This work presents the theories of seven philosophers with influential views on personhood and personal identity, arraying them along a spectrum from psychological reductionism on one end to animalism on the other. The psychological reductionists view psychological features as essential for persons, and the animalists view biological features as essential. I consider three additional views in the middle of this spectrum that attempt to capture the compelling aspects of both the psychologically based theories and the biologically based theories. In the first chapter, I consider the success of each of these views in fulfilling a series of desiderata. In the second chapter, I compare the mid-spectrum views to one another. Finally, I present a view that I call accidental animalism which, I believe, satisfies more of my desiderata for a theory of personhood and personal identity while remaining agnostic on the overall metaphysical landscape in which persons are situated. Accidental animalism aims to articulate the paradigm for personhood, which is a cognitively functional human organism with a persistent first-person perspective. While a cognitively functional human organism is the paradigm, being such an organism is sufficient but not necessary for personhood. Persons could persist without being organisms, in the form of disembodied brains, for example, so long as they maintained their first-person perspectives. I argue that, although it is not accommodated in many commonly accepted theories, the first-person perspective is a central element in personhood and personal identity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have so many people to thank, which is itself a lovely thing.

I will start with the philosophers.

Thank you, a million times, Gil Harman, for your steadfast support over many years. I would not— could not—have undertaken this project without Gil’s willingness to work with me after my long absence from philosophy.

Elizabeth Harman’s enthusiasm and counsel have meant the world. Michael Smith’s encouragement of my work was echoed throughout the department, from Mark Johnston’s resuming a decades-old conversation to Sarah-Jane Leslie’s and Gideon Rosen’s wise counsel. I owe much—as will be obvious—to Mark’s compelling explorations of the topics in this dissertation.

Colleagues across the Princeton campus have been wonderfully supportive. I will single out only David Dobkin for his sage advice; Liz Wood, for the freedom to return to the classroom; and Kevin Heaney, for the flexibility to do the writing. And I owe much to Princeton University for gracing my life with a seat in its classrooms.

In my world outside the campus, I thank Vincent Alfieri, for his profound and essential love, support, and patience. The enthusiasm of my friends and family has been wind in my sails; you know who you are! Lucy Harman has been a constant cheerleader, and Rena Seltzer has been an inspiring and insightful guide. Thanks to my niece, Cara Berg, for her keen eye.

Finally, I thank my parents, Carl and Stefani Larsen, who always honored the life of the mind and always gave me the room to live it.
Table of Contents

Abstract iii

Acknowledgements iv

Table of Contents v

Introduction 1

1. The Spectrum of Theories of Personal Identity 10
   1.1. The Extremes: Psychological Reductionism and Animalism 10
      1.1.1. Locke 11
      1.1.2. Locke and the Desiderata 13
      1.1.3. Contemporary Psychological Reductionism: Parfit and Lewis 14
         1.1.3.1. Derek Parfit: What Matters in Personal Identity 15
         1.1.3.2. Parfit and the Desiderata 20
         1.1.3.3. David Lewis: Identity in Four Dimensions 22
         1.1.3.4. Lewis and the Desiderata 26
      1.1.4. Psychological Reductionism Assessed 27
      1.1.5. Olson on Animalism 29
         1.1.5.1. Olson’s Starting Points and Definitions 30
         1.1.5.2. Olson: Animals and Essence 31
         1.1.5.3. Classic Animalism and the Desiderata 36
      1.1.6. Assessing the Extremes of the Theoretical Spectrum 38
   1.2. The Middle: Closest Continuers, Protean Persons, and Person Lives 42
      1.2.1. Robert Nozick: The Closest Continuer Theory 42
      1.2.2. Nozick and the Desiderata 46
      1.2.3. Johnston: We are Human Beings 49
      1.2.4. Johnston and the Desiderata 54
      1.2.5. Marya Schechtman: Person Life View 57
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2.6.</td>
<td>PLV and the Desiderata</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2.7.</td>
<td>Assessing Mid-Spectrum Views</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Comparing Three Mid-Spectrum Views</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1.</td>
<td>Nozick’s Closest Continuer Schema</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.</td>
<td>Johnston’s and Schechtman’s Views Encapsulated</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3.</td>
<td>Goals</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4.</td>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5.</td>
<td>Personhood and Personal Identity</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6.</td>
<td>Puzzle Cases</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7.</td>
<td>Metaphysics</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8.</td>
<td>Moral and Practical Concerns</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.9.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Accidental Animalism</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.</td>
<td>Preliminaries</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.</td>
<td>First-Person Perspectives</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3.</td>
<td>The Case for Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4.</td>
<td>Future Concern, Bodily Continuity, and Personal Identity</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5.</td>
<td>Tracing Concern in Duplication</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6.</td>
<td>Disabling the Cobbler-Prince Intuition and Its Successors</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8.</td>
<td>The Importance of Psychological Continuity</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9.</td>
<td>Blending Psychological and Bodily Criteria</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10.</td>
<td>Accidental Animalism</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11.</td>
<td>Puzzle Cases</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.12.</td>
<td>Accidental Animalism and the Desiderata</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.13.</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>References</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Exploring what we are and when we survive has been a pursuit of Western thinkers since the Pre-Socratics. Do we have immaterial souls? Do we survive our bodily deaths? Under what circumstances is someone responsible for past actions? When is concern for one’s future appropriate and when not? If a person suffers from complete amnesia, is he the same person as before? Is a “brain-dead” human a person? Is an embryo or a fetus a person? Could “teletransportation” be a way to travel? How many persons are there with conjoined twins? Could machines or “lower animals” be persons? And so on.

The study of personal identity addresses some of the most persistent problems of philosophy, from the so-called mind-body problem to questions of fundamental ontology to the relationship of our concepts to the “outside” world. It also intersects with dialogue about the moral life, responsibility for one’s actions, and concern for oneself and others. Some of the most influential philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries have examined the questions associated with personhood, personal identity, the self, and, of course, ontology.

Contemporary study of personal identity can trace its origins to John Locke. Philosophers since Locke have responded to his intrinsically plausible definition of personhood and articulation of the conditions of personal identity. Locke’s view—that a person is defined and traced by his psychological characteristics, memory in particular—is the ancestor of the contemporary theory of personal identity called psychological reductionism—the view that psychological continuity and connectedness underlie personal identity. The claimed failures of that view have led to another set of theories focusing on the persistence of our animal bodies: animalism. Animalists hold that we are essentially human organisms and that our identity is traced by tracing organisms, for which psychological characteristics are given no pride of place.
Thus we can array theories along a spectrum ranging from those arguing that personal identity consists in psychological continuity alone to others that equate personal identity with human-organism identity, without regard to psychological continuity. Theories at both ends of the theoretical spectrum capture some but not all core intuitions, facts, or other standards for theories of identity. This deficiency leads to proposals that seek a middle ground along the spectrum. Within the dialogue, philosophers present different versions of the principal views, address different questions, and undergird their theses with different metaphysical or logical assumptions.

Questions in the Study of Personhood

For some philosophers defining personhood has involved discussion of the metaphysical status of persons, thinkers, human organisms, or selves; or discussion of the proper use of the concept “person.” Apart from defining personhood, the most common question that philosophers address is one of persistence: under what conditions does a particular person survive, or what makes a person the same person at two different times? Some philosophers tie this inquiry to an epistemological question: how do we authoritatively identify and reidentify ourselves and others? Others focus on defining personhood and the conditions for personal identity so that they jibe with what matters or what should matter in our lives; others explicitly separate questions of personal identity from those of moral philosophy. Another question is that of methodology: in what way, if at all, do our intuitions provide grounding for our theories about personhood, especially when they are the results of our considering real and imaginary puzzle cases?
Philosophers also vary in how and whether they connect theories of personal identity with metaphysics. Metaphysical views undergirding or otherwise attached to theories of personhood and personal identity include views that persons are not genuine entities but are “ontological trash”; that persons and other entities are created by or relative to their cultures; that persons are constituted by but not identical with human organisms; that persisting entities are aggregates of interrelated time-slices; that the self is a genuine but very short-lived entity; that persons are immaterial substances. Some philosophers explicitly separate their theories of personal identity from metaphysics; others connect a particular metaphysical view with definitions of personhood. Some of these go on to offer moral recommendations based on those metaphysical analyses.

In the chapters that follow, I will present in capsule form the theories of seven philosophers with influential views on personhood and personal identity, arraying them along a spectrum from psychological reductionism on one end to animalism on the other. Three of these views go “down the middle” of the spectrum and reflect attempts to capture the compelling aspects of theories at both ends. I will consider the success of these views in fulfilling a series of desiderata and compare the mid-spectrum views to one another. Finally, I will present a view that, I believe, satisfies more of the desiderata for a theory of personhood and personal identity while offering a skeptical perspective on some aspects of this philosophical enterprise. Because I am considering the views in the middle first on their own and then in comparison to one another, there will necessarily be some overlap in the exposition of those views. In addition, I will describe some puzzle cases more than once for ease of reading.
Assumptions and Desiderata for a Satisfying Theory of Personal Identity

Before embarking on an assessment of the philosophy of personhood and personal identity I will present a number of assumptions and a list of my desiderata for a theory. First, the assumptions:

A. For a philosophical discussion about a concept to be informative, we must assume that concept corresponds to some sort of reality beyond our thoughts. By that I mean something relatively weak: that the world includes something beyond our thoughts, which includes human organisms that we call persons. I do not mean to assume anything about the natures of those organisms or about any species or ontological categories to which they might belong.

B. I am assuming that the concept under discussion should apply to and overlap in some way with things in the world external to our minds, but that our applications of the concept need not be infallible. I am assuming that when we divide the world up the way we do, we are capturing something real and not merely linguistic, entirely conventional, or wholly anthropocentric. I am assuming, for example, that humans are genuinely different organisms from birds. However, we can be mistaken about the exact natures of organisms, and the specific borders of the distinction between being a human and being a bird, as well as about the specifics of the relations between humans and birds. In this way, scientific exploration may reveal new genetic connections between the two species that changes the way we categorize and compare them, but the discovery does not signal that we are deeply mistaken in our basic recognition of humans’ and birds’ characteristic features and differences.
C. Our linguistic and conventional applications of the concept of personhood cannot alone provide a complete answer to our questions about personal identity: they reveal conflicts and lacunae. For example, competent users of English can disagree about (or believe that it is indeterminate) when a fetus should be considered a person and when a human has died. So asking about personhood and personal identity is not the same as asking about linguistic usage.

D. A functioning cerebrum underlies our cognition and other psychological phenomena, not an immaterial soul.

E. Personal identity is a 1:1 relation.

I think that there are robust, central intuitions and beliefs about personhood and personal identity—or about viable theses—that a theory of personhood and personal identity should accommodate or explain. I present these below as desiderata, categorized loosely as those that have to do with

- Subjective Internal Experience
- Biology and Psychology
- “Philosophy Room” and Common-Sense

A theory should explain or accommodate the following assertions:

**Subjective Internal Experience:**

1. *Continuing our internal experience or consciousness of our selves is part of what we mean by “survival.”*

By internal experience of our selves, I mean something very simple, namely, a bare first-person perspective, an awareness, an arena of consciousness. I do not intend this to mean that survival
requires that an entity have a sense of itself as a *self*—I mean to refer only to the kind of simple awareness that a sentient creature has. When I hope that I wake up from sleep, I am hoping that this consciousness will continue.

2. *We can anticipate future bodily experiences, such as pain, without psychological continuity.*

This desideratum is aligned with one side of what is now known as the “Williams Conundrum,” from an article by Bernard Williams that has sparked much discussion. While Williams presents a case where amnesia is induced before a painful experience and notes that we would fear that pain even without the prospect of psychological continuity, one can also think of this across longer stretches of time. (The specifics of the conundrum will be detailed below.) I think it is also reasonable to worry about one’s end-of-life suffering, even considering potential psychological discontinuities between a younger and an older self, with or without cognitive impairment.

3. *There is an important difference between my experience of my own identity and persistence and others’ experience of my identity and persistence.*

*My* belief that I am the same person as I was yesterday is fundamentally different from *your* belief that I am the same person as I was yesterday. While my conviction stems from internal, psychological experience, your conviction about me generally comes from the physical continuity that you see or hear from one time to the next. In unusual cases, your conviction may also rest on things I might say to reveal that my memories match up with things you know that only I (and not an imposter or an identical twin) would know.

---

1 (Williams April 1970)
Psychology and Biology:

4. *The continuation of persons’ psychologies is important to personal identity.* By this I do not mean that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity, but rather to acknowledge that it is important to us as persons. Our cultures and our interactions with one another rely on there being bonds of memory, responsibility, respect, and affection over time.

5. *The potential for cognitive activity is necessary for persons.* Here I mean that someone who is brain-dead or an organism without a brain is not a person. This is an area of controversy, but I believe that being a person requires that it be at least possible, in the future, for there to be cognitive activity.

6. *A living human organism with potential for cognitive activity is a person.* This statement is meant to affirm that any human organism with such potential, in any culture, is a person. This would block cultures from excluding from personhood those of different religions, colors, physical abilities, etc. It is not a statement, however, that only living humans can be persons.

“Philosophy Room” and Common-Sense

7. *The facts of personal identity should not depend on facts extrinsic to the relationship between individuals concerned at two different times.* This has both a common-sense and a “philosophy room” aspect. This means that whether I survive should not depend on whether there is a better or equivalent continuer of me. This is known by some philosophers as the “intrinsincness principle.”

---

2 This principle is presented in (Williams, Personal identity and individuation 1973) and discussed by numerous philosophers, including (Parfit 1984)

9. A theory of personhood, persistence, and the self should sit reasonably well with the way we organize our moral and practical lives. This typically involves our belief that personal identity matters.

10. A theory should not conclude that we are badly mistaken about what we are and when personal identity holds.

It shouldn’t be impossible to believe one’s theory, whether considering its plausibility or its compatibility with our person-related practices. This desideratum is shared by others: David Lewis, for example, notes that if he had to choose between a commonsense view and a more challenging philosophically complex theory, “we would have to prefer the platitude of common sense to the interesting philosophical thesis. Else it would be difficult to believe one’s own philosophy!” ³ Derek Parfit notes Thomas Nagel’s comment that “even if the Reductionist View is true, it is psychologically impossible for us to believe this.” ⁴ (Desideratum 10 may, in fact, not be satisfied by any of the philosophical theories considered if we take into account the research showing that most people think that we have immaterial souls.)⁵

11. Our ordinary methods of counting people should be explained.

The number of human thinkers or human persons at a time should typically match up with the number of human bodies. I have separated this statement from the statement about our moral and practical lives because some of the theories considered conflict specifically with this aspect of our practical lives.

³ (Lewis 1983, 56)
⁴ (Parfit 1984, 274). Parfit counters that it is difficult, but not impossible, to believe that psychological reductionism is true.
⁵ Mark Johnston describes research that indicates that 79% of Americans surveyed believe that they have an immortal soul. (Johnston 2010, 3)
While the above statements reflect my own desiderata for a theory, they are not universally embraced by the philosophers whose views will be considered below. In fact, some of the philosophers deny the assertions or repudiate the desiderata. Nonetheless, I think that all of these statements should be weighed when we assess the varied views of personhood and personal identity.
CHAPTER 1: THE SPECTRUM OF THEORIES OF PERSONAL IDENTITY

1.1 THE EXTREMES: PSYCHOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM AND ANIMALISM

As noted in my introduction, theories of personhood and personal identity can be arrayed along a spectrum. At one end we have psychological reductionism—a view that equates us with our psychological features—and at the other we have animalism—a view that equates us with members of a particular animal species. Psychological reductionism, aiming to capture the inherent attractiveness of Locke’s thesis, had been a dominant view of 20th-century analytic philosophers. However, a pair of imaginary cases presented by Bernard Williams revealed jarring conflicts among our ordinary intuitions about identity, thus sparking new interest in the role our bodies play in personhood and personal identity. The most extreme of the views resulting from that interest is animalism, at the opposite end of the theoretical spectrum from psychological reductionism.

What has been dubbed the Williams Conundrum goes something like this: in the first story, two persons, A and B, go into a machine, and when they exit, the A-body person has all the memories and other psychological features that B once had, and the B-body person has all the psychological features that A once had. One of them is going to undergo a very painful experience. Who do you choose to undergo the painful experience, from the perspective of A, before the process? Is the rational and selfish choice to choose the A-body-person, since your psychology will be realized in the B-body person? From Locke to current science fiction, the tendency is to identify B with the A-body person and vice versa, i.e., to trace identity via continuity of psychological features. In the second story, you are told that you will undergo a very painful experience. Before that experience, your psychological traits will all be changed, perhaps even to the psychological traits of someone else. After those losses, you will undergo
the painful experience. Williams argues that the fear and dread of the painful experience would be unavoidable and entirely justified. However, these could just be two different descriptions of the same story, from different perspectives and with information about two different bodies. Why, then, is the reaction to the first story a lack of fear for A looking at the A-body-person’s future pain, and in the second story, dread at the A-body-person’s future pain?\(^6\) Philosophers of personal identity since this conundrum was presented have theorized about the meaning of the apparently conflicting intuitions, about using these intuitions to draw conclusions about philosophical subjects, about the way the stories are framed, and about when self-concern is reasonable and when it is not. But, as noted above, the Williams Conundrum helped to reopen a view challenging the widespread acceptance of psychological reductionism, to which I will turn now.

1.1.1 Locke

Since Locke’s thinking is the ancestor of much contemporary philosophical investigation into personhood and personal identity, I will begin with a capsule summary of his views. In advancing his thesis, Locke explicitly connects the definition of personhood with the persistence conditions for a person over time, writing,

> what Person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it…\(^7\)

For Locke, the sameness of consciousness that secures personal identity is distinct from sameness of substance, whether material or immaterial. Locke allows at least the conceptual possibility that the same consciousness could be attached to a succession of different immaterial

---

\(^6\) (Williams, The Self and the Future 1973)
\(^7\) (Locke 1689-1700/1975, 335)
substances. Locke’s much-cited narrative of the cobbler and the prince is used to demonstrate that personal identity transcends sameness of material substance (or bodily identity). In this story, Locke imagines a cobbler and a prince in circumstances where the cobbler-body-person wakes up believing that he is the prince, with all the memories and psychological traits of the prince, and the prince-body-person wakes up with the memories and psychological traits of the cobbler. Locke assumes a universal intuition that the cobbler and the prince have “switched bodies.” For Locke, the cobbler-body-person IS the prince, because there is sameness of consciousness, and vice versa. Beyond this seminal use of what Mark Johnston calls the “method of cases”—presenting real and imagined puzzle cases to tease out responses to the questions of personhood and personal identity—Locke also provides a criterion for sameness of consciousness (and thus personal identity) that has challenged philosophers ever since.

Locke’s thesis is that you are the same person as a past person if and only if you have access to the consciousness of a past act of that person, just as if you are performing the act. It is not, for Locke, good enough to remember having done the act; you must be able to access what it was like to perform that act, from the inside, and with vividness. This thesis spawned Thomas Reid’s famous objection: even if one weakened the requirement of “same consciousness” so that it is simply a memory from the inside, Locke’s view generates the following apparent conflict with the law of transitivity of identity. Imagine a man at three stages of life, a child, a mature adult, and an old man. The mature adult remembers the activities of the child, and is by Locke’s theory identical with the child. The old man remembers the activities of the mature adult and is thus identical with that mature adult. However, the old man does not

---

8 (Locke 1689-1700/1975, 335-336)
9 (Locke 1689-1700/1975, 340)
10 (Locke 1689-1700/1975, 335)
remember the activities of the child and thus is not identical, on Locke’s theory, with the child. Thus the mature adult is identical with two humans who are not identical with one another, leading to paradox.\textsuperscript{11}

This objection to Locke led to many attempts to capture the underlying identity-intuition behind Locke’s view without the unpalatable logical consequences. Included in these attempts, perhaps, are both the contemporary personal identity theories of psychological reductionism and narrativism. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to look at the historical thread begun by Locke, his legacy in personal identity has multiple strands: the focus on memory, consciousness of self, and psychology as essential to personhood and personal identity; the divorce of these criteria from an underlying substance, material or immaterial; and the use of puzzle cases to draw out the nuances and borders of a concept by reviewing our intuitions about its application.

1.1.2 Locke and the Desiderata

Looking at the desiderata presented earlier, Locke’s theory centers on our continuing internal experience, which on the surface appears to fulfill desideratum 1. His focus on the internal character of our consciousness also distinguishes between our own experiences of ourselves and others’ experiences of us, thus meeting desideratum 3. However, his cobbler and prince narrative shows that he conceives of bodies “swapping souls,” meaning that his view does not provide a way for us to anticipate pain in our (original) bodies through psychological change, thus failing to satisfy desideratum 2. Since Locke’s theory is based on psychological states and defines a person as a thinking, reasoning, self-conscious entity, it satisfies desideratum 4, which notes that psychological continuity is important in personal identity, and desideratum 5, which

\textsuperscript{11} (Reid 1975, 276)
notes that potential for cognitive activity is necessary for personhood. It also fulfills desideratum 6, counting all living humans with cognitive potential as persons.

Within the “philosophy room” and common sense desiderata, Locke’s view of personal identity does not require acceptance of a difficult-to-believe metaphysics (since he is agnostic about the substance underlying our consciousness) and thus fulfills desideratum 8. However, several aspects of his view do not jibe with our moral and practical lives. Locke’s requirement of vivid consciousness of past acts for someone to be responsible for his actions is too stringent: few crimes would be punished, given the dimming of memories relative to the original experiential states. In addition, putting aside the vividness of the requisite memories, we do think that even those who have forgotten their actions are responsible for them, absent any kind of cataclysmic psychological trauma or disease. His theory does not satisfy desideratum 9; Locke’s theory does not work well with our practical and moral lives. It does meet desiderata 10 and 11, since it does not suggest that we are badly mistaken about what we are (10), and, finally, Locke’s theory does not conflict with our common person-counting practices (11).

Much contemporary discussion of personal identity begins with an examination of Locke’s thesis. The objections raised in the earliest criticism have provided the impetus for refinements of his view in what is often called neo-Lockean psychological reductionism. This focus on psychological criteria is central to the views of the next two philosophers to be discussed, Derek Parfit and David Lewis.

1.1.3 Contemporary Psychological Reductionism: Parfit and Lewis

Derek Parfit and David Lewis have presented two of the most influential versions of the psychological reductionist theory of personal identity. For reductionists, the facts of personal
identity can be reduced to other facts: there is nothing to personal identity beyond the holding of certain relations over time. Parfit goes further and claims that the facts of personal identity can be described wholly impersonally. Because the two versions differ in interesting ways, I will discuss both philosophers’ approaches to personal identity below.

1.1.3.1 Derek Parfit: What Matters in Personal Identity

Parfit believes that personal identity over time is secured by sufficient and uniquely held relations of psychological continuity and connectedness, a more precise and plausible version of Locke’s “same consciousness” criterion. Parfit defines psychological connectedness as the holding of direct psychological connections, such as memory, the relation between an intention and an act, or the continuation of a belief, desire, or other psychological feature. Psychological continuity involves overlapping chains of psychological connectedness. For personal identity, psychological continuity, which he calls “Relation R,” must include at least half of “the direct connections that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.” So, for example, a human who suffers total amnesia would not have sufficient continuity with the pre-amnesia person to be the same person as “he” was before being stricken. Since identity is a transitive relation, there is a further requirement for personal identity, namely, that Relation R hold uniquely: if two persons have the requisite amount of psychological continuity with a past person, then personal identity has not been secured. In addition, Parfit believes that we should consider the cause of the continuity. Thus Parfit’s theory of personal identity is this:

(1) There is psychological continuity if and only if there are overlapping chains of strong connectedness. X today is one and the same person as Y at some past time if and only if
(2) X is psychologically continuous with Y, (3) this continuity has the right kind of cause,
and (4) there does not exist a different person who is also psychologically continuous with Y.

There are three different versions of this thesis, varying in the cause of the continuity. The most restrictive is the “Narrow Psychological Criterion,” in which the requisite continuity must have the “normal cause,” in our cases, the persistence of enough of our brains. The “Wide” and “Widest” Psychological Criteria allow causes outside the normal to underlie the continuity. For the Wide Criterion, any reliable cause (for example, a well-functioning teletransportation machine, where the original is destroyed as it is scanned and a duplicate is created elsewhere) would be sufficient to secure identity. For the Widest Criterion, any cause could secure identity. Parfit suggests that we do not need to decide among the three versions of the Psychological Criterion of personal identity. He thinks that it doesn’t matter if the cause is the normal cause, using an analogy of an imagined artificial “eye” that transmits signals that result in one’s having accurate visual experiences. Would we, he asks, not consider this genuine sight?

Going further, Parfit argues that the Widest Psychological Criterion can secure “what matters”—i.e., what matters in survival can be secured by the holding of the R-relation between persons at two different times, with Relation R having any cause.

Parfit believes that the facts about continuity and connectedness fully describe the facts about personal identity: there is no “further fact” about our identities beyond facts about Relation R. There is no “separately existing entity” such as an immaterial soul to go along with our identities. Because identity is cashed out in terms of the holding of relations that admit of degrees, there will be cases where identity is indeterminate. We are mistaken if we believe that

---

14 (Parfit 1984, 207-209)  
15 (Parfit 1984, 208-9). In later works (e.g., (Parfit, Persons, Bodies, and Human Beings 2008), Parfit concludes that personal identity requires that Relation R have its normal cause, i.e. continuation of the same brain.
there is a clear yes-or-no answer to every question about our survival. Those questions might have definite answers if there were indeed a further fact about our identities beyond facts about Relation R—if we had immaterial souls, for example.\textsuperscript{16}

Parfit argues for this indeterminacy by examining the spectrum of different continuity relations that can hold between persons, which, to his mind, demonstrates that there are indeterminate cases of survival (and thus identity). At one end of the spectrum, with full continuity of physical and psychological features, it is clear that the person has survived, and at the other, with zero continuity, it is clear that he or she would not survive. However, in the middle of the spectrum, where there is a sub-optimal amount of continuity, it would be indeterminate whether the person with those R-relations would be identical with the “original” person. Parfit thinks the question of survival in these cases is an empty one.\textsuperscript{17} We could, as we do when considering the survival of a club or a nation, make decisions about where to draw lines, but that would not be a further fact about the situation, but a conventional decision.

He notes that it is difficult to believe that one’s survival could be indeterminate, quoting Thomas Nagel’s comment that it might be impossible to believe a reductionist view even if it were true.\textsuperscript{18} Parfit, however, thinks that it is not only possible but desirable to believe the reductionist view. Once we do so, he argues, we will accept that personal identity is not what matters in survival, and in consequence we will adjust our behavior to have less concern for

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{16} Parfit considers the possibility and outlines the kinds of evidence there might have been if there really were immaterial souls (for example, if there were widespread reports of phenomena suggesting that reincarnation had occurred). He concludes that there is no such evidence. (Parfit 1984, 227-228)
\end{flushleft}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{17} (Parfit 1984, 233)
\textsuperscript{18} (Parfit 1984, 274)
\end{flushleft}
ourselves and more concern for others. What matters instead is Relation R, no matter what the cause.\textsuperscript{19}

To support this view about what matters in survival, Parfit presents cases where adequate psychological continuity holds without personal identity; he argues that these cases preserve “what matters” in survival without personal identity. He imagines that he has cerebral hemispheres that are exactly alike in the way they “contain” his memories, skills, and psychological dispositions. These hemispheres are transplanted into the two functionally similar de-cerebrated bodies of his identical triplet brothers, securing in each brother R-relatedness with Parfit. If only one of the hemispheric transplants were executed, the single recipient would be uniquely R-related to Parfit and thus identical with him. Parfit would survive as the recipient; the recipient would have what matters in survival. However, if both hemispheres are transplanted, both recipients cannot be identical with Parfit, since there are two of them, and they are not identical to one another. It makes no sense for only one of them to be identical to Parfit and not the other, since they both have equal continuity with him. But it is difficult to explain how an adequate continuity relation could hold and still not deliver “what matters” to each of the recipients, merely because the Relation R is held twice over and not uniquely. Parfit’s famous question is, “How could a double success be a failure?”\textsuperscript{20} Thus, he believes, he has demonstrated that the two hemispheric transplant recipients have what matters without identity, and, therefore, that personal identity is not what matters in survival.

To further support his view, Parfit considers an imaginary case of duplication with a “Branch Line” as an example of divergence between identity and what matters. In the Branch

\textsuperscript{19} (Parfit 1984, 217)
\textsuperscript{20} (Parfit 1984, 256)
Line case, Parfit imagines temporal overlap between his original body and a duplicate. He imagines the eerie experience of talking with his duplicate. If his original body is to die within a short time, would the duplicate “become” Parfit after his original body dies? On Wide Psychological Reductionism, the duplicate would have been identical with Parfit if the original had expired immediately. On Narrow, there would be no identity with the duplicate, but the duplicate would have what matters in identity. But with the overlap, which mimics the fission example in a number of ways, there doesn’t seem to be a philosophically satisfactory way to trace identity in a branch line case without resort to semi-arbitrary decisions. Even though Parfit clearly can distinguish between his original self and his duplicate, he believes that the duplicate secures what matters in identity. This is despite the fact that he tells the story from the inside, as himself talking with his duplicate; clearly the kind of psychological continuity that matters to Parfit does not include the same first-person perspective’s continuation, but only a qualitatively exactly similar (or 50% similar) first-person perspective.

As noted earlier, Parfit believes that accepting his view that identity is not “what matters” would have the salutary moral effect of loosening our concerns about ourselves in the near and distant future and realigning our concerns to embrace humanity more broadly. He writes that he finds the realization that identity is not what matters and that our identity does not reflect a further fact beyond the facts of physical and psychological continuity “liberating and consoling.” He adds that he now considers his own death “less bad.”

It goes without saying that this is just a sketch of Parfit’s extensive and compelling arguments in support of psychological reductionism, mattering, and other subjects. Before

---

21 (Parfit 1984, 200-201)
22 (Parfit 1984, 281)
turning to the assessment of Parfit’s core theory against the desiderata, I will note also that
despite his advocacy of psychological reductionism, Parfit acknowledges the attachment we have
to our own bodies, which he thinks is akin to the sentimental value we might place on our
original wedding rings. He also confesses that he would have fear stepping into the
teletransportation machine, even though he knows that the duplicate at the other end would have
what matters in survival: “it is hard to believe that there is not a real question about whether I am
about to die, or shall instead wake up again on Mars.”

1.1.3.2 Parfit and the Desiderata

The first three desiderata are concerned with the first-person perspective being connected
with personal identity. While Parfit’s view focuses on psychological continuity, he defines this
in a third-person way. That being said, when he imagines himself in dialogue with a duplicate,
he thinks there is a real difference between the original continuing and the duplicate continuing,
even though both continue his psychology equally well. There is a real difference between his
duplicate suffering pain on Mars and his suffering pain on Earth. In simple cases, however,
where there is no overlap, there is no important difference between one manifestation of
psychological continuity and another. Parfit does not see a particular first-person perspective as
mattering, though his embrace of narrow psychological reductionism for identity does secure the
first-person perspective in identity without valuing it. His theory thus does not satisfy
desideratum 1, though he would be unlikely to accept this as a desideratum himself.

Parfit rejects as mistaken in the robust intuition evoked by Bernard Williams that we can
reasonably anticipate pain through complete psychological discontinuity. Parfit considers the

---

23 (Parfit 1984, 244)
question and concludes that it is not the case that, “in itself, physical continuity justifies egoistic concern.”24 Thus his view does not satisfy desideratum 2. Because he thinks the facts of personal identity can be recast as impersonal facts, this suggests that his view does not concern itself with distinguishing my first-person experience of myself as surviving from your experience of my survival, thus not meeting desideratum 3.

In terms of the biological/psychological desiderata, Parfit’s theory clearly fulfills the desideratum that a theory hold psychological continuity as central to personhood and personal identity (4), and the desideratum that personhood requires the potential for cognitive activity (5). His theory also jibes with the statement in desideratum 6, that living human organisms with cognitive potential are persons.

In terms of philosophy room and commonsense desiderata, Parfit explicitly rejects the intrinsicness principle (desideratum 7). He argues that, though plausible, that we must reject the requirement that “Whether a future person will be me must depend only on the intrinsic feature of the relation between us. It cannot depend on what happens to other people.”25 Since Parfit defines identity as uniquely held R-relatedness, personal identity hinges on whether a second person has R-relatedness to the original person. But, again, what matters in survival does not hinge on what happens elsewhere; what matters is secured whether or not Relation R is held uniquely.

Desideratum 8 asks that a theory not require a deeply counterintuitive ontology. His reduction of identity to facts about psychological continuity does not rest on a proposal for an elaborate metaphysics. Instead the theory is more a challenge to our moral and practical lives,

---

24 (Parfit 1984, 285)
25 (Parfit 1984, 267)
thus failing to fulfill desideratum 9, which asks that a theory jibe with the way we organize our moral and practical lives. Parfit’s thesis that personal identity does not matter is directly opposed to the way we humans organize our lives; in our commonsense perspective, we clearly believe that personal identity and physical continuity do matter, very much. In addition, even though Parfit believes that personal identity requires physically sustained psychological continuity, he doesn’t think that the physical continuity is important. However, members of our species organize their lives around protecting their physical selves; we fear harm to our bodies. Parfit’s suggestion that accepting his theory should prompt us to redirect self-concern towards others thus clashes with our ordinary practices.

Parfit does believe that we are badly mistaken about what we are, since he believes that we generally think that personal identity is a determinate and important matter, and that it involves a further fact beyond the facts of R-relatedness. Thus Parfit’s view does not satisfy desideratum 10. Finally, when Parfit discusses divided minds, both actual and imagined, he claims that it is not a genuine question whether one or more persons is involved; there are just the facts of the case. In this way, he sidesteps the goal of desideratum 11, that our ordinary ways of counting one person in one body should be explained.

Overall, although Parfit is extremely persuasive in his arguments, the fact that he does not credit the importance of one’s internal self-experience is, to my mind, a serious deficiency that was best illustrated in his perplexing tale of imagining himself talking with his duplicate.

1.1.3.3 David Lewis: Identity in Four Dimensions

While Parfit aims to undermine our conviction that personal identity is “what matters,” that conviction is a starting point for David Lewis’s version of psychological reductionism.
Lewis’s stated goal is to develop a theory about personal identity that matches his common-sense view that what matters in identity is identity: what matters in survival is that HE survives, that someone in the future is identical with him now. Although Lewis and Parfit are both psychological reductionists, Lewis’s view\(^{26}\) includes a number of distinctive aspects that should be addressed in any discussion of psychological reductionism. Like Parfit, Lewis believes that psychological continuity and connectedness (together, R-relatedness) are necessary for survival and personal identity.

When I consider various cases in between commonplace survival and commonplace death, I find that what I mostly want is that my mental life should flow on. My present experiences, thoughts, beliefs, desires, and traits of character should have appropriate future successors. My total present mental state should be but one momentary stage in a continuing succession of mental states. These successive states should be interconnected in two ways. First, by bonds of similarity. Change should be gradual rather than sudden, and (at least in some respects) there should not be too much change overall. Second, by bonds of lawful causal dependence…and this should be so not by accident…but rather because each succeeding mental state causally depends for its character on the states immediately before it.\(^{27}\)

To explicate his four-dimensionalist view, Lewis incorporates the now well-known concepts of person-stages at times. A person-stage is almost exactly like a person, except that it lasts only a short time. Lewis defines a person as a maximal aggregate of R-related person-stages and sees the person as a four-dimensional entity. Therefore, there is personal identity over time if there is one R-related person stage at each relevant time that is part of the same four-dimensional maximal aggregate of person-stages. Like Parfit, Lewis loosens the Lockean personal-identity criterion of sameness of consciousness by allowing overlapping strands of psychological connectedness to constitute continuity, thus allowing the ordinary human degrees of remembering, forgetting, and psychological change to undergird personal identity.

\(^{26}\) Here I will refer mostly to the view presented in (Lewis 1983).
\(^{27}\) (Lewis 1983, 55-56)
Parfit pointed out that Relation R was a relation that allowed multiple continuers of a person, and took that to mean that the identity that could be secured via uniquely held Relation R was not as important as Relation R itself. Lewis’s approach is different. He thinks personal identity IS what matters: “what matters in survival is identity—identity between the I who exists now and the surviving I who will, I hope, still exist then.”28 Starting with this conviction, Lewis offers a different way of explaining how identity and R-relatedness work when there are multiple continuers in imagined cases of fission, without conflicting with the principle that identity is a 1:1 relation.

For Lewis, personal identity can be explained in imagined cases of fission (and fusion, as well) by thinking of these scenarios as instances where two different maximal aggregates of R-related person-stages coincide for a period of time. If fission or fusion is to occur at some point, there are two persons involved all along. Their person-stages coincide for a period either before fission or after fusion. That is, in fission, if a single-pathed (non-maximal) aggregate of R-related person-stages is connected to two distinct future R-related aggregates of person-stages, the single path before fission represents two persons. (Lewis uses diagrams to good effect; imagine a letter “y.”)29 That is, each person-stage before fission is part of two different maximal aggregates of R-related person-stages. And each person-stage after fusion remains part of two different maximal aggregates of person-stages.

In our common parlance, this means that two different people are present along the pre-fission/post-fusion time-space path, sharing one body and one set of psychological states. However, in Lewis’s “philosophy room,” what is present at any one time (fission, fusion, or not)

---

28 (Lewis 1983, 56)  
29 (Lewis 1983, 62)
is not the full person but a person-stage. The person is the whole aggregate over time; the person is not present at each moment, but only over time. In order to demonstrate that there are other kinds of things that we count differently when considering the whole extent of the entity and the narrow piece we are confronting, Lewis uses the analogy of a road. He notes that when we cross a stretch of road that is the overlap between two roads, say, Route 27 and Nassau Street in Princeton, we can count either by focusing on the number of widths of asphalt (one) or the number of continuing roads (two). While we might focus on the coincidence of the two routes, these two roads are not identical. Thus someone who will fission could be counted as one body when we see him or her before fission, but his or her person-stages are part of two continuant persons. We can count either the number of stages before us at a time (one at a time before fission) or the number of continuant persons of which those stages are a part (two).

Another area in which Lewis departs from Parfit is regarding the importance of the cause of the continuity. As noted above, Lewis believes that the cause of the R-relatedness is important: when he discusses the connections among mental states, he notes that changes between them “should conform, for the most part, to lawful regularities concerning the succession of mental states—regularities, moreover, that are exemplified in everyday cases of survival.” Though Parfit is more comfortable with happy accidents of continuity, Lewis does not think accidental or maliciously caused continuity can undergird personal identity.30

30 (Lewis 1983, 55)
1.1.3.4 Lewis and the Desiderata

In terms of satisfying the desiderata about subjective internal experience, Lewis’s focus on psychological continuity with lawful and regular causes does not necessarily preserve a particular subject of experience, thus not satisfying desideratum 1. For example, he talks uncritically about the possibility of brain-state transfers, a high-tech version of the cobbler and prince scenario, securing the proper kind of R-relatedness. That approach to the brain-state transfers suggests that anticipating pain in a case of bodily continuity without mental continuity would not be reasonable, thus not satisfying desideratum 2. Lewis’s theory also does not address desideratum 3, which seeks acknowledgment of an important difference between my experience of my own persistence and others’ perception of it.

With its focus on mental continuity, Lewis’s theory fulfills desiderata 4, 5, and 6. Clearly it satisfies 4, with its claim that psychological continuity is important; 5, with its claim that potential for cognitive activity is necessary for persons; and 6, with its claim that humans with cognitive potential are persons. Lewis’s elegant four-dimensionalist solution to the challenges of fusion and fission respects the intrinsicness principle, fulfilling desideratum 7. Identity is dependent only on the relations among one continuum of person-stages—in fission, for example, identity does not depend on whether the other fissioned entity exists. Included in the four-dimensionalist view is the tenet that persons are not fully present at any one time; only person-stages are. Another metaphysical commitment is the commitment to the reality of person-stages as entities. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address four-dimensionalism in a broader sense. However, the four-dimensionalist view does involve an ontology that is difficult to accept, thus not fulfilling desideratum 8.

---

31 (Lewis 1983, 75)
In addition to its divergence from our commonplace ontologies, numerous philosophers have pointed out that a four-dimensionalist view of personhood does not map cleanly to our ordinary moral and practical lives and would thus not fulfill desideratum 9. For example, if a pre-fission stage has a desire to do something post-fission, how do we determine whether that desire has been fulfilled in the two stages that continue the stage that has the desire? Even without the challenges of fission, Mark Johnston, for example, points out that looking at the reasonableness of life-plans when there are any number of sub-maximal aggregates of person-stages (Personites) seems to lead to our prudential activities’ being unjustifiable for those Personites.32

Finally, Lewis’s theory does not fulfill desiderata 10 or 11. The four-dimensionalist view suggests that we are badly mistaken about what we are: our commonsense ontology includes a belief that a person, and not a person-stage, is present at each moment. And, related, even if fission and fusion were to occur, to believe that in one human body there were stages of two continuant persons would violate our ordinary ways of counting, thus not satisfying desideratum 11. While Lewis’s road analogy shows us that there are different ways of counting things, we also think that it is entirely conventional how we name roads and where we should use those names to indicate the beginnings and ends of roads.

1.1.4 Psychological Reductionism Assessed

As its name suggests, psychological reductionism fulfills the desiderata having to do with psychology (4-6), resting identity (or what matters, for Parfit) on specific psychological connections. However, because both Parfit and Lewis are concerned more with the reliability of

32 (Johnston, The Personite Problem: Should Practical Reason Be Tabled? n.d.)
causation than the specific kind of causation, they hold that what matters can be secured without physical continuity, as long as the cause is reliable. This does not allow us to reasonably anticipate pain through psychological continuity, a robust intuition evoked by the Williams Conundrum. Psychological reductionism, in its aim to explain continuity of consciousness in a third-person fashion, also fails to acknowledge the importance of the first-person perspective, thus not meeting desiderata 1-3.

As noted above, Parfit repudiates the intrinsicness principle, and Lewis embraces it, thus splitting the difference on desideratum 7. On desideratum 8, while Parfit does not include a particular ontology as part of the defense of his thesis about personal identity, Lewis’s four-dimensionalist view is difficult to accept, as noted above. Each of the views has different ways in which it does not jibe with our ordinary moral and practical lives, so neither meets desideratum 9. And neither meets desideratum 10: each thinks we are mistaken about what we are. Finally, Lewis’s view does not jibe with our counting practices, thus not meeting desideratum 11; Parfit’s are more aligned with ordinary practices in this regard.

I believe that the most serious concerns about psychological reductionism involve the failure to connect identity with our first-person perspectives and to explain the robustness of our intuition that we can anticipate pain and our fear of bodily death, concerns included in the first three desiderata. Parfit’s nervousness about stepping into the Teletransporter and his later embrace of brain-based psychological continuity as a requirement for personal identity suggest that there is more to be said about the importance of our bodies. Animalism, at the other end of the theoretical spectrum, places those bodies at the center of the theory, so I will turn to that end of the theoretical spectrum.
1.1.5 Olson on Animalism

In response to the perceived deficits of psychological reductionist theories of personal identity, a number of philosophers have presented a view widely known as “animalism.” These philosophers include Paul Snowden, who coined the term, Peter van Inwagen, and Eric Olson, whose view I will discuss in detail below.

Animalism, as Olson presents it, does not start with the Lockean forensic goals of properly ascribing desert and blame to persons, or their modern correlates of beginning with our moral, practical, or linguistic practices. Instead, Olson seeks to characterize “our” metaphysical natures or substance kind. In Olson’s “classic” form of animalism, we are *essentially* human organisms, and hence our identity could be secured by our being the same organism at two different times. Ontologically speaking, the category “organism” seems a paradigmatic category delivered by nature, with “organisms” defined as living and self-sustaining things. This alignment with apparently natural categories is in direct opposition to exploring other kinds of categorizations that are dependent on human thought or convention, like road names, artifacts, or clubs. Beyond the both philosophical and lay appeal of identifying us as human animals, animalism also appears to align with our views of our bodies in considering questions of survival in various real and imagined puzzle cases. Eric Olson is among the most active advocates of animalism today, so I will focus on his thesis below.33

33 (Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology 1997) and (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007) are my primary sources for Olson’s exposition and defense of animalism.
1.1.5.1 Olson’s Starting Points and Definitions

Olson articulates several assumptions undergirding his inquiry. He outlines without further argument the following:

- There is an informative answer to questions of our persistence.
- Materialism is true—we are wholly physical.
- People exist and persist over time, literally, and the language of personhood is not merely a paraphrase of other facts about particles or relations among stages.
- People and other concrete substances are wholly present across their existence.34

By laying out these assumptions, Olson rules out a number of theories about our natures. In particular, he rules out any four-dimensional theory of our identity, such as David Lewis’s, since Lewis’s view characterizes us as an aggregate of many different short-lived entities who together make up a person, and thus a person is never wholly present at any one time. In addition, it does appear to preclude any theory that posits a relativistic, nihilistic, or ontological-trash view of our identity—for example, Robert Nozick’s, Mark Johnston’s or Marya Schechtman’s theses.

Olson ties his focus on metaphysics with skepticism about the value of commonplace intuitions about identity in puzzle cases: “I am not asking about our conception or understanding of ourselves—about what we take ourselves to be. This is metaphysics, not anthropology. What we ordinarily take ourselves to be may be wildly mistaken.”35 In his most recent work Olson

34 (Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology 1997, 4-5)
35 (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 14)
does not equate *persons* with animals; he eschews addressing the questions of *personal* identity in favor of answering the question “what are we?”

1.1.5.2 Olson: Animals and Essence

As noted above, Olson looks to the biological world and argues that *we* are *essentially* human animals. He thinks that *our* essence is captured by our being human animals and not by our being persons. *We* are substances, “metaphysically independent beings,” and our substance kind is human animal. Using his definition of substance, we could not cease to be human animals without going out of existence altogether. *We* also cannot belong to more than one substance kind: *we* who are essentially human animals may also be persons, but persons are not substances. In addition, it need not be the case that all persons are human animals; there might be non-human persons.

In explaining what he means by “animals,” Olson aligns himself with biologists—animals are biological organisms, all of which have more or less the same metaphysical nature: they are substances rather than events, states, or properties, and they are wholly matter without immaterial parts. Animals differ from other material things by having *lives*; Olson takes his definition of a life from Locke, calling a life “a self-organizing biological event that maintains the organism’s complex internal structure.” Parts of animals are not animals, nor are groups of animals. Olson outlines the criteria for organisms’ survival: an animal persists if its life

---

36 In (Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology 1997) he argues that persons are essentially human animals.
37 (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 5)
38 (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 29)
continues, and when it dies, the organism ceases to exist. For him there really is no such thing as a dead organism.\(^{39}\)

While psychological reductionist theories focus on our cognition and the continuity of our mental states, Olson’s version of animalism aligns our persistence conditions with those of other organisms, such as oysters. He gives no special consideration to cognition among human organisms’ functions. Our mental functions are contingent: we could continue to exist with no mental functions. Olson believes that you could survive the transplant of your cerebrum into another debrained body, but not, as our intuitions strongly suggest, as the recipient of the cerebrum, but rather as the still-functioning decerebrated body. Olson takes this as a place that personhood and organismhood diverge, but believes that one retains one’s essence only as the organism.\(^{40}\)

Olson distinguishes his view from other body-based theories of personal identity, and in particular from “brain views” or “constitution views.” Olson considers the view that we are identical with our brains, according to which we survive as long as our brains function. Thus we would survive the brain transplant as the transplant recipient, and we could anticipate pain through radical amnesia. Because of the role of the physical brain, we would not survive teletransportation. Despite these alignments with intuitions, Olson thinks that the brain view lacks common-sense appeal.\(^{41}\) We do not mean to refer to our brains alone when we talk about ourselves: I do not weigh three pounds, and my brain does not have freckles. (He notes that we could address this common-sense worry with a linguistic workaround, recasting the I-statements

\(^{39}\) (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 28-29)
\(^{40}\) He argues that our intuitions are distorted by the anomaly of the case: in our ordinary lives, we don’t have a psychological continuer that is manifest in a new body. (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 43)
\(^{41}\) (Olson, What Are We? A Study in Personal Ontology 2007, 77)
that refer to our whole bodies into paraphrases.) Olson also criticizes the brain-view because it does not deliver our substance kind: the brain is not a substance kind. Brains are parts of organisms and not in themselves ontologically primary entities. Brains cannot sustain their own existences as whole organisms do. In fact, as will be discussed below, Olson thinks that there really is no such thing as an undetached brain, even though we have been accustomed to referring to such organs as entities.

Constitution views, which also define persons in terms of bodies, typically say that we are persons who are constituted by human bodies. Lynne Rudder Baker, Mark Johnston, and, in the past, Marya Schechtman have presented views that include this claim. These views hold that persons are constituted by, but not identical with, human organisms. Persons could cease to be whole organisms while still remaining persons, and we could cease to be persons while remaining organisms. For example, some think a person could survive as a brain in a vat, but that an organism could not. Others believe that an otherwise functioning human organism with no potential for cognition is no longer a person. These beliefs demonstrate that the persistence conditions of human organisms and human persons are not the same, and therefore that human persons are not identical with human organisms. Instead, the relation between person and organism is one of constitution. Constitution views often make use of the analogy of a lump of clay and a sculpture made of it. The lump of clay precedes the sculpture, can exist after the sculpture is destroyed, but for part of its existence is materially coincident with the sculpture. The lump of clay constitutes but is not identical with the sculpture. Even with this analogy, Olson says he cannot make sense of the relation of constitution, which he describes as a relation
that is partway between identity and distinctness.\footnote{Interestingly, Marya Schechtman, in her discussion of constitution views in \cite{Schechtman2014}, thinks that Olson’s claim that he finds the explication of constitution incoherent represents a deep conceptual impasse: “It seems that some people can make sense of this idea while others cannot and there is no definitive way to demonstrate that one position or the other is the correct one. To this extent we are left with something of a stalemate…”} Olson rejects constitution views as explaining the relationship between person and organisms, and, as noted above, he has abandoned the philosophical quest to explain that relation.

In presenting his view that our essence is captured by our being human organisms, Olson explores a number of overall metaphysical views to gauge their compatibility with his view that we are essentially human organisms. Because human organisms have multiple parts and are alive, he is especially interested in the way metaphysical views explain how composite objects (like animals) can be “genuine” entities as opposed to their being mere combinations of simpler parts. His extensive and nuanced exploration of possible metaphysical frameworks cannot be described here, but in short Olson is seeking an ontology that integrates us into the natural world, that honors the special status of living things, and that provides a clear answer about our persistence.

Olson concludes that the view most compatible with these goals and with animalism is the sparse ontology championed by Peter van Inwagen. In this view, the only genuine entities—substances—are particles and organisms. The fact that organisms are \textit{alive} sets them apart from all other composite objects; life gives the components of organisms an organizing principle that unites them into genuine objects. Olson adopts van Inwagen’s view that “things compose something if and only if their activities constitute a biological life—a self-organizing event that maintains the internal structure of an organism.”\footnote{\cite{Olson2007}} Olson acknowledges that this sparse
ontology has the consequence that most of what Lynne Rudder Baker calls the “medium-sized dry goods” of the world are not genuine objects. For Olson, such things as statues, undetached heads (considered apart from the bodies), and apples are not genuine entities but rather particles (which are genuine entities) arranged statue-wise, head-wise, and apple-wise. On his ontology only being alive provides the proper organizational principle for the particles to reflect a genuine substance. This blocks the reification of such things as “my body minus my arm” or “the combination of this stone and that piece of wood.” Indeed, even dead organisms no longer, strictly speaking, exist.

A few aspects of Olson’s theory merit special attention because they have sparked a great deal of philosophical debate. As noted above, his view has the discomfiting consequence that one of us would not survive as the organism who received his brain, but as the debrained but still functioning body. This would block survival as a brain-in-a-vat, as well. In his view, cases where there are two-headed conjoined twins would be examples where there is one organism and thus one genuine entity, rather than two persons. Seeing these twins as two persons would jibe better both with our intuitions and our practices. In response to objections about this consequence of his theory, he reiterates that he is not interested in the number of persons but in the number of genuine entities from a metaphysical and not a social perspective. He notes that even though he thinks there is one genuine entity, he would give two grades if they were in his philosophy class.44

As will be mentioned again below, a good deal of recent debate focuses on something called the remnant person problem. If we are essentially human organisms, how do we explain

---

44 Thanks to Elizabeth Harman for drawing my attention to the article, (Campbell 2010), that discusses this objection to Olson’s views.
the ontological status of, for example, a disembodied brain during an imagined brain transplant?
In Olson’s view, when this disembodied brain is transplanted into a new body, it will be part of that recipient organism. But there is not a good way, the objections go, to explain the ontological status of the brain mid-process. It doesn’t make sense to say it is a new entity—Mark Johnston objects to the implausibility of something coming into existence by having its body removed. For Olson, the answer is that the disembodied brain is not an entity during this process, but it will become part of another organism. (This is of a piece with his claim that there is no such thing as an undetached head, for example.) The extensive dialogue around these subjects cannot be given its due in this paper.45

1.1.5.3 Classic Animalism and the Desiderata

Despite the prima facie plausibility of equating our essences with membership in a particular animal species, classic animalism does not fulfill many of the desiderata against which I have been assessing theories. In fact, Olson argues against the beliefs underlying a number of the desiderata. Desiderata 1 and 3 focus on the necessity of persistence of an internal perspective for personhood and personal identity and on distinguishing a person’s experience of his own persistence from others’ experiences of his existence. As noted elsewhere, in his most recent work Olson distances himself from questions of personhood and thus does not address the desiderata as I have articulated them. If I recast the desiderata to reflect Olson’s particular focus, they would then ask that a theory of our essences and our persistence conditions include an internal perspective and note the difference between my experience of that perspective and others’ experiences of it. Since Olson explicitly says that our psychologies are only contingent

---

45 See, for example, (Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007), (Olson, Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem 2015), and (Johnston, Remnant Persons: Animalism's Undoing Forthcoming, 2016)
parts of our existences, even these recast desiderata are not fulfilled but rejected by Olson.

Desideratum 2, on the other hand, asks that a theory find it reasonable for us to anticipate pain through complete psychological discontinuity: Olson’s theory is compatible with this desideratum since it aligns our identities with bodily identity.

Desiderata 4, 5, and 6 focus on psychological and biological facts about *personhood*. Here, too, we can recast them to accommodate Olson’s focus on our essences. His rejection of the importance of cognition and psychology to our essences means that his theory does not fulfill desideratum 4, which says that psychological continuity is important to personal identity (recast as “our essences”). Similarly, his view does not meet recast-desideratum 5, which indicates that potential for cognitive activity is necessary for our persistence (recast from “personhood”). He would say that it might well be necessary for personhood but not for our survival. Olson’s view does not conflict with desideratum 6, which locates psychology in the cerebrum.

Stepping back and looking at the theory overall, Olson’s view meets the “intrinsicness principle”: what we are and when we persist does not depend on facts outside the relationship between an organism at one time and an organism at another. By tracing organisms, which he thinks do not persist if they branch (he discusses amoebic fission and concludes that the daughter amoebae are entirely new organisms and the original amoeba has gone out of existence), he meets this desideratum. However, the minimalist ontology he finds most plausible is not plausible from a common-sense perspective: it is difficult to believe that we are genuine entities but that planets, for example, are nothing but particles arranged planet-wise. Similarly, the idea that an undetached head doesn’t really exist is hard to accept. Thus his theory does not meet desideratum 8, which aims to avoid difficult-to-believe ontologies.
Olson’s version of animalism does not jibe with our moral and practical lives and thus does not satisfy desideratum 9. Whether or not we use the language of personhood and personal identity, some of the moral and practical implications of his view are rebarbative. To say that my essence would be preserved in my decerebrated husk does not honor the fact that human cognition is one of the key elements of human existence, nor that damaging the brain that underlies cognition would be graver than damaging a spleen, for example. (That our culture takes brain damage more seriously than limb damage can be seen in personal-injury lawsuits’ awards.) If my essence is preserved in “my” brain dead or decerebrated organism, then harvesting my organs while I am still in existence seems barbaric. Olson believes that we may be “wildly mistaken” about what we are and thus rejects desideratum 10. In fact, his overall claim that psychology is not especially important to our essences suggests that we are mistaken about what is important about human organisms.

Finally, desideratum 11 asks that a theory jibe with our ordinary ways of counting one person and one organism. Olson’s theory sidesteps this desideratum in virtue of his focuses on organisms and essences. While he says that conjoined twins are one entity if one organism with two psychologies and two entities if two fused organisms, he also indicates that he would treat two-headed conjoined twins as two separate students if “their” organism were to enroll in his class.

1.1.6 Assessing the Extremes of the Theoretical Spectrum

At the psychological reductionist end of the spectrum, personhood and personal identity are reducible to other facts about connections among psychological states. At the other end of the spectrum, the classic version of animalism posits that our substance kind is “human
organism,” not “person”; our persistence conditions are those of human organisms. Thus our biological lives alone, apart from any psychological conditions, provide our existence and persistence conditions. When psychological and biological functions diverge, with classic animalism our essence remains with our biological selves, despite the apparent conflicts with robust intuitions to some real and imagined puzzle cases.

The theories at the extremes fail to fulfill many of the desiderata advanced. In distinctly different ways, they do not acknowledge the importance of a particular first-person perspective, wide psychological reductionism with its claim that any cause of psychological continuity can secure both identity and what matters; animalism with its consequence that we would survive removal of our brains. For this reason, psychological reductionism fulfills neither desideratum 1 (which says that a continuing first-person perspective is part of survival) nor desideratum 3, (which asks that a theory acknowledge the difference between my experience of my persistence and your experience of my persistence). Desideratum 2, which asks that a theory jibe with our anticipating future bodily experiences through psychological discontinuity, is fulfilled by animalism and not psychological reductionism.

Only psychological reductionism fulfills the fourth and fifth desiderata. The fourth asks that a theory acknowledge the importance of psychological continuity to personhood (or our natures); as is discussed immediately above, our psychologies are not central in an animalist theory. The fifth asks that a theory acknowledge that potential for cognitive activity is necessary for a personhood or for our survival; animalism denies that this is the case. The sixth desideratum is met (or is at least not challenged) by both theories: it asks that a theory include within the category of persons all human organisms with cognitive potential.
In the philosophy-room and commonsense desiderata, the intrinsicness principle articulated as part of desideratum 7 is fulfilled by Lewis’s theory but not Parfit’s: as discussed above, the branching possible in Parfit’s R-relation means that personal identity is secured only when there is no branching. Lewis’s solution of there being two persons (or rather coincident stages of two continuant persons) all along if branching occurs avoids this problem. And animalism is also compatible with the intrinsicness principle. Organism existence, in Olson’s view, does not permit branching. Of the three views, both Lewis’s and Olson’s views are connected to a difficult-to-believe ontology; Parfit is less explicitly tied to metaphysical position.

None of the extreme views connects especially well to our ordinary practices, the goal of desideratum 9—Parfit explicitly suggests that his view that personal identity does not matter means that we should broaden our self-concern to include greater concern for others. The view that personal identity does not matter is itself a challenge to our everyday perspective, as well. On the other side of the spectrum, Olson’s focus on the ontological statuses of organisms and his dismissal of the questions of personhood does not align well with the centrality of personhood in our moral and practical lives. When someone has a brain-dead relative and is asked a question about organ donation, it is hard to see how understanding “our” metaphysical status is at all helpful. Knowing that the person still has his essence (according to the animalist) does not seem to jibe with our inclination to allow organ donation. Similarly, imagining the world in which brains can be transplanted, we can imagine that the decerebrated-but-still-living husk could be readily discarded despite its putative metaphysical status.

Considering desideratum 10, i.e. that we not be badly mistaken about our natures, neither extreme of the spectrum fulfills this desideratum. Proponents of both psychological reductionism and animalism think our common-sense views are badly mistaken. Psychological
reductionism suggests we are mistaken about the importance of our bodies, and animalism thinks we are mistaken about the importance of our psychologies.

Finally, desideratum 11 aims to have a theory match up with the way we count people. Neither extreme theory fulfills this desideratum. Lewis’s view famously does not match our counting practices with its four-dimensionalist view of persons who split at some point: we would count them as one person pre-split, and Lewis, as noted above, counts stages as being part two continuant persons even before the stipulated fission. Olson’s view does not match up when it considers dicephalic conjoined twins, which if it counted as one organism (depending on the specifics of the case) would not jibe with a commonplace practice of thinking of them as two persons or two entities.

In short, because the desiderata include both physical and psychological aspects of our existence as important in our survival, theories at neither of the two extremes of the spectrum fulfill many of the desiderata. In addition, because the desiderata also appeal to common sense and practical applications of the theory of personhood and personal identity, neither of the theories fulfills the philosophy-room/common-sense desiderata. Both have difficult-to-believe aspects and jibe with only some aspects of our practical and moral lives. In addition, theories at both ends are comfortable saying that we are badly mistaken about what we are and when we survive. For all these reasons, philosophers have sought other views that meet more of these desiderata. In the next sections, I will review three theories that hew more closely to our judgements about personhood and personal identity and then compare them to one another.
Chapter 1.2: The Middle: Closest Continuers, Protean Persons, and Person Lives

In the previous section I reviewed theories of personhood and personal identity at the extremes of a spectrum ranging from widest psychological reductionism to classic or essential animalism at the other. Because each of these “extreme” theories conflicts with very robust intuitions about ourselves, some philosophers have tried to find a path in between—or beyond—animalism and psychological reductionism. Among these theorists are Robert Nozick, with his Closest Continuer Schema; Mark Johnston, with his view that we are of the kind “Human Being,” a partly physical and partly psychological kind, a sub-kind of the kind “Protean Person”; and Marya Schechtman, who believes that persons are those who live “person-lives,” i.e., the lives of “typical enculturated human beings.” Below I will describe these views and consider them against my desiderata for a theory.

1.2.1 Robert Nozick: The Closest Continuer Theory

Nozick, in *Philosophical Explanations*, offers a view that aims to explain and accommodate intuitions that give primacy, respectively, to bodily and psychological continuity in tracking personal identity. Responding explicitly to the stories in the Williams Conundrum, Nozick presents the Closest Continuer Schema (CCS) as an account of identity over time. He argues that identity, including personal identity in particular, is secured by an entity’s being the closest of the close-enough continuers of an entity at an earlier time. It is our application of that principle that results in the apparently conflicting intuitions to what could be two different versions of the same story. When told the story as a “swap” of psychological traits between two bodies, we trace identity by psychological continuity; with only one body in the narrative, we

46 (Williams April 1970)
trace by bodily continuity. We are applying a schema with variable dimensions and weightings for each kind of entity; with persons we are weighting physical and psychological continuity.

How does Nozick cash out the terms in his theory? “Continuer” incorporates a notion of causation. Continuation is not just a matter of qualitative similarity of properties but also includes that the earlier properties cause or generate the later properties. Continuity need not include full temporal continuity; sometimes sufficient continuity for identity can involve an entity’s flickering in and out of existence, although for some entities temporal continuity can be one of the weighted dimensions in the schema. Both the “closest” and the “close-enough” terms are critical to this schema. The adjective “closest” ensures that identity be a 1:1 relation; a tie does not secure identity. The adjective “close-enough” recognizes that there might be other continuers with weak continuity, too weak to secure identity. The notion of a schema, too, is important to Nozick. The schema does not include specific weightings and dimensions of the requisite properties that are continued or not. In questions of personal identity, these weightings and dimensions vary from person to person.

Nozick believes that the CCS explains our patterns of intuitions about the stories in the Williams Conundrum. When we are told the story of the “mind swap” between two bodies, many of us confidently trace identity in virtue of psychological continuity alone. In this case, we are weighting the full psychological continuity as sufficient for personal identity, and as more important than the full physical continuity exhibited in the original body. That does not mean, however, that psychological continuity is necessary for personal identity. Thus regarding intuitions about the narrative that includes someone’s facing psychological discontinuity

---

47 (Nozick 1981, 35-36)
48 (Nozick 1981, 34)
49 (Nozick 1981, 35)
followed by extreme pain. Nozick’s schema explains why we can trace identity in the body with psychological discontinuity. We believe (with our weightings of dimensions) that physical continuity without psychological continuity can secure personal identity: in Williams’ second story, one’s closest continuer is the radically transformed persona in his original body.

Nozick acknowledges that the flexibility of a schema—which has virtues when we have concepts that are not fully precisified—creates a discomfiting result: “we are not willing to think that whether something is us can be a matter of (somewhat arbitrary) decision or stipulation.”50 Going further, Nozick posits that personal identity is different in an important way from the identity of other entities: “what constitutes [persons’] identity through time is partially determined by their own conception of themselves, a conception which may vary, perhaps appropriately does vary, from person to person.”51

Nozick sees the self as something that is self-synthesized; that is, the self is created in the process of reflection. Nozick believes that each of us has an individual set of dimensions and weightings that determine our persistence conditions. We can thus decide ourselves whether we would survive or not in puzzle cases.52 Thus Nozick’s deeper claim is not simply that the closest continuer schema reflects our judgments about identity, but rather that the weightings of various dimensions allow each of us to create a self: he writes, “I have a special authority in fixing who I am.”53

Nozick notes that among persons, we can afford each other some (finite) amount of indeterminacy in the weighted sums of dimensions that are part of each person’s self-conception.

---

50 (Nozick 1981, 35)
51 (Nozick 1981, 69)
52 (Nozick 1981, 105)
53 (Nozick 1981, 107)
This flexibility leads to some pragmatic complexity. For example, I might think that a future person was a close enough continuer to be me, but that future person’s weightings might not see me as a close enough predecessor to be her. What happens if one’s weightings change over time? What happens if there are two beings who believe that there is a single closest predecessor of himself? They can’t both be identical to some one person in the past. Nozick suggests that within a social matrix, out-of-the-ordinary self-conceptions may have consequences: you and I cannot live harmoniously if you believe that my arm is part of you.\(^{54}\)

Nozick considers whether this view fails to give the self an adequately solid ontological status. He considers whether the self might not be an entity but a property; in his mind, this might address some of the traditional problems associated with articulating the nature of the self, including Hume’s claim that he cannot find his self as a separate entity among his perceptions of various kinds, nor can we find ourselves separate from any embodiment,\(^{55}\) and the difficulty of equating the self with those embodiments. Seeing the self as a property, Nozick claims, addresses these worries; further, a property itself “has a durable ontological status.” He acknowledges, however, that the self-reflexive creation of a self, with the fluidity of a closest continuer schema, does make that property changeable. Nozick admits that this view has some “craziness” that may ultimately make it problematic, despite the fact that it illuminates patterns in our intuitions. (He also says immediately afterward that sometimes novel solutions to intransigent problems seem crazy because they are new.)\(^{56}\)

\(^{54}\) (Nozick 1981, 107-108)
\(^{55}\) (Nozick 1981, 111)
\(^{56}\) (Nozick 1981, 113-114)
1.2.2 Nozick and the Desiderata

There are two different aspects to Nozick’s theory. First, we can consider the CCS filled in with the dimensions and weightings that Nozick himself uses and explicates, and second, we can consider it with the ontological commitments Nozick makes. Taken from the first perspective, Nozick’s CCS seems to be a straightforward and sensible—to adopt a Nozickian adjective—proposal to explain the pattern governing our robust intuitions about personal identity and personhood. Looking at the desiderata, Nozick’s Nozick-dimensioned view gives precedence to continuity of first-person perspective without considering it a necessary condition of identity, partly fulfilling desideratum 1; he gives credence to our ability to anticipate pain through bodily discontinuity, meeting desideratum 2; and he does separate out self-experience from third-person experience, meeting desideratum 3. Nozick also believes that psychological continuity is important to personhood; he traces identity through psychological continuity in imagining simple brain-state transfers, meeting desideratum 4. Cognitive activity is also given weight, meeting desideratum 5; he does not exclude from personhood those with potential for cognitive activity, meeting desideratum 6. In terms of common-sense and “philosophy room” desiderata, Nozick does not find a way to honor the intrinsicness principle in cases of fission, thus failing to meet desideratum 7. In cases of branching, identity is not secured even with the same process that would secure identity in non-branching situations.

CCS’s relation to the desiderata looks quite different, however, when considered in the context of his overall theory. First, as noted above, Nozick believes that each of us has his or her own individualized dimensions and weightings governing personal identity and his or her own persistence. Second, Nozick believes that each of us, through self-reflexive thought, creates his or her own self. There are limits: as noted above, Nozick does not think that the weightings
and dimensions are infinitely flexible, and he also observes that in order to live in a society there are limits of the variations acceptable among people. That being said, there remains a disquieting relativism about not just one’s own self-creation, but also in the broad range of ways the schema might be filled in with parameters and weightings.

As part of Nozick’s more general views, Nozick’s view fails to meet many of the desiderata. With the flexibility of the dimensions and weightings that are used to determine the degree of continuity, we cannot say that CCS privileges the internal experience of a person in tracing identity. Either physical or psychological continuity can serve as weighted dimensions of continuity in the absence of the other. Thus CCS fails to fulfill desiderata 1 and 3. Since the weightings need not include any bodily continuity, desideratum 2 is not met: unless your specific set of dimensions includes a requirement of bodily continuity, identity need not include our ability to reasonably anticipate pain through psychological discontinuity. Looking at the psychological and biological desiderata, again because the dimensions and weightings need not include psychological continuity, desideratum 4 is not met. The schema is silent on the weighting of the dimension of cognitive activity, thus not meeting desideratum 5. Because of its schematic nature, and each person’s ability in Nozick’s view to determine the dimensions and persistence conditions for his or her own self, Nozick’s view would not fulfill desideratum 6, which categorizes all human organisms with cognitive potential as persons.

As noted above, because of its requirement of uniqueness in the continuer (i.e. closest of the close-enough continuers), CCS does not fulfill desideratum 7, the intrinsicness principle. However, the largest gap in satisfying the desiderata comes when considering the desiderata that aim towards alignment with common sense ontologies (8) and our practical and moral ways of life (9). Nozick notes that the self-creation part of his thesis sparks a number of ontological
worries. A person, being self-created on his view, and a self, being perhaps a property rather than an entity, seem to be ontologically flimsy items rather than, for example, instances of a category delivered by nature. These aspects mean that his view would not meet desideratum 8. As noted above, great flexibility for dimensions and weightings could cause moral and logistical chaos, thus meaning that Nozick’s theory (unless attached to a robust social-contract thesis) does not meet desideratum 9, which asks that a theory of personhood and personal identity jibe reasonably well with the way we organize our moral and practical lives. If one citizen believes that infanticide is not killing a person, and his neighbor thinks it is murder, that society will have a moral and a practical problem. In addition, this view would also fail to meet desideratum 10: it would mean we were badly wrong about persons and personal identity. We don’t typically think that we create ourselves, or that we decide our selves’ borders, or that it is up to us to determine our conditions of survival. In terms of our counting protocols, it would seem possible under Nozick’s relativism to have a view that allowed multiple instantiations of a person, or that would count as more than one person the personalities of a person with dissociative personality disorder, thus not fulfilling desideratum 11, which aims to respect our ordinary person-counting practices.

In summary, Nozick’s theory seems at first glance to be a reassuring and sensible way to explain the patterns of our apparently conflicting intuitions about personal identity. However, considered in the light of a highly relativistic view of identity over time and the ontological theses that support that view, Nozick’s theory seems better as an explanation of our inconsistent application of concepts—a valuable contribution—than as an answer to the questions “what am I?” and “when do I survive?”
1.2.3 Johnston: We are Human Beings

In his seminal paper, “Human Beings,” Mark Johnston offers both an alternative to a time-honored methodology for investigations of personal identity and a view of our natures that aims to jibe with our commonplace practices. He advances the view that we persons are “Human Beings,” a term he uses to refer to members of a partly physical and partly psychological kind. Human Beings are typically constituted by, but not identical with, particular human organisms, in the manner of a sculpture that is constituted by a lump of bronze.

Johnston rejects what he calls the “method of cases,” using claimed intuitions to puzzle cases to drive philosophical analysis of personhood and personal identity. He believes that taking these intuitions seriously results in the conclusion that we are “bare loci of mental life,” entities for whom neither physical nor psychological continuity is a necessary condition, since one set of intuitions in the Williams Conundrum traces a person via psychological but not physical continuity and vice versa for the other. Johnston argues that the bare locus conception of personhood has too little content to be informative and does not jibe with our practices of identifying and reidentifying ourselves and others over time.

Johnson thus rejects entirely this methodology in favor of an epistemic–metaphysical strategy, exploring what kind of thing can be identified and reidentified over time in the ordinary, “humble and ubiquitous,” ways we identify and reidentify ourselves and others, i.e. by their physical appearances. Beginning with the hypothesis that we track individual human organisms, he ultimately concludes that we are not identical with these organisms. Personhood

\[57\] (Johnston, Human Beings 1987)

\[58\] From this point forward, I will use uppercase letters in the term “Human Being” to signal that I am using the term in Johnston’s particular way.
and organism-hood come would come apart in brain transplants. A person would travel with his brain in a brain transplant scenario, and not remain in the debrained body.\(^59\) He posits that we persons are members of a kind where mental functioning is of primary importance among our functions, a kind he dubs “Human Beings.” Human Beings survive only if they have mental functioning that is supported by their brains’ continuity, though our kind is not “human brain.” We do not trace brains when we trace ourselves and others over time, thus failing Johnston’s basic methodological test. We do not mean “my brain weighs 150 pounds” when we say “I weigh 150 pounds.” Instead, while he believes that persons could survive as properly supported brains or disembodied heads, he characterizes these states as the “limit of mutilation” of a Human Being, rather than its essence.\(^60\)

Johnston’s theory goes beyond these commonsensical perspectives when he contextualizes his theory of personal identity within his metaphysics. In later works, he argues that the kind “Human Being” is not our substance kind; our substance kind is “Protean Person.”\(^61\) “Human Being” is a sub-kind that falls under Protean Person, which, being more general, captures the potential variability across cultures of legitimate conceptions of personhood. In our culture, the borders of personhood are coincident with those of the kind Human Being. However, Johnston believes that other cultures might draw these borders differently in areas of indeterminacy, with those borders remaining the borders of a concept of personhood, and not another person-ish concept. He illustrates this point by comparing the Human Beings culture with the “Teletransporters” culture. We Human Beings believe that persons do not survive teletransportation, which we see as death with a duplicate. However, in Johnston’s view, it is

\(^{59}\) Although Johnston seems to be relying here on the method of cases, in the next chapter I will say more about his argumentative strategy.

\(^{60}\) (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 75-79)

\(^{61}\) (Johnston, Relativism and the self 1989)
conceivable that we could have (or could have had) different conceptual borders for personhood, in which persons survive teletransportation. A lack of coincidence between the extensions of different versions of the concept is acceptable in areas where there is indeterminacy about personhood and personal identity: Johnston claims that teletransportation is such an indeterminate case. Johnston claims that the Human Being culture and the Teletransporter culture have precisified in different ways this indeterminate case.

Although the Human Beings don’t think that teletransportation IS an indeterminate case, Johnston argues that counting this as an area of indeterminacy is justified because it would be possible for some culture to hold that questions of personal identity in teletransportation do not have determinate answers. Building on this base, Johnston then argues that it is reasonable for a member of the Human Beings culture, once he accepts the relativism of his views, to embrace a transfiguring mental event (or to recommend that a “waif” without a home culture embrace the Teletransporter culture) that would allow him to see teletransportation as a means of travel rather than of suicide. It would be rational, he argues, to choose to effect a change in one’s conception that would allow a longer life and more efficient travel.62

Johnston extends this view when he argues that our identities are formed by our own egoistic future-directed concerns, the inverse of our ordinary view that we have such concerns in virtue of our identity with some future person or other. Because of this, we can adjust our

62 (Johnston, Relativism and the self 1989, 467). In (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 254-258), Johnston’s view evolves to advocate “evenhandedness” in our treatment of different conceptions of personhood rather than acceptance of the relativism of personhood and personal identity. Evenhandedness about these concepts means recognizing them as equally acceptable ways of implementing an overarching principle, in this case, the general definition of a person as a Lockean “thinking reflective being.” Johnston maintains the reasonableness of switching from one culture to another for the so-called benefits such as convenient travel. Exploring Johnston’s detailed arguments for relativism and evenhandedness in our cross-cultural personhood-related attitudes is beyond the scope of this paper.
concerns so that we have less concern for our own individual organisms’ futures and more concerns for others. He embraces a view that suggests that shifting what have been identity-determining patterns of concerns from oneself to others can result in our surviving as others. With this perspective, he claims, we can survive, literally, our own bodily deaths and achieve through goodness (manifest in deep and genuine concern for others) a kind of immortality.

In addition, because symmetrical fission is at least theoretically possible, Johnston believes that our disposition-grounded persistence conditions may be those not of each individual human organism but rather of a higher-order individual. Each of our individual organisms and personalities might, in fact, be instantiations of a higher-order individual, like “The Tiger” or “The Monarch of England.” (We would be more like The Tiger since there is the potential for multiple instantiations, just as The Tiger is made up of all the individual tigers). So considering the well-used tale of Brown, whose cerebral hemispheres are transplanted into his debrained triplet brothers, with resulting organisms dubbed “Lefty” and “Righty,” Brown is an instantiation of a higher-order individual (call him “The Brown”). After the surgery, The Brown is instantiated by Lefty and Righty and no longer by Brown. So the identity question is not whether Lefty and Righty are identical with Brown, but rather whether there are any instantiations of “The Brown.”

Looking at Johnston’s claim that the Teletransporters and the Human Beings are using different, but equally legitimate, conceptions of personhood seems to be problematic; why not say that their societies are arranged around a concept that seems like, but is significantly different from, our conception of personhood? The Teletransporters disagree with the Human Beings on a matter that is literally “life and death.” Human Beings think that survival requires the

---

63 (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010)
persistence of our animal bodies (or parts thereof); this conviction seems to be wired into us. As a Human Being I cannot imagine that, facing a car about to mow me down, I would be able to avoid thinking my life was about to end, duplicate prepared or not. We should expect, then, a more neutral reaction to impending biological death among the Teletransporters, especially those with blueprints were available for duplication, more like the prospect of losing a set of keys: painful, undesirable, and inconvenient in the short term, but entirely reparable in the medium term. But imagining such a degree of difference from our instinctual bodily self-preservation seems to require that the Teletransporters, even though they are human organisms, be different from all other biological organisms, which are characterized by powerful drives to sustain bodily survival.  

This difference illuminates the difficulty in accepting Johnston’s recommendation that we treat different conceptions of personhood “evenhandedly.” A Human Being considering a cultural-view transformation would believe, when deciding about the transformation, that after conversion, he would have different views about what it means to live and to die. With the fixed perspective within the Human Beings culture, what Johnston is suggesting is akin to voluntarily disabling some of one’s instincts of self-preservation. Even incorporating the requisite philosophical belief in relativism, or the plea for evenhandedness in Surviving Death, this neutrality seems beyond what is imaginable for Human Beings.

---

64 In conversation, Johnston noted that the Teletransporters would have evolved differently from Human Beings and would have different instincts of self-preservation. However, this evolution would need to include the Teletransporters’ having evolved in a way that would set them apart other animals in terms of instincts for bodily preservation.
1.2.4 Johnston and the Desiderata

Johnston’s statement that we are Human Beings has, of course, a good deal of prima facie plausibility. His use of the commonplace terminology of personhood, coupled with his thesis’s ostensible grounding in the “humble and ubiquitous practices” of our identification of others, is a counterpoint to the nuanced and varied articulation of the criteria of continuity and connectedness of mental states that characterize psychological reductionism. Johnston, like Olson, evokes our common-sense instincts with claims like “surely we know what a person is.” However, the details of Johnston’s view, and the metaphysical context in which these details are set, undercut the commonsensical appeal. To assess his perspective overall, I will measure it against the desiderata presented at the beginning of this chapter. I will distinguish between his view that we, in our culture, are Human Beings, and his overall view, which is that our substance kind is Protean Persons.

With the Human Beings view, Johnston does well with capturing the importance to us of the internal subjective experience, desideratum 1. However, since he also believes that it is coherent to have the conception of personhood of the Teletransporters, he does not, ultimately, believe that these continuing internal perspectives are essential to personhood and thus he does not fulfill desideratum 1 in his overall theory considered more broadly. The second desideratum is fulfilled in body-based definitions of personhood, so when considered in the Human Beings culture, we can certainly anticipate pain through psychological discontinuity. However, Johnston also imagines a culture he calls the Hibernators, who do not believe that persons survive long periods of deep sleep.65 The Hibernators would thus not anticipate as their own pain in “their” original bodies after deep sleep, thus not fulfilling the second desideratum. In

---

65 (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 244-245)
addition, Johnston’s stressing the epistemological importance of the identification of others over our self-identification does not meet desideratum 3, which aims to capture the important difference between our own experience of our identities and others’ tracking of our identities.

With his reliance in the Human Beings culture on our being constituted by individual human organisms, Johnston also honors much of the objective biological and psychological factors that are tied to theories of personal identity. In particular, in the Human Beings culture, psychological continuity and potential for cognitive activity are given primary consideration, thus meeting desiderata 4 and 5; in addition, Johnston sees a living human being with cognitive potential as a person, thus fulfilling desideratum 6. Even considered outside the Human Beings culture, these psychologically-focused desiderata are fulfilled: it does not appear that Johnston’s relativism about personhood includes the suggestion that psychological criteria could be diminished in importance.

Looking at “philosophy room” requirements, Johnston’s Human Beings view does not fulfill the intrinsicness principle, in which whether personal identity holds does not depend on facts outside the relation between a person now and a person at another time, desideratum 7. As noted elsewhere, the intrinsicness principle is most challenged when considering judgments about identity in cases of fission or duplication. In “Fission and the Facts,” Johnston argues that imagined cases of fission are cases of genuine indeterminacy.

Because of the metaphysical grounding for Johnston’s overall view, his theory does not meet some of the other philosophy-room and common-sense desiderata. A number of elements

---

66 Johnston’s methodology involves starting from our means of identifying other persons over time by the persistence of their bodies, not by the persistence of any psychological features over time.
of the metaphysics he suggests do not fulfill desideratum 8, that a theory avoid a deeply
counterintuitive metaphysics. In his metaphysics, I would include the following elements as
difficult to accept: the radical relativism of personhood from one culture to another and the
connected belief that the differences in views of personhood are differences in the circumstances
of one’s survival; the acceptance of individual human persons as embodiments of higher order
individuals like The Tiger; the idea that one’s concerns about future persons are identity-
determining and allow us to survive, literally, as other people. The Human Beings version (or
level) of Johnston’s view was presented as aligning with our “humble and ubiquitous practices.”
The later versions of Johnston’s thesis involve leveraging his ontology to advocate adopting
other-directed concern as a means for securing immortality and loosening one’s ties to one’s own
individual personality. This perspective is counter to what comes entirely naturally to
organisms: an instinct for preserving our biological lives and those of our families. Thus
Johnston’s view does not align with the way we live our practical and moral lives, thus failing to
fulfill the 9th desideratum. In addition, this aspect of Johnston’s view also fails to meet
desideratum 10, since his theory asserts that we are badly mistaken in our commonplace view of
personhood and personal identity, since we generally believe that we are tracing identity in one
body rather than as seeing that body as a manifestation of some more general type. Further, we
also do not believe that our dispositions for self-concern create selves; rather, the common-sense
view is that the self is a given and that I have concern about a future person because that person
is me. In terms of the person-counting desideratum, 11, the proposal that each of us could be one
of a multiplicity of embodiments of some higher-order entity, though not exactly a number
question, seems at odds with our ordinary way of counting persons.
1.2.5 Marya Schechtman: Person Life View

Marya Schechtman seeks to define personhood and personal identity in a way that honors our commonplace intuitions and our moral and other person-related practices, and then to tie that definition to a particular metaphysical view. In her “Person Life View” (PLV), presented in her book *Staying Alive*, Schechtman proposes that a person is someone who lives a “person life” through being a *locus* of a culture’s person-related practices. Personal *identity* involves being part of the same person life. Schechtman motivates her current view by reviewing and rejecting a number of alternate theories of personhood and personal identity: neo-Lockean psychological reductionism, animalism, and the narrative view. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the specifics of her arguments against psychological reductionism and animalism; however, it is helpful to consider PLV’s connection with the narrative view.

Schechtman had held a narrative self-constitution view (NSCV) in the past. She believes, however, that the PLV captures the positives of the NSCV while aligning better with actual person-related practices. PLV also ultimately provides her with a more satisfying ontology of personhood. In the NSCV, developing a narrative about our lives unifies our self-consciousness and constitutes us as persons. A person need not be at every moment explicitly constructing a narrative about his or her life; the requirement is that a person have a holistic view of his or her life that affects decision-making. While it does not do her arguments justice to condense them, in part Schechtman moved away from this earlier view because the requirements for personhood are too stringent. First, she thinks that the “narrative arc,” with a beginning, middle, and end, is too limiting. People’s lives do not flow so neatly. Second, and more

---

67 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014)
68 See, for example, (Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves 1996)
69 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 100-101)
importance, she would like a definition of personhood to include those who are not able, or not yet able, to think of their lives in this overarching, structured way. Schechtman would like to include as persons infants, humans with severe cognitive limitations, and humans in persistent vegetative states, all excluded from personhood by NSCV.

Schechtman begins developing PLV by considering the paradigm of “typical enculturated humans”; we live a “standard person life.” Schechtman argues that we should define personhood by incorporating the whole spectrum of person-related activities and practices, rather than focusing only on one aspect of personhood. She contrasts this approach with other definitions of personhood that capture only one aspect of our lives: Locke’s forensic notion of personal identity focused on rewarding or punishing the correct individuals; Christine Korsgaard’s connecting identity to personal agency; and Eric Olson’s view that our essence consists in our membership in an animal species, with no place for our psychologies or our moral lives.

Schechtman observes that we are not simply organisms carrying psychological or physical traits, but we are also students, wives, sisters, patients, voters, athletes, people entering into contracts, moral agents, and the like. We easily see one another as all of these things at once; it is only in theoretical or circumscribed situations that we can see one another as only one or another of these at a time. Considered as a criminal defendant in a courtroom, as a patient in an operating room, or as a voter in a voting booth, each individual exemplifies only a subset of his or her characteristic roles. However, most of the time, we exemplify many of our roles at once. We should start our explication of personhood from this holistic perspective, Schechtman

---

70 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 111)
71 (Korsgaard 1989) (Olson 2007)
believes, rather than trying to tease out a single set of necessary and sufficient conditions for personhood and personal identity.\textsuperscript{72}

PLV rests on the concept of person-space, which provides the infrastructure for personhood. Person-space includes everything persons do and care about: religion, a legal system, government, language and writing, artmaking, marital and other reproductive customs, etc. In addition, person-space also includes the parameters that govern who is accorded a place in person-space.\textsuperscript{73} For Schechtman, personhood requires that someone is accorded a place in person-space; he or she must be a unified locus of concerns and interactions that are typical for individuals in a culture.

Being such a locus involves \textit{recognition} within one’s culture, i.e., within person-space. Schechtman looks to Hilde Lindemann in developing the view that recognition as a person by other persons accords personhood.\textsuperscript{74} In a narrative view of personhood, an individual creates his or her own (self-constituting) narrative; in PLV, the centrality of cultural recognition means that others accord personhood to individuals. This brings into person-space those who cannot yet, or will never, craft their own narratives, such as those with atypical cognitive trajectories. Examples of such recognition include families treating children with profound cognitive impairments as persons, by celebrating birthdays, dressing them like other children, and relating their histories. While such individuals cannot participate fully in person-related activities, Schechtman argues, they are still persons. They are the right \textit{kind} of entity to be the locus of person-related concerns and practices, even if they themselves are not, or cannot, be the locus of the full range of these practices.

\textsuperscript{72} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 8)
\textsuperscript{73} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 113-118)
\textsuperscript{74} For more specifics about the Lindemann texts, see (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 69-71)
Because resting personhood on recognition might seem to allow the exclusion as well as the inclusion of groups of humans, Schechtman considers oppressed groups within a culture. She discusses attempts by one group to deny human rights to members of other groups. She presents a nuanced argument that the very acts of oppression reflect recognition of the oppressed group’s personhood. She argues that, for example, laws restricting voting rights for certain genders or races are acknowledgements that a member of one of those groups is the right kind of entity to vote; we need no laws to restrict dogs from voting, because they are not the right kind of entity to vote. That recognition, she maintains, itself accords the oppressed group a place in person-space. In addition, Schechtman observes that oppressed sub-groups of humans within a culture have their own person-space and thus accord personhood to the members.\footnote{Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 125-130} This is a nuanced argument that cannot be explored fully here. However, this aspect of Schechtman’s view reveals an asymmetry in the way recognition and the withholding of recognition function. On her view, our treating humans with limited cognitive capacity in human-like ways (e.g. celebrating birthdays, dressing them in human clothing) is a recognition that accords them personhood despite their limitations. However, when oppressors treat cognitively mainstream humans as if they were lower animals, the animal-like treatment does not count as “anti-recognition” and cannot erase the personhood of those humans. In both cases, she relies on membership in the species as making these individuals the right kind of thing to be the locus of person-related concerns. That being said, it would be helpful to hear more about this asymmetry.

Another risk of basing personhood on recognition is that too many individuals might be included in person-space. However, Schechtman places limits. On PLV, a dog treated by its owner in person-like ways is not accorded a place in person-space. The culture at large sets the
parameters for recognition. Though in our present-day culture only humans are the right kind of entity for personhood, PLV allows the possibility of non-human persons. Recognition of non-humans would require that the non-human in question (or the species in question) be able to participate in typical human person-related practices. Ordinary dogs do not meet this standard. However, we could imagine recognizing as persons a group of intelligent aliens who could interact with us as persons, by their ability to communicate with us and to engage in commerce or treaty discussions. We might also be able to imagine recognizing as a person one super-intelligent chimpanzee that could communicate with us and participate in human activities. Schechtman notes that these examples of possible recognition within person-space are necessarily limited by physical realities: while we can imagine communicating effectively with other primates or dolphins, Schechtman worries that we couldn’t have the requisite practical and forensic interactions with, for example, “intelligent balls of light energy.”

Being accorded a place in person-space makes one a person; living the same person life is needed for personal identity. She notes that human persons have a typical life trajectory, moving from infancy with its limited cognitive capacities through maturity. Sentient, self-conscious, self-narrating, a mature person engages in complex inter-personal relations and embraces the norms of the culture. Later, a person’s cognitive and physical powers may wane. To describe the unity of a person life, Schechtman broadens the conception of a biological life as “a self-organizing biological event that maintains the organism’s complex internal structure” to include

76 I note that there is some tension in Schechtman’s imagined extension of person-space beyond our species: aliens would be required to participate in forensic interactions with human persons to be accorded a place in person-space, but humans with atypical developmental trajectories need not be able to participate, Schechtman argues, because they are the right kind of entity to participate.
77 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 134)
78 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 112)
biological, psychological, and social aspects. She leverages Winston Chiong’s concept of homeostatic property clusters, which can sustain biological life in different combinations. Analogously, different clusters of person-related characteristics—biological, social, and psychological—in different combinations can sustain a person life. These three kinds of functions are interdependent in persons: our biology affects our psychology and both affect our social lives, which in turn affect both our psychology and our biology.

A person life, then, can be sustained by any one of a number of combinations of person-characteristic activities, but no one specific set is required. Schechtman believes that while other approaches try to untangle the interconnected components of our lives in order to define the criteria for personhood and personal identity, this is a mistake. The tangle is in fact the key to our—persons’—natures. It might seem as though tracing personal identity via a tangle would be a challenge; Schechtman thinks not, citing using Eric Olson’s comparison of identity of biological life to the identity of a storm. We don’t need to know exactly which particles are caught up in a storm that begins in Cuba to know that it is the same storm that arrived in Alabama.

Although the notion of a locus does not seem at first glance to be a stable ontological foundation for persons, Schechtman’s ultimate goal is literal and not metaphorical definition of personhood. She wishes also to tie person-related concerns to a metaphysical view, and to that end, she explores a number of different ontologies to find one harmonious with PLV. Ultimately, Schechtman adopts a minimalist ontology that recognizes as fundamental building blocks only “particles”: neither persons nor human organisms are substances, primary

---

79 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 147)
80 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014) cites Chiong, “Brain Death Without Definitions,” p. 25
81 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 141), referring to (Olson 2007, 139-140)
ontological phenomena. Persons and organisms are composed of groups of particles arranged either person-wise or human-organism-wise. Persons are loci of concerns and interests and gain their entity-hood from being that kind of locus. Similarly, other organisms are also loci within their environments, though necessarily loci of less complex interests; an oyster’s nature is in having an oyster-life rather than in its being a particular kind of organism. Continuing this line of thinking, Schechtman concludes that persons and oysters are ontologically more fundamental than human or oyster organisms. Focusing only on the organism-related features of any organism provides too circumscribed a view of its nature.\textsuperscript{82} I will discuss Schechtman’s ontological view in more detail in the following chapter.

Schechtman defends PLV against potential objections that the role of cultural recognition makes personhood too conventional. Schechtman argues that the fact that personhood rests on cultural practices does not make personhood arbitrary. We do not have a choice as individuals as to whom we accord places in person-space. The culture and the parameters for personhood are \textit{given} to us, and we follow these parameters when we recognize individuals as persons. We cannot arbitrarily exclude humans from personhood (as seen in Schechtman’s discussion of oppression), and we cannot capriciously include non-humans in personhood (as seen in Schechtman’s discussion of pampered dogs.) The practices evolve with new technologies and new discoveries, but they are stably attached to a particular culture and era. It is for this reason that Schechtman believes that the role of culture in PLV does not make PLV unacceptably dependent on convention.

In the next chapter, I will compare how Johnston and Schechtman handle puzzle cases. However, for the purposes of measuring PLV against the desiderata, I will focus on

\textsuperscript{82} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 169-199)
Schechtman’s discussion of fission, where she projects some deeply counterintuitive results.\(^83\) Schechtman hazards that symmetrical fission (imagine hemispheric transplant into two functionally equivalent bodies) would yield entities who, according to PLV, might not be persons, even though they are functioning human organisms. She argues that the two individuals cannot both be the locus of the same set of person-related concerns, nor can we direct those concerns at the two of them as a unit.\(^84\) For example, romantic relationships are between two individual persons in our culture; a fissioned duplicate of one partner would result in bewilderment, not to mention sharing of time and other resources. A culture where individual parents routinely divided into two would yield a very different family structure. Schechtman believes that the philosophical literature has not given enough consideration to the practical and moral complexities that would accompany fission. If fission were common, our social institutions—marriage, employment, obligations—would be chaotic. Would one be married to both fission successors of a spouse? Would a borrower owe both of them money? Choosing one over the other arbitrarily seems deeply problematic as well. In a fission-ing world, Schechtman thinks that our cultural practices would need to change in such dramatic ways that our practices might no longer count as person-related. She concludes that a fissioning society would require that our psyches be organized differently to accommodate what she sees as a deep biological change. Considering these changes, she writes, “such beings might come to be, but they will probably not be persons.”\(^85\) That being said, Schechtman also says that if fission were rare, we

\(^83\) As noted elsewhere, Schechtman’s assessment of imaginary puzzle cases and PLV is merely conjecture, since the culture would evolve to accommodate new situations.

\(^84\) (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 160).

\(^85\) (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 162) (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 165)
would probably figure out ways to handle the individual cases and accord them places in person-space. The two products of fission would not, however, be identical with the original person.  

I think that Schechtman does not need to take such a polar position; our person-related practices are more flexible than Schechtman allows. For example, our culture has recently seen shifts in our marriage- and gender-related practices. Marriage, long defined in this country as a union only between people of different genders, is now defined, in law and in practice, simply as a union between two different people. Gender identity has long been considered binary and fixed by biology. With new social and scientific perspectives emerging, there have been much controversy and change on this topic. To give a concrete example of evolution in our practices, the women’s institution Wellesley College clarified its transgender admission policies to focus not on applicants’ gender-related biology, but on their gender self-identification.

Given all this evolution in a short time, it might be more plausible for Schechtman to say that in a fissioning world, there will still be persons, but our person-related practices will need to change, sometimes dramatically. As with the questions of same-sex marriage and gender identity, our culture would need to determine how best to navigate the changing technologies and awareness, but that does not necessarily mean that the core concepts would be changed beyond recognition.

1.2.6 PLV and the Desiderata

Looking at the first three desiderata, which focus on the internal subjective experience, Schechtman’s view does not fulfill these. PLV rests personhood on cultural norms over the internal experience of personhood and personal identity. For example, when she imagines brain

---

86 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 165)
transplantation and how to categorize the brain recipient and the “decerebrated husk,” i.e. a
brainless but otherwise operative human body, she notes that it would be possible for the culture
to trace identity in the husk rather than in the brain recipient. Since the brain recipient would
have the internal subjective experience, Schechtman is in essence rejecting these desiderata: the
first desideratum, that our inner experience is part of what we mean by survival, and the third,
that our subjective view of personhood needs to be honored over others’ experience of us. Since
Schechtman’s PLV traces identity in humans in persistent vegetative states, it seems reasonable
that she would trace identity in humans with complete amnesia, as in the Williams Conundrum,
and thus agree that anticipating pain in one’s amnesiac body would be a reasonable
demonstration of self-concern. This would fulfill desideratum #2.

Looking at the desiderata focused on psychology and biology, Schechtman acknowledges
that psychological continuity is especially important in persons, fulfilling desideratum 4.
However, she rejects desideratum 5, linking potential for cognitive activity with persons, when
she claims that those in persistent vegetative states are persons. Her view on fission fails to
fulfill desideratum 5, which states that a human with potential for cognitive activity is a person.
Her view suggests that fission products would not be persons, even if they are humans and fully
capable cognitively.

Schechtman’s overall view conflicts with desideratum 7, the intrinsicness principle.
Personal identity’s dependency on cultural norms means that personal identity rests on more than
the relationship between individuals at two different times; it relies on the cultural viewpoint on
what is required for personal identity, which is being the same locus of person-related interests
and concerns. Further, in her views on fission, the number of continuers of a person could affect
recognition as a person and personal identity, another conflict with this principle.
In terms of ontology, the 8th desideratum is that the ontological framework for one’s theory should not be difficult to believe. I think that the ontology she presents is difficult to believe, with particulars to be investigated in the next chapter. In short, it is difficult to accept her view that the only real entities are particles, but everyday objects like organisms and apples gain ontological status only by their relationships with other things. Her view does jibe with the goal in desideratum 9, which is that a theory should sit well with our moral and practical lives. Since her thesis rests on the practices that compose our moral and practical lives, this desideratum is fulfilled. Desideratum 10 asks that our theory not posit that we are badly mistaken about what we are; PLV sees us as loci, with our existence dependent on cultural recognition. Those of us who think of ourselves as animals or embodied minds, independent of cultural recognition, would thus be badly mistaken.

1.2.7 Assessing Mid-Spectrum Views

Nozick, Johnston, and Schechtman aim to expand the definitions of personhood to embrace a broader swath of our real-life concerns and practices. Although their views capture some aspects of personhood that the extremes of animalism and psychological reductionism do not, they, too, fail to meet numerous desiderata. Beyond assessing these down-the-middle views against the desiderata, in the next chapter I will compare them with one another and consider whether their commonalities stem from their attempts to bridge the divide between animalism and psychological reductionism.
CHAPTER 2: Comparing Three Mid-Spectrum Views

In the preceding section I outlined three mid-spectrum theories and considered them against a set of desiderata. In what follows, I will use Robert Nozick’s Closest Continuer Schema as a starting point for a comparative discussion. Most of the chapter will compare Johnston’s and Schechtman’s views with one another, considering their goals, their methodology, their treatment of puzzle cases, their metaphysics, and any implications for our moral and practical lives, revealing surprising common ground between them.

2.1 Nozick’s Closest Continuer Schema

As noted in the previous chapter, Nozick’s much-discussed Closest Continuer Schema (CCS) is an explicit response to the Williams Conundrum. Nozick concludes that our conflicting intuitions follow a schema for personal identity in which we weight the relative physical and psychological continuity of persons over time. Identity is not secured by a person’s meeting a specific set of necessary and specific conditions, but rather by the person’s uniquely exhibiting the proper sorts and degrees of continuity, which for Nozick has a causal component. In short, according to Nozick, identity is secured at a time if a person is the closest of the close-enough continuers of a person at an earlier time. The requirement of uniqueness is included because personal identity must be a 1:1 relationship: if there are two equally good continuers of the person, then identity cannot hold. What fills in the schema, what makes the continuers “close-enough,” depends on the specific dimensions and weightings assigned to the continuation of particular psychological and physical properties. These dimensions and weightings vary from culture to culture and from individual to individual. Those weightings have ontological heft: they determine the borders of one’s self, and they create that self. In addition to this
metaphysical perspective, Nozick’s theory also has potential to wreak havoc on our moral and practical lives, as discussed more fully in the previous chapter.

As discussed elsewhere, Johnston’s view is that we are “Human Beings,” a category distinct from human organisms; Schechtman’s view is that we are persons in virtue of our living “person-lives.” Each of the views connects the metaphysics of personhood with moral and practical concerns; each of the views requires us to accept some counterintuitive consequences or underpinnings. While they begin from different premises, use different methodologies, and embrace different overall metaphysical views, they share common ground in how they view the relation between personhood and society and in the metaphysical status of persons and its relation to our practical and moral concerns.

2.2 Johnston’s and Schechtman’s Views Encapsulated

Revisiting the discussion in the previous chapter, Johnston argues that in our culture we are “Human Beings,” members of a kind that is paradigmatically constituted by a living human organism. As Human Beings we persist so long as our characteristic mental functioning persists in (at least part of) our original bodies.\(^{87}\) However, other societies could have different and legitimate borders for the concept of personhood, so that for Johnston our true “substance kind” is Protean Person: our nature as persons is protean or changeable and depends upon one’s culture.\(^{88}\) Beyond this, our individual dispositions determine our identities and can extend them beyond the borders of our own biological existences.

Marya Schechtman gives culture a primary role in recognizing persons and thus constituting them and setting parameters for their identities. Person Life View defines a person

\(^{87}\) (Johnston, Human Beings 1987)
\(^{88}\) (Johnston, Relativism and the self 1989)
as an entity who lives a person life; personal identity requires that one live the same person life, over time. Being a person involves being a locus of person-related practices and concerns within one’s culture, which recognizes persons and affords individuals a place in an infrastructure Schechtman calls “person-space.” Person-space and its parameters evolve and vary across time and across cultures. While enculturated human organisms are the paradigm for Schechtman’s persons, she allows that there could be non-human persons, if they were recognized by our or their own cultures as persons.

At first glance, Johnston’s “Human Beings” thesis aligns immediately with a naturalistic perspective about our natures, and Marya Schechtman’s Person Life View seems more straightforwardly dependent on our relations to each other and our culture. However, in the end both philosophers connect personhood and personal identity directly to our cultures rather than to any elevated ontological category. As I will note later in this chapter, although Schechtman’s view of personhood seems to tether our ontological status as persons to something more fluid and capable of evolution than Johnston’s, further examination shows that Johnston’s perspective is capable of even more flux than Schechtman’s.
2.3 Goals

Johnston aims to provide an answer about our natures that gets at the kind of thing that we could be identifying and reidentifying over time the way we do one another, by means of humans’ bodily identity. By “kind of thing” he does not mean what “kinda” thing persons are, but rather what is the “substance kind” associated with persons. Johnston aims to answer a metaphysical question whose answer must jibe with a particular epistemological process.

Marya Schechtman’s goal is to define a person as a unified entity, so as to capture all the different kinds of interpersonal interactions and foci that we associate with personhood and personal identity. She wants to avoid a definition that articulates different conditions for persons considered as organisms or as legal entities or as participants in emotional relationships. We see each other as sisters and homeowners, borrowers of money and medical patients, professors and voters, all at the same time, and our explanation of personhood should reflect this fact. Schechtman also has meta-theoretical goal: she wants her account to provide a literal definition of persons and to reveal that persons’ metaphysical status is intimately linked to their practical concerns. Given this second goal, she examines potential metaphysical views with an eye to their alignment with the Person Life View (PLV).

The two theorists’ stated goals are different. Roughly speaking, Johnston aims to articulate an ontological kind while respecting a particular ordinary epistemological practice, and Schechtman aims to define the entity “person” by incorporating the many different roles a person might have in our culture and nonetheless providing a metaphysically rigorous account.

---

89 (Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 59, 63)
90 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 5)
2.4 Methodology

As noted, Johnston rejects the method of cases as a means of answering philosophical questions of personal identity. Johnston thinks it is a mistake to draw conceptual conclusions from intuitions to puzzle cases, or to see those intuitions as revealing the essential elements of a concept. Locke’s cobbler and prince example launched this tradition centuries ago, yielding a long series of imaginative tales to perplex philosophers and ordinary citizens and to inspire science fiction writers. Many philosophers employ this method to support their views, presenting a puzzle case that isolates some property (such as psychological continuity vs. bodily continuity) associated with exemplars of a concept like personhood. They then cite a set of robust intuitions to that puzzle case and argue that these intuitions demonstrate that the property in question is a necessary and/or sufficient condition for falling under that concept. They also, as needed, offer theories about why we might have intuitions that appear to conflict with their definition. So, for example, with the Williams Conundrum, a proponent of psychology-based personal identity might argue that while we believe that we would suffer pain after psychological reorganization, we have this (mistaken) intuition only because we have a sentimental attachment to our bodies; if our psychologies are realized elsewhere, so too are we.

Johnston maintains that the view resulting from applying the method of cases to the Williams Conundrum is the view that we are “bare loci” of consciousness, something that could undergo any amount of physical or psychological change. He finds this view both uninformative and at odds with a reasonable epistemological requirement: that a theory jibe with how we identify and reidentify ourselves and others on the basis of their bodily appearances. When we trace others, for example, we do so, in virtue of the appearance of their bodies, asleep or awake. We do not reason from a set of beliefs about the relationship between bodies and bare loci; we
simply reidentify the bodies. For these reasons, the bare locus view is unacceptable, and Johnston thus rules out the method of cases that generates it.\footnote{Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 71-75}

Instead, Johnston suggests as a preliminary hypothesis for a theory about persons some “natural kind that is epistemologically ready to hand.”\footnote{Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007, 42} He takes as a starting point our being \textit{Homo sapiens}, members of a particular animal species, one where there is a characteristic mental life. This starting point has, Johnston believes, the advantage of aligning us with the natural world.\footnote{Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 75 and (Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007, 42)} In order to extend and refine his view beyond this initial hypothesis, Johnston looks to what he characterizes as \textit{conceptual truths} rather than puzzle case intuitions as motivating any departures from this species view. (Johnston gives as an example of such a conceptual truth the proposition that a person cannot be survived by his own mind.) He dubs his inquiry a pursuit of real definition, saying “what it is to be” the entity being defined.\footnote{Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007, 33-34}

In more recent works, Johnston offers another gauge of a definition’s validity: it must jibe with the practice of what he calls “offloading.” He believes that we rely on \textit{objects themselves} to reveal their persistence.\footnote{This is an extension of the use, as a theoretical starting point, of our “humble and ubiquitous practices” of identifying and reidentifying ourselves over time from (Johnston, Human Beings 1987).} For persons, as for other entities, we are not applying a set of sufficient conditions to assess persistence. Instead, he argues, the work is done by the objects themselves, which ultimately demonstrate their own natures.\footnote{Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007, 36} We may have in mind some necessary conditions—for example, something won’t have persisted if it has disintegrated—but we do not apply sufficient conditions when we trace entities. While this is a
Like Mark Johnston, Marya Schechtman believes that the method of cases, as a means of getting at philosophical truths, is flawed. Looking at puzzle-case intuitions to tease out necessary and sufficient conditions is inadequate, she thinks, because it isolates individual aspects of personhood and thus leaves out important facts about persons. She thinks that a theory should encompass the many social, biological, and moral roles that persons have in our culture, rather than picking one of these roles.

While philosophers have used the method of cases to untangle the relations among all these roles, Schechtman suggests instead that we take them all together. Starting with enculturated human organisms as our paradigms, Schechtman looks at a number of views of identity and personhood that embrace broad swaths of person-related practices and roles. She builds on elements of several of these views to develop her own thesis about personhood, and then examines how this thesis handles a number of puzzle cases. To complete her examination of the topic, she assesses potential metaphysical contexts to tie the PLV to a particular ontology, thus achieving her goal of linking practical and moral concerns about personhood to a rigorous metaphysics.

Methodologically, both Johnston and Schechtman reject the traditional methodology for theorizing about personal identity because it leads to narrow and uninformative results. Both of

---

97 I have in mind here her consideration of her own Narrative Self-Constitution View; Jeff McMahan’s embodied mind account; Hilde Lindemann on recognition in a culture; Eric Olson on animalism, among other views.
them use our ordinary view of persons as human organisms situated in a culture as a starting point for their revisionary theories. They diverge in how they progress from this point. Johnston continues to seek necessary and sufficient conditions for his definition of personhood working off the membership-in-a-species core. Schechtman takes a different path, believing that any set of necessary and sufficient conditions would result in a constricted understanding of personhood. For Johnston, the everyday practice of reidentification of persons in our ordinary lives provides support for his view rather than its content. Schechtman looks directly to the culture and uses its interpersonal practices to define personhood. Because a person is the locus of the culture’s person-related interests and activities, those interests and activities give content to the metaphysical.

2.5 Personhood and Personal Identity

As noted, Mark Johnston defines personhood in this culture as membership in the kind Human Being. Human Beings are different from human organisms, Johnston maintains, because the most important thing we trace in Human Beings is their mental functioning. So we Human Beings could survive as disembodied brains or heads, but not via teletransportation, because membership in the kind Human Being requires the persistence of specific bodies (or, in cases of “mutilation,” functioning brains or heads). Human Beings do not survive without the functioning of their brains, so those in persistent vegetative states or with brain death are no longer persons.

Johnston also believes that persons are Human Beings in this culture, but that the borders of personhood could be different in other cultures, as in the Teletransporter culture described in

---

98 As noted earlier, I use upper case letters without quotation marks to signal that I am using the term “Human Being” in Johnston’s particular way.
the previous chapter. Our substance kind is thus Protean Person, signaling the concept’s changeability across cultures. (Johnston also argues that it could be rational for us to adopt the conditions for personhood of another culture in order to survive longer, as would be possible, he thinks, in the Teletransporter culture.) Beyond this relativism, Johnston also argues that our future-related concerns are themselves “identity-determining dispositions.” In virtue of these dispositions, we create the borders of our own selves and thus determine the conditions of our survival. He argues that we can extend these concerns to others so that we can literally survive through their lives.99

As discussed in greater detail earlier, Marya Schechtman believes that we are persons because we live person-lives. The paradigmatic person is an enculturated human organism and has a standard life trajectory, with waxing and waning of cognitive and social capacities over time. Being a person and living a person life require recognition as a person by one’s culture, being accorded a place in person-space, an infrastructure created by the culture at large. A person is a locus of person-related practices and concerns; this locus notion is Schechtman’s means of knitting together the many aspects of personhood. Being the same person is being the same locus, being part of the same person life.

Although the paradigm in PLV is an enculturated human organism, recognition within person-space could be accorded to non-human persons, such as super-intelligent animals or aliens, or even sentient machines, as long as they possessed “fundamental forensic capacities.” Cultural recognition can rule IN these entities, but it cannot rule OUT members of our species with atypical cognitive or social positions. According to PLV, even if an individual member of our species does not have certain characteristics, and is thereby not a locus of the full range of

99 (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 274)
person-related interactions, because he or she is a locus of some of those interactions, membership in the species accords the individual a place in person-space and recognizes him or her as a person.

To explain how we reidentify a person as a *locus* of person-related interests and concerns over time and thus flesh out the concept of personal identity, Schechtman proposes a “homeostatic property cluster” concept of a person life. There are different ways in which sets of biological, social, and psychological functions that are characteristic of persons combine to constitute a person life. This concept is described in greater detail in the previous chapter. Schechtman leverages this notion of a continuing locus in assessing questions of personal identity, particularly as regards the puzzle cases of the philosophical literature. I will review Schechtman’s treatment of puzzle cases below. Aside from the question of tracing individuals over time, I noted earlier that the notion of a locus as an entity is not as robust at first glance as that of an organism, but that Schechtman’s minimalist ontology categorizes persons, organisms, and artifacts as being non-fundamental ontological phenomena.

On one level, Mark Johnston’s view that we are Human Beings, in all ordinary cases members of our species, is reassuringly commonsensical as compared with Marya Schechtman’s view that our personhood is created by our being a *locus* of interaction within a culture. Johnston’s leverage of commonplace, body-centric language (vs. Schechtman’s person-as-locus-in-person-space) gives his definition additional plausibility. However, that plausibility diminishes once he extends his view to the Protean Person version. Then what seemed a firm anchor to a natural kind veers into a vertiginous cultural relativism: Johnston’s advocacy for persons’ switching concepts of personhood to live longer, for example, moves our conception of
ourselves from one aligning us with creatures of the natural world to one seeing us entities that can choose their own parameters for survival. (Here he seems aligned with Nozick.)

By contrast, although Schechtman’s concept of persons as loci of interests and activities seems uncomfortably relativistic at the start (for example, I think I would be a person whether or not society recognizes me), a fuller understanding of how societal recognition works, as well as her acknowledging the importance of our bodies and our ordinary practices and our own embodiments helps to balance the view. PLV includes most of the entities we might want to count as persons and excludes those we might not want in person-space. While we might want to have more clarity about personhood and personal identity in puzzle cases than Schechtman provides, she does give us roadmaps for where our culture might land, as will be discussed below.

2.6 Puzzle Cases

Although Mark Johnston and Marya Schechtman reject using puzzle-case intuitions to uncover philosophical truths, a thorough comparison requires review of their treatment of the classic philosophical puzzle cases. As noted immediately above, since Schechtman’s view rests on actual practices of recognition within a culture, her discussion of puzzle cases and PLV involves her predictions of how PLV applied in a possible future human culture would likely categorize the entities in the imagined puzzle cases.

**Brain Transplant:** A healthy cerebrum is removed from Brown’s functioning human body and transplanted successfully into Robinson’s human body, decerebrated but otherwise healthy.

---

100 I will look at views drawn from “Human Beings” as well as *Surviving Death* and other sources, assuming, as he does, that we are part of the Human Beings culture. To apply Marya Schechtman’s PLV, I will use the material in *Staying Alive.*
and appropriate. We can call the result Brownson. In one scenario, Brown’s decerebrated body (Brownless) expires. In another scenario, Brownless continues to maintain non-cognitive bodily functions.

Because Johnston believes that the bare-but-functioning brain in this scenario represents the limit of mutilation of a person, he holds that Brown would travel with his functioning brain to a new body. Brownless, Brown’s decerebrated, but potentially still functioning, body would not be a person but a badly mutilated organism. As noted earlier, this particular scenario is the subject of dialogue between Johnston and Eric Olson about the ontological status of the elements of this puzzle case. Is the brain a new entity created by removing someone’s otherwise healthy tissue? Or is the decerebrated organism a new entity created by removing someone’s otherwise healthy brain? Johnston believes that the disembodied brain is not a new entity but the same Human Being, constituted by the same brain (although the brain is not an organism nor is it, once transplanted, part of the same organism as before).101

Schechtman imagines that if Brownless expires following the transplant, Brownson would be able to return to Brown’s everyday life. For Schechtman, the important fact for personal identity is whether Brownson would be the same locus of person-related interests and concerns as Brown. That locus, she hazards, would most likely continue in Brownson.102 However, Schechtman’s answer is different if both Brownless and Brownson survive, because there would be two potential loci of person-related concerns. While Brownson does appear to be the best candidate to be the same locus of concerns as Brown, and thus be recognized as Brown, this might not be the case. It is likely that the culture would see Brownless as the locus of some

101 (Johnston, "Human Beings" Revisited: My Body is Not an Animal 2007, 45-47)
102 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 152)
of the original Brown-related person-related concerns, in which case neither Brownson nor Brownless would be identical with Brown. In this situation, Brown would cease to exist. The participation of Brown’s parts in two different functioning entities could result in what Schechtman sees as a change in the nature of the concerns directed at Brownless and Brownson, so much change that the concerns might not be sufficiently close to the original Brown-related concerns to secure continuity of a locus.\(^{103}\)

Johnston’s Human Beings view about each of these two scenarios aligns well with our robust transplant intuitions given its reliance on the continuing functioning of our brains, but Schechtman’s provisional view when considering Brownless diverges from widely held intuitions that track the person with his or her brain. While we typically do not think of a functioning decerebrated body as a person (e.g., we would not hesitate to harvest the organs), Schechtman thinks that in a culture where brain-transplants are possible, we could imagine some person-related foci aimed at this decerebrated entity. This divergence from common sense widens in her assessment of symmetrical body-based fission below. (In fact, her positing that we might direct person-related concerns to a brainless husk seems not to match up with her hypothesis that the products of fission would not be persons. In one case, she is imagining directing person-related concerns to a body with no potential for cognition; in the other, she is imagining that we would not be directing person-related concerns to a human with ordinary cognition because the culture would have evolved to accommodate doubling. Surely accommodating doubling of functioning humans in a cultural infrastructure would be easier than accommodating cognition-free husks.)

\(^{103}\) (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 154-159)
Symmetrical Body-Based Fission: Imagine that Smith, idiosyncratically, has two cerebral hemispheres, each of which could support his full mental functioning. Thus, should only one of these hemispheres remain in Smith’s skull, the hemisphere would be able to support fully Brown’s cognitive and bodily life. Imagine that each of these hemispheres is instead transplanted into one of two appropriate decerebrated bodies, with the resulting humans dubbed Lefty and Righty. Both Lefty and Righty would be able to continue Smith’s life, considered individually.\(^{104}\)

Johnston has presented a number of diagnoses for the challenges of symmetrical body-based fission. If only one of Lefty and Righty were to survive, we would unhesitatingly see that survivor as identical with Smith. After all, the hemisphere could sustain Smith as Smith if it remained, solitary, in Smith’s skull. And we have robust intuitions from the previous puzzle that a brain transplanted into a debrained body secures a person’s survival as the brain recipient. In his earlier work, “Fission and the Facts,” Johnston concludes that there are no determinate facts of personal identity in this case. However, in his later views, as captured in Surviving Death, Johnston offers another explanation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the potential for fission suggests that each of us individual human organisms is an embodiment of a higher-order individual. So fission in the imaginary case above would lead to two embodiments of “the Smith” and not two individual Smiths. The Smith is the higher-order individual, first embodied in one first-order individual named Smith and then in two first-order individuals named Lefty and Righty. In this way, Johnston believes that we avoid the paradox of two persons’ being identical with one earlier person and sidestep a violation of the intrinsicness principle when we

\(^{104}\) This is a condensed version of the example presented in (Johnston, Fission and the Facts 1989) based on an earlier puzzle offered by Sydney Shoemaker.
consider cases of symmetrical fission. In this case, the two embodiments of “the Smith” are not at the right ontological level for us to talk about personal identity.105

As discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter, imagining a case of symmetrical fission, Schechtman offers one of the most revisionary theses of PLV: if fission were commonplace, the human organisms that are the products of fission might well not be persons. Schechtman’s foundational definition of a person is as a unified locus of interests and concerns. With symmetrical fission, there are two loci of interests and concerns, Lefty and Righty. To trace a person, we would need to be able to trace a single locus of concern, and it does not seem plausible to trace it as some combination of Lefty and Righty together, or indeed tracing the locus in either Lefty or Righty.

If fission were to be commonplace, Schechtman concludes that dramatic changes in humans and in human culture would need to happen. Our culture’s person-related concerns and practices depend on there being one continuing body associated with a person—for example, marriage, moral responsibility, property ownership, and parenting. In a broadly fissioning society, practices that are similar to person-related practices could emerge. However, with doubling, the underlying concepts and practices would be vastly different from our culture’s unity-based practices. For that reason, Schechtman does not think that the underlying concept for these practices would be a concept of personhood. Thus Lefty and Righty, if the scenario envisioned took place in a culture where fission was prevalent, would not be accorded places in person-space and therefore would not themselves be persons. This is not, however, the same as saying that the fissioned individuals go out of existence, or that fission is the same as ordinary death. Schechtman distinguishes between a society where fission is rare and a society where

105 (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 361-367)
fission is common. Schechtman believes that our society would likely accept one-off Lefty and Righty as persons and figure out some way (perhaps arbitrary) to sort out the concomitant complexities of finances, family, and friends. Nonetheless, in considering widespread fission, she hazards that PLV would project non-person status for the human products of fission.

It is interesting to note that considering fission causes both Johnston and Schechtman to embrace extreme views. In Johnston’s case, he questions the ontological status of persons and posits that we are not ourselves substances but, since there is the possibility of fission, instantiations of “higher-order individuals.” In Schechtman’s case, the possibility of widespread fission in a future culture causes her to believe that in that culture, fissioned individuals would not be persons: given the role that our uniqueness plays in our person-space, what we know now as personhood would be changed beyond recognition by the pervasiveness of this practice.

Teletransportation: Imagine a Star-Trek style machine that scans an original body in one place and, as it destroys the original, creates a molecule-by-molecule replica elsewhere.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Johnston believes that in our Human Beings culture, Human Beings do not survive teletransportation because their bodies are destroyed in the teletransporter machine. Personal identity for Human Beings requires continuity of some portion of the cognition-supporting body parts. However, Johnston envisions a culture he calls the Teletransporters, who have a different and legitimate concept of personhood.106 In the Teletransporter culture, teletransportation is a straightforward way to travel, and bodily discontinuity does not preclude survival. Even if we Human Beings do not survive teletransportation, it might be reasonable for us to adopt the Teletransporters’ broader concept of personhood in order to survive, literally.

106 (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 245 ff.)
Marya Schechtman does not discuss teletransportation explicitly in reviewing how PLV might handle puzzle cases. However, as already noted, she applies PLV cautiously to imaginary puzzle cases, since the cultural norms for them have not yet evolved. Thus it is likely that she would say that whether we survive teletransportation would depend on whether or not the culture accepts the “teletransportee” as the same locus of person-related concerns and activities. Thus we can imagine that PLV could potentially embrace teletransportation as a means of personal survival or could reject it. If our culture were to evolve in the pro-teletransportation direction, new practices would need to evolve to handle potential glitches, such as accidental duplication or failure to destroy the original. Taking the lessons of her treatment of fission, above, we can conclude that teletransportation where the original survived would be treated just as in fission, i.e. if commonplace, there is potential for the resulting products’ not being included in person-space. Alternatively, we could imagine the culture having very specific protocols to ensure that the original was destroyed in order to preserve our way of life, etc., and to recognize the Teletransportees as persons and as continuing the same person life as the original. In this aspect, Schechtman’s view coincides with Johnston’s.

*Amnesia and Dementia: Imagine that someone has very little continuity with his or her past psychological states, either because of a memory disorder or because of grave cognitive degeneration such as Alzheimer’s disease.*

In *Surviving Death*, Johnston discusses cases of complete amnesia and profound dementia. He discusses these cases using a distinction between personhood and one’s individual personality. Cases of total amnesia and profound dementia showcase this distinction: with
Alzheimer’s disease, the person continues but his or her individual personality ceases to exist.\textsuperscript{107} Even though we might say something like, “He is not the same person,” we don’t really mean that a new person has come into existence.

Marya Schechtman holds that those with profound dementia are persons and remain the same persons because they are treated as the same locus of person-related activities and concerns. (This is a departure from her Narrative Self-constitution View, in which infants and those with profound cognitive deficits were not considered persons.) Of course, the specific activities and concerns directed at a person with these afflictions will be different from those directed at the person earlier in his or her life.

\textit{Humans in Persistent Vegetative States: the human organism has no consciousness and no ongoing psychological life.}

Mark Johnston discusses brain death and persistent vegetative states in \textbf{Surviving Death} and hazards that a \textit{person} would probably survive brain death or being in a persistent vegetative state, even without the “arena of consciousness” that he or she would have possessed when in health.\textsuperscript{108} However, in considering this situation in his recent works, he distinguishes between personal identity and self-identity. Johnston believes that the self would cease to exist, but the “public person” could continue. Thus someone in a persistent vegetative state would be a person, and could be the same person as his or her past and healthy counterpart. However, he or she would not have the same self because having a self requires an arena of consciousness. This

\textsuperscript{107} (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 261) This distinction is important but exploring it further is beyond the scope of this paper.

\textsuperscript{108} (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 161), for example. Johnston’s distinction between self and person, like his distinction between personality and person, is an important one but will not be explored further in this paper.
position appears to be different from the view advanced in earlier works, in which mental
functioning was chief among the persistence conditions for a person.

Marya Schechtman’s PLV includes in person-space humans in persistent vegetative states
(PVS), as it does those who have atypical developmental trajectories or those with advanced
dementia. Individuals in PVS, too, continue to be cared for as persons. They wear clothing,
sleep in beds, have their birthdays celebrated, and continue to be visited by friends and families.
Each of these individuals continues to be a locus of concern, even if the locus is very different.
Schechtman acknowledges that this is a “degenerate” form of personhood, since so many of the
person-related concerns and activities are discontinued when a human enters a persistent
vegetative state.109

Johnston’s and Schechtman’s current views are aligned in considering humans in
persistent vegetative states as persons, although this judgement is different from the principles of
personhood in Johnston’s core Human Beings theory. However, it is important to note that
Marya Schechtman’s PLV is motivated by its goal of including as persons those in persistent
vegetative states (and those humans with other cognitive deficiencies). It reflects a core
principle in Schechtman’s view, whereas it appears ancillary to Johnston’s principles.

For the most part, Johnston and Schechtman treat puzzle cases in ways that would be
anticipated from their core views. In the brain-transplant puzzle case, they agree on personal
identity where there is not a continuing decerebrated husk, but they diverge on the facts of
personal identity when the husk survives in ways that jibe with their overall theses’ theoretical
underpinnings. In the case of teletransportation, both Johnston and Schechtman look to the

109 (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 77).
cultures to assess whether someone could survive teletransportation. In Johnston’s case the culture is more of a fixed environment with parameters for the application of the concept; whether you survive depends on where you’ve been brought up. We can answer the question now for the Human Beings culture. We can also answer the question now for the Teletransporter culture, because that answer is stipulated when we flesh out the Teletransporters’ concept of personhood and personal identity. Schechtman is more explicitly attuned to the evolution of the person-related attitudes in response to changes in medicine and technology. For Schechtman, we cannot have a clear answer about PLV’s treatment now, because it is only an imaginary case and our culture has not yet developed practices that accommodate this possibility. In terms of humans with amnesia, dementia, and PVS, the two are in agreement: all are persons, and these are acknowledged as extreme cases rather than cases that reflect paradigmatic personhood and personal identity.

2.7 Metaphysics

Throughout his writings on personal identity, Johnston puts pressure on commonly held metaphysical beliefs. While I discussed some aspects of Johnston’s ontology in the previous chapter, below is a broad-strokes sketch for comparison.110

Johnston proposes that in this culture we are “Human Beings,” members of a kind that is partly physical and partly psychological, constituted by, but not identical with, human organisms. He undermines the commonsense appeal of this view by arguing that persons’ natures are ultimately “Protean,” potentially different in different cultures, making our substance kind not

110 Johnston’s writings on these subjects are complex and extensive, and my discussion necessarily can include only a superficial examination of his nuanced arguments for these positions.
“Human Beings” but “Protean Persons.” When and how we live and die, literally, depends on our culture’s person-related concepts. Johnston also posits that each of us individuals may be an instance of a higher-order individual, just as individual tigers are members of the higher-order individual “The Tiger.” Imagine the case of symmetrical fission described earlier: Lefty and Righty instantiate “the Smith.” The Smith is the same higher-order individual whom Smith alone instantiated before fission. Survival of “the Smith” is achieved by there being some instantiation or other. Because Lefty and Righty are not identical with Smith or “the Smith,” potential philosophical and logical conflicts are avoided. The higher-order view allows each to be an instantiation of “the Smith” without triggering the transitivity required by a claim of identity.

In his more recent works, Johnston has theorized that different cultures exhibit different “identity-determining dispositions.” One’s upbringing in a particular culture gives one dispositions to trace oneself in particular ways. Rather than self-concern, for example, following identity, Johnston believes that such dispositions determine identity. Finally, he wonders whether we might ultimately be “ontological trash,” without any hallowed metaphysical status or pattern organizing our parts that might justify our natural self-concern.111

In the previous chapter I measured Johnston’s overall view against my desiderata; as a general comment here, I will note that the metaphysical views that Johnston ultimately presents have traveled far from their grounding in our humble and ubiquitous practices of identifying each other as continuing human organisms. The underpinnings of what we are veer, in Johnston’s ontology, from entities constituted by individual human organisms to entities whose borders and persistence conditions can be literally created by the attitudes we have about our own futures and

111 (Johnston, Personal Identity: Are We Ontological Trash? 2014)
those of others. The moral and practical implications of Johnston’s view, and, in particular, of his metaphysics, will be discussed below.

As previewed earlier, among Schechtman’s explicit goals is to connect her view of personal identity to a rigorous metaphysics. She is aiming for a literal (if not numerical) definition of personal identity. She also wants to connect our practical and moral concerns to the metaphysics of personal identity, characterizing her view as a “dependence model,” in which any metaphysical account of personhood must also explain how a person is a target of practical questions and concerns.\textsuperscript{112}

As noted earlier, on PLV a person is a locus of person-related concerns, typically associated with a particular human organism. What is the ontological status of a locus, a culturally determined tangle of concerns? Schechtman examines and then draws on ontological views that are potentially harmonious with PLV, in particular, Peter van Inwagen’s minimalist ontology, and Lynne Rudder Baker’s “big tent” ontology.\textsuperscript{113} In Peter van Inwagen’s ontology, only particles and organisms are genuine entities, or substances. Being alive gives organisms an organizing principle that is absent in other composite entities. Other complex things are built up from these elements: a table is a group of particles arranged table-wise and not a genuine entity like a dog or a particle. This means that it can’t be strictly true that an apple is on the table, but statements like these can be recast for “philosophy room” accuracy. If there is an apple on the table, it is philosophy-room true to say that there is a group of particles arranged apple-wise on top of a group of particles arranged table-wise. While there is much more to discuss here, for the

\textsuperscript{112} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 41)
\textsuperscript{113} In the context of this paper, it is not possible to present more than a brief summary of these robustly explicated and defended metaphysical views, nor Marya Schechtman’s extensive consideration of their merits and challenges, to which she devotes much of a chapter in (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 169-199)
purposes of discussing Schechtman’s metaphysics and persons, Van Inwagen’s view on humans is clear: our substance kind is human organism.

Schechtman also considers a very different view, Lynne Rudder Baker’s “big tent” ontology. Within Baker’s metaphysics, there are many, many genuine entities among everyday objects. For Baker, new entities come into being when objects are employed for different uses: an anvil becomes a doorstop, for example, when used to hold a door open. While Schechtman chooses a smaller footprint for her ontological tent, this aspect of Baker’s theory underpins Schechtman’s explanation of how being a locus creates a person, or, indeed, other kinds of entities.

Schechtman adopts an even more minimalist ontology than Van Inwagen’s: for Schechtman, only particles are substances. Neither persons nor human organisms reflect substance kinds. Organisms are thus particles arranged organism-wise; persons are particles arranged person-wise. Within the non-substance category of her ontology, she argues that persons, considered with the panoply of interests and concerns that characterize us, are more important and salient entities than human organisms. We treat one another primarily as persons; we consider each other as organisms only in specific circumstances, such as at the doctor’s office. Thus when Schechtman considers the relative metaphysical statuses of persons and human organisms, she, along with Baker, sees the relational aspects of persons as more important and fundamental than the biological aspects of organisms.

Schechtman extends this locus concept to other organisms. She argues that rather than understanding oysters’ essences as involving their being organisms of a particular type, an oyster lives an oyster life and is the locus of oyster-related interactions with its environment. While an
oyster life is quite different from a person life, in keeping with its biological simplicity and its minimal cognitive activity, it is nonetheless participation in its life that determines oysterhood and oyster identity. In addition, organisms are not the only kinds of things that are loci: she thinks an apple is an object in an everyday sense in virtue of what she can do with it—eat it, use it in a pie, trade it for a different snack. She believes that such a relational view of the metaphysics of these entities is not problematically conventional, because these relations depend on facts about the world and are not simply a matter of individual choice.\textsuperscript{114}

Schechtman has presented what she characterizes as a literal, if not numerical, view of personal identity. She thinks that a definition that delivers numerical identity—the kind of identity that works properly in logical statements—may be unattainable for any complex entity. The literal identity described in PLV is like numerical identity in some aspects—it is non-branching, does not admit of degrees. For Schechtman we can track and interact with the locus that constitutes a person. PLV provides definitive answers to all questions about survival: either there is a continuing locus of concerns or there is not. She argues that in cases where PLV does not have a clear answer, such as in brain transplants, that is because there are missing facts rather than theoretical indeterminacy. In considering brain transplants, for example, we do not yet have a response to questions of personhood in cases that would use this possible future technology.\textsuperscript{115}

Despite the differences in their approaches, there are interesting commonalities between Johnston’s and Schechtman’s metaphysics. Both Johnston and Schechtman believe that what persons are is relative to one’s culture; that our attitudes towards persons create their identities or

\textsuperscript{114} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 195-196)
\textsuperscript{115} (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 198)
the conditions for their identities; that persons are not examples of kinds delivered to us by nature.

Johnston, on the one hand, sees relativism at two different levels, the cultural and the individual. First, the culture in which a person lives inculcates in that person a set of parameters for personhood and their companion identity-determining dispositions. Second, each person has some sort of control over his or her identity-determining dispositions, so that by identifying with other people by directing deep concern towards them, he or she can thus literally survive AS them. By contrast, Schechtman’s cultural milieu is much more stable. The culture as a whole recognizes or does not recognize entities as persons. The existence of these person-related cultural practices is among the facts about the world, thus making personhood less conventional than it might seem at first. Personhood and personal identity are also less dependent on individuals’ attitudes than they are in Johnston’s metaphysics. For Schechtman, although the cultural perspectives on personhood and its borders can vary from one culture to another, those perspectives can vary within a culture over time by evolving rather than by fiat or individual whim. No individual person can create the borders of his own personhood; personhood is bestowed by cultural recognition alone. Nor can individuals create persons of non-persons like dogs, in virtue of anomalous patterns of behavior: the culture as a whole must accord recognition to entities.

Both Johnston and Schechtman take their paradigms as human organisms, and both take off from there. Both see us as persons typically constituted by human organisms, but not identical with them. In so doing, both philosophers depart from a view that rests on the natural kind “organism” for the ontological status of persons. In situating persons in their ontology, each of them diminishes persons in the hierarchy. Johnston, as noted above, thinks we are likely
“ontological trash,” rather than something delivered by nature. Schechtman thinks that the only fundamental entities are physical simples, or particles, not even organisms. Persons are “really” particles arranged person-wise. They gain their entity-hood in virtue of their being a locus—in virtue of their relation to our lives and our world.\textsuperscript{116} Johnston also links his ontology of personhood to a view about persons’ being manifestations of higher-order individuals, a thesis for which there seems to be no correlate in Schechtman’s view.

2.8 Moral and Practical Concerns

Both Schechtman and Johnston connect their views of personhood and personal identity to moral and practical concerns. As discussed, Johnston believes that our identities are determined by our patterns of concern, typically towards oneself.\textsuperscript{117} Changing those patterns can change the borders of one’s life, as in Human Beings adopting the Teletransporters’ conception of personhood. Changing one’s patterns of concern can also make a difference within one’s own culture. A truly good person extends these deep patterns of concern beyond himself and his loved ones to other persons in general. Since these are identity-determining dispositions, the good person will literally survive in the embodiments of all those to whom he directs this deep concern. A genuinely good person, directing his concerns towards the whole of humankind, survives his own bodily death in the lives of all other humans. Johnston uses his metaphysical view to argue for wholesale redirection of egoistic self-concern towards humanity, with the result of both better outcomes for the world and literal immortality for the individual.

Marya Schechtman, rather than advocating a change in our moral behavior in virtue of a metaphysical view, uses the practices and attitudes as the \textit{basis} of that metaphysical view. Her

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{116} It need not be human culture that directs interests at an entity; being the locus of the interests of other creatures can do so, as well. (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 192-193)
\end{quote}
pragmatic approach illuminates many of the real-world questions we face daily: how to treat those humans with cognitive impairments; the personhood of those with profound dementia; the moral status of embryos; the role of recognition in how we treat each other, and how oppression of groups of humans is both a restriction on and an affirmation of their personhood. Her approach honors the moral and practical value of persons as complex individuals.

2.9 Conclusion

Robert Nozick, Mark Johnston, and Marya Schechtman present views that capture a range of qualities of persons, physical, cultural, and psychological. For Nozick, that means characterizing our intuitions as following a schema of closeness of continuity, in which individuals’ weightings of psychological and physical continuities determine persons’ identities, balanced to some degree by the cultural context. For Johnston, that means rejecting the orthodox methodology and positing that we, at least in this culture, are “Human Beings,” members of a partly physical and partly psychological kind, constituted by human organisms, for whom psychological activity is chief among our functions. For Schechtman, it means grounding her view in the culture’s practical and moral concerns for individual persons in all their aspects—from their biological to their legal to their social roles. On her view, persons are the tangle of these roles, and no one of these aspects of personhood (nor any specific combination thereof) offers necessary and sufficient conditions on personhood or personal identity.

Nozick bases his view on the method of cases: he aims to glean from our robust intuitions necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. Rejecting this method because it yields unsatisfying results, Johnston and Schechtman instead rely on our commonplace practices to illuminate questions of personhood and personal identity. Johnston’s starting point is our “humble and ubiquitous” method of identifying ourselves and others over time; any acceptable
definition must jibe with this epistemological method. From this point he considers a naturalistic perspective of us as potentially essentially human organisms and weighs this against a number of epistemic and metaphysical principles. Schechtman’s method is to review a number of theses of personhood and personal identity to see whether they can accommodate the full range of our cultural practices around personhood. She adopts aspects from them and then presents her own view. For Schechtman, our cultural practices, in particular interpersonal practices, are critical; person-related focus guided by cultural norms makes a person a person.

Each of the three philosophers advocates a relativistic theory of personhood and personal identity. Nozick and Johnston think that individuals can determine their own identities. Schechtman believes the culture determines personal identity. Relativism leads naturally to ontological questions: if personhood is at least partly dependent on culture or individual conceptions, can a theory of personhood also “carve nature at the joints”? Is personhood a substance kind, a natural kind, ontological trash? Consonant with their relativism, Johnston and Schechtman classify personhood as falling short of a “substance” concept. We are “ontological trash,” to Johnston, not “primary phenomena or basic items,” and each of us has dispositions (or future directed concerns) that create our identities.\(^{118}\) Johnston’s view recalibrates our ontological status further, by arguing that each of us is an instantiation of a higher-order entity, a token rather than a type. In Schechtman’s view things gain entity-hood— and we gain personhood—in virtue of being loci of interest. Persons are not fundamental entities; persons are particles arranged person-wise, and culture reifies us, and defines us as persons. Because the

---

\(^{118}\) It is also kin, perhaps, to Schechtman’s earlier view, the Narrative Self-constitution View described in the previous chapter. In NSCV, however, although we are persons because of our attitude towards ourselves as living a life that is an ongoing whole, those attitudes must meet a “reality constraint”: a person cannot make an action or experience his just by viewing it as his own. (Schechtman, Staying Alive 2014, 101)
culture and its practices are given and not chosen—they are facts about the world—Schechtman does not see personhood as unacceptably conventional or capricious. Nonetheless, a locus-based ontological status is fluid. Culture evolves and patterns of person-recognition change. Even though both Johnston and Schechtman use human organisms as paradigms in their discussion of personhood, their ultimate views depart dramatically from this naturalistic point of origination.

Both Johnston and Schechtman connect the ontology of personhood with practical and moral concerns, setting themselves apart from philosophers like Christine Korsgaard or Eric Olson, who view metaphysical and moral concerns as separate domains. As discussed above, Johnston uses his assessment of persons’ metaphysical status to advocate a different moral perspective: he encourages lives directed more towards others’ wellbeing than our own. With our identities literally formed through future-directed concerns, behaving with deep concern for humanity allows us to survive through other persons’ lives. Schechtman, as noted earlier, argues for what she calls a “dependence model” for the relationship between personhood and practical and moral concerns. While she rests her analysis of personhood on those moral and practical concerns, she draws no moral conclusions from her ontology. Society’s focus of moral and practical concerns towards each of us is, in itself, entity-creating. Our entity-hood rests on our status as a locus in our culture, which is itself a given. She treats the particulars of the cultural practices evenhandedly in their metaphysical powers. That being said, it is clear that she believes that a culture’s according personhood is associated with certain rights and respect, even when a culture tries to subvert those rights through oppression.

Johnston’s and Schechtman’s theories do map to our intuitions to most puzzle cases. However, both depart from common sense when they respond to the puzzle of fission—at least symmetrical, body-based fission. Considering the possibility of fission leads Johnston to
advance a thesis that we are embodiments of higher order individuals, going beyond the thesis of our Protean Person kind. As discussed above, since symmetrical body-based fission is at least theoretically possible, each of us is not a lower-order individual but rather an embodiment of a higher-order individual, akin to a token of a word type or an individual tiger’s relationship to the higher-order individual “The Tiger.” Marya Schechtman’s view of symmetrical fission is also notably dissonant with common sense; her view is that if fission were widespread, the ordinary human products of fission would likely not be persons at all. She reaches this perplexing conclusion because of the way she believes human society would need to evolve if we routinely doubled. So many of our social structures—from parenthood to marriage to employment, she reasons, depend on the unity of persons over time. While Johnstonian metaphysics may demand that he adopt a view of us as higher-order entities, Schechtman’s extreme view on fission does not seem compelled by the rest of her theory. She could, for example, hazard that commonplace fission would cause an evolution in our person-related practices akin to (but more dramatic than) the evolution recently witnessed in the culture’s expansion of its conception of marriage to include same-sex marriages. The legal and cultural evolution on marriage practices overcame any objections that we had ceased to talk about the institution of marriage. It is puzzling, in the end, why she does not choose a less arduous path when considering fission.

Schechtman’s and Johnston’s extreme views on fission are not alone: fission puzzles strain most theories of personal identity. They motivate Lewis’s claim that where fission occurs there have always been two continuant persons; they cause Parfit to consider the perplexing possibility of talking with his own duplicate, poised to continue Parfit’s life; versions of fission in Olson’s animalist discussions cause the “remnant person/animal/brain” metaphysical

119 Thanks to Elizabeth Harman, who pointed out this aspect of Schechtman’s view about a culture with widespread fission.
quandaries. Perhaps Nozick captured this best, wondering whether identity questions about fission presented philosophers with a “koan,” a Buddhist parable with no apparent answer.\textsuperscript{120}

If we held the kind of micro-relativistic\textsuperscript{121} view that is espoused by Nozick and Johnston, we would need to adjust most of our commonplace interpersonal practices. For example, if my own identity-determining dispositions include my not surviving deep sleep, who would have my job, family, money, obligations, responsibility for actions when “my” body awoke? If I believe that taking your concerns as my own makes me the same person as you, do I have a right to some of your worldly possessions? And how does your view on our identity conditions affect the answers to these questions? If both the Cobbler-body person with the Prince’s psychology and the Prince-body person think that the Prince’s body is what secures identity, who sits on the throne? Within Johnston’s view, there is also the potential for changing of one’s own identity-determining dispositions: your view on what counts as survival is not fixed, even by your home culture.

Compared with the degree of relativism offered by Johnston and Nozick, Schechtman’s societally based relativism seems theoretically conservative. Though the culture has the “power” of recognizing entities as persons and non-persons, that power cannot be applied capriciously or willfully withheld. Cultural norms and practices are among the “external” facts of the world that affect who is accepted into person-space and what counts as living the same person life. You and I cannot decide these things, for ourselves or for others. Even if the cultural norms and practices can and do change, this seems a general and gradual process rather than an abrupt one.

\textsuperscript{120} (Nozick 1981, 47) Nozick frames this in terms of the “temporal overlap” that fission products have.
\textsuperscript{121} By this I mean that the relativism exists on the level of individual persons’ perspectives rather than on the macro level of cultural perspectives on personhood.
On the one end of the theoretical spectrum, personhood and hence personal identity are anchored to something often accepted as an ontologically primary category, namely, membership in an animal species. At the other end, reductionist views typically encourage us to accept a view of us as aggregates of states or stages with borders dictated in a number of different ways. The relativistic views examined in this chapter try to capture the psychological features of personhood that seem to characterize us as well as our role as organisms in the natural world.

Thinking of the three philosophers together, the views they embrace have in common a disconcerting relativism and remove personhood from the ranks of metaphysically primary entities. Are relativism and ontological diminishment inevitable if we honor our intuitions about the importance of our physical selves and our mental selves? Or does the difficulty come from attempting to tie together ontological principles with our practical and moral concerns? In the next chapter, I will explore a view that accommodates our intuitions without ontological commitments.
Chapter 3: Accidental Animalism

3.1: Preliminaries

Below I will present a thesis that offers a body-based perspective on personhood, identity, self-concern, and “what matters.” This theory aligns with the most robust intuitions about personhood and personal identity, both in actual circumstances and in puzzle cases. My view centers on the persistence of the first-person perspective that is characteristic of persons and a cornerstone of personal identity. I argue that this perspective is tied to bodily persistence. While many theories rely on intuitions about puzzle cases to define personhood, my thesis focuses on paradigms of personhood to define personhood and the parameters of personal identity.122

Adapting a term from Eric Olson, I call my view accidental animalism.123 We are human animals, but membership in the species does not capture our essence or substance kind. Our species membership is not the end of the story. This version of animalism differs from the classic, Olsonian version. Olson argues that our essence is “human organism”; we could survive without our brains, which he considers one organ among many. On Olson’s view, even the potential for sentience is not a necessary condition for our survival. I believe that our survival requires not just sentience but also a sustained first-person perspective, and that first-person perspective can be sustained only by persistence of one’s brain or a portion of it.

122 I have relied on Mark Johnston’s very helpful distinction between defining personhood and outlining the borders of the limit of mutilation of a person. (Johnston, Human Beings 1987)
123 Olson discussed and rejected accidental animalism in his article, “Animalism and the Remnant-Person Problem.” (Olson 2015). Olson’s version of accidental animalism characterizes the organism as surviving as a disembodied brain, rather than seeing the person as surviving as the disembodied brain. My version is focused on personhood.
With accidental animalism, sentient human animals constitute persons; the relation is not one of numerical identity. The relation between human organisms (or parts of them) and persons reflects biological facts about paradigm cases in our world. Parts of organisms, including disembodied but functioning brains, could be persons—the person includes whatever organic parts surround and support his or her brain. On the other hand, functioning decerebrated human organisms, not being sentient, would not be persons. There could also, perhaps, be non-human persons. The metaphysical status of animals and persons—substance, essence, phase sortals, and the like—does not factor into the analysis. We can accept accidental animalism and remain agnostic about whether persons or animals are metaphysically more basic, about the exact nature of the relation of constitution, or about whether both of these putative categories reflect only ontological trash, to use Mark Johnston’s phrase.\textsuperscript{124} By remaining ontologically agnostic, we can define personhood so that it is useful in our practical, moral, and social relations. I leave for other discussions whether answering the ontological questions is what matters.

To build my argument, I will illustrate the role of a particular body in securing personal identity by revisiting the Williams Conundrum, bringing in the results of empirical experiments that examine intuitions about bodily and psychological continuity and identity. I will draw on intuitions about self-concern and duplication to argue that a first-person perspective continues only with bodily continuity. I will also undermine persistent intuitions about mere psychological continuity and personal identity and offer possible distorting influences on those intuitions. I will then point out challenges for incorporating psychological reductionism about personal identity into our understanding of death and murder. Following this, I will present accidental

\textsuperscript{124} (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 280)
animalism as an alternative view that avoids the pitfalls of psychology-based views\textsuperscript{125} of personhood as well as the counterintuitive consequences of classic Olsonian animalism. I will detail its treatment of real and imaginary puzzle cases. Finally, I will measure accidental animalism against the desiderata presented in my introduction.

3.2: First-Person Perspectives

In the introduction to this paper, I presented the desideratum that a theory accommodate our persisting internal experiences of ourselves, our first-person perspective. Tracing our internal experience is the core of the Lockean theory, in which he defines a person in terms of his consciousness, which he connects to both thinking and consciousness of oneself as a self.\textsuperscript{126} What makes Locke’s thesis so plausible and thus a starting point for so many contemporary theories of personhood and identity? We typically believe that a feeling of self, of me-ness, continues over time, and after sleep or unconsciousness. There is something or other that “it is like” to be me, and I have reason to think that there is something or other that it is like to be you. It may be impossible, on the other hand, to imagine what it is like to be a bat.\textsuperscript{127} There is a qualitatively similar river of concerns, thoughts, intentions that I have during the day and that I re-enter when I wake up. This river is not merely a set of statements I remember about the

\textsuperscript{125} These objections would apply not only to psychological reductionism, but also to the aspects of Johnston’s and Nozick’s views that involve psychology. For example, the CCS when applied with heavy weighting on psychological continuity would be subject to these objections. They would also count against Johnston’s evenhanded treatment of the Teletransporters, for whom sameness of body is not a requisite for personal identity.

\textsuperscript{126} (Locke 1689-1700/1975, 340-341)

\textsuperscript{127} (Nagel 1979)
past, but rather a set of first-person, “from-the-inside” experiences, sensory, cognitive, and emotional.

The river metaphor highlights some challenges to our perception of self-continuity. We typically believe in a diachronic unity among series of diverse physical and mental experiences. This is in spite of the fact that my experience changes from one moment to the next, either in small or large ways. My perspective, the mine-ness, is part of each of these experiences, at the very least as a not-always-noted backdrop. It seems, from the inside, that there is a unity over time. There is also a synchronic unity among diverse simultaneous experiences, even though there can be many different aspects to our awareness at a given time. I can listen to music while looking at a painting and feeling hungry. Some experiences seem to happen below the level of consciousness: I can drive without really noticing a stop light to which I react by stopping the car. Beyond these examples, “split-brain” experiments show that severed physical connections within the brain cause people to manifest what appear to be two distinct streams of consciousness.

Other metaphors try to capture this me-ness so that it seems more readily traceable. The combination of sensory perceptions and the sense of persistence is likened to a view from an audience to a theatrical stage—an arena of consciousness. Our functioning senses give us a perspective on the world, an awareness of where we are, relative to the rest of the world. We can see, hear, feel, smell, and taste, from the perspectives of our bodies. For example, Johnston, who uses the phrase “arena of presence and action,” focuses on the perspectival nature of this arena.

---

128 In (Strawson 2009) and elsewhere, Galen Strawson reports that he does not have this sense of a persisting self, and that upon waking he has factual memories of what happened the day before without their being connected to a sense of a persisting self.
129 See, for example, Nagel’s “Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness,” in (Nagel 1979)
He notes that our intellectual activities, our decision-making, and our sensory experiences are located together, in some way, in this arena. He connects that co-location with the sense of oneself, and posits that the co-location fosters the sense of unity we typically feel.\textsuperscript{130}

Many questions arise in trying to flesh out what this arena, this sense of a subject, might be. Is there a genuine entity such as a “self,” a “mind” or “the consciousness of a person”? Is the internal perspective a property of some other, genuine entity, such as a functioning human brain or an immaterial soul? Is this internal perspective merely the sum of all the experiences of a human animal linked together synchronically and diachronically into a four-dimensional entity? Or is our experience of a continuing perspective, as Johnston suggests, a defeasible perception, like a hallucination? Or is the unity something that Galen Strawson claims\textsuperscript{131} is experienced only by some people and thus not genuinely a part of self-hood or personhood?

In what follows, I will argue that the continuity of a first-person perspective is necessary for personal identity, and, in most cases, also sufficient for personal identity. I will be using a conception of a first-person perspective that does not equate that perspective with a material entity like a brain or a primary ontological phenomenon like a soul pellet, but rather sees that perspective as something that arises—for us human persons—out of brain activity.\textsuperscript{132} While a person’s first-person perspective could be reduced to bare sentience where cognition is impaired, this does not mean that bare sentience in any creature suffices for that creature to be a person. As has been noted earlier, it is important to be mindful of the difference between a paradigm and

\textsuperscript{130} (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 139-140)
\textsuperscript{131} In (Strawson 2009) and elsewhere.
\textsuperscript{132} Throughout this paper I mean first-person perspective in a very basic sense; we and other conscious beings have a first-person perspective, i.e. an arena of consciousness. Lynne Rudder Baker uses the term in a more robust way to indicate consciousness of oneself as a self; my own use does not require any such awareness. (Baker 2007, 67-93)
a limit of mutilation. A cognitively atypical human organism with sentience is a person; a turtle with similar sentience (to the extent we can conjecture about this) is not. While psychological continuity is very important and is part of the paradigm of personhood and personal identity, I believe that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for personal identity.

3.3: The Case for Bodily Continuity and Personal Identity

Presenting a pair of puzzle-case scenarios in what is known as the Williams Conundrum, described in the preceding chapter, Bernard Williams evoked the strong intuition with one of these scenarios that we would retain our identities—our sense of a persisting self as evidenced by egoistic self-concern—even in the face of complete psychological reorganization. Williams asks the reader to consider undergoing complete psychological change followed by painful injections. He describes us as reasonably anticipating—indeed, fearing—our own bodily pain even after the stipulated total psychological reorganization. Mark Johnston tells the story with a twist: readers are asked if they would like to “avoid” pain in this fashion: by undergoing full psychological reorganization, then the painful experience, and then restoration of our original psychologies. Johnston’s twist amplifies the robustness of our intuitions: each of us can reasonably think that he or she would undergo all these experiences. I would not see this as a way for me to avoid pain.

Because the conundrum has evoked much philosophical discussion, given the robustness of these apparently conflicting intuitions, Shaun Nichols and Michael Bruno conducted a study

---

133 (Williams, The Self and the Future 1973). As noted in the earlier discussion, Williams also shows that we intuitively trace ourselves in terms of our psychologies; thus the “conundrum” is that we can readily trace ourselves by psychological continuity without physical continuity, and by physical continuity in the absence of psychological continuity.

134 (Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 65-67)
of these intuitions among college students.\footnote{Nichols and Bruno 2010} Their findings showed that we often do trace personal identities through psychological discontinuity and, in the case of ourselves, have fears about our own pain after psychological discontinuity: three quarters of the respondents\footnote{I am including in this statement only respondents who showed comprehension of the question.} traced a person’s experience of pain through complete psychological discontinuity. The robustness of this intuition was not without challenge, however. Their tests also indicated that we would trace our identities in “mind swap” narratives, just as Locke assumed. The research went further: they asked respondents to reflect on the conflict between these two intuitions, learning that most would favor psychological-without-physical (“mind swap”) over physical-without-psychological continuity (total amnesia) for preserving identity. While the empirical data on these intuitions is helpful, I maintain that this reflective view is mistaken. I will consider reasons for this mistake later, after arguing for the necessity of physical continuity in personal identity.

3.4: Future Concern, Bodily Continuity, and Personal Identity

Egoistic self-concern and its reasonability play a central role in supporting theories of personal identity. Using this argumentative lever, I will show that bodily continuity trumps psychological continuity in tracing identity, examining our intuitions about self-concern and concern for others in narratives of duplication. In this examination, I will maintain that egoistic self-concern, the concern we direct towards ourselves, is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the concern we have for others, which I will call “third-person concern.” While we have different intensities of third-person concern for others, even the most intense third-person concern is different from first-person concern. This is true even though our egoistic self-concern varies in intensity when we consider the distant future or potential changes in one’s
personality, views, physical health, or cognition. I believe that reasonable self-concern and identity are connected in most cases. I will demonstrate that your attitude towards a future person who has full psychological continuity with you, but not bodily continuity, reflects third-person concern rather than self-concern. Thus psychological continuity alone cannot secure personal identity. In particular, I will argue that the duplication envisioned in classic versions of teletransportation cannot secure personal survival.

Do we reasonably have egoistic self-concern about our human bodies far in the future, even if they might have scant psychological resemblance to the people we are today? Most of us think that it is rational to sign up for insurance coverage for our own long-term care should we develop, for example, Alzheimer’s disease or suffer a stroke. We want to ensure our physical and psychological comfort beyond the time when we can organize this care ourselves. I believe that I do this because this future person will be me, however different she might be psychologically from me now. I believe that even this diminished person would maintain my first-person perspective, even if it is different because of my cognitive changes, just as a first-person perspective continues even if someone loses the sense of hearing, for example. The “arena” of awareness would be qualitatively different with different inputs, but would still be the same arena.

While this section focuses on self-concern, it is important to note that our concern for other individuals also can trace bodily continuity without psychological continuity. We treat the

---

137 There are discussions about the weakening of self-concern when psychological continuity diminishes, for example, in Lewis, Schechtman, and Parfit. I note that there is an interesting question of why egoistic self-concern is evidence for our identities, which cannot be taken up in this paper.

138 As noted in the earlier chapter, Parfit suggests instead that attachment to a particular body might be a kind of sentimental attachment, as to one’s original wedding ring. (Parfit 1984, 286)
cognitively diminished people in our lives in ways that reflect our thinking of them as persons and as the same, but changed, person as before the illness. We consider earlier preferences in their care—whether they liked to wear lipstick or eat grilled cheese—even if they can no longer express these preferences. We do not treat these persons the same way we did before their illness, but they remain our grandparents, our old friends, or our fourth-grade teacher. We treat them as persons while they are alive and sentient and not as lower animals. Our concerns for them follow their bodily continuity in the absence of robust psychological continuity.

3.5: Tracing Concern in Duplication

Intuitions about self-concern in scenarios involving exact duplicates offer further support for connecting personal identity to bodily identity. These puzzle-case duplicates follow the stipulations in narratives of teletransportation: they are individuals who have full psychological and physical similarity to the original, but no physical continuity. I believe that each of us would show far more concern, and qualitatively different concern, for the person in his or her own original body than we would for an exact physical and psychological duplicate. These intuitions weaken arguments for the central thesis of wide psychological reductionism.

I imagine that a duplicate of me is to be created in the future—call her Martian Duplicate Kerstin—and that my original “body-person”—call her Earthly Original Kerstin—would continue as usual. From my pre-duplication perspective, I would not care nearly as much about Martian Duplicate Kerstin as I would about the physically continuous Earthly Original Kerstin. I would also not care about the duplicate in the same internal way that I care about myself. I would think of Earthly Original as me and Martian Duplicate as her. I might have third-person concern for

---

139 I put to the side the question of whether exact psychological similarity is, in fact, psychological continuity in these cases.
the Martian Duplicate, since, after all, she would be just like me, at least in the near future.

However, I also believe that my degree of third-person concern about Martian Duplicate would vary with the origins of the duplicate, and in particular, with my role in the duplicate’s creation.\textsuperscript{140}

How would that variation in third-person concern play out? I believe that the greater my involvement in the creation of the duplicate, the more third-person concern I would have. So, if I commissioned the duplicate, I believe I would care about Martian Duplicate Kerstin, but I don’t think that I would have self-concern about her. There would still be “me” and “her” in my perspective. I would have concern more akin to that of a parent towards her child, i.e., I would feel responsible for a human organism whose existence I initiated. It might be a more empathetic version of concern for an employee, if I had, for example, commissioned a duplicate in response to some practical challenge, such as not being able to take care of a parent on Mars and stay on Earth for my job as well. Concern for the duplicate might be more intense than either of these, because of the qualitative similarity. However much I “identified” with the duplicate, I would have different feelings about my own future torture and the Martian Duplicate’s, in the one case, experiencing cold dread, and in the other, deep sympathy.

I believe that this clear difference in the kinds of concern reveals a fundamental, significant difference in a person’s relationships to his physical continuer and to his duplicate. While in this story, the original survives, the stipulations of the rest of the story are the same as

\textsuperscript{140} I am not suggesting that the degree of concern for a duplicate would be exactly proportionate to the role I might have in the existence of the duplicate, but that the more distance one has from the responsibility, the less concern one is likely to have. Similarly, a man who has donated sperm with a contract that excuses him from financial responsibility for any children that might be created with that sperm would likely have less feeling of concern for those children (should he know of their existence) than for the children he has intentionally fathered.
in the teletransportation cases in which psychological reductionists claim that survival is secured, or at least “what matters.” However, if we connect the self-concern with a continuing first-person perspective, we will have demonstrated that the duplicate does not have the same first-person perspective as the original when the original persists; why then would the first-person perspective migrate to the duplicate upon the destruction of the original?

If I had no role in the duplicate’s creation—imagine that I am involuntarily testing the teletransportation machine—I might not have much concern toward Martian Duplicate Kerstin at all, assuming I knew about Martian Duplicate. (This is apart from the tricky circumstances that might arise in competing for the resources, or the social difficulties of two of us believing we were married to the same man.) I might feel strong empathy or fellow-feeling, a concern about how someone just like me, with quasi-memories and dispositions just like mine, would fare in the world. However, rather than being self-concern, it seems more an extreme version of hearing tragic news about someone in similar circumstances to yours and thinking “there but for the grace of God go I.” Beyond these initial phases, as well, once Martian Duplicate’s path diverges from mine, my fellow-feeling would likely diminish. Her distinct experiences would transform her body and psyche, and the physical and psychological similarities between us would diminish over time. For me to have any concern at all, of course, I would need to know that the duplicate existed. This is an epistemological prerequisite for concern that is simply absent for self-concern: I don’t need to know the fact that I exist to be concerned about or conscious of myself.

To round out the discussion, I will consider whether there might be, somehow, a duplicate of me randomly assembled somewhere. Imagining that person in that world, I can imagine a weak fellow-feeling and curiosity, but nothing like the concern I might have about a relative, a friend, a neighbor or, of course, entirely different from my concern for myself.
In summary, in all the cases where I consider my duplicate, either as a future continuer or as a contemporary continuer, it is the most natural for me to consider the duplicate as her and not as me or even one of me. These are third-person perspectives about the duplicate, not the first-person perspective that is characteristic in considerations of personal identity and self-concern.

I presented these stories about duplicates, causes, first-person perspectives, and concern to show differences between concern towards a duplicate and concern towards one’s own current or future self. These differences demonstrate that the apparent or claimed continuity between an original and a duplicate, with or without the destruction of the original, is not the right kind of continuity for genuine first-person perspective continuity. As I argued earlier, first-person-perspective continuity is necessary for personal identity. Since there is not first-person-perspective continuity between an original and a duplicate when both exist at the same time, there is not first-person-perspective continuity between the original and the duplicate when the original is destroyed, as in teletransportation.141

Thus psychological continuity alone, even with exact physical similarity, is not the right kind of continuity for personal identity. The original differs from the duplicate in the physical continuity undergirding the psychological continuity that in turn secures the persistent first-person perspective needed for personal identity. Later, in my discussion of puzzle cases, I will address the amount of physical continuity required for a continuing first-person perspective and whether body-based fission could result in more than one person’s continuing a (previously single) first-person perspective.

141 Derek Parfit (Parfit 1984, 289) discusses duplication with overlap when the original is short-lived compared with the duplicate. He acknowledges that his “Branch-Line Case” is “one of the cases where [his] view is hardest to believe.” He imagines talking with his Replica, and notes that his “concern for the future needs to be redirected” from his own concern for the original’s life path to that of the Replica. (Italics are mine.)
3.6: Disabling the Cobbler-Prince Intuition and Its Successors

Why do many people have the intuition that persons survive teletransportation, when the first-person perspective has been extinguished in the original person and is merely succeeded by a qualitatively exactly similar first-person perspective in another body? How is it possible to overlook the “death” in what Parfit dubs “death with duplication”? I propose that the way the duplicate can fit into the life of the original and the duplicate’s own beliefs distort the accuracy of the intuition. In addition, many things that “matter” to the original person will be secured in teletransportation, providing a further intuition-distortion. To see how these factors might influence our intuitions, it is helpful to look at the story of teletransportation from different perspectives and consider the potential influence of the “what matters” question.

Distorting Influence 1: The Duplicate Fits Seamlessly into the Original’s World

Other people’s experiences of Martian Duplicate Kerstin play a significant role in the intuition that attributes identity to a duplicate when the original is destroyed.\(^{142}\) Martian Duplicate would, as stipulated in the story, look and behave exactly as Earthly Original would. She would step seamlessly into all the roles, relationships, and conversations, having access from the inside to all the memories, knowledge, dispositions, and preferences of the Earthly Original. It would seem entirely reasonable for loved ones, employers, legal authorities, to recognize this duplicate as the original and allow her to step into the original’s life, as long as Earthly Original was gone.\(^{143}\) Even if they knew that Martian Duplicate was a duplicate of the now-defunct Earthly Original, this might soon be forgotten. They, too, could be forgiven for thinking that

\(^{142}\) This would also apply in a “mind-swap” story like the cobbler and prince.
\(^{143}\) Mark Johnston describes this phenomenon as our following the “social continuer” (Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 82)
teletransportation is a remarkable way to travel—thinking, “Look at how easily Earthly Original Kerst in got here.” Earthly Original’s loved ones, colleagues, debtors, and the like get “what matters” to them in her survival, without Earthly Original’s (bodily) survival.  

*Distorting Influence 2: The Duplicate’s Persuasive First-Person Perspective*

Imagine the experiences of Martian Duplicate. She comes to consciousness on Mars and steps out of the machine. Since she has memories and dispositions qualitatively exactly similar to mine, she thinks “I made it through teletransportation! I was skeptical and thought that it would not work, but here I am on Mars. I can have that big breakfast I was craving on Earth and then call my mother to say that I have safely arrived on Mars.” All of these cognitive states and activities are underlain by biological elements that are physically distinct but qualitatively exactly similar to Earthly Original’s. Even though Martian Duplicate is aware that her body was just created, she does not have any physical history to which she can map all her (quasi-) memories and inclinations. She can look down at the scar on her left pinky finger and think, “That scar is from the cat scratch when I was ten years old,” just as I would. (Perhaps she would think “that scar is from the cat scratch when I was ten years old and in my original body.”)

Eventually, the fact of her body’s being generated by the teletransportation machine may recede.

---

144 This narrative points out a feature of death-with-a-duplicate that dovetails with some of the discussions about why death is a bad thing for the person who dies. Because the person does not exist to suffer once he dies, how do we explain why death is bad for him? Theories sometimes focus on one’s lifetime being shorter than would be expected (in a premature death), or the projects that the person would not have the chance to finish. However, these theories do not capture what seems to be the real loss, which is the loss of existence. There are noted asymmetries: not existing before you are born is not bad, so why is it bad afterwards? The creation of the duplicate seems to address the project-finishing wishes of the original, and wishes that someone be a sister, parent, or partner, but it does not address the “not being there” part of death that most of us see as bad. As will be clear from these rudimentary musings on the subject, this is outside the scope of this inquiry, but the connection between these two discussions may be an interesting area for further exploration.
in importance to her. Thus Martian Duplicate would have no internal-experiential reason to
doubt that she is the same person as Earthly Original. However, the truth would be that the
Earthly Original would no longer have any first-person perspective; Earthly Original Kerstin’s
first-person perspective would be extinguished when Earthly Original Kerstin’s body is
destroyed.\footnote{I think it is safe to assume that dead human bodies do not have first-person perspectives.}

One might object that Martian Duplicate’s first-person perspective actually continues
Earthly Original’s first-person perspective, given that her brain states, etc., are qualitatively
exactly similar to the Earthly Original’s. However, I do not believe this position is defensible. It
is clear in the case where the original and duplicate both exist that there are two distinct first-
person perspectives, though they are by stipulation qualitatively exactly similar. If, when both
survive, there is no continuity of first-person perspective between Earthly Original and Martian
Duplicate, then how can there be such continuity when only Martian Duplicate survives? What
would be different in the relation between Original and Duplicate? Perhaps we can rely on a
version of the intrinsicness principle. That is, if a process does NOT secure continuity of first-
person perspective in one circumstance, then that process does NOT secure continuity of first-
person perspective in another circumstance. Thus it would be mistaken to say that Martian
Duplicate continues Earthly Original’s first-person perspective in teletransportation.

Despite its value in illustrating possible reasons for mistaken intuitions about self-
concern and identity, this focus on the inner experience highlights an epistemological challenge
for my view. My own perception of the persistence of my first-person perspective is vulnerable
to error. My duplicate would mistakenly believe that she is me, even knowing that she has been
newly created. Her first-person perspective would seem to her to be a continuation of my first-
person perspective and not a wholly new perspective (if we can even imagine what that would be like). How, then, can a first-person perspective be a reliable anchor for personal identity? While my belief in the continuity of my first-person perspective (as related to some previous first-person perspective) may be in error, the fact of my having some first-person perspective or other is not subject to error. Adding in the physical continuity necessarily associated with the first-person perspective provides further epistemological grounding for this thesis. There are concrete ways, of course, to trace physical bodies to complement the internal evidence of a first-person perspective.

**Distorting Influence 3: Death with duplication secures some of what matters to me**

To echo Parfit, death with duplication is not as bad as ordinary death. I think that this fact distorts our intuitions in considering teletransportation. People are unhappy when considering their own ordinary deaths, not simply because they do not wish their distinct first-person perspectives and consciousnesses to cease, but they also think of the suffering of loved ones, and the projects they will not complete. However, if Martian Duplicate can step into my life and more than worthily replace Earthly Original, then my friends and family will quickly be consoled. That book I promised to finish, that non-profit I was going to found—those things can happen, with the magic of teletransportation, effected by Martian Duplicate. Some of what mattered to me will be secured in the life of Martian Duplicate. However, I will not have what matters, since I will no longer exist. My body will have died in the teletransporter. Ordinary death leaves a hole in the world; teletransportation fills that hole almost seamlessly.

---

146 Mark Johnston disagrees with this perspective and believes we can hallucinate an arena of consciousness. See, for example, (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 164 ff.) The first-person perspective that is central to my thesis is less reified, I think, than Johnston’s concept of an arena.
These facts distort intuitions and would help me ignore the import of my bodily death. My bodily death with a duplicate is not as bad as ordinary death for my survivors, and not quite as bad for my Earthly Original. However, Earthly Original will die just as thoroughly, from my first-person perspective, as any other non-duplicated dying person. I think that facing bodily death with a duplicate, Earthly Original would not lose the primal fear of the cessation of her own consciousness, even as she might rationalize how much better it would be than my death without a duplicate. A speeding car bearing down on me would cause me terror for my life that would be mitigated only slightly by the knowledge of my imminent duplication.

3.7: Causing Death: Is Murder Plus Duplication Okay?

Beyond these views on first-person perspective continuation, there are other ways to put pressure on the intuitions that psychological continuity alone can secure identity. If duplication alongside a bodily death could secure survival, what is the moral status of the act of bodily destruction that is an essential part of teletransportation? How does that impact our judgments about murder and suicide? Is killing a teletransportee different from ordinary killing? I will present a new scenario for consideration, looking at the intention behind the destruction of the original rather than the intention behind the creation of the duplicate.

In our culture, with some exceptions, deliberately killing a human when it is not self-defense or an act of war is murder. Teletransportation would involve the killing of a human while duplicating that human, so perhaps the “destruction” part of voluntary teletransportation would have something like the (arguably) non-murder status of assisted suicide. However, imagine that there is a different use of the teletransportation technology: the government now has the ability to duplicate at will. Our telephones will scan our bodies continually; these scans can be used to
create duplicates in cases of emergency. In particular, for stability, the government arranges for automatic duplicates of leading officials to be created if they should meet with sudden death. John Smith, the US Ambassador to the UN, interrupts a drug deal; the dealer shoots him fatally. This bodily death triggers Smith’s duplication. If teletransportation duplication preserves identity, has the drug dealer committed murder? I believe that Ambassador Smith has been murdered. His killing was a bad act. But if Ambassador Smith’s duplicate is Ambassador Smith, how can we say Ambassador Smith has died, or been murdered? If killing humans were to become permissible as long as we duplicate the victims, then we have mangled some of the core moral tenets of human culture.

In order to preserve our psychological reductionist thesis, we could recast the definition of murder to reflect the intention behind the destruction of the original body, whether or not a duplicate has been created. That would allow us to say that Ambassador Smith was murdered and recreated, but that Earthly Original Kerstin, destroyed in the teletransporter, was not murdered. As suggested above, perhaps the destruction involved in voluntary teletransportation would be considered akin to assisted suicide, whose moral status is still disputed, but not the killing of the Ambassador. In summary, the possibility of duplication in a number of scenarios brings forth some complicated challenges. These challenges are not faced by body-based accidental animalism, on which view murder remains murder, even with a duplicate.

The discussions above were intended to show a number of different ways that psychological reductionism, with its rejection of the importance of bodily continuity, does not align properly with self-concern and with core moral principles about life and death. Considering the “asymmetrical fission” scenarios in which Earthly Original maintains full physical and psychological continuity that is replicated in the Martian Duplicate, most of us
would trace ourselves in and direct self-concern towards our Earthly Originals. This intuition maps to our tracing self-concern and the first-person perspective that is connected to a particular physical body. While some might believe that first-person concern could appropriately be directed towards a duplicate, I think that this would be a mistaken belief distorted by the factors laid out above. In addition, I suggested that the processes stipulated in a morally neutral way in the teletransportation scenario could, when combined with intentions of murder, result in warping of some key moral principles. From this I conclude that we must reject psychological reductionism and accept the importance of physical continuity in personal identity.147

3.8: The Importance of Psychological Continuity

While I maintain that physical continuity is critical in sustaining one’s first-person perspective and identity, the paradigm person also has psychological continuity. This continuity is very important in the paradigm, and its importance is highlighted in the desiderata introduced at the beginning of this paper. To state the obvious, the paradigm person is cognitively sophisticated and active, and his or her cognition is a crucial part of how he or she survives. From our ability to defend ourselves against predators through reasoning, to our ability to use tools and build things, communicate using language, to our relationships with one another and our sense of ourselves as individuals—our cognitive abilities are likely unique in the animal kingdom.

For these reasons, we care deeply about our psychologies, beyond their merely “carrying” a first-person perspective. Even if we can trace our selves through the devastation of strokes and dementia, most would choose a minor physical loss over significant cognitive loss. (If we

147 While, for the most part, I am arguing against psychological reductionism in this section, in so doing I also highlight the implausibility of Johnston’s claim that the Teletransporters have an equally good conception of personhood.
didn’t, as a species, value our psychological function, psychological reductionism would have no appeal.) Some philosophers would choose to “survive” as duplicates with full psychological continuity rather than to suffer devastating bodily or cognitive impairments. For example, Nagel envisions a society of series-persons where new, disease-free psychologically continuous bodies routinely replace aging bodies; Parfit imagines that he might choose duplication as a way of dealing with illness. As noted above, I believe that these cases would involve death from a first-person perspective, but with the consolation that one’s loved ones and one’s projects would fare about as well as they would have with your (personal and bodily) survival. All these claims reflect the undeniable importance of our psychological continuity to our lives.

3.9: Blending Psychological and Bodily Criteria

Given the importance to humans of both the psychological and the physical, the most plausible theory of personhood and personal identity would recognize that we are both psychological and physical beings. Perhaps in the 21st century this distinction doesn’t seem as meaningful as it once did. There are now much-documented correlations between our bodily and our psychological states. People take antidepressants to enhance their psychological states. When people get eight hours of sleep, drink coffee, or wear a bicycle helmet, they are taking care of their cognitive activity by protecting or promoting the functioning of their brains. The newly coined term “hangry” expresses the way hunger affects moods; chronic pain can trigger sadness; psychosomatic illness is a well-known phenomenon. While the philosophical views at the extremes of the spectrum favor psychological OR bodily continuity as essential for personal

148 Parfit discusses Nagel’s theory of series-persons, which he draws from a then-unpublished draft. (Parfit 1984, 289)
149 Despite the scientific advances linking psychology and biology, the durability of this dichotomy no doubt rests on vestiges of belief in immaterial souls. As noted earlier, Johnston cites research indicating that this belief is beyond vestiges. (Johnston, Surviving Death 2010, 3)
identity, moderate versions of both animalism and psychological reductionism acknowledge the importance of both kinds of continuity. And, as discussed in the previous chapter, there are views that blend together both kinds of continuity (or one of either kind of continuity) as central to human persons and to personal identity.

This blending occurs in what Parfit calls “narrow” psychological reductionism, which, as noted earlier, requires that psychological continuity be secured by its normal cause, which includes the persistence of “enough” of a person’s brain. While brain persistence (assuming no fission) would guarantee the single first-person perspective necessary for personal survival, narrow psychological reductionism incorporates this physical substrate as part of a psychological criterion and, as such, it excludes some situations where I believe a person survives. In particular, making psychological continuity necessary for personhood does not allow one to survive or to anticipate one’s own pain through total psychological discontinuity, one of the desiderata presented in the introduction. In narrow psychological reductionism, personal identity is not secured in profound dementia or total amnesia.

Another view blending psychological and physical criteria is the “brain view” of personal identity, discussed in passing in an earlier chapter. If the cause of our psychological continuity is the brain, and a continuing brain is required for a persistent identity-securing first-person perspective, should we trace our identities through our brains? While the “brain view” maps to robust brain-transplant intuitions and their relatives, this view is unattractive in part because it doesn’t jibe with our practices of tracing persons. As noted earlier, Mark Johnston, points out that the brain view confuses the limit of mutilation of a person with the essence of a person. The

---

150 (Parfit 1984, 208)
151 (Johnston, Human Beings 1987, 78-79)
minimum is not the paradigm. Although many believe that personal identity could be secured by a brain in a vat, the brain in a vat does not reflect our natures as persons. A paradigm person is not a brain in a vat, of course, and has far more physical housing than does the brain in a vat. Even putting aside the role (the non-cerebral parts of) our bodies play in our mental lives, our bodies are central to almost everything we do. Excluding our bodies in a definition of personhood does not capture our natures fully. The brain view provides a necessary condition on personhood and personal identity, namely, the existence and persistence of at least part of a functioning human brain.

As discussed in an earlier chapter, constitution models of personhood, such as Mark Johnston’s Human Beings view, articulate the relation between the organism and the person as constitution. The person is constituted by but not identical to a particular human organism, using the previously mentioned analogy of clay and sculpture. A lump of clay can, for some part of its history, constitute a sculpture. The sculpture and the clay have the same material qualities during this time, although they are not identical with one another because they have different persistence conditions. The clay existed before the sculpture did, and the clay can exist after the sculpture is smashed. Similarly, the argument goes, a human organism can constitute a person. The metaphysical underpinnings of a constitution views are controversial. Eric Olson, for example, claims he cannot make sense of a relation somewhere between identity and distinctness. Constitution views may set up a disputable ontological hierarchy; the thing that constitutes is often deemed ontologically more basic than the thing constituted. Thus the lump of clay is more basic than the sculpture and the organism more basic than the person. This makes the person, in some metaphysical views, a phase sortal rather than a genuine substance or

---

152 See, for example, (Baker 2007, 32-39), 32-39 and (Locke 1689-1700/1975)
Constitution is a complex concept apart from its relation to the discussion of personal identity, and, as noted earlier, Marya Schechtman suggests that there is a profound and substantive metaphysical disagreement between pro- and anti-constitution philosophers.

Another way to accommodate the desired combination of physical and psychological could be through animalism, at least a version of animalism that honors our psychological functioning. Classic Olsonian animalism, again, defines us entirely through our being organisms, without giving special consideration to Homo sapiens’ cognitive abilities. But classic animalism comes with troubling counterintuitive consequences in real and imagined puzzle cases, as discussed in an earlier chapter. Can animalism be modified from its extreme form to avoid these consequences? I believe it can, but this move comes with metaphysical consequences that must be considered.

3.10: Accidental Animalism

I believe that we paradigmatic human persons are human organisms. We are not essentially human organisms on my view, because I believe that each of us could be reduced to parts of human organisms, as long as those parts included enough of his or her functioning human brain. I believe that when we talk about our own survival we mean a survival in which, ideally, our whole human bodies and our intact psychologies continue to function. The paradigm includes both of these. Continuity of a particular first-person perspective requires continuity of at least some of the physical substrate of the perspective, typically an embodied human cerebrum. While

---

153 Eric Olson, e.g., defines a substance as something one cannot cease to be without going out of existence altogether. For him, a human organism cannot continue to exist without being a human organism and thus human organism is a substance kind. A person can cease to exist while “his” human organism continues; thus a person is not a substance kind. By contrast, a phase sortal can apply to an entity for part of its existence. “Adolescent” is an example; a human can cease to be an adolescent without ceasing to exist.
the embodied human cerebrum is the paradigmatic substrate, the first-person perspective could be preserved in a mere brain or in a mere cerebral hemisphere, properly supported.

As material objects and as organs, brains are subject to division and degeneration. How does accidental animalism trace persons where the brain is not paradigmatically healthy? For a person to survive, the potential for the first-person perspective that is supported by (at least a part of) his or her particular brain must continue. Thus there is no person present in a human in a persistent vegetative state, defined as a state where there is no potential for cognitive activity. However, each of us could survive a great deal of degeneration or reduction of physical or psychological continuity. Your first-person perspective would continue even in diminished or splintered states, as long as consciousness is supported by whatever organic material is (or has been) part of “your” human organism: a brain or portion thereof, or a whole functioning human body.

Is there a smaller unit than a brain that could support the first-person perspective? We already know that human organisms can survive the loss of a cerebral hemisphere, so a complete functioning human brain is not necessary for a person. It is a matter of empirical fact, yet to be determined, what percentage and which areas of a brain are sufficient to sustain consciousness or a minimal first-person perspective. As mentioned above, a first-person perspective would survive the loss of one sense. We can also imagine that a first-person perspective could be limited to a visual field or an auditory one, for example, and still maintain that the person continues through that perspective. Beyond the questions of “how much” and “what functions,” is a particular kind of matter needed for the first-person perspective to continue? Could our brain function be replicated by our individual neurons being petri-dished and connected electronically to one another over a large space? Could the carbon-based cells that compose us be replaced—wholly, partially, slowly—by inorganic materials that provide the same electronic signals to one
another as our current cells do? I will address this latter scenario below among the puzzle cases.154

Even though a functioning brain or part of a brain is necessary for personhood and personal identity, what we are is everything organically attached to that brain. A whole functioning human body is what each paradigmatic person is; where the person falls short of the paradigm, the person is the brain integrated with whatever other bodily “resources” are available.

3.11 Puzzle Cases

How does such a thesis address the puzzle cases of the philosophical literature?

Teletransportation

On my theory, as is discussed at length above, you do not survive as the duplicate created in teletransportation, because the body that has supported your first-person perspective no longer exists. While this duplicate could easily pick up the threads of your life, since to your loved ones and acquaintances the duplicate would be indistinguishable from you, the fact would remain that you died. Your first-person perspective relied on your body; the duplicate’s first-person perspective would be qualitatively exactly like yours at the moment of destruction and creation, but it would be a duplicate first-person perspective, relying on a very different physical cause and physically discontinuous with yours. I argue above that one would not feel the same self-concern about a duplicate as one feels about oneself, made evident when we imagine overlap, i.e. when both the original and the duplicate exist at the same time.

154 Mark Johnston suggested that I explore the points in this paragraph.
**Brain Transplant**

Imagining my cerebrum transplanted into a different but functionally similar body, on accidental animalism, my identity would be preserved in the new body. During the time of the operation, I would be preserved in the cerebrum. This functioning brain is not a new person; the functioning decerebrated body or “husk” left behind is not a person. The husk is simply a decerebrated but still mechanically operational human body, i.e. not a person but not a paradigmatic human organism either.

**Brain Cell Replacement**

In accidental animalism, identity rests on the consciousness-generating functions of a particular organ. How then would the replacement of small portions of the brain with artificial materials affect the first-person perspective and hence identity? Imagine that a human brain’s cells are replaced gradually, each by an inorganic “replica” that carries out the electrical work of the cell. There is no evidence in the beginning that this replacement affects cognitive functioning. After all, the cells are being replaced gradually. The human continues to behave as before, with no apparent loss of memory or sense perception; the brain regulates the bodily functions, as before. From our perspective as science fiction readers, the first-person perspective seems to be intact. If early in the process we ask the subject if he has the same arena of consciousness, the same me-ness, as before the operation, he would likely say yes, as long as the replicas actually do have the same electronic effects as the original. However, with more dramatic percentages of replacement, we may not have continuity of first-person perspective. We do not yet know if our organic brain cells can be replaced by inorganic replicas without losing some functionality. In particular, we don’t yet know if conscious experience would be maintained. In gradual replacement, there could be a point at which there is no “there there.”
We cannot assume that this gradual replacement would preserve sentience as the percentage replaced gets larger. Perhaps along the way, with a good portion of the cells replaced, the individual might experience a diminished arena of consciousness, some sort of sense of slippage of awareness (even if the artificial cells were sending signals properly). He might tell us this. If this were the case, we would have evidence that the first-person perspective was waning, and then could hypothesize that the full replacement might not result in a sentient individual, first-person perspective, or personal identity, even if the individual displayed the outward signs of mental survival.

But imagine the subject unconscious throughout the process of total brain cell replacement, and then roused at the end. We could imagine that the artificial cell replacements could produce the outward signs of sentience without genuine sentience. At the end of the process, what would distinguish the resulting cranial hub of activity from a computer, aside from its attachment to organic matter? We could imagine that these signs would be only a Siri-like imitation of an expression of inner life and not an actual inner life. These imaginings highlight the epistemological challenge we have about other minds in general. I conduct myself assuming that others’ behaviors are manifestations of a mental life, but I cannot be certain. I can only be certain of my own mental life. I am extrapolating from your behavior that you, too, have a mental life.155 This challenge is not unique to accidental animalism, but is shared by any thesis.

Metamorphosis

I have argued that we are human animals, and our identity goes along with whatever body we have that is attached to (at least a portion of) our organ of mentation, i.e., our brains. But

---

155 Thanks to the Spring 2016 Dissertation Seminar for raising questions about these puzzle cases.
fiction writers and philosophers have envisioned their bodies gradually becoming the bodies of another kind of animal, such as a cockroach. According to accidental animalism, if the first-person perspective continues, the person survives. However, continuity of first-person perspective might be compromised by the many changes effected by combining the brain of one species and the body of another, assuming that the brain, too, is not transmuted as well. If we combine Kafka with Nagel, and Gregor Samsa becomes a bat, is there enough common ground in the way a bat and a person perceive the world for the same perspective to continue? Perhaps if the transition is from one primate species to another, we could be reasonably confident in the continuation of the first-person perspective. However, as with the cell replacement scenario, our answers about personhood would rest on empirical facts about the process and its effects.

**Psychological Discontinuity with Physical Continuity**

As discussed earlier, on my view we survive radical psychological discontinuity, such as amnesia or severe dementia, when accompanied with the persistence of our bodies, or some non-trivial portion of them. The Williams Conundrum and the Johnstonian twist on the story point out something critical about how we trace ourselves: we have a greater involvement with our bodies than a psychological reductionist view of personhood accommodates. This may well involve a number of factors: our psychologies rest on our bodies. Our sense perceptions shape our knowledge of the world and our first-person perspective. Our bodies are central to most of our activities, from walking to reading to listening to music eating to courtship to sleeping.156

Mark Johnston argues that the method of cases applied to personhood yields the result that we are bare loci of consciousness. I think that we are not-so-bare loci; when we anticipate pain through radical psychological discontinuity, we anticipate at least some connection in the way

156 (Schechtman 2014, 117-119), e.g., discusses this extensively.
we experience our own bodies. This would jibe with our expecting some sort of persisting feeling of me-ness after the psychological discontinuity in the narrative. Perhaps this means that we cannot truly believe that the stipulated psychological discontinuity could really be total discontinuity, given the relation between psychological states and physical states of brain and body alike. Perhaps there would always be, in the physical structure of a brain, some residual perspective. We do not know this, yet.

The narratives sparked by Bernard Williams’ conundrum typically describe full bodily continuity with no psychological continuity whatsoever. However, without the psychological continuity, I believe that if we start to reduce the physical continuity as well, our persistence would be compromised. For example, once the scenario switches to considering a brain wiped clean of its psychology and transplanted into another decerebrated body, we would cease to trace ourselves through that ordeal. This claim is supported by research cited in Nichols and Bruno’s research. In a case where my brain was wiped clean and then transplanted into an appropriate decerebrated body, I believe that it might not be determinate who was in the new body with the tabula rasa’d brain that had been mine. There may be nothing informative to say about this in terms of personal identity—this seems like a new person has come into existence from the body parts of others. This would be beyond the limit of mutilation for a person.

**Symmetrical Brain-Based Fission**

Under the rubric of fission, there are numerous imaginary scenarios against which philosophers have measured theories of personal identity. Since I have already discussed

---

157 Blok, Sergey; Newman, George; Rips, Lance (2005)
teletransportation/duplication (asymmetrical fission), and I have ruled out personal identity without physical continuity, the scenarios I will consider involve only brain-based fission.

In the previous chapter, I characterized the removal of one hemisphere of Brown’s symmetrical cerebrum as clearly leaving Brown to survive in his original body. Then I described each of the two hemispheres being transplanted into decerebrated twins Lefty and Righty. One single hemispheric transplant into Lefty yields the generally uncontroversial intuition\(^{158}\) that Brown is Lefty. However, imagining each of these hemispheres’ being transplanted into an appropriate decerebrated body, we see a duplication of the conditions under which we would trace identity. Who is who? Both Lefty and Righty have adequate physical continuity to meet the personal identity criterion of a continuing, brain-based first-person perspective.

In this case, I believe that Brown’s first-person perspective would continue in two persons. Personal identity would not—could not—hold, because Lefty and Righty cannot be identical with Brown and not be identical with one another. We would need to abandon the intrinsicness principle, discussed earlier and below, at least in part—here the relation that would secure identity with Brown for Lefty if Righty didn’t exist. I say that a person would continue after this operation in the sense that his or her consciousness, his or her first-person perspective, would be continued in the two cerebral recipients, yet permanently split. We could dub this first-person-continuation, which is close to personal identity. One person would have become two, and both could first-person-continue the original life. The intrinsicness principle would apply in considering the relation of first-person continuity rather than personal identity: whether a person first-person-continued as one recipient of a cerebral hemisphere would not depend on whether there was also a recipient of the other hemisphere. Whether one was “the same person as”

\(^{158}\) It is controversial among classic animalists such as Olson.
would depend on whether the other was transplanted successfully. Thus in my view, first-person continuity (along with physical continuity) is necessary but not sufficient for personal identity.

In the brain-based fission narratives, then, each of the recipients has first-person-continuation: continuing the inner experience, the me-ness, of the original person, because of the support of continuing psychological states through parts of the same original brain. Once the two cerebral hemisphere recipients proceed with their lives, their relation to one another will become more and more distant, but each will first-person-continue the consciousness of the original person, while not being identical with that original or with each other.

This split between identity and first-person-continuity may be unsatisfying, but it I think it captures the realities that would underpin this puzzle case. The organic substrate of one person’s consciousness has split into two, and each genuinely continues the full psychology of the original person. However, if we consider smaller and smaller pieces of the brain as supporting some aspect of consciousness (if that makes any sense) and then being transplanted, we may find other indeterminate cases, as we did when considering the cell replacement puzzle.

3.12: Accidental Animalism and the Desiderata

For the purposes of this chapter, I will recapitulate the desiderata for a theory of personal identity set out in my introduction, falling into general categories of “subjective internal experience,” of which I have made much in this chapter; facts about biology and psychology; and “philosophy room” and common sense desiderata.
Subjective Internal Experience

1. Continuing our internal experience or consciousness of our selves is part of what we mean by “survival.”
2. We can anticipate future bodily experiences, such as pain, without psychological continuity.
3. There is an important difference between my experience of my own identity and persistence and others’ experience of my identity and persistence.

Psychology and Biology

4. The continuation of persons’ psychologies is important to personal identity.
5. The potential for cognitive activity is necessary for persons.
6. A living human being with potential for cognitive activity is a person.

“Philosophy Room” and Common Sense

7. The facts of personal identity should not depend on facts extrinsic to the relationship between the individuals concerned at two different times. This is known by some philosophers as the “intrinsicness principle.”
8. A theory of personhood and personal identity should not require acceptance of deeply counterintuitive ontologies.
9. A theory of personhood and personal identity should sit reasonably well with the way we organize our moral and practical lives. This typically involves our belief that personal identity matters.
10. We are not badly mistaken about what we are and when there is personal identity.
11. Our ordinary methods of counting people should be explained.

As is clear, my belief in accidental animalism rests heavily on my giving centrality to the desiderata that focus on the inner self-experience. A persistent inner experience is essential to being the same person. I also distinguished between the experience I have of identifying and re-identifying myself through my continuing first-person perspective from the experience others have of identifying and re-identifying me, for example, in the story of the acceptance by others of Martian Duplicate as Kerstin (desiderata 1 and 3). Because I have presented a body-based theory of personhood and personal identity, it fulfills desideratum 2, which allows anticipation of pain in one’s body through psychological discontinuity.
Psychological function is a central part of the paradigm person, so my thesis meets desideratum 4. I insist that the potential for cognitive activity, which underlies a first-person perspective, is essential for personhood, fulfilling desideratum 5. Similarly, according to accidental animalism all human organisms with cognitive potential are persons, thus aligning with desideratum 6.

In terms of the philosophy room desiderata, in accidental animalism personal identity is based on a relation that could potentially be more than 1:1, namely continuity of the same first-person-perspective. Because I believe that this continuity can branch, the first-person-continuity relationship secures identity only when it is held uniquely. This would violate the intrinsicality principle (desideratum 7) when identity is considered, in branching cases such as symmetrical body-based fission. However, it does not violate the intrinsicality principle when first-person-continuity is considered. Nonetheless, accidental animalism forces a split between the notions of personal identity and first-person-continuity.

Because it is not essentialist, accidental animalism does not require us to believe something implausible about our place in the ontological hierarchy, thus meeting desideratum 8. Being a human animal is our paradigmatic state, but is not our essence. Each of us could survive as part of an animal, without going out of existence altogether. Because accidental animalism works well with our moral and practical lives, it meets desideratum 9. It also meets desideratum 10, since it does not suggest that we are badly mistaken about ourselves. We think we are, in the main, human beings and human organisms and persons; we need not abandon any of these as long as we don’t weight these beliefs with metaphysical import.
In terms of counting persons, most of the time my theory maps the number of human organisms to the human persons, as in desideratum 11. However, it does not extend the counting alignment throughout the puzzle cases. It does not do so when there are disembodied brains, because there are persons without organisms. It also does not align when there are decerebrated but functioning bodies, where there are arguably organisms without persons. These conflicts with this desideratum seem a small price to pay for the other appealing features of accidental animalism, and, in fact, make it seem as though this desideratum is dispensable, in the end.

**3.13: Conclusion**

Ultimately, accidental animalism will be unsatisfying to those seeking to situate persons and organisms in a metaphysical structure, or to capture specific necessary and sufficient conditions about persons and organisms. While theories of psychological reductionism aim to capture in scientific syntax the necessary and sufficient conditions for what we appear to value—what matters—in our survival, perhaps this approach serves to blur what is more appropriately a moral inquiry. By trying to define personal identity in third-person criteria, we risk losing sight of the inner experience that makes us both what and who we are, as individuals and as part of this world. The approaches that link personhood to our lives, with body and “soul” knit together, to my mind, come closer to illuminating what we are and why we should care about personal identity. The accidental animalist view embraces the fact that persons are embodied and that their minds are important to the way we live our lives, while meeting nearly all of the desiderata presented in in the introduction.

I believe we can have answers to important questions about personhood and personal identity without a commitment to an elaborate ontology. The exact metaphysical nature of the first-
person perspective, the parameters of first-person-continuity, whether human organisms and persons are substances, phase sortals, or ontological trash—we do not need answers to these questions to address the moral and practical questions that motivated John Locke. Centering on first-person continuity, which I maintain must include physical continuity, provides the forensic information needed for assigning punishment, blame, obligation, reward and credit. Its principles allows us to live in society, make promises, and follow our natural, biological manifestations of self-concern and relations with others, without the prescriptions embedded in psychological reductionism, the relativism of mid-spectrum views, or the starkness of classic animalism.
REFERENCES


