Forging Fukuoka:
Locality and Development in Modern Japan

Paul Vincent Eason

A DISSERTATION
PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY
OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE
BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
Adviser: Sheldon Garon

September 2012
© Copyright by Paul Vincent Eason, 2012. All rights reserved.
Abstract

Forging Fukuoka:
Locality and Development in Modern Japan

Paul Vincent Eason

This dissertation examines the development of the city of Fukuoka, on the island of Kyushu in southwestern Japan, from its incorporation in 1889 to the closing years of the twentieth century. It analyzes how national trends played out in a regional context, complicating existing narratives of the Japanese developmental model. Far away from Japan’s center, Fukuoka’s shift from nondescript provincial town to regional metropolis, all while failing to develop a significant industrial base and receiving little direct attention or help from the powerful national bureaucracy, was neither inevitable nor linear. The case of Fukuoka suggests the need to rethink the significance of local and regional distinctions in postwar Japan, and the limitations of reducing modern Japan’s history to one single aggregate narrative. It also elucidates the empowerment of localities in the postwar period, documenting the increasing sophistication and scope of local authority alongside its limitations.

Chapter One examines the history of Fukuoka from its formation through the first two decades of the twentieth century, including the long premodern and early modern histories of the city that affected its modern development. Chapter Two chronicles the focus on developing the city’s port to accelerate economic development during the Interwar period, and the gulf between policies fixated on industrialization and the city’s heavily commercial economic base. The dislocation and destruction created by wartime mobilization and the 1945 firebombing of Fukuoka effectively upended the political and economic structures in place up to 1945.
The postwar era from 1945 to the early 1980s is the focus of Chapters Three and Four. Through clever and ambitious planning coupled with shifts in Japan’s political and economic structures, Fukuoka embraced its role as a “service economy” well before it became a model in development planning and policy. Local autonomy allowed for sophisticated planning models, but the city struggled to promote civic engagement among its citizens. Chapter Five examines the resilience of Fukuoka’s economic and planning models in the face of Japan’s post-bubble economic and demographic problems. The Epilogue considers the state of contemporary Japan and the potential to resolve underlying problems that collectively affect Fukuoka, Kyushu, and Japan.
Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ vi

Introduction: Thinking Locally about Modern Japan ....................................................... 1

Chapter One: A City in Search of a Hinterland: the Birth of Modern Fukuoka .......... 14

Chapter Two: Artifice of Empire: Interwar and Wartime Fukuoka ......................... 43

Chapter Three: From Rubble to Regional Center: Fukuoka, the “Capital of Kyushu” ... 86

Chapter Four: Together and Apart: the Regional Metropolis ..................................... 134

Chapter Five: Redefined Localism and Regionalism: Fukuoka and Post-Bubble Japan 182

Epilogue: Reconstructing Cooperation and Collaboration in Contemporary Japan ... 210

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 217
Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to the wonderful community of friends, family, colleagues, mentors, and advisers who made completion of this dissertation a reality. First and foremost I would like to thank my adviser, Sheldon Garon, who has been a source of immeasurable help and intellectual inspiration throughout my graduate career. Let me simply state that there would be no finished dissertation warranting these acknowledgments without his support and guidance throughout my time at Princeton. David Howell’s analytical critiques, thoughtful feedback, and personal generosity – including his sense of humor – provided much encouragement over the years. Amy Borovoy provided helpful feedback and questions throughout the process as well as inspiration through both her research and teaching. Susan Naquin and Joy Kim were both exceedingly generous with their time and insights in providing feedback on my work and support during the writing process. I would also like to thank Janet Chen, Stephen Kotkin, David Leheny, Seiichi Makino, and Gyan Prakash for their advice and inspiration at various stages during my work at Princeton. I would be remiss if I did not thank Andrew Barshay, Mary Elizabeth Berry, Mack Horton, Yosuke Nirei, and Yuma Totani for developing my interest in Japan as an undergraduate student at the University of California, Berkeley. I would never have embarked on the path toward this dissertation without both the excellent training and personal encouragement they provided.

I count myself as lucky to have been surrounded by a remarkable group of colleagues and friends during my time at Princeton. Ilya Kharin, Sangho Ro, and Maren Ehlers have been wonderful friends and colleagues from our first seminar together at Princeton, and their comments and thoughts over the years have been invaluable. Although by no means an exhaustive list let me extend my deep thanks and appreciation to Erin Brightwell, Kjell Ericson,
Yulia Frumer, Nathan Ha, Wayne Soon, Brigid Vance, Alden Young, and Evan Young for their generosity over the years, which has made my graduate career immeasurably richer intellectually and personally. The staffs in the History Department, East Asian Studies, and East Asian Library at Princeton all likewise made my time at Princeton as pleasant as it was productive.

During my time as a research student at Kyushu University in Fukuoka, I was extremely fortunate to have Yamaguchi Teruomi serve as my adviser in the Faculty of Humanities. His generosity in providing feedback on my work, countless suggestions for areas of refinement and additional inquiry, and introductions to various academics and city officials in Fukuoka were crucial to the success of this project. I feel equally privileged to have worked with Arima Manabu, who advised me during my time at Kyushu University as a Fulbright Fellow and provided much support during my graduate research as well. Nōjima Yoshitaka provided a great deal of thoughtful conversation, feedback, and friendship. Beyond Kyushu University, Sasaki Kimiyo generously shared her insights both as an academic studying Fukuoka and as a city official, providing access to additional research material and guidance as my project evolved. Hiroshi Tominaga has been both a steadfast friend and, from his vantage point as a prefectural official in Kumamoto, a source of many insights and thoughtful comments about regional dynamics in Kyushu more generally. My sincere gratitude also to the support and assistance provided by individuals working at the Fukuoka City Hall, Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce, Fukuoka Municipal Library, and the Fukuoka Asian Urban Research Center during my time doing research in Fukuoka.

A Japan Foundation Doctoral Fellowship, as well as the Princeton University East Asian Studies Program and Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, funded my research in Japan. A Japan-United States Educational Commission Fulbright Fellowship funded
a year of research and study in Japan after my undergraduate years that was instrumental to my decision to both pursue graduate work and choose my particular research focus. The Princeton East Asian Studies Program generously provided a Ph.D. Completion Grant that enabled the final push in completing the writing process.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for their continuous support and encouragement. Junichi and Kyōko Toyofuku, who welcomed me into both their house and their family during my first trip to Fukuoka as a Fulbright Fellow, have helped make Fukuoka into a second home for me, and words cannot do justice to my deep appreciation for all they did to make my time doing research in Japan memorable and pleasant. My brother, David Eason, has offered a steady stream of professional and intellectual advice coupled with unconditional personal support for as long as I can remember. My grandparents Allen and Maxine Admire have been unwavering in their encouragement and aid in my studies. This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Anthony and Alynne Eason. My parents have taught me the values of hard work, diligence, and a deep respect for the value of knowledge and education throughout my life, and I am deeply blessed to have had their unconditional love and support over my seemingly endless graduate career.
Introduction: Thinking Locally about Modern Japan

On March 17, 1989, the city of Fukuoka opened the Asian-Pacific Exposition, an event that continued for nearly six months and attracted more than 8,000,000 visitors from 79 countries around the globe. The festivities, originally planned to mark the centennial anniversary of the city’s founding, became an opportunity to not just celebrate the city’s progress and growth over a century, but also develop new partnerships and opportunities with the rising nations of the rest of the Asian-Pacific region. Behind both the theme and the celebration itself, however, was a much deeper history of Fukuoka. Both archaeological and written sources recorded more than 1,800 years of contact with the Asian mainland, and a long history as Japan’s chief international port for most of both nation and city’s collective history. The paradox of a city celebrating its one-hundred year anniversary on the explicit basis of a local history belying that very fact might simultaneously be viewed as both humorous and absurd; at the very least, it warrants an explanation. And it is precisely the complexity underlying the 1989 Asian-Pacific Exposition, designed to reinterpret past legacies for present gain, that lies at the heart of understanding the political, economic, and socio-cultural development of Fukuoka in Japan’s modern period.

This dissertation is about the history of a locality, the city of Fukuoka, within the larger history of an entire nation, Japan, from the late nineteenth century to the dawn of the twenty-first century. This is not a “local history” in the sense of attempting an encyclopedic chronicling of every event or facet of Fukuoka’s modern history; there is an excellent body of literature produced both by historians working independently and under the sponsorship of the municipal government – including a new, updated official history not due out until the mid-2020s at the earliest – to which I owe a deep debt of gratitude and thanks in informing and enriching my own
work. Rather, in the vein of a tradition of urban history—such as William Cronon’s *Nature’s Metropolis*, Mike Davis’ *City of Quartz*, and Edward Seidensticker’s *Low City, High City* and *Tokyo Rising*—I look at Fukuoka through a particular set of lenses to explain how a relatively unremarkable provincial city transformed, in the space of less than a century, into a major national and international metropolis that continues to dominate Southwestern Japan. Just as Seidensticker both lamented the loss of early modern Edo in the modern space of Tokyo while chronicling its continued success as a growing city, this dissertation is neither a positivistic narrative of triumphal success nor a spirited critique of the failings of Fukuoka in particular or modern Japan as a whole. It is, in short, about the why and how of the city’s development from 1889 until roughly the year 2000, and what Fukuoka can illuminate both in particular and in general about the history of modern Japan.

An important element in better understanding a full picture of modern Japan, I argue, is studying localities beyond the national center. While Seidensticker’s two volumes on Edo-Tokyo are rich in detail and reveal a great deal about the history of the city that was, and still remains, the center of the Japan, the fact that capital cities tend to be showpieces that are concentrations of power, wealth, and population reduces their utility as representations or reflections of conditions across the larger whole of a nation. Admittedly, my research on Fukuoka is not meant to offer the city as an alternative to Tokyo that then can represent a collective Japan. For even on a sub-national level, this claim would have very clear limitations: substituting a city of 13 million

---

1 For multiple municipally-commissioned versions of the history of Fukuoka City, see both the reasonably svelte *Fukuoka no rekishi: shisei kyūjūnen shūnen kinen* and the more institutionally-focused and data-heavy *Fukuoka-shishi*, a multi-volume set produced from the 1960s to 1990. The *Fukuoka hyakunen*, a two-volume set published by Yomiuri Shinbun’s Western Division in 1967, offers a fairly robust series of vignettes and major events from the Meiji Restoration to the mid-1960s. The single most prolific local historian, Egajira Kō, produced a variety of titles focused on issues in Fukuoka’s local history—though, with the exception of a brief Fukuoka history manga, none of his work quite amounted to a chronological, event-based city history.

2 For an example of an excellent urban history in the Japanese literature, see Takamura Naosuke’s *Toshi yokohama no hanseki: shinsai fukkō kara kōdō seichō made*. 
representing a nation of 127 million inhabitants for a city of 1.5 million representing a region of 15 million inhabitants is more a matter of scale than substantive difference. Instead, although there is a reasonable argument to be made that Japan’s regional metropolises like Fukuoka function as “Mini-Tokyos” in certain aspects, exploring how they differ from Tokyo is far more instructive than potentially reinforcing unfortunate tropes about Japanese homogeneity.³

One of the central goals of my dissertation is to explain how Fukuoka – a locale that can seem peripheral and unimportant compared to the sheer scale and concentration of people and power in Tokyo – has managed to grow and succeed in the modern era, and to look at how it simultaneously fits into, and challenges, some of the monolithic narratives about Japanese and national history more generally. It is hard to imagine a history of the United States told solely through an account focused on New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, or even Washington DC. The US is a nation of very clear cultural, social, economic, and political differences and diversity. By way of comparison, historiography on modern Japan has all-too-often focused on telling singular, one-size-fits-all narratives: the creation of a strong modern nation-state in a few decades,⁴ the rise and fall of “Taishō” (or “Imperial”) Democracy,⁵ total mobilization and authoritarian control during World War II,⁶ Japan’s rebirth after the war as an economic powerhouse based on exports.

³ The same maxim applies about the equally regrettable tendency in non-academic writing on Japan to fetishize Japanese uniqueness, and another reason why this dissertation is about Fukuoka as a particular locale with both positive and negative attributes in its modern history.
⁴ For more on the prewar story of nation-building from an ideological and institutional perspective, Carol Gluck’s Japan’s Modern Myths remains the gold standard in English.
⁵ Both Andrew Gordon’s Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan and a variety of works in both Japanese and English, such as the Japan in Crisis: Essays on Taishō Democracy volume edited by Ann Waswo, have offered multiple approaches to explaining the “failure” of prewar Japanese democracy. While the scholarship on the topic has been quite good, I am convinced from my own work on Fukuoka and conversations with Japanese academics working on local prewar politics that a detailed study of the penetration of democracy on local and prefectural levels would pose significant questions to both the depth and actual scope of prewar democratic political practices as currently understood.
⁶ The debates over the extent and depth of Japanese authoritarianism – and the tired but frequent question of whether or not Japan was not just authoritarian but actually “fascist” – has been explored at length in both the English and Japanese literatures since the immediate postwar work of Maruyama Masao. Peter Duus and Daniel Okimoto’s “Fascism and the History of Prewar Japan: The Failure of a Concept” in the Journal of Asian Studies, November
guided by the national bureaucracy and major business conglomerates (like Sony or Toyota),\textsuperscript{7} and – since the early 1990s – economic stagnation and impending demographic collapse. All of this also tends to be projected through the prism of policies, institutions, and individuals emanating from one place – Tokyo – that alternately is credited and blamed for the state of Japan as a whole.

A closer examination of local conditions and history in Fukuoka raises multiple questions concerning the applicability of many assumed truths about modern Japan. The prewar city was largely run by a cabal of self-interested businessmen-turned-politicians, who were tight-fisted with their money and cooperated with initiatives from the center primarily when it served their economic interests. Fukuoka was, and still is, all about consumption and services, producing exceedingly little in the way of manufactured goods and lacking an industrial base. Despite all these apparent failings, it has remained the fastest-growing big city in Japan – after Tokyo itself – for most of the period since 1945. Its local bureaucracy is surprisingly cosmopolitan in its search for intellectual models and concepts, but also constrained by a citizenry whose constant mobility and economic prosperity severely limit the efficacy of policies that demand active cooperation. A closer look at Fukuoka, with its problematic divergences from the general narratives about modern Japan and centralization, does not make the more familiar, national histories about a powerful centralized bureaucracy and fixation on heavy industrial development and exports as the key to growth false. I argue, instead, that Fukuoka raises questions about how

\textsuperscript{7} 1979 offers a concise explanation for why fascism is not a particularly useful or helpful term in examining prewar Japan.

\textsuperscript{7} The literature on Japan’s postwar “economic miracle” is almost too voluminous to count, although Chalmers Johnson’s \textit{MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975} has perhaps proved the most durable in both explaining the wider economic model and mantra of growth while revealing its flaws – all before the collapse of the bubble economy at the end of the 1980s. For more general examinations of the role of experts and expertise in shaping top-down economic plans, see Laura Hein’s \textit{Reasonable Men, Powerful Words: Political Culture and Expertise in Twentieth Century Japan}. Sheldon Garon’s \textit{Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life} (and more recent \textit{Beyond Our Means: Why America Spends While the World Saves}) offers a detailed portrait of both the scope of interests, and means of enacting policy, present in Japan’s national bureaucracy.
local and regional differences have, and still do, matter in looking at Japan.⁸ The end result is a richer understanding of the diversity and pluralism within Japan’s modern history and – in the wake of the collapse of the bubble-economy – an important addendum in thinking about the uneven state of contemporary Japan between regions and major cities.

One key theme is the importance of the perceived gulf between economic realities in Fukuoka and models of development promoted on the national level that has been an important driver of politics and policy throughout the modern era. Fukuoka in 1889 was one of many former castle towns that, no longer the center of an early-modern, inwardly-focused local economy, had to shift to the emerging realities of a national economy. As Kären Wigen’s study of Shinshū and the Ina Valley has suggested, the transition from early modern to modern economies inverted social and economic landscapes.⁹ In the case of Fukuoka, a somewhat perverse process occurred in which Fukuoka Prefecture and Northern Kyushu in general became a crucial industrial region central to Japan’s nascent modern economy, while Fukuoka City remained essentially devoid of industry. The quest to industrialize the city, directly tied to beliefs about what defined a modern and sustainable economic base, consumed the city well into the 1960s. Transwar legacies were central to Fukuoka’s economy: the fundamental base of services and commerce remained unchanged in both the prewar and postwar eras, but legacies of regional centralization and consolidation turned Fukuoka into a regional champion and hub for businesses and institutions that, coupled with rising postwar incomes and consumption patterns, provided a powerful engine for growth. Fukuoka’s success as a service economy city, well before it was

---

⁸ The Japanese literature has given increased attention in recent years to investigating how local governments actually function. Muramatsu Michio’s Local Power in the Japanese State is one of the better examples available that is also readily available in translation for an English-reading audience.

⁹ See Wigen, Kären, The Making of a Japanese Periphery,1750-1920, in particular pp. 218-299
recognized as a potential development model, represents a significant departure from national economic patterns and plans that nonetheless generated tremendous growth.

A second major theme related to the successful creation of a distinct business model has been the rise of a powerful, activist local government. In the prewar period, inherently undemocratic institutions (limited franchise, indirect elections for mayors, appointed governors, semi-feudal patronage politics) and the absence of almost any local bureaucracies that were not divisions of, or responsible to, the Home Ministry meant that Fukuoka’s municipal government essentially had only the scant personnel and resources provided from Tokyo. The combination of rapid economic growth – and concurrent double-digit annual budget increases – together with increased local autonomy enshrined in the postwar constitution led to what I argue was a relative decline in the local impact of national bureaucratic decisions and, at the same time, the empowerment of an activist municipal officialdom.\(^\text{10}\) City bureaucrats undertook a wide array of projects and policies aimed at managing Fukuoka’s economy, society, environment, public image, education system, and further initiated Master Plans to both manage, and remove from political manipulation, long-term development goals. The postwar city government also drew inspiration both from wider transnational discourses on city planning and economic development as well as progressive political movements within Japan aimed at encouraging citizen participation and activism. While the importance of national politics and policies should not be ignored, the history of Fukuoka also provides a powerful case for the centrality of local government initiative and authority in dramatically shaping the contours of postwar Japan’s larger economic, political, and social conditions.

\(^{10}\) To refer back to Sheldon Garon’s *Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life*, city officials had a similar belief in the power of “moral suasion” and a direct ability to influence society, albeit events on the ground would challenge this belief as time progressed. The fact that practically every mayor of Fukuoka up to the middle of the 1990s also had previous experience working in the national bureaucracy – either prewar or postwar – is another reason to emphasize the importance of the national model and experience on the local level.
A third theme is the web of ties that intersect and connect between local, regional, and national policies and conditions. Fukuoka’s prewar economic anxieties and failure to industrialize were a result not just of local geographic or socioeconomic factors, but also the prioritization of limited national funds to promote a strategic steel and coal industry across Northern Kyushu that would be oriented back toward the national centers of Osaka and Tokyo. Eventually wartime economic and institutional regional policies forced on Kyushu and Fukuoka alike vastly benefited the city, making it the de facto center of the larger region and providing an economic engine that carried it into the postwar period. Fukuoka’s unique focus on services and commerce, too, was made possible both by the spread of national business chains and networks that needed a regional center to expand into Kyushu and the economic and demographic strength of the wider region that justified the need for a city of Fukuoka’s size to develop and continue growing. Since the late 1980s, Fukuoka’s focus on Asia and internationalization can also be understood as an attempt to escape Tokyo’s shadow as the national center, Kyushu’s ongoing economic and demographic decline by looking beyond its traditional regional sphere, and as a logical focus given the city’s premodern past as a major international port and its geographic proximity to the rest of East Asia. Fukuoka’s modern history has been determined not primarily by national, regional, or local particularities, but by the continued intersection and interaction between these different frames of reference. This dissertation makes a case for greater attention towards local studies of contemporary Japan – not to undermine the concept or value of national history, but to understand the limitations of aggregate pictures. In the case of the wildly uneven development and growth across Japan’s regions and localities in the postwar era, Fukuoka tells us a story of relative success\(^\text{11}\) that may also help forge a better narrative of the post-bubble era.

\(^{11}\) For a more mixed story of success on a regional level, see Michael Lewis’ Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868-1945, which also offers another example of the value of using sub-national units as...
that, rather than speaking of national stagnancy, explains the ever-widening gaps between a handful of major metropolitan centers and the rest of Japan.

These three general thematic areas are traced from modern Fukuoka’s incorporation in 1889 to the turn of the millennium. A variety of official city publications, periodicals, local histories, oral histories, interviews, economic reports, personal memoirs, and a wide variety of secondary sources are used to flesh out a fuller picture of the city during my period of study. One of the challenges of doing local history is the very real limitation of certain source materials; the fact that Fukuoka Prefecture moved its Prefectural Office in 1981, for example, also means that virtually all detailed records before that date no longer exist. Conversely, while Fukuoka City’s wartime documents were fastidiously incinerated en masse – a reasonable precaution, given the war crimes that went on within the city – transcripts of City Council minutes dating back to 1890 exist in all their meticulous detail. The general focus on institutional accounts – whether from the perspective of the city or organizations like the Chamber of Commerce, Kyushu Economic Research Council, or other collective groups – creates a certain bias of attention in this research, and I do not doubt other approaches – such as a cultural history structured around a series of vignettes, or following the lives of particular individuals – could offer additional insight into the city’s overall history. I believe the attempt at relative chronological continuity and

the basis for studying Japan’s modern history.

12 Here again, the compulsive archiving of the national bureaucracy in Tokyo is not a universal truth in prefectural and local offices across Japan. Tighter budgets and limited storage space made indefinite record-keeping impractical, at least before the recent advent of widespread digitization of official documents.

13 The vivisection of POWs at the Kyushu University Hospital is well-documented, and a number of associated figures committed suicide or served long jail sentences and were professionally blacklisted. Multiple personal narratives of the vivisection event, as well as the SCAP manhunt for those responsible during the Occupation, exist in the Japanese literature.

14 On this note, even the many thousands of pages of city council transcripts are not quite the treasure trove of information a researcher might seek. For example, the story of near-violence between City Council members over the city’s name, widely recounted in multiple local histories, remains conspicuously absent. The local newspapers from the same period also make no mention of the incident, which is a reminder that self-censorship and purposeful omissions were and are additional constraints on source materials.
thoroughness over the entire modern period, however, offers a clear benefit when making meaningful comparisons to regional and national events and trends.

I have organized this dissertation diachronically, though there are clear thematic and documentary connections between chapters. Chapter One, “A City in Search of a Hinterland: the Birth of Modern Fukuoka,” examines the creation of the modern city in 1889 and the tensions involved in both forging a collective sense of solidarity and planning Fukuoka’s growth and development in an era of rapid economic, cultural, and social transformation that accompanied the creation of the Meiji state. The chapter begins with a brief survey of the history of Fukuoka prior to 1889, recounting its long history as an international trading port prior to 1600 and its relative decline in importance during the Tokugawa era (1600-1868). The reality of the city’s limited economic and political significance at the dawn of Japan’s modern era proved to be a significant obstacle to the ambitions of the local political and economic elite, while the premodern legacy of trade and commerce – focused on maritime traffic – created a powerful narrative model that would survive well into the latter half of the twentieth century. Behind the formation of the city in 1889 lie two intertwined communities, Hakata and Fukuoka, with distinctive histories and a strong sense of local pride that made cooperation among elites difficult and hindered communal efforts to spur economic development and growth in modern Fukuoka. Growth and development were viewed through a very particular prism – the creation of manufacturing and heavy industry – that ignored or questioned the city’s emergent role as an administrative, cultural, and consumptive center. The relative exclusion of Fukuoka City from the industrialization that swept the rest of the Northern Kyushu region, which also was identified with economic modernity, came to be viewed as a major problem that would then dominate local concerns into the 1960s.
Chapter Two, “Artifice of Empire: Interwar and Wartime Fukuoka,” explores how local economic interests converged with national and imperial objectives in the late 1920s and early 1930s, eventually giving way to the demands of a centralized economy and wartime mobilization that were then followed by the hardships of wartime deprivation and eventual defeat. The circulation of men with strong ties to the national bureaucracy, military, and overseas colonial government into positions of local and prefectural authority in Fukuoka matched local concern over industrial development and maritime trade with national-level strategic objectives. Local political and business elites imagined Fukuoka as the main trading entrepôt between an industrial Japanese metropole and its resource-producing Asian colonies, while Fukuoka’s mayor and fellow national associates acknowledged a goal of developing the city’s port as a key lifeline between Japan and its holdings on the Asian mainland. Anticipated trade and accompanying industrial development never fully materialized, however, as the mobilization required for total war devastated the consumption-driven prewar economy of the city and the eventual firebombing of the city in June 1945 destroyed the urban core of the old city. The consolidation and centralization of regional businesses and administrative institutions within the city of Fukuoka, however, also laid the groundwork for what would become the foundations of the postwar city.

Chapter Three, “From Rubble to Regional Center: Fukuoka, the Capital of Kyushu,” follows the city from the depravations and wreckage of the immediate postwar period through a relatively quick period of recovery followed by extensive growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s. This period was marked by the transformation of Fukuoka from one city among many equals within the Kyushu region into its single largest city, with a heavy concentration of government functions as well as branch offices and divisions of nation-wide private enterprises. A transformation in the role and capacity of government also took place, as the dismantling of
the prewar state coupled with increased local autonomy led to a dramatic expansion in both the size and capacity for action of city officials. The most visible example of this phenomenon was the City Master Plan, a highly-detailed and complex mapping out of the city’s immediate and long-term future in partnership with academics, business leaders, and citizen representatives. The long fixation of city leaders with industrial development also ended with the Second Master Plan in 1965, in which they acknowledged the city’s natural strengths as a center of commerce, services, and consumption as the path to future success and growth in the city. The city also stood apart from relative stagnation and decline throughout the rest of Kyushu, where outward migration and declining heavy industry were in stark contrast to the rapid demographic and economic booms in Fukuoka.

Chapter Four, “Together and Apart: the Regional Metropolis,” examines the period from the early 1970s to the early 1980s, and the growing influence of mass consumption and youth culture alongside anxiety tied to social and generational shifts. The focus of city officials and planning shifted largely from quantitative measures of success to qualitative ones, including general quality-of-life issues, social and community bonds, the maintenance of pollution-free urban spaces, and a much more concerted effort to involve ordinary citizens in civic participation. Fukuoka, despite its conservative political tilt, was part of a broader trend of progressive politics in cities where democratization focused on encouraging citizen activism – albeit within the framework of solving problems identified by political and bureaucratic elites. Despite a continued increase in efforts through newsletters, surveys, and outreach programs by City Hall to engage with city residents, both the willingness and ability of citizens to participate was limited. This period of social flux also brought new opportunities, in the form of a lively youth culture that contributed both to Fukuoka’s image as a creative, attractive metropolis, and economically
in the form of bolstering mass consumption targeted at the young. This also stood in stark contrast to the fortunes of the larger Kyushu region, where decades of outward migration and deindustrialization created increasing gaps in wealth and demography that separated Fukuoka from what truly had become a hinterland.

Chapter Five, “Redefined Localism and Regionalism: Fukuoka and Post-Bubble Japan,” chronicles the growing international orientation of the city beginning in the 1980s, examining its continued resilience in contrast to both general regional and national hardships in the wake of the collapsed bubble-economy in the 1990s. Fukuoka, in celebration of its centennial anniversary since incorporation, planned an event that evolved into the 1989 Asian-Pacific Exposition. The Exposition was, in the eyes of local political leaders, an opportunity to differentiate Fukuoka and create a municipal image beyond that of a miniature version of Tokyo. It also led to cooperation with a large number of international partners that evolved into longer-term relationships and a new, continued emphasis on relationships with Asian partners well beyond Japan. In contrast, the city’s role as the regional hub of Kyushu came under increasing strain. Fukuoka’s role as a regional hub city, as well as the new residents it relied on for continued expansion, both came under threat as demographic contraction and economic difficulties buffeted the rest of Kyushu. The dawn of the new millennium saw the city at a crossroads: a major Japanese metropolis with international aspirations, a strongly-defined identity and active, creative local advocates, but faced with the same uncertain future associated with larger shifts across Kyushu and Japan as a whole.

The study concludes with an Epilogue that looks at the recent history and projected future of the city of Fukuoka, and reflects on how the modern city has transformed since its foundation in 1889. Japan faces what seems to be the inevitable reality of a shrinking, ageing population that
will impact both the demands placed on the state and its ability to fund and provide for the increased social and welfare needs of its population. Through its focus on Asia and continued aggressive efforts to draw in new residents from elsewhere in Japan, Fukuoka has attempted to avoid the crisis at hand; at best, however, it can only delay a problem that requires solutions that only national, or perhaps regional, cooperation and policies can provide. In short, the success of Fukuoka and other major cities is ultimately dependent on the sustained health of larger regional and national units. Reviewing the way Fukuoka has reinvented itself multiple times in the face of crises, both real and perceived, the study ends on a note of cautious optimism: Fukuoka cannot escape the fate of Japan as a whole, but there is reason to believe that neither city nor nation share a future that need be inherently bleak.
Chapter One: A City in Search of a Hinterland: The Birth of Modern Fukuoka

There is a local saying in Fukuoka that “Hakata is Fukuoka, Fukuoka is Hakata,” used to express the oneness or sameness of two different things. Visitors to contemporary Fukuoka from elsewhere in Japan would probably agree with the sentiment: travelers coming into the modern metropolis of a million-and-a-half people most likely arrive either by rail at Hakata Station or air at Fukuoka Airport, both located in Hakata Ward (ku), and hear locals speak in a dialect interchangeably called Hakata-ben or Fukuoka-ben. In a similar manner, Hakata Dontaku and Hakata Gion Yamagasa, two major festivals, are the two most-associated identity markers for Fukuoka in national surveys. The expression is well-reflected by the variety of ways in which traditions and histories associated with Hakata are at the center of modern Fukuoka’s larger identity and immediately recognized as referencing the same locale.

The phrase “Hakata is Fukuoka, Fukuoka is Hakata” would not have been a persuasive sentiment when modern Fukuoka took form, however. The expression, according to Hakata kotowaza sanpo (A Walk Through Hakata Proverbs), has no long history of use and is, in effect, a construction of the modern era. The modern city was formed through an administrative merger of Hakata and Fukuoka, twin communities since the early seventeenth century, in 1889. The new city was first divided into two sections: Hakata Ward and Fukuoka Ward, directly synonymous with the previous cities’ boundaries. For the City Council, which was bitterly divided along geographic rather than ideological fault lines into the 1910s, the very name of the

---

1 See Daitoshi kikakushukansha kaigi, Daitoshi to aidentiti, pp. 82-87, for a list of identity markers and word associations given in reference to Japan’s largest cities by sample groups of their own residents and those in similarly-sized cities.  
2 Egajira Kō, Hakata kotowaza sanpo, pp. 1-4
city – Fukuoka – antagonized the Hakata faction, who made several attempts to change the name “back” to Hakata. The path to synonymy between Hakata and Fukuoka and the formation of the modern city was, in short, both complicated and contested.

This chapter examines the formation of modern Fukuoka City, focusing on its origins and subsequent development in the Meiji and early Taishō periods. I argue that understanding the preceding premodern and early modern histories of Fukuoka is crucial, for three main reasons. First, the city did not spring from the ether full-formed in 1889; the earlier cities of Fukuoka and Hakata were both well-established communities that together comprised a conurbation comparable to other former major early-modern cities. Second, the newly-formed city inherited a set of economic, political, and cultural realities that formed the basis from which it would develop during the modern period. Third, as evidenced by the passions (and violence) that the city’s name itself could evoke among its leaders, Fukuoka’s local history and traditions played an important role in imagining and defining the modern city as it took shape.

I contend that late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Fukuoka had to construct a new identity and plan for its future not only because of its bifurcated past, but also due to larger developments in Meiji and Taishō Japan that affected the city. As Kären Wigen has argued at length in The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920, the creation of the modern Japanese nation-state in the Meiji period also entailed a revolution of geographic relationships which “required that Shimoina – and numerous regions like it – be remade as peripheries of a Tokyo-centered national economy.” For Fukuoka, as the former center of a substantial domain that benefited from mercantilist economic structures that channeled resources and wealth to the

---

3 The list of comparable cities would exclude centers of distinctly national importance such as Edo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Nagasaki. Nagoya, closely associated with the Shogunate as both an exceptionally large domain and ruled by Tokugawa branch house, would also be excluded.

merchants and samurai retainers of the city, the emergence of new national economic and
political structures also removed one of the pillars of its early modern base. Distinct from
Shimoina, however, Fukuoka Prefecture as a whole was not an economic periphery; to the
contrary, it was the heart of Japan’s coal and steel industries and central to Japanese
industrialization. Fukuoka City, in contrast, lacked the factories and mines of the wider region
and remained peripheral to the emergent national industrial economy.

The distinction between prefecture and city is, I argue, both an example of the local
complexities within even a single region and central to understanding an eighty year fixation
on heavy industry in Fukuoka. The importance of conscious decisions on the placement of
infrastructure such as railroads on subsequent patterns of development, as Wigen’s work on the
Ina Valley and Shinshū (present-day Nagano Prefecture) has highlighted,5 played an important
role in Fukuoka as well. Money from Tokyo, both private and public, played a key role in the
development of the coal mines and steel mills of Northern Kyushu that fueled development.
Meiji and Taishō period Fukuoka would also benefit from national decisions on infrastructure
and institutions, albeit in more subtle ways. The focus on infrastructure and industrialization
would ultimately return to the city’s origins, as Japan’s oldest port city, for inspiration in the
modern city.

**Fukuoka before Fukuoka: Hakata, Japan’s “Gateway to Asia”**

Before there was Fukuoka there was Hakata, itself over 1,000 years old by the time
Fukuoka was founded. Geographically, both Hakata and Fukuoka were founded to take
advantage of Hakata Bay, one of the largest and most sheltered natural harbors in the Japanese
archipelago. The area is also one of the few (if small) floodplains in Kyushu well-suited to

---

5 Ibid., pp.180-217.
intensive rice cultivation. It is oriented away from the rest of the Japanese islands, looking outward toward the Korean strait\textsuperscript{6} situated between the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan. The city of Fukuoka, as current-day local tourism publications trumpet ad nauseam, is only ninety miles from the Korean peninsula and the port of Busan, and as close to Shanghai as it is to Tokyo. Moving backward into the foggy world where archaeology, mythology, and recorded history meet, it should come as no surprise that Hakata takes center stage in the earliest historic records of Japan: those provided by neighboring China.

The earliest incarnation of today’s Fukuoka, Na, predates both the city of Hakata and any other recorded polity in Japan. The first mention of Japan in any historical record appeared in the \textit{Book of the Later Han} (\textit{Gohansho}), a book compiled in the sixth century chronicling events of the Later Han Dynasty (25-220 CE). Within the text, Han envoys reported visiting a \textit{Wa}\textsuperscript{7} polity named \textit{Nakoku} in the year 57 CE, whose ruler was given a seal of kingly authority from the Han Emperor and sent tribute to the Chinese court in return. \textit{Nakoku} appeared again in the third-century \textit{Book of Wei} (\textit{Gisho}), in which it was described as being a separate state located to the north of \textit{Yamataikoku} – land of the legendary shaman-queen Himiko.\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Nakoku} would probably have remained consigned to total obscurity were it not for the unearthing of the golden seal described in the \textit{Book of Han} by a Fukuoka domain farmer in the Edo period, in 1784 CE. The \textit{Nakoku} golden seal, or \textit{kinin}, has since become one of Japan’s National

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{6} Also known within Japanese as \textit{genkai-nada}, or the Sea of Genkai.
  \item \textsuperscript{7} \textit{Wa} is generally understood to refer to the Japanese archipelago and its inhabitants, although the inclusiveness of the term as understood by the Chinese in relation to the full archipelago remains unclear.
  \item \textsuperscript{8} There are a multitude of debates, both in Japanese and in English, about both the nature and location of \textit{Yamataikoku} as described in the \textit{Book of Wei}. This debate – whether or not \textit{Yamataikoku} is the same as the ancient \textit{Yamato} State, whether Himiko represented the imperial lineage (or was perhaps even later re-imagined as Amaterasu) or an entirely separate political entity and tradition – are central to understanding the origins of Japan, but also beyond the scope of discussion here.
\end{itemize}
Treasures and is displayed proudly in the Fukuoka City Museum, proof of Fukuoka’s key role in early Japanese contacts with the rest of East Asia.¹

This ancient history of Fukuoka presaged its continued importance linking premodern Japan to the rest of Asia. Nakoku would eventually vanish as part of the unified Yamato state, and while political power would shift away from Kyushu and settle eastwards as time progressed, Hakata Bay remained the point of entry through which foreign goods, peoples, and ideas would then be spread to the rest of Japan (a concept reinforced by the maritime dangers of crossing to and from the wider Asian continent). Hakata, albeit fairly peripheral in terms of the emerging political and cultural hierarchy focused around the imperial court in central Honshu, was central in terms of Japanese international exchanges and, as such, central to the flow of both goods and ideas into the archipelago.

Hakata, as it would come to be called by the sixth century, gradually developed from the narrow gateway of an officially-controlled regime of external relations to an open trading city with a cosmopolitan population of Japanese, Korean, and Chinese residents. Hakata, while no doubt servicing unregulated trade (including that carried out by local officials), was, for hundreds of years, the sole official port of call for foreign embassies from China and Korea visiting Japan. Foreigners were carefully controlled and lodged in an official guest house, the

---

¹ For more on the seal, and its prominent placement in the Fukuoka City Museum’s collection and self-image, see its webpage at http://museum.city.fukuoka.jp/english/eb/eb_fr2.html.

¹⁰ There remains, as there has since the early twentieth century and the “Horse Riders” theory of origins of the Yamato state, continued lively debate about the chronology of events and genealogy of places culminating in a unified Japanese state. Archaeologists have also argued for the possibility of political states which spanned the Korean strait and linked Kyushu or Western Japan with ancient Korean states, and so terming Nakoku a “Japanese” polity could itself be an anachronism.

¹¹ Hakata and the northernmost regions of Kyushu may have been geographically distant from the imperial court, but were still clearly part of the Yamato state in political and cultural terms. This was an important distinction from the “barbarian” Kumaso peoples of southern Kyushu who rejected imperial authority, or the sixth century revolt of a large section of central Kyushu led by the Iwai.

¹² Hakata was initially referred to as Dazai no Hakatatsu (太宰博多津) in the distant past, emphasizing the significance of the city as serving the port for the Yamato court’s regional government headquarters, Dazaifu, which was located somewhat inland.
Kōrokan, before being allowed to continue on to other destinations within Japan. Korean and Chinese merchants began to carry on a significant trade with Hakata as early as the ninth century, in addition to the less welcome activities of Korean pirates and raiders who preyed on the coast of northern Kyushu. The volume of trade led to the establishment of a long-term Chinese district within Hakata – what local historians today proclaim to have been “Japan’s first Chinatown.” Although Hakata’s absolute, state-enforced monopoly on foreign trade and contact broke down in the twelfth century, it remained the center of a rich and powerful community of merchants whose commercial networks were spread across the archipelago and linked to the ports and mercantile families of southern China. Hakata’s simultaneous existence on the periphery of Japan’s political world while being at the geographic center of trading networks with Korea and China would give rise to another characteristic of its premodern history: it was an enticing target for the politically ambitious, a group that became increasingly abundant as the imperial court’s power declined.

Premodern Hakata was an economic, rather than political, center. Hakata was controlled by a deputy, the Kyushu governor-general, who represented the authority of the central regime in Kyushu and – most effectively – in the port of Hakata and its immediate environs from his seat at Dazaifu. As the power of the imperial court declined, ambitious families such as the Taira seized control of Hakata to exploit the important, and highly profitable, trade it

---

13 The original site and significant remains of the original Kōrokan was rediscovered in the 1980s underneath, of all things, the Heiwadai Baseball Stadium in Fukuoka. Bruce Batten’s Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300 offers a brief but informative summary of the process in English.

14 Batten, Bruce, Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300, pp. 82-104.


16 The actual title and rank of the “Kyushu governor-general” as denoted in this dissertation, and other English language scholarship, changed over time, and refers primarily to the role of controlling Dazaifu with formal investiture from the central state. As such, whereas the earliest governor generals would have been called the Tsukushi Dazai, later medieval officials might hold the title Dazai Daini or Dazai Shoni or, during the Muromachi Period, Kyushu Tandai. Holding any of these titles – Kyushu Tandai in particular – by no means mapped to actual political and military control over significant areas of Kyushu or even the province of Chikuzen itself.
conducted with China. Following the establishment of the Kamakura Shogunate in the late twelfth century, the restrictive trade regime controlled from and by Dazaifu collapsed. Foreign trade expanded, but Hakata’s still vast trade retained its luster to military leaders. The Kamakura period gave rise to a number of powerful regional warrior families near Hakata who, after bearing the brunt of efforts to repel the Mongol Invasions of the 1270s, would turn first on the Kamakura government, then the restored imperial court of Emperor Go-Daigo, then the Muromachi government of the Ashikaga family they had helped place in power. Hakata helped fund the ongoing decline of central authority as warrior families continued to use its trade to fund wider military and political intrigues.

Hakata continued to be at the mercy of regional military families until the reunification of Japan under Hideyoshi and Tokugawa at the end of the sixteenth century. A long period of relatively benign autonomy under the Ōuchi family ended when the Ōuchi collapsed in the 1550s and the Ōtomo family, centered in present-day Oita, swept across northern Kyushu and occupied Hakata. The city then became the victim of a decade-long conflict between the Mōri and Ōtomo families, and large sections of Hakata were destroyed during urban battles in 1569. The city was even more thoroughly destroyed in 1580 by the Ryūzōji family of Saga, who in turn lost control to the Shimazu family of Kagoshima, who occupied and at long last began to rebuild Hakata in 1585. The Shimazu promptly set the city ablaze, however, when forced to retreat from the forces of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in 1586, responding to a call for help against the

17 Cobbing, Andrew, *Kyushu: Gateway to Japan*, pp. 98-102  
18 The target for the Mongol landing forces was, unsurprisingly, Hakata. Recent archaeological work has uncovered both the defensive walls built near Hakata to defend the coast, which have been excavated and can be visited within Fukuoka, and shipwrecks in Hakata Bay believed to be remnants of the invasion fleet.  
19 Cobbing, Andrew, *Kyushu: Gateway to Japan*, pp. 125-133  
20 The Mōri, centered in present-day Hiroshima prefecture and who dominated the western end of Honshu in the latter half of the sixteenth century, had destroyed the Ōuchi family – the Mōri’s one-time overlords – in the late 1550s, whose last head was actually the younger brother of the then-head of the Ōtomo family (the two families also had standing marriage ties). The two powers would then fight largely over control of the Ōuchi’s former holdings in northern Kyushu until the early 1570s.
Shimazu from none other than the Ōtomo. At long last, in 1587, the still-powerful merchant community in Hakata, with assistance from the by-then national regime of Hideyoshi, began to restore the physical city while trade with East Asia, and now Europeans, continued to draw in wealth.

The close of the sixteenth century and return to peace in Hakata also marked the end of premodern period, literally\textsuperscript{21} but also more abstractly. The premodern city of Hakata had never been in control of its own political destiny. It was controlled by outsiders who sought to leverage its wealth or – in the intensive warfare and destruction of the late sixteenth century – prevent rivals from benefiting from said wealth. Despite the frequent and thorough destruction that occurred, however, there was a commitment by both the local community of Hakata and outsiders such as the Shimazu or Hideyoshi to restore the city. Hakata was, however marginal politically, one of only a handful of large urban centers in premodern Japan, and nationally prominent. Powerful local merchants such as Shimai Sōshitsu managed to continue to oversee their national and international trading endeavors and helped Hakata maintain a certain level of political favor and patronage under Hideyoshi’s regime.\textsuperscript{22} Hakata was protected both by the apparent attachment of its long-standing merchant houses, who were committed to rebuilding rather than relocating, and the desire of political and military elites to control the city.\textsuperscript{23}

\textsuperscript{21} Standard periodization in Japanese history marks the end of the premodern period in 1600 with the Battle of Sekigahara and the rise of the Tokugawa regime; Fukuoka was founded the same year by the newly-arrived Kuroda family.

\textsuperscript{22} Shimai Sōshitsu, one of the dominant figures in Hakata’s merchant community, maintained trade links with China and Korea and was a prominent figure in the emergence of tea ceremony in the late sixteenth century. A savvy politician as well as merchant, he had personal connections to both Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi – well beyond local leaders in Kyushu. For more on Shimai see Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha, \textit{Hakata shōnin: Kōrokan kara gendai made}, pp. 65-73. He also appears briefly in Yoshikawa Eiji’s famous novel \textit{Taiko}, in an imagined rendition of his last audience with Nobunaga.

\textsuperscript{23} See Batten, Bruce, \textit{Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300}, pp. 132-135, for a take on the nature of Hakata’s comparison with the port of Sakai in terms of being a free, autonomous merchant city versus its vulnerability to external military threats. In reality, the city enjoyed a relatively long period of autonomy under the Ōuchi until the 1550s and again from 1587-1600; the return of “autonomy” under Hideyoshi was highly circumscribed and short-lived.
Hakata can be seen as a community that existed simultaneously as a periphery, but also core, of premodern Japan. Geographically, Hakata was both on Japan’s frontier with Korea and China and far removed from the centers of military and political authority that dominated the archipelago. Its distance from Kyoto, Sakai, Osaka, and the historic cultural center of Japan is equally true. Despite these spatial realities, Hakata also occupied a central space in the minds of its powerful merchant community and, a plethora of foreign and domestic trade networks, and – both through its earlier role as the sole clearinghouse of foreign knowledge and goods entering Japan and through individual actors such as Shimai Sōshitsu – a prominent role in the spread of new ideas and customs across Japan. The most ardent of revisionist historians would be hard-pressed to place Fukuoka at the center of premodern Japan, but its significance in wider narratives should not be dismissed either. Hakata’s role in wider Japanese history has increasingly been recognized by Japanese scholars, and is an important marker of identity and tool for image creation in the present day city of Fukuoka.

Many of the essential characteristics and orientation of modern Fukuoka originated in the mercantile history of premodern Hakata. Geography need not be destiny, but the birth and development of Hakata can be seen as a result of being optimally located to handle what was a real need: namely, international exchange between Japan and its immediate neighbors. Even as the mix of growing wealth, better maritime technology, and weakening central authority ended Hakata’s monopoly on foreign trade, the city’s pre-existing mercantile and trading networks within Japan and overseas maintained its position as premodern Japan’s preeminent international port. The early modern period created a new set of rules related to local politics,

24 To a lesser extent, premodern Hakata’s role has also been brought forward in English by the recent work of Bruce Batten and Andrew Cobbing, with different levels and areas of focus.
25 The rhetorical use of Hakata legacies and history is especially clear in the postwar period from the 1980s onward, a theme detailed in more detail in Chapter Five.
domestic economies, and foreign trade that radically altered the fate of Hakata as well as its brand new twin city: Fukuoka.

**Early Modern Fukuoka: Twin Cities, New Directions**

The history of Fukuoka, as a contemporary place name rather than an anachronism, began in the opening years of the seventeenth century. The Kuroda family, former Hideyoshi loyalists who had played a decisive role in ensuring the victory of the Tokugawa-led forces at the Battle of Sekigahara in 1600, was rewarded for its actions with the 520,000 koku domain of Chikuzen, centered on the wealthy port city of Hakata. As outsiders with limited ties to the area and their own band of vassals and associated hangers-on to support, the Kuroda arrived in Chikuzen and Hakata in need of a center of control and power. They chose to found a new castle and surrounding town, Fukuoka, immediately to the west of Hakata across the Naka River, which would become the center of political life and become the given name of the larger domain they established. As the center of one of the largest domains in the Tokugawa system, Fukuoka would grow to rival the size and population of its twin, Hakata, although the cities would still retain distinct identities and functions.

Fukuoka was, in its original conception, a castle town that housed the retainers of the Kuroda family as well as the artisans, merchants, and other necessary support for the ruling group. Over time, Fukuoka and Hakata would physically grow toward one another, and the unincorporated spaces between them gradually became the entertainment and commercial districts (Nakasu and Tenjin, respectively) that comprise the heart of the modern city’s

---

26 Chikuzen had previously been ruled by the Kobayakawa family, which was rewarded for its role siding with the Tokugawa at Sekigahara by receiving the larger domain of a former Toyotomi loyalist.
downtown area. Early modern Hakata continued to be defined chiefly by its traditional role as a mercantile center, or *shōgyō toshi*, and Fukuoka was essentially an administrative center – what would, in the modern period, come to be called a *gyōsei toshi* – whose inhabitants were the samurai bureaucracy and those who served their consumption needs.

The development of Fukuoka as a political center in its own right also marked a new beginning for the city as the formal center of a larger region. Hakata had always been a strategic and wealthy community, but also subordinated to outside powers; its economic role had never been matched by political significance. The arrival of the Kuroda, for whom Fukuoka and Hakata was the heart of their realm rather than a peripheral possession, marked the birth of Fukuoka as a political and administrative center in its own right, consuming the taxes and surpluses of its own politically-defined periphery rather than simply being a periphery itself. Since 1600, in effect, Fukuoka has been a capital city – however small its subordinated hinterland – and benefitted from the accompanying economic, cultural, and social perks.

While local political shifts empowered and enriched Fukuoka, national geopolitics significantly altered Hakata’s economic realities. Prior to the early modern period, Hakata had been one of, if not the chief, international port for the Japanese archipelago, as well as a linchpin in domestic trading networks. Hakata maintained a thriving trade in not only Chinese and Korean products, but goods from Southeast Asia and Europe as well. The Tokugawa Shogunate began to restrict and redirect international trade in a manner that had not been seen since the Heian period; first came an expansion of Hideyoshi’s earlier decrees that eliminated trade with the Portuguese and Spanish, who had been the main European powers engaged in

---

28 See Batten, Bruce, *Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300*, pp. 132-135
trading with Japan. Hakata might have weathered the elimination of the smaller-scale Western trade with little to no impact overall, but beginning in 1632 the Tokugawa regime also ordered the closing of all ports outside of Nagasaki to Chinese and Korean trade.\(^{29}\) Having thrived for centuries as an *entrepôt* for continental goods, and serving as the home to Japanese as well as Chinese mercantile communities, the loss of the direct connections that had driven both the rise of its merchant houses and the larger economic, political, and cultural significance of Hakata was a heavy blow. Although merchant networks from Hakata maintained a presence in Nagasaki\(^{30}\) and also play a role in the restricted Korean trade conducted through Tsushima, its continuous thousand-plus year history as an international port came to an end in the 1630s.

Hakata’s international exclusion was followed by a relative decline in its domestic importance as well, as crises racked the entire Fukuoka domain beginning in the early eighteenth century well into the mid-nineteenth century. The Kuroda, like the rulers of most domains in the Tokugawa period, had recurring fiscal crises that led to the repeated printing of paper money and the levying of special taxes to address revenue shortfalls.\(^{31}\) As Arne Kalland has noted, records indicate that the Kuroda levied special taxes on Hakata at least twelve times over the course of two decades (1687-1709), followed by almost constant extra taxes beginning in the midst of severe famines in the 1730s and ultimately continuing until 1864.\(^{32}\) The demands of additional taxation first fell chiefly on Hakata, but spread to smaller communities as the domain’s financial situation continued to deteriorate and as the distribution of wealth itself began to shift. Despite its relative decline on a national scale, Hakata and its mercantile

\(^{29}\) Fukuoka ken, *Fukuoka-kenshi Fukuoka han Vol. 2 tsūshi*, pp. 253-254

\(^{30}\) Ibid., pp. 274-277

\(^{31}\) See Andrew Cobbing, *Kyushu: Gateway to Japan*, p. 229 for the peculiar last instance of the Fukuoka domain printing its own paper money – namely, after the Meiji Restoration and to the immense anger of the new national government in Tokyo.

\(^{32}\) Kalland, Arne, *Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 243-245
economy remained a crucial, and heavily burdened, source of revenues for the duration of the Kuroda’s rule.

While Fukuoka grew rapidly until the mid-eighteenth century famines, both Hakata and Fukuoka stagnated in many aspects from the mid-Tokugawa onward. There are multiple reasons to explain why growth was constrained. The first, and arguably most absolute, explanation is that the populations of both cities were badly impacted by the Kyōhō famines of the 1730s. The famines were part of a larger national disaster that appears to have been strongly related to meteorological problems that affected much of the Japanese archipelago for many years. The impact on the Kuroda domain was severe: more than one-fifth of Chikuzen’s total population (over 70,000 people) died, and the figure would not recover to its early eighteenth century peak until the last years of the Tokugawa period. The famine hit Fukuoka and Hakata just as hard as the countryside; accounts from the time claimed that “in both cities, in a single day, ten to twenty people lie dying in the streets… day and night, there is no place their mournful voices cannot be heard.” Based on Bruce Batten’s figures for the population of Hakata (and keeping in mind figures for Fukuoka were likely similar), the population dropped from 19,500 in 1690 to a mere 13,500 by the end of the worst of the famines in 1737. Even allowing for limited migration out of Hakata during the period, the close to thirty-percent drop in population – in tandem with heavy extra taxes levied by the Kuroda domain to balance its finances even during the worst of the famine – limited Fukuoka’s growth well into the mid-nineteenth century.

In addition to demographic issues affecting the two cities, changing economic patterns impacted the relative importance of Fukuoka and Hakata. The depopulation of Chikuzen led to

---

33 Ibid., pp. 54-55
34 Fukuoka ken, Fukuoka-kenshi Fukuoka han Vol. 2 tsūshi, p. 96
35 Batten, Bruce, Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500-1300, p. 135
labor shortages and agricultural production problems that strained both the perennially hard-pressed finances of the Kuroda regime and the samurai inhabitants of Fukuoka, whose stipends’ purchasing power were tied back to the rice market. Hakata, whose *raison d’être* had been connected to its geographic location, suffered not just the loss of foreign trade as a result of Tokugawa trading restrictions but also a major decline in its role as a domestic shipping hub over the course of the early modern period. According to figures compiled by Arne Kalland, the number of trading ships in Hakata went from a total of 132 in 1700 to a mere ten by 1874; figures for Fukuoka in the same years are twenty and twenty-nine respectively, indicating that while Fukuoka had a slight numeric uptick over the latter half of the Tokugawa period, it did not effectively replace declines in Hakata shipping.\(^{36}\)

The explanation for apparent decline comes back to the theme of changing dynamics between center and periphery, even before the modern period. The majority of shipping in the Fukuoka domain moved away from Hakata Bay – which faced outward to Korea and China, now off-limits to almost all domestic shipping – and to ports such as Wakamatsu that were better oriented toward shipping lanes leading directly to the national market centers of Osaka and Edo. The volume of shipping across Japan dramatically increased but, paradoxically, Fukuoka’s merchant marine was increasingly driven out of the shipping business.\(^{37}\) By the end of the Tokugawa period, Fukuoka’s traditional role as a major trading and seafaring community had come under serious pressures; the end effect was a long period of decline that weighed heavily on the modern city as well.

The early modern period, the span of time from Sekigahara in 1600 to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, should not be misread as a dark age for Fukuoka, but viewed as a

---

\(^{36}\) Kalland, Arne, *Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan*, p. 78. Though Kalland does not specify, it seems reasonable to assume the figures refer to vessels capable of open sea-travel, not smaller scale fishing vessels of ferries.

\(^{37}\) Ibid., pp. 77-79
transformative period that reoriented and defined what would become the modern city. Hakata and its merchant traditions continued under the new Kuroda and Tokugawa order, albeit its unique and lucrative role as major national port came to an effective end: Hakata’s economic sphere and connections were reformatted to serve Chikuzen as a trading and market center. Hakata and the newly-established town of Fukuoka together formed a sizeable urban concentration, a nexus of culture, labor, trade, and consumption. More and more of Chikuzen’s rural communities became involved in the production of specialized goods, and the overall commercialization of economic activity continued apace. The Kuroda closely followed Edo culture, maintained close ties with the Tokugawa regime, and followed the trend of promoting Western learning within their domain during the nineteenth century. If these various elements of Fukuoka’s early modern history sound unexceptional, it is with good reason: Fukuoka was well-integrated into the political, economic, cultural, and intellectual life that linked the Japanese archipelago into an increasingly well-integrated national network.

Fukuoka’s history during the early modern period divulges from the standard narrative precisely when viewed in tandem with its premodern story: much of the unique and particular of the Hakata story was significantly altered or lost. Fukuoka-Hakata went from being one of a handful of major urban centers, linked to international trading networks and products, to one of a number of regional market towns and port. In the case of Fukuoka, becoming simply another regional, purely domestic port marginalized what had been its prime geographic asset: an orientation toward China and Korea, rather than toward the emerging national economic centers in the Kansai (Osaka) and Kanto (Edo). Fukuoka grew over the course of the Tokugawa period in an absolute sense, but its comparative importance declined; new urban

38 Compared to Edo’s million residents, or the smaller but still hefty numbers of people in Osaka and Kyoto, the Fukuoka-Hakata population figures were relatively small. On a wider national look beyond the biggest national centers, however, the population of roughly 40,000 at the time of the Meiji Restoration was still relatively large.
centers like Kumamoto, Nagasaki, and Kagoshima developed within Kyushu as the center of their own inwardly-focused economic and political systems, often of a larger scale than that present in Chikuzen. In the realm of high politics, it would prove to be the nearby western domains of Chōshū, Saga, Kagoshima, and Tosa that would leverage their wealth and power to lead the Restoration movement that would once again redefine the national set of relationships within which Fukuoka existed.

Coming to Terms with the Modern: Meiji and Early Taishō Fukuoka

The 1868 abdication of the last Tokugawa Shogun and the proclamation of a restoration of direct imperial rule under the youthful, recently installed Meiji emperor marked the end of the early modern system that been in place since 1600 and the beginning of what is now termed Japan’s modern history. Over the next several decades, Japan would be catapulted from a peripheral nation laboring under unequal treaties and immediate external threats to a full-fledged member of the international community and one of the world’s great powers. After 250 years of largely looking inward and substantially atomized political and economic conditions, Fukuoka was thrown into a new era that offered both substantial opportunities and obstacles for the city.

The Fukuoka domain played a limited role in the politics and events of the Bakumatsu period (1853-1868) and Meiji Restoration, but was quickly brought under the control of the Meiji state. Although outsider (tozama) daimyo far from Edo, the Kuroda were also traditional allies of the Tokugawa who had long been responsible for the defense of Nagasaki and assisted in efforts to punish the Chōshū domain in 1862 and 1864. During the final collapse of the Tokugawa regime, the Fukuoka domain switched sides to support the imperial loyalists at the
last moment, losing the opportunity to play a more activist role in forming the new oligarchy of imperial loyalists who would actually wield power. Former leader Kuroda Nagatomo, moreover, was singled out for punishment in 1870 by the Meiji leadership in response to Fukuoka issuing its own currency; Kuroda’s subsequent removal as governor created fresh grievances among Fukuoka’s samurai inhabitants. Within a brief period, Fukuoka domain’s more than 250 years as relatively independent master of its own affairs was replaced by assertive, and distant, Meiji regime.

The initial responses to the new Meiji state among the largely samurai population of Fukuoka was a mixture of hostility and outright violence. Fukuoka, continuing its early modern role as administrative center, was confirmed as the capital of the eponymous Fukuoka Prefecture in 1871, a unit that would expand to its current borders (subsuming the old Kokura, Kurume, Yanagawa, and Akizuki domains) by 1876. Despite this positive turn of events – the city’s early modern basis as an administrative center was confirmed and its geographic range expanded – the former samurai class of Fukuoka held little love for the Meiji state. An armed uprising against the state took place in Akizuki in the southern part of the prefecture in 1876, and sympathizers with Saigo Takamori’s Satsuma Rebellion in 1878 formed a 500-600 man force and attempted to capture the central government’s base at Fukuoka Castle. The surviving leaders of these anti-government activities in the 1870s would go on to found the *Genyōsha* in 1881, comprised exclusively of former Fukuoka samurai and dedicated to

---

39 One telling example of Fukuoka domain’s indecisiveness during this time period comes from accounts of the 1866 conflict with Chōshū. The Kuroda’s response to Chōshū attacking the fellow Tokugawa-loyalist domain of Kokura was to march a sizeable army to the border of the domain, wait, and – upon confirming that Kokura Castle was ablaze – march back to Fukuoka without attempting to engage Chōshū forces.

40 See Andrew Cobbing, *Kyushu: Gateway to Japan*, p. 229. It should be added that Fukuoka was far from being the only offender in printing its own money among the former domains, a fact which further fanned the anger of former Kuroda retainers who felt Nagatomo was made an example of rather than fairly punished.

41 For a relatively thorough history of the activities of members of the former Fukuoka samurai class in anti-government activities and revolts in the 1870s, see Sabey, John Wayne, *The Gen’yosha, the Kokuryukai, and Japanese Expansionism*, pp. 32-47.
agitating for – and sometimes directly provoking – an ultra-conservative, expansionist course of government action throughout its existence.

While Fukuoka’s former samurai devoted themselves to politics and plotting against the Meiji oligarchy, Meiji-era Hakata continued to serve as the urban economic center of the former Fukuoka domain.\textsuperscript{42} Far from Japan’s national center, Hakata continued to serve as a regional market town, but was effectively shut out of early Meiji international trade and largely uninvolved in, for example, the high-profit silk industry.\textsuperscript{43} Hakata continued to grow despite these limitations, and the trend in growth prior to the merger between Fukuoka and Hakata into the modern city indicated that Hakata was adjusting to the new realities of Meiji Japan’s economic and political structures more easily than the restive samurai of Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{44} Another indication of the gulf between the “twin cities” was that the Gen’ya – comprised, it should be remembered, entirely of members of former samurai households – neither sought nor received funding for its activities from merchants of Hakata, but instead from a newly-emergent class of conservative industrialists whose wealth came from the hills of Chikuho beyond the city.\textsuperscript{45} Early Meiji Hakata and Fukuoka and their elites, in short, responded to the challenge of adjusting to the new structures of modern Japan not by pulling together but by remaining apart.

\textsuperscript{42} The distinction between “former Fukuoka domain” and newly established “Fukuoka Prefecture” is significant, as towns newly incorporated into the prefecture such as Kurume, Moji, Kokura, and Omura had their own distinctive economic orientations and histories.

\textsuperscript{43} See Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, \textit{Hakata kōshi: kaikō hyaku-shūnen kinen}, pp. 12-22

\textsuperscript{44} See Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi Meiji-hen shiryō-shū}, pp. 99-110 for population statistics prior to the merger for the two separate cities. Simply between the years 1888-1890 the population of Fukuoka declined slightly (from 22,162 to 22,099) while that of Hakata experienced significant growth (from 26,099 to 29,562); post-merger geographies of population growth and construction would confirm the former Hakata areas of the city to be the “center” of the new city, whereas the squarely “Fukuoka” area would grow much less vis-à-vis the city as a collective whole.

\textsuperscript{45} Sabey, John Wayne, \textit{The Gen’yosha, the Kokuryukai, and Japanese Expansionism}, pp. 84-86
The 1889 merger of Hakata and Fukuoka did not generate an immediate sense of unity and instead laid bare the historic gulfs and animosities between the leaderships of both communities. In early 1889 both communities learned that the governor of Fukuoka Prefecture, Yasuba Yasukazu, had already informed Tokyo that the name for the soon-to-be-merged city would be Fukuoka, which enraged Hakata’s leaders. Following a series of exchanges and insults between the two sides, and a deadlocked meeting in ending in a verdict determined by former samurai swinging votes to the Fukuoka side (with their swords), the city’s name was temporarily settled; attempts to change the name to Hakata would occur six months after the merger in late 1890 and one last time in 1900. Regardless of the veracity of what is now retold in very colorful terms, the lasting result was two decades of a City Council divided not along ideological or political party lines, but the historic geographic boundaries of the merged city’s two districts. The merger may have made Fukuoka and Hakata synonymous in administrative terms, but did little to bind the two communities together in common purpose or cooperation.

Fukuoka’s role in prefectural, regional, and national economic and political structures remained ambiguous in the early twentieth century. Fukuoka had little in the way of direct representation or patronage in the unelected oligarchy that controlled Meiji and early Taishō period cabinet governments, and the Kuroda – highly ranked, voting members in the House of

---

46 Yasuba Yasukazu was not a local and so had no clear reason for bias: the name of the prefecture was already Fukuoka, so his presumption that the merged city would follow suit may have been perfectly innocent. More offensive, perhaps, was that the merged city’s City Council technically held the power to determine the name. 47 See Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha-hen, Fukuoka hyakunen (jo) bakumatsu kara meiji e, pp. 180-183 for a thorough chronicling of not just the larger story, but details down to the supposed taunts hurled back and forth between Hakata and Fukuoka factionalists. Unsurprisingly, the Gen'yōsha figured prominently in the debate as ardent, violent backers of the Fukuoka city name. 48 The local history enthusiast, looking in the Fukunichinichi Shinbun, will be hard-pressed to find any mention of this event in even indirect terms, and the otherwise voluminous city council minutes are equally silent.
Peers – did little to advocate for their former domain. Fukuoka did benefit from its position as the capital of Fukuoka Prefecture, of course, and the importance of the steel and coal produced in Northern Kyushu meant the transportation infrastructure in particular received significant investment from Tokyo. National institutions such as major army installations and the central regional post office, however, were established in Kumamoto rather than Fukuoka: those institutions helped Kumamoto maintain its regional preeminence in both size and population well into the first decades of the twentieth century. The Meiji government created a strong nation-state and endowed Tokyo with incredible centralized authority and concentrated economic power, but its regional policy dispersed national institutions. Fukuoka, in both size and in function, remained one-among-equals in the community of prefectural capitals in Kyushu.

The size and function of Meiji period Fukuoka’s role in maritime remained largely as it had during the early modern period: subsidiary to multiple regional rivals. Nagasaki lost its two-hundred year monopoly on foreign trade, but still managed to maintain both a significant role in domestic and international maritime commerce while developing as a major center in the emergent modern shipbuilding industry. Fukuoka, in comparison, gained (or regained, as it were) limited rights to serve as an international port in 1891 along with a number of other ports in Northern Kyushu; the right to conduct more expansive services was granted in 1900. This more open trading regime that reappeared in the Meiji period, however, did not lead to the renaissance of Fukuoka as a port city. The earliest figure given for the total value of exports

---

49 Although speculative, the role personal connections played in securing much of the interlocking web of political and economic relationships that dominated prewar Japan suggests that effective local advocates in the national political arena may have led to significant benefits for Fukuoka.
50 Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, *Hakatakōshi: kaikō hyaku-shūnen kinen*, p. 38
51 Technically, the port is named Hakata in the same way that Fukuoka’s major rail terminus is also Hakata Station; in the modern historical context, the two names for the port are largely interchangeable (in the case of railroad travel, there is a separate Fukuoka Station and as such the names provide a useful distinction).
passing through Fukuoka’s port indicate a total figure of 123,909 yen in 1907, which would also reflect newly increased traffic from the Russo-Japanese War and greater involvement in Korea.\textsuperscript{52} In comparison, the nearby port of Moji already exported goods worth 6,166,924 yen in 1898,\textsuperscript{53} a figure that multiplied rapidly as the steel and coal industries it serviced also developed. Fukuoka had lost its premodern regional stranglehold on trade hundreds of years before the Meiji Restoration, and attempting to reestablish even a semblance of the role maritime commerce had once played in Fukuoka’s economy would require a major commitment of collective resources, planning, political will and business cooperation that would all be very slow in coming.

By the early twentieth century Northern Kyushu had emerged as one of the most important heavy industrial regions in Japan, but Fukuoka remained peripheral in the new industrial economy. Coal mining, which had been present on a fairly large scale in the Chikuho region since the eighteenth century, developed rapidly into a major national industry that utilized vast amounts of labor and generated great wealth for the newly emergent industrial elite.\textsuperscript{54} The coal industry also provided the basis for the development of the massive Yahata steelworks, which were championed as a national project by the Meiji state and funded in large part by the war indemnity Japan won following the Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Coal mining would also become a major industry in Omuta, to the southwest of Fukuoka; nearby Kurume gave birth to the Bridgestone tire and rubber conglomerate in the early years of the Shōwa period. This industrial network also required an elaborate transportation infrastructure to move

\textsuperscript{52} Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, \textit{Hakatakōshi: kaikō hyaku-shūnen kinen}, p. 489
\textsuperscript{53} Tokumoto Masahiko, \textit{Kitakyūshū-shi seiritsu katei no kenkyū}, p. 42
\textsuperscript{54} For more on the development of the coal mining industry, there are a variety of excellent materials in the \textit{Fukuoka-ken shi} which has multiple volumes devoted to the topic. On a more general note, it should be pointed out that Japan’s major natural deposits of coal are concentrated in Kyushu and Hokkaido, which influenced the initial location of major steelworks in those same areas.
the bounties of its production beyond the confines of Kyushu. And the preferred method of transportation was, unsurprisingly for a highly mountainous island, over water.

The new industrial complex surrounding Fukuoka inspired city leaders to imagine reclaiming a role as the economic center of its early modern hinterland, but a number of factors both in the larger region and within the city itself complicated those aspirations. The early modern period, as detailed earlier, had left a legacy that seriously disadvantaged local shipping in Fukuoka. In addition to the city’s long-term decline as a center for seaborne transit, new rivals appeared that solidified their presence in the emergent national network of exchange: Moji, an old port strategically located opposite Shimonoseki on the Kyushu side of the narrow strait with Honshu, and the newer port of Wakamatsu that had blossomed over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to handle Fukuoka domain’s seaborne trade. Hakata’s historic role as a major national and international port city was just that by the modern era: a narrative invoked by politicians and businessmen but not an objective, observable reality in terms of the port’s economic impact in the contemporary city. Fukuoka lacked both a pre-existing network of important trading routes and a local community of mercantile interests heavily invested in the port as central to their continued (personal) economic well-being.

Improving the Port of Hakata was seen as natural complement to Fukuoka’s potential as transportation and trading hub, but also required capital that was not forthcoming. During the late 1880s, Fukuoka Prefecture’s governor and assembly agreed to both plan and fund the construction of a rail line from Fukuoka to Kurume, laying the foundation of part of the Kagoshima trunk line that eventually stretched across Kyushu, and the origin for Fukuoka’s role as the main railroad terminus for Kyushu’s various rail lines. The city of Fukuoka,

---

55 Both cities, incidentally, would become two of the five component cities that eventually merged to form Kitakyushu, and are quite closely located and essentially intertwined with Kokura and Yahata.
however, was unable to reach agreement on practical solutions to either fund needed port improvements or even to link the port directly with the rail network.\textsuperscript{56} The necessity of modernizing and expanding the port, and the larger benefits it would produce to the city, were well understood by the City Council, which in 1897 declared port expansion to be “the most urgent of business”\textsuperscript{57} for Fukuoka. In the end, however, political and business leaders failed to achieve agreement on financial arrangements to move from planning to reality. The 1897 case represented neither the first development scheme for the Port of Hakata to go unfulfilled, nor would it by any means be the last. In contrast, nearby Moji and Wakamatsu had managed to obtain significant funding to expand their growing ports in 1890 and 1893, respectively.\textsuperscript{58} Fukuoka’s more extensive capital needs (whether as a result of greater ambitions or inferior preexisting facilities) than elsewhere cannot have been a positive factor, of course, but the multiple aborted attempts at port development plans reveal more than the absence of funding: namely, the weakness of a sense of shared sacrifice and risk-taking among city leaders.

The merger of Hakata and Fukuoka created a new modern city, but administrative rationalization did not generate an instantaneous sense of shared purpose or “the common good.” The same hostility that turned a debate over what to name the new city into a downward spiral of coercive threats and expressions of contempt for either Fukuoka or Hakata plagued the city into the twentieth century, as the same city government that agreed on the necessity of port expansion for the city’s general benefit showed a lack of imagination in raising the funds to move ahead on the project. Whether the divided local elite was either unable or unwilling to come to agreement on concrete steps that involved shared financial burdens for the good of the

\textsuperscript{56} Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, \textit{Hakatakōshi: kaikō hyaku-shūnen kinen}, p. 25
\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., p. 32
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., pp. 28-31. The sums spent by Moji (250,000 yen) and Wakamatsu (400,000 yen) are all the more striking given the small population of both cities at the time.
larger economy and population mattered little. What did matter was the end result: the gap between the state of the port and the investment required to make it useful to the most modern of shipping would continue to increase, and the belief in the value of port modernization as crucial to larger economic development continued to haunt political and business leaders.\textsuperscript{59} Despite their long early modern history as twin communities, the two halves of modern Fukuoka took significant time to mature and establish a unified community and shared identity.

The Meiji Restoration and state brought new economic and political realities to Fukuoka but also confirmed and entrenched certain early modern legacies. Fukuoka’s role as a gyōsei toshi was confirmed and geographically expanded as its former domain became part of its prefecture, and the larger prefecture – with its coal mines, steel mills, and major ports – emerged as an area of major economic and strategic importance for the Meiji state. Fukuoka, both city and prefecture, had ceased to be an integrated and inwardly-focused unit ruled by the locally-invested Kuroda, however. Both political legitimacy and largess came from the national government in Tokyo and its appointed deputy in the form of the prefectural governor. Intensified economic development ringing Fukuoka City also continued two key early modern patterns: a dispersed network of local production in which the countryside had similar stature to urban areas, and an orientation of exports and shipping toward the national center, away from the city itself. The relative geographic balance of population and economic development shifted, however. Fukuoka continued to grow, but cities like Yahata, Omuta, and Tobata that had been little more than small towns grew into major cities teeming with new residents. Combined with the proximity of the five cities that would eventually merge into Kitakyushu,

\textsuperscript{59} Given the reality that much of Fukuoka’s political elite was synonymous with its business elite, it is somewhat surprising that more of the city council was not able to reach an agreement on feasible strategies to develop the port quickly, given that many of them would have stood to benefit personally.
Fukuoka was further de-centered within the demographic and economic realities of Northern Kyushu as Japan’s modern industrial economy matured in the Meiji and Taishō periods.

The image of Meiji and Taishō-era Fukuoka was neither one of regional centrality, nor economic centrality, nor unparalleled growth, but one that still appeared quintessentially “modern” to its contemporaries despite its shortcomings. The city’s leadership continued to worry about the failure to meaningfully link into the network of industrialization that encircled Fukuoka and would focused on the port as a solution to economic fears, convinced that the city was being left behind in a new era. Fukuoka had in many ways already emerged as a center of intellectual and cultural life within the wider region, however, despite its apparent peripheralization in the regional economy. Fukuoka – or the still unincorporated but immediately neighboring ancient town of Hakozaki, technically – was chosen as the home of the fourth imperial university, Kyushu University, building on a legacy of the earlier establishment of a branch medical school of Kyoto University and taking advantage of the city’s centrality within the population and economic center that comprised Northern Kyushu. The sprawling entertainment center of Nakasu that had developed in the early modern period on a sandbar in the river separating Fukuoka and Hakata to serve both communities continued to expand and draw in patrons from the larger region, earning a reputation as the largest red light district in Western Japan. The service and consumer-oriented businesses of Nakasu may not have been particularly “modern,” but they made important economic contributions to the city and met needs and demands present in contemporary society all the same.

60 By the 1930s Fukuoka would emerge as the largest single city in Kyushu, and certainly be far larger than its earlier regional rivals such as Kumamoto or Kagoshima, but also be dwarfed as an urban area by the Moji-Kokura-Tobata-Wakamatsu-Yahata conurbation (Kitakyushu). The Kitakyushu cities were also the focus of more direct planning and investment from the Home Ministry than Fukuoka.

61 The decision to place the university in Fukuoka was not a foregone conclusion, as the merits of putting the university in Fukuoka or alternately Kumamoto were seriously debated.
Fukuoka’s modern credentials were burnished by its status as a routine early adopter of new technologies and trends within Kyushu. The relatively early establishment of municipal electricity and lighting in 1897 also gave rise to the early establishment of the regular screening of motion pictures, still an extremely new technology, followed by dedicated cinema halls in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War. Telephone service, street trolleys, and automobiles: new innovations in Fukuoka Prefecture, if not Kyushu in general, almost always arrived in Fukuoka first before dispersing more widely. Fukuoka’s gyōsei toshi status did not guarantee that the city would become the economic linchpin or undisputed regional hub within Meiji and Taishō Kyushu, or even within its own prefecture. Despite its failure to industrialize and grow at the same extraordinary rate as its neighbors, however, the city’s established mercantile community, important transportation linkages, and role as the capital of one of the most economically advanced and significant within prewar Japan all contributed to growth.

Fukuoka’s incorporation into the general cultural and technological trends that helped transform Japan into a “modern” nation helped produce a city that, even if it lacked unifying visions for the future or heavy industrial development, retained a sense of allure coupled with a continued basis for real growth. New economic opportunities in coal mining or steel milling developed in the countryside and nearby cities that surrounded Fukuoka, but its traditional strengths as a center of entertainment, of culture, of luxuries retained a meaningful allure that continued to draw both visitors who patronized its businesses and migrants who swelled its population. Kyushu University and prefectural high schools produced an educated elite, Nakasu’s theaters and bars and – as the era progressed – cinemas continued to lure consumers downtown, and the blend of streetcars, electric lighting, and an increasing array of goods for sale in the shopping arcades and complexes of the city lured shoppers onto the streets. Fukuoka

62 Nōma Yoshihiro, Fukuoka Hakata eiga hyakunen, pp. 2-8
was not simply a city of consumption and showpiece modernity, but the very scale of the city –
of its population, its plethora of shops and businesses, of its increasingly impressive
infrastructure – also helped create Fukuoka as a place radically different from the rough mining
and agricultural communities that comprised its hinterland. Established elites worried about
competition with regional rivals and relative economic significance, but for countless farmers
and miners who continued to migrate into the city during the Meiji and Taisho period, Fukuoka
was a place full of opportunity and potential set apart from the largely traditional and
unchanged world of rural Japan just beyond the city limits.

**Regional Anxieties and Aspirations**

Fukuoka, by the early Taishō period, was clearly established as one of the leading cities
of Kyushu. It was the home of one of the elite imperial universities, the center of political life
and authority in the most populous and economically advanced prefecture in Kyushu, a
thoroughly modern city of electric lights, street trolleys, and cinemas. At the same time,
Fukuoka was but one of many large cities within Kyushu: Nagasaki was similarly large with its
major port and nationally significant shipbuilding industry; Yahata grew with incredible speed
based on its steel industry; the surrounding cities of Moji, Wakamatsu, Tobata, and Kokura
grew at similarly feverish paces as heavy industry generated an enormous demand for labor
and the services that those new laborers would require, and the transportation of the industrial
goods being produced. Early twentieth century Fukuoka resembled other prefectural capitals
like Kagoshima and Kumamoto as a large city whose prosperity was tied to its role as an
administrative center; it was, however, smaller or of similar size to many of the cities within its
own prefecture, an oddity within the usual pattern of urbanization and population concentration in modern Japan.

The story of Meiji and Taishō Fukuoka is bifurcated into a reality of continuing growth, on a scale actually far more rapid than anything during the Tokugawa period, set against a deeply held conviction of the city’s elites that Fukuoka had not found a sustainable path to success in modern Japan. Bypassed by the state-led and funded industrial development schemes of the earlier Meiji period that had established Yahata as Japan’s great steel center or Nagasaki as a major shipbuilding center, and in a struggle with other regional cities such as Kumamoto for the favorable placement of national institutions and installations within its city limits, Fukuoka’s leaders looked backward to past glories in hopes of finding a path toward a better future. For both the same dissatisfied Fukuoka samurai who founded the Genyōsha and the Hakata merchants who balked at abandoning the Hakata name and its mercantile legacy, the premodern and early modern past represented the familiar promise of a time when Fukuoka was a success story, and its path to prosperity clearly defined and secured.

The longevity of discussion and planning to turn Fukuoka’s long neglected port into a modern international entrepôt represented a way to reconcile anxieties about the city’s place within the emerging realities of modern Japan within the comfortable confines of a traditional understanding about what had made Fukuoka important. When the Hakata faction objected to the Fukuoka name for the merged city, the argument was predicated not on an antipathy toward “Fukuoka” per se, but rather on an endorsement of the understanding that “Hakata” reflected a long local history of prominence and success based on international trade and seafaring.63 The port of Hakata was, even after the relative general economic decline and absolute drop in shipping that occurred within the early modern era, still symbolically linked to success and

---

63 Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha-hen, Fukuoka hyakunen (jo) bakumatsu kara meiji e, pp. 181-182
prosperity by the modern citizens of Fukuoka. This narrative alone, however, was not enough to convince either private individuals or the collective city government in Meiji and early Taishō to muster the cooperation and financial resources necessary to bring the port into the modern era. It would take a new emerging discourse, one centered on the both the demands and opportunities of an expanding Japanese Empire, that would create a new focus and vision for modern Fukuoka: a dream in which Fukuoka would once again thrive as an international port, not a peripheral regional city on the western edge of Japan but a central linchpin in an imperial network.
Chapter Two: Artifice of Empire: Interwar and Wartime Fukuoka

On March 25, 1927, the Eastern Industrial Exhibition opened in Fukuoka amidst great fanfare. Celebrated in photographs, postcards, and colorful tourist maps of the city, the Exhibition showcased a series of spectacular structures near the grounds of what had been Fukuoka Castle in a vast lakeside area that would eventually coalesce into the city’s finest park, Ohori kōen. Running for sixty days and welcoming over a million-and-a-half visitors, the event was both a source of general civic pride – the scope and scale of the Exhibition had outclassed a similar event held in regional rival Kumamoto – and, at higher levels, of political calculation. Mixed in with familiar themes extolling the virtues of industrial and commercial success and pride in the city was a novel argument that became paramount in subsequent years: Fukuoka as a linchpin in the Japanese Empire, uniquely placed to both further the good of the imperial project and, of more tangible and local interest, to itself benefit economically as a strategic entrepôt between colonies and the collective metropole.

This chapter charts the city of Fukuoka from the Interwar Shōwa period of the 1920s and 1930s to the Pacific War ending in 1945, focusing on the continued physical expansion of the city and shifts in city aspirations connected to a prewar embrace of imperialism and less-than-voluntary wartime transformations. I argue that the voluntary embrace of Japanese imperialism in Fukuoka by its political and business elites resulted from a belief that Japan’s colonial empire met local economic self-interest. This conviction did not develop autonomously, however. Tokizane Akiho, the city’s mayor from 1926 to 1930, and other outside officials with backgrounds in the national and colonial bureaucracy were, I contend, an essential part of the diffusion and embrace of national and imperial ideological goals in prewar regional Japan. Tokizane was central to the success of Fukuoka’s Eastern Industrial Exhibition in 1927, and
subsequent port development efforts and extensive studies and plans for developing Fukuoka into an imperial *entrepôt* that followed.

The Interwar period marked not only new ideologically-charged imperial aspirations, but continued population and economic growth at home. The city’s role as a commercial and consumption center continued, with the construction of department stores, dedicated movie theaters, the municipal zoo, and various other new facilities and infrastructure. The city’s geographic size expanded seven-fold through the annexation of a number of neighboring communities, leading Fukuoka to the status of Kyushu’s largest, most populous city by the late 1930s. The city, despite its rapid expansion, also remained dominated both economically and demographically by the same core that had formed early-modern Fukuoka and Hakata. Formal city planning, under the aegis of the Home Ministry, also first appeared during this period. Bypassing local politicians and expertise and focused on plans for deconcentration of Fukuoka’s urban core and heavy industrialization, formal planning remained a tale of underfunded aspirations with limited impact on prewar Fukuoka. I assert that Interwar Fukuoka was marked by a continuation of the same failed industrialization plans detailed in Chapter One and robust growth in services, commerce, and consumption that formed the actual basis of the local economy.

Wartime Fukuoka, in contrast to the Interwar period, marked a fundamental break with much of the prewar period. The outbreak of total war with China in 1937 quickly led to mobilization at home in Japan and a rapid expansion of state control over daily life. An ever-expanding regime of rationed goods, forced closures and mergers of many businesses, the nationalization of key areas of economic production and infrastructure, and restrictions on public life more generally radically altered both city and nation. Fukuoka, I argue, was an immediate
victim but ultimate beneficiary of wider wartime transformation. The rationing of basic commodities constrained the lives of ordinary citizens was a universal Japanese experience, but prohibitions on consumption, commerce, and in particular leisure (luxury items, restaurants, entertainment) undermined the existing local economy. New wartime industrial production and increased trade with Japan’s wartime empire were fleeting, and the firebombing of Fukuoka in June 1945 destroyed the heart of the city. Despite the physical depravations and destruction of the Pacific War, Fukuoka benefitted from an influx of government institutions and new consolidated regional business conglomerates that were created by wartime centralization and regional concentration policies. The transwar endurance of business and government concentration within Fukuoka became, I contend, the basis for rapid recovery and growth that enabled postwar prosperity.

New Approaches to Familiar Goals

In early March 1926, Tokizane Akiho took office as the new mayor of Fukuoka. Tokizane had neither prior personal connections to the city nor a stake in the political infighting that plagued the City Council.\(^1\) However, with the support of prefectural governor Shibata Zenzaburō, Tokizane managed to win enough support to be chosen to lead the city.\(^2\) Tokizane would go on to lead the city until 1930 despite these less-than-populist origins, and leave behind a legacy that extended farther and deeper than his limited tenure as mayor. Tokizane, aloof from the agendas and feuds of party politics, still brought with him a political program with serious

---

\(^1\) The geographic factionalism that had plagued earlier Fukuoka politics had vanished, replaced by the rise of political parties that generated a new partisan divide within local interest groups and continued to hamper decision-making on major issues. In Tokizane’s era, the feud-du-jour was between Kenseikai and Seiyūkai factions.

\(^2\) While Fukuoka technically had mayoral elections, candidates for the position of mayor had to be nominated by the City Council, who were also the sole voters in said elections. The prefectural governor, likewise, was a direct appointment of the Home Ministry in Tokyo; Governor Shibata had also formerly served in the colonial administration of Korea and then in Mie Prefecture before being appointed to Fukuoka.
ramifications: an embrace of Japanese imperialism that argued for imperialism not just on
grounds of nationalism and patriotism, but for the direct material benefit of Fukuoka and its
inhabitants.

The connection between Fukuoka and Japan’s colonial aspirations predated Tokizane, but
had never been a central force in local decision-making. Fukuoka had been the cradle of the
Genyōsha, an organization that supported both Japanese expansion across Asia and had
supported the Chinese Nationalist movement during the final years of Qing China in hopes of
establishing Japanese influence over China. The Genyōsha, in turn, had generated the
Kokuryūkai, an organization that would become far less local but also far more active in
attempting to force the march of Japanese expansion overseas. Neither group, however, proffered
any domestic political program or had much direct impact on the larger local community. The
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 provided a temporary boost to Fukuoka’s economy, but its
long-term effects were little different than anywhere else in Japan. A prefectural administrative
center with no significant local industry and a second-rate port, Interwar Fukuoka was Japan’s
closest geographic link to its continental empire and yet was incredibly removed by any
meaningful measure of connection.

Tokizane Akiho fit into a tradition of Fukuoka notables with colonial connections, but
was the first to embrace the potential of empire in trying to set policies and projects for the city’s
benefit. Tachibana Kōichirō, Tokizane’s immediate predecessor as mayor, had both served in the
Government-General of Korea and taken a leading role in the Siberian Intervention prior to
serving as Fukuoka’s mayor. Tachibana, like Tokizane, had no direct connections to the city
prior to his term in office. Shibata Zenzaburō, the governor who propelled Tokizane into office,
likewise had experience serving in the Japanese colonial government of Korea. This was a
common thread that might help explain the connection that led the three men to run the
prefecture and the city of Fukuoka, although Tokizane actually had the longest tenure of office in
Fukuoka of the trio. Tokizane not only wisely avoided being caught up in the partisan fights of
the Fukuoka City Council, but he remained focused on two major projects: expanding the port of
Hakata and hosting the Eastern Industrial Expedition (Tōakangyōhakurankai) of 1927. Both
projects would enmesh Fukuoka firmly within the rhetoric of Japanese imperial expansion and,
with it, an imagined universe of possibilities that offered new solutions to old problems of
growth and development.

The ongoing saga of port expansion and modernization continued to be a string of
abortive efforts until the end of the nineteen-twenties. However, the motivation and rationale for
progress would become more complex than a simple discussion of economics. In 1925, during
Tachibana’s brief tenure as mayor, a survey of ports conducted by the Home Ministry pointed
out the national importance of the port of Hakata both economically and strategically for Japan. 3
The survey did not fundamentally alter the facts on the ground, however: city leaders in Fukuoka
agreed on the importance of the port, but were ultimately unwilling, and probably unable, to
shoulder the fiscal burden necessary for improvements to modernize the port. So long as rhetoric
emanating from Tokyo was not matched by tangible monetary support, abstract exhortations
from the state about national interests would result in no substantive change. Nationalism may
have been a powerful motivator for career bureaucrats like Shibata and Tachibana and Tokizane,
but paled when set against the primacy of purely economic calculations entrenched in Fukuoka’s
local politics. In the immediate aftermath of World War I, plans were made to seek foreign
investment – from the US-based Asia Development Company, which initially offered a loan of
some $700,000 to complete port development – but the deal eventually fell through. Although

3 Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, Hakatakōshi: kaikō hyaku-shūnen kinen, pp. 36-40
the actual documents pertaining to the deal no longer survive, it is suspected that a combination of a failure of major Japanese banks – or the city of Fukuoka – agreeing to guarantee repayment, coupled with lucrative capital markets elsewhere, doomed the project.4 In short, without preexisting or outside funds to allocate, the business and political elite of the city were disinclined to risk substantial amounts of their own capital with no guaranteed return on their investment.

Tokizane’s great success with port development was less in the physical and more in a transformative vision of how Fukuoka would achieve the economic development and national preeminence long sought by city fathers. Tokizane’s success in port expansion was tangible but limited: a series of small improvements and modernization was made through the nineteen-thirties, in part simply staunching the natural silting and deterioration of the port that had been underway since the early modern period. Both the scale of improvements and direct economic stimulus produced were modest at best.5 Tokizane’s achievements in sediment removal aside, his more abstract achievements proved to have greater significance. As a prominent colonial administrator in Korea, Tokizane had stood firmly with those who advocated educating Koreans for the further development of the peninsula and the empire.6 Returning to the imperial metropole after his stint in Korea to become the new mayor of Fukuoka – which was and is the closest part of the main Japanese archipelago to the Asian mainland – Tokizane put forward an argument that would resonate for close to two decades: Fukuoka’s future prosperity was naturally and fatefully tied to its geographic proximity to the Asian mainland and, by extension, the overall success of Japanese imperialism.

---

4 Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi, pp. 242-244
5 Egajira Kō, “Ōhori Kōen: saiko o moderu ni shita shimin no ikoi no ba,” in Hakata ni tsuyoku narō, p. 412
6 For more on Tokizane’s writings during his tenure in Korea see Ro, Sangho, Reorienting the Book Market in Colonial Korea: Class, Market, and the Kaebiyok Publishing Company (publication pending).
Tokizane’s direct linkage of Fukuoka to Japan’s holdings in Asia may strike an observer of contemporary Japan who is even casually aware of its increasingly globalized economic and cultural trends, and in particular its close relationships with South Korea and Taiwan, as a logical and unsurprising turn of events. And the association by itself could hardly be called novel when Tokizane espoused it in the nineteen-twenties. Fukuoka’s factionalized City Council, based on arguments put forward during the naming debacle in 1889, was fully aware of the Hakata legacy of seaborne trade and its international networks that had defined the premodern era.\(^7\) The assertion that Fukuoka’s present and future economic well-being was directly tied to the overseas empire, timely in the wake of intensified economic development and investment in Japan’s imperial holdings that accelerated throughout the interwar years, was a new argument that would simultaneously manage to capture the interest of Fukuoka’s somewhat parochial local business and political elites while serving the national interests and outlook Tokizane himself championed first and foremost.

The Eastern Industrial Exhibition of 1927 provided an opportunity for displaying both the achievements of a burgeoning Fukuoka but also, at the same time, produced a political and ideological statement that linked the quotidian concerns of businessmen and ordinary citizens with the national – or imperial, if one prefers – represented by Tokizane and other political notables. The concept underlying the exhibition and its goal of emphasizing commercial, industrial, and cultural achievements in a public forum had ample precedent. The “First World’s Fair,” officially known as the Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations, was held in London in 1851, and national as well as international public exhibitions thereafter became a

\(^7\)See Yomiuri Shinbun Seibu Honsha, *Fukuoka hyakunen (jo) bakumatsu kara meiji e*, pp. 180-183 for a recounting of the argument put forward by the Hakata local faction utilizing local history.
regular feature across the industrial world. Fukuoka had a long-established practice of hosting local and regional exhibitions of commercial and industrial products by 1927. As early as 1888 the city played host to the Fifth Kyushu-Okinawa Eight Prefecture Cooperation Association with a prominent role given to promoting the sale of traditional Hakata crafts and products. The 1927 Exhibition marked the ninth-such event hosted in Fukuoka. What made the Eastern Industrial Exhibition novel was because of its proclaimed international dimension – an “international” defined interchangeably with “imperial,” as the exhibition focused on Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Japan’s South Pacific Mandate (Nanyō), and Manchuria as the “Eastern” or “Asia” in question. The location of the Exhibition and its grounds, Ōhori Kōen, was designed – starting in 1925 – to carefully mimic the famous West Lake in Hangzhou, China, replete with Chinese-style pavilions and bridges.

The main goal of the Exhibition was to reinforce the image of a commercially and industrially successful modern city. However, the thematic focus on Japan’s colonial holdings was both a costly and well-conceived element worthy of attention. Given the lack of significant economic ties with the colonies – a theme that will be expanded upon below – the “Eastern” or “East Asian” orientation seems most consistent with both the experiences and programmatic goals of Tokizane, who is typically given credit for the Exhibition (even though work on the grounds started before his arrival in the city). Tokizane, generally remembered as a “good” mayor due to his work on port development and the Eastern Industrial Exhibition in spite of his

---

8 Although the “World Fair” or “Expo” has declined in importance, the Aichi Expo in 2005 or the Shanghai Expo in 2010 have provided recent examples of the continued cultural, political, and symbolic weight these events carry, even if their raw economic significance has continued to deteriorate with time.
9 Fukuoka-shi Kōwankyoku, *Hakatakōshi:kaikō hyakushūnen kinen*, p. 25
10 Egajira Kō, “Ōhori Kōen: saiko o moderu ni shita shimin no ioki no ba,” in *Hakata ni tsuyoku narō*, p. 409
11 Ibid., pp. 408-409.
12 The literal name of the Exhibition in Japanese, 東亜勧業博覧会, quite clearly denotes “East Asia,” but English-language postcards produced for the Exhibition simply call it the “Eastern Industrial Exhibition” – a curious but consistent omission of an easy literal translation.
short tenure, had more direct concerns in mind than the virtues of multiculturalism (if he believed that to be virtuous at all). In the analysis of local Fukuoka historian Egajira Kō the intended audience of the Exhibition – which actually operated at a net loss, despite attracting a number of visitors ten times that of the city’s contemporary population – was a national one. Tokizane invited some 500 notables from the concomitant National Port Association meeting to introduce Fukuoka and make the case for designating Fukuoka as an important national port. The benefits of such a designation were no mean feat, as it meant that the national government would pay up to fully half of the costs of port improvement and modernization – a major incentive in the capital-poor Japan that existed beyond Osaka and Tokyo. Tokizane’s investment paid off: Fukuoka was promoted to the same official category of port regional rivals like Nagasaki, Moji, and Kagoshima. Funding flowed from the national treasury to at long last supplement meager municipal finances. The end result of the Eastern Industrial Exhibition, in a sense, was to lay the groundwork for financing the harbor expansion celebrated in Fukuoka’s 1936 Port Improvement Exhibition.

Reducing Tokizane and the Exhibition to simply operating under a sly economic calculus, however, avoids engagement with the interesting question of why the East Asian (or Pacific, in the case of Japan’s Nanyō holdings) connection was prioritized. Here again the importance of Tokizane – perhaps representing a category as much as a discrete individual – comes to the fore. Tokizane was neither a Fukuoka native nor even a politician as such. His political acumen amounted to acquiescing to the requests of a former Korean colonial service comrade, Fukuoka Prefecture’s Governor Shibata, to “run” for mayor, accept rubber-stamp approval from the city council, and not take sides in the party-based feuding that defined Fukuoka’s prewar politics. Tokizane as mayor was, by training and by focus, an administrator and bureaucrat. He focused

---

13 Egajira Kō, “Ōhori Kōen: saiko o moderu ni shita shimin no ikoi no ba,” in *Hakata ni tsuyoku narō*, pp. 411-12
on the decidedly apolitical task of developing the city and successfully held the Eastern Industrial Exhibition, a crucial element in his longer-term strategy of port development as the linchpin to Fukuoka’s success. His term as mayor was and is celebrated for its successful local projects, but his primary motivation and commitment was to Japan, developed over decades of service in both the domestic and colonial bureaucracy, and to what he regarded as developments ultimately beneficial to the Japanese Empire as a whole.

Tokizane’s commitment was predicated on a steadfast belief, reinforced by his service in Korea, that the developmental goals of the imperial project could be just as beneficial to the metropole as to the colonies. His effort to more directly link Fukuoka to the colonies packaged his ideological concerns and beliefs in a locally palatable package that held out the opportunity for economic success. He directed the attention of locally-oriented businessmen and politicians both outward from home and in closer alignment with the orientation of national goals emanating from Tokyo. Even if the Eastern Industrial Exhibition cannot be read as part of some causal chain leading to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and wartime incarnations of Pan-Asian rhetoric, the work of Tokizane in shifting the focus of Fukuoka’s local elite to the opportunities provided by imperial expansion and development is no small feat. The work of men such as Tokizane, Shibata, and Tachibana, who circulated between national, prefectural, local, and colonial bureaucracies and had roles in forging national consciousness about Japan’s empire overseas and aligning local and national interests as synonymous rather than dissonant is a crucial element in understanding the evolution of Japan’s experience as an imperial power.

Although the Eastern Industrial Exhibition lasted for a mere two months, the larger concept of Fukuoka’s entwinement with empire was to make a far more enduring and significant impression on the city. As mentioned previously, Fukuoka was not – despite its immediate
proximity to both China and Korea – a significant international port when compared to nearby industrial and commercial titans such as Moji and Nagasaki, or even sleepier locales like Kagoshima. And despite cases of individual success or engagement, the city as a larger unit was not a major center in the national arenas of finance and business that would have also translated into the increasing investment of Japanese capital and corporations into the colonial sphere. The exhibition did time nicely, though, with what was to become an increasingly muscular and aggressive policy of Japanese expansion in Asia which, while beyond the control of any local actors in Fukuoka, came to be seen as an opportunity to achieve old goals of prosperity with a new vision of imperial grandeur.

The Manchurian Incident in 1931 provided a new impetus for self-interested nationalism in Fukuoka, as business elites dutifully rallied behind the flag while imagining the new markets and business opportunities Manchukuo would create. Although Fukuoka had little direct foreign trade in 1931, the Manchuria Incident was seen both locally and nationally as a fortunate event, at least economically. The April 1932 edition of the local trade paper for Fukuoka’s Chamber of Commerce, for example, carried a record of the report findings from the “Fourth Meeting of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce Permanent Committee on the China Problem” focused on business opportunities and policy shifts related to the establishment of Manchukuo. Another article in the same edition waxed on about the importance of expanding the port of Hakata in order to expand export opportunities and establish direct links to Korea and Manchuria. The May 1932 edition continued on in a similar vein, bemoaning the lack of adequate connections to

---

14 The fact that Japanese economic historians have devoted books to asking, in effect, where the much-vaulted “Hakata mercantile spirit” was during the Meiji and Taisho periods when nationally successful companies and enterprises formed across the country is a reminder that early modern and modern business models and historical legacies are quite distinct.

15 Local actors anywhere have been hard-pressed to claim any meaningful influence on Japanese foreign policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s, as would any national actors in the civilian sphere as assassinations and provocative incidents created by military factions gained ascendance in Japan.

16 *Hakata shōkōkaigijōhō* Vol. 134, pp. 2-4
Korea and China while offering comparisons of the Asia-oriented port activity at Nagasaki, Moji, and other regional rivals.\footnote{Hakata shōkōkaigijohō Vol. 135, pp. 1-4} Although Fukuoka was probably far less dependent on the Asian mainland for its well-being than many of its neighbors – something that, in the immediate postwar era, would conversely prove to be beneficial – there was a clear sense among the local business elite (which, in the prewar period, also translated easily into the political elite) that Fukuoka’s economic future was tied directly to its ability to fit into an emerging network of trade within Japan’s larger imperial sphere.

Enthusiasm for the opportunities a more robust Japanese imperialism would provide was not limited to the private sphere. Fukuoka’s city government produced a series of studies aimed at analyzing both the city’s present economic and commercial conditions while extolling the possibilities of what reinvigorating port of Hakata could bring to Fukuoka in the new autarkic world Japan’s national leadership envisioned. The series of studies, produced over the span of some seven years between 1936 and 1943, began with a simple overview of the port of Hakata and its economic and trade roles, but expanded quickly to look at the trade possibilities between Fukuoka and Manchuria, Northern China, Central China, and Korea, as well as connections with other parts of Kyushu (and the small, nearby islands of Iki and Tsushima). Produced by the Fukuoka City Commerce Section (shōkōka), the studies provide an insight into the convergent goals of private business interests and public officials – chiefly, the economic development of the city – but also offer a frank account of just where Fukuoka stood vis-à-vis the actual economies at work in the Kyushu region, and the relationship between metropole and colonies.

The earliest of the series of reports, the 1936 “A Comprehensive View of the Port of Hakata,”\footnote{The literal Japanese title is simply Hakatakō taikan (博多港大観).} offers a starting point to understand Fukuoka’s relative economic position and role in
its larger region immediately before wartime mobilization and centralization took hold. Beginning with the almost prerequisite reminder of Hakata’s 2,000 years as a trading center and a brief overview of that history leading up to 1936 (including a list of all recent construction projects), the report then moved on to define the area perceived as Hakata’s economic sphere of interest which carefully omitted the heavy industrial regions to the northeast (Moji, Kokura, Yahata, etc.) but laid claim to the rest of Fukuoka Prefecture and immediate parts of Saga prefecture (including Saga City). A brief description of production and consumption follows, noting both the total population (1.4 million) and annual economic (245 million yen) output of the region before declaring that research on consumption, while “a problem of the utmost interest and concern,” was also extremely complicated to study and would remain a “problem for future study.” Given the city’s economic base was comprised more of shops and services than factories and mines, the issue of consumption was rightfully a topic of interest, if less relevant perhaps to the immediate goals of identifying port traffic and import and export opportunities.

Figures on foreign trade suggest that while Hakata’s slice of the national pie remained small, Tokizane’s vision of an Asia-oriented trade network and the Chamber of Commerce’s optimism about Manchukuo were both prescient. Between 1932 and 1934, the value of exports passing through Hakata almost quadrupled in value (from 524,214 yen to 2,185,894 yen), and those going to Manchukuo in particular tripled (from 111,100 yen to 334,494 yen). The value of “important exports” (chiefly a variety of consumer goods including flour, athletic shoes, rubber soles, and other miscellany) likewise quadrupled over the time period, while “important imports” (petroleum and other fuels accounted for more than 90% of the total value, and was

19 Fukuoka-shiyakusho, Hakatakō taikan, p. 8
20 Ibid., p. 15
21 Ibid., p. 90
rivaled in volume only by soybeans and azuki beans) actually declined by almost a third. Still, by comparison, the value of import and exports passing through nearby Moji for 1934 were 73.93 million yen and 51.95 million yen, respectively – an indication of just where Fukuoka stood vis-à-vis its better-established regional port rivals. Slowly but steadily, Fukuoka’s investment in its port and in an orientation towards Asia seemed to be maturing in value. The idea that it would reclaim its 2,000 year status as the primary international entrepôt for Japan – or even just Kyushu – remained fantastical at best, however. Even within its self-proclaimed sphere, a look at figures provided for early 1940 demonstrate Fukuoka’s marginal position. Taking the example of sake produced in Saga, 90% of the finished product shipped beyond the local region was still being sent out from Moji – despite the geographic reality that Moji is twice as far from Saga as Hakata and, either by train or by truck, any shipment would have to physically pass through Fukuoka on its way to Moji. Fukuoka’s trade may have increased along with the general economic expansion of the nineteen-thirties, but it was not fundamentally realigning the existing economic order or its marginal status within that order.

The surveys produced on trade with Asia, likewise, indicate optimism about what could become of Fukuoka’s maritime commerce, rather than an account of contemporary success. The areas examined were, in chronological order: Manchukuo (1937), Northern China (1939), Central China (1941), Taiwan (1941), Korea (1942), and a final return to “Eastern Manchuria” (1943). Exempting the ubiquitous wartime references to “Great Fukuoka” (Daifukuoka), the actual content of all these studies is almost categorically identical: an overview of the port of Hakata and its immediate economic backdrop and major local products and companies in northern Kyushu with significant exports, followed by mountains of data about the foreign

---

22 Ibid., pp. 91-93
23 Fukuoka-shiyakusho, Hakatakō to Taiwan, pp. 85-86
subject area on demography, major products, major markets, chief existing ports, government structure, and a conclusion looking at existing trade between the subject area, Fukuoka, and Fukuoka’s immediate rivals (typically Moji and Nagasaki, sometimes also the port of Miike). However, there was no detailed explanation on how to redirect existing traffic to Fukuoka, generate new traffic, or otherwise formulate useful policies or business initiatives. Given the wartime economic system and its centralized economic planning that had both rationed goods and abolished commodity markets, what exactly all the information collected by city bureaucrats was to be practically used for seems even more opaque. In the end, despite the vast and systematic collection of data that could hypothetically be of immense use to both private businesses in the city and economic planners at city hall, Fukuoka’s prewar dreams of a maritime mercantile empire never had a real chance to blossom.

Fukuoka’s embrace of the empire, much like its enthusiasm for port development, would prove to be largely aspirational. Barring the involuntary effects of wartime imperialism and centralized controls, it was always more real in planning and discourse than in concrete developments with tangible consequences. Despite these significant caveats, the imagination of what Fukuoka could be, what the empire could trigger and support, manages to illuminate another broadly important to understanding the history of the prewar and wartime city: the rise of planning, official and otherwise, and a desire to control and plot out the future set against the realities and needs of rapid growth. Although the port may have remained marginal and the colonial empire remote, Interwar Fukuoka developed from one of many regional cities to the single largest municipality in prewar Kyushu.
An Expanding City: Planning and Reality

Fukuoka continued to grow rapidly in the 1920s and 1930s despite political bickering among Fukuoka’s local political elite and long-term anxieties about the city’s (self-proclaimed) rightful status as a major actor in modern Japan’s economy. Whereas the city population had been less than 50,000 at the time of its incorporation in 1889, the population by 1920 stood at approximately 95,000 residents; by 1931, the population would swell to more than double that number at 196,000 official residents. This growth came not just in terms of population, but in a rapid expansion in total land area. The original city, slightly beyond 5 square kilometers in size, would grow to 14 square kilometers by 1926 and over 103 square kilometers by the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. Fukuoka followed what students of American urban history might sardonically dub the Los Angeles model of city growth. The city actively and eagerly annexed its neighbors large and small until, by the late nineteen thirties, it emerged as the single largest and most populous city in Kyushu.

The Los Angeles-Fukuoka comparison is not nearly as facetious as one might expect: the first incarnations of modern regional planning, the 1909 Los Angeles Regional Plan and the subsequent 1916 New York Regional Plan, inspired centrally-directed urban planning in prewar Japan. The Home Ministry’s urban planners introduced the American model as early as 1921 in Tokyo, and were apparently great admirers of its perceived merit. The 1919 City Planning Law, which would remain on the books for fifty years before it was replaced, allowed for the subsequent creation of city and regional development plans across Japan. Fukuoka, along with five other cities in Fukuoka Prefecture, was given special attention in 1923 and became the

---

24 Given the system of official population registration and home residence based place of origin, honseki – an administrative system with roots in the Tokugawa period that continues in modified form to the present day – a certain gap exists in official census records provided and the literal numbers, which were also known. The actual population stood closer to 215,000 in 1931.

The district consisted of Fukuoka proper, the clear focus of attention, as well as a ring of suburbs and nearby cities considered to be within its larger social and economic orbit – the crucial rationale behind establishing the regional plans.

Regional planning was a hybrid of national, prefectural, and local authority as well as consensus, although it can hardly be imagined as local in focus. Home Ministry urban planners in Tokyo communicated their intentions to the Fukuoka Regional Planning Committee. The head of the Committee was the Home Ministry-appointed Prefectural Governor. The Governor subsequently communicated with the Mayor of Fukuoka who, after further exchanges with both regional and national planning officials, would finally relay decisions and policies down to the Fukuoka City Council. However byzantine the process may have seemed, it had the definite virtue of putting local and national officials in contact with one another, theoretically allowing some degree of coordination. The downside, as the flow of information and authority might indicate, was that local autonomy or initiative received very little priority and urban planning was constructed entirely by Home Ministry bureaucrats, either back in Tokyo or rotating on a tour of duty in the Fukuoka office. Although Fukuoka became a part of national urban planning in name in 1923, it “can be said to have actually began in 1931” when the Home Ministry first allocated funds to realize some of its planning.

Prewar urban planning in Fukuoka was thorough in scope, if never quite fully grounded in realism. One chief element of the regional plan was, in fact, amalgamating region with city: the region consisted of an area six times the size of present day Fukuoka, and one of the larger concerns expressed in the plan was preventing overpopulation and reducing density while

---

26 Torisu Kyōichi, *Senzenki Fukuokashi no toshikeikaku ni kan suru isshiron*, pp. 2-3
27 Ibid., p. 16
28 Ibid., p. 12
controlling land usage. The Home Ministry may very well have been more concerned with the deconcentration of strategic assets – already an issue of concern in the wake of popularized theories about the efficacy of wartime aerial bombing – than with the relative quality of life and well-being of hypothetical denizens, needless to say. The statistical alleviation of density through merger was a great success: having overcome its initial internecine feuds between the old Fukuoka and Hakata factions, prewar Fukuoka managed to absorb nineteen additional towns and villages that divided the entire city into over 480 distinctively named neighborhoods – a feature that would earn it a humorous, if not altogether unwarranted, reputation for “reducing postmen to tears.”

What kind of city was prewar Fukuoka, given the patchwork of 480 neighborhoods built out of the twenty formerly distinct cities and towns over the course of a mere fifty years? The Home Ministry’s urban planning section had a clear vision of what it wanted the city to be: 50% residential, 30% industrial, 10% commercial, and 10% left to the vagaries of the future. In addition to this general pattern of land use, the Home Ministry envisioned a vast array of parks, scenic zones, and natural preserves. In actuality, it paid for the construction of a series of roads and left the city government to finally begin funding parks on an adequate level in 1938. The residential-industrial-commercial division, however, was more dramatically at odds with the actual character of the city. Based on information provided by the 1938 City Handbook (shisei yōran), farm fields covered more than half of the city’s actual area, and the division of population by occupation shows less than 20% of the city’s population was engaged in industrial work. If the technical category of “commerce” is blended with the related but distinctly-counted

---

29 Ibid., pp. 3-11
30 Asahi Shinbun Seibu Honsha, Seibu Nihon Daiken 1960 nenban, p. 115
31 Torisu Kyōichi, Senzenki Fukuokashi no toshikeikaku ni kan suru isshiron, p. 12
32 Ibid., pp. 13-14
33 Fukuoka-shiyakusho, Fukuoka shisei yōran (1938), p. 3
fields of transportation and bureaucracy, then almost 45% of the city’s residents were dependent on commerce in the aggregate for their livelihoods.\textsuperscript{34} The Home Ministry’s urban planning had ambitious goals, but no bridge over the massive gap between its imagined future Fukuoka and the actual condition of the city in 1938.

Commerce, as indicated by the employment figures in the 1938 city handbook, was quite literally the lifeblood of almost half of Fukuoka’s population. With over 310,000 residents, Fukuoka was the single largest city in Kyushu and boasted four department stores, eleven commercial cinemas, a number of theaters, its own radio station since 1931, and a plethora of shops, businesses, eateries, bars, brothels, and cafés that summed up the “modern” experience of the city. It was home to one of Japan’s premier academic institutions, Kyushu Imperial University, highly respected high schools and private academies like Seinan Gakuin, and the home to thousands of highly-educated bureaucrats who ran one of Japan’s most densely populated and heavily industrialized prefectures. All these positive attributes do not add up to an easily observable or measurable model of economic development or sustainability, however – a problem noted above in the Fukuoka City Commerce Section’s difficulties trying to make sense of consumption, that inescapable companion of goods and services, in its regional economic analyses.

The Home Ministry’s officials and Fukuoka’s local elite both operated under a similar set of understandings about economic growth and progress in which Fukuoka’s vague commercial trajectory was unpalatable. The Home Ministry, and its alumni such as Mayor Tokizane, valued Fukuoka for its excellent potential as a port center that would link colonies and metropole and become a linchpin in the autarkic economic unit the Japanese state had began to envision in the interwar years (and would attempt to realize during wartime). The Chamber of Commerce,

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 6
which hypothetically represented all business interests in the city, specifically began petitioning the city government in 1933 to provide incentives and tax breaks for new industrial concerns to establish themselves in Fukuoka. This marked the start of a process that would be repeated several times throughout the decade.\textsuperscript{35} The concern of both government officials and private business about the lack of industry present in the city reinforces what I would argue is a larger attitude that pervaded Japanese prewar economic thinking and planning: industrialization and manufacturing was the universally recognized sign of success, and a crucial prerequisite for the creation of a sustainable and prosperous economy. As one prewar observer commented in the \textit{Kyushu Geppō} while praising Fukuoka’s clean, soot-free air and leisurely atmosphere, it was unfortunate that Fukuoka’s most applauded assets and pleasant atmosphere amounted to “an unrealistic strategy for prosperity.”\textsuperscript{36} In short, the general perception – by the state, by business, by astute citizens – was that there was one credible path to creating a modern economy and success story in Fukuoka and more generally, and it involved plenty of smokestacks and grime.

Fukuoka’s urban sprawl may have provided growth in statistical measurements, but questions remained as to what the long-term path to Fukuoka’s success would entail. Given the continued influx of residents and conscious efforts to expand the city – efforts welcomed by smaller neighbors who eagerly endorsed the benefits of annexation, it might be added\textsuperscript{37} – it may in hindsight seem surprising that the city’s leaders had serious concerns about abstract rationales for Fukuoka’s continued development and growth. From their contemporary perspective, however, the local political and business elite watched Fukuoka grow as the odd-man out ringed

\textsuperscript{35} Fukuoka shōkōkaiijo, \textit{Fukuoka shōkōkaiijo hyakunenshi}, p.328
\textsuperscript{36} Nozawa Hideki, \textit{Senzen fukuokashi ni okeru toshi kaihatsu to toshi hatten}, pp. 10-15.
\textsuperscript{37} The rationale for city mergers and annexations in the prewar period, as in much of the postwar period, hinged on a belief that administrative merger/annexation would bring additional benefits in rationalizing economic resources and in providing services to residents. At least some local officials in communities being annexed were also, on a less altruistic note, able to expect personal benefit either through the continuation of local bureaucratic offices or, for those with political aspirations, the ongoing expansion of the City Council and its electoral districts.
by rapidly growing towns in what was Japan’s coal and steel center, one of the true major industrial belts of prewar Japan. Pride in the modernization of the city expressed in the Eastern Industrial Exhibition and in other displays was tempered by more sober concerns expressed about setting the city on the right course to a sustainable, and hence industrially-oriented, basis for the future. To understand what this prewar Fukuoka actually looked like, to see what those in a position to espouse plans for the city made of it, and to know what their aspirations for the city entailed is collectively to understand the powerful sway that heavy industry and industrialization held in the imagination of prewar Fukuoka and indeed Japan. This is a narrative with staying power that transcended the war and would continue to dominate thinking about economics within Fukuoka well into the 1960s.

**Wartime Mobilization and Transformation**

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7, 1937 marked the outbreak of a full-scale war between Japan and its vast neighbor, China. This incident lead to a rapid and wholesale transformation of Japan and its underlying political, economic, and social orders into radically new forms. The notion that Japan would eventually be embroiled in a full-scale war had seemed matter-of-fact to state policy planners well in advance of actual hostilities. Between 1931 and 1937 the national budget tripled, and the focus on military expenditures provided the vast majority of that increase.\(^{38}\) Interwar urban planning, likewise, owed much of its inspiration to both the authoritarian centralized planning in Italy and Germany, and with it so too did an emphasis on reducing urban density and industrial concentration with an eye toward the

---

\(^{38}\)Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, *Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi*, p. 343
likelihood of strategic aerial bombing by potential aggressors.\textsuperscript{39} Japan, in short, had been a nation on the march to war since the early thirties, and the businesses, politicians, and ordinary citizens of Fukuoka were swept up in the same nationalism and jingoism as countless other communities across Japan. The war that began in 1937, and would only intensify as Japan’s theaters of operation and array of enemies multiplied and intensified with time, eventually demanded a total mobilization of human and material resources down to the most local and quotidian of levels.

Fukuoka was neither unique in its commitment to Japanese imperialism nor in its optimism that the Japanese Empire could provide opportunities that were locally beneficial. Michael Lewis, in his work on prewar Toyama Prefecture, has demonstrated how the larger idea of the empire – in idealized aspirations more than actual practice – was an important sort of \textit{tabula rasa} for both officials and private citizens across “regional” and “peripheral” parts of Japan to solve the problems of underdevelopment, economic opportunity, and marginalization at home.\textsuperscript{40} Fukuoka was, as a city, in a much different position compared to the general unified picture of Toyama Prefecture. Fukuoka belonged to a prefecture that was politically peripheral but economically central to the larger national unit. The empire represented less an escape from actual economic and cultural marginalization – prewar Fukuoka was a magnet for internal migrants with its expanding economy, after all – than a potential avenue that would transform the city’s relatively localized prosperity and position into a national and imperial ranking of the highest order. The empire was, in short, less a solution to immediate problems for Fukuoka than

\textsuperscript{39} See Ishida Yorifusa, \textit{Kindai nihon toshi keikaku no tenkai}, pp.152-155, for a look at prewar plans for industrial deconcentration in the Kanto region around Tokyo. The detailed plans developed were never carried out, and the immense efficacy firebombing Tokyo would have during World War II remained true.

\textsuperscript{40} For more on the Toyama case see Lewis, Michael, \textit{Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868-1945}. While the example of Toyama has a number of interesting parallels to Fukuoka, I would also argue that the wide gulf in the larger relative positions of the two prefectures – let alone looking at the city of Fukuoka in isolation vis-à-vis the entire prefecture of Toyama – renders the comparative lens unhelpful for most practical purposes.
it was a tool in the strategy of local elites to leapfrog over its industrial neighbors and catapult
the city to simultaneous regional preeminence and a degree of national centrality. Wartime
changes would further much of this strategy, albeit beyond the control of the traditional business
and political elite and in a manner they could hardly have envisioned.

While militarization had proceeded in earnest since 1931, the July 7, 1937 incident near
Peking – which quickly translated into violence in Shanghai and other regions across China –
prompted urgent shifts within Japan on a level fundamentally different from any proceeding
conflict. The Japanese state moved quickly to prepare for a long, full-scale war that would
demand total mobilization of the nation. Using techniques of centralized planning pioneered
during World War I in Europe, and more extensively developed in the interwar years in Fascist
Italy, Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Union, the Japanese government in Tokyo moved quickly
not simply to prepare Japan’s society and economy for war, but to actively direct and control
them on the most intimate of levels. Fukuoka would prove to be no exception to either the
demands of wartime or the pervasive impact of central authority down to the local level.

The first major sign in Fukuoka of the new reality of wartime austerity and state control
of the economy came on October 1, 1937, when a new law regulating businesses (the 1937
shōtenhō) went into effect. The law covered urban wholesalers and retailers – essentially, any
enterprise selling a physical product – as well as barbershops, and set a standard closing time of
10:00 pm. The Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce immediately petitioned for extensions of the
standard closing time to 11:00 pm, a permitted request, for virtually every major commercial
neighborhood in the city; Prefectural Governor Akamatsu denied the request with the exception

---

41 Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi, p. 344. Given the inclusion of barber shops, it seems reasonable to point out that the major group of commercial establishments excluded in this law would be those widely classified as “entertainment” – bars, restaurants, cinemas, theaters, and brothels.
of the Higashi-Nakasu area, which was chiefly composed of theaters, bars, and brothels.\textsuperscript{42} This opening and relatively minor skirmish between the local business community and government authority, and its predictable resolution with the triumph of national standardization over local exceptionalism, was an indicator of both the level of government interventionism and control that would develop over the war. The reality was that local business interests, however ardently they proclaimed their loyalty to nation and empire, discovered that government demands and controls would heavily impact their particular interests.

Putting Japan on a wartime footing meant, in effect, regulating the economy in ever-increasing detail with an eye to both improving productivity and slashing what came to be deemed wasteful and frivolous consumption. For Fukuoka, a city that relied heavily on the consumption habits of the Japanese from well-heeled department-store shoppers to humble laborers heading to a bar or a brothel,\textsuperscript{43} wartime austerity did not bode well for the existing state of affairs. While some businesses and buildings could be retooled, such as the requisition of Fukuoka’s modern downtown offices and shopping centers to serve as ready-made offices for wartime bureaucrats,\textsuperscript{44} much of the city’s existing economic structure and the accompanying livelihoods of many of its people simply did not match with the demands of total war. Commerce did not proceed as usual, as many of the material goods that formed its basis became scarce and entire lines of enterprise were deemed frivolous or inappropriate. Department stores had their hours cut by decree, although the simultaneous move to put the sale of clothing on a strict ticketed system of rationing – coupled with restrictions on obtaining the raw materials that

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., pp. 344-345
\textsuperscript{43} According to the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce’s own statistics, 53,000 of Fukuoka’s 302,000 inhabitants in 1937 were directly dependent on the commercial sector for their livelihoods; moving backward several years prior to two mergers adding 30,000 new residents the figure is virtually unchanged, suggesting the actual ratio was even higher for those who lived within the built-up city rather than its formal administrative boundaries. See Fukuoka shōkōkaigijō, Fukuoka shōkōkaigijō hyakunenshi, p. 346.
\textsuperscript{44} Fukuokashi, Fukuoka no rekishi: shisei kyūjūshūnenkinen, pp. 221-229
controlled what clothing was available to purchase – meant that their economic basis was severely impacted by lack of merchandise to sell.\textsuperscript{45} Rationing of basic commodities like soy sauce and miso came as early as December 1938, preceded by the first of rationed goods – gasoline – in May (and not coincidentally, one month after the introduction of the first charcoal-burning automobile).\textsuperscript{46} White rice became forbidden, followed by the rationing of paper, tobacco, unpolished rice, sugar, and charcoal by the start of November 1940.\textsuperscript{47} As the war continued, the list of proscribed goods became longer and formerly rationed items like sugar simply ceased to be available at all, no doubt undermining the constant stream of state propaganda people heard and read in their increasingly constrained workplaces and neighborhoods.

Mobilizing Japan for war meant increased bureaucratic management of not only products, but of economic activity in all its incarnations. In the case of Fukuoka, as in all localities, this meant the establishment of a system of associations that amalgamated enterprises of various sorts together – in industry, in commerce, in mining, in brewing, and so on down the list. Fukuoka’s business community was divided, in practice, into some 300 different associations set across a range of categories,\textsuperscript{48} just as neighborhood associations subdivided traditional neighborhoods and communities into smaller and more bureaucratically accountable units. There were also businesses which were deemed superfluous or worse. Establishments forced to close ranged from Kyushu University’s café/bar in late 1940 (a closure replicated at all sixty “cafés” identified by the prefectural police), something that probably went unnoticed in the city at large, to five of the total eleven movie theaters in Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{49} By February 1945, according to figures produced by the Fukuoka City Commerce Section, 3,565 businesses had been reduced to 1,422 open

\textsuperscript{45} Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, \textit{Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi}, p. 357
\textsuperscript{46} Nakanishi Masanori \textit{Hakata yamagasa kiroku} (1938).
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., (1939), (1940).
\textsuperscript{48} Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, \textit{Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi}, p. 360
\textsuperscript{49} Nōma Yoshihiro, \textit{Fukuoka Hakata eigai hyakunen}, p. 93
establishments following the establishment of the business association regulations, with the most dramatic declines in small-scale eating establishments and businesses tied to fabric and clothing. The small shops, restaurants, and personal businesses that had been the basis of the city economy and its general prosperity were, through rationing and rationalization, severely compromised by wartime conditions. Fukuoka’s prewar leadership who had doubted whether or not commerce alone could serve as the basis of the city economy had been right to be skeptical, it seemed. They could hardly have anticipated the accompanying statist centralized economic controls that validated their argument, however.

Fukuoka experienced something far more long-lasting than simply economic dislocation and material depravation: the impact of creating and rationalizing institutions to manage the new wartime economy and state. The national government in Tokyo may have issued countless directives about managing the economy and resources and directing society, but none of those proclamations would have amounted to more than rhetoric without a commitment to oversight and a meaningful physical presence beyond the capital. In Fukuoka’s case, the bureaucratic turn had one crucial moment: in December of 1940, the Western Military Command of the Japanese Imperial Army was moved from its previous location in Kokura, in close proximity to the steel mills of Yahata and bustling national and international maritime trade of Moji, to Fukuoka. The military would center its command, appropriately enough, at the Hakozaki Shrine – a religious center and first-ranked Shinto shrine worshipping Hachiman, a deity devoted to warriors. The shrine also venerated the memory of Empress Jingu, said to have personally led Japanese soldiers to military victories on the Asian mainland in Korea in ancient times – a symbolic link with appropriate heft given Japan’s expanding war with China. Beyond this abstract explanation, however, there is no surviving explanation and little clear rationale given for the move:

50 Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo, Fukuoka shōkōkaigijo hyakunenshi, p. 358
geography seems like a reasonable explanation, but Kokura is not far removed from Fukuoka and had excellent land and sea connections to the rest of Kyushu and Honshu, while Fukuoka is no more the “center” of a region stretching over Kyushu and Shikoku and parts of Honshu than Kokura. Regardless of the initial impetus, the relocation of the Western Military Command would be the first in a series of institutional moves that redefined Fukuoka.

The Western Military Command signaled, if not triggered, the start of a concentration of national and regional institutions in Fukuoka that simply had no precedent. Fukuoka, it should be remembered, had served as a prefectural capital since the Meiji period, but the prestige or its centrality of place vis-à-vis the prefecture had not translated into the national frame of reference. Financial and commercial institutions, such as the branch offices of the Bank of Japan or Yomiuri Shinbun or Asahi Shinbun, had been concentrated in Moji. The location offered them access to the urban conglomerate (and vast market) that would become Kitakyushu, and was already recognized as a nationally crucial economic area. In the case of the military, assets were more dispersed, but – in addition to the military command at Kokura – Kumamoto had been the center of the Imperial Army’s presence in Kyushu since the Satsuma Rebellion in 1877. The navy ignored Fukuoka just as much as maritime commerce did, and had its major presences at Sasebo and Nagasaki.\(^51\) The December 1940 move of the Western Military Command was followed shortly thereafter in 1941 by the move of the Bank of Japan branch out of Moji and into Fukuoka.\(^52\) Newspaper offices and postal delivery nodes followed in due course. Fukuoka was living up to its old descriptive label since the Meiji period as an administrative city, or gyōsei toshi, but on a new level concomitant with the centralization and concentration created by Tokyo’s wartime policies.

\(^{51}\) Kumamoto was also, coincidentally, the main regional center for the postal service up until wartime.

\(^{52}\) Fukuoka shōkōkaigijō, *Fukuoka shōkōkaigijō hyakunenshi*, pp. 676-677
Policies from the center that demanded rationalization led to the creation of one of the more enduring institutions to survive the wartime order: the regional conglomerate. In Kyushu’s case, these conglomerates would be born in – and never leave – Fukuoka. One such enterprise was (the eventual) Kyushu Electric Power: although technically not born as a private company until the postwar period, the foundations and structure were entirely produced during wartime and effectively validated in its aftermath by SCAP officials. The national bureaucracy had divided the country into “Electric Cooperative Districts” as early as July 1937, followed by the establishment of the “Japan Electricity Delivery Corporation” in April 1938, at which point the electric grid was officially nationalized. The primary problems faced at this point were issues of standardization (this marks the point at which Western Japan and Eastern Japan solidified their differing voltages, a divide that continues to the present) and adding production capacity to power war industry needs. It also meant, following a spate of mergers in still technically distinct power companies, the formal division of Japan’s electric grid into nine regional power companies. Kyushu, under the aegis of Kyushu Electric Power, quickly established its headquarters in Fukuoka where it closely coordinated procedure and planning with the Western Military Command. In the private sphere, five local rail companies were forcibly merged into Nishinihon Testudō (Nishitetsu) in May 1942; its corporate offices were moved from their original Kokura location to Fukuoka in early 1945 to escape the threat of bombing, an ultimately futile hope. Wartime economic planning not only squeezed small businesses and entrepreneurs, but also fundamentally reordered upper levels of the business world in Japan. In Kyushu, what had been a thoroughly divided but lively marketplace of smaller companies in certain key economic sectors would be, by the end of the war, reborn as a handful of regional titans. These

53 Kyūshū Denryoku kabushikigaisha, Kyūshū chihō denkijigyōshi, pp. 797-798
54 Ibid., p. 799
55 Nishinihon tetsudō kabushikigaisha, Nishinihon tetsudō hyakunenshi, pp. 103-107.
conglomerates would enter the postwar era without competitors – wedded to Fukuoka as the locus of both their corporate offices and accompanying civic-minded largesse.

Wartime, in short, provided immense economic dislocation, but also new opportunities that would become manifest only in the aftermath of the conflict. Under the reality of economic mobilization and militarization, the regional conglomerates created were still tools of the state, and no more sacrosanct than the smaller companies they had replaced. Nishitetsu, with its tentacles in both producing and running services for railroads and automobiles, was itself sublimated – at least in name – to more significant national economic players in early 1945.\textsuperscript{56} The move of Nishitetsu’s corporate offices to Fukuoka was indicative of another reality: Nishitetsu, like Kyushu Electric Power, was heavily subject to state controls and routinely coordinated with military officials at the Western Military Command in its decision-making process. The move of the Western Military Command, whatever the underlying logic, was in retrospect the best thing to happen to Fukuoka during wartime – even though no local officials had any say in the matter and could claim no credit. The concentration of branch offices of national institutions, both new entities like the state-controlled electricity blocs invented to meet war needs and older players such as the Bank of Japan branches, played out to a dual logic of centralized planning coupled with regional delegation to improve efficiency. The end result was, for Fukuoka, to move the city’s claims to being the cultural, social, and political heart of Kyushu from rhetorical assertion to demonstrable fact.

An additional tool to gauge the effect of shifts going on during wartime on the city as a whole is to examine the Fukuoka City Handbook\textsuperscript{57} produced in 1942. While the Handbook

\textsuperscript{56} The incident is wiped clean from the official corporate history, but remains recorded in the wartime newsletters produced by the company. It regained its corporate independence in August 1945.

\textsuperscript{57} For lack of a better term, “City Handbook” is probably the best, if not entirely satisfactory, translation available for \textit{shisei yōran}. Produced annually by most larger Japanese cities today – and more sporadically, by fewer total
provides fairly limited information, it is also one of the few local wartime documents that remains both extant and readily accessible (the *raison d’être* of producing the document, after all). Compared to the 1938 edition mentioned above, there are broad similarities in the statistical information provided and general categories covered. One glaringly obvious difference lies in the physical production and formatting of the book: whereas the earlier 1938 edition read in a Western-style left-to-right, front-to-back, and used Arabic numerals, the 1942 edition consciously read right-left, back-to-front, and completely exorcised the use of Arabic numerals, the Latin script, and foreign-derived loanwords and expressions. Labeling the 1938 edition as more “convenient” or “accessible” is a subjective matter, but the first *shisei yōran* produced after the end of the war, in 1947, rejected the wartime formatting and returned to the general style used in 1938 – an indication that the 1942 edition was an exception not to be replicated. In short, wartime rhetoric and controls demanded, in short, that even mundane local documents like Fukuoka’s City Handbook possess a certain purity of form that was consciously “Japanese” and rejected even that most innocuous of “Western” imports, Arabic numerals. Between the bombastic rhetoric put out by the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and the self-consciously “Japanese” formatting of documents by Fukuoka City Hall, the impact of ideology on even the tangential aspects of routine activity – whether through outside pressure or self-policing – is quickly elucidated.

The 1942 City Handbook provides statistical information reinforcing that wartime mobilization and bureaucratic control had a tangible impact on daily life in Fukuoka. The general information given – on demography, education, social groups, health, finances, postal savings, communications, and the city budget – remains essentially unchanged from the 1938 edition.

locales, in the prewar period – the provides a mix of demographic, economic, geographic, meteorological, political, social, and cultural information.
What is striking is the population growth of 30,000 additional people flooding into the city between 1941 and 1943, and the relative expansion of the number of households whose livelihood was directly tied to government bureaucratic work. The number increased from slightly under 8,200 households to over 9,200 households in the space of two years, a jump of over 12% precisely as regional concentration meant more and more military and civil bureaucracy was concentrated within the city.\(^58\) To consider the figure from another perspective, the growth of bureaucratic employment in the city was absolutely larger than that classified as commercial or industrial, and almost twice as high when viewed as a percentage of growth.\(^59\)

Amidst the economic dislocation of the atrophied consumer market that had been the mainstay of prewar Fukuoka, a new economic order began to take shape in which bureaucrats and white collar workers would play an enlarged role – a precursor to the eventual shape that Fukuoka’s local economy would coalesce into in concrete form by the 1960s.

Statistical information and cataloging of government policies offers a window into the larger structural changes and frameworks within which wartime Fukuoka evolved and operated, but individual accounts of citizens of their wartime experiences provide an avenue to peer into the wartime lives of Fukuoka’s residents.\(^60\) In Fukuoka’s particular case, the largest group of war memoirs is directly tied to the city’s greatest tragedy: the firebombing of the city in June 1945. Collected accounts tend to date at least several decades after the war, beginning in the 1970s.

---

\(^58\) Fukuoka-shiyakusho, *Fukuoka shisei yōran* (1942), pp. 4-6.

\(^59\) Curiously, the same statistics show the number of unemployed households essentially stable, at roughly 4,500, over the three year window provided. Whether the “unemployed” could also be synonymous with the elderly, or students, or some other grouping is unclear, although a catchall “otherwise gainfully employed” category with close to 6,000 households is also recorded, raising questions about the general abundance or scarcity labor actually was in Fukuoka even during the war.

\(^60\) It goes without saying that, on a national scale, Haruko and Theodore Cook’s *Japan at War: An Oral History* is an outstanding collection that includes the stories of a wide range of individuals recounting memories of various moments during the war. For Fukuoka in particular, the Senshūkai’s *Sentōbō to seishun* offers a number of personal recollections of wartime life for young people, including the posthumous publication of a young man prior to being conscripted and dying in combat.
The most temporally proximate source of accounts available is, ironically, the most recent to become publically available: the interviews that were conducted under the US Strategic Bombing Survey in September 1945, within weeks of both the end of the war and the general arrival of SCAP personnel in Fukuoka. While the accounts of single individuals need to be read with caution vis-à-vis claims to representing universal experiences, there are a number of useful facts to be gleaned from personal stories of life in wartime Fukuoka.

One readily-repeated theme, from factory workers to farmers to priests, was the precarious nature of the food situation. Accounts from those in the urban center speak of the situation being better outside the city core, but even those living in what were effectively agricultural villages – but technically in city limits – recounted the importance of vegetables, pumpkins, and especially potatoes in amplifying a precarious food supply.\(^1\) One man, who had served two years fighting in China from 1939 to 1941 before being allowed to return home to his farm, subsequently recalled that farmers in countryside had the same problem: “… everyday was ‘raise more crops!’ and ‘expand production!’ . However much we grew, we had to sell it all to the government... not enough was left to eat… every day was filled with thoughts of hunger.”\(^2\) Even those who made a living by farming found themselves forced to forage and raise whatever crops they could – sweet potatoes, squash, vegetables – that would clandestinely escape government requisitioning. Fukuoka’s still quite sizeable agricultural community felt many of the same hunger pangs as its shopkeepers and day laborers.

The situation of food scarcity may have been hard on food producers, but was even harder on urbanites that had to find both the time and the resources to supplement their meager rationed supplies. The end result was often to the detriment of whatever their formal employment

\(^{61}\) Heiwa kyōikuinkai, *Sensō o kataru: sensō taiken danshū daiisshū*, p. 4

\(^{62}\) Ibid., p. 5
entailed. One factory worker interviewed after the war spoke of electricity shortages happening routinely beginning in 1943 and lasting as long as one to two weeks; he recalled using his days off to help plant pumpkin fields at his factory.63 One Buddhist priest interviewed in September 1945 complained about continuing postwar food shortages but still said that “both the economic and political situations have improved” when measured against wartime.64 Asked about Japan’s wartime failings, he proceeded to bemoan the lack “cooperation toward the war effort,” sermonized on the selfish nature of human beings, and described escalating hostility between farmers and urbanites over food shortages, which led to declining industrial production as factory workers stopped showing up to work and went out to the countryside to try and buy food directly from farmers.65 Even Fukuoka, with its wartime role as the regional administrative center and military headquarters, suffered from routine power shortages that crippled production and a certain level of breakdown in discipline as immediate human needs trumped exhortations about acting in the name of national solidarity and victory.

While wartime centralization transformed Fukuoka, it did not transcend the harsh realities of an economic situation that spiraled downward the longer the war continued. The city population continued to increase, swollen by rapidly-created wartime industry and bureaucracy, but also labored under increasingly precarious conditions. City life – with its barren storefronts, curfews, brownouts, shuttered theaters and cafés – lost its former charms while the list of rationed and, increasingly, unavailable basic commodities weighed on businesses and individuals alike. The little perks of what had been local cosmopolitanism, like the Fukuoka Zoo, became ominous reminders of the dire war situation as the entire population of animals was slaughtered

63 Amerika senryaku bakugeki chōsadan kikitorisho o yomukai, Fukuoka kōshū to amerikagun chōsa, pp. 283-284
64 Ibid., p. 146
65 Ibid., p. 147
to avoid the problem of feeding them.⁶⁶ Newspapers and magazines that managed to retain
access to paper and remained in circulation became scantier and shoddier, and the struggle for
food security trumped abstract questions about the course of the war or the glorious future of a
unified East Asia that lay on the horizon. “Great Fukuoka” and the dream of a thriving imperial
port must have seemed increasingly remote until, in the span of a single night, it became
completely fantastical.

Imperial Dreams Leveled: The Firebombing of Fukuoka

On June 19, 1945, Fukuoka was hit by two squadrons of B-29 bombers that began their
assault at 11:11 pm and continued until approximately 1:10 am in the morning of the following
day.⁶⁷ Although the Western Military Command headquartered in Fukuoka had advance warning
of the impending assault they also had no effective means of intercepting the bombers, with few
planes available to sortie and inadequate anti-aircraft batteries.⁶⁸ To compound matters, a clear
sky and plenty of moonlight meant that both the bombing aircraft and Fukuoka’s residents had a
clear view of the scene that was to follow. The densely packed urban core of the city,
transformed by the needs and dictates of wartime from a commercial and consumption center
into a wartime nerve-center housing a bureaucracy of ever-expanding authority and
responsibility, was gutted by the same incendiary bombs that proved so devastatingly effective in
city after city across Japan.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Hakata yamagasa kiroku, (1944)
⁶⁷ Okuzumi Yoshishige, Chūshōtoshi kūbaku, p. 82
⁶⁸ Nishinihon Shinbunsha, Kaitei Fukuoka Daikūshū, p. 20
⁶⁹ For more details on the wartime bombing of Japan in general, see Mark Seiden’s “A Forgotten Holocaust: U.S.
Bombing Strategy, the Destruction of Japanese Cities, and the American Way of War from the Pacific War to Iraq,”
The force and duration of the firebombing indicated both the relative importance of hitting Fukuoka as well as the sheer size of the target being hit. Japanese estimates made at the time and dutifully recorded in official documents believed the number of planes used in the bombing sortie to be roughly sixty B-29s. In what we can retrospectively see as yet another limitation of Japanese intelligence-gathering – and either an overestimation of the efficacy of limited numbers of planes, or an underestimation of the scope of military hardware being brought to bear on Japan in June 1945 – American documents have subsequently revealed that 223 bombers were used in the bombing, or almost four times the Japanese estimate.\textsuperscript{70} As a city of roughly 300,000 inhabitants, and a major railway center and headquarters for Japan’s Western Army Command, Fukuoka was far below the size and importance of the “Big Six” of Tokyo, Kawasaki, Yokohama, Kobe, Osaka, and Nagoya, but also qualitatively distinct from the much smaller industrial and prefectural centers that were also methodically bombed. Perhaps as a result of these characteristics Fukuoka gained the ubiquitous distinction of being the only one of the “small-middle” class of cities – that is to say, those targets below the “Big Six” but still considered important enough to warrant firebombing – to be hit with two full bomber squadrons, instead of the usual single squadron used.\textsuperscript{71}

What, given the relative lack of heavy industry and major military installations present, was targeted in Fukuoka? Unlike nearby Kokura and regional rival Nagasaki, which both made the short list of eventual atomic bombing targets, Fukuoka was neither a premier military base nor a major center for armament production. American documents relating to the bombing, made public in the postwar period, reveal a surprisingly sophisticated understanding of the nature and layout of the city and an attempt to limit direct targeting of some areas, if by no means any

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., pp. 29-30. The actual intended number of B-29s was 237, but mechanical problems meant only 223 were actually fit for use on the night of June 19, 1945.

\textsuperscript{71} Okuzumi Yoshishige, \textit{Chūshōtoshi kūshū}, pp. 82-83.
naiveté of the destructive potential that would result from bombing. Describing both the geography and layout of the city, military intelligence described a clear separation of residential and industrial districts, “unlike the usual mixture in Japanese industrial cities,” and classified it as a largely modernized “university city” that served as the commercial and political center of northern Kyushu. More to the point, multiple bombing targets both within the city and its general vicinity were identified and validated.\(^2\) Despite the presence of seven rivers and a number of smaller canals and moats, as well as three large open areas,\(^3\) the survey expressed satisfaction that “few of the waterways will effectively halt the spread of fire.”\(^4\) American military planners recognized the ability to use discretion when targeting sites in Fukuoka that might not be available elsewhere due to clean divisions between different sections of the city, but also the inevitability that fires from any site would spread rapidly across the city with relatively little impediment. The two factors would play out in a relatively fortuitous manner, as the scale of physical destruction, while immense, was thankfully not matched by the actual loss of life.

The end result of roughly two hours of bombing was, in short, the leveling of the core of the modern city. The strategic industrial targets – two steelworks, heavy machine workshops, a rubber processing plant, a naval installation – were hit, as well as a number of the bureaucratic centers that had mushroomed since the war started.\(^5\) In particular, the Western Military Command, Fukuoka Regional Command Office, and Kyushu Mining Department all suffered heavy damage or outright destruction, as well as countless post offices and Hakata Station (which burnt to the ground).\(^6\) The majority of these offices, however, were interspersed with

\(^3\) It seems reasonable to expect that military strategists expected these three open spaces to serve as fire breaks and evacuation locations for civilians, and therefore sites to avoid targeting.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 31
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 31
\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 42-43
commercial and residential areas in a way Fukuoka’s industrial infrastructure was not. The Western Military Command, for example, was centered at the ancient Hakozaki Shrine located in the middle of a densely populated residential area. And, just as American military planners had expected, fire spread rapidly throughout the densely packed urban core, engulfing the center in what observers near the epicenter as well as those in the suburbs dubbed a “Sea of Fire.”

The initial damage and casualty figures produced on June 20, 1945 “rose each instance a new count was made and confirmed.”77 Based on SCAP surveys conducted in April 1946 and widely cited in subsequent accounts, the tally for casualties was as follows: 902 deaths, 586 heavily wounded, 492 lightly wounded, 244 missing, and 60,599 left homeless.78 A total presumed death toll of 1,146 for a massive 220 bomber sortie that lasted two hours and leveled 80% of the urban core was mercifully – perhaps surprisingly – low, especially if one considers that three days earlier, in the much smaller city of Kagoshima, over 2,300 residents had died in a raid deploying far fewer bombs.79 American planners had been correct about Fukuoka in some sense, in that the general separation between residential and industrial areas reduced the final death toll. They were also correct, however, in that the multitude of waterways and canals in the city proved no obstacle to the rapid spread of waves of flame: 12,963 buildings were destroyed in the fire, or 18.3% of the city total, and more than 80% of the city’s dense, central core – including those areas that were the historic center of Hakata and Fukuoka – were destroyed.80 The casualty count, while low as a whole, also hides the reality that certain residential neighborhoods intermixed in the densest parts of the old city – such as the Daimyō or Naraya

77 Ibid., p. 41
78 Ibid., p. 40. The death toll as of 1974 had been revised up to 1,388, as new facts and discoveries came to light in the decades that followed.
79 Heiwa kyōikuinkai, Sensō o kataru: sensō taiken danshū daiisshū, p.ii
80 Nishinihon Shinbunsha, Kaitei fukuoka daikāshū, p. 40
areas – suffered almost total annihilation. Naraya lost 1,810 of its 1,814 buildings and was the source of over one-third of the city’s total casualties.\textsuperscript{81}

Damage varied widely from neighborhood to neighborhood, but there is little question that Fukuoka’s core institutions, both public and private, were shattered by the bombing. Some designated safety zones, like Kyushu University and its medical campus, escaped largely unscathed – an unintended irony, given the vivisections of captured American airmen that had been conducted over the month prior to the bombing.\textsuperscript{82} In addition to the damage to an array of bureaucratic institutions, many leading private or semi-public businesses were destroyed: two of the city’s four department stores, a number of banks, eight theaters and cinemas, the headquarters of the recently established Nishinihon Testudō conglomerate, and countless small-scale establishments.\textsuperscript{83} Hakata Station and its environs were leveled, city tram lines – both tracks and carriages – were destroyed, and telephone and telegraph lines and services were badly damaged. Beyond the 20% of Fukuoka’s people suddenly left homeless, the local economy and provision of basic services were both severely compromised.

The response to the bombing on an official level ranged from very limited immediate help from the city to predictable bravado from the Western Military Command. The day following the bombing, the city government distributed emergency relief to each of the victims in the form of one day of supplies: a loaf of bread for the morning, rice balls in the afternoon, two pints of alcohol (per household), five cigarettes, a shirt, a towel, 100 grams of salt, one needle, and three packets of sweet biscuits.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., p. 41
\textsuperscript{82} Ueno Fumio, \textit{Kyūshū kyūsen hiroku}, pp. 69-74. The entirety of the incidents perpetrated at Kyushu University, and the subsequent manhunt by SCAP for those involved, has been widely recounted in general narratives as well as personal memoirs of the incident, including from doctors and students who conducted the operations under military orders (and were likewise convicted of war crimes).
\textsuperscript{83} Nishinihon Shinbunsha, \textit{Kaitei fukuoka daiikūshū}, pp. 43-44
\textsuperscript{84} Heiwa kyōikuinkai, \textit{Sensō o kataru: sensō taiken danshū daiisshū}, p.ii
September suggest these meager supplies were all the help victims received, and the victims seemed loath to even consider which government entity or entities (the city, the prefecture, the national government) had been responsible for its provision. The Western Military Command, its own headquarters damaged along with other army facilities, issued a terse radio statement at 6:00 am on June 20, indicating that sixty B-29s based in the Marianas had bombed Fukuoka, and then (falsely) claiming that “through the valiant efforts of the army, the people and the government, the vast majority of fires were extinguished by 2:30 am." In addition to orders from the Kempeitai demanding obeisance and informing injured victims which particular hospitals they should report to, Fukuoka’s mayor, Hatoyama Shiomi, provided an official municipal response to the bombings in the first post-bombing issue of the local paper, the Nishinihon Shinbun, published on June 21. Hatoyama urged the city’s denizens to redouble their efforts at preventing fires and preparing air defenses, noting that “it is thought the enemy will continue to concentrate on bombing cities” and congratulated the people of Fukuoka on working diligently to display “the efficacy of civil defense” and “create happiness amidst misfortune by minimizing the damage” of the bombing. The last of the fires created by the bombing would not actually be squelched until 6:30 am that morning – a full thirty hours after the bombing.

However confident Fukuoka’s citizens had been of the future awaiting “Great Fukuoka” and a victorious Japan, the physical shattering of the local landscape and torching of the modern city that had blossomed over the past sixty years was a clear indication that leadership, both local and national, had failed to deliver the bright future the citizens had anticipated in Fukuoka and in

---

85 Amerika senryaku bakugeki chōsadan kikitorisho o yomukai, Fukuoka kōshū to amerikagun chōsa, p. 280
86 Nishinihon Shimbunsha, Kaitei fukuoka daikūshū, p. 44
87 Nishinihon Shinbun, June 21, 1945. It probably comes as no great surprise to learn that an angry mob of more than 10,000 people demanded Hatoyama’s departure from office after the war, one of the few genuine mass public demonstrations in modern Fukuoka.
countless other communities across Japan. The best Fukuoka’s hungry, broken population could hope for was a speedy end to the war.

**Rising from the Flames: Ruin and Rebirth**

Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, marked not just the end of the war but the prewar world as a whole, including the goals and assumptions that had guided the business and political elite of Fukuoka for the better part of two decades. The years between World War I and the outbreak of war with China in the 1930s were, in many ways, part of a continuum with Meiji period Fukuoka: factional infighting in local politics, a fixation on developing Hakata’s port as the key to industrial and hence general economic expansion, and sustained growth of the city regardless of the relative success or failure of the plans of local power magnates and government officials. Central authority projected both directly through the Home Ministry’s officials, governors, and often-as-not handpicked mayoral candidates continued to lead the city past internal divisions and toward goals that adhered to national priorities and agendas Fukuoka continued to exist as a bureaucratic and commercial island in an industrial sea of factory workers and miners that populated the rest of the prefecture and grew at a tantalizingly fast pace.

Interwar Fukuoka may not have been transformed over the course of two decades, but the Fukuoka on the cusp of war with China in 1937 was a far different place from the city that greeted the end of the Great War in 1919. Tokizane Akiho had inaugurated a process of linking Fukuoka much more intimately with the mainstream of Japanese national policies by directing the attention of both local government and popular imagination in the direct of Japan’s Asian colonies. He had not offered abstract promises of national pride, or autarkic independence from the West, or ideological struggles, but the very practical – and effective – allure of growing
prosperity. The Home Ministry, equipped with fresh intellectual frameworks, Western examples to build on, and obeisant local governments providing its sandbox, began a process of formalized long-term planning for Fukuoka that would not be fully realized due to contemporary constraints, but presaged increasing government interventionism and cooperative development partnerships in the postwar era. And Fukuoka’s definition as a “modern city” continued to be reinforced by the rush of cafés, cinemas, automobiles, radio broadcasts, department stores, and other trappings that materially separated the city from the past. Prewar Fukuoka was linked to a common story of consumerism and shared cultural experiences across Japan and, if one looks at the top films playing in Nakasu cinemas in the 1920s and 1930s, the wider cultural world of “modern” industrial nations beyond.\(^{88}\)

The outbreak of conflict with China leading into total war and the total mobilization of the Japanese nation meant, both by design and by default, the end of prewar Fukuoka. Mobilization led to the promulgation of multiple new bureaucratic regimes and legal frameworks that brought about the end of the market economy and consumer culture that had been central to the city’s economy. It also caused immense human suffering among the city’s residents, who endured the psychological hardships of wartime in addition to mounting physical hardships caused by the inadequate supply of staples from electricity and matches down to that most essential of staples, food. The ultimate break with the past came on June 19, 1945, when two hours of sustained bombing followed by thirty hours of continuous blazes destroyed some 80% of the downtown area: the very areas, in fact, that were the historic “Fukuoka” and “Hakata” prior to 1889. When the American-led occupation forces arrived in Fukuoka in September 1945

\(^{88}\) See Nōma Yoshihiro, *Fukuoka Hakata eiga hyakunen*, pp. 77-85 for some of the major foreign hits of the Interwar years of Fukuoka cinema.
they found a hungry city of over a quarter of a million people, many homeless and jobless, who were optimistic about the future if desperate in the present.

The rubble of “Great Fukuoka” concealed the shining promise of wartime that survived: the institutional shifts and creations that would help define the postwar city and generate rising prosperity. While anti-militarist purges would sweep both the political and business community, followed within a few short years by countervailing anti-communist purges, the new major entities born in wartime – Nishinihon Tetsudō, Nishinihon Shinbun, Kyushu Electric Power – quickly won the approval of the Occupation authorities. While zaibatsu conglomerates were broken up at the national level, the regional conglomerates wasted no time in establishing Kyushu as a regional fiefdom in which multiple, entangled businesses thrived with no real competition. National institutions like the Bank of Japan and postal service which had relocated did not decamp from the city when the war came to a close; wartime institutional concentration remained and intensified in the postwar era. Wartime movements and policies had set a precedent that any public or private institution that needed an office in Kyushu would, most logically, locate itself in the existing Fukuoka administrative and business nexus, a major shift that transcended the finite span of other wartime innovations and structures. And, while Fukuoka’s dreams of an Asian mercantile empire were put back on the shelf, the city’s relative failures meant that the sudden total halt in trade with China, Taiwan, Manchuria, and Korea that became a reality for Japan did not have nearly the impact it did on its less economically diverse regional rivals, Moji and Nagasaki.

September 1945 marked both the beginning of a long and difficult process of sorting through the displacements and discords generated by war and also a new era of possibilities. The flames of war had not wiped Fukuoka’s slate clean, but cleared the brush that would give way to
the shoots of a regionally ascendant and central Fukuoka born from the seeds of wartime transformation.
Chapter Three: From Rubble to Regional Center: Fukuoka, the “Capital of Kyushu”

Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945 marked the end of debilitating years of wartime austerity and destruction. In Fukuoka, the population of the city had fallen from a high point of over 300,000 in 1940 to just over 200,000 by 1945. Close to 80% of the city center—virtually the entirety of Hakata and Fukuoka in 1889—had been leveled by firebombing, leaving close to one-fifth of the city’s population without homes. In addition to the problems facing the city’s remaining residents, swarms of Japanese refugees from continental Asia began to arrive en masse through the Port of Hakata by late 1945, with little to their name and often no place of return. The end of the Pacific War brought with it a new period of hardships for Fukuoka as major urban destruction, a massive influx of refugees, and limited resources all strained the city’s capacity to meet basic needs.

Within the space of twenty-five years, Fukuoka overcame the trials of immediate wartime reconstruction and came to enjoy a level of prosperity and economic success on par with almost anywhere else in Japan. The city’s population more than tripled while personal income, government taxes and budgets, and the production and sale of goods all increased at breakneck speeds. Public officials as well as private commentators spoke of Fukuoka as the “center” or “capital” of Kyushu, a city on par with other regional centers in Japan that aspired to national, or even international, prominence. City fathers lauded not simply regional success, but aimed to rival or even supersede the aspirational images Tokyo and Osaka provided. Fukuoka had, by the late 1960s, moved from one among many cities of similar size and importance in Kyushu to a one among regional hub cities of similar size and importance spread across Japan.

This chapter chronicles the recovery and subsequent development of postwar Fukuoka from the depravations and reconstruction challenges of immediate postwar to the breakneck
growth and elaborate citywide plans for continued growth that prevailed in the late 1960s and first few years of the 1970s. During this period Fukuoka’s population went from 300,000 to almost 800,000 people, its economy expanded even faster than the average rates of Japan’s postwar “economic miracle,” and a sustained expansion in both the scale and scope of local government occurred. I argue that this was a transitional period that not only moved Fukuoka into a distinctively “postwar” period, but also transformed the underlying economic and political structure in a way that both empowered the local and created gaps with both wider regional and national trends. The emergence of divisions between Fukuoka locally, Kyushu regionally, and Japan nationally offers instructive lessons for understanding postwar Japan more broadly.

The reconstruction of Fukuoka in the aftermath of wartime destruction was not simply the story of new postwar realities, but also transwar continuities. I contend that long after rubble had been cleared and basic infrastructure and urban life restored, the legacy of wartime centralization and creation of new regional conglomerates continued to set Fukuoka apart from its former rivals in Kyushu and fuel its economic growth. Kyushu Electric Power, Nishinihon Shinbun, and other companies that were based in Fukuoka provided not just taxes and jobs, but focused philanthropic gifts and community outreach programs on the city as well. While the impact of these companies, and the structure of regional concentration in the city, was limited in the lean immediate postwar years, they became the nucleus of an expanding city economy centered on services, commerce, and consumption in tandem with Japan’s wider postwar “Economic Miracle.”

The Occupation period, from 1945 to 1952, encompassed a period of rebuilding community and overcoming scarcity. The majority of Japan’s cities faced similar reconstruction challenges, but Fukuoka faced two unusual mitigating factors that created additional pressures.
The first was the worst food situation in Japan: a dense urban population, a rural countryside defined by its coal mines, and delays in the arrival of official rations combined to create hunger across the entirety of Fukuoka Prefecture that lasted nearly two years. The second factor compounded the first: more than one-million Japanese refugees from mainland Asia arrived in Japan through the Port of Hakata, and many had nowhere to go and virtually no possessions to their name. Scarce building materials and a lack of financial resources slowed efforts to restore the physical landscape of the city. Private citizens formed cooperative associations and took action that supplemented the limited responsive capabilities of both Occupation and Japanese officials and planted the seeds for limited economic recovery.

The postwar economic recovery of Kyushu and Fukuoka was also the beginning, I argue, of the deepening gulf between regional Japan and its national centers. Kyushu’s well-established coal and steel industries provided a basis for initial postwar recovery and helped power the rest of Japan, but also had peaked during the prewar period and entered a long period of decline. Economists focused on Kyushu identified deep structural problems both within the region and its relation to the national Japanese economy, issues that contributed to comparative decline and massive emigration to other regions of Japan. The singular exception in the region was, by 1970, one single bright spot of demographic and economic growth: the city of Fukuoka.

Fukuoka’s successful development and growth in the postwar period had its basis in both the city’s prewar role as a center of commerce and services and its emerging role as the concentrated center for government institutions and private businesses. This model came to be known as the branch economy (shiten keizai), a base of economic development that also characterized other major regional urban centers such as Sendai, Sapporo, and Niigata. Fukuoka’s development stood in contrast to the wider stagnation and decline in the rest of
Kyushu, which remained wedded to an ageing industrial base that became less and less important, and competitive, as the postwar period continued. While Kyushu and its various cities faded from competitor or equal to subordinated hinterland, Fukuoka added tens of thousands of residents and experience double-digit economic growth into the early 1970s.

The rapidity of growth in Fukuoka spurred the development of an increasingly sophisticated local bureaucracy and started an era of City Master Plans. I contend that this new era of planning, premised on dramatically increased local autonomy and budgets, was central to both managing the urban environment and actively supporting further development and growth. International examples and precedents were used to develop plans for Fukuoka, but equally important was the composition of the Planning Committee. By creating a common body of academics, businessmen, politicians, bureaucrats, community leaders, youth groups, labor representatives, and others, the Planning Committee ensured that the City Master Plan reflected local concerns and a plurality of views and interests. The Master Plans also became objects of public discussion and debate beyond the Planning Committee, an indication that democratic debate on local policies took place even if the institutional framework was more rigidly top-down.

**Depravation and Rehabilitation: Occupation Era Fukuoka**

Following Japan’s unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945, the first tangible evidence of what foreign occupation meant for Fukuoka became clear with the arrival of American forces in early September. 4,500 soldiers arrived to establish the military governments that would control both Fukuoka Prefecture and the larger regional authority that would manage Kyushu; these soldiers provided not just scarce chocolates and chewing gum to children, but
equally welcome tobacco to the city’s adults.¹ The Americans also conducted, in early November 1945, an extensive set of oral interviews (the Strategic Bombing Survey) with Fukuoka residents to gauge public sentiment toward the war and immediate postwar conditions. The portrait provided by the responses recorded matched neatly with that of Japan as a whole: Fukuoka’s people were relieved that the war had ended, cautiously optimistic about what the new postwar order would mean, and – with little ambiguity or deviation – very, very hungry.

Public provisions for supplying Japan’s burnt-out cities with food had failed well before the war ended, and the immediate postwar situation produced continued chaos rather than stability. Individuals who had fled to the countryside before the war ended in 1945 were unable to return to the cities; efforts to distribute already scarce food supplies in urban centers meant that movement was restricted to prevent new urban refugees from placing added stress on inadequate distribution networks.² In the case of Fukuoka, the very attributes that had made both city and prefecture prosper – a large, dense population, with a combination of coal mines in the countryside and industrial plants in the cities – magnified the standard postwar Japan story of food scarcity to one of acute crisis. In other parts of Japan – including the Kantō, where Tokyo was located – decline from wartime and prewar population levels had a simple logic: hungry urbanites fled bombed-out cityscapes to the countryside where, other difficulties aside, at least more food was available. The geography of Fukuoka Prefecture’s countryside was not a land of broad rice paddies and farms but one of hills dotted with coal mines teeming with equally hungry miners. In effect, there was no rural escape for Fukuoka’s citizens to fall back on. Compounding preexisting economic and demographic geography, typhoons and other weather damage meant

¹ Fukuoka hyakunenshi, pp. 232-233
that only 60% of a normal year’s rice supply was harvested in 1945.\(^3\) Government confusion and damaged infrastructure, coupled with farmers’ refusal to hand over large parts of their already-reduced harvests, meant that only a reduced portion of that unusually small food supply actually made its way to the hungry millions living across Fukuoka Prefecture.

Finding food consumed the efforts of both individual citizens and local officials. Fukuoka residents surveyed in November 1945 were universally concerned about the food situation, but also deferentially polite and diplomatic when speaking with Occupation officials. The food situation, however, was not resolved for over two years, and patience wore increasingly thin on all sides as limited supplies and a mixture of private avarice with public incompetence made obtaining food difficult. Activist city governments in Kokura, Yahata, and Tobata – representing the dense, industrial cities of Kitakyushu – did all they could to divert incoming food shipments to their own citizens. They also sent what amounted to foraging expeditions of city officials southward, to Kumamoto and Miyazaki prefectures, to negotiate directly with farmers and bring back sweet potatoes, squash, and other vegetables to feed their starving citizens.\(^4\) In Fukuoka itself, where less direct assistance prevailed, an enormous black market emerged centered in front of where Hakata Station had once stood. Commonly known as the “Robber’s Market” (dorobo ichiba),\(^5\) city residents with the means to do so could supplement their food rations at prices roughly ten times officially-mandated ceilings.\(^6\)

Fukuoka Occupation officials were well aware of the food situation, but hampered in solving the problem both by limited resources and the additional burden of what they contended was terrible mismanagement by Tokyo officials. An October 6, 1946 report from the Kyushu

\(^3\) Fukuoka hyakunenshi (ka), p. 236
\(^4\) Fukuoka hyakunen (ka), p. 281
\(^5\) Ibid., p. 280
\(^6\) Fukuoka hyakunenshi (ka), p. 235
Military Government Region Headquarters and HQ Detachment (Regional HQ)\(^7\) acknowledged the ongoing problem posed by low food production in Fukuoka set against a dense and highly urbanized population. The situation was made worse by local pressures: there was a “necessity of turning over the bulk of imported foodstuffs as an incentive to coal miners” who were responsible for producing the bulk of coal both for the Occupation regime’s use as well as the basic fuel supply that kept electricity running in the Kansai and Kantō regions.\(^8\) Officials described the situation with a surprising frankness:

…The Central Government failed to take adequate steps to aid Fukuoka ken and as a result, the food situation in the ken is now the worst in Japan, with calorie content of daily food ration down to 750 calories, and even these small rations are as much as 35 days behind.\(^9\)

The dire nature of the food situation becomes clearer if the reader is aware – as Regional HQ surely was – that the minimum caloric intake required for an adult male not engaged in any actual physical labor is roughly 1500 calories per day, to say nothing of what those angry coal miners receiving “extra” rations must have required. Delays of over a month in delivering rations below starvation levels of nutrition to over three million people in Fukuoka Prefecture was a clear crisis, one that did not fully abate until near the end of 1947.\(^10\) Regional occupation officials were quick to blame the Japanese state for its failures, complaining that excessive coal demands for Tokyo usage meant that insufficient stocks remained to fully power the very machinery responsible for extracting new coal in Fukuoka Prefecture.\(^11\) The situation, in short,

---

\(^7\) The Kyushu Military Government Region Headquarters and HQ Detachment was SCAP’s representative in the region, and oversaw a series of prefectural authorities in Kyushu.


\(^9\) Ibid., p. 8

\(^10\) Food figures prominently in a number of personal accounts from this time, unsurprisingly; in one of the more darkly humorous, a doctor being escorted from Ehime to Fukuoka to provide evidence about the war crimes of POW vivisection at Kyushu University Hospital – which involved charges of cannibalism aimed at the Japanese, no less – recalled his immense gratitude toward the Occupation for providing him with the largest pork cutlet he had ever seen while eating dinner on a train limited to Occupation personnel-use.

\(^11\) Ibid., p. 8-10
reveals ineptitude at the center as well as the impotence of regional and local officials – including Occupation personnel – to effectively respond to conditions on the ground.

Occupation officials attempted to alleviate difficult circumstances in the immediate postwar period, but their efforts were limited by available manpower and materiel. The Fukuoka Military Government (the prefectural authority underneath Kyushu’s Regional HQ), for example, held a “demonstration of imported canned food” at the Tamaya department store in Fukuoka to encourage the use of extra supplies Occupation officials obtained to supplement government rationing. Occupation officials also readily admitted that “little actual work [had] been accomplished” after a full year of military governance in terms of rebuilding the city: they blamed the city bureaucracy for failing to obtain funds for reconstruction who then, in turn, placed blame on both rampant inflation and Tokyo’s failure to release promised funding. The Fukuoka Military Government did credit the city government with some successes, setting up orphanages (in old warehouses) and attempting to build housing developments for homeless repatriates from overseas. Regional and local Occupation staffs were ultimately plagued by the same larger issue affecting SCAP in Tokyo: in the year between 1945 and 1946, all but eight of the original staff sent to manage the Kyushu regional government left their posts. Though the Occupation continued for seven years, the individual knowledge and expertise of local conditions its personnel possessed would always be limited. The Japanese themselves would be determined the final extent of recovery, in principle and in practice.

Rebuilding plans in Fukuoka, as in most of Japan, took place under the extra burden of supplying the Allied military government, exacerbating a precarious lack of resources.

---

12 Fukuoka Military Government Team, APO 929 October 1946, p. 5
13 Ibid., p. 16
14 Ibid., p. 11
15 Kyushu Military Government Region Headquarters & HQ Detachment, APO 929 October 1946, p. 1
According to figures produced by Ishida Yorifusa, approximately ten significant cities largely escaped damage from the aerial bombing campaigns waged during World War II. While some 2.1 million homes were destroyed by those bombings, an additional 550,000 dwellings (including 15,000 in Fukuoka, beginning in March 1945) were demolished by the wartime Japanese state by either forced demolition (for firebreaks) or requisition (for alternate usage). Coupled with the lack of new wartime construction and a sudden flood of overseas refugees, the need for new housing to meet existing demand stood at 4.2 million units as of September 1945.  

The most pressing need was simply to put roofs over people’s heads. In this period of acute shortages in the most basic of shelter, it should come as no surprise that “conceptual debates on aesthetics and urban theory were very rare.” Occupation officials had relatively little interest (or capacity, given their resources) in rehabiliting the Japanese economy, which stood at 10% of 1937 production levels in 1945. They did not, however, go so far as to purge the Japanese state of the urban planners and bureaucrats who could direct recovery plans. The burden of building over 4 million new homes would be in the hands of the Japanese, individually and collectively, without outside aid.

Japanese officials at all levels of government made detailed, official plans for reconstruction, but the results yielded were very limited. In Tokyo, the central government set up a War Damage Rehabilitation Board in charge of “War Damage Restoration Planning” that created plans to rebuild 115 cities across Japan. Scare funds and a lack of proactive support from the general public, however, prevented most of these top-down plans from bearing fruit. As Carola Hein has noted “… a major problem of both the 1923 post-Kanto and 1945 postwar reconstruction efforts was their failure to deter unchecked urban development and consider the

---

16 Ishida Yorifusa, *Nihon kingendai toshi keikaku no tenkai, 1868-2003*, p. 172  
17 Hein, Carola et al, *Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945*, p. 7  
18 Ibid., pp. 18-19
areas beyond the most damaged. In this aspect, planning in the postwar era does not differ much from that in the 1920s.” Reconstruction was narrowly defined, and even the limited objectives of the plans created faced significant headwinds.

Official responses to the challenge of rebuilding were, despite the best of intentions, largely inadequate in meeting the scale of actual needs. In September 1945 Tokyo pledged to provide a nation-wide total of 300,000 20.6 square meter dwellings for homeless families, but delegated responsibility for implementation to local authorities. In total, from 1945 to 1950, local governments in Japan actually built only 274,000 housing units, or “only 9.9 percent of the total housing supply” produced in that period. Tokyo, short on manpower and money to address a seemingly endless list of problems, was understandably eager to pass off responsibility – and, as supplied by Occupation officials, blame – for urgent reconstruction to the very same local governments it had stripped of any real authority during wartime.

Fukuoka’s immediate postwar government, with limited control and few financial resources, was unable to start reconstruction efforts on a major scale. The firebombing of Fukuoka, as noted above, destroyed approximately 80% of the city’s urban core and left a fifth of its denizens homeless. Recovery efforts were further complicated by the fact that, unlike most other cities, a rapid influx of new residents necessitated not only the replacement of wartime losses but also the building of brand new infrastructure. As part of the central government’s 300,000 emergency housing units plan from September 1945, the Fukuoka’s city government planned to produce 1,000 of those units (700 to be given to residents, 300 to apparently remain city-owned). By December 1945, however, the city had only broken ground on sixty of the 1,000 units planned. Occupation officials in Fukuoka, analyzing the city government’s shortfall,

19 Ibid., p. 7
20 Ibid., pp. 24-25
21 Torisu Kyōichi, URC Vol. 36 Summer 1998, pp. 49-50
reported that rampant inflation rendered cost estimates obsolete before construction ever began, and promised funding from Tokyo never materialized. Occupation officials compounded problems when they declared that the traditional *genbu seido* – roughly translated as “the area reduction or contribution system” – was unconstitutional, in effect forbidding the official use of eminent domain.\(^{22}\) This prohibition did not apply to the Occupation government, of course: vast amounts of land were expropriated not just for military bases but to build more than 20,000 units of “dependent housing” in appropriate Western style for the families of Allied officials, who also had priority in requisitioning scarce building materials to construct their new houses.\(^{23}\) Japanese government officials had to face not only urgent and massive demand to house its displaced people, but simultaneously subsidize and prioritize comparatively lavish Occupation-use housing.

In Fukuoka, private citizens and actors showed the most success in addressing the housing crisis. In the Naraya neighborhood, one of the neighborhoods worst damaged by the firebombing in June 1945, community members – residents, businessmen, and local officials – formed the Naraya District Residence Association. The Association was formed in conjunction with landlords and property owners as well as renters, in a unique 50-50 split in membership; the end result was a streamlined process for reconstruction that lined up available property, building capital, and interested renters.\(^{24}\) The dwellings, built according to standard blueprints, were extremely modest: houses consisted of two rooms, one 3 tatami-mats and another 6 tatami-mats in size, an entryway, and a closet, all located on a 18.8 by 15.7 meter lot and constructed with the

\(^{22}\) Hein, Carola et al, *Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945*, pp. 20-21. To be fair, the system was – and is today, in fact – a central tool in Japanese planning to rationalize neighborhoods and make way for new infrastructure and large-scale redevelopment. In the context of immediate postwar politics, and the widespread expropriation or demolition of housing by the wartime Japanese state, SCAP probably viewed it as an abuse of state authority and a vehicle for arbitrary use of power and corruption.

\(^{23}\) Ibid., p. 21-22

\(^{24}\) Torisu Kyōichi, *URC* Vol. 36 Summer 1998, p. 56. Torisu’s main source – and an excellent in-depth story of postwar reconstruction in Fukuoka more generally – is Ochiishi Keiichi’s *Sengo Hakata Fukkōshi*. Ochiishi was both a central figure in Naraya’s efforts and was later active in city politics more broadly.
barest of building materials and corrugated roofs. Conversely, they had the winning virtue of being simple to build, taking four men only four days to finish at the affordable cost of 3,600 yen per unit.25 This single group in Naraya managed to erect 325 units in the space of seven months before Occupation officials shut down the Association – deciding, in a bizarre bit of irony, that the community association was too similar to zaibatsu group businesses.26 The Naraya District Residence Association was just one small community group, but still managed to build more than five times the housing produced by the city government in the same span of time. Despite political gridlock among both Occupation and Japanese officials, ordinary citizens found creative, practical solutions to the immediate problems of postwar life.

The recovery of Fukuoka’s business environment was central to effectively addressing the housing and food crises more generally. Given both the size and scale of the black market, and the financial hardships it exacerbated, restoring a regular commercial environment was important not only for the city’s vast retail and services sector, but also ordinary consumers. Despite its prioritized status, promised government assistance for commercial redevelopment never fully appeared: of 25 million yen required to fund land exchanges to even begin the rebuilding process detailed in the official Fukuoka Recovery Plan, less than 7% of that sum was available by 1947.27 Although the shortfall in official funding meant the idealized Recovery Plan would never reach fruition, 863 private businesses had been built as early as May 1947,28 and some 50 shopping arcades and districts were rebuilt by 1950.29 In fact, of a total of 11,500 building rebuilt or replaced by the end of 1947 only 4,200 were dedicated to housing.30

25 Ibid., pp. 51-52
26 Ibid., p. 57
27 Torisu Kyōichi, City Planning of Hakata in the 1940s, #2, pp. 8-11
28 Fujihara Keiyō, Sengo fukuoka no ayumi. In URC Vol. 36 Summer 1998, p. 62
29 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka no rekishi: shisei kyūjūshūnenkinen, p. 236
30 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka shisei yōran 1947, p. 20
Successful rebuilding and reopening of businesses meant that Fukuoka as a whole was moving, however slowly, toward some semblance of normalcy by 1950.

Fukuoka’s path back to normalcy in the immediate postwar faced two mutually-reinforcing problems: the wartime loss of infrastructure and a massive influx of new residents. While Fukuoka’s population underwent a significant and immediate decline in 1944 and 1945, the population quickly surpassed its prewar level. Excepting Kyoto, which had escaped wartime bombing, Fukuoka was the only large city in Japan that actually experienced a population boom between 1944 and 1947.\textsuperscript{31} Fukuoka Prefecture’s inhospitable countryside, as mentioned above, no doubt contributed to the situation, but Fukuoka City had a much more particular factor at work: between August 1945 and April 1947, more than 1.39 million Japanese from overseas disembarked through the Port of Hakata while more than 500,000 Chinese and Koreans embarked for the Asian mainland.\textsuperscript{32}

In addition to the arrival of Japanese refugees, a more surprising set of arrivals – Koreans attempting to reenter Japan after repatriation – caused a great deal of concern in the early Occupation period. Fukuoka itself had never had a large foreign population of any kind, including Korean laborers, but the greater prefecture’s coal mines and industrial plants had a sizable Korean population by the end of the war. The evacuation of Chinese and Koreans from Japan that occurred voluntarily seems to have been a relatively order affair, but Koreans who chose not to depart, as well as those who attempted to return to Japan, alarmed Occupation authorities. Amidst the ongoing food crisis – and the barely averted strikes it prompted – the Kyushu Military Government also reported ongoing cholera outbreaks which it traced to the

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., pp. 22-23. Kyoto’s surging population – an increase of 80% over immediate prewar levels – can probably be connected to the heavy bombing of Osaka and Kobe and other nearby large cities, making it an attractive destination for urban refugees from elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{32} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka no rekishi: shisei kyūjūshūnenkinen}, p. 234
“illegal entry into Kyushu by Repatriates, chiefly Koreans.” Public Safety reports indicated that Japan remained an enticing destination for repatriated Koreans: between June 15 and September 15, 1946, some 14,421 Koreans were apprehended attempting to “illegally reenter” Japan. The solution of the Kyushu occupation officials, as they readily admitted in their reports, was to make it someone else’s problem: diverting the smuggling of Koreans from Kyushu to Honshu was considered a successful policy. Whatever their status and contributions had been in prewar or wartime Japan, a thriving Korean community was not part of the emergent vision for postwar Fukuoka and Kyushu.

In contrast to the “problem” posed by Koreans, the massive influx of repatriated Japanese into Fukuoka benefited the city. The sheer volume of refugees from Japan’s former overseas empire, coupled with the reality that many of them had little to their name and no home to return to within Japan, placed additional stresses on limited housing and food supplies. The 1947 City Handbook offers one of the best insights into the new repatriate community’s situation, made all the more unusual in that subsequent handbooks ceased to treat repatriated residents as a distinct category in any aspect. While not providing a figure for their total numbers in the city, the 1947 handbook recorded that 31,434 of the city’s workers were refugees – a figure that comprised

---

33 Kyushu Military Government Region Headquarters & HQ Detachment, APO 929 June 1946, p. 3. It should be noted that Fukuoka City’s own histories pin the blame on refugees in general rather than Koreans in particular, suggesting that Koreans may have been an easy scapegoat for both Japanese and Occupation officials.

34 Kyushu Military Government Region Headquarters & HQ Detachment, APO 929 September 1946, p. 6. None of the reports indicate an effort to ascertain why Koreans were attempting to enter (or re-enter) Japan, nor where their ultimate destination within Japan may have been. I would speculate that a number of Koreans were attempting to either return to their previous communities and jobs within Japan (i.e. economic reasons) or had personal connections (the presence of other family members, friends, lovers, etc.), but from the Occupation perspective they were a potential threat to fragile public order with no legal basis for return.

35 The implication here would be that repatriates, while facing perhaps some initial stigma—or at least recognized differentiation—in Fukuoka and elsewhere also blended into the established community very quickly. The poverty of both repatriates and native residents in the bleak years of early postwar probably meant there was little obvious gap, and as a city of constant immigrants from elsewhere in Kyushu the repatriates probably fit in well to the general Fukuoka citizenry with little effort.
more than 25% of the entire working population. While more than one-third of the city’s total unemployed was comprised of overseas refugees, they also moved easily into jobs in the city’s commercial sector. Given the recovery of a number of shops within the city, it seems reasonable to credit the influx of repatriated overseas Japanese – a number of whom would stay in the city and become citizens of the new postwar Fukuoka – with a substantial, if difficult to quantify, role in the city’s relatively speedy economic and demographic recovery.

While certain shopping districts and markets – set apart from the “normal” downtown shopping hub of the newly built Shintenchō – catered to the refugee community in particular, refugees also blended into the existing fabric of community life with great speed. In May 1947, the city of Fukuoka was scheduled to hold the “New Japan Peace Exhibition,” a parallel to the Eastern Industrial Exhibition of twenty years earlier that involved pavilions such as an “America Hall” and “Tokyo Hall.” While the event ultimately failed to happen, substantial involvement and planning had been provided by the refugee association as well as more-established community organizations. Refugees may not have had deep preexisting ties to the city, but were eager to join in organizing and supporting public events and, in effect, become equal members of Fukuoka’s wider citizenry. Japanese repatriates in Fukuoka, the last of whom arrived in April 1947, quickly moved into the mainstream of postwar Fukuoka’s economic and community structures.

There is no official marker to end the “recovery” period in the immediate aftermath of wartime, but a number of signs pointed to at least a return to normalcy before the Korean War.

36 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka shisei yōran 1947*, p. 16
37 Ibid., p. 15
38 Ibid., p. 46. The 1947 edition of the city handbook contains an interesting breakdown of new or reopened businesses by broad categories, showing a fairly quick recovery in certain retail and service sectors but also the weaker state of traditional handicrafts damaged by wartime rationing and industrial products damaged both by the end of war procurement and bombing damage.
dramatically altered the overall economic situation in 1949. While financial issues prevented the “New Japan Peace Exhibition” from happening,\footnote{Interestingly, pamphlets and promotional materials to be sent throughout Japan were prepared in advance of the event, indicating an impressive degree of ambition and scale, but harsh economic realities dictated otherwise.} the widely-recounted “Children’s Yamagasa,” or Hakata Recovery Festival, of 1946 – a combination of the two main annual festivals of Dontaku (held in May) and Yamagasa (held in July) – marked a return of traditional community life despite the crises of city life. As multiple photos of the event attest, a striking parade of traditionally-attired men, women, and children wound its way through the avenues of rubble dominating the city core, ending with stops at the Iwataya Department Store and Toyokuni Shrine in Tenjin.\footnote{Ibid., p. 54} While the general population continued to endure various deprivations, there was enough money flowing in the city to support the conspicuous construction of new luxury housing in the city’s central areas in 1947 and a transformation of the once high-class, mixed-use West Nakasu area into a pure red light district of bars and cinemas (and, of course, brothels).\footnote{Fujihara Keiyō, Hakata senzai fukkō keikaku. In URC Vol. 36 Summer 1998, pp. 60-62} 1947 also marked another important landmark of recovery: the city hosted the third national Citizen’s Exercise Convention (kokumin taiiku taikai) and built the Heiwadai Stadium and a series of other sports facilities across Fukuoka.\footnote{Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka no rekishi: shisei kyūjūshūnenkinen, pp. 242-243} While basic infrastructure challenges remained into the 1950s, new private construction, public facilities, and the return of cherished city festivals all signaled a general recovery.

A new normal for civic and cultural activities, centered on private-public collaboration, was also established in immediate postwar Fukuoka. The Fukuoka Military Government singled out the Nishinihon Tetsudō (West Japan Railroad) conglomerate’s “Cultural Association” for its valuable work in furthering adult education and providing cultural opportunities, even in rural
areas well beyond its urban core. The 1947 City Handbook, its last pages filled with advertisements for local businesses to help pay for printing costs, reflected not just the hard economic times of immediate postwar, but also civic community and confidence in a brighter economic future within two years of the war’s end. Fukuoka’s challenge ahead would be to move from simply recovering from wartime destruction to creating a new vision of the city’s future.

Rebuilding a Region: Kyushu, Fukuoka, and the Postwar Order

In 1949, before events in Korea exploded into warfare and, as Yoshida Shigeru put it, became a “gift from heaven” that jumpstarted the still anemic Japanese economy, the recently-formed Kyushu Economic Research Center (Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai), or KERC, issued a lengthy analysis of the postwar situation in Kyushu. Laconically titled Kyushu Economy and Society, KERC used mountains of statistical and analytical data to create both a snapshot of where the Kyushu region stood and offer recommendations for its future development. Completed before the Korean War spurred economic growth in a way few analysts could have anticipated, KERC’s work still offered two key insights with lasting relevance. First, it pointed to the weakness underpinning Kyushu’s regional position as both an economic and cultural hinterland, which did not bode well for its future development. Second, it identified the origins of what would become central to the new models that guided postwar Fukuoka: an ability to develop value-added services, a regional center able to compete with the business and social environment that attracted migrating workers, and growing institutional centralization and concentration.

---

Fukuoka Military Government Team, *APO 929 April 1948*, p. 4. Nishitetsu’s own newsletters from this same time also provide listings of company-sponsored film nights and other events, part of its commitment to building a “democratic culture” in the new postwar; the company, of course, also experienced a leadership purge in late 1945 followed by a Red Purge of the company in 1948.
**Kyushu Economy and Society** was meant to play the role of reference guide for government and business interests alike by providing an array of knowledge that could guide development plans. Its stated goal of providing accurate, updated local information entailed not just official statistics and the monthly number-crunching performed by KERC itself, but also the cooperation of Kyushu’s Fukuoka-based regional monopoly-conglomerates (Nishinihon Tetsudō, Nishinihon Shinbun, the precursor to Kyushu Electric) and some eighty additional major companies.\(^4\) It also provided a list of 26 comparative sets of international statistics related to both the economy and wartime losses, and concluded with prescriptions for development of the regional economy as a whole. KERC’s comparative statistics provided two impressions: first, that Japan was still comparatively backward in its degree of industrialization compared to other major world economies/powers; second, that Japan still had great untapped potential in mobilizing its population toward economic development and growth. Kyushu and Fukuoka, as it turned out, represented both the best and worst of Japan’s 1949 economic reality.

The key gap that divided Fukuoka Prefecture and the rest of Kyushu was the divisions of economy and society between an industrial, urban north and agrarian, rural south. KERC noted that Northern Kyushu, centered on Fukuoka Prefecture, had been Japan’s main heavy industrial core since the Meiji Era, and remained a central part of the national economy in early postwar. In contrast, Southern Kyushu was a rigidly conservative, economically backward region almost entirely set apart unto itself.\(^4\) KERC pointed out that Southern Kyushu’s vast population and high birth rates offered a vast potential labor pool, and indeed the demographic patterns of the most fecund prefecture – Kagoshima – looked almost identical to that found in any developing

---

\(^4\) Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, *Kyushu no keizai to shakai*, Maegaki.
\(^4\) Ibid., p.17. Perhaps to emphasize the division even further, the text commented on Southern Kyushu’s extreme dialect divergences, such that foreigners and even other Japanese found (and still find) the Kagoshima and Miyazaki dialects totally unintelligible.
country. The report expressed a certain pride attributed to the Northern Kyushu industrial complex, its coal industry declared “the parent of Japanese capitalism” and listing its national dominance of steel, coal, and pig iron production. Kyushu, in short, was a region with a sharp internal divide but, between its abundant labor and well-established industries, still key to the Japanese national economy.

Despite Kyushu’s pre-eminent prewar and immediate postwar status, there were also deep structural problems with no obvious solutions: the relative decline in the importance of heavy industries Kyushu excelled at, and what KERC itself termed a “half-colony” structure subordinating the region back to Tokyo and Osaka. While KERC confidently asserted its expectation that coal-mining and steel production would remain the economic basis of Northern Kyushu – and Moji and Wakamatsu would remain key national ports – the accompanying statistics suggested an unsettling future for those industries. Japan, based on 1949 figures, had 0.1% of the world’s coal reserves, and Kyushu possessed 42.3% of that 0.1% to produce 56% of national Japanese coal production. Coal production had peaked across Japan in 1940, however, and declined to 50% of that 1940 high by 1947, suggesting that the importance of domestic coal – and the economic value and employment it could generate – would decline in the future. Likewise, KERC recognized that military procurement purchases would not be replaced by civilian consumption and associated production needs as the driving force of Japanese industry. Kyushu was already well-behind the Kanto or Kansai regions as a producer of either sophisticated machine tools or most value-added goods outside heavy industry, two areas

48 Ibid., pp. 36-37
49 Ibid., p.101
50 Ibid., pp. 165-174. Moji and Wakamatsu were, respectively, the 5th and 6th largest ports of Japan in terms of the volume and value of goods, a status essentially unchanged from prewar realities as well.
51 Ibid., pp. 104-105
holding great future promise. The mining and steel industries, which KERC noted were largely developed as a result of heavy government direction and investment rather than local capital and private initiative, pointed to a “colonialism” that subordinated Kyushu to the national center. Kyushu acted primarily as a supplier of both labor and raw materials to the Osaka and Tokyo regions; even its limited finished goods were first sent to the corporate and commercial core in the Kansai before being redistributed outward. The Kyushu region, despite its local resources and potential, was a follower rather than a leader in the wider Japanese economy.

The future implications of Kyushu’s comparative regional situation were not lost on economists in 1949 Fukuoka. Beyond economic structure, KERC’s researchers noted that Kyushu had obtained the unfortunate reputation of being an intellectual and cultural backwater in the modern period. Most “intellectuals” were concentrated in Tokyo or Osaka, as was most publishing and original print culture; university professors in Kyushu, and elsewhere in regional Japan, expressed an unabashed desire to relocate to Tokyo and its more vibrant intellectual and cultural life. The solution suggested by the researchers involved urbanization as one stopgap measure, but the ultimate solution was to create a more distinctive and autonomously-defined and sustained “Kyushu culture.” While it is possible KERC may have intended to issue a rallying cry in the name of “Kyushuality” and the establishment of alternate loci of identity set against a homogenizing center, I suspect their rationale was much less esoteric and much more practical. KERC realized a crucial, if rarely spoken, truth: the confluence of corporate and capital concentration with intellectual concentration is deliberate, and the relationship – once formed –

52 Ibid., pp. 122-124
53 Ibid., p. 165
54 Ibid., p. 174
55 Ibid., p. 176
56 Ibid., pp. 261-262
57 Ibid., p. 262
is self-reinforcing. All other things equal, businesses seek out capital and the best human talent
available to succeed, capital accumulates around and in successful, well-run businesses, and
talented, educated individuals flock to locations they believe will offer the most rewards for their
abilities. Only by establishing an equally valid but alternative center with cultural and intellectual
appeal to Tokyo or Osaka, then, could Kyushu hope to stimulate its own economic allure to
retain both its inhabitants and its relative significance within Japan. And it was this dilemma of
establishing an urban cultural and educational center in Kyushu that brings the larger regional
story back to Fukuoka City.

Fukuoka was, by 1952, widely considered to be “the center of Kyushu,” but the
definition of that center was itself shaky at best. At the same time, Fukuoka fell outside the realm
of the “industrial cities of Northern Kyushu” and into a much smaller, and less high-profile,
group of cities facing the Genkai Sea toward Korea. The city’s own assessment of its economy
in 1947 concluded much the same, noting that the city’s wartime industrial development had
been transient at best (due both to bombing and to postwar economic chaos) and that Fukuoka
was developing toward a status of either an “industrial city” or “cultural city.” The reality, in
some sense, was that it was neither: commerce and services continued to dominate the economy,
and “culture” remained an amorphous concept. Its population in 1952 stood at close to half a
million – a 50% increase over its prewar high – and reconstruction was judged to be essentially
complete (though complaints about the quality and content of the reconstruction persisted).
Fukuoka, serving as a major base of the U.S. Far East Air Forces, thrived during the Korean War
as procurement by the American military and the presence of military personnel both stimulated

---

58 Yomiuri Shinbun, Nishinihon toshi taikan, p. 5. Fukuoka’s own city publications had proclaimed it to be the
“center of Kyushu” for decades; Nishinihon toshi taikan marked one of, if not the first, time this phrase had been
used by commentators and analysts outside City Hall.
59 Ibid., pp. 4-5
60 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka shisei yōran 1947, pp. 37-38
demand and injected capital into the economy: by 1950, the prewar standard of living had already been surpassed. A return to familiar material comforts of prewar in the city took only five years, even if the city itself had changed substantially.

Fukuoka did become the postwar institutional “center of Kyushu,” a legacy of the continued effects of wartime centralization. Kyushu Economy and Society, which had very little to say about Fukuoka City in general, noted the heavy concentration of national institutions present: only Moji and Kumamoto had any unique bureaucratic offices not found in Fukuoka, whereas any number of national bureaucracies and agencies centered their staff and resources within Kyushu squarely in Fukuoka. Private business concentration began to follow a similar pattern as early as 1949. Occupation officials broke up the old zaibatsu order and reversed the nationalization of the economy that wartime mobilization had produced, but replaced nationwide conglomerates with a smorgasbord of daughter companies and branch offices of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and the other old players (with new locally or geographically-appropriate names). Forced wartime mergers created new regional conglomerates (termed “concerns” by KERC) like Nishinihon Tetsudō and Nishinihon Shinbun in Fukuoka. These new entities had no real local or regional competition in their chosen fields and, while small compared to similar business entities in the Kantō or Kansai areas, also represented the sort of indigenous capital and business concentration that had never existed in the prewar Kyushu. While the transformative nature of these new institutional and business arrangements only became lucid over a lengthy span of time, Fukuoka was beginning to take on distinctive, enduring roles as representative of the

61 Fujihara Keiyō, URC Vol. 36 Summer 1998, p. 63
62 Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, Kyushu no keizai to shakai, p. 238
63 Ibid pp. 165-166
64 Fujihara Keiyō has made the argument, quite succinctly if not through extensive supporting details, that the continuities of wartime government and economic structural shifts into the postwar era explained Fukuoka’s growth through the 1960s. While I disagree with Fujihara on the extent and onset of this impact, especially in regard to
national center and center of regional concentration that set it apart from Kyushu’s other major cities.

Local bureaucrats in 1950 described Fukuoka as “the greatest commercial – and consumption – city in Western Japan,” speaking of the city’s “Hope” to emerge as Japan’s chief port trading with East Asia. This aspiration also translated into spending 37.9% of the city’s budget on port improvements. The focus on the Port of Hakata marked a continuation of the same narratives and plans for municipal success that dated back to the Meiji era and intensified during wartime. It also seems somewhat baffling, however, considering that trade between Japan and Korea or China had largely been shut off (the Korean War, and the reality of the emerging new international world coupled with intensely anti-Japanese nationalism). Setting aside wishful thinking about trading with Japan’s neighbors, the goal behind port development was as old as the modern city itself. Fukuoka’s five-year economic plan unveiled in 1952 argued port development would lure industrial and capital investment – away from the economic core in the Kansai, no less. Despite the changing realities of both international and internal Japanese economies in the postwar period, Fukuoka’s leaders continued to concentrate their attention primarily on industrialization and trade through the city’s port to power growth.

Fukuoka’s continued focus on port expansion and industrialization was not an isolated phenomenon: the larger Kyushu region continued to operate on what were essentially prewar models. These models, unfortunately, had less and less salience in the rapidly shifting postwar economy. In State of the Kyushu Economy, 1956, KERC analyzed the regional economy ten years after the war, identifying the idea that wartime economic institutions lived on in modified form and were crucial to subsequent postwar developments has been eloquently argued in his articles.

Quite literally, the word “hōpu” in katakana was used, another interesting indicator of the shift from wartime discipline on purely Japanese writing and terminology and the intellectual cachet of words and ideas from oversea, a theme repeated again and again in both private and public sector documents from this era.

Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka shisei yōran 1950, pp. 23-27
Yomiuri Shinbun, Nishinihon toshi taikan, p. 65
years after the conclusion of World War II, finding – in blunt terms – prewar economic structures had essentially continued, unchanged. The notion of there being a “Kyushu Economy” was itself considered problematic due both to internal divides within the region and the oversized role direct of government investment and involvement in the region’s economy. This also fit in to what KERC saw as a “population problem” in the region: said dilemma was not tied to birth rates, but rather Kyushu’s inability to retain its natural working population and provide stable employment. Changes in the coal and steel sectors, coupled with the transwar endurance of weak tradition of local capital accumulation and private initiative in the region, threatened the old basis of prosperity that defined Northern Kyushu’s industrial zone.

The relatively static economic structure of Kyushu that continued from prewar into postwar failed to create the new jobs necessary for a rapidly growing regional population. Coal mining, as noted above, was already on the decline in terms of productive output by the late 1940s, but was credited with attracting unemployed urbanites and repatriates in the initial years of the Occupation and enabling a relatively speedy recovery for Northern Kyushu, supplementing growth in the burgeoning fields of construction and even government services. By 1951, however, the mining output declines seen in Kyushu Economy and Society translated into major layoffs of coal miners (optimistically attributed to rationalization of labor and productivity gains, rather than absolute decline, by KERC). Even with the problems in the coal sector Kyushu experienced overall economic growth, but was unable to keep pace with the national average. In addition to the decline of its traditional heavy industry and mining mainstays, the severing of prewar connections to Asia hit Kyushu especially hard, a blow from which the

---

68 Kyūshū keizaï chōsa kyōkai, Kyūshū Keizaï no Genkyō, Maegaki
69 Ibid., p. 16
70 Ibid., p. 19
71 Ibid., pp. 24-26
collective region never fully recovered.\textsuperscript{72} Even Fukuoka Prefecture – which represented almost half of the total value of the annual output of Kyushu as a collective unit – saw its relative share of the national economy fall (from 8.5\% in the immediate prewar period to 4.9\% in 1954) and its growth (a 310\% increase in output from 1949 to 1954) lag behind the national average (447\% in the same period).\textsuperscript{73}

As a region, Kyushu’s relative economic lag became well-entrenched by the end of the 1950s. In the 1959 An Overview of the Kyushu Economy (\textit{Zusetsu Kyūshū no Keizai}), KERC researchers expressed a concern that Kyushu would never recover its relative status in the national economy akin to that of the prewar period; they admitted, in almost defeatist terms, that they had no ready solutions.\textsuperscript{74} Demographic analysis showed that while the Kyushu population continued to grow, emigration from every prefecture on the island accelerated as the decade progressed. In effect, the baby boom of postwar concealed that Kyushu residents were economically voting with their feet, so to speak, and migrating en masse to the rapidly industrializing Pacific Belt stretching from Tokyo to Osaka and Kobe.\textsuperscript{75} KERC researchers were cognizant of both the reasons and effects of this massive population movement. There was, in fact, no autonomous “Kyushu economy” and the region was inherently part of the national economy\textsuperscript{76} – mainly in the role of seemingly endless surplus labor pool, it seemed. To illustrate this larger entwinement, KERC’s analysts charted both Kyushu’s subordinate role in the national economy and the flow of resources from Kyushu to the center and then back to Kyushu.\textsuperscript{77} And,

\textsuperscript{72} The impact was more keenly felt in Southern Kyushu, whereas the industrial belt in Northern Kyushu was oriented more toward the internal Japanese economy as the economic center of its trade.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 46
\textsuperscript{74} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Susetsu kyūshū no keizai}, Hashigaki.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., pp. 10-12
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., p. 31
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., p.190
within the web of transfers from region to national center, the city of Fukuoka played a very particular and central role.

Fukuoka’s role in the regional and national economy was never explicitly recognized in 1950s analyses, but transwar continuity in the city’s role as a center of commerce, governance, and culture was evident. In the 1954 A View of Fukuoka (fukuoka-shi tenbō), a largely pictorial introduction to both hard data and aesthetic views of the city, Mayor Konishi Haruo welcomed readers with the new preferred phrases of city promotion: that Fukuoka was a “city of culture” and the largest city in Western Japan. The vast majority of photographs were of department stores and office buildings in the bigger-and-better postwar Tenjin (the administrative and, increasingly, commercial center of the city). To the extent that it seemed culture equaled modern infrastructure, City Hall’s linkage of the two was not incorrect. A new municipal zoo – replacing the prewar zoo lost in wartime – had opened the previous summer, Fukuoka had one of the few operational domestic civilian-use airports, and the Nishitetsu Lions – established in 1951 – were, and would remain for some time, the sole team representative of professional baseball in Western Japan. Fukuoka’s postwar recovery and reconstruction were evident in the return of leisure facilities and activities that represented the charms of urban life, beyond simply surviving in a material sense.

Fukuoka’s economic picture in 1951 revealed general continuities with the prewar period: weak industry and a dominant commercial sector. Most businesses in the city were small individual entities rather than corporate operations, and only 8% of the city’s businesses and

78 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi tenbō, p. 1
79 The 1950s Lions, who won four straight national championships, were also famous for playing – and winning – while inebriated. The alcohol use was connected to attempts to rest on the uncomfortable, long-distance trains of the early 1950s that had to ferry the team at least as far as Osaka to play matches.
14\% of its workers were involved in manufacturing.\textsuperscript{80} Given the city’s relative affluence and ability to draw new residents, the mass of small businesses and emphasis on sales and services were, in retrospect, a functional (if poorly understood) economic engine. There was huge capital investment in port development and a declared goal of luring large numbers of manufacturers and new industrial plants into the city. Fukuoka’s institutional elites continued to be guided by the same idea which had guided economic thought in the city, and Japan more broadly, since the Meiji period: industrial production was the key to sound development and economic security.

Postwar Japan as a whole experienced continued growth and development, but national aggregate figures also hide what was an ever-widening gap between regional Japan and central Honshu. The economists at KERC and Fukuoka City Hall responded in largely identical terms: accelerating growth was crucial, but that growth was also inexorably linked to a dramatic expansion in Kyushu’s industrial base that would spur urbanization, halt emigration, and redefine the center-periphery dynamic that rendered Kyushu a “half-colony” of the national center. The imagined catalyst for this shift was the same recipe that was already being deployed across Japan: regional development plans with national bureaucratic oversight, and a massive expansion of coordination and planning on the basis of professional expertise. KERC itself, as an institution founded solely to provide information that would facilitate economic decision-making, was a harbinger of the most comprehensive vision and practical plan to define Fukuoka yet: the arrival of the first Fukuoka City Master Plan in 1961.

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 7
Thinking Locally, Regionally, Nationally, Globally: the First City Master Plan

The Fukuoka City Master Plan of 1961\textsuperscript{81} continued prewar traditions of urban planning but also diverged significantly in both spirit and substance. The dissolution of the Home Ministry during the Occupation period had transformed local autonomy in countless ways, including localities’ ability to form and execute their own development plans. Key infrastructure, like major highways and roads, remained the realm of Tokyo bureaucracies and, to a lesser extent, the prefectural office. Local authority expanded, but within finite boundaries. In Tokyo, for example, major theoretical innovator and planner Ishikawa Hideaki held the position of urban planner from 1933-1955 and influenced the evolution of Japanese urban planning as a whole, but never realized his more immediate vision of transforming the capital.\textsuperscript{82} Despite the gap between intent and implementation, postwar Fukuoka gained the ability to create plans and make decisions about the direction of the city’s future with far greater autonomy than ever before. Instead of the rubber-stamping of Home Ministry decisions by Fukuoka’s elected officials, the sovereignty of decision-making – if not always funding – was placed in local hands.

Fukuoka’s Master Plans were shaped by the inspiration and guidance that were decidedly cosmopolitan to produce locally-tailored policies. In his introduction to the 1961 Fukuoka City Master Plan (hereafter referred to as the “First Master Plan”), Mayor Abe Genzō\textsuperscript{83} noted that the work on the 1961 plan had taken almost five years, spanned three different

\textsuperscript{81} The plan, scheduled for 1960, was actually published in 1961 and, retroactively, would become known as the “First” Master Plan when it became clear subsequently that “revisions” imagined would need to be supplanted by wholesale reimagining of the plan on a routine basis.

\textsuperscript{82} Hein, Carola et al, Rebuilding Urban Japan After 1945, pp. 9-10. Hein notes that Ishikawa’s postwar vision of Tokyo – which involved decentralization and deconcentration, calling for a reduction on population from 6.5 to 3.5 million – was almost entirely ignored. Only Kabuki-chō offers “a reminder of what Tokyo could have been had Ishikawa’s ideals been realized” – a curious image for anyone who is familiar with contemporary Kabuki-chō through either direct experience or second-hand information.

\textsuperscript{83} Abe, who would lead the city from 1960 to 1972, was as appropriate a messenger of the plan as anyone could be: a Fukuoka native who had worked for the Home Ministry, was the wartime Japanese mayor of Surabaya, a close personal friend of Indonesia’s Sukarno, and – after his return to Japan – a key political figure in Fukuoka whose role would culminate in three terms as mayor. In a sense, Abe’s experience on the national, international, and local levels matched the hybrid origins and expertise/reference found in the Master Plan itself.
mayors’ terms of office, and was created through substantial research and work.\textsuperscript{84} Abe acknowledged the debt owed to the long history of master planning overseas, but also cautioned that Fukuoka’s plan was meant to be a long-range, long-term plan rather than undergo the constant revision found in American and European plans.\textsuperscript{85} City planners refused to assign Fukuoka to a typology or otherwise detract from the perceived novelty of the First Master Plan, but admitted that the most direct model and stylistic comparison could be made to the 1948 Cincinnati Master Plan.\textsuperscript{86} Cincinatti – an old river port city that struggled in the early twentieth century as general regional economic decline shook the foundations of its economic model – was perhaps as good (and eerily apt) a model as any for 1961 Fukuoka. The efforts of city bureaucrats comparing, analyzing, and dissecting the relative merits of Master Plans from second-tier American cities to create Fukuoka’s own plan, however, reveals the increasing sophistication, and transnational intellectual thought, at work in the city bureaucracy.

Fukuoka’s Master Plan represented a break with earlier, more limited models of urban planning in Japan. Fukuoka was, relative to most localities in Japan, a very early adopter of the Master Plan system. The Urban Master Plan, considered to have originated in the early twentieth-century United States before rapidly spreading internationally, differed from prior forms of urban planning in its all-encompassing (the \textit{sōgō} in the original Japanese) aspirations. Whereas the prewar city plans for Fukuoka crafted by Home Ministry planners listed general goals and suggested land-usage, the First Master Plan in 1961 was more expansive: the economy, community life, welfare, adult and juvenile education, cultural life, garbage disposal, water usage and sewage, transportation infrastructure, and tourism all fell under its purview. The

\textsuperscript{84} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku, hajime ni}
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid., \textit{hajime ni}
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pp. 2-3
Master Plan, in short, quite literally aspired to affect nearly every aspect of life in the city: a truly unified vision of what Fukuoka could and should look like, and how to achieve that endpoint.

The participants on the City Master Plan Committee reflected, and perhaps necessitated, the broad ambitions of the plan to touch all segments of the urban landscape. Beyond its own bureaucrats, Fukuoka’s city government called on the expertise and advice of national tax officials, railroad representatives, prefectural bureaucrats and politicians, agents of major business conglomerates like Nishitetsu, university professors, the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce, youth group representatives, and other various interested parties. The Master Plan was an achievement not simply in its comprehensive scope and detail, but in bringing together officials, businessmen, intellectuals, and local community leaders and organizers in direct collaboration to create the final plan. The First Fukuoka City Master Plan operated on a level of both breadth and depth that dwarfed any planning that had come before it, mobilizing representatives from across a wide spectrum of citizens and organizations to create a plan that was more than bureaucratic dictates.

The First Master Plan’s ambition to transform the city did not extend to a revolution in setting Fukuoka’s general economic policy. The city’s economic situation had a number of problematic issues: a gender gap in both demography (more women than men) and employment (male unemployment, and the unusually high rate of female employment, were linked as concerns), a small industrial sector with low production, low consumption levels by ordinary citizens, limited local capital, and limited government finances. For the first time, however, doubts about transforming Fukuoka into a purely industrial city were officially expressed. Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya were cited as examples of the balanced metropolitan economy Fukuoka

---

87 Ibid., pp. 280-283
88 Ibid., p. 4
could aim to develop beyond a total focus on industrial development.\textsuperscript{89} Port development still remained at the center of this vision: the Plan declared that, akin to Los Angeles and New Orleans, Fukuoka had all the ingredients and geographic positioning necessary to grow into a major international city, oriented toward and connecting Japan with Asia.\textsuperscript{90}

Fukuoka’s development in 1961 was not slowing as a consequence of the economic weaknesses identified by the Plan; on the contrary, massive and accelerating growth underlined the importance to proactively guide the city’s overall development. Mapping out the expected growth of the city for thirty years (to a hypothetical year of Shōwa 65), the city population was expected to reach 1.4 million by 1985.\textsuperscript{91} The expectation as to how an extra 700,000 people would be economically supported rested on a belief that employment in the secondary sector – i.e. manufacturing – would increase from “its current 22.1% to 40%” of Fukuoka’s workforce, and the city – driven by consumer electrical goods and automotive production – would become the leading industrial center in Western Japan. This vision also posited a beneficial symbiosis for the rest of Kyushu: Fukuoka would stimulate, and be stimulated by, growth throughout the region.\textsuperscript{92} It also dovetailed with the national plans emanating from Tokyo, which called for 40.3% of workers nationwide to be involved in secondary sector economic activity by 1980. There was no concrete explanation for how Fukuoka – which the Plan itself acknowledged had an extraordinarily weak industrial sector for a city of its size\textsuperscript{93} – would actually achieve this major realignment of its local economic model.

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., pp. 4-5  
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., p. 5  
\textsuperscript{91} The figure was surprisingly accurate, if slightly high. Additional annexation of Fukuoka’s smaller neighbors would have been difficult to predict in that total, and the ongoing national decline in birth rates was probably expected to moderate and stabilize at a higher level than was actually the case.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., p. 9  
\textsuperscript{93} Ibid., p. 48
The First Master Plan and looked to developmental economics to both explain the how and why of Fukuoka’s industrial future, using new intellectual frameworks to endorse a continuing insistence on local industrialization. The most optimistic commentary on the topic suggested that the existing industrial networks surrounding Fukuoka would, in tandem with favorable local demographics supplying both labor and growing consumer demand, propel the city’s own industrial transformation. Population growth, in short, was expected to drive the logic of industrialization in meeting the needs of that very same population. This logic fit into an astute understanding of developmental economics based on a long list of international conferences and scholarship on urbanization: population drives potential economic growth in cities, and population growth itself was reinforced by the twin engines of industrialization and “modernization.” The major caveat to this circle of logic was that population by itself did not guarantee a city’s continued importance and successful development, and the overall composition – materially and culturally – of a city was crucial. ⁹⁴ For the first time, Fukuoka’s official plans for growth acknowledged that the abstract – its society, its environment, its cultural facilities and entertainment and the allure of “modernization” – were equally powerful, and essential, agents alongside industrial plants and transportation infrastructure.

The tertiary sector that was both the mainstay of the economy and separated Fukuoka from its neighbors continued to be viewed as a subordinate sector when compared to secondary sector industrial production. The Master Plan acknowledged the existence of a school of thought that Fukuoka’s economic growth based on services and commerce meant industrial promotion could simply be ignored. Fukuoka’s planners were skeptics, however, and declared that “independent development of [tertiary economic activities] will be extremely limited” without

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 5
the growth of the primary and secondary sectors.\textsuperscript{95} The tertiary sector of commerce and services in 1961 was still perceived as a subsidiary sector of the economy reliant on production, not as an independent economic engine in its own right.

**Embracing the Present to Create the Future: The Second City Master Plan of 1966**

In 1966, Fukuoka unveiled its Second City Master Plan as a much-needed successor, and replacement, for the rapidly ageing First Master Plan. Mayor Abe cited rapid social and economic changes that outpaced planner’s ability to both anticipate and preemptively address to explain why an intended set of revisions to the original City Master Plan had turned into a full-scale reimagining of the First Master Plan.\textsuperscript{96} The Second Master Plan looked very similar in form to its 1961 predecessor, but shifted toward a heavier emphasis on community issues, culture, environmental concerns, tourism, the commercial sector, and popular sentiment. “The Fukuoka of Tomorrow” (*ashita no toshizō*), the first page of text, set the tone for the overall thrust of the Second Master Plan. The Plan was an effort to work within the reality of a rapidly shifting society and budget limitations, as well as lay out more idealized aspirations. It also acknowledged what had long been happening in Fukuoka: changing labor and economic patterns that emphasized education and culture further entrenched the tertiary sector’s role in economic growth over industrial production. Fukuoka planners, at long last, accepted the city’s commerce and services-based future.\textsuperscript{97}

A pragmatic analysis of the city’s underlying conditions provided the rationale to de-emphasize industrial production in Fukuoka. Soaring population growth without industrial expansion had not constrained the tertiary sector, contrary to the predictions of the 1961 plan. In

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid., pp. 52-53
\textsuperscript{96} Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1966, hajime ni*
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., pp. 1-2
reality, the tertiary sector had experienced continuous expansion that – crucially for the city – generated not just new jobs, but an increasingly high yield of taxes and wealthier citizens. The secondary sector continued to expand somewhat, but the quality of jobs it produced – in furniture-production, food preparation, and in general falling under what today would be called “light industry” activities\textsuperscript{98} – was not on par with the value-added contributions of the tertiary sector. Between just 1960 and 1961, the total value of goods and services produced in Fukuoka increased by 140 billion yen, and over 105 billion yen of that total was produced by the tertiary sector (compared to 28 billion yen from the secondary sector).\textsuperscript{99} This pattern of wealth creation (and employment) would have been highly unrepresentative of anywhere else in Kyushu – and, to be frank, almost anywhere else in Japan – but demonstrated that the city’s commercial and services sector was not just expanding in size, but generating wealth at an accelerating rate. Although seen as a “young” regional center compared to Osaka or Tokyo, there was confidence in its overall trajectory.\textsuperscript{100} Fukuoka, as a center of finance, government, and commerce, had a concentration of regional activity that exceeded even that of Osaka or Tokyo. The Second Plan embraced tertiary sector concentration as Fukuoka’s “natural” course of development as well as the basis of its heretofore success, a dramatic turnaround from a finding that would have cause handwringing about industrial backwardness and economic unbalance only five years earlier.\textsuperscript{101}

The acceptance that Fukuoka’s fixation on services and commerce was a “natural” course of development was part of a quiet revolution in understanding the Japanese economy on both a

\textsuperscript{98} Most of Fukuoka’s city handbooks from the 1950s or 1960s offer a breakdown of the city economy that shows not only the number of workers involved in “industry” or “production,” but also the subcategory of those workers’ employment. Food preparation or processing remained the single largest sector by a wide margin, one that was closely linked to the city’s large population and status as a consumption and distribution center.

\textsuperscript{99} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka shisei yōran 1963}, p. 56

\textsuperscript{100} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1966}, pp. 135-136. One of the more shocking insights revealed in the 1966 Master Plan was the assertion that the wartime economy and government fiat had propelled the economic regional centralization and concentration of banks and companies that were the backbone of Fukuoka’s big economic actors and highest economic tier.

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., pp. 4-6
local and national level. The common wisdom, developed during the Meiji Restoration and reinforced in the postwar period through extensive central planning, held that industrial development was the basis for successful economic growth. Far from being a Japanese concept (though Japan was considered a model case of success), this was also the standard UN-World Bank-OECD developmental model advocated and practiced across the globe. Fukuoka’s leaders, while turning away from the old focus on industrialization, were not advocating a local economy of pure consumption and services in which no goods were produced. They were, however, creating a model of economic planning and development that diverged from Tokyo’s industrialization drive in regional Japan.

Planners developed an understanding of a virtuous cycle in Fukuoka’s economic structure, to the effect that businesses attracted residents, and those new residents attracted more businesses, and so on. Fukuoka did not abandon industry, but planners explained that “…different from Kitakyushu, [it is appropriate] to think of tertiary production-like industries”\(^{102}\) that complemented and reinforced existing services and commercial foci. The heavy industry zone of Northern Kyushu surrounding Fukuoka was understood to enhance the city’s distinctive economic role, and be part of a mutually beneficial symbiosis.\(^{103}\) The high-growth era – which led to rapid growth and real rising incomes across Japan, if unevenly in Kyushu – unleashed a demand for the very activities and products Fukuoka had always excelled in providing. The end result of this rapid rise in average income and consumer demand was that, in defiance of received economic wisdom and close to a century of concerted efforts to industrialize Fukuoka, the Second Master Plan declared that “In our city, industrialization does not further urbanization

\(^{102}\) Ibid., p. 14

\(^{103}\) Ibid., p. 9
and city development.”104 By 1966, the unquestioned march toward industrial development had not only halted, but been replaced by new models of growth.

Questions about the limited value of industrialization in Fukuoka were premised not only on breakneck commercial development and economic expansion, but a new sensibility toward the high cost of unchecked industrial growth. The devotion of an entire chapter of the Second Master Plan to a brand new topic, pollution, was a reminder that even though Fukuoka remained a (statistically) remarkably clean and healthful place to live,105 much of Japan was weighed down by the legacy of unchecked industrial practices and environmental degradation by the middle of the 1960s. The environmental catastrophe at Minamata in Kumamoto Prefecture was already under major investigation and had received significant press attention, while hazardous air quality in Kitakyushu from its factories routinely forced residents and schoolchildren indoors. Chikuho suffered from both the economic impact of its collapsed coal mining industry and – in more literal terms –the hole-ridden earth of the area: old mining tunnels literally collapsed inward without warning, both wrecking roads and limiting the construction of new basic improvements like sewage and gas pipelines. Fukuoka’s planners evolved their thinking on heavy industry, which was transformed from an attractive source of jobs and taxes to a source of blight that ruined citizen quality of life and left long-term, costly legacies without clear solutions.106 The insistence on light industry as being most appropriate to the city was a product of the mounting pile of evidence that industrialization brought a host of hidden detriments as well as confidence in the tertiary sector’s ability to power economic development.

104 Ibid., p. 14
105 Ibid., pp. 118-119. The 1965 levels of industrial pollutants in Fukuoka – sulfur trioxide (the main cause of acid rain), carbon monoxide, and so on – remained lower than in any other major city in Japan; the effect of industrial runoff from upriver on fishing and water quality in Hakata Bay was one of the major concerns of this period in terms of both environmental and economic impact (on fisheries).
106 The continued litigation related to Minamata Disease, ongoing as of early 2012 and requiring massive outlays by the Japanese state and Kumamoto Prefecture in particular, is a potent reminder of the costs of Japan’s breakneck industrial growth and environmental degradation.
The Second Master Plan envisioned a robust economic future for the city without major structural shifts, but also detailed the immense investments in human and physical capital that future would require. As in the First Master Plan, the need for more housing, community markets and shopping centers, and general urban infrastructure was well-understood: the existing housing stock was considered adequate in quantity but not particularly good in terms of quality, and the expectation for a need to build 250,900 new homes by 1990 was based not just on population growth but also changing societal structure and the demand for better living conditions matching soaring incomes.\(^{107}\)

Port improvement and expansion plans remained, but as part of an increasingly sophisticated consumption and distribution network Fukuoka served, not the singular catalyst to industrial and economic growth.\(^{108}\) An increasingly educated workforce, produced by the concentration of universities and technical schools in the city that both lured students to bolster the population and largely retained their presence, worked in the booming white collar sector. That sector had expanded as part of a transformation resulting from wartime corporate and bureaucratic regional concentration, and continued to grow as the Japanese economy recovered and expanded. The Second Master Plan of 1966 built on the achievements and scope of its 1961 predecessor not only by recognizing the potential of concentrating on Fukuoka’s long-present economic strengths, but by realizing that the ordinary citizen – as worker, as consumer, as fellow actor – was central.

\(^{107}\) Ibid., pp. 90-94.
\(^{108}\) Ibid p. 134, 165. Interestingly, exports through the Port of Hakata were stagnant while imports rapidly increased, suggesting again that consumption – rather than production – was driving the local economy. The one quixotic exception was fishing: by 1965, Hakata was already Japan’s largest fishing port in terms of tonnage of catch landed.
A New Kind of City: Democratization, Community, and Citizen

The Second City Master Plan understood the limits of both planning and its ability to use infrastructure and institutions to shape Fukuoka, stating: “No matter how one puts it, the appeal of a city is that it’s a gathering place for people.” These words offer a concise summation of a major shift in the focus of the postwar city: a concern with the thinking, and attitudes, of Fukuoka’s ordinary citizens and their quotidian experiences. The focus on environmental issues, education, transportation, and an extensive section on community-building (still in a largely geographic, rather than more abstract, sense) all had economic rationales, of course. Ultimately, however, they revolved around the lived experience of the city’s denizens. Mayor Abe’s opening comments in the 1966 Second Master Plan spent an extensive amount of space thanking ordinary citizens for their input and cooperation in the new plan. Immediately after Abe, the Planning Committee Chairman, in his “Report,” added that there had been significant vocalization from the general city populace demanding a focus on culture, quality of life, and the preservation of nature and historical sites alongside development. The Chairman concluded with a declaration that “the Master Plan [is] continuing to live together with the city’s people.” The people of Fukuoka, increasingly wealthy, were also increasingly vocal about the direction of the city, and the response of those involved in crafting the Master Plan was to consult and attempt to incorporate, rather than fight, popular opinion.

The manner in which Fukuoka’s City Master Plan was formulated – by public committee that included representatives from beyond the state – reinforced the shift in postwar relationships between city and citizen. The Master Plan process was not inherently democratic: it required years of preparation, thousands of pages of detailed research and analysis on almost every corner

\[109\] Ibid., p. 21
\[110\] Ibid., “Report”
of the city, the participation of national and prefectural officials who had sway over taxation and transportation concerns, and the cooperation of countless bureaucrats. In most other large Japanese cities, such as Tokyo or Osaka or Yokohama, a central figure – the city urban planner – would mastermind the entire process, ensuring a certain unity of vision and form that also tended to extend for decades at a time. In the case of Yokohama, the long-term city planner, Tamura Akira, guided city development to such an extent he was sometimes referred to as the ‘Yokohama Emperor’ by local residents; he was also a prolific writer and academic presence who wrote about the need for a more democratic vision of the city and civic engagement, with mixed success in realizing said goal.111

Fukuoka, in contrast to most other large cities, had no permanent city urban planner, and planning remained a collective affair. Planning, like most complex intellectual work in the official sphere of the city, was farmed out to intellectual specialists.112 The presence of a cadre of university professors who studied urban planning, economics, geography, and so on was central to providing the actual plan. Business leaders and politicians rounded out the bulk of committee members, ensuring that the Master Plans produced were far more consultative and inclusive of local concerns and voices in a way that prewar Home Ministry planning never even contemplated. The resulting final Plan was reverently referred to as “the Bible” (Seisho) through which all city policies related to development would be enacted, with all the inviolable sacredness implied in that language. The planning process, whatever its shortcomings as an

---

111 See Tamura, Akira’s Machizukuri no hassō (1977) for one example of his thinking on the complex nature of city planning and the importance of citizen involvement. The much later Tamura Akira no tatakai: Yokohama “shimin no seifū” o mezashite (2006) offers a summation of much of his thinking about the history and contemporary state of city planning and civic life in Japan on the basis of his decades of public service and academic research.
112 This remains as true today as it was in the 1960s; it both keeps down the cost of bureaucracy and enables the city to obtain expertise on an as-needed basis.
exercise in democracy, was also – through collaboration and consultation – transcend party politics and the prerogatives of individual politicians.

The gap between corporate, intellectual, political, and bureaucratic elites remained different from the divisions between elites and the average city resident. The Plan’s imagined role for ordinary citizens was complicated. There was a predictable expression of respect for their desires and concerns. Underlying that respect, however, was a desire to somehow harness popular energy to create the sense of a stake-holding citizenship that would naturally better city life – a goal that would become increasingly central during the 1970s.\textsuperscript{113} The concern with quality of life issues led to extensive discussions of the importance of economic growth being in harmony with natural environment as well as “culture,” defined both as facilities or objects but also as the traditions and learning endemic to Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{114} Plans for “living streets” and vibrant open urban life that befitted Fukuoka’s status and importance, parks, and greenbelts all became essential elements of the Master Plan. Underlying much of this thinking was a larger concern for citizen welfare and a belief that Japanese cities failed to provide a good quality of life to their citizens; consciousness of international norms, and a frankly acknowledged lag behind a (perceived as) superior Western model of urban form and practice,\textsuperscript{115} motivated Fukuoka’s planners to aim for real shifts in the quality of city life beyond pure statistical metrics.

The City Master Plan was deeply concerned with the lived experience of Fukuoka’s average resident but also inherently top down. In some sense, there was a familiar well-established norm. As Sheldon Garon’s work on Japanese bureaucracy and moral suasion campaigns has demonstrated, Fukuoka bureaucrats and political leaders had a sophisticated – and very successful – model provided by the central government for active campaigns and policies to

\textsuperscript{113} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1966}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., pp. 10-11
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., pp. 12-13
structure the everyday lives of the citizens they governed. The city’s response to the rise of “latchkey kids” (literally: kagikko) and increasing youth delinquency included improving public facilities and providing institutional support, but ultimately came down in favor of the primary need to educate families. While one can read the situation as a desire to empower ordinary citizens, it also shifts a social problem caused by shifts in economic and social structure (the necessity of both parents to work outside the home) back onto the general citizenry. The city offered an approved course of individual behavior in hopes of minimizing the need for direct official intervention, and expenditure, to address the problem. Civic engagement was promoted, but with the expectation and anticipation that greater involvement by ordinary citizens in shaping the city would also dovetail with the expectations and priorities of City Hall.

The first decades of postwar saw not just the institutional expansion of political democracy at the local level, but a growing spirit of democratization in city’s efforts to directly reach citizens. The Fukuoka City Handbook, produced every year, is a prime example of this larger shift. While it is doubtful that many ordinary citizens read the handbook, significant and ongoing changes in the form of the handbook continued to take place. The initial form of the handbook – a nondescript bound text, written in impeccable formal Japanese and devoid of any distractions from the text beyond the occasional chart – was utilitarian, but not user-friendly. The 1947 handbook’s preface that encouraged interested readers to learn about the city was the humble beginning of the postwar democratic rhetorical turn. The 1950 handbook, with its pie charts, photographs, colored bar graphs, and pictorial representations of what before had been

---

116 For more on the general development of civil society and efforts by government bureaucracy to mobilize and persuade ordinary citizens, see Sheldon Garon’s “From Meiji to Heisei: the State of Civil Society in Japan” in the Schwarz edited volume The State of Civil Society in Japan.

117 Ibid., pp. 215-217

118 The audience for the city handbook is unclear, even if its purpose had been expressly stated since the prewar period. Based on personal experience and conversation with city officials in contemporary Fukuoka, I am skeptical that the city handbook receives much more use or attention by officials than by the average resident.
purely textual information, marked in a much more obvious way the new commitment to making information on the city more accessible to the non-bureaucratic, if not necessarily “average,” reader in the city. The new addition of an introduction from the mayor, with comments about the state of the city and its future direction, illustrate another attempt to create a more direct and routine route of communication between City Hall and city resident. The 1962 city handbook added a detailed chart outlining the city bureaucracy, including its internal divisions and departments. The 1963 handbook kept the chart but added a new piece of directly useful information: a list of phone numbers for important public offices within the city, conveniently located at the end of the booklet.

The City Newsletter (*Fukuoka shisei dayori*) represented a much more successful example of mass communication with Fukuoka’s citizens than the City Handbooks. Newspapers, needless to say, were not new; they were also, however, not free (from the perspective of City Hall). The crafting of content, printing of the paper, distribution, and delivery all required significant amounts of work and funding to accomplish. Produced by the mayor’s office – which directly controlled the vast majority of the city bureaucracy – the first city newsletter in Fukuoka was published in 1959. The mayor at the time, Okamura Shigetoshi, stated that the goal of the newsletter was to address ongoing problems and improve communication with Fukuoka’s citizens. The newsletter was published biweekly and distributed to every household in the city. Aesthetically speaking, it was not much to look at in 1959: a broadsheet, almost all entirely text printed in small type, no more than several pages in length. The importance of the newsletter to the city was immense, however: the First Master Plan in 1960 noted that with more than 60% of its population not being native-born residents and only 30% of the population expressing any

---

119 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka shisei yōran 1962*, pp. 16-17
120 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka shisei yōran 1963*
interest in city policies, enhancing communication between citizens and city government was essential.\textsuperscript{121} Fukuoka’s residents may not have been deeply engaged with city politics, but there was reason for optimism that municipal efforts had an impact: 68\% of the population reported reading every city newsletter in detail\textsuperscript{122} and – in some cases – actively responding to it.

Citizen’s groups did heed the call to take greater part in shaping Fukuoka’s path and, in some cases, took the initiative in telling City Hall their opinions in highly public form. The Second Master Plan of 1965 had an extensive list of consultative meetings with a range of citizen groups: the elderly, college students, high school students, female workers, male workers, housewives, businessmen, the youth congress, the chamber of commerce, and labor unions all had direct meetings with officials on the Planning Committee to solicit input and feedback.\textsuperscript{123} In 1968, one citizen’s group took the initiative to offer its own vision of the city: the Fukuoka Youth Congress published Tomorrow’s Fukuoka – A Human Metropolis (ningen toshi e no teian). Echoing the Committee Chair’s report from 1966, the Youth Congress contended that the phrasing for “Human City” (ningen toshi) was rooted in a concern that people and human interaction should remain the center of the urban experience; frequent contact with the Mayor and invocation of the Master Plan followed, recalling their consultative meetings with officials during the creation of the Second Master Plan.\textsuperscript{124} The text declared that life in Fukuoka was superior to Tokyo on account of its clean air, lack of crushing density and strong community traditions, describing a city under threat by the less desirable aspects of continuing growth and modernization.\textsuperscript{125} A collage of photographs highlighting the Youth Congress’ targets of concern followed: images of littered riverbanks, labor rallies, posters of partially nude women and

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku, p. 262\textsuperscript{121}}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 263\textsuperscript{122}}
\footnote{Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1966, pp. 234-235\textsuperscript{123}}
\footnote{Fukuoka seinen kaigijo, Ningen toshi e no teian, pp. 8-11\textsuperscript{124}}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 14\textsuperscript{125}}
\end{footnotes}
suggestive advertisements, dancing at a night club, women in short skirts, and pictures of a tranquil Hakata Bay with praise for its scenic views and clean water (i.e. a cry against cluttering the waterfront, landfill, and port expansion). While stodgy city officials might have nodded approvingly in private at most of these concerns, the focus on regulating personal behavior, challenge to port development plans, and implicit suggestion of censoring popular culture also were all at odds with the official vision of what Fukuoka should aspire to become. The Master Plan was consultative and attempted to solicit public input from a wide variety of sources but it could not be, and clearly was not, all things to all people. Expressing dissent and alternate visions, however, was just as much part of the new milieu of postwar life as collective decision-making at the top.

*Tomorrow’s Fukuoka – A Human Metropolis* concluded with a rare insight into the Fukuoka street: a survey of 1,088 residents on their single largest concern about the city in 1968. Categorically speaking, the concerns were fairly well-balanced (the survey itself was heavily weighted toward young people under thirty, and 82.7% of respondents were male): transportation, roads, water (sewer systems, lakes, and rivers) dominated the list, followed some ways down by issues about the economy and prices. What followed in the statistical compilation and conclusion were the collected comments from each surveyed individual, expressed in colloquial – and blunt – fashion. Surveyed residents wanted wider roads, cleaner rivers, and lower taxes, but also greater cultural facilities: more museums, libraries, and parks. Most surprisingly, however, were requests by Fukuoka’s surveyed citizens for better guidance from the city government, a number of whom invoked the Fukuoka City Master Plan as a model of clear

---

126 Ibid., pp. 34-41
127 Ibid., p. 72
communication. Slowly but surely, the dialogue between city and citizen had evolved from a purely top-down dictate from authority into a wider discourse. City planning and policy debates between the public and City Hall was by no means a conversation between equals, yet was worlds away from prewar patterns.

The Postwar Era: Reimagining and Repositioning Fukuoka

At the same time that the Fukuoka Youth Congress was placing its vision of a better Fukuoka into the public discourse, KERC offered a vision of the larger Kyushu that was far cloudier than the forecast for Fukuoka. The region’s population had been in decline since 1960, and it remained increasingly backward compared to other regions. Government funding was the lowest in the nation, and – while the economic situation still looked better than that in Hokkaido or Hokuriku or Shikoku – the only prefecture that had not lost population was Fukuoka. Within the prefecture, the population of Fukuoka City grew more in a single year than the entire prefecture as a collective unit, as the exodus from coal mines and small industrial towns continued set against the intensifying urbanization in the prefectural and regional core. The one bright spot, in fact, was Fukuoka City; while KERC noted that the economic situation in Fukuoka was very idiosyncratic, it was seen as the one place in Kyushu that would continue to experience high growth lasting well into the 1970s; KERC attributed Fukuoka’s attractiveness in part to the general ability of prefectural capitals to draw in outsiders, but commented that even then growth in the numbers of commuters and students flowing into the city was unusually high – both in relative percentages and in absolute terms. Fukuoka, in short, could expect a brighter

\[\text{Ibid., pp. 74-77}\]
\[\text{Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, Kyushu keizai chōsa geppō August-September 1968, pp. 4-5}\]
\[\text{Ibid., p. 17}\]
tomorrow, even if KERC was not exactly sure how to account for the full picture of growth and development.

By the late 1970s life in Fukuoka – like Japan as a whole – was better than in 1945, at least in terms of material well-being. Recovery had been fairly rapid, and in many aspects the city owed its ongoing prosperity as much to the continuity of wartime legacies. The concentration of bureaucracy and corporate power within the city, the establishment of unified regional systems and conglomerates that were able to gather capital on a previously impossible scale beyond the Kanto or Kansai – Fukuoka’s economy had not undergone fundamental realignment, so much as a blossoming of entrenched structures and new high rates of growth generated by the recovery of Japan as a whole. In short, if recovery in Fukuoka immediately after the war was a story of survival in spite of national difficulties, the high growth of the 1950s and 1960s was also possible only because of general national and regional prosperity.

The stability in economic structure, however, did not mean stagnancy in the political or social realm. Rising wealth and increased local autonomy and professional expertise gave rise to new ideals and visions for the city. Led by new bodies like the Kyushu Economic Research Center, Fukuoka’s local politicians and bureaucrats had an enormous body of new knowledge and detailed statistical analysis to guide their decision-making, and the demise of the Home Ministry and increased – if still limited – local autonomy that followed the creation of the new postwar constitution and political system meant that the city’s leaders had the freedom to make decisions and utilize new information on an unprecedented level. The Fukuoka City Master Plans reflected not just new political confidence and authority but also the horizons of local aspiration: Fukuoka would ascend to its rightful place as not just the center of the larger Kyushu region, but
a national economic core comparable to Osaka or Tokyo or Nagoya\textsuperscript{131} that would eventually rise to be an international city linking Japan to Asia. The vision here, of course, was quite old: the allure of Fukuoka as international port had not vanished, but rather been reincarnated in postwar form as an embrace of self-motivated internationalism. Although initially limited to trade in scope, this internationalism would come to be part of a much more extensive vision of entwinement by the closing years of the twentieth century.

City development took the radical step of abandoning dreams of industrialization, so that by the late 1960s Fukuoka was a model of the success of the services and commercial sector economy. The terminology for this economy, in fact, had no common parlance in contemporary Japan, and the full significance of what Fukuoka represented in relation to the national economy as a developmental model become clear much later, only as the limitations and weaknesses of the manufacturing economy became acute. The city economy envisioned by the Master Plans, with its reliance on human interaction and capital, quickly learned to place value on that previously had no economic measurement: quality of life, environmental protection, education, civic engagement, and so on. The shift to a services economy encompassed a larger shift toward a focus on the conditions and needs of the average citizen, fueling both an increasingly sophisticated bureaucratic-intellectual complex but also a genuinely more democratic model of citizen-government interaction on the local level, one in which ordinary citizens needed to be reached and engaged rather than simply led. Political democracy in form, whether one argues it to be anemic or healthy, was matched just as importantly by an actual democratization of social and political practice in the larger spheres of Japanese life.

The robust health of Fukuoka’s economy and civil society contrasted with the larger

\textsuperscript{131} The stretch of major metropolitan centers and urbanization that came to be known as the “Pacific Belt,” an area further discussed in Chapter Four.
troubles in the Kyushu region as a whole, where population decline and economic backwardness combined to create a mute crisis. Economic growth and rises in income masked what was an increasingly unstable balance between Japan’s economic core in the Pacific Belt and its regional peripheries, a problem that would come to garner increasing attention and concern – if not solutions – as the high growth era of the 1950s and 1960s gave way to the sustained but moderate growth of the 1970s and 1980s. Fukuoka, as a regional center that looked less and less like its surrounding region, did not follow national economic prescriptions for development, yet continued to experience high growth rates. The end of Japan’s high growth era in the 1970s would lead to a reevaluation of economic, political, and social models across the nation, and Fukuoka would be no exception to these wider trends.
Chapter Four: Together and Apart: The Regional Metropolis

On April 1, 1972, Fukuoka City celebrated its official administrative evolution from city to “Designated City” (*seirei shitei toshi*). The status, reserved at the time for municipalities that had reached or were anticipated to reach populations of a million inhabitants or more,\(^1\) was reserved for the handful of major metropolitan centers outside of Tokyo: Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, and the recently-founded Kitakyushu. In addition to Fukuoka, this same day also marked the ascension of Kawasaki and Sapporo to the rank of Designated City and, with it, the creation of a truly national network of metropolises (*daitoshi*), considered to be increasingly similar in both form and function. From Hokkaido to Kyushu, Designated Cities and the major urban centers they signified spanned the length of Japan, key nodes that linked regional Japan back to the national center in Tokyo.

While the decades of the 1950s and 1960s had been dominated by issues of economic growth and establishing postwar stability, the 1970s and 1980s would, like the Designated City status, bring Fukuoka and the larger Kyushu region into greater synchronicity with Japan as a national unit. Despite Japan’s slowed growth in the wake of the 1973 Oil Shock and the end of cheap energy, Fukuoka continued to experience double-digit growth in its local economy fueled by a continued influx of people and wealth even as the vast industrial belt surrounding the city continued to decline. Whereas immediate postwar Fukuoka and its major civilian airport, baseball team, and bureaucratic offices had been something of an isolated outpost linking Kyushu back to Japan’s economic, political, and cultural center, the completion of the Sanyō

---

\(^1\) Fukuoka, at the time of its official transfer to *seirei shitei toshi* status, had a population of roughly 800,000 with forecasts for continued growth well beyond the one-million-inhabitants mark (as projected from the late 1950s and evidenced in its Master Plans). In more recent years the population threshold has been relaxed slightly to allow for slightly smaller regional cities such as Okayama, Shizuoka, and Niigata to join the ranks, while suburbs of pre-existing major cities – Hamamatsu, Sakai, and Sagamihara – have also attained the size to reach the same status.
Shinkansen line in 1975 – with its terminal point at the newly refurbished and expanded Hakata Station\textsuperscript{2} – marked both a symbolic and literal direct linkage of Fukuoka to Tokyo. The Shinkansen, with its rapid speed, comfort, and passenger volume represented the integration of Fukuoka into a web of national connection on a new scale of intensity.

This chapter continues to look at the postwar city, covering the period of the 1970s and early 1980s. The 1970s marked an important transition point, both across Japan in general and in Fukuoka in particular. The Oil Shock, the result of OPEC embargoes and production stoppages tied into ongoing conflicts in the Middle East, upset the supply of cheap, seemingly limitless energy that had fueled the high growth of the 1950s and 1960s. Rising energy costs led to a permanent slowdown in rates of economic growth. Fukuoka weathered the crisis relatively well and continued to grow at rates well above the national average, but the rest of the Kyushu region fell victim to an ever-increasing gap with Japan’s urban and industrial cores that continued to sap the relative economic importance of the region and perpetuated the emptying out of the regional periphery.

Fukuoka escaped the economic problems elsewhere in Kyushu, but faced its own challenges related to the impact of rapid urbanization and growth. Fukuoka became a Designated City, an administrative shift that furthered local autonomy and improved its financial situation. The success of Fukuoka’s commercial and services economy, buoyed by increased consumption, was not under threat; the city’s chief concern was a more broadly-defined quality of life beyond material well-being defined by income levels. In that context, rises in crime, juvenile delinquency, and the increased atomization of city residents all figured prominently in the

\textsuperscript{2} There is a parallel to be made here to Hakata Station’s most recent expansion; beginning in 2005, a massive redevelopment and expansion of the station building and platforms was made – completed in late 2011 – to accommodate increased traffic and commerce expected from the long-awaited completion of the Kyushu Shinkansen linking Fukuoka to Hakata (the Hakata-Nagasaki spoke remains under construction as of early 2012).
concerns of the city’s political elite and policy planners. The Planning Committee appropriated rhetoric on citizen participation that circulated nationally at the time in more progressive circles, repurposing grassroots activism and confrontation with city officials into plans to mobilize and harness citizen energies toward carefully determined top-down policy goals.

I argue that Fukuoka’s official leaders very effectively borrowed and retooled much more liberal discourses on citizen participation to address social problems determined from the top, but had much less success in persuading citizens to actually take action. The absence of widespread opposition politics and an effective LDP monopoly on local offices spoke to a dearth of political democracy in the city, but that same weakness of open protest was the result of citizen preoccupation with their personal affairs, and perhaps a mixture of apathy coupled with relative satisfaction with the direction of the city and its policies. While civil activism and open debate failed to take hold in this period, democratization occurred in Fukuoka’s city government through increased efforts at direct communication, actively soliciting citizen comments and complaints, and a commitment to providing open information about government activities (in line with wider national movements to the same end).

The anemic nature of political activism stood in contrast to a flourishing sphere of cultural activism that developed in the 1970s and 1980s. Fukuoka, with its large populations of students, youthful demographics, and economic focus on consumption, proved to be a natural center for the evolution of youth culture and mass marketing and consumption. A nexus of plentiful young musicians, thriving radio broadcasters, and music publishing coalesced into what came to be known around Japan as “Mentai Rock,” and Fukuoka became part of a cycle of cultural production, marketing, and consumption that connected it to larger trends in popular culture. Underground, self-published magazines that offered guides to enjoying contemporary
culture and amenities were replaced by professional, commercial “Town Magazines” that offered a cookie-cutter experience of localism but also folded youth culture and popular opinion into existing commercial and consumption networks. This burst of local cultural production and marketing was also, I argue, the beginning of a new, publicly identifiable modern “Fukuoka” identity that was not purely reliant on historical narratives and traditions prior to 1889.

**Redefined Relationships: Fukuoka as Designated City and Metropolis**

Designated City status endowed Fukuoka with new responsibilities and capabilities that transferred power to the local level. The Designated City, created by changes to Japan’s local autonomy statutes in 1956, was more than a marker of size and significance: it was a distinct legal and administrative regime that turned large urban centers into quasi-independent units within their own prefecture. Tokyo, with its continued sprawl and increasingly dense development, presented its own set of problems and challenges as both urban space and unit of governance (which had begun to be addressed as early as the prewar period). Even beyond the center, intensive urbanization was fundamentally changing urban Japan. While Japan’s prewar population had nearly doubled between 1868 and 1945, the percentages of rural versus urban dwellers had remained relatively balanced; in the postwar era, rapid population growth was coupled with massive migration out of the countryside and into urban areas. Population migration and accompanying economic concentration in the postwar era created a new range of major urban centers beyond the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka belt. Designated Cities were, in effect, an acknowledgment of the limitations of prefectural-level efficiency in addressing the needs of major urban centers and providing said municipalities and offered flexibility to meet local issues.
Designated Cities shifted the balance of government functions, funding, and power from prefectures to their largest municipalities. When Kitakyushu became a Designated City in 1963, the status was welcomed by both city and prefecture.\(^3\) Reports prepared for the Fukuoka Prefectural Assembly acknowledged a direct and immediate loss of 153 million yen in funds available as a result of funds and taxes being directly sent to Kitakyushu, but also speculated that long-term growth would be enhanced by Kitakyushu’s new status and help both its neighbors and the prefecture’s economic and financial situation as a whole.\(^4\) Designated Cities, in addition to altering taxation and funding, also wrested control for a multitude of government functions away from the prefecture and gave them to city bureaucracies. Areas of direct coordination with the national government (largely focused on road construction and tax payment transfers), logistical support elections, agricultural offices, and most forms of social welfare all devolved to the Designated City.\(^5\) Certain key services – education and policing chief among them – remained firmly within the realm of prefectural authority, but Designated Cities effectively created a new level of entirely local bureaucracy.

Fukuoka city officials had anticipated and actively pursued Designated City status as early as the 1950s. On the simple basis of rapid population growth, both predicted and realized throughout the 1950s and 1960s, qualification for the status seemed like a foregone conclusion. Beyond “demography as destiny,” however, Fukuoka’s future as a Designated City was a political goal of much of the city leadership. Sakada Dai, later a leading figure in the Designated City process preparations wrote a small piece on Fukuoka’s development policy as part of

\(^3\) The Kitakyushu case was additionally complicated in that the city itself was then being formed simultaneously out of five pre-existing cities. In all other Designated City cases, an existing single city, or single city that annexed smaller neighbors but did not need to create new civic institutions whole cloth, was granted a new status rather than an entirely new identity.

\(^4\) Sakada Dai, *Tsuzuki shitei toshi fukuoka*, p. 32

\(^5\) Ibid., pp. 43-44; a practical example is given of the Kitakyushu case with ten years of experience for the purpose of explaining what the Fukuoka handover would look like, although officials once again admit that the financial aftermath is unknown.
compilation celebrating the modern city’s 70th anniversary in 1959. Sakada’s “Plan for Development” (hattensaku) laid out many of the familiar elements that appeared in later plans for the city. Many of the declared aims of the First City Master Plan (1961) made an unofficial debut in Sakada’s condensed article, and the familiar obsession with port development and industrialization remained.6

Sakada’s article contained three important elements of what Fukuoka hoped to achieve by obtaining Designated City status. Sakada, who identified himself first and foremost as a citizen and community member, and the city as the place “where we work, live, and play,” declared that the ultimate goal of all planning was for Fukuoka to evolve a “sumiyoi kindaitoshi”7 – a modern city that was, first and foremost, livable and likable. The second point is that Sakada, quoting Ishikawa Eiyō’s Ashita no nihontoshi, adhered to a view that Japanese cities were in a continuous game of catching up to Western cities, having to address not only the newly appearing issues cities Western civic planners and officials grappled with but also preexisting relative shortfalls in infrastructure and other basic problems.8 Sakada also believed that Japan’s purpose as a nation in the postwar period was to be a “Cultural Nation” (bunka kokka), and that Fukuoka’s collective history and traits would make it an ideal “City of Culture” (bunka toshi) that could be a shining example of the modern Japanese city.9 The bunka toshi concept guided a great deal of development and policy in Fukuoka from the First Master Plan onward, and the Designated City status provided additional tools and resources toward those ends.

Designated City status allowed Fukuoka to manage and spend its growing budget with less outside influence, a powerful tool in realizing development plans. Early postwar period

6 Ibid., p. 117; the original appeared as part of a celebratory collection of articles published in 1959 and is reprinted in Sakada’s work Shitei toshi Fukuoka.
7 Ibid., pp. 105-106
8 Ibid., p. 116
9 Ibid., pp. 116-117
Fukuoka suffered from annual budget deficits that necessitated careful spending; the institutional structure of postwar taxation, in which the vast majority of taxes are collected by the Tokyo bureaucracy and then distributed back to prefectural and local governments, placed structural limitations on the ability of localities to raise funds independently. Regardless of institutional limitations, however, rapid economic growth propelled a massive increase in city finances. For example, the 1973 Fukuoka annual budget of 183.14 billion yen marked a massive double-digit increase from the 1972 budget of 137.84 billion yen, itself a larger jump from the 1971 budget of 111.97 billion yen. The revenue problems that had plagued early postwar were replaced, for a time, by annual surpluses. Designated City status shifted personnel and resources from the prefecture to the city, but generally the early 1970s remained a time of heady economic growth and an overabundance of local government revenues. The latter half of the 1970s, and the 1980s onward, would mark a period of tighter finances and decreased growth in basic revenues that would also make the extra funding – and, crucially, bond-issuing potential – of major cities like Fukuoka crucial.

Fukuoka’s financial windfall allowed a massive expansion in government spending designed to address quality of life issues. Although the prefecture continued to be responsible for the actual establishment and administration of schools and education regardless of the Designated City status, the city was also keen to remind its citizens that their city taxes also helped fund a huge portion of annual expenses per pupil. In 1971, the city spent 8.24 billion

---

10 While borrowing by prefectures was allowed, one of the crucial rewards of the Designated City status is the ability of the municipality to issue and raise its own bonds, creating – potentially – a massive pool of new funding. More recently, the crippling debt burdens carried by Osaka and Kobe are cautionary tales about why this new authority also posed clear risks.
11 Fukuoka kansain, *Fukuoka sainyū saishitsu kessan oyobi kikin unyō jōkyō shinsa iken teishutsu ni tsuite* (1973), p. 58
12 Ibid., p. 5
13 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka shisei dayori*, April 10, 1972, city-wide edition. The city went so far as to calculate the costs per student for nine full years of compulsory education and the city’s total share of that cost. The article seems
yen on education, or slightly over 7% of it its total budget.\textsuperscript{14} Other large categories for expenses included social welfare (8.5 billion yen), general public works (8.92 billion yen), city planning (5 billion yen), sanitation and hygiene (5.77 billion yen), general operating expenses (5.29 billion yen), port facilities (6.43 billion yen), sewers and waterworks (9.67 billion yen), and – the single largest expense – the city-operated boat racing marina, at 31.16 billion yen.\textsuperscript{15} Fukuoka in 1971, in short, spent most of its money on an array of public works and social services. More unexpectedly, however, was the funding of leisure and tourism attractions in the form of the both expensive (yet profitable) marina and boat racing grounds – directly operated city businesses that continue to operate today.

The 1982 city budget, after ten years as a Designated City, reflected even focus on spending designed to improve daily life. By 1982, the city’s total budget stood at 349.12 billion yen\textsuperscript{16} – a very healthy sum, although budget increases had also fallen from the heady 20-30\% per annum increases that were routine in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The structure of budget outlays had also changed over the decade: social welfare continued to be a key expenditure (68.11 billion yen), as did education (46.38 billion yen) and general public works (50.52 billion yen).\textsuperscript{17} The city spent, in both absolute and relative terms, far larger amounts on welfare, education, and public works than it had a decade earlier. Spending on city planning had soared from 5 billion yen in 1971 to 60 billion yen in 1982, becoming the second-largest category of expenses after social welfare. The relative increase in “city planning” seems even more substantial when the transfer of a huge range of social welfare functions from prefecture to city is

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{14} Fukuoka kansain, \textit{Fukuoka saiinyū saishutsu kessan oyobi kikin unyō jōkyō shinsa ikensho} (1971), p. 38
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 38. It should be added that the marina, despite its seemingly outlandish consumption of close to 30\% of the city’s budget, also generated a similar proportion of municipal income.
\textsuperscript{16} Fukuoka kansain, \textit{Fukuokashi ippan saiinyū saishutsu kessan} (1982), p. 15
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 10-11
\end{flushleft}
taken into account in post-1971 budgets, whereas “city planning” remained relatively static in terms of the weight of city versus prefectural versus national roles. The importance of the abstract “sumiyosa,” or quality of life, concept that became a mantra of city planners and politicians was reflected in ever-increasing municipal investment in both citizen welfare and the physical cityscape.

Quality of life issues became a central concern of large cities across Japan during this time period. The postwar period entailed rapid urbanization across Japan, most heavily in the “Pacific Belt,” the intensely urbanized and industrialized belt stretching from Tokyo to Osaka-Kobe. This process also led to massive outward migration from the Kyushu, Tohoku, Hokuriku, Hokkaido, Shikoku, and Chugoku regions to a handful of prefectures – and, in truth, a select number of areas within those prefectures. By 1970, 55.6 million people (57% of Japan’s total population) were concentrated in the narrow, largely coastal stretch running between Tokyo and Osaka. The end result of such intensive concentration was, by the early 1970s, clearly beginning to take a visible toll. In 1971 an OECD delegation, as part of a multinational tour to study comparative development in its member states, visited Japan to “see the achievements so far” in Japanese development, but also “[made no visits to] the underdeveloped areas of Japan” despite its ostensible purpose of studying regional policy. OECD economists and researchers, looking at Japanese economic development as a national whole, concluded that while “it has clearly been more economic to concentrate infrastructure in [the Pacific Belt] than over the whole country… the advantages of concentration have been increasingly eroded… there has been marked deterioration in the living conditions for the people [in the Pacific Belt area].”

---

18 Ibid., p. 11
19 Tsūshō Sangyōshō, *Present State of Regional Development In Japan*, p. 3
20 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Salient features of regional development policy in Japan*, pp. 1-4

142
Japan’s economic development, in short, had been too successful: rapid urbanization and industrial concentration had reached a point of diminishing returns as degradation in both the human and natural environments became increasingly obvious.

Japan’s major urban areas faced mounting, nationwide urban problems in part by sharing data and analysis to find common solutions. A new category largely interchangeable with the Designated City was devised: the metropolis. Japan’s largest cities had been treated as a separate category of analysis and concern since Japan’s 1919 City Planning Law; by the Pacific War, the Home Ministry’s created elaborate plans for redevelopment and industrial direction focused on the “Big Five plus One” metropolises (Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, Kobe, Nagoya, and the quintuplet-cities already being called Kitakyushu). As Fukuoka, Sapporo, and Kawasaki all attained Designated City status, an ever-larger network of metropolitan centers began to spread across Japan. The end result was that the old dichotomy separating Tokyo and regional cities (chihō toshi) gave way to a new way of thinking about the linkages between Japan’s large cities and the increasingly complex and interconnected national space they inhabited.

Led by Osaka – the natural leader of “regional” Japan – city planning officials from all nine extant Designated Cities in 1974 met to share information and solutions on common issues facing Japan’s metropolises. Issues addressed ranged from traffic to pollution to crime, a mixture of social, economic, and environmental issues. Individual gaps between individual cities remained significant: Yokohama and Osaka were far larger in terms of population, for example, compared to Fukuoka or Kawasaki, and Kitakyushu’s manufacturing-based economy had little in

---

21 Daitoshi kiaku shukansha kaigi, Daitoshi o kangaeru, yo ni kaete.
common with Sapporo or Fukuoka. They did, however, face universal problems and, as Designated Cities, shared a common toolkit to address identified concerns.\textsuperscript{22}

Japan’s regional metropolises beyond Tokyo fell within a fairly standard pattern, and Fukuoka was largely unexceptional. Fukuoka had the lowest percentage of native-born residents, and – alongside Yokohama, Kawasaki, and Sapporo – continued to enjoy an increasing concentration of workers and businesses, whereas other major cities were experiencing deconcentration and notable sprawl.\textsuperscript{23} It also had one of the highest concentrations of white-collar workers as a portion of its total workforce, and by far the lowest levels of pollution tied into its tiny manufacturing sector.\textsuperscript{24} Almost every Designated City, however, had a large white-collar employee sector, increasingly important commercial and services sectors, a relatively youthful population, and a concentration of corporate and banking interests that set them apart from both rural areas and smaller cities. Fukuoka, in short, had less in common with its traditional regional neighbors and former rivals in Kyushu, such as Nagasaki and Kumamoto, and more in common structurally, socially, and economically with cities such as Sapporo.

Social issues took center stage across Japan’s major cities as intense urbanization coupled with the coming-of-age of the postwar baby-boom generation created new demands on limited services and infrastructure. While the 1960s and Japan’s income-doubling plan had led to vast increases in the material well-being of the average citizen – and catapulted Japan to the status of second-largest economy in the world – it had also given rise to the overcrowding, pollution, and diminishing quality of life observed both by outside observers such as the OECD and domestic analysts such as the coalition of city planning officials that compiled Daitoshi o kangaeru.

\textsuperscript{22} The Designated City status commonality might also explain the exclusion of Tokyo. Beyond any sort of anti-Tokyo bias or regional resentment, there remained significant differences in the resources and government frameworks between capital and autonomous metropolitan centers.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp. 24-26
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 33
Municipal bureaucrats read the rise in citizen movements and social protests as a direct result of rapid urbanization.\textsuperscript{25} Japan’s metropolises faced the reality that a new generation raised in the growing affluence of the 1950s and 1960s had new expectations of its cities and that large, dense Designated Cities were at risk of being identified primarily as crowded and polluted – resulting in urban flight and urban sprawl.\textsuperscript{26}

Fukuoka’s relatively small size, and nonindustrial economy, were valuable assets in responding to the urban challenges that gained attention in the 1970s. Fukuoka was not, either statistically or in its own imagination, on the same level as Tokyo or Osaka or even Nagoya: statistic after statistic that compared metropolises showed an enormous gap in terms of the concentration of capital, of corporate headquarters,\textsuperscript{27} and in the total economic output of each location. What the city did have was “Fukuoka’s Charm”: \textit{sumiyosa, la dolce vita}, or – quite simply – the good life; excellent public transportation, a thriving economy, affordable living, high quality education, and an abundance of cultural resources.\textsuperscript{28} Fukuoka had one of the best educated workforces and least polluted environments of any major city, and main problems were comparatively high levels of traffic accidents and violent crime in the early 1970s.\textsuperscript{29} Fukuoka had issues that required attention, but the sprawl, high pollution, and negative economic environment afflicting some other metropolises was essentially absent from the city.

Fukuoka had the least in common among major cities with its immediate neighbor and prefectural cohabitant, Kitakyushu. Kitakyushu, a Designated City from its early 1960s creation, was larger than Fukuoka in terms of its population, budget, and geographic expanse. Despite the declining fortunes of the steel and coal industrial complex in Northern Kyushu ever since the

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid., p. 13
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., pp. 58-59
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., p. 129
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., pp. 69-70
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., p. 63.
1950s, it also still provided an economic engine and had a volume of imports and exports through its port that dwarfed the Port of Hakata (whose volume of trade had rapidly expanded but remained quite small by comparison). Kitakyushu suffered, however, from the weaknesses implicit in its erstwhile strengths: high pollution, few cultural facilities or higher educational opportunities, and a good quality of life for laborers that conversely had little to offer culturally. The larger issue, in short, was that Kitakyushu was handicapped in a new era in which “culture,” and overcoming the alienation and artificiality rapid urban growth had created, was increasingly central. While Fukuoka and Kitakyushu faced many of the same challenges in building strong communities to support continued development and prosperity in each city, the playing field was from level. Fukuoka and Kitakyushu shared an administrative status that set them apart from Fukuoka Prefecture and within a small class of cities across Japan, but it was Fukuoka’s older defining characteristic – that of regional hub and commercial center – that would continue to spur its growth and, conversely, limit Kitakyushu’s avenues for reinvention in an era in which Japanese cities were attempting to escape from the dependence on industry that had driven the Kyushu region from the Meiji era to the early years of postwar history.

Growing Apart: The Fates of Fukuoka City and the Kyushu Region

For regional Japan, the apparent problems facing major urban areas seemed like a golden opportunity to reverse the decline of the countryside and begin closing economic and demographic gaps. In its 1973 white paper on city growth and the regional economy in Kyushu, KERC expressed optimism that the 1970s would prove to be a golden era for regions and regional cities and a difficult era for “giant metropolises” (kyodaitoshi) – presumably code for the Greater Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka areas – as overcrowding and pollution prompted a

30 Ibid., p. 127
backlash against overdevelopment and, it was hoped, a flow back to the regions.\textsuperscript{31} KERC was not alone in this line of thinking; the OECD, in its 1971 report, noted that officials in Tokyo were attempting a “radical reorganization of the pattern of development policy”\textsuperscript{32} at the national level. National planning officials sought to deconcentrate the economy by moving industrial and infrastructure investments beyond Osaka and Tokyo: every region outside the Pacific Belt were “areas for development” that would bring new industrial belts to “underdeveloped areas of Japan.”\textsuperscript{33} Regional development under the 1969 National Development Plan still meant urbanization, however, and the explicit creation of cities to serve as concentrated foci for larger regions.\textsuperscript{34} In short, Japan was divided up by Tokyo into “economic blocs,” not unlike the wartime period, with designated regional champions: Sapporo for Hokkaido, Sendai for Tohoku, Tokyo for the Kanto, Niigata for Hokuriku, Nagoya for the Tokai and Chubu, Osaka for the Kansai, Hiroshima for the Sanyō, and Fukuoka for Kyushu. Deconcentration did not necessarily mean reviving the wider health of Japan’s outlying regions or addressing the root causes of depopulation, but chiefly staunching the flow of people into the Pacific Belt by creating regional urban magnets. The 1969 National Development Plan, meant to help the larger Kyushu region, managed to solidify and systematize the \textit{de facto} regional concentration that had emerged in the initial decades of the postwar era.

Kyushu, and regional Japan in general, was not necessarily “underdeveloped” in absolute terms but rather when measured against the Pacific Belt or metropolises like Fukuoka. While the relative share of Japan’s national economy and industrial output in regions such as Kyushu, Hokkaido, and Shikoku had fallen precipitously from prewar highs in the 1930s, absolute

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{31} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Kyūshū keizai hakusho: toshi seichō to chiiki keizai no henbō}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{32} Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, \textit{Salient features of regional development policy in Japan}, p. 1
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., pp. 38-43
\textsuperscript{34} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1971}, p. 11
\end{flushleft}
economic growth had continued to raise standards of livings across the nation. In international comparisons, the gap between national centers and least-developed regions was quite low for Japan, and the inequality present did not stir social or political unrest.\textsuperscript{35} The issue for Kyushu, in short, was not abject poverty or economic distress (excluding perhaps the collapsed Chikuho coal-mining industry, or the severely polluted Minamata area), but rather the question of whether conditions in Kyushu would meet the demands of a booming generation of young people who were both willing and able to relocate anywhere in Japan to pursue economic opportunities.

Kyushu’s citizens were indeed able and willing to seek their fortune far from home, and did so en masse. Beyond aggregate population totals, the key question was what happened to Kyushu’s young people: those who entered the work force and, by extension, went on to form their own families and provide the next generation of citizens. 1972 statistics showed that approximately half of Kyushu’s secondary school graduates (at both the middle and high school levels of exit) found work locally, while half migrated to other regions of Japan (approximately 80\% to the Kanto or Kansai regions, roughly equally divided).\textsuperscript{36} This fed into the population trough developing in Kyushu: migration of young men out of Kyushu to Nagoya, Osaka, and Tokyo almost doubled over the course of the 1960s decade, from 104,000 to 201,000 in the space of a single year.\textsuperscript{37} 1981 statistics remained essentially unchanged from 1972, with marginal declines in the percentage of outward migrants but no larger shifts.\textsuperscript{38} The “golden age” of regional Japan, and the deconcentration promised by series of National Development Plans,

\textsuperscript{35} Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, \textit{Salient features of regional development policy in Japan}, pp. 8-9
\textsuperscript{36} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Kyūshū keizai gaikan}, 1972, p. 14. No statistics were given for the ultimate employment destination of university students, the vast majority of which would also have been concentrated in Fukuoka.
\textsuperscript{37} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Kyūshū keizai hakusho: toshi seichō to chiiki keizai no henbō}, pp. 30-31
\textsuperscript{38} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Kyūshū keizai gaikan}, 1981, pp. 8-9
had failed to manifest in any clear way by the 1980s. Once the floodgates of postwar urban migration opened in earnest, it seemed impossible to close them or stabilize regional populations.

The National Development Plans and shifting developmental and economic trends following the end of the high growth era of the 1950s and 1960s did not leave a static regional Japan, but instead created new patterns of concentration on a more localized level. Fukuoka’s growth since the Meiji period had depended on localized concentration on some level; as a prefectural capital, transportation hub, commercial, cultural, and educational center, the city had attracted newcomers from the time of its official incorporation. The linkage between administrative centers and accelerated economic and population growth was well-known – Tokyo itself, it should be remembered, was the administrative city example *par excellence*, neither Japan’s undisputed industrial nor commercial capital until the postwar era. During the 1970s this pattern also began to appear in prefectural capitals. Previous to the 1970s, a “U-Turn” migration pattern for youth was common, in which young men would head to the Pacific Belt for education and work but were expected to eventually return to their birthplace and raise a family. The new normal, however, was increasingly termed the “J-Turn” migration pattern: young men would return to the general area they were born, but not necessarily their actual hometowns or prefectures.39 The single largest beneficiaries of this pattern, at least in Kyushu, were prefectural capitals. The prefectural countryside continued to experience high rates of outward migration – exacerbated by the increasing rarity of young people returning to their home towns. Traditional patterns of economic, social, and cultural life in regional Japan came under increasing threat as mobile young people left the very countryside whose earlier migrants had created the urban experience postwar youth opted to live in.

39 Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, *Kyūshū keizai hakusho: toshi seichō to chiiki keizai no henbō*, pp. 30-31
The 1970s and 1980s saw a closing of some gaps between rising prefectural capitals and major metropolitan centers, but major gulfs continued and even widened. Sales of major consumer goods increased much more rapidly in “regional” cities such as Kumamoto, Saga, and Hiroshima than in Osaka and Tokyo as living standards in regional Japan began to catch up with the center.\textsuperscript{40} The Kyushu average gained ground relative to the national average from 1970-1975 (from 90\% to 98\% of the national average).\textsuperscript{41} In absolute terms, moreover, household disposable income nearly tripled (from 73,000 to 212,000 yen per month on average) while monthly expenses increased by 120\% (the national average was a 100\% increase) over those same five years.\textsuperscript{42} This narrowed gap, however, was both fleeting and – just as importantly – a total figure that included Fukuoka Prefecture, the least representative prefecture for Kyushu as a regional unit. Revisiting the figures five years later, 1980 data revealed that Fukuoka Prefecture as a unit (including the underperforming rural and former coalmining regions) exceeded the national average income by 4\%, while the Kyushu region – including a reintegrated Okinawa – averaged 87.8\% of the national average.\textsuperscript{43} Net household savings showed a similar gap, where the average Kyushu family had approximately 4.64 million yen in total savings (including regular savings, stocks, bonds, and insurance) compared to 5.79 million yen nationally, with a gap that increased in both relative and absolute terms year-on-year.\textsuperscript{44} The economic backwardness KERC analysts had identified as early as 1949 was still true more than thirty years, and multiple National Development Plans, later.

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., pp. 30-31
\textsuperscript{41} Fukuoka ginkō chōsabu, \textit{Kyūshū keizai gaikan}, 1976, p.15
\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., p. 15
\textsuperscript{43} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, \textit{Kyūshū keizai gaikan}, 1981, p. 11. For the purposes of the Kyushu Region, economic surveys include both Okinawa and, perhaps more surprisingly, Yamaguchi in aggregate data. While Okinawa trails severely behind economically, Yamaguchi conversely tends to rank the highest of any prefecture in the region outside of Fukuoka.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., p. 10
Fukuoka was simultaneously connected to and quite distant from the problems facing the rest of Kyushu. The notion of regional economic blocs, put forward in the middle of World War II to better facilitate economic mobilization, was an effective reality by the early 1970s. Looking at patterns of trade between prefectures, and the first and second-most important trading partners of each prefecture, Japan essentially breaks into 4-5 massive blocs: a Tohoku region (still dominated firstly by Tokyo, then a distant second by Miyagi/Sendai), an expansive Tokyo-Kanto bloc (engulfing most of Hokuriku and the Chubu-Tokai region as well), an expansive Kansai-Osaka bloc (including the southwestern part of Hokuriku, the entire Kansai, and Shikoku), a weakly-defined Chugoku bloc (dominated primarily by Osaka, with a secondary role played by Hiroshima), and a strongly-defined Kyushu bloc (in which every prefecture – except Fukuoka, of course – traded primarily with Fukuoka to a wide margin, followed distantly by Osaka).\(^{45}\) From an institutional perspective, of 36 national institutions with regional functions and offices located in Kyushu, 24 were concentrated in the city of Fukuoka; the exceptions were agricultural offices, customs, naval transportation, and the post office (except for its insurance and banking functions, which were based in Fukuoka along with all other major banking institutions).\(^{46}\) Looking at quasi-independent organizations and businesses, such as Japan Railways or NHK or the Bank of Japan, Fukuoka was once again the center of this set of regional actors as well, excepting Japan Railways and NHK (both of which later relocated to Fukuoka).\(^{47}\) The concentration of official and quasi-official functions in Fukuoka, a wartime legacy, intensified as the postwar era continued.

\(^{45}\) Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, *Kyūshū keizai hakusho: toshi seichō to chiiki keizai no henbō*, p. 20

\(^{46}\) Ibid., p. 15

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 16. Fukuoka, followed by Kitakyushu, possessed the oldest NHK broadcasting office in Kyushu (and the fifth-oldest in Japan in terms of broadcast start-date). The regional office was moved from Kumamoto to a brand-new facility in downtown Fukuoka in 1992.
The concentration of government offices and institutions was matched in the private sector, reinforcing both the notion of regional blocs and Fukuoka’s avowed role as a “branch economy” (shiten keizai) center. Looking at the early 1970s breakdown of the location of major Japanese corporations with multiple presences in major cities, of a total 727 corporate headquarters, three were located in Fukuoka and seven in Kitakyushu. By way of comparison, 409 were in Tokyo and 142 in Osaka; the next highest figure anywhere was 25 in Nagoya.\textsuperscript{48} In terms of branch companies or daughter companies, Fukuoka was home to nine such businesses, with four in Kitakyushu. Looking at branch stores or business sites, however (as opposed to corporate offices), Fukuoka was home to 275 branches, while Kitakyushu had 50 and Kumamoto had three.\textsuperscript{49} Kitakyushu, in fact, was actually losing branch offices: from 1970-1973 alone, more than 20 corporate and business branches (including several banks) had relocated operations to Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{50} The branches in Kumamoto, likewise, were expanded presences in the Kyushu area from the initial Fukuoka foothold, a sign of expanding national supply chains extending further into Kyushu rather than a subversion of Fukuoka’s role as gateway to and center of the region. KERC’s 1949 assessment of a “semi-colonial” subordination of Kyushu to Osaka and Tokyo remained accurate. Major national companies – only 1\% of which were actually based in Kyushu, and “Kyushu” meant two cities in northern Fukuoka Prefecture – increased their regional presences in response to the new business opportunities of rising affluence and consumption, but never relocated main offices or headquarters to the region.

The urban economy of Fukuoka as a single city was heavily dependent on its role in the national branch economy, but – as had always been true – small businesses was central in generating employment and new jobs to accompany new residents. Of 49,492 businesses in the

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 19
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 19
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., p. 94
city in 1973, only 524 had more than 100 workers, while 32,402 had one to four workers.\(^{51}\)

Looking at the entire workforce of the city – excluding public employment – in 1965, 1970, and 1973, the following distribution of employment by businesses follows: \(^{52}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workforce Size</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1973</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>231,320 (100%)</td>
<td>353,183 (100%)</td>
<td>435,796 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4 workers</td>
<td>39,675 (17.2%)</td>
<td>48,883 (13.8%)</td>
<td>69,097 (15.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 workers</td>
<td>31,713 (13.7%)</td>
<td>42,962 (12.2%)</td>
<td>54,393 (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-29 workers</td>
<td>48,047 (20.8%)</td>
<td>75,048 (21.2%)</td>
<td>96,637 (22.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-99 workers</td>
<td>52,819 (22.8%)</td>
<td>85,913 (24.3%)</td>
<td>101,280 (23.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 or more workers</td>
<td>59,066 (25.5%)</td>
<td>100,377 (28.4%)</td>
<td>114,391 (26.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The city’s workforce nearly doubled in size over the course of eight years (roughly 204,000 new workers), while the city population itself grew by about 270,000. Add to this the information that less than one in six of Fukuoka’s residents had been born in the city\(^{53}\) and the importance of migration, youth migration in particular, becomes clear. Breaking down the numbers, small and middle-sized businesses (those with less than thirty workers) and large-scale enterprises (thirty or more workers) each contributed about half the total to employment figures. Leaving aside the quality and compensation of individual jobs,\(^{54}\) the aggregate figures reveal that the branch economy provided both a constant flow of new workers and allowed small businesses to

\(^{51}\) Ibid., p. 52  
\(^{52}\) Ibid., p. 53  
\(^{53}\) Daitoshi kiaku shukansha kaigi, *Daitoshi o kangaeru*, p. 25  
\(^{54}\) Despite compiling statistics for 65 years on the Kyushu economy, to the best of my knowledge KERC has never offered any sort of detailed breakdown of employment by gross income and salary, nor do any general publications of Fukuoka’s city government
continue to thrive and increase, despite the continued spread of national chains and brands into Fukuoka.

Kyushu’s regional economy lacked the dynamism of Fukuoka’s local economy, and continued to struggle. The regional population hit a low point of slightly over 12 million people in the early 1970s, but managed to return to meager levels of growth both as Fukuoka continued to attract and retain new residents and, slowly but surely, a trickle of young people returned – if not to the small towns they had been born and raised in, then at least to burgeoning prefectural capitals. The continued penetration of national business and consumer networks outward from their logistical node in Fukuoka, moreover, continued to homogenize consumer culture. Consumption continued to evolve as part of the regional economic core, and growing consumption matched with Fukuoka’s role as a services, commerce, and consumption center. Fukuoka, in short, prospered even more as the wider economy began to turn toward the services and consumption model the city had embraced in the 1960s, resulting in continuous economic expansion that has continued to the present.

Master Plans and Public Engagement in 1970s and 1980s Fukuoka

While the Kyushu region struggled to overcome decades of negative population growth and relative backwardness as it “caught up” to national averages, Fukuoka remained a beacon of growth and economic development in the decades following the end of the high-growth 1950s and 1960s. The city’s relatively early embrace of the service economy model, highlighted in the 1965 Second Master Plan, continued to bear fruit; as expected, the city rapidly attained Designated City status. The city economy remained dynamic, generating growth not simply in the branch firms and offices that formed a robust backbone to the city’s economy, but a
continued expansion of smaller businesses that managed to employ much of the population. In a region that seemed to have its best days behind it, Fukuoka’s city leaders had plentiful reasons to take pride in their accomplishments and the expectation that a brighter future awaited their city.

The Third Master Plan, issued in 1971, mixed giddy economic forecasting with a deeper focus on social problems. Mayor Abe Genzō, perhaps borrowing a phrase from the Fukuoka Youth Congress’ 1968 plan for the city’s future, opened the plan with his hope that Fukuoka would continue to evolve as a ningen toshi ("Human Metropolis") that offered a “unique” urban atmosphere among Designated Cities, one in which machizukuri would be built on “citizen participation and energy.” Machizukuri quite literally meant “city-building” or “city creation” but, as the ambition and range of city planning in Fukuoka expanded, so too did “city creation” embrace more and more abstract notions.

The new scope of “city creation” in Fukuoka focused on building civil society as much as infrastructure. The “Final Report” section for the 1971 Master Plan noted, much as the 1966 Master Plan had done, that rapid shifts in the national and international situation were affecting Fukuoka locally in terms of both economy and society. In a decidedly revisionist take on recent history, however, the Planning Committee claimed that it had listened to the general public by preventing the development of heavy industry in Fukuoka, and declared the need for a “civil minimum” to guide public debate and policy: holding public hearings, conducting opinion surveys, and generally working toward consensus decision-making in the face of rapid change.

As Simon Avenell has explained in Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology

---

55 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1971, Introduction (unmarked page)
56 The “Final Report” (tōshin ni atatte) is probably best thought of as a sort of introductory addendum provided before publication, distinct both from the mayor’s greetings and subsequent address from the head of city planning.
57 The term is, quite literally, given in katakana with little explanation or Japanese equivalent. It appears to be derived in general use from the work of Matsushita Keiichi, although its usage here predates his publications. It had contemporary currency in Tokyo’s Metropolitan Government as well.
58 Ibid., tōshin ni atatte (unmarked pages)
of the *Shimin* in Postwar Japan, the notion of the “civil minimum” had its origins in progressive grassroots activism in the 1960s. In that light, the “civil minimum” might seem to be an odd fit for the political conservatism that dominated postwar local politics in Fukuoka. The embrace of a citizen-oriented method of shaping public policy, however, was an acknowledgment of the importance of citizen involvement in and, obliquely, the limitations of local officialdom and its business and academic associates in directly shaping the city.

The preface to the Third Master Plan opened with a declaration that “Fukuoka City belongs to the citizens of Fukuoka. It is theirs, and no else’s.” It went on to decry the plurality of Master Plans that were the products of businesses and particular interest groups, claiming that “this is not the case in Fukuoka.” Continuing in an almost utopian vein, the preface invoked the Tennessee Valley Authority as one of the inspirations for Japanese postwar planning, but lamented that the democratic spirit underlying the TVA and David Lilenthal’s vision had been forgotten and shunted aside in Japan, creating a top-down vision of urban and regional planning that excelled in building infrastructure but failed to build plans that truly belonged to the people who they claimed to serve. Fukuoka’s planners called for citizen participation and pluralism to reinvigorate not just city planning, but civic participation in general.

The democratic inclinations of the drafters of the Third Master Plan were, unsurprisingly, more complex than their bombastic language suggested. As explained in Chapter Three, the Master Plan’s Planning Committee was an exercise in limited democracy: politicians and local

---

60 Ibid., p. 1
61 Ibid., p. 1
62 Lilenthal is invoked by name, along with the controversial argument that the TVA was a model for developing democratic societies as well as economic infrastructure. The preface writer remains anonymous, but it seems reasonable to expect that Hama Masao, as the head of the Master Plan Committee in 1971, was responsible for its content – which also has a radically different tone from the subsequent plan under different Committee leadership.
63 Ibid., p. 2
bureaucrats were central to the process, but so too was input and approval from academics, leading businesses, the Chamber of Commerce, youth groups, women’s groups, labor representatives, and community association representatives all were consulted in the drafting process, and the actual Committee itself was likewise diverse. The process was not exactly open to a vote by the public either, of course. It was an exercise in corporatist representation and government-interest group-business collaboration more than genuine solicitation. Still, the planners compiled a list of efforts to democratize planning through meetings, public surveys, and responding to issues brought forward by the public followed.

The sentiment of democratization was not entirely built on idealism, however: the Planning Committee acknowledged both the increasing complexity of society (namely, a pluralism of groups and interests) and the emergence of new social problems that were beyond direct civic control. The solution offered by the plan was, indeed, perhaps not so far from the TVA model: physical infrastructure in the form of community centers and civic centers would be built, in the hopes that these new spaces for public communication and gatherings would generate a set of “community leaders” who could then be cultivated by the city-wide leadership who composed the Master Plan. As Avenell noted more broadly about the rhetoric of citizen participation (shimin sanka) in postwar Japan, progressivism could be, and was, readily appropriated by conservative politicians with their own distinct agendas. In Fukuoka, the conservative LDP establishment hoped that emerging social problems related to shifts generated by intensified urbanization and economic transformation could be tackled by building infrastructure that would translate into self-generating civic activism – all in line with official expectations and policy objectives. Reality, of course, proved to be far more complicated.

---

64 Ibid., pp. 6-7
In contrast to the perceived need for major changes in social planning and policies, Fukuoka’s economic situation in the 1970s seemed relatively secure. The 1969 National Development Plan had set Fukuoka as a the central node in the development plans for Kyushu, and Fukuoka’s population growth was already double that of any other city in Kyushu from 1950-1970; nearby Kitakyushu had actually been losing residents since 1965. Fukuoka had thrived under a relative state of benign neglect from Tokyo in the high-growth decades of the immediate postwar era, and extra money and attention from the center was expected to amplify, not undermine, the existing patterns of regional concentration that had been so beneficial to the city. The consumption and services economy, likewise, was forecast for continuous growth: projections indicated that the total value of commerce in the greater Fukuoka Metropolitan area would increase nine-fold in value between 1970 and 1990, per capita income would increase by approximately 450%, and the total value of consumption would increase nearly six-fold (from 271 billion to 1.579 trillion yen). Almost the entirety of the growth in sale of goods to consumers was expected to take place within Fukuoka City itself, not the ring of smaller cities and suburbs surrounding it – another indicator that concentration within the city would continue apace and its relative economic weight would continue to increase, rather than be diluted, with time.

The 1971 Master Plan demonstrated an evolution from the 1966 Master Plan in both understanding Fukuoka’s economy and utilizing that knowledge. City leaders knew that Fukuoka’s special economic advantage was not focused on the actual production of goods within the city, but on attracting businesses that wanted to operate – and produce – within the city. Fukuoka, both to guarantee its citizens’ quality of life and economic prosperity, needed to be

---

65 Ibid., pp. 11-12
66 Ibid., pp. 28-29
67 Ibid., p. 133
selective in allowing the operation of enterprises that fit well into the city in terms of its workforce, avoiding environmental degradation, and promoted the vision of economic and social planning working in symbiotic fashion.

Fukuoka’s workforce by the early 1970s was increasingly white-collar and well-educated, and city leaders realized there were social implications in that qualitative shift. As of the city’s elevation to Designated City status, Fukuoka was home to 10 universities, more than 53,000 college students (behind Nagoya but ahead of Kobe or Osaka), and had both the lowest percentage of manufacturing and highest percentage of overall tertiary sector employment of any major city in Japan.\(^\text{68}\) It was also home to one of the largest concentrations of bureaucrats, financial and insurance sector workers, corporate managers, and academics of any city, and worlds apart from the decidedly blue-collar industrial belt that engulfed most of Fukuoka Prefecture. In order to retain and attract better-educated workers – and with them, businesses that would provide new jobs and expand the city tax base – the plan emphasized the need to attract “industries of the future” tied to information culture and technology such as printing, electronics, and precision machinery, while continually enhancing its role as a commercial center.\(^\text{69}\) City planners realized they needed to be selective and multidimensional in their considerations of economic planning to meet resident’s expectations of urban life and personal fulfillment beyond simple employment.

The 1976 Master Plan focused increasing attention on the contemporary problems and challenges transforming urban life. The city’s recently elected mayor, Shindō Kazuma (in office from September 1972 to November 1986),\(^\text{70}\) opened the document with a litany of problems:

\(^{68}\) Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, Kyūshū keizai hakusho: toshi seichō to chiiki keizai no henbō, pp. 20-23
\(^{69}\) Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1971, pp. 146-147
\(^{70}\) Shindō Kazuma, like Abe Genzō before him, had a rather colorful background. Shindō had been a central figure in the Tōhōkai before serving as CEO of wartime-created Nishinihon Shinbun followed by leading the Genyōsha
tightening budgetary finances, increasing density in the city, and a spate of social problems tied
to both urbanization and changing social values among the new generations of postwar society.
Despite these challenges, he asserted that the 1976 Master Plan was a “step toward a Master Plan
hand-made by the citizens of Fukuoka.” The Final Report by the Planning Committee Chair,
Tsuru Daijiro, dourly noted that previous efforts to incorporate public opinion were too
simplistic and optimistic about the difficulty involved, and claimed that the 1976 Master Plan
was still quite far from being a plan “hand-made by the citizens of Fukuoka.” He acknowledged,
however, that the plan represented a step in the right direction, and invoked the centrality of both
the “Sumiyosa Model” in planning Fukuoka’s development alongside strengthening
“autonomous society” in the city. While traditional urban planning in the form of infrastructure
and economic development remained the mainstay of the Master Plan, city leaders represented
by the Planning Committee placed increasing rhetorical – and actual – focus on societal issues.

The immediate years following the city’s ascent to Designated City status and the
completion of the Sanyō Shinkansen line were viewed as a period of economic prosperity
coupled with social unease. Just as both the 1971 Master Plan and the 1974 Daitoshi o kangaeru
had suggested, demands for shorter working hours, greater individual opportunities, and a new
range of leisure activities all weighed on matching citizen demands with urban reality. Meeting
demands for urban amenities was complicated by declining economic growth that remained well
above Western rates but also far below the heady days of the 1960s. The Shinkansen

before being forced out by SCAP in 1946. He then became an LDP stalwart in the postwar era, serving in the Diet
representing Fukuoka before becoming mayor in 1972.

71 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976, Introduction (unmarked page)
72 Ibid., tōshin ni atatte (unmarked pages)
73 It should be pointed out that the head of the committee, Tsuru Daijiro, was a professor of economics at Kyushu
University. The head of the 1971 plan, Hara Masao, was affiliated with the Fukuoka Chamber of Commerce and
other regional business associations. The Planning Committee leadership was made of Fukuoka’s elite, but extended
far beyond career politicians and bureaucrats.
74 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976, pp. 5-9
completion coincided with the total of branch businesses in the city rising to more than 400 in total, strengthening the business and managerial focus of the city. Conversely, the Planning Committee believe that middle-sized businesses were more intimately connected to the lives of Fukuoka’s citizens, and called for a “new regionalism” that would mitigate the impact of major national corporations on local businesses while promoting needed modernization and rationalization in the larger economy. In essence, Fukuoka’s planning leaders hoped to promote both economic growth and social stability through the same means.

Localism and its associated lexicon became central to the 1976 Master Plan and the intent of city leaders to better manage local society. The problems of economic modernization had been acknowledged as early as the Second Master Plan, but by 1976 the list of pressing social concerns had expanded: individual mobility eroded traditional community support networks (or rather, in a city where only one in six was born in Fukuoka, they had never fully existed), suicides increased year after year, mental health cases continued to pile up, and juvenile delinquency soared to highs far above not just the national average, but every other metropolis as well. A litany of social problems seemed to be ingrained in the modern experience in Japan, as the alienation of individuals and entire groups from the collective community created problems that Fukuoka’s city government lacked tools to directly address.

The Fourth Master Plan focused on fostering local activism and community spirit in hopes of letting citizens solve social problems that direct top-down action could not affect. Planners focused on the “Development of a New Citizen Culture”: transforming the love that 90% of Fukuoka’s citizens said they held for the city into a greater spiritual community that

\[75\text{ Ibid., p. 10}\]
\[76\text{ Ibid., pp. 225-226}\]
\[77\text{ The concern over the rise of “latch-key kids” resulting from the dislocation of traditional family life was of particular note.}\]
\[78\text{ Fukuoka-shi, } Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976, p. 32\]
made new residents into full-fledged “citizens of Fukuoka.” The notion of citizen participation was crucial, but within a very particular set of circumstances and an apolitical framework. Beyond idealism, pragmatic motivation was at work: rather than the city spending its limited resources on expanding welfare services, the community – and the myriad forms of tangible and intangible support it entailed – would supplement, or even supplant, institutionalized help. The plan acknowledged that a plurality of communities already existed naturally, but the end goal of creating a new overarching community of citizens and residents was to empower citizens to take the initiative in creating conditions that allowed for “the safe growth of both economy and society.” The city government wanted to empower its citizens in a very particular way: to relieve demands for a greater institutional response from government to larger social issues.

Fukuoka’s political and planning elite was wary about the lack of direct control it held over societal changes in the city. Throughout the Master Plan a new phrase, “techniques of control” (seigyo no shuho), appeared repeatedly: in reference to environmental issues, to business, to resource usage, and – quite heavily – in the need to restrain and guide the citizens of Fukuoka. City leaders were not, whatever the rhetoric about a “Master Plan hand-made by the citizens of Fukuoka,” ready to abdicate the centrality of planning and top-down control in creating a vision for the future. A problem emerged, though: a critique of over-centralization in Japan and the all-encompassing powers of not just company towns, but totalized company-societies (kigyō shakai) led to a manifesto for “establishing independent society” (jichi shakai no

---

79 Ibid., pp. 34-46
80 See Avenell, Simon, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan, pp. 158-171 for more on the history of both grassroots citizen activism and the ways in which local officials readily appropriated its discourse and energy. This also seems to explain the logic applied by Fukuoka planners in their understanding of citizen activism.
81 Ibid., pp. 62-63
82 Ibid., pp. 18-19
The city’s goal, however, was not to castrate the corporate and business sector that was the lifeblood of Fukuoka’s rapid growth, but to develop a singular community that included all of Fukuoka’s residents. On the other end of the spectrum, the Master Plan wanted to ensure that “residents’ independence and localism” (Shūmin jichi to rōkarizumu) was more than just “prideful egotism.” Here again, planners very specifically had in mind liberal discourses about grassroots activism and challenges to government authority that were circulating on the national stage. The Planning Committee believed in the potential of ordinary citizens to rectify social imbalances brought on by rapid urbanization and demographic transformation, but only when carefully guided and constrained by safeguards.

In 1976, Fukuoka’s city government surveyed its citizenry to figure out how residents responded to the mass of rhetorical campaigns emanating from its plans and publications. Titled Toshi kōzō to shimin ishiki: comyūniti, morāru, shimin sanka, shiminzō no bunseki, the survey relied on a sample size of over 2,000 respondents to explore both the attitudes and engagement of ordinary people in the city. First and foremost, the survey explicitly stated that “citizen participation” (shimin sanka) needed to mean more than voting, and translate into input on policies and needs as the city government made policy. Citizens agreed, with 80% expressing interest in having their voice more directly reflected in city policies; only 35%, however, expressed interest if personal and leisure time was lost as a result. This gulf between agreement with increased participation and a willingness to make personal sacrifices to directly engage with city government was the central problem that bedeviled the city. Looking either from the

---

83 Ibid., p. 58
84 Ibid., p. 59
85 Ibid., pp. 61-62
86 See Avenell, Simon, Making Japanese Citizens: Civil Society and the Mythology of the Shimin in Postwar Japan, pp. 157-173 for the discourse on “local egotism” endorsed by leftist intellectuals of the 1970s, and summarily rejected by Fukuoka’s conservative political establishment.
87 Fukuoka-shi, Toshi kōzō to shimin ishiki: comyūniti, mora-ru, shimin sanka, shiminzō no bunseki, p. 4
88 Ibid., pp. 4-5
perspective of cynics who wanted to co-opt local energy toward top-down goals or idealists who believed that democratization of society and politics made for a stronger and more prosperous future, the new generations of youthful, materially prosperous postwar Japan were, ultimately, self-interested.

Fukuoka’s leaders faced the challenge of mobilizing a public that had clear opinions on municipal policies, and little interest in proactive efforts to change those policies. The city bureaucracy had an image problem: 81% of surveyed residents found interactions with City Hall unfriendly and difficult to navigate, with 77% sharing the same sentiment toward the recently-established district offices (created in 1972 alongside the Designated City model). 89 93% of respondents felt city officials needed to listen more to the opinions expressed by ordinary citizens, and 66% disagreed with the idea that it was the city government’s responsibility to create comprehensive solutions for all the problems the larger civic community faced. 90 Unambiguous as hostility toward an overbearing, distant City Hall may have been, the fact that 34% of respondents were also willing to leave the local government completely responsible for essentially all issues of public concern is the more stunning figure. Fukuoka residents, in effect, had little interest in directly challenging the policies enacted by the city government; at the same time, they were unwilling to be swayed by grandiose ideas put forward that inconvenienced themselves on a personal level.

A lack of communication or ignorance of city affairs was not the source of public inhibition in civic activism. 95% of those polled read the bimonthly city newsletter (shisei dayori). A separate statistical breakdown revealed those who read the newsletter religiously were no more or less likely to give up their free time to participate in civic affairs than any other

89 Ibid., p. 144
90 Ibid., pp. 128-129
Motivation for reading the city newsletter seemed to be grounded in an interest in local news and events, but this did not translate into an interest in greater citizen activism and participation in city affairs. 76% of citizens were familiar with the chōnaikai, jichikai, and machisewabito methods of participation in civic affairs – all of which effectively provided avenues for community-level action and involvement – but only 18% had actually ever interacted with any of those groups or systems. To put it bluntly, it was not that Fukuoka’s people did not know how to more directly participate in civic affairs; it was that they did not care, or care enough, if there was clear personal detriment involved.

Fukuoka’s planners and bureaucrats understood very well the chasm between citizen participation and citizen opinion. The 1976 Master Plan focused on “techniques of control” and expressed aversion to the naïve optimism of earlier plans that ordinary citizens were truly engaged; caution and carefully planned measures were required. Three enormous caveats guided planners’ skepticism about the mantra of citizen participation: first, that issue that participation could easily degenerate into egotism and complaints rather than beneficial contributions and solutions; second, that citizen participation needed to represent the entire city community rather than just interest groups; third, and not unrelated to the second point, was the issue of class and the ability rather than desire to participate – the recognition that people with free time could participate most easily and often, rather than the vast majority of working citizens. The issue of representativeness was reflected in surveyed opinion: feelings of communal solidarity and a spirit of cooperation among the larger body of Fukuoka’s population were mixed at best.

---

91 Ibid., p. 130-131
92 Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976, pp. 45-47
93 Ibid., pp. 50-51
94 Fukuoka-shi, Toshi kōzō to shimin ishiki: comyūniti, morāru, shimin sanka, shiminzō no bunseki, p. 133
challenge, as well as probable origin, of many of the social issues the city faced was the lack of
colorations between a rapidly expanding and recently transplanted population.

City leaders knew better than to believe that a handful of proactive busybodies could
generate social change in a city of increasingly affluent, atomized, and well-informed citizens.
While citizen participation in Neighborhood Associations, community meetings, planning
committee consultation events, and other forms of institutionally-bound activism were welcomed,
the number of citizens both able and willing to engage was quite low. Citizens were, as reflected
in economic data, increasingly well-to-do, youthful, well-educated, and – both a blessing and a
curse – politically apathetic in large measure. The LDP hegemony in city politics – evident since
the late 1950s – seemed to go unchallenged. But given rising economic prosperity, low levels of
environmental pollution, and commitment to continued investment in new infrastructure, there
were few reasons for overt dissatisfaction with general city policies. Generating public
engagement in wider social and community affairs required sophisticated messaging and
changing attitudes toward the city government as an institution.

Fukuoka’s evolving strategy in the 1970s and 1980s to bridge the gulf between citizen
and city hall was based on outreach involving information campaigns, greater government
transparency, and providing infrastructure that promoted quality-of-life issues for both residents
and visitors. The most familiar, and well-known, means of connecting with the average Fukuoka
resident was the city newsletter. For the string of three-and-four-term mayors who governed
Fukuoka from 1960, the newsletter was a valuable tool to communicate both their larger visions
for the city and practical information to city residents. Fukuoka was among the minority of
metropolises who sent out a bimonthly rather than monthly publication, and relied on the

95 The weakness of labor unions caused by the underlying economic structure of the city – a plethora of small
businesses and little industrial production – may have further blunted a possible source of political and social
agitation against the stable LDP establishment in the city.
machisewabito system to deliver the newsletters to every local resident;\(^{96}\) this also stands in contrast to cities such as Kobe that had its city newsletter folded into commercial newspapers. The city newsletter was a decidedly top-down affair, but also relied on the cooperation of citizens in order to reach its full audience.

The city newsletter provides insight into both contemporary city life and how the city communicated with its residents. The 1972 New Year’s newsletter began with greetings from the mayor referencing major changes ahead (including both Designated City status and the new Master Plan taking effect) before providing a picture of children playing on the beach, a calendar with key city events and photographs, and a list of contact numbers for major city offices.\(^{97}\) The following January 25\(^{th}\) edition included the following features: the mayor celebrating the coming-of-age ceremonies with 17,000 twenty-year olds in Maizuru Park, a list of family events coming up at the city zoo, information on preschool applications and scheduling health checks for students prior to the new school year, information on elections for choosing machisewabito in each chōnaikai, and advertisements for the new opening of a massive city-owned apartment complex taking applications. The least subtle effort to promote citizen engagement on issues important to the city government was the presence of multiple articles on “the war on mice,” reminding citizens to be vigilant and realize that mice “gnaw away at one billion yen a year” in city pest control costs.\(^{98}\) The April 10, 1972 edition opened with the headline “Green Designated City,” with an article titled “Toward a Good Metropolitan Quality of Life” followed by pieces from the mayor and city council head. The mayor called for “a city with individuality” while the

\(^{96}\) The machisewabito system was set up in the wake of the dissolution of the wartime chōnaikai during the Allied Occupation (the chōnaikai terminology was reintroduced in 1953). Each machisewabito was chosen to represent a community of fifty households. In terms of actual duties, the best comparison of the machisewabito is probably a “volunteer social worker” (though “unpaid social worker” would be equally correct) who connects the city government to local neighborhoods.

\(^{97}\) Fukuoka-shi hōkōkka, Fukuoka shisei dayori 1/1/1972, pp. 1-5

\(^{98}\) Fukuoka-shi hōkōkka, Fukuoka shisei dayori 1/25/1972
city council head emphasized “better citizen welfare.” Subsequent articles listed commemorative exhibits sponsored by local media to celebrate Designated City status (including one entirely devoted to ancient Nakoku), and a list of methods to contact the mayor that appeared in every edition.

The city newsletter, with its deluge of information, was both a service to citizens and part of a larger effort to make promote transparent governance that would draw in participation. Its main purpose, and no doubt the reason readership was high (beyond the fact it was free and delivered to people’s homes), was to provide practical information about events in the community such as the coming-of-age ceremony day, school information, or various events. Once Fukuoka became a Designated City, the newsletter was also specialized to contain both a city-wide front section and a separate edition for each district, with new, events, and articles that were geared to neighborhood or smaller-scale neighborhood concerns. Although the extent to which the newsletter succeeded in motivating ordinary citizens to participate in municipally-led organizations and movements is questionable, Fukuoka continued to reach out to citizens with increasingly targeted programs and information.

Ordinary residents of Fukuoka remained far less enthused about officialdom’s plans for mobilizing citizen participation than City Hall. According to a 1981 prefectural survey, no one in Fukuoka Prefecture was particularly impressed with their local governments, although Fukuoka City scored somewhat better than both other municipalities and areas under direct prefectural

99 Fukuoka-shi hōkōka, Fukuoka shisei dayori 4/10/1972
100 For more on the history of the Nakoku, please refer back to Chapter 1. For modern Fukuoka, Na’s position as the first verified/historic “country” in Japan and point of contact with mainland Asia remained a pointed element of pride in its local identity.
101 For more on the health of civil society and citizen’s groups in general, see Robert Pekkanen’s Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members Without Advocates. Of particular interest, and ultimately unanswerable, is the extent to which the endurance of Neighborhood Association participation – as much a standard feature of life in Fukuoka as anywhere in Japan – actually reflects genuine civic activism as opposed to a sense of social coercion or obligation.
control.\textsuperscript{102} The survey also found that Fukuoka, more than any other locality, was where residents were noncommittal about participating more directly in the policy process and city governance to improve infrastructure and public facilities: for 56% of those surveyed, “it [depended] on my schedule.”\textsuperscript{103} The five years between the Fourth Master Plan in 1976 and the Fifth Master Plan in 1981 had not seen marked improvement in the citizen participation deficit.

The overly ambitious goals set out by city planners on what citizen participation could and would achieve may have been part of the reason for the apparent failure of efforts to mobilize citizen activism. The 1976 survey on public opinion, for example, identified three primary motivations for direct citizen involvement in government initiative: perceived pragmatic value (i.e. direct utility), ethical and moral value (i.e. “the right thing to do”), and emotional value (i.e. citizens felt strong, personal attachment to the issues involved); polled citizens ranked their motivations in descending order as emotional value first, pragmatic value second, and ethical or moral value last.\textsuperscript{104} The effectiveness of proselytizing by government officials exhorting citizens to do their duty was, it seemed, highly limited. Fukuoka’s ordinary residents felt deeply about their communities and wanted to improve them, but were not avid consumers of top-down rhetorical campaigns from City Hall that had no tangible benefits. Surveys conducted for the 1981 Master Plan reaffirmed this sentiment: 70% of citizens expressed a willingness to support community facilities and organizations at additional expense, even if only 14% of adult citizens reported volunteering in any sort of community activities.\textsuperscript{105} Ordinary citizens were invested in furthering the development of Fukuoka and improving the lived urban experience, but only a small cadre of citizens ever had the time or motivation to convert sentiment into

\textsuperscript{102} Jichirō Fukuoka-ken honbu, Fukuoka-ken chiibō jichitai kenkyū senta-, \textit{Shūmin anke-to ni miru kenshichimuragyōsei e no ishiki to yōkyū}, p. 12
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., p. 13
\textsuperscript{104} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Toshi kōzō to shimin ishiki: comyōniti, mora-ru, shimin sanka, shiminzō no bunseki}, p. 5
\textsuperscript{105} Fukuoka-shi, \textit{Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1981}, pp. 36-41
service. Expectations remained that government had a job to do providing resources and programs to foster social development, but citizens felt no obligation to order their daily lives around bureaucratic efforts to induce community life.

Fukuoka City’s efforts at moral suasion may have met with limited success, but the democratization element present in the City Master Plans was realized more effectively in how local government conducted itself. “Democracy” and “Democratization” should be clearly delineated: in many ways, the city’s political identity as a stronghold of the LDP in the midst of a Socialist prefecture, with long-term mayors intimately connected to unsavory prewar and wartime ideologies, a city council (the most directly accountable/representative element of the system) with a tiny staff and limited budget, and a large bureaucracy directly accountable to only the Mayor’s Office were not ingredients in a recipe for the thriving debate and pluralism associated with the politics of democracy. Apathetic voter turnout, of course, did little to alter the fundamental formula either. Despite these structural limitations, however, the 1970s and 1980s saw a continuation – and deepening – of the larger trend of government transparency and attempts at inclusiveness that had been pronounced goals of city policy since the late 1950s. The long trend toward more accessible government documents and information, long evident in the increasingly visual and simple-to-use city handbooks (which had gone from walls of text to a mixture of limited text, photography, graphs and other visual mediums of presenting information from the 1950s onward), was part of an increasing democratization of public institutions that became formalized in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The move toward more accessible public information was as much a result of very public official ham-handedness as it was a genuine desire to provide the average citizen with a greater stake in the system. In Fukuoka City, this accessibility took on the form of a Information
Openness and Accessibility Committee (jōhō kōkai chōsa kenkyūuiinkai), established in 1984 with a dual purpose of promoting citizens’ “right to know” as well as protecting individual privacy – the notion that, in effect, open government did not mean indiscriminate government. The Committee referenced the 1967 Freedom of Information Act in the United States, quoted a range of figures from James Madison to Ramsey Clark on the need for an informed citizenry and politics of, by, and for the people, and then listed scandals of recent years: the Hakata Station filming incident in 1969, and a 1973 scandal involving the Foreign Ministry (the corruption of the Tanaka Cabinet and ongoing debacle of Minamata Disease cover-up probably resonated as well). The end result was a 1980 address by the Suzuki Cabinet on government openness at the national level, followed by a consortium of 53 cities and prefectures pledging to promote openness and set common standards for public access to information in 1983. In Fukuoka, this followed both the spirit of the 1981 Master Plan as well as public opinion surveys, which showed citizens were deeply concerned with the responsiveness and responsibility of public servants and spending.

One example of the growing attention to public accountability was the Shimin no koe, or “Citizens’ Voices” report produced annually by the city. In 1981, there were 58,940 individual instances of contact with citizens, of which 34,650 were tokubetsu sōdan – that is to say, approximately 60% of consultations were in response to individual issues or incidents as

---

106 Fukuoka-shi jōhō kōkai chōsa kenkyūiinkai, Fukuoka-shi jōhō kōkai kenkyū hōkokusho, 1986, Introduction (unmarked page)
107 The 1969 Hakata Station incident involved a group of anti-Vietnam War Japanese student activists arriving at Hakata Station on their way to Kyushu University, and being surrounded and detained by several hundred Japan Rail and police security personnel. Under government pressure, media film of the event was withheld until a lengthy court trial forced the release of the film and evidence of excessive force by the police.
109 Ibid., p. 4. It may be worth noting, in the gulf between Fukuoka City and Fukuoka Prefecture, that as of 2010 the prefecture ranked 47 out of 47 in terms of public openness and transparency. I would suggest that the drive toward greater public access and bureaucratic and political accountability was neither inexorable nor universal, and the concerted efforts of government bodies such as Fukuoka City to provide information to its citizens – as well as to archive it for future reference – should not be taken for granted.
opposed to general city policies. The city provided a sample list of questions and comments it received, including complaints about smoking at subway stations (clearly forbidden, the complainant was reassured) and a request for expansion of local school facilities (not within the city government’s direct control, but the individual was assured that the city government agreed and would exert pressure on the prefecture).

The city also made a point of collaborating with local newspapers to increase accessibility beyond its own publications. Approximately 100 Shimin no koe questions and requests over the course of the year, including both the original comment and the city’s response, appeared in commercial papers. Rather than an always purely positive public relations campaign, the published comments included questions about city officials participating in the Dontaku festival (presumably on the public’s time and dime), complaints about print from the city newsletter rubbing off on hands, and scathing missives such as “this must be ‘no city-planning.’” City officials and politicians may have not always agreed with the substance of citizen complaints and comments, and seem to have provided technically correct, deflective responses with unfortunate frequency. The effort to both conduct and publicize dialogue between city hall and citizenry, however, was part of a larger democratization of civic life and culture in Fukuoka, one that intensified as the city – and postwar civil society – matured.

Redefining Culture: From Localism to National Mass Consumerism

While the leadership of Fukuoka City crafted Master Plans and rolled out strategy after strategy to further develop citizen participation, an entirely separate kind of alignment was taking place in the private sphere: the expansion and creation of new patterns, and products, of mass

---

110 Fukuoka-shishiminkyoku, Shimin no koe, 1981, p. 3
111 Ibid., pp. 151-156
112 Ibid., pp. 18-19
consumer culture. The energy and lively democratic participation that city officials and planning committee members sought to bring into the political sphere was, in truth, already very much a visible part of city life. Fukuoka was very much a Cultural City in the same way that citizen participation was evident in the spread, reception, and creation of a new popular culture by the consumers, and especially the youth, of the city. The 1970s and 1980s gave rise to a distinctive local Fukuoka culture and, simultaneously, the commoditization and homogenization of that culture within larger national patterns of mass consumption.

Local culture, as Fukuoka’s city planners knew well, was incredibly hard both to define and to mobilize for use in particular projects. As noted in Chapter 1, Fukuoka – or Hakata – had an extremely long and rich history as an urban center and, in the modern period, an intense awareness of and fierce pride in the city’s traditions. Local culture and local tradition were largely perceived as synonymous as well for much of this period. If a city publication or local newsletter or journal needed to evoke “Fukuoka,” images of the Yamagasa Gion festival, *Hakata ningyō*, *Hakata obi*, or – much less frequently – Hakozaki Shrine featured prominently.\(^\text{113}\) The Master Plans, in their sections on culture and cultural facilities, provided maps of temples, gravesites, and a litany of other historical spots in the city. While there was an appreciation for the depth and richness of local history, there also was not (until well into the 1980s) a well-formulated concept of how “culture” defined as something rooted in preserved historical sites and traditions translated into a more utilitarian resource for the modern city.

The emergence of Fukuoka as a Cultural City, in which creation accompanied simple consumption, was a lengthy process that began in earnest in the 1960s and continues to the

---

\(^{113}\) While it is difficult to provide any sort of exhaustive list of examples, a quick look at the Fukuoka City Handbooks, KERC’s annual economic reports, and multiple local journals all reinforce the notion that visual images of traditional Hakata were one of the most direct, and presumed-to-be effective, ways to identify Fukuoka as a culturally distinctive.
present. I am particularly indebted to the work of Sasaki Kimiyo,\textsuperscript{114} whose Master’s Thesis \textit{Fukuoka no toshibunkashi – 1961 nen ~ 2005 nen made} offers an incredibly detailed and thoughtful overview of the transformation of the physical, socio-cultural, and political landscape of the city over this period related to cultural performance and consumption. Sasaki argues that two dueling Fukuoka radio broadcasters, RKB and KBC, pioneered what was termed “new radio” in the region, creating programs aimed at students (in particular, evening and very late-night programming blocs), playing pop chart hits, the start of taking song requests from phone-in audience calls, and – crucial to the evolution of what came to be Mentai Rock – debuting young local artists live on the air from their studios in downtown Fukuoka.\textsuperscript{115} Beyond simply playing music, the radio disc jockey personality, or “celebrity announcer” emerged on the scene, creating both familiarity and audience loyalty unrelated to the specific music playlist. In addition to carving out a place for radio in the daily lives of the city’s swollen youth demographics, RKB followed the lead of Osaka and Tokyo broadcasting companies by establishing its own record label, with the express goal (beyond making money) of “drawing out talent hidden in the region and supporting regional society.”\textsuperscript{116} The corporate profit motive of local businesses such as RKB, the desire for professional success of young musicians such as Inoue Yōsui (Andre Candre), and the desire to be entertained by music on the part of an increasingly affluent, and expansive, audience of listening consumers came together to create a thriving music scene with economic significance.

\textsuperscript{114} Sasaki Kimiyo produced her Master’s Thesis at Kyushu University in the Graduate School of Comparative Cultural and Social Studies prior to taking a position as the head of the Public Information Bureau of Fukuoka City, a position she no longer holds as of 2011. I was fortunate to have the opportunity to interview her about city policy and public outreach in her capacity as the head of the Public Information Bureau as well as read her academic work.\textsuperscript{115} Sasaki Kimiyo, \textit{Fukuoka no toshibunkashi – 1961 nen ~ 2005 nen made}, pp. 50-53\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 53
Not every musician was a commercial success, but enough individual successes secured Fukuoka’s reputation as a seedbed of commercially viable musical talent. In 1969, KBC’s Kishikawa Hitoshi began broadcasting the program *Utae! Wakamono*, putting as many as seventy to eighty bands live on the air in a given month.\(^{117}\) Drawing on plentiful amateur bands created by high school and college students in the city, Kishikawa allowed bands to do a cold open without auditioning, letting viewer responses determine the subsequent success or failure of the bands. Bands (and individuals from bands) that did well established reputations for themselves and Fukuoka, as a city that generated musical talent. Likewise, Kishikawa himself arranged for successful acts that had found success to return to Fukuoka and play in massive concerts, further solidifying both KBC’s business interests and the relationship between hometown fan base – who took great pride in their returning heroes – and musicians.\(^{118}\) The new dynamic between affluent and youthful consumers, local artists, local business interests, and the wider national markets of consumption and cultural production helped create a “Fukuoka” identity, one unrelated to the usual invocation of Hakata traditions.

Beyond the world of business, the vast youth demographic of Fukuoka, partly inspired by 1960s counter-culture gave birth to new forms of independent media that in turn created an entire new genre of publications from the 1970s onward. The rise of *minikomi* (short for “mini-communication media”) in Fukuoka – self-made magazines that targeted a peer group of fellow students and young people – led to the birth of the so-called “town information publication.”\(^{119}\) Sasaki’s work recounts the history of one of the earliest of these *minikomi*, *Tessy*:\(^{120}\) produced by Urakami Tetsushi, it offered a self-styled “Fukuoka Play Map” that served as a guide to clubs,

\(^{117}\) Ibid., pp. 54-55
\(^{118}\) Ibid., p. 55
\(^{119}\) Ibid., pp. 68-69
\(^{120}\) The name *Tessy* seems to be derived from time Urakami spent overseas in Tasmania, a nod again to the increasingly international scope of popular and youth culture.
theaters, dance halls, restaurants, cafés, and pretty much any venue frequented by young people. These self-made pamphlets and guides became well-known to local businesses, and fostered a new mixture of street life and urban culture alongside the traditional commercial focus of selling goods and services to consumers. The counter-culture, or underground, aspect of youthful society in Fukuoka easily melded into the wider patterns of consumption and spending that drove the city.

Self-made products and guides such as *Tessy* paved the way for a new genre of commercial print publication: the *taun shi* (“Town Magazine”). Publications like *Tessy* clearly owed their inspiration to trends happening in Tokyo, and often sought to emulate or re-appropriate forms developed in Japan’s urban core back at the regional level. Inspired by the local free papers circulating at this time in Europe and the United States, what started as a free model developed into a proper magazine business. Much like *Tessy*, the new Town Magazine provided illustrated maps, working guides, leisure guides, eating guides, music guides, event information, and radio and television guides all rolled into one. It was, in short, a general magazine unabashedly about consumption for consumption’s sake, with a sense of local community and intimate familiarity – authenticity – as the hook. The first of these magazines, *Naga no jōhō* (focused on Nagano City), began publication and circulation in 1974; by 1976, Fukuoka had its own local variant, *Shiti Jōhō Fukuoka* (“Fukuoka City Information”), produced by a branch company of the national media conglomerate, EPC-JAPAN, that had pioneered the

---

122 Ibid., p. 80. Sasaki attempts to chart the path through which this process occurred, but is also forthright in acknowledging that the exact chain of transmission is nearly impossible to prove. Nevertheless, the “U-Turn” and “J-Turn” patterns of migration back to regional Japan must have been central to this general process.
123 Ibid., p. 82
124 Ibid., pp. 82-83
concept. Both the individual magazine and the underlying concept proved to be an incredible commercial success.

The Town Magazine provided a blueprint for combining savvy marketing, national business interests, and localism into a lucrative product. Whereas earlier magazines, such as the women’s magazine *Fujin Kyūshū*, had appealed to a self-defined group with a limited focus, the new wave of magazines like *Shiti Jōhō Fukuoka* appealed to a potentially universal market: the consumer. In practice, of course, the magazine was the domain of young people. Given the demographics of Fukuoka and other major cities, however, the focus was extremely appropriate.

If there is one major critique of the Town Magazine, it was that it produced a sort of interchangeable notion of the local: a cookie-cutter version of localism in which genuine traditions and historical distinctiveness were largely obscured by a focus on contemporary music, food, and consumer products as defining place. The merger of business and commercial interests with youth tastes created a lucrative and viable marketplace, and a distinct Fukuoka atmosphere that only increased its appeal to young people from the rest of Kyushu who sought to emulate the popular culture emanating from urban Japan. At the same time, however, the counter-cultural creativity that had given birth to *Tessy* and the notion of a distinctive Fukuoka-genre of music weakened as the nationalization and homogenization of commercial, mass consumer culture brought Fukuoka more and more in line with the same trends sweeping every other metropolitan center in Japan.

The role of the city and officialdom in this new world of rapidly shifting, trend-powered popular culture and consumption was to provide an environment conducive to these phenomena, not to drive or guide them. As recounted above, the city had long focused on creating a “Human Metropolis” and “Cultural City” in its official plans, although the details of what those terms

---

125 Ibid., p. 83
entailed had always been inchoate. The opinion surveys cited in the 1976 Master Plan indicated that Fukuoka’s citizens wanted a city full of education and culture, and the Planning Committee vowed to support policies that would allow for citizens’ cultural creativity to blossom. In practical terms, this meant that the city undertook a building boom; while the prefectural government struggled to raise funds to build a much-needed new Prefectural Office in Fukuoka City, the city government built an art museum, tea garden, a new subway system to replace the old street trolley lines, a series of libraries, community centers, and parks in a span of time from the late 1970s to the early 1980s. Infrastructure by itself is not, of course, “creative.” What Fukuoka did, however, was to invest in the tools and facilities that would help to produce happier, healthier, more culturally and educationally astute citizens that it hoped would in turn generate the ideas and products of the future and contribute to the continued growth and development of the city. The 1981 Master Plan, looking back on the five years since the last Master Plan, expected even more unpredictable and rapid shifts in the larger regional environment to face Fukuoka than the 1970s had provided. While bemoaning the relatively inelastic nature of a plan updated only every five years, Fukuoka’s leaders and bureaucratic planners could take pride in the fact that the city continued to prosper and grow despite the realization of the obvious shortcomings in both the process and innate possibility of top-down planning.

**Fukuoka as Regional Center, National Metropolis, and Locality**

In September of 1986, the long-term mayoral reign of Shindō Kazuma came to an end, just as four-term prefectural governor Kamei Hikaru’s long era had ended in 1983. Shindō, at the age of 80, had stood for and won a fourth term as mayor earlier that year, allegedly in part

---

126 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976*, pp. 73-76
127 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1981*, p. 20
simply to prevent a younger politician with decidedly radical views from winning office.\textsuperscript{128} The end result, due to Shindō’s ill health, was that a special election held later in the year yielded another LDP bureaucrat-mayor, Kuwahara Keiichi, who would lead Fukuoka into the closing decade of the twentieth century and a celebration of the city’s one-hundredth anniversary as a modern entity. Shindō, a much-beloved mayor,\textsuperscript{129} had a decidedly mixed biography: one-time government bureaucrat, former fascist party member, conservative LDP party stalwart, and \textit{Genyōsha} head forced from public life by Occupation sweeps of militarist and fascist political elements. At the same time, Shindō had led Fukuoka through an era of rapid social and economic change, including the relatively difficult years of rapid inflation and slowing growth in the 1970s, with a commitment to orderly planning and “techniques of control” to restrain undesirable elements of growth and society coupled with creating a more open, accessible city government based on the belief that citizen participation – carefully controlled – would create a more stable social order. Despite his checkered personal history, Shindō was – above all else – a mayor firmly committed to Fukuoka and its continued development. While his politics remained conservative, the willingness to solicit public input, borrow the rhetoric of progressive liberal politicians on citizen participation, and otherwise experiment in policy-making all speak to a pragmatism at the heart of local politics that was above and beyond party affiliation and ideology.

For Fukuoka, the 1970s and early 1980s had been a period of exploratory attempts to engage in social management with limited success. While the city’s Master Plans encompassed increasingly diverse concerns and greater attentiveness to the problems of local society, it had no

\textsuperscript{128} Sasaki Kimiyo, \textit{Fukuoka no toshibunkashi – 1961 nen ~ 2005 nen made}, p. 113
\textsuperscript{129} Shindō remains a visible presence in the city as a massive statue in Higashi kōen – sitting, in a bit of irony, overlooking the Fukuoka Prefectural Office built during his term in office, which saw a massive transfer of power away from the prefecture and to the city, both politically and economically. He also remains the subject of a popular anecdote about listening to citizen requests that is in ethics textbooks that also exists in translation in \textit{Reader’s Digest} in the United States.
real ability to remold the rapidly-changing socio-cultural world of Fukuoka’s citizens. A deluge of surveys and additional efforts to publicize information and promote contact with citizens followed, but the crucial step of transforming information and consultation into socially transformative action was missing. To be perfectly fair, it was never genuinely possible: despite its increasing financial strength, political autonomy, and intellectually and organizationally sophisticated government, the leadership of Fukuoka City also came to terms with its role as a supportive provider of infrastructure and development plans that required citizen volition to realize.

Democratization in politics and society had not just decentralized power away from the center (be it seen as Tokyo, the prefectural office, or city hall), it had helped create a new world of citizen-driven cultural and economic growth. In the developing society of affluent postwar Japan, in which “consumption [became] a virtue,” Fukuoka’s government built museums, libraries, civic centers, performance halls, subways, and basic infrastructure at a rapid pace in the 1970s and 1980s. Empowered by the greater financial and political powers afforded by Designated City status, Fukuoka poured its resources into cultural, educational, and social facilities and programs, cementing both its status as a Cultural City and the gap between the city and the larger region. As Fukuoka thrived and attracted both businesses and youthful residents in a self-reinforcing cycle, the larger Kyushu region – and even Fukuoka Prefecture beyond its now largely autonomous capital – struggled to reverse decades of emigration and peripheralization.

While Fukuoka continued to benefit from the influx of young people from the rest of Kyushu and national businesses and organizations that sought to reach the larger region through a presence in the city, the diverging fates of Fukuoka and Kyushu were increasingly stark. Fukuoka’s identity

\[\text{130} \text{ Fukuoka-shi, } F\ddot{u}k\ddot{o}k\ddot{a}-\text{shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1976, p. 226. The sentiment, of course, was not new by any means; economic planners in Tokyo had long spoken of the need to stimulate citizen consumption and a desire to buy new products in order to further promote economic development and growth.} \]
– as a major Japanese urban center, as the cultural, economic, and institutional axis mundi of
Kyushu, as a unique city with both a rich past and trendsetter in contemporary culture – would
face new challenges as the apparent solidity of Japan’s postwar economy and society came under
threat in the closing decades of the twentieth century.
On March 17, 1989, Fukuoka opened the Asian-Pacific Exposition, also known as Yokatopia, in celebration of the 100th official anniversary of the city’s establishment. Yokatopia, much like the Eastern Industrial Exhibition more than sixty years earlier, was the result of years of planning and preparations. The festival was more than a celebration of the city’s official incorporation one-hundred years earlier, however. It was a reorientation of the city, a turn toward Asia and internationalism both rooted in Fukuoka’s prewar – and premodern – past that sought to define the city. The exposition, timed at roughly the same moment that Japan’s “bubble economy” peaked and began to decline, marked a time of optimism in the city’s achievements but also uncertainty over a future in which a stagnant economy, demographic pressures, and a widening disconnect between Fukuoka and the Kyushu region would all come to bear down on the city.

The period beginning with Mayor Kuwahara Keiichi’s tenure in office, in 1986, to the early years of the twenty-first century was one of continued relative prosperity for Fukuoka. The city continued to grow – maintaining its status as Japan’s second-fastest-growing major city – while an influx of residents, new businesses, growing tourism and exchanges with the rising nations of East and Southeast Asia all contributed to Fukuoka’s apparent success as a model municipality. Youthful demographics, limited local exposure to the asset bubble, and an economic base tied to consumption and services – and hence surprisingly resilient in the face of industrial outsourcing – all produced the image of a city that was doing remarkably well even as Kyushu as a region, and Japan as a larger whole, seemed to face crisis after crisis challenging the

\[^1\]“Yokatopia,” used interchangeably with the more formal Ajia taiheiyo hakurankai, is a play on words involving the local dialect, Hakata-ben. “Yoka” (余暇) also means “good” in addition to its standard Japanese meaning, while “topia” serves as a dual play on the familiar Greek-root “topia” in English as well as the phrase “to pia” in the local dialect.
established systems of postwar economy, society, and politics. International publications, such as *Newsweek* and *Monocle*, lauded early twenty-first century Fukuoka as among the most “dynamic” and “livable” of world cities, and a premier “regional city” in the East Asia region. The city, in short, managed to do well by both domestic and international measurements.

This chapter chronicles the history of Fukuoka from the 1980s to the early years of the twenty-first century, a period of transition marked nationally by the bursting of Japan’s bubble-economy and locally by the 1989 Asian-Pacific Exposition in Fukuoka. Outwardly, this period looked little different from earlier decades: continued population expansion, rates of economic growth well above the national average, and continued confidence projected by city leadership that translated into ambitious plans to improve the prosperity, quality of life, and sense of community and identity shared by Fukuoka’s citizens. The apparent optimism and economic success of the city, however, stood in stark contrast to national and regional trends: negative or anemic growth in the wake of the 1989 collapse of the bubble economy, a rapidly ageing and shrinking population, and a general sense of anxiety about impending crises with no clear solutions. The intersection of local, national, and regional narratives, and their divergences, in the post-bubble era form the endpoint of this study of modern Fukuoka.

The chapter is divided into three major thematic areas: Fukuoka’s increased internationalization with a particular focus on Asia, the widening gulf and fraught relationship between the city and Kyushu as a wider region, and the continued evolution of local autonomy and identity as a linchpin in contemporary and future planning by the city. International exchange in Fukuoka had a long and deep premodern history, but came to a halt during the early modern period and remained largely aspirational for most of the city’s modern history. I argue that the 1989 Asian Pacific Exposition marked a key point that transformed the city’s
relationship to Asia and promoted deepening economic, cultural, and political connections. Initial contacts and makeshift organizations formed in order to successfully hold the Exposition developed into longer term partnerships and permanent institutional arrangements, linking not just the municipal government to international partners but also businesses, cultural exchange organizations, children’s groups, and various other groups within the city. Internationalization remains a work in progress, but one with increasing deep roots that has already bore fruit and helped Fukuoka create an image and identity distinct from other major cities in Japan.

Fukuoka’s emphasis on internationalization as the center of the city’s future development and economic basis also reflected growing isolation from the rest of Kyushu. The gulf between metropolis and regional hinterland was clear: Fukuoka’s growing, youthful population; integration into the highest tier of wider national networks of cultural facilities, sports, transportation, education, business, and consumption; an booming economy focused on commerce, services, education, government, and consumption; in multiple ways, Fukuoka stood apart from the long-troubled rustbelt of Northern Kyushu and rural, largely agrarian Southern Kyushu. I suggest that Fukuoka’s apparent success had been predicated on not just internal achievements within the city and from its citizens, however, but the unsung (and perhaps more structurally important) contributions of the larger region of Southwestern Japan. The ongoing – and increasingly dire – demographic crisis of an ageing population, declining birthrates, and flight to more attractive urban spaces was an ongoing feature not just in Fukuoka, but across Japan.² Fukuoka’s challenge was to provide an attractive quality of life to current and potential residents while also finding a raison d’être that made it more than a “miniature Tokyo.” The lack

² As noted in earlier chapters, statistics and surveys had shown populations hollow out in an observable fashion across rural Japan starting as early as the late 1950s, to the extent that absolute populations fell even in the midst of the post-war baby boom era. It was not until the 1980s and 1990s – and the rise of popular books focused on the low birthrates and ageing population – that the issue became a topic of general public concern and debate.
of direct cooperation with the larger region to reverse negative trends in population and the economy has also, I argue, created uncertainty over the future of both Fukuoka and Kyushu.

Fukuoka’s weak sense of regional solidarity is the inverse of an intensely local sense of identity and urban solidarity that have developed. Inspiration for the theme of the Asian-Pacific Exposition may have come from local history, but much of the infrastructure developed and scale of the event were directly tied to conscious efforts by organizers and local politicians to promote a positive image of the city that emphasized competitiveness with the national center in Tokyo as well as Fukuoka’s distinctive character. I argue that, for the past three decades, Fukuoka’s city bureaucracy has engaged in the active construction and reinforcement of a city brand that would both distinguish Fukuoka and foster greater communal solidarity among its residents. The end result has been a hybrid identity that relies on past history, local tradition, and intensely conscious self-promotion, but also a break with complete reliance on traditional Hakata-Fukuoka bifurcations to define the city that has the potential to evolve as the city continues to adjust to the realities of post-bubble Japan’s uncertain landscape.

Back to the Past: Focusing Fukuoka on Hakata and the Bay

In 1982, the city of Fukuoka assumed its present geographic shape when its five wards were divided into seven: Higashi Ward, Hakata Ward, Chūō Ward, Jōnan Ward, Sawara Ward, Minami Ward, and Nishi Ward. The city reached its contemporary borders in 1975, when Sawara-machi was incorporated into the city. When Fukuoka became a designated city, in 1972, Nishi Ward had comprised nearly half of the city’s total land area; in 1982 it was divided into three new wards (Jōnan Ward, Sawara Ward, and a new Nishi Ward). 1980s Fukuoka City
remained a magnet attracting young-people and economic development, and had – since the late 1970s – developed regional management plans to coordinate issues beyond city limits with its smaller immediate neighbors. The past assumption – written into earlier decades’ regional planning – that the end goal was to merge the smaller ring of suburban bedroom communities into Fukuoka proper had ceased to be true by the 1980s. Although Fukuoka’s rate of population increase continued to be high by national standards, the total population in 1985 stood at 1.16 million: an increase of slightly less than 80,000 over five years. To put this in historical perspective, the 1960 First Master Plan had expected the 1986 population to be 1.45 million with a labor pool of 1.16 million people.³ The city, with vast swaths of open and rural land within the boundaries Nishi Ward and Minami Ward, was not running out of space. It was, however, taking in far fewer new residents – who were far less likely to live in expansive suburbs – than predictions and planning of the past two decades had anticipated. The fear of sprawl voiced in the 1960s and 1970s was replaced by new rhetoric extolling the virtues of a “compact city” that recognized not just slowing growth, but the reality that most residents continued to live, densely, in the same core regions that had made up the city since the prewar period.

Fukuoka’s Fifth Master Plan in 1986 reinforced the “compact city” concept by choosing a familiar node as the center of city development: Hakata Bay. A focus on the bay had long precedent: the city’s historical raison d’être had been its coastal location and excellent natural harbor, and until the 1960s the centrality of developing the port as the key to industrial and economic success had consumed much of the energy and attention of Fukuoka’s economic and political leadership. What was new, however, was the focus on the bay itself as a distinct resource: in terms of leisure, business, tourism, and – in effect – as the catalyst for a new urban image and identity. The 1986 Master Plan set out four guiding principles for a new vision of the

³ Fukuoka-shi, Fukuoka-shi sōgō keikaku kihon keikaku 1960, p. 5
city: 1) A city working communally toward easier individual independence 2) A city rich in living nature, 3) A city embracing history and the sea, 4) A vigorous city focused on Asia.\(^4\)

Mayor Kuwahara laid out the challenges facing Fukuoka in the mid-1980s in frank terms: an ageing society, ever-increasing concentration in Tokyo, the shift toward a more internationalized and information-dependent milieu, and an increasingly harsh regional environment.\(^5\) Hakata Bay provided a means to talk about a number of contemporary problems and concerns while simultaneously charting Fukuoka’s future.

Fukuoka’s city leadership created the “Twenty-First Century Plan” to guide the city into the new millennium and address both problems beyond their control as well as point out new opportunities for development. Enclosed within the 1986 Master Plan, the Twenty-First Century Plan laid out eight areas for concern: internationalization, the rise of the information age, ageing society, increasing concentration and centralization and its relation to the economy, creating comfortable urban living conditions, fostering cultural creativity and individualism, encouraging a strong sense of community, and city development according to citizen (including business) needs.\(^6\) The focus on quality of life, rhetorical importance of citizen participation, and community development were all well-established foci. The concern with economic concentration and changing demography reflected a growing awareness of major nationwide shifts that were severely impacting Kyushu and the rest of an increasingly unhealthy regional Japan, even if the city was largely unaffected. Fukuoka had benefitted immensely from postwar economic concentration and migration as the basis of its rapid development and continued prosperity; the sustainability of that model, however, also relied on the unstable health of greater Kyushu that justified the city’s necessity as a regional hub.

\(^4\) Ibid., *Hajime ni*
\(^5\) Ibid., *Hajime ni*
\(^6\) Ibid., pp. 18-22
The Twenty-First Century Plan provided an opportunity to lay out a new vision for the city, with both a younger and more diverse set of actors at the helm. The committee that devised the plan consisted of 101 members: young scholars, business representatives, citizen groups, architects, Fukuoka Youth Congress leaders, city officials specializing in welfare and education, and representatives of city Neighborhood Associations (chōnaikai) and Women’s Groups (fujindantai). In addition to involving 21 women – including those beyond Neighborhood Associations Women’s Groups representatives, who were expected only to convey information to and from their groups rather than actively opine – the Twenty-First Century Plan actively engaged with the publishers and editors of the new youth-oriented magazines. This marked, as Sasaki Kimiyo has argued, the first real exchange between the youth-driven culture and consumption central to contemporary Fukuoka and institutional city leaders. In short, the Twenty-First Century Plan embraced not only new priorities in city planning, but a wider set of actors less immediately identified with officialdom.

The new priorities represented in the Twenty-First Century Plan and 1986 Master Plan were reinforced by fortuitous archaeological finds in 1987 at Heiwadai Stadium. Heiwadai Stadium, built to host the Third National Citizen’s Exercise Convention in 1948, had been the home of the Nishitetsu Lions until the team relocated in 1978, and was the home stadium for the newly arrived Daiei Hawks from 1988 to 1992, until the Fukuoka Dome opened. Plans to expand seating capacity at the stadium resulted in the 1987 discovery of the ruins of the Kōrokan, the ancient official guesthouse for ambassadors and merchants arriving in Japan from the Asian

---

8 Sasaki argues that the women chosen provide, collectively, a strong impression of articulate opinion and independence, rather than simply parroting group or corporate interests. While it’s impossible to offer conclusive evidence (Sasaki was herself present as a young representative), Sasaki’s assertion suggests another avenue for observing the evolution of gender dynamics within both political and general culture in Fukuoka.
9 Ibid., p. 113
mainland. The discovery set off a flurry of archaeological digs and research at the site that has continued to the present and – along with the discovery of segments of the seawall built to repel the Mongol invasions of the 13th century – served as a physical reminder of the city’s central role in premodern Japanese interactions with Asia. The Kōrokan discovery, as Kuwahara Keiichi related in his memoirs, focused national attention on Fukuoka’s past and became a driving force in focusing the forthcoming 1989 Exposition around the concept of Fukuoka as an Asia-oriented, international city.

The physical result of rhetoric about internationalization, culture, and embracing Fukuoka’s coastal nature was realized in a massive new development project: Seaside Momochi. The Seaside Momochi project was a landfill project in Sawara Ward, claiming land from Hakata Bay as part of a larger reclamation project that had began in the late 1970s. While landfill projects certainly had precedent in the city – much of the area that housed the expanded Port of Hakata was originally part of the bay – the final intent of the project, and its long-term development, were more radical for the city. In his memoir, Fukuoka wa naze genki ka (“Why Fukuoka is Lively”), Kuwahara Keiichi recounted the genesis of the Seaside Momochi project from his days as Deputy Mayor, before more fully realizing a total plan during his tenure as Mayor. Initial plans for the area called for building more than 6,000 new dwellings, five schools, and little else. Kuwahara admitted that the high costs associated with the project, and limited justification for demand, were serious initial problems: “there was no need to turn Fukuoka into a

10 The Kōrokan in Fukuoka was not the only such guest-house, as documents attest to similar structures built in both Dazaifu and Naniwa (Osaka) during later periods. The Fukuoka, or Chikushi, kōrokan is both the oldest – dating to the sixth century – and only one with significant archeological remains discovered, however.
11 That is to say that as of 2012 the excavation process was still active.
12 The 1960s and early 1970s had seen a massive expansion of the physical infrastructure of the Port of Hakata allowing it to handle modern supertankers – a result of containerization and its implications for shipping – coupled with a direct freight rail link that had first been proposed in the late nineteenth century. The majority of the port’s traffic, in fitting with the city’s commercial and consumption characteristics, is by far imports.
bad imitation of Tokyo.”

Even in the heady days of the 1980s property bubble – when rents in certain trendy sections of Tenjin and Daimyō in Fukuoka were among the highest in Japan

the limitations of both private demand and public budgets prompted a need for practicality alongside visionary planning in city-led development.

The solution to realizing a viable version of Seaside Momochi came as an outgrowth of the ideas outlined in the Twenty-First Century Plan coupled with business cooperation. Beyond earlier housing plans, and in line with Fukuoka’s new themes of “the sea” and “internationalization,” the area was chosen to host the facilities for the 1989 Asia Pacific Exposition. The Exposition had been publicly promised by Mayor Shindō Kazuma in 1984, leaving – in the finest of political traditions – the entirety of concrete preparation to his successor, Kuwahara Keiichi. The Exhibition would eventually produce an elaborate set of landmarks complete with its own complicated set of zoning regulations – almost a city within a city – that both provided uses beyond housing and committed the city to long-term investment in the project, with significant ramifications detailed further below. The project was further boosted by the recruitment of the Daiei business conglomerate, a Kobe-based retailer that had recently purchased the Nankai Hawks pro-baseball team, to bring pro-baseball back to Fukuoka. As part of the larger deal to both purchase the team and lure it to Fukuoka, a joint investment by Daiei and the city government was made to build a new stadium, the Fukuoka Dome, to serve as a home for the Hawks. Kuwahara later claimed that the Fukuoka Dome – a replacement for the

13 Kuwahara Keiichi, Fukuoka wa naze genki ka, pp. 12-13
14 The value of land – and corresponding rental rates – in downtown Fukuoka began to soar in the 1970s with the rise of the city’s reputation as a center for youth culture. The prices commanded have fluctuated along with the neighborhood associated with youth trends – Watanabe dōri, Oyafuku dōri, Daimyō, Yakuin, and most recently back to Oyafuku dōri – over the decades. Rents in parts of Daimyō were ranked as the highest in Japan until the mid-2000s.
15 Fukuoka had long been home to another baseball team, the Nishitetsu Lions, that had departed in the late 1970s. The Lions had a long history and strong fan base in both Fukuoka and Kitakyushu, where some of their home matches were played as well.
ageing Heiwadai Stadium that involved more than ten years of committed fiscal resources from the city – was meant to inspire vision, to “create something that Japan didn’t have… to not imitate Tokyo, but to create something [even] Tokyo didn’t have.”

Seaside Momochi was redefined as not simply an economic development project, but as a fundamental element in defining the future direction of Fukuoka: toward Asia, away from Tokyo, and identifiably unique.

The evolution of Fukuoka in the latter half of the 1980s entailed both a refinement of the city’s long-term goals and the role of the city government in reaching those goals. The long-term impact of the Twenty-First Century Plan was that a greater focus on cultural resources, creative and information-derived economic activities, and an international focus figured prominently in Fukuoka’s planned development. The city government would take up the crucial role of large-scale initiator and investor, planning not just individual infrastructure projects but entire multi-year community development plans that required large-scale financial commitments. The role of City Hall would be tempered, of course, by the Fukuoka Dome example as well: private cooperation was absolutely necessary, both to justify the project and to ensure its ultimate success (the end-goal was not vast city-run enterprises). Most significantly, the 1989 Asia-Pacific Exhibition would bridge Fukuoka’s past – being revealed anew in the digs at Heiwadai Stadium, no less – with its future as a city focused outward, across the sea and toward Asia.

**Yokatopia: the 1989 Asia Pacific Exposition and Fukuoka’s 100th Anniversary**

Yokatopia, the realization of Mayor Shindō Kazuma’s promise five years earlier, opened in March 1989 to great fanfare. Just as the 1927 Eastern Industrial Exhibition left a physical and cultural legacy in the form of Ōhori Kōen and a greater focus on Asia, so too Yokatopia significantly mapped the path of post-Exposition Fukuoka. Yokatopia was a relatively brief

---

16 Kuwahara Keiichi, *Fukuoka wa naze genki ka*, pp. 9-11
celebration, but also the culmination of the Seaside Momochi project and its vision of reorienting the city and development toward the sea. The physical impact would also be economic, as buildings and infrastructure constructed for the event were repurposed into a model development project that attracted private developers and businesses while retaining a strong municipal presence.¹⁷

The 1989 Asia Pacific Exposition germinated from plans for a celebration of the city’s one-hundredth-anniversary, but quickly morphed into a more ambitious event. To return to a much earlier point, the one-hundred year mark itself was both relatively arbitrary and widely shared: 1889 had marked the incorporation of most major cities in modern Japan under Meiji-era administrative reforms. Fukuoka City – either as “Fukuoka” or even more so as “Hakata” – had a history that went back hundreds of years. Additionally, only a small section of the total area comprising Fukuoka in 1989 had actually been part of the city in 1889, with a majority of the contemporary city’s land (and population) having been added in living memory for many residents. Shindō Kazuma’s 1984 campaign for mayor revolved in part on the promise of an “international-scale event” to celebrate the city’s forthcoming 100-year, a pledge strongly backed by the LDP apparatus – including future mayors Kuwahara Keiichi and Yamazaki Hirotarō, both major local politicians in their own right. Yamazaki, in his 1986 political memoir and manifesto Fukuoka wa shinario o tsukureru ka (published well before the actual Exposition), recounted both the genesis of the centennial event as a campaign slogan¹⁸ and its subsequent evolution into a concrete event. Yamazaki created the “2001 Group,” a group of intellectuals, politicians, and businessmen to both plan for the coming Exposition and answer the larger looming question:

¹⁷ Pavilions and halls constructed for the event by the city were subsequently repurposed to serve as the foundation for the City Museum and main branch of the Fukuoka City Library; Fukuoka Tower continued to serve as a landmark and tourist attraction.
¹⁸ Yamazaki Hirotarō, Fukuoka wa shinario o tsukureru ka, pp. 160-161. Yamazaki was a member of the City Council and head of the Fukuoka City LDP Branch at the time, playing a major role in Shindō’s reelection campaign.
“What do we do [as a city] once the Exposition is over?” For Yamazaki’s 2001 Group the importance of the 1989 Exposition as a messaging device was, similar to Kuwahara Keiichi’s account regarding the Fukuoka Dome, clear: “Japan is more than just Tokyo! This Exposition will show [everyone] the wisdom of the people of Fukuoka!” Before the details or real planning needed to make the Exposition a success had even begun, its importance in defining Fukuoka’s future, and stepping out of Tokyo’s nation-wide smothering shadow, had been proclaimed.

Turning rhetorical bluster into the Exposition required the mobilization of municipal political leadership, local businesses, national businesses, and eventually international cooperation. In his account of the preparations for the Exposition, Kuwahara recalled taking office in 1986 with next to no actual preparation for the event having been completed (excluding the ongoing landfill project for the grounds of the event that had been planned and approved many years prior). Recent archaeological finds provided a thematic backdrop and inspiration, but real logistical planning and groundwork was needed to turn a concept into an event. Competing with a rush of other cities working on similar events to mark their own centennials, the settling of a theme – on Kyushu and Fukuoka’s linkages to Asia and as a crossroads of cultural exchange – was, in the opinion, of Kuwahara, both necessary but also beneficial in allowing for a concerted drive on lining up outside support.

Fukuoka’s leaders actively propositioned both private businesses and foreign governments to contribute to the event’s thematic construction and success. The Exposition’s overall direction matched up well with strategic business plans for the Tokyū business conglomerate, whose recent acquisition of an island in Fiji and collection of cultural artifacts

---

19 Ibid., pp. 166-167
20 Ibid., p. 169
21 Kuwahara Keiichi, Fukuoka wa naze genki ka, pp. 30-33
proved a natural fit with the wider Asian-Pacific theme.\textsuperscript{22} Kuwahara personally traveled to China and Korea to meet government officials and obtain loans of important cultural artifacts, pitching a direct connection and display of Fukuoka’s continental heritage, like the Golden Seal that had arrived 1800 years earlier as a gift to the local ruler of Na, with similar objects from Chinese and Korean collections.\textsuperscript{23} Fukuoka Tower, the key monument and symbol of the Exposition, was said to be modeled after the Eiffel Tower and its role in the 1889 Exposition Universelle, an international link credited to the advice of sister-city Bordeaux’s five-decade Mayor Chaban-Delmas.\textsuperscript{24} More practically, Fukuoka Tower was built through a combination of public money (30\% of the costs) and the contributions of seven major business partners (the remaining 70\%) including local heavyweights such as Kyushu Electric Power. In the end, hundreds of businesses, both local and national, contributed funding and support to the Exposition – some hosting their own pavilions – alongside NGOs and representatives from more than 37 nations. The Asian-Pacific Exposition may have been hosted and organized by Fukuoka City but was deeply indebted to the cooperation of businesses, foreign governments, and ordinary citizens for its successful execution.

The Asian-Pacific Exposition brought both immediate and longer-term benefits, positioning Fukuoka to prosper in the changing economic and cultural milieu of post-bubble Japan. On a very practical note, the Exposition generated a net profit for the city: evidence of how very popular the Exposition proved with its 8 million visitors, and a welcomed windfall given City Hall’s earlier fears of bleeding red ink. The infrastructure built for the event also paid dividends: while some of the pavilions and landmarks survived, rapid private development also filled in the Momochi area alongside the new Fukuoka Dome, office buildings, new broadcasting

\textsuperscript{22} Ibid., p. 35  
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., pp. 34-35  
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 36
offices for local television networks, and multiple shopping complexes. Subsequent related development projects, such as creating the Software Research Park Fukuoka (SRP) with incentives from City Hall, have helped further diversify the city economy and give it a competitive edge. The Exposition, occurring at almost the same time as Japan’s bubble economy burst, helped with a “soft landing” to the wider crisis of the post-bubble national economy that saw a quick return to general growth.

The Exposition helped redefine internationalization and move Fukuoka City towards deeper relationships with the Asian-Pacific region. Following the jaundiced legacy of wartime militarism and prewar colonialism, postwar Fukuoka effectively ignored wider contacts with Asia until the late 1970s. This was not necessarily a matter of choice: ongoing hostility to Japan guiding postwar government policies in mainland China, Taiwan, and both Korean states would have precluded significant connections to the East Asia region for the first decades of the postwar until normal diplomatic and economic ties were established. A 1973 city study, *Fukuoka-shi ni okeru kokusaiteki kinō no jittai to mondaiten* (“Issues in the Potential for Internationalism in Fukuoka City”), summed up both the physical and conceptual limitations of internationalization of that period: infrastructure was seen as the main limitation, tourists and international students the targeted audience, and “international” was effectively synonymous with “Western.”

One of the achievements of the Asian-Pacific Exposition was the large presence played by Korea, China, India, Southeast Asia, and various South Pacific island states.

---

25 One potential, if difficult to prove, dividend may have been convincing the city that another massive landfill and development project undertaken at public expense, Island City, would be similarly successful to the Momochi project associated with the Asian-Pacific Exposition. Island City, built in the post-bubble era, remains largely empty as of 2012; limited infrastructure, poor transportation connections, and expensive land values have all had an impact.

26 For more on the SRP, see its website at [http://www.fukuoka-srp.co.jp/](http://www.fukuoka-srp.co.jp/); beyond the SPR, some local software companies – such as Level 5, a prominent game development studio – exist spread across the downtown area more generally.

27 In fairness to the report’s compilers, Fukuoka’s sole sister city was Oakland, and the US Consulate – and accompanying “America Center” with its explicit form of cultural diplomacy – played an oversized role compared to institutional linkages with other nations.
in sponsoring pavilions and exhibitions; Oakland, Auckland, and Bordeaux – the Euro-American sister cities – all provided support and a presence, but one of diminished importance. In both titular reference and actual content, Asia was once again at the center of Fukuoka’s conception of international exchange and communication.

The turn toward Asia represented by the 1989 Exposition was made more permanent by the creation of an entire set of institutions and initiatives in its wake to preserve and promote the international opportunities its preparation had required. The Yokatopia Foundation, founded with a combination of funding from private businesses and the city government, was created to both maintain and deepen the connections that the 1989 Exposition had created. In 1990 Fukuoka began its annual “Asian Month,” marked by its “Asian Pacific Festival” and a series of lectures and events. In 1991, the Focus on Asia International Film Festival began. In 1992, the Beetle – a hydrofoil service connecting Busan and Fukuoka – opened to complement air routes and deepen tourism between the two cities. The Fukuoka International Exchange Foundation (FIEF) was created in 1989 to serve both as an information clearinghouse and focus on connecting ordinary citizens through extensive academic and home stay exchange programs. In 1999, the Fukuoka Asian Art Museum – billing itself as the only museum in the world devoted to contemporary and modern Asian art – opened as both a display place and center for talks and direct exchanges. The Yokatopia Foundation also began to award an annual “Fukuoka Asian Culture Prize” to outstanding academic and cultural contributions to the theme of deepening an understanding of Asia. The city, in short, took to heart the theme of the Expo, “to explore new worlds,” and has

28 A list of recipients and additional details on the prize can be found online at http://www.asianmonth.com/prize/english/winner/index.html. The range of recipients, and their countries of origin, is quite varied.
continued to actively foster its internationalist credentials in the decades following the Exposition.\textsuperscript{29}

**Closer to Home: The Regional Cooperation Dilemma**

Fukuoka’s turn toward internationalism since the 1989 Asian-Pacific Exposition has fit into a larger continuous narrative of the city’s success as the center of Kyushu. In much the same way, unfortunately, the years since 1989 have not marked any real improvement in the longer-term issues of demographic and economic decline across the larger region. The larger problem was, in some sense, a very old one: Kyushu was a geographic term and, despite the name of a handful of bodies such as the Kyushu Economic Research Council, far less tangible as either a concept or any sort of actor than individual prefectures and municipalities. While Kyushu provided the necessary ingredients for Fukuoka’s modern growth – as the wider market and population that allowed the city to grow into a regional hub for commerce, culture, and government – the gulf between the two had grown increasingly wide.

Many of the pitfalls to sustaining strong regional development and growth recognized in the immediate postwar period were, unfortunately, prophetically realized. Immediate postwar economists and planners had realized that as long as Kyushu remained a source of raw materials and labor, rather than developing its own engine of economic, educational, and cultural creativity, it would struggle to generate the jobs and quality of life that would keep its people from leaving the region – let alone attract residents from other regions.\textsuperscript{30} The subsequent outflow of Kyushu’s

\textsuperscript{29} In addition to the more institutionalized forms of international exchange and promotion, there are multiple NGOs and private exchange programs that have taken root since the Asian-Pacific Exposition. The line between official and unofficial organizations can be somewhat blurry, and – despite the rise of truly independent, private groups – the fact that the entire drive toward internationalism took place after the municipally-driven process locates the engine that has powered the larger phenomenon.

\textsuperscript{30} Kyūshū keizai chōsa kyōkai, *Kyushu no keizai to shakai*, pp. 261-262
young and able-bodied in the four decades following postwar helped power Japan’s postwar
economic miracle, but that growth was felt less in depopulated and industrially declining
regional Japan. The one real exception at first was Fukuoka Prefecture, or at least its industrial
regions. From the mid-1960s, however, the steel and coal industries that had once powered the
economies of Northern Kyushu, and earlier Japanese industrialization, entered a long-term state
of decline, leaving Fukuoka as the one local exception in an otherwise stagnant or declining
region. 31 By the late 1980s, then, as Fukuoka celebrated what it perceived as a century of
continued achievements and success as a city, Kyushu as a whole faced an uncertain future
defined by both population and economic worries.

One local solution to the region’s crisis was to yoke oneself, when possible, to the engine
of growth that still seemed to function: Fukuoka. Over the postwar period, beyond the physical
expansion of Fukuoka’s boundaries and population, the city came to support a ring of suburbs
and bedroom communities which grew alongside the metropolis. This led to the creation of a city
of Fukuoka Metropolitan Area Policy Plans to coordinate policies between Fukuoka and
surrounding smaller communities. The first plan, produced in 1978, reaffirmed the importance of
greater coordination and complementary policies among the involved cities and towns in line
with continued expectations that the Fukuoka Metropolitan Area would continue to see the vast
majority of any growth across Kyushu. 32 The new logic of city planning within Fukuoka and its
pattern of growth and development, as mentioned earlier, no longer assumed that a geographic
expansion of the city limits was particularly useful: the last merger with another municipality

---

31 To be less sweeping, the 1970s saw a continued growth in the size of prefectural capitals across Japan, although it
was largely relocation from within the same prefecture of a portion of rural residents who would otherwise seek
opportunity in one of the major national metropolitan areas.
32 Fukuoka toshiken kōiki gyōsei suishin kyōgikai, Fukuoka toshiken kōiki gyōsei keikaku 1978, pp. 8-11
occurred in 1975. Immediate coordination with bedroom communities that provided services, workers, and were otherwise directly intertwined with Fukuoka was beneficial, but planning with other cities, or prefectures, that did serve directly useful or relevant functions was ignored.

In contrast to Fukuoka’s insular self-confidence, its one-time rival caught in a spiral of post-industrial decline, Kitakyushu, sought to redefine the larger Fukuoka Metropolitan Area to include itself as an equal partner. Kitakyushu can be read as a sort of parallel, or even alternate, history to Fukuoka: it rose to prominence in the prewar period with the creation of heavy industry as a result of strategic interests and capital investment provided by the central government, experienced heavy wartime bombing, and rapidly recovered in the initial postwar boom. The divergence, so to speak, came in the 1960s when – just as Fukuoka abandoned its efforts to mimic its neighbor’s industry-driven model – Kitakyushu began to decline due to a combination of industrial relocation to the Pacific Belt (coupled with the demise of the intertwined Fukuoka Prefecture coal industry) and decades of severe pollution that further undermined efforts to keep its young people from relocating to Honshu or Fukuoka City. The subsequent history of Kitakyushu has been one of falling population, a declining economic base, and an effort to rebalance the local economy away from industry and toward services and commerce – all in the shadow of Fukuoka, which simultaneously served as both model template

---

33 The received wisdom about the usefulness of continued expansion of the city was explained rather plainly, if politely, to me by Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau officials during an interview on 9/1/2009: the city grew by attracting young people, and the benefits of incorporating new communities and absorbing responsibility for what was likely to be an older demographic of citizens with added pressures on services and welfare (one of the key powers transferred from prefecture to designated city when Fukuoka gained seirei toshi status, it should be remembered) were scant.

34 See Fukuoka tōshiken kōiki gyōsei suishin kyōgikai, Fukuoka tōshiken kōiki gyōsei keikaku 1978, pp. 31-34 for a detailed explanation of how a larger “future vision of the Fukuoka Metropolitan Area” was directly, explicitly tied back into goals set out in the city’s own Master Plan. The Fukuoka Metropolitan Area Policy Plan, from the first 1978 Plan, was not a meeting of equals; it was a supplement to internal city planning.

35 In addition to repeated conventional bombing runs on the Kitakyushu area, Kokura was the intended target of the second atomic bomb – spared only due to cloudy weather.

36 Its steel and coal, though reduced in output by wartime damage, remained in high demand. Referring back to the KERC 1949 report on Kyushu highlighted in Chapter 3, Kitakyushu’s heavy industry was expected to serve as the region’s economic development engine.
and direct competition. For Kitakyushu, Fukuoka represented both a threat to its individual
economic and demographic rejuvenation but also, in a more cooperative setting, its best pathway
to a better future.

In 2002 the book *Fukuoka·Kitakyushu daitoshiken* was published by the Japan Institute
for Community Affairs (*Nihon chiiki shakai kenkyūjo*) to make the case for greater integration
and cooperation between Fukuoka Prefecture’s two million-plus resident cities. The author,
Kaku Shūji, was a veteran economic journalist and writer who also happened to be a native son
of Kitakyushu. With the subheading “from rivalry to symbiosis” (*kyōsō kara kyōsei e*), the larger
message of the book was clear: by combining forces, the two cities stood a better chance in an
age of intense competition to attract businesses and residents that had engulfed all of Japan’s
metropolitan centers. Emphasizing internationalization, improving education resources, an
emphasis on the IT sector, and a focus on building a stronger network of NGOs and increased
citizen participation in municipal affairs, Kaku’s recipe for a better cooperative future of the two
cities should have been warmly welcomed in Fukuoka; he essentially argued for policies that
Fukuoka’s own planners and politicians had already been advocating for well over a decade.

Kaku’s argument about the benefits of moving from competition to cooperation may have
been quite sound, but do not seem to have particularly moved Fukuoka’s civic leadership to any
outreach. The problem behind the author’s arguments was evident in the massive gaps between
the two cities which his own data highlighted. Opening with a comparison of Fukuoka’s Asian-
Pacific Exposition in 1989 and Kitakyushu’s 2001 Exposition, the results showcased Fukuoka’s
strengths and Kitakyushu’s limitations: Fukuoka’s event had four times the visitors, turned a
2.26 billion yen profit as opposed to a 1.79 billion yen loss, and resulted in the establishment of
more than twice as many permanent landmarks and facilities.\textsuperscript{37} The unfavorable comparison between the two expositions brings to mind another example from the world of business: Kitakyushu’s Riverwalk commercial development, opened in 2003, was trumped in both size and commercial importance by Fukuoka’s Canal City Hakata, which had opened seven years earlier in 1996. Kaku referred to the cities as being involved in a long-term “cold war,” but the data he provided – and that Fukuoka’s own planners and politicians already knew – indicated less a stalemate than a total rout of Kitakyushu. The latter city was late to the game of diversifying its economy away from industry and, playing against an opponent that had essentially written the playbook both cities used, lost repeatedly in direct competition. Fukuoka, in short, appeared to be in a highly enviable position. In the same way that mergers were avoided, Fukuoka perceived no clear merit hitching itself to the fate of a declining competitor.

Fukuoka’s unrivaled position as regional hub may have been the envy of its neighbors and smaller regional cities, but also began to be seen by some commentators less as a marker of success and more as evidence of the unhealthy, unsustainable state of contemporary Japan. In 1995, seven years before Kaku Shūji’s call for a truce between Fukuoka and Kitakyushu, the Nishinihon Shinbun Regional News Bureau published Toshin hōkai: ningen toshi e no chōsen, roughly translating to “The Collapse of Downtown: the Challenge of Moving toward a Human City.” The study focused on four regional cities – Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka – to understand the “Mini-Tokyo-ification” of regional Japan.\textsuperscript{38} The authors claimed to shed light on both the “light” and “shadow” present in post-bubble Kyushu, blaming Tokyo and Osaka for building grandiose projects in the region with bubble-era money that never saw completion\textsuperscript{39} and

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{37} Kaku Shūji, Fukuoka-Kitakyushu daitoshiken, pp.8-10
\textsuperscript{38} Nishinihon Shinbun chiiki hōdōbu, Toshin hōkai: ningen toshi e no chōsen, pp. 4-6.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., pp. 32-35. A favorite example detailed by the authors, an unfinished major hotel in Miyazaki built by developers from Osaka, also was invoked briefly in the book’s introduction.
\end{flushleft}
in general for blighting downtowns with massive commercial developments that wiped out mixed-use space and traditional urban communities. Fukuoka, as the central city and effective “Mini-Tokyo” of the region that also had a very lengthy urban history, was declared to be most at risk.

The alarm raised by the writers of the Nishinihon Shinbun Regional News Bureau was not about Fukuoka’s economic future, but rather the sustainability of a distinctive local culture and sense of shared community. These concerns were hardly new: city leaders since the 1970s had been deeply worried by the impact of rapid growth and wider socio-cultural shifts on local communities as well as municipal policies. Using personal narratives and more quantitative forms of data, the authors contended that civic participation in neighborhood associations and community volunteerism had declined sharply between the 1980s and early 1990s, while rising single-person households and emptying urban schools pointed to a future of disconnected, isolated urban denizens who would literally fail to reproduce and sustain the city. While expressing cautious optimism that Fukuoka could be redeemed – and declaring that Osaka and Tokyo were the epitome of broken downtowns and urban communities – the authors also warned that Kyushu’s prefectural capitals, seeking to emulate the development and growth of Fukuoka, were susceptible to the same possible fate if a focus on the quality of life for citizens and the health of local communities were not prioritized. Fukuoka, then, could be seen as a cautionary tale about the hidden costs of conventional measurements of economic and demographic growth: regional hegemony as a Faustian Bargain for the local.

The writings of the Nishinihon Shinbun Regional News Bureau and Kaku Shūji evoked a common concern: the dominance of Fukuoka over Kyushu and its implications for the future. In

---

40 Chapter Four of this dissertation offers a more detailed examination of the 1970s situation.
41 Nishinihon Shinbun chiiki hōdōbu, *Toshin hōkai: ningen toshi e no chōsen*, pp. 18-27
42 Ibid., pp. 31-32.
the case of Kitakyushu’s long struggle to transcend its industrial past, Fukuoka exerted something of a smothering effect on the efforts of nearby communities to effectively compete with the city. And, despite the arguments for symbiosis with Kitakyushu by Kaku Shūji or the spirit of cooperation in the Metropolitan Area Policy Plans, the city’s political and business leaders were ultimately concerned first and foremost with the local interests of Fukuoka. If the two nearby major cities of Fukuoka and Kitakyushu were effectively in a decades-long “cold war” to assert dominance over one another and the wider region, the likelihood of a successful “Kyushu-first” focus seemed, and seems, limited at best.

The quintessential regional dilemma for Kyushu was summed up quite succinctly in the recent publication Kyūshū to iu shisō, produced by the almost-equally new Kyushu Studies Research Group. Combining the work of literary scholars and historians, the simple question “What is Kyushu?” was put forward as its unifying theme. The answer, as it turns out, was the title: Kyushu is much more of an abstraction or concept than it is a concrete unit linked by close cultural, economic, and political linkages between its subsections. At the risk of stark essentialism, Kyushu – with the exception of wartime and postwar Occupation exceptions – has never really functioned as a single unit. The city has benefited from the entire region by serving as a hub connecting nation-wide institutions, trends, and ideas to the rest of Kyushu, but the benefits provided in return as the region’s economic and demographic problems beyond metropolitan Fukuoka deepen remain unclear.

**Branding, Building, and Autonomy: Post-Bubble Fukuoka**

The collapse of Japan’s speculation-driven bubble-economy at the end of the 1980s created a state of effective economic stagnancy that has continued for more than two decades on

43 Matsumoto Tsunehiko, ed. *Kyūshū to iu shisō*, pp. iv-vii
a national level, but proved only a minor blip on Fukuoka’s path of growth. The resiliency of the local economy was a mixture of fundamental strengths and arguably good fortune. Making the case for innate health was the city’s continued development as a center of consumption, services, finance, and a small but growing high-tech sector, and an economy essentially unexposed to growing industrial outsourcing. Continued population growth – and an atypically youthful citizenry – provided another reason for quick recovery compared to rapidly graying communities elsewhere. The case for Fukuoka being lucky comes from a peculiar feature of local development: on the basis of interviews with the Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau, it would seem that the vast majority of excess commercial space in the city that became available in both the 1990s era – and, more recently in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis – was built by Tokyo developers, whereas residential developments (which enjoy far higher occupancy rates) tend to be built by local businesses with local money. Regardless of the exact explanation, post-bubble Fukuoka has continued to grow at a healthy clip.

Fukuoka’s economy through the early years of the third millennium continued to grow, but also had a mixed record of both showpiece projects and massive boondoggles. Canal City Hakata has been a major success as a commercial development, stage for events, and architectural showpiece; cooperation between municipal government and business interests also led to the creation of a highly successful IT cluster in Momochi (near the Asian-Pacific Exposition grounds) and the International Center in Gofukumachi, located in the heart of old Hakata. Far more controversial, and still incomplete, has been the relocation of Kyushu University from multiple campuses in the city center to empty land on the western edge of

---

44 While the exact figure has varied over the years, Fukuoka’s population had the lowest average age of Japan’s fourteen-largest cities, at 40.3 years old, on the basis of 2005 census data.
45 This information is on the basis of an interview held with Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau officials on September 1, 2009. Without exact figures there is room for skepticism, but the information provided also matches with the same development patterns observed in Toshin hōkai: ningen toshi e no chōsen.
Fukuoka. The Island City project – a major landfill project in Higashi Ward that was completed over-time, over-budget, and with few commitments by private enterprise to build anything – attracted significant criticism from the general public, as did the Kyushu University relocation plan.46 Both projects, however, were also written into the City Master Plan – which, in the words of every city official interviewed (and its own text), is the “Bible” for Fukuoka’s development. Violating the existing Master Plan is essentially tantamount to sacrilege, and what functions as a safeguard can also function as a straightjacket. The Master Plan has always been the result of extensive consultation and cooperation between various representatives and segments of Fukuoka’s collective urban community, and was meant to transcend petty political squabbles and receive prioritized funding and execution. The downside has been that projects that may have at one time made sense, like the ongoing relocation of Kyushu University, seem less logical when it becomes clear that the city has not expanded out to the new location, basic infrastructure and surrounding community facilities remains poor, and the relocation has the potential to seriously undermine the appeal of studying at the university – which would then have subsequent effects on consumptive youth culture and the labor pool for local businesses. As economic and demographic expansion dramatically slows even in Fukuoka, hard questions about the ability of an increasingly indebted city government to undertake large-scale development projects will have to be asked. The independence of the city government to undertake major projects has been the source of great pride and lauded successes such as the Asian-Pacific Exposition and the Momochi area, but has also left ample room for heavily indebting the city well into the future.

46 Information is on the basis of an interview held with Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau officials on September 1, 2009. The city also keeps records of citizen comments on file which are publicly available, although an exact numeric figure for comments on the two issues is difficult to obtain (the comments are not organized by issue).
The room for autonomy in postwar, post-Designated City Fukuoka has led to not just physical development projects, but a much larger project of image creation and projection. Both Mayors Yamazaki Hirotarō and Kuwahara Keiichi were strong proponents of branding the city: reaching out to Asia, a professed desire to create unique landmarks in Fukuoka, and a vocal dislike of the suggestion that the city was simply following Tokyo’s lead. Yamazaki was a major regional LDP figure who eventually wound up in a very public feud with the governor of Tokyo over Japan’s 2016 Olympics host city bid candidacies, and Kuwahara had spent decades in the Ministry of Labor before returning to Fukuoka as mayor and, eventually, serving as a vocal advocate on the Decentralization Promotion Committee. Compared to prewar mayors like Tokizane Akiho, who had little direct accountability or personal relationship to the city, postwar mayors from the most nationally-oriented of backgrounds still seem to have become vociferous champions of the local upon assuming office. Emotional connection to Fukuoka, a sense of belonging to the local community, has played a significant role in reinforcing the intensely local focus of municipal politics and policies.

The concept of both branding the city and creating brand loyalty among citizens was very deliberately built into public policy over time. The idea of creating a city of strong local communities that had a high quality of life – the “human city” – was an outgrowth of 1960s and 1970s discourses and planning, but still fairly primitive compared to the focus on city image and reputation that first emerged in the 1980s. The idea of a city brand came back to larger issues of collective identity, an idea explored in the 1989 study Daitoshi to aidentiti – “Identity and the Metropolis.” Commissioned and produced by the Metropolitan Planners’ Conference, Daitoshi to aidentiti surveyed public images of ten major cities across Japan and focused on the efficacy of

---

public relations (PR) campaigns and messaging efforts by those same cities. In the case of Fukuoka, representatives conceded that any image was hazy at best: while more than 50% of respondents surveyed had physically been to Fukuoka, very few could define its image and a very low number – while 60% of local residents saw the city as distinct and defined, less than 10% of visitors agreed.\(^{48}\) In the body of questions posed to survey respondents, a pattern emerged: although general responses indicated a weak image or knowledge of the city in general, Fukuoka was most strongly associated with its festivals and traditional crafts: in a word, Fukuoka was defined by and as “Hakata,”\(^{49}\) and less distinctively as the center or capital of Kyushu across other metropolitan centers.\(^{50}\) This 1989 snapshot of Fukuoka indicated both the potential and sheer scale of work remaining to create a strong civic identity.

While a Fukuoka brand or identity may still be a work in progress, it emerged as a major topic of discussion in the post-bubble era. The city has gone through a variety of campaign slogans and schemes (internationalism, conferences and tourism, etc.), but the perceived merit of actively promoting the city and deliberate image construction remain constant. The 2002 summer edition of URC, the Fukuoka Urban Research Center’s journal, was entirely focused on “The Hakata Brand: Fukuoka and Hakata Identity.” Individual articles focused on identifying brand markers, formulating marketing strategies, and the general relationship between branding and identity. On the last point, Deguchi Atsushi, in his article “City Identity and Image,” observed that contemporary Fukuoka was an amalgamation of modern businesses, consumption, and commerce supported by premodern and early modern cultural traditions. While the Momochi and Canal City development projects were essential parts of the city’s economy and figured strongly in both internal and external perceptions of Fukuoka, some apparently modern

\(^{48}\) Daitoshi kikakushukansha kaigi, Daitoshi to aidentiti, p. 17
\(^{49}\) Ibid., pp. 60-61
\(^{50}\) Ibid., pp. 82-87
developments – such as the trendy Daimyō neighborhood that served as a center of youth culture and consumption – retained the same street layouts and overall building patterns as the samurai districts of early modern Fukuoka.⁵¹ Fukuoka’s history, while not always explicit, was (and is) still very much alive in the composition of even the most modern areas of the city.

Promoting localism and history became a policy priority within City Hall. In interviews with both the Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau and the Public Information and Relations Bureau, the absolute economic value generated by tourism was less an issue of concern than fostering the right kind of tourism: convincing tourists to not simply shop and reliably pump money into the local economy, but see cultural and historical sites within the city.⁵² The promotion of local identity and branding extends to materials aimed at city residents. In the city newsletter, otherwise unremarkable recipes provided are explicitly devised to use entirely locally-produced ingredients, while features of traditional crafts and products are also on display.⁵³ The relentless focus on promoting local identity has an economic rationale but also fits into more general programs to foster a stronger sense of shared community and identity: the communitarian ideal of a “human city” that places citizens and local concerns first. Though the techniques used are heavily top-down, the endpoint of defining the city from a broad base of its traditions – and otherwise marginal groups such as farmers and traditional craftspeople – speaks to a broader philosophy of democratic inclusion in the policy and politics of Fukuoka.

Fukuoka, in the era surrounding and following its centennial anniversary as a modern city, has remained a city of contrasts much as it was in 1889. The bitter divisions between Hakata and Fukuoka have long since vanished, as has competitive anxiety toward its fellow Kyushu

⁵² On the basis of interviews with the Fukuoka City Economic Promotion Bureau on 9/1/2009 and the Public Information and Relations Bureau on 8/26/2009.
⁵³ On the basis of information from an interview with the Public Information and Relations Bureau on 8/26/2009.
municipalities. The contemporary city, however, now looks to redefine itself as an increasingly international location and as part of an East Asia region extending beyond Fukuoka’s traditional regional boundaries. Fukuoka’s simultaneous promotion of its history, culture, and traditional products has grounded the city within a frame of reference and identity that is firmly local. Likewise, the desire – and necessity – to compete with Tokyo and other major metropolitan centers for a similar set of residents and businesses is offset by the fear of becoming a “mini-Tokyo” devoid of a unique urban culture and landscape that both attracts and retains Fukuoka’s citizenry. The benefits provided by the city’s evolution to the status of regional hub and center of Kyushu are undeniable, but there is an immense reluctance to risk its perceived successes by cooperating with Kitakyushu and the rest of the region despite the need for dramatic shifts to sustain the whole. In short, post-bubble Fukuoka looks much like pre-bubble Fukuoka: innovative, locally focused, and in many ways a model of successful development and growth. Whether a city such as Fukuoka, increasingly disconnected from the problems of its regional hinterland, can indefinitely maintain the status quo in a rapidly changing, and deeply troubled, landscape spreading across the majority of Japan remains an open question.
In 2015, for the first time since the Tokugawa Period, Fukuoka City is projected to experience no net population growth. In this one crucial aspect of demographics, Fukuoka is actually behind the times. Beyond the much more local and ongoing example of decline in Kitakyushu, other large cities of similar size such as Kyoto have already begun to contract in size. Japan’s national population peaked at slightly over 128 million in 2010, and – barring dramatic increases in immigration or domestic birth rates – will continue to decline throughout the twenty-first century. In the most extreme statistical projections carried forward, Japan will cease to have children under the age of 15 by the year 3011.\footnote{This is on the basis of a population clock devised by the Tohoku University Graduate School of Economics (see http://mega.econ.tohoku.ac.jp/Children/ for the clock), and the figure has been widely reported across a variety of media outlets.} While there is more than ample room for skepticism about the actual significance or accuracy of a thousand-year out statistical prediction,\footnote{By way of comparison and warning, statisticians looking outward from the absolute low-point in birthrates in interwar Britain in the early twentieth century predicted that the population of England would fall to parity with that of Scotland if drastic changes in the birthrate did not occur. Needless to say, this fate has not come to pass, and indicates that statistical projections into the distant future are – while attention-grabbing – rarely of any practical use.} the figure highlights a perfectly reasonable point: Japan is facing a rapidly ageing population coupled with a shrinking pool of workers and young people that compounds challenges to economic, social, and political institutions that lay at the heart of structuring modern Japan. And the city of Fukuoka, whatever its internationalist aspirations and local distinctions, remains firmly part of this larger national story and its attendant implications.

From its inception in 1889, the city of Fukuoka’s modern history has been defined in large part by the search for a sustainable model of development and growth. The prewar period, with its fixation on industrialization as the definition of success and the Port of Hakata as the catalyst to jumpstarting stillborn industrial development, evolved in symbiosis with Japan’s
larger imperial aspirations until it was forcefully squelched by collapse and defeat in the Pacific War. The prewar focus on industrial growth, reinforced by the policies and actions emanating from the national government in Tokyo, continued to capture the attention of local policy makers and leaders even as Fukuoka’s real economy – reinforced in part by the legacy of wartime centralization and regional concentration – revolved around services and commerce rather than the production of material goods. The decision to actively foster and support the city’s economic strengths in consumption, services, and commerce from the middle of the 1960s marked another key shift in the model, focusing on local strengths and forging a model that was tailored to amplify Fukuoka’s strengths rather than fit into national patterns of development. The Asian Pacific Exposition of 1989 marked the most recent pivot point; the general outline of the city’s form and function remained unchanged, but Asia and international exchange began to play an increasingly important role in planning the city’s economic, cultural, and political evolution. Just as the first City Council and Mayor in 1889 confronted the rapid transformation of Fukuoka’s surroundings in an era of industrialization, centralization, and nation-building, the city leaders of today also face the uncertainty of harsh demographic and economic realities that early twenty-first century Japan must confront.

The largest challenge facing Fukuoka is one shared across Japan: reconciling national policies with local and regional needs. For the city – as would be true in most communities across Japan, and arguably across the globe – the holy grail of success has been “growth,” defined both by continuous economic and demographic expansion over time. Since the bursting of Japan’s bubble economy beginning in 1989, the national economy as an aggregate unit has managed, at best, anemic growth over the past twenty-plus years, and – at worst – a continued relative decline when measured against both comparable large developed nations (Germany,
France, the United States, etc.) and major developing nations (China, South Korea, Malaysia, South Africa, Brazil, India, etc.). While an increased focus on quality of life issues has mitigated the growth-as-success mantra, Japan’s future remains defined by an ageing population and far too few young workers to generate the economic resources needed to sustain welfare and healthcare for its growing ranks of elderly citizens. For Fukuoka, a relatively youthful population and continued appeal to internal migrants within Japan has put off the local day of reckoning – when planning for managed growth must switch to managed decline – longer than most communities across the nation, but not actually solved or avoided the ultimate problem.

Fukuoka’s response to the dual-headed crisis of demographic and economics has been resourceful, but its capacity as a locality is limited. Fukuoka’s economic diversification – and, arguably, divergence – from the standard Japanese model starting in the 1960s has positioned it well to excel in the post-bubble economy in which services, commerce, and information have become increasingly central while the time-honored focus on *monotzukuri* – “making things,” quite literally – has faced the headwinds of outsourcing and cutthroat international competition. As discussed in Chapter Five, another key element of local adaptation in Fukuoka to late twentieth and early twenty-first century realities has been to increasingly hedge its economic bets on closer entwinement with East and Southeast Asia. A redefinition of what it means to be “regional” from within a national framework to an international one is part of a strategy – with apologies to Fukuzawa Yukichi – of “Escaping from Japan” (or at the very least Kyushu) and seeking solidarity with rising fortunes beyond national borders. While the ultimate efficacy of this civic focus remains to be seen, at the very least it suggests the willingness to experiment and

---

3 The exact point at which the graying of Japanese society became a crisis in the wider sphere of public opinion and policy is difficult to pinpoint, although the “1.29” birthrate in 2004 became a widely referenced figure in popular discourse. The rapid depopulation of Japan’s regions – its traditional source for labor to power its economy and people its cities – was a clear trend from the mid-1950s, and well-recognized in commentaries by the mid-1960s. For a wider discussion of the topic, see Florian Coulmas’ *Population and Ageing in Japan: the Social Consequences*. 

212
chart new courses in the hope of maintaining Fukuoka’s prosperity. In other major cities, the response to continued economic difficulty has been a retread of failing policies. In an article for *Time* magazine in 2010, Michael Schuman reported that the city of Sendai (and Miyagi prefecture) had pinned its economic hopes on convincing automotive sector jobs and businesses within Japan to relocate to the area, “a plan [that] might have worked – if the date were 1975.”

Rather than genuinely new growth, a game of musical chairs – in which one area lures existing business and work from another – has taken hold.

The notion of stagnation and decline, and accompanying almost mercantilist counter-strategy, has extended beyond economics into demographic concerns. Here, there is less room for local flexibility: a city like Fukuoka can make itself as attractive and receptive as possible to immigrants, but ultimately it cannot set actual immigration policies that remain in the hands of the Japanese national government. The end result is that the quest to bring in new residents must look closer to home. In the January 2008 publication “Fukuoka, an Asian Business Hub,” Fukuoka City’s Economic Promotion Bureau tellingly targeted not just foreign, but also domestic, workers in its pitch to move to Fukuoka. Using Tokyo as its foil, the city highlighted a brief commute time, cheaper entertainment, food, transportation, abundant open space and recreational opportunities, and an excellent ranking in both international and national surveys of desirable city locations as rationales for relocation. Putting aside the question of whether or not Fukuoka can successfully out-compete Tokyo on various criteria, the larger problem is obvious: with no real remaining rural migration, a rapidly ageing population, and restrictive immigration policies, Japan’s urban centers are left fighting one another for a dwindling pool of potential citizens. Further down the food chain, regional cities within Kyushu such as Kumamoto and

---

5 Fukuoka-shi, *Fukuoka, an Asian Business Hub*, pp. 13-14
Kagoshima warily attempt to hold on to, or lure back home, locals and prevent migration to Fukuoka and Tokyo alike. Contemporary Japan’s economic and demographic crisis is nationwide, but – given the rapid and very real implications of ageing populations, shrinking workforces, and mounting government expenditures coupled with falling tax revenues – defending local self-interest to the point of cannibalizing other cities’ dwindling pools of desirable residents has become a logical endpoint.

The current lack of larger regional and national solutions in the face of truly universal problems highlights both the successes and failures of Fukuoka’s modern history. In the prewar period, given very limited resources and an overpowering central government, reliance on Tokyo’s largesse was one of the surest pathways to success; its absence, likewise, often spelled backwardness and marginalization for regional Japan. In the postwar period, however, greater local autonomy allowed Fukuoka the opportunity to forge its own path both tied to, yet distinct from, the dictates and models emanating from the center. That resulting success created both the pattern of growth that outperformed declining industrial-driven economic policies and a degree of confidence, found in the writings of local politicians and recounted in Chapter 5, that Fukuoka could and should exist beyond Tokyo’s shadow. The drive toward internationalism and focus on Asia since the 1980s has been largely successful, but the looming problems of an ageing and shrinking population are an inexorable reminder: modern Fukuoka developed because of its relationship to the Kyushu region and its position within Japan, and ultimately remains important in a wider sense because of this integration.

Ultimately, the success or failure of Fukuoka as a city will essentially match the larger regional narrative of Kyushu or national narrative of Japan. Fukuoka cannot continue to develop

---

6 Kären Wigen’s *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920* and Michael Lewis’ *Growing Apart* again provide excellent examples of how this process played out in different localities and in slightly different circumstances.
or grow without a healthy Kyushu region, just as Tokyo cannot sustainably exist in isolation from the problems facing the rest of Japan. Since premodern times cities have been a beacon that attracted the young, the mobile, and – to put it bluntly – the population surpluses of rural societies. In the case of early modern Japan, Edo and Osaka relied on a flow of rural migrants for growth; fires, overcrowding, disease, and other factors ensured that new arrivals would always be both welcomed and needed in the cities. In the postwar period, what had once been a steady flow of rural migrants turned into a flood, resulting in both rapid urbanization and an equally sharp, dramatic depopulation of regional and rural Japan. For cities like Fukuoka, or Sapporo, or Sendai, their very reason for being – to link regional Japan back to Tokyo and national institutions – will be endangered if their hinterlands continue to spiral downward. I would argue that, in a sense, there is nothing peripheral about regional and rural Japan, because the existence of Japan’s urban cores has always been intimately dependent on the economic – and demographic – contributions it has made to the development of the cities.

One of the unintended ironies of postwar autonomy has been that the same newfound independence that allowed Designated Cities to run their own affairs further weakened prefectures already limited by the authority of the central government. While Tokyo bureaucrats created regional development plans across the nation and city officials in Fukuoka crafted intensely-local Master Plans, most prefectures – beyond the Pacific Belt sprawl – juggled the needs of a wide range of communities with very finite financial and human resources. Missing from this mix was one of the forgotten innovations of wartime Japan: the regional bloc. It lived on in the shape of the concentrated regional hub cities like Fukuoka and the occasional academic or research group, but the wider sense of any formal, institutional coordination between prefectures vanished. Today, perhaps more than ever before, that sort of regional cooperation
(with more collegial, and less authoritarian, features than the 1940s variant) offers hope as a vehicle for both pooling limited resources and finding new patterns of development and growth that will reset the deeply dysfunctional relationship between city and countryside. Instead of cities and prefectures competing with each other for a dwindling pool of workers and old-style manufacturing jobs, greater regional integration and cooperation could provide a blueprint for a future that, while far from perfect, learns from the past and seeks to transcend its limitations.

The future of Fukuoka and Japan remains unwritten and unknown. As a relatively run-of-the-mill provincial city in 1889 no obvious indicators implied, let alone guaranteed, Fukuoka’s subsequent rise to the status of major national and international urban center within the space of a century. In the same way, the willingness of Fukuoka’s leaders to repeatedly craft new visions of a better future and change course when new options became available provides reason for optimism about the future. Although much of what ails Fukuoka locally, Kyushu regionally, and Japan nationally rests far beyond the control of any one actor, the recognition that Japan as a whole faces a crisis that will impact every locality is an important point of departure for future action. The lessons Fukuoka has learned building partnerships and new relationships with Asia could, applied closer to home, help provide the basis for cooperation between city, prefecture, region, and ultimately nation to build new models of growth and development that are as mutually beneficial as all those levels of Japan are mutually interdependent. Though the challenges facing contemporary Fukuoka and Japan are complicated and deep-rooted, so too is the potential for change and creative planning that has given both city and nation so many successes in their modern history.

---

7 The idea of reviving the old regional system of wartime has gained some traction since the early 2000s in policy circles, and fits well with the larger ongoing pattern of merging communities into ever-fewer, and larger, administrative units within prefectures. See Nihon no Mirai o Tsukurukai, ed. *Nihon no mirai o tsukuru: chihōbunken no gurando dezain* for a detailed argument and plan involving a creation of regional administrative units.
Bibliography


_________. *Hakatakō to manshūkoku*. Fukuoka-Shiyakusho Sangyōka, 1937.


_________. *URC*. Fukuoka: Fukuoka Toshikagaku Kenkyūjo.


Hiroshima Hisako, ed. *Fujin kyūshū: anata to tomo ni kangaeru zasshi*. Fukuoka.


Nishinihon Shinbunsha. Nishinihon Shinbun (Fukuoka). Fukuoka.


__________. “1940 nendai hakata fukkō keikaku (II) (Some Considerations on the City Planning of Hakata (Fukuoka-city) in the 1940’s (II)).” In Kenkyū Yōki No. 6, 1996. Fukuoka: Fukuoka-shi hakubutsukan.


