delegation chain in democracy assistance and discusses how this structure rewards promoting in democracy in measurable and regime compatible ways. It also describes an alternative delegation structure used by private foundations and how that structure rewards different types of programs. Section 3.2 draws on interviews that I conducted with democracy practitioners to develop an argument about how competition and norms have institutionalized certain ideas about how to promote democracy over time. Section 3.3 summarizes the observable implications and hypotheses from the two-pronged argument that will be tested empirically. Section 3.4 presents alternative explanations. Section 3.5 concludes by discussing the argument’s broader implications for world politics.
3.1 Democracy Assistance’s Principal–Agent Structure

3.1.1 The Typical Transnational Delegation Chain

The textbook delegation, or principal–agent, relationship is between an employer and an employee. The employer (principal) hires the employee (agent) to perform a job that the employer either cannot or does not want to do. The employer uses contracts to reward or punish the employee, but the employer cannot fully observe the employee’s work. Furthermore, the employer’s preferences in delegating the job may differ from the employee’s preferences in doing the job. Two common problems arise. First, agents may act in ways that promote their goals rather than the principal’s goals, which is known as moral hazard. Second, agents may manipulate their private information in ways that promote outcomes that are harmful to the principal, which is known as adverse selection.

Democracy assistance is passed from Western democracies to developing democracies and authoritarian countries through a transnational delegation chain. Figure 3.1 illustrates the chain with a typical example of a United States government-funded democracy assistance program in Jordan. Even longer delegation chains regularly occur, especially when aid passes through inter-governmental organizations. In this example, Congress allocates democracy assistance funds, although in the United States, the executive branch can also play a large role in shaping democracy assistance through programs funded by USAID and the State Department.

In Figure 3.1, the original principal is the American public, which elects representatives to Congress to govern on its behalf. Congress, whose median member wishes to promote democracy, in turn delegates authority and funding for democracy promotion to the Na-

\[2\] See Wenar (2006), Wallace and Chapman (2006), and Winters (2010a) for related discussions of chains of delegation and accountability in development aid.

\[3\] Some readers may object to calling the public’s delegation of foreign policy-making duties to elected representatives a principal–agent relationship, although it is often referred to this way in international relations (Milner, 2006). But even if we think of Congress or the President as the original principal in democracy assistance, the key point remains: Elected officials answer to the public, which affects how they think about foreign aid expenses.
Figure 3.1: A Model of the Transnational Delegation Chain in Democracy Assistance. Bottom row depicts delegation from Congress to the final aid recipient, the Al Quds Center. Top row depicts the American public and Jordanian government as monitors.

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an American foundation that was established in 1983. Congress delegates because it lacks the capacity to run democracy assistance programs and because democracy promotion is well served by some separation from the government. But the NED does not run democracy assistance programs itself. Instead, the NED awards grants to organizations, such as the U.S.-based Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), that submit proposals to the NED. Although CIPE has a Middle East program office, it delegates funds to local organizations, such as the Al Quds Center for Political Studies, to enact projects, such as a dialogue on Jordan’s National Budget in this case. The Jordanian government is the final actor, although it is not an agent; since it monitors and can constrain international democracy assistance projects that take place in Jordan, it affects the actors in the delegation chain, starting most directly with the Al Quds Center.

The multiple stage process of delegation in democracy assistance resembles other government contracts, but the principal–agent interaction in democracy assistance differs from typical agency models in an important way. Democracy assistance travels across sovereign states’ boundaries. A strategic interaction therefore occurs between the leaders of the countries where democracy assistance projects take place (target countries) and democracy ass-

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4Gailmard and Patty (2007) make a related, more general point that it is rational for Congress to give discretion to bureaucrats, because doing so encourages them to develop useful expertise. Note also that democracy assistance may be part of a broader trend of delegation in American foreign policy (Stanger, 2009).
sisters, who are subject to these leaders’ constraints. Thus, democracy practitioners must worry about satisfying not only their democratic donor government principals but also their non- or partially-democratic government hosts. As we shall see, this transnational context affects democracy assisters’ strategies in significant ways.

3.1.2 Actors’ Preferences in the Delegation Chain

Democratic Donor Governments

I now proceed to discuss the preferences of the key actors in the transnational delegation chain. Many government officials, such as Congress in Figure 3.1, genuinely seek democratization abroad. Democracy promotion has historically enjoyed bipartisan support in the United States government, including among Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama (Bjornlund, 2004, 20-27), and has deep historical roots in American grand strategy (Ikenberry, 2000). Although some officials care little for democracy promotion, few vocally oppose it; “promoting democracy” is generally a valence issue that politicians are unlikely campaign against, especially since democracy assistance is a relatively small budget item.

Do American officials genuinely want to promote democracy? During the Cold War, the United States repeatedly overthrew democratically elected governments to reinstate pro-American clients (Kinzer, 2007). The United States is still a somewhat ambivalent democracy promoter today in its allies in the “war on terror.” Donor governments surely contain a diversity of preferences over democracy promotion and those diverse preferences only make it easier for agents to divert programs towards their preferences. But the evidence suggests that on average, donor governments do want to promote democracy overseas and use democracy assistance as one tool to do so, even if their other preferences sometimes trump democracy promotion. Consider, for example, a survey of opinion leaders conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs between 1978 and 2004. The survey indicated consistently high levels of support for democracy promotion, even after
Figure 3.2: **Elite Support for Democracy Promotion in the United States, 1978-2004.** This figure shows the percent of elite respondents who said that “helping to bring a democratic form of government to other countries” was “very important” or “somewhat important.” \( N \approx 400. \) Data source: thechicagocouncil.org.

The invasion of Iraq, as Figure 3.2 shows.\(^5\) Outside of the United States, other countries and a variety of international and regional organizations, including the EU, OAS, OSCE, and UN, have publicly stated their commitment to democracy and punished countries that violate democratic norms.\(^6\)

At the same time, elected officials seek reelection without setting off any “fire alarms” among the public (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Even prior to controversial efforts to promote democracy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Holsti (2000) found limited public support for democracy promotion as a main foreign policy goal among ordinary Americans. That

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support declined further after the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Drezner, 2008, 56-58). A skeptical public, however inattentive, means that officials want results on democracy assistance. They need to document democracy assistance’s efficacy in order to justify the money that is spent on this foreign policy objective. One way elected officials attempt to monitor democracy assistance is through public hearings. As Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton told USAID staff in 2009: “You’ve got to be able to make the case that what you do for America is important, even in these tough times.”

Note that although in my argument officials have preferences over democracy promotion, they generally lack preferences over strategies thereof—for example, about how best to promote civil society in Serbia. In contrast to foreign economic or military aid programs, which representatives tend to support when firms from their districts send goods and services overseas (Milner and Tingley, 2010), few such incentives exist for democracy assistance. Officials do not, and likely cannot, monitor democracy assistance programs that closely; in part because of monitoring problems, government democracy assistance programs are often criticized for being duplicative (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009a). In my framework, donors simply want to promote democracy (or not) and to do so in such a way that is efficacious.

**Aid Recipient Organizations**

Aid recipients, such as the NED, CIPE, and the Al Quds Center in Figure 3.1, differ important respects, but they share general incentives as intermediaries, or agents, in the delegation

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7For example, the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs held a hearing entitled “Human Rights and Democracy Assistance: Increasing the Effectiveness of U.S. Foreign Aid” on June 10, 2010 with four leaders in the democracy establishment. See summary available at [http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1187](http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing_notice.asp?id=1187) (accessed June 13, 2010). The “F process,” Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice’s attempt to bring USAID under State Department control and standardize foreign aid evaluations, is another example of the executive branch’s attempts to monitor democracy assistance.

chain. These organizations genuinely seek to promote democracy. Their organizations’ principled missions and ideals of human rights and freedom motivate actors in the democracy establishment. At the same time, in order to continue working, aid recipients must secure funding. Organizations’ leaders need to maintain their budget levels in order to retain staff and pursue their missions. As one long-time practitioner said: “One of my friends runs a $50 million organization and so he has to generate $50 million to keep everyone employed. It means that you have to go where the money is.” Aid recipients thus seek readily measurable results that they can report to their principals. As one former practitioner put it, they need “success stories”—not “lessons learned”—that their funders can show to their funders (Nuti, 2009). Furthermore, in order to continue working and winning grants, organizations must secure continued access to the countries where they implement projects. For organizations such as the Al Quds Center, which is permanently based in Jordan, access problems are especially acute and include fears of arrest and punishment. By mixing idealism and organizational self-interest, actors in the democracy establishment behave similarly to transnational advocacy networks (Bob, 2005; Carpenter, 2007; Sell and Prakash, 2004) and other human rights organizations (Büthe, Major and de Mello e Souza, 2009; Lecy, Mitchell and Schmitz, 2010; Ron, Ramos and Rodgers, 2005).

The projects that best generate funding and access may not be the best ones at democratizing countries—hence the canonical principal–agent problems that arise in democracy assistance. As discussed below, many of the results of the democracy assistance programs most often cited in accounts of successful democratization—such as aid to dissidents, general civil society groups, and civic education—are hard to quickly and quantitatively assess, especially since they may be done covertly. Such programs may also anger the target coun-

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9 See also the discussion of international organizations’ preferences in Barnett and Coleman (2005, 597-598).

10 Interview 70, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010. Interviewees’ names are listed in Appendix B. See also Henderson (2002, 146) and Mitchell (2009, 15), in which the former Georgia Chief of Party for the National Democratic Institute reflects on the field’s “financial motives.”
try. For those reasons, practitioners gravitate towards other strategies.\textsuperscript{11} Wittes (2008, 93), for example, critically described a United States government-funded project in Saudi Arabia that pursued women’s empowerment through regime-friendly support of a breast cancer awareness initiative, rather than supporting “women columnists in national newspapers [who] were arguing for liberal reforms and criticizing clerics and others who promoted outdated views of the relationship between husband and wife.”

**Target Countries**

Finally, the governments of target countries, such as the Jordanian government in Figure 3.1, generally prefer democracy assistance programs that do not challenge their political authority. Certain countries—especially democratizing ones—may embrace democracy assistance. But if democracy assistance threatens a regime’s survival, the government may deny access to the programs. Some countries, such as Syria, consistently prohibit democracy assistance. Others, such as Egypt, Russia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, impose legal and extralegal restrictions on in-country programs, especially since 2005 (Carothers, 2006; Gershman and Allen, 2006).

Even if pseudo-democrats will permit (or embrace) certain types of democracy assistance programs, they generally want to avoid the open contestation and political mobilization that could lead to their replacement. Sherif Mansour, a senior program officer at Freedom House, described the Egyptian government’s attempts to derail his organization’s work during Mubarak’s last year in power in a way that illustrates this phenomenon. Mansour said: “They [Egyptian officials] were constantly saying: ‘Why are you working with those groups [i.e., Egyptian NGOs], they are nothing. All they have are slogans.’” When Freedom House refused to stop its civil society program, its staff members were followed

\textsuperscript{11}An even more cynical perspective suggests that it is not in the interest of the democracy establishment to succeed at democratizing countries because doing so would put it out of business. The evidence does not support this perspective; people in the democracy establishment do generally want to positively affect the countries where they work.
and found that hotels were closed when training sessions were about to be held there.¹²

### 3.1.3 The Information Environment

The preferences of donor governments, aid recipients, and host governments meet in an environment with the limited information. Even intermediate donors, such as the NED and CIPE, cannot monitor their recipients closely. One interviewee who worked at such a donor, for example, unwittingly funded a militia that was posing as a civil society organization.¹³ Thus, although democratic governments set the overall priorities for democracy assistance, their agents have discretion to design programs in ways that meet their preferences for continued funding and access rather than simply donors’ preferences for effective democracy promotion. The result? Programs that at times are unintended consequences—a typical feature of other international bureaucracies (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; Barnett, 2002).

At least three traits of democracy assistance that exacerbate information problems and this agency slack. First, longer delegation chains tend to have more slack. Monitoring is difficult and more agents have the opportunity to shift their tasks away from the original descriptions (Nielsen and Tierney, 2003). Agents can “buffer” their principals, or create barriers between themselves and the principals (Hawkins and Jacoby, 2006). Second, as with foreign aid, the main intended “beneficiaries” of democracy assistance—the citizens of target countries—play no formal monitoring role (Martens et al., 2002). Their absence makes it hard for principals to monitor their agents and properly motivate them. Finally, since democracy assistance is a field with multiple donor principals, the most capable local organizations, which are the donors’ favorites, sometimes pick among their favorite calls-for-proposals (Nuti, 2005, 86). Having multiple principals drive outcomes towards agents’

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preferences and away from principals’ (Hawkins et al., 2006).

3.1.4 Rewards for Measurable and Regime Compatible Programs

The Measurability Proposition

To sum up, actors in the democracy establishment prefer democracy assistance programs that are measurable using clear, neutral, and ideally quantitative indicators. Why? Aid recipients, or agents in the delegation chain, want to show their principals that they are meeting the principals’ objectives. Such a signal can best be sent by measurable programs, which demonstrate a program’s results in terms of a set of tangible, objective performance indicators. Supporting an institutional change, for example, usually sends a clearer, observable outcome signal to principals of an efficacious program than does supporting (perhaps covertly) dissidents. Programs that involve quantitative elements—such as the number of people trained or the number of women in parliament—are especially measurable.

It is important to underscore what measurability, as I use it in this project, does not refer to. As the National Research Council (2008) grappled with, there are practical, ethical, and methodological limitations that make it difficult to assess the causal impact of democracy assistance programs, whether qualitatively, quantitatively, or experimentally. Programs that I call measurable still face such limitations. But at least they have concrete indicators that measure their associated output, which are plausible if minimal barometers of success for government donors.

Anecdotes illustrate democracy assisters’ focus on measurability. When the Bush administration announced the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2002—a new foreign aid program meant to encourage and reward democratic and democratizing countries—considerable effort went into finding “clear and concrete” criteria that would identify countries that “govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom” (Girod, Krasner and Stoner-Weiss, 2009, 71). The criteria were designed to select countries to receive special development assistance. A country’s performance on the indicators would
be published, with public commentary invited, prior to the final selection. In the governance category, indicators from third party organizations (Freedom House and the World Bank Institute) were ultimately chosen. Although subjective and unmeasurable dimensions of democracy surely matter, they do not form clear signals for donor governments. Furthermore, they may appear political. Related studies of development aid also show that practitioners prefer to use technocratic and de-politicized language and measurements (Ferguson, 1990; Jackson, 2005; Dicther, 2003).

Does measurement truly represent a principal–agent problem? In order for a principal–agent problem to occur, the goals of the agents must conflict with the goals of the principals. Do measurable programs harm donors’ ultimate goal of effectively promoting democracy? I suggest that there are at least three drawbacks to measurable programs. First, as Carothers (1999, 291-293) explains, an emphasis on quantitative results and measurement in the democracy establishment can impede effective democracy promotion by promoting a distorted, myopic vision of what democratic progress looks like. In a USAID program in Cambodia in 1997, for example, he recounts an assessment that documented efforts that “exceeded expectations” on a set of pre-existing indicators, despite Cambodia’s democracy-thwarting coup earlier in the year (Carothers, 1999, 291). Second, developing and using quantitative measurement systems requires significant resources. When organizations in the democracy establishment spend less time and money hiring monitoring and evaluation consultants, they have more resources to spend conducting democracy assistance programs. Finally, some important programs (e.g., aid to political parties and dissidents) that are central to democracy promotion success stories are not readily measurable.

Indeed, many practitioners believe that crucial aspects of democracy are not measurable. Some people in the democracy establishment are “true believers” when it comes to measurability, in part as a result of the forces of professionalism that I discuss below.

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14Of course, measurement systems of some sort must play an important role in evaluating democracy assistance programs. My point, however, is simply that emphasizing cross-national quantitative indicators can harm donors’ goal of effectively promoting democracy.
Others view it as a necessary evil, something that can come at the expense of effective programs. One report states, for example, “measurement of the effect of democracy promotion projects on democratization is, in the words of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), ‘an overwhelming, if not impossible, task’” (Epstein, Serafino and Miko, 2007, 17). But promoting democracy in measurable ways secures funding, so even skeptical practitioners will do it. One former director of a USAID-funded project in the Balkans said:

I had to spend all this time with my staff figuring out from our own beneficiaries how many town hall meetings were held in village X to send to USAID in [our country] to send to USAID in Washington to send to Congress. And you think, ‘Oh my god, is this really how we measure impact? It’s so trivial and silly!’ But it’s what you have to do.15

These anecdotes suggest the tension between efficacy and measurement—which is time-consuming and may be easier to pursue through less effective programs—that arises from the principal–agent structure.

The Regime Compatibility Proposition

Democracy should also be promoted in ways that are at least partially compatible with the regimes of the countries where democracy promoters work. Regime compatible programs do not threaten the imminent political survival of the incumbent regime. If an authoritarian ruler blocks access to actors in the democracy establishment, they cannot attempt to foster democratic change there—nor can they obtain funding to do so. Thus, there are both principled and pragmatic reasons to choose regime compatible programs. Some support for the idea that democracy practitioners tend not to push too hard on pseudo-democrats comes from Kelley (2009, 782-783), who found that international election monitor reports treated countries that were improving after an authoritarian past leniently.

15Interview 39, with former director of USAID contractor organization, by telephone, June 14, 2010.
The rewards for leniency are real: Countries frequently block access to democracy practitioners. In 2006, for example, Russia attempted to curb international democracy promotion by passing a law to monitor local and foreign non-governmental organizations and that criticized foreign election monitors (Carothers, 2006, 55-57). Likewise, Blaydes (2011, 192-209) models a strategic interaction between the United States and Egypt in which Egypt can set the agenda for democracy promotion after considering the foreign actors’ preferences as a constraint. American diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks from the U.S. Embassies in Bahrain (2010) and Egypt (2007) confirm that high-level officials complain to the United States government about specific activities of organizations in the democracy establishment within their borders. Democracy practitioners therefore prefer to support practices and institutions that target countries will adopt or at least tolerate. Doing so allows them first, to obtain access, and second, to make some progress to show to funders. Practitioners again note the limitations of regime compatible programs, but view them as the “least worst” option.

Regime compatible forms of democracy assistance are closely connected to the post-Cold War phenomenon of “virtual democracies” or “competitive authoritarian regimes”: countries with some democratic institutions that still lack important political and civil liberties, peaceful transfers of power, or both (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). In such countries, institutions that seem democratic—including elections—can in fact be “instruments of authoritarian rule” (Scheller, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Pseudo-democrats’ willingness to make certain reforms or adopt certain practices influences the democracy establishment, such as when pseudo-democrats began inviting international elections observers and fostered an international norm now endorsed and enforced by the democracy establishment (Hyde, 2011a). At the same time, the democracy establishment’s preferences, such as

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its support of women’s political participation and gender quotas, may influence the political institutions and practices adopted by pseudo-democrats.

3.1.5 An Alternative Model of Delegation in Democracy Assistance

Yet the transnational delegation chain that dominates government-funded democracy assistance programs is not the only possible structure. A few non-governmental donors, such as the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the Ford, Mott, and MacArthur Foundations, also seek to promote democracy abroad through grants but delegate differently. Do they therefore support different types of democracy assistance programs? These counterfactual cases of democracy assistance funded outside of a democratic appropriations process help clarify this study’s argument about monitoring problems.

Figure 3.3 below illustrates the alternative model of delegation with another example from Jordan. Here, the Soros Foundation (also known as OSI) gave a grant to a Jordanian legal group (the Tamkeen Center for Human Rights and Legal Aid) that enabled lawyers to advocate for migrant workers’ rights. As in the previous example, the Jordanian government monitors the local organization. But there are two key differences in the delegation process. First, the donor is not a democratic government that is accountable to a skeptical public; instead, it is a private foundation financed by George Soros. Second, the delegation chain is much shorter. The single act of delegation and absence of a democratic appropriations process ameliorate the monitoring challenges that influence the choice of democracy assistance programs in the transnational delegation chain.

Since monitoring problems are alleviated, implementing organizations such as the Tamkeen Center in Figure 3.3 have first, fewer incentives to promote democracy in measurable ways to perform effectiveness for donors and second, less slack to promote democracy in regime compatible ways to generate access to host countries. On the first point, the delegation logic suggests that donors such as Congress and the National Endowment for Democracy in Figure 3.1 reward measurable programs in part because it is so hard for them to
Figure 3.3: **An Alternative Model of Delegation in Democracy Assistance.** Bottom row depicts delegation from the Soros Foundation to the implementing organization, the Tamkeen Center. Top row depicts the Jordanian government as a monitor.

monitor local implementing organizations such as the Al Quds Center. Although the Soros Foundation still faces difficulties when it tries to monitor the Tamkeen Center since the organizations are in different countries, the single act of delegation makes it easier for the Soros Foundation to observe the programs’ outputs and judge for itself how effective the programs were. As a consequence, the Soros Foundation is less likely to reward organizations that pursue measurable programs and the Tamkeen Center is therefore less likely to pursue such programs. Furthermore, the Soros Foundation’s preferences for measurable programs would be weaker than Congress’ even if its monitoring problems were identical. Since the Soros Foundation is a private foundation, a skeptical public cannot hold it accountable for funding democracy assistance. As a consequence, it worries less about demonstrating measurable results than elected officials in Congress do. In theory, one can imagine private foundations with strong preferences for measurable programs for idiosyncratic reasons, however, in practice, that seems not to be the case. Again, embedded in my claim that donors’ preferences over measurable programs can vary is the assumption that measurable programs, although they make monitoring easier, have some drawbacks (i.e., measurement systems are costly, certain desirable aspects of democracy are harder to promote through measurable programs). In my case studies, I provide evidence that donors do recognize such drawbacks.

On the second point, I assume that the Tamkeen Center in Figure 3.3 prefers to enact
programs that enhance access in Jordan as much as the Al Quds Center does in Figure 3.1. But again, because of the shorter delegation chain, the Soros Foundation finds it easier to monitor its agents than does Congress. As a consequence, the Tamkeen Center finds less slack to shift programs towards its preferences for regime compatible programs than the Al Quds Center does. Is this argument inconsistent with my previous claim that democratic donors generally lack preferences over strategies of democracy assistance—for example, about how best to promote civil society in Serbia? No; the key point is that donors “hire” aid recipients to promote democracy, not to obtain access to countries’ or to ensure their organizations’ survival. To the extent that democracy practitioners shift programs towards their own preferences—in other words, towards regime compatible programs that enhance access—there is indeed a principal–agent problem.

The stark comparison between the Congressional and Soros Foundation delegation processes helps illustrate the broader point that the extent to which there are incentives to promote democracy through measurable and regime compatible programs will depend on the structure of the delegation process. Measurable programs satisfy donors that want effective programs—but the easier the monitoring, the less donors will value quantitative, objective signals of programs’ success because it is easier for them to directly observe the programs. Likewise, government-funded projects are more likely to value measurement than privately funded projects given officials’ need to satisfy the “ultimate” principal, the public. Finally, regime compatible programs satisfy aid recipients that want to maintain access to pseudo-democratic countries—but the easier the monitoring, the less donors will allow aid recipients to pursue regime compatible programs that can cut against donors’ goals of effective programs.
3.2 The Democracy Establishment as a Profession

3.2.1 The Field of the Democracy Establishment

As democracy assistance grew, a network of people and organizations working in democracy assistance emerged with shared ideas about the appropriate institutions and practices for developing democracies. I call that network the democracy establishment. In the United States, it includes bureaus at USAID and the State Department, non-profit organizations such as Freedom House and the Carter Center, and for-profit contractors such as Chemonics and ARD. In Europe, the government-affiliated actors include Germany’s political party foundations (Stiftungen) and Britain’s Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The democracy establishment also includes offices at the major inter-governmental organizations, such as the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union, and the Council of Europe. Other inter-governmental organizations, such as International IDEA, are specifically focused on advancing democracy. Appendix C lists the 150 most important organizations in the field. In addition to serving as a general reference, the list later guides my case selection and interview sampling frame.

In calling the democracy establishment a field, I draw on the definition of sociologists DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 148). They argue that organizational fields comprise diverse organizations—including suppliers, producers, consumers, regulators, and advisors—that engage in common activities and produce similar products or services. Furthermore, the organizations in a field face similar reputational and regulatory pressures. The organizations in the democracy establishment form a field because they share goals of promoting democracy abroad and they participate in the same funding system: the transnational delegation chain. Fields emerge over time as organizations within the field interact more, patterns of hierarchy and coalition form, information flows increase, and organizations start to view

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17Melia (2006) has similarly discussed the “democracy bureaucracy.”

18This paragraph draws heavily on the summary of fields in Powell and Colyvas (2007).
themselves as part of a common enterprise. Such fields, such as the field of international commercial arbitration that Dezalay and Garth (1996, 15-16) studied, are both united by common ideals and also divided by market competition.

The democracy establishment, which is both a networked actor and also a networked structure, resembles other networks in world politics (Kahler, 2009, 3-7). First, it contains many government actors and, similar to members of a transgovernmental network, these actors promote professional norms and provide technical assistance. They do not, however, attempt to directly perform governance functions (Keohane and Nye, 1974; Slaughter, 2004, 14). Second, similar to transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the democracy establishment has a principled agenda: promoting democracy. In contrast to previous scholars (Scott, 1999; Mendelson, 2001), however, I argue that democracy assistance is not a “transnational issue network.” Rather, it is closely tied to state governments and its actors rely on expertise, not moral suasion. Finally, similar to an epistemic community, the democracy establishment is a professional network that provides advice and elucidates cause–effect relationships (Haas, 1992). The case of a politically-linked epistemic community—Keynesian economists—whose ideas served as a policy road map after a major historical break—World War II—parallels the democracy establishment’s post-Cold War influence (Ikenberry, 1993). But the democracy establishment initially derived its legitimacy in large part through the normative links between democracy, peace, development, and good governance, whereas epistemic communities do so through scientific consensus. Over time, the field has become more epistemic. Knowledge has accumulated that is not just instrumental, such as from the influential research conducted by Carothers, Diamond, McFaul, Ottaway, and Zakaria.

Today, the democracy establishment’s members share common normative and cause–effect beliefs. As scholar–practitioner Mitchell (2009, 15) puts it, “an essentially similar battery of democracy promotion programs” is pursued across the globe.\(^\text{19}\) As previous

\(^{19}\text{See also Chapter 5 in Carothers (1999) on the “democracy template.”}\)
research shows, this observation holds for programs funded by the United States, Europe, Canada, and international organizations alike (Magen and McFaul, 2009; Börzel and Risse, 2009; Huber, 2008; Youngs and Wittes, 2009). In the framework of Goldstein and Keohane (1993, 8-10), the democracy establishment’s ideas fall into the categories of both world views and also causal beliefs. Although there are many definitions of democracy, a common approach—focusing on the rule of law, elections, civil society, governance, women’s participation, and local political development—has emerged. The definition used by USAID and the State Department is typical: “Democracy programs promote the rule of law and human rights, transparent and fair elections coupled with a competitive political process, a free and independent media, stronger civil society and greater citizen participation in government, and governance structures that are efficient, responsive, and accountable.”

To use the terms of Carothers (2009a), democracy assistance programs are converging on “developmental” (rather than “political”) approaches that treat democratization as an incremental, broad process. The field’s common beliefs are not only encouraged but enforced through tests, such as the one election observers must take before heading into the field (Coles, 2007, 238).

If the democracy establishment is increasingly like an epistemic community, why don’t its members seek to reform their home countries based on their knowledge and experiences? They do, in fact, although funding for them to work at home is scarce. Two examples will suffice. First, Jeff Merritt worked at USAID-funded democratization programs in Croatia, Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, and East Timor, but returned to New York City in 2005 to found Grassroots Initiative, an elections-consulting firm. Grassroots Initiative works in three areas—civic education, election assistance, and local

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20 Of course, there are some differences, especially rhetorically; for example, European programs advocate eliminating the death penalty whereas American programs do not. See Kopstein (2006) for a discussion.

good governance—that are familiar to professionals in the democracy establishment. The Center for Democracy and Election Management at American University in Washington, D.C. is likewise co-directed by George Guess and Robert Pastor, two longtime veterans of democracy assistance who worked previously for OSI, DAI, and the Carter Center, among others. The Center’s mission “is to provide education, research, and public engagement on the full range of democracy issues in the United States and around the world.” Its United States-based activities include monitoring an election in Indiana and proposing reforms to the United States’ electoral laws.

That the democracy establishment today shares common ideas about promoting democracy is puzzling for at least four reasons. First, in many policy areas, experts disagree about the best ways to achieve a goal. Even in cases of politically influential expert consensus, such as among the Anglo-American Keynesian economists after World War II, the consensus is often momentary and contains many divisions (Ikenberry, 1993). Second, research on foreign aid finds considerable differences in aid giving patterns across bilateral donors (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) and between bilateral and multilateral donors (Milner, 2006). We would therefore expect American, European, Canadian, and other international democracy promotion efforts to differ, and indeed there is some evidence that initially they once did (Crawford, 2001, 66-85). Third, in contrast to some writings about the export of democracy (Barany and Moser, 2009; Schraeder, 2002), people in the democracy establishment commonly promote practices and institutions that donors do not pursue themselves. Elections in developing democracies, for example, should be managed by independent electoral management bodies and monitored by international observers—rare occurrences in developed democracies. Finally, earlier models of American democracy assistance were different from today’s model, which suggests it was uncertain. They used more ad hoc and overtly political strategies, such as overhauling countries’ educational systems and promot-


ing economic justice (Smith, 1994, 18, 45, 169).

3.2.2 Competition and Norms in the Democracy Establishment

According to the classic definition of Wilensky (1964, 138), a profession is defined by two characteristics: “(1) The job of the professional is technical—based on systematic knowledge or doctrine acquired only through long prescribed training. (2) The professional man adheres to a set of professional norms” (emphases in original).

Two processes of professionalization, which follow the predictions of two canonical sociological theories of organizations, fostered common ideas over time within the democracy establishment. On the one hand, Weber (1978 (1922)) expected organizations to become more homogenous because of market competition and the resulting demands for efficiency. On the other hand, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) explained that contemporary organizations can become more homogenous while not necessarily becoming more competitive because of desires for political power and legitimacy. The democracy establishment involves both processes. Competition for funding encourages learning and adaptive change, while normative pressure spreads standards and ideas. The resulting shared values, measures, and expectations serve functions in an organizational field. Thus, international democracy assistance programs in the transnational delegation chain have converged on measurable and regime compatible programs across countries over time (the Convergence Proposition).

It is worth noting that the field’s professionalization has alienated some of the field’s pioneers, who express dismay at the bureaucratization of their idealistic movement. One interviewee said: “Democracy assistance has become like economic development assistance, where building democracy is treated like building a bridge—it’s something that today we think there aren’t too many ways to do well.”24 Others generally approve, since techni-

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24Interview 30, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., September 16, 2009. Another interviewee said: “Because of the funding structure, the whole field has to be very technical, but these are fundamentally political processes…But they [organizations’ leaders] have to watch the organization’s future and the money. This is political work—or at least it should be.” Interview 40, with former director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, New York, N.Y., May 26, 2010.
cal expertise and common ideas foster efficiency and learning. Still, one such interviewee noted: “Our organizations are normal organizations and they operate out of their own self-interest. The sense of mission and idealism has been lost.”

**Competition**

First, a Weberian process of competitive learning has winnowed the democracy establishment’s programs. Many leaders in the field started as idealistic volunteers “specializing in ad-hoc-ery” who were ignorant of democracy assistance before they stumbled into it. Now, entrants to the field studied development and democracy in college or graduate school. As one interviewee put it, “When we started, we were just all pro-bono volunteers. But professionalism is needed now since it’s a business with a lot of money involved.”

The large rise over time in the amount of money spent by Western governments on democracy assistance encouraged more organizations to enter the field and heightened competition. Democracy assisters have learned, both in terms of effecting democratic change and also in terms of attaining funding. The organizations that survived successfully adapted their programs.

Competition focused democracy practitioners on measurement, monitoring, and evaluation, which reinforced the structural incentives towards measurability. Evaluations of democracy assistance often lack rigor (Bollen, Paxton and Morishima, 2005; Brown, 2009). But demonstrating the efficacy of democracy assistance remains a key concern of donors, who sponsor public hearings and reports on evaluations (National Research Council, 2008; Green and Kohl, 2007). Competitive organizations will thus promote democracy in measurable ways. As Nuti (2005, 87), a former practitioner, put it, organizations artfully perform a “democracy dance,” repeating the same steps and success stories in order to “curry favor with donors.” Neutral, professional standards furthermore helped democracy assistance organizations survive in the competition for government funding after the Cold War ended.

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The field’s short-term projects (usually one or two years) further encouraged competitive learning. Cooley and Ron (2002) found that competition for aid contracts among international NGOs in Kyrgyzstan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Bosnia fostered opportunistic adaptations. A similar process occurs within democracy assistance. Actors in the democracy establishment can quickly replicate models that they see succeed elsewhere. USAID, for example, in Serbia wanted to “use community development activities to build trust between different ethnic groups, to demonstrate the value of citizen participation, to support grassroots democratic action and to bring immediate improvement to people’s lives.” The director chose an approach that had previously been used in Lebanon and Kosovo (Merritt, 2006, 29-30). The concentration of democracy assisters in post-conflict countries (Paris, 2004) especially fosters learning through informal communication and coordination. A good idea for a local political development project might come over dinner with other “internationals,” where “you’ll see five people you’ve worked with from Kenya, Liberia, and Indonesia.”

Blowback from the regimes of host countries also fostered competitive learning in the democracy establishment, as in the case of detecting electoral fraud (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009).

Organizations’ directors readily note how funding competition affects their programs. They seek out the regions, countries, and topics where funding is available. In an ethnographic study of democracy assistance in Armenia, Ishkanian (2008, 146) quotes both international and domestic NGO leaders calling each other “grant chasers,” “grantrepreneurs,” and even “prostitutes.” One of my interviewees, for example, returned to the United States after promoting democracy abroad and is the head of an organization that works on elections, preferably in the United States. But he has virtually abandoned that mission in favor of working abroad. He explained: “That’s [the United States] where we’d all like to do our

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27Henderson (2002, 153-154) also observes this phenomenon in her study of democracy assistance in Russia.

28Interview 39, with former director of USAID contractor organization, by telephone, June 14, 2010.
work. That’s where we think we need the work most. But there’s no money for that. What are we doing in the Middle East? Well, that’s where the money is.”

Norms

At the same time as competitive learning has fostered convergence in the democracy establishment, so have norms. Professionalization within the democracy establishment has spread and institutionalized what the field has learned. Two characteristics of the democracy establishment sped up its professionalization. First, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 155) predicted mimetic processes in fields that, like the democracy establishment, rely on few funding sources and interact often with the state. In many cases, donor governments prefer to work with professional recipient organizations, which gives those organizations an instrumental reason to adapt. Second, as noted above, democracy assistance’s short-term contracts involve frequent turnover, or transfers of people across organizations and countries (Coles, 2007, 24, 42). Turnover fosters normative isomorphism since it cross-fertilizes ideas and practices across organizations. For example, the community development project mentioned above moved from Lebanon to Serbia and Kosovo in 2001 with the USAID mission director (Merritt, 2006, 30). Thus, the funding structure and short-term contracts of democracy assistance also fostered the field’s professionalization.

Professionals, and their institutions, share a cognitive base about the appropriate practices and structures of work in their field (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 905). Today, there exists a multi-national group of experts in managing elections, supporting political parties, fostering independent media, and so on. Wedel (2001, 89-92) describes, for example, American political consultants and media pollsters traveling on an East European circuit of Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Moscow, and Kiev to lead workshops on topics such as “How to Use the Post Office in a Political Campaign.” As Chapter 2 illustrated, profes-

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30 See Autesserre (2009) for a related analysis of the organizational field of international peacekeeping.
sionals in the democracy establishment also promote and support gender quotas around the world, which they favored for several principled and pragmatic reasons.

During the field’s early days, an American union activist, journalist, lawyer, or political operative might enter the field in order to help an international counterpart. Although professionals still enter the field from such backgrounds, experience as a journalist or in a political party at home is increasingly required for promoting independent media or political parties abroad. Instead, democracy assistance is a field in its own right. Associations, links with universities, and an elite spread and reinforce the democracy establishment’s body of knowledge, as is typical for professions (DiMaggio, 1991). Georgetown University, for example, now offers a Master’s Degree in Democracy and Governance Studies for “those seeking academic or policy careers in the field of democracy assistance and governance reform.”

Through such programs, experts introduce novices to the field. Conferences—such as NED’s World Movement for Democracy—also diffuse common values and ideas.

Professional norms transmit democracy assistance strategies across countries. Regime compatible democracy assistance programs may succeed at gaining access to competitive authoritarian regimes and thus at getting funding in the transnational delegation chain. Yet over time, practitioners may start to normatively value such programs. Regime compatible forms of democracy assistance, such as supporting women’s political participation, can assume a taken-for-granted, appropriate quality that encourages democracy establishment practitioners to use them even in less restrictive contexts. The means become the ends. Here, I share the interest of Meyer et al. (1997) in studying accepted global models of statehood and attempt to offer a micro-political account of the origins of such models.

Ishkanian (2008, 71) documents the phenomenon of means-becoming-ends in her case study of a USAID-funded anti-domestic violence campaign in Armenia that World Learning implemented. This project supported broader American attempts to build civil society

31See http://www1.georgetown.edu/departments/democracyandgovernance/programs/madg/ (accessed February 12, 2010). Creating indicators is itself an indication of the field’s professionalization (Merry, 2009).
in Armenia at the start of the twenty-first century. Local NGOs got involved with the program in order to get funding. One leader said: “The donors announced the funding proposal and everyone thought, ‘Why not, we can work on this.’” But the campaign took root and NGO leaders came to firmly believe in the cause. An NGO leader said in 2003:

In 2001 domestic violence was a new problem in Armenia. . . . None of us could comprehend the problem. I too did not accept it. When World Learning announced the grant programme, we did some research to see whether the problem existed and sadly we found out that domestic violence does exist in Armenia. So we decided to work on it by taking into account our national mentalitet (mentality) and traditions. Our goal was to prevent family conflict.32

In this way, organizations may pursue programs because of instrumental benefits, but eventually come to appreciate and care about the programs themselves.

To conclude, the democracy establishment’s convergence on measurable and regime compatible programs follows a pattern of organizational goal displacement familiar to sociologists. Warner and Havens (1968, 539) defined goal displacement as when “the major goals claimed by the organization are neglected in favor of goals associated with building or maintaining the organization.”33 They predict an organization’s means to become its ends when it pursues vague and complex goals. Like “helping people become better citizens, developing greater community integration or stronger community spirit, [or] developing attitudes and skills of cooperation,” “promoting democracy” is an important but vague organizational goal (Warner and Havens, 1968, 541). Thus, organizations that seek goals such as “fostering the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world” are likely candidates for goal displacement.34

32Quoted in Ishkanian (2008, 71).
33See also Merton (1940) and Blau (1955) for classic treatments of goal displacement.
34This quote is from is the mission of the NED. See http://www.ned.org/about (accessed June 1, 2011). See Carpenter (2005) on goal displacement in related international humanitarian projects.
Yet the original goals linger. I do not expect the democracy establishment to completely reject non-measurable and regime incompatible programs even when organizations receive most of their funding through the transnational delegation chain. Why didn’t organizations immediately respond to the structural incentives to promote democracy through measurable and regime compatible programs? Why aren’t such programs all that we see today? The answers to both questions lie in the particular blend of ideals and self-interest in the democracy establishment that this section discussed. Pro-bono volunteers specializing in ad-hoc-ery in the early days of democracy assistance did their work because they cared about fostering democratic change. Even if today’s professionals are less idealistic, they still care about their organizations’ missions and many of the early idealists retain leadership roles in the profession. Although competition and norms pressured the democracy establishment to respond increasingly to the structural incentives in the transnational delegation over time, some of the idealism remains. Democracy assistance programs must still promote democracy.

An alternative point of view, which treats actors in the democracy establishment as solely funding-driven (rather than partially mission-driven and partially-funding driven) will be tested against my argument empirically. If people in the democracy establishment care only about funding, in conditions of weak monitoring, they should not pursue any non-measurable, non-regime compatible programs because there is no funding or access incentive to do so. In fact, we shall see that actors in the democracy establishment continue to pursue some forms of non-measurable, non-regime compatible programs owing to their continued (if lessened) commitment to their ideals.

3.3 Hypotheses About Democracy Assistance

My two-pronged argument about democracy assistance generates four predictions about the programs that a donor in a given year sends to a country. It also suggests several additional
observable implications that should be true if the theory is correct. Table 3.1 at the end of the section summarizes those hypotheses. In Section 3.4, I present alternative hypotheses drawn from the foreign aid literature.

First, actors in the democracy establishment should choose democracy assistance programs that match the funding structure’s incentives. Long transnational delegation chains with severe monitoring problems create incentives for agents to pursue measurable programs. Such programs make it easier for donors to monitor how effective their agents’ programs are when information is limited, and so donors are more likely to fund them. Delegation processes with fewer monitoring problems, however, make it easier for donors to monitor their agents and so donors are less likely to reward measurable programs. There are a number of ways that we might measure the extent of monitoring problems, including the length of the delegation chain, the physical proximity of the principal and the agent, the involvement of multilateral organizations, and the involvement of private (as opposed to public) donor organizations. I turn to these issues of measurement in subsequent chapters. For now, it suffices to say that the harder the monitoring is for donors, the more measurable programs pay for aid recipients.

**Hypothesis 1:** The harder it is for donors to monitor their agents, the more measurable the programs that will result, all else equal.

Second, actors in the democracy establishment choose programs that help them gain or maintain access to the host countries. Such programs are regime compatible—they do not threaten the imminent political survival of the incumbent regime, and so they are unlikely to face legal or extralegal restrictions. If authoritarian rulers ban access to actors in the democracy establishment, those actors cannot make progress in promoting democracy, nor can they obtain funding, which they need to survive. Democracy practitioners therefore have both normative and strategic reasons to promote practices and institutions that their host countries seem willing to adopt or at least tolerate. When the delegation process involves harder monitoring problems, it is more difficult for donors to monitor their agents.
As a consequence, the agents are more likely to shift the programs towards their preferred types: regime compatible programs. When the delegation process involves fewer monitoring problems, it is easier for donors to monitor their agents and so less regime compatible programs will result.

*Hypothesis 2:* The harder it is for donors to monitor their agents, the more regime compatible the programs that will result, all else equal.

Third, drawing on a more sociological logic, I expect that actors in the democracy establishment will promote democracy in increasingly similar ways over time because of processes of competition and professionalization. Competition over time focused organizations on the measurable and regime compatible programs that work well given the field’s funding structure. Short-term contracts and more money at stake especially fostered competitive learning. At the same time, professionalization within the democracy establishment spread and institutionalized ideas about how to promote democracy such that they became taken-for-granted. Frequent turnover, concentrations of practitioners in post-conflict countries, and the rise of professional associations and links with universities all fostered professional norms. Professionalization has also created shared standards, which make programs measurable. Thus, as a consequence of both normative and competitive processes, actors in the democracy establishment converged over time on measurable and regime compatible programs across all countries. As is typical in processes of learning and diffusion (Simmons and Elkins, 2004, 174), however, I expect that the growth over time of relatively measurable programs will likely level off eventually.\(^{35}\) Although time is not a true causal variable—rather, it proxies for increasing professionalism—I expect it to be associated with more measurable and regime compatible programs.

*Hypothesis 3:* Over time, the proportion of democracy assistance that is spent on relatively measurable programs in a country–year will grow, all else equal.

\(^{35}\)In developing their argument about the “threshold model of international policy adoption,” Simmons and Elkins draw on earlier models by Granovetter (1978) and Schelling (1978).
Hypothesis 4: Over time, the proportion of democracy assistance that is spent on relatively regime compatible programs in a country–year will grow, all else equal.

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<td>(High Professionalism)</td>
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Table 3.1: Summary of Theoretical Expectations. How measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are depends on how easy it is for principals to monitor agents and how professional the democracy establishment is.

In addition to these hypotheses about variations in democracy assistance across countries and over time, there are six additional observable implications that should be true if the theory is correct. I take up these observable implications in my case studies. First, the argument assumes that there is funding competition in the democracy establishment. If actors in the democracy establishment do not compete for funding, they will lack incentives to design programs in ways that are measurable and regime compatible. Second, organizations in the democracy establishment should worry about demonstrating programs’ efficacy. If generating results to show to their principals is trivial, then the principal–agent argument is not plausible. Third, NGOs in the democracy establishment should feel conflict between their ideals and their incentives to please both their principals and their host governments. Such tensions are crucial if these actors are both idealists and pragmatists as the argument posits. Fourth, donors as well as aid recipients should be able to identify similarities in strategies across donors in the transnational delegation chain. Local NGOs that apply to funders should not view American, European, and other international donors as prioritizing similar types of programs. Fifth, the people that work in the democracy establishment today should share newly-created professional norms, identities, and ideas. They should cite professional expertise, rather than the characteristics of the countries where they work.
or the preferences of donors, when justifying their choice of programs. Finally, the network structure of the democracy establishment should contain many connections between donors and aid recipients, fewer connections among aid recipients, and tight connections between donors. Such a structure would support the development of a profession based around principal–agent interactions.

3.4 Alternative Perspectives on Democracy Assistance

What else could be driving variations and convergence in international democracy assistance programs over time and across countries? Students of foreign aid have long debated the factors that drive foreign aid allocation. The two main perspectives from that literature—which emphasize governments’ political and economic interests and target countries’ needs and characteristics, respectively—both could plausibly explain variations in terms of how measurable and regime compatible international democracy assistance programs are. I present each perspective in turn. Table 3.2 at the end of the section summarizes the empirical predictions of those perspectives.

The hypotheses presented in this section may be regarded both as complements to the principal–agent hypotheses and also as alternatives. Some of them could be true at the same time as the principal–agent and sociological hypotheses are true; still, they should be addressed in the empirical analysis lest we risk omitted variable bias. The hypotheses could, however, also explain the same empirical outcomes as the principal–agent and sociological argument. If the countries that receive democracy assistance have changed over time (either because of different selection procedures or internal political change), for example, then the foreign aid hypotheses offer alternative explanations for the over time variation in democracy assistance.

An additional perspective in the foreign aid allocation literature that I do not directly evaluate in this project emphasizes the domestic politics of foreign aid. In a study of the
United States Congress, Milner and Tingley (2010) found that representatives’ left–right ideology and local political economic concerns significantly affected their votes on development aid. But unlike foreign economic aid, support for democracy assistance does not tend to fall along left–right ideological lines (Holsti, 2000; Bjornlund, 2004, 20-27). Furthermore, democracy assistance does not mobilize a domestic interest group other than the democracy establishment, in contrast with foreign economic aid, which sends American goods overseas and thus mobilizes manufacturers.

Is it plausible to view the democracy establishment as a lobbying group that effectively pressures political leaders to fund democracy assistance? Some parts of the democracy establishment do maintain strong political connections; the best examples are the Stiftungen and the National Endowment for Democracy, with its board of Washington, D.C. insiders. But actors in the democracy establishment are geographically dispersed, and to the extent that they are American, they are largely based in Washington, D.C., where they cannot form a major voting bloc. Furthermore, there is considerable evidence (as presented in Figure 3.2) that political elites generally support democracy promotion and have done so since before the democracy establishment existed. Furthermore, democracy assistance is part of a much broader democracy promotion toolbox that has gained prominence since the end of the Cold War, not just in the United States but worldwide. In the end, the most plausible alternative explanations for democracy assistance patterns derive from donor governments’ political and economic interests and target countries’ needs and characteristics.

### 3.4.1 Donor Countries’ Preferences

Donor governments can have preferences over both measurable programs and regime compatible programs. Although donors’ preferences play an important role in the two-pronged

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36 The NED has in fact been criticized as a “pork barrel for a small circle of Republican and Democratic party activists, conservative trade unionists and free marketeers who use the endowment money to run their own mini-State Departments.” See David Corn, “Beltway Bandits: Better Dead than NED,” *The Nation*, July 12, 1993, 56-57.
argument I developed above, their preferences largely matter in terms of how they play out in a principal–agent context of informational asymmetry. First, donors reward measurable programs more when the delegation chain is long and monitoring is difficult. Second, donors do not prefer regime compatible programs but their preference matters less when agents have more slack. This argument suggests the possibility that high-level American foreign policy can sometimes be at odds with democracy assistance programs since the agents who implement the programs have autonomy. Mitchell (2009, 4) provides some evidence of this tension in his case study of American democracy assistance in Georgia’s Rose Revolution. In 2003, the United States government was disillusioned with President Shevardnadze, but viewed him as a friend in the Iraq War and even as a reformer. At the same time, American democracy assistance played an important role in enabling Georgian dissidents to mobilize in November 2003 after fraudulent elections. The bloodless Rose Revolution eventually forced Shevardnadze to resign. Still, despite this anecdote and others like it, donors’ ideological and strategic motives could affect how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are on average.

First, donors’ ideologies may determine how strongly they prefer measurable programs. Hood (1998) has discussed the rise of New Public Management in the 1980s and 1990s, a movement that sought to bring efficiency, transparency, and measurable outcomes to the public sector. According to this perspective, developed by Hopgood (2008, 105) with respect to humanitarian organizations, perhaps any rise that we see in measurable democracy assistance programs over time is simply in response to donors’ rising preferences for measurement. To the extent that this perspective is true, we would expect key turning points in public management—such as 1993’s Government Performance and Results Act in the United States—to be watersheds for democracy assistance programs. We would also expect some movement away from the emphasis on measurement in the 2000s as the New Public Management movement receded.\footnote{On the movement away from new public management, see Dunleavy et al. (2005).}
Second, donors’ geo-strategic relationships with host countries could drive their preferences for regime compatible programs rather than local NGOs preferring such programs for access reasons. Many scholars have concluded that donor governments’ political and economic concerns drive bilateral foreign aid allocation (McKinlay and Little, 1977; Schraeder, Hook and Taylor, 1998). In a major study, Alesina and Dollar (2000) found that donor and recipient states’ similarities in UN voting patterns and shared colonial legacies mattered significantly more for aid allocation patterns than did the recipient countries’ levels of economic openness and democracy, two traits associated with recipients’ ability to use aid effectively. In addition to using aid as a reward for past behavior, donors also can use it to buy influence or to obtain future policy concessions from recipients (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009). Donors send more aid to countries where foreign influence matters most. The trend holds not just for bilateral donors; Winters (2010b, 444-450) found that the World Bank also takes strategic interests into account, as does the International Monetary Fund (Stone, 2004).

Since democracy assistance has explicitly political goals, donors interests’ could easily drive its allocation. As with foreign aid, donors may favor states with common alliances, similar voting patterns at the United Nations, shared colonial ties, and military value. They may also seek to gain access to markets or resources. To reward or buy off such countries, donors can send relatively more regime compatible democracy assistance programs. Wittes (2008) criticizes, for example, democracy assistance programs to American allies in the Middle East that seem to intentionally promote the regimes’ stability. Three mechanisms could translate into more regime compatible programs in strategically aligned countries. First, donor governments could monitor democracy assistance in geo-strategically important countries more closely. Second, the leaders of geo-strategically important countries may feel sufficiently secure to prevent more threatening types of democracy assistance from operating. Finally, anticipating both constraints but without direct pressure, actors in the democracy establishment may choose pursue regime compatible programs. I probe for
these different mechanisms in the case study chapters.

3.4.2 Target Countries’ Characteristics

An alternative perspective suggests that variations in foreign aid flows can be explained by target countries’ characteristics. Indeed, Lumsdaine (1993) found that humanitarian ideals best explain donors’ foreign aid policies. Foreign aid changed significantly after the end of the Cold War (Arvin, 2002, 28), and some scholars argue that the humanitarian rationale for aid became stronger (Wright and Winters, 2010, 63-65). Using disaggregated foreign aid data from 2000 to 2005, Bermeo (2008) showed that OECD donors were genuinely (albeit not necessarily altruistically) committed to fostering development in poor countries. Especially in aid sectors that require recipient government involvement, donors conditioned aid on the quality of recipient governance, which determines how well the aid will be used. Furthermore, donors conditioned aid on recipient countries’ needs, as measured by the presence of natural disasters and the number of refugees.

Rational donors and aid recipients may also consider target countries’ needs or capacities when designing democracy assistance programs. Along these lines, Scott and Steele (2005, 2011) argue that democracy assistance is targeted and tailored to target countries’ regime types. To use the language of Carothers (1999, 6), the types of projects that would “foster a democratic opening in a nondemocratic country” likely differ from the ones that would “further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening.”38 Elections aid may suit consolidating and transitioning democracies; civil society aid may suit non-democracies. Furthermore, since authoritarian states seek to prohibit destabilizing democracy assistance programs, they could block regime incompatible programs that more democratic states would allow. We might therefore expect a curvilinear relationship between democracy levels and regime compatible democracy assistance: Highly authoritarian states (e.g., Syria and North Korea) restrict all democracy assistance programs, so

38 Carothers (1999, 339) in fact criticized democracy practitioners for using a “one-size-fits-all” approach.
whatever the international community manages to (perhaps covertly) support there will likely challenge the regimes; moderately authoritarian states allow some democracy assistance programs, but not regime incompatible ones; and transitional democracies will allow both regime compatible and regime incompatible programs. As I discuss more fully in the empirical chapters, the type of authoritarian regime—for example in the typology proposed by Geddes (1999b), single-party, personalistic, or military—could also affect the programs used.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Measurable Programs</strong></td>
<td>Donors’ Preferences</td>
<td>Target Countries’ Characteristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase with preference for measurability</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regime Compatible Programs</strong></td>
<td>Increase with strategic ties to host country</td>
<td>Curvilinear with host countries’ democracy levels</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2: Alternative Explanations from the Foreign Aid Literature. Donors countries’ preferences and host countries’ characteristics could also explain how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are.

Table 3.2 summarizes the perspectives from the foreign aid literature. They will be tested against my argument’s hypotheses using statistical analyses and case studies in the coming chapters. I note that although my dissertation seeks to explain the composition of democracy assistance in a given country–year, an analysis of democracy assistance might also explore the determinants of the amount of democracy assistance received in a country–year. My argument does not make predictions about variations in amounts of democracy assistance, but the foreign aid literature does. Since the primary aim of my dissertation is not to explain the amount of democracy assistance received by countries, I largely set this question aside for future research.

### 3.5 Conclusion

In the past twenty-five years, an international network emerged that promotes democracy overseas in particular—and puzzling—ways. Because of the principal–agent structure of
democracy assistance, and the professionalization of its associated field, there is now a common template for democracy assistance. That template can be understood in terms of the incentives created by the lengthy transnational delegation chain in democracy assistance. On one end of the chain, a democratic appropriations process in donor governments constrains democracy practitioners. On the other end of the chain, pseudo-democratic leaders in the target countries do so. Because of the incentives that the delegation chain creates, the international approach to democracy assistance today involves promoting democracy in ways that are measurable using quantitative indicators and that are compatible with the regimes of host countries. Competition and norms have spread and locked in that approach over time. I derived testable hypotheses from the argument that I contrasted with hypotheses drawn from the foreign aid literature. Part II of this dissertation turns to empirically testing this argument using multiple research methods.
Chapter 4

Classifying Democracy Assistance Programs

This dissertation requires a considerable amount of descriptive inference, the process that uses “observations from the world to learn about other unobserved facts” (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994, 8). I claimed that many of today’s democracy assistance programs are not designed in ways that will foster short- or even medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels; instead, practitioners prioritize programs that are measurable and regime compatible, sometimes at the expense of effective democracy promotion. Before testing my explanation for this phenomenon against alternative ones, as I do in the subsequent chapters, it is necessary to first explain how I classify democracy assistance programs. What categories does democracy assistance fall into? Which categories are generally measurable, regime compatible, neither, or both?

This brief chapter answers each question in turn. Section 4.1 offers a typology of democracy assistance programs, which I argue can be divided into twenty categories. These categories fit loosely into the overall sectors of civil society, elections and political processes, governance, and the rule of law. Section 4.2 turns to the issue of which categories are generally measurable and which are not. I argue that categories should be consid-
erred measurable if quantitative indicators exist that measure the program’s desired output and thus make it possible to assess the country’s progress on that dimension. I furthermore show that funders in the democracy establishment use such indicators to help them measure the efficacy of programs. Nine categories are measurable. Section 4.3 examines which categories are generally regime compatible and which are not. I argue that regime compatible programs do not threaten the imminent survival of incumbent regimes in target countries. The twelve categories that I consider regime compatible according to this definition generally do not foster political competition and do not mobilize independent groups that are likely to challenge the regime. Section 4.4 concludes by discussing some of the limitations of the classification scheme developed in this chapter and how I try to overcome those limitations in the empirical chapters.

It is important to note at the outset that although I devote considerable effort to justifying my classification scheme in this chapter, any classification of democracy assistance projects into categories and any grouping of such categories into “measurable” and “regime compatible” sets will retain some subjectivity. Some categories are more clear-cut in how measurable or regime compatible they are than other categories; this observation is not necessarily problematic since I can in fact leverage it in the subsequent empirical analysis. Yet even in the clearer cases, some readers might point out, for example, that a program in a category that I classified as not regime compatible could be designed in a regime compatible way. They are likely correct. But the goal of this exercise in descriptive inference is to determine how measurable and regime compatible certain types of programs generally are relative to other types of democracy assistance programs. Such a goal does allow us to make inferential progress and it is to that goal that I now turn.
4.1 A Typology of Democracy Assistance Programs

USAID and other organizations in the field of democracy assistance typically sort projects into four sectors: civil society; elections and political processes; governance; and rule of law. Civil society projects, which aid non-governmental organizations in various areas (including business, labor, women, and youth), pursue “increased development of a politically active civil society.” Elections and political processes projects support elections and political parties and encourage “more genuine and competitive political processes.” Governance projects, which may be local or national, foster “more transparent and accountable government institutions.” Rule of law projects, which include human rights projects as well as legal aid, “strengthen rule of law and human rights” (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, 2007, 406-407).

I develop a novel classification scheme that subdivides projects within the four well-established sectors into twenty total categories, which Table 4.1 summarizes. Thus, I can examine not just an “elections and political processes” project, but more specifically projects that support elections, legislative assistance, political parties, or women’s political participation. Such projects have diverse goals and so a more fine-grained approach makes sense. Using the twenty disaggregated categories allows me to properly test my argument since, as I discuss below, different categories within the same sector can be more or less measurable and regime compatible. Table 4.2 at the end of the chapter provides short descriptions of each category.

According to my interviews and primary source documents, these twenty categories reflect their ordinary language use in the democracy establishment, which should promote their external validity (Fearon and Laitin, 2000).\textsuperscript{1} They reflect substantive types of democ-

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<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>Business and Enterprise</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civic Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civil Society (Residual Category)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dissidents and Intellectuals</td>
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<td>Media</td>
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<td>Research</td>
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<td>Trade Unions</td>
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<td>Women’s Groups</td>
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<td>Youth Groups</td>
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<td>Elections and Political Processes</td>
<td>Elections</td>
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<td>Legislative Assistance</td>
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<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td>Women’s Political Participation</td>
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<td>Governance</td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>Local Governance</td>
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<td>Rule of Law</td>
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<td>Human Rights</td>
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<td>Legal Systems</td>
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Table 4.1: **Summary of Categories of Democracy Assistance.** The four sectors are as defined by USAID; the twenty categories are as defined by the author.

Democracy assistance and have been pursued in all regions of the world. Some donors do not pursue all twenty categories of democracy assistance, and others may label a category differently (e.g., referring to “legal systems” programs as “rule of law” programs). Still, the categories are familiar to all practitioners in the democracy establishment and represent common areas of work.

In subsequent chapters, I use these categories to code democracy assistance projects by hand and also to map existing coding schemes onto my own. To be clear, each democracy assistance project falls into a single category. Certain projects in fact combine elements of more than one category in their work, such as a project designed to support free and fair elections in a target country by supporting international and domestic monitors that also includes some educational training sessions for journalists who wish to cover the upcoming election. Yet the primary purpose of such a hypothetical project remains
discernible: It seeks to improve a country’s elections. An ordinal scale of democracy assistance projects would provide interesting information by allowing us to consider the aforementioned project as, say, 80 percent elections and 20 percent media. Yet a categorical typology offers a number of advantages, not the least of which is its simplicity and practical clarity. It would be difficult, in the absence of detailed project budgets, to decide exactly how to code the sub-components of projects. Furthermore, the categorical typology fits the way that projects are themselves classified by OECD donors and that practitioners conceive of them. Finally, it makes sense from a research design perspective to code projects in this way since, for example, donors could become more or less likely to over time to combine more than one aim into the same project, thus making it more difficult to make causal inferences about changes in democracy assistance over time.

4.2 Which Categories are Generally Measurable?

I define measurable democracy assistance programs as programs that have an associated impact on a target country’s political practices or institutions that can measured using quantitative (or otherwise clear and objective) indicators. It is important to note that just because I classify a democracy assistance program as measurable does not mean that the causal impact of the program is easy to establish—it is not. The National Research Council (2008, 6) noted that causal inferences about the impact of democracy assistance on democracy levels are difficult to make for multiple reasons, including missing and incomplete data problems, disagreement over the appropriate evaluation criteria, and methodological issues such as selection bias. Still, at least categories of democracy assistance that are defined as measurable have quantitative, country-level indicators that can document the country’s progress in that category and thus hold out the possibility of demonstrating effectiveness.

I define measurable programs in this way because actors in the democracy establish-

2For some discussion of these and related issues, see Collier, LaPorte and Seawright (2012).
ment can use quantitative, country-level indicators as concrete, credible signals of progress to donor governments. An improvement in a country’s Freedom of the Press rating by Freedom House would plausibly document the success of a media strengthening program for the United States government in Washington, D.C. In contrast, aid to dissidents is often done covertly, which makes monitoring and reporting to Congress difficult. Even if monitoring is possible for such a program, its impact is hard to identify short of a revolution sparked by foreign-funded dissidents, and even then donors may not observe a clear or direct causal link between the aid programs they funded and the revolution. Principals—especially far-removed government donors—want country-level indicators that measure a desired outcome of democracy assistance so that they can monitor their agents. Of course even projects that fall into a “non-measurable” category may be crafted in a fairly measurable way, such as a tally of the number of dissidents reached through foreign funding. Still, such a measure is not as clear a signal of effectiveness compared with the third-party Freedom of the Press rating in the context of a Congressional hearing or executive branch report, and so I consider that category relatively less measurable.³

This perspective suggests that a reasonable way for us to identify measurable categories of democracy assistance is to look for relevant indicators developed by researchers based at universities, think tanks, and NGOs. The general assumption of this approach is that if measures were easy to develop, they would be developed. Using this approach, we can identify seven categories of democracy assistance that are associated with a cross-national index and are therefore measurable. These categories (and the most prominent indices associated with them) are:

- Business and Enterprise (the Political Risk Services’ International Country Risk Guide and the Economic Freedom Network’s Business Environment rankings);

³Consider, for example, the quantitative indicators used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation to determine which countries are “governing justly”: http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection/indicators (accessed on September 26, 2010).
• Good Governance and Local Governance (Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index and Global Corruption Barometer, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators and Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys, and the Quality of Government Institute’s Index);

• Human Rights (Freedom House’s Freedom in the World reports, Gibney’s Political Terror Scale, and the CIRI database);

• Media (Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press database, IREX’s Media Sustainability Index, and Reporters Without Borders’ country reports); and

• Women’s Groups and Women’s Political Participation (the UNDP’s World Development Indicators, the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Women in Parliaments database, and the CIRI database).

No comparable quantitative cross-national indices exist for the remaining thirteen categories to the best of the author’s knowledge.

One challenge to using this approach is that quantitative indicators could be developed in response to demands from the democracy establishment or the rising professionalism of the democracy establishment. Furthermore, the indicators could have been developed as part of the overall trend towards quantification in human rights and global governance in the past few decades documented by Merry (2009). I find, however, that most of the indices that make categories of democracy assistance measurable—and at least one index for each measurable category listed above—predated the start of democracy assistance in 1985. Taking care to classify projects according to measures that predate the start of democracy assistance ensures that my findings are not endogenous to the rise of the democracy establishment.

Another reasonable way to identify measurable categories of democracy assistance is to identify the categories for which donors have themselves identified quantitative (or otherwise clear and objective) indicators of progress. Using this approach helps address a
concern that some readers may have with the previous approach: that actors in the democracy establishment eschew the indicators I listed above to measure progress. Consulting the U.S. government’s “Master List of Standard Indicators” for foreign assistance reveals that, in fact, donors do use the aforementioned indicators and that the seven categories listed above are rightly regarded as measurable. In the overall area of governing justly and democratically, the United States government uses indices from Freedom House and the World Bank and the number of women holding seats in national parliament to assess progress. In the specific program area of human rights, it uses indices from the World Bank and CIRI; in the area of governance, it uses its own index; in the area of media, it uses Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Score. These measures serve as the overall and program-level benchmarks for U.S. government-funded democracy assistance projects. Lower level indicators are also used for specific program elements, however, these indicators are so narrow and numerous that far off principals such as Congress cannot easily digest them.

Using this approach to examining what donors view as measurable also reveals that two additional categories should be classified as measurable: elections and constitutions. These categories are measurable because they have clear international norms for appropriate practice, despite lacking cross-national indices. Interviews with democracy practitioners indicate that clear standards have emerged, in contrast to the eleven other remaining categories. With regards to elections projects, Hyde (2011a) and Kelley (2008) have documented the norm of election monitoring, which began in the late 1980s and has fostered a highly technical field that documents elections’ (and, to a lesser extent, electoral institutions’) compliance with international best practices. Furthermore, the U.S. government’s

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master list of standard indicators reveals that the presence of credible election monitors is used a key program indicator for its democracy assistance work. There are also a number of international norms about constitutional design; proportional systems of representation and certain types of quotas for women and minorities in parliament, for example, have come to be regarded as best practices. Institutions including the U.S. Institute of Peace and International IDEA have been key disseminators of constitutional best practices. To ensure such practices are in place, experts advise countries; as discussed in Chapter 2, in post-Taliban Afghanistan, for example, international experts Barnett Rubin, Yash Pal Gai, and Guy Carcassonne were enlisted to ensure that the text met international standards. Again, the U.S. government’s master list of standard indicators shows that constitutions programs are indeed rightly considered measurable; the protection of religious freedoms is used a key program indicator.

Thus, to conclude, this project considers nine categories of democracy assistance measurable. These categories are business, constitutions, elections, good governance, human rights, local governance, media, women’s groups, and women’s political participation. I classified these projects as such because first, quantitative indicators that can assess countries’ progress in their areas of focus exist and second, donors have measures for these categories that they can use in their program evaluations. In contrast, projects’ country-level impacts in the remaining categories—civic education, civil society (residual category), conflict resolution, dissidents, humanitarian assistance, legal systems, legislative assistance, political parties, research, unions, and youth—are not easily measured. Neither cross-national indices nor clear international norms of appropriate behavior have been established.

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6See also Elkins (2009, 59) on networks of constitutional experts.
4.3 Which Categories are Generally Regime Compatible?

I define *regime compatible democracy assistance programs* as programs that are unlikely to threaten the imminent political survival of the incumbent regime in the target state. Here, it is necessary to consider the political preferences of the incumbent regimes in the target states in order to define regime compatibility. The target states of democracy assistance tend to be pseudo-democracies: countries that have some democratic institutions or practices but limit vital political and civil liberties, lack peaceful transfers of both, or both. Above all else, incumbents in such states want to avoid what Huntington (1991, 142-151) calls “replacements”—when “[d]emocratization...results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown.” As a consequence, leaders in target states do not like to allow programs that foster open political contestation and could lead to the overthrow of their regimes.

Which categories of democracy assistance programs regularly or plausibly would endanger the survival of incumbent regimes? Democracy assistance can threaten incumbents in two ways. First, democracy assistance can threaten incumbents by fostering replacements through open and fair political competition. Five categories of democracy assistance programs attempt to foster such open competition and encourage the free exchange of political information: elections, human rights, media, political parties, and research.

Are those categories truly challenging to pseudo-democrats? As previously noted in the dissertation, many democratic institutions and practices have become tools of authoritarian survival in the post-Cold War era, and these institutions and practices include elections, media, political parties, and research. We could conceive of programs in each of these four categories that are in fact compatible with incumbent regimes. Signing international human rights treaties also does not automatically herald improved behavior among states (Hathaway, 2002). If these programs are implemented successfully, however, they will foster political competition and thus it does not seem reasonable to code them as regime compatible relative to other types of democracy assistance. Research shows, in fact, that elections,
human rights, media, and political parties are all important components of democratization. Of the five categories, the most ambiguously coded one is research; programs in this category support research and educational activities about democracy at think tanks and universities in the target countries. Research can, however, be apolitical and so it is somewhat on the borderline between regime compatible and not.

Second, democracy assistance can threaten incumbents in target countries by fostering replacements through the mobilization of independent groups that are likely to challenge the regime. Several types of civil society groups have historically promoted political participation and challenged authoritarian regimes by creating alternative power bases and therefore threaten incumbents (Carothers, 2005, 203-204). The categories of democracy assistance projects that support these groups are: dissidents, unions, and youth. Such programs have arguably helped bring down competitive authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet States by linking local activists with transnational networks (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Beissinger, 2007). Out of the three categories, the most ambiguously coded one is youth. Although Huntington (1991, 144-145) calls youth the “universal opposition” because they have played an important protest role in many societies, youth programs can also be fairly apolitical, such as helping a youth group that focuses on athletics. Thus, youth programs are somewhat on the borderline between regime compatible and not.

I consider the remaining twelve categories of democracy assistance regime compatible. These categories are civic education, civil society (residual), conflict resolution, constitutions, good governance, humanitarian assistance, legal systems, legislative assistance, local governance, women’s rights, and women’s political participation. Although they may challenge the social order or pose a long-term threat to regime stability, they are unlikely to cause immediate regime replacements. Several civil society categories—once dissidents, unions, and youth are removed—are regime compatible. First, as Ottaway (2005a, 116)

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shows, aid to women’s groups is regime compatible, even in the Arab world, the region whose authoritarian regimes are typically thought to be least women-friendly. She writes:

Promotion of women’s rights... can be translated in practice into many concrete, small projects that are not seen as threatening by most Arab regimes and are even welcomed by them as a means to demonstrate their willingness to democratize and modernize. An improvement in the rights of women does not threaten the power of the incumbent authoritarian government in the same way as free elections or a free press would.

Although promoting women’s groups may be a worthy goal for various reasons, neither practitioners nor the incumbents of target states regard doing so as likely to cause replacements. Their logic is that women’s groups often address apolitical issues, or at least issues that do not directly and immediately threaten the survival of incumbents, such as domestic violence or women’s participation in the workforce. It is worth noting that the conventional wisdom that women’s groups do not threaten incumbents may be misguided and perhaps even sexist, but nevertheless it is the conventional wisdom.

Indeed, not all civil society actors prefer regime replacement. Hawthorne (2005, 85), a former senior program officer for the Middle East at IFES, writes that supporting civic education and general (i.e., residual) civil society organizations “seems [to donors] like a good way to support a gradual, citizen-generated transformation of politics...thus avoiding the risk of calling for the immediate democratization of the political sphere.” Civil society actors that are not dissidents, unions, or youth are less likely to agitate for regime replacements. In related research, Jamal (2007) found that civic associations, such as church societies or sports clubs, can entrench authoritarian rule by promoting support for the incumbent regimes in their members. I thus classify the categories of business, civic education, and civil society (residual) as regime compatible.

I also consider eight categories of democracy assistance regime compatible because they usually involve working directly with incumbent governments. These categories in-
clude good governance, humanitarian assistance, legal systems, legislative assistance, local governance, and women’s political participation programs. Furthermore, conflict resolution and constitution projects typically take place in post-conflict settings where transitional governments work closely with donors and have limited independent authority. Since the target countries must assent in order for such programs to take place, the incumbents must not regard them as ones that are likely to threaten their authority. Carothers (2005, 202) writes, for example, that governments “may hope that the [sic] governance programs will render the state more capable of solving citizens’ problems and burnish their own legitimacy as reformist regimes, even as they drag their feet on the necessary institutional changes.” At a minimum, such programs can be closely monitored—and if necessary, controlled or halted—by incumbent regimes. At a maximum, the programs may strengthen incumbent regimes in the short- or medium-term by improving their service delivery capabilities or their public image. In fact, autocrats routinely adopt ostensibly democratic institutions such as parliaments in order to extend their rule (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Schedler, 2006). Programs supporting women’s political participation encourage women to get involved in those channels of political activity (e.g., local councils) that the regime already permits.

One limitation with the aforementioned sorting of categories into the groups of regime compatible and not is that the target state’s regime type may determine if a program is regime compatible. In general, I approached regime compatibility from the perspective of target states that are pseudo-democracies, states that have certain democratic institutions or practices but lack peaceful transfers of power, protections for political and civil rights, or both. I think this approach is reasonable because I argue that the democracy establishment converges on types of democracy assistance programs that help them gain access to target states, and pseudo-democracies are the target states that pose access problems. More democratic countries will welcome democracy assistance as a way of consolidating democracy; extremely authoritarian countries (e.g., North Korea) will not admit
any democracy assistance programs willingly.

Nevertheless, the extent to which programs are regime compatible depends on the regime type of the target state. The target state for democracy assistance could be one of several varieties of authoritarian regimes (e.g., military, single-party, monarchy, or personalist) or it could be transitioning to or away from democracy. The way that I approach this problem is to analyze the determinants of the relative amount of each category of democracy assistance that goes to a country in a certain year in robustness checks, rather than just analyzing the relative amount of regime compatible democracy assistance. When I do so, I include measures of the target state’s regime type as independent (or “right-hand side”) variables. This approach allows me to see if my independent variables of interest—monitoring problems and time—remain significant determinants of each category of democracy assistance in the expected directions in the presence of measures of target state regime type that would also plausibly affect the relative amounts of that category of democracy assistance.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter proposed a typology of twenty categories of democracy assistance programs and explained why certain categories should be considered generally measurable and generally regime compatible. Measurable categories are associated with quantitative (or otherwise clear and objective) indicators that principals in the democracy establishment use to help assess the efficacy of democracy assistance programs. Regime compatible categories do not threaten the imminent political survival of incumbents in the target states. They do not mobilize opposition groups or promote open and fair political competition. The nine measurable categories of democracy assistance and twelve regime compatible categories overlap, but not entirely; in other words, some categories are measurable, others are regime compatible, some are both, and others are neither. I developed the rationales for sorting cat-
categories into these groups independently of each other. Therefore, although the categories coincide somewhat empirically, they are distinct conceptually.

As noted at the start of the chapter, some limitations inevitably remain in my classification system. How measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are remains somewhat subjective despite my attempts to systematically justify their coding. In the empirical chapters to come, I address the coding system’s limitation in several ways. First, I recode each category (e.g., switching it from measurable to not) to address concerns that I have miscoded the categories and that my findings are artifacts of this miscoding. Unless otherwise noted, my main results do not depend on the classification (or misclassification) of any particular category. Second, and as mentioned previously, I also analyze the proportion of democracy assistance in a country–year that is in each of the twenty categories in addition to the blunter “measurable” and “regime compatible” groups to see if my predictions hold. In addition to addressing the concern that how regime compatible democracy assistance programs are depends on the regime type of the target state, this approach also offers a second advantage. It allows me to compare my findings about the more clear-cut categories (e.g., programs aiding dissidents are clearly not regime compatible) with my findings about the less clear-cut categories (e.g., programs aiding youth are likely not regime compatible, but this coding is less clear than it was for dissidents). Finally, qualitative analyses later in the dissertation complement the statistics with a much finer grain of analysis. On the ground in a country, it is possible to see precisely how measurable and regime compatible a program is in the local political context.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Measurable</th>
<th>Regime Compatible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business and Enterprise</td>
<td>To promote business, private enterprise, and entrepreneurship.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Education</td>
<td>To educate the public about democratic values.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society (Residual)</td>
<td>To support the capacity and efforts of civil society organizations, excluding those that work on women, unions, business, or youth.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
<td>To promote conflict resolution and peace.</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutions</td>
<td>To support constitution writing and constitutional reform.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissidents</td>
<td>To promote the exchange of ideas about democracy and human rights among dissidents and intellectuals.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections</td>
<td>To support election observers and free and fair elections more generally.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Governance</td>
<td>To promote good governance, i.e., governance that is consensus-oriented, participatory, effective and efficient, accountable, transparent, responsive, equitable and inclusive, and committed to the rule of law.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>To provide humanitarian assistance (sometimes to political prisoners).</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>To promote human rights awareness and monitoring.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Systems</td>
<td>To support countries’ legal systems.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Assistance</td>
<td>To improve the quality of national legislation and legislative activity in a country.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Governance</td>
<td>To make local governments more effective and democratic.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>To foster a free, independent, and professional media.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>To strengthen and professionalize political parties.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research</td>
<td>To support research on democracy and related issues.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unions</td>
<td>To support democratic trade unions and cooperatives.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Groups</td>
<td>To aid women’s organizations.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Participation</td>
<td>To promote women’s status and participation in politics.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>To promote youth groups and youth’s participation in politics.</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Classification of Categories of Democracy Assistance. Full coding details as developed by the author are provided in the Appendix.
Part II

Evidence
Chapter 5

How Monitoring Problems Affect Democracy Assistance

Consider a few observations about international democracy assistance. First, when democracy assistance donors use implementing agencies to help them enact programs in target countries, they fund on average 11 percent less measurable programs and 16 percent less regime compatible programs. This relationship fades, however, when the target countries are closer geographically to the donor countries. Second, when democracy assistance donors give aid to multilateral organizations, they fund on average 11 percent more measurable programs and 5 percent more regime compatible programs. Finally, when democracy assistance donors are wealthier, they fund less measurable and regime compatible programs. A democracy donor that is wealthier than three-quarters of the other donors gives almost double the amount of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that a donor that is wealthier than only one-quarter of the other donors does.

What explains these variations in democracy assistance programs across donors, target countries, and time? I argue that using implementing agencies, using multilateral organizations, and the wealth of donors all indicate how easy or hard it is for democracy assistance donors to monitor the programs that they fund. Monitoring problems, in turn, are a crucial
factor in determining the nature of democracy assistance programs on the ground overseas.

My central argument is that the transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance rewards organizations that pursue measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs. The more severe the monitoring problems of donors, the stronger the rewards for organizations that pursue such programs. This argument rests on assumptions about both the preferences of democratic donor governments (i.e., principals) and of recipient organizations (i.e., agents). Donor governments sincerely care about promoting democracy abroad, yet they also want to satisfy the publics that elected them. Recipient organizations also sincerely care about advancing democracy in partially or fully authoritarian countries, but at the same time they want to win future contracts and maintain access to the countries where they work. As a consequence, recipient organizations will seek to satisfy donors’ desires for effective democracy assistance by pursuing programs associated with quantitative indicators and they will seek to satisfy target country incumbents’ desires to maintain power by pursuing programs that are compatible with those incumbents. Such programs are often at odds with donors’ desires for effective democracy assistance. The harder it is for donors to monitor their agents, the more likely their recipients will be to pursue their favored measurable and regime compatible programs. This logic supports two hypotheses, which I summarize below.

**Hypothesis 1:** The harder it is for donors to monitor their agents, the more measurable the programs that will result, all else equal.

**Hypothesis 2:** The harder it is for donors to monitor their agents, the more regime compatible the programs that will result, all else equal.

This chapter tests Hypotheses 1 and 2 using data on democracy assistance programs given by sixty bilateral and multilateral government donors between 1985 and 2008. Using these data, I highlight three main findings. First, when donors use implementing agencies—organizations within the target countries that help the donor implement the program—the
programs that ensue are less measurable and less regime compatible than when implementing agencies are not used. I argue that the reason for this difference is that having implementing agencies in the target country makes it easier for the donor to monitor the programs that take place there than when the donor has to communicate directly with a far-off aid recipient. Second, aid given through multilateral donors is more measurable and, to a lesser extent, regime compatible than aid given through bilateral donors. I argue that increased monitoring problems account for this finding, as well. Multilateral aid programs involve collective principal problems and longer delegation chains, both of which lead to agency slack. Finally, wealthier, larger donors fund less measurable and regime compatible programs than other donors, all else equal. I argue that such donors have better abilities to gather information about democracy assistance programs. Taken together, these findings support my argument that democracy assistance is shaped in important ways by its delegation structure.

My findings are robust to the inclusion of a number of variables that we might also expect would influence the outcomes of interest. These variables include measures of shared preferences or strategic relationships between the donor and target countries, the level of democracy and regime type of the target country, the economic development of the target country, and indicators for the regions of the donors and of the target countries. I also examine whether the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 could explain my findings since these major events affected foreign aid strategy in significant ways. Finally, I use statistical matching techniques as a way to boost my findings’ accuracy and reduce their model dependence. Across a variety of models, indicators of donors’ monitoring abilities remain the strongest influence on my outcomes of interest, a finding which bolsters my principal–agent argument about democracy assistance.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 5.1 briefly explicates the causal logic and how we might measure variation in monitoring problems in the realm of democracy assistance. It explains why implementing agencies and multilateral organizations in-
volve different types of delegation structures and therefore why we should expect different
democracy assistance programs to follow. It also explains why wealth is a reasonable
indicator for donor countries’ monitoring capabilities, regardless of delegation structure.
Section 5.2 describes the new data on democracy assistance projects that I employ in this
project and how I code the projects. Section 5.3 introduces the other data and empirical
approach that I use and presents the main results. It also presents a number of robustness
checks, including from statistical matching. Section 5.4 concludes by summarizing the
chapter’s contribution and motivating the need for the additional quantitative and qualita-
tive analyses presented in subsequent chapters.

5.1 Monitoring Problems in Democracy Assistance

Students of foreign aid have for some time noted the principal–agent problems that ensue
when economic aid is delegated across state boundaries and through multiple institutions.¹
This dissertation turns its attention to another, related area where Western governments
seek to influence political outcomes in other countries: democracy assistance. I argue that
principal–agent dynamics are also influential in democracy assistance.

As I explained in Chapter 3, the structure of democracy assistance rewards organi-
zations that pursue certain types of democracy assistance programs. In particular, the
transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance rewards democracy practitioners
that promote democracy through measurable and regime compatible programs. The logic
stems from an observation that people in the democracy establishment are both idealists
and pragmatists. As idealists, they want to promote democracy. But as pragmatists, they
seek goals such as future funding, access to the countries where they work, and programs
that will create quick success stories, rather than slow and steady progress that may frus-
trate their principals. How much the “pragmatic” concerns weigh on professionals’ minds

varies over time, as the next chapter explores. Practitioners’ abilities to pursue programs that satisfy their pragmatic concerns also vary according to the funding structure in which they work. When the delegation process makes it especially hard for donors to monitor their agents, then the agents will be able to shift programs towards their preferred ones: programs that enable them to maintain funding and access. In other words, organizations in the democracy establishment pursue more measurable and regime compatible programs when they are less closely monitored. When donors can monitor their agents more easily, then their agents are forced to enact programs that are closer to the donors’ goals for effective democracy assistance.

In order to empirically test this argument, we must identify the conditions under which donors have a relatively hard time monitoring their agents. In other words, when do donors have better or worse information about what their agents do in a target country? An ideal way to test this argument would be a simple comparison of the relative amounts of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs across different lengths of delegation chains. Since donors do not make this information available, however, we must look for other ways of identifying information problems. This section delineates three ways of empirically testing my argument about principals’ information problems and the programs that should result. I then look for evidence of these relationships using cross-national, time-series data on more than 130,000 democracy assistance programs funded by sixty Western bilateral and multilateral donors between 1985 and 2008.

5.1.1 Implementing Agencies in the Target Countries

When principals in democracy assistance maintain permanent, in-country connections to the target countries of their democracy assistance programs, it is easier for them to gather information about these programs. In other words, having what OECD donors refer to as implementing agencies in target countries—organizations that help deliver the aid program to the recipient organization or government in the target country—makes it easier for
donors to monitor their agents. When there is no implementer—when the donors directly give funding to an overseas organization or government for the purposes of democracy assistance—it is hard to gather direct information about that organization’s performance because the donor cannot observe the organization directly. An implementing agency can help gather and transmit such information.

Consider, for example, a $249,154 United States government local governance grant to Tajikistan in 2007 with the following goal: “[To] create a legislative/regulatory environment for decentralized governance with appropriate devolution of authority and resources to sub-national levels.”\(^2\) The implementing agency for this project was the Urban Institute, an American NGO. It is harder for the United States government to know what happens in Tajikistan when the government there directly oversees such a program than it is when an implementer—such as the USAID country office or, in this case, the American NGO the Urban Institute—helps oversee the program in conjunction with Tajik officials. When implementing officials are present, they can directly monitor what happens in the host country and can communicate using the most efficient and effective language back to the principals in the donor country.

Of course, it is possible that the additional involvement of the Urban Institute makes monitoring more difficult in Tajikistan because there is an additional link in the delegation chain. Although, in general, it is true that longer delegation chains make monitoring more difficult (Nielson and Tierney, 2003), this relationship is not necessarily linear. My interviews indicate that it is very difficult for donors to know what it is happening on the ground in another country. Donors cannot monitor all the different programs they fund in other countries since they cannot see such programs in person—at least not regularly. Working with an implementing agency makes monitoring somewhat easier, because there are people who can regularly oversee the project in the country that also speak the language (both

literally and metaphorically) of donors.

Implementing agencies vary, however, in how well they gather and transmit the appropriate information to donor governments. What sorts of organizations do foreign aid donors use as implementing agencies? According to the OECD, an implementing agency might be a donor government office in the host country, a donor country NGO in the host country, a host country NGO, or the host country’s government. This variation also provides us with some useful empirical leverage for testing my argument. Generally, I expect organizations that are linked to the donor government to gather better information than NGOs and multilateral organizations that act as implementers, which should gather better information than foreign governments that act as implementers. In order to test these expectations about variations in types of implementers, it is necessary to hand-code information given by donors on implementing agencies. Such coding is underway and future versions of this research will include analyses using the new data.

5.1.2 Multilateral Organizations

Multilateral delegation processes involve delegation between governments, international organizations, intermediaries, implementers, and recipients. As a consequence, multilateral delegation processes are unusually complex and can suffer from significant information problems. I expect that multilaterally-funded democracy assistance programs will face harder monitoring problems than will similar programs that go directly (i.e., bilaterally) from governments to implementers and recipients. These monitoring problems have two origins.

First, multilateral organizations are more likely to be associated with agency slack than bilateral donors due to collective principal problems. As Copelovitch (2010, 55) explains:

Agency slack is even more severe in cases of common agency (collective or

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multiple principals), because the multiple members comprising the agent’s principal may have heterogeneous preferences about the agent’s behavior, which the agent can exploit to pursue its own interests.

Prominent multilateral donors in the democracy assistance sector—such as the European Commission, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (part of the World Bank), and the Inter-American Development Bank—indeed have diverse memberships. These institutions’ donor countries are likely to have heterogeneous preferences over foreign policy and democracy promotion and thus we should expect common agency problems to ensue.

Second, multilateral organizations are more likely to be associated with agency slack than bilateral donors due to longer delegation chains. Multilateral organizations must answer to bilateral governments, which must answer to their publics. Thus, multilateral organizations as donors are going to be even more interested in demonstrating measurable results to their principals than bilateral governments, since their principals are agents and their principals’ principals are agents. Likewise, multilateral organizations are even more able to implement regime compatible programs than their bilateral funders because they are harder to monitor from the perspective of voters. For both reasons, I expect that programs funded by multilateral organizations will be more measurable and regime compatible than programs funded by bilateral donors, all else equal.

In foreign economic aid, Milner (2006, 114-115) argues that despite these monitoring problems, multilateral organizations delegate aid effectively because they are more insulated from political pressures than bilateral donors. Milner argues that leaders in bilateral donors like to use foreign aid as political tool both to satisfy geo-strategic preferences and domestic ones, since aid can be linked to purchases from domestic firms. In contrast, multilateral organizations are more likely to give foreign economic aid for truly humanitarian purposes. Yet as discussed in Chapter 3, democracy assistance is less likely than other forms of foreign assistance to reward domestic constituencies beyond the democracy es-
tablishment. Furthermore, bilateral donors generally give democracy assistance because they want to promote democracy. After all, democracy assistance is less easily given as a reward or bribe to target countries than other types of foreign aid, which are often given in the form of direct grants to target countries’ governments. As I show below, multilateral organizations give more measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance than bilateral donors, rather than giving a more “sincere” form of democracy assistance as they do with foreign economic aid.

5.1.3 Information Gathering Capabilities of Donors

Finally, democracy donors vary in their abilities to monitor the same program, regardless of the delegation structure through which it is funded. Collecting information about the performance of democracy assistance programs is costly. Such information must be gathered far from home, often in other languages, and even in the best of circumstances, it is not easy to evaluate democracy assistance programs (National Research Council, 2008). What countries might find it easier to monitor democracy assistance countries?

I expect wealthier, larger donors to have better information gathering capabilities in other countries than smaller, less wealthy donors, all else equal. Wealthy, large countries are able to send more aid personnel abroad to gather information and maintain improved records of the democracy assistance projects that they fund. Portugal and the United States both give democracy assistance today, for example, but I expect the United States’ information gathering capabilities to be greater than Portugal’s. Furthermore, donor countries will also find it easier to monitor countries that they are closer to geographically. I note that conditions in the target countries may also make information gathering easier or harder for donors (e.g., countries that are generally authoritarian and closed may make it difficult for donors to gather information); I discuss these conditions further below.
5.2 Data on Democracy Assistance Projects

In order to test my argument about monitoring problems and democracy assistance programs, this chapter analyzes a large sample of democracy assistance programs funded by bilateral and multilateral democracy assistance donors between 1985 and 2008. I obtained project-level data from the AidData.org database. AidData harmonizes data on foreign aid projects from several sources and represents the most comprehensive current source of data on democracy assistance programs (Findley et al., 2010).\(^4\) The main source of data on democracy assistance projects listed in AidData comes from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. The AidData team has included government aid projects that are missing from the OECD data and also reconciled inconsistencies in the officially-reported data. Figure 5.1 shows the rise of democracy assistance over time in this sample to $16.6 billion constant 2000 U.S. dollars spent in 2008 alone.

Where do government donors give democracy assistance? Figure 5.2 shows the regional distribution of funds given by the government donors in the AidData.org database. Although the Middle East and North Africa has increasingly become crucial as a target region for democracy assistance, as the figure shows, the countries of Latin America and Africa remain overall the main recipients of democracy assistance. As Figure 5.3 shows, countries at a variety of levels of democracy receive democracy assistance. In general, and perhaps contrary to conventional wisdom, the more democratic a country, the more democracy assistance it receives. On the whole, democracy donors seem more likely to support the consolidation of democratization in target countries rather than transition from authoritarian rule.

When donors report to the OECD about their democracy assistance projects, they provide information about the general sector that the projects fell into.\(^5\) Each project is as-

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\(^4\)The findings in this chapter are based on AidData Research Release 1.9.2, which is available at http://data.irtheoryandpractice.org/plaid19/download/ (accessed April 24, 2011).

\(^5\)A small minority of the projects were coded by the AidData.org research team, which used guidelines similar to those of the donors to fill in missing observations.
Figure 5.1: The Rise of International Democracy Assistance Over Time, Government Donors. Commitments are in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Data source: AidData.org.

Figure 5.2: International Democracy Assistance, by Region. Commitments are in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Data source: AidData.org.
Figure 5.3: **International Democracy Assistance by Target State Democracy Level.** Commitments are in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Freedom House score represents the average of the rescaled scores for political rights and civil liberties. A score of 1 represents the least democratic and 7 the most democratic countries. Data sources: AidData.org and *Freedom in the World* Reports.

A single category by OECD donors that captures its main activities. I map the categories assigned by OECD donors onto the twenty categories that I study in this dissertation. Further hand-coding—as I pursue in the next chapter—of the AidData.org project descriptions would allow me to break down the coding into more of the categories and permit a finer grained analysis. Future versions of this research will reflect such coding. Still, the donor-coded categories offer a good (and efficient) starting place for analysis.

The coded projects in the AidData.org database fall into nine out of the twenty categories that I study in this dissertation: business and enterprise (OECD category 15110); civil society (residual category; 15150); conflict resolution (15220); elections (15161); good governance (15120, 15140); human rights (15162); legal systems (15130); media (15163); and women’s groups and women’s political participation (15164). Perhaps unsurprisingly since it is an inter-governmental organization, the OECD’s coding categories emphasize those categories of democracy assistance that are measurable, regime compatible, or both. Still, considerable variation exists in terms of how measurable and regime
Figure 5.4: **International Democracy Assistance Projects, by Category.** Commitments are in constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Data source: AidData.org.

compatible a country’s slate of democracy programming is. Figure 5.4 presents the amount of money spent in each category by the government donors in AidData.org. It shows that overall, good governance (a measurable, regime compatible type of democracy assistance) is by far the most common program category. In Chapter 4, I developed a typology of democracy assistance projects in which some categories of democracy assistance projects are generally considerable measurable and some are generally considered regime compatible. I use this project-level information to create country–year observations recording the proportions of assistance received by a target country from a donor in a given year that are measurable and regime compatible.

The AidData portal also supplies project-level information for my two key independent variables: the presence of implementing agencies and multilateral organizations. When donors report to the OECD, they must disclose if they have delegated to implementing agencies. Implementing agencies include offices of donor government agencies in the target country, offices of donor country NGOs in the target country, the target country’s gov-

---

6 Note that if I exclude good governance projects in the main analyses below, the results hold.
ernment, and NGOs in the target country. If a donor uses an implementing agency for a program in a country in a year, then that country–year observation is coded as 1; all other observations are coded as 0.⁷

I also use the AidData dataset to identify projects funded by multilateral donors, which are coded as 1; all other observations are coded as 0. Twenty-one out of the sixty organizations that gave projects that are classified as democracy assistance between 1985 and 2008 are multilateral. The top twenty democracy assistance donors are listed below in Table 5.1. As expected, the United States is the largest donor by far, followed by the United Kingdom and the EC, although other countries and international organizations have become increasingly important over time.

After classifying the project-level data into these categories, I can compare how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are under different monitoring conditions. As Figure 5.5 shows, programs that do not involve implementing agencies and that are funded by multilateral organizations are more likely to be measurable and regime compatible than other programs. In all cases, the differences are significant at \( p < 0.001 \) when I compare the means using T-tests. These relationships are consistent with my argument that implementing agencies ameliorate monitoring problems and that multilateral organizations worsen them. My argument also predicts that larger, wealthier countries should be able to gather more and better information about democracy assistance projects that they fund in the target countries than other donors. As a consequence, I expect them to fund less measurable and regime compatible programs. Using data on donors’ gross domestic products from Heston, Summers and Aten (2011), I calculate the correlation coefficients between the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance for bilateral donors and the donor’s GDP. In both cases the relationships are neg-

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⁷89 percent of the country–year observations coded as having implementers had implementers for over 50 percent of the donor’s projects to that country that year. In other words, few observations are coded as having implementers that did not involve implementers for most of the projects that country–year. If I recode the implementer variable as a percent indicating the proportion of the donor’s programs that country–year that involved an implementer, the main results hold.
Table 5.1: **The Twenty Most Important Democracy Aid Donors, 1985-2008.** Total for each donor is given in Constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Source: AidData.org.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Millions of Constant 2000 U.S. Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Commission</td>
<td>1,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank – IBRD</td>
<td>1,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
<td>1,478</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank – IDA</td>
<td>557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Development Bank</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andean Development Corporation</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1: **The Twenty Most Important Democracy Aid Donors, 1985-2008.** Total for each donor is given in Constant 2000 U.S. Dollars. Source: AidData.org.

...ative ($\rho = -0.32$ and $\rho = -0.24$). Although these bivariate relationships offer important initial support for my argument, it is important to subject them to more rigorous scrutiny using empirical techniques that can control for other factors that are likely to affect how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance is. I now turn to such tests.

### 5.3 How Delegation Structure Affects Democracy Assistance

Figure 5.5 suggests a systematic relationship between delegation structure and how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are. Although these findings are consistent with my argument, other factors could in fact be driving the correlation be-
Figure 5.5: **Amounts of Measurable and Regime Compatible Democracy Assistance Associated with Monitoring Problems.** Categories coded as measurable and regime compatible by author. Data source: AidData.org.

In addition to testing the explanation that delegation structure shapes democracy assistance outcomes, I now move to an econometric analysis that can do so explicitly. This section presents my main findings, starting with a discussion of the data sources for the other variables that I use, my estimation technique, and my main findings.

### 5.3.1 Other Factors that Could Affect Democracy Assistance Programs

In addition to testing the explanation that delegation structure shapes democracy assistance outcomes, I also test two alternative perspectives from the foreign aid literature. Note that these explanations sometimes pertain to state dyads. Thus I restrict my analysis to bilateral democracy assistance programs as appropriate. Table 5.2 at the end of this section provides descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this chapter’s analysis.
Donor Governments’ Political Preferences

The first alternative perspective emphasizes donor governments’ strategic preferences. We might expect that target countries that are strategically important to donor countries should receive relatively more regime compatible democracy assistance than other countries, all else equal. Research shows that in general, foreign aid donors give aid strategically as a way of rewarding or bribing countries with which they have strategic relationships (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, 2009).

The main measure that I use for strategic or political alignment between two countries is their affinity score. The affinity score measures preference alignment and is based on countries’ similarity in voting records in the United Nations General Assembly (Gartzke, 1998). Although votes in the UN General Assembly are often symbolic, they do provide a helpful measure of countries’ foreign policy preferences (Copelovitch, 2010; Stone, 2004, 580). The variable takes on values between -1 and 1 and is based on a three-category coding of UN votes (yes, no, and abstain). In the subsequent chapter, I use foreign military aid as a more direct measure of strategic alignment when I restrict my analysis to simply the United States as a donor. Such an indicator does not, however, prove useful when considering a wider range of democracy donors, many of which do not give out military aid.

As a robustness check in this chapter, as an alternative measure of the political relationship between the donor and the target country, I use an indicator of the target country’s prior colonial status, either as a former colony of the bilateral donor or as a former colony of an OECD donor member state for multilateral donors (Hensel, 2006). Previous research indicates that this variable is a strong political predictor of foreign aid flows (Alesina and Dollar, 2000).

If donors’ strategic interests matter, we would also expect the composition of democ-

---

8The variable I used is called “Score3i” and was interpolated. As Stone (2004, 580) explains, the variable “measures the similarity between two voting profiles as the length of a line between two points in a multidimensional issue space.” Data are available from Erik Gartzke, “The Affinity of Nations: Similarity of State Voting Positions in the UNGA,” at http://dss.ucsd.edu/~egartzke/htmlpages/data.html (accessed June 20, 2010).
racy assistance programs to change with major shifts in global politics. International democracy assistance increased significantly after the end of the Cold War and again (especially in the United States) after September 11, 2001. Moreover, donor countries’ general political priorities shifted with these major changes in world politics (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000; Traub, 2008). Such strategic break-points may affect either how measurable or how regime compatible democracy assistance programs are due to shifts in donors’ preferences. I therefore include indicator variables for years during the Cold War and since September 11, 2001.9

**Target Countries’ Characteristics**

The second alternative perspective is that donor governments tailor strategies of democracy assistance to target countries’ characteristics or political development needs. Donor governments may use foreign aid as a political tool, but most donors also want aid to be effective at promoting development. When donors give foreign aid to recipient countries, they often tailor aid to those countries’ humanitarian needs or governance characteristics (Bermeo, 2008). A similar process may take place in the case of democracy assistance.

For democracy assistance, a country’s political development needs are captured primarily by its democracy levels. We might expect that the proportion of regime compatible democracy assistance that countries receive would be curvilinear with their democracy levels: Highly authoritarian states (e.g., Syria and North Korea) make it very difficult for donors to implement democracy assistance programs, and any programs that the international community manages to covertly support there will likely challenge the regimes. In contrast, moderately authoritarian states allow democracy assistance programs, but are likely to prevent regime incompatible ones. Finally, transitional democracies allow both regime compatible and regime incompatible programs.

---

9I indicate the Cold War years as those years before 1990, but my findings are robust to instead coding them as those years prior to 1992, another plausible end date to the Cold War.
Data from Freedom House provide my main measure of target countries’ *democracy levels*. I take the average of Freedom House’s scores for countries’ political rights and civil liberties, which I rescaled so that 1 represents the least free countries and 7 the most free. Other indices of democratic institutions also exist, as do dichotomous measures of democracy. In order to ensure that peculiar aspects of the various measures do not drive my results, I use several other measures for democracy. Although Freedom House generally has the best coverage for my sample, I also use the Polity2 measure from the Polity IV dataset, in which a score of 10 represents the most democratic and -10 the most autocratic countries (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2007). I also try variables indicating the change in democracy level from the previous year and a dichotomous measure of democracy (“unfree” vs. “partly free” on the Freedom House scale). Unless otherwise noted, in all cases my main results are robust to the difference measures of democracy.

Within authoritarian countries, important variations in regime type also exist that could shape democracy assistance programs if donors tailor democracy assistance programs to host countries’ characteristics. Different types of authoritarian regimes vary in their strategies of survival and so it makes sense to include indicators of them into my analysis. Some authoritarian regimes (e.g., single-party states and monarchies) have national legislatures, for example, and others do not; we would expect such regimes to vary in terms of how compatible legislative or political party aid would be with their rule. Geddes (1999a, b, 2003) classified durable authoritarian regimes into three categories—military, single-party, and personalist—as well as hybrids between 1950 and 2000. Wright (2008a) extended Geddes’ classification system forward in time to 2003, added in the category of monarchies, classified durable authoritarian regimes into three categories—military, single-party, and personalist—as well as hybrids between 1950 and 2000. Wright (2008a) extended Geddes’ classification system forward in time to 2003, added in the category of monarchies, and heibub r andhi and treeland r xwvr xxor show the various measures of democracy commonly used in cross-national political science research have meaningful differences. Furthermore, the Freedom House indices have notable problems, including the transparency of the coding rules (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 22). Since I am interested in democracy levels broadly, and from the perspective of donor governments, which tend to rely on the Freedom House measures, I think it is valuable to use the Freedom House scores as well as to see how robust my results are to different operationalizations.

---

10 I obtained these data from Teorell et al. (2011). Original data and complete coding information are available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=439 (accessed June 20, 2010).

11 As Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) show, the various measures of democracy commonly used in cross-national political science research have meaningful differences. Furthermore, the Freedom House indices have notable problems, including the transparency of the coding rules (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 22). Since I am interested in democracy levels broadly, and from the perspective of donor governments, which tend to rely on the Freedom House measures, I think it is valuable to use the Freedom House scores as well as to see how robust my results are to different operationalizations.
Table 5.2: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables, Delegation Analysis. Note: The non-logged version of variables are provided in this table for ease of interpretation.

and included authoritarian regimes that lasted less than four years. I obtained indicator variables for Wright’s authoritarian regime types from Teorell et al. (2011).

Finally, strategies of democracy assistance may vary by region due to similarities in target countries’ characteristics or donor countries’ preferences. The Middle East and North Africa, for example, may be an exceptional region in terms of democracy promotion due to Western countries’ geo-strategic relationships with Arab autocrats as well as the persistence of authoritarianism there. I use the following regional categories: Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and the Mediterranean, and Oceania.\(^{12}\)

### 5.3.2 The Model

Since my dependent variables are the proportions of a donor’s aid to a country in a particular year that are measurable and regime compatible, ordinary least squares regressions are not generally appropriate. Likewise, since numerous observations of the dependent variable fall

---


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>% Measurable</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Regime Compatible</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>25,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25,518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.74</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>25,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.23</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personalist Regime</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.48</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity Score</td>
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<td>-1</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3,608</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>19,623</td>
<td>18,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (donor)</td>
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<td>8,259</td>
<td>6,961</td>
<td>89,833</td>
<td>18,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (target)</td>
<td>4,305</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>84,114</td>
<td>22,076</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
at 0 and 1, a logs-odd transformation is problematic since it is undefined for those boundary values. Instead, I use fractional logit models with robust standard errors as recommended by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). These models can be easily estimated in STATA as generalized linear models in the binomial family with a logit link.

Time-series, cross-section data do, however, involve well-known problems of panel and serial correlation that must be addressed. Unfortunately, there is not a straightforward way of handling unbalanced panel data where \( T \) is fixed and the dependent variables are fractional. Papke and Wooldridge (2008) show that unit fixed effects are not appropriate in panels with fixed \( T \) and \( N \to \infty \), but their recommendation of including the over-time averages of all the independent variables applies only for balanced panels. In robustness checks I include the over-time averages of all the independent variables as well as the number of time periods for each target country in fractional probit models, again with robust standard errors.\(^{13}\) This method offers the current best practice for a researcher who wants to approximate heteroskedasticity in unobserved heterogeneity in fractional probit models. An alternative method that I also use as a robustness check includes the dependent variable, lagged by one year, as a regressor.

### 5.3.3 Findings about Implementing Agencies and Multilateral Donors

#### Analysis of Full Sample of Donors

I begin by analyzing the effects of two aspects of delegation structure—the use of implementing agencies and the presence of multilateral donor organizations—on the proportion of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance given out in a target country–year. Table 5.3 presents the main results. As expected and in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, the baseline models (Models 1 and 2) show that working with an in-country implementing agency, which makes it easier for donor governments to monitor the programs they

\(^{13}\)This strategy was suggested by a personal communication with Jeffrey Wooldridge, April 24, 2011. See also Wooldridge (2011).
fund, is associated with lower proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance. On average, going from no implementing agency to an implementing agency is associated with a 11 percent reduction in the relative amount of measurable democracy assistance a country receives and a 16 percent reduction in the relative amount of regime compatible democracy assistance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DV = % Measurable</th>
<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 1</td>
<td>Model 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>-0.49***</td>
<td>-0.69***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>0.46***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.11***</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.31***</td>
<td>1.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>22,499</td>
<td>22,499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-11,528</td>
<td>-13,124</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.3: The Effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

My argument also predicts that multilateral organizations will have a harder time monitoring democracy assistance programs than bilateral donors and that they will fund more measurable and regime compatible programs as a result. As expected, multilateral organizations give on average 11 percent more measurable democracy assistance than bilateral donors (Model 1) and 5 percent more regime compatible democracy assistance (Model 2). Although slightly positive, the coefficient estimate for multilateral organizations in Model 2 is not statistically distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Multilateral organizations therefore have a stronger bias towards measurable programs than regime compatible
programs. This finding makes sense from a delegation perspective since multilateral organizations are likely to care more about proving their efficacy to donors than gaining access to target countries since they are still far away from the target countries. Aid recipients that are local NGOs would care more about maintaining access than multilateral organizations. These findings in Models 1 and 2 are robust to statistical procedures that account for the time-series, cross-section nature of the data; specifically, they are robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as well as the inclusion of the over-time averages of all the independent variables plus the number of time periods for each target country in fractional probit models.

In general, I also find that donors shape democracy assistance strategies according to target countries’ democracy levels, as the foreign aid literature suggests that they might. The estimated coefficient on the host country’s democracy level is clearly less than zero, while the coefficient on the polynomial of the democracy level is clearly greater than zero. In other words, as countries become more democratic, they receive less regime compatible democracy assistance up until a point when they start to receive more regime compatible democracy assistance. This logic—the opposite to what I had hypothesized—suggests that democracy practitioners compromise with incumbent regimes to gain access in highly authoritarian settings by designing regime compatible programs and stop compromising in less stringent authoritarian settings, until a regime becomes sufficiently democratic that democracy assistance can once again support the regime. Using alternative measures of regime type—including the Polity2 measure of democracy, a dichotomous measure of democracy, and the change in democracy level from the previous year—generates similar results.

To further probe this finding on target countries’ characteristics, I restrict the sample to just authoritarian countries between 1985 and 2003, which is the sample for which Wright (2008a) has authoritarian regime type data. If donors tailor democracy assistance to target countries’ regime types, then we would expect how regime compatible programs are to
depend on the authoritarian regime type. I first rerun the Baseline Model (Model 2). After restricting the sample, as Table 5.4 shows, the coefficient estimate on implementing agencies remains statistically significant and negative. Meanwhile, the coefficient estimate on multilateral organizations is clearly positive. It makes sense that monitoring problems are especially significant for how regime compatible the programs are in authoritarian countries, which are the states that pose the greatest access problems for organizations in the democracy establishment. These coefficient estimates remain stable across all the models reported in Table 5.4, which indicates a strong relationship between monitoring problems and democracy assistance in authoritarian regimes. The evidence from these regressions suggests that military and personalistic regimes are less likely to receive regime compatible forms of democracy assistance, whereas monarchies and single-party regimes are more likely to do so (for all regressions, $p < 0.01$). Are certain categories of democracy assistance targeted at certain types of authoritarian regimes? Yes; military regimes receive less business and more legal systems aid than other types of authoritarian regimes, all else equal, while personalistic and single-party regimes receive more support for good governance.

To help test for the possibility that variations in donors’ preferences drive variations in democracy assistance policy, I rerun the Baseline Models (Models 1 and 2) from Table 5.3 with the inclusion of several variables that might indicate changes in donor preferences. Specifically, I include indicator variables denoting years during the Cold War, years since September 11, 2001, and target countries that are former colonies of OECD donors. Models 8-13 in Table 5.5 display the results from those regressions.

Across all the models, the coefficient estimates for my main variables of interest—the presence of implementing agencies and multilateral organizations—are related to measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance in the same ways that they were in the Baseline Models. In other words, implementing agencies are clearly related to less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs, as we would expect since they improve donors’ information. Multilateral organizations are related to more measur-
The effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Authoritarian Regimes

Table 5.4: The Effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Authoritarian Regimes. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

able and slightly more regime compatible programs, as we would also expect since they make it harder for donors to monitor the programs they fund. Interestingly, the variable indicating target countries that are former OECD donors’ colonies is not clearly related to either outcome of interest ($p < 0.23$). Target countries’ democracy levels remain an important predictor of the type of democracy assistance countries will receive, although the statistical significance of some of the estimates is dampened. I also find that the Cold War is associated with more measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance and the post-September 11 period with less measurable and regime compatible democracy assis-
The effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Controlling for Donor Preferences. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures, Cold War, and 9/11) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

These temporal findings are somewhat contrary to my expectations about change over time in democracy assistance, but an examination of the data suggests that the entrance of new donors over time into democracy assistance with different regional focuses and overall approaches to more long-standing donors caused these shifts. Since the panels are unbalanced—in other words, target countries as well as democracy donors move in and out of the sample over time—it is difficult to systematically test my argument about change over time against the alternative explanations with these data. I save such analysis for the next chapter.

Finally, I examine the possibility that donors send different types of democracy assist-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
<th>Model 13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.60***</td>
<td>-0.72***</td>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
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<td>0.50***</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.10**</td>
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<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>-0.17***</td>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cold War</td>
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<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(0.03)</td>
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<td>19,531</td>
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<td>-13,088</td>
<td>-13,043</td>
<td>-11,417</td>
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Table 5.5: The Effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Controlling for Donor Preferences.
tance to different regions in Models 14 and 15 in Table 5.6. Eurasia serves as the omitted comparison region to which the other regions are compared. As Table 5.6 shows, countries in Oceania and the Middle East and North Africa are notable for receiving significantly more measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance than do countries in the other world regions. Meanwhile, countries in Latin America, which are generally the most democratic countries in the sample, receive less regime compatible democracy assistance than do countries in the other world regions. These finding lends some support both to geo-strategic arguments that note foreign aid donors’ desires for stability in the Middle East, as well as arguments about targeted and tailored foreign aid.

**Analysis of Bilateral Donors**

One flaw with the preceding analysis is that it does not control very precisely for relationships between the donor and the host country. In order to do that, I now turn my focus to bilateral donors. Furthermore, since we know that donors are likely to delegate aid to multilateral organizations for strategic purposes, it is important to separate the analysis for bilateral donors. Table 5.7 repeats the analysis from Table 5.3 with the bilateral donor sample. It also includes a variable measuring the affinity match between the donor government and the target country’s government.

As before and in further support of Hypotheses 1 and 2, the Baseline Models (Models 16 and 17) show that working with an in-country implementing agency is associated with lower proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance among bilateral donors. On average, going from no implementing agency to an implementing agency is associated with a 11 percent reduction in the relative amount of measurable democracy assistance and a 21 percent reduction in the relative amount of regime compatible democracy assistance. Again, my findings are robust to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as well as using fractional probit models that include the over-time averages of all the independent variables as well as the number of time periods for each target country, which is a


Table 5.6: The Effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Controlling for Regions. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Eurasia is the omitted comparison region. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

A way of addressing the panel structure of the data.

How do the other variables fare in the Baseline Models? The results from Table 5.7 evince a strong relationship between affinity and the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that countries receive. A perspective grounded in donors’ preferences would suggest that donors would reward target countries with whom they have
The effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Bilateral Donors. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

close relationships and preference alignments by giving them more regime compatible democracy assistance. The findings in Table 5.7 are consistent with this perspective. The substantive effect of the relationship is not, however, large: A host country that has a negative affinity score with a donor is predicted to receive on average around 2 percent less regime compatible democracy assistance in a given year than is a country with a positive affinity score. Replacing the measure of affinity in the Baseline Model (Model 17) with a measure of former colonial status also generates strong positive results ($p < 0.01$). As with the full sample, including indicators for the Cold War and post-September 11 eras in the Baseline Models indicates that these variables are related to democracy assistance programs in significant ways, but the effect of implementing agencies remains strong and negative ($p < 0.01$).

Also as in Table 5.3, I still find a curvilinear relationship between democracy levels and regime compatible democracy assistance among bilateral donors. As countries move from
the least free to partially free, they receive less measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance, but then once they move towards full democracy, they receive more measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance. Using alternative measures of democracy does not alter my findings about implementing agencies, nor does using indicators of authoritarian regime type. What about introducing regional indicator variables to the Baseline Models? As in the full sample, countries in Oceania and the Middle East and North Africa receive considerably more regime compatible democracy assistance programs than countries in other regions.

There are several other ways to extend my argument about monitoring problems in the context of bilateral donors. First, I argued that larger, wealthier donors ought to be better able to monitor democracy assistance programs abroad because they have better information gathering capabilities. Furthermore, my argument about monitoring problems and democracy assistance programs suggests that the positive effect of implementers should not be constant. Instead, democracy assistance programs with implementers should be less measurable and regime compatible than programs without implementers when the distance between the host country and the donor is sufficiently large. When host countries are very close to donors, donors have a relatively straightforward time monitoring programs. In contrast, when host countries are far away from donors, donors have an especially hard time monitoring programs that take place there. In such situations, the presence of an implementing agency ought to be especially helpful.

To test this argument, I introduce three new variables in Models 18-21: the log of the donor country’s real GDP; the log of the distance between the donor and target countries’ capital cities; and an interaction term between that distance measure and the implementer indicator variable (implementer x distance). Data on distance are available from Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch (2010). Table 5.8 presents the results from Baseline Models that include those variables. First, as Models 18 and 20 indicate, larger, wealthier donors are associated with less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs.
Specifically, a country whose wealth puts it at the 75th percentile of donors in terms of GDP (e.g., the United Kingdom in 2008, with a GDP of $35,584 million in constant 2005 U.S. dollars) gives 38 percent less measurable and 34 percent less regime compatible democracy assistance on average than a country at the 25th percentile (e.g., Belgium in 1995 with a GDP of $27,689 million). This finding is consistent with a principal–agent approach to democracy assistance since we would expect such donors to have better monitoring abilities. Interestingly, when this variable is included in the analysis, the sign of the coefficient estimate for affinity changes: Affinity between the target state and donor is now clearly negatively related to regime compatible democracy assistance (Model 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DV = % Measurable</th>
<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 18</td>
<td>Model 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>-0.15***</td>
<td>0.87***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.44***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donor GDP</td>
<td>-2.15***</td>
<td>-3.19***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer x Distance</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.16***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>23.33</td>
<td>0.20***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15,431</td>
<td>15,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-7,903</td>
<td>-8,145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8: The Effect of Donors’ Monitoring Abilities on Democracy Assistance Programs. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$. 
Models 19 and 21 in Table 5.8 introduce the distance measure and an interaction of that variable and the implementer indicator. Regressions with interaction terms must be interpreted with care. First, when I look at the coefficient estimate for the distance variable, I find that when there is no implementer, distance is generally positively associated with measurable programs. This relationship is as we would expect since countries that are farther away from donors would be harder to monitor. There is no clear relationship, however, between distance and regime compatible democracy assistance. Since there are no cases in which a donor gives democracy assistance to itself (i.e., when distance = 0), the independent effect of the implementer variable is not substantively meaningful. Figure 5.6 helps us interpret the meaning of the coefficient estimate for the interaction term. As the distance between the donor and the host country increases, the negative slope of the line in both graphs indicates that implementing agencies are associated with significantly less measurable and regime compatible programs.\footnote{This figure was made by adapting code that was made available by Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006). See \url{http://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/interaction.htm} (accessed August 9, 2011).} In other words, as the target country becomes farther away from the donor country, implementing agencies have a larger negative effect on the proportions of measurable and regime compatible programs sent to target countries. Since target countries that are relatively close to the donor are easier to monitor, implementing agencies matter less than they do when target countries are farther away. Is there evidence that the farther away a host country is, the more likely donors are to use an implementer? In fact, donors that use implementers are closer to the target countries on average than donors that do not use implementers (difference = 0.04, $p < 0.01$). If anything, then, the estimated effect of the implementer in the previous models should therefore be biased downwards.
Chapter 5

Summary of Findings

Before proceeding to additional robustness checks, it is perhaps useful to provide a brief summary of the analysis for readers. Three main findings emerge from the preceding analysis. First, across a variety of econometric models, I found that implementing agencies are associated with less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs. Since I argue that implementing agencies improve donors’ abilities to gather information about democracy assistance programs, this finding is consistent with my argument. Furthermore, I found that the negative relationship between implementing agencies and measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs is conditional on how far away the target countries are from the donors; the farther away the target country, the more negative the relationship between implementing agencies and measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance. I explain this finding in principal–agent terms: when target countries are geographically close to donors, then implementing agencies’ information benefits are less useful to donors.

Figure 5.6: Marginal Effects of Implementing Agencies on Democracy Assistance as the Distance from the Donor Changes. Marginal effects are surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Calculations based on Models 19 and 21.
Second, I found that multilateral organizations are associated with more measurable and, to a lesser extent, more regime compatible democracy assistance programs. I argued that multilateral organizations involve harder monitoring problems for donors because of collective principal problems and longer delegation chains. My findings about multilateral donors are therefore also consistent with a principal–agent approach to democracy assistance.

Finally, I found that wealthier donors are associated with less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs. I expect larger, wealthier donors to have better information-gathering capabilities than smaller, less wealthy donors that may find it difficult to send officials abroad or maintain significant monitoring and evaluation offices. Thus, this relationship too fits a principal–agent approach to democracy assistance. All three findings are robust to the inclusion of a number of variables in multivariate statistical models that might also affect how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance is. These variables include indicators for target countries’ democracy levels and authoritarian regime types, key global events (the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001), target country regions, target countries that are former colonies of donors, and the affinity in foreign policy preferences between donors and target countries. I do find evidence that donors take into account target countries’ regime types and political relationships when giving democracy assistance, although this evidence is at times equivocal. I now turn to some additional robustness checks.

5.3.4 Robustness Checks Using Matching

One concern with my findings is that democracy assistance programs that involve implementing agencies (i.e., the treatment observations) may be systematically different from programs that go forward without implementing agencies (i.e., the control observations).15

15The same is true for bilateral vs. multilateral donors. I repeat the matching analysis done in this section where the treatment is using multilateral organizations and the coarsening groups are the same. Matching also reduces imbalance in this case. When I rerun the regressions from Table 5.3, the substantive findings
Perhaps donors find it useful, for example, to use implementing agencies when programs take place in poorer or especially authoritarian countries. One way to deal with this problem is to use matching. Matching is a nonparametric statistical method that prunes observations from the dataset such that the resulting treatment observations and control observations are more comparable in terms of the pretreatment covariates. Preprocessing the data using matching before conducting more conventional regression analysis has been shown as a way to successfully reduce model dependence and statistical bias (Ho et al., 2007).

Exactly matched data are identical on all covariates except for the treatment, however, finding exact matches can be very difficult and may involve pruning a significant proportion of the observations. Iacus, King and Porro (2011) propose an alternative matching method called Coarsened Exact Matching (CEM). CEM “coarsens” each variable into theoretically-informed groups—such as “not free,” “partially free,” and ”free” on the Freedom House scale—and then matches observations on these coarsened values while saving the original uncoarsened values to use later in regression analysis. In addition to its intuitive and theoretically-informed approach, Iacus, King and Porro (2011) show that CEM has a number of appealing statistical properties when compared to other matching methods. For my analysis, I match treatment and control observations on donor region, target country region, the year, economic development in the target country, and the level of democracy in the target country. All of these variables are plausible determinants of the donor’s choice to use an implementing agency or not, and indeed Table 5.9 shows that there is significant difference along these variables in the unmatched treatment and control groups.

What coarsening groups should we use? As Iacus, King and Porro (2011) discuss, researchers should choose a “reasonable coarsening” for each variable that retains a sufficient number of observations while pruning enough unbalanced pairs to reduce model dependence and estimation error. First, I divide years into new groups every five years with regards to the impact of delegation structure hold up.

I implement the matching procedures using the CEM software for STATA, which is available at http://gking.harvard.edu/cem (accessed April 30, 2011). See also Blackwell, Iacus and King (2009).
(i.e., 1985–1989, 1990–1995, 1996–2000, 2001–2005, and 2006–2008). Second, I divide target countries using Freedom House ratings into the categories of “not free,” “partially free,” and ”free” (i.e., average scores for civil liberties and political rights of between 0–2.75, 2.76–5.25, and 5.26–7). Third, using data on real gross domestic product per capita, I divided target countries into the World Bank categories of low income ($995 or less), lower middle income ($996–3,945), upper middle income ($3,946–12,195), and high income ($12,196 or more). Finally, I matched exactly on donor and target country regions since each region is likely to have particular fixed characteristics that are important for my analysis. After matching, the number of control units was reduced from 11,346 to 8,202 and the number of treatment units was reduced from 7,017 to 6,942. As Table 5.9 shows, CEM improves balance on each covariate, and especially improves balance with regards to year, democracy level, and several regions. When I calculated the $L_1$ statistic, which provides a comprehensive measure of imbalance in the data, I found a striking 72 percent reduction in imbalance in my data after matching.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Pre-Matching</th>
<th>Post-Matching</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Country GDP</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Africa</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Asia</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Eurasia</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Europe</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Latin America</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Middle East</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Region: Oceania</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.9: **Improvements in Balance Measured by Difference in Means between Treatment and Control Units.** The matching method used was CEM with the scott break method. Matches on donor country region omitted for simplicity, but in all cases the balance improved.

After using matching to improve the balance, I use fractional logit regressions to re-
estimate the effect of having an implementing agency on how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are. Specifically, I replicate the Baseline Models for bilateral donors (Models 16 and 17 from Table 5.7). As Table 5.10 shows, the coefficient estimates on the presence of an implementing agency remain statistically significant and negative, as expected. Interestingly, affinity now has a significant negative relationship with regime compatible programs—precisely the opposite relationship that insights from the foreign aid literature might suggest—which suggests that the earlier finding of a positive relationship using the unmatched data was rather fragile. Meanwhile, the curvilinear relationship between democracy levels and regime compatible democracy assistance stands. Most importantly, Table 5.10 shows once more that when projects take place with fairly similar donors, fairly similar host countries, and in fairly similar time periods, the presence of an implementing agency makes them far less likely to be measurable and regime compatible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DV = % Measurable</th>
<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 22</td>
<td>Model 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementer</td>
<td>-0.23***</td>
<td>-0.40***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affinity</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
<td>-0.26**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.79***</td>
<td>0.52***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>13,078</td>
<td>13,078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-7.442</td>
<td>-8.129</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.10: The Effect of Monitoring Structure on Democracy Assistance, Post-Matching. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except monitoring measures) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes \( p < 0.01 \), ** denotes \( p < 0.05 \), and * denotes \( p < 0.10 \).
5.3.5 Category-by-Category Analysis

A final question that arises from the preceding analysis is: What is the empirical overlap between measurable and regime compatible programs? Is it possible that measurable programs drive my findings about regime compatible programs, or vice versa? One way to answer these questions is by separately analyzing each category of democracy assistance to see if monitoring problems affect outcomes more or less for measurable categories, regime compatible categories, or categories that are both measurable and regime compatible. To do that, I simply run regressions in which the dependent variables are the proportions of democracy assistance given by a donor in that country–year in each category, with the presence of an implementing agency, affinity score, and target state democracy level as independent variables.

The method of estimation is necessarily different from the fractional logit models used above since I am now analyzing various proportions of democracy assistance in the same country–years, which must all sum to 1 and are therefore not independent. Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg (2002) recommend using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in such cases. SUR allows the researcher to estimate a system of linear regressions in which the error terms are correlated across the regressions. In order to convert the proportions to an unbounded scale, which is necessary in order to estimate SUR, I apply the multivariate logistic transformation in which conflict resolution serves as the reference group (Tomz, Tucker and Wittenberg, 2002, 68).

As Figure 5.7 shows, the presence of an implementing agency is generally associated with lower proportions of democracy assistance across the categories, although the relationships tend not to be statistically significant at conventional levels. In general, the relationship between monitoring problems and democracy assistance seems strongest for categories of democracy assistance that are both measurable and regime compatible. Although this finding is quite tentative, it suggests that there may be some additive effect: Programs that are both measurable and regime compatible may be rewarded less in conditions of easy
monitoring than programs that are simply measurable or regime compatible.

Figure 5.7: Expected Effect of an Implementer, by Category. Coefficients estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions. The dots represent the estimated coefficient on implementer and the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Categories are measurable, regime compatible, or both.

5.4 Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter strongly supports the principal–agent argument that the structure through which democracy assistance is given out shapes the design of programs on the ground. First, projects without implementing agencies—which help donors monitor programs in other countries—are more regime compatible and measurable than projects with them. Projects with implementing agencies are especially associated with less measurable and regime compatible programs as the distance between the donor government and the host country increases—precisely the sort of relationship that we would
expect if implementing agencies mostly help donors monitor programs when information is scarce. Second, projects funded through multilateral organizations are more measurable than programs funded through bilateral donors. Finally, larger, wealthier donors—which can collect information about democracy assistance programs more easily—fund less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs than smaller, less wealthy donors. These relationships withstand a battery of econometric controls and techniques such as matching. All of these findings are consistent with a logic in which the degree to which principals are able to monitor their agents affects how democracy assistance programs are designed.

The analysis presented in this chapter therefore updates our conventional wisdoms about foreign aid policy-making. The first conventional wisdom emphasizes donor governments’ geo-strategic interests in giving aid. The second conventional wisdom emphasizes target countries’ abilities to use aid effectively as the determinants of aid programs. The second conventional wisdom is borne out more than the first: As countries move from the least free to partially free, they receive less measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance, but then once they move towards full democracy, they receive more measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance. Important variations in democracy assistance also exist according to authoritarian regime type. Although affinity between the donor country and the target country does sometimes affect democracy assistance programs, I do not find that it is uniformly significant across a variety of statistical tests and I sometimes find that its influence operates in the opposite direction to the one that is hypothesized. Taken together with my positive findings with regards to the delegation structure, these findings underscore the utility of looking at not just the donors and the aid recipients, but also at the people and organizations linking them in order to understand foreign aid allocation.

Although this analysis takes pains to carefully examine democracy assistance programs at a fine grain of detail, there are limitations to the classification scheme. To some ex-
tent, using my original coding of the NED’s democracy assistance projects can overcome
the limitations of OECD donor-coded projects. My case studies complement the blunter
coding, as well. There are also additional observable implications about the preferences
and behaviors of organizations inside the democracy establishment (and outside of it) that
I cannot test with cross-national data, but that qualitative analysis can. But before turn-
ing to the qualitative evidence, the next chapter tests another dimension of my argument:
that over time, actors in the democracy establishment converge on strategies of promoting
democracy that respond to the structural incentives of the funding system. This chapter,
which relies on data on donors and host countries that change over time, could not so easily
test that aspect of my argument.
Chapter 6

The Taming of Democracy Assistance at the National Endowment for Democracy

In 1986, measurable and regime compatible programs both represented around 20 percent of the grants given by the National Endowment for Democracy. By 2009, they represented around 60 percent of its grants. Why have measurable and regime compatible programs risen over time as components of democracy assistance? The previous chapter showed that the transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance creates incentives for democracy practitioners to promote democracy in measurable and regime compatible ways and that practitioners respond to those incentives. But as this chapter shows, processes of competition and professionalization reinforce those incentives over time and actors in the democracy establishment increasingly converge in how they promote democracy.

Dual logics of consequences and appropriateness explain convergence on measurable and regime compatible programs over time. First, competition for funding encouraged organizations to respond to the field’s funding structure. Conventional wisdom portrays democracy promotion in largely ideological terms. But more routine concerns—such as organizational survival—in fact play an important role in shaping democracy assistance on the ground. Since other scholars have noted that humanitarian organizations are often
funding-driven and competitive (Cooley and Ron, 2002; Carpenter, 2005), it may not come as surprise to some readers to learn that organizations in the democracy establishment also face competitive pressures. As I discussed in Chapter 3, at least two characteristics of democracy assistance—its short-term contracts and a sharp rise in the number of funders and amount of available funding, which prompted many development organizations to start working on democracy assistance—hastened the competition. Organizations thus adapted to the access and funding incentives, or they did not survive.

Second, professionalization within the democracy establishment spread and institutionalized experts’ ideas about the right way to promote democracy. Again, professionalization is a common force across humanitarian and non-profit organizations (Barnett, 2005; Stein, 2009, 156). Yet certain aspects of the democracy establishment—its transactions with the state, frequent turnover (which leads to circulation of personnel across organizations), links with universities, and the heavy concentration of practitioners in post-conflict countries—sped up the formation and transmission of professional norms. Furthermore, since professionalization created shared standards, programs naturally became more technical and measurable over time. Thus, because of both competition and professionalization, members of the democracy establishment should become more likely to chose measurable and regime compatible programs over time.

Hypotheses 3 and 4 summarize my predictions about change over time. Since at some point, however, the field will have largely adapted to the incentives, I expect that the growth over time of relatively measurable and regime compatible programs will level off eventually. It is important to underscore that time matters in my argument not as a direct causal variable but instead as a proxy for forces of competition and professionalization that increase over time.

*Hypothesis 3:* Over time, the proportion of democracy assistance that is spent on relatively measurable programs in a country–year will grow, all else equal.

*Hypothesis 4:* Over time, the proportion of democracy assistance that is spent
on relatively regime compatible programs in a country–year will grow, all else
equal.

This chapter tests the argument by analyzing an original dataset of democracy assis-
tance projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. The NED is an Amer-
ican democracy promotion organization that Congress founded in 1983 and its projects
generally are excluded from AidData.org. For reasons that I explain below, the NED data
offer an attractive laboratory for testing my argument about change over time in the democ-
Racy establishment, although I also find that my results are somewhat generalizable to other
donors. I use content analysis to classify a random sample of 5,000 of the NED’s projects,
which establishes the proportion of NED projects to a country in a year that are measur-
able and regime compatible. Controlling for a number of other potential factors, I use
regression analysis to show that the passage of time is strongly and positively related to the
relative amounts of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that a coun-
try receives. Of course, a trend over time could in fact be caused by other factors that also
change over time—such as the United States’ changing preferences over democracy assis-
tance, changes in the international system, or changes in target countries around the world.
To the extent possible, I rule out these alternative explanations for my findings through
careful empirical tests. Finally, and somewhat contrary to conventional wisdoms from the
foreign aid literature, I find mixed evidence that the NED tailors programs to target coun-
tries’ political development needs, although I do find that it designs democracy assistance
programs that reward recipients of American military aid.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.1 provides a brief history of the
National Endowment for Democracy and explains why its projects are a useful test of the
argument. Section 6.2 introduces the new data set and presents the main results, along
with a number of robustness checks. Section 6.3 considers how generalizable my results
about the NED are. Section 6.4 concludes by summarizing the chapter’s contribution and
motivating the need for the qualitative evidence that I will present in the subsequent two
chapters.

6.1 Democracy Assistance at the NED

6.1.1 What is the National Endowment for Democracy?

Before analyzing the NED’s projects, I briefly review the history of the National Endowment for Democracy and provide an explanation of why its projects provide a useful test of the dissertation’s argument. The National Endowment for Democracy is an American foundation that Congress established in 1983 to promote democracy abroad according to President Reagan’s vision in the Westminster address: “to foster the infrastructure of democracy—the system of a free press, unions, political parties, universities—which allows a people to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.” Subsequently, Reagan’s administration proposed two democracy promotion vehicles to Congress (Carothers, 1999, 30-32, 357). Reagan first proposed “Project Democracy,” a public diplomacy program that the U.S. Information Agency would coordinate. It failed to win sufficient Congressional support. Reagan then proposed the NED, an indirect, bipartisan grants program whose idea originated in 1969 with Congressman Dante Fascell. Congress supported this proposal. The NED sought to make democracy assistance public after controversial, covert attempts to promote democracy through the Central Intelligence Agency. Its founders modeled the NED on the Stiftungen, the German political party foundations that aided Spain and Portugal’s democratic transitions. The NED also developed links to other democracy foundations, such as the Westminster Foundation in Great Britain and the International Center for Human Rights.

\footnote{For a fuller history of the NED, see Hale (2003), Guilhot (2005), the United States General Accounting Office (1984), and David Lowe, “Idea To Reality: NED At 25.” The Lowe article is available at \url{http://www.ned.org/about/nedhistory.html} (accessed January 3, 2010).}

and Democratic Development in Canada.

The NED distributes funds from Congress and, to a lesser extent, the State Department.\(^3\) Congress first authorized the NED in the FY84/85 State Department Authorization Act (H.R. 2915) for $31.3 million, although the appropriation was only $18 million since the organization started later than expected. In 2009, the NED’s revenue from government agencies was $131.4 million (National Endowment for Democracy, 1985-2009). Figure 6.1 depicts the growth of the NED’s funding over time in constant U.S. dollars, with a jump first in 1990 as the Soviet Union collapsed and then in 2004-2005 with the rise of democracy promotion under President George W. Bush.\(^4\) Meanwhile, Figure 6.2 shows the NED’s grants by region. Among the donors in the previous chapter, the main recipient region was Latin America. In contrast, the main region where the NED sends grants is Asia, although in general there is relatively less variation at the NED in terms of how much funding each region has received than among other democracy donors.

As Figure 6.3 shows, the NED gives grants to countries at a variety of levels of democracy. The most common regime types for target states for NED grants are countries that are fairly (but not extremely) authoritarian. The most prevalent democracy level for NED grants is between two and three on Freedom House’s rescaled seven-point index, on which one is the least democratic and seven the most democratic. Compared with the donors studied in Chapter 5, the NED gives grants to more authoritarian countries than the average democracy donor.

The NED gives grants to four core American organizations and dozens of other NGOs, and it also runs a number of scholarly and intellectual programs such as the *Journal of Democracy* and the World Movement for Democracy conferences. Most of its expenses—

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\(^3\) State Department funding that is appropriated to the NED is a more recent phenomenon and is typically ear-marked, in contrast to the open-ended Congressional funding.

Figure 6.1: Grants from the National Endowment for Democracy, 1985-2009. Funds are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Data source: NED Annual Reports.

Figure 6.2: Grants from the National Endowment for Democracy, by Region, 1985-2009. Funds are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. This graph contains totals only for grants that went to single countries and omits grants to Oceania, which totaled less than $1 million. Data source: NED Annual Reports.

approximately 84 percent in 2009—go to grants. Although the NED gives out grants directly to overseas groups, four American organizations that were key to its founding po-
Figure 6.3: **Total NED Grants by Target State Democracy Level.** Funds are in constant 2010 U.S. dollars. Freedom House score represents the average of the scores for political rights and civil liberties. Data sources: NED Annual Reports and Freedom in the World Reports.

...political compromise—the Solidarity Center (an affiliate of the AFL-CIO that replaced the similarly-affiliated Free Trade Union Institute), the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE; an offshoot of the Chamber of Commerce), the International Republican Institute (IRI; loosely linked with the Republican Party and formerly known as the National Republican Institute), and the National Democratic Institute (NDI; loosely linked with the Democratic Party)—are its core grantees. Those organizations, which can and do seek out funding from sources other than NED, continue to receive just over half of the NED’s grants, although that percentage has declined over time. The core grantees as well as some of the other grant recipients re-grant NED funds to other organizations that then enact the projects in the target countries.

Although the NED refers to itself as a non-governmental organization, it has close government ties since it relies almost exclusively on government grants for its annual revenues. The NED’s governing body is a Board of Directors that contains former and current politi-
cians from both major American political parties, labor and business leaders, and other Washington, D.C. political insiders, such as experts at think tanks and former ambassadors. Although the NED is subject to United States government’s financial management and reporting rules, including audits, it decides where to spend its money. Unlike USAID, the NED can spend its funds anywhere without restrictions, including in countries where there are United States government sanctions or embargoes (Melia, 2005, 3). The one exception is that the NED is legally prohibited from supporting civil society groups that are associated with violence.

6.1.2 Why Study the National Endowment for Democracy?

With this background in mind, we can now answer the question: Why study variations in democracy assistance at the National Endowment for Democracy? In 2009, the NED received $131 million from the United States government; that amount represents at most around 5 percent of total American democracy assistance. Although the NED is a relatively small donor when compared to USAID and the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, it is an excellent test case for my argument about variations in democracy assistance over time because of four research design considerations. Although I assess how generalizable my findings about the NED are more systematically in Section 6.3, I do note here that its grantees typically receive grants from many other donors (Scott and Steele, 2005, 441-442), which suggests that NED projects at least partially represent the activities of the broader democracy establishment. In Jordan I found, for example, that NED recipients on average receive grants from around three other international donors.

First, on a practical level, unlike other American government democracy assistance donors (e.g., USAID) and non-American government donors, many materials related to

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5The exception is funds that Congress or the State Department appropriates to the NED beyond the NED’s core appropriation. The U.S. government sets aside money for specific target countries with these additional funds.
NED grants are subject to Freedom of Information Act reporting requirements. Thus, the NED has cataloged its grants’ project descriptions, recipient countries, and amounts in a thorough, consistent, and transparent way over time in its Annual Reports. In contrast, for example, the USAID democracy and governance data recorded in the OECD database between 1990 and 2003 have only a 0.62 correlation with an internal USAID database (generally regarded as the more reliable data source) that former USAID employees Andrew Green and John Richter kept, which suggests significant measurement error (Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson, 2007, 422). Conversations with people involved in the data collection and reporting suggest that the sources of the errors vary temporally, as do the extent and the content of USAID project descriptions in the Congressional Budget Justifications. Achieving the goals of this chapter requires records that are detailed and consistent over time.

Do NED Annual Reports accurately represent the projects that were funded on the ground? To verify the validity of the NED project descriptions, I interviewed directors at seventeen out of the twenty-four organizations in Jordan that have received NED grants. Their descriptions of the projects uniformly matched the NED project descriptions. Likewise, I found little evidence of additional covert projects taking place in Jordan that were omitted from the Annual Reports. The NED typically withholds the name of the grant recipient in sensitive situations, but it still records the amount given along with a description of the project (minus any identifying details). Thus, I conclude that the NED project descriptions accurately and reliably provide information about American democracy assistance programs.

Second, studying variations in a single donor’s democracy assistance programs allows me to hold constant a number of potentially confounding factors related to organizational structure and donor preferences that could shape my outcomes of interest. In the American

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6Interview 101, with former USAID democracy practitioner, by telephone, July 17, 2009. Specifically, bookkeeping and computing problems seem to have caused the inconsistencies in the OECD data.
context, for example, USAID and the Department of State have changed considerably over time. At USAID, for example, and as I discuss in Chapter 7, democracy and governance activities began in the mid-1980s in the regional bureaus, eventually grew into the Center for Democracy and Governance in the Global Bureau in 1993, and then were downgraded to the Office for Democracy and Governance in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance in 2002. Meanwhile, the Office of Transitional Initiatives was created in 1994 in the Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance to finance rapid-response assistance projects to build democracy and peace (Carothers, 2009b, 10-12). Such transformations change (as well as indicate changes) in how USAID promotes democracy. In contrast, despite its early origins, the NED’s institutional structure and leadership have persisted over time; for example, founding President Carl Gershman continues in that office as of 2011. Although the organization has steadily expanded, its mission remains the same and no major organizational changes have occurred. In an interview, for example, a former NED program officer criticized the organization precisely for its consistency: “The people at the NED are still all the same as at end of the Cold War and they’re still using the same strategies. It’s very problematic!”

Third, the NED has the principal–agent structure that my argument addresses and yet, according to conventional wisdom, is a hard test for the dissertation’s argument. As I described above, the NED receives United States government funds and re-grants them to other organizations, who re-grant those grants. The NED is thus both a principal and an agent in the transnational delegation chain that I predict rewards measurable and regime compatible programs. As I assume would happen in a democratic appropriations process, the NED has been under intense Congressional scrutiny in the past. Concerns about “[h]ow Endowment activities will differ from, and relate to, existing United States government and private sector programs promoting the Endowment’s purposes” were raised from the start

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7Interview 53, with former democracy assistance grant-maker, in person, Washington, D.C., August 19, 2009.
by the United States General Accounting Office (1984, iv). The concerns reached their apex in the early 1990s, when critics from both the left and the right criticized the NED for serving special interest groups, not American foreign policy goals. In 1992, for example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee requested that the General Accounting Office review the NED’s programs to ascertain if they duplicated USAID’s democracy programs. The NED retained its funding as well as a major interest in satisfying its principals, so the theorized causal mechanisms should operate.

But because the NED is partially delinked from the government it may face less stringent reporting requirements than would an explicitly governmental democracy donor. Perhaps in line with that expectation, the NED is conventionally thought of as the nimble, more confrontational cousin of USAID democracy assistance. Three examples illustrate the conventional wisdom. First, Carothers (1999, 95) describes the NED as “operat[ing] in politically sensitive situations, dispersing financial support to human rights groups, independent newspapers and journals, groups of exiled dissidents, fledgling civil activists, and independent civic education efforts.” Second, Diamond (1997, 22-23) writes, “nongovernmental organizations like NED...must remain vigorously engaged in democracy promotion” because of how they differ from USAID. Furthermore, he says, “[US]AID’s elaborate decision mechanisms and reviewing, reporting, and auditing procedures make it unable to respond quickly to crises and new opportunities, less prone to take risks, and less effective in dealing with smaller and less formal organizations.” Finally, a report by the United States Congress (1994, 14) affirmed the NED’s value because it can “work with pioneer (and often controversial) democratic movements, even exile groups,” which would be

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9Note that on average, since 1985 a lower proportion of the NED’s programs have been measurable and regime compatible than the donors’ programs considered in the previous chapter, so there seems to be some truth in this conventional wisdom.
“too risky” for governmental donors. Furthermore, relative to other governmental donors, the NED is also thought to have a “general lack of interest in evaluations” (United States General Accounting Office, 1991; Carothers, 1999, 288). Thus, more so than evidence of the growth of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance over time at the highly bureaucratized USAID, such evidence from the NED would be surprising and strong support for my argument.

Finally, the NED—as the oldest democracy donor in the United States—is an important organization and worthy of study. Network analysts argue that in scale-free networks—networks dominated and linked together by a few key “hubs”—centrally-positioned nodes are powerful agenda-setters and gate-keepers (Lake and Wong, 2009; Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009, 570). As discussed in Chapter 7 in greater detail, the democracy establishment’s network structure involves a tightly connected group of central organizations that are linked to a broad group of peripheral organizations. At the center of the core group is that National Endowment for Democracy, which ranks as the third most linked-to organization in the democracy establishment in cyberspace.\(^\text{10}\)

Furthermore, although the NED’s supporters can provide numerous anecdotes of its success, doubts remain. The NED was credited, for example, with helping the successful democratic transitions in the Czech Republic, South Africa, and Chile (Scott and Steele, 2005, 441). As a consequence, former NDI and Freedom House executive (and current Obama administration official) Thomas Melia has called the NED “[t]he best money available in the democracy promotion business” and called for a quintupling of its budget while slashing USAID and the State Department’s democracy budgets (Melia, 2006, 129).\(^\text{11}\) But systematic, cross-national evidence of the NED’s positive impact is less forthcoming. Scott and Steele (2005) found that NED grants are not associated with democratization in target

\(^{10}\)I collected this data using IssueCrawler, a web-based network mapping software developed by the Gov-com.org foundation and Professor Richard Rogers. Available at http://www.issuercrawler.net/ (accessed April 1, 2011).

\(^{11}\)McFaul (2010, 198)—now also in the Obama administration—likewise recommended expanding the NED.
states and also that democratization in target states is not associated with the allocation of NED grants. They hypothesize that the NED instead allocates grants for “dictatorship resistance.” Hale (2003), in contrast, found that NED grants were targeted to democratic “need” but still were not associated with improvements in levels of democracy. Given those concerns about the NED’s efficacy, and its centrality in the democracy establishment, we need an account of how and why the NED promotes democracy in the ways that it does.

6.2 Changes Over Time in the NED’s Grants

6.2.1 Data and Methods

The National Endowment for Democracy’s Grants

In order to test my argument about convergence within the democracy establishment, I analyzed a random sample of 5,000 projects out of the more than 10,000 total projects funded by the NED between 1985 and 2009. I obtained project descriptions for these grants from the NED’s Annual Reports, 1985-2009, at the organization’s Democracy Resource Center in Washington, D.C. I then classified the projects according to the twenty categories described in Chapter 4. Appendix D contains the coding guidelines. Coding was blind with respect to the project year and target country and was implemented using the Coding Analysis Toolkit (CAT) software. As Figure 6.4 shows, once coded, the top five cate-

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13 Through its Democracy Resource Center, the NED hosts an online database of democracy assistance projects that NED librarians coded by “subject” area. The database is available at http://socialhost05.inmagic.com/Presto/home/Default.aspx (accessed July 15, 2010). The head NED librarian, Allen Overland, recommended against using it in a personal communication because of reliability concerns. Furthermore, the subject areas do not map onto the typical sectors used in the democracy establishment, nor do they have a sufficient level of detail to test the argument.

14 See http://pcat.qdap.net (accessed February 20, 2010). I developed the coding guidelines through an iterative process of coding and validation of hundreds of projects with two trained coders from the University of Massachusett’s Qualitative Data Analysis Program, Meaghan Foran and Nick Losso. I thank them and Stuart Shulman for their help using CAT.
gories (in descending order of dollar amounts) are unions, political parties, business and enterprise, dissidents, and civil society (residual). Notably, three of those categories are neither measurable nor regime compatible—unions, political parties, and dissidents—which makes clear that such programs have historically been important at the NED. Although the NED was a fairly small grant-making institution in the 1980s (see Figure 6.1), programs in all twenty categories were coded in the 5,000 project sample by 1990. For this reason, any increase in the proportions of measurable and regime compatible programs over the NED’s twenty-five year history cannot be caused purely by the introduction of new categories of democracy assistance.

Figure 6.4: NED Grant Commitments, By Category. Programs coded by author. Data source: NED Annual Reports.

As discussed in Chapter 4, the twenty categories can be sorted into measurable and regime compatible groups. After classifying the project descriptions, I created country–year observations that record the proportion of total NED grant money received that are
measurable and regime compatible. These observations serve as the dependent variables for my analysis. Note that any independent state that hosted a NED project was eligible for inclusion in the sample. NED grants that went to a region, non-state entity, or multiple countries, which represent 18 percent of the sample, were excluded from the analysis. 135 countries have received NED grants at some point, with the average country receiving 72 NED grants between 1985 and 2009 and receiving NED grants over a period of twelve years. The average amount for a NED grant in the sample was $90,765, with grants ranging from just $2,800 to $14,700,000.

Having classified the NED’s grants, we can now make some simple bivariate comparisons to see if the expected relationships exist. Figure 6.5 shows the proportions of measurable and regime compatible NED projects over time. It suggests that, as predicted by my argument, over time the proportions of democracy assistance projects that are measurable and regime compatible have increased. The patterns for both measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are similar: Each proportion has more than doubled since 1985, although their increase leveled off in the twenty-first century as threshold models of learning and diffusion would predict.

Other Factors that Could Influence NED Grant-making

Figure 6.5 suggests a systematic relationship between the passage of time and how measurable and regime compatible NED grants are. Although this finding is consistent with my argument about the rise of the democracy establishment, many other factors could also change over time. To account for such factors, I now move to an econometric analysis that can explicitly include them. The rest of the empirical set-up for this analysis follows directly from the previous chapter’s analysis. My main independent variable of interest is now the year, and I also include a year-squared term to test for threshold effects. As

before, I include four types of variables to test my argument against alternative explanations for foreign aid allocation patterns. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis are provided at the end of the section in Table 6.1.

First, I include measures of strategic alignment between the United States and the target countries of NED grants in the previous year. Conventional wisdom about foreign aid predicts that these measures would be positively related to the proportion of regime compatible democracy assistance in a country–year. The United States government may use NED grants as a way of rewarding or bribing countries that comply with American foreign policy. As in the previous chapter, I use the affinity score between the United States and the target country, which is based on states’ similarities in voting records in the United Nations General Assembly, to capture preference alignment (Gartzke, 1998). This variable ranges from -1 to 1. A better measure of a host country’s strategic relationship with the United States is, however, the amount of American military aid it receives. Affinity in UN voting made sense as a control variable when considering a variety of donors, many of which do not give military aid. But giving military aid to a target state is a director indicator of the target state’s strategic relationship with the donor when the donor is the United States.
obtained military aid data from the USAID Greenbook, where they are recorded in millions of constant 2008 U.S. dollars. In robustness checks, I instead use the total annual bilateral U.S. aid received by the target country. This variable captures both the United States’ strategic interests in aiding the country as well as some of the country’s development needs. The OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee Official Development Assistance (ODA) database provides bilateral aid data in constant 2008 U.S. dollars.

Second, I include measures of target countries’ democracy levels and regime types. Research on foreign aid shows that donors will sometimes target and tailor foreign aid to countries’ needs and abilities to use aid effectively. We might expect that the proportion of regime compatible democracy assistance that target countries receive would be curvilinear with their democracy levels: Highly authoritarian states make it very difficult for donors to implement democracy assistance programs, and any programs that the international community manages to covertly support there will likely challenge the regimes. In contrast, moderately authoritarian states allow democracy assistance programs, but are likely to prevent regime incompatible ones. Finally, transitional democracies allow both regime compatible and regime incompatible programs. This curvilinear relationship can be empirically modeled by including a measure of democracy as well as the square of that measure.

As in Chapter 5, Freedom House provides my main measure of target countries’ democracy levels. Freedom House scores countries in terms of their political rights and civil liberties on a one to seven scale, which I transformed such that one represents the least democratic countries and seven the most democratic. In the analyses that follow, I take the average of those two scores and use that average as a measure of target states’ democ-

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16 Available at http://gbk.eads.usaidall.net.gov/ (accessed July 10, 2010). I added one before taking the natural log of all skewed variables in order to eliminate zeroes. If the Greenbook did not contain information about military aid data for a country–year, I assumed that the country received no U.S. military aid. I followed the same procedures when constructing the total bilateral U.S. aid variable below.

17 Available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/qwids (accessed June 20, 2010). NED allocations are generally not included in ODA.

racy levels. In robustness checks, I instead use three alternative measures of target states’ democracy levels: the Polity2 measure from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2007); the change in the average Freedom House score from the previous year; and a dichotomous measure of democracy (“unfree” vs. “partly free” on the Freedom House scale). Unless otherwise noted, my main results are robust to these alternative measures.

Within authoritarian countries, important variations in regime type also exist that may shape democracy assistance outcomes if donors tailor democracy assistance programs to target countries’ characteristics. Authoritarian regimes use a number of institutional strategies to stay in power, and these different arrangements mean that certain types of democracy support would be more or less appropriate; legislative assistance may, for example, reinforce authoritarian rule in a single-party regime or monarchy that holds elections for parliament. To help distinguish between different types of countries that all score low on measures of democracy, Geddes (1999a,b, 2003) classified authoritarian regimes into three categories—military, single-party, and personalist—as well as hybrids. Wright (2008a) extended Geddes’ classification system forward in time and also added in the category of monarchies. I include his authoritarian regime type variables in my analyses. All regime type data were obtained from Teorell et al. (2011).

Third, if donors’ preferences matter, we would also expect the composition of democracy assistance programs to vary at critical moments of political change in donor countries. Such moments of change could have international or domestic origins. On the international side, perhaps the end of the Cold War or September 11, 2001 really caused the changes that I predict take place over time. Both moments significantly reshaped American democracy promotion policy and foreign policy more generally (Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, 2000; Traub, 2008). On the domestic side, two key change points in American politics that could affect democracy assistance policy are the passage of the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the Republican Party’s takeover of Congress in the 1994 election. GPRA, in the words of the GAO, “[sought] to shift the focus of govern-
ment decisionmaking and accountability away from a preoccupation with the activities that are undertaken—such as grants dispensed or inspections made—to a focus on the results of those activities, such as real gains in employability, safety, responsiveness, or program quality.”

We might expect NED programs since 1993 to be more measurable as a result. A major shift in U.S. domestic politics such as the Republican win in 1994 might also affect the NED’s programming since the NED depends on Congressional funding. Since the Republican Party (GOP) scrutinized government spending in 1994, the change in principals may have encouraged more measurable programs at the NED.

Finally, strategies of democracy assistance may vary by region owing to similarities in target countries’ characteristics or in donor countries’ preferences. The Middle East and North Africa, for example, may be an exceptional region in terms of democracy promotion because of Western countries’ geo-strategic relationships with Arab autocrats as well as the persistence of authoritarianism there. I use the following regional categories: Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and the Mediterranean.20

**Estimation Method**

As in Chapter 5, since my dependent variables are proportions—specifically, the proportions of the NED’s aid to a country in a particular year that are measurable and regime compatible—ordinary least squares regressions are not generally appropriate. I use fractional logit models with robust standard errors as recommended by Papke and Wooldridge (1996). I estimate the models in STATA as generalized linear models in the binomial family with a logit link. In order to take into account the time-series, cross-section nature of the data, in robustness checks I include the over-time averages of all the independent variables

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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
<th>N</th>
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</thead>
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<td>0.40</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Regime Compatible</td>
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<td>0.41</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>6.80</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,244</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
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<td>397</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,012</td>
<td>1,079</td>
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<td>0.28</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>0.67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12,180</td>
<td>960</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.64</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>493</td>
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<td>Distance</td>
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<td>3,283</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>16,374</td>
<td>1,244</td>
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</table>

Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables, Over Time Analysis. Note: The non-logged version of variables are provided in this table for ease of interpretation.

as well as the number of time periods for each target country in fractional probit models, still with robust standard errors. This method is more appropriate for unbalanced panels than using unit fixed effects where $T$ is fixed and $N \to \infty$, as is the case in my data (Papke and Wooldridge, 2008, 122). I also include lagged dependent variables as regressors as an alternative robustness check. Unless noted otherwise, my main findings are robust to these methods.

### 6.2.2 Democracy Assistance Projects Across Time and Space

This section presents my main findings from regressions that test the proposition that over time, democracy assistance programs should become more measurable and regime compatible. The Baseline Models (Models 1 and 2) regress the proportion of democracy assistance at the NED that is measurable or regime compatible on a time indicator, time squared, the target state’s lagged military aid receipts, and the target state’s lagged democracy level (measured by Freedom House) and democracy level squared. As Table 6.2 shows, in all models, time is positively and statistically significantly related to the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that a country receives. A shift from
the year 1994 (25th percentile) to 2005 (75th percentile) is associated with an estimated increase of 11 percent in measurable democracy assistance programs and 10 percent in regime compatible democracy assistance programs. This finding supports the argument that democracy practitioners shift their approach gradually in line with the incentives and norms of their field. Furthermore, the year-squared variable is statistically significant and negative across all models, which suggests that the rise of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs eventually plateaued.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DV = % Measurable</th>
<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
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<td>Model 2</td>
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<td>Baseline</td>
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<td>-0.01*** (0.00)</td>
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<td>0.21 (0.16)</td>
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<td>0.01 (0.02)</td>
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<td>2.63*** (0.51)</td>
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<td>-626.89</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: The Effect of Time on NED Grants. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

The foreign aid literature suggests that donors give aid to countries that they wish to reward or bribe for policy concessions to the donor. In line with this finding, Table 6.2 shows that there is a positive relationship between target countries’ receipts of U.S. military aid and the proportion of regime compatible democracy assistance that the NED targets at them. In order to pinpoint the mechanism that relates American military aid to
regime compatible programs, I substitute alternative measures of a target state’s strategic relationship with the United States for military aid. When I replace military aid in Model 2 with target countries’ total bilateral American aid receipts, I find no relationship with regime compatible democracy assistance ($p < 0.82$). Furthermore, when I replace it with a measure of target countries’ affinity with the United States, I find that countries that vote similarly to the United States at the UN receive less regime compatible democracy assistance than other countries, all else equal ($p < 0.02$). Therefore, there is something specific about security hierarchies with host countries—rather than general preference alignments with them—that affects democracy assistance programs. In my case study of democracy assistance in Jordan, I parse out the mechanisms behind this finding further.

The foreign aid literature also suggests that donors may design democracy assistance to match target countries’ political development needs. We might expect donors to give more democratic countries more regime compatible forms of democracy assistance—such as aid for constitutions, good governance, or legislatures—while sending relatively confrontational forms of democracy assistance to more authoritarian countries—such as aid for dissidents, elections, or political parties. In contrast to the donors studied in the previous chapter, and as Table 6.2 shows, large standard errors prevent us from convincingly establishing a relationship between a country’s democracy level and how regime compatible its democracy assistance is. This null result holds when I use a variety of alternative measures of democracy, such as Polity2 score, a dichotomous measure of democracy, and change in democracy scores. Interestingly, there is a clear positive relationship between democracy levels and measurable democracy assistance ($p < 0.01$). Since I did not predict a relationship between these factors, I disaggregated the categories to identify its source. A strong positive relationship between elections aid (a measurable category of democracy assistance) and democracy levels and a strong negative relationship between dissidents aid (a non-measurable category of democracy assistance) and democracy levels seems to drive this finding. It seems that for those two categories, the regime type of the target state is
especially important.

What about variations in authoritarian regime types? To answer that question, I restrict the sample to just authoritarian countries between 1985 and 2003, the years for which Wright (2008a) has data on the types of authoritarian regimes (i.e., military, monarchy, personalist, and single-party). First, I rerun Model 2 (the Baseline Model) from Table 6.2 with the restricted sample. When I do so, the coefficient estimates for year remain statistically significant and positive (and negative for the year-squared variable), further supporting my argument (see Model 3 in Table 6.3). I then add an indicator variable for each authoritarian regime type, one at a time, in Models 4-7 in Table 6.3. The evidence suggests that monarchies receive more regime compatible forms of democracy assistance than other authoritarian countries, all else equal ($p < 0.05$), a relationship that was also true for the democracy donors considered in Chapter 5. Otherwise, I do not find strong relationships between authoritarian regime types and the relative amount of regime compatible democracy assistance that countries receive.

In Table 6.4, I also examine how the NED’s grants vary by region. I initially introduce indicator variables for the six main regions—Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Europe, Latin American, and the Middle East and North Africa—in Models 8 and 10. Latin America is the omitted region to which the other regions are compared. Latin America seems to receive less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance than most other regions in the world, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant coefficient estimates for all the other regional indicator variables. But the logic tested in the previous chapter suggests an alternative explanation for this finding: The closer a target country is to the United States, the less measurable and regime compatible the programs funded by the NED will be because it is easier for the NED to monitor such programs. Since Latin America is the region with the closest countries to the United States, it could receive less measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs because it is easier for the NED to monitor programs there.
The effect of Time on NED Grants, Authoritarian Regimes

Table 6.3: The Effect of Time on NED Grants, Authoritarian Regimes. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

Monitoring Problems at the NED

In order to probe the effect of monitoring problems at the NED, I introduce a new variable in Models 9 and 11 in Table 6.4: the log of the distance between Washington, D.C. (where the NED is based) and the target country’s capital city (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010). Interestingly, in both models, distance is positively related to measurable and regime compatible programs. This finding further supports my principal–agent argument about democracy assistance since monitoring problems tend to increase with distance. As
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<th>Model 8 w/ Distance</th>
<th>Model 9 w/ Regions</th>
<th>Model 9 w/ Distance</th>
<th>Model 10 w/ Regions</th>
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<td>-622.10</td>
<td>-619.70</td>
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Table 6.4: The Effect of Time on NED Grants, Controlling for Distance. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Latin America is the omitted comparison group for the regional fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes p < 0.01, ** denotes p < 0.05, and * denotes p < 0.10.

The negative coefficient estimates for the regional variables in those regressions show, once we take into account distance, Latin America receives more measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs than every other world region except for the Middle East. In other words, the farther a country is from Washington, D.C., the more measurable and regime compatible NED grants it receives; regional differences persist once we ad-
just for distance, however, with Latin America and the Middle East receiving more regime compatible aid. That the Middle East receive more regime compatible aid is perhaps unsurprising, given the United States’ security relationships in the region.

On that note, there is another observable implication of my principal–agent argument that can be tested using the NED data. Although the NED does not report information about its grantees’ use of implementing organizations, we can make one inference about the degree of monitoring problems that are likely to ensue across different NED projects. The NED monitors the four core organizations that it funds (the Solidarity Center, CIPE, IRI, and NDI) less than its other grantees for several reasons. First, the core organizations are more likely to re-grant funds to other NGOs than the overseas NGOs that the NED funds, which are more often small NGOs that would not have the capacity (or the desire) to re-grant the money. Second, the core organizations always receive grants from the NED according to the organization’s founding principles and thus are subject to less monitoring by the NED than are organizations that must apply for grants in a fully competitive environment. As one interviewee put it: “The allocation of funds from NED to NDI is really just a push through... So what NED really cares about are not the programs that it rubber stamps but instead its discretionary programs.”\textsuperscript{21} As a consequence, we would expect that the programs funded through the core organizations would be more measurable and more regime compatible than other programs, all else equal. Figure 6.6 shows that this relationship does, in fact, hold. In both cases, simple T-tests indicate that the differences between core and non-core organizations are statistically significant ($p < 0.02$ for measurable; $p < 0.001$ for regime compatible).

## 6.2.3 Robustness Checks

A skeptical reader might point out at this stage that many things change over time and that using an indicator of a program’s year is at best an indirect measure of the forces of

\textsuperscript{21}Interview 70, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010.
competition and professionalization that I argue inhere in the democracy establishment over time. This critique is fair and important to consider carefully. In the qualitative analysis that follow in subsequent chapters I tackle this weakness head-on by presenting direct evidence of the impact of competition and professionalization on democracy assistance outcomes. For now, I consider five of the most plausible factors that have also changed over time—some with respect to the target countries, some with respect to the donor countries—to see if they are truly what is causing the time trend that I have documented above.

First, perhaps only “hard cases” are left today, so democracy promoters have necessarily changed their strategies. The “third wave” of democratization, which began in Portugal in 1974, brought procedural democracy to countries throughout Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s (Huntington, 1991). As a consequence, the easy cases—true transitioning democracies—may have now transitioned out of the need for democracy assistance, leaving only the intransigent autocratic regimes for democracy
practitioners to work in. Carothers (2002, 17) has developed this point of view and as a consequence called upon what I term the democracy establishment to leave behind the approach that it developed while working in the easy cases in favor of a new approach: “It is time for the democracy promotion community to discard the transition paradigm.”

In Table 6.5, I examine the determinants of NED democracy assistance programs in the “hard cases,” which I define as those countries that Freedom House classifies as “unfree.” Such countries, of which there are seventy in my sample, have a combined Freedom House score that is less than 2.5. I repeat the Baseline regressions (Models 1 and 2) from Table 6.2 with this reduced sample, except that I remove the Democracy-squared term since the range of values for this variable is now truncated. As the results show, even among the hard cases, there is a significant shift over time towards more measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance. Interestingly, among the hard cases U.S. military aid is not clearly related to regime compatible democracy assistance.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
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<td>Model 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hard Cases</td>
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<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>0.21*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-squared</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.00)</td>
<td>-0.01*** (0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
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<td>0.05 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Countries</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Table 6.5: Over Time Changes in NED Programs, “Hard Cases”. All regressions are fractional logit models. “Hard cases” have a combined average Freedom House score of less than 2.5. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$. 
Second, the international system has changed significantly since 1985. Perhaps the end of the Cold War or September 11, 2001, two events that affected democracy promotion and foreign policy more generally in important ways, in fact drive my findings about change over time in democracy assistance. Table 6.6 again replicates the Baseline Models (Models 1 and 2 from Table 6.2), this time with the introduction of indicator variables for the end of the Cold War and for September 11, 2011. Including those variables does not alter the signs or the statistical significance of the coefficient estimates on the year and the year-squared variables. Furthermore, once the overall time trend is accounted for, the end of the Cold War and September 11 have no clear impact on how measurable or regime compatible democracy assistance programs at the NED are. The trend towards these programs is consistent over time and does not coincide with major shifts in the international system. In other words, the end of the Cold War and September 11 did not cause significant over time changes in the composition of NED grants.

Finally, Table 6.7 shows that two important moments in American domestic politics may have affected democracy assistance policy: the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the Republican Party’s takeover of Congress in the 1994 election. In Table 6.7 I introduce variables indicating these moments in U.S. history to the Baseline Models. As Models 17 and 18 show, the events of American domestic politics in 1993 and 1994 do seem to have increased how measurable the NED’s programs are. Since both events happen at around the same time, it is hard to pinpoint the precise cause of the effect. The finding is, however, broadly consistent with the principal–agent logic that also underpins the dissertation. If the NED’s principal—Congress—made an effort in the 1990s to generate more results-oriented government programs and to monitor government spending, then we would expect the NED to respond to that incentive. In fact, it seems that the NED did so with its increase in measurable programs. In contrast, and again in line with

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22The end of the Cold War in Table 6.6 is coded as 1990, although the findings are robust to an alternative coding of the end of the Cold War in 1992.


### Table 6.6: The Effect of Time on NED Programs, Controlling for International Temporal Changes

Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

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<tr>
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<td>-0.00**</td>
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As in Chapter 5, a final way to examine the results is to see what the relationship is between time and each individual category of democracy assistance. Is it possible that variations in only one or two categories drive my positive findings between time and measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs? Do measurable programs really drive my positive findings about regime compatible programs, or vice versa? It is worth
### Table 6.7: The Effect of Time on NED Programs, Controlling for Domestic Temporal Changes

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<td>0.60***</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
<td>-0.07***</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPRA</td>
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<td>0.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOP Congress</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.45*</td>
<td>0.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>-2.24***</td>
<td>-2.13***</td>
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<td>(-0.37)</td>
<td>(-0.40)</td>
<td>(-0.39)</td>
</tr>
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<td>1,074</td>
<td>1,074</td>
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<td>Countries</td>
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<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-628.01</td>
<td>-627.40</td>
<td>-626.53</td>
<td>-625.98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$.

noting that the NED programs are fairly evenly divided between the groups of measurable and regime compatible categories; in my sample, 1,427 projects (29 percent of the 5,000 project sample) are neither regime compatible nor measurable, 1,107 projects (22 percent) are measurable only, 1,452 (29 percent) are regime compatible only, and 1,014 (20 percent) are both measurable and regime compatible.

In order to answer those questions, I again run individual regressions in which the dependent variables are the proportions of democracy assistance given by the NED in that country–year in each category. The independent variables are, as in the Baseline Models (from Table 6.2, Models 1 and 2), year, year-squared, military aid, democracy level, and
democracy level squared. By including these control variables, I can also address the possibility discussed in Chapter 4 that how regime compatible a program is depends on the target country’s regime type. Ideally, I would estimate these regressions using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) as in Chapter 5; SUR estimates a system of linear regressions with correlations across the error terms. These equations do not, however, have a sufficient number of observations to estimate via SUR, so I simply estimate them as fractional logit regressions. Figure 6.7 presents the results of these regressions, focusing just on the coefficients for the year variable.

![Figure 6.7: Expected Effect of Time, by Category](image)

All coefficients were estimated using fractional logit regressions with robust standard errors. The dots represent the estimated coefficient on year and the lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. Categories are measurable, regime compatible, neither, or both.

As Figure 6.7 shows, the estimated coefficients for the year variable vary across categories that are measurable, regime compatible, both, and neither. First, I examine the categories that are neither regime compatible nor measurable. Across all the regressions,
three categories have clearly declined in relative importance over time: aid to dissidents, political parties, and unions. None of these categories are measurable or regime compatible. Thus, their relative decline fits with my predictions about different types of democracy assistance and how appealing they are to professionals in the democracy establishment. In Chapter 4, I classified the categories of research and youth as not regime compatible, but more ambiguously so than the other not regime compatible categories. Figure 6.7 seems to bear this classification out since the time coefficients for those categories are less clearly negative than for the categories of dissidents, political parties, or trade unions.

One possible explanation for the negative coefficient estimates for dissidents, political parties, and trade unions is that the concept of “democracy assistance” at the NED has simply become broader over time. Perhaps the broadening of democracy assistance is why the relative prominence of certain program types has faded. Yet when I examine the predictors of the amount of assistance—rather than the proportion of assistance in those categories—I still find that time is negatively and statistically significantly related to the outcome variables for aid to dissidents and unions ($p < 0.001$). This negative finding is especially significant since the overall amount of aid given out by the NED has increased dramatically over time, as shown by Figure 6.1. It suggests that measurable and regime compatible programs are not just being added to the programs that dominated the NED’s early years but are in fact replacing them.

Second, an examination of the coefficient estimates on time for categories that are either measurable or regime compatible in Figure 6.7 suggests that time is more positively related to both types of programs than it is for programs that are neither measurable nor regime compatible. It is also clear, however, that categories that are only regime compatible seem to have a stronger positive relationship with time than categories that are only measurable. This finding underscores that there is something distinct for each causal process—measurable and regime compatible. Why the NED’s emphasis on regime compatible programs seems to grow stronger over time than its emphasis on measurable programs remains
an open question for future research. Perhaps given the NED’s relatively close proximity to its principal—the U.S. government—and its political opposition the NED faced fairly strong incentives to conduct measurable programs from its start. Meanwhile, the NED increasingly learned to respond to the access-driven incentives that drive it towards regime compatible programs over time.

Finally, in general, the relationship between time and measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs seems strongest for categories of democracy assistance that are both, such as aid to support good governance and to support women’s political participation. This tentative finding of an additive effect seems consistent with the argument that both types of democracy assistance would increase over time. Thus, I conclude that there is something about both measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that matters increasingly over time, and the category-by-category findings line up well with my theoretical expectations.

### 6.3 The External Validity of the Findings

Although the chapter has thus far shown a variety of forms of evidence that there is a positive relationship between time and the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance that countries receive from the NED, some particular characteristic of the NED could cause the findings. This section turns to the issue of the findings’ external validity. Do my findings about the NED reflect a broader trend in democracy assistance?

The complicated issue for this analysis is identifying a broader sample of democracy assistance programs that permits us to accurately test the convergence proposition. As discussed in Section 6.1, using data on democracy assistance projects from the full sample of OECD donors that I considered in the previous chapter raises several problems for determining changes over time. One problem is that the donor governments and organizations have changed considerably over time and therefore other factors could cause any changes
that we find in democracy assistance programs over time. A second problem is that that democracy assistance is *self-identified* by the donors. Whereas all of the NED’s grants are democracy assistance, by definition, when reporting to the OECD, donor governments choose how to categorize their efforts. The growing norms of democracy and democracy promotion give us strong reason to suspect that donors might change how they would categorize the same project over time, perhaps becoming more likely to include activities in democracy assistance that previously they would have categorized in other sectors. Yet this process could occur at different moments for different donors. A final problem is that many donors enter the sample after 1985, and so the comparison group varies year-to-year. I can, however, eliminate this last problem by removing such donors from the sample. When I look for evidence of increases over time in the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance in the resulting sample by replicating the Baseline Models, I do not find it. Owing to the significant remaining problems with this analysis’ research design, however, I do not draw a strong inference from the evidence.

The option I instead pursue to test for the results’ external validity is to examine over time trends in USAID democracy and governance data. There are some inferential problems here, too, as discussed above; specifically, USAID’s institutional arrangements have changed several times with regards to democracy assistance and so fewer factors are held constant in the USAID analysis as in the NED. Still, as the largest democracy donor organization in the largest democracy donor (the United States), an analysis of USAID programs offers a good way to see if the NED trends hold up more broadly. The USAID data that I use are from the Green–Richter database, the most accurate data set on USAID democracy assistance although its time series coverage is more limited than the USAID data contained in the OECD database.23 Annual data on USAID outlays for the categories of civil society, elections, good governance, human rights, legal systems, and media are available

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23 For some discussion of the advantages, see Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007, 415, 421).
from 1990 to 2003. I translate these funding data into the dependent variables of the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance.

My analysis of the data uses a similar approach to my analysis of the NED data. The key difference is that because of the truncated sample of years (my data cover only fourteen years rather than twenty-four), I do not see evidence of the effect of time plateauing, so I exclude the year-squared term. First, I simply regress the proportions of measurable and regime compatible USAID democracy assistance on an indicator of the year. As Table 6.8 shows, as predicted, the year variable is positive and statistically significant in both cases. Democracy assistance in 2001 (75th percentile) is predicted to be 16 percent more measurable than in 1994 (25th percentile) and 3 percent more regime compatible. I then repeat the Baseline Models (Models 1 and 2 from Table 6.2) with this sample in order to control for other key factors that might affect USAID democracy assistance. Although the coefficient estimate for year in the measurable model (Model 22) remains statistically significant and positive, it is no longer statistically significant at conventional levels in the regime compatible models (Model 24).

At USAID, there seem to have been stronger convergence pressures towards measurable programs than towards regime compatible programs, although in general the pressures for both types of programs seem lower than at the NED. One explanation of this finding is that the proportion of regime compatible democracy assistance at USAID was already high (on average, 76 percent) so there may not have been much room to increase it. Another is simply the truncated number of years. Finally, since USAID as an institution has a closer relationship to the United States government than the NED does, USAID has relatively less slack than the NED and the convergence pressures are likely to be less strong.

How do the other variables fare? The coefficient estimate for the military aid variable in Model 24 is positive, as in the earlier NED models. Democracy’s curvilinear relationship

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\(^{24}\)Data available at [http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html](http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html) (accessed July 30, 2009).
with regime compatible democracy assistance is, however, in the opposite direction as it was with the NED; as countries become more democratic, they receive less regime compatible democracy assistance, up until a point where the relationship reverses. In this way, USAID is more similar to the donors considered in Chapter 5. The findings from Table 6.8 are robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.

Thus, I conclude that my findings about the NED generalize somewhat to other donors, although the NED may be unique in the extent to which democracy assistance has been “tamed over time.” The reason, however, is that at least one other prominent democracy donor (USAID) was already fairly “tame.” USAID professionals may have therefore sped up and contributed to the forces that fostered convergence on measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs over time at the NED. Although data limitations and confounding factors make sharp inferences about over time changes at other donors challenging, my analysis of USAID democracy assistance suggests that at least some of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>DV = % Measurable</th>
<th>DV = % Regime Compatible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Model 21</td>
<td>Model 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.06***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
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<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy-squared</td>
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<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.03***</td>
<td>-1.83***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
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<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-639.64</td>
<td>-520.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.8: The Effect of Time on Democracy Assistance Programs, USAID Sample. Notes: All regressions are fractional logit models. All variables (except time) lagged by one year. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** denotes $p < 0.01$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, and * denotes $p < 0.10$. 
the competitive and professional pressures that affect the NED also affect the broader profession.

### 6.4 Conclusion

This chapter tested the dissertation’s hypotheses about variations and convergence in democracy assistance programs over time and across countries. There is a strong positive relationship between the time period and the proportion of democracy assistance in a given country–year that is regime compatible as well as measurable. This relationship supports my argument that competition and professionalism increase over time. In terms of the alternative explanations, I did not find a consistent relationship between regime compatible democracy assistance programs and measures of a target country’s “need” for democracy assistance—be that its democracy level, change in democracy level, or authoritarian regime type. I did find a positive relationship between regime compatible democracy assistance programs and the United States’ strategic relationship with the recipient country—as captured by military aid levels—but a negative relationship with it and UN voting affinity.

The findings are consistent with a principal–agent and sociological approach to democracy assistance. Practitioners respond to incentives to promote democracy in ways that will gain continued funding in an atmosphere of potential backlash, competition for funds, and ongoing monitoring. I substantiated these claims through the content analysis of 5,000 democracy assistance project descriptions from an original database of NED projects as well as analysis of over time patterns among other donors.

Some view the United States as lacking credibility as a democracy promoter: continuing to deal with autocratic friends and praising their superficial reforms while investing insufficient funds in democracy promotion projects (Ottaway, 2005b). Yet this chapter’s evidence suggests that the reasons to question the credibility of U.S.-government funded democracy assistance projects may run deeper. It seems that at least one major democracy
assistance organization, the NED, because of the incentives fostered by the transnational delegation chain, has increasingly pursued technical, measurable, and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance. Although the organization’s professionalization has likely made it more efficient and effective in certain ways, it has also encouraged the organization and its grantees to move towards less confrontational strategies. Measurement and access trump effective democracy promotion. Advocates of democracy promotion that want the United States to take a harder, less regime compatible approach should consider ways to reform the delegation of democracy assistance to get the incentives right. Yet the institutionalization of professional norms within the democracy establishment means that democracy assistance cannot be reformed overnight.

Although its results confirm my hypotheses, this chapter’s analysis has limitations. My measures for key concepts, such as professionalization, measurability, and regime compatibility, are blunt, and in the case of time as an indicator of professionalization, indirect. There are also additional observable implications about the preferences and behaviors of organizations inside the democracy establishment that I cannot test with cross-national data. For those reasons, the dissertation also contains two qualitative chapters to check and supplement the quantitative results using qualitative evidence. I turn now to those chapters.
Chapter 7

The Principals: The Development of Professional Democracy Donors in the United States

In 1941, a small group of activists in New York City—Herbert and Eleanor Agar, Dorothy Thompson, George Field, and Ulric Bell—joined together to form Freedom House. They sought to combat the Nazi propaganda emanating from the Braunes Haus in Munich as well as the growing isolationism of the American public. Over the next two decades, Freedom House’s Board of Trustees and small New York-based staff supported the post-World War II liberal international order, denounced McCarthyism, and promoted civil rights in the United States. The organization furthered those goals through high-profile events, policy statements, and eventually research reports, which it supported through membership fees.

Today, this non-governmental organization formed by the “war hawks of World War II” (Sussman, 2009) is one of the most active American organizations in the promotion of democracy abroad. On its website, Freedom House describes itself “an independent watchdog organization that supports the expansion of freedom around the world. Freedom House supports democratic change, monitors freedom, and advocates for democracy and
human rights.”¹ Its 120 staff members in more than one dozen global offices largely work to support freedom through U.S. government-funded democracy assistance programs. They also advance Freedom House’s mission through a variety of research publications. The organization’s domestic activities ceased long ago. Why did Freedom House’s mission and activities change? More broadly, how and why have key donor organizations in the democracy establishment become more professional over time and, in so doing, shifted their focus? Are the structures and actions of these organizations consistent with my two-pronged argument about democracy assistance?

To answer those questions, this chapter focuses on a group of actors that I refer to as the “principals.” Who are the principals? This term may cause some confusion because, as I discussed earlier in the dissertation, most of the principals in the transnational delegation chain of democracy assistance also act as agents, whether of Congress, the public, or another organization. As I use the term in this chapter, “principals” refers to organizations with two characteristics. First, the organizations are based in the sending state of democracy assistance, rather than in the target state. Second, the organizations generally do not implement or otherwise conduct democracy assistance programs overseas themselves; instead, they give money to other organizations that do so. In the next chapter, I focus on the “agents” of democracy assistance. Again, I use the term loosely, since agents in the democracy establishment are often also principals. That chapter, however, provides a complement to this one by focusing on democracy assistance organizations on the ground in another country, Jordan. It can provide a more thorough discussion of how actors in the democracy establishment seek to maintain access to target countries than this chapter can by focusing on programs in the target country.

An in-depth analysis of the “principals” such as this chapter provides is necessary in order to fully test my argument. The previous two chapters described and explained macro trends in democracy assistance across a wide variety of donors, target states, and years.

Yet some uncertainties remain regarding the chapters’ conclusions. Consider, for example, my finding in the previous chapter that democracy assistance has become more measurable over time. I ruled out the alternative explanations that this change was caused by variations in target states’ democracy levels and regime types or solely by the introduction of the Government Performance and Results Act in the United States. But perhaps government donors have an increased preference for measurable programs over time that cannot be captured merely by the passage of GPRA. We know, for example, that local governance and decentralization were development fads at the end of the twentieth century (Grindle, 2007, 4-9). Hopgood (2008, 105) has argued that humanitarian organizations have become more professional over the past three decades as a consequence of major donors’ general neoliberal orientation rather than as a consequence of organic competition between organizations; in his framework, donors want NGOs to adhere to new public management tools and compete with each other in a marketplace. Qualitative analysis of organizations in the democracy establishment can reveal why organizations became more professional over time and if donors force them to do so.

Specifically, case study analysis can provide evidence in favor of or against five observable implications of the argument. First, organizations in the democracy establishment should compete for funding from state governments and private foundations. I expect this funding competition to affect their strategies for promoting democracy abroad. Second, as a consequence of the search for funding, donor organizations should worry about demonstrating their programs’ efficacy to their funders and to the public. Third, these self-interested concerns should at times conflict with donor organizations’ sincere desires to promote democracy and advance freedom abroad. As a consequence, the organizations’ leaders should express frustration and tensions between their ideological and organizational commitments. Fourth, the staff members of key donor organizations in the democracy establishment should share specialized professional knowledge and institutions. The organizations, furthermore, should become bureaucratic. Finally, the network structure of the
democracy establishment should involve many connections between donors and aid recipients, few connections among aid recipients, and many connections among donors. This structure supports an argument about the development of norms within the headquarters of donor organizations and the transmission of those norms through principal–agent relationships.

In this chapter, I assemble qualitative evidence on a few cases of democracy promotion to show that principals in the democracy establishment behave as we would expect them to in a delegation chain and that they are also subject to the forces of competition and norms. First, I sketch the networked structure of the main organizations in the democracy establishment. I show that the democracy establishment is dominated and linked together by a few key donor hubs. Then, I focus on several important donor organizations with headquarters in the United States. Using data drawn from primary and secondary sources, I trace these organizations’ historical developments, using insights from interviews with their current and former staff to show how the causal mechanisms operate over time. The main organization that I examine is Freedom House, whose extensive administrative records provide a rare glimpse into an organization’s history. I also conduct shorter mini-case studies of the United States Agency for International Development, National Democratic Institute, and Open Society Institute. Wherever possible, and especially in my case study of Freedom House, I rely on primary sources (including archival materials, interview transcripts, and published interviews and memoirs by key players) with textual transcriptions that support my citations according to the principles of active citation (Moravcsik, 2010, 31-32).

Why focus on those organizations? The previous two chapters took great care to analyze the full sample of government-funded democracy assistance programs and to generate systematic, robust results. The approach in this chapter is different: I focus on a few examples in great detail. The organizations that I focus on in this chapter’s case studies are not a random sample of organizations; Freedom House, USAID, NDI, and OSI are among
the most important ones in the democracy establishment.² Yet this sample of organizations does make sense from a research design perspective.³ Since the organizations are all based in the United States, they are roughly comparable. And as illustrated in Table 7.1, they also offer some crucial variation in the independent variables: delegation structure (they include a U.S. government donor agency, private foundation, and two non-governmental organizations that “pass through” government funding) and professionalism over time (all organizations have existed for at least twenty years but started at different times). Such variation is necessary for testing my argument. Thus, I can say something important about how the democracy establishment works for the purposes of theory testing, while also aiming for a larger goal in this chapter: to improve our understanding of the donors that are at the forefront of the phenomenon of international democracy promotion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Headquarters</th>
<th>Year of Founding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom House</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDI</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSI</td>
<td>Private Foundation</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>Government Donor</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1990*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.1: Selection of Organizations for Case Studies Based on Values for Independent Variables. *refers to the start of USAID’s “Democracy Initiative” rather than USAID’s founding.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 7.1, I examine the networked structure of the democracy establishment. This section uses hyperlink analysis to map connections between organizations in the democracy establishment. It shows that the democracy establishment is a scale-free network and helps justify my case selection methods here and elsewhere in the dissertation. Section 7.2 turns to the evolution of Freedom House as an organization: from its activist days during World War II, to its transition towards government grants and overseas work in the 1980s and 1990s, to its present day place as

²See Table 7.2 in the next section.

³In the framework of Seawright and Gerring (2008, 297), these organizations might be loosely thought of as “influential cases” as well as “diverse cases.” Such cases are useful for confirming relationships found statistically and probing causal mechanisms, which are the goals of this chapter.
a full-blown member of the democracy establishment. This analysis draws on interviews as well as an archive of the organization’s administrative records. Section 7.3 expands the historical analysis to three additional U.S.-based organizations in the democracy establishment: the United States Agency for International Development, the National Democratic Institute, and the Open Society Institute. Finally, Section 7.4 concludes, and sets the stage for a turn in the dissertation from the “principals” to the “agents.”

7.1 The Network Structure of the Democracy Establishment

Examining the structure of the democracy establishment can reveal important information about which organizations have social power or are regarded as authorities in the network. The nature and form that the network connections take helps us understand how behaviors and norms diffuse across the democracy establishment and why we see convergence. One can imagine a variety of networked structures in the democracy establishment: connections among regional neighbors; connections among ideological (or other types of) neighbors; random connections; or center–periphery connections. Or perhaps there are few connections and it does not make sense to talk about a democracy establishment. A network analysis can illuminate these issues. According to my argument, I would expect the network structure of the democracy establishment to involve many connections between donors and aid recipients, few connections among aid recipients, and many connections among donors. Such a structure is consistent with norms developing and transmitting through principal–agent relationships.

7.1.1 Mapping Transnational Networks in Cyberspace

One method for assessing the structure of transnational networks is through the analysis of hyperlinks between organizations’ websites. Organizations link to each other in the
World Wide Web in order to establish and publicize their connections, whether with funders, fundees, or partners. Connections may be aspirational, but research shows that they do tend to reflect real social relationships. In a study comparing connections between human rights organizations in real- and cyber-space, for example, Carpenter and Jose-Thota (2008) found many similarities between organizations’ co-links and the networked connections that organizations’ staffs identified in focus groups. Thus, we can plausibly identify centrally-located nodes in networks by seeing which organizations other organizations link to.

The Govcom.org Foundation developed a web-based software called the Issue Crawler that is designed specifically for the purpose of such hyperlink analysis. The Issue Crawler tool collects links between webpages that the researcher feeds it as starting points and graphically represents the connections that result. Using my list of the most important 150 organizations in the democracy establishment, found in Appendix C, I collected the homepage for each organization in the democracy establishment and fed the URLs into the Issue Crawler. I generated the list of 150 organizations through secondary sources and interviews; organizations had to work in at least three countries to be included. Each organization represents a “node,” to use the network parlance. Figure 7.1 presents the result. The map depicts hyperlink relationships between the starting point organizations. Starting point organizations that did not receive any links from another organization are not displayed. The size of the node indicates how many co-links it received; the color of the node refers to domain of the website (e.g., .gov or .org). One limitation of this method of analysis is that it privileges the democracy establishment today over previous iterations since it is based on current websites. Indeed, fourteen organizations that were once prominent in the democracy establishment no longer exist—or do not have websites,

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5I used the “Inter-Actor Analysis” mode on the Issue Crawler, with the maximum number of pages crawled set at 60,000. Note that this Issue Crawler mode does not include any webpages in the analysis other than the ones the researcher feeds it.
perhaps akin to not existing in the twenty-first century—and are therefore excluded. Still, the Issue Crawler tool offers a useful aggregate picture of the democracy establishment as a transnational network.

Figure 7.1: **Network Connections in the Democracy Establishment.** The democracy establishment depicted here includes the most important 150 organizations, as listed in Appendix C. Co-link analysis conducted using the Issue Crawler.

### 7.1.2 The Democracy Establishment as a Scale-Free Network

Figure 7.1 reveals at least three important features of the democracy establishment’s network structure. The first key structural characteristic of the democracy establishment is that it is a variant of what social network analysts would call a scale-free network or hub-and-spoke system. Lake and Wong (2009, 129) define scale-free networks as having “a small number of nodes that are connected to a large number of other nodes that are not
themselves highly connected.” They contrast this type of network structure with random networks, in which the nodes are randomly connected with about the same number of other nodes, and with small world networks, in which nodes are connected to neighboring nodes. In a scale-free network, the central nodes wield social and often material power, since they can directly and indirectly structure activity in the network (Hafner-Burton, Kahler and Montgomery, 2009; Lake and Wong, 2009, 132).

A second interesting aspect of the democracy establishment’s network structure is that the center consists of not one or two but a few dozen organizations that are tightly connected with other “hubs” in addition to a number of “spokes.” To clarify the relationships between the hub organizations at the center of the network, Figure 7.2 displays the connections between the twenty organizations that received the most co-links in the democracy establishment. All of these organizations received at least twenty links from other organizations in the network. Table 7.2 lists the number of total co-links in the analysis for the top twenty organizations. Both Figure 7.2 and Table 7.2 confirm that the inner core of the democracy establishment largely consists of donor organizations or prominent donor-country based NGOs that also act as donors.

It is worth noting that a number of organizations do not even make it into the periphery of the network based on hyperlink analysis. Figure 7.1 includes nodes for the 93 out of 136 organizations in the democracy establishment (68 percent) that receive at least one link from the network. In other words, this network analysis suggests that the democracy establishment consists of perhaps twenty core organizations, an additional seventy-to-eighty peripheral organizations, and many other organizations that receive grants but are not rightly considered part of the true transnational network. Casting the network to include 150 “top” organizations as I did in Appendix C may be too broad to accurately reflect the democracy establishment as a network today.

A final interesting aspect of the democracy establishment is also revealed in Table 7.2, which shows that material and social power overlap, but not entirely, in the democracy
Figure 7.2: **Network Connections Among Core Organizations in the Democracy Establishment.** “Core” organizations are the top twenty most linked to organizations. Co-link analysis conducted using the Issue Crawler.

establishment. Although the most-linked-to organizations are USAID and the EC, as we might expect since these two organizations lead the way in terms of the amount of money given to support democracy abroad, the third most linked-to organization is the NED, a comparatively modest donor. The NED’s many connections to other nodes in cyberspace indicate that it is socially powerful (Kahler, 2009, 19). Why do some donors have relatively more social power than material power in the democracy establishment? I suspect the clarity of organizations’ missions with regards to democracy promotion (i.e., do they focus just on democracy promotion or on other issues, too?) and how early the organization entered the field of democracy assistance jointly determine its social power. Thus, the NED’s social power in the democracy establishment may derive from its first-mover status and its rela-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Number of Co-Links</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. U.S. Agency for International Development</td>
<td>878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. European Commission</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. National Endowment for Democracy</td>
<td>489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pan American Development Foundation (OAS)</td>
<td>316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Freedom House</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. U.S. State Department</td>
<td>225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. European Union</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. United Nations</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Transparency International</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Organization of American States</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Soros Foundation</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. World Bank</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. U.S. Institute of Peace</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Council of Europe</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. National Democratic Institute</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. International IDEA</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. UK Department for International Development</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.2: Top 20 Organizations in the Democracy Establishment by Hyperlinks. Co-link analysis conducted using the Issue Crawler.

tively narrow organizational mission, which focuses exclusively on democracy promotion rather than also on other issues of, for example, development or global governance.

To conclude, the democracy establishment’s structure has important consequences for how democracy is promoted. Its scale-free network structure suggests that, insofar as we see convergence within the democracy establishment, it should be through the peripheral organizations’ interactions with the core organizations in the democracy establishment rather than through some other diffusion mechanism. Although this structure may seem unremarkable or inevitable, it is neither. It is true that donor–recipient and center–periphery relationships do characterize other types of transnational networks (Stein, 2009; Lake and Wong, 2009). But we might imagine an alternative universe in which donor organizations sought to pursue a different kind of power.

What other types of network structures could the democracy establishment have had?
Rather than social power, which nodes acquire through connections to other nodes, bargaining power accrues “through links to network partners that are otherwise weakly connected or those that have few outside options” (Kahler, 2009, 12). Donors could have created stables of their own NGOs that they controlled through bargaining power in this way. To some extent, such a structure was the one originally pursued by the NED, which gave most of its initial grants to its four core institutes (i.e., NDI, IRI, CIPE, and the Solidarity Center). Yet instead we see that most of today’s democracy assistance NGOs are funded by multiple centrally-positioned donors. The NED’s core institutes now seek grants from other sources and receive a lower proportion of the NED’s grants. Why don’t donors seek out bargaining power? Both the funding structure and professional norms in democracy assistance encourage donors to fund NGOs that other donors have also worked with. Furthermore, NGOs want to obtain funding from as many sources as possible so that they have more income and do not depend on a single donor.

Aid recipient organizations could also link more with each other. Perhaps a highly effective organization would become a role model for other NGOs working on similar programs or in similar regions. Yet this type of network connection is atypical in the democracy establishment, likely because such information is scarce and donors do not require or encourage aid recipients to forge such connections. Instead, the key relationships and transactions—of funding, information, and norms—take place between centrally-positioned donors and the organizations that rely upon them for survival. Viewed in this manner, social power in the democracy establishment can indeed be considered coercive rather than simply persuasive.

7.2 The Transformation of Freedom House, 1941-2006

Freedom House is the oldest American human rights organization (Korey, 1998, 443). Furthermore, as Table 7.2 demonstrated, it is a socially influential actor in the democracy
establishment. Yet Freedom House has not always promoted democracy, at least not in the sense that we use the phrase today. Indeed, from its founding in 1941 to the present day, Freedom House has undergone a remarkable transformation as an organization—expanding its size, shifting from domestic to international issues, moving its locus of operations from New York City to Washington, D.C., opening more than one dozen overseas offices, and evolving from an activist to a professional orientation. Table 7.3 summarizes key events in Freedom House’s history as an organization for the reader. I argue that the shifts over time are consistent with the principal–agent and sociological argument that this dissertation develops and, in particular, with my claims about the importance of competition and norms in shaping the emergence of the democracy establishment.

Although Chapter 5 showed that democracy assistance has changed significantly over time, the causal mechanism that links increased professionalism to variation over time is not directly tested. Since the passage of time could indicate changes other than increased professionalism, in this section, I look for concrete evidence of professionalism over time in a key organization in the democracy establishment: Freedom House. In the next section, I examine several additional organizations in short case studies using interview data, organizational documents, and secondary sources. This section uses such material, too, but it also draws on primary source archival material because Freedom House houses its administrative records in a public archive based at Princeton University. The collection includes textual, graphic, and audiovisual materials from 1933 to 2007 and amounts to 106.9 linear feet of paper material.\(^6\) The archive contains: minutes and supplementary materials from all meetings of the Boards of Trustees (including Executive Committees); policy statements by the Boards; the personal papers of the Executive Directors; financial records; and extensive documentation of Freedom House’s programs, projects, press releases, and press clippings over the years. The archives provide an invaluable glimpse into the workings of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Freedom House founded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>Freedom House conducts more than 180 broadcasts in support of U.S. war efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Freedom House purchases Willkie Memorial Building in New York City</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1952 | Freedom House issues statement against McCarthyism  
     Freedom House issues first “Balance Sheet of Freedom” |
| 1959 | Freedom House Books U.S.A. program launches |
| 1966 | Irving Kristol launches *The Public Interest* under Freedom House banner |
| 1967 | Freedom House hosts conference on U.S. military action in Vietnam  
     Founding Executive Director George Field is replaced by Leonard Sussman |
| 1972 | Freedom House issues first Map of Freedom |
| 1973 | Freedom House creates the International Council on the Future of Universities |
| 1979 | Freedom House observes its first election in Cambodia |
| 1982 | Freedom House observes elections in El Salvador |
| 1985 | Willkie Memorial Building sold |
| 1987 | Freedom House Board hires a Washington representative on trial basis |
| 1988 | Executive Director Leonard Sussman replaced by R. Bruce McColm |
| 1993 | Executive Director Bruce McColm leaves for IRI, is replaced by Adrian Karatnycky |
| 1994 | Freedom House conducts voter awareness program in Ukraine  
     Freedom House opens Ukraine Bureau in Kiev |
| 1995 | Freedom House opens Russian Federation Bureau in Moscow |
| 1997 | Freedom House merges with National Forum Foundation |
| 2001 | Jennifer Windsor becomes Executive Director |
| 2002 | Freedom House indicators used by the Millennium Challenge Corporation |
| 2004 | Freedom House operates offices in Central Asia, Nigeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Mexico |
| 2006 | Freedom House hosts President George W. Bush for a speech |

Table 7.3: **Timeline of Freedom House, 1941-2006.** Key events in the history of the organization, as documented in the Freedom House Records and the Freedom House website.

an organization in the democracy establishment and thus a good test for my argument.

### 7.2.1 Origins and Early Era as Domestic Activist (1941-1975)

A group of American activists established Freedom House in 1941 in New York City with the goal of supporting the United States’ involvement in World War II. Although President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration was supporting the Allied war effort through the Lend-Lease program and other efforts, the American public was increasingly isolationist. To combat isolationism, President Roosevelt reached out to the leaders of two American
organizations, Fight for Freedom and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, and invited them to the White House. Their leaders had previously played an important role pressuring Congress to preserve the military draft (Sussman, 2009). While they were at the White House, President Roosevelt urged them help provide “citizen support for his troubled efforts to bring America into effective opposition to Nazism and Fascism” (Korey, 1998, 444). The two organizations united to form Freedom House on November 10, 1941.

According to the Certification of Incorporation, Freedom House served the following purposes:

- To conduct a headquarters in the City of New York to be known as Freedom House and to stand as a symbol and center for the two-fold fight for freedom;
- To define this two-fold fight both in terms of resisting the totalitarian movement now threatening civilization and in terms of aspirations of all peoples for a world of freedom, peace and security;
- To promote the concrete application of the principles of freedom and democracy in the everyday affairs of the U.S.A., governmental and otherwise, so that by sacrifice, intelligence and justice this country can be an example in both the present and post-war world of democracy at its best;
- To encourage all democracies, including captive countries, to look to Freedom House in the U.S.A. as a beacon lighting the struggle for a free world;
- To act as a headquarters and clearing house for organizations enlisted in the fight for freedom, whether at home or abroad;
- To disseminate literature bearing on the above aims; and to serve as a coordinating center for such subordinate centers as may be established anywhere, to make the symbolism of Freedom House plain to the world.7

The resulting bipartisan organization was initially helmed by Executive Director George Field, a small bipartisan Board of Trustees, and honorary chairs from the Democratic Party

7Certificate of Incorporation, pages 1-2; October 29, 1941; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 1; Public Policy Papers, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, Princeton University Library. This collection is hereafter referred to as simply “Freedom House Records.”
(First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt) and the Republican Party (Wendell Willkie, 1940 Republican nominee for president).\(^8\) Its initial members included writers, business and labor leaders, academics, religious and civil rights leaders, government officials, philanthropists, a jurist, and a representative of immigrants (Sussman, 2002, 16).

After the U.S. entry into World War II in December 1941, Freedom House continued to support the war effort through numerous radio broadcasts to the United States as well as occupied Europe. These broadcasts included a weekly series by Wendell Willkie and the CBS show “Our Secret Weapon.” The popular CBS broadcast starred Rex Stout, the detective writer, who debunked Axis propaganda. The show generated revenue for the organization as well as fan mail for its star.\(^9\) Freedom House also pressed for policies that it believed would keep the peace after the war ended. Its activities included policy statements in support of the Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the UN, as well as awards recognizing pioneers for freedom. To further these efforts, Freedom House also hosted occasional conferences, forums, and publications. In the 1940s, its revenue came from primarily membership fees and, to a lesser extent, special events, such as an Inaugural Dinner on March 19, 1942 that raised $500.\(^{10}\)

When World War II ended, Freedom House focused not only on supporting the emerging liberal international order, but also on issues of domestic freedom. In particular, Freedom House was a leader on civil rights issues in the United States. It advocated for the racial integration of the American military and issued a five-point program in 1949 that asked Congress to outlaw lynching and ensure equal opportunities in education and work (Korey, 1998, 446). In 1945, Freedom House purchased a building in New York City in order to honor board member Wendell Willkie upon his passing. The building, called the

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\(^8\)Note that Freedom House Board minutes occasionally refer to the Board of Trustees as the Board of Directors. As far as I can tell, these references simply indicate loose language rather than any institutional change. I always refer to the Board as the Board of Trustees here for clarity’s sake.

\(^9\)Minutes of Regular Meeting, Board of Trustees, taken by Gerald E. MacDonald; April 8, 1942; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 2.

\(^{10}\)Minutes of Regular Meeting, Board of Trustees, taken by Gerald E. MacDonald; April 8, 1942; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 2.
Willkie Memorial Building, held Freedom House’s office and was meant to also house non-profit organizations concerned with issues pertaining to freedom. The Willkie Memorial Building housed, among other organizations, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Anti-Defamation League, a public housing association, and the National Council on Civil Rights.

Freedom House continued work in this vein throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s—issuing policy statements, supporting civil rights, and hosting conferences. One harbinger of the more international orientation to come was that Freedom House began sending books to developing countries through a program called Bookshelf/Books U.S.A. in 1959. The program distributed books such as Profiles in Courage and Leaves of Grass in order to combat anti-Americanism and Communist books. 1972 marked the first year that the organization issued a Map of Freedom, the precursor to what would become its well-known Freedom in the World reports. Throughout this era, Freedom House’s revenues continued to come mostly from general membership fees and earmarked gifts, although the Willkie Memorial Building also generated significant income.\textsuperscript{11}

During the early era of Freedom House, its Board engaged in considerable oversight of the organization. Its members regularly engaged in lengthy intellectual and philosophical discussions and exchanges via mail in between meetings about various issues of the day. Board Members occasionally exchanged treatises on topics such as, “What is Freedom?”\textsuperscript{12} Despite these conversations, the Board of Trustees seemed in agreement on the general orientation of Freedom House until the mid-1970s, as reflected in a summary statement by the Program Audit Committee, which the Board of Trustees tasked with reviewing Freedom House’s activities after the organization’s thirtieth anniversary. In 1974, in response to the

\textsuperscript{11}In 1973, for example, Freedom House’s $183,000 in income came from: general membership contributions (33 percent); earmarked gifts (35 percent); Willkie administrative reimbursement (8 percent); corporate gifts (8 percent); and other (16 percent). The Willkie Memorial Building, which kept somewhat independent financial records, also brought in additional $100,000 that year. Memorandum for Program Audit Committee from Leonard R. Sussman; February 5, 1974; Freedom House Records, Box 21, Folder 4.

\textsuperscript{12}See various documents in Freedom House Records, Box 21.
committee’s report, the Board of Trustees agreed that Freedom House should focus mainly on domestic issues. Board Member Howland Sargeant summarized the Committee’s findings in 1974 as follows: “Although Freedom House’s horizons should never be parochial, its central emphasis should remain on what is going on here in our own country.”

But consensus must not be overstated: The Board of Trustees did experience some of the political and social conflicts that were affecting the country more broadly during the time. The Vietnam War divided the organization’s leaders; the Board of Trustees issued policy statements in favor of American policy, but these statements did not receive the Board’s full support (Sussman, 2002, 47-48). Freedom House also experienced an important institutional change. The founding Executive Director, George Field, retired in 1967 and was replaced by Leonard Sussman. Although Field appointed Sussman, ultimately the two men disagreed over how to run the organization. Sussman wanted to bring greater professionalism to Freedom House, which he would eventually succeed in doing. His aims were summarized in a 1974 letter he wrote to Board Member Henry Gideonse:

Even when George Field had an assistant (for about ten of his 26 years here) this has been essentially a one-man operation. The trick has been to keep a number of balls in the air at one time and create the impression of a substantial operation sufficiently staffed to accomplish its task…The year-round programs were fewer in number [under Field] and all, with the exception of the Books Program in George’s latter period, were ad hoc in nature and essentially undertaken seriatum. The public statements were essentially brief papers drafted rather speedily by a single individual and generally published as a public ad…What this adds up to, I suppose, is that in one sense we are doing business at the same stand but with a far wider variety of wares, each one presumably fashioned for a particular audience.

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13Freedom House Mission: Statement for Program Audit Committee, to Leonard Sussman, from Howland Sargeant; April 1, 1974; Freedom House Records, Box 21, Folder 4.

14Memorandum from Leonard R. Sussman to Dr. Harry D. Gideonse; February 7, 1974; Freedom House
As Sussman’s memorandum indicated, Freedom House was in the first stages of a major organizational transition. This transition to a more professional, bureaucratic, programmatic, and internationally-focused organization would occupy Freedom House from the late 1970s until the mid-1990s.

### 7.2.2 Transition to a Grant-Based, International Organization (1975-1993)

In 1979, Freedom House monitored elections in Cambodia, the first time that the organization had engaged in this relatively new practice.\(^{15}\) Doing so represented a turning point near the start of the organization’s transition to a grant-based, internationally-oriented organization. The organization would continue to take part in election observation missions in the coming decades, such as when Freedom House sent a mission to observe elections in El Salvador in 1982.

Taking part in election monitoring raised some concerns among the Board of Trustees. At the April 1982 meeting, Board Member and labor activist Normal Hill noted “…that there had been questions raised about the urgency with which the mission was undertaken, and the financing secured to mount it. He recommended that some subgroup of the Board be mandated to examine future situations.” The minutes from the meeting indicate that other Board Members agreed. Law professor John W. Riehm, for example, “questioned the efficacy of ad hoc funding of programs that may not have been planned earlier” and “wondered whether the extensive use of staff time and energies for such programs detracted from our general program.” Meanwhile, the Minutes quote presidential adviser, news-anchor, and economist Leo Cherne as voicing concerns about Freedom House engaging in costly overseas activities: “The defense of freedom against its organized enemies has

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\(^{15}\)See Kelley (2008) and Hyde (2011b) on the development of international election monitoring.
become a hopeless undertaking if it involves the expenditure of funds.”

Of course, the modest expense of these early international election monitoring missions paled in comparison to the million dollar initiatives that Freedom House would one day pursue with government grants. Freedom House’s programs in the future would cease to be funded through “ad hoc” mechanisms. In 1982, government funds for democracy assistance did not exist; but in just a year, the first grants from NED appeared and the governmental and non-governmental funding opportunities have steadily increased ever since.

In the early 1980s, Freedom House faced financial troubles that it would not solve for over a decade when it successfully won some of the new democracy assistance funding. The Willkie Memorial Building was expensive to maintain and the organization could no longer afford to do so. In 1985, Freedom House sold the building, which led to lawsuits from the tenants, who tried unsuccessfully to block the sale. The sale of the Willkie Memorial Building distanced Freedom House from the civil rights organizations that it had long allied itself with and their broad domestic agenda.

At the same time as Freedom House shed the Willkie Building, obtaining some of the lucrative new funding opportunities for democracy assistance was crucial for the organization’s survival. Thus, with the increasing opportunities to work abroad, Freedom House was gradually moving away from its domestic focus. Board Members immediately perceived this movement. Some of them supported the shift; others did not. Board Member Philip van Slyck wrote a letter to the Board in advance of its September 1982 meeting advocating a return to domestic issues. He wrote:

I have felt for some time a concern that I know some other board members share that, on some issues of traditional interest to the organization, Freedom House’s trumpet has recently been uncertain or silent, or has modulated its tone.

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16 Minutes of Regular Meeting, Board of Trustees, taken by John W. Riehm, page 3; April 19, 1982; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 13.
rightwards from our familiar centrist ground. I believe this is particularly true on issues of domestic freedom—civil rights, First Amendment, proposals to amend the Constitution and to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the proposal to convene a constitutional convention for the first time since the founding of the Republic. The reasons for our neglect or our change in perspective are understandable, because they reflect a shift in the national mood. The issues on which Freedom House has spoken out in recent years have largely been international issues, where the public consensus, as well as the consensus of the board, has been fairly clear.  

As van Slyck’s letter indicates, the increasing difficulty for Board Members to agree on issues of domestic policy further pushed the organization towards a more international focus. As the organization grew older and founding Board Members retired, it was harder and harder to forge a bipartisan Board that could achieve consensus. Together, Freedom House’s financial straits and the inability of the Board to reach consensus on how to approach domestic political issues compelled the organization to pursue nascent grant resources (much of them governmental) to support new overseas programs. In a May 1984 Board Meeting, for example, the Board carefully reviewed nine proposals that the organization was considering submitting to the NED. In later years, staff would compose and submit such proposals without Board approval; future Freedom House staff members would become experts in navigating the increasingly complex government bureaucracy for democracy assistance, especially since many of them had formerly worked in it. But for now, the level of Board oversight was high, with extensive discussions taking place about the organization’s strategy. They rejected one proposal, “Can New Communications Technologies Be Placed in the Service of Democracies?”, for example, because “no short-term results can be expected.”  

Indeed, and as expected, the same 1984 Board

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17 Letter from Philip van Slyck to the Board of Trustees, page 1; September 20, 1982; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 13.

18 Minutes of Regular Meeting, Board of Trustees, page 1; May 2, 1984; Freedom House Records, Box 1,
minutes indicate that one of the Board’s primary concerns was identifying proposals that were “designed to produce visible results early in the project.”

By 1986, more than half of Freedom House’s revenues came from restricted grant sources (e.g., NED grants) rather than from membership dues, which still did account for $200,000 out of its total income of $1.4 million, or 14 percent of the revenues. In keeping with Freedom House’s increasing focus on government grant revenues, the organization hired its first full-time Washington, D.C.-based staff member, Frank Calzon, on a trial basis in 1987. Not only did the organization retain Calzon after the trial period passed because the Board viewed him as a success, but eventually the entire locus of Freedom House’s American activities would shift there.\textsuperscript{19} Records of Freedom House program activities during the late 1980s show that staff were regularly monitoring elections and engaging in all manner of international work without direct supervision or debate by the Board, suggesting that this work was now taken for granted as part of Freedom House’s agenda.

Despite the rise in funding from government institutions for democracy programs overseas, Freedom House continued to experience financial difficulties through the early 1990s. During meetings, the staff and Board Members debated the best way to position Freedom House vis-à-vis USAID, NED, and the State Department—how to win funding for Freedom House while staying out of bureaucratic politics.\textsuperscript{20} Freedom House struggled to maintain the administrative structure necessary to effectively handle its increasingly large amount

\textsuperscript{19}Deputy Director of Freedom House R. Bruce McColm said the following about Calzon in a report to the Board: “Frank’s work with Freedom House has been invaluable, adding a dimension to our operation we have lacked in past years. He has broadened our contacts on the Hill substantially and disseminated our publications and materials aggressively to the Washington press corps. He has organized media breakfasts for Freedom House and was instrumental in organizing the Congressional reception... for Lino Hernandez, the head of the Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission.” See Letter from R. Bruce McColm to the Board; January 6, 1988; Freedom House Records, Box 1, Folder 1.

\textsuperscript{20}Consider, for example, the following quote: “Mr. [Penn] Kemble commented on the newer thinking in the Agency for International Development (AID), which could open new opportunities for Freedom House...Mr. [Max] Kampelman was concerned that we not do things that cost us too much money and that we keep out of the governmental bureaucratic quarrels.” Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Freedom House, Washington, D.C., notes taken by Gerald L. Steibel, page 3; January 14, 1991; Freedom House Records, Box 148.
of grant revenue and to liaise successfully with proliferating donors.\textsuperscript{21} The organization needed greater professionalism. Furthermore, most of the money that it received from the United States government came in the form of “pass-through grants,” i.e., grants that simply passed through Freedom House on their way to another organization. Freedom House received at most around 5 percent of such grants to cover its overhead.\textsuperscript{22} Around this time, Freedom House’s sources of income included relatively large grants from a number of non-governmental foundations, as well, including: Bradley, Caife, Lilly, Olin, Pew, Rustin, and Smith-Richardson. Freedom House needed to find sources of income that would cover more of its overhead costs (e.g., rent, salary, and health insurance) rather than simply overseas programs.

The transition to a professional, internationally-oriented organization was well underway, but not yet complete. The last gasp for Freedom House’s domestic agenda—and the last significant moment of discussion about the overall direction that Freedom House should pursue as an organization among Board Members—took place in the summer of 1991. At that moment, the organization was preparing for its fiftieth anniversary celebration as well as considering how to position Freedom House in a post-Cold War world. Long-time Board Member Max Kampelman, a former U.S. ambassador to the CSCE, opened a meeting of the Executive Committee plus other Board Members in Washington, D.C. by asking: “Where do we go from here?” According to the minutes, “He spoke on his view that Freedom House should concern itself much more strongly with American domestic issues, such as the underclass, poverty, racial problems, environment, and so on.”\textsuperscript{23}

But when Max Kampelman helped write the organization’s “Statement on the 50th

\textsuperscript{21} Executive Director Bruce McColm reported these concerns to the Board of Trustees as follows. “1. FH’s budget has risen to a much higher level ($3.063 million). But the administrative structure is inadequate to handle it effectively. 2. Relations with the donors have become more complex. Where one a single official acted for the organization, now there are 4 or 5.” See Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Washington, D.C., page 2; September 17, 1990; Freedom House Records, Box 148.

\textsuperscript{22} Meeting of the Board of Trustees, Washington, D.C., page 3; September 17, 1990; Freedom House Records, Box 148.

\textsuperscript{23} Special Meeting of the Executive Committee Plus Other Board Members, Washington, D.C., notes taken by Gerald L. Steibel, page 1; August 3, 1991; Freedom House Records, Box 148.
Anniversary of Freedom House and on the Future,” other Board Members responded negatively to the statement’s treatment, and even inclusion, of domestic issues. Freedom House staff reached out to the Board Members to get their responses to the draft statement and numerous objections were recorded in notes on those conversations. Mitch Daniels, at the time the President and CEO of the Hudson Institute, told Freedom House that he “like[d] the international section, but wonders if [the] push into domestic arena doesn’t make us look like we’re groping for [a] new post-Cold War mission.” Meanwhile, Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former U.S. ambassador to the UN and adviser to Ronald Reagan, was recorded as saying that she, “[f]eels strongly that Freedom House can do useful work in foreign affairs, [and] should leave domestic [sic] to others.”24 The statement was thus rewritten to withdraw the controversial statements about domestic issues that alienated the Board’s more conservative members. Unable to come to an agreement on a domestic agenda, and needing to generate revenue to keep the organization afloat, Freedom House continued to chase its international mission in the 1990s and into the 2000s, without any more moments of serious questioning.

7.2.3 A Fully Professional Organization (1993-Present)

According to former Executive Director Leonard Sussman (2009), “Freedom House’s new era began in 1993 with the election of Bette Bao Lord as chair of the Board of Trustees.” A novelist and human rights activist in China, Lord oversaw Freedom House’s governance from the mid-1990s when it became a fully professional organization. No longer did Freedom House rely extensively on Board Members for counsel on programmatic decisions. Instead, the organization had more than twenty full-time staff by 1994 that operated largely independently. The organization’s capabilities had significantly improved, in part as a response to recommendations by government donors to upgrade its financial systems and

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make them more professional.\textsuperscript{25} The archival materials do, therefore, suggest that government donors’ desires to work with professional organizations had a role to play in Freedom House’s development. Yet other forces were also at work.

In 1994, Freedom House opened its first overseas office in Kiev, Ukraine. It subsequently opened overseas offices in Russia, Serbia, Nigeria, Jordan, Tunisia, Mexico, Southern Africa, and Central Asia. In response to concerns by Board Members in 1994 that the 60 percent increase in outside funding belied an over-reliance on government contracts, new Executive Director Adrian Karatnycky reminded them of the critical value of grants to Freedom House’s organization and mission. The Board minutes record him as stating: “FH could not have weathered the transition period without [government] contracts. The problem is FH would not be as noticed in the world—the organization would become more analytical, without the capacity to share the institution’s values, judgments, and experiences with the outside world.\textsuperscript{26}

Freedom House then took another deliberate step to increase its capabilities in overseas action. In 1997, Freedom House merged with the National Forum Foundation (NFF). The NFF did not pursue a significant research or publications program. Instead, it conducted most of its work overseas using government money for democracy assistance and was even more reliant on government funding than Freedom House. Freedom House leadership viewed NFF, with its competencies in gaining grants and conducting democracy assistance programs abroad on issues such as media development and economic reform, as value-added to Freedom House.\textsuperscript{27} NFF’s president James Denton became Executive Director of Freedom House after the merger, while Adrian Karatnycky transitioned to the role of

\textsuperscript{25} Executive Director Adrian Karatnycky reported to the Board in 1994 as follows: “The AID contracts represent a 16-fold increase in revenues from that agency since 92/93. This has resulted from a long-term dialogue with USAID and strong improvements in FH financial reporting systems.” See Annual Meeting of Freedom House Board of Trustees, New York, Notes taken by Secretary Angier Biddle Duke, page 5; September 20, 1994; Freedom House Records, Box 180.

\textsuperscript{26} Annual Meeting of Freedom House Board of Trustees, New York, Notes taken by Secretary Angier Biddle Duke, page 6; September 20, 1994; Freedom House Records, Box 180.

\textsuperscript{27} See Freedom House and the National Forum Foundation Proposed Merger; January 23, 1997; Freedom House Records, Box 180.
President.

By 1998, 70 percent of the organization’s revenues came from government funds. By 2002 this percent had increased to 80 percent. Government grants that Freedom House then granted to other organizations amounted to 63 percent of the organization’s activities in 2002. Jennifer Windsor, the former director of the Center for Democracy and Governance of USAID, took over as Freedom House’s Executive Director in 2001, continuing to tighten the organization’s relationship with key players in the U.S. government and democracy establishment. By 2006, 183 staff worked for Freedom House full-time. Although Freedom House benefited from the large increase in democracy assistance funding after September 11, 2011, as seen by this growth in the organization, staff members report that they self-consciously tried to stick to their principles. Unlike some other Washington, D.C.-based organizations that receive government grants, Freedom House received relatively little funding for the two largest targets of American democracy assistance: Afghanistan and Iraq. As one staff member put it, “We’ve been pretty good not to go into places where we’d not want to go but there’s money. So we’re really not in Afghanistan or Iraq except for one small program and it’s not in country.”

During the twenty-first century, Board Members continued to try to raise money through individual and corporate donations and through funding drives in order to create an endowment for Freedom House. Despite some success raising such funds, Freedom House continued to rely just as heavily on government grants for its income. An endowment would secure Freedom House’s activities in the absence of government income and allow it to pursue types of initiatives that governments might ignore. One Freedom House staff member explained the need for such funding in an interview as follows: “Say you see a country where Freedom House would really have some value-added, but it’s not a priority for the donors right now. So then we’re out of luck—because we need to find money.”

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28 Interview 11, with practitioner at democracy NGO, by telephone, June 22, 2010.
29 Interview 11, with practitioner at democracy NGO, by telephone, June 22, 2010.
House’s analytical work makes it especially attuned to countries around the world that are backsliding in terms of political reform and helps it identify places where it might work successfully. Yet the difficulty of finding suitable support for such programs continues to constrain the organization’s work; the bulk of its efforts go to obtaining large government grants rather than other smaller sources of support, such as individual, foundation, and corporate donations. Government income persisted as the organization’s key source of revenue into the twenty-first century. According to a report to the Board of Trustees in 2002, just around 3 percent of Freedom House’s entire budget of around $117 million was considered discretionary and this amount went to support the publications programs.\textsuperscript{30}

The organization’s concern with obtaining funding is illustrated by an exchange during the Board meeting in 2003. Ambassador Mark Palmer, one of Freedom House’s Board Members, told the group that the American Cancer Society had recently contacted him to alert him that Freedom House had used money from tobacco companies to support its programs for journalists in Romania. The minutes record Palmer as stating, “it is wrong to associate with an industry where 50 percent of users die from its products, especially in developing nations.” He proposed to “grandfather the program and agree to phase out the tobacco funding in three years... we [should] agree not to take tobacco money in the future.” The motion to grandfather support for the Romania program and avoid tobacco money failed. According to the Minutes, “Other Board Members noted that many companies could be ruled out in a similar fashion, and that by doing so Freedom House [would] eliminat[e] potential sources of support.”\textsuperscript{31} The tobacco case illustrates the value of non-government funding to Freedom House. Even if some Board Members view funding sources as ethically dubious, private donations are key to giving the organization the freedom to implement its preferred programs in the absence of government support. After

\textsuperscript{30}Summary of Freedom House Board of Trustees Meeting, page 1; May 15, 2002; Freedom House Records, Box 181.

\textsuperscript{31}Summary of Freedom House Board of Trustees Meeting, New York City, page 3; October 21, 2003; Freedom House Records, Box 181.
all, despite pursuing such sources of funding, Freedom House staff members already find themselves “nibbling around the edges of other programs” in order to do work in key locations, such as Russia, where the United States government is hesitant to give grants due to opposition from the target governments.32

7.2.4  The History of Freedom House: A Coda

To conclude, by 2011, Freedom House relied on government grants for more than three-quarters of its budget and had as its main products various overseas democracy programs as well as a number of research publications measuring and assessing democracy around the world. What a change from an organization that during most of its early decades relied on membership donations, gala dinners, and statements to the press to make its impact on domestic political issues in the United States. This analysis of the history of Freedom House, which drew on archival materials as well as interviews and secondary sources, showed how the organization changed its focus and became professional. This shift was not inevitable. A comparative analysis by Barnett (2009, 654-655) of humanitarian organizations shows, for example, that despite the emergence of a professional field of humanitarianism over time, not all organizations change to reflect resource competition. He found that humanitarian organizations such as CARE and Médecins Sans Frontières had their own resources and thus did not compete so intensely for government aid. Furthermore, they had strong organizational cultures that encouraged them to stay independent.

Why did Freedom shift from domestic to international issues over time? Several factors mattered. First, the difficulty of finding a common purpose in United States politics after its founding members left the organization and in the context of growing domestic polarization influenced its transition. Second, a particularly important factor was the new funding to work abroad during a time when the organization was in poor financial health. The switch in focus at Freedom House caused some tension and debate on the board, but

32Interview 11, with practitioner at democracy NGO, by telephone, June 22, 2010.
eventually became taken-for-granted. Freedom House is keenly aware of the need to secure funding to survive as an organization. As a consequence, even though the organization’s ideals and analysis alone could guide its decisions about where to work, it must to some extent chase government grants. Finally, the staff and Board of Freedom House increasingly are professionals and experts in the field of democracy assistance; rather than the labor and business leaders of the organization’s early days that engaged in sometimes long-winded discussions about intellectual and philosophical issues related to freedom, the leaders of today are more narrowly focused. They think about strategies for getting grants and improving the organization, not strategies for promoting democracy. Such a shift is precisely what we would expect in a professional organization.

It is also worth spending a moment thinking about what the archival record omitted. Board Members wanted Freedom House to pursue results-oriented programs, but they did not make reference to the Government Performance and Results Act or shifting partisan control in Congress, two factors that Chapter 6 indicated might influence the NED’s shift towards measurable programs. At least at Freedom House, the results orientation seems tied to general concerns about signaling efficacy to donors rather than being a specific response to Congressional policies or composition.

Board Members also paid little attention to what types of organizations Freedom House should fund or what Freedom House was doing to monitor its grantees. Although the significant majority of the democracy assistance funding Freedom House received was “pass-through” funding that Freedom House re-granted to other organizations, the leadership of Freedom House was far more concerned with obtaining such funding (and doing so on favorable terms) than giving it away successfully. Of course, this concern makes sense for an organization that must survive in a competitive environment. But the lack of attention to giving away money highlights the problems of monitoring that occur in the democracy establishment. Aid recipients have slack to implement their preferred types of programs precisely because of that lack of attention. Thus, the absence of attention to monitoring
grant recipients in Board meetings and other organizational documents illustrates what we would expect to take place in principals in the democracy establishment.

7.3 Principals and Principles: Democracy Promotion at Three American Donors

7.3.1 U.S. Agency for International Development

The United States Agency for International Development is the largest democracy donor organization in the largest democracy donor country, the United States. The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act by Congress created USAID, but the foreign aid organization did not start out with an emphasis on promoting democracy. Instead, democracy programming at USAID began in the 1980s in the Agency’s regional bureaus in two substantive areas: what today we would call elections assistance and rule of law assistance. The advent of these programs came when President Reagan’s administration sought to refocus its foreign policy approach to Latin America, starting with El Salvador. El Salvador held an election for its Constituent Assembly in 1982 as part of its post-civil war transition from military rule, and USAID provided funding for the State Department to send a group of Americans to monitor the election. According to Carothers (1999, 34), it was a “superficial, highly politicized observation mission… which USAID resisted supporting until Secretary of State Alexander Haig insisted.” Yet the mission represented the start of a small new wave of Latin American programs at USAID during the 1980s that supported democracy in Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay. A few small efforts were also made outside of Latin America in the Philippines.

Perhaps such programs would have been largely confined to Latin America or continued to be pursued ad hoc, but then the Cold War ended. In 1990, countries in Central and Eastern Europe—as well as in other regions—were seeking to make democratic transitions
in the wake of communism’s collapse. Looking for help, the countries appealed to Western policy makers. Although long-standing foreign service officers at USAID registered some skepticism about promoting democracy in Africa, Europe, and beyond, the passage of major foreign assistance bills in Congress such as the Freedom Support Act of 1991 and pressure from the State Department and the White House pushed USAID to expand its mission to include democracy promotion (Carothers, 1999, 41-42). In 1990, USAID announced its global “Democracy Initiative.”

In these early days, the atmosphere at USAID among democracy-related staff was wide-eyed and exuberant. One crucial player in the development of USAID’s democracy portfolio, who originally planned to work at USAID on Asian programs as a regional expert in 1989, described his situation as follows:

There was no such thing as democracy promotion classes—the field didn’t exist... I was waiting for a security clearance when the Berlin Wall fell, and all of a sudden there were all these former Warsaw Pact countries that wanted free markets and democracy. So Congress set aside money for the first time to USAID for Eastern Europe... I was the only person at USAID that did democracy at that point, and I got put on the task force for the Europe program. The Europe program dominated everything at the Bureau for a while. It was an eighteen-hour day for me on the democracy side trying to figure out how to do it. It didn’t exist! I had no idea what I was doing—I’d never even been to Europe. And then over the next few years, democracy became part of the toolkit for U.S. development.34

In some ways, the movement towards promoting democracy in the early 1990s at USAID was less of an institutional decision and more of a personal one. Carol Adelman, an Assis-

33This initial resistance to democracy promotion at USAID reflects its strong organizational culture, even in the face of new funding opportunities.

tant Administrator at USAID with strong ties to the early neo-conservative foreign policy movement, believed strongly that the United States should promote democracy around the world and wanted USAID to support that mission. And as the supervisor of 400 employees and more than $3 billion, she ensured that it did so.

In order to pursue a mission of promoting democracy abroad, in 1990, USAID’s democracy staff had to sit down and come up with a workable definition of democracy. The resulting definition, which came simply out of principled discussions and philosophical readings by staff members, had four components: elections and political processes; rule of law; governance; civil society; and media. Although media is not its own sub-area today because of a bureaucratic reorganization, the general definition of democracy has persisted at USAID and continues to provide the framework for its democracy and governance programs.

Another important administrator helped ensure that democracy continued to play a larger role at USAID. J. Brian Atwood, the USAID Administrator during the Clinton years, helped institutionalize democracy assistance. Brian Atwood had previously served as the President of the National Democratic Institute and was focused, in the words of one of his former staff members, on “how can we mainstream democracy promotion at USAID.” According to the same interviewee, the democracy assistance advocates at USAID at that time, such as Atwood, were “crusaders, pioneers really, who wanted to get democracy promotion to be a key part of pillar of development policy.” As Carothers (2009b, 10-11) explains, Atwood’s efforts included: making democracy promotion one of the organization’s official pillars; creating the Center for Democracy and Governance in 1993; creating a cadre of democracy and governance (DG) officers; establishing the Office of Transition Initiatives to do DG work in transitional and post-conflict countries; and seeking out re-

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35 Interview 20, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, Washington, D.C., May 4, 2010. Note that Carol Adelman’s husband, Ken Adelman, has served on the Board of Trustees at Freedom House since the 1990s and was also an influential political force in the creation of the democracy establishment.


37 Interview 4, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, Princeton, N.J., August 9, 2009.

38 Interview 4, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, Princeton, N.J., August 9, 2009.
search and lessons learned from previous USAID DG efforts.

By the late 1990s, it is fair to say that democracy assistance at USAID had been institutionalized. As one staff member of USAID at that time explained, “The late 1990s is when we really started to see ‘best practices’ come into play for the electoral processes. You come with a toolbox of stuff: ‘this is how you do it.’”

The professionalization of democracy promotion at USAID was a far cry from the heady, more ideological days at the end of the Cold War, when democracy assistance was pursued by non-experts who had strong principled commitments to the idea of promoting democracy abroad but little background in doing so. In 2002, USAID transformed the Center for Democracy and Governance into the Office of Democracy and Governance during a more general reorganization of the Agency; this shift represented somewhat of a downgrading of democracy assistance into a more mundane, routine part of the organization’s bureaucracy. Still, USAID’s increased expertise in democracy programming meant that it could demand more of its grantees in terms of reporting and measurement by this point.

Was the professionalization of democracy promotion at USAID a good or a bad thing? One long-time democracy assistance practitioner there encapsulated the ambivalent feelings of some of the USAID staff and their awareness of the challenges facing bureaucracies in an interview:

I don’t regret at all that the field is now professional. . . . The danger is that you can become too mechanical about this stuff—as if there’s a recipe. Even a good cook is tasting and refining at every step. These are profoundly political projects at the end of the day. . . . I will be critical of putting a rule of law expert on a plane to look at Ethiopia, because of course they’re going to find problems and suggest working on rule of law. So there is that sort of bureaucratization where people have a stake in a particular approach without taking into account the political context. You need to look at where is the best political opening in

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39 Interview 4, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, Princeton, N.J., August 9, 2009.
the country to advance your democracy agenda.⁴⁰

In other words, professionalization is to some extent inevitable, in many ways desirable, and yet it can have some deleterious effects.

What is perhaps most notable about the bureaucratization and professionalization of democracy promotion at USAID is that it happened faster than at Freedom House, the Soros Foundations, and even the National Democratic Institute. The transformation from an idea-driven enterprise to a technical one happened at USAID in less than a decade. Why did democracy assistance at USAID change so quickly? The answer likely lies in two characteristics of USAID. First, because USAID is a government agency, the forces towards bureaucratization are especially strong there. The more dependent a democracy promotion institution is on the state, the more likely it is to change to fit the rationalizing and bureaucratic demands placed upon it by the state (Barnett, 2009). Since USAID is part of the state, rational and bureaucratic thinking should maximally affect it. Furthermore, USAID already had a general orientation towards measurement and technical work via its work in other areas, such as development aid (Ferguson, 1990). Thus, the organizational culture encouraged a rapid transformation of USAID’s democracy work.

7.3.2 National Democratic Institute

The National Democratic Institute for International Affairs was created in 1983 as one of the four core grantees of the National Endowment for Democracy. Today, it is the largest of those four organizations—whether measured in terms of its income, the size of its staff, or the number of countries where it works—and is one of the most important organizations in the entire democracy establishment. According to its website, NDI “is a nonprofit, nonpartisan, nongovernmental organization working to support and strengthen democratic institutions worldwide through citizen participation, openness and accountability in gov-

ernment.” Its first President was Brian Atwood, who assumed that position in 1985 after previously leading the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; Kenneth Wollack took over the position of President in 1993 when Atwood left for USAID and has continued in that role until the present day.

From the start, NDI was unofficially affiliated with the Democratic Party in the United States and also maintained loose relationships with political party associations abroad such as the Liberal International and Centrist Democratic International. Although this political relationship is reflected by the membership of NDI’s Board of Directors, which Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright currently chairs, the relationship largely stops there. The organization avoids American domestic political issues and it pursues activities that are similar to those pursued by other organizations in the democracy establishment that do not share its political affiliation (e.g., IRI or Freedom House).

The original conception of NDI, as described in the minutes of an early Board meeting, did not include any overseas work. Instead, the organization sought to conduct exchanges, bringing democrats from overseas to the United States on educational trips. It had no overseas offices and just a few staff members based in Washington, D.C. In contrast, today, NDI has field offices in more than sixty countries, which contain a staff of more than 1,000 people, and over the course of its history NDI has operated in approximately 125 countries. Furthermore, over half of NDI’s employees today are not Americans (Melia, 2005, 5). Based on its founders’ vision, we can see that NDI’s remarkable growth and evolution was not preordained; rather it grew out of a particular set of opportunities and the particular organizational culture at NDI.

When NDI was founded in 1983, it faced a wide-open world of possibilities. In the words of one person who worked at NDI in its early years, “A few people had a little tiny bit

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of money, a lot of idealism, a lot of energy, a lot of creativity, and they just started making
things like election monitoring up.\textsuperscript{43} Most of NDI’s funding during the 1980s came from
the NED in the form of small grants. According to one former NDI staff member, “The
allocation of funds from NED to NDI is really just a push through. NDI decides for itself
how to spend the money. So what NED really cares about are not the programs that it
just rubber stamps and instead its discretionary programs.”\textsuperscript{44} This quote helps illustrate not
only NDI’s independence from the NED but also the broader phenomenon of agency slack
that can take place in the democracy establishment when money is passed from donors to
grantees.

When the Cold War ended, the possibilities for NDI to do work overseas exploded with
the rise of funding for democracy assistance. For a brief time, the funding environment was
less about competition than it was about obtaining the available resources. As one person
at NDI said, “You did not go after money, the money came to you.”\textsuperscript{45} Although the tra-
ditional funder of NDI—the NED—continued to give NDI grants, other U.S. government
funders—USAID, especially, and also the Department of State—quickly overtook NED
as NDI’s main sources of income. Eventually (although still to a lesser extent) non-U.S.
governments, private foundations, and international institutions also contributed to NDI’s
revenue. At Freedom House, the new funding opportunities for international work promot-
ing democracy encouraged the organization to abandon some of its traditional domestic
work during a time when the organization was in dire financial straits and faced some dis-
agreement on the Board about how to approach domestic issues. In contrast, for NDI,
the new opportunities allowed the organization to simply expand its mission of advancing
democracy overseas. Given the prevailing enthusiasm for promoting democracy and opti-
mism about democracy’s prospects around the world, doing so seemed to NDI’s leaders as
a natural step.

\textsuperscript{43}Interview 47, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010.
\textsuperscript{44}Interview 57, with democracy assistance practitioner, by telephone, June 4, 2010.
\textsuperscript{45}Interview 57, with democracy assistance practitioner, by telephone, June 4, 2010.
Why was NDI so successful in the 1990s and beyond in obtaining democracy funding? Former staff suggest that NDI’s stellar reputation as an election monitor was a key factor; by the early 1990s, operations in Namibia and the Philippines had built NDI’s reputation and, in many ways, the overall technical standards of this nascent field. In the 1980s, people in the democracy establishment disagreed about whether democracy should be treated as part of development. Controversy continues to this day about if democracy promotion should be considered government advocacy or a technical process.\(^{46}\) NDI adopted and developed the latter perspective, the perspective that eventually won more adherents over time. According to one pioneer in the field:

In 1980, when they had elections in Rhodesia, monitoring was four human rights lawyers getting off a plane and interviewing people. Election observation was extremely ad hoc and informal. Larry Garber [an NDI staff member] organized a conference on principles of election monitoring and it was the first time anyone had ever thought of it. When Brian Atwood was President of NDI, he was initially opposed to election monitoring, but he was convinced by Larry Garber, and then election monitoring basically made NDI. NDI thought you could have people that are technically qualified—they can do more than the media or the government—who can do election observation and make the field much more professional.\(^{47}\)

Thus, by the mid-1990s, things at NDI started to change. The organization rapidly expanded and in so doing became more bureaucratic, professional, and technical.

Still, during the 1990s, NDI had a small enough staff that it was not fully bureaucratic. Brian Atwood believed that staff should “have geographic and substantive diversity because democracy is a holistic animal,” and as a consequence, the organization had a gener-

\(^{46}\)To some extent, this debate is summarized in Carothers (2009a).

\(^{47}\)Interview 47, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010.
ally horizontal structure. The organization retained enough of its original feel that when a long-time staff member left the organization in 1998, his parting memo described the organization as “informal, slightly funky, youthful, risk taking, with an attitude, creative, energetic, non-bureaucratic.” Eventually, the organization would change sufficiently in the late 1990s and early 2000s that this description was no longer so apt. First, geographic divisions were created within the Washington, D.C., headquarters of NDI, followed by thematic divisions (e.g., political parties) and eventually support teams (e.g., evaluation). The more the money flowed in and the organization grew, the more hierarchical and specialized it became. In the late 1990s, as discussed in the aforementioned memo, NDI faced a choice between continuing to follow its informal, short-to-medium term approach to promoting change in transitioning environments and choosing to become a “permanent fixture” in countries’ liberalization. It choose the latter.

NDI’s transformation to professionalism accelerated and perhaps completed during the years immediately following September 11, 2001. More so than certain other peer organizations, such as Freedom House, NDI hotly pursued democracy assistance opportunities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here, NDI had to compete in large part with USAID contractors, many of which are for-profit. For example, NDI supplemented its annual budget in 2004 of $50 million with an additional $40 million for its work in Iraq; in other words, working in Iraq almost doubled NDI’s annual revenues (Melia, 2005, 6). The kind of organizational structures required to conduct $40 million worth of programs in a single country in a single year meant that NDI had to become more bureaucratic and professional. NDI’s pursuit of the Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Afghanistan resources raised the ire of others in the democracy establishment, who questioned the organization’s sincerity as a democracy promoter.

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48 Interview 57, with democracy assistance practitioner, by telephone, June 4, 2010.
49 E-mail from former NDI staff member, “Subject: Farewell,” to NDI Senior Staff, August 19, 1998. The e-mail was shared by its sender with the author.
50 One former NDI professional put it this way: “Being involved in Eastern Europe was exciting and adrenaline-y in the 1990s in a way that it wasn’t before. Now people enjoy the work, but you see yourself as a permanent fixture in a country’s hopefully long-term liberalization.” See Interview 40, with former director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, New York, N.Y., May 26, 2010.
One former staff member put it this way, “There’s kind of a myth that NDI, IRI, etc. are ‘mission oriented’ organizations . . . but in actuality, NDI was providing cover for George Bush’s failed Iraq policy.” Several interviewees stated that American democracy promotion efforts in Iraq harmed the democracy establishment’s work all over the world and thus criticized NDI for putting its organizational self-interest over the field’s more fundamental goals. The extent of NDI’s organizational strength may also be noted in the observation of an interviewee that relatively few officials at NDI left the organization to serve in the Obama administration, despite the organization’s ties to the Democratic Party and in contrast to Freedom House and IRI during the Bush administration. This hesitancy to leave NDI for government service suggests that its leaders are particularly committed to seeing NDI grow as an organization over the long term.

To conclude, NDI has evolved markedly as an organization since 1983. Although its transformation was somewhat more gradual than USAID’s and somewhat less fraught than Freedom House’s, it was a deep transition nonetheless. The evidence suggests that NDI transformed itself in ways that its founders could not have anticipated. NDI’s major changes over time coincided with increased opportunities for lucrative democracy assistance contracts as well as the development of professional norms and technical knowledge and skills. This transformation seems consistent with the dissertation’s argument.

### 7.3.3 Open Society Institute

George Soros was born in Budapest, Hungary in 1930. After his Jewish family survived Nazi Germany’s occupation of Hungary during World War II, Soros moved to Great Britain, where he studied at the London School of Economics. There, he read philosopher Karl Popper, whose works influenced Soros’ subsequent investment strategies as well as his

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51 Interview 47, with director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, Washington, D.C., April 30, 2010.
52 Interview 40, with former director of democracy assistance NGO, in person, New York, N.Y., May 26, 2010.
political ideals.53 After completing his degree, George Soros moved to New York, where he began a career as one of the twentieth century’s most successful financiers. According to Krisch (2009), “He managed his funds in a style later characteristic of his human rights efforts: he was directly involved in their operations; he took large risks, based, however, on his own careful analysis of situations; and he acted boldly and quickly to invest for gain and to retreat to cut losses.”

Drawing on his personal fortune, Soros began promoting human rights abroad in a concentrated way first in 1980 in South Africa, then in 1984 with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences/George Soros Foundation, and then in 1986 with the Fund for the Reform and Opening of China. These early efforts included distributing copying machines to Hungarian dissidents and funding programs in China that were so threatening to the regime that the government’s secret police infiltrated the Soros Foundation’s office. At the time, the foundation was run out of Soros’ home by his wife, Susan (Soros, 1995, 117). Throughout the 1980s, Soros continued to support various efforts by human rights activists and dissidents in other countries, including Russia, the Philippines, South Africa, Guatemala, and Chile.

In 1993, faced with new political openings in Eastern Europe and beyond after communism’s fall, Soros united the various groups and institutions that he had funded in more than thirty-four countries under the umbrella of the Open Society Institute. OSI was directed by former Human Rights Watch Executive Director Aryeh Neier and headquartered in New York and Budapest. Its initial funding allocation was $300 million. The OSI model involved the establishment and founding of local OSI foundations, run by local boards, in addition to grants given out directly by the OSI headquarters. The organization’s mission, as described on its website, is as follows: “The Open Society Foundations work to build vibrant and tolerant democracies whose governments are accountable to their citizens.”54

53 For a more in-depth discussion of Soros’ intellectual roots, see Guilhot (2007, 458-464).

The local foundations received more than $6 billion by 2008 (Krisch, 2009).

OSI has traditionally been unique from other democracy promotion efforts because it gave—and encouraged—autonomy and financial independence to its local foundations. In interviews, former staff at OSI concur that there is far less monitoring and evaluation at OSI than at similar democracy promotion agencies. The reason they give is Soros’ dislike of bureaucracies. Soros sought to keep grantees accountable largely through low overhead, rather than formal monitoring procedures (Soros, 1995, 126). Grantees can apply to OSI on a rolling basis for renewals that they had a high chance of winning as long as the advisory boards of the local foundations approved.55 The organization’s structure grew improvisationally and was fluid, with thematic and regional divisions emerging alongside a number of offices abroad. From the start, George Soros exercised a high degree of oversight of the organization. A former grants officer at OSI described, for example, how on one of his many travels overseas Soros met a Russian journalist who wanted to do a documentary. The New York office consequently funded this journalist.56 Aryeh Neier also exerted a large amount of oversight, personally reviewing all grants over a certain amount before they are funded. OSI is less bureaucratic than other organizations in the democracy establishment in other ways; staff at the headquarters of OSI are more often regional experts (e.g., on Russia) than technical experts (e.g., on elections), and staff at local foundations were often intellectuals and dissidents rather than democracy professionals. My interviews do indicate, however, increasing amounts of crossover between the staffs of OSI, democracy establishment NGOs, and government donors.

Long-time student of democracy assistance Thomas Carothers is generally a harsh critic of democracy assistance programs, yet he has given positive reviews of the Open Society Institute’s efforts (Carothers, 1999, 273-274). Carothers in fact served on the OSI Board of Directors in Budapest for a number of years, starting in 1999. Prior to assuming that

55 Interview 12, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, May 2, 2010.
56 Interview 12, with former democracy assistance practitioner, in person, May 2, 2010.
role, Carothers (1996) compared American government democracy assistance activities in Romania with the Soros Foundation’s efforts and found considerable differences. American foreign service officers on a short-term tour of duty in Romania dominated USAID and were isolated from Romanians; in contrast, Romanians ran the Soros Foundation. Furthermore, USAID funded American and international groups to enact its Romania projects; in contrast, the Soros Foundation funded Romanian organizations. As a consequence, USAID’s office spent more than three times the amount of annual money spent by the the Soros Foundation on grants and hired fewer than one-third of the employees. This difference reflected not only the difference in cost of hiring local vs. international staff, but also something more. According to Carothers (1996, 19):

The much larger number of employees at Soros Romania reflects its much greater level of responsibility with regard to programming and its much lesser reliance on managerial and technical support from external Soros institutions. It is also related to Soros’ much more labor-intensive assistance methods—giving out many small grants to locals rather than large bloc grants or contracts with U.S. organizations.

USAID’s overall approach emphasized results; the Soros Foundation emphasized process (Carothers, 1996, 20). The consequence was a difference in programs: technical, measurable, institutional at USAID vs. aid for education, civil society, and dissidents at the Soros Foundation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, critics and supporters alike singled out the Soros Foundations as particularly important players in successful instances of democracy promotion, especially the Color Revolutions (Beissinger, 2007, 270).

Yet some of the aspects of the Soros Foundations that made them relatively unusual in the democracy establishment—their unique organizational structure (headed by a single person), lack of bureaucracy, fewer monitoring procedures, and somewhat more confronta-

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57As I discuss in Chapter 7, similar differences can be identified in my case study of democracy assistance programs in Jordan.
tional approach to promoting freedom in the countries where they work—seem to be fading. In the words of one former OSI staff member, “OSI has gotten more serious over time in terms of impact.” This change was foreshadowed by Soros in a 1995 interview:

In the beginning, I wanted to have an anti-foundation foundation, and for a time I succeeded: the Hungarian foundation was exempt from all the ills that beset normal foundations. Then came the revolutions and I rose to the challenge…Yet to continue without becoming an institution would be very detrimental. To operate without bureaucracy would render us wasteful and capricious. I have come to realize that we require a solid organization, a bureaucracy if you will. I have become reconciled to the fact that we must switch from a sprint to long distance running (Soros, 1995, 147).

Soros also wanted to turn his attention to other issues and challenges, including United States politics and the global financial crisis.

Today, OSI has more hierarchy and standard operating procedures. Stone (2010, 277), who conducted interviews with a number of OSI headquarters staff, found that OSI is moving towards what she called “a ‘top-down’ professionalised [sic] dynamic of policy interaction with decision makers.” A staff member said OSI is now “more like a traditional foundation with programme [sic] officers in New York” (quoted in Stone (2010, 277)). As a consequence, hierarchical relationships between OSI and grantees, many of whom are repeat grantees over a period of many years, rather than more horizontal relationships increasingly characterize OSI. It seems that some of the pressures to become more professional have hit even the Open Society Institute, an institution that has historically resisted the forces of measurement, reporting, and professionalism. George Soros continues as the head of the organization, as does Aryeh Neier, but he involves himself less. The staff are increasingly shifting towards a dynamic that characterizes the broader democracy establishment.

58 Interview 11, with practitioner at democracy NGO, by telephone, June 22, 2010.
7.4 Conclusion

This chapter focused on the principals in the democracy establishment. First, I described the networked structure of the democracy establishment using hyperlink analysis tools that collect and depict connections across organizations’ websites. I found that the democracy establishment as a network is dominated and linked together by a few key donor organizations. This finding was consistent with an argument that suggests that convergence in the democracy establishment ought to occur through peripheral organizations’ interactions with core donor organizations, rather than through regional or programmatic diffusion patterns. Second, I conducted an in-depth analysis of Freedom House, a leading democracy assistance organization that was founded in 1941 with a mission to promote human rights in the United States and advocate for U.S. participation in World War II. Drawing on a rich archive of Freedom House’s administrative records, as well as interviews and secondary sources, I show that the organization’s transformation coincided with new government funding opportunities as well as ideological debates on its Board and the development of a more professional mindset and skills at the organization. Finally, I expanded this analysis to three other organizations in mini-case studies: the United States Agency for International Development, National Democratic Institute, and Open Society Institute. I found professional convergence among all three organizations, but that the organizational culture and the nature of its funding helped determine how quickly it professionalized and to what extent it did so.

The collected evidence in this chapter suggests reason to believe that the positive relationship found in Chapter 6 between the type of democracy assistance pursued by donors and the passage of time are plausibly connected to the forces of professional competition and norms in the democracy establishment. Furthermore, it suggests a plausibility to the principal–agent argument developed previously. Democracy promotion organizations seem to behave like “regular” organizations in their search for funding, although the extent to which they do so depends not only on the passage of time, but also on the nature of the
organization and its particular culture, and funding sources.

Yet the picture painted in this chapter leaves important issues unaddressed. Specifically, what happens when the programs are implemented? This chapter focuses on organizations headquartered in New York and Washington, D.C. But what about the actual democracy assistance projects—rather than the search for donor funding and the shifts in organizational structures? How do we see programs play out on the ground and what shapes their content? Furthermore, this chapter focused only on U.S.-based democracy promotion organizations. I did so in order to examine a relatively comparable set of organizations. But what about multilateral organizations and donor organizations based in other countries? The next chapter, which focuses on the “agents” of democracy assistance helps me answer those questions by focusing on the entire spectrum of democracy donors on the ground in a single country: Jordan.
Chapter 8

The Agents: The Democracy Establishment in Jordan

According to Heydemann (2007, 31), international democracy assistance programs in the Middle East have been counterproductive. In countries such as Jordan, he writes, the programs have simply shaped strategies of authoritarian survival, creating a situation in which the practices and institutions of authoritarian regimes shift but their core nature does not. As he puts it, “regimes have the system gamed.” As a consequence, he argues that Western democracy promotion organizations need to fundamentally adapt their strategies. But why do external actors promote democracy in the ways that they do in the Middle East in the first place? In order to design more effective democracy assistance programs, it is important to understand what factors affect the selection of democracy assistance programs.

To illuminate the factors that shape international democracy assistance programs in the Middle East, this chapter presents a case study of foreign and domestic efforts to promote political reform in Jordan, primarily between 2008 and 2010. In so doing, this chapter illustrates the dual logics of delegation and change in an idea-driven network that I earlier theorized explain variations in democracy assistance programs across time and space. I argued that the transnational delegation structure of democracy assistance rewards measur-
able and regime compatible programs, and that norms and competition in the democracy establishment foster convergence on those programs over time. To test that argument, the chapter seeks to answer the following questions: Who comprises the “democracy establishment” in Jordan? More specifically, what organizations work in the field, how are they funded, and what ideals and incentives do they have? Furthermore, what democracy assistance programs do they pursue in Jordan and why?

In examining democracy assistance on the ground in Jordan among the final “agents” in the transnational delegation chain—Jordanian NGOs, international NGOs, and local offices of international donor agencies—I find evidence in favor of three key observable implications of my argument. First, I show that there is strong competition for democracy assistance funding in Jordan. Relatedly, I show that organizations working in this field want to demonstrate programs’ efficacy and maintain good relationships with the Jordanian government. Such incentives are necessary for the operation of my argument that actors in the democracy establishment design programs in ways that are measurable in order to satisfy donors and in ways that are regime compatible in order to satisfy their host countries. Second, I show that people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment are both idealists and pragmatists. As a consequence, they feel conflict between their ideals and their incentives to please both their principals and the Jordanian government. Finally, I show that people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment share professional norms, identities, and ideas developed through work over the past three decades inside and outside of Jordan. Such people often cite their professional expertise, rather than purely the constraints of the Jordanian monarchy or the preferences of donors, when justifying their choice of programs. I reach these conclusions primarily on the basis of seventy-one semi-structured interviews conducted during six months of field research in Jordan.

By focusing on recent democracy assistance programs in Jordan, I can also enrich some of the hypothesis tests pursued using other research methods elsewhere in the dissertation. In a way that is difficult to do even with the very best data sources on foreign aid projects,
in a single country I can examine all donor-funded democracy assistance projects, both by foreign governments, international organizations, and private foundations. I expect that the harder the monitoring problems, the more measurable and the more regime compatible the programs will be, all else equal (Hypotheses 1 and 2). I find that measurable and regime compatible projects in Jordan are indeed associated with lower levels of monitoring by principals. In line with this expectation, privately funded programs are less measurable and regime compatible than publicly funded programs; bilaterally funded programs are less measurable and regime compatible than multilateral programs; and programs funded by donors based in Jordan encounter more monitoring than ones funded by donors based abroad. Furthermore, I find that donors as well as aid recipients identify similarities in strategies across diverse donors that delegate aid similarly. Local NGOs that apply to funders tend to view American, European, and other bilateral donors as prioritizing similar goals.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 8.1 provides background information on the Jordanian political context and discusses my selection of the Jordanian case. Section 8.2 introduces the democracy establishment in Jordan, considering the different types of organizations working in the field and their funding structures. I show the competition and the tensions between ideals and interests that arise from that funding structure. I also explain how the democracy establishment has become professional in Jordan. Section 8.3 explores what types of programs the democracy establishment implements in Jordan according to the classification scheme that I developed earlier in the dissertation. I show that monitoring by the donor is correlated with less measurable and regime compatible programs. I also present evidence from interviews that suggests that monitoring concerns do drive that correlation. Section 8.4 weighs some of the alternative explanations for my findings in Jordan and their limitations. Section 8.5 concludes.
8.1 Liberal Authoritarianism in Jordan

Jordan is a hereditary monarchy that has been ruled by King Abdullah II, the son of the long-ruling King Hussein, since 1999. In 1989, King Hussein suspended martial law, reintroduced legislative elections, and allowed political parties to legally organize for the first time since 1956. Yet since that liberal moment, authoritarianism in Jordan has intensified. As Figure 8.1 shows, since 1989, freedom in Jordan has declined despite its steady rise elsewhere in the world.\(^1\) In 1993, Jordan’s election law was amended in order to reduce the influence of opponents of the monarchy in parliament (Lust-Okar and Jamal, 2002, 358). In protest, the main opposition party, the Islamic Action Front, has often boycotted elections. Meanwhile, the king can dissolve parliament at will (as he did in 2001 and 2009), can delay elections indefinitely, gives parliament little authority to make laws, and retains the right to issue “temporary laws” by royal decree without parliamentary consent. Furthermore, freedoms of expression and assembly are heavily restricted. 75 to 80 percent of all respondents in an annual survey run by the Center for Strategic Studies since 2001 have stated that they are afraid to criticize their government (Yom, 2009, 161).

But even as Jordan’s freedoms have declined, the country has adopted certain democratic institutions and practices in an attempt to establish the country’s liberal *bona fides*. In addition to holding elections for parliament, Jordan invited international election monitors to observe the election in 2010 (who favorably reported on the election), adopted a quota for women in parliament in 2003 and doubled it in 2010, and has created prominent government-tied human rights and women’s empowerment organizations.\(^2\) Heydemann (2007) refers to this process as “authoritarian upgrading;” it has become common throughout the developing world since the end of the Cold War (Levitsky and Way, 2002, 51). Why

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upgrade Jordan’s autocracy? Yom (2009, 152) writes that the Jordanian monarchy “maintain[s] a veneer of political openness and moderation that allows Jordan to pose (with a special eye on Western donor countries) as a modern and relatively progressive polity amid the surrounding turmoil of the troubled Middle East.”

Courting foreign approval is crucial since a central feature of Jordanian politics is the country’s dependence on foreign aid. In the days of the British Mandate and then after independence in 1946, the country earned a subsidy from imperial Great Britain. In the 1970s and 1980s, aid from the Gulf countries helped maintain the Hashemite monarchy. Then, large amounts of aid from the West began to flow again in the 1990s. Even after Western countries reengaged with democracy after the end of the Cold War, Jordan successfully maintained its international patronage networks along with many other Arab countries (Bellin, 2004, 148-149). Why is Jordan valuable to foreign aid donors? When Jordan signed a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, the United States rewarded Jordan with

Figure 8.1: Freedom House Scores in the World (Average) and in Jordan, 1972-2010. Scores rescaled so that 1 represents least free and 7 represents most free.
significant foreign aid and has continued to do so while Jordan has served as a key regional ally in the “war on terror.” Jordan has, for example, supported the invasion of Iraq, cooperated on counterterrorism intelligence, provided a rendition site for the Central Intelligence Agency, trained the Iraq military, allowed the American military to use its airbases, and given American aircraft carriers overflight rights. In return, Jordan receives considerable foreign aid. Abdullah’s efforts to create a liberal image for Jordan have especially paid off. In 2010, the United States awarded Jordan a special $275 million grant through the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)—a foreign assistance program created by President George W. Bush that targets well-governed countries—after Jordan passed through a $25 million MCC Threshold Program aimed at strengthening Jordan’s democratic institutions. Meanwhile, after “significant progress progress in the area of governance and transparency,” the European Union rewarded Jordan with “advanced status” in 2010 and a €223 million aid package.

To get some sense of Jordan’s foreign aid dependence, consider that since 1964, Jordan’s central government annual current expenditures have closely tracked external aid receipts. Furthermore, over the same time period, foreign aid as a percentage of Jordanian central government budget expenditures hovered at around 25 percent and never fell below 10 percent (Peters and Moore, 2009, 269, 272). As Figure 8.2 shows, in 2010, the United States State Department and USAID gave Jordan $258 million in economic aid and $380 million in military aid—a figure that dwarfed the $26 million in democracy aid it also gave that year. This aid money is a vital source of regime maintenance in Jordan (Lust-Okar, 2009, 6-7, 30-31), as it is in many developing countries (Morrison, 2009), since it lines the pockets of authoritarian rulers. Rather than responding to their publics, rulers can dis-

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5Jamal (2010) and Brownlee (2011) also emphasize the link between foreign aid dependence and author-
tribute rents to their key supporters, which in Jordan are the Transjordanian tribes that form the monarchy’s traditional base, as opposed to the large population of Palestinian refugees. At the time of writing, in contrast to its neighbors in Egypt and Syria, Jordan’s government had weathered small but steady protests since January 2011 in part by passing food and fuel subsidies. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a 2006 survey found that the third most-cited obstacle to democratization in Jordan is that the United States does not want democracy there (Braizat, 2007, 11). Meanwhile, just 29 percent of Jordanians think that American democracy promotion in the region has been successful.

Figure 8.2: Aid from the United States Government to Jordan by Sector, 2006-2010. Aid is from the Department of State and USAID and is in current U.S. dollars. Source: ForeignAssistance.gov.

It is in this inauspicious context that the international community has sought to promote

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democracy in Jordan. Democracy assistance in Jordan is a relatively new phenomenon; as Figure 8.3 shows, it began not immediately when the Cold War ended but instead in 1995 and has increased since then. Over time, non-American sources of democracy assistance have become relatively more common in Jordan, as is the case elsewhere in the world. The European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP; in 1995) and later the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP; in 2005) have been the key European financial instruments. Interestingly, democracy and governance assistance grew in Jordan at the same time as Jordan’s significance as an ally to the West increased—the precise moment when one might imagine that stability in Jordan’s “benevolent” monarchy would be prized.

Bearing the geo-political context in mind, this chapter seeks to describe and explain variations in international democracy promotion efforts in Jordan. I consider which aspects of Jordan’s authoritarian regime donors choose to tackle and why. In Section 8.4, I return to the alternative explanation that donors’ geo-strategic interests largely shape Jordan’s democracy assistance programs.

### 8.1.1 Why Jordan?

Before delving into the case study of Jordan, it is worth briefly explaining why I chose to focus on it and also what the methods of my analysis are. In general, I use this dissertation’s case studies as a way of triangulating the cross-national, time series analyses, sacrificing breadth and generalizability in favor of depth and more precise measurement. The key independent variables in my cross-national analyses, monitoring problems and professionalism, are somewhat bluntly measured, as are the concepts of “measurable” and “regime compatible” democracy assistance programs, despite my best efforts to develop a valid and replicable coding scheme. Concerns about the heterogeneity of the universe

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8Data from [www.oecd.org/dac/stats/qwids](http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/qwids) (accessed March 29, 2011). The OECD’s “Government and Civil Society” grouping (15100) includes aid in the following sectors: public sector policy, public finance management, decentralization, anti-corruption, legal and judicial development, democratic participation and civil society, elections, legislatures and political parties, media and free flow of information, human rights, and women’s equality organizations and institutions.
of country cases also arise. For those reasons, among others, choosing a country case in which to focus in depth makes sense. But why Jordan? Considerations of research design (both theoretical and practical) as well as policy relevance guided my case selection, as did my previous personal experience in Jordan.

In terms of research design, first, Jordan is an advantageous research site because democracy assistance is a relatively new phenomenon there. Since democracy assistance in Jordan is ongoing and started only fifteen years ago (rather than twenty-five years ago, as in many countries) it is still relatively easy to locate and interview directors of NGOs working in the field. Since I examined the historical evolution of democracy assistance in the previous chapter, this chapter focuses less on over time variation, although I do look for evidence that suggests that convergence has taken place. Furthermore, since most grants have been funded just in the last decade, accurate information about them is still readily available. Although Jordan is an autocracy, the political context does permit open research

Figure 8.3: **Democracy and Governance Aid to Jordan, 1995-2009.** Data on all donors’ aid commitments to governance and civil society in constant 2008 U.S. dollars. Source: OECD.org.
on the topic of political reform.

Second, and also in terms of research design, Jordan satisfies the conditions suggested by scholars for selecting cases for in-depth study. When a country case study is chosen to complement cross-national statistical research, the results of which are generally robust and satisfactory, Lieberman (2005, 444) recommends choosing a country that is well-predicted by the statistical model, or “on-the-line,” in order to confirm that the hypothesized causal mechanisms are at work.² I inspect the residuals from my baseline models to establish that Jordan is, in fact, a well-predicted case. In the Baseline Models for bilateral donors in Chapter 5 (Models 16 and 17), the average residuals for Jordan are 0.06 for the proportion of measurable programs as the dependent variable and 0.12 for the proportion of regime compatible programs as the dependent variable; in the Baseline Models in Chapter 6 (Models 1 and 2), the average residuals were 0.05 for measurable and -0.05 for regime compatible programs.

A third issue of research design arises from my earlier finding that there is a positive relationship between regime compatible democracy assistance programs and American military aid, but not affinity scores when the donor is the United States. The precise causal mechanism is unclear. Since Jordan is a recipient of considerable U.S. military aid but generally has a low affinity with the U.S. in terms of UN voting, this case study can help shed light on the causal mechanism.¹⁰ It also offers a hard test of an alternative explanation: Donors’ geo-strategic interests drive their democracy promotion policies.

Finally, in terms of practical importance, the Arab world has clearly been the focus of the greatest interest in terms of democracy promotion among policy-makers and pundits alike since September 11, 2001. Both American and European donors have dramatically increased their funding on the Middle East since 2001 and, as outlined above, Jordan has been a particular focus of new foreign aid initiatives tied to political reform efforts, such as

²See also Seawright and Gerring (2008, 299-300) on “typical cases.”

¹⁰Jordan’s affinity score with the United States in 2008 was -0.67 on a scale from -1 to 1, with -1 representing the least affinity and 1 the most.
the MCC and ENP. Jordan (tied with Egypt) received more aid in the “Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance” category from the United States government than any country in the region in 2010 except Iraq. Yet serious doubts remain about these democracy promotion efforts, including about their sincerity, practicality, and consistency. Thus, it makes sense to focus on a Middle Eastern country for the analysis because doing so can help show us what factors influence the design of important democracy assistance programs and what changes might be necessary in order to promote democracy more effectively.

### 8.1.2 Methods of Data Collection

I reach this chapter’s conclusions primarily on the basis of seventy-one semi-structured key informant interviews that I conducted in Amman, Jordan, some of them over multiple settings. I also make use of official documents written by democracy assistance donor organizations, news articles, internet archives, and other secondary sources. Interviews typically began with “grand tour questions” that asked respondents to give a verbal tour of their organization’s typical work (Leech, 2002, 667); further questions addressed topics such as career history, decisions about what to fund or what funding to apply for, perceptions of donors and democracy assistance in Jordan, monitoring and evaluation of programs, and examples of effective programs. I conducted the interviews mainly with international donor representatives and directors of Jordanian and international non-governmental organizations working on issues related to political reform. I also interviewed some Jordanian political activists, foreign diplomats, and Jordanian government officials and attended four related conferences as a participant observer. I conducted most of these interviews during Fall 2009, although a few interviews were also conducted during a preliminary trip in Summer 2008 and a follow-up trip in Summer 2010.12

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11Jordan and Egypt both received $25 million in that portfolio, in contrast to, for example, Tunisia, which received just $450,000. See [http://foreignassistance.gov/DataView.aspx](http://foreignassistance.gov/DataView.aspx) (accessed May 30, 2011).

12Appendix B lists the names of interviewees and dates as well as the conferences.
I built the sampling frame for the interviews initially by identifying Jordanian organizations that had received NED grants in the past, online keyword searches, and by locating the Jordanian offices of major international actors in the democracy establishment (see list of Top 150 Organizations in Appendix C). I identified further interviewees through snowball sampling methods, especially seeking out recommendations of Jordanian NGOs that had not received foreign funds but worked on political reform issues. Since interviewees were not selected through a probability sampling technique, any inferences about some larger population that they might belong to must be made with some caution; I could not, for example, locate contact details or any current information about seven (out of twenty-four) political organizations that had received NED funding in the past because, I suspect, they no longer operate and their directors no longer live in Jordan. But even so the sample contains the vast majority of Jordanian organizations working in the democracy field, and it is well-suited for this project’s goals: corroborating what has been established from other sources, gathering basic information about the organizations’ work, and establishing what a set of people think (Tansey, 2007, 766). All but two interviews were conducted in English since the language is prevalent among politically-active, well-educated Jordanians; the remaining two interviews were conducted in Arabic with the aid of a translator. Direct quotes, either in the text or a footnote, support all empirical points gleaned from interviews according to the principles of active citation (Moravcsik, 2010, 31).

### 8.2 The Democracy Establishment in Jordan

This section introduces the democracy establishment in Jordan. I first discuss the different types of organizations working in the field of democracy assistance in Jordan and their various funding structures. I then describe how the competitive search for funding in Jordan’s democracy establishment influences the people and organizations working in the field, and how they struggle with the tensions between their ideals and incentives that arise from that
funding structure. I finally show how the democracy establishment has become professional in Jordan.

8.2.1 An Overview of Jordan’s Democracy Establishment

The field of democracy assistance in Jordan consists of three types of actors: Jordanian non-governmental organizations, international (i.e., non-Jordanian) non-governmental organizations, and international donor organizations. Table 8.1 summarizes the key organizations. These organizations all seek—at least in part, if not as their entire mission—to advance democracy in Jordan by pursuing programs that fall into the twenty categories described earlier that define democracy assistance. Jordanian NGOs need not receive international democracy assistance funds to be included, although as we shall see, most do.

Within the general categories of NGOs and donors, there is significant variation in terms of organizational structure and mission. First, the Jordanian NGOs in the democracy establishment range from small organizations with only two or three full-time employees to broad, membership-based organizations with dozens of full-time staff members and offices that span multiple buildings. The most professional of these organizations include several royal non-governmental organizations (RONGOs), which are large, typically well-run organizations that receive considerable international donor funding. These organizations, which Wiktorowicz (2002, 85-86) describes as examples of how the king seeks to “monopolize international funding resources and slowly establish hegemony over the direction of NGO activities,” clearly ought be doubted as true democratizers even though they may make sincere and significant progress on certain dimensions of democracy—for example, on advancing women’s participation on municipal councils. As I discuss further below, some of the non-royal Jordanian NGOs also maintain connections to the government, either through direct grants or in-kind support of co-sponsored programs.

Second, the international NGOs in the democracy establishment are mostly American non-profit organizations, but also include for-profit American companies (e.g., ARD) and
Jordanian NGOs \((N = 43)\): Adaleh Center for Human Rights Studies, Al Hayat Center for Civil Society Development, Al Quds Center for Political Studies, Al-Mashrek, Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center, Amman Center for Human Rights Studies, AmmanNet, Arab Civitas Regional Office, Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship, Arab Media Institute, Arab Organization for Human Rights, Arab Women Media Center, Arab Women’s Organization, Arab World Center for Democratic Development, Baqa’a Women’s Cooperative Association, Center for Defending Journalists, Center for Strategic Studies, Community Development Center/Zarqa, Community Media Network, Equitas, Family Centre for Counseling and Guidance, Good Life Studies Center (formerly Good Governance Studies Center), Human Forum for Women’s Rights, INJAZ Al-Arab, Jordan Center for Social Research, Jordanian Center for Civic Education Studies, Jordanian National Commission for Women*, Jordanian Society for Democracy, Jordanian Women’s Union, Land and Human to Advocate Progress, Middle East Marketing and Research Consultants, Mizan Law Group for Human Rights, Mleiha Young Women’s Association, Moderation Assembly for Thought and Culture, Mosawah Center for Democratic Studies, Musa Al Saket Cultural Center, National Centre for Human Rights*, Northern Badia Forum for Culture and Development, Partners Jordan, Princess Basma Youth Resource Centre*, Sisterhood is Global Institute, West & East Center for Human Resources Development, Women’s Organization to Combat Illiteracy, Young Entrepreneurs Association

International NGOs \((N = 14)\): Academy for Educational Development, American Bar Association, Arab Women’s Leadership Training Institute, ARD, Center for International Private Enterprise, Freedom House, IFES, iKnow Politics, IREX Jordan, International Republican Institute, National Democratic Institute, People in Need, Solidarity Center, SUNY Center for International Development

International Donors \((N = 13)\): Canada Fund, European Commission, Foundation for the Future, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Hans Seidel Stiftung, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Middle East Partnership Initiative, Rights & Democracy, Soros Foundation, United Nations Development Programme, United States Agency for International Development; Various embassies

Table 8.1: Organizations in the Democracy Establishment in Jordan. Includes Jordanian and international NGOs as well as international donors in the democracy assistance field that had offices in Jordan between Summer 2008 and Summer 2010 in Jordan. * indicates royal NGOs.

non-American non-profit organizations (e.g., People in Need). These organizations implement programs in Jordan based on funding that private and public donors give them.

Yet they all also act themselves as donors in the delegation chain and give small grants to Jordanian organizations to implement programs. Some international NGOs (e.g., Freedom House) also had their Iraq office headquarters in Amman, Jordan, at the time of research because of safety concerns in Iraq, but I do not include them in Table 8.1 or my analysis unless they also work on Jordan.
Finally, the international donors in the democracy establishment in Jordan include bi-
lateral donors (e.g., Canada Fund, USAID), multilateral donors (e.g., Foundation for the
Future, UNDP), and private donors (e.g., Soros Foundation). In addition to these donors,
who maintain offices in Amman, a number of other international donors also fund programs
in Jordan but do not maintain offices in the country (e.g., NED). I consider the programs
funded by such donors in my analysis later on.

8.2.2 Organizational Survival in Jordan’s Democracy Establishment

A survey of the organizations working in the democracy establishment in Jordan quickly
reveals that, as expected, professionals feel torn between their ideals and pressures to please
the two main actors that monitor their activities: the donor government (or organization)
and the Jordanian government. Attempting to serve both masters creates tensions and frus-
trations. As one director of an international NGO in Jordan that came to Amman from
the headquarters of a major American democracy organization commented: “It’s so much
more frustrating to work in the field because you have your D.C. funders as stakeholders as
well as your local stakeholders.”

Many interviewees at Jordanian as well as international NGOs emphasized how their
ideals brought them to work in the democracy assistance field. One organization’s founder
started his NGO on media issues because he believed “freedom of the press is the corner-
stone of democracy and human rights. We started... when the freedom of the press was
very bad.”

Many of these pioneers now chafe at the field’s growing professionalization. The
director of one Jordanian human rights and rule of law organization said, for example,
“We started doing the legal aid as a voluntary thing... Now working on human rights and
democracy has become a business. So for me, it’s a very big challenge to keep working on

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13 Interview 23, with director of INGO, in person, Amman, October 21, 2009.
human rights even though many donors want to fund my organization.” I consider in turn how donors and the Jordanian government shape these idealists’ organizations.

**Donor-Generated Incentives**

Organizations in Jordan that work on democracy issues are in many ways donor-driven. I argue that it is this competition for donor funding that drives organizations to pursue measurable programs to signal effectiveness to donors. Following Sundstrom (2005, 428), I categorize the funding of local non-governmental organizations as follows:

> “Primarily foreign-funded” refers to organizations that have received few (if any) domestic sources of funding and are usually or always supported by foreign donors. “Little or no foreign funding” refers to organizations that may have received a few foreign grants, but throughout most of their history have had either no funding or mostly domestic-sourced funding.

As Table 8.2 shows, using those definitions, the vast majority (91 percent) of NGOs working on political reform in Jordan have received at least some foreign funding and furthermore rely primarily on foreign grants to support their budgets (72 percent). Just around one-quarter of NGOs in Jordan (24 percent) receive little or no foreign funding. Accepting foreign funds, and especially American funds, comes with significant drawbacks in Jordan, where the general public and many NGOs directors alike strongly object to Western countries’ support for Israel and involvement in the Iraq War. Taking foreign funds therefore involves sometimes setting aside principled objections or harming an organization’s local image. Notably, 38 percent of the organizations on which I have data have received direct or in-kind support from the Jordanian government for at least some of their programs, a further example of the regime’s co-optation of liberal efforts and its mechanisms of controlling civil society.

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15 Interview 5, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 5, 2009.
Table 8.2: **Funding Sources of Jordanian NGOs in the Democracy Establishment.** 46 total organizations included. Source: Author’s interviews and organizations’ websites.

Donor-driven NGOs are a familiar—and often allegedly deleterious—outcome to students of democracy assistance who have explored programs on the ground in Eastern Europe and the post-Communist states.\(^\text{16}\) Yet rather than the NGO sector becoming segmented between socially isolated but well-funded NGOs and socially connected but poor NGOs, as has happened elsewhere, Jordanian civil society organizations promoting political reform are overwhelmingly foreign supported. Among my interviewees, the average organization had received funding from five different international donors.

Another way of viewing the donor-driven nature of Jordanian NGOs is by considering how their date of founding coincides with international funding for democracy in Jordan. If NGOs are motivated in large part by funding concerns, then we would expect the distribution of their dates of founding to be related to funding opportunities. As Figure 8.4 shows, few political organizations in Jordan pre-date the advent of democracy assistance there in 1995. Notably, freedom in Jordan seems to have declined since 1995 (see Figure 8.1), so this trend does not seem attributable to a widening of civic or political space in Jordan. Most of the non-governmental organizations that I interviewed in the democracy establishment in Jordan were founded just since 2003, when international democracy assistance spiked and many of the international NGOs first opened their Amman offices.

As a consequence, many leaders of Jordanian NGOs refer to democracy promotion as a business and accuse their fellow NGOs of being *dakakin*—or shops—that search for donor

\(^\text{16}\) For some examples, see Matvueva (2008, 11), Henderson (2002, 162-163), Wedel (2001, 114), and many of the chapters in Mendelson and Glenn (2002).
Figure 8.4: Kernel Density Plot of Year of Founding for Jordanian NGOs that Promote Political Reform. \( N = 28, \) mean = 1997. Source: Author’s interviews and organizations’ websites.

money wherever possible, regardless of how well a call for proposals fits their mandate.\textsuperscript{17} A program director at a Jordanian human rights organization puts it this way: “an organization on youth will apply for a grant on torture just because it is available.”\textsuperscript{18} Another interviewee, who has worked for both an international and domestic NGO in the democracy establishment in Jordan, told me, “I perceive the process of democracy and governance work in Jordan to be really donor-driven. The NGOs want to earn money—and some of them want to drive a Mercedes or BMW—and since the country depends so much on foreign aid, starting up an NGO is the way to do that.”\textsuperscript{19} Others are less critical, saying, “it’s not a bad thing for people to be paid a salary.”\textsuperscript{20}

Leaders of international NGOs and donors that fund Jordanian NGOs are keenly aware of the donor-driven nature of Jordanian civil society and say that they do what they can to

\textsuperscript{17}Expression first used in Interview 5, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 5, 2009, and confirmed in many subsequent interviews.

\textsuperscript{18}Interview 82, with program director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 11, 2009.

\textsuperscript{19}Interview 68, with program officer at INGO, in person, Amman, November 18, 2009.

\textsuperscript{20}Interview 1, with political activist, in person, Amman, December 6, 2009.
avoid funding donor-driven organizations. The director of a USAID-funded project on civil society that gives out grants to Jordanian NGOs said, for example, “The challenge in Jordan is to make sure that were not reinforcing the NGO business.”

A former grant-maker at an American government donor exclaimed in frustration: “Civil society organizations may have only five people—and they’re all working to get funding! They don’t have a constituency or a presence or any visibility.”

The need to obtain donor funding is not something limited to Jordanian NGOs. International NGOs also seek resources to continue their overseas work. The Solidarity Center opened a country office in Jordan in 2003, for example, with the goals of supporting and training Iraqi refugees in Jordan, fostering a regional labor women’s empowerment network, monitoring labor abuses, and supporting organized workers in Jordan’s qualified industrial zones, among other things. But the Solidarity Center lost its funding from the National Endowment for Democracy in 2009 when the U.S. government reshuffled its democracy funding for Iraq. Note that although the Solidarity Center also did work in Jordan, funding for Iraq was one of its main income sources. The NED had been the Center’s main source of grants and when the new call for proposals went out from the State Department rather than NED, the American NGO Relief International won the bid to do union work in Iraq. As a consequence, the Solidarity Center’s office in Jordan closed at the end of 2009. Most international NGOs that I visited in Jordan worried about obtaining funding because of the financial crisis and anticipated cuts in foreign aid budgets; they were applying to new donors and under new areas within democracy and governance to ensure their organizations’ survival. This evidence all helps validate my assumptions about competition in the democracy establishment.

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21 Interview 35, with director of USAID-funded project, in person, Amman, December 12, 2009.
22 Interview 71, with former officer at international donor, in person, Amman, July 1, 2010.
23 Interview 17, with director of INGO, by telephone, November 16, 2009.
24 This anecdote also illustrates the advantages core organizations such as the Solidarity Center enjoy when competing for grants at the NED and therefore the reduced monitoring that they are subject to, as discussed in Chapter 6.
Host Country-Generated Incentives

At the same time as they must obtain funding from foreign donors, however, it is clear that NGOs working in Jordan must serve another master: the Jordanian government. I argue that it is the need to satisfy the host government in order to gain access that drives organizations to pursue more regime compatible programs despite their ideals and donors’ preferences. Although the Jordanian government is not typically considered a government that represses democracy assistance within its borders (Carothers, 2006; Gershman and Allen, 2006), it does threaten democracy assistance programs.

Two examples of access concerns in Jordan will suffice. When I asked the director of an NGO in Jordan working on media issues, for example, to describe his organization’s general strategic plan, he replied: “We can’t really have a strategy as an NGO because we’re just trying to survive in a situation with a lot of political pressures. Also, we can’t plan if we don’t know what our funding opportunities will be in the future—what the government will allow and what the donors will provide.”25 When I asked another NGO director how he chose what programs to pursue, he noted that his family members are political refugees in Jordan. As a consequence, “I know that I don’t want to talk about political rights here in Jordan because of my delicate personal situation. So all I can do is women’s issues, rather than more political issues.”26 As expected, concerns about regime compatibility are especially strong among the staff members of Jordanian NGOs, who more often must to live with the personal consequences of government reprisals, however, they were also articulated by the staff of international NGOs. It is perhaps telling that upon walking into the offices of the international NGOs listed in Table 8.1, visitors immediately face the customary smiling photographs of King Abdullah and his family that one also notices on the walls of shops, homes, and other organizations’ offices throughout Jordan.

What is the nature of the democracy establishment’s access problems in Jordan? I found

26Interview 48, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 26, 2009.
that the government’s threat to NGOs is more often implied than overt, but it is still felt. The director of an NGO working primarily on issues of good governance said:

 Nobody has asked us to stop or do anything differently, but when we published a study there was an incident where we were prohibited without any reason—no reason at all—from doing a program that we had previously agreed that we could do with the Anti-Corruption Commission. However, we have tried to work with the opportunities and degree of freedom that we do have.27

The Jordanian government uses restrictive NGO laws—it has the ability to withdraw permission for NGOs to work legally and must approve of NGOs taking foreign funding through the 2008 Law of Societies—and its infiltration of the civil society sphere via RONGOs to inhibit civil society actors that sincerely want to promote democracy.28

I argued earlier that the transnational delegation chain’s tendencies towards agency slack, which enable organizations that are agents in the delegation chain to shift programs towards their preferences for regime compatibility and away from donors’ preferences, are heightened by the phenomenon of multiple principals. Foreign donors want to work with the best local organizations and people, who thus have some ability to choose the calls-for-proposals that best match their preferences and design programs accordingly. This phenomenon takes place in Jordan. For example, the director of a Jordanian civil society organization relayed the following anecdote to me as an example of his young organization’s success: “Right now there is a call for proposals from the State Department—four U.S. organizations working together, IREX, an American university, NDI, the Social Bank [sic]—and they each contacted us to be their local partner and we’re trying to decide who to work with.”29 As a consequence, his organization had ample opportunity to influence the

27 Interview 77, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 18, 2009.


29 Interview 33, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 22, 2009.
proposal’s content and also to affect the program’s implementation, should it be funded. I expect multiple principal problems to lead especially to regime compatible programs.

**Conclusions about Organizational Survival in Jordan**

To conclude, these interviews as well as evidence on foreign funding and the dates of organizations’ founding strongly suggest that organizations working in Jordan’s democracy establishment are driven both by their ideals and their incentives to please donors and the Jordanian government. Activists want to create real political change in Jordan. As one professional put it: “How did I come to work here? I have always been passionate about reform.” Indeed, in a survey of women working in Jordan’s non-governmental organization sector on the issues of human rights and women’s rights, Clark and Michuki (2009, 355) found that the majority responded that they do their work because they believe in the “aim or purpose” of their organization. In other words, ideals matter.

But democracy cannot be promoted if organizations do not obtain funding. NGOs therefore want to pursue programs that will satisfy donors interested in effective programs. Furthermore, democracy cannot be promoted if the Jordanian monarchy shuts down or otherwise inhibits the work of organizations in the democracy establishment, which provides incentives for NGOs to pursue regime compatible programs. These constraints are consistent with my argument that programs that must meet the structural imperatives of the transnational delegation chain. To sum up with a quote from the director of an American NGO working in Jordan: “We’ve tried to put together a program that recognizes the realities of the place but also allows us to continue to get funding and operate here in Jordan—because [otherwise] we would run into a huge number of problems.”

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30 Interview 71, with former officer at international donor, in person, Amman, July 1, 2011.
31 Interview 50, with director of INGO, in person, Amman, December 13, 2009.
8.2.3 Professionalism in Jordan’s Democracy Establishment

Jordan’s democracy establishment is also characterized by growing professionalization over time in a way that is consistent with my theoretical argument. I expect that people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment today will share professional norms, identities, and ideas, which the field developed through work over the past three decades both inside and outside of Jordan. Processes such as the turnover of personnel, short-term projects, and the concentration of professionals in certain contexts should foster the convergence in strategies that my argument predicts over time. Program choices should be justified at least in part according to professional expertise.

Both for Jordanian professionals and international professionals, circulation across a variety of organizations is typical. Such turnover fosters the growth of a professional field. To give several examples: Frances Abouzeid, the director of AED’s Civil Society Program in Jordan in Fall 2009, entered the field in 1991 by working for George Soros in Prague, continued to work for OSI in New York and Budapest, later directed Freedom House’s office in Jordan, and finally worked for AED in Jordan. Obaida Fares, the founder and director of the Arab Foundation for Development and Citizenship as of Fall 2009, started his Amman-based organization in 2007 after previously working for the National Endowment for Democracy and Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington, D.C. Gregor Meiering, the director of the OSI Jordan office in Summer 2010, previously worked for the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in the Middle East and also as a consultant on related issues for the European Union. Jordanian personnel also circulate through the democracy establishment in Jordan, working in the offices of donors, Jordanian NGOs, and INGOs. The shifting of personnel across organizations and countries helps transmit norms and programs across the profession. Abouzeid, for example, helped oversee the adaptation of some of AED’s global programs to the Jordanian context. Likewise, MaryAnn Forbes, the director of the Solidarity Center’s office in Jordan, found that her experience working in qualified industrial zones in Indonesia and East Africa in the 1990s guided her similar work
in Jordan between 2003 and 2009.

Donors also helped foster convergence on programs and professionalization in Jordanian civil society by bringing specific programs or ideas to their recipients. One director of an organization that relies on funding from the NED, for example, noted that NED staff members have connected him with organizations in other countries, such as Lebanon, working on similar issues and that he has contacted and learned from them. Another organization received funding from international donors to translate civic education texts that were used in other countries into Arabic for use in Jordan and then in other Arab countries. The NGO’s director explained:

The whole idea was to work through some contacts at the U.S. Embassy in Amman in 1998-1999 with the Center for Civic Education in California. We wanted to do something similar here in Jordan. So the first thing to do was to adapt and translate the Center’s materials into Arabic...[In 2002], we got a MEPI grant and expanded to eight countries, including Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia, [and] the West Bank. We basically sought to expand the model of translating and adapting civic education materials and bringing them [sic] to Arab countries. The books were all the same except the first two or three pages that talked about the country.

Democracy assistance practitioners described the emergence of professional identities and standards in ways that conform with my argument about the democracy establishment. The process of professionalization of NGOs in Jordan and the broader Arab world, or the “process whereby problems are increasingly dealt with by persons with relevant subject-specific knowledge, experience and training, rather than by staff members solely recruited for their previous political activism or engagement in the organisation [sic],” has also been

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32Interview 77, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 18, 2009. Specifically, the interviewee said: “Many times they [the NED] have given us contacts in other countries—like in Lebanon especially—that we can learn from and benefit from the experience.”

33Interview 52, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 19, 2009.
noted by previous researchers (Martens, 2006, 21). Much of the literature focusing on NGO professionalization in Jordan emphasizes how this process is driven by the desire of NGOs to obtain funding from international donors that view them as insufficiently professional (Hawthorne, 2005, 105) and to compete successfully for such funding against the relatively more professional royal and semi-governmental NGOs (Hammami, 2000; Clark and Michuki, 2009, 329, 332). Jad (2004), for example, contends that “the NGO-isation of Arab women’s movements” in the past decade is tightly related to American efforts to support civil society since 9/11. As one former American democracy donor explained, “If you want the best civil society work here in Jordan, you go to the Queen.”

Interviewees frequently used the terms “toolbox” and “best practices” to describe their current programming approaches, which they contrasted with the “idealism” and “trial and error” of previous eras. For example, one longtime democracy expert described making the transition from idealist to pragmatist (and sometimes pessimist) over his two decades in the field. The experience of promoting democracy at the end of the Cold War was euphoric but ultimately proved singular after he worked in other regions in other times. “When I first [started working in the field], I was sort of anti-Communist and I wanted to rout out all the bad guys. We were a bit too idealistic and ideological in those days—we were on the right side of history for Eastern Europe. Now, we’ve become much more practical.” To give another example, the director of a European donor organization in Jordan described his surprise at abandoning his principled commitment to supporting gender mainstreaming in favor of following his colleagues in Jordan and working just with women—through targeted aid projects for women’s groups and women’s political participation—when confronted with gender inequalities in the field.

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34 Note that donor-driven professionalism is precisely what DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 155) would expect for an industry that frequently transacts with the state.

35 Interview 71, with former officer at international donor, in person, Amman, July 1, 2010.

36 Interview 50, with director of INGO, in person, Amman, December 13, 2009.

37 Interview 23, with director of INGO, in person, Amman, December 14, 2009. Specifically, the interviewee said: “Normally, my approach is to do gender mainstreaming instead of promoting women. But on a
Note that interviewees described their pragmatism and diminished expectations in Jordan in terms of a recognition, after spending time in the field, of the local political constraints on their work—the difficulty of finding suitable civil society partners or of staying on good terms with the government—rather than in terms of any restrictions put on their work from their embassies, donors, or home offices. The evidence therefore suggests that the correlation that I found in the previous chapter between military aid and regime compatible democracy assistance (but not affinity) may be caused more by an emboldened host country and incentives faced by the democracy establishment rather than by donor pressures. I return to this point below in more detail in Section 8.4.

As suggested by the above interviewee’s comment about gender mainstreaming, many of the internationally funded projects in Jordan are similar owing to processes of learning over time by both donors and recipients. Although funders want to carve a niche within the field, they noted the incentives to fund organizations that other donors have already worked with and that have a track record. Such behavior is what we would expect in a profession, but not in a network in which donors seek to exercise a high degree of control over their grantees. One grant-maker at a multilateral donor organization said:

We don’t mind at all duplicating other donors—many of them [our projects] are duplicates. You can’t just give half a million dollars to a brand-new organization. We do due diligence with other donors to make sure that the grantees are successful...[Also], it is good to link ourselves with other international donors to enhance our profile and raise awareness of our work in the region.\footnote{Interview 9, with officer at international donor, in person, Amman, October 19, 2009.}

It is safer, given local donors’ needs to report back to their principals, to follow the roads already trod by other donors. Donors meet on a monthly basis in Amman to share experiences and information with each other, which fosters further convergence rather than differentiation. Occasionally, donor-funded projects are not simply similar but are in fact national level, if the situation of women is so poor, we may choose to really promote women.”
actual duplicates. Two Jordanian NGOs, for example, jointly wrote one proposal for a parliamentary monitoring project; they split when they found it difficult to work together and each ended up successfully winning a grant from a different international donor to implement the original project, simultaneously.\footnote{The history of this program was conveyed in interviews with the directors of each NGO.}

## 8.3 What is funded in Jordan?

In this section, I turn to the questions of what programs donors fund in Jordan and why. This dissertation’s argument predicts that how measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are depends primarily on two factors: the degree of monitoring problems and how professional the democracy establishment is (which increases over time). Since my field research took place in Jordan between 2008 and 2010, I expect at least a medium level of measurable and regime compatible programs—and a relatively high level of measurable and regime compatible programs when donors have a harder time monitoring their agents (see Table 8.3).

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<td>(High Professionalism)</td>
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Table 8.3: **Predictions about Democracy Assistance Programs in Jordan, 2008-2010.** How measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs are depends on the degree of monitoring problems and how professional the democracy establishment is.

I test this argument via three comparisons of the relative amounts of measurable and regime compatible programs in Jordan according to the coding scheme developed earlier in this project. First, bilaterally funded programs should be similarly measurable and regime compatible, regardless of their country of origin, because they face similar levels of monitoring. Second, bilaterally funded programs should be less measurable and regime compat-
patible than multilateral ones, which involve an additional step of delegation and collective principals and thus relatively more difficult monitoring, all else equal. Relatedly, since they are easier to monitor, programs funded by donors that are based in Jordan should be less measurable and regime compatible than programs that are funded by donors based abroad, all else equal. Third, privately funded programs should be less measurable and regime compatible than publicly funded programs, which again involve an additional step of delegation (from the voters) and thus relatively more difficult monitoring, all else equal.

Earlier in the dissertation, I test the argument in a cross-national, time-series statistical framework that includes other variables in the analysis that may also be related to the outcomes of interest. Here, I concentrate on the programs conducted in Jordan in a way that makes it more difficult to explicitly test other alternative explanations and calculate measures of uncertainty as I did in Chapter 5. Instead, I can take a much more detailed picture of what programs do on the ground with information about their specific funding structures. While doing so, I can provide insight from interviewees about why those programs were chosen and how measurable and regime compatible they really are in the Jordanian context.

Before diving into these comparisons, Figure 8.5 shows the proportion of programs in each of the twenty categories in Jordan between 2008 and 2010. I continue to classify projects in this case study according to my earlier categorization, but I also note that a more fine-grained level of analysis in Jordan suggests that many programs that are not “measurable” from a macro-level, “original principal” perspective are also characterized by professionals seeking out quantitative indicators to satisfy their most immediate donors. An example of a such a program would be a civil society strengthening effort funded by USAID, which developed a survey of civil society organizations to provide some quantitative justification and baseline comparisons for its efforts. Such a survey could be used to report to USAID’s office in Jordan and perhaps even to USAID in Washington, D.C., but ultimately is likely too detailed to present in a report to Congress or to be scrutinized by legislators.
Likewise, certain programs that cross-nationally might seem to threaten regimes are implemented in Jordan in such a way that they are regime compatible. Here, particularly good examples are programs that fall into the category of aiding youth; such efforts are relatively popular in Jordan and are often designed in regime compatible ways, such as the school parliaments program, organized in conjunction with the Jordanian government, that promoted appreciation of and engagement with Jordan’s legislature among school children. Since Jordan’s legislature could be considered an instrument of authoritarian rule, such a program may well enhance the regime’s legitimacy and authority.

Figure 8.5: **Total Democracy Assistance Programs in Jordan, 2008-2010, by Category.**
Source: Author’s coding of interviews and organizations’ materials.

The general pattern revealed in Figure 8.5 seems consistent with the types of democracy assistance programs that we would expect and that have become more and less com-
mon over time cross-nationally. Democracy assistance programs in Jordan are diverse, but little-to-no aid was given in categories such as conflict resolution, constitutions, dissidents, humanitarian assistance, and trade unions. These categories are neither measurable nor regime compatible. Note that aid to these categories does not seem a priori implausible or undesirable in Jordan. Although political parties exist in Jordan, for example, they are extremely feeble in Jordan, which might make them a good target for aid programs. But just around 3 percent of the programs that I identified were working to strengthen political parties. Notably, Jordan-based organizations do some of these types of work elsewhere in the Arab region in countries that have more hostile political climates (e.g., Syria). 40

My findings about democracy assistance programs in Jordan contrast somewhat with those of Carapico (2009, 8), who in a less-clearly defined coding scheme found that “most [Middle East democracy assistance] projects cluster around electoral representation, legal or judicial development, and support for liberal elements of civil society—and they are mostly about collecting or distributing information or supporting institutions to do this work.” Instead, I find that the most popular donor-funded programs in Jordan emphasize governance (good governance and local governance) and women (women’s groups and women’s political participation).

Projects that are compatible with Jordan’s monarchy as well as being easily measured are relatively common. These categories include programs to aid business, good governance, local governance, rule of law, women’s groups, and women’s political participation. 10 percent of the aid recipients that I interviewed were working on business and enterprise projects, which especially emphasized public–private partnerships. Around 25 percent of the internationally-funded organizations that I interviewed worked on local governance, 33 percent on good governance, and 40 percent on women’s issues. Good governance projects typically built the capacity of municipal council members—especially

40Interview 48, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 26, 2009. The details of these programs are kept confidential at the request of the interviewee because of the risks faced by activists in Syria.
women—and promoted participatory budgeting. Rule of law projects were sometimes educational, such as running “know your rights” campaigns or training lawyers who work on human rights issues. Interestingly, organizations with internationally funded human rights projects have especially strong government links; for example, the National Centre for Human Rights was established by law in 2002. Women’s projects engaged women politically—encouraging them to run for office (especially locally), training female civil servants in basic professional skills, and supporting and networking Jordanian women politicians with their counterparts overseas—and empowered them to fight against domestic violence. This pattern of supporting women’s political participation is consistent with broader trends democracy support in the Middle East, which Ottaway (2005a, 166) claims has precisely to do with donors’ desire to find “many concrete, small projects that are not seen as threatening by most Arab regimes.”

8.3.1 Similarities in Bilateral Democracy Assistance Programs

In Jordan, the bilateral donors (as noted in Table 8.1) include organizations from the United States, Canada, Germany, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, various European embassies. According to my argument, since projects funded by such donors involve similarly long delegation chains, the information problems are similar. As a consequence, bilateral donors should fund similar levels of measurable and regime compatible programs. This prediction stands in sharp contrast to some of the conventional wisdom about democracy promotion donors (and foreign aid donors more broadly), which holds that the United States and European countries learned different lessons from the end of the Cold War (Kopstein, 2006; Schmid and Braizat, 2006). This prediction also contrasts with donors’ rhetoric, which often seeks to emphasize their unique approaches and values. In the Middle East, for example, “Europeans assert a guiding philosophy that they perceive to be qualitatively distinct from that of the United States” (Youngs, 2005, 237).

Yet as Figure 8.6 shows, American and non-American bilateral democracy donors fund
similar programs, at least when it comes to how measurable and regime compatible they are. Both groups of donors fund measurable programs 56 percent of the time in Jordan; American bilateral donors fund regime compatible programs 56 percent of the time as well, whereas non-American donors do so 64 percent of the time. That non-American donors do take a somewhat more regime compatible approach than American ones is a surprising finding from a geo-strategic perspective. The United States arguably has a stronger security hierarchy with Jordan and thus the strongest incentive to promote regime stability there, although European countries share some of the United States’ security concerns in Jordan (e.g., the Israel–Jordan peace treaty and counter-terrorism). Of course, the donors’ approaches differ in certain ways—such as the effort in Jordan by certain European donors to promote gay rights, a strategy not adopted by the United States—but these differences do not usually seem to track onto issues of measurement or regime compatibility. Is it possible that these similar overall percentages mask, however, important nuances in donors’ funding strategies?

![Figure 8.6: Measurable and Regime Compatible Programs in Jordan, 2008-2010, by Funding Source. Source: Author’s coding of interviews and organizations’ materials.](image-url)
One way of answering that question is by talking to donors and aid applicants and recipients. In Section 8.2, I discussed how many donors claim that they prefer to fund programs that are similar to other donors. I also found that the recipients of democracy aid in Jordan perceive bilateral donors similarly regardless of their countries of origin. As one director of a Jordanian NGO said, “There are many similar things about the donors—they all like to monitor.” In response to one of the common questions in my interviews, all of the Jordanian NGO representatives that I met with described all bilateral foreign donors as having similar priorities and strategies. Grant procedures do, of course, vary across donors; American donors’ applications are generally thought to be easier to fill out, whereas European countries’ applications are regarded as onerous, to the point that a few organizations claimed to have abandoned their applications because they are so demanding. But outside of the technical aspects of grant applications, interviewees perceived the donors’ priorities as shifting in unison according to fads or political trends. Some interviewees, for example, approvingly noted the focus on women’s empowerment and youth in the past five years; others bemoaned donors’ decreased willingness to fund training sessions as a target activity—a shift that donors themselves mentioned that they were making in interviews. This finding on similarities across donors is generally consistent with some previous research on democracy assistance in the Middle East (Youngs and Wittes, 2009; Huber, 2008).

Indeed, even organizations that one might think would take a different tack in Jordan—such as the German political party foundations, which each identify with a particular politi-

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41 Interview 48, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 26, 2009.

42 A typical response to my question “How are the international donors different from each other?” came in Interview 25, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 11, 2009. The interviewee said: “The priorities are similar across different donors or different countries of origin.”

43 Interview 52, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 19, 2009. “To tell you the truth, I abandoned two or three proposals to the EU because they’re so demanding. But we did just apply and get funding, even though it took us months and months and many colleagues to work on this. I’ve heard that they’re very flexible and understanding once you’ve established a relationship with them. Other funders may have an easier application process, but they want to be very involved in the implementation.” This comment also highlights the multiple principals in democracy assistance, which leads to further agency slack.
cal ideology—tend to follow an approach that closely resembles that of other donors. The Social Democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), for example, focused on training women municipal council members, conducting voter education and candidate training sessions during elections, aiding local actors who advocate for legal reforms (e.g., to the political party law), and—somewhat less typically—occasionally partnering with local trade unions. Aside from its occasional partnership with Jordanian unions—a tactic that I should note that an American funded program also pursued—the FES slate of programs could easily be funded by Canada, the United Kingdom, or the United States. In fact, American donors in Jordan also fund all of its program categories. The similarities in approaches reflect both the constraints of the transnational delegation chain as well as the rise of the democracy establishment.

8.3.2 Variation in Publicly Funded Democracy Assistance Programs

In Jordan, several multilateral organizations fund democracy assistance programs in addition to the bilateral donors discussed above. Those organizations include the Foundation for the Future, European Commission, and United Nations Development Programme. According to my argument, projects funded by multilateral donors involve the problems of collective principals and longer delegation chains. Such traits make monitoring by multilateral donors harder than by bilateral donors, so the resulting programs should be relatively more measurable and regime compatible, all else equal. My argument implicitly assumes that multilateral aid donors want the same thing as bilateral aid donors—democratization in the host countries—but because the monitoring problems more severe, they are more likely to reward measurable and regime compatible programs. In this way, democracy assistance is different from other types of foreign aid, at least with regards to donors’ preferences for

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44 As discussed in Pinto-Duschinsky (1991, 37-42), these organizations have unique ideologies and histories when compared with each other and, traditionally, to other organizations in the democracy establishment.

the outcome variables of measurable programs and regime compatible programs. Research on foreign aid more generally suggests that multilateral donors are likely to have more “truer,” humanitarian preferences than are bilateral donors (Milner, 2006).

As Figure 8.6 shows, multilateral democracy assistance donors do fund different types of programs in Jordan than do bilateral democracy assistance donors. Bilateral donors fund measurable programs 56 percent of the time in Jordan, whereas multilateral donors fund them 69 percent of the time; bilateral donors fund regime compatible programs 58 percent of the time, whereas multilateral donors do so 75 percent of the time. It is particularly striking that this pattern inheres even though the key donors in the multilateral organizations are also bilateral donors in Jordan (e.g., the United States, Canada, and Germany), which we would expect to have stable preferences over democracy promotion whether pursuing it bilaterally or multilaterally. Indeed, research by Stone (2008) suggests that powerful countries can often exert considerable informal influence in international organizations.

A related observable implication of my argument is that, since they are easier to monitor, programs funded by donors with offices in Jordan should be less measurable and regime compatible than programs that donors based abroad fund, all else equal. The logic is, once again, that since donors based in Jordan can monitor their agents more easily, they will be less likely to reward programs that are measurable and less likely to fund programs that are regime compatible. I lack sufficient information about the funding process for all of the donors that fund programs in Jordan to make a quantitative comparison, yet anecdotes shared in interviews do seem to support this argument. I asked one director of a Jordanian NGO who has received funding from the European Union, Canada Fund, Freedom House, SUNY Legislative Strengthening Project, NDI (all of which have offices in Amman, Jordan), NED (which has an office in Washington, D.C.), and MEPI (which has an office in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates) to comment on what he perceives as the main differences between the donors. He said: “The donors are very similar. . . But the three organizations that are very difficult for me in terms of regulations and interference are Freedom
House, SUNY Legislative Strengthening Project, and NDI. I got $25,000 from [each of] them and if I could have given the money back, I would have.”\textsuperscript{46} Another NGO director stated: “MEPI likes to go to the events and see everything for itself. NED just likes to get the reports, the receipts, and the numbers.”\textsuperscript{47} These comments seem consistent with the observable implication of my argument that donors with offices in Jordan can more easily and directly monitor the programs they fund themselves, making them less likely to reward quantitative measurements as ways to gauge effectiveness and less likely to support regime compatible programs.

\textbf{8.3.3 Variation in Public vs. Private Democracy Assistance Programs}

A final comparison contrasts all government-funded democracy assistance programs in Jordan—bilateral and multilateral alike—with privately funded ones. I expect that private foundations that promote democracy in Jordan, such as the Soros or Ford Foundations, will fund less measurable and less regime compatible programs there than do their government counterparts. The logic once again has to do with monitoring. According to my argument, projects funded by government donors involve longer delegation chains than private donors, all else equal, because the public ultimately holds such donors accountable via democratic elections. Furthermore, government donors’ delegation chains usually involve several additional levels of grant-giving. Public, or government, donors should therefore fund relatively more measurable and regime compatible programs than private donors that voters do not ultimately hold accountable through elections.

Again, the evidence presented in Figure 8.6 supports this view. Just around 25 percent of the programs that were funded by private donors in Jordan are measurable and regime compatible—in sharp contrast to the relative amounts given by bilateral and multilateral donors, which are more than twice as large. Indeed, the difference between private

\textsuperscript{46}Interview 31, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 15, 2009.

\textsuperscript{47}Interview 48, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, October 26, 2009.
donors and government donors is much larger than the differences between the other types of donors that I previously discussed. This difference is perhaps not surprising, however, since private foundations almost always delegate their funds several times less than government ones: Whereas the private foundations with local offices tend to immediately give funds to the implementing NGO, government donor delegation chains typically involve at least delegation from the public to the government, the government to a donor agency or organization, and the donor agency to the implementing NGO. But do private donors in Jordan simply have different preferences than government donors over measurement, regime compatible programs, or both? I address this question with regards to preferences over measurement in this section, before turning to donor preferences over regime compatibility in Section 8.4 as I consider alternative explanations for my findings in Jordan.

In interviews, donor representatives emphasized the role that monitoring plays in their decisions about what types of programs to fund rather than fundamentally different preferences. Indeed, private foundations cared less about funding organizations that had been funded by other donors than did government donors for purposes of accountability. In a conversation at the Soros Foundation’s Amman, office, for example, I asked the director why the programs his office chose to fund seemed less associated with quantitative, measurable outputs than other donors. His response emphasized that because a legislature or voters do not hold the Soros Foundation accountable, it rewards measurable programs less. He stated:

We have been less systematic than other donors, for sure. We are still less systematic even with these changes [the Soros Foundation had recently released a new strategic planning document emphasizing measurement]. We are dealing with private funds, money that comes from the Soros Fund, so we are not dealing with so much pressure for results. We know that not everything that counts can be counted. So, for example, if we are working with rights for migrant workers in Lebanon and Jordan, we can ask, who established the legal
help desk for them—the grantee or us? My objective in giving that grant to the Tamkeen Center is achieving the rights of workers. Has this been achieved? It is difficult to answer this question quantifiably. There are some things that can be measured, and others cannot. We can count the number of legal help desks, but the quality of legal help desks is difficult to count [emphases added].

His statement is consistent with the assumption of my argument that measurable programs, although they make monitoring easier, have some drawbacks, specifically that measurement is time-consuming and that certain desirable programs are not easily measured. The extent to which organizations pursue such programs depends on how much monitoring constraints affect the donor and thus how well the donor will respond to them. Given that employees of the Soros Foundation—including in the Jordan office—typically have worked for government donors in the past, it is perhaps not surprising that they have similar feelings about the value of measurement as their counterparts at government donors, but because the structure of their funding is different, they reward measurement less.

8.4 What about Jordan’s Geo-Strategic Importance?

What else could be driving variations and convergence in international democracy assistance programs over time and across countries? Students of foreign aid emphasize governments’ political and economic interests and target countries’ needs and characteristics as explanations for variations in foreign aid. The interview evidence presented above suggests that, on a fine-grained level, professionals in Jordan do consider the special political context in which they work and attempt to tailor certain programs to fit it. When Jordan has an election coming up, for example, more aid programs focus on elections. This finding suggests some additional nuance to my cross-national findings that allows for donor responsiveness.

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48 Interview 61, with international donor representative, in person, Amman, July 1, 2010. Note that his hint at changes at the Soros Foundation towards more monitoring is consistent with my analysis of the organization in Chapter 7.
to target countries’ needs and characteristics. Nevertheless, we can also see much importing of programs and strategies from other contexts and from other donors. Furthermore, it is clear that Jordan’s political context is not the only—or even the main—factor driving organizations’ efforts.

Do donors’ geo-strategic interests affect democracy assistance in Jordan? And if so, how? Given the security relationship described between Jordan and the United States in Section 8.1, we have strong reason to doubt the sincerity of the United States as a democracy promoter and therefore how likely it is to support programs that are not regime compatible (Ottaway, 2005b; Wittes, 2008). Jamal (2011) shows, for example, that Western democracy donors in post-conflict El Salvador and Palestine funded civil society organizations that reflected the parties that were included in the political settlements. Do outside donors play political favorites in Jordan? Many political experts in Jordan not directly involved in the democracy establishment evinced the perspective in interviews that the United States does not want Jordan to democratize and that this preference guides democracy assistance there. Note, however, that there is no evidence in Figure 8.6 that American bilateral donors are more likely to fund regime compatible programs than non-American donors (in fact, there is some evidence to the contrary). This non-finding is inconsistent with a geo-political explanation of democracy assistance in Jordan since most evidence suggests that the United States would more strongly prefer regime stability there than other bilateral donors.

Still, private donors could pursue relatively fewer regime compatible programs in Jordan because they prefer a more confrontational approach. And yet a grant-maker at a private foundation that funds programs in Jordan emphasized that, although his organization wanted to avoid making donations to the government or people close to the government, it did not deliberately seek out an antagonistic stance. He said:

We are not putting pressure on governments, per se, for the sake of putting pressure... Sometimes, when you have a friendly relationship like between [the]
USA and Jordan, it means they [the government donors] don’t put on any pressure. But I think that actually even under this friendly relations paradigm, you find people who use the friendly relations to exercise pressure.⁴⁹

Numerous publicly-funded programs in Jordan do take on a highly regime compatible cast, but I do not find clear evidence that the reason why is direct pressure from donor governments. Consider, for example, a few legislative assistance programs in Jordan, which I classify as not measurable but regime compatible. Part of the mandate of a five-year, $8.7 million USAID-funded legislative strengthening effort in Jordan is to improve parliament’s image in Jordan, a goal which may in fact suit the monarchy, which uses its legislature as a survival strategy in order to distribute patronage, gain foreign aid, and disengage the public (Lust-Okar, 2009, 11-21).⁵⁰ By design, the program is technical, not political. Thus, when the king dissolved parliament in November 2009, most of the program’s efforts could continue as planned since they involved the permanent parliamentary staff on technical issues. The presence of the actual members of parliament was irrelevant. The State University of New York’s Legislative Strengthening Program worked closely with the Jordanian government to increase the capacity of the parliament’s permanent staff and in fact had an office inside parliament. As one practitioner involved with the program put it, “we see ourselves on parliament’s side.”⁵¹

But the fairly innocuous aspects of this program seem to have less to do with satisfying the United States security interests in Jordan than with broader trends in democracy assistance. The program was modeled on the example of previous SUNY legislative assistance projects in the Middle East, as well as in Africa, the Balkans, and Latin America.⁵² Competitive authoritarian regimes such as Benin (2000-2002), Zimbabwe (1999-2003), and Kenya

⁴⁹Interview 61, with international donor representative, in person, Amman, July 1, 2010.
⁵⁰On similar dynamics in other countries, see Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009).
⁵¹Interview 78, with program officer at INGO, in person, Amman, December 8, 2009.
⁵²For examples of this type of work, see http://www.cid.suny.edu/our_work_practices_Legislative_strengthening.cfm (accessed February 12, 2010).
Chapter 8

(2007-2009) hosted similar, precursor USAID programs despite those countries’ far different security relationships with the United States. And in fact, aspects of such seemingly anodyne legislative assistance programs can antagonize the government and professionals working in this area do what they can to push governments to reform. One interviewee explained working with the Jordanian government on legislative assistance in this way:

On the visible level, they [the government] are really supportive of our work, but they don’t really support us and they do everything in their power to undermine reform. You install a $1 million electronic voting system, and they never use it or just use it to take attendance. You ask if you can show the MPs how to ask a good question, but they don’t let you do it… We try to second-guess them so that we can come up with the activities that parliament will agree to but create real progress.53

Legislative assistance in Jordan isn’t always explicitly on parliament’s side. For example, an NDI-funded parliamentary monitoring program seeks to promote transparency and accountability. The Jordanian Parliament Monitor collects information on parliament’s activities—such as the draft laws referred to parliament by the government and the proposals, questions, and comments raised by MPs—that is searchable through a comprehensive website according to MP, political party, and bloc (e.g., women). According to NDI, the effort “is contributing to increased government openness, transparency, and accountability.”54 Although evidence from Brazil suggests that monitoring politicians leads to greater accountability (Ferraz and Finan, 2008), it remains uncertain how parliamentary monitoring works in a non-democratic context. Although the organization running the program did not make information about MP attendance public because they viewed it as too politically sensitive, a radio program funded by the National Endowment for Democracy that also ob-

53 Interview 21, with director of INGO, in person, Amman, October 5, 2009.

tained the information did reveal it on air.\textsuperscript{55} In an interview with the NED, the grant-maker for this media organization made clear to me that it was this confrontational approach that has caused her to regularly fund the group over more than a decade and to consider it to be one of the key successes of NED funding in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{56} My interviews suggest that to the extent that organizations pursue regime compatible programs in Jordan, they often do so because they worry about being threatened by the Jordanian government—not the United States.

It is hard to eliminate the possibility that the Jordanian government is protected from threatening democracy assistance programs because of its value to the West in this case study. The cross-national, time-series analysis pursued in Chapters 5 and 6 does a better job of controlling for this alternative explanation and still finds considerable support for my principal-agent and sociological argument. But the evidence from this chapter suggests that to the extent that Jordan’s strategic relationship with the West matters for the design of democracy assistance programs there, it is most likely because the Jordanian government is emboldened by that relationship and therefore constrains programs that it does not like. One Jordanian interviewee that works for a democracy establishment organization commented on how he believes that the government is playing a double-standard game with donors: “On the one hand, they [the regime] want to work really closely with the U.S. and USAID. On the other hand, they try to do everything in their power to dictate their own agenda to USAID and to undermine Jordanians who work closely with U.S. organizations.” He went onto allege: “For example, everyone who works with a U.S. organization has this as a line on their [biographical] sheet with the intelligence service and this prevents them

\textsuperscript{55}Interview 19, with director of Jordanian NGO, in person, Amman, November 8, 2009. The interviewee said: “There was a big controversy last month because we were secretly taking note of attendance and then during the extraordinary session we revealed the twelve members that hadn’t said one word in parliament over four months and the members that had missed a lot of sessions. We’re aware of the parliamentary monitoring efforts that some NGOs are doing… but we aren’t collaborating with them really. [They have] the information on attendance but didn’t want to publish it because it’s so politically sensitive.”

\textsuperscript{56}Interview 6, with international donor representative, in person, Washington, DC, September 19, 2009. This interviewee recommended meeting with this NGO first and exclaimed about its media program: “The leader of [this organization] is an incredible visionary!”
from working in a sensitive position with the government.\textsuperscript{57} Although the government supports his/her organization’s work superficially, it blocks any of their proposed projects that would lead to real reform.

Comments by several international diplomats suggest that donor governments contain diverse opinions about how hard to push democracy promotion in Jordan. One American official stated, for example: “Some people here [co-workers in the embassy] push too hard for liberalization in Jordan—I think security should really be paramount in a place like Jordan.”\textsuperscript{58} In all likelihood, preferences for democratization in Jordan vary among foreign diplomats. Such disagreements within donors only make it harder for them to successfully motivate their principals, thus worsening the principal–agent problems in democracy assistance. In the end, it is clear that the security context influences the overall democracy promotion agenda in Jordan, but it seems that donors do not dictate a regime compatible approach, nor do donors’ preferences explain much of the variation that we can observe in democracy assistance programs there.

\section{8.5 Conclusion}

The evidence presented in this chapter strongly supports the dissertation’s two-pronged argument that the transnational delegation chain in democracy assistance and the democracy establishment’s growing professionalism over time together shape the outcomes of democracy assistance programs. Jordan’s democracy establishment is characterized both

\textsuperscript{57} Interview 78, with program officer at INGO, in person, Amman, December 8, 2009.

\textsuperscript{58} Interview 59, with American diplomat in Jordan, in person, Amman, December 6, 2009. Yet even if certain representatives of donor governments may be satisfied with fairly superficial liberal reforms, it is not clear that diplomatic preferences immediately translate to democracy donors’ behavior. A former United States government grant-maker said, for example, that American diplomacy and democracy assistance policy were not tightly interrelated and that the disconnect was frustrating: “One thing that I always felt was that the diplomacy and the democracy assistance programs were not happening in tandem.” Interview 71, with former officer at international donor, in person, Amman, July 1, 2010. It is precisely this disconnect that prompted Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to launch a foreign assistance reform effort in 2006 to better align foreign aid with foreign policy, with mixed success (United States Government Accountability Office, 2009b).
by a strong market competition for funding, strong normative pressures to adhere to professional identities and institutions, and strong incentives to avoid punishments for political programs by Jordan’s monarchy. Consistent with the tensions that grow out of these sometimes conflicting ideals and incentives, people in the democracy establishment express frustrations with the current funding structure. All of these traits are key observable implications of my argument and bolster its credibility. Consistent with the cross-national, time-series evidence I presented elsewhere in the dissertation, I also found that the degree of monitoring that agents experience affects how measurable and regime compatible the programs are that they pursue.

My findings about the reasons for what Carothers (2005, 198) calls a generally “gradualist” international approach to democracy promotion in Jordan therefore conflict with two common interpretations of democracy assistance policy and foreign aid policy more broadly. One view holds that the preferences of donor governments—and in particular their strategic interests—determine how they allocate foreign aid. Yet in Jordan, it is unclear that donor governments enforce regime compatible programs; in fact, diplomatic actions and democracy assistance seem somewhat decoupled. American donors, despite the United States’ strategic relationship with Jordan, sometimes applaud programs that take a more confrontational approach. To the extent that the donors’ strategic relationships with Jordan impact democracy assistance programs on the ground, it seems to be because the monarchy is emboldened and does not allow more confrontational programs. Another view holds that the characteristics of recipient countries determine how donors allocate foreign aid. Using a finer-grain of measurement in this case study, I do find evidence that people in the democracy establishment take into account the Jordanian context when designing programs. To some extent they have to, since the Jordanian government threatens to shut down non-compliant programs. At the same time, however, there is considerable evidence that democracy assistance programs are modeled on programs conceived of in other countries and adhere to general professional norms of conduct. This finding holds across a range of
bilateral donors that we might otherwise expect would respond to countries’ characteristics to different extents, as they do in other types of foreign aid (Alesina and Weder, 2002).

Given the prevalence of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance programs in Jordan, it seems that the skepticism of Heydemann (2007) is plausibly warranted. Despite being one of the main recipients of democracy assistance in the Middle East since 2001, Jordan remains robustly authoritarian and is one of the countries in the region that has thus far been relatively untouched by the forces of the Arab Spring. Why aren’t democracy assistance programs in Jordan more effective? Democracy assistance programs in Jordan are driven by organizations’ incentives to pursue projects that are associated with readily measurable outcomes (even though such programs are not always best at creating liberalization) and that are compatible with the Jordanian regime. Given the overall context of foreign aid and support for Jordan’s monarchy, such programs are not likely to foster democratization in the short- or medium-term. My findings from Jordan suggest that, should democracy promotion advocates wish to push donor governments to take a more confrontational and less regime compatible approach, structural changes to reward such programs (and protect NGOs that are afraid of government reprisals) would be advisable.

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59 Jordanians did take to the streets in economic and political protests in 2011, however, Abdullah seems to have survived the protests more successfully than some of his peers by reshuffling his cabinet and prime minister and providing economic subsidies. See Ranya Kadri and Ethan Bronner, “King of Jordan Dismisses Cabinet In Effort to Undermine Protests,” New York Times, February 1, 2011, A14.
Part III

Implications
Chapter 9

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War fundamentally changed world politics. As the world moved from bipolar great power competition to American dominance, the ways that Western countries interacted with the developing world changed in significant ways. For one thing, the aid transferred from wealthy industrialized states to poorer states dropped significantly at the end of the Cold War. When foreign aid outlays increased again in the twenty-first century, they were notably different: Western countries and international institutions used aid less as a geo-strategic tool and more as a way to genuinely support development and good governance in needy countries.¹ The same actors also reoriented their support for democracy in the developing world. Whereas American support for anti-communist tyrants during the Cold War was infamous, the United States increasingly prioritized democracy as a foreign policy goal under Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. So too did the European Union, United Nations, and a host of other international institutions and advanced democracies. As the third wave of democratization swept through Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America, international actors did their best to support and advance democratic transitions around the world.

This dissertation aimed to improve our understanding of international democracy pro-

¹See Bermeo (2008) especially and also Wright and Winters (2010).
motion since the end of the Cold War. International democracy promotion represents the first and largest sustained attempt by a large number of states and international organizations to transform the domestic political practices and institutions of other countries while generally still preserving those states’ sovereignty. The goals of this work continue to be urgent: According to the non-governmental organization Freedom House, which monitors democracy around the world, 2.4 billion people, or 35 percent of the world’s population, live in conditions that are fundamentally “not free.”

Highly repressive regimes such as Syria and Equatorial Guinea continue to intimidate and jail dissidents, while Freedom House recorded notable declines of freedoms in democracies such as Mexico and Ukraine in 2010. Indeed, although more democracies in the world existed at the dawn of the twenty-first century than at any previous time in history, there clearly remains a need for improvements in human rights, democracy, and freedom in many countries around the world.

Yet despite this need, the current outlook in the public discourse on international democracy promotion is rather pessimistic. The backlash against democracy promotion has several sources, including a reaction against American foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq under President George W. Bush, concerns about the rise of anti-American Islamist political parties in the Middle East that might become empowered should the region democratize, and a general disappointment in the failure of democracy promotion efforts (especially in the former Soviet states) to generate long-term democratization. Common criticisms of democracy promotion are that it is hypocritical since democracy promoting states are not themselves perfect democracies, that it is inconsistent since democracy promoting states and institutions do not promote democracy with the same intensity everywhere but instead pick and choose where to push hard for it, and that it is wrong-headed since democracy is not the appropriate form of government for all people and cultures.

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The events of the Arab Spring in 2011 have reignited public interest in and debate surrounding democracy promotion. Much remains unknown about the effects of popular mobilization in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere on long-term regime types in the Middle East. But fears are emerging that what protesters hoped would be true regime change in several countries may instead be old, bitter wines in new bottles. Perhaps the Middle East will now see more cases of the “democracies with adjectives”—regimes with some important trappings of liberal democracy that nevertheless are far from the real thing—that have steadily spread throughout the other world regions (Collier and Levitsky, 1997). What the foreign policies of the United States and other Western countries and international institutions should be towards Arab states in these changing times has emerged as a critical question for democracy practitioners. The time is therefore ripe for an in-depth examination of democracy promotion.

Unlike many other studies, this dissertation has not advocated for why democracy promotion is ultimately “good” or “bad.” Instead, the starting point for this study has been that, despite considerable popular attention to the subject of democracy promotion, we know remarkably little about how international efforts to promote democracy through aid programs work on the ground and why. This micro-level study of democracy assistance projects reveals that many projects today are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels. Some of the most common types of democracy assistance support decentralization, good governance, and women’s political participation. Desirable though these programs may be for various reasons, they are not the sort of programs that are most likely to lead to immediate democratic transitions, in contrast to more forceful aid programs supporting dissidents and political parties that were common in the 1980s. The reason for this shift seems to lie less in changes in the target countries’ characteristics or the donor countries’ preferences, but more within the people and organizations that make up what I call the democracy establishment. The funding structure of democracy assistance rewards promoting democracy in ways that are measurable using
quantitative indicators and that maintain access to the countries where the programs take place. Given those incentives, rational implementing organizations seek out programs that are measurable and that facilitate access, although the extent to which they do so varies according to how closely donors can monitor them. Growing professionalism has subsequently fostered convergence among democracy practitioners on incentive-compatible approaches over time.

The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 9.1, I review some of the dissertation’s major findings. In Section 9.2, I situate my findings within the scholarly literature. I explain how the findings build upon and contribute to literatures on the anatomy of foreign influence, NGOs in world politics, and delegation in world politics. Then, in Section 9.3, I explain how these findings contribute to ongoing debates about democracy promotion policy. My findings that democracy assistance programs increasingly prioritize quantitative measurement and compatibility with the target countries’ regimes should concern people who wish to see the United States, other Western countries, and international institutions advance democracy in unfree parts of the world. Making causal inferences with observational (as opposed to experimental) data is, in this dissertation as in most other social scientific studies, rife with challenges. Yet a rigorous series of quantitative and qualitative tests suggests that the incentives fostered by the transnational delegation chain have prompted people in the democracy establishment to pursue increasingly measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance over time. Many of the world’s people continue to live in fundamentally undemocratic countries. Although states give billions of dollars a year with the goal of trying to help them, our tools of foreign influence are not ideally designed for achieving that goal because of perverse incentives created by democracy assistance’s funding structure. Reforms are needed in order to change the incentives so that democracy assistance is more effective.
9.1 A Summary of the Major Findings

This dissertation sought to understand how and why democracy assistance spread at the end of the Cold War and how democracy assistance has affected the conduct of domestic politics in developing countries across the world. In order to understand these interrelated issues, the dissertation drew on insights from both economic and sociological theory and combined quantitative and qualitative social scientific methods. I used new and existing data sets of democracy assistance projects in order to identify general patterns across time and space in democracy assistance and make some counterfactual inferences. I then presented detailed case studies, which drew on 120 interviews, archival materials, and extensive fieldwork in Jordan and Washington, D.C., in order to validate my argument’s assumptions, provide context, and show the causal steps that give us more confidence in the statistical inferences. This section recapitulates my main findings.

9.1.1 Why Did Developing Countries Adopted Gender Quotas?

In Chapter 2, I observed that countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan—hardly exemplars of women’s political and social rights—have adopted quotas for women in recent years. In total, the number of states with some law setting a minimum number of women in parliament—either through reserved seats for women or the mandatory placement of women on political party lists—has now reached one hundred. Why? Why are developing countries converging on a set of domestic political institutions and practices that includes setting quotas for the minimum number of women in parliaments?

One conventional explanation of this phenomenon, suggested by modernization theory, is that women mobilized politically at the same time as countries have democratized and modernized their economies. Another conventional explanation, suggested by world polity theory, is that developing countries have mimicked the appropriate features of modern statehood as adopted and spread by developed countries, their neighbors, international
institutions, and non-governmental organizations. I demonstrated, however, that neither explanation fits this case well. Indicators of countries’ levels of democracy, religious traditions, numbers of women’s NGOs, histories of women’s suffrage, and neighbors’ adoption of quotas did not do a good job explaining patterns of quota adoption in developing countries since 1960. Even on their own, these null findings made a significant contribution to a rich and growing literature in the subfield of women and politics that often uses some combination of the aforementioned variables to explain gender quotas adoption in single country or regional case studies.

I argued that developing countries where women seem to have an otherwise low status in society adopted gender quotas because of the influence of the democracy establishment. Promoting women’s political participation, including through gender quotas, has become a pillar of democracy promotion over the past three decades. Gender quotas’ international legitimacy causes countries to adopt quotas through two mechanisms. First, the democracy establishment directly influences post-conflict countries’ constitutions through its heavy presence in United Nations peace operations. Second, the democracy establishment indirectly influences countries that wish to signal their commitment to liberal democracy to international or domestic audiences because they are dependent on foreign aid. Since the democracy establishment promotes quotas and women’s political participation more broadly, quotas offer a good signal. I tested this argument using a nested research design that combined event history analysis, which examined more than one hundred countries over time and controlled for a variety of confounding variables, with a process-tracing case of Afghanistan’s 2004 gender quota. I argued that gender quotas are but one example of a larger set of institutions and practices advocated by the democracy establishment—a set that previous researchers have shown also includes international election monitors—that is spreading throughout the developing world as a result of strategic games between the democracy establishment and states’ leaders.

But why does the democracy establishment care so much about women’s political
participation? More broadly, what explains variations in democracy assistance programs across donors, target states, and time? In Chapter 3 I developed a two-part answer to those questions. I first argued that the transnational delegation structure through which democracy assistance is given out rewards promoting democracy in particular ways. Democracy assistance programs that are measurable using quantitative indicators and that maintain access to the countries where the programs take place help organizations in the democracy establishment succeed at gaining funding. Programs to support women’s political participation are one example of such programs since they tend to be associated with clear measures of their outputs and do not usually endanger the survival of the regimes of the countries where the programs take place. Rational implementing organizations thus prefer to design programs that are measurable and that facilitate access. The extent to which they do so depends, however, on how closely donors can monitor them since democracy donors themselves do not prefer measurable and regime compatible programs.

I then argued that competition and professional norms have fostered convergence among democracy practitioners on those programs that the structure rewards. These normative and competitive pressures diffused the practice of promoting women’s political participation in the democracy establishment. Over time, organizations in the democracy establishment learn about the best ways to gain funding and they also become less committed to an ideological, confrontational approach to democracy promotion. Several structural attributes of the democracy establishment, such as its reliance on state funding and short-term contracts, sped up natural processes of competition and professionalization.

The argument that I developed in Chapter 3 treats the actors in the democracy establishment as “normal” organizations and bureaucracies, despite the field’s ideological origins and grand rhetoric. I derived testable hypotheses from the argument about democracy assistance. The predictions from these hypotheses contrast with the predictions of hypotheses from the foreign aid literature, which tend to emphasize how donor countries’ preferences and target countries’ characteristics shape foreign aid allocation decisions. The chapters
in Part II of the dissertation then turned to empirically testing the two-pronged argument about democracy assistance.

### 9.1.2 What Explains Variations in Democracy Assistance Programs?

Why has democracy assistance come to increasingly emphasize projects that are not designed to foster short- or even medium-term changes in countries’ democracy levels? The first four chapters of Part II tracked variations in how measurable and how regime compatible democracy assistance programs are across time and space. A crucial step in these empirical tests was the development of a novel typology of democracy assistance projects in Chapter 4. I divided democracy assistance programs into twenty categories. Drawing on interviews with practitioners as well as insights from the authoritarianism and democratization literatures, I argued that certain categories are generally measurable or regime compatible. I then used this typology to classify thousands of democracy assistance projects in an original data set that was designed in order to test the argument.

Chapter 5 tested the principal–agent argument in a cross-national, time-series framework. Specifically, it examined the proposition that increases in monitoring problems in the transnational delegation chain cause practitioners to pursue more measurable and more regime compatible programs. I used data on more than 130,000 democracy assistance programs given by sixty bilateral and multilateral government donors between 1985 and 2008 in order to test the hypotheses. Regression analyses showed that the degree of monitoring problems—as measured by the use of implementing agencies, the involvement of multilateral donors, the size and wealth of the donor, and the proximity of the program to the donor—is strongly related to the proportions of measurable and regime compatible democracy assistance sent to a country in a year. I used statistical matching techniques and included a number of variables that we might also expect would influence the outcomes of interest in order to test the results’ robustness. The control variables included measures of shared preferences between the donor and target country, indicators for the Cold War and
post-September 11 eras, the level of democracy and regime type of the target country, and indicators for the regions of the donors and the target countries.

Chapter 6 also used a statistical framework to test the sociological argument and, in particular, the proposition that competition and professional norms foster convergence on measurable and regime compatible programs over time. To do so, it examined 5,000 democracy assistance projects that were randomly selected from an original data set of projects funded by the National Endowment for Democracy. The NED is a foundation funded by the American government that seeks to advance democracy abroad through grants. As I explain, its grants serve as a useful test of my argument for a number of research design issues. Using a similar empirical approach as in Chapter 5, I demonstrated that the proportions of democracy assistance in a given country–year that are regime compatible and measurable clearly increase over time, even after controlling for a number of other relevant factors. These factors included the amount of American military aid received by the target countries, indicators for the Cold War and post-September 11 eras, indicators for relevant changes in American domestic politics, the level of democracy and regime type of the target country, and indicators for the regions where programs take place. Furthermore, the over time trend holds even among democracy assistance projects that the NED sent to “hard cases,” or those target countries that are consistently unfree. Finally, the time trend holds among projects funded by the other main American democracy donor, USAID, which suggests that the results are generalizable.

Chapter 7 demonstrated change and convergence in several key American democracy assistance organizations, or “principals” in the transnational delegation chain, and was the first of two qualitative chapters. It began by describing the network structure of the democracy establishment. Using hyperlink analysis to map organizations’ relationships in cyberspace, I showed that the democracy establishment is dominated and linked together by a few key donors. Chapter 7 then shifted focus to the historical development of several American donors that are centrally-positioned and help set the democracy establish-
ment’s agenda. I first showed how Freedom House, an American democracy assistance organization, evolved over time from a domestic advocacy organization to a professional organization with more than one dozen overseas offices. Archival records, interviews, and secondary sources show that the search for funding played an important role in Freedom House’s transformation. I then broadened the analysis to include three other U.S.-based organizations in the democracy establishment: the U.S. Agency for International Development, the National Democratic Institute, and the Open Society Institute. In these organizations, I also found that professionals converged over time in their approaches to democracy promotion. The extent to which they did so—as well as their original starting points—depended, however, on organizational culture and their funding sources.

Chapter 8 examined democracy assistance in the case of Jordan among the final “agents” in the transnational delegation chain. After discussing my selection of the Jordanian case and providing some background information about liberal authoritarianism in Jordan, I presented evidence in favor of five findings. First, organizations compete strongly for democracy assistance funding in Jordan. Relatedly, organizations want to demonstrate programs’ efficacy and maintain good relationships with the Jordanian government. Second, people in Jordan’s democracy establishment are both idealists and pragmatists, which results in some tension and conflict between their ideals and their incentives. Third, people working in Jordan’s democracy establishment are professionals and share norms, identities, and expertise. Finally, measurable and regime compatible projects in Jordan are associated with lower levels of monitoring by principals. Finally, donor governments do not seem to dictate a regime compatible approach to democracy assistance in Jordan despite Jordan’s geo-strategic importance in the United States. Field research in Jordan between 2008 and 2010 supported these conclusions.

In the end, by showing the “anatomy of influence” of wealthy democratic states over developing states, the study brings together and builds upon insights from literatures on delegation, the international sources of domestic politics, and transnational networks in or-
order to better understand democracy promotion. The findings presented in this dissertation draw upon a variety of types of evidence—carefully gathered to match the observable implications of the argument—in order to show that the preferences of the people working in the democracy establishment often matter more for the design of democracy assistance programs than do donor governments’ political preferences or the characteristics of target states. The democracy establishment’s preferences can have far-reaching consequences on the conduct of politics in the developing world, as we saw with the spread of gender quotas. But do these consequences ultimately advance or retard democracy? I return to this question at the end of this chapter, after I discuss the project’s contribution to several scholarly debates and literatures.

### 9.2 Scholarly Contributions

#### 9.2.1 The Anatomy of Foreign Influence

This dissertation explores an important new case of the international sources of domestic politics. A growing literature examines how international actors today promote or otherwise encourage the spread of a variety of forms of political and economic liberalization around the world. This literature represents the post-Cold War variety of what Gourevitch (1978) called the “second image reversed.” The tools of foreign influence examined by previous scholars include shaming and socialization, economic sanctions and rewards, political conditionality, foreign aid, diplomatic measures, and even military intervention. One of the key underlying questions that this body of research seeks to answer is: Under what conditions can states and international institutions successfully influence a target state’s domestic political institutions and practices?

This question is typically answered by focusing on either the preferences of the states

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3See, for example, Hyde (2007), Kelley (2008), Levitsky and Way (2005), Pevehouse (2002), and Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006).
and international institutions attempting to influence other countries or on the preferences of the target states. With regards to the preferences of the states and international institutions that are “influencers,” a considerable body of research has shown that ulterior strategic motives often guide these actors in their attempts to affect target states’ domestic political institutions and practices. Despite the lofty and sometimes idealistic goals that they give for seeking out foreign influence, these actors tend to use foreign influence as a way of playing geo-political favorites. States and international institutions have been shown, for example, to disregard the characteristics of target states that tend to affect foreign aid effectiveness in favor of giving foreign aid as a reward or a bribe for policy concessions from recipient governments. As a consequence, we should expect many attempts at foreign influence to fail because they are not really meant to transform the target states at all.

States and international institutions do, however, sometimes attempt to influence target states’ domestic political institutions and practices more sincerely. Research suggests that more sincere motives—such as a desire to increase economic growth in poor states or to improve target states’ governance—increasingly characterize foreign aid. Yet when donors use tools of foreign influence sincerely, certain target states are more likely to be willing to transform themselves than others. Some foreign aid recipients may, for example, use aid corruptly or for the purposes of strengthening their repressive rule. Countries may invite international election monitors but engage in “strategic manipulation” prior to the election in order to stay in power without alarming the monitors with obvious signs of fraud (Beaulieu and Hyde, 2009). Today, for example, foreign aid donors conventionally believe that the quality of governance in target states is a key factor that determines the effectiveness of foreign aid. Thus, the effectiveness of foreign aid depends not only donors’ intentions, but how likely the target states are to resist or accept the goals of the sending states.

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5See Bermeo (2008), Lumsdaine (1993), Winters (2010b), and Wright and Winters (2010, 63-65).
My research suggests that these two dominant perspectives do not, however, tell the whole story about the anatomy of foreign influence. As I show in democracy assistance, foreign aid donors’ intentions when giving aid are not the only factor that matters for the design of foreign aid programs. Donors actually have a difficult time monitoring foreign aid programs, since the programs take place in distant countries and tend to be funded through a long process of delegation with multiple actors. Furthermore, there is no direct feedback loop between people living in the target states—the people aid programs seek to help—and donors. For these reasons, we should expect that the impact of donors’ preferences will be watered down with each additional step of delegation in democracy assistance, while actors in the democracy establishment will play an increasingly important role in the design of programs. I argue that those actors’ preferences, which arise from the funding structure and are reinforced over time through sociological processes, matter greatly, and a variety of forms of evidence support this argument.

Yet with a few important exceptions (Kelley, 2009; Brown, 2006), the micro-politics of the transnational actors in this “second-image reversed” equation have been left relatively unexplored. This omission is unfortunate since these normative and strategic transnational actors shape the imprint that international forces make on domestic politics. This study provides insight into one set of such actors, the democracy establishment, and explains why its members promote democracy in certain ways. I show that their influence is felt not only on the design of democracy assistance programs but also on the institutions and practices adopted by the developing countries in which the democracy establishment works, as was the case with the adoption of gender quotas. The approach developed here could be used to study the “actors in between” sending and target states in a host of other areas of foreign influence.
9.2.2 NGOs in World Politics: A Mixture of Idealism and Self-Interest

This dissertation’s argument about the democracy establishment—that organizations in the democracy establishment evince a mixture of idealism and self-interest, and that the balance between the two motives changes over time—may come as a surprise to two groups of scholars of transnational networks of non-governmental organizations. On the one hand, optimists tend to view the actors in such transnational networks as altruists and document their positive influence on world politics as a consequence. On the other hand, cynics tend to view such actors as just as materially-motivated as firms despite their high-minded rhetoric and show how moral movements can have adverse consequences. I show that the truth lies somewhere in between the two perspectives for the democracy establishment and, most importantly, that it shifts over time.

Keck and Sikkink (1998) advanced the optimists’ case in their now-classic book, Activists Beyond Borders. The authors showed how networked political entrepreneurs make moral claims that impact global public policy-making through case studies of transnational activism in the areas of human rights, the environment, and women’s rights. Their approach to understanding international non-governmental organizations takes these organizations to some extent at face value; the organizations say that they are motivated by various altruistic concerns, and Keck and Sikkink show that they are. In a recent statistical study, Büthe, Major and de Mello e Souza (2009) confirm this point of view by showing how humanitarian motives shape the allocation decisions for foreign aid given by prominent private organizations.

But most recent research since Keck and Sikkink has taken a more cynical turn. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 30) distinguished different types of transnational networks according to their motives: instrumental (e.g., networks of corporations); causal (e.g., epistemic networks); or principled (e.g., transnational advocacy networks). But perhaps transnational networks are just as instrumental as transnational corporations. An exemplar of research in this more cynical tradition is an influential paper by Cooley and Ron (2002) that examines
the behaviors of transnational organizations working in the fields of humanitarian relief and development.⁶ They find that competition over funding drives these seemingly-idealistic organizations to pursue ineffective and dysfunctional programs.

Drawing on seminal sociological theories of organizations, I joined the debate by examining in-depth how an idea-driven network changes over time. In general, change in international organizations and non-state actors in world politics is understudied when compared to issues such as when and why states establish such organizations (Barnett and Coleman, 2005, 593-594). I show the importance of ideas in the democracy establishment’s origins but the increasing influence of competition, self-interest, and institutionalization as time has passed. Actors in the democracy establishment usually respond rationally to the incentives created for them. Rather than viewing democracy assistance bureaucrats as corrupt careerists, however, I show that they continue to display some idealism and that professional norms matter. The balance between their ideals and interests evolves. Other recent studies also find some room for both ideals and competitive self-interest in the behaviors of transnational networks purporting to advance human rights.⁷ This study builds on their insights by adding a dynamic, over-time component.

What is important in order to gain an accurate understanding of empirical reality for a variety of international non-governmental organizations is to appreciate that the mix of idealism and self-interest in such fields (as in the democracy establishment) is unlikely to remain static over time. Competition, professionalism, and institutionalization are likely to gradually emerge in a host of other domains of transnational activism. In order to understand the life cycle of principled activism in world politics, we must pay attention to the structural conditions that reward certain behaviors on the part of activists. How activists across different issue areas respond to such structural incentives, and why, is likely to be a fertile area for future research.

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⁶For other important contributions in this tradition, see Diether (2003) and Hancock (1989).

9.2.3 A Model of Transnational Delegation

One of the central arguments of this dissertation—that the “taming of democracy assistance” is driven in large part by the structure through which Western governments delegate authority to promote democracy—draws on economic principal–agent arguments that have recently gained prominence in the study of world politics. Previous studies have largely examined multilateral delegation between states and international organizations. I build off of these studies’ insights in order to examine transnational delegation, which involves transfers of authority across state boundaries but that also involves supra- and sub-state actors. The unique transnational setting in which democracy assistance takes place reveals new tensions and information problems that can occur when agents must answer not only to their principals but also to the governments that host them. I show how regimes on both ends of democracy assistance’s delegation chain—democratic donors on the sending side and pseudo-democracies on the target side—affect the strategies that the democracy establishment uses to promote democracy. Democracy assistance’s delegation chain is thus part of that ever-denser set of transnational relations—formal and informal ties across societies, states, and various types of non-state organizations—that Keohane and Nye (1977) studied in their seminal work on complex interdependence.

But is the model of transnational delegation developed in this dissertation portable to other issue areas? Evidence suggests that it is. Anthropologists have for some time paid attention to the middlemen (and women) of foreign aid, presenting rich detail from specific aid sectors, in specific target countries, at specific times about the same competitive and normative processes laid out in this dissertation. By embedding these sociological processes within a structure it was possible to develop a more general model of behavior that can explain other phenomena.

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8For some important recent contributions, see the chapters in Hawkins et al. (2006) and also Gutner (2005), Nielson and Tierney (2003), and Johnson (2010).

9Exemplars of research in this tradition include Ferguson (1990) and Jackson (2005).
Consider, for example, the field of international environmental assistance. Environmental assistance resembles democracy assistance in many ways. As Roberts et al. (2009, 12) show, bilateral environmental aid roughly quadrupled between 1980 and 1999 and multilateral environmental aid roughly doubled over the same time period. Domestic support for environmental aid in donor countries—spurred on by several prominent environmental disasters caused by development projects in the 1980s—helps account for this transformation. As with democracy assistance, however, donor countries do not themselves have consistent or perfect environmental records. Meanwhile, target states often do not desire environmental aid projects. At a minimum, many target states would prefer other forms of foreign assistance that would give them a more direct political or economic benefit; at a maximum, certain target states may want to prevent environmental aid programs supporting favored international goals such as conserving biodiversity, which can come at the expense of local economic development when pursued in isolation. Target states therefore prefer environmental assistance programs that are delivered alongside other types of assistance programs and in the form of direct grants to their governments.

As with democracy assistance, aid recipient organizations in environmental assistance are likely to face conflicting pressures from their donors and their host countries and consequently confront incentives to design programs in ways that will keep their funding sources flowing and access open. This conflict of interest leaves the intermediary organizations “caught in the middle,” as Buntaine (2011) puts it—stuck in between their ideals and interests and between their principals and the target states. Perhaps as expected, a study of environmental aid in Kazakhstan shows local non-governmental organizations that receive international aid forgoing work on urgent local environmental concerns (e.g., unclean water) and instead pursuing the favorite issue areas of foreign donors (e.g., biodiversity) in order to win grants (Weinthal and Luong, 2002). A similar approach to the one developed in this study could thus be used to study environmental assistance and perhaps other domains of foreign influence, too. Doing so would not only provide a comparative per-
spective on democracy assistance, but also help illuminate broader debates about foreign aid allocation and effectiveness.

9.3 Implications for Democracy Promotion Policy

At its core, this dissertation has helped illuminate ongoing debates about American and European democracy promotion. Previous findings about the impact of democracy assistance on democracy levels have been surprisingly mixed. Two recent studies found that American democracy assistance has often, but not uniformly, encouraged democratization in competitive authoritarian regimes (Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Levitsky and Way, 2010). In some contexts—such as the revolutions that occurred in the post-Communist states between 2000 and 2006—democracy assistance successfully spread ideas and fostered transnational linkages among activists (Beissinger, 2007; Bunce and Wolchik, 2006), while contemporaneous efforts—as in Russia—largely failed (Mendelson, 2001). Democracy assistance has expanded greatly in the Middle East, but it has been criticized for entrenching authoritarian rule there (Wittes, 2008). Perhaps the most comprehensive assessment of democracy assistance’s impact was the multivariate statistical analysis of Finkel, Pérez-Liñán and Seligson (2007), who found that $10 million of U.S. democracy and governance aid was associated with a quarter of a point improvement in Freedom House’s seven-point scale of democracy. The difficulty in making causal inferences using observational data on democracy assistance programs, which are not assigned to countries randomly, means, however, that the impact of democracy assistance on democracy levels remains a lively area of research.\(^{10}\)

Even setting aside concerns about selection bias in such studies, macro-level correlations between democracy assistance and democracy levels offer little guidance for prac-

\(^{10}\)Scott and Steele (2011) likewise found a positive relationship between U.S. Agency for International Development democracy aid and democratization using a simultaneous equation model, and Nielsen and Nielson (2010) used matching. Kalyvitis and Vlachaki (2010) found that democracy aid from all donors in the OECD improved recipients’ democracy levels; Savun and Tirone (2011) found that it helped prevent democratizing states from descending into civil conflict. Carothers (1999) and Carapico (2002) offer far more critical assessments of democracy assistance’s impact using case studies.
titioners about how democracy assistance programs might be most effectively designed. Likewise, field and natural experiments—promising methods for evaluating specific democracy and governance interventions, such as a particular civic education program (Hyde, 2010; Moehler, 2010)—necessarily leave unanswered questions about the utility of that civic education program versus, for example, a media program. The difficulty of translating research on democracy assistance’s impact into practice is part of a broader scholar–practitioner divide on democracy assistance (Mitchell, 2010). An important cause of that divide is that, outside of the democracy assistance field, there is little knowledge of what democracy assistance programs actually do where and why. In order to accurately evaluate democracy assistance programs, we need to understand what they are trying to accomplish. As I showed this dissertation, democracy assistance programs deliberately vary a great deal in the extent to which they confront authoritarian regimes. One way of understanding many of the pessimistic or ambiguous results in terms of the effects of democracy assistance writ large is that not all democracy assistance programs are designed to create short-term changes in countries’ scores on a democracy scale.

If developed democracies and international institutions do not use democracy assistance as a tool to influence target states, how else can they encourage those states to democratize? A comprehensive recent analysis by Jan Teorell of the determinants of democratization between 1972 and 2006 suggests that the answer may be “few.” Replicating and extending many of the most recent quantitative findings about democratization, Teorell (2010, 145-147) finds that the key triggers of democratization include economic crisis, democratization in a neighboring country, participation in democratic regional organizations, peaceful demonstrations, and multiparty systems in autocracies. Meanwhile, Muslim populations, large geographic size, oil wealth, and large amounts of trade impede democratization. Finally, socioeconomic modernization (specifically media proliferation) and economic freedom help sustain democracy; Muslim populations may reverse it. Most of the factors that Teorell identifies as important either do not change over time or change slowly. Other fac-
tors, such as economic crisis, would be unlikely events for the international community to want to encourage. Outside of democracy assistance, what we are left with is that autocracies should be encouraged to participate in democratic regional organizations, a finding that echoes previous research by Pevehouse (2002). Otherwise, the most plausible points of influence would be for the international community to empower civil society actors that could peacefully demonstrate against authoritarian regimes, support multiparty elections, and promote media proliferation—activities that already fall under the rubric of what we refer to today as democracy assistance.

Advanced democracies and international institutions could largely step away from direct democracy assistance programs and instead encourage countries to democratize through diplomatic leverage and more indirect processes of socialization and shaming. They could reward countries that join democracy regional organizations. But democracy promotion is likely here to stay. Not only is there little historical evidence that foreign assistance programs evaporate once started, but also democracy promotion has deep roots in the prevailing liberal international order. Most American presidents have stated the United States’ preference for democratization abroad. Furthermore, although the United Nations’ Charter does not include the word “democracy,” the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights evinces a commitment to democracy, as does the 1948 Charter of the Organization of American States. Although budget battles over specific instruments of democracy assistance (e.g., over the NED in the United States) have taken place, no mainstream movement to eliminate democracy assistance exists. If Western states and international institutions are likely to continue to engage in democracy assistance, then the important question is: How best can they promote democracy in the developing world?

The research presented in this dissertation suggests that the funding structure of democracy assistance ought to be reformed in order to reward the types of democracy assistance that are most likely to create real change. Although this dissertation does not directly try to assess the impact of democracy assistance programs on recipient countries’ democracy
levels, its two central findings do raise concerns about that impact. First, actors in the
democracy establishment prioritize programs with measurable, quantitative outputs in or-
der to signal effectiveness to inattentive donors. But some types of democracy assistance
programs that evidence suggests are likely to successfully advance democracy, such as aid
to dissident groups or political parties, are not readily measurable. Measurable programs
also require an investment of time and other resources. Second, actors in the democracy
establishment prioritize programs that are compatible with the regimes of the target coun-
tries in order to gain access. Yet such programs necessarily do not challenge authoritarian
governments, a goal that should be a part of democracy assistance programs that will bring
about democratization. In the end, democracy assistance programs are not as effective as
they could be because of the funding structure.

It is important to underscore what this dissertation is not arguing. This account has not
intended to paint actors in the democracy establishment as craven or corrupt in the way
that previous scholarly indictments of foreign aid professionals have at times done. Far
from it: People in the democracy establishment are in many ways idealists, even if they
become professionals over time. Yet they respond rationally to the incentives put in front
of them. In other words, this dissertation does not take the democracy establishment’s
good intentions entirely at face value, either. Democracy assistance works like any other
government program. As a consequence, in order to reform democracy assistance, the
incentives must be changed. Using this project’s findings as a starting point, I now turn to
some modest suggestions for how such changes might be accomplished.

9.3.1 Nine Suggestions for Democracy Assistance Reform

The general principle that should guide reform to the funding structure of democracy assis-
tance is simple: Funders should do everything that they can to reduce monitoring problems.
Significant literatures in the fields of domestic politics and economics seek to understand
how principals can better control agents; this subject is, in fact, the focus of an entire field,
“contract theory” (Hawkins et al., 2006, 26-31). I build off of the basic insights of these literatures, as well as the dissertation’s empirical findings, to suggest a number of simple but concrete ideas for donors that wish to reform democracy assistance.

1. **Shorten the delegation chain from democratic donor government to implementing organization.** The longer the delegation chain, the harder it is for donors to monitor their agents. Furthermore, more agents can shift their activities away from the preferred activities of the principals. If at each step of the delegation chain, agents shift the activities a bit, then the total amount of shifting could be significant in a delegation chain with four, five, or six links. Donors should therefore try to minimize the length of the delegation chain, giving grants whenever possible to organizations that are unlikely to re-grant the aid several times.

2. **Improve feedback loops between people on the ground in target countries and donor officials.** Monitoring by democracy donors is currently characterized by “police patrols,” or in other words, by principals’ direct information gathering and monitoring of agents. An alternative method of monitoring is “fire alarms,” in which principals rely upon citizens and interest groups to inform them about the agents (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). To the best of my knowledge, democracy donors currently have no formal “fire alarm” mechanisms. My field research in Jordan suggests that Jordanians have a great deal of information and a fair number of complaints about democracy assistance programs in their country. This information is currently conveyed to donors in a largely ad hoc and informal manner. Major international democracy assistance organizations should have ombudsmen for their overseas projects, rather than simply supporting ombudsman offices for other countries’ governments.

3. **Follow the private foundation model whenever possible.** I found that private and quasi-private foundations promote democracy in less measurable and regime com-

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11In fact, during my interviews with donors, the interviewees often solicited such information from me.
patible ways than do government donors, which suggests that they may be more nimble and effective players in democracy assistance. Although doing so may not be politically feasible, government donors may want to consider ways in which the private foundation model could be adopted for government aid. The United States government tried to do this by creating the NED. Although I show that the NED has become somewhat “tamed” over time, its programs are still less measurable and regime compatible than other donors’ programs. But the NED receives considerably less funding than USAID and the State Department. Private organizations might even make sensible contractors if given a sufficient amount of discretion. Due to their unique organizational culture, private foundations will likely maintain some of their advantages over government agencies as donors even if they receive government money, although these advantages would diminish over time.

4. Use bilateral channels of democracy assistance when and where possible. Bilateral democracy assistance may be more effective than multilateral democracy assistance, which because it involves an additional chain of delegation and faces the problem of collective principals. The collective principals problem arises since the decision makers in international institutions often have diverse preferences over the amount and form of democracy assistance, which makes it harder for them to properly motivate their agents. As a consequence, I show that multilateral organizations give more measurable and regime compatible forms of democracy assistance than bilateral donors.

5. Send donor officials in the target countries who can observe programs firsthand. Maintaining program offices in target countries is clearly costly for donors, but donors will be able to identify good partners and motivate those partners properly much more easily when they have in-person contact. I demonstrated that programs that involve a direct communication link between the democratic donor government and the grantee
are less measurable and regime compatible than other programs, all else equal. For this reason, donors should prioritize sending officials abroad to gather information.

6. *During the grant application process, encourage more applications for grants and specify more of the terms of the grants.* In order to choose recipients with closer preferences, donors must use selection and screening mechanisms carefully. Currently, democracy donors such as USAID work with a stable of favorite “primary implementing partners,” but using such partners makes it more difficult for donors to ensure that their agents hew closely to their preferences. Likewise, giving agents considerable discretion in the form of grants (as opposed to more rule-based contracts) also makes it harder for donors to control their agents. Although giving agents discretion and working with a stable of regular partners both are efficient strategies for donors, the efficiency gains come at the cost of effective programs.

7. *Conduct formal, institutionalized comparisons of programs with donors who fund similar programs.* My research in Jordan suggests that international donors with country offices overseas do meet to share information about their efforts on an ad hoc basis. But much more information sharing could take place among donors, including (and perhaps especially) among donor organizations’ headquarters. One of the ways that principals can monitor their agents is by seeing the two agents perform the same task and comparing their outcomes, the cost of their efforts, and so on. As shown in this dissertation, most international donors promote democracy in remarkably similar ways, whether measured by the goals of their programs or the specific local NGOs that they ultimately fund overseas. Such donors therefore should undertake monitoring activities not just individually but collectively and regularly in order to improve their information.

8. *Specialize in promoting democracy in nearby countries.* Some international institutions, such as the OAS and EU, already concentrate on aiding democracy in countries
that are in their neighborhoods. But most bilateral donors tend to promote democracy worldwide. It may make sense for countries to consider specializing in democracy promotion activities that it will be easier for them to monitor. One type of democracy promotion activity that is easier to monitor is democracy promotion that is geographically nearby. If reducing the number and breadth of target countries is not politically desirable, as it may not be, it is especially important for donors to use tools that will help them improve monitoring—such as offices on the ground, feedback loops from people in the country, and information sharing with other donors—for programs that take place far away.

9. Use professional networks and institutions to foster new norms about democracy assistance. This dissertation showed that professional institutions and norms developed over time that fostered convergence on incentive-compatible programs in the democracy establishment. Donors should work with educational institutions (e.g., universities with graduate degrees in democracy and governance), conferences, think tanks, and other professional institutions and events to foster and disseminate new norms within the profession. Appeals to practitioners’ ideals as well as organizations’ self-interests should be effective modes of persuasion.

As the last recommendation notes, my research on change in the democracy establishment over time found that professional norms and identities now exist in the field of international democracy assistance. As a consequence, even if donors enact some or all of the reforms suggested above, it is unlikely that the democracy establishment will change overnight. Norms are “sticky.” Still, since actors in the democracy establishment do respond rationally in the long-term to the incentives they confront, reforms should be eventually effective. And even if all donors do not adopt such reforms, the ones that do ought to influence the entire democracy establishment since it is a professional field. Furthermore, by working with professional institutions, donors may accelerate the change. What democracy assistance needs is engaged and informed donor governments and motivated
yet idealistic aid recipients in order to create democratic change.

9.4 Conclusion

Just thirty years ago, the term “democracy assistance” hardly existed. To the extent that anyone pursued democracy assistance, it was a fairly small set of German political party foundations that did so. Although the United States avowed a commitment to democracy in the fight against global communism, empowering anti-communist allies was more often a guiding foreign policy principle than promoting democracy. Today, democracy assistance represents a multi-billion dollar a year industry in which all the major Western countries and international institutions participate. The motivation for this dissertation was to understand this shift and in particular to understand how it is that a specific template of activities came to dominate the diverse global field of international democracy assistance. Yet one of the fundamental contributions of my dissertation was to simply show the rise of international democracy assistance and, in clear terms, define what it is and how we might classify its programs.

This dissertation argued that a profession called the democracy establishment has made a significant impact on the way that democracy is promoted abroad today. As time passed, organizations in the democracy establishment shed some of their idealism and started working increasingly hard to pursue programs that would succeed at pleasing their donors and gaining access to the countries where they did their work. Motivated by incentives created by the funding structure of democracy assistance, those organizations pursued programs that are measurable and that are compatible with the regimes of the target states. The end result has been democracy assistance programs influenced not so much by the preferences of the donor countries or the characteristics of the target states, but rather by the ideas and interests of the democracy establishment.

This dissertation has also shown that the democracy establishment’s ideas and interests
significantly affect the actual conduct of politics in many developing countries. As a result of the democracy establishment’s direct and indirect influence, dozens of developing countries have adopted quotas for women’s representation in national legislatures, and they have also pursued other practices such as inviting international election monitors and improving local governance. Since the democracy establishment has such a notable impact on world politics, it is all the more important that the political practices and institutions that it promotes in the developing world are the ones that are most likely to advance democracy—not ones that authoritarian leaders can easily co-opt in order to prolong their rule. My findings suggest that the funding structure for democracy assistance unfortunately rewards tools of foreign influence that prioritize measurement over effectiveness and stability in the target states over regime change. Aiding democracy abroad is a good thing, but democracy aid in its current form is not always. The funding structure of democracy assistance should be reformed in order to get the incentives right for the democracy establishment to succeed at its stated mission of advancing democracy around the world.
Appendix A

Countries in the Sample that Adopted Legal or De Facto Legal Quotas, 1960-2006

Appendix C

The Top 150 Organizations in the Democracy Establishment

Governmental and Inter-Governmental Organizations

Canadian International Development Agency
Commonwealth Secretariat
Council of Europe
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA)

Department for International Development (DfID)
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
European Union
Friedrich Ebert Foundation

1This list was gathered from my database of NED projects, Diamond (1997), Carothers (1999), and Stanford University’s Program on Evaluating International Influences on Democratic Development. Available at http://fsi.stanford.edu/research/program_on_evaluating_international_influences_on_democratic_development/ (accessed February 12, 2010). NED grantees were included in this list if they received grants to work in more than two countries and are marked with asterisks.
Friedrich Naumann Foundation
Hans Seidel Foundation
International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB)
International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development
Konrad Adenauer Foundation
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)
Norwegian Agency for Development (NAD)
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Organization of African Unity
Organization of American States

Non-Governmental and Quasi-Governmental Organizations

Academy for Educational Development
African-American Institute*
Africare*
America–Mideast Educational and Training Services

Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA)
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
U.S. Department of State - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor
U.S. Department of State - Middle East Partnership Initiative
U.S. Department of State - U.S. Information Agency (USIA)
UN Democracy Fund (UNDEF)
UN Electoral Assistance Unit (UNEAD)
Westminster Foundation for Democracy (WFD)
World Bank

American Bar Association’s Rule of Law Initiative
American Committee for Aid to Poland
American Federation of Teachers*
American University*
America’s Development Foundation (ADF)*
Arab Institute for Human Rights*
ARD, Inc.
Asia Foundation
Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development*
Association d’Appui au Développement des Initiatives Communautaires (ADIC)*
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)*
Capacitas International*
Carnegie Corporation
Carter Center
Casal and Associates, Inc.
Center for Democracy and Human Rights*
Center for Democracy and Reconciliation in Southeast Europe*
Center for Foreign Journalists (CFJ)*
Center for Global Communication Studies
Center for Human Rights Advocacy
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE)*
Center for Justice and International Law*
Center for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University*
Center of International Media Assistance (CIMA)
Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc.
Chemonics International
Civic Education*
Club de Madrid
Committee to Protect Journalists
Congressional Human Rights Foundation*
Creative Associates International
Delphi International (formerly Delphi Research Associates)*
Democracy International
Development Alternatives
Digital Freedom Network
DPK Consulting
Esquel Group Foundation*
Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO)*
Eurasia Foundation
Ford Foundation
Foreign Policy Research Institute*
Foundation for a Civil Society*
Foundation for Education for Democracy*
Foundation for the Future
Freedom House*
Fund for Peace*
German Marshall Fund of the United States
Global Rights*
Helsinki Citizens Assembly*
Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Republika Srpska*
Human Rights Information and Documentation Center*
Human Rights Protection*
Institute for Democracy in Eastern Europe (IDEE)
Institute for North-South Issues (INSI)*
International Center for Global Communications Foundation*
International Development Law Organization
International Federation of Journalists*
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES)*
International Human Rights Law Group*
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
International Press Institute (IPI)
International Republic Institute (IRI)*
International Rescue Committee (IRC)*
James F. Byrnes International Center*
Jan Bus Educational Foundation*
Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC)*
Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies*
League of Women Voters
Legacy International
MacArthur Foundation
Management Sciences for Development
Mershon Center of Ohio State University*
Milan Simecka Foundation*
Millennium-IP3
Mott Foundation
National Center for State Courts
National Democratic Institute (NDI)*
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
National Forum for Human Rights (NFHR)*
National Forum Foundation*
National Institute for Citizen Education in the Law
National Peace Foundation*
Nonviolence International*
Open Society Institute
Outreach International
PADCO
Pan American Development Foundation
Partners for Democratic Change
Partners of the Americas
People in Need (PIN)*
People in Peril Association (PIPA)*
Peoples Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL)*
Polish Czech-Slovak Solidarity Foundation*

Private Agencies Collaborating Together (PACT)*
Pro Democracy Association (APD)*
Puebla Institute*
Research Triangle Institute
Resources for Action, Inc. (RFA)*
Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights*
Search for Common Ground (SFCG)*
Smoloskyp*
Solidarity Center (formerly Free Trade Union Institute)*
Soros Foundations / Open Society Institute
STINA News Agency*
SUNY Center for International Development
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
International City / County Management Association
Transparency International*
U.S. Institute of Peace
Union of Councils*
United Nations Association of Georgia*
US Overseas Cooperative Development Committee (OCDC)*
Vital Voices Global Partnership*
Washington Office for Democracy in Zambia*
Women’s Campaign International
Women’s Learning Partnership*

World Learning
World Press Freedom Committee
YMCA of the USA - International Division*
Appendix D

Coding Guidelines for NED Democracy Assistance Projects

These coding guidelines were originally written as instructions for two coders that helped classify democracy assistance projects for this dissertation during pre-tests. The guidelines were revised in an iterative process with the coders and are presented here as a reference for readers.

D.1 Project Description

This project analyzes variations in international democracy assistance projects across time and space. Democracy assistance is a type of democracy promotion, which is any attempt by a government to encourage democratization (either through a transition or consolidation) in another country. *Democracy assistance* is “aid specifically designed to foster a democratic opening in a nondemocratic country or to further a democratic transition in a country that has experienced a democratic opening” (Carothers, 1999, 6). It typically falls into four sub-sectors: elections and political processes; rule of law; civil society; and governance. It began in the early- to mid-1980s and has since greatly expanded into a multi-billion dollar a year field that includes aid projects financed by the United States as
well as Canada, most Western—and increasingly, Eastern—European countries, and many international organizations.

This project explores how and why democracy assistance activities have varied over time and across countries by analyzing an original dataset of democracy assistance projects supported by the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The NED is an American democracy promotion organization that was founded in 1983 and that gives out grants to other organizations to promote democracy abroad. It is funded largely by the United States Congress. My dataset includes all projects to promote democracy overseas that the NED funded between 1985 and 2009, which total more than 10,000. I obtained project-level data from the NED’s *Annual Reports* for the years 1985 through 2009 at the organization’s Democracy Resource Center in Washington, D.C (National Endowment for Democracy, 1985-2009). I also obtained project-level data on democracy assistance efforts that were funded by other governmental and non-governmental donors from the AidData database.\(^1\)

### D.2 Variables Covered

Each observation in the dataset contains the following information about a democracy assistance project: project description; year; country where the project took place; recipient organization’s name; and amount of the grant. All this information is available in the metadata, but only the project description will be presented for coding. We classify each project description by assigning it a category that captures what the project works on. The categories are: Business; Civic Education; Civil Society (Residual Category); Conflict Resolution; Dissidents; Elections; Good Governance; Human Rights; Humanitarian Assistance; Legal Systems; Legislative Assistance; Local Governance; Media; Political Parties; Research; Unions: Women’s Groups; Women’s Political Participation; and Youth. Table D.1 summarizes the categories and shows how they fit together. The resulting project-level

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dataset will ultimately be converted into a dataset with country–year observations. To do this, I sum the amounts of any projects that were coded in a certain category in a country that year and then divide that by the total amount of NED democracy assistance that was allocated to the country that year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>USAID Subsector</th>
<th>Category of Democracy Assistance</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections and Political Processes</strong></td>
<td>Elections</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legislative Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Women’s Political Participation</td>
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<td><strong>Rule of Law</strong></td>
<td>Constitutions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Human Rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legal Systems</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Civil Society</strong></td>
<td>Business and Enterprise</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Civic Education</td>
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<td>Civil Society (Residual Category)</td>
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<td>Dissidents and Intellectuals</td>
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<td>Media</td>
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<td>Research</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
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<td>Women’s Groups</td>
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<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Conflict Resolution</td>
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<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Local Governance</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table D.1: **Summary of Categories of Democracy Assistance for Coders.** The four sectors are as defined by USAID; the twenty categories are as defined by the author.

### D.3 Coding Procedures

The project uses content analysis to code a random sample of 5,000 of the NED’s projects. Data are coded using the Public Comment Analysis Toolkit (PCAT), which is an online tool for efficient, reliable text analysis. Each project is coded by the principal investigator and may also be coded by additional people in the future. The coding guidelines were

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refined through a four-round pre-test period in which random samples of 100-200 projects were coded by the principal investigator and two trained coders from the Qualitative Data Analysis Program at the University of Massachusetts (Nicholas Losso and Meaghan Foran) and then discrepancies were discussed via conference call. I may use the random sample of 5,000 coded projects to code additional projects from the NED and other donors using a supervised learning algorithm in the future.

D.4 General Instructions for Coders

You should read all of a project’s description before assigning it a category. The recipient organization’s name, which you can find by clicking on its metadata, may also provide guidance. Please read through the entire codebook carefully before beginning. You will need to re-read these coding guidelines regularly in order to keep them fresh in your memory; some coding categories will not appear often in your projects. Always keep the coding guidelines nearby when coding.

You may assign one category to a project, although some projects may seem to fall into more than one category. The idea is to capture the main goal of the project. A civil society project may include media outreach, for example, but this does not mean that it should be coded as if it were promoting an independent, professional press. To give another example, a civic education project for the general public—which may explicitly include women and youth—should be coded simply as a civic education project rather than as a project supporting women’s groups or youth groups. In the rare case that a project seems to fall equally into two categories, code it as falling into the first category that was mentioned in the project description.

During the pre-test period, please note any project descriptions that you find surprising or interesting or any concerns about how to code a particular project through the “memo” function. If you are uncertain as to how to code a project, please re-read the coding guide-
lines and then give it your best shot while leaving a note in the memo, if necessary.

D.5 Explanations and Examples of Coding Categories

This section contains a brief explanation for the types of projects that fall into each of the twenty coding categories. It also provides at least one “representative” example NED project for each category. I have tried to choose relatively short example descriptions. Where appropriate, I note tricky aspects of coding projects in a certain category and how they should be distinguished from projects in other categories.

D.5.1 Business and Enterprise

- **Explanation:** These projects promote business, private enterprise, market economies, and entrepreneurship. They include working with chambers of commerce, offering trainings and networking opportunities to would-be business leaders, disseminating information about free enterprise, and supporting research and education related to business and enterprise. Grants to the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) often, but not always, fall into this category.

- **Example:** To enable the Botswana Confederation of Commerce, Industry, and Manpower (BOCCIM) to complete its transition to a self-sufficient national organization promoting advocacy, entrepreneurial development, and institutional advancement.

D.5.2 Civic Education

- **Explanation:** According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, civic education “prepares people of a country, especially the young, to carry out their roles as citizens.”³ Civic education (or civics) projects inculcate democratic values and re-

responsibilities. They include seminars that educate the public (and often, but not always, youth) about human rights, citizenship, and democratic values and programs that supply civic education materials to teachers and schools. They also include the “training of trainers” in civic education or democratic principles and processes.

- **Special Note:** These projects are not professional training sessions—such as for media professionals, political party leaders, or government officials—which would fall under their respective project categories. Nor are they voter education projects, which fall under elections projects. Instead, civic education projects have the goal of **educating the public about general democratic values and responsibilities.**

- **Example:** To support the Voice of the Voiceless’ efforts to increase the understanding of and commitment to human rights and democracy in Zaire through a civic education project that includes a monthly bulletin, audiovisual materials, and public meetings.

### D.5.3 Civil Society (Residual Category)

- **Explanation:** These projects support the capacity and efforts of civil society organizations (or NGOs), which are voluntary civic and social organizations. They include holding advocacy trainings for civil society leaders, publicizing civil society actors in the media, supporting events hosted by civil society organizations, and offering networking opportunities to civil society organizations.

- **Special Note:** These projects refer to **general** civil society organizations rather than **specific** civil society organizations that are primarily led by or targeting business leaders, trade unions, women, or youth. Such civil society organizations should be coded under their respective category. The exception is that if a variety of civil society groups are named as the targets of a program, and there is no discernible emphasis placed on one over the others, then you should code the project in this category. Note
also that civil society projects aim to *strengthen or empower civil society organizations* rather than simply involving civil society actors as a means to some other end, such as resolving conflicts.

- *Example:* To promote an independent civil society in Bosnia by strengthening NGOs at the grassroots level, and to encourage participation in the upcoming nation-wide elections...

### D.5.4 Conflict Resolution

- *Explanation:* These projects promote conflict resolution and peace. They include holding trainings to reduce violent political action, supporting peace agreements, and promoting reconciliation and co-existence across ethnic, religious, and racial lines. Anti-prejudice programs generally fall into this category.

- *Example:* To foster ethnic and historical reconciliation by building public support for the establishment of a regional post-conflict fact-finding body. In cooperation with partners from Bosnia and Croatia, the HLC will coordinate regional consultations with various interest groups, prepare policy recommendations for national and international decision-makers, and conduct advocacy and outreach efforts throughout the former Yugoslavia for a permanent institution on war crimes.

### D.5.5 Constitutions

- *Explanation:* These projects support constitution writing and reform. They include supporting constituent assemblies, disseminating draft constitutions, providing technical assistance (e.g., on legal and historical issues related to constitutions), and supporting civil society organizations’ participation in the constitutional process.

- *Example:* To promote citizen oversight of and informed debate about the Constituent Assembly. CEDA will lead an initiative to monitor the Constituent Assembly, ed-
ucate Ecuadorians about the debates and decisions therein, and promote informed
discussion about the Assembly’s actions and the proposed constitution.

D.5.6 Dissidents and Intellectuals

• *Explanation:* These projects foster the exchange of democratic ideas among dissi-
dents and intellectuals. They include supporting literary publications, translating
and disseminating key democratic texts or textbooks, and sponsoring conferences
that promote the exchange of information about democracy. They support individu-
als that are activists (potentially abroad or underground), democratic pioneers in the
country, or both.

• *Special Note:* These projects should not be confused with media projects that are de-
dsigned to foster a free, independent, and professional press for public consumption.
Rather, dissidents’ projects may be designed to foster discussions about democracy
and human rights among activists or the free flow of information without any of
involvement of the media, per se. Likewise, dissidents projects should be distingui-
shed from research projects in that they seek to empower and spread democratic
ideas among activists rather than create or exchange “objective” knowledge.

• *Example:* To assist the continued publication of this Russian-language quarterly
which analyzes current developments in the communist countries of Eastern Europe,
with particular emphasis on the experiences of dissidents and democratic reformers.
The journal is published by émigré scholars and writers for an audience composed
primarily of political elites in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China...

D.5.7 Elections

• *Explanation:* These projects fund, train, and otherwise support election monitors
and observers and also support free and fair elections in other ways. They include
training political and civic leaders about the proper conduct of elections, offering voter education programs, conducting “get out the vote” campaigns, and supporting reforms or improvements to electoral processes by the government.

• *Example:* To organize a three-day election observer training seminar in cooperation with the Benin-based Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherches sur la Democratie et Le Developpement Economique et Social (GERDDES) with participants drawn from a number of Francophone countries holding their first competitive elections beginning in 1992.

• *Example:* To conduct seminars in South Africa on election processes and laws and to enable representatives of South African political organizations to participate in relevant NDI projects in other countries.

**D.5.8 Good Governance**

• *Explanation:* These projects promote good governance by working with elected officials and civil servants. Good governance is defined by the United Nations as: consensus oriented; participatory; committed to the rule of law; effective and efficient; accountable; transparent; responsive; and equitable and inclusive.⁴ These projects need not cover each of those dimensions, but they generally seek to improve the quality of the government’s provision of basic services (as opposed to, say, the quality of elections). They provide technical assistance and training on such topics as budgeting, office management, and communication with the public. Government anti-corruption programs (but not business anti-corruption programs) should generally fall into this category.

• *Special Note:* These projects focus on governance at a *national* level; projects that focus on *local* good governance should be classified as such (see below).

• *Example:* To provide public officials with skills that will facilitate good governance policies, practices, and initiatives, IRI will launch a Good Governance Online University. Through this project, IRI will offer public officials skills that facilitate the implementation of good governance policies and practices, capacities to address pressing issues, skills to improve a city’s economic performance, opportunities to review state legislation and benefit minority communities, and quality training in good governance.

### D.5.9 Humanitarian Assistance

• *Explanation:* These projects provide humanitarian assistance, which is foreign aid that is given to the needy in order to save lives and alleviate suffering. They typically target people who are poor, ill, refugees or forced migrants, or political prisoners.

• *Example:* To protect refugees remaining in Ingushetia and those who return to Chechnya. The Committee will distribute frequent press releases on developments in the region from its headquarters in Ingushetia, as well as from three regional offices in Chechnya. The Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Forced Migrants will receive a small support grant for a program to reduce tensions in the region.

### D.5.10 Human Rights

• *Explanation:* These projects promote human rights. They include supporting human rights education, providing resources for citizens to monitor and report human rights abuses, aiding civil society organizations that work on human rights, publicizing human rights violations in the media, promoting basic freedoms (e.g., of expression),
and encouraging countries’ participation in international human rights laws and institutions.

- **Example**: To coordinate advocacy and conduct investigations of human rights violations through the joint efforts of leading human rights groups, and to promote a greater understanding of the Khmer Rouge trial process. The Action Committee, a coalition of 18 human rights groups, will coordinate investigations, provide legal assistance, advocate for better human rights conditions, and meet with government officials to press for resolution of significant human rights cases and issues.

### D.5.11 Legal Systems

- **Explanation**: These projects support the rule of law. They include supporting transitional justice institutions, educating citizens about their legal rights and duties, providing technical assistance for legal reform projects (e.g., to a project to reform the criminal code), and monitoring the legal system. They also include programs that train lawyers, paralegals, judges, and other legal professionals in general skills as well as democratic principles. These projects also provide pro-bono legal assistance to people working on democracy and human rights or who are otherwise needy. Programs that pertain to the military and the police often, but not always, fall into this category.

- **Example**: To implement a project to increase the transparency and fairness of judicial and law-enforcement organs, with a focus on cases of domestic violence. Project activities will include monitoring and compilation of a database concerning disposition of domestic-violence cases; conducting of roundtables and workshops to seek solutions to unfairness of judicial and law-enforcement organs; and dissemination of information about all stages of the project.
• *Example:* To provide legal assistance to groups within Kenya whose aims are to protect the constitutionally established rule of law and to promote democracy.

### D.5.12 Legislative Assistance

• *Explanation:* These projects seek to improve the quality of a country’s national legislature (i.e., its parliament or congress) and the legislation it produces. They include training parliamentarians and their staff on writing laws or running an office, supporting parliamentarians’ constituent outreach, helping civil society actors monitor and lobby the legislature, financing a media office for the legislature, and encouraging parliamentary reform and modernization.

• *Example:* To conduct a workshop in cooperation with the Assembly of Representatives of Namibia designed to give practical advice about conducting legislative affairs to recently elected members of the Namibian assembly.

### D.5.13 Local Governance

• *Explanation:* These projects seek to improve the effectiveness and democratic character of local or municipal governments. They are good governance projects that take place locally. They include training and offering technical assistance to local officials, supporting decentralization efforts, publicizing good governance locally, and helping civil society actors participate in and monitor local governments. They also include other monitoring programs for municipal councils or other local bodies.

• *Example:* To increase the transparency of and citizen participation in local government. Working in two municipalities, Grupo Faro will bring together government officials and community leaders to monitor and improve the provision of public services, increase government transparency, and encourage active citizen participation in local government.
D.5.14 Media

- **Explanation:** These projects seek to foster a free, independent, and professional media (including new media). They include giving direct grants or equipment to presses or newspapers, supporting press freedom, and training media professionals and students in good journalistic practice. Whereas other projects use the media to attain goals, here, improvements to the media itself is the goal.

- **Special Note:** These projects are designed to foster a free, independent, and professional press for the public, whereas dissident projects are designed to foster discussions about democracy and human rights among elite activists.

- **Example:** To conduct a three-day seminar for Ethiopian media professionals in Addis Ababa to explore basic issues pertaining to the role of the media in a democratic society. The seminar will be followed by a needs assessment for assisting the development of a free press in Ethiopia, and its findings will serve as a basis for future project funding of indigenous media initiatives there.

D.5.15 Political Parties

- **Explanation:** These projects seek to strengthen and professionalize political parties. They include trainings for political party leaders and members in campaigning, communications strategies, and developing party platforms.

- **Special Note:** These projects should not include good governance or legislative assistance projects that happen work with elected members of political parties. To be coded under this category, a project should attempt to specifically *strengthen and improve political parties*.

- **Example:** To provide political party training in Poland through consultations on the election law, organization and management, message development, issue communi-
cation, voter turnout and education, and media training.

D.5.16 Research

- **Explanation**: These projects support research on democracy and related issues (e.g., human rights). They include supporting universities and think tanks in new research endeavors about democracy, such as conferences, workshops, public opinion surveys, or publications. They might also include study trips.

- **Special Note**: Some projects in other categories involve research components. Research that is conducted with the objective of serving some other immediate goal (e.g., for an advocacy campaign) should not automatically be coded as research. Instead, the primary objective of research projects is *research itself* (i.e., creating and exchanging knowledge).

- **Example**: To assist the Democracy Research Project of the University of Botswana in providing information to politicians and the public to stimulate debate on possible election law reforms, assembling and circulating position papers, and to publish a final report to be distributed throughout Southern Africa.

D.5.17 Unions

- **Explanation**: These projects support trade unions and cooperatives. They include holding trainings for union leaders in advocacy, offering special civic and voter education opportunities for union members, supporting unions’ advocacy campaigns, conducting research related to trade unions, and supporting international union exchange trips. Grants to the Solidarity Center and Free Trade Union Institute should generally fall into this category. Projects that are focused on workers’ rights and concerns should also fall into this category.
• *Example:* To conduct an Ethiopian trade union survey intended to study the state of unions during the communist period, document abuses of trade union rights, and propose a new trade union structure which will enable the unions to defend the interests of their members.

**D.5.18 Women’s Groups**

• *Explanation:* These projects support women’s civil society groups and women’s standing in society. They include supporting women’s legal rights, offering technical assistance and other forms of support to women’s civil society groups, and promoting civic education among women.

• *Example:* To promote women’s leadership and combat discrimination, CEDEAL will work with the County Womens Assembly to implement a community education program focused on democratic governance and human rights. CEDEAL and the Assembly will also support women as they create oversight committees to monitor local government.

**D.5.19 Women’s Political Participation**

• *Explanation:* These projects promote women’s participation in politics. They include supporting female candidate trainings, building the capacity of female elected officials and civil servants, and encouraging women to vote.

• *Special Note:* These projects usually focus on various types of political activity—voting, lobbying, running for political office, supporting candidates, persuading others to vote, etc.—in contrast to general civil society activism, which falls under women’s groups.

• *Example:* To bring six to eight women candidates from Jordan to the United States to learn practical political organizing skills and observe political processes, allowing
them to enhance their understanding of political organizing and observe U.S. women candidates in action.

D.5.20 Youth Groups

- *Explanation:* These projects promote youth (or student) civil society organizations. They include supporting school parliaments, offering technical assistance and support to youth civil society groups, and promoting democratic values among youth through education and discussion. These projects work with university students as well as younger students and people.

- *Example:* To support a training program for young political activists in Kaliningrad oblast. Regional Strategy will offer training in practical aspects of NGO organization to about 200 young volunteers, open two new branches in the cities of Gvardeisk and Zelenogradsk, and offer seminars for regional officials and enterprises on questions of organizational and financial assistance to youth associations.
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